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        BOOK III
                
         
        THE COUNCIL OF BASEL 
        
          
          1419-1444.
            
           
         
              
         
        
           
         
        CHAPTER III.
        
  
          BOHEMIA AND THE HUSSITE WARS
          
          1418- 1431
          
          
         
          
         
        The fortunes of Sigismund had not been prosperous
          since his departure from Constance. The glories of the revived empire which had
          floated before his eyes soon began to fade away. Troubles in his ancestral
          states occupied all his attention, and prevented him from aspiring to be the
          arbiter of the affairs of Europe. His dignified position at Constance as
          Protector of the Council that was to regulate the future of the Church entailed
          on him nothing but disappointment. It was easy for the Council to burn Hus and
          to condemn his doctrines; but the Bohemian people were not convinced by either
          of these proceedings, and cherished a bitter feeling of Sigismund’s perfidy. He
          had invited Hus to the Council, and then had abandoned him; he had inflicted a
          disgrace on their national honor which the Bohemians could never forgive. The
          decrees of the Council found little respect in Bohemia, and a league was formed
          among the Bohemian nobles to maintain freedom of preaching. The teaching of
          Jakubek of Mies, concerning the necessity of receiving the communion under both
          kinds, give an outward symbol to the new beliefs, and the chalice became the
          distinctive badge of the Bohemian reformers. The Council in vain summoned
          Wenzel to answer for his neglect of its monitions; in vain it called on
          Sigismund to give effect to its decrees by force of arms. Sigismund knew the
          difficulties of such an attempt, and as heir to the Bohemian kingdom did not
          choose to draw upon himself any further hatred from the Bohemian people.
              
         
        Before the election of a new Pope, the Bohemians could
          still denounce the arbitrary proceedings of the Council, and hope for fairer
          hearing in the future. But the election of Oddo Colonna, who as Papal
          commissioner had condemned Hus in 1411, dashed all further hopes to the ground.
          Martin V accepted ail that the Council had done towards the Bohemian
          heretics, and urged Sigismund to interpose. He threatened to proclaim a crusade
          against Bohemia, which would then be conquered by some faithful prince, who
          might not be willing to hand it over to Sigismund. The threat alarmed
          Sigismund, who wrote urgently to his brother Wenzel; and the indolent Wenzel,
          who had allowed dim notions of impossible toleration to float before his eyes,
          at last roused himself to see the hopelessness of his attempt neither to favor
          nor discourage the new movement. At the end of 1418 he ordered that all the
          churches in Prague should be given up to the Catholics, who hastened to return
          and wreak their wrath on the heretics. Two churches only were left to the
          Utraquists, as the reformed party was now called, from its administration of
          the communion under both kinds. But the multitudes began to meet in the open
          air, on hill-tops, which they loved to call by Biblical names: Tabor and Horeb
          and the like. Peacefully these assemblies met and separated; but this condition
          of suppressed revolt could not long continue. On July 22, 1419, Wenzel’s wrath
          was kindled by hearing of a vast meeting of 40,000 worshippers, who had
          received the communion under both kinds, and had given it even to the
          children of their company.
          
         
        These meetings at once awakened the enthusiasm of the
          Utraquists, and gave them confidence in their strength. On Sunday, July 30, a
          procession, headed by a former monk, John of Sulau, who had preached a fiery
          sermon to a large congregation, marched through the streets of Prague, and took
          possession of the church of S. Stephen, where they celebrated their own rites.
          Thence they proceeded to the Town Hall of the Neustadt, and clamored that the
          magistrates should release some who had been made prisoners on religious
          grounds. The magistrates were the nominees of Wenzel to carry out his new
          policy; they barred the doors, and looked from the windows upon the crowd.
          Foremost in it stood the priest, John of Sulau, holding aloft the chalice.
          Someone from the windows threw a stone, and knocked it from his hands. The fury
          of the crowd blazed out in a moment. Headed by John Zizka, of Trocnow, a
          nobleman of Wenzel’s court, they burst open the doors, slew the burgomaster,
          and flung out of the windows all who did not succeed in making their escape. It
          was the beginning of a religious war more savage and more bloody than Europe
          had yet seen.
          
         
        Wenzel’s rage was great when he heard of these
          proceedings. He threatened death to all the Hussites, and particularly the
          priests. But his helplessness obliged him to listen to proposals for
          reconciliation. The rebels humbled themselves, the King appointed new
          magistrates. Wenzel’s perplexities, however, were soon to end; on August 16 he
          was struck with apoplexy, and died with a great shout and roar as of a lion. He
          was buried secretly at night, for Prague was in an uproar at the news of his
          death. Wenzel’s faults as a ruler are obvious enough. He was devoid of wisdom
          and energy; he was arbitrary and capricious; he was alternately sunk in sloth,
          and a prey to fits of wild fury. He had none of the qualities of a statesman;
          yet with all his faults he was felt by the Bohemians to have a love for his
          people, to whom he was always kindly and familiar, and to whom in his way he
          strove to do justice. His own ambiguous position towards his brother Sigismund
          and European politics corresponded in some measure with the ambiguous attitude
          of Bohemia towards the Church, and for a time he was no unfitting
          representative of the land which he ruled. Just as events had reached the point
          when decision was rendered inevitable, Wenzel’s death handed over to Sigismund
          the responsibility of dealing with the future of Bohemia.
          
