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**THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR**

**VOLUME TWO**

*the Thomas Hobbes Translation*

*Edited by David Grene*

*with an Introduction by Bertrand de Jouvenel*



# THUCYDIDES

## The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

VOLUME TWO



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# THE FIFTH BOOK

## THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

The former year's truce ended, Cleon warreth on the Chalcidic cities, and recovereth Torone.—Phaeax is sent by the Athenians to move a war amongst the Sicilians.—Cleon and Brasidas, who were on both sides the principal maintainers of the war, are both slain at Amphipolis.—Presently after their death a peace is concluded; and after that again, a league between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians.—Divers of the Lacedaemonian confederates, hereat discontented, seek the confederacy of the Argives. These make league, first with the Corinthians, Eleians, and Mantineans, then with the Lacedaemonians, and then again, by the artifice of Alcibiades, with the Athenians.—After this the Argives make war upon the Epidaurians; and the Lacedaemonians upon the Argives.—The Athenian captains and the Melians treat by way of dialogue touching the yielding of Melos, which the Athenians afterwards besiege and win.—These are the acts of almost six years more of the same war.

1. The summer following, the truce for a year, which was to last till the Pythian holidays,\* expired. During this truce, the Athenians removed the Delians out of Delos, because [though they were consecrated, yet] for a certain crime committed of old they esteemed them polluted persons; because also they thought there wanted this part to make perfect the purgation of the island, in the purging whereof, as I declared before, they thought they did well to take up the sepulchres

\* Exercises dedicated to Apollo, and celebrated at Delphi (Hobbes).

of the dead. These Delians seated themselves afterwards, every one as he came, in Adramyttium in Asia, a town given unto them by Pharnaces.

2. After the truce was expired, Cleon prevailed with the Athenians to be sent out with a fleet against the cities lying upon Thrace. He had with him of Athenians twelve hundred men of arms and three hundred horsemen, of confederates more, and thirty galleys. And first arriving at Scione, which was yet besieged, he took aboard some men of arms of those that kept the siege and sailed into the haven of the Colophonians, not far distant from the city of Torone. And there, having heard by fugitives that Brasidas was not in Torone nor those within sufficient to give him battle, he marched with his army to the city and sent ten of his galleys about into the haven. And first he came to the new wall, which Brasidas had raised about the city to take in the suburbs, making a breach in the old wall that the whole might be one city.

3. And Pasitelidas, a Lacedaemonian, captain of the town, with the garrison there present came to the defence and fought with the Athenians that assaulted it. But being oppressed, and the galleys which were before sent about being by this time come into the haven, Pasitelidas was afraid lest those galleys should take the town, unfurnished of defendants, before he could get back, and that the Athenians on the other side should win the wall and he be intercepted between them both; and thereupon abandoned the wall and ran back into the city. But the Athenians that were in the galleys, having taken the town before he came, and the land-army following in after him without resistance and entering the city by the breach of the old wall, slew some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans on the place; and some others, amongst whom was the captain Pasitelidas, they took alive. Brasidas was now coming with aid towards Torone, but, advertised by the way that it was already lost, went back again, being about forty furlongs short of preventing it. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the haven, another at the wall. The women and children of the Toronaeans they made slaves; but the men of Torone and the Peloponnesians and such Chalcideans as were amongst them, in all about seven hundred, they sent away prisoners to Athens.



The Peloponnesians were afterwards at the making of the peace dismissed; the rest were redeemed by the Olynthians by exchange of man for man.

About the same time the Boeotians took Panactum, a fort of the Athenians standing in their confines, by treason.

Cleon, after he had settled the garrison in Torone, went thence by sea about the mountain Athos [to make war] against Amphipolis.

4. About the same time Phaeax the son of Erasistratus, who with two others was sent ambassador into Italy and Sicily, departed from Athens with two galleys. For the Leontines, after the Athenians upon the making of the peace were gone out of Sicily, received many strangers into the freedom of their city; and the commons had a purpose also to have made division of the land. But the great men, perceiving it, called in the Syracusians and drave the commons out; and they wandered up and down, every one as he chanced; and the great men, upon conditions agreed on with the Syracusians, abandoning and deserting that city, went to dwell with the privilege of free citizens in Syracuse. After this again, some of them upon dislike relinquished Syracuse and seized on Phoceae, a certain part of the city of the Leontines, and upon Bricinniae, a castle in the Leontine territory. Thither also came unto them most of the commons that had before been driven out, and settling themselves, made war from those places of strength. Upon intelligence hereof the Athenians sent Phaeax thither to persuade their confederates there and, if they could, all the Sicilians jointly to make war upon the Syracusians, that were now beginning to grow great, to try if they might thereby preserve the common people of the Leontines. Phaeax arriving prevailed with the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines; but the business finding a stop at Gela, he went unto no more, as conceiving he should not be able to persuade them. So he returned through the cities of the Siculi unto Catana, having been at Bricinniae by the way and there encouraged them to hold out; and from Catana he set sail and departed.

5. In his voyage to Sicily, both going and coming, he dealt as he went by with sundry cities also of Italy to enter into friendship with the Athenians. He also lighted on those Locrians

which having dwelt once in Messana were afterwards driven out again, being the same men which, after the peace in Sicily, upon a sedition in Messana, wherein one of the factions called in the Locrians, had been then sent to inhabit there, [and now were sent away again]; for the Locrians held Messana for a while. Phaeax, therefore, chancing to meet with these as they were going to their own city, did them no hurt, because the Locrians had been in speech with him about an agreement with the Athenians. For when the Sicilians made a general peace, these only of all the confederates refused to make any peace at all with the Athenians. Nor indeed would they have done it now but that they were constrained thereunto by the war they had with the Itoneans and Melaeans, their own colonies and borderers. And Phaeax after this returned to Athens.

6. Cleon, who was now gone from Torone and come about to Amphipolis, making Eion the seat of the war, assaulted the city of Stageirus, a colony of the Andrians, but could not take it; but Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, he took by assault. And having sent ambassadors to Perdicas to will him to come to him with his forces, according to the league, and other ambassadors into Thrace unto Polles, king of the Odomantians, to take up as many mercenary Thracians as he could, he lay still in Eion to expect their coming. Brasidas upon notice hereof, sat down over against him at Cerdylum. This is a place belonging to the Argilians, standing high and beyond the river, not far from Amphipolis, and from whence he might discern all that was about him. So that Cleon could not but be seen if he should rise with his army to go against Amphipolis, which he expected he would do, and that in contempt of his small number he would go up with the forces he had then present. Withal he furnished himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and took unto him all his Edonians, both horsemen and targetiers. He had also of Myrcinians and Chalcideans a thousand targetiers, besides them in Amphipolis. But for men of arms, his whole number was at the most two thousand, and of Grecian horsemen three hundred. With fifteen hundred of these came Brasidas and sat down at Cerdylum; the rest stood ready ordered with Clearidas, their captain, within Amphipolis.

7. Cleon for a while lay still, but was afterwards forced

to do as was expected by Brasidas. For the soldiers being angry with their stay there, and recounting with themselves what a command his would be, and with what ignorance and cowardice against what skill and boldness of the other, and how they came forth with him against their wills, he perceived their muttering, and being unwilling to offend them with so long a stay in one place, dislodged and led them forward. And he took the same course there, which having succeeded well before at Pylus gave him cause to think himself to have some judgment. For he thought not that any body would come forth to give him battle, and gave out he went up principally to see the place, and stayed for greater forces, not to secure him in case he should be compelled to fight, but that he might therewith environ the city on all sides at once, and in that manner take it by force. So he went up and set his army down on a strong hill before Amphipolis, standing himself to view the fens of the river Strymon and the situation of the city towards Thrace; and thought he could have retired again at his pleasure, without battle. For neither did any man appear upon the walls nor come out of the gates, which were all fast shut. Insomuch as he thought he had committed an error in coming without engines, because he thought he might by such means have won the city, as being without defendants.

8. Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians remove, came down also from Cerdylum and put himself into Amphipolis. He would not suffer them to make any sally nor to face the Athenians in order of battle, mistrusting his own forces, which he thought inferior, not in number (for they were in a manner equal) but in worth (for such Athenians as were there were pure,\* and the Lemnians and Imbrians which were amongst them were of the very ablest); but prepared to set upon them by a wile. For if he should have showed to the enemy both his number and their armour, such as for the present they were forced to use, he thought that thereby he should not so soon get the victory as by keeping them out of sight and out of their contempt till the very point. Wherefore choosing to himself a hundred and fifty men of arms and committing the charge of the rest to Clearidas, he resolved to set suddenly upon them

\* I.e., were citizens.

before they should retire, as not expecting to take them so alone another time if their succours chanced to arrive. And when he had called his soldiers together to encourage them and to make known unto them his design, he said as followeth:

9. "Men of Peloponnesus, as for your country, how by valour it hath ever retained her liberty, and that being Dorians you are now to fight against Ionians, of whom you were ever wont to get the victory, let it suffice that I have touched it thus briefly. But in what manner I intend to charge, that I am now to inform you of, lest the venturing by few at once, and not all together, should seem to proceed from weakness and so dishearten you. I do conjecture that it was in contempt of us, and as not expecting to be fought withal, that the enemy both came up to this place, and that they have now betaken themselves carelessly and out of order to view the country. But he that best observing such errors in his enemies shall also to his strength give the onset, not always openly and in ranged battle, but as is best for his present advantage, shall for the most part attain his purpose. And these wiles carry with them the greatest glory of all, by which, deceiving most the enemy, a man doth most benefit his friends. Therefore whilst they are secure without preparation, and intend, for aught I see, to steal away rather than to stay, I say, in this their looseness of resolution, and before they put their minds in order, I for my part with those I have chosen will, if I can, before they get away fall in upon the midst of their army running. And you, Clearidas, afterwards, as soon as you shall see me to have charged and, as it is probable, to have put them into affright, take those that are with you, both Amphipolitans and all the rest of the confederates, and setting open the gates run out upon them, and with all possible speed come up to stroke of hand. For there is great hope this way to terrify them, seeing they which come after are ever of more terror to the enemy than those that are already present and in fight. And be valiant, as is likely you should that are a Spartan; and you, confederates, follow manfully, and believe that the parts of a good soldier are willingness, sense of shame, and obedience to his leaders; and that this day you shall either gain yourselves liberty by your valour, and to be called confederates of the Lacedaemon-

ians, or else not only to serve the Athenians yourselves, and at the best, if you be not led captives nor put to death, to be in greater servitude than before, but also to be the hinderers of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. But be not you cowards, seeing how great a matter is at stake; and I, for my part, will make it appear that I am not more ready to persuade another than to put myself into action."

10. When Brasidas had thus said, he both prepared to go out himself, and also placed the rest that were with Clearidas before the gates called the Thracian gates to issue forth afterwards as was appointed. Now Brasidas having been in sight when he came down from Cerdylum and again when he sacrificed in the city by the temple of Pallas, which place might be seen from without, it was told Cleon [whilst Brasidas was ordering of his men] (for he was at this time gone off a little to look about him) that the whole army of the enemies was plainly to be discerned within the town, and that the feet of many men and horses, ready to come forth, might be discerned from under the gate. Hearing this, he came to the place; and when he saw it was true, being not minded to fight until his aids arrived, and yet making no other account but that his retreat would be discovered, he commanded at once to give the signal of retreat, and that as they went the left wing should march foremost, which was the only means they had to withdraw towards Eion. But when he thought they were long about it, causing the right wing to wheel about and lay open their disarmed parts to the enemy, he led away the army himself. Brasidas at the same time, having spied his opportunity and that the army of the Athenians removed, said to those about him and the rest: "These men stay not for us; it is apparent by the wagging of their spears and of their heads; for where such motion is, they use not to stay for the charge of the enemy; therefore open me some body the gates appointed and let us boldly and speedily sally forth upon them." Then he went out himself at the gate towards the trench, and which was the first gate of the long wall, which then was standing; and at high speed took the straight way, in which, as one passeth by the strongest part of the town, there standeth now a trophy, and charging upon the midst of the Athenian army, which was terrified both with their own dis-

array and the valour of the man, forced them to fly. And Clearidas, as was appointed, having issued out by the Thracian gates, was withal coming upon them. And it fell out that the Athenians, by this unexpected and sudden attempt, were on both sides in confusion; and the left wing which was next to Eion, and which indeed was marching away before, was immediately broken off from the rest of the army and fled. When that was gone, Brasidas coming up to the right wing, was there wounded. The Athenians saw not when he fell; and they that were near took him up and carried him off. The right wing stood longer to it: and though Cleon himself presently fled (as at first he intended not to stay) and was intercepted by a Myrcinian targetier and slain, yet his men of arms, casting themselves into a circle on the [top of a little] hill, twice or thrice resisted the charge of Clearidas and shrunk not at all, till begirt with the Myrcinian and Chalcidean horse and with the targetiers, they were put to flight by their darts. Thus the whole army of the Athenians, getting away with much ado over the hills and by several ways, all that were not slain upon the place or by the Chalcidean horse and targetiers, recovered Eion. The other side taking up Brasidas out of the battle, and having so long kept him alive, brought him yet breathing into the city; and he knew that his side had gotten the victory, but expired shortly after. When Clearidas with the rest of the army were returned from pursuit of the enemy, they rifled those that were slain and erected a trophy.

11. After this the confederates, following the corpse of Brasidas, all of them in their arms, buried him in the city, at the public charge, in the entrance of that which is now the market place. And the Amphipolitans afterwards, having taken in his monument with a wall, killed unto him as to a hero, honoured him with games and anniversary sacrifice, and attributed their colony unto him as to the founder, pulling down the edifices of Agnon, and defacing whatsoever monument might maintain the memory of his foundation. This they did both for that they esteemed Brasidas for their preserver and also because at this time, through fear of the Athenians, they courted the Lacedaemonians for a league. As for Agnon, because of their hostility with the Athenians, they thought it neither expedient for

them to give him honours, nor that they would be acceptable unto him if they did. The dead bodies they rendered to the Athenians, of whom there were slain about six hundred, and but seven of the other side, by reason that it was no set battle, but fought upon such an occasion and precedent affright. After the dead were taken up, the Athenians went home by sea; and Clearidas and those with him stayed to settle the estate of Amphipolis.

12. About the same time of the summer now ending, Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedaemonians, were leading a supply towards the parts upon Thrace of nine hundred men of arms; and when they were come to Heracleia in Trachinia, they stayed there to amend such things as they thought amiss. Whilst they stayed, this battle was fought; and the summer ended.

13. The next winter, they that were with Ramphias went presently forward as far as [the hill] Pierium in Thessaly. But the Thessalians forbidding them to go on, and Brasidas, to whom they were carrying this army, being dead, they returned homewards, conceiving that the opportunity now served not, both because the Athenians were upon this overthrow gone away and for that they themselves were unable to perform any of those designs which the other had intended. But the principal cause of their return was this: that they knew at their coming forth that the Lacedaemonians had their minds more set upon a peace than war.

14. Presently after the battle of Amphipolis and return of Ramphias out of Thessaly, it fell out that neither side did any act of war but were inclined rather to a peace; the Athenians for the blow they had received at Delium, and this other a little after at Amphipolis, and because they had no longer that confident hope in their strength on which they relied when formerly they refused the peace, as having conceived upon their present success that they should have had the upper hand; also they stood in fear of their own confederates, lest emboldened by these losses of theirs they should more and more revolt; and repented that they made not the peace after their happy success at Pylus, when occasion was offered to have done it honourably; and the Lacedaemonians on the other side did

desire peace because the war had not proceeded as they expected; for they had thought they should in a few years have warred down the power of Athens by wasting their territory; and because they were fallen into that calamity in the island, the like whereof had never happened unto Sparta before; because also their country was continually ravaged by those of Pylus and Cythera, and their Helotes continually fled to the enemy; and because they feared lest those which remained, trusting in them that were run away, should in this estate of theirs raise some innovation, as at other times before they had done. Withal it happened that the thirty years' peace with the Argives was now upon the point of expiring; and the Argives would not renew it without restitution made them of Cynuria; so that to war against the Argives and the Athenians, both at once, seemed impossible. They suspected also that some of the cities of Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives, as indeed it came afterwards to pass.

15. These things considered, it was by both parts thought good to conclude a peace, but especially by the Lacedaemonians for the desire they had to recover their men taken in the island. For the Spartans that were amongst them were both of the prime men of the city and their kinsmen. And therefore they began to treat presently after they were taken; but the Athenians, by reason of their prosperity, would not lay down the war at that time on equal terms. But after their defeat at Delium, the Lacedaemonians, knowing they would be apter now to accept it, made that truce for a year, during which they were to meet and consult about a longer time.

16. But when also this other overthrow happened to the Athenians at Amphipolis, and that both Cleon and Brasidas were slain, the which on either side were most opposite to the peace, the one for that he had good success and honour in the war, the other because in quiet times his evil actions would more appear and his calumniation be the less believed, those two that in the two states aspired most to be chief, Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and Nicias, the son of Niceratus, who in military charges had been the most fortunate of his time, did most of all other desire to have the peace go forward. Nicias because he was desirous, having hitherto never been overthrown, to



carry his good fortune through and to give both himself and the city rest from their troubles for the present, and for the future to leave a name that in all his time he had never made the commonwealth miscarry; which he thought might be done by standing out of danger and by putting himself as little as he might into the hands of fortune; and to stand out of danger is the benefit of peace. Pleistoanax had the same desire because of the imputation laid upon him about his return from exile by his enemies, that suggested unto the Lacedaemonians upon every loss they received that the same befell them for having, contrary to the law, repealed his banishment. For they charged him further that he and his brother Aristocles had suborned the prophetess of Delphi to answer the deputies of the Lacedaemonians, when they came thither, most commonly with this: that they should bring back the seed of the semigod, the son of Jupiter, out of a strange country into his own; and that if they did not, they should plough their land with a silver plough;\* and so at length to have made the Lacedaemonians, nineteen years after, with such dances and sacrifices as they who were the first founders of Lacedaemon had ordained to be used at the enthroning of their kings, to fetch him home again; who lived in the meantime in exile in the mountain Lycaean, in a house whereof the one half was part of the temple of Jupiter, for fear of the Lacedaemonians, as being suspected to have taken a bribe to withdraw his army out of Attica.

17. Being troubled with these imputations and considering with himself, there being no occasion of calamity in time of peace and the Lacedaemonians thereby recovering their men, that he also should cease to be obnoxious to the calumniations of his enemies whereas, in war, such as had charge could not but be quarrelled upon their losses—he was therefore forward to have the peace concluded.

And this winter they fell to treaty, and withal the Lacedaemonians braved them with a preparation already making against the spring, sending to the cities about for that purpose, as if they meant to fortify in Attica, to the end that the Athenians might give them the better ear. When after many meetings

\* A proverbial expression for a time of farming when the crops were worth so much that the farmer "ploughed with a silver plough."

and many demands on either side, it was at last agreed that peace should be concluded, each part rendering what they had taken in the war, save that the Athenians should hold Nisaea (for when they [likewise] demanded Plataea and the Thebans answered that it was neither taken by force nor by treason, but rendered voluntarily, the Athenians said that they also had Nisaea in the same manner), the Lacedaemonians calling together their confederates, and all but the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and Megareans, (for these disliked it) giving their votes for the ending of the war, they concluded the peace, and confirmed it to the Athenians with sacrifice, and swore it, and the Athenians again unto them, upon these articles:

18. "The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their confederates have made peace and sworn it, city by city, as followeth:

"Touching the public temples, it shall be lawful to whomsoever will to sacrifice in them and to have access unto them and to ask counsel of the oracles in the same and to send their deputies unto them, according to the custom of his country, securely both by sea and land.

"The whole place consecrate and temple of Apollo in Delphi, and Delphi itself, shall be governed by their own law, taxed by their own state, and judged by their own judges, both city and territory, according to the institution of the place.

"The peace shall endure between the Athenians with their confederates and the Lacedaemonians with their confederates for fifty years, both by sea and land, without fraud and without harm-doing.

"It shall not be lawful to bear arms with intention of hurt, neither for the Lacedaemonians and their confederates against the Athenians nor for the Athenians and their confederates against the Lacedaemonians by any art or machination whatsoever; if any controversy shall arise between them, the same shall be decided by law and by oath, in such manner as they shall agree on.

"The Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall render Amphipolis to the Athenians; the inhabitants of whatsoever city the Lacedaemonians shall render unto the Athenians shall

be at liberty to go forth whither they will with bag and baggage.

“Those cities which paid the tribute taxed in the time of Aristides, continuing to pay it, shall be governed by their own laws. And now that the peace is concluded, it shall be unlawful for the Athenians or their confederates to bear arms against them or to do them any hurt as long as they shall pay the said tribute; the cities are these: Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus; and they shall be confederates of neither side, neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians; but if the Athenians can persuade these cities unto it, then it shall be lawful for the Athenians to have them for confederates, having gotten their consent.

“The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and Singaeans shall inhabit their own cities on the same conditions with the Olynthians and Acanthians.

“The Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall render Panactum unto the Athenians.

“And the Athenians shall render to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante; they shall likewise deliver whatsoever Lacedaemonians are in the prison of Athens or in any prison of what place soever in the Athenian dominion, and dismiss all the Peloponnesians besieged in Scione and all that Brasidas did there put in, and whatsoever confederates of the Lacedaemonians are in prison, either at Athens or in the Athenian state.

“And the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall deliver whomsoever they have in their hands of the Athenians or their confederates in the same manner.

“Touching the Scionaeans, Toronaeans, and Sermlyians, and whatsoever other city belonging to the Athenians, the Athenians shall do with them what they think fit.

“The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, city by city; and that oath shall be the greatest that in each city is in use. The thing that they shall swear shall be this: ‘I stand to these articles and to this peace, truly and sincerely.’ And the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall take the same oath to the Athenians. This oath

they shall on both sides every year renew and shall erect pillars [inscribed with this peace] at Olympia, Pythia, and in the Isthmus; at Athens, within the citadel; and at Lacedaemon, in the Amyclaeum.

“And if anything be on either side forgotten, or shall be thought fit upon good deliberation to be changed, it shall be lawful for them to do it, in such manner as the Lacedaemonians and Athenians shall think fit, jointly.

19. “This peace shall take beginning from the 24th of the month Artemisium, Pleistolas being ephore at Sparta, and the 15th of Elaphebolium, after the account of Athens, Alcaeus being archon.

“They that took the oath and sacrificed, were these. Of the Lacedaemonians: Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philocaridas, Zeuxidas, Anthipus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians these: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasyclus, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.”

20. This peace was made in the very end of winter and the spring then beginning presently after the City Bacchanals and [full] ten years and some few days over after the first invasion of Attica and the beginning of this war. But now for the certainty hereof, let a man consider the times themselves and not trust to the account of the names of such as in the several places bare chief offices or for some honour to themselves had their names ascribed for marks to the actions foregoing. For it is not exactly known who was in the beginning of his office, or who in the midst, or how he was, when anything fell out. But if one reckon the same by summers and winters, according as they are written, he shall find by the two half years which make the whole, that this first war was of ten summers and as many winters continuance.

21. The Lacedaemonians (for it fell unto them by lot to begin the restitution) both dismissed presently those prisoners they had then in their hands and also sent ambassadors, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocaridas, into the parts upon Thrace with command to Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athe-

nians, and requiring the rest of their confederates there to accept of the peace in such manner as was for every of them accorded. But they would not do it because they thought it was not for their advantage; and Clearidas also, to gratify the Chalcideans, surrendered not the city, alleging that he could not do it whether they would or not. And coming away soon after with those ambassadors to Lacedaemon, both to purge himself, if he should be accused by those with Ischagoras for disobeying the state's command, and also to try if the peace might by any means be shaken; when he found it firm, he himself, being sent back by the Lacedaemonians with command principally to surrender the place, and if he could not do that, then to draw thence all the Peloponnesians that were in it, immediately took his journey.

22. But the confederates chanced to be present themselves in Lacedaemon; and the Lacedaemonians required such of them as formerly refused that they would accept the peace. But they, upon the same pretence on which they had rejected it before, said that unless it were more reasonable they would not accept it. And the Lacedaemonians, seeing they refused, dismissed them and by themselves entered with the Athenians into a league, because they imagined that the Argives would not renew their peace (because they had refused it before when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos, and held them for no dangerous enemies without the Athenians); and also conceived that by this means the rest of Peloponnesus would not stir; for if they could, they would turn to the Athenians. Wherefore the ambassadors of Athens being then present, and conference had, they agreed; and the oath and league was concluded on in the terms following:

23. "The Lacedaemonians shall be confederates with the Athenians for fifty years.

"If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedaemonians and do the Lacedaemonians any harm, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians against them in the strongest manner they can possibly; but if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then that city shall be held as enemy both to the Lacedaemonians and to the Athenians and shall be warred upon by them both; and both cities shall again

lay down the war jointly; and this is to be done justly, readily, and sincerely.

"And if any enemy shall invade the territories of the Athenians and do the Athenians any harm, then the Lacedaemonians shall aid the Athenians against them in the strongest manner they can possibly; but if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then shall that city be held for enemy both to the Lacedaemonians and to the Athenians and shall be warred upon by both; and both the cities shall again lay down the war together; and this to be done justly, readily, and sincerely.

"If their slaves shall rebel, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedaemonians with all their strength possible.

"These things shall be sworn unto by the same men on either side that swore the peace and shall be every year renewed by the Lacedaemonians [at their] coming to the Bacchanals at Athens and by the Athenians [at their] going to the Hyacinthian feast at Lacedaemon; and either side shall erect a pillar [inscribed with this league], one at Lacedaemon, near unto Apollo in the Amyclaeum, another at Athens, near Minerva in the citadel.

"If it shall seem good to the Lacedaemonians and Athenians to add or take away anything touching the league, it shall be lawful for them to do it jointly.

24. "Of the Lacedaemonians, took the oath these: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagerus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcínadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes."

This league was made not long after the peace; and the Athenians delivered to the Lacedaemonians the men they had taken in the island; and by this time began the summer of the eleventh year. And hitherto hath been written these ten years, which this first war continued without intermission.

25. After the peace and league made between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians after the ten years' war, Pleistolas being

ephore at Lacedaemon and Alcaeus archon of Athens, though there were peace to those that had accepted it, yet the Corinthians and some cities of Peloponnesus endeavoured to overthrow what was done, and presently arose another stir by the confederates against Lacedaemon. And the Lacedaemonians also after a while became suspect unto the Athenians for not performing somewhat agreed on in the articles. And for six years and ten months they abstained from entering into each other's territories with their arms; but the peace being weak, they did each other abroad what harm they could, and in the end were forced to dissolve the peace made after those ten years, and fell again into open war.

26. This also hath the same Thucydides of Athens written from point to point, by summers and winters, as everything came to pass, until such time as the Lacedaemonians and their confederates had made an end of the Athenian dominion and had taken their long walls and Piraeus. To which time, from the beginning of the war, it is in all twenty-seven years.\* As for the composition between, if any man shall think it not to be accounted with the war, he shall think amiss. For let him look into the actions that passed as they are distinctly set down and he shall find that that deserveth not to be taken for a peace, in which they neither rendered all nor accepted all, according to the articles. Besides, in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and in other actions, it was on both sides infringed; moreover, the confederates on the borders of Thrace continued in hostility as before; and the Boeotians had but a truce from one ten days to another. So that with the first ten years' war, and with this doubtful cessation, and the war that followed after it, a man shall find, counting by the times, that it came to just so many

\* This indicates that Thucydides lived to the end of the war. We do not know how much longer he lived after. There is a story that he was executed by the Thirty Tyrants, the oligarchic government installed by the Lacedaemonians in Athens in 404-403. The History breaks off in Book viii, when dealing with the events following 411. Thucydides may have had notes for the progress of the war from then till the capture of Athens, but being busy with the revision and final draft of the rest of the work, and particularly Books i-iv, he was unable to give final shape to the last part and so did not leave it in form for publication.

years and some few days, and that those who built upon the prediction of the oracles have this number only to agree. And I remember yet that from the very beginning of this war and so on till the end it was uttered by many that it should be of thrice nine years' continuance. And for the time thereof I lived in my strength and applied my mind to gain an accurate knowledge of the same. It happened also that I was banished my country for twenty years, after my charge at Amphipolis; whereby being present at the affairs of both, and especially of the Lacedaemonians by reason of my exile, I could at leisure the better learn the truth of all that passed. The quarrels, therefore, and perturbations of the peace, after those ten years, and that which followed, according as from time to time the war was carried, I will now pursue.

27. After the concluding of the fifty years' peace and the league which followed, and when those ambassadors which were sent for out of the rest of Peloponnesus to accept the said peace were departed from Lacedaemon, the Corinthians (the rest going all to their own cities), turning first to Argos, entered into treaty with some of the Argive magistrates to this purpose: that the Lacedaemonians having made a peace and league with the Athenians, their hitherto mortal enemies, tending not to the benefit, but to the enslaving of Peloponnesus, it behoved them to consider of a course for the safety of the same, and to make a decree that any city of the Grecians that would, and were a free city, and admitted the like and equal trials of judgment with theirs, might make a league with the Argives for the one mutually to aid the other; and to assign them a few men, with absolute authority from the state, to treat with; and that it should not be motioned to the people, to the end that, if the multitude would not agree to it, it might be unknown that ever they had made such a motion; affirming that many would come into this confederacy upon hatred to the Lacedaemonians. And the Corinthians, when they had made this overture, went home.

28. These men of Argos having heard them and reported their proposition both to the magistrates and to the people, the Argives ordered the same accordingly and elected twelve men with whom it should be lawful for any Grecian to make the league that would, except the Lacedaemonians and Athe-



nians, with neither of which they were to enter into any league without the consent of the Argive people. And this the Argives did the more willingly admit, as well for that they saw the Lacedaemonians would make war upon them (for the truce between them was now upon expiring), as also because they hoped to have the principality of Peloponnesus.\* For about this time Lacedaemon had but a bad report and was in contempt for the losses it had received. And the Argives in all points were in good estate, as not having concurred in the Attic war, but rather been at peace with both, and thereby gotten in their revenue. Thus the Argives received into league all such Grecians as came unto them.

29. First of all, therefore, came in the Mantineans and their confederates, which they did for fear of the Lacedaemonians. For a part of Arcadia, during the war of Athens, was come under the obedience of the Mantineans, over which they thought the Lacedaemonians, now they were at rest, would not permit them any longer to command; and therefore they willingly joined with the Argives, as being, they thought, a great city, ever enemy to the Lacedaemonians, and governed as their own by democracy. When the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of Peloponnesus began also to mutter amongst themselves that it was fit for them to do the like; conceiving that there was somewhat in it more than they knew that made the Mantineans to turn; and were also angry with the Lacedaemonians, amongst many other causes, for that it was written in

\* I.e., to obtain the leadership (hegemony) of all the various states in the Peloponnesus. The Spartans were at the head of the Peloponnesian confederacy and therefore held at this time the hegemonia. The confederacy was loosely organized; Sparta had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the several states, but there was a kind of gentleman's agreement that external (i.e., outside the Peloponnesus) affairs should only be settled by consultation with Sparta. In addition it seems as though, in fact, the Spartans did apply pressure unofficially to secure that only oligarchic governments friendly to Sparta held power in the Peloponnesian states. The confederacy was certainly never as tightly organized as that of Delos with Athens at its head, nor did the Lacedaemonians exact any official yearly tributes. But the bitter words of the Athenian envoys at Sparta at the beginning of the war comparing the two as actual and potential empires would seem to have been justified.

the articles of the Attic peace that it should be lawful to add unto or take away from the same, whatsoever should seem good to the two cities of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. For this was the article that the most troubled the Peloponnesians and put them into a jealousy that the Lacedaemonians might have a purpose, joining with the Athenians, to bring them into subjection; for in justice, the power of changing the articles ought to have been ascribed to all the confederates in general. Whereupon, many, fearing such an intention, applied themselves to the Argives, every one severally striving to come into their league.

30. The Lacedaemonians, perceiving this stir to begin in Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians were both the contrivers of it and entered themselves also into the league with Argos, sent ambassadors unto Corinth with intention to prevent the sequel of it: and accused them both for the whole design and for their own revolt in particular, which they intended to make from them to the league of the Argives, saying that they should therein infringe their oath and that they had already done unjustly to refuse the peace made with the Athenians; forasmuch as it is an article of their league \* that what the major part of the confederates should conclude, unless it were hindered by some god or hero, the same was to stand good. But the Corinthians, those confederates which had refused the peace as well as they being now at Corinth (for they had sent for them before), in their answer to the Lacedaemonians did not openly allege the wrongs they had received; as that the Athenians had not restored Solium nor Anactorium nor anything else they had in this war lost; but pretended not to betray those of Thrace, for that they had in particular taken an oath to them, both when together with Potidaea they first revolted and also another afterwards. And therefore, they said, they did not break the oath of their league by rejecting the peace with Athens. For having sworn unto them by the gods, they should in betraying them offend the gods. And whereas it is said "unless some god or hero hinder it," this appeareth to be a divine hindrance. Thus they answered for their old oath. Then, for their league with the Argives, they gave this answer: that when they had

\* I.e., the Peloponnesian League.

advised with their friends, they would do afterwards what should be just. And so the ambassadors of Lacedaemon went home. At the same time were present also in Corinth the ambassadors of Argos to invite the Corinthians to their league, and that without delay. But the Corinthians appointed them to come again at their next sitting.

31. Presently after this came unto them an ambassage also from Eleians; and first they made a league with the Corinthians, and going thence to Argos, made a league with the Argives, according to the declaration before mentioned. The Eleians had a quarrel with the Lacedaemonians concerning Lepreum. For the Lepreates having heretofore warred on certain of the Arcadians, and for their aid called the Eleians into their confederacy with condition to give the moiety of the land [to be won from them], when the war was ended, the Eleians gave unto the Lepreates the whole land to be enjoyed by themselves, with an imposition thereon of a talent to be paid to Jupiter Olympian, which they continued to pay till the beginning of the Athenian war. But afterwards upon pretense of that war giving over the payment, the Eleians would have forced them to it again. The Lepreates for help having recourse to the Lacedaemonians, and the cause being referred to their decision, the Eleians afterwards, upon suspicion that the Lacedaemonians would not do them right, renounced the reference and wasted the territory of the Lepreates. The Lacedaemonians nevertheless gave sentence that the Lepreates should be at liberty to pay it or not, and that the Eleians did the injury; and because the Eleians had not stood to the reference, the Lacedaemonians put into Lepreum a garrison of men at arms. The Eleians, taking this as if the Lacedaemonians had received their revolted city, and producing the article of their league "that what every one possessed when they entered into the Attic war, the same they should possess when they gave it over," revolted to the Argives as wronged and entered league with them as is before related. After these came presently into the Argive league the Corinthians and the Chalcideans upon Thrace. The Boeotians also and Megareans threatened as much; but because they thought the Argive democracy would not be so commodious for them, who were governed according to the govern-

ment of the Lacedaemonians, by oligarchy, they stirred no further in it.

32. About the same time of this summer the Athenians expugned Scione, slew all that were within it at man's estate, made slaves of the women and children, and gave their territory to the Plataeans. They also replanted the Delians in Delos, both in consideration of the defeats they had received after their expulsion, and also because the oracle at Delphi had commanded it. The Phocceans and Locrians also began a war at that time against each other.

And the Corinthians and Argives, being now leagued, went to Tegea to cause it to revolt from the Lacedaemonians, conceiving it to be an important piece [of Peloponnesus], and making account, if they gained it to their side, they should easily obtain the whole. But when the Tegeates refused to become enemies to the Lacedaemonians, the Corinthians, who till then had been very forward, grew less violent and were afraid that no more of the rest would come in. Nevertheless they went to the Boeotians, and solicited them to enter into league with them and the Argives and to do as they did. And the Corinthians further desired the Boeotians to go along with them to Athens and to procure for them the like ten days' truce to that which was made between the Athenians and Boeotians presently after the making of the fifty years' peace, on the same terms as the Boeotians had it; and if the Athenians refused, then to renounce theirs and make no more truces hereafter without the Corinthians. The Corinthians having made this request, the Boeotians willed them, touching the league with the Argives, to stay a while longer, and went with them to Athens, but obtained not the ten days' truce; the Athenians answering that if the Corinthians were confederates with the Lacedaemonians, they had a peace already. Nevertheless the Boeotians would not relinquish their ten days' truce, though the Corinthians both required the same and affirmed that it was so before agreed on. Yet the Athenians granted the Corinthians a cessation of arms, but without solemn ratification.

33. The same summer the Lacedaemonians with their whole power, under the conduct of Pleistonanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, made war upon the Parrhasians

of Arcadia, subjects of the Mantineans, partly as called in by occasion of sedition and partly because they intended, if they could, to demolish a fortification which the Mantineans had built and kept with a garrison in Cypsela, in the territory of the Parrhasians towards Sciritis of Laconia. The Lacedaemonians therefore wasted the territory of the Parrhasians. And the Mantineans, leaving their own city to the custody of the Argives, came forth to aid the Parrhasians their confederates; but being unable to defend both the fort of Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians too, they went home again. And the Lacedaemonians, when they had set the Parrhasians at liberty and demolished the fortification, went home likewise.

34. The same summer, when those soldiers which went out with Brasidas and of which Clearidas after the making of the peace had the charge were returned from the parts upon Thrace, the Lacedaemonians made a decree that those Helotes which had fought under Brasidas should receive their liberty and inhabit where they thought good. But not long after they placed them, together with such others as had been newly enfranchised, in Lepreum, a city standing in the confines between Laconia and the Eleians, with whom they were now at variance. Fearing also lest those citizens of their own, which had been taken in the island and had delivered up their arms to the Athenians, should upon apprehension of disgrace for that calamity, if they remained capable of honours, make some innovation in the state, they disabled them [though] some of them were in office already. And their disablement was this: that they should neither bear office, nor be capable to buy and sell. Yet in time they were again restored to their former honours.

35. The same summer also the Dictideans\* took Thyssus, a town in Mount Athos, and confederate of the Athenians. This whole summer there was continual commerce between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians; nevertheless they began, both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, to have each other in suspicion immediately after the peace, in respect of the places not yet mutually surrendered. For the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it fell to make restitution first, had not rendered

\* The Greek word is actually the *Dians*, i.e., the inhabitants of Dium in the Athos peninsula.

Amphipolis and the other cities, nor had caused the peace to be accepted by the confederates upon Thrace, nor by the Boeotians nor Corinthians, though they had ever professed that in case they refused they would join with the Athenians to bring them to it by force, and had prefixed a time (though not by writing) within the which such as entered not into this peace were to be held as enemies unto both. The Athenians, therefore, when they saw none of this really performed, suspected that they had no sincere intention, and thereupon refused to render Pylus when they required it; nay, they repented that they had delivered up the prisoners they took in the island; and detained the rest of the towns they then held till the Lacedaemonians should have performed the conditions on their part also. The Lacedaemonians to this alleged that they had done what they were able to do, for they had delivered the Athenian prisoners that were in their hands and had withdrawn their soldiers from the parts upon Thrace, and whatsoever else was in their own power to perform; but Amphipolis, they said, was not in their power to surrender; that they would endeavour to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians to accept the peace, and to get Panactum restored, and all the Athenian prisoners in Boeotia to be sent home; and therefore desired them to make restitution of Pylus, or, if not so, at least to draw out of it the Messenians and Helotes, as they for their part had drawn their garrisons out of the towns upon Thrace; and if they thought good, to keep it with a garrison of Athenians. After divers and long conferences had this summer, they so far prevailed with the Athenians at the last as they drew thence all the Messenians and Helotes and all other Laconian fugitives and placed them in Cranii, a city of Cephallenia. So for this summer there was peace and free passage from one to another.

36. In the beginning of winter (for now there were other ephores in office; not those in whose time the peace was made, but some of them that opposed it), ambassadors being come from the confederates, and the Athenian, Boeotian, and Corinthian ambassadors being [already] there, and having had much conference together but concluded nothing, Cleobulus and Xenares, ephores that most desired the dissolution of the peace, when the rest of the ambassadors were gone home, entered into

private conference with the Boeotians and Corinthians, exhorting them to run both the same course; and advised the Boeotians to endeavour first to make a league themselves with the Argives and then to get the Argives together with themselves into a league with the Lacedaemonians, for that they might by this means avoid the necessity of accepting the peace with Athens; for the Lacedaemonians would more regard the friendship and league of the Argives than the enmity and dissolution of the peace with the Athenians; for they knew the Lacedaemonians had ever desired to have Argos their friend upon any reasonable conditions, because they knew that their war without Peloponnesus would thereby be a great deal the easier. Wherefore they entreated the Boeotians to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedaemonians, to the end that, if they could get Pylus for it in exchange, they might make war against the Athenians the more commodiously.

37. The Boeotians and Corinthians, being dismissed by Xenares and Cleobulus, and all the other Lacedaemonians of that faction, with these points to be delivered to their commonwealths, went to their several cities. And two men of Argos, of principal authority in that city, having waited for and met with them by the way, entered into a treaty with them about a league between the Argives and the Boeotians as there was between them and the Corinthians and the Eleians and Mantineans already; for they thought, if it succeeded, they might [the more] easily have either war or peace (forasmuch as the cause would now be common), either with the Lacedaemonians or whomsoever else it should be needful. When the Boeotian ambassadors heard this, they were well pleased. For as it chanced, the Argives requested the same things of them, that they by their friends in Lacedaemon had been sent to procure of the Argives. These men therefore of Argos, when they saw that the Boeotians accepted of the motion, promised to send ambassadors to the Boeotians about it, and so departed. When the Boeotians were come home, they related there what they had heard both at Lacedaemon and by the way from the Argives. The governors of Boeotia were glad thereof, and much more forward in it now than formerly they had been, seeing that not only their friends in Lacedaemon desired, but the Ar-

gives themselves hastened to have done the self-same thing. Not long after this the ambassadors came to them from Argos to solicit the dispatch of the business before propounded; but the governors of Boeotia commended [only] the proposition and dismissed them with promise to send ambassadors about the league to Argos.

38. In the meantime the governors of Boeotia thought fit that an oath should first be taken by themselves and by the ambassadors from Corinth, Megara, and the confederates upon Thrace to give mutual assistance upon any occasion to them that should require it and neither to make war nor peace without the common consent; and next that the Boeotians and Megareans (for these two ran the same course) should make a league with the Argives. But before this oath was [to be] taken, the governors of Boeotia communicated the business to the four Boeotian councils, in the which the whole authority of the state consisteth, and withal presented their advice that any city that would might join with them in the like oath for mutual assistance. But they that were of these councils approved not the proposition, because they feared to offend the Lacedaemonians in being sworn to the Corinthians that had revolted from their confederacy. For the governors of Boeotia had not reported unto them what had passed at Lacedaemon, how Cleobulus and Xenares, the ephores, and their friends there had advised them to enter first into league with the Argives and Corinthians and then afterwards to make the same league with the Lacedaemonians; for they thought that the councils, though this had never been told them, would have decreed it no otherwise than they upon premeditation should advise. So the business was checked and the ambassadors from Corinth and from the cities upon Thrace departed without effect. And the governors of Boeotia, that were before minded, if they had gotten this done, to have leagued themselves also with the Argives, made no mention of the Argives in the councils at all nor sent the ambassadors to Argos, as they had before promised; but a kind of carelessness and delay possessed the whole business.

39. The same winter the Olynthians took Mecyberne, held with a garrison of the Athenians, by assault.

After this the Lacedaemonians (for the conferences between



the Athenians and Lacedaemonians about reciprocal restitution continued still), hoping that if the Athenians should obtain from the Boeotians Panactum, that then they also should recover Pylus, sent ambassadors to the Boeotians with request that Panactum and the Athenian prisoners might be put into the hands of the Lacedaemonians, that they might get Pylus restored in exchange. But the Boeotians answered that unless the Lacedaemonians would make a particular league with them as they had done with the Athenians, they would not do it. The Lacedaemonians, though they knew they should therein wrong the Athenians, for that it was said in the articles that neither party should make either league or war without the other's consent, yet such was their desire to get Panactum to exchange it for Pylus, and withal they that longed to break the peace with Athens were so eager in it, that at last they concluded a league with the Boeotians, winter then ending and the spring approaching; and Panactum was presently pulled down to the ground. So ended the eleventh year of this war.

40. In the spring following, the Argives, when they saw that the ambassadors which the Boeotians promised to send unto them came not, and that Panactum was razed, and that also there was a private league made between the Boeotians and the Lacedaemonians, were afraid lest they should on all hands be abandoned, and that the confederates would all go to the Lacedaemonians. For they apprehended that the Boeotians had been induced both to raze Panactum and also to enter into the Athenian peace by the Lacedaemonians; and that the Athenians were privy to the same, so that now they had no means to make league with the Athenians neither; whereas before they made account that if their truce with the Lacedaemonians continued not, they might upon these differences have joined themselves to the Athenians. The Argives being therefore at a stand and fearing to have war all at once with the Lacedaemonians, Tegeats, Boeotians, and Athenians, [as] having formerly refused the truce with the Lacedaemonians and imagined to themselves the principality of all Peloponnesus, they sent ambassadors with as much speed as might be, Eustrophus and Aeson, persons as they thought most acceptable unto them, with this cogitation, that by compounding with the Lacedaemonians as well as for

their present estate they might, howsoever the world went, they should at least live at quiet.

41. When these ambassadors were there, they fell to treat of the articles upon which the agreement should be made. And at first the Argives desired to have the matter referred, either to some private man or to some city, concerning the territory of Cynuria, about which they have always differed, as lying on the borders of them both (it containeth the cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and is possessed by the Lacedaemonians). But afterwards, the Lacedaemonians not suffering mention to be made of that, but that if they would have the truce go on as it did before, they might, the Argive ambassadors got them to yield to this: that for the present an accord should be made for fifty years; but withal, that it should be lawful nevertheless, if one challenged the other thereunto, both for Lacedaemon and Argos to try their titles to this territory by battle, so that there were in neither city a plague nor a war to excuse them (as once before they had done, when, as both sides thought, they had the victory); and that it should not be lawful for one part to follow the chase of the other further than to the bounds either of Lacedaemon or Argos. And though this seemed to the Lacedaemonians at first to be but a foolish proposition, yet afterwards, because they desired by all means to have friendship with the Argives, they agreed unto it and put into writing what they required. Howsoever, before the Lacedaemonians would make any full conclusion of the same, they willed them to return first to Argos and to make the people acquainted with it, and then, if it were accepted, to return at the Hyacinthian feast and swear it. So these departed.

42. Whilst the Argives were treating about this, the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, Andromedes and Phaedimus and Antimenidas, commissioners for receiving of Panactum and the prisoners from the Boeotians to render them to the Athenians, found that Panactum was demolished, and that their pretext was this: that there had been anciently an oath, by occasion of difference between the Athenians and them, that neither part should inhabit the place solely, but jointly both. But for the Athenian prisoners, as many as the Boeotians had, they that were with Andromedes received, convoyed, and delivered them unto

the Athenians, and withal told them of the razing of Panactum, alleging it as rendered in that no enemy of Athens should dwell in it hereafter. But when this was told them, the Athenians made it a heinous matter, for that they conceived that the Lacedaemonians had done them wrong, both in the matter of Panactum, which was pulled down and should have been rendered standing, and because also they had heard of the private league made with the Boeotians, whereas they had promised to join with the Athenians in compelling such to accept of the peace as had refused it. Withal they weighed whatsoever other points the Lacedaemonians had been short in, touching the performance of the articles, and thought themselves abused; so that they answered the Lacedaemonian ambassadors roughly and dismissed them.

43. This difference arising between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, it was presently wrought upon by such also of Athens as desired to have the peace dissolved. Amongst the rest was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, a man, though young in years,\* yet in the dignity of his ancestors honoured as much as any man of what city soever. Who was of opinion that it was better to join with the Argives, not only for the matter itself, but also out of stomach labouring to cross the Lacedaemonians, because they had made the peace, by the means of Nicias and Laches, without him, whom for his youth they had neglected and not honoured as for the ancient hospitality between his house and them had been requisite; which his father had indeed renounced,† but he himself, by good offices done to those prisoners which were brought from the island, had a purpose to have renewed. But supposing himself on all hands disparaged, he both opposed the peace at first, alleging that the Lacedaemonians would not be constant and that they had made the peace only to get the Argives by that means away from them and afterwards to invade the Athenians again when they should be destitute of their friends; and also, as soon as this difference was on foot, he sent presently to Argos of himself, willing them

\* The Greek adds "though still young *by the standards of any other state.*"

† According to the Greek it was his grandfather who had renounced it, and the hospitality was the office of proxenus or consul.

with all speed to come to Athens, as being thereunto invited, and to bring with them the Eleians and Mantineans to enter with the Athenians into a league, the opportunity now serving, and promising that he would help them all he could.

44. The Argives, having heard the message, and knowing that the Athenians had made no league with the Boeotians, and that they were at great quarrel with the Lacedaemonians, neglected the ambassadors they had then in Lacedaemon, whom they had sent about the truce, and applied themselves to the Athenians, with this thought: that if they should have war, they should by this means be backed with a city that had been their ancient friend, governed like their own by democracy, and of greatest power by sea. Whereupon they presently sent ambassadors to Athens to make a league; and together with theirs went also the ambassadors of the Eleians and Mantineans. Thither also with all speed came the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, persons accounted most gracious with the Athenians, for fear, lest in their passion they should make a league with the Argives, and withal to require the restitution of Pylus for Panactum, and to excuse themselves concerning their league with the Boeotians, as not made for any harm intended to the Athenians.

45. Now speaking of these things before the council, and how that they were come thither with full power to make agreement concerning all controversies betwixt them, they put Alcibiades into fear, lest, if they should say the same before the people, the multitude would be drawn unto their side, and so the Argive league fall off. But Alcibiades deviseth against them this plot. He persuaded the Lacedaemonians not to confess their plenary power before the people, and giveth them his faith that then Pylus should be rendered (for he said he would persuade the Athenians to it as much as he now opposed it), and that the rest of their differences should be compounded. This he did to alienate them from Nicias; and that by accusing them before the people as men that had no true meaning nor ever spake one and the same thing, he might bring on the league with the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans. And it came to pass accordingly. For when they came before the people, and to the ques-

tion whether they had full power of concluding, had, contrary to what they had said in council, answered *No*, the Athenians would no longer endure them, but gave ear to Alcibiades, that exclaimed against the Lacedaemonians far more now than ever; and were ready then presently to have the Argives and those others with them brought in, and to make the league; but an earthquake happening before anything was concluded, the assembly was adjourned.

46. In the next day's meeting, Nicias, though the Lacedaemonians had been abused, and he himself also deceived touching their coming with full power to conclude, yet he persisted to affirm that it was their best course to be friends with the Lacedaemonians and to defer the Argives' business till they had sent to the Lacedaemonians again to be assured of their intention, saying that it was honour unto themselves and dishonour to the Lacedaemonians to have the war put off. For, for themselves, being in estate of prosperity, it was best to preserve their good fortune as long as they might; whereas to the other side, who were in evil estate, it should be in place of gain to put things as soon as they could to the hazard. So he persuaded them to send ambassadors, whereof himself was one, to require the Lacedaemonians, if they meant sincerely, to render Panactum standing, and also Amphipolis; and if the Boeotians would not accept of the peace, then to undo their league with them, according to the article that the one should not make league with any without the consent of the other. They willed him to say further that they themselves also, if they had had the will to do wrong, had ere this made a league with the Argives, who were present then at Athens for the same purpose. And whatsoever they had to accuse the Lacedaemonians of besides, they instructed Nicias in it and sent him and the other his fellow-ambassadors away. When they were arrived and had delivered what they had in charge, and this last of all, that the Athenians would make league with the Argives unless the Lacedaemonians would renounce their league with the Boeotians if the Boeotians accepted not the peace, the Lacedaemonians denied to renounce their league with the Boeotians; for Xenares, the ephore, and the rest of that faction carried it; but at the request of Nicias

they renewed their former oath. For Nicias was afraid he should return with nothing done and be carped at (as after also it fell out) as author of the Lacedaemonian peace.

At his return, when the Athenians understood that nothing was effected at Lacedaemon, they grew presently into choler; and apprehending injury (the Argives and their confederates being there present, brought in by Alcibiades), they made a peace and a league with them in these words:

47. "The Athenians and Argives and Mantineans and Eleians, for themselves and for the confederates commanded by every of them, have made an accord for one hundred years, without fraud or damage, both by sea and land. It shall not be lawful for the Argives nor Eleians nor Mantineans nor their confederates to bear arms against the Athenians or the confederates under the command of the Athenians or their confederates by any fraud or machination whatsoever.

"And the Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans have made league with each other for one hundred years on these terms:

"If any enemy shall invade the territory of the Athenians, then the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans shall go unto Athens to assist them, according as the Athenians shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy, after he have spoiled the territory, shall be gone back, then their city shall be held as an enemy to the Argives, Eleians, Mantineans, and Athenians, and war shall be made against it by all those cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of those cities to give over the war without the consent of all the rest.

