CHAPTER LXIII.

AUSTERLITZ AND JENA

 

NAPOLEON did not abandon all hope of the appearance of his fleet till August 28th, when, hearing that Villeneuve had put into Cadiz, and also that the Austrians were in motion, he issued orders for raising the camps upon the coast. The troops were directed towards the Rhine in four divisions, under Davoust, Soult, Lannes, and Ney, with orders to be in position between Strassburg and Mainz before the end of September. At the same time the army of Holland, under Marmont, also marched towards Mainz, and that of Hanover, under Bernadotte, was put in motion; but its destination was concealed, in order to deceive the King of Prussia, in case of the failure of the negotiations which were still in progress. The allied Powers had formed a plan to frighten Frederick William III out of his neutrality. A Russian army was to advance to the frontiers of Prussian Poland, to force them, if necessary, and to advance through Silesia towards the Danube. Another army, composed of 45,000 English, Swedes, and Russians, was to land in Swedish Pomerania and at the mouth of the Weser, and thence to make an irruption into Hanover. The Allies hoped that, Prussia being thus surrounded with a network of troops, Frederick William, as well from fear as from a secret sympathy with their cause, would be induced to join the Coalition. To oppose these designs, Napoleon, who knew that the King of Prussia had long coveted Hanover, pro­posed to him, through the French Ambassador, M. de la Forest, to deliver over to him that Electorate, to be incor­porated in the Prussian dominions, as the price of his alliance with France. The proposition was supported by Hardenburg. To the King’s scruples at robbing the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg, his relatives, Hardenberg replied, that the morality of a Sovereign resembled not that of an individual; that the operation was one calculated to place his Monarchy in the rank it ought to occupy in the world, as well as to allay the storm that menaced the Continent, and to force England to a peace. Frederick William, yielding to these arguments, notified his assent to the French proposal, but on condition that France should engage to respect the independence of Switzerland, Holland, and those States of the Italian Peninsula which belonged not to the French Empire nor to the Kingdom of Italy. Encouraged by this progress, Napoleon dispatched Duroc, the Grand-Marshal of his Palace, to Berlin, to bring the negotiations to a conclu­sion; without, however, consenting to the conditions respect­ing Italy, and the Swiss and Batavian Republics. But before Duroc could arrive the timorous Frederick William had changed his mind. The hope of preserving the peace of Europe had induced him, as much as the acquisition of Han­over, to listen to Napoleon’s offer; and meanwhile he had discovered that war was inevitable. The Allies had also worked on his fears, by representing to him the gigantic projects of ambition entertained by the French Emperor, and their representations were supported by the Queen of Prussia, as well as by the greater part of Frederick William’s Court. After an attempt at mediation, the last decision of Frederick William was for a strict neutrality; but in this he was firm as well as sincere. The Emperor Alexander, in pursuance of the plan already mentioned, marched an army towards the Prussian frontiers; requested that it should be permitted to pass through the Prussian dominions towards the Inn; and asked for a personal interview with Frederick William. M. Alopeus, the Emperor’s Minister at Berlin, even went so far as to name the day when the Russian troops would cross the frontiers of Prussia. But this insult filled Frederick William with all the energy of anger, and he immediately ordered an extraordinary levy of 80,000 men. At the same time France was informed that the King of Prussia would sign an alliance with her on the slightest infraction of his neutrality by Russia; while the Emperor Alexander received a similar assurance in case of an aggression on Prussia by France. Such was the position of the Prussian Monarchy when the campaign opened on the Danube.

The operations of the Coalition were conceived on an immense scale; they embraced Germany and Italy, and extended from the mouth of the Weser to the Gulf of Taranto. Austria was ready to enter upon the campaign early in September. Her army in Italy, commanded by the Archduke Charles, consisted of 120,000 men; a second of 35,000, under the Archduke John, was posted in Tyrol; a third, in Germany, of about 80,000 men, was nominally commanded by the Archduke Ferdinand, a cousin of the Emperor, but in reality by General Mack. His appointment seems to have been effected through the influence of the English Cabinet, in spite of his signal failure in Italy. Mack had been condemned by the greatest general of the age, the Emperor Napoleon. Nelson, who saw him at Naples, had also con­demned him. This incompetent man was now to decide the fate of empires.

An army of Russians and Swedes was to operate in North Germany; while two Russian armies of about 60,000 men each, under the orders of Kutusov and Buxhovden, were to march through Galicia and join Mack on the Upper Danube. Russian troops from the Ionian Islands, combined with some English detachments from Malta, were to land in the Nea­politan dominions, drive out the French, and assist the operations of the Austrians in Northern Italy. To frustrate this plan, as well as to assume the appearance of having removed one of the obstacles to peace, and, at the same time, to be enabled to employ his troops in Southern Italy against the Archduke Charles, Napoleon concluded at Paris a convention with the Marquis San Gallo, September 21st, 1805, by which the French troops were to evacuate the Kingdom of Naples; Ferdinand IV undertaking, on his side, to observe a strict neutrality, to repel by force any attempt to violate it, and to permit no belligerent squadron to enter his ports. This convention was very distasteful to the Court of Naples; but the dread of immediate hostilities compelled Ferdinand to ratify it.

It was of the highest importance to the success of the campaign in Germany that Austria should assure herself of the cooperation of the electors of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden. From the situation of their dominions between the contending Powers, it was impossible for those Princes to remain neutral. They were known to be inclined towards Napoleon, by whom, as we have seen, they had been highly favored in the matter of the indemnifications; and the only method by which Austria could hope to insure their aid was to compel it by a sudden invasion. Instead of this, the Cabinet of Vienna attempted to conciliate the employment of force with the observance of forms. On September 6th Prince Schwarzenberg arrived in Munich with a letter from the Emperor Francis, beseeching Maximilian Joseph to unite his arms with those of Austria, and guaranteeing to him the integrity of his dominions, whatever might be the event of the war. The Elector, after giving a ready assent to this request, addressed on the following day a letter to the Emperor Francis, in which he stated that his son, the Electoral Prince, was in France; that he would be lost if the Bavarian troops were to march against Napoleon; and he, therefore, supplicated his Imperial Majesty to be allowed to maintain his neutrality. In fact, however, Maximilian Joseph had already signed the preliminaries of an alliance with Napoleon, August 24th; and actuated by the fear of being crushed between two such Powers, he wrote an abject letter, September 8th, to M. Otto, the French Minister at Munich, stating what he had done, and deprecating the anger of Napoleon. M. Otto, perceiving that the Elector was about to secede, hastened to the palace, and, partly by threats, partly by painting to him in vivid colours the ignominy of his situation if he remained a day longer at Munich, he, with the aid of the Minister Mongelas, persuaded Maximilian to set off with his Court that very night for Wurzburg; where he would be protected by the advancing French columns. The Bavarian troops, 26,000 in number, followed by forced marches.

The day after the Elector’s flight, and when it was no longer possible to secure him, the Austrian army crossed the Inn, and entered Bavaria (September 19th). Thus deprived of the cooperation of the Bavarians, Mack should have awaited in that Electorate the arrival of the Russian army under Kutusov, which was still at a great distance. Instead of doing so, he traversed Bavaria, entered Swabia, and took up a position on the Iller, between Ulm and Memmingen, occupied the defiles of the Black Forest, and pushed the heads of his columns as far as Stockach; thus throwing him­self into the jaws of his formidable enemy, and separating himself more and more from the Russians. Unfortunately for Mack, Napoleon in person had undertaken the German campaign with the greater part of his forces; while the Austrian Cabinet, thinking that Italy would be the chief point of attack, had posted their best general and their largest army in that country. Napoleon, after appearing at Paris in the Senate, September 23rd, set off to join his army. He had formed a plan to surprise and overwhelm Mack on the Upper Danube, with all his forces, and to cut him off from the Russians and from Vienna. The French army destined to operate in Germany consisted of 190,000 men. Besides the four divisions already mentioned, and those of Marmont and Bernadotte in Holland and Hanover, a seventh corps, from Brest, with the guard and reserves of cavalry, was directed on Haguenau, Strassburg, and Schlettstadt. The success of Napoleon’s plan depended on the precision with which the movements of the different corps were exe­cuted. Davoust passed the Rhine at Mannheim, September 26th, and directed his march on Oettingen. Soult and Ney also passed the Rhine on the 26th, the first at Spires, the second at Karlsruhe, and made for Donauworth and Dillingen. Bernadotte in Hanover, Marmont in Holland, were both to direct their march on Wurzburg; the former by Gottingen, the latter by Utrecht and Mainz. Thus, while Mack was expecting an attack in front, nearly the whole French army was “pivoting” on his right, and manoeuvring to cross the Danube in his rear. Napoleon, to keep up his delusion, ordered a false attack in front. Lannes, with his division, and Murat, with 7,000 cavalry, having passed the Rhine, September 27th, marched straight forwards towards Reuchen and Hornberg, as if they would force the defiles of the Black Forest. Napoleon having joined this division, October 1st, directed its march upon Stuttgart. Here he signed a treaty of alliance with the Elector of Würtemberg, October 3rd, who agreed to furnish 8,000 men during the war. Napoleon now made some false demonstrations and manoeuvres to conceal from the enemy the march of his columns upon Donauworth. Marmont’s and Bernadotte’s divisions had already arrived at Wurzburg. From this place the Elector of Bavaria had sent a declaration to the Emperor Francis, that he had determined to remain neutral, and that all the menaces of France should not make him abandon this unalterable resolution. Yet in less than a fortnight after these solemn assurances the Bavarians joined Bernadotte and Marmont immediately on their appearance; and on October 12th the Elector ratified the provisional treaty with France of August 24th.