         
        Sigismund did not judge it expedient to turn his
          attention immediately to Bohemia. His Hungarian subjects clamored for his aid
          against the Turks, who were pressing up the Danube valley. He was bound to help
          them first, and obtain their help against Bohemia. He trusted that conciliatory
          measures would disarm the Bohemian rebels, whom he would afterwards be able to
          deal with at leisure. Accordingly he appointed the widowed queen, Sophia, as
          regent in Bohemia, and round her gathered the nobles in the interests of public
          order. At the head of the Government stood Cenek of Wartenberg, who was leader
          of the Hussite league, and who strove to check excesses by a policy of
          toleration. But men needed guarantees for the future. The Diet which met in
          September, 1419, and in which the Hussites had a majority, demanded of
          Sigismund that he should grant full liberty for the Utraquist preaching and
          ceremonies, and should confer office in the State on the Czechs only.
          Sigismund returned the ambiguous answer that he hoped soon to come in person,
          and would govern according to the old customs of his father, Charles IV. No
          doubt the answer was pleasant to the patriotic aspirations which their request
          contained; but men significantly observed that there were no Hussites in
          Charles IV’s days.
          
         
        Queen Sophia was obliged to write repeatedly to
          Sigismund, begging him to be more explicit; but only drew from him a
          proclamation recommending order and quiet, and promising to examine into the
          Utraquist question when he arrived. Sigismund hoped to gain time till he had an
          army ready; he hoped to win over the Hussite nobles by a display of confidence
          meanwhile, and slowly gather round himself all the moderate party.
          
         
        But Sigismund did not know the strength nor the
          political sagacity of the leaders of the extreme party, which had been slowly
          but surely forming itself since the death of Hus. The moderate party were men
          of the same views as Hus, who were faithful to an ideal of the Church, repelled
          the charge of heresy, and still hoped for tolerance, at least in time, for
          their own opinions. With men such as these Sigismund could easily deal. But the
          extreme party, who were called Taborites from their open-air meetings,
          recognized that the breach with Rome was irreparable, and were prepared to
          carry their opinions into all questions, religious, political, and social
          alike. Their position was one of open revolt against authority both in Church
          and State; they rested on the assertion of the rights of the individual, and
          appealed to the national sentiment of the masses of the people. At the head of
          this party stood two men of remarkable ability, Nicolas of Hus and John Zizka,
          both sprung from the smaller nobility, and both trained in affairs at Wenzel’s
          court. Of these, Nicolas had the eye of a statesman; Zizka the eloquence, the
          enthusiasm, and the generalship needed for a leader of men. Nicolas of Hus saw
          from the first the real bearing of the situation; he saw that if the extreme
          party of the reformers did not prepare for the inevitable conflict they would
          gradually be isolated, and would be crushed by main force. Zizka set himself to
          the task of organizing the enthusiasm of the Bohemian peasants into the stuff
          which would form a disciplined army. Like Cromwell in a later day, he used the
          seriousness that comes of deep religious convictions as the basis of a strong
          military organization, against which the chivalry of Germany should break
          itself in vain. While Sigismund was delaying, Zizka was drilling. On October 25
          he seized the Wyssehrad, a fortress on the hill commanding the Neustadt of
          Prague, and began a struggle to obtain entire possession of the city. But the
          excesses of the Taborites, and the fair promises, of the Queen-regent,
          confirmed the party of order. Prague was not yet ready for the Taborites, and
          on November 11 Zizka and his troops fell back from the city.
          
         
        In this state of things Sigismund advanced from
          Hungary into Moravia, and in December held a Diet at Brünn. Thither went Queen
          Sophia and the chief of the Bohemian nobles; thither, too, went the ambassadors
          of the city of Prague, to seek confirmation for their promised freedom of
          religion. Sigismund’s attitude was still ambiguous; he received them
          graciously, did not forbid them to celebrate the communion in their own fashion
          in their own houses, but ordered them to keep peace in their city, submit to
          the royal authority, lay aside their arms, and he would treat them gently. The
          burghers of Prague submitted, and destroyed the fortifications which menaced
          the royal castle. Sigismund could view the results of his policy with
          satisfaction. The submission of Prague spread terror on all sides; the power of
          Sigismund impressed men’s imagination; the Catholics began to rejoice in
          anticipation of a speedy triumph.
          
         
        From Brünn Sigismund advanced into Silesia, where was
          received with loyal enthusiasm, and many of the German nobles met him at
          Breslau. Sigismund became convinced of his own power and importance and let
          drop the mask too soon. At Breslau he put down the Utraquists, inquired
          severely into a municipal revolt, which was insignificant compared to what had
          happened in Prague, caused twenty-three citizens to be executed for rebellion,
          and on March 17 allowed the Papal legate to proclaim a crusade against the
          Hussites. The result of this false step was to lose at once the support of the
          moderate party, and to alienate the national feeling of the Bohemians. The
          people of Prague issued a manifesto calling all who loved the law of Christ and
          their country’s liberties to join in resisting Sigismund’s crusade. The nobles,
          headed by Cenek of Wartenberg, denounced Sigismund as their enemy and not their
          king. The country was at once in arms, and the pent-up fanaticism was let
          loose. Churches and monasteries were destroyed on every side. No country was so
          rich in splendid buildings and treasures of ecclesiastical ornament as was
          Bohemia; but a wave of ruthless devastation now swept across it which has left
          only faint traces of the former splendor. Again excesses awoke alarm among the
          modern nobles. Cenek of Wartenberg went back to Sigismund’s side; and the
          burghers of Prague saw themselves consequently in a dangerous plight, as the
          two castles between which their city lay, the Wyssehrad and the Hradschin,
          again declared for Sigismund. As they could not defend their city, they again
          turned to thoughts of submission, in return for an amnesty and permission to
          celebrate the communion under both kinds. But Sigismund had now advanced into
          Bohemia and proudly looked for a speedy triumph. He demanded that they should
          lay aside their arms and submit. This harshness was a fatal error on
          Sigismund’s part, as it drove the burghers of Prague into alliance with the
          extreme party of Zizka.
          
