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
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GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT  
OF THE  
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR



THE SCHA-HO  
(TEXT)



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
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THE  
**RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR**



**THE BATTLE ON THE SCHA-HO**

PREPARED IN THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE  
GERMAN GENERAL STAFF



AUTHORISED TRANSLATION BY

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
[Vol. 4 pt 1]

WITH ELEVEN MAPS AND EIGHTEEN APPENDICES  
INCLUDING FIVE PHOTOGRAPHIC VIEWS

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1910

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DS  
516  
P93  
U.4  
pt. 1

## EXPLANATION OF TERMS USED ON THE SKETCHES

- Abds.* = in the evening.  
*Abt.* = Abteilung.  
*Abteilung* = (if an Artillery unit)  
 2-4 batteries (equivalent to  
 a British Artillery Brigade),  
 otherwise = Detachment.  
*Ag.* = Advanced Guard.  
*A. K.* = Army Corps.  
*Allg. Res.* = General Reserve.  
*A. R.* = Army Reserve, General  
 Reserve.  
*Arriergarde* = Rearguard.  
*Artillerie Brigade* = 2 Regiments of  
 Artillery of 2-4 Abteilungen  
 each.  
  
*Berg* = Hill, Mountain.  
*Bhf.* = *Bahnhof* = Railway Station.  
*bis* = until.  
*Brücke* = Bridge.  
  
*Ehem.* = formerly, former.  
*Eisenbahn* = Railway.  
  
*Fahnen Hügel* = Colour or Stan-  
 dard Hill.  
*Fels Hügel* = Rock Hill.  
  
*H. Q.* = General Headquarters.  
*H. R.* = General Reserve.
- Hügel, hügel* = Hill, Hillock,  
 Knoll.  
  
*J. D.* = Infantry Division.  
*J. R.* = Infantry Regiment.  
  
*Kaisergrab* = Imperial Tomb.  
*Kas.* = Cossack.  
*Kav.* = Cavalry.  
*K. B.* = Cavalry Brigade.  
*Khf.* = Graveyard, Cemetery.  
*Kohlengruben* = Coal-pits.  
*Kolonne* = Column.  
*Komp.* = Company.  
*Kp.* = Company.  
*Kuppen* = Knolls.  
  
*Lj.* = Liubavin.  
  
*n.* = *nach* = (if along a road) to.  
  
*O.* = East.  
*O. A.* = Eastern Detachment or  
 Group.  
*Ostl., Oestl.* = Eastern.  
*Ost* = East.  
*Ost-Abteilung* = Eastern Detach-  
 ment or Group.  
  
*Rj.* = Riabinkin.

## viii EXPLANATION OF TERMS

*Süd* = South.

*Teile der* = Portions of.

*Tempelhügel* = Temple Hill.

*Truppen* = Troops.

*u.* = *und* = and.

*v.* = (if along a road) from.

*verst.* = *verstärkte* = reinforced.

*von* = of, from.

*Vorposten* = Outposts.

*West-Abteilung* = Western Detachment or Group.

*Westlicher* = Western.

*Zentrum* = Centre.

*Zgl.* = Brickfield.

*zu* = to, belonging to.

*zu (D.)* = belonging to (Dembovski).

*zwei* = two.

*Zwei Kuppen Hüge* = Hill with two knolls.

LIST OF NAMES SPELT IN THE TEXT  
DIFFERENTLY TO THOSE GIVEN ON THE MAPS

Baranovski = Baranowski.	Sackarov = Sacharow.
Bolotov = Bolotow.	Sarubaiev = Sarubajew.
Dembovski = Dembowski.	Shabyko = Schabyko.
Kondratovitsh = Kondratowitsch.	Shatilov = Schatilow.
Koshelevski = Koschelewski.	Shdanovski = Schdanovski.
Kossovitch = Kossowitsch.	Shileiko = Schileiko.
Levestam = Lewestam.	Shitkovski = Schitkowski.
Lipovaz - Popovitsh = Lipowaz - Popowitsch.	Sivizki = Ssiwizki.
Lissoviski = Lissowski.	Soboliev = Ssoboljew.
Mishtshenko = Mischtschenko.	Solomko = Ssolomko.
Musshelov = Musshelow.	Stakovitsh = Stakowitsch.
Novgorod = Nowgorod.	Wassiliev = Wassiljew.
Novikov = Nowikow.	Wolkov = Wolkow.
Peterov = Peterow.	Woltshanovski = Woltschanowski.
Plieshko = Pljeshko.	Y enissei = Jenissei.
Putilov = Putilow.	Yepifan = Jepifan.
Riabinkin = Rjabinkin.	Yuchnov = Juchnov.
	Zurikov = Zurikow.



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# THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

## I

### GENERAL SITUATION AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN

#### (a) *Russians*

WHEN, during its retreat after the battle of Liao-yan,<sup>1</sup> the Russian Army had succeeded in getting away from the Japanese, all its portions continued their march in the general direction on Mukden. On September 6 the main bodies of the Army crossed the Hun-ho. General Kuropatkin, the Commander-in-Chief, had first intended to conduct the Army straight back to Tië-lin.<sup>2</sup> He wished to resume the fight in the position prepared there, to which, from the beginning of the campaign, he had paid special attention, owing to its supposed great defensible capabilities. Only the 10th as well as the 2nd and 3rd Siberian Army Corps were to remain for the present in the earthworks of Mukden,<sup>3</sup> designed as a kind

Kuropatkin resolves to stay at Mukden from his retreat on Liao-yan on Tië-lin.

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III. "The Battle of Liao-yan," pp. 194-207.

<sup>2</sup> 65 kilometres north-east of Mukden.

<sup>3</sup> The construction of the "Mukden Position" had been commenced under the personal supervision of the G.O.C. Engineers of the Manchurian Army during the summer, when the Japanese Armies began their advance, converging on Liao-yan.

## 2 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

of bridge-head, to cover the crossing of the remainder of the Army. But when it became clear that the Japanese, contrary to all expectations, did not pursue, and were not in any strength advancing north from Liao-yan beyond the branch line leading from Yen-tai Station to the coal-pits, General Kuropatkin resolved to discontinue his retreat, to concentrate the Army again at Mukden, and to offer renewed resistance to the enemy's advance.

This resolve meant for the Russians a moral gain. The prestige of the Russian arms, which had sunk low after all these previous defeats, decidedly rose when the Army, scarcely a three days' march distant from the battlefield, faced about again with the object of renewing its resistance. The Russians had certainly not been completely defeated at Liao-yan—they had retired only because their supreme commander had not had the strength of mind to fight the battle to the bitter end; yet the final result of the last actions, which had entailed such heavy sacrifice, was after all a retreat, making the Japanese undisputed masters of the battlefield. In addition to the moral advantages gained by ceasing to retreat, certain material gains accrued as well. By retaining possession of Mukden, the rich resources of that wealthy, thickly populated city continued to be available for supplying the Russian Army. Politically it was not without importance that the Manchurian capital, the ancient home of the reigning Chinese Dynasty, with its sacred imperial tombs, should thus remain in the hands of the Russians.

## AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN 3

Having determined to stay his retreat, Kuropatkin next tried to form an opinion on the value of the "Mukden Position." He therefore charged the Generals Commanding the 3rd Siberian and 10th Army Corps to inspect the works thoroughly. While General Ivanov<sup>1</sup> was against the use of the position, chiefly for reasons of Artillery defence, General Slutshevski<sup>2</sup> was much in its favour, recommending the work to be continued. On September 6, the Commander-in-Chief himself inspected the works; agreeing with General Slutshevski's opinion, he ordered him to adopt at once comprehensive measures for the completion of the "Mukden Position."

Based on his resolve of holding for the present a position on the Hun-ho with a portion of his Army, General Kuropatkin gave his directions to the troops in General Order No. 5<sup>3</sup> of September 7. The bulk of the Army, in compliance with them, was concentrated around Mukden on the northern Hun-ho bank, while General Slutshevski was to occupy the "Position" with the 10th Army Corps and the 2nd Siberian Corps.<sup>4</sup> The 2nd Siberian Corps was to push protective detachments to Kuan-lin-pu and Lin-schin-pu, south-west of Mukden, and the 10th Army Corps an advanced guard to Fön-kiap-pu, south-east of Mukden. By this General Order were to stand :

Kuropatkin arranges by General Orders for the disposition of his troops at Mukden.

Sketch 1.

<sup>1</sup> General Commanding the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.

<sup>2</sup> General Commanding the 10th Army Corps. <sup>3</sup> Appendix III.

<sup>4</sup> By General Order No. 4, the actual text of which is not known, it had been settled for the 2nd Siberian Army Corps to occupy the section west of the railway, and the 10th Army Corps the section to the east of that line.

#### 4 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

The 4th and 5th Siberian Army Corps southwest of the town on both sides of the railway ;

The 17th Army Corps on the Mandarin Road inside the area between Mukden and the Hun-ho, with an advanced guard at Scha-ho-pu, under the orders of the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps ;

The 1st Siberian Army Corps east of the Mandarin Road, likewise between the river and the town ;

The 3rd Siberian Army Corps south-east of Mukden, on the northern Hun-ho bank at Szöwan-fön and Tschin-wan-fön ;<sup>1</sup>

The 1st (European) Army Corps, the main body of which was still on the way, close north-west of the town between the roads to Sin-min-tun and to San-dia-sa.

The right flank was covered by General Kossagovski's reinforced brigade standing on the road to Sin-min-tun.<sup>2</sup> In front, about halfway between Mukden and Liao-yan, on the general line Hun-lin-pu—Hun-pau-schan—Fön-kia-pu, were Grekov's, Mishtshenko's, and Samsonov's Cavalry forces, which were to extend their reconnaissances beyond that line. Three detachments under Generals Liubavin, Peterov, and Eck were pushed to the Kau-tu-lin Pass, the Da-lin Pass, and to In-pan, to cover the left flank, Eck having advanced bodies at Sin-tsin-tin.

<sup>1</sup> Kuropatkin had dropped his original intention of using the 3rd Siberian Army Corps in the defensive position as well.

<sup>2</sup> Kossagovski is said to have advanced on the road to Sin-min-tun, close to the border of the neutral territory, *i.e.* the railway line Sin-min-tun—Schan-hai-kwan.

Next day, September 8, the Commander-in-Chief issued a fresh Order,<sup>1</sup> based in the main on the former, but making various changes in the distribution of the forces. Although the Order began with the words, "It being my intention to make preparations for assuming the offensive with the Army," the Commander-in-Chief at that time had probably not yet made up his mind to attack, but merely wished to raise perhaps the spirit of his troops by these introductory remarks. The essence of the Order was in the arrangements for the defence of the "Mukden Position," in which Kuropatkin thought to offer a determined resistance to the Japanese should they advance. The positions the Russians occupied by General Order No. 6 were then as follows :

The 2nd Siberian and the 10th Army Corps, under the orders of General Slutshevski, remained in the sections of the "Mukden Position" assigned to them, their advanced guards on the line Kuan-lin-pu—Lin-schin-pu—Huan-schan.<sup>2</sup> The 17th Army Corps, forming the nearest support for the main position, was also left in its former place immediately south of Mukden. The greatest care was taken to secure the flanks, especially the left flank, for which Kuropatkin seemed most anxious, probably on account of the mountainous character of the

<sup>1</sup> Appendix IV.

<sup>2</sup> Different from the General Orders Nos. 5 and 6, which prescribed an advanced guard of the 10th Army Corps to be at Fön-kia-pu. Another Russian source states that the protective detachments at Lin-schin-pu and Kuan-lin-pu were furnished by the 17th Army Corps since September 9.

country. The main task of securing the left flank was entrusted to General Ivanov, who in addition to his own, the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, which moved to Fu-schun, was also placed in command of the 3 advanced detachments in the south and east. The disposition of the latter remained the same; their strength merely seems to have been somewhat altered. Liubavin's Detachment (6 battalions, 12 sotnias, 14 guns) had to occupy the passes at Fan-schön and the Kau-tu-lin Pass; Peterov's Detachment (3 battalions, 6 sotnias, 4 guns), the Da-lin Pass; Eck's Detachment (9 battalions, 4 sotnias, 20 guns, 1 Sapper company) remained at In-pan, with a guard at Sin-tsin-tin. The 1st Siberian Army Corps was to move from its former position close south of Mukden to the neighbourhood of Fu-lin and Kiu-san, as a "near protection to the left flank"; that corps served at the same time as a connecting-link between the main body of the Army and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, to which it was also its first support. The march was not to be carried out on the next day (September 9), but on the 10th of that month. The security of the right flank was entrusted to General Dembovski, commanding the 5th Siberian Army Corps, who, however, had at his disposal only 10 battalions, 10 sotnias, 24 guns, and 1 company of Sappers.<sup>1</sup> This detachment was to move to Tszö-kia-pu to oppose any hostile forces

<sup>1</sup> Appendix I. The rest of the 5th Siberian Army Corps was distributed among various detachments; one portion was, moreover, handed over to the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps to make up their losses.

advancing by the right bank of the Hun-ho, or to prevent any crossing in the south. The protection of the "extreme right flank" was left to General Kossagovski's Detachment (6½ battalions, 9 sotnias, 16 guns), which moved to Tun-ta-wan, on the Liao-ho. The "General Reserve" was formed of the 1st Army Corps, whose place of assembly was removed farther north to the country between Hu-schi-tai Station and Pu-ho, and of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, which was to go to the north-west of Mukden into the former quarters of the 1st Army Corps. The Cavalry detachments in front remained in the places assigned to them, namely, the Orenburg Cossack Brigade under General Grekov (12 sotnias, 6 guns), in the country west of Hun-lin-pu; the Transbaikal Cossack Brigade under General Mishtshenko (24 sotnias, 10 guns), at Hun-pau-schan; and the Siberian Cossacks under General Samsonov (18 sotnias, 6 guns), at Fön-kia-pu. The Order did not assign fresh tasks to the Cavalry; reconnaissance was to be continued as hitherto. The actual text of General Order No. 4 outlining these duties not being available, we do not know the objects and limits for this reconnaissance.

The whole position was very much extended; including the guard at Sin-tsin-tin from Eck's Detachment, the distance between the extreme wings measured over 160 kilometres. Uncommonly strong forces—34½ battalions, 43 sotnias, and 78 guns, not counting the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps—had been detailed to protect the flanks. Their protection might very well have

## 8 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

been left entirely to the Cavalry if its duties and employment had been better understood generally.

During the time the movements of the troops as arranged by General Order No. 6 were carried out, progress was made in further entrenching the "Mukden Position."

The "Position of Mukden" is being constructed as a bridge-head with three defensive lines behind each other.

Sketch 2.

The entrenchments then existing were partly finished and partly still unfinished earthworks like forts, redoubts, lunettes, trenches, and gun-pits. They embraced like a bridge-head the roads converging on Mukden, with their crossings over the Hun-ho. The villages Yen-schu-tiën-tsy (southern portion), Ti-kia-wan, Yü-schu-tai, and Hun-ho-pu were fortified in addition.

General Slutshevski, by a series of Orders,<sup>1</sup> arranged for the further consolidation of the "Position." Three lines, one behind the other, came to be constructed, resting with their flanks on the Hun-ho. The foremost line, containing five forts,<sup>2</sup> was looked upon as the "Main Position." It stretched in the form of a slight arc from the river-bend west of Tso-tsuan-tun, across the railway junction and Tschien-yü-schu-tai, to the country north-east of Hun-ho-pu village. The second line extended from the neighbourhood north-west of Lan-wa by Yen-shu-tiën-tsy and Sa-kan-tsy to the bridge east of Tia-ho; and the third line from Schu-lian-za by Ma-kiao-tun and Hou-kia-ho to the little wood

<sup>1</sup> Appendices V. to VIII.

<sup>2</sup> Not forts in the proper sense of the term; they were closed earthworks of a type more or less provisional.

west of Tia-ho. Each of these positions was carefully strengthened by completing the works started, by designing new works, and by fortifying the villages situated within the "Position." The fire-trenches were provided with overhead cover and other structures. Only in the two front lines were fire-positions prepared for the Artillery. To clear the field of fire in front of the "Position," large tracts of gaoljan and tshumisa<sup>1</sup> were mowed off, and only where the gaoljan was required to mask the entrenchments or hide movements of troops was it left standing. Ranges were, moreover, marked, roads improved, new roads laid out, guide-posts erected, numerous obstacles constructed in front, and bridges thrown across the Hun-ho, their number amounting to fifteen towards the end of September. So as to enfilade the approaches to the "Position," emplacements, for a battery each, were established on the northern bank of the river at Kin-tiën-tun and San-kia-la.

As garrison were apportioned: the 2nd Siberian Army Corps to the section west of the railway, and the 10th Army Corps to the section adjoining east; the portion up to, but excluding, Fort II being assigned to the 9th Infantry Division, and the portion from Fort II up to the left flank, to the 31st Infantry Division.

In addition to the general arrangements for the further consolidation of the "Position," Slutshovski's Orders contained numerous directions of various kinds. With the object of getting early notice

<sup>1</sup> A sort of millet.

of a nocturnal surprise, large heaps of dry wood were to be ignited in front by listening-posts. Even by day it was hoped to demoralise the enemy by kindling fires in front of the "Position," Slutshevski saying in one of his Orders<sup>1</sup>: "At a distance of 800 paces in advance of the foremost trenches large fires must be prepared, which, at the moment the enemy is approaching, are to be ignited by electricity to illuminate the foreground. These fires are to be lit even by day so as to impress the enemy." General Slutshevski also hoped to impose on the Japanese by sham mines. He ordered that, "where it is impossible to construct mines in advance of the works, red flags, marking as it were the position of the mines, must be placed so as to confuse the enemy." The course of events giving the Japanese no chance of attacking the "Mukden Position," the effect of the burning heaps of dry wood and of the red flags could not be tested.

When the Commander-in-Chief inspected the "Position" on September 12, the new works as well as all the measures adopted met with his approval.

It was inherent in the peculiar Russian conduct of war to bestow far too much care and attention on the works south of Mukden than was legitimately their due, for they were after all not suited to an obstinate defence. The position in itself was not a strong one; the country, completely flat, did not offer much view, which, moreover, was greatly hampered by numerous villages, hamlets, and

<sup>1</sup> Appendix VIII.

## AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN 11

cultivated fields. But the low water-level of the Hun-ho at that time was especially disadvantageous, being fordable at many places in spite of its imposing breadth (up to 500 metres). To march on Mukden the enemy was therefore not obliged to attack the bridge-head, but could cross over to the other bank at any other place he pleased.

At the same time that the "Position of Mukden" was being constructed new positions were started on the northern bank of the Hun-ho. West of Mukden a number of villages and low sandhills were fortified facing west, and connected with each other by shelter-trenches, thus causing a fresh position to arise stretching from Hou-ta by Yuhuan-tun—Yan-szö-tun to Kin-tiën-tun. There were further created a series of fortifications, extending close to the river-bank east of the Mandarin Road by Fu-lin to Kiu-san. These entrenchments came into prominence afterwards in the battle of Mukden.

On September 10 General Kuropatkin drew the 2nd Siberian Army Corps<sup>1</sup> south-east, away from the "Main Position," with the object of moving it to Hei-sun-pu, 13 kilometres north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, where it too formed a kind of advanced flanking position. The gap thus formed in the "Position of Mukden" was to be filled by portions of the 10th Army Corps. General Slutshevski

<sup>1</sup> The 2nd Siberian Army Corps chiefly consisted of only the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division; the other Division (1st Siberian) belonging to the corps was employed as garrison, and apportioned to other units. (Appendix I.)

re-arranged the occupation of the "Position" by assigning the defence of its right half to the 9th Infantry Division, and of its left half to the 31st Infantry Division. The inner flanks of the Divisions were in touch east of Fort III.

Arrival of reinforcements. Drafts to replace losses.

The 1st (European) Army Corps was completely assembled north of Mukden soon after September 15; the first transports of the 6th Siberian Army Corps had begun to arrive.<sup>1</sup> By the arrival of these reinforcements not only the losses of the battle of Liao-yan and of the actions preceding it were made good, but the Army gained also considerably in strength by them. Drafts, however, arrived in addition to fill the gaps, especially of those regiments which had suffered most. With the object of making good to some extent the severe losses of the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps, men of the 5th Siberian Army Corps were handed over to those two corps.<sup>2</sup> The lightly wounded rejoined their units in large numbers. Until the end of September the Army had been increased in strength by 50,000 men; it must be left open how far in this number are included drafts and men recovering from wounds. The wastage in horses, matériel, equipment, and cloth-

<sup>1</sup> The 6th Siberian Army Corps commenced detraining first at Tië-liu, and with its last troops at Mukden, remaining for the present at the disposal of the Viceroy, whose Headquarters had been transferred to Charbin. On September 28 the first troops began to detrain at Mukden; they were one battalion 220th Infantry Regiment. The corps was then placed under the orders of Kuropatkin for his offensive. In addition to the 6th Siberian and 1st Army Corps, there arrived the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Mountain Batteries, the East Siberian Siege Company, a balloon detachment, and one bridging battalion.

<sup>2</sup> P. 6, footnote.

## AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN 13

ing was soon made good as well. At the same time the spirit of the troops was rising visibly. After the retreat had been discontinued the general despondency soon gave way to a more hopeful spirit. This change was aided by the phlegmatic nature of the Russian, who is not slow in shaking himself free of the impressions produced by ill-luck and misfortune. Within a comparatively short time General Kuropatkin was convinced of having in his hands again an Army ready to strike and to operate. This favourable impression, jointly with the passive attitude of the Japanese, caused the Commander-in-Chief gradually to view the situation in a different light from that he had gained under the depressing effects of ill-success and retreat; the resolve to assume the offensive was maturing in his thoughts.

If the fortune of war was to change at all, it could only be brought about by an offensive in grand style—it was necessary to force the enemy to a decisive battle and to wrest victory from him. Kuropatkin saw that a defensive or expectant attitude of his Army would only bring it nearer to its doom. The situation of the enemy, moreover, invited to offensive action. The Japanese strength was exhausted after the obstinate combats around Liao-yan. The main body of their Army had been unable to conquer the Russian works in front, in spite of great sacrifice; the intended envelopment of the Russian left across the Tai-tsy-ho with insufficient means had not succeeded to its fullest extent. When the Russians finally began to retreat to the surprise of their adversary,

Kuropatkin resolves to assume the offensive.

the Japanese had no longer the strength of following up their success by a vigorous pursuit; their movements came to a standstill at the branch line leading to the coal-mines of Yen-tai. It was then found that the Japanese apparently felt altogether unable to continue their operations for some considerable time. Presumably they awaited the arrival of the 8th Division, of whose dispatch Russian General Headquarters had received knowledge. That force being unable to reach Liao-yan before the beginning of October, it was not likely that the Japanese would resume active operations before the middle of October.

The opportunity was therefore altogether favourable for a Russian offensive, considering the numbers concerned. By the arrival of the 6th Siberian as well as of the 1st Army Corps the Russian Army was superior to the enemy. If the resolve to attack had been steadily and rapidly turned into action it might have led to great results being obtained. But Russian General Headquarters were never in a hurry when deciding on any course of action. First of all, Kuropatkin obtained the views of his Generals in command, who were not over-confident. They generally held that the moment for assuming the offensive had not yet arrived. General Slutshevski proposed to await the Japanese in the "Position of Mukden," to beat off their attack, and then only to assume the offensive. Stackelberg, too, advised to be cautious, counselling the Commander-in-Chief to wait as yet a while. Kuropatkin justly urged against these proposals that any delay would procure the

## AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN 15

enemy time to bring up his reinforcements and to strengthen his positions about Liao-yan with all available means. It was, moreover, likely that Port Arthur would soon succumb to the siege, its power of resistance being not much thought of at Russian Headquarters; in that case Nogi's Army would become available, and might appear at Liao-yan in support of the Field Army within measurable time. Now, on the other hand, the Japanese as yet had hardly made good their recent losses; in their present plight they seemed to need some urgent rest still; if the Russians wished to make use of this favourable situation, it was necessary to strike soon.

In addition to these reasons arising from the general state of affairs, some reasons of a personal nature urged Kuropatkin to strike at once.

By an Imperial Ukas of September 24 General Gripenberg had been appointed to command a Second Army of Manchuria, which was to consist of the 6th Siberian and 8th Army Corps, as well as of the 61st Infantry Division and 4th Don Cossack Division, the Ukas at the same time co-ordinating him to Kuropatkin. The Viceroy, Alexeiev, was nominated Supreme Commander over all the forces. Kuropatkin cherished the legitimate hope of being summoned to the first place himself; but it was not likely that he could count upon being appointed Commander-in-Chief, if he did not gain a real success in the near future.

All these considerations led Kuropatkin to adhere to his resolve, against the opinions of his subordinate commanders, and to prepare to attack the Japanese.

Strength  
of the  
Army.

Including the 6th Siberian Army Corps, the Army numbered roughly 250 battalions, 143 squadrons or sotnias, 744 guns, and 32 machine-guns.<sup>1</sup> The strength of the units varied very much. The companies probably numbered only 150 to 160 men, and frequently less than that.<sup>2</sup> At the beginning of October the Commander-in-Chief gave the strength of his Infantry as "147,000 bayonets"; but according to another trustworthy Russian source, becoming known only after the campaign, they were 181,000 men.<sup>3</sup> Adding to these numbers the mounted branches, one can hardly go wrong in estimating the numbers of the whole fighting troops of the Army as roughly 210,000 men.

Intelli-  
gence  
about the  
enemy.

Intelligence about the enemy was extremely poor. Japanese advanced bodies were said to be standing at Bian-yu-pu-sa, 21 kilometres north-east of the coal-pits of Yen-tai, on the upper reaches of the Scha-ho, also south of the Schi-li-ho, and at Tschan-tan on the Hun-ho, north-west of San-de-pu; these were all the details the Russian Cavalry had ascertained. There was still want of

<sup>1</sup> War Organisation, Appendix I.

<sup>2</sup> The companies of the 213th Infantry Regiment are said to have numbered but 120 to 130 men.

<sup>3</sup> This total strength of Infantry is arrived at as under :

1st Siberian Army Corps	. . . . .	19,700
2nd " " "	. . . . .	7,000
3rd " " "	. . . . .	16,700
4th " " "	. . . . .	20,000
5th " " "	. . . . .	19,000
6th " " "	. . . . .	30,000
1st Army Corps	. . . . .	27,000
10th " " "	. . . . .	19,000
17th " " "	. . . . .	23,000

## AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN 17

clearness about the disposition of the enemy's main bodies, likewise about his strength. The reports of the spies proved inaccurate and contradictory. When, on September 21, the news came in of Peterov's Detachment having been attacked at the Da-lin Pass on the 19th, and forced to retreat in a north-westerly direction on Ma-tsiundan,<sup>1</sup> a general attack upon the Russian left wing was expected as a matter of course. But such an attack was not made; the Japanese—it was only a small body—evacuated the pass again, enabling General Peterov to reoccupy it without fighting. A few days afterwards an attack was feared upon the right wing, reports having come in of an advance by Japanese columns from Yen-tai in a north-westerly direction. Soon after this alarming news, too, all was quiet again in front of the Army. It remains unintelligible why the 54 sotnias in front of the Army were unable to gain any insight into what the Japanese were doing.

### (b) *Japanese*

After the actions around Liao-yan the 1st of the Japanese Armies alone was completely north of the Tai-tsy-ho, the 2nd Army and strong portions of the 4th being still on the southern bank at Liao-yan.<sup>2</sup> The 12th Division of the 1st Army on the right was standing at Yüan-kia-pu, 6½ kilometres south-west of the coal-pits of Yen-tai, the Guard Division to the west of it at Fa-schi-

Disposition of the Japanese Army after the battle of Liao-yan. Sketch 1.

<sup>1</sup> The action is not mentioned by the Japanese.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. III., "The Battle of Liao-yan," p. 205.

ko-schan, and the 2nd Division at Siau-miau-tsy. Army Headquarters were at Fön-schan, 4 kilometres north-east of Liao-yan. During the first decade of September<sup>1</sup> General Baron Kuroki moved the 12th Division somewhat more east to Ta-yau-pu, and the 2nd Division to Yüan-kia-pu into the place of the 12th. The Guard Division was therefore now stationed on the left. The Guard Kobi Brigade, under the command of General Umesawa, forming part of the 1st Army, had, after its participation in the recent fights, marched to Bian-yu-pu-sa, 21 kilometres north-east of the coal-pits, arriving there on September 9. It was therefore a day's march distant from the right wing of the Army it belonged to. The Japanese being provided only with very unreliable maps of that particular country, of which whole districts were not marked at all on them, they knew little about the various distances. Headquarters of the 1st Army thought Bian-yu-pu-sa to be very much nearer to the coal-pits; it was some time before Army Headquarters became aware of the isolated position of the Guard Kobi Brigade.

Of the 4th Army, Headquarters of which were billeted at Tun-tu-dia-wa-tsy, 4 kilometres south of Liao-yan, the 5th Division was standing north-east of Liao-yan, on the northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho at the Mandarin Road; and the 10th Division, as well as the formations attached to that Army, were still south of the town.

The 2nd Army had sought shelter with the

<sup>1</sup> Exact date not known.

## AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN 19

3rd and 6th Divisions in that quarter of Liao-yan which the Russians had raised outside the city walls ; the 4th Division was standing at Si-guan, close west of Liao-yan.

Headquarters of the Japanese Field Army and the General Reserve were in Liao-yan.

Immediately after the battle of Liao-yan, Marshal Marquis Oyama had arranged for a series of positions to be prepared for an obstinate defence in case of a sudden and unforeseen attack. The heights east of Liao-yan were strongly fortified ; there were, furthermore, extensive positions at Bian-yu-pu-sa, on the heights between Man-hua-pu and Tsiën-tau on the Schi-li-ho, along the branch line and at La-mi-pu, likewise at Hun-ai-tsy south-east of La-mi-pu, and west of Tschan-tai-tsy south-west of La-mi-pu.<sup>1</sup>

Directly the pause in the operations began, strenuous efforts were made for raising again the striking power of the Japanese Army.

Making good the enormous losses suffered in the battle of Liao-yan proceeded but very slowly. It was not till the end of September that all units had been brought up again to their proper strength. Of fresh reinforcements, there arrived up to the middle of the month only the 2nd Cavalry Brigade under General Prince Kan-in, as well as some Kobi formations.<sup>2</sup> The value of these formations, of which in other respects there was little to choose between them and the Line formations, was some-

Positions prepared.

Sketch 2.

Drafts to replace losses, and fresh reinforcements.

<sup>1</sup> The entrenchments along the branch line and at La-mi-pu are identical with the positions of the 10th and 5th Divisions marked on Sketch 2.

<sup>2</sup> Their exact names are not known.

what impaired by the different armament with which they were equipped (captured rifles, or of an old pattern). At home there were still available, of regular troops, the 7th and 8th Divisions; but General Headquarters could not make up its mind to bring up these forces at once. The conditions in front of Port Arthur seem to have decided that question. It is alleged that originally it was intended to employ these two Divisions for a siege of Vladivostok, but this idea was dropped when Port Arthur was holding out longer than was anticipated, and the Field Army could no longer be reinforced by the Siege Army. It is not known when it was finally decided to issue the orders for the dispatch of the 8th Division to the Field Army. The first échelons arrived at Liao-yan on October 13; but the Division did not take part in the combats on the Scha-ho. The 7th Division was retained in Japan to cover the Island of Yesso, particularly Port Otaru, against likely enterprises of the Russian Vladivostok Fleet.

The numbers of the Japanese Field Army,<sup>1</sup> even including the 8th Division, were inferior to those of the Russians. If the companies had all their full strength of 200 men, the Japanese Army, including the mounted arms, must have numbered about 170,000 men.

The lines of communication are being re-arranged. Japanese Headquarters took special care to reorganise the lines of communication. The change of gauge of the railway from Dal-ni<sup>2</sup> by

<sup>1</sup> War Organisation, Appendix II.

<sup>2</sup> Sketch 1 of Vol. I., "Ya-lu."

## AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN 21

Kin-tschou to Liao-yan had progressed far enough to allow traffic to commence on the whole line from the beginning of October, thus facilitating in particular the evacuation of the wounded.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to this line of railway, the sea transport by Yin-kou,<sup>2</sup> at the mouth of the Liao-ho in the Liao-tung Bay, became of increasing importance, as the winter was closing the roadsteads of Da-gu-schan, a port on the south coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and the mouth of the Ya-lu; and the overland route by the mountains to the seaports of Korea<sup>3</sup> was far too long and of too little use for supplying the three Armies for any length of time.

Difficulties arose in the supply of ammunition. The small arsenal at home was not capable of manufacturing rapidly enough the quantities of ammunition necessary for the Army, and the less so because the siege of Port Arthur made ever-increasing demands for ammunition. Even after its enlargement it was only able to meet these demands after the utmost exertions. The supply of draught horses caused some difficulties. In place of the rather useless Japanese horse, Chinese ponies and mules were drafted into the service in large numbers, these animals proving very useful. The supply of sufficient provisions from home for

<sup>1</sup> The first Japanese trains ran on the line on August 1 as far as Liao-tau; on August 20 the portion was finished up to Kai-ping; on September 12 up to Ta-schi-tschao and Yin-kou; and on October 3 up to Liao-yan.

<sup>2</sup> Sketch 1 of Vol. I., "Ya-lu."

<sup>3</sup> Japanese railway troops worked at the laying of a railway through Korea; but the line was not yet open to traffic.

man and beast was a constant anxiety, for even the Japanese soldier does not so easily bear up with shortness of rations.

Intelli-  
gence  
about the  
enemy.  
Sketch 1.

Until September 11 the Japanese were in possession of the following intelligence about their enemy. Two new Russian Army Corps, the 1st European and the 6th Siberian, were said to be arriving north of Mukden; strong Cavalry was standing on the road Fu-schun—Bian-yu-pu-sa; there had further been seen a Cavalry detachment, with some guns as well, on the San-kai-seki-san, 9 kilometres north of the coal-pits; at Fönkia-pu, north-east, and Men-hu-lu-tun, north-west of Yen-tai, Cavalry had also been observed; finally, strong Cavalry was said to be on the road between Sin-min-tun and Mukden. In addition some entrenchments had been ascertained south of Mukden, and the departure from the city of strong forces in an easterly direction on Fu-schun had been noticed.

All this intelligence the Japanese owed less to the activity of their weak Cavalry than to the services of Chinese spies, whom both belligerent powers were particularly fond of employing.

Marshal  
Oyama  
decides to  
concentrate  
his  
Armies on  
the north-  
bank of  
the Tai-  
tsy-ho.

About the middle of September Japanese Headquarters decided to concentrate the Armies on the northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. To the 1st Army was now apportioned the section from Siën-tschan-tsy, 10 kilometres south of Bian-yu-pu-sa, to the coal-pits; the 4th Army was to move to the west of it, and the 2nd Army was to form up as the left wing within the space between Nan-tai, 16 kilometres north east of Liao-yan,

and Schan-tai-tsy, 11 kilometres to the west of Nan-tai.

The 1st Army seems, however, to have remained in its former position.<sup>1</sup> The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, arriving at Liao-yan on September 17, was placed under the command of the 1st Army. General Baron Kuroki charged General Prince Kan-in, its commander, to reconnoitre north and north-east of the coal-pits and establish communication with the Guard Kobi Brigade at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

It is not known how far the 4th Army complied with the General Order. The 5th Division seems to have advanced on the Mandarin Road to about Tschan-tai-tsy. If the other portions of that Army did cross at that time, they probably did not advance far beyond the country north-east of Liao-yan. As a measure of security the 5th Division had pushed a weak detachment to La-mi-pu on the Mandarin Road, which was afterwards relieved by the 8th Brigade,<sup>2</sup> to which were attached some Cavalry, Artillery, and an Engineer detachment. This brigade was commanded by General Otani.

The 2nd Army had crossed completely ; and of that Army were standing west of the Mandarin Road the 3rd Division at Ta-pa-tai-tsy, with an advanced guard at Ta-tu-san-pu on the Scha-ho ; the 4th Division at Liën-kia-kou-men, with an advanced guard at Lan-tun-kou ; and the 6th Division, which had pushed some protective troops to Liu-tiau-tschai, was standing at Si-ku-kan-tsy, in the centre behind the two other Divisions. The

<sup>1</sup> P. 18.

<sup>2</sup> From the 10th Division. The exact date is not known.

1st Cavalry Brigade was reconnoitring from the neighbourhood of Pan-puo-sa, on both banks of the Hun-ho.

On September 17 the first serious action took place at Bian-yu-pu-sa, revealing the exposed position of the Guard Kobi Brigade.<sup>1</sup> At 11.30 a.m. two Russian battalions, with a few squadrons, advanced from Siau-yau-pu in the Scha-ho valley, east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, on Bian-yu-pu-sa. General Umesawa deployed his troops in the prepared position south of that place, receiving the enemy with a brisk fire. The Russians replied to it, but abstained from advancing farther when becoming aware of the strength of the Japanese; about 3 p.m. they withdrew, not without loss, on Tschin-hsi-sai and Kan-to-li-san, east and north of Bian-yu-pu-sa respectively. This reconnoitring action, which is not mentioned by the Russians, took therefore a turn favourable to the Japanese; but the situation of the Guard Kobi Brigade might have become very serious if General Liubavin, who probably had ordered the attack, had pushed forward with his whole detachment, or had acted jointly with the 2nd Siberian Army Corps standing at Hei-sun-pu.

When General Baron Kuroki received knowledge of these events and was, moreover, by the activity of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade informed about the actual distance to Bian-yu-pu-sa,<sup>2</sup> he shifted his Army somewhat east so as to bring his right wing nearer to General Umesawa's Brigade; the positions assigned to the Divisions are not known.

<sup>1</sup> P. 18.

<sup>2</sup> P. 18.


The 1st  
Army is  
being  
pushed  
east.

## AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YAN 25

Meanwhile reports from spies came in about the advance of strong hostile forces in a south-easterly direction from the neighbourhood of Mukden. General Baron Kuroki looked upon this as a threat to the Japanese right wing, his view of the matter being strengthened when, on September 22 and 23, reports came in of strong Russian forces really advancing upon the right wing and right flank of the 1st Army. The Guard Kobi Brigade now seemed to be in serious danger; decisive measures for its protection were urgently demanded. Kuroki once more ordered his Army to shift to the right; at the same time the 12th Division was pushed out in a south-easterly direction for employment on the right wing. Again the objectives to be reached are not exactly known; the 12th Division seems to have taken post at Kau-kia-pu-tsy, south-east of the coal-pits of Yen-tai; the 2nd Division moving to the coal-pits, and the Guard Division to the country west of them. These movements had been executed by October 1.

No more changes in the position of the forces comprising the 2nd and 4th Armies seem to have occurred up to that date.

The outposts in front of the Armies stretched from the neighbourhood east of Tschin-hsi-sai to the Hun-ho at Tschan-tan.



## II

### BEGINNING OF THE RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS

General Kuropatkin issues the Order for the advance. AFTER General Kuropatkin had finally decided to attack,<sup>1</sup> he issued the particulars for the advance in a detailed General Order<sup>2</sup> on September 28. But some extensive preparations were to be carried out before the movements began; General Headquarters therefore reserved to itself the fixing of the first day of march.

The General Order organised all the forces into several independent groups, each of which was to be employed in a special manner. The two main groups were the Western Detachment (10th and 17th Army Corps, 2nd Orenburg Cossack Brigade, and Ural Cossack Brigade<sup>3</sup>) under General of Cavalry Baron Bilderling, hitherto commanding the 17th Army Corps, and the Eastern Detachment (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Siberian Cossack Division<sup>4</sup>) under General Baron Stackelberg, commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps. In addition, the Order provided for

<sup>1</sup> P. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix IX.

<sup>3</sup> 64 battalions, 40 squadrons, 190 guns, and 2 Sapper battalions.

<sup>4</sup> 73 battalions, 32 machine-guns, 34 squadrons or sotnias, 170 guns, and 3 Sapper battalions.

Flank Guards, a General Reserve (4th Siberian, and 1st European Army Corps, and the independent Transbaikal Cossack Brigade<sup>1</sup>), and a Rear Protection (6th Siberian Army Corps).

General Headquarters intended to advance with the left wing of the Army—the Eastern Detachment—against the right wing of the Japanese, enveloping it; to push back the enemy's forces in the mountains, and then, jointly with the Western Detachment, to advance for a decisive attack upon the enemy's main forces supposed to be concentrated at the coal-pits of Yen-tai. In this operation the General Reserve, which was retained behind the centre, was meant to co-operate either by reinforcing one of the Army groups or filling the gap between them.

The most important task fell to the lot of the Eastern Group. General Baron Stackelberg was Sketch 2 directed to concentrate his forces on the line Tai-kia-miau-tsy—Hei-sun-pu—Pa-kia-tsy, 12 to 17 kilometres north and north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, with the object of making an enveloping attack upon the right wing of the Japanese supposed to be stationed at that place.

The task of the Western Group demanded from it a somewhat reserved attitude. Conforming to the operations as they were intended, it ought to have attacked too, but no word was said as yet in the Order to that effect. The troops were first to assemble on the Scha-ho, and then to advance on Liao-yan on both sides of the railway between the Hun-ho and the road east of the railway

<sup>1</sup> 56 battalions, 20 sotnias, 224 guns, and 2 Sapper battalions.

## 28 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

running from Huan-schan (18 kilometres south-east of Mukden) — Lüan-fan-tun — Pu-tsau-wa—Ta-pu—coal-pits of Yen-tai. But for the time being it was given the limits of two day's marches only. The main bodies were to halt on the second day of march on the line Lin-schin-pu—Scha-hopu—Lüan-fan-tun, after covering therefore about half the distance to Yen-tai, and then to proceed, preparing entrenched positions; the advanced guards were to push to the northern tributary of the Schi-li-ho.

Sketch 1.

Kuropatkin's anxiety of his wings becoming enveloped, which had been apparent already in the former grouping of his units, is shown again in his present arrangements. The detachments charged hitherto with protecting the flanks continued in this duty. The Order distinguished between a "right" and "extreme right" flank, and a "left" and "extreme left" flank.

Dembovski's Detachment, which had been charged with the close protection of the right, was to advance on the western bank of the Hun-ho along that river, and construct a bridge at Tschan-tan, covering it by forming a double bridge-head on the banks of the Hun-ho. General Dembovski had for that purpose available the respectable force of 12 battalions, 16 sotnias, 32 guns, and two battalions of technical troops.<sup>1</sup>

The "extreme right flank" was secured by General Kossagovski with the troops he had before. That detachment was to advance along the left

<sup>1</sup> The composition and strength of the advanced detachments had meanwhile been partly changed.

bank of the Liao-ho and to keep connection with Dembovski's Detachment.

The close protection on the left was provided by the detachment of General von Rennenkampf,<sup>1</sup> who took united command of the former individual detachments of Liubavin, Peterov, and Eck.<sup>2</sup> He had available 13 battalions, 16 sotnias, and 30 guns. By the General Order this detachment was to concentrate in the direction of Ma-tsiun-dan—Da-lin Pass, advancing then by Siao-syr, 45 kilometres south-east of Pen-si-hu, probably against the right flank of the Japanese. But the Commander-in-Chief dropped again this intention, doubts having probably arisen in his mind about the advisability of detaching so strong a force for making this wide turning movement; it seemed to him more practical to let this detachment closely co-operate with the Eastern Group as a reinforcement for that enveloping wing. General von Rennenkampf was therefore ordered to join the Eastern Detachment in the direction of Pen-si-hu, by San-kia-tsy, north-east of the former place, after he had begun the movement originally ordered.<sup>3</sup> On the extreme left, the flank protection was effected by Colonel Madritov's Detachment, who was to advance with 1 battalion, 2 Scout detachments, 2 sotnias, and 2 guns by

<sup>1</sup> General von Rennenkampf had been wounded on July 13, but had now returned to the Army convalescent. During the battle of Liaoyan he was seconded by General Liubavin.

<sup>2</sup> With some modifications; Rennenkampf's newly formed detachment was somewhat weaker than the total strength of those three detachments.

<sup>3</sup> It cannot be ascertained when Kuropatkin issued the order to that effect, and where that order reached Rennenkampf.

Ta-pin-di-schan on Sai-ma-tsy,<sup>1</sup> keeping at the same time in touch with General von Rennenkampf.

Sketch 2. The General Reserve was directed to concentrate on the first day of the march on the northern bank of the Hun-ho on both sides of the Mandarin Road, and to march next day, after crossing the river, to the neighbourhood of San-lin-tsy—Wanti-sai, south-east of Mukden.

The 6th Siberian Army Corps, after finishing detraining, was to remain north of Mukden as “rear-protection.”

Independent Cavalry corps were not mentioned in the Order. Apart from General Mishtshenko's Transbaikal Cossack Brigade belonging to the General Reserve, the Cavalry, consisting of 143 squadrons or sotnias, was distributed along the whole of the front. With the left wing, which had to operate in the mountains, 50 sotnias were to co-operate; in the Hun-ho plain, on the other hand, where strong Cavalry could have rendered excellent service, particularly on account of the small numbers of Japanese squadrons, no independent Cavalry detachment was employed at all. The Cavalry forces attached to the Western Group, as well as to Dembovski's and Kossagovski's Detachments, were partly split up for minor duties, and partly kept in such close contact with the main bodies, that they were altogether removed from their real duties, reconnoitring on a large scale.

<sup>1</sup> Ta-pin-di-schan is 32 kilometres south of Sin-tsin-tin, Sai-ma-tsy 100 kilometres south-east of Liao-yan. Madritov's Detachment is no longer mentioned afterwards in any report.

It seemed as if the Russian commanders voluntarily abandoned all efforts for obtaining by their Cavalry an insight into the dispositions of the enemy. This limited comprehension of the use of Cavalry for distant reconnoitring is all the more remarkable because the detachments of mounted Scouts were available for tactical or close reconnaissance and other minor duties.

At the same time the Order was issued for the advance of the Army, General Headquarters directed the commanders to make some preparations "in view of the impending movements of the Army for the offensive, or in case the enemy should attack." The additional sentence "or in case the enemy should attack" makes us believe that the Russian Commander-in-Chief at heart did not seriously mean to act on the offensive; perhaps he had a sort of presentiment that the initiative would soon be again in the hands of the Japanese.

For preparation were recommended, among other items, the making good of deficiencies in arms, equipment, clothing, and boots, the storing of ammunition, procuring of large live stock, keeping ready pack-animals<sup>1</sup> with the Siberian Army Corps, which were going to advance in the mountains, so as to bring up ammunition, supplies, water, etc. The commanders were directed to make use of local supplies, and advised to establish magazines and collect fodder for the horses. Reconnaissances of the roads and probable billeting-areas were ordered for tactical reasons as well as for reasons of supply.

<sup>1</sup> Mostly small donkeys.

These measures were, of course, necessary and justifiable ; it is strange only that Kuropatkin should have felt obliged to call his commanders' attention to things which are a matter of course, and to which they might have attended for the most part some weeks before, when the operations came to a standstill. Great activity being now displayed everywhere by the orders of General Headquarters, it was more than likely that Chinese spies would report this to the enemy. The attention of the Japanese was in this way roused artificially, and the Russians lost some precious time, which they could no more retrieve, for every day of delay in the offensive was only of advantage to the enemy.

Kuropatkin proclaims to the Army his resolve of assuming the offensive.

But General Kuropatkin apparently did not think it even necessary to hide his intentions from the Japanese as long as possible, for on October 2 he issued a long address to the Army, not marked "Confidential," and therefore bound to become very soon known to the enemy too. In this Proclamation<sup>1</sup> the Commander-in-Chief made known to the Army his resolve in high-sounding terms. Therein he stated that the failures hitherto had been caused only by the inadequacy of the forces ; considerable difficulties had to be overcome for bringing up the Army to a strength that would ensure victory. But now they would no longer retreat, as the Army was this day strong enough to assume the offensive and crush the Japanese by decisive blows.

The Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief

<sup>1</sup> Appendix X.

was received by the troops with great enthusiasm. The announcement of the offensive was joyfully re-echoed in the heart of every soldier. At last they were to go forward to search for and beat the enemy before whom they had continually retreated after bloody contests.

The day before he issued this Proclamation General Kuropatkin sent the Commanding Generals a wire in cypher fixing the advance for October 5.

The country which was to become the scene of the combats is of very unequal nature. Topo-  
graphy  
of the  
country.

West of the Mandarin Road an almost perfect plain stretches to the Hun-ho; apart from cultivation, view is only hampered by some few low eminences. Some few hundred metres east of the Mandarin Road a narrow low range of hills stretches north and south, from which rise the eminences east of Wu-li-tai-tsy, and of Schi-li-ho and the Ko-ho-san, east of Pan-kiau-pu. North of the Ko-ho-san the elevation continues as a terrace 8 to 10 metres high as far as the Hou-tai Hill, thence descending gently to the Scha-ho. This range of hills is separated from the heights forming the western edge of the mountains by a broad plain, gently rising and narrowing as it extends north. While the western portion of the heights forms a continuous bare hilly country, with some eminences up to 100 metres high within the space included by the roads Hou-liu-tun (4 kilometres east of Scha-ho-pu)—Tun-san-tsy—Ta-pu, and Fön-kia-pu—Ma-niu-tun—Sia-liu-ho-tsy—Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko, the country east of it assumes more and more a real mountainous character; the individual

hills attain the heights of the lesser mountain ranges in Germany, but are more rugged and steeper, thus rendering movements of troops very difficult off the few roads and bridle-paths, and causing even Infantry much hardship when moving outside the roads; the other arms are altogether confined to the roads.

The Scha-ho, a right tributary of the Tai-tsy-ho, is on the average 50 to 80 metres broad at the bottom; the Schi-li-ho<sup>1</sup> and its northern nameless affluent are of lesser breadth. All these rivers are very sinuous, with a sandy bed about 8 to 10 metres deep, and sometimes steep banks. Carrying but little water in the dry season at the beginning of October, these rivers were fordable at many places, affording therefore nowhere a serious obstacle to Infantry, at least not on the first days of battle, their valleys rather affording cover to troops in motion and at rest. Artillery was obliged to cross by the bridges.

None of the rivers mentioned were particularly suitable for the defence; their defensive use was still more reduced by the fact that the villages were frequently situated on both banks of the river, forcing the defenders to select their position at the edge of the village on the enemy's side, thus leaving the obstacle in rear of the defender.

In addition to a few very open pine and poplar woods, villages surrounded by high trees and Chinese burial-places are strewn over the country. The houses are frequently built of stone, the yards and gardens being surrounded by clay

<sup>1</sup> Appendix XVI.

walls 50 to 60 centimetres thick, and easily adapted for defence. The villages are connected by numerous roads formed by traffic; they were in good repair on the first days of battle.

The crops of the fields, millet and beans in addition to gaoljan, were mostly cut, but the rather pointed stumps of the gaoljan left in the ground hampered the movements of troops, especially those of the mounted branches.

The heavy clay-soil can be worked easily, is very firm, and was therefore very suitable for constructing field entrenchments.

On October 4<sup>1</sup> the Eastern Detachment began to move; the remainder started on the next day.

By orders of the General Commanding the Western Detachment,<sup>2</sup> the 17th Army Corps was to advance on the right between the Hun-ho and the road Tia-ho—San-ho-kuan-tun—La-mu-tun, ending about 2 kilometres east of the railway to Liao-yan, and the 10th Army Corps on the left, the last-mentioned road and all the other roads as far as the road Mukden—Pai-tschit-schai—Huan-schan—Pu-tsau-ma—Ta-pu—coal-pits of Yen-tai being placed at its disposal.

The 17th Army Corps marched in two columns. The right column (8 battalions, 24 guns, and half a company of Sappers<sup>3</sup>) crossed the Hun-ho by

<sup>1</sup> By Kuropatkin's telegram the advance was fixed for October 5; but according to Russian accounts the Eastern Detachment began the movement already on the 4th, probably on account of having to cross the Hun-ho. The places reached on the 4th are not known.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix XI.

<sup>3</sup> 1st Brigade 3rd Infantry Division, one Abteilung 3rd Artillery Brigade, and half a company 17th Sapper Battalion.

The Western Detachment begins to advance on October 5.

the railway bridge, and then took the road by Tso-tuan-tun to Ta-su-kia-pu, the village its main body was to reach on the 5th. The left column (16 battalions, 48 guns, and 1 company of Sappers<sup>1</sup>) crossed somewhat farther east by one of the numerous bridges, marching by Ma-kiao-tun along the railway to Su-ya-tun. The march of the corps was to be secured by General Ianshul. With this object the advanced guard of  $5\frac{1}{2}$  battalions, 16 guns, 5 squadrons, and half a company of Sappers, hitherto standing at Scha-ho-pu, was to move a few kilometres west to Lin-schin-pu, on the Scha-ho, uniting, after being relieved by the 10th Army Corps, with another advanced guard, of 2 battalions and 8 guns, standing there. A battalion which had been pushed out to the right by the detachment at Lin-schin-pu remained in Kuan-lin-pu.

The 10th Army Corps formed two advanced guards. General Mau's advanced guard, standing already at Huan-schan, 18 kilometres south-east of Mukden, and numbering 8 battalions, 1 sotnia, 16 guns, and 1 company of Sappers,<sup>2</sup> was to stand still on October 5, and to march on the 6th by Lüan-fan-tun (7 kilometres south-west of Huan-schan) and Pu-tsau-wa on Ta-pu at the San-kai-seki-san; for relieving the advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps standing in Scha-ho-pu, a new "right advanced guard," under General

<sup>1</sup> 35th Infantry Division, together with the 35th Artillery Brigade and 1 company 17th Sapper Battalion.

<sup>2</sup> 1st Brigade 31st Infantry Division, 1 sotnia 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment, 1st and 7th Batteries 31st Artillery Brigade, and 1 company 6th Sapper Battalion.

Riabinkin, was formed, which, numbering 8 battalions, 1 sotnia, 24 guns, 1 company of Sappers, and 1 Balloon company,<sup>1</sup> was to arrive in Scha-ho-pu on the 5th, reaching, on the 6th, Hun-pau-schan, 7 kilometres south of Scha-ho-pu. The main body of the corps<sup>2</sup> was marching with one column each by the Mandarin Road, and by the road Tia-ho—San-ho-kuan-tun—Szö-kau-tun, and was to advance on the first day's march to about Sia-örr-tun, reaching on the second day's march the line of villages Scha-ho-pu—Lüan-fan-tun.

General Grekov's half Orenburg Cossack Division (12 sotnias and 6 guns<sup>3</sup>), attached to the Western Detachment, was directed to continue reconnoitring between the Hun-ho and Scha-ho, to keep touch with Dembovski's Detachment, and to concentrate on the second day's march at Wan-tschuan-tsy, 10 kilometres north-west of Schi-li-ho. Colonel Shabyko, commanding the Ural Cossack Brigade, was charged with continuing reconnoitring in front between the Scha-ho and the Mukden—Fön-kia-pu—Bian-yu-pu-sa road; the main body of the brigade was to concentrate at Hun-pau-schan on October 6.

The orders for the advance were carried out, with some few alterations. On the evening of

<sup>1</sup> 2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division, 2nd, 6th, and 8th Batteries 31st Artillery Brigade, 1 sotnia 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment, 1 company 6th Sapper Battalion, and East Siberian Balloon Company. The actual commander of the 2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division was General Wassiliev, who, however, had not yet recovered from his wounds.

<sup>2</sup> 9th Infantry Division, 9th Artillery Brigade, 4 sotnias 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment, and 1 company 6th Sapper Battalion.

<sup>3</sup> Horse Artillery.

Points  
reached  
on Octo-  
ber 6.

October 6 the Western Detachment occupied the following positions: The 17th Army Corps on the right had reached with its advanced guard Hun-lin-pu and Liu-kia-san-kia-tsy, and, with an advanced detachment, Liu-tan-kou; outposts were standing on the Schi-li-ho. The main body was standing in two groups, at Ta-lian-tun (3rd Infantry Division), and at Lin-schin-pu (35th Infantry Division).

Of the 10th Army Corps, General Riabinkin's advanced guard was at Hun-pau-schan, a small mixed detachment<sup>1</sup> under Colonel Solomko having been pushed forward to Sin-tschuan. The left advanced guard was standing at Ho-schen-kou, with outposts on the heights north of San-kia-tsy. The main body, under General Gerschelmann, had reached Scha-ho-pu.

Within the lines of the advanced guards, as well as within those of the main bodies, entrenching commenced as demanded by Bilderling's Orders.<sup>2</sup> Grekov's Cavalry was at Wan-tschuan as directed, écheloned in advance of the 17th Army Corps' right wing; the Ural Cossack Brigade, with the exception of two sotnias, remaining with the 10th Army Corps, had disappeared behind the front.

The captive balloon, "Field-Marshal Gurko," had also arrived at Scha-ho-pu, together with the Balloon Company, but it was never used; for on the very next day it tore loose in a strong wind, flying away without its crew.

<sup>1</sup> Two battalions 124th Infantry Regiment, 4 guns, 3 troops of Cossacks, and detachments of Scouts from 124th Infantry Regiment.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix XI.

General Dembovski had apparently received another order, directing him not to advance on the right bank of the Hun-ho, but on the left. The detachment crossed the stream at Ma-tou-lan on October 6, taking up a position at Ta-wan-kan-pu, and pushing an advanced guard to Sintai-tsy.

The result of the first two days of operations with the Western Detachment was extremely poor. On October 5 the troops had started in high spirits and with flourish of trumpets, in joyful expectation of a vigorous offensive; but, scarcely 10 miles distant from the "Mukden Position," a halt was made again on the 6th, to prepare once more some fresh "positions."

Meanwhile, reports about the enemy had come in, which, though they were of a general nature, seemed to General Baron Bilderling significant enough for making some new arrangements. One spy reported that nine hostile Divisions, at least 120,000 men, were concentrated about Yen-tai, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief being there too.

Fresh intelligence about the enemy is arriving.

This report should have certainly been received with a great deal of caution. It was not likely that the Japanese should have concentrated almost their whole Army within a limited space that could be enveloped by the Russians in the east and west. But there could be no surprise that strong forces should be reported in the neighbourhood of Yen-tai. According to Kuropatkin's General Order<sup>1</sup> four Divisions were supposed to be north

<sup>1</sup> Appendix IX

of Liao-yan. Since, moreover, two Divisions were assumed to be south of San-de-pu and two at the coal-pits, the Western Detachment was bound to expect meeting with strong forces of the enemy. For the success of the operations this could only be looked upon as favourable; for the more forces of the Japanese Army the Western Detachment was holding fast, the more successfully would turn out the advance of the Eastern Detachment, which was to bring about the decision. By immediately reinforcing Bilderling's weak forces from the reserves, Kuropatkin could have made him easily strong enough to attack, which would have been the best way of solving his task.

But, after the intelligence received, the situation was now looked upon by the Western Detachment as having completely changed. General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, being asked for his opinion, declared it impossible for the Western Detachment to continue its movement in the face of the far superior forces of the enemy. The effect of the Eastern Detachment's operations must be awaited absolutely. It would be therefore necessary to halt for the present, or even to retire again eventually, so as to be able to repel the attack of the Japanese in a "good position." General Baron Bilderling agreed with this opinion in all essentials, ordering the Western Detachment to remain in its present position on October 7, saying that the greatest caution was necessary, and that it was perhaps possible to work forward from "position to position." General Kuropatkin, who took quarters in San-lin-tsy on

October 6, evidently approved of these measures too, for no orders were received from him altering anything.

Though there was no sign of an impending attack by the Japanese, the Russian offensive was already paralysed, even at this early stage, by a preconceived notion.

Consequently the Western Detachment remained halting on October 7, the advanced guards only pushing some portions farther south, probably for the purpose of reconnoitring. This brought about a small action with Japanese outposts at Wu-li-tai-tsy, leading to a temporary occupation of that place by the Russians.

On the following day, October 8, the Western Detachment was to resume its advance. But taking into consideration the supposed state of affairs with the enemy, and no intelligence from the Eastern Detachment arriving, General Kuropatkin decided to stop the Western Detachment for the present. He ordered the entrenchments to be continued, and, in case of a hostile attack, to hold with the main bodies the positions occupied by the advanced guards. The main body of the 17th Army Corps thereupon moved forward to the line Tsun-lun-yen-tun—Tschien-liu-tan-kou—Liu-tan-kou—Pan-kiau-pu, improving further the positions begun by the advanced guards. The main body of the 10th Army Corps (9th Infantry Division, the 31st Infantry Division having been detailed as advanced guards) only marched to the line San-kia-tsy — Hou-huan-hua-tiën. The advanced guards of the 10th Army Corps worked

The Western Detachment remains halting on October 8.

at the position Hun-pau-schan—Nin-kuan-tun—Man-kia-fön. The earthworks on the Scha-ho, evacuated by the main bodies, were now named “rear-position,” and still further improved. To protect the working-parties in the main position, the 17th Army Corps pushed its advanced guard to the Schi-li-ho between Nan-kuan-tsy and the village of Schi-li-ho, where it had to entrench itself. The corps therefore, on the fourth day of the “offensive,” could make use of three defensive positions, one behind the other, not including the “Position of Mukden.” The 10th Corps secured its working-parties by the detachments it had pushed to Sin-tschuan and to the neighbourhood between Man-kia-fön and San-kia-tsy. With the object of strengthening General Mau’s advanced guard, which, as left wing of the Western Detachment, with its front refused, was to entrench the heights between Man-kia-fön and Yin-schou-tun, and helping his working-parties, General Kuropatkin sent him from the General Reserve four battalions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, whose advanced guard reached the neighbourhood of Hsin-lun-tun on October 8.

The heights occupied by the Western Detachment afforded an extensive view. Towards the west and south-west the plain stretched perfectly level for miles without the slightest rise. Towards the south, too, the country was very flat, height “99,” about 7 kilometres south-west of Liao-yan,<sup>1</sup> being distinctly visible. But view was intercepted here by the heights of Wu-li-tai-tsy, 4

<sup>1</sup> Vol. III., “Liao-yan,” Sketch 2.

kilometres south of Schi-li-ho, which were occupied by Japanese outposts. The Russian entrenchments consisted of shelter-trenches and numerous pivots ; gun-pits had been constructed about half a kilometre in rear of the main position.

For the advance of the Eastern Detachment the General Order had apportioned the space enclosed by the roads Fu-lin—Pu-lië-san-tsy—Bian-yu-pu-sa—Pen-si-hu, and Fu-schun — Ta-yu — Pa-kia-tsy—Tschau-huan-tschai—San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho. The line Yen-tau-tsy—Schi-hui-tschön was to be reached with the main bodies on October 5, and the line Tai-kia-miau-tsy—Hei-sun-pu—Pa-kia-tsy on the next day.

Advance  
of the  
Eastern  
Detach-  
ment  
until Oc-  
tober 6.

The 1st Siberian Army Corps was marching on the right with a column each by Ko-kuan-tsy and Yen-tau-tsy, and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps<sup>1</sup> on the left by La-ku-yu and Schi-hui-tschön. The 2nd Siberian Army Corps in the centre had already moved to the neighbourhood of Hei-sun-pu before the middle of September.<sup>2</sup> On the evening of October 6 the Eastern Detachment was stationed as follows : The 1st Siberian Army Corps had got to Hou-schi-tai and Tai-kia-miau-tsy, having pushed an advanced guard to Tsai-kia-tun. Lieutenant-Colonel Grekov, with six sotnias, was dispatched to Liu-tschen-ku-tun, 4 kilometres east of Fön-kia-pu, to reconnoitre towards the line Sia-liu-ho-tsy—Bian-yu-pu-sa, and to establish touch with Mish-tshenko's Brigade, standing at Lüan-fan-tun, from

<sup>1</sup> Right column : 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division ; left column : Corps Headquarters, 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, and 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

<sup>2</sup> P. 11.

October 6 to 8. The reinforced 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which was more or less the 2nd Siberian Army Corps,<sup>1</sup> was standing at Hei-sun-pu, its advanced guard being at Yin-pan, east of Kan-to-li-san. Of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps the main body had reached the Pan-mau-lin Pass and Pa-kia-tsy; advanced guards were at the Tsöu-tulin Pass and at Kau-tu-lin, on the road to Yin-pan; a detachment under Colonel Drushinin,<sup>2</sup> which was afterwards to act as flank-guard, had been pushed to Tschau-huan-tschai. The Siberian Cossack Division, under General Samsonov, was standing at Tun-kou in front of and half-way between the two columns of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps; it was ordered to reconnoitre beyond the line Huan-lin-tsy (9 kilometres south of Tun-kou)—Tschau-huan-tschai, and to report on all the roads and paths leading in a westerly direction towards the section of ground Bian-yu-pu-sa—Siën-schan-tsy (10 kilometres north of Pen-si-hu) from the line Ta-pei-kou (6 kilometres south-west of Tun-kou)—Kau-tai-tsy (7 kilometres north-east of Pen-si-hu). Samsonov was, moreover, to establish touch with Rennenkampf's Detachment standing on the Tai-tsy-ho within the space San-kia-tsy—Mi-tsy—Pei-lin-pu-tsy. The movements of the Eastern Detachment having constantly to be prepared first by detailed reconnaissance, owing to the very imperfect maps, General Baron Stackelberg employed on that duty General

<sup>1</sup> P. 11, footnote <sup>1</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> Two battalions, three detachments mounted Scouts, two guns, one sotnia, and half a Sapper company.

Staff officers in addition. They established during the first days of the march the fact of the Japanese having entrenched themselves on the steep hills south of Bian-yu-pu-sa ; an entrenched advanced position on the line Hu-schi-tai—Tun-kou was occupied by them as well.

Although this intelligence did not furnish any new information, the occupation of the heights at Bian-yu-pu-sa having been known already through the reconnoitring action of September 17,<sup>1</sup> it had a similar paralysing effect upon the operations here, as with the Western Detachment, for General Baron Stackelberg ordered October 7 to be a day of rest—it is true by order of superior authority, as it seems. After performing a march of scarcely 30 kilometres this solicitude for the welfare of the troops was, we may say, uncalled for. The day was wasted, and again to the advantage of the enemy. Only the 3rd Siberian Army Corps extended somewhat its feelers by portions of its advanced guards pushing to the line Tschin-hsi-sai—Schin-hai-lin Pass ; the left flank-guard remained at Tschau-huan-tschai. Samsonov's advanced bodies, too, pushed forward, driving away some Japanese patrols in the valley Schin-hai-lin—Li-kia-wo-pön.

Stackelberg orders a day of rest for October 7.

Yet, not even on the following day, but only on October 9 did General Baron Stackelberg intend to attack the Japanese at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

The 8th of October he wished to make use of for moving the main bodies up to the advanced guards, and reinforcing the Artillery in front.

<sup>1</sup> P. 24.

Another day was therefore to be spent in preparations. By this over-caution a favourable chance for gaining a success was missed. Had Stackelberg decided to attack the enemy at Bian-yu-pu-sa already on October 7, he might have gained a victory which, as a preliminary to the great offensive, must have had a most valuable effect. On the heights south of Bian-yu-pu-sa was standing completely isolated the reinforced Japanese Guard Kobi Brigade under General Umesawa.<sup>1</sup> All the Eastern Detachment needed to do was merely to continue marching by its former roads, the right of the 1st Siberian Army Corps by Liu-tschen-ku-tun—Yen-sin-tun, and the left of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps by the Kau-tu-lin Pass—Schun-schui-tsy. The Japanese could then, while the 2nd Siberian Army Corps was advancing in front, be attacked and enveloped on both wings and be beaten. Success was guaranteed alone by the overwhelming numbers of the Russians. But as Stackelberg did not make use of the favourable chance he had, or perhaps shirked the responsibility of entering upon decisive action without special orders, the Japanese were able to escape in time the danger of being enveloped. On the morning of October 8 the Russians found the heights abandoned. The Japanese brigade in its retreat having left behind in their former position small tents, accoutrements, also portions of a telegraph station, the Russians almost thought they had gained a victory. Kuropatkin, too, looked upon the event in that light, as he

<sup>1</sup> Six battalions, one squadron, and one battery. (Pp. 24, 25.)

afterwards congratulated the Commander of the Eastern Detachment on this first success.

The withdrawal of the Japanese having been ascertained, the leading portions of the Eastern Detachment pushed forward, being on the evening of October 8 in the following positions: The advanced guard of the 1st Siberian Army Corps had entrenched itself on the heights at Sun-wu-pu-tsy, outposts having been pushed some kilometres south-west in the general direction of Yin-tsiën-pu. A portion of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps' advanced guard was holding the position on the knolls south-east of Wei-sy-kou. It cannot be ascertained whether the main bodies of the 1st and 2nd Siberian Army Corps closed up as intended on the advanced guards, and up to what places they moved forward. With the 3rd Siberian Army Corps the Field Artillery, hitherto attached to the left column, was handed over to the right column (3rd East Siberian Rifle Division); that column only marched about 7 kilometres in a southerly direction to Hou-lou-tsy-gou, while the left column (6th East Siberian Rifle Division) reached with its main body Tschui-kiaputsy—Li-kiaputsy, thus approaching Pensi-hu to within about 13 kilometres. The centre of the Eastern Detachment (2nd Siberian Army Corps), and the right column of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps were therefore remarkably far behind, whilst the left had already come in touch with the enemy.

Portions  
of the  
Eastern  
Detach-  
ment  
move for-  
ward on  
October  
8.

Samsonov's Cavalry had advanced in the direction of Siën-schan-tsy, occupying that village after

having driven away weak hostile outposts from the neighbourhood of Kau-tai-tsy.

Rennenkampf's Detachment, after leaving a guard at San-kia-tsy, reached with its foremost portions the line Kau-tai-tsy—Wei-niu-nin; two companies occupied a pass east of Sei-ko on the road to Pen-si-hu.

The  
General  
Reserve  
and 6th  
Siberian  
Army  
Corps  
follow.

The General Reserve had marched forward in compliance with orders.<sup>1</sup> On October 6 the 1st Army Corps moved into the space Schan-hsün-kou-tsy—Pai-tschi-tschai—San-lin-tsy, and the 4th Siberian Army Corps into the space Liu-kuan-tun—Yin-tschen-tsy. An advanced guard of the 1st Army Corps was standing at Huan-schan. The Transbaikal Cossack Brigade of General Mishtshenko which had hitherto been active in front concentrated at Lüan-fan-tun on the Scha-ho. On October 7 the 4th Siberian Army Corps got on to the road San-lin-tsy—Örr-tau-kou,<sup>2</sup> while the 1st Army Corps remained on the whole stationary, pushing only its advanced guard from Huan-schan to Sa-ho-tun. On October 8 the 4th Siberian Army Corps, which had received orders from Kuropatkin to close the gap between the Eastern and Western Detachments, reached Hsin-lun-tun with its advanced guard; the 1st Army Corps reached Pai-tschi-tschai and Lo-siën-tun.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. 30.

<sup>2</sup> The 4th Siberian Army Corps bivouacked at Örr-tau-kou on October 7, with its advanced guard in the neighbourhood of Fön-kia-pu.

<sup>3</sup> Army Corps Headquarters and 22nd Infantry Division: Pai-tschi-tschai; 37th Infantry Division: Lo-siën-tun.

The 6th Siberian Army Corps, having meanwhile completed detraining at Mukden, had likewise marched forward on the 7th, reaching the space Ta-tai — Lan-schan-pu — Ta-su-kiap-pu; it was therefore standing écheloned to the right behind the right wing of the Western Detachment. The corps having been obliged to leave behind the 1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division as well as two batteries which were to be employed in the positions at Tië-lin and Mukden, it entered operations weakened by a quarter of its strength. It was also very annoying for the corps to be without either Cavalry or detachments of mounted Scouts,<sup>1</sup> being thus unable to reconnoitre or establish touch with the neighbouring troops by means of its own. On October 8 the corps remained in the space assigned to it.

The weather was dry and bright, but at night and in the morning already sensibly cool; at times strong winds were blowing, raising up a great amount of disagreeable dust. The mounted arms mostly marched in great-coats; those dismounted partly in tunics, partly in shirt-blouses; some men also in blue padded Chinese jackets.

<sup>1</sup> According to a Russian source. Afterwards six sotnias of different units are said to have joined the corps—namely, three from the 2nd Werchneudinsk Cossack Regiment, two from the 5th Ural Cossack Regiment, and one from the 10th Orenburg Cossack Regiment.

### III

#### THE MEASURES OF THE JAPANESE AT THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER

Various signs point to a Russian offensive.

Sketch 2.

ON the Japanese side the impression gained daily more ground, during the first days of October, that the Russians were planning some extensive operations. Especially Headquarters of the 1st Army were convinced of the enemy entering upon a general attack and directing the main blow against the Japanese right wing. Oyama's Headquarters did not share this view at first; the events, however, of the next few days showed that General Baron Kuroki was right. On October 6, strong Russian forces, entrenching on the heights north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa,<sup>1</sup> appeared opposite General Umesawa's Brigade. Several strong cavalry detachments, moreover, advanced towards the weak outpost-line between Bian-yu-pu-sa and the San-kai-seki-san, trying to pierce it. The Japanese Cavalry available here being inferior to the Russian Cavalry, there was the danger of the Guard Kobi Brigade being completely cut off.

Opposite the 4th and 2nd Armies the symptoms of an impending Russian offensive were,

<sup>1</sup> Probably from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps. (P. 44.)

## THE MEASURES OF THE JAPANESE 51

increasing too. Small Russian detachments appeared here and there; frequent skirmishes with Japanese outposts took place. As the strength of the Russian detachments advancing was constantly growing, the 2nd Army drew back somewhat the detachments it had sent forward on October 5.

On the afternoon of October 6 intelligence arrived at Headquarters of the 1st Army removing every doubt about the enemy's intentions. It was reported, probably by spies, that the Russian Army had begun crossing the Hun-ho on October 3. On the 5th, there had remained only weak forces on the northern bank; the main forces were marching in a south-easterly direction.

The forces standing opposite General Umesawa's Brigade were therefore to be viewed as the advanced guards of the Russian Offensive Army; the brigade seemed very much in danger. So as not to sacrifice it, it had either to be withdrawn in line with the Army, or the Army itself must be pushed to the heights south of the Scha-ho. General Baron Kuroki, not wishing to be responsible for the isolated advance of his Army without an order from General Headquarters, resolved to withdraw the brigade. But also his Army seemed seriously threatened, should it continue further in its present position in an expectant attitude. General Baron Kuroki therefore reported to Oyama's Headquarters that the Russians were, without any shred of doubt, advancing to attack the Japanese right wing, and that he was

Kuroki places the 1st Army in a position of readiness behind the line Pen-si-hu—coal pits.

therefore going to place the 1st Army in a position of readiness behind the line Pen-si-hu—coal-pits. With this object he issued at 2 a.m. on October 7 in Fön-schan, the following

*Army Order*

“ 1. The enemy is advancing south from the Hun-ho valley east of Mukden. The heads of his columns must have reached the line Schun-schui-tsy<sup>1</sup>—Kan-to-li-san<sup>2</sup>—Tsu-ti-tschuan-tsy<sup>3</sup> on October 6.

“ 2. The Army will occupy the line: neighbourhood of Liu-schu-kia—heights south of Yin-tsiën-pu—coal-pits.

“ 3. The Guard Kobi Brigade will go back to Liu-schu-kia as quickly as possible, occupying a position on the heights there.

“ 4. The 12th Division will start to-day and occupy the heights south of Yin-tsiën-pu.

“ 5. The Guards will concentrate at Tschan-hei-tun. Entrenchments are to be constructed on the heights north of that place.

“ A detachment of the Guards will remain on the height north of the coal-pits.

“ 6. The 2nd Division will remain in its present position.

“ 7. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade will reconnoitre towards Schuan-tai-tsy.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 10½ kilometres east-north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>2</sup> 6 kilometres north of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>3</sup> 10½ kilometres north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>4</sup> 5 kilometres east of Schi-li-ho.

“ 8. The General Reserve will arrive at Ta-yau-pu<sup>1</sup> on the 8th.

“ 9. I shall be in Fön-schan.”

After this Order had been issued to the troops, the directives of the Commander-in-Chief arrived.

Marshal Marquis Oyama had also arrived at the conclusion that the Russians were going to assume the offensive. The latest intelligence arriving at his Headquarters had confirmed the advance of strong hostile forces ; large masses of troops were said to be standing at Schun-schuitsy (10½ kilometres east-north-east of Bian-yu-pusa), at the San-kai-seki-san (9 kilometres north of the coal-pits), and at Wu-li-tai-tsy (3½ kilometres south of Schi-li-ho). This intelligence, supplemented by the reports of the 1st Army, brought Oyama round to the same view Kuroki had already expressed—namely, that the Russians intended to direct their main blow upon the right wing of the Japanese. A lucky chance, moreover, so willed it that at the Ta-lin Pass a detailed order of Kuropatkin to Stackelberg was found on the dead body of a Russian General Staff officer, according to which Stackelberg was to turn the right flank of the Japanese and push on to Liao-yan. The moment Marshal Oyama had clearly discerned the enemy's intentions he matured the resolve not to be forced into the defensive by the attack of the Russians, but to assume the offensive himself. He did not, however, intend to attack at once, but to let the Russians first run up against his prepared positions, so as to break the

Oyama  
agrees  
with  
Kuroki's  
views.

<sup>1</sup> 5 kilometres south of the coal-pits.

force of their offensive. For the moment it appeared therefore advisable only to get the Armies into a position of readiness. The 4th and 2nd Armies received orders to concentrate their troops within the sections assigned to them; the 4th Army was at the same time to extend towards the right to the coal-pits, and replace the outposts of the Guard Division which was moving east; every one was to be prepared to assume the counter offensive. The intentions of the 1st Army's Headquarters were approved.

The 1st Army, on October 7, carried out the movements ordered by its commander: the 12th Division was standing south of Yin-tsiën-pu; of the Guards, the 1st Brigade had marched by Hui-yau to Tan-kia-pu-tsy, and the 2nd to Tschan-hei-tun; there they commenced at once to entrench in the evening. Great difficulties were met in preparing the position, owing to the steepness of the slopes and the hardness of the rocky soil. The 2nd Division had remained in its former position, where it likewise began to entrench.

Rennen-  
kampf's  
advance  
is being  
felt on  
the ex-  
treme  
right  
wing.

Meanwhile, on the extreme right the advance of Rennenkampf's Detachment had made itself felt. On the evening of the 7th the 1st Army received a report from the commander of a Line of Communication battalion stationed at Pen-si-hu, that about 2,000 hostile Cavalry with five or six guns, advancing in the Tai-tsy-ho valley, had reached San-kia-tsy on October 6. This intelligence, as well as the Army Order, was communicated to General Umesawa by the telegraph connection leading by Pen-si-hu to Bian-yu-pu-sa. In the

face of the Russian forces advancing in the Tai-tsy-ho valley General Umesawa considered it imperative to get away from the enemy opposite him by a hurried night march. Thanks to Stackelberg's inactivity the brigade succeeded in escaping unmolested;<sup>1</sup> it arrived at Liu-schu-kia on the morning of October 8. During that march its commander received the report of the Russian forces advancing on Pen-si-hu having been strengthened by Infantry, about three battalions; and of the enemy having already pushed back the weak Japanese outposts, and crossed the Tai-tsy-ho with a portion of his force, probably with the object of advancing on Pen-si-hu from the south as well. Large supplies of all kinds<sup>2</sup> being stored in Pen-si-hu and Si-ho-yan, it was undesirable to let these places fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly Pen-si-hu. General Umesawa therefore decided to send to Pen-si-hu one battalion 4th Kobi Regiment and two guns in support of the Line of Communication Defence Troops.

The commander of the Line of Communication battalion in that place, consisting of three companies 39th Kobi Regiment, had already withdrawn his outposts to the fortified Mei-san and La-ut-ha-la-sa on October 8; they were composed of one company and a half, and had probably been standing along the stream between Wei-niu-nin and Jo-gu. The retirement was made under

<sup>1</sup> P. 46.

<sup>2</sup> In Si-ho-yan (15 kilometres south of Pen-si-hu) there were, moreover, large stores of ammunition for the Murata Rifle, with which the Kobi troops were armed. One company of Line of Communication Defence Troops formed the garrison of Si-ho-yan.

Russian Artillery fire, and hence not without some loss. But *Rennenkampf's* vanguards, following up the outposts, confined themselves to occupying the outpost position that had been abandoned.

After the arrival of the Guard Kobi Brigade at *Liu-schu-kia* the forces on the extreme right were distributed as follows: The battalion of the 4th Kobi Regiment detailed in support of the Line of Communication Defence Troops marched to the heights east of *Pen-si-hu*. Colonel *Hirata*, commanding the 39th Kobi Regiment, with the seven companies now at his disposal, formed three groups, directing the right group to occupy the heights east of *Riu-wo-bio*; the centre group, with which were also the eight guns, to occupy the *Mei-san* and the *La-ut-ha-la-sa Hill*; and the left group the *Seki-san* and the heights adjoining west of it. The position to be defended extending almost 10 kilometres, the defensive line was exceedingly weak. The military bridge constructed at *Riu-wo-bio* was guarded by a section of Pioneers; *Pen-si-hu* village was not occupied at all.

The 1st Guard Kobi Regiment and one battalion 4th Kobi Regiment were stationed astride of the *Ta-lin Pass*, two companies of the 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment being sent to the *Tu-men-tsylin Pass*; the rest remained in reserve at *Liu-schu-kia*.

The Japanese 4th Army is being concentrated forward.

The portions of the 4th Army still south of *Liao-yan*—the 10th Division, 3rd, 10th, and 11th Kobi Brigades, and 1st Field Artillery Brigade—were, by *Oyama's* directions, moved forward to the northern bank of the *Tai-tsy-ho*. The 10th Division took

up a position on the branch line to the coal-pits, the 20th Brigade occupying the eastern half of the position prepared there from the coal-pits to Sia-tai-tsy, and the 8th Brigade the western portion. At the Mandarin Road the 5th Division continued the front, moving up to La-mi-pu. To the Kobi Brigades, as well as to the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, places were assigned behind the 10th and 5th Divisions.<sup>1</sup> Army Headquarters went from Liao-yan to Fa-schi-ko-schan.

The detachment which the commander of the 10th Division had pushed to La-mi-pu<sup>2</sup> had meanwhile got in close touch with the enemy.<sup>3</sup> When intelligence came in of strong Russian columns having crossed the Hun-ho between Fu-schun and Kiu-san, General Otani<sup>4</sup> caused the 40th Infantry Regiment, with Artillery and Engineers, to go forward and reconnoitre in a northerly direction early on October 6. The detachment reached Wu-li-tai-tsy without encountering the enemy; it left there, as well as on the height east of it, some small force for further observation, going then back to Yen-tai. On the following day these posts of observation ascertained a hostile Infantry brigade, with one regiment of Cavalry,<sup>5</sup> to be standing in an entrenched position at Pan-kiau-pu, and about five battalions in a similar

A small action is fought at Wu-li-tai-tsy on October 7.

<sup>1</sup> The places are not known.

<sup>2</sup> P. 23. At first the 5th Division pushed an outpost to La-mi-pu, being relieved afterwards by Otani's Detachment from the 10th Division. Otani seems to have remained at La-mi-pu even after the 5th Division had moved up to that place.

<sup>3</sup> P. 41.

<sup>4</sup> Commanding 8th Brigade.

<sup>5</sup> From the Russian 17th Army Corps.

one at Hun-pau-schan.<sup>1</sup> About 11.40 a.m. a Russian battalion and several guns advanced from Liu-tan-kou south along the railway, halting west of Schi-li-ho. The village itself was being occupied by some other Infantry and Cavalry. In the afternoon a battalion came out of Schi-li-ho, deploying at Siau-wen-kou against Wu-li-tai-tsy, and pushing back the Japanese post of observation. Eight guns at Schi-li-ho opened fire on the post on the neighbouring hill, forcing it to give way south. On hearing the sound of guns Colonel Kamada advanced with the 40th Infantry Regiment from Yen-tai, deploying the 1st Battalion on the road, the 2nd Battalion to the left of it, and ordering the mountain-guns to come into action. Towards 4.30 p.m. the Japanese guns opened fire, the Infantry attacking the Russians and pushing them again from Wu-li-tai-tsy, as well as from the height on which they had meanwhile established themselves. Colonel Kamada then left the 3rd Battalion in the captured position, returning with the rest to Yen-tai towards evening. On October 8 two additional mountain batteries were attached to the regiment to make it more fit for an eventually renewed reconnaissance. But Colonel Kamada, fearing that, when reconnoitring with the whole of his detachment, an action might easily ensue, the limits of which he could no longer control, pushed only the 2nd Battalion to Schan-yau-pu, so as to be able to support the 3rd Battalion in case of need, but keeping for the rest his forces concentrated at Yen-tai.

<sup>1</sup> From the Russian 10th Army Corps.

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Oyama's orders apparently did not cause any change in the disposition of the 2nd Army. Army Headquarters went from Liao-yan to Ta-tsy-fan, on the northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, on October 8. The 1st Cavalry Brigade had pushed to the neighbourhood of Hei-kou-tai, on the Hun-ho; during the last days it had already had some slight skirmishes with Russian advanced bodies, probably from Dembovski's Detachment.

The Japanese 2nd Army remains halting.



## IV

### THE FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE

OCTOBER 9

**RUSSIANS** GENERAL KUROPATKIN was well aware of the difficulties the Eastern Detachment had to contend with in its operations, and that no rapid success could be expected from it. He therefore sent the order to Stackelberg on October 8, before the intelligence of the Japanese having evacuated the position of Bian-yu-pu-sa had come in, "to confine himself on the 9th to an attack merely upon the advanced position." To give more emphasis to this short directive, he soon afterwards supplemented it by another letter,<sup>1</sup> enjoining him once more not to attack the enemy's main position until the 10th, especially on account of the 4th Siberian Army Corps and of Rennenkampf's

The Western Detachment and Centre advance on both banks of the Schili-ho against the Japanese front.

Sketch 3.

<sup>1</sup> "Even if the enemy, threatened by General Ivanov with envelopment, evacuates the advanced position on October 8 or during the night 8-9 without fighting, I do not consider ourselves sufficiently prepared to venture already upon the attack on the enemy's main position on the 9th, having special regard to General v. Rennenkampf and to the 4th Siberian Army Corps. I fix upon the 10th for that attack. Should great difficulties arise through the topography of the country, or owing to superior numbers of the enemy, the attack must be continued for several days consecutively."

Detachment. The Commander-in-Chief probably wanted to bring up the 4th Siberian Army Corps farther south first, to have it ready in support; of the arrival of Rennenkampf's Detachment on the extreme left he apparently had not yet received any news.

Kuropatkin therefore expected the decisive attacks of the Eastern Detachment to begin on October 10. To prevent the Japanese from supporting the portions opposite the Eastern Detachment, he considered it necessary to push the Western Detachment somewhat south. General Baron Bilderling was therefore ordered to move the main bodies of the 10th and 17th Army Corps up to the line of the advanced guards (which, moreover, had been done in part already on October 8<sup>1</sup>), and to push these likewise a little more forward, but not so far as to involve them in serious action—about as far as the line Nan-wu-li-tai (near the railway bridge over the Schi-li-ho)—Fan-kia-tun. The General Reserve, too, received orders to march forward. The 1st Army Corps was to push its advanced guard to Tun-san-ho, and the 6th Siberian Army Corps was to occupy the villages of Schau-kia-lin-tsy, Lan-schan-pu, and Pen-tiën-tsy.

The Commander of the Western Detachment having transmitted Kuropatkin's order to the Generals commanding, another order of the Commander-in-Chief arrived, placing the left advanced guard of the 10th Army Corps (Mau) and the Transbaikal Cossack Brigade (Mishtshenko) under

<sup>1</sup> P. 41.

the orders of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. General Sarubaiev, commanding that army corps, was directed to advance and take up a position to the left, and in advance of the Western Detachment.

The advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps had already been pushed to the Schi-li-ho on October 8<sup>1</sup>; it therefore continued its march on the 9th by the Mandarin Road, driving weak Japanese outposts from Örr-tai-tsy, Schuan-tai-tsy, and Ke-de-gou, and occupying these villages as well as Wu-li-tai-tsy, from which the Japanese withdrew without fighting. Colonel Stakovich<sup>2</sup> was sent with a small force (one battalion, six squadrons, and two guns) by the right bank of the Scha-ho to the village of Ta-tu-san-pu, from which the enemy's outposts likewise withdrew. General Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade also arrived at Ta-tu-san-pu. The main bodies of the 17th Army Corps, on the evening of October 9, were standing as follows: The 35th Infantry Division with a brigade each at Liu-tan-kou and Liu-kia-san-kia-tsy (one battalion had been pushed out to the southern portion of Hun-lin-pu); the 1st Brigade 3rd Infantry Division, with an Abteilung 3rd Artillery Brigade, and half a Sapper company, had billeted in Lan-tsy-tai, on the Schi-li-ho, west of the railway. Portions of the 35th Infantry Division were entrenching along the right tributary of the Schi-li-ho between Tschien-liu-tan-kou and Pan-kiau-pu.

While the left advanced guard of the 10th Army Corps was joining the 4th Siberian Army

<sup>1</sup> P. 42.

<sup>2</sup> Commanding 52nd Dragoons.

Corps, General Riabinkin, in carrying out the General Order, was marching with the right advanced guard at noon from Hun-pau-schan to Fan-kia-tun, sending thence the 124th Infantry Regiment with two batteries, under Colonel Solomko, still farther south-west. The Colonel determined to capture Ku-schu-tsy village, which he knew to be occupied by the Japanese.<sup>1</sup> He ordered his batteries to come into action, proceeding to attack with the Infantry after the Artillery had played for some time upon the enemy. The Japanese were pushed from the village, and evacuated also the height west of it. The Russians occupied first Ku-schu-tsy, and, when it became dark, also the height abandoned by the enemy, as well as the village of Siau-kan-kia-tsy, the outposts being pushed to Tschou-kuan-tun. From the main body of the 10th Army Corps the main portions of the 9th Infantry Division were meanwhile moving up from the line San-kia-tsy—Hou-huan-hua-tiën to the line Hun-pau-schan—Nin-kuan-tun, occupying the positions left by the advanced guard.<sup>2</sup> Corps Headquarters went to Hou-huan-hua-tiën.

The 4th Siberian Army Corps, with Mau's Detachment under its orders, was standing in the evening to the left and in advance of the Western Detachment; its advanced guard (5th and 8th Siberian Infantry Regiments, from the 2nd Siberian

<sup>1</sup> This occupation of Ku-schu-tsy is not mentioned in Japanese records.

<sup>2</sup> A portion of the 9th Infantry Division seems to have arrived within the line Hun-pau-schan—Nin-kuan-tun only on the forenoon of October 10.

Infantry Division) had marched first from Hsin-lun-tun to Sia-liu-ho-tsy, and was then pushed forward to the western San-jo-shi-san to entrench it; the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division,<sup>1</sup> with the Artillery, had moved from Örr-tau-kou to Sia-hei-niu-tun. Portions of the corps, during their march, had met with some weak outposts of the Japanese, which they pushed back jointly with a right flank-guard of the 1st Siberian Army Corps. Mau's Detachment was standing on the heights east of Tan-hai-schi. General Mishtshenko was originally to advance on Bian-yu-pu-sa; but, when it became known that the Japanese had evacuated that village, the General was, by wire, summoned to General Headquarters, when he was ordered to march with the Transbaikal Cossacks on Ta-pu on the Schi-li-ho.

Of the 1st Army Corps, the advanced guard reached Tun-san-ho behind the left wing of the Western Detachment, and the main body Lüan-fan-tun—Sa-ho-tun. Corps Headquarters went to San-kia-tsy. One battalion from the 37th Infantry Division was sent to Örr-tau-kou as escort to General Headquarters, marching with it on the next day to Tun-san-ho.

The 6th Siberian Army Corps had advanced by two roads; the 1st Brigade 72nd Division as advanced guard reached Schau-kia-lin-tsy by the evening; the 2nd Brigade Lan-schan-pu; and the 2nd Brigade 55th Infantry Division Pen-tiën-tsy,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Less 11th Infantry Regiment, being with Mau's Detachment.

<sup>2</sup> The 1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division was left behind at Tië-lin and Mukden. (P. 49.)

where Corps Headquarters were too. The Artillery was apportioned to the brigades. Immediately after arrival in those villages entrenching commenced. The corps remained in this position on the next day. Dembovski's Detachment retained its former position at Ta-wan-kan-pu — Sin-tai-tsy.

General Baron Stackelberg had decided to attack the Japanese at daybreak on October 9; he knew them to be on the heights between Pen-si-hu and Liu-schu-kia. Before the movements had begun, Kuropatkin's two letters<sup>1</sup> came to Headquarters early in the morning, the one shortly after the other, urging delay of the attack. But Stackelberg having already issued the orders for the attack, he decided to carry it out. He had probably arrived at the conclusion that further delay could only be injurious; and since it was, after all, not improbable that the attack on the 9th would not at all strike the main position, but only the enemy's advanced positions, he believed himself to be acting in the spirit of the Commander-in-Chief's intentions, if he did not stop the movements he had ordered.

The General had given the troops the task of getting first possession of the passes in the country south of Bian-yu-pu-sa. With this object the advanced guards, with the left wing bent forward, were to push to the line Tschien-kou-lin Pass—Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass—Ta-lin Pass—Wei-niu-nin. Pa-kia-tsy was to be occupied on the extreme right, and the ford over the Tai-tsy-ho at Ja-un-ssun on

The Eastern Detachment advances against the passes south of Bian-yu-pu-sa, attacking the Japanese east of Pen-si-hu.

the left. General Samsonov was sent to reconnoitre with his Siberian Cossacks on Pen-si-hu, while General von Rennenkamps Detachment, which, for the time being, was placed under the orders of the Eastern Detachment, was at the same time charged with watching to the left of Samsonov, in a southerly and south-easterly direction, and with keeping occupied San-kia-tsy, on the Tai-tsy-ho.

The 1st Siberian Corps on the right continued its march forward on October 9 in two columns, detailing a flank-guard to protect its right. The right column, under General Krause (3 Infantry Regiments,<sup>1</sup> 24 guns, 1 machine-gun company, and 1 Sapper company from the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division), was to march on Yin-tsiën-pu, north of the Tschien-kou-lin Pass; but, missing its way—the country on the maps available showing merely a blank—got south of Bian-yu-pu-sa behind the left column of its army corps, on the road to Schan-pin-tai-tsy. General Gerngross, commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps, stopped General Krause's column at Schan-pin-tai-tsy, so as to send it by the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass to Yin-tsiën-pu.<sup>2</sup> The left column (9th East Siberian Rifle Division), under General Kondratovich, marched by Bian-yu-pu-sa to Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy, where it closed up. The column had pushed forward two protective bodies, namely, a right advanced guard (33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment and 8 guns), under Colonel Lissovski, on Kau-kia-pu,

<sup>1</sup> 1st, 2nd, and 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments.

<sup>2</sup> This movement was apparently executed only on October 10.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 67

north of the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass, and a left one (34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and 8 guns), under Lieutenant-Colonel Musselov, on Siën-schan-tsy. Colonel Lissovski's advanced guard came, some time during its march, under the fire of a Japanese battery standing south-east of Kau-kia-pu, which in turn was fired at by the Artillery of the left advanced guard. Lieutenant-Colonel Musselov reached the object of his march unmolested. South-west of Siën-schan-tsy the left advanced guard relieved portions of Samsonov's Siberian Cossack Division, and established touch with the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, from the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.

The right flank-guard of the 1st Siberian Army Corps (4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, with a battery) marched by Fön-kia-pu to Sia-liu-ho-tsy. On the way the column came in touch with portions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps,<sup>1</sup> when they jointly pushed back Japanese outposts. At Sia-liu-ho-tsy the flank-guard met some outposts of the enemy as well, but these soon withdrew. In the evening the regiment reached Pa-kia-tsy.

On the left of the Eastern Detachment the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, marched only from Tschui-kia-pu-tsy to Jo-gu, reaching that place with the main body towards evening. The left flank-guard, under Colonel Drushinin,<sup>2</sup> was pushed across the Tai-tsy-ho; it constructed across the river two bridges, one of which was passable for all arms, and

<sup>1</sup> P. 64.

<sup>2</sup> P. 44.

occupied the heights south of Ja-un-ssun. The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, General Baron Stackelberg apportioned as his reserve; it seems to have marched on the 9th only to Ta-pei-kou, and to have stopped there.

The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, followed the left column of the 1st Siberian Army Corps likewise as reserve, closing up at Sia-pin-tai-tsy and Bian-yu-pu-sa in the evening.

General Samsonov's Siberian Cossack Division, which had advanced from Siën-tshan-tsy against the line Liu-schu-kia—Pen-si-hu, came upon the enemy in the neighbourhood of Kau-kia-pu at the Ko-san-shi-sen-san. The Japanese, who had entrenched themselves on the heights north-east of Liu-schu-kia, offered a determined resistance to the Cossacks, who at once attacked. They did not succeed in driving back the Japanese, even after General Ivanov, commanding the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, had sent forward the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment in support of them. The Russians were at last obliged to desist from the attack and to look, in turn, for cover in the country. They entrenched themselves on the height south-west of Siën-schan-tsy; at night, as has been stated, they were relieved by the left advanced guard of the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

Rennenkampf's Detachment came in close touch with the enemy as well on October 9. This detachment, transgressing the observant attitude prescribed to it by Stackelberg,<sup>1</sup> had advanced in

<sup>1</sup> P. 66.

two columns on the left of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. The right column, under General Peterov, was directed to go to Pen-si-hu, on the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho; while General Liubavin, with his Cavalry Brigade and one battery,<sup>1</sup> was to advance south of the river. Peterov's column had scarcely got on the way when it encountered the position occupied by Colonel Hirata.<sup>2</sup> The Japanese, cleverly adapting themselves in very extended formation to the accidents of the ground, opened at once on the Russians a brisk fire from the steep heights, prominent of which is especially the La-ut-ha-la-sa by its rugged forms. General Peterov determined to capture the heights. But the position of the Japanese proved so strong, that the Russian attack, in spite of repeated rushes, did not succeed. General Ivanov, who had already supported General Samsonov's Detachment, helped in this action too, by sending two battalions with six guns of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division from Kau-tai-tsy against the left wing of the Japanese. The action dragged along almost the whole day without the Russians succeeding in driving the Japanese from the precipitous La-ut-ha-la-sa. After a hot contest the more weakly occupied Mei-san was at last captured by the Russians; portions of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, moreover, succeeded in establishing themselves on the Ha-shi-ra-yama, which had been defended by two companies of

<sup>1</sup> 2nd Brigade Transbaikal Cossack Division, with a horse mountain battery of the Frontier Guard.

<sup>2</sup> P. 56.

the 1st Guard Kobi Regiment.<sup>1</sup> But the Russians were unable to gain any further advantages.

General Liubavin, on the south bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, had pushed back small Japanese outposts; it was only possible to defend the road to Pen-si-hu by the few skirmishers distributed on the heights east of Riu-wo-bio. But Liubavin, probably fearing to meet at Pen-si-hu with stronger forces of the enemy, outmatching his Cavalry, and his request to Rennenkampf to give him some Infantry and some few more guns being declined, decided to remain on the left bank. Two kilometres from the bridge leading to Pen-si-hu, he selected a position, in which his troops entrenched themselves towards evening. From the trenches it was noticed in the evening that two buildings in Pen-si-hu were in flames; spies reported that the Japanese had set fire to the magazines. The battery had previously been sent to the main body, after having spent all its ammunition in shelling the Japanese pontoon-bridge at Riu-wo-bio.

Though the Eastern Detachment's attack on October 9 was lacking in sufficient energy, it revealed to the Japanese once more the dangerous situation of their right wing. It is true the strength of the Russians who had appeared east of Pen-si-hu were estimated at one Division only, but it was to be anticipated that the enemy would con-

<sup>1</sup> Russian reports do not mention the occupation of the Ha-shi-ryama; probably because the height was lost again next morning. Some reports maintain that the La-ut-ha-la-sa, and not the Mei-san, was captured by the Russians, but that its occupation by the Russians had been temporary only.

tinue his attack next day with far superior forces. In front, too, the enemy had everywhere been pushing on; at various points strong forces had shown themselves, driving back the Japanese outposts. There could be no longer any doubt of a general attack by the Russians being imminent.

While these facts caused in Oyama fresh ideas and resolutions to mature, he left the measures necessary for reinforcing the right wing in the hands of the 1st Army.

General Baron Kuroki resolved to strengthen the threatened wing with the 12th Division, which, however, was to leave a portion of its troops in their former position south of Yin-tsiën-pu.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, General Umesawa's Detachment was placed under the orders of that Division. General Baron Ino-uye, commanding the 12th Division, left the 23rd Brigade, with Artillery and Cavalry attached, under General Kigoshi, south of Yin-tsiën-pu, he himself starting in a south-easterly direction with the 12th Brigade and the bulk of the Artillery on the afternoon of October 9. While the 47th Infantry was at once branched off to the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass, General Shimamura continued marching on to Pen-si-hu, with the 14th Infantry Regiment and one battery. It was night, and the fight for the La-ut-ha-la-sa had died away long ago, when this detachment, exhausted by the arduous march, arrived to bring relief to Hirata's defensive force,<sup>2</sup> already greatly reduced

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The 1st Army reinforces the right wing with the main body of the 12th Division against the Russian attacks; the 4th and 2nd Armies remain in their positions.

<sup>1</sup> P. 54.

<sup>2</sup> P. 56. This force is said to have lost two-thirds of its fighting strength.

in numbers. The troops having rested a few hours, General Shimamura, about 2 a.m., apportioned one battalion to the defensive group at Riu-wo-bio, another battalion and the battery to the group at the La-ut-ha-la-sa; the third battalion probably remained as reserve at Sei-ko.<sup>1</sup>

When, during the day, the passage of Russian forces to the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho had been established, General Prince Kan-in was ordered to march with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade from the left wing of the 1st Army to Si-ho-yan,<sup>2</sup> and cover that post on the line of communications. One regiment started thither in the evening; the other regiment, being still charged with reconnoitring, was to follow next day. With the object of strengthening the garrison of Si-ho-yan by Infantry as well, the Inspector of Communications apportioned for that purpose 300 men—Lines of Communication Troops—that had just arrived.

The Guard and 2nd Divisions were busy preparing their positions. The Guard Cavalry Regiment, which had been sent to reconnoitre towards the Ba-ji-san on October 8, was obliged to withdraw again, before superior hostile forces, on the 9th. The enemy, strong Infantry and Cavalry, seemed to follow by Pa-kia-tsy—Man-hua-pu, some patrols pushing to the Wai-to-san. Hostile Cavalry appeared on the Ohara-yama opposite the 2nd Division; the Western San-jo-shi-san was being occupied by Russian Infantry.

<sup>1</sup> Some batteries of the 12th Division were probably distributed along the whole line.

<sup>2</sup> 15 kilometres south of Pen-si-hu. (Sketch 1.)

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 73

With the 4th Army, the 3rd Battalion 40th Infantry Regiment, which Otani had pushed to Wu-li-tai-tsy, retired south on the approach of strong Russian forces; the 2nd Battalion of the same regiment, which had been pushed to Schan-yau-pu, rejoined the detachment in Yen-tai<sup>1</sup> as well.

Nothing of importance occurred with the 2nd Army on the 9th; the outposts standing in Schuan-tai-tsy, Örr-tai-tsy, and Ta-tu-san-pu fell back before the vanguards of the Russian 17th Army Corps and Stakovich's Detachment.<sup>2</sup>

### OCTOBER 10

The events of October 9 on the Japanese right wing had confirmed the surmises about the direction of the Russian main attack. From the reports, which frequently varied in their statements, and were often contradictory too, it was difficult for Oyama's Headquarters to gain a true insight into the distribution of the enemy's forces. Opposite the right of the 1st Army the enemy was reported to be in strength as follows: On the left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho about a brigade; east of Pen-si-hu at least a division; north of the Ta-lin and Tu-men-tsy-lin Passes another brigade; and between the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass and San-kia-tsy about two divisions. Opposite the Guard and 2nd Divisions, Russian vanguards had on the 9th advanced to the line Wai-to-san—Ohara-yama (height "238")—Western San-jo-shi-san. By the

JAPANESE  
Intelli-  
gence  
about the  
enemy.

Sketch 4.

<sup>1</sup> P. 58.

<sup>2</sup> P. 62.

reconnaissances of General Otani's Detachment, and by the action of Wu-li-tai-tsy,<sup>1</sup> the 4th Army had ascertained strong forces on the Mandarin Road in the neighbourhood of Schi-li-ho. Opposed to this was the intelligence received by the 2nd Army, that the Russians had been reinforced on the Mandarin Road, but had not advanced beyond Pan-kiau-pu. Hostile bodies were said to have advanced in unknown strength west of the Mandarin Road on both banks of the Scha-ho to the line Liu-tan-kou—Li-kia-tun, the main bodies standing at Ta-tai and Li-kia-tun. The outposts of the 2nd Army had retired already, on October 5, before the Russian vanguards.<sup>2</sup> The sum total of all these reports corroborated the fact that a general attack by the Russians was imminent.

Based on the intelligence received from the Armies, supplemented probably by reports from spies, Japanese General Headquarters believed the Russian forces to be grouped as follows:<sup>3</sup> In the country east and north of Pen-si-hu two corps were supposed to be standing; at Fön-kia-pu, as well as on the Mandarin Road, three corps each to be assembling; and north of Fön-kia-pu one more corps to be in reserve. The Russian extreme right was assumed to be at Li-kia-tun, and the extreme left south of Pen-si-hu, on the left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho; from this it followed, that the Russian front extended about 70 kilometres.

Marshal Marquis Oyama thought the situation

<sup>1</sup> P. 58.

<sup>2</sup> P. 51.

<sup>3</sup> The ideas General Headquarters had formed did not quite coincide with the various intelligences received; the reports of the armies therefore seem to have been accepted as only partly correct.

to be now clear enough to warrant his assuming the offensive. Being probably impressed by the threat to his right, and assuming that the enemy's main forces had not yet finished their concentration on the southern bank of the Hun-ho, he dropped his original intention of awaiting first the Russians in the prepared positions, and then to assume the offensive,<sup>1</sup> and resolved to anticipate the enemy's offensive.

Japanese General Headquarters therefore issued the following Order at 10 p.m. on October 9:

*"I shall attack the enemy before he is completely deployed, and advance against the line Kan-to-li-san<sup>2</sup>—Fön-kia-pu—Li-kia-tun.*

*"The First Army will attack, with the 12th Division and Major-General Umesawa's Brigade, in the direction of Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy,<sup>3</sup> and, with its main bodies, in the direction of Fön-kia-pu; it will delay its attack until the Fourth Army has captured Wu-li-tai-tsy.*

*"The Fourth Army will advance on the 10th in the morning, attacking in the direction of Nin-kuan-tun.*

*"The Second Army will advance to attack the line Pan-kiau-pu—Tai-pin-tschuan. Strong forces are to be retained behind its right wing. The left wing is to advance more rapidly, and make an enveloping movement."*

The Order meant to leave full liberty to the Army Commanders in carrying out the general

<sup>1</sup> P. 53.

<sup>2</sup> 5 kilometres north of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>3</sup> 6 kilometres south of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

Oyama  
orders the  
Armies to  
advance  
for at-  
tack.

intentions, General Headquarters expecting the Army Commanders to adapt the directives given to any change in the situation. And, therefore, to the 1st Army was also left the extremely important task of securing the right flank. With the object of discussing the probable future course of the operations, the Chiefs of the Staffs of the Armies had been summoned to General Headquarters at Liao-yan as early as October 6; it was already on that occasion that Marshal Marquis Oyama said he intended to assume the offensive.

Based on Marshal Marquis Oyama's directives, General Baron Kuroki gave the following Order to the 1st Army:

“TA-YAU-PU, October 9, 11.30 P.M.

“1. *The enemy*, at least 4 Divisions strong, is, since last night, gradually advancing against our front, right flank, and rear.

“*Another Division* is advancing on Liao-yan along the Mandarin Road, its head having reached Wu-li-tai-tsy. West of that road, *the enemy* is standing on the line Liu-tan-kou—Li-kia-tun.

“2. *The Fourth Army* is going to assume the offensive to-morrow, on the 10th, attacking in the direction of Nin-kuan-tun.

“*The Second Army*, in touch with the Fourth, is going to advance against the line Pan-kiau-pu—Tai-pin-tschuan.

“3. *The First Army* will attack the enemy in front in the direction of Fön-kia-pu after the Fourth Army has captured Wu-li-tai-tsy.

“4. *The 12th Division* will act in compliance

The 1st Army stands fast on the extreme right, maintaining and strengthening the positions in front.

with its former orders,<sup>1</sup> advancing on Kan-to-li-san after the enemy has been repulsed.

“5. *The Guard and 2nd Divisions* will for the present hold their positions.

“6. *The General Reserve*<sup>2</sup> will reach Hui-yau at 5 a.m. on the 10th.

“7. *The Cavalry Brigade* will remain with its main body at Kan-sa,<sup>3</sup> covering the Army to the right rear, while watching the Tai-tsy-ho valley.

“8. *I shall be in Ta-yau-pu.*”

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was previously directed to move to Si-ho-yan<sup>4</sup>; but there being every reason to expect, from the intelligence that had meanwhile come in, that this important line-of-communication post would be occupied by the Russians before the Cavalry could possibly arrive there, the Army Commander kept at first the brigade on the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. But, strangely enough, the Russians did not pay any attention to that place, with all its stores. This omission enabled the Cavalry Brigade to occupy Si-ho-yan on October 11, and to intervene on the 12th in a most effective manner in the action on the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho.

The detachment east of Pen-si-hu, which had been reinforced by the 14th Infantry Regiment and one battery,<sup>5</sup> and being now commanded by Major Honda, in place of the wounded Colonel Hirata, made use of the fog in the early hours

<sup>1</sup> P. 71.

<sup>2</sup> 29th Kobi Regiment, Kobi Artillery Abteilung, and Hidikata's Battery. (P. 53.)

<sup>3</sup> 20 kilometres west of Pen-si-hu on the northern Tai-tsy-ho bank.

<sup>4</sup> P. 72.

<sup>5</sup> P. 71.

of the 10th by retaking from the Russians the positions they had captured. The Ha-shi-ra-yama was simultaneously attacked by the 3rd Company 14th Infantry Regiment and by the 1st Company 1st Guard Kobi Regiment, who drove back the Russians after an obstinate resistance. Both companies then occupied the height jointly with a third.<sup>1</sup> As the action lasted all the morning before it was decided, General Baron Ino-uye had taken the precaution of calling up to Liu-schu-kia the 24th Infantry Regiment of the 23rd Brigade as a reinforcement. But, on the leading battalion of that regiment arriving at Kuan-lin-tsy about 10 a.m., the Ha-shi-ra-yama had been captured, being occupied by the three companies. Meanwhile the fog had cleared away ; from the Japanese position, a camp could be seen in an easterly direction, with innumerable Russian tents, stretching in a wide arc even beyond the Tai-tsy-ho, and revealing a tremendous superiority of the enemy. General Baron Ino-uye, therefore, did not send back the 24th Infantry Regiment, but employed it in reinforcing the positions at Pen-si-hu generally, and forming a reserve. The Mei-san, too, was recaptured at the point of the bayonet, and maintained in the face of vigorous counter-attacks, likewise delivered with the bayonet. The positions at the Ta-lin and Tu-men-tsy-lin Passes had not been seriously attacked hitherto ; nor were they on the 10th. General Baron Ino-uye having on his side no reason for advancing from his covered positions against the superior enemy, no actual

<sup>1</sup> According to Japanese reports, from the Nakagawa Battalion.

fighting took place on this portion of the front, the batteries on both sides only firing at each other for some time, without, however, obtaining any material effect.

The Guard and 2nd Divisions maintained an expectant attitude on October 10, in compliance with the Army Order. They occupied a continuous defensive position, stretching by Ni-doko to the coal-pits, in prolongation of the trenches of the 46th Infantry Regiment, which, together with one or two batteries of the 12th Division, had remained at the Tschien-kou-lin Pass. The 1st Brigade of the Guard Division was on the right; it had pushed forward a small detachment to occupy the Sa-to-rei Pass. In advance of Tschan-hei-tun was the 2nd Brigade, facing north-east. The entrenchments, groups of fire-trenches, constructed in the rocky soil, possessed throughout great defensive strength. The position was at first but weakly occupied; the main body of the 1st Brigade was at Tan-kia-pu-tsy, and that of the 2nd at Tschan-hei-tun. Some few companies had been pushed to the various knolls in front of the position, as a measure of security. The Artillery was standing ready at Huan-kia-pu-tsy; Divisional Headquarters were at Tan-kia-pu-tsy.

The 2nd Division adjoined the Guards at Ni-doko. The position of the Division formed an arc salient to the north, and, like the Guards' position, was tactically ably chosen, and very carefully fortified. The Infantry line had everywhere the profile of trenches for firing standing, with numerous overhead cover, traverses, look-outs,

and covered approaches from the cover-trenches of the reserves behind the line. The height east of Tsiën-tau, which had to be included in the position, is a rocky cliff falling steeply to the north-east, with a clear field of fire in every direction up to 1,500 metres; at the corner projecting farthest north-east were several tiers of fire-trenches; the village of Tsiën-tau, surrounded by a clay wall, was placed in a state of defence in front and on both sides; owing to the configuration of the ground, the batteries were distributed throughout the position. For the guns, entrenched on the height east of Tsiën-tau, cover had been constructed with boulders, on which earth was heaped. One battery at Schi-hui-yau, in the plain, was very cleverly masked by gaoljan. Cover-trenches with casemates had been constructed for the gun detachments as well, by partly making use of corrugated iron taken by the Japanese from Russian barracks.<sup>1</sup> All along the front were abattis and wire entanglements. The position was occupied as follows: On the right was the 4th Infantry Regiment, in continuation of which, to the left, was the 29th Infantry Regiment; the western portion of the position, from Tsiën-tau to the low knoll north of the coal-pits, was occupied by the 15th Brigade.

On the morning all remained quiet opposite the Guards. Towards noon four hostile guns came into action at the road east of the Ohara-yama,

<sup>1</sup> At the coal-pits of Yen-tai were unfinished Russian barracks, which were intended for the 22nd Sotnia Frontier Guard. The Japanese afterwards used them for lines-of-communication purposes.

firing about twenty rounds in the direction of the 2nd Brigade of Guards. The Japanese Artillery not replying, the fire ceased again. The Japanese Infantry remained under cover. During the day only a few more Cavalry patrols of the enemy were noticed; for the rest, nothing else happened on that day.

Opposite the 2nd Division, some Russian batteries, perhaps three in number, having got into position unobserved at the north-west slope of the Western San-jo-shi-san, about 7 a.m. suddenly opened fire on the Japanese batteries standing entrenched on the right wing of the Division. It was previously known<sup>1</sup> that the Western San-jo-shi-san was also occupied by hostile Infantry; they were troops of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. It being impossible from the Japanese position to locate exactly the Russian Artillery, in spite of its fire, an observation officer, with signal-flags and mounted orderlies, was sent forward to a small eminence east of Pan-la-schan-tsy, by whose signals the fire was replied to. The Russian Artillery delivered a rapid fire for half an hour, and then abated it. But it had no effect at all, all the shrapnels passing beyond the mark. The Artillery force on the Japanese left did not take part in the action at first. Towards 11 a.m. Russian Infantry, about a battalion strong, advanced to the height south-west of the Western San-jo-shi-san; two Japanese batteries began directing a brisk fire on them, but ceased the moment the Russian batteries poured a rapid fire into those of the Japanese. This

<sup>1</sup> P. 72.

alternate firing of both Artilleries—of the Japanese on Infantry, and of the Russians on the Japanese batteries—was several times repeated until noon. Towards 12.45 p.m. the head of a long Russian Infantry column on the march appeared on the road leading over the heights north of Temple Hill, in the direction of San-kia-tsy. This column, about the size of a brigade, probably likewise portions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, continued its march to a low crest north-east of Temple Hill; here it partly formed up, extended a long skirmishing line until about 2 p.m., and began to entrench. Soon afterwards the Russian Artillery, again unnoticed, moved off by East San-kia-tsy. During the afternoon a Russian battery once more appeared north of San-kia-tsy, firing a short time, and then disappearing again. The Japanese Artillery occasionally fired on Russian Infantry.

The 4th Army takes possession of the heights on the southern bank of the Schi-li-ho.

Marshal Marquis Oyama had ordered the 4th Army to advance on Nin-kuan-tun; but General Count Nodzu considered it necessary to abstain from an attack on Nin-kuan-tun for the present. A general attack by the Russians on October 10 being looked upon as certain, the General assumed the enemy would try to push strong forces to the gentle range of hills stretching from Kuschu-tsy in the direction of the coal-pits. That would have made it impossible to advance in a northerly direction on Nin-kuan-tun, and would have necessitated a costly attack to drive the enemy away again from the heights. Count Nodzu therefore determined to occupy them at once with

the 10th Division; the 5th Division was meanwhile to take possession of Wu-li-tai-tsy and the height adjoining it. If he captured the low hills east of Yun-kuan-tun—Tu-men-tsy, as well as Wu-li-tai-tsy, the Army was in a correct position with regard to its neighbour, the 2nd Division on its right still standing in its former position, and in a favourable situation for future operations in the general direction on Nin-kuan-tun.

General Baron Kawamura, commanding the 10th Division, ordered the 39th Infantry Regiment, with some mountain-guns, to start at 6 a.m. from Tun-ta-liën-kou for Yun-kuan-tun. Should this advanced detachment meet with strong forces of the enemy already east of Yun-kuan-tun, it was to hold back, and be sustained by the main body of the Division coming up behind; should it meet with weak forces, it was to attack at once. The low heights east of Yun-kuan-tun were very weakly occupied by Russian outposts, belonging probably to Mau's Detachment. On Colonel Yasumura approaching the height with his detachment, the Russians withdrew, after a brief resistance. Towards 11 a.m. the main body of the 10th Division occupied the heights gained.

The Artillery action previously described had meanwhile developed with the 2nd Division on the right. The positions of the Russian batteries on the Western San-jo-shi-san could in part be clearly seen from the heights east of Yun-kuan-tun; General Kawamura therefore ordered the Artillery of his Division, as well as the 14th Field Artillery Regiment from the 1st Field Artillery

Brigade (probably being under his orders), to come into action east of Po-lin-tsy and Yun-kuan-tun and intervene in the fight of the 2nd Division. The Japanese batteries gradually drew upon themselves the fire of sixteen Russian guns standing at Temple Hill, and belonging probably to Mau's detachment, fighting them until darkness set in.

The 5th Division, to which the Commander of the 4th Army had gone, advanced by Yen-tai; at Schan-yau-pu it came under a heavy Artillery fire from Wu-li-tai-tsy and the height east of it, as well as from the railway line. The Divisional Commander decided to attack the height east of Wu-li-tai-tsy, and deployed the Division. The attack met with great difficulties. The assailant did not succeed in capturing by frontal attacks the narrow Russian position strengthened by deep trenches. The attempt of enveloping it in the west was frustrated by a flanking fire of Artillery near the railway. The Russian batteries were so cleverly placed that they could not be located by the Japanese batteries. The hope of being somewhat relieved by the 3rd Division of the 2nd Army on the left advancing on Wu-li-tai-tsy was not realised. Considerable loss was being suffered already, without the attack making any progress; the situation became more and more serious the more the day advanced.

On General Baron Kawamura being informed of the nature of the action in which the 5th Division was involved, he at once sent the 8th Brigade of his 10th Division, together with some batteries of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, in support.

While the Infantry was preparing for the attack on the height at Wu-li-tai-tsy the batteries unlimbered under cover at Tschiu-tsai-tai, opening fire at 3.30 p.m. Its effect became soon apparent. Scarcely forty minutes had elapsed when the fire of the Russian guns east of the height, being now enfiladed, was growing sensibly weaker; at 5.30 p.m. it ceased altogether. Many horses of the limbers and first and second line waggons were killed apparently; it could be seen from Tschiu-tsai-tai how the Russian artillerists were trying to push back their guns by hand to get them safely away.

Kawamura's intervention gave new life to the attack of the 5th Division. Though the Russians made several counter-attacks from Wu-li-tai-tsy, as well as from the height, the Japanese, persevering with tenacity, constantly renewed their attacks, until at last, when it was pitch dark, they succeeded in driving the Russians from their trenches, and in capturing the height east of the village. Portions of the Division had penetrated also into Wu-li-tai-tsy, driving the hostile garrison out of it. The 5th Division had therefore accomplished its task for the day. The action cost it: 1 officer dead, 10 officers wounded, and 246 men dead or wounded.

Whether and to what extent the 8th Brigade had been intervening in the fight cannot be ascertained; nor is there any clue as to what became on that day of the 3rd, 10th, and 11th Kobi Brigades, as well as of the portions of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade not engaged; they were moved up pro-

bably to the neighbourhood of Yun-kuan-tun—Po-lin-tsy after the 10th Division had occupied the low height north-west of the coal-pits.

The 2nd  
Army ad-  
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with the  
4th  
Army,  
pushing  
back  
Russian  
outposts.

General Baron Oku had arranged for the 2nd Army to advance in three columns in a north-easterly direction. The right column (6 battalions, 3 squadrons, 7 batteries, and 2 Pioneer companies of the 3rd Division) was to advance between the railway and the line Ta-pa-tai-tsy—Scha-örr-tai—Schuan-tai-tsy—Nan-kuan-tsy to attack the line Pan-kiau-pu — Tschen-kia; the centre column (6 battalions, 3 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 3 Pioneer companies of the 6th Division) between the right column and the left bank of the Scha-ho against the line Tschien-liu-tan-kou — Tsun-lun-yen-tun (the latter exclusive); and the left column (6 battalions, 3 squadrons, 7 batteries, and 3 Pioneer companies of the 4th Division) was to march with its right wing along the western bank of the Scha-ho towards the line Tsun-lun-yen-tun—Tai-pin-tschuan. The columns were to start at 6.30 a.m. The other eighteen battalions and five Pioneer companies were to assemble at 8 a.m. on the line Pei-siau-fan-tsy—Si-siau-fan-tsy as reserve of Army Headquarters. The 1st Cavalry Brigade was charged with covering, jointly with the left column, the left flank and rear of the Army, and to reconnoitre especially towards Tschou-kuan-pu, north of San-de-pu.

Each division advanced in two columns. The right column of the 3rd Division (2 battalions, 2 squadrons, 1 battery, and 1 Pioneer company) reached Schin-liën-tun at 10.50 a.m., and the

left column, consisting of merely 2 companies, Men-hu-lu-tun about the same time. The other portions followed on Schin-liën-tun as reserve of the Divisional Commander. When the heads of the columns had just passed the villages named, the commander of the left column heard that Schuan-tai-tsy was occupied by the enemy; at the same time a lively fusillade, soon mixed with the thunder of cannon, became audible, coming from the neighbourhood of Wu-li-tai-tsy. The columns were stopped for the moment. Intelligence arrived from the 4th Army saying that the 5th Division was in action with the enemy, who was holding Wu-li-tai-tsy. General Baron Oshima, commanding the 3rd Division, intended first to advance on Wu-li-tai-tsy (probably having previously agreed with the Commander of the 5th Division to do so), and with that object reinforced his right column by two companies and one battery. But as his advance could be enfiladed from Schuan-tai-tsy he resolved to attack that village in the first instance. By pushing next towards Nan-kuan-tsy he intended to render the 5th Division indirectly the wished-for support. The right column was therefore stopped at Schin-liën-tun, the reserve was moved behind the left column, and the latter was reinforced. The attack on Schuan-tai-tsy made, however, but slow progress; it was 5.30 in the evening before the Russians, weak outposts of the 17th Army Corps, evacuated the place. When the Japanese showed themselves at the north edge of the village, they were at once briskly fired on by Artillery from a northerly and

north-easterly direction; it being further ascertained that Nan-kuan-tsy was strongly held by the enemy, the Divisional Commander decided to delay the attack until next day. The Division remained during the night in fighting formation in the position it had reached.

The right column of the 6th Division (1 battalion and 1 squadron only) marched by Scha-örr-tai, and the left column (2 battalions, 1 quarter-squadron, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company), followed by the Divisional reserve, marched by Kan-ku-tun. Between 10 and 11 a.m. both columns—the right at An-kia-san-kia-tsy, and the left at Siau-tun-schan-pu—met weak outposts of the 17th Army Corps, who, after a brief resistance, withdrew on Örr-tai-tsy and Ta-tu-san-pu. The Japanese followed, driving, until 5 p.m., the Russians also out of these places. The right column had been strengthened for that purpose by three battalions. Strong forces of the enemy having meanwhile been reported to be standing at Nan-kuan-tsy and Yen-kia-wan, the further attack was discontinued. The two columns established themselves for the night in the villages captured. The reserve of the Division went to Siau-tun-schan-pu.

Of the 4th Division, 2 battalions, with 1 troop of Cavalry, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company, marched by Tschu-tschuan-tsy—Si-kuan-schan-tun on Yen-kia-tiën-tsy, pushing back here some weak hostile outposts, and pursuing the Russians, who belonged to Stakovich's Detachment, to Yu-kia-tiën-tsy. To the west of this column, two battalions advanced by Ku-kia-tsy, reaching Hua-kia-tun at

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 89

noon ; weak Russian Cavalry fell back before them north. Taking into consideration the points the other Divisions had reached in their march, General Tsukamoto, commanding the 4th Division, halted it at Yu-kia-tiën-tsy and Hua-kia-tun ; the reserve closed up at Schu-pei-tai.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade, under General Akiyama, started from Hei-kou-tai about noon, reaching San-de-pu at 3 p.m. It left a small detachment behind in its late quarters, and another party, which had been sent to the right bank of the Hun-ho, got as far as Tu-tai-tsy.

Army Headquarters arrived in Sun-lun-pu at noon, going for the night to Pu-tsau-kou ; the reserve of the 2nd Army moved forward to Sun-lun-pu and Scha-örr-tai.

On the evening of the 10th the main bodies of that Army were standing on the line Schin-liën-tun — Örr-tai-tsy — Ta-tu-san-pu — Yu-kia-tiën-tsy — Hua-kia-tun.

The General Reserve advanced, by orders of Oyama, to Lö-ta-tai ; General Headquarters apparently continued to remain in Liao-yan.

Although General Kuropatkin had distinctly stated in the two letters which Stackelberg received early on October 9,<sup>1</sup> that he expected the Eastern Detachment to attack the main position of the Japanese on the 10th, yet he thought it necessary to furnish the Commander of the Eastern Detachment with new directives. During the 9th two more letters were dispatched to Stackelberg. The first document reaching Stackelberg on

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Kuropatkin orders the Eastern Detachment to attack, enveloping the enemy's right wing, while he is holding back still the Western Detachment.

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 60 and 65.

the same day, in addition to the congratulations on the occupation of the Bian-yu-pu-sa position,<sup>1</sup> contained the advice to proceed cautiously with the attack on the main position; in the second letter Kuropatkin sent to the General an explicit and firmly worded directive. This document, dispatched late in the evening of October 9, was worded as follows:

*“ÖRR-TAU-KOU, 9th October, 11 p.m.*

“I propose to you to make a wheel forward with the left wing of the Eastern Detachment. Advance with that wing along the Tai-tsy-ho in a westerly direction against the right of the enemy’s position. Push back the Japanese, forming your front in such a way as to bring your left to Kan-kwan-tun on the Tai-tsy-ho,<sup>2</sup> and your right near the heights east of Tsiën-tau at the coal-pits. You must apportion sufficient forces for guarding your rear and left flank. Direct General v. Rennenkampf to remain for the present at Pen-si-hu, and to keep the Tai-tsy-ho occupied east of that place. Your right will be secured by the 4th Siberian Army Corps and by one brigade of the 31st Division,<sup>3</sup> which to-day has occupied the heights east of Tan-hai-schi.

“Let me know by return how far you want to go to-morrow and on the 11th. The main bodies of the 4th Siberian Army Corps will stay to-night at Sia-hei-niu-tun. Report on your movements of to-day by the morning of the 10th.”

<sup>1</sup> P. 46-47.

<sup>2</sup> 12 kilometres south of the coal-pits.

<sup>3</sup> Mau’s Detachment.

General Kuropatkin, adhering to the view that the Western Detachment must not attack before the Eastern Detachment had made some more decisive progress, gave no orders to Bilderling to advance. All he considered necessary were a few movements by some troops of the 10th Army Corps, sending therefore his orders straight to the chief of the staff of that corps. These movements he altered twice until forenoon of October 10. On the evening of the 9th the Commander-in-Chief made known that the left flank of the 10th Army Corps would be sufficiently secured by the advance of the 1st Army Corps, which was going to move into the line Tun-san-ho—Schi-miau-tsy, as well as by the attack of the Eastern Detachment; the 10th Army Corps was therefore to place its reserves behind its right wing so as to be capable of supporting, in case of need, the 17th Army Corps. A little later the order was dispatched to occupy, with General Riabinkin's advanced guard, the height west of Ku-schu-tsy. Finally, on the next morning, Kuropatkin ordered the height west of Ku-schu-tsy to be occupied with only three battalions, while Riabinkin was to move with the rest of the advanced guard into a fortified position on the Schi-li-ho between Fan-kia-tun and Yin-pan; this position, he said, was selected as the pivot of "the position of the 10th Army Corps" in its further progress.

The 17th Army Corps, as far as is known, did not receive any orders; but it was probably informed of the 6th Siberian Army Corps having

been directed, "to respond to General v. Bilderling's request for support, in case the enemy should proceed to make a decisive attack."

The advanced troops of the Western Detachment fall back into the main position on the Schi-li-ho in the face of Japanese attacks. The Centre is entrenching its main position at Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

During October 10 the 17th Army Corps began to feel the pressure of the Japanese 4th and 2nd Armies.<sup>1</sup> The detachment sent under Colonel Stakovich to Ta-tu-san-pu, as well as the outposts pushed by the advanced guard to Örr-tai-tsy and Schuan-tai-tsy, were in the afternoon driven back by portions of the Japanese 2nd Army.<sup>2</sup> Stakovich established himself again at Yen-kia-wan, the other portions withdrawing into the position of the 3rd Infantry Division behind the Schi-li-ho.

General Grekov, with his Cossack Brigade, gave way in the direction of Li-kia-tun.

Late in the evening the main bodies of the advanced guard gave up Wu-li-tai-tsy, when pressed by the 5th Japanese Division, having previously been told not to engage in serious action. They withdrew on Schi-li-ho.<sup>3</sup>

The various orders of Kuropatkin caused at first great confusion in the 10th Army Corps. On his first directing to place the reserves behind the right wing, General Slutshevski ordered General Riabinkin, when obliged to evacuate the advanced-guard position, to move behind the right wing to Tschan-sin-tiën, 5 kilometres south of Scha-ho-pu. When next Kuropatkin's second order, to send Riabinkin's Detachment to the heights of Kuschu-tsy, crossed his arrangements, he meant to withdraw the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division into the reserve at Tschan-sin-tiën; this

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 82-89.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 88 and 89.

<sup>3</sup> P. 85.

movement to be carried out during the forenoon of October 10. Finally, only the last of Kuropatkin's orders, demanding the occupation of the heights at Ku-schu-tsy with some portions, came to be executed.

Having received this last order from Slutshevski, Riabinkin directed Colonel Solomko to remain with his party<sup>1</sup> on the height near Ku-schu-tsy, causing at the same time two battalions of the 123rd Infantry Regiment and two batteries to occupy the villages of Siau-fan-kia-tun and Fan-kia-tun, as well as the course of the Schi-li-ho between these places; two companies and the Scouts of the 123rd Infantry Regiment of that force were detached to move to Yin-pan. Two battalions from the 123rd Infantry Regiment, and one battalion from the 124th, were stationed as General Reserve south of Sin-tschuan. Colonel Solomko pushed one battalion as outposts beyond Tschou-kuan-tun, occupying, with one battalion each, Ku-schu-tsy village and the height west of it; here they used the trenches abandoned by the Japanese. The outpost battalion beyond Tschou-kuan-tun was directed not to engage in decisive action, but to withdraw in time before an attack by the enemy behind the height at Ku-schu-tsy, so as to be available as reserve of the detachment. The battery was standing ready under cover west of the village, behind a ridge.

The attack of the Japanese 5th Division developed towards noon against the height between

<sup>1</sup> Three battalions from the 124th Infantry Regiment, and the 2nd Battery 31st Artillery Brigade. (Pp. 62-63.)

Wu-li-tai-tsy and Ku-schu-tsy<sup>1</sup>; the outpost battalion had previously retired from Tschou-kuan-tun to that height. After the Japanese Artillery had opened fire on the heights, the Russian battery left its position, withdrawing to the country north of Ku-schu-tsy. As it did not reopen fire, and the Japanese continued to fire upon the unoccupied height, its losses were very small.

The issue of the fight for the height, lasting till dark, is described by both parties in a different way. While, according to Russian reports, the hill remained in the hands of Solomko's Detachment, the Japanese insist upon having captured it at 10 in the evening.<sup>2</sup> At any rate, Solomko evacuated the position at daybreak on October 11, leading his battalion back behind the Schi-li-ho, between Hun-kia-tschuan and Fan-kia-tun.

During October 10 the last portions of the 9th Infantry Division's main body of the 10th Corps moved forward, in compliance with the Order, early on October 9, with the object of occupying the former position of the advanced guard. After completing the movements, the troops were stationed in the following manner: Of the 9th Infantry Division the 2nd Brigade, with the 2nd Abteilung 9th Artillery Brigade, was on the right, the 35th Infantry Regiment having occupied Kian-hu-tun village and the pagoda west of the height of Hun-pau-schan, and the 36th Infantry Regiment

<sup>1</sup> P. 84.

<sup>2</sup> P. 85. The Japanese probably captured only the southern part of the height on the evening of October 10, the northern portion still remaining in the hands of the Russians.

Hun-pau-schan and Wan-kia-lou-tsy villages. The Abteilung Artillery had unlimbered in the gun-pits on the western and eastern slopes of the height of Hun-pau-schan. The 1st Brigade, together with the 1st Abteilung 9th Artillery Brigade, was on the left, the 33rd Infantry Regiment standing in Nin-kuan-tun, while the 34th Infantry Regiment, with the Artillery, was pushed forward to Schuan-tai-tsy, to establish touch with Mau's Detachment, from the 4th Siberian Army Corps, which was standing with its main body at Tan-hai-schi.

Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps remained in Hou-huan-hua-tiën.

The 4th Siberian Army Corps and Mau's Detachment remained in their positions north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy and at the Nan-san, which they had to fortify. The 4th Siberian Army Corps seems to have reinforced the regiments standing already on the Western San-jo-shi-san by dispatching there some more troops. The 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division probably also advanced to Pa-kia-tsy as early as October 10. Mau's Detachment occupied Temple Hill with an advanced guard, after weak outposts had abandoned the low heights on the western bank of the Schi-li-ho on the approach of the Japanese 4th Army.<sup>1</sup> Mishtshenko's Cossack Brigade was moved from Ta-pu to the left wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The Artillery of the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the Western San-jo-shi-san had some passing fight with Japanese Artillery east of the coal-pits.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. 83.

<sup>2</sup> P. 81.

The 6th Siberian Army Corps did not advance on October 10. During the night October 9-10 its commander had received the following directive from the Commander-in-Chief:

“In case the enemy is advancing for decisive attack against the Western Detachment, I have left it to General v. Bilderling to apply to you for any support he should need. Respond to such request, but not with small parties, nor, if possible, by breaking up units.

“But remember that you are forming my Strategic Reserve.”

Dembovski's Detachment on the right of the corps was standing, as before, at Ta-wan-kan-pu—Sin-tai-tsy; the 1st Army Corps in the east had likewise retained its widely scattered position at Tun-san-ho and Lüan-fan-tun.

General Kuropatkin, with his Staff, went to Tun-san-ho on the left of the 10th Army Corps.

The Eastern Detachment, contrary to Kuropatkin's orders, remains in its positions.

General Baron Stackelberg had probably expected some better success with the Eastern Detachment, in spite of his insufficient measures, being consequently disappointed with the real course of events. The rugged mountainous country without roads, represented by very imperfect maps giving little information, coupled with the awkwardness of the Russians in moving through the hills, made it not easy for the Eastern Detachment to carry out its task. Without once more thoroughly reconnoitring the ground, the Commander thought it hopeless to continue the attack against the steep heights. Though Stackelberg's Staff did not think they

were facing a superior enemy, still they were convinced that even a small force could successfully face far superior forces on ground so exceedingly favourable for defence as it was here. General Baron Stackelberg therefore decided to make use of October 10 merely for reconnoitring purposes. In this decision the General was confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief's last letter arriving on the 9th,<sup>1</sup> and exhorting him to be cautious in the further attack upon the main position.

On the afternoon of October 9 General Baron Stackelberg issued the following Order :

“ *The Eastern Detachment* will remain in its present position to-morrow. The 1st Siberian Army Corps will occupy the point of observation north-west of Yin-tsiën-pu<sup>2</sup> and Sia-schi-tsiu-tsy ; advanced guards are to be left on the line Kau-kia-pu—Siën-schan-tsy.

“ *The 3rd Siberian Army Corps*<sup>3</sup> will remain at Kau-tai-tsy and Jo-gu ; advanced guard at Wei-niu-nin.

“ *The 2nd Siberian Army Corps* will remain in general reserve at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

“ To-morrow, October 10, each Army Corps will reconnoitre in its section the enemy's position, with the object of ascertaining the approaches and roads for turning it ; at the same time the strength of the enemy is to be established.

“ *The Siberian Cossack Division* will march from Siën-schan-tsy to Hoe-lin, reconnoitre towards the

<sup>1</sup> P. 89.

<sup>2</sup> It cannot be ascertained which point is meant.

<sup>3</sup> The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division was placed again under the orders of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.

Kuan-lin-tsy—Pen-si-hu valley, and serve as a connecting-link between the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps. All roads and paths leading into the valley named are to be followed up, so as to ascertain whether it is possible to turn the passes occupied by the enemy. *Lieutenant-General von Rennenkampf's Detachment* will look to the safety of the left flank. He is requested to co-operate on the left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho by marching on Pen-si-hu; a provisional protective force is to be pushed to San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho for guarding the lines of communication of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.”

When day broke on October 10, the letter<sup>1</sup> dated October 9, 11 p.m., arrived from General Headquarters, calling upon the Commander of the Eastern Detachment, in contradiction to the exhortation just previously given, to act with vigour.

In reply Stackelberg sent a lengthy document to General Headquarters, pointing out the awkward situation of the Eastern Detachment, and at the same time complaining about the deficiency of his maps:

“Despatch 10,053 I have received. The enemy has occupied a strong position on the line Tan-kia-pu-tsy<sup>2</sup>—Pen-si-hu facing north-north-east, holding as advanced posts the strongly entrenched positions on the Tschien-kou-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Ta-lin Passes in front, as well as the three successive defiles on the road Wei-niu-nin—Pen-si-hu. This day (October 10) I have ordered to be spent in

<sup>1</sup> P. 90.

<sup>2</sup> 5½ kilometres south-west of the Tschien-kou-lin Pass.

reconnoitring the approaches and roads leading to the enemy's positions; to-morrow, the 11th, I intend to attack only the advanced positions. You have not yet received my report apparently, describing the situation of my Force. I cannot execute the envelopment demanded of me until I have captured the position of Pen-si-hu; if matters proceed normally and favourably this cannot be done before the 12th or 13th. On the maps in our hands the country where the attack is to be made is a blank surface, with only one road leading from east to west (from Pen-si-hu to the coal-pits), without showing any kind of features. On the other hand, the country through which we have to march is in reality exceedingly mountainous, and scarcely passable for artillery. The map not showing any roads deprives me of the possibility of apportioning to the columns the roads, the choice of which I must first settle by reconnaissance. Thus, for instance, the road from Kaukia-pu by Pa-kia-tsy to Schan-liu-ho-tsy is only a narrow path, completely impassable for artillery and military wagons.

“I report this, expecting further orders. Should there be maps at General Headquarters showing the country in which my troops have to move, I beg you to send them here.”

Nothing was changed in the orders for the 10th. At daybreak the Japanese, under cover of the fog, recaptured the positions they had lost on the 9th. Apart from the unsuccessful counter-attacks, no other attack was made on the Russian side.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 77-79.

At 8.40 p.m. Kuropatkin's answer to Stackelberg's letter arrived. The Commander-in-Chief wrote:

"The report you sent by Lieutenant-Colonel A. I have received. The directives given to you remain in force. The time for executing them is left to your discretion, but you must not lose another day without urgent reasons, especially not if only weak forces are opposing you."

General Baron Stackelberg had already decided to attack the Japanese with the utmost vigour on October 11. "For to-morrow, the 11th," so ran the order to his troops, "I order you to attack the enemy in his advanced positions, driving him from there, and, cost what it might, to take possession of the passes."

The 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps were the forces apportioned to attack; with this object Rennenkampf's and Samsonov's Detachments were placed under the orders of General Ivanov, commanding the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. The 1st Siberian Army Corps was to drive the Japanese from the Tschien-kou-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Talin Passes, General Ivanov was to attack the enemy's extreme right wing at Pen-si-shu, and to threaten it by a movement on the left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho; a strong detachment on the road Hoe-lin—Kuan-lin-tsy had to establish touch with the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

With the object of particularly calling the attention of the troops to the difficult tasks of the next day, Stackelberg, in addition to his Order, made known the following address:

"You heroic troops of the Eastern Group and

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 101

of General von Rennenkampf's Detachment! From to-morrow we will have to face a series of fights with the Japanese. Remember, all Russia is looking on you during these days, expecting from you the highest courage, manliness, and heroic deeds. We will ever keep before our eyes that we are Russians, and that we must be victorious."

October 10, in the course of events, brought about a change of decisive importance. Marshal Marquis Oyama did not wait for the further advance of the Russians, but directed his Armies, in conformity with his orders of October 9, in the evening, to go forward, with the object of forestalling the enemy's attack. The 4th and 2nd Armies pushed back the Russian outposts south of the Schi-li-ho, as well as on the western bank of the Scha-ho, arriving on the line generally: heights east of Yun-kuan-tun—Wu-li-tai-tsy—Hua-kia-tun; the Guard and 2nd Divisions of the 1st Army, who were to give a start to the 4th Army on their left, maintained, for the present, their positions on the right bank of the Upper Schi-li-ho. The 12th Division of the 1st Army, on the right, succeeded in snatching from the Russians the advantages they had gained on October 9.

On the Russian side, the intended offensive, though hardly begun, was nearing its end. The Western Detachment had remained halting on the Schi-li-ho and its right tributary, and was entrenching by orders of Kuropatkin, the 10th Army Corps having thus as well the use of three defensive positions, one behind the other. The Eastern Detachment was, it is true, directed to

Result of  
October  
10.

attack, but it also remained halting, its commander considering it first necessary to make some special reconnaissances. Even at this stage it could be guessed pretty well that it would not be long before the whole Russian Army was confined to the defensive.

## OCTOBER 11

Kuropatkin expects the Eastern Detachment to gain a victory, ordering the Western Detachment to recapture the positions south of the Schli-ho it had lost on October 10.

After the directives he had given to the Eastern Detachment on October 10, with his peremptory demand to continue the offensive, General Kuropatkin thought he could calmly await the course of events on his left wing. He hoped that within the next few days he would hear of the longed-for message of victory, the effect of which would probably mean the end of the campaign. General Headquarters were therefore absolutely confident. A participation in the attack of the Centre (the term applicable to the General Reserve after it had moved into the front line), and of the Western Detachment, the Commander-in-Chief did not consider necessary; it seemed to him sufficient if these Army Groups would proceed to attack the moment the Eastern Group had accomplished the main work. On the other hand, it was not permissible to allow the Western Detachment to be pushed back previously, as it would otherwise not be able to march at once with the Eastern Detachment on Liao-yan and envelop the Japanese after Stackelberg's victory. But the initial retrograde step had already been taken, since the 10th and 17th Army Corps had

left their advanced positions in the hands of the Japanese on the 10th. Kuropatkin therefore thought it proper to cause these Army Corps to recapture on the 11th the positions they had evacuated on the 10th; he issued orders to that effect to the Commander of the Western Detachment.

On the morning of October 11 the Western Detachment was disposed as follows: The 17th Army Corps occupied, with the 3rd Infantry Division, the strongly entrenched position extending on the Schi-li-ho from Örr-schi-kia-tsy to Schi-li-ho village, two battalions of the 10th Infantry Regiment, the 9th Infantry Regiment, and three batteries standing in the western section from Örr-schi-kia-tsy to Nan-kuan-tsy, and three battalions of the 11th Infantry Regiment, two of the 12th, and likewise three batteries in the eastern section from Lun-wan-miau to Schi-li-ho. Three battalions and a half remained available as local reserve south of Pei-wu-li-tai. The 35th Infantry Division was standing in brigades as general reserve of the Army Corps at Tschien-liu-tan-kou. With the 10th Army Corps the advanced guard, under General Riabinkin, was in the Schi-li-ho position east of Siau-schan-tun, the 9th Infantry Division being in reserve at Hun-pau-schan.

When, towards 9.30 a.m., the Commander-in-Chief's request to recapture the former positions had become known to the Western Detachment, General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, gave General Riabinkin the order to hold

the position Hun-kia-tschuan—Fan-kia-tun occupied by him, at the same time requesting him to state what numbers he considered sufficient for recapturing the height west of Ku-schu-tsy. General Riabinkin thought an Infantry Division, with the proper amount of Artillery, would be necessary; but that an attack on the Mandarin Road ought to be made at the same time as well. To have the forces ready for such an attack, General Baron Bilderling, commanding the Western Detachment, then ordered the 17th Army Corps, about noon, to send one Infantry regiment, together with an Artillery Abteilung from the 35th Infantry Division in reserve, on Schi-li-ho.

Meanwhile the action had been proceeding all along the front.

Oyama intends to push the Russians north-east. The Japanese 1st Army initiates the attack in a northerly direction.

For continuing the attack on October 11 Marshal Marquis Oyama had issued an Order to the Armies, expressing the intention of pushing the enemy north-east.<sup>1</sup> The 1st Army<sup>2</sup> was therefore to advance from its position in a northerly direction to the line Ba-ji-san<sup>3</sup>—Yen-tschien-tschai<sup>4</sup>; the 4th Army to regulate its advance in conformity with the Armies on the wings, to push the enemy from the height east of Wu-li-

<sup>1</sup> According to Japanese sources of Captain Sanders (retired). The intention of making a wheel with the 2nd Army was only apparent in the General Order issued at 10 in the evening of October 9. (P. 75.)

<sup>2</sup> The Order, the wording of which is not known, does not contain anything about the task of the 12th Division, which was covering the right flank on the extreme right of the 1st Army.

<sup>3</sup> 10 kilometres west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>4</sup> 8 kilometres west of the Ba-ji-san.

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tai-tsy<sup>1</sup> before daybreak, and then carry out a right wheel in the direction on Tan-hai-schi<sup>2</sup>; and the 2nd Army to push back the enemy opposing it, and then advance on Scha-ho-pu—Lin-schin-pu in support of the attack of the 4th Army.

Based on these directives of General Headquarters, General Baron Kuroki issued in Ta-yau-pu the following Order for the 1st Army on the evening of October 10 :

“ 1. *The enemy* facing the Army is entrenched on the line: Height north of Man-hua-pu—Sankia-tsy; outposts are standing on the heights south of Schan-liu-ho-tsy and north of Shimo-rokunko.<sup>3</sup>

“ *The right Division of the Fourth Army* is going to attack the enemy to-morrow, October 11, in touch with the left of the First Army.

“ 2. *The First Army* will at daybreak on the 11th, with its main bodies, advance to attack the line: Heights north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy—heights north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

“ 3. *The 12th Division* will hold its position, but, if it can possibly be done, will support the attack of the main body of the army by an offensive stroke of some portions in the direction of the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass.

“ 4. *The Guards* will push the enemy from height ‘238’ before daybreak, attacking then the heights north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy.

“ 5. *The 2nd Division* will capture the height

<sup>1</sup> The height east of Wu-li-tai-tsy was, as a matter of fact, in the hands of the Japanese already at daybreak of October 11. (P. 85.)

<sup>2</sup> 9 kilometres east of Wu-li-tai-tsy.

<sup>3</sup> North and south of the Watanabe-yama.

north-west of Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko, advancing then to attack the heights north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

"6. *The General Reserve* will be south of Hui-yau at 4 a.m.

"7. *I shall be on the Ma-tsi-schan*<sup>1</sup> at 8 a.m."

The 5th Kobi Brigade, under General Aibara, after landing at An-tung<sup>2</sup> on October 10, was placed under command of the 1st Army, receiving orders to move on Si-ho-yan by forced marches.<sup>3</sup>

The Russian Eastern Detachment attacks the right wing of the Japanese.

At daybreak on the 11th Stackelberg initiated the Eastern Detachment's attack by a powerful fire of artillery; more than 100 guns of the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps poured their fire into the positions of General Baron Ino-uye. The troops then deployed for attack. The 1st Siberian Army Corps, on the right of which was the Cavalry of the Army Corps under Lieutenant-Colonel Grekov, attacked the Tschien-kou-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Ta-lin Passes, the 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Rennenkampf's Detachment, reinforced by five battalions of that corps, at the same time pushing on the left of the 1st Siberian Army Corps<sup>4</sup> to the heights north and east of Pen-si-hu. Between both these attacking groups there was a wide gap. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, together with the 2nd East Siberian Field Mortar Battery, attached from the

<sup>1</sup> At the coal-pits.

<sup>2</sup> At the mouth of the Ya-lu.

<sup>3</sup> 15 kilometres south-south-east of Pen-si-hu.

<sup>4</sup> The 1st Siberian Army Corps was fighting with the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division on its right; but the units seem to have got mixed afterwards.

3rd Siberian Army Corps, as well as the 1st Brigade 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, from the 1st Siberian Army Corps, were retained in reserve at Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy.

The attack turned out to be very difficult generally. In the morning the air was cool and bright, the heat, however, increasing during the forenoon, until it was oppressively hot about noon. The troops being all in full marching order, the movements over the mountainous country were extremely trying and fatiguing. Noon was approaching without the attack making any progress. The Japanese Infantry, hidden in their deep trenches at wide intervals, presented but a bad target to the Russian fire; while the Japanese themselves were able to make good practice from their commanding heights. Nor did the Russian Artillery much assert itself in spite of its enormous superiority, because coming into action in suitable positions was very difficult on the one hand, and, on the other, because the batteries became engaged mostly singly, never unitedly; and were, therefore, unable to establish superiority of fire anywhere. The Japanese batteries often evaded the Artillery duel, with the object of using their full strength against the enemy's Infantry. It was difficult for the Russian Artillery to locate the hidden batteries of the Japanese. The Russians, moreover, diminished their effect by needlessly keeping at too great a distance from their enemy, mostly 4,000 metres; at these long ranges the battery commanders allowed themselves to be misled to fire on sham batteries, with which the Japanese

deceived them by exploding powerful detonators. Of the 122 guns<sup>1</sup> apportioned to the attack, large numbers were not engaged at all, it is said, owing to the difficulties of ground; yet the great numbers actually engaged in the action ought to have produced some effect, if properly employed.

Climbing and clambering up from one hill to the other, the Russian Infantry was working its way forward; sometimes the men had to crawl on all fours to avoid slipping and falling on the polished surface of the rocky soil. Whenever the skirmishers had gained some ground for a short distance, they lay again for hours engaged in fire-action on the rocky ground, which was kept at red heat by the rays of the sun.

General Baron Ino-uye's troops awaited the attack in their positions on the rocks. For the time being it was impossible for the General to think of any counter-attack, which Kuroki, by his Order, expected him to make; he looked upon his task as accomplished if he succeeded in merely holding at bay the superior forces of the enemy. The whole position from the valley of the Taitsy-ho at Pen-si-hu to the Tschien-kou-lin Pass had now been occupied, in some places strongly, in others weakly, just as the ground necessitated it. Units could not be kept intact; defensive groups were apportioned to the various sections of ground, battalion commanders being given

<sup>1</sup> 1st Siberian Army Corps 62 guns (less H.A. mountain battery).

3rd „ „ „ 60 „ (less mortars).

122 guns.

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charge of them. The reserves still available were placed so as to rapidly reach any point threatened.<sup>1</sup>

While the troops of the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps were attacking frontally the passes south of Bian-yu-pu-sa, General von Rennenkampf had charged General Liubavin with making once more an enveloping movement from the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. No Infantry having been attached to the General in this case either,<sup>2</sup> it could be foreseen that the result would be just as indifferent as on October 9. General Shimamura, commanding the 12th Brigade and in the section east of Pen-si-hu, had already made provision to meet this expected attempt of the Russians to turn the position. A battalion was formed of odd companies,<sup>3</sup> and pushed to the southern bank of the river. When the Cossack Brigade came on, the battalion occupied the heights south of Riu-wo-bio, preventing the enemy by their fire from pushing beyond To-ka-ho-shi. Liubavin, finding the road to the northern bank barred, gave up the enveloping movement, and retired in an easterly direction. General Samsonov's attitude may have contributed to this resolve; he had been charged with guarding Liubavin's left flank and had like-

<sup>1</sup> More details about the occupation of the Japanese positions are not known.

<sup>2</sup> The detachment of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps (2 battalions, 2 guns, 1 sotnia, and 3 detachments of mounted Scouts) under Colonel Drushinin, which had been pushed to the heights of Ja-un-ssun, on the south bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, was withdrawn to the north bank of the river during the night October 10-11.

<sup>3</sup> Two companies 39th Kobi Regiment, 2 companies 4th Kobi Regiment, and 1 company 14th Infantry Regiment.

wise fallen back east, feeling himself threatened from Si-ho-yan probably.<sup>1</sup>

The Japanese composite battalion had been directed to co-operate with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, whose arrival in the country south of Pen-si-hu was expected on that day. But Prince Kan-in, who, after an exceedingly fatiguing march, reached Si-ho-yan on the 11th, did not turn up yet. The Japanese battalion, after having repulsed the Russians on the south bank, returned to the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, and was then being distributed along the whole front.

When noon had passed without the Japanese on the right wing having abandoned a single point of their position, Stackelberg by a verbal order urged the "attack to be carried forward now." The 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Rennenkampf's Detachment then engaged all their forces, the reserves following each other like waves, carrying the firing-lines with them. Six times the assault was repeated, but not in a single instance did they succeed in breaking into the enemy's main position. It is true, the gallant assailants at some points pushed far enough forward to oblige their Artillery to cease firing, for fear of hitting their own Infantry; some Japanese advanced trenches were also temporarily captured by General von Rennenkampf's troops, but the strength failed them for the final decisive blow. Completely exhausted from the fatigues of the unaccustomed tactics, tormented moreover by thirst

<sup>1</sup> In Si-ho-yan were only Lines of Communication Troops on the morning of October 11.

in the excessive heat, the Russians broke down almost when in the enemy's trenches, exposed to the cross-fire of the enemy, unable to make another step forward. They crowded together in dead ground and holes not seen into, waiting for dusk. Till night the 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Rennenkampfs Detachment had lost about 5,000 men, surely an eloquent testimony of the heroic self-sacrifice and devotion of these troops.

The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps had remained standing inactive all day at Sia-schi-tsiu-tsy; the General Commanding had been unable to make up his mind to stake it.<sup>1</sup>

The Japanese, too, paid for that day with heavy sacrifice. When darkness set in, ending the fight for the moment, one-third of the brave troops was dead or wounded. Major Honda's composite battalion, which had to face the most serious attacks east of Pen-si-hu, had suffered most of all. General Baron Ino-uye reported to Headquarters of the 1st Army in the evening:

“The enemy east of Pen-si-hu has increased in strength to about one division and a half. The right and centre of Shimamura's Detachment are being attacked in very great strength. General Shimamura was obliged to engage all his forces,

<sup>1</sup> Only the 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was started at 5 p.m. for the right wing of the 1st Siberian Army Corps; this regiment was to guard against envelopment a battalion of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment which the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division had engaged on the extreme right of the Eastern Detachment in support of the attack of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division. The General Commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps probably disposed of the 1st Brigade 1st East Siberian Rifle Division.

and is fighting a desperate action. The division has sent thither a battalion from its last reserve.

“Enemy in direction of Ta-lin and Tu-men-tsy-lin superior in numbers. Severe action proceeding there.

“The division is obliged to move up a battalion from Kigoshi’s Detachment.”<sup>1</sup>

General Baron Kuroki, seeing from this report the great danger still threatening his right, sent orders to General Kigoshi to leave only one battalion of the 46th Infantry Regiment south of Yin-tsiën-pu, and to march with the rest at once to the 12th Division. Kigoshi, thereupon, moved to the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass, pushing from there his troops into the left of Ino-uye’s force.

The Japanese Guards and the 2nd Division advance against the Russian Centre (4th Siberian Army Corps and Mau’s Detachment), gaining a firm footing on heights south and west of Schan-liu-ho-tsy.

General Asada, commanding the Guard Division, decided to capture before daybreak the Wai-to-san, on which the enemy had not yet shown himself in strength; he did this to enable him to carry out the attack on the heights north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy in the direction required. He therefore issued the following Order:

“*The right column*, under Major-General Izaki (5 battalions of the 1st Brigade<sup>2</sup> and half a troop of cavalry), will be ready in the valley south of the Wai-to-san at 5 a.m., and attack that height at daybreak.

“*The left column*, under Major-General Watanabe (5 battalions of the 2nd Brigade<sup>2</sup> and half a troop

<sup>1</sup> The detachment under General Kigoshi, left behind by the 12th Division south of Yin-tsiën-pu. (P. 71.)

<sup>2</sup> One battalion remaining as Divisional Reserve.

of cavalry), will stand at Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko before daybreak, ready to attack height '238.'

"Of the *Artillery*, the batteries on the heights north of Tan-kia-pu-tsy and north of Tschan-hei-tun will remain in their positions, supporting, if necessary, the infantry attack. The four batteries standing at Huan-kia-pu-tsy will be prepared to advance.

"The *Engineers* will remain with the last-named batteries to aid and improve roads, in case the artillery is moved forward.

"The *Guard Cavalry Regiment* will advance on the right of the right column, covering the right flank of the division.

"One battalion each of the 1st and 2nd Brigades will remain at Tan-kia-pu-tsy and Huan-kia-pu-tsy, at the disposal of the General Commanding the Division."

The 1st Brigade started from its bivouacs between 2 and 3 a.m., advancing in the direction of the Wai-to-san; the 1st Guard Regiment was marching on the right, and the 2nd Guard Regiment on the left. It was soon seen that the Wai-to-san was occupied by the Russians with but very weak outposts, which at once withdrew in a northerly and north-easterly direction on the approach of the Japanese. The height was occupied by the brigade at 6.30 a.m.—the brigade halting there for the present. At the same hour the Guard Cavalry Regiment arrived at Hi-ro-ki-rei, covering the right flank of the Guards after establishing touch with the left of the 12th Division at the Tschien-kou-lin Pass.

General Watanabe, commanding the 2nd Brigade of the Guard Division, received the Divisional Order at 1.30 a.m. On this, the 4th Guard Regiment, of which the 1st Battalion was apportioned as the Divisional Commander's reserve, was moved to a road east of Ni-do-ko, and the 3rd Guard Regiment to that village, both regiments to be ready there at 3 a.m. The commander of the brigade, who was with the 3rd Guard Regiment, retained two companies of that regiment at his disposal.

The men of the 2nd Brigade had their rifles loaded, it is true, but they had been ordered not to fire before it grew light, and to close on the enemy with the bayonet. In case a fire-action should ensue after all, in the dark, the men were recommended to fire on those who were taller than the Japanese. Both regiments advanced from their position of assembly across country—the 4th Guard Regiment to the right of and past Shimo-ro-kun-ko in the direction of height "238"; and the 3rd Guard Regiment past the left of the village named, against a low knoll west of the height. The regiments suited their formations to the ground. The 3rd Guard Regiment covered its front by a battalion moving on a broad front and forming a chain of patrols, followed at 50 metres' distance by three companies in line, the fourth company in the same formation keeping in third line at about 150 metres' distance. The other two battalions were marching in column of route—partly in fours, partly in groups—behind the battalion in front, at 200 metres' distance. The

4th Guard Regiment was advancing in a similar manner. The night was very dark. Marching off the roads proving rather difficult, frequent halts had to be made. Towards 5 a.m. the advanced patrols of both regiments were approaching height "238"; when the skirmishing line of the 4th Guard Regiment was mounting the slopes, it suddenly came upon Russian sentries, who at once gave fire. Without replying to it, the Japanese patrols fell back on their companies. The regiment continued its advance; the Russians, who were outposts of a brigade pushed to Pa-kia-tsy by the 4th Siberian Army Corps,<sup>1</sup> after a few shots retired into a position a little more north. When the foremost battalion of the 4th Guard Regiment had approached that position to within about 300 metres it began to dawn. The Russians then opened fire. The individual Russian marksmen being clearly visible against the brightening skyline, thus presenting a good target, the Japanese began to fire too; at the same time, the front of the leading battalion was prolonged to the right by two companies. It was soon seen that the Russians had only a weak garrison there; the Japanese therefore advanced to within closest distance of the position. Meanwhile the leading battalion of the 3rd Guard Regiment, after advancing over the low knoll west of height "238," had deployed against the right wing of the enemy.

The Russians, threatened in front and flank, did not wait for the assault, but withdrew to the

<sup>1</sup> P. 95.

northern portion of the Watanabe-yama.<sup>1</sup> Six wounded Russians were found in the advanced trenches, which had been occupied by one company, and one Russian was made prisoner; the main position, somewhat farther north, had been defended by one battalion. The 3rd Guard Regiment now occupied the Ohara-yama, and the 4th Guard Regiment on the right the slopes east of it on both sides of the road from Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko to Pa-kia-tsy. The Divisional Commander had meanwhile been holding back the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Guard Regiment for his own use. The regiments at once entrenched. By this time it was broad daylight. The commander of the Russian brigade engaged a fresh battalion, which had been standing on the road to Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko, against the 2nd Guard Brigade, ordering also a battery to come into action east of Pa-kia-tsy. This battalion deployed, advanced to within 200 metres of the fire-trenches of the 4th Guard Regiment, and opened a brisk fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Ida, commanding the regiment, on this account reinforced his front by one of the companies still available. The Russian garrison of the Watanabe-yama farther north maintaining also a hot fire on the 4th Guard Regiment, it had a rather hard struggle. Its losses were increasing; at noon the last company had to be engaged. It was afternoon, after the Japanese Artillery had done some good practice,

<sup>1</sup> This height was afterwards named Watanabe-yama, after the Japanese General of that name, who had captured it. The Ohara-yama is named after Colonel Ohara, commanding the 3rd Guard Regiment.

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before the situation of the hard-pressed regiment was improving.

When the Divisional Commander received the report of the capture of the Wai-to-san and Ohara-yama, he ordered the four batteries standing at Huan-kia-pu-tsy to advance. The order found the batteries already on the march, the Artillery commander having been watching the action, and having started the batteries on his own initiative without waiting for orders.

The 4th Battery therefore arrived already, shortly after 9 a.m., at Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko, coming into position east of that village, and opening fire on the Watanabe-yama.

In the afternoon the Russian detachments lying immediately opposite the 4th Guard Regiment withdrew to a distance of about 500 metres, but resumed their fire-action there. The losses of the two battalions of the 4th Guard Regiment fighting here amounted to 180 dead and wounded, of whom 50 by Artillery fire.

The 3rd Guard Regiment, too, had been unable to advance beyond the Ohara-yama. The Russians were lying quite close opposite the regiment, up to within 100 metres. Towards 8 a.m. they strengthened this portion of their fighting-line; some batteries at the same time came into action north of the Western San-jo-shi-san, directing their fire chiefly on the right wing of the 2nd Division, but at times also upon the 3rd Guard Regiment. Three sotnias as well, probably from General Mishtshenko's Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, rode up in a long extended line, in the

valley east of the Western San-jo-shi-san, against the left wing of the 3rd Guard Regiment. One company was deployed against the Cavalry, driving it back rapidly by fire.

Towards 9.30 a.m. the Russians were again considerably reinforced on the Watanabe-yama, whilst Mishtshenko at the same time was trying once more to make his arm felt by moving forward strong Cavalry from the neighbourhood of Schan-liu-ho-tsy against the left wing of the 3rd Guard Regiment. But this attack also failed, with considerable loss.

At 11 a.m. the 1st and 5th Batteries of the Japanese arrived at Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko, directing their fire, jointly with the 4th Battery, upon the Watanabe-yama.<sup>1</sup> But the Russian Infantry found good cover on the steep slopes, and was, moreover, entrenched; the effect of the Artillery was therefore too small for allowing the 3rd Guard Regiment to advance.

Towards 1 p.m. the Russians made more vigorous efforts for pushing back the 2nd Guard Brigade. General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps, ordered fresh Infantry to advance from Schan-liu-ho-tsy against the 3rd Guard Regiment, and the batteries north of the Western San-jo-shi-san and east of Pa-kia-tsy to direct, at the same time, an enveloping fire upon the Japanese lines; the Russian Infantry on the Watanabe-yama began to fire more vigorously too. But the 3rd Guard Regiment, having reinforced

<sup>1</sup> It cannot be ascertained what became of the fourth of the batteries that had been ordered up from Hun-kia-pu-tsy.

its firing-line, was able to stay the advance of the Russians ; nevertheless the situation of the regiment continued to be very difficult.

Meanwhile, on the right of the Japanese Guard Division, affairs had developed in the following way.

After the 1st Brigade had occupied the Wai-to-san at daybreak, patrols ascertained the enemy to be standing with about two companies<sup>1</sup> at Men-ka-ko. The commander of the brigade then pushed a party to the right, to cover his right flank ; he deployed the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment against height "135" on the northern slope of the Wai-to-san, which the Russians had occupied but weakly. The battalion succeeded in pushing back the enemy and occupying the height at 7.30 a.m. after a brief fire-action.

Shortly after 10 a.m. a long column, estimated at five battalions of Infantry, was ascertained from the Wai-to-san to be marching from Pa-kia-tsy on Man-hua-pu ; it was evidently the 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division from the 4th Siberian Army Corps under General Shileiko, which had been pushed to Pa-kia-tsy already on October 10.<sup>2</sup> One battalion of that force deployed against height "135," held by the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment, and opened fire at perhaps 700 metres' range ; about two companies continued marching on Men-ka-ko, and, with the two companies already there, advanced against the right flank of the 1st Brigade ; the rest seemed to remain halting at

<sup>1</sup> Probably from the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

<sup>2</sup> P. 95.

Man-hua-pu. Simultaneously with the Infantry, a battery of eight guns appeared east of Man-hua-pu, taking under fire the Japanese Infantry lying on the Wai-to-san. The situation of the brigade would doubtless have become very serious had the Russians engaged all their forces available in a decisive assault on the right of the Guard Division; though the strength of the column marching from Pa-kia-tsy on Man-hua-pu may have been overestimated, there is no doubt it was several battalions strong. But its commander, according to Russian custom, being unable to make up his mind to stake his whole force, and supporting the troops engaged in fighting merely by dribbles, the Japanese succeeded in maintaining themselves after their firing-line had been reinforced by all the reserves available. The Infantry was supported by Major Hidikata's Battery,<sup>1</sup> which, shortly before 2 p.m., unlimbered north of Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko, firing with good effect upon the battery at Man-hua-pu. Towards 3 p.m. the 1st Brigade received further welcome aid by the intervention of a battalion from the 46th Infantry Regiment, which had probably been standing as Kigoshi's reserve<sup>2</sup> at Ria-ka-ho-shi. Jointly with this battalion the right wing of the brigade advanced as well, driving the Russians back at Men-ka-ko; at 4.30 p.m. the heights east of that place were occupied by the Japanese.

When, shortly after 1 p.m., the Divisional Commander was informed of the great straits in which

<sup>1</sup> Composed of Russian guns captured on the Ya-lu.

<sup>2</sup> P. 112.

his 2nd Brigade was, he handed back to the 3rd Guard Regiment the 2nd Battalion he had retained as his reserve after the Ohara-yama had been occupied. About this time General Asada had gained the impression that the right wing of his division was not in very great danger, and would be able to hold on in spite of the Russian attempt to envelop it by Men-ka-ko; but the 2nd Brigade, forming his left wing, on the other hand, seemed to be threatened seriously, because the 3rd Guard Regiment was unable to gain ground; and, moreover, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, fighting on the left of that regiment, had as yet been unable to capture the strongly occupied height of the Western San-jo-shi-san. To safeguard the left of the Guard Division it seemed urgent to make first sure of that hill. The 2nd Guard Brigade was therefore ordered "to attack the Western San-jo-shi-san jointly with the 3rd Brigade, with as many troops as were available." General Asada, in addition, ordered the commander of the Artillery to unlimber an Artillery Abteilung south-west of the Ohara-yama, near the road from Ka-mi-ro-kun-ko to Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko, in support of the attack.

But, owing to a report wrongly delivered, the attack of the 2nd Guard Brigade did not come off in the manner intended.

The 2nd Battalion 3rd Guard Regiment having arrived south-west of the Ohara-yama, the commander of the brigade attached it to the 4th Guard Regiment, ordering Lieutenant-Colonel Ida, commanding the regiment, to advance with

that battalion and his own 1st Battalion, which during the night attack had remained as Divisional Reserve at Huan-kia-pu-tsy, to attack the Western San-jo-shi-san in co-operation with the 3rd Brigade. While General Watanabe was issuing this order, a warrant officer (holding an honorary commission) of the 3rd Brigade 2nd Division turned up, reporting that his brigade was facing a strongly superior enemy, and was withdrawing into its original position north of Tschan-hei-tun. Under these circumstances it was no longer a question of attacking the Western San-jo-shi-san, but for General Watanabe rather a question of directly protecting his seriously endangered left wing. He therefore ordered the 2nd Battalion 3rd Guard Regiment to occupy the knoll north-west of Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko, the Divisional Commander at the same time dispatching immediately after receiving this report an adjutant to the 3rd Brigade, to inform himself more exactly about the state of affairs there. When the adjutant returned, at 4.20 p.m., it proved the warrant officer had delivered the report he had to transmit wrongly. Its wording should have been actually: "The brigade is unable to capture the Western San-jo-shi-san alone in the face of the strength of the opposing enemy; it will therefore remain for the present in its position on the heights south of Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko."

The misunderstanding having been cleared up, General Watanabe, at 4.30 p.m., ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Ida to proceed now with the attack in support of the 3rd Brigade. As the 1st Battalion

4th Guard Regiment, coming up from Huan-kia-pu-tsy, did not arrive before dark, the 2nd Battalion 3rd Guard Regiment alone was available at once. That battalion deployed in the direction of the Western San-jo-shi-san, engaging the Russians occupying the north-eastern slopes of that hill; but it did not succeed in making material progress, the Russian Infantry, entrenched and supported by the batteries in the valley west of Schan-liu-ho-tsy, taking the assailants under an effective fire. Even when the 1st Battalion 4th Guard Regiment was being engaged towards evening, the attack did not make progress beyond Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko. The Divisional Commander finally ordered General Watanabe to withdraw his troops from Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko to the heights north-west of Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko.

The Japanese 2nd Division, on the left, received the Army Order for October 11 about midnight. General Baron Nishijima then ordered the 3rd Brigade to attack the Western San-jo-shi-san at daybreak, and the 15th Brigade to be standing at the same time ready on the line Pan-la-schan-tsy—Schuan-lun-szö, so as to turn against Temple Hill and the Russian position on the heights north of San-kia-tsy in co-operation with the advance of the 4th Army.

During the night one battery was brought forward to the north-west corner of Tsiën-tau, and the three batteries standing hitherto on the left were brought forward into positions south and south-east of Pan-la-schan-tsy. The Artillery regiment had orders to support the attack.

General Matsunaga, commanding the 3rd Brigade, was standing ready at Ka-mi-chin-ka-ko at 5 a.m. with the four battalions he had still available, the 1st and 2nd Battalions 29th Infantry Regiment having been taken away from him to form the reserve of the Divisional Commander. He ordered the 4th Infantry Regiment to advance against the heights of the Western San-jo-shi-san. The 3rd Battalion 29th Infantry Regiment remained behind in reserve.

The Western San-jo-shi-san and the heights south of it are steep and perfectly bare. The valley in front of the Japanese, stretching south of the block of hills, and being 500 to 600 metres broad, could be completely seen into from the Russian positions, the gaoljan having been everywhere harvested. Ditches traversing the fields, and numerous nullahs on the slopes, were the only means affording some cover to the attacking Infantry.

The Colonel Commanding the 4th Infantry Regiment deployed the 2nd Battalion in the direction of Ka-mi-yo-ka-ko and of the Western San-jo-shi-san, and the 1st Battalion on the left against the height south-east of Pan-la-schan-tsy, jutting out south-west, and occupied by the Russians as early as October 10.

During the advance of the regiment, and while it was approaching the bottom of the valley, it was seen that the Russian lines on the Western San-jo-shi-san were being gradually reinforced; the main hill-top was ascertained to be very strongly occupied; the occupants of the height

south-west of the hill were estimated at about two battalions. There was further reported an advance of strong Russian Infantry—about a brigade—from Sia-liu-ho-tsy towards the Western San-jo-shi-san. These were troops of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, evidently bent on offering here a determined resistance.<sup>1</sup> Under these conditions General Matsunaga decided to confine himself to an attack on the height south-west of the hill. After giving the Colonel of the 4th Infantry Regiment the necessary instructions, the latter brought his 3rd Battalion on the left wing into action too.

Meanwhile the Japanese batteries had opened fire, directing it partly on the Russian Infantry on the Western San-jo-shi-san, and partly on the height south-west of it. The Russian Artillery had come into action in the same position as on the previous day, that is to say, on the north-western slope of the hill, firing on the Japanese Artillery and on the 15th Brigade, which was advancing farther in the west. The Japanese batteries did not engage with the Russian in decisive action. They followed generally the tactics frequently used by them, to fire only when the Russian Artillery was firing slowly or not at all; but when the Russians directed a rapid fire on the Japanese batteries they at once became silent, the gun-detachments withdrawing under cover.

The 3rd Battalion 4th Infantry Regiment having prolonged the left of the firing-line, about

<sup>1</sup> Nothing is known about the employment in detail of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

10.45 a.m., the whole line began to advance against the San-jo-shi-san in rushes. The attack across the valley against the slopes occupied by the Russians took a pretty long time; more than two hours elapsed before the Japanese had worked up close enough to deliver the assault. In the last portions of the field of attack the nullahs on the slopes afforded the skirmishers in part good cover, enabling them on their left to approach the enemy to within 30 paces. When the Russians found themselves face to face with their assailants at such close quarters, they rose from their trenches, rushing out to meet the Japanese, who were charging them with the bayonet. After a violent struggle, lasting a few minutes, the Russians were pushed back in a north-easterly direction, pursued with a hot fire by the victor. The pursued crowded together in a deep ravine in the west, at the foot of the Western San-jo-shi-san; afterwards more than 200 dead from the 8th Siberian Infantry Regiment were found in there.

The advance of the Japanese 4th Infantry Regiment came to a standstill after this success. General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps, was determined to hold the northern portion of the Western San-jo-shi-san at all cost. He occupied that height very strongly, ordering, in addition, several counter-attacks for recapturing the lost advanced positions; all of which, however, failed, in face of the Japanese Infantry and Artillery fire.

Such was the situation when in the afternoon General Matsunaga made another vain attempt

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 127

of advancing against the northern portion of the Western San-jo-shi-san, aided by portions of the Guard Division.<sup>1</sup> Further attacks had to be postponed till night.

The 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division, in accordance with Orders, was standing at daybreak of October 11 on the line Pan-la-schan-tsy—Shuan-lun-szö ready to advance, the 16th Infantry Regiment being on the right, and the 30th on the left. Two companies of each regiment were stationed south-west of Schuan-lun-szö as reserve of the brigade. On the left the brigade was in touch with the right Division of the 4th Army. The advanced guard of Mau's Detachment on the Russian side had occupied Temple Hill.<sup>2</sup> The Russian position extended from the country north of San-kia-tsy in the direction of Siau-pu; in the centre the line occupied formed a salient projecting from Temple Hill south.<sup>3</sup> The position was not well chosen. The salient angle was exposed to the danger of being enveloped on both sides by an assailant. The country north of Pan-la-schan-tsy to the line San-kia-tsy—Temple Hill being perfectly open, the Russian position might have been chosen much better perhaps from the southern extremity of Temple Hill to East San-kia-tsy along the bed of the brook south of Temple Hill. In front of this ready-made trench was a clear field of fire of more than 1,500 metres' extent; the villages of West and East San-kia-

<sup>1</sup> P. 124.

<sup>2</sup> P. 95.

<sup>3</sup> Temple Hill is a knoll wooded on its western slope, and containing a large temple, several buildings enclosed by walls. (Appendix XVIII.)

tsy, consisting of massive buildings surrounded by stone and clay walls, would, moreover, have served as excellent pivots. The position selected by the Russians was occupied by five or six companies; weaker parties had been pushed to San-kia-tsy and Ko-ka-tsy.

As the Orders ran, the 15th Brigade was to time its attack with that of the 4th Army.<sup>1</sup> But as the 10th Division on the left did not attack at all in the morning, the 15th Brigade was lying idle too in its position of readiness until the afternoon. Russian batteries standing northwest of the Western San-jo-shi-san, further, one battery north of East San-kia-tsy, and one on the San-kai-seki-san, sometimes directed their fire upon the troops resting, who, however, covered by the country, did not suffer any loss; only the 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, finding no proper cover, lost 10 men dead or wounded by Artillery fire. The Russian battery north of East San-kia-tsy was fired upon by two batteries standing at Pan-la-schan-tsy, and by some batteries of the 4th Army; it therefore changed its position frequently, but continued firing until evening.

Towards 3 p.m. the 15th Brigade was ordered not to wait any longer for the advance of the 4th Army, but to attack Temple Hill now. General Okasaki, commanding the brigade, thereupon deployed his troops for attack: The 16th Infantry Regiment was to advance on West San-kia-tsy, and the 30th Infantry Regiment to try gaining as rapidly as possible Ko-ka-tsy, and then

<sup>1</sup> P. 123.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 129

to capture Temple Hill. The regiments deployed aligned in line; the skirmishers moved at first with intervals of two to three paces, but drawing closer together as the attack proceeded. At first the whole line moved at a walk, but shortly afterwards began to run, because the Russians opened fire the moment the advance commenced. The Japanese skirmishing-line opened fire, after arriving within about 900 metres of the Russian detachments at San-kia-tsy and Ko-ka-tsy; thence the advance over the perfectly level plain began in rushes, mostly carried out by companies. Though the gaoljan cut was still lying on the fields, their small bundles did not afford any cover to the troops. The supports, as well as the companies in reserve, advanced by rushes; in doing so they adopted generally a single-line formation with loose touch. Nowhere on the field of attack were column formations seen which would have offered favourable targets to the Russian Artillery on the flanks. The four companies of the brigade reserve also advanced from Schuan-lun-szö by rushes in single line, following each other écheloned to the right and left at about 75 metres' distance.

From Ko-ka-tsy a portion of the 30th Infantry Regiment's right wing made very clever use of the deeply cut bed of the brook south of Temple Hill for pushing the attack farther.

The Russian Artillery took the assailants under a severe fire, but without obtaining any material effect. Only the 10th and 11th Companies of the 30th Infantry Regiment, which had remained in

reserve, were, about 4 p.m., struck by two percussion-shells, killing or wounding some 50 men.

The attack proceeded without material delay. On the Japanese approaching the villages the Russian advanced detachments withdrew; at 4.45 p.m. Ko-ka-tsy village was left behind by the 30th Infantry Regiment. The fire-fight became now most violent. It was necessary to engage one company of the brigade reserve, which had followed behind the left wing, against the Russian Infantry on the San-kai-seki-san, to ward off flanking fire.

Shortly after 5 p.m. the firing-line assaulted Temple Hill, capturing its foremost trenches. The Russians hurried back to the northern edge of the hill, offering renewed resistance behind the rocks there. The Japanese pushed on. Another violent fire-action developed at close range on Temple Hill, producing no longer any decisive result. The right of the 16th Infantry Regiment, having somewhat lagged behind during the main attack, probably on the report of Russian Infantry advancing from the east on East San-ki-tsy, the advance of the brigade now came to a standstill. The Japanese, as was their custom, at once began to entrench after their successful assault; the newly captured position, beginning west of East San-ki-tsy, stretched to the western slopes of Temple Hill, projecting on the hill itself in a salient bent north. The villages East and West San-ki-tsy, as well as Ko-ka-tsy, remained occupied.

During the evening, troops of General Mau's

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 131

Detachment and portions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps made several counter-attacks, without succeeding in pushing the Japanese from Temple Hill. Appreciating the situation correctly, General Okasaki, commanding the Japanese 15th Brigade, had previously asked support from the Divisional Commander, so as to have fresh troops at hand to oppose any likely counter-attacks. General Baron Nishijima then placed at the disposal of the brigade six companies of the 29th Infantry Regiment, belonging to the 3rd Brigade.

The Russian Centre vainly attempts to drive the Japanese 2nd Division again from Temple Hill.

Two counter-attacks, made by General Mau against Temple Hill from a north-easterly and north-westerly direction in the evening failed, owing to the well-directed fire from the Japanese trenches. But the repulse of an attack from the east was more difficult. General Sarubaiev had detailed a regiment from the 4th Siberian Army Corps to attack the right flank of the 15th Brigade from Sia-liu-ho-tsy. In dense columns, and with bands playing, the Russians advanced on East San-kia-tsy, but then stopped short north-east of the village, looking calmly on how the six companies of the Japanese 29th Regiment proceeded to occupy that village, quietly adopting measures for meeting the expected counter-attack. Three more companies of the 16th Infantry Regiment were moved up to reinforce the garrison. When darkness had set in, the Russian regiment began to assault, penetrating into the village on three sides at one and the same time; there was an obstinate fight of man against man, ending finally with the discomfiture of the Russians. The

Russians withdrew in the dark in a north-easterly direction. East San-kia-tsy remained in the hands of the Japanese.

All the counter-attacks having failed, the troops of General Mau's Detachment abandoned the portions of Temple Hill still held by them in front, evacuating the height completely during the night, and retiring to the knolls situated farther north. Behind the rocks where the Russians had once more established themselves the Japanese found afterwards, in addition to some wounded, about 50 dead, of the 121st and 122nd Infantry Regiments,<sup>1</sup> mostly shot in the head; they found, moreover, at various other spots on Temple Hill more than 300 dead, and buried them.

That day cost the 15th Brigade 921 men, of whom 112 were dead.

The course the fight was taking with the Guard Division and with the right wing of the 2nd Division caused General Baron Kuroki to think that the position the enemy was still holding on the general line Man-hua-pu—Watanabe-yama—Western San-jo-shi-san could no longer be captured on October 11; he therefore, at 6.30 p.m., arranged for the Guard and 2nd Divisions to continue the attack during the night.

Although the two Divisions had not succeeded till the evening of the 11th in pushing the troops of the 4th Siberian Army Corps entirely from the Watanabe-yama and Western San-jo-shi-san, yet General Sarubaiev, taking into consideration

<sup>1</sup> 1st Brigade 31st Infantry Division, belonging to Mau's party.

the severe losses, thought he could no longer maintain himself there; he therefore determined to withdraw gradually during the night to the heights north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy—Schan-liu-ho-tsy.

Mau's Brigade, after the loss of Temple Hill, had fallen back in a north-easterly direction to the heights at Örr-wa, thus gaining touch again with the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

General Mishtshenko's Cossack Brigade was still on the left of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, where he had made some local attacks on the Japanese Guards.<sup>1</sup>

General Count Nodzu, after capturing the heights east of Wu-li-tai-tsy, which the Russians, by the way, had already evacuated,<sup>2</sup> was to make with his 4th Army a right wheel, timing his advance with that of the 1st and 2nd Armies.<sup>3</sup> The movements of his Army thus depending in the first instance on the progress the Armies on his flanks were making, he decided to support their attacks with strong forces. He ordered the 5th Division to continue its attack upon the line Fan-kia-tun—Schi-li-ho, in touch with the 2nd Army, and caused the 20th Brigade of the 10th Division to co-operate with the attack of the 1st Army. Colonel Kamada, commanding the 8th Brigade (also of the 10th Division), in place of General Otani, fallen ill, received orders to attack the San-kai-seki-san, but to arrange beforehand with the 20th Brigade and 5th Division.

The Japanese 4th Army attacks the positions of the 1st and 10th Army Corps without making any progress.

To each of the two brigades of the 10th Division were apportioned as a reinforcement one Abteilung

<sup>1</sup> P. 118,

<sup>2</sup> P. 85.

<sup>3</sup> P. 104.

of the Divisional Artillery, one Kobi regiment, another Abteilung from the 14th Field Artillery Regiment, as well as a detachment of Cavalry and Pioneers.

Just the same as the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division, adjoining on the right, had been waiting for the advance of the right of the 4th Army before deploying for attack against Temple Hill, so the Commander of the 20th Brigade seems to have waited for the start of the 15th Brigade. The Infantry remained inactive north-east of Tu-men-tsy, while the Artillery attached to them was intervening in the Artillery fight of the 2nd Division from positions north of Yun-kuan-tun. The Russians bringing gradually numerous batteries into action at different places, General Baron Kawamura, commanding the 10th Division, sent one more Abteilung of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade into the fire position, probably on the authority of his Army Commander, there being thus finally in action at Yun-kuan-tun, 18 mountain-guns of the 10th Division and 36 field-guns. When the 15th Brigade proceeded to attack Temple Hill in the afternoon after the Japanese Artillery had made good practice for some considerable time, the 20th Brigade started, too, deploying and advancing against that height on the left of the 15th Brigade, without, however, keeping in close touch with it. In the actual assault the brigade did not take part. As the 15th Brigade was making rapid progress, the 20th Brigade gradually wheeled north in the direction of the San-kai-seki-san,

reaching the country east of Ta-pu when it began to grow dark.

The 8th Brigade had not done anything decisive up to this time either. General Baron Kawamura, commanding the 10th Division, probably wishing to wait first for some success of the 5th Division, directed the Artillery attached to the 8th Brigade to support the advance of that Division. The batteries unlimbered east of Tschou-kuan-tun, taking the Russian Artillery standing at Schi-li-ho under fire.

The hesitating attitude of the 10th Division was of advantage to the enemy, who at first had not occupied the threatened San-kai-seki-san at all.

The critical situation of his Centre had caused the Russian Commander-in-Chief already some anxiety. When the Japanese, early in the morning, attacked the Russian front, the interval, several kilometres long, between the left of the 10th Army Corps at Fan-kia-tun and Mau's Detachment on Temple Hill looked rather serious, a downright challenge to penetrate. To meet this danger Kuropatkin, by direct orders, moved up the nearest available portions of the General Reserve — 3 battalions 145th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battery 43rd Artillery Brigade from the advanced guard of the 1st Army Corps—directing them to occupy the San-kai-seki-san. Orders were dispatched to the 10th Army Corps to hold Yin-pan village so as to protect the right flank of Mau's Detachment.

Meanwhile the Japanese 5th Division, supported by Artillery of the 10th Division, was attacking

the advanced-guard position of this Army Corps on the Schi-li-ho, where General Riabinkin was in command. The attack did not make any progress during the day. The Japanese Infantry, insufficiently supported by its own Artillery, suffered from the fire of the Russian batteries; various attempts to assault were beaten off.

The indifferent progress the 5th Division was making was somewhat due to the hesitating attitude of the right of the adjoining 3rd Division belonging to the 2nd Army.<sup>1</sup>

Riabinkin's troops had nevertheless a hard time. When the Commander-in-Chief's request to occupy Yin-pan village for protecting the left flank of Mau's Detachment was received, the commander of the advanced guard had but two battalions still in reserve, which he could not spare. General Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Infantry Division, which was standing idle at Hun-pauschan, was therefore ordered to send two battalions of the 34th Infantry Regiment to Yin-pan,<sup>2</sup> and to place them under General Riabinkin, who was to keep touch with Mau's Detachment. Afterwards the 9th Infantry Division was obliged to detach two more battalions from the 35th Infantry Regiment in support of the advanced guard, whose reserves had been quickly used up. Under these

<sup>1</sup> More details about the combat of the 5th Division are wanting. Nor is it known where on this day the 10th, 11th, and 3rd Kobi Brigades, as well as the portions of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade not employed in action, were stationed.

<sup>2</sup> Yin-pan had been occupied by two companies on October 10, but it looks as if these two companies retired early on October 11 into the Schi-li-ho position with Colonel Solomko's Detachment. (Pp. 93 and 94.)

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 137

circumstances recapturing the height of Ku-schut-sy was out of the question. Apart from the severe losses suffered by the Infantry (the 124th Infantry Regiment had lost in the morning 7 officers and 250 men), the superiority of the Japanese Artillery was very much in evidence too, the very unskilful handling of the Russian batteries certainly contributing to that effect. The advanced guard having in all only three batteries available,<sup>1</sup> these ought to have been brought into action at least together; instead of this, General Riabinkin ordered first one battery to unlimber, and later on a second. The third battery the General did not engage at all, but sent it back to the main body at Hun-pau-schan at 4 p.m., with the remark that he had no use for it. The two batteries in action were fought down within a short time without having obtained any effect against the batteries of the Japanese which had unlimbered under cover. In the evening the batteries had lost a third of their gun-detachments and numerous horses. It was not till matters had come to such a pass that General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, made up his mind to push forward to Sin-tschuan an Abteilung of the 9th Artillery Brigade to reinforce the advanced guard, and to withdraw to the main body during night the 6th and 8th Batteries, which had fought with so much loss. The other Abteilung of the 9th Artillery Brigade was to go into position between Fan-kia-tun and Ta-kou; to Ta-kou were to move,

<sup>1</sup> Two batteries 31st Artillery Brigade belonged to Mau's Detachment.

moreover, another battalion and a half of the 34th Infantry Regiment, which had already pushed two battalions to Yin-pan. These measures were to be carried out during night.

The 4th Battalion 145th Infantry Regiment, from the 1st Army Corps, arrived in the afternoon at the San-kai-seki-san from Tun-san-ho, while the 146th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd and half the 3rd Battery 43rd Artillery Brigade were marching to the height east of Tan-hai-schi, prolonging the position of the 145th Infantry Regiment eastward. The 146th Infantry Regiment established touch with Mau's Detachment standing at Orr-wa. The 2nd Brigade 37th Infantry Division, together with the 2nd Abteilung 43rd Artillery Brigade,<sup>1</sup> was then moved up to Tun-san-ho by order of Kuropatkin; one battalion of the 147th Infantry Regiment, serving as escort to Kuropatkin's Headquarters, was there already.

The 22nd Division of the 1st Army Corps moved forward to Tun-san-tsy; Kuropatkin's Headquarters remained at Tun-san-ho.

The 2nd Japanese Army successfully attacks on both sides of the Scha-ho the advanced positions of the Russian 17th Army Corps.

General Baron Oku, with the 2nd Japanese Army, had, after the actions on October 10, ascertained that the enemy's main position into which the Russian advanced troops had retired, was on the line Schi-li-ho—Yen-kia-wan, and had decided to attack that position on the 11th. He therefore, on October 10, at 8.30 in the evening, issued an Army Order embodying the following :

<sup>1</sup> The 6th Battery 43rd Artillery Brigade, during its transport by rail from home, had managed to provide itself on its own initiative with protective shields giving cover against shrapnel and Infantry fire up to 500 metres' range.

“*The Army* will attack the enemy to-morrow; the first objective of the attack is the enemy standing on the Schi-li-ho.

“*The foremost line of Infantry* will begin to move for attack from the line Schuan-tai-tsy—Ta-tu-san-pu at 6 a.m., *the 3rd Division* against the section Schi-li-ho—Nan-kuan-tsy (inclusive), and *the 6th Division* against the section to the west of the former as far as Yen-kia-wan.

“*The 4th Division* is to advance against Ta-yutschun-pu and to the west of it.

“*The General Reserve* will assemble in their bivouacs at 6 a.m.”

When, after issuing this Order, Oyama's directives for October 11<sup>1</sup> arrived, there was no need for changing that Order.

General Baron Oshima started with the 3rd Division at 6 a.m. on October 11. Branching off two battalions, probably from the 6th Infantry Regiment, to go from Men-hu-lu-tun to Wu-li-tai-tsy, to establish touch with the 5th Division, the main body of the Division advanced from Schuan-tai-tsy on Nan-kuan-tsy over the gaoljan fields, mostly cleared of their crops. The 2nd Battalion 18th Infantry Regiment formed the advanced guard. On approaching Nan-kuan-tsy to within 800 metres, it met with intense Infantry fire coming from the southern edge of the village; at the same moment several Russian battalions from the 1st Brigade 3rd Infantry Division 17th Army Corps, as well as two batteries of the 3rd Artillery Brigade and one sotnia, advanced from

<sup>1</sup> P. 104.

the north on Nan-kuan-tsy. While the Russian batteries unlimbered south-west of the place, the Japanese advanced-guard battalion deployed, engaging in a fire-action; but Russian Infantry advancing was threatening its left flank. The 3rd Battalion of the same regiment, which was marching at the head of the main body, then prolonged the left of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st Battalion advancing to reinforce the right. The Artillery of the Division came into action in two groups north-east of Men-hu-lu-tun.

The two battalions 6th Infantry Regiment had meanwhile traversed Wu-li-tai-tsy, which the Russians had previously evacuated, and were moving in the direction of Siau-wen-kou. Schi-li-ho being strongly occupied, the 5th Division on the right being hotly engaged without making any progress, and on the left the 17th Brigade, which was engaged south of Nan-kuan-tsy, seeming to be hard pressed, the 6th Infantry Regiment was also unable to advance any farther. The commander therefore decided to halt for the present at Siau-wen-kou.

The action at Nan-kuan-tsy had meanwhile assumed the character of a stationary fight. Vigorous counter-attacks of the Russians with two battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division's Reserve obliged the Japanese to engage gradually all their forces available; the Japanese line was but slowly gaining ground at some points. At first the front of the 18th Infantry Regiment was prolonged to the right by the other regiment (the 34th) of the 17th Brigade; later, after severe loss, General

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 141

Baron Oshima brought up as reinforcement the last reserve, the 33rd Infantry Regiment of the 5th Brigade. Once, by an energetic counter-attack of the Russian 9th Infantry Regiment from Nan-kuan-tsy, the Japanese were driven back for a considerable distance; but ultimately, towards evening, after engaging also portions of the General Reserve of the 2nd Army, they succeeded in repulsing the Russians for good and occupying Nan-kuan-tsy. Especially the Japanese 18th Infantry Regiment had suffered much in the exceedingly bloody action. A striking feature was the small effect of the Russian Artillery; the batteries, hampered in their view by the gaoljan which was still partly uncut, probably could not locate the Japanese guns, and hence fired at random, without any material results.

The Japanese 6th Division, advancing in two columns to the left of the 3rd Division, had some more rapid success. Though the 45th Infantry Regiment, advancing by Örr-tai-tsy as right column, was gaining ground but slowly, owing to the ground being open, the left and stronger column, the 24th Brigade, succeeded about 3 p.m. in driving Colonel Stakovitch's Detachment, belonging to the 17th Army Corps, from Yen-kia-wan, and in occupying that place. On the right column hearing of this, it worked its way up closer, too, when reinforced by portions of the 13th Infantry Regiment, reaching by rushes, without undue loss, the little wood south of Yen-kia-wan, where it began to entrench.

Of the Artillery of the Japanese 6th Division

four batteries had unlimbered west of Örr-tai-tsy, and two east of Ta-tu-san-pu, supporting the advance of their Infantry.

Great alarm was caused in the Russian position by the evacuation of Yen-kia-wan; this alarm increased when, farther west, General Grekov, with his Orenburg Cossack Brigade was, owing to the advance of the Japanese 4th Division, obliged to give way north from Li-kia-tun, exposing the flank of the 17th Army Corps. With the object of recapturing Yen-kia-wan, General Wolkov, commanding the 17th Army Corps, reinforced Stakovich's Detachment by two battalions 140th Infantry Regiment and one battery, these being taken from the 35th Infantry Division in reserve, and put in motion on Tsun-lun-yen-tun. But nothing came of it, the right column of the Japanese 4th Division having meanwhile deployed on the western bank of the Scha-ho against Ta-yu-tschun-pu, threatening to capture that place.

The 4th Division, after starting in the morning, likewise in two columns,<sup>1</sup> to advance, in compliance with Army Orders, against Ta-yu-tschun-pu and west of it,<sup>2</sup> received about 10.30 a.m. instructions from General Baron Oku to keep more to the right, and drive the enemy from the line Yen-kia-wan—Ta-yu-tschun-pu, so as to facilitate thereby the attack of the 6th Division.

But the left column of the 6th Division having meanwhile made progress unaided, and driven the

<sup>1</sup> From the 7th Brigade; the 19th Brigade is said to have joined the General Reserve altogether.

<sup>2</sup> P. 139.

enemy from Yen-kia-wan, the Army Commander ordered the 4th Division to push in the general direction on Lin-schin-pu, to threaten the right flank of the Russians. General Baron Tsukamoto, commanding the 4th Division, was, however, unable to carry out the order, he having ascertained the presence of strong Russian forces<sup>1</sup> in the neighbourhood north-west of Lin-schin-pu. He was, moreover, obliged to deal with the enemy at Ta-yu-tschun-pu first. The right column therefore, deployed against that village, attacking six companies of the 11th Infantry Regiment, from Colonel Stakovich's Detachment, which had retired thither. After a prolonged and obstinate resistance, Stakovich gave way to the superior pressure of the Japanese, retiring on Tsun-lun-yen-tun. The Japanese, however, did not pursue, but established themselves for the night at Ta-yu-tschun-pu. The left column of the 4th Division had merely met portions of General Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade, driving them away as the column advanced. The column remained overnight at Li-kia-tun, so as to be ready for opposing at once any likely attack of the enemy from the country north-west of Lin-schin-pu. General Baron Oku reiterated, in the course of the day, several times his order to the 4th Division to advance on Lin-schin-pu; he, therefore, does not seem to have been sufficiently informed by the 4th Division about the 6th Siberian Army Corps. A vigorous intervention by that corps might have placed the whole of

<sup>1</sup> 6th Siberian Army Corps.

the 2nd Army, or at least the 4th Division, in a very tight corner. Headquarters of the 2nd Army billeted in Pu-tsau-kou; the General Reserve bivouacked there too.

The Russian 6th Siberian Army Corps advances to protect the Russian right flank.

General Baron Bilderling had requested General Soboliev, commanding the 6th Siberian Army Corps, already in the morning, to relieve the right flank of the 17th Army Corps by going forward. But, having regard to Kuropatkin's telegram, in which the Commander-in-Chief had designated the 6th Siberian Army Corps as his strategic reserve,<sup>1</sup> General Soboliev did not think himself justified in responding to this request. He only promised to look after the protection of the right flank in case the Western Detachment was going to retire; he would then accept battle in his prepared positions. After this reply General Baron Bilderling applied to the Commander-in-Chief direct, obtaining from him at 12 noon an order causing the 6th Siberian Army Corps to move with the advanced guard on Wan-tschuan-tsy, and with the main body to the line Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun. After this movement had been completed at 4 p.m., the sorely pressed Colonel Stakovich, and General Grekov, also turned to Soboliev, with the request of supporting them by an offensive move of his advanced guard. Thereupon, General Soboliev directed, at 7 p.m., three battalions of the advanced guard to go forward in a south-westerly direction and occupy Ta-tai. This order had been effected about 10 p.m., but when, during the night, General

Soboliev heard of General Grekov retiring with his Cossacks farther north, he ordered the three battalions to face about likewise, and to withdraw on the main body of the advanced guard.

Nothing is reported on what Dembovski's Detachment was doing; it therefore seems that Dembovski was standing fast at Ta-wan-kan-pu—Sin-tai-tsy on the 11th as well.

The Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade had reached San-de-pu in accordance with orders. In the afternoon the brigade was attacked by several Russian companies, which, probably belonging to Dembovski's Detachment, were advancing from Ku-kia-tsy. After a brief fire-fight, in which the brigade was considerably supported by the Infantry attached to it, the attack was repulsed, the Russians withdrawing again in a northerly direction.

At 6 p.m., before the 3rd Division had succeeded in capturing Nan-kuan-tsy, Headquarters of the Second Japanese Army dispatched to Oyama's Headquarters a report on the situation, and on the further intentions. This report stated that after the capture of Yen-kia-wan, on the Scha-ho, the Army, having been opposed by at least two Divisions, had continued the attack in the direction ordered, but had failed to make any more material progress; that, if at dusk no further advantage was gained, it was intended to continue the attack during the night and in the early morning.

Marshal Marquis Oyama did not, even on October 11, obtain quite an accurate picture of the actual distribution of the Russian forces.

Views  
and inten-  
tions of  
Japanese  
General  
Head-  
quarters  
on the  
evening  
of Octo-  
ber 11.

From the reports coming in, he thought he must conclude the main mass of the enemy to be concentrated about Fön-kia-pu. He therefore hoped in the further conduct of his operations, which were to consist of a gradual wheel of his whole Army north-east, to be able to meet the main forces presently, and to beat them. With the object of the better qualifying for its task the 4th Army, which had certainly initiated the wheel demanded of it for October 11, but had not carried it through completely, and in all likelihood was bound to come across the main forces of the enemy about Fön-kia-pu, the Commander-in-Chief placed under its orders the whole of his General Reserve, retaining in its stead at his disposal the 5th Division, which was being assembled at Ku-schu-tsy. The General Reserve of the Japanese Army had marched during the day from Lö-ta-tai to Tumen-tsy; thence it could be moved up by the 4th Army. In the evening the Armies received orders to continue the attack on October 12; the right wing of the 1st Army was to remain on the defensive, and its left was to attack jointly with the 4th Army. The task of the 2nd Army to advance on Scha-ho-pu and Lin-schin-pu, with the object of facilitating the right wheel of the 4th Army, remained unaltered.

The closing of the day did not synchronise with the finish of the fighting. The action continued on the western and eastern wings. When the Japanese succeeded in capturing Nan-kuan-tsy towards evening,<sup>1</sup> General Wolkov, commanding the 17th

<sup>1</sup> P. 141.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 147

Army Corps, became very anxious at the loss of that place. Taking into consideration the fact that this extensive place close opposite Yen-tou-niu-lu village might form an excellent pivot for any further attacks by the Japanese, and be of the utmost value to them, especially in any attempt at penetration, he resolved to retake that village. But the 3rd Infantry Division was no longer fit to do it; for the combat lasting all day had absorbed already all its reserves. The right at Örr-schi-kia-tsy had been reinforced by one battalion of the 10th Infantry Regiment; it had been also necessary to support the 12th Infantry Regiment fighting at Lun-wan-miau. But the recapture of the heights west of Ku-schu-tsy having meanwhile been abandoned,<sup>1</sup> the 138th Infantry Regiment, that had been brought up to Schi-li-ho, became available; six companies of it were to march to Lun-wan-miau, and to advance at once on Nan-kuan-tsy. But on the news coming in from the right that Colonel Stakovich, after his retreat from Yen-kia-wan to Ta-yu-tschun-pu, could no longer hold on even to that place, the attack was given up for the moment; the General Commanding resolved, however, to capture the place by a night attack.

With growing darkness the fire-fight was dying away gradually. When darkness was complete, General Wolkov ordered the General Commanding the 35th Infantry Division to attack Nan-kuan-tsy. The latter detailed for this duty the 139th Infantry Regiment and two battalions of the 140th Infantry

The Russian 17th Army Corps recaptures the village of Nan-kuan-tsy.

<sup>1</sup> P. 137.

Regiment that were closest at hand. The last reserve of the 137th Infantry Regiment, with some batteries, was placed in readiness at Tschien-liu-tan-kou in case of failure, and to protect the right flank.

The troops attacking were ordered to leave behind their knapsacks, to put on their greatcoats, and to carry out the assault without firing a shot. The start was made from Tschien-liu-tan-kou, the 139th Infantry Regiment leading. The night was perfectly dark. When the leading companies marching through the man-high gaoljan were approaching Lun-wan-miau, a lively fusillade was suddenly heard. General Glasko, who commanded the 2nd Brigade 35th Infantry Division, and was leading the troops, was afraid his approach had been discovered by the Japanese, and thought he had better carry out the attack at daybreak supported by the Artillery. But the fire soon ceasing, the advance was continued. Next morning it became known that the fire they had heard had proceeded from their own troops of the right section. At Lun-wan-miau the colour of the 139th Infantry Regiment was left behind, escorted by the 3rd Company, the 1st and 2nd Companies extending skirmishers, and the 4th Company following in support. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions formed up in companies, following the 1st Battalion afterwards. Of the 140th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion traversed Lun-wan-miau to assault Nankuan-tsy from the east, the 2nd Battalion of that regiment forming the General Reserve. The troops having gone forward in this formation for about

another quarter of an hour, they suddenly met with a severe fire, doing but little damage, the Japanese firing too high. The contours of Nan-kuan-tsy village now emerged from the darkness. The 4th Company 139th Infantry Regiment was brought up into the first line; the skirmishers descended the precipitous slopes of the river-bank, resolutely forcing their way into the village on the other bank. Portions of the battalions of that regiment following in rear had previously wheeled off to assault the village from the west, while the 1st Battalion 140th Regiment pushed into the village from the east. A furious fight with cold steel ensued, ending with the victory of the Russians. The Japanese, being taken partly by surprise, so much as to leave behind their piled arms on the village green, gave way, and are said (according to Russian reports) to have left about 1,000 dead in Nan-kuan-tsy. The chief loss of the Japanese fell upon the 33rd Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Division; the Russian loss was insignificant. It was 11 in the evening when the attack was decided.

The 17th Army Corps was now holding again its position as in the morning; but this success was purchased by staking almost the whole of the reserves, although the troops who had attacked Nan-kuan-tsy had suffered little. Of fresh forces the General Commanding had now only available fifteen companies of the 137th Regiment and four batteries; of these troops one more battalion had to be detailed during the night to go to Örr-schi-kia-tsy to reinforce the right

section, movements of the enemy being constantly noticed in front, giving rise to fears of a night attack. The chances for a successful continuation of the battle on October 12 were therefore, in spite of the nocturnal success, not favourable at all; and the less so because the right wing was exposed to an envelopment, owing to the loss of Yen-kia-wan and Ta-yu-tschun-pu.

There was, of course, no need to be afraid of this, if the 6th Siberian Army Corps could be relied upon to intervene vigorously. But General Wolkov having waited all day in vain for this intervention, the co-operation of that corps on October 12 did not seem to be ensured at all.

Portions  
of the 1st  
Siberian  
Army  
Corps de-  
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tsy-lin  
Passes,  
but have  
to give up  
again the  
positions  
captured.

General Baron Stackelberg had been firmly resolved to push the eastern wing of the Japanese back and carry through the task imposed on him. But when the day passed off and evening came without his troops by their efforts being rewarded with success, he almost gave up the game. He certainly had the intention of continuing the attack during the night, but dropped it at once when hearing of the state of affairs in the Centre of the Russian front.<sup>1</sup>

Towards evening, reports came in from the 4th Siberian Army Corps adjoining on the right, saying that the corps was unable to hold its advanced positions any longer, and that the General Commanding felt therefore induced to withdraw his troops to the heights north of Sia-liu-ho-tsy and Schan-liu-ho-tsy.

This message greatly alarmed General Baron

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 132 and 133.

Stackelberg. Not only had the attack of his troops failed, but his own right wing, the portion of the 1st Siberian Army Corps standing at the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass, was now also unguarded, and liable to be enveloped, owing to the retrograde movement of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The General therefore decided to discontinue the attack against the heights of the passes, so as to be able to meet the new danger. About midnight he issued the following Order :<sup>1</sup>

“ 1. The attack initiated will be discontinued.

“ 2. At once, during night, under cover of darkness, as many troops as possible are to be withdrawn from the fighting-line, to reinforce the reserves of the corps.

“ 3. The positions occupied are to be entrenched.

“ 4. The main reserve (5th East Siberian Rifle Division), reinforced by a portion of the artillery 3rd Siberian Army Corps, will move to Sia-pin-tai-tsy,<sup>2</sup> establishing there a position, in case of a hostile attack through the gap between our right and the 4th Siberian Army Corps. Two regiments, with two batteries, will march to the Wai-tauschan<sup>3</sup> and the hill with the two knolls.<sup>4</sup>

“ 5. If the 4th Siberian Army Corps continues retreating, only what is absolutely necessary must be left on the heights mentioned ; the main reserve, with all the rest, will advance from the Wai-tau-

<sup>1</sup> According to sources of Captain Markov of the Russian General Staff (“ Woienni Sbornik,” 1905).

<sup>2</sup> 2½ kilometres south of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>3</sup> West of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>4</sup> South-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa (“ Zwei Kuppen Hügel ” on the map).

schan, vigorously attacking flank and rear of the enemy pressing the 4th Siberian Army Corps."

But before this Order had become known to all the troops, which, owing to the difficulties of transmission in the mountainous country, may have taken all night, the various attacks for capturing the passes continued.

On the Japanese side, the 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment and one battalion 4th Kobi Regiment, from the Guard Kobi Brigade, were holding the small hills on both sides of the Ta-lin Pass. The largest of these hills was east of the pass, somewhat in advance of the rest of the hill range, being defended by one section of the 2nd Company 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment.

Although the ground favours an attack on these heights at the passes<sup>1</sup> much more than an attack on the southern section of the Japanese position east of Pen-si-hu, the 1st Siberian Army Corps had not seriously attacked them during the day. The Japanese only noticed the enemy pushing gradually closer to the Ta-lin Pass position. General Baron Ino-uye therefore reinforced his line towards evening, placing at the disposal of the 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment one company of the 24th Infantry Regiment, from General Kigoshi's 23rd Brigade,<sup>2</sup> as reserve. The Russian movements continued also during the night, until towards 3 a.m. about two battalions rushed forward to attack on both sides of the pass-road. But this surprise having been anticipated,<sup>3</sup> it was easily

<sup>1</sup> Appendix XVIII.

<sup>2</sup> P. 112.

<sup>3</sup> Patrols on the foreground had, moreover, signalled the approach of the Russians by setting fire to fagots of dry wood.

beaten off by the Japanese. At 5 a.m., however, another attack was made in greater strength, the Russians (portions of the 34th and 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiments) this time rushing the enemy on the small advanced hill and capturing the height. In the furious bayonet charge, every man of the Japanese section was cut down.

If the Russians had now made use of this success by establishing themselves on that height, bringing up at once strong reserves behind it, and continuing the attack upon the main position after a brief rest, there was every likelihood of their piercing the thin Japanese line in the centre. But an attempt of this kind was not made. The main forces engaged in the attack apparently retired again at once; on the height they had stormed only a small force was left behind, which was bound to succumb to a determined counter-attack.

When Colonel Ota, commanding the 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment, heard of this event, he charged the 3rd Company 24th Regiment, which had come up in the evening, to recapture the hill in the dark. The company advanced, and, arriving to within 20 paces of the knoll, was then pushed back by a counter-attack of the Russians. Meanwhile it began to dawn. Two Japanese guns in the neighbourhood of the position could make out the contours of the hill, and began to take it under fire. Colonel Ota, placing himself at the head of his colour-company, which was joined by the other two sections of the 2nd Company, as well as by the rest of the 3rd Company 24th Infantry Regiment, seized the colour, and assaulted the hill

with his troops. The Colonel was killed, likewise the officer commanding the 1st Battalion, the officer carrying the colour, and the Regimental Adjutant, who, one after the other, had seized the colour. Finally a private planted it on the hill, henceforward called "Standard Hill" (Gun-giyama).<sup>1</sup> The Russians were driven away, leaving 95 prisoners, and making no other attempt to attack the Ta-lin Pass. Among their numerous dead (exact data are wanting) was also Lieutenant-Colonel Pekuta, of the General Staff, who was found with sword in hand, and having apparently led the Russian attacking troops. A document found in his pocket contained the task assigned to the Eastern Detachment,

The half-battalion of the 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment, engaged in that fight, lost 4 officers and 48 men killed, 5 officers and 148 men wounded. The loss of the 3rd Company 24th Infantry Regiment was 40 men dead, and about 100 men wounded.

The Russians made a night attack also on the Japanese positions at the Tu-men-tsy-lin Pass, occupied by the 47th Infantry Regiment and one mountain battery.

About 700 metres in front of the Japanese position, held by the 2nd Battalion 47th Infantry Regiment, east of the pass-road, was an isolated rocky hill of rugged shape,<sup>2</sup> affording an extensive view, but otherwise rather unsuitable for placing troops. If that hill was left unoccupied, an ex-

<sup>1</sup> Called "Fahnen-Hügel" on the map.

<sup>2</sup> Called "Felshügel" on the map.

ceedingly favourable point of observation would be surrendered to the Russians, from which they would be able to overlook completely the Japanese position ; but if, on the other hand, the height was included in the general line of defence, a prominent salient would be created, challenging envelopment on both sides. Colonel Sugihara, commanding the 47th Infantry Regiment, pushed, therefore, merely the 5th Company to that height, to deny its occupation by the Russians. The Captain of the company ordered one section to occupy a position to the right of the hill, and two sections to the left of it, where they entrenched. The rocky hill itself was apparently not occupied at all, or only weakly. The trenches to the left of the hill were the object of attack of the Russians. Several field batteries and heavy mortars having taken these trenches under fire since early morning, but with little effect it seems, the Russian Infantry—portions of the 33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, under Colonel Lissovski—moved forward against them, the Infantry being continually reinforced during the day.

In the ensuing fire-fight, the 5th Company was supported by the firing-lines, not far in rear, but upon it was concentrated the bulk of the Russian fire ; it suffered, therefore, considerably. Night came on without the Russians proceeding to deliver the assault. Both adversaries were lying opposite each other at closest range, until about 3 o'clock in the morning, when the Russians rose to storm. The two sections of the 5th Company, after a gallant defence, succumbed

to the superior numbers, being almost completely annihilated. The Captain was killed; all the other officers were wounded. The noise of the action was heard in the main position, but no support was sent, because leaving the main position in the darkness seemed inadvisable. The Russians were therefore able to establish themselves within the line captured; but they did not adopt any measures for taking advantage of their success here either. At daybreak on October 12, Colonel Sugihara proceeded to make a counter-attack, pushing the Russians back again after a hot contest, bravely fought on both sides, and lasting for some hours. The 47th Infantry Regiment lost 146 men,<sup>1</sup> most of whom belonged to the 5th Company. The Russians left 200 corpses on the field of action.

No more night attacks were made by the 3rd Siberian Army Corps and Rennenkampf's Detachment.

Result of  
October  
11. The result of October 11 was the following :

On the Japanese side the extremely weak right wing maintained its position east of Pen-si-hu and at the Ta-lin, Tu-men-tsy-lin, and Tschien-kou-lin Passes. The rest of the Japanese Army gained ground in the attack, the 1st Army reaching the line Men-ka-ko—Temple Hill, the 4th and 2nd Armies the Schi-li-ho. On the left wing the 4th Division overlapped the enemy's right wing, since the 6th Siberian Army Corps was hanging back.

The Russian Western Detachment was sorely pressed, the Centre was wavering, the Eastern Detachment gave up the attack.

<sup>1</sup> 1 officer and 42 men dead, 3 officers and 100 men wounded.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 157

Kuropatkin's battle-plan of attacking the enemy and enveloping his eastern wing had therefore failed already.

### OCTOBER 12

General Kuropatkin had not obtained a correct idea of what had happened on the eastern wing on October 11. Maybe General Baron Stackelberg had sent in favourable reports, maybe he had not yet reported at all; the Commander-in-Chief, at any rate, felt confident that all was well with the Eastern Detachment, and that ultimate victory was ensured. Kuropatkin had given up the original plan of supporting the enveloping movement of the Eastern Detachment by an offensive along the front; he thought there was no longer any need at all for the Western Detachment to attack in order to complete the enemy's defeat. It seemed to him sufficient if the main forces of the Army held their ground until the decision had been brought about in the east. The Commander-in-Chief had therefore ordered the Western Detachment, on the evening of October 11, to continue the battle on October 12 in the positions of the advanced guards, and to continue strengthening them during the night. General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, on this, pushed to Ta-kou the other two battalions of the 34th Infantry Regiment (two being already in Yin-pan<sup>1</sup>), placing them likewise under the orders of General Riabinkin, so as to form in this way a strong connecting-link between the 10th

Kuropatkin views the situation of the Russians in a favourable light.

Sketch 6.

<sup>1</sup> P. 138.

Army Corps' position and the brigade of the 1st Army Corps<sup>1</sup> standing on the heights east and west of Tan-hai-schi.

The Japanese continued their attacks early in the morning: the battle on the eastern wing assumed the character of a stationary action.

The Russian Eastern Detachment opposite Ino-uye's Japanese Detachment discontinues its attack.

After Ino-uye's Detachment had steadfastly repulsed all attacks of the Eastern Group during October 11, as well as during the night following, the strength of the assailant seemed to fail him finally. The Russians certainly opened fire again with Artillery generally at dawn, but there was no longer any vigorous attack by Infantry; some attempts of pushing once more to the heights east of Pen-si-hu were soon given up again, when towards noon the sound of brisk rifle-fire was heard coming from the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. A composite half-battalion, with Cavalry attached, had been pushed out to the heights south of Riu-wobio, as on the previous day, to guard the right flank. General Samsonov's<sup>2</sup> Siberian Cossack Division came upon this detachment, but was attacked in turn by the Japanese 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

General Prince Kan-in had arrived in Si-ho-yan<sup>3</sup> on October 11. Reinforced by 359 men, Lines of Communication Troops, he started at 6 a.m. on October 12, by several roads, for Pen-si-hu, to remove, by an attack against the Russian forces on the south bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, the danger of the Japanese right wing being enveloped. The

<sup>1</sup> 145th and 146th Infantry Regiments. (P. 138.)

<sup>2</sup> P. 109.

<sup>3</sup> 15 kilometres south-south-east of Pen-si-hu. (Pp. 77 and 110.)

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 159

advance through the roadless, rugged, mountainous country proved very difficult, the four-horsed vehicles carrying the machine-guns<sup>1</sup> being only able to proceed after the utmost exertions. The machine-guns had to be carried by the men over the steep passes of the road, the limbers and waggons finding it impossible to follow. Yet, for all that, the brigade succeeded in approaching General Samsonov's Cossack Division unobserved, and in occupying with the main body a position almost in rear of the enemy. About 11 a.m. a hot fire from rifles, carbines, and machine-guns suddenly poured into the hostile Cavalry masses; the Russians, completely taken by surprise, hurriedly retreated in an easterly direction, a portion of the Japanese Cavalry following them. The main body of the brigade remained for the present in the position occupied. One machine-gun section, moreover, fired with some good effect on Russian battalions standing in close formation as reserve on the northern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, probably in the neighbourhood of Cho-ka-ko. The intervention of Kan-in's Cavalry Brigade greatly alarmed the Russian Eastern Detachment. Stackelberg believed the whole wing of the Japanese standing east of Pen-si-hu was advancing to attack, ordering therefore the 3rd Siberian Army Corps to hold its ground at all cost.

General Ivanov, nevertheless, withdrew from the fighting-line all the portions he had still

<sup>1</sup> In place of this mode of transport, ill-adapted for Manchuria, pack-horses were introduced for carrying the machine-guns; but it was not till the end of January that the former system of transport was completely replaced by the pack-horse system.

engaged, except the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which was fighting in the direction of Kuan-lin-tsy; the main body of his Army Corps remained all day in a position north of Kau-tai-tsy; during the night the corps began to retreat in a north-easterly direction on the Kau-tu-lin Pass.

General von Rennenkampf, who in the morning had assailed once more the heights east of Pen-si-hu, abstained from any further attack the moment he heard of Samsonov's Division having been attacked by surprise and forced to give way in an easterly direction, and all the more did he abstain because he had to return to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps the five battalions General Ivanov had given him on October 11. Anxiety for his left flank caused him to abandon all the positions he was still holding opposite the enemy, and to retire in the direction of San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho.

By the timely intervention of Prince Kan-in the last danger was removed from the Japanese right wing. But General Baron Ino-uye was looking upon the situation of the troops under his command as being, all the same, extremely serious early in the morning. Not knowing anything about the Russian intentions to retreat, he was bound to assume they would continue their attacks with every man available. He therefore, with the consent of General Headquarters, withdrew the last battalion of his Division from the extreme left in the neighbourhood south of Yin-tsiën-pu, so as to give a little fresh strength to the greatly reduced numbers of the defensive troops at Pen-si-hu. Until the morning of October 12 Major

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 161

Honda's composite battalion, which had been fighting east Pen-si-hu, had lost all its officers; of the five companies, three had about 20 men left, one only 16, and one even had no more than 12 men in the ranks; it was just possible to form one section with the rest of the battalion.<sup>1</sup> The total loss of Ino-uye's Detachment amounted in all to 1,765 men, over 1,000 of whom fell to the lot of the 14th Infantry Regiment alone.

The gap still remaining between the 12th Division and the Guards in the neighbourhood of the Tschien-kou-lin Pass was closed by the combined Cavalry of the Guards and the 2nd Division under Colonel Kasa.

On the afternoon of October 11 General Baron Kuroki had ordered the Guards and the 2nd Division to continue the attack during the night; the Guard Division was first to capture the Watanabe-yama, and then the heights east of Do-mon-shi. The 2nd Division was given the task of attacking Sia-liu-ho-tsy and the heights north-west of it, after capturing the Western San-jo-shi-san.

As the enemy was still holding strongly the general line Man-hua-pu—Watanabe-yama—Western San-jo-shi-san, the General Commanding the Guard Division decided to capture first the position Man-hua-pu—Watanabe-yama, and then to push on gradually farther, in conformity with the Army Order.

The order for the attack was issued at 11 p.m. on October 11. The 1st Brigade was to capture

According to Japanese accounts of Captain Sander (retired).

The Japanese Guard Division breaks through the Russian position at Man-hua-pu, pushing Mish-tshenko's Cossack Brigade and portions of the 1st Siberian Army Corps to the north, and portions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps to the north-west.

Man-hua-pu and the heights farther north, the 2nd Brigade to drive the enemy from the Watanabeyama, and then to advance to the heights east of Pa-kiatsy. It being assumed that the 2nd Brigade would meet with more serious resistance, the 1st Brigade was ordered to time its advance by the former.

The 1st Brigade started at 3 a.m. on October 12. The 1st Guard Regiment advanced on a broad front over the northern extremities of the Wai-to-san and the heights east of it, its left taking the direction on Man-hua-pu. The 2nd Guard Regiment was following in second line. One company was pushed out to the left to keep in touch with the 2nd Brigade; but it did not succeed in maintaining it, the touch with the neighbouring brigade being soon lost. On the first line approaching Man-hua-pu village, the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment of the 1st Siberian Army Corps withdrew in a northerly direction, Mishtshenko's Cavalry Brigade at the same time giving way in a north-easterly direction. This being reported to the Commander of the 1st Brigade, he resolved to continue his advance alone, although he had been ordered to time it by that of the 2nd Brigade. Scarcely meeting with any resistance, the brigade occupied the heights north of Man-hua-pu about 7 a.m., pursuing the retreating Cavalry by fire.

The attack of the 2nd Brigade was not so simple. General Watanabe had ordered the 4th Guard Regiment of his command to start from its position at 2.30 a.m., and, marching with its

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 163

left past the eastern outskirts of Pa-kia-tsy, to attack the heights east of that place. The 3rd Guard Regiment was to drive the Russians from the Watanabe-yama, and then to occupy Pa-kia-tsy. The Brigadier remained with the 3rd Guard Regiment, of which he retained the 1st Battalion at his disposal.

When, in the evening, the 4th Guard Regiment received the order to move forward, the enemy's positions on the Watanabe-yama and east of it were still occupied, as during the day, by portions of the 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division, under General Shileiko<sup>1</sup>; but the Russians fell back before the 4th Guard Regiment had any chance of attacking. With bayonets fixed and rifles unloaded, the two battalions<sup>2</sup> of the regiment started at the appointed time from the country east of Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko, in the direction generally on the heights east of Pa-kia-tsy, some few shots only being fired at them by the retreating Russians. But they could hear, in a westerly direction, the 3rd Guard Regiment being hotly engaged in action, the left of their own regiment even suffering considerable loss by stray shots from the Watanabe-yama. When the regiment, moving on a broad front, was approaching a height south-west of Man-hua-pu, the glare of bivouac-fires became clearly visible at Pa-kia-tsy. Lieutenant-Colonel Ida, commanding the regiment, expected, from the last reports, to meet there with strong resistance. The advance having taken a long time

<sup>1</sup> P. 119.

<sup>2</sup> One battalion was Divisional Reserve.

hitherto, owing to darkness and the difficulties of ground, he was afraid it would be daylight before the regiment had crossed the valley in front for attacking the heights east of Pa-kia-tsy. As a matter of fact it was dawning when the foremost lines arrived in front of the village; but it was only weakly occupied—by about one company—the same as the heights east of it, from which a brisk fire was directed upon the Japanese. When six companies of the first line advanced to charge with the bayonet, the Russians, after a brief resistance, withdrew in a northerly direction. By 7 a.m. the heights were taken.

The left company of the regiment had penetrated into Pa-kia-tsy, which was evacuated by its garrison; the company then fired with some effect upon a Russian battery bivouacking to the west of the village. Most of the battery succeeded in limbering up in time and escaping, escorted by fifty Cavalry, but three vehicles remained behind, disabled by the fire of the Japanese.

The 3rd Guard Regiment was standing deployed at the cross-roads, 1 kilometre north-east of Shi-mo-ro-kun-ko, ready for the advance at 3 o'clock in the morning, the 2nd Battalion being on the right, and the 3rd Battalion on the left;<sup>1</sup> the 8th Company was held in reserve by the Colonel. It was believed the enemy would not be met until the Hachi-maki-yama was reached, but the foremost lines of the 3rd Battalion met him before that. The 2nd Battalion therefore advanced its right shoulder, so as to wheel a little to the left,

<sup>1</sup> The 1st Battalion remained at the disposal of the Brigadier.

towards the west. On the approach of the enemy a loud whistle was heard in the Russian position, followed by the word of command to fire a volley; this was done at about 100 metres' range. The Japanese, being put on their guard by that whistle, threw themselves down flat on the ground, just in time to let the projectiles pass harmlessly over their heads. They then deployed a dense skirmishing-line, firing on their own part several volleys on the Russian skirmishers, clearly visible against the sky-line. The 2nd Battalion, receiving some flanking fire from the Hachi-maki-yama, after executing the wheel, the battalion commander sent one section of the 7th Company of his reserve to the right to guard the flank. The 5th and 6th Companies meanwhile ascended the steep slopes of the Watanabe-yama to assault. The Russians delivered a rapid fire, throwing some hand-grenades at short range, which caused great loss. The first bayonet charge was beaten off, and likewise a second, in which the two sections of the 7th Company still in reserve took part as well. The two adversaries were now lying opposite each other at from 2 to 20 metres' range, until at last a third assault succeeded. The Japanese on the steep slopes are said to have slipped right underneath the Russians, seizing the muzzles of the rifles projecting beyond the edge and breaking off the bayonets. The 3rd Battalion advanced to assault, too. After a furious hand-to-hand fight the Russians withdrew to the Hachi-maki-yama, and to the heights west of it. The Japanese followed, reaching, at 5.30 a.m., the neighbour-

hood close south of the Hachi-maki-yama, where they halted for the moment.

Three companies of the 1st Battalion, standing behind the left wing at the disposal of the Brigadier, were securing the left flank, and drove, with the bayonet, a weak Russian garrison from a knoll on the southern slope of the Watanabe-yama, north-west of height "238."

The night attack had cost the 3rd Guard Regiment heavily, especially the 2nd Battalion, which lost its commander, 9 officers, and 197 dead or wounded. About four-fifths of the casualties were caused by the hand-grenades. The Russians also lost very considerably; on the Watanabe-yama and its slopes were found about 400 dead.

The 4th Guard Regiment was meant, by Brigade Orders, to take possession of the heights east of Pa-kia-tsy only; but the Colonel commanding the regiment thought he would be acting more correctly, after carrying out this task, if he followed up the enemy. He therefore engaged in the first line the company he had till then held back, advancing with his eight companies north of the road Pa-kia-tsy—Schan-liu-ho-tsy to a gentle elevation half-way between both these villages; a weak garrison remained in Pa-kia-tsy. When the regiment had reached the height named, the advanced detachments of General Shileiko's<sup>1</sup> troops, as well as those of General Levestam, who commanded the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division,<sup>2</sup> were just then

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 119 and 163.

<sup>2</sup> It was impossible to ascertain when the troops under General Levestam occupied the Hachi-maki-yama, and what units they were.

retiring north across the valley from the Hachi-maki-yama, from Kami-yo-ka-ko, and from the Western San-jo-shi-san, with the object of rallying. The 4th Guard Regiment faced about, opening at once, at 1,200 to 1,400 metres' range, a hot fire on the enemy's forces, about a brigade in strength, of whom some portions were at first endeavouring to reach Pa-kia-tsy; but under the fire they thronged together in the direction of Schan-liu-ho-tsy, suffering heavy loss.

The garrison left behind by the 4th Guard Regiment in Pa-kia-tsy had meanwhile found there a weak Russian Infantry detachment, hiding in the buildings. Then ensued a brief street fight, in which the Russians were cut down.

Colonel Ida, commanding the 4th Guard Regiment, seeing the 3rd Guard Regiment advancing from the Watanabe-yama in pursuit of the enemy, and knowing also that the Divisional Reserve had started from Kami-ro-kun-ko on Pa-kia-tsy, determined to push on in the direction of the heights east of Do-mon-shi, so as to cut off the enemy retiring on Shan-liu-ho-tsy. The regiment started, and occupied with one battalion a steep height north-east of Schan-liu-ho-tsy; the other battalion was being rallied under cover behind the height. Soon the last battalion of the regiment that had been following as Divisional Reserve arrived here also. Further advance was inadmissible, the heights south of Do-mon-shi being strongly occupied by the Russians, who were, moreover, directing from various sides a strong Artillery fire upon the regiment.

The 1st Brigade of the Guard Division had meanwhile rested for some time upon the heights north of Man-hua-pu. It then continued its movement over the Eastern San-jo-shi-san, driving away without serious fighting a few protective parties of the Russians (probably from the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment), and occupying with the 1st Guard Regiment the Ba-ji-san, unmolested, at 11.30 a.m.

On the Russian side the vanguards of the 4th Siberian Army Corps had, after the loss of the Watanabe-yama and Western San-jo-shi-san, retired to the heights near Do-mon-shi. The main body was standing at Schan-hei-niu-tun. General Kossovich, commanding the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division, had occupied the heights east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy with the 12th Siberian Infantry Regiment and two batteries, so as to cover the retreat of General Shileiko's battalions from Schan-liu-ho-tsy to Yen-san-sai.

The Japanese 1st Guard Regiment having arrived on the Ba-ji-san, its left wing noticed the retreat of Shileiko's column, and at once opened fire on it. The Russians deployed with some portions against the regiment, which wheeled to the left, facing north-west. By degrees the 2nd Guard Regiment also came into action on the right of the 1st Guard Regiment.

As soon as Pa-kia-tsy, as well as the heights north-east of that place, had been captured, early in the morning, the General Commanding the Guard Division sent orders to his Artillery to move forward. At 8 a.m. three batteries arrived in

the valley at Pa-kia-tsy and unlimbered south of the village, taking under fire a Russian battery of the Artillery of the 4th Siberian Army Corps' main body in position south of Sia-hei-niu-tun. As no effect could be obtained, owing to the distant range, the batteries were brought forward to the gentle elevation close north of Pa-kia-tsy, whence they afterwards supported the attack of the 3rd Brigade adjoining on the left against the heights of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

Of the 2nd Brigade, the 4th Guard Regiment was as yet standing on the heights north-east of Schan-liu-ho-tsy, and the 3rd Guard Regiment was standing with its main body concentrated at Pa-kia-tsy. Small parties were still holding the Watanabe-yama.

About this time—perhaps 9.20 a.m.—the appearance of strong hostile Cavalry with Infantry<sup>1</sup> in the Scha-ho valley, near the villages of Wai-tau-schan and Ta-tsy-pu, was reported to the Divisional Staff, whose position is not known. No reports on the movements of the 1st Brigade having been received up to that hour, the Divisional Commander detached two companies of the 3rd Guard Regiment, which occupied the Ka-ko-rei-san, to guard the right flank of the Division.

The last batteries of the Division had meanwhile been moved up. It having become apparent that the effect upon the enemy's Artillery was too little, even from the position north of Pa-kia-tsy, these two batteries, as well as one of those stand-

<sup>1</sup> The reinforced 5th East Siberian Rifle Division. (P. 151.)

ing north of Pa-kia-tsy, were ordered to come into action west of Schan-liu-ho-tsy. A portion of the road thither was under fire from the Russian battery stationed south of Schan-hei-niu-tun; the guns were therefore obliged to advance singly at long distances. With the aid of the Pioneers, forming the escort to the Artillery, it was possible to bring the batteries into action by 3 p.m. The fire was then opened from this new position with good effect upon the Russian Artillery. Major Hidikata's<sup>1</sup> battery, which the day before had suffered considerable loss, especially in teams, did not arrive at Pa-kia-tsy until about 5 p.m.

No more attacks were made by the Japanese Guard Infantry. The 1st Brigade on the Ba-ji-san entered into a stationary fight against portions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the Liën-hua-schan, lasting into the afternoon; neither Russians nor Japanese made any decisive step. The 4th Guard Regiment, standing north-east of Schan-liu-ho-tsy, did not advance either; the 3rd Guard Regiment was still at Pa-kia-tsy, with two of its companies on the Ka-ko-rei-san.

In the afternoon the Divisional Commander received a message from the Chief of General Staff, 1st Army, saying that about one regiment of Russian Infantry was apparently marching against the Guard Division from the direction of Sia-pin-tai-tsy, south of Bian-yu-pu-sa. Colonel Kasa's Cavalry, on the right flank of the Division, moreover, reported the presence of strong hostile forces

<sup>1</sup> P. 120.

—about 10,000 men—between Wai-tau-schan and Bian-yu-pu-sa, natives estimating the enemy's strength in that neighbourhood even at 20,000 men. These reports evidently referred to the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which the Commander of the Eastern Detachment was pushing forward in a north-westerly direction from its position at Sia-schi-tsiau-tsy.<sup>1</sup>

The right wing of the 2nd Division, having at that time not yet pushed beyond the heights east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, the Guard Division, deployed as it was towards the north-west, with its back turned against the newly reported hostile forces, was in a very dangerous situation. So as to have at once strong forces available to oppose the new enemy, should he continue to advance from Wai-tau-schan, the Divisional Commander decided to abstain for the present from continuing the attack on the Liën-hua-schan. As an immediate protection, the detachment the 3rd Guard Regiment had sent to the Ka-ko-rei-san was reinforced by two more companies. The Division then spent the night in the position it was holding, the 1st Brigade probably in close touch with General Shileiko's battalions which were occupying the Liën-hua-schan.

When, on October 11, the attack of the 3rd Brigade 2nd Division on the Western San-jo-shi-san was making no progress, General Baron Nishijima asked for support from Headquarters of the 1st Army, which then gave him the 29th Kobi Regiment. The Divisional Commander placed the regiment at the disposal of the 3rd Brigade,

<sup>1</sup> P. 151.

The Japanese 2nd Division pushes the right wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps from the Western San-jo-shi-san back to the heights west of Do-mon-shi and south-west of the Len-ge-san, and Mau's Detachment from the heights at Orr-wa and from the Nan-san back to the Lo-to-san.

with the object of capturing the Western San-jo-shi-san at night, while the 15th Brigade was to attack the heights north-west of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

The 3rd Brigade, after a severe contest, succeeded in completing its task. The attack, of which details are not known, began as early as 7 p.m. on October 11, but it was past midnight before the Japanese were masters of the Western San-jo-shi-san. The losses of the four battalions<sup>1</sup> taking part in the attack, including the action on October 11, were 185 men dead and 718 men wounded. The 29th Kobi Regiment was taking part in the night attack only as reserve.

The great exhaustion of the troops obliged the Commander to give the brigade a rest for a few hours in the position captured.

The 15th Brigade, which, on the afternoon of October 11, had captured Temple Hill, continued its advance at 3.30 on the morning of October 12, proceeding to attack the heights of Örr-wa, held by portions of the 4th Siberian and 1st Army Corps, as well as by Mau's Detachment. The following were to attack: The six companies of the 29th Infantry Regiment,<sup>2</sup> the heights east of Örr-wa; the 16th Infantry Regiment, the height projecting south of the Nan-san; and the 30th Infantry Regiment, to the left of the 16th Infantry

<sup>1</sup> The 4th Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion 29th Infantry Regiment; the other two battalions of the regiment were the reserve of the Divisional Commander. Nishijima had six companies of it attached to the 15th Brigade on the afternoon of October 11.

<sup>2</sup> Belonging to the 3rd Brigade; placed under orders of the 15th Brigade by the Divisional Commander on the afternoon of October 11. (P. 131.)

Regiment, the slopes west of the Nan-san. The Divisional Commander was following from West San-kia-tsy with two companies in reserve behind the centre of the 16th Infantry Regiment. The latter formed up at Örr-wa after some strong officers' patrols had driven away small protective bodies the Russians had left behind before the movement had begun. Then seven companies advanced to assault with the bayonet the height south of the Nan-san, driving back, after a brief struggle, the Russian garrison, completely taken by surprise and furnished by the 146th Infantry Regiment, which, by direct orders of Kuropatkin, had occupied the heights east of Tan-hai-schi on October 11.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese were in possession of the heights at 5.10 a.m. One company of the 16th Infantry Regiment was acting as flank-guard, and had passed Örr-wa on the east; one of its sections, without meeting with any resistance, had just been reaching the knoll east of that place, when, in the dark, one battalion of General Mau's Detachment, probably from the 121st Infantry Regiment, was marching past it at a distance of not more than 50 metres. The section delivered a rapid fire at this range, taking the battalion completely by surprise and causing it to face about and stream back into the valley west of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

The six companies of the 29th Infantry Regiment occupied the height south-east of Örr-wa without serious opposition by the enemy. The 30th Infantry Regiment, advancing against the western slopes of the Nan-san, met at first with superior

<sup>1</sup>P. 138.

Russian Infantry, which, however, withdrew in a northerly direction as soon as the salient height south of the Nan-san had been captured by the 16th Infantry Regiment. During its advance the regiment had established touch with the right wing of the 4th Army<sup>1</sup>; that wing, having likewise taken its direction on the Nan-san, the 30th Infantry Regiment was moved towards the right, behind the 16th Infantry Regiment, and engaged between it and the 29th Infantry Regiment.

The 16th Infantry Regiment had meanwhile continued its attack, capturing the Nan-san itself without meeting with any material resistance. That height was then given over to the 4th Army.

On the morning of October 12 the brigade was holding a position extending from the ridge west of Sia-liu-ho-tsy by Örr-wa to the Nan-san, facing north-east generally. The firing-lines entrenched, the reserves finding good cover in the deep nullahs and clefts on the slopes.

When it began to be light the Russian Artillery commenced to fire. At first two batteries did so from the neighbourhood east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, but they soon ceased and moved off. Then some batteries came into action farther north at the Len-ge-san, without producing any effect whatever, the projectiles, as usual, overshooting the mark.

The patrols, sent by the 15th Brigade beyond the position, ascertained that the heights north-east of Örr-wa were strongly occupied; a Russian

<sup>1</sup> 11th Kobi Brigade.

Infantry brigade was reported to be in reserve at Ha-ma-tan.

The 3rd Brigade, which had captured the Western San-jo-shi-san, had started again after a repose at night of some hours' duration, and at 6.30 a.m. was standing south of Sen-kiu-yo ready to attack the heights south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy. As soon as the concentration of these troops was noticed, the Russian batteries opened fire from these heights, but, the bursting points of the shells being far too high, no results were obtained. The right half of the Japanese 2nd Artillery Regiment then came into action on the western slopes of the Western San-jo-shi-san, drawing upon itself the fire of the Russian batteries; the other half, having taken up a position north of Pan-kia-tsy already on the evening of October 11, resumed its fire too. With considerable expenditure of ammunition they succeeded in silencing, about 9.30 a.m., the Russian batteries standing at Sia-liu-ho-tsy; they could now direct their fire entirely upon the Russian Infantry position. Previously two batteries of the Guard Artillery, at the request of General Matsunaga, commanding the 3rd Brigade, had fired from Pa-kia-tsy upon that position. At 10.30 a.m. the 3rd Brigade deployed for attack. When emerging from Sen-kiu-yo the Russians began firing volleys from their shelter-trenches; the Japanese returned the fire, after having come up by rushes to within 1,300 to 1,400 metres. Meanwhile the Russian Artillery resumed its fire, but again without effect, the sights not being altered to suit the advance of the Japanese. Only at one spot of the

space covered by the fire seemed the ranges exactly to agree with the length of time-fuze; the Japanese turned that dangerous zone by closing in to the right and left.

The attack was carried through rapidly. After brief fire-pauses the whole line advanced by rushes in groups of comparatively large size, mostly companies; but frequently men singly threw themselves down to recover their breath or to shoot. Although the Japanese were obliged to traverse a perfectly level and open valley, the Russians were unable to repel the attack. At about 700 metres' range the main fire-fight blazed up, lasting, however, for seven minutes only, after which the Japanese lines resumed their rushes. The Russian fighting-line was as yet being reinforced by some battalions of the 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division, under General Shileiko, which were just at that moment retiring from the neighbourhood of Pa-kia-tsy to the Liën-hua-schan,<sup>1</sup> but when, at 300 metres' distance, the attacker made ready to assault, the Russians abandoned the position. The retreating crowd was rallied by supports moving up and occupying a crest-line east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy. About 12.30 p.m. the 3rd Brigade was in possession of the height south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy. The comparatively small losses—29 men dead and 213 wounded—were pretty evenly distributed over the whole distance traversed in the advance, thus indicating that the Russians made no better practice even at the close ranges. General Matsunaga first reorganised his troops in the position captured,

<sup>1</sup> P. 166

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 177

and then gave them some rest; he meant to resume the offensive against the Len-ge-san in the afternoon. But about 2 p.m. he was ordered to march with his brigade and two batteries by way of the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass, urgent reinforcements being needed on the eastern wing.

For, about 10.30 a.m., a message of the 4th Army came in at Headquarters of 1st Army, saying that its Infantry had captured the heights of Man-kia-fön, north of the San-kai-seki-san. The Guards, moreover, had reported that they had already reached the heights east of Do-mon-shi. Army Headquarters concluded from these reports that the attack was making progress, and that the Russians were falling back generally, opposite the Guard and 2nd Divisions; the situation of the 12th Division being still looked upon as critical, General Baron Kuroki resolved to reinforce the right wing by the 3rd Brigade. The message from the 4th Army was afterwards found to be erroneous, the 10th Division having not got beyond the San-kai-seki-san.

In view of the Russian batteries still in position at Do-mon-shi and south-west of the Len-ge-san, an immediate departure of the 3rd Brigade through the open valley of Tsun-yau—Pa-kia-tsy did not seem feasible; the Commander therefore ordered his troops to cook, and arranged for them to start at 7 p.m. When about that time the brigade was on the point of moving off, the report of a patrol seemed to indicate that the Russians were advancing to attack from the Len-ge-san; but it was soon found that it was nothing more than a

small party, probably pushed forward to reconnoitre. The skirmishers deploying against them drove them back after a brief fire-fight. At 7.30 p.m. the brigade started for the eastern wing, leaving one battalion of the 29th Kobi Regiment behind to hold the captured position south-east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

The 15th Brigade, after occupying the heights east of Örr-wa, remained at first in the position captured, fortifying it by numerous fire-trenches. The Infantry fire of General Mau's troops, directed from the Lo-to-san at distant ranges, was not replied to during the forenoon. About noon the left Abteilung of the 2nd Artillery Regiment, standing hitherto in action north of Pan-la-schan-tsy,<sup>1</sup> was placed under the orders of the brigade. The Abteilung then advanced by batteries on Örr-wa. The battery arriving first unlimbered on the low-lying slope north-east of Temple Hill, between 1 and 2 p.m.; about 3 p.m. the other batteries had completed their change of position too. One came into action at Örr-wa, firing common shell upon Russian Infantry north of the Lo-to-san, the other joined the battery which had arrived first. About this time Headquarters of the 2nd Division arrived on Temple Hill. Afterwards the last battery of the regiment<sup>2</sup> was brought up too; it did no longer come into action, but remained limbered up in reserve east of Temple Hill. Close south-west of Temple Hill was standing an Abteilung of the 10th Division adjoining on

<sup>1</sup> P. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Two batteries had been handed over to the 3rd Brigade.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 179

the left, firing in a north-westerly direction upon Russian batteries, probably belonging to the 1st Army Corps. The officer commanding the Abteilung was on Temple Hill directing the fire from there with the aid of a chain of men, transmitting his orders by word of mouth.

When the Japanese batteries had opened fire, the 15th Brigade made several attempts to storm the Lo-to-san, each attempt failing owing to the severe fire of General Mau's Infantry. Those portions of the firing-line which, rushing forward, had left the trenches, were unable to maintain themselves on the open ground, and were therefore obliged to crawl back again into the trenches.

Darkness coming on, the attempts for assaulting were given up for the present. The brigade lost 569 men on October 12, and spent 110,000 rounds of ammunition.

A heavy thunderstorm broke during the night, lasting till morning. Under cover of that storm General Okasaki, commanding the 15th Brigade, once more tried to capture the Lo-to-san. But the Russians were not to be surprised; they beat off the attack.

The Staff of the 2nd Division, together with the Divisional Reserve<sup>1</sup> still available, spent the night at East San-kia-tsy.

To comply as quickly as possible with Marshal Marquis Oyama's demands of executing a right wheel in the direction of Tan-hai-schi,<sup>2</sup> General

<sup>1</sup> Two companies 29th Infantry Regiment and one battalion 39th Kobi Regiment.

<sup>2</sup> P. 105.

The Japanese 10th Division attacks the San-kai-seki-san, and pushes portions of the Russian 1st Army Corps north.

Count Nodzu had ordered the 10th Division on the evening of October 11 to capture the San-kai-seki-san by a night attack. This rocky height, rising abruptly from the plain, named by the Japanese also Futa-go-yama or Twins Hill, owing to the similarity of its two knolls, seemed to them to be the key of the Russian position; at the foot of the hill, as well as on its slopes, were strong entrenchments; on the saddle between the knolls was a Chinese temple surrounded by a wall.<sup>1</sup>

The troops of the 10th Division, after what they had been doing on October 11, were, on the evening of that day, standing in two separate groups. While the 20th Brigade, under General Marui, was to make a frontal attack from its position south of Ta-pu, Colonel Kamada, with the 8th Brigade and 12th Kobi Regiment, was to attack from the west; both columns were to start at a fire-signal appearing on a hill to their rear. The assaulting troops took off their knapsacks, leaving behind all clattering and rattling objects, and put on their greatcoats. To recognise each other more readily in the dark, they fastened a white band round their left arm. At 1 a.m. the fire blazed up, and so they started.

Of the 20th Brigade, the 39th Infantry Regiment was in first line, the battalions being deployed on a broad front, in line with each other; the 20th Infantry Regiment was following, écheloned to the right. In spite of all precautionary measures the attack was discovered early in the Russian position, which was occupied by the 145th Infantry Regiment,

<sup>1</sup> Appendix XVII.

from the 1st Army Corps,<sup>1</sup> the regiment directing a hot fire upon the assailants in the darkness. The Japanese did not return it, but advanced by rushes as far as San-kuai-schi village, at the foot of the San-kai-seki-san. Here they met with an obstinate resistance. A destructive fire was poured on them from the houses and loopholed walls, forcing them to seek cover and take up the fire-fight. Their fire proving, however, ineffective, they presently rose again and attacked the trenches at the foot of the hill, rushing from all sides into the village, where a furious hand-to-hand fight developed.

The 20th Infantry Regiment, sweeping around farther east, and losing touch with the 39th Infantry Regiment, took part in the fray from 3 o'clock in the morning. Rifle-fire being, meanwhile, also heard in the neighbourhood of the Nan-san, a battalion was left behind to protect the right flank; the other two battalions, on hearing the noise of the action at the San-kai-seki-san, wheeled around north-west and attacked the Russians holding the rocky knolls.

The struggle lasted for some time indecisively. When, finally, both regiments had engaged their reserves, they succeeded in driving the enemy from the trenches on the southern and south-eastern slopes, and pushing them in a northerly direction, after charging vigorously with the bayonet; the Russians in San-kuai-schi village alone continued to offer an obstinate resistance, their retreat having been cut off. With the object of avoiding un-

<sup>1</sup> P. 138.

necessary bloodshed, the Adjutant of the 20th Brigade, acting for his wounded Commander, called upon the senior Russian officer commanding in the village to lay down arms ; but Lieutenant-Colonel Gringenberg, the acting Colonel of the 145th Infantry Regiment, replied he had ordered his men to hold out to the very last. Another summons to surrender, which a non-commissioned officer addressed to the Russian privates straight, was responded to by some 100 men ; the remainder, about 200 men, determined to continue the fight. Then the Japanese rushed into the village ; many of them were carrying in their hands dry gaoljan fagots, laying fire to the houses. In a few minutes the village was ablaze. All the Russians remaining in the village were either cut down or perished in the flames.

The sister brigade of the 20th (the 8th Brigade) took an active share in the attack, too, as ordered. The 40th Infantry Regiment was set to assault the San-kai-seki-san from the south-west, and the 10th Infantry Regiment to assault from the west. The 40th Infantry Regiment, with two battalions deployed in first line, and followed by one battalion as well as by the 12th Kobi Regiment in second line, gained touch with the 39th Infantry Regiment at Sui-tsy-schan. At Ta-pu its left came in touch with the 10th Infantry Regiment, which had likewise deployed two battalions, with one in reserve. The attack of both regiments proceeded slowly at the same rate, as the 20th Brigade gained ground. As the 145th Russian Infantry Regiment was holding especially strongly the

westernmost of the two hilltops, the position could not be stormed off-hand ; the 10th Infantry Regiment was, moreover, being enfiladed by fire from Tsan-kia-tun. Towards the morning the 5th Company of the regiment worked its way forward single-handed, climbing up the south-western slopes, and breaking by surprise into the enemy's position. The Russians fell back, leaving a large portion of the rocky knoll in the hands of the Japanese. On the other companies of the 2nd Battalion following the example of the 5th, the whole western portion of the hill was gradually taken possession of. Only in a few clefts of the rocks, difficult of access, the defenders were still offering a desperate resistance. The combat lasted till daybreak ; when it was perfectly light, the whole height was in the hands of the Japanese.

The 10th Division had lost heavily ; 15 officers dead and 45 wounded, 1,250 men dead or wounded. The Russians left about 800 dead behind on the hillsides ; in addition, 200 prisoners, 2 field-guns, and 8 ammunition waggons fell into the hands of the Japanese. To give some rest to the much-exhausted troops after the attack, and to allow them to reorganise their units, General Count Nodzu, early on the morning of October 12, when the Banner of the Rising Sun was floating over the captured hill, ordered the 10th and 11th Kobi Brigades to continue the attack against the line : heights east of Yen-tschien-tschai—Man-kia-fön, and the 10th Division to stand fast for the present at the San-kai-seki-san. The 8th Brigade was

apportioned by General Baron Kawamura as Divisional Reserve.

On the Russian side, the 1st Brigade 37th Infantry Division, from the 1st Army Corps, after losing the San-kai-seki-san and the Nan-san, withdrew to the line Tsan-kia-tun—heights south of Ha-ma-tan, being reinforced there by the 2nd Brigade. In addition, the 88th Infantry Regiment, the 4th Battery 7th Artillery Brigade, the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, as well as the two Transbaikal Cossack Batteries, were brought up from Tun-san-tsy to Tun-san-ho, and placed at the disposal of the Division. In this new position the division was no longer attacked on October 12.

On the east, the 37th Infantry Division was again in touch with Mau's Detachment, which had fallen back before the Japanese 15th Brigade<sup>1</sup> to the heights south of Ha-ma-tan.

The attack of the Japanese 10th Division was continued by the Kobi troops. The 11th Kobi Brigade had been moved up so early that it was already deployed and advancing from Siau-pu on Tan-hai-schi when the 15th Brigade was making its attack on the Nan-san. The Kobi Brigade resumed touch on the right with the 30th Infantry Regiment of the 15th Brigade 2nd Division, and, advancing over the Nan-san after the Russians had given way to the pressure of the 15th Brigade, occupied a two-knolled low hill to the west of Yen-tschien-tschai. The 2nd Division, on the left of the 1st Army, intending to continue its attack on the Lo-to-san, the 11th Kobi Brigade was given

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 175 and 179.

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as its next objective the occupation of the Djo-san, east of Yen-tschien-tschai. The brigade was deployed on a broad front, with the 43rd on the right and the 22nd Kobi Regiment on the left. The 10th Kobi Brigade and portions of the 10th Division were standing at the San-kai-seki-san, covering the left flank of the 22nd Kobi Regiment. The Divisional Artillery Regiment, as well as the 14th Field Artillery Regiment, unlimbered in the plain east of the San-kai-seki-san; the former was firing upon hostile Artillery of the Russian 1st Army Corps in the direction of Tun-san-ho and Ku-kia-tsy, and the latter, pushing some batteries to the foot of the height west of Yen-tschien-tschai, was firing upon the strong position at the Djo-san. The various attacks made by the Infantry against the heights failed in like manner as those made by the 15th Brigade on the right against the Lo-to-san. The Russians had again strongly entrenched themselves on the Djo-san. The advance was, moreover, rendered very difficult by the flanking fire of Artillery from the neighbourhood of Tun-san-ho. The day passed without any material progress being made; an attack made after 9 o'clock in the evening likewise failed.

The 10th Kobi Brigade, and the portions deployed of the 10th Division, who might have attacked frontally in the direction of Tsan-kia-tun, to relieve the pressure on the 11th Kobi Brigade, abstained from doing so, in consideration of the evident superiority of the enemy in the positions opposite.

The 5th Division, which, by Oyama's order, had

The Russian Western Detachment decides to hold its advanced guard positions on the Schi-li-ho.

concentrated as his reserve at Ku-schu-tsy on October 11,<sup>1</sup> deployed again on the 12th, in cooperation with the 3rd Division, against the advanced-guard position of the 10th Army Corps on the Schi-li-ho; but did not carry out an attack by Infantry, merely confining itself to firing with Artillery. The Russians replied with their Artillery from their position, but for the rest did nothing decisive against the Japanese Division.

The Russian Commander-in-Chief had no intentions at all of acting offensively with the Western Detachment; the loss of the San-kai-seki-san and Nan-san having become known to him, he even considered it necessary—in consideration also of the threatening attacks of the 2nd Japanese Army on October 11—to withdraw the advanced portions of the 10th and 17th Army Corps to the main position on the line Liu-tan-kou—Hun-pauschan. He directed orders to be sent to that effect to the Commander of the Western Detachment, adding that the 10th Army Corps should at the same time concentrate at least one Division, keeping it as long as possible in reserve.

The 17th Army Corps being already hotly engaged with the Japanese 2nd Army when this order arrived, at 7.30 a.m., General Baron Bilderling considered it impossible to comply with it. Retreating at once under the fire of the Japanese simply spelt ruin. He, moreover, knew the 6th Siberian Army Corps to be écheloned to the right behind the 17th Army Corps, and was hoping that that force, as well as Dembovski's

<sup>1</sup> P. 146.

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Detachment, would prevent his right flank from being enveloped. He therefore resolved to continue the fight in the advanced-guard positions on his own responsibility. This intention was made known to the Generals in command, the 10th Army Corps receiving Bilderling's order at 8.15 a.m.

But General Slutshevski had already received the directive above mentioned straight from Kuropatkin, and had handed it down to the commander of the advanced guard; General Riabinkin had thereupon reported that the retrograde movement was being gradually initiated from the left.

General Baron Bilderling, shortly after sending his order to stand fast in the advanced-guard positions, requested the 10th Army Corps to keep its reserves behind its right wing, so as to be able, in case of need, to close the gap between the 10th and 17th Army Corps. But almost at the same moment a fresh order came in from the Commander-in-Chief demanding the reserves of the corps to be placed behind its left wing, ready to support Mau's Detachment with one regiment or with one brigade. General Riabinkin, moreover, asked to be allowed to delay the retreat into the main position until evening, as a withdrawal by day would be causing too much loss.

All these contradictory demands General Slutshevski thought he would meet best by agreeing with Riabinkin's intentions. With the units of the 9th Infantry Division assembled around Hunpau-schan, he was able to meet requests for support, as well as to prolong the right of his

advanced-guard position. To enable him in urgent cases to bring rapid aid to the Centre, he ordered General Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Infantry Division, to move up the 33rd Infantry Regiment from Nin-kuan-tun to behind the left wing of the corps, and to occupy the village mentioned by one battalion from the 36th Infantry Regiment. General Slutshevski reported the arrangements he had made to the Commander-in-Chief, and to the leader of the Western Detachment.

Kuropatkin intends to close the gap between the Eastern Detachment and the Centre with the reserve of the Eastern Detachment, i.e. the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division.

Kuropatkin's directive to Slutshevski, to place his reserves behind the left wing, probably originated from the Commander-in-Chief's general anxiety for the Centre. The possibility of the Japanese advancing into the gap between the Eastern Detachment and the 4th Siberian Army Corps, in the neighbourhood of the Eastern San-jo-shi-san, breaking thereby the Russian Centre, was constantly preying on the mind of Kuropatkin. The danger of penetration was increasing, when during the day it became known that the 1st Brigade of the Japanese Guard Division had occupied the Ba-ji-san, thus actually penetrating into the imperilled gap; staking strong forces was all that was wanted now for completely breaking the Russian battle-front.

It seeming impossible to spare for the moment the only reserve still available in the Centre, the 22nd Infantry Division, from the 1st Army Corps,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The 88th Infantry Regiment and one battery of the 22nd Infantry Division had already been moved up from Tun-san-tsy to Tun-san-ho in support of the 37th Infantry Division. (P. 184.)

standing north of Tun-san-ho, Kuropatkin decided to bring up the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, forming the reserve of the Eastern Detachment, and to close the gap with it.

But General Baron Stackelberg did not feel inclined to comply with Kuropatkin's request. By reason of the reports arriving from the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the evening of October 11, he had finally resolved to give up the attack, and to confine himself entirely to the defensive.<sup>1</sup> The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which he had not yet engaged, he wished to keep available for guarding his right flank, which he believed to be in danger of being enveloped; but he had not yet reported to the Commander-in-Chief the grave resolve he had come to. Even in the letter Stackelberg was dispatching to General Headquarters at 6 a.m. on October 12, there was not a single word of it. He reported on the measures he meant to adopt in case of his right flank being enveloped; but kept silent on the fact that all attacks of the Eastern Detachment had hitherto failed, and that he had given up persisting in them further. He therefore kept the Commander-in-Chief for the moment still in the belief that all was going well with the Eastern Detachment.

A lively correspondence was carried on between the Commander-in-Chief and the leader of the Eastern Detachment about the employment of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, dragging along from early morning till nightfall.

As early as 5 o'clock in the morning Kuropatkin

<sup>1</sup> P. 151.

had sent General Baron Stackelberg the order to start at once the whole available reserve of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, or at least ten battalions, for joining temporarily the 4th Siberian Army Corps; the height, moreover, west of Yen-sin-tun,<sup>1</sup> was to be secured by one battalion with some guns. Of this intention the Commander-in-Chief informed General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps, by a message received by him about 10 a.m. The letter proposed, in the first instance, to keep, in case of retreat, the eye on Örr-tau-kou,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres north of Fön-kia-pu, but to fall back only step by step, offering an obstinate resistance, especially on the heights north of Schan-hei-niu-tun. "If you are obliged," Kuropatkin concluded his letter, "to evacuate your present position in the face of a superior enemy, I authorize you to demand, in my name, from the leader of the Eastern Detachment, the dispatch of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps<sup>2</sup> to Fön-kia-pu; that corps will then come under your orders. The leader of the Eastern Detachment will be informed of this at the same time."

When the Japanese 3rd Brigade was about to capture the height of Sia-liu-ho-tsy, and General Kossovich in front was gradually falling back upon the main position, south of Schan-hei-niu-tun,<sup>3</sup> General Sarubaiev thought the time had come for moving up the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, dispatching therefore about noon to

<sup>1</sup> On the Upper Scha-ho, north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, essentially, the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division.

<sup>3</sup> P. 168.

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the Eastern Detachment a summons to that effect.

Stackelberg had already replied to the Commander-in-Chief, at 9.45 a.m., in a negative sense, after receiving his letter. "If the 4th Siberian Army Corps is retiring farther north into the position of Schan-hei-niu-tun," he wrote, "I shall support it with the 2nd Siberian Army Corps. With that object I have moved up one regiment of infantry, with artillery, to the west of Bian-yu-pu-sa. Should it become necessary, I intend to advance with the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, and attack the right flank of the enemy pressing the 4th (Siberian) Army Corps. . . . The 1st and 3rd (Siberian) Army Corps," he goes on in the same telegram,<sup>1</sup> "have orders to go forward, and in no case to retire."

The Commander of the Eastern Detachment thought he was relieved by his report to the Commander-in-Chief from replying to the General Commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

The additional remark, referring to the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps, is worthy of notice. Even at this hour General Baron Stackelberg fought shy of reporting clearly how matters were proceeding on his wing. Instead of reporting that the attack was given up as impossible, and that the Eastern Detachment had assumed already the defensive, Stackelberg thought fit to choose some ambiguous terms.

Before this letter arrived at General Headquarters, General Kuropatkin had drawn up a

<sup>1</sup> The complete wording of the telegram is not available.

fresh order for Stackelberg, dispatched at 9.40 a.m. from the heights of Tun-san-ho, and received by the Eastern Detachment about 2.30 p.m.<sup>1</sup> The note ran as follows :

“Since the Eastern Detachment’s attack is hanging fire, and the Japanese, on the other hand, are continuing their attack on the 4th Siberian Army Corps with great obstinacy, leading perhaps to penetration between the Eastern and Western Detachments, I have left it to General Sarubaiev, when forced to evacuate the position he is occupying, to move up to him the 2nd Siberian Army Corps. Should General Sarubaiev make this demand, I propose you should start the Corps on Fön-kia-pu. Try to avoid that necessity. [?] I have ordered General Gerngross<sup>2</sup> to-day to support General Sarubaiev, and to send at least one brigade to the left wing of the latter.”

In reply to this, Stackelberg reported at 3.40 p.m. the following :

“With the object of securing myself and the 4th Siberian Army Corps against penetration by the Japanese between Yen-sin-tun and Bian-yu-pu-sa, I have pushed forward the 2nd Siberian Army Corps into a position south of Tin-kia-tai—Sun-wu-pu-tsy, facing west and south-west ; touch has been established with the 1st Siberian Army Corps by the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass. During the night I will withdraw from the fighting-line every

<sup>1</sup> The indifferent connection between General Headquarters and the Eastern Detachment is striking, orders and reports needing five to six hours before reaching their destination.

<sup>2</sup> General Commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 193

unit that can be spared, so as to strengthen the General Reserve of the corps and the better secure the right flank of the 1st Siberian Army Corps. By day it is difficult for the troops to carry out the movements, having regard to the commanding positions of the enemy. The General Reserve, seven battalions from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, is standing between Ta-tsy-pu and Wai-tau-schan at the northern foot of the height with the temple, so as to hide its position from the Japanese post of observation at 'A.'<sup>1</sup> I have no longer any sectional reserve, since, by your Excellency's Order (10,081), I am holding ready the 2nd Siberian Army Corps for placing it at the disposal of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. At the same time I consider it my duty to report that, by the withdrawal of the 4th Siberian Army Corps to Fön-kia-pu, the country between Yen-sin-tun and the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass will be completely denuded of troops, and thus open to an attack by the Japanese."

As the asked-for support by the 2nd Siberian Army Corps failed to arrive, General Sarubaiev, meanwhile, appealed directly to Kuropatkin's Headquarters for help. On this he received a note from the Chief of the Staff at 2.10 p.m., saying that three regiments and five batteries of the 22nd Division 1st Army Corps<sup>2</sup> had started and were coming under his orders. But since the Commander-in-Chief, in his constant practice of always

The 4th Siberian Army Corps is being reinforced by troops from the 22nd Infantry Division.

<sup>1</sup> The position of this post of observation "A" is not known.

<sup>2</sup> The 85th, 86th, and 87th Infantry Regiments, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Batteries 7th Artillery Brigade.

forming fresh reserves, was holding back the 86th Infantry Regiment, as well as the 5th and 6th Batteries 7th Artillery Brigade, only two regiments of two different brigades and the 1st Abteilung 7th Artillery Brigade, as well as a Sapper company, joined the 4th Siberian Army Corps; and with them arrived the General Commanding the Division and three Generals of Brigade! Of these reinforcements two battalions from the 87th Infantry Regiment were engaged in first line at Ma-niu-tun, on the left wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps; the other portions did no longer come into action on October 12, but bivouacked 2 kilometres north-east of Schan-hei-niu-tun.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of this direct support he had given to the 4th Siberian Army Corps, General Kuropatkin adhered to his intention of moving up the 2nd Siberian Army Corps as well for reinforcing the Centre. Without waiting for Stackelberg's reply to his letter dispatched at 9.40 a.m., he therefore sent another order to Stackelberg, worded as follows:

“SCHI-MIAU-TSY, EAST OF TUN-SAN-HO.

“*Dispatched 1.15 p.m.*

“General Sarubaiev, who was holding a position north of Schan-liu-ho-tsy and Pa-kia-tsy, is forced to retire, and is falling back in the direction of Yen-san-sai and Schan-hei-niu-tun. I am sending the 22nd Division in his support. Immediately

<sup>1</sup> During the action, lasting all day, two battalions of the 147th Infantry Regiment and one battery of the 43rd Artillery Brigade were already engaged by the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The battalions were employed on the right wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

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after receipt of this order, start the 2nd Corps (by forced march) on Yen-sin-tun<sup>1</sup>; continue then further, as the General Commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps may arrange. If you have already engaged portions of that corps, you must at all cost replace the missing units, or relieve them by parts of other corps. I grant that the situation of the 1st Siberian Army Corps is rather alarming. There must not be an isolated withdrawal without maintaining close touch with the left of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. Let me know your views on the co-operation of the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps."

With the portions attached to him from the 22nd Division General Sarubaiev thought himself now strong enough for holding the heights south of Sia- and Schan-hei-niu-tun without the aid of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps. He reported this view to General Kuropatkin.

When, late in the afternoon, General Baron Stackelberg received the Order dispatched at 1.15 p.m., he reported in reply at 6 p.m. briefly the following: "Order No. 108, dispatched 1.15 p.m., just received. The 2nd Siberian Army Corps is entrenching for the last three hours in a position south-east of Yen-sin-tun, facing south-west; the right is standing at the knoll with the temple."<sup>2</sup>

General Sarubaiev's last report to General Headquarters was settled by a message from Kuropatkin

<sup>1</sup> 9 kilometres north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>2</sup> He probably means the Wai-tau-schan.

to General Baron Stackelberg, being dispatched by way of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, and reading as follows:

*“ Dispatched 5.45 p.m.*

“The whole front of the 17th and 10th Army Corps has been standing fast until sunset. The 4th Siberian Army Corps has somewhat retired, so as to be in line with the other corps; reinforced by fresh troops, it is occupying a very favourable position.

“The issue of to-day’s fight on this front may be looked upon as very favourable generally. From you I have no news. The orders regarding the 2nd Siberian Army Corps you need no longer execute, the 4th Siberian Army Corps having been reinforced by portions of the 1st Army Corps. Your report on the 1st Siberian Army Corps approaching Sarubaiev’s left wing I have received.”<sup>1</sup>

The main body of the reinforced 5th East Siberian Rifle Division from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps remained therefore at Sun-wu-pu-tsy.

The Japanese 2nd Army rolls up the Russian advanced-guard position of the 17th Army Corps from the west.

While General Kuropatkin was focussing his whole interest on his Centre, a decision was brought about on the western wing determining the final issue of the whole battle—the 17th Army Corps succumbed to the attacks of the Japanese 2nd Army.

Oyama’s Order on the evening of October 11,<sup>2</sup> by which the 2nd Army was to continue the attack

<sup>1</sup> This report is not known.

<sup>2</sup> P. 146.

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on its former objects, that is to say, against Scha-ho village and to the west of it, was followed at 1.15 a.m., during the night October 11-12, by a telegraphic direction requesting the 2nd Army to reach, above all, the line Pan-kiau-pu—Liu-tan-kou, to enable the 4th Army to continue its right wheel.

The Commander of the Army had already previously informed the Commander-in-Chief of his intention to continue to attack during the night October 11-12.

Of the 3rd Division, the 6th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by two battalions from the General Reserve of its Army,<sup>1</sup> advanced, about midnight, from Siau-wen-kou to within 800 metres of Schi-li-ho village, entrenching a position opposite that village, which the Russians had strongly fortified. The fire-trenches were occupied by six companies, and connected by a communicating trench with Siau-wen-kou. Three batteries of the Divisional Artillery unlimbered at 3 a.m. close south of, and the others south-east of, Siau-wen-kou. In addition, one battery of the 4th Division and one composite battery of 10.5 centimetre guns, captured at Kin-tschou, took up a position on the western border of Wu-li-tai-tsy. The advance and the entrenching of the Japanese were discovered by the Russians, who fired at the Japanese, but without material effect, the fire being too high in the darkness. The Japanese remained in their trenches till morning, the trenches being constructed to allow them to fire standing.

<sup>1</sup> From the 34th Infantry Regiment.

The main forces of the Division, after having been driven out of Nan-kuan-tsy<sup>1</sup> by the Russians at 11 p.m. on October 11, entrenched themselves again 800 metres away from the village, waiting for the morning of October 12. The reserve of the Division was standing at Schuan-tai-tsy.

From its positions at Yen-kia-wan, and the little wood south-east of it, the 6th Division worked its way up to the enemy slowly, by very cleverly taking advantage of the darkness; but the greatest caution had to be exercised, the Russians keeping a sharp look-out, and frequently opening fire. Repeatedly it was thought the enemy was going to sally from his position at Siau-tun-tai and Örr-schi-kia-tsy for counter-attack.

The 11th Brigade 6th Division, which in the evening had reached the little wood south-east of Yen-kia-wan, and was commencing to throw up shelter-trenches,<sup>2</sup> was suddenly surprised at night by a violent fire. The commander decided to await the enemy's attack in the shelter-trenches. But when, after some time, the firing ceased, and patrols, pushed forward, reported that all was quiet again in the enemy's position, the commander seized the favourable moment to lead his battalion some 400 metres forward, where it began to entrench once more.

The left column of the 6th Division—the 24th Brigade—which had captured Yen-kia-wan, resumed its movement after sunset on October 11 by advancing on Örr-schi-kia-tsy. But the column had proceeded only a short distance when it also

<sup>1</sup> P. 149.

<sup>2</sup> P. 141

met with a heavy fire. The leading lines entrenched, waiting till all was quiet again. Then the advance was continued. Three times the Japanese found themselves obliged to stop and work with the spade before they succeeded in getting within 600 metres of Örr-schi-kia-tsy. The 1st Battalion 45th Infantry Regiment, which, at 5 p.m. on October 11, had been moved up from the reserve to Yen-kia-wan, had cooked, and received there the order at 9 p.m. to advance and envelop the enemy's right wing at Örr-schi-kia-tsy, was unable to carry out the order completely. It is true, it succeeded in advancing a good distance without loss in the deeply cut bed of the Scha-ho; but when it had to quit that cover, the battalion was obliged by heavy fire to seek shelter by entrenching. It then advanced for about another 300 metres, when trenches were constructed once more, because news came from the battalion on the right that it was likewise unable to advance any farther.

The 3rd and 6th Divisions had worked their way up to the enemy far enough for enabling them to continue their attack against the right wing of the Western Detachment at dawn on October 12.

The 4th Division remained during the night October 11-12 in the places they had reached on the 11th at the end of their march, on the line Ta-yu-tschun-pu—Li-kia-tun.

The 17th Army Corps of the Russians made use of the night for feeding the troops and providing them with ample ammunition, but it had

been impossible to reorganise the strongly mixed units.

On the right, under the uniform command of Colonel Stakovich, at Tsun-lun-yen-tun, were standing: 2 battalions from the 140th Infantry Regiment,  $\frac{1}{2}$  battalion from the 11th Infantry Regiment, 1 battery of the 35th Artillery Brigade and 2 guns of the 3rd, and, in addition, the 52nd Dragoon Regiment and a detachment of Scouts from the 10th Infantry Regiment.

The section Örr-schi-kia-tsy—Lan-tsy-tai—Siau-tun-tai was held by: 1 battalion 137th Infantry Regiment, 2 battalions 10th Infantry Regiment, the whole of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 6 companies from the 12th Infantry Regiment, and 3 batteries 3rd Artillery Brigade. The 139th Infantry Regiment was standing in Nan-kuan-tsy. Two battalions 140th Infantry Regiment, and 1 battalion 10th Infantry Regiment, were at Lun-wan-miau. Between Lun-wan-miau and Schi-li-ho were  $1\frac{1}{2}$  battalions from the 138th Infantry Regiment, and 2 batteries 3rd Artillery Brigade. On the left, Schi-li-ho village was occupied by  $2\frac{1}{2}$  battalions from the 11th Infantry Regiment, 6 companies 138th Infantry Regiment, 2 companies 12th Infantry Regiment, and, in addition, by 3 batteries 35th Artillery Brigade and 2 batteries of the 3rd. One battalion 138th Infantry Regiment and 2 squadrons 51st Dragoon Regiment were standing at Nan-wu-li-tai as sectional reserve; the main reserve—3 battalions 137th Infantry Regiment and 4 batteries 35th Artillery Brigade—was standing somewhat behind the centre.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 201

Some other battalions and batteries seem to have been distributed, moreover, all along the front, the place where they were employed being unknown.

Headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army was staying in Pu-tsau-kou from daybreak, October 12. In like manner, as partly on the previous days, officers of the Staff were sent to the Divisions with the object of keeping the General Commanding the Army constantly informed on the progress of events.

After it had become known that the 1st Army had successfully advanced during the night, and that the 4th Army had captured the San-kai-seki-san, General Baron Oku ordered the Divisions to carry out the attack now at all cost.

The advance of the 3rd Division did not make rapid progress in the forenoon. While the left column, which, during the night, had suffered heavily, was slowly working its way up towards Nan-kuan-tsy, the 6th Infantry Regiment, being too weak for carrying out a frontal attack on the strongly fortified Schi-li-ho village, remained for the moment in its position. The Divisional Commander first wanted to wait for the Artillery to have some effect, and also to see how the attack on Nan-kuan-tsy would turn out, before carrying out the attack on Schi-li-ho village.

More rapidly and more effectively proceeded the attack of the 6th Division, which, at daybreak, opened with an overwhelming Artillery fire. Army Headquarters had, from its reserve, placed at the disposal of the Division one Field Artillery regi-

ment, which the Divisional Commander, together with five batteries of his own Division, ordered to come into action at Örr-tai-tsy; one battery unlimbered at Yen-kia-wan. When it began to dawn, the Infantry commenced to attack. The Russian position was at first indicated merely by some glimmering points, which the Japanese took for glowing cigarettes. With the object of inducing the enemy to fire, some companies of the 2nd Battalion 45th Infantry Regiment, standing north of Yen-kia-wan, began to shoot. The Russians at once replied, and, contrary to their habit, not with volleys, but with a wildly delivered individual fire. The fire-fight now ensuing increased in violence as daylight was growing. About 9 a.m. the 2nd Battalion was reinforced by the 3rd. The effect of fire could not be mistaken; clearly could the Japanese watch how the Russians were carrying back from their trenches numerous wounded, and perhaps also dead. To the 1st Battalion 45th Infantry Regiment, which, the night before, had been designated by the Divisional Commander to turn the Russian right at Örr-schi-kia-tsy, the order was renewed at 10 a.m. to cross the Schi-li-ho and carry out the envelopment. The battalion first pushed one company to the left bank of the Schi-li-ho, with orders to occupy the farther edge of the river-bank; then a second company followed, and finally a third. The movement was a complete success: the Japanese skirmishers appeared straight on the right flank of the Russian entrenchments; the Russians were altogether taken by surprise. Its effect increased when, about 11 a.m.,

on the left of the 1st Battalion 45th Infantry Regiment, came up the 1st Battalion 13th Infantry Regiment, which the Divisional Commander had likewise ordered to turn the position, with the object of increasing the pressure.

There being no longer any sectional reserves behind the right wing of the Russian position on the Schi-li-ho capable of meeting this envelopment, the Russians were exposed to the full effect of this enfilade fire. Within a short time they began to lose heavily; disorder and consternation began to spread, and, without waiting for any orders, the firing-line commenced to retire, pursued by the withering fire of the Japanese. When the first signs of demoralisation in the Russian lines were being noticed, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions 45th Regiment stormed forward against the front. Soon after 11.30 a.m. Örr-schi-kia-tsy was captured by these four battalions. A flag, hoisted on a tall tree, announced to the troops in rear, and particularly to the Artillery, the success gained. For the moment the Russians were still holding out in Siau-tun-tai, and in the trenches to the east of it; their Artillery, too, was keeping up a brisk fire on the assailants. Portions of the lines, surging back, established themselves again at Lan-tsy-tai. The Japanese, after rallying and reorganising at Örr-schi-kia-tsy, pushed on towards Siau-tun-tai and Lan-tsy-tai, capturing those places about 1.30 p.m. The 48th Infantry Regiment, hitherto held back in reserve, arrived about that time in Lan-tsy-tai. A Russian battery of the 3rd Artillery Brigade, north of that village, standing in an

unfavourable position near a little lake, and almost unable to move, was attacked and captured by one company of the first line. With great difficulty the artillerists succeeded in escaping with the breech-blocks, which they took with them.

When the Japanese were advancing from Örr-schi-kia-tsy on Lan-tsy-tai, an attack was made from a northerly direction upon their left flank by seven or eight Russian squadrons, probably from the 2nd Independent Cavalry Brigade, belonging to the 17th Army Corps. The horse-men, however, did not charge with cold steel, but fired at pretty close range, sitting on their horses. To ward off the attack, one company of the 1st Battalion 13th Infantry Regiment, acting as flank protection, deployed, succeeding within a short time in driving away the hostile Cavalry by fire.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions 13th Infantry Regiment had been carrying on a lively fire-fight against the Nan-kuan-tsy—Siau-tun-tai section of ground since daybreak. When, towards noon, the fire of the Russians began to slacken, the Japanese advanced; their left wing penetrated into Siau-tun-tai, crossed the Schi-li-ho, and, together with the right wing of the 45th Infantry Regiment, captured a Russian battery standing east of that village.

Two companies of the right wing had been facing Nan-kuan-tsy since morning, and were but slowly working up to that place, with heavy losses. The Divisional Commander therefore reinforced them by one battalion 23rd Infantry Regiment, which the Army Commander had placed at his

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 205

disposal. But the Russian 139th Infantry Regiment, holding Nan-kuan-tsy, and being attacked by the 3rd Division, stood fast with great gallantry. It was only when, at 1 p.m., the troops of the 6th Division were penetrating into the village from the west, and those of the 3rd Division from the south, that the bulk of the defenders withdrew north; isolated groups, however, were still making a stand in some few buildings, and could not be driven out until about 3.30 p.m., after an obstinate contest.

After the capture of Lan-tsy-tai, the Commander of the 6th Division moved up all his Artillery, except one battery, which he attached to the 13th Infantry Regiment, and initiated the pursuit. To carry it out, he detailed 4 battalions—of which two were from the 23rd Infantry Regiment—2 squadrons, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company, all under General Koizumi, commanding the 24th Brigade.

After his right wing had given way, General Wolkov, commanding the Russian 17th Army Corps, made some futile attempts to restore the battle. Whatever of intact bodies he had available he engaged in counter-attack. Several battalions of the right section, having probably been in reserve north of Lan-tsy-tai, were the first to make a counter-attack, which, however, failed completely. In dense columns, as on review, the battalions advanced without firing a shot. The Japanese, being deployed in firing-lines in and near Lan-tsy-tai, allowed them to approach within about 600 metres, when they poured a

The Russian 17th Army Corps tries in vain to hold the position on the Schi-li-ho.

rapid, withering fire on the Russians, which they were unable to resist. With heavy loss, they streamed back in a northerly and easterly direction. General Baron Okubo, commanding the Japanese 6th Division, expecting further counter-attacks by the Russians, reinforced the troops apportioned for the pursuit by one more battalion and five batteries. The Japanese then pressed on. When they were about 1 kilometre north of Lan-tsy-tai, the Russians made another counter-attack. After many urgent requests from Bilderling, the 2nd Brigade 55th Infantry Division was placed at last, by the 6th Siberian Army Corps, at the disposal of the Western Detachment, and arrived at Tschien-liu-tan-kou during the forenoon. At 12 noon the 219th Infantry Regiment of that brigade received orders to attack, with the object of giving relief to the 17th Army Corps. But the counter-attack being made in the same impracticable manner as the first, this attempt to turn the fortune of the day failed too. With the same result ended a counter-attack made by portions of the 139th Infantry Regiment about 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

When the Commander of the Russian 3rd Infantry Division saw that the position on the Schi-li-lo was no longer tenable, he issued orders to withdraw to the main position on the line Tschien-liu-tan-kou—Pan-kiau-pu. All the troops who had not yet evacuated their former positions began the movement in the direction ordered.

The General Commanding the 17th Army Corps, on the other hand, seemed to be of opinion that there was no need for evacuating the Schi-li-ho

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 207

position at once ; he thought it more practical to begin the retreat under cover of night, and therefore issued the following Order to the Generals commanding Divisions, as well as to Colonel Stakovich :

“ The General Officer Commanding orders the positions occupied to be held till dark, to withdraw then into the position Pan-kiau-pu—Liu-tan-kou—Tschien-liu-tan-kou—Hun-lin-pu, and to make there the following dispositions :

“ The 35th Infantry Division will occupy the section Pan-kiau-pu to Tschien-liu-tan-kou inclusive ; the 2nd Brigade 55th Infantry Division will move to the right of the 35th Division, and extend to Hun-lin-pu ; Stakovich's Detachment will occupy Hun-lin-pu ; the 3rd Infantry Division will be stationed in reserve at Schu-lin-tsy.

“ The General Commanding 35th Infantry Division will rally the troops retreating, organise them, and occupy with them the second position. The 3rd Infantry Division will not stop in the second position, but march at once to Schu-lin-tsy. The brigade from the 55th Infantry Division will rally and move into the line assigned to it, a portion of which it has already been occupying to-day. All the positions taken up are to be defended. Colonel Stakovich will establish touch with the 6th Siberian Army Corps, and General Dobrshinski with the 10th Army Corps.

“ I shall be at Scha-ho Station <sup>1</sup> at the beginning of the action. Ammunition is to be replenished during night.” <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> “ Bhf. Scha-ho ” on map.

<sup>2</sup> The Order also contained details about baggage and ambulances.

Under the conditions then prevailing, it was impossible to carry out the Order. When, about 4.45 p.m., the Order was received by the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division, the whole of the position between the Scha-ho and Schi-li-ho village was already evacuated. All the troops were mixed, moreover; it was therefore out of the question to disentangle the various units. Not only was it impossible to hold the Schi-li-ho position till dark, but rallying and disposing the troops on the line indicated by General Wolkov were also impossible, as the Japanese were pressing hard in pursuit, and the last pivot of the position defended, the village of Schi-li-ho, had fallen into the hands of the enemy as well.

The Japa-  
nese 3rd  
Division  
captures  
Schi-li-  
ho village.

The right column of the Japanese 3rd Division had, by direction of the Divisional Commander, remained in its trenches, north of Siau-wen-kou, to wait for the result of the attack on Nan-kuan-tsy, in which the main forces of the Division were engaged.

About noon it became clear, from the din of battle, that the crisis was near at hand at Nan-kuan-tsy. Its effect seemed already to spread to the position at Schi-li-ho village, it being distinctly noticed how, at first, single men were quitting the Russian trenches, and then small groups. And as, moreover, the Japanese Artillery had evidently gained the mastery over the Russian batteries, the moment for successfully carrying out the assault seemed to have arrived. At 3 p.m. the order to attack was given. Increasing their Artillery and Infantry fire, by which means the Russians were

kept down in their trenches, the Japanese succeeded in approaching by rushes to within 600 metres without any loss. Then the Russians, with portions of the 2nd Brigade 3rd Infantry Division, as well as of the 138th Infantry Regiment,<sup>1</sup> engaged in a fire-fight with volleys. The Japanese slowly worked their way forward; an envelopment of the enemy's right wing accelerated the success of the assault. The position west of Schi-li-ho village having already been abandoned by the Russians, two companies of the 34th Infantry Regiment, advancing along the railway, succeeded in crossing the Schi-li-ho by the railway bridge unmolested, and in appearing then on the right flank, and in rear of the Russians. The attack in front was continued by rushes. The Russians fell back from the southern portion of the village, but were still maintaining the trenches on either side, and the portion of the village north of the river; the Russian batteries resumed their fire against the Japanese Infantry with great violence, too. The Japanese advanced by rushes of small groups.

The flat country affording no cover at all, the men individually, after each rush, formed some small earth-cover with their spade, as was the custom with the 2nd Army generally after its experiences at Liao-yan; the wounded, too, tried to protect themselves in this way from being hit once more. The whole field of attack was strewn with these small earth-heaps.

When the Japanese had approached to within about 300 metres, the Russians withdrew in large

<sup>1</sup> P. 147.

troops also from the trenches outside the village, retiring at first to the cover offered by the deep valley of the Schi-li-ho, and then through the northern portion of the village. The two companies which had made their appearance on the right flank took the retreating Russians under a most effective fire, shooting down also some of their artillery horses. When next the Japanese rose to assault in front, the trenches had all been abandoned; four guns and five ammunition wag-gons fell into the hands of the assailants. The fight was over at 4.20 p.m. One regiment followed the Russians to Pan-kiau-pu. The heights east of the village being still strongly occupied by portions of the 9th Infantry Division 10th Army Corps, and darkness meanwhile setting in, the Japanese abstained from further pursuit, and bivouacked at Pan-kiau-pu.

The Japa-  
nese 4th  
Division  
attacks  
the Rus-  
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forces  
west of  
the Scha-  
ho.

On the left wing of the 2nd Army the 4th Division likewise commenced to attack early in the morning, the right column of it (4 battalions of the 7th Brigade,  $\frac{1}{4}$  squadron, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company) being directed on Tsun-lun-yen-tun—Hun-lin-pu; while the 1st Battalion 38th Infantry Regiment, with 2 squadrons, as left column, was to attack the line Ta-lian-tun—Kuan-lin-pu. The reserve of the Division assembled at Yu-kia-tiën-tsy. It was known of the enemy that there was about one regiment with eight guns at Tsun-lun-yen-tun, and that there were troops of unknown strength at Ta-tai—Siau-tai. In consideration of the enemy being at Ta-tai—Siau-tai, the object indicated to the left column seemed

rather far away ; the Divisional Commander therefore changed his order, directing the column, supported by three companies, to attack first Siau-tai. The weak protective party from the 6th Siberian Army Corps standing there withdrew without fighting on the approach of the Japanese ; the left column therefore succeeded in capturing Siau-tai as early as 8.20 a.m.

The right column was, meanwhile, attacking Tsun-lun-yen-tun, which Colonel Stakovich had occupied with six companies of the 11th Infantry Regiment and some Artillery on October 11, after his retreat from Ta-yu-tschun-pu.<sup>1</sup> Fearing he would again be obliged to give way to superior forces of the Japanese, he addressed a request for support to the advanced guard of the 6th Siberian Army Corps<sup>2</sup> standing at Wan-tschuan-tsy. General Bolotov, commanding the advanced guard, did not feel justified in giving troops away ; but he decided to give relief to Stakovich's Detachment by an offensive move of his advanced guard on Siau-tai.

The Japanese attack, meanwhile, continued to make progress. Towards noon the Japanese Artillery succeeded in silencing Colonel Stakovich's guns at Tsun-lun-yen-tun ; but it was not long before three Russian batteries turned up at Wan-tschuan-tsy, probably as a preliminary to General Bolotov's intended offensive move, drawing upon themselves the fire of the whole Divisional

<sup>1</sup> P. 143.

<sup>2</sup> The 1st Brigade 72nd Infantry Division, with an Abteilung 10th Artillery Brigade.

Artillery. The Russian battery at Tsun-lun-yen-tun was therefore soon able to resume its fire. The Japanese left column had, meanwhile, been reinforced by one more company and three batteries. The Japanese Divisional Cavalry was pushed to Li-kia-tun to cover the left flank.

About 1 p.m. General Baron Tsukamoto, commanding the Japanese 4th Division, was informed by Army Headquarters of the success of the other two Divisions, being at the same time requested to continue his attack. The Divisional Commander then reinforced the right column by one battalion, ordering the attack on Tsun-lun-yen-tun to be pushed home.

It was about this time that the Russian 17th Army Corps was making the futile counter-attacks with its reserves in order to retain possession of the Schi-li-ho line.<sup>1</sup> One battalion of the 138th Infantry Regiment was directed to counter-attack from Nan-wu-li-tai on Lan-tsy-tai; its attack, like that of the 139th and 219th Infantry Regiments, failed; the battalion was driven in a north-westerly direction, where it met Stakovich's Detachment, to which it was a welcome reinforcement. The battalion was then engaged north-west of Tsun-lun-yen-tun. When the Russian batteries in action at Wan-tschuan-tsy, as well as their advanced Infantry at Ta-tai, were being reinforced, the Commander of the 4th Division thought the Russians were now going to make a counter-attack; but General Bolotov was still holding back, causing the Japanese attack

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 205-207.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 213

to make further progress. At 4.30 p.m. the right column succeeded in penetrating into Tsun-lun-yen-tun, and pushing back the Russians still in there. The evacuation of Tsun-lun-yen-tun was perhaps a voluntary act, because, meanwhile, Colonel Stakovich had probably received General Wolkov's order directing him to establish touch with the 6th Siberian Army Corps, and occupy Hun-lin-pu.<sup>1</sup> It was only now that several battalions of Bolotov's advanced guard sallied forth to make a counter-attack from the line Ta-tai—Ho-liën-tai. The Japanese having been on the look-out for this attack, it did not come upon them as a surprise. The Russians were opposed by a strong fire-front at Siau-tai, and were obliged to fall back with considerable loss<sup>2</sup> to Wan-tschuan-tsy, after they had fought and carried the attack forward to some distance.<sup>3</sup>

The left column of the 4th Division followed, occupying Ta-tai.

Owing to darkness coming on, the Division

<sup>1</sup> P. 207.

<sup>2</sup> In the attack took part in first line: the 14th, 15th, and 16th Companies 286th Infantry Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion 285th Infantry Regiment. Of each regiment one battalion formed the reserve.

Losses.—285th Infantry Regiment: 3 officers dead, 9 wounded.

” ” ” 139 men dead, 348 wounded.

Losses.—286th Infantry Regiment: 23 men dead.

” ” ” 3 officers, 78 men wounded.

During the night October 12-13 the advanced guard was ordered to march back to Schau-kia lin-tsy; at 5 a.m. it started unperceived by the enemy. Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade, which had taken no part in the action of October 12, withdrew from Kau-kia-tai in a northerly direction too.

<sup>3</sup> According to Japanese information the Russian Infantry is said to have been firing standing all the time in that attack.

did not go beyond the line Tsun-lun-yen-tun—Ta-tai.

The main body of the 1st Cavalry Brigade had remained in San-de-pu. The party which had been dispatched to the right bank of the Hun-ho advanced 3 kilometres farther north from Tu-tai-tsy.

Based on the reports giving information on the favourable course of the attack all along the front of the Army, General Baron Oku issued in the afternoon the following Order :

“The 3rd Division will pursue the enemy with some portions to Pan-kiau-pu, occupying with the rest the line Hun-pau-schan—Liu-kia-san-kia-tsy ; the 6th Division will go forward to the line Liu-kia-san-kia-tsy—Hun-lin-pu ; the 4th Division to that place, and to the west of it.”

It was not possible at first to carry out this order completely, for at Hun-pau-schan were still some strong hostile forces, as the 3rd Division had ascertained, Hun-lin-pu being also still occupied.

The 3rd and 4th Divisions remained at the places previously mentioned. The pursuit, initiated by the 6th Division, came to a standstill on the right tributary of the Schi-li-ho. The main body of that Division closed up.

While General Baron Oku was taking his measures for pursuit, the 17th Army Corps was in full retreat.<sup>1</sup> The events at Schi-li-ho, as well as the steady advance of the 4th Division against the right flank, made it clear that taking up a position between Tschien-liu-tan-kou and Pan-

<sup>1</sup> P. 206.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 215

kiau-pu was no longer possible. To save the much-weakened corps, and disengage it from the victorious enemy, it was imperative to continue the retreat a good way beyond the right tributary of the Schi-li-ho. The Divisional Commanders therefore agreed to retreat behind the Scha-ho. The Japanese constantly pressing forward, especially from Lan-tsy-tai, the troops were directed to rally in the direction on the railway. The 137th Infantry Regiment, standing in reserve at Tschien-liu-tan-kou, was ordered by the General Commanding the 35th Division to hold the trenches there at all cost, with the object of ensuring the retreat of the troops; with the same object, two battalions from the 140th Infantry Regiment, who had fought at Lun-wan-miau, were sent towards Nan-wu-li-tai. These measures were reported to the General Officer Commanding, who was staying at Scha-ho Railway Station.

Contrary to the orders of the General Commanding the Divisions of the Russian 17th Army Corps withdraw behind the Scha-ho.

Under cover of darkness, which had meanwhile set in, it was possible to lead back the rest of the Divisions, and thus save them from destruction. Nevertheless, they still incurred considerable loss, especially when crossing the Scha-ho at Han-kui-pu, where, at the ford and at the small bridge previously constructed, the troops were crowding together under the fire of Japanese Artillery.

At Scha-ho Station the intelligence of the corps' defeat produced the greatest consternation. In feverish haste, measures were adopted to bring into safety the wounded—more than 500 in number—as well as to send back the stores collected there. The general confusion was increased by the

numberless vehicles of the baggages that had assembled there, and had now to be started northwards as well.

According as the troops arrived, places were assigned to them in the position prepared beforehand, extending from Ku-kia-tsy (on the right) by Lin-schin-pu to La-mu-tun; three battalions of the 138th Infantry Regiment were detailed to occupy the trenches at La-mu-tun.<sup>1</sup> The 2nd Brigade 55th Infantry Division, which the 6th Siberian Army Corps had placed at the disposal of the 17th Army Corps,<sup>2</sup> was directed to continue marching on Pen-tiën-tsy to rejoin its corps. It was broad daylight before it arrived there.

The bringing back of the wounded and of the stores, likewise the crossing of the impedimenta, was carried out in perfect order under the direction of General Dobrshinski, commanding the 35th Division; by 3.30 in the morning not a single vehicle was left on the southern bank of the river.

The 10th Army Corps, the advanced guard of which, under General Riabinkin, was still holding its position on the Schi-li-ho, while the main body of the 9th Infantry Division was standing in the main position at Hun-pau-schan,<sup>3</sup> had received during the day, from an officer dispatched to the 17th Army Corps, several reports on what was happening with that Army Corps on October 12. From this intelligence, as well as from the repeated requests addressed to him for support,

<sup>1</sup> The other details are not known. Stakovich's Detachment, too, probably withdrew from Hun-lin-pu to the new position.

<sup>2</sup> P. 206.

<sup>3</sup> P. 103

The Russian 10th Army Corps withdraws from the Schi-li-ho into the position south of Scha-ho-pu.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 217

General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, who was on the height at Hun-pau-schan, gathered that the neighbouring corps was in great distress.

Towards 2 p.m. two orders, arriving simultaneously, were received at Corps Headquarters. In the one the Commander-in-Chief requested six to eight battalions, without Artillery, to be held in readiness to support, in case of need, the right wing of the Army; the other was a demand from the Commander of the Western Detachment to send him one Infantry brigade at once. General Slutshevski thereupon directed General Shatilov, commanding the right section of the main position, to dispatch the 36th Infantry Regiment in support of the 17th Army Corps. He ordered General Riabinkin to start two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment with the same object. And, finally, General Gerschelmann was to conduct the 33rd Infantry Regiment to the right of the corps, and occupy with it the section formerly held by the 2nd Brigade 9th Infantry Division.

Three battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment moved off first to the 17th Army Corps, then the two battalions from the 35th Infantry Regiment of the advanced guard started, and lastly the 4th Battalion of the 36th Infantry Regiment followed; the last-named battalion had only just gone to Nin-kuan-tun, in compliance with an order issued but a short time previously.<sup>1</sup>

The issue having been decided meanwhile with the 17th Army Corps, these supports from the

<sup>1</sup> P. 188.

10th Army Corps were no longer able to change the fortune. The two leading battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment, on arrival, were first employed in securing the departure of transport from Scha-ho Station, and afterwards in forming the rearguard; it was impossible to ascertain whether, and where, employment was found for the other two battalions of the regiment, as well as for the portions of the 35th Infantry Regiment.

At 4 p.m. General Riabinkin, in response to Kuropatkin's order,<sup>1</sup> began to withdraw with the advanced guard on and through the main position. The retreat was carried out in perfect order and without any loss. By a strong Artillery fire from the main position the enemy was prevented from pressing too closely or occupying the position evacuated. The advanced guard of the 10th Army Corps retired as far as Hou-huan-hua-tiën, where it remained as reserve.<sup>2</sup> The Japanese 5th Division did not follow until the 3rd Division had captured Schi-li-ho, reaching then Hun-kia-tschuan in the evening of October 12. The Japanese records do not mention whether the General Reserve of the Japanese Armies, which had been placed at the disposal of the 4th Army on October 11, was pushed forward.<sup>3</sup> It does not seem to have been employed at all.

It was evening before General Slutshevski ob-

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 186-188.

<sup>2</sup> The 34th Infantry Regiment had already evacuated Yin-pan and Ta-kou when the 1st Brigade 37th Infantry Division gave up the San-kai-seki-san.

<sup>3</sup> According to a lecture given on the battle by General Baron Kodama, Chief of the Staff of the Army, at the beginning of 1905. (P. 146.)

tained a more exact knowledge of what had happened to the 17th Army Corps. He had sent a General Staff Officer to the western wing, hearing through him from the General Commanding the 3rd Division, as well as from the Chief of the Staff of the 17th Army Corps, that the corps, severely shaken after fighting hard, was retreating, and would be unable to make another stand in the main position; it would, therefore, continue its retreat to behind the Scha-ho.

Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps had meanwhile ridden to Hou-tai, intending to billet there. General Slutshevski was now placed before the alternative of either continuing next morning the battle in the position of Hun-pau-schan, or of retiring likewise into the prepared positions south of Scha-ho-pu.

Having available for the defence of the position, extending on a front of about 7 kilometres, only 18 battalions,<sup>1</sup> 8<sup>2</sup> of which had been fighting for some days already, the right flank, by the retirement of the 17th Army Corps, having nothing to lean upon, and no orders from the Commander of the Western Group coming in at all, the General Commanding decided to withdraw into the position south of Scha-ho-pu.

The beginning of the retreat was fixed for 12 midnight, the Commander-in-Chief<sup>3</sup> being informed of the decision arrived at. The officer

<sup>1</sup> The 2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division (8 battalions), the 1st Brigade 9th Infantry Division (8 battalions), and 2 battalions from the 35th Infantry Regiment.

<sup>2</sup> Riabinkin's Brigade.

<sup>3</sup> It was impossible to ascertain whether the Commander of the Western Group was informed as well.

carrying the dispatch to Kuropatkin, whose Headquarters were not exactly known, but were guessed to be in San-kia-tsy, had scarcely left at 7.30 p.m., when an order of the Commander-in-Chief to the leader of the Western Group, issued at 6 p.m., arrived, instructing him "vigorously to hold the main position to-morrow, the 13th; to resist at the point of the bayonet; and in no case to retire to the Scha-ho."

Though this order was issued earlier than the Commander-in-Chief could have known of the 17th Army Corps' defeat, General Slutshevski nevertheless thought he could now no longer depart for the Scha-ho without a special order; he therefore resolved to move, for the present only, all the trains to the right bank of the Scha-ho, and otherwise to wait for special orders. At 9.5 p.m. an aide-de-camp of the General Officer Commanding was dispatched to Kuropatkin's Headquarters at Liu-tsiën-tun to report in this sense. This officer saw the Commander-in-Chief before the General Staff Officer, who had brought the first dispatch, had left General Headquarters. On the report of the 17th Army Corps' retreat, General Sakarov, Chief of the Staff of the Army, had replied "that the corps, even if it should have actually retired, would, after receiving the order for an obstinate resistance, surely have returned to the position indicated, and that, therefore, the right flank of the 10th Army Corps was absolutely secure." In the name of the Commander-in-Chief, General Sakarov gave the order to maintain at all cost the position of Hun-pau-schan.

## FIRST FOUR DAYS OF BATTLE 221

Before, however, the the two officers dispatched to Kuropatkin's Headquarters had returned, an order by wire from the leader of the Western Detachment was received by the 10th Army Corps at 11.15 p.m., to withdraw during the night to the line of the Scha-ho.

General Slutshevski then no longer waited for the Commander-in-Chief's decision, but began to retreat at night during a heavy thunderstorm, in perfect order. Early on October 13 the prepared position, south of the river at Scha-ho-piu, was occupied. Corps Headquarters billeted in Pa-ta-kia-tsy.

On the evening of October 12 fate had irrevocably decided in favour of the Japanese in the combats on the Scha-ho. The Japanese right wing, under General Baron Ino-uye, was repelling the last attacks of the Russian Eastern Group against his position on the heights of Pen-si-hu and at the passes north-west of those heights. By the retreat of General Samsonov's Cossack Division, General von Rennenkampf and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps were induced to retire too. The Japanese Guard Division had pushed over the Eastern San-jo-shi-san to the Ba-ji-san, embracing the left wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps; and the Japanese 2nd Division had pushed back the right wing of the 4th Siberian Army Corps to the heights of Do-mon-shi and to the Djo-san. In the centre, the 10th Division of the Japanese 4th Army had captured the San-kai-seki-san, defended by portions of the 1st Army Corps. And finally, on the western wing, the Russian 17th

Result  
of Octo-  
ber 12.

Army Corps was pushed back by the Japanese 2nd Army from its advanced-guard position on the Schi-li-ho to behind the Scha-ho, beyond the main position on the northern tributary of the Schi-li-ho; in this retreat the Russian 10th Army Corps joined, though remaining still south of the Scha-ho. The Russians had thus been thrown on a very trying defensive, after conducting an offensive in a half-hearted manner. But the Japanese had not succeeded in pushing them north-east; the Russians retired straight back on the Hun-ho.



## V

### THE LAST DAYS OF THE BATTLE

OCTOBER 13

AFTER the Western Detachment had retired to and behind the Scha-ho on October 12, the Russian Centre seemed to be again in an extremely dangerous situation. The positions of the 4th Siberian and 1st Army Corps were projecting like a bastion beyond the general line of the front, and downright challenging the enemy to a twofold envelopment. But withdrawing the Centre at once seemed impracticable, having regard to the Eastern Detachment, which otherwise might be completely cut off. General Kuropatkin therefore decided to reinforce, for further resistance, the 4th Siberian Army Corps, whose left flank was being threatened in the first instance by the Japanese Guard Division. At 5 a.m. he dispatched an Order to the Eastern Detachment, requesting it, as before, in his Order of 1.15 p.m.<sup>1</sup> on October 12, to put in motion the whole available reserve of the 5th East Siberian Division, from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, and to place it

General Kuropatkin initiates the retreat of his eastern wing to the Upper Scha-ho.

Sketch 7.

<sup>1</sup> P. 194.

under the temporary command of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. In a letter dispatched at 7.20 a.m. he informed General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps, of this measure.

General Baron Stackelberg had already, at 3.55 a.m., dispatched a report to the Commander-in-Chief, describing in a few words the situation of the Eastern Detachment: "I have given orders for the position to be held to the last man; there will be no retreat." Apparently somewhat later, he reported further: "If the 4th Siberian Army Corps continues to retreat, my rear will be uncovered; I am anxious for the safety of my right flank and rear, but I cannot do anything myself to protect them, having no more reserves." A copy of this last report was also sent to the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

If General Kuropatkin had still any doubt, before receiving the first of these messages, whether success could be looked for from the Eastern Detachment or not—such doubts being justified by Stackelberg's ambiguous reports of October 12<sup>1</sup>—this last dispatch must have made him see clearly the hopeless situation of Stackelberg. As it must be assumed that Stackelberg's message of 3.55 a.m. did not reach General Headquarters before 9 or 9.30 a.m., owing to the defective mode of transmission, the Commander-in-Chief seems to have made up his mind immediately after receipt of the letter to look upon Stackelberg's operations as having finally failed, and to withdraw now the Eastern Detachment.

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 191-193.

He sent its commander the following directive at 10 a.m. :

“The 17th Army Corps has suffered a defeat, and was obliged to retire on the Scha-ho line. This defeat, together with the failure of your operations, forces me to abandon the task imposed upon the Eastern Detachment, and to withdraw your troops north, so as to bring them in closer touch with the other units. The retreat of the 17th Army Corps, and, after it, that of the 10th Army Corps, entailed the withdrawal of the 4th Siberian Army Corps by my orders. A gap was thereby caused between the latter corps and your own troops. I have ordered the 4th Siberian Army Corps to make a stand again at Schan-hei-niu-tun. I propose to you to abandon further operations for gaining the passes, and to select a position covering the left flank of the Army. The retirement of the troops must be effected rapidly, since another failure on the right wing may lead to the retreat of that wing being continued on Mukden even to-morrow.

“Forward the order to General von Rennen-kampf’s Detachment to go to San-kia-tsy and cover the Army against any enterprises the Japanese may plan towards its line of retreat.

“Report to me at once when and how you intend to concentrate the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps and the portions of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps not belonging to the reserve you dispatched to General Sarubaiev.”

In this letter General Kuropatkin was still counting upon the 4th Siberian Army Corps

making a stand at Schan-hei-niu-tun; an hour afterwards he decided to withdraw also that corps. At 11.20 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief sent the following Order to General Sarubaiev:

“During the night the Japanese forced the 17th Army Corps to retire to the Scha-ho. This movement affecting the 10th Army Corps, that corps retired too. I am therefore obliged to order you to evacuate your position south of Yen-san-sai,<sup>1</sup> and to retire somewhat more north into a position which you may select at your discretion.”

Kuropatkin had thus initiated the retreat of the whole of the eastern wing of the Army.

Since an immediate retreat by the 4th Siberian Army Corps in face of the Japanese Guard Division would probably have entailed great loss, General Sarubaiev decided to carry out the retrograde movement at dusk.

After receiving Kuropatkin's instructions to retreat, General Baron Stackelberg issued the necessary orders to his troops. The following places were to be reached by the main bodies: The 2nd Siberian Army Corps, portions of which were meanwhile attacking in a south-westerly direction in relief of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, Tai-kia-miau-tsy<sup>2</sup>; the 1st Siberian Army Corps, Kuan-tai<sup>3</sup> and Hei-sun-pu; the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, Pan-mau-lin, still farther east; rearguards were to be left 5 to 7 kilometres south of these places on the line Tsai-kia-tun — Kan-to-li-san — Hou-lou-tsy-gou by the 2nd, 1st, and 3rd Siberian

<sup>1</sup> North of the Len-ge-san.

<sup>2</sup> 7 kilometres north of Kan-to-li-san.

<sup>3</sup> 5½ kilometres north-east of Kan-to-li-san.

Army Corps respectively. The beginning of the movements was fixed for 7 p.m. When the troops were on the march, Headquarters of the Eastern Detachment received at 8.15 p.m., the following brief Order of Kuropatkin :

“Make at once arrangements for the Eastern Detachment to retreat on a level with Bian-yu-pu-sa ! Army is facing about on the Scha-ho.”

After this Order had left General Headquarters, probably a message from Stackelberg came in, stating the various places he intended to reach. But Kuropatkin desiring the Eastern Detachment to be somewhat in advance on the left of the Centre, he sent an Order modifying matters, this Order being received by the Staff of the Eastern Detachment at 1.25 a.m. on October 14. Stackelberg then reported to the Commander-in-Chief, at 3.30 a.m., that, in compliance with the changes ordered, he had arranged for the 2nd Siberian Army Corps to remain in its former position south of Yen-sin-tun — Hu-schi-tai, the 1st Siberian Army Corps to occupy the fortified position south of Bian-yu-pu-sa ; and that the 3rd Siberian Army Corps had been ordered to entrench on the line Schin-hai-lin Pass (11 kilometres south-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa)—Tschau-huan-tschai (7 kilometres east of Schin-hai-lin).

Owing to the difficulties of transmitting orders, it was, however, not possible to concentrate the troops at the places mentioned in the report. When receiving the fresh Order during the night, they had already marched beyond the points reported, except the 2nd Siberian Army Corps.

Early on October 14 there were on the Scha-ho: the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, between Yen-sin-tun and Sun-wu-pu-tsy; the 1st Siberian Army Corps, north and north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, with one Division each at Kan-to-li-san and Ya-malin-tsy; and the 3rd Siberian Army Corps on the line Tschin-hsi-sai—Huan-lin,  $6\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, and 10 kilometres east of Tschin-hsi-sai respectively.

Rennenkampf's Detachment had fallen back to San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho, to cover the left flank of the Army. In the days succeeding, it gradually drew near the Army, marching east of the Kau-tu-lin Pass.

Disengaging the Eastern Detachment from the enemy had succeeded without difficulty; but the nocturnal retreat proved very difficult, all the more since, owing to the bad roads, most of the wounded had to be carried.

Marshal  
Oyama  
orders a  
pursuit to  
the left  
bank of  
the Scha-  
ho.

Based on the events of October 12, Marshal Marquis Oyama issued the following General Order<sup>1</sup> in the afternoon:

“ I shall pursue the enemy to the left bank of the Scha-ho.

“ The *First Army* has to reach the line Tai-kou<sup>2</sup>—Tun-kia-fön<sup>3</sup>; *Matsunaga's*<sup>4</sup> march is to be accelerated as much as possible, to cut the Russian line of retreat.

“ The *Fourth Army* will advance on Lu-su-tun<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Summary only known.

<sup>2</sup> 7 kilometres north-west of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>3</sup> 3 kilometres south-east of Fön-kia-pu.

<sup>4</sup> P. 177.

<sup>5</sup>  $1\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres south-east of Fön-kia-pu.

— Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy<sup>1</sup>; the *Second Army* on Scha-ho-pu—Lin-schin-pu.<sup>2</sup>

“ If the enemy is standing with strong forces in an entrenched position on the right bank of the Scha-ho, he is no longer to be attacked there.

“ The *General Reserve of the Army* will concentrate at Ku-schu-tsy.”<sup>3</sup>

General Baron Kuroki, after receiving the aforementioned Order, arranged for the Japanese 1st Army to continue the attack on October 13, and to reach the line Tai-kou—Tun-kia-fön.

Ino-uye's Detachment of the Japanese remains in its position.

General Baron Ino-uye, on the right, thought already on October 12 that the Russian attack was slackening<sup>4</sup>; this impression grew stronger on the 13th; it even seemed as if the Russians were retiring, especially in the section on the Tai-tsy-ho. To assume the offensive himself, Ino-uye did not think feasible, having regard to the extensive ground occupied by his greatly reduced numbers. His party therefore confined itself to holding the position, and opposing the fire-action which the Russians were still carrying on in a half-hearted manner on various points along his front. Towards night, the 5th Kobi Brigade, under General Aibara, arrived at last in Pen-si-hu<sup>5</sup>; it had been eagerly looked for during the last few days. The brigade had landed at An-tung, and was then put in motion, going by Tiu-ren-tschin on the Ya-lu; it came under the orders of the 12th Division.

<sup>1</sup> 9 kilometres west of Fön-kia-pu.

<sup>2</sup> On the Scha-ho, not far from the railway.

<sup>3</sup> 4 kilometres south-east of Schi-li-ho.

<sup>4</sup> P. 158.

<sup>5</sup> According to Japanese sources of Captain Sander (retired).

General  
Matsun-  
aga's re-  
inforcing  
Detach-  
ment  
fights an  
indecisive  
action at  
Man-hua-  
pu against  
Russian  
Rifle  
Regi-  
ments  
of the  
Eastern  
Group.

General Matsunaga, with the reinforced 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division,<sup>1</sup> being apportioned to support the 12th Division, had got as far as Man-hua-pu<sup>2</sup> on the evening of October 12, after various detours, and was taking a rest there. At 4 a.m. on October 13 the detachment started again, with the object of continuing its march by Kau-kia-pu. When, towards 5 a.m., the brigade was approaching the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass, it came upon the enemy. General Matsunaga determined to attack. The Russians—the 3rd and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, from the 1st and 2nd Siberian Army Corps, forming the right wing of the Russian forces engaged at the passes—had, however, chosen a very favourable and strongly commanding position, from which they repelled repeated attacks of the Japanese. The situation of the 3rd Brigade grew very difficult, and it was only due to the effect of its two batteries that the brigade was able to hold its own.

On General Baron Stackelberg learning of this action, he became anxious for the safety of his right flank, and therefore at once moved Infantry,<sup>3</sup> with two batteries from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, in support, the force starting from the country south of Tin-kia-tai, north-east of the Wai-tau-schan.

About 1 p.m. this Russian detachment arrived at the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass, and proceeded to

<sup>1</sup> Less the six companies 29th Infantry Regiment, being with the 15th Brigade. (Pp. 131 and 172.)

<sup>2</sup> South of the Eastern San-jo-shi-san.

<sup>3</sup> The 17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment apparently.

attack the left flank of the 3rd Brigade. General Matsunaga, having meanwhile abstained from any further attempts of attacking the exceedingly strong position of the Russians, and having confined himself to the defensive, succeeded in warding off this attack, as well as the blows directed on him by the other Rifle Regiments. The fire-action continued till evening ; the Japanese tried to avoid too great losses by looking for shelter in the rents and clefts formed by the thunderstorm of the previous night, as well as behind the numerous high boulders strewn about there.<sup>1</sup> No decisive results were obtained on either side.

The Japanese remained during the night in fighting order within the position ; next morning the Russians had disappeared.

On Kuroki's orders for continuing the attack, General Asada had given the following directions to the Guard Division :

“ The *3rd Guard Regiment*, with one battery, under the command of General Watanabe, will occupy the line Riu-ka-san—Ka-ko-rei-san, covering at the same time the right flank of the division. As soon as the situation allows it, the detachment will rejoin the division.

“ The *1st Brigade* will advance at 6 a.m., attacking the enemy on the Liën-hua-schan ; on the left of the brigade *one battalion of the 4th Guard Regiment* will likewise deploy for attack. The *rest of the regiment* will remain as divisional reserve at

The Japanese Guard Division unsuccessfully fights with portions of the 2nd and 4th Siberian Army Corps, and with the Transbaikalian Cossack Brigade for the heights between the Ka-ko-rei-san and Do-mon-shi.

<sup>1</sup> Their loss was :

4th Infantry Regiment,	27	men	dead,	102	wounded.
29th            ,,            ,,	36			325	

Schan-liu-ho-tsy. The *Artillery* will support the attack from its positions at Pa-kia-tsy and Schan-liu-ho-tsy."

Cavalry having appeared on the right flank of the 1st Brigade, its commander, at daybreak, pushed the 1st Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment on the Ba-ji-san forward to the right. The 2nd Battalion of that regiment, as well as one battalion from the 2nd Guard Regiment, deployed in their positions on the Ma-örr-schan, engaging in a fire-fight with Russian Infantry (portions of General Shileiko's Brigade<sup>1</sup>) holding the Liën-hua-schan. The other two battalions of the 2nd Guard Regiment were ordered to make an enveloping attack on that height from the east. The battalions started, reaching, without meeting with serious resistance, the country east of Ma-niu-tun, after passing over the Ba-ji-san, when they were suddenly met by a hot fire.

General Mishtshenko, who, with his independent Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, had fallen back from the Eastern San-jo-shi-san north-east,<sup>2</sup> had been watching the Japanese battalion advancing, and immediately informed the 85th Infantry Regiment,<sup>3</sup> standing north-east of Ma-niu-tun, which, with other portions of the 1st Army Corps, had been handed over to the hard-pressed 4th Siberian Army Corps on October 12. The colonel of that regiment at once moved the 1st and 2nd Battalions against the enemy. In view of the imminent danger, he abstained from obtaining first the con-

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 166 and 168.

<sup>2</sup> P. 162.

<sup>3</sup> The Colonel-in-Chief is his Majesty the German Emperor. (P. 193.)

sent of General Sarubaiev, commanding the 4th Siberian Army Corps, whose reserve the regiment was forming. The battalions deployed, taking the skirmishers of the 2nd Guard Regiment under fire, as these latter were advancing; especially two companies of the 2nd Battalion were able to fire with great effect. The enveloping movement initiated by the Japanese came to an end thereby.

Meanwhile, the Artillery on either side had opened fire too, the Russian north of Do-mon-shi, and the Japanese from Pa-kia-tsy and Schan-liu-ho-tsy. The Russian batteries had made good practice, especially against the left wing of the 1st Brigade at the Ma-örr-schan. When against that wing Russian Infantry advanced to attack from Do-mon-shi, the brigade commander engaged the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment. The battalion came into action on the Ma-örr-schan about 8 a.m., drawing upon itself strong forces of the enemy; it had a very hard time until dark, suffering considerable loss, especially from Artillery fire. The battalion commander and all captains were placed out of action, a lieutenant ultimately commanding the battalion. Here, as well as on the right wing of the 1st Brigade on the Ba-ji-san, the attack did not make any progress, support by Artillery being wanting. It is true, the Japanese Artillery did fire from their positions at Pa-kia-tsy and Schan-liu-ho-tsy, but the 1st Brigade could not see any effect upon the enemy opposing it. The Japanese Infantry had the sort of feeling that the batteries shirked leaving their protecting earth-cover for a more effective range farther

forward ; but the Infantry was wrong, because the Artillery, as a matter of fact, was firing in a direction altogether different.

The battalions of the 2nd Guard Regiment, north of the Ba-ji-san on the right, making repeated attempts of gaining ground, General Mishtshenko once more turned to the 85th Infantry regiment with a request for support. The colonel of the regiment gave him the 3rd Battalion, and afterwards two more companies, hitherto not engaged, of the 2nd Battalion. These forces were engaged east of Ma-niu-tun, on the left of the portions of the regiment first sent forward. Meanwhile the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which Mishtshenko had attached to his detachment on October 12, had also deployed, advancing against the 2nd Guard Regiment from the neighbourhood of Wu-tin-kou. Under the destructive fire of the Russians on its right flank, the situation of the 1st Brigade was beginning to be serious. Considerable loss was caused in a short time ; reserves were no longer available. The commander of the brigade, therefore, with the consent of the Divisional Commander, decided at 2 p.m. to withdraw his troops to the Eastern San-jo-shi-san as far as the country south of Tia-tun-nan-kou. The movement was carried out in échelons. The Russians pushed after them, establishing themselves again opposite the Japanese on the line Ma-örr-schan Hill —Tia-tun-nan-kou.

On the left of the Japanese 1st Brigade, the 2nd Battalion 4th Guard Regiment, in compliance with Divisional Orders, had started at daybreak

from the neighbourhood south of Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko, advancing in the direction on Do-mon-shi ; but it was not long before it was obliged to engage in a fire-action, owing to severe hostile fire from the heights opposite. The enemy, showing himself considerably superior, and threatening the right of the battalion by advancing into the gap between the battalion and the 1st Brigade, General Asada, commanding the Guard Division, convinced himself of the impossibility of the battalion attacking Do-mon-shi single-handed ; he therefore placed the battalion again under the command of the colonel of the regiment, ordering him to carry out the attack with two battalions and a half. Two companies were held back as Divisional Reserve at Schan-liu-ho-tsy.

It was 8 a.m. when the 4th Guard Regiment, starting from Schan-liu-ho-tsy, deployed for attack against the heights north of Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko. It had to traverse first a broad, open depression. At about 1,800 metres from the enemy the regiment began to deploy. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to advance against the heights south-east of Do-mon-shi, with its left skirting the road Schan-liu-ho-tsy—Do-mon-shi ; the 3rd Battalion was engaged on the right, keeping touch with the 2nd Battalion. The two companies available of the 1st Battalion were being held in reserve by the colonel.

At about 1,500 metres the Russian Infantry (portions of General Shileiko's Brigade<sup>1</sup>) opened fire from the heights at Do-mon-shi. The 4th

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 168 and 232.

Guard Regiment, without replying to the fire, began to advance in rushes of companies for distances of 40 to 80 metres. In this manner it succeeded in traversing the depression rapidly, and even without any material loss, for, although the Russians were firing pretty rapidly, they fired badly. The Japanese did not open fire until the leading lines had approached the enemy's position to within 600 metres. Till then the regiment had not suffered by Artillery. The three Japanese batteries at Schan-liu-ho-tsy had kept up a brisk fire since daybreak, supporting the attack of the 4th Guard Regiment; the Artillery Abteilung at Pa-kia-tsy was acting against the heights north-west of Do-mon-shi, thereby supporting the 2nd Division, adjoining on the left.

On the foremost line of the 4th Guard Regiment reaching the foot of the heights north of Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko, the two companies of the regimental reserve followed. The companies were marching in company columns, the sections in fours at 15 to 20 paces' intervals, and not behind the front line, but somewhat farther east, for cover's sake.

The regiment had hitherto been making but slow progress. By engaging, however, the companies retained in support, the leading line finally succeeded in working up so close to the enemy that portions of both adversaries were lying partly opposite each other at shortest ranges, up to 150 metres. The losses were very great, especially on the right wing, where the company on the right lost all its officers. The colonel decided to engage his reserves now, ordering, at 2.30 p.m.,

the two companies in reserve, together with the company on the right, to storm the enemy's position with the bayonet, after delivering for a few minutes a rapid fire ; the remaining companies were to support that assault by a rapid fire.

The assault, delivered by the three companies, was successful. The portions of General Shileiko's Brigade opposite were pushed back in a northerly direction on Schan - hei - niu - tun. But, the victorious companies trying to push farther, they came under such a hot cross-fire that the attack came to a complete standstill. Then fresh Russian forces made a counter-attack in front, causing considerable loss to the Japanese assaulting companies ; it was only with the greatest difficulty that they were able to maintain themselves in the position they had captured.

The small success on the right was therefore of no use to the regiment as a whole. Lieutenant-Colonel Ida, commanding the 4th Guard Regiment, had meanwhile tried to assault with the remaining portions of his regiment, too, all attempts, however, failing under the vigorous fire of the Russians. Nor did it help to change the situation when the 7th Company was shifted from the left of the firing-line to the right.

The Artillery of the Division was trying its best to be of some help to the 4th Guard Regiment. It seems that, in the afternoon, all the batteries received orders to support the attack of the regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Ida had asked the commander of the Artillery to continue firing heedlessly until the very last moment before

his own Infantry was in the enemy's position. The Artillery complied with this request. The Japanese shrapnels therefore burst immediately in front of their own skirmishers. The whole height is said to have been under Japanese and Russian Artillery fire, to such an extent that it was scarcely possible to distinguish where their own and where the enemy's projectiles were coming down.

But, in spite of this vigorous support of the Artillery, no success was gained. Darkness came on without the regiment having succeeded in pushing the enemy from the heights.

The loss of the ten companies the regiment had engaged was 132 dead and 338 wounded. Ammunition had been spent freely—354,447 rounds, it is said, were fired; several times the ammunition had to be replenished. The pack-horses had been moved up to Na-ka-ko-ri-ki-ko. When, in the afternoon, the ten companies had all been extended, the ammunition was brought up into the firing-line by Army Service Corps men; many of their carriers were killed or wounded.

The 3rd Guard Regiment, with a battery, under General Watanabe, which had been detached to cover the right flank of the Guard Division, was meanwhile holding the position assigned to it on the line Riu-ka-san—Ka-ko-rei-san,<sup>1</sup> where four companies of the regiment had been standing on the previous day,<sup>2</sup> without seeing any enemy, until noon. But in the afternoon an attack was made by strong Russian forces; from the direction

<sup>1</sup> P. 231.

<sup>2</sup> P. 171.

of the Wai-tau-schan were deploying six battalions and a half, with Artillery and Cavalry, of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division.<sup>1</sup> Without waiting for the final assault, the 3rd Guard Regiment abandoned its position, retiring into the valley of the river at Man-hua-pu. Nor was Colonel Kasa's<sup>2</sup> Cavalry able to stay the attack when, at Kuroki's orders, it advanced from the country south of the Riu-ka-san, in relief of the 3rd Guard Regiment. The enemy occupied the height evacuated about 6 p.m. The Russians could have continued the attack against the right flank of the 1st Brigade, which had gone back from the Ba-ji-san to the Eastern San-jo-shi-san,<sup>3</sup> but probably abstained from doing so as it was beginning to grow dark. During the night they joined in the general retreat of the Eastern Detachment.

At 10 p.m. the Commander of the Guard Division issued the following Order:

"The Division will remain in its present position, ready to advance at any moment.

"The troops will bivouac in fighting formation, keeping in close touch with the enemy."

The Divisional Commander at that time had already been informed of the enemy being in retreat with some portions.

During the night preceding October 14 the following Army Order was received by the Division:

<sup>1</sup> The 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2½ battalions from the 18th East Siberian Regiment, 1 battalion from the 2nd Siberian Infantry Regiment, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Batteries 5th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, 1 detachment of Scouts, and 1 squadron Dragoons.

<sup>2</sup> P. 161.

<sup>3</sup> P. 234.

“1. The *Army* will continue the attack tomorrow.

“2. The *Guard Division* will advance to the east of, and the *2nd Division* to the west of, the road Do-mon-shi—Fön-kia-pu.

“3. *Watanabe's Detachment* will be relieved by a portion of the General Reserve.”

The Divisional Commander gave no further orders on that evening.

When Marshal Marquis Oyama received during the day the report of the Guard Division having given up the Ba-ji-san, the Ka-ko-rei-san, and the Riu-ka-san, he gave the Commander of the 1st Army to understand that he would send him support so as to continue the fight on the 14th with better success. For reinforcing the 1st Army he apportioned the bulk of the 5th Division and a Mortar Abteilung, standing at his disposal in the neighbourhood of Hun-kia-tschuan.<sup>1</sup> They were sent to Headquarters of the 1st Army at Pan-la-schan-tsy, where they arrived on the evening of October 13.

The 41st Infantry Regiment, with an Artillery Abteilung, was left behind at Hun-kia-tschuan by the 5th Division; to these were added, as a reinforcement, the 20th Kobi Regiment, and two batteries of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade. General Yamada, commanding the 9th Brigade, was in charge of this detachment.

Oyama's General Reserve was not employed on this day either. If it was still in existence, and

<sup>1</sup> P. 218. The Mortar Abteilung probably belonged to the General Reserve of the Army, which was standing at Tu-men-tsy.

not perhaps dissolved, it probably remained at Tu-men-tsy, as on the 12th. We must assume it to be still there on the days succeeding, since no further mention is made of it in the sources available.

The first échelons of the 8th Division arrived at Liao-yan on October 13, and were thus at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

The 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division was fighting with more luck on the left of the Guard Division.

After its vain attempts of capturing the Lo-to-san during the night of October 12-13,<sup>1</sup> the brigade assumed an expectant attitude on the forenoon of October 13. The Divisional Artillery available had since early morning been firing upon Russian Artillery of the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the Len-ge-san, but with little effect apparently. The Russian batteries replied to the fire, searching and sweeping, moreover, with a great amount of ammunition, the neighbourhood of San-kia-tsy, south of the Lo-to-san, and more particularly the low ground close south-west of Temple Hill, where, on October 12, the batteries of the 10th Division had been standing.

Shortly after 2 p.m. the 15th Brigade was ordered to attack, one battalion of the 29th Kobi Regiment being placed at its disposal for that purpose. The Lo-to-san, which was held by the bulk of Mau's Detachment,<sup>2</sup> and by portions of

The Japanese 2nd Division pushes troops of Mau's Russian Detachment from the Lo-to-san, and the right of the 4th Siberian Army Corps from the Len-ge-san.

<sup>1</sup> P. 179.

<sup>2</sup> Portions of Mau's Detachment seem to have withdrawn already, on October 12, in a northerly direction, to the heights north of Schi-miau-tsy—Tun-san-ho.

the 1st Army Corps, being still looked upon as the key of the Russian position, General Okasaki ordered the 16th Infantry Regiment to capture that height. With the object of supporting this attack, the six companies of the 29th Infantry Regiment on the right, which on the afternoon of October 11 had been attached to the brigade,<sup>1</sup> and the 30th Infantry Regiment, were to engage the enemy in the direction of the Len-ge-san.

The Artillery Abteilung received orders to engage the Russian Artillery with two batteries, and with one battery to keep playing on the Lo-to-san. The Kobi Artillery Abteilung went into position at Sen-kiu-yo, firing at Russian batteries near the Len-ge-san.

The space at Örr-wa, within which the 16th Infantry Regiment was to attack the Lo-to-san, being rather limited—the right of the 4th Army was fighting on the left of the regiment—the colonel only deployed the 1st Battalion. The attack made rapid progress at first. The skirmishers worked forward by rushes, making partly use of the deep nullahs for cover, and arriving about 3.45 p.m. close below the knoll, thus bringing the right wing of the battalion to within 60 to 70 metres from the Russian line at the least. In its rushes the firing-line became a deep dense swarm, into which the Russians were firing. The Russian trenches were sited so far back on the heights that the men had to rise to fire, else the assailant would have remained invisible in the dead ground. The

<sup>1</sup> P. 131.

bearing of the Russian rank and file deserves the highest praise; in spite of the severe Japanese Infantry and Artillery fire, the individual men regularly rose to their full height, deliberately aiming and firing.

The Japanese Artillery was firing here, too, over the heads of their own Infantry to the very last moment, the shells bursting sometimes within their own line.

Within close range of the Russian position the 1st Battalion's force of attack was spent. The 2nd Battalion was therefore deployed shortly after 4 p.m. The supports came up to the firing-line of the 1st Battalion by long rushes, and, on entering the firing-line, made it denser still. Towards 5 p.m. two officers, followed by an irregular crowd of about two sections, broke out from the right wing of the firing-line to assault the height. The Russians started to their feet, rushing forward to meet the Japanese with the bayonet. Fresh Russian Infantry hurried up from the left; but the Japanese were receiving reinforcements too. A furious struggle with cold steel was enacted, ending after ten minutes with the victory of the Japanese. The Russians were defeated, and the Lo-to-san was occupied by the Japanese.

The whole slope was covered with the slain; particularly in the last Japanese fire-position severe loss was suffered. The assault cost the two Japanese battalions 15 officers, of whom 6 were dead, and 337 men. Major Nihira, commanding the 1st Battalion, who with his Adjutant had followed the firing-line, was also killed. The

Commander of the 1st Army, who had been watching the assault from a small eminence north of Pan-la-schan-tsy, at once sent by wire a "Kanjo"<sup>1</sup> to the 1st Battalion 16th Infantry Regiment. The 1st Battalion of the regiment kept the height occupied during the night; the other two battalions went to Sia-liu-ho-tsy.

The regiment spent 212,950 rounds of ammunition in the attack on the Lo-to-san.

About 500 Russian dead were found on the Lo-to-san; these were from the 1st Army Corps, and from the 10th, of which Mau's Detachment had been originally the advanced guard.

While the 16th Infantry Regiment was attacking the Lo-to-san, the 30th Infantry Regiment and, to the right of it, the six companies from the 29th Infantry Regiment, advanced against the Len-ge-san, held by troops of Generals Kossovich and Levestam from the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The battalion of the 29th Kobi Regiment which General Matsunaga's Brigade had left behind in the position east of Sia-liu-ho-tsy<sup>2</sup> took part in the attack too; but the other battalion of that regiment, which had been placed at the disposal of the brigade, seems to have remained in reserve. The attack over the open country was exceedingly difficult. To avoid unnecessary loss, General Okasaki, commanding the 15th Brigade, ordered the attack to be delayed till after dark. The firing-lines therefore remained in their positions from 4.45 p.m. until about 7 p.m., when the movements were continued. At 8 p.m. the assault with the

<sup>1</sup> A letter in praise of valour.

<sup>2</sup> P. 178.

bayonet was delivered; the Russians were driven off. But having previously decided to retreat, their retirement, at least in part, was probably a voluntary act. The Russians eased their withdrawal by two counter-attacks.

The Japanese lost about 300 men in this attack; the Russians left 130 dead behind.

Marshal Marquis Oyama had given the 4th Army the task of advancing against the line Lu-su-tun—Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy<sup>1</sup> on October 13.

To be able to advance with the right wing on Lu-su-tun, the Djo-san had first to be captured. That height, which was being held by General Mau's Detachment and by portions of the 37th Infantry Division 1st Army Corps, had been unsuccessfully attacked by the 11th Kobi Brigade on the 12th, as well as during the night following that day.<sup>2</sup> The Djo-san being still strongly occupied on the morning of the 13th, repeating the frontal attack looked rather hopeless even now. But, in order to carry out his task, the Army Commander decided to advance first with his left in the direction of Tun-san-ho and Schuan-tai-tsy against the Russian 37th Infantry Division, and then to attack the Djo-san, enveloping it from the north. He not only hoped to capture the position by this movement, but also to cut the Russian line of retreat.

As a preliminary to the attack, General Count Nodzu brought into action strong Artillery, with the object of subduing the hostile batteries which had been maintaining a brisk fire since early morning.

The Japanese 4th Army pushes portions of the 1st Army Corps and Mau's Detachment from the Djo-san, and from the country north of the San-kai-seki-san.

<sup>1</sup> P. 228.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 184-185.

The 14th and 15th Field Artillery Regiments, belonging to the reserve of the 4th Army, unlimbered at the San-kai-seki-san, taking under fire a Russian Artillery force of about 24 guns from the 1st Army Corps, which, from the heights north of Ha-ma-tan, were enfilading the 11th Kobi Brigade, as well as portions of the 15th Brigade; one portion of the Japanese batteries was firing upon a long line of Russian guns of the 1st Army Corps at Schuan-tai-tsy, which had been further reinforced in the morning. Of the Artillery of the 10th Division, one Abteilung was fighting against General Mau's batteries standing at the Djo-san.

Towards 10 a.m. it was noticed that the enemy was gradually withdrawing from the line Ha-ma-tan — San-kia-tsy — Schuan-tai-tsy. The Army Commander at once gave orders to follow up the enemy, some Kobi regiments and the 8th Brigade being, with that object, sent forward on a broad front. On the right, the 10th Kobi Regiment advanced on Ha-ma-tan, with the 34th Kobi Regiment on its left. The 12th and 40th Kobi Regiments took the direction on Tun-san-ho—Schuan-tai-tsy,<sup>1</sup> and the 8th Brigade of the 10th Division on the left on Schuan-tai-tsy. To cover this movement the 14th Field Artillery Regiment, and one Abteilung of the 15th, fired upon the Russian batteries that had still remained in action. One Abteilung of the 15th Field Artillery Regiment followed the 12th and 40th Kobi Regiments.

<sup>1</sup> It is remarkable that the Kobi troops were not employed in brigades.

The retreat of the Russians proceeded slowly, effectively covered by their Artillery. It was 5 p.m. before the 12th Kobi Regiment arrived as the first at Tun-san-ho and the heights east of it; gradually the other portions came up, establishing themselves to the right and left of the 12th Kobi Regiment. The weak rearguards the Russians had left behind evacuated their positions after a brief resistance. The Russian 37th Infantry Division, less the portions attached to the 4th Siberian Army Corps,<sup>1</sup> retired to the heights north of Schi-miau-tsy, that is to say, to the Sei-ko-san, where they were supported by the 86th Infantry Regiment.<sup>2</sup> The reserve of the 37th Infantry Division—that is, the 88th Infantry Regiment, the 4th Battery 7th Artillery Brigade, and the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, with the two batteries—moved to Tun-san-tsy, Corps Headquarters going to Pu-tsau wa.

The Artillery Abteilung of the 15th Field Artillery Regiment, which followed the 12th Kobi Regiment, came into action at Man-kia-fön, facing south-east, and taking under fire the right flank and rear of the enemy at the Djo-san. Soon afterwards one more Abteilung of the Artillery,

<sup>1</sup> Two battalions of the 147th Infantry Regiment, and one battery of the 43rd Artillery Brigade.

<sup>2</sup> According to other information, the 37th Infantry Division was also supported by the whole of Mau's Detachment, which in that case must have been standing on the heights north of Schi-miau-tsy already since October 12. But after the attack of the Japanese 15th Brigade against the Lo-to-san on October 13, numerous dead of the 121st and 122nd Infantry Regiments (belonging to Mau's Detachment) having been found, the assumption seems justified that the main body of Mau's Detachment had been standing fast on the heights south of Ha-ma-tau (Lo-to-san—Djo-san) as yet October 13. (Pp. 241-242.)

standing at the San-kai-seki-san—probably the other Abteilung of the 15th Field Artillery Regiment—advanced to the height south-east of Tun-san-ho. The effect of the Japanese batteries was, however, a limited one, as it was beginning to grow dark. When all was dark, General Mau's Detachment evacuated its position on the Djo-san, the position having become untenable after being turned by the Japanese Kobi Regiments, and retired by the Sen-san on Örr-tau-kou during the night. The withdrawal of the Russians was carried out under the vigorous pressure of Nihira's Battalion,<sup>1</sup> and of the 11th Kobi Brigade.

The Japanese remained during the night in the positions they had reached; the 20th Brigade of the 10th Division seems to have halted at the San-kai-seki-san.

The Russian 4th Siberian Army Corps retires on Fön-kiapu, and Mish-tshenko's Brigade to the Bak-san.

By the opportune intervention of the 85th Infantry Regiment, as well as of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and the Cossack Brigade under the command of General Mishtshenko, which had pushed the 1st Brigade of the Japanese Guard Division from the Ba-ji-san to the Eastern San-jo-shi-san,<sup>2</sup> the 4th Siberian Army Corps was able to carry out the retreat ordered by Kuropatkin<sup>3</sup> to Schan-hei-niu-tun in perfect order, and to disengage itself without particular difficulty from the enemy.

The 37th Infantry Division, and with it Mau's Detachment, having gradually given way in the

<sup>1</sup> The 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, which had the largest share in the storming of the Lo-to-san.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 232-234.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 225-226.

course of the day, thus enabling portions of the Japanese 4th Army to make their appearance at Tun-san-ho about 5 p.m., any protracted resistance of the 4th Siberian Army Corps about Schan-hei-niu-tun would have no longer been feasible either. Moreover, all reserves available had gradually been engaged, so that there were no fresh troops at hand for a continuation of the battle in the former position.<sup>1</sup>

General Sarubaiev resolved to retire on Fön-kia-pu, issuing orders to that effect at 6 p.m. The retreat was carried out under cover of a rearguard formed of troops from the 22nd Division, under the orders of the General Commanding the 1st Brigade of that Division. The 85th Infantry Regiment was entrusted with forming the rear party, which at the same time had to fulfil the duty of not allowing any man, or any wounded, or any vehicle to be left behind. The march of the regiment in the dark of night, on bad roads, with the soaked soil, was exceedingly wearisome and fatiguing; it was 5 o'clock in the morning when the exhausted troops, after picking up on the road numerous wounded and vehicles of all kinds, arrived at their rendezvous, 1 kilometre south of Fön-kia-pu; at 7 a.m. they continued their march to that place itself.<sup>2</sup> Mishtshenko's Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, together with the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, joined in the

<sup>1</sup> Apart from Kuropatkin's last reserve—i.e. the 86th Infantry Regiment, as well as the 5th and 6th Batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade, which probably had not yet been engaged. (P. 194.)

<sup>2</sup> Loss of the regiment on October 13: 4 officers, 59 men dead; 5 officers, 210 men wounded.

retreat of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, withdrawing from Ma-örr-schan in the direction of the Ba-ken-ji-san, and occupying that height, probably by order of General Kuropatkin.

No instructions were given apparently by the Commander-in-Chief to the Russian Western Detachment, regulating its attitude in the new position on and behind the Scha-ho.<sup>1</sup> Kuropatkin is said to have been very angry about the issue of October 12, although the defeat of the 17th Army Corps can be mostly attributed to his failing of making up his mind to place at the disposal of the Western Detachment the 6th Siberian Army Corps and General Dembovski's Detachment.

On the morning of October 13 the 17th Army Corps had taken up the following position :

The main position between Ta-lian-tun and La-mu-tun was occupied by the 35th Infantry Division; two battalions of the 139th Infantry Regiment were standing west of Lin-schin-pu; and the 137th Infantry Regiment in the village itself, and in the position adjoining east, as far as the railway. To the left of it fourteen companies of the 138th Infantry Regiment occupied the position extending to the western outskirts of La-mu-tun. The other two battalions of the 139th Infantry Regiment were retained as sectional reserve north-west of Lin-schin-pu; the 140th Infantry Regiment was forming the General Reserve at Yin-kuan. The 35th Artillery Brigade was apparently posted in two groups north of Lin-schin-pu.

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 215-216 and 220-221.

The Russian Western Detachment, the 6th Siberian Army Corps, and Dembovski's Detachment repel on the Scha-ho the attacks of the pursuing Japanese 2nd Army.

Colonel Stakovich's troops were, in the morning, not altogether in their new position west of Lin-schin-pu; they were not complete there until about 1 p.m.

Of the 3rd Infantry Division, the 11th and 12th Infantry Regiments, with all the Artillery still available, were standing in the section Ku-kia-tsy—Szö-fan-tai, farther in rear; the 9th and 10th Infantry Regiments, each formed in three battalions, were in position close north of Szö-fan-tai.

With the 17th Army Corps were, moreover, the six battalions General Slutshevski had sent in its support from the 10th Army Corps on the afternoon of October 12<sup>1</sup>; and of these the 36th Infantry Regiment was standing not far from the 140th Infantry Regiment at Yin-kuan; while the two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment, which at first had also been at Yin-kuan, moved to La-mu-tun about 10 a.m.

Nothing was seen of the Japanese until noon, but towards 1 p.m. strong forces were ascertained within the space Tschan-lin-pu—Ki-siau-tun, further at Schu-lin-tsy, and at Scha-ho Railway Station. Both Artilleries commenced to fire; the Japanese were firing chiefly upon Lin-schin-pu village and on a series of gun-emplacements constructed by the Russians some time ago, but not occupied by them now; the Russians were firing upon the places where the Japanese were assembling, and upon their batteries. No attack was made by the Japanese Infantry in front; but the Russians were expecting an attack on their right wing

<sup>1</sup> P. 217.

before evening. Little reliance being placed on the 6th Siberian Army Corps, standing with its advanced guard on the line Lan-schan-pu—Pen-tiën-tsy, after what had occurred during the last few days, the General Commanding the 35th Infantry Division ordered the line Szö-fan-tai—Yin-kuan, as well as these places themselves, to be artificially strengthened, in case of the front line having to retreat; one battalion of the 36th Infantry Regiment was, moreover, ordered to construct trenches between Yin-kuan and Kuan-tun, and some earthworks behind them at Han-tschen-pu, as far as time would admit. For reinforcing the garrison of La-mu-tun, one more battalion of the 140th Infantry Regiment was sent forward to that place; the 36th Infantry Regiment then occupied the line Szö-fan-tai—Yin-kuan. The 17th Army Corps was thus standing in two entrenched lines, one behind the other.

At La-mu-tun the position of the 10th Army Corps adjoined that of the 17th; its extent was about 6 to 7 kilometres, stretching by Yu-kia-la-tsy, the heights north of Hou-tai, and by Ku-kia-tsy to Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy, and consisting of shelter-trenches, small earthworks, gun-pits, and fortified villages. For its occupation, after deducting the six battalions handed over to the 17th Army Corps, General Slutshevski had available eighteen battalions only, of which some had been in action for some days already; towards noon two battalions had, moreover, to be detailed, by order of Kuropatkin, to occupy the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy, so as to keep in touch

with the Centre. Considering the extent of the position, the available forces were thus very weak. General Slutshevski retained only one battalion at his disposal; he was hoping General Baron Bilderling would, after the request addressed to him, presently send back the six battalions the 10th Army Corps had given to the 17th Army Corps on October 12; these forces were to be held ready in reserve. The position was occupied in the following manner: In La-mu-tun was 1 battalion of the 35th Infantry Regiment; 2 battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment were standing between La-mu-tun and Yu-kia-la-tsy; the salient portion of the position projecting south between Yu-kia-la-tsy and Ku-kia-tsy was being held by the 123rd and 34th Infantry Regiments; at Ku-kia-tsy 3 battalions of the 33rd Infantry Regiment adjoined on the left; the 4th Battalion of this latter regiment was standing in reserve at Scha-ho-pu. Of the 31st Artillery Brigade, 3 batteries, under escort of 1 battalion 35th Infantry Regiment, were entrenched north-east of La-mu-tun; the 9th Artillery Brigade was standing in two groups south of Scha-ho-pu and north-east of Ku-kia-tsy.

General Gerschelmann was in command of all the troops occupying the position. The right section, extending to Hou-tai Hill, was at first under General Riabinkin, who, however, in the evening, handed over the command to General Wassiliev, the convalescent Commander of the 2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division; Riabinkin was to resume next day command over his own

brigade, the 1st of the 9th Infantry Division, which was holding the left section, but did not, as he was shot before he could do so.

General Baron Bilderling, like the General Commanding 17th Army Corps, anxious for the right wing of the Western Detachment, thought he could not yet spare on the western wing the six battalions of the 10th Army Corps, declining, therefore, General Slutshevski's request. But on the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps renewing his request, representing that, with the great extent of his position, he ought to have a strong reserve, and must, at all cost, count upon these six battalions, the leader of the Western Detachment informed him, at 5.35 p.m., that the six battalions would rejoin the 10th Army Corps, but that, in order not to rouse the enemy's attention, their departure for rejoining the corps would not be effected till dark. General Slutshevski thereupon requested the 17th Army Corps to start the battalions for Scha-ho-pu, where they were to remain for the night at the disposal of General Gerschelmann; he intended to place these six battalions next morning as General Reserve farther back at Pa-ta-kia-tsy.

Opposite the 10th Army Corps the enemy did not make a decisive attack with Infantry either. The Japanese 3rd Division, it is true, tried to advance against the position, but was unable to make any progress; it therefore chiefly confined itself to firing with Artillery. The Russian batteries replied, directing their fire mainly on the villages in advance of the position.

General Kuropatkin's constant anxiety was that

the Japanese, disregarding the 10th Army Corps, might advance against the right flank and rear of the 1st Army Corps in the Centre, and thus carry out the much-feared penetration of the Russian front; for that reason he had ordered the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy to be occupied by two battalions, as previously stated. The concentration of strong Japanese forces being reported south of Hou-tai, he directed, moreover, by a telegram, that Hou-tai and the country east of that village should be taken under a severe fire of Artillery. Several batteries, by degrees, began to fire thither, 56 guns of the 10th Army Corps finally uniting their fire in the direction indicated.

Apart from these measures, Kuropatkin had also come to the conclusion that the most effective means of preventing penetration was to assume the offensive himself. The 6th Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detachment had not been engaged as yet; if these fresh forces were to attack the Japanese 2nd Army, it could be assumed that not only that Army would be placed in a very difficult position, but that this offensive would also make itself felt with the 4th Army, preventing it from making attempts at penetrating in the Centre. General Kuropatkin, therefore, at last resolved to place the 6th Siberian Army Corps, as well as Dembovski's Detachment, under the command of the Western Detachment; on the evening of October 13 an order to that effect was received by its commander.

But General Baron Bilderling still hesitated to make the only practical use of the forces placed

under his command. He merely ordered<sup>1</sup> the 6th Siberian Army Corps to advance at daybreak on October 14 to the line Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun. Dembovski's Detachment was even to remain "on the right bank of the Hun-ho." Bilderling, therefore, did not know at all that Dembovski's Detachment was already for some time on the left bank of the Hun-ho, and thus available for use at once. The Caucasian Cavalry Brigade, attached to Dembovski, was to reach, with its main body, Yen-schu-lin-tsy, pushing its advanced guard farther to the south-east. Grekov's Cavalry Brigade was directed to cover the right flank of the Western Group, and to drive the enemy from San-de-pu. The 10th and 17th Army Corps were to continue obstinately defending their positions on the Scha-ho, but "to be ready for assuming the offensive."

It being expected from the results of this day, when the Japanese did not make any material progress opposite the Western Detachment, that they would continue their attacks during the night, measures were adopted to guard against surprise. With the 10th Army Corps, General Gerschelmann gave orders to keep the trenches on the Hou-tai Hill occupied, and those on either side of it. Detachments of Scouts were pushed farther out, and a double row of listening-posts was established. The pivots remained occupied by small parties, the actual garrisons being withdrawn to have some rest. On the left, the two battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment, as well as the Scouts of the 33rd and

<sup>1</sup> Appendix XII.

34th Infantry Regiments, had resumed touch with the 1st Army Corps.

General Gerschelmann went into quarters at Scha-ho-pu, anxiously awaiting the arrival of the 2nd Brigade of his Division, which had been with the 17th Army Corps.

General Baron Oku, commanding the Japanese 2nd Army, had given it orders for October 13 to advance from the line Pan-kiau-pu—Liu-tan-kou—Ta-tai in a northerly direction, with the object of continuing the attack upon the line Scha-ho-pu—Lin-schin-pu, in compliance with the General Order.<sup>1</sup> It being reported to him<sup>2</sup> that strong hostile forces were still on the height east of Pan-kiau-pu on the Mandarin Road, he ordered the 11th Brigade, retained in reserve by the 6th Division, together with the units of the other arms attached to the brigade, to move as a flank-guard to the right of the 3rd Division, so as to enable the latter to employ its full strength in the direction of Scha-ho-pu. General Baron Okubo, commanding the 6th Division, had started already with the reinforced 11th Brigade from Tschen-kia in a northerly direction, with the object of following General Koizumi, who, on October 12, with 5 battalions of the 24th Brigade, 2 squadrons, 8 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company, was in pursuit of the enemy after the capture of Lan-tsy-tai,<sup>3</sup> when he received the order of his Army Commander; the direction of the march was thereupon

<sup>1</sup> P. 229.

<sup>2</sup> The report was probably dispatched on the evening of October 12, when the 10th Army Corps was still holding Hun-pau-schan.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 205 and 214.

at once changed to the east, in the direction of the Ko-ho-san. About noon the brigade met several orderlies of General Headquarters, one of whom was bringing the 6th Division a "Kanjo" of Marshal Marquis Oyama for its conduct on October 12. General Baron Okubo, on this, at once dismounted, reading to the officers assembled this mark of approval. When the head of the column had reached the Ko-ho-san, it was seen that the height was no longer occupied by the enemy. General Baron Okubo rode up to it, meeting there the Army Commander and General Baron Oshima, commanding the 3rd Division, both watching the Russian position of the 10th Army Corps at Hou-tai,<sup>1</sup> as well as a captive balloon which had ascended behind it.

The Army Commander, on the morning of October 13, had ridden forward from Men-hu-lu-tun by Nan-wu-li-tai to the Ko-ho-san. That height was the objective also of the 3rd Division, whose commander believed it to be still occupied by the enemy in the morning; he had therefore adopted measures before daylight for attacking the Ko-ho-san; but the troops found the trenches and gun-pits abandoned by the enemy, and so they occupied the hill at 7.30 a.m. When the report came in of strong forces—a Division, at least—standing on the heights north of Hou-huan-hua-tiën, the Army Commander reinforced the 3rd Division by the greater part of his reserve,<sup>2</sup> order-

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 253 and 256.

<sup>2</sup> It cannot be ascertained how strong the reserve was on October 13, consisting on October 10 of 18 battalions and 5 Pioneer companies.

ing the Division to support the attack of the 4th Army upon the line Tun-san-ho—Schuan-tai-tsy,<sup>1</sup> by an offensive blow against Hou-huan-hua-tiën.

General Baron Oshima, commanding the 3rd Division, charged a mixed brigade ( $5\frac{1}{2}$  battalions, 2 squadrons, 3 batteries, and 1 Pioneer company) to deliver this blow in a northerly direction. The rest of the 3rd Division was being concentrated at Pan-kiau-pu; the two batteries which, on October 12, had been attached to the Division,<sup>2</sup> were returned to the General Reserve.

The advance of the troops of the 3rd Division encountered but little resistance at first. At 10 a.m. two battalions occupied Tschan-sin-tiën; the three batteries came into action east of the village, opening fire against the line Hou-tai Hill—La-mu-tun, occupied by portions of the Russian 10th Army Corps,<sup>3</sup> but the batteries did not succeed in silencing the Russian batteries standing at the latter place. Being, moreover, fired at from the neighbourhood of Ku-kia-tsy, the attack came here to a standstill for the moment.

The Army Commander becoming aware, about noon, that the Russians were still holding Tun-san-tsy on his right flank, it being therefore clear that the Army adjoining on the right could not have made any material progress, he thought the right flank of the 3rd Division seriously threatened; he therefore ordered General Baron Okubo to advance with the 11th Brigade on Tschien-huan-hua-tiën, placing, for that purpose, at his disposal

<sup>1</sup> P. 246.

<sup>2</sup> P. 197.

<sup>3</sup> P. 253.

eight batteries of the General Reserve ; the 3rd Division was to attack the enemy in front. General Baron Okubo ordered his Artillery to come into action east of Wan-kia-lou-tsy, and to fire on the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy ; the Infantry did no longer attack, owing to the day rapidly declining. The reinforced 11th Brigade slept during the night at Wan-kia-lou-tsy—Hun-pau-schan.

The 3rd Division moved as yet its whole Artillery into position south-east of Tschan-sin-tiën, and reinforced the right wing of the leading brigade with three battalions ; but the attack did not gain ground ; one battalion did push to Hou-tai, but, finding itself quite alone here, 100 metres distant from and opposite the enemy's line, was ordered to come back after darkness had set in. The foremost line of the Division remained during the night on the line Kian-hu-tun—Tschan-sin-tiën.

Of the 6th Division, General Koizumi's Detachment<sup>1</sup> had started from Liu-tan-kou at 6 a.m. ; on October 12 it had pursued the retreating Russian 17th Army Corps from Lan-tsy-tai, getting as far as Tschiën-liu-tan. Reconnaissance having established the fact that the enemy was still in Hun-lin-pu, the brigade detailed a weak right-flank-guard, which was to march on Han-kui-pu, and itself attacked Hun-lin-pu, surprising here two Russian battalions, probably from Colonel Stakovich's Detachment,<sup>2</sup> resting there quite unconcerned ; they fled in disorder north, leaving behind them most

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 205 and 214.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 213, 216 (footnote 1), and 251.

of their equipments. At the same hour—about 8.20 a.m.—troops of the 4th Division likewise entered Hun-lin-pu from the south-west.

After capturing that place, General Koizumi's reinforced 24th Brigade continued its advance, reaching the line Schu-lin-tsy—Ki-siau-tun at 11 a.m., and engaging there with its Artillery the hostile batteries of the 10th Army Corps at La-mu-tun. The Russian 17th Army Corps, having strongly occupied<sup>1</sup> the line La-mu-tun—Lin-schin-pu, the brigade could not advance beyond the line it had reached. The portions on the eastern bank of the Scha-ho were barely able to repel several counter-attacks of the Russians.

The Japanese 4th Division had formed two columns on the morning of October 13. The right column started from Tsun-lun-yen-tun, occupying Hun-lin-pu simultaneously with troops of the 6th Division. It then continued its advance, reaching, at 11 a.m., the line Ki-siau-tun—Tschan-lin-pu, in spite of the fire from three Russian batteries at Ta-lian-tun; the Artillery of the Division unlimbered at Tschan-lin-pu.

At 1 p.m. the Division was ordered by the Army Commander to support the attack of the 3rd Division and of the reinforced 11th Brigade, by vigorously advancing jointly with General Koizumi's Brigade of the 6th Division.

The enemy facing the 24th Brigade and 4th Division was about this time assumed to be in a strong position on the general line Lin-schin-pu—Ta-lian-tun—Schau-kia-lin-tsy; three batteries

<sup>1</sup> P. 250.

were said to be at Ta-lian-tun, one at Schau-kia-lin-tsy, and one between both places.<sup>1</sup>

The right column of the 4th Division tried to carry forward the attack on Lin-schin-pu, after three batteries from Hun-lin-pu and six (including three from General Koizumi's Detachment) from Schu-lin-tsy had been firing on Lin-schin-pu; but, owing to the severe flanking fire from Ta-lian-tun, it was impossible to advance over the open plain. The troops were therefore ordered to wait until it was dark, but as a matter of fact the fight was no longer continued in the evening.

The left column of the 4th Division advanced from Tsun-lun-yen-tun on Ta-tai, but was unable to get beyond Ta-tai, owing to strong forces of the enemy being at Wan-tschuan-tsy. One battalion of the enemy at Wan-tschuan-tsy made a counter-attack on Ta-tai, but was easily repelled by the two battalions standing there; three batteries, sent by the Divisional Commander in support, did not come into action any more.<sup>2</sup>

The Divisional Cavalry was again to cover the left flank at Li-kia-tun. But when the 1st Cavalry Brigade moved to Li-kia-tun, the Divisional Cavalry left that place to the brigade, going to Tai-pin-tschuan.

The Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade had arrived in Li-kia-tun at 7.30 a.m. When, at 2 p.m., it

<sup>1</sup> The country about Schau-kia-lin-tsy was free from the enemy; on the other hand, Russian batteries were standing 2 kilometres north of Ta-lian-tun at Ku-kia-tsy.

<sup>2</sup> Russian reports do not mention the forces left behind in Wan-tschuan-tsy; probably a rear party of the 6th Siberian Army Corps is meant.

resumed its march on Ho-liën-tai it was attacked by strong hostile Cavalry—presumably Grekov's Brigade—which, however, withdrew on San-kia-tsy, when fired upon by the battery of the Japanese brigade. The detachment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, hitherto on the right bank of the Hun-ho, went to San-de-pu.

Headquarters of the 2nd Army, together with the reserve, spent the night at Pan-kiau-pu.

Two Orders had come in from Oyama's Headquarters during the day. While the one, arriving about 5 p.m., contained the information that the enemy was advancing to attack the Guard Division, and that, therefore, the larger portion of the 5th Division was placed under the orders of the 1st Army; the other, arriving at 10 p.m., demanded the continuation of the attack next morning in the direction ordered. Based on the latter directive General Baron Oku ordered the 3rd Division, together with General Koizumi's Detachment, to attack the enemy at La-mu-tun on the 14th, and all other troops to attack straight ahead.

No material success was gained by either party on October 13.

Result  
of Octo-  
ber 13.

On the Japanese side, the danger threatening the right wing was finally removed by the withdrawal of the Russians. But the greatly reduced 12th Division was unable to follow up the enemy, and remained in its position about Pen-si-hu, where the 5th Kobi Brigade arrived in support. In the Centre, the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division and the 4th Army pushed the right wing of the Russian Centre from the Len-ge-san and Lo-to-san;

while the Guard Division, being itself enveloped on its right, had to fall back to the Eastern San-jo-shi-san, unable to advance again till evening. Nor was the 2nd Army able to gain ground opposite the strong position of the Western Detachment, reaching only the line generally Tschan-sin-tiën—Tschan-lin-pu. Everybody began to feel exhausted.

Kuropatkin gave up the plan of deciding the battle by an enveloping attack with the Eastern Detachment, ordering therefore this detachment and the Centre to retreat. Stackelberg faced about again in the country north of Bian-yu-pusa; the main body of the Centre took up a position at Fön-kia-pu, but portions established themselves still on the southern bank of the Scha-ho, on the line Sei-ko-san—Ba-ken-ji-san. The Western Detachment maintained its position on both banks of the Scha-ho; for future operations the 6th Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detachment were placed under its command.

Although the Russians began to feel somewhat exhausted too, Kuropatkin, probably in view of the events of the day having not been altogether unfavourable for the Russians, was filled with fresh hopes.

#### OCTOBER 14

Japanese General Headquarters ordered the Armies, during the night October 13-14, to continue the attack next morning in the directions prescribed; for the rest Oyama probably expected the Army Commanders to push the enemy beyond

the Scha-ho in conformity with the directive given on October 12, but to attack him no longer on the northern bank of the river.

General Baron Kuroki issued various separate Orders to the 1st Army. The Guard and the 2nd Divisions were, as previously mentioned,<sup>1</sup> directed to continue the attack by advancing on both sides of the road Do-mon-shi—Fön-kiapu. The 5th Division,<sup>2</sup> attached to the 1st Army on October 13, received the following Order: “Russians have apparently withdrawn. The division will follow in the direction of Wai-tauschan, pushing to the Scha-ho.” The reinforced 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, under General Matsunaga, which on October 13 was stopped by the Russians at the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass,<sup>3</sup> received orders to cut off its opponent<sup>4</sup> by advancing in the direction of Schan-pin-tai-tsy. The Guard Kobi Brigade, under General Umesawa, was directed to march from the neighbourhood of Liu-schu-kiap to San-kiap-tsy, 4 kilometres south-west of Scha-ho-pu. The 1st Army having been reinforced by the 5th Kobi Brigade,<sup>5</sup> Umesawa was to join the General Reserve of the Japanese Army.

On the morning of October 14 the whole of the 1st Army advanced again, General Ino-uye's Detachment included, which apparently had received no fresh orders. The last of Stackelberg's weak rearguards, which had been holding their positions hitherto, having been withdrawn during

The Japanese 1st Army advances to the Scha-ho, pushing back portions of the Russian Eastern Detachment and Centre beyond the river.

Sketch 8.

<sup>1</sup> P. 240.

<sup>2</sup> P. 240.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 230-231.

<sup>4</sup> Portions of the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

<sup>5</sup> P. 229.

the night, General Baron Ino-uye thought it useless to keep his forces any longer scattered in their extensive positions; he therefore concentrated the bulk of his forces and advanced on Schan-schi-tsiautsy in pursuit, probably going by Siën-schan-tsy.<sup>1</sup>

Following the example of the Army's right wing, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade went forward too on the left bank of the Tai-tsy-ho from the neighbourhood south of Pen-si-hu; it crossed the river, marching on the northern bank to San-kia-tsy, which *Rennenkampf's* rearguard had probably evacuated already. General Matsunaga's Brigade, establishing touch with the 12th Division on the right, started from the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass on Schan-pin-tai-tsy.

General Baron Stackelberg made arrangements for the Eastern Detachment to continue its retreat. The 1st Siberian Army Corps, which, early on October 14, had reached Ya-ma-lin-tsy with the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, and Kan-to-li-san with the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, was ordered to march on Hei-sun-pu; the 3rd Siberian Army Corps was to continue its retreat to the Kau-tu-lin Pass, and the 2nd Siberian Army Corps to cover the retreat as rearguard at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

During the forenoon an order of the Commander-in-Chief arrived, demanding the immediate dispatch of 25 battalions to Lo-siën-tun, 8 kilometres north-west of Fön-kia-pu, for the formation of a General Reserve of the Army. Stackelberg, probably assuming that Kuropatkin was going to

<sup>1</sup> The 5th Kobi Brigade, which had arrived on October 13, seems to have gone ahead with the 12th Division as well.

concentrate such a strong reserve only for offensive purposes, thought he would most effectively support such an attack if he likewise assumed the offensive with all his available forces. He therefore dispatched an officer to General Headquarters with the report that he "intended to concentrate the whole of the Eastern Detachment, and to fall upon the right flank of the Japanese in a south-westerly direction to-morrow, if the Commander-in-Chief was going to attack towards the south." Kuropatkin insisted upon his demand. Meanwhile the retreat had commenced. General Baron Stackelberg detailed, for the use of the Commander-in-Chief, the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, which had already arrived at Yin-pan, and was now marching back to Kan-to-li-san, and, in addition, the 19th and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, as well as the 213th Infantry Regiment, attached to that Army Corps; in all, 22 battalions. These troops, under the united command of General Gerngross, commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps, were put in motion, going by Örr-tau-kou, and arriving at Lo-siën-tun on October 15.

The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division was directed not to march now to Hei-sun-pu, but to march back to Kan-to-li-san, where it remained for the present. The main body of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps went back to about the Kau-tu-lin Pass, its rearguard reaching the line Schun-schuitsy—Wan-fu-lin Pass. The rest of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, remained halting north-west of Bian-yu-

pu-sa. The protective detachments, which had remained on the left bank of the Scha-ho, at the Wai-tau-schan and Tsio-tso-schan, were attacked and pushed back to the right bank by portions of the Japanese Guard Division and by the 5th Japanese Division.

The Japanese Guard Division had been noticing since midnight that the Russians facing them<sup>1</sup> were in full retreat; portions only, opposite the 3rd Guard Regiment, were holding still the Wai-tau-schan and Wu-tin-kou village.

At 8.30 a.m. General Asada issued the following Order, north-east of Schan-liu-ho-tsy:

“1. The *Division* will pursue the enemy.

“2. The *1st Brigade* will advance at 11 a.m. from the country north-east of Do-mon-shi, with the object of occupying the line Hua-sa-tun—Kin-cho-san. It will reconnoitre on Fön-kia-pu and secure the right flank. One battalion is to be left north of Do-mon-shi, at the disposal of the Divisional Commander.

“3. The *4th Guard Regiment* (less one battalion) will advance from Do-mon-shi at 10 a.m., occupying the line from the Kin-cho-san to the road Schan-liu-ho-tsy—Fön-kia-pu.

“4. *One battalion of the 4th Guard Regiment, the Artillery, and the Pioneer battalion* will follow the 4th Guard Regiment.

“5. *Watanabe's Detachment*<sup>2</sup> will rejoin the

<sup>1</sup> The 4th Siberian Army Corps and Mishtshenko's Brigade.

<sup>2</sup> Watanabe's Detachment consisted of the 3rd Guard Regiment and one battery; it was to cover the right flank of the Guard Division on October 13, and had retired before superior Russian forces to the neighbourhood of Man-hua-pu. (P. 238.)

Division, after being relieved by the General Reserve."

The late hour of starting is said to have been due to the difficulty of reconnaissance. The Divisional Cavalry Regiment having joined Kasa's Detachment since October 11,<sup>1</sup> the Guard Division had but a very small party of horse.

The 1st Guard Brigade, which at daybreak had pushed one battalion of the 2nd Guard Regiment to the Ba-ji-san, to cover the right flank, must have started earlier than the Order prescribed, for its vanguards occupied the Sen-san as early as 11 a.m. During its further advance thence it was reported to the brigade that strong forces of the enemy, with advanced detachments on the Tsio-tso-schan, were standing to the east in the Scha-ho valley; the forces in question were portions of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division. It being not safe under these circumstances to march straight on Kin-cho-san village, the brigade commander detached a force of some strength, which, in co-operation with the battalion from the 2nd Guard Regiment on the right, on the Ba-ji-san, succeeded, after a short action, in driving the enemy from the Tsio-tso-schan. The advance of the brigade was considerably delayed by this incident; it was 5 p.m. before its head arrived at Tai-kua-tun and established touch with the 4th Guard Regiment.

The latter had started at the appointed time from Do-mon-shi, probably marching by the road

<sup>1</sup> P. 161. The whereabouts of Kasa's Detachment cannot be traced for October 14 and the days afterwards.

through Yen-san-sai, driving back weak Russian rearguards and occupying the Kin-cho-san with its vanguard at 1 p.m. It having become known meanwhile that the enemy was still in strong force on the Ba-ken-ji-san (Mishtshenko's Brigade, with the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment), the bulk of the Japanese 4th Guard Regiment was formed up south of the Kin-cho-san ready to attack the height mentioned. The Artillery had meanwhile also arrived, and gone into position at Ta-yin-schou-tun; four batteries were firing upon Mishtshenko's troops on the Ba-ken-ji-san, and on his Artillery, which was ascertained to be east of the hill; three batteries<sup>1</sup> took under fire the Sei-ko-san, being held by the Russian 37th Infantry Division, against which the Japanese 2nd Division, on the left, was advancing to attack at the same time.

Together with the 4th Guard Regiment, which about 5 p.m. was deploying against the Ba-ken-ji-san, the 1st Guard Brigade advanced to attack that height from Tai-kua-tun, the 2nd Guard Regiment being in first line, and the 1st in second line. The Infantry attack having been well prepared by the Artillery, and being well supported also by the batteries, it made at first good progress; but shortly after 5 p.m. a terrible thunderstorm broke suddenly, rendering all further movements impossible. The rolling of thunder drowned the roaring of the guns; regardless of the action, friend and foe alike looked for shelter in the country to

<sup>1</sup> The seventh battery was probably Major Hidikata's Battery. (P. 170.)

save themselves, at least to some extent, from the floods of the torrential rains. With the thunderstorm dusk came rather quickly. Under cover of darkness the Russians evacuated their position, retiring behind the Scha-ho, probably to the neighbourhood of Örr-tau-kou. When the storm had abated sufficiently for the action to be resumed, the enemy had already disappeared. Growing darkness prevented pursuit. The Commander of the Guard Division therefore ordered the troops to rest. Having probably learned meanwhile of the evacuation by the Russians of the Sei-ko-san, he ordered outposts to be placed merely facing the Scha-ho, between Yen-sin-tun and the country west of Fön-kia-pu. To the 1st Guard Brigade was assigned the section from the Kin-cho-san to beyond the Ba-ken-ji-san, and the task of establishing touch with the 2nd Division; the main body bivouacked at Ta-yin-schou-tun. Adjoining, on the right, the 4th Guard Regiment furnished outposts as far as the Sen-san, and bivouacked near Kin-cho-san village. The Artillery bivouacked near its positions, and the Divisional Reserve north of Do-mon-shi.

It cannot be ascertained whether, and when, Watanabe's Detachment rejoined the Guard Division on October 14.

The 5th Division,<sup>1</sup> which was detailed to relieve it, had meanwhile advanced against the Wai-tauschan, west of General Matsunaga's Detachment, pushing back there rearguards of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division. At 12.30 p.m. the Divi-

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 240 and 265.

sional Commander reported to the 1st Army that the 5th Division was on the point of crossing the Scha-ho; that the enemy facing it was retreating.

But an order of Marshal Marquis Oyama having in the meantime arrived, saying that the Armies were to halt on the left bank of the Scha-ho, and finish the battle as soon as possible, the intention of the Division was no longer carried out.

Conforming to General Baron Kuroki's directive,<sup>1</sup> the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division continued its advance, too, early on October 14. Patrols had pushed during the night to the heights of Schau-schi-miau-tsy without meeting any enemy; the brigade therefore started in good time, occupying the heights mentioned as early as 7 a.m.

Russian batteries being observed there on the Ba-ken-ji-san, and farther north (Mishtshenko's Artillery), the Divisional Artillery moved into position, two batteries unlimbering on the heights of Schau-schi-miau-tsy, and two east of Miau-kou, all four then uniting their fire upon the Russian guns on the Ba-ken-ji-san. The Divisional Artillery was supported by the Mortar Abteilung attached to the Army on October 13,<sup>2</sup> which General Baron Kuroki engaged east of Miau-kou between the Guard and 2nd Divisions. The enemy's Artillery moving off from the Ba-ken-ji-san<sup>3</sup> about 1 p.m., the batteries of the Division stationed east of Miau-kou went forward to the northern slope of the heights of Schau-schi-miau-

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 239-240.

<sup>2</sup> P. 240.

<sup>3</sup> Probably to change its position merely, because in the afternoon the Guard Artillery was firing still upon Russian guns at the Ba-ken-ji-san. (P. 270.)

tsy, shelling, jointly with the other two batteries, the Sei-ko-san, occupied by portions of the Russian 37th Infantry Division; of the Infantry of the brigade, only the 30th Infantry Regiment was deployed for attack, in touch with the right wing of the 4th Army. The Artillery fire was very effective, the Russians retreating before the actual assault was pushed home by the Infantry. When delivered in the afternoon, jointly with troops of the 4th Army, the assault by Infantry met with small forces only of the enemy, who, after a brief resistance, retired.

The 15th Brigade, apparently, did not advance afterwards beyond the Sei-ko-san.

After the 4th Army had pushed back the Russian 37th Infantry Division to the heights north of Schi-miau-tsy—Tun-san-ho on October 13,<sup>1</sup> General Count Nodzu, acting in the spirit of Oyama's Order, dated October 12 in the evening,<sup>2</sup> decided to continue the attack on October 14, and clear the left bank of the Scha-ho of the enemy completely.

By reconnaissance it was ascertained that the enemy was, with strong forces, still on the Sei-ko-san, and on the heights at Tun-san-tsy; the first object was, therefore, to capture these heights. The Army Commander charged the 10th and 11th Kobi Brigades to carry out the attack, the 10th Division being held back in reserve.<sup>3</sup> The 11th Kobi Brigade formed up in readiness

The Japanese 4th Army and the right wing of the 2nd Army attack the 37th Infantry Division of the Russian 1st Army Corps, and portions of the 10th, on the Sei-ko-san and San-ka-ku-san.

<sup>1</sup> P. 247.

<sup>2</sup> P. 228.

<sup>3</sup> Locality of its position not known; the Division was probably standing north of the Nan-san.

south of Schi-miau-tsy, and the 10th Kobi Brigade at Tun-san-ho. The Russians—portions of the 37th Infantry Division—had entrenched their position as usual, but without special care, the lines of trenches and gun-emplacements being clearly visible on the Japanese side. Four batteries were counted on the Sei-ko-san and on the heights of Tun-san-tsy, and, in addition, about three batteries (probably from the 4th Siberian Army Corps), which had gone into position on the northern bank of the Scha-ho, on the south-eastern slope of the To-san, rising steeply from the lowland, and were directing an ineffective fire upon the Japanese at Schi-miau-tsy and Tun-san-ho, of course, owing to the distant range.<sup>1</sup> With the object of fighting down the hostile Artillery on the heights straight in front, three Abteilungen of the 14th and 15th Field Artillery Regiments, as well as an Abteilung of the 10th Division, unlimbered on the slopes east and west of Man-kia-fön, opening an overwhelming fire at 9 a.m.; some batteries prepared to accompany the attacking Infantry during its advance.

While the Artillery of the 4th Army was thus engaging the enemy's position in front, General Baron Okubo, of the 2nd Army, commanding the 6th Division, advanced, by direct orders of Oku, early on October 14, with the reinforced 11th Brigade, to attack the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy, bringing his batteries into action east of Tschien-huan-hua-tiën. By this he managed to enfilade freely the Russian guns at Tun-san-tsy.

<sup>1</sup> According to Japanese sources of Captain Sander (retired).

This superior fire from two directions the Russian batteries were unable to stand long; within a comparatively short time they all ceased fire. The Infantry had in the meantime deployed for attack, the 11th Kobi Brigade advancing against the Sei-ko-san, and the 10th Kobi Brigade against the heights of Tun-san-tsy; of the 11th Brigade of the 6th Division, two battalions attacked the heights north of Tun-san-tsy, and two battalions the San-ka-ku-san. The Russians being kept down in their trenches by the strong Artillery fire, and the fog, which was lying over the lowlands on the morning, facilitating the approach, the attacking Infantry gained ground without undue loss, the 11th Brigade of the 6th Division capturing the coveted heights even before noon. The attack of the Kobi Regiments, which had begun later, to let the Artillery have some effect first, made rapid progress too.

When, about 2 p.m., most of the Artillery of the 4th Army was obliged to cease fire, in order not to endanger its own Infantry, which had arrived quite close to the enemy's position, four batteries of the 2nd Division of the 1st Army on the right intervened most effectively in the action of the 4th Army; the batteries had unlimbered east of Schau-schi-miau-tsy, and were partly enfilading the Russian position on the Sei-ko-san. The 30th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division, as was mentioned,<sup>1</sup> took a share in the attack of the Kobi Brigades. The Russians do not seem to have waited for the final blow of the assailant,

<sup>1</sup> P. 273.

but to have evacuated their position previous to that. When the heights were in the hands of the Japanese, Artillery was brought up at once, taking the troops streaming back under a withering fire, without the Russian batteries on the To-san being able to prevent it. Nine ammunition waggons had been left behind in the captured position. Batteries of the 6th Division had meanwhile unlimbered on the heights east of Wa-ho-putsy, and were joining in the concentric pursuing fire. The Russians fell back to the country north-west of Örr-tau-kou; Headquarters of the 1st Army Corps billeted in Huan-schan. The 2nd Battalion of the 40th Kobi Regiment, and the 30th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division went in pursuit, preventing the defeated from making a renewed stand, and inflicting fresh losses on them by cutting off portions of them. It was only when the thunderstorm began,<sup>1</sup> and the tremendous rain made it impossible for the gunners and marksmen to continue their fire, that the remnants of the Russians succeeded in escaping further pursuit under cover of the storm, and in gaining the right bank of the Scha-ho.

The 1st and 4th Armies had accomplished their task; the enemy opposing them had been pushed to the northern bank of the Scha-ho. Continuing the attack across the river was for the present not the intention of General Headquarters; Marshal Marquis Oyama therefore ordered both Armies to establish themselves in the positions captured.

General Yamada's Detachment, which the 5th

<sup>1</sup> P. 270.

Division had left behind on its recent battle-ground in the country east of Schi-li-ho on October 13,<sup>1</sup> did not take any part in the combats of October 14; it therefore seems to have remained in reserve at Hun-kia-tschuan.

The action on October 14 having brought about a temporary mixture of units on the inner wings of the 4th and 2nd Armies, General Headquarters ordered the country east of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy to belong to the 4th Army, and therefore the troops of the 2nd Army within that area to be withdrawn therefrom. On this, the Commander of the 6th Division left three battalions only on the heights south-east of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy in the evening, concentrating the rest of his troops as reserve at Tschien-huan-hua-tiën. Next day the whole of the 11th Brigade started to rejoin the 24th Brigade, making the 6th Division thus complete again.

The losses of Nodzu's Army during the combats from October 10 to 14 were roughly 3,140 men, among whom were 40 officers dead and about 100 wounded.

Complying with the Army Commander's directive to attack, jointly with the 24th Brigade of the 6th Division, in the direction of La-mu-tun,<sup>2</sup> the General commanding the 3rd Division got his troops ready for attack long before day-break; three battalions were to advance against Hou-tai Hill, and six battalions on their left against Yu-kia-la-tsy. Before these had started, a reconnaissance was made in the dark by two Russian companies from Hou-tai Hill. They

The Japanese 3rd Division attacks the Russian Western Detachment, piercing its front.

<sup>1</sup> P. 240.

<sup>2</sup> P. 263.

pushed to Hou-tai, but retired again apparently satisfied when they were not fired upon from the village, which the Japanese had not yet occupied. Without being noticed by the enemy, the Japanese followed to the northern edge of the village, while the lines deployed on the Mandarin Road were at the same time gaining ground as well. About 3.30 a.m. the whole line rose to assault the enemy's position on Hou-tai Hill and at Yu-kia-la-tsy; but the Russians (123rd Infantry Regiment, and 4th Battalion 34th Infantry Regiment,<sup>1</sup> which had been moved up for the night to Hou-tai Hill) were not to be surprised, for they repelled the assault by a hot fire. The Japanese then rallied and formed for another assault, made shortly after 5 a.m., but failing likewise. The vigour of the assaults, however, had shaken the Russians to such an extent that soon afterwards a third assault succeeded; but it must be stated that some portions of the garrison (two companies of the 123rd Infantry Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 34th Infantry Regiment) had retired already after the second assault, thus weakening the defensive front.

While the Japanese made their first assaults chiefly with the bayonet, their third assault at daybreak was opened by a sudden fire of the whole line on the Russian position, producing extraordinary consternation. Making use of the disorder prevailing, the Japanese pushed on, capturing the whole section of the front assaulted.

<sup>1</sup> From the 10th Army Corps.

The Russians streamed back in disorder, pursued by the Japanese, into whose hands fell the whole of the 2nd Abteilung of the 9th Artillery Brigade, under the command of Colonel Smolenski—24 guns in all, as well as some ammunition waggons. The gunners, taken by surprise, vainly tried to mow down with case-shot<sup>1</sup> the swarms of skirmishers assaulting them so suddenly, and which they had taken at first to be their own Infantry; within a few minutes the whole Abteilung was disabled. The commander of the Abteilung and two commanders of batteries were killed, the third battery commander was wounded; in addition, the Abteilung lost 8 officers and 151 men dead or wounded, and most of its horses.

On the report of his front having been pierced, General Gerschelmann, commanding the Russian 9th Division, engaged the only battalion<sup>2</sup> he had available as reserve at Scha-ho-pu; but this weak force did not succeed in stopping the Japanese, who, on the contrary, pushed forward along the Mandarin Road as far as Scha-ho-pu. Here they met with a more obstinate resistance. The village, as well as the fire-trenches in front of it, had been occupied, after the retreat from Hou-tai Hill, by the 4th Battalion 34th Infantry Regiment, which obstinately defended its position; but the Japanese by degrees gained ground.

While the centre of the Japanese attack pushed through as far as Scha-ho-pu, the wings of the 3rd Division were meeting with far greater

<sup>1</sup> Shrapnels with time-fuze set O.

<sup>2</sup> From the 33rd Infantry Regiment.

difficulties. The left wing certainly succeeded, after a short time, in pushing beyond the Scha-ho the Russian garrison holding the portion between Yu-kia-la-tsy and La-mu-tun, and furnished by the 124th Infantry Regiment, but inside the village of La-mu-tun the adversary held his ground with the utmost obstinacy; the 1st Brigade of the Russian 9th Infantry Division maintained itself in like manner opposite the Japanese right wing on the southern river-bank; the brigade was facing there south-west, leaning with its right on the Scha-ho.

In spite of the success in the centre, the situation of the 3rd Division was therefore not favourable at all. It was fighting on three fronts; if fresh strong forces were going to make a counter-attack now, the Division was not only running the risk of losing the advantages gained, but also of being hemmed in on three sides, and of being defeated itself. General Baron Oshima, commanding the Division, nevertheless determined to remain on the defensive with his right wing only, and, for the rest, to continue the attack on Scha-ho-pu and La-mu-tun. Six batteries of the 2nd Army's General Reserve had been placed for support at the disposal of the Division; these came into action south of Yu-kia-la-tsy. The Divisional Artillery had come into action probably previous to that; but its fire-position is not known.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nor was it possible to ascertain how many batteries the Division had available on that day. The Japanese Army Commanders mostly detailed a portion of the Artillery of each Division into their General Reserves; but it seems that the number of batteries taken from the Divisions was not always the same. General Baron Oshima had most likely not more than three batteries with his Division on October 14.

This most determined attack on Scha-ho-pu the Russians were unable to resist; they evacuated the southern portion of the village, withdrawing to the right bank of the river, where they established themselves in the northern part of the village for renewed resistance. The Japanese followed them, occupying the southern part of the village. Shortly before the Russians crossed the river, General Riabinkin, who, after handing over the right section of defence<sup>1</sup> to the convalescent General Wassiliev, was on the point of returning to resume command of his own brigade,<sup>2</sup> was mortally wounded by a rifle-bullet at the southern edge of Scha-ho-pu village.

That the 3rd Division succeeded in pushing back the Russian front south of Scha-ho-pu, was probably due only to the want of strong reserves with the 10th Army Corps. If the six battalions of the 2nd Brigade 9th Infantry Division had returned in time to its corps from the 17th Army Corps,<sup>3</sup> they might have changed the fortune of the day.

But, in spite of the assurance given by the General Commanding the 17th Army Corps, these battalions had not yet arrived on the evening of October 13. In vain did General Gerschelmann wait during the night for the brigade to make its appearance at Scha-ho-pu. When, on the morning, the enemy had penetrated into the fortified position, the General Commanding dispatched two troops of Cossacks in search of the brigade, and to bring it up to Scha-ho-pu; he presumed the

<sup>1</sup> P. 253.

<sup>2</sup> 1st Brigade 9th Infantry Division.

<sup>3</sup> P. 254.

brigade to have missed its way in the darkness, or its commander not to have received the order. A General Staff Officer was sent off with the same mission; he was, moreover, to carry to the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division 17th Army Corps the request to move to Pa-ta-kia-tsy whatever he could spare of troops, because the front of the 10th Army Corps had been pierced, and the corps was now retiring behind the Scha-ho. The officer, riding off at 7.30 a.m., met near the railway south of Han-tschen-pu General Wolkov, commanding the 17th Army Corps, who was greatly astonished on hearing that Shatilov's Brigade had not yet joined the 10th Army Corps, he having given orders for its departure yesterday already. North of Lin-schin-pu village the General Staff Officer met General Dobrshinski, commanding the 35th Infantry Division, learning from him that Shatilov's Brigade had been hitherto at his disposal, but had now started to rejoin the 10th Army Corps; that he could not spare any of his own troops, on account of his own corps being hard pressed itself. It proved, however, that of the missing brigade only three battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment had started for Scha-ho-pu, General Dobrshinski having sent the two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment to La-mu-tun, with the object of reinforcing his own troops engaged there; the fourth battalion of the 36th Infantry Regiment General Dobrshinski had retained at first too, but allowed it to follow its regiment afterwards. The first three battalions arrived at Scha-ho-pu towards 9 a.m.,

where they formed a rallying-point for the retiring firing-line of the 123rd Infantry Regiment. The two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment it was impossible to withdraw from the fighting-line at La-mu-tun; one company of them seems to have been the only one not engaged; General Shatilov, commanding the brigade, reached Pa-ta-kia-tsy with that company at 10 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

After the capture of the southern part of Scha-ho-pu, the Japanese got some machine-guns into position along the bank of the river, overwhelming the Russians on the northern bank with a murderous fire. After a short time the latter evacuated the northern part of the village as well, withdrawing on Pa-ta-kia-tsy without the Japanese pushing after them. Generals Gerschelmann and Shatilov succeeded in staying the masses streaming back, and occupying with them the fire-trenches existing halfway between Scha-ho-pu and Pa-ta-kia-tsy at about 11 a.m. It was 1 p.m. before the last battalion of the 36th Infantry Regiment arrived here.

General Kuropatkin, having heard of what had occurred with the 10th Army Corps, at once resolved to come to the rescue with his reserve. At 11.35 a.m. Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps were informed by telephone from General Headquarters that the Commander-in-Chief was advancing to attack with all his available forces in

The Russian Western Detachment vainly attempts to recapture Scha-ho-pu from the Japanese 3rd Division.

<sup>1</sup> On his arrival at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, he reported that General Dobrshinski on the day before, when receiving the order to send back the brigade to the 10th Army Corps, had said "he would never dream of obeying the order until after the battle; he was expecting an attack himself."

the direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy<sup>1</sup>—Ku-kia-tsy against the enemy's right flank. The 10th Army Corps was to maintain itself obstinately, and to attack as soon as Kuropatkin's counter-attack became effective.

Somewhat later the copy of an Order<sup>2</sup> by the Commander-in-Chief to the leader of the Western Detachment came to Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps, saying that the 1st Army Corps was going to join the General Reserve in the neighbourhood of Lo-siën-tun—San-kia-tsy, and that Mau's Detachment had started from the neighbourhood of Örr-tau-kou<sup>3</sup> to join the 10th Army Corps; that the 10th Army Corps, whose left flank was being secured by the disposition of the General Reserve, was to prepare a position on its left, in which it would be able to delay the enemy's attack until the General Reserve, under the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief, was advancing to attack.

About the same time this last message arrived at Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps, General Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Division, received a message direct from the Commander-in-Chief, dispatched from San-kia-tsy: "I am coming to help you, and am advancing in the direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy, with the object of pushing against the right flank of the enemy attacking you. For the present I have only four

<sup>1</sup> North-east of Hou-tai Hill.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix XIII.

<sup>3</sup> The main forces of Mau's Detachment, after the action at the Djo-san on October 13, had probably retired, jointly with the 4th Siberian Army Corps, to the country north of Fön-kia-pu during the night following that day.

battalions, but hope to gather together eight to twelve."

At 1 p.m. General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, was ordered by the Commander of the Western Detachment to retake at all cost the position of Scha-ho-pu, so as to come in line again with the 17th Army Corps. Finally, at the same time, a message from the Quartermaster-General arrived, saying that the leading regiment of the promised supports had started from San-kia-tsy in the direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy.

From all this intelligence General Slutshevski was justified in concluding that help for his corps was coming up soon; for, apart from the fact that the Commander-in-Chief was apparently marching to his aid, the arrival of Mau's Detachment could be expected. Although Kuropatkin had demanded of the 10th Army Corps not to advance before the reserves were intervening against the Japanese 3rd Division, General Slutshevski, probably influenced by Bilderling's urgent order, resolved to attack Scha-ho-pu at once.

The attack was to be carried out by the 36th Infantry Regiment, which was now complete, and standing in the trenches half-way between Scha-ho-pu and Pa-ta-kia-tsy. While two battalions, under Colonel Shdanovski, commanding the regiment, were to make a frontal attack along the Mandarin Road, General Shatilov, commanding the brigade, was to attack with the other two battalions from Schan-lan-tsy. In support of the attack were detailed the Abteilung of the 31st

Artillery Brigade and the 3rd Battery of the 9th Artillery Brigade<sup>1</sup> which had gone into position south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, the former to the west, and the latter to the east, of the Mandarin Road.

Shatilov's column succeeded in crossing the river at Schan-lan-tsy, and taking possession of the little wood north-east of Scha-ho-pu. All attempts, however, of pushing farther failed, owing to the severe fire of the Japanese. Colonel Shdanovski, commanding the 36th Infantry Regiment, occupied the empty northern portion of Scha-ho-pu; one part of his column worked its way still farther forward at the north-east corner of the village, gaining the southern bank of the river, and establishing touch with Shatilov's firing-line, in prolongation of which they engaged in the fire-fight. The frontal attacks of Shdanovski's main forces were all repelled, the Russians maintaining themselves, however, in the part of the village situated on the northern bank.

The attack, made in reliance upon supports that were promised, thus ended without any material gain; it was, of course, evident from the beginning that four battalions alone would not be able to snatch from an ever-victorious Japanese Division anything it was holding, if the promised aid failed to come up. Neither Mau's Detachment had arrived, nor had Kuropatkin intervened. Towards 2.30 p.m. Mau's Detachment had reported, it is true, that it was marching in support of the corps to San-kia-tsy, on Kuropatkin's personal

<sup>1</sup> The 1st and 2nd Batteries were still on the southern bank of the Scha-ho

direction; the attempt, too, had been made of sending an officer to meet the detachment, so as to bring it up in the direction on Hou-tai-lin-tsy: but the detachment did not arrive, and nothing more was heard of what had become of it.

When it began to grow dark during these vain attempts of carrying through the attack, to which no vigour could be given, from want of fresh supports, the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps resolved to abandon the attack finally. The troops on the southern bank of the river were ordered at 8 p.m. to go back to the northern bank, but the 36th Infantry Regiment was to hold the northern part of Scha-ho-pu at all cost.

To prevent being surprised again, all the batteries were sent back for the night to the country north of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, with instructions to resume their positions on the northern Scha-ho bank at daybreak.<sup>1</sup>

General Slutshevski reported to the Commander of the Western Group the situation of the 10th Army Corps, asking him at the same time to send, during the night, at least one brigade of intact troops to Pa-ta-kia-tsy; else his Army Corps, owing to the loss and exhaustion of the troops, would be unable to face fresh fights.

The 1st Army Corps at Huan-schan was requested by Slutshevski to send back again to the 10th Army Corps the two battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment which had been covering the right flank of the 1st Army Corps.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> During the night the Artillery, except one Abteilung, was brought back still farther north, beyond Hua-schi-ho.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 252-253.

The river was crossed during the night, as ordered. The troops of the left defensive section went into bivouac east of Pa-ta-kia-tsy; the remaining portions were probably stationed between Pa-ta-kia-tsy and Kuan-tun. On the southern bank of the Scha-ho, La-mu-tun village only remained occupied by two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment; the 36th Infantry Regiment was holding the northern part of Scha-ho-pu, as directed.

Mau's Detachment not having arrived after dark, a General Staff officer was dispatched in search of it, and to conduct it to Pa-ta-kia-tsy. After many wanderings, the officer found the brigade at last near Fu-kia-tun-kou at 1 o'clock in the morning. The men were exceedingly tired, after marching to and fro on the bad roads softened by rain; General Kuropatkin had ordered them, therefore, to spend the night wherever they would be at dusk.

After its first rapid success the Japanese 3rd Division had a hard struggle. The last man of the Division had to be engaged to maintain the position gained and to beat off the various counter-attacks. It vainly attempted to recapture from the Russians also La-mu-tun. When night made at last an end to the combats, the Japanese remained in the position captured on the Scha-ho, where they had probably entrenched themselves during the day. Infantry fire lasted all night in Scha-ho-pu, without, however, leading to more serious fighting.

General Kuropatkin, as we mentioned before,<sup>1</sup> on the intelligence of the Japanese having pierced

<sup>1</sup> P. 283.

the front of the 10th Army Corps at dawn, determined to push with strong forces against the right flank of the Japanese 3rd Division in relief of the 10th Army Corps. The General Commanding the 1st Army Corps was to advance with the 37th Infantry Division from Yin-schou-tun at the Sei-ko-san, whilst the Commander-in-Chief himself intended to attack with portions of the 22nd Infantry Division from Lüan-fan-tun in the direction on Ku-kia-tsy, east of Hou-tai Hill. General Baron Meindorf, commanding the 1st Army Corps, who was in his quarters in the neighbourhood of Huan-schan, therefore received, at 9.55 a.m., the following Order :

General Kuropatkin tries to recapture Scha-ho-pu with his last reserves.

“The enemy has broken through the 10th Army Corps’ position at Hou-tai. While covering your front, advance to attack the right flank of the enemy, who is pressing the 10th Army Corps.

“I myself am proceeding to attack with the reserve, eight or twelve battalions from the 22nd Infantry Division; for the moment I have only four battalions. I shall direct my blow from San-kia-tsy<sup>1</sup> on Ku-kia-tsy; you must direct your attack so as to let your right touch my left.”

Attached to this Order was a sketch showing the converging advance of both attacking columns in the direction on Ku-kia-tsy.

After the Commander-in-Chief’s directive had arrived at Headquarters of the 1st Army Corps, the Chief of the Staff sent the document to Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps, accompanied by the following communication :

<sup>1</sup> North-east of Lüan-fan-tun.

*“ Dispatched 11.35 a.m.*

“ In compliance with the accompanying order of the Commander-in-Chief, the 37th Infantry Division, together with its artillery, one sotnia 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, and 2nd Siberian Cossack Battery, which has been standing south of the villages Yin-schou-tun—Tun-san-tsy, are advancing at once to attack the right flank of the Japanese, who have pushed through the centre of the 10th Army Corps. The same order has been given to the 1st Battalion 88th Infantry Regiment, standing in the section east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy.

“ The Chief of the Staff of the Army wishes to inform you that he is collecting reserves in your support.”

At the time the Commander-in-Chief, apparently from Huan-schan, was disposing of the 1st Army Corps, and the General Commanding that Army Corps was directing the 37th Infantry Division to march on Ku-kia-tsy, and the Chief of the Staff of the Army was informing the 10th Corps of the imminent intervention of these forces, the 37th Infantry Division itself was being attacked on all sides at the Sei-ko-san by portions of the Japanese 1st, 4th, and 2nd Armies, and able only to escape annihilation by favour of the disturbances in the weather.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, of the 22nd Infantry Division 1st Army Corps, which, since October 12, had been broken up, some troops were collected for carrying

<sup>1</sup> P. 276.

out the intended attack. In addition to the Commander-in-Chief's last reserve—86th Infantry Regiment and 2nd Abteilung 7th Artillery Brigade, from the 1st Army Corps—which Kuropatkin had retained on October 12, when the 4th Siberian Army Corps was being supported by portions of the 22nd Infantry Division,<sup>1</sup> there were detailed for this attack: the 88th Infantry Regiment,<sup>2</sup> likewise from the 1st Army Corps; the 2nd and 3rd Transbaikal Cossack Batteries, as well as the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, which, about 12 noon, had been withdrawn from Pu-tsau-wa, north-east of the San-kaku-san, into the General Reserve of the Army. During the afternoon these forces, by General Kuropatkin's personal arrangements, made a counter-attack from Liu-tsiën-tun in a south-westerly direction against the line Hou-tai-lin-tsy—Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy under the command of Colonel Sivizki. The attack was at first accompanied by success on both wings, but, when meeting at Hou-huan-hua-tiën the reinforced 11th Brigade of the Japanese 6th Division, it was repelled by that brigade, with the co-operation of portions from the Japanese 3rd Division. The attack therefore could not materially relieve the 10th Army Corps. The troops engaged in the attack withdrew again north-east. In the evening they were standing north-west of Liu-tsiën-tun and at Lüan-fan-tun, with outposts on the heights north-east of Ku-kia-tsy; portions occupied the height

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 193-194.

<sup>2</sup> Probably less 1st Battalion, which had been fighting already on the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy.

with the isolated tree south of the Scha-ho, afterwards called Novgorod Hill.

The 85th and 87th Infantry Regiments and the 1st Abteilung 7th Artillery Brigade of the 22nd Infantry Division, which were with the 4th Siberian Army Corps after Kuropatkin had placed them at the disposal of the General Commanding that Army Corps on October 12,<sup>1</sup> had retired with that corps on the morning of October 14 from Fönkia-pu, where during the night October 13-14 they had interrupted their retreat, in a north-westerly direction, by order of Kuropatkin; the 5th and 8th Infantry Regiments of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division,<sup>2</sup> and half the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division, had moved to Örr-tau-kou, the remaining portions of the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division being placed as reserve of the Commander-in-Chief at San-kia-tsy—Lo-siën-tun. Thither was also directed, by Kuropatkin's direct order, the 85th Infantry Regiment, which, after its arrival at Fönkia-pu,<sup>3</sup> had marched on to Örr-tau-kou, to join the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division. After cooking its dinner it continued its march to Lo-siën-tun on muddy roads, at 1.45 p.m., during a violent thunderstorm; going, moreover, by roundabout ways, the troops arrived completely drenched and exhausted, at their place of destination, only 3 to 4 kilometres distant, which took them several hours to cover.

The 87th Infantry Regiment was likewise

<sup>1</sup> P. 193.

<sup>2</sup> The 6th and 7th Infantry Regiments were with the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. (War Organisation, Appendix I.)

<sup>3</sup> P. 249.

detailed to reinforce the reserves of the Commander-in-Chief, the regiment being in the evening at San-kia-tsy, south-west of Huan-schan. It is not known where the 1st Abteilung of the 7th Artillery Brigade went to.

The Japanese 6th Division was on October 14 still divided. While General Baron Okubo, commanding the Division, was attacking the heights east of Wa-ho-pu-tsy with the reinforced 11th Brigade from Tschien-huan-hua-tiën, and Hou-huan-hua-tiën, covering thereby the right flank of the 3rd Division, as well as facilitating the frontal attack of the 4th Army,<sup>1</sup> General Koizumi, with the reinforced 24th Brigade, was lying opposite the Russian position of the 17th Army Corps between La-mu-tun and Lin-schin-pu, held by the 137th and 140th Infantry Regiments.

The Japanese 24th Brigade of the 6th Division pushes the Russian 17th Army Corps over the Scha-ho at Lin-schin-pu.

After the futile attempts of capturing the strong position on October 13,<sup>2</sup> General Koizumi continued his attacks on the 14th. The brigade had been bivouacking at Schu-lin-tsy, one company having been pushed to Scha-ho Railway Station. Reconnaissances during the night had established the following: "Close north of La-mu-tun are large bivouacs. Lin-schin-pu is being defended by one battalion entrenched south of the village. The Scha-ho is fordable everywhere, its bed affording good cover for an attack on Lin-schin-pu. The country between La-mu-tun and Lin-schin-pu is a perfectly open plain; the attack upon one of the villages can be flanked from the other; both places must therefore be attacked at one

<sup>1</sup> P. 291.

<sup>2</sup> P. 261.

and the same time." But the strength of the 24th Brigade was not sufficient for that purpose; it seemed therefore imperative to carry out the attack jointly with the 4th Division. But the neighbouring Division being itself hard pressed, the brigade was left for the moment to its own resources. General Koizumi made, however, some preparations for carrying out the attack, in case the 4th Division should be able to render some assistance: two battalions occupied Scha-ho Railway Station at 11.15 a.m., and two battalions crossed the river at Schu-lin-tsy, deploying along the outskirts of the northern portion of that place.

The Russian 17th Army Corps had occupied the position practically in the same way as on the day before.<sup>1</sup> By reconnaissance at night, the enemy was established to be in force at Scha-ho Station, at Schu-lin-tsy, Han-kui-pu, and at Ki-siau-tun. Kuropatkin's directive for the Western Detachment was for it to hold its position with obstinacy. General Wolkov had therefore given the necessary orders to his Army Corps. At 7 a.m. the officer commanding the 2nd Battalion 137th Infantry Regiment, in the fire-trenches south of Lin-schin-pu, reported the approach of three hostile columns from the direction of Schu-lin-tsy. General Wolkov then ordered the position to be held to the utmost. When later, between 10 and 11 a.m., Headquarters of the 17th Army Corps became aware of the 10th Army Corps' front having been pierced at Scha-ho-pu, the General Officer Commanding sent his last Reserve—two battalions

<sup>1</sup> P. 250.

of the 140th Infantry Regiment—to La-mu-tun, for reinforcing his left wing. The troops were exhorted once more to hold their ground firmly.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had commenced to attack. When, at 10.30 a.m., two battalions and a half of the 4th Division adjoining on the left were advancing from Siau-san-kia-tsy on Lin-schin-pu, establishing touch with the 24th Brigade, General Koizumi gave the order for the attack to be carried through on La-mu-tun and Lin-schin-pu. Whilst the two battalions holding Scha-ho Station were unable to gain any ground over the perfectly open plain towards La-mu-tun, especially owing to the heavy fire of Artillery directed upon them, the attack proceeding from Schu-lin-tsy and Siau-san-kia-tsy on Lin-schin-pu made good progress. Until noon the firing-line succeeded in approaching Lin-schin-pu to within about 600 metres. The attack was supported by three batteries of the 6th Division attached to the 24th Brigade, their position being unknown. The Artillery of the 4th Division had gone into a fire-position south-west of Tschan-lin-pu during the night; but it seems to have taken no part in the attack on Lin-schin-pu.

On the Russian side, batteries were firing from the neighbourhood of Ta-lian-tun and Szö-fan-tai upon the Infantry attacking Lin-schin-pu, as well as La-mu-tun; the 2nd Abteilung 35th Artillery Brigade, from its position north-west of La-mu-tun, took Scha-ho-pu especially under fire. The vigour of the attack of the Infantry advancing against Lin-schin-pu threatened to grow weary

under the effect of this Artillery fire, and all the more so, because the Russian fighting-line was also being reinforced at 10 a.m. by a composite battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, and at 12 noon by one battalion from the 12th Infantry Regiment. General Koizumi therefore ordered two companies of his reserve to advance from Schu-lin-tsy along the bed of the Scha-ho river against the left flank of the enemy's firing-line, south of Lin-schin-pu, facilitating thereby the continuation of the attack in front. The two companies succeeded in coming up entirely unnoticed and in opening at 400 metres' range unexpectedly an enfilade fire upon the Russians in the fire-trench south-east of Lin-schin-pu. Making use of the confusion caused thereby, one of the two companies continued to rush forward, penetrating into the fire-trench at 1.15 p.m.

Meanwhile, the other firing-lines attacking in front had also pushed on, and were now rising to assault as well; about 2.30 p.m. the whole of the enemy's line in front of Lin-schin-pu was captured. But the Russians were still holding on at the southern borders of the village, and, reinforced by reserves,<sup>1</sup> were even making repeated counter-strokes. The Japanese being at that moment short of ammunition, their situation grew rather serious. But when, after the arrival of pack-horses at Schu-lin-tsy, fresh supplies of ammunition were brought up into the firing-line by

<sup>1</sup> Details are not known; probably by degrees the two battalions 139th Infantry Regiment were engaged which had been kept back as sectional reserve north-west of Lin-schin-pu.

companies held in reserve, it was possible to prepare the assault on Lin-schin-pu by a brisk fire. The assailants succeeded in penetrating into the village during the time the thunderstorm broke in the afternoon. The Russians offered a determined resistance; it was only after a long and severe street-fight that they were pushed back to the northern edge of the village, where they still maintained themselves in a group of houses at the north-west corner of the village. To protect themselves from the strong Artillery fire coming from the neighbourhood of Szö-fan-tai, the assailants at once proceeded to construct some cover. The Infantry fire-fight continued to last till dark.

The news of the loss of Lin-schin-pu made the General Commanding the 17th Army Corps feel very uneasy; he immediately ordered the village to be recaptured by the troops charged with the defence of that section. At 11 p.m. two companies of the 140th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Battalion 12th Infantry Regiment advanced to attack, probably from the neighbourhood of Szö-fan-tai; but the attack failed, in spite of their gallantry, especially of the companies from the 140th Infantry Regiment,<sup>1</sup> owing to the hot fire of the vigilant Japanese. A small portion only succeeded in pushing into the village, but their inferior number was unable to hold its own; after a long and obstinate hand-to-hand fight the Russians were again obliged to abandon Lin-schin-pu.

<sup>1</sup> The two companies lost 120 men, 70 of whom were killed.

While the combat was raging around the position of the 35th Infantry Division, General Wolkov was casting his eyes west, distinctly expecting the 6th Siberian Army to attack at last, in his relief, the left wing of the Japanese 2nd Army.

The 6th Siberian Army Corps is arrested in the neighbourhood of Schau-kia-lin-tsy by the attack of the Japanese 4th Division.

General Soboliev, commanding the 6th Siberian Army Corps, had ordered an advance to be made early on October 14, in compliance with Bilderling's directive.<sup>1</sup> The corps started at 5 o'clock in the morning with a right column from Lanschanchan-pu on Schau-kia-lin-tsy, and with a left column from Pen-tiën-tsy on Ta-lian-tun, passing west of Ku-kia-tsy. Reports stated the villages of Sin-tai-tsy, San-kia-tsy, Wu-tschan-yin, Tschanlin-pu, and Lin-schin-pu to be occupied by the Japanese.

When the 6th Siberian Army Corps had reached with its vanguards the line Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun at 7 a.m., the General Officer Commanding received from the Commander of the Western Group the following letter: "Please begin the attack on Hun-lin-pu—Ta-tai, and occupy the places mentioned. The 17th Army Corps has orders to support you as reserve; General Dembovski is instructed to post himself as a protection for your right flank in the neighbourhood of Pau-sen-tun—Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy. I request you to start at once, reporting to me."

The movement began by the right column first turning on Sin-tai-tsy and San-kia-tsy, 800 metres south of Sin-tai-tsy, and attacking and driving

<sup>1</sup> P. 256.

thence the Japanese protective parties<sup>1</sup> stationed there; the left column, meanwhile, does not seem to have advanced beyond Ta-lian-tun. The attack was continued after 9 a.m., the right column taking now its direction on Ta-tai, and the left by Tschan-lin-pu on Hun-lin-pu.

On the Japanese side, the 4th Division had arranged to advance with one battalion and a half on Ton-tai-tsy whilst the attack on Lin-schin-pu was proceeding, so as to prevent the enemy standing there from flanking the attack. The Artillery of the Division had gone into position south-west of Tschan-lin-pu; the reserve was in a position of readiness south of that place—one battalion occupied Wan-tschuan-tsy as a flank protection.

The Japanese troops detailed to advance on Ton-tai-tsy seem to have met the 6th Siberian Army Corps first, forcing its leading portions to engage in a fire-fight, the Japanese Artillery at the same time intervening in the action. The strongly superior forces of the Russians succeeded in pushing back the Japanese for the moment, thus enabling the Russian right column to occupy, with portions, Wu-tschan-yin, and the left to push on to Tschan-lin-pu by Ton-tai-tsy and Ta-lian-tun. While General Baranowski, commanding the 72nd Infantry Division, was then continuing with a portion of the right column his advance on Pau-tsy-yan, reaching it about 11 a.m., General

<sup>1</sup> In Japanese reports nothing is mentioned of protective detachments standing in Sin-tai-tsy and San-kia-tsy; they were therefore probably quite insignificant parties.

Laiming, commanding the 55th Infantry Division, with the left column, was meeting with an obstinate resistance at Tschan-lin-pu. Probably the main body of the Japanese 4th Division was being engaged here. In spite of the conspicuous gallantry of the Russian troops, of whom the greatest sacrifices were demanded, they did not succeed in pushing the Japanese from Tschan-lin-pu. The reason for it was probably, in the first instance, the antiquated and unsuitable tactics insisted upon by the Russians the same as ever, notwithstanding all their bitter experiences.

An eye-witness of the combats on the Japanese side gives the following account of one of the Russian attacks on Tschan-lin-pu: "About 11 a.m. two more battalions advanced from Ton-tai-tsy; they acted as if they were attacking a skeleton enemy; in Ton-tai-tsy they formed up; the mounted officers dismounted and inspected their troops. Then they moved off in column, forming a dense firing-line after covering a distance of 300 to 700 metres, and advancing without firing to within 700 metres of Tschan-lin-pu. When, at that moment, the Japanese Infantry and Artillery opened fire on them at one and the same time, they suffered at once severe loss, and retired completely disorganised."

The Japanese battalion standing in Wanschuan-tsy as flank-guard, and being meanwhile attacked by the Russian right column, had been reinforced by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, with one company and two guns; afterwards two more companies arrived from the Divisional Reserve to

support the left wing of the Division. The Russian right column, which was to continue its advance from San-kia-tsy on Ta-tai, succeeded in approaching the Japanese line at Wan-tschuan-tsy to within about 500 to 600 metres, where it commenced to entrench itself. In all attempts at pushing home the attack, the Russian tactics failed similarly, as with Laiming's column. Under the calm and deliberate fire of the Japanese, the clumsy attack broke down, the Russian battalions streaming back again in a hurried retreat north—so hurriedly that the battery with the column had to leave behind two guns and five ammunition waggons.<sup>1</sup>

The disorder arising with the Russians, by their repulse in the attack, was made use of by the troops of the 4th and 6th Divisions, opposite Lin-schin-pu, for a further advance.

After one battalion of the General Reserve had been placed at the disposal of the 4th Division, the Russians, at 4 p.m., advanced once more from San-kia-tsy and Wu-tschan-yin to within 1,000 metres of the left wing of the Division at Wan-tschuan-tsy, where they entrenched themselves. The Divisional Commander, expecting another attack by the enemy, reinforced the threatened wing by three companies. But the Russians made no further attack; they remained for some time in their position, and then retired north at dusk. The Japanese followed, with their left, to Pau-tsy-yan; the main body of the Division

<sup>1</sup> The guns were, however, brought back by the Russians during the night.

bivouacked within the line Lin-schin-pu—Wan-tschuan-tsy.

The Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade had remained with its main body at Ho-liën-tai. One portion of it, as intimated, supported the left of the 4th Division at Wan-tschuan-tsy, and another portion occupied Li-kia-tun, posts of observation being stationed between the latter place and the Hun-ho. On the Russians advancing to attack Wan-tschuan-tsy, the battery of the brigade<sup>1</sup> came into action, materially contributing by its flanking fire to the repulse of the attack. It was at the same time so cleverly placed that three Russian batteries, appearing at San-kia-tsy to combat it, were unable either to locate it or effectively to bombard it.

Towards 6 p.m. General Dembovski's troops advanced from a westerly direction on Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy, driving in some Japanese Cavalry and then occupying Li-kia-tun. The covering detachment standing there fell back on Tai-pin-tschuan, where also the squadrons returning from the 4th Division arrived at 7.30 p.m. Occupying the villages Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy and Li-kia-tun was all that General Dembovski thought he could achieve, and yet he was standing with 14 battalions, 16 sotnias, and 32 guns on the flank of the Japanese 2nd Army.

Headquarters of the Japanese 2nd Army and its General Reserve remained during the night at Pan-kiau-pu.

<sup>1</sup> Less two guns, handed over to the garrison of Wan-tschuan-tsy (P. 300.)

At 10 p.m. General Baron Oku issued the following Order:

“The *main forces of the enemy* are in retreat all along the line; some detachments are still making a stand west of the main road.

“The *3rd Division* will push back the enemy opposite it on both sides of the Mandarin Road.

“The *6th Division* will keep Hou-huan-hua-tiën occupied and support the attack of the 3rd Division; General Koizumi’s Brigade will attack La-mu-tun.

“The *4th Division* will support the attack of General Koizumi’s Brigade, but otherwise maintain the line occupied to-day.

“The *Reserve* will assemble at Tschan-sin-tiën to-morrow at 5 a.m. *Headquarters of the Army* will be on the Ko-ho-san at 5 a.m.”

Portions of the 8th Division having arrived from home at Liao-yan,<sup>1</sup> were moved up by General Headquarters to Yen-tai; but they did not come any more into action.

The day had caused great loss to the 6th Siberian Army Corps. The 219th Regiment, belonging to Laiming’s column, lost almost all its officers in the attack on Tschan-lin-pu. As was customary with the Russians, the companies which had no more officers left had then simply retired. General Laiming, as well as the officers of his staff, were obliged to step in personally to conduct the retreating troops back into action again. Nevertheless, the repeated attacks failed under the murderous fire of the enemy. Having regard to the enormous

<sup>1</sup> P. 241

loss suffered by the left column—2nd Brigade, 55th Infantry Division<sup>1</sup>—the General Officer Commanding ordered the 219th Infantry Regiment to be withdrawn from the fighting-line during a retrograde movement, and to be replaced by another regiment.

After its last futile attempts to attack, the Army Corps was on the point of entrenching itself north of Tschan-lin-pu, when the following letter arrived from the Commander of the Western Detachment, dispatched from Han-tschen-pu village on the railway:

“Thanks to your forward move we succeeded in maintaining the Scha-ho line; but the 10th and 17th Army Corps had to engage all their reserves. I request you to lead back for the night your main body to the line Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun as échelon behind the right wing of the 17th Army Corps, awaiting in that position further orders of the Commander-in-Chief. Keep in closest touch with the 17th Army Corps and take care of your right flank. Send frequent reports on your situation. I shall spend the night at Su-ya-tun village.”<sup>2</sup>

General Soboliev, on this, led back his Army Corps into the position it had been holding early in the morning at Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun.

Although the success of the 6th Siberian Army Corps on October 14 was an extremely moderate one—if it can be called a success at all—yet the Commander of the Western Detachment saw fit to

<sup>1</sup> The 219th Infantry Regiment is said to have lost 2,000 men, dead or wounded.

<sup>2</sup> Near the railway junction, 9 kilometres north of Lin-schin-pu.

express once more his special acknowledgment to the General Officer Commanding for what he had done. Next morning Soboliev received the following letter:

“As an act of duty and comradeship I take the liberty of expressing to you my deep gratitude for the timely and vigorous support rendered to us yesterday by the 6th Siberian Army Corps, enabling thereby the Western Detachment, and especially the 17th Army Corps, to sustain the severe combat with the enemy’s main bodies, and to maintain all the positions they had occupied.

“GENERAL BILDERLING.”

General Grekov’s Orenburg Cossack Brigade seems to have taken no part in the combats of October 14, but to have remained at Kau-kiat-tai.

By continuing their attacks on October 14, the Japanese had almost gained their object of driving the Russians from the southern bank of the Scha-ho; apart from the low hills west of Lüan-fan-tun, only La-mu-tun remained in the hands of the Russians. Result of  
October  
14.

Of the 1st Army, the left wing—that is to say, the Guard Division and the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division—had met as yet with serious resistance at the Ba-ken-ji-san and Sei-ko-san. Opposite the right wing of the Army, the Eastern Detachment fell back without fighting behind the Scha-ho. The 5th Division, sent in support of the 1st Army, did not become fully engaged, Marshal Marquis Oyama prohibiting the intended attack of the Division from the Wai-tau-schan on the northern bank of the Scha-ho.

The forces of the 4th Army, which had taken part in the combats, as well as the half-division (6th) of the 2nd Army, also attacked the Sei-ko-san and the heights north of it, in close touch with the 1st Army, gaining roughly the line Sei-ko-san—Tschien-tshan-lin-tsy.

With the 2nd Army, the 3rd Division succeeded in piercing the front of the Russian 10th Army Corps and pushing to Scha-ho-pu; its success had, however, no further effect, the 24th Brigade of the 6th Division, engaged on the left of the 3rd Division against the line La-mu-tun—Lin-schin-pu, as well as the 4th Division, fighting on the left against the Russian 6th Siberian Army Corps, being unable to make any progress, apart from the capture of Lin-schin-pu.

For the Russians the day was one causing only fresh losses. By using the 6th Siberian Army Corps in the impracticable way it was done, that corps had now lost much of its fighting strength too.

Of the Centre, the main forces had retired during the night October 13–14 to the neighbourhood of Örr-tau-kou, only the 37th Infantry Division of the 1st Army Corps and Mishtshenko's Detachment remaining without any object still south of the Scha-ho. As could be anticipated, they were attacked there again, and pushed back to the northern bank of the Scha-ho with loss.

In spite of all the failures of the day, Kuropatkin concentrated in the neighbourhood north-west of Fön-kia-pu strong reserves, with which he intended to assume the offensive presently.

OCTOBER 15

Early on October 15, Oyama's Headquarters issued the following General Order :

" 1. The *First, Fourth, and Second Armies* have pushed the *enemy* north.

" 2. *Marshal Marquis Oyama* intends to reorganise the troops and prepare for continuing the offensive.

" 3. The *First Army* will reorganise its forces south of the line Tai-kua-tun<sup>1</sup>—Hsin-lun-tun,<sup>2</sup> reconnoitring on Mukden; the *12th Division and 5th Kobi Brigade* will remain south of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

" 4. The *5th Division* will rejoin the *Fourth Army*.<sup>3</sup>

" 5. The *Fourth Army* will hold the line Pu-tsau-wa<sup>4</sup>—heights north of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy, reconnoitring on Mukden.

" 6. The *Second Army* will gain the line Scha-ho-pu—Lin-schin-pu; it will reconnoitre west of the Hun-ho."

Based on this Order, General Kuroki directed General Baron Ino-uye's Detachment to move from Schan-schi-tsiautsy<sup>5</sup> somewhat farther north. The 12th Division, reinforced by the 5th Kobi Brigade, therefore marched to the neighbourhood of Sia-pin-tai-tsy. Opposite of it, on the heights of Kan-to-li-san, portions of the 2nd Siberian Army

The Japanese 1st and 4th Armies take up a position of readiness south of the Scha-ho.

Sketch 9.

<sup>1</sup> 1.6 kilometres north-east of the Kin-cho-san.

<sup>2</sup> 4 kilometres north-west of Tai-kua-tun.

<sup>3</sup> P. 240.

<sup>4</sup> 3 kilometres west of Hsin-lun-tun.

<sup>5</sup> 7½ kilometres south of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

Corps and of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division entrenched themselves. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade continued its reconnaissance in a northerly direction from San-kia-tsy on the Tai-tsy-ho. The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, under General Matsunaga, which on the 14th had advanced to Schan-pin-tai-tsy, 5 kilometres south-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa, was relieved of its task of cutting off the Russians,<sup>1</sup> and marched to rejoin the rest of its Division—probably by Man-hua-pu, 3 kilometres north of the Wai-to-san. The 5th Division received orders to start returning from the Wai-tau-schan to the 4th Army on the 16th.<sup>2</sup>

The Guard Division seems to have advanced somewhat from the position it had reached at the Sen-san and Kin-cho-san<sup>3</sup> on the 14th, pushing its outposts farther east to the Tsio-tso-schan, and occupying and fortifying the low heights south-east of Fön-kia-pu, facing north and north-east. On the left, the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division adjoined, holding the Ba-ken-ji-san. General Umesawa's Brigade, after departing from General Baron Ino-uye's Detachment, was marching to San-kia-tsy,<sup>4</sup> with the object of remaining there at the disposal of General Headquarters.<sup>5</sup>

The disposition of the 4th Army on October 15 is not known in detail; it probably advanced to the line Pu-tsau-wa—heights north of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy—in conformity with Oyama's Order. There was no longer any serious fighting on the 15th, either opposite the 1st or the 4th Army.

<sup>1</sup> P. 265.<sup>2</sup> Pp. 271-272.<sup>3</sup> P. 271.<sup>4</sup> South-west of Scha-ho-pu.<sup>5</sup> P. 265.

At times a feeble and ineffective Artillery duel was carried on. On the other hand, a portion of the 4th Army had an opportunity of supporting the 2nd Army, where the combats were continued.

The Commander of the 2nd Army had requested the 3rd Division to push back the enemy opposing it on both sides of the Mandarin Road.<sup>1</sup> But after the great exertions imposed upon the Division on the previous days, especially on October 14, the troops were no longer able to continue the attack over the Scha-ho section with sufficient vigour. General Baron Oshima confined himself to deploying weak forces for capturing the low heights north-east of Ku-kia-tsy, on which were standing advanced detachments of the Russian 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments, from the 1st Army Corps.<sup>2</sup> Under the severe but ineffective fire of Russian batteries from the neighbourhood north of Schan-lan-tsy, to which six Japanese batteries were replying from Hou-tai Hill, the capture of the heights mentioned was effected by 10 a.m. In Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy the Russians maintained themselves with greater obstinacy; the portions engaged here by the 3rd Division were unable to push them from the village; it was only when, at 3 p.m., a detachment of the 4th Army intervened in the action,<sup>3</sup> and continued the attack, that any progress was made. The Russians evacuated the village, as well as the small eminence east of it, retiring to the one-tree hill south of the Scha-ho; two guns with two ammunition waggons fell into

The Japanese 2nd Army pushes portions of the Russian Western Detachment from Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy and Lamu-tun.

<sup>1</sup> P. 303.

<sup>2</sup> P. 291.

<sup>3</sup> More detail not known.

the hands of the Japanese, who at once pushed after the Russians, occupying the small eminence after sunset.

The reinforced 11th Brigade of the 6th Division was in the morning in its former position,<sup>1</sup> three battalions standing south of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy, and the main body at Hou-huan-hua-tiën ; to give the support to the 3rd Division demanded by the Army Order, one battalion was pushed forward in the direction of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy ; with the same object the three batteries of the brigade had moved into a position of readiness east of Hou-huan-hua-tiën. General Baron Oku, after conferring with the Commander of the 4th Army, having gained the impression that there was no longer any attack of the enemy to be feared from the east, gave, at 10 a.m., orders to the Commander of the 6th Division for assembling the troops of the reinforced 11th Brigade at Kian-hu-tun, 5 kilometres south of Scha-ho-pu. By noon this order was executed. When next, at 1.20 p.m., Headquarters of the 2nd Army received notice of portions of the 4th Army being on the point of attacking Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy in support of the 3rd Division, the 11th Brigade was evidently no longer wanted in its former section of defence east of Scha-ho-pu. General Baron Oku therefore ordered the Commander of the 6th Division to support with his whole strength the attack of the 24th Brigade on La-mu-tun<sup>2</sup> ; for this purpose the Artillery of the 11th Brigade was to come into action at San-kia-tsy, south of La-mu-tun, and to

<sup>1</sup> P. 293

<sup>2</sup> P. 303.

be under the orders of the Artillery Commander of the Division.

The 24th Brigade of the 6th Division continued, on the morning of October 15, the attack on La-mu-tun, which it had begun already on October 13. One battalion from the General Reserve at Tschan-sin-tiën was placed at the disposal of the brigade; General Koizumi engaged this battalion to reinforce the two battalions at Scha-ho Station, with orders to press home now the attack on La-mu-tun. The three batteries of the brigade had to support the attack from their fire-position at Schu-lin-tsy. The garrison of Lin-schin-pu was also directed to co-operate against La-mu-tun: but the forces standing there were held fast by a counter-attack of the Russians.

About 6 a.m. three Russian battalions, probably from the 12th Infantry Regiment, suddenly appeared about 30 metres in front of the village, having approached from the 17th Army Corps' position in rear, at Szö-fan-tai—Yin-kuan, by making able use of the cover afforded by the group of houses north of Lin-schin-pu. By the rapid fire of the defenders their further advance was stayed for the moment; but, when two more battalions then came up in their support, the whole line, with the greatest gallantry, made a rush for the village. A furious hand-to-hand struggle ensued, in which the Russians were ultimately the vanquished. With great loss, they retired on Szö-fan-tai, where they were supported by fresh troops. Under these circumstances, the Japanese battalions at Scha-ho Station were left to their

own resources in their attack on La-mu-tun. At 7.30 a.m. they began to advance, but were gaining ground very slowly, because the defenders, being well covered by the clay wall surrounding the village, were difficult to reach by the Japanese fire, and because Russian batteries were enfilading the Japanese attack, as on the day before, from the neighbourhood of Szö-fan-tai. About 9 a.m. the Japanese had worked up their way to within 600 metres of the village—farther they could not go for the present; a hot stationary fire-action then originated.

When, at 11 a.m., Headquarters of the 2nd Japanese Army was informed of the difficulties the attack on La-mu-tun was encountering, the whole of the Artillery reserve came into action to support it, and was placed under uniform command. At 12.30 p.m. thirteen batteries,<sup>1</sup> on the line Tschan-sin-tiën—Pa-kia-tsy, opened fire on La-mu-tun. At 1 p.m. the Commander of the 24th Brigade was informed that the rest of the 6th Division had also been detailed for the attack on La-mu-tun. The 23rd Infantry Regiment, standing in Lin-schin-pu, having about this time to ward off a counter-attack of the Russians, and the enemy having evidently been reinforced in La-mu-tun, General Koizumi decided to await the co-operation of the 11th Brigade before he continued the attack.

Towards 3 p.m. the 45th Infantry Regiment arrived at the northern exit of San-kia-tsy, south of La mu-tun, and began to deploy against La-

<sup>1</sup> Including a captured Russian field-battery.

mu-tun with two battalions in first line. The defender had meanwhile been very much shaken by the severe Artillery fire, individual groups commencing already to retire north. It was therefore not a particularly difficult task which the 45th Infantry Regiment had to perform. The attack, which the battalions from Scha-ho Station had also resumed, was then carried out almost without a single stop; at 4 p.m. the southern portion of the village was captured after a short fire-action, and at 4.40 p.m. the portion also on the right bank of the Scha-ho. The Russians retired north, pursued by a hot fire of Infantry and Artillery.

Noticing this failure, the Russian detachments, which had again advanced against Lin-schin-pu, now also gave up their attack. The Russian trenches on either side of Lin-schin-pu had been evacuated already early in the afternoon. The retrograde movement, which the Japanese never expected, began in the section between Lin-schin-pu and the railway, and was spreading everywhere. In the evening the whole of the Scha-ho position was abandoned by the Russians.

The right of the Japanese 4th Division supported, from Siau-san-kia-tsy, the garrison of Lin-schin-pu in repulsing the enemy's attacks. The Division was unable to make any progress against the strongly occupied line of the 6th Siberian Army Corps west of the Scha-ho, between Ta-lian-tun and San-kia-tsy, which was being supported by a long row of batteries at Schau-kia-lin-tsy.

The main body of the Japanese 1st Cavalry

Brigade, reinforced by two companies of the 4th Division, tried to push General Dembovski's troops again from Li-kia-tun.<sup>1</sup> But that village and Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy proved to be too strongly occupied; the attack was, moreover, being enfiladed by two Russian batteries from a northerly direction. The Cavalry Brigade, after failing to capture Li-kia-tun till sunset, was concentrated at Tai-pin-tschuan. The Russians evacuated Li-kia-tun during the night; the village could then be re-occupied by portions of the brigade.

A detachment of the Cavalry Brigade was standing during the day at Han-schan-tai, maintaining itself there, in spite of repeated attempts by General Dembovski's troops to push it back from there.

The 2nd Army, having attained the object assigned to it by the General Order for the 15th, General Baron Oku did not intend to advance any farther. Army Headquarters went back for the night to Schi-li-ho; the General Reserve was being assembled at Tschan-sin-tiën.

As we can guess already, from the acknowledgment addressed by General Baron Bilderling to the General Commanding the 6th Siberian Army Corps,<sup>2</sup> he looked upon the task of the 6th Siberian Corps, as well as of Dembovski's Detachment, as altogether accomplished; neither of these two commanders received any intimation for continuing the attack on the left wing of the Japanese 2nd Army. General Soboliev, being not inclined to advance on his own initiative, in view, probably,

<sup>1</sup> P. 302.

<sup>2</sup> P. 305.

of the bloody action on October 14, confined himself, from his position between Schau-kia-lin-tsy and Ta-lian-tun, to replying with his batteries at Schau-kia-lin-tsy to the Artillery fire the Japanese 4th Division was keeping up in a half-hearted manner. Dembovski's Detachment, likewise, remained standing inactive at Pau-sen-tun, Fu-kia-tschuan-tsy, and Li-kia-tun, merely intent on repelling any attempts of the Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade to attack.

The 17th Army Corps had been hotly engaged in the fight for Lin-schin-pu and La-mu-tun since the morning of October 15, the action increasing in violence towards noon. When, about that time, Headquarters of the 6th Siberian Army Corps received intelligence of portions of the 17th Army Corps evacuating the first position at Lin-schin-pu under the pressure of the enemy, and retiring to the second position on the line Ku-kia-tsy—Szö-fan-tai, the whole of the 40 guns, which were engaged in the Artillery combat, transferred their fire, by Soboliev's order, to the section of the 17th Army Corps, which was in imminent danger; the 285th Infantry Regiment was, moreover, moved up to Ta-lian-tun from the reserve standing at Kuan-lin-pu, to cover, at the request of the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division, the right flank of the first position, which was much shaken already. For the rest, the 6th Siberian Army Corps retained its former position; the four Infantry regiments—285th, 286th, 288th, and 220th—belonging to three different brigades, and seven batteries were, in the evening, in the entrenched

The Russian 17th Army Corps evacuates its position on the Schau-ho at Lin-schin-pu and La-mu-tun in face of the attacks by the Japanese 2nd Army, and retires into its position farther north on both sides of Yin, kuan.

line Schau-kia-lin-tsy — Ta-lian-tun; the 287th Infantry Regiment, as well as the much reduced 219th Infantry Regiment, with three batteries, were standing in reserve at Kuan-lin-pu. Touch with General Dembovski's Detachment was effected by a sotnia of Ural Cossacks, which, at the same time, was charged with securing the right flank of the Army Corps.

The evacuation of the position held by the 35th Infantry Division astride of Lin-schin-pu, coming as a surprise even to the Japanese, must be attributed to the unsuitable measures adopted. In his Order for October 15, the General Commanding the 17th Army Corps had arranged for the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division to send back, on October 15, all the troops he had received from the 3rd Infantry Division as reinforcement on the 14th. There was no difficulty in bringing back to the 3rd Infantry Division the two battalions of the 12th Infantry Regiment, one of which had been engaged in Lin-schin-pu, and the other in the nocturnal counter-attack on Lin-schin-pu;<sup>1</sup> two companies of the 9th Infantry Regiment, which on the day before had fought in the trenches south of Lin-schin-pu, could be sent back without any trouble too; but it was not possible, for the moment, to return again the other two companies of the 9th Infantry Regiment. These companies were being engaged in the section close east of Lin-schin-pu, just at the moment

<sup>1</sup> On October 14, in the evening, jointly with two companies of the 140th Infantry Regiment. (P. 297.) The renewed attack on Lin-schin-pu early on October 15 was probably also made by battalions of the 12th Infantry Regiment. (P. 311.)

when the southern portion of the village was captured by the Japanese; it was their task, therefore, to cover the right flank of the section Lin-schin-pu—railway against the hostile garrison of that village. The Russians not succeeding in recapturing Lin-schin-pu, the task of the two companies continued the same for the night, as well as for the coming day. It, therefore, did not seem feasible to withdraw them from their position. But during the day urgent requests were repeatedly addressed to the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division to send the two companies to Han-tschen-pu as reserve for the Army Corps.<sup>1</sup> Although General Dobrshinski begged to be allowed to wait until it was dark, the General Commanding demanded the execution of the order given. The Divisional Commander then issued the order for the departure of the two companies; he intended, in case of need, to move into their place one battalion of the 138th Infantry Regiment, which, during the night, had been detailed to the left section.

General Wolkov, commanding the 17th Army Corps, had meanwhile taken measures to occupy Han-tschen-pu and Kuan-tun, east of the railway, with portions of his reserve, should retreat become necessary; he had, moreover, given verbal instructions to Colonel Martynov,<sup>2</sup> commanding the left section, "that, should the *right* section retire, he was to fall back likewise behind the line Han-

<sup>1</sup> Two battalions of the 10th Infantry Regiment had been there already since the evening of October 14; the composite battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment was to join them in addition.

<sup>2</sup> Commanding the 140th Infantry Regiment.

tschen-pu—Kuan-tun, and not to make a stand again before he reached that line, so as not to mask the fire from the position in rear." This order, of which the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division had not been informed, entailed some undesirable and unexpected consequences; for when, at 3 p.m., the two companies of the 9th Infantry Regiment, during a pause in the action, retired in groups, led by their officers, to march to Han-tschen-pu as directed, the adjoining portions of the 138th Infantry Regiment began to evacuate their positions too. These were joined by others, thus causing the whole section between Lin-schin-pu and the railway gradually to be abandoned. True, at some places it was possible to make the retreating forces see the mistake they had made, and to induce them to re-occupy the position; but the movement had already made such progress as to make it altogether impossible to hold the position between Ta-lian-tun and La-mu-tun any longer. The order had therefore to be given to abandon the Scha-ho position, and to halt again in the second position Szö-fan-tai—Yin-kuan—Kuan-tun. The 138th and 140th Infantry Regiments, under a most severe fire of Japanese Artillery, entrenched themselves on the line Yin-kuan—Kuan-tun, in which portions of the 36th Infantry Regiment had commenced digging trenches already on October 13.<sup>1</sup> The evacuation of the Scha-ho position, commencing at 3 p.m.,

<sup>1</sup> Losses :

138th Infantry Regiment :	4 officers,	48 men.
140th        ,,        ,,	8        ,,	217        ,,

was probably also the main cause why the Japanese 6th Division, after its former vain attempts,<sup>1</sup> was able to execute the attack on La-mu-tun without delay at 4 p.m.

During the time the 35th Infantry Division was evacuating the Scha-ho position, fresh disquieting reports were coming in; it was said that strong forces of the enemy were being concentrated at Ki-siau-tun and Schu-lin-tsy, on both banks of the Scha-ho, south of Lin-schin-pu; and it was feared that the Japanese were on the point of advancing against the second position. No more fresh reserves being available, the Commander of the 35th Infantry Division resolved to stop the enemy from continuing his attack by massed Artillery fire.

All the batteries of the Division were directed to sweep and search by their fire the area in which the Japanese were supposed to be concentrating. An exceedingly violent cannonade developed; within 40 minutes, of which 20 minutes must be deducted for observation and change of target, the 48 guns engaged fired about 8,000 rounds.<sup>2</sup> The result of this rapid fire is said to have been "splendid." According to reports from observing officers, the Japanese had been thrown into the greatest confusion; columns had been literally scattered; the men had dispersed, and had disappeared behind houses and in the folds of the ground. Of losses suffered, the observing officers

<sup>1</sup> P. 313.

<sup>2</sup> Each gun 166 rounds, *i.e.* 8 to 9 rounds per minute (allowing 20 minutes for actual firing).

did not mention anything. The Russian massed Artillery fire not being mentioned in Japanese reports, its effect seems to have been very small only; it was, at any rate, out of all proportion to the enormous amount of ammunition spent. But as the Japanese desisted from continuing their attacks, confining themselves to occupying the position abandoned on the Scha-ho, the Russians believed this result to have been brought about by their Artillery.

After the proceedings of October 14, General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, looked forward with anxiety to what might happen on the 15th. He was afraid the Japanese were going to continue their attack beyond the Scha-ho, and believed his troops unfit to resist another onslaught after the preceding exhausting fight, and all the more unfit when Mau's Detachment had not yet arrived from Örr-tau-kou by 2 o'clock in the morning.<sup>1</sup> The officer of the 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment, who had been dispatched in search of this detachment at 2.30 p.m. on the 14th,<sup>2</sup> returned without having effected his object. No hope being thus held out for the arrival of the anxiously looked-for reserve at daybreak, the Chief of Staff of the 10th Army Corps informed the Chief of Staff of the Western Detachment at 2.30 a.m. of the little-hopeful views entertained by his Commanding General on the situation, asking at the same time for any fresh body of troops to be sent to the Mandarin Road as reserve. The reply to this request is not known; but the ques-

The Russian 10th Army Corps leaves weak protective detachments on the Scha-ho, and strengthens its position south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy.

<sup>1</sup> P. 288.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 286-287.

tion of support became less urgent, because the Japanese did not continue their offensive against the 10th Army Corps either during the night or on the next day. Early on the morning of October 15 the General Staff officer who had been dispatched to Mau's Detachment<sup>1</sup> returned, moreover, with the reassuring report of the detachment having spent the night at Fu-kia-tun-kou, and of its going to march at daybreak to Pa-ta-kia-tsy. At noon the Quartermaster-General of the Army gave the additional information of the 85th Infantry Regiment from the General Reserve, together with a battery of the 7th Artillery Brigade, going to start about 12 noon from San-kia-tsy, 3 kilometres south-west of Huan-schan, north of the Scha-ho, with the object of joining the 10th Army Corps. Somewhat later this information was supplemented by an order arriving from Kuropatkin, saying that this regiment was to be looked upon as the last reserve, and to be engaged only in the very last instance.

The reinforced 1st Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division, under General Mau,<sup>2</sup> arrived at last at Pa-ta-kia-tsy at 12 noon, and the 85th Infantry Regiment at 6 p.m. These troops now formed the "general reserve" of the corps, being posted north of that village.

On the orders of Kuropatkin and of the Commander of the Western Detachment, to offer an

<sup>1</sup> P. 288.

<sup>2</sup> The 121st and 122nd Infantry Regiments, the 1st and 7th Batteries of the 31st Artillery Brigade, the 3rd Sotnia of the 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment, and one Sapper company. (P. 36, footnote 2.)

obstinate resistance to the enemy in case of attack,<sup>1</sup> the fortifications of the position south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, which had been commenced already the day before, were continued on October 15. The position was divided into two sections: the right section, stretching from Kuan-tun village to the Mandarin Road, was occupied by the 2nd Brigade 31st Infantry Division<sup>2</sup> as well as by two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment, under General Wassiliev; in the left section, east of the Mandarin Road, was the 9th Infantry Division,<sup>3</sup> under General Gerschelmann, commanding the Division. Of the 35th Infantry Regiment two battalions, jointly with portions of the 17th Army Corps, were still fighting at La-mu-tun;<sup>4</sup> between that village and the northern portion of Scha-ho-pu, which was still being held by the 36th Infantry Regiment,<sup>5</sup> there remained only weak detachments on the right bank of the Scha-ho. To keep in touch with the 1st Army Corps, Wu-kia-tun was occupied by two sotnias of the 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment.

The Artillery of the Army Corps was moved up from Hua-schi-ho in the afternoon only. The batteries came into action south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, on both sides of the Mandarin Road, taking the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu under fire. The Japanese Artillery replied to the fire, but not vigorously.

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 283-285. It is not certain when Kuropatkin gave the order to that effect.

<sup>2</sup> The 123rd and 124th Infantry Regiments.

<sup>3</sup> Less the 35th Infantry Regiment.

<sup>4</sup> P. 282.

<sup>5</sup> Pp. 287-288

The Commander-in-Chief was standing with his Staff on the hill east of Schan-lan-tsy. He was planning an offensive for October 16, with the Western Detachment and all the reserves he had available. But to do this it was necessary for the Army to hold its present positions on the 15th. Kuropatkin therefore became very indignant when, quite unexpectedly, the 10th Army Corps reported that the General Officer Commanding was determined to evacuate the position north of the Scha-ho. This information was, however, wrong, and seems not to have emanated from General Slutshevski. The facts were the following :

General Kuropatkin decides to attack with the Western Detachment and with his reserves on October 16.

When General Slutshevski, in the morning, received from the Quartermaster-General the rather hazy intelligence "that those units of the 1st Army Corps which had captured the height of Hou-tai on October 14"<sup>1</sup> would be handed over to the 10th Army Corps, when he knew nothing about the capture of the height indicated, he charged the Commander of the 9th Infantry Division with clearing up the matter. When next a report came from Colonel Sivizki, who on October 14 had conducted the attack from Liu-tsiën-tun in a south-westerly direction under the immediate orders of Kuropatkin, that he was standing on One Tree Hill<sup>2</sup> at the disposal of the 10th Army Corps, with the 88th Infantry Regiment, 3 battalions of the

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Sivizki's troops were evidently referred to, who, on October 14, had carried out the attack from Liu-tsiën-tun in a south-westerly direction. (P. 291.) They had, however, not captured the height at Hou-tai, but had only pushed to the neighbourhood of Hou-tai-lin-tsy.

<sup>2</sup> Afterwards called Novgorod Hill.

86th Infantry Regiment, and 1 company each of the 87th Infantry Regiment and 11th Siberian Infantry Regiment, as well as with 4 batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade, a General Staff officer was dispatched to him with the order to support the left of the corps, and, should the Japanese advance to attack the 10th Army Corps, to take the enemy's right flank under Artillery fire from the height. The General Staff officer was, moreover, directed to inquire, in passing the Commander-in-Chief, whether the troops mentioned of the 1st Army Corps were actually at their entire disposal, or were charged with a special task. If on that occasion the Commander-in-Chief should inquire after the situation of the Army Corps, this officer was to report that, "having regard to the great exhaustion of the troops and their bad condition after the combats of October 14, the Army Corps was unfit for active employment on that day, but that, after the expected arrival of Mau's Detachment, the General Officer Commanding was counting on being able to maintain his position."<sup>1</sup>

But, as a matter of fact, the General Staff officer reported to the Commander-in-Chief something quite different, as can be guessed from the written reply Kuropatkin handed to the bearer :

"The officer you dispatched reported to me you were determined to evacuate the Scha-ho position.

"I direct your attention to the fact that such a step would entail the retreat of the whole Army.

<sup>1</sup> General Slutshevski insists upon having charged the officer with delivering this report.

If you have no confidence in the troops placed under your command, I recommend you to remind them by your personal example of the glory of the colours under which they are serving.

“Supported you shall be to the utmost; of retreat there can be no question!

“You have completely misled me by your report of yesterday, as I inferred from it that Scha-ho-pu had been recaptured.”<sup>1</sup>

Verbally, the Commander-in-Chief added that the 10th Army Corps was to hold its position at all cost.

The officer was further told that the detachment on One Tree Hill was now under the command of General Novikov,<sup>2</sup> and entirely at the disposal of the 10th Army Corps. On the General Staff officer expressing some doubts regarding the capture of the Hou-tai height on the day before, General Kuropatkin replied that its capture by troops of the 1st Army Corps had been reported to him; it had, moreover, been reported to him the day before, that General Gerschelmann had recaptured Scha-ho-pu,<sup>3</sup> in consequence of which he had initiated the attack, not on Scha-ho-pu, but farther south.

With the 10th Army Corps nobody knew anything about a report on Scha-ho-pu; but no

<sup>1</sup> The misunderstanding may have arisen by the General Staff officer explaining to the Commander-in-Chief where the 10th Army Corps had been standing with the main bodies on the morning of October 15. The officer probably did not mention the weak outposts in the actual Scha-ho position.

<sup>2</sup> Commanding the 1st Brigade 22nd Infantry Division.

<sup>3</sup> As a matter of fact, the portion of Scha-ho-pu north of the river was still in possession of the 10th Army Corps on October 15.

attempt was made of clearing up the matter either.<sup>1</sup>

During all that time, at Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy the action was still going on, ending with the retreat of the Russian advanced troops of the 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments to One Tree Hill, and with the occupation of Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy village, as well as the small eminence east of it, by portions of the Japanese 3rd Division.<sup>2</sup>

Although Kuropatkin had only a moment before expressly emphasised the fact that retreat was out of the question, he himself suggested to the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps a few hours afterwards to retire a little. When, in the afternoon, the evacuation of the 17th Army Corps' advanced position had become known, Kuropatkin dispatched the following letter to General Slutshevski :

“ According to reports I have received, the 17th Army Corps has retired a little. I leave it to you to retire likewise somewhat for the time being.

“ Novikov's Detachment of seven battalions and a half (of the 86th, 87th, 88th, and 11th Infantry Regiments), with artillery, will secure your left flank.

“ The height east of Schan-lan-tsy will be

<sup>1</sup> When, afterwards, the General Staff officer brought General Slutshevski's order to General Novikov on One Tree Hill, to support the left wing of the 10th Army Corps, he happened to mention also the capture of the Hou-tai height. It came to light that an error had been committed: the Russian troops who made the attack on October 14 did not capture Hou-tai Hill, but temporarily occupied a height situated farther east; it was probably the eminence north of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy.

<sup>2</sup> P. 309,

occupied, and the position on both banks of the Scha-ho entrenched, as I have directed.

“Of my General Reserve I have pushed twelve battalions to Tou-siën-tun; 22 battalions, under General Gerngross, remain at San-kia-tsy.

“With these forces I intend to make a decisive attack to-morrow.”

Only weak protective parties of the 10th Army Corps being on the Scha-ho, whilst its main bodies were holding the entrenched position south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, there was no reason for retiring farther back without being forced by the enemy. The request addressed to General Slutshevski, therefore, to go back makes it appear as if Kuropatkin was even then not yet clearly informed of how the 10th Army Corps was disposed. The Commander-in-Chief, moreover, in spite of the assurance distinctly given, that Novikov's Detachment was under the orders of the 10th Army Corps, seemed to wish to dispose of it himself, as is apparent from his remark about the flank protection and the construction of a position on both banks of the Scha-ho.

Not many changes were made in the disposition of the Russian Centre on October 15. Of the 1st Army Corps, the 37th Infantry Division remained at Örr-tau-kou, whither it had retired on October 14.<sup>1</sup> At the To-san, and adjoining east, were the two half-divisions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps;<sup>2</sup> on the left was standing Mishtshenko's Detachment,<sup>3</sup> with which was as yet the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.<sup>4</sup> These

The Russian Centre and Eastern Detachment establish themselves in positions north of the Scha-ho.

<sup>1</sup> P. 276.

<sup>2</sup> P. 249.

<sup>3</sup> P. 270.

<sup>4</sup> P. 234.

troops entrenched a continuous line, stretching from the country north-west of Örr-tau-kou over the To-san in the direction on the Tio-to-san.

The troops under General Gerngross,<sup>1</sup> dispatched by the Eastern Detachment for forming the General Reserve of the Army, arrived on October 15 at Lo-siën-tun, 2 kilometres south-west of Huan-schan. The Commander-in-Chief, who had billeted in Huan-schan, thus had at his disposal  $41\frac{1}{2}$  battalions,<sup>2</sup> with Artillery attached,<sup>3</sup> including Novikov's Detachment, standing on the heights west of Lüan-fan-tun.

The remainder of the Eastern Detachment did not continue its retreat. The 1st Brigade of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, with the battalion of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Regiment attached to it by the War Organisation, and four batteries, occupied a position on the Hou-ho,<sup>4</sup> from Tsai-kiä-tun to Kan-to-li-san; one detachment was pushed to Tso-kou. On the left, to the east, the

<sup>1</sup> P. 267.

1. 9th East Siberian Rifle Division (from 1st Siberian Army Corps) . . . . .	12	battalions.
2. 19th and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments (from 2nd Siberian Army Corps) . . . . .	6	„
3. 213th Infantry Regiment (from 5th Siberian Army Corps) . . . . .	4	„
4. Half 3rd Siberian Infantry Division (from 4th Siberian Army Corps) . . . . .	8	„
5. Novikov's Detachment (from 1st Army Corps)	$7\frac{1}{2}$	„ 4 batteries.
6. 87th Infantry Regiment (from 1st Army Corps) . . . . .	4	battalions.
Total	<u><math>41\frac{1}{2}</math></u>	<u>battalions.</u>

<sup>2</sup> It was not possible to ascertain the number of batteries in detail.

<sup>4</sup> Right tributary of the Scha-ho.

1st East Siberian Rifle Division,<sup>1</sup> from the 1st Siberian Army Corps, adjoined, its left reaching as far as east of Yin-pan. The 3rd Siberian Army Corps continued in its former position, with the main body at the Kau-tu-lin Pass, and with its rearguard on the line Schun-schui-tsy—Wan-fu-lin Pass.<sup>2</sup> Headquarters of the Eastern Detachment billeted in the Ya-ma-lin-tsy.

October 15 showed Oyama's efforts to finish the battle as quickly as possible. All was quiet already with the 1st and 4th Armies. The troops on the southern bank of the Scha-ho proceeded to entrench their positions—the 12th Division, with the 5th Kobi Brigade, south of Bian-yu-pu-sa; the Guard Division and the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division, in the neighbourhood south of Fön-kia-pu; and the 4th Army, in touch with the 1st, between Putsau-wa and Hou-tai-lin-tsy. Nor did anything of importance occur on both wings of the 2nd Army; the 3rd Division captured Tschiën-san-takan-tsy, and the 4th maintained the positions it had gained already on October 14. The 6th Division alone, now again re-united, continued its attacks on La-mu-tun, the Russian 17th Army Corps falling back before it from the Scha-ho to its position in rear, between Szö-fan-tai and Yin-kuan.

On the Russian side, October 15 may be characterised almost as a day of rest too. The portions of the Eastern Detachment which had remained under Stackelberg's orders entrenched themselves

<sup>1</sup> Less the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, being with Mishtshenko's Detachment.

<sup>2</sup> P. 267.

Result of  
October  
15.

generally on the line Kan-to-li-san—Kau-tu-lin Pass, and the Centre—half the 4th Siberian and half the 1st Army Corps—north of Fön-kia-pu. The 10th Army Corps, after its front was pierced on October 14, held the Scha-ho section with outposts only, taking up the positions of readiness south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy on October 15, with the main bodies. The 6th Siberian Army Corps, apart from Artillery fire, remained inactive opposite the Japanese 4th Division. Every one of the Western Detachment felt more and more exhausted. Yet, for all that, Kuropatkin thought this detachment still strong enough to advance with it, and, with the reserves collected at Lo-siën-tun and Tou-siën-tun, to attack on October 16.

## OCTOBER 16

The Japanese force the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy, keeping occupied the positions they had gained on October 15.

The Japanese 2nd Army, having attained the object assigned to it, of capturing the Scha-ho section La-mu-tun—Lin-schin-pu, Headquarters of the Japanese Field Army looked upon the battle as finished. Marshal Marquis Oyama seems to have given no order for October 16; but the Armies had been directed to entrench the positions occupied on October 15, and to hold them against any attacks of the enemy, thus causing all movements on the Japanese side to cease generally on the morning of October 16.

Sketch 10.

But, during the night of October 15–16, an attack was made by some Japanese forces, entailing disastrous consequences for the Japanese arms afterwards,

The 11th Brigade, having moved on October 15 from the right wing of the 2nd Army to the left wing, the 6th Division being thus re-united for the attack on La-mu-tun,<sup>1</sup> the detachment which the 5th Division had left behind at Hun-kiatshuan, under General Yamada,<sup>2</sup> was to move up to the right of the 3rd Division, thus re-establishing touch of the 2nd Army with the main body of the 4th.

The detachment had started on October 15, in the evening. The object it was to march on is said to have been a height situated south of Scha-ho-pu, east of the Mandarin Road—most likely, therefore, Hou-tai Hill. But General Yamada did not find the height indicated, and mistook for it a group of hills west of Lüan-fan-tun and Scha-ho-yan, prominent and clearly visible for some long distance in the flat country. The column therefore advanced in a direction somewhat more north-easterly, encountering, north of Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy and Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy, outposts of Novikov's Russian Detachment,<sup>3</sup> and pushing them back. The Japanese then attacked One Tree Hill,<sup>4</sup> as well as the hill east of Schanlan-tsy. General Novikov's Russian troops standing here had received orders already in the afternoon to evacuate the position, as being too salient of the line held by the 10th Army Corps, and at dusk had begun to retire across the Scha-ho.

<sup>1</sup> P. 310.

<sup>2</sup> The 41st Infantry Regiment and an Artillery Abteilung, reinforced by the 20th Kobi Regiment and two batteries of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade—altogether 5 battalions and 30 guns. (P. 240.)

<sup>3</sup> P. 325,

<sup>4</sup> Afterwards called Novgorod Hill,

Only two battalions, the detachments of Scouts from the 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments, and two batteries, were as yet standing on the heights mentioned, covering the retreat. At the moment the Japanese were making their attack, the 3rd and 4th Batteries were just being withdrawn over the river, with the help of some men of the 88th Infantry Regiment. The sudden and violent fusillade caused great confusion. But soon the noise of battle abated. About midnight all was quiet again. During the night the Russian troops, which had covered the withdrawal of the main body, remained on One Tree Hill. The main body bivouacked at Scha-ho-yan and in the trenches north of it.

On October 16, between 8 and 9 a.m., the Russian covering troops abandoned One Tree Hill, owing to a panic, it seems. The whole of Novikov's Detachment retired, under the fire of Japanese Artillery, 1 kilometre farther north at first, and ultimately to Wu-kia-tun. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 88th Infantry Regiment covered their retirement at great sacrifice, two officers and one man of the 4th Company only being unwounded. The detachment covered itself by outposts on the line Wu-kia-tun—Fu-kia-tun-kou; strength, three companies and five batteries.

General Yamada's troops at once occupied and entrenched the position captured on the heights.

For the rest, only individual units of the Japanese carried out some movements on October 16. The main forces of the 5th Division were, by Kuroki's

orders, to start from the Wai-tau-schan on October 16, to rejoin the 4th Army.<sup>1</sup> It cannot be ascertained how far the Division, which left a battalion on the Wai-tau-schan, actually got on that day.

General Prince Kan-in's 2nd Cavalry Brigade advanced to Ko-dai-rei,<sup>2</sup> in compliance with the reconnoitring duties it was charged with, but, encountering there strong Russian forces of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, withdrew again to Tschau-huan-tschai.

The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, led by General Matsunaga, which, after the action at the Tschau-hsiën-lin Pass,<sup>3</sup> had advanced to Schan-pin-tai-tsy, with the object of cutting off the Russians, but was then withdrawn, arrived at Ha-ma-tan at 2 p.m., rejoining the main body of its Division on the following day.

The 5th Division, having left behind on the Wai-tau-schan only one battalion, General Baron Kuroki dispatched thither Lieutenant-Colonel Kani<sup>4</sup> with three battalions<sup>5</sup> to give more strength to the force protecting the right flank of his Army. One regiment of the Guard Division, which had been put in motion with the same object, as well as one mountain battery,<sup>6</sup> was placed under his command. The detachment reached the neighbourhood of Tiën-liu-yu, south of the Wai-tau-schan, hearing there that the battalion of the

<sup>1</sup> P. 308.

<sup>2</sup> 18 kilometres north-east of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 230-231.

<sup>4</sup> Commanding the 29th Kobi Regiment.

<sup>5</sup> Impossible to ascertain more details.

<sup>6</sup> The mountain battery belonged to the 5th Division, and had been employed with the Guard Division.

5th Division had been pushed back by superior forces of the Russians (these were six companies from the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, belonging to the 1st Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division), and had abandoned the Wai-tau-schan. Lieutenant-Colonel Kani, however, did not make any counter-attack, but confined himself to watching the enemy.

General Umesawa's Brigade, which Oyama had detailed for his reserve, continued its march to San-kia-tsy, south-west of Scha-ho-pu.

General Kuropatkin had given his orders in conformity with his intention of making a final attempt to attack<sup>1</sup> with the newly formed General Reserve, in co-operation with the Western Detachment. The General Order is not known, but seems to have arranged for the Western Detachment to attack straight ahead generally, whilst the Commander-in-Chief intended to push with the General Reserve in a south-westerly direction. The hour for commencing the enterprise was to be communicated separately. The portions of the 1st and 4th Siberian Army Corps standing at Örr-tau-kou—the 37th Infantry Division, half the 2nd, and half the 3rd Siberian Infantry Divisions, as well as Mishtshenko's Detachment—were to hold their positions, supporting the attack by Artillery fire.

Based on the General Order, General Baron Bilderling issued his orders for the Western Detachment.<sup>2</sup> The places to be reached by the troops were fixed rather distant, probably in compliance with Kuropatkin's directives.

<sup>1</sup> P. 323.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix XIV.

The attack of the Russian Western Detachment and of the Russian Reserves does not come off. Preparations are being made for recapturing the heights east of Schanlan-tsy.

General Dembovski's Detachment, under the command of the 6th Siberian Army Corps, which could have taken advantage of its position much earlier for enveloping the enemy's left wing, was to push to Tsun-lun-yen-tun on the Scha-ho; the unnamed right tributary of the Schi-li-ho was indicated to the three corps as their objective—namely, the 6th Siberian Army Corps was to reach Tschien-liu-tan-kou; the 17th Army Corps the section Liu-tan-kou—Pan-kiau-pu; and the 10th Army Corps the section Hun-pau-schan—Nin-kuan-tun. General Grekov's Orenburg Cossack Brigade, which had last established connection between the 6th Siberian Army Corps and General Dembovski's Detachment, was to cover the right flank of the Army.

As a preliminary to the attack, a strong Artillery fire was opened at daybreak all along the front of the Western Detachment on either side of Yin-kuan. The 6th Siberian Army Corps,<sup>1</sup> on its own initiative, began to advance with some portions. General Soboliev, thinking it advisable to take possession of Wu-tschan-yin village for the future development of the attack, ordered General Bolotov, commanding the right section of the attack, to advance against that place. The place was probably but weakly occupied by the Japanese 4th Division, the right column of the 6th Siberian Army Corps succeeding, therefore, in capturing it without great loss by 11 a.m. Before continuing the attack

<sup>1</sup> The 217th Infantry Regiment, belonging to the 1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division 6th Siberian Army Corps, which had remained in the "Position of Tië-lin," joined the corps. (P. 49.)

General Soboliev waited for the order of the Western Detachment to advance, as it was to be communicated separately; but the order never came. General Dembovski's Detachment seems to have advanced a little in an easterly direction as well, but to have stopped again shortly afterwards.

The Artillery of the 17th Army Corps took under fire the Scha-ho position held by the Japanese, and the batteries of the 10th Army Corps fired from their positions south of Pa-ta-kia-tsy upon the Artillery of the Japanese 3rd Division at Hou-tai Hill; both vigorously replied to that fire. The distance intervening between the two Artilleries was 5 to 6 kilometres.

At early dawn two battalions of the 34th Infantry Regiment, from the 10th Army Corps, advanced from their position west of Wu-kia-tun across the river, occupying Schan-lan-tsy. The colonel commanding the regiment had received the order for this already the night before; by occupying Schan-lan-tsy it was intended to fill the gap between the 36th Infantry Regiment in the northern portion of Scha-ho-pu, and the 33rd Infantry Regiment in the trenches on the right bank of the river. But the order having arrived very late, the regiment had first occupied the northern portion of the village only; at daybreak the southern portion was then taken possession of. But the battalions could not stay there long; for, after General Yamada's Detachment had driven General Novikov from the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy on the morning of October 16, the Japanese

batteries directed their fire upon the village. To prevent the troops being altogether annihilated by the effective flanking fire, the colonel commanding the regiment obtained from General Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Division, permission to evacuate Schan-lan-tsy again. The battalions withdrew into the position of the 33rd Infantry Regiment north-east of the village, when Colonel Shitkovski, commanding the regiment, was wounded.

On the intelligence of General Novikov's retreat into the line Wu-kia-tun—Fu-kia-tun-kou, General Gerschelmann was afraid of losing touch with that general's detachment; he therefore ordered a low eminence at Wu-kia-tun to be occupied by the other two battalions of the 34th Infantry Regiment which had belonged to the sectional reserve. General Slutshevski, commanding the 10th Army Corps, placed, moreover, the 121st Infantry Regiment at the north-east corner of Pa-ta-kia-tsy ready, in case of need, to support the left wing of the Army Corps.

At 8.10 a.m. a note came from the Chief of the Staff of the Army, saying that Novikov's Detachment was withdrawn again from General Slutshevski's command, and placed under the orders of the General Commanding the 1st Army Corps. The detachment had been ordered by the 10th Army Corps to hold and strengthen its new position for the present, because the Commander of the Western Detachment had apparently deferred the general attack. Slutshevski had, moreover, made use of the opportunity of recalling

to his own Army Corps the two battalions of the 124th Infantry Regiment attached to Novikov's Detachment. Towards 11 a.m. the two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment detained by the 17th Army Corps<sup>1</sup> returned at last to the command of the 10th Army Corps, too, the corps being thus again completely united, excepting the Artillery Abteilung the enemy captured on October 14.<sup>2</sup>

Whilst the Artillery duel was proceeding, which both adversaries conducted with great violence, the troops of the Western Detachment were waiting in vain for the order to advance, which Kuropatkin had reserved to himself. It seems the successful night attack of General Yamada's Detachment exerted at first a paralysing influence on Kuropatkin's decisions in the morning. The Commander of the Western Detachment is said to have received at 11.15 a.m. the following communication from the Commander-in-Chief: "I do not intend carrying out the attack, considering it sufficient if the Western Detachment holds the Scha-ho line to-day." Bilderling accordingly directed his troops to remain in their positions, the attack being postponed. But inconsistent with this is a letter sent by Kuropatkin to the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps in the afternoon, containing the following:

"By whose directions has General Bilderling abandoned the attack? Don't you think it necessary to make use of the presence of my reserves for recapturing the village of Scha-ho-pu? If you prefer postponing the attack until to-

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 282-283.

<sup>2</sup> P. 279.

morrow, report to me how you intend preparing the attack by artillery fire, and whether you do not think it advisable to take hold of Schan-lan-tsy village as yet to-day, whence the attack on Schaho-pu could be prepared by common-shell batteries<sup>1</sup> from my reserve. General von Meiendorf's<sup>2</sup> task for to-day is to retake One Tree Hill, and the positions of the 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments. Support General von Meiendorf by the fire of your batteries."

Kuropatkin, nevertheless, seems still to have counted upon the Western Detachment assuming the offensive on October 16, late in the day as it was, for at 2.30 p.m. word came from the Chief of the Staff of the Army to the 10th Army Corps that the 1st Army Corps had been ordered to push to the line Tschien-san-ta-kan-tsy—Liu-tsiëntun in support of the Western Detachment's attack, and that a brigade of the General Reserve of the Army would be moved against Schan-lan-tsy village, for supporting, in case of need, the left wing of the 10th Army Corps.

But no one of the Western Detachment thought of attacking any longer; the troops did not stir in their positions.

Of the General Reserve, single batteries first, then constantly more and more batteries, had, since early morning, come into action with General Yamada's Artillery standing on One Tree Hill

<sup>1</sup> Only with the 4th Siberian Army Corps were some guns still of an old pattern firing common shell. The shrapnels of the quick-firing guns having proved ineffective against masonry, the old guns had come into prominence again in village fighting.

<sup>2</sup> General Commanding the 1st Army Corps.

and north-west of it. General Baron Meiendorf, commanding the 1st Army Corps, of whose troops the 22nd Infantry Division, as well as some other units, belonged to the General Reserve,<sup>1</sup> hearing in the morning of the loss of the height mentioned, ordered the commander of the 7th Artillery Brigade belonging to his corps, before having received any directive from Kuropatkin, to support Novikov's Detachment with 2½ battalions of the 87th Infantry Regiment, 2 batteries of his brigade, and the 2 Transbaikal Cossack batteries, in case the capture of the heights should be ordered.

But, meanwhile, General Gerngross,<sup>2</sup> commanding the 1st Siberian Army Corps, who was with the General Reserve and in command of the portions detailed by the Eastern Detachment to the General Reserve, was ordered by Kuropatkin to recapture the heights lost, with a reinforced brigade from the General Reserve, and with the 2nd Transbaikal Cossack Brigade, which was going to be placed under his command. General Gerngross detailed for that purpose the 2nd Brigade of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division under General Putilov, as well as the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, from the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division. General Baron Meiendorf then ordered General Novikov, at 11.35 a.m., to join the attack of Putilov's Brigade with the 86th, 87th, and 88th Infantry Regiments, the 1st and 5th Batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade, the 3rd and 6th Batteries of the 43rd Artillery Brigade,

<sup>1</sup> P. 291.

<sup>2</sup> P. 267.

and one Sapper Company. In addition, the 11th Siberian Infantry Regiment was to take part in the attack.

All the other tasks assigned by Kuropatkin to the Western Detachment, and to the General Reserve for October 16, were relegated to the background in favour of the imminent recapture of the lost heights.

At 4 p.m. the Commander-in-Chief informed the 10th Army Corps that the brigade of the General Reserve which was going to be moved on Schan-lan-tsy had now been detailed to attack, jointly with Novikov's Detachment, One Tree Hill; it would therefore not be available for taking part in the attack on Scha-ho-pu until that height had been re-occupied.

A General Staff officer of the 10th Army Corps, who, on this, was sent forward to find out what was going on, met the commander of the 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, belonging to Putilov's Brigade, in the position this regiment was occupying at Wu-kia-tun, learning from him that that brigade had orders to attack the knoll east of Schan-lan-tsy at dusk; and that General Novikov was going to attack One Tree Hill.

When, about that time, movements were noticed on the western slopes of the knoll east of Schan-lan-tsy, as if the Japanese were retiring, the colonel ordered his regiment to start, with the object of advancing first to the Scha-ho. Should the Japanese be actually retiring, he intended to cross the river at nightfall. He begged the 10th

Army Corps to make a move forward with its left wing in support of the attack.

On his General Staff officer's report, General Slutshevski ordered General Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Division, to support the attack of Putilov's Brigade, and to re-occupy Schan-lantsy should the attack prove successful.

When reporting these measures, the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps at the same time informed the Commander-in-Chief regarding the attack on Scha-ho-pu, that "he considered it necessary to capture first One Tree Hill, and next the villages of Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy and Tschien-tshan-lin-tsy; the attack on Scha-ho-pu and Hou-tai Hill must then be prepared by common-shell batteries from these places."

Meanwhile it was evening. For the night the 121st Infantry Regiment, standing at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, placed two battalions at the disposal of General Gerschelmann, commanding the left section of the attack, and one battalion at the disposal of General Wassiliev, commanding the right section. The left section was, moreover, reinforced by the two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment which had arrived in the forenoon.<sup>1</sup>

In the Centre, the batteries of the 37th Infantry Division, of half the 4th Siberian Army Corps, and of Mishtshenko's Detachment, kept up a brisk fire on the left wing of the Japanese 1st Army, and on the right wing of the Japanese 4th Army, both of which vigorously returned the fire.

But neither the Russians nor the Japanese seem

<sup>1</sup> P. 338

to have felt much of the effect of the Artillery duel, conducted on the whole front with great violence.

Not much was altered in the disposition of the forces with the Eastern Detachment. The 1st Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division 2nd Siberian Army Corps, whose main body was standing north-west of Kan-to-li-san, hearing that the Wai-tau-schan was occupied by but weak parties of the enemy, the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, forming probably the rearguard standing at Tso-kou,<sup>1</sup> drove the Japanese from that height, and re-occupied it.

The Russian Eastern Detachment maintains its positions north of the Scha-ho.

The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division remained in its former position, north-east of Kan-to-li-san; the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, likewise, at the Kau-tu-lin Pass; its rearguard only seems to have been withdrawn a little farther back. An attack of the Japanese 2nd Cavalry Brigade, penetrating as far as Ko-dai-rei, was repulsed after a brief action.<sup>2</sup> Rennenkampf's Detachment arrived at the Da-lin Pass.<sup>3</sup>

All had become quiet on the whole of the Japanese front. Yamada's Detachment alone pushed back some weak Russian protective parties of General Novikov's Detachment from the last Russian position, south of the Scha-ho, on the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy.

Result of October 16.

This small success of the Japanese affected the Russian Commander-in-Chief to such an extent that the grand attack of the Western Detachment and of the newly formed Reserves, planned by

<sup>1</sup> P. 328.

<sup>2</sup> P. 333.

<sup>3</sup> Sketch 1.

Kuropatkin, did not come off, but merely shrunk into preparations for the recapture of the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy.

## OCTOBER 17

The Russian troops of General Putilov push back the Japanese Detachment of General Yamada from the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy. Sketch 10.

From the events of October 16 it appeared to General Yamada as though his small detachment would be unable after all to hold for any length of time the heights it had captured east of Schan-lan-tsy. The strong Russian Artillery fire directed upon and maintained against the position for hours, as well as the enemy's masses of Infantry pushing gradually against the heights, made it clear that the Russians were bent on recapturing the position on the heights at any price. It being, further, almost impossible to count on being reinforced by own troops, General Yamada decided to abandon the heights as yet on October 16, after darkness had set in.

General Yamada had distributed his forces in this way: the 20th Kobi Regiment<sup>1</sup> was standing on the left, therefore with its main body probably on the height east of Schan-lan-tsy, and the 41st Infantry Regiment was occupying One Tree Hill; the 3rd Battalion of the 41st Infantry Regiment, and the 7th Company, with the colour, remaining concentrated in reserve. The two batteries furnished by the 1st Field Artillery Brigade were standing on the western slopes of the height behind the 20th Kobi Regiment; the Abteilung mountain-guns of the 5th Division had come into position

<sup>1</sup> At two battalions.

somewhat farther to the left, and in rear. The retreat was intended to be carried out by the Artillery moving off first, then the Kobi Regiment and the reserve battalion were to retire, the 1st and 2nd Battalions 41st Infantry Regiment finally following as rearguard. But before all the orders had been issued, and before it was possible to begin the movement, the Russians had begun to attack.

General Putilov having, at 4 p.m. on October 16, been placed in command of all the troops detailed for the attack,<sup>1</sup> got his forces ready for attack in four columns at 6 p.m. With the right column, consisting of the 2nd Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, under his personal command, he intended to attack, from Wu-kia-tun, the western height, afterwards called Putilov Hill. The centre main column, formed of the 86th, 87th, and 88th Infantry Regiments, under the command of General Novikov, was to turn from Wu-kia-tun on Scha-ho-yan, capturing One Tree Hill, afterwards called Novgorod Hill; and, to the left of this column, the centre minor column, the 11th Siberian Infantry Regiment, was to push forward from Fu-kia-tun-kou by Lüan-fan-tun. The left column, or 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, was to sweep round from Sa-ho-tun by Liu-tsiën-tun to get on the right flank and in rear of the Japanese on the Novgorod Hill. It was therefore intended to envelop Yamada's Detachment on both sides.

With the centre main column, the 87th Infantry Regiment was to attack in first line. The com-

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 340-342.

mander of the regiment therefore sent his detachments of Scouts, before 5 o'clock in the afternoon, from Wu-kia-tun to Scha-ho-yan. They succeeded in driving from that village Japanese outposts of General Yamada.

This rapid success led to the whole centre main column advancing to attack already, at 5 p.m. instead of at 6 p.m. : in first line, the 87th Infantry Regiment; in second line, three battalions of the 88th Infantry Regiment écheloned to the left, and two battalions of the 86th Infantry Regiment écheloned to the right; the reserve of the column—one battalion 88th Infantry Regiment, and two battalions 86th Infantry Regiment—remained at first in Wu-kia-tun. The first line occupied Scha-ho-yan; the second moved up; then fire was opened. The troops in the neighbourhood of the village took cover from the Japanese Artillery fire behind the walls of that place. The 88th Infantry Regiment was the first to reach the steep banks of the river, under heavy loss; many officers were disabled already. It was, nevertheless, possible to bring the regiment across the Scha-ho, which, owing to the numerous projectiles falling into it, is said to have looked as if it was boiling. Then, on the right of the 88th, the 87th Infantry Regiment, from Scha-ho-yan, gained the left bank; Colonel Rondenko, commanding the regiment, and the lieutenant-colonel were killed. In dense masses the regiment now tried to climb Novgorod Hill, the same as the neighbouring sister-regiment (88th) on its left. Four times the troops were on the point of streaming back, but were pre-

vented by their officers from doing so. At 6 p.m. the 86th Infantry Regiment, on the right of the 87th, had got at last across the river too. At the same time, the enveloping wings began to intervene as ordered, and the reserves were moving up. The 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment surrounded the left battalion of the 20th Kobi Regiment, penetrating with portions into the batteries and ammunition column standing behind the Kobi Regiment. The left company of the 10th Army Corps—the 12th of the 34th Infantry Regiment—was led away by the neighbouring skirmishers, and, likewise, took part in the attack. In the front, flanks, and rear of the Japanese a hot fire-action ensued.

General Yamada now urged an immediate retreat, charging the 41st Infantry Regiment with covering the withdrawal. Owing to the rains of the days preceding, the roads had changed into a deep mire; and, worse still, the night had grown pitch dark. The movement of all vehicles was therefore but very slow. To maintain the position of his regiment for some time longer against the overwhelming odds of the assailant, Lieutenant-Colonel Uzawa, commanding the 41st Infantry Regiment, detailed also the 3rd Battalion to reinforce the foremost fighting-line; the 7th Company, as well as one section of the 9th Company, was all that remained available as reserve. The 20th Kobi Regiment disengaged itself from the enemy with heavy loss; after a furious hand-to-hand struggle it succeeded in cutting its way through, in the direction on Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy. The com-

plete darkness, aiding it thereby, was to the disadvantage of the assailants.

On One Tree Hill, on which was the Japanese right, the situation had, meanwhile, grown from bad to worse. With the few bodies still intact, the commander of the 41st Infantry Regiment was behind the front on a small eminence, making arrangements for the retreat of the colour-company, as well as for the removal of the wounded, when he heard in his rear hot rifle-fire. By patrols, it was ascertained that the Russians—about two companies strong, probably from the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment—were close in rear of the regiment, and attacking the trains.<sup>1</sup> The commander of the regiment thereupon ordered the ensign to go back with the colour on Housan-ta-kan-tsy.

Immediately afterwards, the enemy emerged from the dark, pushing forward from behind against the small eminence. The 7th Company and the section of the 9th rushed to meet the Russians with the bayonet; the colonel and his staff joined them, swords in hand. In the hot fire-action at closest range, and in the hand-to-hand struggle, both adversaries suffered enormous losses. Lieutenant-Colonel Uzawa and the officers of his staff were killed. Ultimately, the Russians occupied the small eminence. On the noise of battle behind the front of the regiment, Major Ino-uye, with two companies of the 3rd Battalion 41st Infantry Regiment, which were just going up to reinforce the front line, hurried

<sup>1</sup> Probably first-line transport.

back again to the height on which he thought the commander of the regiment to be. When finding the enemy in possession of the height he at once deployed the companies for attack. Once more a hot struggle developed, ending almost with the annihilation of the Russians, exhausted as they were already. Portions of the 20th Kobi Regiment intervened in the action too. The remnants of the Russian troops were pushed back south, thus leaving the Japanese free to retreat south-west. After more severe losses the foremost line of the 41st Infantry Regiment succeeded in gradually evacuating the position and withdrawing in the dark. By order of Major Ino-uye, the dead bodies of the officers killed, as far as they could be recognised, were picked up and carried along. The last unit to leave One Tree Hill was the 1st Battalion, whose share it was to form the rearguard. Towards 3 o'clock in the morning, the Russians were finally able to occupy the heights. General Yamada's Detachment fell back on the Japanese 3rd Division, in the neighbourhood of Ku-kia-tsy.

The nocturnal struggle cost both adversaries heavy sacrifice. The Japanese estimate their loss at, roughly, 32 officers and 1,000 men. With the 41st Infantry Regiment, 8 officers and 322 men were killed, 9 officers and 184 men wounded. The great number of dead, in proportion to the wounded, shows how gallantly the Japanese had been fighting. The equally high losses of the 20th Kobi Regiment are not known in detail. The Japanese Artillery seems to have taken an

active share in the combat as well. Not all the batteries succeeded in limbering up and getting away in time ; nine field and four mountain guns, and one machine-gun, all intact, remained in the hands of the Russians. The two Russian guns captured by the Japanese the night before were also left behind by them on the height.

The Russian losses were still greater ; in all, they were 2,250 men, the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment alone losing about 800 men. The regiment is said to have met in the dark with some of their own troops, who opened a withering fire, believing they were facing the enemy.

Early on October 17 General Kuropatkin inspected the theatre of the nocturnal combats. With the consent of the Tsar, to whom the message of victory was conveyed by telegraph, the height fought for was named "Putilov Hill,"<sup>1</sup> after General Putilov, commanding the 2nd Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, who had directed the attack. But the Russian Army afterwards gave this name only to the height east of Schan-lan-tsy actually attacked by Putilov's Brigade, One Tree Hill being named "Novgorod Hill," after the peace garrison of the regiments engaged against that height. By order of Kuropatkin, the ridge was occupied by the Putilov Brigade, as well as by the 33rd and 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, with Artillery attached, under the command of General Gerngross. The 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments and one Sapper company were stationed in reserve

<sup>1</sup> Appendix XVI.

at the eastern foot of the height. The other troops which had shared in the attack returned to the General Reserve at San-kia-tsy.

The success gained during the night roused the spirit of enterprise of the 10th Army Corps, which had intended the recapture of Schan-lan-tsy<sup>1</sup> already on October 16. When, at daybreak, the Russian victory became known, Colonel Woltshanovski, with the 1st Brigade 9th Infantry Division and two battalions of the 121st Infantry Regiment, advanced from his position north of Schan-lan-tsy across the Scha-ho, occupying the village, and, by an offensive move against the line Scha-ho-pu—Hou-san-ta-kan-tsy, taking part in the attack of General Putilov's Brigade, which about that time was descending on the enemy's side from the height it had captured. The last-named village had been occupied already by Putilov's skirmishers; the portions of the 10th Army Corps ensconced themselves at the edge of the ravine situated north-east of Scha-ho-pu, entering into a fire-action with the Japanese holding the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu. When the General Commanding received intelligence of the successful advance of the troops of his Army Corps, and at 7 a.m. was, moreover, informed of the enemy's Artillery, standing at Scha-ho-pu, limbering up and retreating, he decided to attack the southern portion of Scha-ho-pu. The reserve of the corps was moved up to Pa-ta-kia-tsy. The troops of the left wing, which had crossed over to the southern bank of the Scha-ho, were ordered

The Russian 10th Army Corps is fighting with the Japanese 3rd Division a futile action for Scha-ho-pu.

<sup>1</sup> P. 342.

to entrench themselves in the position they had taken up, and to wait there for the general attack. The 1st Abteilung 9th Artillery Brigade, standing east of Pa-ta-kia-tsy, was directed to prepare the attack by their fire on Scha-ho-pu.

At the same time, General Gerschelmann, commanding the 9th Infantry Division, pushed two battalions of the 36th Infantry Regiment from his reserve to the northern portion of Scha-ho-pu, while charging two battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment with supporting the portions already on the left bank of the river. The colonel commanding the 35th Infantry Regiment then took command over all the troops in first line on this wing of the corps.

When, at 9.30 a.m., these arrangements had been made, the 10th Army Corps received an Order of the Commander-in-Chief to the leader of the Western Detachment, dispatched on October 16, at 11.40 p.m. The Order contained the tasks of the Army for October 17—namely, the 10th Army Corps to capture Scha-ho-pu, while the 1st Army Corps was to attack the line Scha-ho-pu—Hou-tai Hill; General Dembovski's Detachment, as well as the 6th Siberian and 17th Army Corps, to hold their positions. At the same time, to the 6th Siberian and the 10th Army Corps were handed over two mortar batteries<sup>1</sup> each and to the 17th Army Corps one,<sup>2</sup> for preparing and supporting the attack. It is not

<sup>1</sup> The 2nd East Siberian Field Mortar Battery and 1st Battery 5th Field Mortar Regiment.

<sup>2</sup> 1st East Siberian Field Mortar Battery.

known how far the Commander of the Western Detachment acted upon this Order; General Baron Bilderling, at any rate, does not seem to have issued any special orders to the 10th Army Corps.

Conforming with Kuropatkin's directive, General Dembovski's Detachment and the 6th Siberian and 17th Army Corps confined themselves to ordering their Artillery to fire on the enemy. The mortar battery attached to the 17th Army Corps went into position at Yin-kuan, taking La-mu-tun under fire. The effect was small, though the battery is said to have fired 181 shells.

With the 10th Army Corps, the portion of Scha-ho-pu south of the Scha-ho still in the hands of the enemy was to be prepared by the mortars for an assault. But the batteries apparently arrived too late for fire to be opened on the 17th.

The Japanese 3rd Division replied to the Artillery fire from Hou-tai Hill, overwhelming, especially, the Mandarin Road and the ground adjacent to it with high explosive shells. Though the whole road was covered with vehicles and troops of the Russian 10th Army Corps, and shells were falling into the Russian reserves, the actual effect was likewise very small.<sup>1</sup>

The preparation of the offensive by heavy Artillery recommended by Kuropatkin, as well as his intimation of common-shell batteries going to

<sup>1</sup> The Japanese Shimose shell took effect only close to the point of impact; a few paces distant from it there was hardly any danger. One shell, for instance, on October 17, fell right into one battalion of the 85th Infantry Regiment, between two companies lying close behind each other in column formation, without a single man being injured.

be attached to the 1st Army Corps, with the particular object of attacking Scha-ho-pu, was, for the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps, a welcome inducement for postponing his attack to the next day. Slutshevski was confirmed in his decision by the report of strong forces of the enemy advancing on Scha-ho-pu.

The troops of the 10th Army Corps on the southern bank of the river were, meanwhile, engaged in a severe and costly combat. No orders for executing the attack, nor fresh forces as reinforcement arriving, their situation grew more difficult from hour to hour. Of this, General Slutshevski, who, as on October 16, was spending all day in a trench at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, seems to have had no report, as he did not adopt any counter-measures. In the afternoon, Kuropatkin's order came for withdrawing the troops of the 10th Army Corps stationed on the southern bank of the Scha-ho, so as to give the common-shell batteries of the 1st Army Corps, which had come into position at Schan-lan-tsy, and on the Putilov Hill, the chance of bombarding Scha-ho-pu. The Commander-in-Chief himself, therefore, no longer thought of carrying through the intended attack on October 17.

General Slutshevski directed the portions of his Army Corps on the southern bank of the Scha-ho to effect the recrossing in the dark. The exhausted troops, who would have been obliged to retire, anyhow, without any orders, began the movement at night, the southern part of Schan-lan-tsy alone remaining occupied on the left bank.

In the Russian Centre, the 37th Infantry Division, the portions of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, and Mishtshenko's Detachment, remained in their positions about Örr-tau-kou. The batteries shared in the general Artillery duel.

The Russian Centre and the Eastern Detachment hold their positions. The Japanese remain south of the Scha-ho.

The Eastern Detachment retained its position at Kan-to-li-san, and at the Kau-tu-lin Pass as well.<sup>1</sup> The Wai-tau-schan remained occupied by six companies of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, by three detachments of Scouts, and by two machine-guns.

On the Japanese side, the troops completed the movements as ordered.<sup>2</sup> General Umesawa's Guard Kobi Brigade got as far as San-kia-tsy, south-east of Scha-ho Railway Station. The 5th Division seems to have joined the 4th Army,<sup>3</sup> and taken up a position on that Army's left; but no other details are known.

October 17 caused only indifferent changes in the position and distribution of both forces, exhaustion being felt generally. On the eastern part of the battlefield, where fighting had ceased already for days, individual groups, widely separated from each other, had formed on either bank of the Scha-ho, the Russians being north, and the Japanese south of that line. But on the western portion, where the battle had not yet completely died away, both adversaries were standing opposite each other at gun-shot range, in long, continuous positions, which were being entrenched. Serious actions were no longer fought on October 17; the successful recapture, during the night preceding

Result of October 17.

<sup>1</sup> P. 343.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 307-309.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 308 and 332-333.

October 17, of the Putilov and Novgorod Hills—the only success of a lasting nature the Russians had during the whole of the battle—was merely of local importance.

Marshal Marquis Oyama looked upon the battle as finished already on October 15. On the Russian side the battle had finished, as a matter of fact, too, though Kuropatkin had not yet given up completely his intentions to attack.

#### OCTOBER 18 AND THE END OF THE BATTLE

The Russians abstain from attacking on their right, remaining in position north of the Scha-ho.

During the night of October 17–18 a steady, copious rain came down, lasting till noon on October 18, softening again all roads and paths, and changing them into a mire. Under cover of this bad weather, the Japanese tried to regain possession of the lost heights. But the attack, probably made by the main body of the 5th Division, was repulsed by the Russians.<sup>1</sup>

Kuropatkin intended to carry out at last, on October 18, the offensive<sup>2</sup> he had deferred day after day. The 10th Army Corps—probably, as yet, on the evening of October 17—was ordered to get possession of Scha-ho-pu at daybreak. The reserve of the corps had therefore been standing under arms all night at Pa-ta-kia-tsy, in pouring rain. The troops were waiting, in vain, for the heavy Artillery to open the fire which was to prepare the attack thoroughly. One of the mortar batteries, however, had selected its position

<sup>1</sup> The 5th Division is said to have arrived again on the left of the 4th Army on October 17; General Yamada's Detachment belonged to that Division.

<sup>2</sup> P. 323.

in the dark so close to the enemy, that at day-break it found itself within 600 metres opposite Scha-ho-pu. It was at once overwhelmed by a rapid fire, without being able to fire even a single shot; its ammunition waggons had, moreover, stuck fast on the muddy roads.<sup>1</sup> The attack was therefore postponed again; the reserve of the corps—the 85th and 122nd Infantry Regiments—returned to its bivouacs at Tschan-kia-pu-tsy. Soon afterwards an order of Kuropatkin's arrived, fixing the commencement of the attack for 3 p.m. But on General Slutshevski reporting that his reduced and exhausted troops, without a previous thorough rest, were not in a position to carry out an attack with any hope of success at all, Kuropatkin yielded, withdrawing the order. He resolved to defer the attack for a few days, to grant the troops some rest during that time, and to prepare the attack by Artillery. The positions occupied by the troops were to be held and fortified. The order having been issued to that effect, the troops at once began to entrench. Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps went to Hua-schi-ho towards evening.

With the 17th Army Corps, the 1st East Siberian Field Mortar Battery had taken under fire Lin-schin-pu, but without result on this day too, the Japanese being not induced to evacuate that village. On Kuropatkin's order coming in to strengthen the positions occupied, the troops began to establish themselves on the line Szö-fan-

<sup>1</sup> The locality and employment of the other mortar batteries are not known.

tai—Yin-kuan—country north of Wan-tië-ku-  
kia-tsy.

The 6th Siberian Army Corps and General Dembovski's Detachment, probably by a separate order, disengaged themselves without difficulty from their opponent. The former took post on the right of the 17th Army Corps between Kuan-lin-pu and Szö-fan-tai; General Dembovski's Detachment was withdrawn behind it to the neighbourhood of Siau-su-kia-pu.

No material changes occurred in the disposition of the Centre and Eastern Detachment on October 18.

On the morning of October 19 a wire from the Commander-in-Chief was received by the General Officers Commanding, ordering the troops to set to work at once constructing pivots, with overhead cover, obstacles, etc. These measures were meant to give the Army the chance of holding its positions for some time. The intention of resuming the offensive within a limited time was expressed in a General Order<sup>1</sup> made known to the troops in the forenoon. This Order at the same time testifies to the imperturbable optimism the Commander-in-Chief was imbued with. Side by side with a partly exaggerated estimate of the enemy's forces, Kuropatkin pointed to the alleged deplorable state of the Japanese Army: the Japanese had incurred enormous losses, and were suffering from want of supplies and from the cold of the nights; their defeat at Putilov Hill, where three regiments had been completely

<sup>1</sup> Appendix XV

annihilated, had caused the utmost consternation and depression in their ranks. "We must wish the Japanese some more of these lessons," concludes Kuropatkin; "we are already somewhat superior in numbers; we are more experienced in the conduct of an action. We must take advantage of the defeat we have inflicted on them. The troops must be made clearly to understand that fresh and vigorous efforts are necessary for the relief of Port Arthur; that no time must be left to the enemy for reinforcing himself and making good his losses."

The Order produced but a faint impression on the troops; not much weight was attached to the vague announcement of continuing the offensive. The physical and psychological exhaustion of every one was so great as to produce merely a general craving for rest. Nor did Kuropatkin return any more to his intention of "leaving no time to the enemy"; he probably became aware of the Army, in its present condition, being unable to deliver any decisive blows. The idea for the offensive faded more and more out of sight, being for the next month finally abandoned altogether.

The Army had meanwhile begun consolidating its position. On the right, the main position of the Western Detachment stretched from Kuan-lin-pu by Ku-kia-tsy—Szö-fan-tai—Kuan-tun to the northern part of Schan-lan-tsy. General Dembovski's Detachment, by its position behind the right wing of the 6th Siberian Army Corps at Siau-su-kia-pu, was securing the right flank

Positions  
of the  
Russian  
Army  
from  
October  
19.

Sketch 11.

of the Army. Facing the Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade were Cossacks, probably from General Grekov's Detachment and from the 4th Don Cossack Division,<sup>1</sup> who, in continuation of the advanced troops of the 6th Siberian Army Corps, entrenched a position.<sup>2</sup> At Schan-lan-tsy the Western Detachment was in touch with General Gerngross's Detachment, which was in occupation of Putilov and Novgorod Hills. East of Lüan-fan-tun, in the neighbourhood of Örr-tau-kou, was the position of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, which was rejoined by half the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division on October 26; this latter had moved to Lo-siën-tun and San-kia-tsy on October 14, forming part of Kuropatkin's General Reserve.<sup>3</sup> The 1st Army Corps was to form the reserve of the Army, in addition to the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, standing as yet at Lo-siën-tun, but was rather scattered within the space Ta-san-pu<sup>4</sup>—Huan-kia-tun<sup>5</sup>—Liu-tsiën-tun—Lüan-fan-tun. The 85th Infantry Regiment, with the battery attached to it from the 7th Artillery Brigade, was still with the 10th Army Corps;<sup>6</sup> and the 146th Infantry Regiment, with one battery from the 43rd Artillery Brigade, was in the position held by the 4th Siberian Army Corps.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The 4th Don Cossack Division began to arrive in Mukden on October 20, being placed under the command of the 6th Siberian Army Corps.

<sup>2</sup> Sketch 11 only indicates the general line of the position.

<sup>3</sup> P. 292.

<sup>4</sup> 2 kilometres north-west of Huan-schan.

<sup>5</sup> 3 kilometres south of Huan-schan.

<sup>6</sup> P. 321.

<sup>7</sup> P. 138.

Corps Headquarters was billeted in Ta-san-pu.<sup>1</sup>

Mishtshenko's Detachment, including the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, seems to have gone forward to the Scha-ho, and to have taken up a position at Fön-kia-pu; it was charged with keeping connection between the 4th Siberian Army Corps and Stackelberg's Detachment.

The Eastern Detachment made some few more changes in the distribution of its forces. The position north-west of Kan-to-li-san held by the 1st Brigade 5th East Siberian Rifle Division being too extended for that force, two regiments of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division<sup>2</sup> were handed over to it; these had been making a reconnaissance in force in a south-westerly direction, by order of Stackelberg, but had returned without having met the enemy. On General Sassulitsh<sup>3</sup> reporting, however, on October 19 that

<sup>1</sup> The disposition of the 1st Army Corps on October 20 was, in detail, as follows: Of the 22nd Infantry Division were standing in Lüan-fan-tun, as reserve for General Gerngross's Detachment, Divisional Headquarters, the 86th and 88th Infantry Regiments, five batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade, and one Sapper Company; the 85th Infantry Regiment and one battery were with the 10th Army Corps; the 87th Infantry Regiment was stationed behind the 4th Siberian Army Corps on the road to Huan-schan. Of the 37th Infantry Division, the Staff, the 145th and 148th Infantry Regiments, as well as the 43rd Artillery Brigade (less one battery) and one Sapper company, were at San-kia-tsy; of the 147th Infantry Regiment, two battalions were at Sa-ho-tun, two being pushed to Liu-tsiën-tuu; the 146th Infantry Regiment, with one battery, was with the 4th Siberian Army Corps. The 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment and the 3rd Transbaikal Cossack Battery were in Ta-san-pu. The position of the 2nd Transbaikal Cossack Battery, as well as of the company missing from the Sapper battalion, cannot be traced.

<sup>2</sup> The 1st and 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments.

<sup>3</sup> General Commanding the 2nd Siberian Army Corps.

the forces at his disposal were insufficient for occupying the whole of the position at Kan-to-li-san, because it had meanwhile been still further prolonged in a north-westerly direction to the neighbourhood of Liu-tschen-ku-tun, the 6th and 7th Siberian Infantry Regiments, from the 4th Siberian Army Corps,<sup>1</sup> were placed, a few days afterwards, under the orders of General Sassulitsh as well.

The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division at first retained its position east of Kan-to-li-san; but on October 24 it was moved, by Kuropatkin's orders, in a north-westerly direction. The Division marched in two nights by Örr-tau-kou—Huan-schan to Siau-tschan-örr-tun, 5 kilometres north of Putilov Hill, and to Tou-siën-tun.<sup>2</sup> The 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, of which only the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had shared in the attack on One Tree Hill, being still at Lo-siën-tun, the 1st Siberian Army Corps was again united towards the end of October.<sup>3</sup> Corps Headquarters billeted in Fu-kia-tun-kou. The position the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division had abandoned was occupied by five battalions from the 6th and 7th Siberian Infantry Regiments.

The 3rd Siberian Army Corps remained as it was before, forming an entrenched position on the

<sup>1</sup> They had been attached to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. (War Organisation Appendix I.)

<sup>2</sup> The 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment returned to its Division on October 27.

<sup>3</sup> The 1st and 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiments, which Stackelberg had placed under the orders of Sassulitsh on October 18, seem to have joined in the march.

line Fan-schön—Kau-tu-lin Pass. Three Infantry regiments of this Corps are said to have moved to Yin-pan, 1·5 kilometres north-east of Kan-to-li-san, to form the reserve of the Eastern Detachment. Corps Headquarters billeted in Schan-ha-lin-tsy, and General Baron Stackelberg, on October 20, in Kan-to-li-san.

Kuropatkin's Headquarters was in Huan-schan.

All along the front, the troops were actively engaged in consolidating their positions. By means of groups of fire-trenches, batteries, and fortified localities, entrenchments grew up, gradually attaining powerful defensive capabilities, through the great amount of labour spent on them. Putilov Hill was particularly strongly fortified. Some localities, like Liu-tsiën-tun—Sa-ho-tun, in the section of the 1st Army Corps, were almost changed into small fortresses, by the clay walls of the farms and buildings being prepared for defence, by deep trenches being dug in front of them and connected with the localities by communicating trenches, and by surrounding the whole position with a thick belt of obstacles, like military pits, abattis, and wire entanglements. The fire-trenches, being generally well adapted to the ground, were mostly narrow, and sunk into the ground almost 6 feet deep. They were often covered against Artillery fire by roofs formed of doors, tops of tables, window-frames, or planks, which, again, were covered by straw mats on which earth was piled. In a similar way were also constructed the trenches for the gun-detachments.

Positions  
of the  
Japanese  
after the  
battle.

After the futile attempts of recapturing Putilov Hill, the offensive power of the Japanese was also spent. Marshal Marquis Oyama had, moreover, declared already on October 14 that he wished to end the battle. The 1st and 4th Armies had therefore on that day already begun to entrench the positions occupied by them. On October 16 the 2nd Army began to entrench as well.

The actual positions of the 1st Army immediately after the battle cannot be exactly traced. The 12th Division, with the 5th Kobi Brigade, was still in the country south of Bian-yu-pu-sa; it had constructed a very extensive position stretching from the Schin-hai-lin Pass, west, some few kilometres beyond Schan-pin-tai-tsy. The Guards and the 2nd Division had evacuated the heights they had recently been occupying south of Fön-kia-pu and had somewhat retired; the line now occupied by them probably extended from the country east of the Eastern San-jo-shi-san over the Ba-ji-san to the Sen-san.

On the Sei-ko-san was the right of the 4th Army, whose position ran by Pu-tsau-wa to the heights north of Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy. The entrenchments were occupied by the 10th Division, with the exception of a small portion on the left, where Kobi troops were standing. The main body of the Kobi troops, probably under the uniform command of General Uchiyama,<sup>1</sup> was quartered within the space Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy—Hou- and Tschien-huan-hua-tiën. The 5th Division, Marshal Marquis Oyama again retained at his own disposal,

<sup>1</sup> Commanding the 1st Field Artillery Brigade.

ordering it to move to Schi-li-ho.<sup>1</sup> Headquarters of the 4th Army was in Ta-kou, north-west of the San-kai-seki-san. The position of the 2nd Army stretched from Hou-tai-lin-tsy by Ku-kiatsy—Hou-tai Hill—La-mu-tun—Lin-schin-pu—Tschan-lin-pu to Wan-tschuan-tsy. Adjoining on its left were the outposts of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which extended by Fu-kiatschuan-tsy to Han-schan-tai, thus making the position of the 2nd Army 25 kilometres long. It was probably owing to the futile attempts of recapturing Putilov Hill that General Headquarters ordered the evacuation of Scha-ho-pu, which could be permanently enfiladed from the hill named. The troops of the 3rd Division garrisoning Scha-ho-pu withdrew therefore to Hou-tai Hill during the night October 19–20. When, at noon on October 20, the abandonment of that village became known on the Russian side, General Slutshevski at once ordered the village to be re-occupied. The withdrawal of the Japanese was looked upon as a fresh sign of the demoralisation affecting the Japanese Army.

The Japanese, too, took great pains in consolidating their positions. The great amount of wood available in the numerous villages made it possible to provide the trenches and Artillery positions with the requisite structures, like casemates, ammunition chambers, and overhead cover, and to construct extensive obstacles. The Russians having, as usual, constructed, mostly, several defensive lines

<sup>1</sup> Instead of it, the Guard Kobi Brigade was again placed under the orders of the 1st Army.

in advance of each other, and the Japanese having covered various sections of defence by fortified advanced outpost positions, both adversaries were at some places lying opposite each other, within a stone's throw. The consequence was that both parties had a most trying time on outpost duty, especially at the beginning, when skirmishes were frequent, though ending mostly without any tangible result. Both opponents, moreover, tried to disturb each other from time to time in their entrenching operations by fire from heavy and light guns. But there was no longer any serious fighting; the 1st Army alone had one more action of some importance to record.

Because General Baron Kuroki felt it annoying for the Russians to be in occupation of the Wai-tau-schan, on the left bank of the Scha-ho, at such comparatively close distance opposite the position of his Army,<sup>1</sup> he ordered General Umesawa, on October 26, to recapture that height. Covered by the Artillery fire of the Guard Division, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Guard Kobi Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 39th Kobi Regiment deployed, at 8 a.m. on October 27, in the valley of Tia-tun-nan-kou, and attacked the Wai-tau-schan, while the main body of the Guard Kobi Brigade was standing as reserve in the valley west of that height. The attack of the two Kobi Regiments, made under the eyes of numerous representatives of foreign nations, met with an obstinate resistance on the part of the Russian garrison.<sup>2</sup> It was not till 4 o'clock in the

<sup>1</sup> P. 343.

<sup>2</sup> P. 355.

afternoon that the height was finally in the hands of the Japanese, who lost 12 officers and 190 men, dead or wounded. The Russians, under the orders of Colonel Lipovaz-Popovitsh, had been obliged to fight unsupported by any Artillery; the firing-lines, apart from the losses, were weakened by many of the men, without authority, insisting on helping to carry away the wounded. The losses were very considerable; they are said to have been 426 men; all the officers except two were wounded. The Russians, in their retreat on the main position, left about 30 dead behind; in addition, both machine-guns fell into the hands of the victors.

A counter-attack, attempted by the Russians in the night of October 28-29, and preceded by a strong Artillery fire directed against the Wai-tau-schan on October 28, failed. The Japanese remained in possession of the height, but did not prevent the Russian outposts from establishing themselves on the left bank of the Scha-ho, north-east of the Wai-tau-schan and Tsio-tso-schan.

The fortified position was now advanced to the Wai-tau-schan, and occupied by the Guard Division. The Guard Kobi Brigade was withdrawn behind the front to Man-hua-pu—Pa-kiatsy.

Both adversaries stood opposite each other, in the positions indicated, for three months, mostly inactive.

The Russians awaited the arrival of the reinforcements mobilising at home, and the Japanese the fall of Port Arthur, with the object of hurrying

up the besieging Army for the final decisive battle.

It was not until the middle of January, 1905, after the surrender of Port Arthur, that Kuropatkin felt strong enough for renewing the offensive; he hoped to beat the Japanese decisively before General Baron Nogi's Army could make its appearance on the battlefield.

#### TOTAL LOSSES FROM OCTOBER 5 TO 20

##### (a) *Russians*

Dead . . . . .	187	Officers . . . . .	4,964	Men.
Wounded . . . . .	854	„ . . . . .	31,002	„
Missing <sup>1</sup> . . . . .	5,638	Officers and Men.		
Total . . . . .	<u>42,645</u>	Officers and Men.		

<sup>1</sup> Most of the missing may be counted as dead.

##### (b) *Japanese*

Reliable statements are wanting in detail. Total loss, roughly, 20,000 all told.

The Japanese captured 46 guns, 1 machine-gun, 37 ammunition waggons, 5,474 rifles, and, in addition, entrenching tools, tents, and clothing.

## COMMENTS

AFTER the unfortunate battle of Liao-yan the Russians. Russian Army regained its freedom of action by an able retreat, and by completely disengaging itself from the enemy. There is no need for arguing the point that this advantage of the situation, after reorganising and reinforcing the Army, left no other course open than to attack the enemy, who remained on the Tai-tsy-ho, apparently inactive and weakened. That not all the General Officers Commanding agreed with the good reasons the Commander-in-Chief urged in favour of attack showed already before the battle how little impressed the Russian Commanders were with offensive ideas. The open and noisy manner in which Kuropatkin pursued his preparations for the attack made, however, every one expect that he at least was thoroughly imbued with the firm will to act, and with the conviction of doing the right thing by what he had resolved. But, then, he certainly forgot the precaution we must practise in war, of hiding from the adversary one's own plans. It could not, and ought not to, have been unknown to the Russians that they were surrounded by spies who secretly informed the enemy

of all that was worth knowing. The Russian unconcern was in strong contrast with the scrupulousness with which the Japanese used to guard the secrets of their intentions.<sup>1</sup>

General Kuropatkin followed the principle derived from military history, that, in attack, a blow directed on the flank or the rear of the enemy offers the best chances for victory. There was, indeed, the possibility of gaining the flanks of the Japanese, though not their rear. From what was known of the Japanese, their outpost position stretched from San-de-pu on the Hun-ho to the country east of Bian-yu-pu-sa ; the main body was behind the centre, and two Divisions were behind each of the two wings.<sup>2</sup> The left wing, it seemed, was leaning on the Hun-ho, and the right was without support. This offered a chance of successfully enveloping the right wing. But against it could be raised weighty objections. It would be

<sup>1</sup> The carelessness in the handling of things which it is absolutely necessary to keep secret is a fault to be frequently noticed with the Russians. In the "Memoirs from the Life of the Imperial Russian General of Infantry Carl Friedrich Graf von Toll," Bernhardt recounts the following incident: "In 1812, a few weeks before the battle of Borodino, some papers were captured during a village fight in the quarters of the French General Sebastiani. Among them was an Order of the Day, in which Murat was informing General Sebastiani of the Russians being on the point of marching with all their forces on Rudnia, and requesting him to withdraw on the Infantry. On the Russian side they were astonished at finding the enemy so well informed, treason being suspected. But afterwards it was found out that an equerry of the Emperor had heard the Russian plan of attack being discussed in the open street among young officers of General Headquarters in Smolensk. He hastened to warn his mother, who was living in the country whereabout the operations were in progress, by a letter written in French ; and Murat being quartered in the house of the lady, the information came as straight as it could be to the right man."

<sup>2</sup> Appendix IX.

necessary to make the envelopment in a mountainous country, of which there were only defective maps or none at all, where the movement of troops would meet with many difficulties, where the display of Russian superiority might be hampered, and where everything favoured the defence. Hitherto the Japanese had proved far superior to the Russians in the conduct of mountain warfare ; it was therefore to be expected that, when forced to retire, the Japanese would give way only inch by inch, defending in their retreat every new height and every fresh section of ground with the utmost obstinacy. The Russians could hope for a really decisive result only if they succeeded in pushing the enemy from the railway line Charbin—Port Arthur, which, for the Japanese, as well as for the Russians, was the all-important line of communication to the rear. But this was hardly possible by enveloping the enemy's right wing ; from the neighbourhood of Bian-yu-pu-sa and Pensi-hu to Liao-yan is a long distance, and it was not likely that the Japanese could be denied an orderly retreat along the railway line. These objections therefore point to an envelopment of the enemy's left wing. This would have been carried out in the plain, would have allowed a full use of superior forces, and would have severed the Japanese from the railway with greater certainty. The operations in the open country could have been veiled by 143 squadrons or sotnias. The support the Hun-ho gave to the enemy's left wing was only an imaginary one,<sup>1</sup> and if it had been

<sup>1</sup> Sketch 1.

a support, as the Russians were bound to assume, there would have been hardly any objection of pushing enveloping troops to the western bank of the Hun-ho, and dividing the forces by this watercourse, the river here forming no material obstacle.

We do not know what considerations decided Kuropatkin to envelop the Japanese right wing. Perhaps the fact finally settled the matter that this unsupported wing was already overlapped by the disposition of the Russian forces, which were extending far to the east. There is no doubt that success could have been achieved by the plan adopted, if only the enveloping attack had been conducted with circumspection and energy, after once the Russians had deprived themselves of the advantage of surprise.

But they did not act with circumspection; they rather acted with too much caution, energy being replaced by a hesitating mode of procedure, which has nothing in common with the *sine quâ non* of success, nothing in common with the firm confidence in the performances of commanders and troops, and nothing in common with the imperturbable will to conquer.

The distribution of the forces alone for the attack makes it clear that Kuropatkin was more bent upon guarding himself against reverses than securing success at all cost. Of the eight Army Corps available on the spot, not less than three were retained by the Commander-in-Chief at his own disposal, one of these corps being used in securing the rear. Although these three Army

Corps, as well as other detachments, with the exception of far-distant flank-guards, ultimately took a share in the battle, yet the numbers allotted to the main fighting groups, viz. the Eastern and Western Detachments, were insufficient from the outset. Especially for the Eastern Detachment, which was meant to bring about the decision by its enveloping attack in the mountains, it was not possible to be too strong. It had to be reckoned with that the enemy would oppose a fresh front to the enveloping force, perhaps on the line Pen-si-hu—Bian-yu-pu-sa; that front it would have been necessary to pierce, or to turn on the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho if required, and it was then necessary to carry the attack farther in the direction on Liao-yan.

For his difficult task General Baron Stackelberg disposed in all about three Army Corps,<sup>1</sup> which were obliged to extend over a space of 30 kilometres' length. The Western Detachment was to advance in front on both sides of the railway, with the object of engaging the enemy's main body and pinning it to the ground, while farther in the east the decision was maturing and brought to an issue. The two Army Corps of the Western Detachment were faced by the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies in superior strength, necessitating very soon afterwards fresh forces to be brought up to the Western Detachment for repelling the hostile attacks. By placing his

<sup>1</sup> The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division and *Rennenkampf's* Detachment together were about the size of an Army Corps. In addition, there was the Siberian Cossack Division.

General Reserve behind the centre of the whole battle-front, Kuropatkin had, from the outset, kept in view the contingency of having to close with it the gap existing already between the Eastern and Western Detachments at the beginning of the movements, and increasing as operations proceeded. He thereby interpolated between the two main fighting groups another group, never uniformly commanded, and, although badly wanted in the front line, yet reluctantly used as reserve after all. An allotment of the General Reserve to the Eastern and Western Detachments would have strengthened them for their task and made matters clearer; the 6th Siberian Army Corps would have sufficed as General Reserve for the Army. The fighting power of an Army Corps is great enough for the Commander-in-Chief to ensure his influence on the course of the battle at the spot where he desires that influence to be felt. True, the 6th Siberian Army Corps was not complete; one brigade had remained behind at Tië-lin and Mukden, to occupy the positions there. The Russians were still far from adhering to the principle of staking for final decision everything, even the very last man.

But the mistake in the allotment of the forces might have been made good during the battle, if only the attack had been carried through with the utmost energy. It was then the Commander-in-Chief himself who, by his directive for the advance,<sup>1</sup> paralysed the undoubted longing of his soldiers for closing with the enemy. The object

<sup>1</sup> Appendix IX.

of the advance was the defeat of the enemy ; but he gave it as the task of his Army "to take possession of the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho first." The Western Detachment ought to have attacked the enemy in front, the same as Prince Friedrich Karl's Army did attack the Austrian front on the Bistritz on July 3 of 1866. But in the task assigned to the Western Detachment there was no mention made of attack ; merely a slow advance from position to position by short marches was prescribed to it, which did not bring it in touch with the enemy, even after a two days' march. For the Eastern Detachment it was a question of bringing rapidly against the enemy's right flank as strong a force as possible, the remainder, meanwhile, gripping the Japanese right wing in front ; true, it was charged with attacking the enemy in front and on the right flank, but the start necessary in the difficult mountainous country to be traversed by it was denied to the detachment. The points to be reached by it were on the same level as those of the Western Detachment, far away from the enemy's front, and farther still from his right flank. It was first to capture the Japanese position projecting north at Bian-yu-pu-sa, in front of which the whole of the Eastern Detachment therefore stopped. Against the right flank of the Japanese was sent, alone, across the Tai-tsy-ho, on the line Mi-tsy—Siao-syr, Rennenkampf's Detachment, less than a division strong, and far too weak in comparison with the forces engaged in front.

It was certainly justifiable in itself when General

Kuropatkin prescribed certain objects to be reached by his troops before they were in touch with the enemy, so as to harmonise their advance; but it was out of place to give this first move against the enemy the impress of an over-cautious, nay almost timid, operation. Where did come in the self-consciousness, the assurance, and the eagerness to accomplish great feats, with which the commander of an army proceeding to attack must be animated? Cautious and reserved as the Commander-in-Chief was, his subordinate commanders were not less so, especially the Commander of the Eastern Detachment, General Baron Stackelberg, who had dissuaded General Kuropatkin from attacking, and had advised him to wait.<sup>1</sup> On October 7, when, with greater expedition of the advance, the attack of the Western, as well as of the Eastern, Detachment could have commenced, Stackelberg—probably by superior orders—interposed a day of rest not justified by anything; he therefore did not attack the enemy's position at Bian-yu-pu-sa, but rather allowed the enemy to escape thence, and even on October 8 advanced only by quite short marches, without reaching the enemy. To prepare the envelopment, he sent ahead, in a southerly direction, a Division, which was approaching Rennenkampf's Detachment. Yet even the idea of envelopment had much of its wings already clipped. Rennenkampf's original direction of advance towards the line Mi-tsy—Siao-syr would have almost led him into the enemy's rear on the southern bank of the

<sup>1</sup> P. 14.

Tai-tsy-ho. But this seemed too bold ; he was recalled to San-kia tsy, on the northern bank ; here he was certainly still on the flank, but the portions of the Eastern Detachment next to him he pushed towards the enemy's front, causing him afterwards to execute the decisive flank attack, chiefly by himself alone.

The Western Detachment made as little progress on October 7 and 8 as the Eastern Detachment. Here it was an exaggerated report of very strong hostile forces being at Yen-tai which destroyed every trace of offensive spirit that was still alive, replacing it by the idea that all that was wanted was repelling the superior attack of the Japanese in the three positions prepared behind each other ; here the appreciation of the situation, afterwards adopted by Kuropatkin, too, asserted itself, that there was no need for the Western Detachment to attack at all until the Eastern Detachment's decisive operations had become effective. By this they failed to recognise the principle that pinning the enemy to his ground in front is the first condition for successfully enveloping one or the other of his flanks. It is true, it was not till October 13, after they had become certain of being superior to the Western Detachment, that the Japanese dispatched a portion of their western wing (5th Division) in support of their 1st Army ; but it was not permissible for the Russians to count upon the enemy acting in this manner. It was to be presumed that the Japanese would endeavour to transfer forces as strong as possible in support of their more seriously threatened right wing ;

accordingly, it was the duty of the Western Detachment to attract upon itself as many forces as possible by its attack. If it suffered a reverse, there were sufficient reserves available to support it in the entrenched positions.

When, on October 9, the Russian Eastern Detachment began to attack in earnest, contrary to Kuropatkin's wish, success was still possible. The Japanese right wing, against which the envelopment was directed, was extremely weak. Between the Tai-tsy-ho at Pen-si-hu and the Tumen-tsy-lin Pass about seven Japanese battalions, with one battery,<sup>1</sup> were standing, on a front more than 20 kilometres long, in a mountainous position undoubtedly rather strong; the short flank east of Pen-si-hu, refused towards the south, was originally defended by but three companies. Stackelberg could not know that the enemy was so weak; but, in spite of this ignorance, it would have been advisable to give the attacking troops more distant objects than was done on October 9. "If we wish to attack, we must do so with determination. Half-measures are out of place; vigour and confidence alone carry the troops away and assure success."<sup>2</sup> The day had no results to show; only on the enemy's right flank some small progress was made by Rennenkampf's Detachment, whose attack did not agree with Stackelberg's intentions. This should have been a hint

<sup>1</sup> Six battalions of the Guard Kobi Brigade, three companies of Lines-of-Communication troops, one Pioneer company, and one battery.

<sup>2</sup> From "Instructions to Superior Commanders" ("Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer"), of June 24, 1869.

where the strongest lever was to be applied next day. Kuropatkin, too, recommended, on October 9, in the evening, an enveloping movement with the left wing along the Tai-tsy-ho. But Stackelberg, becoming doubtful, owing to the strong positions of the enemy and the repeated reminder of the Commander-in-Chief to be cautious, did not continue the attack on October 10, thus taking the fatal step leading to failure. The advantages gained were lost again on October 10; the Japanese found time to reinforce their right wing by one Division. Their position was therefore a little improved when Stackelberg carried out the attack on October 11.

It was in accordance with Russian custom, when he retained a very strong reserve—more than a Division—behind the centre of the Eastern Detachment; but it cannot be approved that he did not stake it even in the afternoon, when he ordered his troops, which had been fighting hitherto without success, to deliver the final desperate blow. A reserve is never provided for its own sake, but must be engaged to the last man when the struggle for the mastery demands it. If on October 11 the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, in touch with Rennenkampf's Detachment, had attacked on the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho, thus completing the envelopment of the Japanese right wing, the Eastern Detachment would probably have been the victor, and the Russians, pushing by Pensi-hu on Liao-yan, would have seriously menaced the Japanese fighting in front. Yet it might have been possible to pierce even the front of the

Japanese right wing, if the Division had been employed more promptly and judiciously, for the defenders were still far inferior to the assailants, and near the end of their resources, with the positions quite thinly occupied.

October 11 thus became a failure of the Eastern Detachment, and, worse, the fundamental idea of the Russian operations, to decide the battle by the enveloping attack of Stackelberg's troops, was wrecked. On the evening of October 11, Stackelberg found himself being threatened on his right flank, owing to the 4th Siberian Army Corps, adjoining on his right, intending to fall back a little during the night before the Japanese Guard Division. His resolve to discontinue the attack now altogether can hardly be justified. He knew the Commander-in-Chief had reserves available; he could therefore ask him to look after the safety of the Eastern Detachment's right flank; he himself ought to have tried with every possible means to accomplish on October 12 the task he had failed to solve on October 11. But having once thwarted the Commander-in-Chief's plan, he should in no case have left him in ignorance of it for such a long time as he afterwards did. The excessive anxiety for the flanks was, moreover, peculiar to most of the Russian commanders; Rennenkampf, Liubavin, and Samsonov, too, succumbed to it in the actions east of Pen-si-hu. Nothing can more illustrate this anxiety than the employment of Stackelberg's reserve, which, on October 11 or 12, might have decided the day on the left wing by enveloping the enemy's right wing, but on

October 12 was standing as a flank-protection behind his own right wing, where never a flank attack was made by Japanese forces really worth mentioning.

The Eastern Detachment having once given up the attack, the Russians were then actually fighting merely to ensure their retreat. The Western Detachment had allowed itself to be forced on the defensive from the outset, it is true ; but this did not prevent the offensive being resumed at the proper moment. At first the Japanese left wing proved superior to the Western Detachment ; but when, by October 11, the 1st (European) and the 4th Siberian Army Corps had marched into line with it on the east, and the 6th Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detachment had been placed in readiness behind its right wing, the forces were at least equal, and the troops retained on the right wing offered the means of attacking and enveloping the left wing of the Japanese engaged opposite the front of the Western Detachment and of the Centre. But in spite of this equality in numbers, the Japanese had already gained a moral superiority on October 11. The tentative and hesitating advance of the Western Detachment, the construction of several entrenched positions behind each other (although the talk was previously of attack), and a series of small successes by the enemy against the Russian advanced detachments on October 10—all this served to depress officers and men. To this must be added the fatal view that the Eastern Detachment alone was to carry out the main task. In this way, on

October 11, and on the days following, it was omitted to strike a great blow and regain again the initiative. Especially remarkable is the constant omission of recognising the possibility of enveloping the Japanese left wing. Neither Kuropatkin, nor Bilderling, commanding the Western Detachment, ever gave the slightest thought to employing the 6th Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detachment with that view. Nothing could be hoped from the initiative of the General Commanding the 6th Siberian Army Corps after Kuropatkin, during the night of October 9-10, had certainly given him permission to support the Western Detachment, but with the additional remark, "Remember that you are forming my strategic reserve!" With this remark all idea for bold and decisive action was nipped in the bud.

All that Kuropatkin did from October 11 for conducting the battle on the western wing were small and indifferent measures adapted to meet momentary tactical wants. On October 11 he ordered the Western Detachment to recapture the positions lost on October 10. Nothing came of it; but the Japanese on that day successfully advanced against the front of the Centre and of the Western Detachment. On October 12 he decided to withdraw the advanced guards of the 10th and 17th Army Corps in the main positions; but it was already too late for that. The advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps was enveloped on the Scha-ho by the Japanese 2nd Army, the whole corps being pushed behind the Scha-ho; the 10th Army Corps was of necessity

forced to join in this retrograde movement. The envelopment was made scarcely half a day's march distant from the main bodies of the 6th Siberian Army Corps and of Dembovski's Detachment, who remained inactive. How was it possible that the Commander-in-Chief did not make use of these reserves to prevent the Western Detachment being defeated? It may be explained, but not excused, by the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the Russian Centre on October 12, which drew his attention entirely away from the right wing. The Japanese 1st Guard Brigade had pushed between the Centre and Eastern Detachment as far as the Ba-ji-san; it must be conceded that such a penetration, although mostly highly dangerous to the penetrating troops themselves, is certainly apt to cause the leader of the affected party great anxiety. It is intelligible that Kuropatkin should have turned his attention thither and looked for fresh forces to meet the danger in the Centre; but for the means of warding off the danger he was looking in the wrong direction. Of his former General Reserve he had still directly available the 22nd Division of the 1st Army Corps at Tun-san-ho. That he did not engage it, was on all fours with the reluctance of the Russian Commanders generally to engage in case of urgent need even the last man; he therefore preferred asking for the reserve of the Eastern Detachment, from a portion of his Army, therefore, which at his bidding was fighting the really decisive action of the battle. He thought, of course, that all was going well with the Eastern

Detachment, but he knew that it was still in action, and he had no report of its having defeated the enemy's right wing. One almost feels inclined to think that at that time already he no longer seriously believed in a victory of his Army, and that the order for the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division to come up was a makeshift, inspired by the wish of preventing a defeat above all things.

Strange is the correspondence between Kuropatkin and Stackelberg, who refused the Commander-in-Chief the reserve, but at the same time hid from him the hopeless situation of the Eastern Detachment. Ultimately, portions of 22nd Division were, after all, placed at the disposal of the threatened 4th Siberian Army Corps. In all this, there is nothing indicating energy and mastery of the situation, nothing of that intimate co-operation between Commander-in-Chief and subordinate commanders so essential for the welfare of the whole. Why were not the Japanese who had penetrated, attacked and pushed back, or annihilated, by all the Russians troops available in the neighbourhood?

On October 11 the Russian Army, thanks to its superiority in numbers, could have obtained a victory by enveloping both wings of the Japanese; on October 12 the conditions were not at all unfavourable to a degree as to prevent the situation taking a favourable turn by staking and uniformly employing every unit available; on October 13 defeat was an accomplished fact, the Eastern Detachment was retreating, the

Centre in danger of being enveloped, and the Western Detachment severely pressed. That the Centre was still able to escape from its dangerous position was due to the weakness of the Japanese, who had not troops enough for achieving here a great success. And it was just at this period that the Russian Commander-in-Chief conceives the astonishing idea of assuming the offensive. Did he really hope to make good his omissions, or did he wish to make sure of being vindicated for having tried his utmost? With the Eastern Detachment he had done; now the Western Detachment and a newly formed reserve were to be the bearers of a belated victory. Meanwhile the Western Detachment was obliged to give up, with heavy loss, the whole of the southern bank of the Scha-ho; general exhaustion increased; nobody shut his eyes to the fact that the severely tried troops would need first some considerable rest before they were able to strike another blow. And, therefore, the offensive idea met with no response during the last days of the battle, but faded away more and more, until only the capture of Putilov and Novgorod Hills, during the night of October 16-17, was all the trace it left ultimately behind. Although unimportant in itself, and made by superior numbers, this capture was at least some performance, the only one during the whole of the battle of lasting success. The two hills, as well as a short stretch of country north-east of the Wai-tau-schan, were maintained after the rest of the Russian Army had crossed over to the northern bank of the Scha-ho. The

insignificant portions of ground the Russians were holding on the southern Scha-ho bank could not alter the fact that the Russian arms had suffered a severe and costly defeat.

The battle was lost because the deliberate attack was made in a half-hearted manner and with too many in reserve, and because it was prematurely abandoned after some few failures. The chief blame must therefore be attached to General Headquarters, which is responsible also for the frictions and evils revealed in the inner working of the Russian Army. The Commander-in-Chief acted judiciously when he formed armies in the shape of the Eastern and Western Detachments; for the number of army corps had increased to such an extent as to render guidance from one place difficult. It was rather bad that the Commanders of the Eastern and Western Detachments did not take over their commands before the forward movement began, having thus no time to accustom themselves and their troops to the new order of things; but it was worse when the Commander-in-Chief himself broke the chain of responsibility he had forged, by sending over the heads of the Army Commanders orders direct to the Generals Commanding Army Corps, and occasionally even to their Chiefs of the Staff.

From this, the Western Detachment, in whose neighbourhood the Commander-in-Chief was constantly staying, had especially to suffer; while the Eastern Detachment was a little more removed from him. This habit originated with him from a strongly developed desire of advising his subordi-

nate commanders, and of disposing, if possible, of every single unit himself. Admirable is the amount of work the Commander-in-Chief managed to get through, he even finding time to write long letters and orders during the battle, and to arrange for many details forming no part of a Commander-in-Chief's office. He thought he was guiding the battle, yet his reins were dragging along the ground. Communication between him and his subordinate leaders was bad; it is almost inconceivable that the transmission of letters and messages from the Commander-in-Chief to the Army Commanders and *vice versâ* took hours and hours, and this not only with the Eastern Detachment, but also with the Western Detachment, standing much closer to him. The telegraph seems to have been used in a most perfunctory manner. Under these circumstances the Commander-in-Chief was not always sufficiently informed about the progress of the battle; he frequently assumed things more in harmony with his wishes than with the hard facts, and, in his desire of directing everything, often enough adopted measures not suiting the occasion, and which had to be adjourned, changed, or withdrawn, or were not carried out by the subordinate leaders at all. It was his own fault if his will was not enforced everywhere; though we cannot deny that little support was rendered him by many of his subordinate leaders.

Conspicuous as was the want of precise and firm command, the disadvantage of mixing units which in part had existed already before the battle was no less of an evil. A complete division was

broken up and distributed among other units; some bodies of troops were not with the unit they originally belonged to, but were forming special detachments newly organised. This process of breaking up the established war organisation continued during the battle. Higher points of view had never a share in deciding such a question—merely the demands of the moment were consulted; the Commander-in-Chief's mania for constantly forming fresh reserves had something to do with it too. Thus brigades, regiments, and battalions were shifted from corps to corps, and from division to division; new units were created; the commanders were robbed of their troops, and these were placed under leaders unknown to them. It was due to this practice that the Japanese succeeded in penetrating at Scha-ho-pu on October 14 in their fight with the 10th Army Corps, which found itself deprived of two brigades, getting them back only after some difficulty, and then too late. At the conclusion of the battle the powers of command with Kuropatkin's newly formed reserve were perfectly undefined. We need only recall to mind from what a chaos of orders the attack on the Novgorod and Putilov Hills originated, where troops of four different army corps were engaged. But the Russian commanders were so much used to the arbitrary manner in which their troops were employed, that Stackelberg was the only one who, for a time, refused to be deprived of his reserve.

In the face of the defects of an injudicious military organisation it is the Russian soldier

alone who deserves high praise. The same as the Japanese, the Russians captured villages and heights, defeated attacks after fighting hard, stood their ground in hopeless situations, and bore infinite fatigues and privations. But, if we add up on both sides the performances decisive for the issue, a tremendous balance for the Japanese will, after all, be the result. They had the advantage of a better field-training, of better command, and of a more judicious employment of their forces. They knew what they were fighting for; whereas, on the Russian side, the war had no place in the heart of the people.

When after the battle of Liao-yan the Japanese <sup>Japanese.</sup> did not pursue the Russians, the former were perfectly aware of the disadvantage of having, at no distant date, to repeat the struggle for the decisive issue of the war.

They might have gained much by a pursuit, no doubt. The retiring masses of the Russians were thronging together on few roads, made almost impassable by the heavy rains, and it was to be anticipated that the retreat would suffer dangerous delay at the Hun-ho bridges, south of Mukden, as really proved to be the case.

It would have been easy, therefore, to close with the retreating enemy. If, for all that, the Japanese did not continue beyond the battlefield, there must have been weighty reasons preventing their doing so and tying them to the Tai-tsy-ho, logical as they were in all they did. And so it was indeed. Exhaustion of man and beast was so great after the battle as to make it quite hope-

less to exact anything from the troops in the way of rapid marching. Moreover, the ammunition was almost spent, especially that of the Artillery, there being little prospect of replenishing it soon. There was also want of provisions, and the losses much exceeded those of the enemy.

One may certainly urge against this that the Russians, after the same battle, proved still fit to march, and that the feeling alone of being pursued, even without great quantities of ammunition, would have accelerated disorganisation. However much value we may therefore attach to the reasons preventing the Japanese from following up their victory at once, by the fundamental principles of war it must be considered a neglect of having not at least attempted to pursue.

But the Russians once having been permitted to withdraw without molestation, it was certainly wise of the Japanese after a short respite and hasty reorganisation, not to have followed the enemy, who, on September 6, disappeared with the bulk of his force behind the Hun-ho. It was then no longer possible to strike terror into his ranks; it was known that the Russians were falling back on their resources, and it was necessary to bear in mind the possibility of having to fight another battle, which could not be fought without sufficient ammunition. It was a characteristic feature of the Japanese conduct of war never to venture upon anything adventurous, and always to avoid reverses and failures. The Japanese resources were not as inexhaustible as those of the Russians; bringing up reinforcements and supplies

was not safe, as long as complete command of the sea was not yet assured. The *sine quâ non* for continuing the campaign were a thorough rehabilitation of the forces and of the matériel, and the bringing up of reinforcements. The latter was very important, it being expected that the Russians would be reinforced too, but it extended the pause in the operations more than was desired. At first it was probably hoped that the fall of Port Arthur would set free the besieging Army; it was only after this hope had disappeared that the 8th Division was called up from home. It arrived too late; the Japanese had to meet the unexpected attack of the Russians certainly well furnished with matériel of every kind, but inferior in numbers by about 40,000 men.

The attack of the Russians came as a surprise indeed, not in the sense of the Japanese having had no timely warning of it—the Russians themselves took care of that; but it was scarcely expected that the enemy would recover so soon after his defeat at Liao-yan. There was the danger of the Russians retaining the initiative if the Japanese did not act promptly. Oyama's Headquarters were not, even for a single moment, in doubt that the Russian attack must be met by a counter-attack. But on October 7 it was at first decided to let the enemy, who, in the plain, had already approached to within about 10 kilometres, and, in the mountains at Bian-yu-pu-sa, was still closer to Umesawa's Brigade, run up against the prepared positions, and then to issue from them for counter-attack.

A plan was therefore adopted frequently recom-

mended by Field-Marshal Count von Moltke.<sup>1</sup> As late as 1874, when criticising a tactical problem, he expressed the view that the improvement in firearms was to the advantage of the defensive, and that it would be much better to assume the offensive after several attacks of the enemy had been repulsed, than to attack, oneself, the enemy at great sacrifice.<sup>2</sup> Undoubtedly the Field-Marshal was perfectly aware of the fact that he who acts in this way leaves, of course, to his opponent, up to the moment of the counter-attack, certain advantages—namely, greater freedom of action and gaining time—advantages which, for the other side, mean so many disadvantages. Moltke, in his campaigns, had never to deal with these disadvantages, but always managed to retain the initiative from the outset, which is proof that he never sought salvation in principles, but always acted as suited the occasion. Oyama was acting in a similar way when the expected attack of the Russians did not come off.

Perhaps the defensive plan was merely adopted to allow the Armies time for properly arranging their forces, and to wait for more information, giving a clearer view of the situation. But on October 8 the situation was already clear enough to leave no doubt, either in Oyama's or Kuroki's mind, that the right wing of the 1st Army was most seriously threatened by an enveloping

<sup>1</sup> Von Moltke, "Taktisch-strategische Aufsätze" ("Tactical and Strategical Essays"), Preface, p. xii.

<sup>2</sup> "Moltke's Tactical Problems," Solution of Problem 50, p. 105. (Hugh Rees, Ltd., 119, Pall Mall, London, S.W.)

attack of the Russians. It is astonishing that only the Guard Kobi Brigade, which had retired from Bian-yu-pu-sa, and three companies of Lines-of-Communication troops were employed, without any reserve, for holding the extensive positions at Pen-si-hu. If the Russians had attacked them there on October 9 with stronger forces, making better use of the chances offered to an envelopment, Umesawa could not have avoided defeat. It was only due to the mistakes committed by the Russians that the Japanese were able to reinforce in time their right wing by one Division (the 12th) before the attacks were renewed. Even then the total of all the forces engaged there was far too small; it almost looks as if the danger so imminent was not recognised.

Until the evening of October 9, Japanese General Headquarters had obtained an idea of the distribution of the enemy's forces pretty well corresponding with what it actually was, being at the same time certain that the Russian advance, which had led to a serious encounter on the extreme right wing only, was hanging fire. The moment, therefore, was propitious for anticipating the enemy by the counter-attack that had been planned already. Oyama's first attack orders of October 9, at 10 o'clock in the evening, combined with the later directives he issued, up to October 11 inclusive, make it clear that he did not mean to push the Russians back in the direction they had come from, but to cut them off from Mukden and Tië-lin. This was to be attained by the Army during its advance and in the combats (for the advance was

bound to lead at once to fighting) executing a right wheel, with the 1st Army, which, however, was to advance on its own part too, acting as pivot.

The right wing of the 1st Army was given an objective for attack close at hand ; to its left wing and to the 4th and 2nd Armies were prescribed more distant objectives. The 1st Army was to wait with its attack until the 4th Army had gained ground for some distance ; the 2nd Army was to advance more rapidly with its left wing, and make a wide enveloping movement, but to keep strong forces ready behind its *right* wing.

No exception can be taken in these arrangements against the resolution, proving self-reliance and boldness, to advance for attack with inferior numbers. But it must have been questionable, from the outset, whether the battle could still be turned into a decisive victory by pushing the enemy from his line of communication. The plan of attaining this by a right wheel found the Army in a situation where, close in front of the enemy, it was no longer master of its own movements ; the enormous fronts were pretty well running parallel and close to each other. Pushing the enemy away from his line of communication is, as a rule, the consequence of a blow directed against one or the other of his flanks, such a blow being necessarily initiated by forming up in depth. But it was now too late for shifting considerable forces towards the right flank of the Russians ; nor was the Japanese Army strong enough for that. An effort was therefore made to obtain the decisive effect by prescribing to the left wing an enveloping move-

ment, in addition to the wheel, with the hope, probably, of outflanking the Russians west of the Scha-ho. But absolutely opposed to this was the further arrangement of keeping strong forces ready behind the *right* wing of the 2nd Army. The one prevented the other; for the envelopment that was planned, these forces were needed behind the left wing. General Kodama, Chief of the General Staff at Japanese General Headquarters, afterwards explained this by saying that it was hoped to pierce the Russian front at Pan-kiau-pu on the Mandarin Road; that it was then intended, with the forces retained by the 2nd Army, either to act against the left flank of the enemy's group, assumed to be on the Mandarin Road, or against the right flank of the group at Fön-kia-pu. Two things were therefore in preparation—namely, a wheel with envelopment, and penetration.

We have to prove still, by the progress of the battle, that the Japanese Army could not execute a wheel in the battle. It is true that, during the later days of the battle, the centre was in advance of the right wing, and the left wing in advance of the centre. But that was only the result of an advance in *échelon*, which took a different shape with the individual Armies, according to the amount of opposition offered by the enemy, and to the progress they themselves were making. If a right wheel had really been executed, the left wing of the 2nd Army must have ultimately crossed the Mandarin Road in a north-easterly direction south of Mukden; but it remained always west of the Mandarin Road. There were envelopments and

penetrations, but not in the sense of great operations deciding a battle. The Russians were pushed back rather in a straight line on their starting-points.

The means, therefore, the Japanese were trying to make use of for increasing as much as possible the defeat of the Russians did not assert themselves. This was a natural consequence of the late resolve to attack, and of the Russian superior numbers, but would have failed perhaps, even under more favourable circumstances, owing to the arrangements as they were made. It is always a delicate thing to pursue two objects concurrently in a battle. The leading idea was that of a wheel, with a simultaneous envelopment of the Russian right wing; this alone, and not the side issue of penetrating, ought to have decided the employment of the forces with the 2nd Army. In a manner similar to Oyama, Napoleon had tried, in the battle of Wagram on July 6, 1809, at one and the same time to envelop the right wing of the Austrians at Markgrafneusiedl, and to penetrate their centre at Süssenbrunn; he succeeded only in the envelopment. But on the Scha-ho it would have been impossible to execute the envelopment as well, even if the troops in reserve had been *écheloned* behind the left wing; for the Russians were holding back very strong forces behind their right wing. Denuded of all reserves, the Japanese left wing itself was even now being threatened by an envelopment. That it did not come about in the course of the battle is not the merit of the Japanese, but a consequence of the want of

activity on the part of the Russians, who failed to recognise the advantage of their situation.

The menace to both the Japanese wings clearly shows that they were fighting with a minority against a majority. It is remarkable that Oyama, on October 9, in the evening, demanded also of the extreme right wing, opposite which he assumed two Russian Army Corps to be, to make a move forward, though but a short one. He probably had not been aware yet of the severe combats at Pen-si-hu on October 9. Kuroki, commanding the 1st Army, rectified the Commander-in-Chief's order by imposing some restraint upon the 12th Division, which had meanwhile reinforced Umesawa's Detachment, by not permitting it to go beyond the position hitherto defended, until the enemy was beaten off. But for the rest he left this, the most threatened portion of the Japanese battle-order, all to itself.

The trust reposed by him in the firmness of his troops was fully justified by General Ino-uye repelling on October 11 with his weak forces the furious assaults of far superior numbers of the Russians. The heroes fighting almost to the last man at the passes north of Pen-si-hu and on the steep edges of the valley east of the town were the real victors of the battle; for at no other point of the battlefield were the Russians so near victory as here. It was highly fortunate for the Japanese that their enemy did not use sufficient force on October 11 for completing the envelopment on the southern bank of the Tai-tsy-ho. But ought we to allow Kuroki to count upon such

good luck? Or had he good reasons for hoping Prince Kan-in to be in time with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade to ensure the safety of the extreme right wing? The Prince arrived only on October 12, and, even granted that the Japanese had no occasion for estimating very highly the performances of the Russians in the attack, yet there remains the fact that what was exacted from Ino-uye's small force was too much to be compatible with the situation, the superior numbers of the Russians, and the want of reserves.

But the extreme right wing was without doubt intentionally kept as weak as possible. The special significance of General Baron Ino-uye's desperate fight lies in the fact that, with his Division and General Umesawa's seven battalions, he riveted the attention of almost three Russian Army Corps. This alone permitted the Japanese to employ on the other portions of their extensive battle-front sufficient forces to feel on equal terms with the Russians. In this way they were able on October 11 to carry out with some chance of success the deliberate attack against the mass of the enemy standing fast in its positions, while the Russian Eastern Detachment was assaulting the extreme right wing. At the end of the day it almost seemed as if the intended right wheel of the Army was really preparing. The 4th Army, in the centre, had actually effected a kind of right wheel towards Tan-hai-schi, as ordered for October 11; the 2nd Army had sufficiently far advanced northwards to cover the left wing of the 4th Army, overlapping, as it seemed, the extreme right wing

of the Russians. At that time the Japanese were probably not yet accurately informed about the presence of the 6th Siberian Army Corps and of Dembovski's Detachment. It is therefore intelligible that Oyama should still adhere to the idea of a right wheel when arranging for the continuation of the attack on October 12; only the extreme right wing, after the experiences of October 11, was directed to continue in its position.

On October 12 the 2nd Army, on whose rapid advance all depended, certainly gained a splendid victory over the Russian Western Detachment, which was pushed into its last prepared positions on the Scha-ho; but just that day proved the impossibility of carrying out the wheel. The envelopment, to which the 2nd Army owed its victory, affected only a portion of the Russian right wing, and did not prevent the Western Detachment from retiring in the direction from which it had come; but at the same time the 6th Siberian Army Corps and Dembovski's Detachment made their presence felt between the Hun-ho and the Scha-ho. The 2nd Army thus found itself opposite an overlapping Russian front which it was impossible either to envelop or to push from its line of communication. This obliged also the 4th Army to continue the attack frontally in a northerly direction and to give up the wheel already initiated, as it would otherwise have been endangering its left wing.

Japanese General Headquarters did not hesitate to adapt themselves to the altered conditions. The objective of attack assigned to the three Armies

for October 13, Tai-kou—Tun-kia-fön to the 1st Army, Lu-sun-tun—Tschien-tshan-lin-tsy to the 4th, and Scha-ho-pu—Lin-schin-pu to the 2nd, prove that the intention of pushing the enemy from Mukden and Tië-lin had been given up. On the other hand, these objectives, by the additional paragraph that the enemy was no longer to be attacked on the northern bank of the Scha-ho, should he be standing there in entrenched positions, make it clear that Oyama did not intend to carry the attack and pursuit beyond the Scha-ho. The reasons for it are intelligible. Oyama saw there was, anyhow, no longer any chance of defeating the enemy decisively, and that his own troops, who had been fighting already since October 9, would be exhausting their strength in trying combats without achieving more than a retreat of the Russians. But it was likely that this retreat would come to an end at the latest on the Hun-ho, or perhaps already on the northern bank of the Scha-ho, where it was thought the Russians had some more troops in reserve. In that case the Japanese, immediately after the recent fights, would have to face another struggle for a strong position. It seemed imperative to let them first recover their breath and gather fresh strength for a decisive battle afterwards. Oyama thought, as the victor in the present struggle, he had it in his hand to make an end to the battle on the Scha-ho.

It was surely no easy matter for Japanese General Headquarters to arrive at this decision. It meant postponing once more the struggle for the issue of the war. It would be a mistake to look

upon this as want of energy. It is better to abandon a hopeless operation, and to construct a new basis upon which to act afresh, than to waste the strength of the fighting force in endeavouring to attain an object that cannot be reached. Yet it cannot be done with disregard to the enemy; of this the Japanese were to become aware as yet.

But Oyama did not wish to let the Russians escape across the Scha-ho without inflicting on them at least some damage. With the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, which Kuroki, on October 12, had moved from the left wing of the 1st Army to its right wing, he intended to separate and cut off from the Centre those portions of the Russian Eastern Detachment which were still lying opposite General Baron Ino-uye's Detachment. They were actually separated already on the morning of October 13, the 4th Siberian Army Corps having, on October 12, retired more than Stackelberg's troops; the 1st Guard Brigade, indeed, had already penetrated into the gap by occupying the Bai-ji-san. The operation, by itself, had therefore some chance of succeeding, but was made with too weak a force. The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division met with superior Russian Infantry on the right wing of the Eastern Detachment, and was gaining no ground. Over and over again is seen the disadvantage of the inferior numbers of the Japanese; it deprived them also at another place of the chance of taking advantage of a situation particularly unfavourable for the Russian Centre.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> When, where, and how Oyama's General Reserve was used cannot be ascertained.

By the retreat of the Western Detachment to the neighbourhood of Scha-ho-pu on October 12, the right of the 1st Army Corps at Man-kiä-fön had become most seriously endangered. Between it and the left of the 10th Army Corps at Tschien-tschan-lin-tsy there yawned a wide gap, open to the west, which the Russians were unable to close in any strength. Had Oyama had sufficient troops with the 4th Army to continue his advance against the front of the Western Detachment, as well as against the right flank and rear of the Centre, the fate of the 1st Army Corps and of the 4th Siberian Army Corps would have probably been sealed. But just then, on October 13, he sent the 5th Division from the 4th to the 1st Army, with the object of supporting the Guard Division, which on that day was deprived again of the advantages of its penetration at the Ba-ji-san by the 4th Siberian Army Corps and the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division. On October 14 the Centre and Eastern Detachment had retired approximately in line with the Western Detachment; now there were no longer opportunities for cutting off or annihilating portions of the Russian Army.

It may have been a mistake of Oyama to call the 5th Division away from a spot where it could achieve a great success; the danger threatening the Guard Division was, as a matter of fact, already removed when it was joined by the 5th Division. It is, of course, difficult to determine with certainty after the event what induced Oyama to act as he did. In any case, he had no more hopes

now of reaping special advantages, and was therefore most anxious to end the battle at last. The 1st and 4th Armies were stopped by him on the southern bank of the Scha-ho on October 15, and the 2nd Army alone was to do the final work by capturing the heights east of Schan-lan-tsy, and the village of La-mu-tun, the pivots that were still in the hands of the enemy. Oyama's plan of breaking off the battle synchronised with Kuropatkin's fresh thoughts of leading the Western Detachment and his newly formed General Reserve forward to attack. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief's wish was, therefore, not responded to by the intentions of the hostile Commander.

Oyama had certainly a right to suppose the Russians to be equally fatigued as his own troops, perhaps even more fatigued than the latter, owing to the effects of constant failure; nevertheless, it is shown here again that the enemy can do as he likes so long as his will is not crushed by a decisive victory. Kuropatkin's eagerness to attack could, of course, no longer be turned into any violent action. But the defeat suffered by the Japanese at the Putilov and Novgorod Hills during the night of October 16-17 gave them clear proof that they had no right to look upon the battle as finished at a moment when it suited their intentions best. It was not till October 19 that a tacit agreement was established between both parties for abstaining from further fighting. Now came the curious situation of both Armies standing, almost inactive, opposite each other for a long time at close distances,

The Japanese Commander had to face a difficult task in the battle on the Scha-ho. The battle was forced upon him by superior numbers. He discerned the right moment for snatching the advantages of resolute action from the hesitating enemy. But all attempts of giving a decisive turn to the extensive frontal attack failed. This is not meant as a reproach, though the critic, looking backwards, may not approve of all the measures adopted by the Commander; it rather shows the determined efforts, indispensable for success, of trying everything to gain something. What was achieved was, after all, an almost unbroken chain of successes in detail, but no complete victory—a defeat of an enemy pushed back, but not his destruction.

The situation, as it was, scarcely permitted to achieve more, and the gains must not be underrated. Not the great losses of the Russians, exceeding twice those of the Japanese, indicate the gain; for the Russians were able to make good their losses at any time. The tremendous superiority possessed by the Japanese since the days of Liao-yan was once more established, and to a degree which deprived the Russians of all hope of ever giving the war a turn in their favour. They had been unable to hold out in the defence, and now their attack had failed likewise. They certainly contributed themselves to the success of their enemy, and the fortune of war was on the side of the Japanese. But this fortune was well deserved by the constant manifestations of a firm will to beat the enemy, by the indefatigable energy

of the attacks, and by the cheerful sacrifice of the troops.

In clear and firm lines the Commander-in-Chief defined the limits within which his subordinate commanders had complete freedom of action in solving the tasks imposed on them. This trust in the performance of commanders and commanded was transmitted down to the lowest private, producing that sureness and those methods which seemed almost natural and characterised everything the Japanese were taking in hand. Frictions and difficulties disappeared in the enormous working of the Japanese Army because every one, from the highest Commander down to the lowest coolie-soldier, was imbued with the feeling that he was responsible for the issue of the war.

The strategic result of the battle on the Scha-ho falls behind the moral results. The Japanese had certainly made a step forward; but the Russians ultimately remained half a day's march south of the positions they had originally intended to defend after the battle of Liao-yan. The situation, however, created by the battle on the Scha-ho was of importance for this reason—that it formed the starting-point for the final great struggle for the issue of the war, and naturally influenced the course of events in the battle of Mukden.

Result of  
the battle.



## APPENDIX III

### ORDER No. 5 TO THE TROOPS OF THE ARMY OF MANCHURIA

MUKDEN, *September 7, 1904, 9.30 P.M.*

The following is to be carried out by the Army of Manchuria on **Sketch 1**, September 8 :

1. *The 10th Army Corps and the 2nd Siberian Army Corps* will remain under the orders of Lieutenant-General Slutshevski, in the section assigned to them by General Order No. 4.<sup>1</sup> Advanced guards are to be pushed forward : by the 10th Army Corps, in the direction on Pen-si-hu, to about the village of Fön-kia-pu ; by the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, to the railway bridge on a level with Lin-schin-pu, with a flank-guard at Kuan-lin-pu.

2. *The 17th Army Corps* will remain in the section prescribed to it by General Orders,<sup>2</sup> pushing its advanced guard to Scha-ho-pu village. The advanced guard, until it is withdrawn behind the entrenched position on the left bank of the Hun-ho, is to be placed under the orders of the General Commanding the 10th Army Corps.

3. *The advanced guards* will keep in touch with each other.

4. *The 3rd Siberian Army Corps*<sup>3</sup> will cross to the right bank of the Hun-ho, and be stationed in the neighbourhood of Tschin-wan-fön village.

5. *The 1st Siberian and the 4th Siberian Army Corps* will remain in the sections indicated by General Order No. 4.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> By General Order No. 4, of which there is no verbatim copy, the portion of the Mukden Position west of the railway was assigned to the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, and that east of the railway to the 10th Army Corps. Headquarters of the 10th Army Corps went to Tia-ho, on the Hun-ho.

<sup>2</sup> On the northern bank of the Hun-ho, on the Mandarin Road, south of Mukden.

<sup>3</sup> The 3rd Siberian Army Corps, on September 6, had occupied the left wing of the fortified position on the southern bank of the Hun-ho, at Hun-ho-pu.

<sup>4</sup> North of the Hun-ho : 1st Siberian Army Corps, east of the Mandarin Road ; 4th Siberian Army Corps, at the railway.

6. *The 1st Army Corps* will remain in the space opposite the north west corner of Mukden, between the roads indicated.

7. [Refers to the portions of the 5th Siberian Army Corps detailed to other units.]

8. *Major-General Kossagovski's Brigade* will unite opposite Sin-min-tun to cover the extreme right of the Army.

9. *General Liubavin's Detachment* will be stationed at the passes on the road Fu-schun—Bian-yu-pu-sa, near Fan-schön village, as well as at the Kau-tu-lin Pass, occupying the passes for defence.

10. *Lieutenant-Colonel Koshelevski's Detachment* will march to Fan-schön, joining Major-General Liubavin's command.

11. *Major-General Peterov's Detachment* will remain at the Da-lin Pass.

12. *The detachment at Sin-tsin-tin* will remain in that place, covering the extreme left of the Army.

13. *The Orenburg Cossack Brigade* will move forward 5 versts, continuing in the duties laid down in General Order No. 4.

14. *Major-General Mishtshenko's Detachment* will advance as much as possible, to about Hun-pau-schan village, continuing in its duties in accordance with my directions given in General Order No. 4, but confining them towards the east, to the line Mukden—Bian-yu-pu-sa.

15. *The Siberian Cossack Division* will concentrate on the line Mukden—Bian-yu-pu-sa, in the neighbourhood of Fön-kia-pu, covering and reconnoitring in front of the Army, between the line Mukden—Bian-yu-pu-sa and the line Mukden—Fan-schön. Reconnaissance towards the enemy in the section Fön-kia-pu—Fan-schön.

16. *The Terek-Kubanski Regiment* will continue carrying out the task prescribed in General Order No. 4.

17. *All units* will establish communication with their Corps Headquarters by flying post, or, if possible, by telephone and telegraph; Corps Headquarters, in their turn, with General Headquarters.

18. *General Headquarters* will be at Mukden Railway Station.

(Signed) The Commander-in-Chief:

General Aide-de-Camp KUROPATKIN.

Chief of the Staff: Lieutenant-General SACKAROV.

## APPENDIX IV

### ORDER No. 6 TO THE TROOPS OF THE ARMY OF MANCHURIA

MUKDEN STATION, *September 8, 1904, 11 P.M.*

It being my intention to prepare for assuming the offensive with the Army, I consider it necessary to oppose strong resistance to the enemy in the position near Mukden, should he advance on that town. With this object, I order the units of the Army to adopt the following measures :

#### 1. *Main Position*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SLUTSHEVSKI

(a) 10th Army Corps : 32 battls., 6 sotnias, 104 guns,<sup>1</sup> 6 Sapper battls.

(b) 2nd Sib. Army Corps : 12 battls., 2 sotnias, 32 guns, 24 mortars, 3rd E. Sib. Sapper Battl.

(c) Advanced Guard of 17th Army Corps.

(d) 2nd Sib. Art. Abteilung.

will remain in the position prescribed by General Order No. 5; the preparation for defence of the entrenched position is to be continued. The ground in front is to be secured by the advanced guards on the line of the villages Fön-kia-pu—Lin-schin-pu—Kuan-lin-pu. In case of a hostile attack, the position will be defended, the advanced guards at the same time being withdrawn, when the advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps will rejoin its corps in time.

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<sup>1</sup> The number of guns with the 10th Army Corps was only 88, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Batteries of the 31st Artillery Brigade being disbanded, and all other batteries organised at 8 guns each.

2. *Covering the Left Flank*

## LIEUTENANT-GENERAL IVANOV

(a) 3rd Sib. Army Corps : 24 battls., 6 sotnias, 64 field guns, 24 mtn. guns, 4 Horse Artillery mtn. guns, 2nd E. Sib. Sapper Battl.

(b) Major-General Liubavin's Detachment :

213th Infantry Regt. . .	4 battls.
26th Artillery Brig. . .	8 field gns.
1st Sib. Infantry Regt. . .	1 battl.
2nd Sib. Infantry Regt. . .	1 battl.
Frontier Guard . . .	2 field gns.
2nd Brig. Transbaikal	
Cossack Division . . .	12 sotnias.
4th H.A. Mtn. Batt'y. . .	4 mtn. gns.

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Total : 6 battls., 12 sotnias, 10 field guns, 4 mtn. guns.

(c) Major-General Peterov's Detachment :

214th Infantry Regt. . .	3 battls.
26th Artillery Brig. . .	4 gns.
2nd Dagestan Cossack	
Regt. . . . .	6 sotnias.

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Total : 3 battls., 6 sotnias, 4 gns.

(d) Major-General Eck's Detachment :

214th Infantry Regt. . .	1 battl.
26th Artillery Brig. . .	4 gns.
282nd Infantry Regt. . .	4 battls.
283rd Infantry Brig. . .	4 battls.
28th Artillery Brig. . .	16 gns.
Amur Cossack Regt. . .	2 sotnias.
1st Argunski Cossack	
Regt. . . . .	2 sotnias.
5th Sapper Battl. . . .	1 Sap. co.

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Total : 9 battls., 4 sotnias, 20 gns, 1 Sapper company.

guarding and defending the left flank of the Army within the section Fan-schön—Kau-tu-lin—Da-lin—Sin-tsin-tin. Reconnaissance of the roads leading from the line Pen-si-hu—Mi-tsy into the valley of the Hun-ho.

With this object are to be occupied :

by the *Main Body* : Fu-schun town ;

by *Liubavin's Detachment* : the passes at Fan-schön and Kau-tu-lin ;

by *Peterov's Detachment* : the Da-lin Pass ;

by *Eck's Detachment* : In-pan ; advanced guard, Sin-tsin-tin.

Lieutenant-General Ivanov will see to the whole district Fu-schun—In-pan—Sin-tsin-tin—Da-lin—Fan-schön being reconnoitred, as well as to preparations being made for defence by entrenchments (positions, roads, crossings).

Lieutenant-General Ivanov and Major-General Eck will move on September 9 to the places indicated to them.

3. *Close Protection of the Left Flank*LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BARON STACK-  
ELBERG

1st Sib. Army Corps: 24 battls.,  
10 squadrons or sotnias, 56 field  
guns, 1 Sapper and 1 Telegraph  
company from 1st E. Sib. Sapper  
Battl.

will secure and defend the right  
bank of the Hun-ho within the  
section Fu-lin—Kiu-san, serving  
as connecting-link between the  
main body of the Army and the  
3rd Siberian Army Corps, to  
which it will form the nearest  
support. This force will move  
on the 10th inst. into the section  
mentioned.

4. *Covering the Right Flank*

## LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DEMBOVSKI

215th Infantry Regt. . . 4 battls.  
216th Infantry Regt. . . 2 battls.  
26th Artillery Brig. . . 16 guns.  
284th Infantry Regt. . . 4 battls.  
28th Artillery Brig. . . 3 guns.  
1st Argunski Cossack  
Regt. . . . . 4 sotnias.  
Terek Kubanski Cos-  
sack Regt. . . . . 6 sotnias.  
5th E. Sib. Sapper  
Battl. (less 1 co.) . . 1 Sap. battl.

will on September 9 move to  
Tszö-kia-pu,<sup>1</sup> covering the right  
flank of the Army; any advance  
of the enemy along the right  
bank of the Hun-ho, as well as  
any crossing of the river, must  
be opposed within the area oc-  
cupied by the detachment, per-  
haps from Ma-kia-pu to Örr-tai-  
tsy villages.

Total: 10 battls., 10 sotnias, 24  
guns, 1 Sapper battl.

5. *Covering the Extreme Right Flank*

## MAJOR-GENERAL KOSSAGOVSKI

281st Infantry Regt. . . 4 battls.  
28th Artillery Brig. . . 8 guns.  
4th Sib. Infantry Regt. . 2 battls.  
4th Sib. Art. Abteilung . 4 guns.  
Amur Cossack Regt. . . 3 sotnias.  
Frontier Guard . . . ½ battal., 6  
sotnias, 4  
guns.

Total: 6½ battls., 9 sotnias, 16 guns.

will be stationed with the Infan-  
try on the Liao-ho, near the  
villages of Kun-lin-tun and Tun-  
ta-wan, and with the Cavalry  
one day's march farther in ad-  
vance, continuing in the duties  
assigned to it: of covering the  
extreme right flank of the Army,  
of preventing the enemy from  
crossing the Liao-ho, and of  
reconnoitring within the area  
between the Liao-ho and Hun-  
ho.

<sup>1</sup> 16 kilometres south-west of Mukden.

6. *Cavalry*

(a) MAJOR-GENERAL GREKOV	will remain in the sections ap-
Orenburg Cossk. Brig. 12 sotnias.	portioned to them by General
11th H.A. Batty . 6 guns.	Order No. 5, continuing in their
<hr/>	
Total : 12 sotnias, 6 guns.	duties.

(b) MAJOR-GENERAL MISHTSHENKO	
Independ. Transbaikal	
Cossack Brig. . 12 sotnias.	
1st Transbaikal Cos-	
sack Batty. . . 6 guns.	
Ural Cossack Brig. . 12 sotnias.	
6th H.A. Batty. Fron-	
tier Guard . . . 4 guns.	
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Total : 24 sotnias, 10 guns.	

(c) MAJOR-GENERAL SAMSONOV	
4th, 7th, and 8th Sib.	
Cossack Regts. . 18 sotnias.	
20th H.A. Batty . 6 guns.	
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Total : 18 sotnias, 6 guns.	

7. *Nearest Support of the Main Position*

GENERAL OF CAVALRY BARON  
BILDERLING  
17th Army Corps, less the units  
detailed as advanced guard in front  
of the main position.

will remain in the section ap-  
portioned to it by General Order  
No. 5.

8. *General Reserve*

(a) *Northern portion*, GENERAL AIDE-  
DE-CAMP BARON MEIENDORF  
1st Army Corps and 5th Sib. Cos-  
sack Regt. (6 sotnias).

will concentrate between Pu-ho  
village and Hu-schi-tai Station.

(b) *Southern portion*, LIEUTENANT-  
GENERAL SARUBAIEV  
4th Sib. Army Corps, less the  
brigade detached to Tië-lin ; 2nd  
Werchneudinsk Cossack Regt. (6  
sotnias).

will concentrate on September 9  
opposite the north-west corner  
of Mukden city, between the  
roads to Sin-min-tun and San-  
dia-sa.

9. *All units* will establish communication with their Corps Headquarters by flying post, or, if possible, by telephone and telegraph ; Corps Headquarters, in their turn, with General Headquarters.

10. *General Headquarters* at Mukden Station.

(Signed) General Aide-de-Camp KUROPATKIN.  
Lieutenant-General SACKAROV.

## APPENDIX V

### ORDER NO. 1 FOR THE TROOPS DEFENDING THE ENTRENCHED POSITION OF MUKDEN

TIA-HO VILLAGE, *September 9, 1904.*

With the object of making the defence as strong as possible, the **Sketch 2.** Commandant of Defence has ordered :

1. In addition to the *Main Fortline of Defence*, two more defensive lines are to be prepared in its rear, viz. :

(a) From Tia-ho village to Sa-kan-tsy—centre portion of Yen-schu-tiën-tsy—Lan-wa villages ; the flanks of the line are to be turned inward to the Hun-ho.

(b) From the copse near the footbridge, by Ma-kiao-tun and Schu-lian-za, to the Hun-ho.

2. The sectional commanders will prepare the main line and the 2nd line ; the Commander of the General Reserve, the 3rd line.

To be carried out :

(a) *Strengthening the Main Position* : clearing the field of fire to within 1,600 metres at least. Gaoljan and high tshumisa are to be cut down in front of the position ; belts are to be left standing behind the position, for masking artillery and covering movements.

(b) *In the 2nd and 3rd Positions* : preparing the villages for defence, clearing the field of fire, etc., as above.

(c) *Ranges* are to be measured and marked, roads to be improved, bridges to be constructed, guide-posts to be erected.

3. With every unit must be officers who have made themselves thoroughly familiar with the country, to guide the troops by day and by night.

4. *The detachments of scouts* will thoroughly reconnoitre the ground in front of the entrenchments, directing their attention to the most suitable approaches to the position, as well as to likely positions for the enemy's batteries, etc. The maps of the entrenched position are to be verified during these reconnaissances.

5. *Working hours*, daily from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m., and from 2 to 6 p.m.

(Signed) Chief of the Staff of the Defence :

Major-General ZURIKOV.

## APPENDIX VI

### ORDER NO. 3 FOR THE TROOPS DEFENDING THE ENTRENCHED POSITION OF MUKDEN

TIA-HO VILLAGE, September 11, 1904.

In compliance with the General Order of yesterday I order :

1. *From Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard*, standing at Scha-ho-pu, are to be detailed three battalions, eight guns, and one squadron, and to be dispatched at once to relieve the units of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps standing at Lin-schin-pu and Kuan-lin-pu ; the first-named of the two places will be occupied at the same time by two battalions, eight guns, and half a squadron, and the last-named by one battalion and half a squadron. These units form the right advanced guard of the defending troops, and will remain under the direct orders of Major-General Jakubinski.

2. *Lieutenant-Colonel Savitsh's advanced guard* (121st Infantry Regiment, half a battery, and half a sotnia 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment) will remain in the neighbourhood of Fön-kia-pu, guarding in the direction on Bian-yu-pu-sa.

3. *All advanced guards*, if obliged by superior hostile forces, will retire simultaneously, keeping in touch with each other, and continuing to guard in the directions they have done so hitherto. In that case, Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard will join the General Reserve of the Defence, and be stationed at Tia-ho village. Lieutenant-Colonel Savitsh's advanced guard will join the local reserve in the left section of the position, and be at the disposal of Major-General Riabinkin.

4. *The 2nd Siberian Army Corps* having been charged with a new task, the entrenched position will be occupied in the following manner :<sup>1</sup>

(a) The 9th Infantry Division, after detailing one regiment and half a battery to the General Reserve, will occupy the right section, from the Hun-ho to fort "III." inclusive, and half the interval between the latter and redoubt "G."

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<sup>1</sup> Till then had occupied : the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, the section west of the railway ; the 10th Army Corps, the portion east of the railway to fort "II." exclusively, with the 9th Infantry Division ; the portion from fort "II." to the left wing on the Hun-ho, with the 31st Infantry Division,

(b) The 31st Infantry Division, after detailing the 122nd Tambow Infantry Regiment, with half a battery, to the General Reserve at Tia-ho village, will occupy the left section from the centre of the interval between fort "III." and redoubt "G" to the Hun-ho.

5. For *enfilading the approaches* to the position mentioned, the sectional commanders will select artillery positions on the right bank of the Hun-ho, near the villages of Kin-tiën-tun and San-kia-la, occupying them each with a battery with escort.

6. From the 5th Mortar Regiment, two mortar batteries will be attached to each of the 9th and 31st Infantry Divisions.

7. *The General Reserve*—

a combined Infantry Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division,  
122nd Tambow Infantry Regiment,  
two half-batteries,  
two sotnias of Cossacks—

will be commanded by Major-General Kuswin.

8. The sectional commanders and the Commander of the General Reserve will continue *strengthening the fortified position*, in compliance with Order No. 1.

9. Having regard to the great distance of the enemy, *outposts* are to be furnished only during the night, and these in small strength only, to give less fatigue to the men :

(a) by the 9th Infantry Division, beginning at the Hun-ho, along the brook to Sia-ho-tun village, then farther along the railway branch line, to the point where the railway crosses the road Wan-schi-tun—Tia-ho.

(b) by the 31st Infantry Division, from that crossing to the Hun-ho.

10. By the 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment will be detailed :

one sotnia each to Generals Gerschelmann and Riabinkin, the latter sotnia including the half-sotnia with the 121st Infantry Regiment ;

two sotnias to the General Reserve at Tia-ho village.

11. *Of the bridges over the Hun-ho* will be used :

by the 9th Infantry Division, the railway bridge and the bridge at Lan-wa village ;

by the 31st Infantry Division, the bridge north of Tia-ho village, and the great Mandarin Road Bridge.

12. *The Divisional dressing-stations* are to be established on the right bank of the Hun-ho, as directed by the Divisional Commanders.

13. *The Ambulant parks* are to be stationed as directed by the Divisional Commanders.

14. *Reports* are to be sent to Tia-ho village.

15. *Deputies* : MAJOR-GENERAL GERSCHELMANN.

MAJOR-GENERAL KUSWIN.

(Signed) The Commandant of the Defence :

Lieutenant-General SLUTSHEVSKI.

## APPENDIX VII

### ORDER NO. 4 FOR THE TROOPS DEFENDING THE ENTRENCHED POSITION OF MUKDEN

TIA-HO VILLAGE, *September 13, 1904, 11 A.M.*

One more Infantry regiment from the 17th Army Corps having been detailed and being at my disposal when the action begins, I order, *amending Order No. 3*:

1. *The half-batteries* of the 9th and 31st Infantry Divisions now with the General Reserve will be returned to their sectional commanders.

2. The Infantry regiments of the 9th and 31st Infantry Divisions now with the General Reserve are to be placed at the disposal of the sectional commanders when the action begins, after Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard has been withdrawn into the entrenched position.

3. To the *General Reserve*, under the orders of Major-General Kuswin, will be detailed:

(a) Major General Jakubinski's advanced guard—strength: one Infantry Brigade, one battery, and five squadrons Dragoons—which, after its arrival in the entrenched position, will be stationed at Tia-ho village.

(b) One Infantry regiment of the 17th Army Corps on the right bank of the Hun-ho, which, at the beginning of the action, will likewise move to Tia-ho village.

4. Batteries from Major-General Jakubinski's advanced guard, after its arrival in the entrenched position, will be detailed, one to each of the sectional commanders, who will arrange for cover being prepared for these batteries now; the selection of the position for these batteries is left to the sectional commanders.

(Signed) The Commandant of the Defence:

Lieutenant-General SLUTSHEVSKI.

## APPENDIX VIII

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE MAIN POSITION OF MUKDEN <sup>1</sup>

1. For the *occupation of the works*, the garrison will be divided into:
  - (a) the *fighting portion*, and
  - (b) the *inner reserve*.

The *outer reserve* of the work concerned is to be formed of troops not belonging to the garrison.

For the fighting portion are to be detailed three-quarters of the garrison, and for the inner reserve one-quarter.

For the fighting portion must be allowed one man per pace of crest of the faces and flanks, and for the inner reserve one man for every two or three paces of gorge parapet of the work.

2. During the *bombardment of the work* by Artillery the garrison will be kept in the trenches on either side. When the enemy's Artillery fire ceases—his Infantry having approached to within half a kilometre—the garrison must rapidly mount the banquetts [“fighting portion”] or take post behind the parados [“inner reserve”] so as to be able to open fire at once.

Cover must be prepared for the outer reserve where there is no natural cover.

3. *Husbanding ammunition*: in the defence, fire to be opened only on visible objects!—100 rounds in addition to the regulation number to be held ready for every man in the works; targets clearly to be indicated!

4. When the enemy rises from the ditch to mount the parapet, the garrison of the work will rapidly go to meet him, *pushing him back with the bayonet*.

5. *In advance of the line of forts*, at a distance of about half a kilometre, fire-trenches are to be constructed, or the villages lying within that distance must be put into a state of defence on the side facing the enemy.

Then a second line of fire-trenches must be constructed *along the line of forts*, and finally, about half a kilometre behind it, *cover for artillery* behind the intervals of the works.

The Artillery here will fire over the heads of their own Infantry in the trenches about 1 verst in front of the Artillery; in the second line of trenches intervals must be left through which the Artillery can fire on the assailant.

<sup>1</sup> Complete text not available.

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6. [Refers to the *mortar batteries*; as much as possible centrally.] Here to be kept in view that the effect of their fire is best at 1,600 to 2,500 metres' range.

7. Behind the first line of defence are to be established :

(a) *A second defensive line* from Tia-ho village to Sa-kan-tsy village—centre portion of Yen-schu-tiën-tsy village—Lan-wa village to the Hun-ho.

(b) *A third defensive line* from the copse at the footbridge at Tia-ho village to Ma-kiao-tun and Schu-lian-za villages. Construction of fire-trenches, preparation of villages for defence, etc. Batteries are to be constructed in the second, but not in the third, defensive line.

In case of retreat on the third defensive line, first the Artillery must be gradually withdrawn to the right bank of the Hun-ho, and then, by degrees, the Infantry. The Artillery will open fire at once from the other bank.

8. Small bridge-heads are to be constructed in front of the bridges to ensure the crossing.

9. —

10. [Refers to guarding against surprise by night.] In order to give the garrison timely warning of a surprise by night, *fires* are to be lit, apart from other measures, by advanced listening-posts, for which purpose they must keep handy dry material.

At a distance of 800 paces in advance of the foremost trenches *large fires* must be prepared, which at the moment the enemy is approaching are to be ignited by electricity to illuminate the foreground. These fires are to be lit even by day, so as to *impress the enemy*.

11. The *mines* constructed in advance of the works are to be ignited only by orders of the commandant of the work. Where it is impossible to construct mines, red flags, marking, as it were, the position of mines, must be placed so as to confuse the enemy!

12. [Refers to *construction of roads* within the position to connect the works and the reserves and river crossings behind; erection of guide-posts.]

13. I allow the troops of the foremost trench-lines to retire on the firing-line of the line of forts, if it is absolutely necessary; but I do not allow the latter line to be abandoned without a distinct order from a superior, for the fort-line is our main defensive line, in which we can, and must, offer the greatest possible resistance. The troops holding the works must be deeply rooted in them, such that they can only be pulled out with the roots—that is to say, they must die, but not surrender the works.

(Signed) The General Commanding 10th Army Corps :

Lieutenant-General SLUTSHEVSKI.

## APPENDIX IX

### ORDER NO. 8 TO THE TROOPS OF THE ARMY OF MANCHURIA

MUKDEN STATION, *September 28, 1904, 6 P.M.*

*Outposts of the enemy* are holding the line of villages Tschan-tan<sup>1</sup>—Skotch 1. Ta-tu-san-pu<sup>2</sup>—Sia-liu-ho-tsy<sup>3</sup>—Tschin-hsi-sai.<sup>4</sup>

On *our wings* have been ascertained : on the right, small bodies of the enemy on the left bank of the Liao-ho, on the line of villages Tawan—Ma-my-kai ; on the left, about one Infantry brigade, opposite the Da-lin Pass.

The enemy's main forces are distributed as follows :

About two Divisions écheloned on the line San-de-pu—Hokun-pu ;<sup>5</sup>

About four Divisions within the space Tschan-tai-tsy—Sachutun—Liao-yan ;

About two Divisions at the coal-pits of Yen-tai ;

About two Divisions écheloned on the line Bian-yu-pu-sa—Pen-si-hu.

The enemy is entrenching *positions* :

1. On the line of villages Schan-kan-tsy—Tschan-tai-tsy—on the heights south of Yin-tschen-tsy village, on the line of villages Tun-ta-liën-pu—Tsiën-tau—on the heights east of Tsiën-tau ;

2. North of Bian-yu-pu-sa village, and south-west of that place in the direction on Yin-tsiën-pu.

In rear of the first position are being fortified the heights on the Tai-tsy-ho between the villages of Mu-tschan and Sy-kwan-tun, and behind the second position another at Schan-pin-tai-tsy village.

The Army of Manchuria under my command will advance and attack the enemy in the position he has occupied. Its first task will be to get possession of the right bank of the Tai-tsy-ho.

<sup>1</sup> On the Hun-ho, 4 kilometres north-west of San-de-pu.

<sup>2</sup> On the Scha-ho, 13 kilometres south-east of San-de-pu.

<sup>3</sup> 6 kilometres south-east of the San-kai-seki-san.

<sup>4</sup> 6 kilometres east of Bian-yu-pu-sa.

<sup>5</sup> Where the Scha-ho joins the Tai-tsy-ho.

1. *Western Detachment*

GENERAL OF CAVALRY BARON BILDERLING	
10th Army Corps	. 32 battls., 6 sotnias, 88 guns, 1 Sap. battl.
17th Army Corps	. 32 battls., 12 sqns, 96 guns, 1 Sap. battl.
11th and 12th Orenburg Cossack Regts.	. 12 sotnias.
Ural Cossack Brig. <sup>1</sup>	. 10 sotnias.
11th H.A. Batty.	. 6 guns.
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Total :	64 battls., 28 sotnias, 12 sqns., 190 guns, 2 Sapper battls.

will assemble at the Scha-ho, with the object of advancing thence on both sides of the railway, between the Hun-ho and the road Mukden—Ho-mi-kan—Pai-tschi-tschai—Lüan-fan-tun—Pu-tsau-wa—Tappu—coal-pits of Yen-tai; in doing so, the last-named road is to be used only by protective detachments, the road being apportioned to the advance of the General Reserve.

On the *first day's march* the *advanced guards* will remain in the positions they are in now. The *main bodies* of the 10th and 17th Army Corps will occupy the line Ta-su-kia-pu—Bhf. Su-ya-tun—Sia-örr-tun—Pai-tschi-tschai.

On the *second day's march* the *advanced guards* will occupy the line Tschien-liu-tan-kou—Hun-pau-schan—Yin-schou-tun, proceeding to entrench the position. The *main bodies* will occupy the line Lin-schin-pu—Scha-ho-pu—Lüan-fan-tun, entrenching this position.

2. *Eastern Detachment*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BARON STACKELBERG	
1st Sib. Army Corps	. 24 battls., 16 mach. guns, 10 sotnias, 60 guns, 1 Sap. battl.
2nd Sib. Army Corps <sup>2</sup>	. 17 battls., 8 mach. guns, 2 sotnias, 32 guns, 1 Sap. battl.
3rd Sib. Army Corps <sup>4</sup>	. 32 battls., 8 mach. guns, 7 sotnias, 66 guns, 1 Sap. battl.
Sib. Cossack Division	15 sotnias.
20th H.A. Batty	. 6 guns.
<hr/>	
Total :	73 battls., 32 mach. guns, 34 sotnias, 164 guns, 3 Sap. battls.

will assemble on the line of villages Pa-kia-tsy<sup>2</sup>—Hei-sun-pu—Tai-kiamiau-tsy, with the object of attacking the enemy's position in front and on the right flank. The space for its advance is limited by the roads Fuschun—Ta-yu—Yin-schou-pou-tsy—Pa-kia-tsy—Tschau-huan-tschai—San-kia-tsy, and Fu-lin—Pu-lië-san-tsy—Fön-kia-pu—Bian-yu-pu-sa—Pensi-hu, both roads inclusive.

<sup>1</sup> The Ural Cossack Brigade had to leave Mishtshenko's Division on the evening of the second day's march, and join the Western Detachment.

<sup>2</sup> 3 kilometres north-east of the Kau-tu-lin Pass.

[For notes 3 and 4, see next page.]

On the *first day's march* the *main bodies* will reach the line of villages Schi-hui-tschön—Yen-tau-tsy.

On the *second day's march* the *main bodies* will occupy the line of villages Pa-kia-tsy—Hei-sun-pu—Tai-kia-miau-tsy; *advanced guards* are to be pushed forward to the line Wan-fu-lin Pass—Hou-lou-tsy-gou—Yin-pan<sup>1</sup>—Liu-tschen-ku-tun.

The first task of the Eastern Detachment is to seize the enemy's position at Bian-yu-pu-sa.

### 3. General Reserve

#### (a) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SARUBAIEV

4th Sib. Army Corps : 24 battls.,  
5 sotnias, 48 guns, 1 Sapper battl.

2nd, 3rd, and 4th<sup>1</sup> Sib. Artillery  
Abteilungen : 36 old guns.

5th Mortar Regt. : 18 mortars.

1st and 2nd E. Sib. Mortar  
Batteries<sup>2</sup> : 12 mortars.

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Total : 24 battls., 5 sotnias, 114  
guns, 1 Sapper battl.

#### (b) GENERAL AIDE-DE-CAMP BARON MEIENDORF

1st Army Corps : 32 battls., 4  
sotnias, 96 guns, 1 Sapper battl.

2nd and 3rd Transbaikal Cos-  
sack Batteries : 12 guns.

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Total : 32 battls., 4 sotnias, 108  
guns, 1 Sapper battl.

#### (c) MAJOR-GENERAL MISHTSHENKO À LA SUITE OF H.M.

Independent Transbaikal Cossack  
Brig. : 11 sotnias, 6 guns.

6th H. A. Batty. of Frontier  
Guard : 2 guns.

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Total : 11 sotnias, 8 guns.

<sup>1</sup> Only half a battery.

<sup>2</sup> The 2nd East Siberian Mortar Battery was afterwards attached to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. In the War Organisation (Appendix I.) it is therefore shown with the 3rd, and not with the 4th, Siberian Army Corps.

[Notes continued from previous page.]

<sup>3</sup> Attached to the 2nd Siberian Army Corps were : 213th Infantry Regiment, 4 battalions; 2nd Siberian Infantry Regiment, 1 battalion; 26th Artillery Brigade, 8 guns.

<sup>4</sup> Attached to the 3rd Siberian Army Corps were : 6th Siberian Infantry Regiment, 4 battalions; 7th Siberian Infantry Regiment, 4 battalions; 2nd Werchneudinsk Cossack Regiment, 1 sotnia.

will assemble on the *first day's march* in the space between Mukden and the Hun-ho, east of the Mandarin Road; on the *second day's march*, the bridges in the neighbourhood of Ho-mi-kan village are to be crossed. Billeting within the space Liu-kuan-tun—Yin-tschen-tsy—Schi-kia-tsy.

will assemble on the *first day's march* between Mukden and the Hun-ho, west of the Mandarin Road; on the *second day* the bridges of the Mandarin Road and at Tia-ho village are to be crossed. Billeting within the area San-lin-tsy—Yin-pan.

will assemble at Lüan-fan-tun, after the advanced guards of the Western Detachment have occupied the line Tschien-liu-tan-kou—Hun-pau-schan—Yin-schou-tun.

4. *Covering the Flanks*(a) *Right Flank.* LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DEMBOVSKI

215th Infantry Regt.	4 battls.
216th Infantry Regt.	4 battls.
284th Infantry Regt.	4 battls.
28th Artillery Brig.	18 guns.
4th Sib. Artillery Brig.	8 guns.
1st Argunski Cossack Regt.	4 sotnias.
Independ. Caucasian Cavalry Brig.	12 sotnias.
4th Transbaikal Cossack Batty.	6 guns.
5th E. Sib. Sap. Battl.	} 2 battls.
East Sib. Bridg. Battl.	

Total : 12 battls., 16 sotnias, 32 guns, 2 techn. battls.

## MAJOR-GENERAL KOSSAGVOSKI

281st Infantry Regt.	4 battls.
4th Sib. Infantry Regt.	2 battls.
28th Artillery Brig.	8 guns.
4th Sib. Artillery Brig.	4 guns.
Amur Cossack Regt.	3 sotnias.
Frontier Guard	2 cos., 6 sotnias, 4 guns.

Total : 6½ battls., 9 sotnias, 16 guns.

(b) *Left Flank.* LIEUTENANT-GENERAL VON RENNEKAMPF

214th Infantry Regt.	4 battls.
282nd Infantry Regt.	4 battls.
283rd Infantry Regt.	3 battls.
1st Sib. Infantry Regt.	1 battl.
2nd Sib. Infantry Regt.	1 battl.
26th Artillery Brig.	24 guns.
Frontier Guard	2 guns.
2nd Brig. Transbaikal Cossack Div.	12 sotnias.
1st Argunski Cossack Regt.	2 sotnias.
Amur Cossack Regt.	2 sotnias.
4th H. A. Mtn. Batty.	} 4 guns.
Frontier Guard	
5th E. Sib. Sapper Battl.	1 co.

Total : 13 battls., 16 sotnias, 30 guns, 1 Sapper company.

will secure the right flank of the Army; assembling on the *first day's march* at Pa-tiën-tai village, pushing an advanced guard to San-tsian village; on the *second day*, march to be continued to Hei-tschuan-tsy village; advanced guard to Tschan-tan.

The further task of the detachment will be the occupation of the crossing at Tschan-tan, where a bridge is to be thrown, and to be protected by a bridge-head on both banks of the Hun-ho.

will cover the extreme right flank of the Army on the Liao-ho, advancing on the left bank of the Liao-ho, and remaining on a level and in touch with Dembovski's Detachment.

During the advance, portions of the detachment are to be left behind for protecting the Liao-ho line, beginning at Schi-futsy<sup>1</sup> village.

will cover the left flank of the Army. With this object, the detachment will concentrate in the direction of Ma-tsiu-dan—Da-lin Pass (Sin-tsin-tin will remain occupied), advancing then against the front, Mi-tsy—Siao-syr. This movement is to conform with that of the Army.

<sup>1</sup> Position of the place not known,

## COLONEL MADRITOV, OF THE GENERAL

## STAFF

1st Sib. Infantry Regt.	1 battl.
Detachments of Mounted Scouts of 1st and 15th E. Sib. Rifle Regts. . . . .	
Ussuri Cossack Regt.	1 sotnia.
Caucasian Volunteers	1 sotnia.
Frontier Guard . . . . .	2 guns.
<hr/>	
Total :	1 battl., 2 sotnias, 2 detachments, Scouts, 2 guns.

will cover the extreme left flank of the Army ; advance in the direction of Ta-pin-di-schan—Sai-ma-tsy, keeping in touch with Rennenkampf's Detachment.

5. *Covering the Rear*

6th Sib. Army Corps : 32 battls.,<sup>1</sup> will be écheloned between Mukden and Tië-liu, in conformity with a special Order.  
6 sotnias, 96 guns,<sup>2</sup> 1 Sapper battl.

*Total strength of fighting troops* : 257½ battalions, with 32 machine guns, 143 squadrons or sotnias, 760 field guns (among which 48 old field guns, 36 mortars, 16 quick-firing mountain guns, and 14 old mountain guns), 9 Sapper battalions, 1 Bridging battalion.<sup>3</sup>

6. A supplementary Order will be issued when the *advance is to begin*.

7. *2nd line transport* will be half a day's march, and *3rd line transport* one whole day's march behind the end of the column marching on the roads assigned to them by the Commanders of the Detachments.

8. *Reports* will be sent to the head of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, which is going to advance by the road Mukden—Ho-mi-kan—Pai-tschi-tschai—Örrr-tau-kou.

*Deputies* : LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SACKAROV.

GENERAL AIDE-DE-CAMP BARON MEIENDORF.

(Signed) The Commander-in-Chief of the Army :

General Aide-de-Camp KUROPATKIN.

Chief of the Staff : Lieutenant-General SACKAROV.

<sup>1</sup> In the War Organisation (Appendix I.), the 1st Brigade 55th Infantry Division is not included, hence only 24 battalions there.

<sup>2</sup> Two batteries of the 10th Artillery Brigade are not included in War Organisation (Appendix I.), hence only 80 guns there.

<sup>3</sup> Including the troops remaining behind in the positions of Tië-lin and Mukden. Without them results the total strength calculated in War Organisation (Appendix I.).

## APPENDIX X

### KUROPATKIN'S PROCLAMATION OF OCTOBER 2, 1904

More than seven months have now passed since the enemy treacherously surprised us without previous declaration of war. Since that time, the Russian troops have achieved many great deeds by land and sea, of which our fatherland may be proud; but the enemy has not only been hitherto unconquered, he is also constantly striving to beat us completely. The troops of the Manchurian Army were certainly strong in courage, but not strong enough in numbers for driving away the Japanese Armies. Much time was required for removing all obstacles, and making the Army strong enough for taking in hand, with full confidence, the solution of the heavy but honourable and glorious task imposed on it. This was the reason why I did not think the time had arrived yet for assuming the offensive myself, but ordered a withdrawal on the occasions when we successfully repelled the Japanese attacks at Ta-schi-tschao, Lian-dia-san, and in the positions of Liao-yan. You have abandoned the heroically defended positions, strewn with countless Japanese corpses, without being pressed by the enemy; you have withdrawn to the prepared positions ready to resume the combat after the fights lasting five days around Liao-yan, which cost the Japanese heavy loss. Though completely successful, you have abandoned every position, retiring under most unfavourable conditions. Attacked by Kuroki's Army pushing against the flank, you have marched on Mukden, have waded through bottomless morasses, have fought day and night, and brought away guns and vehicles with your own hands; you did not leave a gun or a prisoner in the hands of the enemy—have taken along with you all wounded, and not lost a vehicle. With sadness in my heart, I have ordered you to retire, but also with the unshakable confidence that our retreat was absolutely necessary to gain a decisive victory over the enemy, when the time has come. By the supreme will of His Majesty the Emperor, new forces have been detailed, which shall ensure us victory. All difficulties of bringing up the fresh reinforcements the

long distance of 10,000 versts from home have been overcome in splendid manner by the persevering energy and ability of the authorities and persons who have dealt with this difficult transport, which is without a parallel. Several 100,000 men, many thousands of horses and vehicles, million puds<sup>1</sup> of material have been brought up into Manchuria by rail from European Russia and Siberia, without interruption, in the course of seven months, and this stream is still swelling.

If the number of troops available do not appear sufficient, new regiments will arrive; the firm will of His Majesty the Emperor, however, that we shall beat the enemy, must be carried out at all cost. Hitherto, our adversary, by making use of his superior numbers, and by disposing his Army to envelop us, has operated according to his own free will, choosing his time for attacking us when it pleased him. But now the time the Army has been longing for has at last arrived, that we should go forward and meet the enemy. The moment has arrived for us to force *our will* upon the Japanese, for we are now strong enough for *assuming the offensive*. But you must not forget that, to gain a victory over a powerful and brave enemy, it is necessary, in addition to numerical superiority, for every one, from the oldest to the youngest, to be resolute to the last, whatever sacrifice it may cost. Hold in mind, every one of you, the importance of a victory for Russia; remember, especially, how necessary it is for us to join hands with our brethren in Port Arthur, who for the last seven months have been heroically defending the fortress entrusted to their care. Our Army has in all wars achieved great deeds when protecting throne and fatherland, and has acquired the highest fame among every nation. Now bear in mind that, by the will of the Tsar, you are charged with upholding Russia's position and her rights in the Far East; think that, by the trust imposed in you by our Tsar, you are charged with preserving the honour of the Army of Russia. Our august Master and, with him, all Russia are praying for us and bless us! Invigorated by this prayer, and fully conscious of the importance of the task entrusted to us, we will fearlessly advance, firmly resolved to stake our lives in fulfilling our duty to the last. **May the will of the Almighty guide us all!**

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<sup>1</sup> Pud = 40 Russian lb. = 33 English lb. (about)

## APPENDIX XI

### ORDER TO THE TROOPS OF THE WESTERN DETACHMENT

MUKDEN, September 30, 1904.

*Information about the Enemy*  
*Intentions of the Commander-in-Chief*  
*Distribution and Task of the Western Detachment* } Verbatim,  
as in  
General Order.

Sketch 1. 1. *10th Army Corps* (LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SLUTSHEVSKI): 32 battalions, 6 sotnias, 88 guns, 1 Sapper battalion. For concentration at the Scha-ho the road Tia-ho—San-ho-kuan-tun—La-mu-tun—Pan-kiau-pu, and the roads east of it as far as the road Mukden—Ho-mi-kan—Pai-tschi-tschai—Lüan-fan-tun—Pu-tsau-wa—Ta-pu—coal-pits of Yen-tai, are apportioned to the corps; the latter road must only be used by protective detachments, it being proposed to use that road for the advance of the General Reserve.

On the *first day's march* the advanced guard will remain in its position at Huan-schan; a new advanced guard is to be sent forward by the main body, relieving on that same day the portion of the advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps standing at Scha-ho-pu. The main body will advance on a level with Sia-örr-tun village.

On the *second day's march* the advanced guards will reach the line of villages Pan-kiau-pu—Hun-pau-schan—Yin-schou-tun, entrenching that line; the heights near Yin-schou-tun village are to be fortified particularly strongly. The main body will reach the line of villages Scha-ho-pu—Lüan-fan-tun, proceeding to entrench the position south of that line; particular attention must be paid here to fortifying the height north of Hou-tai village.

2. *17th Army Corps* (LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WOLKOV): 32 battalions, 11 squadrons,<sup>1</sup> 96 guns, 1 Sapper battalion. For concentration at the Scha-ho the roads along the railway embankment, and west of it as far as the road Ma-kia-pu—Kuan-lin-pu—Ta-tu-san pu—Ko-tschen-pau, are apportioned to the corps.

On the *first day's march* the portion of the advanced guard of the 17th Army Corps standing at Scha-ho-pu will join the portion of the advanced guard standing at Lin-schin-pu after it has been relieved by the advanced guard of the 10th Army Corps. The portion of the advanced guard standing at Kuan-lin-pu will remain in its position on the first day's march. The main body of the corps will reach the line of villages Ta-su-kia-pu—Su-ya-tun Station (Bhf.).

On the *second day's march* the advanced guards will reach the line

<sup>1</sup> One squadron of the 52nd Dragoon Regiment is charged with a special task in paragraph 4 of this Order.

Liu-tan-kou — Tschien-liu-tan-kou — Tsun-lun-yen-tun, constructing entrenchments here. The main body will reach the line of villages Lin-schin-pu—La-mu-tun, proceeding to entrench the position south of that line.

3. *Cavalry* :

(a) MAJOR-GENERAL GREKOV. Orenburg Cossack Division : 12 sotnias, and 6 guns. Watching and reconnoitring in front between the Scha-ho and Hun-ho is to be continued. Protecting the right flank of the Western Detachment during its advance. Touch is to be maintained with Dembovski's Detachment and with the Ural Cossack Brigade.

On the *second day's march* the main body will concentrate at Wan-tschuan-tsy.

(b) COLONEL SHABYKO. Ural Cossack Brigade : 10 sotnias. After the line of villages Tschien-liu-tan-kou—Hun-pau-schan—Yin-schou-tun has been occupied by the advanced guards, the Ural Cossack Brigade will continue watching and reconnoitring in front between the Scha-ho and the road Mukden—Fön-kia-pu—Bian-yu-pu-sa.

Touch is to be maintained with the Cavalry of the Eastern Detachments and with Grekov's Detachment.

On the *second day's march* the main body of the brigade will concentrate at Hun-pau-schan village.

4. *Communication*.—Lieutenant-Colonel Mirbach, with a squadron 52nd Dragoon Regiment. When the advance begins, communication will be established between the staff of the Western Detachment under my command and the staffs of the Army Corps, Grekov's Detachment, and General Headquarters.

5. Attention is called to the necessity of the *columns keeping in touch with each other*.

6. Verbatim, as in paragraph 7 of the General Order.

7. I request most energetic measures to be taken for keeping the intended operations *secret* from the inhabitants of the country. When our operations begin, Chinamen must be prevented at all cost from passing our line in the direction of the enemy.

8. *Reports* are to be sent to the head of the main body of the 17th Army Corps, which is going to march by the road along the railway embankment.

9. *Deputies* : LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SLUTSHEVSKI.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WOLKOV.

10. A supplementary Order will be issued, stating the time when the *advance is to begin*.

(Signed) The Commander of the Western Detachment of the Army :  
General of Cavalry Baron BILDERLING.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Baron THIESENHAUSEN,

THE ORDER IS DISPATCHED *October 1, 12 NOON*.

## APPENDIX XII

### ORDER TO THE TROOPS OF THE WESTERN DETACHMENT OF THE ARMY

HAN-TSCHEN-PU, *October 13, 6 P.M.*

1. The Commander-in-Chief has placed under my orders *the 6th Siberian Army Corps* and *Dembovski's Detachment*.

2. *The enemy* is standing on the line Hun-lin-pu—Schu-lin-tsy—San-kia-tsy.

3. To-morrow *the 10th and 17th Army Corps* will continue obstinately defending their positions on the Scha-ho.

4 *The 6th Siberian Army Corps* will advance at daybreak to the line Schau-kia-lin-tsy—Ta-lian-tun.

5. *Dembovski's Detachment* will remain on the right bank of the Hun-ho. The Caucasian Cavalry Brigade, with the two battalions attached to it, will go to-morrow with its main body to Yen-schu-lin-tsy, and with its advanced guard to Ho-liën-tai.

6. *Grekov's Cavalry Brigade* will continue its reconnoissance in front between the Scha-ho and Hun-ho, advancing with its main body in the direction on San-de-pu, covering the right flank of our Army Group, and endeavouring to drive the enemy out of San-de-pu.

7. *The troops of our Army Group* will be prepared to assume the offensive.

(Signed) BILDERLING.

## APPENDIX XIII

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE WESTERN DETACHMENT

*October 14.*

RECEIVED 11.45 A.M.

General Sarubaiev is withdrawing into a position in advance of Örr-tau-kou to align himself with the Army.

The 1st Army Corps, which is still in action, will be conducted back to the General Reserve at Lo-siën-tun—San-kiä-tsy. Mau's Brigade is going to rejoin its corps.

Your left flank is thus secured by the disposition of the General Reserve; you will have to adopt only measures for watching the interval between your position and that of the 4th Siberian Army Corps.

On the left wing of the 10th Army Corps a position must be prepared in which that corps, while refusing its left wing, can delay the enemy's attack long enough for me to bring into action the General Reserve, and neutralise the enemy's envelopment.

Hold your position, giving more frequent information on the situation to enable me to dispose of the General Reserve accordingly.

(Signed) KUROPATKIN.

## APPENDIX XIV

### ORDER TO THE TROOPS OF THE WESTERN DETACHMENT OF THE ARMY FOR OCTOBER 16

1. *The enemy* is in occupation of the southern bank of the Scha-ho and of Lin-schin-pu village.

2. *Our troops* are on the line Fu-kia-tun-kou—Kuan-tun—Ta-lian-tun—Schau-kia-lin-tsy.

3. *The Army* is going to attack; the General Reserve is advancing to attack on our left.

4. *The 10th Army Corps* will reach the line Nin-kuan-tun—Hun-pauschan,

*the 17th Army Corps*: the line Pan-kiau-pu—Liu-tan-kou,

*the 6th Siberian Army Corps*: Tschien-liu-tan-kou,

*Dembovski's Detachment*: Tsun-lun-yen-tun.

*Dembovski's Detachment* is placed under the orders of the 6th Siberian Army Corps; a flank guard will be left behind at Likia-tun.

5. *Grekov's Cavalry Brigade* will cover the right flank of the Army.

6. *Touch* with Novikov's Detachment from the 1st Army Corps will be maintained by two sotnias of the 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment.

7. *The hour* for beginning the attack will be issued in a supplementary order.

8. The units will mutually inform each other of their position, so as to avoid firing into each other as they have done.

(Signed) BILDERLING.

## APPENDIX XV

### THE GENERAL ORDER ISSUED ON OCTOBER 19

The series of the past combats have confirmed what we assumed to be the distribution of the Japanese forces.

*Oku's Army*, about 60 battalions and 30 squadrons strong, is on the left, opposite Dembovski's Detachment, the 6th Siberian, the 17th, and part of the 10th Army Corps.

In the centre have been ascertained: the 5th and 10th Divisions of *Nodzu's Army*, about 32 battalions strong, opposite the 10th Army Corps and Gerngross's Detachment (1st Army Corps).

Farther east, in the direction of the Yen-tai mines and Örr-tau-kou, *Kuroki's Army* is operating—strength: three Divisions with reserve brigades; of these, one or two Divisions, with one or two reserve brigades, are opposite the 4th Siberian and 1st Siberian Army Corps; <sup>1</sup> farther east, at Bian-yu-pu-sa, about two reserve brigades are opposed to General Rennenkampf. One or two Divisions of Kuroki's Army are stationed as General Reserve north of the Yen-tai coal-pits; this reserve may be used against our left flank as well as against our centre.

At Port Arthur have been ascertained: the 1st, 9th, and 11th Divisions. As regards the 7th and 8th Divisions, their station is not exactly known; but probably one of these Divisions is at Liao-yan, if not both.

Prisoners state that the Japanese have suffered heavy losses in the recent combats, that their companies are far from being up to their full strength, and that the number of their sick is great. The Japanese Army is suffering from want of food and from the cold nights. In the action of October 16<sup>2</sup> three regiments of the 5th and 10th Divisions were completely annihilated, the Japanese losing here 14 guns and 1 machine gun, and suffering enormous losses in dead and wounded. Judging by the moods of the prisoners, this bloody action has crushed the spirit of the Japanese completely.

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
<sup>1</sup> That is to say, somewhere near Fön-kia-pu.


<sup>2</sup> Fight for Putilov Hill.

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We must wish the Japanese some more of these lessons! We are already somewhat superior in numbers; we have greater experience in conducting an action. We must take advantage of the defeat inflicted on them. The troops must be given to understand that fresh and energetic efforts are required for relieving Port Arthur, and that we must leave the enemy no time for reinforcing himself and making good his losses.

(Signed) KUROPATKIN.





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