Bernadotte, by the junction of Marmont’s division and the Bavarians, finding himself at the head of 60,000 men, directed his march towards the Danube. The union of so large a force at Wurzburg should have opened Mack’s eyes; but he imagined that Bernadotte was stationed there to watch the Prussians, and he did not begin to perceive that Marshal’s real intentions till he arrived at Eichstadt and Donauworth. The direct road between Wurzburg and Eichstadt traverses the margraviate of Anspach, belonging to Prussia. A cir­cuitous route might have spoilt Napoleon’s combinations, and his troops took that of Anspach at the risk of provoking the hostility of the King of Prussia by this violation of his neutrality. By the 8th of October 180,000 French had crossed the Danube at different points : Bernadotte and the Bavarians at Ingolstadt, whence he marched rapidly upon Munich; Davoust and Marmont at Neuburg; Soult, Lannes, Murat, and the Guard at Donauworth and Dillingen. The Austrian General, Kienmayer, with 12,000 men, appointed to guard the bridges, was compelled to fly beyond the Isar. Marmont and Soult advanced towards Augsburg; Napoleon in person, with Lannes and Murat, on Zusmarshausen. Ney, with 40,000 men, remained on the left bank of the Danube. Mack might have retreated into Tyrol and joined the army of the Archduke John; but he persisted in thinking that Napoleon was still in his front, and that Bernadotte alone had gotten into his rear. Under the influence of this idea, recalling the corps which he had posted in the Black Forest, he wheeled about, and advanced, as he supposed, against Bernadotte and Marmont. He was soon undeceived. At Wertingen his advanced guard fell in with Murat and the French cavalry, and was completely routed; 4,000 Austrian grenadiers and all their artillery were captured (October 8th). This affair opened Mack’s eyes; but, though the road to Tyrol was still open, he persisted in remaining at Ulm. Matters growing hourly worse, he at length adopted the resolution of forcing his way towards Bohemia. With this view he endeavored to force Ney’s positions at Gunzburg and Albeck, but was repulsed with considerable loss (October 9th). Napoleon, meanwhile, investing Ulm with his center and right, extended his left so as to cut off Mack’s retreat to Tyrol. The investment on this side was completed by the occupation of Memmingen by Soult, October 14th.

Meanwhile the Russians were approaching; their advanced guard had passed Linz, and the Archduke Charles had detached thirty-three battalions from the army of Italy to proceed to Mack’s rescue. Napoleon drew closer the blockade of Ulm. Shut up in such a town with some 60,000 men, with provisions and ammunition only for a small garrison, Mack’s position was becoming desperate. Another attempt was made to force the road to Bavaria, October 14th, when the Austrians were defeated with great loss by Ney at Elchingen. The Archduke Ferdinand, however, and Prince Schwarzenberg, succeeded in forcing a passage with upwards of 20,000 men, and gained Heidenheim. On the 15th, Napoleon, having carried the heights which command Ulm, summoned Mack to surrender, and in an interview with Prince Lichtenstein pointed out that Mack’s position was inextricable, and threatened, if forced to it, to treat the Aus­trian army as he had treated the garrison of Jaffa. To avoid an assault Mack capitulated on the 17th. On the morning of October 20th 24,000 Austrians defiled before Napoleon, and laid down their arms at his feet as prisoners of war.

The French enter Vienna.

The Russian advanced guard under Prince Bagration had effected a junction, October 16th, at Braunau with Kienmayer, who had retreated beyond the Inn, pursued and harassed by Bernadotte and the Bavarians. But they were compelled to evacuate Braunau on the approach of the French, who, with the exception of Ney’s corps, advanced rapidly after the surrender of Ulm. Lannes occupied Braunau. October 29th; Bernadotte entered Salzburg on the 30th. On the 4th of November the French army passed the Enns. On the 5th Ney took the fort of Scharnitz, which opened the road to Innsbruck. On the 7th an action took place at Maria Zell between the advanced guard of Davoust and the Austrians under Meerveldt; who lost 4,000 prisoners and sixteen guns. On the 9th the Russians repassed the Danube at Grein; and on the 11th an action between Marshal Mortier and Prince Kutusov took place near Durrenstein, a castle rendered famous by the captivity of Richard Coeur de Lion. The French general, who had only 5,000 men, cut his way through four times that number of Russians, and succeeded in reaching Davoust’s division. Kutusov continued his retreat towards Moravia, to join the Russian corps which was coming to his aid. In these disastrous circumstances, the Emperor of Austria, in order to save his capital, sent Count Giulay to Napoleon’s headquarters to inquire on what terms he would grant an armistice for the negotiation of a peace. Napoleon demanded that the Russians should return into their own country, that the Hungarian insurrection should be dissolved, and that Venice and Tyrol should be provisionally abandoned to the French. Francis refused these conditions, which were, in fact, equivalent to surrendering at discretion. But it seems probable that the offer was made only to gain time for the advance of the Russians under Buxhovden and the completion of the Hungarian insurrection. Meanwhile the French army continued its march along the right bank of the Danube, and on the 13th of November Murat and Lannes entered Vienna without resistance. Such had been the orders of Francis, on quitting his capital a few days before to join at Brunn the Emperor Alexander, who accompanied the second Russian division: and, in fact, Vienna was not in a condition to make any defence.

In Italy the Austrians had made vast preparations in the anticipation that it would be the principal scene of action. But Napoleon’s movements gave quite an unexpected turn to affairs, and rendered the campaign in Italy only subsidiary to that in Germany. Massena had at first only 30,000 men to oppose to the vast army of the Archduke Charles, and he was therefore instructed to stand on the defensive on the Adige. On the other hand, the Archduke, through Mack’s disasters, which had compelled him to detach a large force to the assistance of that general, was prevented from taking the offensive. After the King of Naples had ratified the Treaty of Paris, Gouvion St. Cyr, who occupied the peninsula of Otranto with 25,000 men, hastened to join Massena. But these troops had not yet come up when Massena, whose army, by reinforcements from other quarters, now numbered near 60,000 men, and about equalled the Archduke’s, having learned the capitulation of Ulm, and foreseeing that the Archduke would fly to the defence of Vienna, impetuously attacked the Austrians in their position at Caldiero between Verona and Vicenza (October 29th). In a desperate struggle, which lasted three days, the French lost 6,000 men, were completely repulsed, abandoned the field of battle, and retreated to Verona. Yet Thiers and other French writers claim a brilliant victory! The Archduke Charles was now at liberty to pursue his road into Austria, by way of Croatia; a movement, however, which could not but look like a retreat. He was pursued by the French; and a corps of 5,000 men, which he had left behind to cover his march, was compelled to capitulate at Casa Albertini, November 2nd. He summoned his brother John with his army to join him from Tyrol; the two Archdukes effected a junction near Cilli, towards the end of November, and, with their united forces, hastened to the Danube, but were too late to be present at the decisive battle. The Archduke John had also summoned Jellachich from the Vorarlberg; but that commander had been obliged to capitulate to the French.

