CHAPTER LVI (56)

IONIC REVOLT.

 

Hitherto, the history of the Asiatic Greeks has flowed in a stream distinct from that of the European Greeks. The present chapter will mark the period of confluence between the two.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa, carrying with him the Milesian Histiaeus, he left Artaphernes, his brother, as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native despots in each; and Miletus especially, in the absence of Histiaeus, was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the height of power and prosperity,—in every respect the leading city of Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly about 512 bc, from which time forward the state of things above described continued, without disturbance, for eight or ten years—“a respite from suffering,” to use the significant phrase of the historian.

It was about the year 506 BC, that the exiled Athenian despot Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous refusal of the Lacedemonian allies to take part in his cause, presented himself from Sigeium as a petitioner to Artaphernes at Sardis. He now, doubtless, found the benefit of the alliance which he bad formed for his daughter with the despot Aeantides of Lampsacus, whose favor with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian dominion  and Artaphernes was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to aid him in his design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians despatched envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial, but of menace,—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they looked for safety. Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration of war, and so it was construed at Athens. If leads us to infer that he was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica, in conjunction with Hippias; but, fortunately for the Athenians, other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several years the execution of the scheme.

 

SARDIS (SARDES)

 

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of Naxos. Here, too, as in the case of Hippias, the instigation arose from Naxian exiles,—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a rising of the people. This island, like all the rest of the Cyclades, was as yet independent of the Persians. It was wealthy, prosperous, possessing a large population both of freemen and slaves, and defended as well by armed ships as by a force of eight thousand heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras, who saw that he could turn them into instruments of dominion for himself in the island, provided he could induce Artaphernes to embark in the project along with him,—his own force not being adequate by itself. Accordingly, he went to Sardis, and laid his project before the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with a powerful support. Naxos would be reduced with little trouble: that the neighboring islands of Paros, Andros, Tenos, and the other Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor even the large and valuable island of Euboea. He himself engaged, if a fleet of one hundred ships were granted to him, to accomplish all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of the armament besides. Artaphernes warmly entered into the scheme, loaded him with praise, and promised him in the ensuing spring two hundred ships instead of one hundred. A messenger despatched to Susa, having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was forthwith equipped, under the command of the Persian Megabates, to be placed at the disposal of Aristagoras,—composed both of Persians and ail the tributaries near the coast.

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from Miletus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont. On reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbor of Kaukasa for a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. No suspicion was entertained in that island of its real purpose, nor was any preparation made for resistance, and the success of Aristagoras would have been complete, had it not been defeated by an untoward incident ending in dispute. Megabates, with a solicitude which we are surprised to discern in a Persian general, personally made the tour of his fleet, to see that every ship was under proper watch, and discovered a ship from Myndus (an Asiatic Dorian city near Halikarnassus), left without a single, man on board. Incensed at this neglect, he called before him Skylax, the commander of the ship, and ordered him to be put in chains, with his head projecting outwards through one of the apertures for oars in the ship’s side. Skylax was a guest and friend of Aristagoras, who, on hearing of this punishment, interceded with Megabates for his release; but finding the request refused, took upon him to release the prisoner himself. He even went so far as to treat the remonstrance of Megabates with disdain, reminding him that, according to the instructions of Artaphernes, he was only second and himself (Aristagoras) first. The pride of Megabates could not endure such treatment: as soon as night arrived, he sent a private intimation to Naxos of the coming of the fleet, warning the islanders to be on their guard. The warning thus fortunately received was turned by the Naxians to the best account. They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet, probably delayed by the dispute between its leaders, at length arrived, it was met by a stout resistance, remained on the shore of the island for four months in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as lodgment for the Naxian exiles. After a large cost incurred, not only by the Persians, but also by Aristagoras himself, the unsuccessful armament was brought back to the coast of Ionia.