         
        As yet this alliance had not been made; as yet Prague
          wished to proceed on the old constitutional lines. It wished to recognize the
          legitimate king, and obtain from him tolerance for the new religious beliefs.
          If this were impossible, there was nothing left save to throw in their lot with
          those who wished to create a new constitution and a new society. Zizka had been
          preparing for the contest. He remorselessly pursued a policy which would
          deprive the Catholics of their resources, and would compel Bohemia
          to follow the course in which it had engaged. Monasteries were everywhere
          pillaged and destroyed; Church property was seized; the lands of the orthodox
          party were ruthlessly devastated. Sigismund, if he entered Bohemia, would find
          no resources to help him. Zizka so acted as to make the breach at once
          irreparable; he wished to leave no chance of conciliation, except on condition
          of recognizing all that he had done. Moreover, he established a center for his
          authority. When he failed to seize Prague as a stronghold, he sought out a spot
          which would form a capital for the revolution. A chance movement made him
          master of the town of Austi, near which were the remains of an old fortified
          place. Zizka’s eye at once recognized its splendid military situation, lying on
          the top of a hill, which was formed into a peninsula by two rivers which flow
          round its rocky base. Zizka set to work to build up the old walls, and
          strengthen by art the strong natural position. The approach to the peninsula,
          which was only thirty feet wide, was rendered secure by a triple wall and a
          deep ditch. Towers and defenses crowned the whole line of the wall. It was not
          a city, but a permanent camp, which Zizka succeeded in making, and to
          which was given the characteristic name of Tabor. Henceforth the name of
          Taborites was confined to Zizka’s followers.
          
         
        Before the danger which threatened them with entire
          destruction, as Sigismund’s army numbered at least 80,000 men from almost every
          nation in Europe, all parties in Bohemia drew together. The troops of Zizka
          entered Prague, and the burghers destroyed such parts of their city as were
          most open to attack from the Wyssehrad and the Hradschin, which were held by
          the Royalists. The hill of Witkow, on the north-east of the city, was still
          held by the Hussites, and against that Sigismund directed an attack on July 14.
          The attention of the enemy was distracted by assaults in different quarters,
          and Sigismund’s soldiers pressed up the hill. But a tower, defended by
          twenty-six Taborites, with two women and a girl who fought like heroes, kept
          the troops at bay till a band of Zizka’s soldiers came to their aid, and
          charged with such fury that the Germans fled in dismay. Sigismund learned with
          shame and anger the powerlessness of his great host to contend against a people
          actuated by national and religious zeal. Their repulse kindled in the Germans a
          desire for vengeance, and they massacred the Bohemian inhabitants of the
          neighboring towns and villages. When the Bohemian nobles of the King’s party
          resented this display of hatred against the entire Bohemian race, Sigismund’s
          unwieldy army began to break up. There was again a talk of negotiation, and the
          people of Prague sent to Sigismund their demands, which are known as the Four
          Articles of Prague, and formed the charter of the Hussite creed. They asked for
          freedom of preaching, the communion under both kinds, the reduction of the
          clergy to apostolic poverty, and the severe repression of all open sins. These
          articles were a worthy exposition of the principles of the Reformation: the
          first asserted the freedom of man to search the Scriptures for himself; the second
          attacked one of the great outposts of sacerdotalism, the denial of the cup to
          the laity; the third cut at the root of the abuses of the ecclesiastical
          system; and the fourth claimed for Christianity the power to regenerate and
          regulate society. There was some semblance of discussion on these points but
          there could be no agreement between those who rested on the authority of the
          Church and those who entirely disregarded it.
          
         
        These negotiations, however, gave still further
          pretext for many of Sigismund’s troops to leave his army. Resolving to do
          something, Sigismund on July 28 had himself crowned King of Bohemia, a step
          which gave greater appearance of legitimacy to his position. He strove to bind
          to his interests the Bohemian nobles by gifts of the royal domains and of the
          treasures of the churches. Meanwhile the Hussites besieged the Wyssehrad and
          succeeded in cutting off its supplies. It was reduced to extremities when
          Sigismund made an effort to relieve it. The chivalry of Moravia, Hungary, and
          Bohemia were checked, in their fiery charge by the steady organization of the
          Taborites, and more than four hundred of the bravest nobles were slaughtered by
          the flails of the peasants as they struggled in the vineyards and marsh at the
          bottom of the hill. Sigismund fled, and the Wyssehrad surrendered on November
          1.
          
         
        After this, Sigismund’s cause was lost, and he was
          regarded as the murderer of the nobles who fell in the disastrous battle of the
          Wyssehrad. The troops of Zizka overran Bohemia, and the Catholic inhabitants
          fled before them. Town after town submitted, and in March, 1421, Sigismund left
          Bohemia in despair. He had hopelessly mismanaged affairs. He had alternated
          between a policy of conciliation and one of repression. He had alienated the
          Bohemians through the cruelty of his German followers, and had lost the support
          of the Germans through his anxiety to win the Bohemian nobles. Finally his hope
          of overcoming the people by the help of the native nobles had ignominiously
          failed and had covered Sigismund with disgrace.
          
         
        The Utraquists were now masters of Bohemia, and the
          whole land was banded together in resistance to the Catholicism and Sigismund.
          The nobles joined with the people, and Prague was triumphant; even the
          Archbishop Conrad accepted the Four Articles of Prague on April 21, 1421. The
          movement spread into Moravia, which joined with Bohemia in its revolution. The
          next step was the organization of the newly-won freedom. A Diet held at Caslau
          in June accepted the Four Articles of Prague, declared Sigismund an enemy
          of Bohemia and unworthy of the Crown, appointed a Committee of twenty
          representatives of the different estates and parties to undertake the
          government of the land until it had a king, and left the organization of
          religious matters to a synod of clergy which was soon to be convoked.
          Sigismund’s ambassadors offering toleration, scarcely obtained a hearing: the
          offer came a year too late.
          