The French made no halt at Vienna, but crossed the Danube, November 14th, in pursuit of the Russians. Prince Auersperg, who had been instructed to destroy the Tabor bridge, suffered himself to be deceived by Murat, who pretended that a truce had been concluded, and the French were permitted to pass over. This ruse was as good as a victory to the French. Marshal Lannes came up with the Russians at Hollabrunn, November 15th. Kutusov, to escape from a bad position, pretended to parley for an armistice; and leaving Prince Bagration behind, with a corps of 6,000 men, whom he abandoned in order to deceive the enemy, hastened his march northwards. Bagration, though attacked by upwards of 30,000 men at Hollabrunn, November 16th, and again at Guntersdorf on the following day, contrived to save part of his troops, and rejoined Kutusov at Wischau, on the 19th. That general, having been joined by the Russian army under Buxhovden from Galicia, had now arrested his retrograde march. Murat had entered Brunn, November 18th, and Napoleon fixed his headquaters in that town on the 20th.

At this moment the Emperors Francis and Alexander were at Olmütz. The Russian Emperor had had, a little before, an interview with Frederick William III at Berlin, where he arrived unexpectedly, October 25th. Demonstrations of affec­tion were lavished on both sides; the Queen, especially, was charmed by Alexander’s grace of manner and chivalrous bearing. The King of Prussia and his subjects were, at this time, filled with rage and indignation at Napoleon’s violation of the Prussian territory; a cry for war again arose at Berlin; when, suddenly, came the news of Mack’s capitulation. Alexander, however, persuaded Frederick William to sign a secret convention at Potsdam, November 3rd, by which he acceded to the Coalition; with the reservation, however, of making a last attempt to bring Napoleon to moderate views. As the conditions of a general peace, based on that of Lunéville, a military frontier was to be demanded for Austria, an indemnity for the King of Sardinia, the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland, a guarantee for the independence of those two countries, and the separation of the crown of Italy from that of France. Count Haugwitz was to carry these conditions to Napoleon, and, in case of their rejection, war was to be declared, December 15th. At the same time all the Prussian forces were put upon a war footing.

By way of compensation for the French insults, one of the Prussian King’s first steps had been to forward to Alexander an authority for his troops to traverse Silesia and Lauenburg; in consequence of which 36,000 Russians had entered Silesia, while 18,000 more under Tolstoi, and 12,000 Swedes, disembarking at Stralsund, directed their march through Lauenburg upon Hanover. Of this last army, Gustavus IV of Sweden was to have taken the command in person; and, after its union with 12,000 Hanoverians at Stade, and some British troops under Lord Cathcart, it was to have made a powerful diversion in Holland. But that capricious Sovereign, who had called on Prussia for an explanation of her armaments, offended by an imaginary slight on the part of the Emperor of Russia, laid down the command of the combined army, and recalled his troops, already on their march for the Elbe, into Pomerania. Several weeks were lost in negotiations before the Swedes were again put in motion; and, shortly after, the battle of Austerlitz changed the policy of the various Cabinets. Frederick William also announced to the French Government, October 14th, that henceforth he regarded himself as released from all his engagements respecting the neutrality of North Germany. He had not, however, made these efforts, though necessary for his own honor, and even safety, without asking to be compensated. In return for his eventual cooperation, he demanded that the King of England should cede to him Hanover, in exchange for the Prussian possessions in Westphalia. The English Cabinet would not accede to this demand; but promised to cede that part of the Electorate which is surrounded by the Prussian dominions, provided Prussia should make war upon France.

Even now Frederick William’s intentions were not sincere; and had they been so, Haugwitz was not a fit agent to carry them out. In spite of the convention, it is evident that a great latitude had been allowed to that Minister; that his demands were to rise or fall, according to the fortune of the French arms. Haugwitz did not obtain an interview with Napoleon till November 28th, at his headquarters at Brünn. The French Emperor diverted the negotiations from the main subject to collateral ones, and Haugwitz, who saw that a great battle was impending, was not unwilling to wait. Napoleon’s situation was by no means secure. He was faced by an Austro-Russian army, superior in number to his own; 45,000 English, Russians, and Swedes were assembled in North Germany; the Hungarian levy or insurrection was going on; the Archdukes, Charles and John, were advancing. Under the circumstances, Prussia really held in her hands the fate of the campaign and the destinies of Europe. Had Frederick William put his troops in motion, the allies would not have delivered the battle of Austerlitz; they would have waited till Haugwitz had discharged his mission, and have allowed time for the Prussian troops to come up.

On the night before he quitted Potsdam, Alexander, accompanied by the King and Queen of Prussia, had visited by torchlight the tomb of Frederick the Great, in the garrison-church of that place; the Sovereigns had prostrated themselves before the tomb, and had sworn to one another an eternal friendship. But events soon showed that this romantic scene was without meaning. From Potsdam, Alexander flew to put himself at the head of his army at Olmütz. Here he supplicated in vain for an auxiliary corps of 10,000 Prussians; more, perhaps, with the view of irrevocably engaging Frederick William in the war, than for the actual benefit of their services. The King of Prussia could no longer hope to be sincerely pardoned by Napoleon. His only safety lay in striking a rapid blow; but when it was necessary to act his heart failed him. He determined to await the result of Haugwitz’s negotiations. Thus, as a French writer has observed, in the hands of this Prince an armed mediation united all the inconveniences both of neutrality and war. Without the security of the first, or the glorious chances of the second, it menaced, without coercing, Napoleon, and deceived Austria and Russia with false hopes.

The Austro-Russian army occupied a very strong position between Olmütz and Olschan. The foremost columns of the Battle of Archduke Charles had reached Weinpassing, on the road between Oedenburg and Vienna. The Russian corps of Essen and Beningsen were also coming up. The allies, therefore, had every reason to await the decision of Prussia, and to postpone a battle, till December 15th, whilst the same motives urged Napoleon to seek one. Alexander, however, and the youthful warriors who surrounded him, trusting in their superior force, were for immediate action. Another motive was the want of stores for the support of so large a force. Some parley took place before the battle. The Emperors of Austria and Russia sent Counts Giulay and Stadion to Napoleon’s camp, with proposals for a peace, but on conditions which the French Emperor could not listen to. Napoleon, on his side, on the arrival of Alexander at Olmütz, twice dispatched General Savary to compliment him, and to request an interview. His object was, apparently, to impress the Russians with the idea that he dreaded a battle, and thus to entice them into one. Alexander declined the proposed interview; but he sent Prince Dolgorouki, who only offended the French Emperor by his arrogant pretensions.

A feigned retreat by Napoleon for some miles increased the ardor of the Russians for battle. Kutusov’s plan was to turn the right of the French, in order to drive them into the mountains of Bohemia, and cut off their communications with Vienna. Napoleon immediately penetrated this design, and delivered at Austerlitz, December 2nd, a battle, which has been reckoned one of his masterpieces. Although he had fewer men than his opponents, yet, at the decisive point, he had massed twice as many as they. The heights of Pratzen, which lay in the middle of the Austro-Russian line, were the key of their position. These he stormed and took, thus dividing the line of the allies, and separating their center both from the right and left wings. The battle was now lost, though some detached fights ensued. The losses of the allies were great; 12,000 men were killed or wounded, 15,000 made prisoners, and 80 guns were captured. The French loss was probably 10,000 men, though Napoleon’s bulletin stated it at only 3,900. The defeat was serious, but with skill and courage, perhaps, not irretrievable. The formidable position which the Austro-Russians had held at Olmütz, might have been regained and defended with 50,000 men. The Archdukes, Charles and John, were advancing with 80,000 men, who had not been beaten; they were in communication with Hungary, which was fast rising; the Archduke Ferdinand was bringing 20,000 men from Bohemia; another Russian corps was approaching, and the whole Russian Empire was behind them; 180,000 Prussian, Saxons, and Hessians were in arms, but on these it would have been imprudent to reckon. The allied Emperors and their general, Kutusov, appear, however, to have lost their courage. After an interview with Alexander, December 4th, Francis proceeded by appointment to the French camp. He found Napoleon at the bivouac of Saroschütz. The two Emperors soon came to an agreement for an armistice, which was definitely concluded, December 6th, at Austerlitz. The French were to occupy Austria with Venice and its territory, the circle of Montabor in Bohemia, and all to the east of the road from Tabor to Linz, also a part of Moravia and the town of Pressburg in Hungary; the Russian army was to evacuate Moravia and Hungary within a fortnight, and Galicia within a month; the levies in Hungary and Bohemia were to be stopped; no foreign army was to enter the Austrian territory; negotiations for a peace were to be opened at Nikolsburg. The day after the signature of this armistice Napoleon levied on the Austrian provinces a contribution of 100,000,000 francs. The Russians began their homeward march towards Poland. The Emperor Alexander had given no pledge as to his ulterior intentions. Napoleon, who wished to gain his friendship, not only ordered his retreat to be respected, but also sent back Prince Repnin and all the soldiers of the Imperial Guard who had been captured at Austerlitz. Alexander placed his troops in Silesia and Mecklenburg at the disposal of the King of Prussia, and released him from the engagements which he had entered into by the Convention of Potsdam.

