READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

A HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE : A.D. 1453-1900

CHAPTER LXXII.

THE UNION OF ITALY

THE period which elapsed between the close of the Crimean war and the establishment of the German Empire at the beginning of 1871, may be said to contain events of more im­portance as regards the European system than even its reconstruction by the Congress of Vienna. These events are, besides the new Empire just mentioned, and a few minor occurrences, the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy, the absorption of the Pope’s temporal power, the realization of Prussian su­premacy, the decline of Austria, and the Franco-German war. In the same period occurred two events of vast moment in the history of the world : the Indian revolt and the civil war in America, which threatened at one time to break up and divide the great Republic of the Western Hemisphere ; but these have no direct bearing on our peculiar subject, the European concert. The affairs of Italy first claim our atten­tion, from their priority in order of time.

The Austrian occupation of Lombardy and Venetia seemed still in the year 1858 to offer an insuperable bar to Italian ' unity and freedom. Whilst the possession of these provinces severed Italy, it also enabled the Austrians to introduce their forces into that country for the purpose of upholding its several governments; all of which, with the exception of Sardinia, were more or less under their influence. The sovereigns of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, were connected with the Austrian Imperial family, and leaned on it for support; whilst the Austrian Cabinet had also a powerful voice in the Neapolitan and Papal councils, and may thus be said to have dominated nearly all Italy. Without the expulsion of the Austrians, the views of Italian patriots could not be realized, and without foreign help they could not be expelled. The attempt had been made in 1849, and ended in disastrous failure.

Other necessary conditions for the freedom and unity of Italy were, that the Italians themselves should desire them, and be agreed as to the means for their attainment. Hence a difficulty almost as great as the presence of the Austrians. For though dissatisfaction at the existing state of things was a very prevalent feeling, opinions varied as to the remedy to be applied. The more ardent patriots desired republican institutions, but of these some would have been content with a confederation of independent commonwealths, whilst others aimed at an undivided Italian Republic. This last party, the most stirring and influential, was led by Mazzini and his sect, or society, called La Giovine Italia, or Young Italy; which, though itself a secret society, had now pretty well superseded others of a like nature, as the Carbonari. The men who adhered to Mazzini were dazzled by ideas, which had the fault of being utterly impracticable. He was for reconstructing society from its foundations, something after the fashion of Rousseau; nay, he thought that art, science, philosophy, in short everything in the world required renovation. Nor were his views confined to Italy. They embraced all Europe, and in 1834 he had drawn up a scheme of La Giovine Europa, “an apostolate of ideas,” as he calls it, by which the whole continent was to be remodelled on the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity ; but he allows that he expected no practical result.

A few men of wiser and more statesmanlike views saw that the only hope for Italy lay in the suppression of such con­spirators, who were not only abortive disturbers of the public peace at home, but also disposed European opinion against Italian freedom: for these politicians saw that the emancipation of Italy from a foreign yoke was simply impossible without help from abroad. This school, as was natural, had its origin in Piedmont, the only constitutional Italian State; and probably their plans for Italian unity were not unmixed with some desire for the aggrandizement of their native country. At the head of them must be placed Count Massimo d’Azeglio, and a few of his friends, as Balbo, Gioberti, and others. D’Azeglio’s leading idea was, that no revolutionary attempts could succeed but such as were conducted in open day. To the success of his plans the formation of a sound public opinion was necessary, and with this view he had undertaken in 1845 a journey through great part of Italy in order to ascertain the sentiments of the people; when he discovered that all persons of sense and respectability were disgusted with the absurdities of the followers of Mazzini, and desirous of a new path. His views were approved by King Charles Albert, who encouraged him to publish them. Such was the origin of his political writings. After the defeat and abdication of that sovereign in 1849, d’Azeglio became the Prime Minister of his son and successor, Victor Emanuel II, a post which he held till 1852, when he was succeeded by Count Cavour.

Without this change Italian independence and unity would probably not have been achieved. With all his talent and good sense, d’Azeglio lacked the energy, perhaps also we may say the unscrupulous boldness, without which great revolu­tions cannot be effected. Of a generous temper, and devoted to literature and art, he was somewhat inactive and unpractical. Cavour, on the contrary, was evidently a man of action, and from the time of his taking office, he may be said to have held the fate of Italy in his hands. A main part of his policy was to obtain for it the good opinion of Europe. Hence his commercial treaties with France, England, Belgium, and Switzerland; hence also the seemingly inexplicable part which he took in the Crimean war. It was, in fact, a well considered blow at Austria. Sardinia appeared among the European Powers at the Congress of Paris in 1856, and her envoy sat side by side with the Austrian Minister, Count Buol; before whose face he denounced the dangerous state of Italy through foreign occupation.

Cavour, though enterprising, was cautious, and awaited his opportunity. He appears to have early contemplated the establishment of a northern Italian kingdom by means of French intervention, and he prepared for future events by strengthening Alessandria, Casale, and Valenza, and by creat­ing a great naval arsenal at Spezia. With regard to home policy, he loudly denounced the revolutionists and republicans. A national opinion, fostered by the means to which we have adverted, was now beginning to prevail over the sects, and the “ National Society,” organized by La Farina, served to recall many from Mazzinian affiliations. The last insurrectionary attempt of Mazzini, at Genoa, proved a miserable failure. With like views, Cavour conciliated Daniel Manin, the Venetian patriot. Manin repudiated as he did the plots of conspirators and the daggers of assassins, and pressed Mazzini to retire from a scene where he was only an obstacle to Italian progress.

Cavour thought that he might securely reckon on the help of Napoleon III., the insurgent in Romagna in 1831 for Italian independence, when a detestable act seemed to shatter his hopes. As the French Emperor and Empress were pro­ceeding to the opera on the 14th of January, 1858, one Orsini, who after the Roman revolution had taken refuge in England, and hatched there his diabolical plot, discharged at the Imperial carriages a so-called “infernal machine,” consisting of a number of gun barrels, fired simultaneously by a train of powder. Fortunately neither the Emperor nor Empress was hit, but several of their suite, as well as by­standers, were killed or wounded. England was denounced at Paris as having hatched the conspiracy, and Count Walew- ski, the French Foreign Minister, addressed a remonstrance, couched in moderate terms, to the British Cabinet. It was of course an absurd suspicion that the English nation or government should abet assassination, but the French had some grounds for it. In the preceding year three Italians had gone from London to Paris, with the design of taking the Emperor’s life, but were arrested and convicted. Mazzini was proved to have inspired this plot, and a member of the British Cabinet, Mr. Stansfeld, was his professed admirer and correspondent. The threats of some French colonels occasioned in England the establishment of the volunteers, and the whole affair a change of ministry, Lord Palmerston giving place to Lord Derby. By moderation on both sides, however, the rupture of the French and English alliance was averted, and the visit of Queen Victoria to the French Em­peror at Cherbourg, on the reopening of that port in August, 1858, seemed to disperse the clouds which had gathered on the political horizon.

Strangely enough an event which threatened to upset all Cavour’s plans served eventually to forward them. That Minister having loudly denounced in the Sardinian parlia­ment the crime of political assassination, some confidential communications from Napoleon followed, and soon after a letter, inspired by him, containing the embryo scheme of an alliance between France and Piedmont. Cavour in consequence, ostensibly on a pleasure trip, procured an interview with Napoleon at Plombières, July 20th, 1858, where the terms of the projected alliance were arranged. They com­prised the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy by the French and Italian arms ; the erection of a Northern Italian kingdom of some eleven million souls in favour of Victor Emanuel, and in return the cession of Savoy and Nice to France. A marriage was also agreed upon between the Emperor’s cousin, Napoleon, son of King Jerome, and Clotilda, daughter of the King of Sardinia.

Napoleon, who had much of the conspirator in his nature, had formed this plot, for such it must be called, without the knowledge of his ministers. There was no legitimate cause of quarrel between France and Austria. The pretext put forth was Austrian misgovernment in Italy; Napoleon’s real motive, it can hardly be doubted, was to add strength and lustre to his dynasty by the aggrandizement of France. Piedmont also had not for the moment any valid plea for a war with Austria. But her case was very different from that of France. The occupation of Lombardy by the Austrians was a constant threat to her safety and independence, as well as the chief bar to Italian unity.