         
        Although Bohemia was united in opposition to Sigismund
          and Catholicism, it was but natural that the divergencies of opinion within
          itself should grow wider as it felt itselt more free from danger. The division
          between the Conservative and Radical party became more pronounced. The
          Conservatives, who were called Calixtins or Utraquists from their ceremonial,
          or Praguers from their chief seat, held by the position of Hus—a position of
          orthodoxy in belief, with a reformation of ecclesiastical practice carried out
          according to Scripture. They altered as little as possible in the old
          ecclesiastical arrangements, retained the mass service with the communion under
          both kinds, and observed the festivals of the Church. Against them were set the
          Radicals, the Taborites, amongst whom there were several parties. The most
          moderate, at the head of which stood Zizka, differed from the Praguers not so
          much in belief as in the determined spirit with which they were prepared to
          defend their opinions and carry them out in practice. The thorough Taborites
          cast aside all ecclesiastical authority and asserted the sufficiency of
          Scripture, for the right understanding of which the individual believer was
          directly illuminated by the Holy Ghost. They rejected Transubstantiation, and
          asserted that Christ was present in the elements only in a figurative way.
          Besides these were various extreme sects, who held that the Millennium had
          begun, that God existed only in the hearts of the believers, and the devil in
          the hearts of the wicked. Most notorious amongst these was the small sect of
          the Adamites, who took possession of a small island on the river Nezarka and
          gave themselves up to a life of communism which degenerated into shameless
          excesses. Against these extreme sectaries the Praguers and Zizka set up a
          standard of orthodoxy, and proceeded to measures of repression. Fifty of both
          sexes were burned by Zizka on the same day: they entered the flames with a
          smile, saying, “Today will we reign with Christ”. The island of the Adamites
          was stormed, and the entire body exterminated. Martinek Hauska, the chief
          teacher who opposed Transubstantiation, was burned as a heretic in Prague.
          
         
        It was indeed needful that Bohemia should retain the
          appearance of unity if she were to succeed in maintaining her new religious
          freedom. Sigismund was disheartened by the failure of his first attempt, and
          was ready to wait and try the results of moderation. But the German electors
          and the Pope were by no means willing to give up Bohemia as lost. The four
          Rhenish Electors formed a league against the heretics: the Papal legate,
          Cardinal Branda, journeyed through Germany to kindle the zeal of the faithful.
          Sigismund was openly denounced as a favorer of heresy, and was compelled to
          bestir himself. It was agreed that the Electors should lead an army from
          Germany, and Sigismund should advance from Hungary through Moravia and unite with
          them. In September Germany poured an army of 200,000 men into Bohemia; but
          Sigismund tarried and deferred his coming. Loud accusations of treachery were
          brought against him by the angry princes, and disputes sprang up among them.
          The vast army wasted its energies in the siege of Saaz, and began gradually to
          disperse; the news of Zizka’s advance turned it to shameful flight. It was said
          ironically that such was the horror which the German princes felt against the
          heretics, that they could not even endure to see them. When Sigismund had
          finished his preparations, he also in December entered Bohemia with a
          formidable army of 90,000 men, well-armed, trained in warfare, led by Pipo of
          Florence, one of the most renowned generals of the age. Zizka put forth all his
          powers of generalship to save Bohemia from the impending danger.
          
         
        Zizka, who had been one-eyed for years, had lost his
          remaining eye at the siege of the little castle of Rabi in August. He was now
          entirely blind, but his blindness only gave greater clearness to his mental
          vision, and he could direct the movements of a campaign with greater precision
          than before. The very fact that he had to be dependent on others for
          information led him to impress more forcibly his own spirit on those around
          him, and so train up a school of great generals to succeed him. Under Zizka’s
          guidance the democratic feeling of the Bohemians had been made the basis of a
          new military organization which was now to try its strength against the
          chivalry of the Middle Ages. Strict discipline prevailed amongst Zizka’s
          troops, and he was able to meet the dash of the feudal forces with the coolness
          of a trained army which could perform complicated manoeuvres with unerring
          precision. He paid especial attention to artillery, and was the first great
          general to realize its importance. Moreover, he adapted the old war chariots to
          the purposes of defence. His line of march was protected on the flanks by
          wagons fastened to one another by iron chains. These wagons readily formed the
          fortifications of a camp or served as protection against an attack. In battle
          the soldiers, when repulsed, could retire behind their cover, and form again
          their scattered lines. The wagons were manned by the bravest troops, and their
          drivers were trained to form them according to letters of the alphabet; so that
          the Hussites, having the key, easily knew their way amongst the lines,
          while the enemy, if they forced their way, were lost in an inextricable
          labyrinth. At times the wagons, filled with heavy stones, were rolled downhill
          on the enemy’s ranks; when once those ranks were broken, the wagons were
          rapidly driven in, and cut in two the enemy’s line. It was a new kind of
          warfare, which spread terror and helplessness among the crusading hosts.
          
         
        This new organization was sorely tried when, on
          December 21, Sigismund’s army advanced against Kuttenberg, and met Zizka’s
          forces hard by its walls. The wagons of the Bohemians proved an impregnable
          defence, and their artillery did great injury, against the Hungarians. But
          treachery was at work in Kuttenberg, and opened the gates to Sigismund. Next
          day the Bohemians found themselves shut in on all sides, and their foes
          prepared to reduce them by hunger. But in the darkness of the night Zizka drew
          his troops together, and with a charge of his wagons broke through the enemy’s
          line and made good his retreat. Rapidly gathering reinforcements, Zizka
          returned to Kuttenberg on January 6, 1422, and fell suddenly upon the centre of
          the unsuspecting army. A panic seized the Germans; Sigismund fled
          ignominiously, and his example was followed by all. Zizka followed, and, aided
          by the wintry weather, inflicted severe losses on the invaders. More than
          12,000 men are said to have perished. The second crusade against the Hussites
          failed even more signally than the first.
          