Frederick William’s prospects began to look gloomy. When Haugwitz congratulated Napoleon on his success, the latter answered: “This compliment was meant for others, but fortune has changed the address”. He then bitterly denounced the King of Prussia’s understanding with his enemies; but ended with promising to forgive what had happened, provided Prussia would form a close alliance with France, offensive and defensive, and as a pledge of sincerity should take formal possession of Hanover. General Don, with the Hanoverian legion and some English troops, had disembarked at Stade, November 17th; some Swedish and Russian troops also subsequently passed the Elbe, and the Electorate had been restored to the possession of George III. Haugwitz, instead of fulfilling his instructions, signed at Schönbrunn, December 15th—the very day on which Frederick William had promised to declare war against France if his ultimatum was refused—a convention laid before him by Napoleon, of which the principal points were, the cession to France of Neufchatel in Switzerland, and of the remaining portion of the Duchy of Cleves; also of the Principality of Anspach to Bavaria. Prussia, in return, was to take possession of the Electorate of Hanover.

Peace of Pressburg, 1805

The armistice between France and Austria was soon followed by the Peace of Pressburg, signed December 26th; to which place the negotiations, if such they can be called, had been transferred. Talleyrand had followed the French army; the treaty was drawn up by him, and the Austrian plenipotentiaries had only to affix their signatures. The Emperor Francis recognized all that Napoleon had done in Italy, and renounced the Venetian States ceded to him by the Treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville. These were now to be united to the Kingdom of Italy. Napoleon was recognized as King of Italy; but that Kingdom was ultimately to be separated from France; though Napoleon was to name his successor. Thus the House of Austria was completely excluded from Italy, where she had ruled for centuries, and where she now possessed not even a single fief. The Peace included Napoleon’s allies, the Electors of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden; which Princes, as we have seen, he had attached to his fortunes by giving them so large a share of the ecclesiastical spoils in the matter of the indemnifications. The title of King now assumed by the Electors of Würtemberg and Bavaria was recognized by Francis; and these two Sovereigns caused their new dignity to be proclaimed, January 1st, 1806. The Elector of Baden assumed the title of Grand Duke. By Article VIII Austria made considerable territorial cessions to these three Princes. Bavaria, especially, was augmented by the addition of the Vorarlberg, Tyrol, with Brixen and Trent, the Principality of Eichstadt, part of that of Passau, and several other districts. Napoleon regarded the transfer of Tyrol to Bavaria as necessary to the safety of his Italian Kingdom. The cession of these provinces was particularly grievous to the Emperor Francis. They had been the patrimony of his family from the most ancient times; from their geographical situation they were necessary to the security of his frontiers; and he now saw himself compelled to abandon them to Princes against whom he had several causes of complaint, and who had failed in their engagements towards him. Austria was cut off from her communications with Italy and Switzerland, and deprived of her influence in Germany; she lost a population of nearly three million souls, with a revenue of between thirteen and fourteen million florins. Salzburg was the only compensation which she received, and the hereditary right of appointing the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. The Grand Duke Leopold, to whom Salzburg had been assigned in 1803, was compensated with the Princi­pality of Wurzburg, with the electoral vote.

Such were the effects of a campaign of two months! one of the military chefs-d'oeuvre of Napoleon, though easily achieved through the unskillfulness of the generals with whom he had to contend, the irresolution of the allies, and the conduct of Prussia. But the Peace of Pressburg was too humiliating to be lasting. A treaty exacted by force which compromised the safety of the Austrian Monarchy, and violated the rights and constitution of the Empire, could be regarded only as a truce, to be broken on the first favorable opportunity. The victor, by abusing his power, and exceeding the bounds of moderation, was only arming against himself the animosity of all Europe.

Battle of Trafalgar, 1805

Napoleon’s success had experienced only one material draw-back. On October 21st, 1805, Nelson had almost annihilated, off Trafalgar, the combined French and Spanish fleets. Of the combined fleet of thirty-three sail of the line, twenty were taken or destroyed by the English at Trafalgar, while four which had escaped from the action were subsequently captured by Sir Richard Strahan November 4th. This decisive battle secured to England the sovereignty of the seas. The news of it reached Napoleon on his march to Vienna. He saw at once the whole extent of its consequences, and exclaimed, “I cannot be everywhere!”. The destruction or capture of a French squadron of five vessels off St. Domingo, by Admiral Duckworth, February 6th, 1806, gave the finishing blow to the French marine. It never rose again during the war. From May, 1803, to October, 1806, the combined French and Spanish navies lost 32 ships of the line, 26 frigates, and 83 smaller ships.

To the loss of her greatest naval hero England was soon after to add that of her foremost statesman. Pitt expired January 23rd, 1806, at the age of forty-six. Pitt’s Ministry was succeeded by that of “all the talents”, with Lord Grenville at its head, and Fox for Foreign Secretary. Fox, who had always denounced the war as unjust and impolitic, opened negotiations with the French Goverment for a peace; which, however, had no result. They went off chiefly on the subject of Sicily, which the French Government at first consented to include in the uti possidetis, but withdrew that concession after effecting a peace with Russia. Fox did not live to see these negotiations terminated. He expired a few months after his great antagonist, September 13th, 1806.

The nature of the convention which Haugwitz had concluded at Schönbrunn with Napoleon, disclosed on that Minister’s return to Berlin, filled Frederick William III with astonishment and grief. With his usual timid and compromising policy he laid the treaty before a Grand Council, collected all the principal objections to it in the form of an explanatory memoir, which he annexed to the act of ratification, and sent Haugwitz to Paris to defend this mutilated monument of his weakness and irresolution. At the same time he caused his troops to enter Hanover; but hastened to inform the British Government that the occupation of the Electorate was only provisional till the general peace. He also proceeded to reduce his army to the peace establishment, and he invited Russia and England to withdraw their troops from Hanover and Lauenburg. Never were so many fatal errors committed in so short a time. Napoleon kept his eyes fixed on the Prussian King. He was persuaded that Frederick William was secretly hostile to him; that he was only seeking to gain time and avoid a rupture with England. But he said nothing, deferred an interview with Haugwitz, and waited till Prussia had disarmed herself; when he received the Prussian Minister, and brow-beat and frightened him with one of those bursts of rage which were half real, half assumed. A few days after Talleyrand notified to Haugwitz that the treaty of December 15th not having been ratified within the prescribed time, must be considered as null, and laid before him for signature another and more disadvantageous one, in which no compensation was allowed to Prussia for the cession of Anspach; and, in order to involve her in a war with the English, Napoleon’s principal object, she was required to shut against them the mouths of the Weser and Elbe and all the Prussian ports, and to declare the occupation of Hanover definitive. Haugwitz was told that if he refused to accept this treaty the French armies would immediately march into Prussia; and under this threat he signed it, February 16th, 1806. Frederick William III ratified it, March 9th. Thus the successor of Frederick the Great had fallen all at once to the condition of an Elector of Brandenburg.

In consequence of this treaty the King of Prussia declared that having by a convention with France, and in consideration of the cession of three Provinces, obtained lawful possession of the German States of the House of Brunswick Luneburg, belonging to France by right of conquest, he hereby took possession of them, and henceforward they were to be considered as subject to Prussia. The Baron d'Ompteda, Minister of George III, as Elector of Hanover, at Berlin, demanded his passports, April 7th; and on the 20th the King published a manifesto reproaching Prussia with her conduct, and calling upon the Emperor and the German body for aid, as one of the States of the Empire. At the same time an embargo was laid on Prussian vessels in British ports, and all communication with Prussia forbidden. The blockade of the Ems, Weser, Elbe, and Trave was declared (May 16th), but that of the Trave was raised a few days after in favour of Russian and Swedish commerce. On the 11th of June Great Britain declared war against Prussia. The occupation of Hanover by the Prussians also led to a declaration of war against that Power by Sweden. Gustavus IV was a warm partisan of Great Britain; even against the desire of the British Cabinet he persisted in occupying the Duchy of Lauenburg, part of the Hanoverian dominions, after Prussia had announced her intention to take possession of them. Hostilities, however, were chiefly confined to a blockade of the Prussian ports by the Swedes, and were terminated in a few months without any event of importance.