Napoleon displayed his intentions on receiving the diplo­matic circle on January 1st, 1859, when he expressed his regret to M. Hubner, the Austrian Ambassador, that his relations with his master, Francis Joseph, were not cordial. Such an announcement so suddenly and openly made filled all Europe with astonishment and alarm. Suspicion had however prevailed in some quarters of an approaching rupture. In the preceding year, Piedmont had ostentatiously displayed her enmity towards Austria, and reports of French military preparations had been rife in diplomatic circles. Not only the Sardinian official press, but the Chambers also had attacked the right of Austria to her Italian possessions, whilst she, on her side, had redoubled her military precautions, and renewed her ancient treaties with Italian States. Already before Napoleon’s declaration, the Austrian troops, which had been largely reinforced, had taken up a threatening position on the Ticino.

Victor Emanuel’s speech on opening the Chambers at Turin, January 10th, 1859, taken in connection with Napoleon’s declaration, was calculated to remove any remaining doubt as to the true nature of the crisis. He exhorted the Parliament to meet coming events with resolution ; he bade them remark the credit which the country had acquired in the councils of Europe, but that such a situation was not without danger, for if on the one hand treaties were to be respected, on the other, they could not be insensible to the cries of anguish directed towards them from every part of Italy. The marriage of Prince Napoleon and Prin­cess Clotilda, January 30th, threw further light on the situation.

Napoleon’s views were set forth in a pamphlet published early in February, entitled “Napoleon III. et l’ltalie;” which, though written by M. de La Gueronnière, was well known to have been inspired by the Emperor. It insisted on the necessity of reorganizing Italy, freeing it from foreign domination, and reconstituting it on the base of a federative union. Treaties were spoken of with levity as no longer answering the needs of the time, and it was proposed to submit the whole question to the judgment of Europe—Napoleon’s favourite resort in difficult emergencies, or when he wanted to act the first part with a show of moderation. His speech, indeed, on opening the French Chambers, February 7th, seemed to breathe of peace. He affected astonishment at the uneasiness which had been shown; reminded the Assembly of his declaration, L’Empire c'est la paix, and in mentioning Austria, adverted only to some difficulties about the Danubian

Principalities, as if they had been the occasion of his New Year’s declaration. When touching on the abnormal state of Italy, where order could be maintained only by foreign troops, he observed that it was not a sufficient motive for anticipating a war. And he concluded by solemnly declaring that his first impulses, as well as his last judges, were God, his conscience, and posterity.

But in spite of this declaration all Europe was convinced The that war was imminent. England especially took the alarm ultimatum and made some impotent attempts at mediation, which were 1859. answered only with rebuffs both at Vienna and Turin. In March, Russia suddenly proposed a Congress, and some negotiations on the subject ensued, when a hasty step on the part of Austria rendered war inevitable. She refused to admit Sardinia to the Congress, and required, as a condition of her own acceptance of it, that that power should immediately disarm; and on the 23rd of April she sent to Turin an ultimatum to that effect, allowing only three days for a reply.

Although Cavour ardently desired a war, his position was European embarrassing. He knew that Napoleon III’s character was fickle; that his policy had encountered great opposition in France, especially among the Church party; that Count Walewski, the French Foreign Minister, was not only opposed to a war, but even personally hostile to himself. On the other hand, the attitude of the rest of Europe was encouraging. Although no active help could be expected from Eng­land, her sympathy and moral support might be relied on. Russia was then unfavourably disposed towards Austria, and on friendly terms with the French Emperor, who had made advances to her after the Crimean war. The Prussian Regent, influenced by England and by the attitude of Russia, perhaps also by ancient jealousy of Austria, had refused to interfere in the matter, and denied that it concerned the German Confederation. The South German States, however, supported Austria, and ultimately, when war was no longer doubtful, the Prussian Minister at the Diet carried a resolution that the Confederate troops should be held in readiness, and orders to that effect were given for the Prussian contingent, but solely as a measure of precaution and defence.

On receipt of the Austrian ultimatum, the Sardinian government demanded from Napoleon III an immediate succour of 50,000 men. A small body already assembled in the south of France was at once embarked for Genoa, while others took the road to Turin by the Col di Susa. The Austrians, who had in Italy about 200,000 men, under the command of Count Giulay, crossed the Ticino, April 29th, though it had been notified to them that France would regard such a step as a declaration of war. By so doing they abrogated the treaties of 1815, and put themselves in the wrong with the public opinion of Europe. They occupied Vigevano, Novara, Vercelli, and two or three other towns without opposition, and with due diligence it would have been easy for them to seize Turin, an open town, and to crush the small, and as yet unsupported Piedmontese army. But though they had displayed so much precipitation in their diplomacy, their military operations seemed struck with sudden paralysis. Giulay showed the greatest indecision, changed his plans every three days, advanced sometimes on the right, sometimes on the left, bank of the Po, seemed to stand on his defence rather than to take the offensive. Thus time was lost till May 10th, when the allies had assembled in force.

Cavour had made the most active preparations, and he accepted the help of the revolutionary party, except only the Mazzinians, whom he threatened to fire upon if they stirred. These irregular forces consisted of three regiments called Cacciatori degli Alpi, or Riflemen of the Alps, led by Garibaldi. The Sardinian army, amounting to about 80,000 men, was commanded by the King, having at his side General La Marmora. Napoleon III. took the command of the French army. Before starting to join it he published a proclamation denouncing the Austrian aggression, and declaring that Italy must be liberated as far as the Adriatic. He was visited at Genoa by Victor Emanuel, and next day, May 14th, he established his headquarters at Alexandria. The Franco-Sardinian army now amounted to about 200,000 men.

We can give only the main outline of the campaign.¹On the advance of the allies, Giulay retreated to Pavia. In order to ascertain the position of the enemy, he directed a reconnaissance in force on Carteggio, May 20th. The Austrians having been beaten in an affair at Genestrello, retired to Montebello, whence they were expelled the same day, after an obstinate and bloody fight. Expecting to be attacked on the Po, Giulay had weakened his force in the neighbourhood of Lago Maggiore; and Garibaldi took advantage of that circumstance to seize Varese, the Austrians retiring on Como, May 23rd. Four days after Como also was entered. The Piedmontese, under the King, crossed the Sesia, and attacked the Austrians at Palestro, at first with doubtful success, but, being supported by a French Zouave regiment, completely defeated them.

The attack in this quarter was intended to mask the advance of the French. Giulay continued his retreat to elbow formed by the junction of the Ticino with the Po. On the 1st of June General Niel entered Novara, after a slight engagement; and on the 3rd the French began to cross the Ticino. On the 4th they gained the victory of Magenta, chiefly by a skilful manoeuvre of McMahon, which procured for him on the field a marshal’s baton, and the title of Duke of Magenta. In this battle the Austrians are said to have lost 20,000 men. Their haste in evacuating Milan, without carrying off or even spiking their guns, revealed to the inhabitants that their masters had received a disastrous defeat. The municipality, except the Podesta, who fled, formed themselves into a temporary government, and sent a deputation to Victor Emanuel, to announce their annexation to Sardinia. On the 8th of June, that Sovereign, accompanied by the French Emperor, triumphantly entered the Lombard capital. Hence Napoleon addressed a proclamation to the Italians in general, calling on them to take up arms for the liberation of their country.

On the same day that the Emperor entered Milan, the French defeated the Austrians at Melegnano (anciently Marignano), who now crossed the Mincio, deeming their position impregnable through the so-called Quadrilateral, formed by the fortresses of Lonato, Peschiera, Mantua, and Verona. Here they were joined by the Emperor Francis Joseph ; and, on the night of the 23rd of June, they recrossed the Mincio, to give battle to the allies. Both sides were unaware of the position of their opponents. The Battle of Solferino which ensued was a kind of haphazard affair, gained by sheer fighting (June 24th). All three Sovereigns were present at this battle, and displayed great personal courage. Early in the day the Piedmontese on the left wing had experienced several repulses, but after the taking of Solferino by the French, drove the Austrians from positions which were become untenable. The loss on both sides, and especially the Austrian, was enormous. By the 1st of July the allies had effected the passage of the Mincio, and the Austrians retired into Verona.

And now when the French Emperor seemed to be on the point of completing his programme, when the hopes of the Italians were excited to the highest pitch, and when all Europe was wrapt in expectation, Napoleon suddenly stopped short in his victorious career. On July 7th he despatched General Fleury to the Austrian camp, with proposals for an armistice, and on the 11th, after an interview with the Austrian Emperor, the preliminaries of a peace were signed at Villafranca.

