



# THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON

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WITH TWENTY-NINE ILLUSTRATIONS

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## PREFATORY NOTE

**D**URING the years from Napoleon's birth in 1769 to 1796, when the Directory was firmly established, Europe passed through a period of great importance. In the East of Europe the Partitions of Poland, 1772, 1793, 1795, and the successful wars of Catherine II, against Turkey, ending in the Treaties of Kainardji, 1774, and Jassy, 1792, had marked the rise of Russia. That event tended to change entirely the views hitherto held as to what should constitute the balance of power in Europe, and had led to important modifications in the foreign policy of the chief European States.

The rise of Russia to a leading place in Europe had to be recognized, while her intention to take part in Western politics was unmistakably shown in 1799, when Suvorov, at the head of a Russian army, entered Italy. While this revolution was in progress in the North of Europe, other revolutions of a different character were taking place elsewhere. In Poland the years 1789-93 witnessed an attempt to carry out a revolution, which, if effected, would have

given Poland an hereditary monarchy and a stable Government. As Poland was a country of similar extent to that of France, the effect of the establishment of a consolidated kingdom in the East of Europe would have been immense. The year 1789 also witnessed revolutions in Belgium and France—that in the former country being the result of Joseph II's attempts to change the character of the Government, and to introduce reforms, while that in the latter country was due to a desire not only to change the form of the Government, but also to bring about drastic reforms.

While the efforts of the Polish reformers and of Joseph II ended in failure, the revolutionary party in France succeeded beyond their wildest hopes.

The overthrow of the monarchy, the rise of the war party, the desire of the revolutionists to spread their doctrines all over Europe, and, during the process, to vanquish England, rendered all other revolutionary movements in Europe of little account, as compared with the French Revolution. That Revolution passed through a series of stages. In 1791 France had received a Constitution which the majority of Frenchmen regarded as adequate. But the predominance, first of the Girondist party, and then of the Jacobin party, together with the outbreak of war, resulted in a system of terror in France which did not come to an end till the safety of France from all

danger of foreign invasion was secured. In 1795 the Government of the Directory which ruled France till 1799 was established, and it was during a struggle in Paris which preceded its advent to power that Napoleon Bonaparte came prominently forward as Barras' lieutenant.

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THIS book does not presume to give a final verdict upon the character of Napoleon. It simply aims at conveying as far as possible an accurate impression of the man and his times. One writer has truly said that "there is no age, no personality in history of greater interest, either to France or to the world, than the Napoleonic era and Napoleon". Both as a soldier and as a statesman he rose superior to all his contemporaries. He waged war on a scale hitherto unheard of; his reorganization of France, and his arrangements for the government of the client states, bear evidence of the possession of statesmanlike qualities of a very high order.

The pictures of Napoleon, given us by Madame de Staël and Madame de Rémusat, are now recognized as being untrustworthy, and, therefore, of no historical value.

The reader who has not sufficient leisure to study the works of Sorel, Vandal, Thiébauld and Fournier cannot do better than read Mr. Rose's "Life of

Napoleon"; Lord Rosebery's, "Napoleon: the Last Phase"; and Gourgaud's "Diary". By the perusal of these works he will at anyrate obtain not only something more than an outline of the history of Europe during the years 1789-1815, but he will also be enabled to form an estimate of Napoleon as a Statesman and as a General.

Of the greatness of his genius there can be no question, and Europe owes him an unspeakable debt of gratitude. Without this "scavenger of God," it is difficult to see how the sense of nationality in Italy and Germany could have been aroused and stimulated. Napoleon was not making an extravagant statement when he said, "Centuries may pass before circumstances combine to produce another such as I was".

The Bibliography of the Napoleonic period is rapidly increasing. The list of works connected with the history of Europe during that period, and with the life of Napoleon, fills 120 pages of Volume IX of the "Cambridge Modern History". Mr. Rose's "Life of Napoleon" is probably the best known to Englishmen, and well deserves its high reputation. Of French works, Sorel's "History of Europe during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era" is invaluable to the student of the general history of the period. Fournier's "Life of Napoleon," and Vandal's "Napoléon et Alexandre I," have also a well-deserved

popularity in England, and add considerably to our knowledge of the aims of Napoleon at various crises in his career.

The perusal of these works, together with some of the Memoirs of the time, will supply the reader with very accurate information regarding Napoleon's life and the times in which he lived. Of these Memoirs, those of Generals Marbot, Junot, and Rapp will be found especially interesting. Seeley's "Life of Stein" and Oman's "History of the Peninsular War" throw ample light upon the situation in Germany and Spain during the critical years which preceded and witnessed the fall of Napoleon.

Vol. IX — "Napoleon" — of the "Cambridge Modern History" is in itself a mine of information, and should be used as a guide-book for the whole of the Napoleonic period.

For the early years of Napoleon's career I have found "The Growth of Napoleon," by Mr. Norwood Young, most suggestive. To Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, of New College, Oxford, and to Mr. J. Holland Rose, of Christ's College, Cambridge, I am under deep obligations. Their writings upon the Napoleonic period must be constantly consulted by any one who is studying the history of Europe between 1789 and 1815.

"The Account of Napoleon's Life on St. Helena," by Mr. Fisher, in Vol. IX of the "Cambridge

Modern History," and the publication by Lord Rosebery of his brilliant description of the later days of Napoleon in the volume entitled, "Napoleon: the Last Phase," would, under ordinary circumstances, have rendered any account by me of Napoleon's captivity unnecessary.

Fortunately, the late Mr. John C. F. Ramsden, of Willinghurst, Guildford, most kindly presented me with a copy of Captain Henry Meynell's "Memoranda of Conversations with Napoleon," which was privately printed in 1909, and of that volume I have made considerable use in the last chapter of this book. Captain Meynell's "recollections undoubtedly contain fresh matter, in addition to what is related by Sir Pulteney Malcolm," and will be of interest to all students of the Life of Napoleon.



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# THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON

## CHAPTER I

### THE YOUTH AND RISE OF NAPOLEON, 1769-1795

Birth and parentage of Napoleon—Early life—At the military school in Paris—Joins the army—His views on religion—In Corsica, 1789—In Paris, 1792—Corsica and Sardinia, 1792-3—"Le Souper de Beaucaire"—The Siege of Toulon, 1793—Italy, 1794—Vendémiaire.

NAPOLEON was to all intents and purposes an Italian—and one of the most remarkable Italians that the world has ever seen. In one sense he was the last as he was the greatest of that remarkable race of adventurers who flourished in all parts of Europe during the eighteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

But the period from 1789 to 1815 which witnessed the rise and fall of Napoleon cannot be said to belong to any century. It certainly had few of the characteristics of the eighteenth; it was in no sense part of the nineteenth century. It is the period which saw the

<sup>1</sup> For a summary of the evidence bearing on the date of Napoleon's birth, see Baring Gould, "Life of Napoleon Bonaparte," p. 6.

birth of Modern Europe, which event was directly hastened by the instrumentality of Napoleon, who acquired a most remarkable ascendancy over, and exercised a most profound influence upon, France and indeed Europe. France at the time of the beginning of his ascendancy required order and organization, and Europe needed reconstruction. The rule of the benevolent despots had proved inadequate to the needs of the time, and till the Peace of Tilsit Napoleon in destroying the effete system of the Holy Roman Empire, in expelling the Austrians from Italy and in exposing the stagnation which had settled upon Prussia, was laying the foundations of Modern Europe. After Tilsit the inevitable though to him unexpected results of his work began gradually to be seen in the rise of national feeling in the countries which he had conquered or overrun; and the steady growth of that national feeling in Europe led inevitably to his downfall.

Napoleon was born on 15 August, 1769, the year of the birth of Castlereagh and Wellington. It has, however, been asserted that he was born on 7 January, 1768, when the French authority over Corsica was by no means fully established, and, therefore, if Napoleon was born in 1768 it is incorrect to say that Napoleon was born a French subject.

Napoleon was the second son of Charles Bonaparte and Laetitia Ramolino, both members of Corsican families. Charles Bonaparte was himself the son of Joseph who had secured from the Grand Duke of Tuscany the right to bear the Buonaparte arms.

This right was gained on 28 May, 1757, and in 1760 Joseph died. His son Charles was born at Ajaccio in 1746 and in June, 1764, married the beautiful Laetitia.

Corsica was at that time under the influence of Paoli, who in 1767 invited Charles Bonaparte to leave Italy and to take up his residence in Ajaccio. Consequently Charles and Laetitia returned to Corsica in 1767, and, as has been stated, it is declared by some writers that at Corte, on 7 January in the following year, their first son Napoleon was born, and that Paoli was his godfather. Madame Junot, however, relates that on 9 November, 1799, she had a long conversation with Napoleon's mother who spoke emphatically on the subject. "I know not why," she said, "it has been reported that Paoli was Napoleon's godfather. It is not true; Laurent Jjubega (a relation of Napoleon) was his godfather."<sup>1</sup> Geltruda, wife of Nicolo Parivisino, was his other godparent. Napoleon's elder brother, Joseph Nabulione, was born on 7 January, 1768, at Corte, and no doubt his second Christian name is partly answerable for the confusion between his birth and that of the great Napoleon.

In the struggle headed by General Pascal Paoli against the forces of Louis XV, Carlo Bonaparte took a conspicuous part, and was given the rank of Major. On the final conquest of Corsica by the French, Carlo was only persuaded to remain on the island through the efforts of his uncle, a canon of the Church. In

<sup>1</sup> "Memoirs of Napoleon," by the Duchess d'Abrantes, Vol. I, p. 194. London, Bentley, 1836.

1773 Carlo represented the Corsican nobles when a deputation of the three estates was sent to the King of France. Shortly after this visit he became *procuratore reale* of Ajaccio.

On 1 January, 1779, Napoleon and his brother Joseph were placed in a school at Autun under the Abbé de Chardon in order that they might learn French.

The Abbé in his Reminiscences tells us that Napoleon's character was thoughtful, gloomy, and imperious. In three months he had acquired a satisfactory knowledge of French.

Fortunately for his family, Charles Bonaparte had secured the friendship of General Count Marbœuf, the Governor of Corsica, and it was owing to the latter's influence that Carlo's second son, Napoleon, was on 19 May, 1779, placed by the Marshal de Ségur, the French Minister at War, as an *Élève du Roi* in the *École Militaire* at Brienne in the province of Champagne. At the Military College, where he remained till October, 1784, his individuality at once made itself felt.

The *École Militaire* was under the direction of the fathers called Minims. There, under the supervision of Father Petrault, Napoleon learnt the rudiments of mathematics, and at the same time studied ancient and modern languages, geography, literature, history, and every branch of military science. While at the Royal Military Academy of Brienne Napoleon devoted himself to his studies. He showed moroseness of temper,

courted solitude, was absorbed in his own pursuits and studies, and was unpopular with his schoolfellows. He gloried in being a Corsican, and declared that he would deliver Corsica from its dependence upon France.

His moods apparently varied; at one time he appeared to be a quiet, hard-working student, at another time he would be quarrelsome and headstrong. The general opinion, however, was that it was impossible to persuade him to change his opinion when once he had made up his mind. His character, said Pichegru, who afterwards conquered Holland, and was then on the staff of teachers, was inflexible.

In 1783 Keralio, a royal inspector of military schools, recommended Napoleon, whose conduct he described as most exemplary, and whose work showed thought, for promotion to the Military School of Paris. Before the recommendation could take effect Keralio was succeeded by Reynaud who, however, in 1784 selected Napoleon with four others to go to the Military College in Paris. There he remained from October, 1784, to October, 1785, and was treated with contempt by the noble students whose indolence and extravagance contrasted markedly with the quiet and studious character of the life led by the future Emperor.

In August, 1785, after his final examination, Napoleon received the appointment of sub-lieutenant in the Artillery. He was thereupon ordered to join the regiment of La Fère then stationed at Valence. At Valence he remained with his regiment La Fère

till September, 1786, when he left for long leave, and returned to Corsica. He was still an ardent Corsican and an admirer of Paoli, burning with a desire to avenge his country's wrongs. He continued his studies, working chiefly at mathematics and Italian, and was a constant reader of the works of Corneille, Racine, Voltaire, and Rousseau.

In Corsica he remained for a year, till September, 1787, when, owing to the possibility of war with Prussia he was recalled. But Vergennes being dead, French foreign policy under Montmorin entered upon a tranquil period and all danger of war passed away. Bonaparte therefore was able to visit Paris, where he remained from September to December, 1787, when he returned to Corsica, arriving at Ajaccio early in January, 1788. His father died in the following month. Bonaparte only remained in the island till June when he rejoined his regiment at Auxonne. While in Corsica he dined with the officers of the French artillery garrison, and his conversation as described by a brother officer makes it quite evident that, though only eighteen years old, Bonaparte showed himself far better informed than his brother officers in knowledge of ancient and modern history.<sup>1</sup> It was evident that he was still a patriotic Corsican, resenting the French occupation of his island home. It was also quite evident that he was already far better educated than the ordinary French officer, and that he was always revolving in his mind social pro-

<sup>1</sup> See Norwood Young, "Growth of Napoleon," pp. 157-8.



blems. He remained with his regiment at Auxonne from June, 1788, to September, 1789. Those months mark an epoch in his career, for he now fell under the influence of Baron J. P. du Teil, the Commander of the Artillery School at Auxonne.

The outbreak of the Revolution in May, 1789, was followed by mutinous acts on the part of the regiment. On 23 August the officers took an oath not to employ troops against the citizens unless authorized to do so by the civil or municipal officers.

During these years from 1785 to 1789 Napoleon had had some experience of the world, and had worked hard. While at Valence and Auxonne the young Corsican studied not only mathematics, in which he acquired great proficiency, but also history. He was also much influenced by Rousseau's writings, and defended the latter's attack on Christianity in the "Social Contract" against the criticisms of a Protestant pastor of Geneva. In his view the perfection of society and the welfare of mankind could be secured without the aid of religion. He advocated the adoption of a general uniformity of life, which could only be attained by means of the State. According to him "the Christian creed was directly hostile to a perfect polity," for it encouraged individual liberty of thought, and "by bidding men look forward to another life it rendered them too submissive to the evils of the present".<sup>1</sup>

The adherence to these opinions explains not only

<sup>1</sup> See "Quarterly Review," No. 396, p. 340.

Napoleon's sympathy with the French Revolution, but also his admiration of Robespierre, and his friendship with the younger Robespierre.

His arrival in Corsica from Auxonne in the autumn (September) of 1789 was followed by many stirring events. He was already imbued with the revolutionary doctrines and at once joined a small party in Corsica in organizing a revolutionary committee and a national guard. In adopting these measures he encountered much opposition. In Ajaccio the royalist party were supreme, and De Barrin, the Commandant, suppressed all revolutionary movements. In Bastia, the capital of the island, however, the revolutionists prevailed. Supported by Paoli who had been amnestied, and facilitated by the definite incorporation of Corsica with France (decreed on 30 November, 1789, by the National Assembly of France), revolutionary doctrines spread in the island. A General Assembly met at Orezzo in the autumn of 1790, Paoli being elected president, and Napoleon took a leading part in the debates.<sup>1</sup> In February, 1791, he rejoined his regiment at Auxonne, taking with him his brother Louis, the future King of Holland. He was not liked by his brother officers, partly owing to his foreign extraction, partly to his political views and bitter tongue. In June, 1791, he was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant, and was

<sup>1</sup> "A young artillery officer, extremely thin, very brown, with piercing eyes, a serious expression, and a slight Italian accent." Such is a description of Napoleon at this time. (See Norwood Young, "The Growth of Napoleon," p. 224.)

sent to join the Fourth Regiment, then stationed at Valence, a town which embraced with fervour the revolutionary cause. Bonaparte was now an avowed supporter of the Republican party. He was a member of the Revolutionary Club where he delivered inflammatory speeches, and on 14 July, the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, he and the other officers took an oath of fidelity to the nation and the new Constitution. In September of the same year he again visited Corsica, and found Ajaccio in a state of tumult. He at once took part in the disputes that rent the town, behaved with "unscrupulous violence," and was denounced to the authorities in Paris by the Commander of the garrison for instigating the disturbances of the public peace. The French War Office took the view of the Commander, declared that Bonaparte had ignored the orders for his return to his regiment, and struck him off the list of the army. Meanwhile, on 1 April he had been promoted to second lieutenant-colonel of the 2nd Battalion of Corsican Volunteers.

Nothing, however, remained for Bonaparte but to get the order of the War Office rescinded, and accordingly he left Corsica in May, 1792, and proceeded to Paris. War against the Emperor had been declared on 20 April, and officers would in all probability be required for active service. On his arrival on 28 May, he found that city in a most disturbed condition. "It is flooded with strangers," wrote Napoleon to Joseph, "and the discontented are very numerous. The national guard which remained at the Tuileries to

guard the King has been doubled . . . the news from the frontiers is always the same : it is probable that our troops will retire in order to carry on a defensive war. Desertion is very frequent among the officers. Our position is very critical in every respect."

He watched with disgust the proceedings of the mob on 20 June. "Why," he said to Bourrienne, "have they let in all that rabble (to the Tuileries gardens), they should sweep off four or five hundred of them with the cannon." On 22 June he wrote to his brother Joseph a description of the scene. In a further letter on 3 July, he expresses his contempt for the revolutionists and for the men at the head of affairs, as "being little worth the trouble one takes to obtain their favour. You know the history of Ajaccio ; that of Paris is exactly the same ; perhaps men here are even smaller, worse, greater calumniators, and more censorious."

His anxiety for the future of France was much increased by the events of 10 August. On that day he was a witness, from the other side of the Seine, of the disorderly scenes which resulted in the fall of the monarchy. In his opinion the Swiss, under good leadership, would have easily and completely routed their opponents. Unfortunately, however, Louis XVI ordered the troops to cease firing, and that order sealed the fate of the monarchy. On that day Napoleon was himself in some danger, as he "excited many looks of hostility and defiance as being unknown and suspect".

In the meantime, on 10 July, he had been reinstated

in the army, and had been given the rank of captain in the Fourth Regiment. His rank as captain was to date from 6 February, 1792, and he received his arrears of pay. He left Paris early in September in company with his sister, Marianne (Élisa), and arrived safely at Ajaccio on 14 September. Early in 1793 he took part in an expedition against Sardinia which, owing to no fault of his, proved a failure. Troubles in Corsica forced the Bonaparte family to leave the island, on 11 June, 1793, and after landing at Toulon to proceed to Marseilles.

“What a flight it was,” writes Captain Bingham, “one exile became Emperor of France and King of Italy ; another reigned first at Naples, then at Madrid ; Lucien became Prince of Canino ; Louis sat on the throne of Holland ; Marianne became Grand Duchess of Tuscany ; Pauline a Princess ; and Abbé Fesch a Cardinal.”<sup>1</sup> Jerome and Caroline who were left behind also became famous ; the former was destined to be King of Westphalia, the latter to sit on the throne of Naples.

Meanwhile, on 13 June, Bonaparte joined his regiment at Nice, but he was soon called upon to take part in the reduction of Avignon, which town with Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon refused obedience to the Committee of Public Safety. Avignon was soon reduced to submission, and on 28 July, Bonaparte, now with the rank of Capitaine Commandant, pro-

<sup>1</sup> Bingham, “Letters and Despatches of the First Napoleon,” Vol. I, p. 30. London, 1884.

ceeded to Beaucaire. In consequence of a dispute with some merchants whom he met there, he wrote a dialogue called "Le Souper de Beaucaire," in which he gave his reasons for adopting in Corsica Jacobin principles in opposition to Paoli and his adherents. It is evident that his *volte-face* was due to his conviction that Jacobin principles and not Corsican patriotism were destined to win the day. By the orders of Salicetti and other deputies then in Provence, the "Souper de Beaucaire" was in August published at the expense of the Treasury.

Some writers would date Napoleon's rise from the siege of Toulon. It is therefore of some interest to notice the opinion already formed of him by his brother Lucien. "I tell you," the latter wrote to Joseph, on 24 June, 1792, "I have always discerned in Napoleon an ambition not entirely egotistical, but which overcomes his desire for the public good; I am convinced that in a free State he would be a dangerous man. He seems to me to have a strong inclination to be a tyrant, and I believe he would be one if he were King."<sup>1</sup>

In the autumn of 1793 Bonaparte, who had now definitely decided to find his career not in Corsica but in France, took part in the recapture of Toulon which had handed itself over to the British and Spanish fleets. Dommartin, who commanded the artillery, was wounded on 7 September, and Bonaparte was

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from Norwood Young, "The Growth of Napoleon," pp. 271, 272.

appointed in his place. He had now his first opportunity of seeing real warfare, and throughout the operations for the recapture of Toulon he showed consistent activity and courage.

It was an anxious time for the French officers who upon any failure might fall into disfavour with the ruling Committee of Public Safety in Paris and be guillotined. Bonaparte did not approve of the way in which Carreaux, the French commander, formerly a painter, conducted the operations, and wrote letters full of complaint and criticism to the Committee in Paris. He also asked that an artillery officer of high rank should be sent to Toulon. On 6 November, Dugommier, "a brave veteran," and General du Teil arrived. The former superseded Carreaux as commander-in-chief, and the latter took command of the artillery.

Success followed these changes. Whoever held the fort l'Aiguillette commanded the harbour. On the night of 18 December the French captured the fort, and on 19 December, 1793, the French forces entered Toulon. Though Napoleon had throughout shown undeniable ability, Du Teil and the whole artillery staff must share in the credit of the capture of Toulon. The legend that Bonaparte was in command of the artillery was invented later, and Napoleon's statement at St. Helena that Du Teil "understood nothing about artillery," is not borne out by the testimony of Dugommier who, when reporting on the siege of Toulon, declared that Du Teil's "distinguished services

. . . deserve the recognition of the nation," and that he "showed in all his dispositions much intelligence and military talents".<sup>1</sup>

At the same time it is undeniable that Bonaparte had acquitted himself well, and his fortunes began with the success at Toulon. In the "Moniteur" of 7 December, 1793, Dugommier wrote: "Among those who distinguished themselves most, and who aided me to rally the troops and push them forward, are citizens Buona Parte . . . Arena and Cervoni". At Toulon Bonaparte first met Junot, who attracted his attention by his coolness under fire. He also at that time acquired a lifelong ascendancy over Marmont.

Lord Acton, in his "Lectures on the French Revolution," points out that the first event of Bonaparte's career was the spectacle of a British fleet flying before him by the glare of an immense conflagration. He also notices that in their retirement the English only "imperfectly destroyed the French ships they could not at once take away, leaving the materials for the Egyptian expedition".<sup>2</sup>

The siege of Toulon was thus an event of some importance in Bonaparte's career.

Napoleon was not long idle. The war between France and Europe was at its height, and French armies were fighting in the Low Countries, on the

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Norwood Young in "The Growth of Napoleon," p. 326. London, John Murray, 1910.

<sup>2</sup> Acton, "Lectures on The French Revolution," p. 315. London, Macmillan, 1910.



Spanish frontier, and in Italy. In that quarter the French force was divided into the army of the Alps and the army of Italy. The latter army was commanded by General Dumerbion, a man of no military capacity, and Bonaparte commanded the artillery. He was ordered to draw up a plan of campaign for both armies, but before his plan could be carried out Robespierre had fallen, and the Government, by the advice of Carnot, stopped the operations in Italy and ordered the armies to occupy the chief passes of the Alps.

During July Bonaparte had been sent by the younger Robespierre on a mission to Genoa to persuade that city (which was ostensibly neutral) not to allow the coalition to occupy its territory. The Revolution of Thermidor (27 July, 1794) was followed by the arrest and imprisonment of Bonaparte in Fort Carré near Antibes. The arrest was due to his well-known friendship with the younger Robespierre and generally with the Robespierre clique. However, on 20 August, he was set at liberty. His early difficulties were not yet over. Corsica was practically in the hands of the English, and in March, 1795, an expedition, in which were Bonaparte, his brother Louis and Marmont, was fitted out to recover the island. The English fleet, however, who were on the watch, captured two of the French ships and forced the remainder to return to France. Bonaparte, who was General of Brigade, then received orders to take command of the artillery of the army of the west, and

in May he arrived in Paris. He had no wish to take up his appointment, and an opportune illness enabled him to be on furlough for some months, and consequently he was in Paris during most of that eventful year. During the first eight months he lived quietly in Paris corresponding with his relations and watching events. He professed and probably felt sympathy with the revolutionists, and was opposed to all attempts at a reaction in favour of the monarchy. On 29 May, 1795, in a letter to his brother Joseph he says: "Gentlemen in green neckcloths are arrested here on the suspicion that they are Jesuits. Many are arrested suspected to be emigrants. We begin to perceive that the Royalists are to be feared because they believe themselves to be favoured, and that it is time to end their hopes."<sup>1</sup>

Joseph, who married Julie, the daughter of a rich merchant, was now living in Marseilles, where he had taken refuge owing to the insurrection in Corsica against France. Napoleon was at this time engaged to the sister of Julie, Eugenie Désirée, who later became the wife of Bernadotte. In June, 1795, Napoleon declares that he intends to have his portrait painted, as such is the wish of Désirée, but at the same time he writes in a melancholy vein. "Life," he says, "is a flimsy dream soon to be over." From his letters it would appear that Paris was assuming its normal aspect and that confidence was returning.

<sup>1</sup> "The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his Brother Joseph," p. 3. London, John Murray, 1855.

In a very interesting letter written on 18 July, he gives a very remarkable account of the life of the Parisians after they had emerged from the Reign of Terror.

“Luxury, pleasure, and the arts are reviving here in a wonderful manner. Yesterday they acted ‘Phédre’ at the Opera House for the benefit of a former actress; the crowd was immense from two o’clock in the afternoon, although the prices were trebled. Equipages and dandies are re-appearing. . . . Libraries are formed, and we have lectures on history, chemistry, botany, astronomy, etc. We have heaped together here all that can make life amusing and agreeable; reflection is banished. Women go everywhere; to the theatres, to the public walks, to the public theatres. . . . A woman does not know her value or the extent of her empire till she has spent six months in Paris.”<sup>1</sup>

It was quite evident that the reaction had come to stay. The singing of the “Réveil du Peuple” and the “Marseillaise” in the theatres caused disturbances; there was a feeling of satisfaction that the Constitution was approaching completion. In July he described in a letter the overthrow of the *émigrés* who had landed at Quiberon, and wonders at Pitt’s folly in sending 12,000 men to attack France. The victory at Quiberon, together with the conclusion of peace with Spain, Naples, and Parma, undoubtedly

<sup>1</sup> “The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his Brother Joseph,” p. 6.

strengthened the hands of the executive and enabled more attention to be paid to Italy, from which country the Austrians and Sardinians were engaged in attempting to expel the French. "We shall soon," wrote Napoleon on 1 August, 1795, "have some very serious work in Lombardy." In August it seemed not unlikely that Napoleon might be sent to Turkey as General of artillery in order to organize the Sultan's artillery. Napoleon had decided that in that event he would have Joseph appointed Consul. Fortunately for Napoleon he was not sent to Turkey, but remained in Paris watching very carefully the movements of the French armies and studying the political situation. "The Constitution," he wrote on 6 September, "will be accepted unanimously ; the only cause of alarm is the Decree retaining two-thirds of the Convention."

His view proved to be correct, and it was only through Napoleon's firmness and skill in suppressing the rising of Vendémiaire that the obnoxious portion of the Constitution was retained.

During September the Constitution had been completed, and Napoleon on 12 September wrote saying that the crisis was over, and that the Republic was secure. Later in the month, however, he became aware that the Constitution with its obnoxious clause retaining two-thirds of the Convention was not going to be accepted quietly. At two in the morning of 6 October (the night of 13-14 Vendémiaire) he wrote : "At last all is over. . . . The Convention order the

Section Lepelletier to be disarmed. It repulsed the troops. . . . The Convention appointed Barras to command the military force: the committees appointed me second in command. We made our dispositions; the enemy marched to attack us in the Tuileries. We killed many of them—they killed thirty of our men, and wounded sixty. We have disarmed the sections and all is quiet. As usual I was not wounded. P.S.—Fortune favours me.”<sup>1</sup>

Vendémiaire testified to the incapacity of the royalists in France who, instead of biding their time and trusting to the increase of their influence at the annual elections, had blundered into a struggle for which the Thermidorians had prepared. By means of his cannon Napoleon had crushed the *Jeunesse Dorée*, “had ensured the continuance under legal forms of the Jacobin rule, and destroyed the hopes alike of a royalist restoration and of a moderate republic”. Mallet Du Pan<sup>2</sup> and others had hoped for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. But the time had not yet come for a restoration of the Bourbons, and the upper classes, a large proportion of whom were *émigrés*, had not yet realized that the greater part of the French nation would be satisfied with nothing less than the Constitution of 1791. It would be impossible to realize the absolute

<sup>1</sup> “The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his Brother Joseph,” p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> “Mallet Du Pan and the French Revolution,” by Bernard Mallet. London, Longmans, 1902.

blindness of the *émigrés*, or to comprehend their incapacity to understand the political situation in France, did we not possess in the history of the Bourbon Restoration from 1814 to 1830 evidence that most of the members of that family had even then learned nothing. The *émigrés* were by no means displeased at the failure of Vendémiaire, "because the livery of the *ancien régime* had not been at once assumed," and because the royalism "of its authors did not possess its sixteen quarterings"! How could any cause hope to succeed with such supporters? They were naturally the despair of all moderate and sensible royalists who, like Mallet Du Pan, aimed at the establishment of a constitutional monarchy after the English type.

The advent of the Directory to power put an end not only to all hopes of a Bourbon restoration, but also to all chance of peace. During its tenure of office, from 1795 to 1799, Napoleon laid the foundation of his supremacy in France. In 1795 he was merely an artillery officer who owed his prominence at Vendémiaire to the accident of his being in Paris at the time, and to his friendship with Barras. In 1799 he was the most prominent French subject, and sufficiently powerful to drive the Directory from power, and to seize the reins of office.

#### CHIEF DATES

Birth of Napoleon	. . . . .	15 August, 1769.
At school at Autun, and at Brienne	. . . . .	1779.
At the military school in Paris	. . . . .	1784.

Sub-lieutenant in the regiment of La Fère . . . . .	1785.
In Corsica . . . . .	1786.
Visits Paris . . . . .	1787.
In Corsica and at Auxonne . . . . .	1788.
Outbreak of the French Revolution . . . . .	1789.
In Corsica . . . . . August, 1789 to February, 1791.	
At Auxonne . . . . . February to June, 1791.	
At Valence (first lieutenant) . . . . . June to September, 1791.	
In Corsica . . . . . September, 1791 to May, 1792.	
In Paris . . . . . May to September, 1792.	
Expedition to Sardinia . . . . .	1793.
The Bonaparte family leave Corsica . . . . .	1793.
The Siege of Toulon . . . . .	1793.
With the Army in Italy . . . . .	1794.
The Revolution of Thermidor . . . . . July, 1794.	
Vendémiaire . . . . .	1795.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ITALIAN AND EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS, 1796-1799

Bonaparte commands the army in Italy—His appearance—Justification of his appointment—His victories—The Preliminaries of Leoben—The Franco-Spanish Alliance—The Papacy—The Cisalpine Republic—Fructidor—Peace of Campo Formio—Bonaparte at Rastadt—In Paris—The Egyptian Expedition—The Battle of the Nile—Acre—Bonaparte's return to France—The political situation, 1799.

**V**ENDÉMIAIRE was destined to mark an epoch not merely in the history of France but also in the history of Europe. The man who defeated the insurgents was Bonaparte, "through whose genius the Revolution was to subjugate the continent". There is no doubt that owing to his conduct in the conflict of Vendémiaire Bonaparte obtained the Italian command. He had by his conduct secured the favourable notice of Carnot, he was supported by Barras, and before the end of 1795 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Interior. During the winter he took the greatest possible interest in the Italian army, and never ceased his efforts to secure the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the army of Italy.

On 2 March, 1796, when in his 27th year,



he received that appointment. On 9 March he married Josephine, and on 27 March he arrived at Nice, the head-quarters of the French army of Italy. He had now the opportunity which he had been waiting for, and the post which enabled him to show the superiority of his qualifications to those of his contemporaries.

In appointing him to the command in Italy the Directors were taking a considerable risk. But his personality had impressed many of the leading men in Paris; his action during the events of Vendémiaire had attracted attention; he had already some acquaintance with the Italian theatre of war. He was consequently in a position to push forward his demand for the command of the army in Italy. Moreover, he was familiar with the Italian language, and in this respect was better suited than were such men as Kellermann or Davoust for the appointment. He was indeed better qualified for the post than any of his contemporaries, for in addition to his acquaintance with Italian he had received the best military education; he had gained valuable experience at the siege of Toulon, and in 1794 he had drawn up for the Italian campaign plans which would have proved successful had Carnot not ordered a general retirement. As it was, his plans were carried out under his own direction in 1796.

His Corsican origin was in itself an advantage, for "the Corsicans," we are told, "had a widespread reputation for being persons of rare qualities, amongst

whom a prodigy might easily be found".<sup>1</sup> Moreover, his Corsican rearing led him to treat his soldiers as personal friends, and in this way he inspired feelings of devotion to himself. His personal influence over his soldiers never lessened. It was, moreover, an immense advantage to be far removed from Paris. His natural promptitude and habit of making rapid decisions thus had full play, and when directions arrived from Paris the matter treated of in those directions had already been settled by Bonaparte in his own way. He alone of the French generals secured perfect freedom of action, which in itself was an unspeakable advantage when opposing the generals of continental powers, none of whom could have any freedom of action.

Then Bonaparte's youth was another advantage. In his early campaigns he was opposed by men much older than himself, such as Beaulieu, Wurmser, and Alvinzi—men who could not easily adapt themselves to new conditions of warfare.

His career falls naturally into two periods. The first period begins with his arrival at Nice and ends with the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. During that period Napoleon effected a most useful work. He initiated the growth of Italian unity, and he cleared the ground for the firm establishment of the feeling of nationality in Germany. That period saw his famous Italian campaign, his Egyptian expedition, the Marengo, Auster-

<sup>1</sup> Norwood Young, "The Growth of Napoleon," p. 359. London, John Murray.



NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC  
FROM THE PAINTING BY H. F. J. PHILIPPOLEAUX AT VERSAILLES



litz, Jena, and Friedland campaigns. It saw the establishment of the French power in Italy, it saw the power of the French Empire at its height.

From the Treaty of Tilsit may be dated the second period in Napoleon's career, a period which witnessed his superhuman efforts to ruin Great Britain, by the stern enforcement of the continental system. The attempted execution of this project involved him in the Spanish and Russian Wars, and in the War of Liberation which finally effected his overthrow.

The description of Bonaparte given by Mr. Norwood Young in "The Growth of Napoleon," is admirable. In 1796 "he measured 5 feet  $5\frac{3}{4}$  inches, and was very thin, with small hands and feet. His hands were always in a clean and cared-for condition; they were his one vanity. He had a sickly, pale olive complexion. His lank, chestnut hair he allowed, following a not unusual custom in the Republican Army, to grow so long that it reached his shoulders. It was this frail appearance, so unwarlike, so far removed from the soldier type, that earned him the title of *petit caporal*, and aided him in assuming the character of an abnormal being."<sup>1</sup>

Much of his success in the Italian campaign was by some of his leading opponents in 1796 ascribed to his Corsican blood.

The Archduke Ferdinand, it is said, had declared that Bonaparte being a Corsican was enterprising and

<sup>1</sup> Norwood Young, "The Growth of Napoleon," p. 357.


likely to attack, while Colli's chief of staff, Costa de Beaurepaire, wrote : " General Bonaparte, a creature of Barras, is not known for any stirring achievement ; but he is regarded as a profound theorist and a man of genius ".<sup>1</sup>

On his arrival at Nice he found that all was ready for an advance. Scherer's victory at Loano in 1794 had enabled the French to occupy a position suitable as the starting-point of a fresh campaign.

The French army of Italy was at that time the best in Europe, but when Napoleon reached Nice it was in a dejected, half-starved condition. For two years it had been campaigning on the outskirts of Northern Italy and had become discontented and undisciplined. Bonaparte at once established his influence over them by the issue of a stirring address. " Soldiers, you are ill-fed and almost naked. The Government owes you much but can do nothing for you. Your patience, your courage do you honour, but bring you neither advantage nor glory. I intend to lead you to the most fertile plains in the world. Rich provinces, great cities will be in your power. There you will find honour and glory and wealth. Soldiers of the Army of Italy, will you be found wanting in courage and constancy? "

On arriving at Nice Bonaparte found opposed to him the Austrian and Sardinian armies. On 12 April he defeated the Austrians in the battle of Montenotte, which has been described as a necessary operation

<sup>1</sup> Norwood Young, " The Growth of Napoleon, " p. 354.



NAPOLEON AT THE BATTERY





but not a serious battle. According to an enthusiastic admirer of Bonaparte this was "the first in a series of eighteen great pitched battles that he won before the peace of Campo Formio in 1797, and the names of which still reflect his early glory".<sup>1</sup>

By his victory at Montenotte Bonaparte prevented the Austrians from joining their Sardinian allies. "My title of nobility," Bonaparte declared later, "dates from the battle of Montenotte. On the following day, 13 April, the Austrians again suffered defeat at Millesimo, and on the 15th an Austrian division, unaware that on the previous day the Austrian forces had been defeated and driven from Dego, re-occupied the village only to suffer a severe defeat at the hands of Bonaparte.

All danger of a union of the Austrian and Sardinian armies was now removed, and Bonaparte was enabled, after a struggle at Mondovi, to force the court of Turin to sign the armistice of Cherasco. When the Piedmontese officers expressed surprise at Bonaparte's impatience to receive the treaty duly signed from the Sardinian Government, the conqueror replied, "I may often lose a battle, but I shall never lose a minute". Savoy and Nice were ceded to France, the fortresses of Alessandria, Tortona, and Coni were placed in the hands of the French, and other fortresses were destroyed. Bonaparte had now secured "the keys of the Alps," and he was

<sup>1</sup> Kielland, "Napoleon's Men and Methods," p. 19. London, A. Owen & Co., 1909.

able to concentrate his efforts upon the Austrian army.

The Milanese were now open to the French attack, and on 10 May the passage of the Adda at Lodi was effected. Lodi, in Bonaparte's own words on the evening of the battle, was not much of an affair ; later in his career, however, he used both it and Montenotte as a basis of the Napoleonic legend. The "astonishing passage of the bridge of Lodi," became the subject for painters. Bonaparte, by his personal bravery on 10 May, had roused the enthusiasm of the army which saluted him as *le petit caporal*.

Lodi was certainly an epoch in the life of Bonaparte. Frequently during the previous years he had indulged in ambitious hopes and fantastic dreams. Before Vendémiaire his ambition had been noted, and indeed during the early years of the Revolution he had not unfrequently shown that his expectations were by no means of a moderate order.

At St. Helena, however, he said to Las Cases : "Vendémiaire and even Montenotte did not lead me to regard myself a man out of the ordinary. It was only after Lodi that the idea came to me that I might, after all, indeed become a decisive actor on the political stage. Then arose the first gleam of high ambition." The success at Lodi strengthened Bonaparte's position enormously. He became a popular hero in Paris, and was henceforward free from all interference on the part of the Directors, who no longer dare oppose him.

On 15 May he entered Milan, and wrote to his brother Joseph that the French were masters of all Lombardy. Then followed the severe and prolonged struggle over the famous "quadrilateral," ending with the surrender of Mantua by the veteran Austrian General Wurmser, and the supremacy of the French in Northern Italy.

After occupying Milan Bonaparte issued a proclamation for the purpose of inspiring the Italians with ideas of liberty. He declared that his object was "to restore the capitol; to replace there the statues of the heroes who have rendered it immortal; to rouse the Romans from centuries of slavery—such will be the fruit of our victories; they will form an era in history; to you will belong the glory of having changed the most beautiful part of Europe".

This declaration did not prevent him from wringing 20,000,000 francs from the Italians, or from destroying Brescia. The French troops entered Verona; Beaulieu, the Austrian commander, retired into the Tyrol, and Bonaparte began his long series of attempts to capture the well-fortified town of Mantua.

Wurmser, Beaulieu's successor, entered Mantua on 1 August, but was defeated at Lonato on 3 August and at Castiglione on 5 August, and retired into the Tyrol. In September Wurmser again entered Mantua in order to reinforce the garrison, but he himself was besieged. In November Alvinzi endeavoured to raise the siege. But though checked on 12 November at Caldiero Bonaparte proved vic-

torious in the three days' battle at Arcola (15-17 Nov.) and Alvinzi fell back to the mountains. For some two months no serious operation was undertaken and both French and Austrians received reinforcements.

On 14 January, 1797, however, an Austrian army under Alvinzi, advancing down the Adige, was defeated by Bonaparte, who on 16 January crushed a column under Provera which had penetrated to the suburbs of Mantua.

On 2 February, 1797, Mantua itself capitulated, and the era of Hapsburg predominance in Italy came to an end. From this time onwards the desire for freedom and independence steadily developed in Italy.

During the Italian campaign many of those who became celebrated French generals leaped into prominence. Lannes, Berthier, Oudinot, Masséna, and others distinguished themselves and showed the possession of military qualities which was at once recognized by the young Bonaparte. His ambitious schemes had now taken a concrete form, and he was resolved to become the first man in France.

On 7 April, 1797, the advance guard of the French army arrived at Leoben. The Austrians were completely outgeneralled, and after one more defeat under the very walls of the Austrian capital itself Austria would be at the mercy of the French conqueror. In Vienna itself panic reigned, and, in spite of the brave words of Thugut, the party in favour of peace gained the day.

Anxiety, too, for the welfare of the Court of Naples rendered Francis eager to end the war; the new Tsar, Paul I, showed no desire to oppose the French, and by its withdrawal from the Mediterranean the English fleet could no longer impede French operations in Italy. Preliminaries were therefore signed at Leoben on 18 April, but Thugut succeeded in postponing the conclusion of a definite peace.

Various circumstances had contributed to this striking success on the part of the young general. Germany was still far from being united in opposition to the French. Frederick William II of Prussia had on 5 August, 1796, signed a secret supplement to the Treaty of Basel, while Baden, Würtemberg, and Bavaria anticipating in a way the events of 1806, when the Confederation of the Rhine was formed, had entered into negotiations with the Directory.

Moreover, the action of Spain had facilitated in a most striking fashion Bonaparte's conquest of Lombardy. On 10 August, 1796, Charles IV, under the influence of his minister Godoy, had at San Ildefonso signed an offensive and defensive alliance with the French Republic, and the Spanish fleet effected a junction with the French fleet at Toulon. Spain had declared war upon Great Britain on 9 October, 1796, and the same month Sir John Jervis, finding himself outnumbered, was forced to withdraw from Corsica and the Mediterranean. No British fleet appeared again in that sea for some eighteen months, in spite

of the defeat of the Spanish fleet by Jervis in the battle of St. Vincent on 14 February, 1797.

Moreover, before invading the Tyrol Bonaparte had taken steps to secure his position in Central as well as in Northern Italy. In 1796 he had occupied the Legations of Ferrara and Bologna, and early in 1797 he had advanced on Rome and forced Pius VI to sign on 19 February the Treaty of Tolentino.

During 1796 he had fully realized the immense power wielded by the Papacy, and had ignored the orders of the Directory to destroy the Pope's authority. At the same time while he was asserting that in order to quiet the "alarmed consciences of many nations," he was anxious to become the saviour far more than the destroyer of the "Holy See," he was making preparations to secure the all-important seaport of Ancona. His policy to the Papacy at this period was in reality that of an opportunist. He was resolved that the Pope should realize that better terms would be obtained from him than from the Directors. At the same time he did not hesitate to impose upon "the old fox," as in a private letter he styled the Pope, the humiliating Treaty of Tolentino (19 February, 1797), which insisted upon the payment of a heavy fine, and the removal to Paris from Rome of one hundred works of art.

The importance, however, of gaining over to his side the clerical influence in Italy was not lost upon Bonaparte, who in setting up a republican form of government in Northern Italy declared that "the

morality of the Gospel is that of equality," and henceforth it is most favourable "to the republican government" which he then imposed upon the Italians. In following this policy Bonaparte was acting independently of the Directors, who would have preferred the destruction of the Papacy and the abolition of religion.

The success which attended Napoleon's arms had thus completely outweighed the effects of the retreat of Moreau from Southern Germany, necessitated by the failure of Jourdan to hold his own against the Archduke Charles, the failure of Hoche to land a force in Ireland in December, 1796, and the arrival in Portugal of a British force under Sir Charles Stuart.

The cessation of hostilities with Austria, which followed the negotiations at Leoben, left Bonaparte free to complete the subjugation of Northern Italy. On 16 May Venice was occupied, the ancient Government of Genoa was dissolved, and on 14 June the Ligurian Republic was set up.

On 9 July the Cisalpine Republic, consisting of the Northern Italian States, with the exception of Piedmont, was formed and the Ionian Islands were annexed to France. It only remained to convert the Preliminaries of Leoben into a permanent peace. Those Preliminaries, as the Austrian Court knew, had been signed by Bonaparte without the authorization of the Directory, then involved in a political and religious crisis which threatened to result in its overthrow.

Should the fall of the Directory take place it seemed as if a reaction against its foreign as well as its home policy would assert itself, and that consequently Austria might secure more advantageous terms from a new French Government whose policy was opposed to that of its predecessor. That Thugut's expectations were not groundless is apparent from a consideration of the state of parties in France.

During 1796 and indeed till September, 1797, when the Revolution of Fructidor took place, there had been little religious persecution. The Directors were far more interested in foreign than in domestic matters, and the Constitution of the year III apparently removed all religious difficulties. The laws against emigrants and refractory priests remained to a great extent in abeyance, and it is asserted that up to Fructidor only twenty priests suffered death under the Directory. The Pope recommended with certain reservations obedience to the civil power, many priests returned, and the churches were crowded. It is said that by the summer of 1797 the old religious services were conducted in 38,000 parishes. A crisis, however, occurred a few months after the elections of 1797.