Such, in Northern Europe, were the consequences of the battle of Austerlitz and Peace of Pressburg. We must now consider their effects in the South. Upwards of 13,000 Russians from Corfu, and about 6,000 English from Malta, had landed in the Bay of Naples, November 20th, 1805. The King of the Two Sicilies, although bound by the treaty of September 21st to resist by force any infringement of his neutrality, not only made no opposition to the landing of these troops, but openly joined in the coalition, by putting the Neapolitan army at the disposal of General Lacy, the Russian commander. The Court of Naples thus committed, no doubt a technical breach of its engagements. The matter, however, resolves itself into a question of policy; and in this view no doubt Ferdinand IV, or rather Queen Caroline, committed an error, but a very natural and excusable one. The Anglo-Russian and Neapolitan armies, when united, numbered more than 60,000 men, and it was decided that this force should traverse Italy and throw itself upon Massena’s rear. To oppose this movement, the Viceroy, Prince Eugene Beauharnais, detached all the men that could be spared from Gouvion St. Cyr's force at Venice, mobilized 25,000 of the National Guard, and with the addition of the garrison of Ancona, and some detachments from Leghorn, collected on the frontiers of the Roman States an army of 45,000 men.

Napoleon at first dissembled his resentment against the Court of Naples. It was not till after the Peace of Pressburg had been signed that he drew up at Schönbrunn, December27th, 1805, a proclamation addressed to his army, but intended for all Europe, in which he denounced the ingratitude of the King of Naples, lauded his own generosity, and announced that the Neapolitan Dynasty had ceased to reign. The proclamation, however, was not published at Paris till January 31st, 1806, after Napoleon’s return, when he had ripened his plans and assured himself of all the advantages of the Treaty of Pressburg. Napoleon gave the nominal command of the army destined against Naples to his brother Joseph, thus designating him as the successor of Ferdinand IV; but the operations were in reality directed by Massena. The invasion of the Neapolitan dominions was a mere military promenade. The day after his defeat at Austerlitz the Emperor Alexander had directed General Lacy to evacuate Italy and return to Corfu. The English were consequently also obliged to retire, but they proceeded only into Sicily. Queen Caroline, thus deserted by her allies, dispatched Car­dinal Ruffo to deprecate Napoleon’s wrath, and to offer very humble conditions; but he refused to receive her ambassador. Ferdinand, perceiving that all was lost, embarked for Sicily, January 13th. Caroline, who inherited her mother’s spirit, remained behind, and raised an army composed of the brigands of Calabria and the Abruzzi, and the lazzaroni of the metropolis, with whom were joined the prisoners in the jails. But the richer and more respectable classes, alarmed at a proceeding which threatened their properties and their lives, also armed, formed themselves into regiments, and awaited the approach of the French as liberators. Massena arrived before Naples with the center of the French army without having fought a battle, February 14th, and entered the capital without resistance. The Queen did not quit Naples till the French had arrived, when she embarked for Sicily. Joseph Bonaparte entered Naples, February 15th. He was received by the common people with feelings of hatred, by the citizens and nobles with undisguised joy.

The Prince Royal had retired into Calabria with about 18,000 men under Marshal Rosenheim and Count Roger de Damas; while the Prince of Hesse Philippsthal, with another division of the Neapolitan army, had thrown himself into Gaeta and announced his intention to hold out to the last extremity. Massena undertook the siege of Gaeta; General Reynier was dispatched against the Count de Damas and Rosenheim, whose troops he soon dispersed. The Prince Royal embarked at Scylla for Sicily. Joseph Bonaparte now proceeded into Apulia and Calabria, and received at Sciliagno the Imperial Decree of April 1st, 1806, which constituted him King of the Two Sicilies. The crown was to be hereditary in the male line, and his rights to the crown of France were reserved, but the two crowns could not be united on the same head. Napoleon, however, still kept his brother in dependence by giving him, at the same time with the Neapolitan crown, the dignity of Grand Elector of the French Empire, and thus reducing him to the rank of a feudatory.

King Joseph did not enjoy his new dignity altogether unmolested. The revolution had caused great discontent in the provinces, the lawless population of which revolted at the severe administration introduced by the French. Their discontent was encouraged by Queen Caroline, who opened a correspondence with the brigands of Calabria, engaged their two most famous chiefs, Michael Pezzo, better known as Fra Diavolo, and Sciarpa, to organize an insurrection, and placed them at the head of the royal army. The movement was assisted by the English. General Stuart, embarking at Mes­sina, July 1st, 1806, with 6,000 English and 3,000 Neapolitans, landed in the Gulf of Eufemia. Stuart defeated at Maida, July 5th, the French under Reynier, inflicted on them a loss of 4,000 men, and compelled them to retreat to Catanzaro. A general rising of the peasantry now took place; many of the French were massacred, Reynier was surrounded at Catanzaro, but succeeded in cutting his way through the insurgent bands and reaching Cassano. The surrender of Gaeta at length enabled Massena to come to his assistance. On July 10th the intrepid commandant of that place was wounded in the head, and conveyed on board an English vessel; and on the 18th it capitulated. Massena soon succeeded in putting down the insurgent royalists. General Stuart reembarked for Sicily, September 5th, and thus put a virtual end to the insurrection. Some of the more obstinate, however, still held out, as Fra Diavolo, who, however, was captured at Sora, and guillotined at Naples, November 10th.

After his splendid campaign of 1805, Napoleon proceeded with his favorite object of obliterating all traces of republicanism. On January 1st, 1806, the Republican calendar was suppressed and the Gregorian restored. The Pantheon was again dedicated to Divine worship. Before long the Tribunate was abolished. Bonaparte, who, on his accession to the Consulate, had proclaimed aloud the principles of liberty and equality, now proceeded to elevate his family by royal and princely marriages. His step-son, Eugene Beauharnais, was married to a daughter of the King of Bavaria. The Grand Duke of Baden demanded for his son the hand of Eugene’s sister, Stephanie. Of Napoleon’s three sisters, the principality of Guastalla was conferred upon Pauline, married to Prince Borghese: Eliza, married to the Corsican Bacciocchi, had been invested with the Principalities of Lucca and Piombino, to which Massa Carrara was added: his third sister, Caroline, was married to Murat, on whom Berg and Cleves, ceded by Prussia, were now bestowed, with the title of Grand Duke of Berg. Two more brothers besides Joseph were soon to receive the royal diadem. The Venetian States were united to the Kingdom of Italy by Imperial Decrees, and the Provinces of Dalmatia, Istria, the Eriuli, Cadora, Belluno, Conegliano, Treviso, Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, Rovigo, were erected into Duchies, grand fiefs of the Empire. Six more fiefs were created in the Kingdom of Naples, three in Parma and Piacenza. Berthier was presented with the Principality of Neufchatel; Talleyrand with that of Benevento; Bernadotte with that of Ponte Corvo.

 Louis King of Holland,  1806

A distinction began at this period to be drawn between France and the French Empire. Napoleon had revived the project of a universal monarchy. France was to become the center of a political system, round which other States were to gravitate. But her government having become a despotism, a republic among her satellites would have been an incongruity; and the Dutch, who had already sacrificed their independence, were therefore now to lose even the forms of freedom. Their subjection to France had been productive of nothing but misery and discontent. The maritime war into which they had been compelled to enter had deprived them of their colonies and their trade. In May, 1806, the Emperor’s brother, Louis, with the title of King of Holland, received also that of Constable of France, reminding him that he was but a feudatory of the Empire. The burdens imposed upon his kingdom were of a corresponding nature. Holland was compelled to increase its army from 10,000 to 50,000 men, and to keep it on that footing by the French method of conscription. It is just, however, to say that Louis resisted as much as he could the tyranny of Napoleon. The French Emperor did not venture to convert the Helvetic Republic into a monarchy, but contented himself with the office and title of Mediator.

The appropriation of the Kingdoms of Italy, Naples, and Holland, and the erection of the Italian fiefs, were the direct results of conquest; the overthrow of the Empire, the most audacious, and, it may be added, the most lasting act of Napoleon’s reign, and the erection on its ruins of another subservient State, the Confederation of the Rhine, though also due to the preponderance of the French arms, were effected by the fiat of Napoleon in the midst of peace, and with the consent of the Powers forming the Confederation. The Empire had long been declining. The Reformation had struck the first blow at it by dividing its unity and separating the interests of its various States. The growth of the Prussian kingdom, and especially the reign of Frederick the Great, had tended further to its ruin, not only by weakening the power and prestige of the House of Austria, in which the Imperial crown had become almost a heirloom, but also by destroying all respect for the forms of the ancient régime. The consequences became apparent in the war with the French Republic. The want of union among the German States in that struggle, we have already seen. Many of them adhered to the policy of defection adopted by Prussia, and hence the Imperial authority became little more than nominal. The Treaties of Campo Formio and Lunéville, the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, and the indemnifications and secularizations consequent upon it, gave the first tokens of dissolution; and after the Treaty of Pressburg the Holy Roman Empire existed only by sufferance.