Napoleon’s conduct has been variously accounted for. His apologists allege his age—a little past fifty, the heat of the weather, the sight of so much carnage, and the loss of so many men. He is also said to have received news of the probable intervention of Prussia; but, though some Prussian corps had been marched towards the Rhine, they were not intended to take the offensive. Austria, apparently from latent suspicions, had declined Prussia’s offer of an armed mediation, and called upon her for immediate action, for which Prussia was not inclined. What chiefly weighed with Napoleon were probably two circumstances, both of which might have been foreseen. One of these was the strength of the Quadrilateral, and the necessity for some tedious sieges. Another was the enthusiasm displayed in the Italian duchies for annexation to Piedmont. This formed no part of Napoleon’s plan; and lest the French should take alarm at some dictatorships which had been erected in the duchies by Victor Emanuel, he was careful to inform them in an official note in the “Moniteur,” June 23rd, that they were only provisional and temporary. But here it will be necessary to cast a glance at the proceedings in these States.

The news of approaching hostilities had agitated the Italian duchies. In Tuscany, the government of the Grand Duke, Leopold II, was not oppressive; but he was bound to the Austrian court by kinship, as well as by treaties, which, to the disgust of the Florentines, he was now called upon to fulfil. Leopold had just made a journey to Rome and Naples, undertaken, no doubt, with a view to concert measures of common safety; and his return was marked by a more rigorous Austrian policy. Many young men of the best Florentine families now set off for Piedmont, to offer their swords to Victor Emanuel; and a meeting of the principal citizens addressed a paper to the Grand Duke, expressing a wish for the independence of the different Italian States, and their union in a Confederation. Finding himself no longer master of his actions, Leopold quitted Florence for Vienna. A provisional government established in the Palazzo Vecchio now besought Victor Emanuel to appoint a governor of Tuscany, and Signor Buoncompagni, the Sardinian Minister at the Tuscan court, was ultimately made Royal Commissary. He formed a ministry of which Baron Ricasoli was one of the most dis­tinguished members—a man of austere and resolute character, but of moderate political views. In the revolution of 1848 he had supported the Grand Duke; but, on his entering Florence, on his return from Gaeta, with an Austrian escort, Ricasoli, in disgust, renounced his connection with the Court, and r­tired to his domain of Brolio, near Siena, where he watched with interest the progress of Piedmontese policy. The Tuscans formed an army of nearly 20,000 men; but before they could join the allies the Peace of Villafranca had been concluded.

Duke Ferdinand V of Modena was also connected with the. Austrian imperial house. His government was despotic and tyrannical, especially at Carrara, where the Austrian major, Widerkhem, enforced martial law. Some of the inhabitants had been put to death, hundreds condemned to imprisonment or the galleys. The movement in Tuscany excited an insurrection in Massa and Carrara. The Duke fled to the fortress of Brescello, carrying off with him a large sum of money, the crown jewels, and the most precious articles from the public museums and libraries. He also brought away eighty political convicts, and cast them into the dungeons of Mantua. The Piedmontese government proclaimed the annexation of Massa and Carrara, May 20th; and after the battle of Magenta Duke Francis retired into Austrian territory. The tricolor was now hoisted, Victor Emanuel II proclaimed, and the historian, Farini, appointed Piedmontese Commissary at Modena.

The mild and indulgent government of Parma, by the Duchess Louisa Maria of Bourbon, as Regent for her minor son, Duke Robert I, presents an agreeable contrast to that of Modena. She desired to preserve a strict neutrality in the war, but such a course was impossible in a small State situated like Parma. Notwithstanding the comparatively popular government, the movement in Tuscany caused a corresponding one in Parma. Towards the end of April a provisional junta was formed, in the name of the King of Sardinia, and the Regent proceeded with her son to Mantua. She was shortly afterwards recalled, but her restoration lasted little more than a month. Finding herself compelled either to take part in the war, or to violate her engagements with Austria, she retired into Switzerland, June 9th. The municipal government, after the evacuation of Piacenza by the Austrians, proclaimed annexation with Sardinia, when M. Pallieri was appointed Governor of the Duchy. The further history of these States, and of Romagna, will be resumed after describing the Peace OF VlLLAFRANCA.

By the preliminaries the two Emperors engaged to promote an Italian Confederation, with the Pope as honorary president. Austria was to cede her possessions in Lombardy, except Mantua, Peschiera, and the territory east of the Mincio, to the Emperor of the French, who would transfer them to the King of Sardinia. Venetia, though still under the Austrian sceptre, was to form part of the new Confederation. The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena were to re-enter their dominions on giving a general amnesty. The two Emperors would demand from the Holy Father some indispensable reforms. The preliminaries of Villafranca were completed by the Treaties of Zurich, signed November 10th. The most notable difference is in the 19th Article of the Treaty of Peace between France and Austria, regarding the duchies. It is there stated that, as the boundaries of these States cannot be altered without the concurrence of the Powers who presided at their formation, the rights of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, of the Duke of Modena, and the Duke of Parma (now men­tioned for the first time) are expressly reserved by the high contracting parties. This is a variation from the engagement that they should re-enter their States.

Zara and Venice threatened by French fleets, disturbances in Hungary, and the defeats and losses which she had suffered in the war, seem to have been Austria’s motives for making a peace which involved so considerable a sacrifice. Nevertheless, the campaign must be pronounced a failure on the part of Napoleon. He had not carried out his agreement with Cavour, and could not, therefore, claim the stipulated reward. The Lombards excepted, who had obtained their freedom, nobody was satisfied with the result. It excited great discontent in France; and the address of the Emperor to the Legislature (July 19th) betrayed an uneasy consciousness that he had but half performed the task which he had undertaken in the face of Europe. Cavour’s disappointment was bitter indeed. An Italian confederation under Papal presidency, with Austria as a member of it, and retaining a footing in Italy, still left Francis Joseph master of the situation. When informed of the peace by Victor Emanuel, Cavour’s rage was ungovernable. He immediately resigned, and was succeeded by General La Marmora and Ratazzi.

The revolted duchies showed no inclination for the return of their former masters. Of all the central provinces, Romagna, which had also joined the revolt as soon as the Austrians had been compelled by defeats to withdraw their troops from Bologna and Ancona, most dreaded the restoration of its former government. The Papal administration was, indeed, about the worst of all those misgoverned States. Hundreds of persons had been condemned to fine or imprisonment for what were called erroneous political ideas, a liking for innovation, want of attachment to the government, etc. The disaffection was almost universal, and shared by the highest class, including the Marquis Pepoli, grandson of Murat, and cousin of Napoleon III. An Assembly of an aristocratic caste, elected by universal suffrage, unanimously voted the abrogation of the rule of the Holy See, and annexation to Sardinia. But Victor Emanuel hesitated to accept the proffered dictatorship. Romagna was in a different situation from the duchies, and the question of the Pope’s temporal authority might involve many diplomatic complications. But the King sent d’Azeglio as Commissary Extraordinary, who organized a government. Soon after, Farini being offered by the Assembly the direction of affairs, took the title of Governor-general; and, on the 1st of January, 1860, he united the three governments which he held, viz., Romagna, Modena, and Parma, to which last he had been appointed after the peace of Villafranca, under the ancient title of Ae4milia. The Pope compensated himself for the impotence of his temporal weapons by resorting to his spiritual ones, and the singular prerogative which he enjoys of consigning his enemies to everlasting perdition. He fulminated in open consistory a Bull of Excommunication against all the promoters, abettors, and adherents of the usurpation (March 30th), which would include the French Emperor as well as Victor Emanuel; but nobody was named. The bull was placarded in Rome; but it was necessary to post gendarmes to protect it.

With regard to Tuscany, Ferdinand, Leopold’s son—who had fought with the Austrians at Solferino, and was now become sovereign by the abdication extorted from his father—proclaimed that he would adopt the national colours, uphold the Constitution, and recognize the popular rights. But the Tuscan municipalities voted the deposition of the House of Lorraine by a large majority. Buoncompagni was recalled in order that the proceedings of the people might appear entirely free, and on the 1st of August he handed over his authority to Ricasoli, President of the Ministry, who firmly repressed all insurrectionary attempts. A newly elected Assembly confirmed the deposition of the dynasty, and unanimously voted annexation to Sardinia. A military League was formed between the central Italian States, including an agreement to prevent pontifical restoration in Romagna. The army of the League was placed under the Piedmontese general Fanti, and Garibaldi contented himself with the command of the Tuscan division.