In May, 1797, elections to the Directorate and Legislative Body took place. These elections gave the country an opportunity of showing its dissatisfaction with the majority of the Directors, and its hatred of all who had been concerned with the Reign of Terror. Of the Legislative Body only eleven out of the 216 retiring members, most of whom stood again,



were elected, their places being taken by men of moderate or royalist opinions. The reactionary or Clichian party—so called because its members met in the Rue de Clichy—was composed of able men who were united in desiring to expel from power all who had been concerned with the Reign of Terror, and in wishing to carry out a peace policy abroad. The party, however, was not united with regard to the future government of France. Some of its members wished to secure the return of the Bourbons, and the re-establishment of the *ancien régime*, while others advocated a constitutional monarchy of the English type. But the fact that the Bourbons would not accept the Constitution of 1791 weakened the Clichian party, and at the same time the desire for a universal peace was not shared by the army or by Bonaparte.

The news of the signature of the Preliminaries of Leoben was received with great satisfaction in Paris, and the Directors at once sent Hoche to Holland to prepare for the invasion of England. The financial distress in France had been considerably relieved by the fact that the large French armies were living at the expense of other countries, while the money sent back by the French generals came at a most opportune time.

Moreover, three Directors, Barras, Reubell, and Larevellière, had resolved to spare no efforts to keep themselves in power. In the early autumn they appealed to Bonaparte who sent Augereau to Paris. On 4 September, with 2000 soldiers, he carried out the

Revolution of 8 Fructidor. The reactionary movement was suppressed with severity, and the Directory was maintained in power for another two years. Nevertheless though the Directory, owing to Bonaparte's genius and to the efficiency of the French armies, had overthrown the Austrians and gained supremacy in Italy, failure attended its efforts to subjugate Great Britain. Within a week of the signature, on 17 October, of the Peace of Campo Formio, the French plans for the invasion of England had already been entirely overthrown, and England was saved from immediate attack by the defeat of the Dutch fleet on 11 October, 1797, at the battle of Camperdown.

The Peace of Campo Formio revealed to the world Bonaparte's determination to secure the supremacy of France in the Mediterranean, and has an especial importance in that he was now enabled to define his Eastern ambitions. The Austrians might have Venice so long as France secured the Adige boundary for the Cisalpine Republic, and the Rhine boundary together with the Ionian Islands.

The conquest of Italy was now virtually complete, and the way prepared for the future expansion of France in the Levant. Bonaparte's brilliant Italian campaign had a far-reaching importance for Italy no less than for France. The old order was overthrown in Italy, and was followed by a slow though steady growth of the feeling of nationality. Thus the campaigns of 1796-7 constitute an epoch in the history of Italian unity. None the less do those campaigns

mark an epoch in the history of France. The victories won proved to be a distinct step in Napoleon's rise to supremacy in France, and form "the starting-point of a series of campaigns prompted by personal ambition and a desire for national aggrandizement".<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the predominance of military instincts over democratic theories was now assured. The army had illustrated its political power in the events of Fructidor. Henceforward its predominance became unmistakable. The age of revolutionary principles was over, and a policy of aggression towards foreign countries at once begins. As head of the victorious army Bonaparte was now all-powerful, and his ambitious policy was shortly revealed to an astonished and unprepared world.

The years 1796 and 1797 were indeed of importance to Europe no less than to Bonaparte. Europe suddenly realized that in Bonaparte she had to deal with a man whose military genius was only equalled by his political sagacity no less than by his ambition.

From April till 30 October, 1797, Bonaparte and Josephine lived in the villa of Passeriano near Udine. Probably these months constitute the happiest period in Napoleon's life. During that period his brother Joseph was acting as French ambassador in Rome and was engaged in continual negotiations with the Pope. Bonaparte watched the intrigues of the Papacy and the Court of Naples with ill-concealed impatience. "I cannot believe it," he wrote on 29 September,

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. VIII, p. 593.

“ though I have perceived for some time a sort of coalition between the courts of Naples and Rome, and even of Florence. It is the alliance of the rats against the cat.”

Had the Pope happened to die at this juncture it appears certain that Bonaparte would have done all he could to prevent the election of a successor. To Bonaparte France was the first nation in the world, and therefore he felt justified in adopting what his enemies might consider a somewhat arrogant tone in dealing with things spiritual as well as with things temporal.

On 16 November, 1797, Bonaparte, who had been in Milan since 30 October, set out from Milan for Rastadt where the diplomatists of Germany were gathered together to consider the new situation which had arisen. The political problems of Germany, since the conquest of the Netherlands and of the Milanese, and the extension of France to the Rhine, had become for the first time of some interest to the conqueror of Italy. On his journey by way of Mont Cenis, Geneva, and Basle he was treated with the greatest respect. At Basle indeed the chief men of the city made special efforts to win his favour, and Bonaparte took the opportunity of congratulating them and the Genevans upon their democratic feelings. He arrived at Rastadt on the evening of 25 November, and his arrival created no little stir. The members of the peace deputation showed great anxiety to see the conqueror of Italy, and Mr. Fisher relates how

they described "his yellow complexion, his thin body, his lively gestures, and profound glance, his dress rich but careless, his bearing courteous but unrestrained by diplomatic forms".<sup>1</sup>

During his stay at Rastadt he gained much knowledge of Germans and German politics. He realized that French interest lay in the secularization of the ecclesiastical territories and in winning over the middle German states, which always tended to regard Austria and Prussia with jealousy. To the envoys of the free towns to whom he expatiated on his love of liberty he was especially civil, and he openly expressed his contempt for Austria, and "his disgust at the delay of the Austrian plenipotentiaries to appear at the congress". His avowed object in his conversations was to show that Austria was the real enemy of the Reich.

On 2 December, after arranging with the Austrian envoy, Cobenzel, a military convention with regard to Mainz and Venice, Bonaparte left Rastadt for Paris. There he received the well-deserved "homage of an enraptured people". The Italian campaign of 1796-7 was of immense importance to Europe. It proved the starting-point of the national movement in Italy. From this time the Italians began to develop a craving for unity, and a feeling for nationality. For France Bonaparte's successes marked "the definite

<sup>1</sup>Fisher, "Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany," p. 32. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1903.

ascendancy of military instincts over the democratic theories of the Revolution".<sup>1</sup>

Bonaparte reached Paris on 5 December, and though the populace received him with acclamation the Directors eyed him with distrust—which found some justification in a speech in which the young conqueror hinted that he was uncertain whether he should make a revolution in France or devote his attention to the liberation of Greece. He was, however, soon appointed to the command of what was termed the Army of England (*Général en chef de l'armée d'Angleterre*), and turned his thoughts to the destruction of England's maritime power. England's power in his opinion could be destroyed by direct invasion, or by an attack through Egypt upon India, or by a systematic attack upon her commerce as was afterwards carried out by the continental system. At this time he ostensibly spent most of February, 1798, in considering the possibility of an invasion of England, the prospect of which roused the patriotic feelings of the English nation,<sup>2</sup> but before the end of

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. VIII, p. 593.

<sup>2</sup> Over twenty of the Kent clergy raised regiments in their parishes and placed themselves in command. This movement was organized by the Hon. and Rev. Lord George Murray then in charge of the Parish of Hunton near Maidstone. In April the Archbishop of Canterbury issued a circular letter to the clergy of his diocese in which he mentioned that the country was expecting the appearance of a desperate and malignant enemy. He added that if the "enemy set his foot upon our shores our hand with that of every man must, in every way, be against those who come for

the month he reported against such a project and recommended the seizure of the mouths of the Rhine and the Elbe, or an expedition to the Levant. The adoption of the last suggestion would, he believed, not only ruin England's commerce with the East Indies, but would permanently destroy England's trade in the Mediterranean, and would force her to relinquish her hold upon India. For some months he had pondered over his "Oriental plan" which in 1798 seemed to him capable of realization. In 1798 England had practically withdrawn from the Mediterranean. She had relinquished her hold on Corsica, and though she possessed Gibraltar had taken no steps to prevent the Mediterranean from becoming a French lake. In spite of its victories of St. Vincent and Camperdown, the British fleet was in a very unsatisfactory condition, as shown by the mutinies at the Nore and Spithead. The fleets of Spain and Holland could now be united with the French fleet, and this union would threaten the British supremacy of the high seas.

The Peace of Campo Formio had given the French the Ionian Islands—of great value to France now that she was supreme in Italy. The commandant of the Knights of St. John at Malta had been won over by bribery, while in India Tippoo Sahib of Mysore was a French ally. It would seem that it only required the French conquest of Egypt to bring to an end the British dominion in India.

purposes of rapine and desolation, the avowed champions of Anarchy and Irreligion, defying the Living God".

The Egyptian expedition has been described as "little more than a dramatic interlude in Napoleon's career". At the same time it must be remembered that though it proved to be a useful interval during which the Directory rapidly collapsed, the Egyptian expedition had several claims to attention. In the first place, during the months which were occupied by that expedition, it became clearly apparent that in religious matters Bonaparte was an opportunist. During the months after the settlement of peace at Leoben he held a court at Milan, and while there fully realized the importance of the Church as a great governing power. He checked in Milan the excesses of the Italian Jacobins who in 1796 had dragged the statue of St. Ambrose through the streets, and who among other profanities had turned several churches into Jacobin clubs. Against these excesses a reaction had set in which found a supporter in Bonaparte. He won over many Italian bishops to his side, and at the same time endeavoured to preserve a level balance in religious matters.

When, however, he was in Egypt he endeavoured to win over the Moslems by declaring that the French had overthrown the Pope and the Knights of Malta. Moreover, while in the East he did not hesitate to try to win over the Christians of the Lebanon by specious words. But all chance of gaining the definite support of these Christians was lost as soon as Sir Sidney Smith had astutely caused copies of Bonaparte's Moslem proclamations, when he was in Egypt,



to be distributed among the inhabitants of the Lebanon.

The Egyptian expedition has been compared to the Russian campaign of 1812. Both were failures, and in both cases Bonaparte left his army in difficulties. But his secret departure from Egypt marked an important stage in his rise to supreme power, while his return from Smorgoni in 1812 in no sense contributed to any restoration of his power. In many respects, however, the Egyptian campaign is interesting. For the first time the world was informed of Bonaparte's ambitious but vague Eastern schemes. Further, the occupation of Egypt by Frenchmen had been suggested to Louis XIV, and though Bonaparte's expedition ended in failure the interest of France in Egypt continued all through the nineteenth century, till it received a severe check in 1882.

Further, the Egyptian expedition drew attention to the military qualities not only of Kléber and Desaix but also of Junot, Rapp, Lannes, and Davoust. The Egyptian expedition, too, brought home to Bonaparte the absolute necessity for a powerful fleet. But Trafalgar ruined all chance of defeating the English at sea, and his schemes were henceforth perpetually checked by the want of a fleet.

Bonaparte's preparations for the Egyptian expedition were most elaborate. Early in 1798 he had engaged several Arab interpreters; he had arranged for a number of the learned members of the lately

founded Institute of France to accompany him ; for the equipment of the expedition he had wrung money from the Pope and the citizens of Rome. Difficulties of all sorts—financial and material—had been overcome, and on 19 May the fleet, composed of contingents from Corsica, Genoa, Marseilles, and Civita Vecchia, set sail.

The ostensible object of this expedition was to drive the English as far as possible from their possessions in the Red Sea and the East, to cut through the Suez Canal, to take possession of Egypt and the Red Sea, to ameliorate the lot of the inhabitants of Egypt, and to keep on good terms with the Turks. Moreover, Napoleon had resolved to seize Malta, and with its capture and with the establishment of the French in Egypt an overwhelming blow, it was believed, would have been struck at England's power not only in the Mediterranean but also in Egypt and the East. Admiral Brueys, however, was keenly alive to the risks run by his unwieldy fleet, but for a time those fears were falsified.

On 19 May Bonaparte wrote from on board "l'Orient," then at Toulon, that he was just setting sail, and on the 25th that they were just about to pass Bastia, adding that he had not been "sick on the open sea". In his letters on the voyage he urges Joseph to be kind to his (Bonaparte's) wife, Josephine, and these directions, in view of what happened in later years, have a pathetic ring about them. Malta, which owing to the cowardice of the Grand Master the French

occupied after a harmless cannonade of ten days, is, he declares, the strongest place in Europe.

By good luck the fleet escaped the notice of Nelson who was cruising off Crete and reached Alexandria in safety. That city was taken, the battle of the Pyramids was fought and won on July 21, and Cairo was occupied on 23 July. "Egypt," wrote Bonaparte on 25 July, "is the richest country in the world for wheat, rice, pulse, and meal." In the same letter he indicates a feeling of deep distress with regard to the conduct of Josephine during his absence. "I have," he writes, "much domestic distress," and he adds the remarkable statements that he "may be in France in two months, that he intends on arriving in France to shut himself up in a villa for the winter, that he is tired of human nature, that greatness fatigues him, that at 29 glory has become flat".

There seems little doubt that his suspicions with regard to Josephine occupied and disturbed his mind during the whole of the Egyptian campaign.

Nelson's victory, known as the battle of the Nile, on 1-2 August, had, however, destroyed the French fleet and shut up Bonaparte and his army in Egypt. Full of resource, however, Bonaparte resolved to convert Egypt into a firm base and to continue his efforts to rouse malcontents, such as Tippoo Sahib in India, to rise against the English. In order to overthrow a Turkish army then advancing by land he proceeded to Palestine, but Sidney Smith's defence of Acre, followed later by the lack of food and water,

and by an outbreak of plague, caused the retreat of the French army to Egypt. "The shadow of such deeds as the massacre at Jaffa . . . and the charge of having given opium to a large number of pest-stricken French soldiers . . . was," it is said, "cast over the figure of the young General."<sup>1</sup> In Egypt the Turkish fleet had disembarked 1000 troops, who were, however, overthrown at the battle of Aboukir on 21 July.

At St. Helena Napoleon recognized the decisive character of the siege of Acre. "Without the English filibuster and the French emigrants who directed the Turkish artillery, and who with the plague made me raise the siege, I would," he declared, "have conquered half Asia and come back upon Europe to seek the thrones of France and Italy."<sup>2</sup> On his return to Egypt Bonaparte, it is believed, received news from France which indicated that the "pear was ripe". On 2 August Sir Sidney Smith sent him a packet of papers, and he at once decided to return to France with the utmost speed leaving his army in Egypt under Kléber.

On 23 August he sailed with Marmont, Lannes, and Berthier from Alexandria in a small frigate—the "Muiron"—and landed at St. Raphael in the bay of Fréjus forty-seven days later, on 9 October, 1799.

At St. Helena Napoleon expressed his regret that he had ever left Egypt. He would far rather

<sup>1</sup> Kielland, "Napoleon's Men and Methods," p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: the Last Phase," p. 201.

have been Emperor of the East than Emperor of the West. Had he taken Acre he would have marched to India. "I should," he said, "have assumed the turban at Aleppo, and have headed an army of 200,000 men. The East only awaits a man."<sup>1</sup> He saw clearly that a power in possession of Egypt could threaten if not eventually conquer India. Leibnitz had advised Louis XIV to occupy Egypt, but unlike Napoleon the French monarch never realized that France, mistress of Egypt, might (Napoleon said *would*) become mistress of India. By becoming ruler of the East, Napoleon would have emulated Alexander the Great, for whom he had a deep admiration.

His journey through France was a triumphal progress. Marbot describes the scene as Napoleon passed through Lyons. Crowds blocked the streets, and amid universal rejoicings cried, "Vive Bonaparte qui vient sauver la patrie". He reached Paris on 16 October, and for three days refused to see Josephine. It was only in consequence of Bourrienne's entreaties that a reconciliation was effected. Napoleon's arrival in France at this juncture proved to be a memorable event in his career and in the history of Europe: The Russian fleet could easily have rendered his safe arrival in France impossible, but as had already been often the case Napoleon was aided by the particularist aims of one or other of the allies. In the

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: the Last Phase, pp. 148-9.

war of the Second Coalition the Austrians, bent on territorial aggression, had first thwarted and then quarrelled with the Russians, while the Russians themselves instead of using their fleet for the purpose of keeping Napoleon in Egypt were bent on securing Malta, Ancona, the Ionian Islands, and Corsica.

The shortsightedness of the allies and their selfish aims thus proved of incalculable value to Napoleon, who was enabled to return to France at a very critical moment in her history. On his arrival in Paris he soon realized that the country, weary of the tyranny and incompetence of the Directorate and of its inability to govern or even to preserve order, was anxious for peace abroad and for an honest, a stable, and a methodical republican government at home.

He also found that his position was far different from what it was after the Peace of Campo Formio. Then he was a hero but only for the moment. "They have only to see me," he said, "three times at the play to tire of me. They would run after me just as eagerly if I were on my way to the scaffold. If I remain long without doing anything I am done for." It was a far different state of things in October, 1799. Throughout France men longed for a strong hand to drive back the foreigner and to restore peace and order. With a unanimity which it is difficult to explain, Frenchmen now concentrated their thoughts upon Napoleon as the man who would be the saviour of his country.

Napoleon's reconciliation with Josephine was, it is

said, brought about mainly by the recognition of the fact that a serious quarrel with his wife might interfere with the ambitious plans which he was meditating, and which were executed some three weeks later.

## CHIEF DATES

Bonaparte appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Italy . . . . .	2 March, 1796.
The Battle of Montenotte . . . . .	12 April, 1796.
The Battle of Millesimo . . . . .	13 April, 1796.
The Battle of Dego . . . . .	14 April, 1796.
The Treaty of Cherasco . . . . .	14 April, 1796.
The Battle of Lodi . . . . .	10 May, 1796.
Bonaparte enters Milan . . . . .	15 May, 1796.
The Battle of Lonato . . . . .	3 August, 1796.
The Battle of Castiglione . . . . .	5 August, 1796.
The Battle of Arcola . . . . .	15-17 November, 1796.
Capitulation of Mantua . . . . .	2 February, 1797.
The Treaty of Tolentino . . . . .	19 February, 1797.
The French at Leoben . . . . .	7 April, 1797.
Revolution of the 8 Fructidor . . . . .	4 September, 1797.
The Peace of Campo Formio . . . . .	17 October, 1797.
At Rastadt . . . . .	25 November to 2 December, 1797.
In Paris . . . . .	5 December, 1797.
The Egyptian Expedition starts . . . . .	19 May, 1798.
The Battle of the Nile . . . . .	1-2 August, 1798.
The Siege of Acre . . . . .	1-2 August, 1798.
Bonaparte leaves Egypt . . . . .	23 August, 1799.
His arrival in Paris . . . . .	16 October, 1799.

## CHAPTER III

### THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPEROR, 1799-1804

France in 1799—Unpopularity of the Directory—Brumaire—The Consulate—Napoleon's character—The Marengo campaign—Hohenlinden—The Treaty of Lunéville—The Armed Neutrality of 1800-1—Its failure—Napoleon's policy to Naples and Portugal—The Treaty of Amiens—Paris after the conclusion of peace—Popularity of the peace in France—Napoleon Consul for life—The Constitution—The Code Napoleon—The Concordat—Napoleon's defence of his religious policy—General character of the Consulate—Cadoudal's conspiracy—The execution of the Duc d'Enghien—Napoleon becomes Emperor—The French Empire—The court and nobility.

THE period from 1799 to 1804 begins with the fall of the Directory and closes with the establishment of the Napoleonic Empire. The weakness of the Directory since the *coup d'état* of Fructidor, in 1797, had steadily increased, and its unpopularity had become widespread. It had interfered with established beliefs, it had failed to preserve order in the country, its armies had been driven from Italy. France in 1799 was in a condition of anarchy and disorder; liberty no longer existed, and all free institutions had disappeared. The army was the real master of the situation, but the army did not realize its power.



Fortunately it did not oppose the *coup d'état* of Brumaire, which, badly arranged and clumsily carried out, was found to have strong popular support. That accomplished Bonaparte, having won Marengo and re-established the credit of the French arms, speedily climbed to a position of supreme power. In him Frenchmen readily saw a necessary absolutism taking the place "of a corrupt and inefficient oligarchy".

The landing of Napoleon at Fréjus thus proved to be the turning-point in the history of Europe. Between 1799 and 1815, in consequence of the safe return of Napoleon from Egypt, Europe underwent a thorough but necessary revolution. The quarrels and jealousies of the allies during the war of the Second Coalition, the selfishness of Prussia, the divisions in Italy, the lethargic condition of Spain, illustrate the necessity for a period of thorough reform.

Had the European body politic been in a sound and healthy condition it could not have found a more favourable situation than was presented to it in 1799 for reducing the overgrown power of France, but the selfishness and shortsightedness of the allies, the want of a cordial understanding, the complete lack of any system of co-operation—all combined to complete the failure of the Second Coalition. "Fourteen years were to elapse before there occurred so favourable an opportunity of checking the overweening pretensions of France; and then it was a Europe vivified by the reforms originating from the Revolution which finally beat down the might of Napoleon."

“We were plunging under full sail back to the abyss of the Terror.”

In 1799 the majority of Frenchmen desired peace and order. The working men had acquired land, a settled position, and a competence. To them the period of revolution was over, and they had no wish either to see the Bourbons restored or to plunge France into further disorder. Among the lowest orders in Paris Jacobin principles indeed prevailed. But it can hardly be said that even among them the Directory was popular. Since its triumph on the 8 Fructidor the Directory had become steadily more and more unpopular. It had endeavoured to suppress Catholicism by means of what were practically *lettres de cachet*. The observance of the *Décadi* was insisted upon, and no religious liberty was permitted. Moreover, order was not preserved in the country, which was infested by brigands. Rebellion was chronic in the west of France, trade was disorganized, the State was practically bankrupt; on 19 July, 1799, the daily journals recorded that “there is no longer any business doing on the Bourse in Paris. Every day money becomes tighter.”<sup>1</sup> So unpopular did the Directory become that recruiting for the army was rendered wellnigh impossible, and the recruits took to brigandage. France was in a state of anarchy and disorder when Napoleon escaped from Egypt. On returning to France he found that the old enthusiasm of 1789 had vanished. Ten years of revolu-

<sup>1</sup> Vandal, “L’Avènement de Bonaparte,” Vol. I, p. 197.

tion had wrought many changes, and had dissipated many hopes. The majority of Frenchmen "were so thoroughly sick of Jacobinism, and all its works, that they wished to rid themselves not only of the Revolution, but of the monstrous regime to which it had given birth, though they had no desire to return to the old one with all its abuses. They longed for quiet, order, and a cessation of proscription at home and of war abroad."<sup>1</sup>

Such was the opinion of Mallet du Pan who had watched the events in France for so many years, and whose judgment upon the Directory was remarkable for its sagacity and accuracy. But Napoleon found not only that the Directory had failed hopelessly in its task of governing France, but that it had also failed in its foreign policy. Though the French armies had proved successful against the Russians in Switzerland, and against the Russians and British in Holland, Italy was lost. "The glory of our arms was tarnished, our conquests lost, our territory threatened with invasion." This somewhat exaggerated statement represents, however, the general feeling in France in the autumn of 1799.

The events which filled those momentous days between 9 October, 1799, when Napoleon landed at Fréjus, and 9 November (18 Brumaire), when the Directory was overthrown, were of momentous importance to France and indeed to Europe.

On his arrival in Paris Napoleon found the

<sup>1</sup> "The Edinburgh Review," No. 411, p. 79.

Government of the Directory disorganized and discredited. "The Revolution having destroyed all the old corporations, legal, religious, and industrial, had left the individual face to face with the State, so that an extreme theory of collective control had been insensibly but logically substituted for the individualism of 1789".<sup>1</sup>

But the local functionaries were incapable either from ignorance or fear to perform their duties, as the State which was bankrupt made no attempt "to organize education, to tend the sick, to assist the poor, to check brigandage, to punish crime, to check disorder," or to carry on the work of internal administration. France was in a most precarious position. There was a general desire for an honest, capable Republican Government, which in accordance with the shortlived Constitution of 1791, should recognize Roman Catholicism, and having assured to France its natural frontiers of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, should give the country a period of peace. "Peace abroad, and methodical government at home," was the desire of a large majority of Frenchmen.

Till 1799 the power of the Directory was based on military successes abroad, but the expulsion of the French from Italy by the Russians and Austrians was not in the minds of the French nation compensated for by Masséna's victory at Zurich on 25-26 September, by Suvorov's retirement into Bavaria, or

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. VIII, p. 665.

by the evacuation of Holland by the Duke of York in October.

Owing to the selfish and particularist aims of the allies and to the inaction of Prussia, France though temporarily deprived of Italy had in reality nothing to fear from the European Coalition which had indeed already broken up. Nevertheless the loss of Italy had robbed the Directory of its one remaining hope of continuing in power, and the army now demanded a change of government. Everything being in a chaotic and uncertain condition, an opportunity was given to Abbé Siéyès to carry out his famous intrigue which had for its object the overthrow of the Directory and the establishment of a government more in harmony with the wishes of the French nation.

The revolution of Brumaire has been described as "a Day of Dupes"; Siéyès and those who supported him had no wish to set up a military despotism. "All men, however," writes Marbot, "understood that some great change was necessary and inevitable." Some thought a mere change of Directors would suffice, others like Siéyès thought that the reins of power should be placed in the hands of some strong man, but one who would certainly not attempt to establish a despotism. Of the possible leaders in such a movement, Bernadotte, Masséna, and Moreau, the first-named was not considered to be sufficiently capable, Masséna was a mere soldier, and Moreau, who was lazy, refused to lead a movement. He was

not a politician, and in times of peace preferred hunting to politics. On his refusal to act, Siéyès had written to Napoleon then in Egypt acquainting him with the condition of France.

The revolution of Brumaire was partly the work of the tactful and courageous Lucien Bonaparte and of the astute Talleyrand, but owed its success in no small degree to Siéyès. During the few weeks previous to the *coup d'état* of Brumaire, Lucien had scope for his undoubtedly great abilities. It was, however, Siéyès who, when Napoleon hesitated, said, "they," the Council of 500, "have put you outside the law, put them outside the Hall". Lucien always considered that after Brumaire Napoleon regarded him with jealousy. The feud between them became well-nigh irreconcilable, and Lucien, with the title of Prince of Canino, settled at Rome, devoting himself to artistic, literary, and agricultural pursuits. During the crisis of Brumaire he had certainly shown considerable tact and courage.

The Directory fell without exciting the regret of any section of Frenchmen. Its lack of governing power, its failure to hold Italy, together with the absence of social stability in France, and the financial disorganization which everywhere prevailed, justified the general satisfaction felt at the events of the 19 Brumaire.

But though the *coup d'état* had succeeded, "though much was to be gained by the concentration of the executive authority, and much also by the suppression

of extravagant political debate, the price was destined to be such as no one in France imagined on that November evening, while the deputies were rushing wildly through the park, and the fog was falling upon the last fevers of the French Revolution".<sup>1</sup>

Brumaire was not a victory of the army—"it was not by the sword that he had seized power"—and Napoleon found himself at the head of affairs in France not by means of merely military support, but rather through the instrumentality of public opinion. Napoleon even after Brumaire was far from being sure of the army, least of all of the garrison of Paris, and one of his first duties was to negotiate with the generals. Opposition also came from the "intellectuals," the friends of Madame de Staël, from "ideologues," and from professional men. Napoleon's strength, it has been said, "lay in public opinion, in the weakness of the Councils, the corrupt discredited conventionals and terrorists, in the support of the working classes of Paris who feared reaction, as well as of the middle classes eager for orderly government and peace". Moreover, the peasants and working men generally throughout France "were sick of the Republic as understood by the Jacobins, of its corruption, its horrors, and its bombast".<sup>2</sup>

From 11 November to 25 December, 1799, the three Consuls of the French Republic, Siéyès, Roger

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. VIII, p. 688.

<sup>2</sup> See Aulard, "The French Revolution, a Political History," translated by Bernard Miall, London, Fisher Unwin, 1910.

Ducos, and Napoleon, composed "an Executive Commission invested with the full powers of the Directory". On Christmas Day the new Constitution, under which the government was soon to fall entirely into the hands of Napoleon, came into being. That Constitution, the character of which will be described later, was obviously drawn up in great haste, and bristled with imperfections. Many of its clauses were vague, many of its arrangements lacked definiteness, in several cases machinery was lacking for the due execution of several of its enactments.

In 1799, however, France demanded a strong government. The fear of Socialism was ever before the eyes of the middle classes, and to avert the triumph of Socialistic ideas the majority of Frenchmen were willing for a time to sacrifice a certain amount of liberty. Napoleon "believed in the magic of private property," and was rewarded by the confidence which during the Consulate and for many years after France placed in him.

The character of Napoleon can only be understood after a careful study of his life, and only by remembering that he was an Italian in temperament. From his earliest youth he was liable to violent outbursts of temper—Corsican passionateness—which led him at times to commit acts such as the execution of the Duc d'Enghien, which were, to say the least, regrettable. He had no strict regard for truth, and "of the many base, blackhearted lies which have been brought home to Bonaparte, the slander of his dead colleague



(Admiral Brueys, who was defeated at the battle of the Nile) is one of the basest". The fact was he lied if it was convenient to him to do so, and consequently not much reliance can be placed on much that he said and wrote at St. Helena.

His organization of France during the Consulate shows his extraordinary breadth of view and his mastery of detail, a powerful imagination, a largeness of perception, the possession of an infinite patience—such were some of the qualities which he possessed in a marked degree. Often when he refused to listen to suggestions it was found that he had more knowledge of the facts than those who tendered the advice. "His Majesty's character," writes Gourgaud, "is a combination of contrasts."

Before, however, Napoleon could show his remarkable genius for organization, by not only making the Constitution workable, but by using it as a means for establishing himself as the despotic ruler of France, it was necessary first to establish order at home and then to deal with the external foes of France.

La Vendée was at that time in full revolt. Napoleon at once issued a masterly manifesto offering an amnesty to all who laid down their arms, but threatening death to all who resisted. As Napoleon had an army on which he could rely, and as to the astonishment of the Vendéens he showed respect for their religion, the pacification of La Vendée was easily accomplished.

Till, however, Marengo had been fought and won Napoleon's position was uncertain. France desired

peace and rest, and it was only after Great Britain and Austria had declined to consider any terms of peace which did not include "the withdrawal of France within her former frontiers, and the re-establishment of the monarchy," that Napoleon opened the famous campaign of 1800.

Opposed to France were the nations who had formed the Second Coalition. England, Austria, Russia, Turkey, Sweden, and Denmark had been its original members. But Russia, owing to the conduct of the Austrians, had recalled its chief army under Suvorov, from Italy, and had, moreover, become temporarily alienated from England.

Napoleon with his habitual adroitness at once comprehended the situation. He released a number of Russian prisoners, and sent them back to Russia with a courteous message to Paul I. That half-demented sovereign was at once won, and till his death became a warm admirer of the First Consul. Freed from all danger from an attack by Russia, or from Prussia, which still pursued its neutral line of policy, Napoleon was able to devote all his attention to the Austrians in Italy.

The allies, by continuing hostilities, thus played into the hands of Napoleon, whose real object was to secure unlimited power by war and the support of the army. That army was starving, and was anxious for war as the speediest means of securing food, money, honour, and comfort. Moreover, a successful campaign would replenish the French Treasury

which under the wasteful, dishonest, and incompetent rule of the Directory had run dry.<sup>1</sup> "Our task," said Napoleon to the army on the day following Brumaire, "is not to defend our own frontiers but to invade the territory of our foes," and no sooner was the renewal of the struggle with Austria and England imminent than he held out to the army the hope of a speedy end to all their anxieties. "Victory," he assured the soldiers, "will give you bread."

Rarely was Napoleon's power of rapid organization seen to greater advantage than during the early weeks of 1800. Though Moreau had on the Rhine some 110,000 men accustomed to war, Masséna's troops stationed near Genoa who numbered but 25,000 were disorganized.

Napoleon at once set to work to form with the aid of Berthier a fresh army, and reinforced by some 18,000 of Moreau's force found himself on the plains of Lombardy in the middle of May at the head of 70,000 men.

The crossing of the Great St. Bernard on 20 May was fraught with considerable danger. And yet Napoleon, with his army dragging its artillery, performed this difficult operation. The men "un-

<sup>1</sup> "On ne pouvait espérer mettre fin à la detresse financière du pays qu'en faisant contribuer les voisins au paiement des impôts, soit en les annexant bonnement soit en créant sur les frontières de la France une ceinture de république vassales ayant à supporter leur part des charges de l'état." Fournier, "Napoleon I," Vol. I, p. 216. Paris, Emile Bouillon.

locked the cannon from their stocks, put them in the hollow trunks of trees, and then one-half the battalions dragged them up the mountain while the other half carried the arms and accoutrements of their comrades, with stores of provisions for five days". The frightful precipice of St. Pierre demanded the greatest care, and Napoleon nearly lost his life by slipping from his mule down one of them. His guide, however, seized him just in time, and was rewarded with 1000 francs.

On 22 May Ivrea was taken, and on the 28th Napoleon wrote an account of its capture to Joseph. "We fell down upon them here," he says, "like a thunderbolt: the enemy did not in the least expect us, and even now can hardly believe that we are here." On 2 June he was at the gates of Milan.

In the battle of Marengo, fought on 14 June, Napoleon, though at first technically beaten, was able through the timely arrival of Desaix to defeat the Austrians, with a loss of 9000 men killed and wounded.

Soon after the opening of the battle the Austrians occupied the village of Marengo, and the French right wing and centre were compelled to retreat. At three o'clock in the afternoon the battle seemed lost, and the aged Austrian General Melas left the field and sent messages to Vienna to announce his victory. Till five o'clock the French slowly retreated, and then Desaix arrived—only to be himself shortly afterwards killed by a cannon ball.

But the troops which he brought with him amply

avenged his death, and led by Bonnet threw themselves upon the Austrian grenadiers who were commanded by General Zack. At the same time Kellermann attacked them on their flank, while the French left wing advanced. The village of Marengo was reoccupied and a decisive victory was won.

During the closing scenes of this famous battle, the confidence of the troops who had borne the heat of the day was entirely restored by the courage shown by "the little man on the white horse" who was ever in the front, and no small part of the credit of the victory was due to Napoleon, whose orders were skillfully carried out by Desaix and Kellermann.

In Paris the victory was celebrated by illuminations, and Louis, the Bourbon claimant to the French throne, wrote to congratulate the successful general.

The battle of Marengo was the real turning-point in Napoleon's career. Defeat would have ruined him and his family. As it was, the reverses suffered by the Austrians on the Danube during the summer of 1800,<sup>1</sup> culminating in their disastrous defeat by Moreau at Hohenlinden, "a victory more brilliant and more complete than that of Marengo," rendered Francis II ready to consider the question of peace. Moreover, the Austrians had been driven out of Italy which was again in French hands, and at the same time the Tsar Paul had not only entered upon a quarrel with Great Britain over the question of Neutrals, but had made

<sup>1</sup> On 19 June Moreau had defeated Kray in the battle of Hochstädt.

advances to Napoleon. The distrust felt by both Russia and Prussia of Austria contributed in no small degree to the position of supremacy to which Napoleon attained. Cobenzel who had succeeded Thugut as Austrian Foreign Minister, and whose natural hesitation in agreeing to the French terms was severely criticized by Napoleon, was compelled most reluctantly to agree to the proposed terms, and on 9 February, 1801, signed what he styled the "terrible" Treaty of Lunéville. France was now assured in her possession of the German districts on the left bank of the Rhine, and, moreover, definitely obtained Belgium and Luxemburg. In Italy she gained the frontier of the Adige, and the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics were placed under her protection. French troops occupied Piedmont in the North and Taranto in the South, and Tuscany—now the kingdom of Etruria—was ruled by the Duke of Parma (a mere figurehead); Rome was defenceless, and the King of Naples owed his preservation to the influence of the Tsar Paul. Marengo placed Napoleon's power on a sound basis—it was the first occasion since 1791 when public rejoicings were spontaneous and universal. "The French nation," Napoleon declared, "is satisfied with the Treaty, and I am extremely pleased with it."

After the conclusion of the Peace of Lunéville Napoleon seemed in a strong position. Contributions from Holland, Portugal, and Italy enabled him to pay his troops without taxing the French people, while in various parts of Europe, especially in Germany, his

armies lived on the inhabitants among whom they were quartered. Denmark, Sweden, and Russia were prepared to war against England. He therefore proposed to continue with vigour his struggle with England, and to overcome her resistance by his occupation of Egypt, and by intrigues in India and Ireland. The hostility of Paul of Russia to England and the formation of the Armed Neutrality would prove, he thought, of great value in the furtherance of his crusade against the unconquerable Island kingdom. Paul, indeed, carried away by his fantastic imagination, spoke of invading India by way of Khiva and Herat. On 20 January, 1801, before the Treaty of Lunéville was signed Napoleon had declared that peace with the Emperor was of no importance compared with the Russian alliance, which he trusted would overpower England and preserve Egypt to France.

The Armed Neutrality of 1800-1 seemed to Napoleon to offer an excellent opportunity of ruining British trade in the North. He had failed to ruin that trade in the East, but this time he had every reason to expect success. Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark had united in protesting against England's right to search the ships of Neutrals, and to confiscate as contraband of war all goods of belligerents found on them. Thus at a period when Russia and Prussia might reasonably have been expected to unite with England against France, those Powers combined with Sweden and Denmark in an attempt to weaken the leading opponent of Napoleon.

A series of misfortunes, however, wrecked all the hopes of Napoleon. Not only had the British seized Malta on 5 September, 1800, but on 8 March, 1801, the battle of Copenhagen in which the Danish fleet was in great part destroyed, preceded by the failure of the French fleet to succour the army left in Egypt, and followed by the death of Paul I on 23 March, upset the calculations which he had formed of striking a severe blow at British commerce. "In concert with the Tsar," he told Bourrienne, "I was sure of striking a mortal blow at the English power in India. A palace revolution has overturned all my projects." Nevertheless he still endeavoured to isolate Great Britain, and hoped by closing the ports of Western and Southern Europe to her ships to bring her to terms.

The new Tsar Alexander was, however, hostile to Napoleon. Russia was a large producer of articles carried by British ships, and as Great Britain was Russia's chief customer the material interests, especially of the landowners who were for the most part the great nobles, were bound up with peace with the Government of George III. On 17 June the Treaty of St. Petersburg re-established good relations between England and Russia.

Napoleon had already shown that he completely under-estimated the vitality of a State like England round which centred a far-reaching commercial system. He never understood the maritime problem with which he had to deal. Henceforward, however, the possibility of closing the North of Europe to British trade, and of



combining the Baltic navies against the navy of Great Britain, became one of the fixed ideas of his mind.

While he was endeavouring to support the Northern Powers in a League against Great Britain, he had not been idle in the South of Europe.

On 28 March, 1801, he made an agreement known as the Treaty of Florence with the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. By this Treaty Naples was to exclude from her ports the ships and the commerce of England and Turkey. The South of Italy was to be occupied by 15,000 French troops in order to facilitate communication with Egypt. His hope was that by means of naval combinations the Northern ports could be closed to English ships, that Egypt might remain in French hands, and that England would be forced to make peace.

However, on 21 March, the combined English and Turkish armies won the battle of Alexandria; on 27 June Cairo fell into the hands of the British, and on 2 September the French were compelled to make a convention abandoning Egypt.

While he was hoping for French successes in the Mediterranean, Napoleon had instigated Spain to attack Portugal. On 1 October, 1800, he had concluded with Spain the Treaty of Ildefonso, by which Tuscany (the kingdom of Etruria) was promised to the Queen of Spain's daughter who had married the Bourbon Prince of Parma. On 21 March, 1801, the Princess took possession of the new kingdom. On its part Spain ceded to France, Parma, Elba, and Louisiana,

and promised to attack Portugal—the ally of England. A Spanish army, aided by a French corps, did indeed invade Portugal, but on 6 June, 1801, the Treaty of Badajos ended the war. Portugal, to the infinite rage of Napoleon, who, however, had received a large sum of money from the Portuguese, refused to close her ports to English commerce.

Thus at the end of 1801, the sea power of Great Britain remained unconquered. The Northern Coalition had been dispersed; the great States, apart from France, showed friendly feelings towards Great Britain. The control of the Mediterranean was still in the hands of the British fleet; the French had failed in Egypt.

The situation certainly was far from favourable to Napoleon. France was practically isolated, Russia was ready to challenge her supremacy in Germany and Italy; the neutrality of Prussia was uncertain; Austria was anxious for an opportunity of evading the terms of the Treaty of Lunéville. All Napoleon's grandiose projects had failed. The English were supreme in Egypt and the Mediterranean; Spain had made peace with Portugal; Denmark had been compelled by Nelson to desert the Armed Neutrality.

Napoleon at once realized that his best policy was to come to terms with Great Britain. On 1 October, 1801, the preliminaries of peace with Great Britain were signed. He had found it necessary to make a truce with the English nation while he reorganized France from within, and brought more completely under his

control Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and to some extent Germany. In other words, he realized that a period of peace would enable him to establish his own supremacy on a firm basis in France, and French supremacy outside her borders, while he would be able to make adequate preparations to renew the struggle with Great Britain in a few years. Thus his first attempt to establish his supremacy over Europe had failed.

In the negotiations at Amiens the French representatives, of whom Joseph Bonaparte was the chief, outwitted the English Government on many points. England certainly gained Trinidad and Ceylon, but the Dutch recovered the Cape of Good Hope. France undertook to restore Egypt to Turkey, to guarantee the integrity of Portugal, and to retire from Naples. England agreed to evacuate Malta, never expecting that the French would continue to occupy Holland, Piedmont, and Switzerland. On 8 October peace was formally made with Russia, the latter power engaging not to support the Bourbons, while Napoleon engaged not to aid the Poles. Treaties with Turkey and Bavaria marked the final pacification of Europe.

Unfortunately Addington had not insisted upon the independence of Holland and Switzerland. In his opinion Article 11 of the Treaty of Lunéville "which expressly guaranteed the independence of the Batavian Republic," and Article 2 of the Franco-Dutch Convention "of the 29 August, 1801, which specified that the French troops should only remain in the Batavian

Republic until the general peace," rendered the evacuation of Holland a necessary and immediate consequence of the Treaty of Amiens. Napoleon, however, refused to evacuate Holland, and at the same time demanded that the English should quit Malta without delay. As neither party would yield, matters drifted on till the outbreak of war in 1803.

In her "Memoirs" the Duchess d'Abrantes has given us a very interesting account of Paris on the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens. Paris was thronged with foreigners, among whom were Charles Fox, Lord and Lady Cholmondeley, the Duchess of Gordon, and Lady E. Foster afterwards Duchess of Devonshire.

"Nothing," we are told, "could exceed Napoleon's extreme and rigid economy in all his private concerns; but when circumstances required it, he could equal in magnificence the most sumptuous sovereign of the East."<sup>1</sup>

At this time he disliked foreigners, and in spite of some attempts never succeeded in acquiring more than a smattering of English. But he insisted that foreigners should be treated with courtesy and shown the art treasures in Paris.

An Englishman in Paris describes Napoleon at a Review on 3 August, 1802. "Bonaparte," he says, "wore a plain green coat with a narrow white cloth edging at the seams . . . and a cocked hat without

<sup>1</sup> "Memoirs of Napoleon," by the Duchess d'Abrantes, Vol. I, p. 538. London, Bentley, 1836.

any lace. His hair is very black, and is cropped very close to his head and neck, so that his ears are all bare. It falls down over his brow. His complexion is swarthy, his face long, a fine nose, his eyes are very dark, and his eyebrows fall, or are drawn down, much over his eyes. His cheek bones are high, and his cheeks sink between the bones of the face and those of the chin, which gives him a wasted consumptive look. His upper lip projects in the middle of his mouth considerably over the under one, and his chin is sharp and prominent. . . . To me he appeared to have the look of anxiety or rather of fear. He was mounted on a beautiful Arabian grey horse, one of the most perfect animals I ever saw. . . . During all that period (nearly an hour and a half) he never once opened his lips, nor did he turn his head to the right or to the left. . . . No person spoke to him, nor was he cheered or huzzaed, either when he came into the Cour or when he departed.”<sup>1</sup>

After the settlement of peace with Great Britain, France seemed to have secured what she had desired for many years, a period of tranquillity. Napoleon had been accepted as the head of the State, because he had overthrown the Directory whose execrable home policy had covered it with disgrace, and because he had won Marengo and regained Italy. France had entered upon a brilliant period in her annals—and if peace had been prolonged for ten or even for

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Harold Wheeler in “The Story of Napoleon,” p. 126, from the Diary of Robert Sym.

five years it is difficult "to conjecture what might have been the course of history".

After Marengo Napoleon's position in France was assured. The French nation, however, still desired peace—and a long continuance of peace. "The millions who by successive *plébiscites* confirmed Napoleon in the possession of sovereign power expected that he would establish orderly and methodical government and maintain equality." They never realized, however, that in setting up Napoleon they were giving themselves a master whose aims ran directly counter to those of the majority of the French nation.

Most Frenchmen hoped to see the establishment of a Republic, and of the Constitution, with modifications, of 1791. Napoleon, on the other hand, lost no time in bringing about the restoration of monarchical rule with himself as monarch. The nation, satisfied with having secured what it called its "natural" boundaries—namely, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees—desired peace. Napoleon, on the other hand, never ceased planning for the extension of France beyond her borders—an extension which could only be effected by acts of invasion, and a period of conquest. Like the army, he desired war. During the period of peace, indeed, he never ceased from acts of aggression and from arranging plans of conquest. In 1802, after the conclusion of peace, he annexed Elba, Piedmont, Parma, and Piacenza, while from 1801 to 1805 he was constantly devising schemes

against the English in India. These schemes indeed failed, but it was not till 1810 that Mauritius was captured from France and a continual menace to British merchantmen removed.

In August, 1802, Napoleon was appointed Consul for life, and a new period in French history is entered upon. The Concordat with the Pope brought to France international peace, while the Peace of Amiens with England gave the country that rest from war which all Frenchmen desired. The position of France was, moreover, immensely strengthened by the discord which prevailed in Germany. On 25 February, 1803, the reconstruction of Germany was decided upon, and the Holy Roman Empire came practically to an end.

The victory of Marengo placed Napoleon in a position of supremacy in the world of politics; the Peace of Lunéville and the Peace of Amiens strengthened enormously that position. France had now obtained a welcome respite from war. She also desired the establishment of order and a settled form of government. Napoleon in 1802 had an excellent opportunity of showing his skill as an administrator, and at the same time of advancing towards the attainment of despotic power. The Constitution of the year VIII, or the Consulate, indeed bristled with checks and balances, and Bonaparte as First Consul seemed to all but a few astute heads simply a *primus inter pares*. Frenchmen desired a restoration of the Republic and a return to the Constitution of 1791.

They aimed at personal security and freedom in place of anarchy and oppression. A policy of tolerance and the recognition of religion as the basis of society were required to satisfy the majority of Frenchmen who had seen with pleasure the overthrow of the Directory.

Though the men who carried out the revolution of Brumaire had no intention of giving to Napoleon the position of a dictator, they had unconsciously acted well for French interests in placing the successful general at the head of the new Government. For Napoleon was by nature an ideal administrator, with a passion for efficiency. His administrative capacity was simply prodigious, and no living man was his superior in the art of organization.

But this power of evolving order out of chaos, of choosing efficient instruments for carrying out the work of reorganization, and of assuring to France peace within her borders, was accompanied by an overweening ambition. Napoleon was already determined to make himself supreme, and to use the general desire for reforms and reorganization as a step towards imperialism.

The new Constitution itself, which had been hurriedly drawn up, afforded opportunities for a man of Bonaparte's determination for the creation of a despotism. The Legislature was divided between the Legislative Body of 300, and the Tribunate of 100, both bodies being chosen by the Senate. The Tribunate's duty was to discuss laws but not to vote,



while to the Legislative Body was assigned the duty of voting on the laws which had been already discussed by the Tribunate. The Legislature thus had no popular foundation, and its powers divided between two bodies were closely curtailed and checked by the Senate of eighty and by the Council of State, the members of both bodies being nominated by the Consuls. While the Council of State initiated the laws, the Senate had power to veto any laws which endangered the Constitution.

The Senate, while it erected and controlled the Legislative Body and the Tribunate, soon found itself powerless before the strong Executive which it had set up. Three Consuls appointed by the Senate formed the Executive Authority, and the First Consul, Napoleon, was given powers which soon enabled him to sweep away all the checks which had been devised by the Constitution.

The appointment of Ministers was given to Bonaparte as First Consul, and he at once constructed a Ministry after his own heart. Lucien Bonaparte (who was succeeded in 1801 by Chaptal) became Minister of the Interior, Fouché remained Minister of Police, Decrès became Minister of the Navy, Barbé-Marbois Minister of the Public Treasury, Dejean Minister of Military Affairs, and in 1802 Regnier was appointed Minister of Justice.

The local administration was organized with the same care that characterized Napoleon's systematic organization of the central administration.

Over each Department was placed a "Préfet," who presided over the Council of the Department, while in the towns the Councils were presided over by the Mayors who were appointed by the "Préfets". These "Préfets," who were chosen with great care, proved admirable officials. They were already skilled in administrative work, and under their supervision the local administrators worked well.

Civil and Criminal Tribunals were set up over which was a *Cour de Cassation* at Paris. The judges were appointed by the First Consul for life. To the ordinary Frenchman Napoleon appeared to be restoring the Republic, and his title of First Consul roused no feelings of suspicion. The measures taken on the fall of the Directory were statesmanlike, and France and her armies believed that a new era in the history of revolutionary government had dawned. Very few realized that the promulgation of the Constitution of the year VIII was the first step in the establishment of a despotism.

The Code Napoleon which carried out the codification of the French law was a remarkable illustration of Napoleon's energy. Like the legal reforms of Justinian, Napoleon's Code remains the most permanent of the gifts of the Consulate to France. The French Revolution had led to endless confusion, but had also cleared the way for a code of uniform laws. The French people, in Napoleon's opinion, desired equality, and the Code Napoleon provided them with equal justice, "one weight, one measure, one law".

Henceforward all citizens had equal opportunities of advancement. Already the Convention and Directory had made efforts to provide a code. But it was not till after Marengo that a period of calm ensued, and a committee of lawyers was appointed on 12 August, 1800, to draw up a Civil Code. "That code," writes Mr. Fisher, "harmonized the discoveries of democratic jurisprudence with the ripe and tested wisdom of the legists of the monarchy." It remains "the most durable monument of Napoleon's genius".<sup>1</sup>

During his campaign in Italy in 1796-7 Napoleon showed his realization of the value of Christianity as an effective political force. His Moslem proclamations during the Egyptian expedition were merely temporary expedients to serve a certain purpose, and after Brumaire he at once acted in opposition to the belief held by men of revolutionary temperament and as a rule by the army that Catholicism was hostile to liberty.

The history of his efforts to carry out this striking revolution in Republican policy is a signal proof of his astuteness and determination. To those who professed Catholicism Brumaire came as a most welcome relief. The unlimited persecution which had disgraced the last two years of the Directory came to an end, the laws of deportation were repealed, the opening of churches was allowed, and gradually the observance of *Décadi* was ignored by the religious

<sup>1</sup> Fisher, "Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany," Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1903.

world. The condition of the clergy was at the time pitiable, their lands had been confiscated, public worship had been checked, and was barely legal, a schism still divided the "non-juring" from the constitutional clergy.

Nevertheless the Catholic Church remained a great force, and her immense influence could not be ignored. Of all the various religions adhered to in France that of Catholicism rested on the most stable foundations, and remained unchanged. Its influence was fully recognized by Napoleon who determined to direct its policy; he saw that its complete re-establishment was advisable if not absolutely necessary for the success of his political schemes, but he was equally resolved that the disendowment of 1790 must not be interfered with. He was determined to carry through a plan for the redistribution of dioceses and parishes, and to procure not only the Papal recognition of the constitutional orders, but also the Papal sanction to his right to nominate to bishoprics, and to rearrange the dioceses and parishes.

During the years from 1790 to 1794 the Church had remained a State Institution in accordance with the Civil Constitution of the clergy set up in 1790; the salaries of the clergy being paid from the public treasury. But the vast majority of the clergy refused to take the oath of allegiance which the revolutionists demanded, and were in consequence subject to extreme persecution. The Act of 1790 was simply "a return to despotic precedents, and the old contempt

for human liberty," and by it thousands of the clergy and faithful Catholics who had hitherto warmly supported the Revolution were alienated.

In September, 1794, by order of the Convention, salaries paid to the conforming priests ceased, Church and State were thus separated, and till Napoleon made the Concordat with the Pope all creeds were on the same level. But in France Catholicism was still a force, and in spite of the persecuting policy of the Directory from 1797 to 1799 the Catholics continued without any help from the State and independent of Rome to hold their services.

For two years after Brumaire liberty of conscience and liberty of worship were tacitly allowed, Catholic services were not interfered with, the clergy resumed their clerical dress, the Seminarists began to return to France and their duties. It seemed as though Catholicism separated from the State would remain simply a spiritual power. Protestantism was not interfered with,<sup>1</sup> Jews were tolerated. The doctrine of liberty and equality in religion seemed to be fully recognized, the Gregorian Calendar came more into use, and many shops remained closed on Sundays.

Napoleon himself fully realized the strength of Catholicism, the advantages of a union between Church and State and the importance of enlisting on

<sup>1</sup> It has been stated that at this time there were in France 3,000,000 Protestants, 17,000,000 Freethinkers, 15,000,000 Catholics. (See Pressensé, "L'Eglise et la Revolution Française".)

his side one of the great forces in French society. While, however, he was quite willing to restore the connexion between the Papacy and the Gallican Church he was determined that bishops should be nominated by himself and that he should direct their policy.

He studied Bossuet's writings in order to make himself conversant with the views of that strenuous upholder of French liberties, and he only acted after mature deliberation.

There is no evidence that Napoleon was in his policy to the Church governed by any love for, or belief in religion. His action was the result of cool calculation. By the restoration and public recognition of the Catholic religion he secured the gratitude of a considerable portion of Frenchmen. At the same time he checked the growth of a voluntary movement and brought the Church within his system of centralization.

The Papal acquiescence to the Concordat was only obtained after much wrangling. It was obviously the interest and desire of the Papacy to bring about a renewal of the union of the French Government and the Catholic Church. But the Pope struggled hard against the necessity of accepting Napoleon's terms, in accordance with which the Civil Constitution of 1790—the democratic element being eliminated—was the basis of the proposed Concordat. The Pope for some time resisted the demand that he should recognize the "constitutional" priests and "con-

stitutional" orders, but Napoleon eventually secured this recognition and himself nominated to the new Episcopate at least ten from among the constitutional clergy. Thus the Pope had to acknowledge the validity of the constitutional orders, and to accept Napoleon's future nominations to bishoprics, as well as his plan for the redistribution of dioceses and parishes. In other respects the Pope was compelled to leave the civil power master of the clergy, who being salaried were bound to conform to the edicts of the State. The Government was to countersign all addresses sent by the Pope to the clergy, to give its sanction to the meeting of all councils and diocesan synods, and generally to supervise the conduct of its secular clergy. For the payment of the clerical salaries the French taxpayers were called upon to pay an immense sum.

On 15 July, 1801, Gonsalvi and Joseph Bonaparte signed the Concordat, the negotiations for which had been carried on in Rome by Joseph who was in constant correspondence with Napoleon. On 15 August, at the suggestion of the Papal Legate, a "*fête de Napoleon*" was celebrated in Notre Dame. At the entrance the priests received Napoleon singing *Ecce mitto angelum meum, qui preparabit meam viam*. Many of those who witnessed the ceremony, and who had taken part in the early years of the French Revolution, and struggled to destroy the power of the Roman Church in France, resented bitterly its restoration by a French Consul. In later years it is said

that Napoleon regarded the Concordat as the great mistake of his administration. He himself had no fixed religious beliefs, and his restoration of the Catholic religion in France was merely a matter of policy. In 1802, however, he was about to place the French Government on a monarchical basis, and by the Concordat he had for the time secured the support of "the disciplined host of the Catholic Church".

In a memorial written at St. Helena in 1816 he declares that when on the fall of the Directory he had seized the helm he had "weighed the importance of religion" and had decided to re-establish it. By coming to an understanding with the Pope, he had caused war to cease between the two clerical parties.

Besides, his understanding with the Pope allowed him to use his influence sooner or later with 100,000,000 Catholics.<sup>1</sup>

There is little doubt that Napoleon in restoring Roman Catholicism in France was pursuing a statesmanlike policy, and one that commended itself to the masses in France. That being so, he was wise in ignoring the opinions of the refractory clergy, of the Jacobins, and of those who, like Madame de Staël, desired the establishment of Protestantism in France.

Thus in 1801 by the Concordat Napoleon pacified France, and by allowing religious liberty he had acted wisely. "I wanted," he said, during his captivity in St. Helena, "to establish universal liberty

<sup>1</sup> "The Exile of St. Helena," by Philippe Gonnard, pp. 165-6. London, W. Heinemann, 1907.



of conscience. I wanted everyone to be allowed to think and believe in his own way, and all men, whether Catholics, Protestants, Mahometans or Deists, to be equal."<sup>1</sup>

During the Consulate his measures had for their aim, he declared, economy and the general benefit of all classes. In 1799 the French nation was practically without a system of education and a large proportion of the people were uneducated. Their condition in 1799 may be appreciated if it is remembered that even in 1804 96 per cent could not read.

Nevertheless the Press was not free, and before long it became apparent that the foundations of a powerful monarchy were being carefully laid. Order had been established in Church and State, law was enforced in the administration.

Guizot declared that "Napoleon's greatest and most arduous achievement was the revivification of the idea of authority—an idea which it was thought that the Great Revolution had completely discredited".

Napoleon was a strong believer in the principle of power and domination, and disbelieved in the principles of private judgment and individual liberty.

The Consulate had many merits; equality before the law was recognized, merit was recompensed, education was organized and its cost lowered—in a word, the interests of the community were secured by a firm, intelligent, and stable Government. Napoleon

<sup>1</sup> "The Exile of St. Helena," by Philippe Gonnard, p. 127.

brushed aside the charge that he in 1804 usurped the throne. According to him he found the crown in the gutter and the French people placed it on his head. He defended his creation of a nobility on the ground that it contributed to the stability of the State to attach to the idea of nobility the conception of services rendered to the State. That his rule was mild was in his opinion proved by the fact that his eight prisons only contained 243 persons, and that the annual inspection of these prisons made by the Councillors of State precluded any risk of arbitrary detention. Napoleon in fact insisted that while he allowed religious liberty, his system of criminal justice gave France a complete measure of political liberty.

After August, 1802, when Napoleon was appointed for life, none could doubt that they would shortly witness the establishment of the Empire. If Napoleon had only given France a period of peace for ten or even for five years he could have concentrated his energies on civil and colonial enterprises. France would have become so strong that "it is impossible to conjecture what would have been the course of European history".

In 1803, when war with England broke out, the world saw the definite opening of a new period marked by the appearance of the Empire, and by the definite attempt on the part of Napoleon to establish his supremacy over Europe and to extend his influence over Asia and Australasia.

Napoleon had satisfied the wishes of those who

desired the establishment of a methodical and orderly government. His "administration surpassed in methodical and intelligent vigour anything Europe had hitherto seen". Moreover, as regarded the peace which Frenchmen desired, Napoleon protested that peace had been the object of his most strenuous endeavours, but that "the inveterate malignity of the enemies of France and of the Revolution refused all terms compatible with her honour and safety". For a time Napoleon's glorious victories and the plunder of conquered nations reconciled the French nation to the wars in which France found herself, while before the war with England had proceeded little more than a year the Consulate gave place to the Empire. That change in the government of France had been hastened by the discovery of plots against Napoleon's life.

The conspiracy of Cadoudal had been discovered in February, 1804, and Cadoudal himself was arrested on 9 March. The plot had wide ramifications and had been to a great extent hatched in London, and both Moreau and Pichegru were implicated. Napoleon convinced himself, or appeared to convince himself, that a prince was to head the movement, and that the Duc d'Enghien, then living quietly at Ettenheim near the Rhine, was to take command of the "assassins". Without any delay d'Enghien was seized on 14 March, and on 21 March he was shot at Vincennes. On 16 April Pichegru died in prison; Cadoudal and several of his fellow-conspirators were

executed, and Moreau who sailed in June to America was pardoned.

Cadoudal's conspiracy, which undoubtedly threatened the life of Napoleon, was the last of many minor conspiracies during the Consulate. To Napoleon Moreau represented the dissatisfied republicans, and d'Enghien the relentless royalists. Napoleon had now struck terror into the hearts of his opponents and no further opposition to him was forthcoming. "We have done more than we hoped to do," Cadoudal had said while in prison, "we meant to give France a King, and we have given her an Emperor."

No doubt in the case of the Duc d'Enghien, Napoleon was betrayed into an exhibition of "Corsican passionateness," for though by no means cruel by nature he was liable to outbursts of passion when he committed deeds over which he grieved later. But the execution of the Duc d'Enghien was no worse than the murder of the French envoys at Rastadt on 28 April, 1799, by some Austrian hussars, and very little worse than the abstention of the British Government from checking plots against Napoleon's life which were hatched in England.

On 18 May, 1804, Napoleon, at the age of 33 years and 8 months, took the title of Emperor with the name of Napoleon I. The discovery of the conspiracy of Georges Cadoudal in February had hastened the establishment of the Empire. On 29 March Napoleon had declared that the interests of France demanded an hereditary ruler, and on the

following day the Senate had petitioned him to become their ruler *de jure* as well as *de facto*. His acceptance of the imperial dignity marked the close of a development which had steadily proceeded since the deposition of Louis XVI in 1792.

In that year, writes M. Sorel, "le peuple avait fait la table rase; il avait délégué sa souveraineté à une Convention de sept cents membres; cette assemblée en avait délégué l'exercice à un Comité de neuf membres; puis on était passé, a travers les plébiscites, à un Directoire de cinq, à un Consulat de trois; l'évolution aboutissait à l'unité". Napoleon had ample justification for taking into his own hands the government of France. There was danger of anarchy from within, and there was the likelihood of invasion from without. Constitutional government at that time was impossible, and Napoleon realized that concentration of authority in the hands of one man was necessary. He was, he declared, the rider of a spirited horse, who in order to keep a straight course was compelled to control his steed with bit and curb.

For some years after the establishment of the Empire the French coins which were issued bore "Napoléon Empereur" on one side and "République Française" on the other. The Napoleonic absolutism was essentially different from the Bourbon absolutism. It was based on democracy not on privilege, and "its keynote was equality—equality of burdens, and equality of rights". It was avowedly a government of efficiency, and, moreover, it was a govern-

ment of conciliation; all Frenchmen could hope for employment, and all internal discords were healed. Thus equality, the passion of all Frenchmen, was secured, and the laws civil and criminal dealt equal justice to all. The Legion of Honour symbolized equality, and was the reward of every kind of talent.

Within a few years of Brumaire Napoleon had effected a complete revolution in the administration of France. That administration became centralized, and "its stability has survived every political crisis". He founded the University, he gave France the Code Napoleon, he established the Bank of France, he inaugurated the Comédie Française, he arranged the Concordat. In place of the chaos in which France was plunged in 1799 he established order, he regulated education, he set on foot an administrative system. No doubt the Napoleonic reorganization was, as Taine declares, imperfect, but nevertheless it remains the framework of French society, and has outlived numerous upheavals and political crises. "Napoleon," writes Mr. Bodley, "seemed to be called into being—a miraculous or at all events an abnormal figure—to save the existence of France; and that his work has lasted without any serious effort to upset it shows how good it was."<sup>1</sup>

During the Consulate a new Court had been gradually formed at the Tuileries, and the Paris *salons* again became prominent and Paris life became as gay as ever. Thus the way was prepared for a

<sup>1</sup> Bodley, "France," Vol. I, p. 109.

rapid development of the nobility of the Empire. "An aristocracy is necessary to every nation," was Napoleon's defence of the growth of dignitaries, civil and military, during his rule in France. Moreover, he asserted that the way to honour was open to everyone. "During my reign," he asserted, "every Frenchman could say to himself: 'If I deserve it I shall be Prime Minister, Grand Officer of the Empire, Baron, Count, Duke, or even King'. There was no obstacle for anyone." By granting equality he could say that the nobility was the people's nobility.<sup>1</sup>

Before the close of 1804 Napoleon had conferred immeasurable benefits upon the French nation. It trusted him fully, and though desirous of peace, soon reconciled itself to war with its hated enemy—Great Britain.

It was in fact not till after 1808, when the brilliant romance of Napoleon's early victories had worn off, that the spirit of moderation, which marked the temper of the French people in 1799 and the following years, began to revolt against the later extravagancies of the Imperial policy.

#### CHIEF DATES

The Revolution of Brumaire . . . . .	November, 1799.
Bonaparte First Consul . . . . .	December, 1799.
Election of Pope Pius VII . . . . .	1800.
Marengo . . . . .	14 June, 1800.
Hochstädt . . . . .	19 June, 1800.
Treaty of Ildefonso . . . . .	1 October, 1800.

<sup>1</sup> Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," p. 124.

Hohenlinden . . . . .	2 December, 1800.
The Second Armed Neutrality . . . . .	16-18 December, 1800.
The Treaty of Lunéville . . . . .	9 February, 1801.
Battle of Copenhagen . . . . .	8 March, 1801.
Battle of Alexandria . . . . .	21 March, 1801.
Death of Paul I, Accession of Alexander I . . . . .	24 March, 1801.
Treaty of Florence . . . . .	28 March, 1801.
The Treaty of Badajoz . . . . .	6 June, 1801.
The Concordat . . . . .	15 July, 1801.
The Peace of Amiens . . . . .	March, 1802.
Napoleon Consul for life . . . . .	May, 1802.
Creation of the Legion of Honour . . . . .	May, 1802.
Outbreak of war between England and France . . . . .	May, 1803.
French invasion of Hanover . . . . .	May, 1803.
Cadoudal's plot, execution of d'Enghien . . . . .	March, 1804.



## CHAPTER IV

### WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806

Reopening of the war with England—The camp at Boulogne—War with Austria and Russia—Trafalgar—Austerlitz—The Treaty of Pressburg—The German Revolution—Maida—The end of the Holy Roman Empire—Joseph's rule in Naples—Jena—Napoleon supreme in Germany—His family policy—The Berlin Decree—The Continental System.

THE years 1803-5 are of enormous importance in European history. They saw the opening of the final struggle between Napoleon and Great Britain; they witnessed the slow beginnings of a new life in Germany rendered possible by the revolution effected in that country under the influence of the First Consul. It is no longer possible to accept the view of the late M. Sorel that Napoleon's wars after 1803 were "the logical, the necessary consequence of the legitimate desire of France to secure her 'natural limits,' and of the determination of Europe to deprive her of all territory acquired after 1792".

It is equally impossible to assert that "after 1802 Napoleon did but continue the policy of the Directory, of the Convention, of Louis XIV". It is probably nearer the truth to say that Napoleon recognized that

in England he found the irreconcilable opponent to his determination to give France what he considered as her natural frontiers. So long as he regarded Holland and Belgium as lying within those natural frontiers, so long would he find in England an irreconcilable enemy. After 1803 Napoleon was by no means content to aim at the objects desired by the Convention; he determined not merely "to restore to France her 'natural limits,' but to make conquests beyond her borders".

With the opening of the struggle with Great Britain, France entered upon a period of war which continued till the entry of the allies into Paris in 1814, followed by the departure of Napoleon to Elba.

During the years from 1803-14, the war between France and Great Britain never ceased, and consequently there is much to be said for the view that the "great drama of the Napoleonic period" centred round that struggle. At the same time it is probably true that Napoleon regarded the war with Great Britain as merely a temporary obstacle to the realization of his Eastern schemes—*the establishment of French influence in Turkey*; the partition of its dominions, being accompanied by the setting up of a subservient Sultan at the head of a small kingdom encircling Constantinople; *the establishment of French supremacy in the Mediterranean*, and *the conquest of India*.

Till 1811 such appears to be the main object, the ground plan of Napoleon's policy.

While waiting for a favourable concatenation of events which should enable him to emulate and surpass Alexander, he was led by his wars with Austria, Prussia, and Russia to emulate Charles the Great, and to continue and develop the policy of Francis I, of Richelieu, and of Louis XIV towards Germany. His conquests in Central Europe were followed by the careful organization of the States included in the Confederation of the Rhine, and of Italy.

His supremacy in Germany and Italy necessitated the establishment of rulers in the various parts of Europe which acknowledged his sway, and therefore he inaugurated a family policy which was fully developed in 1810 when his brothers were ruling in Holland, Spain, and Westphalia—Northern Italy under a stepson; Southern Italy under a brother-in-law; Tuscany under a sister.<sup>1</sup> The rulers of Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg had all married relations of Napoleon whose son, the King of Rome, was intended to govern Italy. This family policy had, however, for its chief object the overthrow of Great Britain. That accomplished the Emperor would be able to carry out his Oriental schemes.

No one reading the account of Napoleon's doings between the opening of the negotiations at Amiens and the outbreak of war in 1803 can accept his assertion, made when a prisoner at St. Helena, that he was pacific at heart, that he was fired by the benevolent intention of bestowing liberal institutions upon the

<sup>1</sup> Fisher, "Bonapartism," p. 45.

reorganized nations of Europe, and that his admirable intentions had been frustrated by "the implacable hatred" of the rulers of Europe—wicked men who had "never ceased to make war on France and her principles".

At St. Helena Napoleon insisted at great length and with much emphasis that England forced war upon him in 1803. He desired "general peace as the only condition of the regeneration of Europe," but from the Campo Formio settlement a coalition "fostered and upheld by<sup>f</sup> England," who "was paying Europe for trying to kill France," existed either publicly or privately. He declared, moreover, that England, aware that peace would bring to France prosperity and render her the metropolis of the world, insisted upon a renewal of war in 1803.<sup>1</sup> Even the Peace of Amiens, he asserted, was due solely to the loyalty of Cornwallis, and was concluded against the wishes of the English Ministry. "I honestly thought at Amiens," Napoleon said, "that the fate of France, of Europe, and of myself was settled and that war was ended. It was the English Cabinet which rekindled everything." Ignoring the question of Holland, he endeavoured to prove that the retention of Malta by England was the real cause of the war in 1803.<sup>2</sup>

He averred, moreover, at St. Helena that in 1803 he had been driven into universal war, and into assuming the Dictatorship of Europe, in order to

<sup>1</sup> Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," pp. 146, 147.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 148.

obtain that peace which he always so sorely desired. While making these assertions Napoleon omitted to add that though he desired peace in 1802 and 1803, he wanted it on his own terms. He further omitted to point out that at the time of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens he showed no intention of being satisfied with the possession of the "natural" boundaries of France—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees.<sup>1</sup> Therefore such assertions as the following may sound plausible, but they are historically worthless. "I honestly thought at Amiens," he declared at St. Helena, "that the fate of France, of Europe, and of myself was settled, and that war was ended. If England and France could have acted together, how much good we might have done! We should have brought about the emancipation of all nations, we should have established peace and prosperity everywhere." But in all these reflections he makes no allusion to his aggressions in Switzerland and elsewhere during the period of peace, or to his continual occupation of Holland contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Lunéville.

In 1803 Napoleon had by the continuance of his policy of aggression, carried on during a period of peace, made the reopening of war inevitable. That war was to be not only a war of propaganda, and a war of aggression, but a duel between Great Britain and France, during which Napoleon eventually

<sup>1</sup> Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," pp. 149-53.

found himself faced by the new force of militant democracy.

By Article 10 of the Treaty of Lunéville Napoleon guaranteed the independence of the Batavian Republic. This guarantee was repeated in Article 2 of the Convention of the Hague. This evacuation was to take place as soon as peace was concluded with England. As soon, therefore, as the Peace of Amiens had been signed the British Government were justified in expecting that the evacuation would take place. To England the independence of Holland was a matter of vital necessity. So long as Holland was in the hands of Napoleon, the Cape of Good Hope, lately restored to the Dutch, might at any moment "become the base of operations of French cruisers and privateers preying upon English East Indiamen".<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon's object in 1802 and onwards was simply to subjugate all Europe in order to destroy Great Britain's trade, and to exhaust her so completely that there should be no existing check to his scheme of universal empire. Like Alexander the Great, he desired not only to conquer Europe but to subjugate India. Like Charles the Great, he was resolved while executing his schemes for the establishment of a world-empire to carry out a policy of family aggrandisement. In Holland, Spain, Westphalia, and Italy he endeavoured, as has already been stated, when at the height of his power in 1810, to establish his relations as sub-kings, who should look to Paris for direction.

<sup>1</sup> Coquelle, "England and Napoleon," p. 18.

The action of Napoleon in forcing Great Britain to plunge into war proved in the end to be a fatal mistake. And apparently no one realized more clearly than did Napoleon in his calmer moments, the necessity for a period of peace in order to complete his preparations.

Somewhat naturally French writers have endeavoured to fix the blame for the reopening of the war upon Great Britain. The breach of the peace, they say, was due to the treacherous refusal of the English to evacuate Malta, though the French had withdrawn from various positions in South Italy. Thus they assert that while the French had loyally fulfilled their engagements, the English had in a most dishonest manner refused to carry out their promises. Unless the ordinary reader has a close and accurate knowledge of the history of the time, he is liable to be deceived by such an inaccurate presentation of the facts. The evacuation of Southern Italy was not a matter with which the Treaty of Amiens had anything to do. That evacuation had been arranged between Napoleon and the King of Naples by the Treaty of Florence signed on 28 March, 1801.

About the annexation of Piedmont to France, and the invasion of Switzerland—both effected during the period of peace—the same French writers say nothing. Nor do they seem to realize that the continued occupation of Holland, in direct contravention to the terms of the Treaty made by Napoleon with Austria, could not be tolerated by Great Britain,

That Power had shortly after the Treaty of Amiens showed her desire for peace in an unmistakable manner. She had restored Minorca to Spain, and Martinique, Goree, Saint Pierre, Miquelon, and the Isle of Saint Marcouf to France. Moreover, she had not only withdrawn from Elba, but had declared her willingness to surrender Malta. Before, however, Malta had been evacuated British Ministers became convinced of Napoleon's bad faith as seen in his annexation of Piedmont, his occupation of Switzerland, and his refusal to evacuate Holland.

It is difficult to explain or understand Napoleon's conduct, when it seems undoubted that he desired a continuance of peace in order to develop the internal resources of his country, and by this means to place France in the foremost position in Europe. That he really recognized the advantages to be gained by France from a prolongation of peace seems to be proved from the fact that England, not France, delivered the ultimatum in the spring of 1803 and declared war.

The real explanation of the outbreak of war would seem to be found in Napoleon's failure to understand the character of the English nation; his failure to appreciate the depth of the national resentment in England at his actions and general attitude, and his belief that the Addington Cabinet was incapable of any active resistance to his policy.

He never realized that his overbearing and insulting conduct increased the risk of a fresh outbreak



of war between England and France. In the autumn of 1802 he was forced to recognize the failure of his ambitious projects connected with Louisiana and the Mississippi, for the success of which the subjugation of San Domingo was necessary. The failure in San Domingo rendered it imperative that the issues between England and France should be settled in Europe. Undismayed at his failure in the West, Napoleon redoubled his efforts in Europe. In answer to the Dutch he declared that he would not withdraw his troops from Holland till England had carried out the terms of the Treaty of Amiens and had ceased her intrigues at The Hague. He was resolved to get Malta into his hands and to use it as a base for his operations in the East, and only too late realized that the English occupation of Malta was regarded by his enemies as a set-off to his occupation of Holland and Switzerland, to his annexation of Piedmont, and to his creation of the kingdom of Etruria, and of the Ligurian Republic—both of which were under the control of France. Moreover, he never appreciated the depth of the hostile feeling to him which was aroused in England by his virtual prohibition of the entry of English manufactures into France. It was distinctly the interest of Great Britain to renew the war, and the opportunity of tearing up the Treaty of Amiens was gladly seized upon by many leading Englishmen.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In his preface to "Napoleon's Men and Methods," by A. Kielland, Mr. Oscar Browning writes: "There can be no doubt but that it (the Treaty of Amiens) was broken by England".

Sebastiani's report which appeared early in 1803 had stirred up the indignation of the English Government, which in face of the open avowal of the Emperor's designs in the East became more determined than ever to retain its hold on Malta as a check to Napoleon's projects. As early as the autumn of 1802 Napoleon had sent Brune to Constantinople in order to re-establish French influence in Turkey. Thus, while the strain of the Emperor's trade prohibitions increased the tension between the two countries, and the continual occupation of Holland by French troops rendered war on the part of England justifiable and unavoidable, the appearance of Sebastiani's report rendered war wellnigh inevitable.

On 6 March, 1803, Napoleon had despatched General Decaen with an insignificant force to the East Indies, and till his return peace was essential for the development of his plans.

Decaen's instructions were, we are told, "drawn up in such a manner as to make it clear that war was not anticipated till about September, 1804".<sup>1</sup> On 11 March, 1803, however, Napoleon had learnt with profound irritation that England was thoroughly alarmed at his threats, and was arming in order to preserve Malta, and generally to be prepared in case of the fresh outbreak of war.

Napoleon was undoubtedly taken aback at the English attitude. Decaen could not reach the East Indies for some weeks, and upon a declaration of war

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 209.

might with his whole force be captured. Moreover, the French fleet was by no means ready for war, and a considerable portion of it was operating in the West Indies against San Domingo. Nevertheless, in order probably to be ready for all emergencies, troops were at once collected, naval preparations were made, and England's perfidy was denounced to the rulers of Spain, Russia, and Prussia. In fact, before the close of March, all arrangements were made for operations in Hanover and elsewhere should war suddenly break out.

What, too, increased the tension between the two countries towards the close of 1802 and in the early weeks of 1803, and rendered the preservation of peace wellnigh impossible, was the general belief in England that Napoleon meditated an early invasion of the country. On this point English opinion was, however, probably wrong, though Napoleon's violent language to Lord Whitworth, and his restless ambition, fully justified the apprehensions felt by the English people.

Napoleon had probably no idea that his menaces and talk of invading England would be taken seriously. It must have been obvious to him that France required a period of tranquillity. Moreover, as has been pointed out, time was required for the development of his plans for the conquest of India, for the overthrow of the English power in the East, and for the strengthening of the fleet, which was in a disorganized condition.

“L’Angleterre! Voila la racine des discordes Europiennes.” By these words Napoleon from the time of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens endeavoured to explain and to extenuate his endeavours to dominate the whole of Europe. From 18 May, 1803, the date of the reopening of the war with England, to 1814, “all his wars with Austria and Prussia, with Spain and Russia, which acted with such solvent power upon the old fabric of Europe, rose out of the war with England and are connected with it”.<sup>1</sup> Before the actual declaration of war between England and France in 1803, Napoleon had indeed shown his prescience by quietly preparing to occupy Hanover. In April, 1803, troops, as has already been stated, were massed at Nimeguen, and no sooner had war with Great Britain begun than General Mortier at the head of 22,000 troops entered Hanover. Weakness prevailed at Hanoverian governmental head-quarters, and on 8 June the Convention of Suhlingen, followed on 5 July by the Elbe Convention, placed Hanover in the hands of Napoleon. Hanover, by this rapid movement of troops, so characteristic of Napoleon, was closed to British trade, and moreover found itself compelled to support the army of occupation.<sup>2</sup> The first step towards the establishment of the continental system was thus taken, and proved the forerunner of a policy which aimed at hermetically closing Europe to Great Britain’s commerce.

<sup>1</sup> Fisher, “Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany,” p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> See Ward, “England and Hanover”.

Three days after the Convention of Suhlingen had been signed Decaen, escorted by Admiral Linois, arrived before Pondicherry, but the British authorities in Madras refused to hand over the town.

Before the end of the year Arthur Wellesley overthrew the Mahrattas at Assaye and Argaum, while Lake overthrew Scindiah's forces and occupied Delhi.

"In three months the results of the toil of Scindiah, the restless ambition of Holkar, the training of European officers and the secret intrigues of Napoleon were all swept to the winds."<sup>1</sup> Perron, a French adventurer who had drilled the armies of the Mahratta chiefs, returned to France in disgrace. Napoleon's disappointment at the failure of his hopes was deep, though Decaen and Linois, who escaped to the Île de France, managed during the ensuing years to inflict serious losses upon British trade by their frequent captures of merchantmen.

No man in Europe was more fitted than Napoleon for the immense struggles which lay before him. His mind was constantly revolving plans, the success of which depended entirely on his military ability and vigilance. Napoleon's power of work was extraordinary, and the account of his activity as given by Méneval fills one with astonishment. He often called his secretary in the middle of the night, or at four in the morning, when he would dictate letters or sign documents. His ideas, we are told, developed, as he

<sup>1</sup>Rose, "The Life of Napoleon I," Vol. I, pp. 377, 378. London, George Bell & Sons, 1902.

dictated, with "an abundance and a clearness which showed that his mind was firmly riveted to the subject with which he was dealing ; they sprang from his head even as Minerva sprang, fully armed, from the head of Jupiter".<sup>1</sup> During his labours he would often send for sherbet and ices, and the work finished he would return to bed. He had most elaborate reports supplied by Ministers of War and Marine, and these he so thoroughly mastered that he always knew the exact strength of each regiment, the positions which they were to occupy in time of war, and the places at which they should be stationed in the time of peace. He loved to study these reports, especially those relating to the ships of the navy. His memory, however, was so retentive that he knew better than his Ministers the composition of each corps. His memory was equally good with regard to places or persons, and his power of concentration upon a given subject was most remarkable. He rarely wrote himself, but preferred to dictate his wishes to a secretary. He had no difficulty in finding words with which to express his thoughts, and usually his words were alive with fire and energy. He was equally at home in dealing with commercial, financial, diplomatic, military, or governmental matters, and could pass from one subject to another without any difficulty. Fortunately for himself he could go to sleep at will, and he would often spend whole days without apparently doing any work.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> De Méneval, "Memoirs of Napoleon," Vol. I, p. 368. Hutchinson, London.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* Vol. I, pp. 374, 376.

Much of the success which attended his projects was due to the enormous care with which he made his preparations. Nothing was left to luck. His plans were subjected to the closest scrutiny, and by his calculations and arrangements adverse chances were minimized. It would have been surprising if his plans which had been prepared with so much skill and care had failed. These remarks, however, are only true with regard to Napoleon's campaigns in Germany and to some extent in Italy. His campaigns were only successful so long as they did not clash with national feeling. Against national feeling, and against Great Britain's sea power, his most careful calculations ended in failure.

During many years he entirely under-estimated the immense strength which Great Britain wielded through her naval supremacy, and he entirely failed to appreciate the power which a country possesses when once national feeling is aroused.

The question whether Napoleon really intended to invade England at this time, 1803-5, has been fully discussed by many writers.

Evidence for and against has been produced, and even now historians are divided in opinion. There seems little doubt that in England there was a widespread belief in the reality of the danger. In spite of the view of Bourrienne and Miot de Mérito that "the invasion scheme was only a feint intended to dissimulate his (Napoleon's) plans of conquest on the Continent," most historians to-day prefer to accept the

view of Méneval, Napoleon's secretary, corroborated by Napoleon himself when a prisoner at St. Helena, that the invasion of England was intended. Captain Mahan has no doubt that Napoleon's invasion schemes were certainly not "a blind," and agrees with the opinions of Ney, Marmont, and Davoust; while as late as 1906 Dr. Rose, in his introduction to "Napoleon's Last Voyages," declares that the Emperor's "extensive preparations on the northern coast" make it "difficult to believe that he did not really intend to strike at London". In this view he is also supported by Barante (a friend of Daru, Secretary-General of the Minister of War who was with Napoleon at Boulogne), and who, after calling attention to the enormous preparations made at Boulogne, suggests that "Dès le commencement de 1805, il tenait en reserve un autre vaste entreprise pour la substituer à la descente si elle (la descente en Angleterre), ne pouvait être tentée. La grand armée campée sur les côtes de France depuis Brest jusqu'à Amsterdam serait dirigée contre l'Autriche."<sup>1</sup>

Whatever view is held with regard to the probability of an invasion of England, the Boulogne army, at any rate, proved an irresistible weapon in the hands of Napoleon during his campaign against Austria in the autumn of 1805.

At the time of the opening of the campaign Great Britain was in a position far different from that which

<sup>1</sup> See "Quarterly Review," No. 415, p. 435.



she occupied at the time of the accession to power of the Addington Ministry.

The year 1803, which saw the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, was remarkable in many ways. Wellesley's victories of Assaye and Argaum over the Mahrattas secured the British position in India from all chance of immediate downfall, while in Ireland the arrest and execution of Robert Emmet averted all danger of any serious rising. In the following year Pitt formed his second Ministry, and at once supported with enthusiasm the Russian proposals for the formation of a European Coalition against France.

During the period when an expedition from Boulogne to England seemed feasible Napoleon frequently revolved in his mind the question of an expedition to India. The choice of a general capable of leading such an expedition was difficult, and while thinking the matter over he often regretted the death of Desaix at Marengo. That general had just those political gifts which fitted him for carrying out an undertaking as stupendous as an expedition to India would prove to be.

Méneval, whose secretarial work brought him into close contact with Napoleon, has no doubt with regard to Napoleon's intention of invading England. He himself had little doubt that such an invasion would be eminently successful. One victory would place London in the hands of the Emperor, and in three months the British Isles would be completely conquered.

It was only, he says, the unfortunate blunder of Admiral Villeneuve in putting back into Cadiz instead of coming to join the Brest fleet, and Austria's declaration of war, which led to the abandonment of this great enterprise.

During the early months of 1805 Napoleon had not been idle. The success of his projects for the invasion of England depended upon the ability of the French admirals to deceive Nelson and to concentrate in the English Channel. Meanwhile, his presence was demanded in Italy, where the position of the French required strengthening. On 10 May, 1805, Napoleon entered Milan. His journey, we read, was one triumphal procession, and while in Milan his *salon* was crowded by diplomatists. On 26 May he was crowned with the iron crown of Italy, and a herald proclaimed him as "Napoleon Emperor of the French and King of Italy".

Realizing that the possession of Genoa was indispensable in his struggle with England, he united the city and its possessions to his Empire and virtually opened the continental blockade. While in Italy, however, his great project of an invasion of England was seen to be impossible owing to the activity of the English fleet, and the consequent failure of Villeneuve to reach the English Channel.

Meanwhile, news of the formation of a great European Coalition reached the ears of Napoleon who on 8 July left Turin, arriving in Paris on the 11th. Till 12 August, however, he clung to his hope that

an invasion of England would be possible. After that day he realized that his project of an invasion of England was impossible, and he turned his attention to the consideration of "a continental war". On 12 August he wrote that unless Austria disarmed he would march against her.

This decision marked the beginning of what was an all-important development in Napoleon's plans. He had already resolved to become master of the Mediterranean. The overthrow of Austria was the first step towards the supremacy of Napoleon, not only in Germany but also over the Mediterranean. It marked the second stage in the revolution which had already broken out in Central Europe.

Simultaneously with the beginning of the life-and-death struggle with Great Britain had begun the reconstruction of Germany. That reconstruction was virtually a revolution, the outbreak of which facilitated to an enormous degree Napoleon's conquest of Austria and later of Prussia. In the case of France it must be remembered that it was not till she had experienced more than ten years of struggles within and without, after the revolution of 1789, that she found under the government of the Consulate an opportunity of establishing a well-ordered government, of reorganizing and placing on a sound basis her finances, and of effecting a satisfactory settlement of the relations of Church and State.

The French Revolution was a movement which occupied several years and passed through several

stages. Similarly the Revolution of Germany did not take place in one year, but also passed through several stages and was marked by four distinct events. These events have been summarized as follows:—

1. The Principal Resolution of the Imperial Deputation which, asserted in 1803, secularized the Empire and inaugurated the absorption of the small by the large States.

2. The war of the Third Coalition. The Peace of Pressburg found Austria at the mercy of Napoleon who had been aided by Baden, Bavaria, and Würtemberg.

3. The creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, 1806, which marked the final end of the Holy Roman Empire.

4. The formal abdication of the Emperor Francis II from his position as Emperor in August, 1806.

“The French Revolution,” writes Mr. Fisher in his “Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany” (p. 22), “supplied the electric shock which woke Germany from her lethargy,” while M. Joseph Reinach, the author of “De l’influence historique de la France sur l’Allemagne,” says the same thing in even more emphatic language: “La Revolution française est pour l’Allemagne ce que le Nil est pour l’Egypte, le fleuve créateur qui couvre la veille terre de ses flots, la féconde et fait sortir les moissons de son sein”.<sup>1</sup>

In 1789 and the years immediately following

<sup>1</sup> See “Quarterly Review,” No. 415, p. 440.

neither the German Government nor German society was prepared to welcome the French Revolution, though in no country was a complete Revolution more necessary than in Germany.

Under the influence, however, of the French Revolution, and of Napoleon's victorious campaigns which ended at Campo Formio and Lunéville, the political map of Germany became completely changed. The old ideas which had for ages dominated the small German principalities disappeared, and gradually a new conception of the meaning of such words as *Patriotism* and *State* were evolved. A national literature began to spring up, and gradually the literary supremacy in Europe which had been enjoyed by England during the early years, and by France during the later years of the eighteenth century, passed to Germany. Equally important was the effect of the Revolution of 1803 upon the map of Germany. Over 300 small States disappeared, and when the Holy Roman Empire definitely came to an end in 1806, Germany consisted of Austria and Prussia, and a number of secondary States of which Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse were the chief. This Revolution, as drastic as any which had hitherto been effected in Europe, was thus due in the first place to the conquests of Napoleon and to the selfish policy of Austria which had long since ceased to recognize its Imperial responsibilities. The Revolution was also furthered by the absence of any national feeling in Germany, and by the fatal neutrality of Prussia

during the last four months of 1805 when the destinies of Germany hung in the balance.

The conduct of Prussia provided indeed ample evidence of the necessity of a revolution, and it is difficult to avoid the conviction that Napoleon's victories at Austerlitz and Jena, and his consequent supremacy in Germany, were in the end unspeakably beneficial to the whole of Central Europe.

In 1803 Germany, like France in 1789, definitely began her revolution, that revolution which first and foremost demanded the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire with its three centres, political at Vienna, legislative at Ratisbon, and judicial at Wetzlar, and with its division of Germany into circles for administrative, taxative, and judicial purposes—a revolution which had been begun at Campo Formio and Lunéville. It was now definitely proclaimed to the world in February, 1803, by the Principal Resolution of the Imperial Deputation.

Hitherto there had been little evidence of a revolutionary spirit in Germany; but at the same time there was no trace of any national feeling. This absence of the feeling of nationality had rendered German opinion indifferent to the partial disappearance of many of the ecclesiastical States before 1803.

The revolution which was begun in Germany in 1803 implied the secularization and Protestantization of the Empire and a complete change in Austria's position in Germany.

The peculiar influence which Austria had hitherto

exercised in the affairs of Germany was at once destroyed, but Austria's power was thereby strengthened and consolidated. Her territory, too, became more compact, though the position which hitherto had given her "a natural authority and pre-eminence in the affairs of the Empire" was taken from her.