         
        Bohemia had now beaten back both Sigismund, who came
          to assert his hereditary rights to the crown, and the German princes, who
          viewed with alarm the dismemberment of the empire. There remained the more
          difficult task of organizing its political position. The great statesman,
          Nicolas of Hus, was dead, and Zizka had the talents of a general rather than a
          politician. His own democratic ideas, were too strong for him to put himself at
          the head of the State, and bring about the necessary union between the Praguers
          and the Taborites. The Bohemian nobles and the Conservative party generally
          desired to take the management of affairs out of the hands of the
          Taborites, and reestablish a monarchy. Already they had offered the kingdom to
          Ladislas, King of Poland, who shrank from incurring the charge of heresy, which
          would hinder him in his constant warfare against the Teutonic Knights in
          Prussia. But Witold, Grand Duke of Lithuania, a man of high political sagacity,
          had before his eyes the possibility of a great Slavic confederacy which would
          beat back all German aggression. He saw in the Hussite movement a means of
          bridging over the religious differences between the Latin and Greek Churches,
          which were an obstacle to the union of Prussia and Poland. These plans of
          Witold created great alarm in Germany, and many efforts were made to thwart
          them; but Witold took advantage of events, announced to the Pope that he wished
          to restore order in Bohemia, and in May, 1422, sent the nephew of Ladislas of
          Poland, Sigismund Korybut, with an army to Prague. Prague, torn with internal
          dissensions, accepted Korybut as a deliverer. Zizka recognized him as ruler of
          the land, and Korybut showed zeal and moderation in winning over all parties to
          his side.
          
         
        This union of Bohemia and Poland was a standing menace
          to Germany, and a Diet held at Nurnberg in July appointed Frederick of
          Brandenburg to lead a new expedition into Bohemia. Frederick was keenly alive
          to the gravity of the situation, which indeed threatened himself in Brandenburg.
          He endeavored to gather together both an army for a crusade and a permanent
          army of occupation, which was to be left in Bohemia. But Germany’s internal
          weakness and constant dissensions prevented Frederick from accomplishing
          anything. He led a few soldiers into Bohemia, spent some time in negotiations,
          and then returned Nor was Korybut’s position in Bohemia a strong one. He failed
          in his military undertakings; his attempts at conciliation alienated the
          extreme Taborites; Zizka maintained an attitude of neutrality towards him.
          Meanwhile Martin V was untiring in his endeavors to break down the alliance
          between Poland and Bohemia. He exhorted the Polish bishops to labor for that
          purpose. He wrote to Ladislas and Witold, pointing out the political dangers
          which beset them if they strayed from Catholicism. Sigismund, on his part, was
          willing to purchase an alliance with Poland by abandoning the cause of the
          Teutonic Knights. The combined efforts of Martin V and Sigismund were
          successful. Witold wrote to the Bohemians that his desire had been to reconcile
          them with the Roman Church; as they were obstinate, he was driven to abandon
          them to their fate. Korybut was recalled, and left Prague on December 24. The
          great idea of a Slavonic Empire and Church was at an end, and the future of
          Poland was decided by its cowardice at this great crisis. Henceforth it was
          condemned to the isolation which it had chosen through want of foresight.
          
         
        The departure of Korybut and freedom from invasion
          awakened amongst the Bohemians the differences which danger made them forget.
          The Praguers and the Taborites stood in stronger opposition to one another. The
          Praguers were more disposed to negotiation, and hoped that they might still
          find room for their opinions under the shadow of the authority of the Church.
          Zizka had grown more convinced of the futility of compromise, and a stern
          spirit of resistance took possession of him and his followers. The year 1423 is
          full of the records of civil war and devastation in Bohemia, and Zizka spread
          fire and slaughter even in the neighboring lands of Moravia and Hungary. The
          year 1424 is known in Bohemian annals as “Zizka’s bloody year”. He swept
          like a storm over towns and villages of those who wished for compromise, and
          inflicted a sore defeat on the forces of the Praguers who were following on his
          track. The Praguers in dismay looked for a leader and found him in Korybut, who
          in June, 1424, returned to Prague, no longer as the deputy of Witold and the
          Governor of Bohemia, but as a personal adventurer at the head of the Moderate
          party. Zizka advanced against Prague; and the capital of Bohemia, the seat of
          Hus and his teaching, was in danger of a terrible siege. But moderate counsels
          prevailed at the last moment to avert this crowning calamity. Zizka withdrew
          and soon after died of the plague on October 11. His followers bewailed the
          loss of one who was to them both leader and father; they took the name of
          Orphans in sign of their bereavement.
          
         
        Zizka was a man of profound, even fanatical, piety,
          with great decision and energy, who clearly saw the issue that lay before the
          Bohemians if they wished to maintain their religious freedom. But he was a man
          of action rather than reflection. He had the qualities necessary to head a
          party, but not those necessary to lead a people. He could solve the problem for
          himself by a rigorous determination to be watchful and to persist; but his
          range of ideas was not large enough to enable him to form any policy which
          would organize the nation to keep what it had won. Amid Bohemian parties he
          maintained a strong position, opposed to extremes but convinced of the
          hopelessness of conciliation. As a general he is almost unrivalled, for he knew
          how to train out of raw materials an invincible army, and he never lost a
          battle. He could drive back hosts of invaders and could maintain order within
          the limits of Bohemia; but he lacked the political sense that could bind a
          people together. His position became more and more a purely personal one; his
          resolute character degenerated into savagery; and his last energies were spent
          in trying to impress upon all his own personal convictions without any
          consideration of the exact issue to which they would lead. Without Zizka
          Bohemia would never have made good her resistance to the Church and to
          Sigismund. It was his misfortune rather than his fault that he had not also the
          political genius to organize that resistance on a secure basis for the
          future.
          