The turn events had taken was a source of much anxiety to the Sardinian government, and of very grave embarrassment to Napoleon III. He began to see that his idea of an Italian confederation under the Pope was simply impossible; that even the temporal power of the Holy See, which he was pledged to maintain, was in danger. The provisional governments, also, established in the duchies were of course only temporary, and it became every day more necessary that something decisive should be done. To relieve himself from this difficulty he proposed a Congress of the Powers which had been parties to the Treaties of Vienna: the proposal was accepted, and it was agreed that the Congress should meet at Paris in January, 1860.

Towards the end. of the year Napoleon published a pamphlet entitled Le Pape et le Congres, which rendered the assembly impossible. It contained some very absurd ideas. Rome was to be converted into a sort of large monastery under the Pope; and though the citizens were to be without political interests or passions, each of them would be able to say, “Civis Romanus sum! ” Pio Nono was urged to acquiesce in the independence of Romagna, to make large political reforms in his remaining States, and to content himself with a nominal sovereignty at Rome. It was maintained very truly, but hardly in accordance with the keeping of French troops at Rome, that the less territory the Holy Father had to govern the less would his spiritual authority be exposed to vicissitudes. This line of argument raised a storm throughout Europe, and put an end to the Congress. The French Emperor followed up his views in a letter to the Pope, December 31st, in which he was advised to place the legations, which could be recovered only by force, under the vicariate of Victor Emanuel, and Europe would then guarantee him in his other possessions. But such views suited not Pio Nono nor his adviser, Cardinal Antonelli. About the same time, by replacing Walewski as Foreign Minister by Thouvenel, Napoleon proclaimed the end of all hostile diplomacy towards Italy. Indeed, between the signing of the preliminaries of Villafranca and the execution of the Treaties of Zurich his views had already begun to waver. In a letter to Victor Emanuel (October 20th) he had proposed several variations from the Villafranca programme, though the idea of restoring the sovereigns was preserved in the main. In the same letter he still adhered to his scheme of a federative union under the Pope; from which also before the end of the year he began to vary.

The ministry of La Marmora and Ratazzi, which had become unpopular, seemed unequal to the importance of the crisis, and on the 20th of January, 1860, Cavour accepted a recall to power. The vacillation of Napoleon encouraged him to attempt annexation of the central provinces. Napoleon now withdrew from the responsibility of the situation which he had himself created. He recalled the French army of occupation from Lombardy, and left Cavour to proceed at his own risk; only stipulating that in case the annexation of the duchies to Piedmont should be effected, France was to receive Savoy and Nice as the price. A clear breach of the stipulations of Villafranca. There could be no doubt as to the wishes of the population of the central provinces, and to please Napoleon Cavour adopted his favourite method of a plebiscite. It was held with a favourable result on the 11th of March, and a week afterwards Tuscany and Aemilia were declared, by a royal decree, annexed to Piedmont. Elections were then held throughout the newly-constituted State for the first Italian Parliament. This assembly confirmed the annexations, but not without violent though ineffectual opposition, led by Ratazzi, to the cession of Nice and Savoy. By the cession of Nice, Garibaldi’s birth-place, Cavour incurred his implacable hatred. The English cabinet, with Lord Palmerston at the head, made some abortive attempts to prevent the cession of Savoy and Nice to France. Even Austria refused to interfere, and, apparently from domestic difficulties, quietly acquiesced in the flagrant violation of treaties.

Thus the French Emperor obtained his share of the Plombières programme by means which he had neither contemplated, approved, nor promoted; whilst Cavour saw indeed the Piedmontese kingdom enlarged beyond his expectations, but with the annoying circumstance that Napoleon had not fairly earned the ceded provinces. For the present, however, he was prepared to acquiesce in what had been done, and to leave the completion of his plans to some future opportunity, when an unexpected enterprise of Garibaldi’s—which, but for its success, would have been deemed one of the rashest and most foolish ever undertaken—opened out to him the prospect of a kingdom more extensive than he had ever dreamt of, even that of all united Italy.

The population of Sicily was dissatisfied with the government, and ripe for revolt. On the 17th of April, a Sicilian deputation had requested Victor Emanuel, then at Florence, to take possession of the island, which, under present circumstances, he declined to do. But Garibaldi saw before him a magnificent field of enterprise. With the help of Mazzini he collected at Genoa a band of volunteers called the “ Thousand,” and on the night of the 5th of May he embarked them on board two steamers which he had forcibly seized. He landed at Marsala without opposition, though two Neapolitan frigates were cruising in the neighbourhood. As he marched towards Palermo his little force was increased by insurgents and by deserters from the Neapolitan army. After some skirmishes at Monreale and Calatafimi, Palermo was entered almost without opposition, although there were more than 20,000 regular troops in the city and neighbourhood. The commandant signed a capitulation on board an English man-of-war. Garibaldi’s progress was now easy. The royal troops, though far outnumbering his, retired into Messina, after making a last stand at Melazzo.

Cavour was alarmed as well as surprised at Garibaldi’s rapid success. The hatred which Garibaldi entertained for him, had prevented any concert between them; but Cavour, though aware of the enterprise, did nothing to arrest it. He would have preferred a federal union between North and South Italy to annexation; but when he saw that Garibaldi would pretty certainly succeed, he directed Admiral Persano to help him with the Italian fleet. The state of the Neapolitan dominions promised an easy triumph. Francis II, who had recently succeeded to the crown on the death of his father, Ferdinand II (May 22nd, 1860), had contrived in two or three months to alienate the affection of his subjects by puerile reactionary attempts. Garibaldi, crossing the Straits early in August, marched upon Naples without striking a blow. Francis betrayed helpless irresolution. Instead of opposing the invader, he tried conciliation by granting a constitution, offered to join Victor Emanuel against Austria, appealed to France and England for help, and on Garibaldi’s approach retired to Capua with 50,000 men!

It now became necessary for Cavour to take some decisive step. Garibaldi, elated by his wonderful success, seemed to consider himself Dictator of all Italy, a title which he had already assumed with regard to Sicily and Naples. He talked openly of going to Rome and Venice; steps which would necessarily produce a collision with either France or Austria, perhaps with both. He wrote to Victor Emanuel demanding the dismissal of Cavour and Farini. Cavour knew that Garibaldi did not share the views of Mazzini and the republicans, though he had many of them in his ranks, and that he sincerely desired Italian unity under the sceptre of Victor Emanuel. Cavour let him know that the King and his government confided in him, but at the same time resolved to take the movement out of his hands. To facilitate matters, he is said to have tampered with and bribed several of Francis II’s officers and councillors, and even members of the Royal family itself.

Garibaldi’s progress could be arrested only by force, for he was deaf to all considerations of policy. But to use force it would be necessary to violate international law, by marching an army through the Papal States. Fortunately, the Pope, or rather his counsellor, Antonelli, had afforded a pretext for such a step. Rome dreamt of nothing less than reconquering Romagna, and with that view had formed a legion of adventurers of all nations, of whom the distinguished French general, Lamoricière, an enthusiast for the Pope, accepted the command. This force, which amounted to about 10,000 men, was a menace to Piedmont, threatening to crush the new Italian kingdom between itself and the Austrians posted on the Po. Antonelli having refused to dismiss it, Cavour seized the pretext to despatch an army through the Marches to arrest Garibaldi’s progress. Napoleon had been previously consulted, who, as in the case of the annexations, left Cavour to act on his own responsibility. A large Piedmontese force, under Generals Cialdini and Fanti, defeated Lamoricière, September 18th, at Castelfidardo, near Ancona, into which city the French general retired; but as the Italian fleet, under Persano, began to bombard it, he was obliged to capitulate.

Fortunately, Francis II, by disputing Garibaldi’s passage of the Volturno, October 1st, had arrested his march, and thus unwittingly aided Cavour’s policy by giving the Italian army time to come up. Victor Emanuel had now joined Cialdini and accompanied his march. They fell in with Garibaldi at Teano, when the King gave him his hand, with the laconic address, “Grazie” (I thank you). Their united forces now marched to Naples, which the King and the Dictator entered in the same carriage. Garibaldi had exchanged his characteristic red shirt for a uniform, but he declined the offer of a field-marshal’s baton.

Garibaldi, disappointed and disgusted, retired soon after to Caprera. Before doing so, in his capacity of Neapolitan Dictator, he proclaimed Victor Emanuel “King of Italy.” But it was determined that the Two Sicilies should choose their own sovereign by a plebiscite; and, due precautions being taken, Victor Emanuel was elected at the end of October. He declined, however, to assume that title till it should be con­ferred on him by a National Assembly. The first parliament of the now almost united Italy, assembled at Turin, proclaimed Victor Emanuel as its Sovereign, March 14th, 1861. Francis II. had already surrendered. He had retired with the remnant of his forces into Gaeta, where he was besieged by the Piedmontese army united with the Garibaldians. The siege was protracted through the equivocal conduct of the French fleet, which seemed at first disposed to protect the town. This proceeding, which has been ascribed to various motives on the part of Napoleon III., was probably caused by irresolution. It is certain that he disliked the annexation of the Two Sicilies to Piedmont, but he hesitated to strike a blow to prevent it. On the withdrawal of the French fleet, and consequent bombardment of the town by that of Persano, it capitulated, February 13th. It had made an heroic defence, during which the Neapolitan Queen, Maria of Bavaria, displayed remarkable courage. Francis II and his consort then retired to Pome. Messina, the last place which held out for the Royal cause, surrendered March 13th.

Thus Cavour’s policy had succeeded beyond his most sanguine expectations. Instead of a kingdom of 11,000,000 souls, he had realized one of double that number. His success in North Italy was, indeed, of a very different kind from that in the South, but both showed the versatility of his talent. The kingdom of North Italy was the calculated result of a long chain of policy; in the annexation of South Italy, his merit lies not in any preconcerted plan, but in his knowing how to use and direct the daring, but thoughtless, adventurer who had brought it about without his foreknowledge, and even perhaps, at first, against his will. The state of Europe favoured the operation, which was approved by some Powers and seriously opposed by none. They regarded the Neapolitan revolution as a fait accompli, the conduct of which was at all events better in the hands of a constitutional king than in those of republicans and anarchists. Napoleon, indeed, when appealed to by the Pope, made some show of displeasure, and for a time recalled his Ambassador from Turin; an example which was followed by Russia and Prussia. Austria, whose domestic troubles prevented her from interfering, contented herself with protesting. The British Cabinet was not averse to the aggrandizement of Italy, and was satisfied with Cavour’s engagement not to attack Austria, and to make no more cessions to France. Francis Joseph could obtain no promise of aid either from Prussia or Russia. The Italian cause was favourably viewed in North Germany. On the accession of the Regent William to the Prussian throne on the death of his brother, January 2nd, 1861, Cavour sent General La Marmora to Berlin to represent that the interests of the two countries were identical—the establishment of national hegemony.¹ But Bismarck had not yet appeared as protagonist on the political scene, and Prussian views on that point were not clearly defined.

Cavour had achieved much, but a great deal still remained to be done. Italian unity was not complete while Venetia and Rome held out; and their annexation promised to be a work of much greater difficulty than that of the other provinces. The Piedmontese rule remained to be consolidated in South Italy, where it was far from popular. When Victor Emanuel visited Sicily, his reception was the reverse of flattering. Great part of the Southern Italians were Garibalians or Mazzinians. On the Fete of the Nativity at Naples, the bambino, or Infant Christ, was dressed in Garibaldian costume. Frequent risings took place in the provinces, which were encouraged by the ex-King Francis II. at Rome, and by the priests, who sometimes led them. The French garrison at Rome also indirectly encouraged, or at all events countenanced, the half robber, half royalist bands, which disturbed the Neapolitan dominions.

Of the Venetian and the Roman questions, the latter was by far the more difficult one. The liberation of Venice con­cerned only one foreign Power, and had to be left alone for the time. The annexation of Rome touched the views and interests of all Catholic States, and involved the formidable opposition of the Church. The more ardent Ultramontanists maintained that the independence and sovereignty of the Pope were necessary to his spiritual security; that he must be free not only at home from the domination of popular assemblies, but also abroad from the dictation of foreign Powers; and that for these ends the possession of sovereign temporal power was indispensable. The first of these postulates would make the Pope an absolute and irresponsible despot; the second is impossible. To make it feasible, the Pontiff should be the greatest of all military potentates, for so long as there is a greater he may be liable to dictation. And, as a matter of fact, he had not been able for many years to hold his own territories without the help of foreign bayonets. The Austrians had held Romagna for him since 1848, and as soon as they evacuated it, the population threw off his yoke. At that moment he was maintained in his own episcopal city only by a French garrison. These evils were incurred through his temporal power; without which his spiritual authority would have been greater and more respected. His temporal sov­ereignty was a political solecism in modem Europe, and utterly opposed to the principles of modern society. The views still entertained by the Roman Court are shown in the Encyclical known as Quanta Cura, drawn up by the Jesuit Perrone, and with the annexed Syllabus, or list of errors, published in December, 1864. Liberty of conscience and of worship are treated as hallucinations; the independence of the civil power, the liberty of teaching and of the press, together with many other things which more enlightened nations regard as their dearest privileges are forbidden.

Cavour’s religious views were liberal, but free from that  morbid hatred of the Church which characterized most of the revolutionists. His maxim was Libera Chiesa in libero Stato —a free Church in a free State, in accordance with which he held that the Pope’s temporal power must fall. He suppressed some of the more useless monastic Orders, but he retained such as did good by teaching or by charitable acts, as the Soeurs de Charité and others. He had at first hoped to con­ciliate the Pope by friendly negotiations, which proved fruitless. They were renewed, with the knowledge of the French Emperor, after the march of the Sardinian army through the Papal territories. Pio Nono was offered a large patrimony, absolute property in the Vatican and other palaces, the maintenance of his sovereign rights, prerogatives, and inviolability, with freedom from State interference in the affairs of the Antonelli affected for a while to listen, perhaps to get at the bottom of the Piedmontese plans, then suddenly broke off the negotiations.

To effect the legislative and administrative assimilation of so many very different provinces; to reorganize the army of the new kingdom; to fuse into a single budget those of six or seven States, while embarrassed at the outset by a deficit of 500 million francs (20 millions sterling); to allay the disturbances caused by Garibaldians, Mazzinians, and Neapolitan Royalists—such were the gigantic tasks to be undertaken in consolidating united Italy. It was necessary to dissolve Garibaldi’s army, which was done as gently as possible. Some of the chiefs were made generals, while many of the officers accepted commissions in the national army. Garibaldi at Caprera was furious. He overwhelmed Cavour and the moderate liberals with abuse as traitors, and demanded a national arming. Ricasoli in an eloquent speech in the Chamber denounced Garibaldi. Garibaldi appeared in the Chamber, April 18th, in his red shirt and American cloak, and amidst violent uproar accused Cavour of fomenting fratricidal war. But he failed to shake the firm and constant mind of the great Minister, who persisted in his resolution to dismiss the volunteers. The King brought about an interview between them at the palace, and there was an apparent recon­ciliation. Cavour carried his point, and Garibaldi returned to Caprera.

This contest with the popular, but unreflecting, hero, gave a fatal shock to Cavour’s health, already undermined by the multiplicity of his cares and labours. On the night of May 29th he was seized with a violent illness, and on the 6th of June he died. There will be few dissentient voices as to his merits. He was essentially the founder of the kingdom of Italy.

Ricasoli, a declared enemy of the priests, now for a time became Prime Minister. Napoleon made him promise to undertake nothing against Rome, and French intrigues used the democratic faction, animated by Mazzini and led by Ratazzi, to overthrow him. Ratazzi then occupied his post. Garibaldi, meanwhile ill at ease in his retirement, was plotting the seizure of Venice and Rome. He held a great democratic Congress at Genoa, in March, 1862, and assembled volunteer corps at Bergamo and Brescia, with intent to invade Venetia, but Ratazzi caused the greater part of them to be disarmed. In the following June, Garibaldi, relying on the hatred of the Neapolitans and Sicilians for the Sardinian government, attempted another insurrection in that quarter, with the view of marching on Rome. He landed in Sicily and passed over to Calabria with some 1,200 men. But General Cialdini, who had been despatched with some troops to arrest his progress, caught him at Aspromonte. His men were dispersed, he himself wounded in the foot, and carried to Spezia.

The repression of Garibaldi’s attempt showed Victor Emanuel strong enough to maintain order, and on the strength of it he claimed to be put in possession of Rome, when he engaged to guarantee the Pope’s spiritual headship. This demand offended Napoleon III, and occasioned a change both in the French and Italian Ministry. At Paris, Thouvenel was replaced by Drouyn de l’Huys, who was more favourable to the Pope; at Turin, Ratazzi was succeeded by Farini. It was the policy of Napoleon to keep Victor Emanuel weak in South Italy, and so dependent on him. With the same view apparently, the French garrison at Rome continued to connive at secret armings in favour of Francis II, and during two years there were constant skirmishes in the mountains, attended not only with much bloodshed, but also with the most horrible atrocities.

At length, in the autumn of 1864, a suspected new coalition among the northern Powers induced Napoleon to alter his views. The evacuation of Rome would, it was thought, con­ciliate England and sow dissensions among the new allies— September Protestant Prussia, schismatic Russia, and Catholic Austria. There was at that time some misunderstanding between the French and English Cabinets. England had given a flat refusal to Napoleon’s proposal of a Congress in November, 1863, while the enthusiastic reception of Garibaldi in England in the spring of 1864 had caused the Italian government much embarrassment. On the 15th of September of that year a definitive Convention was concluded between France and Italy on the subject of Rome. Victor Emanuel undertook not to attack the Pope’s dominions, and to protect them from all external assaults, while Napoleon on his side agreed to the gradual withdrawal of his troops from Rome, to be completed within two years. The formation of a papal army, recruited from various countries, sufficient to maintain the Pope’s authority without menacing Italy, was allowed. As the French Emperor demanded some material guarantee, the removal of the Italian capital from Turin to Florence within six months was arranged by a protocol appended to the Convention. The news of the change of capital caused a riot at Turin, accompanied with considerable loss of life. To appease these disturbances the ministry was dismissed, and La Marmora, of Piedmontese origin, made President of the Council. The riots, however, were renewed in January, 1865; it is supposed at the instigation of Mazzini. There were cries of “Abasso il re,” and on the 3rd of February Victor Emanuel left Turin for Florence.

Italy was now gradually taking her place among the great European Powers. By the end of 1865 she had been recog­nized by most of them. In the autumn of 1864 Austria herself had proposed to do so on the base of uti possidetis, on the sole condition that she should not be attacked for a certain number of years. Thus, for the sake of her material interests, she was prepared to abandon not only her allies the Italian potentates, but even the Holy Father himself. But public opinion in Italy would not have allowed the formal abandonment of Venice. The internal unity of Italy was confirmed January 1st, 1866, when the new codes of law came into operation throughout the annexed provinces. The principal features of them were civil marriages—a blow at the clergy— and the equal division of property among children of both sexes—a blow at the aristocracy. In the foreign policy of the newly-created nation the first most remarkable features are her treaties with Prussia, first by joining the Zollverein towards the end of 1865, and on the 10th of April of the next year by that momentous alliance which was attended with such prodigious effects for both countries. But to explain these matters we must take a retrospect of German affairs, which we have brought down in the preceding chapter to the establishment of the Prussian Regency in 1858.

The internal troubles of Austria—one of the principal causes of the loss of Lombardy—became after that event matter for serious consideration with the imperial Cabinet. Financial affairs, chiefly intrusted to Jews, were badly managed, and the debt continually increased. The army, administered by incompetent persons, daily deteriorated. The superior officers adopted a brutal tone towards their subalterns, called the “Russian manner,” and these again used the cane unsparingly on the men. An open contempt was displayed for religion, and profanity became the tone of the Court. To these sources of weakness and decay were added open discontent, and even rebellion, in some of the various provinces constituting the ill-cemented Austrian empire.

These latter evils were the most pressing. To meet them reforms were made in the various provincial Landstage, or parliaments, and a new constitution was framed for the whole empire, which was proclaimed February 26th, 1861. The Emperor opened the new Reichstag, or imperial parliament, May 1st. It consisted of an Upper and Lower House, the first named for life by the Emperor, while the second was composed of 343 delegates from the different provincial Landstage. Toleration was held out for Protestants, which pleased many of the Hungarians, but the Archbishops, who commonly obeyed in silence, ventured to express a hope that the Catholic character of the monarchy would not be destroyed ; and the Tyrolese, who are papists, refused to carry out the new regulations.

It soon became evident that the new constitution would not work. The Hungarians and Croats refused to recognize it, and sent no delegates to the Reichstag. Bohemia quietly enjoyed these quarrels, while the Magyars, under Deak’s leadership, resolved to recover the national rights which they had lost by their rebellion in 1849; but, for fear of Russia, they offered only a passive resistance. Kossuth, indeed, in London, and Garibaldi in Italy, agitated for an insurrection in Venetia and Dalmatia, to be followed by a rising in Hungary, but without effect. General Benedek, a Hungarian by birth, was sent to conciliate his fellow-countrymen, but neither his persuasions nor his threats had any result. Addresses poured in demanding the constitution of 1848, and Francis Joseph at length consented to the assembling of a Hungarian Parliament, which was opened April 2nd, 1861.

The programme of the constitutional party was that Hun­gary was no Austrian province, but a substantive kingdom, having only a personal union with Austria; that the abdicated Emperor Ferdinand, now residing at Prague, their lawful king, was not justified in having transferred the crown of St. Stephen to his nephew without the consent of the Hungarian nation; but if he would declare his abdication, and if Francis Joseph would submit to be crowned after the ancient fashion, no further resistance would be offered. The Emperor would not listen to these conditions. He dismissed the Assembly, sent large bodies of troops into Hungary, and collected the taxes by force.

Whilst Austria thus presented all the symptoms of decay, Prussia, her younger and more vigorous rival, was preparing for the struggle for supremacy. Under the weak reign of Frederick William IV, and the administration of what was called the Kreuz party, she had considerably retrograded. The accession of the Prince of Prussia to the Regency threw somewhat more vigour into the counsels of the Berlin Cabinet. But some years were still to elapse during which Prussia submitted, for the most part, to follow in the wake of Austria. The programme of the Regent and of the new Ministry under Prince Hohenzollem-Sigmaringen, a puisne prince of the royal house, was to discountenance all liberal revolutions, to respect Roman Catholic rights, but, at the same time, to cherish the evangelical union, to patronize learning and science, and, above all, to bestow especial care upon the army. The accession of the Regent to the Prussian throne, by the death of his brother, January 2nd, 1861, and the deaths in the same year of General Von Gerlach and Privy Councillor Stahl, two of the leaders of the Kreuz party, did not at first cause much alteration in the policy of the Berlin Cabinet. William I. was deeply imbued with feudal notions, and the idea of sovereignty by the grace of God. Although of the seven preceding kings of his house, the first only, Frederick I., had been crowned, William celebrated his coronation with great pomp at Konigsberg, October 18th. Taking the crown from the altar, he placed it on his own head, and then on his queen’s. In his address to the Parliament he observed: “The rulers of Prussia receive their crown from God; therein lies its holiness, which is unassailable.” But he failed not to intimate that he would listen to their advice. This speech, taken in connection with some measures of the Cabinet, was regarded by the Liberals as reactionary, and threatening a return to absolutism. That party had a majority in the Parliament which assembled in January, 1862, and offered so violent an opposition that Prince Hohenzollern retired in favour of Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen. A new Parliament proved equally refractory. The Fortschritt party, as it was called, or Party of Progress, was, indeed, pleased with the recognition of Italy, and with the treaty between the Zollverein and France, effected in March, 1862; but, in other respects, the parliamentary opposition was just as violent as before. The new Ministry was in turn compelled to retire, when the King named Herr Bismarck Schonhausen President of the Council, or Prime Minister, who from this moment may be said to have guided the destinies of Germany as Cavour had previously done those of Italy.

To compare Bismarck with Cavour implies that their work was a good deal alike; and, indeed, the state of Germany at this time bore considerable resemblance to that of Italy. It presents the picture of a struggle for national unity achieved at last, as in Italy, by its chief military Power, under the guidance of a remarkable statesman. In both countries these Powers were ruled by patriotic and energetic sovereigns, soldiers by profession. But some differences must be observed. Germany had already a federative union, and was not made up, like Italy, of a number of wholly independent States. In Germany, again, the struggle was entirely national. There was no foreigner to be expelled, no need of foreign aid. But the most striking point of difference is that Germany con­tained two great military Powers, by whose rivalry, and the ultimate ascendancy of one of them, unity was effected. Besides these two Powers, there was a number of minor States, fearful of losing the prerogatives conferred upon them by the treaties of Vienna, and as they could not stand alone, for the most part satellites of Austria. But their safety chiefly lay in keeping both Austria and Prussia from becoming predominant, and in fomenting the mutual hatred and jealousy of those Powers. Hence these middle States were the chief obstruction to German unity. At one time, as we have said, under the leadership of Von Beust, the Saxon Minister, they entertained the idea of effecting a union among themselves, and thus forming a German Triad, which would have made confusion worse confounded. During the period under review, therefore, the interest of German history centres in the dis­putes between Austria and Prussia. These concerned, of course, questions relating to the Confederation, such as the fortifying and garrisoning of federal fortresses, like Ulm and Rastadt, the government of electoral Hesse, and questions of the like nature.

The war in Italy and peace of Villafranca had much influence on German affairs. They not only widened the breach between Austria and Prussia—the former Power complaining that she had been shamefully abandoned—but also caused a great national movement, by having displayed the impotence of the Confederation. One of their first effects was the foundation of the Nationalverein, or National Association, formed at Eisenach towards the end of July, 1859, by the radical Hanoverian, Baron Benigsen, and Herr Metz, of Darmstadt, and patronized by Duke Ernest II of Saxe- Coburg-Gotha. Its programme was to substitute for the Bund the German Constitution of 1848—a German Parliament constituent and sovereign, and Germany united under the hegemony of Prussia, with Austria excluded. This asso­ciation was soon after opposed by another, called the Reform- verein, founded in 1862 by what was called the Great German Party. The national interests were the watchword of both; but the first was for Prussia, the second for Austria. Neither of them, however, did anything but talk.

The history of the German Bund, as Professor Von Sybel has remarked, is the history of a protracted malady, which began with its birth in 1815. By means of its Diet, a Congress of Princes, manipulated with consummate skill by Metternich, Austria and the reactionary party had triumphed for a long series of years, and even at Berlin. Bismarck himself, though a Prussian Junker, had been, as we have said, a member of the Kreuz party, and an advocate of Austrian supremacy. His experience as Prussian envoy at the Diet, and subsequent ambassadorships to Paris and St. Peters­burg, altered and extended his views. He saw that Germany, to be strong, must be reconstructed, that Prussia alone was equal to the task, but not before she had been strengthened. Soon after his accession to power, he is said to have remarked that the questions which agitated the German Fatherland could not be decided by speeches and vetos, but by blood and iron. With this view, assisted by Von Loon, the Minister at War, he reformed and increased the army. Hence the Parliamentary opposition to which we have alluded. The democrats hated nothing so much as a strong government, and Bismarck was assailed with the most virulent abuse. But he persisted in his plans, in which he was supported by King William I, who declared in the Chamber that the reformation of the army was his own work, that he was proud of it, and would carry it through.

The Zollverein, or Customs Union, formed by Prussia, enabled her to speak with authority. Austria was excluded from the treaty with France already mentioned, and to the minor States she intimated that if they would not join it they must quit the Zollverein. The demand of Austria for admittance was supported by these States, who threatened to quit the Zollverein in case of refusal. But Prussia persisted, well knowing that the benefits which they derived from it were greater than anything that Austria could offer to them. This of course inflamed the quarrel between the two great Powers. Austria now proposed to several of the States a separate Parliament for general affairs, to sit side by side with the Diet. The proposal was supported by the four German Kings and several Princes. Bismarck now adopted a high tone. He declared that Prussia would not bow to a majority of the Diet, and was not bound to do so by the Federal Constitution. Austria was further incensed by a remark ascribed to Bismarck, that she should remove her capital to Ofen; which, indeed, would have been more central for her dominions.

The unpopularity of the home government of Prussia seemed to offer an opportunity for attack. After some secret negotiations, Austria invited the minor German Sovereigns to a Govern-Fürstentag at Frankfurt, August, 1863. William I was kept in the dark till the last hour, and refused to attend. In this Assembly, Austria proposed a new constitution, which, as it never came to anything, we need not detail. Its main features were, a sort of Directory of five Princes, with the Austrian Emperor as President, superior to the Bund; a confederate tribunal, and a national parliament, but of a very circumscribed sort, in which Prussia was sure to be outvoted. This, it was thought, if carried into effect, would tie Prussia’s hands; if she rejected it, she might be denounced as the enemy of German unity. Prussia steadily rejected the importunities of the minor Sovereigns to attend the meeting, and the project came to nothing.

Austria now changed her front. Count Kechberg, her Minister, determined on conciliating Prussia. This unexpected union of the two Powers staggered the middle States, neutralized the power of the Diet, and paralyzed the patriotic associ­ations. But the Nationalverein had already abandoned the cause of Prussia on account of the defensive treaty which she had made with Russia (February 8th, 1863), on the breaking out of the Polish insurrection. The German democrats represented this treaty as an offensive one, and the Nationalverein resolved to abandon its former Gotha programme so long as Bismarck should be Minister. The Prussian Chamber displayed the most violent animosity towards the Ministry, and the historian, Von Sybel, took a leading part in the attacks upon it. The President of the Assembly sometimes prevented the Ministers from speaking, who declared that they would not again enter the House unless freedom of speech were guaranteed to them. And, supported by the King, they set at defiance the contumacious opposition of the Chamber.

The Polish Insurrection just adverted to broke out at the beginning of 1863. Grave symptoms of discontent had manifested themselves in Poland a year or two before on the occasion of the police having interfered with an anniversary celebration of the Polish victory over the Russians at Grochow in 1831. Some lives were lost in the riot which ensued; this rankled in the minds of the Poles; a general mourning was adopted, even by the women, and other tokens of discontent were displayed. The insurrection came at a very inopportune moment for Russia. She was again looking after the “sick man’s” property, and had been stirring up revolt in the Christian provinces of Turkey, which was to break out in 1863, but did not take effect. Great quantities of arms had been sent into Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia; the Herzegovina and Montenegro were in open insurrection; and in Greece the revolution was preparing which hurled Otho from the throne? In these circumstances an attempt was made to conciliate the Poles. For this purpose the Emperor Alexander sent his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, to Warsaw, in June, 1862. Constantine had been recalled from his travels in the preceding year on account of some disturbances in Russia, and particularly at St. Petersburg. He was bold and energetic, and the partisan of a vigorous autocracy in Russia; but at the same time, by his travels in France and England, he had imbibed many of the liberal ideas of the time, and a taste for progress. He was accompanied to Warsaw by the Marquis Wielopolski, a native Pole, who was made chief of the Polish Council. Wielopolski entertained the impracticable idea of reconciling the Poles and Russians, and uniting them in the Panslavist interest.

In Russia itself much discontent existed, principally excited by the emancipation of the serfs, begun in 1857. Alexander II has received great credit for his humanity in this measure, but it appears rather to have been dictated by policy, with a view to break the power of the nobles. The alliance of despotism with extreme democracy and the lowest classes of society is a fact that has been often illustrated in our own time. Alex­ander’s principal design was to withdraw the serfs from the influence of their masters, the boyars, and place them under his own. The measure caused great discontent among the nobles and educated classes, who now saw no barrier between the throne and themselves. There were demands for a Constitution and a Parliament, and the discontent was manifested by incendiarism in most of the great towns, including St. Petersburg. Nor was the condition of the serf improved. He was still attached to the soil and to his horde, or com­munity, which spared him less than the landed proprietor had done. Similar measures, with the like views, were contem­plated for Poland.

The state of that country under Russian despotism may be inferred from the fact that in the first half of the year 1862, nearly 15,000 persons, or about one-fifth of the whole male population of Warsaw, had been thrown into the dungeons of that city. Count Andrew Zamoyski, selected to represent the national sentiments to the Tsar, was seized, carried to St. Petersburg, and thence into exile. Alexander II. was for some time doubtful what course to pursue. There were two sets of counsellors. The old Russian, or Muscovite party, to which Prince Gortschakov belonged, followed the traditional policy of the Emperor Nicholas, and was for mild and conciliatory measures, with certain reforms. On the other hand, the German, or “Young Russia” party, invited by Prussia, was for using the greatest severity. Their counsels prevailed, and war to revolutionists became the order of the day.