Austria's position in Germany had hitherto been of a most remarkable and peculiar character. Her rulers since 1438 (if we except the years 1742-5 when a Bavarian Elector had been Emperor) had been Emperors as well as Austrian monarchs, and her connexion with Germany was of a most intricate character. The majority in the Electoral College had been Roman Catholic; she had held a majority in the Imperial Diet. She had thus for centuries wielded a "natural authority and pre-eminence in the affairs of the Empire".

All this was now changed, and the revolution which gave her a more compact territory lost her this position of pre-eminence in Germany. The Chamber of Electors henceforth was to number ten; of its members, the Archbishop of Mainz remained the one ecclesiastical elector, though he was transplanted to Ratisbon, the new Electors being the rulers of Baden, Würtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Salzburg.

In the Chamber of Princes the majority passed from the hands of the Roman Catholics into those of the Protestants, from the South to the North, from the party of Austria to the party of Prussia. Owing to the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine by the

French that Chamber of Princes now only numbered eighty-two instead of a hundred. Of these twenty-six (instead of as of old thirty-four) votes were spiritual, and fifty-six (instead of sixty) temporal. The Third Chamber, that of Imperial towns, of which only six (Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, Frankfurt, Augsburg, Nuremberg) existed, now disappeared.

Thus the Empire was definitely secularized, for the spiritual princes were for the most part non-existent, the temporal princes having taken possession of many of the secularized bishoprics. The majority, too, was now definitely Protestant, the Protestants numbering fifty-three and the Roman Catholics eighty-three. Thus with the strengthening of Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg, the whole internal balance of power was overturned, and it was evident that Germany was nearing the end of her mediæval constitution.

The *first stage* in the German Revolution was thus accomplished, the Empire became secularized and Protestantized; and the pre-eminence of Austria in Germany was undermined. It only required the Austerlitz campaign to complete the final stages in a revolution which entirely changed the character and political position of Germany.

On 23 August, 1805, the French troops received the order to march. Napoleon's decision had not been taken too soon. The long period of inaction had been accompanied by the increase of military offences, by desertion, and insubordination. For some two years



the army had experienced repeated disappointments, in striking contrast to the occasional periods of eager expectation, and the general condition of the troops was becoming serious. With the order to march the moral tone was at once restored, and full of hope and determination the army set out for the Danube. While Napoleon was engaged on the Austerlitz campaign, his brother Joseph was his representative in Paris, and during the next few months the latter received some interesting letters from the Emperor. On 23 September Napoleon left Paris, and from 25 September to 1 October was at Strassburg; on 1 October he was at Würzburg on the Neckar, and there on 2 October he heard at the Court Theatre the German "Don Juan," the music of which he much admired. On 9 October his head-quarters were at Zusmarshausen, where was fought, in 1648, one of the last battles of the Thirty Years' War, and on the evening of that day he reached Munich, having surrounded Ulm with his troops.

The surrender of that city by Mack followed on 20 October,<sup>1</sup> but Napoleon, who on 27 October was still at Munich, now realized that the equivocal conduct of Prussia might develop into open hostility. Nevertheless he showed no feeling of nervousness as to the

<sup>1</sup> A week after the capitulation of Ulm, Captain J. W. Wright, R.N., who had been taken prisoner in 1804 at Quiberon Bay, came to a violent end in Paris. His death, like that of the Duc d'Enghien, has been described as one of the episodes in Napoleon's career which proved "most repugnant to British opinion".

result of the campaign. "Before a fortnight," he wrote, "I shall have opposed to me 100,000 Prussians and 60,000 Austrians, sent from Italy or from the other reserves of that kingdom. I shall conquer them, but probably not without loss."<sup>1</sup>

On 30 October he was at Braunau, "one of the keys of Austria, well fortified and full of magazines," and on 15 November he arrived at Vienna, where he captured vast stores of ammunition, 2000 pieces of cannon and 100,000 muskets.

The weather during October had been cold, with heavy snow and hard frost. So far Napoleon had met with little opposition, and had already formed a poor opinion of the Russians. The Russian army, he says, rob and steal everywhere to the great disgust of the people. The Russian officers "look down on the Austrians who seem no longer to like fighting; the men (Russians) are brutes who do not know an Austrian from a Frenchman". The critical moment was now at hand, though even as late as 28 November when the Prussian Haugwitz appeared at the French head-quarters, Napoleon seemed to think that peace might be at once concluded. He was anxious to return to Paris, and wrote from the seat of war to hasten the completion of the Tuileries. Meanwhile, stirring events of vast import to France and to Napoleon's schemes had taken place elsewhere.

Saint-Cyr had been ordered to occupy Naples, and in case he should not be able to hold his own against

<sup>1</sup> "Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, p. 60.

any combined attack by the British and Russians, Napoleon had decided to send Villeneuve's fleet to Italy. That fleet was lying off Cadiz, but Villeneuve was in disgrace, and in consequence on 18 September Admiral Prasily was ordered to proceed at once to Cadiz to supersede Villeneuve (who was to repair to Paris), and to sail to Naples. A rumour of Napoleon's intention to supersede him reached Villeneuve from Madrid, and thinking that Nelson's fleet numbered less ships than it really did he sailed on 19 October from Cadiz with the intention of proceeding to Naples. The battle of Trafalgar, fought on 21 October, saw the destruction of twenty-one of the thirty-three ships that composed Villeneuve's fleet. Great Britain's supremacy of the sea was by that battle finally assured.

The battle of Trafalgar was in one sense a mere episode in the great campaign which England, in alliance with Russia, was waging against Napoleon. The latter undoubtedly regarded Italy as the starting-point for operations in the Ottoman Empire, as well as against the British power in India. While Pitt directed Great Britain's foreign policy, Lord Barham,<sup>1</sup> the director of naval strategical operations, "handled the fleet with a mastery never equalled since Anson's days".

The campaign of 1805, from the British and Russian side, was intended to be one of combined aims, and alliances with the great military Powers of the Continent were to be secured. France was to be prevented

<sup>1</sup> Charles Middleton became Admiral in 1787, and was created Lord Barham in 1805.

from seizing Sicily, the base of the supplies for the British fleet; and if possible a combined force of Russians and British was to be landed in Southern Italy. Thus the British navy was to be employed on the Italian coast, and, provided Prussia joined the Coalition, in the North Sea and Baltic. Thus the battle of Trafalgar had a most damaging effect upon Napoleon's plan for securing Sicily and supremacy in the Mediterranean.

In 1806 Sicily was safe from danger of becoming a French possession, and the British in possession of the Cape controlled the route to India. Thus the adoption by the British Government in 1805 of a policy of "aggressive action and interference with Napoleon's designs," had in spite of Prussia's defection and Austria's defeat been to a great extent successful in the Mediterranean. The British fleet remained in undisputed command of the sea. "The ships at Trafalgar," it has been said, "were the victors at Waterloo."

On 18 November, while at Znaym, Napoleon received the first news of Trafalgar, and of the failure of the hopes which he had founded on the possession of a strong fleet. All his hopes of acquiring immediate mastery of the Mediterranean were shattered. Undeterred, however, by the failure of the plans which he had formed of overthrowing the sea power of Great Britain, Napoleon pursued a bold course. His position was most critical, for had Prussia declared war his line of communications might have been easily cut by

the Prussian troops. While, however, the King of Prussia hesitated, Napoleon was aided by the impetuosity of the Tsar who brought on the battle of Austerlitz under conditions favourable to the exercise of the French Emperor's military skill. On the evening of 1 December, Napoleon received the plaudits of his army as he rode round the camp to the light of torches made of straw. On 2 December the battle of Austerlitz was fought, and proved, as far as Austria was concerned, decisive.

The right wing which played the most important part in the battle was led by Soult, the left wing by Lannes; while Bernadotte was in command in the centre. Murat led the cavalry which was drawn up in two lines. Under Napoleon were ten battalions of the guard supported by some battalions of grenadiers under Oudinot.

Soon after the sun had risen the battle began, and after two hours of hard fighting the Russian Field-Marshal, Kutusof, who had the chief command, was forced to relinquish his attempt to regain the heights of Pratzen and to give way. Lannes and Murat drove back the enemies' right wing, General Rapp made a remarkable charge with the cuirassiers, the General being himself badly wounded, and when Napoleon arrived to support Soult the battle was virtually over.

In the matter of pensions to the relations of the French soldiers who had fallen, Napoleon behaved, as he always did, in a princely manner, while to the leading

generals he gave honours and estates. Eugene Beauharnais became Viceroy of Italy; Berthier, Prince of Neuchâtel; Murat, Grand Duke of Berg. Not long afterwards his brother Louis was created King of Holland, and Joseph, King of Naples. Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden had aided him, and while the two former were made kingdoms, the last-named was created a Grand Duchy.

Many officers were also handsomely rewarded for their energy and bravery. In a letter to Joseph, written the following day, Napoleon infers that he tried to save a column of Russians who had taken refuge on a frozen lake. Till quite lately it was believed that the French batteries by the Emperor's orders first fired on the ice near the shore and then on the parts of the ice on which the Russians stood, and that 6000 Russians were thus destroyed.<sup>1</sup> Two days later Francis of Austria sued for terms, and at 4 o'clock on the morning of 27 December, 1805, the Peace of Pressburg was signed by Talleyrand, Prince Lechtenstein, and General Gurlay, and the war between France and Austria came to an end.

The Treaty of Pressburg was for Napoleon a great triumph. Throughout the whole campaign he had shown remarkable resourcefulness and determination. He had on 20 December declared that if peace was not quickly made, there would be an engagement which would not leave the Austrian monarchy "the

<sup>1</sup> The whole story of the drowning of the Russians is now discredited.

shadow of a resource". His overthrow of Austria was at once followed by the beginning of a system of establishing his brothers and relations as kings, and on 31 March, 1806, he inaugurated the system by the issue of an order to his brother Joseph to assume the Neapolitan Crown.

The Treaty of Pressburg was followed by the Treaty of Schönbrunn (Jan., 1806) with Prussia, the Government of which by its vacillating policy had delivered itself into the hands of Napoleon. Disappointment at its conduct was the immediate cause of the death of Pitt.

The way was now cleared for *the third step* in the German Revolution, viz. the setting up of the *Confederation of the Rhine*. Its establishment marked the definite end of the Holy Roman Empire, and led immediately to the *fourth and last stage in the German Revolution*, marked by the abdication by Francis of Austria of his Imperial Crown.

The brilliance of the victory of Austerlitz has blinded many historians to the doubtful wisdom of the Treaty of Pressburg. That Treaty completed the humiliation of Austria, and carried out the aims of successive French rulers and ministers since the days of Francis I. That monarch, like Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV and Fleury, had aimed at the subjugation of the Hapsburg monarchy and the partition of its territories. The Treaty of Pressburg saw Austria shut out of Italy and Switzerland, and driven back from the Rhine. It saw Bavaria and Würtemberg

created monarchies, with which the new Grand Duchy of Baden divided between them the Austrian possessions in the West. By that Treaty Napoleon thought he had once and for all crushed Austria, and rendered her unable for all time to hinder the execution of his world-wide Imperial schemes. Four years later, when in 1809 Austria again tried issues with France, Napoleon realized his mistake of 1805. In spite of the severity of the terms of the Treaty of Pressburg, Austria was able to reorganize her armies, and to regain her strength. Looking back on the events of 1805 it is evident that Napoleon ought *either* to have utterly destroyed Austria *or* to have adopted Talleyrand's advice and returned to the policy of Bernis and Kaunitz which is known as *the Diplomatic Revolution*. From 1756 to 1792 France and Austria were nominally allies,<sup>1</sup> and Talleyrand argued that a Franco-Austrian alliance would render Russia helpless and would exclude Great Britain from the Continent. Such an alliance, in his opinion, could have been effected by the grant of the Danubian Principalities to Austria as a compensation for her exclusion from Italy and Germany.

Relying, however, on his alliance with Prussia which shortly came to an end, and on the stability of the Confederation of the Rhine which he had already begun to build up, Napoleon, perhaps naturally, re-

<sup>1</sup> Since 1774, when Louis XVI became King of France, and Vergennes the chief Minister, the Franco-Austrian alliance had been practically non-existent.



fused to believe in the possibility of any future danger from Austria.

Moreover, as his chief object at that time was the ruin of England's trade, it was most important to secure the adhesion of Russia and Prussia to his "continental system". The grant of the Danubian Principalities to Austria would permanently alienate Russia.<sup>1</sup> Filled with confidence at the overwhelming success of the French arms, Napoleon, therefore, hastened in the early months of 1806 to complete the edifice of the Confederation of the Rhine and to take steps for securing French supremacy in the Mediterranean. The idea of a settlement of Germany by means of a Confederation of the smaller German princes acting in subordination to France was first conceived in the sixteenth century. Richelieu had endeavoured to put the idea into execution, and Mazarin, in assisting in the formation of the League of the Rhine, could rest satisfied that he had seriously weakened the power of the Hapsburgs and had given France a leading position in Germany. It was only the folly of Louis XIV that to a great extent undid the work of the two astute cardinals. At the time of the Austrian Succession War Belle-Isle returned to the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, and elaborated a plan which in its general features anticipated that followed by Napoleon. But Austria proved too strong, the French were driven from Germany, and the only

<sup>1</sup> Atkinson, "A History of Germany, 1715-1815," p. 404. London, Methuen & Co.

result of Belle-Isle's policy was the advancement of Prussia. The Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756 gave Germany, after the close of the Seven Years' War, rest for thirty years—which was broken by the Wars of the French Revolution. During those wars one party in the Directory advocated the policy of driving Austria eastwards, and Prussia behind the Elbe, and forming a confederation of the secondary German States under the ægis of France. In 1806 Napoleon, sure of his Prussian alliance, carried out the German policy of the *ancien régime* with his own additions and stamped with his own individuality.

The Confederation of the Rhine, which was finally agreed upon on 17 July, 1806, consisted of a number of princes of the Empire. A Diet composed of two colleges—the College of Kings and that of Princes—settled the affairs of the Confederation, of which Napoleon was named Protector. Indirectly Germany gained much from Napoleon's enforced simplification of its territory. The small courts which had been hotbeds of corruption were swept away, and the German people enjoyed for a time better government than had been bestowed on them by the vast host of petty princes. But the primary object of Napoleon's policy to Germany was to ensure the subordination of the members of the Confederation to himself. The better the States were governed the greater would be their ability to contribute men and money for the furtherance of his schemes. In the articles which regulated the Confederation it was expressly laid

down that "there should be between the French Empire and the Confederate States of the Rhine, collectively and separately, an alliance in virtue of which every continental war, in which one of the contracting parties might be involved, would become immediately common to all the others," and the actual number of troops to be supplied by each State was mentioned. The establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine brought to an end the Holy Roman Empire. And on 6 August, 1806, Francis of Austria formally renounced the Imperial title.

After the overthrow of Prussia at Jena and Auerstädt Saxony joined the Confederation of the Rhine, and its Elector received the title of King, and bound himself to supply Napoleon with 20,000 troops. Napoleon had thus made a considerable advance towards the realization of his idea of making Europe into a single State or Confederation of States under the hegemony of France, with a "unity of codes, of opinions, of views, of interests". There is no doubt that the pressure which he brought to bear upon Prussia at the time of the Treaty of Tilsit to join the Confederation of the Rhine, had for its object the political annihilation of that State. As it was, Prussia was only saved from extinction by Alexander's opposition to Napoleon's harsh treatment of the country, and by the Spanish rising which diverted Napoleon from his design to effect Prussia's complete destruction. For some years, however, Prussia was a *quantité*

*négligeable*, and Napoleon's command of the immense military resources of the Confederation of the Rhine enabled him to overthrow Austria in 1809 and to invade Russia in 1812, without any fear of opposition from Prussia. Being unable to annex Prussia to the Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon, after Jena, robbed Prussia of her Polish possessions, and set up the kingdom of Westphalia.

“Among the political creations of Napoleon in Germany,” writes Mr. Fisher, “the most curious and important was the kingdom of Westphalia.” It was formed in 1807 and consisted of lands taken from the King of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and the Elector of Hesse-Cassel. It extended from the Elbe to Osnabrück, and from Bremen to Marburg, and thus included Prussians, Brunswickers, and Hessians. Over this small but important State, Napoleon placed his youngest brother Prince Jerome, with the title of king. A good constitution given to the new kingdom by Napoleon was rendered in the end ineffective by a licentious Court and a lazy and voluptuous King. Jerome's incompetence was soon recognized by Napoleon, who took the kingdom under his care and succeeded in establishing for a short time some sort of order. “A good system of finance, a zealous and well-directed administrative class, and a sound though somewhat autocratic constitution,” was given to the Westphalians, who till the Moscow campaign were prepared to accept Napoleon's system

with equanimity.<sup>1</sup> But Jerome's incapacity, Napoleon's interferences, the increasing financial burdens, the demand for soldiers, all arrested civil progress, and the Russian expedition finally brought to an end the history of the Westphalian kingdom.

From the history of Napoleon's policy during the first six months of 1806 two facts seem clear. His mind was not bent on the immediate subjugation of Prussia, and he had as yet not formulated "any permanent plan for the settlement of Europe".<sup>2</sup> After the overthrow of Prussia at Jena and Auerstädt in the autumn of 1806, the formation of the kingdom of Westphalia in 1807, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 with Russia, the German policy of Napoleon becomes more intelligible, and we are able to appreciate its advantages, its defects, and its results.

The policy itself was no new one. It had been, as has been said, advocated and in part carried out by Francis I, by Richelieu, by Louis XIV, and by Fleury. But in the days of Napoleon the policy could be justified on surer grounds than on previous occasions. Since the days of Fleury the partitions of Poland had taken place, and projects for the partition or the absorption of Bavaria by Austria had again and again appeared. In 1744, in 1778 and 1785, in 1793 and in 1799 Austrian statesmen had considered the possibility of

<sup>1</sup> Fisher, "Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany," p. 291. Oxford, The Clarendon Press.

<sup>2</sup> "Bonapartism," pp. 52-3. Oxford, The Clarendon Press.

a union of Bavaria with the Hapsburg monarchy. There seemed nothing dishonest or reprehensible on the part of a strong power considering schemes for rounding off its territory by the absorption of weaker States. Before 1806 the conquest of the Rhine frontier by France had necessitated a considerable re-adjustment of German territories, and the overthrow of Austria at Austerlitz was followed by the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine in 1806. That Confederation had in itself much to commend itself to the inhabitants of Germany. The number of German principalities had been reduced from 365 to 39 in 1803. In 1806 the middle States, such as Bavaria and Würtemberg, gained large and important accessions of territory, their rulers, moreover, receiving royal titles.

On 17 July the Treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine was signed in Paris, by fifteen princes of the Empire, of whom the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Duke of Cleves and Berg (Prince Joachim Murat), and Dalberg, the Arch-Chancellor, were the most important. The affairs of the Confederation were to be managed by two colleges. Of these the College of Kings included the Arch-Chancellor, henceforward to be styled the Prince-Primate, the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, and the Grand Dukes of Berg, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Baden. The College of Princes included the remainder of the princes. Of this Confederation of Princes the Emperor of the French was Protector.



NAPOLEON'S REDINGOTE AND COCKED HAT  
FROM THE COLLECTION OF PRINCE VICTOR





Arrangements were also made in the Treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine for the simplification of the map of Germany. Hitherto Germany may be said to have consisted of the large kingdoms of Austria and Prussia, of a number of middle States such as Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, Württemberg, Hesse and the Nassaus, and of a number of small principalities held by the Imperial knights, and by the free towns. The petty courts connected with this last section of German rulers were now swept away. The celebrated Stein, who belonged to this category of lesser princes, lost his estates, but seems to have realized that a reconstructed Germany was impossible so long as these "petty courts, full of picturesque anomalies," but "the hotbeds of tiny and contemptible intrigue,"<sup>1</sup> were allowed to exist. Though the ancient sovereign rights of these dispossessed princes were thus destroyed, they were left in the enjoyment of many of their privileges.<sup>2</sup>

A step of vital importance in the interests of the future administrative unity of Germany was thus taken, and the way was thus unconsciously being prepared for the growth of a feeling of nationality. From 1806 "the formation of a united Germany without the Hapsburgs became one of the permanent political ideas in the German mind".<sup>3</sup> Some years had, how-

<sup>1</sup> Fisher, "Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany," p. 119. Oxford, The Clarendon Press.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 119.

<sup>3</sup> Fisher, "Bonapartism," p. 53. Oxford, The Clarendon Press.

ever, to elapse, and many bitter experiences had to be undergone before Germany as a whole could unite in a concerted movement for the expulsion of French soldiers from its soil, and for the partial elimination of French ideas from the German system. It took seven years to eradicate from the members of the Confederation of the Rhine their pro-French and selfish tendencies. It was not till 1813 that the whole German people united in the War of Liberation.

At the time, however, of the formation of the Confederation, its members recked little of their duties to their country and had no realization of the possible future of Germany. "They were alike traitors to a great historic tradition, and blind to the higher things of the future. It was one of those moments in history when vulgar greed is made the instrument of social and political improvement."<sup>1</sup>

The growth of German nationality was thus a direct, but as far as Napoleon was concerned a most unexpected, result of the French conquest. Though France indeed made Germany, it did so contrary to the intention of Napoleon. One of the Emperor's objects was to form Europe into a Grand Empire which, under the direction of France, should overcome Great Britain. Europe, in fact, was to become a vast French camp in which preparations for the overthrow of Great Britain should never cease till the downfall of Great Britain had been accomplished. The national interests of

<sup>1</sup> Fisher, "Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany," pp. 119, 120. Oxford, The Clarendon Press.

the rest of Europe were, in view of this object, to be mercilessly disregarded, and the characteristics of Napoleon's system were to be "its close far-reaching network, these all-pervading Imperial eyes, the omnipotence of the civil authority in a military empire".<sup>1</sup> Paris was to be the centre of the Empire, French was to be the official language, a fusion of heterogeneous races was to be accomplished—the whole to be governed by a supreme centralized bureaucracy.

Napoleon at this period of his career made no pretence of being actuated by any but purely selfish motives, though from St. Helena he assured the world that he had always been actuated by the most noble and justifiable ambitions. The German princes were to become permanently the allies of France, which was to dictate the policy which they were submissively to follow. By Article 35 of the Confederation of the Rhine it was provided that there should be between the "French Empire and the Confederate States of the Rhine, collectively and separately, an alliance in virtue of which every continental war, in which one of the contracting parties might be involved, would become immediately common to all the others". In France Napoleon's Empire was based upon the support of the peasantry. In Germany he was allied not with the peasants but with the princes. Thus his position in Germany depended upon "personal prestige, the force of arms, and the alliance of the ruling princes". Faced by the War of Liberation, which was "a move-

<sup>1</sup> Fisher, "Bonapartism," p. 58.

ment of peoples" and an "outburst of the old passion for political liberty," Napoleon fell.

The campaign of Austerlitz thus had far-reaching results for Europe. The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire implied a revolution in Germany, the full effects of which were only recognized after many years of war, and after many revolutionary movements.

The immediate effect which attracted the attention of European rulers and statesmen was the firm superimposition of the Napoleonic system upon the middle States of Germany, and the advancement of members of his own family. Bavaria and Würtemberg became kingdoms, and Baden a Grand Duchy. Berthier, whose absence from his side was so serious a matter for Napoleon during the Waterloo campaign, was made Prince of Neuchâtel, and Murat, who had married Caroline Bonaparte, Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves; Eugene Beauharnais, son of Josephine, was appointed Viceroy of Italy, and married a daughter of the ruler of Bavaria. Soon afterwards, in March, 1806, Joseph Bonaparte became King of Naples, and on 5 June, 1806, Louis Bonaparte was declared King of Holland, while to Pauline Bonaparte was given the principality of Guastalla which was ceded to the kingdom of Italy a few months later (Aug., 1806). Duchies in Italy were also carved out and bestowed upon generals like Soult and politicians like Talleyrand. By these means a new nobility was gradually formed.

In 1807 Jerome Bonaparte became King of

Westphalia—which State was created for the purpose of keeping Prussia in check and as a step in the denationalization of Germany. But the foolish and incapable rule of Jerome, coupled with the unpopularity of the continental system, resulted in the failure of Napoleon's policy, and the "trend of public opinion set steadily away from Paris and towards Berlin".

With the abdication of the Emperor Francis on 6 August, 1806, from his position as Emperor, the Holy Roman Empire thus came definitely to an end. Just as the modern history of France opens with the meeting of the States-General in 1789, so the modern history of Germany dates its beginning from the events of 1806.

At the same time, however, the years 1805 and 1806 mark definitely the beginning of a new period in the history of France and in the career of Napoleon. Hitherto, though many indications can be found of ambitious projects with regard to the extension of French domination over the Mediterranean and in the East, there was no definite proof that Napoleon aimed at the complete subjugation of Austria and Prussia. But the formation of the Third Coalition gave him the opportunity of crushing Austria, while the rashness of Prussia afforded him an excuse, for a time removing that Power from the list of great European nations. The overthrow of Prussia at Jena on 14 October, 1806, came upon Europe like a thunderbolt. It had not been realized how superior were the French armies to those of Prussia, nor what an advantage it was for

France to be able to draw her armies from not only France proper but also from "the whole left bank of the Rhine, with Belgium and Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, much of Lombardy and the South-Western States of Germany itself".<sup>1</sup> The victory of Austerlitz had ended once and for all any hope that Napoleon would continue to adopt a temporizing policy towards Austria and Prussia, and it only required the rash declaration of war by Frederick William to complete the subjugation of Germany by the French Emperor.

The decline and fall of Prussia forms one of the most dramatic events of the early years of the XIXth century, and resulted in the unquestioned supremacy of Napoleon in central and southern Europe. In 1805-6 Napoleon "had eliminated Austria from the German system, and left Germany divided between Frederick William and himself".<sup>2</sup> He had thus successfully carried out a policy which with varying success had been aimed at by Francis I, Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV, and Belle-Isle.

So long as the League of Princes was directed against the Hapsburgs it had within it the elements of stability. In 1806 Napoleon and the King of Prussia divided Germany between them, and the policy desired by the Directory in 1795 had been carried out. Nevertheless there was a sense of insecurity in Prussia, where the death of William Pitt had been deeply regretted among the educated classes, who had recognized in him

<sup>1</sup> Seeley, "Life and Times of Stein," Vol. I, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> Fisher, "Bonapartism," p. 382.

Napoleon's most formidable opponent. Nevertheless peace between France and Prussia continued during the first eight months of 1806 till Napoleon's provocative policy, which to his astonishment was immediately resented, resulted in the war with Prussia, the French victories of Jena and Auerstädt, and till 1813 the complete dominance of France in Germany.

During the first half of 1806 there was no apparent likelihood of war between France and Prussia. The fall of the Holy Roman Empire clearly showed how useless were the efforts of Russia and England to restrain the onward course of Napoleon's policy. Both England and Russia entered into negotiations with Napoleon, who appeared not to be disinclined to consider peace proposals. He seemed anxious to consolidate his new position as Head of the German Body of Princes, and at the same time to make preparations for carrying out his policy of extending the French power in the East. Prussia, which was not a member of the German Confederation, was to be lulled into a sense of security by the prospect of being Head of a North German Confederation. It would appear that Napoleon's real intention was to exclude Prussia from all influence in Germany, but early in August, when his negotiations with Russia and England came to a close, Napoleon concluded that those two Powers were forming a new Coalition with Prussia. It was at this moment that his famous offer of Hanover to England, followed by the murder of Palm, the bookseller, on 25 August, aroused a bitter feeling in Prussia.

These two circumstances tended to decide the vacillating Prussian army to prepare for war.

Already on 9 August the Prussian army had been mobilized, and Frederick William was led to believe that his cause was by no means a hopeless one.

Napoleon at first treated the Prussian preparations with contempt. His mind had been occupied during the first six months of 1806 partly in the reconstruction of Germany, but mainly with the future of Italy. He was resolved to secure Sicily and the mastery of the Mediterranean. He would thus be able to carry out those Eastern projects which had been so rudely interrupted by the battle of the Nile, by his failure to take Acre, and by his defeat at Trafalgar. In 1806 his Italian schemes seemed to him to have in them the elements of success.

Though, however, Joseph established himself in the kingdom of Naples, he was unable to take Sicily. Indeed, an English squadron under Sir Sidney Smith could have destroyed the town of Naples by bombardment early in May. The situation was graphically described by Sidney Smith. "The city," he says, "was illuminated on account of Joseph Bonaparte proclaiming himself King of the Two Sicilies! The junction of the 'Eagle' (the other ships being the 'Pompei,' 'Excellent,' 'Intrepid,' and 'Athenian') made us five sail of the line, and it would have been easy for their fire to have interrupted this ceremony and show of festivity, but I considered that



Le combat pour la liberté  
Je ne m'arrêterai pas que ne  
sois sur l'inn, ou plus loin. Je me confie à votre bravoure et à vos talents.  
Gagnez-moi des victoires.—NAPOLEON  
d'arrêter  
d'arrêter

JE COMTE PASSER LE RHIN LE 5 VENDÉMAIRE. JE NE M'ARRÊTERAI PAS QUE NE  
SOIS SUR L'INN, OU PLUS LOIN. JE ME CONFIE À VOTRE BRAVOURE ET À VOS TALENTS.  
GAGNEZ-MOI DES VICTOIRES.—NAPOLEON

LETTER OF GENERAL MASSÉNA, DATED 18 SEPTEMBER, 1805



the unfortunate inhabitants had evil enough on them ; that the restoration of the capital to its lawful sovereign and its fugitive inhabitants would be no gratification if it should be found a heap of ruins, ashes, and bones, and that as I had no force to land and keep order in case of the French army retiring to the fortresses, I should leave an opulent city a prey to the licentious part of the community who would not fail to profit by the confusion the flames would occasion : not a gun was fired."

In Napoleon's correspondence there is no indication that he realized that the existence of Joseph's capital was due to the humanity of an English Admiral, nor is there any allusion to the fact that Sidney Smith, on 11 May, dislodged the French garrison from the Island of Capri : " which from its situation protecting the coasting communication southward was a great object for the enemy to keep, and by so much one for me to wrest from him ".

On 11-12 May the French on Capri agreed to a capitulation, and the English Admiral undertook to convey the French officers and soldiers to the mainland. On 24 May Napoleon wrote to Joseph that he had foreseen what would happen at Capri, and that the only way to keep a " solitary island was to put into it a great many troops or none at all ". In the same letter he warned Joseph not to be " intoxicated by the demonstrations of the Neapolitans," and assures him that Sir Sidney Smith is a man whom it is easy to deceive . . . " all that he wants is to make a noise, and the

more you talk about him the more he will intrigue". Napoleon had no doubt that he could capture Sicily and so become supreme in the Adriatic and indeed in the Mediterranean. On 1 August he assured Joseph that a year sooner or a year later he would be master of Sicily.

The defeat of Reynier on 4 July, in the battle of Maida—a battle which had a beneficial effect upon the spirits of the English troops who realized that the French were not irresistible—had simply led Napoleon to criticize severely the military operations in Italy. The capture of Gaeta later in the month somewhat reassured him, and he remained determined to secure Sicily. The victory of Maida, moreover, showed that the British Government, which since Trafalgar had been inspired by a false sense of security, had now realized the importance of preventing the French occupation of Sicily. That island was regarded by Napoleon as the stepping-stone for France towards the East. Had it not been for the outbreak of the war with Prussia he would certainly have visited Naples at the end of September. As it was, he continued throughout the remainder of the year, and indeed throughout 1807, to send frequent and minute instructions to Joseph for the administration of his kingdom. In spite of the revolt in southern Italy, consequent on the British victory of Maida, Joseph during the ensuing two years succeeded in establishing order in the finances and contentment among

the people. His constructive work in Naples deserves the highest praise.<sup>1</sup>

These Italian projects were, however, interrupted by the attitude taken up by Prussia in August. On 12 September Napoleon wrote that "Prussia is arming in a most ridiculous manner". He had no fear of the Prussian army, and was justifiably confident. He knew that he could shortly be at the head of 150,000 troops and had little doubt that he could reduce Berlin and St. Petersburg to submission. When once he realized that Prussia was resolved upon war he made his preparations in characteristic fashion.

Pretending that he was engaged in Paris in hunting and other amusements, he made ready to crush Prussia if the necessity of doing so was forced upon him. By 18 September it became evident that a war with Prussia had become wellnigh inevitable. The European horizon, he declared, "is rather dark ; it is possible I may soon be at war with the King of Prussia". It is said that at Paris on 26 September, Napoleon, while studying a map, foretold the overthrow of the Prussian army about 15 October. On 1 October he left Mainz for Würzburg, where he assembled his army, and a dispatch sent on 3 October to Rochefoucauld, the French ambassador in Vienna, "gives a most vivid picture of Napoleon's mind at this time". In it he declared that he was resolved to break off

<sup>1</sup> "Napoleon's Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, pp. 120-3.

all alliance with Prussia. "I will," he writes, "have no alliance with a power so changeable and so contemptible."

At the same time he declared that he was willing to be at peace with her, as he felt he had no right to shed uselessly the blood of his subjects. None the less, though he desires a continental alliance to support his maritime projects, he will not rely upon the friendship of Prussia, for "she is now, as she was in 1740, and always has been, without consistency and without honour". In the same dispatch he declares himself in favour of an Austrian alliance based on the independence of Turkey. An Austrian alliance, he writes, would secure the peace of Europe and enable him to *turn his attention to his fleet*. "I am not," he reiterates, "opposed to a system which might unite me more closely to Austria."

In this interesting dispatch we see that his real aim was maritime supremacy, which would secure the predominance of France in the Mediterranean and in the Councils of Turkey. Though the outbreak of war with Prussia was only a matter of days, he regarded such a war with contempt, and merely as a slight interruption in his vast plans for securing a position of supremacy in Europe. England, he declared, will be tired of constant failure and will soon make peace. In any case he expected in a month or two to be master of the Mediterranean.

On his part Frederick William could at any rate point to the fact that his relations with Russia were

on a friendly footing, and he had some reason to expect aid from England, if not from Austria, in the event of the outbreak of a war with France. In consequence of the Partitions of Poland his territory was larger than that ruled over by Frederick the Great, and the Prussian army was still regarded as one of the most formidable armies in Europe. The outbreak of war with France in October, 1806, a war which continued till July, 1807, brought with it a rapid disillusionment to all those who had not, like the old Duke of Brunswick, realized the change which had come over the Prussian army since the days of Frederick the Great. The King of Prussia and his generals were confident of victory. Of the two Prussian armies one was under the King and Brunswick, the other was under Prince Hohenlohe. Both armies were completely defeated, the former at Auerstädt, by Davoust, who was created Prince of Auerstädt for his brilliant victory; the latter at Jena, by Napoleon.

On 27 October Napoleon rode triumphantly into Berlin and was welcomed by the population effusively and enthusiastically. An anti-French feeling did not exist in Germany in 1806 or 1807. That feeling was created later by French excesses. Such of the Prussian forces as had not yet been annihilated or captured retreated in the direction of the still formidable Russian army, while Napoleon spent the winter in Eastern Prussia whence he directed affairs in Paris and in Italy. Before the end of the year Napoleon

had secured a useful ally in Saxony whose Elector was given the title of King on 4 December, and who joined the Rhenish Confederacy. On the other hand, the Duke of Brunswick, the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, and the Prince of Orange were deprived of their possessions.

Napoleon, though forced for a few months to divert his attention from his Mediterranean schemes to the task of crushing Prussia, never, however, ceased to revolve plans for the destruction of the power of Great Britain; the only real obstacle, as he believed, to his supremacy in Europe. On 11 November he wrote to his brother Joseph, in Naples, that the news of his successes in Prussia had thrown London into consternation. He added that the occupation of Hamburg, which he had just effected, together with the declaration of the blockade of the British Islands by the Berlin Decree, would increase that uneasiness.

The language used in drawing up the Berlin Decree on 21 November gives some indication of the feelings held by Napoleon towards England. It is asserted that England's monstrous abuse of the right of blockade is "altogether worthy of the age of barbarism," and is "advantageous to that power to the prejudice of every other". Consequently Napoleon decreed that the British Isles were in a state of blockade, that all commerce and correspondence with them was prohibited, that all Englishmen found in any country were prisoners of war, and that the use of English goods was forbidden. These and other



articles were issued by Napoleon in the hope that British trade would be ruined, and that England would be compelled to sue for peace.

This thunderbolt was followed up by the Milan Decree of 17 December, 1807, and Napoleon hoped that British commerce would by means of these decrees be destroyed. These decrees, however, had not the desired effect and must be numbered among Napoleon's colossal failures. Owing to the lack of a fleet he was unable to blockade the British ports, and so to bring about the submission of his hated foe. Moreover, these decrees first brought home to the populations of Europe the real character of the tyranny of the French Emperor. "Every poor man who was debarred from the means of providing sugar or cloth for his family felt a grievance." Sugar was at that time brought chiefly from Britain's colonies, and the Decree depriving continental Europe of sugar was keenly resented. Beetroot factories, however, rapidly sprang into existence, and the resentment at the effect of the Decree upon the supply of sugar was gradually modified.

It was not till a few years later that the thoroughgoing enforcement of the continental system proved too great to be borne, and contributed greatly to the rising of the nations against the Napoleonic domination.

With regard to the subject of sugar, Napoleon, when on St. Helena, declared "that if the war with England had lasted two or three years longer, France

would not have had any further occasion for Colonies, as he had already caused to be made in France, sugar from the Beet Root”.

As a memento of the overthrow of Prussia the Car of Victory, in copper, by Schadow, which stood on the top of the Brandenburger Thor, at the end of the Unter den Linden, was carried off to Paris and not restored till after the fall of Napoleon.

With the defeat of Prussia at Jena and Auerstädt came the punishment of Saxony for the support which its ruler had given to Frederick William. At Posen, on 11 December, the Elector was forced to accept Napoleon's terms. Saxon troops were to aid Napoleon in combating the Prussians and Russians, while the King of Saxony was to pay a heavy subsidy and to become the faithful ally of Napoleon. The rulers of Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick were deposed, William Frederick of Orange, who governed a small principality—Fulda-Corvey—suffered the same fate. “Napoleon was now Master of Northern Germany from end to end.”<sup>1</sup>

#### CHIEF DATES

War between France and Great Britain . . . . .	1803.
Napoleon Emperor of the French . . . . .	March, 1804.
His coronation . . . . .	December, 1804.
The camp at Boulogne . . . . .	1803-1805.
Outbreak of war with Austria and Russia . . . . .	1805.
Trafalgar, Ulm . . . . .	October, 1805.
Austerlitz . . . . .	December, 1805.

<sup>1</sup> Fisher, “Napoleonic Statesmanship,” p. 141.

## WAR WITH EUROPE, 1803-1806 145

Peace of Pressburg (France and Austria)	. . . . . January, 1806.
Treaty of Paris (France and Prussia)	. . . . . February, 1806.
Joseph Bonaparte King of Naples	. . . . . March, 1806.
Battle of Maida	. . . . . July, 1806.
The Confederation of the Rhine	. . . . . June-July, 1806.
End of the Holy Roman Empire	. . . . . August, 1806.
Jena and Auerstädt	. . . . . October, 1806.
The Berlin Decree	. . . . . November, 1806.

## CHAPTER V

### THE TREATY OF TILSIT, 1807

Napoleon and the Mediterranean—The Russian campaign—Eylau, Heilsberg, and Friedland—The Treaty of Tilsit—Position of Prussia—Summary of Napoleon's political activities, January-June, 1807—His correspondence with Joseph—The real meaning of the Treaty of Tilsit—Napoleon's policy after Tilsit—The seizure by England of the Danish fleet—The Treaty of Fontainebleau—The plan of the Partition of Portugal—The real aims of Napoleon and Alexander—Napoleon's policy to the Papacy—His religious policy explained at St. Helena—Consideration of his policy after Tilsit—France after Tilsit—The growth of national feeling in Europe.

AFTER the conclusion of the Treaties with Austria at Pressburg on 1 January, and with Prussia at Paris on 15 February, 1806, Napoleon had devoted his energies to the completion of the reconstitution of Germany, and to attempts to secure Sicily. The overthrow of Austria and the subservience of Prussia had removed all obstacles in the way of the dissolution of the Empire and of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine. On 6 August, 1806, the Emperor Francis II had recognized that the Empire no longer existed, and became Francis I Emperor of Austria. As Protector of the Confederation of the

Rhine which included, apart from Prussia and Austria, the principal states in Germany, Napoleon had secured a dominant position in Central Europe.

His determination to become all-powerful in the Mediterranean had been shown by his strenuous efforts in 1806 to obtain Sicily. The victory of Maida, won by Sir John Stuart on 4 July, had checked the execution of Napoleon's plan, while the discovery of his duplicity in connexion with his secret negotiations with Russia, Great Britain's ally, had alienated Fox, and on his death Lord Howick resolved not to trust the French Emperor any longer. Napoleon, however, did not withdraw from his determination to secure the island. His possession of Sicily would, in his opinion, change the face of the Mediterranean. It was only the presence of British forces that prevented Joseph Bonaparte, and after him Murat, from conquering the island between 1807 and 1812.

In 1806 and 1807, however, the chances of the British Empire being able to hold its own against Napoleon seemed doubtful. The war between France and Prussia in the autumn of 1806 had resulted in the occupation of Berlin by the French. Recognizing the impossibility of winning Great Britain over to an acquiescence in his policy, Napoleon had resolved to crush her at all costs. His Berlin Decree, issued on 21 November, 1806, was intended to exclude Great Britain from the Continent until she restored her colonial conquests. Before, however, he could carry out his policy of excluding Great Britain from all

intercourse with the Continent, or could partition Prussia, Napoleon had either to crush or to come to some agreement with the Russian Emperor. To occupy Russian troops in Turkey, Napoleon sent Sebastiani to Constantinople. In December, 1806, Turkey declared war upon Russia, and Napoleon sent French officers to aid the Turks. He thus compelled Alexander to maintain a considerable force on the Turkish frontier during the first six months of 1807. He also carried on negotiations with Persia, and Alexander, fearful for her Eastern interests, felt compelled to keep troops near Persia. At Eylau, on 8 February, 1807, Napoleon fought a drawn battle with the Russians, but in May Lefebvre captured Dantzic—valuable as a base from which the army could be furnished with corn; on 10 June, a most sanguinary conflict, known as the battle of Heilsberg, took place with no decisive results; and on 14 June Napoleon won a battle at Friedland, which proved to be in its effects of decisive importance. That battle was shortly followed by the Treaty of Tilsit. The Treaty of Tilsit was a great relief to Napoleon. Until he had come to terms with Russia no settlement could be made with regard to Prussia, nor could the continental blockade, first established by the Berlin Decree in November, 1806, be enforced. Moreover, Eylau had made a period of peace necessary for Napoleon. The French losses had been immense, and the discouragement of the army profound. Fortunately for him a strong body of Russian

opinion insisted on peace after the Russian defeat of Friedland.

Friedland, a battle which the rash Bennigsen, the Russian general, ought never to have fought, took place on 14 June, and the Russians lost over 15,000 men killed and wounded. It was a victory for Napoleon (whose losses were about a half less than those of the Russians) as decisive as was that of Marengo.

The retreat of the Russians after the battle was not seriously interfered with, and during the night following no effort to pursue was made. Probably Napoleon was anxious not to make a permanent enemy of Alexander ; if so, this would explain the inaction of the French cavalry. He had already, in March, 1807, when writing to Talleyrand, declared that he would prefer a Russian to an Austrian alliance. In his struggle with Great Britain it was essential to secure the co-operation of Russia with its long seaboard. If he could put an end to the trade between England and Russia an important step would have been taken towards the subjugation of the Island kingdom. The importance of the victory of Friedland, therefore, cannot be exaggerated. On 19 June the Russian army recrossed the Niemen ; on 21 June an armistice was agreed upon ; and on the same day Alexander informed Frederick William of Prussia that he had resolved to ally himself with France.

Alexander's motives for this sudden change of attitude were various, and there is no doubt that the attitude and views of his generals had considerable weight

with him. At the Russian head-quarters there was an almost general demand for peace, and the Grand Duke Constantine, who was supported by Czartoryski, Kurakin the Gallophil Russian Minister, and others, informed Alexander that the temper of the army being what it then was, he could not but remind him of the fate of his father the Tsar Paul. Alexander, moreover, had developed an admiration for Napoleon, and he was justly irritated with the English Government which had given him little or no help, and which was enforcing against Russia "a most stringent maritime code". Though Alexander, as late as the battle of Friedland, had given the King of Prussia no hint of a possible change of policy, the Russian generals had for some time past conceived the greatest contempt for the Prussians, and after Friedland openly objected to sacrifice Russia for Prussia. Budberg, a Livonian, had succeeded Czartoryski on 17 June, 1806, as Chancellor, and hitherto his sympathies had been decidedly Prussian. Though he was compelled to accept his master's new policy, and to inform Hardenberg on 21 June, 1807, that the Russian political system of alliances was completely changed, he realized even thus early that an alliance between Alexander and Napoleon could not, in the nature of things, be of long duration, nor could it offer to Europe any chance of a period of tranquillity. On 1 September, 1807, before the Treaty of Tilsit was six weeks old, he informed Leveson-Gower, the British envoy in St. Petersburg, that "the continental peace cannot be



of long duration : any peace with France must be considered as a momentary respite, and by no means as affording any prospect of permanent tranquillity ; neither the French Government, nor the French people, is ripe for peace ; they retain too much of their revolutionary restlessness. We must employ this moment of repose in preparing the means of resistance against another attack.”<sup>1</sup>

By the terms of the Treaty, which was finally concluded on 9 July, Prussia lost heavily, being reduced to half her original dimensions. While East Frisia was given to Holland, most of her provinces west of the Elbe were included with Hesse, partly in the Grand Duchy of Berg, partly in the new kingdom of Westphalia which was to be ruled by Jerome Bonaparte. Her Polish Provinces, with the exception of Bialystock which was to go to Russia, and Dantzic which became nominally independent, were to form the Duchy of Warsaw, under the King of Saxony to whom was given Cottbus. Alexander, moreover, gave up all claim to Corfu, Cattaro, and the Ionian Isles, and declared his readiness to recognize Joseph Bonaparte as King of Sicily, if Ferdinand was given the Balearic Isles or Crete.