"And if an enemy shall invade the territory, either of the Argives or of the Eleians or of the Mantineans, then the Athenians shall come unto Argos, Elis, and Mantinea to assist them, in such sort as those cities shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy, after he hath wasted their territory, shall be gone back, then their city shall be held as an enemy both to the Athenians and also to the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and war shall be made against it by all those cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to give over the war against that city without the consent of all the rest.

"There shall no armed men be suffered to pass through the

dominions either of themselves or of any the confederates under their several commands to make war in any place whatsoever, unless by the suffrage of all the cities, Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, their passage be allowed.

“To such as come to assist any of the other cities, that city which sendeth them shall give maintenance for thirty days after they shall arrive in the city that sent for them; and the like at their going away; but if they will use the army for a longer time, then the city that sent for them shall find them maintenance, at the rate of three oboles of Aegina a day for a man of arms, and of a drachma of Aegina for a horseman.

“The city which sendeth for the aids shall have the leading and command of them whilst the war is in their own territory; but if it shall seem good unto these cities to make a war in common, then all the cities shall equally participate of the command.

“The Athenians shall swear unto the articles both for themselves and for their confederates; and the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and the confederates of these shall every one swear unto them city by city. And their oath shall be the greatest that by custom of the several cities is used, and with most perfect hosts,\* and in these words: ‘I will stand to this league, according to the articles thereof, justly, innocently, and sincerely, and not transgress the same by any art or machination whatsoever.’

“This oath shall be taken at Athens by the senate and the officers of the commons, and administered by the Prytanes. At Argos it shall be taken by the senate and the council of eighty and by the Artynae, and administered by the council of eighty. At Mantinea it shall be taken by the procurators of the people and by the senate and by the rest of the magistrates, and administered by the theori and by the tribunes of the soldiers. At Elis it shall be taken by the procurators of the people and by the officers of the treasury and by the council of six hundred, and administered by the procurators of the people and by the keepers of the law.

“This oath shall be renewed by the Athenians, who shall go to Elis and to Mantinea and to Argos thirty days before the

\* I.e., with full-grown sacrificial victims.

Olympian games; and by the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, who shall come to Athens ten days before the Panathenaeon holidays.

“The articles of this league and peace and the oath shall be inscribed in a pillar of stone by the Athenians in the citadel; by the Argives in their market place within the precincts of the temple of Apollo; and by the Mantineans in their market place within the precinct of the temple of Jupiter. And at the Olympian games now at hand, there shall be jointly erected by them all a brazen pillar in Olympia [with the same inscription].

“If it shall seem good to any of these cities to add anything to these articles, whatsoever shall be determined by them all in common council, the same shall stand good.”

48. Thus was the league and the peace concluded; and that which was made before between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians was, notwithstanding, by neither side renounced. But the Corinthians, although they were the confederates of the Argives, yet would they not enter into this league; nay, though there were made a league before this between [them and] the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans that where one there all should have war or peace, yet they refused to swear to it, but said that their league defensive was enough, whereby they were bound to defend each other but not to take part one with another in invading. So the Corinthians fell off from their confederates and inclined again to the Lacedaemonians.

49. This summer were celebrated the Olympian games, in which Androsthene, an Arcadian, was the first victor in the exercise called Pancratium.\* And the Lacedaemonians were by the Eleians prohibited the temple there, so as they might neither sacrifice nor contend for the prizes amongst the rest; for that they had not paid the fine set upon them, according to an Olympic law, by the Eleians, that laid to their charge that they had put soldiers into the fort of Phyrcon and into Lepreum in the time of the Olympic truce. The fine amounted unto two thousand minae, which was two minae for every man of arms, according to the law. But the Lacedaemonians, by their ambassadors which they sent thither, made answer that they had been

\* I.e., wrestling and boxing.



unjustly condemned, alleging that the truce was not published in Lacedaemon when their soldiers were sent out. To this the Eleians said again that the truce was already begun amongst themselves, who used to publish it first in their own dominion; and thereupon, whilst they lay still and expected no such matter, as in time of truce, the Lacedaemonians did them the injury unawares. The Lacedaemonians hereunto replied that it was not necessary to proceed to the publishing of the truce in Lacedaemon at all if they thought themselves wronged already; but rather, if they thought themselves not wronged yet, then to do it by way of prevention, that they should not arm against them afterwards. The Eleians stood stiffly in their first argument, that they would never be persuaded but injury had been done them, but were nevertheless contented if they would render Lepreum, both to remit their own part of the money and also to pay that part for them which was due unto the god.

50. When this would not be agreed unto, they then required this: not that they should render Lepreum, unless they would, but that then they should come to the altar of Jupiter Olympian, seeing they desired to have free use of the temple, and there before the Grecians to take an oath to pay the fine at least hereafter. But when the Lacedaemonians refused that also, they were excluded the temple, the sacrifices, and the games, and sacrificed at home; but the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreates, were all admitted to be spectators. Nevertheless, the Eleians, fearing lest they would come and sacrifice there by force, kept a guard there of their youngest men in arms, to whom were added Argives and Mantineans, of either city one thousand, and certain Athenian horsemen, who were then at Argos waiting the celebration of the feast. For a great fear possessed all the assembly lest the Lacedaemonians should come upon them with an army; and the rather because Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, had been whipped by the serjeants upon the race; for that when his chariot had gotten the prize, after proclamation made that the chariot of the Boeotian state had won it (because he himself was not admitted to run), he came forth into the race and crowned his charioteer, to make it known that the chariot was his own. This added much

unto their fear, and they verily expected some accident to follow. Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians stirred not; and the feast passed over.

After the Olympian games, the Argives and their confederates went to Corinth to get the Corinthians into their league. And the Lacedaemonian ambassadors chanced to be there also; and after much conference and nothing concluded, upon occasion of an earthquake they brake off the conference and returned every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.

51. The next winter, the men of Heracleia in Trachinia fought a battle against the Aenianians, Dolopians, Melians, and certain Thessalians. For the neighbour cities were enemies to this city, as built to the prejudice only of them; and both opposed the same from the time it was first founded, annoying it what they could; and also in this battle overcame them and slew Xenares, a Lacedaemonian, their commander, with some others, Heracleots. Thus ended this winter, and the twelfth year of this war.

52. In the very beginning of the next summer, the Boeotians took Heracleia, miserably afflicted, into their own hands, and put Hegesippidas, a Lacedaemonian, out of it for his evil government. They took it because they feared lest, whilst the Lacedaemonians were troubled about Peloponnesus, it should have been taken in by the Athenians. Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians were offended with them for doing it. The same summer Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, by the practice of the Argives and their confederates, went into Peloponnesus, and having with him a few men at arms and archers of Athens and some of the confederates which he took up there as he passed through the country with his army, both ordered such affairs by the way concerning the league as was fit; and coming to the Patreans, persuaded them to build their walls down to the seaside, and purposed to raise another wall himself towards Rhium in Achaia. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and such others as this wall would have prejudiced came forth and hindered him.

53. The same summer fell out a war between the Epidaurians and the Argives; the pretext thereof was about a beast for sacrifice, which the Epidaurians ought to have sent in con-

sideration of their pastures to Apollo Pythius, and had not done it, the Argives being the principal owners of the temple. But Alcibiades and the Argives had indeed determined to take in the city, though without pretence at all, both that the Corinthians might not stir and also that they might bring the Athenian succours from Aegina into those parts, a nearer way than by compassing the promontory of Scyllaeum. And therefore the Argives prepared, as of themselves, to exact the sacrifice by invasion.

54. About the same time also the Lacedaemonians, with their whole forces, came forth as far as Leuctra, in the confines of their own territory towards Lycaem, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. No man knew against what place they intended the war; no, not the cities themselves out of which they were levied. But when in the sacrifices which they made for their passage the tokens observed were unlucky, they went home again and sent word about to their confederates (being now the month Carneius) to prepare themselves, after the next feast of the new moon (kept by the Dorians), to be again upon their march. The Argives, who set forth the twenty-sixth day of the month before Carneius, though they celebrated the same day, yet all the time they continued invading and wasting Epidauria. And the Epidaurians called in their confederates to help them, whereof some excused themselves upon the quality of the month; and others came but to the confines of Epidauria and there stayed.

55. Whilst the Argives were in Epidauria, the ambassadors of divers cities, solicited by the Athenians, met together at Mantinea, where in a conference amongst them Euphamidas of Corinth said that their actions agreed not with their words; forasmuch as whilst they were sitting there to treat of a peace, the Epidaurians with their confederates and the Argives stood armed, in the meantime, against each other in order of battle; that it was therefore fit that somebody should go first unto the armies from either side and dissolve them, and then come again and dispute of peace. This advice being approved, they departed, and withdrew the Argives from Epidauria. And meeting afterwards again in the same place, they could not for all that agree; and the Argives again invaded and wasted Epidauria.

The Lacedaemonians also drew forth their army against Caryae; but then again, their sacrifice for passage being not to their mind, they returned. And the Argives, when they had spoiled about the third part of Epidauria, went home likewise. They had the assistance of one thousand men of arms of Athens, and Alcibiades their commander; but these hearing that the Lacedaemonians were in the field, and seeing now there was no longer need of them, departed. And so ended this summer.

56. The next winter the Lacedaemonians, unknown to the Athenians, put three hundred garrison soldiers under the command of Agesippidas into Epidaurus by sea. For which cause the Argives came and expostulated with the Athenians that whereas it was written in the articles of the league that no enemy should be suffered to pass through either of their dominions, yet had they suffered the Lacedaemonians to pass by sea; and said they had wrong, unless the Athenians would again put the Mesenians and Helotes into Pylus against the Lacedaemonians. Hereupon the Athenians, at the persuasion of Alcibiades, wrote upon the Laconian pillar, [under the inscription of the peace], that the Lacedaemonians had violated their oath; and they drew the Helotes out of Cranii and put them again into Pylus to infest the territory with driving off booties; but did no more.

All this winter, though there was war between the Argives and Epidaurians, yet was there no set battle, but only ambushes and skirmishes, wherein were slain on both sides such as it chanced. But in the end of winter, and the spring now at hand, the Argives came to Epidaurus with ladders, as destitute of men by reason of the war, thinking to have won it by assault, but returned again with their labour lost. And so ended this winter, and the thirteenth year of this war.

57. In the middle of the next summer, the Lacedaemonians, seeing that the Epidaurians their confederates were tired and that of the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus some had already revolted and others were but in evil terms, and apprehending that if they presented it not the mischief would spread still further, put themselves into the field with all their own forces, both of themselves and their Helotes, to make war against Argos, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. The Tegeats went also with them, and of the rest of Arcadia

all that were in the Lacedaemonian league. But the rest of their confederates, both within Peloponnesus and without, were to meet together at Phlius; that is to say, of the Boeotians five thousand men of arms and as many light-armed, five hundred horse, and to every horseman another man on foot, of Corinthians two thousand men of arms, and of the rest more or less as they were; but the Phliasians, because the army was assembled in their own territory, put forth their whole power.

58. The Argives, having had notice both formerly of the preparation of the Lacedaemonians and afterward of their marching on to join with the rest at Phlius, brought their army likewise into the field. They had with them the aids of the Mantineans and their confederates and three thousand men of arms of the Eleians; and marching forward, met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, each side seizing on a hill. And the Argives prepared to give battle to the Lacedaemonians whilst they were single. But Agis, dislodging his army by night, marched on to Phlius to the rest of the confederates, unseen. Upon knowledge hereof, the Argives betimes in the morning retired first to Argos and afterwards to the forest of Nemea, by which they thought the Lacedaemonians and their confederates would fall in. But Agis came not the way which they expected, but with the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, whom he acquainted with his purpose, took another more difficult way to pass and came down into the Argive plains. The Corinthians also, and Pellenians and Phliasians, marched another troublesome way. [Only] the Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians were appointed to come down by the way of the forest of Nemea, in which the Argives were encamped, to the end that if the Argives should turn head against the Lacedaemonians, these might set upon them at the back with their horse. Thus ordered, Agis entered into the plains and spoiled Saminthus and some other towns thereabouts.

59. Which when the Argives understood, they came out of the forest somewhat after break of day to oppose them, and lighting among the Phliasians and Corinthians, slew some few of the Phliasians, but had more slain of their own by the Corinthians, though not many. The Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians marched forward towards Nemea and found that the

Argives were departed; for when they came down and saw their country wasted, they put themselves into order of battle. And the Lacedaemonians on the other side did the same; and the Argives stood intercepted in the midst of their enemies. For in the plain between them and the city stood the Lacedaemonians and those with them; above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and towards Nemea were the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. And horsemen they had none; for the Athenians alone of all their confederates were not yet come.

Now the generality of the army of the Argives and their confederates did not think the danger present so great as indeed it was, but rather that the advantage in the battle would be their own; and that the Lacedaemonians were intercepted, not only in the Argives territory, but also hard by the city. But two men of Argos, Thrasylus, one of the five commanders of the army, and Alciphron, entertainer\* of the Lacedaemonians, when the armies were even ready to join, went unto Agis and dealt with him to have the battle put off, forasmuch as the Argives were content and ready both to propound and accept of equal arbitrators in whatsoever the Lacedaemonians should charge them withal, and in the meantime to have peace with them solemnly confirmed.

60. This these Argives said of themselves, without the command of the generality. And Agis, of himself likewise, accepting their proposition without deliberation, had with the major part, and having communicated it only to some one or more of those that had charge in the army, made truce with them for four months, in which space they were to perform the things agreed upon betwixt them; and then presently he withdrew his army without giving account to any of the rest of the league why he did so. The Lacedaemonians and the confederates followed Agis, according to the law, as being their general, but among themselves taxed him exceedingly; for that having a very fair occasion of battle, the Argives being inclosed on all sides both by their horse and foot, he yet went his way doing nothing worthy the great preparation they had made. For this was, in very truth, the fairest army that ever the Grecians had in the

\* Again, proxenus.

field unto this day. But it was most to be seen when they were all together in the forest of Nemea, where the Lacedaemonians were with their whole forces, besides the Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans; and these all chosen men of their several cities and such as were thought a match not only for the league of the Argives but for such another added to it. The army, thus offended with Agis, departed, and were dissolved every man to his home.

The Argives were much more offended with those of their city, which without the consent of the multitude had made the truce, they also supposing that the Lacedaemonians had escaped their hands in such an advantage as they never had the like before, in that the battle was to have been fought under the city walls and with the assistance of many and good confederates. And in their return they began to stone Thrasyllus at the Charadrum, the place where the soldiers, before they enter into the city from warfare, use to have their military causes heard. But he, flying to the altar, saved himself; nevertheless they confiscated his goods.

61. After this, the Athenians coming in with the aid of one thousand men of arms and three hundred horse under the conduct of Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives (for they were afraid for all this to break the truce with the Lacedaemonians) willed them to be gone again; and when they desired to treat, would not present them to the people till such time as the Mantineans and Eleians, who were not yet gone, forced them unto it by their importunity. Then the Athenians, in the presence of Alcibiades, that was ambassador there, spake unto the Argives and their confederates, saying that the truce was unduly made without the assent of the rest of their confederates, and that now (for they were come time enough) they ought to fall again to the war; and did by their words so prevail with the confederates that they all, save the Argives, presently marched against Orchomenus of Arcadia. And these, though satisfied, stayed behind at first, but afterwards they also went, and sitting down before Orchomenus, jointly besieged and assaulted the same, desiring to take it in as well for other causes as chiefly for that the hostages which the Arcadians had given to the Lacedaemonians were there in custody. The Orcho-

menians, fearing the weakness of their walls, and the greatness of the army, and lest they should perish before any relief could arrive, yielded up the town on conditions to be received into the league, give hostages for themselves, and to surrender the hostages held there by the Lacedaemonians into the hands of the Mantineans.

62. The confederates after this, having gotten Orchomenus, sat in council about what town they should proceed against next. The Eleians gave advice to go against Lepreum, but the Mantineans against Tegea. And the Argives and Athenians concurred in opinion with the Mantineans. But the Eleians, taking it in evil part that they did not decree to go against Lepreum, went home. But the rest prepared themselves at Mantinea to go against Tegea, which also some within had a purpose to put into their hands.

63. The Lacedaemonians, after their return from Argos with their four months' truce, severely questioned Agis for that, upon so fair an opportunity as they never had before, he subdued not Argos to the state; for so many and so good confederates would hardly be gotten together again at one time. But when also the news came of the taking of Orchomenus, then was their indignation much greater; and they presently resolved, contrary to their own custom, in their passion, to raze his house, and fine him in the sum of ten thousand drachmes.\* But he besought them that they would do neither of these things yet, and promised that, leading out the army again, he would by some valiant action cancel those accusations; or, if not, they might proceed afterwards to do with him whatsoever they thought good. So they forbore both the fine and the razing of his house, but made a decree for that present, such as had never been before, that ten Spartans should be elected and

\* The Greek says a *hundred* thousand drachmae. It is nearly impossible to give any statement as to the actual value of money in fifth-century Greece. The most useful indication of the comparative significance of sums of money in their coinage and ours is perhaps given by the pay of soldiers. Double pay for tasks of extreme difficulty or hardship was one drachma a man a day. Some authorities have considered that this sum represents enough to support the man and his family in food for one day.



joined with him as councillors, without whom it should not be lawful for him to lead the army into the field.

64. In the meantime came news from their side in Tegea that, unless they came presently with aid, the Tegeans would revolt to the Argives and their confederates, and that they wanted little of being revolted already. Upon this, the Lacedaemonians with speed levied all their forces, both of themselves and their Helotes, in such number as they had never done before, and marched unto Oresteium in Maenalia, and appointed the Arcadians, such as were of their league, to assemble and follow them at the heels to Tegea. The Lacedaemonians, being come entire to Oresteium, from thence sent back the sixth part of their army, in which they put both the youngest and the eldest sort, for the custody of the city, and with the rest marched on to Tegea; and not long after arrived also their confederates of Arcadia. They also sent to Corinth, and to the Boeotians, Phoceans, and Locrians to come with their aids with all speed to Mantinea. But these had too short a warning; nor was it easy for them, unless they came all together and stayed for one another, to come through the enemy's country, which lay between and barred them of passage. Nevertheless, they made what haste they could. And the Lacedaemonians, taking with them their Arcadian confederates present, entered into the territory of Mantinea, and pitching their camp by the temple of Hercules, wasted the territory about.

65. The Argives and their confederates, as soon as they came in sight, seized on a certain place fortified by nature and of hard access and put themselves into battle array. And the Lacedaemonians marched presently towards them and came up within a stone or a dart's cast. But then one of the ancient men of the army cried out unto Agis (seeing him to go on against a place of that strength) that he went about to amend one fault with another, signifying that he intended to make amends for his former retreat from Argos, which he was questioned for, with his now unseasonable forwardness. But he, whether it were upon that increpation or some other sudden apprehension of his own, presently withdrew his army before the fight began, and marching unto the territory of Tegea, turned

the course of the water into the territory of Mantinea; touching which water, because into what part soever it had his course it did much harm to the country, the Mantineans and Tegeans were at wars. Now his drift was, by the turning of that water to provoke those Argives and their confederates which kept the hill, when they should hear of it, to come down and oppose them, that so they might fight with them in the plain. And by that time he had stayed about the water a day, he had diverted the stream. The Argives and their confederates were at first amazed at this their sudden retreat from so near them and knew not what to make of it. But when after the retreat they returned no more in sight, and that they themselves, lying still on the place, did not pursue them, then began they anew to accuse their commanders, both for suffering the Lacedaemonians to depart formerly, when they had them inclosed at so fair an advantage before Argos, and now again for not pursuing them when they ran away, but giving them leave to save themselves, and betraying the army. The commanders for the present were much troubled hereat; but afterwards they drew down the army from the hill, and coming forth into the plain, encamped as to go against the enemy.

66. The next day, the Argives and their confederates put themselves into such order as, if occasion served, they meant to fight in; and the Lacedaemonians returning from the water to the temple of Hercules, the same place where they had formerly encamped, perceived the enemies to be all of them in order of battle hard by them, come down already from the hill. Certainly the Lacedaemonians were more affrighted at this time than ever they had been to their remembrance before. For the time they had to prepare themselves was exceedingly short; and such was their diligence that every man fell immediately into his own rank, Agis, the king, commanding all according to the law. For whilst the king hath the army in the field, all things are commanded by him; and he signifieth what is to be done to the polemarchi, they to the lochagi, these to the pentecontateres, and these again to the enomotarchi, who lastly make it known, every one to his own enomotia. In this manner, when they would have anything to be done, their commands pass through the army and are quickly executed. For almost all the

Lacedaemonian army, save a very few, are captains of captains; and the care of what is to be put in execution lieth upon many.

67. Now their left wing consisted of the Sciritae, which amongst the Lacedaemonians have ever alone that place. Next to these were placed the Brasideian soldiers lately come out of Thrace, and with them those that had been newly made free. After them in order the rest of the Lacedaemonians, band after band; and by them Arcadians, first the Heraeans, after these the Maenalians. In the right wing were the Tegeats, and a few Lacedaemonians in the point of the same wing. And upon the outside of either wing, the horsemen. So stood the Lacedaemonians. Opposite to them, in the right wing, stood the Mantineans, because it was upon their own territory; and with them such Arcadians as were of their league. Then the thousand chosen Argives, which the city had for a long time caused to be trained for the wars at the public charge, and next to them the rest of the Argives. After these, the Cleonaeans and Orneates, their confederates. And lastly, the Athenians, with the horsemen (which were also theirs) had the left wing.

68. This was the order and preparation of both the armies. The army of the Lacedaemonians appeared to be the greater. But what the number was, either of the particulars of either side or in general, I could not exactly write. For the number of the Lacedaemonians, agreeable to the secrecy of that state, was unknown; and of the other side, for the ostentation usual with all men touching the number of themselves, was unbelieved. Nevertheless, the number of the Lacedaemonians may be attained by computing thus. Besides the Sciritae, which were six hundred, there fought in all seven regiments; in every regiment were four companies, in each company were four enomotiae, and of every enomotia there stood in front four; but they were not ranged all alike in file, but as the captains of bands thought it necessary; but the army in general was so ordered as to be eight men in depth. And the first rank of the whole, besides the Sciritae, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight soldiers.

69. Now when they were ready to join, the commanders made their hortatives, every one to those that were under his own command. To the Mantineans it was said that they were

to fight for their territory, and concerning their liberty and servitude; that the former might not be taken from them, and that they might not again taste of the latter. The Argives were admonished that whereas anciently they had the leading of Peloponnesus, and in it an equal share, they should not now suffer themselves to be deprived of it for ever; and that withal, they should now revenge the many injuries of a city, their neighbour and enemy. To the Athenians, it was remembered how honourable a thing it would be for them, in company of so many and good confederates, to be inferior to none of them; and that if they had once vanquished the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnesus, their own dominion would become both the more assured and the larger by it; and that no other would invade their territory hereafter. Thus much was said to the Argives and their confederates. But the Lacedaemonians encouraged one another both of themselves and also by the manner of their discipline in the war, taking encouragement, being valiant men, by the commemoration of what they already knew; as being well acquainted that a long actual experience conferred more to their safety than any short verbal exhortation, though never so well delivered.

70. After this followed the battle. The Argives and their confederates marched to the charge with great violence and fury. But the Lacedaemonians slowly and with many flutes, according to their military discipline, not as a point of religion, but that, marching evenly and by measure, their ranks might not be distracted, as the greatest armies, when they march in the face of the enemy, use to be.

71. Whilst they were yet marching up, Agis, the king thought of this course. All armies do thus. In the conflict they extend their right wing so as it cometh in upon the flank of the left wing of the enemy: and this happeneth for that every one, through fear, seeketh all he can to cover his unarmed side with the shield of him that standeth next to him on his right hand, conceiving that to be so locked together is their best defence. The beginning hereof is in the leader of the first file on the right hand, who ever striving to shift his unarmed side from the enemy, the rest upon like fear follow after. And at this time, the Mantineans in the right wing had far encompassed

the Sciritae; and the Lacedaemonians on the other side, and the Tegeats, were come in yet further upon the flank of the Athenians, by as much as they had the greater army. Wherefore Agis, fearing lest his left wing should be encompassed, and supposing the Mantineans to be come in far, signified unto the Sciritae and Brasideians to draw out part of their bands, and therewith to equalise their left wing to the right wing of the Mantineans; and into the void space he commanded to come up Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two colonels, with their bands out of the right wing, and to fall in there and make up the breach, conceiving that more than enough would still be remaining in their right wing, and that the left wing opposed to the Mantineans would be the stronger.

72. But it happened (for he commanded it in the very onset and on the sudden) both that Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to go to the place commanded (for which they were afterwards banished Sparta, as thought to have disobeyed out of cowardice), and that the enemy had in the meantime also charged; and when those which he commanded to go to the place of the Sciritae went not, they could no more reunite themselves nor close again the empty space. But the Lacedaemonians, though they had the worst at this time in every point for skill, yet in valour they manifestly showed themselves superior. For after the fight was once begun, notwithstanding that the right wing of the Mantineans did put to fight the Sciritae and Brasideians, and that the Mantineans together with their confederates and those thousand chosen men of Argos, falling upon them in flank by the breach not yet closed up, killed many of the Lacedaemonians, and put to flight and chased them to their carriages, slaying also certain of the elder sort left there for a guard, so as in this part the Lacedaemonians were overcome, yet with the rest of the army, and especially the middle battle where Agis was himself, and those which are called "the three hundred horsemen" about him, they charged upon the eldest of the Argives, and upon those which are named "the five cohorts," and upon the Cleonaeans and Orneates, and certain Athenians arranged amongst them, and put them all to flight; in such sort as many of them never struck stroke, but as soon as the Lacedaemonians charged gave ground presently,

and some for fear to be overtaken were trodden under foot.

73. As soon as the army of the Argives and their confederates had in this part given ground, they began also to break on either side. The right wing of the Lacedaemonians and Tegeats had now with their surplusage of number hemmed the Athenians in, so as they had the danger on all hands, being within the circle, pent up, and without it, already vanquished. And they had been the most distressed part of all the army had not their horsemen come in to help them. Withal it fell out that Agis, when he perceived the left wing of his own army to labour, namely, that which was opposed to the Mantineans and to those thousand Argives, commanded the whole army to go and relieve the part overcome. By which means the Athenians and such of the Argives as, together with them, were overlaid, whilst the army passed by and declined them, saved themselves at leisure. And the Mantineans with their confederates and those chosen Argives had no more mind now of pressing upon their enemies, but seeing their side was overcome and the Lacedaemonians approaching them, presently turned their backs. Of the Mantineans the greatest part were slain; but of those chosen Argives the most were saved; by reason the flight and going off was neither hasty nor long. For the Lacedaemonians fight long and constantly, till they have made the enemy to turn his back; but that done, they follow him not far.

74. Thus, or near thus, went the battle, the greatest that had been of a long time between Grecians and Grecians, and of two the most famous cities. The Lacedaemonians, laying together the arms of their slain enemies, presently erected a trophy and rifled their dead bodies. Their own dead they took up and carried them to Tegea, where they were also buried, and delivered to the enemy theirs under truce. Of the Argives, and Orneates, and Cleonaeans were slain seven hundred; of the Mantineans, two hundred; and of the Athenians with the Aeginetac, likewise two hundred, and both the captains. The confederates of the Lacedaemonians were never pressed, and therefore their loss was not worth mentioning; and of the Lacedaemonians themselves, it is hard to know the certainty; but it is said there were slain three hundred.

75. When it was certain they would fight, Pleistoanax, the

other king of the Lacedaemonians, and with him both old and young, came out of the city to have aided the army, and came forth as far as Tegea, but being advertised of the victory, they returned. And the Lacedaemonians sent out to turn back also those confederates of theirs which were coming to them from Corinth and from without the isthmus. And then they also went home themselves, and having dismissed their confederates (for now were the Carneian holidays), celebrated that feast. Thus in this one battle they wiped off their disgrace with the Grecians; for they had been taxed both with cowardice for the blow they received in the island and with imprudence and slackness on other occasions. But after this, their miscarriage was imputed to fortune, and for their minds they were esteemed to have been ever the same they had been.

The day before this battle it chanced also that the Epidaurians with their whole power invaded the territory of Argos, as being emptied much of men, and whilst the Argives were abroad, killed many of those that were left behind to defend it. Also three thousand men of Elis and a thousand Athenians, besides those which had been sent before, being come after the battle to aid the Mantineans, marched presently all to Epidaurus and lay before it all the while the Lacedaemonians were celebrating the Carneian holidays; and assigning to every one his part, began to take in the city with a wall. But the rest gave over; only the Athenians quickly finished a fortification (which was their task), wherein stood the temple of Juno. In it amongst them all they left a garrison, and went home every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.

76. In the beginning of the winter following, the Lacedaemonians, presently after the end of the Carneian holidays, drew out their army into the field, and being come to Tegea, sent certain propositions of agreement before to Argos. There were, before this time, many citizens in Argos well affected to the Lacedaemonians and that desired the deposing of the Argive people; and now after the battle they were better able by much to persuade the people to composition than they formerly were. And their design was, first, to get a peace made with the Lacedaemonians, and after that a league, and then at last to set upon the commons.

There went thither Lichas the son of Archesilaus, entertainer of the Argives in Lacedaemon, and brought to Argos two propositions: one of war, if the war were to proceed; another of peace, if they were to have peace. And after much contradiction (for Alcibiades was also there), the Lacedaemonian faction, that boldly now discovered themselves, prevailed with the Argives to accept the proposition of peace, which was this:

77. "It seemeth good to the council of the Lacedaemonians to accord with the Argives on these articles:

"The Argives shall redeliver unto the Orchomenians their children, and unto the Maenaliens their men, and unto the Lacedaemonians those men that are at Mantinea; they shall withdraw their soldiers from Epidaurus and raze the fortification there.

"And if the Athenians depart not from Epidaurus [likewise], they shall be held as enemies both to the Argives and to the Lacedaemonians and also to the confederates of them both.

"If the Lacedaemonians have any men of theirs in custody, they shall deliver them every one to his own city.

"And for so much as concerneth the god, the Argives shall accept composition with the Epidaurians, upon an oath which they shall swear, touching that controversy; and the Argives shall give the form of that oath.

"All the cities of Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall be free according to their patrial laws.

"If any without Peloponnesus shall enter into it to do it harm, the Argives shall come forth to defend the same, in such sort as in a common council shall by the Peloponnesians be thought reasonable.

"The confederates of the Lacedaemonians without Peloponnesus shall have the same conditions which the confederates of the Argives and of the Lacedaemonians have, every one holding his own.

"This composition is to hold from the time that they shall both parts have showed the same to their confederates and obtained their consent.

"And if it shall seem good to either part to add or alter anything, their confederates shall be sent unto and made acquainted therewith."



78. These propositions the Argives accepted at first; and the army of the Lacedaemonians returned from Tegea to their own city. But shortly after, when they had commerce together, the same men went further, and so wrought that the Argives, renouncing their league with the Mantineans, Eleians, and Athenians, made league and alliance with the Lacedaemonians in this form.

79. "It seemeth good to the Lacedaemonians and Argives to make league and alliance for fifty years on these articles:

"That either side shall allow unto the other equal and like trials of judgment, after the form used in their cities.

"That the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus (this league and alliance comprehending also them) shall be free both from the laws and payments of any other city than their own, holding what they have and affording equal and like trials of judgment according to the form used in their several cities.

"That every of the cities confederate with the Lacedaemonians, without Peloponnesus, shall be in the same condition with the Lacedaemonians; and the confederates of the Argives in the same with the Argives, every one holding his own.

"That if at any time there shall need an expedition to be taken in common, the Lacedaemonians and the Argives shall consult thereof and decree as shall stand most with equity towards the confederates. And that if any controversy arise between any of the cities, either within or without Peloponnesus, about limits or other matter, they also shall decide it.

"That if any confederate city be at contention with another, it shall have recourse to that city which they both shall think most indifferent; but the particular men of any one city shall be judged according to the law of the same."

80. Thus was the peace and league concluded; and whatsoever one had taken from the other in the war, or whatsoever one had against another otherwise, was all acquitted. Now, when they were together settling their business, they ordered that the Argives should neither admit herald nor ambassage from the Athenians till they were gone out of Peloponnesus and had quit the fortification, nor should make peace or war with any without consent of the rest. And amongst other things which they did in this heat, they sent ambassadors from both

their cities to the towns lying upon Thrace and unto Perdiccas, whom they also persuaded to swear himself of the same league. Yet he revolted not from the Athenians presently, but intended it, because he saw the Argives had done so, and was himself also anciently descended out of Argos. They likewise renewed their old oath with the Chalcideans and took another besides it. The Argives sent ambassadors also to Athens, requiring them to abandon the fortification they had made against Epidaurus. And the Athenians, considering that the soldiers they had in it were few in respect to the many others that were with them in the same, sent Demosthenes to fetch them away. He, when he was come and had exhibited for a pretence a certain exercise of naked men without the fort, when the rest of the garrison were gone forth to see it, made fast the gates; and afterwards having renewed the league with the Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves put the fort into their hands.

81. After the revolt of the Argives from the league, the Mantineans also, though they withstood it at first, yet being too weak without the Argives, made their peace with the Lacedaemonians and laid down their command over the other cities. And the Lacedaemonians and Argives with a thousand men of either city having joined their arms, the Lacedaemonians first, with their single power, reduced the government of Sicyon to a smaller number; and then they both together dissolved the democracy at Argos. And the oligarchy was established conformable to the state of Lacedaemon.

These things passed in the end of winter and near the spring. And so ended the fourteenth year of this war.

82. The next summer the Dictidears seated in Mount Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcideans.

And the Lacedaemonians ordered the state of Achaia after their own form, which before was otherwise. But the Argives, after they had by little and little assembled themselves and recovered heart, taking the time when the Lacedaemonians were celebrating their exercises of the naked youth, assaulted the few; and in a battle fought within the city, the commons had the victory; and some they slew, others they drave into exile. The Lacedaemonians, though those of their faction in Argos sent for them, went not a long time after; yet at last they ad-

journed the exercises and came forth with intention of giving them aid. But hearing by the way at Tegea that the few were overcome, they could not be entreated by such as had escaped thence to go on, but returning, went on with the celebration of their exercises. But afterwards, when there came ambassadors unto them, both from the Argives in the city, and from them that were driven out, there being present also their confederates, and much alleged on either side, they concluded at last that those in the city had done the wrong and decreed to go against Argos with their army; but many delays passed, and much time was spent between. In the meantime the common people of Argos, fearing the Lacedaemonians and regaining the league with Athens, as conceiving the same would turn to their very great advantage, raised long walls from their city down to the sea-shore, to the end that if they were shut up by land, they might yet with the help of the Athenians bring things necessary into the city by sea. And with this their building some other cities of Peloponnesus were also acquainted. And the Argives universally, themselves and wives and servants, wrought at the wall, and had workmen and hewers of stone from Athens. So this summer ended.

83. The next winter the Lacedaemonians, understanding that they were fortifying, came to Argos with their army, they and their confederates all but the Corinthians; and some practice they had beside within the city itself of Argos. The army was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. But those things which were practising in Argos and supposed to have been already mature did not then succeed. Nevertheless they took the walls that were then in building and razed them to the ground; and then, after they had taken Hysiae, a town in the Argive territory, and slain all the freemen in it, they went home and were dissolved every one to his own city. After this, the Argives went with an army into Phliasia, which when they had wasted, they went back. They did it because the men of Phlius had received their outlaws; for there the greatest part of them dwelt.

The same winter the Athenians shut up Perdiccas in Macedonia [from the use of the sea], objecting that he had sworn the league of the Argives and Lacedaemonians; and that when

they had prepared an army, under the command of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, to go against the Chalcideans upon Thrace and against Amphipolis, he had broken the league made betwixt them and him, and by his departure was the principal cause of the dissolution of that army, and was therefore an enemy. And so this winter ended, and the fifteenth year of this war.

84. The next summer went Alcibiades to Argos with twenty galleys and took thence the suspected Argives and such as seemed to savour of the Lacedaemonian faction, to the number of three hundred, and put them into the nearest of the islands subject to the Athenian state.

The Athenians made war also against the isle of Melos, with thirty galleys of their own, six of Chios, and two of Lesbos. Wherein were of their own twelve hundred men of arms, three hundred archers, and twenty archers on horseback; and of their confederates and islanders, about fifteen hundred men of arms. The Melians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and therefore refused to be subject, as the rest of the islands were, unto the Athenians, but rested at the first neutral; and afterwards, when the Athenians put them to it by wasting of their land, they entered into open war.

Now the Athenian commanders, Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, being encamped upon their land with these forces, before they would hurt the same sent ambassadors to deal with them first by way of conference. These ambassadors the Melians refused to bring before the multitude, but commanded them to deliver their message before the magistrates and the few; and they accordingly said as followeth:

85. *Athenians*. "Since we may not speak to the multitude, for fear lest when they hear our persuasive and unanswerable arguments all at once in a continued oration, they should chance to be seduced (for we know that this is the scope of your bringing us to audience before the few), make surer yet that point, you that sit here; answer you also to every particular, not in a set speech, but presently interrupting us whensoever anything shall be said by us which shall seem unto you to be otherwise. And first answer us whether you like this motion or not?"

86. Whereunto the council of the Melians answered: "The

equity of a leisurely debate is not to be found fault withal; but this preparation of war, not future but already here present, seemeth not to agree with the same. For we see that you are come to be judges of the conference, and that the issue of it, if we be superior in argument and therefore yield not, is likely to bring us war, and if we yield, servitude."

87. *Ath.* "Nay, if you be come together to reckon up suspicions of what may be, or to any other purpose than to take advice upon what is present and before your eyes, how to save your city from destruction, let us give over. But if this be the point, let us speak to it."

88. *Mel.* "It is reason, and pardonable for men in our cases, to turn both their words and thoughts upon divers things. Howsoever, this consultation being held only upon the point of our safety, we are content, if you think good, to go on with the course you have propounded."

89. *Ath.* "As we therefore will not, for our parts, with fair pretences, as, that having defeated the Medes, our reign is therefore lawful, or that we come against you for injury done, make a long discourse without being believed; so would we have you also not expect to prevail by saying either that you therefore took not our parts because you were a colony of the Lacedaemonians or that you have done us no injury. But out of those things which we both of us do really think, let us go through with that which is feasible, both you and we knowing that in human disputation justice is then only agreed on when the necessity is equal; whereas they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get."

90. *Mel.* "Well then (seeing you put the point of profit in the place of justice), we hold it profitable for ourselves not to overthrow a general profit to all men, which is this: that men in danger, if they plead reason and equity, nay, though somewhat without the strict compass of justice, yet it ought ever to do them good. And the same most of all concerneth you, forasmuch as you shall else give an example unto others of the greatest revenge that can be taken if you chance to miscarry."

91. *Ath.* "As for us, though our dominion should cease, yet

we fear not the sequel. For not they that command, as do the Lacedaemonians, are cruel to those that are vanquished by them (yet we have nothing to do now with the Lacedaemonians), but such as having been in subjection have assaulted those that commanded them and gotten the victory. But let the danger of that be to ourselves. In the meantime we tell you this: that we are here now both to enlarge our own dominion and also to confer about the saving of your city. For we would have dominion over you without oppressing you, and preserve you to the profit of us both."

92. *Mel.* "But how can it be profitable for us to serve, though it be so for you to command?"

93. *Ath.* "Because you, by obeying, shall save yourselves from extremity; and we, not destroying you, shall reap profit by you."

94. *Mel.* "But will you not accept that we remain quiet and be your friends (whereas before we were your enemies), and take part with neither?"

95. *Ath.* "No. For your enmity doth not so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument of our weakness and your hatred of our power amongst those we have rule over."

96. *Mel.* "Why? Do your subjects measure equity so, as to put those that never had to do with you, and themselves, who for the most part have been your own colonies, and some of them after revolt conquered, into one and the same consideration?"

97. *Ath.* "Why not? For they think they have reason on their side, both the one sort and the other, and that such as are subdued are subdued by force, and such as are forborne are so through our fear. So that by subduing you, besides the extending of our dominion over so many more subjects, we shall assure it the more over those we had before, especially being masters of the sea, and you islanders, and weaker (except you can get the victory) than others whom we have subdued already."

98. *Mel.* "Do you think then, that there is no assurance in that which we propounded? For here again (since driving us from the plea of equity you persuade us to submit to your profit), when we have shewed you what is good for us, we

must endeavour to draw you to the same, as far forth as it shall be good for you also. As many therefore as now are neutral, what do you but make them your enemies, when, beholding these your proceedings, they look that hereafter you will also turn your arms upon them? And what is this, but to make greater the enemies you have already, and to make others your enemies, each against their wills, that would not else have been so?"

99. *Ath.* "We do not think that they shall be ever the more our enemies, who inhabiting anywhere in the continent, will be long ere they so much as keep guard upon their liberty against us. But islanders unsubdued, as you be, or islanders offended with the necessity of subjection which they are already in, these may indeed, by unadvised courses, put both themselves and us into apparent danger."

100. *Mel.* "If you then to retain your command, and your vassals to get loose from you, will undergo the utmost of danger, would it not in us, that be already free, be great baseness and cowardice if we should not encounter anything whatsoever rather than suffer ourselves to be brought into bondage?"

101. *Ath.* "No, if you advise rightly. For you have not in hand a match of valour upon equal terms, wherein to forfeit your honour, but rather a consultation upon your safety that you resist not such as be so far your overmatches."

102. *Mel.* "But we know that, in matter of war, the event is sometimes otherwise than according to the difference of number in sides; and that if we yield presently, all our hope is lost; whereas if we hold out, we have yet a hope to keep ourselves up."

103. *Ath.* "Hope, the comfort of danger, when such use it as have to spare, though it hurt them, yet it destroys them not. But to such as set their rest upon it (for it is a thing by nature prodigal), it at once by failing maketh itself known; and known, leaveth no place for future caution.\* Which let not be your

\* The Greek here is exceedingly difficult, but Hobbes has at best expressed only the gist of this sentence. It means "But for those who are making a cast for their all (and hope is naturally prodigal), it (hope) is only known for what it is at the moment of failure, and even in a case where a man knows it so and guards against it,

own case, you that are but weak and have no more but this one stake. Nor be you like unto many men, who, though they may presently save themselves by human means, will yet, when upon pressure of the enemy their most apparent hopes fail them, betake themselves to blind ones, as divination, oracles, and other such things which with hopes destroy men."

104. *Mel.* "We think it, you well know, a hard matter for us to combat your power and fortune, unless we might do it on equal terms. Nevertheless we believe that, for fortune, we shall be nothing inferior, as having the gods on our side, because we stand innocent against men unjust; and for power, what is wanting in us will be supplied by our league with the Lacedaemonians, who are of necessity obliged, if for no other cause, yet for consanguinity's sake and for their own honour, to defend us. So that we are confident, not altogether so much without reason as you think."

105. *Ath.* "As for the favour of the gods, we expect to have it as well as you; for we neither do nor require anything contrary to what mankind hath decreed, either concerning the worship of the gods or concerning themselves.\* For of the gods we think according to the common opinion; and of men, that for certain by necessity of nature they will everywhere reign over such as they be too strong for. Neither did we make this law nor are we the first that use it made; but as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for ever, so also we use it, knowing that you likewise, and others that should have the same power which we have, would do the same. So that forasmuch as toucheth the favour of the gods, we have in reason no fear of being inferior. And as for the opinion you have of the Lacedaemonians, in that you believe they will help you for their own honour, we bless your innocent minds, but affect not your folly. For the Lacedaemonians, though in respect of themselves

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it still plagues him" (literally, "does not desert him"). The following passage explains a lot. Men in a dangerous situation might save themselves by human means. Instead, they trust to open or reasonable hope, and when these fail have recourse to the blind expectation of oracles, divination, etc.

\* A closer translation would be something like this: "Neither in what we claim nor what we do are we outside of what man thinks about the gods and what he wishes for himself."



and the constitutions of their own country they are wont for the most part to be generous; yet in respect of others, though much might be alleged, yet the shortest way one might say it all thus: that most apparently of all men, they hold for honourable that which pleaseth, and for just that which profiteth. And such an opinion maketh nothing for your now absurd means of safety."

106. *Mel.* "Nay, for this same opinion of theirs, we now the rather believe that they will not betray their own colony, the Melians, and thereby become perfidious to such of the Grecians as be their friends and beneficial to such as be their enemies."

107. *Ath.* "You think not, then, that what is profitable must be also safe, and that which is just and honourable must be performed with danger, which commonly the Lacedaemonians are least willing of all men to undergo [for others]."

108. *Mel.* "But we suppose that they will undertake danger for us rather than for any other; and that they think that we will be more assured unto them than unto any other, because for action, we lie near to Peloponnesus, and for affection, are more faithful than others for our nearness of kin."

109. *Ath.* "The security of such as are at wars consisteth not in the good will of those that are called to their aid, but in the power of those means they excel in. And this the Lacedaemonians themselves use to consider more than any; and therefore, out of diffidence in their own forces, they take many of their confederates with them, though to an expedition but against their neighbours. Wherefore it is not likely, we being masters of the sea, that they will ever pass over into an island."

110. *Mel.* "Yea, but they may have others to send; and the Cretic sea is wide, wherein to take another is harder for him that is master of it than it is for him that will steal by to save himself. And if this course fail, they may turn their arms against your own territory or those of your confederates not invaded by Brasidas. And then you shall have to trouble yourselves no more about a territory that you have nothing to do withal, but about your own and your confederates."

111. *Ath.* "Let them take which course of these they will that you also may find by experience and not be ignorant that the Athenians never yet gave over siege for fear of any diver-

sion upon others. But we observe that, whereas you said you would consult of your safety, you have not yet in all this discourse said anything which a man relying on could hope to be preserved by; the strongest arguments you use are but future hopes; and your present power is too short to defend you against the forces already arranged against you. You shall therefore take very absurd counsel, unless, excluding us, you make amongst yourselves some more discreet conclusion; for [when you are by yourselves], you will no more set your thoughts upon shame, which, when dishonour and danger stand before men's eyes, for the most part undoeth them. For many, when they have foreseen into what dangers they were entering, have nevertheless been so overcome by that forcible word dishonour that that which is but called dishonour hath caused them to fall willingly into immedicable calamities, and so to draw upon themselves really, by their own madness, a greater dishonour than could have befallen them by fortune. Which you, if you deliberate wisely, will take heed of, and not think shame to submit to a most potent city, and that upon so reasonable conditions as of league and of enjoying your own under tribute; and seeing choice is given you of war or safety, do not out of peevishness take the worse. For such do take the best course who, though they give no way to their equals, yet do fairly accommodate to their superiors, and towards their inferiors use moderation. Consider of it, therefore, whilst we stand off; and have often in your mind that you deliberate of your country, which is to be happy or miserable in and by this one consultation."

112. So the Athenians went aside from the conference; and the Melians, after they had decreed the very same things which before they had spoken, made answer unto them in this manner: "Men of Athens, our resolution is no other than what you have heard before; nor will we, in a small portion of time, overthrow that liberty in which our city hath remained for the space of seven hundred years since it was first founded. But trusting to the fortune by which the gods have preserved it hitherto and unto the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians, we will do our best to maintain the same. But this we offer: to be your

friends, enemies to neither side, and you to depart out of our land, after agreement such as we shall both think fit."

113. Thus the Melians answered. To which the Athenians, the conference being already broken off, replied thus: "You are the only men, as it seemeth to us, by this consultation, that think future things more certain than things seen, and behold things doubtful, through desire to have them true, as if they were already come to pass. As you attribute and trust the most unto the Lacedaemonians, and to fortune and hopes, so will you be the most deceived."

114. This said, the Athenian ambassadors departed to their camp. And the commanders, seeing that the Melians stood out, fell presently to the war, and dividing the work among the several cities, encompassed the city of the Melians with a wall. The Athenians afterwards left some forces of their own and of their confederates for a guard both by sea and land, and with the greatest part of their army went home. The rest that were left besieged the place.

115. About the same time the Argives, making a road into Phliasia, lost about eighty of their men by ambush laid for them by the men of Phlius and the outlaws of their own city. And the Athenians that lay in Pylus fetched in thither a great booty from the Lacedaemonians. Notwithstanding which, the Lacedaemonians did not war upon them [as] renouncing the peace, but gave leave by edict only to any of their people that would take booties reciprocally in the territory of the Athenians. The Corinthians also made war upon the Athenians; but it was for certain controversies of their own, and the rest of Peloponnesus stirred not.

The Melians also took that part of the wall of the Athenians, by an assault in the night, which looked towards the market place, and having slain the men that guarded it, brought into the town both corn and other provision, whatsoever they could buy for money, and so returned and lay still. And the Athenians from thenceforth kept a better watch. And so this summer ended.

116. The winter following, the Lacedaemonians being about to enter with their army into the territory of the Argives, when

they perceived that the sacrifices which they made on the border for their passage were not acceptable, returned. And the Argives, having some of their own city in suspicion in regard of this design of the Lacedaemonians, apprehended some of them, and some escaped.

About the same time the Melians took another part of the wall of the Athenians, they that kept the siege being then not many. But this done, there came afterwards some fresh forces from Athens, under the conduct of Philocrates, the son of Demeas. And the town being now strongly besieged, there being also within some that practised to have it given up, they yielded themselves to the discretion of the Athenians, who slew all the men of military age, made slaves of the women and children, and inhabited the place with a colony sent thither afterwards of five hundred men of their own.





# THE SIXTH BOOK

## THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

Sicily described.—The causes and pretences of the Sicilian war, with the consultation and preparation for the same.—Alcibiades, one of the generals of the army, accused of defacing the images of Mercury, is suffered for that present to depart with the army.—The Athenian army cometh to Rhegium; thence to Catana.—From thence Alcibiades is sent for home to make answer to his accusations, and by the way escaping, goeth to Lacedaemon.—Nicias encampeth near Syracuse, and having overcome the army of the Syracusians in battle, returneth to Catana.—The Syracusians procure aids amongst the rest of the Sicilians.—Alcibiades instigateth and instructeth the Lacedaemonians against his country.—Nicias returneth from Catana to Syracuse, and encamping in Epipolae, besiegeth the city and beginneth to enclose them with a double wall, which was almost brought to perfection in the beginning of the eighteenth year of this war.

1. The same winter the Athenians, with greater forces than they had before sent out with Laches and Eurymedon, resolved to go again into Sicily, and, if they could, wholly to subdue it, being for the most part ignorant both of the greatness of the island, and of the multitude of people, as well Greeks as barbarians, that inhabited the same, and that they undertook a war not much less than the war against the Peloponnesians. For the compass of Sicily is little less than eight days' sail for a ship; and though so great, is yet divided with no more than twenty furlongs, sea measure, from the continent.

2. It was inhabited in old time thus, and these were the nations that held it: The most ancient inhabitants in a part thereof are said to have been the Cyclopes and Laestrigones, of whose stock and whence they came or to what place they removed I have nothing to say. Let that suffice which the poets have spoken and which every particular man hath learned of them. After them, the first that appear to have dwelt therein are the Sicanians, as they say themselves, nay, before the other, as being the natural breed of the island. But the truth is, they were Iberians, and driven away by the Ligyans from the banks of Sicanus, a river on which they were seated in Iberia. And the island from them came to be called Sicania, which was before Trinacria. And these [two] inhabit yet in the western parts of Sicily. After the taking of Illium, certain Trojans, escaping the hands of the Grecians, landed with small boats in Sicily; and having planted themselves on the borders of the Sicanians, both the nations in one were called Elymi; and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. Hard by these came and dwelled also certain Phoceans, who, coming from Troy, were by tempest carried first into Africa and thence into Sicily. But the Siculi passed out of Italy (for there they inhabited), flying from the Opici, having, as is most likely and as it is reported, observed the strait, and with a fore wind gotten over in boats which they made suddenly on the occasion, or perhaps by some other means.

There is at this day a people in Italy called Siculi. And Italy itself got that name after the same manner from a king of Arcadia called Italus. Of these a great army crossing into Sicily overthrew the Sicanians in battle and drave them into the south and west parts of the same; and instead of Sicania, caused the island to be called Sicilia; and held and inhabited the best of the land for near three hundred years after their going over, and before any of the Grecians came thither. And till now they possess the midland and north parts of the island.

Also the Phoenicians inhabited the coast of Sicily on all sides, having taken possession of certain promontories and little islands adjacent, for trade's sake with the Sicilians. But after that many Grecians were come in by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned most of their former habitations, and uniting themselves, dwelt



in Motya and Soloeis and Panormus, upon the borders of the Elymi, as relying upon their league with the Elymi, and because also from thence lay the shortest cut over unto Carthage. These were the barbarians, and thus they inhabited Sicily.