There can be no doubt that the Polish insurrection was purposely excited by Russia. The method adopted was an illegal conscription. Lists were made out of young men of the noble and burgher classes, the most troublesome to Russia, who were to be pressed into the army, while the peasants were left untouched. Thus one of two objects would be attained : either the disaffected would be rendered powerless, or, what was both more probable and more agreeable to Russian policy, a rebellion would ensue.

The measure was executed in the most brutal manner. On the night of January 15th, 1863, Warsaw seemed to be suddenly converted into a town taken by assault. The conscripts marked out by the police were seized in their beds ; where they could not be found, their kinsmen, old men and boys, were dragged in their stead to the citadel. A few days after, the Russian official journal announced, with a cynical irony, that the conscription had been peaceably effected! Insult added to injury was too much for human nature to bear, and the insurrection sprung at once into life. Many marked for conscription had escaped into the country, and were soon joined by others from different quarters. Before the end of January the insurrection was regularly organized with a central anonymous committee at Warsaw.

In this disastrous struggle the Poles displayed the greatest heroism. The spirit which animated them is illustrated by a combat at Wengrow. The Polish main body having been defeated by a superior Russian force, a body of 200 youths, mostly nobles, to cover the retreat of their comrades, made a desperate charge up to the Russian guns, and were killed to a man. The warfare was of the guerilla kind. It was at first endeavoured to give the insurgents a more regular organization, and with this view, Langiewicz, who had served under Garibaldi, was made Dictator. He collected some 12,000 men, and established his headquarters at Radom. But he was interfered with by the Polish Committee in London, and by their protege Microslawskv, who wanted the chief command, and thwarted all his plans. Langiewicz was defeated by the Russians, March 19th, and his army dispersed. He himself escaped into Galicia, and was favourably received by the Austrian authorities.

Austria at first ostensibly favoured the Poles. The Vienna and St. Petersburg Cabinets were at that time far from friendly. Austria suspected and feared the Russian plots to excite rebellion in Turkey, which could not but be prejudicial to her interests. Russia, the foremost advocate of passive and slav­ish obedience, scruples not, when it suits her plans, to foment rebellion among her neighbours. Bismarck had endeavoured to draw Austria on the side of Russia. The treaty with Russia before mentioned made the question a European one. It has not been published; but the chief feature of it seems to have been to allow the Russians to pursue the Poles into Prussian territory. When the Western Powers interfered, Bismarck at­tempted to disavow it; but practically it was carried into effect. The French people sympathized with the Poles, but the Germans, who were averse to them, stood like a wall between them and France. Napoleon III was at that time well disposed towards the Tsar, and unwilling to compromise one of the first of Continental alliances. He observed in his speech on opening the Chambers in November, that Alexander II had faithfully supported him during the war in Italy and the annexation of Savoy and Nice. France, therefore, did not proceed beyond diplomatic action, in which she was joined by England and Austria. Lord John Russell drew up some pedantic notes in which he lectured Russia on the treaties of 1815. Those treaties had indeed secured for Poland many rights which might now be sought in vain—religious freedom, liberty of the press, equality before the law, the sole use of the Polish tongue in public affairs, the filling of all posts, both civil and military, by Poles alone, a national representation of two Chambers, and several more. But of all these they had been deprived after the extinction of their rebellion in 1831, and to invoke them now was like calling spirits from the vasty deep. The Russians, of course, only laughed in their sleeves, and more especially, perhaps, at the appeals which the notes contained to Russian magnanimity and clemency. Gortschakov made a semiserious reply. Austria cared little for the Poles. Her chief anxiety was for her province of Galicia, though probably she was not displeased with an opportunity to spite Russia. Gortschakov’s answer to her note was short and dry; to France he replied with protestations of goodwill, inter­mingled with sarcastic remarks about the dangers of revolutionary principles. In June the three Powers followed up their notes by a joint one, in which, on the suggestion of the English Cabinet, the following six points were laid down as the basis of a pacification:—1. A complete and general amnesty. 2. National representation. 3. Public offices to be filled by Poles. 4. Perfect religious liberty. 5. The Polish language to be the official one. 6. A legal system of recruiting. A suspension of arms was also demanded, and a Con­gress of the five great Powers to settle the matter. Gortschakov replied that the Tsar had already made concessions which were contemned by the Poles; asserted that the centre of the insurrection was to be sought in the revolutionary committees in London and Paris, and refused a suspension of arms. The suggestion of a conference was contemptuously met in the reply to Austria by a counter one for a conference of the three Powers which had divided Poland; thus intimating that the Western Powers had no business to interfere. Russia came victorious out of the diplomatic contest. She knew her own will, while the counsels of the three Powers were divided and irresolute. The French and English ambassadors at St. Petersburg let fall, indeed, some obscure threats and on the 3rd of August the three Powers renewed their re­presentations. But the season was now too far advanced for naval operations in the Baltic. Early next month Gortschakov announced that the discussion was closed.

Meanwhile the war had proceeded with increased intensity. After the defeat of Langiewicz, the Central Committee gave up the idea of another Dictatorship, and guerilla warfare was resumed, for which the numerous woods afforded great facilities. It was marked by extreme barbarity on the part of the Russians. All Polish officers captured were shot or hanged. Towns and villages were burnt, their inhabitants massacred, prisoners put to death; robbery and murder were the order of the day. Several Russian officers committed suicide rather than carry out their barbarous instructions, among them Colonel Korf, who declared that he could not reconcile his orders with his duties as an officer and man of honour. In the midst of these horrors, the Central Committee conducted its business with wonderful secrecy, under the very eyes of the Russian author­ities. It exercised all the functions of a regular government, raised taxes, granted passports, and even passed sentences of death. Its commands were implicitly obeyed, though nobody knew whence they came. Once a treacherous workman betrayed to the Russians the chamber in which the proclamations and other papers of the Committee were printed. The house was surrounded, the chamber searched; only a large chest was found, and in it the corpse of the traitor!

The insurrection had been propagated in Lithuania and the General Russo-Polish provinces, but not in those belonging to Austria methods and Prussia, for fear of bringing those Powers into the field. The mission of General Muraviev into Lithuania with dictatorial power, was a sort of answer and defiance to the Western Powers. His methods were death or Siberia and confiscation. Immediately after his arrival he shot or hanged some of the chief landed proprietors of the province, as well as several priests and abbes. He emancipated the Lithuanian peasants, incited them against their masters, whose lands he promised them. He is computed to have driven at least a quarter of a million Lithuanians into the Steppes of Orenburg. His fury was particularly directed against women and priests; women, indeed, were the soul of the insurrection. The schismatical Church of Russia has always displayed the utmost intolerance and hatred towards the Roman Catholics. The clergy were subjected to heavy contributions, and decimated by arrests. Within the year 183 priests were apprehended. Colonel Moller, Russian commandant in Wilkomir, said in a circular, “I attribute all the disturbances in Poland to the inclination of the Romish clergy for brigandage and rebellion, which is common to them with Pio IX and his Cardinals.”

The Grand Duke Constantine, who had not acted with the expected vigour, quitted Warsaw in August. General de Berg now assumed dictatorial power, and imitated the example of Muraviev at Wilna. He discovered some members of the secret government, hanged five of them, and condemned sixteen others, including four ladies, to hard labour in the Siberian mines. Austria gave a death-blow to it, and at the same time reconciled herself with Russia, by proclaiming martial law in Galicia. One of the last brutalities of the Russians was the destruction of Ibiany, in the government of Kowno, in May, 1864, which had distinguished itself in the insurrection. The principal inhabitants were put to death, the rest were transported into remote provinces, and their lands distributed among Rascolniks, or old orthodox Russians, the town was razed, its very name effaced, and the new colony was called “Nicholas.” By a decree of the Tsar, March 2nd, 1864, the lands of the Polish nobles were given to the peasants, with only a nominal compensation. Polish officials who did not speak Russian were dismissed, and the Russian tongue was introduced into all schools. The children of the poor were forcibly baptized by Russian popes; the rich had to pay for the privilege of Catholic baptism. The same policy was pursued in subsequent years. In July, 1869, the Polish university of Warsaw was converted into a Russian one, and all lectures were to be in that tongue. Shopkeepers and innkeepers were forbidden to answer an address in Polish; the speaking of that language aloud in the streets was prohibited ; nay, fathers and mothers were forbidden to teach it to their children! A German author has truly remarked, that though some of the tyrants of antiquity turned whole populations out of their lands and homes, and sent them into strange lands, there is no instance of their having deprived them of the use of their mother tongue.¹