By the secret articles it was decided, if Great Britain did not make peace by 1 November and restore all conquests made since 1805, that France and Russia, which now joined the continental system, should unite against her and call upon Austria, Den-

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in “Cambridge Modern History,” Vol. IX, p. 304.

mark, Sweden, and Portugal to co-operate. Moreover, it was decided, if Turkey did not make peace within three months, that France and Russia would unite against her.

Prussia was thus abandoned by Alexander, who, however, never allowed Napoleon to annihilate her. Great Britain and Turkey were the chief objects of the opposition of the two kings. Both countries, in the event of the non-acceptance of the terms offered them, were to be attacked by the united forces of Napoleon and Alexander. Prussia had lost about half of her territory, was forced behind the Elbe, and became subservient to France and Russia. Had it not been for the opposition of Alexander to Napoleon's proposals for her destruction Prussia would have disappeared from the list of nations, and the Vistula would have become the dividing line between the French and Russian monarchies.

During the period between the overthrow of Prussia and the Peace of Tilsit with Russia, i.e. between October, 1806, and July, 1807, Napoleon had been in Eastern Europe. During the severe weather which always characterized the winters in that portion of Europe he enjoyed excellent health. At the same time his political activities never ceased. In November, 1806, he had issued the celebrated Berlin Decree declaring the British Isles in a state of blockade and prohibiting all commerce with them. He kept up a constant correspondence with Joseph and sent most minute instructions with reference to the government

of Naples. From Naples he withdrew large numbers of troops for his forthcoming campaign in Poland. In December, 1806, the whole of Poland had declared for Napoleon, and troops were being raised in every direction. The attitude of Austria, however, caused Napoleon some uneasiness, and though he received from Vienna pacific assurances he very characteristically acted as though hostilities were likely to break out. He formed two camps, one at Verona, and one at Brescia, and he advised Joseph not to send for his wife from Paris till the political situation in Italy was more assured. Already he had adopted the plan of employing men of all nationalities in his *Grande Armée*.

The Polish legion in 1806 was in Naples, but was recalled to serve against Russia. Several thousands of Neapolitans were also summoned to serve in Germany and elsewhere. In January, 1807, Napoleon ordered Joseph to send him the regiments which had been defeated at Maida, as he wished to have them under his own eye. "They have," he said, "to wipe out the shame of having been beaten by the English." It is unnecessary to wonder at Napoleon's successful career when one marks not only his close attention to the smallest details, but also the fact that this attention to detail did not in any way interfere with his conception of Empire. In the early months of 1807, though his attention was concentrated upon his campaign against Russia, he never ceased to follow the events in Joseph's kingdom of Naples with the closest interest.

On 28 January he wrote to Joseph : " Your fortunes and victories have interposed between us vast countries ; you are on the shores of the Mediterranean, I am on those of the Baltic ; but on the harmony of our measures we tend towards the same object. Keep a watch on your coast : do not suffer it to be approached by the English or by their commerce." A curious sidelight is thrown on the aspirations and high spirit of the French soldiers when we read of the murmurings of the troops in Naples because they have not the opportunities enjoyed by their comrades in Poland of acquiring distinction. Somewhat naturally the news of the prodigious victories gained in Germany, and of the promotions won, increased their dissatisfaction with their own position—engaged " in a painful and obscure war". Napoleon's reply to Joseph's letters with reference to this discontent was very characteristic. " Allow no complaining. With the French you must show firmness. The army of Naples has no cause for murmuring. Say to them, ' Do you complain ? ' Ask General Berthier, he will tell you that your Emperor has been living for weeks upon potatoes, and bivouacking in the snows of Poland. You may judge from this of what happens to the officers ; they get nothing to eat but mere meat.<sup>1</sup> . . . Neither the staff nor the colonels nor the other regimental officers have taken their clothes off for the last two months, some not for four months (I myself have been a

<sup>1</sup> Napoleon's " Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, p. 233.

fortnight without taking off my boots) in the middle of snow and mud . . . fighting with our bayonets frequently under grape shot. . . . After having destroyed the Prussian monarchy, we are fighting against the remnant of the Prussians, against Russians, Cossacks, and Kalmucks, and the tribes of the North who formerly conquered the Roman Empire. We have war in all its fierceness and all its horrors. In such fatigues every one has been more or less ill, except myself, for I never was stronger; I have grown fat."<sup>1</sup> From this remarkable letter we can learn the secret of Napoleon's rapid and overwhelming successes. Indomitable resolution, careful forethought, a readiness to share in all the discomforts of a campaign—such qualities were bound to bring success to their possessors.

During the winter campaign of 1806-7 Napoleon had ample opportunity of exhibiting to the world his possession of these qualities, as well as his consummate knowledge of the currents of European opinion. His acquaintance with the immediate needs of his army was equally complete. Writing to Talleyrand who was at Warsaw on the evening of 12 March, he urges him to send every day to his head-quarters at Osterode, eight days' journey from Warsaw, 50,000 rations of biscuit and 20,000 pints of brandy. "The success," he says, "of the greatest combinations, indeed the fate of Europe, depends on a question of subsistence."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Napoleon's "Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, p. 232.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 234-5.

“If I have bread,” he continues, “to beat the Russians is child’s play.” He was right. During a long winter campaign, such as Napoleon was experiencing, the question of the commissariat was of the first importance. The matter was, as he declared, “more important than all the negotiations in the world . . . these rations and pints of brandy will spoil the combinations of all the hostile powers”. Throughout May, while the fate of France and indeed Europe hung upon the success of the French arms over those of the Russians in the coming final struggle, Napoleon was writing instructions to Joseph on even minute points. His confidence in his ability to defeat the Russians and to triumph over all his difficulties was justified, for the victory of Friedland, fought on 14 June, the anniversary of Marengo, was followed by the Treaty of Tilsit. The battle of Friedland was indeed, as Napoleon declared, as decisive as those of Marengo, of Austerlitz, and of Jena.

While the negotiations were proceeding which eventuated in the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon kept his attention firmly fixed on the Mediterranean, and never ceased to consider plans for establishing his supremacy in that quarter.

Corfu (which with Cattaro had been definitely assigned to France) was to become an important French station; Joseph was to begin the construction of two ships of seventy-four guns to be launched in the spring of 1808; Napoleon’s mind was evidently full of plans for the development of the French power in the

Eastern Mediterranean. An officer was sent from Tilsit to Corfu to act as chief of the staff; Joseph was to keep some "brigs or gun boats at Taranto, Otranto, or Brindisi in order to keep the communications open between Corfu" and Naples. Corfu was to be victualled immediately, and everything necessary was to be sent there. Throughout his correspondence with Joseph, Napoleon insisted on men of action being chosen to carry out all his plans. "I look upon men of learning and brilliancy," he declared, "as I do upon coquettes."

During the eight months which followed the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit, i.e. from July, 1807, to 1 April, 1808, Napoleon remained, with the exception of a short visit to Milan, in or near Paris, while Joseph, a king since 1806, remained in his kingdom of Naples.

During these months Napoleon's main aim was to deliver the Continent from the presence of the English and to force England to come to terms with him. Consequently he concentrated his attention not only upon the conversion of the Baltic and the Mediterranean into French lakes, but also upon becoming supreme over the whole of the Spanish Peninsula.

The Treaty of Tilsit marks the firm establishment of Napoleon's power over Central Europe. The treaty of Lunéville had given France the left bank of the Rhine, a priceless possession, for the attainment of which Frenchmen had longed through many centuries. Napoleon himself was only 32 years old in

1801 when he gave France this invaluable territory. Between the conclusion of the Treaty of Lunéville and the Treaty of Tilsit, Europe had itself experienced a revolution which to a great extent had been accelerated by Napoleon's defeat of Austria. In 1805 Austria had been overthrown; in July, 1806, the Holy Roman Empire had come to an end, and in October of the same year Prussia had been crushed. In June, 1807, the Treaty of Tilsit with Russia closes a period of unprecedented successes.

At the same time the Peace of Tilsit, unlike the Peace of Utrecht or the Peace of Paris in 1763, did not mark an epoch in European history, nor did it effect a permanent settlement of questions which had long been in dispute. It rather belongs to that class of temporary arrangements which like the Peace of Ryswick or the Peace of Amiens merely gave breathing time to the combatants. Soldiers might indeed hope that a period of rest from war would follow the pacification arranged by Napoleon and Alexander, but Napoleon himself regarded the peace "as the beginning of a new time of activity, in which the forces of the Continent were to be used for the humbling of Great Britain, and in due course for the prosecution of new schemes in the East".<sup>1</sup>

The task of humbling Great Britain was no easy one, and as upon its realization depended the success of his Eastern schemes Napoleon at once took the matter in hand. By securing his predominance in the

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 294.



Baltic and in the Spanish Peninsula, Napoleon hoped to intimidate Great Britain's allies, ruin her trade, and force her to agree to his terms. His domination of the land would, he thought, amply compensate for his failure to dominate the sea, and by a firm enforcement on his part of the Berlin Decree Great Britain would be brought to her knees. According to his expectations this Decree would "deal a deadly blow" at the Island State.

The attempt to carry out what was one of the principal objects of his policy, viz. the complete humiliation of Great Britain, thus involved Napoleon in various schemes. French supremacy in the Baltic, the complete conquest of Spain and Portugal, French ascendancy in the Mediterranean, the destruction of the Turkish power on its complete subordination to France, the continued subordination of the German powers to his will, and the continuance of the Russian alliance were all absolutely necessary for the success of Napoleon's designs against Great Britain. Thus the Emperor's undertakings were indeed "complex and many-sided"; but through them all runs one main thread. Once Great Britain ruined and conquered, then the difficulties in the way of the realization of Napoleon's Eastern schemes would be comparatively small.

There seems little doubt that at Tilsit Napoleon had looked forward "to the accession of the Danish fleet to the naval resources of France, Russia, Holland, Spain, Northern Italy, and probably Portugal".

Such a combination would, he thought, be sufficient to drive Great Britain from the Baltic and Mediterranean and bring about her submission. Russia, Holland, Northern Italy, and Spain could be counted upon for support in the anti-British crusade. It only remained to coerce Denmark and Portugal.

Canning was therefore fully justified in his seizure of the Danish fleet, and in thus destroying Napoleon's plan of looking upon the Danish navy as "the right wing in the naval operations eventually to be carried out against the mistress of the seas".

Before the seizure of the Danish fleet by Canning, Napoleon had determined (1) to do all in his power to keep Russia a subservient ally, and (2) by bringing Portugal and Spain into the continental system to force England to come to terms, and to complete his plans for the complete enslavement of Italy. His endeavour to obtain control over the Mediterranean in 1805 had been foiled by the battle of Trafalgar. He now endeavoured to secure the same object by establishing his power over Portugal as well as Spain. In the autumn of 1807, however, the bombardment of Copenhagen, followed by the seizure of the Danish fleet by Canning, struck a severe blow at the attempt to force Denmark into the Napoleonic system.

His failure there only increased Napoleon's intention of succeeding in Portugal, Spain, and Italy. The resistance which he met with in the Spanish Peninsula in 1808 was of enormous importance, because he was forced to postpone his Mediterranean and

Eastern plans, and the delay in the realization of these plans caused by that resistance gave time to Prussia and Austria under Stein and Stadion "to reorganize the resources of those countries, and prepare them for vigorous and effective resistance in the future".

On 27 October, 1807, Napoleon's plans with regard to Spain and Portugal began to take shape in the Treaty of Fontainebleau. He had already in 1806 discussed the question of the partition of Portugal with Godoy. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau the greater part of Portugal was to be divided between the Queen of Etruria (a Spanish princess) and her son, the grandson of Charles IV, and Godoy, the disposal of the intermediate districts to be settled later. By the Treaty, too, it was arranged that while the greater part of the Spanish forces were to be sent to Portugal, 28,000 French troops (to be followed by another 40,000 if required) were to be admitted into Spain.

Thus the partition of Portugal was to be carried out for two objects:—

(1) In order to deal a severe blow at Great Britain's maritime trade.

(2) In order to provide an exchange for Tuscany. "It is," Napoleon wrote, "very difficult for a branch of the House of Spain to be established in the middle of Italy." The truth of this is apparent when it is remembered that Napoleon had determined to "secure complete domination in Italy in matters commercial, religious, and political". Portugal was

like Venice in 1797 to be sacrificed in order to satisfy the political and commercial aims of Napoleon.

Though Portugal declared in October, 1807, her adhesion to the continental system, Junot and French troops invaded the country only to find that on 29 November the Prince Regent had escaped by the aid of the British fleet.

The possession of Spain and Portugal, in Napoleon's opinion, would be followed by far-reaching results. The supremacy of the British in the Mediterranean would be destroyed. Sicily and Malta would inevitably fall into the hands of France, and the Spanish naval resources would enable him to carry out his Eastern schemes.

At the time of the Treaty of Tilsit Napoleon had heard of the deposition of Selim II, the reforming Sultan of Turkey, and the accession of Mustapha IV. In concert with Alexander, Napoleon at once decided upon a joint spoliation of the Turkish Empire. Before, however, this plan could be carried out it was necessary to secure complete predominance in Spain. Thus Turkey was for the time safe from French interference, while after the Conference of Erfurt prudential motives prevented Alexander from undertaking any extensive operations against Turkey.

Till July, 1808, however, Napoleon hoped to be able to carry out his designs for the subjugation of Turkey, and for the conquest of Egypt and India. But from that time (July, 1808) events in Spain forced him (1) to forego his Eastern projects, (2) to modify

his plans generally, (3) to meet Alexander at Erfurt. Thus the summer of 1808 proved to be of momentous importance in Napoleon's career, while to Europe generally the effect of the events in Spain cannot be over-estimated.

During all the years from 1797 to 1808, Napoleon had never dismissed from his mind his Asiatic and Colonial designs. His views were by no means limited to a mere European supremacy, the attainment of which was by him regarded as a preliminary measure to extensive Eastern conquests.

During the first six months of 1806, before his plans were interfered with by the hostility of Prussia, his mind was mainly occupied with designs for securing Sicily and the Mediterranean. By the conclusion of peace with Great Britain he hoped to obtain a respite from war long enough to enable him to form a powerful fleet.

But circumstances forced him to postpone the execution of these projects and to devote all his attention to the struggles with Prussia and Russia.

After Tilsit, however, he was enabled to return to his earlier plans. The Continent was now under his ascendancy. It was united under his command in antagonism to Great Britain, and he himself was apparently in a position to resume his Asiatic schemes. France had indeed no adequate fleet, but he hoped soon to be in a position to use the fleets of Denmark, Spain, and Portugal, and having established his supremacy over those countries, to include in his system the

Spanish and Portuguese colonies of Central and Southern America. Thus in order to secure a complete mastery over the Baltic and the Mediterranean, and to place his Empire on an equality with Great Britain as a colonizing power, Napoleon had merely to secure the alliance of Denmark and Spain, just as he had secured the alliance of Bavaria and other German secondary States.

The war with Spain broke out in 1808, and though Napoleon regarded it in the light of a rising which could easily be suppressed, its outbreak interfered with the execution of his schemes in the Mediterranean, and forced him to postpone his designs with regard to Turkey and the East generally.

Simultaneously with the national uprising in Spain in 1808, marked by the capitulation of Baylen and the Convention of Cintra, there became apparent a feeling of general dissatisfaction on the part of the Tsar Alexander with the conduct of Napoleon in relation to the Treaty of Tilsit. Alexander had come away from Tilsit with his mind bent upon conquests in Turkey. The French alliance was never popular in Russia, but, as Alexander and his minister Romanzoff were well aware, successful enterprises against Turkey would still all discontent and satisfy the Russian people. But at Tilsit Napoleon had asserted his right to act as arbiter in the war between Russia and Turkey, for he feared if war continued Turkey would throw itself into the arms of Great Britain. In all future operations against Turkey, the eventual partition

of which was ever in Napoleon's mind, Russia and France in his opinion must act simultaneously and in unison.

Moreover, Napoleon, in the *Secret* Treaty concluded at Tilsit, had definitely laid it down that whenever the partition of Turkey should be taken in hand "the town of Constantinople and the province of Roumelia" should not be included in the territory handed over to Russia.

If, however, Russia was bound by the Treaty of Tilsit to retire from the Danubian provinces, Napoleon was equally bound by the same Treaty (Article 4) to withdraw his troops from Prussian territory. While the wish nearest to Alexander's heart was the annexation of much of Turkey, including Constantinople, the determination of Napoleon to destroy Prussia was equally strong. Prussia had steadily refused to enter into the Confederation of the Rhine, and in consequence Napoleon was resolved to bring about her political annihilation. A suggestion by Napoleon that an arrangement might be come to by which he should work his will upon Prussia without interference, while Alexander should be allowed to keep the Danubian provinces, was peculiarly distasteful to the latter monarch. His sympathies had been aroused by the misfortunes of the Prussian King and of his wife, Queen Louise, and his mind revolted from a bargain which meant the utter ruin of the Hohenzollern House.

Thus no definite settlement was come to on these important questions, and the opening of 1808 found

the French and Russian Emperors each dissatisfied with the conduct of the other. While things were in this position the Spanish rising took place. Its effect upon the relations of Napoleon and Alexander was manifested in unmistakable fashion in October, 1808, at Erfurt. No one, however, least of all Napoleon, imagined during the early months of that year that the course of events in Spain was destined to be more than a temporary check upon the development of Napoleon's fortunes.

In fact Napoleon imagined that his position after Tilsit rendered him the dictator of Europe, and it was not till 1811 that he began to realize fully the existence of obstacles to the full attainment of his ambitious views.

One result of the position attained by Napoleon at the time of the Treaty of Tilsit was the altered tone which he adopted in his relations with the Papacy. It became evident that his object was to enslave the Church. He pictured himself as the head of a vast European dominion in which he was to rule the consciences of his subjects through his vassals, the Pope and Bishops. This he thought could be accomplished without any direct assumption of authority in things spiritual.

To this scheme Pius VII, to his eternal credit, offered strenuous opposition, and in consequence Napoleon determined to transfer the Papacy to Paris or some other French town, to enforce the adoption of the distinctive principles of Gallican theology, and



generally to dictate the Papal policy. As a means of carrying out this vigorous policy Napoleon relied upon the hearty co-operation of the Gallican Episcopate.

In 1806 he issued the Catechism of the Empire which was agreed to by the Papal Legate but not by the Pope, who, however, made no formal protest. Early in 1808 the occupation of Rome by French troops commanded by Miollis announced to the world the declaration of war between the French Emperor and the Pope. The struggle between these potentates was nominally over that article in the Concordat which provided that the Prelates nominated by Napoleon should be instituted to their office by the Pope. Pius VII, a prisoner at Savona since 5 July, 1809, declined to recognize the appointments to vacant bishoprics, on the ground that Napoleon, being guilty of culpable conduct to the Papacy, was not in a fit position to exercise the right of nomination, and on this ground he refused to institute Cardinal Maury to the Archbishopric of Paris.

In consequence of this determination on the part of Pius, no less than twenty-seven sees were vacant in 1809, and Napoleon in order to secure his aims appointed in November, 1809, an Ecclesiastical Commission to deal with the crisis. He further attempted to conciliate Pius by offering him the Papal possessions south of the Apennines. Pius, however, refused to treat except from Rome, which he was, however, not to see again till 1814. The situation was not unlike that of 1682 when Louis XIV

thought of setting up an independent Gallican Church, and, moreover, Napoleon's Commission recommended, as had been done in 1682, the summoning of a national representative Council.

The reply of Pius to Napoleon's appointment of an Ecclesiastical Council was a Papal Bull excommunicating all who had been guilty of aggressions against the Holy See, but its only effect at the time was to irritate the Commission which practically endorsed Napoleon's policy. In 1809 the question of Napoleon's divorce from Josephine and his marriage with Marie Louise of Austria (after the divorce had been recognized by the Senate) was referred to the Consistory Court of Paris. This marriage caused much searching of hearts among the Cardinals who in November, 1809, were ordered to proceed to Paris. Many who were doubtful of the legality of the marriage refused to go, and were imprisoned or exiled, but Maury and those who agreed with him drew up on 16 January, 1810, an address in support of Napoleon's wishes.

From this time Napoleon made no secret of his zeal for the Gallican principles as laid down in 1682, and for the extinction of the independence and autonomy of the Church.

During 1810 and 1811 the struggle proceeded and in June, 1812, Pius was taken to Paris. In December, however, the failure of the Russian expedition and the overthrow of the Grand Army were accomplished facts, and the attitude of Napoleon was

at once changed. In January, 1813, the Treaty of Fontainebleau was made by Napoleon with Pius who, shortly afterwards, was allowed to return to Rome. The fall of the Empire was accompanied by a retraction of the Treaty by Pius who, like many temporal monarchs, regained that liberty of action of which he had been like them deprived for so many years.<sup>1</sup>

At St. Helena Napoleon wrote and spoke of his religious policy. He fully realized how powerful a lever was religion in the hands of a ruler, and how necessary it was to be on good terms with the Pope. "By being on good terms with the Pope," he said, "one can govern the consciences of a hundred million Catholics. . . . What an immense influence that means! What a hold on public opinion!"<sup>2</sup> He explained his rupture with the Papacy by the facts that though Pius VII had some affection for him, politics caused the breach between them. The Pope, he declared, desired above everything else temporal power, and that as soon as he realized that he could not enjoy it, he entered upon a course of first secret and then open hostility to the French Emperors. Napoleon declared, moreover, that he always made a distinction between the Pope as Prince and the Pope as Pontiff. At the same time he firmly asserted

<sup>1</sup> This subject is very adequately treated in Jervis's "History of the Gallican Church," a work to which I am much indebted.

<sup>2</sup> Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," p. 164. London, Heinemann, 1909.

(though his letters furnish conclusive proof that the removal of Pius to Avignon was carried out by his express orders) that though General Miollis was justified in removing the Pope from Rome yet that he acted without orders. Rome was in a dangerous condition, a rising was probable, and the removal of Pius to Savona was, in his opinion, a wise step. Though Pius was well treated he at once transformed "the political conflicts into a religious war"; and his refusal to institute the Bishops chosen by Napoleon justified the calling of the Council of 1811. The summoning of this Council, so Napoleon stated, was meant to be the first step in the direction of handing over to the State the immediate control of religious affairs. The political resistance of the European sovereigns had led to an extension of his plans, and similarly the struggle with Pius caused him to develop his projects for securing full control of the religion of his subjects. But all his projects were overthrown by the events of 1812 and the following years, owing to the uprising of Europe against the French domination. Such was Napoleon's explanation of his anti-papal policy. The Papacy had its revenge. After 1812 "the Pope, the Spaniards, and the sailors who maintained the continental blockade" were together responsible for that rising of the nations which eventually freed them from the Napoleonic despotism.

An interesting question arises with respect to Napoleon's position after Tilsit. Had he not under-

taken the invasion of Spain in 1807-8, nor of Russia in 1812, would he have remained Emperor till his death? Madame de Staël held the view that war was necessary to him for the preservation of his absolutism. "A great nation," she says, "would not have endured the monotonous and degrading weight of despotism, if military glory had not continually roused and animated public sentiments." Mr. Bodley holds the contrary view. In his opinion, Napoleon having finished his great work of organization, but "given to the army eleven years of legitimate glory from Castiglione to Friedland, had an unexampled opportunity of ruling peacefully a contented people".<sup>1</sup> There is much to be said in support of this view; but Napoleon, ignorant of the real strength of the British navy, and still more ignorant of the determination and vitality of the British nation, was resolved to carry out his Eastern schemes. It is seldom realized how dear to him were those schemes. Supremacy in the Mediterranean, the downfall of the British power in India, the subjection of England to his will—these seemed to him in 1807-8 when at the height of his power to be objects well within his reach.

Consequently after Tilsit his character degenerates. "The lawgiver, the organizer, the statesman disappears; he is only the conqueror, conscious of his skill in the terrible game of war, which distorts his imagination and drags him in a furious wanton course to Madrid, to Moscow, and to Leipsic."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bodley, "France," Vol. I, p. 111.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* Vol. I, p. 111.

“After Tilsit, and especially after the Austrian marriage,” writes another biographer,<sup>1</sup> “Napoleon was suffering from conceit and ‘pride’. For ten years he had wielded absolute power, and those ten years had changed him from a strenuous hard-worker, who studied the situation with great care, to a self-willed despot, who expected everything to go as he wished because he wished it, and imagined himself a being apart from mankind endowed with supernatural powers.”

Tilsit saw Napoleon at the height of his power. From the date of that treaty the foundations of his empire became unsound. Had the Emperor abandoned projects of aggression, had he modified the continental system, had he refrained from endeavouring to force his policy upon Spain, had he recognized the immense power of the Roman Church, it is quite possible that the rule of his family in France might have been perpetuated. But his “restless egotism” and the growth of “the despotic habit” appeared more and more unmistakably after 1807, and his policy became “increasingly dissociated from the opinion and the tradition of France”. After 1807 France, satisfied with the establishment of the Napoleonic Empire, desired peace.

The substitution of Champagny and Maret the Duke of Bassano for Talleyrand as confidential advisers marks the increase of Napoleon’s impatience of able and independent advisers. Thus while the

<sup>1</sup> Norwood Young, “The Growth of Napoleon,” p. 389.

growing opposition to the continental system was tending to rouse in Germany a spirit of revolt, in Spain the abhorrence of Napoleonic rule was sapping his military strength. Moreover, as the years following Tilsit proceeded, the French people realized that the spirit of moderation was more and more absent from the schemes of the Emperor, who, moreover, by his anti-papal policy, alienated many of those who adhered to the Roman Catholic faith.

CHIEF DATES

War between Russia and Turkey . . . . .	December, 1806.
Napoleon takes Dalmatia and Ragusa . . . . .	December, 1806.
Venice united to the Italian Kingdom . . . . .	December, 1806.
British Orders in Council . . . . .	January, 1807.
Eylau . . . . .	8 February, 1807.
Convention of Bartenstein (Russia, Prussia, Sweden)	April, 1807.
Heilsberg . . . . .	10 June, 1807.
Friedland . . . . .	14 June, 1807.
Treaty of Tilsit . . . . .	9 July, 1807.
Formation of Grand Duchy of Warsaw . . . . .	July, 1807.
British seizure of Danish fleet . . . . .	September, 1807.
Treaty of Fontainebleau . . . . .	October, 1807.
French invasion of Portugal . . . . .	October-November, 1807.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE BEGINNING OF NAPOLEON'S INTERVENTION IN SPAIN AND THE CONGRESS OF ERFURT, 1807- 1808

After Tilsit—Growth of national feeling and of national opposition to Napoleon—Junot's invasion of Portugal—Napoleon's Mediterranean schemes—The importance of Spain—Napoleon in Italy, 1807—The Milan Decree—The meaning of the continental system—Advantages to Spain of a French alliance—Its importance for Napoleon's Mediterranean policy—Napoleon's policy to Spain—The Bayonne interview—Explanation of Napoleon's action—The influence of religion in Spain—Summary of the events leading to the Spanish rising—Accession of Joseph—The Spanish rising—Baylen and Cintra—Murat, King of Naples—The Congress at Erfurt—Its meaning and importance.

**T**ILL Tilsit Napoleon had been the scourge of Europe. Europe demanded a scourge, and in the words of Lord Rosebery, he purged "the floor of Europe with fire".<sup>1</sup> All the ancient monarchies were compelled "to set their houses in order," with results highly beneficial to themselves and to Europe. In 1799 it seemed as though Europe would escape from reform; in 1815 she had not only been forced to adopt reforms but had experienced a revolution. After

<sup>1</sup> Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: the Last Phase," p. 228.



Tilsit Europe definitely entered upon a new period in its career.

The Revolution which had done its work in France had, unwittingly and unconsciously, instilled new life into Europe. National feeling was created, and simultaneously with its unexpected assertion in Spain began to show itself in many parts of Germany. In 1813 it was strong enough to force Napoleon back into France, and in 1814 it brought about his downfall. But in 1807 Napoleon, carried away by his successes, culminating in the Treaty of Tilsit, determined to bring the Spanish Peninsula under his immediate influence. His policy towards Spain well illustrated his extraordinary confidence in himself, his belief in his destiny, his audacity, and his gambling spirit. At St. Helena he recognized how mistaken had been his policy to Spain.

While Junot was traversing Spain in the later months of 1807 Napoleon's activity never ceased. Junot occupied Lisbon on 13 December, 1807; on 23 November Napoleon had entered Milan on his way to Venice. He was resolved, as far as Italy was concerned, to close all Italian ports to English ships. Leghorn and Ancona were at once forced into obedience, and Napoleon returned to those projects of domination in the Mediterranean which he had cherished when, at the age of 26, he had commanded 30,000 men in Egypt, and had never abandoned. France had, indeed, owing to the superiority of the English fleet, lost her colonies and

much of her commerce. But the establishment of French supremacy in the Mediterranean implied not only the conquest of Macedonia and of Egypt and complete mastery over Dalmatia and the Ionian Isles, but also the subjugation of Spain. The Mediterranean would thus be closed to the English, Spain in possession of Gibraltar and subservient to France would hold the keys of this new Empire, the possession of which would amply compensate France for the loss of her colonies.

The way to the complete success of the continental blockade, therefore, lay through Spain, and Napoleon's mind during this period never wandered far from Spain. Unless his plans in Spain were successful all the money expended in the south of Italy would be wasted. And Naples had proved "un gouffre sans fond, d'hommes et d'argent". Napoleon, indeed, was far from being satisfied with Joseph's government. An easy-going man, without any special political capacity, and one who was, moreover, apt to become discontented with his position, Joseph was tolerant even with those who openly declared their preference for a Republican to an Imperial form of government. What was more serious, the Calabrian district of the Neapolitan kingdom was infested with brigands, while at Reggio the English held their own.

On his return to Milan after visiting Venice and Mantua, Napoleon issued on 17 December, 1807, the Milan Decree—the complement of the Berlin Decree of 21 November, 1806. By it every ship—no matter of

what country—which accepted the English Orders in Council was declared liable to capture. Also every ship sailing from or to England, or from or to one of the English colonies, was, if possible, to be seized. In fierce terms Napoleon condemned the English declaration that the flag did not render the cargo free from the danger of capture. In adopting this tone and these measures Napoleon was in fact repeating the French Navigation Act of September, 1793, and the declarations of the Committee of Public Safety.

In adopting this policy Napoleon ignored the possibility of an uprising of the nations against a system which touched every man. He seems to have imagined that in order to secure adhesion to his disastrous policy he had simply to procure the easily-obtained acquiescence of the rulers. By the continental system not only were the nations of Europe ruined, they were humiliated. For their acceptance of the continental blockade implied absolute subservience to a tyrannical foreigner.

The tyranny of the English edicts was not so apparent to the ordinary inhabitant of continental Europe as was the French domination, the severity of which was felt by him every day of the week.

If he happened to live in one of the provinces which had been torn from Austria or Prussia he found himself placed under the rule of a stranger. He was surrounded by Custom House officials, by a foreign gendarmerie; he was liable to domiciliary visits; he saw his children forced to serve in the French armies;

he was ruined by the weight of taxation. Owing to the continental system he was now faced by the fear of starvation.

Till the continental system threatened Europe Napoleon had reason to believe that there was no danger of any serious opposition to his supremacy. His successes had been extraordinary, and so easily obtained that he never realized their superficial character. He had "partitioned kingdoms, overthrown dynasties, erected kings," but he never realized the possibility of Europe rising to shake itself free from his domination.<sup>1</sup>

For the success of his schemes, the establishment of the French power in the Mediterranean and the active co-operation of Spain and Portugal in the policy of the continental blockade were absolutely necessary. That accomplished it would then become necessary to make some satisfactory arrangements with Russia. That Power had interests in the Mediterranean which, if strenuously upheld, might interfere seriously with Napoleon's projects. The firm friendship of Russia was absolutely essential to the success of his plan. While he was forcing the acceptance of his will upon Spain and Portugal, he relied upon the Tsar to prevent any rising on the part of Austria or Prussia.

To a man of the imaginative character of Napoleon nothing was impossible. He determined to use all

<sup>1</sup>Sorel, "L'Europe et la Revolution Française," Vol. VII, p. 236. Paris, Plon.

his efforts to turn the attention of Russia towards the Baltic. The seizure of certain of Sweden's possessions would necessitate removal of Russian troops from the Danube to Finland. Later, he hoped to turn the attention of Russia towards Asia. The conquest of Russia and even of India would have a twofold effect. Alarmed at the threatened attack upon their Indian possessions the English would evacuate the Mediterranean, and would hasten to make peace with France. And at the same time the absence of the Russian armies in Asia would give Napoleon a free hand with regard to Egypt and Turkey.

At the end of January, 1808, Savary returned from a mission to Russia and Napoleon realized that Alexander would not acquiesce as easily as he had hoped in his schemes. Moreover, he was at the same time brought to realize that the British Government, undeterred by its apparent isolation in Europe, was resolved to continue the war to the bitter end. The declared opinion of the English Parliament implied war to the death.

Nevertheless no thought of failure crossed Napoleon's mind. He was busy arranging for the inclusion of the whole of the Spanish Peninsula in his continental system, and he never imagined that he would meet with any serious opposition.

Moreover, during the early months of 1808, he had ever reason to believe that French supremacy in the Mediterranean would be firmly secured.

The Treaty of Tilsit, as has been seen, "had enabled Napoleon to turn from the contests of the North towards his cherished schemes for securing supremacy in the Mediterranean".<sup>1</sup>

Alexander had relinquished his hold on the Ionian Islands in favour of Napoleon, who in February, 1808, dispatched a fleet under Ganthéaume who seized and occupied Corfu. This success was regarded by Napoleon as a preliminary step to the establishment of his supremacy in the Mediterranean and to the partition of Turkey between France, Russia, and Austria.

But before these ambitious projects so dear to Napoleon could be carried out, the Spanish rising took place, an event which led to the overthrow of his Eastern schemes and indirectly to his own fall.

After Tilsit Napoleon, as has been pointed out, looked forward confidently to the overthrow of Great Britain, the ruin of her Eastern Empire, and the firm establishment of France as the leading power in the world. To overcome Great Britain he relied upon the Russian alliance, the Berlin and Milan Decrees, his coercion of Denmark and Portugal, and the complete subservience of Spain.

The issue of the Berlin Decree in November, 1806, was followed by the English Orders in Council, January to November, 1807, and by the Milan Decree, and a long and bitter struggle ensued—in the case of

<sup>1</sup> Johnston, "The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy," Vol. I, p. 172. London, Macmillan & Co., 1904.

the British nation, a struggle for life. As Napoleon realized that he could not attack Great Britain directly he devised his plan of commercial strangulation. In spite of the temporary relief afforded to British manufacturers by the Spanish rising which enabled them to pour their goods into Spain and the Spanish colonies, the manufacturing districts in England underwent great misery. The relief, however, afforded to British commerce by its ability to trade with Spain, Portugal, and their colonies, together with Napoleon's adhesion to the old mercantile theory, enabled the British nation to struggle through the terrible years 1810 and 1811. Thus Napoleon's two gigantic blunders—the war with Spain and his permission to export corn into England—finally put an end to all chance of the establishment on the part of France of a great world Power giving laws to Europe and developing the resources of a vast colonial Empire.<sup>1</sup>

The Berlin and later the Milan Decree no doubt caused great inconvenience to the inhabitants of Great Britain, but in themselves they were not sufficient to establish Napoleon's ascendancy in Europe. The seizure of the Danish fleet in September, 1807, relieved the British Government from any fear of the destruction of its naval power in the Baltic, but at the time it proved but a slight advantage to Great Britain and interfered with Napoleon's plans to only a moderate extent.

<sup>1</sup> "Lectures upon the History of the Nineteenth Century," p. 77.


The real issue between Napoleon and Great Britain had to be fought out in the Spanish Peninsula. Napoleon's Empire was in reality staked upon his success or failure in Spain.

With Spain as a cordial ally, Napoleon would be able to compete with Great Britain as a naval and colonizing power. Since 1795 Spain had been the nominal ally of France, and her ruler was as subservient as were the rulers of Bavaria and Würtemberg. Portugal could not hope to resist any force that Spain might bring against her, and as far as her resources and position as a European power were concerned might be placed in the same category as such states as Sardinia, Naples, Hanover, and Brunswick.

For Spain the advantages to be derived from her reorganization by Napoleon seemed undeniable. A hundred years previously Louis XIV had saved her from undergoing the fate of Poland by bringing her into close relations with his monarchy, and by carrying out by means of his agents the complete rehabilitation of the Spanish administration. With the accession of Philip V, the Bourbon grandson of Louis, new life was instilled into Spain, and till the death of Charles III, in 1788, she had enjoyed the benefits of the efforts made by her Bourbon rulers and by such enterprising ministers as Alberoni, Patiño, Wall, Squillacci, D'Aranda, and Campomanes.

Spain in 1807 was still passing through a period of misgovernment which followed the death of Charles III. Her army was worthless; her navy





PAULINE BONAPARTE, PRINCESS BORGHESE.  
FROM THE SEAT BY CANOVA IN THE VILLA BORGHESE AT ROME.



had been wellnigh destroyed at Trafalgar. But had her army and navy been placed at the disposal of Napoleon, had she been treated as an honoured ally of France, as Bavaria had been treated, and been given a share of Portugal—then Spain would have become a client state of France, and would have aided not only the establishment of French supremacy in the Mediterranean, but would have contributed to the complete isolation of Great Britain.<sup>1</sup>

Instead, however, of adopting this course and taking steps to make his alliance with Spain durable and valuable, Napoleon insisted on placing his brother Joseph Bonaparte on the Spanish throne. Louis XIV had indeed pursued a somewhat similar course, but he acted in accordance with the wishes of the Spanish people. In 1700 the death of Charles II had left Spain without a ruler, and in order to avert partition at the hands of France, Austria, and Great Britain, the Spaniards invited Philip, the grandson of Louis, to become their king. In 1807, however, Spain had a king and a crown prince, but Napoleon, adopting a high-handed course, procured their abdication, and without consulting the wishes of the Spanish nation forced upon it as king Joseph Bonaparte.

Napoleon's three months' sojourn at Bayonne in 1808 may be said to mark the turning-point in his career. It was then that he decided upon the fatal mistake of transferring his brother Joseph from Naples to Spain.

<sup>1</sup> See Seeley, "Life of Stein," Pt. IV, ch. 1.

Mistakes he had already made, but his miscalculation with regard to the true policy to be carried on in his relations with Spain proved overwhelmingly disastrous. Spain had always gravitated naturally towards France, and Napoleon could without much difficulty have counted upon the ready subservience of the Spanish monarch.

Some justification has been urged on behalf of what seems to be an extraordinary blunder and a fatal miscalculation on the part of Napoleon. The Government of Spain, it is asserted, and with truth, was the worst in Europe. The existing abuses were manifest to the world, and their existence was the more incapable of defence if it be remembered that under Charles III abuses had been checked and the country placed in a prominent position among European Powers. By restoring order in Spain and by carrying out reforms similar to those instituted by Charles III, Napoleon, it would seem, might have resuscitated the vast Spanish Empire, modernized it, and launched it afresh on a career not unworthy of its past traditions.

In an age, too, which has been styled one of "international lawlessness," Napoleon considered that the benefits likely to accrue to Spain and her people would justify in the eyes of the world his daring and revolutionary policy. To a man of Napoleon's vigour, capacity, enterprise, and ambitions, the opportunity of reforming and launching on a successful career, a great country like Spain with all its infinite resources must have seemed irresistible. The corrup-

tion in every department of the Spanish Government was so manifest that to him the benefits, which would be derived from the reform of abuses, would easily outweigh a few high-handed and revolutionary acts.

Without drastic measures it would seem impossible to rescue Spain from the effects of the rule of the most contemptible of the Bourbon race. Moreover, the very existence of a Bourbon ruler was repugnant to Napoleon and to every exponent of French revolutionary principles.

Napoleon, too, realized that the misgovernment of Spain could not be cured under the weak rule of Charles IV, and that the Spanish alliance during the last few years had been of little value to France. Its debt was enormous, its fleet was practically valueless, its army in a state of dissolution: in a word, its alliance with France had proved of small advantage to Napoleon. By taking possession of Spain, Napoleon would deal "a final blow to the House of Bourbon," he would remove from France all danger of finding in Spain during the ensuing years an enemy, he would advance the interests of his own house, and, above all, by striking a blow at Great Britain from which as he hoped she would not recover, he would be enabled to carry out his ambitious Eastern schemes and establish the world-wide supremacy of France. He had thus many and plausible reasons for treating Spain on a plan totally different from that which he had adopted with regard to Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden,

With his immense army he felt, moreover, able to act not only as a reformer but, if necessary, as a conqueror.

Moreover, the establishment of Spain under his direct control would mark the completion of the continental system and would place in his hands her fleet and colonial Empire. Cadiz and Carthage would be invaluable bases for expeditions, the command of the Mediterranean would pass to France, half of the new world would be under her rule. Great Britain would assuredly be ruined.

It has been argued that the true policy of Spain was to accept Napoleon's intervention and reforms in the spirit in which his vassal states in Germany had accepted them. By so doing Spain like Bavaria would have found herself in a strong position after Napoleon's downfall. Spain, according to this view, should have sacrificed her political independence for a time in order to regain prosperity and, later, independence. Her true interests, it is further alleged, were opposed to those of Great Britain; and by entering into the Peninsular War she merely supported the cause of British trade and that of the Roman Church.

Plausible as this view may seem, it errs in ignoring the fact that Spain in resisting Napoleon was struggling for the independence of Europe, and was the first continental power to oppose the "international lawlessness" which characterized the Napoleonic regime.

There is, moreover, no doubt that Spain differed widely from the German States which Napoleon had so far been chiefly concerned with. No national life

existed as yet in Germany nor in Italy. In neither of those countries had he been opposed by the people. His entry into Berlin after Jena was accompanied by the plaudits of the Prussian inhabitants of that city. Neither in Germany nor in Italy had the people been allowed any share in political affairs. Both countries also had been divided among so many rulers that a feeling of nationality did not exist. Neither Germany nor Italy were independent countries, and in neither case was the State the nation. Neither country was held together by that all-powerful influence—religion.

In no respect did Spain differ from Germany so greatly as in the matter of religion. In Spain religion was the strongest existing force. To Napoleon's offer of reforms which should benefit the common interests of the Spaniards, the reply was that his projects endangered the existence of Catholicism in Spain. The Spaniards were held together by a tie of supreme force—that of religion,<sup>1</sup> “a religion fierce, ignorant, intolerant”.

Moreover, in Spain the feeling of patriotism, which as yet did not exist in Germany and Italy, was always latent, and after the Bayonne interview was roused and rapidly developed. “When the State fell to pieces the nation held together and proceeded to put forth out of its own vitality a new form of State.” When Napoleon imagined that he had established his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain, he was startled by finding that an unexpected obstacle to the realiza-

<sup>1</sup> Seeley, “Life and Times of Stein,” Pt. IV, ch. 1, p. 83.

tion of his hopes had appeared—an obstacle which “proved fatal to his (Napoleon’s) Empire”.<sup>1</sup> With the outbreak of this Spanish revolt may be dated the definite beginning of the fall of Napoleon.

In 1806 it had become evident to Napoleon that the tie which by the Treaty of 1795 held Spain to France was a very slight one. During the campaign of Jena a proclamation issued by Godoy calling upon the Spanish people to prepare for war, convinced Napoleon “that a Bourbon on the Spanish throne was a tiresome neighbour—too weak as an ally, yet dangerous as a possible enemy”.<sup>2</sup> The possibility of an attack by Spain while he was occupied in central Europe, and the conviction that no Bourbon could be a faithful ally of one who had sprung from the Revolution, decided Napoleon, after the conclusion of peace with Alexander at Tilsit, to take in hand the affairs of Spain and Portugal. Already in March, 1807, he had obtained from Godoy 18,000 of the best Spanish troops who were stationed on the Baltic. Thus was Spain at a critical moment in her history deprived of an invaluable source of defence. At the end of July Napoleon had returned to Paris, and early in August French troops began to assemble at Bayonne with the ostensible purpose of forcing Portugal to carry out the Berlin Decree. The half-measures proposed by the Prince Regent in reply to Napoleon’s demand for the seizure of all British merchants in Portugal were

<sup>1</sup> Seeley, “Life and Times of Stein,” Pt. IV, ch. 1, p. 85.

<sup>2</sup> Oman, “History of the Peninsular War,” Vol. I, p. 3.



not considered satisfactory. On 13 October a proclamation was issued in Paris that "the House of Braganza had ceased to reign".

On 18 October a French army, under Junot, entered Spain, and on 30 November he entered Lisbon only to find that on the previous day the Prince Regent sailed for South America. The formal annexation of Portugal by France was the next step in Napoleon's policy. On 13 December the tricolour was hoisted in Lisbon.

The history of Napoleon's occupation of Portugal is of considerable interest. It shows that while the Emperor was denouncing Great Britain for her rapacity and disregard of conventions in seizing the Danish fleet, he was himself contemplating a very similar line of conduct in Portugal. The occupation of Portugal by the French, too, decided Napoleon to continue his designs for the dethronement of the Spanish Bourbons.

On 14 April, 1808, Napoleon reached Bayonne, and the next day he wrote to acquaint Joseph in Naples with the position of affairs. "I am," he said, "expecting the Prince of the Asturias who has taken the name of Ferdinand VII, and I am also expecting the unfortunate Charles IV and the Queen. The Grand Duke of Berg (Murat) is at Madrid, General Dupont is at Toledo. I have divisions at Aranjuez and at the Escorial," and he might have added at Barcelona, Figueras, Pampeluna, St. Sebastian and Burgos.

It is quite clear from this letter and one—a very important one—written on 18 April that the occupation of the Spanish Peninsula by French troops and the substitution of Joseph for Charles or Ferdinand was part of the scheme for the expulsion of the English from the Mediterranean, and had been projected long before Canning's seizure of the Danish fleet. For, while explaining to Joseph the political situation in Spain, Napoleon alludes with satisfaction to Corfu and to the fact that Scylla—that important post—is being fortified. He was more firmly resolved than ever to carry out the continental system and to ruin England, which was, as he knew, beginning to suffer from the effects of her long war. "Nothing but peace with that country," he declared, "can make me sheathe the sword and restore tranquillity to Europe."

On 5 May, 1808, Charles IV and Ferdinand VII resigned the crown of Spain to Napoleon. Already on 2 May a serious insurrection had broken out in Madrid, which might have warned Napoleon of the danger of proceeding too hastily. But neither that rising nor the insurrections which had taken place in various parts of Spain between 22 and 30 May had any effect upon Napoleon's plans. On 11 May he had informed Joseph that he was King of Spain, and indicated to him the advantages of that position. "It is a throne which places you at Madrid, a three days' journey from France. . . . At Madrid you are in France; Naples is the end of the world." Lucien Bonaparte (the Prince of Canino) would probably

have made a better king of Spain than Joseph. He had considerable oratorical powers; he had more energy: the success of the *coup d'état* of Brumaire was, to a great extent, due to him. He knew his limitations and would not have meddled in military affairs. If success could have attended the Spanish experiment (which is very doubtful after the perfidy of Bayonne) it would have been with Lucien or Murat at Madrid.

Joseph had, however, proved himself an able diplomatist both at Lunéville and at Amiens. His work at Naples, too, had been most creditable. He had restored order to the finances, he had swept away feudal abuses, he had reorganized the taxation, he had established and preserved order. In transferring him to Madrid, however, Napoleon committed a great blunder.

On 6 June Joseph was proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies by Napoleon; on 7 June he arrived at Bayonne; on 9 July he entered Spain; on 20 July he arrived at Madrid. Two days later Dupont's capitulation at Baylen took place, and on 1 August Wellesley landed in Portugal.

Meanwhile Joachim Murat, who had married Caroline Bonaparte, had accepted the throne of Naples and on 6 September he entered his capital. He at once infused new life into his kingdom, inaugurated reforms, and endeavoured though in vain to capture Sicily. In 1812 he joined the Moscow expedition as commander of the cavalry. It was

evident to him that the future of his kingdom of Naples would be decided in the north of Europe.

The rising in Spain in 1808 marks the opening of a new epoch in European history. It shows that the real meaning of the Revolution under Napoleon was gradually becoming patent to keen observers. The war of 1792 can, indeed, be adduced as the first example in the eighteenth century of a war which was essentially national, but in its later phases the effects of the Revolution were essentially cosmopolitan and anti-national.

The rising in Spain, like the rising in Austria in 1809 and of Germany in 1813, was decidedly national, and the growth of the spirit of nationality was directly opposed to the teaching of the Revolution. The more predominant Napoleon's influence became in Germany the more the spirit of nationality was checked. How fatal to liberty was French influence can be realized if it be noted that the adoption of French doctrines led to the suppression of the old estates in Bavaria and Würtemberg, and to the complete abolition of the old-established forms of self-government.

The rising in Spain was, if we look into its real meaning, the unconscious expression of a revolt against "the uniformity and the break with old-established customs caused by the French". From 1807 onwards were sown the seeds of the romantic revival in Europe, and of the reaction against Rousseau's teaching. The rising in Spain illustrates the force of the

opposition which the French Revolution, as directed by Napoleon, was already—as early as 1808—calling into existence.

Spain had hitherto given no sign of being able to resist invasion. No other country in Europe has suffered so many conquests, probably none has been embroiled in so many civil wars. At the same time, in justice to the Spanish patriotism, it must be remembered that the French invasion of Spain, as undertaken by Napoleon, was the best organized that had ever swept over the land. The resistance of the Spaniards, which could not have proved as effective as it did without the aid of the English (any more than the English intervention could have proved as effective as it did without the Spanish rising), was characterized, like all Spanish risings, by reckless bravery and by lack of discipline. Probably, however, the Napoleonic struggle produced the nearest approach to united action on the part of the Spaniards that has ever been witnessed.

The French failure in the Peninsula is mainly to be attributed to Napoleon himself. Only his violent breach of good faith could have united the Spaniards with the Portuguese and the English. Once roused, the stubborn racial identity of the Spaniards speedily asserted itself, and the national antagonism to France was intensified by religious fanaticism. The Spanish organization, indeed, never rose much above the guerilla order, but with the aid of the English it proved sufficient to hold the French at bay till the break-down of

the continental system, and the hostility of Russia forced Napoleon to devote his chief attention to Central and North-Eastern Europe.

Instead, therefore, of securing the naval and mercantile resources of the Spanish Peninsula, Napoleon, by his haste, by his lack of appreciation of the difference between Spain and Central Germany, was led to commit one of his greatest blunders, viz. his treacherous action at Bayonne. Instead of adding enormously to the naval and mercantile resources of France by his seizure of Spain, "he brought on a struggle that was to occupy the energies of a quarter of a million or more of his best troops for five years to come, that was to empty his coffers, and—worst of all in his sight—was to give most timely relief to England".<sup>1</sup> From the opening of the Spanish war British goods began to pour into Spain, and the Spanish colonies for the first time in the history of Great Britain began to admit British merchandise. Thus Napoleon's mistaken policy in the Spanish Peninsula saved Great Britain from that ruin which he imagined was made inevitable from the date of the arrival of Junot at Lisbon.

In saying that the risings in Spain, Austria, and Germany were national, care must be taken to distinguish the movement in Spain from that of Germany, and that of Germany from that of Italy. It is often asserted with some truth that the Spanish rising in-

<sup>1</sup> "Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century: England and Napoleon," p. 74.

augurated a general movement in Germany and Italy against the Napoleonic regime, and that before the "rising of the nations" Napoleon fell. Symptoms of a national movement in various parts of Europe appeared after the Treaty of Tilsit. In Spain, in Austria, and in Prussia can be found evidence of the steady growth of political feeling antagonistic to the aims of Napoleon.

In that struggle against the French predominance, we must distinguish the idea of nationality as it showed itself in Spain and as it was gradually evolved in Italy, from the idea of nationality as it was adopted in Germany.

The idea of nationality as it appeared to the Spaniards and later to the Italians "pointed to the political unification of populations having a language and literature, a character and memories, in common,"<sup>1</sup> while on the other hand the German sentiment was primarily connected with the feeling of race, which, while admitting "the existence of ruling and subject races, never dreamt of relaxing the German hold on Poles or Italians". Thus at the Congress of Vienna the hold of Prussia and Austria over parts of Poland or Italy was recognized.

In the Spanish resistance to Napoleon religion played an important part. Napoleon's treatment of the Pope was deeply resented in Spain. In the war against Napoleon the Spaniards fought not only for

<sup>1</sup> "Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century," p. 42.

national independence, but also for the cause of religion against the infidel.

The Spanish rising in 1808, however, has a special importance in that it marked the beginning of a series of risings before which Napoleon eventually fell.


In 1809 the Austrians rose ; in 1812 the Russian opposition to Napoleon led to the Moscow expedition ; in 1813 the War of Liberation, ending with the downfall of the French Emperor, began.

In 1808 it was evident to Napoleon after the capitulation of Baylen (July) and the Convention of Cintra (30 August) that his Eastern schemes must be postponed, and that the opposition to the execution of his plans in Spain must be at once checked, no matter at what cost.

Joseph seems from his arrival in Madrid to have gauged the situation far more accurately than did Napoleon. Before he had heard of the Baylen disaster he had written to the Emperor pointing out the evil results which must follow upon Caulaincourt's pillage of churches in Cuenza. And on 24 July he assured Napoleon that he (the Emperor) had been deceived and that glory would be shipwrecked in Spain. At the same time he promises to do his best in the difficult situation in which he finds himself. With honest generals, good troops, and 50 millions, something might yet be done to retrieve the position.

On 28 July Joseph heard of Dupont's capitulation and retired from Madrid to Miranda between Burgos and Valencia, having been only eight days in Madrid.





JOSEPH BONAPARTE  
FROM A LITHOGRAPH



The capitulation of Baylen was followed by a respite from serious operations by the French for a period of some three months. Napoleon, on hearing of the disaster, followed a few weeks later by the battles of Roliça on 17 August, of Vimeiro on 21 August, and of the Convention of Cintra on 30 August, at once ordered a large body of his most experienced troops which were then in Germany to march into Spain. The necessity for the departure of troops for Spain compelled Napoleon to remove all his soldiers from Prussia, though he left garrisons in the fortresses of Custrin, Glogau, and Stettin. The removal of the troops was not, however, begun till Prussia had agreed to a humiliating convention, which only permitted her to possess an army of 42,000 and forbade the organization of any form of a militia. The French troops could not, however, reach Spain before October, and in the meantime Napoleon went to Erfurt in order to assure himself of freedom from all anxiety in central Europe, while he concentrated his efforts upon the suppression of the Spanish insurrection.

His policy, which included the Partition of Turkey and the conquest of Egypt and India, had, since the Treaty of Tilsit, developed in a most extraordinary fashion, but its success depended on (1) the acquiescence of Russia, (2) the conquest of Spain. At first it seemed that from Russia he would receive cordial support in the execution of his plans. In Russia, Count Budberg had been succeeded as Minister of Foreign Affairs by Count Romanzoff, a strong supporter of the

Russian alliance and "a firm believer in Russia's mission to effect the overthrow of Turkey".<sup>1</sup> At Tilsit, however, Napoleon had played the part of arbiter, and he proposed not only to act as arbiter in all questions relating to the complex Eastern question, but above all to prevent Constantinople and the province of Roumelia from falling into the hands of Russia.

Alexander was naturally irritated at Napoleon's attitude with regard to Constantinople, and as the French troops had not, according to Article 4 in the Treaty of Tilsit, been withdrawn from their occupation of certain Prussian fortresses and districts, he did not withdraw the Russian forces from the Danubian provinces.

Dupont's capitulation, followed by the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro and by the Convention of Cintra, made it all the more necessary for Napoleon to place his relations with Alexander on a firm basis. A free hand in Spain for a few months was all that he asked for. He sent Ney to Spain, and he wrote to Joseph to say that shortly 100,000 more men would be sent to his assistance and that in the autumn Spain would be conquered. Joseph, however, held a very different view. In his opinion the Spaniards would never be reconciled to his rule.

Early in September, then, Napoleon arranged for vast reinforcements to proceed to Spain, while he impressed upon Joseph the necessity of acting with severity

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 805.

towards all the disaffected. Three weeks later he was at Erfurt, where on the 27th the conferences, which lasted till 13 October, began. At this brilliant gathering, at which were present numerous kings and princes, and where Goethe, "the representative of the cosmopolitanism and lack of patriotism which had enabled Napoleon to attain to his predominant position,"<sup>1</sup> received the Cross of the Legion of Honour, the French Emperor was compelled to yield to many of Alexander's demands. On 13 October he wrote that he had arranged all with the Emperor of Russia. As the price of Alexander's non-interference with Napoleon's seizure of Spain, Russia was to have Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia. "I am," he said, "to start to-morrow for Paris, and in a month's time I shall be at Bayonne." He was full of confidence. "At present," he wrote, "the enemy's presumption is so great that I am inclined to think he will remain where he is. The nearer he is to us the better. A well-arranged manœuvre might terminate the war by a single blow, and for this my presence is necessary."<sup>2</sup>

In reality the price which he had paid for Russian non-intervention with his plans in Spain was a heavy one. He still occupied certain fortresses in Prussia, which he never intended to evacuate, and he was willing to recognize the possession by Russia of Moldavia and Wallachia if he could keep Prussia, the

<sup>1</sup> Atkinson, "A History of Germany, 1715-1815," p. 523.

<sup>2</sup> "Napoleon's Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. I, p. 336.

total ruin of which he desired, in his possession. This scheme had never met with Alexander's approval and at Erfurt was dropped, owing to the necessity recognized by Napoleon for doing nothing which would in any degree alienate the Tsar. The whole Eastern question was left unsettled, for it was recognized that it was unadvisable to press Turkey lest she should throw in her lot with England. Moreover, it was agreed that the acquisition by Russia of Moldavia and Wallachia should be deferred. "The Spanish rising," it has truly been said, "saved Prussia from virtual extinction and the Turkish Empire from partition."<sup>1</sup>

But some years were to elapse before Napoleon, unlike his brother Joseph, realized the true meaning of the Spanish insurrection. In the spring of 1808, while planning the deposition of the Spanish Bourbons, he had been preparing for an Eastern expedition. He continued to regard the opposition in Spain to Joseph as a matter of little moment, and till the failure of the Moscow expedition he never seems to have realized the possibility of the total failure of his schemes in Spain.

Though after the close of the Erfurt Conference Napoleon was in Spain during November and December, he was fully aware of the trend of events in Germany, and at the end of December, 1808, he declared Stein to be an outlaw. Stein, who had been dismissed on 24 November by Frederick William, to whom his ministers' project for an insurrection was

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 315.

distasteful, found himself obliged to leave Berlin with the utmost diligence and secrecy on 6 January, 1809, and fled to Buchwald, the residence of the Count Reden in Silesia, arriving there on 9 January. Being in imminent danger of capture, he hastened to cross the border into Austrian territory, and thus escaped Napoleon's vengeance. That he was enabled to escape successfully was due to the assistance which he received from the Count and Countess Reden.<sup>1</sup> This incident, one result of which was that Stein was enabled later to influence in a marked degree the Tsar during the War of Liberation, is an admirable proof of Napoleon's resolve to crush Prussia completely, and of his realization of the danger from the growth of national feeling in Germany. It is, moreover, an excellent instance of the pertinacity with which he pursued his schemes.

## CHIEF DATES

Occupation of Portugal by Junot . . . . .	November, 1807.
The Milan Decree . . . . .	December, 1807.
French troops occupy Spanish fortresses . . . . .	February, 1808.
Abdication of Charles IV of Spain . . . . .	March, 1808.
Abdication of Ferdinand at Bayonne . . . . .	May, 1808.
Annexation of Tuscany to France . . . . .	May, 1808.
Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain . . . . .	May, 1808.
Beginning of Spanish risings . . . . .	May, 1808.
The Baylen Capitulation . . . . .	July, 1808.
Battle of Vimeiro, Convention of Cintra . . . . .	August, 1808.
Congress of Erfurt . . . . .	October, 1808.

<sup>1</sup> "A Pietist of the Napoleonic Wars and After," p. 81 *seq.* London, John Murray, 1905.

## CHAPTER VII

### NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER, 1808-1812

After Erfurt—Napoleon in Spain—Corunna—Napoleon's return to Paris—The situation in Paris—War with Austria—Its causes—Prussian neutrality—The views of Stadion, Archduke Charles, Stein, Scharnhorst—The Wagram campaign—Napoleon's Hungarian policy—The Peace of Vienna (Schönbrunn)—Napoleon in Paris—The Austrian marriage—Napoleon divorces Josephine—The importance of the Russian alliance—The continental system at its height—Position of Great Britain—The continental system *versus* the continental blockade—The year 1810—Abdication of Louis King of Holland—The Russian Ukase of 31 December, 1810—Its importance upon the relations of Napoleon and Alexander.

HAVING arranged matters at Erfurt with the Tsar, and having secured a free hand in Spain, Napoleon returned to France with the intention of crushing without delay all opposition in Spain and of driving the English from the Peninsula.

On 1 August, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley had landed in Portugal, and before the month was closed the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro had been fought and won by the English, followed a few days later by the Convention of Cintra.

But Napoleon brushed aside these events as



incidents of no importance. On 11 August he had assured Joseph that the English were not worth consideration, and that they never had more than a quarter of the troops that they professed to have. He was resolved to overwhelm all opposition in Spain, and had arranged for the removal of the Grand Army from Germany to the Peninsula as soon as he was sure of Russia. In fact, before he reached Erfurt, considerable bodies of troops had begun to march towards Spain.

He had left Erfurt on 14 October and arrived in Paris on the night of the 18th. On 3 November he was at Bayonne. At that moment the French fortunes in Spain were at a low ebb. Joseph had been compelled to abandon Madrid, one French force had capitulated to the English at Cintra, another to the Spaniards at Baylen. The remaining French troops had retired beyond the Ebro. The first French campaign in Spain had failed. With the arrival of Napoleon the second campaign was entered upon with vigour, and in three months Joseph had re-entered Madrid, the English had been driven out of the country, and the Spanish resistance was confined to guerilla warfare in the southern and western provinces, and to the defence of a few towns. So long as Napoleon was in Spain his generals obeyed his commands and acted harmoniously. But it was only during Napoleon's stay in Spain that the French cause met with continuous successes. As soon as he left the country the weakness of Joseph and the

quarrels of the French generals enabled the English first to acquire a firm foothold in Portugal, and then gradually with the aid of the Spaniards to free Spain of the French. The influence, too, of the priests, an influence which Napoleon ignored, was immense, and was used to encourage the peasants to take advantage of the geographical peculiarities of the country, and to cut off isolated French columns and detached parties.

At Bayonne, however, Napoleon speedily restored order in place of the chaos which reigned in the French armies. He at once saw that the troops were properly clothed and fed. Greatcoats and shoes were the chief desiderata, and these were immediately supplied.

From Burgos he instructed Joseph how the work of reorganizing the police and the finances should be carried out. His presence in Spain soon made itself felt. On 10 and 11 November Marshal Victor defeated Blake at Espinosa; on 23 November Ney defeated Castanos at Tudela; while a week later Napoleon himself overthrew a force of 7000 at Sono Sierra, the French loss being "almost unappreciable". On 4 December Napoleon entered Madrid.

Meanwhile Sir John Moore had marched from Portugal to Sahagun in order to strike a blow at Marshal Soult and the French line of communications, and on 24 December began his famous retreat. Napoleon, as is well known, turned aside in order to crush the audacious English general. He was full of hope of exterminating Moore's force. "If," he wrote

on 27 December, "they retire, they will be pushed so vigorously to their ships that half of them will never re-embark."

And on 31 December he again wrote: "There could not have been a better sedative for Spain than to send her an English army". However, on the road to Astorga Napoleon received dispatches from Paris which not only acquainted him with the intrigues of Talleyrand and Fouché, but also informed him of the warlike preparations being made by Austria.

Napoleon therefore returned to Benevento, leaving to Soult the duty of pursuing Moore, who eventually defeated the French army at Corunna, and though he lost his own life in the battle succeeded in securing the embarkation of his army in the English ships. From Benevento Napoleon proceeded to Valladolid in order to be able to communicate more rapidly with France, and remained there from 8 January, 1809, till he returned to Paris. While still in Spain he wrote many interesting letters to Joseph. He declared that he had no hopes of peace in Europe during 1809, owing to the fierce hatred of England and to the events in Constantinople. As far as Spain was concerned, however, he thought that she was settling into tranquillity; and while at Valladolid, too, he endeavoured to place the French army in Spain on a sound footing and to weed out all incompetent officers. He criticized very severely the operations of the Duke of Dantzic (Lefebre). "That Marshal," he wrote, "commits nothing but follies; he cannot

read his instructions. It is impossible to entrust him with the command of a corps, which is a pity, as he shows great bravery in battle."<sup>1</sup> On 10 January Napoleon wrote definitely to Joseph: "Send back the Duke of Dantzic to me at Valladolid; he shall no longer command the 4th corps."<sup>2</sup>

During his stay at Valladolid he received confirmation of the hostile attitude of Austria. "War with Austria," he wrote on 7 January, "seems imminent, and her troops are already encamped upon her frontiers." In consequence he at once began to withdraw several of his more able generals and officers from Spain for service in Germany.

On 15 January he wrote very explicitly to Joseph: "The Court of Vienna is behaving very ill; she may have to repent of it. Do not be uneasy. I have troops enough even without touching my army in Spain to go to Vienna in a month."

Then he adds very characteristically: "You must tell every one, and let it be generally believed in the army, that I shall return in three weeks or a month. In fact my mere presence in Paris will reduce Austria to her usual insignificance, and in that case I shall come back before the end of October."<sup>3</sup>

He had no presentiment of the complications and difficulties which were to result from his enforcement of the continental system, and which would prevent him from ever returning to Spain. He imagined

<sup>1</sup> "Napoleon's Correspondence with Joseph," Vol. II, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 13.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 27.

when he left Valladolid on 16 January, 1809, that Spain would settle down quietly; and so convinced was he that her tranquillity was assured that he told Joseph that as soon as Saragossa had surrendered he might send for his wife and children. They could stay at Marrac (Napoleon's villa near Bayonne) for about three weeks from the date of their arrival there on 25 February, and, Saragossa fallen, they could then proceed to Madrid.

During the Emperor's absence from Spain, Bessières, the Duke of Istria, who was in command of the Imperial Guard and whose head-quarters were at Valladolid, was ordered to send to him daily a courier with dispatches.

On 16 January, at 6 a.m., Napoleon mounted his horse and rode out to Valladolid attended only by Savary, and began his journey *au grandissime galop* across "the lonely guerrilla haunted mountains". He arrived in Paris on 23 January, at 8 a.m., in excellent health. With the return of Napoleon to France "began," says Thiers, "the series of faults, the results of the selfishness and the jealousy of our generals, which lost the cause of France in Spain, and, by losing it in Spain, lost it also in Europe".

On his arrival in Paris Napoleon realized the existence of a network of intrigues. Not only were the royalists in La Vendée active, but his own personal followers were engaged in plots against him. Of these the chief were Fouché and Talleyrand. All his rage was concentrated upon Talleyrand, and on

28 January he covered his minister with reproaches. "Vous êtes un voleur, un lâche, un homme sans foi"—such were the terms used during an invective which lasted half an hour. Though, however, Talleyrand was removed from the post of Chief Chamberlain he still continued in Napoleon's service. In later years Napoleon regretted that he had not consigned Talleyrand to prison, for the fallen minister never ceased to intrigue with the Austrians and Russians.

Napoleon, however, was full of confidence with regard to the future. On the 27th he wrote that his prompt arrival in Paris had at once changed the tone of Austria, and that "fear has succeeded to her arrogance and her extreme confidence". However, he was not lulled into a sense of false security; the conscription continued to be levied with rapidity, and troops continued to march towards Italy and the Rhine.

Since her overthrow in 1805 Austria had steadily made preparations for a renewal of her struggle with Napoleon. Count Stadion, who became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1806, and the Archduke Charles, Commander-in-Chief since February, 1806, had undertaken a complete reform of the Austrian army. In the autumn of 1808 Stein and a strong party in Prussia and in Vienna desired the immediate declaration of war. All north-west Germany was, it was thought, ready to rise, and Napoleon's absence in Spain seemed to be an admirable opportunity for throwing off the French yoke.

Both Stein and Scharnhorst desired a universal rising of the German nation, "in concert with such armies as Prussia could send to the field under Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, helped by the money and stores of England".<sup>1</sup> Stein argued that as continued submission to Napoleon on the part of Prussia would lead to ruin, resistance in alliance with Austria to France could not place his country in a worse position than that in which she then stood. Prussia had little to lose, for as things then were, her annihilation was certain to come about in a few years at the hands of France.

The king, however, refused to adopt the war policy of his ministers. He had no confidence in his own subjects; he mistrusted Austria, the hereditary foe of his house; he still relied upon Russia. His decision, which was strengthened by an interview with Alexander on his way to Erfurt, proved to be of the most immense importance, and deeply influenced the future history of Prussia and Germany. As things turned out, Prussia was eventually saved by Russia, and the close relations which in consequence subsisted between the two Powers deeply affected later European history.

The autumn of 1808, when Napoleon after the Conference of Erfurt had proceeded to Spain, seemed for Austria and Prussia an admirable opportunity for rising against Napoleon. But the inaction of Prussia, and the attitude of Alexander who had promised to

<sup>1</sup> Seeley, "Life and Times of Stein," Pt. X, ch. II.

help Napoleon if the Emperor Francis attacked France, prevented Austria from beginning hostilities during Napoleon's absence in Spain.

As it was, the war broke out in the spring of 1809 after Napoleon had returned in triumph from Spain. Nevertheless Napoleon's position in Europe was by no means what it had been at Tilsit. The events at Bayonne made it clear that no confidence could be placed in his promises, and "that no amount of subservience would make a dependent State secure even of its existence if it should suit him to decide otherwise".<sup>1</sup> It was this conviction that explains and justifies the Austrian determination to enter upon war with Napoleon. It was the opinion of Stadion, who was supported by Metternich, that the postponement of war would enable Napoleon to choose his own time for attacking Austria. Further, unless Austria took the lead no rising in North Germany, where hatred of Napoleon was intense, could be expected. Moreover, by her preparations, Austria had disclosed her hostility to Napoleon, and this fact, apart from other considerations, justified the conference of 8 February, 1809, in deciding upon war.

Napoleon, who since his return from Spain had been preparing for the outbreak of hostilities with Austria, seems to have expected that he would receive active support from the Tsar. The position taken up by Russia with regard to Austria, therefore, came as a profound disappointment to Napoleon. Alex-

<sup>1</sup> Atkinson, "A History of Germany, 1715-1815," p. 525.



ander had already gained from his alliance with Napoleon all the advantages that he could hope for. He held Finland; he was prepared to occupy the Danubian Principalities. He had no wish to see Prussia or Austria trampled under foot by Napoleon. Speranski, his minister, held similar views, and on various grounds advocated for Russia a firm and pacific policy. He, therefore, in January, 1809, urged the continuance of peace. "It is," he said, "in our interest to prevent a rupture between France and Austria." If Austria declared war, he would be compelled by his engagements with France to oppose actively the Emperor Francis. If, however, France took the first hostile step, the Tsar, though realizing the delicate position in which he would be placed, did not consider that he was necessarily compelled to join in the war.<sup>1</sup>

On 30 March, 1809, Napoleon set his army in motion, and the war broke out. For the last time Austria acted as the national leader of Germany. Alexander's position was an unenviable one. A revolution had taken place in Sweden, the Turks had adopted aggressive measures, and war was on the point of being declared by them upon the Tsar over the question of the Danubian Principalities. Alexander adopted a middle position. He issued a manifesto against Austria, and at the same time

<sup>1</sup>Sorel, "L'Europe et la Revolution Française," Vol. VII, p. 544.

informed Napoleon that he was fully occupied in Finland and on the Danube. He was prodigal of assurances and promises. He let it be known in Vienna that he would not take any definitely hostile line of action ; at the same time he sent a most trustworthy agent to act as a spy upon Napoleon's movements. The relations between the French Emperor and the Tsar were very different from what they had been at Tilsit or even at Erfurt.

In the campaign which followed the outbreak of war the slowness of the Austrians in April considerably lessened their chance of success. Their failure at Eckmühl on 22 April destroyed all hope of a general rising in Germany. Risings under Ferdinand von Schill and Frederick William of Brunswick did indeed take place in May and July. But Schill, after heroic efforts, perished in Stralsund, while the Duke, with his Black Legion, after a raid into Brunswick, was compelled to escape by ship to Ireland.

No help came to Austria from North Germany, and though her army won a victory on 21 and 22 May at Aspern, she was defeated at Wagram on 4 and 5 July.

The battle of Wagram was "a masterpiece of Napoleon's strategy and organization". Never was his genius, his determination, and his resourcefulness better exemplified. Very characteristically, during his preparations, he had encouraged every kind of gaiety in Vienna, in order to re-establish on the part of his allies and army full confidence in himself. At the same

time he realized that upon his own energy and ability depended the success of his efforts.

The practical valuelessness of the Russian alliance was now manifest to him, and henceforth he was aware that he could no longer rely upon Alexander to aid him in his enterprises.

On 4 and 5 July the battle of Wagram had been fought and the Austrians had been defeated. But the French losses were immense, and Austria was by no means crushed. Her defeat was in part due to the neutrality of Prussia, and to the aid given to Napoleon by certain German states. With Polish aid Austria could have been completely crushed, but to take any step which might encourage the Poles to demand independence would bring about the total alienation and open hostility of Russia.

On 14 October the Treaty of Vienna or Schönbrunn was concluded. The war had proved disastrous to Austria and to all her supporters. In February, 1810, Hofer, who headed the Tyrolese in a vain attempt to aid Austria, perished, and the Tyrol was divided. Austria was by the Treaty of Vienna cut off from the sea ; she lost an immense amount of territory ; she was forced to join the continental system.

To Napoleon the war with Austria in 1809 brought with it considerable risks, and though he was ultimately successful the contest had proved an unusually severe one. On its conclusion, too, the prospects of the realization of his plans were not altogether bright. Wellesley's presence in the Spanish Peninsula was making

itself felt. England might create a diversion in the Netherlands or in North Germany, Prussia might join Austria, national risings in Germany might take place.

Moreover, in the east of Europe he had, so far, been unable to carry out his ambitious projects. In a letter of October, 1802, he had said: "My plan would be to make Hungary the centre of a great Eastern Empire, and I would place one of my brothers at the head of it". This idea he had never lost sight of, and between 1800 and 1809 he had never ceased his efforts to detach Hungary from its allegiance to the House of Hapsburg. He hoped to effect his object by negotiations with the Magyars which would result in the outbreak of an insurrection. These efforts went on uninterruptedly during periods of war no less than during intervals of peace. Secret missions were sent to Hungary, and the persons sent carried letters from Napoleon which bear witness to his political genius. They show his ability to grasp the essential points of the situation in Hungary, though he had had few opportunities of knowing anything whatever about that country or its inhabitants. They certainly attest Napoleon's knowledge of human nature. Proclamations were dispatched to Hungary in the Hungarian, French, and Slavonic languages, and it was evident that Napoleon expected the outbreak of a widespread insurrection of the Magyars against the reigning Hapsburg House.

In May, 1809, when the issue of his campaign against Austria was as yet doubtful, he addressed a

proclamation to the Hungarian nation. "The name Hungarian," he had declared in an earlier period, "is connected abroad with the idea of revolution"; and in the proclamation he openly invited the Magyars to desert the House of Hapsburg, and to choose a king from amongst his brothers. But the proclamation had not the expected effect, and Napoleon's projects in Hungary miscarried.

Since his adoption of the Imperial title Napoleon had lost *prestige* with the Hungarian population, and, moreover, his treatment of the Poles had roused the fears and suspicions of the Magyar nobility. Hungary, therefore, did not prove a profitable ground for French agitation as carried on by Napoleon. His attempts, however, to establish a Napoleonic dynasty in that country are a further illustration of his ceaseless activity and of his ambitious designs.

The overthrow of Austria at Wagram, and the conclusion of peace, rendered the question of the future policy of Napoleon a very serious one for all European potentates and statesmen.

Joseph, King of Spain, expected that the French Emperor would himself proceed to Spain and, with strong reinforcements, overwhelm Wellington whose success at Talavera on 27 July had prevented the French from invading Portugal, though it was not sufficiently decisive to save Andalusia.

Stein, on the other hand, predicted with extraordinary accuracy that the overthrow of Austria would be followed by an attempt on the part of Napoleon to

subjugate Russia. "When Russia is subjugated," he wrote, "France will find in the use it will make of its fragments, in the passive obedience of the miserable and selfish German princes, and the insurrectionary spirit of the 12,000,000 Poles, the means of weakening Russia still further." But his poor opinion of the ability of Russia to defend itself, and his estimate of the character of the Tsar Alexander, proved to be very inaccurate. He styles Alexander "a weak, sensual prince who, as the head of a nation the great mass of which are slaves, will not long maintain the fight against civilized Europe".

The first part of Stein's prediction, viz. that Napoleon would deliberately attack Russia, proved correct, but he himself in 1812 and 1813 willingly recognized how erroneous were his estimate of Alexander's character and of the power of resistance possessed by the Russian nation.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna on 14 October, Napoleon's intention seems to have been to conduct in person the war in Spain. On 7 October, while at Schönbrunn, he writes that his purpose is to proceed to Spain in December with 80,000 infantry and 15,000 or 16,000 cavalry. But at Paris he found himself involved in an infinity of distractions. The Government demanded his presence, his alliances required his constant attention, and the situation in Holland his direct supervision. Moreover, the question of a second marriage now began to occupy his thoughts,

Though compelled to renounce all idea of conducting a campaign in Spain, he never, however, considered the failure of the French arms possible. Masséna, Ney, and Soult would, he thought, quickly overthrow all Spanish opposition. In a short time he hoped to unite part of Spain permanently to France, to bring about the resignation of Joseph, and to rule the remainder of Spain by means of his marshals. In 1810 Holland was on the abdication of Louis brought under Napoleon's immediate supervision. A similar fate was now being prepared for Joseph and for Spain.

The weeks between November, 1809, and March, 1810, constitute a critical period in Napoleon's career. They may in a sense be regarded as the turning-point in the history of the French Empire. He had overthrown all his enemies on the Continent; Germany was at his mercy; the Spanish insurrection, in his opinion, would shortly be suppressed. The sea power of Great Britain alone remained unsubdued. But since the Walcheren disaster Napoleon was more confident than ever in his ability to subjugate Great Britain.

The enforcement of the continental blockade for a few months would, he felt certain, suffice to bring about the submission of the English. That accomplished, and the conquest of Spain effected, he would be master of the Continent, and be able to return to his Eastern schemes.

Meanwhile, though outwardly everything seemed to betoken the continuance of the successful career of

Napoleon, signs were not wanting to show that much discontent prevailed in all parts of Europe.

“It was in the years between Wagram and the retreat from Moscow that the attitude of the German people towards Napoleon finally crystallized into one of uncompromising hostility.”<sup>1</sup>

In France the desire for peace was almost universal; abroad the arrest of Frederic Staps on 10 October, 1809, had illustrated the hatred felt for Napoleon in Germany. At any moment illness, or the hand of an assassin, might leave France without a ruler.

The insecurity of his position which such events and considerations brought home to Napoleon made it all the more necessary, in his opinion, that he should have an heir, so strengthen his position, and found a dynasty.

His intention was, after having divorced Josephine, to contract a marriage alliance with Russia. By entering the sacred circle of royalty he could look forward to the firm establishment of his position, and eventually to peace.

After Wagram, however, he appears to have lost sight of the fact that the Napoleonic system in Europe hinged upon the Tilsit and Erfurt arrangements, in other words upon the friendly co-operation of Russia. Neither does he appear to have fully realized the unpopularity in Russia of the French alliance. From 1807 to 1810 it is true that Alexander, aided by his

<sup>1</sup> Atkinson, “History of Germany, 1715-1815,” p. 547.



minister Michael Speranski, endeavoured to modernize Russia somewhat after the example of France—to abolish the absolute Russian autocracy and to introduce to some degree a system of popular representation. But the Russian nation was not sufficiently civilized to appreciate Alexander's reforming ideas, while Napoleon's increasing ambition and his Austrian alliance forced Alexander in 1810 to concentrate his attention upon foreign politics and upon the necessity of securing for Russia some alleviation from the continental system.

In 1808 Napoleon's opposition to any scheme by which Russia should obtain Constantinople had made a rift in the Russo-French alliance, and that rift was widened when in April, 1810, the French Emperor married Marie Louise of Austria.

Napoleon had, indeed, after the Peace of Vienna in 1809, made proposals for the hand of the Grand Duchess Anna, sister of the Tsar. But the Empress Dowager, who hated Napoleon, consistently opposed the match. In order not to receive a refusal the latter had entered into negotiations for the hand of a Hapsburg princess. On 4 January, 1810, a convention with regard to Poland had been signed by the representatives of Napoleon and Alexander. This Napoleon now refused to ratify, and that refusal, together with Napoleon's marriage in April with Marie Louise, implied a radical change in his foreign policy and foreign relations. In this matter the Russians were at fault. As a condition of Napoleon's marriage

with a Russian princess, Alexander had extracted from the French Emperor a promise that the kingdom of Poland should never be re-established. But then the Russians hoped to put off Napoleon with evasive words. On 4 January, 1810, the Treaty with regard to Poland was signed. Alexander thought that he had won a signal triumph, that he had carried out his wishes with regard to Poland, and that he had saved his sister from a *mésalliance*. But he soon found that Napoleon had outwitted him.

The latter had already laid his plans with consummate skill. On 15 December, 1809, the divorce of Josephine had been finally accomplished, and Napoleon had at once sounded first Madame Metternich and then Metternich with regard to a marriage with Marie Louise of Austria. Thus when on 27 January, 1810, Napoleon convinced himself from a perusal of Caulaincourt's dispatches from Russia that Alexander had no intention of giving him his sister in marriage, he at once continued with Austria the negotiations with regard to which Alexander was ignorant, and moreover he refused, as has been stated, to ratify the Treaty of 4 January, 1810.

As the success of his continental system apparently depended entirely upon the continuance of the Russian alliance, Napoleon would seem to have been incurring a serious risk in entering upon the Austrian marriage. He seems, however, to have thought that not only would any possible loss arising from the weakening of his friendship with Russia be amply

compensated for by the Austrian marriage, but that at any rate the Russian alliance would continue till he had forced England to come to terms. He had little doubt that England's submission would be brought about within a very short period.

On 28 January, 1810, the question of Napoleon's marriage was formally discussed at a meeting of the chief French Ministers at the Tuileries, all except Talleyrand being unaware of what had already occurred in respect of this matter. Opinions were divided, some being in favour of a Russian, some in favour of an Austrian match.

On 6 February, however, Napoleon received information which made it quite clear that a Russian match was impossible. He had, as has been seen, already anticipated a refusal, and on 7 February the marriage contract with Marie Louise, daughter of Francis, Emperor of Austria, was signed. This marriage Napoleon was convinced would strengthen his position immensely.

Meanwhile it was, he thought, good policy, while strengthening himself in Germany by means of his marriage with Marie Louise, to continue active operations in Spain, and generally to maintain the *status quo* in Europe. Thus, should Great Britain refuse to come to terms he would be in an unassailable position. The year 1810 may thus be said, as far as outward appearances went, to mark the period at which Napoleon reached the summit of his power.

On 28 March Marie Louise arrived at Compiègne,

and the marriage was celebrated in Paris with illuminations, while, with the exception of London and St. Petersburg, congratulations poured in from all the chief European capitals.

Various circumstances, however, soon occurred to bring disillusionment to Napoleon's ambitious hopes. The effect of the marriage upon the relations of Austria and Russia was not what he had expected. Instead of Russia and Austria becoming mutually hostile, they tended to come together. Not that Napoleon anticipated an outbreak of hostilities between France and Russia, but he relied upon the assistance of Austria should such hostilities take place. Further, he hoped to force England to make peace, and in order to do so he endeavoured to unite all the continental powers against the Island kingdom. "1810," writes Sorel, "marque l'heure de la pleine mer, de la mer étale et par un jour radieux." With the exception of England Europe had been conquered, for in Spain no one dreamt of the ultimate failure of the French. Outwardly Napoleon seemed satisfied. Never had he spent so long a period in France as he did during 1810. Europe had seen the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, and of the Empire of Charles the Great; it had now witnessed the rise of the Napoleonic Empire. Napoleon compared himself to a Roman Emperor and his government to that of Diocletian. Since 1799 he had created an administration and had given France a code, and his work

as an administrator and legislator indeed survived his fall and lives on in the present day.

If Frenchmen did not enjoy the liberty which they had gained at the Revolution, they had at any rate secured equality. Any loss of liberty was amply compensated for by the position which France had gained in Europe.

Moreover, France was prosperous, and such was the hatred of England that the continental system was by no means generally unpopular among the French people. In fact the hardships incident to it fell mainly on the Germans, the Dutch, and the Italians. With the producers the protective system was popular, and all Frenchmen, feeling secure in life and property, were united in supporting Napoleon in his fierce crusade against the British. War was confined to countries outside France, which itself did not feel any of the hardships of war with the exception of the conscription which, being necessary, was generally regarded till 1812 with equanimity. "The period between the end of 1810 and the middle of 1812," says Pasquier, "was the calmest period enjoyed by the French nation since the consulate." "Never," writes Balzac, "even in the great days of the monarchy, was the French aristocracy richer or more brilliant."<sup>1</sup>

During the years immediately succeeding the Treaty of Vienna, Russia, and indeed Austria, were

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Sorel, "L'Europe et la Revolution Française," Vol. VII, p. 466.

however merely biding their time, and only in form were adhering to the continental system. Their ambassadors had indeed been withdrawn from London, but Metternich avowed to Bathurst before his departure from Vienna, that Austria's peace with Napoleon was simply an opportunity for preparations for war, while between England and Russia no open hostilities had taken place, the Russian fleet captured in the Tagus being merely detained in an English port till the inevitable conflict between Napoleon and Alexander should break out.

All Napoleon's hopes of carrying out the continental system therefore depended upon the continuance of the Russian alliance, and thus Alexander held the key of the position. If once Alexander relaxed the restrictions upon English trade with Russia, all hope of bringing about the submission of Great Britain, and of seeing the realization of Napoleon's European and Oriental schemes, would vanish into thin air.

After the overthrow of Austria at Wagram and the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna, Napoleon therefore seemed to all outward appearance to be at the height of his power. But as long as Great Britain continued to defy him, his successes on the Continent were not sufficient and left the main object of his hopes unsatisfied. His Eastern schemes could not be carried out so long as the English fleet rode triumphant on the Mediterranean. Malta, and Sicily, and Portugal still remained unconquered, and his hold upon Spain was fiercely contested.

He was, therefore, more firmly than ever resolved to carry out the continental system in its entirety and to compel England to make peace. But that system had as yet never been systematically enforced. In Holland and in the Austrian dominions British goods found an entrance, and what was more serious Alexander showed signs of disagreeing with Napoleon on many fundamental points.

It was only by the most constant and rigorous system of supervision that Napoleon could hope to make the continental system effective. Consequently it was of the greatest importance to keep Russia true to her alliance with France.

Already, however, in 1810, it was beginning to be apparent that Napoleon's continental system could not be strictly enforced.

The war of 1809, though temporarily disastrous to Austria, had had one noteworthy result. "It destroyed in the eyes of Europe the halo of invincibility that had encircled the head of Napoleon."<sup>1</sup> It had synchronized, too, with the risings of Schill, the Duke of Brunswick, and Hofer, which, though themselves unsuccessful, indicated the growth of a feeling of nationality in Germany, the result itself of the French victories and domination. At the same time Napoleon showed no misgivings as to the ultimate success of his schemes.

After the defeat of Austria at Wagram and the Treaty of Vienna (Schönbrunn) he had, however,

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 360.

some justification for regarding the future with confidence. Germany was as yet far from being united. Prussia, owing to Frederick William's feeling of distrust of Austria, had not joined in the late war, in which indeed Napoleon had been aided by several of his German vassal states. The Bavarian and Franconian rulers regarded him as their defender against the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, and in other parts of Germany the people showed no disposition to throw off the military rule imposed by France.

It was not till after the Wagram campaign that the Napoleonic regime became generally unpopular in Germany, and that "the attitude of the people of Germany towards Napoleon finally crystallized into one of uncompromising hostility".<sup>1</sup> This change, which brought about the overthrow of Napoleon, was due to the gradual enforcement, after the Wagram campaign, of the continental system. In order to ruin England Napoleon threw away all the advantages which he had hitherto gained. As the German states realized that they were being sacrificed to the continental system they rapidly developed an intense feeling of hostility to Napoleon.

The failure of the Walcheren expedition in the summer and autumn of 1809 made the annexation of Holland an easy matter. His brother Louis, whom he had made King of Holland, had ruled, as far as possible, in the interest of the Dutch. From 1806 when Louis (the morbid elements of whose singular

<sup>1</sup> Atkinson, "A History of Germany, 1715-1815," p. 547.



character have lately been well brought out<sup>1</sup>) was placed over Holland, trade with England had by no means been wholly prevented, and the Dutch coasts had not, in accordance with Napoleon's wishes, been sealed up against British merchandise. Napoleon had indeed stated in a dispatch to Louis that he intended "to conquer the sea by the land," and while he was at Erfurt in October, 1808, he again had warned Louis that trade between England and Holland was carried on and that it must be put an end to. Louis, however, whose difficulties under the terrible grip of the continental system were only equalled by the generosity of his aims for his Dutch subjects, paid little attention to these orders, and Napoleon as a first step annexed the Island of Walcheren in January, 1810.

For some six months a correspondence between Napoleon and Louis took place, while at the same time Fouché entered into secret negotiations with England. In July Napoleon discovered Fouché's intrigue, dismissed him, and Louis fled to Bohemia, and the same month Holland was annexed to the French Empire. Apparently Napoleon, like Fouché, had himself considered the possibility of coming to terms with Great Britain, for in "The Times" of Saturday, 17 March, 1810, it is stated that "a French flag of truce from Boulogne having on board dispatches for the British government had been met by the Cherokee gunboat whose captain received the dispatches from the French Foreign Office and proceeded with them to Dover

<sup>1</sup> Atteridge, "Napoleon's Brothers". Methuen, 1909.

where he arrived (accompanied by the French vessel) at nine o'clock the same evening". In "The Times" comment was made on the occurrence. The funds rose a trifle on the prospects of peace, but it is evident from the attitude of the article that there was small chance of peace. "There are not twenty men in the kingdom," it stated, "who think that anything like security is to be obtained by a treaty of peace. We therefore believe that Bonaparte's proposals will meet with a cool reception. We are under the obligation of a solemn compact with the Spaniards to make common cause against France, and not to make peace with that Power except by common consent." The article goes on to express confidence in the patriotism of the ministers, though it criticizes severely their system of government, and the necessity for internal reform. "Nevertheless, in spite of the corruption, extravagance, and favouritism which it is asserted mark the existing system of government, it is hoped that the nation will not droop, but maintain a manly and erect position against its foreign foe, who either by treachery or violence has saddened the rest of Europe, and who only proposes peace as conducive to his designs of conquest. Our domestic enemies may be gradually shaken off; or if not they do but weaken—the other will overwhelm us."

This expression of the determination of the British nation to struggle on is especially interesting when it is remembered how dark the future must have appeared to thoughtful Englishmen in 1810, when the effects of

Napoleon's commercial system, in shaking his supremacy in Europe, were not yet apparent. Though reduced to great misery the English people, however, received some relief from the export of corn from the states ruled by Napoleon.

Fortunately, though imports from England were practically forbidden, Napoleon permitted the export of corn from the Continent to Great Britain, and thus enabled his enemy to survive the terrible year of 1810—a year when, owing to the failure of the harvest, the price of wheat advanced to 118s. the quarter.

In 1811 the crisis was over, and in March of that year the official report stated: "From Europe the importations from places from which the British flag is excluded have been immense".<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon, however, was still full of confidence as to the ultimate success of his policy, and he had some justification for that confidence.

In 1810 Wellesley seemed to be making little headway in Spain, and taking into consideration the failure of the Walcheren expedition in the previous year, the marriage of Napoleon to Marie Louise in 1810, and the occupation of Russia in a war with Turkey—one need not be surprised at Napoleon's anticipation of a triumph over England, and of the firm establishment of his supremacy over Europe.

On 24 March, 1811, he assured a deputation from the General Councils of Commerce and Manufactures

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 372.

in France that "in about six months his sword would pierce England to the heart".<sup>1</sup> At the very moment, however, that Napoleon made this statement he was aware that owing to the action of Alexander the continental system was breaking down.

In 1810 Napoleon had realized that there was no time to be lost and energetic measures were taken to enforce the continental system. Before the end of August Napoleon had occupied Lübeck, Lauenburg, Hamburg, all the left bank of the Elbe as far as Bremen, and Oldenburg—though as yet it was not formally united to his Empire.<sup>2</sup> He had thus acquired the means of constructing a vast fleet, and he felt confident that by 1812, if the continental blockade had not forced the English nation to make peace, he would have Great Britain at his mercy. He never for one moment imagined that Alexander would adopt a hostile attitude, at any rate before 1812. Alexander's position was indeed one of great and unexpected strength. On 19 September, 1809, he signed a treaty with Sweden which left him in possession of Finland. The annexation of Finland being thus accomplished he was able to concentrate his attention upon Poland. Alexander wished not only to abolish the name of Poland, but to use that country as an advanced western post of the Russian Empire. On

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 380.

<sup>2</sup> Sorel, "L'Europe et la Revolution Française," Vol. VII, p. 452.

this subject there was now little hope of an agreement being come to between him and Napoleon, and the closing months of 1810 saw the beginning of a crisis in the affairs of Europe which was only ended at Waterloo. That crisis was brought on by the refusal of Alexander on 31 December, 1810, to carry out the continental system.

By the end of December, 1810, Napoleon was thus suffering from two misfortunes—the Spanish resistance, and the refusal of Russia to adhere to the continental system. Napoleon's Spanish blunder in 1808 had saved Great Britain from the necessity of yielding to Napoleon. At the beginning of 1808 the British merchants were threatened with bankruptcy, but most unexpectedly Spain and the markets of Central and South America were suddenly thrown open to them. The transference of the Portuguese Royal Family to Brazil was accompanied by the opening of trade between Great Britain and a portion of South America.

This temporary relief was followed in 1810 and especially in 1811 by a relapse and reaction, and Mr. Rose says that "1811 must be regarded as the crisis in the commercial struggle between us and our mighty antagonist".<sup>1</sup>

The continental system which was at its height in 1810-11 has suffered from endless attacks, but from Napoleon's point of view it was defensible. There is nothing to show any determination on his part to make

<sup>1</sup> Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 194.

it perpetual. On the contrary he regarded it as a temporary measure intended to bring about the ruin of Great Britain. "It came," writes Mr. H. H. Wilson, "perilously near to effecting its object. . . . The control of the Baltic by Napoleon, especially in 1810-11, shook England to her foundations. In 1812 the British people were face to face with actual famine."<sup>1</sup>

That Great Britain had not yielded earlier was due to improved agriculture and the factory system. She was not dependent upon the Continent for clothing, and owing to the introduction of machinery was able to produce goods which were necessary to the continental nations and which were imported secretly. After Tilsit, and more particularly after the Treaty of Vienna in 1809, Napoleon had entered into a most determined conflict with Great Britain. Against England's *continental blockade* which was first notified to the world in the Orders in Council, Napoleon elaborated the *continental system*. From 1809 Europe gradually but steadily rose against Napoleon, and the *continental blockade* strangled the *continental system*.<sup>2</sup>

Warnings had indeed reached Napoleon of the disastrous effect which the adhesion to the continental system would have upon his fortunes. Bourrienne, whose advice was so often disregarded, after a visit to Hamburg for the purpose of enforcing the continental system upon the citizens, wrote that "the

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, p. 241.

<sup>2</sup> Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 197.

hurling of twenty kings from their thrones would have excited less hatred than this contempt for the wants of nations".<sup>1</sup>

The Continent depended upon the fleets of England for cloth, leather, and colonial produce, which Napoleon believed came entirely from English colonies. In spite of Napoleon's orders to the contrary, Bourrienne relates how he was compelled to obtain army clothing from England. Had he not done so the French troops then quartered in Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck would have perished from cold.<sup>2</sup>

The famous Russian Imperial Ukase of 31 December, 1810, was the result of this intolerable pressure which Napoleon had brought to bear upon Russia. The British commerce with Russia had been for a time cut off, and Alexander found it necessary to break away gradually from the continental system.

A crisis in Napoleon's fortunes was indeed arrived at on 31 December, 1810. On that day, as has been stated, Alexander issued his edict modifying his adhesion to the continental system. Napoleon was furious. "This was," he exclaimed, "the leak that was sinking the ship." His rage was natural. He had deliberately staked all upon the overthrow of Great Britain by means of his continental system.

On 6 August, 1810, he had issued a severe decree to check English smuggling, but in order to enforce that decree he had posted French troops in Stettin, in the Prussian ports, in Lübeck, Hamburg, Lauen-

<sup>1</sup> Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 198.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 199.

berg, and along the west bank of the Elbe. On 19 October he had issued his famous order that all British goods were to be publicly burnt, and on 10 December he announced to the Senate the annexation of all the Hanse towns and the region between them and Holland, which included Oldenburg.

Oldenburg, however, was held by a relative of the Tsar, but was a favourite resort of smugglers, and therefore was included in this order; thus Russia's dynastic interests were affected.

Napoleon had also on 17 November forced Sweden to declare war upon England, and he hoped to close the Baltic to English commerce. It seemed as though a few months of consistent adherence by Napoleon's allies to the continental system would have the desired effect, and that Great Britain would be compelled to accept the French terms. But Alexander's decision to break away, even in a slight degree, from the trammels of the continental system ruined Napoleon's plans, and saved Great Britain from all necessity of even considering the question of entering upon negotiations. It also led to the events of 1813 and 1814—the Moscow campaign, the battle of Leipzig, and the abdication of Napoleon.

#### CHIEF DATES

Napoleon in Spain . . . . .	December, 1808.
Stein advocates declaration of war by Prussia and Austria . . . . .	December, 1808.
Battle of Corunna . . . . .	January, 1809.
Napoleon returns to France . . . . .	January, 1809.



War with Austria . . . . .	March, 1809.
Battles of Abensberg and Eckmühl . . . . .	April, 1809.
Napoleon annexes the Papal States . . . . .	May, 1809.
Battle of Aspern . . . . .	May, 1809.
Battle of Talavera . . . . .	July, 1809.
Battle of Wagram . . . . .	July, 1809.
The Walcheren expeditions . . . . .	July-November, 1809.
Peace of Vienna (Schönbrunn) . . . . .	October, 1809.
Convention between Russia and France about Poland (not ratified) . . . . .	January, 1810.
Marriage of Napoleon to Marie Louise . . . . .	April, 1810.
Annexation of Holland by Napoleon . . . . .	July, 1810.
Invasion of Portugal by Masséna . . . . .	August, 1810.
The Fontainebleau Decrees . . . . .	October, 1810.
The Russian Ukase modifying its support of the continental system . . . . .	December, 1810.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE FALL OF NAPOLEON, MOSCOW, LEIPZIC, WATERLOO, 1813-1815

Napoleon's religious policy a cause of his fall—The effect of the continental system—The Decree of 31 December, 1810—Alexander's alienation from Napoleon—The Polish question—The Moscow expedition—The composition of Napoleon's army—Borodino—Moscow—The retreat—At Smorgoni Napoleon leaves the army—In Paris—Lützen and Bautzen—The Armistice of Pläswitz—Leipzig—The campaign of 1814—The abdication of Napoleon—The restoration of Louis XVIII—The allied sovereigns in England—Napoleon in Elba—the Congress of Vienna—Indifference of the allies to the possibility of Napoleon's escape—Napoleon's return to France—The Hundred Days—Waterloo—Napoleon in St. Helena.

THE fall of Napoleon was brought about by a variety of causes—religious, commercial, political. Of these the religious causes are apt to be overlooked, though their importance cannot be exaggerated. During the Consulate and the early years of the Empire he posed as the friend and champion of religion. "Religious liberty" seemed to him as dear as civil liberty. Though Roman Catholicism was restored, and became the State religion of France, the Jews

and Protestants were treated with the utmost toleration.

During his exile he asserted that he had been anxious to establish universal liberty of conscience, and that he desired "all men whether Catholics, Protestants, Mohammedans, or Deists to be equal". But during the years of his decline and fall the Protestants alone of the various religious bodies in France had no ground of complaint against him. Among the Jews and the Roman Catholics, on the other hand, there had grown up a bitter feeling of hostility to the Emperor. With the Jews opposition to Napoleon first began when on 17 March, 1808, he issued a decree for the regulation of their worship and trade. The articles which were contained in the decree were considered by the Jews an infraction of the assurances which he had already given them, and were couched in insulting terms. As a result, a powerful opposition was at once engendered among the Jews, who henceforth supported the efforts of the secret societies to effect the Emperor's downfall.

The alienation of the Roman Catholic Church was, however, far more serious. The great majority of his subjects belonged to that Church, and its influence was enormous and widespread. Perhaps the greatest mistake made by Napoleon was his attack on the Papacy and his imprisonment of Pius VII. The security of his government depended upon the goodwill of the Pope, and though Napoleon recognized the immense influence of Roman Catholicism in

France, Spain, Italy, and Southern Germany, he seems after 1807 to have thought that he was strong enough to insist upon the passive obedience of the Papacy.

The alienation of the Church, more than any single cause, had contributed to the fall of James II of England; it had brought about the failure of the schemes of the Emperor Joseph II; it proved the most important factor in undermining the basis of Napoleon's power. As First Consul Napoleon had fully recognized the importance of religion as represented by Roman Catholicism, and none of his measures were more statesmanlike than those by which he won over the French Roman Catholics to his side. As Emperor, however, he gradually drifted away from that statesmanlike position towards religion which as First Consul he had adopted. His loss of the goodwill of the Pope was accompanied by the ever-increasing hostility of the French clergy, whose influence among the mass of the people cannot be overrated. Thus, during the later years of the Emperor, the resentment of the clergy even to his rule was ever increasing. Having "undermined the basis of popular support" on which Napoleon had placed his throne, the Church intrigued for a return of the Bourbons.

Thus Napoleon's religious policy teemed with blunders. He drove the Jews to intrigue with the powerful secret societies; he failed to realize "that the Holy See was a power to be reckoned with"; he

turned against him the religious opinion of most of his subjects.

The commercial and political causes of Napoleon's fall are closely interwoven. The submission of Austria, the overthrow of Prussia, the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, the powerlessness of Italy, and the Russian alliance had enabled Napoleon to develop gradually but steadily his continental system. The rising in Spain he regarded merely as a temporary difficulty which would shortly be overcome. The success, however, of Napoleon's policy depended chiefly upon the continuance of the alliance of Russia, the only continental Power which could treat with Napoleon on equal terms.

It was therefore of first-rate importance to keep Alexander firm to his alliance with Napoleon.

The refusal, therefore, of Alexander, on 31 December, 1810, to adhere strictly to the continental system was a deadly blow to Napoleon's most cherished designs. Napoleon, as has been stated in a previous chapter, had earlier in the same year refused to sign a convention with Alexander directed against the aspirations of the Poles for national independence. Thus at the beginning of 1811 serious differences had arisen between the two monarchs. Each had been wounded in his tenderest point.

To Alexander the definite refusal of Napoleon's aid in suppressing the Polish national aspirations was as important as was the continuance of the continental system to Napoleon. Naturally, therefore, the year

1811 was an anxious one for both sovereigns, each of whom accused the other of making preparations for war. Upon that war hung the fate of Poland, as well as that of the continental system, if not indeed that of Europe.

For this struggle Napoleon was not as well prepared as he had been for the war of 1805 or indeed for the war of 1809. The Grand Army of 1805 was, according to Napoleon, "the best he had ever commanded," and the overthrow of Austria had been followed by the willing submission of the states which were formed into the Confederation of the Rhine. In 1809, though he again conquered Austria, signs were not wanting that the French victory was not likely to be followed by results as satisfactory to Napoleon as those which flowed from the victory of Austerlitz.

The alliance of Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit had appeared to affirm the complete overthrow of the European system and to establish the Napoleonic supremacy in Central, Western, and Southern Europe. That Napoleon himself thought such was the case is evident from the zeal which he showed in carrying out the continental system, hoping thereby to effect within a short period the commercial strangulation of Great Britain.

But, as has been stated, the enforcement of the system tended to encourage the new national movement in Central Europe, which was itself encouraged by the outbreak of the Spanish resistance to Napoleon's schemes.

In 1809 the determination of Austria to defeat Napoleon was based upon national considerations. Austria in 1809 represented the rising spirit of nationality in Germany, and at the same time continued that struggle with France for supremacy in Europe, which dated from the wars of Charles V and Francis I. The war roused great enthusiasm in Germany, and though Austria was defeated it was now recognized that Napoleon was not invincible. The national awakening of Germany had begun—"the first step towards the overthrow of Napoleon's power".<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, in spite of the warnings from Germany and in spite of the continuance of the Spanish war, and the growing tension between France and Russia, Napoleon continued to insist upon the enforcement of the continental system.

In 1811 he regarded war with Russia as necessary for the success of his plans for the destruction of Great Britain. In order to make success certain he assembled an army which numbered "610,000 men with 1242 field pieces, and 130 siege guns".<sup>2</sup>

But neither Napoleon nor his army were what they had been in 1805. In 1812 he was himself physically and mentally unequal to the immense strain of the Russian campaign, while his army was largely composed of soldiers of various subject nations, and was lacking in coherence and not well officered; the

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. X, p. 360.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 488.

commissariat, also, was far from being in a satisfactory condition.

At Verdun, through which a great part of the Imperial Guard passed on their way to Wilna (the head-quarters of the forces which were being assembled to act against Russia), an Englishman, J. Spencer Stanhope, was living on *parole*, having been taken prisoner while travelling in Spain.

He gives an interesting description of Napoleon as he saw him passing through Verdun in his carriage on his way to the front.

Napoleon had travelled all night and did not look at his best. "His face looked swollen, his complexion sallow and livid. In his eyes was a depth of reflection, a power of intention (if I may so call it) of seeing into the souls of men; there was a murkiness, a dark scowl, that made me exclaim 'nothing in the world would tempt me to go one hour in that carriage with that man!'"

The late M. Albert Sorel brings forward a long list of authorities to show the accuracy of his statement that as early as August, 1810, Alexander had begun his preparations for an attack upon the French Emperor.<sup>1</sup> He estimates that in February, 1811, Alexander had 230,000 men ready to further his plans. Those plans included the substitution of Russian for French influence in Poland, and a close alliance with Prussia, Sweden, and Austria. Once a general rising

<sup>1</sup> Sorel, "L'Europe et la Revolution Française," Vol. VII, p. 508.



had been planned against the French domination, Alexander felt that he could count upon the support of the Dutch, the active assistance of Great Britain, and the continued opposition in Spain to Napoleon's plans. Moreover, the dispersion of the French troops would in his opinion facilitate the success of an aggressive movement by an army strong in numbers and impregnated with a hatred of French domination.

Alexander had many substantial reasons for his determination to resist the growth of Napoleon's influence. The latter's avowed intention of securing a mastery over the Mediterranean and the adjacent countries, his retention of the Ionian Islands, his opposition to the idea of a Russian occupation of Constantinople, his sudden marriage on 2 April, 1810, with the Austrian Duchess Marie Louise, before the proposed match between him and a Russian princess had been formally broken off, the hardship suffered by Russian trade owing to the continental system, and lastly the annexation on 10 December, 1810, of the Duchy of Oldenburg (with the whole coast-line from Friesland to Denmark), which belonged to a near relative of the Russian Tsar—had decided Alexander to take a step which led directly to Napoleon's Moscow expedition.

Among the causes of the friction between Alexander and Napoleon the Polish question was an important one. Both the monarchs fully recognized the military value of Poland; both became rivals for the friendship of the Poles. In this contest for the favour

of Poland Alexander was worsted, though early in 1811 he made a vigorous attempt to gain the Poles by liberal promises. In 1812 Napoleon definitely realized that Alexander would not support the continental blockade. The Tsar's refusal to unite with Napoleon "in severe repressive measures against British and American trade," made it necessary for Napoleon either to abandon the continental system or to compel Alexander to support it.

The alienation of Alexander began, as has been shown, in 1810. In 1811 that monarch entered upon his preparations for war; on 29 March, 1812, he dismissed his chief minister Speranski, who was succeeded by Shishkoff, a representative of the old Russian party which was opposed to the policy of Tilsit. 29 March, 1812, is said to mark "a turning-point in Alexander's career, for he now entered deliberately upon a life-and-death contest".<sup>1</sup> The date has, indeed, a wide significance, for it marks the opening of the period of Russia's supremacy in Europe—a period which was not closed till the Crimean War.

Early in May, 1812, Napoleon proceeded to Dresden, where he met the rulers of Austria and Prussia and a host of German princes. While there he heard that Alexander, who in April had secured the alliance of Sweden, had concluded on 28 May the Peace of Bucharest with the Turks.

Moreover, in June, Napoleon, who till his arrival at Moscow remained hopeful of winning over Alex-

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, pp. 487-8.



MARSHAL NEY COVERING THE RETREAT, 1812  
FROM THE PAINTING BY YVON AT VERSAILLES



ander, disappointed the Poles by refusing to recognize, in accordance with the wishes of the Polish Diet, the restoration of the kingdom of Poland.

Nevertheless Napoleon remained, as ever, confident in the success of his policy. His army, which included contingents from Austria, Prussia, Poland, Italy, Saxony, the Rhine Provinces, and Westphalia, was superior in numbers to that of Alexander and was under experienced officers.

But Napoleon himself was not in good health, and mentally he had weakened, not having the same power of decision as heretofore, and not having the same sense of proportion. Though immense, his army had no coherence, and was now called upon to undertake a campaign under conditions not hitherto met with.

On 24 June the French army crossed the Niemen ; on 17 August Napoleon drove the Russians out of Smolensk ; on 7 September he fought the drawn battle of Borodino. Had Napoleon used his guard he would have won a decisive victory. Ségur asserts that he was ill at Borodino ; this assertion, however, has been denied. In any case the non-employment of the guard at Borodino was a blunder of some magnitude, and, moreover, seems to indicate that he was no longer the Napoleon of the Italian campaigns.

As is well known, the arrival of the army at Moscow, which was destroyed by fire by the Russians, was the limit of Napoleon's success. Alexander refused to yield, and Napoleon had no alternative but to retreat,

In that famous retreat which began on October, 1812, the French army was decimated by cold, disease, and the continuous onslaught of the triumphant Russians. Having arrived at Smorgoni, Napoleon, on 5 December, decided to leave his army and with a few companions to return rapidly to Paris.

The description given us by Spencer Stanhope of Napoleon's arrival in Paris from Smorgoni is full of interest. "I hurried to the Tuileries. He was, indeed, returned, but in an inferior sort of a hackney carriage. Paris was much agitated, and menacing placards continued to be posted, though they were rapidly removed by the police. Napoleon, however, who was in excellent health, opened the Senate in state, the brilliancy of the Imperial procession being little less than *magnifique*. The glass coach in which he and the Empress sat was drawn by cream-coloured horses, and in its progress to the Chamber he greeted the crowd with a smile which was strikingly beautiful; there was a fascination about it which even in spite of my previous impressions (at Verdun) I could not resist."<sup>1</sup>

In his speech, which was written, Napoleon announced the total destruction of his army, but declared that he required neither men nor money.

The events in the east of Europe, however, soon necessitated a new conscription, and Napoleon went

<sup>1</sup> "Memoirs of Anna Maria Wilhelmina Pickering, together with Extracts from the Journal of her Father, John Spencer Stanhope," pp. 487-90. London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1903.

in person to the Invalides to ascertain if any of the pensioners were fit for service. His return from this visit was marked by an absence of cries of "*vive l'Empereur*" and by a shower of petitions which were thrown in at his carriage window. Before the Emperor left for the front a masked ball was given at the Tuileries. The Emperor was present and had a long conversation with Cambacérés.

What the effect of a successful war against Russia, upon Europe generally, and Great Britain in particular, would have been can only be surmised. By her seizure of the Danish fleet and by her intervention in the Spanish Peninsula, Great Britain had taken very effective steps to hamper Napoleon's efforts to dominate Europe. But the success of the campaign against Russia would have laid Europe at the feet of Napoleon, and it is quite possible that he would have returned to his plan of 1804-5 of an invasion of England. Thus the success or failure of Napoleon's invasion of Russia was a matter of vital interest to the inhabitants of Great Britain no less than it was to the Spaniards, and indeed to the whole of continental Europe. In July, 1812, both countries had made treaties with Alexander, upon whose success so much depended.

The colossal failure of the Russian campaign, ending in Napoleon's hasty departure from Smorgoni for Paris on 5 December, had brought upon France defeat and disaster. In spite of Napoleon's herculean efforts in the spring of 1813, rewarded as they were

by the victories of Lützen and Bautzen, Central Europe was determined to shake itself free from his control. Its efforts were unexpectedly facilitated by Napoleon's assent to the armistice of Pläswitz.

The armistice of Pläswitz on 4 June proved to be one of Napoleon's most fatal blunders. Lützen and Bautzen had certainly proved costly victories, and his troops were not in a fit condition for another campaign. But the Austrians were not as yet openly hostile, the Russo-Prussian alliance could not survive more defeats, and further victories would strengthen Napoleon's wavering allies. It is true that there were many arguments in favour of an armistice. The Saxon campaign, with its hardly-won victories, had convinced Napoleon of the necessity of refitting, reorganizing, and increasing his forces. Moreover, he wished to delay further operations until his army in Italy, under Eugene, was able to make a demonstration on the frontier of Carniola. Napoleon did not realize the magnitude of his failure in Spain, nor the possibility of Austria joining his foes, nor the national character of the opposition to him in Northern Germany.

That the acceptance by Napoleon of the armistice of Pläswitz was a blunder of the most enormous magnitude is now recognized. In an Austrian State Paper, written in 1813, are these remarkable criticisms: "La plus grande faute qu'ait fait Napoleon dans sa carrière militaire, c'était avoir consenti à l'armistice". And again: "Enfin, en commettant la faute de consentir à l'armistice, il en fit une qui lui ôtait



la chance de rester le plus puissant souverain, c'était de n'avoir pas entendu les propositions de paix à Prague, à prix de légers sacrifices de son côté".<sup>1</sup> In making this armistice Napoleon was clearly throwing away the advantages which he had gained by his victories at Lützen and Bautzen.

No doubt Napoleon was convinced that his reasons for making the armistice were sound. He desired a period of peace during which he could reorganize his cavalry, and strengthen it by reinforcements. Moreover, he underrated the strength of Austria and was confident that he could overcome his foes.

During the armistice, which lasted till 10 August, the Russians and Prussians were able to reorganize their forces, to recover from their defeats at Lützen and Bautzen, and to arrange a plan of campaign. Early in July the news arrived of Wellington's victory at Vittoria, and it had a most encouraging effect upon the allies. Moreover, Austria, then guided by Metternich, finally decided, in consequence of Napoleon's refusal to accept her proposals, to join Russia, Prussia, and Sweden. Between 10 August and 15 October a number of pitched battles were fought, the total result of which was that the French army was finally brought to bay at Leipzig, where on 16, 17, 18 and 19 October the allies won a decisive success. All that remained for Napoleon was to make a rapid retreat to France pursued by the allied forces.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by J. Holland Rose in his "Napoleonic Studies," p. 255.

The battle of Leipzig brings into prominence many of the chief causes of the decline and fall of Napoleon. In the first place, he was not able, as in former years, to count upon the whole-hearted support of the French nation nor upon continual supplies of French soldiers.

The condition of France in 1799 had, indeed, rendered Cæsarism inevitable and necessary. But "the break-down of system and tradition in France," we read, "left men unsettled and prepared for continual change". The failure of the Russian campaign brought out all the weak points of Napoleon's position. He had no second in command in whom he could place absolute confidence; many of the great generals of his early wars were dead or worn out. National enthusiasm is now seen in the Prussian not in the French armies, composed as they were at this time to a large extent of foreigners.<sup>1</sup>

During the campaign which opened on 10 August and ended at Leipzig Napoleon had committed many blunders. The numerous isolated engagements fought in August and September had all ended in defeat, and were in direct defiance of the principles which guided his famous campaign in Italy in 1796 and 1797.

When the battle of Leipzig was fought he had at least 100,000 troops holding various fortresses. The absence of these troops on the days of the battle rendered Napoleon's defeat certain. At Leipzig and in the ensuing campaigns in 1814 and 1815 it is the

<sup>1</sup> About 60 per cent of Napoleon's army in 1812 were non-French.

Prussians not the French who show a national enthusiasm. It is the Prussians who were "électrises au dernier degré".

After Leipzig there was no attempt made on the part of the Grand Army to resist its foes till the Rhine had been crossed. For great as were the military results of the battle, its political results were no less striking. Bavaria had on 10 October made terms with Austria at the Treaty of Ried; after Leipzig the other members of the Confederation of the Rhine hastened to follow her example. The tide of nationalism, to Metternich's alarm, rose rapidly, and till Napoleon's overthrow received no check.

After winning at Hanau on 28 and 29 October over the Bavarians his last victory on German soil, Napoleon, with the remains of his army, passed the Rhine. Germany was at last freed from the rule of the French Emperor.

Much, however, remained to be done if Europe was to be relieved of all fear of future attacks by France. Napoleon had no intention of acquiescing in his defeat at Leipzig. France was, it is true, exhausted, but Napoleon, who most unwisely had left many French garrisons in Northern Germany, trusted that the threat of invasion would have effects similar to those produced in 1792 and 1793, when France, even in an unprepared condition and with only young and undisciplined troops, defeated and broke up a European coalition.

But there was a radical difference between the

situation in 1793 and 1813. In 1813 Europe no longer as in 1793 relied upon effete monarchies in its struggle with the French Revolution. In 1793 France alone of European countries was alive with the spirit of nationality and patriotism ; in 1813 practically the whole of Europe was actuated by that spirit, and was burning to drive the French invaders within their own boundaries. Had Napoleon accepted the excellent terms known as the "Proposals of Frankfort," offered to him in November, France would have received the boundaries of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees.

But, fortunately for Europe, Napoleon trusted to the dissensions of the allies, and his refusal of the terms rendered peace impossible, and for a time united the allies in one common object—viz. his own overthrow.

Thus Napoleon's self-confidence, coupled with his obstinacy, and his failure to realize the strength of the desire for revenge which animated the Russians and Prussians, as well as the growth of a national feeling in Germany, and the increasing discontent in France at the continuance of expensive wars, led him irresistibly to his fall.

That the allies fully realized the magnitude of the task involved in the overthrow of Napoleon is evident when we remember that their forces numbered some 300,000 men. That these forces were not too numerous is evident when one studies the marvellous campaign in France during the first three months of 1814. Never had Napoleon shown greater skill than during

those months, when with a comparatively small army he kept his enemies at bay, and maintained in the most masterly fashion an unequal struggle against overwhelming odds.

On 25 January, 1813, Napoleon, having appointed the Empress Regent and placed Joseph in charge of Paris, set out for Châlons-sur-Marne, the head-quarters of his army. At Châtillon the allies held a congress and entered into negotiations with the Duke of Vicenza who, as Napoleon's envoy, was endeavouring to extract from them terms which the Emperor would accept.

But as yet Napoleon refused to acknowledge defeat, or the necessity of considering seriously the question of terms. The allies, on account of the difficulties of obtaining adequate supplies, had distributed their forces over a wide area, thus giving that great master of the art of war, Napoleon, a splendid opportunity of attacking them in detail.

Wide intervals separated the invading forces, which ought to have concentrated their efforts upon the immediate destruction of Napoleon's remaining army.

Thus the army led by Schwarzenberg advanced down the valley of the Seine to Troyes, while the smaller army, headed by Blücher, marched along the valley of the Marne to St. Dizier. Napoleon at once decided to attack the latter. On 28 January he attacked the enemy at St. Dizier and separated the divisions commanded by Blücher and York. At Brienne on 29 January he attacked Blücher whose forces consisted mainly of Russians, and forced him

back in the direction of Schwarzenberg's army. However, on 1 February, Blücher advanced, and after a severe struggle during a snowstorm occupied La Rothière. Blücher's victory cost Napoleon some 6000 men and seventy guns.

Napoleon then fell back upon Nogent-sur-Seine, while Blücher, breaking up his army into detachments, endeavoured to march north of him and so to reach Paris.

Napoleon now seized the opportunity which the over-confidence of the allies had given him. He at once fell upon a force of 5000 detached Russians whom he practically annihilated, and with the aid of Marmont drove larger detachments under Sacken and York towards Soissons. Blücher was compelled to forego his ambitious scheme and hastily fell back. Napoleon then turned rapidly upon Schwarzenberg's advanced guard, and with the aid of Oudinot and Macdonald drove it back in disorder beyond Troyes.

Blücher, however, on 24 February attacked Marmont on the Marne and forced him to retire towards La Ferte-sons-Jouarre.

Till Castlereagh's arrival at the allied headquarters, Napoleon's hopes, that owing to jealousies the "cohesion of the Coalition" would weaken, were by no means groundless. And those jealousies were increased by the initial successes of Napoleon in the early days of the campaign of 1813.

Napoleon's energy, activity, and determination, indeed, never left him during this trying time. On

5 March he tells Joseph, who was then in Paris, that he has ordered the instant trial and execution of the commandant of Soissons, who had evacuated that town without firing a shot. On the following day he writes that he intends to drive the enemy towards Laon and then to march upon Châlons and Arcis. "It is," he says, "indispensable to hold the Seine for five or six days at Nogent, Bray, and Montereau." On 8 March he won the battle of Craonne, defeating the Russian army under Sacken, but the following day Joseph wrote a despairing account of the situation as it appeared to him in Paris. There the funds had fallen on 8 March to £51. Civil war, with the headquarters of the opposition to Napoleon at Bordeaux, seemed likely to break out, while all through these anxious days the allied troops were steadily drawing nearer to Paris. To Joseph a peace, giving France her ancient limits, seemed absolutely necessary. But Napoleon showed no sign of yielding to Joseph's entreaties. On 9 March Blücher defeated at Laon the French Emperor, who retreated to Rheims.

Napoleon was thus seriously threatened by two armies, that of Blücher and that of Schwarzenberg. Still hoping for success Napoleon resolved to attack the Austrians. On 20 March the decisive battle of Arcis-sur-Aube was fought, and Napoleon's troops were completely overwhelmed by Schwarzenberg's army. The decisive character of this battle gives it a place among the notable battles of the world. Napoleon had played his last card, and had lost.

On 28 March the envoy Wessenberg, on his way from London to join the Austrian Emperor, was brought by some French troops, as a captive, to St. Dizier, the head-quarters of Napoleon. The French Emperor had still hopes of winning Austria to his side. He therefore released Wessenberg, and before the latter's departure endeavoured to impress upon him the difference of the interests of Austria from those of her allies. He asked Wessenberg to tell his sovereign how anxious he (Napoleon) was for peace, and assured him that all he asked for was France with the frontiers that he found on his accession to the throne. He declared that he was even ready to give up all his colonies if he could keep the mouth of the Scheldt, for he was sure that England would not insist on the cession of Antwerp if Austria did not support her.<sup>1</sup> Events later in the year 1814, when England, and Austria, and France united against Russia and Prussia in opposition to the schemes of those powers at the Congress of Vienna, somewhat justified his declaration to Wessenberg that "the time will come when Austria will stand in need of me".

It was, however, too late, for three days later the allies were before Paris. Napoleon, with some justification, throughout these eventful weeks had based his hopes upon the break-up of the alliance in consequence of the differences which had always existed between the allies. The objects aimed at by Russia

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Rose in "Napoleonic Studies," p. 266.



and Prussia were by no means acceptable to Francis of Austria or to Metternich. And Napoleon's rush eastwards was "based on diplomatic no less than on military grounds".<sup>1</sup> Instead, however, of the alliance breaking up, his enemies marched upon Paris. Since 20 March Austria had unreservedly thrown in her lot with the other members of the alliance, and from that date all negotiations with Caulaincourt had ceased. The cause of this unexpected union of the allies is to be found in a letter sent on 19 March by Maret to Caulaincourt. This letter, evidently dictated by Napoleon, had fallen into the hands of the allies. The letter speaks for itself:—

"l'Empereur désire que vous restiez dans le vague sur tout ce qui serait relatif à la livraison des places d'Anvers, Mayence, et Alexandrie, si vous étiez obligé à consentir à ces cessions, étant dans l'intention, même quand elle aurait ratifié le traité de prendre conseil de la situation militaire des choses. Attendez à dernier moment."<sup>2</sup>

The end was now at hand. On 29 March the Empress fled from Paris, and on 30 March the last battle took place outside Paris. As soon as the victory of the allies seemed assured Joseph and Jerome Bonaparte fled from the capital, while an armistice was arranged.

On the same day Napoleon left Fontainebleau

<sup>1</sup> Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 268.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Mr. Rose from Fournier's work on the "Congress of Châtillon".

with some cavalry for Paris. On hearing that Paris had capitulated he returned in despair to Fontainebleau.

On 31 March the Tsar and the King of Prussia rode into Paris. Napoleon had staked all upon the chance of quarrels breaking out among the allied sovereigns, and had lost. During the ensuing ten days he was the prey to doubt and uncertainty. On 4 April the Senate decreed his deposition, and Napoleon found that his resolve to strike a last blow was not supported by his marshals. He then decided to abdicate in favour of his son. Meanwhile, Marmont, on condition "that the personal safety and liberty of Napoleon should be respected," had decided to throw in his lot with the allies. There was now nothing to fear from any action on the part of Napoleon, and on the initiative of Alexander, the envoys from Fontainebleau—Caulaincourt, Ney, and Macdonald—were informed that Napoleon's abdication must include his whole family.

On 13 April Napoleon accepted the terms offered him by the allies—known as the Treaty of Fontainebleau. By that treaty he was granted a liberal revenue, and the island of Elba, which he had chosen in preference to Corsica or Corfu, in full sovereignty.

Moreover, the Empress was given the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla.

A week later, after an affecting farewell to those troops who were still faithful to him, Napoleon set out for Elba.

Owing to the firmness of the English ministers all the statuary taken from the Vatican to the Louvre was restored except a few statues of little value. Many magnificent pictures taken from various Italian churches were sent back to Pius, and with them and some 500 MSS. carried off by the French in 1798 and in 1814 restored, he laid the foundation of the famous Vatican Library. Still, the invasion and occupation of Italy had resulted in no little loss as regards its art treasures. The costly tiara of Paul III had been broken up by Napoleon, and its loss was by no means compensated for by the Sèvres candelabra which he presented to the Pope in 1814.

Napoleon's journey to Elba was full of incident. He was accompanied by Colonel Campbell, and was forced to adopt all sorts of expedients and disguises to avoid the fury of the populace in the South of France. At one time he dressed himself as a post-boy and wore a white cockade—a necessary disguise, for the mob in one place had erected a gallows and were determined to hang him. Once on board the English frigate he declared to Colonel Campbell, with whom he was on very friendly terms, that for the first time for several years he felt in security.<sup>1</sup>

The Duchess d'Abrantes gives an interesting account of Napoleon's departure from Fontainebleau. On 20 April, with him, she tells us, were Colonel Campbell, General Schuvalov, General Koller, M. de

<sup>1</sup> "Chronicles of the Families of Atholl and Tullibardine," Vol. IV, pp. 253, 254.

Schack, representing England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia respectively, and an escort of 1500 foreign troops. In his carriage, which was drawn by six horses, was General Bertrand. The Emperor, we are told, was calm and serene, and "bowed with that wonted smile so peculiar to him". At Orgon his life was in danger from an infuriated mob, and at Avignon he disguised himself in a travelling coat of General Koller's. Before embarking for Porto Ferrajo he stayed a day and a half with his sister Pauline.

The reaction in France after Napoleon's fall has been described by many writers. From all parts of the world people flocked to the French capital. Among other visitors was Lord James Murray who, sailing from Southampton on 25 April, arrived at Paris on the 27th. In his letters he describes many interesting incidents. The Rue Napoleon had been at once changed into the Rue de la Paix, and Napoleon's statue in the Place de Vendôme, hitherto at "the top of a most beautiful column of bronze, made out of the cannon that had been taken by him at different periods," had been "lowered down with a rope about the neck".<sup>1</sup> On 3 May the King of France made his entry into Paris, the carriages and horses used on this occasion being those that had belonged to Napoleon, but "it was easy," we are told, "to perceive that his arms had been blotted out for those of the Bourbons". Nevertheless there was no good feeling in Paris between the

<sup>1</sup> "Chronicles of the Families of Atholl and Tullibardine," Vol. IV, pp. 252, 253.

French and the allies. Duels were frequent, and many lives were lost. The country was in a most unsettled state and Paris, so long as the allied armies were in occupation, remained unsettled.

At Malmaison the ex-Empress Josephine was living and received some of the allied officers with courtesy. On 7 May Lord James Murray visited her, and a few days later was invited to a *déjeuner* at her house.

On 7 June there arrived in London the Tsar, the King of Prussia, and his sons, Marshal Blücher, Count Platoff, General Barclay de Tolly, and many other heroes in the struggle against Napoleon. They remained in England till the end of the month, visiting Oxford and being present at the Ascot races. In the autumn the famous Congress of Vienna took place, and hardly had the most important matters been settled when in March, 1815, the news arrived of Napoleon's escape from Elba. The army declared in his favour, and Louis XVIII fled to the Netherlands. In Germany, as elsewhere, the consternation caused by these events was extreme.

During Napoleon's residence in the Villa San Martino in Elba, the whole of Europe had been in a state of unsettlement. The question of the future of Italy was in itself sufficient to occupy the energies of the leading statesmen of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. While the Hapsburgs openly desired to re-establish their power in Italy, it was felt that if the Austrian policy was carried out Italy would find her-

self more crushed and humiliated than ever, and, moreover, that a strong inducement would be given to the Italians to welcome the restoration of the power of Napoleon. In July, 1814, it was rumoured that Napoleon and Murat were united in planning some operation in Italy. And in September it was evident to the Austrians themselves that the movement in favour of Italian independence must be recognized, and that great care should be taken not to arouse the fears of the Italian patriots. It was necessary for Austria to *ménager l'esprit National de l'Italie*. There was no doubt, too, that Castlereagh, who represented English opinion, was in favour of constitutional government in Italy. In order "to scare the Bourbons, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the rest, into granting or maintaining constitutional rule,"<sup>1</sup> he held out to those Powers the possibility of Napoleon's escape.

It is seldom realized at the present day not only how ineffective were the obstacles placed by the allies to the escape of Napoleon from Elba, but also with what indifference some of the allies regarded the possibility of such an escape. In fact the leading Powers were far more concerned with securing their own gains than in safeguarding Europe from the return of the Corsican.

The united action of the allies in effecting the complete downfall of Napoleon after Leipzig, as has been already remarked, was only brought about by Castlereagh's persuasion, strengthened by the perusal

<sup>1</sup> "Quarterly Review," January, 1810, p. 255.

of the letter which disclosed the duplicity of the French Emperor. After Napoleon's arrival in Elba the danger of the establishment of Russian influence in Europe appeared, at any rate to Metternich, to be the paramount question.

Napoleon had indeed succumbed, but now Alexander was raising pretensions which might easily become of a Napoleonic character. If Napoleon escaped from Elba, overthrew the Bourbons, and established himself in Paris, it might be advisable for Austria to ally with him. Such an alliance would upset the plans of the Italian secret societies of which Metternich was deadly afraid; it would, moreover, seriously interfere with Alexander's projects with regard to Poland. In fact, Alexander, when faced by the alliance of Austria, France, and Great Britain, which was arranged in 3 January, 1815, had threatened to "let the monster go"—(the "monstre que," in Talleyrand's words, "le Czar se reservait de lâcher").

In fact, early in 1815, "each of the allies was threatening the others with Napoleon".<sup>1</sup> But while Metternich's attention was chiefly devoted to the task of checking Russian aspirations and safeguarding Austrian interests in Italy, Castlereagh was honestly desirous of securing the maintenance of constitutional government in France, Piedmont, and Tuscany. The fear of the escape of Napoleon from Elba would, he hoped, force the representatives of the ancient dynasties to realize how much depended upon the

<sup>1</sup> "Quarterly Review," January, 1910, p. 255.

contentment of the peoples over which they ruled. In fact, unless the rulers of France, Piedmont, and Tuscany acted upon liberal principles, it was certain not only that the Italian party of independence would cause trouble, but that in Paris itself, where there were "so many discontented and so little to prevent mischief," there would be a dangerous upheaval which would lead to disturbances throughout France.

The Treaty of 3 January, 1815, which had divided the allies into two parties, had revealed to the world the possibility of endless confusion and uncertainty. However, though the prospects of peace remained for a time clouded, the realization of the immense importance to Europe of the continuance of friendly relations between the allies led to an amicable settlement of all outstanding difficulties, and Napoleon could no longer count upon disunion among his enemies.

But in France it was otherwise. The return of the Bourbons had called forth a certain amount of enthusiasm, but before the end of 1814 that enthusiasm had vanished, the army had become disaffected, the peasants had become anxious for their property; in the ministry of Louis XVIII there could not be found either strength or discretion; the king himself showed no ability for dealing with a situation which required a strong man and a coherent policy.

"Paternal anarchy" was the description given to the Government which was, moreover, faced with the necessity of imposing heavy taxes in order to meet the financial deficit. The Imperial Guard, too, was



alienated, while the attitude of the monarchy towards the Legion of Honour caused deep dissatisfaction. The affair of General Excelmans, who was prosecuted by the Government (for writing a letter in which he offered his services to the King of Naples should he be deposed by the Congress of Vienna), and acquitted on 25 January, 1815, did much to weaken the Bourbons. In the early months of 1815 the condition of things in Paris and in the provinces might be described as a state of tension. Rumours of plots and counterplots added to the excitement, and Fouché planned the deportation of Napoleon to some distant spot, and the setting up of the regency of Marie Louise in place of the Bourbon monarchy.

Meanwhile Napoleon was calmly watching the course of events from Elba. He had hoped for the outbreak of war between the great Powers; but though his hopes in this respect were disappointed, the situation in France became each day more favourable to him, and less favourable to the Bourbons. The allies were well aware that he was inadequately guarded, and both Louis XVIII and Castlereagh realized that there should have been chosen "another position in lieu of Elba for the seat of Napoleon's retirement". Louis himself had written that unless Napoleon was deported to Africa "ou verrait un jour l'homme de l'île d'Elbe paraître en Italie".

After the beginning of 1815 a descent from Elba by Napoleon was regarded by all the Powers as possible, if not actually imminent. Their disputes and

conflicting interests had prevented the adoption of any adequate measures for preventing the escape of Napoleon from his island home.

On 28 March the Countess Reden, on hearing of Napoleon's escape from Elba, writes that she is "in no fear of that horrible Napoleon being able to make any lasting progress". A few days later, on 31 March, she adopts a more despondent tone: "It is a long time," she says, writing from Silesia, "that I have been so upset as I have been by the news to-day. I never could have imagined that it could be so bad, nor that the advance could be so rapid as 120 miles in twenty days, and no difficult march but a triumphal progress."<sup>1</sup>

On 5 March it was announced in Paris that Napoleon had landed in France. His arrival at once dissipated into thin air intrigues of Fouché against the Bourbons, and shook the insecure foundations of the Bourbon monarchy itself. Nothing testifies eloquently to the sagacity of Napoleon, and to his marvellous influence, as does the history of the return from Elba. Whatever may be said in criticism of his life and policy, it is impossible to overlook the fact that he was head and shoulders the most influential man of his time. Mr. Fisher, whose knowledge of Napoleon and the period is so profound, has in a few lines described the position. "Napoleon," he writes, "was not brought over from Elba by plot or conspiracy. He came because he had correctly divined

<sup>1</sup> "A Pietist of the Napoleonic Wars and After," p. 100. London, John Murray, 1905.

the situation in France. His march to the capital is one of the miracles of history. He fought no battle; he shed no blood; he was greeted by the peasantry all along the route as a saviour and a friend; not a soldier would fire on him; his name was a talisman which drew all the valour of the kingdom to itself. He often rode before his troops unattended; yet no one offered him violence. . . . Never had the instinct for action been more faultless, his demeanour more enchanting in its direct and spontaneous ease: *Roule ta boule, roi cotillon, Rends ta Couronne à Napoléon*, blithely sang men, women, and children along his triumphal way."<sup>1</sup>

Between 1795 and 1799 the French nation had accepted and tolerated the increasingly vicious and unpopular rule of the Directory, because the Bourbons and their supporters would not promise to accept the land settlement which had been effected between 1789 and 1795; in March, 1815, the Bourbons fell, and Napoleon returned because Louis XVIII had taken no steps "to make secure every peasant-holding in France". The suspicions of the provinces had been aroused, while the susceptibilities of the army had not been soothed. Thus not only the army but the whole of Northern, Eastern, and Central France welcomed the return of the Napoleonic *régime*.

"The *Cent Jours*," it has been truly said, "will always remain one of the most extraordinary epochs" of Napoleon's life. "Within three months he created an

<sup>1</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, pp. 573-4.

army which all but proved successful in the Waterloo campaign. Is there in history any more astounding exhibition of human energy?" In his Memoirs Thiébauld declares that he observed in April, 1814, a marked change in Napoleon's appearance. "His look," he says, "had lost its power and intentness; his features had lost all their expression and their character of strength. His contracted mouth no longer retained its old magic. His head had no longer that carriage which marked the ruler of the world." Nevertheless, Napoleon, as in the 1814 campaign, was about to enter into a struggle during which his energy as in 1814 would startle the European world.

Napoleon, having broken the convention of April, 1814, was now in the position of an outlaw, and was regarded by the allies "as the enemy and disturber of the peace of the world". To secure the support of all Frenchmen he posed as a liberal sovereign, and issued a liberal programme known as the *Acte Additionnelle*. But he had no opportunity for giving satisfactory proofs of his readiness to rule as a constitutional monarch, for with the overthrow of King Joachim (Murat) in Naples, in May, he found himself destitute of allies and compelled single-handed to withstand all Europe. In the famous campaign that followed Napoleon won Ligny, though Quatre Bras was a distinct check to his troops.

Napoleon, it is said, ought to have attacked early on the morning of 18 June. But at St. Helena Napoleon speaks of "the pelting rain which so

soaked the ground that it was impossible for me to attack at daybreak”.

All evidence points to the fact that the state of the ground throughout the day made it difficult for the gunners to work their guns. Napoleon, therefore, who had good reason for knowing what an important part was played by artillery, was fully justified “in allowing the ground to dry sufficiently to permit of the movement of the guns”. It was not till about 11.30 a.m. that the battle of Waterloo began.

The French army was drawn up in three lines, and throughout the day Napoleon insisted on frontal attacks, refusing to follow Reille’s advice and to try flank movements. He, like Grouchy, had failed to foresee Blücher’s great flank march to join Wellington. Napoleon, however, after he had realized that the Prussians were marching to aid Wellington, hoped to win the battle before their arrival. While separate attacks were made upon the farms of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, four vast columns at 1.30 attacked Wellington’s left centre. After a fierce struggle the French were driven back. At 4 p.m. Milhaud led a cavalry charge (5000 horsemen) against the British squares which, however, though crippled by the French artillery, were unbroken.

Ney thereupon brought to Milhaud’s aid the remainder of the cavalry, 5000 strong, but they too failed to break in upon the British and German squares. By this time (4-6 p.m.) the leading Prussian divisions under Bülow were in touch with Napoleon’s right

flank, and Napoleon was compelled to use against them some 14,000 of his reserve. But the steadiness of the British, together with a fatal delay on the part of Napoleon, enabled Wellington to win the day. At 6.30 the French captured La Haye Sainte, but it was not till forty minutes later that Napoleon decided to send forward the old guard to deliver a final attack upon Wellington's squares. During these precious forty minutes Wellington reformed and strengthened his fighting line, "and a solid front was once more displayed" by the British army. He was thus able to resist the final assault of the French columns led by Ney. The fire of Maitland's Brigade and of Colborne's battalion (the 52nd Regiment) threw the French into hopeless disorder, and at that moment Ziethen's Prussian corps advanced from the north-east towards La Belle Alliance.

The battle of Waterloo thus proved a decisive French defeat, and Napoleon fled to Paris, arriving there on 21 June. The Chambers at once asserted their authority which Napoleon, broken down in spirit, decided not to oppose, though his brother Lucien counselled resistance.

On 22 June, in deference to a message from the Chambers threatening his deposition, unless he himself resigned the throne, he decided to take the advice of Lucien and to resign in favour of his son, whom he styled Napoleon II.

On 25 June he retired to Malmaison, where he remained till 29 June. On 7 July the allies entered



THE KING OF ROME

FROM THE PAINTING BY SIR T. LAWRENCE IN THE COLLECTION OF THE DUKE OF BASSANO





Paris; on the 8th Louis XVIII returned to the Tuileries; on 3 July Napoleon arrived at Rochefort, and on the 15th he surrendered to Captain Maitland of the "Bellerophon".

Napoleon's attempt to carry out a revolution in 1815 had thus ended in failure. Brumaire signified the desire of the majority of Frenchmen for the establishment of order at home and an honourable conclusion of the war. There was then no break in the course of the French Revolution; the men who applauded the overthrow of the Directory were supporters of the Constitution of 1791. The same men deserted Napoleon in 1814. In 1799 the French nation saw in Napoleon their one hope of the establishment of order and of a glorious peace; in 1814 Napoleon had made use of the powers given him to establish a despotism, while his desire for a universal supremacy united all Europe against France. In 1815 Napoleon attempted too late to return to the programme of 1799.


At St. Helena Napoleon insisted that he was always anxious to bring to an end his dictatorship, and that if he had conquered at Waterloo he would have established constitutional government in France. If he had defeated the Russians in 1812, he said, he would have associated his son with the Empire and his constitutional reign would have begun. On his return from Elba he realized that the French nation was not satisfied with equality but desired liberty in addition. He assured O'Meara that his victory at Waterloo would

have been followed by the adoption of a constitutional form of government.<sup>1</sup> But he refused to realize the immense disasters which his ambition since the Treaty of Tilsit had brought upon Europe, and that in the interests of European peace the British Government was justified in sending him to St. Helena.

## CHIEF DATES

Birth of the King of Rome . . . . .	March, 1811.
Battle of Albuera . . . . .	May, 1811.
Alliance of Sweden with Russia . . . . .	April, 1812.
Peace of Bucharest between Russia and Turkey . . . . .	May, 1812.
Outbreak of war between Russia and France . . . . .	June, 1812.
Peace between England and Russia . . . . .	July, 1812.
Battle of Salamanca . . . . .	July, 1812.
Battle of Borodino . . . . .	September, 1812.
The French enter Moscow . . . . .	September, 1812.
The French evacuate Moscow . . . . .	October, 1812.
Napoleon leaves the army at Smorgoni . . . . .	5 December, 1812.
Treaty of Kalisch between Russia and Prussia . . . . .	February, 1813.
Beginning of the War of Liberation . . . . .	February, 1813.
The battles of Lützen and Bautzen . . . . .	May, 1813.
The Armistice of Pläswitz . . . . .	4 June-9 August, 1813.
Battle of Vittoria . . . . .	June, 1813.
Treaty of Töplitz (Austria and Prussia) . . . . .	September, 1813.
Treaty of Ried (Austria and Bavaria) . . . . .	10 October, 1813.
Battle of Leipzig . . . . .	16-19 October, 1813.
Wellington in France . . . . .	November, 1813.
The Conference of Châtillon . . . . .	February, 1814.
The decisive battle of Arcis-sur-Aube . . . . .	20 March, 1814.
The allies enter Paris . . . . .	31 March, 1814.
Abdication of Napoleon . . . . .	13 April, 1814.

<sup>1</sup> Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," p. 132.



"SIRE, YOU MAY RECKON ON US AS ON YOUR OLD GUARD"  
FROM A ILLUSTRATION BY LAFLET



First Treaty of Paris . . . . .	May, 1814.
The allied sovereigns in England . . . . .	June, 1814.
Congress of Vienna meets . . . . .	September, 1814.
Return of Napoleon . . . . .	March, 1815.
The Hundred Days . . . . .	March-June, 1815.
The battle of Waterloo . . . . .	18 June, 1815.
Second abdication of Napoleon . . . . .	June, 1815.
He lands in St. Helena . . . . .	17 October, 1815.
Second Peace of Paris . . . . .	November, 1815.
Death of Napoleon . . . . .	5 May, 1821.

## CHAPTER IX

### SUMMARY OF NAPOLEON'S CAREER

Justification of Napoleon's victories—Political morality in Europe at a low ebb—The cases of Silesia and Poland—The European situation in 1807—Summary of the events leading to Napoleon's supremacy—His political sagacity at Brumaire—His decline and fall after Tilsit—The political effects of the continental system—The rising of the peoples of Europe.

NO one who has studied the history of the eighteenth century can regret the rise of Napoleon. Similarly, no one can deny that the rising of the nations in the years succeeding the Treaty of Tilsit was justified and necessary.

Europe, in the closing years of the eighteenth century, required a revolution. The aims and policy of Frederick the Great and Catherine II made it quite evident that government, according to the principles of "enlightened despotism," was a failure. The seizure of Silesia and the partitions of Poland were acts of robbery, and deprived Europe of any adequate ground of complaint when Napoleon treated Austria and Prussia as they had treated Poland and Silesia. The jealousy which divided Prussia and Austria, the corrupt character of many of the 300 odd

states into which Germany was divided, the domination of the foreigner in Italy, were circumstances which seemed to preclude any improvements in the political condition of Europe. In other words, Europe required a revolution, and till that revolution had taken place it was worse than useless for a country like England to pour money into the treasuries of the Powers whose triumph over the French, before 1810, would have been a European disaster. Till his death Pitt never realized how thoroughly rotten was the political condition of the countries which he was supporting with funds. Instead of allowing his health to be weakened by anxieties concerning Austria and Prussia, he should have confined his energies to the strengthening of Great Britain's army and navy.

It was not till all Europe, having passed through a severe ordeal, was in arms that Napoleon succumbed.

It was indeed fortunate for Europe that the French Revolution produced a man whose personality and abilities were as pronounced as those of Alexander the Great, Julius Cæsar, Charles the Great or Louis XIV. During the years from 1807 to 1812, Napoleon seemed to have the whole of continental Europe in his power. Europe was completely overawed by him; it was doubtful in 1810-1 if Great Britain would not be starved into surrender; it seemed not unlikely that his influence would impress itself upon Asia and Africa.

That France had acquired this enormous influence, that these immense possibilities lay before her, was

due to the ability of a single man—Napoleon, and to the absence of any national feeling in Germany and Italy. Without him the French Revolution would not have had its immense significance to Europe ; but at the same time it must be remembered that without the French Revolution Europe would not have fallen under the sway of Napoleon.

The French Revolution had by 1794 run its course. France was secure from foreign invasion ; her boundaries had been extended ; her foes were divided ; the fate of Poland attracted the chief attention of the three great Powers—Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Consequently, on the relaxation of external pressure, the need for rigorous and precautionary measures at home ceased. The Committee of Public Safety, whose policy was identified with despotism and terror, was no longer united or necessary to France. Its instability was evident, and its abolition was consequently desirable. At the same time a strong though a milder form of government was desirable, for the European war still continued, and it was necessary to stamp out the civil war in La Vendée and elsewhere. In 1794 and 1795 France was in urgent need of the restoration of order and of the establishment of a settled form of government. In October, 1795, the revolution of Vendémiaire was crushed by Napoleon, and France was given the government of the Directory.

During the following years Napoleon was twice called upon to interfere in the internal affairs of France.



In 1797 his soldiers suppressed the rising of Fructidor, and in 1799 he himself carried out the revolution of Brumaire, on which occasion he represented the desire of the great majority of the French nation for the overthrow of the Directory, for the conclusion of an honourable peace abroad, and for the restoration of order at home. For the carrying out of these aims a statesman as well as a soldier was required.

It was indeed necessary that the chief of the army should be a man of surpassing intellectual force—a man who not only could defeat his enemies in the field but who could reduce order out of chaos, who could place the religious question on a satisfactory basis, who could restore the finances, and who, in a word, could unify France and give her a stable government. For this work “an irresistible force of head and sword was necessary”. That force was Napoleon.

It had never appeared likely that the Directory would be more than a temporary expedient. The defects in its constitution had been amply demonstrated. From the moment of its establishment it was obvious that the Directory could not hope to provide a permanent solution of the existing political, social, and religious problems; it proved merely a step towards the establishment of a military despotism.

That Napoleon was able to take advantage of the situation at Brumaire was due to the fact that while in 1799 he represented the need of order and settlement in France, he also represented a period of conquest and glory. The failure of the French generals in

Italy during his absence in Egypt merely tended to increase the reputation of the man whose victories in Italy in 1796 and 1797 had been crowned by the Peace of Campo Formio. Valmy had inaugurated the beginning of a war of aggrandizement, and with it the Napoleonic era. Superior in intellectual qualities to Hoche, Masséna, and other revolutionary generals, Napoleon had shown superiority in military qualities. Thus in 1799 he was pre-eminent among the revolutionary generals, he was the outcome and child of the militant Revolution, and he was fitted to become its leader and master.

In 1799 he rescued France from a serious dilemma. To the majority of Frenchmen the "Principles of 1789" and the Constitution of 1791 represented their aspirations. The middle classes and the peasants had acquired much of the national property. Moreover, the weakness of the government of the Directory, which was at the same time oppressive and ineffective, had been unable to preserve order, or to enforce the law, or to afford protection to the majority of the French people. A restoration of the Bourbons would mean a sacrifice of all that had been gained by the Revolution. At this crisis Napoleon stepped in. Having succeeded in securing the adhesion of the army he acted in accordance with public opinion, and obtained the support not only of the peace-loving middle classes but also of the working classes of Paris who shared in the general fear of a royalist reaction. Brumaire, followed by Marengo, implied the stability

of the Revolution, and secured the establishment of an orderly and methodical government. A centralized despotism was indeed set up, but freedom was with certain modifications recognized, and equality so dear to Frenchmen was maintained. France apparently had secured all that she desired—peace with her boundaries extended to her “natural frontiers,” and an admirable administration.

The outbreak of war in 1803 was indeed contrary to the wishes of the French people, but the glory of Napoleon’s victories, and the plunder of the conquered nations, soothed any irritation that might have been felt, and reconciled the nation to a period of war and conquest which culminated at Tilsit.

The victory of Napoleon at Austerlitz in December, 1805, had been followed by the completion of the necessary revolution in Germany, marked by the final disappearance of the system of the Holy Roman Empire; the humiliation of Prussia in January, 1806—the event which finally caused Pitt’s death—was a necessary preliminary step to the complete reorganization of that power after Jena.

From 1807, however, Napoleon gradually entered upon the period of his decline and fall. His successes in Germany and Italy blinded him to the fact that in attempting to conquer Russia he might meet with geographical difficulties which were not to be found in central Europe. Moreover, he failed to appreciate the steady growth in Germany of a national sentiment which his conquests had produced. Nor did he realize

that in Spain religious fanaticism might lead to a resistance the like of which he had not hitherto met with. Indeed, his remarkable ignorance not only of economic truths but also of the character of the British constitution, and of the political and social condition of the British nation, led him to commit the greatest blunder of his career—the attempted enforcement of the continental system upon all Europe. His policy to the Papacy after 1807 was also a blunder of the greatest magnitude and its effects were far-reaching.

At St. Helena he declared that the malignant and implacable jealousy of England made a lasting peace impossible, as that Power insisted upon the withdrawal of France within its former limits. The statement was obviously inaccurate. As is well known, Napoleon was resolved to force England to accept his terms of peace. Had she done so Napoleon would have been firmly established as master of Europe. His determination to overthrow Great Britain, therefore, led him to dominate every European Power which possessed a harbour. Only thus he believed could he carry out effectively the continental system and conquer England.

From the outbreak of war with Great Britain in 1803 Bonapartism could under no circumstances be described, as Napoleon at St. Helena described it, as essentially pacific. There is much that can be said in defence of his aggressions and conquests before Tilsit, and little sympathy can be felt for the fate of Austria and Prussia so long as their policy was

dictated by selfishness, and so long as neither sought the welfare of Germany or considered even the welfare of their own subjects. In 1807, however, France had secured, through the heroism of her Republican armies, her "natural" boundaries—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. There was no question of his sacrificing these boundaries so dear to every Frenchman. But at this period the ambition of Napoleon ran counter to the national interests of France. It was obvious that "it was not for the good of France, but to satisfy his own restless and extravagant ambition that the flower of her youth were taken from the fields to perish in the snows of Russia or the sierras of Spain".

Henceforward "the spirit of moderation and good sense" in France, "which had been overcome by the brilliant romance of the early victories, revolted against the extravagance which marked the later designs". These designs, which included the subjugation of Great Britain, the conquest of Spain, the re-establishment of the Polish kingdom and the defeat of Russia, miscarried, because in the first place while Spain was struggling for its independence, the invasion of Russia was undertaken and ended in failure, and secondly, because central Europe gradually revolted against the intolerable pressure of the continental system. Upon the success of that system Napoleon's schemes hung. Moreover, when the revolt against the continental system definitely began, Germany, now roused from her "sleep of lethargy" and taught by

adversity, had acquired national aspirations and took the lead. The Confederation of the Rhine had been an alliance between Napoleon and the princes, and the War of Liberation was "a movement of peoples rather than princes".

The chief blunders of Napoleon's career thus seem to have been, first his treatment of the inhabitants of the states which formed the Confederation of the Rhine. He not only took no steps to gain the affection of the peasants, but allied himself with the princes and relied upon these alliances, his "personal prestige," and especially upon the force of arms for the permanent establishment of his authority.

Moreover, after 1807, he alienated from him the inhabitants of the German states by the continental blockade, and by the fiscal system which he imposed upon them.

By 1812 the prosperity which these states had formerly enjoyed was absolutely destroyed by the continental system, by military billeting, and by the forced enlistment in the French armies of the youthful portion of the inhabitants. Unlike the Rhine Departments on the left bank of the river which were wisely ruled, and which until 1814 did not suffer from the visitation of war, the states on the right bank of the Rhine which were included in the Confederation seized the opportunity offered them, after the disasters of the Moscow campaign, and joined in the War of Liberation.

The second of Napoleon's disastrous blunders was

the invasion of Spain and the attempt to place Joseph on the Spanish throne. Later, at St. Helena, he recognized how mistaken had been his policy in the Peninsula. The third of his chief mistakes was his treatment after 1807 of the Pope. It is impossible to estimate the full effects of this policy, for the influence of the Roman Church was widespread and impossible to appreciate at its exact value. Napoleon like a gambler had staked all upon the success of the continental system, and had lost.

In 1813 and 1814 the effect of all his blunders and miscalculations made themselves felt, and resulted in the fall of the great French Emperor.

## CHAPTER X

ST. HELENA, 1815-1821

Arrival of Napoleon—His religious views—Lord Rosebery's criticisms of the leading biographers—Captain Henry Meynell's Memoirs—Napoleon's appearance—His habits—His opinions upon Ossian's "Poems," Egypt, the growth of nationalities, India, a Suez Canal, the siege of Toulon, Vendémiaire, the Moscow expedition, the Italians, the character of the French people, the invasion of Spain, the true policy of Louis XVIII, Ney, Scotland and England—The question of the treatment of Napoleon—Views of Lord Rosebery and Dr. Rose—The debt of Europe to Napoleon.

ON 15 July, 1815, Napoleon took refuge in the "Bellerophon," hoping to find a refuge in England. After an anxious month of waiting, he heard that the British Government had on 28 July decided that he was to be sent to St. Helena, an island belonging to the East India Company. The voyage to that island, under the charge of Admiral Cockburn, began on 7 August, and on 17 October, 1815, Napoleon arrived at his destination.

After a sojourn of two months in a cottage called "The Briars" he moved on 10 December to Longwood, in which residence he spent the rest of his life.

With Napoleon were twenty-five persons, includ-



ing Generals Bertrand and Gourgaud, the Count Montholon, Dr. Barry O'Meara, and Las Cases as secretary. He was allowed about a dozen servants, and Bertrand and Montholon were accompanied by their wives.

Till 14 April, 1816, Admiral Cockburn, who was in command of the squadron, was responsible for the care of the Emperor and for the government of the island. He was succeeded as commander of the squadron first by Admiral Malcolm, and on June, 1817, by Admiral Plampin, while Sir Hudson Lowe took over the government of the island.

With Cockburn and Malcolm Napoleon was on friendly terms. His relations with Plampin were not very intimate, while with Hudson Lowe they soon became strained.

The exile of Napoleon is of some importance, owing partly to the sympathy which his captivity aroused, and partly to his writings. By the latter the Napoleonic legend was created which later had an unmistakable influence upon French and indeed upon European politics.

Napoleon desired that his life on St. Helena should be regarded by posterity as a period of martyrdom, and so far as the French nation was concerned he succeeded in his aim. For, owing to the "haze of sentiment" aroused by the captivity of the great Emperor and by his writings, his nephew, Napoleon III, was enabled to found that second Empire which came to so untimely an end in 1870.

Whether or not Napoleon "had religion" will always remain a moot point. From his conversations with Gourgaud on St. Helena it would seem that he was distinctly hostile to Christianity. But he probably spoke deliberately in a spirit of opposition to Gourgaud who was a professed Christian. The Revolution had abjured Christianity, and the army was distinctly non-Christian. Napoleon as the child of the Revolution, and as the head of the army which was his chief support, showed marked strength of mind when he insisted upon the restoration of the French Church and the conclusion of the Concordat. Nevertheless, it is impossible to say that Napoleon had ever any definite religious beliefs.<sup>1</sup>

Lord Rosebery gives us some sound criticism upon the chief descriptions left us of Napoleon in St. Helena. "Gourgaud's account," he says, "is the most faithful transcript, and far superior to the other records. Montholon is not so reliable, or so intelligent. Las Cases pads and fabricates. O'Meara's book is a translation into English of conversations carried on in Italian. It is both spirited and interesting, but does not inspire any confidence."<sup>2</sup> The "Memoranda of Conversations with Napoleon," by Captain Henry Meynell, has, however, lately been privately printed since the appearance of Lord Rosebery's work, and upon it the present chapter is based.


Captain Henry Meynell saw Napoleon on 20

<sup>1</sup> Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: the Last Phase," p. 171.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 165.



NAPOLEON ON ST. HELENA  
FROM A LITHOGRAPH BY HENRI VERDEL



THE EXILE  
FROM A WATER-COLOUR DRAWING BY AN ENGLISH OFFICER AT  
ST. HELENA. LONGWOOD, 24 JULY 1820



June, 1816, on the occasion of a formal visit to Longwood by the English admiral. His description of Napoleon's personal appearance is of interest. "He struck me," writes Meynell, "as resembling a picture painted by Robert Lefevbre, only Considerably stouter. His face remarkably pale, a very thick neck, and Broad Shoulders, a well-made Leg and Foot, in Height about 5 feet 5 inches (it was remarked by Lady M., a few days afterwards, that he had also a very Handsome Hand). In his dress he was not particularly neat. He wore a single-breasted Green Coat, or Habit de Chasse with a velvet Collar and Silver Buttons, having the figures of different animals on them. He had on the Star of the Legion of Honour, White Breeches, Silk Stockings, and Shoes, with Gold Oval Buckles. He kept his Cocked Hat under his left arm, with that hand generally in his Pocket, the other was occupied with a Snuff Box out of which he took a good deal of snuff. His figure though fine is certainly not graceful. He spoke quick, and I thought his French difficult to understand. His countenance was pleasant and he seemed in good humour." Then Meynell describes his course of life. "He is irregular in his meals, but generally breakfasts at 11 and dines at eight. He Remains in his Apartment until 4 in the afternoon when he walks or drives out until sunset. Bertrand has since informed me that he often gets up in the middle of the night and writes, or reads for an hour or two, having contracted that habit at an early period when Commanding his Armies."

On 25 June, 1816, the Admiral and Lady Malcolm, with Meynell, again visited Napoleon who was most gracious. He talked a good deal to Lady Malcolm, asked her if she liked hunting, as he understood that ladies in England were partial to that amusement. He also talked to her about Ossian's "Poems," which he admired, said that he had brought them into fashion on the Continent and declared that he had ever been accused of having his head filled with Ossian's clouds. The Italian translation of them he admired the most. He further asked her if she thought them genuine, and whether she did not think that Macpherson had written them. Lady M. replied "that she did not think Macpherson capable of writing them, that the Highland Society had taken much pains to investigate it, and proved their authenticity".<sup>1</sup>

Captain Meynell frequently accompanied the Admiral and Lady Malcolm on their visits to Napoleon and made careful notes of the conversations in which he took part. These visits extended over a year, with a break from 21 September to 25 November, 1816 during which period the Admiral and Captain Meynell visited the Cape.

The "Memoranda" contain, as can be guessed much that is of very great interest. One of Napoleon's favourite topics was Egypt. He declared that Admira

<sup>1</sup> Captain Henry Meynell (H.M.S. "Newcastle"), "Memoranda of Conversations with Napoleon, St. Helena, 1816," pp. 1, 2, 3. (Printed for private circulation.) Guildford, A. C. Curtis 1909.

Brueys could have averted his destruction at the Battle of the Nile if he had followed his (Napoleon's) advice and taken the fleet into Alexandria.

Any orders of his (Napoleon's), however, were rendered futile by the Bedouin Arabs who interposed between Alexandria and his army which he had led into the interior. He spoke a good deal about Kléber whom he considered a brave and clever man, and expressed the opinion that had that general lived the French occupation of Egypt would have continued. If, Napoleon said, the French had kept possession of Egypt, the English would sooner or later have lost India. For, in possession of the Red Sea, all Indian commerce would have been controlled by the French. Therefore, he was of opinion that Alexandria was of more importance to England than Malta, for as things were it was only the weakness and ignorances of the Turks which prevented the British trade with India from being ruined.

One day or another, he said, you will see Egypt destroy the East India Company. The preservation of Turkey as a European power, was, however, in his opinion as essential for British as it was for French interests.

One of the most emphatic of Napoleon's assertions at Longwood was that Bonapartism was essentially pacific. He asserts repeatedly that he was always pacific, and that it was only "the malignant and implacable jealousy of England that rendered a peaceful policy on his part impossible". To him at St.

Helena it seemed that the best means to render Bonapartism acceptable to the France of the Restoration was to represent it as not only peaceful but as the patron and supporter of nationalities. That there was a certain amount of truth in these assertions is undeniable, for one result of Napoleon's career was to rouse the feeling of nationality in Italy which was never quenched, while it is undoubted that the restoration of Poland as a kingdom would have resulted from Napoleon's defeat of Russia in the Moscow campaign. But Napoleon's Empire was not peaceful, its existence was not compatible with liberal institutions, and it was only in a very modified sense the ally of the Church.

"At Tilsit," he said, in the hearing of Captain Meynell, "the Emperor Alexander was, as always, strongly desirous of driving the Turks out of Europe." But a study of the map, Napoleon declared, convinced him that it was not in the interests of France to allow Constantinople to fall into the hands of the Russians and Austrians. He was, however, well aware that in the event of a war between Russia and Turkey the Greeks would on this matter side with the Russians, who would free them from the Turkish yoke.<sup>1</sup>

These views represent the attitude taken by France towards Turkey since the days of Francis I, while in Louis XIV's reign the importance of Egypt to the French monarchy had been insisted upon, though in

<sup>1</sup> As is well known, Greece secured its independence a few years after Napoleon uttered these words.



vain, by Leibnitz. As it was, Louis XIV entered into close relations with Siam, and, had he not been fully occupied in Europe, he might have anticipated the policy of the Directory and of Napoleon in Egypt.

At St. Helena Napoleon, we are told, had in his possession a memoir on the subject of opening the Ancient Canal from Suez to Cairo. "He thought it practicable, and it was his intention to have done it. He had ascertained that the Nile at Cairo was nearly on a level with the Red Sea. He proposed effecting this by means of the waters of the Nile, the embankments of which are 4 feet higher than the Red Sea."<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon, as is well known, had very elaborate plans for establishing the French power in Egypt, and for using Egypt as a stepping-stone to India. In addition to the canal from Suez to Cairo, he had in his mind one from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.

The Red Sea had been carefully surveyed, the proposed Canal was declared practicable, the expense was calculated to amount to about 18,000,000 francs, and two years' labour would, he thought, suffice for its construction.<sup>2</sup>

If the French, he said, had kept Egypt, sooner or later the English would have lost it, and he would have made the India (!) Company trade with him. "Merchants," he declared, "were of the country that gave them most profit. Those of London had fre-

<sup>1</sup> Meynell, *loc. cit.* p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

quently supplied him with money. On his return from Elba he had several propositions, one from a very rich house. He had this proposal with him. He was to repay them with Government funds, but it was to have been a secret how those funds were disposed of. The Admiral (Sir Pulteney Malcolm), as on a former occasion, observed that he hoped one of these days we should see all these things published. B. laughed.”<sup>1</sup>

On the same day on which he spoke of Egypt he related how Paoli had advised him to enter the English service. But he considered that a revolution offered opportunities for a young man, apart from the fact that he spoke French, “was of their religion and understood their manners”. Paoli was angry, but the two men respected each other.

A few years later the siege of Toulon gave Napoleon an opportunity of showing his military abilities. That siege, he declared, “was the beginning of my rise,” and owing to the fact that a number of the soldiers had been made officers there were few artillery men there who were men of science. His success at Toulon gained for him reputation, and he was “fortunately in Paris just in time for the Revolution of the 13 Vendémiaire”. Then he was sent to Italy where, as he added somewhat modestly, he “gained further reputation,” while from Egypt he returned at “a fortunate moment”.

With regard to the Russian campaign, he declared

<sup>1</sup> Meynell, *loc. cit.* p. 12.

that he "was in too much of a hurry. I should have remained a year on the Niemen and in Prussia, and then devoured Prussia." But had he taken Moscow and crushed Russia, he might have returned to his Eastern schemes. "Would it not then be possible for a great French army with auxiliaries from Tiflis to attain the Ganges? Once touched by a French sword, the scaffolding of mercantile power in India would fall to the ground. It would be a gigantic expedition, I admit, but practicable in the nineteenth century."<sup>1</sup> He, however, consoles himself with the reflection that the Russians already in Persia (!) have not far to go to reach India.

The burning of Moscow, he confessed, in Captain Meynell's hearing, strengthened the position of Russia in the East, for it not only enraged the Greeks, whose religious susceptibilities were roused, but it also ruined his plans. He went to Moscow instead of to St. Petersburg, because "round Moscow there was a fine country with abundance of grain," and he felt that he could have dictated terms of peace from Moscow.

The much criticized invasion of Russia was caused by Alexander's non-fulfilment of the Treaty of Tilsit, and by his (Napoleon's) desire to establish on a solid foundation the kingdom of Poland "as a barrier against the Russians, for sooner or later they would overrun Europe".

<sup>1</sup>Quoted by Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: the Last Phase," p. 201.

His remarks about the Belgians, Piedmontese, and Italians contained much that was true. All these, he asserted, wished for his success at the battle of Waterloo. "The Piedmontese preferred being a province of France to being an independent kingdom under that king of Sardinia."

Speaking of his invasion of Spain, he confessed that the system which he pursued in that country was contrary to the opinion of the nation, and that therefore he failed. In his opinion, expressed in the "Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène,"<sup>1</sup> Spain and England were in a similar political condition, both countries being dominated by a tyrannical oligarchy. "The Spanish nation despised its government; it was crying out for regeneration. I felt sorry for Spain, and seized the only opportunity for regenerating the country."

He showed, as was only to be expected, an accurate knowledge of the character of the French people, and his remarks with regard to the Bourbons, had they been known and acted upon by that family, would have saved France from the Revolution of 1830.


Louis XVIII on his return to France would, in his opinion, have done wisely "to have considered himself as the Beginner of the Fifth Dynasty," and he ought to have said to the people . . . "Grave changes have induced you to recall my family to the throne; I will forget all that is past and commence a new dynasty". As it was, the Bourbons were inse-

<sup>1</sup> P. Gonnard, "The Exile of St. Helena," p. 142. London, William Heinemann.



"JE PRIE MES PARENTS ET AMIS DE CROIRE TOUT CE QUE LE  
DOCTEUR O'MEARA LEUR DIRA RELATIVEMENT À LA POSITION OÙ  
JE ME TROUVE ET AUX SENTIMENS QUE JE CONSERVE."

Sur vos Moeurs l'ordre  
je compte de permettre  
qu'il soit l'ordre  
m. m. H. P. S.  
le 25 juillet 1818



PORTRAIT CAMEO OF NAPOLEON AND SPECIMEN OF HIS  
WRITING FROM ST. HELENA, 1818



curely seated on the throne, "that they sat on a smothered volcano".<sup>1</sup>

On another day he again spoke of the Bourbons. Louis XVIII "was a well-disposed man, but there was a party that he could not keep in order who would *Boulverse* France". That party contained the most violent royalists whom the Government could not control. In fact, his estimate of the Bourbons was singularly correct. The Duke of Orleans, in his opinion, was "the only one of the Bourbons who could settle France. . . . He had made himself popular by wearing the Legion of Honour—which was apparently a trifle," but "apparent trifles are great things at times in France. Reason nothing."<sup>2</sup>

Of the Comte d'Artois he had formed a poor opinion, which was fully justified after his accession as Charles X to the French throne. His wearing of the Order of St. Esprit, "which all those who have been born since the Revolution hate" because it demands from the wearer "four generations of nobility of Blood," was a great blunder. He had also twelve officers on his staff not one of whom had fought with the army, and as they had fought in the ranks of his enemies none bore the Legion of Honour.

He was, moreover, of the opinion that Louis XVIII should have abolished the Legion of Honour. "It will," he said, "always call me to remembrance, but as they have continued it they should not vilify me, they should praise me for what I did, that brought

<sup>1</sup> Meynell, *loc. cit.* p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 18.

glory to France." And then, with true prophetic instinct, he added: "I will tell you what will happen, when I am personally out of the question in thirty years, the Government will be obliged to yield to public opinion, and raise a monument to me for the glory of the nation".

He gave, too, an interesting account of his return from Elba, but added little to what is generally known, beyond a few personal details of his experiences on his journey to Paris. He spoke highly of Colonel Moncey and of Soult, but of Ney he remarked that while "a hero in the field he was not clever in other respects". He clearly showed that "he had committed himself to the Bourbons. His conduct on the whole was bad."

Many of his remarks showed discernment and a correct appreciation of political situations. Thus, he said with some truth that Italy was longing for a constitution as were many of the German states. And he was probably right in his surmise that when the Emperor of Austria travelled through Italy he mistook the applause he met with—for it was intended not for him but for his daughter (Bonaparte's wife) who was travelling with him. In fact the Belgians, Italians, and Piedmontese preferred his (Napoleon's) rule to that of their present masters.

In all his remarks about the Continent he showed, as was to be expected, accurate knowledge. But in all his statements and questions regarding England and Scotland there is that curious ignorance which is



still to be found on the Continent. The character of the British nation is proverbially misunderstood in Europe, and Napoleon on that subject was no more well informed than the large majority of his subjects.

There was, perhaps, some ground for his belief that the inhabitants of Scotland drank very hard, and that the Prince Regent, when young, had been a hard drinker. He seemed interested in Scotland, spoke of its manufactures, and declared its climate was too damp for poetry—a remark which will not be appreciated by the admirers of Burns.

He could not understand how Scottish Peers could become English Peers, and asserted that the Douglas family was the greatest in Scotland. On these points the Admiral enlightened him, explaining the position of Scottish Peers since the Union, and telling him that in addition to the family of Douglas the Campbells and others held positions of some importance.

His ignorance of the English and of England was indeed profound. He often asserted that his landing in England and entry into London would be followed by the overthrow of the British monarchy with the ready acquiescence of the British people. At the same time he recognized that the national spirit of the British was superior to that of the French, that the English were more practical than the French, and were braver. Like many historians, he could not understand why at the conclusion of peace in 1814-5 they derived so little benefit from the long war.

With regard to the strict enforcement of regulations,

based on the view that the escape of Napoleon from St. Helena was possible, it is unnecessary to say much. Lord Rosebery has lately, in his incomparable style, thrown ridicule upon the measures taken by Sir Hudson Lowe to ensure the safety of his prisoner. He shares the opinion held by the Duke of Wellington, that considerable freedom might have been allowed to Napoleon provided the landing-places were carefully guarded. But apparently the great Duke was not aware of the actual position of affairs on St. Helena, and Lord Rosebery ignores the Government records of the years covering Napoleon's captivity. Napoleon's escape from Elba was in every one's memory, and Napoleon's success in quietening the suspicions of Sir Neill Campbell, the Commissioner, was a warning to the officials in St. Helena. Escape from St. Helena was possible; schemes of escape were being devised, and, with Campbell's example before him, Lowe was fully justified in adopting all necessary precautions. Napoleon, it is true, stated at St. Helena that he had no desire to escape; he had made similar statements while in Elba. And moreover, there is, we are assured by Mr. Rose,<sup>1</sup> evidence in the British Archives which fully explains and justifies Lowe's precautions.

As is well known, Napoleon, during his exile on St. Helena, left all the materials for the formation of the Napoleonic legend. He claimed that he represented

<sup>1</sup> Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," p. 328. George Bell & Sons, 1904.

the principles of the Revolution, and that as far as was possible he had recognized those principles. He asserted that equality—the passion of the French middle and lower classes—was fully established by him—“an equality of the burdens, and an equality of all rights”. The Legion of Honour which could be offered to every one was, he asserted, the symbol of equality. Whether the creation of a new nobility did not collide with the principle of equality was a point on which at St. Helena he expressed some doubts. “I fancy I was wrong,” he said, “because it weakened that system of equality which the nation liked so much.”<sup>1</sup>

As regarded the principle of liberty, Napoleon asserted that he did support liberal institutions—that both civil and religious liberty existed in France under him. But he declared with justice that in 1799 and during the ensuing years a strong government in France was absolutely necessary.

“I never usurped the crown,” he said; “I lifted it out of the gutter, and the people put it on my head.” France at that time (1799) was isolated, and might “have perished under the blows of United Europe”. He had ample justification for his policy during the Consulate. The French were incapable of self-government, and Napoleon was acting wisely in ruling with a firm hand. On his escape from Elba he declares he realized that the French had become capable of appreciating the value and meaning of liberty, and con-

<sup>1</sup> Rosebery, “Napoleon : the Last Phase,” p. 125.

sequently that he was prepared in future to rule constitutionally.

With regard to his treatment of foreign nations, Napoleon's position was less sound. He owned, however, that he had made a mistake in attempting to place Joseph on the Spanish throne, for he thus had wounded the national feeling of the Spaniards. He apparently thought that England was in a political condition similar to that existing in Spain, and that both countries, like France before 1789, required complete regeneration.

The Moscow expedition, however, prevented him from achieving success in Spain. That expedition, he declared, was forced on him by the hostility of Russia. Had it succeeded he would have established Poland as a powerful barrier to the advance of Russia westwards.

Much that he said about the future aggrandizement of Russia, and of the future rivalry of Russia and Great Britain in Asia, showed remarkable prescience.

Throughout his conversations and writings it is never apparent that he recognized the influence of the continental system in bringing about his downfall. He never seemed to realize that from 1805 the growth of national feeling in Germany constituted a real danger to his vast schemes. Nor did he realize that England, Prussia, Russia, and Austria would under no circumstances accept peace on his impossible conditions. His continued assertions at St. Helena that his Empire meant peace, and that his pacific intentions were not





ON HIS DEATH BED

FROM A SKETCH MADE BY CAPTAIN MARRIAT BY THE ORDER OF SIR HUDSON LOWE

understood, have never yet been accepted by any one who has made even a cursory study of Napoleon's life.

The closing years of Napoleon's exile on St. Helena have been admirably described by Mr. Rose in his "Life of Napoleon".

In 1820, when his relations with the governor had become more cordial, and the restrictions imposed upon him were lessened, he seems to have been contented. Early in 1821 illness supervened, and on 5 May he died. In 1840 his ashes were removed with great pomp to the *Invalides* in Paris. A few years afterwards a member of his family, Napoleon III, restored the Empire which lasted till 1870. A great ruler and an unsurpassed leader in war, Napoleon remains one of the most remarkable products of European civilization. He was the man "who bridled the Revolution, and remoulded the life of France, who laid broad and deep the foundations of a new life in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, who rolled the Western on the East, in the greatest movement known since the Crusades".<sup>1</sup>


He did more : in France "he restored the administrative centralization of the *ancien régime* with those improvements which the Revolution had rendered possible—a centralization, scientific, uniform, all-pervasive, untrammelled by the spirit of locality, caste, or corporation ; no great modern community of men has ever received so much from a single human mind".<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rose, "Life of Napoleon," Vol. II, p. 574.

<sup>2</sup> "Cambridge Modern History," Vol. IX, pp. 769, 771.

But he left England supreme on the sea, with her colonial and maritime power more firmly established than ever, and he left the Continent to a great extent subservient to Russian influence till the close of the Crimean War. Napoleon's career may be termed "an explosion of human energy". Was it a maleficent or a superb one? I think superb.





RECEPTION OF THE BODY AT THE INVALIDES

FROM A DRAWING BY FERRIGIO AND GERARD



## APPENDICES

- I. LIST OF NAPOLEON'S MOST FAMOUS GENERALS.
- II. LEADING MINISTERS DURING THE EMPIRE.
- III. NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS.
- IV. THE MEMORANDA OF CAPTAIN H. MEYNELL, R.N.
- V. LORD BARHAM.
- VI. A LIST OF THE CHIEF AUTHORITIES FOR THE  
NAPOLEONIC PERIOD.
- VII. THE EDICT OF 19 OCTOBER, 1810.
- VIII. GENEALOGY OF THE BONAPARTES.



## I. NAPOLEON'S GENERALS

Augereau, Duke of Castiglione.  
Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo, Crown Prince of Sweden.  
Berthier, Duke of Neufchâtel, Prince of Wagram.  
Bessières, Duke of Istria.  
Davoust, Duke of Auerstädt, Prince of Eckmühl.  
Beauharnais, Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, Prince of Venice.  
Grouchy, Count of the Empire.  
Jourdan, Count.  
Junot, Duke of Abrantes.  
Lannes, Duke of Montebello.  
Lefebre, Duke of Danzig.  
Macdonald, Duke of Taranto.  
Marmont, Duke of Ragusa.  
Masséna, Duke of Rivoli, Prince of Essling.  
Moncey, Duke of Conegliano.  
Mortier, Duke of Treviso.  
Murat, Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves, King of Naples.  
Ney, Duke of Elchingen, Prince of Moskwa.  
Oudinot, Duke of Reggio.  
St. Cyr, Gouvion, Marquis.  
Soul, Duke of Dalmatia.  
Suchet, Duke of Albufera.  
Victor, Duke of Belluno.

## II. LEADING MINISTERS DURING THE EMPIRE

Cambacérés, Prince of Parma, 1804.

Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza.

Champagny, Duke of Cadore.

Clarke, Duke of Feltre.

Fouché, Duke of Otranto.

Lebrun, Duke of Plaisance, Governor-General of Holland.

Maret, Duke of Bassano.

Savary, Duke of Rovigo.

Talleyrand, Prince of Benevento, 1804; Vice Grand Elector, 1807;  
Prince of Talleyrand, 1814.

## III. NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS

Masséna	}	appointed in 1804.
Jourdan		
Bernadotte		
Lannes		
Soult		
Ney		
Kellermann		

Victor, appointed in 1807.

Macdonald	}	appointed in 1809.
Marmont		
Oudinot		

Suchet, appointed in 1811.

St. Cyr, Gouvion, appointed in 1812.

Pomatowski, appointed in 1813.

IV. THE MEMORANDA OF CAPTAIN H. MEYNELL,  
R.N.

Captain Meynell was born in 1789, and was the second son of Hugo Meynell of Hoar Cross, Co. Stafford, his mother being the Hon. Elizabeth Ingram, daughter of Charles, 9th Viscount Irwin, of Temple Newsam, Yorkshire. Having entered the Navy in 1803, he saw service in the Mediterranean and in the East Indies. In 1816 he was serving as Captain in the "Newcastle," the flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm, the Commander-in-Chief at St. Helena station. He often accompanied the Admiral on the latter's visits to Napoleon, and his recollections "undoubtedly contain fresh matter in addition to what is related" in "A Diary of St. Helena, 1816-1817," by Lady Malcolm: "They supplement and confirm the account given in the 'Diary,' and are of value and importance as showing the effect upon Captain Meynell of Napoleon's manner and personality. For these reasons Captain Meynell's independent recollections have been rightly thought worthy of publication."

## V. LORD BARHAM

Charles Middleton, first Baron Barham, had served in the Navy and risen to the rank of Admiral. In 1794 he was Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty; in 1805 became First Lord of the Admiralty and was created Baron Barham.

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[A full bibliography of the Napoleonic Period is to be found in Vol. IX of the "Cambridge Modern History".]

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
#### VII. THE EDICT OF 19 OCTOBER, 1810

"The Times" of 5 November, 1810, has some severe remarks upon Napoleon's Decree (ordering all British goods to be burnt) of 19 October, "which must increase in an immeasurable degree the universal detestation in which he (this despot) is held on the Continent.

"We could hardly have conceived that, violent, despotic, and unjust as we know him to be, he would have had recourse to an act of such tremendous and general oppression, as will be found in the Decree. . . .

"Nothing less than military execution can enforce the horrible provisions of such a Decree, which affords a triumphant proof of the inadequacy of all the previous laws against the introduction of Colonial produce, and British manufactures."





THE TOMB OF NAPOLEON AT ST. HELENA  
FROM AN ANONYMOUS LITHOGRAPH