The project of a Confederation of the secondary German States under the protection of some great foreign Power, originated with the Baron de Waitz, principal Minister of the Elector of Hesse, in 1804. It was proposed that the Confederation should consist of purely German States, that is, such as were unconnected with any other country; a regulation which excluded Austria, Prussia, and Hanover. The scheme was favorably received by Talleyrand; but so long as Napoleon hoped to obtain the alliance of Prussia, nothing was done towards its execution. That hope being entirely dissipated in 1806, the project was revived. The Baron Dalberg, Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, was the prime mover in it; and especially he appointed Cardinal Fesch, Napoleon’s uncle, to be his coadjutor, a step which gave great displeasure to the Emperor Francis. The matter was concluded by a treaty signed at Paris, July 12th, 1806, by Talleyrand and the Ministers of twelve Sovereign Houses of the Empire, of which the principal were the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Elector of Mainz, the Grand Duke of Baden, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt. These Princes declared themselves perpetually severed from the Empire, and united together as “the Confederate States of the Rhine”. The common interests of the Confederation were to be treated in a Diet to assemble at Frankfurt (Art. 6). This Diet, however, never met, nor was its Assembly ever invoked by any member of the League.

The Emperor of the French was proclaimed Protector of the Confederation (Art. 12). As such, he was privileged to name the successor of the Prince-Primate, to call out the contingents of the members of the Confederation, and to concur in the admission of new members. Napoleon proclaimed, by a letter of September 11th, 1806, that he intended not to meddle with the internal affairs of the different States, and he kept his word; for they were, in fact, a matter of perfect indifference to him. The sole object at which he aimed was secured by Article 35, which established an alliance between the French Empire and the Confederation, binding it to make common cause with Napoleon in all his wars; an arrangement which immediately placed at his dis­posal nearly 70,000 men. The Confederation was gradually enlarged by the accession of other States up to the year 1808. They were admitted by Napoleon alone, without consulting the other members. The potentates thus subsequently admitted were the Elector of Wurzburg, the Elector of Saxony, the new King of Westphalia, the Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, the Dukes of Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Gotha, and many minor Princes. In 1810, the States composing the Confederation had a total population of between fourteen and fifteen million souls, bound to furnish contingents amounting to 120,682 men. By Articles 24 and 25 of the Treaty of Confederation, the immediate German nobility, that is, those Princes and nobles who were before subjected only to the sovereignty of the Emperor and the Empire, were now reduced under that of the Princes in whose dominions their domains lay; and thus, from being subjects of the Empire, they became subjects of co-estates of the Empire. Such princes and nobles were said to be mediatized; a new euphemism, invented for an act of spoliation. Two of the few remaining Imperial cities, Nuremberg and Frankfurt, lost their independence by the Act of Confederation; Augsburg had been placed under the dominion of Bavaria by the Peace of Pressburg.

End of the Holy Roman Empire, 1806

On August 1st, 1806, Bacher, Napoleon's chargé d'affaires at the Diet of Ratisbon, presented a note declaring that the French Emperor no longer recognized the Imperial Constitution, and that he had accepted the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. A declaration to the same effect was also handed in by the Confederate Princes. Napoleon alleged as his principal reasons for this step: that the Treaty of Pressburg had placed the German Courts allied with France in a condition incompatible with that of States of the Empire; that the Empire had been reduced to such a condition of weakness as to afford no protection to its subjects, and to have become only a means of dissension and discord. Thus an Electorate had been suppressed by the union of Hanover with Prussia, and a Northern King had incorporated with his other States a Province of the Empire. This allusion referred to Gustavus IV of Sweden, who, offended by the conduct of his Pomeranian subjects, had annulled, by a rescript of June 26th, 1806, the actual constitution of his German provinces, and introduced that of Sweden.

The Emperor Francis immediately determined to resign a crown which had long been little more than a vain ornament. He published a declaration at Vienna, August 6th, 1806, to the effect that by the Confederation of the Rhine he con­sidered himself released from all connection with the German body, and that in laying down the Imperial Crown and Government, he absolved the Electors, Princes, and States of the Empire from their allegiance to him. At the same time he liberated all his German Provinces from their obligations towards the Empire. Thus was extinguished, after a duration of more than a thousand years, the Holy Roman Empire. Francis II, the twenty-first Emperor of the House of Austria, henceforth bore the title of Francis I, Emperor of Austria.

All resistance would, indeed, have been useless, even had Francis been inclined to resist. Napoleon had retained 160,000 men in Bavaria and Swabia, who were supported at the expense of those subservient provinces. An act of the Russians afforded him a pretext for this proceeding. By the Treaty of Pressburg, Istria and Dalmatia were ceded to the French; but the Montenegrins, at the instigation of the Russians, who had a squadron in the Gulf of Cattaro, descended from the mountains to prevent the French General Molitor from taking possession of Cattaro; and Baron Brody, the Austrian commandant, under the plea of compulsion, had delivered that place, together with Budna and Castel Novo, to a few Russian troops (March 4th, 1806). Napoleon hereupon declared that it was for Austria to deliver to him these places agreeably to treaty; that he should not attempt to take them by force; but that meanwhile, till the treaty was fully executed, his army would continue to occupy the central provinces of Germany. In this occupation was included the Austrian town of Braunau, which the French had not yet evacuated.

Negotiations for a peace between France and Russia had been going on at the same time with those already mentioned between France and England. M. d'Oubril, the Russian plenipotentiary, signed a treaty at Paris, July 20th, 1806, by which it was agreed that the Russians should evacuate all the district known as the Bocca di Cattaro; Napoleon, on his side, consenting to restore the independence of the Republic of Ragusa, which the French had seized, May 27th, and to withdraw his troops from Germany within three months after signature of the treaty. But the Emperor Alexander, alleging that d'Oubril had not observed his instructions, refused to ratify. The abolition of the Empire, indeed, in the maintenance of which Russia took a great interest, made an essential alteration in the questions between that country and France. Alexander declared in a manifesto addressed to his Senate, September 1st, 1806, that he found himself compelled to continue the war against Napoleon. Hence the Bocca di Cattaro remained in the possession of the Russians till the Peace of Tilsit, August, 1807.

Napoleon’s tyrannical proceedings in Germany, the extinction of the Empire, the burdens imposed upon the inhabitants for the maintenance of the French troops, excited indignation even among those who had once been his admirers. Numerous articles and pamphlets were published at Nuremberg and Leipzig, painting him in the darkest colors as the oppressor of Germany, and calling on the Germans to shake off the yoke. Marshal Berthier caused Palm, a bookseller of Nuremberg, charged with selling a pamphlet entitled Germany in its deepest Humiliation, to be apprehended and conducted to the fortress of Braunau; where, by sentence of a court-martial, he was shot, August 26th. But this cruel and tyrannical act was calculated to inspire the Germans with a deeper hatred of Napoleon and the French than any pamphlets could have excited.

The Confederation of the Rhine completed another great step towards universal domination. Napoleon was now master of Italy and Dalmatia; he had humbled Austria and overturned the first throne of Christendom; he was the Protector and Dictator of a great part of Germany. A German coalition against him was no longer possible; yet, while a military monarchy like Prussia remained intact, he could hardly be said to reign in Germany. That monarchy, however, was now isolated, and it would not be difficult to crush it. The subjection of Prussia would open out new paths to Napoleon’s boundless ambition. The conquest of Denmark would then be easy, and would insure that of Sweden. Russia might next submit to the yoke; and then, if even England herself could not be subjugated, a march into Asia and the destruction of her empire in that quarter might at least cease to be chimerical.

The establishment of the Rhenish Confederation was at once an attack and an insult upon Prussia. Although she had the deepest interest in the matter, she had not been consulted; nay, it had been kept a profound secret from her. Contempt was thus added to perfidy. Both these were also manifested by the twenty-fourth article of the treaty, by which Frederick William’s brother-in-law, the head of the House of Nassau-Orange, was mediatized, and one of the most illustrious princes of Europe reduced to the condition of a vassal under Murat, the new Grand Duke of Berg. By way of conciliating the King of Prussia, he was told that if he should be inclined to unite the remaining German States into a new Confederation, and to assume the Imperial Crown for the House of Brandenburg, Napoleon would second the project. The latter part of this offer was at once declined by Frederick William, out of consideration for the House of Austria; but he appears to have joyfully accepted the idea of a new Confederation, and to have made some advances in that way to the Electors of Saxony and Hesse-Cassel, and to the Dukes of Mecklenburg. Napoleon, however, was not sincere in these overtures. The French Government took care to excite the suspicions of the Court of Dresden respecting the intentions of Prussia. The Elector of Hesse was openly menaced with the loss of Hanau, if he should accede to the rival Confederation, while the principality of Fulda was held out to him as a bait for joining that of the Rhine.