         
        By Zizka’s death the party opposed to reconciliation
          with Rome lost its chief strength. The Taborites divided into two—the Orphans,
          who held by the opinions of Zizka, and were separated from the Praguers rather
          on social and political than on religious grounds; and the extreme Taborites,
          who denied Transubstantiation and were entirely opposed to the Church system.
          But both these parties were feeble, and spent their energies in conflicts with
          one another. The field was open for Korybut and the Praguers to continue
          negotiations for peace and reconciliation. Bohemia was growing weary of
          anarchy. The first fervor of religious zeal had worn away, the first enthusiasm
          had been disillusioned. Men were beginning to count the cost of their political
          isolation, of the devastation of their land by foes without and quarrels
          within, of the ruin of their commerce. Against this they had little to set as a
          counterpoise. The exactions of feudal lords were as easy to bear as the
          exactions of a plundering army; the equality which they had hoped to find
          through religion was not yet attained. Though victorious in the field, the
          great mass of the Bohemian people longed for peace almost on any terms.
          
         
        During the year 1425 Korybut pursued his negotiations,
          engaged in paving the way for reconciliation with Rome. The people were not
          unwilling, but the army still remained true to its faith. As they felt that
          danger was menacing them, the Taborites again drew together, reasserted their
          principles and prepared to wage war. Besides the danger from half-heartedness
          at home, two active enemies harassed the Bohemian border. Albert of Austria
          attacked Moravia, and Frederick of Meissen, whom Sigismund had made Elector of
          Saxony, was winning back Silesia. A new leader arose to guide the renewed vigor
          of the Taborites, Procopius, called the Great to distinguish him from others of
          the same name. Procopius, like Zizka, was sprung from the lower nobility, and
          was a priest at the time when he first attached himself to the party of Hus.
          Without possessing the military genius of Zizka, he knew how to manage the army
          which Zizka had created; and he had a larger mind and was capable of greater
          plans than his predecessor. Procopius was averse from war, and as a priest
          never bore arms nor took part in the battles which he directed. He wished for
          peace, but an honorable and enduring peace, which would guarantee to Bohemia
          her religious freedom. Peace, he saw, could only be won by arms; it was not
          enough to repel the invaders, Bohemia must secure its borders by acting on the
          offensive. He led his troops up the Elbe to the siege of Aussig. Frederick of Saxony
          was absent at a Diet at Nurnberg, but his wife Catharine called for succors and
          gathered an army of 70,000 men. The Bohemian troops, reinforced by Korybut,
          amounted only to 25,000, On June 16, 1426, was fought the battle under the
          walls of Aussig.
          
         
        The Bohemians entrenched themselves behind their
          wagons, and the furious onslaught of the German knights forced the first line.
          But the artillery opened on their flank; the Bohemians from their wagons
          dragged the knights from their horses with long lances, and dashed them to the
          ground. TheGerman lines were broken, and the Bohemians rushed in and turned
          them to flight. The slaughter that ensued was terrible; 10,000 Germans were
          left dead upon the field. Procopius wished to lead his victorious army farther,
          so as to teach the Germans a lesson; but the Moderates refused to follow, and
          the campaign came to an end without any other results.
          
         
        As usual, a victory united Germany and disunited Bohemia.
          Korybut pursued his schemes for union with Rome, and wrote to Martin V asking
          him to receive Bohemian envoys for this purpose. Martin V expressed his
          willingness, provided they would abide by the decision of the Holy See, which
          was, however, ready to receive information of their desires. Korybut hoped that
          the Pope would abandon Sigismund and recognize himself as King of Bohemia in
          return for his services to the Church. But Korybut was not yet firm enough in
          his position to carry out his plan. The dissension between the Taborites and
          the Praguers was not yet so profound that the Moderates as a body were willing
          to submit unreservedly to Rome. Korybut’s plans were known in Prague, and a
          party formed itself, which, while in favor of reconciliation, stood firm by the
          Four Articles. On Maundy Thursday, April 17, 1427, an eloquent and popular
          priest, John Rokycana, denounced in a sermon the treachery of Korybut. The
          people flew to arms, drove out the Poles, and made Korybut a prisoner. His
          plans had entirely failed, and the victory of the Moderate party over him
          necessarily turned to the profit of Procopius and the Taborites.
          
         
        Procopius was now ruler of Bohemia, and carried out
          his policy of terrifying his opponents by destructive raids into Austria,
          Lusatia, Moravia, and Silesia. Germany in alarm again began to raise forces;
          and Martin V hoped to gain greater importance for the expedition by appointing
          as Papal legate Henry Beaufort, Bishop of Winchester, whom he made Cardinal for
          the purpose. Beaufort’s experience of affairs and high political position made
          him a fit man to interest England and France in the cause of the Church. In
          July, 1427, a strong army entered Bohemia and laid siege to Mies; but the
          soldiers were undisciplined and the leaders were disunited. On the approach of
          Procopius a panic seized the army, and it fled in wild confusion to Tachau.
          There Henry of Winchester, who had stayed behind in Germany, met the fugitives.
          He was the only man of courage and resolution in the army. He implored them to
          stand and meet the foe; he unfolded the Papal banner and even set up a crucifix
          to shame the fugitives. They stayed and formed in battle order, but the
          appearance of the Bohemian troops again filled them with dread, and a second
          time they fled in panic terror. In vain Henry of Winchester tried to rally
          them. He seized the flag of the Empire, tore it in pieces and flung them before
          the princes; but at last was himself driven to flee, lest he should fall into
          the hands of the heretics.
          
         
        This disgraceful retreat did not bring men’s minds
          nearer to peace. Martin V urged a new expedition, and Sigismund was not sorry
          to see the Electors in difficulties. In Bohemia the party of peace made a vain
          effort to raise Prague in the name of Korybut; but the rising was put down
          without the help of Procopius, and Korybut was sent back to Poland in
          September, 1427. Procopius rallied round him the entire Hussite party, and,
          true to his policy of extorting an honorable peace, signalized the year 1428 by
          destructive raids into Austria, Bavaria, Silesia, and Saxony. After each
          expedition he returned home and waited to see if proposals for peace were
          likely to be made. In April, 1429, a conference was arranged between Sigismund
          and some of the Hussite leaders, headed by Procopius, at Pressburg in Hungary.
          Sigismund proposed a truce for two years till the assembling of the Council at
          Basel, before which the religious differences might be laid. The Hussites
          answered that their differences arose because the Church had departed from
          the example of Christ and the Apostles: the Council of Constance had shown them
          what they had to expect from Councils; they demanded an impartial judge between
          the Council and themselves, and this judge was the Holy Scripture and writings
          founded thereon. The proposal of Sigismund was referred to a Diet at Prague,
          and answer was made that the Bohemians were ready to submit their case to a
          Council, provided it contained representatives of the Greek and Armenian
          Churches, which received the Communion under both kinds, and provided it
          undertook to judge according to the Word of God, not the will of the Pope.
          Their request was equitable but impracticable. It was clearly impossible for
          them to submit to the decision of a Council composed entirely of their
          opponents; yet they could have little hope that their proposal to construct an
          impartial tribunal would be accepted.
          
         
        The negotiations came to nothing. Indeed, Sigismund
          was busy at the same time in summoning the forces of the Empire to advance
          again Bohemia. Henry of Winchester had gathered a force of 5000 English
          horsemen, and in July, 1429, landed in Flanders on his way to Germany. But
          religious considerations were driven to give way to political. The unexpected
          successes of Jeanne d’Arc, the raising of the siege of Orleans, the coronation
          of Charles VII at Rheims, gave a sudden check to the English power in France.
          Winchester’s soldiers were ordered to the relief of their countrymen; the
          Cardinal’s influence could not persuade his men to prefer religious zeal
          to patriotic sentiment. The Catholics in Germany broke into a wail of lamentation
          when they saw the forces of the Papal legatediverted to a war with France.
          
         
        Germany was feeble, and Bohemia was again agitated by
          a struggle. The peace party in Prague had for its quarters the Old Town, and
          the more pronounced Hussites the New Town. The two quarters of the city were on
          the point of open hostility when Procopius again united Bohemia for a war of
          invasion. The year 1430 was terrible in the annals of Germany, for the Hussite
          army carried devastation into the most flourishing provinces of the Empire.
          They advanced along the Elbe into Saxony, and penetrated as far as Meissen;
          they invaded Franconia, and threatened with siege the stately town of Nurnberg.
          Wherever they went the land was laid waste, and fire and slaughter were spread
          on every side.
          
         
        The policy of Procopius was beginning to have its
          effect. The Hussite movement was the great question which attracted the
          attention of Europe. Hussite manifestoes were circulated in every land; the new
          opinions were discussed openly, and in many places met with considerable
          sympathy. The Hussites complained that their opponents attacked them without
          really knowing their beliefs, which were founded only on Holy Scripture;
          they invited all men to acquaint themselves with their opinions; they appealed
          to the success of their arms as a proof that God was on their side. The opinion
          began to prevail that, after all, argument and not arms was the proper mode of
          meeting heresy, particularly when arms had proved a failure. Martin V, who
          hated the very name of a Council, was again haunted at the end of 1430 by the
          face of John of Ragusa, who had been negotiating with Sigismund that he should
          combine with the University of Paris to urge on the Pope a speedy summons of
          the Council to Basel. Soon after John’s arrival in Rome, on the morning of
          November 8, the day on which Martin V was to create three new Cardinals, a
          document was found affixed to the door of the Papal palace which caused a great
          sensation in Rome.
          
         
        “Whereas it is notorious to all Christendom, that
          since the Council of Constance an untold number of Christians have wandered
          from the faith by means of the Hussites, and members are daily being lopped off
          from the body of the Church militant, nor is there any one of all the sons whom
          she begat to help or console her; now, therefore, two most serene princes
          direct to all Christian princes the following conclusions, approved by learned
          doctors both of canon and of civil law, which they have undertaken to defend in
          the Council to be celebrated according to the decree of Constance in March
          next”. Then followed the conclusions, which set forth that the Catholic faith
          must be preferred before man, whoever he be; that princes secular as well as
          ecclesiastical are bound to defend the faith; that as former heresies, the
          Novatian, Arian, Nestorian, and others, were extirpated by Councils, so must
          that of the Hussites; that every Christian under pain of mortal sin must strive
          for the celebration of a Council for this purpose; if Popes or Cardinals put
          hindrances in the way they must be reckoned as favorers of heresy; if the Pope
          does not summon the Council at the appointed time those present at it ought to
          withdraw from his obedience, and proceed against those who try to hinder it as
          against favorers of heresy. This startling document was currently supposed to
          be authorized by Frederick of Brandenburg, Albert of Austria, and Lewis of
          Brieg.
          
         
        Several of the Cardinals, chief of whom was
          Condulmier, future Pope, urged on Martin V to comply with the prevailing wish.
          But Martin V wished again to try the chance of War, and awaited the results of
          a diet which Sigismund had summoned to Nurnberg. On January 11, 1431, he
          appointed a new legate for Germany, Giuliano Cesarini, whom he had just created
          Cardinal. Cesarini was sprung from a poor but noble family in Rome, and his
          talents attracted Martin V’s notice. He was a man of large mind, great personal
          holiness, and deep learning. His appearance and manner were singularly
          attractive, and all who came in contact with him were impressed by the
          genuineness and nobility of his character. If any man could succeed in
          awakening enthusiasm in Germany it was Cesarini.
          
         
        Before Cesarini’s departure to Germany Martin V had
          been brought with difficulty to recognize the necessity of the assembly of the
          Council at Basel, and commissioned Cesarini to preside at its opening. The Bull
          authorizing this was dated February 1, and conferred full powers on Cesarini to
          change the place of the Council at his will, to confirm its decrees and do all
          things necessary for the honor and peace of the Church. This Bull reached
          Cesarini at Nurnberg, shortly after the news of Martin V’s death. The Diet of
          Nurnberg voted an expedition into Bohemia, and Cesarini eagerly travelled
          through Germany preaching the crusade. At the same time steps were taken to
          open the Council at Basel. On the last day of February a Burgundian abbot read
          before the assembled clergy of Basel the Bulls constituting the Council, and
          then solemnly pronounced that he was ready for conciliar business. In April
          representatives of the University of Paris and a few other prelates began to
          arrive; but Cesarini sent to them John of Ragusa on April 30 to explain that
          the Bohemian expedition was the object for which he had been primarily
          commissioned by the Pope, and was the great means of extirpating heresy. He
          besought them to send envoys to help him in his dealings with the
          Bohemians, and meanwhile to use their best endeavors to assemble others to the
          Council. The envoys of the Council, at the head of whom was John of Ragusa,
          followed Sigismund to Eger, where he held a conference with the Hussites. The
          conference was only meant to divert the attention of the Bohemians, and it was
          speedily ended by a demand on the part of the envoys that the Bohemians should
          submit their case unconditionally to the Council’s decision. Sigismund returned
          to Nurnberg on May 22, and the German forces rapidly assembled. There were
          complaints at the legate’s absence; Cesarini’s zeal had led him as far as Koln,
          whence he hastened to Nurnberg on June 27. There he found a messenger from
          Eugenius IV, urging the prosecution of the Council, and bidding him, if it
          could be done without hindrance to the cause at heart, to leave the Bohemian
          expedition and proceed at once to Basel. But Cesarini’s heart and soul were now
          in the crusade. He determined to pursue his course, and on July 3 appointed
          John of Palomar, an auditor of the Papal court, and John of Ragusa, to preside
          over the Council as his deputies in his absence.
          
         
        On July 5 Cesarini addressed an appeal to the
          Bohemians, protesting his wish to bring peace rather than a sword. Were they
          not all Christians? Why should they stray from their holy mother the Church?
          Could a handful of men pretend to know better than all the doctors of
          Christendom? Let them look upon their wasted land and the miseries they had
          endured; he earnestly and affectionately besought them to return while it was
          time to the bosom of the Church. The Bohemians were not slow to answer. They
          asserted the truth of the Four Articles of Prague, which they were prepared to
          prove by Scripture. They recounted the results of the conferences at Pressburg
          and Eger, where they had professed themselves willing to appear before any
          Council which would judge according to Scripture, and would work with them in
          bringing about the reformation of the Church according to the Word of God. They
          had been told that such limitations were contrary to the dignity of a General
          Council, which was above all law. This they could not admit, and trusting in God’s
          truth were prepared to resist to the utmost those who attacked them.
          
         
        On July 7 Cesarini left Nurnberg with Frederick of
          Brandenburg, who had been appointed commander of the Crusade. Cesarini had done
          his utmost to pacify the German princes and unite them for this expedition. He
          was full of hope when he set out from Nurnberg. But when he reached Weiden,
          where the different contingents were to meet, his hopes were rudely dispelled.
          Instead of soldiers he found excuses; he heard tales of nobles needing their
          troops to war against one another rather than combine in defence of the Church.
          “We are many fewer”, he wrote to Basel on July 16, “than was said in Nurnberg,
          so that the leaders hesitate. Not only our victory but even our entry into
          Bohemia is doubtful. We are not so few that, if there were any courage amongst
          us, we need shrink from entering Bohemia. I am very anxious and above measure
          sad. For if the army retreats without doing anything, the Christian religion in
          these parts is undone; such terror would be felt by our side, and their
          boldness would increase”. However, on August 1, an army of 40,000 horse and
          90,000 foot crossed the Bohemian border, and advanced against Tachau. Cesarini
          seeing it unprepared for attack urged an immediate onslaught: he was told that
          the soldiers were tired with their march, and must wait till tomorrow. In the
          night the inhabitants strengthened their walls and put their artillery into
          position, so that a storm was hopeless. The crusading host passed on,
          devastating and slaughtering with a ruthless cruelty that was a strange
          contrast to the charitable utterances of Cesarini’s manifesto. But their
          triumph was short-lived. On August 14 the Bohemian army advanced against them
          at Tauss. Its approach was known, when it was yet some way off, by the noise of
          the rolling wagons. Cesarini, with the Duke of Saxony, ascended a hill to see
          the disposition of the army; there he saw with surprise the German wagons
          retreating. He sent to ask Frederick of Brandenburg the meaning of this movement,
          and was told that he had ordered the wagons to take up a secure position in the
          rear. But the movement was misunderstood by the Germans. A cry was raised that
          some were retreating. Panic seized the host, and in a few moments Cesarini saw
          the crusaders in wild confusion making for the Bohemian Forest in their rear.
          He was driven to join the fugitives, and all his efforts to rally them were
          vain. Procopius, seeing the flight, charged the fugitives, seized all their
          wagons and artillery, and inflicted upon them terrible slaughter. Cesarini
          escaped with difficulty in disguise, and had to endure the threats and
          reproaches of the Germans, who accused him as the author of all their
          calamities.
          
         
        Cesarini was humbled by his experience. He reproached
          himself for his confidence in German arms; he had now seen enough, of the
          cowardice and feebleness of Germany. He had seen, too, the growing importance
          of the Hussite movement, and the force which their success was giving to the
          spread of their convictions throughout Germany. When he returned to Nurnberg
          Sigismund met him with due honor; the German princes gathered round him and
          protested their readiness for another campaign next year. But Cesarini answered
          that no other remedy remained for the check of the Hussite heresy than the
          Council of Basel. He besought them to do their utmost to strengthen the
          feeble and cheer the desponding in Germany, to exhort those whose faith was
          wavering to hold out in hope of succor from the Council. With this advice he
          hastened to Basel, where he arrived on September 9. To the Council were now
          transferred all men’s expectations of a peaceable settlement of the formidable
          difficulty which threatened Western Christendom.
          
         
         
          
         
        
           
         
        
        
         
          
         
          
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