3. Now for Grecians, first a colony of Chalcideans, under Thucles, their conductor, going from Euboea, built Naxos and the altar of Apollo Archegetes, now standing without the city, upon which the ambassadors employed to the oracles, as often as they launch from Sicily, are accustomed to offer their first sacrifice. The next year Archias, a man of the Herculean family, carried a colony from Corinth and became founder of Syracuse, where first he drove the Siculi out of that island in which the inner part of the city now standeth, not now environed wholly with the sea as it was then. And in process of time, when the city also that is without was taken in with a wall, it became a populous city. In the fifth year after the building of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcideans, going from Naxos, built Leontium, expelling thence the Siculi, and after that Catana; but they that went to Catana chose Euarchus for their founder.

4. About the same time in Sicily arrived also Lamis, with a colony from Megara, and first built a certain town called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacius, where for a while after he governed the estate of his colony in common with the Chalcideans of Leontium. But afterwards, when he was by them thrust out, and had builded Thapsus, he died; and the rest going from Thapsus, under the conduct of Hyblon, a king of the Siculi, built Megara, called Megara-Hyblaea. And after they had there inhabited two hundred and forty-five years, they were by Gelon, a tyrant of Syracuse, put out both of the city and territory. But before they were driven thence, namely one hundred years after they had built it, they sent out Pammilus and built the city of Selinus. This Pammilus came to them from Megara, their own metropolitan city, and so together with them founded Selinus. Gela was built in the forty-fifth year after Syracuse, by Antiphemus, that brought a colony out of Rhodes, and by Entymus, that did the like out of Crete, jointly. This city was named after the name of the river Gela; and the place where now the city standeth, and which at first they walled

in, was called Lindii. And the laws which they established were the Doric. About one hundred and eight years after their own foundation, they of Gela built the city of Acragante, calling the city after the name of the river; and for their conductors chose Aristonous and Pystilus, and gave unto them the laws of Gela. Zancle was first built by pirates that came from Cume, a Chalcidean city in Opicia; but afterwards there came a multitude, and helped to people it, out of Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; and their conductors were Perieres and Crataemenes, one of Cume, the other of Chalcis. And the name of the city was at first Zancle, so named by the Sicilians because it hath the form of a sickle, and the Sicilians call a sickle *zanclon*. But these inhabitants were afterwards chased thence by the Samians and other people of Ionia that in their flight from the Medes fell upon Sicily. After this, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, drave out the Samians, and peopling the city with a mixed people of them and his own, instead of Zancle called the place by the name of his own country from whence he was anciently descended, Messana.

5. After Zancle was built Himera, by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, the most of which colony were Chalcideans; but there were also amongst them certain outlaws of Syracuse, the vanquished part of a sedition, called the Myletidae. Their language grew to a mean between the Chalcidean and Doric; but the laws of the Chalcidean prevailed. Acrae and Casmenae were built by the Syracusians, Acrae twenty years after Syracuse, and Casmenae almost twenty after Acrae. Camarina was at first built by the Syracusians, very near the hundred and thirty-fifth year of their own city, Dascon and Menecolus being the conductors. But the Camarinaeans having been by the Syracusians driven from their seat by war for revolt, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, in process of time, taking of the Syracusians that territory for ransom of certain Syracusian prisoners, became their founder, and placed them in Camarina again. After this again, having been driven thence by Gelon, they were planted the third time in the same city.

6. These were the nations, Greeks and barbarians, that inhabited Sicily. And though it were thus great, yet the Athenians longed very much to send an army against it, out of a

desire to bring it all under their subjection, which was the true motive, but as having withal this fair pretext of aiding their kindred and new confederates. But principally they were instigated to it by the ambassadors of Egesta, who were at Athens and earnestly pressed them thereto. For bordering on the territory of the Selinuntians, they had begun a war about certain things concerning marriage and about a piece of ground that lay doubtfully between them. And the Selinuntians, having leagued themselves with the Syracusians, infested them with war both by sea and by land. Insomuch as the Egestaeans, putting the Athenians in mind of their former league with the Leontines made by Laches, prayed them to send a fleet thither in their aid, alleging, amongst many other things, this as principal: that if the Syracusians, who had driven the Leontines from their seat, should pass without revenge taken on them, and so proceed, by consuming the rest of the allies of the Athenians there, to get the whole power of Sicily into their hands, it would be dangerous lest hereafter some time or other, being Dorians, they should with great forces aid the Dorians for affinity, and being a colony of the Peloponnesians join with the Peloponnesians that sent them out, to pull down the Athenian empire; that it were wisdom, therefore, with those confederates they yet retain, to make head against the Syracusians; and the rather, because for the defraying of the war the Egestaeans would furnish money sufficient of themselves. Which things when the Athenians had often heard in their assemblies from the mouths of the Egestaeon ambassadors and of their advocates and patrons, they decreed to send ambassadors to Egesta to see, first, whether there were in their treasury and temples so much wealth as they said there was, and to bring word in what terms the war stood between that city and the Selinuntians. And ambassadors were sent into Sicily accordingly.

7. The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, all but the Corinthians, having drawn out their forces into the territory of the Argives, wasted a small part of their fields and carried away certain cart-loads of their corn. Thence they went to Orneae, and having placed there the Argive outlaws, left with them a few others of the rest of the army; and then making a composition for a certain time, that they of

Orneae and those Argives should not wrong each other, they carried their army home. But the Athenians arriving not long after with thirty galleys and six hundred men of arms, the people of Argos came also forth with their whole power, and joining with them, sat down betimes in the morning\* before Orneae. But when at night the army went somewhat far off to lodge, they within fled out; and the Argives, the next day perceiving it, pulled Orneae to the ground and went home. And so also did the Athenians not long after with their galleys. Also the Athenians transported certain horsemen by sea, part of their own and part Macedonian fugitives that lived with them, into Methone and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. And the Lacedaemonians sent unto the Chalcideans upon Thrace, who held peace with the Athenians from ten days to ten days, appointing them to aid Perdiccas. But they refused. And so ended the winter, and the sixteenth year of this war written by Thucydides.

8. The next summer, early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, and the ambassadors of Egesta with them, and brought in silver uncoined sixty talents, for a month's pay of sixty galleys, which they would entreat the Athenians to send thither. And the Athenians, having called an assembly and heard both from the Egestaeans and their own ambassadors, amongst other persuasive but untrue allegations, touching their money, how they had great store ready both in their treasury and temples, decreed the sending of sixty galleys into Sicily, and Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, the son of Xenophanes, for commanders with authority absolute; the which were to aid the people of Egesta against the Selinuntians, and withal, if they had time to spare, to plant the Leontines anew in their city, and to order all other the affairs of Sicily as they should think most for the profit of the Athenians. Five days after this the people assembled again to consult of the means how most speedily to put this armada in readiness and to decree such things as the generals should further require for the expedition. But Nicias, having heard that himself was chosen for one of the generals, and conceiving that the state had not well re-

\* The Greek means "for one day."

solved, but affected the conquest of all Sicily, a great matter, upon small and superficial pretences, stood forth, desiring to have altered this the Athenians' purpose, and spake as followeth:

9. "Though this assembly was called to deliberate of our preparation and of the manner how to set forth our fleet for Sicily, yet to me it seemeth that we ought rather once again to consult whether it be not better not to send it at all than, upon a short deliberation in so weighty an affair and upon the credit of strangers, to draw upon ourselves an impertinent war. For my own part, I have honour by it; and for the danger of my person, I esteem it the least of all men (not but that I think him a good member of the commonwealth \* that hath regard also to his own person and estate; for such a man especially will desire the public to prosper for his own sake): but as I have never spoken heretofore, so nor now will I speak anything that is against my conscience, for gaining to myself a pre-eminence of honour: but that only which I apprehend for the best. And although I am sure that if I go about to persuade you to preserve what you already hold, and not to hazard things certain for uncertain and future, my words will be too weak to prevail against your humour; yet this I must needs let you know, that neither your haste is seasonable nor your desires easy to be achieved.

10. "For I say that going thither you leave many enemies here behind you, and more you endeavour to draw hither. You perhaps think that the league will be firm that you have made with the Lacedaemonians; which, though as long as you stir not, may continue a league in name (for so some have made it of their own side †), yet if any considerable forces of ours chance to miscarry, our enemies will soon renew the war, as having made the peace constrained by calamities, and upon terms of more dishonour and necessity than ourselves; besides, in the league itself we have many things controverted. And some there be that refuse utterly to accept it, and they none of the

\* The Greek says "an *equally* good citizen."

† The Greek says "for that is the way some have made it both on our own side and the enemy's." What is meant is a reference to Alcibiades on the Athenian side and the Spartan ephors Cleobulus and Xenares.

weakest; whereof some are now in open war against us, and others, because the Lacedaemonians stir not, maintain only a truce with us from ten to ten days, and so are contented yet to hold their hands. But, peradventure, when they shall hear that our power is distracted, which is the thing we now hasten to do, they will be glad to join in the war with the Sicilians against us, the confederacy of whom they would heretofore have valued above many other. It behoveth us\* therefore to consider of these things and not to run into new dangers when the state of our own city hangeth unsettled, nor seek a new dominion before we assure that which we already have. For the Chalcideans of Thrace, after so many years' revolt, are yet unreduced; and from others in divers parts of the continent we have but doubtful obedience. But the Egestaeans, being forsooth our confederates and wronged, they in all haste must be aided; though to right us on those by whom we have a long time ourselves been wronged, that we defer.

11. "And yet if we should reduce the Chalcideans into subjection, we could easily also keep them so; but the Sicilians, though we vanquish them, yet being many and far off, we should have much ado to hold them in obedience. Now it were madness to invade such, whom conquering you cannot keep, and failing, should lose the means for ever after to attempt the same again. As for the Sicilians, it seemeth unto me, at least as things now stand, that they shall be of less danger to us if they fall under the dominion of the Syracusians than they are now; and yet this is it that the Egestaeans would most affright us with. For now the states of Sicily, in several, may perhaps be induced, in favour of the Lacedaemonians, to take part against us; whereas then, being reduced into one, it is not likely they would hazard with us state against state. For by the same means that they, joining with the Peloponnesians, may pull down our dominion, by the same it would be likely that the Peloponnesians

\* It is hard to be sure about the meaning of this. Where Hobbes translates "us," the Greek uses the word which means "a certain," but it also means "one," like the French *on* or German *man*. Consequently, Thucydides may be saying either "It behoves one (i.e., us) to consider," or, more directly, "It behooves someone (i.e., Alcibiades) to consider."

would subvert theirs. The Grecians there will fear us most if we go not at all; next, if we but show our forces and come quickly away. But if any misfortune befall us, they will presently despise us and join with the Grecians here to invade us. For we all know that those things are most admired which are farthest off, and which least come to give proof of the opinion conceived of them. And this, Athenians, is your own case with the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, whom because beyond your hope you have overcome in those things for which at first you feared them, you now in contempt of them turn your arms upon Sicily. But we ought not to be puffed up upon the misfortunes of our enemies, but to be confident then only when we have mastered their designs. Nor ought we to think that the Lacedaemonians set their minds on anything else but how they may yet for the late disgrace repair their reputation, if they can, by our overthrow, and the rather because they have so much and so long laboured to win an opinion in the world of their valour. The question with us therefore, if we be well advised, will not be of the Egestaeans in Sicily, but how we may speedily defend our city against the insidiation of them that favour the oligarchy.

12. "We must remember also that we have had now some short recreation from a late great plague and great war, and thereby are improved both in men and money, which it is most meet that we should spend here upon ourselves and not upon those outlaws which seek for aid, seeing it maketh for them to tell us a specious lie; who, contributing only words whilst their friends bear all the danger, if they speed well, shall be disobliged of thanks, if ill, undo their friends for company. Now if there be any man here that for ends of his own, as being glad to be general, especially being yet too young to have charge in chief, shall advise the expedition to the end he may have admiration for his expense upon horses and help from his place to defray that expense, suffer him not to purchase his private honour and splendour with the danger of the public fortune. Believe rather that such men, though they rob the public, do nevertheless consume also their private wealth. Besides, the matter itself is full of great difficulties, such as it is not fit for a young man to consult of, much less hastily to take in hand.

13. "And I, seeing those now sit by and abet the same man, am fearful of them; and I do on the other side exhort the elder sort (if any of them sit near those other) not to be ashamed to deliver their minds freely, as fearing that if they gave their voice against the war they should be esteemed cowards, nor to doat (as they do) upon things absent, knowing that by passion the fewest actions and by reason the most do prosper; but rather for the benefit of their country, which is now cast into greater danger than ever before, to hold up their hands on the other side and decree that the Sicilians, within the limits they now enjoy, not misliked by you, and with liberty to sail by the shore in the Ionian gulf, and in the main of the Sicilian sea, shall possess their own and compound their differences between themselves. And for the Egæstæans, to answer them in particular thus: that as without the Athenians they had begun the war against the Selinuntians, so they should without them likewise end it; and that we shall no more hereafter, as we have used to do, make such men our confederates, as when they do injury, we must maintain it, and when we require their assistance, cannot have it.

14. "And you, the president, if you think it your office to take care of the commonwealth and desire to be a good member of the same, put these things once more to the question, and let the Athenians speak to it again. Think (if you be afraid to infringe the orders of the assembly) \* that before so many witnesses it will not be made a crime, but that you shall be rather thought a physician of your country, that hath swallowed down evil counsel. And he truly dischargeth the duty of a president who laboureth to do his country the most good, or at least will not willingly do it hurt."

15. Thus spake Nicias. But the most of the Athenians that spake after him were of opinion that the voyage ought to pro-

\* Plainly, the putting of the question the second time, that is, asking for a second vote on a matter already determined by this same assembly, could be construed as a fundamental questioning of the will of the people and, presumably, as punishable on somewhat the same grounds as treason is. Certainly it is hard to get the president and the presiding tribe to do it. Notice, for instance, the same difficulty in regard to the second debate on the fate of the people of Mitylene in Book iii.



ceed, the decree already made not to be reversed; yet some there were that said to the contrary. But the expedition was most of all pressed by Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, both out of desire he had to cross Nicias, with whom he was likewise at odds in other points of state, and also for that he had glanced at him invidiously in his oration, but principally for that he affected to have charge, hoping that himself should be the man to subdue both Sicily and Carthage to the state of Athens, and withal, if it succeeded, to increase his own private wealth and glory. For being in great estimation with the citizens, his desires were more vast than for the proportion of his estate, both in maintaining of horses and other his expenses, was meet; which proved afterwards none of the least causes of the subversion of the Athenian commonwealth. For most men fearing him, both for his excess in things that concerned his person and form of life and for the greatness of his spirit in every particular action he undertook, as one that aspired to the tyranny, they became his enemy. And although for the public he excellently managed the war, yet every man, privately displeased with his course of life, gave the charge of the wars to others, and thereby not long after overthrew the state. Alcibiades at this time stood forth and spake to this effect:

16. "Men of Athens, it both belongeth unto me more than to any other to have this charge; and withal I think myself (for I must needs begin with this, as having been touched by Nicias) to be worthy of the same. For those things for which I am so much spoken of do indeed purchase glory to my progenitors and myself; but to the commonwealth they confer both glory and profit. For the Grecians have thought our city a mighty one, even above the truth, by reason of my brave appearance at the Olympic games, whereas before they thought easily to have warred it down. For I brought thither seven chariots \* and not only won the first, second, and fourth prize, but carried also in all other things a magnificence worthy the honour of the victory. And in such things as these, as there is honour to

\* The Greek adds "which no private person had ever done before," distinguishing between the chariots equipped by private persons and the national teams, publicly financed, sent by the several states. At the Olympic races the national and private chariots ran together.

be supposed according to the law, so is there also a power conceived upon sight of the thing done. As for my expenses in the city upon setting forth of shows,\* or whatsoever else is remarkable in me, though naturally it procure envy in other citizens, yet to strangers this also is an argument of our greatness. Now, it is no unprofitable course of life when a man shall at his private cost not only benefit himself but also the commonwealth. Nor doth he that beareth himself high upon his own worth and refuseth to make himself fellow with the rest wrong the rest; for if he were in distress, he should not find any man that would share with him in his calamity. Therefore, as we are not so much as saluted when we be in misery, so let them likewise be content to be contemned of us when we flourish; or if they require equality, let them also give it. I know that such men, or any man else that excelleth in the glory of anything whatsoever, shall as long as he liveth be envied, principally of his equals, and then also of others amongst whom he converseth; but with posterity they shall have kindred claimed of them, though there be none; and his country will boast of him, not as of a stranger or one that had been a man of lewd life, but as their own citizen and one that had achieved worthy and laudable acts. This being the thing I aim at and for which I am renowned, consider now whether I administer the public the worse for it or not. For having reconciled unto you the most potent states of Peloponnesus without much either danger or cost, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake all that ever they had upon the fortune of one day of Mantinea.†

17. And this hath my youth and madness, supposed to have been very madness, with familiar and fit words wrought upon the power of the Peloponnesians, and shewing reason for my passion, made my madness now no longer to be feared.‡ But as

\* In Athens the expenses incurred in the putting on of plays were all discharged by rich men who paid them as part of their tax obligations.

† The Greek adds "From this battle it is true they escaped, but even now they have not recovered their confidence."

‡ This does not seem the correct sense. The literal translation would be something like this: "This is what my youth (and what appears to be my unnatural folly) achieved in its dealing with the power of the Peloponnesians by the use of appropriate speeches, and by its very passion carried conviction."

long as I flourish with it, and Nicias is esteemed fortunate, make you use of both our services. And abrogate not your decree touching the voyage into Sicily, as though the power were great you are to encounter withal. For the number wherewith their cities are populous is but of promiscuous nations, easily shifting and easily admitting new comers, and consequently not sufficiently armed, any of them, for the defence of their bodies, nor furnished, as the custom of the place appointeth, to fight for their country. But what any of them thinks he may get by fair speech or snatch from the public by sedition, that only he looks after, with purpose, if he fail, to run the country.\* And it is not likely that such a rabble should either with one consent give ear to what is told them or unite themselves for the administration of their affairs in common; but if they hear of fair offers, they will one after one be easily induced to come in, especially if there be seditions amongst them, as we hear there are. And the truth is, there are neither so many men of arms as they boast of, nor doth it appear that there are so many Grecians there in all as the several cities have every one reckoned for their own number. Nay, even Greece hath much belied itself, and was scarce sufficiently armed in all this war past. So that the business there, for all that I can by fame understand, is even as I have told you, and will yet be easier. For we shall have many of the barbarians, upon hatred of the Syracusians, to take our parts against them there; and if we consider the case aright, there will be nothing to hinder us at home. For our ancestors, having the same enemies which they say we leave behind us now in our voyage to Sicily, and the Persian besides, did nevertheless erect the empire we now have by our only odds of strength at sea. And the hope of the Peloponnesians against us was never less than now it is, though their power were also as great as ever; for they would be able to invade our land, though we went not into Sicily; and by sea they can do us no harm though we go, for we shall leave a navy sufficient to oppose theirs behind us.

18. "What therefore can we allege with any probability for our backwardness; or what can we pretend unto our con-

\* Our colloquial usage may mislead us; Hobbes' meaning is "intending, if he should fail, to flee from the country."

federates for denying them assistance? Whom we ought to defend, were it but because we have sworn it to them, without objecting that they have not reciprocally aided us. For we took them not into league that they should come hither with their aids, but that by troubling our enemies there they might hinder them from coming hither against us. And the way whereby we, and whosoever else hath dominion hath gotten it, hath ever been the cheerful succouring of their associates that required it, whether they were Greeks or barbarians. For if we should all sit still, or stand to make choice which were fit to be assisted and which not, we should have little under our government of the estates of other men, but rather hazard our own. For when one is grown mightier than the rest, men use not only to defend themselves against him when he shall invade, but to anticipate him, that he invade not at all. Nor is it in our power to be our own carvers how much we will have subject to us; but considering the case we are in, it is as necessary for us to seek to subdue those that are not under our dominion, as to keep so those that are; lest if others be not subject to us, we fall in danger of being subjected unto them. Nor are we to weigh quietness in the same balance that others do, unless also the institution of this state were like unto that of other states. Let us rather make reckoning by enterprising abroad to increase our power at home, and proceed on our voyage that we may cast down the haughty conceit of the Peloponnesians and show them the contempt and slight account we make of our present ease by undertaking this our expedition into Sicily. Whereby, either conquering those states we shall become masters of all Greece, or weaken the Syracusians, to the benefit of ourselves and our confederates. And for our security to stay, if any city shall come to our side, or to come away if otherwise, our galleys will afford it. For in that we shall be at our own liberty, though all the Sicilians together were against it.

“Let not the speech of Nicias, tending only to laziness and to the stirring of debate between the young men and the old, avert you from it; but with the same decency wherewith your ancestors, consulting young and old together, have brought our dominion to the present height, endeavour you likewise to enlarge the same. And think not that youth or age, one without the

other, is of any effect, but that the simplest, the middle sort, and the exactest judgments tempered together is it that doth the greatest good; and that a state as well as any other thing will, if it rest, wear out of itself, and all men's knowledge decay; whereas by the exercise of war experience will continually increase, and the city will get a habit of resisting the enemy, not with words, but action. In sum, this is my opinion: that a state accustomed to be active, if it once grow idle, will quickly be subjected by the change; and that they of all men are most surely planted that with most unity observe the present laws and customs, though not always of the best."

19. Thus spake Alcibiades. The Athenians, when they had heard him, together with the Egestaeans and Leontine outlaws, who being then present entreated, and objecting to them their oath, begged their help in form of suppliants, were far more earnestly bent upon the journey than they were before. But Nicias, when he saw he could not alter their resolution with his oration, but thought he might perhaps put them from it by the greatness of the provision, if he should require it with the most, stood forth again and said in this manner.

20. "Men of Athens, forasmuch as I see you violently bent on this expedition, such effect may it take as is desired. Nevertheless I shall now deliver my opinion upon the matter as it yet standeth. As far as we understand by report, we set out against great cities, not subject one to another, nor needing innovation, whereby they should be glad, out of hard servitude, to admit of easier masters, nor such as are likely to prefer our government before their own liberty; but many (as for one island), and those Greek cities. For besides Naxos and Catana (which too I hope will join with us for their affinity with the Leontines), there are other seven, furnished in all respects after the manner of our own army, and especially those two against which we bend our forces most, Selinus and Syracuse. For there are in them many men of arms, many archers, many darters, besides many galleys and a multitude of men to man them. They have also store of money, both amongst private men and in their temples. This have the Selinuntians. The Syracusians have a tribute beside, coming in from some of the barbarians. But that wherein they exceed us most is this: that they abound in

horses, and have corn of their own, not fetched in from other places.

21. "Against such a power we shall therefore need not a fleet only, and with it a small army, but there must great forces go along of land soldiers, if we mean to do anything worthy of our design and not to be kept by their many horsemen from landing; especially if the cities there, terrified by us, should now hold all together, and none but the Egestaeans prove our friends and furnish us with a cavalry to resist them. And it would be a shame either to come back with a repulse or to send for a new supply afterwards, as if we had not wisely considered our enterprise at first. Therefore we must go sufficiently provided from hence, as knowing that we go far from home and are to make war in a place of disadvantage, and not as when we went as confederates to aid some of our subjects here at home, where we had easy bringing in of necessaries to the camp from the territories of friends. But we go far off, and into a country of none but strangers, and from whence in winter there can hardly come a messenger unto us in so little as four months.

22. "Wherefore I am of opinion that we ought to take with us many men of arms of our own, of our confederates, and of our subjects; and also out of Peloponnesus as many as we can get, either for love or money; and also many archers and slingers, whereby to resist their cavalry; and much spare shipping, for the more easy bringing in of provision. Also our corn, I mean wheat and barley parched, we must carry with us from hence in ships; and bakers from the mills, hired and made to work by turns, that the army, if it chance to be weather-bound, may not be in want of victual. For being so great, it will not be for every city to receive it. And so for all things else, we must as much as we can provide them ourselves and not rely on others. Above all, we must take hence as much money as we can; for as for that which is said to be ready at Egesta, think it ready in words, but not in deeds.

23. "For although we go thither with an army not only equal unto theirs, but also (excepting their men of arms for battle) in everything exceeding it, yet so shall we scarce be able both to overcome them and withal to preserve our own. We must

also make account that we go to inhabit some city in that foreign and hostile country, and either the first day we come thither to be presently masters of the field, or failing, be assured to find all in hostility against us. Which fearing, and knowing that the business requires much good advice and more good fortune (which is a hard matter, being we are but men), I would so set forth as to commit myself to fortune as little as I may and take with me an army that in likelihood should be secure. And this I conceive to be both the surest course for the city in general and the safest for us that go the voyage. If any man be of a contrary opinion, I resign him my place."

24. Thus spake Nicias, imagining that either the Athenians would, upon the multitude of the things required, abandon the enterprise; or if he were forced to go, he might go with the more security. But the Athenians gave not over the desire they had of the voyage for the difficulty of the preparation, but were the more inflamed thereby to have it proceed; and the contrary fell out of that which he before expected. For they approved his counsel and thought now there would be no danger at all. And every one alike fell in love with the enterprise: the old men, upon hope to subdue the place they went to, or that at least so great a power could not miscarry; and the young men, upon desire to see a foreign country and to gaze, making little doubt but to return with safety. As for the common sort and the soldiers, they made account to gain by it not only their wages for the time, but also so to amplify the state in power as that their stipend should endure forever. So that through the vehement desire thereunto of the most, they also that liked it not, for fear if they held up their hands against it to be thought evil-affected to the state, were content to let it pass.

25. And in the end a certain Athenian stood up and, calling upon Nicias, said he ought not to shift off nor delay the business any longer, but to declare there before them all what forces he would have the Athenians to decree him. To which unwillingly he answered and said he would consider of it first with his fellow-commanders. Nevertheless, for so much as he could judge upon the sudden, he said there would need no less than one hundred galleys, whereof for transporting of men of arms, so many of the Athenians' own as they themselves should think

meet, and the rest to be sent for to their confederates; and that of men of arms in all, of their own and of their confederates, there would be requisite no less than five thousand, but rather more, if they could be gotten; and other provision proportionable. As for archers, both from hence and from Crete, and slingers, and whatsoever else should seem necessary, they would provide it themselves and take it with them.

26. When the Athenians had heard him, they presently decreed that the generals should have absolute authority, both touching the greatness of the preparation and the whole voyage, to do therein as should seem best unto them for the commonwealth. And after this, they went in hand with the preparation accordingly, and both sent unto the confederates and enrolled soldiers at home. The city had by this time recovered herself from the sickness and from their continual wars, both in number of men fit for the wars, grown up after the ceasing of the plague, and in store of money gathered together by means of the peace; whereby they made their provisions with much ease. And thus were they employed in preparations for the voyage.

27. In the meantime the Mercuries of stone throughout the whole city of Athens (now there were many of these of square stone set up by the law of the place, and many in the porches of private houses and in the temples) had in one night most of them their faces pared. And no man knew who had done it; and yet great rewards out of the treasury had been propounded to the discoverers, and a decree made that if any man knew of any other profanation, he might boldly declare the same, were he citizen, stranger, or bondman. And they took the fact exceedingly to heart as ominous to the expedition and done withal upon conspiracy for alteration of the state and dissolution of the democracy.

28. Hereupon, certain strangers dwelling in the city and certain serving-men revealed something, not about the Mercuries, but of the paring of the statues of some other of the gods, committed formerly through wantonness and too much wine by young men; and withal, how they had in private houses acted the mysteries of their religion in mockery; amongst whom they also accused Alcibiades. This they that most envied Alcibiades, because he stood in the way that they could not constantly



bear chief sway with the people, making account to have the primacy if they could thrust him out, took hold of and exceedingly aggravated, exclaiming that both the mockery of the mysteries and the paring of the Mercuries tended to the deposing of the people, and that nothing therein was done without him, alleging for argument his other excess in the ordinary course of his life, not convenient in a popular estate.

29. He at that present made his apology and was there ready, if he had done any such thing, to answer it before he went the voyage (for by this time all their preparation was in readiness) and to suffer justice if he were guilty and if absolved to resume his charge, protesting against all accusations to be brought against him in his absence, and pressing to be put to death then presently if he had offended, and saying that it would not be discreetly done to send away a man accused of so great crimes with the charge of such an army before his trial. But his enemies, fearing lest if he came then to his trial he should have had the favour of his army and lest the people, which loved him because the Argives and some of the Mantineans served them in this war only for his sake, should have been mollified, put the matter off and hastened his going out by setting on other orators to advise that for the present he should go, and that the setting forward of the fleet should not be retarded, and that at his return he should have a day assigned him for his trial; their purpose being, upon further accusation, which they might easily contrive in his absence, to have him sent for back to make his answer. And thus it was concluded that Alcibiades should go.

30. After this, the summer being now half spent, they put to sea for Sicily. The greatest part of the confederates and the ships that carried their corn and all the lesser vessels and the rest of the provision that went along, they before appointed to meet [upon a day set] at Corcyra, thence all together to cross over the Ionian gulf to the promontory of Iapygia. But the Athenians themselves and as many of their confederates as were at Athens, upon the day appointed, betimes in the morning came down into Peiraeus and went aboard to take sea. With them came down in a manner the whole multitude of the city, as well inhabitants as strangers, the inhabitants to

follow after such as belonged unto them, some their friends, some their kinsmen, and some their children, filled both with hope and lamentations; hope of conquering what they went for, and lamentation as being in doubt whether ever they should see each other any more, considering what a way they were to go from their own territory; (and now when they were to leave one another to danger, they apprehended the greatness of the same more than they had done before when they decreed the expedition: nevertheless their present strength, by the abundance of everything before their eyes prepared for the journey, gave them heart again in beholding it); but the strangers and other multitude came only to see the shew, as of a worthy and incredible design.

31. For this preparation, being the first Grecian power that ever went out of Greece from one only city, was the most sumptuous and the most glorious of all that ever had been sent forth before it to that day. Nevertheless, for number of galleys and men of arms, that which went forth with Pericles to Epidaurus and that which Agnon carried with him to Potidaea was not inferior to it. For there went four thousand men of arms, three hundred horse, and one hundred galleys out of Athens itself, and out of Lesbos and Chios fifty galleys, besides many confederates that accompanied him in the voyage. But they went not far and were but meanly furnished. Whereas this fleet, as being to stay long abroad, was furnished for both kinds of service, in which of them soever it should have occasion to be employed, both with shipping and land-soldiers. For the shipping, it was elaborate with a great deal of cost, both of the captains of galleys and of the city. For the state allowed a drachma a day to every mariner; the empty galleys which they sent forth, being of nimble ones sixty and of such as carried their men of arms forty more, and the captains of galleys both put into them the most able servants, and besides the wages of the state, unto the [uppermost bank of oars, called the] *Thranitae*, and to the servants, gave somewhat of their own, and bestowed great cost otherwise every one upon his own galley, both in the badges and other rigging, each one striving to the utmost to have his galley, both in some ornament and also in swiftness, to exceed the rest. And for the

land forces, they were levied with exceeding great choice, and every man endeavoured to excel his fellow in the bravery of his arms and utensils that belonged to his person. Insomuch as amongst themselves it begat quarrel about precedency, but amongst other Grecians, a conceit that it was an ostentation rather of their power and riches than a preparation against an enemy. For if a man enter into account of the expense, as well of the public as of private men that went the voyage, namely, of the public, what was spent already in the business, and what was to be given to the commanders to carry with them, and of private men, what every one had bestowed upon his person and every captain on his galley, besides what every one was likely, over and above his allowance from the state, to bestow on provision for so long a warfare, and what the merchant carried with him for traffic, he will find the whole sum carried out of the city to amount to a great many talents. And the fleet was no less noised amongst those against whom it was to go for the strange boldness of the attempt and gloriousness of the show than it was for the excessive report of their number, for the length of the voyage, and for that it was undertaken with so vast future hopes in respect of their present power.

32. After they were all aboard, and all things laid in that they meant to carry with them, silence was commanded by the trumpet; and after the wine had been carried about to the whole army, and all, as well the generals as the soldiers, had drunk a health to the voyage,\* they made their prayers, such as by the law were appointed for before their taking sea, not in every galley apart, but all together, the herald pronouncing them. And the company from the shore, both of the city and whosoever else wished them well, prayed with them. And when they had sung the Paean and ended the health, they put forth to sea; and having at first gone out in a long file, galley after galley, they after went a vie by Aegina. Thus hasted these to

\* A fair enough seventeenth-century rendering. What the Greeks actually did was to pour a small portion of wine out of each cup in honor of one of the gods and drink off the rest. But the ceremony was, in fact, a solemn wish for good luck for the expedition while asking the god's blessing upon it.

be at Corcyra, to which place also the other army of the confederates were assembling.

At Syracuse they had advertisement of the voyage from divers places; nevertheless it was long ere anything would be believed. Nay, an assembly being there called, orations were made, such as follow, on both parts, as well by them that believed the report touching the Athenian army to be true as by others that affirmed the contrary. And Hermocrates the son of Hermon, as one that thought he knew the certainty, stood forth and spake to this effect:

33. "Concerning the truth of this invasion, though perhaps I shall be thought, as well as other men, to deliver a thing incredible, and though I know that such as be either the authors or relaters of matter incredible shall not only not persuade, but be also accounted fools, nevertheless, I will not fear thereof hold my tongue, as long as the commonwealth is in danger, being confident that I know the truth hereof somewhat more certainly than others do. The Athenians are bent to come even against us (which you verily wonder at), and that with great forces both for the sea and land, with pretence indeed to aid their confederates the Egestaeans and replant the Leontines; but in truth they aspire to the dominion of all Sicily, and especially of this city of ours, which obtained, they make account to get the rest with ease. Seeing then they will presently be upon us, advise with your present means how you may with most honour make head against them, that you may not be taken unprovided through contempt nor be careless through incredulity, and that such as believe it may not be dismayed with their audaciousness and power. For they are not more able to do hurt unto us than we be unto them. Neither indeed is the greatness of their fleet without some advantage unto us; nay, it will be much the better for us in respect of the rest of the Sicilians. For being terrified by them, they will the rather league with us. And if we either vanquish or repulse them without obtaining what they came for (for I fear not at all the effecting of their purpose), verily it will be a great honour to us, and in my opinion not unlikely to come to pass. For in truth there have been few great fleets, whether of Grecians or barbarians, sent far from home that have not prospered ill. Neither are

these that come against us more in number than ourselves and the neighbouring cities; for surely we shall all hold together upon fear. And if for want of necessaries in a strange territory they chance to miscarry, the honour of it will be left to us against whom they bend their councils, though the greatest cause of their overthrow should consist in their own errors. Which was also the case of these very Athenians, who raised themselves by the misfortune of the Medes (though it happened for the most part contrary to reason); because in name they went only against the Athenians. And that the same shall now happen unto us is not without probability.

34. "Let us therefore with courage put in readiness our own forces; let us send to the Siculi to confirm those we have, and to make peace and league with others; and let us send ambassadors to the rest of Sicily to show them that it is a common danger, and into Italy to get them into our league, or at least that they receive not the Athenians. And in my judgment it were our best course to send also to Carthage, for even they are not without expectation of the same danger. Nay, they are in a continual fear that the Athenians will bring war upon them also, even to their city. So that upon apprehension that if they neglect us the trouble will come home to their own door, they will perhaps, either secretly or openly or some way assist us. And of all that now are, they are the best able to do it, if they please. For they have the most gold and silver, by which the wars and all things else are the best expedited. Let us also send to Lacedaemon and to Corinth, praying them not only to send their succours hither with speed, but also to set on foot the war there. But that which I think the best course of all, though through an habit of sitting still you will hardly be brought to it, I will nevertheless now tell you what it is. If the Sicilians all together, or if not all, yet if we and most of the rest, should draw together our whole navy, and with two months' provision go and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia, and let them see that they must fight for their passage over the Ionian gulf before they fight for Sicily, it would both terrify them the most and also put them into a consideration that we, as the watchmen of our country, come upon them out of an amicable territory (for

we shall be received at Tarentum), whereas they themselves have a great deal of sea to pass with all their preparations and cannot keep themselves in their order for the length of the voyage; and that for us it will be an easy matter to assail them, coming up slowly as they do and thin. Again, if lightening their galleys, they shall come up to us more nimbly and more close together, we shall charge upon them already wearied, or we may, if we please, retire again into Tarentum. Whereas they, if they come over but with a part of their provisions, as to fight at sea, shall be driven into want of victuals in those desert parts, and either staying be there besieged, or, attempting to go by, leave behind them the rest of their provision, and be dejected, as not assured of the cities whether they will receive them or not. I am therefore of opinion that dismayed with this reckoning they will either not put over at all from Corcyra, or whilst they spend time in deliberating and in sending out to explore how many and in what place we are, the season will be lost and winter come; or deterred with our unlooked-for opposition, they will give over the voyage. And the rather for that as I hear the man of most experience amongst their commanders hath the charge against his will and would take a light occasion to return if he saw any considerable stop made by us in the way. And I am very sure we should be voiced amongst them to the utmost. And as the reports are, so are men's minds; and they fear more such as they hear will begin with them than such as give out that they will no more but defend themselves, because then they think the danger equal. Which would be now the case of the Athenians. For they come against us with an opinion that we will not fight, deservedly contemning us because we joined not with the Lacedaemonians to pull them down. But if they should see us once bolder than they looked for, they would be terrified more with the unexpectedness than with the truth of our power itself. Be persuaded therefore, principally to dare to do this, or if not this, yet speedily to make yourselves otherwise ready for the war, and every man to remember that though to show contempt of the enemy be best in the heat of fight, yet those preparations are the surest that are made with fear and opinion of danger. As for the Athenians, they come; and I am sure are

already in the way and want only that they are not now here."

35. Thus spake Hermocrates. But the people of Syracuse were at much strife amongst themselves, some contending that the Athenians would by no means come and that the reports were not true, and others that if they came they would do no more harm than they were likely again to receive. Some contemned and laughed at the matter; but some few there were that believed Hermocrates and feared the event. But Athenagoras, who was chief magistrate of the people, and at that time most powerful with the commons, spake as followeth:

36. "He is either a coward or not well affected to the state, whosoever he be, that wishes the Athenians not to be so mad as coming hither to fall into our power. As for them that report such things as these and put you into fear, though I wonder not at their boldness, yet I wonder at their folly, if they think their ends not seen. For they that are afraid of anything themselves will put the city into affright that they may shadow their own with the common fear. And this may the reports do at this time, not raised by chance, but framed on purpose by such as always trouble the state. But if you mean to deliberate wisely, make not your reckoning by the reports of these men but by that which wise men and men of great experience, such as I hold the Athenians to be, are likely to do. For it is not probable that, leaving the Peloponnesians and the war there not yet surely ended, they should willingly come hither to a new war no less the former, seeing, in my opinion, they may be glad that we invade not them, so many and so great cities as we are.

37. "And if indeed they come, as these men say they will, I think Sicily more sufficient to dispatch the war than Peloponnesus, as being in all respects better furnished, and that this our own city is much stronger than the army which they say is now coming, though it were twice as great as it is. For I know they neither bring horses with them nor can they get any here, save only a few from the Egestaeans, nor have men of arms so many as we, in that they are to bring them by sea. For it is a hard matter to come so far as this by sea, though they carried no men of arms in their galleys at all, if they carry with them all other their necessaries, which cannot be small

against so great a city. So that I am so far from the opinion of these others that I think the Athenians, though they had here another city as great as Syracuse, and confining on it, and should from thence make their war, yet should not be able to escape from being destroyed, every man of them, much less now, when all Sicily is their enemy. For in their camp, fenced with their galleys, they shall be cooped up and from their tents and forced munition never be able to stir far abroad without being cut off by our horsemen. In short, I think they shall never be able to get landing, so much above theirs do I value our own forces.

38. "But these things, as I said before, the Athenians, considering, I am very sure will look unto their own; and our men talk here of things that neither are or ever will be, who I know have desired, not only now but ever, by such reports as these or by worse, or by their actions, to put the multitude in fear that they themselves might rule the state. And I am afraid, lest attempting it often, they may one day effect it; and for us, we are too poor-spirited either to foresee it ere it be done, or foreseeing to prevent it. By this means our city is seldom quiet, but subject to sedition and contention, not so much against the enemy as within itself, and sometimes also to tyranny and usurpation. Which I will endeavour (if you will second me) so to prevent hereafter as nothing more of this kind shall befall you; which must be done, first by gaining you the multitude, and then by punishing the authors of these plots, not only when I find them in the action (for it will be hard to take them so), but also for those things which they would and cannot do. For one must not only take revenge upon an enemy for what he hath already done, but strike him first for his evil purpose; for if a man strike not first, he shall first be stricken. And as for the few, I shall in somewhat reprove them, in somewhat have an eye to them, and in somewhat advise them. For this, I think, will be the best course to avert them from their bad intentions. Tell me forsooth (I have asked this question often), you that are the younger sort, What would you have? Would you now bear office? The law allows it not; and the law was made because ye are not [now] sufficient for government, not to disgrace you when you shall be sufficient. But forsooth,



you would not be ranked with the multitude! But what justice is it, that the same men should not have the same privileges?

39. "Some will say that the democracy is neither a well-governed nor a just state, and that the most wealthy are aptest to make the best government. But I answer first, *democracy* is a name of the whole, *oligarchy* but of a part. Next, though the rich are indeed fittest to keep the treasure, yet the wise are the best counsellors, and the multitude, upon hearing, the best judge. Now in a democracy all these, both jointly and severally, participate equal privileges. But in the oligarchy they allow indeed to the multitude a participation of all dangers, but in matters of profit, they not only encroach upon the multitude, but take from them and keep the whole. Which is the thing that you the rich and the younger sort affect, but in a great city cannot possibly embrace. But yet, O ye the most unwise of all men, unless you know that what you affect is evil, and if you know not that, you are the most ignorant of all the Grecians I know; or, ye most wicked of all men, if knowing it you dare do this.

40. "Yet I say, inform yourselves better or change your purpose and help to amplify the common good of the city, making account that the good amongst you shall not only have an equal but a greater share therein than the rest of the multitude; whereas if you will needs have all, you shall run the hazard of losing all. Away therefore with these rumours, as discovered and not allowed. For this city, though the Athenians come, will be able to defend itself with honour. And we have generals to look to that matter. And if they come not (which I rather believe), it will not, upon the terror of your reports, make choice of you for commanders and cast itself into voluntary servitude; but taking direction of itself, it both judgeth your words virtually as facts, and will not upon words let go her present liberty, but endeavour to preserve it by not committing the same actually to your discretion."

41. Thus said Athenagoras. Then one of their generals, rising up, forbade any other to stand forth, and spake himself to the matter in hand to this effect:

"It is no wisdom, neither for the speakers to utter such calumnies one against another, nor for the hearers to receive

them. We should rather consider, in respect of these reports, how we may in the best manner, both every one in particular and the city in general, be prepared to resist them when they come. And if there be no need, yet to furnish the city with horses and arms and other habiliments of war can do us no hurt. As for the care hereof and the musters, we will look to it, and will send men abroad both to the cities and for spials, and do whatsoever else is requisite. Somewhat we have done already; and what more we shall hereafter find meet, we will from time to time report unto you."

Which when the general had said, the Syracusians dissolved the assembly.

42. The Athenians were now all in Corcyra, both they and their confederates. And first the generals took a view of the whole army and put them into the order wherein they were to anchor and make their naval camp; and having divided them into three squadrons, to each squadron they assigned a captain by lot, to the end that being at sea they might not come into want of water or harbours or any other necessaries where they chanced to stay; and that they might otherwise be the more easy to be governed when every squadron had his proper commander. After this they sent before them three galleys into Italy and Sicily to bring them word what cities in those parts would receive them, whom they appointed to come back and meet them that they might know whether they might be received or not before they put in.

43. This done, the Athenians with all their provisions put out from Corcyra towards Sicily, having with them in all one hundred and thirty-four galleys and two Rhodian long-boats of fifty oars a-piece. Of these, a hundred were of Athens itself, whereof sixty were expedite, the other forty for transportation of soldiers; the rest of the navy belonged to the Chians and other the confederates. Of men of arms they had in all five thousand one hundred. Of these, there were of the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred enrolled and seven hundred more [of the poorer sort, called] Thetes, hired for defence of the galleys. The rest were of their confederates, some of them being their subjects: of Argives there were five hundred; of Mantineans and mercenaries, two hundred and fifty. Their

archers in all, four hundred and eighty, of which eighty were Cretans. Rhodian slingers they had seven hundred. Of light-armed Megarean fugitives, one hundred and twenty; and in one vessel made for transportation of horses, thirty horsemen.

44. These were the forces that went over to the war at first. With these went also thirty ships carrying necessaries, wherein went also the bakers and masons and carpenters and all tools of use in fortification; and with these thirty ships went one hundred boats by constraint, and many other ships and boats that voluntarily followed the army for trade; which then passed all together from Corcyra over the Ionian gulf. And the whole fleet being come to the promontory of Iapygia and to Tarentum and such other places as every one could recover, they went on by the coast of Italy, neither received of the states there into any city nor allowed any market, having only the liberty of anchorage and water (and that also at Tarentum and Locri denied them), till they were at Rhegium, where they all came together again and settled their camp in the temple of Diana (for neither there were they suffered to come in) without the city, where the Rhegians allowed them a market. And when they had drawn their galleys to land, they lay still. Being here, they dealt with the Rhegians, who were Chalcideans, to aid the Leontines, Chalcideans likewise. To which was answered that they would take part with neither, but what the rest of the Italians\* should conclude, that also they would do. So the Athenians lay still, meditating on their Sicilian business, how they might carry it the best, and withal expected the return from Egesta of the three galleys which they had sent before them, desiring to know if so much money were there or not, as was reported by their messengers at Athens.

45. The Syracusians in the meantime from divers parts and also from their spies had certain intelligence that the fleet was now at Rhegium: and therefore made their preparations with all diligence and were no longer incredulous, but sent unto the

\* Hobbes' use of *Italians* is confusing. The Greek word is *Italiois*. This signifies the Greek settlers in Italy. *Italois* (Italians) is the word used by Thucydides for the non-Greek natives. There is the same distinction between *Siciliois* (Greek settlers in Sicily) and *Siculi* (native Sicilians).

Siculi, to some cities men to keep them from revolting, to others, ambassadors, and into such places as lay upon the sea, garrisons; and examined the forces of their own city, by a view taken of the arms and horse, whether they were complete or not, and ordered all things as for a war at hand and only not already present.

46. The three galleys sent before to Egesta returned to the Athenians at Rhegium and brought word that for the rest of the money promised there was none, only there appeared thirty talents. At this the generals were presently discouraged, both because this first hope was crossed, and because also the Rhegians, whom they had already begun to persuade to their league, and whom it was most likely they should have won, as being of kin to the Leontines and always heretofore favourable to the Athenian state, now refused. And though to Nicias this news from the Egestaeans was no more than he expected, yet to the other two it was extreme strange. But the Egestaeans, when the first ambassadors from Athens went to see their treasure, had thus deceived them. They brought them into the temple of Venus in Eryx and showed them the holy treasure, goblets, flagons, censers, and other furniture, in no small quantity; which being but silver, appeared to the eye a great deal above their true value in money. Then they feasted such as came with them in their private houses, and at those feastings exhibited all the gold and silver vessels they could get together, either in the city of Egesta itself, or could borrow in other as well Phoenician as Grecian cities, for their own. So all of them in a manner making use of the same plate, and much appearing in every of those houses, it put those which came with the ambassadors into a very great admiration, insomuch as at their return to Athens they strove who should first proclaim what wealth they had seen. These men, having both been abused themselves and having abused others, when it was told that there was no such wealth in Egesta, were much taxed by the soldiers. But the generals went to counsel upon the business in hand.

47. Nicias was of this opinion: that it was best to go presently with the whole fleet to Selinus, against which they were chiefly set forth, and if the Egestaeans would furnish them with money

for the whole army, then to deliberate further upon the occasion; if not, then to require maintenance for the sixty galleys set forth at their own request, and staying with them by force or composition to bring the Selinuntians and them to a peace; and thence passing along by other of those cities, to make a show of the power of the Athenian state, and of their readiness to help their friends and confederates; and so to go home, unless they could light on some quick and unthought-of means to do some good for the Leontines, or gain some of the other cities to their own league; and not to put the commonwealth in danger at her own charges.

48. Alcibiades said it would not do well to have come out from Athens with so great a power and then dishonourably without effect to go home again; but rather to send heralds to every city but Selinus and Syracuse and assay to make the Siculi revolt from the Syracusians and others to enter league with the Athenians, that they might aid them with men and victual; and first to deal with the Messanians, as being seated in the passage and most opportune place of all Sicily for coming in, and having a port and harbour sufficient for their fleet; and when they had gained those cities, and knew what help they were to have in the war, then to take in hand Syracuse and Selinus, unless these would agree with the Eggestaeans and the other suffer the Leontines to be replanted.

49. But Lamachus was of opinion that it was best to go directly to Syracuse and to fight with them as soon as they could at their city whilst they were yet unfurnished and their fear at the greatest. For that an army is always most terrible at first, but if it stay long ere it come in sight, men recollect their spirits and contemn it the more when they see it. Whereas if it come upon them suddenly while they expect it with fear, it would the more easily get the victory, and everything would affright them, as the sight of it (for then they would appear most for number) and the expectation of their sufferings, but especially the danger of a present battle. And that it was likely that many men might be cut off in the villages without, as not believing they would come; and though they should be already gotten in, yet the army, being master of the field and sitting down before the city, could want no money; and the other

Sicilians would then neglect leaguings with the Syracusians, and join with the Athenians, no longer standing off and spying who should have the better. And for a place to retire unto and anchor in, he thought Megara most fit: being desert, and not far from Syracuse neither by sea nor land.

50. Lamachus said, but came afterwards to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this, Alcibiades, with his own galley having passed over to Messana, and propounded to them a league and not prevailed, they answering that they would not let the army in but allow them only a market without the walls, returned back to Rhegium. And presently the generals, having out of the whole fleet manned threescore galleys and taken provision aboard, went along the shore to Naxos, having left the rest of the army with one of the generals at Rhegium. The Naxians having received them into the city, they went on by the coast to Catana. But the Catanæans receiving them not (for there were some within that favoured the Syracusians), they entered the river of Terias; and having stayed there all that night, went the next day towards Syracuse leisurely with the rest of their galleys; but ten they sent before into the great haven, [not to stay, but] to discover if they had launched any fleet there, and to proclaim from their galleys that the Athenians were come to replant the Leontines on their own, according to league and affinity, and that therefore such of the Leontines as were in Syracuse, should without fear go forth to the Athenians as to their friends and benefactors. And when they had thus proclaimed, and well considered the city and the havens and the region where they were to seat themselves for the war, they returned to Catana.

51. An assembly being called at Catana, though they refused to receive the army they admitted the generals and willed them to speak their minds. And whilst Alcibiades was in his oration and the citizens at the assembly, the soldiers, having secretly pulled down a little gate which was but weakly built, entered the city and were walking up and down in the market. And the Catanæans, such as favoured the Syracusians, seeing the army within, for fear stole presently out of the town, being not many. The rest concluded the league with the Athenians and willed them to fetch in the rest of the army from Rhegium. After this, the Athenians went back to Rhegium, and rising

from thence, came to Catana with their whole army together.

52. Now they had news from Camarina that if they would come thither, the Camarinaeans would join with them, and that the Syracusians were manning their navy. Whereupon with the whole army they went along the coast, first to Syracuse, where not finding any navy manned, they went on to Camarina. And being come close up to the shore, they sent a herald unto them. But the Camarinaeans would not receive the army, alleging that they had taken an oath not to receive the Athenians with more than one galley unless they should have sent for more of their own accord. Having lost their labour, they departed, and landed in a part of the territory of Syracuse, and had gotten some booty. But the Syracusan horsemen coming out and killing some stragglers of the light-armed, they returned again to Catana.

53. Here they find the galley called Salamina, come thither from Athens, both for Alcibiades, who was commanded to come home to purge himself of such things as were laid to his charge by the state, and also for other soldiers that were with him, whereof some were accused for profanation of the mysteries and some also for the Mercuries. For the Athenians, after the fleet was put to sea, proceeded nevertheless in the search of those that were culpable, both concerning the mysteries and the Mercuries. And making no inquiry into the persons of the informers, but through jealousy admitting of all sorts, upon the reports of evil men apprehended very good citizens and cast them into prison, choosing rather to examine the fact and find the truth by torments,\* than that any man, how good soever in estimation, being once accused should escape unquestioned. For the people, having by fame understood that the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons was heavy in the latter end, and withal, that neither themselves nor Harmodius, but the Lacedaemonians overthrew it,† were ever fearful, and apprehended every thing suspiciously.

\* Hobbes is probably wrong in his interpretation here. The word used means "to sift completely," "to torture," but since the object of the verb is "the matter," it seems likely that what Thucydides means is "to sift the affair completely."

† Thucydides is referring to the dictatorship of Peisistratus and his sons which was terminated nearly one hundred years before this time. Popular legend was that two popular young Athenians, Harmodius

54. For the fact of Aristogeiton and Harmodius was undertaken upon an accident of love, which unfolding at large, I shall make appear that neither any other, nor the Athenians themselves, report any certainty either of their own tyrants or of the fact. For the old Peisistratus dying in the tyranny, not Hipparchus, as the most thing, but Hippias, who was his eldest son, succeeded in the government. Now Harmodius, a man in the flower of his youth, of great beauty, was in the power of one Aristogeiton, a citizen of a middle condition that was his lover. This Harmodius, having been solicited by Hipparchus, the son of Peisistratus, and not yielding, discovered the same unto Aristogeiton. He apprehending it (as lovers use) with a great deal of anguish and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he should take him away by force, fell presently, as much as his condition would permit, to a contriving how to pull down the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus, having again attempted Harmodius and not prevailed, intended, though not to offer him violence, yet in secret, as if forsooth he did it not for that cause, to do him some disgrace. For neither was the government otherwise heavy till then, but carried without their evil will. And to say the truth, these tyrants held virtue and wisdom in great account for a long time, and taking of the Athenians but a twentieth part of their revenues, adorned the city, managed their wars, and administered their religion worthily. In other points they were governed by the laws formerly established, save that these took a care ever to prefer to the magistracy men of their own adherence. And amongst many that had the annual office of archon, Peisistratus also had it, the son of Hippias, of the same name with his grandfather, who also, when he was archon, dedicated the altar of

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and Aristogeiton, put an end to the tyranny by murdering the reigning tyrant, one of the sons of Peisistratus. The fact, as narrated below, was that the murdered man was the nonreigning brother of the tyrant, that the motives were personal and discreditable, and that the deliverance of Athens from dictatorship had to wait for the action of the Lacedaemonians. The latter were traditionally for aristocratic feudalism if at all possible, and otherwise for an oligarchy of wealth, but opposed either to an openly exercised democratic power or a dictatorship, which in Greece was usually the outcome of a period of democratic crisis.



the twelve gods in the market place and that other in the temple of Apollo Pythius. And though the people of Athens, amplifying afterwards that altar which was in the market place, thereby defaced the inscription; yet that upon the altar that is in the temple of Apollo Pythius is to be seen still, though in letters somewhat obscure, in these words:

*Peisistratus the son of Hippias  
Erected this to stand  
Pth' Temple of Apollo Pythius,  
Witness of his command.*

55. And that Hippias, being the elder brother, had the government, I can affirm, as knowing it by a more exact relation than other men; and it may be known also by this: It appears that of all the legitimate brethren, this only had children, as is both signified by the altar and also by that pillar which for a testimony of the injustice of the tyrants was erected in the Athenian citadel. In which there is no mention of any son of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but of five sons of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, the daughter of Callias, the son of Hyperchidas; for it is probable that the eldest was first married. And in the forepart of the pillar, his name after his father's was the first, not without reason, as being both next him in age and having also enjoyed the tyranny. Nor indeed could Hippias have easily taken on him the government on a sudden, if his brother had died seized of the tyranny, and he been the same day to settle it on himself. Whereas he retained the same with abundant security, both for the customary fear in the people and diligence in the guard, and was not to seek like a younger brother, to whom the government had not continually been familiar. But Hipparchus came to be named for his misfortune, and thereby grew an opinion afterwards that he was also tyrant.

56. This Harmodius therefore that denied his suit, he disgraced as he before intended. For when some had warned a sister of his, a virgin, to be present to carry a little basket in a procession, they rejected her again when she came and said that they had never warned her at all, as holding her unworthy the honour. This was taken heavily by Harmodius; but Aris-

togeiton, for his sake, was far more exasperated than he. Whereupon, with the rest of the conspirators, he made all things ready for the execution of the design. Only they were to stay the time of the holiday called the Great Panathenaea, upon which day only such citizens as lead the procession might, without suspicion, be armed in good number. And they were to begin the fact themselves; but the rest were to help them against the halberdiers. Now the conspirators, for their better security, were not many; for they hoped that such also as were not privy to it, if they saw it once undertaken, being upon this occasion armed, would assist in the recovery of their own liberty.

57. When this holiday was come, Hippias was gone out of the city into the place called Cerameicum with his guard of halberdiers, and was ordering the procession how it was to go. And Harmodius and Aristogeiton, with each of them a dagger, proceeded to the fact. But when they saw one of the conspirators familiarly talking with Hippias (for Hippias was very affable to all men), they were afraid and believed that they were discovered and must presently have been apprehended. They resolved therefore (if it were possible) to be revenged first upon him that had done them the wrong, and for whose sake they had undergone all this danger, and, furnished as they were, ran [furiously] into the city, and finding Hipparchus at a place called Leocorium, without all regard of themselves fell upon him, and with all the anger in the world, one upon jealousy, the other upon disgrace, struck and slew him. Aristogeiton, for the present, by means of the great confluence of people, escaped through the guard, but taken afterwards, was ungently handled; but Harmodius was slain upon the place.

58. The news being brought to Hippias in the Cerameicum, he went not towards the place where the fact was committed, but presently unto those that were armed for the solemnity of the shows and were far off, that he might be with them before they heard of it; and composing his countenance [as well as he could] to dissemble the calamity, pointed to a certain place and commanded them to repair thither without their arms. Which they did accordingly, expecting that he would have told them somewhat. But having commanded his guard to take those arms away, he then fell presently to picking out of such

as he meant to question and whosoever else was found amongst them with a dagger. For with shields and spears to be in [the head of] the procession was of custom.

59. Thus was the enterprise first undertaken upon quarrel of love, and then upon a sudden fear followed this unadvised adventure of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. And after this time the tyranny grew sorer to the Athenians than it had been before. And Hippias, standing more in fear, not only put many of the citizens to death, but also cast his eye on the states abroad to see if he might get any security from them in this alteration at home. He therefore afterwards (though an Athenian and to a Lampsacen) gave his daughter Archedice unto Aeantidas, the son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus, knowing that the Lampsacens were in great favour with King Darius. And her sepulchre is yet to be seen with this inscription:

*Archedice, the daughter of King Hippias,  
Who in his time*

*Of all the potentates of Greece was prime,  
This dust doth hide.*

*Daughter, wife, sister, mother unto kings she was,  
Yet free from pride.*

And Hippias, after he had reigned three years more in Athens, and was in the fourth deposed by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonides, went under truce to Sigeium, and to Aeantidas at Lampsacus, and thence to King Darius; from whence, twenty years after in his old age, he came to Marathon with the Medan army.

60. The people of Athens bearing this in mind, and remembering all they had heard concerning them, were extremely bitter and full of jealousy towards those that had been accused of the mysteries, and thought all to have been done upon some oligarchical or tyrannical conspiracy. And whilst they were passionate upon this surmise, many worthy men had already been cast in prison; and yet they were not likely so to give over, but grew daily more savage, and sought to apprehend more still. Whilst they were at this pass, a prisoner \* that seemed most to be guilty was persuaded by one of his fellow prisoners to

\* Andocides, the orator whose speech "On the Mysteries" we possess.

accuse somebody, whether it were true or not true; (for it is but conjectural on both sides; nor was there ever, then or after, any man that could say certainly who it was that did the deed); who brought him to it by telling him that though he had not done it, yet he might be sure to save his own life and should deliver the city from the present suspicion; and that he should be more certain of his own safety by a free confession than by coming to his trial if he denied it. Hereupon, he accused both himself and others for the Mercuries. The people of Athens, gladly receiving the certainty (as they thought) of the fact, and having been much vexed before to think that the conspirators should never [perhaps] be discovered to their multitude, presently set at liberty the accuser and the rest with him whom he had not appeached; but for those that were accused, they appointed judges, and all they apprehended they executed; and having condemned to die such as fled, they ordained a sum of money to be given to those that should slay them. And though it were all this while uncertain whether they suffered justly or unjustly, yet the rest of the city had a manifest ease for the present.

61. But touching Alcibiades, the Athenians took it extreme ill through the instigation of his enemies, the same that had opposed him before he went. And seeing it was certain, as they thought, for the Mercuries, the other crime also concerning the mysteries, whereof he had been accused, seemed a great deal the more to have been committed by him upon the same reason and conspiracy against the people. For it fell out withal, whilst the city was in a tumult about this, that an army of the Lacedaemonians was come as far as the isthmus upon some design against the Boeotians.\* These therefore they thought were come thither not against the Boeotians, but by appointment of him, and that if they had not first apprehended the persons appeached, the city had been betrayed. And one night they watched all night long in their arms in the temple of Theseus within the city. And the friends of Alcibiades in

\* This is a slip on the part of Hobbes. The Greek means "a small army of the Lacedaemonians came as far as the isthmus on some matter where they had an understanding with the Boeotians." Similarly in the next sentence the meaning is "not because of the Boeotians."

Argos were at the same time suspected of a purpose to set upon the people there; whereupon the Athenians also delivered unto the Argive people those hostages which they held of theirs in the islands to be slain. And there were presumptions against Alcibiades on all sides. Insomuch, as purposing by law to put him to death, they sent, as I have said, the galley called Salaminia into Sicily both for him and the rest with him that had been accused; but gave command to those that went not to apprehend him, but to bid him follow them to make his purgation, because they had a care not to give occasion of stir either amongst their own or their enemy's soldiers, but especially because they desired that the Mantineans and the Argives, who they thought followed the war by his persuasion, might not depart from the army. So he and the rest accused with him in his own galley, in company of the Salaminia, left Sicily and set sail for Athens. But being at Thurii they followed no further, but left the galley and were no more to be found, fearing indeed to appear to the accusation. They of the Salaminia made search for Alcibiades and those that were with him for a while, but not finding him, followed on their course for Athens. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, passed shortly after in a small boat from Thurii into Peloponnesus; and the Athenians, proceeding to judgment upon his not appearing, condemned both him and them to death.

62. After this, the Athenian generals that remained in Sicily, having divided the army into two and taken each his part by lot, went with the whole towards Selinus and Egesta with intention both to see if the Egestaeans would pay them the money and withal to get knowledge of the designs of the Selinuntians and learn the state of their controversy with the Egesteans. And sailing by the coast of Sicily, having it on their left hand, on that side which lieth to the Tyrrhene gulf, they came to Himera, the only Grecian city in that part of Sicily; which not receiving them, they went on, and by the way took Hyccara, a little town of the Sicilians enemy to the Egestaeans, and a sea-town; and having made the inhabitants slaves, delivered the town to the Egestaeans, whose horse-forces were there with them. Thence the Athenians with their landsmen returned through the territory of the Siculi to Catana; and the galleys went about with the captives. Nicias going with the fleet presently from Hyccara

to Egesta, when he had dispatched with them his other business and received thirty talents of money, returned to the army. The captives they ransomed, of which they made one hundred and twenty talents more. Then they sailed about to their confederates of the Siculi, appointing them to send their forces; and with the half of their own they came before Hybla in the territory of Gela, an enemy city, but took it not. And so ended this summer.

63. The next winter the Athenians fell presently to make preparation for their journey against Syracuse; and the Syracusians, on the other side, prepared to invade the Athenians. For seeing the Athenians had not presently, upon the first fear and expectation of their coming, fallen upon them, they got every day more and more heart. And because they went far from them into those other parts of Sicily, and assaulting Hybla could not take it, they contemned them more than ever, and prayed their commanders (as is the manner of the multitude when they be in courage), seeing that the Athenians came not unto them, to conduct them to Catana. And the Syracusian horsemen, which were ever abroad for scouts, spurring up to the camp of the Athenians, amongst other scorns asked them whether they came not rather to dwell in the land of another than to restore the Leontines to their own.

64. The Athenian generals, having observed this and being desirous to draw forth the Syracusians' whole power as far as might be from the city, to be able in the meantime without impeachment, going thither in the night by sea, to seize on some convenient place to encamp in; for they knew they should not be able to do it so well in the face of an enemy prepared, nor if they were known to march by land, for that the Syracusian horsemen being many would greatly annoy the light-armed and other multitude, they themselves having no horsemen there; whereas thus they might possess themselves of a place where the horse could not do them any hurt at all to speak of (now the Syracusian outlaws that were with them had told them of a place near the temple Olympieium, which also they seized); I say, the Athenian generals, to bring this their purpose to effect contrived the matter thus: They send a man, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and in the opinion of the Syracusian

commanders no less a friend of theirs. This man was a Catanæan and said he came from Catana, from such and such, whose names they knew, and knew to be the remnant of their well-willers in that city. He told them that the Athenians lay every night within the town and far from their arms; and that if with the whole power of their city, at a day appointed betimes in a morning they would come to their camp, those friends of the Syracusians would shut the Athenians in and set on fire their galleys, by which means the Syracusians, assaulting the palisado, might easily win the camp, and that the Catanæans that were to help them herein were many, and those he came from already prepared for it.

65. The Syracusian commanders, having been also otherwise encouraged, and having intended a preparation to go against Catana thought this messenger had not come, did so much the more unadvisedly believe the man, and straightways being agreed of the day on which they were to be there, sent him away. These commanders (for by this time the Selinuntians and some other their confederates were come in) appointed the Syracusians universally to set forwards by a day. And when all their necessaries were in readiness and the day at hand on which they were to be there, they set forwards towards Catana and encamped the night following upon the banks of the river Simæthus in the territory of the Leontines. The Athenians, upon advertisement that they were set forth, rising with their whole army, both themselves and such of the Siculi and others as went with them, and going aboard their galleys and boats, in the beginning of the night set sail for Syracuse. In the morning betimes the Athenians disbarked over against Olympieium to make their camp. And the Syracusian horsemen, who were at Catana before the rest, finding the camp risen, came back to the foot and told them; whereupon they went all together back to the aid of the city.

66. In the meantime, the way the Syracusians had to go being long, the Athenians had pitched their camp at leisure in a place of advantage, wherein it was their own power to begin battle when they list, and where both in and before the battle the Syracusian horsemen could least annoy them. For on one side there were walls and houses and trees and a lake that kept them

off; on the other side steep rocks; and having felled trees hard by and brought them to the seaside, they made a pallisado both before their galleys and towards Dascon. And on that part that was most accessible to the enemy, they made a fort with stone (the best they could find, but unwrought) and with wood, and withal pulled down the bridge of the river Anapus. Whilst this was doing, there came none to impeach them from the city. The first that came against them were the Syracusian horsemen, and by and by after, all the foot together. And though at first they came up near unto the camp of the Athenians, yet after, seeing the Athenians came not out against them, they retired again, and crossing to the other side of the Helorine highway, stayed there that night.

67. The next day the Athenians and their confederates prepared to fight, and were ordered thus: The Argives and the Mantineans had the right wing, the Athenians were in the middle, and the rest of their confederates in the other wing. That half of the army which stood foremost was ordered by eight in file; the other half towards their tents, ordered likewise by eights, was cast into the form of a long square and commanded to observe diligently where the rest of the army was in distress and to make specially thither. And in the midst of these so arranged were received such as carried the weapons and tools of the army.

The Syracusians arranged their men of arms, who were Syracusians of all conditions and as many of their confederates as were present, by sixteen in file (they that came to aid them, were chiefly the Selinuntians, and then the horsemen of the Geloans, about two hundred, and of the Camarinaeans, about twenty horsemen and fifty archers); the cavalry they placed in the right point of the battle, being in all no less than a thousand two hundred, and with them the darters. But the Athenians intending to begin the battle, Nicias went up and down the army, from one nation to another, to whom and to all in general he spake to this effect:

68. "What need I, sirs, to make a long exhortation when this battle is the thing for which we all came hither? For in my opinion, the present preparation is more able to give you encouragement than any oration how well soever made, if with a



weak army. For where we are together, Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders, how can we choose among so many and good confederates, but conceive great hope of the victory; especially against tag and rag, and not chosen men, as we are ourselves, and against Sicilians, who though they contemn us, cannot stand against us, their skill not being answerable to their courage? It must be remembered also that we be far from our own and not near to any amicable territory but such as we shall acquire by the sword. My exhortation to you, I am certain, is contrary to that of the enemy. For they say to theirs, 'You are to fight *for* your country.' I say to you, You are to fight *out of* your country, where you must either get the victory, or not easily get away; for many horsemen will be upon us. Remember therefore every man his own worth, and charge valiantly; and think the present necessity and strait we are in to be more formidable than the enemy."

69. Nicias, having thus exhorted the army, led it presently to the charge. The Syracusians expected not to have fought at that instant; and the city being near, some of them were gone away; and some for haste came in running; and though late, yet every one, as he came, put himself in where was the greatest number. For they wanted neither willingness nor courage, either in this or any other battle, being no less valiant, so far forth as they had experience, than the Athenians; but the want of this made them, even against their wills, to abate also somewhat of their courage. Nevertheless though they thought not the Athenians would have begun the battle, and were thereby constrained to fight upon a sudden, yet they resumed their arms and came presently forward to the encounter.

And first, the casters of stones and slingers and archers of either side skirmished in the midst between the armies, mutually chasing each other, as amongst the light-armed was not unlikely. After this, the soothsayers brought forth their sacrifices according to the law of the place; and the trumpets instigated the men of arms to the battle. And they came on to fight, the Syracusians for their country and their lives for the present, and for their liberty in the future; on the other side, the Athenians to win the country of another and make it their own and not to weaken their own by being vanquished; the Argives and other free con-

federates, to help the Athenians to conquer the country they came against and to return to their own with victory; and their subject confederates came also on with great courage, principally for their better safety, as desperate if they overcame not, and withal upon the by, that by helping the Athenians to subdue the country of another, their own subjection might be the easier.

70. After they were come to hand-strokes, they fought long on both sides. But in the meantime there happened some claps of thunder and flashes of lightning together with a great shower of rain; insomuch as it added to the fear of the Syracusians, that were now fighting their first battle and not familiar with the wars; whereas to the other side that had more experience, the season of the year seemed to expound that accident; and their greatest fear proceeded from the so long resistance of their enemies, in that they were not all this while overcome. When the Argives first had made the left wing of the Syracusians to give ground, and after them the Athenians had also done the like to those that were arranged against them, then the rest of the Syracusian army was presently broken and put to flight. But the Athenians pursued them not far, because the Syracusian horsemen, being many and unvanquished, whensoever any men of arms advanced far from the body of the army, charged upon them and still drave them in again; but having followed as far as safely they might in great troops, they retired again and erected a trophy. The Syracusians, having rallied themselves in the Helorine way and recovered their order as well as they could for that time, sent a guard into Olympieium, lest the Athenians should take the treasure there, and returned with the rest of the army into the city.

71. The Athenians went not to assault the temple, but gathering together their dead, laid them upon the funeral fire, and stayed that night upon the place. The next day they gave truce to the Syracusians to take up their dead, of whom and of their confederates were slain about two hundred and sixty; and gathered up the bones of their own. Of the Athenians and their confederates there died about fifty. And thus, having rifled the bodies of their dead enemies, they returned to Catana. For it was now winter; and to make war there, they thought it yet

unpossible before they had sent for horsemen to Athens and levied other amongst their confederates there in Sicily, to the end they might not be altogether over-mastered in horse; and before they had also both levied money there and received more from Athens and made league with certain cities, which they hoped after this battle would the more easily hearken thereunto, and before they had likewise provided themselves of victuals and other things necessary, as intending the next spring to undertake Syracuse again.

72. With this mind they went to winter at Naxos and Catana.

The Syracusians, after they had buried their dead, called an assembly; and Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a man not otherwise second to any in wisdom, and in war both able for his experience and eminent for his valour, standing forth gave them encouragement and would not suffer them to be dismayed with that which had happened. Their courage, he said, was not overcome, though their want of order had done them hurt. And yet in that they were not so far inferior as it was likely they would have been, especially being (as one may say) home-bred artificers, against the most experienced in the war of all the Grecians. That they had also been hurt by the number of their generals and commanders—for there were fifteen that commanded in chief—and by the many supernumerary soldiers under no command at all. Whereas if they would make but a few and skilful leaders, and prepare armour this winter for such as want it, to increase as much as might be the number of their men of arms, and compel them in other things to the exercise of discipline, in all reason they were to have the better of the enemy. For valour they had already, and to keep their order would be learnt by practice; and both of these would still grow greater: skill, by practising with danger; and their courage would grow bolder of itself, upon the confidence of skill. And for their generals, they ought to choose them few and absolute, and to take an oath unto them to let them lead the army wheresoever they thought best. For by this means, both the things that require secrecy would the better be concealed and all things would be put in readiness with order and less tergiversation.

73. The Syracusians, when they had heard him, decreed all

that he advised and elected three generals, him, Heracleides, the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, the son of Exekestus. They sent also ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedaemon, as well to obtain a league with them as also to persuade the Lacedaemonians to make a hotter war against the Athenians and to declare themselves in the quarrel of the Syracusians, thereby either to withdraw them from Sicily or to make them the less able to send supply to their army which was there already.

74. The Athenian army at Catana sailed presently to Messana to receive it by treason of some within; but the plot came not to effect. For Alcibiades, when he was sent for from his charge, being resolved to fly and knowing what was to be done, discovered the same to the friends of the Syracusians in Messana, who with those of their faction slew such as were accused, and being armed upon occasion of the sedition, obtained to have the Athenians kept out. And the Athenians, after thirteen days' stay, troubled with tempestuous weather, provision also failing and nothing succeeding, returned again to Naxos; and having fortified their camp with a pallsado, they wintered there, and dispatched a galley to Athens for money and horsemen to be with them early in the spring.

75. The Syracusians this winter raised a wall before their city, all the length of the side towards Epipolae, including Temenites, to the end, if they chanced to be beaten, they might not be so easily enclosed as when they were in a narrower compass. And they put a guard into Megara and another into Olympieium, and made pallsadoes on the seaside at all the places of landing. And knowing that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they marched with all the power of the city unto Catana, and after they had wasted the territory and burnt the cabins and camp where the Athenians had lodged before, returned home. And having heard that the Athenians had sent ambassadors to Camarina, according to a league made before in the time of Laches, to try if they could win them to their side, they also sent ambassadors to oppose it. For they suspected that the Camarinaeans had sent those succours in the former battle with no great good will; and that now they would take part with them no longer, seeing the Athenians had the better of the day, but would rather join with the Athenians upon the former

league. Hermocrates, therefore, and others being come to Camarina from the Syracusians, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians, when the assembly was met, Hermocrates, desiring to increase their envy to the Athenians, spake unto them to this effect:

76. "Men of Camarina, we come not hither upon fear that the forces of the Athenians here present may affright you, but lest their speeches which they are about to make may seduce you before you have also heard what may be said by us. They are come into Sicily with that pretence indeed which you hear given out, but with that intention which we all suspect; and to me they seem not to intend the replantation of the Leontines, but rather our supplantation. For surely it holdeth not in reason that they who subvert the cities yonder should come to plant any city here; nor that they should have such a care of the Leontines, because Chalcideans, for kindred's sake, when they keep in servitude the Chalcideans themselves of Euboea, of whom these here are but the colonies. But they both hold the cities there and attempt those here in one and the same kind. For when the Ionians and the rest of the confederates, their own colonies, had willingly made them their leaders in the war to avenge them of the Medes, the Athenians, laying afterwards to their charge, to some the not sending of their forces, to some their war amongst themselves, and so to the rest the most colourable criminations they could get, subdued them all to their obedience. And it was not for the liberty of the Grecians that these men, nor for the liberty of themselves that the Grecians made head against the Medes; but the Athenians did it to make them serve not the Medes but them, and the Grecians to change their master, as they did, not for one less wise, but for one worse wise.

77. "But in truth we come not to accuse the Athenian state, though it be obnoxious enough, before you that know sufficiently the injuries they have done, but far rather to accuse ourselves, who, though we have the examples before our eyes of the Grecians there brought into servitude for want of defending themselves, and though we see them now, with the same sophistry of replanting the Leontines and their kindred and aiding of their confederates the Egestaeans, prepare to do

the like unto us, do not yet unite ourselves and with better courage make them to know that we be not Ionians nor Hellenes nor islanders, that changing serve always the Medes or some other master, but that we are Dorians and freemen, come to dwell here in Sicily out of Peloponnesus, a free country. Shall we stand still till we be taken city after city when we know that that only way we are conquerable; and when we find them wholly bent to this, that by drawing some from our alliance with their words, and causing some to wear each other out with war upon hope of their confederacy, and winning others by other fit language, they may have the power to do us hurt? But we think, though one of the same island perish, yet if he dwell far off, the danger will not come to us; and before it arrive, we count unhappy only him that suffereth before us.

78. "If any therefore be of this opinion, that it is not he but the Syracusan that is the Athenian's enemy, and thinketh it a hard matter that he should endanger himself for the territory that is mine, I would have him to consider that he is to fight not chiefly for mine, but equally for his own in mine, and with the more safety for that I am not destroyed before and he thereby destitute of my help, but stand with him in the battle. Let him also consider that the Athenians come not hither to punish the Syracusians for being enemies to you, but by pretence of me to make himself the stronger by your friendship. If any man here envieth or also feareth us (for the strongest are still liable unto both), and would therefore wish that the Syracusians might be weakened to make them more modest, but not vanquished for their own safety's sake, that man hath conceived a hope beyond the power of man. For it is not reasonable that the same man should be the disposer both of his desires and of his fortune. And if his aim should fail him, he might, deploring his own misery, peradventure wish to enjoy my prosperity again. But this will not be possible to him that shall abandon me and not undertake the same dangers, though not in title, yet in effect the same that I do. For though it be our power in title, yet in effect it is your own safety you defend. And you men of Camarina, that are borderers and likely to have the second place of danger, you should most of all have foreseen this and not have aided us so dully. You should rather have come to us; and that which, if

the Athenians had come first against Camarina, you should in your need have implored at our hands, the same you should now also have been seen equally to hearten us withal to keep us from yielding. But as yet, neither you nor any of the rest have been so forward.

79. "Perhaps, upon fear, you mean to deal evenly between us both and allege your league with the Athenians. You made no league against your friends, but against your enemies, in case any should invade you; and by it you are also tied to aid the Athenians when others wrong them; but not when, as now, they wrong their neighbour. For even the Rhegians, who are also Chalcideans, refuse to help them in replanting the Leontines, though these also be Chalcideans. And then it were a hard case if they, suspecting a bad action under a fair justification, are wise without a reason; and you, upon pretence of reason, should aid your natural enemies and help them that most hate you to destroy your more natural kindred.

"But this is no justice; to fight with them is justice, and not to stand in fear of their preparation. Which, if we hold together, is not terrible, but is, if contrarily (which they endeavour) we be disunited. For neither when they came against us, being none but ourselves, and had the upperhand in battle, could they yet effect their purpose; but quickly went their ways.

80. "There is no reason therefore we should be afraid when we are all together, but that we should have the better will to unite ourselves in a league; and the rather because we are to have aid from Peloponnesus, who every way excel these men in military sufficiency. Nor should you think that your purpose to aid neither, as being in league with both, is either just in respect of us or safe for yourselves; for it is not so just in substance as it is in the pretence. For if through want of your aid the assailed perish and the assailant become victor, what do you by your neutrality but leave the safety of the one undefended and suffer the other to do evil? Whereas it were more noble in you, by joining with the wronged and with your kindred, both to defend the common good of Sicily and keep the Athenians, as your friends, from an act of injustice. To be short, we Syracusians say that to demonstrate plainly to you or

to any other the thing you already know is no hard matter; but we pray you, and withal if you reject our words we protest, that whereas the Ionians, who have ever been our enemies, do take counsel against us, you, that are Dorians as well as we, betray us. And if they subdue us, though it be by your counsels that they do it, yet they only shall have the honour of it; and for the prize of their victory, they will have none other but even the authors of their victory; but if the victory fall unto us, even you also, the cause of this our danger, shall undergo the penalty. Consider therefore now and take your choice whether you will have the servitude without the present danger, or saving yourselves with us, both avoid the dishonour of having a master and escape our enmity, which is likely otherwise to be lasting."

81. Thus spake Hermocrates. After him Euphemus, ambassador from the Athenians, spake thus:

82. "Though our coming were to renew our former league, yet seeing we are touched by the Syracusian, it will be necessary we speak something here of the right of our dominion. And the greatest testimony of this right he hath himself given, in that he said the Ionians were ever enemies to the Dorians. And it is true. For being Ionians, we have ever endeavoured to find out some means or other how best to free ourselves from subjection to the Peloponnesians, that are Dorians, more in number than we and dwelling near us. After the Medan war, having gotten us a navy, we were delivered thereby from the command and leading of the Lacedaemonians, there being no cause why they should rather be leaders of us than we of them save only that they were then the stronger. And when we were made commanders of those Grecians which before lived under the king, we took upon us the government of them, because we thought that, having power in our hands to defend ourselves, we should thereby be the less subject to the Peloponnesians. And to say truth, we subjected the Ionians and islanders (whom the Syracusians say we brought into bondage being our kindred) not without just cause; for they came with the Medes against ours, their mother city, and for fear of losing their wealth durst not revolt, as we did, that abandoned our very city. But



as they were content to serve, so they would have imposed the same condition upon us.

83. "For these causes we took upon us our dominion over them, both as worthy of the same, in that we brought the greatest fleet and promptest courage to the service of the Grecians, whereas they, with the like promptness in favour of the Medes, did us hurt; and also as being desirous to procure ourselves a strength against the Peloponnesians. And follow any other we will not,\* seeing we alone have pulled down the barbarian and therefore have right to command, or at least have put ourselves into danger more for the liberty of the Peloponnesians than of all the rest of Greece, and our own besides. Now to seek means for one's own preservation is a thing unblameable. And as it is for our own safety's cause that we are now here, so also we find that the same will be profitable for you. Which we will make plain from those very things which they accuse, and you, as most formidable, suspect us of, being assured that such as suspect with vehement fear, though they may be won for the present with the sweetness of an oration, yet when the matter comes to performance, will then do as shall be most for their turn.

"We have told you that we hold our dominion yonder upon fear; and that upon the same cause we come hither now, by the help of our friends to assure the cities here, and not to bring you into subjection but rather to keep you from it.

84. "And let no man object that we be solicitous for those that are nothing to us; for as long as you be preserved and able to make head against the Syracusians, we shall be the less annoyed by their sending of forces to the Peloponnesians. And in this point you are very much unto us. For the same reason it is meet also that we replant the Leontines; not to subject them, as their kindred in Euboea, but to make them as puissant as we can, that, being near, they may from their own territory weaken the Syracusians in our behalf. For as for our wars at home, we

\* I believe Hobbes has taken the wrong reading here. The other reading would mean "we will not use any fine phrases to the effect that because we alone destroyed the power of the Persians we have a natural right to empire."

are a match for our enemies without their help; and the Chalcidean (whom having made a slave yonder, the Syracusian said, we absurdly attempt to vindicate into liberty here) is most beneficial to us there without arms, paying money only; but the Leontines, and our other friends here, are the most profitable to us when they are most in liberty.

85. "Now to a tyrant or city that reigneth, nothing can be thought absurd if profitable, nor any man a friend that may not be trusted to. Friend or enemy he must be, according to the several occasions. But here it is for our benefit not to weaken our friends, but by our friends' strength to weaken our enemies. This you must needs believe, inasmuch as yonder also we so command over our confederates as every of them may be most useful to us: the Chians and Methymnaeans redeem their liberty with providing us some galleys; the most of the rest, with a tribute of money somewhat more pressing. Some again of our confederates are absolutely free, notwithstanding that they be islanders and easy to be subdued; the reason whereof is this: they are situate in places commodious about Peloponnesus. It is probable, therefore, that here also we will so order our affairs as shall be most for our own turn and most according to our fear, as we told you, of the Syracusians. For they affect a dominion over you, and having by advantage of your suspicion of us drawn you to their side, will themselves by force, or (if we go home without effect) by your want of friends, have the sole command of Sicily, which, if you join with them, must of necessity come to pass. For neither will it be easy for us to bring so great forces again together, nor will the Syracusians want strength to subdue you if we be absent. Him that thinketh otherwise, the thing itself convinceth.

86. "For when you called us in to aid you at the first, the fear you pretended was only this: that if we neglected you, the Syracusians would subdue you, and we thereby should participate of the danger. And it were unjust that the argument you would needs have to prevail then with us should now have no effect with yourselves, or that you should be jealous of the much strength we bring against the power of the Syracusians when much rather you should give the less ear unto them. We cannot so much as stay here without you; and if becoming

perfidious we should subdue these states, yet we are unable to hold them, both in respect of the length of the voyage and for want of means of guarding them, because they be great and provided after the manner of the continent. Whereas they, not lodged near you in a camp, but inhabiting near you in a city of greater power than this of ours,\* will be always watching their advantages against you; and when an opportunity shall be offered against any of your cities, will be sure not to let it slip. This they have already made to appear, both in their proceedings against the Leontines, and also otherwise. And yet have these the face to move you against us that hinder this, and that have hitherto kept Sicily from falling into their hands. But we, on the other side, invite you to a far more real safety, and pray you not to betray that safety which we both of us hold from one another at this present, but to consider that they by their own number have way to you always, though without confederates, whereas you shall seldom have so great an aid again to resist them. Which if through your jealousy you suffer to go away without effect, or if it miscarry, you will hereafter wish for the least part of the same, when their coming can no more do you good.

87. "But, Camarinaeans, be neither you nor others moved with their calumnies. We have told you the very truth why we are suspected; and summarily we will tell it you again, claiming to prevail with you thereby. We say we command yonder lest else we should obey, and we assert into liberty the cities here lest else we should be harmed by them; many things we have to be doing, because many things we are forced to beware of; and both now and before, we came not uncalled, but called as confederates to such of you as suffer wrong. Make not yourselves judges of what we do, nor go about as censors (which were now hard to do) to divert us; but as far as this busy humour and fashion of ours may be for your own service, so far take and use it; and think not the same hurtful alike to all, but that the greatest part of the Grecians have good by it. For in all places, though we be not of any side, yet both he that looketh to be wronged and he that contriveth to do the wrong, by the obviousness of the hope that the one hath of our aid

\* I.e., "than this *army* of ours which we have brought here."

and of the fear that the other hath of their own danger if we should come, are brought by necessity, the one to moderation against his will, the other into safety without his trouble. Refuse not therefore the security now present, common both to us that require it, and to yourselves. But do as others use to do: come with us, and instead of defending yourselves always against the Syracusians, take your turn once and put them to their guard as they have done you."

88. Thus spake Euphemus. The Camarinaeans stood thus affected: they bare good will to the Athenians, save that they thought they meant to subjugate Sicily; and were ever at strife with the Syracusians about their borders. Yet because they were afraid that the Syracusians, that were near them, might as well get the victory as the other, they had both formerly sent them some few horse, and also now resolved for the future to help the Syracusians, but underhand and as sparingly as possible; and withal that they might no less seem to favour the Athenians than the Syracusians, especially after they had won a battle, to give for the present an equal answer unto both. So after deliberation had, they answered thus: that forasmuch as they that warred were both of them their confederates, they thought it most agreeable to their oath for the present to give aid to neither. And so the ambassadors of both sides went their ways.

And the Syracusians made preparations for the war by themselves.

The Athenians, being encamped at Naxos, treated with the Siculi to procure as many of them as they might to their side. Of whom, such as inhabited the plain and were subject to the Syracusians for the most part held off; but they that dwelt in the most inland parts of the island, being a free people, and ever before dwelling in villages, presently agreed with the Athenians, and brought corn into the army, and some of them also money. To those that held off the Athenians went with their army; and some they forced to come in and others they hindered from receiving the aids and garrisons of the Syracusians. And having brought their fleet from Naxos, where it had been all the winter till now, they lay the rest of the winter at Catana and re-erected their camp formerly burnt by the Syracusians. They sent a galley also to Carthage to procure amity and what help

they could from thence; and into *Hetruria*,\* because some cities there had of their own accord promised to take their parts. They sent likewise to the *Siculi* about them and to *Egesta*, appointing them to send in all the horse they could, and made ready bricks and iron and whatsoever else was necessary for a siege, and every other thing they needed, as intending to fall in hand with the war early the next spring.

The ambassadors of *Syracuse* which were sent to *Corinth* and *Lacedaemon*, as they sailed by, endeavoured also to move the *Italians* to a regard of this action of the *Athenians*. Being come to *Corinth*, they spake unto them and demanded aid upon the title of consanguinity. The *Corinthians*, having forthwith for their own part decreed cheerfully to aid them, sent also ambassadors from themselves along with these to *Lacedaemon* to help them to persuade the *Lacedaemonians* both to make a more open war against the *Athenians* at home and to send some forces also into *Sicily*. At the same time that these ambassadors were at *Lacedaemon* from *Corinth*, *Alcibiades* was also there with his fellow fugitives, who presently upon their escape passed over from *Thurii* first to *Cyllene*, the haven of the *Eleians*, in a ship, and afterwards went thence to *Lacedaemon*, sent for by the *Lacedaemonians* themselves, under public security. For he feared them for his doings about *Mantineia*. And it fell out that in the assembly of the *Lacedaemonians* the *Corinthians*, *Syracusians*, and *Alcibiades* made all of them the same request. Now the *ephores* and magistrates, though intending to send ambassadors to *Syracuse* to hinder them from compounding with the *Athenians*, being yet not forward to send them aid, *Alcibiades* stood forth and sharpened the *Lacedaemonians*, inciting them with words to this effect:

89. "It will be necessary that I say something first concerning mine own accusation, lest through jealousy of me you bring a prejudicate ear to the common business. My ancestors having

\* The Greek is actually *Tyrseia*, by which is meant the whole of western Italy. According to *Herodotus*, the people inhabiting this area were *Pelasgians* originally. But in historical times the race that dominated the country were *Etrurians* (hence *Hobbes'* *Hetruria*), who are certainly of no Greek origin. The Greeks continued to speak of them as *Tyrseians* and actually to identify them with the original *Pelasgians*.

on a certain quarrel renounced the office of receiving you,\* I was the man that restored the same again and showed you all possible respect, both otherwise and in the matter of your loss at Pylus. Whilst I persisted in my good will to you, being to make a peace at Athens, by treating the same with my adversaries, you invested them with authority and me with disgrace. For which cause, if in applying myself afterwards to the Mantineans and Argives, or in anything else I did you hurt, I did it justly; and if any man here were causelessly angry with me then when he suffered, let him be now content again when he knows the true cause of the same. Or if any man think the worse of me for inclining to the people, let him acknowledge that therein also he is offended without a cause. For we have been always enemies to tyrants; and what is contrary to a tyrant is called the people; and from thence hath continued our adherence to the multitude.† Besides, in a city governed by democracy, it was necessary in most things to follow the present course; nevertheless we have endeavoured to be more moderate than suiteth with the now headstrong humour of the people. But others there have been, both formerly and now, that have incited the common people to worse things than I; and they are those that have also driven out me. But as for us, when we had the charge of the whole, we thought it reason, by what form it was grown most great and most free and in which we received it, in the same to preserve it. For though such of us as have judgment do know well enough what the democracy is, and I no less than another (insomuch as I could inveigh against it; but of confessed madness nothing can be said that is new), yet we thought it not safe to change it when you our enemies were so near us.

90. "Thus stands the matter touching my own accusation. And concerning what we are to consult of, both you and I, if I know anything which you yourselves do not, hear it now. We made this voyage into Sicily, first (if we could) to subdue

\* This is another reference to the office of proxenus.

† The Greek is stronger than Hobbes' words. It means "our primacy in the democratic party." Alcibiades refers to the leadership of the democratic party which had been in the hands of the Alcmaeonidae, his family.

the Sicilians, after them the Italians, after them, to assay the dominion of Carthage, and Carthage itself. If these or most of these enterprises succeeded, then next we should have undertaken Peloponnesus, with the accession both of the Greek forces there and with many mercenary barbarians, Iberians and others of those parts, confessed to be the most warlike of the barbarians that are now. We should also have built many galleys besides these which we have already (there being plenty of timber in Italy); with the which besieging Peloponnesus round, and also taking the cities thereof with our land forces, upon such occasions as should arise from the land, some by assault and some by siege, we hoped easily to have debelled it and afterwards to have gotten the dominion of all Greece. As for money and corn to facilitate some points of this, the places we should have conquered there, besides what here we should have found, would sufficiently have furnished us.

91. "Thus, from one that most exactly knoweth it, you have heard what is the design of the fleet now gone; and which the generals there, as far as they can, will also put in execution. Understand next that unless you aid them, they yonder cannot possibly hold out. For the Sicilians, though inexpert, if many of them unite may well subsist; but that the Syracusians alone, with their whole power already beaten and withal kept from the use of the sea, should withstand the forces of the Athenians already there is a thing impossible. And if their city should be taken, all Sicily is had, and soon after Italy also; and the danger from thence which I foretold you would not be long ere it fell upon you. Let no man therefore think that he now consulteth of Sicily only but also of Peloponnesus, unless this be done with speed. Let the army you send be of such as being aboard may row and landing presently be armed; and (which I think more profitable than the army itself) send a Spartan for commander, both to train the soldiers already there and to compel unto it such as refuse. For thus will your present friends be the more encouraged, and such as be doubtful come to you with the more assurance. It were also good to make war more openly upon them here, that the Syracusians, seeing your care, may the rather hold out, and the Athenians be less able to send supply to their army. You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia

in the territory of Athens, a thing which the Athenians themselves most fear, and reckon for the only evil they have not yet tasted in this war. And the way to hurt an enemy most is to know certainly what he most feareth and to bring the same upon him. For in reason a man therefore feareth a thing most as having the precisest knowledge of what will most hurt him. As for the commodities which yourselves shall reap and deprive the enemy of by so fortifying, letting much pass, I will sum you up the principal. Whatsoever the territory is furnished withal will come most of it unto you, partly taken and partly of its own accord. The revenue of the silver mines in Laurium and whatsoever other profit they have from their land or from their courts of justice will presently be lost; and, which is worse, their confederates will be remiss in bringing in their revenue and will care little for the Athenians if they believe once that you follow the war to the utmost. That any of these things be put in act speedily and earnestly, men of Lacedaemon, it resteth only in yourselves; for I am confident, and I think I err not, that all these things are possible to be done.

92. "Now I must crave this: that I be neither the worse esteemed for that, having once been thought a lover of my country, I go now amongst the greatest enemies of the same against it, nor yet mistrusted as one that speaketh with the zeal of a fugitive. For though I fly from the malice of them that drave me out, I shall not, if you take my counsel, fly your profit. Nor are you enemies so much, who have hurt but your enemies, as they are that have made enemies of friends. I love not my country as wronged by it, but as having lived in safety in it. Nor do I think that I do herein go against any country of mine, but that I far rather seek to recover the country I have not. And he is truly a lover of his country not that refuseth to invade the country he hath wrongfully lost, but that desires so much to be in it as by any means he can he will attempt to recover it. I desire you therefore, Lacedaemonians, to make use of my service in whatsoever danger or labour confidently, seeing you know, according to the common saying, if I did hurt you much when I was your enemy, I can help you much when I am your friend. And so much the more in that I know the state of Athens and but conjectured at yours. And considering



you are now in deliberation upon a matter of so extreme importance, I pray you think not much to send an army both into Sicily and Attica, as well to preserve the great matters that are there with the presence of a small part of your force, as also to pull down the power of the Athenians both present and to come, and afterwards to dwell in safety yourselves, and to have the leading of all Greece, not forced, but voluntary and with their good affection."

93. Thus spake Alcibiades. And the Lacedaemonians, though before this they had a purpose of their own accord to send an army against Athens but had delayed and neglected it, yet when these particularly were delivered by him, they were a great deal the more confirmed in the same, conceiving that what they had heard was from one that evidently knew it. In-somuch as they had set their minds already upon the fortifying of Deceleia and upon the sending of some succours into Sicily for the present. And having assigned Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, unto the Syracusian ambassadors for chief commander, they willed him to consider, both with them and the Corinthians, how best for their present means and with greatest speed some help might be conveyed unto them in Sicily. He thereupon appointed the Corinthians to send him two galleys presently to Asine, and to furnish the rest they meant to send, and to have them ready to sail when occasion should serve. This agreed upon, they departed from Lacedaemon.

In the meantime the galley arrived at Athens which the generals sent home for money and horsemen. And the Athenians, upon hearing, decreed to send both provision and horsemen to the army. So the winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war written by Thucydides.

94. In the very beginning of the next spring the Athenians in Sicily departed from Catana and sailed by the coast to Megara of Sicily. The inhabitants whereof, in the time of the tyrant Gelon, the Syracusians (as I mentioned before) had driven out and now possess the territory themselves. Landing here, they wasted the fields; and having assaulted a certain small fortress of the Syracusians, not taking it, they went presently back, part by land and part by sea, unto the river Tereas. And landing again in the plain fields, wasted the same and burnt up their

corn; and lighting on some Syracusians, not many, they slew some of them, and having set up a trophy, went all again on board their galleys. Thence they returned to Catana and took in victual; then with their whole army they went to Centoripa, a small city of the Siculi, which yielding on composition, they departed, and in their way burnt up the corn of the Inessaean and the Hyblaeans. Being come again to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived from Athens, without horses, though not without the furniture, supposing to have horses there, and thirty archers on horseback, and three hundred talents of silver.

95. The same spring the Lacedaemonians led forth their army against Argos and went as far as to Cleonae; but an earthquake happening, they went home again. But the Argives invaded the territory of Thyrea, confining on their own, and took a great booty from the Lacedaemonians, which they sold for no less than twenty-five talents.

Not long after, the commons of Thespieae set upon them that had the government, but not prevailing, were part apprehended and part escaped to Athens, the Athenians having also aided them.

96. The Syracusians the same summer, when they heard that the Athenians had horsemen sent to them from Athens and that they were ready now to come against them, conceiving that if the Athenians gat not Epipolae, a rocky ground and lying just against the city, they would not be able, though masters of the field, to take in the city with a wall, intended therefore, lest the enemy should come secretly up, to keep the passages by which there was access unto it with a guard. For the rest of the place is to the outside high and steep, falling to the city by degrees, and on the inside wholly subject to the eye. And it is called by the Syracusians Epipolae,\* because it lieth above the level of the rest. The Syracusians, coming out of the city with their whole power into a meadow by the side of the river Anapus betimes in the morning (for Hermocrates and his fellow-commanders had already received their charge), were there taking a view of their arms; but first they had set apart seven hundred men of arms, under the leading of Diomilus,

\* Literally, "the city above"; cf. the English name *Overton*.

an outlaw of Andros, both to guard Epipolae and to be ready together quickly upon any other occasion wherein there might be use of their service.

97. The Athenians the day following, having been already mustered, came from Catana with their whole forces and landed their soldiers at a place called Leon, six or seven furlongs from Epipolae, unperceived, and laid their navy at anchor under Thapsus. Thapsus is almost an island, lying out into the sea and joined to the land with a narrow isthmus, not far from Syracuse, neither by sea nor land. And the naval forces of the Athenians, having made a pallisado across the said isthmus, lay there quiet. But the land soldiers marched at high speed towards Epipolae and gat up by Euryelus before the Syracusians could come to them from out of the meadow where they were mustering. Nevertheless they came on, every one with what speed he could, not only Diomilus with his seven hundred, but the rest also. They had no less to go from the meadow than twenty-five furlongs before they could reach the enemy. The Syracusians, therefore, coming up in this manner and thereby defeated in battle at Epipolae, withdrew themselves into the city. But Diomilus was slain, and three hundred of the rest. The Athenians after this erected a trophy and delivered to the Syracusians the bodies of their dead under truce, and came down the next day to the city. But when none came out to give them battle, they retired again, and built a fort upon Labdalum, in the very brink of the precipices of Epipolae, on the side that looketh towards Megara, for a place to keep their utensils and money in when they went out either to fight or to work.

98. Not long after, there came unto them from Eggesta three hundred horsemen, and from the Siculi, namely the Naxians and some others, about one hundred; and the Athenians had of their own two hundred and fifty for which they had horses, part from the Eggestaeans and Catanaeans, and part they bought. So that they had together in the whole, six hundred and fifty horsemen. Having put a guard into Labdalum, the Athenians went down to Syca and raised there a wall in circle very quickly, so that they struck a terror into the Syracusians with the celerity of the work. Who, therefore, coming forth, intended to have given them battle and no longer to have neglected the matter.

But when the armies were one set against the other, the Syracusian generals, perceiving their own to be in disarray and not easily to be embattled, led them again into the city, save only a certain part of their horsemen; which staying, kept the Athenians from carrying of stone and straggling far abroad from their camp. But the Athenians with one squadron of men of arms, together with their whole number of horse, charged the horsemen of the Syracusians and put them to flight, of whom they slew a part, and erected a trophy for this battle of horse.

99. The next day the Athenians fell to work upon their wall to the north side of their circular wall, some building and some fetching stone and timber, which they still laid down toward the place called Trogilus, in the way by which the wall should come with the shortest compass from the great haven to the other sea. The Syracusians, by the persuasion of their generals, and principally of Hermocrates, intended not to hazard battle with their whole power against the Athenians any more, but thought fit rather, in the way where the Athenians were to bring their wall, to raise a counterwall; which, if they could but do before the wall of the Athenians came on, it would exclude their further building; and if the Athenians should set upon them as they were doing it, they might send part of the army to defend it, and pre-occupy the accesses to it with a pallisado; and if they would come with their whole army to hinder them, then must they also be forced to let their own work stand still. Therefore they came out, and beginning at their own city, drew a cross-wall beneath the circular fortifications of the Athenians, and set wooden turrets upon it, made of the olive trees which they felled in the ground belonging to the temple. The Athenian navy was not yet come about into the great haven from Thapsus, but the Syracusians were masters of the places near the sea; and the Athenians brought their provision to the army from Thapsus by land.

100. The Syracusians, when they thought both their pallisado and wall sufficient, and considering that the Athenians came not to impeach them in the work, as they that feared to divide their army and to be thereby the more easy to be fought withal, and that also hastened to make an end of their own wall wherewith to encompass the city, left one squadron for a guard of

their works and retired with the rest into the city. And the Athenians cut off the pipes of their conduits, by which their water to drink was conveyed under ground into the town. And having observed also that about noon the Syracusians kept within their tents, and that some of them were also gone into the city, and that such as were remaining at the pallisado kept but negligent watch, they commanded three hundred chosen men of arms, and certain other picked out and armed from amongst the unarmed, to run suddenly to that counter-wall of the Syracusians. The rest of the army, divided in two, went one part with one of the generals to stop the succour which might be sent from the city, and the other with the other general to the pallsado next to the gate of the [counter-wall]. The three hundred assaulted and took the pallisado, the guard whereof, forsaking it, fled within the wall into the temple ground; and with them entered also their pursuers; but after they were in were beaten out again by the Syracusians and some slain, both of the Argives and Athenians, but not many. Then the whole army went back together and pulled down the wall and plucked up the pallisado, the pales whereof they carried with them to their camp and erected a trophy.

101. The next day, the Athenians, beginning at their circular wall, built onwards to that crag over the marshes, which on that part of Epipolæ looketh to the great haven, and by which the way to the haven, for their wall to come through the plain and marsh, was the shortest. As this was doing, the Syracusians came out again and made another pallisado, beginning at the city, through the middle of the marsh, and a ditch at the side of it, to exclude the Athenians from bringing their wall to the sea. But the Athenians, when they had finished their work as far as to the crag, assaulted the pallisado and trench of the Syracusians again. And having commanded their galleys to be brought about from Thapsus into the great haven of Syracuse, about break of day went straight down into the plain, and passing through the marsh, where the ground was clay and firmest, [and partly] upon boards and planks, won both the trench and pallisado, all but a small part, betimes in the morning, and the rest not long after. And here also they fought, and the victory fell to the Athenians; the Syracusians, those of

the right wing, fled to the city, and they of the left, to the river. The three hundred chosen Athenians, desiring to cut off their passage, marched at high speed towards the bridge. But the Syracusians, fearing to be prevented (for most of the horse-men were in this number), set upon these three hundred, and putting them to flight, drave them upon the right wing of the Athenians, and following, affrighted also the foremost guard of the wing. Lamachus, seeing this, came to aid them with a few archers from the left wing of their own and with [all] the Argives, and passing over a certain ditch, having but few with him, was deserted and slain with some six or seven more. These the Syracusians hastily snatched up and carried into a place of safety beyond the river; and when they saw the rest of the Athenian army coming towards them, they departed.

102. In the meantime, they that fled at first to the city, seeing how things went, took heart again, and re-embattled themselves against the same Athenians that stood ranged against them before; and withal sent a certain portion of their army against the circular fortification of the Athenians upon Epipolae, supposing to find it without defendants and so to take it. And they took and demolished the outworks ten plethers in length; but the circle itself was defended by Nicias, who chanced to be left within it for infirmity. For he commanded his servants to set fire on all the engines and whatsoever wooden matter lay before the wall: knowing there was no other possible means to save themselves for want of men. And it fell out accordingly, for by reason of this fire they came no nearer, but retired. For the Athenians, having by this time beaten back the enemy below, were coming up to relieve the circle; and their galleys withal (as is before mentioned) were going about from Thapsus into the great haven. Which they above perceiving, speedily made away, they and the whole army of the Syracusians, into the city, with opinion that they could no longer hinder them, with the strength they now had, from bringing their wall through unto the sea.

103. After this the Athenians erected a trophy and delivered to the Syracusians their dead under truce; and they on the other side delivered to the Athenians the body of Lamachus and of the rest slain with him. And their whole army, both land and

sea forces, being now together, they began to enclose the Syracusians with a double wall from Epipolae and the rocks unto the seaside. The necessaries of the army were supplied from all parts of Italy. And many of the Siculi, who before stood aloof to observe the way of fortune, took part now with the Athenians, to whom came also three penteconteri, [long boats of fifty oars apiece,] from Hetruria; and divers other ways their hopes were nourished. For the Syracusians also, when there came no help from Peloponnesus, made no longer account to subsist by war; but conferred, both amongst themselves and with Nicias, of composition; for Lamachus being dead, the sole command of the army was in him. And though nothing were concluded, yet many things (as was likely with men perplexed, and now more straitly besieged than before) were propounded unto Nicias, and more amongst themselves. And the present ill success had also spread some jealousy amongst them, one of another. And they discharged the generals under whose conduct this happened, as if their harm had come either from their unluckiness or from their perfidiousness, and chose Heracleides, Eucles, and Tellias in their places.

104. Whilst this passed, Gylippus of Lacedaemon and the Corinthian galleys were already at Leucas, purposing with all speed to go over into Sicily. But when terrible reports came unto them from all hands, agreeing in an untruth, that Syracuse was already quite enclosed, Gylippus had hope of Sicily no longer; but desiring to assure Italy, he and Pythen, a Corinthian, with two Laconic and two Corinthian galleys, with all speed crossed the Ionic sea to Tarentum; and the Corinthians were to man ten galleys of their own, two of Leucas, and three of Ambracia, and come after. Gylippus went first from Tarentum to Thurii, as ambassador, by his father's right, who was free of the city of Tarentum; but not winning them to his side, he put out again, and sailed along the coast of Italy. Passing by the Terinaean gulf, he was put from the shore by a wind which in that quarter bloweth strongly against the north, and driven into the main sea; and after another extreme tempest brought in again into Tarentum, where he drew up such of his galleys as had been hurt by the weather and repaired them. Nicias, hearing that he came, contemned the small number of his gal-

leys, as also the Thurians had before, supposing them furnished as for piracy, and appointed no watch for them yet.

105. About the same time of this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded the territory of Argos, they and their confederates, and wasted a great part of their land. And the Athenians aided the Argives with thirty galleys; which most apparently broke the peace between them and the Lacedaemonians. For before, they went out from Pylus with the Argives and Mantineans but in the nature of freebooters, and that also not into Laconia, but other parts of Peloponnesus. Nay, when the Argives have often entreated them but only to land with their arms in Laconia, and having wasted never so little of their territory to return, they would not. But now, under the conduct of Pythodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus, they landed in the territory of Epidaurus Limera and in Prasiae, and there and in other places wasted the country, and gave unto the Lacedaemonians a most justifiable cause to fight against the Athenians. After this, the Athenians being departed from Argos with their galleys, and the Lacedaemonians gone likewise home, the Argives invaded Phliasia, and when they had wasted part of their territory, and killed some of their men, returned.







# THE SEVENTH BOOK

## THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

Gylippus arriveth at Syracuse, checketh the fortune of the Athenians, and cutteth off their works with a counter-wall.—The Lacedaemonians invade Attica and fortify Deceleia.—The confederates of each side are solicited for supplies to be sent to Syracuse.—Two battles fought in the great haven: in the first of which the Syracusians are beaten, in the second superior.—Demosthenes arriveth with a new army, and, attempting the works of the enemy in Epipolae by night, is repulsed with great slaughter of his men.—They fight the third time, and the Syracusians, having the victory, block up the haven with boats.—A catalogue of the confederates on each side.—They fight again at the bars of the haven, where the Athenians, losing their galleys, prepare to march away by land.—In their march they are afflicted, beaten, and finally subdued by the Syracusians.—The death of Nicias and Demosthenes and misery of the captives in the quarry.—Which happened in the nineteenth year of this war.

1. Gylippus and Pythen, having repaired their galleys, from Tarentum went along the coast to Locri Epizephyrii. And upon certain intelligence now that Syracuse was not wholly enclosed, but coming with an army there was entrance still by Epipolae, they consulted whether it were better to take Sicily on their right hand and adventure into the town by sea, or on the left and so first to go to Himera, and then taking along both them and as many other as they could get to their side, to go into it by land. And it was resolved to go to Himera, the rather be-

cause the four Attic galleys, which Nicias, though he condemned them before, had now when he heard they were at Locri sent to wait for them, were not arrived yet at Rhegium. Having prevented this guard, they crossed the strait, and touching at Rhegium and Messana by the way, came to Himera. Being there, they prevailed so far with the Himeraeans that they not only followed them to the war themselves, but also furnished with armour such of Gylippus and Pythen's mariners as wanted; for at Himera they had drawn their galleys to land. They likewise sent to the Selinuntians to meet them at a place assigned with their whole army. The Geloans also, and other of the Siculi, promised to send them forces, though not many, being much the willinger to come to the side both for that Archonidas was lately dead (who reigning over some of the Siculi in those parts, and being a man of no mean power, was friend to the Athenians), and also for that Gylippus seemed to come from Lacedaemon with a good will to the business. Gylippus, taking with him of his own mariners and sea-soldiers, for whom he had gotten arms, at the most seven hundred, and Himeraeans with armour and without in the whole one thousand, and one hundred horse, and some light-armed Selinuntians, with some few horse of the Geloans, and of the Siculi in all about one thousand, marched with these towards Syracuse.

2. In the meantime, the Corinthians with the rest of their galleys putting to sea from Leucas, made after [as they were] every one with what speed he could; and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, though the last that set forth, arrived first at Syracuse with one galley, and but a little before the coming of Gylippus. And finding them ready to call an assembly about an end of the war, he hindered them from it and put them into heart, relating how both the rest of the galleys were coming, and also Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, for general, sent unto them by the Lacedaemonians. With this the Syracusians were re-confirmed, and went presently out with their whole army to meet him, for they understood now that he was near. He, having taken Iegas, a fort, in his way as he passed through the territory of the Siculi, and embattled his men, cometh to Epipolae, and getting up by Euryelus, where also the Athenians had gotten up before, marched together

with the Syracusians towards the wall of the Athenians. At the time when he arrived, the Athenians had finished a double wall of seven or eight furlongs towards the great haven, save only a little next the sea, which they were yet at work on. And on the other side of their circle, towards Trogilus and the other sea, the stones were for the most part laid ready upon the place; and the work was left in some places half, and in some wholly finished. So great was the danger that Syracuse was now brought into.

3. The Athenians, at the sudden coming on of Gylippus, though somewhat troubled at first, yet put themselves in order to receive him. And he, making a stand when he came near, sent a herald to them, saying that if they would abandon Sicily within five days with bag and baggage, he was content to give them truce. Which the Athenians contemning, sent him away without any answer. After this, they were putting themselves into order of battle one against another; but Gylippus, finding the Syracusians troubled and not easily falling into their ranks, led back his army in a more open ground. Nicias led not the Athenians out against him, but lay still at his own fortification. And Gylippus, seeing he came not up, withdrew his army into the top called Temenites, where he lodged all night. The next day, he drew out the greater part of his army and embattled them before the fortification of the Athenians that they might not send succour to any other place; but a part also they sent to the fort of Labdalum, and took it, and slew all those they found within it; for the place was out of sight to the Athenians. The same day the Syracusians also took an Athenian galley as it entered into the great haven.

4. After this, the Syracusians and their confederates began a wall through Epipolae, from the city towards the single cross wall upwards, that the Athenians, unless they could hinder it, might be excluded from bringing their own wall any further on. And the Athenians by this time, having made an end of their wall to the sea, were come up again; and Gylippus (for some part of the wall was but weak), rising with his army by night, went to assault it. But the Athenians, also knowing it (for they lodged all night without the wall), went presently to relieve it; which Gylippus perceiving, again retired. And

the Athenians, when they had built it higher, kept the watch in this part themselves, and divided the rest of the wall to the charge of their confederates. Also it seemed good to Nicias to fortify the place called Plemmyrium. It is a promontory over against the city, which, shooting into the entrance of the great haven, straiteneth the mouth of the same; which fortified, he thought would facilitate the bringing in of necessaries to the army. For by this means, their galleys might ride nearer to the haven of the Syracusians, and not upon every motion of the navy of the enemies to be to come out against them, as they were before, from the bottom of the [great] haven. And he had his mind set chiefly now upon the war by sea, seeing his hopes by land diminished since the arrival of Gylippus. Having therefore drawn his army and galleys to that place, he built about it three fortifications, wherein he placed his baggage, and where now also lay at road both his great vessels of carriage and the nimblest of his galleys. Hereupon principally ensued the first occasion of the great loss of his sea soldiers. For having but little water, and that far to fetch, and his mariners going out also to fetch in wood, they were continually intercepted by the Syracusian horsemen, that were masters of the field. For the third part of the Syracusian cavalry were quartered in a little town called Olympieium to keep those in Plemmyrium from going abroad to spoil the country. Nicias was advertised moreover of the coming of the rest of the Corinthian galleys, and sent out a guard of twenty galleys with order to wait for them about Locri and Rhegium and the passage there into Sicily.

5. Gylippus in the meantime went on with the wall through Epipolae, using the stones laid ready there by the Athenians, and withal drew out the Syracusians and their confederates beyond the point of the same, and ever as he brought them forth put them into their order; and the Athenians, on the other side, embattled themselves against them. Gylippus, when he saw his time, began the battle; and being come to hands, they fought between the fortifications of them both, where the Syracusians and their confederates had no use at all of their horsemen. The Syracusians and their confederates being overcome, and the Athenians having given them truce to take up their dead and erected a trophy, Gylippus assembled the army and told them

that this was not theirs, but his own fault, who, by pitching the battle so far within the fortifications, had deprived them of the use both of their cavalry and darters; and that therefore he meant to bring them on again, and wished them to consider that for forces they were nothing inferior to the enemy; and for courage, it were a thing not to be endured that, being Peloponnesians and Dorians, they should not master and drive out of the country Ionians, islanders, and a rabble of mixed nations.

6. After this, when he saw his opportunity, he brought out the army again. Nicias and the Athenians, who thought it necessary, if not to begin the battle, yet by no means to set light by the wall in hand (for by this time it wanted but little of passing the point of theirs, and proceeding, would give the enemy advantage, both to win if he fought, and not to fight unless he listed), did therefore also set forth to meet the Syracusians. Gylippus, when he had drawn his men of arms farther without the walls than he had done before, gave the onset. His horsemen and darters he placed upon the flank of the Athenians, in ground enough, to which neither of their walls extended. And these horsemen, after the fight was begun, charging upon the left wing of the Athenians next them, put them to flight; by which means the rest of the army was by the Syracusians overcome likewise and driven headlong within their fortifications. The night following, the Syracusians brought up their wall beyond the wall of the Athenians so as they could no longer hinder them, but should be utterly unable, though masters of the field, to enclose the city.

7. After this, the other twelve galleys of the Corinthians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians, undescried of the Athenian galleys that lay in wait for them, entered the haven, under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, and helped the Syracusians to finish what remained to the cross wall.

Now Gylippus went up and down Sicily, raising forces both for sea and land and soliciting to his side all such cities as formerly either had not been forward or had wholly abstained from the war. Other ambassadors also, both of the Syracusians and Corinthians, were sent to Lacedaemon and Corinth to procure new forces to be transported either in ships or boats, or

how they could; because the Athenians had also sent to Athens for the like. In the meantime, the Syracusians both manned their navy and made trial of themselves, as intending to take in hand that part also, and were otherwise exceedingly encouraged.

8. Nicias perceiving this and seeing the strength of the enemy and his own necessities daily increasing, he also sent messengers to Athens, both at other times and often, upon the occasion of every action that passed, and now especially, as finding himself in danger, and that unless they quickly sent for those away that were there already, or sent a great supply unto them, there was no hope of safety. And fearing lest such as he sent, through want of utterance or judgment \* or through desire to please the multitude, should deliver things otherwise than they were, he wrote unto them a letter, conceiving that thus the Athenians should best know his mind, whereof no part could now be suppressed by the messenger, and might therefore enter into deliberation upon true grounds. With these letters and other their instructions, the messengers took their journey. And Nicias, in the meantime having a care to the well guarding of his camp, was wary of entering into any voluntary dangers.

9. In the end of this summer, Euetion, general for the Athenians, with Perdiccas, together with many Thracians, warring against Amphipolis, took not the city, but bringing his galleys about into Strymon, besieged it from the river, lying at Imeraem. And so this summer ended.

10. The next winter, the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens, and having spoken what they had in charge, and answered to such questions as they were asked, they presented the letter; which the clerk of the city, standing forth, read unto the Athenians, containing as followeth:

11. "Athenians, you know by many other my letters what hath passed formerly; nor is it less needful for you to be informed of the state we are in, and to take counsel upon it, at this present. When we had in many battles beaten the Syracusians, against whom we were sent, and had built the walls within which we now lie, came Gylippus a Lacedaemonian, with an army out of Peloponnesus, and also out of some of the cities of

\* The Greek is "want of capacity or memory."



Sicily, and in the first battle was overcome by us; but in the second, forced by his many horsemen and darters, we retired within our works. Whereupon giving over our walling up of the city for the multitude of our enemies, we now sit still. Nor can we indeed have the use of our whole army, because some part of the men of arms are employed to defend our walls. And they have built a single wall up to us, so that now we have no more means to enclose it, except one should come with a great army and win that cross wall of theirs by assault. And so it is that we who seemed to besiege others are besieged ourselves for so much as concerneth the land; for we cannot go far abroad by reason of their cavalry.

12. "They have also sent ambassadors for another army into Peloponnesus; and Gylippus is gone amongst the cities of Sicily, both to solicit such to join with him in the war as have not yet stirred, and of others to get, if he can, both more land soldiers and more munition for their navy. For they intend, as I have been informed, both to assault our wall by land with their army and to make trial what they are able to do with their navy by sea. For though our fleet (which they also have heard) were vigorous at first, both for soundness of the galleys and entireness of the men, yet our galleys are now soaked with lying so long in the water and our men consumed. For we want the means to haul a-land our galleys and trim them, because the galleys of the enemy, as good as ours and more in number, do keep us in a continual expectation of assault, which they manifestly endeavour. And seeing it is in their own choice to attempt or not, they have therefore liberty to dry their galleys at their pleasure; for they lie not, as we, in attendance upon others.

13. "Nay, we could hardly do it, though we had many galleys spare, and were not constrained, as now, to keep watch upon them with our whole number. For should we abate though but a little of our observance, we should want provision; which, as we are, being to pass so near their city, is brought in with difficulty. And hence it is that our mariners both formerly have been and are now wasted. For our mariners, fetching wood and water and foraging far off, are intercepted by the horsemen; and our slaves, now we are on equal terms, run over to

the enemy. As for strangers, some of them having come aboard by constraint, return presently to their cities; and others having been levied at first with great wages, thinking they came to enrich themselves rather than to fight, now they see the enemy make so strong resistance, both otherwise beyond their expectation and especially with their navy, partly take pretext to be gone that they may serve the enemy, and partly, Sicily being large, shift themselves away every one as he can. Some there are also, who having bought here Hyccarian slaves, have gotten the captains of galleys to accept of them in the room of themselves, and thereby destroyed the purity of our naval strength.

14. "To you I write, who know how small a time any fleet continueth in the height of vigour, and how few of the mariners are skilful both how to hasten the course of a galley and how to contain the oar. But of all, my greatest trouble is this: that being general, I can neither make them do better (for your natures are hard to be governed) nor get mariners in any other place (which the enemy can do from many places), and must of necessity have them from whence we brought both those we have and those we have lost. For our now confederate cities, Naxos and Catana, are not able to supply us. Had the enemy but that one thing more, that the towns of Italy that now send us provision, seeing what estate we are now in and you not helping us, would turn to them, the war were at an end and we expugned without another stroke.

"I could have written to you other things more pleasing than these, but not more profitable, seeing it is necessary for you to know certainly the affairs here when you go to council upon them. Withal, because I know your natures to be such as though you love to hear the best, yet afterwards when things fall not out accordingly you will call in question them that write it, I thought best to write the truth for my own safety's sake.

15. "And now think thus: that though we have carried ourselves, both captains and soldiers, in that for which we came at first hither, unblameably, yet since all Sicily is united against us and another army expected out of Peloponnesus, you must resolve (for those we have here are not enough for the enemy's present forces) either to send for these away, or to send hither

another army, both of land and sea soldiers, no less than the former, and money not a little; and also a general to succeed me, who am able no longer to stay here, being troubled with the stone [in the kidneys]. I must crave your pardon. I have done you many good services in the conducts of your armies when I had my health. What you will do, do in the very beginning of spring, and delay it not. For the enemy will soon have furnished himself of his Sicilian aids; and though those from Peloponnesus will be later, yet if you look not to it, they will get hither partly unseen, as before, and partly by preventing you with speed."

16. These were the contents of the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, when they had heard it read, though they released not Nicias of his charge, yet for the present, till such time as others chosen to be in commission might arrive, they joined with him two of those that were already in the army, Menander and Euthydemon, to the end that he might not sustain the whole burthen alone in his sickness. They concluded likewise to send another army, as well for the sea as the land, both of Athenians enrolled and of their confederates. And for fellow-generals with Nicias, they elected Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, the son of Thucles. Eurymedon they sent away presently for Sicily, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten galleys and twenty talents of silver, to tell them there that aid was coming and that there was care taken of them.

17. But Demosthenes, staying, made preparation for the voyage to set out early the next spring; and sent unto the confederates, appointing what forces they should provide, and to furnish himself amongst them with money and galleys and men of arms.

The Athenians sent also twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, to watch that none should go over into Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnesus. For the Corinthians, after the ambassadors were come to them and had brought news of the amendment of the affairs in Sicily, thought it was well that they had sent thither those other galleys before; but now they were encouraged a great deal more, and prepared men of arms to be transported into Sicily in ships; and the Lacedaemonians did the

like for the rest of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians manned five-and-twenty galleys to present battle to the fleet that kept watch at Naupactus, that the ships with the men of arms, whilst the Athenians attended these galleys so embattled against them, might pass by unhindered.

18. The Lacedaemonians, as they intended before, and being also instigated to it by the Syracusians and Corinthians, upon advertisement now of the Athenians' new supply for Sicily, prepared likewise to invade Attica, thereby to divert them. And Alcibiades also importunately urged the fortifying of Deceleia, and by no means to war remissly. But the Lacedaemonians were heartened thereunto principally because they thought the Athenians having in hand a double war, one against them and another against the Sicilians, would be the easier pulled down, and because they conceived the breach of the last peace was in themselves. For in the former war, the injury proceeded from their own side, in that the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of peace; and because also, whereas it was inserted in the former articles that arms should not be carried against such as would stand to trial of judgment, they had refused such trial when the Athenians offered it. And they thought all their misfortunes had deservedly befallen them for that cause, remembering amongst others, the calamity at Pylus. But when the Athenians with a fleet of thirty sail had spoiled part of the territory of Epidaurus and of Prasiae and other places, and their soldiers that lay in garrison in Pylus had taken booty in the country about, and seeing that as often as there arose any controversy touching any doubtful point of the articles, the Lacedaemonians offering trial by judgment, they refused it, then indeed, the Lacedaemonians, conceiving the Athenians to be in the same fault that themselves had been in before, betook themselves earnestly to the war. And this winter, they sent about unto their confederates to make ready iron, and all instruments of fortification. And for the aid they were to transport in ships to the Sicilians, they both made provision amongst themselves and compelled the rest of Peloponnesus to do the like. So ended this winter, and the eighteenth year of the war written by Thucydides.

19. The next spring, in the very beginning, earlier than ever

before, the Lacedaemonians and their confederates entered with their army into Attica, under the command of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. And first they wasted the champagne country, and then went in hand with the wall at Deceleia, dividing the work amongst the army, according to their cities. This Deceleia is from the city of Athens at the most but one hundred and twenty furlongs, and about as much or a little more from Boeotia. This fort they made in the plain, and in the most opportune place that could be to annoy the Athenians, and in sight of the city. Now the Peloponnesians and their confederates in Attica went on with their fortification. They in Peloponnesus sent away their ships with the men of arms about the same time into Sicily, of which the Lacedaemonians, out of the best of their Helotes and men made newly free, sent in the whole six hundred, and Eccritus, a Spartan, for commander; and the Boeotians three hundred, under the conduct of Xenon and Nicon, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian. And these set forth first, and put to sea at Taenarus in Laconia. After them a little, the Corinthians sent away five hundred more, part from the city itself of Corinth and part mercenary Arcadians, and Alexarchus, a Corinthian, for captain. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred with them that went from Corinth, and Sargeus, a Sicyonian, for captain. Now the twenty-five Corinthian galleys that were manned in winter lay opposite to the twenty galleys of Athens which were at Naupactus till such time as the men of arms in the ships from Peloponnesus might get away; for which purpose they were also set out at first, that the Athenians might not have their minds upon these ships so much as upon the galleys.

20. In the meantime also the Athenians, whilst Deceleia was fortifying, in the beginning of the spring, sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus under the command of Charicles, the son of Apollodorus, with order when he came to Argos to take aboard the men of arms which the Argives were to send them, according to league; and sent away Demosthenes (as they intended before) into Sicily, with threescore galleys of Athens and five of Chios, and one thousand two hundred men of arms of the roll of Athens, and as many of the islanders as they could get, provided by their subject confederates of all other neces-

saries for the war. But he had order to join first with Charicles and help him to make war first upon Laconia. So Demosthenes went to Aegina and stayed there both for the remnant of his own army, if any were left behind, and for Charicles till he had taken aboard the Argives.

21. In Sicily, about the same time of the spring, Gylippus also returned to Syracuse, bringing with him from the cities he had dealt withal as great forces as severally he could get from them. And having assembled the Syracusians, he told them that they ought to man as many galleys as they could and make trial of a battle by sea; and that he hoped thereby to perform somewhat to the benefit of the war which should be worthy the danger. Hermocrates also was none of the least means of getting them to undertake the Athenians with their navy, who told them that neither the Athenians had this skill by sea hereditary or from everlasting, but were more inland men than the Syracusians, and forced to become seamen by the Medes, and that to daring men, such as the Athenians are, they are most formidable that are as daring against them; for wherewith they terrify their neighbours, which is not always the advantage of power, but boldness of enterprizing, with the same shall they in like manner be terrified by their enemies. He knew it, he said, certainly, that the Syracusians, by their unexpected daring to encounter the Athenian navy, would get more advantage in respect of the fear it would cause than the Athenians should endamage them by their odds of skill. He bade them therefore to make trial of their navy and to be afraid no longer. The Syracusians, on these persuasions of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and others if any were, became now extremely desirous to fight by sea, and presently manned their galleys.

22. Gylippus, when the navy was ready, drew out his whole power of land soldiers in the beginning of night, meaning to go himself and assault the fortifications in Plemmyrium; withal the galleys of the Syracusians, by appointment, thirty-five of them came up towards it out of the great haven; and forty-five more came about out of the little haven, where also was their arsenal, with purpose to join with those within and to go together to Plemmyrium that the Athenians might be troubled on both sides. But the Athenians having quickly manned sixty galleys

to oppose them, with twenty-five of them they fought with the thirty-five of the Syracusians in the great haven, and with the rest went to meet those that came about from the little haven. And these fought presently before the mouth of the great haven and held each other to it for a long time, one side endeavouring to force, the other to defend the entrance.

23. In the meantime, Gylippus (the Athenians in Plemmyrium being now come down to the water side, and having their minds busied upon the fight of the galleys) betimes in the morning and on a sudden assaulted the fortifications before they could come back again to defend them, and possessed first the greatest and afterwards the two lesser; for they that watched in these, when they saw the greatest so easily taken, durst stay no longer. They that fled upon the losing of the first wall and put themselves into boats and into a certain ship got hardly into the camp; for whilst the Syracusians in the great haven had yet the better in the fight upon the water, they gave them chase with one nimble galley. But by that time that the other two walls were taken, the Syracusians upon the water were overcome; and the Athenians which fled from those two walls got to their camp with more ease. For those Syracusian galleys that fought before the haven's mouth, having beaten back the Athenians, entered in disorder, and falling foul one on another, gave away the victory unto the Athenians, who put to flight not only them, but also those other by whom they had before been overcome within the haven, and sunk eleven galleys of the Syracusians and slew most of the men aboard them, save only the men of three galleys, whom they took alive. Of their own galleys they lost only three. When they had drawn to land the wreck of the Syracusian galleys and erected a trophy in the little island over against Plemmyrium, they returned to their camp.

24. The Syracusians, though such were their success in the battle by sea, yet they won the fortification in Plemmyrium, and set up three trophies, for every wall one. One of the two walls last taken they demolished; but two they repaired and kept with a garrison. At the taking of these walls, many men were slain and many taken alive; and their goods, which altogether was a great matter, were all taken. For the Athenians

using these works for their storehouse, there was in them much wealth and victual belonging unto merchants and much unto captains of galleys. For there were sails within it for forty galleys, besides other furniture, and three galleys drawn to land. And this loss of Plemmyrium was it that most and principally impaired the Athenians' army. For the entrance of their provision was now no longer safe; for the Syracusians lying against them there with their galleys kept them out, and nothing could be brought in unto them but by fight; and the army besides was thereby otherwise terrified and dejected.

25. After this the Syracusians sent out twelve galleys under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusian. Of which one carried ambassadors into Peloponnesus to declare what hope they had now of their business and to instigate them to a sharper war in Attica. The other eleven went into Italy, upon intelligence of certain vessels laden with commodities coming to the Athenian army, which also they met with and destroyed most of them; and the timber, which for building of galleys the Athenians had ready framed, they burned in the territory of Caulonia. After this they went to Locri; and riding here, there came unto them one of the ships that carried the men of arms of the Thespians, whom the Syracusians took aboard and went homeward by the coast. The Athenians that watched for them with twenty galleys at Megara took one of them and the men that were in her, but could not take the rest, so that they escaped through to Syracuse. There was also a light skirmish in the haven of Syracuse, about the piles which the Syracusians had driven down before their old harbour, to the end that the galleys might ride within and the Athenians not annoy them by assault. The Athenians, having brought to the place a ship of huge greatness, fortified with wooden turrets and covered against fire, caused certain men with [little] boats to go and fasten cords unto the piles, and so broke them up with craning. Some also the divers did cut up with saws. In the meantime the Syracusians from the harbour and they from the great ship shot at each other, till in the end the greatest part of the piles were by the Athenians gotten up. But the greatest difficulty was to get up those piles which lay hidden. For some of them they had so driven in as that they came not above the water,



so that he that should come near was in danger to be thrown upon them as upon a rock. But these also, for reward, the divers went down and sawed asunder. But the Syracusians continually drave down other in their stead. Other devices they had against each other, as was not unlikely between armies so near opposed; and many light skirmishes passed, and attempts of all kinds were put in execution. The Syracusians moreover sent ambassadors, some Corinthians, some Ambraciotes, and some Lacedaemonians, unto the cities about them to let them know that they had won Plemmyrium and that in the battle by sea they were not overcome by the strength of the enemy, but by their own disorder; and also to show what hope they were in in other respects, and to entreat their aid both of sea and land forces; forso much as the Athenians expecting another army, if they would send aid before it came whereby to overthrow that which they had now there, the war would be at an end. Thus stood the affairs of Sicily.

26. Demosthenes, as soon as his forces which he was to carry to the succour of those in Sicily were gotten together, put to sea from Aegina, and sailing into Peloponnesus, joined with Charicles and the thirty galleys that were with him. And having taken aboard some men of arms of the Argives, came to Laconia, and first wasted part of the territory of Epidaurus Limera. From thence going to that part of Laconia which is over against the island Cythera, where there is a temple of Apollo, they wasted a part of the country and fortified an isthmus there, both that the Helotes might have a refuge in it running away from the Lacedaemonians and that freebooters from thence, as from Pylus, might fetch in prizes from the territory adjoining. As soon as the place was taken in, Demosthenes himself went on to Corcyra, to take up the confederates there, with intent to go thence speedily into Sicily. And Charicles, having stayed to finish and put a garrison into the fortification, went afterwards with his thirty galleys to Athens; and the Argives also went home.

27. The same winter also came to Athens a thousand and three hundred targetiers, of those called Machaerophori of the race of them that are called Dii, and were to have gone with Demosthenes into Sicily. But coming too late, the Athenians

resolved to send them back again into Thrace, as being too chargeable a matter to entertain them only for the war in Deceleia; for their pay was to have been a drachma a man by the day. For Deceleia, being this summer fortified first by the whole army and then by the several cities maintained with a garrison by turns, much endamaged the Athenians and weakened their estate, both by destroying their commodities and consuming of their men, so as nothing more. For the former invasions, having been short, hindered them not from reaping the benefit of the earth for the rest of the time. But now, the enemy continually lying upon them, and sometimes with greater forces, sometimes of necessity with the ordinary garrison making incursions and fetching in booty, Agis, the king of Lacedaemon, being always there in person and diligently prosecuting the war, the Athenians were thereby very grievously afflicted. For they were not only deprived of the fruit of the land, but also above twenty thousand of their slaves fled over to the enemy, whereof the greatest part were artificers; besides they lost all their sheep and oxen. And by the continual going out of the Athenian horsemen, making excursions to Deceleia and defending the country, their horses became partly lamed through incessant labour in rugged grounds and partly wounded by the enemy.

28. And their provision, which formerly they used to bring in from Euboea by Oropus the shortest way, through Deceleia by land, they were now forced to fetch in by sea at great cost about the promontory of Sunium. And whatsoever the city was wont to be served withal from without, it now wanted, and instead of a city was become as it were a fort. And the Athenians, watching on the battlements of the wall, in the day time by turns, but in the night, both winter and summer, all at once (except the horsemen), part at the walls and part at the arms, were quite tired. But that which pressed them most was that they had two wars at once. And yet their obstinacy was so great as no man would have believed till now they saw it. For being besieged at home from the fortification of the Peloponnesians, no man would have imagined that they should not only not have recalled their army out of Sicily, but have also besieged Syracuse there, a city of itself no less than Athens;

and therein so much have exceeded the expectation of the rest of the Grecians both in power and courage (who in the beginning of this war conceived that if the Peloponnesians invaded their territory, some of them, that they might hold out two years, others three, no man more), as that in the seventeenth year after they were first invaded they should have undertaken an expedition into Sicily, and being every way weakened already by the former war, have undergone another, not inferior to that which they had before with the Peloponnesians. Now their treasure being by these wars and by the detriment sustained from Deceleia and other great expenses that came upon them at a very low ebb, about this time they imposed on such as were under their dominion a twentieth part of all goods passing by sea for a tribute, by this means to improve their comings in. For their expenses were not now as before, but so much greater by how much the war was greater, and their revenue besides cut off.

29. The Thracians, therefore, that came too late to go with Demosthenes, they presently sent back, as being unwilling to lay out money in such a scarcity, and gave the charge of carrying them back to Diitrephes, with command as he went along those coasts (for his way was through the Euripus), if occasion served, to do somewhat against the enemy. He accordingly landed them by Tanagra and hastily fetched in some small booty. Then going over the Euripus from Chalcis in Euboea, he disembarked again in Boeotia and led his soldiers towards Mycalessus, and lay all night at the temple of Mercury undiscovered, which is distant from Mycalessus about sixteen furlongs. The next day he cometh to the city, being a very great one,\* and taketh it; for they kept no watch nor expected that any man would have come in and assaulted them so far from the sea. Their walls also were but weak, in some places fallen down, and in others low-built, and their gates open through security. The Thracians, entering into Mycalessus, spoiled both houses and temples, slew the people without mercy on old or young, but killed all they could light on, both women and children, yea, and the labouring cattle, and whatsoever other

\* The better reading in the manuscript is the negative "being *no* great one."

living thing they saw. For the nation of the Thracians, where they dare, are extreme bloody, equal to any of the barbarians. Inasmuch as there was put in practice at this time, besides other disorder, all forms of slaughter that could be imagined; they likewise fell upon the schoolhouse, which was in the city a great one, and the children newly entered into it; and killed them every one. And the calamity of the whole city, as it was as great as ever befell any, so also was it more unexpected and more bitter.

30. The Thebans, hearing of it, came out to help them, and overtaking the Thracians before they had gone far, both recovered the booty and chased them to the Euripus and to the sea, where the galleys lay that brought them. Some of them they killed; of those most in their going aboard, for swim they could not, and such as were in the [small] boats, when they saw how things went a-land, had thrust off their boats, and lay without the Euripus. In the rest of the retreat, the Thracians behaved themselves not unhandsomely against the Theban horsemen, by whom they were charged first; but running out, and again rallying themselves in a circle, according to the manner of their country, defended themselves well and lost but few men in that action. But some also they lost in the city itself, whilst they stayed behind for pillage. But in the whole of thirteen hundred there were slain [only] two hundred and fifty. Of the Thebans and others that came out to help the city, there were slain, horsemen and men of arms, one with another about twenty; and amongst them Scirphondas of Thebes, one of the governors of Boeotia: and of the Mycallestians there perished a part. Thus went the matter at Mycalessus, the loss which it received being, for the quantity of the city, no less to be lamented than any that happened in the whole war.

31. Demosthenes, going from Corcyra \* after his fortifying in Laconia, found a ship lying in Pheia of Elis, and in her certain men of arms of Corinth, ready to go into Sicily. The ship he sunk; but the men escaped, and afterwards, getting another ship, went on in their voyage. After this, Demosthenes, being about Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took aboard their men of arms and sent to Naupactus for the Messenians. From thence he

\* The Greek is "*in the direction of Corcyra.*"

crossed over to the continent of Acarnania, to Alyzea and Anactorium, which belonged to the Athenians. Whilst he was in these parts, he met with Eurymedon out of Sicily, that had been sent in winter unto the army with commodities, who told him amongst other things how he had heard by the way after he was at sea that the Syracusians had won Plemmyrium. Conon also, the captain of Naupactus, came to them and related that the twenty-five galleys of Corinth that lay before Naupactus would not give over war and yet delayed to fight, and therefore desired to have some galleys sent him, as being unable with his eighteen to give battle to twenty-five of the enemy. Whereupon Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent ten galleys more to those at Naupactus, the nimblest of the whole fleet, by Conon himself, and went themselves about furnishing of what belonged to the army. Of whom Eurymedon went to Corcyra, and having appointed them there to man fifteen galleys, levied men of arms; for now giving over his course to Athens, he joined with Demosthenes, as having been elected with him in the charge of general; and Demosthenes took up slingers and darters in the parts about Acarnania.

32. The ambassadors of the Syracusians, which after the taking of Plemmyrium had been sent unto the cities about, having now obtained and levied an army amongst them, were conducting the same to Syracuse. But Nicias, upon intelligence thereof, sent unto such cities of the Siculi as had the passages and were their confederates, the Centoripines, Halicyaeans, and others, not to suffer the enemy to go by, but to unite themselves and stop them, for that they would not so much as offer to pass any other way, seeing the Agrigentines had already denied them. When the Sicilians were marching, the Siculi, as the Athenians had desired them, put themselves in ambush in three several places, and setting upon them unawares and on a sudden, slew about eight hundred of them, and all the ambassadors save only one, a Corinthian, which conducted the rest that escaped, being about fifteen hundred, to Syracuse.

33. About the same time came unto them also the aid of the Camarinaeans, five hundred men of arms, three hundred darters, and three hundred archers. Also the Geloans sent them men for five galleys, besides four hundred darters and two hundred

horsemen. For now all Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, but all the rest, who before stood looking on, came in to the Syracusian side against the Athenians. [Nevertheless], the Syracusians, after this blow received amongst the Siculi, held their hands and assaulted not the Athenians for a while.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having their army now ready, crossed over from Corcyra and the continent with the whole army to the promontory of Iapygia. From thence they went to the Choerades, islands of Iapygia, and here took in certain Iapygian darters to the number of two hundred and fifty, of the Messapian nation. And having renewed a certain ancient alliance with Artas, who reigned there and granted them those darters, they went thence to Metapontum, a city of Italy. There, by virtue of a league, they got two galleys and three hundred darters, which taken aboard, they kept along the shore till they came to the territory of Thurii. Here they found the adverse faction to the Athenians to have been lately driven out in a sedition. And because they desired to muster their army here, that they might see if any were left behind, and persuade the Thurians to join with them freely in the war, and, as things stood, to have for friends and enemies the same that were so to the Athenians; they stayed about that in the territory of the Thurians.

34. The Peloponnesians and the rest, who were at the same time in the twenty-five galleys that for safeguard of the ships lay opposite to the galleys before Naupactus, having prepared themselves for battle, and with more galleys, so as they were little inferior in number to those of the Athenians, went to an anchor under Irineus of Achaia in Rhyfica. The place where they rode was in form like a half moon; and their land forces they had ready on either side to assist them, both Corinthians and their other confederates of those parts, embattled upon the points of the promontory; and their galleys made up the space between, under the command of Polyantes, a Corinthian. Against these the Athenians came up with thirty-three galleys from Naupactus, commanded by Diphilus. The Corinthians at first lay still; but afterwards when they saw their time, and the signal given, they charged the Athenians and the fight began.

They held each other to it long. The Athenians sank three galleys of the Corinthians; and though none of their own were sunk, yet seven were made unserviceable, which, having encountered the Corinthian galleys a-head, were torn on both sides between the beaks and the oars by the beaks of the Corinthian galleys, made stronger for the same purpose. After they had fought with equal fortune, and so as both sides challenged the victory; though yet the Athenians were masters of the wrecks, as driven by the wind into the main, and because the Corinthians came not out to renew the fight, they at length parted. There was no chasing of men that fled, nor a prisoner taken on either side; because the Peloponnesians and Corinthians fighting near the land easily escaped, nor was there any galley of the Athenians sunk. But when the Athenians were gone back to Naupactus, the Corinthians presently set up a trophy as victors, in regard that more of the Athenian galleys were made unserviceable than of theirs, and thought themselves not to have had the worse for the same reason that the others thought themselves not to have had the better. For the Corinthians think they have the better when they have not much the worse; and the Athenians think they have the worse when they have not much the better. And when the Peloponnesians were gone and their army by land dissolved, the Athenians also set up a trophy in Achaia, as if the victory had been theirs, distant from Erineus, where the Peloponnesians rode, about twenty furlongs. This was the success of that battle by sea.

35. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after the Thurians had put in readiness to go with them seven hundred men of arms and three hundred darters, commanded their galleys to go along the coast to Croton, and conducted their land soldiers, having first taken a muster of them all upon the side of the river Sybaris, through the territory of the Thurians. But coming to the river Hylia, upon word sent them from the men of Croton that if the army went through their territory it should be against their will, they marched down to the seaside and to the mouth of the river Hylia, where they stayed all that night and were met by their galleys. The next day embarking, they kept along the shore and touched at every town saving Locri till they arrived at Petra in the territory of Rhegium.

36. The Syracusians in the meantime, upon intelligence of their coming on, resolved to try again what they could do with their navy and with their new supply of landmen, which they had gotten together on purpose to fight with the Athenians before Demosthenes and Eurymedon should arrive. And they furnished their navy, both otherwise and according to the advantages they had learnt in the last battle, and also made shorter the heads of their galleys, and thereby stronger, and made beaks to them of a great thickness, which they also strengthened with rafters fastened to the sides of the galleys, both within and without, of six cubits long, in such manner as the Corinthians had armed their galleys a-head to fight with those before Naupactus. For the Syracusians made account that against the Athenian galleys not so built, but weak before, as not using so much to meet the enemy a-head as upon the side by fetching a compass, they could not but have the better, and that to fight in the great haven, many galleys in not much room was an advantage to them; for that using the direct encounter, they should break with their firm and thick beaks the hollow and infirm foreparts of the galleys of their enemies; and that the Athenians, in that narrow room, would want means both to go about and to go through them, which was the point of art they most relied on. For as for their passing through, they would hinder it themselves as much as they could; and for fetching compass, the straitness of the place would not suffer it. And that fighting a-head, which seemed before to be want of skill in the masters [to do otherwise], was what they would now principally make use of; for in this would be their principal advantage. For the Athenians, if overcome, would have no retiring but to the land, which was but a little way off and little in compass, near their own camp; and of the rest of the haven themselves should be masters. And the enemy being pressed, could not choose, thronging together into a little room and all into one and the same place, but disorder one another, which was indeed the thing that in all their battles by sea did the Athenians the greatest hurt, having not, as the Syracusians had, the liberty of the whole haven to retire unto. And to go about into a place of more room, they having it in their power to set upon them from the main sea, and to retire again at



pleasure, they should never be able, especially having Plemmyrium for enemy, and the haven's mouth not being large.

37. The Syracusians, having devised thus much over and above their former skill and strength, and far more confident now since the former battle by sea, assaulted them both with their army and with their navy at once. The landmen from the city Gylippus drew sooner out a little and brought them to the wall of the Athenians' camp upon the side toward the city; and from Olympieium, the men of arms, all that were there, and the horsemen and light armed of the Syracusians came up to the wall on the other side. And by and by after, came sailing forth also the galleys of the Syracusians and their confederates. The Athenians, that thought at first they would have made the attempt only with their landmen, seeing also the galleys on a sudden coming towards them, were in confusion; and some of them put themselves in order upon and before the walls against those that came from the city; and others went out to meet the horsemen and darters that were coming in great numbers and with speed from Olympieium and the parts without; others again went aboard, and withal came to aid those ashore. But when the galleys were manned they put off, being seventy-five in number, and those of Syracuse about eighty.

38. Having spent much of the day in charging and retiring and trying each other, and performed nothing worth the mentioning, save that the Syracusians sank a galley or two of the Athenians, they parted again; and the land soldiers retired at the same time from the wall of the Athenian camp. The next day the Syracusians lay still without showing any sign of what they meant to do. Yet Nicias, seeing that the battle by sea was with equality and imagining that they would fight again, made the captains to repair their galleys, such as had been torn, and two great ships to be moored without those piles which he had driven into the sea before his galleys, to be instead of a haven enclosed. These ships he placed about two acres' breadth asunder, to the end, if any galley chanced to be pressed, it might safely run in and again go safely out at leisure. In performing of this the Athenians spent a whole day from morning until night.

39. The next day the Syracusians assaulted the Athenians

again with the same forces, both by sea and land, that they had done before, but begun earlier in the morning; and being opposed fleet against fleet, they drew out a great part of the day now again as before in attempting upon each other without effect. Till at last Ariston, the son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, the most expert master that the Syracusians had in their fleet, persuaded the commanders in the navy to send to such in the city as it belonged to and command that the market should be speedily kept at the seaside, and to compel every man to bring thither whatsoever he had fit for meat and there to sell it, that the mariners, disembarking, might presently dine by the galleys' side, and quickly again, unlooked for, assault the Athenians afresh the same day.

40. This advice being liked, they sent a messenger and the market was furnished. And the Syracusians suddenly rowed astern towards the city, and disembarking, dined there right on the shore. The Athenians, supposing they had retired towards the city as vanquished, landed at leisure, and amongst other business went about the dressing of their dinner, as not expecting to have fought again the same day. But the Syracusians, suddenly going aboard, came towards them again; and the Athenians, in great tumult and for the most part undined, embarking disorderly, at length with much ado went out to meet them. For a while they held their hands on both sides and but observed each other. But anon after, the Athenians thought not fit by longer dallying to overcome themselves with their own labour, but rather to fight as soon as they could, and thereupon at once with a joint shout charged the enemy, and the fight began. The Syracusians received [and resisted] their charge, and fighting, as they had before determined, with their galleys head to head with those of the Athenians, and provided with beaks for the purpose, brake the galleys of the Athenians very much between the heads of the galleys and the oars. The Athenians were also annoyed much by the darters from the decks, but much more by those Syracusians who, going about in small boats, passed under the rows of the oars of the enemy's galleys, and coming close to their sides, threw their darts at the mariners from thence.

41. The Syracusians, having fought in this manner with the

utmost of their strength, in the end gat the victory; and the Athenians, between the [two] ships, escaped into their harbour. The Syracusian galleys chased them as far as to those ships; but the dolphins hanging from the masts over the entrance of the harbour forbade them to follow any further. Yet there were two galleys, which upon a jollity after victory approached them, but both were lost, of which one with her men and all was taken. The Syracusians, after they had sunk seven galleys of the Athenians and torn many more, and of the men had taken some alive and killed others, retired, and for both the battles erected trophies, and had already an assured hope of being far superior by sea, and also made account to subdue the army by land. And they prepared to assault them again in both kinds.

42. In the meantime Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian supply, being about seventy-three galleys, and men of arms, of their own and of their confederates, about five thousand, besides darters, as well barbarians as Greeks, not a few, and slingers and archers, and all other provision sufficient. For the present it not a little daunted the Syracusians and their confederates to see no end of their danger, and that, notwithstanding the fortifying in Deceleia, another army should come now equal and like unto their former, and that their power should be so great in every kind. And on the other side, it was a kind of strengthening after weakness to the Athenian army that was there before. Demosthenes, when he saw how things stood, and thinking it unfit to loiter and fall into Nicias' case—for Nicias, who was formidable at his first coming, when he set not presently upon Syracuse but wintered at Catana, both grew into contempt and was prevented also by the coming of Gylippus thither with an army out of Peloponnesus; the which, if Nicias had gone against Syracuse at first, had never been so much as sent for; for supposing themselves to have been strong enough alone, they had at once both found themselves too weak and the city been enclosed with a wall; whereby, though they had sent for it, it could not have helped them as it did—Demosthenes, I say, considering this, and that he also even at the present and the same day was most terrible to the enemy, intended with all speed to make use of this present terribleness of the army. And having observed that the cross wall of the

Syracusians, wherewith they hindered the Athenians from enclosing the city, was but single, and that if they could be masters of the ascent to Epipolae and again of the camp there, the same might easily be taken (for none would have stood against them), hasted to put it to trial, and thought it his shortest way to the dispatching of the war. For either he should have success, he thought, and so win Syracuse, or he would lead away the army and no longer without purpose consume both the Athenians there with him and the whole state. The Athenians therefore went out and first wasted the territory of the Syracusians about the river Anapus, and were the stronger, as at first, both by sea and land. For the Syracusians durst neither way go out against them, but only with their horsemen and darters from Olympieum.

43. After this, Demosthenes thought good to try the wall which the Athenians had built to enclose the city withal with engines. But seeing the engines were burnt by the defendants fighting from the wall, and that having assaulted it in divers parts with the rest of his army he was notwithstanding put back, he resolved to spend the time no longer, but having gotten the consent of Nicias and the rest in commission thereunto, to put in execution his design for Epipolae, as was before intended. By day it was thought impossible not to be discovered, either in their approach or in their ascent. Having therefore first commanded to take five days' provision of victual, and all the masons and workmen, as also store of casting weapons, and whatsoever they might need, if they overcame, for fortification, he and Eurymedon and Menander, with the whole army, marched about midnight to Epipolae, leaving Nicias in the camp. Being come to Epipolae at Euryelus, where also the army went up before, they were not only not discovered by the Syracusians that kept the watch, but ascending took a certain fortification of the Syracusians there and killed part of them that kept it. But the greatest number, escaping, ran presently to the camps, of which there were in Epipolae three walled about without the city, one of Syracusians, one of other Sicilians, and one of confederates, and carried the news of their coming in, and told it to those six hundred Syracusians that kept this part of Epipolae at the first, who presently went forth to meet them.

But Demosthenes and the Athenians lighting on them, though they fought valiantly, put them to flight, and presently marched on, making use of the present heat of the army to finish what he came for before it were too late; and others [going on] in their first course took the cross-wall of the Syracusians, they flying that kept it, and were throwing down the battlements thereof. The Syracusians and their confederates, and Gylippus and those with him, came out to meet them from their camps; but because the attempt was unexpected and in the night, they charged the Athenians timorously, and were even at first forced to retire. But as the Athenians advanced more out of order, [chiefly] as having already gotten the victory, but desiring also quickly to pass through all that remained yet unfoughten with, lest through their remissness in following they might again rally themselves, the Boeotians withstood them first, and charging, forced them to turn their backs.

44. And here the Athenians were mightily in disorder and perplexed, so that it hath been very hard to be informed of any side in what manner each thing passed. For if in the day time, when things are better seen, yet they that are present cannot tell how all things go, save only what every man with much ado seeth near unto himself, how then in a battle by night (the only one that happened between great armies in all this war) can a man know anything for certain? For though the moon shined bright, yet they saw one another no otherwise than as by the moonlight was likely, so as to see a body, but not be sure whether it were a friend or not. And the men of arms on both sides, being not a few in number, had but little ground to turn in. Of the Athenians, some were already overcome, others went on in their first way. Also a great part of the rest of the army was already part gotten up and part ascending, and knew not which way to march. For after the Athenians once turned their backs, all before them was in confusion; and it was hard to distinguish of anything for the noise. For the Syracusians and their confederates prevailing encouraged each other and received the assailants with exceeding great shouts (for they had no other means in the night to express themselves); and the Athenians sought each other and took for enemies all before them, though friends and of the number of those that fled, and

by often asking the word, there being no other means of distinction, all asking at once they both made a great deal of stir amongst themselves and revealed the word to the enemy. But they did not in like manner know the word of the Syracusians, because these, being victorious and undistracted, knew one another better; so that when they lighted on any number of the enemy, though they themselves were more, yet the enemy escaped as knowing the watchword; but they, when they could not answer, were slain. But that which hurt them most was the tune of the Paean, which being in both armies the same, drave them to their wits' end. For the Argives and Corcyraeans and all other of the Doric race on the Athenians' part, when they sounded the Paean, terrified the Athenians on one side; and the enemy terrified them with the like on the other side. Wherefore at the last, falling one upon another in divers parts of the army, friends against friends, and countrymen against countrymen, they not only terrified each other, but came to hand-strokes and could hardly again be parted. As they fled before the enemy, the way of the descent from Epipolae by which they were to go back being but strait, many of them threw themselves down from the rocks, and died so. And of the rest that gat down safely into the plain, though the greatest part, and all that were of the old army by their knowledge of the country, escaped into the camp; yet of these that came last, some lost their way, and straying in the fields, when the day came on were cut off by the Syracusian horsemen that ranged the country about.

45. The next day the Syracusians erected two trophies, one in Epipolae at the ascent and another where the first check was given by the Boeotians. The Athenians received their dead under truce. And many there were that died, both of themselves and of their confederates; but the arms taken were more than for the number of the slain. For of such as were forced to quit their bucklers and leap down from the rocks, though some perished, yet some there also were that escaped.

46. After this, the Syracusians, having by such unlooked-for prosperity recovered their former courage, sent Sicanus with fifteen galleys to Agrigentum, being in sedition, to bring that city, if they could, to their obedience. And Gylippus went

again to the Sicilian cities by land to raise yet another army, as being in hope to take the camp of the Athenians by assault, considering how the matter had gone in Epipolae.

47. In the meantime the Athenian generals went to council upon their late overthrow and present general weakness of the army. For they saw not only that their designs prospered not, but that the soldiers also were weary of staying. For they were troubled with sickness, proceeding from a double cause, this being the time of the year most obnoxious to diseases, and the place where they lay moorish and noisome; and all things else appeared desperate. Demosthenes thought fit to stay no longer, and since the execution of his design at Epipolae had failed, delivered his opinion for going out of the haven whilst the seas were open and whilst, at least with this addition of galleys, they were stronger than the army of the enemy. For it was better, he said, for the city to make war upon those which fortify against them at home than against the Syracusians, seeing they cannot now be easily overcome; and there was no reason why they should spend much money in lying before the city. This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

48. Nicias, though he also thought their estate bad, yet was unwilling to have their weakness discovered, and, by decreeing of their departure openly with the votes of many, to make known the same to the enemy; for if at any time they had a mind to be gone, they should then be less able to do it secretly. Besides, the estate of the enemy, inasmuch as he understood it better than the rest, put him into some hope that it might yet grow worse than their own, in case they pressed the siege, especially being already masters of the sea, far and near, with their present fleet. There was moreover a party for the Athenians in Syracuse that desired to betray the state into their hands, and that sent messengers unto him and suffered him not to rise and be gone. All which he knowing, though he were in truth doubtful what opinion to be of, and did yet consider, nevertheless openly in his speech he was against the withdrawing of the army, and said that he was sure the people of Athens would take it ill if he went thence without their order; for that they were not to have such judges as should give sentence upon their own sight of things done rather than upon the report of

calumniators, but such as would believe whatsoever some fine speaker should accuse them of. That many, nay most of the soldiers here, who now cry out upon their misery, will there cry out on the contrary, and say the generals have betrayed the state and come away for a bribe. That he would not, therefore, knowing the nature of the Athenians so well, choose to be put to death unjustly and charged with a dishonourable crime by the Athenians rather than, if he must needs do one, to suffer the same at the hand of the enemy by his own adventure. And yet, he said, the state of the Syracusians was still inferior to their own. For paying much money to strangers and laying out much more on forts [without and about the city], having also had a great navy a year already in pay, they must needs want money at last, and all these things fail them. For they have spent already two thousand talents, and are much in debt besides. And whensoever they shall give over this course and make pay no longer, their strength is gone, as being auxiliary and not constrained to follow the war as the Athenians are. Therefore it was fit, he said, to stay close to the city and not to go away as if they were too weak in money, wherein they were much superior.

49. Nicias, when he spake this, assured them of it, as knowing the state of Syracuse precisely and their want of money, and that there were some that desired to betray the city to the Athenians and sent him word not to go. Withal he had now confidence in the fleet, which, as being before overcome, he had not. As for lying where they did, Demosthenes would by no means hear of it. But if the army might not be carried away without order from the Athenians but must needs stay in Sicily, then, he said, they might go to Thapsus or Catana, from whence by their landmen they might invade and turn much of the country to them and wasting the fields of the enemies, weaken the Syracusians; and be to fight with their galleys in the main sea, and not in a narrow (which is the advantage of the enemy), but in a wide place, where the benefit of skill should be theirs, and where they should not be forced, in charging and retiring, to come up and fall off in narrow and circumscribed limits. In sum, he said, he by no means liked to stay where they were, but with all speed, no longer delaying the matter, to arise and be



gone. Eurymedon also gave the like counsel. Nevertheless, upon the contradiction of Nicias, there grew a kind of sloth and procrastination in the business, and a suspicion withal that the asseveration of Nicias was grounded on somewhat that he knew above the rest.\* And thereupon the Athenians deferred their going thence and stayed upon the place.

50. In the meantime Gylippus and Sicanus returned unto Syracuse. Sicanus without his purpose at Agrigentum, for whilst he was yet in Gela, the sedition which had been raised in the behalf of the Syracusians was turned into friendship; but Gylippus not without another great army out of Sicily, besides the men of arms, which having set forth from Peloponnesus in ships the spring before, were then lately arrived at Selinus from out of Afric. For having been driven into Afric, and the Cyrenaeanes having given them two galleys with pilots, in passing by the shore they aided the Euesperitae besieged by the Africans; and having overcome the Africans, they went over to Neapolis, a town of traffic belonging to the Carthagenians, where the passage into Sicily is shortest, and but two days and a night's sail over; and from thence they crossed the sea to Selinus. As soon as they were come, the Syracusians again presently prepared to set upon the Athenians, both by sea and land. The Athenian generals, seeing them have another army, and their own not bettering but every day growing worse than other, but especially as being pressed to it by the sickness of the soldiers, repented now that they removed not before; and Nicias, being now no longer against it as he was but desirous only that it might not be concluded openly, gave order unto all as secretly as was possible to put forth of the harbour and

\*Nicias had actually been in touch with a faction in Syracuse which wished to turn over the city to the Athenians (Chap. 86 of this book). He was very wealthy and had many connections all over Greece. What Thucydides means here is that the other generals feared to insist on this plan of going away because they thought that Nicias' private information was definitely that the city would be betrayed to them, and that naturally enough at this stage he declined to be more explicit as to his sources or their reliability. It was obviously very hard for them to gauge accurately the proportions of Nicias' timidity and irresolution on the one hand and his access to secret information on the other.

to be ready when the sign should be given. But when they were about it and everything was ready, the moon happened to be eclipsed; for it was full moon. And not only the greatest part of the Athenians called upon the generals to stay, but Nicias also (for he was addicted to superstition and observations of that kind somewhat too much) said that it should come no more into debate whether they should go or not till the three times nine days were past which the soothsayers appoint in that behalf. And the Athenians, though upon going, stayed still for this reason.

51. The Syracusians, also having intelligence of this, were encouraged unto the pressing of the Athenians much the more, for that they confessed themselves already too weak for them, both by sea and land; for else they would never have sought to have run away. Besides, they would not have them sit down in any other part of Sicily, and become the harder to be warred on; but had rather thereright, and in a place most for their own advantage, compel them to fight by sea. To which end they manned their galleys; and after they had rested as long as was sufficient, when they saw their time, the first day they assaulted the Athenians' camp. And some small number of men of arms and horsemen of the Athenians sallied out against them by certain gates; and the Syracusians intercepting some of the men of arms, beat them back into the camp. But the entrance being strait, there were seventy of the horsemen lost, and men of arms some, but not many.

52. The next day they came out with their galleys, seventy-six in number, and the Athenians set forth against them with eighty-six; and being come together, they fought. Eurymedon had charge of the right wing of the Athenians, and desiring to encompass the galleys of the enemies, drew forth his own galleys in length more towards the shore, and was cut off by the Syracusians, that had first overcome the middle battle of the Athenians, from the rest, in the bottom and inmost part of the haven, and both slain himself, and the galleys that were with him lost. And that done, the rest of the Athenian fleet was also chased and driven ashore.

53. Gylippus, when he saw the navy of the enemy vanquished and carried past the piles and their own harbour, came with a

part of his army to the pier to kill such as landed and to cause that the Syracusians might the easier pull the enemy's galleys from the shore, whereof themselves were masters. But the Tuscans, who kept guard in that part for the Athenians, seeing them coming that way in disorder, made head, and charging these first, forced them into the marsh called Lysimeleia. But when afterwards a greater number of the Syracusians and their confederates came to help them, then also the Athenians, to help the Tuscans and for fear to lose their galleys, fought with them; and having overcome them, pursued them, and not only slew many of their men of arms, but also saved the most of their galleys and brought them back into the harbour. Nevertheless the Syracusians took eighteen and slew the men taken in them. And amongst the rest they let drive before the wind (which blew right upon the Athenians) an old ship full of faggots and brands set on fire to burn them. The Athenians on the other side, fearing the loss of their navy, devised remedies for the fire, and having quenched the flame and kept the ship from coming near, escaped that danger.

54. After this the Syracusians set up a trophy, both for the battle by sea, and for the men of arms which they intercepted above before the camp, where also they took the horses. And the Athenians erected a trophy likewise, both for the flight of those footmen which the Tuscans drave into the marsh and for those which they themselves put to flight with the rest of the army.

55. When the Syracusians had now manifestly overcome their fleet (for they feared at first the supply of galleys that came with Demosthenes), the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out of heart. And as they were much deceived in the event, so they repented more of the voyage. For having come against these cities, the only ones that were for institution like unto their own and governed by the people as well as themselves, and which had a navy and horses and greatness, seeing they could create no dissension amongst them about change of government to win them that way, nor could subdue it with the greatness of their forces when they were far the stronger, but misprospered in most of their designs, they were then at their wits' end; but now, when they were also vanquished by sea

(which they would never have thought), they were much more dejected than ever.

56. The Syracusians went presently about the haven without fear and meditated how to shut up the same that the Athenians might not steal away without their knowledge, though they would. For now they studied not only how to save themselves, but how to hinder the safety of the Athenians. For the Syracusians conceived, not untruly, that their own strength was at this present the greater, and that if they could vanquish the Athenians and their confederates both by sea and land, it would be a mastery of great honour to them amongst the rest of the Grecians. For all the rest of Greece should be one part freed by it, and the other part out of fear of subjection hereafter; for it would be impossible for the Athenians, with the remainder of their strength, to sustain the war that would be made upon them afterwards. And they, being reputed the authors of it, should be had in admiration, not only with all men now living, but also with posterity. And to say truth, it was a worthy mastery, both for the causes shewn and also for that they became victors not of the Athenians only but many others, their confederates; nor again they themselves alone but their confederates also, having been in joint command with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, and both exposed their city to the first hazard, and of the business by sea performed the greatest part themselves. The greatest number of nations, except the general roll of those which in this war adhered to Athens and Lacedaemon, were together at this one city.

57. And this number on both sides, against Sicily and for it, some to help win and some to help save it, came to the war at Syracuse, not on any pretence of right nor as kindred to aid kindred, but as profit or necessity severally chanced to induce them. The Athenians, being Ionic, went against the Syracusians, that be Doric, voluntarily. With these, as being their colonies, went the Lemnians and Imbrians, and the Aeginetae that dwelt in Aegina then, all of the same language and institutions with themselves; also the Hestiaeans of Euboea. Of the rest, some went with them as their subjects and some as their free confederates and some also hired. Subjects and tributaries: as the Eretrians, Chalcideans, Styrians, and Carystians, from

Euboea; Ceians, Andrians, Tenians, from out of the islands; Milesians, Samians, and Chians, from Ionia. Of these the Chians followed them as free, not as tributaries of money, but of galleys. And these were almost all of them Ionians, descended from the Athenians, except only the Carystians, that are of the nation of the Dryopes. And though they were subjects and went upon constraint, yet they were Ionians against Dorians. Besides these there went with them Aeolians, namely, the Methymnaeans, subjects to Athens, not tributaries of money but of galleys; and the Tenedians and Aenians, tributaries. Now here, Aeolians were constrained to fight against Aeolians, namely, against their founders the Boeotians, that took part with the Syracusians. But the Plataeans, and only they, being Boeotians, fought against Boeotians upon just quarrel. The Rhodians and Cythereans, Doric both, by constraint bore arms; one of them, namely the Cythereans, a colony of the Lacedaemonians, with the Athenians against the Lacedaemonians that were with Gylippus; and the other, that is to say, the Rhodians, being by descent Argives, not only against the Syracusians, who were also Doric, but against their own colony, the Geloans, which took part with the Syracusians. Then of the islanders about Peloponnesus, there went with them the Cephallenians and Zacynthians, not but that they were free states, but because they were kept in awe as islanders by the Athenians, who were masters of the sea. And the Corcyraeans, being not only Doric but Corinthians, fought openly against both Corinthians and Syracusians, though a colony of the one and of kin to the other, which they did necessarily (to make the best of it), but indeed no less willingly, in respect of their hatred to the Corinthians. Also the Messenians, now so called, in Naupactus, were taken along to this war, and the Messenians at Pylus, then holden by the Athenians. Moreover the Megarean outlaws, though not many, by advantage taken of their misery, were fain to fight against the Selinuntians that were Megareans likewise. But now the rest of their army was rather voluntary. The Argives not so much for the league as for their enmity against the Lacedaemonians and their present particular spleen, followed the Athenians to the war, though Ionic, against Dorians. And the Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries went with them as men ac-

customed ever to invade the enemy shewed them; and now for gain had for enemies, as much as any, those other Arcadians which went thither with the Corinthians. The Cretans and Aetolians were all mercenary; and it fell out that the Cretans, who together with the Rhodians were founders of Gela, not only took not part with their colony, but fought against it willingly for their hire. And some Acarnanians also went with them for gain; but most of them went as confederates, in love to Demosthenes and for good will to the state of Athens. And thus many within the bound of the Ionian gulf. Then of Italians, fallen into the same necessity of seditious times, there went with them to this war the Thurians and Metapontians; of Greek Sicilians, the Naxians and Catanaeans. Of barbarian, the Eggestaeans, who also drew with them the most of those Greek Sicilians. Without Sicily, there went with them some Tuscans, upon quarrels between them and the Syracusians, and some Iapygian mercenaries. These were the nations that followed the army of the Athenians.

58. On the other side, there opposed them on the part of the Syracusians, the Camarinaeans their borderers; and beyond them again the Geloans; and then (the Agrigentines not stirring) beyond them again the same way, the Selinuntians. These inhabit the part of Sicily that lieth opposite to Afric. Then the Himeraeans, on the side that lieth on the Tyrrhene sea, where they are the only Grecians inhabiting, and only aided them. These were their confederates of the Greek nation within Sicily, all Dorians and free states. Then of the barbarians there, they had the Siculi, all but what revolted to the Athenians. For Grecians without Sicily, the Lacedaemonians sent them a Spartan commander, with some Helotes and the rest freedmen. Then aided them both with galleys and with land men the Corinthians only; and for kindred's sake, the Leucadians and Ambraciotes; out of Arcadia, those mercenaries sent by the Corinthians; and Sicyonians on constraint; and from without Peloponnesus, the Boeotians. To the foreign aids the Sicilians themselves, as being great cities, added more in every kind than as much again; for they got together men of arms, galleys, and horses, great store, and other number in abundance. And to all these again the Syracusians themselves added, as I may

say, about as much more, in respect of the greatness both of their city and of their danger.

59. These were the succours assembled on either part, and which were then all there; and after them came no more, neither to the one side nor the other. No marvel then if the Syracusians thought it a noble mastery if to the victory by sea already gotten they could add the taking of the whole Athenian army, so great as it was, and hinder their escape both by sea and land. Presently therefore they fall in hand with stopping up the mouth of the great haven, being about eight furlongs wide, with galleys laid cross and lighters and boats upon their anchors; and withal prepared whatsoever else was necessary in case the Athenians would hazard another battle, meditating on no small matters in anything.

60. The Athenians, seeing the shutting up of the haven and the rest of the enemy's designs, thought good to go to council upon it. And the generals and commanders of regiments having met and considered their present want, both otherwise and in this, that they neither had provision for the present (for upon their resolution to be gone, they had sent before to Catana to forbid the sending in of any more), nor were likely to have for the future unless their navy got the upper hand, they resolved to abandon their camp above and to take in some place, no greater than needs they must, near unto their galleys, with a wall, and leaving some to keep it, to go aboard with the rest of the army, and to man every galley they had, serviceable and less serviceable; and having caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it out, if they gat the victory, to go to Catana; if not, to make their retreat in order of battle by land (having first set fire on their navy) the nearest way unto some amicable place, either barbarian or Grecian, that they should best be able to reach unto before the enemy.

As they had concluded, so they did. For they both came down to the shore from their camp above and also manned every galley they had and compelled to go aboard every man of age of any ability whatsoever. So the whole navy was manned to the number of one hundred and ten galleys, upon which they had many archers and darters, both Acarnanians and other strangers, and all things else provided according to their means

and purpose. And Nicias, when almost everything was ready, perceiving the soldiers to be dejected for being so far overcome by sea, contrary to their custom, and yet in respect of the scarcity of victual desirous as soon as could be to fight, called them together and encouraged them then the first time with words to this effect: \*

61. "Soldiers, Athenians, and other our confederates, [though] the trial at hand will be common to all alike and will concern the safety and country no less of each of us than of the enemy (for if our galleys get the victory, we may every one see his native city again), yet ought we not to be discouraged like men of no experience, who failing in their first adventures, ever after carry a fear suitable to their misfortunes. But you Athenians here present, having had experience already of many wars, and you our confederates, that have always gone along with our armies, remember how often the event falleth out otherwise in war than one would think; and in hope that fortune will once also be of our side, prepare yourselves to fight again in such manner as shall be worthy the number you see yourselves to be.

62. "What we thought would be helps in the narrowness of

\* Nothing stands out clearer throughout Book vii than the necessity under which the Athenian generals stood of taking account of the morale of their men from moment to moment. Even if this is true of any army at any time, the present case is extreme and its extremity proves the nature of the Athenian forces. These are citizens first and soldiers after. There is no professional army with a tradition of obedience, discipline, and endurance to death for a flag or a regiment—all the code that was created in the three centuries before the war of 1914-18. Here these citizens-in-arms were far from home, frightened and bewildered by the unexpected success of an enemy they had thought to defeat with little trouble. Consequently, from first to last their commanders had to persuade them, like an election meeting, of the necessity of fighting bravely. Furthermore, the commanders have to bear in mind what will happen to themselves by the votes of these same soldiers when they get home, if they ever do. See in Chapter 48 the speech of Nicias "that many of the soldiers who now cry out upon their misery will then cry out on the contrary and say the generals have betrayed the state for a bribe." Admitting the indecisiveness of Nicias' character, a great deal of the negligence and procrastination with which this campaign was conducted is directly due to the generals' fear of their soldiers as potential voters and fear of the home government as voters actually registering their votes on them at the time of their military actions.



the haven, against such a multitude of galleys as will be there and against the provision of the enemy upon their decks, whereby we were formerly annoyed, we have with the masters now considered them all, and as well as our present means will permit, made them ready. For many archers and darters shall go aboard: and that multitude, which if we had been to fight in the main sea we would not have used, because by slugging the galleys it would take away the use of skill, will nevertheless be useful here, where we are forced to make a land-fight from our galleys. We have also devised, instead of what should have been provided for in the building of our galleys, against the thickness of the beaks of theirs, which did most hurt us, to lash their galleys unto ours with iron grapnels, whereby (if the men of arms do their part) we may keep the galleys which once come close up from falling back again. For we are brought to a necessity now of making it a land-fight upon the water; and it will be the best for us neither to fall back ourselves nor to suffer the enemy to do so, especially when, except what our men on land shall make good, the shore is altogether hostile.

63. "Which you remembering, must therefore fight it out to the utmost and not suffer yourselves to be beaten back unto the shore; but when galley to galley shall once be fallen close, never think any cause worthy to make you part unless you have first beaten off the men of arms of the enemy from their decks. And this I speak to you rather that are the men of arms than to the mariners, inasmuch as that part belongeth rather unto you that fight above; and in you it lieth even yet to achieve the victory for the most part with the landmen. Now for the mariners, I advise, and withal beseech them, not to be too much daunted with the losses past, having now both a greater number of galleys and greater forces upon the decks. Think it a pleasure worth preserving that being taken, by your knowledge of the language and imitation of our fashions, for Athenians (though you be not so),\* you are not only admired for it through all Greece, but also partake of our dominion in matter

\* This is addressed to the *metoicoi*, or aliens permanently resident in Athens. This class was subject to military service and all the obligations of citizens. They also shared in all of the privileges except that of voting.

of profit no less than ourselves, and for awfulness to the nations subject and protection from injury, more. You therefore that alone participate freely of our dominion cannot with any justice betray the same. In despite therefore of the Corinthians, whom you have often vanquished, and of the Sicilians, who as long as our fleet was at the best durst never so much as stand us, repel them; and make it appear that your knowledge, even with weakness and loss, is better than the strength of another with fortune.

64. "Again, to such of you as are Athenians, I must remember this: that you have no more such fleets in your harbours, nor such able men of arms, and that if aught happen to you but victory, your enemies here will presently be upon you at home; and those at home will be unable to defend themselves both against those that shall go hence and against the enemy that lieth there already. So one part of us shall fall into the mercy of the Syracusians, against whom you yourselves know with what intent you came hither; and the other part, which is at home, shall fall into the hands of the Lacedaemonians. Being therefore in this one battle to fight both for yourselves and them, be therefore valiant now if ever; and bear in mind every one of you that you that go now aboard are the land forces, the sea forces, the whole estate and great name of Athens. For which, if any man excel others in skill or courage, he can never shew it more opportunely than now, when he may both help himself with it and the whole."

65. Nicias, having thus encouraged them, commanded presently to go aboard. Gylippus and the Syracusians might easily discern that the Athenians meant to fight by seeing their preparation. Besides, they had advertisement of their purpose to cast iron grapnels into their galleys; and as for everything else, so also for that they had made provision. For they covered the fore-part of their galleys and also the decks for a great way, with hides, that the grapnels cast in might slip and not be able to take hold. When all was ready, Gylippus likewise and the other commanders used unto their soldiers this hortative:

66. "That not only our former acts have been honourable, but that we are to fight now also for further honour, men of

Syracuse and confederates, the most of you seem to know already; for else you never would so valiantly have undergone it; and if there be any man that is not so sensible of it as he ought, we will make it appear unto him better. For whereas the Athenians came into this country with design first to enslave Sicily and then, if that succeeded, Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece, and whereas already they had the greatest dominion of any Grecians whatsoever, either present or past, you, the first that ever withstood their navy, wherewith they were everywhere masters, have in the former battles overcome them, and shall in likelihood overcome them again in this. For men that are cut short where they thought themselves to exceed become afterwards further out of opinion with themselves than they would have been if they had never thought so; and when they come short of their hope in things they glory in, they come short also in courage of the true strength of their forces. And this is likely now to be the case of the Athenians.

67. "Whereas with us it falleth out that our former courage, wherewith though unexperienced we durst stand them, being now confirmed, and an opinion added of being the stronger, giveth to every one of us a double hope. And in all enterprises the greatest hope conferreth for the most part the greatest courage. As for their imitation of our provisions, they are things we are acquainted withal, and we shall not in any kind be unprovided for them. But they, when they shall have many men of arms upon their decks, being not used to it, and many, as I may term them, land-darters, both Acarnanians and others, who would not be able to direct their darts though they should sit, how can they choose but put the galleys into danger and be all in confusion amongst themselves, moving in a fashion not their own? As for the number of their galleys, it will help them nothing, if any of you fear also that, as being to fight against odds in number. For many in little room are so much the slower to do what they desire, and easiest to be annoyed by our munition. But the very truth you shall now understand by these things, whereof we suppose we have most certain intelligence. Overwhelmed with calamities and forced by the difficulties which they are in at this present, they are grown desperate, not trusting to their forces, but willing to put them-

selves upon the decision of fortune, as well as they may, that so they may either go out by force or else make their retreat afterward by land, as men whose estates cannot change into the worse.

68. "Against such confusion, therefore, and against the fortune of our greatest enemies now betraying itself into our hands,\* let us fight with anger, and with an opinion not only that it is most lawful to fulfil our hearts' desire upon those our enemies that justified their coming hither as a righting of themselves against an assailant, but also that to be revenged on an enemy is both most natural and, as is most commonly said, the sweetest thing in the world. And that they are our enemies, and our greatest enemies, you all well enough know, seeing them come hither into our dominion to bring us into servitude. Wherein if they had sped, they had put the men to the greatest tortures, the women and children to the greatest dishonesty, and the whole city to the most ignominious name in the world. In regard whereof, it is not fit that any of you should be so tender as to think it gain if they go away without putting you to further danger; for so they mean to do, though they get the victory; but effecting (as it is likely we shall) what we intend, both to be revenged of these and to deliver unto all Sicily their liberty, which they enjoyed before but now is more assured. Honourable is that combat and rare are those hazards wherein the failing bringeth little loss and the success a great deal of profit."

69. When Gylippus and the commanders of the Syracusians had in this manner encouraged their soldiers, they presently put their men on board, perceiving the Athenians to do the same. Nicias, perplexed with this present estate, and seeing how great and how near the danger was, being now on the point to put forth from the harbour, and doubting, as in great battles it falleth out that somewhat in every kind was still wanting, and

\* More correctly it is "against the fortune of our greatest enemies that has already succumbed." The *Tyche*, or fortune, of the Athenians is thought of as something separate from them, in a certain sense. It is all the chances which by a throw of the dice might turn in their favor. What Gylippus implies is that fortune, personified in *Tyche*, has decisively deserted the Athenians.

that he had not yet sufficiently spoken his mind, called unto him again all the captains of galleys and spake unto them every one by their fathers, their tribes, and their proper names, and entreated every one of them that had reputation in any kind not to betray the same, and those whose ancestors were eminent not to deface their hereditary virtues, remembering them of their country's liberty and the uncontrolled power of all men to live as they pleased; and saying whatsoever else in such a pinch men are accustomed, not out of their store, to utter things stale, and in all occasions the same, touching their wives, children, and patrial gods, but such things as being thought by them available in the present discouragement, they use to cry into their ears.\* And when he thought he had admonished them, not enough, but as much as the time would permit him, he went his way and drew out those forces that were to serve on land on the seaside and embattled them so as they might take up the greatest length of ground they were able, thereby so much the more to confirm the courage of them that were aboard. And Demosthenes, Menander, and Eudemus (for those of the Athenian commanders went aboard), putting forth of the harbour, went immediately to the lock of the haven and to the passage that was left open with intention to force their way out.

70. But the Syracusians and their confederates, being out already with the same number of galleys they had before, disposed part of them to the guard of the open passage and the rest in circle about the haven, to the end they might fall upon the Athenians from all parts at once, and that their land forces might withal be near to aid them wheresoever the galleys touched. In the Syracusian navy commanded Sicanus and Agatharchus, each of them over a wing; and Pythen, with the Corinthians, had the middle battle. After the Athenians were come to the lock of the haven, at the first charge they

\* A more literal modern rendering is something like this: "Saying other things, too, such as men are used to say at such a moment of crisis, without seeming to anyone to guard against uttering platitudes, things brought forward on behalf of every occasion about women and children and gods of your country; yet in the immediacy of their confusion, judging them useful, they have recourse to them."

overcame the galleys placed there to guard it, and endeavoured to break open the bars thereof. But when afterwards the Syracusians and confederates came upon them from every side, they fought not at the lock only but also in the haven itself; and the battle was sharp, and such as there had never before been the like. For the courage wherewith the mariners on both sides brought up their galleys to any part they were bidden was very great, and great was the plotting and counterplotting and contention one against another of the masters; also the soldiers, when the galleys boarded each other, did their utmost to excel each other in all points of skill that could be used upon the decks; and every man, in the place assigned him, put himself forth to appear the foremost. But many galleys falling close together in a narrow compass (for they were the most galleys that in any battle they had used, and fought in the least room, being little fewer on the one side and the other than two hundred), they ran against each other but seldom, because there was no means of retiring nor of passing by, but made assaults upon each other oftener, as galley with galley, either flying or pursuing, chanced to fall foul. And as long as a galley was making up, they that stood on the decks used their darts and arrows and stones in abundance; but being once come close, the soldiers at hand-strokes attempted to board each other. And in many places it so fell out, through want of room, that they which ran upon a galley on one side were run upon themselves on the other; and that two galleys, or sometimes more, were forced to lie aboard of one; and that the masters were at once to have a care, not in one place only but in many together, how to defend on the one side and how to offend on the other; and the great noise of many galleys fallen foul of one another both amazed them and took away their hearing of what their directors directed. For they directed thick and loud on both sides, not only as art required but out of their present eagerness; the Athenians crying out to theirs to force the passage, and now if ever valiantly to lay hold upon their safe return to their country; and the Syracusians and their confederates to theirs, how honourable a thing to every one of them it would be to hinder their escape and by this victory to improve every man the honour of his own country. Moreover, the commanders of

either side, where they saw any man without necessity to row a-stern, would call unto the captain of the galley by his name and ask him, the Athenians, whether he retired because he thought the most hostile land to be more their friend than the sea, which they had so long been masters of; the Syracusians theirs, whether when they knew that the Athenians desired earnestly by any means to fly, they would nevertheless fly from the flyers.

71. Whilst the conflict was upon the water, the land men had a conflict and sided with them in their affections, they of the place contending for increase of the honours they had already gotten, and the invaders fearing a worse estate than they were already in. For the Athenians, who had their whole fortune at stake in their galleys, were in such a fear of the event as they had never been in the like, and were thereby of necessity to behold the fight upon the water with very different passions. For the sight being near, and not looking all of them upon one and the same part, he that saw their own side prevail took heart and fell to calling upon the gods that they would not deprive them of their safety, and they that saw them have the worse not only lamented but shrieked outright, and had their minds more subdued by the sight of what was done than they that were present in the battle itself. Others that looked on some part where the fight was equal, because the contention continued so as they could make no judgment on it, with gesture of body on every occasion agreeable to their expectation, passed the time in a miserable perplexity. For they were ever within a little either of escaping or of perishing. And one might hear in one and the same army, as long as the fight upon the water was indifferent, at one and the same time lamentations, shouts that they won, that they lost, and whatsoever else a great army in great danger is forced differently to utter. They also that were aboard suffered the same, till at last the Syracusians and their confederates, after long resistance on the other side, put them to flight, and manifestly pressing, chased them with great clamour and encouragement of their own to the shore. And the sea forces, making to the shore, some one way and some another, except only such as were lost by being far from it, escaped into the harbour. And the army that was upon the land,

no longer now of different passions, with one and the same vehemence, all with shrieks and sighs unable to sustain what befel, ran part to save the galleys, part to the defence of the camp, and the residue, who were far the greatest number, fell presently to consider every one of the best way to save himself. And this was the time wherein of all other they stood in greatest fear, and they suffered now the like to what they had made others to suffer before at Pylus. For the Lacedaemonians then, besides the loss of their fleet, lost the men which they had set over into the island; and the Athenians now, without some accident not to be expected, were out of all hope to save themselves by land.

72. After this cruel battle, and many galleys and men on either side consumed, the Syracusians and their confederates, having the victory, took up the wreck and the bodies of their dead, and returning into the city, erected a trophy. But the Athenians, in respect of the greatness of their present loss, never thought upon asking leave to take up their dead or wreck, but fell immediately to consultation how to be gone the same night. And Demosthenes, coming unto Nicias, delivered his opinion for going once again aboard and forcing the passage, if it were possible, betimes the next morning, saying that their galleys which were yet remaining and serviceable were more than those of the enemy; for the Athenians had yet left them about sixty, and the Syracusians under fifty. But when Nicias approved the advice and would have manned out the galleys, the mariners refused to go aboard, as being not only dejected with their defeat, but also without opinion of ever having the upperhand any more. Whereupon they now resolved all to make their retreat by land.

73. But Hermocrates of Syracuse, suspecting their purpose, and apprehending it as a matter dangerous that so great an army, going away by land and sitting down in some part or other of Sicily, should there renew the war, repaired unto the magistrates and admonished them that it was not fit, through negligence, to suffer the enemy in the night time to go their ways (alleging what he thought best to the purpose), but that all the Syracusians and their confederates should go out and fortify in their way and prepossess all the narrow passages with



a guard. Now they were all of them of the same opinion no less than himself and thought it fit to be done; but they conceived withal that the soldier now joyful and taking his ease after a sore battle, being also holiday (for it was their day of sacrifice to Hercules), would not easily be brought to obey. For through excess of joy for the victory, they would most of them, being holiday, be drinking, and look for anything rather than to be persuaded at this time to take up arms again and go out. But seeing the magistrates upon this consideration thought it hard to be done, Hermocrates, not prevailing, of his own head contrived this. Fearing lest the Athenians should pass the worst of their way in the night and so at ease out-go them, as soon as it grew dark he sent certain of his friends, and with them certain horsemen, to the Athenian camp; who, approaching so near as to be heard speak, called to some of them to come forth, as if they had been friends of the Athenians (for Nicias had some within that used to give him intelligence) and bade them to advise Nicias not to dislodge that night for that the Syracusians had beset the ways; but that the next day, having had the leisure to furnish their army, they might march away.

74. Upon this advertisement they abode that night, supposing it had been without fraud. And afterwards, because they went not presently, they thought good to stay there that day also, to the end that the soldiers might pack up their necessaries as commodiously as they could, and begone, leaving all things else behind them save what was necessary for their bodies. But Gylippus and the Syracusians, with their land forces, went out before them, and not only stopped up the ways in the country about by which the Athenians were likely to pass and kept a guard at the fords of brooks and rivers, but also stood embattled to receive and stop their army in such places as they thought convenient. And with their galleys they rowed to the harbour of the Athenians and towed their galleys away from the shore. Some few whereof they burnt, as the Athenians themselves meant to have done, but the rest at their leisure, as any of them chanced in any place to drive ashore, they afterwards hauled into the city.

75. After this, when everything seemed unto Nicias and Demosthenes sufficiently prepared, they dislodged, being now

the third day from their fight by sea. It was a lamentable departure, not only for the particulars, as that they marched away with the loss of their whole fleet, and that instead of their great hopes they had endangered both themselves and the state, but also for the dolorous objects which were presented both to the eye and mind of every of them in particular in the leaving of their camp. For their dead lying unburied, when any one saw his friend on the ground, it struck him at once both with fear and grief. But the living that were sick or wounded both grieved them more than the dead, and were more miserable. For with entreaties and lamentations they put them to a stand, pleading to be taken along by whomsoever they saw of their fellows or familiars, and hanging on the necks of their comrades, and following as far as they were able; and when the strength of their bodies failed, that they could go no further, with ah-mes! and imprecations were there left. Insomuch as the whole army, filled with tears and irresolute, could hardly get away, though the place were hostile and they had suffered already, and feared to suffer in the future, more than with tears could be expressed; but hung down their heads and generally blamed themselves. For they seemed nothing else but even the people of some great city expugned by siege and making their escape. For the whole number that marched were no less one with another than forty thousand men. Of which not only the ordinary sort carried every one what he thought he should have occasion to use, but also the men of arms and horsemen, contrary to their custom, carried their victuals under their arms, partly for want and partly for distrust of their servants, who from time to time ran over to the enemy; but at this time went the greatest number. And yet what they carried was not enough to serve the turn, for not a jot more provision was left remaining in the camp. Neither were the sufferings of others and that equal division of misery, which nevertheless is wont to lighten it in that we suffer with many, at this time so much as thought light in itself. And the rather because they considered from what splendour and glory which they enjoyed before into how low an estate they were now fallen. For never Grecian army so differed from itself. For whereas they came with a purpose to enslave others, they departed in greater fear of being made slaves them-

selves; and instead of prayers and hymns with which they put to sea, they went back again with the contrary maledictions; and whereas they came out seamen, they departed landmen, and relied not upon their naval forces but upon their men of arms. Nevertheless, in respect of the great danger yet hanging over them, these miseries seemed all [but] tolerable.

76. Nicias, perceiving the army to be dejected, and the great change that was in it, came up to the ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as for the present means he was able. And as he went from part to part he exalted his voice more than ever before, both as being earnest in his exhortation and because also he desired that the benefit of his words might reach as far as might be.

77. "Athenians and confederates, we must hope still, even in our present estate. Men have been saved ere now from greater dangers than these are. Nor ought you too much to accuse yourselves, either for your losses past, or the undeserved miseries we are now in. Even I myself, that have the advantage of none of you in strength of body (you see how I am in my sickness), nor am I thought inferior to any of you for prosperity past, either in respect of mine own private person or otherwise, am nevertheless now in as much danger as the meanest of you. And yet I have worshipped the gods frequently according to the law and lived justly and unblameably towards men. For which cause my hope is still confident of the future, though these calamities, as being not according to the measure of our desert, do indeed make me fear. But they may perhaps cease. For both the enemies have already had sufficient fortune, and the gods, if any of them have been displeased with our voyage, have already sufficiently punished us. Others have invaded their neighbours as well as we; and as their offence, which proceeded of human infirmity, so their punishment also hath been tolerable. And we have reason now both to hope for more favour from the gods (for our case deserveth their pity rather than their hatred) and also not to despair of ourselves, seeing how good and how many men of arms you are, marching together in order of battle. Make account of this, that wheresoever you please to sit down, there presently of yourselves you are a city, such as not any other in Sicily can either easily sustain if you assault

or remove if you be once seated. Now for your march, that it may be safe and orderly, look to it yourselves, making no other account, any of you, but what place soever he shall be forced to fight in, the same, if he win it, must be his country and his walls. March you must with diligence, both night and day alike, for our victual is short; and if we can but reach some amicable territory of the Siculi (for these are still firm to us for fear of the Syracusians), then you may think yourselves secure. Let us therefore send before to them and bid them meet us and bring us forth some supplies of victual. In sum, soldiers, let me tell you it is necessary that you be valiant; for there is no place near where, being cowards, you can possibly be saved; whereas if you escape through the enemies at this time, you may every one see again whatsoever anywhere he most desires; and the Athenians may re-erect the great power of their city, how low soever fallen. For the men, not the walls nor the empty galleys, are the city."

78. Nicias, as he used this hortative, went withal about the army, and where he saw any man straggle and not march in his rank, he brought him about and set him in his place. Demosthenes, having spoken to the same or like purpose, did as much to those soldiers under him. And they marched forward, those with Nicias in a square battalion, and then those with Demosthenes in the rear. And the men of arms received those that carried the baggage and the other multitude within them. When they were come to the ford of the river Anapus, they there found certain of the Syracusians and their confederates embattled against them on the bank; but these they put to flight, and having won the passage marched forward. But the Syracusian horsemen lay still upon them, and their light-armed plied them with their darts in the flank. This day the Athenians marched forty furlongs, and lodged that night at the foot of a certain hill. The next day, as soon as it was light, they marched forwards about twenty furlongs, and descending into a certain champaign ground, encamped there, with intent both to get victual at the houses (for the place was inhabited) and to carry water with them thence; for before them, in the way they were to pass, for many furlongs together there was but little to be had. But the Syracusians in the meantime got before them and

cut off their passage with a wall. This was at a steep hill, on either side whereof was the channel of a torrent with steep and rocky banks; and it is called *Acraeum Lepas*. The next day the Athenians went on; and the horsemen and darters of the Syracusians and their confederates, being a great number of both, pressed them so with their horses and darts that the Athenians after long fight were compelled to retire again into the same camp, but now with less victual than before, because the horsemen would suffer them no more to straggle abroad.

79. In the morning betimes they dislodged and put themselves on their march again, and forced their way to the hill which the enemy had fortified, where they found before them the Syracusian foot embattled in great length above the fortification [on the hill's side]; for the place itself was but narrow. The Athenians coming up assaulted the wall; but the shot of the enemy, who were many, and the steepness of the hill (for they could easily cast home from above) making them unable to take it, they retired again and rested. There happened withal some claps of thunder and a shower of rain, as usually falleth out at this time of the year, being now near autumn, which further disheartened the Athenians, who thought that also this did tend to their destruction. Whilst they lay still, Gylippus and the Syracusians sent part of their army to raise a wall at their backs, in the way they had come; but this the Athenians hindered by sending against them part of theirs. After this, the Athenians retiring with their whole army into a more champaign ground, lodged there that night, and the next day went forward again. And the Syracusians with their darts, from every part round about, wounded many of them; and when the Athenians charged, they retired, and when they retired, the Syracusians charged, and that especially upon the hindmost, that by putting to flight a few they might terrify the whole army. And for a good while the Athenians in this manner withstood them; and afterwards, being gotten five or six furlongs forward, they rested in the plain; and the Syracusians went from them to their own camp.

80. This night it was concluded by Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the miserable estate of their army, and the want already of all necessaries, and that many of their men in many assaults

of the enemy were wounded, to lead away the army as far as they possibly could; not the way they purposed before, but toward the sea, which was the contrary way to that which the Syracusians guarded. Now this whole journey of the army lay not towards Catana, but towards the other side of Sicily, Camarina and Gela, and the cities, as well Grecian as barbarian, that way. When they had made many fires accordingly, they marched in the night; and (as usually it falleth out in all armies, and most of all in the greatest, to be subject to affright and terror, especially marching by night and in hostile ground, and the enemy near) were in confusion. The army of Nicias, leading the way, kept together and got far afore; but that of Demosthenes, which was the greater half, was both severed from the rest and marched more disorderly. Nevertheless, by the morning betimes they got to the seaside, and entering into the Helorine way they went on towards the river Cacyparis, to the end when they came thither to march upwards along the river's side through the heart of the country. For they hoped that this way the Siculi, to whom they had sent, would meet them. When they came to the river, here also they found a certain guard of the Syracusians stopping their passage with a wall and with piles. When they had quickly forced this guard, they passed the river and again marched on to another river, called Erineus; for that was the way which the guides directed them.

81. In the meantime the Syracusians and their confederates, as soon as day appeared and that they knew the Athenians were gone, most of them accusing Gylippus as if he had let them go with his consent, followed them with speed the same way, which they easily understood they were gone, and about dinner time overtook them. When they were come up to those with Demosthenes, who were the hindmost and had marched more slowly and disorderly than the other part had done, as having been put into disorder in the night, they fell upon them and fought. And the Syracusian horsemen hemmed them in and forced them up into a narrow compass, the more easily now because they were divided from the rest. Now the army of Nicias was gone by this time one hundred and fifty furlongs further on. For he led away the faster because he thought not

that their safety consisted in staying and fighting voluntarily, but rather in a speedy retreat, and then only fighting when they could not choose. But Demosthenes was both in greater and more continual toil, in respect that he marched in the rear and consequently was pressed by the enemy; and seeing the Syracusians pursuing him, he went not on but put his men in order to fight, till by his stay he was encompassed and reduced, he and the Athenians with him, into great disorder. For being shut up within a place enclosed round with a wall, and which on either side had a way [open] amongst abundance of olive trees, they were charged from all sides at once with the enemy's shot. For the Syracusians assaulted them in this kind, and not in close battle, upon very good reason. For to hazard battle against men desperate was not so much for theirs as for the Athenians' advantage. Besides, after so manifest successes, they spared themselves somewhat, because they were loth to wear themselves out before the end of the business, and thought by this kind of fight to subdue and take them alive.

82. Whereupon, after they had plied the Athenians and their confederates all day long from every side with shot and saw that with their wounds and other annoyance they were already tired, Gylippus and the Syracusians and their confederates first made proclamation that if any of the islanders would come over to them, they should be at liberty. And the men of some few cities went over. And by and by after, they made agreement with all the rest that were with Demosthenes that they should deliver up their arms, and none of them be put to death, neither violently, nor by bonds, nor by want of the necessities of life. And they all yielded, to the number of six thousand men; and the silver they had, they laid it all down, casting it into the hollow of targets, and filled with the same four targets. And these men they carried presently into the city.

Nicias, and those that were with him, attained the same day to the river Erineus, which passing, he caused his army to sit down upon a certain ground more elevate than the rest.

83. Where the Syracusians the next day overtook and told him, that those with Demosthenes had yielded themselves, and willed him to do the like. But he, not believing it, took truce

for a horseman to enquire the truth. Upon return of the horseman and word that they had yielded, he sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusians, saying that he was content to compound on the part of the Athenians to repay whatsoever money the Syracusians had laid out, so that his army might be suffered to depart, and that till payment of the money were made, he would deliver them hostages, Athenians, every hostage rated as a talent. But Gylippus and the Syracusians, refusing the condition, charged them, and having hemmed them in, plied them with shot, as they had done the other army, from every side till evening. This part of the army was also pinched with the want both of victual and other necessaries. Nevertheless, observing the quiet of the night, they were about to march. But no sooner took they their arms up than the Syracusians perceiving it gave the alarm. Whereupon the Athenians, finding themselves discovered, sat down again, all but three hundred, who breaking by force through the guards, marched as far as they could that night.

84. And Nicias, when it was day, led his army forward, the Syracusians and their confederates still pressing them in the same manner, shooting and darting at them from every side. The Athenians hasted to get the river Asinarus, not only because they were urged on every side by the assault of the many horsemen and other multitude and thought to be more at ease when they were over the river, but out of weariness also and desire to drink. When they were come unto the river, they rushed in without any order, every man striving who should first get over. But the pressing of the enemy made the passage now more difficult. For being forced to take the river in heaps, they fell upon and trampled one another under their feet; and falling amongst the spears and utensils of the army, some perished presently; and others, catching hold one of another, were carried away together down the stream. And [not only] the Syracusians standing along the farther bank, being a steep one, killed the Athenians with their shot from above as they were many of them greedily drinking and troubling one another in the hollow of the river; but the Peloponnesians came also down and slew them with their swords, and those especially



that were in the river. And suddenly the water was corrupted; nevertheless they drunk it, foul as it was with blood and mire; and many also fought for it.

85. In the end, when many dead lay heaped in the river, and the army was utterly defeated, part at the river, and part (if any gat away) by the horsemen, Nicias yielded himself unto Gylippus (having more confidence in him than in the Syracusians) to be for his own person at the discretion of him and the Lacedaemonians, and no further slaughter to be made of the soldiers. Gylippus from thenceforth commanded to take prisoners. So the residue, except such as were hidden from them (which were many), they carried alive into the city. They sent also to pursue the three hundred which brake through their guards in the night, and took them. That which was left together of this army to the public was not much; but they that were conveyed away by stealth were very many; and all Sicily was filled with them, because they were not taken, as those with Demosthenes were, by composition. Besides, a great part [of these] were slain; for the slaughter [at this time] was exceeding great, none greater in all the Sicilian war.\* They were also not a few that died in those other assaults in their march. Nevertheless, many also escaped, some then presently and some by running away after servitude; the rendezvous of whom was Catana.

86. The Syracusians and their confederates, being come together, returned with their prisoners, all they could get, and with the spoil into the city. As for all the other prisoners of the Athenians and their confederates, they put them into the quarries as the safest custody. But Nicias and Demosthenes they killed, against Gylippus' will. For Gylippus thought the victory would be very honourable if, over and above all his other success, he could carry home both the generals of the enemy to Lacedaemon. And it fell out that one of them, Demosthenes, was their greatest enemy for the things he had done in the

\* The word *Sicilian* is certainly a false insertion. What Thucydides means is unquestionably that the slaughter was greater than in any other battle in the whole Peloponnesian war, as anyone can see by looking at the figures.

island and at Pylus; and the other, upon the same occasion, their greatest friend. For Nicias had earnestly laboured to have those prisoners which were taken in the island to be set at liberty by persuading the Athenians to the peace. For which cause the Lacedaemonians were inclined to love him; and it was principally in confidence of that that he rendered himself to Gylippus. But certain Syracusians, as it is reported, some of them for fear (because they had been tampering with him) lest being put to the torture he might bring them into trouble, whereas now they were well enough; and others, especially the Corinthians, fearing he might get away by corruption of one or other, being wealthy, and work them some mischief afresh, having persuaded their confederates to the same, killed him. For these, or for causes near unto these, was he put to death; being the man that, of all the Grecians of my time, had least deserved to be brought to so great a degree of misery.\*

87. As for those in the quarries, the Syracusians handled them at first but ungently. For in this hollow place, first the sun and suffocating air (being without roof) annoyed them one way; and on the other side, the nights coming upon that heat, autumnal and cold, put them, by reason of the alteration, into strange diseases; especially doing all things, for want of room, in one and the same place, and the carcasses of such as died of their wounds or change [of air] or other like accident lying together there on heaps. Also the smell was intolerable; besides that they were afflicted with hunger and thirst. For for eight months together, they allowed no more but to every man a cotyle of water by the day and two cotyles of corn. And whatsoever misery is probable that men in such a place may suffer, they suffered. Some seventy days they lived thus thronged. Afterwards, retaining the Athenians, and such Sicilians and Italians as were of the army with them, they sold the rest. How many were taken in all it is hard to say exactly; but they were seven thousand at the fewest. And this was the greatest action that happened in all this war, or at all, that we have

\* Here is one of Hobbes' inexplicable omissions. The Greek reads "having least deserved to fall into such misfortune, *having regulated all his life in accordance with what has been considered virtue.*"

heard of amongst the Grecians, being to the victors most glorious and most calamitous to the vanquished. For being wholly overcome in every kind and receiving small loss in nothing, their army and fleet and all [that ever they had] perished (as they use to say) with an universal destruction. Few of many returned home. And thus passed the business concerning Sicily.







# THE EIGHTH BOOK

## THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

The revolt of the Athenian confederates and the offers made by Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, the king's lieutenants of the lower Asia, draw the Lacedaemonians to the war in Ionia and Hellespont.—First in Ionia, and the provinces of Tissaphernes, who, by the counsel of Alcibiades and connivance of Astyochus, hindereth their proceedings.—Alcibiades in the meanwhile, to make way for his return into his country, giveth occasion of sedition about the government, whence ensued the authority of The Four Hundred, under the pretext of The Five Thousand; the recalling of Alcibiades by the army, and at length, by his countenance, the deposing again of The Four Hundred, and end of the sedition.—But in the meantime they lose Euboea.—Mindarus, the successor of Astyochus, finding himself abused by Tissaphernes, carrieth the war to Pharnabazus into Hellespont, and there presently loseth a battle to the Athenians before Abydos, being then summer and the twenty-first year of the war.

1. When the news was told at Athens, they believed not a long time, though it were plainly related and by those very soldiers that escaped from the defeat itself that all was so utterly lost as it was. When they knew it, they were mightily offended with the orators that furthered the voyage, as if they themselves had never decreed it. They were angry also with those that gave out prophecies and with the soothsayers and with whosoever else had at first by any divination put them into hope that Sicily should be subdued. Every thing, from every place, grieved them; and fear and astonishment, the

greatest that ever they were in, beset them round. For they were not only grieved for the loss which both every man in particular and the whole city sustained of so many men of arms, horsemen, and serviceable men, the like whereof they saw was not left, but seeing they had neither galleys in their haven nor money in their treasury nor furniture in their galleys, were even desperate at that present of their safety; and thought the enemy out of Sicily would come forthwith with their fleet into Peiraeus, especially after the vanquishing of so great a navy, and that the enemy here would surely now, with double preparation in every kind, press them to the utmost both by sea and land and be aided therein by their revolting confederates. Nevertheless, as far as their means would stretch, it was thought best to stand it out and, getting materials and money where they could have it, to make ready a navy and to make sure of their confederates, especially those of Euboea; and to introduce a greater frugality in the city, and to erect a magistracy of the elder sort, as occasion should be offered to preconsult of the business that passed. And they were ready, in respect of their present fear (as is the people's fashion), to order every thing aright. And as they resolved this, so they did it. And the summer ended.

2. The winter following, upon the great overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily, all the Grecians were presently up against them. Those who before were confederates of neither side thought fit no longer, though uncalled, to abstain from the war, but to go against the Athenians of their own accord, as having not only every one severally this thought, that had the Athenians prospered in Sicily they would afterwards have come upon them also, but imagined withal that the rest of the war would be but short, whereof it would be an honour to participate. And such of them as were confederates of the Lacedaemonians longed now more than ever to be freed as soon as might be of their great toil. But above all, the cities subject to the Athenians were ready, even beyond their ability, to revolt; as they that judged according to their passion, without admitting reason in the matter, that the next summer they were to remain with victory. But the Lacedaemonians themselves took heart, not only from all this, but also principally from that,



that their confederates in Sicily with great power, having another navy now necessarily added to their own, would in all likelihood be with them in the beginning of the spring. And being every way full of hopes, they purposed without delay to fall close to the war, making account, if this were well ended, both to be free hereafter from any more such dangers as the Athenians, if they had gotten Sicily, would have put them into, and also, having pulled them down, to have the principality of all Greece now secure unto themselves.

3. Whereupon Agis, their king, went out with a part of his army the same winter from Deceleia and levied money amongst the confederates for the building of a navy; and turning into the Melian gulf, upon an old grudge took a great booty from the Oetaeans, which he made money of, and forced those of Pthiotis, being Achaians, and others in those parts subjects to the Thessalians (the Thessalians complaining and unwilling) to give them hostages and money. The hostages he put into Corinth, and endeavoured to draw them into the league. And the Lacedaemonians imposed upon the states confederate, the charge of building one hundred galleys; that is to say, on their own state and on the Boeotians, each twenty-five; on the Phocceans and Locrians, fifteen; on the Corinthians, fifteen; on the Arcadians, Sicyonians, and Pellenians, ten; and on the Megareans, Troezenians, and Hermionians, ten. And put all things else in readiness presently with the spring to begin the war.

4. The Athenians also made their preparations as they had designed, having gotten timber and built their navy this same winter, and fortified the promontory of Sunium that their corn-boats might come about in safety. Also they abandoned the fort in Laconia, which they had built as they went by for Sicily. And generally where there appeared expense upon anything unuseful, they contracted their charge.

5. Whilst they were on both sides doing thus, there came unto Agis about their revolt from the Athenians, first the ambassadors of the Euboeans. Accepting the motion, he sent for Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaidas, and for Melanthus from Lacedaemon to go commanders into Euboea. Whom, when he was come to him with about three hundred freedmen, he was now about to send over. But in the meantime came the Lesbians,

they also desiring to revolt; and by the means of the Boeotians Agis changed his former resolution and prepared for the revolt of Lesbos, deferring that of Euboea, and assigned them Alcamenes, the same that should have gone into Euboea, for their governor; and the Boeotians promised them ten galleys and Agis other ten. Now this was done without acquainting therewith the state of Lacedaemon. For Agis, as long as he was about Deceleia with the power he had, had the law in his own hands to send what army and whither he listed and to levy men and money at his pleasure. And at this time, the confederates of him (as I may call them) did better obey him than the confederates of the Lacedaemonians did them at home; for having the power in his hands, he was terrible wheresoever he came. And he was now for the Lesbians. But the Chians and Erythraeans, they also desiring to revolt, went not to Agis, but to the Lacedaemonians in the city; and with them went also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, lieutenant to king Darius in the low countries of Asia.\* For Tissaphernes also instigated the Peloponnesians and promised to pay their fleet. For he had lately begged of the king the tribute accruing in his own province; for which he was in arrearage, because he could receive nothing out of any of the Greek cities by reason of the Athenians. And therefore he thought by weakening the Athenians to receive his tribute the better, and withal to draw the Lacedaemonians into a league with the king; and thereby, as the king had commanded, to kill or take alive Amorges, Pissuthnes' bastard son, who was in rebellion against him about

\* The Persian king had divided Asia Minor into a number of satrapies or governorships. Pharnabazus held one, comprising, among other states, a number of the northern Greek cities, e.g., those in the Hellespont and in Phrygia and Bithynia. Tissaphernes held the southern satrapy with Ionia, Caria, Lycia, etc. The policy of both of the governors was, as far as the Peloponnesian War was concerned, only to secure what could be secured for the Persians. To this end they would use one of the Greek combatants to weaken the other. It is only in the last five years of the war, after the period of which Thucydides wrote, that the king sent down his son Prince Cyrus to the coast with authority superior to that of the satraps. Cyrus took the part of the Lacedaemonians with decision and his support was one of the most potent factors against Athens in the end of the war. See Book ii, Chapter 65.

Caria. The Chians, therefore, and Tissaphernes followed this business jointly.

6. Calligeitus, the son of Laophon, a Magarean, and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both banished their own cities and abiding with Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnaces, came also about the same time to Lacedaemon, sent by Pharnabazus to procure a fleet for the Hellespont, that he also, if he could, might cause the Athenian cities in his province to revolt for his tribute's sake, and be the first to draw the Lacedaemonians into league with the king, just the same things that were desired before by Tissaphernes. Now Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, there was great canvassing at Lacedaemon between the one side that persuaded to send to Ionia and Chios and the other that would have the army and fleet go first into the Hellespont. But the Lacedaemonians indeed approved best by much of the business of the Chians and of Tissaphernes. For with these co-operated Alcibiades, hereditary guest and friend of Endius, the ephore of that year, in the highest degree; insomuch as in respect of that guesthood, Alcibiades' family received a Laconic name. For Endius was called Endius Alcibiadis. Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians sent first one Phrynias, a man of those parts, to Chios to see if the galleys they had were so many as they reported and whether the city were otherwise so sufficient as it was said to be. And when the messenger brought back word that all that had been said was true, they received both the Chians and the Erythraeans presently into their league and decreed to send them forty galleys, there being at Chios, from such places as the Chians named, no less than sixty already. And of these at first they were about to send out ten, with Melancrias for admiral; but afterwards, upon occasion of an earthquake, for Melancrias they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten galleys they went about the making ready of five only in Laconia. So the winter ended, and nineteenth year of this war written by Thucydides.

7. In the beginning of the next summer, because the Chians pressed to have the galley sent away and feared lest the Athenians should get notice what they were doing (for all their ambassadors went out by stealth), the Lacedaemonians send

away to Corinth three Spartans to will them with all speed to transport their galleys over the isthmus to the other sea towards Athens, and to go all to Chios, as well those which Agis had made ready to go to Lesbos as the rest; the number of the galleys of the league which were then there being forty wanting one.

8. But Calligeitus and Timagoras, who came from Pharnabazus, would have no part in this fleet that went for Chios, nor would deliver the money, twenty-five talents, which they had brought with them to pay for their setting forth, but made account to go out with another fleet afterwards by themselves. When Agis saw that the Lacedaemonians meant to send first to Chios, he resolved not of any other course himself; but the confederates assembling at Corinth went to council upon the matter and concluded thus: that they should go first to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, who was making ready the five galleys at Laconia; and then to Lesbos under the charge of Alcamenes, intended also to be sent thither by Agis; and lastly into Hellespont, in which voyage they ordained that Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, should have the command; and concluded to carry over the isthmus first the one half of their galleys, and that those should presently put to sea, that the Athenians might have their minds more upon those than on the other half to be transported afterwards. For they determined to pass that sea openly, contemning the weakness of the Athenians in respect they had not any navy of importance yet appearing. As they resolved, so presently they carried over one-and-twenty galleys.

9. But when the rest urged to put to sea, the Corinthians were unwilling to go along before they should have ended the celebration of the Isthmian holidays, then come. Hereupon Agis was content that they for their parts should observe the Isthmian truce, and he, therefore, to take the fleet upon himself as his own. But the Corinthians not agreeing to that, and the time passing away, the Athenians got intelligence the easier of the practice of the Chians and sent thither Aristocrates, one of their generals, to accuse them of it. The Chians denying the matter, he commanded them for their better credit to send along with him some galleys for their aid due by the league; and they

sent seven. The cause why they sent these galleys was the many not acquainted with the practice, and the few and conscious not willing to undergo the enmity of the multitude without having strength first, and their not expecting any longer the coming of the Lacedaemonians, because they had so long delayed them.

10. In the meantime the Isthmian games were celebrating, and the Athenians (for they had word sent them of it) came and saw; and the business of the Chians grew more apparent. After they went thence, they took order presently that the fleet might not pass from Cenchreiae undiscovered. And after the holidays were over, the Corinthians put to sea for Chios under the conduct of Alcamenes. And the Athenians at first with equal number came up to them and endeavoured to draw them out into the main sea; but seeing the Peloponnesians followed not far, but turned another way, the Athenians went also from them. For the seven galleys of Chios, which were part of this number, they durst not trust. But afterwards having manned thirty-seven others, they gave chase to the enemy by the shore and drave them into Peiraeus in the territory of Corinth (this Peiraeus is a desert haven, and the utmost upon the confines of Epidauria). One galley that was far from land the Peloponnesians lost; the rest they brought together into the haven. But the Athenians charging them by sea with their galleys, and withal setting their men a-land, mightily troubled and disordered them, brake their galleys upon the shore, and slew Alcamenes, their commander. And some they lost of their own.

11. The fight being ended, they assigned a sufficient number of galleys to lie opposite to those of the enemy and the rest to lie under a little island not far off, in which also they encamped, and sent to Athens for a supply. For the Peloponnesians had with them for aid of their galleys the Corinthians the next day, and not long after, divers others of the inhabitants thereabouts. But when they considered that the guarding of them in a desert place would be painful, they knew not what course to take; and once they thought to have set the galleys on fire; but it was concluded afterwards to draw them to the land and guard them with their landmen till some good occasion should be

offered for their escape. And Agis also, when he heard the news, sent unto them Thermon, a Spartan. The Lacedaemonians, having been advertised of the departure of these galleys from the isthmus (for the ephores had commanded Alcamenes when he put to sea to send them word by a horseman), were minded presently to have sent away also the five galleys also that were in Laconia, and Chalcideus the commander of them, and with him Alcibiades. But afterwards, as they were ready to go out, came the news of the galleys chased into Peiraeus, which so much discouraged them, in respect they stumbled in the very entrance of the Ionic war, that they purposed now not only not to send away those galleys of their own but also to call back again some of those that were already at sea.

12. When Alcibiades saw this, he dealt with Endius and the rest of the ephores again not to fear the voyage, alleging that they would [make haste, and] be there before the Chians should have heard of the misfortune of the fleet, and that as soon as he should arrive in Ionia himself, he could easily make the cities there to revolt by declaring unto them the weakness of the Athenians and the diligence of the Lacedaemonians, wherein he should be thought more worthy to be believed than any other. Moreover to Endius he said that it would be an honour in particular to him that Ionia should revolt and the king be made confederate to the Lacedaemonians by his own means, and not to have it the mastery of Agis; for he was at difference with Agis. So having prevailed with Endius and the other ephores, he took sea with five galleys, together with Chalcideus of Lacedaemon, and made haste.

13. About the same time came back from Sicily those sixteen galleys of the Peloponnesians, which, having aided Gylippus in that war, were intercepted by the way about Leucadia and evil entreated by twenty-seven galleys of Athens, that watched thereabouts under the command of Hippocles, the son of Menippus, for such galleys as should return out of Sicily. For all the rest, saving one, avoiding the Athenians, were arrived in Corinth before.

14. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, as they sailed, kept prisoner every man they met with by the way, to the end that notice might not be given of their passage. And touching first at

Corycus in the continent, where also they dismissed those whom they had apprehended, after conference there with some of the conspirators of the Chians, that advised them to go to the city without sending them word before, they came upon the Chians suddenly and unexpected. It put the commons into much wonder and astonishment; but the few had so ordered the matter beforehand that an assembly chanced to be holden at the same time. And when Chalcideus and Alcibiades had spoken in the same and told them that many galleys were coming to them, but not that those other galleys were besieged in Peiraeus, the Chians first and afterwards the Erythraeans revolted from the Athenians. After this they went with three galleys to Clazomenae and made that city to revolt also. And the Clazomenians presently crossed over to the continent and there fortified Polichna, lest they should need a retiring place from the little island wherein they dwelt. The rest also, all that had revolted, fell to fortifying and making of preparation for the war.

15. This news of Chios was quickly brought to the Athenians, who, conceiving themselves to be now beset with great and evident danger, and that the rest of the confederates, seeing so great a city to revolt, would be no longer quiet, in this their present fear decreed that those thousand talents, which through all this war they had affected to keep untouched, forthwith abrogating the punishment ordained for such as spake or gave their suffrages to stir it, should now be used, and therewith galleys not a few manned. They decreed also to send thither out of hand, under the command of Strombichides, the son of Diotimus, eight galleys of the number of those that besieged the enemy at Peiraeus; the which, having forsaken their charge to give chase to the galleys that went with Chalcideus, and not able to overtake them, were now returned; and shortly after also to send Thrasycles to help them with twelve galleys more, which also had departed from the same guard upon the enemy. And those seven galleys of Chios, which likewise kept watch at Peiraeus with the rest, they fetched from thence, and gave the bondmen that served in them their liberty, and the chains to those that were free. And instead of all those galleys that kept guard upon the galleys of the Peloponnesians, they

made ready other with all speed in their places, besides thirty more, which they intended to furnish out afterwards. Great was their diligence; and nothing was of light importance that they went about for the recovery of Chios.

16. Strombichides in the meantime arrived at Samos, and taking into his company one Samian galley, went thence to Teos and entreated them not to stir. But towards Teos was Chalcideus also coming with twenty-three galleys from Chios, and with him also the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans. Whereof Strombichides having been advertised, he put forth again before his arrival, and standing off at sea, when he saw the many galleys that came from Chios, he fled towards Samos, they following him. The land forces the Teians would not at first admit; but after this flight of the Athenians, they brought them in. And these for the most part held their hands for a while, expecting the return of Chalcideus from the chase; but when he stayed somewhat long, they fell of themselves to the demolishing of the wall built about the city of Teos by the Athenians towards the continent, wherein they were also helped by some few barbarians that came down thither under the leading of Tages, deputy lieutenant of Tis-saphernes.

17. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into Samos, armed the mariners that were in the galleys of Peloponnesus and left them in Chios, instead of whom they manned with mariners of Chios both those and twenty galleys more; and with this fleet they went to Miletus with intent to cause it to revolt. For the intention of Alcibiades, that was acquainted with the principal Milesians, was to prevent the fleet which was to come from Peloponnesus and to turn these cities first, that the honour of it might be ascribed to the Chians, to himself, to Chalcideus, and (as he had promised) to Endius that set them out, as having brought most of the cities to revolt with the forces of the Chians only and of those galleys that came with Chalcideus. So these, for the greatest part of their way undiscovered, and arriving not much sooner than Strombichides and Thrasycles (who now, chancing to be present with [those] twelve galleys from Athens, followed them with Strombichides), caused the Milesians to revolt. The Athenians following them at



the heels with nineteen galleys, being shut out by the Milesians, lay at anchor at Lada, an island over against the city.

Presently upon the revolt of Miletus was made the first league between the king and the Lacedaemonians by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, as followeth:

18. "The Lacedaemonians and their confederates have made a league with the king and Tissaphernes on these articles:

"Whatsoever territory or cities the king possesseth and his ancestors have possessed, the same are to remain the king's.

"Whatsoever money or other profit redounded to the Athenians from their cities, the king and the Lacedaemonians are jointly to hinder, so as the Athenians may receive nothing from thence, neither money nor other thing.

"The king and the Lacedaemonians and their confederates are to make joint war against the Athenians. And without consent of both parts it shall not be lawful to lay down the war against the Athenians, neither for the king nor for the Lacedaemonians and their confederates.

"If any shall revolt from the king, they shall be enemies to the Lacedaemonians and their confederates; and if any shall revolt from the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, they shall in like manner be enemies to the king."

19. This was the league. Presently after this the Chians set out ten galleys more and went to Anaea, both to hearken what became of the business at Miletus and also to cause the cities thereabouts to revolt. But word being sent them from Chalcideus to go back, and that Amorges was at hand with his army, they went thence to the temple of Jupiter. [Being there] they descried sixteen galleys more, which had been sent out by the Athenians under the charge of Diomedon after the putting to sea of those with Thrasyclus, upon sight of whom they fled, one galley to Ephesus, the rest towards Teos. Four of them the Athenians took, but empty, the men having gotten on shore; the rest escaped into the city of Teos. And the Athenians went away again towards Samos. The Chians, putting to sea again with the remainder of their fleet and with the land forces, caused first Lebedos to revolt and then Erae; and afterwards returned, both with their fleet and landmen, every one to his own.

20. About the same time, the twenty galleys of Peloponnesus, which the Athenians had formerly chased into Peiraeus, and against whom they now lay with a like number, suddenly forced their passage, and having the victory in fight, took four of the Athenian galleys, and going to Cenchreiae, prepared afresh for their voyage to Chios and Ionia. At which time there came also unto them from Lacedaemon for commander, Astyochus, who was now admiral of the whole navy. When the landmen were gone from Teos, Tissaphernes himself came thither with his forces; and he also demolished the wall, as much as was left standing, and went his way again. Not long after the going away of him, came thither Diomedon with ten galleys of Athens. And having made a truce with the Teians, that he also might be received, he put to sea again and kept the shore to Erae and assaulted it, but failing to take it, departed.

21. It fell out about the same time that the commons of Samos, together with the Athenians who were there with three galleys, made an insurrection against the great men and slew of them in all about two hundred. And having banished four hundred more and distributed amongst themselves their lands and houses (the Athenians having now, as assured of their fidelity, decreed them their liberty), they administered the affairs of the city from that time forward by themselves, no more communicating with the Geomori nor permitting any of the common people to marry with them.

22. After this, the same summer, the Chians, as they had begun, persevering in their earnestness to bring the cities to revolt, even without the Lacedaemonians, [with their single forces], and desiring to make as many fellows of their danger as they were able, made war by themselves with thirteen galleys against Lesbos; which was according to what was concluded by the Lacedaemonians, namely, to go thither in the second place, and thence into the Hellespont. And withal the land forces, both of such Peloponnesians as were present and of their confederates thereabouts, went along by them to Clazomenae and Cyme, these under the command of Eualas a Spartan, and the galleys, of Deiniades, a man of the parts thereabouts. The galleys putting in at Methymna, caused that city to revolt first.

23. Now Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, having set forth as he intended from Cenchreiae, arrived at Chios. The third day after his coming thither came Leon and Diomedon into Lesbos with twenty-five galleys of Athens; for Leon came with a supply of ten galleys more from Athens afterwards. Astyochus, in the evening of the same day, taking with him one galley more of Chios, took his way toward Lesbos to help it what he could, and put in at Pyrrha, and the next day at Eressos. Here he heard that Mytilene was taken by the Athenians, even with the shout of their voices. For the Athenians, coming unexpected, entered the haven, and having beaten the galleys of the Chians, disembarked and overcame those that made head against them and won the city. When Astyochus heard this, both from the Eressians and from those Chian galleys that came from Methymna with Eubulus, which having been left there before, as soon as Mytilene was lost fled, and three of them chanced to meet with him (for one was taken by the Athenians), he continued his course for Mytilene no longer; but having caused Eressos to revolt, and armed the soldiers he had aboard, made them to march toward Antissa and Methymna by land, under the conduct of Eteonicus; and he himself, with his own galleys and those three of Chios, rowed thither along the shore, hoping that the Methymnaeans, upon sight of his forces, would take heart and continue in their revolt. But when in Lesbos all things went against him, he re-embarked his army and returned to Chios. And the landmen that were aboard, and should have gone into Hellespont, went again into their cities. After this came to them six galleys to Chios, of those of the confederate fleet at Cenchreiae. The Athenians, when they had reestablished the state of Lesbos, went thence and took Polichna, which the Clazomenians had fortified in the continent, and brought them all back again into the city which is in the island, save only the authors of the revolt; for these got away to Daphnus. And Clazomenae returned to the obedience of the Athenians.

24. The same summer, those Athenians that with twenty galleys lay in the isle of Lada before Miletus, landing in the territory of Miletus at Panormus, slew Chalceus, the Lacedaemonian commander, that came out against them but with a

few, and set up a trophy, and the third day after departed. But the Milesians pulled down the trophy, as erected where the Athenians were not masters.

Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian galleys that were at Lesbos, made war upon the Chians by sea from the isles called Oenussae, which lie before Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum (forts they held in Erythraea), and from Lesbos. They that were aboard were men of arms of the roll, compelled to serve in the fleet. With these they landed at Cardamyle; and having overthrown the Chians that made head in a battle at Bolissus, and slain many of them, they recovered from the enemy all the places of that quarter. And again they overcame them in another battle at Phanae, and in a third at Leuconium. After this, the Chians went out no more to fight; by which means the Athenians made spoil of their territory, excellently well furnished. For except it were the Lacedaemonians, the Chians were the only men that I have heard of that had joined advisedness to prosperity, and the more their city increased, had carried the more respect in the administration thereof to assure it. Nor ventured they now to revolt (lest any man should think that, in this act at least, they regarded not what was the safest) till they had many and strong confederates with whose help to try their fortune, nor till such time as they perceived the people of Athens (as they themselves could not deny) to have their estate after the defeat in Sicily reduced to extreme weakness. And if through human misreckoning they miscarried in aught, they erred with many others, who in like manner had an opinion that the state of the Athenians would quickly have been overthrown.

Being therefore shut up by sea, and having their lands spoiled, some within undertook to make the city return unto the Athenians. Which though the magistrates perceived, yet they themselves stirred not; but having received Astyochnus into the city with four galleys that were with him from Erythraea, they took advice together, how by taking hostages, or some other gentle way, to make them give over the conspiracy. Thus stood the business with the Chians.

25. In the end of this summer a thousand five hundred men of arms of Athens, and a thousand of Argos (for the Athenians

had put armour upon five hundred light-armed of the Argives), and of other confederates a thousand more, with forty-eight galleys, reckoning those which were for transportation of soldiers, under the conduct of Phrynicus, Onomacles, and Scironides, came in to Samos, and crossing over to Miletus encamped before it. And the Milesians issued forth with eight hundred men of arms of their own, besides the Peloponnesians that came with Chalcideus and some auxiliar strangers with Tissaphernes (Tissaphernes himself being also there with his cavalry) and fought with the Athenians and their confederates. The Argives, who made one wing of themselves, advancing before the rest and in some disorder, in contempt of the enemy as being Ionians and not likely to sustain their charge, were by the Milesians overcome, and lost no less than three hundred of their men. But the Athenians, when they had first overthrown the Peloponnesians and then beaten back the barbarians and other multitude and not fought with the Milesians at all (for they, after they were come from the chase of the Argives and saw their other wing defeated, went into the town), sat down with their arms, as being now masters of the field, close under the wall of the city. It fell out in this battle that on both sides the Ionics had the better of the Dorics. For the Athenians overcame the opposite Peloponnesians, and the Milesians the Argives. The Athenians, after they had erected their trophy, the place being an isthmus, prepared to take in the town with a wall, supposing if they got Miletus, the other cities would easily come in.

26. In the meantime it was told them about twilight that the five-and-fifty galleys from Peloponnesus and Sicily were hard by and only not already come. For there came into Peloponnesus out of Sicily, by the instigation of Hermocrates to help to consummate the subversion of the Athenian state, twenty galleys of Syracuse and two of Selinus; and the galleys that had been preparing in Peloponnesus being then also ready, they were, both these and the other, committed to the charge of Theramenes, to be conducted by him to Astyochnus, the admiral; and they put in first at Eleus, an island over against Miletus. And being advertised there that the Athenians lay before the town, they went from thence into the gulf of Iasus

to learn how the affairs of the Milesians stood. Alcibiades coming a horseback to Teichiussa of the territory of Miletus, in which part of the gulf the Peloponnesian galleys lay at anchor, they were informed by him of the battle; for Alcibiades was, with the Milesians and with Tissaphernes, present in it. And he exhorted them, unless they meant to lose what they had in Ionia and the whole business, to succour Miletus with all speed and not to suffer it to be taken in with a wall.

27. According to this, they concluded to go the next morning and relieve it. Phrynichus, when he had certain word from Derus of the arrival of those galleys, his colleagues advising to stay and fight it out with their fleet, said that he would neither do it himself nor suffer them to do it, or any other, as long as he could hinder it. For seeing he might fight with them hereafter, when they should know against how many galleys of the enemy and with what additions to their own, sufficiently and at leisure made ready, they might do it, he would never, he said, for fear of being upbraided with baseness (for it was no baseness for the Athenians to let their navy give way upon occasion; but by what means soever it should fall out, it would be a great baseness to be beaten), be swayed to hazard battle against reason and not only to dishonour the state but also to cast it into extreme danger, seeing that since their late losses it hath scarce been fit with their strongest preparation, willingly, no nor urged by precedent necessity, to undertake, how then without constraint to seek out voluntary, dangers? Therefore he commanded them with all speed to take aboard those that were wounded and their landmen and whatsoever utensils they brought with them; but to leave behind whatsoever they had taken in the territory of the enemy to the end that their galleys might be the lighter; and to put off for Samos, and thence, when they had all their fleet together, to make out against the enemy as occasion should be offered. As Phrynichus advised this, so he put it in execution, and was esteemed a wise man, not then only, but afterwards, nor in this only, but in whatsoever else he had the ordering of. Thus the Athenians presently in the evening, with their victory unperfect, dislodged from before Miletus. From Samos the Argives, in haste and in anger for their overthrow, went home.

28. The Peloponnesians, setting forth betimes in the morning from Teichiussa, put in at Miletus and stayed there one day. The next day they took with them those galleys of Chios which had formerly been chased together with Chalceids, and meant to have returned to Teichiussa to take aboard such necessaries as they had left ashore. But as they were going, Tissaphernes came to them with his landmen and persuaded them to set upon Iasus, where Amorges, the king's enemy, then lay. Whereupon they assaulted Iasus upon a sudden; and they within not thinking but they had been the fleet of the Athenians, took it. The greatest praise in this action was given to the Syracusians. Having taken Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, but a rebel to the king, the Peloponnesians delivered him to Tissaphernes to carry him if he would to the king, as he had order to do. The city they pillaged, wherein, as being a place of ancient riches, the army got a very great quantity of money. The auxiliary soldiers of Amorges they received, without doing them hurt, into their own army, being for the most part Peloponnesians. The town itself they delivered to Tissaphernes, with all the prisoners, as well free as bond, upon composition with him, at a Daric stater by the poll.\* And so they returned to Miletus. And from hence they sent Pedaritus, the son of Leon, whom the Lacedaemonians had sent hither to be governor of Chios, to Erythrae, and with him the bands that had aided Amorges by land, and made Philip governor there in Miletus. And so this summer ended.

29. The next winter, Tissaphernes, after he had put a garrison into Iasus, came to Miletus; and for one month's pay, which was promised on his part at Lacedaemon, he gave unto the soldiers through the whole fleet after an Attic drachma a man by the day. But for the rest of the time he would pay but three oboles till he had asked the king's pleasure; and if the king commanded it, then he said he would pay them the full drachma. Nevertheless upon the contradiction of Hermocrates, general of the Syracusians (for Theramenes was but slack in exacting pay, as not being general, but only to deliver the galleys that came with him to Astyochus), it was agreed that but for the five galleys that were over and above, they should have more than three

\* I.e., at a price the equivalent of twenty Attic drachmae apiece.

oboles a man. For to fifty-five galleys he allowed three talents a month, and to as many as should be more than that number, after the same proportion.

30. The same winter the Athenians that were at Samos (for there were now come in thirty-five galleys more from home, with Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, their commanders), having gathered together their galleys, as well those that had been at Chios as all the rest, concluded, distributing to every one his charge by lot, to go lie before Miletus with a fleet, but against Chios to send out both a fleet and an army of landmen. And they did so. For Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty galleys and part of those thousand men of arms that went to Miletus, which they carried along with them in vessels for transportation of soldiers, according to their lot went to Chios; and the rest, remaining at Samos with seventy-four galleys, were masters of the sea, and went to Miletus.

31. Astyochus, who was now in Chios requiring hostages in respect of the treason, after he heard of the fleet that was come with Theramenes and that the articles of the league with Tissaphernes were mended, gave over that business, and with ten galleys of Peloponnesus and ten of Chios, went thence and assaulted Pteleum; but not being able to take it, he kept by the shore to Clazomenae. There he summoned those within to yield, with offer to such of them as favoured the Athenians that they might go up and dwell at Daphnus. And Tamos, the deputy lieutenant of Ionia, offered them the same. But they not hearkening thereunto, he made an assault upon the city, being unwall'd; but when he could not take it, he put to sea again, and with a mighty wind was himself carried to Phocaea and Cume; but the rest of the fleet put in at Marathusa, Pele, and Drimyssa, islands that lie over against Clazomenae. After they had stayed there eight days in regard of the winds, spoiling and destroying, and partly taking aboard whatsoever goods of the Clazomenians lay without, they went afterwards to Phocaea and Cume to Astyochus.

32. While Astyochus was there, the ambassadors of the Lesbians came unto him, desiring to revolt from the Athenians. And as for him, they prevailed with him; but seeing the Corinthians



and the other confederates were unwilling in respect of their former ill success there, he put to sea for Chios. Whither, after a great tempest, his galleys, some from one place and some from another, at length arrived all. After this, Pedaritus, who was now at Erythrae, whither he was come from Miletus by land, came over with his forces into Chios. Besides those forces he brought over with him, he had the soldiers which were of the five galleys that came thither with Chalcideus and were left there, to the number of five hundred, and armour to arm them.

Now some of the Lesbians having promised to revolt, Astyo-chus communicated the matter with Pedaritus and the Chians, alleging how meet it would be to go with a fleet and make Lesbos to revolt, for that they should either get more confederates, or failing, they should at least weaken the Athenians. But they gave him no ear; and for the Chian galleys, Pedaritus told him [plainly] he should have none of them.

33. Whereupon Astyo-chus, taking with him five galleys of Corinth, a sixth of Megara, one of Hermione, and those of Laconia which he brought with him, went towards Miletus to his charge, mightily threatening the Chians, in case they should need him, not to help them.

When he was come to Corycus in Erythraea, he stayed there. And the Athenians from Samos lay on the other side of the point, the one not knowing that the other was so near. Astyo-chus, upon a letter sent him from Pedaritus, signifying that there were come certain Erythraean captives dismissed from Samos with design to betray Erythrae, went presently back to Erythrae; so little he missed of falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus also went over to him; and having narrowly enquired touching these seeming traitors, and found that the whole matter was but a pretence which the men had used for their escape from Samos, they acquitted them, and departed one to Chios, the other, as he was going before, towards Miletus.

34. In the meantime, the army of the Athenians, being come about by sea from Corycus to Arginum, lighted on three long-boats of the Chians, which when they saw they presently chased. But there arose a great tempest; and the long-boats of Chios with much ado recovered the harbour. But of the

Athenian galleys, especially such as followed them furthest, there perished three, driven ashore at the city of Chios; and the men that were aboard them were part taken and part slain. The rest of the fleet escaped into a haven called Phoenicus, under the hill Mimas, from whence they got afterwards to Lesbos and there fortified.

35. The same winter, Hippocrates, setting out from Peloponnesus with ten galleys of Thurium, commanded by Dorieus, the son of Diogoras, with two others, and with one galley of Laconia and one of Syracuse, went to Cnidus. This city was now revolted from Tissaphernes; and the Peloponnesians that lay at Miletus, hearing of it, commanded that, the one half of their galleys remaining for the guard of Cnidus, the other half should go about Triopium and help to bring in the ships which were to come from Egypt. This Triopium is a promontory of the territory of Cnidus, lying out in the sea and consecrated to Apollo. The Athenians, upon advertisement hereof, setting forth from Samos, took those galleys that kept guard at Triopium; but the men that were in them escaped to land. After this they went to Cnidus, which they assaulted and had almost taken, being without wall. And the next day they assaulted it again; but being less able to hurt it now than before, because they had fenced it better this night, and the men also were gotten into it that fled from their galleys under Triopium, they invaded and wasted the Cnidian territory, and so went back to Samos.

36. About the same time, Astyochnus being come to the navy at Miletus, the Peloponnesians had plenty of all things for the army. For they had not only sufficient pay, but the soldiers also had store of money yet remaining of the pillage of Iasus. And the Milesians underwent the war with a good will. Nevertheless, the former articles of the league made by Chalcideus with Tissaphernes seemed defective and not so advantageous to them as to him. Whereupon they agreed to new ones, in the presence of Tissaphernes, which were these:

37. "The agreement of the Lacedaemonians and their confederates with king Darius and his children and with Tissaphernes for league and amity according to the articles following:

"Whatsoever territories and cities do belong unto king Darius,

or were his father's or his ancestors', against these shall neither the Lacedaemonians go to make war nor any way to annoy them; neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor their confederates exact tribute of any of those cities. Neither shall king Darius, nor any under his dominion, make war upon or any way annoy the Lacedaemonians or any of the Lacedaemonian confederates.

"If the Lacedaemonians or their confederates shall need anything of the king, or the king of the Lacedaemonians or their confederates, what they shall persuade each other to do, if they do it, shall be good.

"They shall both of them make war jointly against the Athenians and their confederates; and when they shall give over the war, they shall also do it jointly.

"Whatsoever army shall be in the king's country, sent for by the king, the king shall defray.

"If any of the cities comprehended in the league made with the king shall invade the king's territories, the rest shall oppose them and defend the king to the utmost of their power. If any city of the king's, or under his dominion, shall invade the Lacedaemonians or their confederates, the king shall make opposition and defend them to the utmost of his power."

38. After this accord made, Theramenes delivered his galleys into the hands of Astyochus and, putting to sea in a light-horseman, is no more seen.

The Athenians that were now come with their army from Lesbos to Chios, and were masters of the field and of the sea, fortified Delphinium, a place both strong to the landward, and that had also a harbour for shipping, and was not far from the city itself of Chios. And the Chians, as having been disheartened in divers former battles, and otherwise not only not mutually well affected but jealous one of another (for Tydeus and his accomplices had been put to death by Pedaritus for Atticism, and the rest of the city was kept in awe, but by force, and for a time), stirred not against them. And for the causes mentioned, not conceiving themselves, neither with their own strength nor with the help of those that Pedaritus had with him, sufficient to give them battle, they sent to Miletus to require aid from Astyochus. Which when he denied them,

Pedaritus sent letters to Lacedaemon complaining of the wrong. Thus proceeded the affairs of the Athenians at Chios. Also their fleet at Samos went often out against the fleet of the enemy at Miletus; but when theirs would never come out of the harbour to encounter them, they returned to Samos and lay still.

39. The same winter, about the solstice, went out from Peloponnesus towards Ionia those twenty-seven galleys which at the procurement of Calligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus were made ready by the Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus. The commander of them was Antisthenes, a Spartan, with whom the Lacedaemonians sent eleven Spartans more to be of council with Astyochus, whereof Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, was one. These had commission that when they should be arrived at Miletus, besides their general care to order everything to the best, they should send away these galleys, either the same or more or fewer, into the Hellespont to Pharnabazus if they so thought fit, and to appoint Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, that went along in them, for commander; and that the same eleven, if they thought it meet, should put Astyochus from his charge and ordain Antisthenes in his place; for they had him in suspicion for the letters of Pedaritus. These galleys, holding their course from Malea through the main sea and arriving at Melos, lighted on ten galleys of the Athenians, whereof three they took, but without the men, and fired them. After this, because they feared lest those Athenian galleys that escaped from Melos should give notice of their coming to those in Samos (as also it fell out), they changed their course and went towards Crete; and having made their voyage the longer that it might be the safer, they put in at Caunus in Asia. Now from thence, as being in a place of safety, they sent a messenger to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy.

40. The Chians and Pedaritus about the same time, notwithstanding [their former repulse, and] that Astyochus was still backward, sent messengers to him, desiring him to come with his whole fleet to help them, being besieged, and not to suffer the greatest of their confederate cities in all Ionia to be thus shut up by sea and ravaged by land, as it was. For the Chians having many slaves, more than any one state except that of the

Lacedaemonians, whom for their offences they the more ungenerally punished because of their number, many of them, as soon as the Athenians appeared to be settled in their fortifications, ran over presently to them; and were they, that knowing the territory so well, did it the greatest spoil. Therefore the Chians said he must help them whilst there was hope and possibility to do it, Delphinium being still in fortifying and unfurnished, and greater fences being in making both about their camp and fleet. Astyochus, though he meant it not before, because he would have made good his threats, yet when he saw the confederates were willing, he was bent to have relieved them.

41. But in the meantime came the messenger from the twenty-seven galleys and from the Lacedaemonian counsellors that were come to Caunus. Astyochus, therefore, esteeming the wafting in of these galleys, whereby they might the more freely command the sea, and the safe coming in of those Lacedaemonians, who were to look into his actions, a business that ought to be preferred above all other, presently gave over his journey for Chios and went towards Caunus. As he went by the coast, he landed at Cos Meropidis, being unwall'd and thrown down by an earthquake which had happened there, the greatest verily in man's memory, and rifled it, the inhabitants being fled into the mountains; and overrunning the country, made booty of all that came in his way, saving of freemen, and those he dismissed. From Cos he went by night to Cnidus, but found it necessary, by the advice of the Cnidians, not to land his men there, but to follow as he was after those twenty galleys of Athens, wherewith Charminus, one of the Athenian generals gone out from Samos, stood watching for those twenty-seven galleys that were come from Peloponnesus, the same that Astyochus himself was going to convoy in. For they at Samos had had intelligence from Miletus of their coming; and Charminus was lying for them about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia; for by this time he knew that they were at Caunus.

42. Astyochus, therefore, desiring to outgo the report of his coming, went as he was to Syme, hoping to find those galleys

out from the shore. But [a shower of] rain, together with the cloudiness of the sky, made his galleys to miss their course in the dark and disordered them.

The next morning, the fleet being scattered, the left wing was manifestly descried by the Athenians, whilst the rest wandered yet about the island. And thereupon Charminus and the Athenians put forth against them with twenty galleys, supposing they had been the same galleys they were watching for from Caunus; and presently charging, sunk three of them and hurt others, and were superior in the fight till such time as, contrary to their expectation, the greater part of the fleet came in sight and enclosed them about. They then betook themselves to flight; and with the loss of six galleys the rest escaped into the island of Teuglussa, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians, putting in at Cnidus and joining with those seven-and-twenty galleys that came from Caunus, went all together to Syme, and having there erected a trophy, returned again and lay at Cnidus.

43. The Athenians, when they understood what had passed in this battle, went from Samos with their whole navy to Syme. But neither went they out against the navy in Cnidus, nor the navy there against them. Whereupon they took up the furniture of their galleys at Syme, and assaulted Loryma, a town in the continent, and so returned to Samos.

The whole navy of the Peloponnesians, being at Cnidus, was [now] in repairing and refurnishing with such things as it wanted; and withal those eleven Lacedaemonians conferred with Tissaphernes (for he also was present) touching such things as they disliked in the articles before agreed on, and concerning the war, how it might be carried for the future in the best and most advantageous manner for them both. But Lichas was he that considered the business more nearly, and said that neither the first league nor yet the later by Theramenes was made as it ought to have been; and that it would be a very hard condition that whatsoever territories the king and his ancestors possessed before he should possess the same now; for so he might bring again into subjection all the islands, and the sea, and the Locrians, and all as far as Boeotia; and the Lacedaemonians, instead of restoring the Grecians into liberty, should

put them into subjection to the rule of the Medes. Therefore he required other and better articles to be drawn, and not to stand to these; as for pay, in the new articles they would require none. But Tissaphernes, chafing at this, went his way in choler, and nothing was done.

44. The Peloponnesians, solicited by messengers from the great men of Rhodes, resolved to go thither, because they hoped it would not prove impossible with their number of seamen and army of land soldiers to bring that island into their power; and withal supposed themselves able, with their present confederates, to maintain their fleet without asking money any more of Tissaphernes. Presently therefore, the same winter, they put forth from Cnidus, and arriving in the territory of Rhodes at Cameirus, first frightened the commons out of it, that knew not of the business, and they fled. Then the Lacedaemonians called together both these and the Rhodians of the two cities Lindus and Iëlysus and persuaded them to revolt from the Athenians. And Rhodes turned to the Peloponnesians. The Athenians at the same time, hearing of their design, put forth with their fleet from Samos, desiring to have arrived before them, and were seen in the main sea, too late, though not much. For the present they went away to Chalce, and thence back to Samos; but afterwards they came forth with their galleys divers times, and made war against Rhodes from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. Now the Peloponnesians did no more to the Rhodians but levy money amongst them to the sum of thirty-two talents; and otherwise for fourscore days that they lay there, having their galleys hauled ashore, they meddled not.

45. In this time, as also before the going of the Peloponnesians to Rhodes, came to pass the things that follow. Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus in battle at Miletus, being suspected by the Peloponnesians, and Astyochnus having received letters from them from Lacedaemon to put him to death (for he was an enemy to Agis, and also otherwise not well trusted), retired to Tissaphernes first, for fear, and afterwards to his power hindered the affairs of the Peloponnesians. And being in everything his instructor, he not only cut shorter their pay, insomuch as from a drachma he brought it to three oboles, and those also not continually paid, advising Tissaphernes to tell them

how that the Athenians, men of a long continued skill in naval affairs, allowed but three oboles to their own, not so much for want of money, but lest the mariners, some of them growing insolent by superfluity, should disable their bodies by spending their money on such things as would weaken them, and others should quit the galleys with the arrear of their pay in their captains' hands for a pawn; but also gave counsel to Tissaphernes to give money to the captains of the galleys and to the generals of the several cities, save only those of Syracuse, to give way unto it. For Hermocrates, [the general of the Syracusians,] was the only man, that in the name of the whole league stood against it. And for the cities that came to require money, he would put them back himself and answer them in Tissaphernes' name, and say, namely to the Chians, that they were impudent men, being the richest of the Grecian states and preserved by strangers, to expect nevertheless that others, for their liberty, should not only venture their persons but maintain them with their purses; and to other states, that they did unjustly, having laid out their money before they revolted that they might serve the Athenians, not to bestow as much or more now upon themselves; and told them that Tissaphernes, now he made war at his own charges, had reason to be sparing; but when money should come down from the king he would give them their full pay and assist the cities as should be fit.

46. Moreover, he advised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty to make an end of the war, nor to fetch in the Phoenician fleet which was making ready, nor take more men into pay, whereby to put the whole power both by sea and land into the hands of one, but to let the dominion remain divided into two, that the king, when one side troubled him, might set upon it with the other; whereas the dominion both by sea and land being in one, he will want by whom to pull down those that hold it unless with great danger and cost he should come and try it out himself; but thus the danger would be less chargeable, he being but at a small part of the cost; and he should wear out the Grecians one against another and himself in the meantime remain in safety. He said further that the Athenians were fitter to partake dominion with him than the other for that they were less ambitious of power by land and that their speeches and actions



tended more to the king's purpose; for that they would join with him to subdue the Grecians, that is to say, for themselves as touching the dominion by sea, and for the king as touching the Grecians in the king's territories; whereas the Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, were come to set them free; and it was not likely but that they that were come to deliver the Grecians from the Grecians will, if they overcome the Athenians, deliver them also from the barbarians. He gave counsel therefore, first to wear them out both and then, when he had clipped, as near as he could, the wings of the Athenians, to dismiss the Peloponnesians out of his country.

And Tissaphernes had a purpose to do accordingly, as far as by his actions can be conjectured. For hereupon he gave himself to believe Alcibiades as his best counsellor in these affairs, and neither paid the Peloponnesians their wages nor would suffer them to fight by sea; but pretending the coming of the Phoenician fleet, whereby they might afterwards fight with odds, he overthrew their proceedings and abated the vigour of their navy, before very puissant, and was in all things else more backward than he could possibly dissemble.

47. Now Alcibiades advised the king and Tissaphernes to this whilst he was with them, partly because he thought the same to be indeed the best course, but partly also to make way for his own return into his country, knowing that if he destroyed it not, the time would one day come that he might persuade the Athenians to recall him. And the best way to persuade them to it, he thought, was this: to make it appear unto them that he was powerful with Tissaphernes. Which also came to pass. For after the Athenian soldiers at Samos saw what power he had with him, the captains of galleys and principal men there, partly upon Alcibiades' own motion, who had sent to the greatest amongst them that they should remember him to the best sort and say that he desired to come home so the government might be in the hands of a few, not of evil persons nor yet of the multitude that cast him out, and that he would bring Tissaphernes to be their friend, [and to war on their side], but chiefly of their own accords had their minds inclined to the deposing of the popular government.

48. This business was set on foot first in the camp and from

thence proceeded afterwards into the city. And certain persons went over to Alcibiades out of Samos and had conference with him. And when he had undertaken to bring to their friendship first Tissaphernes and then the king, in case the government were taken from the people, for then, he said, the king might the better rely upon them, they that were of most power in the city, who also were the most toiled out, entered into great hope both to have the ordering of the state at home themselves and victory also over the enemy. And when they came back to Samos, they drew all such as were for their purpose into an oath of conspiracy with themselves, and to the multitude gave it out openly that if Alcibiades might be recalled and the people put from the government, the king would turn their friend and furnish them with money.

Though the multitude were grieved with this proceeding for the present, yet for the great hope they had of the king's pay they stirred not. But they that were setting up the oligarchy, when they had communicated thus much to the multitude, fell to consideration anew and with more of their complices of the things spoken by Alcibiades. And the rest thought the matter easy and worthy to be believed; but Phrynichus, who yet was general of the army, liked it not, but thought, as the truth was, that Alcibiades cared no more for the oligarchy than the democracy, nor had any other aim in it but only by altering the government that then was to be called home by his associates; and said they were especially to look to this, that they did not mutiny for the king, who could not very easily be induced (the Peloponnesians being now as much masters at sea as themselves, and having no small cities within his dominions) to join with the Athenians, whom he trusted not, and to trouble himself, when he might have the friendship of the Peloponnesians, that never did him hurt; as for the confederate cities to whom they promise oligarchy, in that they themselves do put down the democracy, he said, he knew full well that neither those which were already revolted would the sooner return to, nor those that remained be ever the more confirmed in their obedience thereby; for they would never be so willing to be in subjection either to the few or to the people, as they would be to have their liberty, which side

soever it were that should give it them, but would think that even those which are termed the good men, if they had the government, would give them as much to do as the people, being contrivers and authors to the people of doing those mischiefs against them, out of which they make most profit unto themselves; and that if the few had the rule, then they should be put to death unheard and more violently than by the former; whereas the people is their refuge and moderator of the others' insolence. This, he said, he was certain that the cities thought; in that they had learned the same by the actions themselves; and that therefore what was yet propounded by Alcibiades, he by no means approved.

49. But those of the conspiracy there assembled, not only approved the present proposition, but also made preparation to send Pisander and others ambassadors to Athens to negotiate concerning the reduction of Alcibiades,\* the dissolution of the democracy, and the procuring unto the Athenians the friendship of Tissaphernes.

50. Now Phrynichus, knowing that an overture was to be made at Athens for the restoring of Alcibiades and that the Athenians would embrace it, and fearing lest being recalled he should do him a mischief (in regard he had spoken against it) as one that would have hindered the same, betook himself to this course: He sends secret letters to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian general, who was yet about Miletus, and advertised him that Alcibiades undid their affairs and was procuring the friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians, writing in plain terms the whole business and desiring to be excused if he rendered evil to his enemy with some disadvantage to his country. Astyochus had before this laid by the purpose of revenge against Alcibiades, especially when he was not in his own hands. And going to him to Magnesia and to Tissaphernes, related unto them what advertisement he had received from Samos, and made himself the appeacher. For he adhered, as was said, to Tissaphernes for his private lucre, both in this and in divers other matters; which was also the cause that concerning the pay, when the abatement was made, he was not so stout in op-

\* This is Hobbes' seventeenth-century English for "the bringing back home of Alcibiades."

posing it as he ought to have been. Hereupon Alcibiades sendeth letters presently to those that were in office at Samos, accusing Phrynichus of what he had done and requiring to have him put to death. Phrynichus, perplexed with this discovery and brought into danger indeed, sends again to Astyochus, blaming what was past as not well concealed, and promised now to be ready to deliver unto him the whole army at Samos to be destroyed; writing from point to point (Samos being unwall'd) in what manner he would do it, and saying that since his life was brought in danger, they could not blame him though he did this or any other thing rather than be destroyed by his most deadly enemies. This also Astyochus revealed unto Alcibiades.

51. But Phrynichus having had notice betimes how he abused him, and that letters of this from Alcibiades were in a manner come, he anticipates the news himself, and tells the army that whereas Samos was unwall'd and the galleys rid not all within, the enemy meant to come and assault the harbour; that he had sure intelligence hereof, and that they ought therefore with all speed to raise a wall about the city and to put garrisons into other places thereabouts. Now Phrynichus was general himself, and it was in his own power to see it done. They then fell to walling, whereby Samos (which they meant to have done howsoever) was so much the sooner wall'd in. Not long after came letters from Alcibiades that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy purpos'd to invade the harbour where they lay. But now they thought not Alcibiades worthy to be believed, but rather that having foreseen the design of the enemy, he went about, out of malice, to fasten it upon Phrynichus as conscious of it likewise. So that he did him no hurt by telling it, but bare witness rather of that which Phrynichus had told them of before.

52. After this Alcibiades endeavoured to incline and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians. For though Tissaphernes feared the Peloponnesians, because their fleet was greater than that of the Athenians, yet if he had been able, he had a good will to have been persuaded by him, especially in his anger against the Peloponnesians after the dissension at Cnidus about the league made by Theramenes (for

they were already fallen out, the Peloponnesians being about this time in Rhodes). Wherein that which had been before spoken by Alcibiades, how that the coming of the Lacedaemonians was to restore all the cities to their liberty, was now verified by Lichas, in that he said it was an article not to be suffered that the king should hold those cities which he and his ancestors then or before had holden. Alcibiades, therefore, as one that laboured for no trifle, with all his might applied himself to Tissaphernes.

53. The Athenian ambassadors sent from Samos with Pisander, being arrived at Athens, were making their propositions to the people, and related unto them summarily the points of their business, and principally this, that if they would call home Alcibiades, and not suffer the government to remain in the hands of the people in such manner as it did, they might have the king for their confederate, and get the victory of the Peloponnesians. Now when many opposed that point touching the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades clamoured withal that it would be a horrible thing he should return by forcing the government, when the Eumolpidae and Ceryces bare witness against him concerning the mysteries for which he fled and prohibited his return under their curse, Pisander, at this great opposition and querimony, stood out, and going amongst them took out one by one those that were against it, and asked them whether, now that the Peloponnesians had as many galleys at sea to oppose them as they themselves had, and confederate cities more than they, and were furnished with money by the king and Tissaphernes, the Athenians being without, they had any other hope to save their state but by persuading the king to come about to their side. And they that were asked having nothing to answer, then in plain terms he said unto them: "This you cannot now obtain, except we administer the state with more moderation and bring the power into the hands of a few that the king may rely upon us. And we deliberate at this time, not so much about the form as about the preservation of the state; for if you mislike the form, you may change it again hereafter. And let us recall Alcibiades, who is the only man that can bring this to pass."

54. The people, hearing of the oligarchy, took it very heinously

at first; but when Pisander had proved evidently that there was no other way of safety, in the end, partly for fear and partly because they hoped again to change the government, they yielded thereunto. So they ordered that Pisander and ten others should go and treat both with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades as to them should seem best. Withal, upon the accusation of Pisander against Phrynichus, they discharged both Phrynichus and Scironides, his fellow-commissioner, of their command, and made Diomedon and Leon generals of the fleet in their places. Now the cause why Pisander accused Phrynichus and said he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges was only this: he thought him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades.

Pisander, after he had gone about to all those combinations\* (which were in the city before for obtaining of places of judicature and of command), exhorting them to stand together and advise about deposing the democracy, and when he had dispatched the rest of his business so as there should be no more cause for him to stay there, took sea with those other ten to go to Tissaphernes.

55. Leon and Diomedon, arriving the same winter at the Athenian fleet, made a voyage against Rhodes, and finding there the Peloponnesian galleys drawn up to land, disbarked and overcame in battle such of the Rhodians as made head, and then put to sea again and went to Chalce. After this they made sharper war upon them from Cos. For from thence they could better observe the Peloponnesian navy when it should put off from the land.

In this while there arrived at Rhodes Xenophontidas, a Laconian, sent out of Chios from Pedaritus, to advertise them that the fortification of the Athenians there was now finished and that unless they came and relieved them with their whole

\* What is referred to here is the institution of the political clubs. These were private aristocratic associations, professedly existent to support their members in relation to offices, etc. Actually they were small, tightly organized power units with the continuous aim of destroying the democracy. They had existed for a very long time, thirty years or more, apparently, but became really politically important only in the last decade of the Peloponnesian War.

fleet, the state of Chios must utterly be lost. And it was resolved to relieve them. But Pedaritus in the meantime, with the whole power both of his own auxiliary forces and of the Chians, made an assault upon the fortification which the Athenians had made about their navy, part whereof he won, and had gotten some galleys that were drawn a-land. But the Athenians, issuing out upon them, first put to flight the Chians, and then overcame also the rest of the army about Pedaritus, and slew Pedaritus himself, and took many of the Chians prisoners and much armour.

56. After this the Chians were besieged both by sea and land more narrowly, and great famine was in the city.

Pisander, and the other Athenian ambassadors that went with him, when they came to Tissaphernes, began to confer about the agreement. But Alcibiades (for he was not sure of Tissaphernes, because he stood in fear too much of the Peloponnesians, and had a purpose besides, as Alcibiades himself had taught him, to weaken both sides [yet more]), betook himself to this shift: that Tissaphernes should break off the treaty by making to the Athenians exorbitant demands. And it seemed that Tissaphernes and he aimed at the same thing, Tissaphernes for fear, and Alcibiades for that when he saw Tissaphernes not desirous to agree, [though the offers were never so great], he was unwilling to have the Athenians think he could not persuade him to it, but rather that he was already persuaded and willing, and that the Athenians came not to him with sufficient offers. For Alcibiades being the man that spake for Tissaphernes, though he were also present, made unto them such excessive demands that though the Athenians should have yielded to the greatest part of them, yet it must have been attributed to them that the treaty went not on. For they demanded, first, that all Ionia should be rendered; then again, the adjacent islands and other things; which the Athenians stood not against. In fine, at the third meeting, when he feared now plainly to be found unable to make good his word, he required that they should suffer the king to build a navy and sail up and down by their coast wheresoever and with what number soever of galleys he himself should think good. Upon

this the Athenians would treat no longer, esteeming the conditions intolerable and that Alcibiades had abused them, and so went away in a chafe to Samos.

57. Presently after this, the same winter, Tissaphernes went to Caunus with intent both to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus and also (as soon as he should have agreed unto new articles, such as he could get) to give the fleet their pay, and not to fall directly out with them for fear lest so many galleys, wanting maintenance, should either be forced by the Athenians to fight and so be overcome, or, emptied of men, the business might succeed with the Athenians according to their own desire without him. Besides, he was afraid lest looking for maintenance they should make spoil in the continent. In consideration and foresight of all which things he desired to counterpoise the Grecians. And sending for the Peloponnesians, he gave them their pay, and now made the third league, as followeth:

58. "In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexipidas being ephor in Lacedaemon, agreement was made in the plain of Maeander between the Lacedaemonians and their confederates on one part and Tissaphernes and Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces on the other part concerning the affairs of the king and of the Lacedaemonians and their confederates.

"That whatsoever country in Asia belongeth to the king shall be the king's still; and that concerning his own countries, it shall be lawful for the king to do whatsoever he shall think meet.

"That the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall not invade any the territories of the king to harm them; nor the king, the territories of the Lacedaemonians or their confederates.

"If any of the Lacedaemonians or their confederates shall invade the king's country to do it hurt, the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall oppose it; and if any of the king's country shall invade the Lacedaemonians or their confederates to do them hurt, the king shall oppose it.

"That Tissaphernes shall, according to the rates agreed on, maintain the present fleet till the king's fleet arrive.

"That when the king's navy shall be come, the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall maintain their own navy themselves, if they please; or if they will have Tissaphernes to



maintain it, he shall do it; and that the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, at the end of the war, repay Tissaphernes whatsoever money they shall have received of him.

“When the king’s galleys shall be arrived, both they and the galleys of the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall make the war jointly, according as to Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall seem good; and if they will give over the war against the Athenians, they shall give it over in the same manner.”

59. Such were the articles. After this Tissaphernes prepared for the fetching in of the Phoenician fleet, according to the agreement, and to do whatsoever else he had undertaken, desiring to have it seen, at least, that he went about it.

60. In the end of this winter, the Boeotians took Oropus by treason. It had in it a garrison of Athenians. They that plotted it were certain Eretrians and some of Oropus itself, who were then contriving the revolt of Euboea. For the place being built to keep Eretria in subjection, it was impossible, as long as the Athenians held it, but that it would much annoy both Eretria and the rest of Euboea. Having Oropus in their hands already, they came to Rhodes to call the Peloponnesians into Euboea. But the Peloponnesians had a greater inclination to relieve Chios now distressed, and putting to sea, departed out of Rhodes with their whole fleet. When they were come about Triopium, they descried the Athenian fleet in the main sea going from Chalce. And neither side assaulting other, they put in, the one fleet at Samos, the other at Miletus; for the Peloponnesians saw they could not pass to relieve Chios without a battle. Thus ended this winter, and the twentieth year of this war written by Thucydides.

61. The next summer, in the beginning of the spring, Dercylidas, a Spartan, was sent by land into Hellespont with a small army to work the revolt of Abydos, a colony of the Milesians. And the Chians at the same time, whilst Astyochnus was at a stand how to help them, were compelled by the pressure of the siege to hazard a battle by sea. Now whilst Astyochnus lay at Rhodes, they had received into the city of Chios, after the death of Pedaritus, one Leon, a Spartan, that came along with Antisthenes as a private soldier, and with him twelve

galleys that lay at the guard of Miletus, whereof five were Thurians, four Syracusians, one of Anaea, one of Miletus, and one of Leon's own. Whereupon the Chians, issuing forth with the whole force of the city, seized a certain place of strength and put forth thirty-six galleys against thirty-two of the Athenians and fought. After a sharp fight, wherein the Chians and their associates had not the worst, and when it began to be dark, they retired again into the city.

62. Presently after this, Dercylidas being arrived now in Hellespont from Miletus by land, Abydos revolted to him and to Pharnabazus; and two days after revolted Lampsacus. Strombichides, having intelligence of this, made haste thither from Chios with four-and-twenty sail of Athenians, those being also of that number which transported his men of arms. And when he had overcome the Lampsacenes that came out against him, and taken Lampsacus, being an open town, at the first shout of their voices, and made prize of all the goods they found and of the slaves, he placed the freemen there again and went against Abydos. But when that city neither yielded nor could be taken by assault, he crossed over from Abydos to the opposite shore; and in Sestos, a city of Chersonesus, possessed heretofore by the Medes, he placed a garrison for the custody of the whole Hellespont.

63. In the meantime not only the Chians had the sea at more command, but Astyochus also and the army at Miletus, having been advertised of what passed in the fight by sea, and that Strombichides and those galleys with him were gone away, took heart. And Astyochus, going to Chios with two galleys, fetched away the galleys that were there, and with the whole fleet now together went against Samos. But seeing they of Samos, by reason of their jealousy one towards another, came not against him, he went back again to Miletus. For it was about this time that the democracy was put down at Athens.

For after that Pisander and his fellow-ambassadors that had been with Tissaphernes were come to Samos, they both assured their affairs yet better in the army and also provoked the principal men of the Samians to attempt with them the erecting of the oligarchy, though there were then an insurrection amongst them against the oligarchy. And withal the Athenians

at Samos, in a conference amongst themselves, deliberated how, since Alcibiades would not, to let him alone; for indeed they thought him no fit man to come into an oligarchy; but for themselves, seeing they were already engaged in the danger, to take care both to keep the business from a relapse and withal to sustain the war and to contribute money and whatsoever else was needful with alacrity out of their private estates, and no more to toil for other than themselves.

64. Having thus advised, they sent Pisander with half the ambassadors presently home, to follow the business there, with command to set up the oligarchy in all the cities they were to touch at by the way; the other half they sent about, some to one part [of the state] and some to another. And they sent away Diotrophes to his charge, who was now about Chios, chosen to go governor of the cities upon Thrace.

He, when he came to Thasos, deposed the people. And within two months at most after he was gone, the Thasians fortified their city, as needing no longer an aristocracy with the Athenians but expecting liberty every day by the help of the Lacedaemonians. For there were also certain of them with the Peloponnesians driven out by the Athenians; and these practised with such in the city as were for their purpose to receive galleys into it and to cause it to revolt. So that it fell out for them just as they would have it, and that estate of theirs was set up without their danger and that the people was deposed that would have withstood it. Insomuch as at Thasos it fell out contrary to what those Athenians thought which erected the oligarchy; and so, in my opinion, it did in many other places of their dominion. For the cities, now grown wise and withal resolute in their proceedings, sought a direct liberty and preferred not before it that outside of a well-ordered government introduced by the Athenians.

65. They with Pisander, according to the order given them, entering into the cities as they went by, dissolved the democracies; and having in some places obtained also an aid of men of arms, they came to Athens, and found the business, for the greatest part, dispatched to their hands by their accomplices before their coming. For certain young men, combining themselves, had not only murdered Androcles privily, a principal

patron of the popular government and one that had his hand the farthest in the banishment of Alcibiades (whom they slew for two causes: for the sway he bare amongst the people, and to gratify Alcibiades, who they thought would return and get them the friendship of Tissaphernes), but had also made away divers men unfit for their design in the same manner. They had withal an oration ready made, which they delivered in public, wherein they said that there ought none to receive wages but such as served in the wars, nor to participate of the government more than five thousand, and those, such as by their purses and persons were best able to serve the commonwealth.

66. And this with the most carried a good shew, because they that would set forward the alteration of the state were to have the managing of the same. Yet the people and the Council of the Bean met still, but debated nothing, save what the conspirators thought fit; nay, all that spake were of that number, and had considered before what they were to say. Nor would any of the rest speak against them, for fear, because they saw the combination was great; and if any man did, he was quickly made away by one convenient means or other, and no inquiry made after the deed-doers, nor justice prosecuted against any that was suspected. But the people were so quiet and so afraid that every man thought it gain to escape violence though he said never a word. Their hearts failed them because they thought the conspirators more indeed than they were; and to learn their number, in respect of the greatness of the city and for that they knew not one another, they were unable. For the same cause also was it impossible for any man that was angry at it to bemoan himself, whereby to be revenged on them that conspired; for he must have told his mind either to one he knew not or to one he knew and trusted not. For the populars approached each other, every one with jealousy, as if they thought him of the plot. For indeed there were such amongst them as no man would have thought would ever have turned to the oligarchy; and those were they that caused in the many that diffidence, and by strengthening the jealousy of the populars one against another, conferred most to the security of the few.

67. During this opportunity, Pisander and they that were

with him, coming in, fell in hand presently with the remainder of the business. And first they assembled the people and delivered their opinion for ten men to be chosen with power absolute to make a draught of laws, and having drawn them, to deliver their opinion at a day appointed before the people, touching the best form of government for the city. Afterwards, when that day came, they summoned the assembly to Colonus, which is a place consecrated to Neptune without the city, about two furlongs off. And they that were appointed to write the laws, presented this, and only this: That it should be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatsoever opinion he pleased; imposing of great punishments upon whosoever should either accuse any that so spake of violating the laws or otherwise do him hurt. Now here indeed it was in plain terms propounded that not any magistracy of the form before used might any longer be in force, nor any fee belong unto it; but that five Prytanes might be elected, and these five choose a hundred, and every one of this hundred take unto him three others; and these four hundred, entering into the council-house, might have absolute authority to govern the state as they thought best and to summon the five thousand as oft as to them it should seem good.

68. He that delivered this opinion was Pisander, who was also otherwise openly the forewardest to put down the democracy. But he that contrived the whole business, how to bring it to this pass, and had long thought upon it, was Antiphon, a man for virtue not inferior to any Athenian of his time, and the ablest of any man both to devise well and also to express well what he had devised; and though he came not into the assemblies of the people nor willingly to any other debates, because the multitude had him in jealousy for the opinion they had of the power of his eloquence, yet when any man that had occasion of suit, either in the courts of justice or in the assembly of the people, came to him for his counsel, this one man was able to help him most. The same man, when afterwards the government of The Four Hundred went down and was vexed of the people, was heard plead for himself, when his life was in question for that business, the best of any man to this day. Phrynichus also shewed himself an earnest

man for the oligarchy, and that more earnestly than any other, because he feared Alcibiades and knew him to be acquainted with all his practices at Samos with Astyochus, and thought in all probability that he would never return to live under the government of the few. And this man, in any matter of weight, appeared the most sufficient to be relied on. Also Theramenes, the son of Agnon, an able man both for elocution and understanding, was another of the principal of those that overthrew the democracy.

So that it is no marvel if the business took effect, being by many and wise men conducted, though it were a hard one. For it went sore with the Athenian people, almost a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants, to be now deprived of their liberty, having not only not been subject to any, but also for the half of this time been inured to dominion over others.

69. When the assembly, after it had passed these things, no man contradicting, was dissolved, then afterwards they brought The Four Hundred into the council-house in this manner. The Athenians were evermore partly on the walls and partly at their arms in the camp in regard of the enemy that lay at Deceleia. Therefore, on the day appointed, they suffered such as knew not their intent to go forth as they were wont. But to such as were of the conspiracy they quietly gave order not to go to the camp itself but to lag behind at a certain distance, and if any man should oppose what was in doing, to take arms and keep them back. They to whom this charge was given were [the] Andrians, Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and such of the colony of Aegina which the Athenians had sent thither to inhabit, as came on purpose to this action with their own arms. These things thus ordered, The Four Hundred, with every man a secret dagger, accompanied with one hundred and twenty young men of Greece, whom they used for occasions of shedding of blood, came in upon the Counsellors of the Bean as they sat in the council-house and commanded them to take their salary and be gone, which also they brought ready with them, for the whole time they were behind, and paid it to them as they went out.

70. And the rest of the citizens mutinied not, but rested quiet.

The Four Hundred, being now entered into the council-house, created Prytanen amongst themselves by lot, and made their prayers and sacrifices to the gods, all that were before usual at the entrance upon the government. And afterwards receding far from that course which in the administration of the state was used by the people, saving that for Alcibiades' sake they recalled not the outlaws, in other things they governed the commonwealth imperiously, and not only slew some, though not many, such as they thought fit to be made away, and imprisoned some, and confined others to places abroad, but also sent heralds to Agis, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was then at Deceleia, signifying that they would come to composition with him, and that now he might better treat with them than he might before with the unconstant people.

71. But he, not imagining that the city was yet in quiet nor willing so soon to deliver up their ancient liberty, but rather that if they saw him approach with great forces they would be in tumult, not yet believing fully but that some stir or other would arise amongst them, gave no answer at all to those that came from The Four Hundred touching the composition, but having sent for new and great forces out of Peloponnesus, came down himself not long after, both with the army at Deceleia and those new comers, to the Athenian walls, hoping that they would fall into his hands according to his desire, at least the more easily for their confusion, or perhaps at the very first shout of their voices, in respect of the tumult that in all likelihood was to happen both within and without the city. For, as for the long walls, in regard of the few defendants likely to be found upon them, he thought he could not fail to take them. But when he came near, and the Athenians were without any the least alteration within, and had with their horsemen which they sent out, and a part of their men of arms and of their light-armed and of their archers, overthrown some of his men that approached too near and gotten some arms and bodies of the slain, rectified thus, he withdrew his army again. And himself, and such as were with him before, stayed in their places at Deceleia; but as for those that came last, after they had stayed awhile in the country, he sent them home again. After this The Four Hundred, notwithstanding their former repulse, sent ambassadors unto Agis

anew; and he now receiving them better, by his advice they sent ambassadors also to Lacedaemon about an agreement, being desirous of peace.

72. They likewise sent ten men to Samos, to satisfy the army and to tell them that the oligarchy was not set up to any prejudice of the city or citizens, but for the safety of the whole state; and that they which had their hands in it were five thousand and not four hundred only; notwithstanding that the Athenians, by reason of warfare and employment abroad, never assembled, of how great consequence soever was the matter to be handled, so frequent as to be five thousand there at once. And having in other things instructed them how to make the best of the matter, they sent them away immediately after the government was changed, fearing, as also it fell out, lest the seafaring multitude would not only not continue in this oligarchical form themselves, but the mischief beginning there would depose them also.

73. For in Samos there was a commotion about the oligarchy already; and this that followeth happened about the same time that The Four Hundred were set up in Athens. Those Samians that had risen against the nobility and were of the people's side, turning when Pisander came thither at the persuasion of him and of those Athenians in Samos that were his accomplices, conspired together to the number of three hundred and were to have assaulted the rest as populars. And one Hyperbolus, a lewd fellow, who, not for any fear of his power or for any dignity, but for wickedness of life and dishonour he did the city, had been banished by ostracism, they slew, abetted therein both by Charminus, one of the commanders, and by other Athenians that were amongst them, who had given them their faith. And together with these, they committed other facts of the same kind, and were fully bent to have assaulted the popular side. But they, having gotten notice thereof, made known the design both to the generals, Leon and Diomedon (for these, being honoured by the people, endured the oligarchy unwillingly), and also to Thrasylus and Thrasylus, whereof one was captain of a galley and the other captain of a band of men of arms, and to such others continually as they thought stood in greatest opposition to the conspirators; and required of them



that they would not see them destroyed and Samos alienated from the Athenians by the only means of which their dominion had till this time kept itself in the state it is in. They, hearing it, went to the soldiers and exhorted them one by one not to suffer it, especially to the Paralians, who were all Athenians and freemen, come thither in the galley called Paralus, and had always before been enemies to the oligarchy. And Leon and Diomedon, whensoever they went forth any whither, left them certain galleys for their guard, so that when the three hundred assaulted them, the commons of the Samians, with the help of all these, and especially of the Paralians, had the upperhand, and of the three hundred slew thirty. Three of the chief authors they banished, and burying in oblivion the fault of the rest, governed the state from that time forward as a democracy.

74. The Paralus, and in it Chaereas, the son of Archestratus, a man of Athens, one that had been forward in the making of this change, the Samians and the soldiers dispatched presently away to Athens, to advertise them of what was done; for they knew not yet that the government was in the hands of The Four Hundred. When they arrived, The Four Hundred cast some two or three of these of the Paralus into prison; the rest, after they had taken the galley from them and put them aboard another military galley, they commanded to keep guard about Euboea. But Chaereas, by some means or other getting presently away, seeing how things went, came back to Samos and related to the army all that the Athenians had done, aggravating it to the utmost, as that they punished every man with stripes to the end that none should contradict the doings of those that bore rule; and that their wives and children at home were abused; and that they had an intention further to take and imprison all that were of kin to any of the army which was not of their faction, to the intent to kill them if they of Samos would not submit to their authority. And many other things he told them, adding lies of his own.

75. When they heard this, they were ready at first to have fallen upon the chief authors of the oligarchy and upon such of the rest as were partakers of it. Yet afterwards, being hindered by such as came between and advised them not to overthrow the state, the enemy lying so near with their galleys to

assault them, they gave it over. After this, Thrasybulus, the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus (for these were the principal authors of the change), determining now openly to reduce the state at Samos to a democracy, took oaths of all the soldiers, especially of the oligarchicals, the greatest they could devise, both that they should be subject to the democracy and agree together and also that they should zealously prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians, and withal be enemies to The Four Hundred and not to have to do with them by ambassadors. The same oath was taken by all the Samians that were of age; and the Athenian soldiers communicated with them their whole affairs, together with whatsoever should succeed of their dangers; for whom and for themselves, they made account there was no refuge of safety; but that if either The Four Hundred or the enemy at Miletus overcame them, they must needs perish.

76. So there was a contention at this time, one side compelling the city to a democracy, the other, the army to an oligarchy. And presently there was an assembly of the soldiers called, wherein they deprived the former commanders, and such captains of galleys as they had in suspicion, of their charge, and chose others, both captains of galleys and commanders, in their places, of which Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. And they stood up and encouraged one another, both otherwise and with this: that they had no cause to be dejected for the city's revolting from them; for they at Athens, being the lesser part, had forsaken them, who were not only the greater part, but also every way the better provided. For they, having the whole navy, could compel the rest of the cities subject unto them to pay in their money as well now as if they were to set out from Athens itself. And that they also had a city, namely Samos, no weak one, but even such a one as, when they were enemies, wanted little of taking the dominion of the sea from the Athenians. That the seat of the war was the same it was before; and that they should be better able to provide themselves of things necessary, having the navy, than they should be that were at home in the city. And that they at Athens were masters of the entrance of Peiraeus, both formerly by the favour of them at Samos; and that now also, unless they restore them the government, they shall again be brought to that pass that those at

Samos shall be better able to bar them the use of the sea than they shall be to bar it them of Samos. That it was a trifle and worth nothing, which was conferred to the overcoming of the enemy by the city, and a small matter it would be to lose it, seeing they had neither any more silver to send them (for the soldiers shifted for themselves), nor yet good direction, which is the thing for which the city hath the command of the armies. Nay, that in this point they erred which were at Athens, in that they had abrogated the laws of their country; whereas they at Samos did both observe the same themselves and endeavour to constrain the other to do so likewise. So that such of them in the camp as should give good council were as good as they in the city. And that Alcibiades, if they would decree his security and his return, would with all his heart procure the king to be their confederate. And that which is the main thing, if they failed of all other helps, yet with so great a fleet they could not fail of many places to retire to, in which they might find both city and territory.

77. When they had thus debated the matter in the assembly and encouraged one another, they made ready, as at other times, whatsoever was necessary for the war. And the ten ambassadors which were sent to Samos from The Four Hundred, hearing of this by the way at Delos, whither they were come already, stayed still there.

78. About the same time also, the soldiers of the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus murmured amongst themselves that Astyochus and Tissaphernes overthrew the state of their affairs. Astyochus in refusing to fight, both before, when their own fleet was stronger and that of the Athenians but small, and also now, whilst they were said to be in sedition and their fleet divided; and in expecting the Phoenician fleet, in fame, not in fact to come from Tissaphernes; and Tissaphernes, in that he not only brought not in that fleet of his but also impaired theirs by not giving them their pay, neither fully nor continually; and that they therefore ought no longer to delay time, but to hazard battle. This was urged principally by the Syracusians.

79. Astyochus and the confederates, when they heard of the murmur and had in council resolved to fight, especially after

they were informed that Samos was in a tumult, putting forth with their whole fleet to the number of one hundred and twelve sail, with order given to the Milesians to march by land to the same place, went to Mycale. But the Athenians, being come out from Samos with their fleet of eighty-two galleys, and riding now at Glauce of the territory of Mycale ([for] in this part [toward Mycale] Samos is but a little way from the continent), when they descried the Peloponnesian fleet coming against them, put in again to Samos, as not esteeming themselves a sufficient number to hazard their whole fortune on the battle. Besides, they stayed for the coming of Strombichides from Hellespont to their aid (for they saw that they of Miletus had a desire to fight) with those galleys that went from Chios against Abydos; for they had sent unto him before. So these retired into Samos. And the Peloponnesians, putting in at Mycale, there encamped, as also did the land-forces of the Milesians and others of the country thereabouts. The next day, when they meant to have gone against Samos, they received news that Strombichides with his galleys was arrived out of Hellespont, and thereupon returned presently to Miletus. Then the Athenians on the other side, with the addition of these galleys, went to Miletus, being now one hundred and eight sail, intending to fight; but when nobody came out against them, they likewise went back to Samos.

80. Immediately after this, the same summer, the Peloponnesians, who refused to come out against the enemy, as holding themselves with their whole fleet too weak to give them battle, and were now at a stand how to get money for the maintenance of so great a number of galleys, sent Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, with forty galleys, according to the order at first from Peloponnesus, to Pharnabazus. For not only Pharnabazus himself had sent for and promised to pay them, but they were advertised besides by ambassadors that Byzantium had a purpose to revolt. Hereupon, these Peloponnesian galleys, having put out into the main sea to the end that they might not be seen as they passed by, and tossed with tempests, part of them, which were the greatest number, and Clearchus with them, got into Delos, and came afterwards to Miletus again; but Clearchus went thence again into the Hellespont by land and had the

command there; and part under the charge of Helixus, a Megarean, which were ten sail, went safely through into the Hellespont and caused Byzantium to revolt. And after this, when they of Samos heard of it, they sent certain galleys into Hellespont to oppose them and to be a guard to the cities thereabouts; and there followed a small fight between them of eight galleys to eight, before Byzantium.

81. In the meantime, they that were in authority at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who after the form of government changed was still of the mind to have Alcibiades recalled, at length in an assembly persuaded the soldiers to the same. And when they had decreed for Alcibiades both his return and his security, he went to Tissaphernes and fetched Alcibiades to Samos, accounting it their only means of safety to win Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly being called, Alcibiades complained of and lamented the calamity of his own exile, and speaking much of the business of the state gave them no small hopes of the future time, hyperbolically magnifying his own power with Tissaphernes to the end that both they which held the oligarchy at home might the more fear him, and so the conspiracies dissolve, and also those at Samos the more honour him and take better heart unto themselves; and withal, that the enemy might object the same to the utmost to Tissaphernes and fall from their present hopes. Alcibiades therefore, with the greatest boast that could be, affirmed that Tissaphernes had undertaken to him that as long as he had anything left, if he might but trust the Athenians they should never want for maintenance; no, though he should be constrained to make money of his own bed; and that he would fetch the Phoenician fleet, now at Aspendus, not to the Peloponnesians but to the Athenians; and that then only he would rely upon the Athenians when Alcibiades called home should undertake for them.

82. Hearing this and much more, they chose him presently for general together with those that were before, and committed unto them the whole government of their affairs. And now there was not a man that would have sold his present hopes, both of subsisting themselves and being revenged of The Four Hundred, for any good in the world, and were ready even

then, upon those words of his, concerning the enemy there present, to set sail for Peiraeus. But he, though many pressed it, by all means forbade their going against Peiraeus, being to leave their enemies so near; but since they had chosen him general, he was, he said, to go to Tissaphernes first and to dispatch such business with him as concerned the war. And as soon as the assembly brake up, he took his journey accordingly, to the end that he might seem to communicate everything with him, and for that he desired also to be in more honour with him, and to show that he was general and a man capable to do him good or hurt. And it happened to Alcibiades that he awed the Athenians with Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

83. When the Peloponnesians that were at Miletus heard that Alcibiades was gone home, whereas they mistrusted Tissaphernes before, now they much more accused him. For it fell out that when at the coming of the Athenians with their fleet before Miletus they refused to give them battle, Tissaphernes became thereby a great deal slacker in his payment; and besides that he was hated by them before this for Alcibiades' sake, the soldiers now, meeting in companies apart, reckoned up one to another the same matters which they had noted before, and some also, men of value and not the common soldier alone, recounted this withal, how they had never had their full stipend; that the allowance was but small, and yet not continually paid; and that unless they either fought or went to some other place where they might have maintenance, their men would abandon the fleet; and that the cause of all this was in Astyochnus, who for private lucre gave way to the humour of Tissaphernes.

84. Whilst these were upon this consideration, there happened also a certain tumult about Astyochnus. For the mariners of the Syracusians and Thurians, by how much they were a multitude that had greater liberty than the rest, with so much the stouter importunity they demanded their pay. And he not only gave them somewhat an insolent answer but also threatened Dorieus, that amongst the rest spake for the soldiers under himself, and lift up his staff against him. When the soldiers saw that, they took up a cry like seamen indeed, all at once, and were running upon Astyochnus to have stricken him. But

foreseeing it, he fled to an altar, and was not stricken, but they were parted again. The Milesians also took in a certain fort in Miletus, built by Tissaphernes, having privily assaulted it, and cast out the garrison that was within it. These things were by the rest of the confederates, and especially by the Syracusians, well approved of; but Lichas liked them not, saying it behoved the Milesians and the rest dwelling within the king's dominion to have obeyed Tissaphernes in all moderate things, and till such time as the war should have been well dispatched to have courted him. And the Milesians, for this and other things of this kind, were offended with Lichas, and afterwards when he died of sickness, would not permit him to be buried in that place where the Lacedaemonians then present would have had him.

85. Whilst they were quarrelling about their business with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus cometh in from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus in his charge of the fleet; and as soon as he had taken the command upon him, Astyochus departed. But with him Tissaphernes sent a Carian named Gauleites, one that spake both the languages, both to accuse the Milesians about the fort and also to make an apology for himself, knowing that the Milesians went principally to exclaim upon him, and that Hermocrates went with them and would bewray how Tissaphernes undid the business of the Peloponnesians with Alcibiades, and dealt on both hands. For he was continually at enmity with him about the payment of the soldiers' wages; and in the end, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other commanders of the Syracusian fleet, namely, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, were arrived at Miletus, Tissaphernes lay more heavy upon him, being an outlaw, than before, and accused him, amongst other things, that he had asked him money, and because he could not have it became his enemy. So Astyochus and Hermocrates and the Milesians went their way to Lacedaemon.

Alcibiades by this time was come back from Tissaphernes to Samos.

86. And those ambassadors of The Four Hundred, which had been sent out before to mollify and to inform those of Samos, came from Delos now whilst Alcibiades was present.

An assembly being called, they were offering to speak. But the soldiers at first would not hear them, but cried out to have them put to death for that they had deposed the people; yet afterwards with much ado they were calmed and gave them hearing. They declared that the change had been made for the preservation of the city, not to destroy it nor to deliver it to the enemy; for they could have done that before now when the enemy during their government assaulted it, that every one of The Five Thousand was to participate of the government in their turns; and their friends were not, as Chaereas had laid to their charge, abused, nor had any wrong at all, but remained every one quietly upon his own. Though they delivered this and much more, yet the soldiers believed them not, but raged still and declared their opinions, some in one sort some in another, most agreeing in this to go against Peiraeus. And now Alcibiades appeared to be the first and principal man in doing service to the commonwealth. For when the Athenians at Samos were carried headlong to invade themselves, in which case most manifestly the enemy had presently possessed himself of Ionia and Hellespont, [it was thought that] he was the man that kept them from it. Nor was there any man at that time able to have held in the multitude but himself. He both made them to desist from the voyage and rated off from the ambassadors those that were in their own particular incensed against them. Whom also he sent away, giving them their answer himself: That he opposed not the government of The Five Thousand, but willed them to remove The Four Hundred and to establish the council that was before of five hundred; that if they had frugally cut off any expense so that such as were employed in the wars might be the better maintained, he did much commend them for it. And withal he exhorted them to stand out and give no ground to their enemies, for that as long as the city held out, there was great hope for them to compound; but if either part miscarry once, either this at Samos or the other at Athens, there would none be left for the enemy to compound withal.

There chanced to be present also the ambassadors of the Argives, sent unto the popular faction of the Athenians in Samos to assist them. These Alcibiades commended and ap-



pointed to be ready when they should be called for and so dismissed them. These Argives came in with those of the Paralus, that had been bestowed formerly in the military galley by The Four Hundred to go about Euboea and to convoy Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias, ambassadors from The Four Hundred, to Lacedaemon. These, as they sailed by Argos, seized on the ambassadors and delivered them as principal men in deposing of the people to the Argives, and returned no more to Athens, but came with the galley they then were in to Samos and brought with them these ambassadors from the Argives.

87. The same summer, Tissaphernes, at the time that the Peloponnesians were offended with him most, both for the going home of Alcibiades and divers other things, as now manifestly Atticizing, with purpose, as indeed it seemed, to clear himself to them concerning his accusations, made ready for his journey to Aspendus for the Phoenician fleet, and willed Lichas to go along with him, saying that he would substitute Tamos, his deputy lieutenant over the army, to pay the fleet whilst himself was absent.

This matter is diversly reported, and it is hard to know with what purpose he went to Aspendus and yet brought not the fleet away with him. For it is known that one hundred and forty-seven sail of Phoenicians were come forward as far as Aspendus; but why they came not through, the conjectures are various. Some think it was upon design (as he formerly intended) to wear out the Peloponnesian forces; for which cause also Tamos, who had that charge, made no better but rather worse payment than himself. Others, that having brought the Phoenicians as far as Aspendus, he might dismiss them for money, for he never meant to use their service. Some again said it was because they exclaimed so against it at Lacedaemon, and that it might not be said he abused them, but that he went openly to a fleet really set out.

For my own part, I think it most clear that it was to the end to consume and to balance the Grecians that he brought not those galleys in; consuming them, in that he went thither and delayed the time; and equalizing them, in that bringing them to neither he made neither party the stronger. For if he had had a mind to end the war, it is manifest he might have

been sure to have done it. For if he had brought them to the Lacedaemonians, in all reason he had given them the victory, who had a navy already rather equal than inferior to that of their enemies. But that which hurt them most was the pretence he alleged for not bringing the fleet in. For he said they were not so many sail as the king had ordained to be gotten together. But sure he might have ingratiated himself more in this business by dispatching it with less of the king's money than by spending more. But whatsoever was his purpose, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and was with the Phoenicians; and by his own appointment the Peloponnesians sent Philip, a Lacedaemonian, with him with two galleys as to take charge of the fleet.

88. Alcibiades, when he heard that Tissaphernes was gone to Aspendus, goes after him with thirteen galleys, promising to those at Samos a safe and great benefit, which was that he would either bring those Phoenician galleys to the service of the Athenians, or at least hinder their coming to the Peloponnesians; knowing, as is likely, the mind of Tissaphernes by long acquaintance, that he meant not to bring them on, and desiring, as much as he could, to procure him the ill will of the Peloponnesians for the friendship shown to himself and to the Athenians that he might thereby the better engage him to take their part. So he presently put to sea, holding his course for Phaselis and Caunus upwards.

89. The ambassadors of The Four Hundred being returned from Samos to Athens and having related what they had in charge from Alcibiades, how that he exhorted them to hold out and not give ground to the enemy, and that he had great hopes to reconcile them to the army and to overcome the Peloponnesians, whereas many of the sharers in the oligarchy were formerly discontented and would gladly, if they could have done it safely, have quitted the business, they were now a great deal more confirmed in that mind. And already they had their meetings apart and did cast aspersions on the government, and had for their ringleaders some of the heads of the oligarchicals and such as bare office amongst them, as Theramenes, the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, and others, who though they were partakers with the foremost in the affairs of state, yet feared, as they said, Alcibiades and the army at Samos;

and joined in the sending of ambassadors to Lacedaemon, because they were loth, by singling themselves from the greater number, to hurt the state, not that they dismissed the state into the hands of a very few, but said that The Five Thousand ought in fact to be assigned, and not in voice only, and the government to be reduced to a greater equality. And this was indeed the form pretended in words by The Four Hundred. But the most of them, through private ambition, fell upon that by which an oligarchy made out of a democracy is chiefly overthrown. For at once they claimed every one not to be equal but to be far the chief. Whereas in a democracy, when election is made, because a man is not overcome by his equals, he can better brook it. But the great power of Alcibiades at Samos and the opinion they had that the oligarchy was not like to last was it that most evidently encouraged them; and thereupon they every one contended who should most eminently become the patron of the people.

90. But those of The Four Hundred that were most opposite to such a form of government, and the principal of them, both Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos and was ever since at difference with Alcibiades, and Aristarchus, a man that had been an adversary to the people both in the greatest manner and for the longest time, and Pisander and Antiphon, and others of the greatest power, not only formerly, as soon as they entered into authority and afterwards when the state at Samos revolted to the people, sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon and bestirred themselves for the oligarchy, and built a wall in the place called Eetioneia; but much more afterwards, when their ambassadors were come from Samos and that they saw not only the populars but also some others of their own party, thought trusty before, to be now changed. And to Lacedaemon they sent Antiphon and Phrynichus with ten others with all possible speed, as fearing their adversaries both at home and at Samos, with commission to make a peace with the Lacedaemonians on any tolerable conditions whatsoever or howsoever; and in this time went on with the building of the wall in Eetioneia with greater diligence than before. The scope they had in this wall, as it was given out by Theramenes, [the son of Agnon], was not so much to keep out those of Samos in case they should

attempt by force to enter into Peiraeus as at their pleasure to be able to let in both the galleys and the land forces of the enemies. For this Eetioneia is the pier of the Peiraeus, close unto which is the mouth of the haven. And therefore they built this wall so to another wall that was built before to the continent that a few men lying within it might command the entrance. For the end of each wall was brought to the tower upon the [very] mouth of the haven, as well of the old wall towards the continent as of the new which was built within it to the water. They built also an open ground-gallery, an exceeding great one and close to their new wall within Peiraeus, and were masters of it, and constrained all men as well to bring thither their corn which they had already come in, as to unload there whatsoever should come in afterward, and to take and sell it from thence.

91. These things Theramenes murmured at long before; and when the ambassadors returned from Lacedaemon without compounding for them all in general, he gave out that this wall would endanger the undoing of the city. For at this very instant there happened to be riding on the coast of Laconia forty-two galleys, amongst which were some of Tarentum, some of Locri, some Italians, and some Sicilians, set out from Peloponnesus at the instance of the Euboeans, bound for Euboea and commanded by Hegesandridas, the son of Hegesander, a Spartan. And these Theramenes said were coming not so much towards Euboea as towards those that fortified in Eetioneia, and that if they were not looked to, they would surprise the city. Now some matter might indeed be gathered also from those that were accused, so that it was not a mere slander. For their principal design was to retain the oligarchy with dominion over their confederates; but if they failed of that, yet being masters of the galleys and of the fortification, to have subsisted free themselves; if barred of that, then rather than to be the only men to suffer death under the restored democracy, to let in the enemy; and without either navy or fortification to have let what would have become of the city and to have compounded for the safety of their own persons.

92. Therefore they went diligently on with the fortification, wherein were wickets and entries and backways for the enemy,

and desired to have it finished in time. And though these things were spoken but amongst a few before and in secret, yet when Phrynichus, after his return from his Lacedaemonian embassy, was by a certain watchman wounded treacherously in the market place when it was full, as he went from the council-house, and not far from it fell instantly dead, and the murderer gone, and that one of his complices, an Argive, taken by The Four Hundred and put to the torture, would confess no man of those named to him nor anything else saving this, that many men used to assemble at the house of the captain of the watch and at other houses; then at length, because this accident bred no alteration, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and as many other either of The Four Hundred or out of that number as were of the same faction proceeded more boldly to assault the government. For now also the fleet, being come about from Laconia and lying upon the coast of Epidaurus, had made incursions upon Aegina. And Theramenes thereupon alleged that it was improbable that those galleys holding their course for Euboea would have put in at Aegina and then have gone back again to lie at Epidaurus, unless they had been sent for by such men as he had ever accused of the same; and that therefore there was no reason any longer to sit still. And in the end, after many seditious and suspicious speeches, they fell upon the state in good earnest. For the soldiers that were in Peiraeus employed in fortifying Eetioneia (amongst whom was also Aristocrates, captain of a band of men, and his band with him) seized on Alexicles, principal commander of the soldiers under The Four Hundred, an eminent man of the other side, and carrying him into a house, kept him in hold. As soon as the news hereof was brought unto The Four Hundred, who chanced at the same time to be sitting in the council-house, they were ready all of them presently to have taken arms, threatening Theramenes and his faction. He to purge himself was ready to go with them and to help to rescue Alexicles, and taking with him one of the commanders who was also of his faction, went down into Peiraeus. To help him went also Aristarchus and certain horsemen of the younger sort. Great and terrible was the tumult. For in the city they thought Peiraeus was already taken and him that was laid in hold slain; and in Peiraeus they expected

every hour the power of the city to come upon them. At last the ancient men, stopping them that ran up and down the city to arm themselves, and Thucydides of Pharsalus, the city's host, being then there, going boldly and close up to every one he met and crying out unto them not to destroy their country when the enemy lay so near waiting for an advantage, with much ado quieted them and held their hands from spilling their own blood. Theramenes, coming into Peiraeus (for he also had command over the soldiers), made a shew by his exclaiming of being angry with them; but Aristarchus and those that were of the contrary side were extremely angry in good earnest. Nevertheless the soldiers went on with their business and repented not a jot of what they had done. Then they asked Theramenes if he thought this fortification were made to any good end and whether it were not better to have it demolished. And he answered that if they thought good to demolish it, he also thought the same. At which word they presently got up, both the soldiers and also many others of Peiraeus, and fell a digging down of the wall. Now the provocation that they used to the multitude was in these words, that whosoever desired that the sovereignty should be in The Five Thousand instead of The Four Hundred ought also to set himself to the work in hand. For notwithstanding all this, they thought fit as yet to veil the democracy with the name of The Five Thousand and not to say plainly whosoever will have the sovereignty in the people, lest The Five Thousand should have been extant indeed, and so a man by speaking to some or other of them might do hurt to the business through ignorance. And for this cause it was that The Four Hundred would neither let The Five Thousand be extant nor yet let it be known that they were not. For to make so many participant of the affairs of state they thought was a direct democracy, but to have it doubtful would make them afraid of one another.

93. The next day, The Four Hundred, though out of order, yet met together in the council-house, and the soldiers in Peiraeus, having enlarged Alexicles whom they had before imprisoned, and quite razed the fortification, came into the theatre of Bacchus near to Munychia and there sat down with their arms; and presently, according as they had resolved in an as-

sembly then holden, marched into the city and there sat down again in the temple of Castor and Pollux. To this place came unto them certain men elected by The Four Hundred, and man to man reasoned and persuaded with such as they saw to be of the mildest temper both to be quiet themselves and to restrain the rest, saying that not only The Five Thousand should be made known who they were, but that out of these such should be chosen in turns to be of The Four Hundred as The Five Thousand should think good, and entreating them by all means that they would not in the meantime overthrow the city and force it into the hand of the enemy. Hereupon the whole number of the men of arms, after many reasons alleged to many men, grew calmer and feared most the loss of the whole city. And it was agreed betwixt them that an assembly should be held for making of accord in the temple of Bacchus at a day assigned.

94. When they came to the temple of Bacchus and wanted but a little of a full assembly, came news that Hegesandridas with his forty-two galleys came from Megara along the coast towards Salamis. And now there was not a soldier but thought it the very same thing that Theramenes and his party had before told them, that those galleys were to come to the fortification, and that it was now demolished to good purpose. But Hegesandridas, perhaps upon appointment, hovered upon the coast of Epidaurus and thereabouts; but it is likely that in respect of the sedition of the Athenians he stayed in those parts with hope to take hold of some good advantage. Howsoever it was, the Athenians, as soon as it was told them, ran presently with all the power of the city down to Peiraeus, less esteeming their domestic war than that of the common enemy, which was not now far off but even in the haven. And some went aboard the galleys that were then ready, some launched the rest, and others ran to defend the walls and mouth of the haven.

95. But the Peloponnesian galleys, being now gone by and gotten about the promontory of Sunium, cast anchor between Thoricus and Prasiae and put in afterwards at Oropus. The Athenians with all speed, constrained to make use of tumultuary forces, such as a city in time of sedition might afford, and de-

sirous with all haste to make good their greatest stake (for Euboea, since they were shut out of Attica, was all they had), sent a fleet under the command of Timocharis to Eretria. Which arriving, with those galleys that were in Euboea before, made up the number of six-and-thirty sail. And they were presently constrained to hazard battle; for Hegesandridas brought out his galleys from Oropus when he had first there dined. Now Oropus is from Eretria about threescore furlongs of sea. Whereupon the Athenians also, as the enemy came towards them, began to embark, supposing that their soldiers had been somewhere near unto the galleys. But it fell out that they were gone abroad to get their dinner, not in the market (for by set purpose of the Eretrians, to the end that the enemy might fall upon the Athenians that embarked slowly before they were ready and force them to come out and fight, nothing was there to be sold), but in the utmost houses of the city. There was besides a sign set up at Eretria to give them notice at Oropus at what time to set forward. The Athenians, drawn out by this device and fighting before the haven of Eretria, made resistance nevertheless for a while; but afterwards they turned their backs and were chased ashore. Such as fled to the city of the Eretrians, taking it for their friend, were handled most cruelly and slaughtered by them of the town; but such as got to the fort in Eretria, holden by the Athenians, saved themselves; and so did so many of their galleys as got to Chalcis.

The Peloponnesians, after they had taken twenty-two Athenian galleys with the men, whereof some they slew and some they took prisoners, erected a trophy; and not long after, having caused all Euboea to revolt save only Oreus, which the Athenians held with their own forces, they settled the rest of their business there.

96. When the news of that which had happened in Euboea was brought to Athens, it put the Athenians into the greatest astonishment that ever they had been in before. For neither did their loss in Sicily, though then thought great, nor any other at any time so much affright them as this. For now when the army at Samos was in rebellion, when they had no more galleys nor men to put aboard, when they were in sedition



amongst themselves and in continual expectation of falling together by the ears, then in the neck of all arrived this great calamity, wherein they not only lost their galleys, but also, which was worst of all, Euboea, by which they [had] received more commodity than by Attica. How then could they choose but be dejected? But most of all they were troubled, and that for the nearness, with a fear lest upon this victory the enemy should take courage and come immediately into Peiraeus, now empty of shipping, of which they thought nothing wanting, but that they were not there already. And had they been anything adventurous, they might easily have done it; and then, had they stayed there and besieged them, they had not only increased the sedition but also compelled the fleet to come away from Ionia to the aid of their kindred and of the whole city, though enemies to the oligarchy, and in the meantime gotten the Hellespont, Ionia, the Islands, and all places even to Euboea, and, as one may say, the whole Athenian empire into their power. But the Lacedaemonians, not only in this but in many other things, were most commodious enemies to the Athenians to war withal. For being of most different humours, the one swift, the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous; the Lacedaemonians gave them great advantage, especially when their greatness was by sea. This was evident in the Syracusians, who, being in condition like unto them, warred best against them.

97. The Athenians upon this news made ready, notwithstanding, twenty galleys, and called an assembly, one then presently in the place called Pnyx, where they were wont to assemble at other times, in which having deposed The Four Hundred, they decreed the sovereignty to The Five Thousand, of which number were all such to be as were charged with arms; and from that time forward to salariate no man for magistracy, with a penalty on the magistrate receiving the salary to be held for an execrable person. There were also divers other assemblies held afterwards, wherein they elected law-makers, and enacted other things concerning the government. And now first (at least in my time) the Athenians seem to have ordered their state aright; which consisted now of a moderate temper, both

of the few and of the many. And this was the first thing that after so many misfortunes past made the city again to raise her head.

They decreed also the recalling of Alcibiades and those that were in exile with him, and sending to him and to the army at Samos, willed them to fall in hand with their business.

98. In this change Pisander and Alexicles, and such as were with them, and they that had been principal in the oligarchy, immediately withdrew themselves to Deceleia. Only Aristarchus (for it chanced that he had charge of the soldiers) took with him certain archers of the most barbarous and went with all speed to Oenoe. This was a fort of the Athenians in the confines of Boeotia; and (for the loss that the Corinthians had received by the garrison of Oenoe) was by voluntary Corinthians and by some Boeotians by them called in to aid them now besieged. Aristarchus, therefore, having treated with these, deceived those in Oenoe and told them that the city of Athens had compounded with the Lacedaemonians and that they were to render up the place to the Boeotians, for that it was so conditioned in the agreement. Whereupon, believing him as one that had authority over the soldiery and knowing nothing because besieged, upon security for their pass they gave up the fort. So the Boeotians receive Oenoe; and the oligarchy and sedition at Athens cease.

99. About the same time of this summer, when none of those whom Tissaphernes at his going to Aspendus had substituted to pay the Peloponnesian navy at Miletus did it, and seeing neither the Phoenician fleet nor Tissaphernes came to them, and seeing Philip, that was sent along with him, and also another, one Hippocrates, a Spartan, that was lying in Phaselis, had written to Mindarus, the general, that the fleet was not to come at all and in every thing Tissaphernes abused them; seeing also that Pharnabazus had sent for them and was willing, upon the coming to him of their fleet, for his own part also as well as Tissaphernes, to cause the rest of the cities within his own province to revolt from the Athenians; then at length, Mindarus, hoping for benefit by him, with good order and sudden warning that the Athenians at Samos might not be aware of their setting forth, went into the Hellespont with seventy-

three galleys, besides sixteen which the same summer were gone into the Hellespont before and had overrun part of Chersonesus. But tossed with the wind she was forced to put in at Icarus; and after he had stayed there through ill weather some five or six days, he arrived at Chios.

100. Thrasyllus having been advertised of his departure from Miletus, he also puts to sea from Samos with five-and-fifty sail, hasting to be in the Hellespont before him. But hearing that he was in Chios and conceiving that he would stay there, he appointed spies to lie in Lesbos and in the continent over against it, that the fleet of the enemy might not remove without his knowledge; and he himself, going to Methymna, commanded provision to be made of meal and other necessaries, intending, if they stayed there long, to go from Lesbos and invade them in Chios. Withal, because Eressos was revolted from Lesbos, he purposed to go thither with his fleet; if he could, to take it in. For the most potent of the Methymnaean exiles had gotten into their society about fifty men of arms out of Cume and hired others out of the continent, and with their whole number in all three hundred, having for their leader Anaxarchus, a Theban, chosen in respect of their descent from the Thebans, first assaulted Methymna. But beaten in the attempt by the Athenian garrison that came against them from Mytilene and again in a skirmish without the city driven quite away, they passed by the way of the mountain to Eressos, and caused it to revolt. Thrasyllus therefore intended to go thither with his galleys and to assault it. At his coming he found Thrasybulus there also before him with five galleys from Samos, for he had been advertised of the outlaws coming over; but being too late to prevent them, he went to Eressos and lay before it at anchor. Hither also came two galleys of Methymna that were going home from the Hellespont; so that they were in all three-score and seven sail, out of which they made an army, intending with engines, or any other way they could, to take Eressos by assault.

101. In the meantime, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet that was at Chios, when they had spent two days in victualling their galleys and had received of the Chians three Chian tes-saracostes a man, on the third day put speedily off from Chios

and kept far from the shore, that they might not fall amongst the galleys at Eressos. And leaving Lesbos on the left hand, went to the continent side, and putting in at a haven in Craterai, belonging to the territory of Phocaea, and there dining, passed along the territory of Cume, and came to Arginusae in the continent over against Mytilene, where they supped. From thence they put forth late in the night and came to Harmatus, a place in the continent over against Methymna; and after dinner going a great pace by Lectus, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and other the towns in those parts, came before midnight to Rhoeteium; this now is in Hellespont. But some of his galleys put in at Sigeium and other places thereabouts.

102. The Athenians that lay with eighteen galleys at Sestos knew that the Peloponnesians were entering into the Hellespont by the fires, both those which their own watchmen put up and by the many which appeared on the enemies' shore; and therefore the same night in all haste as they were, kept the shore of Chersonnesus towards Elaeus, desiring to get out into the wide sea and to decline the fleet of the enemy, and went out unseen of those sixteen galleys that lay at Abydos, though these had warning before from the fleet of their friends that came on to watch them narrowly that they went not out. But in the morning, being in sight of the fleet with Mindarus and chased by him, they could not all escape, but the most of them got to the continent and into Lemnos; only four of the hindmost were taken near Elaeus, whereof the Peloponnesians took one with the men in her that had run herself aground at the temple of Protesilaus, and two other without the men, and set fire on a fourth, abandoned upon the shore of Imbros.

103. After this they besieged Elaeus the same day with those galleys of Abydos which were with them, and with the rest, being now altogether fourscore and six sail. But seeing it would not yield, they went away to Abydos.

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their spies, and not imagining that the enemy's fleet could have gone by without their knowledge, and attended at leisure the assault of Eressos, when now they knew they were gone, immediately left Eressos and hastened to the defence of Hellespont. By the way they took two galleys of the Peloponnesians that, having

ventured into the main more boldly in following the enemy than the rest had done, chanced to light upon the fleet of the Athenians. The next day they came to Elaeus and stayed; and thither from Imbros came unto them those other galleys that had escaped from the enemy. Here they spent five days in preparation for a battle.

104. After this, they fought in this manner: The Athenians went by the shore, ordering their galleys one by one, towards Sestos. The Peloponnesians also, when they saw this, brought out their fleet against them from Abydos.

Being sure to fight, they drew out their fleets in length, the Athenians along the shore of Chersonnesus, beginning at Idacus and reaching as far as Arrhiana, threescore and six galleys; and the Peloponnesians, from Abydos to Dardanum, fourscore and six galleys. In the right wing of the Peloponnesians were the Syracusians; in the other, Mindarus himself and those galleys that were nimblest. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left wing and Thrasybulus the right; and the rest of the commanders, every one the place assigned him.

Now the Peloponnesians laboured to give the first onset and with their left wing to over-reach the right wing of the Athenians and keep them from going out, and to drive those in the middle to the shore which was near. The Athenians, who perceived it, where the enemy went about to cut off their way out, put forth the same way that they did and outwent them; the left wing of the Athenians was also gone forward by this time beyond the point called Cynos-sema. By means whereof that part of the fleet which was in the midst became both weak and divided, especially when theirs was the less fleet; and the sharp and angular figure of the place about Cynos-sema took away the sight of what passed there from those that were on the other side.

105. The Peloponnesians, therefore, charging this middle part, both drave their galleys to the dry land, and being far superior in fight, went out after them and assaulted them upon the shore. And to help them neither was Thrasybulus able, who was in the right wing, for the multitude of the enemies that pressed him; nor Thrasyllus in the left wing, both because he could not see what was done for the promontory of Cynos-sema and be-

cause also he was kept from it by the Syracusians and others, lying upon his hands no fewer in number than themselves. Till at last the Peloponnesians, bold upon their victory, chasing some one galley some another, fell into some disorder in a part of their army. And then those about Thrasybulus, having observed that the opposite galleys sought now no more to go beyond them, turned upon them, and fighting put them presently to flight; and having also cut off from the rest of the fleet such galleys of the Peloponnesians, of that part that had the victory, as were scattered abroad, some they assaulted, but the greatest number they put into affright unfoughten. The Syracusians also, whom those about Thrasyllus had already caused to shrink, when they saw the rest fly fled outright.

106. This defeat being given and the Peloponnesians having for the most part escaped first to the river Pydus and afterwards to Abydos, though the Athenians took but few of their galleys (for the narrowness of the Hellespont afforded to the enemy a short retreat), yet the victory was the most seasonable to them that could be. For having till this day stood in fear of the Peloponnesian navy, both for the loss which they had received by little and little and also for their great loss in Sicily, they now ceased either to accuse themselves or to think highly any longer of the naval power of their enemies. The galleys they took were these: eight of Chios, five of Corinth, of Ambracia two, of Leucas, Laconia, Syracuse, and Pellene, one apiece. Of their own they lost fifteen.

When they had set up a trophy in the promontory of Cynossema and taken up the wrecks and given truce to the enemies to fetch away the bodies of their dead, they presently sent away a galley with a messenger to carry news of the victory to Athens. The Athenians, upon the coming in of this galley hearing of their unexpected good fortune, were encouraged much after their loss in Euboea and after their sedition, and conceived that their estate might yet keep up if they plied the business courageously.

107. The fourth day after this battle, the Athenians that were in Sestos, having hastily prepared their fleet, went to Cyzicus, which was revolted; and espying, as they passed by, the eight galleys come from Byzantium riding under Harpagium and

Priapus, set upon them, and having also overcome those that came to their aid from the land, took them. Then coming to Cyzicus, being an open town, they brought it again into their own power and levied a sum of money amongst them.

The Peloponnesians in the meantime, going from Abydos to Elaeus, recovered as many of their galleys [formerly] taken as remained whole; the rest the Elaeusians [had] burnt. They also sent Hippocrates and Epicles into Euboea to fetch away the fleet that was there.

108. About the same time also returned Alcibiades to Samos with his thirteen galleys from Caunus and Phaselis, reporting that he had diverted the Phoenician fleet from coming to the Peloponnesians and that he had inclined Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians more than he was before. Thence manning out nine galleys more, he exacted a great sum of money of the Hallicarnasseans, and fortified Cos. Being now almost autumn, he returned to Samos.

The Peloponnesians being now in Hellespont, the Antandrians (who are Aeolians) received into the city men of arms from Abydos by land through mount Ida, upon injury that had been done them by Arsaces, a deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This Arsaces, having feigned a certain war, not declared against whom, had formerly called out the chiefest of the Delians (the which in hallowing of Delos by the Athenians were turned out and had planted themselves in Adramyttium) to go with him to this war; and when under colour of amity and confederacy he had drawn them out, he observed a time when they were at dinner, and having hemmed them in with his own soldiers, murdered them with darts. And therefore, for this act's sake fearing lest he might do some unlawful prank against them also, and for that he had otherwise done them injury, they cast his garrison out of their citadel.

109. Tissaphernes, hearing of this, being the act of the Peloponnesians as well as that at Miletus or that at Cnidus (for in those cities his garrisons had also been cast out in the same manner), and conceiving that he was deeply charged to them, and fearing lest they should do him some other hurt, and withal not enduring that Pharnabazus should receive them and with less time and cost speed better against the Athenians than he

had done, resolved to make a journey to them in the Hellespont, both to complain of what was done at Antandros and to clear himself of his accusations the best he could, as well concerning the Phoenician fleet as other matters. And first he put in at Ephesus and offered sacrifices to Diana.

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the one-and-twentieth year [of this war] shall be complete.



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