The towns of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck received im­perious orders not to enter the Prussian League, though Napoleon had no right to dictate to those cities. Napoleon’s unfriendly intentions were also displayed by other measures. Marshal Bernadotte was ordered to occupy Nuremberg, and to advance towards the frontiers of Prussia and Saxony. The fortress of Wesel, on the right bank of the Rhine, was seized and incorporated with the department of the Roer. The Abbeys of Verden, Elten, and Essen, in Westphalia, were also seized by Murat. A large force was assembled on the Ems; the Duchy of Berg was inundated with troops, and the western frontier of Prussia appeared to be surrounded.

It is possible, however, that Frederick William III might have overlooked these injuries and insults, but for another, which filled up the measure of them. It will be recollected that negotiations for a peace were at this time going on between England and France. When Frederick William learned, on August 7th, that Napoleon intended to restore to England Hanover which he had received in order to avert the French Emperor’s wrath, and which he looked upon as the price of his dishonor, his rage knew no bounds. The news soon got abroad, and produced a like effect upon the people. It was, in fact, the immediate cause of the war which ensued. The Prussian Ministers affected to attribute their indignation solely to the perfidy of the French Government, in threatening to deprive them of a country which it had forced them to accept; but it is certain that the King and many leading personages had thrown a covetous eye upon Hanover, and that they were exceedingly sorry to be deprived of it. The restoration of it was, however, now become necessary, in order to make their peace with England.

Napoleon affirmed that he was driven into the Prussian war; that it had not entered into his calculations. But it appears from the correspondence of his Foreign Office, that the overthrow of Prussia had been contemplated since November, 1805; his measures were well calculated to provoke a war, and the retaining of his troops in Germany to carry it on with speed and success. On the other hand, Prussia chose an unfortunate moment to commence it. She had already accepted many insults, and if she could have digested those now offered to her but half a year, she might probably have found herself supported by another coalition. But a violent war party had arisen, at the head of which was the beautiful and spirited Queen, the King’s cousin, Prince Louis, and many of the leading statesmen and generals of the Kingdom; and the melancholy and irresolute Frederick William found himself unable to resist the warlike ardor of his Court and people. Another motive seems also to have operated with his Ministry. Prussia was in a state of isola­tion. She had lost the confidence of Europe, and any propositions for support and alliance would not have been listened to, unless she first proved her sincerity by a war.

 A day or two after it was known in Berlin that Napoleon contemplated the restoration of Hanover to England, the Prussian army was ordered to be placed on a war footing. Before commencing the war, it was necessary for Prussia to disembarrass herself of the enemies which her alliance with France had brought upon her. A reconciliation was effected with the King of Sweden, August 17th. Diplomatic rela­tions were renewed with the English Government, and Lord Howick, who had succeeded Fox as Foreign Minister, announced, September 25th, the raising of the blockade of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems. Lord Morpeth was dispatched a few days after to negotiate a treaty. On his arrival at Berlin, the King and Queen of Prussia had already set off for the army. He found them at Weimar, October 12th. A great battle was then impending, and Haugwitz would settle nothing with the English Ambassador till it had been decided. The King of Prussia, it is said, if his arms should be successful, was resolved to keep Hanover; in the other event, to exchange it for the alliance and subsidies of England. As a last attempt to avert a war, which Frederick William viewed with increasing dread as it became more imminent, General Knobelsdorf was dispatched to Paris early in September to attempt a renewal of negotiations. When the Prussian ultimatum arrived, Napoleon was already at Bamberg, superintending the march of his army (October 7th). It demanded the immediate evacuation of Germany by the French troops; that France should not oppose a league of North Germany to embrace all the States not comprised in the Confederation of the Rhine; the opening, without delay, of a negotiation to arrange all matters still in dispute; with the basis, for Prussia, of the separation of Wesel from the French Empire, and the reoccupation of Elten, Essen, and Verden, by the Prussian troops. Frederick William could hardly have imagined that such an ultimatum would be accepted; and it can, therefore, only be regarded as a declaration of war.

Such a declaration was formally issued, October 8th. Prussia had thus committed herself irrevocably to a struggle with all the might of France, without the hope of any timely succor. Frederick William had delayed to apply to the Emperor Alexander for aid till he had received his first dispatch from Knobelsdorf, September 18th. A promise of assistance was frankly given by the Russian Emperor; but it was now impossible that his troops should arrive on the scene of action before the end of November. Application had also been made to the Emperor of Austria, but met with a refusal. Her only ally was Saxony, and that a forced one. Prince Hohenlohe had invaded that country, compelled the Court of Dresden to declare for Prussia, and enlisted under her banner the Saxon army of 18,000 men. The Elector of Hesse-Cassel maintained his neutrality, with the view of joining the winning side.

The Prussian army consisted of about 180,000 men; good troops, no doubt, but of which only a small portion had seen any actual service. The King had intrusted the command-in-chief to the Duke of Brunswick, now upwards of seventy years of age, whose military reputation dated from the Seven Years’ War. The rest of the Prussian état major was also for the most part composed of old men; as Marshal Mollendorf, Prince Hohenlohe, Gneisenau, Blucher, Kalkreuth; though Blucher, at more than sixty years of age, still retained all the fire and energy of youth. The army of France, superior in number to that of Prussia, was reinforced by a contingent of 25,000 men from the Rhenish Confederation. The French, commanded by Bonaparte in person, and his best generals, Bernadotte, Lannes, Davoust, Ney, Soult, Augereau, Lefebvre, were already in Germany. But Brunswick, thinking that they were dispersed in Franconia, and not yet prepared to take the offensive, formed the plan of falling suddenly upon their dispersed divisions from the hills and forests of Thuringia. With this view he concentrated his center at Erfurt, extending his right wing beyond Gotha towards Eisenach, while his left was placed between Jena and Blankenheim. But the Duke neither knew the true position of the French, nor allowed for the eagle's eye and the eagle’s swoop of Napoleon. By October 8th, the French army was already assembled at the foot of the Fichtelgebirge, which separates the valley of the Main from that of the Saale. Napoleon had determined to repeat the grand manoeuvre which he had performed with such wonderful success at Marengo and Ulm. Brunswick’s position exposed his left to be turned, his communications with the Saale and the Elbe to be intercepted; and thus his retreat to be cut off, and his junction with the Russians prevented. The French advanced in three columns. On the right, the corps of Soult and Ney marched by Hof upon Plauen; on the left, Lannes and Au­gereau debouched from Coburg upon Grafenthal and Saalfeld; the centre, with Murat and the Imperial Guard, and the corps of Davoust and Bernadotte, took the direction of Lobenstein along the high road between Bamberg and Leipzig. Further on the same road, at the little town of Gera, all the three columns were to form a junction. Brunswick, on discovering this movement, instead of securing the bridges over the Saale, concentrated his forces at Weimar, as if to await a battle there. Bernadotte, having defeated a Prussian corps at Schleitz, October 9th, continued his march towards Gera. On the following day, Lannes, with the French left, obtained a still more important victory over the Prussians at Saalfeld. In this battle, Prince Louis was killed in a single combat with Guindet, a French maréchal des logis. On the 12th, Napoleon had established his headquarters at Gera. Hence Davoust and Murat with the light cavalry were despatched to seize Naumburg and the bridge of Kosen, thus cutting off the Prussian line of retreat from Weimar to Berlin; while Bernadotte was directed upon Dornburg. From Gera, Napoleon directed his main body towards the left, hoping to envelop the Prussians at Jena.