The failure of this expedition threatened Aristagoras with entire ruin. He had incensed Megabates, deceived Artaphernes, and incurred an obligation, which he knew not how to discharge, of indemnifying the latter for the costs of the fleet. He began to revolve in his mind the scheme of revolting from Persia, when it so happened that there arrived nearly at the same moment a messenger from his father-in-law, Histiaeus, who was detained at the court of Susa, secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom to trust with this dangerous message, Histiaeus had caused the head of a faithful slave to be shaved,—branded upon it the words necessary,—and then despatched him, so soon as his hair had grown, to Miletus, with a verbal intimation to Aristagoras that his head was to be again shaved and examined. Histiaeus sought to provoke this perilous rising, simply as a means of procuring his own release from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to the coast to reestablish order. His message, arriving at so critical a moment, determined the faltering resolution of Aristagoras, who convened his principal parti­sans at Miletus, and laid before them the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one remarkable exception,—the historian Hecataeus of Miletus; who opposed it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius was too vast, to leave them any prospect of success. When he found direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of at once seizing the large treasures in the neighboring temple of Apollo, at Branchidae, for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By this means alone, he said, could the Milesians, too feeble to carry on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at sea,—while, if they did not take these treasures, the victorious enemy surely would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, were listened to. Probably the seizure of the treasures,—though highly useful for the impending struggle, and though in the end they fell into the hands of the enemy, as Hecataeus anticipated,—would have been insupportable to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more injurious than beneficial: perhaps, indeed, Hecataeus himself may have urged it with the indirect view of stifling the whole project. We may remark that he seems to have urged the question as if Miletus were to stand alone in the revolt; not anticipating, as indeed no prudent man could then anticipate, that the Ionic cities generally would follow the example.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt, and their first step was to conciliate popular favor throughout Asiatic Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities,—the instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendency, as Histiaeus had well urged at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity was favorable for striking this blow at once on a considerable scale. The fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at the head of their ships. Iatragoras was despatched from Miletus, at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto against Darius. Iatragoras was successful: the fleet went along with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands,—among them Histiaeus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa (both Carians), Koes of Mitylene and Aristagoras (also a second person so named) of Kyme. At the same time the Milesian Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and continental, a similar revolution was brought about; the despots were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the bands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To this treatment the only exception mentioned is Koes, who was stoned to death by the Mitylenaeans.

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume an extensive and formidable character; much more so, probably, than the prudent Hecataeus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force of the Persians in the Aegean was at once taken away from them, and passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the sea; and would in fact have remained so, if a second naval force had not been brought up against them from Phenicia,—a proceeding never before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals, and to put themselves in a state of defence, Aristagoras crossed the Aegean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of king Kleomenes; to whom he addressed himself, “holding in his hand a brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, with the whole sea and all the rivers.” Probably this was the first map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even in the time of Herodotus. Having emphatically entreated the Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom,—he proceeded to describe the wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle, and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare of the Asiatics. The latter, he said, could be at once put down, and the former appropriated, by military training such as that of the Spartans,—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breastplate, and ample shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian. He then traced out on his brazen plan the road from Ephesus to Susa, indicating the intervening nations, all of them affording a booty more or less rich; but he magnified especially the vast treasures at Susa: “Instead of fighting your neighbors, he concluded, Argeians, Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small reward, why do you not make yourself ruler of all Asia, a prize not less easy than lucrative?” Kleomenes replied to these seductive instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day. When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how for it was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered, with more frankness than dexterity, that it was a three months’ journey; and he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when Kleomenes interrupted him: “Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian stranger; you are no friend to the Lacedemonians, if you want to carry them a three months’ journey from the sea.” In spite of this peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource. He took in his hand the bough of supplication, and again went to the house of Kleomenes, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgo, a girl of eight years old. He requested Kleomenes to send away the child, but this was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length, the little girl suddenly exclaimed, “ Father, the Stranger will corrupt you, if you do not at once go away.” The exclamation so struck Kleomenes. that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted Sparta.

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from Lacedemonian informants. But we may be permitted to doubt, whether any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out, as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras,—suggestions and hopes which might well be conceived in 450-440 bc, after a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no pertinence in the year 502 bc. Down even to the battle of Marathon, the name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians are highly and justly extolled as the first who dared to look them in the face. To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt, would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented, that the Spartans were more than a match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been considered, in 502 BC, rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding power of Hellas,—a character which we thus find more and more recognized and passing into the habitual feeling of the Greeks. Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by the circumstance, that Croesus singled them out from all other Greeks to invite as allies: now they accepted such priority as a matter of course.

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly the second power in Greece. And here he found an easier  task, not only as it was the metropolis, or mother-city, of Asiatic Ionia, but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias: whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by meddling in the Asiatic war. The promises and representations of Aristagoras were accordingly received with great favor by the Athenians: who, over and above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves,—and to whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once resolved to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the revolted Ionians,—ships which are styled by Herodotus, “the beginning of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians,” —as the ships in which Paris crossed the Aegean had before been called in the Iliad of Homer. Herodotus farther remarks that it seems easier to deceive many men together than one,—since Aristagoras, after having failed with Kleomenes, thus imposed upon the thirty thousand citizens of Athens. But on this remark two comments suggest themselves. First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the name in regard to the Ionic quarrel,—an observation which Herodotus himself had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference, as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not less to Athens than to Greece.

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians engaged in the siege of Miletus. The twenty Athenian ships soon crossed the Aegean, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also come to the succor of the Ionians; the Eretrians generously taking this opportunity to repay assistance formerly rendered to them by the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalcis. On the arrival of these allies, Aristagoras organized an expedition from Ephesus up to Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus, with others. The ships were left at Koressus, a mountain and seaport five miles from Ephesus, while the troops inarched up under Ephesian guides, first, along the river Caister, next, across the mountain range of Tmolus to Sardis. Artaphernes had not troops enough to do more than hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his force near Miletus, and summoned Persians and Lydians from all the neighboring districts, thus becoming more than a match for Charopinus; who found himself, moreover, obliged to evacuate Sardis, owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all of them had thatched roofs; hence it happened that a spark touching one of them set the whole, city in flame. Obliged to abandon their dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated in the market-place,—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious: they evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount Tmolus, and, when night came, made the best of their way to the sea-coast. The troops of Artaphernes pursued, overtook them near Ephesus, and defeated them completely. Eualkides, the Eretrian general, a man of eminence and a celebrated victor at the solemn games, perished in the action, together with a considerable number of troops. After this unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part of Aristagoras to induce them to stay. They took no farther part in the struggle; a retirement at once so sudden and so complete, that they must probably have experienced some glaring desertion on the part of their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas, in 396 BC. Unless such was the case, they seem open to censure rather for having too soon withdrawn their aid, than for having originally lent it.

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including the temples of the local goddess Kybebe, which perished with the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both sides—encouraging the revolters, as well as incensing the Persians. Aristagoras despatched ships along the coast, northward as far as Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or by inclination, to take part with him: the Carians embraced his cause warmly; even the Kaunians, who Lad not declared themselves before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis; while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of Amathus, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for a strenuous contest. Onesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city in the island,—finding the population willing, but his brother, the despot Gorgus, reluctant,—shut the latter out of the gates, took the command of the united forces of Salamis and other revolting cities, and laid siege to Amathus. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem always afterwards to have continued, under the government of despots; who. however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along with their subjects in the revolt against Persia.

The rebellion had now assumed a character more serious than ever, and the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one against the other; and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. After a year spent in getting together forces, the Phenician fleet was employed to transport into Cyprus the Persian general Artybius with a Cilician and Egyptian army,—while the force under Artaphernes at Sardis was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory. Un the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit, and we hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.

Apprized of the coming of Artybius with the Phenician fleet, Onesilus arid his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet, which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether they would fight the Phenicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their natural determination was in favor of the sea­fight, and they engaged with a degree of courage and unanimity which procured for them a brilliant victory; the Samians being especially distinguished. But the combat on land, carried on al the same time, took a different turn. Onesilus and the Salaminians brought into the field, after the fashion of Orientals rather than of Greeks, a number of scythed chariots, destined to break the enemy’s ranks; while on the other hand the Persian general Artybius was mounted on a horse, trained to rise on his hind legs and strike out with his fore legs against an opponent on fool. In the thick of the fight, Onesilus and his Carian shield­bearer came into personal conflict with this general and his horse; and by previous concert, when I he horse so reared as to get his fore legs over the shield of Onesilus, the Carian with a scythe severed the legs from his body, while Onesilus with his own hand slew Artybius. But the personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stesenor, despot of Kurium, deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots of Salamis followed his example. The brave Onesilus, thus weakened, perished in the total rout of his army, along with Aristokyprus despot of Soli, on the north coast of the island: this latter being son of that Philokyprus who had been immortalized more than sixty years before, in the poems of Solon. No farther hopes now remained for the revolters, and the victorious Ionian fleet returned home. Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while the remaining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken: not without a resolute defence, however, since Soli alone held out five months.

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled at Sardis,—Daurises, Hymeas, and other generals who had married daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against different parts of the western coast. Daurises attacked the towns near the Hellespont,—Abydus, Perkote, Lampsacus, and Paesus,—which made little resistance. He was then ordered southward into Caria, while Hymeas, who, with another division, had taken Kios on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the conquest of the Troad as well as of the Aeolic Greeks in the region of Ida. Artaphernes and Otanes attacked the Ionic and Aeolic towns on the coast,—the former taking Klazomenae, the latter Kyme. There remained Caria, which, with Miletus in its neighborhood, offered a determined resistance to Daurises. Forewarned of his approach, the Carians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the confluence of the rivers Maeander and Marsyas. Pixodarus, one of their chiefs, recommended the desperate expedient of fighting with the river at their back, so that all chance of flight might be cut off; but most of the chiefs decided in favor of a contrary policy,—to let the Persians pass the river, in hopes of driving them back into it and thus rendering their defeat total. Victory, however, after a sharp contest, declared in favor of Daurises, chiefly in consequence of his superior numbers: two thousand Persians, and not less than ten thousand Carians, are said to have perished in the battle. The Karian fugitives, reunited after the flight, in the grove of noble plane-trees consecrated to Zeus Stratius, near Labranda, were deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or emigrate forever, when the appearance of a Milesian reinforcement restored their courage. A second battle was fought, anti a second time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling chiefly on the Milesians. The victorious Persians now proceeded to assault Carian cities, but Herakleides of Mylasa laid an ambuscade for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was nearly destroyed, and Daurises with other Persian generals perished. This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honor to the constancy of the Carians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns, which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the capture of Miletus.

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though at sea the Ionians still remained masters. But the unwarlike Aristagoras began to despair of success, and to meditate a mean desertion of the companions and countrymen whom he had himself betrayed into danger. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Miletus. He then put the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in Thrace, near the Strymon (which Histiaeus had begun some time before to fortify, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter), appeared to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons consulted was Hecataeus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the neighboring island of Leros; a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold Miletus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon as opportunity offered. Such an opinion must doubtless have been founded on the assumption, that they would be able to maintain superiority at sea. And it is important to note such confident reliance upon this superiority in the mind of a sagacious man, not given to sanguine hopes, like Hecataeus,—even under circumstances very unprosperous on land. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians, if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again to extend it to the Strymon. Nevertheless, the consultation ended by adopting this scheme, since, probably, no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear him company; but he perished not long after landing, together with nearly all his company, in the siege of a neighboring Thracian town. Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in gi eat measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears however that the Milesians, glad to get rid of a leader who bad brought them nothing but mischief, paid little obedience to his successor, and made their government from this period popular in reality as well as in profession. The desertion of Aristagoras, with the citizens whom he carried away, must have seriously damped the spirits of those who remained: nevertheless, it seems that the cause of the Ionic revolters was quite as well conducted without him.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histiaeus of Miletus, his father-in-law, and jointly with him the fomenter of the revolt—presented himself at the gates of Miletus for admission. The outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and by the general revolt of Ionia, headed (so the news reached him) by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active cooperation of the Athenians. “The Athenians (exclaimed Darius), who are they?” On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow, placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could towards the heavens, saying: “Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians.” He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him thrice every day at dinner: “Master, remember the Athenian, for as to the Ionians, he felt assured that their hour of retribution would come speedily and easily enough”.

This Homeric incident deserves notice as illustrating the epical handling of Herodotus. His theme is, the invasions of Greece by Persia: he has now arrived at the first eruption, in the bosom of Darius, of that passion which impelled the Persian forces towards Marathon and Salamis,—and he marks the beginning of the new phase by act and word both alike significant. It may be compared to the libation and prayer addressed by Achilles in the Iliad to Zeus, at the moment when he is sending forth Patroklus and the Myrmidons to the rescue of the despairing Greeks.

At first, Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia to the secret instigation of Histiaeus, whom he called into his presence and questioned. But the latter found means to satisfy him, and even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if he, Histiaeus, had been at Miletus instead of being detained at Susa. “Send me down to the spot, be asseverated, and I engage not merely to quell the revolt, and put into your hands the traitor who heads it, but also, not to take off this tunic from my body, before I shall have added to your empire the great island of Sardinia.” An expedition to Sardinia, though never realized, appears to have been among the favorite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day. By such boasts and assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished them.

But on reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernes better informed than the Great King at Susa. Though Histiaeus, when questioned as to the causes which had brought on the outbreak, affected nothing but ignorance and astonishment, Artaphernes detected his evasions, and said: “I will tell you how the facts stand, Histiaeus: it is you that have stitched this shoe, and Aristagoras has put it on.” Such a declaration promised little security to the suspected Milesian who heard it; and accordingly, as soon as night arrived, he took to flight, went down to the coast, and from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on the opposite count, as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of Ionia: he was released, however, on proclaiming himself not merely a fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also as the prime author of the Ionic revolt. And he farther added, in order to increase his popularity, that Darius had contemplated the translation of the Ionian population to Phenicia as well as that of the Phenician population to Ionia,—to prevent which translation he, Histiaeus, had instigated the revolt. This allegation, though nothing better than a pure fabrication, obtained for him the good-will of the Chians, who carried him back to Miletus. But before he departed, he avenged himself on Artaphernes by despatching to Sardis some false letters, implicating many distinguished Persians in a conspiracy jointly with himself: these letters were so managed as to fall into the hands of the satrap himself, who became full of suspicion, and put to death several of the parties, to the great uneasiness of all around him.

On arriving at Miletus, Histiaeus found Aristagoras no longer present, and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old despot. Nevertheless, he tried to force his way by night into the town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh, he returned to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships: he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium, pillaging and detaining the Ionian merchant­ships as they passed into or out of the Euxine. The few remaining piracies of this worthless traitor, mischievous to his countrymen down to the day of his death; hardly deserve our notice, amidst the last struggles and sufferings of the subjugated Ionians, to which we are now hastening.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually concentrating itself near Miletus, against which city Artaphernes had determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army of Asia Minor, but also the Cilician and Egyptian troops fresh from the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves, were brought up as reinforcements; while the entire Phenician fleet, no less than six hundred ships strong, cooperated on the coast. To meet such a land-force in the field, being far beyond the strength of the Ionians, the joint Pan-Ionic council resolved that I he Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having been victorious over the Phenicians near Cyprus, and having sustained no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Aeolic Lesbians, amounting in all to the number of three hundred and fifty-three ships, was accordingly mustered at Lade,—then a little island near Miletus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation of land in the bay at the mouth of the Maeander. Eighty Milesian ships formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the centre, and sixty Samian ships the left wing; while the space between the Milesians and the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priene, three from Myus, and seventeen from Teos,—the space between the Chians and Samians was filled by eight ships from Erythrae, three from Phocaea, and seventy from Lesbos.

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that which, fifteen years afterwards, gained the battle of Salamis against a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover, the courage of the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the Aegean; while in respect of disagreement among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding the battle of Salamis still more menacing than those before the coming battle of Lade. The chances of success, therefore, were at least equal between the two; and indeed the anticipations of the Persians and Phenicians on the present occasion were full of doubt, so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for disuniting the Ionians,—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxes at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various despots whom Aristagoras. at the beginning of the revolt, had driven out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernes, each of these men despatched secret communications to their citizens in the allied fleet, endeavoring hi detach them severally from the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of compliance, and by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from all was one unanimous negative. And he confederates at Lade seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans, and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale,— the superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis, coupled with the fact that they were Athenians,—that is, in command of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Lade, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise: each separate contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities—Milesian, Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistocles, competent and willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and to usurp for the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a privilege not intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy and forwardness to do this, was the Phocaean Dionysius,—unfortunately, the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore enjoying the least respect. For Phocaea, once the daring explorer of the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships; and her ancient maritime spirit survived only in the bosom of her captain. When Dionysius saw the Ionians assembled at Lade, willing, eager, full of talk and mutual encouragement, but untrained and taking no thought of discipline, or nautical practice, or cooperation in the hour of battle,—he saw the risk which they ran for want of these precautions, and strenuously remonstrated with them: “Our fate hangs on the razor’s edge, men of Ionia: either to be freemen or slaves,—and slaves too, caught after running away. Set yourself at once to work and duty,—you will then have trouble indeed at first, with certain victory and freedom afterwards. But if you persist in this carelessness and disorder, there is no hope lor you to escape the king’s revenge for your revolt. Be persuaded and commit yourself to me: and I pledge myself, if the gods only hold an equal ba­ance, that your enemies either will not fight, or will be severely beaten.”

The wisdom of this advice was so apparent, that the Ionians, quitting their comfortable tents on the shore of Lade and going on board their ships, submitted themselves to the continuous nautical labors and manoeuvres imposed upon them by Dionysius. The rowers, and the hoplites on the deck, were exercised in their separate functions, and even when they were not so employed, the ships were kept at anchor, and the crews on board, instead of on shore; so that the work lasted all day long, under a hot summer’s sun. Such labor, new to the Ionian crews, was endured for seven successive days, after which they broke out with one accord into resolute mutiny and refusal: “Which of the gods have we offended, to bring upon ourselves such a retribution as this? madmen as we are, to put ourselves into the hands of this Phocaean braggart, who has furnished only three ships! He has now got us and is ruining us without remedy: many of us are already sick, many others are sickening; we had better make up our minds to Persian slavery, or any other mischiefs, rather than go on with these present sufferings. Come, we w ill net obey this man any longer.” And they forthwith refused to execute his orders, resuming their tents on shore, with the enjoyments of shade, rest, and inactive talk, as before.

I have not chosen to divest this instructive scene of the dramatic liveliness with which it is given in Herodotus,—the more so as it has all the air of reality, and as Hecataeus, the historian, was probably present in the island of Lade, and may have described what he actually saw and heard. When we see the intolerable hardship which these nautical manoeuvres and labors imposed upon the Ionians, though men not unaccustomed to ordinary ship-work,—and when we witness their perfect incapacity to submit themselves to such a discipline, even with extreme danger staring them in the face,—we shall be able to appreciate the severe and unremitting toil whereby the Athenian seaman afterwards purchased that perfection of nautical discipline which characterized him at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It will appear, as we proceed with this history, that the full development of the Athenian democracy worked a revolution in Grecian military marine, chiefly by enforcing upon the citizen seaman a strict continuous training, such as was only surpassed by the Lacedaemonian drill on land,—and by thus rendering practicable a species of nautical manoeuvring which was unknown even at the time of the battle of Salamis. I shall show this more fully hereafter: at present, I contrast it briefly with the incapacity of the Ionians at Lade, in order that it may be understood how painful such training really was. The reader of Grecian history is usually taught to associate only ideas of turbulence and anarchy with the Athenian democracy; but the Athenian navy, the child and champion of that democracy, will be found to display an indefatigable labor and obedience nowhere else witnessed in Greece, and of which even the first lessons, as in the case now before us, prove to others so irksome as to outweigh the prospect of extreme and imminent peril. The same impatience of steady toil and discipline, which the Ionians displayed to their own ruin before the battle of Lade, will be found to characterize them fifty years afterwards as allies of Athens, as I shall have occasion to show when I come to describe the Athenian empire.

Ending in this abrupt and mutinous manner, the judicious suggestions of the Phocaean leader did more harm than good. Perhaps his manner of dealing may have been unadvisedly rude, but we are surprised to see that no one among the leaders of the larger contingents had the good sense to avail himself of the first readiness of the Ionians, and to employ his superior influence in securing the continuance of a good practice once begun. Not one such superior man did this Ionic revolt throw up. From the day on which the Ionians discarded Dionysius, their camp became a scene of disunion and mistrust. Some of them grew reckless and unmanageable, that the better portion despaired of maintaining any orderly battle; and the Samians in particular now repented that they had declined the secret offers made to them by their expelled despot,—Aeakes, son of Syloson. They sent privately to renew the negotiation, received a fresh promise of the same indulgence, and agreed to desert when the occasion arrived. On the day of battle, when the two fleets were on the point of coming to action, the sixty Samian ships all sailed off, except eleven, whose captains disdained such treachery. Other Ionians followed their example; yet amidst the reciprocal crimination which Herodotus had heard, he finds it difficult to determine who was most to blame, though he names the Lesbians as among the earliest deserters. The hundred ships from Chios, constituting the centre of the fleet—such ship carrying forty chosen soldiers fully armed—formed a brilliant exception to the rest; they fought with the greatest fidelity and resolution, inflicting upon the enemy, and themselves sustaining, heavy loss. Dionysius, the Phocaean, also behaved in a manner worthy of his previous language,—capturing with his three ships the like number of Phenicians. But these examples of bravery did not compensate the treachery or cowardice of the rest, and the defeat of the Ionians at Lade was complete as well as irrecoverable. To the faithful Chians, the loss was terrible, both in the battle and after it. For though some of their vessels escaped from the defeat safely to Chios, others were so damaged as to be obliged to run ashore close at hand on the promontory of Mykale, where the crews quitted them, w ith the intention of marching northward, through the Ephesian territory, to the continent oppo­site their own island. We hear with astonishment that, at that critical moment, the Ephesian women were engaged in solemnizing the Thesmophoria,—a festival celebrated at night, in the open air, in some uninhabited portion of the territory, and without the presence of any male person. As the Chian fugitives entered the Ephesian territory by night, their coming being neither known not anticipated,—it was believed that they were thieves or pirates coming to seize the women, and under this error they were attacked by the Ephesians and slain. It would seem from this incident that the Ephesians had taken no part in the Ionic revolt, nor are they mentioned amidst the various contingents. Nor is anything said either of Kolophon, or Lebedus, or Erse.

The Phocaean Dionysius, perceiving that the defeat of Lade was the ruin of the Ionic cause, and that his native city was again doomed to Persian subjection, did not think it prudent even to return home. Immediately after the battle he set sail, not for Phocaea, but for the Phenician coast, at this moment stripped of its protecting cruisers. He seized several Phenician merchant­men, out of which considerable profit was obtained: then setting sail for Sicily, he undertook the occupation of a privateer against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, abstaining from injury towards Greeks. Such an employment seems then to have been perfectly admissible. A considerable body of Samians also migrated to Sicily, indignant at the treachery of their admirals in the battle, and yet more indignant at the approaching restoration of their despot Aeakes. How these Samian emigrants became established in the Sicilian town of Zankle, I shall mention as a part of the course of Sicilian events, which will come hereafter.

The victory of Lade enabled the Persians to attack Miletus by sea as well as by land; they prosecuted the siege with the utmost vigor, by undermining the walls, and by various engines of attack: in which department their resources seem to have been enlarged since the days of Harpagus. In no long time the city was taken by storm, and miserable was the fate reserved to it. The adult male population was chiefly slain; while such of them as were preserved, together with the women and children, were Bent in a body to Susa, to await the orders of Darius,—who assigned to them a residence at Ampe, not far from the mouth of the Tigris. The temple at Branchidae was burned and pillaged, is Hecataeus had predicted at the beginning of the revolt: the large treasures therein contained must have gone far to defray the costs of the Persian army. The Milesian territory is said to have been altogether denuded of its former inhabitants,—the Persians retailing for themselves the city with the plain adjoining to it. and making over the mountainous portions to the Carians of Pedasa. Some few of the Milesians found a place among the Simian emigrants to Sicily. It is certain, however, that new Grecian inhabitants must have been subsequently admitted into Miletus; for it appears ever afterwards as a Grecian town, though with diminished power and importance.

The capture of Miletus, in the sixth year from the commencement of the revolt, carried with it the rapid submission of the neighboring towns in Karia. During the next summer,—the Phenician fleet having wintered at Miletus,—the Persian forces by sea and land reconquered all the Asiatic Greeks, insular as well as continental. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos,—the towns in the Chersonese,—Selymbria and Perinthus in Thrace,— Proconnesus and Artake in the Propontis,—all these towns were taken or sacked by the Persian and Phenician fleet. The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalcedon fled for the most part, without even awaiting its arrival, to Mesembria, and the Athenian Miltiades only escaped Persian captivity by a rapid flight from his abode in the Chersonese to Athens. His pursuers were indeed so close upon him, that one of his ships, with his son Metiochus on board, fell into their hands. As Miltiades had been strenuous in urging the destruction of the bridge over the Danube, on the occasion of the Scythian expedition, the Phenicians were particularly anxious to get possession of his person, aft the most acceptable of all Greek prisoners to the Persian king; who, however, when Metiochus the son of Miltiades was brought to Susa, not only did him no harm, but treated him with great kindness, and gave him a Persian wife with a comfortable maintenance.

Far otherwise did the Persian generals deal with the reconquered cities on and near the coast. The threats which had been held out before the battle of Lade were realized to the full. The most beautiful Greek youths and virgins were picked out, to be distributed among the Persian grandees as eunuchs, or inmates of the harems; the cities with their edifices, sacred as well as profane, were made a prey to the flames; and m the case of the islands, Herodotus even tells us, that a line of Persians was formed from shore to shore, which swept each territory from north to south, and drove the inhabitants out of it. That much of this hard treatment is well founded, there can be no doubt. But it must be exaggerated as to extent of depopulation and destruction, for these islands and cities appear ever afterwards as occupied by a Grecian population, and even as in a tolerable, though reduced, condition. Samos was made an exception to the rest, and completely spared by the Persians, as a reward to its captains for setting the example of desertion at the battle of Lade; at the same time, Aeakes the despot of that island was reinstated in his government. If appears that several other des­pots were also replaced in their respective cities, though we are not told which.

Amidst the sufferings endured by so many innocent persons, of every age and of both sexes, the fate of Histiaeus excites but little sympathy. Having learned, while earning on his piracies at Byzantium, the surrender of Miletus, he thought it expedient to sail with his Lesbian vessels to Chios, where admittance was refused to him. But the Chians, weakened as they had been by the late battle, were in little condition to resist, so that he defeated their troops and despoiled the island. During the present break­up of the Asiatic Greeks, there were doubtless many who, like the Phocaean Dionysius, did not choose to return home to an enslaved city, yet had no fixed plan for a new abode: of these exiles, a considerable number put themselves under the temporary command of Histiaeus, and accompanied him to the plunder of Thasos. While besieging that town, he learned the news that the Phenician fleet had quitted Miletus to attack the remaining Ionic towns; and he left his designs on Thasos unfinished, in order to go and defend Lesbos. But in this latter island the dearth of provisions was such, that he was forced to cross over to the continent to reap the standing corn around Atarneus and in the fertile plain of Mysia near the river Kaikus. Here he fell in with a considerable Persian force under Harpagus,—was beaten, compelled to flee, and taken prisoner. On his being carried to Sardis, Artaphernes the satrap caused him to be at once crucified : partly, no doubt, from genuine hatred, but partly also under the persuasion that, if he were sent up as a prisoner to Susa, he might again become dangerous,—since Darius would even now spare his life, under an indelible sentiment of gratitude for the maintenance of the bridge over the Danube. The head of Histiaeus was embalmed and sent up to Susa, where Darius caused it to be honorably buried, condemning this precipitate execution of a man who had once been his preserver.

We need not wonder that the capture of Miletus excited the strongest feeling, of mixed sympathy and consternation, among the Athenians. In the succeeding year (so at least we are led to think, though the date cannot be positively determined), it was selected as the subject of a tragedy,—The Capture of Miletus,—by the dramatic poet Phrynichus; which, when performed, so painfully wrung the feelings of the Athenian audience, that they burst into tears in the theatre, and the poet was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachmae, as “having recalled to them their own misfortunes.” The piece was forbidden to be afterwards acted, and has not come down to us. Some critics have supposed that Herodotus has not correctly assigned the real motive which determined the Athenians to impose this fine. For it is certain that the subjects usually selected for tragedy were portions of heroic legend, and not matters of recent history; so that the Athenians might complain of Phrynichus on the double ground,—for having violated an established canon of propriety, as well as for touching their sensibilities too deeply. Still, I see no reason for doubting that the cause assigned by Herodotus is substantially the true one; but it is very possible that Phrynichus, at an age when tragic poetry had not yet reached its full development, might touch this very tender subject with a rough and offensive hand, before a people who had fair reason to dread the like cruel fate for themselves. Aeschylus, in his Persae, would naturally carry with him the full tide of Athenian sympathy, while dwelling on the victories of Salamis and Plataea. But to interest the audience in Persian success and Grecian suffering, was a task in which much greater poets than Phrynichus would have failed,—and which no judicious poet would have undertaken. The sack of Magdeburg, by Count Tilly, in the Thirty Years’ war, was not likely to be endured as the subject of dramatic representation in any Protestant town of Germany.