Battles of Jena and Auerstädt, 1806

After the check at Saalfeld, Prince Hohenlohe and the greater part of the Prussian generals had expressed their opinion that no time should be lost in repassing the Saale, and retiring behind the Elbe. But the Duke of Brunswick took three days to decide. Meanwhile Naumburg had been seized, his left turned, and his army placed in the same situation as that of Mélas at Marengo, and Mack at Ulm. It was not till he heard that some of the French forces were marching upon Leipsic, quite in his rear, that he began to understand the true nature of his position. Now, at last, when it was too late, he began to move. The King and the Duke of Brunswick, with 65,000 men, the élite of the army, and the most distinguished generals, Mollendorf, Blucher, Schmettau, Kalkreuth, the Prince of Orange, the Princes Henry and William of Prussia, directed their march on Freiburg, by Auerstädt and Naumburg; the remainder, including the Saxons, under the command of Prince Hohenlohe, were left behind at Jena to cover the retreat. Here they were entirely defeated by Napoleon in person, with much superior forces, October 14th, and compelled to retreat beyond Weimar behind the Ilin. On the same day the King of Prussia and Brunswick fell in with Davoust at Auerstädt, where they experienced a still more signal defeat, though the French forces scarcely numbered more than half the Prussians. Brunswick was disabled by a wound in the forehead, and died not long afterwards at Oltensee; Mollendorf, who succeeded him in the command, was also mortally wounded. Frederick William, uninformed of the battle of Jena, ordered a retreat upon Weimar; but the flying troops fell in near Apolda with Bernadotte’s van. Here also they learned that Weimar was occupied by the French. Now commenced a disorderly flight, the horror and confusion of which was soon augmented by the fugitives of Jena. A great part of the army dispersed; a portion, with which was the King, retreated by Sommerda to Sondershausen; at which place Frederick William arrived October 16th, escorted by a regiment of Guards and a bat­talion of Grenadiers. Thence after a sojourn of a few hours, he set off for his northern provinces, leaving the command to Prince Hohenlohe, with instructions to make Magdeburg the rallying point.

The loss of the Prussians in these two battles is variously estimated, but, at the least, may be stated at 30,000 men, killed, wounded, or captured, with almost all their guns and magazines. Those who had escaped were in a state of complete demoralization. The Prussian Monarchy lay at Napoleon's mercy. Murat, Soult, and Ney were despatched after the Prussians, who were retreating upon Magdeburg; Davoust and Lannes were directed on Wittenberg and Dessau, en route for Berlin; Bernadotte on Halle, into which the Prince of Würtemberg had thrown himself with 16,000 men, and whence he was driven with great slaughter, October 17th. Murat and Ney had appeared at Erfurt on the 15th, where they took 14,000 prisoners, 120 guns, and large magazines. Among the captured were four wounded generals : the Prince of Orange, Grawert, Zweiffel, and Field-Marshal Mollendorf; the last expired soon after. Napoleon dismissed all his Saxon prisoners, in number 6,000. This act had the effect intended. On the 23rd of October the Elector announced that he had separated his arms from those of Prussia, and proclaimed his neutrality.

Napoleon arrived at Potsdam, October 24th. Here he visited the tomb of Frederick the Great. The sword, the cordon of the Black Eagle, even the sash and stock of the Prussian hero, were seized, and sent as trophies to the Invalides at Paris. Napoleon entered Berlin October 27th, and was received with the acclamations of the populace.

Prince Hohenlohe, with the remnant of the Royal army, made no stay at Magdeburg, but hoping to reach Stettin and the Oder before the French, rapidly directed his march on that place by way of Rathenow, Ruppin, and Prenzlau. But at Zehdenick, where the road is crossed by that from Berlin through Oranienburg, the Prussian advanced guard was overtaken and defeated by Murat and his cavalry. Murat, closely followed by Lannes, then hastened on to Prenzlau; and when Hohenlohe arrived at that place, October 28th, he found it occupied by the French. Some proposed to cut their way through, but the enterprise was clearly too desperate; and the Prince, after a short conference with Murat, surrendered at discretion. This division consisted of 16,000 foot, six regiments of cavalry, and 64 guns: the last considerable remains of the Prussian army. There were, however, still some dispersed corps. Of these, two were compelled to surrender at Pasewalk and Anclam. More to the North were Blucher, with a large body of cavalry, and a division under General Winning. Blucher learned at Boitzenburg the occupation of Prenzlau by the French, and, finding the road to Stettin thus intercepted, resolved to make for Stralsund. Having formed a junction with Winning, he found himself in command of about 20,000 men. But the active Murat, with his accustomed celerity, had occupied Demmin, cut off the road to Stralsund, and advanced upon Grustrow. Blucher being also pressed in other directions by the advance of Soult and Bernadotte, had no resource but to seize the neutral town of Lübeck, November 5th, and to maintain himself there a day or two, till he should have embarked his troops, and so gained the Baltic. But on the night of the 5th, the columns of all his pursuers entered the town in different directions. Blucher, after an heroic resistance, effected his escape to the left bank of the Trave, whilst Lübeck was sub­jected to all the horrors of a sack. But the Prussian general was surrounded, his escape hopeless, and on the 7th of November, he was obliged to surrender himself prisoner with all his division.

Several strong fortresses still remained to be reduced, but a panic seems to have seized the Prussian soldiery, and they were surrendered with a haste which does little credit to their commandants. Stettin, with a garrison of 6,000 men, 150 guns, and provisions for a long siege, capitulated at the first summons, October 29th. Custrin, an almost impregnable place on an island of the Oder, surrendered to a detachment of light cavalry, November 1st. Magdeburg on the Elbe, the chief fortress of the Prussian Monarchy, with a garrison of 20,000 men, after a blockade of a fortnight surrendered at discretion to Ney, who had only about 10,000 men, and was destitute of siege artillery, November 8tb. In this place were found near 800 guns and immense magazines. Several smaller places capitulated in the like disgraceful manner. The surrender of these places rendered the French masters of the Elbe and the Oder, and may be said to have terminated the campaign. Rarely had a great Kingdom fallen so rapidly.

Hesse-Cassel, Swedish Pomerania, the Principality of Fulda, the Hanseatic Towns, the Duchies of Mecklenburg and Brunswick, condemned as more or less concerned in the Prussian cause, were occupied by the division of Marshal Mortier. A paragraph in the Moniteur announced soon after that the Elector of Hesse had ceased to reign. It remained to reduce the fortresses of Silesia, Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, Neisse, Schweidnitz, Glatz. This operation was entrusted to the troops of the Rhenish Confederation, under Prince Jerome and General Vandamme. The commandants of most of these places distinguished themselves by a resistance which con­trasted strongly with that of the Prussian towns; most of them were eventually reduced.

While the French were advancing in their irresistible career, Frederick William III was flying towards the eastern frontiers of his kingdom. From Custrin he had addressed a letter to Napoleon, October 25th, with offers of peace and friendship, and promises to send back the Russian army. But Napoleon’s demands increased with his success. Although the Prussian plenipotentiaries notified their acceptance of the terms previously offered by Napoleon at Wittenberg, their note remained unanswered; nor did a second letter from Frederick William, from Graudenz, alter his determination. Lucchesini and General Zastrow, the Prussian negotiators, now endeavored to obtain an armistice; which Napoleon granted, but on terms which he knew could not be accepted. They involved the occupation by the French of the Prussian provinces on the right bank of the Vistula, and the surrender by them of Thorn, Graudenz, Dantzic, Colberg, Glogau, Breslau, Hameln, and Neuburg; none of which places had at that time capitulated. Indeed, Talleyrand plainly told the plenipotentiaries that the Emperor was not disposed to make a separate peace with Prussia; that France, and Spain and Holland, her allies, had lost many of their colonies; that it was only just that the French conquests should serve to regain some of these possessions. Thus the successes of England were to compensate the reverses of Prussia. Napoleon publicly announced this to be his policy in a message to the Senate, November 21st.

Lucchesini and Zastrow, however, signed this capitulation at Charlottenburg, November 16th; but the King refused to ratify. In fact he was no longer in a condition to do so without the consent of the Emperor Alexander, whose troops now occupied part of the territories demanded by Napoleon. Napoleon, rejoicing at Frederick William’s determination, applied himself to raise an insurrection in Prussian Poland, fixed his headquarters at Posen, November 24th, pushed forward his army to the Vistula, and with the view of inciting the Poles, caused a letter to be forged in the name of Kosciuszko, calling them to arms. But the Polish patriot, faithful to the oath which he had given to the Emperor Paul, refused all Napoleon’s solicitations to engage him in the insurrection, and publicly disavowed the letter attributed to him. General Dombrowski, however, one of Kosciuszko’s former associates, took an active part in organizing an insurrection. A national administration was everywhere substituted for that of Prussia, and a deputation waited upon the French Emperor to supplicate the reestablishment of Poland. But Napoleon had no such intention. His measures were intended only to aid him against Russia and Prussia, and to enable him to raise for that purpose two regiments of Polish patriots.

 

CHAPTER LXIV.

TILSIT AND THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM