



SHELLED FROM THREE POINTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF A RUSSIAN BATTERY BY THE CONCENTRATED FIRE OF THE JAPANESE.



CASSELL'S HISTORY
OF THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Illustrated

VOLUME II

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REJOICINGS IN TOKIO OVER A VICTORY.

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THE SURRENDER OF PORT ARTHUR: THE CAPITULATION FLAGS.



Photo: T. Ruddiman Johnston, Tokio.

RUSSIAN PRISONERS FROM PORT ARTHUR ARRIVING AT TAKAHAMU, JAPAN.

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
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DALNY THEATRE CONVERTED INTO A RETREAT FOR SICK AND WOUNDED JAPANESE SOLDIERS.



Photo: Urban, Limited.

MAIN STREET, HARBIN.

THE HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

CHAPTER XLVII.

INSIDE PORT ARTHUR—A SPIRITED DEFENCE—THE JAPANESE APPROACH—OYAMA IN
COMMAND—DIARY OF THE SIEGE—TORPEDO ATTACKS—CAPTURE OF WOLF'S HILL—
NAVAL INCIDENTS.

THE morning mist has lifted from the sea, and in the growing light of a summer day Port Arthur and its environs are revealed in clear-cut detail. A contrast, this, with the midnight gloom in which, also at Port Arthur, the first great opening scene of the war was enacted; and the contrast deepens as we examine more closely the appearance of the great Russian fortress after nearly half a year of almost continuous and strongly determined fighting.

The Russian flag is still flying, and flying with a pride that is fully justified by a splendidly stubborn defence. In the harbour Russian warships are still grouped in no inconsiderable strength. Our old friend, the battleship *Tsarevitch*, with several consorts and a fair show

of cruisers, including the trusty *Bayan* and the plucky little *Novik*, are still at their moorings; and there are more than enough destroyers for the purpose of patrolling the restricted area left unguarded by the blockading enemy. But even here the change is marked, indeed, from the aspect at the beginning of February, when Russia fondly believed that at sea as well as on land her weight of metal would give her a supremacy which Japan would hardly dare to question. The ships have been patched up, and are more or less ready for sea, but here and there it is evident that the battering which some have received has left its mark upon speed and fighting efficiency. Nor is the harbour either the post of refuge or the centre of activity which it

has been at a comparatively recent stage of the war itself. Occasionally it suffers from the high-angle fire of the Japanese guns, and the docks and workshops, by reason of the Chinese exodus, are no longer full of the busy hum of men. In place of the former rush of work, and ceaseless clanging of hammers and whirring of lathes, there is little beyond the business of ordinary repairs, and a general air of anxious waiting for the moment when relief from the present suffocating strain can be obtained by vigorous action.

Seldom has a powerful fleet suffered such a period of enforced idleness as that imposed upon the Russian warships at Port Arthur by the wrong-headedness of Russia's naval policy, coupled with Japan's watchful superiority in all that relates to operations at sea. It is surprising, indeed, that any efficiency or morale should remain after the vicissitudes of the past few months, and, though it does remain, and is presently to be demonstrated, there is no question that the Squadron moored in Port Arthur harbour in July is sadly changed from that of which the battleships lay grouped in the outside roadstead on the night of February 8th.

Coming ashore, we find the difference between then and now still more marked. It is a curious characteristic of most great sieges that, after the alarm of the early bombardments, and the realisation of the fact that relief is practically out of the question, a disposition sets in to accept the situation, and to make little of it by resumption of the ordinary modes of life. It is not a matter of bravado so much as of sheer *ennui*. People get tired of thinking about nothing else than their uncomfortable surroundings, and long for some relief from the monotony, even if added

danger be incurred in the process. Accordingly, at Port Arthur this July morning there is still some show of animation in the streets. Captain Bradley, of the *Hipsang*, the British steamer which, as narrated in Chapter XLIII., was torpedoed in Pigeon Bay on July 16th, reports that the general appearance of the town does not at this period indicate a state of siege or, indeed, of any sort of distress. The shops and stores are open, and business is brisk. Captain Bradley expressly mentions that during his detention at Port Arthur, which lasted a fortnight, he was twice allowed to leave his quarters in order to purchase provisions, which were plentiful and moderate in price. He also speaks of seeing ladies and children in the streets, and remarks on the maintenance of communication, presumably by blockade runners and wireless telegraphy, with Chifu and other places. Altogether an impression which goes far to contradict the gloomy reports given by Chinese and other refugees, who declare that Port Arthur has been reduced to very considerable straits, that the supply of fresh meat has been exhausted, and that only the troops are getting salt meat, non-combatants subsisting mainly on oatmeal and rice.

Perhaps the absolute truth lies somewhere between Captain Bradley's favourable description and the highly-coloured account given by men possibly not unwilling to exaggerate a little in order to procure some added sympathy. It must be remembered that, in the case of a close investment, it is almost invariably sought by the besieged to give outsiders the idea that, practically speaking, no inconvenience is being suffered, and that provisions, in particular, are plentiful. It may be that no special precaution was

taken in this respect with Captain Bradley; but it is equally possible that the authorities, in view of his release, made a special effort to convince him that Port Arthur was in a good way as regards necessaries of life, and that the inhabitants regarded with comparative in-

oldest ruses of war, this of attempting to convey indirectly to the outside world the notion that a siege is being rather enjoyed than otherwise; and without, of course, any thought of disparaging Captain Bradley's evidence, there is no harm in supposing that he was to some extent



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ARRIVAL OF RUSSIAN CAVALRY AT PORT ARTHUR BEFORE ITS INVESTMENT.

difference the circumstance that they were literally encompassed by a strong and skilful enemy. In fact, it is recorded that when the master of the *Hipsang* was examined by the captain of the *Retvisan* the latter roundly asserted that Port Arthur was provisioned for three years. Similarly, when Captain Bradley was permitted to purchase provisions, it is not improbable that he was allowed to buy them at a low price. It is one of the

purposely misled as to the real state of affairs inside the fortress.

On the other hand, there is even greater cause to mistrust the reports of the refugees, some of which are proved in other directions to have been quite baseless. It is quite possible that "useless mouths" at Port Arthur during the later developments of the siege were not often filled with substantial food, but that is the ordinary fate of civilians who persist

in remaining in a beleaguered town, usually in hope of making some inordinate profit, when they have been given a strong hint to get away. But whatever may have been the unsatisfied longings of the non-combatant population, there is no reason to suppose that the troops at Port Arthur during July were suffering from any lack of provisions, or from any other kindred hardship except, it seems, the loss of *vodka* and tobacco. In these, it appears from a private letter from an officer of the garrison to a friend in Mukden, which was smuggled out of the fortress by a Chinaman, there is a veritable famine. In the letter in question, the genuineness of which is vouched for by the *Daily Express* Correspondent at Chifu, "an impassioned appeal" is made to the Mukden friend to get Chinamen, at any cost, to run the blockade with cigarettes concealed on their persons, and it is declared that the lack of anything to smoke is the chief cause of the depression among the gallant defenders of Port Arthur.

It is not likely that in the imaginary visit we are paying to Port Arthur we should notice such a detail as this, but there are other matters connected with the position of the besieged which would not fail to catch the eye. First, we could not but notice many traces of the repeated bombardments to which the town, as well as the forts and harbour, has been subjected. Captain Bradley speaks of the town as being "uninjured by the bombardment;" but here again it is natural to suppose that care was taken to disguise from him the more serious ravages caused by the constant arrival of big shells charged with one of the most powerful explosives known. It is mentioned in the above-quoted letter, which was written before the great attack on

Port Arthur was commenced, that even then the Japanese shell-fire was causing daily losses among the troops; and before a shell causes the death of a single soldier it may well happen that half-a-dozen buildings are wrecked.

But it is not in Port Arthur town that the main interest of the siege is centred, but in the defensive works, the men behind the guns, and the officers who direct the latter. It is possible that on board the ships in the harbour we may have caught a glimpse of Admiral Vitoft—whose name in earlier despatches, by an error of transliteration, is usually given as "Witgert"—and Grigorovitch, and now on shore we are very likely to encounter General Stoessel on his daily round of the defences. The gallant commandant is, perhaps, preparing, as he goes along, one of those spirited speeches which he constantly delivers to the men, telling them that the eyes of the Tsar and of all Russia are upon them, that they must help him to hold out to the last, and that Kuropatkin is only biding his time to sweep the Liaotung Peninsula clear of the Japanese, and thus bring the temporary isolation of Port Arthur to a great and glorious conclusion. At heart, one fears, poor General Stoessel is not so confident. That he will hold out to the last, like the good fighting soldier he is, need not be doubted; but he has probably little doubt as to the inevitable result of the siege, for it appears that he is about to send away Madame Stoessel, who has thus far devotedly stayed by his side; and in a letter written not long after this period he is said to have used the pathetic words, "Good-bye, good-bye, for Port Arthur will be my tomb!"

But of such sad foreboding there is no reflection, we may be sure, in the

General's proud demeanour, nor in that of his subordinates. For there is ample evidence that throughout this period the discipline and morale both of the troops and the fleet are excellent. Captain Bradley particularly notices the smartness and good spirits exhibited by the officers; and where these preserve their indifference to an ugly and uncomfortable environment we may be sure the Russian rank and file are up to the mark. Yet it must need all their fortitude to maintain a bold front with the clear knowledge that day by day the enemy's grip is tightening, and that as yet no solitary gleam of hope beyond the Commandant's assurances has brightened the monotony of constant fighting and repeated losses. The health of the troops is declared to be excellent; but there must be hundreds in hospital suffering from wounds, and for a garrison now reduced, it is expertly estimated, to about 22,000 men, the wear and tear of duty in the trenches alone must be very exhausting. For attacks by night are frequently delivered by the Japanese, not, in all probability, with any idea of creating any deep impression, but merely to prevent the garrison from getting rest.

For the rest, it would seem that for the defenders of Port Arthur during July the main interest lies in the fact that, even before the final series of attacks is delivered, the altered character of the siege is becoming daily more apparent. No longer is the sea the quarter from which danger is to be chiefly apprehended. There are attacks occasionally carried out by venturesome Japanese torpedo craft against the Russian guardships, and mines continue to be sown; but the era of alarm caused by continual attempts to block the harbour by sunken merchantmen seems to have passed. Considerable liberty of movement is

allowed to the Russian ships, for we hear of opportunities seized by the brisk little *Novik* to dash out and bombard the enemy's positions on the narrowing semi-circle which shuts in Port Arthur by land. But the brunt of the present fighting has to be borne by the troops, and for these there is practically no respite. Day in and day out, and at all hours, not only must the gun-teams be on the alert, but the infantry must be prepared to resist a violent inrush, and, if they are compelled to give way, they must lose no time in girding themselves for a desperate effort to regain some useful position they have lost. We shall never, in all probability, have any circumstantial and coherent account of the manner in which the Russian troops in Port Arthur fought out the long weary days and short, sharp nights of July in one almost continuous struggle against the gradually advancing forces of the Japanese. But there is no doubt that the record in question, were it available, would be one of unflinching heroism, of steady reluctance to fall back, of passionate devotion to duty, and of calm loyalty to the old watchword, "Mighty Russia and the Tsar!"


And now let us endeavour to construct, from the scanty materials available, at least an outline narrative of these initial weeks of siege, taking a few known facts as our starting point, and discarding many of the doubtful rumours which, under the appropriate designation of "Chifooleries," are forthcoming in rank abundance at this period. The task is no easy one, for the reticence of the Japanese authorities reaches its culminating point in respect of the earlier operations around Port Arthur, and for nearly six weeks since the occupation of Dalny not one single official report

concerning the doings of the besieging army is sent out from Tokio. Indeed, so rigorous is the censorship that an English journal published at Yokohama, which issued the news of the fighting on June 26th, to which allusion was made in Chapter XXXVI., was promptly cited before a law court and fined. Subsequently a special veto was placed upon the appearance in any paper produced in, or any telegram sent from Japan, of any sort of news likely to throw light on the siege operations at Port Arthur. From time to time there are messages from General Stoessel, and here and there the statements of the refugees bear signs of being remotely trustworthy. But, as the Tokio correspondent of the *Times*, writing on July 10th, remarks, it is scarcely too much to say that at no period of the war have military affairs been shrouded in greater secrecy than at this. Nor is the obscurity likely to be much lightened in regard to the earlier stages of the siege, in which the fighting was mostly desultory, and fortune seems to have favoured both sides pretty equally.

A brief reference has already been made in Chapter XXXVI. to the fighting of June 26th and July 4th, in the course of which the Japanese succeeded, first in occupying a line of eminences confronting the fortress on the east, and afterwards in capturing the Miaotsui Fort (page 440). These operations fell to the share of the column advancing from Dalny by way of the Siao-ping-tao Promontory, which lies only about fourteen miles from the eastern face of the Port Arthur fortifications. Simultaneously, as before mentioned, there is another column following the central road from Kin-chau, and working its way toward Shui-shi-ying, or "Naval Camp," which is plainly marked on the plan on page

437. About half a mile south of the village of Shui-shi-ying is an eminence about 200 feet high, and surmounted by a temple which is known as Wolf's Hill, and which must not be confounded with the White Wolf Mountain to the southwest of the Tiger's Tail. Of a very determined struggle which took place at this point something will be said presently. In the meantime, mention is merely made of the locality in order to indicate the converging nature of the Japanese attack.

As another interesting piece of preliminary information, it should now be stated that Field-Marshal Count Oyama, who, as noted at the close of Chapter XXXIV., left Tokio on July 6th to assume his active duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese armies in the field, has elected to make the siege operations at Port Arthur his earliest care. He is accompanied by General Baron Kodama as his Chief of the Staff, and by Major-Generals Fukushima and Inokuchi. It is not difficult to imagine the joyful satisfaction with which the veteran captor of Port Arthur in 1894 is received at Dalny, where there is already a notable revival even of commercial activity. To Marshal Oyama himself the landing must indeed be pregnant with reflections, with memories of the vigorous operations he directed aforesaid with such prompt success, with grave anticipations of much greater difficulties now to be surmounted. There is something historically most remarkable in this instance of a military commander being called upon a second time within a decade to take charge of the siege of a mighty fortress. To an emotional people such a repetition might seem to carry with it the best of omens for a fresh success. But to a singularly level-headed thinker like Oyama it will



BEFORE PORT ARTHUR A SECOND TIME: MARSHAL OYAMA, COMMANDER OF THE JAPANESE FIELD FORCES.

Ten years ago Marshal Oyama directed the operations which led to the capture of Port Arthur. He has now taken the field in person with a view to repeating his former success.

probably have seemed that the very successfulness of his first endeavour was a bad preparation for the strongly enhanced obstacles that beset his present enterprise. For it is no disparagement to his victorious entry of Port Arthur in 1894 to say that between the rushing of the fortress then and its present investment there is almost as much difference as there was between the Mahdi's long siege of Khartoum in 1884-5 and Kitchen-er's swift capture of Omdurman in 1898.

After the fighting on July 4th there appears to have been a slight lull; but accounts from two distinct sources agree that there was a brisk renewal of hostilities two or three days later, in which the Russians claim to have recaptured an advanced hill commanding the Lung-wang-tang Pass. On July 9th another suspension takes place, during which the Japanese intrench themselves in such positions as they have secured. The Russians press them with rifle fire, and the work is further impeded by heavy falls of rain.

On July 10th the Russian cruisers *Bayan*, *Diana*, *Pallada*, and *Novik*, with two gunboats and seven destroyers, emerge from the harbour, preceded by many mine-clearing dredgers. In the afternoon they are nearing the entrance to the Lung-wang River when they are met and attacked by a Japanese flotilla, which exchanges fire with the *Bayan*, and is so persistent in its attentions that the Russian ships retreat into the harbour. The same night a spirited attack with torpedo-boats is carried out by the Japanese, but with no results. According to the Port Arthur journal, the *Novy Krai*, the attack was delivered by twenty torpedo-boats covered by six cruisers and five gunboats. The Russians were on the alert, and the Japanese were repulsed

without, however, sustaining apparent loss. It is reminiscent of former Japanese naval exploits that later in the night a single torpedo-boat should have made for the harbour entrance at full speed, after the manner of the *Asagiri* and *Hayatori* on the night of February 13th. But on this occasion the plucky little adventuress, whoever she is, is met by a hail of shells, and is compelled to withdraw without having effected her purpose.

Mention of the *Hayatori* brings us to a clever capture made about this time by that smart destroyer, which succeeds in waylaying a junk carrying a bag of letters from Port Arthur to Chifu. The haul is a useful one, for among the letters are some conveying valuable information regarding the naval and military conditions at Port Arthur. It is pleasant to be able to add that, with scrupulous courtesy, the Japanese forward all letters not dealing with warlike topics to St. Petersburg, with the request that they may be duly delivered thence to the addressees.

The attack by the torpedo craft on July 10th may possibly have been intended to keep the Russians pleasantly occupied pending the reception of the touring vessel *Manchu Maru*, with the Navy Department's guests on board, by Admiral Togo. This function appears to have taken place on July 14th at the "secret naval base" of the Japanese Fleet in the Elliot Group, three or four hours' steaming from Port Arthur. Admiral Togo would naturally prefer not to be interrupted on such an interesting occasion by being compelled to hover round Port Arthur with his larger ships, and so may have devised the torpedo attack as a means of deterring the Russians from venturing outside the harbour for some few days. Be this as it may, there is no further sortie for the

present; and Admiral Togo is able to show his guests a very imposing spectacle in the shape of five battleships and nine cruisers, with gunboats and torpedo-craft, all grey and powder-stained, but presenting a magnificent panorama of fighting power and readiness.

It is utterly impossible to follow the land operations in detail during the next fortnight; but some credence may be given to the report that on July 12th a considerable Japanese force succeeded in effecting a temporary lodgment in a fort only four or five miles east of Port Arthur, but was surrounded and practically annihilated by the Russians before reinforcements could come up. It is said that on this occasion the Russian land mines were exploded with particularly deadly effect.

On July 16th occurs the episode of the sinking of the *Hipsang*, to which allusion was made in Chapter XLIII. From further details now available, it would seem that the Russian account of this incident is altogether misleading, for the vessel, having apparently been mistaken for a Japanese transport, is torpedoed and sunk in an outrageously off-hand fashion, for which in due course an indemnity will be demanded.

According to Chinese accounts, which fit in rather better than usual with the probabilities of the situation, there was heavy fighting round Lung-wang-tang on July 17th and 18th. The Russian wounded brought in by carts and rickshaws were estimated at 400, and there is no question that throughout July the fighting on this eastern face of the Port Arthur defences must have been extraordinarily severe and deadly.

On July 24th the destroyer *Lieutenant Burukoff*, which has recently run the blockade and made a daring journey to

and from Niu-chwang (by a misreading of the earlier despatches this vessel, on page 429, was stated to have been commanded by Lieutenant Burukoff), comes to grief in a fog. In company with two other destroyers she falls foul of two Japanese gunboats and some torpedo-boats, and is torpedoed and sunk, her companions being variously reported as cripples and total losses.

Hitherto, most of the land fighting round Port Arthur has been done by the column operating from Dalny, but on July 25th the column advancing along the Kin-chau road on Shui-shi-ying begins to come into very active prominence. On the afternoon of that day the Japanese artillery opens fire, and the Russians, evidently noticing an increase in the weight of metal employed, sleep that night on their arms in the trenches, which are said to occupy a line nearly fifteen miles long. At six o'clock in the morning of the 26th the Japanese again open fire, and continue all day bombarding the whole length of the Russian line. "The Japanese aim," says the *Novy Krai*, "was more accurate than before, showing the benefit of the previous day's practice. Their heaviest fire was directed against the batteries, which included the 12-in. naval guns, commanded by Prince Tscheodse and Captain Skrydloff. A perfect shower of shells struck the earthworks or went screeching overhead into the valley behind the batteries, causing considerable havoc among the artillerymen."

According to some accounts, the Japanese made one or more attacks on Wolf Hill—the position of which has already been described—in the course of the 26th, but were heavily repulsed, and spent the night lying on the slopes leading up to the temple-crowned eminence.

July 27th is a day of terrific struggle. That particularly severe fighting is anticipated by the Japanese is evidenced by the fact that Marshal Oyama leaves Dalny, and moves out to the zone encircling Port Arthur in order to superintend the operations in person.

At daybreak a terrific cannonade is directed more especially against the Russian right wing, of which General Kondratchenko is in command, the naval battery again bearing the brunt of the fire. A hail of shrapnel is also thrown into the valley behind the Russian batteries, evidently under the impression that the Russian reserves are collected there. The Russian artillery appears to have been silenced, but the defending infantry and a number of quick-firers lay concealed in the trenches, well-protected, and suffered little loss.

At about nine o'clock the Japanese advance to the attack, and there is reason to believe that some of the hottest fighting of the whole war takes place at this juncture. The struggle is hot in more senses than one, for the sun is scorching, and in an atmosphere thickened by such tremendous discharges of artillery and musketry, and by the constant bursting of shells, the work on both sides must have been terribly exhausting. But neither attackers nor defenders take much heed of such trifles. In a dark wave the Japanese surge up the slopes, and are met by a fire so tremendous that it is described as resembling "a thousand volleys in one simultaneous explosion." As far as can be gathered, the whole Japanese force round Port Arthur must have taken part, directly or indirectly, in this assault; for there is evidence to show that the Russian right was heavily engaged, as well as the real objective, Wolf's Hill. But the attack in this quar-

ter does not seem to have been pressed home. When the Japanese advance ceased, says the *Novy Krai*, "the Russians cheered; but at this moment the news arrived from General Stoessel that the terrific pounding of the right flank had been a mask covering the concentration of the Japanese to attack the left flank, of which Wolf's Hill was the key. General Stoessel commanded the presence of General Kondratchenko, who, with his staff, mounted and rode off immediately. After a brief ride the General was compelled to choose between two roads, a long one safe from fire, and a short cut through a shell-swept valley. 'May God favour the brave,' he said, and galloped through the valley in safety."

Meanwhile, the attack on Wolf's Hill is developed, and as the Japanese advance towards the eminence, the concealed machine guns and riflemen open fire, and the slopes are strewn with slain. Still the gallant Japanese struggle on, and, according to one account, they actually succeed in carrying the position, but are driven out by a strong force of Russian reserves which has been held in readiness for this purpose. Very reluctantly, we may be sure, do the gallant Japanese fall back from the ground they have temporarily won at such fearful cost, leaving General Stoessel at the close of the 27th in occupation of the advanced positions he has so brilliantly held against an enemy of greatly superior strength. Indeed, it is said that in these two last days the Japanese have showed that they have at their disposal some 70,000 men.

The infantry attack, at any rate on Wolf's Hill, does not appear to have been renewed on the 28th and 29th, doubtless for the reason that the Japanese




Illustration by
APRA
F. RINGS

THE SECRET NAVAL BASE FOR THE JAPANESE ATTACKS UPON PORT ARTHUR.

Hitherto the Japanese naval base has been designated, in official and Press despatches, as "a certain place." The base is now known to have been one of the many natural havens in the Elliot Group. Here, between the islets of Da-ch-san and Khas, only about three hours' steam from Port Arthur, the Japanese ships have been re-coated, re-victualled, and repaired.

were not a little shaken by the repulses of the 26th and 27th. But the cannonading continued, and on the 28th the Japanese artillery succeeded in making a useful breach in the Russian shelter trenches.

At four o'clock in the morning of July 30th the Japanese, strongly reinforced—it is said that the attackers on this occasion numbered 60,000—deliver their final assault on the Wolf's Hill position. To all intents and purposes it is a night attack, but there is no question of a surprise. The Russians are very much on the alert, and when, after creeping up under cover of the darkness to within fifty yards of the summit of the hill, the Japanese rush forward in three columns, they are met with the bayonet, and a hand-to-hand combat ensues in which the Russians appear for a time to hold their own with brilliant success. Wolf's Hill itself is defended by the 13th Regiment, which repeatedly drives back the enemy, but is forced from its position by sheer weight of numbers. The 14th Regiment, however, rushes up and dislodges with the bayonet the Japanese, who have begun to raise cheers of victory. The tide of battle now ebbs and flows till the slopes are covered with dead and dying, and literally stream with blood. For this is ghastly butcher's work which is being done in the dim light of the breaking day. It is not as it is in the ordinary attack when, as the thin line or denser column rushes forward, the crackle of musketry breaks out from the defenders' trenches, and men stagger, throw up their arms, and fall back, or stumble forward on their faces, cleanly hit by bullets which often leave no easily perceptible mark. Very different are the results of the grim bayonet play on the slopes of Wolf's Hill this July morning.

Both sides are in deadly earnest, and both are masters of the weapon which in good hands can deal destruction more surely, if not more swiftly, than either lance or sword. For the latter, wielded by mounted men, may be robbed of half its effect by a horse's sudden swerve, and in the storm and stress of a cavalry charge comparatively few of the cuts and points delivered are likely to prove fatal. But in hand-to-hand fighting with the bayonet there is no promiscuous slashing and thrusting, and then galloping on to slash and thrust again. The infantry soldier at close grips with the enemy sees before him for a moment but a single figure, bent like himself on killing; and the combat, if not to the death, must be, at any rate, to a temporary finish. A thrust, well guarded perhaps; a counter-thrust, which maybe only rips a sleeve or pricks a thigh; a spring to one side to catch the adversary at a disadvantage; a side left unexposed; a strong lunge forward with the whole weight of the body in the rifle; and, as the cruel point penetrates, the stricken one collapses in an ugly heap, his life-blood welling out long before "first aid" can reach him. It is gory, unlovely work, this bayonet fighting, and yet there is something more human, less uncanny, in it than the destruction of enemies out of sight by long range fire; and in the majority of cases the killing and wounding process is, perhaps, more merciful in the case of the bayonet than in that of the bursting shell.

But it is not all cold steel that comes into murderous operation at Wolf's Hill. The Russians have protected their position with mines, and one of these is said to have wiped out five hundred Japanese. "It was an awful sight, and can only be described as a volcano of stones and

dismembered bodies. The sky was lit up with a purple glare, and the mud walls of the Chinese villages were thrown down by the shock." Of all forms of obstacle a mine is the one which most demoralises the stoutest-hearted infantry, and this is so well understood that a familiar *ruse de guerre* is to surround a position with the little flags used to denote the presence of mines, in the hope of cheaply inspiring a numerous enemy with a wholesome dread of the "real thing." Even when mines have exploded prematurely or ineffectively, it is sometimes difficult to get men to continue the advance. It is then no ordinary tribute to the tenacity of the Japanese soldier, and the grip which the Japanese officer has of him, that, after seeing half a battalion swept suddenly away by the explosion of one of these dreadful engines, the attack should still have been pressed with unabated fury, until at last the Russians are utterly overpowered, and the coveted summit of Wolf's Hill is won.

As far as can be gathered from the information available, the Japanese right worked round to the enemy's left rear, and the pressure so exercised forced the Russians to the eastward, thus enabling the Japanese to advance and complete their occupation of these outworks. The Russians are stated to have retired in good order, covered by their artillery, having, in truth, fought an excellent fight that for many a long year will take high rank as a magnificently dogged defence against odds which, taking not only the numbers, but also the fanatical determination of the enemy into account, can only be classed as overwhelming.

The "butcher's bill" on this momentous occasion is altogether obscure. During July 26th, 27th, and 28th, General Stoessel admits that he lost about 1,500

men and 40 officers killed and wounded; but of the fighting on July 30th he merely remarks that "our losses are not great." The Japanese are still more reticent. On the evening of July 30th the General Staff at Tokio breaks the silence it has hitherto observed with respect to Port Arthur, by stating that in the fighting since the 26th five officers have been killed, and forty-one wounded, but no mention is made of the losses in men.

In the trenches on Wolf's Hill the Japanese captured two Maxims and a Nordenfeldt. The last bore the mark of the Kure arsenal, and was evidently a gun taken from one of the Japanese merchantmen sunk in the attempt to seal Port Arthur.

Let us now examine a little more closely the nature of the success which Japan has won at a cost which, if not so terrific as the Russians would have us believe, must still have been greater than any as yet suffered by the attack in any one operation of the war. The real importance of Wolf's Hill has not primarily to do with the military measures against Port Arthur. The hill lies about a mile outside the perimeter of the Port Arthur defences, and is not of serious value for the purpose of shattering the latter, because in front of it, and within the main line of the Russian defences, there are two greater elevations, Obelisk Hill and Poya-shan; which block to a considerable extent the line of fire. But between these two hills there is a gap less than half a mile wide, through which direct fire, at some 6,000 yards range, from Wolf's Hill, can reach the usual anchorage of the Port Arthur Fleet, which is near the end of the Tiger's Tail.

The immense importance of Wolf's Hill to the Japanese thus becomes quickly apparent. If they can succeed in planting



RUSSIAN SUBMARINE MINES REMOVED BY THE JAPANESE FROM OUTSIDE PORT ARTHUR.

siege guns on this position they will be able to rain shells upon the ships in the harbour until the latter becomes a veritable inferno, and the Fleet will be simply compelled to take to the open, where Admiral Togo will, of course, be ready to give it an equally warm, if not still warmer, welcome.

The purpose of this chapter is not to carry the land operations round Port Arthur to a later date than the end of July, thus bringing the siege to the chronological level of the other movements belonging to what, for the purpose of this narrative, has been accepted as the second phase of the war. It may, however, be usefully anticipated here that by August 8th the Japanese succeeded in the exceedingly difficult and dangerous task of bringing up siege guns and planting them on Wolf's Hill in the face of the heavy fire from the Russian forts. The results of this fine, and probably costly, performance will be found in a

later chapter, but it may be remarked that they are sufficiently dramatic to invest the preliminary capture and occupation of Wolf's Hill with something more than ordinary interest.

Meanwhile, there are one or two naval episodes of this period which merit record. On July 26th the *Bayan*, *Askold*, *Palladc*, *Novik*, and some gunboats, steamed out of Port Arthur with the intention of bombarding the Japanese positions. They were attacked by the old battleship *T'sin yen*, which Japan took from China in 1894, the cruisers *Chiyoda*, *Itsukushima*, and *Matsushima*, two second-class cruisers, and thirty torpedo-boats. The Russians claim that an 8-in. shell from the *Bayan* burst in the stern of the *Itsukushima*, and that the *Chiyoda* was damaged by a Russian mine. The following day the same Russian cruisers, together with the *Retvisan*, three gunboats, and twelve torpedo-boats, under command of Rear-Admiral Leschinsky,

were sent out towards Lung-wang-tung to bombard the enemy's positions, by way of supporting General Stoessel's right.

About this time—the exact date is not specified—an exciting incident occurs near Lung-wang-tung while the Japanese are engaged in sweeping for mines. A Japanese gunboat becomes entangled with a Russian mine, and in trying to free herself she gets caught in the sweeping apparatus and drifts helplessly to Hsien-sheng Point, where she is exposed to a heavy Russian cannonade. Captain Hirose in another gunboat goes to the rescue, and is towing the unfortunate little ship away when a Russian destroyer darts out and attacks the two Japanese gunboats with great spirit. Captain Hirose's vessel is hit twice, he himself and ten others are wounded, three men are killed, and it is only after an hour's hard fighting that the Japanese gunboats succeed in shaking off their troublesome assailant.

Another brisk little engagement takes place on July 5th, which shows that the spirit of the officers who handle the Japanese destroyers is being well maintained. Two Japanese destroyers, the *Oboro* and *Akebono*, are scouting near Port Arthur about 4 p.m., when fourteen

Russian destroyers emerge swiftly from the harbour and split up into three flotillas. One of four destroyers steams south-west, another of seven south, and a third of three steers for Hsien-sheng, evidently with the intention to surround the *Akebono* and *Oboro*. The latter, after exchanging a heavy fire at 5,000 yards, also make for Hsien-sheng, and attack the smallest of the three Russian flotillas, which, however, declines a combat and makes for the harbour. Meanwhile,

another Japanese destroyer, the *Ikad-suchi*, comes up to reinforce, and the three plucky little vessels, instead of retiring quietly in the face of a very superior force, promptly steam south in order to do battle with the remaining eleven Russian ships! These, perhaps, impressed by the audacity of the Japanese, do not seek to make the most of their opportunity, but withdraw into the harbour. No loss appears to have resulted from this affair, but as an ex-



THE MEGAPHONE IN USE BY A JAPANESE
SIGNALLING PARTY.

hibition of fine pluck the incident is an inspiring one, and has doubtless by this time taken an honoured place among the many similar achievements which constitute the brilliant, if "short and simple, annals" of the Navy of Japan.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

A NEW PHASE—CONCERTED MOVEMENTS—THE RUSSIAN BARRIER—KUROKI TAKES THE OFFENSIVE—YU-SHU-LING-TZU AND YANG-TZU-LING—ARTILLERY PERFORMANCES—CAPTURE OF TO-MU-CHAN—OKU'S ADVANCE TO HAI-CHENG—JAPANESE TRANSPORT.

SINCE the capture of Hsihoyen by the "right column" of General Kuroki's Army on July 19th, of which an account was given in Chapter XL., no important movement has been made by the Japanese forces to the east of Liao-yang. Towards the end of July, however, the success of General Oku's Army at Ta-shi-chao, followed by the occupation of Niu-chwang, has brought the Second Army into such close touch with the First and Takushan Armies that a concerted advance becomes practicable. Accordingly, on the last day of July we see an extremely interesting movement of this character commenced, and carried to a temporary conclusion, with singular vivacity and thoroughness, notwithstanding really serious obstacles. The whole operation comprises three separate battles, coupled with several distinct tactical and strategical movements. Any attempt to produce a panoramic description of such widely scattered, although carefully co-ordinated, fighting would be quite hopeless. Attention, therefore, will first be paid to General Kuroki's victories, and here again priority of treatment will be accorded to the more northerly of the two engagements.

It will be remembered that a couple of days before the capture of Hsihoyen the Russians made a series of attacks on the Japanese positions at the Motien-ling and elsewhere, all of which were more or less

heavily repulsed. Notwithstanding the failure of this attempt to beat back the Japanese line, and the subsequent failure to hold the very important Hsihoyen position, the Russians evidently cling to the idea of putting as many obstacles as possible in the way of a further advance in the direction of Liao-yang, and General Count Keller, in spite of his previous mishaps, remains in command of a strong force, the business of which is to act as a barrier between Liao-yang and General Kuroki's Army. General Count Keller himself is occupying the Yang-tzu-ling, a pass six miles to the west of the Motien-ling, with the 3rd and 6th Divisions, a brigade of the 9th Division, and four batteries. Another force, also acting as a barrier, occupies Yu-shu-ling-tzu, four miles to the west of Hsihoyen, the detail being a brigade of the 9th Division, the main part of the 31st and 35th Divisions, and four batteries.

There are thus, at a moderate computation, some 60,000 Russians screening Liao-yang and holding strong advanced positions, each about twenty-five miles distant from General Kuropatkin's headquarters. At daybreak on July 31st the forces under General Kuroki's command commence operations for the attack of these positions, both of which are said to possess great natural advantages in having precipitous ground to the front, while the rugged sides of the mountains

end abruptly in open valleys. According to Mr. McKenzie, the war correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, the Japanese were divided for the two attacks into three columns, of which one and a portion of another attacked Yu-shu-ling-tzu, the remainder being engaged in frontal and turning movements against the Yang-tzu-ling.

On the night of July 30th the advanced guards of all three columns worked hard to repair the roads, so as to make them practicable for artillery. They succeeded as far as the guns were concerned, but it was found impossible to get forward the ammunition waggons. The shells had therefore to be carried by hand, considerable shortage of ammunition during the following day being the natural result.

Taking the Yu-shu-ling-tzu position first, this, it appears, was quite as strong as that at Hsihoyen, and much more strongly held. As the correspondents appear to have been mostly engaged in watching the Yang-tzu-ling fighting, there are only scanty details available of the northerly engagement, but it must have been a very brisk little affair, culminating in a marked Japanese success, notwithstanding the equal, if not superior, strength of the enemy. The attack commenced at 8 o'clock in the morning, and evidently included a bold turning movement, for we hear of heavy losses inflicted upon the right flank of the Russians, who are said to have had about 500 casualties. In the course of the afternoon the Russians raised the Red Cross flag in order to carry away their wounded, the Japanese promptly suspending their fire to allow this duty to be performed. By sunset the Japanese claim to have defeated the enemy, but owing to the large forces opposed to them, and the strength of the positions

occupied, they were unable to capture the latter.

At daybreak the next day the attack is resumed, and by noon the Russians are finally expelled from their positions, and are retreating towards An-ping. General Kuroki says that the Japanese pursued for four miles, and that the enemy "fled," but Reuter's correspondent declares that the Russians fell back in splendid order and in admirable fashion. "Their line in contact with the enemy," he writes from the battlefield, "can be seen for miles, and the conduct of the men is irreproachable."

Reverting to the attack on the Yang-tzu-ling, here again we have an extraordinarily strong position, the centre of which is a fort erected by the Russians above To-wan, the name given to the pagoda at the western entrance to the Motien-ling. No pains have been spared to make the position apparently impregnable to either frontal or flank attack, and a special feature of the defence is the employment of batteries, admirably placed, of the new Russian field-gun, which is a true quick-firer of great range and power, carrying a fifteen pound shell as against the eleven pound shell carried by the Japanese gun. Hitherto, the latter has had it all its own way against the old pattern Russian gun; but now the conditions are to be partly altered, and experts do not hesitate to say that if the Russians can now bring into action a sufficiency of their newer weapons, the Japanese will find themselves placed at a serious disadvantage.

The action commences at 7 a.m., the orders apparently being that the Russian right should be held by the Japanese troops in position at the Motien-ling; while on the Japanese left a triple attempt is to be made to weaken the enemy's

right, to work round to his rear, and to threaten his communications on his left rear with Liao-yang.

During the earlier part of the day the action was merely confined to the artillery, and it is clear from the statements of eye-witnesses that the duel was one of great severity, in which the Japanese worked manfully to make up for the enemy's superiority in weight and range by a skilful use of indirect fire. Although their guns are not quick-firers, in the true sense of the word, the Japanese had by noon fired a thousand shells against the enemy's three infantry and artillery positions. Of the Russian artillery practice, several correspondents speak in terms of warm admiration. In the earliest stages of the fight a Russian battery opened fire upon a Japanese battery at 5,000 yards, found the range immediately, and compelled the Japanese gunners to take cover. Shrapnel appears to have been used throughout by the Russians, but towards the afternoon the Japanese, who, as noted above, were a good deal handicapped by not being able to bring up their ammunition waggons, exhibited a marked preference for common shell.

Coming to the actual attack, it is fortunate that there should be available an eye-witness's account of this engagement, which for clearness, coupled with much picturesqueness of description, could not readily be surpassed. The account in question is that telegraphed on the morrow of the fight by the Special Correspondent of the *Standard*, and from it some deeply interesting extracts may usefully be made. The first relates, as will be seen, to the attempts against the Russian right :—

“ Part of our left wing had been pushed forward during the night, with the object

of getting to the right rear of the enemy. The Russians sought to frustrate this flanking movement by a counter attack, which was repulsed with great loss.

“ Early in the afternoon the order was given to move forward. The command was obeyed with alacrity, though the situation appeared hopeless for the assailants. The enemy occupied a wooded hill, on which their batteries were well screened, and held three tiers of trenches, which, being carefully concealed by branches, it was not easy to locate precisely.

“ Both the day and the deed constituted a tremendous test of endurance. The air pulsated with the burning heat, and the men were exhausted with their labour and the exposure to a pitiless sun. When they reached the foot of the wooded hill many were suffering from sun-stroke and heat apoplexy.

“ Further advance was impossible under such a rain of bullets and hail of shrapnel as swept the slope, yet the Japanese stuck to their position, taking whatever cover the exposed hill-side offered.

“ Before their blistered eyes ran a mountain stream, to reach which they had to cross a fire-swept zone; but thirst overpowers the fear of death, and, as I have seen British soldiers do more than once, many of the Japanese risked their lives for a draught of water.

“ Seeing that the advance was hopeless under such conditions, the order was given to retire, and the men withdrew to shelter behind the hill, there to await developments in the centre.

“ Two regiments suffered heavily, having 300 casualties. Among the slain was Lieutenant Shirasawa, who had served with great distinction at Hamatan, where he led his section up a hill and



Photo: "Collier's Weekly."

THE TSAR AS THE "LITTLE FATHER."

This picture gives a vivid idea of the patriarchal character of the Tsar, who is head not only of the army but also of the Church. He is holding an "eikon," or sacred picture, which is very popular in Russia, where it is regarded as a sort of talisman. The soldiers are kneeling round their "little father," getting his blessing.



captured a Russian battalion. Lieutenant Kiyokka, a member of a noble family, was also killed. With his last breath he cried, ' Long live the Mikado ! ' ”

Passing to the manner in which the Japanese troops at the Motien-ling held the Russian right, while the flank attacks were being developed, the *Standard* correspondent adds :—

“ Our centre at Motien-ling remained inactive in the meantime, its purpose being to threaten the Russian right while the attack was being pressed on both flanks.

“ This was not a difficult task, nor an unwelcome one, for the sun was blazing down upon us. We watched in tranquillity the development of the turning movement.

“ In the early morning we had seen a few of the enemy's horsemen in the valley of To-wan, which divided the Russian position, and had also observed, at the base of the pagoda, a dummy battery. But the real artillery position was on a sharp ridge to the east.

“ From this lofty height, between two conical peaks, the enemy's guns kept up a steady cannonade. Their shells searched closely the spur on the western front of the pass, where two of our batteries were posted.

“ Here again the Russian gunners displayed unwonted skill, and proved the superior weight and range of their weapons. The trees on the hill in front of them had been felled, and the range measured to a yard.

“ The accuracy of the shooting became apparent when the shells began to burst in the midst of our battery, wounding several of the men—among them the officer in command, who was slightly injured—and sending the others to cover.

“ There was, however, one gun in

position on a slope to the left of the Pass which the enemy had not succeeded in locating, so carefully had it been concealed.

“ Hour after hour went by, and the cannonade neither paused nor ceased. The hills echoed with the roar of it, and the sky was flecked with tiny white clouds, out of which poured down a hail of lead. It began to look as if the day was to end as it had begun, with the duel of artillery.

“ Our left wing had been checked. So much was manifest from the continued inaction of the centre, whose movements were dependent on success in other parts of the field. What was happening on our right, where we knew that a large force was at close grips with the enemy?

“ At half-past two in the afternoon there were symptoms among the Russians of a disposition to retire. The movement seemed to argue that we had scored a success on our flank, but it was of short duration.

“ The guns continued to speak, and towards five o'clock began to turn their attention to the valley fronting our position.

“ Into this valley was descending a large body of infantry. It advanced speedily in open order, forming two sides of a triangle, with the points turned towards the right and left of the position held by the Russian guns.

“ From the pyramid-shaped hill to the south rose up more riflemen, who had lain for hours, like yellow stones in a ploughed field. They, too, descended into the valley at right angles to the line of the infantry advance.

“ Then our centre moving rapidly forward, with the Japanese colours flying as a warning to our batteries, began to threaten the enemy's right.

“The key to the position was now in our hands, and the left wing was free to press the assault.

“The order was given for a general advance, and the whole line surged forwards. The Russian guns were withdrawn in haste. One was struck by a shell and sent spinning down the hill. The muzzle buried itself deep in the ground, and, as we came up to it, we could see a shell still lying in the open breach.

“Another gun, breaking loose, tumbled down the precipitous slope, and lay turned up on end in the road near the village of Tien-yu-cheng.

“The gunners had removed the breech-block, but the presence of two score live shells in the emplacements above was proof of the haste with which they had abandoned the position.

“Though our left wing was now free to move, the advance was still difficult and hazardous. A thickly-wooded hill, fortified with a triple line of trenches, remained in the possession of the enemy, and was defended with desperate gallantry.

“The plunging fire directed against them by our batteries on the neighbouring heights made no apparent effect, so thoroughly were the Russians concealed. But the situation was an obviously hopeless one, and the remnant of the defending force eventually fell back.

“At dusk our centre occupied Tien-tzu-ling, a village on the road to Liao-yang. Our left was in possession of To-wan and the neighbourhood, where it made ready to drive the enemy from the Pass to the north.

“But force was no longer called for. The Russians retreated in the night to another position five miles to the north.”

The concluding statement seems to require some slight modification. In his official report General Kuroki says that by sunset his troops had carried the enemy's principal positions, but that a portion of the enemy offered the most stubborn resistance, and that the Japanese therefore bivouacked on the night of July 31st in battle formation. “At day-break on August 1st,” says the General, “we resumed attack, and at 8 a.m. all heights fell into our hands, and the enemy fled towards Tang-ho-yen.”

The total casualties during the battles of Yu-shi-ling-tzu and Yang-tzu-ling must have been very large. General Kuroki's report of his own losses include 40 officers and 900 men killed and wounded. He believes that the enemy's losses were at least double. Eight Russian officers and 149 men were taken prisoners, and two guns and 500 rifles were captured.

Among the Russian killed was the General commanding, Count Fedor Keller, an extremely interesting personality. Count Keller belonged to a well-known Prussian family which was ennobled by the Austrian Government in 1737, and has many important Continental connections. Count Fedor himself was related to several distinguished French families, being a cousin of the Marquis de Beauvoir, and was *persona grata* in France, where he had followed the French manœuvres, and had been created a Commander of the Legion of Honour. General Keller, who was born in 1850, had had a notable career, having succeeded Kuropatkin as Skobelev's aide-de-camp when the present Russian Commander-in-Chief was wounded in the Shipka Pass in 1877. He retired on half-pay in 1887, but seven years later was appointed Governor of Ekaterinoslaf.

At the beginning of the war he volunteered for service in the Far East, and was employed for a time as Intelligence Officer. He was much esteemed by Kuropatkin, who, on his arrival at the front, presented him to the troops as the man most fitted to revive the Skobelev

of first-class ability, and by some Continental critics his loss at such a juncture was regarded as irreparable.

The death of this fine officer was evidently due to reckless self-exposure. An eye-witness says that when the artillery fire on the 31st ult. began to slacken,



LIEUT.-GENERAL COUNT KELLER.

tradition. When General Sassulitch was recalled after the battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, Count Keller was appointed to supersede him. Although he had not been by any means successful in either his defence of, or his attempt to recapture, the Motienling, Count Keller was evidently regarded in the Russian Army as a leader

Count Keller proceeded to make an inspection of his positions. "On arriving at the passes he was warned that he was the object of the enemy's fire. The General, who had now reached a battery in a somewhat exposed position, thereupon dismounted; but, notwithstanding this, almost immediately afterwards a

shrapnel shell burst three paces from him between two of the guns. The General was thrown to the ground. A sergeant rushed up and tried to raise him, but Count Keller only said, 'Leave me alone,' and expired in a few minutes. He had been struck by two fragments in the head, and by three others in the chest, besides which he had thirty-one shrapnel bullet wounds in different parts of his body."

There are several interesting features to which attention may be drawn in connection with, more especially, the Yang-tzu-ling battle. The fighting for both

sides was an extremely exhausting business, for this summer in Manchuria is an exceptionally hot one, and the temperature during July 31st is reported by General Kuroki to have been 100 degrees Fahrenheit. But with this exception the disadvantages seem to have been entirely on the side of the attack. The steepness of the ground and the lack of suitable artillery positions are specially noticed by the victorious commander; but it is evident that the Russians, in addition to their improved artillery practice, had taken special pains with their trenches, and defended them with great skill and



Photo: "Colliers Weekly."

JAPANESE RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES IN THE FIELD.

A Shinto service at Feng-Hwang-Cheng in the presence of the Japanese General Staff and Military Attachés.

tenacity. The manner in which the attack on the Russian right was checked was in marked contrast with previous exhibitions of irresolution on the development of a flank attack. It is said, on the other hand, that no effort was made to screen the Russian artillery, and that indirect fire was not attempted. Speaking generally, the battle may be said to have been won by the patience, persistence, and desperate gallantry of the Japanese infantry. As to results, the Russian barrier has been pushed back, and the Japanese have gained at least ten miles in their advance towards Liao-yang. Incidentally, it is remarked by Continental critics that the bulk of the troops which General Kuroki has thus unceremoniously pushed out of what seemed almost impregnable positions belonged to newly-arrived Army Corps. It had been confidently predicted, by German experts more particularly, that the stability and uniform constitution of these fresh European troops would enable them to make a much better show than their Siberian comrades. The result, however, has shown that even these new arrivals are hardly a match for the once despised, but now thoroughly respected, "yellow-skins."

We must now leave General Kuroki in order to see how admirably his efforts at Yu-shu-ling-tzu and Yang-tzu-ling have been seconded by the "Takushan Army," and by General Oku, having as their immediate objectives Tomuchan (Shimucheng) and Hai-cheng respectively.

If we turn back to page 509 we shall see that on the eve of General Oku's attack on Ta-shi-chao the Takushan Army sent out a detachment in the direction of Tomuchan, which encountered, a little to the east of the latter, the 17th

Siberian Rifles. It would seem from what follows that this regiment must be part of a force of about two divisions which, under General Alexeieff, has for many weeks past been working hard to make the most of an important position at Tomuchan. The actual Russian position, which was strongly fortified, appears to have extended along a range of heights two or three miles north of Tomuchan, the right resting on Hung-yao-ling, which appears to lie about four or five miles north-west of Tomuchan, and about ten or eleven miles south-east of Hai-cheng. Against this position the Taku-shan Army moved on July 30th, deploying westward from a place called Ta-fang-shen, some three miles south-east of Tomuchan, until the whole line of the Russian defences was faced and, on the right, slightly overlapped by Japanese troops.

At dawn on July 31st the Japanese commenced what seems at first to have differed very slightly from a frontal attack, in the course of which the Russian right, where there was a strong artillery position, proved a very hard nut to crack, owing to constant reinforcements both in men and guns, the number of the latter being increased to twenty-one. The Japanese left, however, was correspondingly stiffened, and at 3 p.m., after a hot cannonade, the Russians were driven back. Meanwhile, the Japanese main body had attained some success among the highlands on the Russian left, forcing the enemy out of their infantry positions at 10 a.m. Continuing the advance, it was checked by the heavy fire from the Russian artillery posted on the heights, and at 5 p.m. was suddenly called upon to assume the defensive against a brisk Russian counterstroke. The enemy had been strongly reinforced,

but their efforts proved ineffectual. The Japanese were well prepared, and the Russians found themselves smartly repulsed, with heavy loss. Again the Japanese would have advanced, but were prevented by the admirable manner in which the Russian artillery was served. The Japanese official report makes particular mention of the "quick-firers," and the extent to which they impeded the advance.

At the close of the day the two armies bivouacked close to each other. During the night the Russians evidently took into grave consideration the success of the Japanese left wing during the previous day, and, fearing lest daylight should bring about a determined effort to cut their line of retreat, they took advantage of the darkness to retire to Hai-cheng. This performance could hardly have been a premeditated one in view of the pains taken to strengthen the Tomuchan position, and the useful purpose it served in hindering any junction between the Second and Takushan Armies.

The losses of the Russians in the Tomuchan engagement must have been very large, since it is officially stated that about 700 Russian corpses were buried by the Japanese. The latter also captured six field guns, many rifles and shells, and large quantities of flour and barley. But these notable results were not achieved without considerable sacrifice. The Japanese casualties are returned at 194 killed and 666 wounded.

But the advance of the Takushan Army against Tomuchan is not the only southern movement in co-ordination with Kuroki's attacks on the barrier in front of him. On August 1st the Second Army under General Oku leaves Ta-shi-chao in five columns and advances on Hai-cheng. Here at one time it was suspected that

the Russians would make a specially determined stand, but Kuropatkin's policy is still one of gradual withdrawal, and, accordingly, on August 3rd we have General Oku's Army entering Hai-cheng practically unopposed, and also occupying Old Niu-chwang, which lies some thirty miles north-east of the Port at the mouth of the Liao river.

There is little or no information concerning this advance, but it appears to have closely resembled the rest of the recent operations in the north of the Liaotung Peninsula. The Russians are said to have fought several rear-guard actions before finally evacuating Hai-cheng, and General Kuropatkin claims that the eventual retirement along the An-shanchan road was carried out in perfect order without any molestation by the enemy. "Every effort," he adds, "was made to lighten the burdens of the infantry, and carts were given to each company to carry the men's great-coats and the kit bags. Nevertheless, the heat of the sun was so intense that, in spite of the measures taken to relieve the soldiers, the number of the men who succumbed to sunstroke was considerable."

A good deal of sympathy will undoubtedly be felt with the Russian soldier in these trying circumstances. It has already been hinted that he has begun to grumble at the continual "strategical retirements" in which he is compelled to take part, and from the letters which are beginning to appear in the Russian and German papers it is evident that he has other and substantial causes for complaint. The tinned food is said to be scarcely fit to eat, and where it is edible it is neither nourishing nor sustaining. Provisions, moreover, are sometimes wanting altogether, and the medical and sanitary arrangements not at all what they

should be. Even the doctors, though admitted to be devoted to their work, are said to be often insufficiently trained and badly equipped. Lastly, the heavy boots with which the Russian soldier is shod are a grievous burden, alike in the frightful heat and in the alternating spells of torrential rains which convert the lowlands into a sea of mire.

While, then, the Russian generals may talk proudly of the "perfect order" in which their repeated withdrawals from strong positions are carried out, there is little question that the sufferings of the rank and file are not calculated to keep them consistently at any very high pitch of either fighting efficiency or fighting enthusiasm.


Very different is the case of the Japanese soldier, now engaged in the comparatively exhilarating process of pursuit. Certainly, he has discomforts to endure, but the trouble which is taken to alleviate them, and the anxious solicitude displayed in continually oiling, as it were, every little wheel and rod in the military locomotive are truly remarkable. For in the Far East little can be done in this way by unpremeditated effort, however heroic, on the spot. Everything, more especially in the way of supply and transport, has to be thought out months before, and a host of ingenious precautions taken against the constant probability of a break-down.

From time to time, in the course of this narrative, casual allusions have been made to the Japanese supply and transport arrangements; but now an opportunity occurs for making a more detailed reference to this extremely important, and by no means uninteresting, subject. In a letter of considerable length, the *Times* correspondent deals specially with "The Transport of the Japanese Army," in-

cluding some mention of the supply depôts; and from this valuable communication—all the more valuable because it is evidently based on an intimate knowledge of our own Indian system, hitherto regarded as "bad to beat"—an excellent idea may be gleaned of the thoroughness and marvellous grasp of local requirements which the Japanese have applied to this extraordinarily significant branch of their warlike preparations.

The Japanese regular transport system, as already pointed out in Chapter XXVI., is a three-fold one, including horse-carts, hand-carts, and pack-horses; and to this are added, as opportunity serves or occasion requires, coolies and the local cart transport available more particularly in Manchuria. The horse-cart is thus described in detail by the *Times* correspondent:—"It consists of a platform of light bars of wood, 6 ft. long and 30 in. broad, placed upon an axle fitted into wheels 3 ft. in height, so that the floor of the cart is raised from the level of the ground only some 18 in. In front there is a skeleton framework of light iron rising 2 ft. above the body of the cart, upon which is a seat for the driver. The shafts, after leaving the sides of the cart, make a sweep upward so as to reach the level of the flanks of an ordinary sized Japanese horse. The wheels look very little stouter than those of a perambulator, but being built of thoroughly seasoned wood, and being well tired, they are much stronger than they look. The whole cart is firmly bound together and braced by light ironwork. Harness (of a very serviceable kind) and cart together weigh 400 lb."

The transport horses, as to which a very unfavourable opinion was formed by correspondents who saw them when they were first landed at Chemulpo and Chinnampo, have turned out a good deal



*The Pier of Shimono, Japan
from the Custom House Steps at Shimono-SEKI.*

"EACH MAN A HOUSEHOLD": JAPANESE TROOPS, WITH FULL KIT, EMBARKING FROM THE CUSTOM HOUSE STEPS AT SHIMONOSEKI.



better than was expected. Of these maligned animals the authority quoted gives a particularly interesting and instructive account. "Out of thousands," he says, "which I passed on the road to An-tung I did not see one which did not step jauntily along, making light of the loaded cart to which it was harnessed. The horses were the same—skinny and weedy. But every neck was arched, every coat shone like silk, every eye was bright, every ear alert. Truly, three months of regular daily work had agreed with these animals. And for excellent reasons. The Japanese have the reputation of being bad horsemasters; and so, indeed, they often appear to be. But in dealing with their transport horses they have exercised great judgment. They have acted on the principle which a prudent man adopts in regard to his income—that of living within it. They ask a horse to do only that which is easily within his compass. They load him, not with what he can pull on the level road, but with what he can drag up a steep mountain pass without inducing serious fatigue. The weight of an average Japanese horse is over 800 lb. With a load of 400 lb., and a cart weighing a similar amount, we have a total well within the draught capacity of the animal employed. Twelve to eighteen miles loaded, and the return journey empty, is the task usually allotted to the horse and cart. It has been found that work to this extent can be endured for twenty to thirty consecutive days, after which the horses become rather fine drawn and are given a day off.

"It is interesting to note that on occasion the cart transport with the drivers seated can cover a distance of four kilometres in twenty minutes, a performance, I think, beyond the capacity of the

regular transport service of any other army in the world. The daily ration of each horse is 8 lb. of uncrushed barley, 8 lb. of hay, and 8 lb. of straw, of which the latter two items have frequently to be reduced, as the Japanese depend on the country through which they are marching, and cannot always obtain them in sufficient quantities. The veterinary returns for the horses of the 12th Division, which was the first to land, and which made the trying journey from Chemulpo to Ping-yang which the horses of the other divisions escaped, show a decrease in effective strength of 6 per cent. Mortality accounts for only a small portion of the losses, the greater part being due to sore backs, from which the animals affected are fast recovering. This remarkable result has been attained by the moderate nature of the tasks imposed upon their horses by the Japanese, and by the fact that they never work a sick, lame, or exhausted horse. At the first sign of unfitness the animal is passed over to the veterinary department for treatment."

The hand-carts are built on the same idea as the horse, or rather pony, carts, and resemble the now familiar jinrickshaw, having short shafts joined by a cross-bar, and weighing about 200 lb. "One coolie between the shafts pushes and steers on the cross-bar, another pushes behind, whilst one, two, or three more are available to drag with ropes or help otherwise as circumstances demand. Here again there is applied the principle of requiring only work well within the capacity of the worker. The coolies look the picture of health, strength, and cheerfulness. They are not so dapper in appearance as when they landed, and many have discarded the army boot in favour of Korean sandals, and even bare feet.

They are easily capable of transporting a load of 300 lb. fifteen miles per day and making the return journey empty-handed. At a pinch they can do thirty miles with a full load. So well is it within the power of the appointed number of coolies to manage their work, that their strength to each cart is frequently cut down to four, and even three. The percentage of sickness amongst these men is the astonishingly small one of 2 per cent. The unintermittent labour, of a kind accomplished without any undue strain on the vitality, and the simple, yet ample, ration of rice, has built up these young fellows, already chosen for compactness of physique, into splendid specimens of their race."

The pack-saddle is of the Indian pattern, but half the weight. Indeed, the Japanese appear to have studied our Indian system most carefully, and then to have set to work to introduce improvements with, it must be admitted, conspicuous success. On the other hand, the fact that, putting aside ammunition, for which the usual heavy waggons are provided, the main requirements of Japanese troops are rice, with barley for the horses, makes the problem of transport much easier for Japan than for any country whose marching columns include European troops. Both rice and barley can be, and are, packed in bags, the former weighing about 70 lbs., the latter about 40 lbs., thus enabling them to be readily carried either in carts or by pack-horses or coolies.

Mention has before been made in these pages of the perfection of the Japanese supply arrangements; but the following little picture of a Japanese supply depôt must not be missed: "The little plain by the depôt is one mass of men and horses. Approaching from all directions

are endless trains of transport carts, pack-horses, hand carts, Chinese carts, wheelbarrows, and Korean coolies, who have hung on to the army, reaping a golden harvest by carrying rice sacks at a daily wage five times as high as they have been accustomed to earn. From the depôt run roads to each point of the compass, and at the beginning of each road stands a pulpit-like erection in which sit uniformed tally-clerks, who check the incoming and outgoing goods. Here and there are little encampments where Japanese merchants have set up business to cater to the soldiers. You can buy beer, saké, hot tea, tinned food, biscuits, cigarettes, writing materials, and a hoist of other things that the soldier wants. It is one of the distinctive features of a Japanese army that wherever it goes the little private purveyor is allowed to follow. He is a champion robber, and mulcts his customers one hundred per cent. But then it costs him a good deal to bring his goods to market, and there is risk and hardship; so perhaps his prices are not so high after all, particularly when one remembers the anguish of paying in South Africa a sovereign for a bottle of bad whisky, five shillings a tin for butter, and half-a-crown for a tin of milk. The Chinaman, too, is glad to turn an honest penny, and he offers bread, cakes, eggs, and vegetables. There is thus a large selection of eatables, and I make a satisfactory lunch on beer, hard-boiled eggs, and a Chinese roll."

What a contrast all this with the surroundings of the Russian soldier. That the Russian supply and transport arrangements are altogether bad cannot be seriously maintained, but, even if they were very much better than we have reason to believe is the case, it would be impossible for them to work altogether

satisfactorily under conditions of almost uninterrupted retirement. The wonder is that the Russian Army hangs together so well as it does in circumstances calculated to take the heart out of almost any troops. Conversely, we must remember that, although even when things are going smoothly in the field, the transport and supply of large armies is a most difficult and exhausting business. we have as yet

only seen the Japanese system working in success. It is not altogether certain that arrangements so precise, and to some extent complicated, would not be liable to serious disorganisation in the case of a long series of rear-guard actions, such as the Russians have fought since the day their venture southward was so rudely checked by General Oku at Telissu.



BRINGING A WOUNDED RUSSIAN INTO THE JAPANESE LINES.

By this method of conveyance jolting is almost obviated, as the short bamboos on which the slings are hung act like springs. In dealing with the wounded the Japanese have cared for friend and foe alike.



Photo: S. Cribb, Southsea.

TYPICAL GROUP OF NAVAL OFFICERS.

(Taken on board the "Mikasa," now Admiral Togo's flagship.)

CHAPTER XLIX.

NAVAL SORTIE FROM PORT ARTHUR—THE JAPANESE ON THE ALERT—A FLEET ACTION AT SEA—BATTLESHIPS AT CLOSE QUARTERS—THE RUSSIAN FLEET DISPERSED—LOSSES AND INJURIES—AN EPOCH-MAKING FIGHT.

IT is 5 o'clock in the morning of August 10th when the overture to one of the greatest performances of the war begins. Within the next fifteen hours we are to see what with studied accuracy has been described as "the first serious fleet action on blue water in the history of armoured navies," an event for which the critics of half a score of nations have been eagerly waiting, and which, however inconclusive the result, cannot but add greatly to the sum of naval knowledge. For such one-sided conflicts as the so-called Battle of the Yalu in 1894, and the naval Battle of Manila Bay and Santiago in 1898, have left untouched several great

problems, the solution of which can only be hoped for when two fleets of something like equal size and strength come into collision under leaders desperately determined to make the most of their respective opportunities.

The day thus fraught with tremendous issues has been slowly but surely led up to by a series of incidents, of which the most important were related in the last chapter but one. We have seen how carefully Admiral Togo has kept watch and ward over the entrance to Port Arthur harbour; we have noted the unremitting industry with which the work of repairing the damaged Russian ships

has been carried on ; and particular stress has been laid on the significance from the naval standpoint of the land attack on Wolf's Hill. It is this latter circumstance that now brings matters, as regards the Port Arthur Fleet, to a head, and eventually produces the general action at sea, which twice before—on April 13th and June 23rd—has been within an ace of happening.

Through the narrow opening between Obelisk Hill and Poya-shan the Japanese siege guns on Wolf's Hill begin, from about August 7th, to pour shells upon the Russian anchorage, and on the 8th Admiral Vitoft reports that the commander of the *Retvisan*, Captain Shtchensnovitch, has been wounded, and that his own position has become intolerable. Admiral Alexeieff accordingly forwards to Admiral Vitoft the Tsar's orders to effect a sortie and, if possible, a junction with the Vladivostok Squadron. At dawn on August 10th the operation commences by the movement of the Port Arthur Fleet from the inner harbour into the outer roadstead.

At 8.30 the following vessels leave the entrance to the harbour preceded by a flotilla of mine-clearing launches :— Battleships, *Tsarevitch* (flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Vitoft, commanding the squadron), *Retvisan*, *Pobieda*, *Peresviet* (flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky, commanding the ironclad division), *Sevastopol*, *Poltava*; cruisers, *Askold* (flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Reitzenstein, commanding the cruiser division), *Pallada*, *Diana*, and *Novik*. The last-named goes ahead of the squadron, and eight torpedo craft of the first division are posted near the leading battleship. Two gunboats and the second division of torpedo craft accompany the exit of the squadron, in order to protect

the mine-clearing flotilla on its way back. The hospital ship *Mongolia*, flying the Red Cross flag, steams on one side of the squadron. A good many hopes, and perhaps some fears, must be packed away in this imposing procession of fine ships, which, with becoming caution, begins to make its way across the mined roadsteads that separate the harbour entrance from the open sea. But uppermost, no doubt, is a feeling of profound relief at escaping from the thralldom of the siege, and especially the recent storm of shells, to which it was not possible to make effective reply. With this must be coupled strong regret at leaving so many brave comrades still exposed to the unwearying attentions of the Japanese gunners, and particularly at having to part with the trusty *Bayan*, which cannot join in the sortie by reason of serious damage too recently received to have rendered timely repair possible.

From the time the sortie commenced the Japanese must have been on the watch, and, as soon as the movement out of the harbour is perceptible, a message is despatched by wireless telegraphy to Admiral Togo, who is doubtless at or near the naval base in the Elliot Group. We learn that the news is "received with delight." Admiral Togo rapidly makes all his dispositions, his plan being "to draw the Russians as far south as possible, in order to prevent a repetition of the fiasco of June 23rd." He is not, of course, aware what the Russian destination is, and so steers south, relying on his scouts to give him constant information of the enemy's proceedings.

At nine o'clock the Russian commander hoists the signal to make for Vladivostok. A thrill of satisfaction runs through the fleet at the issue of an order which may mean a bright ending to a sadly

inglorious term of wearing watching, and which must mean bringing matters to a clear issue by the stern arbitrament of a fight. For there can hardly be a Russian bluejacket that does not know what the gradual thickening of the Japanese ships on the horizon means. Twice have the Russians seen the battle-flags hoisted on Admiral Togo's splendid squadron, and well they know that it was not he who refused battle on those memorable occasions. "Make for Vladivostok" is a goodly signal; but between Port Arthur and the Golden Horn lie all the countless possibilities included in the now certain prospect of a determined, probably decisive fight.

Successfully, if somewhat tediously, the Russian ships thread their way across the

roadstead, at the bottom of which there must lie enough mines, Russian and Japanese, to send half-a-dozen squadrons to destruction. The passage takes two hours, and it is not until 10.15 that the mine-clearing flotilla returns to Port Arthur under escort of the gunboats and the second torpedo-boat division.

The squadron now steams out, making at first eight and then ten knots, and

reaches the open sea. At noon the speed is thirteen knots. By this time the combined Fleet of Japan has been sighted in three divisions, the first being to the port of the Russian ships, steaming so as to cross their course. This division includes the battleships *Mikasa* (flying the flag of Admiral Togo, commanding the Fleet), *Asahi*, *Shikishima*, *Fuji*, and *Yashima*, with the new armoured cruisers, *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*.

On the horizon are two other divisions, one consisting of the one armoured and three protected cruisers, the other of one armoured and four protected cruisers, with the old battleship *Tsin-yen*, and about forty torpedo-craft.

The squadrons gradually approach, the Japanese ships being to the east.

At 12.30 a point some twenty-five miles south of Port Arthur having been reached, Admiral Togo signals to his ships to go into action. The Russians respond by forming single column line ahead—a formation of which a graphic illustration is given on page 96—with the *Tsarevitch* leading. At 1 p.m. the fight begins.

It is a tremendous moment. The long



Photo: Daziaro, St. Petersburg.

ADMIRAL UKHTOMSKY.

lines, which for some time have been nearly parallel, converge slightly; the Admirals and Captains in their conning towers gaze anxiously to east and west, as the case may be, watching the decreasing interval; the sailors stand to their guns, the tension growing almost beyond human endurance; and on, on, go the great ships, steaming well within their powers, for, when both sides in a great encounter at sea mean fighting, it is the capacity to hit, not the capacity to overtake or to run away, which first needs exhibition.

A roar breaks the close stillness of the summer day as the action opens with shells from the battleships' big guns—shells weighing between seven and eight hundredweight, and specially pointed for armour-piercing purposes. The Russian aim is not good, probably because the gunners have had little practice in firing at moving objects from moving platforms. Shot after shot flies wide, and the hope of scoring early by reason of the possession of a battleship to the good, grows gradually fainter.

The Japanese, on the other hand, now profit by the constant opportunities they have enjoyed during the past six months, at any rate, of firing from moving platforms, and the efforts of their gunners are well seconded by the scientific training of the officers in the art of calculating distances. Time after time the Japanese shells go home against the armoured sides of the Russian battleships, for it is upon these that Admiral Togo's fire is mainly concentrated. Twice the lines approach and recede during the first two and a half hours of fighting which constitute the first phase of the battle, and then at 3.30 the two fleets separate for an hour. In this interval it is found that, among other damage, the Russian cruiser

Askold, which has been following directly behind the battleship *Poltava*, has been struck in the forward funnel by a shell which has rendered the forward boiler useless.

The Russian cruiser squadron now leaves the line and takes up a position with the leading ship level with the *Tsarevitch*, on the port side. At about half-past five the Japanese Fleet again approaches, and the Russians open fire, which is largely concentrated on Admiral Togo's flagship. A trifle like this, however, does not disconcert the Commander-in-Chief, who remains quite unconcerned, and calmly directs every operation.

The Russian vessels now change their direction to the south-east, and the Japanese follow the movement closely. At 7.30 the fight, which until now has brought no serious disadvantage to either side, suddenly changes in character. The Russian battleship *Tsarevitch* is still gallantly leading the line and keeping up a constant fire, when almost simultaneously two great disasters overtake her. The gallant Admiral Vitoft is struck by fragments of a shell, loses both legs, and dies instantly; and another shell strikes the flag-ship on the port side, damaging her engines and steering gear. The *Tsarevitch* falls suddenly out of the line to starboard, making the signal "The Admiral transfers the command," and the ships following put their helms to port and starboard in order to avoid collision, and fall into confusion.

The Japanese are quick to seize such a favourable opportunity. Closing in to about 3,500 yards they pour in a hot fire, and do more damage apparently in the ensuing half-hour than has been done in the whole action hitherto. One after the other the Russian battleships are struck and damaged so seriously that their fire



Photo : Nouvelle, Paris

A SORTIE FROM FORT ARTHUR.

Impressive spectacle afforded by the Russian fleet assembled in the routstead after clearing the harbour entrance.

is virtually silenced. The *Retvisan* holds out stubbornly, being handled with conspicuous gallantry; but Admiral Togo orders his squadron to concentrate its fire upon her at little over 3,000 yards, and she, too, is soon reduced to fitful discharges from one or two of her guns.

Meanwhile, the Russian cruiser division commanded by Rear-Admiral Reitzenstein, who flies his flag on the *Askold*, has been, practically speaking, inactive. In an engagement of this character the brunt of the fighting falls naturally on the battleships, and the cruisers, unless very heavily armed, like the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, do well to keep out of the way of firing against which their comparatively light armour affords no adequate protection, and to which they cannot effectively reply. It has already been mentioned that in the second phase of this fight the cruisers *Askold*, *Novik*, *Diana*, and *Pallada* took up a position to the starboard of the battleship line, and it may readily be imagined that when Admiral Reitzenstein perceived that the *Tsarevitch* had been practically disabled, and read the signal "The Admiral transfers the command," he felt that his position had suddenly become one of grave responsibility. It is said that the last signal which Admiral Vitoft personally ordered to be made was "Remember the Tsar's command not to return to Port Arthur," and in any case it must have been clearly impressed upon all the subordinate commanders before leaving harbour that morning that every sort of effort should be made to reach Vladivostok. As the Russian battleship squadron is now clearly getting the worst of it in circumstances in which the cruisers could not lend any practical assistance, it would seem that Admiral Reitzenstein is fully justified in deciding to break through the

enemy's line without loss of time. What immediately follows is best told in the Admiral's own words:—"Having signalled to my squadron to follow me, I left with the *Askold* at the head to cut a passage. We were struck by the opening shots. Behind me came the *Novik*, and at some distance followed the *Pallada* and the *Diana*. The cruiser squadron was sent to cut another passage, and encountered four of the enemy's second-class cruisers and several torpedo-boats, while to the right of it were three cruisers of the *Matsushima* type.

"The seven Japanese ships riddled our cruisers with shells. Approaching the enemy's circle I remarked that one of the four cruisers blocking our way was a vessel of the *Asama* type. The quick-firing guns of the *Askold* seemed to do some damage to the three Japanese second-class cruisers; while they also set fire to the big cruiser, which then retired, leaving the *Askold* a free passage. Four of the enemy's battleships then approached and attacked the *Askold*, firing four torpedoes, which, however, did not hit her. A Japanese torpedo-boat was sunk by a lucky shot from one of the *Askold's* 6-in. guns, while another retreated precipitately."

According to Admiral Reitzenstein's official despatch, this cruiser action lasts twenty minutes, and is of a very lively character. Shells fall like hail, especially on the *Askold*, which, however, with the *Novik*, succeeds in getting through the enemy's line, followed by the *Pallada* and *Diana*. The Japanese cruisers give chase to the *Askold* and *Novik*, but these vessels, notwithstanding the hammering which the *Askold* has received, can still steam twenty knots, and so have little difficulty in drawing away from their pursuers. It is now dark, and Admiral Reitzenstein is

unable to make out whether the *Pallada* and *Diana* are following or not. As a matter of fact, the *Pallada* has dropped behind, and at dawn the next day is back in Port Arthur harbour. In the Japanese accounts of the battle it is stated that the fifth Japanese destroyer flotilla under Captain Mathuoka approached a cruiser of the *Pallada* type, and fired a torpedo at her from a distance

from its stern guns on the enemy's battleships. Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky, whose flag is flown on the *Peresviet*, has taken command, but is unable to signal his orders satisfactorily, owing to the damage to his flagship's masts. He displays the signal "Follow me" on the captain's bridge, but it is hardly likely that all the ships were able to distinguish it.



Photo: S. Cribb, Southsea.

THE JAPANESE BATTLESHIP FUJI.

of 400 yards. Captain Mathuoka saw the torpedo hit the vessel and explode. The inference is that either the *Pallada* reached Port Arthur in a very damaged condition, or that the stricken vessel was the *Diana*, which subsequently reaches the French port of Saigon. The *Diana* is a sister ship to the *Pallada*, and would easily be mistaken for her in a bad light.

It is time to return to the Russian battleship squadron, which is now falling back, at the same time keeping up a fire

As the *Peresviet* has lost many killed and wounded, and her armament, hull, and electric apparatus are seriously damaged, Prince Ukhtomsky decides, in contravention of the Imperial orders, to return to Port Arthur. The battleships *Retvisan*, *Pobieda*, *Sevastopol*, and the *Tsarevitch*, and the Red Cross ship *Mongolia*, start on the return course, but now the Japanese destroyers dash in and cause further damage and confusion. The *Tsarevitch* drops out, and, after repeated changes of course, owing to the

constant torpedo attacks, the shattered squadron regains with difficulty the harbour it had so proudly left the previous morning. At dawn only the battleships *Peresviet*, *Retvisan*, *Pobieda*, *Poltava*, and *Sevastopol*, and the cruiser *Pallada*, with three out of the eight destroyers, were at Port Arthur. The battleships are badly crippled, but Prince Ukhtomsky reports that in all only 38 men have been killed, and 21 officers and 286 men wounded, 50 severely; by no means a heavy list of casualties considering the fierceness of the engagement and the power of the enemy's armament.


The unfortunate *Tsarevitch* not being able to follow the battleship squadron, and losing sight of it, takes a southerly course in order to attempt to reach Vladivostok under her own steam. During the night she, too, is attacked by Japanese torpedo-boats, and at dawn is in the vicinity of the Shan-tung Promontory. An examination is now made of the ship, and her injuries are found to be such that Rear-Admiral Matussevitch, who is on board, decides that she cannot hope to make Vladivostok, and that the only course open is to proceed to the German port of Kiao-chau, in the hope of being allowed to repair. The ship has suffered terrible punishment. Her rudder shaft is broken and one gun disabled; her life-boats have been shot away, her masts are bent in the form of a cross, and the funnels riddled with shot. The bridge is twisted, and there are holes above the water line, which have been plugged with makeshift stoppers of wood. The damage to her engines is so considerable that she can only steam four knots—her nominal speed is eighteen—and she can only compass this by burning immense quantities of coal.

The *Tsarevitch* may justly claim to have

borne the brunt of the fighting in this great battle. During the action her decks are said to have been slippery with blood, and she had three officers killed besides Admiral Vitoft, and eight officers wounded, including Admiral Matussevitch, who speaks highly of the unexampled bravery of both officers and men. Altogether the *Tsarevitch* lost fifteen killed and forty-five wounded.

The *Tsarevitch* reaches Kiao-chau at 9 o'clock in the evening of August 11th, and finds there the cruiser *Novik* and the destroyer *Bezchumni*. These had arrived between 4 and 5 p.m., the *Novik* slightly damaged, but with no dead aboard, and the destroyer pretty badly knocked about. Later, two more destroyers seek this post of refuge, which is guarded by a German squadron of four cruisers and two gunboats.

Returning to the *Askold*, which we left showing its heels to the pursuing Japanese cruisers, we learn that Admiral Reitzenstein, noting that the chase was being abandoned, slowed down to wait for the other ships of his squadron. How she has contrived to make the speed she has is remarkable, considering the damage she has sustained. It is estimated by Reuter's correspondent, who afterwards visited her in port, that the *Askold* must have been pierced by nearly 200 shells, and in another account it is stated that she was hit eighty times below the water-line, a signal testimony to the accuracy of the fire. The following description of the *Askold's* injuries is interesting as showing what punishment a modern warship can receive without going to the bottom:—"Her first and third funnels are riddled with machine-gun bullets, and the base of one funnel has been almost entirely blown away at the level of the deck by a big shell. The



TOGO AT WORK: A DISTANT GLIMPSE OF THE PORT ARTHUR FIGHTING.

An exciting incident during the cruise of the "Manchu Maru" the vessel that, at the invitation of the Japanese Government, carried the Foreign Naval Attachés and the Newspaper Correspondents to Korean waters and ports.

after-funnel has been cut in two and telescoped. Its remains are only held up by the guy ropes. An 8-in. armour-piercing shell entered the starboard side forward about two feet above the water-line, and lodged in a bunker. A 12-in. shell exploded in the starboard hammock netting amidships, the fragments riddling and destroying four metallic life-boats. Another similar shell entered the stateroom of the starboard quarter and cut its way across the deck, exploding in the officers' quarter on the port side, and destroying everything *en route*. The deckhouse on the superstructure under the forward bridge was riddled by fragments of a shell, which exploded in the forward funnel. The vessel's search-lights are all damaged beyond repair. The torpedo netting was cut up by a shell, and is practically useless. In the ship's bottom there are several old and new injuries, one torpedo having made a big hole through the side into a bunker, which happily proved fairly watertight." It may be noted that with all this structural damage, the *Askold* has only eleven killed and forty-eight wounded, more than half of the latter having been but slightly injured. None the less, the ship has been right bravely fought, Admiral Reitzenstein drawing special attention to the heroism of the chaplain, who went from one part of the ship to another with a cross, giving his benediction to the men; while the doctors, under a hail of shells, removed the wounded to a place of safety.

Admiral Reitzenstein during the night is apparently joined by the *Novik* and the destroyer *Grosvoii*. The former he allows to act independently, and, as we have seen, she makes forthwith for Kiaochau. The *Askold* is for the present kept well out to sea in order to avoid torpedo

attacks from Shan-tung. At dawn an attempt is made to put on more speed, but it is found that the engines will not bear the strain, and accordingly the idea of proceeding to Vladivostok has to be abandoned. It is believed that on the night of the 11th the *Askold* and *Grosvoii* attempted to follow the *Novik* into Kiaochau Bay, but were headed off by a Japanese cruiser, and ultimately made for the neutral port of Shanghai, which was reached in the early morning of the 12th.

We have located every vessel of the dispersed Port Arthur Fleet with the solitary exception of one destroyer. For, according to Prince Ukhtomsky's official report, the battleships *Peresviet*, *Pobieda*, *Retvisan*, *Poltava*, and *Sevastopol*, the cruiser *Pallada*, and three destroyers out of eight were at Port Arthur; the battleship *Tsarevitch*, the cruiser *Novik*, and three destroyers are at Kiaochau; the cruiser *Diana* is at Saigon; and the cruiser *Askold* and one destroyer are at Shanghai. There remains one destroyer, the *Reshitelny*, which later becomes the centre of a very dramatic incident, to be related hereafter. For the present it is sufficient to say that, when on the night of the 11th the Japanese destroyers were let loose on the dispersed Russian Fleet, two of them, the *Asashio* and *Kasumi*, gave chase to the *Reshitelny* and, after losing her in the darkness, found that she had entered Chifu. The Japanese destroyers wait for a time outside the port, and here we may leave them in order to pay a visit to the victorious Japanese squadron, which has thus so unceremoniously dispersed one of the most powerful fleets ever collected in Far Eastern waters.

In comparison with the injuries sustained by the Russian ships those of the

Japanese squadron are slight. Admiral Togo specially reports, on the forenoon of August 12th, "Our ships suffered no serious damage, and are fit to resume their places in the line of battle. Our total casualties were 170 of all ranks." Later returns give the casualty list as follows: In the *Mikasa*—killed, 4 officers and 29 men; severely wounded, 6 officers and 29 men; slightly wounded, 4 officers and 49 men. In the *Yakumo*—killed, 1 officer and 11 men; wounded, 10 men. In the *Nisshin*—killed, 7 officers and 9 men; wounded, 2 officers and 15 men. In the *Kasuga*—10 men wounded. In the *Asagiri*—2 men killed. In Torpedo-boat No. 38—1 man killed and 8 wounded. Commander his Imperial Highness Prince Kwacho was slightly wounded on board Admiral Togo's flagship.

It is, perhaps, almost more by the insignificance of these injuries and casualties that the greatness of Admiral Togo's victory will eventually have to be judged than by the damage he has succeeded in inflicting on the Russian ships. It is possible that if he had been in a position to display a little greater recklessness the results would have been much more striking. One of the most obvious things about this battle is that the fighting was confined almost entirely to the battleships, and in these at the commencement the numerical superiority lay with the Russians, for of course the old *Tsin-yen* does not count. It is true that the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* appear to have been fought as small battleships, which to all intents and purposes they are; but the fact still remains, that with better shooting it might have been quite possible for the Russians at the outset to have so disabled some of their larger adversaries that a subsequent junction with the Vladivostok Squadron would

have been easily practicable. It behoved Admiral Togo, then, to be extremely careful not to allow the superiority which the efficiency of his ships and the splendid training of his officers and men gave him to pass from him at an early stage of the engagement.

The caution exhibited by the Japanese met with its reward. To be able to say, two days later, that all his ships were able to resume their places in the line of battle was something of which Admiral Togo might well be proud, and indicated perhaps as great a service as it was possible for him to render his country at this juncture. For if he had succeeded in still more completely crippling the Port Arthur Fleet at a corresponding loss to his own, a new set of risks would have come into operation which might ultimately have had to be very seriously considered by a country unable to procure fresh battleships and large cruisers until the end of the war. It must be remembered that at this time the Vladivostok Squadron was still in being; Port Arthur, although heavily pressed, was still in effective Russian occupation; and the sailing of the Russian Baltic Fleet, although a remote and rather shadowy contingency, would undoubtedly have been accelerated if it had transpired that another Japanese battleship or two, in addition to the ill-fated *Hatsuse*, had been permanently disabled by a few well-aimed 12-inch shells.

As things are, the blow which Admiral Togo has delivered is a staggering one. It is true that five out of the six battleships and one of the four cruisers have regained Port Arthur harbour, whence it is possible that, with the astonishing vitality possessed by Russian warships, they may emerge at no distant date apparently not very much the worse for

wear, in company, maybe, with the rejuvenated *Bayan*. But it must be remembered that the main reason why the Port Arthur Fleet went out on the morning of the 10th was because the harbour was getting too hot to hold them, and there is small likelihood that the fire from Wolf's Hill will now slacken. As to the remaining battleship and three cruisers,

Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Navy would, perhaps, have secured a heartier round of popular applause, even from his own countrymen, if he had gone in a little closer and sent two or three of the Russian battleships to the bottom, as he doubtless could have done had he chosen to take the risk. But his caution has been abundantly justified ; and it may



Photo : Symonds & Co., Portsmouth.

THE JAPANESE BATTLESHIP SHIKISHIMA.

one of the latter cannot yet be accounted for, and we may anticipate the future a little by saying that the *Tsarevitch*, *Askold*, *Diana*, and *Novik* will soon have to be regarded as *hors de combat*. Admiral Togo, then, has not only dispersed, disorganised, and to some extent demoralised his powerful adversary, but has weakened him very considerably in just those very factors of strength which are of paramount importance to the maintenance of Japan's naval superiority. The

be many a long day before another action at sea is fought between fleets on the whole by no means unequally matched, in which the victor will succeed in punishing the vanquished so seriously with such conspicuously little hurt to himself.

More detailed accounts of the battle may reveal interesting and instructive points on which fresh theories can be based, and in no case can it be expected that the full significance of such an epoch-making fight will dawn all at once

on even expert spectators at a distance. But for the present, two monumental facts stand out with singular clearness. One is, that where there are battleships, cruisers must be content to remain in the background, if they do not retire altogether; the other great lesson to be

all their own, although without them a naval action must soon become little more than a grim absurdity. But rapid and accurate fire means either the assertion of an immense and immediate superiority, or the levelling of many advantages possessed by the other side. A few well-



ADMIRAL VITOFT.

derived from this encounter of giants is that, more especially, perhaps, with battleships and 12-inch guns, superior gunnery is absolutely the first consideration. Speed is, of course, a valuable aid in forcing a battle upon an unwilling adversary, and at times it may play an all-important part in manœuvring. Discipline and courage have a significance


aimed shots produced both the disablement of the *Tsarevitch* and the complete derangement of the Russian line of battle. But it is in the handling of the biggest guns of all that the good practice must be made, if appreciable results are to be secured. The Japanese themselves may perhaps have taken to heart the fact that, while the riddling of the *Askold*

with nearly 200 shells is a strong evidence of notable marksmanship, an even more impressive result might have been attained by a tenth of the projectiles had they all come from 12-inch muzzles.

Closely related to the question of rapid and accurate practice is that of concentration of fire, a matter as to which Admiral Togo, in common with most up-to-date authorities, evidently holds strong views. It would seem that the *Tsarevitch* and *Retvisan* suffered particular injury from the concentrated fire of the Japanese battleships, and it can be readily understood that the effect of the simultaneous arrival of two or three winged messengers of destruction weighing not very far short of half a ton apiece must be terrific. The Russians, too, appear to have devoted a disproportionate amount of attention to the *Mikasa*. But, of course, concentrated fire requires to be accurate, and it is clear that in this respect the Russians were sadly inferior to their opponents.

Apart from such technical considerations, there is much in the conclusion of this great naval battle calculated to inspire grave and earnest reflection. In

a sense it is a decisive victory, for it has settled, at any rate for a long interval, the question of the capacity of the Port Arthur Fleet to dispute seriously the command of the sea with the Navy of Japan. Extraordinary credit is due to the Russians for the persistence with which, after repeated disasters, they patched up their ships and brought them out in fighting trim to do battle bravely with such a formidable antagonist. But the great collision has taken place, and Russia has been beaten—beaten and scattered beyond hope of re-union—and the disparity has been so increased that it seems hopeless to think that any comparison can ever again be made between the naval power of Russia in the Far East and that of Japan. Till this fleet action was fought a hundred things might have happened to qualify, if not to alter radically, the result. But the time is over for such uncertainties. The fight has been, as far as such a fight could be, to the finish, and, while the ships of Russia seek here and there an inglorious refuge, the morrow's dawn brings added and lasting glory to the Rising Sun of Japan.



CHAPTER L.

KAMIMURA ON GUARD—THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON SIGHTED—A CRUISER ACTION—
DESPERATE FIGHTING—SINKING OF THE *RURIK*—JAPANESE HUMANITY—AT VLADI-
VOSTOK—HOPES AND FEARS.

THE day breaks beautifully clear on August 14th, and Admiral Kamimura, who has been lying with a squadron of four cruisers off the southern coast of Korea, is not likely to let anything slip past him in conditions so favourable to the task he has in hand. Since the night of the 10th he has been aware of the sortie of the Port Arthur fleet, of Admiral Togo's victory, and of the dispersal of the Russian ships. He has been warned that some part of the scattered fleet will probably try to force the Tsu-shima Strait and make for Vladivostok, and that the Vladivostok Squadron will probably co-operate in this enterprise. Very alert, then, has Admiral Kamimura been these last three days, and possibly now he is beginning to fear lest once again ill-luck may be dogging his footsteps, and that once again the enemy's ships may have contrived to elude one of the smartest and keenest officers of the Japanese Navy.

The Admiral's flag is flying on the fine armoured cruiser *Idzumo* of 9,800 tons, which has a nominal speed of over 24 knots. In his squadron are the *Idzumo's* sister ship, the *Iwate*, which has on board Rear-Admiral Misu; the *Tokiwa*, which is the sister ship to the well-known *Asama*, and is of 9,750 tons, with a nominal speed of 21.5 knots; and the *Adzuma*, of 9,438 tons, with a nominal speed of 21 knots. Altogether,

a very powerful and homogeneous squadron, splendidly fitted not only for the purpose of patrolling a strait which heavily armed vessels of the enemy may attempt to force, but also for that of bringing any but battleships to book. For all are well armed with British guns supplied from Elswick, all have good armour protection, and the slowest has a very fair turn of speed.

It is a little before 5 a.m., and the squadron is near Ul-san, which lies some thirty miles north-east of Fusan, when on the port bow a great and glorious sight is discerned. The three Vladivostok cruisers are seen steering south at a distance of 11,000 yards! Earnestly the Japanese pray that, at last, their vigilance will be rewarded, and that the squadron which has given such infinite trouble will not again escape. For a short time the Russian ships come on at full speed, evidently unconscious of the enemy's proximity; but soon they catch sight of the Japanese vessels, and, true to their old policy, they endeavour to get away. Putting about, the Russian Admiral makes a course to the north-east, with the object of reaching the open sea. The *Rossia* (12,200 tons, nominal speed 18 knots) is leading; the *Gromoboi* (12,336 tons, nominal speed 20 knots) follows; and the rear is brought up by the *Rurik* (10,940 tons, nominal speed 18 knots). The three ships steam

at their full speed, but evidently cannot, at first, make more than 15 or 16 knots, and the Japanese soon overtake them, holding a parallel course, and forcing the Russians to accept battle.

It is now 5.20 a.m. and the two squadrons are 8,750 yards apart. The Russians are still in single column line ahead, but the Japanese now adopt a

matched, for the numerical inferiority of the Russians is compensated by the fact that all the three Russian ships are considerably heavier than any in the Japanese squadron. On the other hand, the Japanese have a distinct superiority in speed, and in weight of broadside fire. But here again, as in the battleship action described in the last chapter, it is



From photo supplied by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd.

JAPANESE CRUISER *IDZUMA*.

T-shaped formation, in which later they cross the enemy's course, raking his ships fore and aft, while these mask each other's fire. Further, Kamimura subsequently manœuvres to keep his back, as far as possible, to the sun, thereby giving his gunners a marked advantage.

The fight begins at 5.23—one can imagine Admiral Kamimura taking out his watch and noting the time with punctilious exactitude—and it is soon evident that the struggle will be a severe one. In point of strength the two squadrons are by no means unevenly

the accuracy of fire that eventually tells. The tactical advantage of speed is finely illustrated by the fact that Admiral Kamimura was enabled to force a battle on an enemy whose one idea was to escape it, and it must have largely assisted the manœuvring of the Japanese ships with a view to concentrating their fire, and hindering that of the Russians. But it is the constant hitting which enables Admiral Kamimura from the first to take a dominant part in the proceedings, and finally to emerge from them with an important little victory to his credit.



JAPANESE NAVAL BRIGADE LANDING UNDER FIRE AT PITSANI.

Repeatedly the Japanese projectiles take effect, and Admiral Jessen is beginning to realise that at last a day of reckoning has come for the valiant squadron which has hitherto waged such relentless war upon transports and unarmed merchantmen. He is still endeavouring to make for the open sea towards the north-east when, in the distance, he sees another Japanese warship coming up from the southern straits. This is the famous *Naniwa*, which took such a prominent part in the war with China, and which is now, consequently, no longer in her fighting prime. Still, she is a handy light cruiser of nearly 4,000 tons, and with a speed of about 17 knots. With her now is her sister ship, the *Takachiho*, the two belonging to what is known as the "Fourth Squadron," under command of Rear-Admiral Uriu.

Observing that the Russian squadron is trying to get away to the north-east, the *Naniwa* shapes its course with a view to preventing the execution of this manœuvre. "Consequently," says the Russian Admiral in his official despatch, "choosing a favourable moment, I turned sharply to the right and steamed towards the north-east, calculating that I should be able to turn northwards before I reached the Korean coast." There seems to be some error—possibly arising in the translation—as to the direction indicated, since it is difficult to see how the Korean coast could possibly have been reached in the circumstances on a north-easterly course. But if we read the despatch, "I turned sharply to the left and steamed towards the north-west," the manœuvre appears to become quite intelligible.

According to the Russian Admiral there seemed an excellent chance that the

manœuvre in question would succeed, for he had increased his speed to 17 knots, at which rate the Japanese might have had some difficulty in overtaking him. But in less than five minutes after the new movement commenced the *Rurik* leaves the line and hoists the alarming signal "Steering gear not working." She is told to steer by means of her engines, and to keep on in the course on which the *Rossia* and the *Gromoboi* are steaming; but she makes no response, having, indeed, a good deal at this unpropitious moment to occupy her attention.

For the Japanese soon take advantage of the *Rurik's* inferior speed, and, coming up swiftly, concentrate their fire on her at a range of 4,500 to 5,500 yards.

The Russian Admiral, observing the *Rurik's* plight, immediately checks his retreat and does his best to redeem the unenviable reputation of his squadron for persistent anxiety to run away from danger. As he says, all his subsequent manœuvres have the sole object of affording the *Rurik* an opportunity of repairing her damaged gear, and the Japanese bear ready testimony to the devoted gallantry with which the *Rossia* and the *Gromoboi* endeavour to draw on themselves the whole of the Japanese fire.

The two big ships circle round their smaller comrade, and the fighting becomes fast and furious. The Japanese cruisers rake the enemy again and again, and the Russians reply with every available gun. But the sacrifice is to little purpose. The *Rurik* bursts into flames, and describes uneasy circles which show clearly that the injury to her steering gear is a deep-seated one. "I cannot steer," she signals pathetically, and again the *Rossia* and the *Gromoboi* manœuvre in front of her so as to give her an opportunity of retiring in the

direction of the Korean coast, now only two miles distant.

At 8 o'clock the Russian Admiral hoists the signal to make for Vladivostok. This is repeated by the *Rurik*, which follows in the wake of the *Rossia* and *Gromoboi* towards the north-west, apparently steaming at considerable speed, and only separated from the ship in front of her by about four miles.

The *Rossia* and *Gromoboi* have meanwhile sustained considerable damage. According to one account both have been repeatedly set on fire, flames pouring out from their port holes, and much confusion evidently being caused before the fires can be extinguished. On board the *Rossia* three of the boilers are reported by the Admiral to have been rendered useless at this stage.

At 8.30 the end of the unfortunate *Rurik* is not far off. She has been fighting all the time with the Japanese cruisers, who have been holding a parallel course and pouring in well-aimed shells at a range of about 5,000 yards. She now begins to lag very much behind, and to exhibit an ugly list to port. But her gallant crew never flag in serving their guns, until towards the last only two guns are left in action, and the ship, with her mizzenmast shot away, presents a truly battered condition.

At 9 a.m. the *Rossia* and the *Gromoboi* note that the *Rurik* has been engaged by the two light cruisers of the Fourth Squadron, the *Naniwa* and *Takachiho*, and shortly afterwards she is lost to sight. This enables Admiral Kamimura to follow the *Rossia* and *Gromoboi* with all his four armoured cruisers, and in the circumstances Admiral Jessen can hardly be blamed for his abandonment of the *Rurik*. His hope is that the latter may beat off her two opponents and, in spite

of the damage she has sustained, may be able to reach Vladivostok under her own steam. In view of the splendid fight he has already made, and the manner in which he has exposed his two remaining ships in order to cover the *Rurik*, it will be a captious critic indeed who finds fault with Admiral Jessen for a decision which cannot but have cost him a bitter pang.

In any case, his own position is sufficiently serious. Shortly before 10 o'clock the Japanese open a particularly deadly fire upon the *Gromoboi* and *Rossia*, and those in the latter feel sure that this is a prelude to an increase of speed with a view to a final attack. But, to the astonishment of the Russians, something quite different happens. The whole Japanese squadron bears away, the ships turning to the right in succession and ceasing fire.

The action of Admiral Kamimura in abandoning a pursuit which if continued might have enabled him to sink both the remaining ships of the Vladivostok Squadron, has been much criticised. The only explanation seems to be that the *Gromoboi* and *Rossia* were still steaming at great speed, and gave their pursuers the idea that although their hulls and armament were severely injured their engines were working satisfactorily, and that it would be hopeless to attempt to overtake them. It may be, too, that, in conjunction with this estimate, Admiral Kamimura took into consideration the chance that the *Rurik* might still succeed in beating off the *Naniwa* and *Takachiho*. The bare possibility of the *Rurik's* escape would be most seriously distasteful, for the Japanese have a strong sentimental grudge against this particular vessel, apart from her co-operation in the feats of the Vladivostok Squadron. For, as the Tokio Correspondent of the *Standard*

points out, the *Rurik* was the flagship of the Russian Squadron ten years ago on the historic occasion when the combined Russian, German, and French Fleet demonstrated in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li in support of the joint intervention which forced Japan to relinquish Port Arthur, her legitimate prize of war.

Whatever may have been at the back of Kamimura's mind when he abandons the pursuit of the *Rossia* and *Gromoboi*, there is no questioning the relief which the Russians experience at getting rid of their pursuers. Immediately after the Japanese cruisers have put about, Admiral Jessen proceeds to ascertain the losses and damage sustained by his ships, in the vague hope that it may still be

in the *Rossia* eleven holes have been made below the waterline, and in the *Gromoboi* six. The losses of officers in the two cruisers exceed half their total number, while those of the men amount to 25 per cent. of the entire strength. In these circumstances it is manifestly impossible to renew the conflict. Accordingly, advantage is taken of the calm weather to repair the more serious breaches, and in due course the squadron proceeds mournfully to Vladivostok.

Let us now leave the *Gromoboi* and *Rossia* and return to the unfortunate *Rurik*, which, dealing now with the *Naniwa* and *Takachiho*, renews the fight with splendid gallantry. But she is too far gone to maintain any but a brief and





CHART OF THE VLADIVOSTOK RAIDS UP TO THE SINKING OF THE *RURIK*.

possible to renew the fight by returning to the spot, now thirty miles to the south, at which the squadron had parted company from the *Rurik*. It is found that

feeble resistance. Gradually she sinks, and with touching solicitude the sailors hasten to place their wounded comrades on planks and lower them into the sea,

so that they may have a chance of drifting away before the end comes. Almost to the very last the guns are fired. Finally the *Rurik* "stands up," that is, her

his ships, too, lower their boats, and a splendid record of life-saving work is accomplished. Indeed, in their anxiety to rescue their gallant foes the Japanese



THE RUSSIAN CRUISER RURIK.

bows rise into the air, and she goes down by the stern, eleven thousand tons of steel, and in her day one of the best-known and most formidable fighting machines afloat. For the past few hours she must have been a hell to those on board, for her construction favoured the outbreak of fire, and the flames are known to have been raging furiously through the doomed vessel from a comparatively early stage of the fight.

The sea is now strewn with planks and hammocks, to which hundreds of Russians are clinging. With ready humanity the *Naniwa* and *Takachiho* lower their boats in order to save life, and a torpedo-boat flotilla, which has just arrived, lends its assistance.

Meanwhile, Admiral Kamimura has returned from his chase of the *Rossia* and *Gromoboi*, and, seeing the state of affairs,

bluejackets dangerously overload many of their boats, one of which returns to its ship with 52 Russian sailors on board. Altogether, the official list of those saved includes 16 officers, of whom seven were wounded, one priest, four warrant officers, of whom three were wounded, and 592 sailors, of whom 166 were wounded. The survivors stated that the Captain, Commander, and most of the officers of the *Rurik* were killed during the battle.

The Japanese regard the rescue of the *Rurik's* sailors with peculiar satisfaction. On the morrow of the fight a prominent official remarked to the Kobe Correspondent of the *Daily Express*, "Japan has avenged the *Hitachi Maru*. The men Kamimura rescued and succoured yesterday aided in the sinking of the *Hitachi Maru*, and sailed away from a hundred

of their drowning victims. We offer their living for our dead."

The Japanese loss and damage in this remarkable engagement were very small. Admiral Kamimura reported that his ships "suffered somewhat, but nothing serious," and there is other evidence to show that their fighting power was unimpaired. The Japanese casualties were 44 killed, including two officers, and 65 wounded, including seven officers.

Before we proceed to discuss the lessons and results of this brisk naval engagement let us take a parting glance at the *Rossia* and *Gromoboi*, as they steam slowly towards Vladivostok. It is a melancholy crowd of officials and civilians which lines the water-front of the great northern port when the two returning cruisers are sighted. For the fate of the *Rurik* is known, and by this time the magnitude of the disaster which has resulted from the naval sortie from Port Arthur is realised. What a different home-coming from that which might have been had even a portion of the Port Arthur Fleet succeeded in breaking through the Japanese blockade and effected a junction with Admiral Jessen's three ships, now reduced to a wretched pair! What a miserable ending to the "commerce-destroying" exploits of which Vladivostok has been so proud, possibly because they have, at any rate, served to draw her from the obscure position to which she had been relegated during the early stages of the war by the studied indifference of Japan! One can hardly imagine a more complete upsetting of calculations, a cruder wrecking of hopes, than this, which the Russian residents of the "Sovereign City of the East" are now undergoing.

An eye-witness gives a graphic account of the depressing spectacle afforded by

the two cruisers themselves as they make their way gloomily into the Golden Horn. They never seem previously to have presented a particularly spick-and-span appearance, but they always gave the idea of being powerful and efficient fighting ships, and now even this grimly attractive aspect has given place to one of rather woebegone forlornness. Funnels, masts, and bridges have been riddled with shells. "Iron plates, temporarily riveted over breaches made by the enemy, fairly covered the hulls of both ships"—giving them, one would imagine, rather the appearance of wounded elephants with their hurts hidden by gigantic squares of court-plaster. "Some of these breaches," it is stated, "were large enough for a man to creep through." There are other signs of heavy fighting to be seen, and, as a fillip to the human interest of a dreary scene, a figure lies prone under an awning on the quarter-deck of the *Gromoboi*, the figure of a badly wounded officer, Captain Dabitch, the commander of the cruiser, who was twice hit during the action, but clung to his post till it was over.

There are inspiring stories told of Captain Dabitch's behaviour. He took his stand on the upper bridge of the *Gromoboi* and remained there until he was wounded. As soon as his wound had been treated he again assumed command, and again mounted the bridge. Another shell almost immediately burst on the *Gromoboi*, killing several officers and again wounding the captain. Captain Dabitch had now to send his own signals to the engine-room, for no officer was available for the duty. A little later, thinking his gallant fellows wanted heartening, he himself, in spite of his second wound, and weak as he was from loss of blood, came down on deck and showed

himself among the sailors, saying, "You see, men, I'm all right."

There are similar stories told of the gallant captain of the *Rossia*, who at one period of the fight was informed that out of twenty guns only three were workable. He then calmly ordered the torpedo lieutenant to have everything in readiness to send the ship to the bottom. "His coolness and good spirits never wavered."

From these bright tales of Russian gallantry we must now turn to make a few very brief comments on the general aspects of this cruiser engagement. There is really very little to say beyond what has been said already as to the supreme value of accurate gunnery, and the extent to which this levels other considerations when once a naval action has become inevitable. In this particular case it will have been noticed that accurate fire, in a sense, takes the place of speed. It seems quite possible that, if the *Rurik* had been able to maintain the 17 knots at which she was steaming at one period of the fight, the Russian ships might have got away without much injury. But the straight powder of the Japanese soon knocked the *Rurik's* speed out of her, and, by rendering her helpless, placed the *Gromoboi* and *Rossia* also at a disadvantage. That this action, following on that of August 10th, will give a great impetus to the study and practice of naval gunnery, there can be little doubt. It is possible that, even in the greatest navies of the world there may be exhibited a more frequent tendency to practise with full charges, and perhaps a little less reluctance to subordinate gunnery needs to the exigencies of man-of-war smartness.

As to the manœuvring, here, as in the case of the battleship action of the 10th,

there may be technical lessons to be derived from the full details which will ultimately, no doubt, be available. But naval tactics are for the most part either so simple as to require no explanation, or so dependent upon data, which few but genuine naval experts understand, as to be beyond the scope of useful discussion in a work of this description. For the present, then, at any rate, let us be content with the assurance that Admiral Kamimura's victory was mainly due to accuracy of fire, and that it would probably have been just three times as decisive as it was had he known as much as we know now of the condition of the Russian ships.

Of the moral effects of the success it is easy to speak with greater confidence. Although the snake has not been killed, he has been badly scotched, and there does not seem much likelihood that ever again will a "Vladivostok Squadron" become such a terror, or rather, such a pestilential nuisance, as did the one which has just been so roughly handled. Even assuming that the big holes in the hulls of the *Gromoboi* and *Rossia* can be satisfactorily patched, and their other defects made good, they will undoubtedly be more cautious now in venturing forth in order to waylay innocent merchantmen, causing intense irritation among neutral maritime nations by their high-handed exposition of their own laws of contraband. There is a grave difference between hunting in couples and hunting in threes in such a case, more especially now that more Japanese armoured cruisers can be spared for the express purpose of preventing and punishing any raids from Vladivostok.

In this connection it may be mentioned that, in thanking Admiral Kamimura for the great service he has rendered, the

Mikado takes occasion to dwell specially on the fact that hitherto it has been the Admiral's sole duty to guard the Korean Strait. This is understood to be intended as a rebuke to the previous criticism which has been lavished upon Admiral Kamimura for not preventing the sorties of the Vladivostok Squadron.

As a matter of fact, it may well be that, with the loss of the *Rurik* and the hammering of the *Rossia* and *Gromoboi*, a new era has commenced for Vladivostok. Sooner or later the Japanese should have to take into serious consideration the desirableness of reducing this place, and much of the naval difficulty has now been removed. Little more than a fortnight after Admiral Kamimura's victory the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Echo de Paris* declares that the Japanese are about to attempt to seize the island of Sakhalin, in order to make it a base for operations against Vladivostok. The correspondent adds that General Linievitch has already sent troops to the island, and will shortly despatch reinforcements thither. This may be an altogether premature surmise, but, at any rate, it shows that the Russians themselves are alive to the altered situation.

It may incidentally be mentioned that about this time Admiral Alexeieff pays a visit to Vladivostok, with the intention, it is said, of conferring with General Linievitch as to the formation of a new

army to operate independently of that under command of General Kuropatkin. Here, again, we seem to be in the region rather of shadowy contingencies than of practical politics, taking into consideration the carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway. But the suggestion is instructive, partly as indicating that the antagonism between Alexeieff and Kuropatkin still continues unabated, and partly as a proof of the Viceroy's possession of a very pronounced never-say-die quality, which cannot but extort admiration, even where it fails to command respect. Apart from this, there is something rather sad in the apparent fact that Alexeieff is beginning to look upon Vladivostok as a last resort. Port Arthur, the Port Arthur which is intimately associated with the Viceroy's assertion of himself and his great office, still holds out, but it is beyond hope of relief by land or sea. Mukden is now being menaced by the advance of the combined armies of Japan upon General Kuropatkin's position at Liao-yang. Before a final withdrawal to Harbin takes place Admiral Alexeieff evidently thinks that advantage can be taken of the comparative immunity from attack which Vladivostok has hitherto enjoyed. It is not unlikely that his visit there is the prelude to some strenuous and interesting endeavours, if not to some dramatic results.

CHAPTER LI.

SEQUEL TO THE NAVAL SORTIE FROM PORT ARTHUR—CAPTURE OF THE *RESHITELNY*—
ANGRY PROTESTS — JAPAN'S JUSTIFICATION — REFUGEE SHIPS AT KIAO-CHAU.
SHANGHAI, AND SAIGON—DISARMAMENT.

THE dispersal of the Russian Fleet after its sortie from Port Arthur on the memorable August 10th has a strangely variegated sequel. Some of the ships, as has already been noted, have found their way back to the harbour whence they emerged on that fateful morning, while others have sought refuge in no fewer than four different ports, Chifu, Kiao-chau, Shanghai, and Saigon. These last especially meet with curious experiences in circumstances of very great interest from an international standpoint. But before we proceed to follow their respective adventures, a few words must be given to the bulk of the defeated squadron which, under Prince Ukhtomsky, succeeded on the night of August 11th in regaining the doubtful shelter of Port Arthur. The ships in question were, it will be remembered, the battleships *Peresviet*, *Pobieda*, *Sevastopol*, *Retvisan*, and *Poltava*, and the cruiser *Pallada*. Most of these were known to have suffered considerably during the action, but the Russians are so skilful and industrious in repairing their damaged warships—not to speak of the wide experience they have recently had in this melancholy direction—that it will not be surprising if at no distant date the majority of the vessels named are again to be encountered outside the harbour, in company with the cruiser *Bayan*, which could not join in the sortie owing to a recent "accident."

But it soon becomes evident that Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky is to receive little credit for having brought this considerable remnant of the Fleet out of action. In Russia great indignation is expressed at his failure to carry out the Tsar's behest to remove the ships at all costs from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, and the opinion is freely ventilated that he altogether failed to realise the responsibilities which devolved upon him on the death of Admiral Vitoft. There is no question that great results were expected to follow the escape of even part of the main fleet to Vladivostok, and that the return of five battleships and a cruiser to the shell-swept harbour of Port Arthur, followed by the defeat of the Vladivostok Squadron and the loss of the *Rurik*, has impressed the Russians perhaps more disagreeably than any previous naval incident of the war. Accordingly, it is hardly to be wondered at that, in spite of his important connections, Prince Ukhtomsky should be immediately deprived of his command, with a view, it is said, to his trial by court martial. A little later Captain Wiren, commanding the cruiser *Bayan*, is appointed to take Prince Ukhtomsky's place, with the rank of Rear-Admiral Commanding the Port Arthur Squadron.

We may now pass to an incident which, although it only affects the fate of a single Russian destroyer, is of more dramatic, and, indeed, to some extent,

of greater historical interest than even the return of the greater portion of the Port Arthur Fleet to its original base. This is the capture of the *Reshitelny* in the harbour of Chifu, an important Chinese port situated at the entrance to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li about 80 miles nearly due south of Port Arthur. Some allusion has already been made to Chifu as a hotbed of doubtful rumours. It may be added, that the place contains some 50,000 Chinamen and a fair sprinkling of foreign residents. There is reason to believe that, apart from the blockade-runners, a pretty constant communication has been kept up between Port Arthur and the Russian Consulate at Chifu by means of a system of wireless telegraphy, a receiving pole in connection with which is said to have been set up in the Consulate grounds in defiance of Japan's protest against what seems a clear violation of China's neutrality.

In Chapter XLIX. we left two Japanese destroyers waiting outside Chifu for the re-appearance of the *Reshitelny*, which was known to have taken refuge here. It appears that the Russian destroyer, having effected its escape after the action of August 10th, arrived at Chifu with important despatches and, it is said, with several personages on board disguised as engineers. According to the account given by the commander of the destroyer, Lieutenant Rostachakovski, the ship was forthwith disarmed, the breech-blocks of the guns and rifles being handed over to the Chinese Admiral at the port, and the ensign and pennant lowered.

The Japanese official reports say that the destroyers *Asashio* and *Kasumi*, having waited till nightfall on August 11th for the *Reshitelny* to come out, entered the harbour and found the Russian vessel not yet disarmed. Ac-

cordingly, Lieutenant Terashima, with an interpreter and a party of Japanese blue-jackets, was sent on board the *Reshitelny* to offer the commander the alternative of surrender or departure from the port at dawn.

A very graphic description of what follows is given by Reuter's correspondent at Chifu. It appears that when the Japanese lieutenant boarded the *Reshitelny*, followed by his boat's crew armed with rifles and bayonets, the Russian commander protested. "I am unable to resist," he said, "but this is a breach of neutrality and courtesy." He then gave secret orders for preparations to be made to blow up the ship. In order to gain time for this operation, Lieutenant Rostachakovski proceeded to argue the points of international law bearing on the case, being met by vigorous injunctions either to get out into the open sea for a fight or prepare to be towed out. The Japanese officer added that, if Lieutenant Rostachakovski would surrender, his life would be spared.

"This insult so stung me," said the Russian officer afterwards, "that I struck the Japanese officer before I meant to, as I was afraid that the explosive for blowing up my ship was not yet ready. My blow knocked the Japanese lieutenant overboard. In falling he dragged me with him, he dropping into his boat, I into the water. I clung to the lieutenant's throat, pummelling him till my hold was broken."

Lieutenant Rostachakovski subsequently attempted to return to his ship, but was shot at while in the water and wounded in the leg. He then swam to a neighbouring junk, whose crew beat him off with a boathook. He is said to have remained in the water fifty minutes, swimming, though hampered by his

wounds, till he was picked up by a boat from the Chinese warship *Hai-yung*.

Meanwhile, a free fight had commenced between the Russian and Japanese sailors. One of the former jumped overboard with the Japanese interpreter, and the confusion was intensified by the explosion of the *Reshitelny's* magazine causing several casualties. Eventually the Japanese got the upper hand, hoisted their flag, and one of their destroyers towed the *Reshitelny* out of the harbour.

The Japanese lost one man killed and fourteen wounded in this affair, which, as witnessed from the deck of the Chifu lightship, is said to have been of a very picturesque description. The Japanese destroyers had their search-lights turned on the *Reshitelny*, and one could see plainly the altercation between the Russian and Japanese lieutenants, followed by the discharge of rifles, the flash of cutlasses, and the springing of the Russians overboard. The actual fighting lasted only ten minutes, when the magazine explosion took place, blowing away the main bridge, but not damaging the hull.

There is some mystery as to the Russian despatches carried on board the *Reshitelny*. According to one account, some secret papers were burned before the Japanese boarded the vessel; according to another, they fell into the hands of the captors. But it is understood that Lieutenant Rostachakovski's mission was an important one, and that the capture of the ship was a serious blow to the Russian plans.

The reports as to the action of the Chinese naval authorities during this startling performance are very conflicting; one indicating complete non-interference, another alleging complicity with the Japanese, and a third suggesting that

the Chinese Admiral did make serious protests, but, finding them disregarded, was so deeply hurt that he handed over the command of his squadron to one of his captains! But the main point seems to be that, whether China did or did not wish to take active steps to prevent the violation of her neutrality, her attitude made no practical difference in the result.

At first the capture of the *Reshitelny* created a tremendous hubbub. The Russian Government protested both in Peking and, through the French Minister, in Tokio that the capture was an "astounding violation" of Chinese neutrality and of international law. In the Russian note to the Chinese Government complicity was distinctly charged, and the Chinese naval authorities accused of either cowardice or treason. A full explanation was demanded, also the punishment of the Chinese Admiral, and the restoration of the destroyer. At Peking the Russian demands are said to have been supported by the French and German Ministers.

Even in Great Britain Japan was at first pretty roundly blamed for having, in this case, departed from her usual attitude of strict correctness in regard to neutrality. In a word, an international situation of some gravity seemed to have been created, when Japan issued a remarkably clear and dignified statement defining her position both in regard to this particular incident and to Chinese neutrality in general. The following is a reproduction of the greater part of this extremely interesting and important communication, which was first made through Reuter's correspondent at Tokio. The Japanese Government begins by declaring the status of China in the present struggle to be quite unique. She is not a party to a conflict, most of the military

operations connected with which are being carried on within her borders, and, accordingly, some of her territory is belligerent, while the rest remains neutral. In such an anomalous and contradictory state of affairs the only way of limiting the area of hostilities at the commencement of the war was for both Russia and Japan to regard the case as a special one, and to give their adhesion to a special understanding.

"In the interests of foreign intercourse and the general tranquillity of China, the Japanese Government agreed to respect the neutrality of China outside the

regions actually involved in war, provided that Russia made a similar agreement and carried it out in good faith. The Japanese Government considered that they were precluded by their engagement from occupying or using for warlike purposes of any kind the territory or ports of China outside the zone which was made the theatre of war, because it seemed to them that such occupation or use would convert places thus occupied or used from neutral to belligerent territory. Equally it seemed to them that any such occupation or use of neutral Chinese territory or ports by the Russian

forces would give effect to the proviso in the Japanese engagement, which would justify her in considering ports so occupied or used as belligerent. In other

words, the Japanese Government hold that China's neutrality is imperfect, and applicable only to those places which are not occupied by the armed forces of either belligerent, and Russia cannot escape the consequences of an unsuccessful war by moving her army or navy into those portions of China which have by arrangement been made conditionally neutral.

"From Port Arthur Russia sought in Chifu an asylum from

attack which her home port had ceased to afford her. In taking that step Russia was guilty of a breach of the neutrality of China as established by agreement between the belligerents, and Japan was fully justified in regarding the harbour of Chifu as belligerent so far as the incident in question is concerned. With the termination of the incident the neutrality of the port was revived. The action taken by Japan at Chifu was the direct and natural consequence of Russia's disregard of her engagement, but it was not alone in this matter, not alone at Chifu, that Russia



Photo: C. Cozens, Southsea.
JAPANESE "SMALL-ARM MEN" OF THE BATTLESHIP
ASAHI.

flagrantly violated China's neutrality and ignored her own engagement."

The Japanese Government here proceeds to instance the establishment of the system of wireless telegraphy between Port Arthur and the Russian consulate at Chifu. It also mentions the case of the Russian gunboat *Mandjur*, which at the beginning of the war remained at Shanghai for weeks after receiving formal notice to leave, and was only disarmed after protracted negotiations. Finally, the case is quoted of the *Askold* and the *Grosvoii*, now seeking refuge at Shanghai, to which allusion will be made

consent to Russian warships, as the result of a broken engagement and violated neutrality, finding unchallenged in the harbours of China a safe refuge from capture or destruction. The declaration concludes as follows:—

"The statement of the commander of the *Reshitelny* that his vessel was disarmed upon her arrival at Chifu is untrue. The vessel was fully armed and manned when visited by Lieutenant Terashima, but in any event her disarmament would not fulfil the requirements of the regulations concerning China's neutrality. It was, moreover,



Photo: C. Cozens, Southsea.

JAPANESE BLUEJACKETS: A TYPICAL GROUP ON BOARD THE *ASAMI*.

presently. The Japanese Government observes that it has no intention of disregarding China's neutrality as long as it is respected by Russia; but it cannot

for China, and not Russia, to decide whether the alternative of disarmament would be acceptable. It is suggested that the present case is comparable with

that of the *Florida*, among others, but the Japanese Government draw a clear distinction between the two events. The neutrality of Brazil was perfect and unconditional, and the port of Bahia was a long distance from the seat of war; whereas the neutrality of China is imperfect and conditional, and the port of Chifu is in close proximity to the zone of military operations. The Russian officers who took part in the Chifu incident agree that the *Reshitelny* was the aggressor and the first to begin the hostilities which resulted in her capture. This fact would, the Japanese Government believe, deprive Russia of any grounds for complaint which she might possess if the legality of the capture were otherwise in doubt. In this respect the case resembles the cases of the American privateer *General Armstrong* and of the British ship *Anne*.

“The case of the *Reshitelny* is in itself of trifling importance, but it involves a principle of paramount importance. Experience has shown that China will take no adequate steps to enforce her neutrality laws. If in these circumstances the *Reshitelny* could make Chifu harbour a port of refuge, then the great ships of the Russian Navy might do the same, and nothing would prevent these ships from issuing forth from their retreat to attack Japan. The necessity of guarding against such an eventuality was too commanding and too overwhelming to permit the *Reshitelny* to establish a precedent.”

It is significant that after the publication of this weighty statement the *Reshitelny* incident seems to recede into the background, and we hear as little of Japan's “astounding violation of neutrality” as we now do of her “treachery” in attacking the Russian

ships at Port Arthur on the night of February 10th.

The next episode in connection with the dispersal of the Port Arthur Fleet is that of the battleship *Tsarevitch* and the three Russian destroyers in Kiao-chau Bay. The latter lies on the east coast of the Shantung province, and at its entrance is the important German port of Tsing-tau, where Germany has a control as absolute as is ours at Wei-hai-wei. Several German warships are in the harbour, and it is clear that the position may become at any moment inconveniently strained unless Germany takes far prompter steps than did China to vindicate her neutrality. This Germany is happily in a position to do, and does with a thoroughness which is regarded as quite satisfactory everywhere except possibly in Russia, where fantastic views of German friendliness are believed to have been entertained.

When the news of the arrival of the crippled Russian ships reaches Berlin, the authorities immediately transmit to the Governor of Kiao-chau, Naval Captain Truppel, the necessary instructions for the observation of the strict rules of neutrality. The Russian ships are to be accorded a period of grace, during which the repairs needful to ensure seaworthiness may be undertaken, and after the lapse of which the vessels are to be summoned to leave German territory within twenty-four hours. On the other hand, no work of any kind calculated to restore or increase the fighting efficiency of the Russian refugees is to be countenanced.

On August 15th it was stated that the *Tsarevitch* and the three Russian destroyers were in the hands of the local German Government for repairs, and that the Governor had made a formal visit to

the ships to demand the hauling down of the Russian flag pending the completion of repairs. On the approach of the Governor and his staff the crew of the *Tsarevitch* were at first alarmed, and seized their weapons; the excitement, however, being quickly allayed. On the day following the striking of the ensigns, the Russian ships were dismantled, it being evident that they would not be able to cope with the greatly superior Japanese force which was lying in wait outside the harbour. All the ammunition was removed and stored in the German magazine, and the guns rendered temporarily quite useless. The terms of *parole* obliged the Russian officers and sailors to remain at Tsing-tau until the end of the war. Meanwhile, every precaution was taken to prevent a repetition of the Chifu incident; a German cruiser remaining on guard outside the harbour, while an intimation is conveyed to the Japanese that any ship entering the harbour at night without lights will be fired upon.

On August 16th Admiral Ikadzuki with his staff arrived at Tsing-tau in a Japanese destroyer and called upon the Governor, who reassured him as to the complete dismantling of the Russian ships. The Admiral then left the harbour, duly saluted by the German warships, and the incident was evidently regarded as closed by all concerned. About three weeks later a correspondent accompanied several Italian naval officers over the *Tsarevitch*, and reported that, in addition to the injuries mentioned in Chapter XLIX., the battleship had two holes below the water-line, which, however, had been easily handled. The general impression made upon the visitors was that the ship was far from being *hors de combat*, and that she would have been capable of inflicting severe damage

on the Japanese had she remained in the fight. She had plenty of ammunition and coal, and, though her electrical steering gear was gone, her hand and steam steering gear remained. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the *Tsarevitch* eventually parted company with the other ships because she could not keep up with them, and that when she arrived at Tsing-tau she was only making four knots with an immense expenditure of coal. Also, it is possible that the repairs effected in Kiao-chau Bay were considerable, for, even after the dismantling, the Russian sailors continued to work on the damaged vessel.

Before leaving Chifu and Kiao-chau a note may be made of the loss of a Russian torpedo-boat near Shan-tung in the early morning of August 12th. The boat in question was the *Burni*, commanded by Lieutenant Tyrtoff; but it is not quite certain that she was in the action of the 10th, since all the torpedo-craft which accompanied the Port Arthur Fleet in its sortie appear to be otherwise accounted for, three having returned to harbour, three being at Kiao-chau, one at Shanghai, and one, the *Reshitelny*, having been captured by the Japanese. An alternative suggestion is that the *Reshitelny* only emerged from Port Arthur after the action. The point, however, is not important, and mention is only made of the *Burni* because her crew sought refuge in a British port. The vessel went on the rocks near Shan-tung in a fog, and was blown up by order of her commander. Lieutenant Tyrtoff and his crew, all of whom were saved, made their way on foot to Wei-hai-wei, where they were accommodated on board H.M.S. *Humber*, and afterwards sent to Hong-kong.

There remain the case of the cruiser *Askold* and the destroyer *Groszovoi*, which

arrived at Shanghai on August 12th, and that of the cruiser *Diana* at Saigon. The position of the first two ships gave rise to a great deal of trouble, which at one time threatened to become acute, owing to fresh attempts on the part of Russia to take advantage of China's inability to enforce her neutrality. For several days a sort of "triangular duel" went on between the Russian, Chinese,

increase the fighting efficiency of the ships, such as, for instance, the provision of new funnels. The Chinese authorities met both Russian and Japanese demands with a series of diplomatic contortions, the practical result of which was, of course, that nothing was done except to produce a really dangerous state of tension. The situation was still further complicated by the fact that the



KIAO-CHAU BAY AND TSING-TAU.

and Japanese authorities. The Russians claimed the right to remain in the river until necessary repairs to the two ships had been effected, it being suggested that in the case of the *Groszovoi* this would occupy eighteen, and in that of the *Askold* twenty-eight, days. Japan vigorously demurred to this, pointing out that the only repairs contemplated by the laws of neutrality were those necessary to make a ship seaworthy, and that no work ought to be done of a nature likely to

dock in which the repairs to the *Askold* were being effected was in the hands of a British company not subject to Chinese jurisdiction.

After some ten days of very acrimonious negotiation it became evident that Japan would not allow herself to be trifled with much longer, and apprehensions were beginning to be felt that she would proceed forthwith to take the law into her own hands. At least, when the matter had apparently reached a climax,

an order from the Tsar arrived at Shanghai commanding Admiral Reitzenstein to disarm the *Askold* and *Grosvoei* without further delay. The flags of both vessels were accordingly lowered, and during the ensuing week the disarmament was duly carried out. Some further difficulty arose in respect of the crews of the two

ulates, namely, Chifu, Tien-tsin, Hankau, Shanghai, and Fu-chau.

The case of the cruiser *Diana*, which took refuge at the port of Saigon, the capital of the French colony of Indo-China, also remained a considerable time in abeyance, but seems never to have given rise to much anxiety. The *Diana*




Photo: Renard, Kiel.

THE RUSSIAN CRUISER *ASKOLD*.

ships. Japan demanded that these should be "interned" until the war was ended, having been apprised of the fact that the crews of the *Varyag* and *Koriets*, who were sent home on *parole*, were now serving again with the Baltic Fleet. On the other hand, it was felt that the presence of such a large body of Russian sailors at Shanghai might lead to serious disturbances. Accordingly, it was ultimately decided to intern these crews, and distribute them among the Treaty Ports of China where there are Russian Con-

was damaged by a shell below the waterline in the action of August 10th, while another shell killed an officer and three men, and wounded twenty-three men. The *Diana* was making for Shan-tung, but was obliged to change her course, as she met some Japanese torpedo-boats, which are said to have discharged nine torpedoes at her without effect. According to the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Petit Parisien*, it was expected in the Russian capital that the *Diana*, after having undergone the necessary repairs,

would leave Saigon for the Red Sea "to assist the volunteer fleet vessels in their search for contraband of war"! But this ingenuous suggestion proved to be inaccurate. On September 4th the commander of the *Diana* received orders from the Russian Admiralty to disarm the vessel, and two days later the French Minister at Tokio formally notified the Japanese Government that the *Diana* would disarm at Saigon.

It has been necessary to follow this remarkable series of incidents rather closely, partly because the issues are somewhat complicated, but chiefly because the events themselves open up a new chapter in the history of warfare. As the Japanese Government has justly observed, the position of China in this war is altogether unique, and that the position has not long ago become utterly insupportable is, perhaps, the finest tribute to the good sense of the "looker-on" nations that could possibly be imagined. Even as it is, the behaviour of the Chinese authorities at Chifu and Shanghai has brought matters perilously near to the point at which China certainly, and perhaps three or four European nations, might have become suddenly embroiled. On the other hand, even the prompt and correct action of the Germans at Kiao-chau hardly removes the impression that the international law of neutrality as regards the rights of refugee warships is not in an altogether satisfactory state. At present, everything seems to depend upon the capacity of the nation whose neutrality is thus affected to maintain that neutrality, if necessary by force of arms. One suspects that if Kiao-chau had belonged not to Germany but, say, to the tiny Republic of Andorra, Japan would have stood upon little ceremony, and would

have cut out the *Tsarevitch* just as she did the *Reshitelny*. Europe would have been profoundly shocked, but no European nation would care to declare war against Japan merely out of anxiety to keep Andorran neutrality inviolate.

Possibly, then, the incidents narrated in this chapter may have a significance all their own, in that they may lead up to new and much more binding international agreements as to refugee ships. For, at the bottom of much of the fuss and fury which have arisen lurks the distinct probability that Russia has been cynically using the uncertainty which prevails as to the treatment of refugee ships to assist her materially in her warlike operations. It is of no slight advantage to her to lock up a considerable portion of the Japanese Fleet in watching the exits of harbours in which crippled Russian warships are being more or less leisurely repaired. All this relieves the pressure on Port Arthur, and puts off the day of reckoning for Vladivostok. Probably Russia from the first had no intention of allowing the *Tsarevitch*, *Askold*, and *Diana* to leave their respective shelters; indeed, she might not have been displeased to see all her remaining ships in the Far East comfortably interned where there was a chance of recovering them at the end of the war. All this is highly detrimental to the interests of Japan, whose sole consolation is that, if she continues victorious, she may be able to make it a condition of peace that the ships now lying dismantled in Chinese ports shall be handed over to her, together with any found at Port Arthur or Vladivostok. Probably Japan would cheerfully relinquish such remote reversionary chances for the present satisfaction of dealing with the refugee ships at sea, or, at least, of seeing them promptly disarmed.

CHAPTER LII.

THE *NOVIK*—HER FLIGHT TO SAKHÁLIN ISLAND—THE JAPANESE SEARCH—A CRUISER DUEL—THE *NOVIK* SUNK—A FAMOUS LITTLE SHIP—JAPANESE REAPPEAR AT KORSAKOVSK.

“THE cruiser *Novik*, which possesses a good turn of speed, was allowed to act independently.” So wrote Rear-Admiral Reitzenstein, commanding the cruiser squadron of the Port Arthur Fleet, in the official report of the movements of his four ships on the night of the memorable battle of August 10th. The sequel to the independent action of the *Novik* is a sad one, but the story is relieved by many touches of real interest, and well deserves to be told in a separate chapter. For the *Novik* is a little ship with a big record, compiled in six short months, of sturdy fighting under conditions seldom favourable to a vessel of her class. Since February 9th, when she ran out of Port Arthur and boldly faced the bombarding fleet of Japan, but was soon crippled by her giant adversaries, she has been the “plucky little *Novik*” to all students of the campaign, and has won many a round of hearty applause from the friends of both the combatant nations. Her end is drawing near, but it is an end worthy of a gallant ship, and far less to be deplored than loss by striking a mine or any such untoward accident born of negligence or foeman’s craft. Before passing to the details of the *Novik*’s last fight, let us see what manner of a ship she was, and how poorly she was fitted to meet any but the very lightest warships in the Japanese Navy. The *Novik* was launched at

Elbing, Germany, in 1900, and may be described as a very fast protected cruiser of 3,300 tons, and with 18,000 horse-power engines. She had a nominal speed of 25 knots, and carried coal sufficient for a run of 900 miles at full speed. She had triple screws and was three funnelled, and her armament consisted of six 4·7 inch guns and six three-pounder and two one-pounder quick-firers. She had also five torpedo tubes. The weak spot in her design was that her engines were not entirely below the water-line; but she was a great favourite in the Russian Navy, and her brisk performances at Port Arthur were a constant source of pride and satisfaction throughout the Empire.

After parting company with the *Askold* on the night of August 10th, the *Novik* made for Kiao-chau harbour, which she entered on August 11th, and, after coaling, left the following morning. It was lucky that at this stage she escaped the attentions of Admiral Togo’s watch-dogs, which shortly afterwards kept such close guard over the entrance to Kiao-chau Bay in order to intercept the *Tsarevitch* should the latter attempt to make an exit.

From Kiao-chau the *Novik* shaped her course round Japan for Vladivostok. It is believed that the intention of her commander was to make a dash through the Tsugaru Straits, in which the Vladivostok



ADMIRAL TOGO ON BOARD HIS FLAGSHIP, THE MIKASA.
A Sketch from Life.

Squadron aforesaid has disported itself, but the forts had extinguished their lights, making the passage impossible. Accordingly, the *Novik* proceeded north until on August 20th she reached the port of Korsakovsk in the Island of Sakhalin.

Here the *Novik* was among compatriots, for the Island of Sakhalin, which lies off the east coast of the Maritime Province of Siberia, is Russian territory, and is peopled largely by Russian convicts, some 5,000 of whom are employed to work the coal mines. The southern extremity of Sakhalin is separated from the Japanese island of Yezo by the Strait of La Pérouse, sometimes called the Soya Straits, from Soya Point on the Yezo coast. The southern part of Sakhalin used formerly to be claimed by Japan, but in the year 1875 she ceded it to Russia in exchange for certain of the Kurile Islands.

The captain of the *Novik* was evidently minded to make no long stay at a port which, although Russian, afforded no real shelter from the enemy's cruisers. He probably was well aware that his ship had been sighted at different points of her northward journey, and that the Japanese would make every effort to intercept her in the Soya Straits. His only hope seemed to be to coal as quickly as possible, and try to get through to Vladivostok before it was too late. By 4 p.m. on the afternoon of August 20th, he had coaled, and was preparing to come out of the harbour when a vessel was sighted, which proved to be a Japanese cruiser. True to the traditions which had already clustered round his gallant ship and crew, the captain of the *Novik* put to sea in order to give battle to the new-comer, hoping, perhaps, that in an interval his turn of speed would allow

him to slip away through the Soya Strait, and make direct for the Golden Horn.

We must now turn to the Japanese, and see what steps they have been taking to catch this swift-winged refugee from Port Arthur. As already hinted, the *Novik* has been reported once or twice during her journey up the east coast of Japan, and two fairly fast cruisers, the *Tsushima* and *Chitose*, have been detailed, if possible, to bring her to book.

The *Chitose* is a sister ship to the *Kasagi*, is of 4,784 tons displacement, and has a nominal speed of 22½ knots. The *Tsushima* is a sister ship to the *Niitaka*. She is of only 3,420 tons displacement, with a nominal speed of 20 knots. Both ships are, however, much more heavily armed than the *Novik*, the weight of the *Chitose's* broadside fire being 800 pounds, and that of the *Tsushima's* 920 pounds, while the *Novik's* broadside only aggregates 180 pounds.

It is early in the morning of August 19th that the *Tsushima* and *Chitose* learn that the *Novik* has been sighted from the Atoeya lighthouse on the Kurile Islands. The two vessels immediately head for the Soya Straits at full speed.

At dawn on Saturday, August 20th, the *Chitose* arrives at a point 20 miles north-east of Rebunshiri Island, and proceeds to search the Soya Straits, but is greatly handicapped by the heavy weather. At 8 o'clock the *Tsushima*, which has been searching to the westward, joins the *Chitose* close to Rebunshiri Island, and further measures are concerted. One can understand with what anxiety the chances are reckoned, and what close calculations are made of the possibility that the *Novik* has already made her escape. Of course, it is all a matter of coal and speed. It is clear that, even at the comparatively slow rate

at which she must have been steaming when she passed up the east coast of Japan, the *Novik's* coal must have been running rather short when she rounded the Kurile Islands. The problem seems to have been whether she had husbanded enough to enable her to get across to Vladivostok without touching at Sakhalin Island, and it is evident that the Japanese judged such a contingency to be possible, or they would not have commenced their search so far to the westward. The facts of the case as stated above show that the *Novik* must have been more or less compelled to coal at Korsakovsk before making finally for Vladivostok, and the rapidity with which she did this and put out again to sea shows that she, too, realised what a matter of minutes her chance of escape must have been.

The two Japanese cruisers, having compared notes upon the situation, set about the renewal of their search in a very methodical manner. Soya Straits at their narrowest are only forty miles wide, but the *Chitose* takes the line from Cape Soya to Isiretoko Point, some seventy miles to the north-east on the coast of Sakhalin Island, doubtless following what is called a "curve of search," such as is usually adopted by warships on the lookout for a moving enemy whose whereabouts are not accurately known. Meanwhile, the *Tsushima* is despatched towards Korsakovsk. It should be noted that both the Japanese cruisers, although comparatively small vessels, are duly equipped with the wireless telegraphy system which the Japanese have already shown their ability to use to the very fullest advantage. Doubtless, the *Chitose*, being the larger ship, would in ordinary circumstances have been selected to proceed to Korsakovsk,

but the *Chitose* had often been seen in action by the *Novik*, which, it was feared, might dart off at once on the approach of what she knew to be a hostile ship. The *Tsushima*, on the other hand, having two masts and three funnels, somewhat resembles the *Bogatyr*, and there was just a chance that the *Novik* might believe that that unfortunate vessel, which went on shore near Vladivostok in May, had been refloated, and was coming to her assistance. As a matter of fact, this expectation seems to have proved quite groundless, the *Tsushima* being promptly recognised by the *Novik* as a cruiser of the *Niitaka* type, but the suggestion shows how carefully every little movement of the Japanese warships is thought out, and how extremely anxious these two in particular were lest their quarry should escape them.

The *Tsushima* steers due north after parting from the *Chitose*, and in the afternoon comes sufficiently near to Korsakovsk to sight a three-funnelled ship lying inside the harbour. Approaching still closer, the Japanese discovered the *Novik* preparing to come out. She heads to the south, and has evidently planned to escape through the Soya Straits. The *Tsushima* places herself in a position to bar any sudden dash in that direction, and manœuvres so as to keep her port guns trained on the *Novik*. At the same time, a message by wireless telegraphy is despatched to the *Chitose*.

A duel at sea in any circumstances can hardly fail to be of great dramatic interest, but in this case there is much to accentuate the impressiveness of a scene which will live long in the annals of the two navies concerned. It is not so much the actual surroundings, as the moral conditions in which the fight to a finish is about to take place that lend special




Photo: Topical Press Photo Agency.

THE RUSSIAN CRUISER *NOVIK*.

fascination to the grim encounter. Yet there is something weird about the very remoteness of the spot, far removed as it is from any trace of civilisation other than that which but lightly tinges a convict settlement, more especially, perhaps, one like that on Sakhalin Island. At Korsakovsk there may be some few spectators of the combat, for there is a detachment of Russian troops in the place, and the officers will be anxiously following the movements of the two vessels with their glasses. For the rest, there are probably only a handful of wretched Mongols and Ainus who could possibly be witnesses of this sharp, short struggle between two modern warships, one hoping still to find a shelter after her long flight from Port Arthur, the other nervously resolute to spare no effort to disable a renowned and highly respected adversary.

As will have been gathered from the details given, the two combatants are

not unequally matched. The *Tsushima* has the weight of metal, and the *Novik* has the turn of speed. Nor, in all probability, has the former any such advantage in the matter of gunnery as the Japanese have hitherto enjoyed in their naval encounters with the enemy. This is the *Tsushima's* maiden fight, for hitherto she has been engaged exclusively in patrol duties. On the other hand, the *Novik* has been so constantly in action that her gunners have had perhaps more practice than those on board any other Russian vessel; while it is certain that she will be well handled from the start by her gallant captain, whose splendid seamanship has already won him many a frank encomium from Admiral Togo's officers and men.

It is half-past four, and the vessels have drawn within fairly close range of one another. The captain of the *Tsushima* presses a button, and the whole of the ship's port broadside, nearly half

a ton of steel, is poured against the enemy. The *Novik* responds immediately, and the shells from her 4.7 inch guns come screeching round the *Tsushima* in such a businesslike fashion as to make it evident that the victory is no foregone conclusion for the more heavily-armed ship. Hot and furious becomes the interchange of fire. The Japanese gunners are desperately eager in their efforts to hit the *Novik*, and some of the officers become so hoarse trying to make themselves heard above the din of battle that they completely lose their voices, and are reduced—so says the *Standard's* Tokio correspondent—to writing their words of command with chalk!

After three-quarters of an hour's hard fighting, the *Novik* puts about and heads again for Korsakovsk harbour. She

has three holes below the water-line and two above, while part of her steering gear is damaged, and only six of her boilers are in good order. As she steers northwards, still fighting, the *Tsushima* follows. Suddenly one of the *Novik's* shells comes ricocheting from the water and strikes the *Tsushima* on the star-board side near the coal bunkers. The ship begins to leak, but the handy Japanese soon effect temporary repairs. Further pursuit is, however, out of the question, and the engagement accordingly ends at 5 o'clock.

The *Tsushima* now makes further signals by wireless telegraphy to the *Chitose*, and it is indicative of the smartness of the Russians that, notwithstanding their rather sorry plight, they should try hard, and for a time successfully, to intercept



Photo: S. Crabb, Southsea.

JAPANESE BLUEJACKETS ON THE *MIKASA*.

these messages by their own wireless installation. At last, however, the *Tsushima* manages to inform the *Chitose* that the *Novik* is in Korsakovsk harbour, which she herself proceeds to keep under observation during the ensuing hours of darkness.

And what of the *Novik*? Alas, the good little ship has fought her last fight, and her end is very near. Her captain had hoped to effect repairs in Korsakovsk harbour, which would enable him to put to sea again at night. But the rudder is found to be past all hope. Moreover, fresh lights show that the *Tsushima* is being reinforced—for the *Chitose* is now coming up—and with sad reluctance, we may be sure, the captain of the *Novik* decides to abandon his beloved ship, and to sink her in shallow water, in the vague hope that some day it may be possible to refloat her and restore her to the list of Russia's fighting ships. During the night of August 20th, accordingly, the officers and crew and stores of the *Novik* were conveyed ashore. The crew are still engaged in landing at dawn when they are disturbed by the sudden appearance of the *Chitose*, and have to take rather hurriedly to their boats and launches.

The *Chitose*, the officers and crew of which are doubtless a good deal disheartened at their bad luck in missing the duel, enters the Korsakovsk harbour at daybreak, and finds the place seemingly deserted. With the exception of the sailors, who are landing from the *Novik*, there is no one about, and the houses are closed. It seems likely that the town, such as it is, has been temporarily abandoned, the residents withdrawing to a safe distance beyond the reach of a warship's guns.

The *Novik* herself lies beached close to

the town. She has listed ten degrees to port, and her upper works aft are awash.

From about half-past six to quarter past seven the *Chitose* shells the *Novik's* hull, with a view to completely disabling her. An inglorious process, truly, but a wise precaution to take with a modern warship which has as many lives as a cat, and can be made "as good as new" after having been to all appearances riddled like a sieve.

After coming to within 2,500 yards of the partly submerged vessel the *Chitose* steams away, her officers satisfied that the *Novik's* injuries are such that no amount of repairs will ever restore the vessel's fighting efficiency.

Thus ends the brief and brilliant career of the "pet toy of the Russian Navy," a ship whose exploits are of just that class that go far to keep naval opinion in a healthy state of flux. No one, of course, who is moderately sane contends that a plethora of *Noviks* can make up for a deficiency in battleships, and we have already seen the *Novik* herself, on the morning of February 9th, compelled to withdraw very hastily out of range of the great *Mikasa's* guns. Half a dozen *Noviks* might well hesitate to attack a single battleship, except on the desperate chance of getting some of their torpedoes home while two or three of themselves were being sent to the bottom. But there is much virtue in a fine record of success in actual fighting, and the services which the *Novik* has been able to render Russia in the first six months of war are such that she will long serve to support the arguments of those who believe the future to have great things in store for very fast light cruisers a quarter of the size of our monsters *Terrible* and *Powerful*, and with some of the *Novik's* more serious

limitations removed. For the *Novik* might be fighting Russia's battles still, if any one of her three chief defects had been remedied. If her coal capacity had been but a little greater she would undoubtedly have reached Vladivostok before she could have been overtaken; if she had been less vulnerable, her boilers would not have suffered as they did, and she might have escaped during the action itself; and, finally, if she had had heavier guns, she might have succeeded in sinking the *Tsushima* instead of merely crippling her for the time being.

Be all this as it may, the *Novik's* course is run, and she will live in history as one of several little ships which have gained immortality by the exhibition of sheer audacity and entire indifference to overwhelming odds. In our naval history there are some notable examples. Take, for instance, the case of Lord Charles Beresford's gunboat, which earned the famous signal, "Well done, *Condor!*" at the bombardment of Alexandria. A finer record still is that of the "mad little craft" which forced the fifty-three great ships of Spain, and of which our Tennyson sings so gloriously:

"And so

The little *Revenge* ran on sheer into the heart
of the foe,
With her hundred fighters on deck and her ninety
sick below;
For half of their fleet to the right and half to
the left were seen,
And the little *Revenge* ran on thro' the long sea-
lane between."

No single vessel of small size could hope nowadays to emulate the glorious last fight of Sir Richard Grenville's ship, for naval science has sadly diminished the value of the points which once belonged to seamanship alone. But the

Novik has won the right to be classed in the noble company of such great little men-of-war, and her flag should fly all the more proudly in the atmosphere of naval history by reason of the poor show made by so many of the bigger and stronger ships in the Navy of which she has been a sparkling ornament.

The casualties in the duel between the *Novik* and the *Tsushima* were quite surprisingly small. The latter, indeed, according to the official report, had not a single man killed or wounded. On the *Novik* there were two sailors killed, and two seriously wounded, while a lieutenant and fourteen sailors were slightly wounded.

In Japan the news of the fate of the *Novik* creates great satisfaction, tempered by sincere sentimental regret for the loss of a gallant adversary. The escape of such a fast vessel to Vladivostok might have caused Japan serious inconvenience, and have greatly discounted the advantages secured by the sinking of the *Rurik*, and the damages inflicted on the *Rossia* and *Gromoboi*. In St. Petersburg, the destruction of the *Novik* frees a flood of deplorable recriminations at the Admiralty, much of it apparently quite disconnected with the mishap itself. This is no uncommon phenomenon, but it is one of rather more than ordinary significance in such a hot-bed of officialdom in Russia. At present the favourite scapegoat seems to be Admiral Skrydloff, who is greatly blamed for having allowed the Vladivostok squadron to go so far south in the hope of joining the Port Arthur Fleet. Certainly, if he had sent them instead to the Soya Straits to meet and assist the *Novik*, he might have saved the latter, and sunk either the *Chitose* or *Tsushima*, or both. But it is easy to be wise after

the vessels, and head towards the cruiser *Novik*, which they reach about 10 o'clock. Japanese sailors are seen moving on the bridge of the *Novik*.


The commander of the Russian detachment now orders his men to fire on the boats, and on the deck of the *Novik*. The fire is sufficiently accurate to disturb the Japanese at their work, and to cause them to return to their ships. The Russians continue firing, and the Japanese reply from their boats, but no damage is done on either side.

The ships—the unlikelihood of their being cruisers is supported by the fact that they have not attempted to shell the Russian detachment—having taken the boats on board, weigh anchor about noon, and stand away to sea. The Russians now proceed to examine the *Novik*, in which they find some mines

and electrical conductors, evidently laid with the intention to blow up what remained of the cruiser.

The Japanese officers of this expedition on returning to Tokio report that the *Novik* has now a list of 30 degrees, and, with the exception of a small portion of the bows, is entirely submerged, the water being knee-deep even at the shallowest parts on the upper deck. The conning-tower and upper works are badly knocked about, and the destruction under water is evidently considerable.

There is a later telegram to the effect that two Japanese warships bombarded Korsakovsk on September 7th, and fired torpedoes at the sunken cruiser. Evidently the Japanese want to make sure that the "plucky little *Novik*" will not once more walk the waters, and have to be destroyed all over again.



From a Native Drawing.

JAPANESE WARSHIP OF THE SHŪGUN, OF THE PERIOD KA-YEI (A.D. 1848-1854).

(From Arthur Diōsy's "The New Far East.")

CHAPTER LIII.

RUSSIA AND NEUTRAL SHIPPING—DANGEROUS STATE OF TENSION—LORD LANSDOWNE'S STATEMENT OF BRITISH POLICY—THE VOLUNTEER "CRUISERS" RE-APPEAR—PROTEST OF THE LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE—THE *FORTE* FINDS THE *PETERBURG* AND *SMOLENSK*—IMPROVED PROSPECTS.

IT is annoying to be compelled to recur at this juncture to the subject of Russia's interference with neutral shipping, a subject which it is not easy to invest with anything like picturesque attractiveness. But even a war history cannot be all "purple patches," and in this case an otherwise rather dull series of episodes has some bright redeeming features. Above all, we must remember that, quite apart from the big commercial interests involved, this particular chapter of events had at one time a very lurid interest for Great Britain. It is easy, now that the danger seems to be over, to say that there never was much danger, and that, even if things had gone further than they did, the "common-sense of most" would have asserted itself, and a peaceful issue would have been found. But the facts point all the other way, and it is not too much to believe that, during this period some very anxious moments were passed by our responsible statesmen, in the fear lest diplomacy might not be able to prevent a complication from which any sort of pacific withdrawal would be hopeless.

In Chapter XLIII. the question of Russia's interference with neutral shipping was discussed up to a point at which it seemed that a settlement would almost immediately follow. An understanding had been arrived at with regard, at any

rate, to the Volunteer Fleet steamers, the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, and it was clear that the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was in earnest in his endeavours to bring about a more satisfactory situation. But the Russian Admiralty had issued a memorandum with reference to the *Malacca* incident, which was open to some objection, and the performances of the Vladivostok Squadron had given rise to such anxiety among shipowners in this country, that the P. and O.—followed later by other lines—had announced its determination to suspend temporarily its service to Japan.

In other words, notwithstanding official assurances, there was an uneasy feeling abroad that further trouble might be brewing even in regard to the Volunteer Fleet. It was also abundantly clear that the actual situation was an exasperating one to the greatest maritime nation in the world. The withdrawal from the Japan service of the P. and O., Holt, Thompson, and other leading English lines gave a prompt and decided stimulus to the carrying trade of Germany, and British shipowners naturally viewed with growing bitterness this serious transfer of profits to rivals whose risks ought to have been the same as theirs, but who nevertheless continued to accept as freight merchandise undoubtedly contraband according to the Russian

view. Rightly or wrongly, the idea was strengthened that German ship-owners expected to secure from Russia more favourable treatment than that which would be accorded to British vessels. It goes without saying, that a suspicion of this sort, coupled with a most serious pecuniary loss in the present, and the knowledge that the British carrying trade to Japan would probably suffer future lasting injury by reason of this suspension, was hardly calculated to promote friendly feeling. Indeed, it is difficult to exaggerate the intense irritation which existed during July and August, and more especially, perhaps, during the first three weeks of the latter month, with reference to the extraordinary position in which British shipping interests had been placed by Russian pretensions as to the right of search. In not a few quarters was to be heard the bitter lament that Palmerston could not rise from his grave and take in hand a situation which doubtless he would have dealt with summarily, though possibly with hardly satisfactory results.

For there is not much doubt that a good deal of the trouble which arose from Russia's treatment of neutrals was deliberately anticipated by a certain section in Russia which would have been only too pleased if the British Government had acted according to the Palmerstonian tradition. As has already been indicated in this narrative (see page 530), the Russian Admiralty is swayed by the anti-British influence of the Grand Duke Alexander Michailovitch to such an extent that the Russian Foreign Office has the greatest difficulty in carrying on its negotiations with Great Britain. Had the Marquis of Lansdowne acted at any stage of the *Malacca* affair as the great high-handed Pam would have done, war

would probably have been inevitable, since the anti-English party at St. Petersburg would have found it easy to persuade the Tsar that the honour of Russia had been grossly insulted. Even as things were, there must have been a time when only by a supreme effort could Count Lamsdorff get the mastery of the forces working against him.

To some who love history for history's sake, it may seem that, in the whole record of the first six months of the war between Russia and Japan, there is no more striking situation than this, which has been organised by a small but immensely powerful clique of high personages seeking to cover their country's humiliation by a display of arrogance certain, if carried to much greater lengths, to create a fresh and much more powerful adversary. One may go further and doubt whether in the recorded annals of the world there is anything that quite tallies with this remarkable development of an already great and epoch-making war. For half a year it has been clearly apparent to the civilised nations of the earth that Russia will have as much as she can do to prevent the utter annihilation of her Far Eastern interests by the Army and Navy of Japan. Her finances are in no flourishing condition, her internal state is full of dangerous possibilities; yet, deliberately, those highest in the councils of the Tsar are seeking to provoke the resentment of a Power which, whatever may be its limitations, has certain warlike attributes calculated to inspire respect.

The exact cause of this phenomenon will probably never be known. It has been suggested that, while the idea of making terms with Japan was utterly repugnant to the proud *entourage* of the Tsar, it was thought some less humiliating

compromise could be effected if Great Britain could be goaded into a declaration of war which would link her with Japan in a fighting alliance. Other theories point to a wish to entangle Great Britain at any cost, in the hope of securing the intervention of France or Germany, or both. A third supposition is that, in some Russian circles it was still believed that a Russian descent upon India could be made which would soon wipe out the memories of reverses in the Far East, and would even compensate the destruction of what is left of the Russian Navy. Whether any or none of these hypotheses be sound, the fact remains that the Russian Admiralty strained the patience of the British nation in August, 1904, well-nigh to the breaking-point, and that the tension was fully as great as it was after the Panj-deh incident of 1886 or *l'affaire* Fashoda of 1898.

What added enormously to the indignation felt in this country was the studiously aggravating fashion in which Russia set to work, after the apparent settlement of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* dispute, to devise fresh means of subjecting British commerce to scrutiny and delay. Putting aside for the moment the question as to the right of Volunteer steamers, which had passed the *Dardanelles* as merchantmen, to transform themselves suddenly into men-of-war, the Russian Government proceeded to convert other merchant vessels into "cruisers" merely for the purpose of searching for contraband; and one or two liners purchased from Germany were reported to have undergone this strange transformation. At first, it was believed in this country that such a proceeding was in sheer defiance of the international laws of war, and that, in fact, the example of the *Alabama* was here being

closely imitated. But it subsequently transpired—and the point is of the greatest interest—that, according to the Law Officers of the Crown, "there can be no doubt that merchant ships may be sold by neutrals to any government, and that government may turn these ships into cruisers if they please."

On the other hand, there is something questionable in the action of a government which seems to strain its legal powers more for the purpose of giving annoyance to neutrals, or, as is suggested in this case, one particular neutral, than with any definite hope of achieving practical results. Contraband is, of course, being carried to Japan in British and other ships, and contraband will continue to be carried, in every war in which there is a chance of making a profit sufficient to compensate the risk. But the amount of genuine contraband of war which is being taken to Japan is certainly relatively small, for the simple reason that Japan does not want it. As regards war material she is amply supplied, and now, to a great extent, self-supporting. But it is easy for Russia to pretend the contrary, in order to give her an opportunity of interfering with the world's commerce. Accordingly, her "quick-change cruisers"—merchantmen one day and warships the next—are sent to various points of the compass to intercept British ships, board them, worry the captains with questions, talk bigly about their belligerent rights, and, in short, make themselves seriously objectionable. Well may the British master mariner—sometimes a choleric individual—chafe at being stopped by vessels whose sole claim to be considered men-of-war lies in a flag and a few hastily imported guns. Well may British shipowners ask how it is that a strong Government, with


the greatest navy in the world at its beck and call, cannot secure its mercantile marine from such constant and often causeless interruption.

The British Government is not slow to perceive that the temper of the nation is rising, and that more particularly the case of the *Knight Commander*, the vessel actually sunk by the Vladivostok Squadron, has aroused the sort of feeling which no Government can afford to disregard. On August 11th, then, in reply to a carefully pointed question from the Marquis of Ripon, the Marquis of Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, makes a singularly important statement as to the policy of the Government in regard, first, to the sinking of the *Knight Commander*; secondly, to the general question of contraband of war; and thirdly, to the passage of the Dardanelles by steamers of the Russian Volunteer Fleet.

A statement of policy like this is, of course, a very serious, indeed a most solemn matter, quite apart from the personality of those concerned in it. Yet, to some present on this occasion, it must have seemed that only with difficulty could two statesmen representing opposite parties in the House of Lords have been selected to replace the Marquises of Lansdowne and Ripon as the appropriate chief actors in such a scene. Both have been Viceroys of India, both have been Secretaries of State for War, and each has many separate claims to distinction on the score of brilliant public service wholly dissociated—for both are noblemen of immense wealth and influence—from any idea of personal aggrandisement. Lord Lansdowne speaks with all the added dignity conferred by his actual position, as well as by the historic prestige of the "F. O.;" yet a peculiar

interest is attached to the question put by Lord Ripon, in that the latter won his marquise by services as chairman of the *Alabama* Commission. The exploits of that famous privateer, which, under the Confederate colours, captured nearly seventy Northern vessels in her career of nearly two years, and eventually cost this country three and a quarter millions, are fading from men's minds. But it may be recalled of her that, like the Vladivostok Squadron, she did not do much fighting, but preyed on merchant vessels that could not fight. It is one of the minor curiosities of history that such a memory should have been revived—although the fact does not appear to have been noted at the time—in connection with episodes like the sinking of the *Knight Commander* and performances like those of the unlicensed rovers of the Russian Volunteer Fleet.

From which digression let us revert to Lord Lansdowne's weighty statement. The Foreign Secretary deals first with the question of the passage of the Dardanelles by the Volunteer Fleet steamers. With reference to the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, he observes that the question has now passed out of the acute stage, and he adds, "As we now know that the instructions which have been sent to these ships to desist from similar seizures *have reached their destination*, we may therefore assume that no further seizures will take place." In view of what follows, the words italicised should be remembered. As to the reports current respecting further movements of Volunteer steamers through the Dardanelles, Lord Lansdowne confirms the statement that the Turkish Government has insisted that in future such vessels should contain no munitions of war nor armament, that they should fly the commercial flag during



MR. BALFOUR ADDRESSING THE DEPUTATION FROM THE LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

their whole voyage, and should not be turned into cruisers.

Lord Lansdowne next proceeds to discuss the question of contraband of war, the definition of which by Russia has not, he states clearly, been acquiesced in by the British Government. This is not the place to go clearly into the question of absolute and conditional contraband, some expert remarks upon which were given at the close of the first volume of this history. But it may be said briefly that Lord Lansdowne emphatically denies that this country had recognised Russia's right "to decide that certain articles or classes of articles are, as a matter of course, and without reference to other considerations, to be dealt with as contraband of war, regardless of the well-established rights of neutrals." On the contrary, the British Government has entered a firm protest on the subject, and has refused to be bound by or to recognise as valid the decision of any Prize Court which violates neutrals' rights or is otherwise not in conformity with the recognised principles of International Law.

Thirdly, the Foreign Secretary uses particularly plain language on the subject of the sinking of the *Knight Commander*. "We are altogether unable, my lords," says the noble marquis, speaking for his Majesty's Government in the full consciousness of what that spokesmanship implies, "to admit that the sinking of the *Knight Commander* was justifiable according to any principles of international law by which this country has ever regarded itself as bound." He goes on to observe that the case of the *Knight Commander* awaits trial by the appellate Prize Court at St. Petersburg. If the St. Petersburg Court should reverse the decision of the Vladivostok

Court, that will be a matter for congratulation. "But, whether that be the case or not, we are in any case unable to admit that the destruction of the vessel was justifiable, or that the proceedings of these vessels have any validity so far as this particular case is concerned." There is nothing more uncompromisingly lucid than the language of British diplomacy when at last the moment for "straight talk" has arrived, and Palmerston himself could not, with all his bluff homeliness, have stated the Government policy with regard to the sinking of the *Knight Commander* more directly and emphatically than did the courtly and polished statesman who followed the great Lord Salisbury as our Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In concluding this memorable utterance, Lord Lansdowne dwells on the cumulative effect upon British commerce which such measures as those adopted by Russia could not fail to exercise. He gives examples, too, of the cruel injustice which might be perpetrated if the doctrines advocated by Russia were pushed to very ordinary lengths. Strong representations have been made to Russia to the effect that its conduct in this matter has gone far beyond what the British Government considers justifiable. The language of the Russian Government favours the belief that acts of destruction of neutral prizes will not be repeated, and there is room for hope that a reasonable and amicable understanding will be arrived at upon the question of contraband. "I can assure your lordships," says the Foreign Secretary, in a peroration which draws cheers from an audience not usually emotional, "that we deeply realise the gravity of the question to which the noble marquis has called attention, and we shall deem it

our duty to insist strongly upon the rights which this country possesses as a neutral Power, rights which, owing to her predominant interest in the commerce of the Far East, she is, more than any other Power, called upon to vindicate."

A few days after the making of this statement in the House of Lords a note was presented to the Russian Government through Sir Charles Hardinge, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in which the questions raised by Lord Ripon were specifically dealt with. Exception was taken to the Russian doctrine concerning the contraband nature of food-stuffs, the right of Russia to sink neutral merchantmen was contested, and compensation was demanded in the case of the *Knight Commander*. Simultaneously the Government of the United States made a protest against the confiscation of flour found on board the *Arabia*, and also contended that, in the case of a variety of articles mentioned in the Russian list of contraband of war, a distinction should be drawn between absolute and conditional contraband; that coal, for instance, should not be regarded as contraband unless it is obviously intended for use by the enemy's warships.

A conciliatory spirit was beginning to be manifested by the Russian Government with regard to these protests when, on the top of various despatches announcing detentions and searches by Russian "warships," came a telegram from Durban stating that on the previous day the steamer *Comedian* had been stopped by our old friend the *Smolensk*, still posing as a Russian man-of-war!

The impression created by this announcement was a painful one. It had been confidently believed that, as Lord Lansdowne stated in the House of Lords, the instructions to the *Peterburg* and

Smolensk to cease masquerading as warships had been duly delivered, and that no further trouble would arise in respect to these two vessels. Even when it transpired that the instructions had not reached their destination, having arrived at Suez after the *Smolensk* had left, it was recalled that in the terms of the Russian Admiralty Memorandum quoted on page 526, the two vessels had received a "special commission," the term of which had long ago expired. It was impossible to recognise the reappearance of the *Smolensk* in her old rôle as compatible with that declaration, which now, more than ever, seemed to partake of the character of a diplomatic fiction. The British Press commented with significant vigour upon an incident which savoured so strongly of bad faith. It is pleasant to be able to add that even in Russia the news was very unfavourably received in official circles, in which some regard was still felt for the traditions of honourable diplomacy. It was felt that once again Count Lamsdorff had been placed in a difficult position "by the same great personages who had thwarted all his efforts, and overruled all his advice in the early stages of the disastrous Far Eastern imbroglio." The fact that the *Smolensk* and her consort had not yet been put in possession of the orders terminating their "commission" was evidently regarded as an indication that forces were still at work in Russia itself which might seriously counteract the best efforts of her diplomatists.

Although not directly arising out of the *Smolensk's* stoppage of the *Comedian*, there is little doubt that a marked agitation among British shipping circles was brought to a head by this incident. At any rate, on August 25th a large and representative meeting of the East India

and China Trade Section of the London Chamber of Commerce, and others interested in the shipping industry, was held in Cannon Street, with a view to making representations to his Majesty's Government on the unsatisfactory condition of affairs as regards contraband of war and trade with the Far East generally. The Prime Minister had consented to receive subsequently a deputation from this meeting, whose deliberations were, therefore, of even more than usual gravity and interest.

A great deal of quiet impressiveness surrounds a meeting of any of the larger Chambers of Commerce in this country, more especially, perhaps, where huge shipping interests are concerned. The Merchant Princes of England are men who as individuals almost invariably command respect. For the mere existence of a successful business enterprise in these days of progress and competition generally depends upon the possession by the head of the firm of altogether exceptional qualities of administration, not to speak of singular gifts of resolution, alertness, and sagacity. Many of the strong, calm faces to be seen at such meetings as that under allusion belong to men who are called upon a dozen times in the day to decide at short notice issues involving the movements of scores, perhaps hundreds, of *employés*, and the disbursement of thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of pounds. A special influence, of course, is wielded by those who place huge steamships on the sea, and direct their movements from port to distant port as easily and confidently as a child shifts his fleet of paper boats. These, perhaps more than all the rest, are, if not the kings, at least the true "Ablemen," as Carlyle would say, of commerce, for they rule both by land and

sea, crowding the ocean highways with craft which in size and swiftness rival the finest warships afloat, and in ports and cities swaying great staffs of workers, and dealing daily with massive problems of freight, insurance, passenger traffic, and what not else of maritime significance.

The collective influence of a body of men like this can never be accurately gauged. It is a thing so many-sided, so indefinite, that those whom it most affects cannot always be sure from what quarter the pressure comes, or the extent to which it is being exercised. But it is safe to say that the London Chamber of Commerce can, if it wishes, wield a power in some respects not very far short of that possessed by the House of Commons itself. It generally surpasses that Assembly, too, in knowing what it wants, and in the force and brevity with which it does its business.

At this historic meeting these last-named attributes are sharply in evidence. The chairman, himself a member of Parliament, Mr. William Keswick, of the great China firm of Jardine and Co., after briefly stating the reasons why the meeting had been called, pointed out how important it was that what they had to represent should be discussed "quietly, reasonably, and with proper appreciation of the difficulties." This was the note to which this remarkable meeting was attuned; and very quietly, very reasonably, and with every consideration for the position of the Government, resolutions were passed voicing the apprehensions felt in the City as to the effect upon British trade of Russia's interpretation of contraband, and calling upon the Government to take immediate and effective steps for the protection of British shipping. In one respect the

resolution appealing to Government was remarkable. It was asked that an effort should be made to "ensure the same degree of immunity from vexatious stoppages and examinations as was apparently enjoyed by the shipping of other nationalities."

When, later in the day, a deputation from this meeting was received by Mr.

underwriters who were prepared to insure foreign ships proceeding to the Far East at far lower rates than those at which they would insure British ships. With regard to contraband of war, Mr. Balfour repeated the assurance given by the Marquis of Lansdowne, and alluded to the presentation of a note to Russia defining a position from which it was im-




Photo: S. Cribb, Southsea.

H.M.S. FORTE.

Balfour at the Foreign Office, the Prime Minister went very carefully into the question of the alleged preference shown to shipping of other nationalities, and he did his best to show that no differential treatment had in fact occurred. He even entered into a little rule of three calculation of the ratio of captures to the value of shipping in the case of Germany and ourselves. But the deputation were not profoundly impressed. They pointed out that they had to deal with

possible for the British Government to recede.

One piece of special information the Prime Minister had for the deputation. This related to the appearance of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* in South African waters, an "unfortunate occurrence," as Mr. Balfour moderately observed. The Russian Government had now asked the British Government to search for the two ships, and convey a message carrying out the pledges already given. Accordingly,

two British cruisers from the Cape of Good Hope Squadron had been ordered to make the search, thereby, it was to be hoped, bringing the Volunteer Fleet episode finally to an end.

The sequel to this arrangement is of some interest. Unfortunately, at the moment the Cape of Good Hope Squadron, which is under the command of Rear-Admiral John Durnford, C.B., D.S.O., is not very well placed for carrying out such a search as the one indicated, being a good deal scattered; while the only ships at the headquarters of the Squadron, St. Simon's Bay, are the cruiser *Terpsichore* and the depôt-ship *Simoom*, both of which are undergoing repairs, and the cruiser *Barrosa*, which is under orders for Walfisch Bay to relieve the gunboat *Partridge*. Admiral Durnford with his flagship, the cruiser *Crescent*; the cruisers *Pearl* and *Forte* and the sloop *Odin* are near Zanzibar, and it is clear that some time will probably elapse before the two rovers are found in the extensive hunting grounds in which they are now moving.

As a matter of fact, it is not until 3 o'clock in the morning of September 6th that H.M.S. *Forte*, having weighed anchor and steamed south from Zanzibar, observes the masts of two suspicious steamers in Menai Bay, South Island. A German steamer had, on the previous day at Zanzibar, reported sighting two Russian "warships" in territorial waters, and there can now be no doubt that these are the identical pair. In the dim morning light the two vessels do not notice the *Forte* until she is fairly close to them, but when they do catch sight of the British cruiser they hurriedly interchange signals and weigh anchor.

The *Forte*—which is a second-class cruiser of 4,360 tons commanded by

Captain Charles Dundas—runs up the signal "Have important despatches," and the Russian vessels drop anchor again. Captain Dundas now sends a boat conveying a Russian telegram in cipher and the British Government's formal demand that the two "cruisers" are to desist forthwith from interfering with British shipping. It is a somewhat exciting moment, for it is clearly understood that instructions have been given to the captain of the *Forte* to "stand no nonsense." Presently the boat returns with the message that a reply will be sent shortly from the *Peterburg*.

In due course Captain Skalsky, of the *Peterburg*, comes on board the *Forte*, and, as he is unquestionably a captain in the Imperial Russian Navy, whatever may be the status of his vessel, he is received with the usual compliments. He proves to be a very courteous and polished gentleman, speaking English fluently. He states that he only arrived yesterday, and that stress of weather accounts for the presence of the two "cruisers" off Zanzibar, and for the fact that they have only searched one steamer.

It is impressed upon Captain Skalsky that he must not linger in these parts, and the Russian captain declares that the two ships shall leave at once. With admirable presence of mind he asks to be permitted to coal at Zanzibar now that he is under orders for Russia, but Captain Dundas says that it will be necessary to refer home before this request can be granted. In view of what follows, the request made by the Russian captain is rather entertaining.

Captain Dundas duly returns Captain Skalsky's visit, and it is ascertained that, notwithstanding the latter's assurance, the *Peterburg* is full of coal. She carries seven 5-in. and a few smaller guns; the

Smolensk's armament being apparently eleven guns of different calibres, the one large gun being of not much use, while all are more or less obsolete. Such is the warlike "make-up" of these bogeys of the British shipping trade.


As soon as Captain Dundas has returned to the *Forte* the *Smolensk* and *Peterburg* get under way and stand off to the south. The *Forte* remains watching the pair closely. When they are about seven miles off another steamer is sighted, making for their previous anchorage. She proves to be their collier, and is believed to be the Hamburg-American liner *Holsatia*. She alters her course, and the Russian vessels do the same. When last seen the three vessels are fifteen miles to the west of the south point of Zanzibar. Earnestly is it to be hoped that this is really and absolutely the termination of an episode which has strained the patience of Great Britain most severely, and has added another to the long list of instances in which Russian good faith has not been displayed to sparkling advantage.

Much more might be written concern-

ing the interference of Russia with neutral shipping in the course of the first six or seven months of the war, and there are various cases—those of the *Hipsang*, the *Colchas*, and others—to which attention could be drawn were this intended to be an absolutely comprehensive history. But enough has been said to give a general idea of a development which, however important, becomes a little tedious as the more serious risks connected with it are eliminated. And this is happily what is now being foreshadowed at St. Petersburg as well as in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar. A joint commission representing the Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Marine, with Professor Martens, the eminent jurist, as president, is assembled at the commencement of September to discuss the desirableness of drawing a distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. A few days later their report is handed by Count Lamsdorff to the Tsar, and it is anticipated that a conciliatory reply to both the British and the American Notes will be forthcoming.

PETERBURG

SMOLENSK



THE RAIDERS OF THE RED SEA.

CHAPTER LIV.


THE ADVANCE ON LIAO-YANG—INTERVENING EVENTS—BIRTH OF THE TSAREVITCH—THE
TSAR STILL BELLICOSE—RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE POSITIONS—PRELUDE TO THE
LIAO-YANG BATTLES.

RESUMING our warlike narrative, we find in the early days of August a situation which may remind some of that prison in Edgar Allan Poe's famous story, the walls of which moved inwards a little each day, until eventually the wretched prisoner was crushed between them. It is true that Kuropatkin gives little sign of viewing his surroundings with the frenzy of despair; it is true that the outcome in this case is not so completely tragic as we are led to infer it was in that of Poe's miserable captive. But the process by which the Japanese seek to compass the envelopment of the whole of the main Russian Army is certainly not unlike the mechanism of those ghastly prison walls, and at the period which is now to be dealt with, the prospects of escape, when the machinery shall have done its work, seem almost equally hopeless.

In Chapter XLVIII. we left General Kuroki several valuable and hard-won miles nearer to Liao-yang by reason of the successes of his troops at Yu-shu-ling-tzu and Yang-tzu-ling. By his occupation of the latter, which is four miles west of Hsihoyen, he is within very easy distance of the Tai-tse-ho, the river which runs through Liao-yang and joins the Hun-ho, which, again, is a larger tributary of the Liao river, and at its upper reaches flows near Mukden. The Takushan Army commanded by General Nozu—often called the Third Army, although the Japanese have not hitherto

used that designation in their official despatches—has advanced to Tomuchan, or, as it appears on some maps, Shimucheng, and is said to be receiving reinforcements, which have been landed at Takushan. General Oku's army has occupied Hai-cheng and the city of Old Niu-chwang, some twelve miles to the west. When we recall the steps by which this arc of a greatly diminished circle has been reached by armies which not long since were at Port Adams, Takushan, and Feng-hwang-cheng respectively, the comparison with Poe's moving prison walls seems to gain in force and accuracy.

The period covered roughly by the first three weeks in August is of importance out of all proportion to the actual operations carried out. These, as will be seen, were not of a very dramatic description, largely owing to the intervention of torrential rains. But they form the prelude to one of the most tremendous conflicts of modern times, and in themselves present several points of interest. In the course of this chapter they will be duly summarised, and, in the meantime, they afford a convenient centre round which to group a number of those incidental details respecting the condition and prospects of the two opposing forces, which have such a special attractiveness in connection with this particular war. For, the deeper one dips into the recorded information concerning this momentous conflict, the



HAND-TO-HAND: RUSSIANS AND JAPANESE AT CLOSE QUARTERS.

During the fight at Telissu the Russians crept so close up to the Japanese trenches that in some places neither side could use their rifles, owing to an intervening rise in the ground. Finally, the Japanese began to hurl down stones upon their adversaries.



more frequently is one reminded of the epoch-making difference between it and any other previous campaign. Crowded as it is with naval and military lessons of special value at a transitional period in the history of warfare, it is even more closely packed with that human interest which is often more conspicuous in the settlement of great political and racial questions than it is in the actual conduct of warlike operations.

Do we seek an instance? It is here ready to our hand, and the manner of its introduction is peculiarly human. In the second week of August, when the main armies of the Tsar and the Mikado are "jockeying for their places" in what, it is thought, may prove a decisive contest; when, for the first time, the Russian and Japanese Commanders-in-Chief are set against one another in a definite trial of wits; when soldiers fresh from Europe are beginning to know what it feels to come to hand grips with the once despised yellowskin; when almost daily within five and twenty miles of Liao-yang is to be heard the rattle of musketry that tells of an affair of out-posts or an encounter of patrols—there appears on the scene at St. Petersburg a person of little weight but of much consequence, who may come to have a greater influence upon the course of the war than Kuropatkin or Oyama themselves. There is more human interest attached to the arrival at this juncture on the stage of the world's affairs of a certain small baby boy than there is in the storming of Nan-shan or the sortie of ships from Port Arthur. Perhaps it may transpire that, even in naval and military significance, and even in relation to this very war, the tiny Tsarevitch's coming may prove to be of the three events the one of greatest import.

Since the second Nicholas of the House of Romanoff married, in 1894, our Queen Victoria's granddaughter, Princess Alix of Hesse, four daughters had been born to the devoted Imperial couple, but never an Heir. The Heir Presumptive to the Throne of All the Russias was still the Grand Duke Michael and to a deeply superstitious people it seemed as if the blessing of Heaven did not lie upon a union which was yet known to be marked by notable domestic happiness. It was an open secret that the Tsar and Tsarina—the latter a particularly sympathetic figure in English eyes—felt deeply the untoward growth of this unfortunate development of Russian sentiment. It is whispered, that in the case of the Tsar, the actual fear lest the absence of a direct male Heir to the Throne portended grave Divine displeasure produced at times a serious despondency, tending to vagaries which would have suited the soothsayer-led kings of early Egypt better than they did the latterday court of a European monarch. But the Tsar's helpless confidence in spiritualist and other counsellors was soon obscured by the concentrated interest of the civilised world in the announcement that a fifth Imperial baby was expected. On August 12th the event took place, and the birth of a Tsarevitch plunged the Russian Empire into joy, and evoked the most sincere and lively satisfaction throughout Europe.

At the front, it is needless to say, the joyful news is received with a genuine burst of enthusiasm by the Russian troops, partly out of honest loyalty to the Tsar, partly by reason of the superstitious idea above alluded to. Kuropatkin in person parades the troops, and expresses a hope that, as an appropriate

sequel to the event, he will soon lead the Russian Army to victory. At Port Arthur the tidings are similarly honoured, and even in the dock at Shanghai one of the battered survivors of the naval action of two days before takes appropriate notice of the realisation of the Empire's heart-felt wish. The cruiser *Askold*, sorely damaged as she is, and on the point of being dismantled, and so for the time ceasing to have a recognised existence as a man-of-war, "dresses ship" and covers her crippled spars with gay bunting in honour of the little Tsarevitch.

Yet who shall say that the new Heir to the Russian Throne comes altogether as an evangel, even to the Empire in which he has been received with such a vociferous welcome? His advent makes for unquestioned good in some directions, for the shadow of an alienation between the crowned heads of a mighty people and the people themselves, whatever the basis on which it rests, is a grievous thing. It may be even a terrible thing in a land where, arrayed against the forces of despotism and bureaucracy, are those of a desperate socialism, which acknowledges no law save that of successful violence. The pardons and amnesties which follow the birth of the happy Tsar's baby son not only are the gracious expression of a kindlier feeling, more especially towards the Finlanders, who have lately been far from basking in the sunshine of Imperial favour, but may be productive of future better feeling in hundreds of remote corners of the Tsar's dominions. The divinity that doth hedge a Russian Autocrat, God-favoured by an Heir, is great. But even in ignorance-sodden Russia there is a growing appreciation of the Tsar's power to better ordinary conditions of life by the per-


formance of very ordinary acts of administrative goodness.

But as to the war, alas, the infant Tsarevitch's influence is not likely to be beneficial. Quite the contrary. The fear of Heavenly indignation has passed from his Imperial sire, and it would seem that his warlike purpose has been stiffened by an event which, from a kinder human standpoint, would have inspired hope of peaceful counsels. This view receives striking confirmation at the christening of the Tsarevitch, to whom our own King Edward, bound to the Tsar by close family ties, stands sponsor. The King sends as his representative to St. Petersburg Rear-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, who, doubtless by his Majesty's desire, is said to have alluded in conversation with the Tsar to the possibility of peace in the near future between Russia and Japan. The reported sequel is impressive. Standing up, and with a deliberation which induced the belief that the utterance was meant to be repeated, the Tsar said solemnly, "As long as a Russian soldier remains standing, and there is a rouble left in the Imperial Treasury, I shall continue this war against the Japanese, who forced me to take up arms. There are no disasters in the field that can move me from this resolution."

With Nicholas II. in this anything but pacific frame of mind, it may be imagined that both in Russia and at the front an active state of warlike preparation continues. We have seen that these efforts, even in the short period under review, are being discounted by the naval successes of Admiral Togo and Admiral Kamimura, and perhaps still more by Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky's fatuous mistake in bringing the bulk of the main Russian Fleet back to Port Arthur. But

Russia can still hope to retrieve on land what she has lost at sea, and there is little doubt that now her machinery of military reinforcement is beginning to

sults in this direction; but it may once again be recalled, that at a very early stage of this narrative the military possibilities connected with the region in



SHANGHAI HARBOUR.

work with far greater smoothness than it has done until quite recently. As will be seen when we come to dissect the operations round Liao-yang, the number of men at Kuropatkin's disposal is larger than is supposed by some who have calculated the rate of his possible reinforcement with mathematical precision. We have no means of knowing exactly what troops are now being conveyed by the Siberian Railway, or how they are being disposed on arrival at Harbin. But there is a growing conviction that slowly but surely Russia, in the matter of reinforcement, is beginning to make real headway, and that before long she will be in a position not only to meet General Kuropatkin's requirements, but to provide a reserve, which will enable movements to be made if necessary in support of, or in alternation with, those of the main army. It is as yet premature to anticipate re-

which Vladivostok is the chief point were carefully indicated. Whatever may be the result, these possibilities still exist, and are by no means entirely dissociated from the position round Liao-yang.

It may be said that, if this be so, the Russians are acting foolishly, since concentration is the end and aim of tactics, and generally of strategy also. Moreover, with the example of Port Arthur to guide them, it would be strange if the Russians made the similar mistake of locking up a number of troops at Vladivostok. But there is no question of locking up troops here, merely one of utilising a second military centre which, it must always be remembered, has two very distinct advantages over Port Arthur. It has not behind it an isthmus only a few miles wide like that at Kinchau, and it has communication not only

with Harbin by the Siberian Railway, but also by rail with Khabarovsk on that great stream the Amur, down which thousands of Russian soldiers can be, and have aforesaid been, floated on rafts. Attention is here called to these dim possibilities, because they constitute a background to the operations round Liao-yang which may be a little hazy at present, but is not without suggestiveness.

Whether there is or is not a disposition on the part of Russia to endeavour to have for the future "something up her sleeve" is, however, for the moment a matter of secondary importance. The supreme question is, will Kuropatkin fight at Liao-yang, and, if so, how is he prepared to resist the skilful and industrious attempts which the Japanese are making to envelope him? He is known to be withdrawing a quantity of stores and war material from Liao-yang to Mukden and Harbin, and yet he remains in very great force round the first-named, which he has strongly fortified, and where there still remains a large accumulation of supplies. We may

anticipate the future to the extent of saying that Kuropatkin does mean to fight at Liao-yang, and that he will not leave it by any means with such readiness as has characterised the withdrawals from the various points in the Liao-tung Peninsula and, more recently, from Ta-shi-chao and Hai-cheng. The position at Liao-yang has all along constituted a definite point from which it was not intended to recede unless under pressure amounting to forcible expulsion, and this

view of its purposes is about to be justified.

There is much to admire in two aspects of the Russian scheme of operations up to and including this prelude to the Liao-yang fighting. We have to bear in mind that, having been compelled against his will to adventure a considerable portion of this force in an insane attempt to relieve Port Arthur, General Kuropatkin was thrown out of all his calculations on the

subject of reinforcement, and might have been taken at a serious disadvantage had he been attacked by the combined armies of Oku, Nozu, and Kuroki, before he had time to make up the deficit



Photo: A. Paselli, St. Petersburg.

THE TSARINA IN FULL COURT DRESS.

caused by the disastrous defeat of Telissu. Here, doubtless, is the explanation of the series of rear-guard actions fought by the tail of what was once General Stackelberg's fine force. Although those actions meant a loss which, in the aggregate, amounted to some thousands, they also meant the gain of a good many days, during which reinforcements were coming in steadily; and Kuropatkin, although still far from having the crushing superiority to which he has aspired, is in a far better position to meet his triune adversary than he would have been nearly two months ago. For Telissu was fought on June 15th, and, unopposed, General Oku might have found it a matter of not much more than a fortnight to reach Hai-cheng, which he does not, as it is, occupy till August 3rd. Although Kuropatkin cannot yet say that he, like Fabius, *cunctando restituit rem*, it is now possible to see that, if he had not given his commanders in the south orders to render General Oku's advance as difficult as possible, he might have been long ago either forced to give battle at a most serious disadvantage, or to beat a really inglorious retreat.

Indeed, by way of parenthesis, one can hardly help thinking—and the elaborate defensive preparations made at Ta-shi-chao, for instance, support this view—that at one time Kuropatkin hoped that he would have been able to delay the union of the three Japanese Armies sufficiently to render a combined attack impossible before winter set in. This would have enabled him to hold Kuroki alone until the great Russian Army, 400,000 strong, which is believed to represent Kuropatkin's estimate of the requirements of the situation, had been collected for the purpose of a great offensive. But Japanese method and per-

sistence have at least shattered any such dream as this for the present. The columns have converged, if not with the same precision, or to such a restricted area, as at Königgrätz, with much the same practical result as far as the menaced adversary is concerned. A fight may not be inevitable, but the invitation is, at any rate, so pressing, that Kuropatkin does not, in short, decline it when the time comes, a little later, for him to fight or run.

The other feather temporarily in Russia's cap is the stubborn defence of Port Arthur. This, in due course, will be dealt with in detail separately, but it is essential to note here what singular good service the Port Arthur garrison is rendering the Russian Commander-in-Chief by their heroic resistance. Kuropatkin would doubtless be very pleased to have with him the five-and-twenty thousand or so gallant fighters who are holding Port Arthur so nobly against the almost frantic efforts of a powerful adversary. But the reinforcement would cost him dear if it involved the release of the 100,000 Japanese who are now, it is said, lying about the beleaguered fortress. Had the defence not been conducted with superb skill and gallantry, the entire garrison might by this time have been annihilated, and perhaps some 60,000 men added in a couple of weeks to General Oku's Army. Well may the Russians be proud of a tenacity which has served them so well at such a critical juncture, and which may come to have a yet more important influence upon the future of the land campaign.

Turning now to the Japanese, we have naturally to reverse the conditions under which Russia has gained some advantage by the retarding of General Oku's advance, and the detention of a large in-

vesting force round Port Arthur. There is no question that, as regards the latter, the Japanese are by no means pleased with the turn which affairs have taken. There is reason to believe that they counted confidently on reducing Port Arthur before they proceeded to the attempted envelopment of Kuropatkin at Liao-yang. It is true that their machinery has not been by any means thrown out of gear by this unexpected check, and the mere circumstance that they can carry on the siege of Port Arthur and threaten the main army of the enemy concurrently, and with such apparent ease, is in itself a singular tribute of their foresight in providing against mishaps. But it is a grave matter that an operation of such magnitude as the reduction of Port Arthur should be delayed week after week, and that, after two months of desperate fighting, during which the losses of the attackers may well have been in proportion to the numerical superiority of the latter, the fortress should still be holding out manfully. The Japanese shopkeepers at Tokio have probably packed away the lanterns and other decorations with which quite a long time since they were preparing to celebrate the fall of the fortress whose very existence as a Russian stronghold touches Japanese sentiment so deeply. Marshal Oyama himself has left the siege operations in order to direct the operations against Liao-yang. But this, we may be sure, is not the measure of Japan's disappointment at the postponement of what seemed a certain triumph in view of the singular success of the preliminary steps taken to procure it. The complete defeat of Kuropatkin at Liao-yang might render the siege at Port Arthur an operation which could be completed almost at leisure, with a fraction


of the sacrifices now being incurred. But Kuropatkin has not yet been completely defeated, and the Japanese General Staff has shown itself from the first by no means so premature in counting unhatched chickens as the confident little Tokio shopkeeper.

As to the northward march of Oku's Army, it is easy to see that this might have been notably expedited—was doubtless intended to be expedited—by the release of the bulk of the force investing Port Arthur. At the same time, it is thought by some advanced critics that, as has been hinted at one or two stages of the fighting in the Liao-tung Peninsula, Oku might have been in position at Hai-cheng some weeks earlier, Port Arthur or no Port Arthur, had he been a little less methodical, less Teutonic in his movements. There is no gainsaying the advantages of thoroughness in warfare, as in most other things, but it is possible to be too thorough. There is a good story told of a British and a German detachment which were detailed during the international operations in China to capture a Chinese village. The forces marched by different routes, and there was no special agreement as to a rendezvous. The German commander was resolved to leave nothing to chance, and his arrangements for the capture of that doomed village were quite convincing in their completeness. He had well-nigh surrounded the place, and was about to give the final word to attack, when an object was discerned on one of the roofs, which caused an immediate "stay of execution." It was merely the British flag, planted by the British detachment which had arrived and entered the village hours before!

It is, perhaps rather unfairly and unkindly, suggested that, if Oku had been

a little less anxious to make good his foothold each time he drove the Russians from one of their positions, he might have saved himself some trouble, and have gained some precious weeks in bringing himself up in line with the First and Takushan Armies, by adopting a

beaten enemy moving, particularly one so skilled in rear-guard operations as Russia. Had Oku swept victoriously onward he would probably have prevented the Russian rear-guard from re-forming repeatedly and showing its teeth, and this alone would have saved the Japanese



SKETCH MAP SHOWING POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL ARMIES AT THE END OF AUGUST, 1904.

more go-ahead style of movement. With him there was no necessity to steady his rate of advance; on the contrary, there was much advantage in pushing forward, even if Kuroki and Nozu had not been so ready, as they clearly were, to take up their parts in the combined movement. For there is great virtue in keeping a

some hundreds of good fighting men. But such criticism must be tempered with the reflection that Oku may have had to contend with difficulties, more especially as regards supplies, of which we, owing to the Japanese censorship and the fact that the bulk of the correspondents were with Kuroki's Army, know nothing.

MR. MAXWELL,
Standard.

COLONEL HUME,
Military Attaché, Tokio.

MR. KNIGHT,
Morning Post.

SIR IAN HAMILTON

MR. KIRTON,
Graphic.

MR. MACHUGH,
Daily Telegraph.



LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON. BRITISH ATTACHÉ, AS GUEST OF THE BRITISH WAR CORRESPONDENTS AT FENG-HWANG-CHENG.

Again, it is easy to see that the positive advantages which Japan has gained, partly, perhaps, by reason of this same deliberation of movement, are very substantial. There is little doubt that in the matter of the Liao-tung Peninsula the Japanese are looking ahead much in the same way as in the case of Korea, although necessarily the precautions to be taken are of a different character. The railway running down to Port Arthur is to Liao-tung in the present what the railway in course of construction from Seoul to Wi-ju will be to Korea in the future, and we may be sure that, with each successive stage of Oku's advance to the north, something has been done to confirm Japan's control of this main artery of communication. It is suggested, and the idea is a probable one, that as the Japanese proceed they are altering the gauge of the line to enable their own light rolling stock to move along it, and at the same time to render future use by the Russians impossible without alterations, which would take a long time.

It may be remarked in passing, that possibly here we have the inception of a very large and far-sighted scheme for the permanent aggrandisement of Japan and the permanent hindrance of Russian supremacy in the Far East. For it seems that, in addition to the Seoul-Wi-ju line, the Japanese have been constructing a light railway from An-tung, on the opposite side of the Yalu, to Wi-ju, in the direction of Feng-hwang-cheng. Presumably, in due course, this is intended to be carried on to Liao-yang. Now, if the Japanese can alter the gauge of the Manchurian Railway up to Liao-yang, the latter would be a possible junction for narrow gauge systems both in Liao-tung and Korea, in the working of which

Japan, if victorious in this war, could easily retain a dominating influence. At the same time a break of gauge, even at Liao-yang, would of itself be an apt reminder of the passing of Russian supremacy in this quarter. This is looking very far ahead, but "long shots" are necessary in order to understand a good deal of Japan's silent strategy.

Another advantage which the thorough and methodical operations of General Oku, prior to his arrival at Hai-cheng, have conferred upon the Japanese, is the complete control of the Liao River from the mouth up to Old Niu-chwang. With the latter, as well as the Port of Niu-chwang (Ying-kau), in Japanese hands, the supply system of the Second Army has already been greatly simplified, and this additional line of communication will doubtless prove of still more extended value in the future, when a temporary concentration further north than Hai-cheng takes place.

It is now time to turn our attention to the actual operations south and west of Liao-yang during the first three weeks of August. It will simplify our comprehension of these if we commence by borrowing from the *Times* a few observations by an evidently well-informed correspondent on "Summer Conditions and Food Supplies in Manchuria." From this important source of information it appears that there is a considerable difference in the circumstances of Kuroki's Army and those of the other two armies under Nozu and Oku respectively. The hilly region north and west of Feng-hwang-cheng is much healthier and much better supplied, at any rate as regards cereals, bean-cake—on which horses thrive—and fuel. "It should be well understood," says the writer of this article, "that there are two harvest

seasons in Manchuria. The first is that of wheat and barley, which in the central and southern provinces ripens at the end of June or early in July, immediately before the usual summer rains; whereas in the northern provinces it follows the rainy season, being cut towards the end of August. The second or greater harvest commences in the extreme south in September, and later as one advances northwards; around Harbin, for instance, about the first week in October."

A good deal depends, of course, on these rather variegated conditions; but, speaking generally, it may be inferred that until Liao-yang is reached, General Kuroki is more happily placed than either of the other two Japanese generals, or than Kuropatkin, since he not only has a fertile country from which to draw supplies, but is less affected than they are by the alternations of summer heat and rain. "The roads from Feng-hwang-cheng, whether north to Tie-ling or Mukden, west to Liao-yang and Hai-cheng, or even to Siu-yen, Ta-ku-shan, and the (Liao-tung) Promontory, are the best in Manchuria for summer traffic. After a heavy and continuous rain certain streams cannot be crossed, but the water usually sinks rapidly, and boggy places are rare, and when found, could be easily made passable. All through the summer heavily-laden native carts travel to Mukden, Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, and Kai-ping." All this seems to favour, though it may not account for, the fact that in the operations against Liao-yang, the forces under the immediate control of General Kuroki take from start to finish a leading part. Yet even these must have been hampered both by the rain and by very tall crops of millet, to the tactical importance of which, as screens, attention was drawn in Chapter XXXIV.

On the other hand, it is important to remember that the intelligence and industry with which this fertile region is cultivated by the Chinese is of great advantage to Russia also, as long as she holds the great grain region east and north of Harbin; for, provided she can import a fair quantity of hay from the west, she can, at any rate, feed her immense number of horses and animals on beans and other food obtainable in quantities locally. Again, as regards the meat supplies which are available, and which come almost entirely from Mongolia, the Russians at present have the chief control.

Hai-cheng, it will be recalled, was occupied by General Oku on August 3rd, and on the following day his advanced guard was ten miles to the north of that important position. Meanwhile, the Russians have been falling back also before General Kuroki's forces, and on the 6th we hear of them five miles from the Japanese in the Motien-ling, but with a larger encampment at An-ping, only twelve miles south-east of Liao-yang. About this period—the date is uncertain, but the affair appears to be an early sequel to the Yang-tsu-ling fight on July 31st—the Japanese score a very decided success at the Chobaidai Pass, ten miles from the Motien-ling. A brigade of the centre column races two Russian regiments for the possession of the summit of the pass, which commands the Russian flank. The Japanese get there first, and, seizing an overhanging cliff, they fire upon the ascending Russians, of whom they kill about a thousand in a few minutes, with a loss to themselves of only twelve.

On August 4th a great fall of rain takes place at Liao-yang, and for some days the roads in the immediate neigh-

bourhood are transformed into marshes. A spell of torrid heat follows, with the thermometer standing at 120 deg. Fahr. At Liao-yang itself there are many wounded—Colonel Gädke, the correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, has been allowed by the censor to state this fact—and there is a growing apprehension as to General Kuroki's movements. It may also be mentioned, in passing, that on August 6th not only Kuropatkin, but Alexeieff is at Liao-yang. The object of the Viceroy's visit is not recorded, but it may well have reference to the enormous quantities of military stores which have been accumulated at Liao-yang, and which now are evidently in some danger. It is estimated by the Russian Press that this accumulation amounts to upwards of a million poods (a pood is about 36 lbs.), and the opinion is freely expressed that the destruction or loss of these resources would be equivalent to the loss of a battle.


At the close of the first week in August the operations appear to have come once more to the same sort of standstill as followed each of the principal Japanese successes during the past seven or eight weeks. To the south of Liao-yang General Oku is still a few miles north of Hai-cheng, with the Russians confronting him at An-shan-chan. Between Liao-yang and the Motien-ling the chief Russian advanced position is at An-ping. Some thirty miles to the east of Liao-yang the Japanese are in considerable force on the left bank of the Tai-tse River, but are at present unable to cross the river owing to the presence of Russian detachments at Pen-si-hu on the right bank, which are stubbornly defending the fords. A few days later it is reported from Liao-yang that the Russo-Chinese Bank is moving to Tie-ling.

The women and children have already left. It is rather symptomatic of the state of affairs that some rich Chinese, anticipating the Japanese entry into Liao-yang, should now be addressing letters to Generals Oku and Kuroki placing houses at their disposal.

During the ensuing week the principal development is a display of strangely marked activity among the Chunchuses, the bandits whose hostility to Russia was noticed at a very early stage of this narrative. These troublesome rogues under, it is said, Japanese leadership, are now very much in evidence in the region of the Liao River above Niu-chwang, and have even been bold enough to attack the railway between Liao-yang and An-shan-chan.


At the close of the second week in August the rains have commenced again, and, beyond daily affairs of outposts, there is not much movement. The Russians have been a good deal heartened by the announcement of the birth of the Tsarevitch, and general satisfaction is expressed at the infant Prince's appointment to the Colonelcy-in-Chief of the 12th Siberian Regiment, which took a very gallant part in the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng and in all the recent fights with General Kuroki's Army, including that of July 31st.

On August 18th the *Times* correspondent with General Kuroki's Army telegraphs that, after four days' disastrous rain, which has rendered both rivers and roads impracticable, the weather has dried, but continues threatening. He adds that the Japanese camp has been much disturbed by the presence of several Russian soldiers hiding in the cornfields. In other directions there is evidence that, practically speaking, contact exists between the opposing forces



JAPAN'S IRRESISTIBLE ADVANCE.

A fight in the rain: The Japanese driving the Russians from the mountain passes southeast of Kaiping.



along the whole line from about An-shan-chan through An-ping to the Tai-tse-ho, and, between advanced parties, at points beyond these. Evidently the great collision cannot now be long delayed, and we may be sure that on both sides there is the keenest eagerness to bring matters to a clear issue, and put an end to a trying period of suspense.

Such is the state of affairs up to about August 23rd, when the situation round Liao-yang begins to take a new shape, and we enter upon the contemplation of one of the most terrific struggles the world has ever seen. In subsequent chapters each phase of this great conflict will be carefully dealt with, and many no doubt will prefer to study it as an independent set of operations. But, none the less, much of the real interest of the fighting round Liao-yang lies in the preliminary stages by which the armies of Kuroki, Nozu, and Oku have gradually been brought up from Korea,

Takushan, and the Liao-tung Peninsula respectively, to the accompaniment of much hard fighting and unremitting labour. There is, too, something deeply attractive in the spectacle of Kuropatkin anxiously striving to improve what he must have known from the first to be a situation full of risks. In the near future we shall see both the pushful industry of the Japanese and the monumental patience of Kuropatkin to some extent rewarded, and in the storm and stress of a historic series of battles much of what has gone before may be forgotten. But the true lessons of the Liao-yang operations can never be fairly grasped by those who have not studied the antecedent strategy of the Japanese, or who fail to appreciate Kuropatkin's masterly consolidation of a force, impotent, it is true, to stem the enemy's advance, but sufficient, at least temporarily, to save Russia from irreparable disaster.



Photo: Nouvelle, Paris.

RUSSIANS REQUISITIONING MULES FROM THE CHINESE WHEN IN OCCUPATION OF NIU-CHWANG.

CHAPTER LV.

THE HISTORIC BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG—RUSSIAN ADVANCED POSITIONS—JAPANESE STRATEGY—KUROKI'S THREE COLUMNS—CAPTURE OF THE TANG-HO POSITION—OKU AND NOZU ADVANCE—RUSSIANS EVACUATE AN-SHAN-CHAN—FIRST PHASE ENDED.

ON August 23rd, 1904, the curtain rises on an act which for thrilling interest spread over a wide expanse of country, for eager devotion animating huge masses of fighting men, for restless activity extending over a long space of time, has an almost unique fascination. Unfortunately these attributes are somewhat to the disadvantage of one who essays to make popular history of a great and complicated military operation. In a case like this a bird's-eye view is impossible, and generalities would be hopelessly misleading. At a dozen different points quite distinct aspects present themselves. Only here and there can the connection between the working of this body of troops and that be traced without cautious explanation. Even the landscape is strongly variegated. Here a river with level banks "comes cranking in"; there a line of steep hills stands out sharply against the sky. Bare precipices alternate with immense patches of cultivation, and from day to day violent changes in the weather produce further bewildering combinations. No composite picture will ever do justice to the battle, or, to speak with precision, the closely linked series of battles, of Liao-yang.

On the other hand, this tremendous conflict will undoubtedly, as time goes on, and full information as to details shall have become available, prove to be curiously crowded with isolated incidents

such as will give full scope to either the pictorial or the literary artist. Some of these incidents will be found dealt with in the ensuing narrative. But it may be years before any but a very incomplete idea can be gained of the countless minor acts of heroism and endurance which go to make up the sum of this ten days of continuous fighting. Indeed, one could hardly expect it to be otherwise, since, even as to the larger movements on both sides, there are tongues yet to be loosed, records yet to be laid bare. The pride of Russia, the reticence of Japan may, for a whole generation, veil much that it would be deeply interesting to know concerning strategic plans and tactical developments.

With all this abundance, with all these limitations, the operation about to be described has one claim to special attention to which it is well, perhaps, to draw emphatic notice before we proceed to the discussion of the actual course of events. There are not a great many battles in history which can truly be described as historical events, and Liao-yang is unmistakably one of them. It was not decisive, but it has none the less left an indelible mark; and the mere fact that the object of the victors was not fully accomplished has an instructiveness, the extent of which can hardly at present be realised. It may be possible to deal later with the historical aspect of the Liao-yang fighting as regards results, but its antecedents

alone, as lightly sketched in the preceding narrative, are sufficient to show that genuine history, as well as tactics, is involved in the study of this battle. For here we have the culmination of the first definite attempt in modern times of an Eastern nation literally to overwhelm the main field army of a European Power. If the reader carries that reflection along with him, as in imagination he charges with the glorious infantry of Japan, or falls back stubbornly contesting every step with the splendidly tenacious Russian rear-guards, every incident will take a graver meaning, every sacrifice will become more significantly picturesque.

After this brief introduction let us endeavour to realise the position and strength of the opposing forces on the date, August 23rd, on which the first phase of the Battle of Liao-yang may be said to commence. In order to escape the necessity for repeated explanations, it may be well at this point to state, that for the purpose of this narrative the fighting before, at, and beyond Liao-yang will be considered as a Battle of three Phases, one lasting from August 23rd to 28th inclusive, the next from August 29th to 31st, and the third from September 1st to 3rd. It may also be remarked that, although the Japanese after the earliest stage of the fighting had been concluded expressed an intention to speak of their three armies in future as the Right and Left Wings and the Centre, this division will not be strictly adhered to here. The assignment of three distinct forces to Generals Kuroki, Nozu, and Oku has become a familiar arrangement, and, as no inaccuracy is involved by adhering to it a little longer, it will be preserved except in cases where the new designation tends to greater simplicity.

On August 23rd the Russian position in front of Liao-yang had a total extent of about forty miles. The extreme right was at An-shan-chan, some twenty miles to the south-west of Liao-yang, and close to the railway. From An-shan-chan the line of defences ran eastward to Kao-feng-shu; thence in a north-easterly direction to the immediate east of An-ping; and finally to the Tai-tse-ho. The position and course of the latter stream, which runs past Liao-yang and joins the Hun-ho, a tributary of the Liao River, should be attentively studied on the map. It will be noted that about ten miles east of Liao-yang the Tai-tse receives an affluent, the Tang-ho, on the right bank of which, to the south-west of Liao-yang, lies An-ping.

In this outer chain the Russians have only two, or at most three, chief positions, that at An-shan-chan, that near Kao-feng-shu, and that—the most important of all—in front of An-ping. The latter may be termed the Tang-ho position, and consisted of a line of steep hills running in a south-westerly direction from Hun-sha-ling. This position was strongly fortified, and is said to have been defended by 120 guns, and held by 65,000 men. The whole of the 10th Army Corps was here, and half of the 17th, with other troops, including the mountaineer contingent from the Caucasus.

The position near Kao-feng-shu appears to have been closely linked up with that to the east of the Tang-ho, about an army corps, perhaps, being distributed among the highlands in this quarter. On the Russian right the position at An-shan-chan was one of great natural strength, a saddle-backed hill which commanded the surrounding plain being utilised, and the line of entrenchments being stiffened by semi-permanent fortifications.

It must not be supposed that Kuropatkin's entire force was engaged in occupying this chain of advanced positions. At least one army corps was held in reserve beyond Liao-yang, and the number of troops in and immediately around the town itself was very considerable. And hereby hangs a tale by no means creditable to the Russian Army, and one which goes far to explain the actual sequel. According to Reuter's correspondent at Liao-yang, who did not accompany the

quarters could be heard the clink of glasses and the tinkle of musical boxes." As a shrewd observer remarks, the *coulisses* of a Russian Army are seldom edifying, but it would seem that in this case a very high pitch of shameless in-



Photo: Urban, Limited.

RUSSIA'S CARE FOR HER WOUNDED: INTERIOR VIEWS OF RAILWAY HOSPITAL CAR CONNECTING THE FIGHTING FRONT WITH THE BASE HOSPITALS.

1, General Ward.

2, Operating Room.

Russians in their eventual retreat, the dissipation and demoralisation of the Russian officers at this period was very marked, and scenes were observable at the Pagoda Gardens which boded ill for the success of the Russian arms in the coming struggle. "From the officers'

difference to the gravity of the surroundings must have been reached. We have now to consider the forces at the disposal of the Japanese commanders. According to the *Times* correspondent with General Oku's Army the Japanese strength remained at eight divisions, the distribution from right to left being as follows:—With General Kuroki the Guards Division, 2nd Division, and 12th Division; with General Nozu the 10th Division and 5th Division; and with General Oku the 4th Division, 3rd Division, and the 6th Division. One

brigade of the latter was holding Ying-kau until it was relieved by the reserve troops from Japan. As regards the armies of Generals Oku and Nozu, the above estimate is doubtless exact, and very possibly the detail of divisions allotted to General Kuroki is nominally correct also. But there is reason to believe that the last-named commander had under his control many more than the 60,000 men which could be represented by three Japanese divisions at full strength. He is known to have been strongly reinforced, and it will not probably be found an over-estimate if we place the entire strength handled by General Kuroki at not far short of 80,000 or 90,000 men. Assuming General Oku's and General Nozu's forces to be at the fullest strength, with some reinforcements, the total Japanese Army under command of Field Marshal Oyama cannot have amounted to much less than 200,000 men, and may well have exceeded that figure. Opposed to these, the Russians appear to have had about 160,000 to 180,000 men. The Russian guns are calculated by the Japanese to have numbered 572. The most likely estimates place the number of Japanese at about 600. But gross totals of this sort are generally misleading. In the first place, such numerical superiority as is assigned to the Japanese Army should here have been more than compensated by the strength of the Russian positions. Secondly, in these large battles, occupying an enormous tract of territory, thousands of troops are often not engaged at all during whole days of the fighting, and, although a certain moral value may be, and often is, attached to the possession of considerable numbers of unwearied troops in reserve, it is not mere figures alone but the

actual concentration of fighting bodies that usually wins a battle.

We need not, in any case, for the present lay great stress upon the statistics of these two armies beyond saying, that all things being considered, the original odds seem to have been very fairly balanced, and that the better side won because it was the better side, and not because it was so many tens of thousands of men to the good. Indeed, as will be seen, it was largely by reason of sheer inability to bring enough troops into action in the region of the Tai-tse-ho that the winners failed to secure the full fruits of their extraordinary exertions. This is a hardly fair anticipation, but may be defended on the ground of anxiety to enhance the interest of the fight by showing that from start to finish mere numbers were never thrown unduly into the Japanese side of the scale.

For some days before August 23rd there had been a marked cessation in the operations, partly owing to the weather, and there had also been an apparent modification in the Japanese plans. In particular, the extreme right of General Kuroki's Army seems to have fallen away from Tai-tse-ho and to have been withdrawn a good deal further south. Perhaps this was due to the considerable strength of the Russian detachments on the right bank of the river, which are said to have repeatedly foiled the attempts made by General Kuroki's right column to cross the river. On the other hand, this column may have hitherto been acting merely as a corps of observation, and its work may have been completed the first fortnight or so of August. At any rate, we know that, although the Japanese have not yet crossed the Tai-tse-ho in force, their patrols have been encountered on the right bank working in

the direction of Mukden. It is likely, then, that Kuroki's right column was not withdrawn before it had acquired some useful information as to the Russian movements on the line of communications, which Japan will soon make a strenuous endeavour to cut.

For the time has now come for the development of the main Japanese strategical plan, which is to strike the Russian communications north of Liao-yang concurrently with an attack on Liao-yang itself from the south-east and south. By this means the Japanese hope to accomplish their ambitious project of closing in on the main field army of Russia, and either annihilating it or forcing it to surrender.

At the outset the obstacles are, first, the difficulty of crossing the Tai-tse-ho; and secondly, the strong and admirably chosen Russian advanced positions, more especially that to the east of An-ping.

On August 23rd General Kuroki, whose Army is still divided into three columns, makes the first move against the Kao-feng-shu and Tang-ho positions. The left column moves out by the Yang-tzu-ling, and driving in the enemy's outposts, takes up a position from Erh-tao-ho to Pe-ling-tzu, a few miles to the westward. Here it waits until dawn on the 26th, by which time some striking developments have been brought about by the right and centre columns operating with the precision and perfect co-ordination which have marked the work of the First Army throughout.

The right column appears to have moved out on the 24th, and to have rested until the very early morning of the 26th in the immediate neighbourhood of Hun-sha-ling.

The centre column, with which are most of the correspondents, leaves Tien-

shu-tien on August 25th, and bivouacs among the cornfields in some ravines four miles to the north-west.

The three columns of the First Army are now in position to attack the Tang-ho and Kao-feng-shu positions, which have a front ten miles long, and beyond which, at a distance of five miles, runs the Tang-ho.

At 3 a.m. on the 26th the centre column delivers a great infantry attack upon the Russian defences at Kung-chang-ling. The hills are steep, but the active Japanese swarm up them, and for a time carry all before them. The Russian main position is captured, but the defenders are strongly reinforced, and in a second and third position offer stout resistance. There is plenty of hand-to-hand sword and bayonet fighting, and up to noon it looks as if the Japanese might be compelled to abandon what they have won. For the Russian artillery now posted at An-ping keeps up a heavy fire, to which the Japanese, having no positions for their guns, cannot reply. For a time, according to General Kuroki's report, the column is in jeopardy, but it succeeds in holding its ground and, eventually, in driving the enemy back into the valley of the Tang-ho.

A very graphic description of the performances of the central column is given by Mr. McKenzie, the war correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, from whose cabled despatch the following is an extract:—

“The Japanese infantry advanced in an arc-shaped formation towards the Russians. Massing at every convenient point of shelter, they soon reached the foot of the mountain, where the angle of the slope afforded protection.

“From a hill opposite I saw a steady, persistent move forward, now by twos and threes, now in long lines, as the

Japanese crept from point to point. Then a heavy fusillade began.

“ The Japanese soldiers tore off their coats in order to move more freely, thus presenting splendid white marks to the enemy.

“ The Japanese guns apparently found it difficult at first to get the exact range. Soon, however, the spurting smoke and flame showed where the respective batteries of the two combatants were work-

ping common shell and shapnel right into the midst of the Russian trenches, they caused the Russian fire momentarily to waver. Then it was renewed more vigorously than ever ; but it was the beginning of the end.

“ Some Japanese, after creeping around and wriggling through the corn, burst unexpectedly on the trenches. There was a bloody fight.

“ Then, as though by magic, white




Photo: Urban, Limited.

LIAO-YANG: A BUSY THOROUGHFARE.

ing ruin. There was a ceaseless crackle from the front.


“ A blue haze above the rifle-pits revealed the presence of the infantry. The day grew warmer. The white-clad soldiers, sharply silhouetted against the flowers and dark autumn-green tints of the landscape, became more numerous and conspicuous.

“ Then two Japanese mountain guns, greatly daring, advanced on the right below the Russian front, concealing themselves in the corn. Rapidly drop-

ping common shell and shapnel right into the midst of the Russian trenches, they caused the Russian fire momentarily to waver. Then it was renewed more vigorously than ever ; but it was the beginning of the end.

“ On the summit stood a man waving the flag of the Rising Sun aloft. Standard-bearers could be seen tearing up the slope eager that their companies should have the honour of reaching the top of the mountain first.

“ The Japanese infantry now opened fire upon the Russians descending the opposite slopes, while the Russian artillery turned savagely upon the heights held shortly before by their own men.



BATTLES AROUND LIAO-YANG: FIRST PERIOD, AUGUST 23-28.

The fight for the outer positions, An-shan-shan to the Tang-ho Heights: Kuroki drives in the Russian left, which retreats to its second line of defense.

"Almost to a man the Russians died at their posts or got clear away, only three prisoners being brought in by the centre column.

"As the result of the day's fighting, the Japanese losses were very heavy. One company is reported to have had over one-half its total strength killed or wounded. Sixteen officers in one regiment were killed or wounded. The total casualties of the centre were probably 600.

"The Russian artillery covered the retreat. Russian soldiers, plunging down into the valley, quickly took up other positions as the shells fell behind them."

Meanwhile, the right column, also starting into action before dawn on the 26th, has attacked Hun-sha-ling and the heights a few miles to the south. The latter are successfully escaladed, but, although the fight lasts till sunset on the 26th, it is found impossible to capture Hun-sha-ling.

The left column at dawn on the 26th attacks Tai-shu-kou, its artillery engaging the enemy's guns, which are posted in a position defended by semi-permanent works extending north to Ta-tien-tzu and north-west to Kao-feng-shu. The duel, writes General Kuroki, was most vehement, and lasted two hours. The *Times* correspondent with the central column adds that, in spite of the distance and the intervening mountains, the agitation of the air was so great, that he and those with him were affected as if by the vibrations of a magnetic current.

The Japanese succeeded in occasionally silencing the enemy's guns, but could not gain any marked superiority. Russian reinforcements were brought up, and pressed heavily on the left column.

During the afternoon a tremendous thunderstorm broke over the hills, which

were afterwards so enveloped in mist as to render a complete suspension of hostilities necessary.

"To sum up these operations," says General Kuroki with characteristic terseness, "we pierced the enemy's centre, but our wings were unable to carry his positions before nightfall on the 26th."

It is a pity that no correspondent seems to have been allowed with the right column, and that those with the centre column were not permitted to see the first stage of the attack on Kung-chang-ling. For General Kuroki states that the night attacks on the latter and Hun-sha-ling produced the heaviest fighting of this section of the operations. "The moonlight enabled the enemy to detect our advance, and exposed us to a heavy fire. The enemy was also able to roll down rocks from the summit of the hills, whereby many were killed and wounded. Nevertheless, our men never flinched. They scaled the steep hill and charged into the enemy's lines, suffering heavily."

During the night of the 26th the Russians delivered several counter-attacks from Hun-sha-ling and Tai-shu-kou. These the Japanese right and left columns repulsed, the former pushing its success, occupying Hun-sha-ling, and capturing eight of the guns from which it had suffered so severely during the previous day.

By the morning of August 27th the hills fringing the right bank of the Tang-ho were practically untenable for the Russians, who had been out-flanked where they had not been expelled, but still clung tenaciously to the lower slopes commanding the river. The morning was very foggy, and very little movement was possible. The Russians, however, commenced their retirement, and the Japanese under cover of the fog managed to

establish a field battery on a position commanding the line of retreat to An-ping. At this point it is satisfactory to be able to quote a very vivid piece of descriptive writing by the *Times* correspondent:—

“As the afternoon wore on, the mist rose occasionally, and the battery at long range swept the road on which parties of the enemy were seen retiring. At 5 o'clock the wind caught the curtain which was hiding the landscape, and by a sudden movement tossed it aside, displaying to my gaze a scene worthy of the great wars of the last century. Between two deep rifts in the hills the front of the broad valley containing the Tang-ho could be seen. On the far side stood glistening thousands of white tents, and the great baggage train stretched westward into the hills. Tents were falling fast, and being piled on waggons by the feverish efforts of a host of ant-like figures. Fronting the narrow bridge was a black mass of troops and baggage, and conveying it from different valleys in front of us were long transport trains, besides columns of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. The Russian forces were in full retreat.

“Within sight were three divisions of troops with an enormous following of transport. With the rising of the mist our guns opened a heavy and regular fire upon the upper part of the valley before the artillery. Our division, some miles to the right, now came into action, and we could hear the roar of their guns and see the smoke of the bursting shrapnel. In the valley beyond An-ping the loud rattle of musketry also came to us, showing on the left our infantry hot on the heels of the retiring enemy. Presently, far beyond the ridge, two Russian batteries came into action. The enemy's

guns were directed against the attacking infantry which threatened the bridge and the *mêlée* of troops and baggage waiting to cross. Mingling with the white clouds raised by our shrapnel, we could see the darker smoke of the enemy's shrapnel, but the effect of the fire was veiled by the intervening hills. The block at the bridge was somewhat relieved near night-fall by cavalry fording the river. The stream was rapid and deep, the horses were almost covered by the rushing water, and many were unable to cross. Some were swept off their feet by the current and hauled out of danger by those more strongly mounted. As we watched the shadows were lengthening, and presently the sun sank beyond the horizon, leaving great masses of crimson clouds to veil the Russian retirement. The retreat was conducted in perfect order and evidently planned beforehand. The enemy now retired to the left bank of the Tang-ho, to seize which was the immediate object of General Kuroki's movements.”

By the morning of August 28th the greater portion of General Kuroki's Army was occupying the right bank of the Tang-ho. Before them lay the river, 200 yards wide and running rapidly. On the opposite side rose precipitous hills on which in every direction the lines of the enemy's trenches could be traced. The Japanese were at a serious disadvantage, for here again they lacked artillery positions, and only single mountain guns could be used at the main point of attack. These began to speak at 8 o'clock, and, as the shrapnel burst among the Russian trenches, the latter were forsaken, the defenders streaming to the rear into a patch of millet, and then climbing the steep ascent beyond. Although their cream-coloured linen coats made each

man a perfect target against the green hillside, and the shrapnel burst with great precision at a range of 3,000 yards, the retiring Russians were observed to suffer strangely little loss. But better results were obtained a little later by the Japanese, when three of their field batteries which had been posted on their right, now resting on An-ping, came into action against the trenches on the Russian left. An attempt was made to reinforce the latter, two companies marching down boldly from the higher slopes in the rear for this purpose. But at the bursting of the first shell from the guns at An-ping, these companies turned tail and fled up a ridge on the left, followed almost immediately by the occupants of the trenches, among whom the hail of shrapnel this time wrought considerable havoc.

The Russian trenches were now systematically searched for half an hour in preparation for the passage of the Tang-ho. For a description of this operation we are again indebted to the *Times* correspondent, who was extremely well-placed for watching it, being posted on a peak a mile distant from the river and commanding it for many miles:—


“On either hand our men in four columns lay close to the river under cover of the millet. At 1 o'clock the attacking forces set in motion four columns which crossed the river bed, entering the water in a storm of long-range rifle fire. The column immediately beneath was very clearly visible. The men, in extended order, dashed into the water and were soon immersed to the waist and afterwards to the shoulders. Holding their rifles above their heads, some were swept off their feet by the rapid current, and a few were wounded. Fortunately for the Japanese, the Russian guns did not com-

mand the crossing. In ten minutes three columns were across; the fourth, attempting to cross at an unfordable point, had to return to seek a better place. During their half-hour of exposure I could not see any casualties, although the water and sand around them were churned by the rain of bullets.

“On landing, the various columns, without delay, advanced in long strings into the ravines leading to the enemy's main line, a mile beyond the river.”

The above remarks apply chiefly to the 2nd Division, which the *Times* correspondent seems to have accompanied, and the Guards Division on the right. The 12th Division on the left must meanwhile have been engaged in rolling up the Russian right, and assisting its retreat along the main road—the Peking road, as it is called, to Liao-yang. The Japanese left column seems to have met with a much more stubborn resistance than that encountered by the centre and right columns, as to which the *Times* correspondent speaks very disparagingly. “I find it impossible,” he says, “to refrain from remarking on the pusillanimous flight of the enemy from their advanced trenches. I heard a foreign attaché say when he saw the Russians running that it made him ashamed for white men. Possibly the Russians did exactly as they intended, but their selection of the positions of some of their trenches suggested that these were meant to be held, and it is difficult to understand why they constructed earthworks for 2,000 or 3,000 yards offering an exposed line of retreat, unless they deemed it necessary seriously to retard the passage of the river by the infantry.”

It is only fair to balance this by an allusion to General Kuropatkin's despatches, in which the Commander-in-



THE EVENING OF BATTLE: PRAYER ROUND A RUSSIAN CAMP FIRE IN MANCHURIA.

Chief praises warmly the "devotion of all the troops on the east front," which alone enabled the withdrawal from the advanced positions to be carried out in good order. "Only after incredible difficulties was it found possible to drag all the guns without exception and all the baggage through the passes. Some of the guns were carried through the mountains by the infantry. Difficult as the retreat through the passes under pressure from the enemy had been, the march across the open country was still more arduous. The left and centre columns, however, succeeded in getting all their artillery and baggage to Liao-yang." In passing one is a little surprised at the emphatic statement of General Kuropatkin as to the safe withdrawal of *all* the guns belonging to the Russian left and centre columns. It will be remembered that General Kuroki's right column was stated to have captured eight guns at Hun-sha-ling, and this statement is endorsed by General Kuroki himself in his official report. In such a case "where doctors disagree" it is, indeed, difficult to decide; but the mere discrepancy is interesting, as indicating the occasional difficulties that beset the compilation of a story like this.

While for the moment we are dealing with the Russian side, it should be mentioned that some uncertainty exists as to the identity of the Russian commanders on the left and centre. A certain amount of shuffling appears to have taken place on the left, but it is mentioned by Reuter's correspondent that the late General Keller has been succeeded in command of the troops immediately opposed to General Kuroki by Lieutenant-General Ivanoff, an officer fifty-three years of age, who won considerable distinction in the Russo-Turkish War, and has since, from 1890

to 1899, commanded the garrison artillery at Kronstadt.

At nightfall on August 28th we have all General Kuroki's three columns on the left bank of the Tang-ho, and the right column cannot be more than a very few miles from the junction of that stream with the Tai-tse-ho. The Russian left and centre have fallen back on the Liao-yang position, and so we may reckon General Kuroki's object to have been, if laboriously, at any rate successfully, accomplished. It now remains to ascertain whether the forces of Generals Oku and Nozu have been equally fortunate during this First Phase of the great Liao-yang Battle.

We left General Oku at the close of Chapter LIV. still at Hai-cheng, in close communication with General Nozu. To his front lay a strong screen of Russian troops, and beyond them one of the Russian main advanced positions at An-shan-shan. General Oku's advance appears to have commenced on August 25th, his force marching in several columns along the west of the Hai-cheng-Liao-yang road, while General Nozu's corps marched to the east of it. It will be remembered that the detail of divisions from right to left is said to have been as follows:—10th and 5th Divisions with Nozu; 4th, 3rd, and 6th Divisions with General Oku.

Of General Nozu's advance there is very scanty information available. He appears to have followed the first valley, furnishing a road parallel to the railway, and may later have branched off more to the east, in order to drive in the Russians holding the chain of minor advanced positions between An-shan-shan and Kao-feng-shu. We know that on the 28th General Nozu had worked up sufficiently far north to be able to detach the 10th,

Division to form a junction with General Kuroki. On the previous day he had apparently assisted General Oku by overtaking the enemy, who were then in full retreat upon Liao-yang, and throwing them into much confusion by a well-directed artillery fire. These performances support the view advanced in a previous chapter, that the junction of General Nozu's force has hitherto been not so much to attempt individual operations of importance as to render timely help to the armies on his right and left as occasion might require.

General Oku's force to the west of the railway evidently met with a good deal of opposition, and on the 26th there was a sharp engagement lasting an hour, after which the Russians retired on the An-shan-shan position.

An interesting glimpse of the Russian position at An-shan-shan is given by the Liao-yang correspondent of the *Paris Journal*, M. Ludovic Naudeau, who reached this point on August 26th. "The configuration of the country," he says, "permitted me to obtain a wide view. Not only could I observe the shooting of the Russian batteries, but I could also follow the explosion of their shrapnel in the wooded country held by the Japanese. In the afternoon everything had been prepared for a great battle. A long rocky crest of steep heights barring the plains was held by a line of sharpshooters. Below them, half-way down the slope, were the infantry in five pentagonal redoubts in a position to deliver a cross-fire. The rain fell heavily, yet the troops stoically passed the night in these favourable positions, where the Japanese ought to have suffered enormous losses on the morrow."

But the morrow's great battle of An-shan-shan was not to be. It will be re-

membered that during the night of August 26th General Kuroki's right column had completed to all intents and purposes the capture of the Tang-ho position by an assault upon Hun-sha-ling. The loss of this position and the attendant heavy casualties seem now to have rendered Kuropatkin disinclined to risk another reverse on his right. Accordingly, the order was sent to the force at An-shan-shan to retire upon the Shu-shan Hills, an order which, we are told, created profound disappointment. This is hardly surprising in view of the long and weary series of rear-guard actions which this force had fought since its repulse at Telissu, and the immense labour which must have been expended on the fortifications at An-shan-shan. Probably the Russian hopes had seldom run higher than on this occasion, more especially as, with the exception of the engagement on the 26th, there had been no fighting of any consequence for weeks, and the Russian troops were far fresher than before most of the preceding actions.

"On the 27th, at noon," writes M. Naudeau, "the retreat was accomplished, and from a high vantage ground I witnessed a stirring sight. Towards the north the Russian infantry, abandoning its positions, retired in good order in columns, with bands playing. To the south the Japanese scouts came out into the open, followed by dense masses, whose approach I could distinctly follow. For half an hour I watched the two hostile armies marching simultaneously northward. Columns of smoke went up. The Russians were burning the An-shan-shan station and the railway bridge south of the station."

The subsequent course of the Russian retreat was hardly so orderly as it appeared at noon to the well-posted cor-

respondent of the *Journal*. We have already seen how the retiring Russians suffered to the east of the railway at the hands of General Nozu's force. Nor was General Oku's Army, although somewhat fatigued, behindhand in taking advantage of the unexpected evacuation of An-shan-shan. Having hastily occupied the latter a force was pushed forward, which succeeded in overtaking a considerable body of the Russians and punishing it severely.

This incident, to which General Kuropatkin makes feeling allusion in one of his despatches, must have been a striking one. The Russian retirement was now being conducted under terribly trying conditions. The rain was falling heavily, and the great Liao plain to the west of the railway must have been in a frightful state. Laboriously the guns and baggage waggons were being dragged over this tract of mud, when one whole battery became bogged in some marshy ground, and the guns began to sink. The enemy were pressing on the rear and flanks, and the situation was one calling for the best sort of energy and fighting courage. It would appear that the Russians rose well to the occasion. While the rear-guard, under Major-General Rutkovsky, faced about and did its best to keep the enemy at bay, tremendous exertions were made to save the guns. As many as twenty-four horses were hitched on to each piece, while companies of infantry with long ropes assisted in the work. The horses and men, however, sank so deep in the soft ground that many of the latter could not free themselves, and had to be hauled out by their comrades. Major-General Rutkovsky remained in his position so long in order to cover the work of extricating the guns, that his force sustained heavy

losses. The gallant General himself and Colonel Raaben, commanding the 4th Regiment of Eastern Siberian Sharpshooters, were killed.

It is quite painful to add, that in spite of these heroic efforts and serious sacrifices, the guns, which had sunk as far as the tops of the wheels, had to be abandoned, and in due course fell into the hands of the Japanese.


On August 28th the Armies of General Oku have approached to within about a dozen miles to the south and south-west of Liao-yang.

It now remains to review briefly the operations, more especially of the past four days, and to make a rough estimate of the losses and gains on both sides. As regards casualties there seems little to choose. The Russians confess to having had "about 1,500" killed and wounded on the right and centre, and General Kuroki returns his casualties on the 26th and 27th at 2,000. On the other hand, the Russians must have suffered very much more severely than the Japanese in the fighting, such as it was, round An-shan-shan. Perhaps we shall not be very far from the mark if we put the losses on each side at a little over 2,000, by no means a heavy list considering the very large numbers engaged and the desperate character of some of the fighting.

Turning to the results achieved, we find the Russians withdrawn from all their advanced positions into the inner line of Liao-yang defences, which are now being definitely menaced by the combined Japanese forces. Quite apart from the cut-and-run performances of the Russian infantry on the left bank of the Tang-ho, it can hardly be argued that the attitude of the Russian Army during the First Phase of the Battle of Liao-yang has

been a dignified one. Even if we assume that an early retirement on the inner line of defences was intended, it seems incredible that such a force as Kuropatkin had disposed on the line An-shan-shan—

deadly effect, but this they were unable to do in the attack on the Tang-ho position, and had no occasion to do in the case of An-shan-shan. The conviction is forced upon us that the troops



RUGGED MANCHURIA: DIFFICULTIES OF JAPANESE ARTILLERY TRANSPORT.

Kao-feng-shu—An-ping should have been unable to inflict a greater loss upon the enemy from behind such elaborate and admirably planned defences. The case would have been different had the Japanese been able to use their artillery with

defending the Tang-ho were indeed demoralised by the badness of their officers, to whom the proximity of Liao-yang with its various unwholesome attractions has, as we have already seen, proved a constant snare. Indeed, Reuter's corres-

pendent at Liao-yang says, explicitly, that after the evacuation of the Tang-ho position numbers of the officers who had been engaged hurried back to Liao-yang and there plunged into unlovely dissipation.

The force at An-shan-shan might have made a far better show had it had the chance, being composed largely of officers and men who had fought dogged rear-guard actions up the north of the Liaotung Peninsula, and were probably in first-rate trim as regards *morale*. Indeed, the episode of the stand made in the hope of saving the bogged guns indicates a very different spirit from that which was exhibited on the Russian right and centre.

The Japanese may claim to have carried out the first part of their programme with conspicuous success, and with remarkably small loss. They have captured all the advanced positions of the enemy and sixteen guns, with a loss only half as great as that endured in the attack upon Nanshan. This is a truly remarkable performance, and all the more so since the result has been achieved by steady, straightforward fighting. On the other hand, the First Army has undoubtedly been a good deal strained in the process, and at the close of the 28th is not sufficiently concentrated to be able to take up its allotted task—that of moving north, and to cut, if possible, the Russian

communications—with the requisite speed and vigour.

It has been suggested that it would have served the Japanese purpose better had General Nozu's Army co-operated with General Kuroki instead of with General Oku, thus rendering the attack on the Tang-ho position less wearing. But, when we come to the bed-rock of fact, it is difficult to see how this would have been possible without serious risk. The Japanese had no right to suppose that the An-shan-shan position would be evacuated, as it was, almost without a shot being fired. Even assuming the prompt capture of the Tang-ho position, it was hardly to be foreseen that Kuropatkin would not allow An-shan-shan to be defended for a single day, in the course of which a blow might have been dealt against the unaided Army of General Oku from which it might not readily have recovered. Surely the Japanese are not to be blamed for looking ahead in this direction, more especially as the actual numbers at Kuroki's disposal appeared amply sufficient for the first part of the task allotted to him.

Beyond these incidental reflections we need not at present go. It is sufficient to say that the First Phase of the Battle of Liao-yang is now ended, and that tomorrow (August 29th) the struggle will be resumed with equal determination and far more sanguinary results.

CHAPTER LVI.

BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG CONTINUED—THE SECOND PHASE—LIAO-YANG ITSELF—RUSSIAN DEFENCES—OKU'S AND NOZU'S ADVANCE—TERRIFIC ASSAULTS—KUROKI'S FLANKING MOVEMENT—PASSAGE OF THE TAI-TSE.

HEAVY with lurid significance opens, on the morning of August 29th, the Second Phase of the battle of Liao-yang. Now at last we are getting at the heart of a situation gradually produced by months of alternating feverish activity and patient waiting. It is one of those situations, too, of which the outcome is complicated by a dozen considerations that cannot be brought together in any sort of harmony. At the moment not Oyama, not Kuropatkin, not the most sagacious critic at a distance can foretell with certainty the final issue. We ourselves may be able to invest this Phase with greater interest if we assume a similar incertitude. But we may trench on our store of post-eventual wisdom by taking it for granted that the three days' period with which we are about to deal is an intermediate period, in which, although there is fighting of the most impressive sort and on a truly massive scale, there is hardly such a definite result secured as in the case of the Phase dealt with in the preceding chapter. On the other hand, many present doubts will in this interval have been removed, and by the evening of the 31st a point will have been reached from which to the really interested observer the end should be in sight.

In the account given of the First Phase of the Liao-yang fighting precedence was accorded to the columns under

General Kuroki. In dealing with the Second Phase it is expedient to commence with the operations of Generals Oku and Nozu, the latter of whom still plays a somewhat secondary rôle. But before we proceed to examine the movements of the attacking Japanese we may profitably devote attention to the new Russian position which, as already explained, embraces the inner defences of Liao-yang, and in which Liao-yang itself is consequently a centre of interest, though not of engrossing tactical importance.

Liao-yang has been described as the Russian military capital of Southern Manchuria. A large town of about 60,000 inhabitants, its position at the junction of the two main roads to Korea and Port Arthur respectively gives it very considerable commercial significance. But its value to Russia was chiefly bound up in the railway, and it was round the railway station that the Russian settlement had grown up, with an immense agglomeration of magazines, storehouses, hospitals, and other establishments connected with the maintenance of the army in the field. From time to time in the course of this narrative allusion has been made to the conditions of life at Liao-yang and to its more prominent features as a military centre. It now remains to see what steps Kuropatkin has taken to justify his long sojourn at a spot from which many critics



Photo: Urban, Limited.

LIAO-YANG SUBURBS, LOOKING EAST.

think he should have retired months ago, and in which it is possible that he is even now sojourning against his better judgment.

Although the place is far from being impregnable, there is no question that Russian engineering skill has transformed Liao-yang into a field fortress of very real strength. From the first, considerable natural advantages were present. South-west of the town, at a distance of about six miles, stands a rocky eminence some 900 feet high, known as Mount Shu-shan, and from this to the south and south-east of the town runs in crescent shape a chain of hills terminating near the left bank of the Tai-tse-ho, not far from its junction with the Tang. This first line has been furnished with elaborate fortifications commenced before the war broke out, and since greatly extended and perfected. Many large guns said to have been removed from Russian fortresses in Europe have been emplaced here, and the point to the south has been rendered difficult of approach by wire entanglements and other obstacles. During the actual defence of Liao-yang Mount Shu-shan will be used as an observatory from which all the artillery fire

to the south can be directed by telephone. The main position to the south of Liao-yang, and the one against which the chief attack will be delivered, runs eastwards from Mount Shu-shan for about five miles, and consists of several distinct hills joined by low saddles. In front of this—it is the *Times* correspondent with the Japanese Left Army who furnishes this information—is a gently sloping plain many hundred acres in extent, deep in crops, and studded with half a dozen Chinese hamlets. In front of Mount Shu-shan, again, is a Chinese village the walls of which are loopholed.

To the left of the Russian main position the country was broken and unentrenched, the Russians trusting to a second position on a supporting range 1,000 yards to the north for protection in this quarter. The defence of Liao-yang against an attack from the east need not now be taken into account. To the right of Mount Shu-shan an extension of the main position carried the line of defence westwards to Hsin-li-tun. Lastly, it may be noted that, in anticipation of a fight to a finish, a "line of clever entrenchments actually in the flats of the suburbs" had been prepared by the Russian engineers.

On August 29th the preliminaries of the Second Phase of the battle of Liao-yang were accomplished without much fighting. General Oku's headquarters were halted, while his advanced guard felt the Russian front. Meanwhile, General Nozu's 5th Division—it will be remembered that he had detached the 10th Division on the previous day to co-operate with General Kuroki's army—came into contact with the Russians who were holding the unentrenched broken ground on the left of the enemy's main position, and made some impression on them. But no attempt was made to deliver an organised attack, chiefly, no doubt, owing to the delayed concentration of the First Army, to which allusion was made at the close of the last chapter. The gradual closing up of General Oku's and General Nozu's forces to within striking distance of the Shu-shan hills may well have been an impressive, although perhaps not a spectacular, performance. In the case of the Second Army the process represents the climax in a long and toilsome series of fights and marches, which for many of those concerned has lasted since the landing which preceded

the battle of Nan-shan. To all both of Oku's and Nozu's officers and men the prospect of getting at the vitals of the Russian strategical scheme must have been inexpressibly welcome. One can imagine the enthusiasm produced by the sight of the Shu-shan hills, only half a dozen miles beyond which Liao-yang itself was known to lie. When, too, at the close of the 29th, the Japanese to the south of this formidable position bivouacked in the full knowledge that on the morrow would commence some of the fiercest fighting of the campaign, the universal feeling must have been one of joyful resolution to spare no effort, shrink from no sacrifice, to make the day and those following it stand out in history to the eternal credit of Japan.

At 5 o'clock in the morning of August 30th, General Oku's army marched out in three columns from its lines at Sha-ho-cheng, about ten miles to the south-west of Liao-yang. The advance was made under cover of the crops, and it was not until an hour and a half later that two Russian batteries opened fire on the advancing, snake-like columns from a saddle south of Mount Shu-shan. Simul-



Photo: Urban, Limited.

GENERAL KUROPATKIN'S HEADQUARTERS AND SPECIAL TRAIN AT LIAO-YANG.

taneously, heavy firing was heard from the direction of General Nozu's army on the right. It would appear that at this stage the Japanese infantry was adventured somewhat too freely, and that it was severely punished by the accurate shrapnel fire of the Russians. Nevertheless, the three columns of Oku's army pushed on, preserving close touch with Nozu's 5th Division, until by mid-day a position was reached, the left of which extended westward so as to overlap Hsin-li-tun.

The artillery on both sides now came hotly into action, and, in fact, to the south of the Shu-shan hills the firing seems to have lasted practically all day. The Japanese suffered from some disadvantage, as in the damp atmosphere the smoke of their guns raised a haze which was wafted higher than the tall millet stalks concealing them. Of such good marks the Russian artillery, itself admirably masked, would not fail to take advantage.

Meanwhile the infantry columns worked forwards more cautiously, the divisional commanders receiving orders to attack at dusk. For this attack preparation was made by a tremendous artillery fire from 100 Japanese field-guns and 60 howitzers. The Russians replied from about 50 guns, or half the number said to be mounted on the Shu-shan hills. The Special Correspondent of the *Paris Temps* was on Mount Shu-shan while this cannonade was proceeding, and says that the peak was raked with shrapnel. General Stackelberg, by whose side the correspondent was standing, was nearly killed by a shell which burst only a few yards off.

In order to prepare for the coming infantry attack the Russians now brought up their reserves, and the cavalry under

General Mishtchenko was disposed with a view to dashing in upon the Japanese flanks.

The result of this first infantry attack was, says the *Times* correspondent with the Left Army, abortive. "Gallantly the little infantrymen responded to the order in their groups of twelve, which is their formation for such an attack, and pressed up towards the inferno prepared for them." The leading battalions of the 4th and 6th Divisions dashed at the approaches of Mount Shu-shan itself, "but a sheet of lead from the loopholed village at the base of the eminence and from the supporting trenches swept them back, and they were fain to dig themselves into the soft mud on the fringe of the standing corn.

"The 3rd Division, with the gallant 34th Regiment leading, made a similar attempt nearer the centre, but the result was the same harrowing slaughter.

"On the Russian left the right brigade of the 3rd Division and the 5th Division had made better progress. . . . The men of the 3rd Division had seized a small underfeature, and the 5th Division had made good the hills in front of them which the Russians had failed to entrench."

Towards evening the rain began to come down heavily, and at nightfall the Japanese forces, drenched and weary, were faced by the fact that their first attack on the inner defences of Liao-yang had been a costly failure.

In his official report, General Oku attributes this result largely to the state of the roads, which had hindered the collective action of his artillery, and thus made it impossible to weaken the enemy's fire. One can understand the disappointment of a general with 160 pieces of artillery at his disposal, and a screen of crops

nearly ten feet high behind which to work them, yet utterly unable to mass them by reason of muddy roads.

An interesting feature of the operations on August 30th was the employment by the Russians of a captive balloon for the purpose of observing the enemy's movements. It would be difficult to imagine a case in which aërial reconnaissance would be more useful than it must have been in this. Evidently the balloon scouts caused General Oku active annoyance, for he speaks of them as "frequently modifying the tactics on the various fronts." This is a rather cryptic phrase, it is true, as it may mean that either the Russian or Japanese tactics were affected. But clearly General Oku resented the presence of these inconvenient scouts, to whom most of his manœuvres in the tall millet patches must have been easily discernible.

It might be thought that after such a heavy and discouraging day's fighting the Japanese Second Army would have been allowed a brief respite in which to recuperate. But *nec mora nec requies* is the motto of the Japanese infantry in the field, and at nightfall on the 30th it was determined that the three columns, under cover of the darkness, should destroy the obstacles and renew the attack, which, if successful, should be repeated at dawn. Of this gallant attempt the best and only detailed description appears to be that given by General Oku himself in his official despatch.

"At 3 a.m. on the 31st the infantry of the first column made a resolute attack, and about dawn a regiment on the column's left captured the highlands south of Shou-shan-pao. But in consequence of a heavy fire on its front and both flanks and a counter-attack by a superior force of the enemy from the

heights to the north, the regiment was compelled to fall back to the foot of the hills after a hard fight in which it suffered many casualties. The column's right also, though bravely advancing undeterred by the great difficulties and heavy losses, found the enemy's fire so withering and the hills so steep that the men were finally obliged to lie down at the foot of the heights and were unable to rise.

"The second column, repulsing frequent counter-attacks from 1 a.m., followed up the enemy during the darkness, and, in spite of a heavy fire from machine guns, pushed on to the railway, getting within 50 to 100 metres of the enemy's position. But being overlooked from the heights and suffering heavily from the enemy's fire, it was unable to make a final charge before daybreak, when five battalions from the third column, deploying to the left of the second column, greatly stiffened the latter. At 7 a.m. three battalions, advancing from the main road, reinforced the left of the first column. However, although the first and second columns attacked in full strength, while the artillery of the whole force hotly cannonaded the forts at effective ranges, yet they did not succeed in opening a way for pressing home the attack."

General Nozu's 5th Division co-operated in this attack, and its temporary success against the Russian left is well described by the *Times* correspondent. "The position here was composed of a brush-covered hogsback, sloping to the east, defended by a triple line of trenches with a glacis protected by a 10-ft. entanglement covering a honeycomb of pits containing spikes at the bottom. The lower feature of this hill was a salient, but the upper works were flanked by a conical hill in front which acted as a

bastion, and which was also cunningly entrenched.

“ In the semi-darkness of the morning the 41st Regiment carried this underfeature after losing 75 of the 100 pioneers, who hacked their way through the entanglement with axes. The men, rushing through the gap, overpowered the sentries in the trenches before the supports, sleeping in splinter proofs behind, could reinforce them. But daybreak brought a tragedy of the kind which is so common in modern war. Shell fire, believed to be from Japanese guns, drove this gallant storming party from its hold, filling the Russian trenches with Japanese dead. Thus an hour after sunrise the position of the defence and of the attack on this front was practically the *status quo*.”

From this same correspondent, whose lucid and impartial despatches have now the approval even of Russian newspaper critics, we borrow a particularly fine description of the work of the 5th Division during the morning and afternoon of the 31st.

“ The weather was now fine, and the energy of this southern attack all the morning was concentrated in an artillery fire on the bushy hill that had been won and lost. At 10 o'clock we could see the 5th Division moving up against the Russian left. The slow and creeping work of this division had enabled them to approach within nearer range of the enemy, and their little hand howitzers, which weapons accompany every infantry brigade, were now brought up to the support of the firing line. They massed against rocky excrescences which gave cover from the Russian artillery fire until the preparation seemed complete, then they extended down the inner and outer slope of the ridge in company columns in

single line, shoulder to shoulder, lying down. At a quarter to 12 the advanced lines broke into groups of twelve, and began a series of rushes according to the usual method of Japanese infantry attack. After making a short rush the men lie down. They do not fire, rifle support coming from the supports in rear. In this case the firing line was thrown out along the actual crest which divided the two attacking lines.

“ There is a moment of intense excitement while the summit of the Russian position is like a miniature Mount Pelée in eruption owing to the bursting of dozens of Shimoshi shells. The head of the assault is in the gap in the entanglement. The artillery is supporting the assault. Three or four ground mines explode in the midst of the leading assaulting groups. Then as the smoke clears the black-coated Russians are seen leaving the position. In a moment the Japanese are in, and the whole of the lines in support on the crest are firing down the slope into the retreating Russians.

“ But one swallow does not make a summer. Although the underfeature of the bushy hill was carried, the rest of the assault failed miserably. No Japanese could live within 500 yards of the bastion hill, and though the Japanese came out of the corn until the groups were so numerous that I can liken them only to swarming bees, it was only to be swept backwards into cover again, leaving behind the heavy price of their valour. The handful of men who seized the hill were able to hold it, but could not advance an inch, and thus the afternoon wore on. All along the line no movement could be traced except the moving nearer in of some few Japanese batteries. The artillery duel, however, continued unabated.

Along the fringe of the Japanese front individual infantrymen had crept forward and dug themselves in where mounds or watercourses made it possible to escape the searching fire of the Russian rifles,

ported that a considerable body of the enemy with some guns had appeared two hours previously to the north-west of Go-tau-ka-tse, the remaining reserves of the third column were sent to meet them,



JAPANESE ARTILLERY ON THE MARCH.

while all the time the Russian shrapnel was causing hundreds of casualties in the flats."

About 5 p.m. a diversion took place on the extreme Japanese left. The commander of the third column having re-

and the Japanese cavalry, also operating in this quarter, reconnoitred in the direction of Liao-yang.

By 7 p.m. General Oku was getting desperate, and accordingly it was determined to make yet one more attack, the

third in twenty-four hours. At the hour named, accordingly, the artillery fire was concentrated on the fortifications, which appeared to be greatly shaken by the terrific cannonade. During the night, says General Kuroki in his official despatch, the infantry on all faces, after full preparation, forced the secondary obstacles, and by gallant charges the first column seized the hills west of Go-tau-ka-tse, the second column gained an eminence to the west of Mount Shu-shan, and the second column's auxiliary force occupied the hills along the highway.

At this dramatic point, which was reached shortly after midnight on August 31st, we shall leave for the present the Japanese forces to the south of Liao-yang. But before we break the thread of the narrative of General Oku's grand performance it may be well to elucidate two doubtful points. According to the *Times* correspondent's account the artillery preparation from 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. was followed by an attack which was a failure. "It was a repetition of all the previous assaults except at one portion of the line. For the rest there was gruesome evidence on the following morning to show how, like hares in snares, the heroic infantry had struggled into barbed wire entanglements to die, how, blundering in the darkness, sections had thrown themselves down 30 yards from the flaring line of muzzles whose flashes marked the goal they were never to win. But the first battalion of the 34th Regiment, which for forty-eight hours had been lying in the scrub at the foot of the green glacis on the centre hill, broke through abatis and entanglements, and, in spite of a flanking fire which swept away group after group, had enough endurance to reach the first trench.

"What happened there none know;

but in the morning, when we viewed the position, Russians and Japanese were lying intermingled waist-deep in the ditch, while from parapet to entanglement, perhaps 150 yards, the thick trail of prostrate khaki told a tale that no pen can describe."

The inference seems to be that there was an unsuccessful attack which General Oku's published report leaves untouched, and which was followed by a successful advance possibly in the teeth of some, though not serious, opposition. For, as we shall see when we come to the opening of the Third Phase of the battle, the Russian defence of the Shu-shan hills has now been completely broken down.

This brings us to the second point, as to which there is some anxiety. According to Reuter's correspondent at Liao-yang, General Stackelberg with the 1st Army Corps was still facing General Oku, while General Nozu was confronted by General Ivanoff, who, with a large portion of the "Eastern Army," had been driven back from the region of the Tang-ho. On the extreme Russian right was General Mishtchenko, with a mixed cavalry, infantry, and artillery force. During the night of August 31st, if not before, Generals Stackelberg and Ivanoff withdrew their headquarters, the former to Liao-yang itself, the latter across the Tai-tse to a point sheltered by the city wall on the road to Yen-tai. General Mishtchenko was transferred to the north-east with a view to meeting General Kuroki's movement in that quarter. The veteran cavalry leader, General Greikoff, was left in charge of the advanced defence with a force consisting apparently of the whole of the Siberian Reserves Division, part of the 1st and 5th Rifle Divisions—in all, perhaps, some 25,000 men—and about 50 guns. These,

too, at 3 a.m. on September 1st, were retreating in the direction of Liao-yang.

While naturally the main interest of the desperate fighting to the south of Liao-yang on August 31st is centred in the attack, there are some thrilling details given of the scenes witnessed from the side of the defence. It is evident that

diers, and hear the commands of the officers. Here and there the opposing troops were so close that they even hurled stones at each other.

The well-known Russian war correspondent, M. Nemirovitch Dantchenko, says:—

“The battlefield was a perfect hell.



GENERAL GREIKOFF.

at times the struggle was of the closest and bitterest sort imaginable. At one point the Russian officers drew their swords and revolvers in order to prepare for hand-to-hand fighting, but a timely arrival of infantry reserves postponed the actual collision. At another the railway embankment alone separated the adversaries. The Russians could see quite distinctly the forces of the Japanese sol-

General Stackelberg, wounded but despising death, remained immovable at his post, watching the progress of the fight. In the evening he sent a message to General Kuropatkin to say that not only could he hold his positions, but could, if necessary, even take the offensive immediately with every hope of success.

“Among other incidents of the fighting,

the Russians pursued two Japanese battalions through the kao-liang grass to Saitzza, and surrounded them. A desperate fight ensued. The Japanese refused to accept quarter, preferring death to surrender. The Russians would have liked to spare them, but they had no alternative in the circumstances but to kill them all.

“ In another part of the field the Japanese reached a trench which had been abandoned by the Russians. Another Japanese force, in the belief that the trench was held by the enemy, shelled the position, and then captured it by assault. It was only on reaching the trench that they realised they had killed their own comrades. They fell on the prostrate bodies in the trenches, covering them with their tears.

“ The Russian Frontier Guards remained at their posts, and died refusing to surrender. It was the anniversary of the creation of their regiment, and they had spent the previous night in celebrating the event, singing the military songs as is the usual custom of the Russian troops, in spite of constant alarms. The regiment lost a large number of its officers on this fatal day.

“ The Russian soldiers worship their guns and quote the words of General Kuropatkin, who said to them, ‘ Soldiers, die for your guns as you would for your flags.’ The pits dug by the Russians in the kao-liang grass were filled with Japanese corpses, over which their comrades passed. The Russian evacuation of the forts and entrenchments was carried out without loss. The troops crossed the river by the pontoon bridges and the railway bridge in perfect order and safety.”

We must now turn our attention to General Kuroki's army, which we left

on August 28th with its right and centre columns preparing to move northwards with a view to crossing the Tai-tse river in order to attempt the severance of the Russian communications.

It will be remembered that on the 28th General Nozu detached the 10th Division for the purpose of co-operating with Kuroki's army. This division was still seeking a junction when at 6 a.m. on the 30th it found itself confronted by the enemy on the hills to the east of Dawa, and forthwith opened an artillery fire upon him. This was followed by an infantry attack, which at first promised to be successful. But at 10 a.m. a large column from Liao-yang came out in reinforcement of the Russians, augmenting the latter's force to two divisions with 50 or 60 guns. The Russians now assumed the offensive, and made a strong attack, which the 10th Division must have had great difficulty in resisting. However, by 3 p.m., after a hot and gallant struggle, a junction was effected with the left column of Kuroki's army, which, as mentioned in the last chapter, had been a good deal delayed by the stout opposition it had encountered in its march up from Pe-ling-zu. The two united columns now had little difficulty in tackling the Russians and forcing them to retire. Subsequently, the left column of the First Army moved in a northeasterly direction from the neighbourhood of Dawa so as to form, as illustrated in the map of this Phase on page 109, a screen in front of the Russian left.

Meanwhile, the right and centre columns of Kuroki's army are moving in order to carry out, if possible, the arduous task assigned to them. Such troops as are on the left bank of the Tang-ho recross the river with a view to making the passage of the Tai-tse at



BACK TO SHELTER: COSSACKS, REPULSED DURING A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE, RETIRING UNDER COVER OF THEIR OWN GUNS.



points not commanded by the Russian guns posted on the hills near Si-kwan-tun. August 29th and 30th are occupied in the necessary concentration and reconnaissance, and at about midnight on the 30th the passage of the river begins. The right column crosses in its entirety, but the centre leaves a portion to assist the left column in its work of keeping the Russian left occupied. The Tai-tse is in flood, but the Japanese are characteristically prepared for all contingencies, having brought their extremely serviceable pontoons with them from the Yalu.

An interesting experience befalls the correspondents with General Kuroki's central column on August 30th. On this date they catch their first sight of Liao-yang, which for the last few days, although within comparatively easy distance, has been hidden by intervening hills. One can hardly hope to vie with an eye-witness in trying to reproduce an impression of this kind, and on that account, as well as for its intrinsic merits, the following passage is borrowed *verbatim* from the account given by the Special Correspondent of the *Standard*:—

“ From the summit of a lofty mountain I now looked down on a plain which stretches far away north, to the very fringe of the mysterious desert of Gobi. The interminable expanse of green and brown seemed to be dotted with dark graves. At our feet flowed the waters of the Tai-tse river, within whose sinuous embrace lay the destined city. Above the houses rises a famous pagoda, dedicated to the eight incarnations of Buddha. Among the trees gleamed the walls of houses. Vast stores were scattered over the plain; and far away to the north was the white trail of the railway line. To the west of Liao-yang the flats spread like a desert. To the south were a few

low ridges and isolated hills. To the east was the tossing sea of mountains over which the Japanese troops had painfully toiled, but not in vain.


“ Conscious of its impending doom, the city of Liao-yang awaited the assault which was to mark the end of the First Phase of the memorable war between the East and West. The stillness which hung over the scene was charged like a thundercloud with the certainties of fate, yet only to the experienced eye was there any visible sign of the mighty struggle upon which we were about to enter. On the crests and slopes of the hilly ridges south and east of the city lay the legions of the Czar. On the plain and behind the low ranges were batteries of artillery, presently to awake in thunders. Nearer to me, on the level country, south, east, and west of the city, the soldiers of Japan stood to arms, never for a moment doubting of the issue of the coming contest. Their regiments, brigades, and divisions were stretched out like one great circle, ready to close the road of escape to the north, and at the same time overwhelm the tranquil-looking city.”

On August 31st General Kuroki's right column and the bulk of his centre column, having successfully crossed the Tai-tse-ho, pushed steadily on in a north-westerly direction, driving back the enemy's infantry where found, and occupying without Pen-si-hu, where the existence of important fortifications had favoured expectation of a stout resistance. During the night of the 31st the field guns, which were waiting for the river to be bridged, crossed and joined the force. At this point, which marks the close of what we have regarded as the Second Phase of the battle of Liao-yang, we will leave General Kuroki, just as we left Generals

Oku and Nozu, in a highly dramatic situation, the further and final development of which must be left until the next chapter.

But some special attention must be paid to this remarkable movement on military grounds. In the first place, it is impossible to realise it properly, even

kept as many Russian troops as possible occupied south of the Tai-tse. But think of the higher generalship required to control such a movement as Kuroki's, and at the same time to direct such a series of almost frantic attacks as those launched by Oku and Nozu against the bristling entrenchments and frowning



BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG: SECOND PERIOD, AUGUST 29-31.
 Attack on the inner line. Beginning of Kuroki's flank movement.

from the tactical standpoint, unless one remembers what was going on simultaneously in other parts of the fighting area. We know that it was General Kuroki's business to dash northwards and attempt to isolate Liao-yang, while Oku's and Nozu's armies, and such part of Kuroki's as could be, or had to be, left behind,


artillery on the Shu-shan hills. No pen can accurately convey the immensity of conception, the variety of execution, included in this vast simultaneous manipulation of military force. The only way in which those interested in such exercises can hope to gain any realistic idea of an operation like this is by moving mimic

units over a large scale map with great deliberation, and filling in the intervals with as much industrious imaginativeness as possible. By a careful collation of dates and hours it may then, sometimes, be found remotely possible to form a vague idea of the responsibilities of a general who has to keep 200,000 men and 600 guns moving against a strong and skilful adversary.

What a day of tremendous, many-sided action must August 31st have been on the Japanese side alone in that great twenty-mile arc of a circle which was bent round Liao-yang from the west of the Shu-shan hills to the north of the Tai-tse-ho! From one end of the fighting front of Oku's and Nozu's armies to the other, the glorious infantry of Japan were hurling themselves with sublime intrepidity against positions held by some of the most stubborn soldiery in the world, behind shelters devised by engineers second to none in experience and skill. From hundreds of iron throats shot and shell were being vomited almost ceaselessly. Even the cavalry were not allowed to be idle in the midst of this intense preoccupation. Yet this was but the secondary part to that being played by Kuroki's force now moving swiftly onward in the

hope of dealing a far more deadly blow against Russia than can be dealt in a score of desperate assaults on the Shu-shan hills, or a week of furious fighting on the banks of the Tang. How can we hope in cold words to do justice to the almost pathetically laborious foresight involved in the mere preparation of such a plan, to the iron tenacity of purpose and wholesale sacrifice necessary to its grim and sanguinary execution?

And what of Kuropatkin during this fateful period of storm and stress? The star of his military luck may not be in the ascendant, but never more brightly shone his military genius. He has been cornered before he deems himself fully ready, but he faces the situation on the whole finely, and the skill with which he extricates himself from it is a revelation. The full beauty of his performance cannot yet be made clear without undue anticipation. But it may be said that on the night of August 31st, when the final orders were given for the withdrawal from the Shu-shan hills position, and Mishtchenko's command was at once transferred to the trans-Tai-tse region, Kuropatkin did more to help Russia and hinder Japan than has been done in any month since the outbreak of the war.



RUSSIAN CADETS.

(From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia.")

CHAPTER LVII.

BATTLE OF LIAO - YANG, THIRD PHASE—KUROPATKIN SAVES THE SITUATION—RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS—SCENES IN LIAO - YANG—JAPANESE OPERATIONS—CAPTURE OF LIAO - YANG—KUROKI'S FLANKING MOVEMENT.

ON September 1st—the anniversary of Sedan!—the position round Liao-yang may be summarised as follows:—During the previous night Kuropatkin, realising that his main danger lay to the north-east, from which quarter it was now clear that Kuroki would presently seek to cut the Russian line of retreat, had withdrawn the bulk of the troops still remaining in Liao-yang, and had started northwards towards Yen-tai, in order to secure his threatened flank of communication with Mukden. Kuroki, having crossed the Tai-tse-ho with a large portion at least of his army, was now striking north-westwards in the hope of reaching the railway before the main Russian force could be disentangled from Liao-yang. In Liao-yang itself a comparatively small body of Russians—possibly numbering about 30,000—was fighting what was to all intents and purposes a rear-guard action against the Army of General Oku stiffened by General Nozu's Fifth Division. The latter forces, after the frightful struggle of August 31st, were now taking possession of the Shu-shan Hills position to the south of Liao-yang, but were at present powerless to press beyond it. Utterly exhausted by their tremendous efforts, they had still before them an enemy which, if shaken, was yet capable of further dogged resistance, and was by no means badly posted to resist a further precipitate advance.

There is another explanation of this lull in the Japanese advance from the south. Even if General Oku had imagined that he could now capture Liao-yang by a *coup de main*, he would probably have been held back from any such enterprise by his superior officer, Field-Marshal Oyama. The end and aim of all the appalling sacrifices made by Japan in the past week of close and bitter fighting have been, as was evident from the first, not so much the capture of the Russian military capital of Manchuria as the complete enclosure of the main Russian Army. Liao-yang, it well may have been anticipated by Japanese students of military history, would prove a sort of Sedan for Holy Russia. Just as the French Army, with its veteran Commander *hors de combat*, was crowded into Sedan or under its walls with nearly 500 Prussian guns playing on it, so the Japanese may have pictured the Russian Army of Manchuria caught at Liao-yang, and either annihilated or forced to surrender. And, with such a picture before its eyes, the General Staff at Tokio would hardly have allowed Oku to consider himself at liberty to expel—if he could—what he probably supposed to be a very large retaining force from Liao-yang before he knew that Kuroki was in a position to intercept it.

But whether this interesting tactical speculation be sound or not, the point we have now to consider is that, in reality,

the anniversary of Sedan marks the opening of a new Phase of the Liao-yang Battle at the very point at which the likelihood of an envelopment has been dispelled. Not any mistake on the part of Kuroki, not any hesitancy on that of Oku and Nozu, but the combined luck and judgment of Kuropatkin have already saved the situation for Holy Russia. What the Russian Commander-in-Chief is doing resembles what Wellington did on August 21st at Vimiera, although the result is hardly what it was in Wellington's case. Still there is a fair comparison to be drawn between the manner in which the Great Duke, then Sir Arthur Wellesley, transferred four brigades from his right to his left almost at the moment of contact, and Kuropatkin's masterly withdrawal of the greater part of his army from Liao-yang to the right bank of the Tai-tse-ho in order to fend off Kuroki from the railway and the road to the north.

Let us commence our study of the Third Phase of the Battle of Liao-yang by a glance at the Russian movements from the night of August 31st onwards. In one of his simple and soldierly despatches Kuropatkin himself gives a summary of his plan, which, if studied in connection with the map of the Third Phase printed on page 141 of this narrative, will go far towards increasing the interest and instructiveness of the entire operation. In Kuropatkin's own words, "The troops having crossed to the right bank, the Army was to take up positions between the village of Si-kwan-tun and the heights near the Yen-tai coal-mines, which were to have been occupied by Major-General Orloff's detachment, composed of thirteen battalions. Taking a position near Si-kwan-tun as a pivot, the Army was to have effected a move-

ment to the right to flank the Japanese positions, which extended from the Tai-tse, near the village of Kwan-tun, towards the Yen-tai collieries."

It will be seen that the second half of the plan introduces a new development. Kuropatkin evidently hoped that he would be enabled not only to hurl Kuroki back, but to turn the tables on him by a flanking movement which would have the effect of cutting him off completely from the Armies of Generals Oku and Nozu. This idea was not destined to be realised, but the mere conception is a strong and able one, and shows that Kuropatkin, throughout this anxious period, not only kept his head as to the immediate business in hand—that of extricating his army from a cunningly thrown net—but displayed that peculiarly high form of generalship which consists in a fine attempt to push home a counterstroke.

There is something particularly grand—and, indeed, it is the grandeur of this idea which dominates the whole of this phase—in the spectacle of Kuropatkin at this moment playing his best card for the honour of Russia and his Imperial Master. What the Russian Commander-in-Chief's difficulties at this moment were it is almost impossible to realise. With a powerful and relentless enemy in the Viceroy, he was well aware that anything which could be done by Alexeieff to thwart his plans, to magnify his failures, to belittle his success, would be done as a matter of course. At home the intrigues against him would continue whatever the result of the present conflict. But far more pressing than either of these embarrassments must have been the bitter reflection that there were elements of rottenness in his own army, to the existence of which allusion has already been made, and which were beyond

hope of removal for some time to come. Kuropatkin's feelings when he heard of the poor show made on the banks of the Tang especially are better imagined than described, and it is a striking tribute to his magnificent *sang-froid* that, even with his confidence sapped by such a miserable exhibition, he should have launched his main army

taking place. As for the officers, the heroes of the Pagoda Gardens and other "unworthy places," to quote the words of Reuter's correspondent, they, too, must have felt a little dismayed at the prospect of being suddenly deprived of the doubtful pleasures which had, so far, helped to alleviate the hardships of campaigning. But officers and men,



MAJOR-GENERAL ORLOFF.

on the greatest and most daring operation he had as yet undertaken.

Something is due, too, to the Russian troops for the manner in which they pulled themselves together at this crisis. Taught to believe that the great Russian victory of the war would be won long before the Japanese could reach Liaoyang, the simple soldiery must have felt their last hopes slipping from them when, on the night of August 31st, it became evident that a general retirement was

whatever may have been their private sensations, seemed to have risen to the occasion. Whether Kuropatkin resorted, as he has so often done, to personal exhortation, coupled with some drastic measures of correction, we have no means of knowing. It may be that at last it was beginning to dawn on all ranks of the Russian Army in Manchuria that, even individually, the Japanese soldier was a match—and often more than a match—for the soldier of the Tsar. But,

be the reason what it may, there is no question that the manner in which the withdrawal of the main army from Liao-yang on the night of August 31st was effected reflected the greatest credit upon all concerned.

It must have been a strange and inspiring spectacle. It will be remembered that this was a military movement only, since not until the next morning was the order received for non-combatants to leave the town, and for another two days the latter was still to be in some sort of Russian occupation. But during the night of August 31st an imaginative observer might have heard an imaginary bell ringing dully a very dismal chime—the death-knell of, at any rate, the present existence of Liao-yang as the centre of Russia's military interests in the Far East. Streaming columns of men, weary lines of waggons conveying wounded, had told, towards nightfall, a tale of desperate fighting, of which, on the same scale and in the same quarter, there would be no renewal. And now, as the columns of troops and lines of transport pass through and to the side of Liao-yang, and the centre of activity is shifted to the bridges, permanent and pontoon, which span the Tai-tse in the neighbourhood of the town, another chapter is being unfolded. To the actual onlooker it bodes not well, this transfer of the bulk of the army from one threatened quarter to another, while as yet there is no news of a Japanese repulse. Presently the rumour gains strength that this is no tactical movement undertaken to snatch or drive home a victory, and to render secure by heavy blows dealt upon the advancing enemy. It becomes known that these battalions and batteries are marching in from abandoned positions, which the Japanese will surely occupy to-

morrow, and are doing so in order to meet a fresh attack far away on the north-east. The question is asked, what would the success of that fresh attack mean? Would it not be followed, more especially now that the advanced defences to the south, upon which such care has been lavished, have been left to the Japanese to enter at their leisure, by an envelopment from which no escape would be possible? One may well imagine that a prospect of this sort was profoundly objectionable to the variegated mass of humanity which the presence of the Russian headquarters in Liao-yang had collected. Yet for the moment the steady tramp of battalion after battalion towards the river may have served to kindle a hope that, after all that has happened, Kuropatkin's patience was to be rewarded, and that a concentrated effort would serve to hurl the Yaponskis back in disastrous rout.

At the river itself the arrangements made for crossing seem to have worked admirably. Several subsidiary pontoon bridges had been constructed, and the roads to and from them clearly marked out, with the result that, notwithstanding the darkness of the night, "all the troops destined to take the offensive"—to use Kuropatkin's own words—were safely on the right bank of the river. This must be reckoned a remarkable performance in the circumstances, and spectacularly the scene afforded by this rapid passage of a great body of troops over the pontoon and other bridges available must have been an impressive one. What might have happened had Oku's and Nozu's troops been in a position at this juncture to deliver a night attack is, perhaps, an idle speculation; but it may assist one to understand the risk run in




Photo: "Collier's Weekly." WITH GENERAL KUROPATKIN'S GUNS OUTSIDE LIAO-YANG.

carrying out a movement of this kind, practically speaking in the presence of the enemy. The reflection should also increase our admiration of the steadiness and precision with which the work was carried out, and the forethought displayed in the arrangements which made such a result possible.

Leaving Kuropatkin's "troops destined to take the offensive" on the right bank of the Tai-tse-ho, let us now return to Liao-yang, the inner line of defences to the south of which are now being held by a rear-guard still, apparently, under command of General Greikoff. On the morning of September 1st all non-combatants were ordered to leave Liao-yang, the Chinese being given two days in which to remove themselves and their belongings. It was observed that the Japanese were beginning to take possession of the Shu-shan Hills position, and about midday this fact became unpleasantly clearer. It has been mentioned before that at Liao-yang the chief centre of activity is the railway station, and at the latter the main point of assembly seems still to have been the buffet. Here about noon on the 1st was the special correspondent of the *Paris Temps* with a crowd of other customers, when suddenly a shell burst fifty yards away, followed by a second, and then a third. "The crowd rushed to the platform. The line was occupied by ambulance trains. Several persons were killed, and a Sister of Charity was wounded. In the mad hubbub everyone ran away without his baggage. The Chinese coolies pilaged everything, while the Cossacks fell upon the champagne. The station hands displayed admirable coolness. The trains started in good order."

As a fitting pendant to this graphic little pen-sketch may be quoted the allu-

sion of Reuter's correspondent to the opening stages of the bombardment which followed. "Shells burst over the post-office, the Red Cross tents, the station garden, the hospital, and also in the park under the ancient Pagoda, where a crowd of people who had been refreshing themselves at a restaurant there, headed by the restaurant keepers, fled helter-skelter with panic-stricken officers, orderlies, and a horde of miscellaneous people seeking refuge behind the north wall of the city. The Chinese immediately began looting, but swift punishment overtook them."

How often one is reminded in this war of Russian incapacity to realise the presence of danger, coupled with the exhibition of a disregard which is neither dignified nor simply courageous, but grossly foolhardy! Of course, a man must eat, and many of the frequenters of the buffet and the Pagoda restaurants may simply have been snatching a meal in the intervals of real business. But many more must have been mere loafers unwilling to tear themselves away from the chance of a little dissipation in "good company" until the advent of winged messengers of death in the shape of shells scatters them in shameless flight. More businesslike, but hardly more edifying, is the behaviour of the Asiatic element. The Cossack falls upon the abandoned champagne, the Chinaman upon the derelict property. Meanwhile the Japanese guns thunder from the everlasting hills, and the Ta Pagoda (see Vol. I., page 558), the oldest inhabitant of Liao-yang by three centuries at least, solemnly awaits its chance of being reduced to ignominious dust along with the mushroom structures of Russian "civilisation." It is a queer mixed picture this, not of real warfare, but of what may

be termed the "behind-the-scenes" of war.

But we must not tarry with the perturbed "customers" at the various drinking-places of Liao-yang. It is necessary now to cross over to the Japanese side, and in doing so we may again have preliminary recourse to the splendid account given of the operations of General Oku's force by the special correspondent of the *Times*. The latter begins by explaining how, on September 1st, he arose from his bivouac in a Chinese village to find the Japanese infantry in possession of the whole southern Russian position, namely, the line from Mount Shu-shan to the rough country seized by General Nozu's 5th Division. "As seen from the summit of the position Liao-yang lay in the plain due north, a walled city with a predominating pagoda." The correspondent continues:—

"The general impression was that we had only to advance to occupy the town, but the armies of General Oku and General Nozu required a day's rest. In fifty hours the former had made four general infantry assaults which had failed, and had subsisted through the inclement weather solely on rations carried on the person, while the reserve of ammunition had to be replenished.

"The Russians had fallen back in good order, taking everything with them except some 200 of their latest dead, while the only prisoners who fell into Japanese hands were seven men who were entombed in an observation mine casemate on the brush-covered hill. The Japanese storming party had piled sandbags over the orifice of the casemate. It was altogether an extraordinary incident, for the entombed Russians had shot two officers who wished to parley with them, and eventually surrendered thirty-six hours

later. They were in a horrible state, three being desperately wounded.

"I will not dwell on the sickening and harrowing sights of the battlefield except to mention one incident in the centre. Here during the evening assault on the 31st the stormers of the 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment had penetrated to the highest trench and had overpowered the Baikal Cossacks who were holding it, but supports from the splinter-proof shelter behind had fallen with their bayonets on the gallant Japanese in the moment of their success, and the bodies of both Japanese and Cossacks lay piled thick upon each other in a hideous heap."

A little later the *Times* representative adds:—

"I returned to our bivouac over the battlefield through acres of millet, where the Japanese infantry had been mown down in hundreds. Already twenty or thirty columns of smoke showed where the Japanese dead had been collected for cremation. I visited several dressing stations of the field hospital. All were filled to double their capacity. The victims were cheerful, glorying in their wounds. The hospital arrangements were splendid, but the position was taken at a terrible cost. The casualties of the Japanese five divisions at the lowest computation were not less than 10,000, and probably were more, for owing to the crops many wounded were not found, and must have died miserably, while many bodies will never be found until the crops are cut.

"All the time reserves were passing up to the fighting line to fill the vacancies, while trains of ammunition carts were hastening forward. It is impossible even to conjecture what the expenditure was. An examination of the enemy's trenches showed that the Japanese shell fire was

not so devastating as was anticipated, and, as I surmised, only charges of shrapnel were found in the Russian batteries, whose fire was indirect from the reverse of the position throughout.

"It is impossible to estimate the Russian losses, but, giving the Japanese shrapnel its due, and knowing that the rifles of the 5th Division did great execution among the enemy retreating from the bushy hill, I should say that they amounted to half those of the attacking force. It must be remembered that my estimate of the Japanese casualties does not include those of the 10th Division nor those suffered by General Kuroki's force."

About noon on September 1st, as has already been indicated in the account of the Russian movements, the Japanese began firing on the Liao-yang railway station, subsequently extending the bombardment to other parts of the town. Meanwhile the captured positions were more completely occupied, and at night-fall the tired soldiers of Japan bivouacked within about six miles of the "Russian military capital of Manchuria."

At daybreak on September 2nd a movement was made towards Liao-yang by the armies of Oku and Nozu. It was soon discovered that the Russians intended to make a stubborn defence in a position closely screening the town itself. In the accompanying map of the Third Phase of the Battle the railway is very clearly shown entering Liao-yang on the western side, the station being separately marked. The existence of what might be termed a suburban line of defences was mentioned in the last chapter, and it is now only necessary to explain that the position ran from the west of the railway eastwards through the southern suburbs, and then turned up north towards the

Tai-tse-ho. A corresponding curve was followed by the attacking forces, the respective arcs being perhaps four and twelve miles in length.


The fighting on September 2nd need not be closely followed, although interesting from the expert standpoint, and throughout of a very brisk and vigorous sort. The Japanese pushed the advance manfully, though obviously still tired, and the Japanese artillery came into combined action with much spectacular impressiveness. But the Russians showed no signs of yielding, and, to quote General Oku's report, owing to the strength of their defences and the desperate character of their resistance sunset came before the Japanese could push the advance home. During the night an isolated attempt was made to charge some of the forts on the Russian right, but failed owing to the obstacles encountered and a scathing cross-fire from the Russian machine guns.

"At dawn on September 3rd," writes General Oku in his official despatch, "our guns reopened fire and the enemy continued his obstinate resistance; whereupon our guns were advanced within rifle range with the object of breaching the forts and silencing the machine guns. As a result one part of the enemy's force seemed disordered, but the remainder stood firm. Our artillery, therefore, concentrated again, pending a general attack by the infantry, which had gradually crept up within 200 to 300 metres of the enemy's position. Finally at 7 p.m., while the whole of the artillery redoubled their fire, the infantry charged along the entire line. A heavy fight ensued, lasting into the night, but at 12.30 a.m. the enemy's position was completely forced, and the line of fortifications was captured amid vociferous cheering."

It is difficult to imagine from the above

terse paragraph that what is alluded to is, in one sense, the climax of the great Battle of Liao-yang, in other words, the capture of Liao-yang itself! And yet there is, perhaps, something of dramatic appropriateness in thus placing at any rate the outline of the *dénouement* before

Russians time after time hurling back with stubborn vigour these frantic onslaughts until plain and slopes were strewn with corpses. For days past we have watched artillery duels alternating with infantry rushes; have noted the heavy smoke from bursting shells relieved



BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG: THIRD PERIOD. SEPTEMBER 1-3.

Kuropatkin holds Kuroki by vigorous counter attacks and gradually evacuates Liao-yang.

our readers in the brief and simple words of the Japanese Commander chiefly responsible for the great result in question. We have already had to pass under review a long sequence of desperate attacks, informed with splendid valour, and superbly typical of the fighting spirit of the Island Nation. We have seen the

by the sharp flashes from answering guns; have realised that yonder fair standing crops have been but so much cover for ghastly carnage. Why tell in slightly altered language the tale of another day's deadly struggle fought out on almost identical lines? Better, surely, to join Oku's and Nozu's gallant fellows

in their final irresistible charge, which was to be followed a few hours later by the complete Japanese occupation of Kuropatkin's former stronghold.

But, perhaps, some of us might like to choose our place in that glorious movement. With many the preference might lie with the grand 20th Regiment, which formed part of Nozu's force, and which had already suffered terrible losses during the past few days. Its regimental commander and one battalion had fallen near An-shan-shan. Two more battalion commanders had been killed at Weijago, near Dawa, in the Second Phase of the fighting. On September 2nd the regiment lost its new colonel commanding and two new battalion commanders. There was thus none left on the 3rd to take the regimental command, which was accordingly assumed by Major-General Marui.

General Nozu in his official despatch gives a stirring account of the behaviour of this magnificent corps in the final struggle of September 3rd. Its leading line was almost swept away, and, although stiffened by reserves, the regiment was wavering under a withering fire when Captain Egami led the colour company in advance of the skirmishers, whereupon the whole regiment charged furiously, tore away the obstacles, and carried the opposing forts, cheering for the Emperor. Some idea of the terrific casualties entailed on individual corps by the fighting on September 3rd may be gathered from the fact that one battalion of the 20th Regiment lost every officer, the command of companies being assumed by first-class privates; one company was reduced to fourteen or fifteen men, and the regiment's total casualties were 1,200 to 1,300.


While the armies of Oku and Nozu

were thus successfully pressing home their final assault—the eighth in five days—upon the inner defences of Liao-yang, the Russian rearguard was making strenuous preparations for retirement. On the whole the usual preliminaries to evacuation were carried out well, and it was afterwards remarked that the spoils of war which fell into Japanese hands were quite insignificant when one considers the former importance of Liao-yang as a Russian possession. The railway station and nearly all the warehouses were burned—the rolling stock had been pushed forward previously—the railway bridge was wrecked, and a quantity of ammunition and provisions was destroyed. The actual falling-back of the rearguard, too, seems to have been accomplished with considerable steadiness, and, when the passage of the Taitse-ho had been effected, the pontoon bridges were duly dismantled and the pontoons removed. But a regiment which had been stationed in Liao-yang itself had seized the opportunity before retiring to sack all the European shops and many of the houses of the wealthy Chinese. It may be inferred, then, that the night of September 3rd in Liao-yang afforded a good many unlovely scenes, and was thus, perhaps, a not altogether inappropriate termination to the existence of the place as the headquarters of the Russian field army.

Kuropatkin himself, of course, had not witnessed these closing episodes. He had left Liao-yang at eight o'clock in the morning of September 2nd, in the famous train in which so much of his work as Commander-in-Chief had been done for months past. Well may he have felt a pang at being thus unceremoniously forced to leave a place from which it is clear that one time he had hoped

to take a final offensive with an overwhelming army. But, throughout the whole of the war hitherto, Kuropatkin's

yang when he left it, he was the last man to betray any sentimental regrets, or to let bystanders imagine that he



GENERAL BARON OKU.

attitude has been one of stoical indifference to reverses which would have driven many more highly-strung generals crazy, and, although he probably had no illusions on the subject of the fate of Liao-

now felt the ground slipping from under his feet.

The Russian Army, then, main body, Commander-in-Chief, and even rear-guard, is now, at dawn on September

4th, on the right bank of the Tai-tse-ho. Not a live Russian is left in Liao-yang, save a few deserters dressed in Chinese clothes who are hiding among the houses. The Russian settlement is in ruins, and in the old town there is hardly a sign of life. A day or two back the Chinese, on noting the evacuation of the Shu-shan Hills position, had started to make Japanese flags in order to welcome the victors in the great battle. But the looting performances of the 10th Siberian Rifles, and the bombardment of the previous two days, in which a large number had been killed, had sent them bolting into their dens like scared rabbits.


Nor were their troubles now over, for Reuter's correspondent, who had been until recently with the Russian Army, and had been taken unawares by the Japanese entry, reports that the Japanese troops showed for the first time at Liao-yang that lack of restraint which has often been exhibited by European troops in similar circumstances. "They had been fighting for five days without food, except dry rice, and broke loose on entering the town, looting right and left. As the shops had already been rifled, the Japanese turned their attention to private houses. They were chiefly in search of food, but overlooked nothing. . . . Their officers were much disturbed, and the men were finally taken out of the walled city, which they were no longer allowed to enter without a special pass."

While, as has been noted, the legitimate spoils of war which fell into the hands of the Japanese after the capture of Liao-yang were insignificant compared with what they might have been had the retirement been less skilfully conducted, the total is impressive. Putting aside General Kuroki's captures, which include

the eight guns taken at Hun-sha-ling, Generals Oku and Nozu secured nearly 3,000 rifles and about a million rounds of small arms ammunition, some 7,000 rounds of gun ammunition, and a quantity of mixed munitions and provisions.

A rather unnecessary sensation was at first created by the suggestion that the Japanese found among the captured boxes of cartridges a quantity of so-called "Dum-dum" ammunition, our own occasional use of which in past frontier and other expeditions has aroused much humanitarian hubbub. In this instance the fuss and fury were the more superfluous, since on examination the so-called "Dum-dum" bullets proved to be those belonging to revolver cartridges, which are often fitted with a flat-nosed projectile for "man-stopping" purposes. Cases also seem to have occurred in the course of the war of wounds caused by sporting ammunition fired from the sporting carbines carried by Russian officers, just as they were carried by our own officers in South Africa. The point is not one calling for serious discussion, but, as the Japanese laboured it somewhat at the time, it seems desirable in this record to give it passing and explanatory allusion.

As to casualties, these it will never be easy to compute with exactitude. Here again, on the Japanese side, we must first set apart General Kuroki's Army, and having done so we find the official return of the losses of General Oku's Army to be 7,681, and those of General Nozu's Army 4,992. The official telegram from Tokio conveying this information is dated September 11th, by which time the full reports should have been received from the field hospitals. On September 22nd the Russian General Staff at St. Petersburg issued detailed lists of the Russian casual-



THE EARLY DAYS OF LIAO-YANG : KUROPATIN'S ARTILLERY PASSING THE TAI-TSE-HO.

ties at Liao-yang. The number of men killed was 1,810; 10,811 men were wounded, and 1,212 were left on the field. Of the regimental officers 54 were killed, and three generals were wounded, and five officers were left on the field.

It is not easy to make out whether the Russian lists are really comprehensive, or whether they only include the officers and men who fell in the fighting with Oku's and Nozu's Armies. In the former case the total would have to be balanced by the 4,866 officially reported in General Kuroki's Army, which brings the total Japanese casualties between August 25th and September 4th up to 17,539. Probably a gross total of 35,000 to 40,000 casualties on both sides is not very far from the actual mark.

Before leaving the Armies of Generals Oku and Nozu in order to turn to the details of General Kuroki's flanking movement, it may be of interest to note how it is that such comparatively full and satisfactory information is available concerning not only the movements of these two forces, but also the last stages of the Russian defence. As regards the latter, it has already been mentioned that Reuter's correspondent with the Russian Army was taken unawares by the Japanese, who, it seems, rushed into the town while he, relying on General Sassulitch's assurance that the town would not be evacuated before September 4th, was assisting to tend the Chinese sick and wounded. On the entry of the Japanese he was ordered to consider himself a prisoner, but managed to get a long and vivid despatch placed on the wires before he could be prevented.

The experiences of the special correspondent of the *Times* with General Oku's Army exhibit in a still stronger light the energy and resourcefulness of the

Knights of the Pen under very trying circumstances. Knowing well that it would be hopeless to expect a Japanese censor to pass such a despatch as he proposed to send, this correspondent, after witnessing the occupation of Liao-yang on the afternoon of September 4th, rode out to the Shu-shan Hills, and remained there all night. Early the next morning he left, accompanied by a *confrère*, on horseback, and, riding all day with a Chinese guide, reached old Niu-chwang on a branch of the Liao River towards evening. Here he succeeded in engaging a junk, in which he and his friend proceeded down stream all night and till noon on the following day, when contrary winds made it necessary to abandon the boat. The two correspondents thereupon marched on foot the remaining twenty miles to Ying-kau, where they arrived after dark on the 6th. They crossed the following morning to the railway station, reaching Shan-hai-kwan the same evening. Here the *Times* representative put on the wires one of the finest descriptions of a great operation ever cabled—one which, with much descriptive power, combines a singular sense of proportion and quite exceptional critical faculty.

Let us now turn to General Kuroki's flanking movement. We left the First or Right Army on the morning of September 1st, pushing on from the right bank of the Tai-tse-ho, to which it had just crossed, in a northerly and north-westerly direction. During the day very little progress was made, owing to the increasing strength of the enemy, who was being hourly reinforced by the troops which had been withdrawn during the night from Liao-yang. Throughout the day there was a vigorous interchange both of artillery and rifle fire, but no advantage was gained by either side,

with the possible exception that the first or right Japanese column succeeded in establishing itself in the hills to the east of the Yen-tai coal-mines.

During the night of September 1st-2nd the Japanese delivered a series of attacks, the first column struggling to get nearer to the coal-mines, while the second column attacked the Russian positions at Si-kwan-tun and Hei-yan-tai. The detachment which attacked the Si-kwan-tun ridge was not only heavily cannonaded by the enemy concentrated here, but was sharply counter-attacked at 10 a.m. on the 2nd. Nothing, accordingly, was effected in this direction, but the attack had served to cover a successful movement against Hei-yan-tai. Here some of the bloodiest fighting of the war took place, and it is almost inconceivable that troops should have been found to return to attack after meeting with such terrible experiences as were encountered at this important vantage ground. According to one correspondent the Russians had even gone to the length of defending their trenches with lines of wire highly charged with electricity. The Japanese touching these in the darkness are said to have received severe shocks, while further confusion was caused by hand grenades thrown from the trenches among the attackers.

During September 2nd the Japanese maintained a precarious footing at Hei-yan-tai, exposed to a terrible cross-fire from the Russian batteries on the Si-kwan-tun ridge. "Thus the second column," writes General Kuroki in his official report, "was extremely harassed. The soldiers since the preceding night had not eaten one meal nor drunk a drop of water, subsisting on the few grains of raw rice carried in their wallets."

But where was the third column all

this time? Evidently it was fully occupied in filling up the gap between Hei-yan-tai and the Tai-tse-ho, thus preventing the insertion of the wedge with which Kuropatkin had hoped to cut Kuroki completely off from communication with Oku and Nozu.

At sunset on September 2nd the Russians, with two or three brigades, made a determined effort to recapture Hei-yan-tai. Fortunately a portion of the third column, which had been summoned during the afternoon, advanced and relieved the pressure. But even the combined forces were not able to drive back the enemy. Once, indeed, the Japanese were driven from their trenches, but returned to the struggle and expelled the Russians. Then, it would seem, the Russians counter-attacked a second time, and were badly repulsed.

Reuter's correspondent draws a harrowing picture of the scene after the final struggle at Hei-yan-tai:—

"The spectacle which the hill presented has seldom been equalled in any war. The top of the hill is less than a quarter of a mile long. The crest, slopes, and ravines were literally honeycombed with trenches, ditches, and furrows for shelter. Trenches and counter-trenches ran in every direction, testifying to the number of attacks and the different points from which assaults had been attempted. Close to the summit 200 Russians lay with their rifles where they had fallen. It appeared that they had advanced upon the word of command, and the whole line was mowed down when almost upon the trenches. The bodies were black, having lain there in the sun while the firing was so constant and fierce that the Japanese were unable to bury them. Many corpses were strewed in the fields below. Hundreds of shells had fallen on

the hill, tearing pits and furrows in it. Fragments of steel were everywhere under foot. Several Russian drums and two or three hundred Russian rifles and cooking pots were all torn and shattered by shot, bayonets were twisted and broken, and the rags of uniforms and caps were shot-torn and blood-soaked. Blood was smeared everywhere, in the trenches, and on the turf. It was impossible to step without treading on bullets."

Meanwhile, on September 2nd, the right column of General Kuroki's Army had been heavily engaged near the Yen-tai coal-mines with a Russian force under General Orloff, who was in a strong position on the heights to the north of the mines. General Orloff detached part of his force in order to aid the troops fighting at Si-kwan-tun, and this detachment fell in with the Japanese right column, and was severely handled by it. The Russian troops advanced to the attack through fields of *kao-liang* or tall millet, and were met by such a heavy frontal and flank fire that they became confused and lost their bearings in the *kao-liang*. Eventually they fell back, and subsequently Orloff's main body in the hills also retired westward, the Japanese following and extending northwards until they had occupied the whole range of the hills and the Yen-tai mines. In this movement General Orloff was wounded, and also General Fomin, who later succumbed.

There is no doubt that General Orloff's mismanagement of the part entrusted to him was a great blow to General Kuropatkin. In his report he says, evidently with some bitterness, that at the time of their retirement General Orloff's troops were "within two versts (less than a mile and a half) of the other forces,"

and it is clear that the arrival on the scene at this critical time of a considerable body of comparatively fresh troops might have made all the difference to the Russian Army. There are conflicting stories, but perhaps what was originally intended was that Orloff should advance with his whole force and roll up the Japanese right as soon as the Yen-tai mines were seriously threatened. It is suggested that he was held back by Admiral Alexeieff at Mukden. As we have seen, the whole movement was a fiasco, and the Yen-tai mines, which were of great importance to Russia in connection with the railway, fell into the hands of the Japanese, notwithstanding a desperate final resistance by a dismounted sotnia of Samsonoff's Siberian Cossacks. General Orloff, for his share in this unfortunate performance, was afterwards recalled from the Manchurian Army and, generally speaking, came to be regarded in Russia as having been mainly responsible for the failure to convert the fighting from September 1st to September 3rd into a great Russian victory. Such scapegoats are not uncommon in the history of war!

The repulse of the Russian counter-attacks on Hei-yan-tai practically speaking concluded the fighting part of the Liao-yang battle. On September 3rd, writes General Kuroki, the first and second Japanese columns did not move, but awaited assistance from the third column, which was rendered the more speedily as it was clear that the Russian idea of working round the Japanese left flank had been abandoned.

The fact is that early on September 3rd both armies made discoveries. Kuropatkin found that it would be useless to attempt to take the offensive against Kuroki, and that obviously his best policy

was to get his army away to Mukden as soon as possible. Kuroki, on the other hand, became finally aware that the Russians were too strong for him, and that any hope of rendering his flanking movement effective had evaporated.

The result of these discoveries was apparent in the movements of September

4th. Kuropatkin commenced the withdrawal of his troops towards Mukden; Kuroki advanced a little, and then swung northwards in pursuit. Thus ends the great battle of Liao-yang, of the lessons and incidents of which we may have something more to say in another chapter.



REQUISITIONED MANCHURIAN PONIES BEING ENTRAINED
IN EASTERN MONGOLIA.

CHAPTER LVIII.

SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR CONTINUED—AN INTERMEDIATE STAGE—THE COMMANDANT AND HIS HEROIC WIFE—GARRISON SUMMONED TO SURRENDER—INDIGNANT REJECTION OF TERMS—A GENERAL ASSAULT—TYPICAL FIGHTING—A SECOND ASSAULT—LIFE AT PORT ARTHUR—THRILLING EPISODES—FRESH PREPARATIONS.

ONCE more the imaginary balloon of observation, from which we have looked down on such a long series of stirring scenes in this historic drama, floats over Port Arthur. Once more we see below us the spreading cluster of white houses which marks the European settlement, with the camp and parade grounds to the rear, and the harbour to the front. Once more our eyes wander round the chain of forts, taking in the sea defences of the Tiger's Tail, and that notable work on Golden Hill, from which so many of the naval incidents and accidents of the past half-year have been witnessed. Once more we see beyond the line of Russian fortifications the contracted ring of Japanese investment. Port Arthur besieged claims our attention again, and the spectacle afforded is sufficient, surely, to make us forget for a time even the colossal conflict which is taking place to the north between the main armies of the two combatant nations. For not less indelibly than the Battle of Liao-yang and the operations which followed it will the Siege of Port Arthur be written on the tablets of the world's history. Nor, although it is but an interval in the story of that Siege which we are about to describe, is that interval lacking in episodes fully as inspiring as the fanatical heroism displayed on the slopes of the Shu-shan Hills, fully as dreadful as the holocaust of slaughter

that closed the grim struggle for Hei-yan-tai.

We dropped the narrative of the land operations against Port Arthur at the end of July, by which time the Japanese were in possession of Wolf's Hill, that important eminence half a mile south of Shui-shi-ying, from which it is possible to cast shells through the narrow opening between Obelisk Hill and Poya-shan into Port Arthur Harbour. In Chapter XLVII. the stage we are now entering upon was so far anticipated as to make it clear that the Japanese occupation of Wolf's Hill was swiftly rendered effective by the emplacement of siege guns which, by the end of the first week in August, had begun to rain projectiles upon the fleet at anchor. In Chapter XLIX. the result of this development was dealt with. We saw the harbour becoming untenable, and we followed the Russian Fleet in its disastrous sortie. At nightfall on that memorable August 10th we watched the reduced and crippled squadron crawling back into Port Arthur, the naval strength of which was reported on the following day to consist of the battleships *Peresviet*, *Pobieda*, *Retvisan*, *Poltava*, and *Sevastopol*, the cruisers *Bayan* and *Pallada*, and perhaps a dozen torpedo destroyers. What a day of gloom must August 11th have been for Port Arthur! For, although the departure of the Fleet in the small hours of the previous morning deprived

the garrison of much substantial assistance in the way of long range artillery, there may well have been high hopes cherished of a victory at sea such as could not but lessen the stringency of the blockade even if it did not relieve the pressure of the land investment.

How terrible must have been the drop from any such aspirations, how grim the disappointment, how blank the prospect, as those in Port Arthur who were not busy in the trenches gazed at the remnant, large and still imposing, but sadly battered, of the powerful squadron which only yesterday morning had worked its way out through the heavily-mined harbour entrance into the open sea. In the course of the next few days, too, we may be sure that news began to trickle in showing the real extent of the loss entailed by yesterday's battle: Admiral Vitoft killed; the *Tsarevitch* and *Askold*, and later the *Diana* safe, it is true, in neutral ports, but dismantled; and, lastly, the poor little *Novik* sunk. Those must have been bad days, indeed, for Port Arthur, and worst of all for the sailors who, through the public reproaches cast on Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky, were made to feel that by returning to Port Arthur they had brought on themselves the sharp displeasure of their Imperial Master.

Henceforth, at any rate, during the intermediate stage with which we are now concerned, the main work of defending Port Arthur devolves upon the land forces, and right valiantly do they discharge their responsibilities, sustained daily by fresh tingling exhortations from the indefatigable Stoessel. In Chapter XLVII. we left this heroic Governor going his rounds, outwardly as full of pluck and buoyant energy as possible, but at heart, perhaps, a little despondent,


more especially at the thought of having to part shortly with Madame Stoessel, who a little later was reported to have left the place in a destroyer. More recent advices show that the Governor's brave wife scorned to take advantage of the opportunities offered her of escape from the beleaguered fortress, and remained at her husband's side taking a noble share in the work of maintaining a stout resistance to the enemy. Prince Radziwill, a Russian lieutenant, who succeeded in getting away from Port Arthur to Chifu with despatches on September 16th, speaks enthusiastically of this heroic lady's behaviour. "Madame Stoessel," he says, "takes the lead in the Red Cross work, and is in almost constant attendance at the hospital, tenderly caring for the wounded. In the midst of this exhausting work she finds time to aid orphans and widows, and superintend the making of bandages. The soldiers consider her their guardian angel."

During the first fortnight in August the Japanese land operations against Port Arthur chiefly affect the east and west forces of the defensive system. On the east the principal objective is Ta-ku-shan, an eminence which lies a little to the east of the fort marked No. 8 on our plan on the following page; on the west the main effort is made to gain a foothold to the west of Itzu Hill. The latter operation, although stoutly opposed, appears at first to have given less trouble than the former, since landing was easy on the shore of Louisa Bay, the more northerly of the two inlets to the west of the Kwan-tung Promontory; while from Pigeon Bay the Japanese ships could lend occasional valuable assistance to the troops on shore.

The attack on Ta-ku-shan appears to have been a most hotly-contested affair,

the fight lasting for fifteen hours. During the whole of August 8th the Japanese had been exposed to a terrific fire from the forts on the east front, and must have suffered greatly. On August 9th, however, they succeeded in occupying

successful, and on the night of August 10th, the date of the Fleet action, the Japanese, during a heavy rainstorm, made a determined attack on the east fort, evidently in the hope of rushing forts Nos. 8 and 9. The attack was sup-



THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.

both Ta-ku-shan and Siao-kou-shan, which lies to the south on the shore of Takhe Bay, and fronts Fort No. 9 on our plan, just as Ta-ku-shan fronts Fort No. 8. The Russians made, on the night of the 9th, a strenuous effort to recover the Ta-ku-shan position, but were not

ported by a demonstration along the whole of investment as far as Wolf's Hill; but the Russian fortifications were too strong, the defenders were too alert, and no impression was made. Some idea of the severity of the fighting may be gained from the fact that the admitted



GENERAL STOESEL: THE HEROIC DEFENDER
OF PORT ARTHUR.



losses of the Port Arthur garrison from August 8th to August 10th were 7 officers and 248 men killed, 35 officers and 1,553 men wounded, and 1 officer and 83 men missing. This is a very heavy tale of casualties in a force fighting behind elaborately constructed fortifications, and it must be inferred that the losses suffered by the Japanese were far greater. At the same time the latter have gained a substantial advantage by their sacrifices, as far as those incurred in the capture and retention of Ta-ku-shan and Siao-kou-shan are concerned. For they have secured two new positions for their guns, from which a constant fire can be kept up not only on the forts immediately in front, but also upon those to the north, some of which it should now be possible to harass with reverse fire.

It may be noted that about August 10th the Japanese reserves arrived, thus greatly stiffening the attack. On the night of the 13th a determined effort was made on the left of the Russian defences, the Japanese advancing from Louisa Bay, and at the same time making an attempt to capture certain important positions to the north-east of Ta-ku-shan. Two of the latter were occupied, notably that at Pa-li-chwang, which lies about four miles to the north-east of the town, west of the railway and south of Shui-shi-ying. It would seem that the Russians succeeded in recapturing these positions on their right, but did not re-occupy them, contenting themselves with preventing the Japanese from returning and emplacing siege guns there.

On the Russian left wing the fighting was fast and furious all through the 14th and 15th, the Japanese continuing to lose heavily, more especially through mine explosions, but still pressing onward until they had captured and placed batteries

on several important points dominating the town. The result of this movement, which cannot be said to have terminated much before the 17th, is that the line of investment is now bent round Port Arthur in a pretty complete semi-circle, running from the shores of Pigeon Bay up through the open country to the north of Itzu Hill, past Shui-shi-ying, and thence in a south-easterly curve to Ta-ku-shan and Siao-hou-shan. The only sections of the defensive system now not directly menaced seem to be the forts in the Liao-tie-shan Promontory on the Tiger's Tail, and on Golden Hill. These cannot at present be attacked by land without weakening the remainder of the investment, and they are too strong to render it advisable at this stage to risk valuable ships against them.

On the night of the 15th there is a lull in the firing, and General Stoessel receives word that the Japanese desire to send in a "parlementaire." The latter, in the person of a Japanese field-officer, Major Yamaoka, presents himself at the Russian advanced posts, and, after the usual cautious and courteous preliminaries, is conducted to General Stoessel's presence.

The reception of a parlementaire during an important siege is usually a somewhat theatrical performance. Elaborate formality prevails, for the officer who carries the message from the besiegers has generally been carefully selected for his tact and good manners, while on the side of the besieged there is almost invariably a strong wish to assume an attitude of dignified repose. Above all, it is the custom to make every effort to convince the parlementaire that things are going splendidly within the walls of the beleaguered town, that the besieged rather enjoy the circumstances than otherwise, and that

of food in particular there is an overflowing abundance. These harmless deceptions never convince any practised observer, who quietly disregards them and does his best, without exciting suspicion, to note other points which cannot be so readily concealed. But it is one of the rudimentary principles of the art of war that a parlementaire should be bamboozled, if possible, into reporting that those whom he has visited are in first-rate "fettle," and it is not likely that the Russians departed on this occasion from the time-honoured precedent.

Major Yamaoka comes, it should be mentioned, not in the name of Field-Marshal Oyama, who is now proceeding northwards to direct the operations against Liao-yang, but in the joint names of General Nogi, on whom the control of the land operations against Port Arthur has now devolved, and Admiral Togo. The Major brings two documents. The first is an order recently issued by the Mikado through Field-Marshal Yamagata, directing that facilities should be given to women, priests, merchants, and diplomatic officers of neutral Powers to leave Port Arthur, and that if necessary shelter should be accorded to any refugees at Dalny. The order declares that the Emperor is prompted by a feeling of humanity and a desire to spare non-combatants at Port Arthur from the devastation wrought by fire and sword. The second document is of a more sensational nature. It calls upon the Russian garrison of Port Arthur to surrender, the terms being as follows:—The troops to march out with all the honours of war and with permission to join General Kuropatkin; all civilians to be brought to a place designated by the Russian Admiral; and the Russian ships in the harbour, namely, the *Retvisan*, *Sevastopol*, *Pobieda*,

Peresviet, *Poltava*, *Bayan*, and *Pallada*, four gunboats, and twelve or more destroyers, to be handed over to the Japanese.

The terms are such that to a despondent commander they might well have afforded comfort and relief. For not only to march out with all the honours of war, but to be enabled to join the main army in the field, is a concession indeed. But terms of any sort involving the surrender of Port Arthur and the ships in harbour are doubly impossible to the Russian Commandant, even if he had the remotest inclination in that direction. For only recently he has received the Tsar's warm congratulations on the bravery exhibited by the Russian troops at the close of July, the message concluding with an appeal to Heaven to "protect the fortress of Port Arthur from the attacks of the enemy." Surrender after such a veiled mandate would in any case be out of the question.

As a matter of fact, General Stoessel does not need any sort of stimulus to work him up to the rejection of these terms. Except in the matter of addressing fiery orations to the troops, the General is a silent man; but when the terms are submitted to him, his habitual taciturnity deserts him, and he bursts into a storm of invective. Not, it would seem, against Major Yamaoka, whom personally he treats throughout with great courtesy, but against the "cursed spite" which has subjected him to what he regards—somewhat fantastically—as a humiliation. After stamping up and down the room for some time he regains his composure, and turning to the parlementaire, remarks that the action of the Japanese in sending him such a summons is "a joke in bad taste." As for the terms, they are, of course, rejected. Apparently the General also formally

declines to consider the Mikado's suggestive order as to the removal of non-combatants. Major Yamaoka now asks for a three days' truce to bury the dead. Even this is refused. The General will assent to nothing, will do nothing but fight. Accordingly, the Japanese parlementaire withdraws, and in a few hours fighting is resumed with furious vigour on all sides.

The Japanese papers of this date profess unstinted admiration of General Stoessel's determination to defend Port Arthur to the last, but blame him greatly for not acceding to the suggestion as to the removal of non-combatants. There is some doubt on the latter point, and it is expedient that General Stoessel should be given the benefit of it. It is by no

made, it is distinctly stated that, at one period or another of the siege, three hundred women engaged in hospital work at Port Arthur were "advised to leave, but replied that they would rather face massacre than desert their posts."

As regards non-combatants generally, it is not altogether surprising that the Commandant of Port Arthur should not altogether relish the idea of these being afforded shelter at Dalny, where they would inevitably be "pumped" for information as to the resources of the garrison, and might, innocently enough, tell a good deal which it was not altogether desirable the besiegers should know. Humanity is, of course, a primary consideration; but, in such a case as that of Port Arthur, non-combatants must be



Photo: Nouvelle, Paris.

STORES OF VODKA AT PORT ARTHUR.

means certain that he did not give the non-combatants in the town the chance of taking advantage of the offer, and, in the account given by Prince Radziwill, from which a quotation has already been

regarded as having remained, if not to serve their own ends, at any rate at their own risk, and a commander would be justified in regarding their safety as not necessarily a more serious responsibility

than his duty towards the combatant garrison.

The foreign Attachés, it should be remarked, were permitted, if not urged, to take their departure about this time,

an hourly risk of exposure to a storm of bullets. The Attachés, it should be mentioned, appear all to have left Port Arthur in junks, one of them escorting three French ladies, who could hardly have left



LIEUT. GENERAL SMIRNOW : IN CHARGE OF THE PORT ARTHUR FORTS.

the General presumably trusting to their honour not to talk too freely about the state of affairs inside the fortress. For some little time past these Attachés had been quartered in the Tiger's Tail battery, 600 feet above the sea level. Shells often burst near them, but apparently without effect. The Attachés were treated with great consideration, but were not allowed to go near any point from which they could view more particularly the naval operations. As to the land fighting, it would have been difficult, seemingly, for anyone not in a balloon to have obtained any coherent idea of this without running

the place unnoticed had General Stoessel been resolved to inhibit all non-combatants other than attachés from escaping.

Between August 18th and 22nd some of the hottest fighting of the whole siege occurred, culminating in a general assault on the latter date, which the Russians succeeded in repelling, though only with great difficulty. The main attack was delivered against the Russian centre and left, but the only real success attained seems to have been the capture of a small work on the east front, called Poyodo Fort, lying between Ta-ku-shan

and the main line of defences. On the Russian left and centre the fighting was terribly severe. Assisted by artillery fire from Shui-shi-ying and Louisa Bay, the Japanese made a series of desperate charges into the open country to the east of Pigeon Bay, driving the Russians back to the main forts. But all about here it is flat, and the *kao-liang* had been cut. Consequently the Japanese failed to hold the positions they had captured, and were swept back repeatedly by the deadly artillery fire from the forts. Time after time the ghastly process was gone through. A grand charge, hand-to-hand bayonet fighting, and then a temporary triumph. Siege-guns would now be dragged up, and frantic efforts made to get them into position. But by this time the Russian forts would be relieved from the risk of firing on their own infantry, and their powerful modern guns would open on the clustering Japanese. A few well-aimed shells, and the ground won at great sacrifice would become quite untenable. Reluctantly the victors in the recent hand-to-hand struggle would retire, paying another heavy toll to the enemy's guns. One important fort on the I-shan Hills, midway between the western sea-coast and the railway, about half-way between Pigeon and Louisa Bays, is said to have been captured and evacuated in this trying fashion. The position was first subjected to a heavy bombardment for forty-eight hours. "The Japanese infantry then advanced, compelling the Russians to retire, but the captors in their turn were driven out by the fierce fire of the Russian batteries."

Although the Japanese assault on this occasion was unquestionably repulsed with serious losses, it is evident that the defence, too, was considerably shaken by

the desperate onslaught, accompanied, as the latter was, by an almost ceaseless bombardment. It is said that during the four days over 5,000 shells, large and small, were fired into the town, the Japanese artillerymen having located the public buildings, and being bent on destroying them. Poor General Stoessel's headquarters seem to have received special attention, for they are described as being "continually shelled." A grimly quaint incident takes place on the 19th in connection with a Chinese theatre in the native town, at which, in sublime Celestial indifference to the surroundings, a performance is proceeding. The latter is rudely interrupted by the arrival of a nine-inch shell, which bursts and kills eighteen of the wretched audience.

The Russian losses during this period must have been very severe, although doubtless not so heavy as those of the Japanese. It is said that the storage buildings along the docks are now being turned into dead-houses, whence the bodies are hurried to pits dug on the outskirts of the town and covered with quick-lime.

"The civilians have grown careless of bursting shells, and are leaving their bomb-proof shelters. During Friday's (August 19th) bombardment they walked freely about the streets, smoking and speculating where the next shell would drop." Thus writes the *Express* correspondent at Chifu, which now seems to be receiving almost daily intelligence from Port Arthur. The Japanese evidently do not trouble to prevent the Chinese from carrying to Chifu and elsewhere a goodly stock of "news," much of which has, however, to be received with caution.

On August 22nd the Japanese fire perceptibly slackened, and the failure of the

Japanese assault not only inspirits the besieged, but creates a very favourable impression in St. Petersburg, where it is now confidently expected that the fall of Port Arthur, believed a few days ago to be imminent, will be indefinitely postponed. General Stoessel, who has been created Aide-de-camp to the Tsar, is now the hero of the hour, and for the twentieth time the despatch of the Baltic Fleet to redress the naval balance in the Far East is enthusiastically mooted.

It is not only in St. Petersburg that the failure of the recent general assault on Port Arthur causes some revulsion of popular feeling. In Europe generally there had been a disposition to believe that, when the time came for the Japanese to deliver a grand attack, that attack would in all probability be successful. The impression created by previous Japanese triumphs certainly favoured the idea that, after such a deliberate and costly preparation, and with such large resources in the way of men and guns at their disposal, the Japanese, carried on as at Nan-shan by desperate valour and almost frantic resolution, would find some means of driving their first real assault home. But it was now evident that the strength of the Port Arthur fortifications and the spirit of the defenders had been underrated. Public opinion underwent a decided reaction, and in many quarters it was freely anticipated that the garrison might still contrive to hold out until help arrived, and that, in any case, the Japanese could not hope to make a successful entry until they had suffered losses still more appalling than those already inflicted upon them by the obstinate defenders.

At Tokio itself the failure of the assault caused much discouragement, and great dissatisfaction was openly expressed with

Field-Marshal Oyama, just as it had been in the case of Admiral Kamimura until the latter won his way back into favour by the sinking of the *Rurik*. This exhibition of feeling may seem trivial, but is a useful reminder of the unquestioned fact that, while the Japanese extort our admiration by their patience in the field, they are not as a nation very good losers, and in this war have become so accustomed to success that they are far too prompt to blame their commanders, naval and military, for failures which cannot in any way fairly be traced to incompetence or lack of energy.

About this time the idea becomes prevalent that, in view of the heavy losses hitherto incurred, the Japanese will abstain from regular assaults on Port Arthur, and will endeavour to starve out the unfortunate garrison. This idea, although erroneous, receives some support from the increased watchfulness of the vessels told off to maintain the blockade, and a growing reluctance to allow Chinese refugees to leave the town. As yet, however, there is no trustworthy talk of scarcity at Port Arthur, and the United States Naval Attaché, who left the fortress in the third week in August, is said to have stated definitely that the place could hold out as regards food for another three months, at any rate. Moreover, where there is any sort of a chance of successful blockade-running it will always be attempted, and cannot be invariably hindered. As far, then, as this intermediate stage is concerned, we need not trouble ourselves to formulate the prospect of the reduction of Port Arthur by the grim process of waiting until the food supplies give out. More inspiring is the circumstance that, although the Japanese hopes as regards the efficacy of general assaults may have been somewhat

dashed, they continue to hammer away at the tremendous obstacles before them with little or no diminution of fighting energy.


During and after the general assault of August 18th to 22nd there is some indication of an attempt on both sides to introduce once more the naval element. On August 20th a Japanese torpedo flotilla tries to steal into the harbour in the hope of damaging some of the ships at anchor, but is surprised by the shore batteries, and returns unsuccessful. In the forenoon of August 23rd the great Japanese armoured cruisers *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* steam in close to the Lao-li-tsui Forts (No. 9 on our plan) and silence them. On the same day the Russian battleship *Sevastopol* also takes a hand in the operations, and bombards the Japanese line of investment from the roadstead. But while engaged in this occupation the unfortunate vessel strikes a mine, and is seen by a Japanese destroyer to list badly to starboard with her bows submerged. She is afterwards towed into harbour. The following day a Russian destroyer strikes a mine and sinks off the harbour entrance. Meanwhile the ships in harbour are going through troublous times. They are scattered about in the hope of escaping the rain of shells, but it is said that the *Retvisan*, *Bayan*, and *Potava* have been badly hit, the damage to the first being below the water-line.

After the general assault of August 18th to 22nd there was a slight lull; but on the night of August 23rd, at eleven o'clock, the Japanese moved up a considerable force for an attack on Zaredoutni Fort, a strong position on the Russian right flank. According to the *Novy Krai*, the well-known Port Arthur newspaper, "the Japanese made clever use of the available cover, and by mid-

night they formed up within striking distance of the fortifications. They made a powerful rush forward, but were mowed down on all but one side, where a detachment succeeded in entering the port over the dead bodies of their comrades. Nearly all of them were bayoneted, and the remnant retreated, suffering severe losses. The Japanese were soon reinforced, and again furiously attacked the fort, only to be once more repulsed, and a third attempt was also unsuccessful. At daylight there was an artillery duel. The fort suffered considerably, and the garrison was ordered into the undamaged trenches."

Let us endeavour briefly to realise this scene, which is probably typical of many of the desperate attacks made by the Japanese in the course of the siege on individual positions. The fort in question is a comparatively small one, but it is evidently strong, and very possibly, as is often the case with Russian defences, rather over- than under-manned. In the darkness we may not be able to make out much more than a single face of the work, but even a glimpse will show how thoroughly the Russian engineers understand their business, and what determination and sacrifice are necessary to effect an entry into such a stronghold. Most of the forts round Port Arthur have their parapets fronted by very deep ditches which, again, have at intervals what are known as *kaponiers*, or bomb-proof structures containing quick-firing guns so arranged as to sweep the ditch from end to end. Beyond the ditch there may be, and in this case doubtless are, wire entanglements with a view to breaking a sudden rush, and in the ditch itself there may be other obstacles in the way of spikes or branches of trees.

The fort may or may not be provided



THE MOLE IN THE NIGHT: THE STEALTHY JAPANESE THROWING UP EARTHWORKS BEFORE PORT ARTHUR.

with a search-light. The chances are that it is; but it does not follow that this appliance is very freely used, for many engineers consider it to be rather like a two-edged tool, which is a little apt to hurt the unskilful user. A search-light shows up an attack very clearly, but it also gives the latter the right direction from the first, and, though the sensation of advancing to an assault with the search-light playing on them may be anything but pleasant, many soldiers will go forward more readily in such conditions than in complete darkness.

It is evident that, search-light or no search-light, the attacking party which is creeping up for a rush has a trying experience before it. After collecting in sufficient strength within striking distance, the signal for the advance is given, and the devoted band goes forward with bayonets fixed and probably with wire-cutters in readiness. They cannot hope to reach the ditch before the alarm is given, and parapets in front—in this case, perhaps, three faces of a pentagonal redoubt are being simultaneously assaulted—are bristling with the defenders' rifles. Flashes break out continuously along the lines of breastwork, the search-light, if there is one, begins to traverse the front of the fort, machine-guns come into action, and scores of fine fellows throw up their arms and fell back, or stumble limply forward, never to rise again. Arrived at the ditch, an attempt may be made to use scaling ladders either as ladders or bridges, but most of the Port Arthur forts are built to frustrate escalade. There remains the heroic process of jumping into the ditch and climbing up the opposing slope—the escarp, it is called—which is made as steep as possible in order to render the ascent more difficult. At this stage the quick-firers

in the kaponiers come into play, and the ditch is soon heaped high with corpses. Pouring over the dead bodies of their comrades come fresh hordes of attackers, and, clambering up the escarps and the exterior slopes of the parapet, they not unfrequently meet the defenders hand-to-hand on the top or "superior slope" of the parapet itself. Here it is all bayonet work of the most desperate character. The Japanese might be thought to be at a disadvantage in the matter of bayonet fighting as compared with their big adversaries; but they are, of course, extremely active, and, moreover, are specially trained to stoop and deliver an upward thrust with the bayonet so as to get under a tall man's guard.

We may take it, then, that not through any inequality in this respect do the Japanese fail in the attack on Zaredoutni Fort. It is simply because the loss incurred in getting a foothold has been so terrific that the foothold cannot possibly be retained. Three times, we are told, is the attack renewed, and we may be sure that each time the Japanese fought with almost demoniacal fury. But the odds, natural and artificial, against them are too great, and gradually they are beaten back, leaving hundreds, maybe, of their gallant fellows dead or dying in and around that dreadful pentagon.

Between August 23rd and 27th we do not hear of any but incidental fighting. In the interval the Japanese are busy preparing for another general assault. Special attention is paid to the left of the Russian line of defence, doubtless with a view to future operations in the Liau-ti-shan Promontory. A large park of artillery is formed at Louisa Bay, and on the shores of Pigeon Bay a considerable fort is said to be in course of construction.

Between August 27th and 31st there is

more heavy fighting, the Japanese opening the ball by an attack delivered at 3 a.m. during a storm, upon the positions on the Russian left flank. Later the attack seems to have developed all along the line, but was only successful in the case of the position of Pa-li-chwang, which has already been mentioned as lying about four miles to the north-east of the town. This time the Japanese not only capture, but retain the position, on which they proceed to mount heavy guns. On the evening of the 29th, about nine o'clock, there is a brisk little engagement near Shui-shi-ying, where the Japanese have ingeniously unroofed some strong Chinese houses made of mud, and converted them into redoubts. A Russian regiment makes a sudden onslaught on one of these improvised forts, and forces the Japanese back at the point of the bayonet to a second "redoubt." The fire from the latter is, however, too fierce for the Russians, and they retire. The incident seems trivial, but is interesting as an instance of the numerous counter-strokes made by the Russians during the siege. Such performances reflect great credit on the defenders, and, moreover, serve to emphasise the extraordinary difficulties which the besiegers have to encounter. For it argues a notable quality of resistance that, towards the close of what may, perhaps, be fairly described as the second general attack on Port Arthur, in the course of which the fortifications have been repeatedly shaken by a fearful cannonade, the defenders should have the "grit and go" necessary to emerge and engage hand-to-hand with the attacking infantry in their trenches.

On August 30th, at three o'clock in the morning, the Japanese moving out from their new position at Pa-li-chwang deliberately assaulted Sun-shu-shan (Pear

Tree Hill) and Er-lung-shan (Two Dragon Hill) Forts (Nos. 4 and 5 on the plan), making repeated attacks until two o'clock in the afternoon, when, according to Reuter's correspondent at Chifu, they were compelled to fall back, having lost over a thousand men. "Finding these forts impregnable, the next morning, at four o'clock, the Japanese forces hurled themselves against another fort near Er-lung-shan, and after a hand-to-hand fight succeeded in driving out the Russians occupying the position. Artillery was brought up, and desperate efforts were made to render the position secure; but after enduring for seven hours the artillery fire of the other forts, the Japanese were compelled to retire. They succeeded, however, in making the position useless to the Russians, and it is now (September 3rd) unoccupied."

Here is an example of the application of the principle of reciprocal defence to fortification, by which we have to understand that, in a big scheme of defence, the forts are commonly arranged so that if one is captured it can be immediately swept by artillery fire from one or more other forts. It is this circumstance which often deprives a splendidly successful assault of any practical result, and, incidentally, it is for this reason that general assaults are sometimes delivered in cases in which anything like general success is quite hopeless. Probably in the latter suggestion lies the secret of the retention of the position at Pa-li-chwang. The fort or forts from which it could have been harassed after its occupation by the Japanese were doubtless kept busy until, with sandbags and by rapid trenching, sufficient protection was afforded for guns and men to enable both to remain in the new position.

During the first fortnight of September

the fighting is continuous, the Japanese here and there scoring a slight success, but not appreciably advancing the line of investment. On the 2nd and 3rd the Japanese bombardment was very heavy, and a couple of guns in a fort near Erlung-shan are said to have been dismounted. On September 4th the Russians retorted by shelling the covered Japanese trenches in front of Pa-li-chwang and destroying them.

The *Novy Krai* mentions a typical case of heroic self-sacrifice on the part of a Japanese on September 5th. The man calmly left a redoubt occupied by his comrades, and deliberately marched towards the Russians, carrying two boxes, and thinking, perhaps, that the Russians out of curiosity would allow him to come among them before shooting him down. As it was, he was not picked off by the sharpshooters until he had approached quite near. When the body was examined it was found that the boxes contained lyddite, and that fuses were carefully attached to them.

Between September 8th and 10th the Japanese capture a fort situated on a high hill two miles east of Golden Hill. The position is taken by assault, but we are told that the fighting is not severe, and that the Japanese are enabled to remain in the fort on account of the poor powder which is now being used by the Russians at Golden Hill. Small as the distance is, many of the Russian shells fall short, and others fail to explode. A month ago the batteries on Golden Hill used to respond briskly to the firing from Shui-shi-ying, but now this is quite out of the question. The shortage of ammunition is evidently a fact, judging from the triumphant satisfaction displayed about this time at the discovery of a secret depôt established by the

Chinese before the war with Japan, in which some three hundred Krupp guns and a quantity of ammunition had been stored. It is reported a little later that many of the projectiles falling into the Japanese lines are Chinese shells which have been fied down to fit the Russian guns in position.

Several interesting accounts of life inside and outside Port Arthur at this period are available. Writing on August 30th, a young Dane, in a private letter which finds its way to Copenhagen, says that General Stoessel "has asked all the inhabitants for their own sakes to take at least six hours' rest *per diem*, though he never seems to sleep himself. He is always bright and cheery. . . . The Japanese are wonderfully plucky fighters—they stand the heaviest fire quite coolly—young boys, too, of seventeen or eighteen years of age. The explosions of mines, for which we use Whitehead torpedoes, are truly awful to see, dismembered bodies flying all round. Thousands of mines have been laid. How will the Japanese fare when they get nearer?"

Prince Radziwill, who, as noted above, left Port Arthur on September 15th, gives a terrible account of the intensity of the fighting. During a recent assault "the Japanese had charged madly in deep columns, losing heavily from the Russian shell-fire. There were horrible scenes when they reached the Russian lines. No quarter was given, and couples were found locked in a death embrace, the teeth of one in the other's throat, and fingers plunged into the enemy's eyes. The 9th Japanese Division had charged in double columns. The first having fallen back under the avalanche of shot and shell, the general in command of the second fired upon it, exterminating it!"

There were, however, moments when

good humour took the place of savage rage. On a rainy day one of a number of Japanese massed beneath a height crowned by a fort cried out to the Russians, "I say, you fellows up there, come

an end to his resistance. Before his sword broke he put eight Japanese *hors de combat*, meanwhile receiving wounds all over his body.

Another inspiring story is told of a



AFTER THE ASSAULT.

The Japanese succouring their wounded by searchlight after an attack upon the batteries before Port Arthur.

down and take our place; it's your turn to get wet through!"

Individual acts of heroism were numerous, a particular case cited being that of Lieutenant Petroff, who was surrounded by Japanese and fought successfully until his sword was broken. He then used his fists; but Japanese bayonets quickly put

company which occupied a perilous outpost, and, finding the position untenable, sent word to General Stoessel, "We are unable to hold the position." "But you can die," the General replied. And so they died.

Mme. Anna Kravchenko, an Englishwoman married to a Russian officer, who

escaped from Port Arthur at the same time as Prince Radziwill, speaks highly of the spirit displayed by the garrison: "I cannot imagine a braver or finer set of men. They come from three days' duty in the trenches singing and laughing, though there are many vacant places in the ranks. They have all unlimited confidence in their power to hold the fortress."

A very trying feature of the siege is the number of dead bodies which are lying unburied round the town, poisoning the air. The stench from these is so awful that the Russian soldiers have to stuff camphor up their nostrils in order to avoid being overcome.

The Japanese are, of course, free from many of the disabilities which oppress the besieged, but are not without their trials and privations. The supply system is said to be working satisfactorily, but there is a scarcity of good drinking water and, apparently, some sickness in consequence. But the Japanese are at a great advantage by reason of their occupation of Dalny, which they are turning to the best possible account. They have recently repaired the Russian dry dock, having discovered the dock gates, which the Russians had sunk on abandoning the port. A steamer, sunk by the Russians at the entrance to the dock, and a number of launches sunk near the pier, have also been raised and taken into use. The workshops at Dalny are now busy in constructing and sending forward heavy gun-shields which are to be used in the case of future captures of forts as a protection against the fire of other forts.

Great preparations are being made for the next big assault, which, it is understood, will be delivered against Er-lung-shan and Chi-huan-shan (Cockscomb Hill)

Forts (Nos. 5 and 6 on the plan). The preliminary work is being carried out chiefly at Pa-li-chwang. "The hills crowned by Chi-huan-shan and Er-lung-shan have," says Reuter's correspondent at Chifu, "regular stopping places, enabling a large force of Japanese to rest securely some distance up the slope. The force has tents pitched, and the troops are relieved every three days. Food, ammunition, etc., are brought up to the troops under cover of darkness, as detachments have to cross a level stretch before reaching safety. Trenches almost under the Russian noses are partially constructed. The Russians constantly endeavour to level the incline by shelling all projections affording any shelter to the attackers. The Japanese artillery engages the Russian guns to prevent the cover from being destroyed.

"Two full divisions of infantry are available in this vicinity under Generals Oshima and Tuchiya. The entire force surrounding Port Arthur numbers 80,000 fighting men."

The above preparations are said to have been completed on September 15th, and at dawn on that day the Japanese bombardment from Shui-shi-ying, Pa-li-chwang, and Pigeon Bay is redoubled in intensity. There must have been other serious fighting on the 15th, as General Stoessel, in a telegram to the General Staff at St. Petersburg, says that 45 Russian guns were destroyed, and that there were 400 killed and 800 wounded, of whom 5 per cent. were officers.

In a future chapter the story of the siege of Port Arthur will be resumed at this point, at which the termination of our "intermediate stage" seems clearly indicated.



Photo: Urban, Ltd.

NATIVE QUARTER IN LIAO-YANG.

CHAPTER LIX.

LIAO-YANG AND AFTER—RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE VIEWS—IMPERIAL MESSAGES—THE ARMIES IN THE FIELD—TYPICAL SOLDIERS' LETTERS—JAPAN AND THE WAR CORRESPONDENTS—EUROPEAN OPINIONS.

ALTHOUGH three chapters of considerable length have been devoted to the Battle of Liao-yang, there remains a host of important and interesting considerations demanding close attention from those who are real students of this historic event. In a narrative like the present it is not necessary to discuss such sequels and side issues at all exhaustively. But it will be convenient, before leaving the Liao-yang operations and pushing on to the equally, if not more momentous movements which followed them, to touch lightly on the immediate consequence of the battle, and to glance at certain military, sentimental, and international questions arising from it.

First, let us look at what has happened

from the standpoint of the nation whose army has been victorious in this long series of engagements. Public opinion in such matters is not always a very sure guide, and the fact that the capture of Liao-yang was celebrated by copious "mafficking" in Tokio cannot be taken as the measure of the national sentiment on the subject. As usual, the Tokio populace was a little "previous" in its rejoicing, and as early as the evening of September 2nd an immense torchlight procession took place, in which, according to the *Express* correspondent, students, business men, girls, and women participated. "The marchers carried fanciful paper lanterns, tin trumpets, and illuminated banners, which rudely

pictured the flight of Kuropatkin. The bands played the Japanese national anthem over and over again. The procession passed through the principal streets, and at a late hour was massed around the brilliantly lit headquarters of the Army Staff, where a further report from Marshal Oyama was impatiently awaited." To some extent, as we know, the result justified an expression of public satisfaction, and doubtless the temptation to use up the paper lanterns prepared in anticipation of the fall of Port Arthur was great. But the occasion was hardly one for such an extravagant departure from the studied moderation with which the Japanese have hitherto received the news of their successes in the field or at sea.

A higher note was struck a few days later by a long message of congratulation from the Mikado to his gallant troops. In this communication the Emperor shows that he is under no illusions as to the indecisiveness of the recent victory. In particular he alludes to the end of the war as being still far distant; and we may take it that the publication of this important and well-considered message acted as a very useful corrective to the premature and exuberant enthusiasm of the Tokio "maffickers."

To the Japanese in the field the victory, such as it was, at Liao-yang did not bring by any means complete satisfaction. They are said by Reuter's correspondent to have been greatly disappointed at the failure of their plan to bring about a final and decisive battle at Liao-yang, resulting in the annihilation of the present Russian army in Manchuria. In any case, they could not have failed to recognise the fact that never before—except, of course, at Port Arthur—have they met with such dogged resistance, coupled

with a tactical ability which must have extorted their complete respect. Accustomed hitherto to see their schemes of envelopment resulting, if not in enclosure of the enemy, at any rate in his early evacuation of his positions, they have been somewhat rudely awakened at Liao-yang to the occasional risks attendant upon such movements. They have captured Liao-yang itself, it is true, but they have only done so at a very heavy price, and there were times in the course of Kuroki's flanking movement at which the position of the Right Army must have been distinctly precarious. Such reflections must have been grave ones, indeed, for the more thoughtful Japanese officers in the field, who, more clearly than the General Staff at Tokio, were able to appreciate the quality of the Russian resistance on the Shu-shan hills, and the unpleasant surprise caused on the other side of the Tai-tse-ho by finding Kuropatkin's main army in position instead of a weak, unprotected line of communications.

It is the more creditable to the Army of Japan that it should have realised as promptly as it did the imperative necessity of not allowing the grass to grow under its feet after the occupation of the former Russian military capital of Manchuria. One does not allude so much to the pressure still exercised upon the Russian Army which, after September 4th, retired on Mukden and Tie-ling, as to the vigorous efforts made in connection with Liao-yang and the lines of communication. There is no question that much of the Japanese success in the subsequent operations was due to the extraordinary industry and energy which the new occupiers of Liao-yang infused into the business of making the most of their important acquisition. The town had hardly



"MISSING": JAPANESE DEAD AND WOUNDED IN A FIELD OF MILLET.

The millet fields of Manchuria have both aided and handicapped the Japanese in their struggle with Kuropatkin. The crops have served to mask the movements of their troops, but they have also made the work of the parties searching for dead and wounded exceptionally difficult



been entered when Marshal Oyama made it his headquarters, and in less than a week the old Russian settlement was beginning to wear the appearance of a modern Japanese town. Meanwhile the occupation of Niu-chwang was also being justified in a remarkable manner. Reinforcements and supplies were being pushed up thence to the north by every conceivable means, the estuary and tributaries of the Liao River being crowded with boats, while along every road and bypath leading to Liao-yang there were strings of hand-carts bearing grain and ammunition.

Nothing is more remarkable in the conduct of warlike operations by the Japanese than their seizure of every opportunity of this sort to push up supplies to the front in order that the soldier in the ranks may be made as comfortable as means will permit. In too many European armies the tendency is to make constant overdrafts on the energy and endurance of the soldier without making really adequate efforts to refund him, so to speak, the moment there is a chance of doing so. The consequence is that he is sometimes suffering hardships and privations even in the hour of victory, not because there are not abundant supplies in rear, but because no proper arrangements have been made to bring them up promptly as soon as ever the hostile pressure in front has ceased. That is evidently not the Japanese idea. With this level-headed army the central notion seems to be that the maintenance of the soldier at the highest point of efficiency throughout a campaign depends largely on the care which is taken of him. He is expected at times to do extraordinary things on a few grains of dry rice, but he is made to feel that at the very earliest possible instant he will again be properly

fed, and even have his small luxuries in the way of cigarettes and so forth. The hurling back of the enemy will thus mean not only "Long life to Japan!" but will be followed by an almost immediate improvement in the present hard conditions of existence. However glorious a soldier's spirit may be, he is seldom blind to the comfortable prospect of a "square meal," and we may be quite sure that none of Oyama's men was altogether indifferent to the spectacle of supplies pouring into Liao-yang the moment it was ascertained that Kuropatkin was in retreat.

It will be very interesting if ever we can get at the back of the minds of the Japanese soldiery at this period. But necessarily a long interval must elapse before even officers, not to speak of fighting men in the ranks, will be allowed to talk or write freely of a great battle in which Japanese losses were so appalling. We have it on Field-Marshal Oyama's authority that the spirits of the troops after the battle were high in spite of the ten days' continuous fighting in which they had been engaged, and the hammering they had received. This is hardly to be wondered at when the glowing patriotism which inspires the humblest Japanese conscript is taken into consideration. In which connection it may be interesting if we here interpolate a genuine Japanese soldier's letter which, if it does not describe any fighting, is at least a useful indication of the sort of fervour with which Oku's glorious infantry dashed themselves against the Russian positions at Liao-yang in a series of frontal attacks unsurpassed for burning courage and grim tenacity. The correspondent who sent the letter from Japan—it was printed in the *Times* shortly after the battle of Liao-yang—mentions that it was written

by a former servant in an English resident's family to a fellow-servant. "One thing, you may be certain," says the English correspondent, "the writer means every word he says; and, mind you, this is no descendant of Samurais, but a humble fellow from the country, who will willingly die if he can but strike one blow for his Emperor and his native land. What will stop a nation of such men?"

The letter translated runs as follows:—

"Hokkaido, August 5th, 1904.

"Since the war began we have been for months impatiently longing for orders to mobilise; this very day, the 5th, the order has been given to our division, and fortunately I have been selected for one of the field infantry companies, and have to be ready in twelve days, and we are leaving our native country for the front to fight with the enemies of right. Fortunately, ever since the first fights on sea and land, our officers and comrades have been gaining victories by the assistance of Heaven and the virtue of our Emperor; and I, too, though merely a humble fellow from the country, have the chance to strike one blow at the Russians. The Russo-Japan War is quite different from the China-Japan War, and we pray that now by our efforts we may spread the glory of our empire throughout the world. We are going into the battlefield, and we do not know whether we shall come back; but it is a great thing to be able to sacrifice our lives for the Emperor and our beloved country. I am in a hurry to prepare for the front, hereby I write to say good-bye to you and the rest of the household, and also to inform you of my good luck while yet I am alive.

"YASUMITSU MUKAI,

"26th Regiment Infantry,

"Asahigawa, Hokkaido."

Turning our attention now to the Russian standpoint we find here again, strange to say, a tendency to premature rejoicing over the earlier stages of the Liao-yang battle. The preliminary repulse of the armies of Oku and Nozu by the force entrenched on the Shu-shan seems to have been altogether overrated even by the Russian military authorities at the front, and on August 31st, the Russian *Official Messenger* announced that a great Russian victory had been gained! It is needless to dwell on the manner in which this illusion was painfully dispelled, more especially since, to the thinking Russian public, it soon became evident that even if a victory had not been secured, and something in the nature of a sharp defeat had been sustained, at least a great disaster had been averted. Bitter as was the disappointment at finding that once more the detested Yaponskis had scored a triumph, it was a great consolation to feel that the bulk of the Russian army in the field was still in being, and that the retirement from Liao-yang had been conducted in a manner by no means discreditable to the reputation and traditions of the Russian Army.

For some days no attempt was officially made to put the Russian public in possession of the facts; but about September 14th General Kuropatkin's admirable despatch, dated the 11th, and giving an account, simple and unvarnished, of the operations from August 26th to September 7th, was officially reproduced, and created a very good impression. In the circumstances it is not surprising that a good deal of obloquy should have been showered upon the unfortunate General Orloff, whose failure either to secure, or to create a useful diversion from, his position near Yen-tai was such a melancholy feature of the Russian movements in the

Third Phase of the battle. For the rest, the Russian public was evidently still prepared to regard Kuropatkin as a great commander, who had done his best in very difficult circumstances, and every effort was made in the Press and elsewhere to discount the importance of the loss of Liao-yang.

The Tsar was not behindhand in assisting to make the best of a doubtful business. On receipt of General Kuropatkin's despatch he forwarded to him the following message:—

“I see from your report that you were unable to hold the fortress of Liao-yang owing to the enemy threatening to cut off your communications.

“The retreat of the whole army in such difficult circumstances and over the terrible roads was an operation excellently carried out in face of grave difficulties.

“I thank you and your splendid troops for their heroic work and their continued self-sacrifice. God guard you.—NICHOLAS.”

This gracious message General Kuropatkin caused to be read before the troops of all detachments of the field army with solemn ceremony. In commenting on it in a General Order he remarked that it contained a further expression of lofty benevolence on the part of the Tsar—presumably with reference to the part played by the Commander-in-Chief himself—and added: “I am quite sure that in the work that lies before the Manchurian Army every soldier will put forth his best efforts to achieve victory over the enemy, and to become worthy of the confidence of the Emperor of Russia.”

To his Imperial Master General Kuropatkin telegraphed that the entire Manchurian Army rejoiced inexpressibly at his Majesty's appreciation of its labours and its military deeds. “We are all

animated,” he declared, “by the one desire to beat the enemy and to justify the confidence placed in us by the supreme chief of the Russian Army, who may feel perfectly sure in regard to the troops' future self-denial and devotion.” With somewhat remarkable insistence the General goes on, or is made by his St. Petersburg editors to go on, to repeat that the departure from Liao-yang, in the conditions in which it was accomplished, was an absolutely indispensable though most difficult undertaking. Attention was further drawn to the fact that the enemy has laid no claim to captures of prisoners, guns, or other trophies. Finally, it is pointed out that General Kuroki's report confirms the statement that on the morning of September 4th the Russian Army might have been cut into two if steps had not been taken to prevent that catastrophe.

While these amenities are being exchanged between St. Petersburg and Mukden on the subject of the recent great battle, there is reason to believe that there is still some want of harmony at the front, and that the leadership of the Russian generals is being subjected on the spot to a good deal of acrimonious criticism. “Everywhere,” telegraphs a French correspondent, “I hear complaints and recriminations against officers of high rank.” He adds his own conviction that “with certain rare exceptions, such as the late Count Keller and General Bilderling, the Manchurian Army has suffered greatly from the lack of competent officers. As far as personal courage went they seem to have behaved admirably; but individual heroism, when not backed up by qualities of leadership, initiative, and resource, is of little use to a commander called upon to handle troops against such enemies as the Japanese.

Incompetence on the part of junior Russian officers was the more deplorable because, as has been hinted before in this narrative, the Russian soldier is not trained to act on his own responsibility.

fed. Contrast this with what the famous Russian war correspondent, M. Nemirovitch Dantchenko, tells us about the brave but, in this respect, rather sheep-like Russian soldier. "There have been



Photo: "Collier's Weekly."

GENERAL KUROPATKIN AWARDING THE CROSS OF ST. GEORGE ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

We saw in the course of the battle of Liao-yang how, during one stage of the fighting, Japanese "first-class privates" had to take command of companies, all the company officers having been killed; and it is evident from the result that the sudden promotion was abundantly justi-

cases," he says with mistaken pride, "when all the officers being killed, the troops appealed to the officers of the Red Cross detachments to take the command, because they would be left alone without permission to attack the enemy." From the standpoint of practical warfare there

is nothing whatever to admire in this Casabianca-like attitude, which undoubtedly goes far to explain the Russian failure in such a hurly-burly of fighting as the battle of Liao-yang became at several stages in its progress.

But it is not easy to find further fault with the gallant, good-hearted, simple-minded Russian fighting-man. A little while back we quoted a letter from a Japanese conscript who had just been ordered to join his regiment. Here are a few extracts from a Russian soldier's letter which was published by a Moscow paper, and was translated and reproduced in the Moscow correspondence of the *Standard*. The letter begins:—

“ You wanted me to write you, brother, all about the service. Well, here you are—.” And the writer goes on to detail his experiences, commencing with the attack on Port Arthur on February 8th, which, using the Old style of the Russian calendar, he makes January 27th. From Port Arthur his regiment, the 10th, was transferred to the Yalu, and hence we may follow his letter *verbatim*, again reminding readers that the difference of thirteen days between the Old and New styles must be allowed for:—

“ On March 29th, the second day of Easter, thirty of our scouts, with three officers, went across the River Yalu to make a reconnaissance, and had a turn-up with the Japanese—five killed and twenty-three wounded we had. This was our first baptism of fire, and from that day forward we had skirmishes every day. On April 16th, 17th, and 18th was the big battle at Turen-chen, lasting from five in the morning till one o'clock in the day. We got the orders to retire to the rear, and very sorry we were to have to abandon our killed and wounded, but we couldn't possibly take them up.

Our losses were 800 men. So we retired back 150 versts (100 miles), carrying wounded men on our backs. Here we stopped till May 17th, and they changed our commanding officer. In place of Sassulitch came Lieut.-General Count Keller, and with him we advanced again. He had not gone above seventy versts when we came upon the Japanese, and there was a fight. We retired on our positions, where we remained till June 12th. On that day the Japanese began to attack our position, about a division strong, and in the position there was only our one regiment. In the night we retired to the rear, fifty versts. In the night of June 20th we went for the Japanese, cut off two of his pickets, and rushed at them with the bayonet. This was a night fight. But, as always, the Japanese sent against us a countless host, and we retired to our detachment with a loss of 250 men killed and wounded.


“ On July 3rd there was a night affair. We marched out at two o'clock in the night, but the Japanese spied us and retired. On July 4th at dawn the whole of our regiment was sent into the firing line, and there was a fight lasting from five in the morning till three in the afternoon. It was a hot business, and we lost about a thousand men. We did not want to retire, but they gave us orders to go. On July 18th there was a still more terrible fight, when the Japanese killed our hero, Count Keller, with a shell. All our fellows are very sorry to lose our glorious brave leader. God gave him a good death from shell; he was hit in the head, and did not live more than twenty minutes after. After this fight we retired on Liao-yang, and are now posted fifteen versts (ten miles) from it. Here we got a new chief, Lieut.-General Ivanov. They say there will soon be a

general engagement. Is it possible we shall retire again? Of our regiment there is not much left after all our losses, some killed, some badly wounded and died. Myself, I have not been wounded once, although I have been under the fire of the Japanese in all our fights. I have a cap that I put on, and so long as I wear that no bullet can get me. I got it from a Chinaman at Port Arthur, a good fellow he was, too. I wonder where he is now. The Sergeant-Major tells me I shall soon be sent up for the St. George's Cross. God grant it, and then I shall return to you, brother, a regular cavalier. . . ."

Scarcely less captivating than the Japanese soldier's fiery patriotism is the sturdy fighting spirit displayed in the above characteristic document with its stolid references to a long series of hard fights, and the queer, little superstitious touch about the charmed cap. It will be noted that from first to last there is only one complaint, that of being called upon to retire when "we" would have preferred to stay and fight it out to the bitter end. Incidentally it may be recalled that this gallant fellow's regiment was certainly concerned in the Battle of Liao-yang. As a matter of fact, it was the 10th Siberian Rifle Regiment which occupied the old town of Liao-yang, and, before retiring, took the opportunity of looting the place. Let us hope that our simple friend was not concerned in that objectionable performance, but took his manful share of the fighting, duly protected by his wonderful cap!

Having dealt with the impression created by the Battle of Liao-yang upon the Japanese and the Russian public, and having further taken a glance at the armies in the field, let us now turn to the effect of this great operation upon

British and Continental opinion. It is a very interesting circumstance that this battle marks a very decided change in the policy of Japan as regards foreign criticism of her naval and military operations. Allusion has been made on several occasions to the strictness of the Japanese censorship, and every allowance has been made in this narrative for the necessity imposed upon a country, which is literally fighting for its life, of shrouding its movements in the greatest possible secrecy. But Japan has gone, perhaps, a little farther than is necessary in this direction, and has fettered honourable and experienced representatives of the foreign Press with restrictions which have not unnaturally been resented. The fact that the representative of the leading English journal should have had to sever his connection with the Japanese Army in order to furnish his paper with an independent account of the movements of Generals Oku and Nozu was painfully suggestive of a needless attempt at gagging. It was becoming apparent, too, that the position of foreign correspondents would not be improved unless the Japanese authorities were made to feel that Press censorship can be carried to extremes which are not only objectionable, but risky. There is no need here to expatiate upon the means adopted, but after the Battle of Liao-yang the Japanese Government suddenly became aware that, in treating the representatives of the foreign Press as if they were a pack of prying children, it had converted powerful friends into embittered critics. As a Tokio journal remarked, it began to seem likely that the success of the next Japanese loan would be endangered by the anxiety of the Japanese generals to keep all the correspondents about them closely and perpetually blindfolded.



OYAMA'S OBJECTIVE: THE APPROACH TO MUKDEN, AND THE PASS OF TIE-LING.

At Tie-ling the plain closes in to a valley through which run the river, railway, and main road. This is the wide gate between Northern and Southern Manchuria.

There is no occasion for us to argue the *pros* and *cons* of this question. It is sufficient to say that the Japanese Government realised that its policy in the

matter of the censorship had serious drawbacks, and that public opinion in foreign countries was a factor to be reckoned with. Accordingly, Field-Mar-



THE COST OF VICTORY: THE HIDEOUS CARNAGE ON THE SOU-SHAN HILL, ONE OF THE MOST HOTLY CONTESTED POSITIONS AT LIAO-YANG.

"On the south front rose a conical hill, the whole face of which was a steep green slope. It was strewn thickly with Japanese dead. In one cluster lay over three hundred bodies. The wide area of the trench upon the summit was filled with badly mauled dead soldiers. There lay upon a space no larger than Primrose Hill, the corpses of a thousand men."—Extract from a telegram in the Daily Telegraph from Mr. Bennet Burleigh, the war correspondent.

shal Yamagata, as Chief of the General Staff at Tokio, telegraphed to Field-Marshal Oyama as follows :—

“ The Imperial declaration of war, as proclaimed to the people, is universally recognised as being based upon broad principles of justice. It makes no distinction of race, religion, or national manners and customs. The sole objects of the war are to ensure the safety of this Empire, to guarantee the peace of the Orient, to spread the blessings of civilisation and humanity, and to promote the general interests of all nations. It is, therefore, earnestly hoped that these principles will also find expression in the treatment of the foreign officers and correspondents attached to our army, and that, so long as the rule of military secrecy is not infringed, frank and candid consideration will be extended to them, so that the spirit of sincerity which animates this Empire may be fully demonstrated to the whole world.”

It is clear that this exhortation had its due effect, for after Liao-yang the Press correspondence becomes much fuller and very much more instructive, and one representative sends a special message expatiating upon the happy change that has taken place in the conditions under which he is working.

While the correspondents with the Japanese Army have had much cause for complaint, those with the Russian headquarters have hardly been on velvet. But the grievance here has been not so much on the score of the censorship as on that of doubtful treatment as regards creature comforts. M. Naudeau, the correspondent of the *Paris Journal*, from whose despatches, duly passed by the censor, several passages relating to the retreat from Liao-yang were quoted in Chapter LVII., speaks very bitterly of

the difficulties thrown in the way of himself and all his *confrères*, M. Dantchenko alone excepted. It is said that, but for an occasional French missionary, these correspondents might more than once have risked dying of hunger! Almost all had had dysentery, of which one had died. It must, however, be remembered that the Russian Army had, at the time this statement was made, been almost constantly in retreat, and in such circumstances the claims of Press correspondents to consideration are apt to be disregarded.

It now remains to ascertain, as far as is possible in a brief and rapid survey, to what extent British and Continental opinion on the war has been modified by the Liao-yang operations. It is not altogether easy to do this, because the standpoints from which the non-belligerent nations of Europe approached the subject were so curiously different, each being more or less complicated by considerations of alliance or by a reluctance to give offence to a Power which, notwithstanding its Far Eastern reverses, still loomed very large on the horizon of European politics. England may be said to have been frankly prejudiced in favour of her ally, Japan, just as France was naturally inclined to stand by her ally, Russia. Germany may have been anxious not to offend her “ Eastern neighbour ” by overmuch plainness of speech, and Austria-Hungary, associated with Russia in the question of forcing the reforms in Macedonia upon the Sultan, would doubtless have preferred not to have expressed an opinion, one way or another. Indeed, for some time past the official Press in Vienna had maintained great reserve on the subject of the war, and editorial references to the Japanese successes had been entirely suspended.

But the Battle of Liao-yang was an event of such commanding significance, was of such absorbing interest in a historical as well as political and military sense, that it could not be passed over in silence. Accordingly, for about a week the Press of Europe simply hummed with comment on the recent fighting and the new situation which it had produced.

It is one of the surprises of contemporary history, that nowhere was the Japanese victory at Liao-yang received with more cool discrimination than in this country. Here and there dithyrambics were indulged in; but the general tendency among competent critics was to lay somewhat serious stress upon the indecisive character of the success attained, and to point out that, unless it were rapidly followed up, such improvement as had taken place in the Japanese position would soon be obscured by fresh risks. It was realised that the skill with which Kuropatkin had extricated himself from what might have been a very deadly situation, and had even at one time gravely menaced his adversary, placed the future chances of Russia in a new light. A general capable of such enlightened strategy was a force to be reckoned with, now that the main armies of the two combatant nations were in conflict. Every credit was given to the Japanese conception of an envelopment; but the failure of the plan, and the heavy losses inflicted upon the armies of Oku and Nozu by a comparatively small Russian rear-guard, considerably impressed the more thoughtful among British military critics. That the result was a Japanese victory was extremely gratifying to Japan's ally, but British military opinion is nothing if not candid, and in more than one quarter it was felt that the success had been far too dearly

bought, and that more must be done, and done quickly, if Japan were to reap any sort of advantage from her recent movements.

The Japanese were much hurt at this "change of sentiment," as they imagined it to be, and attributed it largely to the dissatisfaction of the war correspondents, because they had not been given larger facilities. They pointed out that they had secured Liao-yang, "the richest town in Manchuria, the chief emporium of local supplies and foodstuffs, and the principal strategical base." They urged that the Russians had been "signally defeated," and had been compelled to burn or abandon ammunition and provisions in such quantities that to make good the loss would demand several months' work on the Siberian Railway. Finally, they hoped that the embittered criticism of war correspondents with a grievance would not be allowed to warp the judgment and undermine the confidence of the British nation at large.

It is almost needless to say that the class of expert British military opinion, to which reference has been made, could not have been seriously influenced by the treatment, however tactless, accorded by the Japanese to the foreign correspondents. Nor would any military critic worthy of the name fail to recognise and give full weight to the substantial advantages secured by Japan in the occupation of Liao-yang. But the fact remained that Japan had spent some months in weaving a net wherewith to catch the entire Russian Army, and, when the time had come for casting it, the meshes had been found too large, and the fish had mostly slipped through. Nor could any amount of argument explain away the fact that Kuropatkin was still in evidence only a few miles off with nearly 200,000

men, and with the Siberian Railway bringing him fresh men and supplies almost every hour.

As we shall shortly see, the British estimate of the gravity of the situation after the Battle of Liao-yang came to be modified by a fresh instance of Russian military unwisdom which could hardly

been somewhat similarly placed in dealing with remote menaces to our supremacy. While deference to Japanese susceptibilities forbids the enlargement of this argument, the allusion may be useful to defend British critics from the charge of being quite unworthily prejudiced by small personal considerations.



THE STAFF OF A RUSSIAN TRAVELLING HOSPITAL.

have been foreseen. But, at the time, the expert view taken by men who would not allow their Japanese sympathies to blind them to clear military facts was undoubtedly the only view that comprehended the European as well as the Far Eastern prospect. We, perhaps more clearly than any other European nation, understood what the preservation of the bulk of Kuropatkin's Army from destruction meant to Russia, for we have

While in Great Britain the feeling was one of some apprehension lest a new prospect not wholly favourable to Japan had been unfolded, Continental journals were almost unanimous in deploring the great blow which had fallen upon Russia. In France the prevailing sentiment was one of profound regret for Russia, coupled with a strong hope that now some peaceful settlement would be possible. A French correspondent, whom

we have quoted before, was allowed to speak very candidly in the *Journal* as to Russia's prospects of gaining the upper hand. "No doubt if Russia sets her teeth to this task she will yet be victorious, but this will imply astounding efforts, the results of which will be out of all proportion with the sacrifices. An impartial witness is necessarily saddened by the struggle. I, for my part, am persuaded that it would be in the interest of both parties to renounce their national pride, and by mutual concessions put an end to this war, which is a real and terrible disaster that will be the ruin of both. I make no mention of the unfortunate population of a whole vast province which, belonging to neither party, is the blood-stained victim of their terrible struggle. There are cases in which national pride should not be blindly heeded."

The military criticism offered by France upon the operations at Liao-yang was naturally cautious. In the *Temps* General Orloff was made the scapegoat of the defeat, which was not regarded as a tactical disaster, but only as the "sorry conclusion of courageous, sterile, and persevering efforts." Lieut.-General Picquart, in *L'Aurore*, emphasised what has already been independently put forward in this chapter as to the utter want of initiative displayed by the Russian soldier. "In Russia it is impossible to employ an infantryman on patrol duty or as a scout. The ordinary soldier there is comparatively useless if he does not manœuvre in obedience to order and in compact formations." As for Russian tactics, they are those of "ignorant and fanatical persons!" The Japanese successes are "the victory of the Japanese schoolmaster over the Russian pope."

The German Government journals did

their best to minimise the significance of the Russian defeat; but in other organs much admiration was expressed for Japanese tactics. A sentence from the *Kreuz Zeitung* of September 2nd, written while the battle was still in progress, may be quoted as an instructive though not quite accurate prediction: "The 1st of September, 1904, presents an extraordinary likeness to the 1st of September, 1870, with this difference that, radiating in all directions from Sedan there was a large number of roads by which it was possible to break through, whereas from Liao-yang there is only the road leading to Mukden. The Russians will assuredly not fail to break out in that direction, but one cannot help doubting whether they will succeed." In the *Lokalanzeiger* of Berlin, Count von Pfeil wrote a little later that Kuropatkin evidently relied on the assistance of General Linievitch, who, it was suggested, was held back by Admiral Alexeieff.

In Austria-Hungary, where, apart from official circles, pro-Japanese sentiments were pretty freely expressed, the Liao-yang battle was very seriously discussed. "The fuller tidings of the Japanese triumph," wrote the Vienna correspondent of the *Times*, "evoked enthusiasm. The tenacity and dogged bravery of the Russian troops are everywhere recognised, and nowhere is it suggested that any European soldiers would have made a better stand against such a foe; but admiration for the brilliant leading of the Japanese attack, and for the unprecedented combination of scientific training with passionate gallantry among the Japanese rank and file, overcome every other sentiment."

In Italy the fullest credit was given to the Japanese generals for their tactics, but much the same view was expressed

as in England as to the doubtful prospect. Liao-yang was compared with Leipsic, and it was suggested that Kuropatkin might consummate his effort to escape by winning another Hanau.

These excerpts will suffice to show the trend of European opinion on the Liao-yang battle, individually considered. But many more would be needed to demonstrate what was, after all, the most serious result of the Japanese victory as far as Europe was concerned. This result has been defined by one Continental paper as "the collapse of belief in Russian omnipotence," and beyond this happy definition it would be premature to travel far at present. At the same time it will be readily understood that the Battle of Liao-yang marked the beginning of an inevitable change in the position, diplomatically and internationally speaking, of Russia in Europe. Russia's immense resources, and, more particularly, her military strength, had long been articles of faith among European nations, and she had presumed heavily on them by asserting her right to interfere very arbitrarily, more especially of course in all Near Eastern affairs. Although there had still remained a

shrewd notion that the feet of the Colossus were of clay, a good deal of diplomatic deference had been paid to Russia on the ground that it was better to make some concession than to call into operation the tremendous forces which the Tsar was supposed to have under ready control. The first six months of the Russo-Japanese War had gone far towards rectifying these mistaken notions. But, until the Battle of Liao-yang took place, Russia could always plead unpreparedness or an overwhelming numerical superiority on the enemy's part. Now she had been fairly and squarely beaten in an honest trial of strength, and the crumbling of her Far Eastern supremacy was not unnaturally followed by a marked diminution of her European prestige. It is too early as yet to estimate the precise effect of her humiliation upon the balance of power in Europe. But it may be freely said that a long interval must elapse before she is again allowed to dominate, for example, the Near Eastern Question, as she did while as yet her main army in Manchuria was unbeaten, and Oyama had not expelled nearly 200,000 of her best troops "bag and baggage" from Liao-yang.



TYPE OF COSSACK GUARD STATION AND WATCH TOWER FOR THE
DEFENCE OF THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

(From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia.")



Photo: Nouvelle, Paris.

PRINCE KHILKOFF ON LAKE BAIKAL.

CHAPTER LX.

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY COMMAND IN MANCHURIA—NEW ARMY WANTED—A MOBILISATION ORDER—GENERAL GRIPENBERG'S APPOINTMENT—INTRIGUES AT ST. PETERSBURG—KUROPATKIN GENERALISSIMO—ALEXEIEFF LOSING FAVOUR—COMPOSITION OF SECOND ARMY.

IN the preceding chapter we have glanced at the Russian Army in the field, have touched lightly on the shortcomings of the officers, and have dealt more or less indulgently with that brave, simple-minded fellow the Russian private soldier. We have now to follow the military operations of Russia in a new direction, one of immense interest and importance, namely, the attempted construction of a new Manchurian Army, and a readjustment of the entire system of Russian military control in the Far East.

On looking back it will be seen that

in a military sense Russia not only was utterly unprepared for war with Japan, but had arranged her forces in the Far East on about as bad a system as could possibly have been conceived with a view to urgent probabilities. When the crisis arrived there was no one on the spot who could be safely entrusted with the supreme military command; and, when in due course a Commander-in-Chief, Kuropatkin, was imported from Russia, he was the last man between whom and the Viceroy Alexeieff any harmonious co-operation was possible. We have seen the terrible effects of this mistaken

policy, and have gleaned some idea of the shameless intrigues which have prevented Kuropatkin from doing himself justice. At the close of the Battle of Liao-yang it has become clear that to persevere along this insane line will simply mean a series of fresh and probably more serious disasters. Something must be done, and done quickly, and Russia does it. Whether what is done is the right thing is another matter ; but at any rate the new conception is impressive, and from a Russian standpoint full of attractive possibilities.

In a story of this sort there is no necessity to pay very close attention to details of military organisation, and care has been taken not to overload these pages with precise allusions to Army Corps and other units. In the course of this chapter it may be necessary at times to particularise a little more closely, but for the present it is sufficient to say that, shortly after the Battle of Liao-yang Kuropatkin must have still had at his immediate disposal the equivalent of between six and seven army corps ; in other words, perhaps rather more than 200,000 men. What is a more important consideration is that the bulk of this great army is, so to speak, bunched together, and in any case is expected to respond more or less swiftly to the direct instructions of the Commander-in-Chief. This is doubtful policy, since there have been few leaders in the world's history who have been capable of controlling effectively an army of more than 100,000 or, at most, 150,000 men. Even when partly distributed, huge bodies like this occupy a great deal of ground, and it needs very extraordinary military talent to

manœuvre with equal freedom and effectiveness forces which may be twenty or thirty miles or more apart.

In the case of Japan, it is clear that not far short of quarter of a million men are in a sense under the control of Field-Marshal Oyama; but the conditions are altogether different. The forces of Japan



GENERAL BILDERLING.

are intelligently distributed into armies, only one of which, General Kuroki's, approaches the maximum which one commander of real ability can comfortably handle. Each of the three armies engaged round Liao-yang, moreover, was led by men to whom a very considerable amount of discretion could be allowed, and who could, at the same time, be

trusted to carry out the general ideas of their supreme chief. What Oyama commanded, then, was not so much an army of 250,000 men as three first-class generals to whom he could safely leave the details necessary for the execution of the strategy decided upon by himself in co-operation with the General Staff at Tokio.

Contrast this with the difficulties with which Kuropatkin has had to contend. Never could a man be more truly said to command an army, for under him there is hardly a single man of first-class merit as a controller of great forces of all arms. In point of experience and, perhaps, sagacity, General Linievitch, who commands the Amur military district, of which the chief military centre is Vladivostok, is the most prominent. But Linievitch is getting old, and it is extremely doubtful whether he could stand such a strain as even the post of second-in-command to Kuropatkin would involve. The only other first-class general in the Russian Army in Manchuria seems to be General Bilderling, who, however, has yet to be tried on a large scale. Generals Stackelberg and Zarubaieff have not greatly distinguished themselves so far, except in rear-guard fighting, which is a thing apart. General Ivanoff has been a doubtful successor to General Count Keller, and General Sassulitch has hardly as yet made amends for his poor handling of the Russian troops at Kiu-lien-cheng. General Meyendorf, who recently came out from Russia in command of the First Army Corps, may be a "dark horse," but will have to display a number of unsuspected qualities before he can be regarded as on quite the same footing as Kuroki and his two colleagues Oku and Nozu.

Of course, there are some very good

men among the Russian major-generals, but the successful major-general does not always do well when promoted to higher responsibilities. Thus Kashtalinski created a favourable impression at Kiu-lien-cheng, but did not shine very brightly in the attack on the Motien-ling on July 17th. Again, General Gerngross has yet to enlarge upon the good work he did at Telissu and elsewhere before he can be accounted as fit to rank with commanders of the first class. The same remark applies, with variations, to dashing leaders like Samsonoff, Mishtchenko, and Rennenkamf, not to speak of the senior, but probably, as regards troop-handling, less experienced Chief of the Staff, Sakharoff.

It will be seen from this brief survey that General Kuropatkin may be not inappropriately described as over-manned and under-officered. He has at his disposal more men than any but a Napoleon could properly handle, and he cannot essay the *rôle* of a Moltke because the deficiencies of his generals make it necessary for him to appear constantly in what is to all intents and purposes an executive part. The Tsar and his advisers at St. Petersburg, then, are face to face with the initial problem of making some change in the higher system of military control in the Far East which will enable better results to be obtained both from Kuropatkin and from the very considerable army already in the field.

On the heels of this problem presses another. Large as Kuropatkin's army is, it is evidently inferior both in numerical strength and efficiency to that under the control of Field-Marshal Oyama. In order successfully to resist, not to speak of making headway against, the future efforts of Japan, reinforcements of the biggest sort and size will be necessary,

the campaign being practically reopened on a fresh basis in the spring. This is not such an empty dream as it might have seemed a few months ago, although, of course, there are grave difficulties in the way of reinforcing an army already in a somewhat precarious position both as regards hostile pressure and supplies. Not only is the Siberian Railway still

Of course, as regards mere soldiers Russia's resources are ample. She has normally twenty-five army corps in Europe and the Caucasus, besides two in Turkestan, and the two which normally belong to the Amur district. Six or seven corps have been sent, or are on their way, to the Far East, and although for purposes of war in Europe the Rus-



GENERAL KASHTALINSKI.

working, but its usefulness has been enormously increased by the construction, under the energetic personal supervision of Prince Khilkoff, the Russian Minister for Public Works, of the Circum-Baikal Section. This, it will be remembered, was put vigorously in hand at the commencement of the war in order to save the trying journey across Lake Baikal; and the recent opening of the section is a striking monument to Russian perseverance and disregard of engineering obstacles.

sian scheme of mobilisation is a somewhat tardy and cumbrous one, the collection of an imposing array of forces for transference by comparatively easy stages to the Far East is not half such a difficult task as that of arranging for their transport and maintenance.

Let us now examine the steps which Russia, after the Battle of Liao-yang, takes to improve her military position in the Far East; to put into practice the lessons she has acquired by her own

failures and the Japanese successes; and to profit by the substantial advantages conferred by a huge trained army and a stringent system of compulsory military service.


On August 20th it was announced from St. Petersburg that an Imperial ukase had been issued ordering the calling out of the reservists in forty-seven districts of the governments of Poltava, Kursk, Tver, Samara, Saratoff, Astrakhan, Ufa, Simbirsk, Perm, St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Pskoff, Livonia, Esthonia, Archangel, and Olonetz. Certain categories of reservists were specially called out in addition, and all reserve officers throughout the Empire were called to the colours.

This ukase, described by the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *New York Herald* (Paris edition) as "Russia's reply to the Japanese assertions that the war is nearly over," created a profound impression throughout the Tsar's dominions. Affecting as it did all classes of the population, the gravity of this military measure was eagerly discussed by crowds even in the streets of St. Petersburg, and general alarm and apprehension were excited as to the effect of the apparently interminable war upon the political and financial future of Russia.

When the British Army Reserves were called out in the South African War, an example of patriotic enthusiasm was afforded which is not likely to be forgotten by those who witnessed it. Even in the case of married reservists who had to throw up good positions in civil life in order to rejoin the colours, the utmost willingness was exhibited; and employers and the public readily came forward in order to guarantee comfortable subsistence allowances to wives and families thus deprived of their chief means of

support. But it must be remembered that with us in those days the Army Reserve only numbered about 80,000 men, a large proportion of whom would have gladly gone back, war or no war, to the service which they had voluntarily adopted as their profession. There is an obvious distinction to be drawn between a case like this and that of a country where military service is compulsory, and where the available reserve is estimated to contain over a million men. Of course, the Imperial ukase referred to above does not mean that all that number of men were withdrawn suddenly from civil occupations. As a matter of fact many thousands of reservists have been called up already, and many more will remain after the present ukase has been complied with. But the districts now affected are mostly those in which reservists are in fairly good positions, earning decent wages, and supporting often considerable families. The outlook in the latter case is especially depressing. The wives and children of the men now summoned to the colours, and the mothers and fathers of unmarried reservists dependent upon the latter for support, are, it is true, entitled to a Government allowance, but it is indeed a meagre one. A wife is allowed three roubles (a rouble is worth about 2s. 2d.) a month, with one rouble for each child. A monthly allowance of three roubles is also made to mothers who lose the support of unmarried sons. It goes without saying, moreover, that where the call to arms affects such enormous numbers, private benevolence can do little to assist the victims of official parsimony.

The natural result is that the mobilisation order meets with a very doubtful response. In some instances there are numerous reservists who simply decline



GENERAL KUROPATKIN AND STAFF EXAMINING A POSITION.

to turn up at the district headquarters on the appointed day. In other cases there are grave disturbances, and nowhere is there any display of real enthusiasm. Some of the statistics of the "missing" are instructive. A little later than the ukase just quoted comes the order for mobilisation in the four governments of Kherson, Bessarabia, Ekaterinoslaf, and the Taurida. In the last named the proportion of absentees is said to be not very great, but in Ekaterinoslaf about 3,000 reservists are reported missing, about the same number in Bessarabia, and nearly 8,000 in Kherson. In the government of Kherson there are a great many Jews who have emigrated during the last four or five months, evidently with a view to escape the mobilisation, and this fact seems to have greatly swollen the absentee return. But in any case the lists are painfully indicative of anything but patriotic fervour.

Some striking information on the subject of these absentees, who are in effect deserters, is given by one of the Russian correspondents of the *Times*. It is said that they will do anything to avoid being sent to Manchuria, and that men inscribed in one military district are to be found hundreds of miles away from it, living from hand to mouth, without passports, in the hope that their existence may be forgotten. "The police are overwhelmed with work in trying to track out these deserters, and the partial relaxations of the measures against political offenders is due to this cause. Desertion is becoming so general, that it is hardly possible to cope with it." There is also the strongest disinclination to Far Eastern service on the part of officers of the reserve, for the most part men who have put in a year's service as privates and, having then passed an

examination after a few weeks' special training, have returned to business or private life. However, it seems that reserve officers are not alone in their reluctance to serve their country against the Japanese. "One officer in a Guards regiment in St. Petersburg, on being asked by a British officer, who happened to be in Russia, if he were not going to the front, and whether he could not obtain some Staff billet by means of influence at Court, replied: 'Of course I could, but I much prefer remaining with my regiment in St. Petersburg!'" This is hardly the same spirit as that which prompts our Guards' officers to volunteer for all sorts of arduous service in remote and unhealthy wilds, and which sent representatives of every noble family in the country to fight as Imperial Yeomen against the Boers.

But, of course, taking all these drawbacks into account, Russia's capacity to put in the field, or at any rate to mobilise, an army quite as large as that already under Kuropatkin's command is, practically speaking, undoubted. We may now, therefore, turn to the question as to what Russia intends to do in order to put the matter of the supreme command of her troops in Manchuria on a better footing.

As early as the middle of July there were rumours that the General Staff at St. Petersburg was preparing, in concert with the Tsar and the principal Imperial officials, a modification of the existing military hierarchy in the Far East. Not only was it becoming evident that General Kuropatkin could only with difficulty control the remote extremities of his constantly increasing forces, the General Staff had also been profoundly impressed with the mobility of the Japanese, which was clearly due in great

measure to their division into three armies under independent commanders. Accordingly, the idea was mooted of a Second Russian Army entirely separate from the First, which would still be commanded by General Kuropatkin. The

neither of these two was selected, but General Sukhotin may well be kept in view by the reader as an officer with a brilliant reputation, who is likely sooner or later to come to the front in connection with the war.



GENERAL SUKHOTIN.

two "favourites" for the command of the Second Army were General Sukhotin, ex-President of the General Staff Academy, and now in command in Eastern Siberia; and General Sukhomlinoff, now in command of the Kieff Military District. As it turned out,

On September 25th considerable sensation was created at St. Petersburg by the announcement that General Gripenberg, commanding the Military District of Wilna, had been appointed to the command of the Second Manchurian Army. Simultaneously it became known that in

acquainting General Gripenberg with his elevation to this extremely responsible post, the Tsar had written him the following autograph letter :—

“ The intense energy with which Japan is conducting the war, and the stubbornness and high warlike qualities displayed by the Japanese, impel me to make considerable additions to the strength of my forces at the front in order to attain a decisive success within the shortest possible time. Since in the accomplishment of this the number of military units will reach such a figure that their continuance in one army is not admissible without prejudice to the proper direction, manœuvring, and mobility of the troops, I have found it necessary to divide the troops destined for active service in Manchuria into two armies.

“ While leaving the command of one of these armies in the hands of General Kuropatkin, I appoint you to command the second. Your many years of service, your warlike exploits, and your wide experience in the warlike training of troops give me full assurance that you, following the general directions of the Commander-in-Chief, will successfully lead to the attainment of the object of this war the army which is entrusted to you, and which will show its own valour and power of endurance in the fight against the foe for the honour and dignity of the fatherland. God bless you for your great and glorious services to me and to Russia. I remain ever your affectionate NICHOLAS.”

Oscar Casimirovitch Gripenberg, who has received this signal mark of Imperial confidence, was born in 1838, and is now, therefore, sixty-six years old, and with exactly half a century of military service to his credit. He won his spurs in the Crimea, served later in the Polish Insur-

rection, and distinguished himself greatly in the campaign in Turkestan. During the Russo-Turkish War, as colonel in command of one of the regiments of the Guards, he won an action at Arab Konak, and received the third class of the Order of St. George, besides being appointed one of the Tsar's aides-de-camp. After holding several posts connected with the Guards, General Gripenberg became, in 1900, Commander of the 6th Army Corps, at Warsaw, and later was given charge of the military district of Wilna. Only a few weeks back, on the occasion of the baptism of the Tsarevitch, the Tsar gave him the title of Aide-de-Camp General. It is said that General Gripenberg's training under Gourko, in Turkestan, helped to make him “ not merely an officer capable of rapid decision and a strict disciplinarian, but a strategist of the first rank, who has the absolute confidence of his troops.” On the other hand, he is believed to be a little unpopular among his officers, he is getting on in years, and he has had one attack of apoplexy. It must also be remembered that, notwithstanding his “ warlike exploits,” of which the Tsar speaks so approvingly, the new Commander of the future Second Army of Manchuria has held in none of his campaigns any command of sufficient importance to enable us to judge whether he can lead a large army successfully against such an enemy as the Japanese.

On yet another ground the appointment of General Gripenberg is surprising, for he is described by one authority as “ a Protestant and a German from Livonia,” and by another as of Finnish extraction. In this connection the Paris correspondent of the *Times* makes the interesting observation that of late the confidence of the Tsar has been freely bestowed on officers of foreign origin.



GENERAL GRIPENBERG, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE SECOND MANCHURIAN ARMY.



Apart from General Gripenberg, one of whose Finn ancestors is said to have distinguished himself under Charles XII., and another under Gustavus III., the families of Admiral Avellan, Minister of Marine, and Admiral Wirenius are also Finnish, while the Jessens and Rennenkamfs are of German extraction. General Kuropatkin himself is believed to be one of the few pure-blooded Muscovite superior officers who have distinguished themselves in the Far East.

General Gripenberg is said by some to owe his appointment largely to the influence of Prince Mirski, the new Minister of the Interior in place of the assassinated M. de Plehve. Others declare that the Tsar acted on the advice of the Grand Duke Vladimir, the latter having exerted himself to place at the head of the Second Manchurian Army an officer whose character and military traditions are the opposite of those of General Kuropatkin. Almost universally the appointment is considered to be an undeserved snub to Kuropatkin, more especially as it is explained that the term "Commander-in-Chief," in the Tsar's letter to General Gripenberg, is intended to refer, not to Kuropatkin, but to the Viceroy, Alexeieff.

The Tsar is evidently anxious not to hurt Kuropatkin's feelings unduly, for, according to a very well informed French correspondent, he telegraphs in affectionate terms to the only Russian Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria who is worthy of the name, explaining his reasons for the formation of a second army, and for the choice of General Gripenberg. Kuropatkin happily replies that he is grateful for the appointment of his friend and former companion in Turkestan. A little later he telegraphs to Gripenberg himself as follows:—

"As soon as the rumours of your ap-

pointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Second Manchurian Army reached me I sent you a letter and various documents which I thought were likely to be useful to you in connection with your appointment. Now that the news is official, I beg you to accept my sincere congratulations. I recall with the keenest pleasure the time we served the Fatherland in Turkestan. During that campaign you were my master in the art of war. I am sure we shall work here as friends. May God further all your undertakings."

Truly it must be said of Kuropatkin that, whatever may be his shortcomings as a strategist—shortcomings for which he personally is not always responsible—he presents a very attractive example of a chivalrous, patriotic, and high-minded "officer and gentleman."

Following on the appointment of General Gripenberg to the command of the Second Army there ensues an interval of lively intrigue at St. Petersburg, in which, as usual, nearly everyone with influence at Court seems to take part. The condition of affairs created by the Tsar's letter to Gripenberg undoubtedly favours military wire-pulling at home. Although it may suit Kuropatkin's opponents for the present to regard Admiral Alexeieff as not only Viceroy but Commander-in-Chief, it is clear that there will be grave objections to the continuance of any such arrangement. Even the Russian aristocracy is not wholly impervious to foreign opinion, and must have taken to heart such criticism as that frankly uttered by the German military paper the *Reichswehr*, which says—"It is the strangest thing possible, and surely without any known parallel, that a naval man should hold the chief command over two armies operating on land. If there might have been some sense in it so long

as co-operation between the Russian Army and Navy was still possible, it is incomprehensible now." Not less outspoken are several other Continental journals, one of which declares that the Viceroy will still "frustrate every measure not quite to his liking;" while another remarks that "on both Commanders will weigh the heavy hand of the intriguer Alexeieff!"

The first solution of the problem thus arising is highly characteristic of Russian methods. The suggestion is that the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievitch, the Tsar's cousin, who is now Grand Master of the Russian Cavalry, should be appointed Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria, while Admiral Alexeieff remains at Harbin as Viceroy. There is probably a strong body of Court influence in favour of this arrangement, which would hamper Kuropatkin almost as much as does the existing plan, and would not necessitate Alexeieff's recall. We may take it that, in particular, the support of General Sakharoff, the Minister of War, has been gained for this proposed measure, since that official has shown himself a very pliant tool in the hands of the Grand Dukes. This General Sakharoff, by the way, must not be confounded with the General Sakharoff at the front, who has been acting as Kuropatkin's Chief of the Staff. He is the man who succeeded Kuropatkin as Minister of War when the latter went out to Manchuria, and he has been one of his predecessor's worst friends ever since.

Another proposition which finds favour in some quarters is that the veteran General Dragomiroff, whose name is a "household word" in the Russian Army, and who is largely responsible for the Russian system of military training, should be appointed to the supreme com-

mand. Here, again, antagonism to the unfortunate Kuropatkin is indicated, for Dragomiroff is strongly opposed to the latter. The objection to this eminent soldier is that he is undoubtedly old and infirm, but his friends insist that this need not be a bar to his appointment, since "stationed at Harbin he would become the Russian Moltke."

Quite at the end of September a Grand Council of War is held at Peterhof to determine the grave question of the supreme military command in Manchuria. There are present at this momentous conference the Tsar, the Grand Dukes Vladimir and Nicholas, the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Tsar's Aides-de-Camp. Although the deliberations of such an august assembly are, of course, shrouded in secrecy, there is every reason to believe that the result was much as described by M. Hutin, the able and well-posted St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Echo de Paris*. This authority, with what are evidently exceptional sources of information at his command, says that the appointment of the Grand Duke Nicholas was carefully discussed in that dignitary's own presence. It says much for Russia and her future chances that, at this critical moment, and in such circumstances, a voice should have been raised in strong opposition to the Grand Duke's claims, and in loyal support of those of Kuropatkin.

Whose voice this was we have no means of knowing. But M. Hutin says distinctly that it was not that of the Minister of War, and it is hardly likely to have been that of the Grand Duke Vladimir. "One of the Imperial Councillors . . . declared that General Kuropatkin had incontestably committed blunders during this campaign, but that

he had sufficient qualities of energy, endurance, and efficiency to turn to account in the next campaign the experience he had already acquired. This councillor affirmed that the highest interests of the Fatherland required before the world the maintenance of General Kuropatkin at the head of both armies, and that final victory depended on his retaining the post of Commander-in-Chief."

It is said that the Tsar was much impressed by these arguments, and that, on the breaking-up of the Council of War, he telegraphed to General Kuropatkin, announcing that the latter was to consider himself in command of both armies. Shortly afterwards it was semi-officially understood that the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievitch had withdrawn his candidature for the supreme command in Manchuria, on the ground that he did not possess the necessary "qualities" for such an extremely responsible post. Thus to all appearance ends a singularly interesting and instructive chapter of Russian intrigue, which may be accepted as typical of much that has taken place with reference to the Far East both before and since the outbreak of the war with Japan. As remarked above, it is a very healthy sign of Russia's return to a condition of sanity, as regards her true interests in Manchuria, that the flood of underhand scheming against Kuropatkin should have thus been checked by vigorously delivered counsels of prudence. But the question remains whether the check may not have been administered too late to be of much practical use.

And now, what of the "heavy-handed intriguer" Alexeieff? It goes without saying that any mark of Imperial favour bestowed on Kuropatkin is a snub to the Viceroy, and the recognition of the former, not merely as the

"General Commanding in Manchuria," but as Commander-in-Chief or, as some say, Generalissimo, cannot but detract somewhat from the Viceregal position. Indeed, it would seem as if Alexeieff's glory were now distinctly on the wane. Not only in the Continental Press, but in St. Petersburg society, is he beginning to be spoken of in a tone of contempt. Especially is his conduct after the Battle of Liao-yang criticised. An officer of high rank has written home—and the letter is evidently exhibited freely—to say that, when the news of the retreat upon Mukden reached that place, Admiral Alexeieff, who was there, lost no time in preparing for the departure of his train. "He was in so great a hurry that he interrupted for some hours the departure of the southward bound trains, and, a stationmaster having neglected to signal the Viceroy's special, there was a terrible railway accident, forty wounded men in the ambulance train being killed." It will probably be hard even for a Russian Viceroy to "live down" an incident like that.

For some time after the Peterhof Council of War, rumour was busy anticipating Admiral Alexeieff's recall. It was said that he was about to be summoned home in order to discuss the situation more closely with the Tsar than was possible by correspondence or by wire; and that, once in St. Petersburg, he was to be kept there in some high appointment. But apparently his influence is still powerful, for nearly a month later he is again at Mukden "conferring" with Kuropatkin, notwithstanding the conviction which prevails that he is no longer regarded as having any military responsibility.

We may now revert to the question of the future composition and command of

the two Russian armies. It is not yet settled, at the beginning of October, who is to command the First Army when the Second comes into existence, and Kuropatkin formally assumes the Commander-in-Chiefship. The choice appears to lie between Generals Linievitch, Bilderling, and Kaulbars, but the matter is one which need not yet be seriously discussed. As regards the Second Army, it is officially announced that Lieut.-General Russki, who is understood to be a pupil of General Dragomirow, has been appointed Chief of the Staff to General Gripenberg, Major-General Schwank becoming Quartermaster-General, and Lieut.-General Kahanoff Inspector of Artillery.

The Second Army, it is said, will be composed of the 4th, 8th, and 16th Army Corps, the 6th Siberian Corps, and several brigades of sharpshooters. It should be noted that the 6th Siberian Corps is already under Kuropatkin's con-

trol at Mukden, and that, therefore, it is clearly intended to cut down the First Army to rather more handy dimensions. It may be added that, before proceeding to the Far East, the 16th Army Corps is to undergo a change of commanders, General Toponin succeeding General Razgonoff. It is thought that the Second Army may be ready to take the field in January, and already the formation of a Third Army is contemplated, "but it cannot be ready before the spring." Optimism as regards military organisation is a plant of very rapid growth—one which has been known to flourish among ourselves. The fact, however, that one of General Gripenberg's corps is already at the front, while another, the 8th or Odessa Corps, is on the point of starting for the Far East early in October, indicates that, at any rate, the Second Army is likely to materialise at no distant date.



GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS NICOLAIEVITCH.

CHAPTER LXI.

KOREA—THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE—EFFECT OF THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG—RUSSIAN RETIREMENT—JAPANESE PREPARATIONS—JAPAN'S CIVIL WORK IN KOREA—POPULAR AGITATION—REFORMS EFFECTED—HOSTILE NATIVES.

WE have to go back rather a long way in order to pick up that thread of our narrative which has reference to the progress of affairs in the "Hermit Kingdom" of Korea. Since, in Chapter XXX., reference was made to the reported bridging of the Tumen River by the Russians, about the middle of June, nothing has occurred to compel our serious attention in this direction. Nor would it now be necessary to deal very closely with Korea and the Koreans but for the fact that the Battle of Liao-yang has reacted very strongly upon the immediate prospects of this country and people. It may seem a little strange that such a battle should have such an effect. But a brief survey of the facts will soon render the position clear, and, incidentally, some interesting glimpses will be revealed of a curious spectacle—that of a nation, which is a principal bone of contention in a great war, being almost turned inside out and thoroughly reformed, while as yet the end of hostilities is not in sight.

It is useful to remember, and to keep on remembering, the pregnant words with which Mr. Diósy, in his Introduction to this History, dilated upon the extraordinary importance of Korea to Japan. After speaking of the natural wealth of this "distressful" country, and of the manner in which Japan set herself long before the war to develop these neglected

resources, Mr. Diósy remarked that "Japan has thus created for herself in the Korean Empire interests so considerable that they would alone entitle her to a predominant position in that peninsula even if its geographical situation did not make it so vitally important." In detailing, then, as we shall do presently, the progress of the Japonification of Korea, we shall be merely continuing an old story, to which, in this narrative, some contributions have been made in the way of allusions to the construction of the Seoul-Wiju Railway, and to attempted internal reforms.

But it is the warlike pattern interwoven in this fabric of peaceful progress that makes it trebly interesting. For, as we have seen, the fighting possibilities of Korea did not by any means cease with the Battle of the Yalu, and even now there is the prospect that the north-east corner of the "Hermit Kingdom" may prove, if not the objective, the starting point of serious operations. In this narrative the relation of Korea to Vladivostok has always been kept clearly in view. Primarily, of course, the proposition was that Russia would threaten Korea by a descent from Vladivostok along the coast of the Ham-yeng province. But there was the converse possibility that, in due course, the Russian advance in this direction being defeated, or checked, or diverted, the Japanese

would themselves take the same line, working up from Gen-san northwards towards Vladivostok.

In view of the result there is no need to go very closely into the details of the Russian attempted invasion of Korea from Vladivostok. In some quarters it has been suggested that the idea of such an invasion only existed in the imagination of Russian and French journalists. But there is ample evidence to show that the project was a serious one, and that at one time it was gravely hoped that by this means a most useful diversion would be created. A writer in the Russian *Viedomosti*, an important Moscow organ, has not only admitted that an expedition from Vladivostok into Korea formed an important part of Russia's plan of campaign, but has given some interesting details which prove clearly that the end in view was a very definite one, and by no means confined to mere interference with the Japanese occupation. The idea was that, eventually, the expedition should act much as did General Sherman's in the American Civil War, which marched round to the rear of the Confederates, who, pressed by Grant on the north and Sherman on the south, were driven to the sea and compelled to surrender.

The writer in the *Viedomosti* evidently thinks that the expedition was foredoomed to failure from the moment that the Russians lost the command of the Japanese Sea. So no doubt it was, as far as its later developments were concerned. But a properly organised raid on a large scale into Korea might have had important results, notwithstanding the risk of an attack by troops landed in rear. It would seem, too, that the Russian military authorities held this view, for they continued their preparations,

and did not abandon them until long after every vestige of a chance of wresting the command of the sea from Japan had disappeared. What eventually crushed the expedition from Vladivostok into Korea was not the misfortunes of the Port Arthur ships, not the failure of the Vladivostok Squadron, not even the tardiness of the Baltic Fleet in getting to sea, but the Battle of Liao-yang.

After the reported bridging of the Tumen River by the Russians we do not hear much of the movements of the latter until the second week in July, when some adventurous Japanese scouts found the Tumen closely guarded, and a permanent fort in course of construction near Kyeng-Keung on the river's bank. There had previously been a considerable Russian garrison at Hun-chan, some twenty-eight miles north-west of Kyeng-Keung, but this had now been reduced to one battalion, a larger concentration being reported on the shores of Possiet Bay. A little later Russian scouts were reported nearly 150 miles south of the Tumen.

On July 19th a telegram from the Tokio correspondent of the *Times* announced that the Russians in North-east Korea were reported "to be building roads, bridging the Tumen, and otherwise making preparations which suggest the advent of a large force."

Early in August it was stated that the Russians had established a small permanent garrison of 220 men at Kyeng-heung, in addition to strong patrols north, south, and east of that point. Communication with Vladivostok was said to be maintained by torpedo-boats and by telegraph. Twenty Russian engineers with several hundred coolies had reconstructed the road running to the south-west along the Tumen River for about 100 miles as far as the town of Mu-san.

They had also repaired the road to Song-ching (Sin-Chyong), and extended the telegraph to that point. These roads, formerly mere paths, were now nine feet wide. It was added that, as the Russian military control advanced, Russian and Chinese traders followed, resuming the

leaving three dead and taking away seven wounded. There were no Japanese casualties. The incident is interesting, as this is, for the present at any rate, the most southerly collision between the Russians and the Japanese in this quarter, and is rather typical of the whole



From a Japanese Drawing.

STREET IN SEOUL.

(From Arthur Diösy's "The New Far East.")

trade interrupted by the outbreak of the war.

On August 4th a detachment of 400 arrived at Ham-yeng, and four days later a scouting party of thirty troopers appeared about three miles north-west of Gen-san, and were immediately driven off by the Japanese. On August 9th, at dawn, 200 Cossacks with machine guns attacked Gen-san, but found the Japanese alert and in superior force. At half-past eight the Cossacks retired,

of the proceedings in North-east Korea during the past three months.

On August 4th there were 200 Russians at Ko-wen, only about a dozen miles north-west of Gen-san. The Russians had now, in addition, 500 men at Kyeng-seng (Kyöng-syong), 100 each at Kil-ju and Song-ching, and 2,200 at Ham-yeng, with some Hotchkiss guns.

At the close of August it was reported from Gen-san that numerous Chinese junks were busily transporting military

supplies from Vladivostok to Kyeng-seng, the transportation to the south being effected overland. "The Russian commissariat preparations on this coast," writes the Gen-san correspondent of the

It is at this point that the Battle of Liao-yang (August 28th—September 4th) intervenes with crushing effect as far as the Russian invasion of Korea is concerned. For, telegraphing at the begin-



MAP ILLUSTRATING RUSSIA'S PROJECTED INCURSION INTO KOREA.

New York Herald, "foreshadow a long campaign with a large body of troops. The Ham-yeng River still marks the furthest southerly point of the Russian advance in force. Road-repairing and reconnaissance parties only are moving nearer Gen-san."

ning of the second week in September, the above-quoted correspondent says that a column of two thousand Russians with six field-guns has left Ham-yeng, taking the Kap-san road to the north, and leaving a quantity of supplies unprotected at Ham-yeng.

The turn of the tide is not long in coming. By the close of September the Liao-yang victory is having some remarkable results in the "Hermit Kingdom" in the way of increased garrisons and preparations. Telegraphing on the 25th, a Seoul correspondent says that in the last ten days 2,500 troops have arrived at Chemulpo, and that others are expected. The Japanese authorities at Gen-san are collecting 4,000 pack ponies for the use of the army in its advance along the eastern coast towards Vladivostok.

It is not intended in this Chapter to carry the course of events in Korea to a later date than the end of September. It is only necessary, then, to state briefly that by the 25th the advance had already begun. Sixteen hundred Japanese troops, five machine guns, 500 pack ponies, and 400 coolies were reported to have arrived at Ham-yeng. The advanced guard of this force appears to have an unpleasant experience. Some Cossacks had re-occupied the town, and these now fired upon the Japanese, killing ten men and wounding seventeen more. The advance guard was completely surprised, and had to fall back and wait for the main body to come up. At Gen-san the garrison was being reinforced from Seoul and Ping-yang.

Before we turn to the record of civil progress in Korea during the past four months, a few words may usefully be added to what has already been said with reference to these interesting military developments in the north-eastern corner of the country. The more closely one studies the question, the stronger grows the conviction that, if the Battle of Liao-yang had been anything less of a victory than it was, Japan would have found this corner productive of more trouble than any section of the theatre of war, Port

Arthur, of course, excepted. It is true that her communications would not have been seriously menaced, for even the First or Right Army is now so placed that it could, if necessary, change its base. But if Kuropatkin had succeeded in his design of isolating Kuroki, and, even if not victorious, had punished the latter somewhat heavily, the Japanese would have found it extremely inconvenient to stem the Russian irruption into Korea, which would have immediately followed. As things are, the result of the Liao-yang battle has been exactly contrary. The Russian "trek" has been, to use the late Mr. Kruger's historic phrase, "damped," and, instead of the Russians invading Korea, and scattering the good effects of Japanese reforms in civil administration to the winds, the Japanese appear to be on the point of attempting the passage of the Tumen—in other words, of actually invading Russia!

But the alternative which is now disappearing is not without its lesson. And this lesson is that a very big Power in conflict with a comparatively small Power, in a very large theatre of operations, can, even while it is getting the worst of it, exert pressure at unconsidered points, which it may tax the smaller Power heavily to meet. Russia knows this well enough, and, up to a certain point, the pressure exercised upon Gen-san was skilful, and calculated to prove eventually effective. But something of Linievitch's age and caution is reflected in the actual handling of the Russian force, small as it was, in this quarter. A resolute attack on Gen-san by the whole of the Ham-yeng force would probably have resulted in its capture, and in a marked increase of the anti-Japanese feeling among the Koreans. Doubtless the place could not have been held, but

the diversion would have been a useful one, and much more impressive than the ridiculous Cossack failure recorded above.

We have now to consider the steps which Japan, since she assumed a virtual protectorate over Korea, has been taking both to discharge her new responsibilities and to consolidate what is not an altogether satisfactory position. The importance of such a survey is great even from the military standpoint. Although the main interest of the war has now been shifted to Manchuria, although for the present the idea of a Russian invasion of Korea has evaporated, Japan cannot by any means afford to take it for granted that the country will not again become the scene of serious hostilities. As we know, she has taken adequate precautions on the banks of the Yalu ; she has an important depôt at Ping-yang ; the future Seoul-Wiju Railway will be a valuable aid to any possible, if improbable, frontier operations ; and on the north-east side preparations are apparently being made for taking an offensive which is not likely to be checked, at any rate south of the Tumen. But in a peninsula like Korea frontiers are not everything. Moreover, there must be Japanese statesmen who realise that, although there is no present prospect that Japan will ever lose the command of her seas, there is always the bare chance that some day Russia, with assistance, might contrive to land a force in Korea such as could only with difficulty be dealt with by a country whose resources have been sapped, and whose army has been enfeebled, by the strain of perhaps some years of constant and exhausting warfare.

Of course, at the bottom of all these reflections lies the simple fact that Korea is a prize very well worth striving for. In competent hands it is a region capable

of producing not only far more than would be required in the way of supplies for a largely increased population, but also an important revenue. Herein, perhaps, lies the greatest danger of Japan, a danger which, we may be sure, she thoroughly understands. Even if she can keep Korea, practically speaking, for herself, she is hardly in a position—and at the end of the war may be still less in a position—to develop the resources of the country without foreign assistance. She is not like England, which can lend a Colony twenty or thirty millions without any appreciable effort. Later on, the conversion of Korea from a semi-barbaric Sleepy Hollow into an up-to-date centre of commercial and industrial activity will require large capital and enterprise, and for this Japan, with all her glowing energy and boundless ambition, will have to depend largely upon the foreigner. But the foreigner who puts capital and enterprise into what is to all intents and purposes a new nation wants one of two things, in addition to a handsome return upon his outlay. He wants either a good working administrative system which will protect him and his business interests, or the chance of taking a hand himself in the management of the country, with a view to realising his own ideals in the way of Government assistance for himself and Government discouragement for everyone else.

Now, of course, this is the very last thing which would suit Japan. Self-confidence is the salient feature of the Japanese character, and we may take it that sooner or later Korea is intended to be an exemplar of Japanese administrative capacity to the rest of the civilised world. There is nothing very presumptuous in this idea. Japan herself has achieved

wonders in a quarter of a century, and, what is more to the point, she has attained a really remarkable success in Formosa, which fell into her hands after the war with China. But it is essential to the proper working of her methods that she should enjoy absolute freedom from interference. In the early stages of the development of her navy and army she had to seek foreign advice and adopt foreign models. But at the earliest possible moment she discarded the advice wholly, and, to some extent, the models also; and, so far, has had no cause for regret. Whether she can safely ignore foreign counsels in the future government of such "kittle cattle" as the Koreans is another matter; but it is evident that she intends making the experiment, and is quite confident as to the result.

We see, then, Japan actuated by a double motive in her actions with regard to the—shall we say civilisation?—of Korea. In the first place, a settled country with a large admixture of Japanese immigrants will afford far greater facilities for any future military movements or dispositions than did the Korea of last February. Secondly, if foreign assistance has subsequently to be sought in the opening up of the great stores of mineral and other wealth which are here available, it will be procured at far less cost, and dispensed with far sooner, if the civil administration is working smoothly, if peace and order reign throughout the land, and if there are productive public works to offer as security for loans.

Unfortunately Japan, in regard to Korea, labours under two disadvantages. The first is her own attitude, or rather that of the average Japanese individual, towards Asiatics and, above all, towards Chinamen and Koreans. There is no

doubt that the Japanese in general are extraordinarily overbearing where these two races are concerned, and doubtless they are, to some extent, justified in regarding the bulk of the inhabitants of the Celestial and Hermit Kingdoms from a standpoint of contemptuous superiority. But it is a grave question whether in the long run it is the best policy to treat the Oriental, whether Mongol or Aryan, in this fashion. We do not find it so in India, where our experience has been not only uniquely wide, but also uniquely successful. Of course, occasionally, the pride, or rather the arrogance, of race improperly asserts itself; but, on the whole, the relations between the British and the natives in India are admirably balanced on a give-and-take basis. It is the same with Russia in Central Asia. The Russians would never have attained such results as they undoubtedly have attained in Turkestan if they had not cemented their military achievements by the display of a very skilful regard for the susceptibilities of the queerly constituted races now under their protection.

It may be that an Asiatic cannot safely apply to another Asiatic the same rules of forbearance and consideration that are expedient in the case of a European who wants a native of India, or of China, or of one of the Central Asian khanates, to render him willing, loyal, and efficient service. But it is at least questionable whether the Japanese have not yet to learn an important lesson in this respect, and whether their present failure to comprehend the need of such a lesson may not in the end prove a costly one.

A second disability against which the Japanese have to contend is the character of the Koreans themselves, a subject which was dealt with as far back as Chapter XI. of this history. Even in the



EUROPEAN NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS BEING PRESENTED TO THE KOREAN EMPEROR.

early days of the war it was clear that the Koreans were by no means entirely grateful to the Japanese for their benevolent intervention in Korean affairs. As the campaign has progressed, and Japan's intentions with regard to reforms in the civil administration have become manifest, distrust and suspicion have deepened; while naturally, where vested interests have been threatened, active opposition has been aroused. It is quite a mistake to suppose that liberal payment for military supplies and labour is sufficient to neutralise animosities of this sort in a country in which indolence, ignorance, and corruption flourish to such an extent as they do in Korea. Moreover, of late, another class besides the Korean official and the Korean coolie has had reason to deplore the intervention of the Japanese. This is well brought out in an interesting letter from the correspondent of the *Standard* on board the *Manchu Maru*, the passengers on which were taken to Seoul in the course of their memorable tour. "In almost every town of any importance," writes this correspondent under date July 18th, "you will find that the best of the smelling, muddy lanes which pass for streets have been bought up by the enterprising Japanese trader, whose stall at once supplants that of the Korean. In every town, if you want to stop the night, the only possible habitation is the Japanese tea-house, which makes its appearance directly a few settlers from the Land of the Gods have taken up a permanent residence. Here you will find comfort, cleanliness, good food, and attendance—a veritable oasis in the midst of the surrounding squalor and filth. The Korean sees with dismay the Japanese settler ousting him, slowly but surely, from his former trades and monopolies. . . .

Unfortunately, the character of the Japanese settlers is not all that could be desired. Like the pioneers of most new countries, the Japanese, directly he removes from the influence of his home surroundings, ceases to lead a life compatible with the civilisation of the country to which he belongs. In Korea he often behaves in a way that disconcerts his fellow countrymen . . . not always being over honest in his dealings with the natives. This," adds the *Standard* correspondent, confirming strangely what has been said above, "combined with the naturally arrogant and somewhat overbearing Japanese character, especially when brought into touch with other Oriental races, is responsible for the growing dislike of the Koreans for the Japanese."

The writer just quoted speaks elsewhere of the Korean's fatuous belief in the "power and sanctity" of his country. It is an interesting coincidence that, while these impressions were being committed to paper on board the *Manchu Maru*—which had then proceeded on her voyage—events should have been taking place at Seoul sharply indicative of the Korean's suspicious objections to the Japanese, and their fear lest the latter might have designs upon the "integrity" of the kingdom. An ex-Japanese official, Mr. Nagamori, had conceived the idea of applying for a waste-land concession in Korea, and had calmly asked for a fifty years' lease of all unutilised moors and other lands in the peninsula, except such as belonged to the Throne or served for burial or religious purposes. It is expressly stated by the *Times* correspondent in Tokio that the Japanese Government had not originally been connected with the Nagamori Syndicate. "That they approved of the project is tolerably certain, since it would have simultane-

ously enriched Korea and opened a convenient source of food supply for Japan. But they did not support it officially, or interfere in any way," until afterwards. In the first instance the Japanese representative at Seoul merely presented the application in the ordinary course of routine.

The result was impressive. "Many Koreans," says the *Times* correspondent, "are still disposed to sit on the fence between Japan and Russia; the events of the war have not yet convinced them. Many others are distinctly pro-Russian. Both of these classes, the waverers and the Russophiles, regarded, or pretended to regard, the Nagamori proposition as a sinister design upon the territorial integrity of their country. A clique of agitators—many of them thoroughly honest no doubt—was quickly organised under the name of the 'peace-preservation party,' and by menace or persuasion they induced the Court not only to assist them with money, but also to sanction the formation of a native company which should itself be the nominal recipient of the very concession sought by the Nagamori Syndicate."

Here was a pretty kettle of fish! No sort of doubt existed as to the violence of the commotion created, or the reality of the feelings aroused. The Korean officials were powerless to cope with the situation, and in Seoul itself a body of rioters, 2,000 strong, assembled and refused to disperse although ordered to do so by the Emperor himself. The intervention of the Japanese troops was necessary before tranquillity could be restored.

It is characteristic of Japanese smartness that it was found possible to turn even this incident to advantage. The first step of the Japanese Minister at Seoul was to issue a proclamation stating

that, in consequence of the recent disturbances, the Japanese would assume the police power in all matters affecting Japanese interests, and that in future no anti-Japanese meetings would be allowed.

Finding itself forced by the organisation of the bogus native company to intervene on the question of the waste-land concession, the Japanese Government had little difficulty in arranging a compromise. The concession granted, or about to be granted, to the native company was knocked on the head, and the application of the Nagamori Syndicate was understood to have been favourably considered "in principle." At the same time, in view of the popular clamour on the subject, the application was to be regarded as in abeyance for the present. Thus ended an incident which, if it did nothing else, served to show that, in attempting internal reforms in Korea, Japan has almost as hard a task in an administrative sense as she has strategically and tactically in Manchuria and before Port Arthur.

Japan's next step was to lay before the Emperor of Korea a detailed scheme of reforms containing some thirty items, of which a few may usefully be mentioned. It was suggested that advisers recommended by Japan should be appointed to the Departments of Finance and Foreign Affairs; that the Japanese Minister should be privileged at any time to have audience of the Emperor without the intermediary services of the Korean Foreign Minister; that the Korean Army should be reduced to a bodyguard of 1,000 men; that the Japanese currency should be adopted; that all Korean Ministers and Consuls in foreign countries should be recalled, and Korean interests placed in charge of Japanese Ministers and Consuls; and that official corruption should be rigorously suppressed.

This scheme was submitted by Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Minister at Seoul, on August 12th, and ten days later an agreement was signed with regard to the serious question of foreign and financial advisers. The Korean Government agreed to engage as financial adviser a Japanese subject recommended by Japan, whose counsel should be taken in all matters of finance. It further agreed to engage as diplomatic adviser a foreigner recommended by Japan, whose counsel should be taken in all important matters concerning foreign relations. The last paragraph of this noteworthy agreement was as follows: "The Korean Government shall consult the Japanese Government before concluding treaties or conventions with foreign Powers, and in dealing with other important diplomatic affairs, such as the granting of concessions to, or contracts with, foreigners."

In accordance with the above agreement Mr. Megata, "one of the ablest among the junior members of the Japanese Treasury," was chosen for the post of Financial Adviser to the Korean Government. An excellent Diplomatic Adviser was forthcoming in an American, Mr. D. W. Stevens, for many years Secretary of the United States Legation in Tokio, and now Counsellor to the Japanese Legation in Washington.

About the same time that the above agreement was entered into the Japanese are said to have obtained a monopoly of the fishery rights on the Korean coast, and to have induced the Korean Government to cancel the concession made to Russia for the exploitation of the vast forests in the region of the Ya-lu and Tumen Rivers. The timber concession in question had a good deal to do with the outbreak of the present war. For

it was taken over in a very paternal sort of way by the Russian Government, and made the pretext for various acts of aggression, against which the Japanese protested vainly until they backed up their arguments with the torpedo and the bayonet.

Japan now proceeded to turn her attention to the extension of the railway system. At the commencement of the war there was only one short line running from Seoul to the port of Chemulpo. Thanks to the energy of the Japanese military engineers, railway communication between Seoul and Wi-ju on the Yalu was now, practically speaking, an accomplished fact. In the first week of September a railway between Fusan and Ma-san-po was begun, and seemed likely to be continued to Seoul. About the middle of the same month we heard that Mr. Hayashi had recommended the construction, as a commercial venture, of yet a new line between Seoul and Gensan. There is an important future, one would imagine, for such an extension on military as well as commercial grounds, and it goes without saying that, with all the more important Korean railways completely under Japanese control, Japan would be able, if necessary, to exercise an altogether exclusive influence upon the future development of the country. At the same time there were not wanting signs of Korean opposition to this policy. During September the Japanese found it necessary to execute three Koreans whom they caught in the act of wrecking property on the new Seoul-Wi-ju line, and who were found to be in the pay of Russian sympathisers.

At the end of September it was reported that the Bank of Japan, which is officially connected with the Tokio Finance Department, was establishing

branches in important towns throughout Korea. Thus Japan in two or three months had successively attacked the question of Korea's civil administration, her diplomatic relations, her trade and industries, her railways, and her public and private finance. Such a performance in such circumstances is unique, and the somewhat close attention we have given the subject is surely justified on the ground that here we have one of the most remarkable side-issues of a war, still in active progress, which has ever been chronicled in history.

Will the Japanese succeed in this astonishing endeavour? If energy and enterprise, and apparent sincerity of purpose, can effect what is desired, no doubt they will. But it will be an uphill task, infinitely more troublesome than was that which Japan had to face in effecting her own emancipation from the semi-barbarism of her former state. Even in the month to the close of which we have

brought this rapid survey there are continued indications of Korean pig-headedness and reluctance to be civilised at any price. At the gate of the Emperor's Palace Korean petitioners kneel in the old Korean way, praying the Emperor to adopt a strong anti-Japanese policy. The Emperor declines to accept memorials, the Japanese police arrest the petitioners, yet the latter "continue the exercise fearlessly." Even in the country the anti-Japanese feeling flourishes. In the north, it is said, "another secret society" has been formed by Russophil Koreans "with the object of becoming affiliated to the Tonghaks and lending assistance to the Russian advance." There are two ways of dealing with fractious children. Japan has tried, is still trying, one. If she be compelled to try the other, one fears that there are troublous times in store for the Hermit Kingdom and its blindly foolish inhabitants.



THE "WAR OFFICE," SEOUL.
(By permission from "Koreans at Home.")

CHAPTER LXII.

RUSSIA AND GERMANY—JAPAN'S SUSPICIONS—IRRITATION IN GREAT BRITAIN—GERMANY'S FAR EASTERN INTERESTS—AN OSTENTATIOUS NEUTRALITY—THE *TIMES* STATEMENT—FRENCH NEWS—PRACTICAL SYMPATHY.

IT will be remembered that when, in the second week of July, the 85th (Wi-borg) Regiment of the Russian Army was ordered to the Far East (see Chapter XXXVII., Vol. 1, p. 448), its Colonel-in-Chief, the German Emperor, addressed to it a somewhat remarkable telegram of congratulation and encouragement. Even in Berlin this message was regarded as a "demonstration too friendly in the manner of its expression not to deserve criticism." In St. Petersburg it first raised glowing hopes of German intervention in the conflict, but further comments on these lines were promptly, and doubtless authoritatively, suppressed. In Tokio the message was treated jocosely, but there is little question that it was regarded with some seriousness. In other quarters the opinion was freely expressed that the German Emperor had gone a good deal further than was necessary or desirable to emphasise his evident wish for Russia's success.

Some time before this unfortunate message was put on the wires Japan had begun to entertain pretty definite suspicions of Germany's partiality for Russia, and it is not surprising that, in the wake of these suspicions, marked resentment should have followed. It was not exactly soothing to Japan to learn that, in the words of the correspondent of the Paris *Matin*, the German Embassy in St. Petersburg was "as busy as a newspaper office," every member of the staff being

engaged in the collection of news and rumours, and the minutest details being despatched daily to the Kaiser, "who immediately sends his congratulations, or condolences and wreaths." It is true that in St. Petersburg it was clearly understood that the German people did not entirely share their impulsive Sovereign's Russophil sentiments. But it was hardly to be expected that Tokio would discriminate very carefully between well-restrained Japanese sympathies of an unknown section of the German public and the open friendliness of the German Emperor for Japan's great and deadly enemy.

It soon became evident, moreover, that, whether sympathetic or not, there were plenty of Germans ready to render Russia very practical assistance by sailing quite close to the wind in regard to neutral obligations. We have already discussed in a previous chapter the actual legality of the sales by Germany to Russia of large merchant vessels, which the latter can, and does, convert forthwith into "third-class cruisers." It is understood that this practice does not contravene the international laws of war, and, accordingly, the conduct of Germany in this respect cannot be fairly called in question. At the same time, if one nation acts in a very unfriendly way towards another, the mere fact that the laws of neutrality have not been actually infringed does not prevent that other nation from feeling sore.

It has also been pointed out in the course of this narrative that the apparent existence of a bond of sympathy between Russia and Germany has aroused a good deal of irritation in this country. When the excitement created by the performances of the Volunteer cruisers and the Vladivostok Squadron in regard to neutral shipping was at its height, it was not only felt, but pretty openly remarked, that the injury done to the commerce of Great Britain was attended by singular advantages to our German rivals. Putting aside the question whether German shipping did or did not suffer in the same proportion as ours did from the lawless behaviour of Russian naval officers, the fact remained that freights to the Far East were accepted for German vessels at a much lower rate of insurance than for English ones. The discontinuance, moreover, by several English steamship lines of their services to Japan meant an advantage to German companies, which would hardly have been conceded to them had British owners been convinced that in the Far East there was still a fair field and no favour for all neutral vessels.

We shall presently go a little more closely into the question whether these suspicions on the part of Japan, and this irritation on the part of ourselves, were justified. But in the meantime it will be well to say a few words as to the possible reasons for Germany's anxiety to stand well with her Eastern neighbour in regard to the struggle for supremacy in the Far East. It will be necessary, perhaps, to speak somewhat plainly on this subject; but the facts are not seriously in dispute, and in drawing a few simple inferences from them we need not display a tittle of the partiality which Germany has so often manifested in commenting upon British policy and methods.

For some years past it has been Germany's dream to become an Asiatic Power, and, ever since her occupation of Kiao-chau she has lost no opportunity of developing in the great Chinese province of Shan-tung a position similar to that which Russia formerly occupied in Manchuria. Writing about the middle of July—with reference, by the way, to the German Emperor's telegram to the Wiborg Regiment—Dr. George Morrison, the *Times* correspondent at Peking, makes the following significant observations :—“ In Europe even yet you fail to realise how great has been the energy devoted by Germany to the Germanisation of the province of Shan-tung. Long ago she secured practical railway and mining monopolies throughout the entire province. The weak, old Governor plays into her hands. She has an extensive postal system, and has even refused to carry the Imperial Chinese mails on the German trains. There are more than 500 German officials and civilians scattered through the province. In Tsinanfu, the capital, for example, there is a German infantry instructor, a German Supervisor of the Construction of Roads, a German professor in the Shan-tung Provincial College, a German postmaster, a German Consul, a German Chancellor, a German oculist, besides business men, hotel-keepers, railway *employés*, and mining engineers. In the Customs at Kiao-chau there is an exclusively German staff, and the name of every *employé* has to be submitted first by Sir Robert Hart to the German Governor for approval.”

It does not require much insight to understand that Japan's supremacy in the Far East might be a serious bar to the development of these substantial and growing interests. In the first place, Japan is fighting in the present instance

not only on account of Korea, but also, to some extent, as the champion of the integrity of China. Assuming that she succeeds in turning Russia out of Manchuria, it is not at all inconceivable that her next step would be directed against the expulsion of Germany from Shantung.

A moment's reflection will show that, in any such event as this, Germany's position would be one of humiliating impotence. It is all very well to talk of Germany's mailed fist when a nation like China is concerned, but with a possibly hostile Japan the case is altogether different. It is quite true that Germany is not only stronger than Japan on land, but has a larger navy. But Germany's land forces are of comparatively little use to her in the Far East, with which she has not, as Russia has, any land communication. As for her Navy, it is true that she has twelve modern battleships, admirably officered and manned, but it is a grave question whether she would care to send out in any case even half of these to the Far East. Even supposing she sent them all, the problem of coaling, which has not yet been satisfactorily solved in the case of the Russian Baltic Fleet, would have to be faced. Lastly, if trouble arose between Germany and Japan, after the latter had gained possession of both Port Arthur and Vladivostok, the question of a Far Eastern naval base for Germany would be a difficult one. As a matter of course, Japan would blockade, if she did not capture, Kiao-chau (Tsingtau), and Germany could hardly expect either Great Britain or France to allow her warships to make a convenience of their harbours. Germany would therefore be compelled to rest her chances on a Fleet action at sea, and, unless she emerged from this more completely vic-

torious than it would seem wise for her to expect, she would have no more chance of hurting Japan than a tiger has of catching a skylark. Not only this, but almost in any case the damage done to her trade with China would be terrific.

It has been necessary to put this matter somewhat crudely, not in the least with a view to fomenting anti-German sentiment, but merely by way of a common-sense explanation of the German attitude. A very ordinary error into which the British public has fallen with regard to the friendly feeling evinced by Germany for Russia during the war in the Far East is a failure to appreciate the existence of German interests and ambitions in China, interests and ambitions which of themselves command some sort of admiration if not of respect. Whether a nation, whatever it may stand to gain or lose, is justified in playing such a part as Germany has played in this case is one thing; whether such a policy as Germany's is likely to prove in the long run a safe one is another. But it is idle to ignore the fact that Germany's temptation was a strong one, and that the situation appealed with special force to the German Emperor and those who, like himself, had strained every nerve to gain a foothold for Germany in the Far East, and were eager to see some early return for the expenditure of money and energy incurred.

At the same time, while it was clearly to Germany's interest that Japan should not emerge from her struggle with Russia so completely victorious that her supremacy in the Far East would be, practically speaking, assured, there were certain other considerations which made it necessary for, at any rate, the German Government to exhibit great caution. Probably the last thing in the world which



RUSSIAN CRUISER STOPPING A CONTRABAND STEAMER ON THE HIGH SEAS.

Germany wanted was to become herself embroiled in the war. There is no man living who understands what sea-power means better than the German Emperor, and the fact that any overt act of hostility against Japan on the part of Germany would necessarily bring the British Navy on the scene, must have been considered by such an authority in every possible aspect. Putting aside, however, a contingency which it would not be good taste to discuss in detail, Germany was obliged to reckon to some extent with the force of public opinion, not only on the Continent, but in the United States. Powerful as she is she cannot afford to disregard, as Russia has habitually disregarded, the very strong views which highly civilised nations now take when international laws are too rudely slighted. The rôle which Germany has so greatly enjoyed playing, that of the "honest broker," would become impossible if her honesty became too obviously fly-blown. Accordingly, she has now to "walk delicately," as regards her avowed diplomacy, and, above all, her outward observance of the laws of neutrality must be such as to enable her to pose before the whole world as a model of studious impartiality.

When, therefore, after the naval action of August 10th, certain Russian ships sought refuge at Tsing-Tau, Germany's attitude was almost fussily correct. There were not wanting unkind critics to suggest that the German authorities at Tsing-Tau had anticipated the arrival of some portion of the Port Arthur Fleet, and had considerably made arrangements for coaling with the utmost despatch such vessels as might be able to take the sea again. This, it will be remembered, was actually done in the case of the *Novik*, which managed to coal

and get away within the twenty-four hours' time limit. The remaining ships, however, were so knocked about that escape was hopeless, and in these circumstances the German authorities had no option but to dismantle them and intern their crews. This was done with much ceremony, it being doubtless expected that the world would be suitably impressed by the spectacle. As a matter of fact, it would have been extremely risky for Germany to have failed in her obvious duty on this occasion. Such a flagrant breach of neutrality would, surely, have been tantamount to an act of war against Japan, and the latter would have been clearly justified in appealing—as she had threatened in such an event to do—to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Whether Germany is as yet anxious to pit her newly-formed Navy—admirably efficient and powerful as it is—against the fleets of Great Britain is open to question. But the fact remains that, if Germany had not behaved as she did towards the Russian ships in Tsing-Tau Harbour, she would have incurred the prompt and, perhaps, dangerous resentment of Japan; would have stood convicted before the world of a shameless breach of the laws of nations, and might have had to fight Japan's ally. The proud references, therefore, of the German Press to the "scrupulously conscientious manner" in which Germany "performed her duty as a neutral Power at Tsing-Tau" have not any very grave historical or other value.

The prevailing doubt as to the absolute soundness of German neutrality found expression in various ways, and on September 14th the *Times* published as "From a Correspondent" an article in which the existence of a "Far Eastern Understanding" between Russia and

Germany was alleged with singular force, and with aid of several striking examples. Apart from the suggestion that the Germans at Tsing-Tau would gladly have assisted the crippled Russian warships, if they could have done so without incurring the odium of the civilised world, other instances were quoted in which the friendliness of Germany towards her Eastern neighbour seems to have been pleasingly demonstrated. Thus, it was remarked by this plain-spoken correspondent that, at the outset, "the German Emperor took the initiative by proffering to the Tsar explicit assurances of support, amounting to a practical guarantee of immunity from all danger of interference in Europe, which enabled the Russian War Office not only to withdraw from the western provinces of the Empire some of its finest troops of all arms for service in the Far East, but even to dismantle to some extent the western fortresses, in order to provide siege guns for Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Liao-yang, and Harbin.


"This spontaneous demonstration of German friendship was followed by a variety of smaller services, down to the arrest and surrender to Russia of deserters who had escaped across the German frontier. Every facility was given for the execution of Russian contracts for war material at Essen and in other German workshops more or less directly controlled by the German Government. The two great German shipping companies, the North-German Lloyd and the Hamburg-America, were allowed to transfer several of their ocean steamers to Russia to be converted into cruisers, and to enter into large contracts for coaling Russian cruisers on their commerce-destroying errands, as well as the Baltic fleet on its way out to the Far East, if circumstances

allowed of its despatch. It has even been stated that torpedo-boats from Schichau have been transported in sections across the German frontier. When, owing to excesses of zeal that are probably inevitable in such circumstances, one or two ships were sunk or seized by Russian cruisers which turned out to be not British but German ships, the German Government, instead of entering vigorous protests and mobilising the semi-official Press against Russia, as it did in 1900 against England after the seizure of the *Bundesrath*, confined itself to the most gentle remonstrances in St. Petersburg, and furnished its organs at home with all manner of explanations and assurances in order to minimise the importance of these incidents."

The conclusions arrived at by this clearly well-informed as well as fearless critic of Germany's "most benevolent and elastic" neutrality accorded pretty closely with the ideas advanced in the earlier part of this chapter. After hinting that Germany had already in July obtained important concessions in a new commercial treaty with Russia, it was observed that William II. "is apparently no less confident than the most sanguine of Russians that Russia will ultimately wear out Japan, and that sooner or later she is bound to become the predominant Power in Eastern Asia. As it is also his *idée fixe* that in Eastern Asia lies the best and largest field for the expansion of German influence beyond the seas, from the base which Germany has already acquired in Shan-tung, the present juncture has been eminently favourable for laying down the lines upon which German and Russian interests may be promoted in the Far East with the least prospect of ulterior friction. It would be rash to assume that the understanding now es-

tablished between Germany and Russia is confined altogether to the Far East ; but it may safely be asserted that it secures for Russia Germany's support in the ultimate settlement of the terms of peace with Japan, and for Germany, as far as Russia is concerned, a free hand in the future for carrying out her scheme of *Welt-politik* on the lines of least resistance in China—*i.e.* where it will come

anecdote concerning German diplomatic methods with reference to Press statements and contradictions. It was in Bismarck's time, and Prince Gortchakoff was discussing a more than usually audacious statement evidently issued from the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin. Another diplomatist, knowing full well that there was little love lost between the old Russian Chancellor and the old German Chancel-



THE RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP *TSAREVITCH* AFTER THE FIGHT OFF PORT ARTHUR, AUGUST 10.

The "*Tsarevitch*" put into Kinchau in a badly battered condition. Her rudder-shaft was broken, one gun disabled, the lifeboat lost, the masts bent, and the bridge twisted, while the holes above the water-line had to be plugged with makeshift stoppers of wood.

into contact only with British interests." Of course, the German Press was very angry with the *Times* for giving currency to this frank statement, and *démentis* were forthcoming in plenty. Unfortunately, the semi-official organs seemed to be chiefly concerned in contradicting statements never made in the *Times* nor elsewhere in this country. This circumstance moved the writer in the *Times* to relate in a subsequent article an amusing

lor, ventured to observe:—" *Le fait est qu'on sait joliment mentir à Berlin.*" Prince Gortchakoff promptly rebuked this undiplomatic abruptness of speech. "*Pas de gros mots, je vous en prie, cher ami. Disons plutôt qu'on sait joliment démentir à Berlin!*" Apparently, as the *Times* writer remarked, the art of *démentis* is still practised in the German capital, but it is no longer "a fine art."

This almost historic indictment, and the

ponderous attempts to quash it which followed, have a serious bearing upon the history of the war. The one opened many eyes to the existence of tremendous

heart so clearly anxious to propitiate one of the two belligerent Powers.

In October two circumstances combined to foster the growth of the latter senti-



Photo: C. Schaarwachter.

THE GERMAN EMPEROR.

possibilities arising out of the restless anxiety of the German Emperor to Teutonise the greater portion of the world's surface; the other increased in several quarters the distrust of a Government so elaborately correct in its attitude, yet at

ment. When it became known that in the new Second Army, the formation of which was dealt with in Chapter LX., the Warsaw Army Corps might be included, considerable surprise was expressed in France that Russia should feel

that she could without danger withdraw her troops from the Polish frontier for the purpose of a Far Eastern campaign. The St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Petit Parisien* accordingly sought an explanation from a diplomatic source, and received an illuminating reply. This was to the effect that the German Government had given an assurance that "no complication would take place through its fault on the Polish frontier during the present war, and that Russia, if she thought proper to do so, could, in case of need, employ the picked troops quartered in that territory." Here we have a striking confirmation from an independent source of the hint already given by the writer in the *Times* above quoted. It may be added that, when the correspondent of the *Petit Parisien* asked whether this active friendliness on the part of Germany would not affect the Franco-Russian alliance, the diplomatist referred to replied: "Certainly not. But I ought to tell you that the German party is daily gaining ground here, and you will see that at the end of the war Germany will obtain numerous advantages as a reward for her attitude during the painful adventure in which Russia is engaged."

The other circumstance to which allusion is intended is the arrangement made for the coaling of the Baltic Fleet. It is necessary for us, in particular, to clear our minds of cant in respect to this transaction. We must remember that our merchants have not hesitated to supply many thousands of tons of coal which they knew perfectly well were destined for use on Russian warships. Up to a certain point Germany was as much entitled as we were to make a profit out of the urgent requirements of either of the two belligerents, provided that the laws

of neutrality were not violated. Nor had we, on the face of things, any more right to connect the German Emperor with the remarkably comprehensive plan adopted for the coaling of Russian warships at sea from German colliers than we had to suggest that the Cardiff merchants were being encouraged to sell coals for Russian use by the British Government. It is essential in such matters to be fair, and to admit that in some cases where private interests could be served, in other words, where large profits could be made, by disregarding both national sentiment and international law, Great Britain's commercial record may not have been absolutely spotless.

But it may reasonably be urged that in this matter of coaling the Baltic Fleet the Germans have touched a point far beyond any hitherto reached by this or any other great Power. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that, had it not been for this system organised by German contractors, the Baltic Fleet would never have left the Baltic for the Far East. Russian warships had been by proclamation forbidden to coal at British ports, and it is quite certain that no British steamship owners would have cared to incur the odium of having made the voyage of the Baltic squadron possible. It is much to be doubted whether any other country possessing the necessary facilities would have concluded such a contract as that now entered into by German ship-owners. For in such cases, where publicity cannot be avoided, the force of public opinion, to say nothing of Government disapproval, tacit or expressed, must count for a good deal. It is quite easy to say that the German Government and the German people strongly objected to a display of commercial enterprise which was obviously tantamount to assisting Russia

in the most practical fashion possible to get the better of Japan. But would anyone attach much importance to any such proposition?

The sum of the matter is that, up to the sailing of the Baltic Fleet, at any rate, Germany, no doubt, has preserved her neutrality inviolate as far as strictly legal and public obligations are concerned. But it would be idle to suggest that her Sovereign and her mercantile

community have not displayed a sympathy with Russia which has at times appeared to take a very practical shape. It is possible that this may seriously affect the progress of the present war. In any case, it can no more be forgotten, nor disregarded, from the historical standpoint, than Germany's co-operation with Russia in ousting Japan from Port Arthur, and her subsequent rather remarkable acquisition of Kiao-chau.



MO-TIEN-LING PASS, WITH THE RUSSIAN POSITIONS IN THE DISTANCE.

General Keller was killed on the slope of the distant mountain.

CHAPTER LXIII.


THE BALTIC FLEET—RUSSIAN SHIP-BUILDING CONDITIONS—PROBLEMS OF THE ROUTE—
ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY ASSUMES COMMAND—A TRIAL CRUISE—COMPOSITION OF
THE SQUADRON—NERVOUS FEARS.

FROM a very early stage of the war much Russian hope and international interest were centred in the question whether the Russian Fleet in the Baltic could be despatched to the Far East with some reasonable expectation of reaching it in fighting trim. As a matter of fact, it was more or less authoritatively announced, immediately after the torpedo attack on Port Arthur, that another powerful Russian Fleet would shortly be sent out from the Baltic, and the end of June was mentioned as the probable date of departure. The squadron, it was said, would consist of eight battleships and five cruisers, accompanied by thirty torpedo-boats, and the command was to be given to Admiral Rozhdestvensky, a very well-known officer, who had been Russian Naval Attaché in London. The latter admitted in April that he had been offered, and had accepted, the command in question, but is reported to have expressed doubts whether he would ever take the Baltic Squadron to the Far East. It might, he thought, be required nearer home, and, in his personal opinion, by September the Russian Navy would have nothing more to do with the Far East.

It soon became apparent that in this last surmise, at any rate, the gallant Admiral was likely to prove entirely at fault. Accordingly, the work of preparing the squadron for sea was pushed on with great vigour, and in June it was

generally understood that, by some means or another, the Baltic Fleet would endeavour to make its way out to the seat of war, and redress, if possible, the balance of naval power, now clearly showing to Japan's advantage. In this country and on the Continent grave doubts were expressed as to the possibility of even getting ready the ships for sea, and these doubts, proceeding from authoritative sources, have been reflected in this narrative. It is, therefore, expedient to say thus early that these predictions, like those of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, proved inaccurate, and that in due course a considerable squadron, including seven battleships, actually sailed for the Far East from Libau in October.

This result was the more surprising, as Russian ship-building conditions are somewhat curious, and do not favour the rapid completion of vessels in course of construction, as some of the new battleships in the Baltic were at this time. In the *Times* of June 7th appeared a most interesting article dealing with the question of the Baltic Fleet's departure, and giving some useful details as to Russian ship-building methods. It appeared that at that moment there were five powerful battleships of the *Borodino* type lying afloat on the Neva or at Kronstadt. Of these two had been launched in 1901, two in 1902, and the fifth in 1903, yet even the two first—



RUSSIA'S SECOND FLEET: WARSHIPS OF THE BALTIC SQUADRON DESIGNATED FOR SERVICE IN THE FAR EAST.



the *Imperator Alexander III.* and the *Borodino*—had been either quite recently finished or still had some details incomplete. On the Neva, warships are launched as mere shells, without armour on the sides, and with the hulls, and more especially the superstructures, in a very rudimentary state. Hence, partly, the long period which often elapses between launching and completion. Moreover, Russian State dockyards are most imperfectly equipped for dealing with the complicated and elaborate internal fittings and arrangements of warships, and much of this work is delegated to sub-contractors, often with very unsatisfactory results.

Again, there is only a very moderate depth of water available for warships built on the Neva for their passage to Kronstadt. This was illustrated by the grounding of the *Orel* on her way down, notwithstanding the fact that she had been considerably lightened. Lastly, "the arsenal at Kronstadt is itself not well adapted for the final stages of the completion of ships, although work of that class has necessarily to be done there on a large scale. The docks are excellent, but plant and equipment are not of corresponding quality."

It is very remarkable that, in spite of these drawbacks, the Baltic Fleet should have contrived even to make a start for the Far East in 1904. But Russian energy and industry are immense, and the completion of a squadron fit for sea in October, after competent critics had doubted whether more than one or two battleships could be got ready this year, is comparable with the wonderful repository work effected on the damaged ships at Port Arthur. Throughout the war these naval surprises have been frequent, and their significance in some

cases has been considerable. For they are an apt reminder of the value to a nation which leans on its navy of private ship-building yards, by the help of which results such as those attained by Russia with infinite labour and sacrifice are often attainable with very little trouble, always provided that the necessary funds are forthcoming.

On June 20th, according to the *St. Petersburg* correspondent of the *Paris Journal*, the Higher Naval Board assembled under the presidency of the Tsar at Tsarskoe Selo to discuss the despatch to the Far East of the Baltic Fleet, or, as it was officially called, the Third Squadron of the Russian Fleet in the Pacific Ocean. The Board included Admiral Avellan, the Minister of Marine, and Admirals Rozhdestvensky, Niloŭ, Wirenius, Dubassof, and Birileff, the last-named being the Chief of the Defences in the Baltic. The result of the discussion was a decision that the Fleet should start early in September by the Cape Horn route, in order to avoid the delay in the Suez Canal for the coal transports. As a matter of fact this decision is afterwards altered, but is noteworthy as showing how, even at this date, the movement of the squadron was beset by doubts and apprehensions.

From that time forward the Baltic Fleet was a fertile source of rumours, disappointments, changes, and surprises. The first grave matter to be settled was, of course, the coaling question, and it is this, in large measure no doubt, which caused an alteration in the route to be adopted. In due course it was announced that a great German steamship line had undertaken to coal the fleet by means of colliers stationed along the route, a proceeding as to which we had something to say in the preceding chapter. Some idea

of the magnitude of the service thus contracted for may be gathered from some simple figures of coal expenditure. It is recorded that the Japanese battleship *Asahi*, for instance, in her voyage out from Europe consumed about 5,700 tons of coal, and the *Shikishima* nearly 4,800 tons, while Japanese armoured cruisers each consumed from 3,400 to 4,400 tons. It must be remembered, too, that some of the Russian ships have uneconomical engines compared with those on the up-to-date Japanese ships. The total quantity, therefore, required for a squadron of seven battleships—to say nothing of cruisers and other craft—proceeding from the Baltic to the Far East would be something truly enormous.

As, moreover, many of the Russian ships can only carry a limited supply of coal, the frequent replenishment of their bunkers introduces a new problem. Coaling at sea is a troublesome business at the best of times, and in rough weather is practically impossible except with special appliances which are still in the experimental stage.

The matter of coaling the Baltic Fleet may, however, be dismissed for the present, and a few words given to other difficulties surrounding this huge projected naval reinforcement.

Of course, from the outset there has been the grave risk that, after a voyage lasting over two months—for some of the Russian ships are very slow, and the pace must be regulated by that of the "tubs"—the redoubtable squadron may find itself in Japanese waters without a base. Not only Port Arthur but Vladivostok also may have fallen, and, in such an event, the position of the "Third Pacific Squadron" might be most uncomfortable, not to say precarious. But evidently the Russians were confident that one, if

not both, of their two great strongholds in the Far East will hold out, and afford a haven for their new fleet in the interval of its exploits on the high seas.

Perhaps the most really pressing embarrassment in connection with the departure of the Baltic Squadron was the dearth of engineer officers and engine-room artificers of the requisite experience. It is said that the Russian Admiralty had special difficulty in securing well-trained chief and second engineers, as the pick of these grades had been drafted out to the Far East before the war, and the Black Sea Fleet had since been drawn upon to make good the war wastage. A number of engineers were taken over by the Admiralty from subsidised Russian steamship and private companies, but these have had little or no experience with the Belleville boilers, which have been supplied to every one of the newer Russian battleships. It goes without saying that here is a difficulty of the first magnitude, and one which, even though temporarily overcome, must react upon the efficiency of the squadron if ever it comes to close grips with the swift and splendidly handled ships of the Japanese Fleet.

In connection with this reported dearth of engineers it is necessary to allude to a charge made against Russia, which does not appear to have been indignantly met, as one would have expected it to have been met, by a prompt and authoritative denial. It will be remembered that, after the destruction of the *Varyag* and the *Koriets* at Chemulpo, the crews of these two vessels were allowed to return to Russia, the understanding being that they should not be allowed to take any further part in the fighting. In October a correspondent of the *Times* declared that at Kronstadt it

was generally stated, and not denied in Russian naval circles, that, notwithstanding Russian engagements to the contrary, the crews of the *Varyag* and *Koriets* had been drawn upon for the purposes of the Baltic Fleet. It is hardly conceivable that a Great Power should have stooped to the commission of an act of rank bad faith like this, but the statement was a circumstantial one, and the fact of its appearance in the columns of the *Times* should have facilitated instant and vigorous contradiction.

As regards naval commanders, "deck officers"—as distinct from engine-room staffs and minor deck ratings—the Russian Navy appears to suffer from no serious numerical deficiency. But the quality is hardly all that could be desired. The late Admiral Makaroff is known to have held rather gloomy views as to the shortage of officers—by which, presumably, we are to understand officers of the right sort—in the Russian Navy. A superior officer of the French Navy has also spoken with some frankness on this subject. "Russia," he said, "is not a maritime nation. Her Fleet is the result of a political policy. Her officers are not

in training, being condemned by the ice to spend six months on shore, where they acquire deplorable habits. This has been fully realised by Russia, who has strained every nerve to secure an ice-free port where her sailors could be kept in constant training."

As regards the command of the "Third Squadron of the Fleet in the Pacific Ocean" there is no question that the reputation of the officer selected stands high. Admiral Sinowi Petrowich Rozhdestvensky was born in 1848, and entered the Russian Navy in 1865. Having made a special study of marine artillery, he passed in 1873 with distinction out of the Michael Artillery Academy, and four years later did brilliant service in the Russo-Turkish War as commander of a small



ADMIRAL WIRENIUS.

vessel, the *Vesta*. Ordered by his Chief to attack the Turkish Fleet he did so, although his ship only carried two guns, with a reckless bravery which gained him immense popularity throughout Russia, as well as Imperial commendation. He was decorated by Alexander II., and, after a period of service in Bulgaria, where he organised the Bulgarian "Navy," he came in 1885 to



Charles W. White

DEPARTURE OF THE BALTIC FLEET FOR THE FAR EAST:
THE SQUADRON LEAVING KRONSTADT.



London as Russian Naval Attaché. Here he was much liked and respected, and wrote some interesting essays on the British Navy. During the war between China and Japan he commanded the Russian Squadron in the Pacific, and in 1898 he was appointed Chief of the Marine Artillery. Early in 1904 Admiral Rozhdestvensky succeeded, as Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Avellan, the latter having taken the late Admiral Tyrtoff's place as Minister of Marine. He was formally appointed to his present post on the death of Admiral Makaroff in the *Petropavlovsk*, but, as noted above, it was some months before the appointment could be said to have taken effect.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky is described later, when events have seemed to invest such a description with probable accuracy, as liable to fits of nervousness, and not long before the squadron sailed he was reported to be ill. But he may well have been worried nearly to death by the heartrending anxieties of his position. Not only had he before him a long and most troublesome voyage, the difficulties of which would be increased tenfold by the constant necessity for coal-ing at sea. Not only had he to face the certainty of meeting, on the completion of this long and arduous cruise, an alert and powerful enemy who would have ample time to prepare a warm welcome for him. Long before these stages were arrived at there were tremendous obstacles to be overcome in the way of official ineptitude and dockyard incompetence. The higher naval administration in Russia, sadly liable as it is to interference on the part more especially of the Grand Duke Alexander Michailovitch, does not make the way smooth for an able and conscientious officer whose one thought is the efficiency of his command, and it is

easy to understand that, from June to September, Rozhdestvensky must have gone through very wearing times. In particular, he probably experienced no little trouble in getting the armament of his ships arranged to his liking. In this direction he is likely to have proved an exacting critic, for he had always retained his interest in marine artillery questions, and had won the special commendation of the German Emperor by his handling of the Russian Gunnery Instruction Squadron at Reval on the occasion of the Imperial meeting in 1902.

The naval action off Port Arthur on August 10th seems to have galvanised the home authorities into instant action, for on August 14th Admiral Rozhdestvensky went on board the battleship *Kniaz Suvaroff* in the roadstead of Kronstadt, and formally assumed command of the Third Squadron of the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Birileff, commanding at Kronstadt, signalled a farewell message, expressing his confidence, and wishing the Squadron good luck. But, in point of fact, a considerable time had yet to elapse before the former Baltic Fleet could make a fair start towards its remote destination.

On August 25th it was announced that the Squadron, with the exception of the battleship *Orel*, was leaving Kronstadt on a ten days' cruise, presumably intended to serve as a trial trip. The omission of the *Orel* was due to another accident to that unfortunate vessel, which had already undergone some painful experiences. First she stranded in the Neva, and then, having been got off and taken to Kronstadt, her sea-plugs were unaccountably withdrawn, and it was some time before the hundreds of tons of water which rushed in could be pumped out. On the eve of the Squadron's departure on its

trial cruise, the *Orel* was found to be incapable of movement! On examination it was discovered that the shaft was clogged with sand, evidently put there for the purpose, notwithstanding the careful watch that had been kept. As a matter of course the outrage was attributed to the Japanese, but it is hardly likely that the latter, if they had had access to the vitals of a Russian battleship, would have stopped short at merely throwing her machinery temporarily out of order.

Apparently the "ten days' cruise" had to be curtailed owing to fresh accidents. It was rumoured that some of the ships were damaged in the course of the trials with the 12-in. guns, and on August 30th it was reported that the Squadron had returned to Kronstadt. Here any defects must have speedily been made good, for on September 11th a telegram from Kronstadt conveyed the stirring news that the Fleet had "sailed for the Far East."

But a further delay was impending. Two days later it was announced that Admiral Rozhdestvensky's ships would remain about five weeks at Reval and Libau, going through firing practice and manœuvres, and waiting for the battleship *Orel* and the protected cruiser *Oleg*. Here for the present, then, we will leave the redoubtable Squadron, to the composition of which we may now devote attention.

The first point to be noted is that the Fleet is by no means what in this country would be considered a good fighting fleet, owing to the lack of uniformity in the units, both of the battleship and cruiser divisions. Assuming the *Orel* and the *Oleg* to have joined, the Fleet now consists of seven battleships, two armoured cruisers, and five or six protected cruisers, with a few destroyers. The

battleships are the *Kniaz Suvaroff*, *Imperator Alexander III.*, *Borodino*, *Orel*, *Ossliabya*, *Navarin*, and *Sissoi Veliki*. The two armoured cruisers are the *Dmitri Donskoi* and the *Admiral Nakhimov*; the protected cruisers the *Aurora*, *Almaz*, *Svetlana*, *Jemchug*, *Oleg*, and, perhaps, the *Izumrud*. Before the Squadron actually sails from Libau, some "third-class cruisers"—i.e. converted merchantmen—may have to be added to the above list.

The newest battleships are those of the *Borodino* class, to which the *Imperator Alexander III.* and the *Orel* belong, and which may be said to include the *Kniaz Suvaroff* also, since, with the exception of displacing about 450 tons less, she is a sister ship. The *Borodino* is of about 13,500 tons displacement, with 16,300 horse-power engines, and a nominal speed of 18 knots. She has protective armour nine inches thick, tapering to four inches. She has six torpedo tubes, and carries four 12-in. guns, twelve 6-in. quick-firers, and many smaller guns.

The *Ossliabya*, which was on its way to the Far East when the war broke out, is of 12,674 tons displacement, and was launched in 1898. Her nominal speed is also 18 knots, but she is not so well protected as the ships of the *Borodino* class; she carries four 10-in. and eleven 6-in., besides numerous smaller guns, and has six torpedo tubes. The *Navarin* and *Sissoi Veliki* are older ships, heavily armed and protected, but slow, having an official speed of 16 knots, from which two or three may safely be deducted. The *Navarin* is of 10,000, the *Sissoi Veliki* of 8,880 tons displacement. Both carry four 12-in. guns, and eight and six 6-in. quick-firers respectively.

Of the cruisers, the *Dmitri Donskoi* and *Admiral Nakhimov* are both old and

slow, the former being of 5,796 tons, the latter 8,500 tons. The *Admiral Nakhimov* carries eight 8-in. and ten 6-in. guns, the *Dmitri Donskoi* six 6-in. and ten 4.7-in. guns. The biggest of the protected cruisers are the *Aurora* and *Oleg*, of nearly 7,000 tons, with a main armament of eight 6-in. and twelve 6-in.

guns respectively. The rest are small ships of under 4,000 tons, but swift and handy, with speeds varying from 19 to 24 knots, nominally. They carry six guns—4.7-in. and 5.9-in. as main armament. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Russia has still some powerful ships in the Far East, and that, in the doubtful event of this new squadron's arrival, and the still more improbable event of a conjunction with even two or three of the larger vessels under Admiral Skrydloff's



ADMIRAL AVELLAN.

command, the Russian naval forces in the Pacific would once more be sufficient to cause Japan great uneasiness. But this is a direction in which we certainly need not seek to anticipate actual events.

A more profitable topic is the extraordinary nervousness which the Russians display with reference to the future sailing of the Squadron from the Baltic. When the Squadron had been at Libau


When the Squadron had been at Libau

When the Squadron had been at Libau

about a week it became known in Copenhagen that a large number of vessels in the Russian service were cruising in northern waters without any definite destination. A correspondent of a leading Berlin paper wrote about this time:— "The chief command over this spy fleet is said to be exercised by a Russian naval captain named Hartling, who has for a long time been in Copenhagen, and who maintains an active telegraphic correspondence with numerous points on the coast." It was evident that the Russians were being unduly influenced by the absurd stories circulated regarding Japanese preparations for laying submarine mines in the channel through which the Russian Fleet must pass in order to reach the North Sea. Apparently they communi-

cated their fears to others, and asked for assistance against the supposed nefarious designs of the far-off enemy. For considerable discussion was aroused in the Danish Press by the manner in which the Japanese Naval Attaché, Captain Takikava, was "shadowed" by the Danish police during a recent visit to the Skaw.

Since even the higher naval authorities thought fit to lend a ready ear to such stories, it may be imagined that the officers and men of the Fleet were not wholly free from apprehensions. In a properly trained Navy constantly at work such silly scares would hardly be possible. But that they were possible on Russian warships is about to be proved by actual happenings, the detail of which must be reserved for another chapter.



EFFECTS OF JAPANESE SHELLS ON A RUSSIAN WARSHIP.

The "Gromoboi" at Vladivostok after the combat of August 13. Examination of the "Gromoboi" plates reveals how marvellously the Japanese contrived to concentrate their fire upon the vital portions of the enemy's ship. Round about the gun embrasures the hits are thickly planted.

CHAPTER LXIV.

JAPANESE ADVANCING—RUSSIANS AT MUKDEN—THE IMPERIAL TOMBS—POSITION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES—JAPANESE SOLDIER'S OUTFIT—CHANGE OF ATTITUDE—RUSSIANS PREPARE TO TAKE OFFENSIVE—KUROPATKIN'S ORDER OF THE DAY.

THE indecisive character of the great Battle of Liao-yang is clearly reflected in the condition of affairs which prevailed in both the opposing armies in the two or three weeks following the Russian retirement. Had Liao-yang been a conclusive victory for Japan we may be sure that, utterly worn out as the bulk of her gallant soldiers were, a sufficient number would have been got together to pursue the shattered remnant of the Russian forces beyond Mukden, and perhaps beyond Tie-ling, with a view to an early and final advance upon Harbin. Had they been thus pursued the Russians might have stood firmly at Tie-ling, but hardly at Mukden, which was then by no means well adapted for the purposes of an obstinate defence. In a word, the sequel of the battle would have been as different as possible from what it was, namely, a retirement only moderately hindered by pursuit, followed by a distinct lull, in which both sides made strenuous, but not at all excited, preparation for a fresh bout of still more deadly and desperate fighting.

We have already had occasion to speak in Chapter LIX. of the promptitude with which the Japanese after the capture of Liao-yang proceeded to utilise their new possession as an immense supply depôt. In a short time their facilities in this direction will have been enormously increased, for their engineers have been busy with the line of

railway in rear, and also with the construction of the field line to An-tung on the banks of the Yalu, which is intended eventually to join the Manchurian Railway at Liao-yang. This matter of communication is of such extreme interest and practical importance that we may usefully anticipate a little, and mention here that before the end of September the first Japanese train arrived at Liao-yang, a change of gauge having been now effected between the latter place and Dalny. Attention has been drawn in a previous chapter to the seriousness of the blow thus dealt to the Russians, who, even if they succeed in recapturing the line, cannot use their broad-gauge engines and trucks upon it, and cannot easily reconstruct the old track, as the Japanese have thoughtfully cut down the sleepers. A neat example this of the scientific fashion in which warfare is conducted nowadays.

Also, the Japanese took care to strengthen their hold upon Liao-yang by providing it with some useful defences which, although not so formidable as those which the Russians had time to construct on the Shu-shan hills, may still prove effective should the Russians ever succeed in driving the Japanese field army to the south of the Tai-tse-ho in the endeavour to regain their lost military capital of Manchuria.

Before leaving Liao-yang it is interest-

ing to note that among the various paraphernalia left behind by the Russians the Japanese came across a highly instructive "find," a set, namely, of the general orders issued from day to day by General Kuropatkin. Some very impressive extracts from these orders are given by the Special Correspondent of the *Standard*, who says that "they disclose the gravest defects in the discipline and training of the Army, and more especially of the Cossacks. It appears from them that the colonel of one of the Cossack regiments was removed from the command for deserting a post of great importance at the mere rumour of the enemy's approach, and without waiting to inform the force on his immediate front—a defection which endangered the whole movement.

"Two colonels of the 23rd East Siberian Regiment were, it seems, cashiered, for reasons that are not stated, and the Commanding Officer of the 5th Ural Cossacks was dismissed the Service for conduct unworthy of an officer and for habitual drunkenness.

"These are only a few examples of the looseness of discipline in the higher commissioned ranks. Numbers of the Russian officers, it is said, stayed behind drinking in Liao-yang while their regiments were fighting at the front. Many of them are censured by General Kuropatkin for discussing in public the conduct of the war, and the character and ability of their seniors in rank.

"The orders contain repeated complaints of the shameful treatment to which the Chinese were subjected, and the wilful destruction of property.

"General Kuropatkin also calls attention to the readiness with which ammunition and transport waggons were abandoned during retreat, and the serious difficulties such laxity entailed."

When it is added that General Kuropatkin in these orders complains bitterly of the enormous waste of shells by the quick-firing guns "which blaze away at ineffectual ranges and without a definite objective," it will be understood that the Japanese are encouraged in the belief that in discipline and training, at any rate, the Russian Army can hardly claim superiority to their own. Such an official revelation, too, goes far to explain much of the Liao-yang and subsequent fighting, and to enhance our sympathy for a Commander-in-Chief who has to meet a dangerous enemy with troops so badly officered.

We may now turn to the Japanese armies in the field, which, by the end of September, we find occupying to the north of Liao-yang the same order as they did before the battle of August 28th—September 4th. In the meantime some pressure has been exercised on the retreating Russians, but it has not amounted to much, practically speaking, partly because the troops were frightfully exhausted, and partly because between Yen-tai and Mukden Kuropatkin had a fresh force in reserve—probably one First Army Corps under General Baron Meyendorf—which Kuroki naturally hesitated to tackle with tired troops. While, then, the Russians were withdrawing behind this useful screen the troops engaged in the Liao-yang operations, the Japanese Armies filled their empty stomachs and rested their tired limbs, at the same time strengthening their hold upon a new position which had to Mukden much the same relation as had their position on August 28th to Liao-yang. Their right was thrown forward to Ben-tsia-pu-tse to the south-east of Mukden on the road which runs down to Pen-si-hu on the Tai-tse River. They were also in occupation of the Yen-tai coal-mines, and had several


divisions on and to the west of the railway north of Liao-yang. If we compare this with the position shown in the map on page 108 of the present volume, we shall find a repetition such as does not often occur in the history of a campaign, although, of course, there are conditions, geographical and other, which modify the resemblance.

Exactly what the Japanese intended to do by way of following up their incomplete though highly important victory at Liao-yang will probably never be known except to a chosen few. But there is ground for the belief that they contemplated a resumption of the offensive in three columns by way of Pen-si-hu and Ben-tsia-pu-tse, from the Yen-tai coal mines, and along the main road—the Imperial Road as it is called—between Liao-yang and Mukden. It is suggested that this advance would have taken place about September 20th, but that the Japanese were deterred from making it by finding an unexpected increase in the strength of the Russian forces, the numerical superiority of which had been secured by recent large and continuous reinforcements. But it is equally possible that they may have gleaned some idea of what was going on behind the Russian screen, and learnt that the enemy, too, was contemplating an offensive movement. The subsequent proceedings point more clearly to cheerful willingness on the part of the Japanese to allow the Russians to blunder into a hornets' nest than they do to reluctance to attack merely because the enemy had been reinforced. Be this as it may, the Japanese, with the exception of a slight movement at the end of the third week in September, allow the month to pass without any attempt to put Mukden through the same damaging process to

which they had recently subjected Liao-yang. At the same time they keep closely in touch with the enemy, and omit no precaution necessary to enable them to make a swift and effective counterstroke should the enemy be foolish enough to attack them on their long but carefully guarded front.

We must now take a glance at the Russians, who, having retired to Mukden and Tie-ling, take speedy advantage of the fact that their retreat has been accomplished with such comparative ease and freedom from interruption. There is pretty strong evidence that, at one time or another, there was a good deal of confusion during the retirement, which was aggravated by heavy rains, rendering the withdrawal of the wounded and the transport extremely difficult. Apparently it was Kuropatkin's expectation that the Japanese would immediately continue the pursuit, for his first thought seems to have been the fortification of Tie-ling with a view to an early evacuation of Mukden. It is said that at this stage Kuropatkin received a peremptory order from the Tsar to retake Liao-yang, and that in consequence of this he altered his plans for making a stand at Tie-ling, and prepared first to check the enemy south of Mukden and then to march down south. But it is equally probable that it was the failure of the Japanese to press the pursuit which emboldened the Russian Commander-in-Chief to pause in his retirement, and so avoid the further loss of prestige which a hurried withdrawal from Mukden would have entailed.

As a military position Mukden is of little use. South of the town flows the Hun river through a low, sandy waste which stretches for about twenty miles, and south of which, again, there appears



A FORMIDABLE RUSSIAN DEFENCE AT LIAO-YANG: JAPANESE STORMERS CAUGHT IN PITFALLS AND BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS.

to have been a long line of sand-bag batteries. These, with railway embankments affording some protection of the Russian right flank, and a mud rampart covering the suburbs, appear to have been the main defences of Mukden at this period, though we hear later of points in the neighbourhood which are rather vaguely spoken of by the Russians as "strongly fortified." But, apart from these military deficiencies, Mukden is a busy and thriving commercial centre, with a population of over 300,000, and an imposing appearance, resembling that of Peking, of which it is a copy on a smaller scale. The native town lies to the east of the railway station, and is surrounded by sixty-foot walls. It is in the form of a square with sides a mile long, each of which is pierced by two massive gateways surmounted by watch-towers and batteries. The suburbs extend for a mile on each side of the walls and, as noted above, are enclosed within a rampart of earth. The railway station is about two miles from the gates in the western wall, and between it and the western suburbs is the newly built Russian cantonment.

Mukden was the old Manchu capital, and still retains a special sanctity in the eyes of the Chinese, since here are the venerated tombs of the ancestors of the Imperial family. Further, quite close to Mukden, about five miles from the north-west of the city, rises a range of hills which, except for sundry small valleys, runs for about 700 miles to a certain lake near the summit of the sacred "Ever White Mountain." In that lake, according to Chinese tradition, rests the head of the Great Dragon, whose body occupies the whole aforesaid range of hills, and the tip of whose tail is immured near Mukden.

There have been many descriptions of the Imperial tombs, but none more adapted for reproduction here than one contributed to the *Times* of September 22nd, 1904, which states that "due north about two miles from the outer city, on dry rising ground, is a beautiful semi-wild park of common forest trees and bushes, covering, probably, 2,000 acres. In the centre of this park is a grove of fine fir trees, which are surrounded by a brick wall about 600 yards in each direction, forming a perfectly square enclosure. The south or main approach is over a long stone-paved causeway, now overgrown with trees and grass. Near the great white marble *Pai-lau*, or triumphal arch, it widens and crosses a ruined marble bridge over some artificial water, now much filled in with reeds and sedge grass. Beyond a grand gateway, with yellow and purple glazed tiled roofs, stand on either side buildings which were once palatial halls. Within, a wide paved avenue flanked with huge stone monuments of elephants, horses, cows, camels, and white marble pillars, with carved clouds encircling them; houses in which the retinue of the Emperor can rest; a magnificent square tower, with three-tiered roof shelters; a huge white marble tablet nearly thirty feet high, standing on the back of a marble tortoise, and bearing an inscription sacred to the wonderful deeds of Tai Tsung, the conqueror of China, who compelled the Chinese to wear the queue (pigtail), and tried in vain to make their women cease deforming their feet.

"Beyond, and north of this tower, is a high embattlemented brick wall with a strong gateway and guard tower, as of a city. These walls are about 250 yards in each direction. Within their square enclosure are the three great halls where the


worship of the spirit of the departed Tai Tsung is carried on by some Prince of the Blood, or the Tartar General, as proxy for the Emperor, on the first and fifteenth days of the moon, and especially at the solstice festivals. North of this square, and surrounded by a high, circular, embattlemented brick wall, is a huge oval mound of earth, beneath which slumbers, surrounded by all that makes for peaceful, quiet beauty, Tai Tsung, father of the first Manchu Emperor of China. Above this most sacred mound (there is apparently no entrance to the interior) appear the topmost branches of an old elm, still putting out leaves in spring, though badly weakened by huge bunches of mistletoe. The tree is said to be the dwelling place of one of the spirits of Tai Tsung. It was the custom of his ancestors to bury their chiefs in hollow trees. Thus, it is said, were originally buried the chiefs whose graves lie further east, near the Manchu village at Yung Ling (Tombs of the Brave), about 80 miles east from Mukden. To the rear of Tai Tsung's grave mound is a small artificial horseshoe-shaped mountain to guard it from the evil north.

"Seven miles due east of Mukden are about 4,000 or 5,000 acres of beautiful parklike forest, with steep cliffs to the south, under which winds the Hun river. Near the centre of this forest is the second Mukden tomb, the Fu Ling (Tomb of the Blessed), also called Tung Ling (Eastern Tomb), with buildings and arrangements similar to those at the Pei Ling, but a somewhat larger grave mound, beneath which rest the sacred remains of No-ar-chu, father of Tai Tsung. All the spirits hold frequent and social intercourse with each other and with the sacred deities of the Dragon Pool on the Long White Mountain; they travel underground along the ever-throbbing pulses of the Great

Dragon. Hence the agony of the Manchus when it was proposed that the Russian railway should cross over the ridge between the two tombs of Tai Tsung and No-ar-chu. The railway eventually found a convenient little valley."

As may be expected, the prospect of a battle in the vicinity of these extremely sacred tombs is most agitating to the Chinese Government, which makes urgent representations to the Tsar and to General Kuropatkin not to allow these hallowed resting places to be desecrated. The Chinese Governor of Mukden even beseeches the Russian Commander-in-Chief on no account to fight a battle near the city, to which Kuropatkin drily replies that it would be more to the point to refer that request to the Japanese. But Kuropatkin knows well the risk incurred by treating such representations with complete indifference, and, accordingly, on September 22nd he pays a special visit to the holy groves in connection with a complaint that has been made that the Russians have been felling trees there. The complaint is declared by Kuropatkin to be without foundation, and the Chinese Government is notified that the Imperial Tombs are badly neglected, and that the Manchu guardian of the sacred groves has been ascertained to be himself in prison for having sold timber from the sacred enclosure to the inhabitants of Mukden!

But Kuropatkin has other things to think about besides the necessity of allaying the apprehensions of the Chinese concerning the Imperial Tombs. He has a large and rapidly increasing force under his orders, and these have to be distributed with a view not only to future fighting but also to present commissariat possibilities. The recent enormous concentration of troops at Mukden is said



GENERAL KUROPATKIN INTERVIEWING CHINESE OFFICIALS DURING THE STOPPAGE OF HIS SPECIAL TRAIN AT MUKDEN.

to have completely exhausted the food reserves, and the provision dealers following the army have lost most of their stocks during the retreat from Liao-yang owing to inadequate means of transport. There is also a good deal of trouble experienced in the matter of warm clothing, with which the Russian troops are very poorly supplied, and, as the cold weather is setting in earlier than usual, the military authorities resort to the plan of buying Chinese clothing. This is strongly resented by the Japanese, who on several occasions are deceived by the appearance of the enemy in this unfamiliar garb. A point of international law is thus raised, for it is quite contrary to international usage to employ troops so dressed that they cannot be distinguished as troops, and, although it would seem that the Russians have not erred in this matter knowingly, it is generally admitted that the practice complained of is quite unjustifiable.


Notwithstanding commissariat and sartorial deficiencies, the Russian troops

at Mukden and Tie-ling soon pull themselves together after the retreat, and by the end of the second week of September General Kuropatkin is once more in command of a large and fairly compact army. With this he is not only occupying both Mukden and Tie-ling, the fortifications of the latter being still in progress, but is also holding the banks of the Hun-ho and various points between Mukden and Sim-min-ting, which lies between thirty and forty miles to the west of Mukden on the Liao River. The latter precaution is necessary in view of a possible Japanese flanking movement on Mukden along the Liao from Ying-kau, and it is rather a troublesome precaution by reason of the Chun-chuses, who are now beginning to display most objectionable activity in this quarter.

There is no need to follow at all closely the movements of the two opposing forces during the last three weeks of September. It is sufficient to say that no very serious fighting ensues, the most important engagement being one near Ben-tsia-pu-tse on the 17th, which was the result of a

reconnaissance in force by the Russians under Generals Rennenkampf and Sampsonoff. The Russians found the Japanese strongly posted at Ben-tsia-pu-tse, which was well fortified and occupied by "at least one brigade of infantry with 12 guns." General Mishtchenko, at the head of two Cossack regiments, had also been in daily contact with the enemy. On the 20th-21st the Japanese made a forward movement to one of the several passes in this region which are known as Ta-lings, this one being an important position on the extreme Russian left, about fifty miles east by south-east of Mukden. According to the Russian official account this attack was repulsed by General Bildering after three hours' fighting on the 21st, in the course of which the Japanese are said to have lost 700 men, while the Russian casualties were 96 men killed and 270 wounded.

It was this attack, accompanied by indications of movement all along the line, that fostered the idea of an immediate Japanese advance, and the idea continued to prevail until the end of September, when the complexion of affairs suddenly changed. During the last week of the month there were daily encounters of patrols, and behind the outpost screens on both sides there must have been a good deal of activity if only by reason of the constant influx of reinforcements. For the Japanese, as well as the Russians, are making good use of the lull in the fighting to stiffen their ranks. They have also thrown several bridges over the Tai-tse-ho, and have replenished their stock of ammunition until, by the end of the month, they are as fit and eager for "business" as ever they have been throughout the campaign. It is well they are, for the test to which they



THE SACRED TOMBS OF MUKDEN.

Marble Arch and South Entrance into the North Tomb, where lies the father of the first Manchu Emperor of China.

are about to be put is one which could not possibly be stood by any troops who were not both in the pink of fighting condition, but also splendidly "found" as regards every sort of equipment and war material.

At the close of September the position of the opposing forces was as follows: The Russians had two divisions on the Hun river south of Mukden, four divisions at Mukden itself, and detachments guarding Sin-min-ting to the west and a line running eastwards along the Hun-ho through Fu-shun—where there are important coal mines—to the Ta-ling Pass above mentioned. The remainder of the Russian Army was concentrated at Tieling.

The Japanese were in their old order, the Right Army, under General Kuroki, being to the east at Ben-tsia-pu-tse, where there was one division, the remaining two divisions being at the Yen-tai mines. General Nozu's Centre Army, with a portion of the Left Army under General Oku, was on the main line of the railway and along the branch line from Yen-tai to the mines. The remainder of General Oku's force was to the west of the railway.

On September 30th Reuter's correspondent at Mukden telegraphs that the Russian estimate of the Japanese strength is as follows: "General Kuroki has the Guards, the 2nd Division, and the 12th Division, totalling 36 battalions; nine squadrons of cavalry and 108 guns; a separate artillery corps of 108 guns; the Guards' Reserve Brigade, consisting of eight battalions with 24 guns; and the reserve brigades, 32 battalions with 36 guns. The total of General Kuroki's Army is 76 battalions, 18 squadrons of cavalry, and 246 guns.

"General Oku's Army consists of the

3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions, or 36 battalions, with nine squadrons of cavalry and 108 guns; one separate cavalry brigade of eight squadrons; a separate artillery brigade of 108 guns; a cavalry brigade of nine squadrons; reserve brigades, 24 battalions, with 26 guns. The total strength of General Oku's Army is 60 battalions of infantry, 26 squadrons of cavalry, and 242 guns.

"General Nozu commands the 5th and 10th Divisions. His total force consists of 44 battalions of infantry, nine squadrons of cavalry, and 120 guns.

"The grand total of the Japanese Army now facing that of General Kuropatkin is 180 battalions—which, allowing 800 men for each battalion, works out at 144,000 bayonets, 6,380 cavalry, and 638 guns."

With all possible respect for the Russian calculations, it may be seriously doubted whether this is not a considerable under-estimate, in view of the pretty generally accepted facts as to the strength of the Japanese during the Liao-yang fighting, the probability that a large proportion of the wounded must have resumed their places in the fighting line, and the certainty that very large reinforcements have been received during the past three weeks as a set-off to those which are known to have been arriving at Mukden.

The marvellous preparedness of the Japanese Army was, perhaps, at no stage of the campaign more clearly demonstrated than it was at this juncture. In singular contrast to the deficiency of warm clothing among the Russian troops were the admirable arrangements long ago carefully thought out, and now in perfect working order, for affording the Japanese soldiers protection against the impending winter cold. By the end of

September all the three armies in the field had been supplied with their cold weather kit, and it is undoubtedly due in great measure to this circumstance that Marshal Oyama's troops were subsequently enabled to accomplish a feat of endurance in the way of hard and continuous fighting for which it is well-nigh impossible to find a parallel in the history of war.

Mention has been made from time to time in this narrative of some of the more important articles of the Japanese soldier's service uniform and equipment. But at this point it will be specially interesting to take advantage of a very full and practical description of the complete outfit which appeared in the *British*

Medical Journal of Nov. 12th as the outcome of a unique opportunity for examination and report. Miss McCaul, a lady with wide experience of active service conditions in South Africa, and of the working of the British Army Medical Department, had been commissioned by Her Majesty the Queen to go to Japan and inquire into the working of the Japanese Red Cross Society. She had brought back with her the complete outfit of a soldier of the Japanese Imperial Guard, and these, after they had been inspected with great interest by the King,

were placed at the disposal of the Editor of the *British Medical Journal* for examination. Subjoined is a transcript from the admirable report furnished by that organ, which has always displayed an extremely keen and critical appreciation of all matters relating to the

physical welfare of fighting men.

"The complete outfit," says the *British Medical Journal*, "comprises both winter and summer uniforms and under-clothing, over-coats, putties and boots, gloves and hoods, knapsack, water bottle, mess-tin and canteen, a grass-woven case to contain the ration of rice, blanket, portable tent, mosquito net for the head, housewife, bandage-wrapper and identification label.



MISS MCCAUL.

There is even a tin box containing creosote pills, which each soldier must carry and is expected to take as a prophylactic against dysentery. One notable feature of all the clothing is that it is apparently made of the best material. The material for the winter clothing appears to be all wool, and in colour and warmth reminds one of the brownish Jaeger clothing which is well known in this country."

Of the summer kit which, at the period now being dealt with, the Japanese soldier is discarding, but which has evidently stood well a very exhaustive test, the

following is a detailed description :—“ In the neat blue parade uniform, jacket or tunic, plain flat brass buttons are used, but in the working kit buttons are done away with as far as possible, fastenings being in nearly all instances carried out by means of flat hooks and eyes. The


summer jacket and trousers are of khaki drill; the jacket is perfectly plain, and there are no buttons on any of the garments. A strip of white linen is issued to wind round the neck as a collar inside the tunic. The forage cap which goes with this uniform is a marvel of lightness. It has a detachable linen collar to be used in summer, from which hangs a linen screen to protect the neck. This screen being made in three parts—a centre and two sides—allows the air to pass freely. For all uniforms the trousers are made like riding breeches, in that they end above the ankle,

where they are made to fit tight to the limb, being fastened by tapes instead of buttons. Putties or gaiters must, of course, be worn with these. The ordinary great-coat is of thick woollen cloth with bone buttons. It has a hood which can be drawn over the head. A comparatively small detail in the cut of this, as also of the winter great-coat, shows how carefully health and comfort, and therefore individual efficiency, have been considered. The free edges of the

front, instead of being cut straight, slope outwards below the waist, making the skirt of the coat lap over more completely below; it is thus prevented from gaping in walking, and the legs and knees are protected from rain. The front of the skirt can be buttoned back

in order to allow free movement of the lower limbs for marching in dry weather.

“ A mosquito-net ‘helmet,’ or head covering, in addition to its value as a preventive of malaria, is a great comfort in summer, when there are many flies. That issued to the Japanese soldier is made of green netting, stretched on two circles of cane, so as to make a long drum with one end knocked out, into which the head is passed. The two rings of cane are kept apart by a wire spring, which allows the drum to be flattened and buttoned down for carriage.”



CAMPAIGNING KIT OF A JAPANESE INFANTRYMAN.

The winter jacket and trousers are cut plain like the summer khaki suit, but are made of the aforesaid brown woollen material. The “cold-proof” winter overcoat receives special description and warm commendation in the *British Medical Journal*. “Made of thick woollen cloth it has a large collar covered with fur, which is of course inside when the collar is raised. From the middle of the edge of this collar a cotton cap or hood can be pulled out so as to cover the head, and over this can be



PROCESSION AT YOKOHAMA TO CELEBRATE THE VICTORY AT LIAO-YANG.

worn the ample detached woollen 'cold-proof' hood. Hanging by cords from the neck are large gloves or mittens—one division for all the fingers and one for the thumb; they can thus be thrown off, when the hand is required for firing or any other purpose, without being lost. A sheepskin waistcoat with the wool outside is also issued for severe weather. It fastens on one side.

"The underclothing is of similar good material to that of the outer garments, a cotton shirt and drawers for summer and a thick knitted woollen jersey, or sweater, and pants for winter. The ribbed woollen stockings are made without heels, and warm toe-caps are issued in the coldest weather to wear over the stockings to prevent frost bite. These toe-caps are made of a lambswool material like very thick lint, the soft surface being inside. A roll of fine striped flannel of very good quality and about a yard and a half long is issued to be wound round the abdomen, and takes the place of a cholera belt."

Of the Japanese army boots it is said that in general appearance they resemble the well-known "ammunition boot" issued to the British soldier, "but on close inspection they are seen to be far superior. The leather of the uppers is good and reasonably soft, the sole is thinner than that of our Army boot, and is thinned off at the waist, making the boot more flexible in marching. The flat of the sole is studded with iron hobnails, and the toe and heel have brass plates. The boots weigh 3 lb., as against the 4 lb. of our soldiers' boots. For the temporary use of men with sore feet, the soft native shoe with grass sole, such as is used by the 'rickshaw' men and the people generally in Japan, is served out.

"The knapsack is of leather with the

hair outside, its shape being maintained by a wooden frame, and this seems to us to be capable of improvement. The khaki-coloured hemp haversack is divided lengthwise to form two compartments, and resembles somewhat the haversack carried by our officers. A useful addition to the slings supporting it from the opposite shoulder is a short strap fixed in the centre of the top of the sack with a hook to fix on the waist-belt, and thus take off some of the weight from the sling.

"For carrying additional small articles of clothing the soldier has a long sack about 9 inches in width and 6 feet long, open at each end and stitched across at its centre, so as to make two bags. It is worn over one shoulder like a bandolier, the ends being tucked under the waist-belt at the opposite side.

"The water bottle, canteen, and mess-tin are of aluminium, the first two being blackened outside; the mess-tin fits inside the canteen like a tray. The rice ration is carried in the small grass box shown in front of the mess-tin. The copper Chinese camp kettle is a very practical contrivance. It has double sides; the water poured into the outer jacket is heated by burning charcoal in a small stove in the centre of the vessel, air being admitted by the lateral aperture near the bottom, through which also the ashes can be extracted. With this, water can be boiled even in a gale, and the Japanese soldiers have realised its value in campaigning, and use it very generally."

After this somewhat long but surely interesting digression we may return to the Japanese armies actually in the field, in whose attitude, as foreshadowed in the commencement of this chapter, a singular change is now taking place. After the movement on September 20th-


21st, the pressure on the Russian front is gradually relaxed, until it becomes evident that preparations are being made to stand on the defensive. There are outpost collisions in the first two or three days of October, but nothing in the nature of an advance, and about October 3rd telegrams from Mukden state that the Japanese are entrenching along their whole front, and, assisted by a large number of Chinese, are constructing strong defences to the east of the railway.

Meanwhile a contrary disposition is being exhibited on the Russian side. On October 2nd General Kuropatkin issues to his troops an Order of the Day which it is necessary to quote in full, since, notwithstanding the onesidedness of the views expressed, it forms a genuine historical preface to the tremendous operation that ensues:—

“More than seven months ago the enemy treacherously fell upon us at Port Arthur before war had been declared. Since then, by land and sea, the Russian troops have performed many heroic deeds of which the Fatherland may be justly proud. The enemy, however, is not only not overthrown, but in his arrogance continues to dream of complete victory. The troops of the Manchurian army, in unvarying good spirits, have hitherto not been numerically strong enough to defeat the Japanese army. Much time is necessary for overcoming all difficulties and strengthening the active army so as to enable it to accomplish with complete success the arduous but honourable task imposed upon it. It is for this reason that, in spite of the repeated repulse of the attacks of the Japanese upon our positions at Ta-shi-chao, Lian-dian-san and Liao-yang, I did not consider the time to have arrived to take advantage of

these successes to begin a forward movement, and I, therefore, gave the order to retreat. You left the positions you so heroically defended covered with piles of the enemy's dead, without allowing yourselves to be distorted by the foe, and, in preparedness for a fresh fight, after five days' battle at Liao-yang, you retired on the new positions previously prepared.

“After successfully defending all advanced and main positions you withdrew to Mukden under the most difficult conditions. Attacked by General Kuroki's army, you marched through almost impassable mud, and, fighting throughout the day and extricating the guns and carts with your hands at night, and returned to Mukden without abandoning a single gun, prisoner, or wounded man, and with the baggage train entirely intact. I ordered the retreat with a sorrowful heart, but with unshaken confidence that it was necessary in order to gain a complete and decisive victory over the enemy when the time came. The Emperor has assigned for the conflict with Japan forces sufficient to assure us victory. All the difficulties of transporting these forces over a distance of 10,000 versts (6,666 miles) are being overcome in a spirit of self-sacrifice, and with indomitable energy and skill by Russian men of every branch and rank of the service and every social position, to whom has been entrusted this work, which for difficulty is unprecedented in the history of warfare. In the course of seven months hundreds of thousands of men, tens of thousands of horses and carts, and millions of poods of stores have been coming uninterruptedly by rail from European Russia and Siberia to Manchuria. If the regiments which have already been sent out prove to be in-



MASSING OF RUSSIAN COSSACK CAVALRY BEFORE A FIGHT.
One of the greatest surprises of the war up to this stage, at least, has been the ineffectiveness of the much vaunted Cossacks. They have proved of little use in the larger operations, and have been disappointing even as scouts.

sufficient fresh troops will arrive, for the inflexible wish of the Emperor that we should vanquish the foe will be inflexibly fulfilled.

“Hitherto the enemy in operating has relied on his great forces, and, disposing his armies so as to surround us, has chosen as he deemed fit his time for attack. But now the moment to go and meet the enemy, for which the whole army has been longing, has come, and the time has arrived for us to compel the Japanese to do our will, for the forces of the Manchurian army are strong enough to begin the forward movement. Nevertheless you must unceasingly be mindful of the victory to be gained over our strong and gallant foe. In addition to numerical strength, in all commands, from the lowest to the highest, a firm determination must prevail to gain the victory, whatever be the sacrifices necessary to this end. Bear in mind the importance of victory to Russia, and, above all, remember how necessary victory is, the more speedily to relieve our brothers at Port Arthur, who for seven months have heroically maintained the defence of the fortress entrusted to their care.

“Our army, strong in its union with the Tsar and all Russia, performed great deeds of heroism for the Fatherland in all our wars, and gained for itself well-merited renown among all nations. Think at every hour of the defence of Russia’s dignity and rights in the Far East, which has been entrusted to you by the wish of the Emperor. Think at every hour that to you the defence of the honour and fame of the whole Russian Army has been confided. The illustrious head of the Russian land, together with the whole of Russia, prays for you and blesses you for your heroic deeds. Strengthened by this prayer, and imbued

with the consciousness of the importance of the task that has fallen to us, we must go forward fearlessly with a firm determination to do our duty to the end, without sparing our lives. The will of God be with us all!”

The wording of this remarkable document gives rise to various reflections. In the first place it may be doubted whether any of the bombastic utterances thus voiced can be fairly ascribed to Kuropatkin himself, and this doubt supports the theory that once again the Commander-in-Chief may have yielded to pressure in attempting to advance against his better judgment. For it is difficult to see wherein such a shrewd observer as Kuropatkin could have imagined his position to have altered so conspicuously for the better during the past four weeks as to justify the belief that he would now crush finally the enemy who literally squeezed him out of Liao-yang.

It has further been questioned whether it is quite in keeping with the character of one who, in most respects, has shown himself a very able and sagacious, if occasionally mistaken, leader of armies, to make such a triumphant parade of his future movements. Since the French shouted “*À Berlin!*” in 1870, it has not been the military fashion to anticipate too freely the hour of victory, and special caution is usually displayed in such directions by generals who have recently suffered unmistakable defeat. While, therefore, something of Kuropatkin’s fine spirit, his personal gallantry, and his fiery resolution are reflected in some parts of this exhortation, one feels that other hands and minds may have been at work in causing Kuropatkin thus to pledge himself to an enterprise fraught, as will presently be seen, with sharp calamity.

CHAPTER LXV.

KUROPATKIN TAKES THE OFFENSIVE—THE SHA-HO BATTLEFIELD—THE FIGHTING FROM DAY TO DAY—A TITANIC CONFLICT—RUSSIANS FORCED TO RETIRE—JAPANESE VICTORIOUS—SOME THRILLING INCIDENTS.

WHATEVER may have been the inspired source of Kuropatkin's Order of the Day of October 2nd, he was by no means so prompt as might have been expected in carrying out his published intentions. Not until the 5th does the Russian Army in Manchuria begin to take the offensive, and that day the principal feature seems to have been a great religious service in the field chapel at Mukden, at which special prayers were offered up for the success of the Russian arms. The service on this memorable occasion concluded with a sermon by the Grand Almoner, who, addressing General Kuropatkin, said: "Of old the parting warrior was told, 'Return with your shield or on it,' but to-day I say to you, 'Go with the Cross, and in the Faith of Christ.'" If at times the Russian character exhibits unamiable traits, it will be conceded to the Army of the Tsar that it seems never to have allowed the hardships, the terrors, or the preoccupations of a frightfully exacting campaign to lessen its religious fervour or to neglect the full observance of its Church's elaborate rites and ceremonial.

The task which now lay before Kuropatkin and his legions was not dissimilar from that which faced Oyama before he made his arrangements for the final advance on Liao-yang. Nor does the Russian Commander-in-Chief disdain to employ a very similar form of strategy. In fact, by turning the map upside down,

and then shifting the two flanks, one arrives at a conception of the Russian advance which corresponds quite strangely with the actual trend of the Japanese operations against Liao-yang. In the latter case there was an advance up the railway against the enemy's right, strong pressure on his centre, and an attempt to turn and envelope his right. Roughly speaking, Kuropatkin's plan consists of an advance down the railway against the Japanese left, a vigorous attempt to debate with him the possession of the Yen-tai coal-mines, which constitute, practically speaking, the enemy's centre, and to work round his right flank at Pen-si-hu on the Tai-tse River.

A glance may now be given at the geographical features of the situation. To the west of Liao-yang the Tai-tse-ho has two affluents, one the Hun-ho, which comes down from the north after flowing past Mukden, and the other the Sha-ho, or Sand River, which is crossed by the Imperial Road at Sha-ho-pu, about fourteen miles south by west of Mukden. A little south of Sha-ho-pu, some twenty miles south by west of Mukden, a small affluent of the Sha-ho is also crossed by the Imperial Road. This is the Shi-li-ho, which flows roughly from east to west in a very narrow and deep bed.

A correspondent has given in the *Times* an interesting account of the Sha-ho, which, from a point a few hundred miles west, and for a long distance east of the

road, is in some places 500 yards wide and all sand. The actual river is at this season a mere stream which meanders from side to side of the bed, and is nowhere just now more than 50 or 60 yards wide, and rarely more than 3 feet deep. South of the river there is a long series of sand dunes stretching for some miles eastward of the Imperial Road, and generally crowned with trees. West of the Imperial Road the Sha-ho flows through a narrow and very steep bed, with steep banks. There is much deep water and a treacherous mud bottom. Only the railway bridge exists, and a passage of the stream at this point by a great body of troops would seem to be difficult. Sha-ho-pu was once a small town on the north bank, but was all eaten away during the floods of 1888, and its former site now forms part of the deep, open sandy river bed. To the south of the river, along a gully winding from the south, is the present little village, which consists of only about twenty houses, mostly in yards surmounted by high mud walls.

The first few days of the great and protracted operation which will go down to history as the Battle of the Sha-ho are uninteresting and, as regards details, rather obscure.

At first, it would seem, the Russians met with some success in the course of their advance, particularly on their right. By the 9th their scheme was beginning to develop, and the actual struggle began. The initial result of importance appears to have been the Russian occupation of Ben-tsia-pu-tse which, as noted in the previous chapter, is an important point on the road from Mukden to Pen-si-hu, formerly held in some strength by the Japanese. The latter had fortified the place pretty strongly, but, it is said, had

neglected to take into account a certain hill from which a galling flank fire could be delivered on the Ben-tsia-pu-tse position. The Russians, it is claimed—and the Japanese do not controvert this account—duly seized this hill, and made such good use of it in connection with their attack that the Japanese evacuated their position without further serious resistance.

Meanwhile, the Russians had been pushing on against both Yen-tai and the Yen-tai coal-mines, and had further worked round first to the east and then southwards, until, on the morning of the 9th, they were able to cross the Tai-tse-ho near Pen-si-hu with a brigade of infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and two guns. Now General Kuroki not only had a detachment at Pen-si-hu, but one or more to the east of this place. Accordingly this Russian movement meant not only a menace to the Japanese right flank; it involved also a complete severance of communications between the main body and the detachments guarding that flank.

October 9th, then, finds the Japanese in a situation demanding high qualities of generalship. As far as the evacuation of Ben-tsia-pu-tse is concerned there is no particular cause for regret, as it merely necessitates a shrinkage of the Japanese resistance, which is now chiefly concentrated in and round the Yen-tai colliery position. But the Russian movements on the Tai-tse-ho need to be strongly checked, lest they be followed up by attacks in force calculated to throw the whole of the Japanese right flank into disorder.

The Japanese rise to the occasion finely. Although there is only a weak detachment near Pen-si-hu, and the Russians under General Rennenkampf are reinforced



RUSSIAN PRACTICE WITH LAND MINES NEAR MUKDEN.

by another brigade of infantry, 1,500 more cavalry, and eight more guns, the attackers soon find they have their work cut out for them. Before their communications have been severed the defenders manage to let General Kuroki know what is happening, and they then set themselves to the business of offering the stoutest possible resistance. Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon the Russian infantry and artillery by a sudden attack seize the heights east of Pen-si-hu, and, later, capture another position commanding the road. The fighting throughout the 9th in this quarter is described as being of the fiercest description, and the Russian losses alone were admitted to be "about 200." That the Russians were very much in earnest in attempting to beat down the Japanese resistance is apparent from the number of troops they showed in this quarter.

For behind the two infantry brigades and the 3,000 odd cavalry who were actually operating on or had crossed the Tai-tse River, there seem to have been large bodies moving down from the direction of the Ta-ling, presumably with the intention of completing the process of rolling up the Japanese right flank when the fighting in the centre had become more developed.


But, notwithstanding their capture of the two positions mentioned, the Russians may well have been taken aback by the furious reception they encountered. By all accounts they might as well have engaged a full division as this small, isolated detachment, judging by the extraordinary tenacity and hitting power displayed by the latter. Nor were Japanese pluck and resolution to go unrewarded. By 9 p.m. on October 9th a reinforcement despatched by General

Kuroki had fought its way to the rescue of the hard-pressed detachment, and throughout the night a vigilant watch was kept in order to frustrate a possible attack in the darkness.

We may anticipate events in this a little by mentioning that on the morning of the 10th the Japanese at Pen-si-hu made a brisk counter-attack under cover of a thick fog, and succeeded by 11 a.m. in regaining both of the positions lost on the previous day. Exasperated at this the Russian cavalry swept up in a desperate charge, coming, according to the official despatches, "within sword-length," but they were repulsed, leaving many dead and wounded. Later the Russians were reinforced, but the Japanese continued to hold their ground well,

and there can be little question that the Russian failure to make a serious impression on this flank contributed largely to the eventual result of the battle thus fiercely begun.

The remainder of the fighting on the 9th was not very dramatic, the Russians being still engaged in covering the considerable space between the Hun-ho and the Japanese left and centre. During the morning only one division was observed in the centre, but in the afternoon a large column, five miles long, was seen moving southwards down the railway. According to Russian unofficial accounts one Russian force, which had crossed the Sha-ho on the 9th, was engaged during the day at Ha-ma-tung, which lies to the north of the Yen-tai coal mines about



THE JAPANESE PONTOON BRIDGE OVER THE TAI-TSE RIVER.

twenty miles south-east of Mukden. On the hills round Ha-ma-tung the Japanese had planted four batteries. When the Russians advanced these retired southward across a narrow valley which runs east and west, and joined the main Japanese force on the hills beyond. In the fighting round Ha-ma-tung a few Japanese prisoners are said to have been taken. The Russians followed the Japanese across the valley, taking up positions on the foothills, from which the artillery shelled the Japanese forces while the infantry advanced through the defiles.

On October 10th the principal fighting took place between the branch line from Yen-tai to the coal mines and the Shih-li-ho, the little stream flowing at right angles to the Imperial Road, of which mention was made at the beginning of this chapter. On the previous evening the Russian outposts had advanced to within three or four miles of Yen-tai, and at this point the Japanese evidently intended to check the enemy's progress. Accordingly they brought up strong reserves with artillery, and a vigorous duel takes place, the Japanese not only maintaining their positions, but even assuming the offensive after they had thoroughly searched the Russian positions with a well-directed artillery fire. In the evening the Russians fell back across the Shih-li river in order to bivouac, but on the morning of the 11th they recrossed, and fighting was resumed with the utmost vigour.

In the early morning of the 10th there was sharp fighting far away on the Japanese right, some distance beyond Pen-si-hu, at a place called Han-chang. Here the Japanese had an outlying detachment, more, it would seem, for purposes of observation than with any idea of independent action, and the post had

been attacked by the Russians as far back as October 7th. Apparently the solitary idea in the mind of a Japanese officer attacked under such circumstances is to fight and keep on fighting, and the commander of this detachment is no exception to the rule. He resists on the 7th, and continues to resist throughout the 8th and 9th. We have no details of his performances, but it is duly recorded by Marshal Oyama that at 3 a.m. on the morning of the 10th the Japanese at Han-chang made a night attack on the enemy confronting them, and drove them back eastward.

During the 10th no serious movement is recorded on the Japanese left, but preparations are being made to assume the offensive on the following day.

The 11th is a day of close and bitter fighting all along the line. The Russians at ten o'clock in the morning open a severe attack on the Japanese forces at Pen-si-hu, which have been considerably stiffened, and the battle rages hotly in this quarter until sundown without, it would seem, much advantage being gained on either side, the Russians being in considerable strength, and having now some 80 guns east of Pen-si-hu.

In the Japanese centre rather more marked progress is made. To the north of the Yen-tai coal mines there is very fierce fighting, in the course of which the Japanese begin gradually to assume the offensive, but as yet they do not make much headway in this direction owing to the strength of the enemy, and the alternating fortune of war, which for a time places the greater portion of an important position east of the mines in the hands of the enemy.

It is on the left that the fighting on the 11th assumes its most distinctive aspect. Marshal Oyama, finding that

both his centre and right can hold their own, has determined to reinforce his left considerably with a view to a vigorous counterstroke and an attempt to envelope the Russian right. By way of prelude, General Oku's Army flings itself heavily on the enemy to the north of Yen-tai station, and a terrific encounter ensues, the heights being held alternately by Russians and Japanese. The former had General Daniloff, commanding the 6th Siberian Regiment, wounded. The result of the day's fighting in this quarter also was indecisive, but it was unmistakably favourable to the Japanese, who undoubtedly on this day succeeded in putting a new complexion on the battle. In point of fact, the Russian attack may already have said to have failed, for it has been checked on the left and centre, and on the right is beginning to be rolled back. The Japanese, at the close of the 11th, are threatening the Russian right flank and rear, and it is quite clear that, unless some decided Russian success can be gained at some other point in the line, some twenty-three miles in length, along which the fighting now extends, the effect of this pressure will rapidly become serious.

One correspondent, describing the progress of the battle on the 11th, gives a lurid account of the Vorognetz Regiment of Russian infantry against the flanks of which several squadrons of Japanese cavalry made a desperate charge, "but not a man reached the Russian lines, and not a man returned. The Vorognetz Regiment was again attacked by the Japanese, and this time suffered frightful loss. The opposing forces at this point were within 400 paces of each other, taking cover behind trees."

Marshal Oyama is not slow to take advantage of the more favourable aspect

of affairs presented at nightfall on the 11th. At midnight the Centre Army pushes forward in a night attack, and starts well by capturing a couple of guns and eight ammunition wagons, though at the cost of some casualties, including Major-General Marui wounded and Colonel Yasumura killed. At dawn on October 12th the Centre Army had reached the highlands a little to the east of Yen-tai, and had commenced a vigorous attempt to keep the enemy on the move, eventually capturing 11 guns and 150 prisoners.

Some capital work is now done by the Right Army under General Kuroki, which, with some assistance from the Centre Army, was actively engaged throughout the 12th and made considerable progress. Twelve miles to the east of Yen-tai a Russian force of infantry and artillery was enveloped and fled in great disorder. During the day General Kuroki detached a considerable body of cavalry under Prince Kanin with orders to cut off the retreat of the Russian force operating against Pen-si-hu. The latter had made several fresh attacks, but all had been repulsed, and, in view of the tendency to weakness now being shown by the Russian centre, its position was becoming precarious, and towards evening it began to show signs of retreating.

The 12th was a great day for General Oku's Army on the left. After repulsing a strong force of the enemy, the central column of this army occupied on Wednesday afternoon Liu-san-kia-tzu, five miles north-east of Yen-tai, capturing 16 guns. From this point it pursued the enemy, and succeeded in capturing four more guns. The enemy twice attempted desperate counter-attacks, delivered with a gallantry which evoked the warm admiration of the Japanese, but to no pur-

pose. The tide had definitely turned, the Japanese gave no chances, and the counter-attacks were repulsed with heavy losses.

Nor was the complete tale of the Left Army's achievements on this memorable day yet told. General Oku's right column while pursuing the enemy near Shih-li-ho captured five more guns, making a total of 25 guns taken by the Left Army alone, in addition to the 13 which, with some extra ammunition wagons, had fallen into General Nozu's hands.

At the close of the 12th the situation is becoming clear. Any doubt as to the futility of the great Russian attack may now be considered set at rest, for it is quite hopeless for the Russians to expect to resume the offensive unless the Japanese make some amazing error. The Russian right is beginning to be crumpled up, the Russian centre is giving way, and the left at Pen-si-hu is preparing to retreat. The most that can be done is to get back in fairly good order without allowing the successes gained by General Oku to lead to a Russian rout. Early on the 13th the Japanese force at Pen-si-hu assumed the offensive against the Russian left, which now commenced a gradual retirement. During this operation the Japanese cavalry force under Prince Kanin, which had been despatched by General Kuroki on the previous day in the hope of interrupting the Russian retreat, emerged on the enemy's left flank and rear, shattering his reserves, which, as Marshal Oyama tersely remarks, "greatly improved the situation in this part of the field." The Russians, however, succeeded, eventually, as will be seen, in making good their retreat, the hoped-for isolation of their forces in this quarter being doubtless hindered by General Kuroki's inability to detach suffi-

cient infantry for this purpose from his busily occupied main body.


Throughout the 13th Generals Kuroki and Nozu appear to have been engaged in much the same sort of fighting as on the previous day. The Russian centre, although it has now been to all intents and purposes falling back for at least twenty-four hours, has yielded very little ground, and during the morning of the 13th fights with the greatest courage and tenacity, the Tomsk Regiment especially distinguishing itself by the defence of one of the advanced positions. Kuropatkin himself watches the struggle in this quarter, and bears testimony to its desperate character. But not even Russian obstinacy could prevail against Japanese determination. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the Russian centre finally gives way, and the troops composing it retire closer to the line of the Sha-ho, the Japanese occupying the eminences which the Russians have evacuated.

Some progress is made by the Japanese on the 13th, but not sufficient to warrant any sanguine hopes of a successful envelopment. It is apparently in this quarter that an incident occurs which is typical of the extraordinary severity of the fighting from one end to the other of this vast battlefield. One has to say "apparently," for the name of the locality as recorded in the Reuter's telegram describing the incident cannot be found on any generally accessible map. This fact does not materially lessen, however, the grim interest of the story, which is as follows: The Russians had on the evening, it seems, of the 12th occupied the village in question after a brilliant attack which was pressed home so vigorously that the surviving Japanese in retiring left behind numbers of rifles. Shortly afterwards the Japanese artillery bombarded the vil-

lage so hotly that the Russians were obliged to evacuate it, retiring to some hilly positions in the vicinity. The Japanese now resumed their occupation of the place.

try using cut *kaoliang* as cover. Without awaiting orders from their officers the Russians made a magnificent charge, killing their enemy to the last man.

“ On the following morning the Jap-



MAP SHOWING AREA OF THE BATTLES ON THE SHA-HO.

Ordered to retake the village the Russians, among whom were included the Zaraisk Regiment, “ approached under cover of night and surprised the Japanese, all of whom were either asleep or eating. Only a handful escaped. Again the Japanese attacked, their infan-

try advanced to the final attack, sweeping the village and heights with artillery, and driving the Russians out with heavy losses. Of some Russian companies but ten or fifteen men came through alive.”

Even more stubbornly than the Russian centre did the Russian right dispute the

ground with the advancing Japanese, and would doubtless have gone on disputing but for an order received at nightfall on the 13th from General Kuropatkin to retire on the Sha-ho. Evidently the Japanese pressed hotly on their heels, for towards evening we hear of them commencing to attack Sha-ho-pu and Lin-shi-pu.

The weather during the past day and night had been extremely trying. During the night of the 12th-13th a heavy rain and thunder-storm had burst over the opposing forces, and the rain and thunder continued all through the morning of the 13th.

Early on the 14th the Japanese at Pen-si-hu take up the pursuit of the Russian left and drive the enemy northwards for a considerable distance. Simultaneously the remainder of General Kuroki's Army and the Centre Army under General Nozu press forward in a grand advance, and force the enemy to the Sha-ho and beyond it. By the evening of the 14th there seem to be few, if any, of the troops of the Russian centre on the south bank of the Sha-ho, and the positions occupied by the Right and Centre Japanese Armies are held so strongly that Kuropatkin's hopes of continuing the struggle to some definite purpose seem quite illusory.

On the Japanese left the wretched little village of Sha-ho-pu was the scene of continued encounters. While the right column of General Oku's Army was engaged in capturing some useful heights south to the east, the central column devoted its attention to the heights south of Sha-ho-pu, which it occupied during the afternoon. According to Russian official reports the Japanese succeeded subsequently in getting into Sha-ho-pu, but were eventually ejected by the Russians and driven back for over a mile. At Lin-

shi-pu the Japanese were more successful. Part of the central and part of the left column of the Left Army charged the position here at 4 p.m., and captured it after a severe hand-to-hand fight, in which a Russian regiment and two batteries were driven back.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the left column had crossed the Sha-ho further to the west of the railway, and occupied a position at Chang-liang-pau. This the Russians made desperate attempts to recover, sending against it four regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, all of whose attacks, however, were repulsed.

During the 14th, again, the fighting was rendered more difficult by torrential rains, a thunderstorm bursting shortly after noon and flooding the roads.

The night of the 14th passed quietly, and on the 15th the Right and Centre Japanese Armies advanced to the banks of the Sha-ho, driving back such forces of the enemy as still remained south of the river. Telegraphing at nightfall on the 15th Marshal Oyama remarked that the enemy were still in some force on the farther bank of the Sha-ho confronting the Japanese Right and Centre Armies, but not in sufficient strength to give battle. During the day the Russians at Sha-ho-pu had maintained a most stubborn resistance, but in the evening even here the Japanese were successful, and, by nightfall on October 15th, the great Battle of the Sha-ho was to all practical intents and purposes a Japanese victory.

We shall deal in a separate chapter with the sequel to the Sha-ho fighting, of which a daily record has been given above, and may there have occasion to discuss some of the more important lessons of this momentous conflict. But before we leave the present stage of the operations there are one or two supple-

mentary notes and incidents that will more conveniently find a place here than at a future period.

It will be remarked by the majority of readers that the Battle of the Sha-ho is one which does not lend itself at all readily to descriptive treatment. The area occupied by the fighting is so enormous, the space of time over which the operation is spread is so considerable, that it is extremely difficult to make any account at once coherent and picturesque. Practically speaking, the Sha-ho fighting is quite a little campaign in itself, and on that basis would afford material for a goodly volume. If we regard it, as in this case it is expedient to do, in the light of a battle, or connected series of battles, incidental to the war, some loss is inevitable. Either one must miss a good deal of colour and effectiveness in the attempt to make the various movements over a huge battlefield fairly clear, or the anxiety to "make pictures" will both blur the detail and spoil the continuity of the narrative.

The compromise here attempted, namely, a brief day-to-day record with an appendix—of which the succeeding chapter will form part—of such details as are available from various sources, is the more excusable since the sources in question are not wholly satisfactory. Eventually, no doubt, there will be notable descriptions forthcoming of the several phases of the battle. But the cabled accounts, apart from the official despatches, were singularly meagre. We had nothing in the case of the Japanese movements, for instance, to compare with the splendid record of the work of General Oku's Army in the Battle of Liao-yang by the Special Correspondent of the *Times*. Nor had we any account of the Russian retirement half so illu-

minating as that which Reuter's Correspondent sent from Liao-yang itself.

To M. Recouly, the Correspondent of the Paris *Temps*, we are indebted for one of the most interesting bits of information received in connection with the Russian advance. M. Recouly accompanied the Russian left or, as he calls it, the Eastern Army, to the movements of which we have only been able to make a brief allusion in our daily record. The "Eastern Army" was "composed of excellent troops, and appeared to have a most important part to play on the Japanese flank—that is to say, it was to make the turning movement that would force the enemy to retreat. It started from Fu-ling and Fu-shun on October 6th, passing through the smaller valleys running from north to south. Its first engagement was on the evening of the 10th, at Liao-chan-tzu. Its object was to capture the Tu-men Pass (Tu-nien-tzu-ling) in order to open the way to Pen-si-hu, on the Tai-tse River. On the 11th there was a general attack, in which almost the entire Russian forces were engaged. The Russian left tried to rush an almost perpendicular height and was repulsed. The divisions to the right vigorously and successfully attacked some ridges of secondary importance, and succeeded in getting to the foot of the principal position. This was a steep height of considerable elevation crowned with Japanese redoubts. At daybreak on the 12th six battalions delivered a furious bayonet attack, scaling the heights, but they failed to capture the position. Two Colonels and a Chief of the Staff were killed. The fight continued all day. The Russians climbed higher and higher, and the principal positions would have been taken if it had been possible to bring up the reserves.

Unfortunately, they were required elsewhere to check the Japanese offensive, and to fill a gap between the Eastern and Central Armies. Several companies of Russian soldiers remained two days, without food or drink, crouching between the rocks on one of the steepest sides of the height. Yet the Japanese had but a small force, and the two batteries rarely fired."

M. Recouly subsequently left the Eastern Army, and on the 13th passed westward along the whole of the Russian fighting front. The cannonade at the centre and in the west was terrific. The Western Army fought without intermission for three days and nights. The Japanese had massed their principal forces on that part of the field, where they slowly repulsed the Russians. On the evening of the 13th the Russian right wing had given way, and the Japanese were still advancing. The Russian failure was attributed to the slowness of the Eastern Army, but, says M. Recouly, it was impossible to take the Tu-men Pass as rapidly as was imagined.

Of the episodes of the battlefield none is, perhaps, more strangely moving than the following:—While the battle was at its height a wounded Russian officer and a handful of wounded men reported themselves to the General in command. The General stormed at them, "How dare you leave your men at such a moment? Back with you at once. Where is your regiment?" "Here, sir," replied the officer. "What, is that all?" the General exclaimed with horror. "Yes, sir, that is all."

Time after time there occurred terrible encounters marked by almost frantic ferocity. At one point some Russian Grenadiers deliberately threw away their rifles, and with their bayonets in their

teeth climbed some almost perpendicular rocks held by a Japanese company. Both fought savagely hand to hand to the death. Again, Lieutenant Crosdeff, the only surviving officer of a Siberian regiment, arrived in one of the Japanese entrenchments with a few of his men, and the Japanese, having no more cartridges, attacked them with stones, fists, and bayonets.

In another part of the field the Russians stormed a pass which was dominated by two forts erected on an almost perpendicular rocky eminence, and garrisoned by the Japanese. Under a devastating fire the Russians advanced against the rock and climbed up the steep sides, leaving heaps of dead at its base. At last they reached the top, when they were met by the Japanese, who rushed from their trenches and flung hand-grenades at them. Only a mass of frightfully mutilated corpses and dismembered arms and legs reached the bottom of the mountain.

General Kuropatkin himself gave striking proof of cool personal courage. When the Russian centre was in danger of being pierced, and reports arrived that the position was becoming untenable, the Commander-in-Chief mounted his charger and personally, in spite of the entreaties of his staff, led the Petroff Regiment right up to the enemy.

Another inspiring example of personal gallantry was afforded by Colonel Putiloff, who led a magnificent bayonet charge against a prominent eminence formerly known as "One Tree Hill," which appears to lie about two miles south-east of Sha-ho-pu. The fighting was so desperate, and Colonel Putiloff's courageous efforts so successful, that Kuropatkin promptly decorated the gallant officer with the Cross of St. Vladimir, and caused



THE CAMERA AS WAR ARTIST: RUSSIAN TROOPS TAKING POSITION ALONG A HILL-TOP TO REPEL AN ATTACK.

the eminence to be re-named "Putiloff's Hill" on the official maps.

Some terrible accounts of the awful carnage are given by Japanese correspondents. A luridly interesting excerpt from these was cabled from Tokio by the Correspondent of the *Daily Express*, who makes special mention of the incessant hand-to-hand fighting which took place on the 10th and 11th, and "in which hundreds of men were literally hacked to pieces by bayonets and knives. In an attack made by a Japanese column the Russians, after firing volley after volley into the oncoming Japanese, received them with bayonets, and then used their clubbed rifles with the most terrible effect. Dozens of Japanese soldiers were found on the field with their skulls crushed in.

"The surgeons on both sides found it impossible to cope with the never-ceasing stream of wounded. The Japanese Red Cross resources, admirable in every respect, were wholly inadequate for the occasion, so that thousands of wounded men lay on the field for hours, or crawled about in the most pitiful agony, without

being attended to. In this way it is certain that the death-roll has been increased by hundreds of lives.

"The great thunderstorm of Friday (October 14th) added to the intense agonies of the suffering wounded, who had lain all day in the field. The little rivulets that ran down the hills were literally red with the blood of the wounded and dying Russians and Japanese. One of the correspondents, who states that he rode over a part of the field occupied by General Oku's forces, telegraphs that the scene was the most appalling ever witnessed by man. The cries of the wounded soldiers, asking to be taken out of the rain, were heard far above the din of rifle fire. The stolidity of the Japanese soldier and the dumb courage of the Russian were not proof against the terrors of the day. In one place the correspondent came upon a heap of Russian dead piled six deep at a spot where a Finnish regiment had for hours withstood the attacks of the pick of Oku's Army. They had fought to the last man, and their trenches were packed with the dead."



CHAPTER LXVI.

CONTINUED FIGHTING—LOSS OF JAPANESE GUNS—RESULT OF THE BATTLE—FORCES ENGAGED—FRIGHTFUL CASUALTIES—PATHETIC SCENES—COMPARISON WITH LIAO-YANG—A LESSON.

ALTHOUGH, as has been stated in the preceding chapter, the Battle of the Sha-ho ended, to all intents and purposes, on the evening of October 15th, the fighting was more or less continuous for some time after that date. Evidently the idea in the minds of the Japanese was to ascertain by sustained pressure on the Russian front whether it would be possible to push the enemy back not only to the Hun-ho, but beyond Mukden. The Russians, on the other hand, seem at first to have been inspired by a vague hope of counteracting the disastrous failure of the past six days by a fresh offensive. On neither side were such sanguine expectations to be realised. The Russians were to be pressed a little further back, but Mukden was still to remain in their hands. The Japanese were to suffer one smart, if incidental, reverse, but the ground they had won was not to be yielded by them, nor the prospect of recapturing Liao-yang to be brought any closer to the Russians. Both sides were beginning to feel the strain of the long and uninterrupted fighting very severely, and, although such minor combats as are recorded during the subsequent week display almost unabated fury, it is clear that the great battle has, to use the expressive phrase of one correspondent, "worn itself out," at any rate within two or three days of the time-limit—the 15th—

which Marshal Oyama officially puts to it.

During the night of the 15th there was a very sharp encounter on the Japanese left. It will be remembered that the Japanese captured the village of Lin-shi-pu to the west of Sha-ho-pu on the evening of the 14th. The position was an important one, and the Japanese had made the most of it by transforming a large stone temple with thick stone walls into a fort surrounded with ditches, palisades, and barbed wire. On the night of the 15th the Russians attacked the position, and by midnight had occupied most of the village. But the temple-fort proved too hard a nut to crack, although subjected to a nocturnal pounding with artillery. Desultory firing went on for many hours, the opposing forces being only eight hundred paces from one another.

Throughout the 16th the Russians made repeated counter-attacks on the Japanese left, but without any effective result. A village called Li-mun-tun, a little to the east of the railway, fourteen miles south of Mukden, which had been occupied by the Japanese in the evening of the 15th simultaneously with the capture of Sha-ho-pu, went through much the same experience as Lin-shi-pu, and with the same result. Telegraphing on the evening of the 16th, Marshal Oyama mentioned that since the morning the

enemy made no fewer than six counter-attacks against the left column of the Japanese Left Army. All these had been repulsed. "Nevertheless," added the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, "this evening five or six battalions of infantry, with two or three batteries, renewed the attack, which we are now engaged in repelling."

It became desirable to increase the Japanese pressure on the Russian right, and accordingly, on the evening of the 16th, a mixed force under Brigadier-General Yamada, consisting of five and a half battalions and some field and mountain artillery, was despatched to co-operate with part of the Left Army in an attack north of Sha-ho-pu. Coming into line with the troops with whom it was intended to work, this force drove back the enemy, capturing two guns, but subsequently seems to have pushed too far forward. For, when returning to camp on the evening of the 17th it found itself enveloped by eleven and a half battalions of the enemy, who fell upon it with much vigour. A fierce hand-to-hand combat ensued, in which the Japanese centre succeeded in driving back the enemy. The wings were not so fortunate, and were compelled to cut their way out. The most serious loss was that sustained by the artillery, most of the men and horses of which were shot down. Eventually the Japanese were compelled to abandon nine field and five mountain guns.

The remainder of the fighting on the 17th was chiefly in the centre, and consisted largely of artillery fire. On the morning of the 17th the Russians held a position twelve miles south of Mukden on the main road. Just before noon the Japanese found the main road and the village occupied by the Russians, and


shelled them with shrapnel and Shimose powder contact shells, without, however, doing much damage. Towards evening there was a lull, but in the course of the night the Russians delivered two fierce attacks against the front of the right column of the Japanese Left Army, and also minor attacks in the direction of the Centre and Right Armies. All these the Japanese claim to have repulsed, the enemy retreating and leaving many corpses.

On the 18th the exchange of artillery fire continued, but the day was uneventful save for a mishap to a force of Russian cavalry which, while engaged on a reconnaissance, was enticed into pursuing the enemy and lured into contact with a considerable body of Japanese accompanied by machine and field guns. A patrol commanded by Second Lieutenant Turgenieff met the fire of the machine guns at 200 paces, and all the troopers' horses were either killed or wounded. The gallant subaltern, although hit himself, helped a wounded Cossack scout on to his own horse and got away with him under fire.

At this point we will, for the present, leave the record of the actual fighting with a few explanatory remarks as to the position now occupied by the opposing armies. On the Japanese right and centre it is sufficient to say that the Japanese now hold the left bank of the Sha-ho, but to the westward this definition will not serve. For on their extreme left, that is to the west of the railway, the Japanese hold several important positions on the right bank of the river, notably the temple-fort at Lin-shi-pu. On the other hand, a little to the east of the railway, the Russians hold a small *enclave*, about three miles long, of the left bank, at the point where "One-

Tree" or Putiloff Hill is situated. The Russian centre has recently been reinforced, and there is still a considerable

for the present to make any serious forward movement even if it were not utterly fatigued and greatly shaken by



AFTER THE BATTLE: RUSSIAN RED CROSS NURSES PREPARING FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE WOUNDED.

Russian force available to the east and north-eastward. It will be seen then, that something like a natural dead-lock has been arrived at, neither side being able

the fightful casualties of the past nine or ten days. Any attempt on the part of the Japanese to weaken their right and centre appreciably, in order to bring

matters to a swift conclusion on their left, would assuredly be followed by a fresh advance of the Russians on the east. On the other hand, it is only by keeping a most vigilant eye on both their flanks that the Russians can prevent the envelopment against which they have hitherto fought with remarkable skill and success.

We may now turn to the discussion of several facts and inferences concerning this truly Titanic struggle. We have previously noted the Russian estimate of the Japanese forces engaged at the commencement, an estimate which there is reason to believe was under rather than over the mark as regards the number, at any rate of the infantry, at Marshal Oyama's disposal. The probability is that the Japanese Commander-in-Chief could reckon on at least 200,000 of that arm, which would bring it on an equality with the Russian infantry as enumerated in the Japanese official estimate. According to the latter the Russian forces engaged at the Battle of the Sha-ho consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Siberian Divisions, the 1st, 10th, and 7th Army Corps, two regiments of Moscow Infantry, eight regiments of the East Siberia Brigades, five batteries of field-mortars, two batteries of mortars, five batteries of horse artillery, five batteries of mountain guns, one battery of siege guns, and one battery of light guns, altogether 276 battalions, 122 batteries, and 173 sotnias, making about 200,000 infantry, 26,000 cavalry, and 950 guns.

An impressive feature of all expert calculations of the forces at work on the Sha-ho is the extraordinary number of guns. According to the Russian estimate of the Japanese artillery the latter had only 638 "pieces," but this is almost

unquestionably wrong, unless it refers only to field-guns of the ordinary type, and does not take into account howitzers and mountain guns. It is difficult to believe that the Japanese could have had less than 800 and the Russians less than 900 guns, and the grand total thus arrived at is one which will appeal strongly to most imaginations. Indeed, it is likely that the artillery duels at several stages of the battle must have surpassed in intensity anything yet recorded in the annals of shot and shell. As evidence of this proposition it may be mentioned that one French correspondent at St. Petersburg, having access to much official information, declares that in eight days of Sha-ho fighting the Russian artillery fired more projectiles than were fired during the whole Russo-Turkish War! Of the Japanese artillery, by the way, the Russians expressed warm admiration, noting especially the quickness and exactitude with which they found the range. The Russians, too, appear to have improved greatly in the matter of accuracy of artillery since the opening of the campaign. The Hon. Maurice Baring accompanied the 2nd Transbaikal Battery as War Correspondent of the *Morning Post* during the Battle of the Sha-ho, and speaks warmly of its "splendidly accurate" fire during the preliminary shelling of a hill which was captured on the following day and was found to be "covered with dead."

It is, practically speaking, impossible to arrive at any exact statement of the casualties in the Battle of the Sha-ho, because the Russian and Japanese official returns cover periods of varying length. In the case of the Japanese we have an official despatch from Marshal Oyama stating that the total Japanese casualties from the commencement of the Sha-ho

battle up to October 25th were 15,879 officers and men killed and wounded. Probably we shall not be far wrong if we estimate those killed and wounded in the last week of this period at about 3,000 only, which would leave about 13,000 casualties for the period from October 9th to October 18th. The return of killed, wounded, and missing in the latter period, which was issued by the Russian General Staff at St. Petersburg on October 29th, amounted to a much more appalling total, namely, 800 officers and 45,000 men!

Apart from the solemn reflections which are inspired by the bare statement of the results of this awful carnage, it will be seen that the above figures settle once and for all the question as to the reality of the Japanese victory. It has never been suggested in this narrative that casualties of themselves are any sure criterion of success. If they were, the Battle of Nan-shan, for example, would have been a Japanese defeat. But, where one side is attacked deliberately by another side, and not only repels the attack but considerably advances its own positions, captures 45 guns, and, in addition, inflicts losses on the enemy which are to its own as three is to one, it is idle to talk, as the friends of Russia sought to do at one time, of a drawn battle. Surely, then, Marshal Oyama was justified in telegraphing as he did on the 15th: "As a sequel to a fight lasting continuously for five days, we have driven back the superior forces of the enemy at every point, pursuing him and forcing him to the south bank of the Hun. We have inflicted heavy losses, and captured over thirty guns and hundreds of prisoners. We have defeated his plans and converted an offensive operation into a radical failure."

It may be imagined that such ghastly results as those chronicled were attended by some very pitiful scenes, more especially on the Russian side. Touching details of the misery caused by the constant stream of wounded into Mukden were published in the Russian and French papers and transmitted from St. Petersburg and Paris by British correspondents. Here is an extract from the *Daily Express*, in which the state of affairs at Mukden is vividly depicted: "The wounded commenced to arrive at Mukden on October 11th, and the heaviest day was October 16th, when the main road leading to the city was absolutely choked with ambulances, carts and litters.

"So far as possible, preparations had been made by the Red Cross Corps to cope with the inevitably heavy casualty list. When General Kuropatkin began his unfortunate advance, every available ambulance accompanied him, as well as the doctors and nurses who served through the Liao-yang engagement. Still, the facilities were miserably inadequate. A large portion of the much needed hospital supplies were not forwarded to Mukden, the result being that the Red Cross was handicapped in every way.

"Trainloads of wounded were sent direct to Tie-ling, and all who could bear the journey were shipped to Harbin, but there remained thousands of cases which required immediate attention, and these were ordered to Mukden.

"The doctors have been practically without sleep for a week. Several nurses are reported to have actually died of exhaustion, one of them—a Sister of Charity—collapsing while assisting at an operation. The supply of medicines and surgical appliances has run short.

“It is estimated that at least 28,000 wounded men have been treated at Mukden. Scores of them have died before surgical assistance could reach them.”

In the formerly fertile and populous district south of Mukden the effect of the terrible casualties in the Sha-ho conflict was heightened by the increasing cold and the devastated aspect of the surrounding country. Here is a pen-sketch from a Paris paper whose correspondent telegraphs from Mukden: “Uninterrupted lines of wounded and dying are extended along the roads, all of which present the same lamentable appearance. At each step there are rags and dressings soaked in blood. Moving parallel to the stream of wounded are all the inhabitants of the country districts, who are fleeing from the battlefields and coming to seek refuge at Mukden. Women and children are carried in vehicles which convey at the same time the few belongings which remain from their past prosperity. On the one hand are soldiers groaning in their death agony, while on the other are little children perishing with cold. All the doors, windows, and other wooden fittings have been taken from the huts, a large number of which have been razed to the ground, all that remains of them being a heap of stones. Mukden is full of fugitives, and thousands of families who have been deprived of all their possessions are living in the streets.”

With some relief we turn from such harrowing details to the contemplation of the Battle of the Sha-ho in its purely military and historical aspects. It must be admitted that in neither does this tremendous operation appear, at any rate to the writer, to be as interesting or as significant as the Battle of Liao-yang.

The latter not only bristled with big points of instructiveness as to the capacity of strongly fortified positions to resist infantry attack, and the possibilities of an eminently strategic retreat, but it was real history. It showed the turning-point in the war arrived at by the grouping of the three Japanese armies under the personal control of one man; it also marked the consolidation of all the Russian forces under the direct leadership of Kuropatkin. The battle, accordingly, was the first real trial of strength between the two opposing Commanders-in-Chief, and, if it resulted in the partial triumph of one, it gained for the other a greatly increased respect among those who had formerly questioned his capacity for generalship of the higher sort. While, again, it was to this extent indecisive, it indicated the loss to Russia and the gain to Japan of a place only second to Mukden in point of local prestige, and only second to Tieling as regards strategical significance.

The Battle of the Sha-ho loses by comparison in these respects. The immense number of troops engaged, the enormous area of the battlefield, the desperate character of the fighting, the protracted period over which the operation extended, and lastly the ghastly length of the “butcher’s bill,” combine to make it remarkable, and, up to a certain point, both interesting and instructive. But it is a veritable nightmare of strategical and tactical futilities, and, with the exception of the casualties, the result is singularly trivial. A fortnight later the opposing forces are in much the same position, and much the same relative strength, as they were before Kuropatkin took off his coat, like Mr. Snodgrass, and intimated that he was “going to begin.” At the best, the Battle of the Sha-ho, tremendous as




COSSACK CAVALRY UNDER SHELL FIRE.



it is, separately considered, and packed as it is with sufficient detail to fill, as has already been suggested, a considerable volume, is curiously incidental when its effect on the war comes to be considered. Historically speaking, the period in which it occurs is a mere interval employed by the Russians in making a foolish experiment out of which they emerge with fingers very badly burned, but with no hurts which Doctor Siberian Railway cannot heal. As for strategy and tactics, again, there is very little of these in the Sha-ho battle which is not wholly rudimentary. There is nothing, for instance, to compare with Kuroki's movement across the Tai-tse-ho after the First Army had accomplished its share in the first phase of the Battle of Liao-yang, and certainly nothing half so impressive as Kuropatkin's effort to combine a masterly retreat from Liao-yang with the isolation of Kuroki's forces.

The critics appear to have found the indeterminate and at times rather confused character of the Sha-ho struggle so puzzling, that they have hesitated to

state the nature of the lessons to be derived from it. Perhaps, as expert opinion on the subject comes to be crystallised, it will be found that the one great educational result of the battle is a negative one. Surely there could be no better example than this of the absurdity of attempting decisive results in a single operation with armies so preposterously large, and composed of so many variegated units, that control by one man is utterly hopeless. At one stage of the Sha-ho battle one, if not both, of the Commanders-in-Chief was striving to control the movements of a quarter of a million of men, some detachments of whom had been separated by about forty miles, with only the most meagre means of inter-communication. Even the fine co-ordination of the Japanese armies was partially wrecked, while there were days during which portions of the Russian forces were as much "at a loose end" as if they had been in Kamtchatka. This is not war, and it may be doubted whether from any reasonable standpoint it can even be called "magnificent."



A TYPICAL STATION ON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY IN PEACE TIME.

(From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia.")

CHAPTER LXVII.

RUMOURED RECALL OF ALEXEIEFF—A VICEREGAL ORDER OF THE DAY—DEPARTURE FOR ST. PETERSBURG—UNPLEASANT REFLECTIONS—ARRIVAL IN RUSSIA—DOUBTFUL RECEPTION—INTERVIEWS AND EXPLANATIONS.

ON page 196 of the present volume we left the question of the control of the Russian operations in the Far East in rather an interesting condition of uncertainty. After a good deal of discussion variegated by a quantity of intrigue, the Tsar had confirmed General Kuropatkin in the direction of military affairs at the front, and it was understood that there would shortly be two Russian armies in Manchuria over which Kuropatkin would exercise the authority, hitherto nominally vested in Admiral Alexeieff, of Commander-in-Chief. As will be seen, this arrangement is modified later by preparations for the formation of a Third Russian Army for the Far East; but this is a matter which can be reserved for future consideration. What is proposed as the subject for this chapter is the position of the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeieff, as affected by these remarkable changes, and still more by subsequent rather sensational happenings.

It will be remembered that in Chapter LX. it was remarked that, for some time after the great Council of War at Peterhof, at which it was decided that Kuropatkin should be officially recognised as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies in Manchuria, there were many rumours that Admiral Alexeieff would shortly be recalled. Support was subsequently lent to this view by a re-

port that a "travelling chancellery," divided into two departments, diplomatic and civil, had been attached to the Admiral's Field Staff, a provision which naturally seemed to point to an impending journey. But the Viceroy made no sign, and, although it was generally believed that he was no longer considered by the Tsar to possess any military authority, he continued to confer with Kuropatkin, and was by many regarded as the principal composer of Kuropatkin's famous Order of the Day of October 2nd, announcing the Russian movement against Liao-yang. It will be seen later that the Admiral denies the truth of this suggestion with some vehemence, but the allusion to the "treacherous attack" of the Japanese upon the fleet at Port Arthur has such an Alexeieffian ring that it is hard indeed to believe that the Viceroy had not some hand in the production of the unfortunate manifesto in question.

It may, as a matter of history, be recorded that the St. Petersburg Correspondent of the *Echo de Paris* states explicitly that it was known in the capital that the order was "drawn up by the Admiral and forced on the General, who appealed to the Emperor, but was not supported." On the other hand, the correspondent of a Russian paper, the *Novosti Dnia*, who was an eye-witness of the meeting between the Viceroy and the

Commander-in-Chief prior to the Russian advance across the Sha-ho, says that after an interview lasting two hours and a half the Viceroy, in addressing his own Staff, said, "Having examined the plans of the Commander (not Commander-in-Chief, be it noted), I recognise their full significance and correctness." Further, this correspondent maintains that the meeting was of a perfectly friendly character, and was followed by a dinner at which the Staffs of both the high officials concerned were present. The question involved is not, perhaps, one of paramount importance; but it is somewhat unfortunate that Kuropatkin cannot be more definitely relieved from the responsibility of issuing an order the pretentious ineptitude of which is a blot on his reputation, while it would have made very little difference to that of his rival.

There is ground for the belief that during the first three weeks of October the Viceroy was making a pretty strong effort to counteract the influences now being exercised against him; and that, finding success to be hopeless, he endeavoured to arrange that his "letting down" should be as gentle as possible. Such, at any rate, seems to be the explanation of a very remarkable order published by him at Harbin on October 25th, of which the following is the text:—

"His Majesty to-day acceded to my request to be relieved of the duties of Commander-in-Chief, and has appointed General Kuropatkin Commander-in-Chief of all our land forces in the Far East, while retaining me in my position of Viceroy. His Majesty at the same time deigned to favour me with an expression of sincere appreciation of my efforts in connection with the formation of the military forces of the Vicerealty and

their concentration in the war zone, and of my conduct of affairs as Commander-in-Chief of our forces in the Far East.

"While notifying the land and sea forces in the territory of the Far East of the Imperial will, and of the mark of favour graciously conferred by the Monarch, I consider it my duty to convey my cordial thanks to the glorious troops under my command who have taken an immediate share in the military operations for their truly self-sacrificing service, distinguished by many heroic deeds both of men and leaders belonging to all grades. I also express my sincere thanks to the troops which have not yet met the enemy for their energy and indefatigability in a difficult position. I shall always be proud and hold it to be the highest honour that the special confidence of the Monarch conferred on me the command-in-chiefship of the glorious troops which have adorned their banners with fresh glory.

"It is my firm belief that, with God's help, our strong foe will be overthrown by our troops, to the glory of the Emperor and to the welfare of our beloved fatherland."

It is hardly likely that anyone will ever put himself to the trouble of compiling a full biography of the first "Viceroy of the Far East," but, if such a record be forthcoming, surely the above-quoted document will be regarded as one of the crowning achievements of Alexeieff's career. It is practically certain that the wishes of the Tsar as to the assumption by Kuropatkin of the Commander-in-Chiefship were known to the Viceroy early in October, if not before. It is hardly to be doubted that the change was extremely distasteful to Alexeieff, as robbing him of by far the greater part of his dignity. Yet not until the last




Photo : Nouvelle, Paris.

RUSSIAN FORAGE CARTS PASSING ALONG THE MAIN STREET OF MUKDEN.

week in October does he promulgate the Imperial decree, and then he seeks to convey the idea that it is at his own instance that the Commander-in-Chiefship has been transferred to his great rival!

The full extent of the amazing audacity displayed by Alexeieff at this juncture can be realised when it is added that, when the above order was telegraphed to St. Petersburg, the belief at the office of the General Staff was that Kuropatkin was about to be invested with the supreme direction of the naval as well as of the military forces in the Far East. "It is expected," adds Reuter's Correspondent, telegraphing from the Russian capital, "that Admiral Alexeieff will very shortly arrive at St. Petersburg, and that his stay here will be of a prolonged character." In the melancholy history of fallen favourites one cannot recall an instance in which a former "power in the land," well knowing that his reign was coming to a sudden and inglorious end, has asserted himself more boldly to the very last. Typically Russian is, perhaps, the best verdict on a performance which somehow compels admiration of a sort, even though the virtues displayed be only pluck and tenacity of a rather doubtful order. But that a Russian should try to bluff Russians into accepting him at his own valuation, notwithstanding such clear signs of his depreciated authority, may almost be classed as one of the curiosities of history.

Five days after his publication of the order relating to the Commander-in-Chiefship Admiral Alexeieff and his Staff leave Harbin for St. Petersburg, where they are timed to arrive a fortnight later. It is officially given out that the Viceroy's return is due to the fact that his service is needed in forming new plans for the

campaign in Manchuria; but elsewhere the opinion is freely expressed that the recall is a permanent one, and has been brought about entirely by Alexeieff's failure of late to retain the confidence of his Imperial Master. The old adage, *Le Roi est mort. Vive le Roi!* is exemplified in this instance by the haste with which not only high military officials but civil and municipal bodies tender their congratulations to General Kuropatkin. On all sides, save among the Japanese, there seems a general disposition to regard the Viceroy's return, or recall, with satisfaction. The Japanese can hardly be expected to regard the matter in the same light as their enemies, for they are shrewd enough to have perceived that the conflict of ideas between Alexeieff and Kuropatkin hitherto has been all to their advantage. The prospect of a change from this divided authority, these divided counsels, and the consequent occasional confusion, to a strong, coherent system of naval and military control, can hardly be welcome to an adversary who has scored so heavily by the mistakes of the *régime* now ended.

Personally and individually speaking, no doubt, the Japanese are glad enough to hear that Alexeieff has left Manchuria, never, perhaps, to return. For there can be no question as to the bitterness of feeling inspired by this strange man among all classes of the Island Nation. It cannot, of course, be said that, if Kuropatkin and not Alexeieff had become Viceroy of the Far East after that momentous Council at Port Arthur in 1903 to which allusion was made in Chapter XXX., there would have been no war between Russia and Japan. But it certainly would not have been entered on in the same spirit of insolent confidence on the one hand and aggravated

bitterness on the other. Alexeieff personally seems to have lost no opportunity in those early days of behaving towards the Japanese with overbearing haughtiness, and there is no doubt that in the early stages of the war the Japanese would have given a great deal if, as on one occasion seemed likely to occur, their old enemy had fallen into their hands. Toward Kuropatkin, on the other hand, the attitude of the Japanese has always been one of frank respect, just as it had been in the case of Admiral Makaroff, and is still in that of General Stoessel. Chivalrous fighters themselves, they have nothing but admiration for brave and honourable men like those mentioned. For Alexeieff, the intriguer, the bluffer, the lover of luxurious surroundings, the panic-stricken refugee from Mukden at the first whisper of approaching danger, men like Togo, Oyama, and Kuroki could not be expected to entertain any feelings but those of dislike, suspicion, and contempt.

Let us now accompany the Viceroy for a short time on his return journey to St. Petersburg. We have said that he is accompanied by his Staff, but the statement needs some qualification. For apparently his Chief of the Staff has been left behind to take up an appointment under the new administration. At the commencement of the war Admiral Alexeieff's Chief of the Staff was Major-General Pflug, who seems to have controlled what was known as the Vice-regal Bureau des Opérations. For many weeks all the official news from the front came over the signature of General Pflug, but suddenly this name drops out, and the telegrams to the General Staff at St. Petersburg are sent by General Sakharoff, Chief of the Staff

to Kuropatkin. Meanwhile there have been other changes. Kuropatkin's original Chief of the Staff was Lieutenant-General Gilinski, of whom a portrait was given on page 126 of the first volume of this History. When General Sakharoff became Kuropatkin's Chief Staff Officer, Gilinski appears to have succeeded Pflug as Chief of the Vice-regal Staff. It is he who is now being left behind at the front, where such an able officer should be far more useful than in the *entourage* of the returning Viceroy.

One can hardly envy Alexeieff his reflections as his luxuriously appointed "special" covers the thousands of versts which separate Harbin from St. Petersburg. Little more than a year has elapsed since, as the newly appointed Viceroy of the Far East, he had leapt unexpectedly to perhaps the most coveted position in the whole Russian Empire. In the period that has elapsed history has been made at a fast and furious rate, and even Alexeieff must feel that at no single point in the chronicles of events since and including the first midnight attack at Port Arthur, does his own share of what has happened appear a very heroic one. He who inaugurated his term of office by an ostentatious review of the largest fleet ever collected at one time by a single Power in Far Eastern waters, has seen that fleet reduced to a mere handful of sound ships and a scattered array of sadly damaged cripples. He who thought to overawe Japan by parading at Port Arthur some 70,000 troops, and adding 30,000 to the paper total, has seen the Japanese put almost without an effort some 300,000 men into the field which have time and again proved, man for man, a match for the picked soldiers of the Tsar. He who thought to absorb

Korea as a boa constrictor absorbs a rabbit, has seen Russian influence ousted, and Russian troops unceremoniously ejected, from the Hermit Kingdom, and the latter converted into a Japanese Protectorate. He who counselled first the retention and then the relief of Port Arthur at all costs and risks, has seen tens of thousands of lives sacrificed to these futile ends, and now knows well

Imperial favour. Kuropatkin may have failed twice in his endeavours to meet and defeat the Japanese in a great battle. But he has not lost his prestige as the Viceroy has. Russia trusts him, the Tsar trusts him, to restore the balance, and it is not likely that he will be disturbed in the Chiefship, for, at any rate, a long time to come. All this must be inexpressibly galling to the man but for




MAJOR-GENERAL PFLUG.

that the condition of affairs in the beleaguered fortress is, humanly speaking, hopeless. And whom does the world at large, and Russia in particular, hold responsible for these nine months of humiliation and disaster?

Surely these thoughts gain added bitterness for Alexeieff from the reflection that he leaves behind him a rival, if not triumphant, at least for the moment on a pedestal of combined popularity and

whose underhand intrigues Kuropatkin would have been the First Viceroy of the Far East.

It has been mentioned that Admiral Alexeieff was timed to arrive at St. Petersburg on November 14th. But, whether owing to the facilities afforded by the new Circum-Baikal connection, or because he was in a hurry to get home for personal or political reasons, the Viceroy actually arrives on the 10th, and



THE RUSSIAN OUTRAGE IN THE NORTH SEA: THE FIRST SHOT.
The scene on the trawler "Mino," the first vessel to be struck. (See p. 278.)

is accorded what would seem to be a very mixed reception. The accounts differ rather curiously, and the only safe inference is that, while the official welcome was decorously warm, there was some public disapproval exhibited in the streets. For there can be no sort of doubt that Admiral Alexeieff, far from being a popular hero like Kuropatkin, is now being regarded by all save a small band of loyal friends with something akin to marked hostility. Herein lies the weakness of his present position, a weakness which he certainly does not fully appreciate, but which is clearly beginning to cause him and his party some uneasiness.

For, although he at first declined to allow himself to be interviewed, the Viceroy had hardly been in St. Petersburg a day before he unbosomed himself with singular frankness to representatives of the Paris Press. That he should have done this was naturally attributed to the disagreeable discovery that the Russian public were far more anti-Alexeieff than had been expected, and that vigorous effort would be necessary to convert them to a better frame of mind. The Viceregal defence, though hardly convincing, was so remarkable that some of the points which occur in the interviews granted to the correspondents of the *Petit Parisien* and *Echo de Paris* may usefully be reproduced here.

Categorically the Viceroy declared that there had never been any ill-feeling between Kuropatkin and himself; that he had never proffered any strategic advice or tactical counsel to the "Generalissimo," who bore the full responsibility for all his acts; that he only knew of Kuropatkin's Order of the Day after it had been issued; that he had not ordered the naval sortie of August 10th, which had been decided upon by Admiral

Skrydloff and Vitoft; and, finally, that he had never had any difference with Admiral Skrydloff.

It goes without saying that these "comprehensive but belated denials," as the Paris correspondent of the *Times* neatly labels them, are not generally regarded as very convincing. In particular it may be noted that the Alexeieff who is so anxious to disclaim more particularly the military responsibility for what has occurred, is the same Alexeieff who less than three weeks ago was pluming himself at Harbin on having been Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops in Manchuria, and announcing that he had been specially thanked by the Tsar for the excellent services he had rendered.

As regards the denial that any ill-feeling had ever existed between himself and Kuropatkin, the Viceroy must surely either have had his tongue in his cheek when he made this statement, or have been serenely oblivious of the countless witnesses who could affirm from personal observation the direct opposite. Latterly, no doubt, Alexeieff has been disposed to be very friendly with the "Generalissimo," but to suggest that he had always worked in harmony with him, and had never forced his views on him with reference to tactical and strategical movements, is in quite ridiculous contradiction of scores of authentic reports from Liao-yang, and entirely at variance, too, with the actual results of well-understood disagreements. Why, too, it may be asked, should the Viceroy be so eager to claim friendly co-operation with Kuropatkin now, when it would have been so much more beneficial to have repudiated three months ago those stories which were the common talk of the troops at the front?

Scarcely more happy was the Viceroy in his assumption of virtuous innocence of the charge of having assisted to bring about the war. He had foreseen the war, had even predicted it, he affirmed, but had not desired it, because he felt it would be a struggle not between two peoples but two races and civilisations. He had something to say of the Yellow Peril, and seemed more concerned for the effects upon other white races in the Far East than for any risk to Russia, who "was protected by geographic conditions." But we need not follow further this herring which the Viceroy would doubtless like to see drawn across the real track.

Of the Japanese, too, the Admiral seems to have discoursed with some fluency. The Japanese, he thought, prepared their plans so carefully that they often overlooked opportunities of striking rapid blows. He declared that at the beginning of the war the Japanese would, if they had displayed a little more audacity and determination, have taken Port Arthur, as the forts had not been finished. In conclusion, he asserted that, while in April the Russians had only 100,000 men in the field, they now had 400,000, thanks to

the efforts of Prince Khilkoff to improve the carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway.

We need hardly waste further comment on this remarkable communication to the Press on the part of a man who, if not yet disgraced, is at any rate abundantly discredited. Apparently his idea is, as the *Times* observes, "that all is well that ends well, and that an eventual Russian victory will secure plenary absolution for his errors." But the tale of the latter is a long and crowded one, and there are some memories over which the sponge is not likely to be passed when the record of Alexeieff's opportunities and his failures comes up, as it must inevitably, for future historical review. For the present we may leave him to his denials, his optimism, his possible future intrigues against the rival with whom he has always been such capital friends. At this stage there seems little to add to the dry remark of one of the two French journalists to whom the above-mentioned interviews were accorded, that "in anticipating a revival of his influence the Viceroy fails to reckon with Russian public opinion, which will have none of him."



ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

ON THE DOGGER BANK—BRITISH FISHERMEN AT WORK—SUDDEN APPEARANCE OF BALTIC SQUADRON—RUSSIANS OPEN FIRE—KILLED AND WOUNDED—BRITISH INDIGNATION—ROYAL SYMPATHY—GOVERNMENT TAKES ACTION—NAVAL PREPARATIONS.

IN the early morning of October 22nd—only half an hour or so after midnight—the trawlers of what is known as the “Gamecock Fleet” of Hull are peacefully fishing on the famous Dogger Bank in the North Sea, about 220 miles east by north of Spurn Head. There are between forty and fifty vessels in the Gamecock Fleet, each a little single screw steamer, of at most about a hundred tons, specially built for the work, and carrying a crew of eight or nine men. The maximum speed of these boats is only some ten knots, but they are very handy and seaworthy craft, as, indeed, they must be to stand the stress of the terrible weather for which the North Sea has a doubtful reputation. These steam trawlers are, as Mr. Walter Wood, who is an authority on North Sea matters, tells us, “the successors of the old fleets of sailing smacks, whose practice was to spend six or eight weeks at sea, run home for a week to refit and re-provision, and return to the fleet which was always present, though constantly changing in its individual parts.” The modern practice is for a number of vessels to be collected in a fleet, which goes out to the Dogger and stays there for a month or six weeks, the catch being gathered from the fishing vessels daily by steam-carriers, which take the fish to Billingsgate, Hull, and other markets.


A trawling fleet at work, especially at

night, is, says Mr. Walter Wood, “a wonderful spectacle. Everything is done in orderly fashion. At the head of the fleet is the ‘admiral,’ a smacksmen who is chosen by his fellows to guide and order the movements of the whole. He it is who gives the signal to shoot or haul the trawls. At night this signal would take the form of a rocket. On seeing it, the trawls would be shot—that is, got over-board—a simpler thing nowadays with the almost universal Otter trawl than it was in the days of the sailing smacks with the beam trawl. Most of the crews would be below, resting while the trawl was at work, and getting ready to haul the trawl when the ‘admiral’ gave the signal. At least there would be one man on deck, the man at the wheel, and probably another; but the look-out work on fishing craft is not, as a rule, rigidly conducted.”

In the case with which we are dealing, the “admiral” has duly given the fleet the signal to shoot the trawls, and has also indicated, according to custom, the tack on which the vessels are to sail during the night. The weather is moderate, a little hazy, but, from a North Sea trawler’s point of view, nothing to complain of, and sufficiently clear to render it impossible to mistake the character and occupation of the fishing fleet. The latter is trawling on the starboard tack, and the boats are showing the ordinary lights of a trawler, a red, white, and

green lantern on the foremast, and a white stern light. On board some of the boats men are engaged in gutting fish in anticipation of the steam carrier's visit.

of lights come into view, and presently such of the fishermen as are on deck discern the shapes of five large vessels, which prove on closer inspection to be



THE DAMAGED TRAWLERS *MOUNTAIN* AND *MAV* BRINGING BACK THE DEAD AND WOUNDED FISHERMEN TO HULL, OCTOBER 23RD.

The trawlers are spread over an area of some miles. One or two steam-carriers are close at hand, and are filling in the time until morning with a night's fishing.

Suddenly from the north-east a number

men-of-war. Some of the hands on board the little steamers know that the Russian Baltic Fleet has set sail, and, though the fishing grounds on the Dogger Bank would be some thirty miles

out of that fleet's ordinary course, they jump to the right conclusion that these are Russian warships on their way to the Far East. Others of the fishermen believe that what they see is a portion of the British Channel Fleet under Lord Charles Beresford, which has recently been visiting Tynemouth. But the apparition is so sudden as to leave little time for speculation, and in any case there is no need for alarm. Everyone knows of the fishing that goes on in this part of the North Sea, and trawlers are easily recognised by their high bows, from which they run away to a very low counter, this, with the low bulwarks, being necessary for the purpose of boarding the fish. Moreover, there is plenty of light about the fishing fleet, and vessels coming so close as these warships are doing cannot fail to perceive the nature of the peaceful work in which the hands are engaged. The only cause for apprehension is lest some of the big ships should crash into the little ones, and in one or two cases those on board the latter shift their helms in order to give the newcomers a wide berth.

The squadron now sighted appears to consist of five warships, the leading one with her searchlight out, sweeping the sea in front of her from starboard to port. These five vessels steam quietly on to the westward of the fishing fleet, and within one hundred yards of some of the boats. No sooner have they passed when another squadron of warships looms into view, and begins throwing searchlights on the fishing fleet. On board one of the steam-carriers the crew are so dazzled by the blinding glare that they fear they will be run down. "So me and the rest of the crew,"—these are the words of the boat-swain of the steam carrier *Swift*—"held up fish to show what we were, and to

show that we could not get out of the way. I held a big plaice up. My mate, Jim Tozer, deck hand, showed a haddock."

The second squadron does not, like the first, continue on its course, but goes away suddenly to the south-east, thus placing the Gamecock Fleet between it and the first squadron, now about a mile and a half to the south-westward.

Suddenly the still night air is rent with the sound of firing, evidently from the quick-firing guns of the second squadron. The fishermen for the moment imagine that a sham fight has commenced, and look forward with delight to witnessing an interesting spectacle. But to their horror they discover that the firing is not with blank cartridge, but with shot and shell, which pour in like hail upon the poor little steamers, hitting some, and causing the water to fly up all round the others.

The fishermen are, naturally, bewildered. All is confusion and terror. Some of the boats were in the act of hauling their trawl when the firing began. These cut away their nets, get up steam, and hurry away as fast as they can. On board others the surprise is so complete, the shock so awful, that the men's faculties are benumbed, and they seek refuge blindly below, although they are hardly safer there from the shells than on deck, and are much more likely to be drowned if the ship is sunk. There are no braver, more hardy fellows afloat than the North Sea fishermen, but this is work which they cannot understand. Small wonder is it that to be caught thus helpless in a storm of whistling shell produces for a time a paralysed condition of mingled stupor and fear.

The firing lasts, according to some accounts, not more than about ten

minutes, according to others nearly half an hour ; but it is easy to understand how the duration of such an experience might come to be exaggerated. In the period, whatever it is, several of the boats are hit, while the trawler *Crane* receives such injuries that she begins to sink.

On board the *Crane* there has been a terrible scene of bloodshed. The skipper and the third hand are killed, and all the rest are wounded with the exception of

" I turned to assist him, when another shell burst through the *Crane's* side and hit me on the left arm, tearing away the flesh. But in the excitement I did not until ten minutes later realise that I was wounded, although the shell had actually grazed my face and head.

" We believed the *Crane* was being sunk, so the mate shouted ' Out boat.' We found, however, that we could not launch the boat because the winch had




Photo : Gledstone & Bernard, Hull.

A SHOT HOLE IN THE MOULMEIN (MARKED X X).

the cook. Some shocking details afterwards furnished by Albert Almond, trimmer on board the unfortunate trawler, give a painfully realistic idea of what happens :—" I had just turned into my berth when I heard the firing of guns. Going on deck, I saw several ships, which had covered us with their searchlights, and which were all firing at us simultaneously. I ran below again, and was followed by the boatswain, Hoggart, who had nearly reached the bottom of the ladder when he fell backwards crying, ' I am shot. My hands are off.'

been riddled with shot, and would not work. A little later I met the chief engineer, John Nixon. He had been fearfully wounded in the head, and, staring at me, said, ' Who are you ?'

" ' Why, I am Almond,' I replied. Then he exclaimed, ' My head is off.' The poor fellow seemed almost out of his mind. Then I saw Captain Smith lying against the winch, his shoulders pointing to the port side. I took one glance at him, and I dared not look again. I learnt afterwards that his head had been blown off. The third hand, Leggett,

was found at the bottom of the fore-castle ladder with his face blown away except the chin.

“All this time the battleships were firing at us, and young Smith, the son of the captain, was running about crying out for his father. We feared to tell him that he was dead. Two ships fired at us continuously, one on the port bow and the other on the starboard. I believe that other ships were firing at other trawlers.”

The warships having ceased firing, now disappear, steaming away to the south-west. One vessel is descried apparently lingering to see what damage has been done, but, to the eternal discredit of the Russian Navy, no attempt is made to render such assistance to the sinking *Crane* as would have been rendered by the warships of almost any civilised nation in such a case, even had the wretched trawler been a belligerent cruiser. It is left for another trawler, the *Gull*, which has herself been twice hit, to send a boat to the *Crane* in order to take off the two dead bodies and the wounded. By the time the boat has got back to the *Gull*, the *Crane* has sunk.

It is only right to add that, after the first feeling of amazement and alarm to which allusion is made above, has passed away, the fishermen rapidly recover their senses—the prompt help afforded to the crew of the *Crane* is evidence of this—and most of the boats go on trawling as if nothing had happened. It is not surprising that curses loud and deep should have been muttered at the thought of such an unheard-of outrage, and many a grim hope expressed that vengeance would overtake the cowardly brutes who had been content, after wreaking such ghastly mischief on a harmless fishing fleet, to sail away without waiting to see, and in


some degree repair, the consequence of their insane mistake.

On the evening of October 23rd the fishing fleet returns to Hull, headed by the trawler *Moulmein* with her flag flying at half-mast, as is the custom when a fatality has occurred in a fishing fleet. The news that the fleet had been fired on by the Russians flies like wild-fire through the town, and crowds of people flock to the harbour and inspect the riddled boats. The bodies of the skipper and third hand of the *Crane*—both decapitated—are taken ashore, and on all sides there is a hum of indignation, and a chorus of anxious hope that the British Navy will show the Russians that the lives and property of British fisher-folk are not to be jeopardised in this reckless and inhuman fashion.

On the morning of October 24th the newspapers are full of the outrage; narratives by eye witnesses are given at length, and the heart of the nation is stirred to such anger as is rarely shown by the phlegmatic and businesslike British citizen. Of the manner in which this wave of popular feeling spreads itself details will be given presently. But in the meantime the coherence of this narrative will be best served by our turning our attention to the perpetrators of this remarkable outrage, now known without the shadow of a doubt to be the ships of the Baltic Fleet, which, at the close of Chapter LXIII. we left undergoing firing practice and manœuvres at Reval and Libau preparatory to commencing the voyage to the Far East.

At the end of the first week in October the ships of the Baltic Fleet were concentrated at Reval. On the 9th the Tsar arrived there, and, accompanied by the Grand Duke Alexis, who is Grand Admiral of the Russian Navy, and Admirals

*Russian Ships Firing and
using Searchlights.*



Cranic.

Gull.

THE NORTH SEA OUTRAGE: THE TRAWLER CRANE SINKING UNDER THE SHELL FIRE OF THE RUSSIAN BALTIC SQUADRON.
THE GULL STANDING BY TO RESCUE THE SURVIVORS.

Avellan, Birileff, and Rozhdestvensky, proceeded to inspect the squadron, as to the official title of which a slight alteration appears to have been recently made. There is authority for believing that the original intention was to call it the Third Pacific Squadron, the Port Arthur ships ranking, presumably, as the First, and the Vladivostok cruisers as the Second Squadron. Later, however, possibly in view of the doubtful continuance of the Port Arthur division as a recognisable unit of offence, Admiral Rozhdestvensky's command came to be habitually alluded to as the Second Pacific Squadron, and this distinction will be observed henceforth in the present narrative.

The review of the Second Pacific Squadron by the Tsar appears to have occupied the afternoon of October 9th and the morning of the 10th. On October 11th a telegram from St. Petersburg stated that "the Baltic Fleet, consisting of forty-two ships," had left Reval for Libau, but this formidable number was considerably whittled down by a later telegram to the *Echo de Paris*, in which it was stated that the new fleet comprised in all seven battleships, eight cruisers, nine destroyers, and ten torpedo-boats, several of the last-named being armed so as to be able to serve as auxiliary cruisers.

On October 13th Admiral Wirenius at St. Petersburg made an interesting statement to the correspondent of the *Echo de Paris*. Alluding to the fact that the Second Pacific Squadron had not then left Libau, and accounting for the secrecy of its movements, the Admiral said:—

"The Straits of the Belt and the Sound are particularly favourable for an attack owing to their narrowness, which obliges the fleet to proceed in Indian file. We

know that officers of the Japanese Navy have left Japan for Europe. We have to fear an attack by means of mines thrown along the route of the squadron in the Danish Straits. They would not dare to do that in the English Channel, where there are too many neutral ships, but in the Belt a small craft could throw a mine in front of an armour-clad. . . . We have at least 21,000 miles to cover, by the Cape of Good Hope, to reach Vladivostok. At an average speed of nine knots the journey alone will take more than one hundred days. Add thirty more for repairs, provisioning, and coaling. In my opinion we may be very glad if the squadron arrives in the Far East at the beginning of March."


Here we have a repeated indication of those nervous fears, to the existence of which attention was drawn in Chapter LXIII., and the prevalence of which even at St. Petersburg was a poor preparation for such a journey as that which lay before Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Squadron.

The actual start of the fleet appears to have been made about October 15th, and on the 18th we hear of some of the ships anchoring off Langeland, near Farke Bjerg, and taking in coal, while others were passing through the Great Belt. On October 20th the fleet had arrived in the bay south of the Skaw, and on that evening nearly half the ships proceeded to the North Sea, it being expected that the remainder, after landing their Danish pilots, would follow almost immediately. This expectation was evidently realised, the squadron steaming slowly in three divisions until, at midnight on the 21st, two of these came within easy distance of the Dogger Bank, with the dramatic results above described.

Something has already been said as to

the route which it is intended that the squadron shall take, but there is reason to believe that up to the last moment there was dubiety on the subject, even among the Russian naval authorities. For as late as October 20th two different versions of the route were current in Paris, which had, for the most part, been

hesitancy which surrounded the earliest movements of the squadron ; but it is not of practical importance, for, whatever may have been the intentions formulated at the time the fleet started from Libau, there seems no question that these had to be considerably modified in consequence of the steps taken by the British Govern-



MAP ILLUSTRATING ALTERNATIVE ROUTES FROM EUROPE TO JAPANESE WATERS; THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL, ROUND CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, AND THROUGH THE STRAITS OF MAGELLAN.

kept very well informed as to the composition and movements of the squadron by St. Petersburg correspondents. Thus, the readers of the *Matin* were assured that the cruisers would pass through the Suez Canal, while the battleships would go round the Cape of Good Hope. The correspondent of the *Journal*, on the other hand, had heard from the former captain of the ill-fated *Petropavlovsk*, now in St. Petersburg, that the whole fleet would go round the Cape. The discrepancy is interesting, as showing the uncertainty and

ment as a result of the squadron's extraordinary performance in the North Sea.

For it goes without saying that the British Government, well knowing that in such a case it had behind it the whole nation, was prompt to take the necessary diplomatic action. On the evening of October 24th, the day following the return of the fishing fleet to Hull, the following official communication was issued to the English Press:—

“ The Foreign Office have been in communication with representatives of the

fishing industry of Hull and Grimsby, and have obtained from them a full statement of the facts connected with the attack made during the night of the 21st instant by the Russian Baltic Fleet upon a part of the Hull trawling fleet.

“Urgent representations based upon this information have been addressed to the Russian Government at St. Petersburg, and it has been explained that the situation is one which, in the opinion of his Majesty’s Government, does not admit of delay.”

It subsequently transpired that a deputation of fishermen from the Gamecock Fleet had come from Hull by the night mail on October 23rd, and had been taken by the local member of Parliament, Sir Henry Seymour King, to the Foreign Office, where, in Lord Lansdowne’s absence, they had an interview with some of the leading officials. Of this meeting a little detail may be recorded. One member of the deputation showed part of a shell which had crashed through the side of his vessel and was found by him on her deck. Another was asked if he, like his comrade, had any tangible evidence of the cannonade. He replied laconically: “What need? There are two headless trunks at Hull. Several men have been struck and some crippled, at least one good trawler has been sent to the bottom, and the facts speak for themselves.”

The King was deeply moved when the news of the incident reached him, and he at once caused an intimation to be conveyed to Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he desired to see him on the subject. Lord Lansdowne, who was at Bowood, came up to town forthwith, and, after learning at the Foreign Office the facts of the case, as presented earlier in the day by the

deputation of Hull fishermen, proceeded to Buckingham Palace, and had an interview with his Majesty. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, on receipt of intelligence of the outrage, had telegraphed both to the Foreign Office and, significantly as it would seem, to the Admiralty, besides making immediate preparations to return to London.

It was eminently characteristic of our gracious Sovereign that, notwithstanding the preoccupations of the moment, he should hasten both to express his sympathy with the victims of the outrage and to render prompt and practical aid to those to whom the incident meant immediate and substantial pecuniary loss. To the Mayor of Hull the Private Secretary to the King telegraphed as follows on October 24th:—

“The King commands me to say that he has heard with profound sorrow of the unwarrantable action which has been committed against the North Sea fishing fleet, and to ask you to express the deepest sympathy of the Queen and his Majesty with the families who have suffered from this most lamentable occurrence.—Knollys.” Later in the day the Mayor received from the King, through Sir Dighton Probyn, a donation of 200 guineas for the victims of the outrage. The next morning came yet another letter from Buckingham Palace, forwarding £100 from the Queen “for distribution amongst those who are disabled, and for the widows and children of the fishermen who have lost their lives in the recent disaster.” An expression of kindly sympathy for the sufferers was added, and a report desired of the condition of the men who had been wounded. Although no proof is ever needed of the personal tie which binds the King and Queen to their loving subjects, the strong

and simple manner in which their sentiments were exhibited on this momentous occasion—and particularly, perhaps, the directness of the King's allusion to the "unwarrantable" character of the Russian Fleet's performances—made a singular impression on the public mind, and served to enhance the effect of one of

and full compensation to the sufferers. Further, it had been insisted that an inquiry should be instituted with all despatch, and under conditions which should ensure that appropriate action would be taken upon the result of the investigation. The last demand was taken in this country to mean that those found respon-



ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY.

the most remarkable instances of British unanimity on record.

By the evening of October 25th the situation created by the outrage was beginning to assume definite shape. It was understood that in the Note despatched by the British Government to St. Petersburg certain definite demands had been put forward, comprising in the first place the apologies due for the outrage,

sible for the outrage would be adequately punished. This Note was duly communicated to the Russian Government by Sir Charles Hardinge, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, on October 25th. On the same day Count Lamsdorf, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, called at the British Embassy and requested Sir Charles Hardinge to convey to King Edward and to the British

Government a message from the Tsar, who, while he had received no news from the Admiral in command of the fleet, could only attribute the incident in the North Sea to a very regrettable misunderstanding. The Tsar wished to express his sincere regret to the King and the Government for the sad loss of life that had occurred, and to say that he would take steps to afford complete satisfaction to the sufferers as soon as the circumstances of the case were cleared up.

In passing, it is only fair to Count Lamsdorf to state that he himself had previously expressed his deep concern, and had volunteered an assurance that the fullest satisfaction would be afforded. Unfortunately, it turns out that here, as in the case of the *Malacca* incident, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is not in a position to answer for the Russian Admiralty, which, at this critical moment, refuses to communicate the sailing orders given to Admiral Rozhdestvensky, and professes entire inability to reach him with orders or demands for a detailed report of what has happened in his command up to date. Throughout the succeeding negotiations the attitude of the Russian Admiralty is in strange contrast with the far more reasonable and conciliatory tone of the Russian Foreign Office. Its defiant indifference to the frankly expressed opinions even of Continental critics produces, moreover, at more than one stage an uneasy feeling that nothing would please the personages connected with this Department of the Russian Government more than a complete rupture of those friendly relations with Great Britain which Count Lamsdorf has striven so manfully to preserve.

The Continental criticism alluded to is, indeed, frank to the verge of contemptuous ridicule. In France, where there is

naturally every disposition to palliate what has occurred, it is clear that a most disagreeable impression has been created. In Germany and Austria the action of the Baltic Fleet is subjected to the gravest censure, and it is freely suggested that to an attack of nerves, or to intoxication, or to both, can such an extraordinary incident alone be assigned. To take a single and moderate instance of German comment, the *Berliner Tageblatt* permits the naval critic, Count Reventlow, to say in its columns, "The officers commanding these Russian ships must be all the time in an abnormal state of mind, and it is therefore not altogether unjustifiable to ask, as the English are asking, whether a squadron led as this squadron is led, ought to be allowed to sail the seas." Of the Admiral commanding, this same naval critic remarks:—"Rozhdestvensky is known to be an exceedingly nervous gentleman, who gets into a state of boundless excitement over trifles, and it is all the more strange that he should have been entrusted with a post so unsuitable to a person of his character."

But we need not linger to discuss either the Russian Admiralty's demeanour or Continental opinions on the outrage. What is more to the point is the action taken by the British Admiralty in respect of this strange and sudden side issue of the Russo-Japanese War, which has so unfortunately compromised our own relations with one of the belligerents. It should be mentioned that since the *Malacca* incident one important change has taken place in the great Department which controls our sea service. The First Sea Lord of the Admiralty is now Admiral Sir John Fisher, G.C.B., who has recently been Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, and who had previously had charge of our magnificent Mediterranean

Fleet. Admiral Sir John—far better known as “Jack”—Fisher enjoys the complete confidence and respect of the nation, as well as the warm affection of all ranks of the British Navy. He is essentially a practical, vigorous man of affairs, and he came to the Admiralty, in which he had already made his mark as Second Sea Lord, with an open programme of reform, of which the prominent feature is utter and complete efficiency of ships and officers and men.

Although at such a crisis the handling of our Navy depends largely upon the personality of the senior Naval Lord, provided, of course, that the personality in question is a strong one, as in Admiral “Jack” Fisher’s case, the influence of his Parliamentary superior, the First Lord of the Admiralty, who represents the Department in the Cabinet, means much for good or ill. Here, too, in this time of stress, we are fortunate in having as the “Ruler of the King’s Navee” an extremely able and popular official in the person of the Right Hon. the Earl of Selborne, who, though a comparatively young man of forty-five, has already held his present appointment for nearly four years, and has been a Member of Parliament for nearly twenty. Working always in complete harmony with his

Naval colleagues, and admirably qualified to bring their views forcibly and sensibly before his fellow members of the Cabinet, Lord Selborne is well liked and respected for his own sake, and it is certain that there is no self-assertive greybeard living for whom, at this juncture, the British public would willingly exchange their present First Lord.

It was said above that by the evening of October 25th the situation in regard to the North Sea outrage was becoming clear. Perhaps the best and most striking confirmation of this proposition is to be found in an official communication circulated that evening by the Admiralty to the principal organs of the British Press. It ran, simply and significantly, as follows:—“After the receipt of the news of the tragedy in the North Sea on Monday, the 24th inst.,

preliminary orders for mutual support and co-operation were, as a measure of precaution, issued from the Admiralty to the Mediterranean, Channel, and Home Fleets.”

It is presently seen that at the back of this short and simple announcement lies a demonstration of naval strength and preparedness which may truly be classed as the most impressive which the world has ever yet witnessed. For the purposes of the Jubilee reviews there may



Photo: G. C. Bevesford, Brompton Road, S.W.
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FISHER.

have been assemblages of ships more numerous, and the actual readiness and efficiency of the British Fleet on those occasions may have been not greatly inferior. It is also an axiom worthy to be held in constant recollection that a British warship at sea is always, practically speaking, on active service. But there is a distinct and decided difference between any sort of peaceful demonstration and one made in such circumstances as those alluded to in the above Admiralty communication.

It is a far cry from the Sea of Japan to the "silver streak" which has sundered Great Britain from the Continent of Europe. There is yet insufficient cause, moreover, why the British nation should be involved in the devastating conflict which for more than eight weary months has been raging in the Far East. But, when the British Navy is told to make ready for possible contingencies, it must do so in no half-hearted fashion, and the realism and thoroughness of the British naval preparations during the next fortnight are but a little less pronounced than if this country had suddenly determined to make common cause with Japan against the latter's adversary. The only difference is that the steps openly taken are purely naval steps, and are, broadly

speaking, confined to the Home, Channel, and Mediterranean Fleets. In the latter, the measures taken are, as regards fighting details, measures identical with those which would be taken in war, though, naturally, the strategy adopted might have been different had the outrage committed by the Baltic Fleet in the North Sea been promptly construed as a hostile act, instead of being charitably accepted as an insane error.

Moreover, as the whole incident of the outrage springs directly out of the Russo-Japanese War, the naval preparations made by Great Britain in consequence are almost as clearly connected with the history of that war as if they took place in Far Eastern waters. A third argument in favour of a detailed account of the demonstration in question might be adduced from the effort subsequently made by Russia to lay the onus of the North Sea calamity upon the Japanese. Although, then, happily the immense naval power of Great Britain did not on this occasion require to be put to absolutely warlike purposes, its exhibition at this critical juncture forms an episode of the war, as well as a magnificent object lesson of the possibilities of naval supremacy backed up by superb organisation and vigorous counsels.





THE WATCH DOGS OF THE STRAITS.

Line of British battleships, cleared for action, lying off Gibraltar at the time of the crisis.

CHAPTER LXIX.

NORTH SEA INCIDENT CONTINUED—BRITISH GOVERNMENT TAKES ACTION—NAVAL PREPARATIONS—RUSSIAN ADMIRAL'S REPORT—ON THE BRINK OF WAR—A PEACEFUL SOLUTION—CONTINENTAL VIEWS—RUSSIAN FLEET PROCEEDS—DOUBTS AND FEARS—ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT SIGNED.

AT the time the Baltic Fleet was firing on the defenceless Hull fishermen the British Home Fleet was in Scottish waters at Cromarty. It consisted of the battleships *Exmouth* (flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, commanding the Fleet), *Royal Oak* (flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Barlow), *Empress of India*, *Revenge*, *Royal Sovereign*, *Russell* and *Swiftsure*; cruisers *Bedford*, *Dido*, *Essex*, and *Juno*. The *Triumph* battleship was also attached to the Home Fleet, but was at the moment at Portsmouth undergoing repairs.

At various Home ports the ships of the Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Wilmot Fawkes, were refitting, the *Good Hope* (flagship) and

Drake at Portsmouth, the *Donegal* and *Monmouth* at Devonport, and the *Berwick* and *Kent* at Chatham.

In addition to the eight battleships and ten cruisers above mentioned, there were available at home or in reserve eight battleships and four cruisers in commission, with others which could be commissioned at short notice.

At or near Gibraltar lay the Channel Fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, and consisting of eight modern battleships—*Cesar*, *Victorious*, *Hannibal*, *Illustrious*, *Jupiter*, *Magnificent*, *Majestic*, and *Mars*, and the cruisers *Theseus*, *Endymion*, *Doris*, and *Hermes*. Lord Charles Beresford's flag was carried on the *Cesar*, that of his

second in command, Rear-Admiral Bridgman, being flown on the *Victorious*. The battleships of the Channel Fleet were all of what is known as the *Majestic* class, being of 14,900 tons displacement, and a speed of $17\frac{1}{2}$ knots. A perfectly homogeneous squadron, commanded by one of the most renowned fighting sailors in the Navy, and with a particular reputation for smartness and good shooting, these eight battleships of the Channel Fleet constituted perhaps the most perfect example of naval efficiency in existence at the time.


At the time of the North Sea outrage, two divisions of the Mediterranean Fleet were in the Adriatic on a visit to the Italian and Austrian ports in that sea. These divisions comprised the battleships *Bulwark* (flying the flag of Admiral Sir Compton Domville, Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean), *Venerable* (flag of Vice-Admiral Custance), *Duncan*, *Cornwallis*, *Irresistible*, *Formidable*, and *Prince of Wales*; the cruisers *Furious*, *Minerva*, *Venus*, *Pandora*, *Pioneer*, *Pyramus*, and *Leander*, with two gunboats and six destroyers. There were also at or near Malta, at or near Gibraltar, or between Malta and Gibraltar, the battleships *Albemarle* (flag of Rear-Admiral Hamilton), *London*, *Montagu*, *Implacable*, and *Queen*, the cruisers *Bacchante* (flag of Rear-Admiral Sir B. Walker), *Aboukir*, *Diana*, *Lancaster*, and *Suffolk*, with two gunboats and twenty-two destroyers. The total strength here indicated, namely, twelve battleships, twelve cruisers, four gunboats, and twenty-eight destroyers, is rendered additionally impressive by the fact that the whole of the Mediterranean Fleet is, practically speaking, always on a war footing, and comprises habitually a large proportion of the most powerful ships afloat.

Not taking into account the guardships and other vessels in reserve, the Home, Channel, and Mediterranean Fleets, with the Cruiser Squadron, comprised the magnificent aggregate of twenty-eight battleships and twenty-two cruisers, besides smaller craft in abundance. Such figures are of themselves impressive, but they are rendered trebly so by the fact that, with the three great fleets to which they refer, a primary consideration is the "mutual support and co-operation" of which the Admiralty speaks in its communication to the Press, and that this end is extraordinarily well served by the existence of our naval bases at Gibraltar and Malta. Hitherto there had existed in the public mind some misconception of the functions more especially of the Channel Fleet, a misconception favoured by its not altogether fortunate title. The crisis produced by the performances of the Russian Fleet in the North Sea did much to dispel this erroneous idea. Although, as a matter of eventual fact, the Channel Fleet acted in this instance independently, it became clearly apparent, even to the "man in the street," that its graver function in war time might be to reinforce either the Home or the Mediterranean Fleet, according to the requirements of the case, and so to produce, almost without an effort, an agglomeration of strength, either along the nearer coasts of the Continent or in the Mediterranean, such as might well knock, literally as well as figuratively, the bottom out of any probable coalition.

Of the actual steps taken by the British Admiralty to ensure the mutual support and co-operation of the Home, Channel, and Mediterranean Fleets, if necessary, on this momentous occasion, only a brief account need be given. The Home Fleet left Cromarty Firth, and proceeded to

take up its station at Portland, overtime being ordered on the battleship *Triumph*, in order to enable it to join the fleet at the earliest possible date. Work was also hurried on in the case of the six ships of

stores, and the entire Gibraltar torpedo flotilla was commissioned. That portion of the Mediterranean Fleet which had been in the Adriatic, under Admiral Sir Compton Domville, moved down, con-



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE COURSE OF THE BALTIC FLEET FROM KRONSTADT TO VIGO AND TANGIER, AND THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE BRITISH FLEETS AT THE TIME OF THE CRISIS.

the Cruiser Squadron, with the result that in a very few days the squadron was ready for sea. The ships of the Channel Fleet promptly filled their bunkers, and replenished their ammunition and other

centrated at Corfu, and sailed thence to Malta, a considerable portion of the fleet being immediately and subsequently despatched to Gibraltar, which was now on a war footing, the entrance to the har-

bour being closed nightly by boom defences.


It will be seen that, from the very moment the outrage occurred, the British Navy was in a position to bring the "Second Pacific Squadron" of the Russian Fleet to book if the situation rendered such a drastic proceeding in any way desirable. Either the Home or Channel Fleet would have been amply sufficient to deal with such a heterogeneous collection of vessels as those under Admiral Rozhdestvensky's command, and accordingly the Second Pacific Squadron had no sooner left the scene of its disgraceful exploit than it became, to use a happy phrase employed by a correspondent in writing on the subject to the *Times*, "the ham of a strategical sandwich." As far, in fact, as the whole strength of Russia in European waters was concerned, the position became, automatically as it were, so hopeless as to render any but a *q. e. a.* solution impossible. If Admiral Rozhdestvensky had been ordered to fight he had but the option of being sunk by Sir A. K. Wilson or blown out of the water by Lord Charles Beresford. Retreat and advance were equally deadly alternatives, and escape across the open Atlantic was out of the question in view of the necessity for coaling. There remained but two or three Russian vessels fit for service in the Baltic. The Black Sea Fleet might have attempted to force the Dardanelles, but the "Overlord of the Mediterranean," as the Commander-in-Chief of that station has been appropriately called, has always ample forces within sufficiently easy call to deal effectively with any eruption of that sort.

Why, then, all these tremendous preparations, all this massing of ships, all this throbbing activity at half-a-dozen

dockyards and arsenals? Such measures cost large sums of money, and they are apt to disturb the public mind to a dangerous extent. Could not the matter of reparation for the North Sea outrage have been safely left to diplomacy backed up by the normal strength and distribution of the Home, Channel, and Mediterranean Fleets?

The answer to such questions is one which, simple as it is, cannot be easily answered without even plainer speaking than that which was necessary in the chapter devoted to the attitude maintained towards Russia in respect of the war by Germany. Of course, in the first instance, it was a measure of the most ordinary precaution on our part to secure ourselves against the operation of any possible clause, known or secret, in the alliance between Russia and France. We could not afford to take it for granted that the latter would decline to intervene in a quarrel which was none of her own making, more especially having regard to the chivalrous sentimentality—using the word in its best sense—habitually displayed by our gallant neighbours where they imagine their honour to be even remotely involved. But it may freely be stated that in no considerable section of the British public did the idea prevail that France would, in any circumstances, back up Russia should the latter refuse to give reasonable satisfaction for the North Sea outrage. The *entente cordiale* was at its brightest and best during the anxious period which followed that terrible episode, and it will be seen later that not without reason did we count upon France to stand aloof from the support of her ally in a situation in which the latter's position was so wholly indefensible.

But with Germany the case was differ-



READY, AYE READY!

A gun's crew on a British cruiser sleeping at their post during the crisis.



ent. For some years past Germany's naval power has been growing at such a rapid pace that it would be fatuous to deny that those responsible for that growth had hopes of some day disputing with Great Britain the supremacy of the seas. Germany's main fleet of twelve modern battleships was one which even the British Navy must reckon with respectfully as a possible instrument for something quite outside the extension of German commercial aims. We had neither the right nor the inclination to suggest openly that Germany would have been well pleased if at this moment she could have caught us napping, and, by siding with Russia, have produced a condition of affairs with which we might have been unable, even navally, to cope. But neither had our statesmen, holding in trust our enormous and many-sided interests, the right, let alone the inclination, to suppose that Germany would stand our friend, or would even remain neutral, if we came to blows with Russia. In the latter's trouble with Japan, she had preserved a sort of neutrality as regards Kiao-chau, well knowing that, if she had not done so, her hopes of dominating Shan-tung would soon be rudely imperilled. The disarmament of the *Tsarevitch* was a matter of policy as well as of good faith. But at home the tender solicitude displayed by the German Emperor for the welfare of the Tsar's army and navy was, as has

been shown in this narrative, sufficiently marked. Of Germany's feeling towards ourselves we had not received of late any evidence calculated to make us doubt her cheerful willingness to do us a bad turn if advantage and no risk to herself were involved. There was also human nature to be considered. Proud in the possession of an undoubtedly formidable navy, the German nation might reasonably welcome an opportunity of employing it in inflicting a serious blow upon the prestige of the premier naval power of the world. If Admiral Rozhdestvensky's seven battleships had been as up-to-date and well-handled as Germany's twelve, and Great Britain had shown at this crisis any sign of weakness, it would hardly have been surprising if the partiality of the German Emperor for his Eastern neighbour had undergone some remarkable developments.

Accordingly, the British Government, and the British Navy acting under its orders, took no risks, and made its preparedness, in Europe at any rate, on almost the same scale as if we were already at war with two or three Continental Powers of the first magnitude. The Home Fleet stood for the moment on guard, while the powerful Cruiser Squadron completed its refitting, and, although no complete mobilisation took place at home, we may be sure that the preparations for utilising the ships and men in reserve were being unostentatiously put




Photo: Russell & Sons, Baker Street, W.
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD.

forward, and that, if war had super-vened, the Home Fleet would have assumed impressive proportions in an incredibly short space of time. Up to Gibraltar rolled battleship after battleship of the Mediterranean Fleet, ships and officers and bluejackets all in superb fighting trim, and the two last almost pathetically eager for the "ball to open." At the glorious old Rock itself—that grim

White, the gallant Irishman who, as a regimental officer, had won the Victoria Cross for cool gallantry in Afghanistan, and, later, as a General, had successfully held Ladysmith against the Boers in one of the famous sieges of history.

It was at Gibraltar that the naval preparations of Great Britain, in view of a possible untoward consequence of the North Sea incident, were most brilliantly



THE ROCK OF GIBRALTAR FROM ALGECIRAS

memorial of so much of Britain's naval and military valour in the past, that splendid sign of her greatness and tenacity in the present—the hum of war-like preparation was heard on every side. The demonstrative measures now being taken were necessarily naval ones, but at such a centre as this some show of military activity, too, was inevitable. In which connection it deserves to be recorded in passing that the Governor of Gibraltar at this time was that grand veteran, Field-Marshal Sir George

and impressively exemplified in the alertness with which the Channel Fleet made ready for all emergencies. Almost in a flash Lord Charles Beresford's command not merely cleared its decks for action, but, to use a metaphor which denotes the last stage of naval fitness for the fray, prepared for battle. Using his cruisers as eyes and ears, the gallant and popular Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Squadron kept his battleships together, in order to bar, if necessity arose, the further passage of Admiral Rozhdest-

vensky's ships. Nor is there much question that, if matters had come to the stern arbitrament of war, the care and labour expended by this able fighting seaman upon the condition of his ships, and the shooting capacity of officers and men, would have been abundantly justified. But we must not anticipate. Rather let us close our account of this phase of the affair by recalling the characteristic message reported to have been signalled on the morning of October 26th by Lord Charles Beresford to some cruisers detached to watch the movements of the oncoming Russian ships between Cape St. Vincent and Cape Spartel: "Situation critical; good luck."

While the British Navy was thus pointedly demonstrating its ability to back up the just demands of the British Government for satisfaction on account of the North Sea outrage, matters were by no means standing still in other directions. For a couple of days after the publication of the news of the disaster, the British public had to rest content with the knowledge that the British Government's Note to Russia had been duly presented, and with such additional scraps of information concerning the outrage itself as could be gathered from the fishermen of the Gamecock Fleet. Not until the morning of October 27th was it generally known that a portion of the Russian "Second Pacific Squadron," including Admiral Rozhdestvensky's flagship, had arrived at Vigo, and that an attempt would be made to explain the attack on the fishing vessels by the suggestion that there were Japanese torpedo boats among them! Some vessels of the squadron had been previously reported to have put in at Brest, but these had been detached from the main squad-

ron, and had seen nothing of the firing on the night of October 21st-22nd.

The arrival of Admiral Rozhdestvensky at Vigo was attended by some little disturbance, quite apart from the general anxiety to hear his explanation of his recent performances. Notwithstanding the protests of the Spanish authorities, the Russian war vessels sought to take in coal from German colliers in Spanish waters, and, by dint of urgent representations, were eventually allowed to ship four hundred tons each, in defiance of the generally accepted rules of neutrality. Remonstrances were subsequently addressed by Japan to the Spanish Government on this subject, the latter declaring that she had followed a precedent established by other Powers. But the Japanese have long memories, and it is not unlikely that some day the indulgence accorded to Admiral Rozhdestvensky on this occasion at Vigo may be recalled, to Spain's distinct inconvenience. In any case, such precedents as those quoted—presumably the facilities afforded by Germany and France—need hardly have led Spain to depart from an attitude in the maintenance of which she would have had prompt and ample support. The incident is, for the moment, at any rate, trifling, but it is curiously instructive, as indicating yet another direction in which this tremendous war has, to some extent, involved a country many thousands of miles from the actual area of conflict, and not in the remotest degree connected with or interested in the points of dispute.

But Admiral Rozhdestvensky's coaling requirements are of small concern compared with his demeanour on the subject of the North Sea outrage. It would seem that when first questioned upon the incident the Admiral exhibited much



BRITAIN'S SEA POWER.
The great gathering of British warships in the Solent upon the occasion of the Coronation of King Edward VII.

irritability, and declined to give details beyond stating that he had acted according to his conscience, with the object of preventing the destruction of his squadron. He is said to have added that, before leaving Libau, he had made known his intention of attacking any ship that approached his fleet. It should be mentioned in this connection that evidently the Admiral's apprehensions as to the possible existence of mysterious enemies had not yet left him, for all his ships were still cleared for action, and all movements of the craft in Vigo harbour were closely watched by the Russian sentries.


More illuminating than Admiral Rozhdestvensky's veiled utterances was the explanation given by some of the officers as to the Dogger Bank episode. This explanation, afterwards, it will be seen, expanded in Admiral Rozhdestvensky's report, is interesting as the first sign of the course intended to be taken in reference to Russia's responsibility for what had occurred. According to a Madrid newspaper, the Russian officers stated to a Vigo correspondent that during their voyage down the North Sea two torpedo boats were observed between the lines of the squadron. Supposing they had to deal with a Japanese attack, they opened fire. They asserted that they saw guns in two of the boats, and that none of the sailors looked like fishermen. They were unaware that any of the crew were wounded, and they regretted "the mistake."

Not until the 28th was the full text of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's official report available. On that day the Russian Naval General Staff published the two following telegrams from the Admiral Commanding the Second Squadron of the Pacific Fleet :—

1.—“The incident of the North Sea was provoked by two torpedo boats which, without showing any lights, under cover of darkness advanced to attack the vessel steaming at the head of the detachment. When the detachment began to sweep the sea with its searchlights, and opened fire, the presence was also discovered of several small steam vessels resembling small steam fishing boats. The detachment endeavoured to spare these boats, and ceased fire as soon as the torpedo boats were out of sight.

“The English Press is horrified at the idea that the torpedo boats of the squadron, left by the detachment until the morning on the scene of the occurrence, did not render assistance to the victims. Now, there was not a single torpedo boat with the detachment, and none were left on the scene of the occurrence. In consequence, it was one of the two torpedo boats, which was not sunk, but which was only damaged, which remained until the morning near the small steam craft. The detachment did not assist the small steam craft, because it suspected them of complicity, in view of their obstinate persistence in cutting the line of advance of the warships. Several of them did not show any lights at all. The others showed them very late.”

2.—“Having met several hundreds of fishing boats, the squadron showed them every consideration, except where they were in company of the foreign torpedo boats, one of which disappeared, while the other, according to the evidence of the fishermen themselves, remained among them until the morning. They believed her to be a Russian vessel, and were indignant that she did not come to the assistance of the victims. She was, however, a foreigner, and remained until the morning looking for the other torpedo



SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN AND FISHING FLEETS, WHEN THE WARSHIPS OPENED FIRE.

boat, her companion, either with the object of repairing her damage or from fear of betraying herself to those who were not accomplices.

“ If there were also on the scene of the occurrence fishermen imprudently involved in this enterprise, I beg, in the name of the whole fleet, to express our sincere regret for the unfortunate victims of circumstances, in which no warship could, even in time of profound peace, have acted otherwise.”

It need hardly be said that this remarkable report did not meet with acceptance in this country, where the idea of the mysterious torpedo boats moving about among the trawlers was openly scouted as a wild figment of Russian imagination. The fishermen had seen

no torpedo boats, and the suggestion that Great Britain had connived at the use of her ports by Japanese naval officers bent upon thus waylaying the Baltic Fleet at its outset was indignantly repudiated. These details will be dealt with later, but in the meantime a point made by the Prime Minister in his great speech on the subject at Southampton on October 28th may usefully be anticipated. There is no question that on the night of October 21st-22nd the Baltic Fleet was thirty miles out of its course. There is equally no question that the Admiral must have known that the Dogger Bank is always crowded with fishing boats, for there is a note to that effect in the Russian official Sailing Directions for the North Sea. The Russian Admiral then,

as Mr. Balfour pointed out, must have gone "thirty miles out of his course to a spot which he knew was crowded with fishing boats, and there he found lying in wait among those fishing boats two torpedo craft. Why did the commander of these two torpedo craft choose that particular station for preparing their attack upon the Russian Fleet? Why did they choose a station which, from the nature of the case, involved publicity? The very fact that the Dogger Bank is crowded with fishermen—and fishermen of all nationalities—would make such an operation absurd on the face of it, and if these mysterious craft wanted to conceal their very existence from the public eye, would they have gone over the whole North Sea and chosen alone among all the spots open to them that one where publicity was inevitable and certain? And, in the second place, if they had wanted to lie in wait for the Russian Fleet, by what extraordinary powers of prevision did they foresee that the Russian Fleet would come thirty miles out of its ordinary course?"

To this may be added the statement made by Viscount Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador in London, when interviewed on the subject of the torpedo boat yarn:—

"The story is so ridiculous that it is not worth a denial. I would, however, myself ask a few questions which, perhaps, the Russians may be able to answer. How is it possible that Japanese torpedo boats or other small craft could have remained constantly at sea in wait for the Baltic Fleet ever since it was first reported to be on the point of sailing? Is it known by what means such vessels could exist away from bases for food, water, or coal? Is it generally regarded as possible that torpedo boats could make the voyage from the Far East to the British coasts without coaling and without their presence being known?"



Photo: Gledstone & Bernard, Hull.
EFFECT OF SHELL FIRE ON THE TRAWLER
MOULMEIN.

While cold logic made it difficult for the British public to regard Admiral Rozhdestvensky's two torpedo boats as anything but pure fancy, the receipt even of this doubtful explanation produced at once a great revulsion of feeling in St. Petersburg. Here there had previously prevailed a pretty general apprehension lest the culpability of the Baltic Fleet should prove beyond question. The story of the torpedo boats came as an immense relief to the Russian public mind, and several of the St. Petersburg papers waxed very eloquent over "the presentation of indisputable facts which justify the action of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, not only in our eyes, but in the

eyes of every impartial observer on the European Continent." "The lessons of the first days of the war," the *Novoe Vremya* went on to observe, "have not been wasted, and the new and treacherous attack by the Japanese has been met by the vigilant and pitiless eye of our Admiral and the straight fire of our guns!"

It is a little unfortunate that, while these and similar vapourings were being indulged in in St. Petersburg, news should be received of other, though happily not so tragic, instances in which the Russians, while still in Danish waters, had displayed extraordinary nervousness and a ferocious readiness to regard the most harmless craft as treacherous enemies. Throughout October 21st in particular, Russian imagination appears to have run riot in conjuring up fictitious foes. Thus, according to a statement made by the captain of the Swedish steamer *Aldebaran*, that vessel was, on the evening on which the North Sea outrage occurred, chased by a foreign warship, apparently a cruiser of the Russian Fleet, which threw her searchlights upon her. The cruiser then increased her speed, and, passing the *Aldebaran*, fired a shot, which, however, did no damage. The *Aldebaran* now hoisted her flag, but did not stop. The cruiser again threw its searchlights upon the *Aldebaran*, and in a few minutes poured a perfect hail of bullets all around her, but without hitting her. The cap-

tain now gave orders for the steamer to be stopped, and took refuge with his men below. The foreign warship thereupon disappeared in the darkness. The *Aldebaran* luckily sustained no damage, notwithstanding the "straight fire" of the Russian guns of which the *Novoe Vremya* speaks so proudly.

Another unpleasant experience was undergone by the German trawler *Sonntag*, the skipper of which reported as follows:—"On the 21st we were off the Hornsriff fishing grounds, on the west coast of Jutland. In the morning five large Russian ships passed, and in the evening nine more. To the north of us was a large cargo steamer. At half-past eight searchlights were thrown on us; immediately afterwards the first shells fell in our vicinity. A Russian ship fired in all directions, and as many




Photo: Gledstone & Bernard, Hull.

SHOT HOLES ON THE TRAWLER *M/V*.

as eighty shots a minute. About half-past nine the cargo steamer came near us, and drew the fire upon herself. By the rays of the searchlight we could see the shells falling close to this steamer;

we then observed to the south a second searchlight, and noticed shells falling near the ship which was firing at us. We sustained no damage. After eleven o'clock the shells ceased coming." Here, again, the shooting of the Russian naval gunners seems to have been temporarily a little at fault.

Before leaving this section of a thorny and painful subject, it is desirable to draw attention to a very remarkable narrative published by the *Daily Mail*, in which the North Sea incident is vividly described by a steward on board one of the Russian ships. This curiously realistic account was procured by the Special Correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, Mr. Edgar Wallace, who was at Vigo during the visit of the Russian Squadron. The statement, in which, for obvious reasons, the names are suppressed, is of such unique interest that it is here reproduced *verbatim* :—

"I am a wardroom steward on the Russian battleship ——. On the night of the attack in the North Sea I was on duty in the pantry cleaning glass after dinner. I afterwards went into the mess-room, where I found six officers seated and playing cards. Nobody on board the vessel was drunk that evening, except one of the under officers in the men's quarters.

"I was engaged in writing when a midshipman rushed into the messroom, and exclaimed in most excited tones, 'The Japanese are attacking us!'

"All the officers immediately rushed on deck. I remained below. Some little time afterwards a sailor came down to me and said that Lieutenant — wanted me to bring up on deck two glasses of brandy. I went up with the brandy, and just as I reached the upper deck I heard shooting.

"All the sailors on deck were lying down on their faces, and the officers were all under cover. I must admit that I was very much frightened, for the officers were greatly excited, and were all talking together at the top of their voices. Midshipman B—— was waving his drawn sword, crying out, 'The Japanese!'

"I took the brandy to the lieutenant, who told me that I was to remain on deck, as I might be wanted. Looking over the side of the vessel I could see nothing, as there was a thin fog on the counter, but I could plainly discern the signals made by the flagship.

"I heard one of the marine officers say that four Japanese torpedo boats had attacked the fleet. At that moment all the ships were firing.

"We fired several rounds from two small guns, and very soon afterwards, under the glare of our searchlights, I perceived the enemy. There were a number of small torpedo boats, about twenty, I should say, at a distance of less than a kilometre (1,100 yards) from us. We continued firing for about ten minutes, and passed the enemy without sustaining any damage.

"During the whole of that night the entire crew stood to the guns. At daylight speed was reduced, and divers went over the side of the vessel to ascertain what injury, if any, had been done to her.

"On Sunday (October 23rd) the flagship signalled by means of the secret code, and orders were subsequently issued calling attention to the regulations prohibiting sailors and soldiers from imparting military secrets to any of their relatives or friends.

"On Wednesday an order was issued that any man speaking, writing, or

having any communication whatever with relatives or friends on the subject of Friday night's incident would be summarily dealt with under the provisions of the penal code.

"You ask me whether our officers were not drunk. They were not drunk, as I have already said, but they were very much excited, and one of the lieutenants fainted from sheer excitement."

Comparison of this personal narrative with the official report furnished by Admiral Rozhdestvensky certainly favours the theory that the nervous fears of the Russian sailors were at their height during the passage of the fleet through the North Sea, and the discrepancy between the Admiral's two torpedo boats, the marine officer's four, and the steward's twenty, seems to point clearly to inability to distinguish between a trawler or equally pacific steam carrier and a "chooser of the slain."

On October 27th the two men killed on board the trawler *Crane* were buried at Hull. The bodies were followed to the grave by a long procession of mourners, and the simple funeral was watched by many thousands of deeply moved spectators. The same evening the Mayor of Hull received from the Mayor of Tokio a cablegram, asking him to accept the profound sympathy of the inhabitants of the Japanese capital for the victims of the Russian outrages and their bereaved families. History and human nature are both condensed in this timely and feeling despatch, which showed with curious distinctness how, though "East is East and West is West," the twain can sometimes meet.

The 27th and 28th were anxious days for the country. On the 27th a Cabinet Council was held at which, it was understood, Admiral Rozhdestvensky's report

was discussed, and at the close of the day the Press was informed that the British demands had not yet been satisfactorily complied with, and that no public announcement was yet possible. Meanwhile the British naval preparations, as we have seen, progressed rapidly, and the nation, although assuredly in no Jingo spirit, made ready to hear the worst.


On October 30th another Cabinet Council was held, and the same evening Mr. Balfour made an eagerly looked-for statement at a meeting of the National Union Conservative Associations at Southampton. At the opening of this historic speech, the Premier dwelt with satisfaction on a previous utterance of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in which the Leader of the Opposition had finely enunciated the doctrine that in a matter such as the North Sea incident there could be no question of party feeling. Mr. Balfour went on to say that happily what he himself had to say on the subject of the situation created by the outrage was of a favourable complexion. After recapitulating and commenting on what had occurred, Mr. Balfour stated that the Russian Government had now ordered the detention at Vigo of that part of the Baltic Fleet which was concerned in the North Sea incident, in order that the naval authorities might ascertain what officers were responsible for it. These officers and any material witnesses would not proceed with the fleet on its voyage to the Far East. An inquiry would be instituted into the fact, an International Commission of the kind provided for by the Hague Convention would be held, "and any person found guilty by this tribunal would be tried and punished adequately." These arrangements were, Mr. Balfour

was careful to remark, supplementary to the regrets expressed and promises of liberal compensation made by the Tsar and the Russian Government.

"I think we must admit," said Mr. Balfour in the course of a striking peroration, "that the Russian Government has shown an enlightened desire that truth and justice in this matter shall prevail. Only a few hours ago I should myself have taken a very gloomy view of the possibilities of a satisfactory, and, therefore, a peaceful solution of this question. I think the Tsar has shown himself an enlightened judge of what is right in this matter as between nation and nation. We, after all, have asked nothing of others that I believe we should not gladly have granted had we been in their place. We have shown no desire—and I do not think such desire was present in the heart of any man—to take advantage of what might, perhaps, be thought Russia's difficulties, to enforce our demands. We have appealed simply to justice, to equity, to the principles which ought to govern good relations between nation and nation, and we have not appealed in vain. It might have been otherwise. We might have seen the delay of diplomacy intervene. We might have seen one excuse urged after another, until either the Russian Fleet had vanished into the Far East, or until other things had occurred. That we have not seen this is due, I hope, in part, to the justice and moderation of our requests. It is also due to the far-sighted wisdom of the Emperor. The world has now got its eyes concentrated on one great warlike tragedy moving through its appointed course in the Far East. It would have been appalling, but it was not at one time impossible, that that great world-tragedy should have been doubt-

by another, and that we should have seen the greatest calamity which could befall mankind—a struggle between two first-class Powers. Speaking for the Government, I may say that we have done all we could, consistently with national honour, to avert that calamity. I, speaking for my colleagues, gladly grant that we have been met in a like spirit by the Government with which we have had dealings."

It goes without saying that the announcement made by Mr. Balfour was received throughout the country with feelings of profound relief. Conscious of the strength of its position, resolute in its determination not to allow the outrage to pass into the limbo of purely diplomatic controversy, confident in the capacity of the Navy to take what warlike steps might be necessary, the nation naturally shrank from the thought of becoming so soon involved in another devastating war. The conflict in South Africa had caused such countless bereavements, had been attended by such grave financial, industrial, and commercial depression, was even now an open sore in thousands of saddened homes and shattered businesses, that a peaceful, if honourable outcome of the present crisis was intensely welcome. For, although it was understood that the cloud had not yet rolled away, it was felt that the trouble had assumed a different aspect. Mr. Balfour's speech had shown clearly that, at one stage during the past few days, the situation had, indeed, been extraordinarily critical, and that a score of things might have occurred to precipitate a "locking of horns," from which no extrication would have been possible until a terrible end had been reached. That tense condition of affairs was over, and with the continuance of such sensible



MR. BALFOUR SPEAKING AT SOUTHAMPTON.

and enlightened counsels as had already prevailed on both sides, a completely satisfactory solution of the difficulty might surely be hoped for.

This satisfaction and hopefulness on the part of the British public were considerably enhanced by the discovery that the settlement arrived at had been greatly assisted by the good offices of France.

No sooner had

Mr. Balfour's announcement become generally known than evidence began to accumulate that our neighbours across the Channel had acted from the first a part in reference to the outrage which was splendidly worthy of a great and high-minded nation. Promptly perceiving that war between their allies and their friends would be a calamity second only to a war in which they them-

selves were implicated, the French Government set themselves to make every possible effort to bring about a better understanding, and the consummate friendliness and tact displayed to this honourable end will always remain one of the brightest features of the incident. It will, perhaps, never be generally known exactly what steps were taken by M. Delcassé, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to

produce a *rapprochement* in place of the extremely dangerous situation which at one time undoubtedly existed. But there is no question, and on no side has there been any disposition to raise a question, as to the immense importance of the good offices of France on this occasion, good offices which were the more significant in that they were rendered on the

eve of the discussion of the Anglo-French agreement in the French Parliament.

On the Continent generally, the news that Great Britain and Russia had come to an arrangement with reference to the North Sea outrage was received with marked gratification. In Austria and Italy, particularly, there was great rejoicing over the prospect of a peaceful solution of a difficulty which had caused

grave forebodings. The Austrians appear to have specially admired the spectacle of the numerous and powerful British squadrons "assembling at a few hours' notice, and clearing for action without flurry or mishap," a spectacle rightly regarded in Vienna as far more impressive than organised parades of strength, like the Jubilee naval reviews. This sight, to quote the Vienna correspondent of the *Times*, was expected to work as a most salutary reminder in




Photo: Abdullah Frères, Constantinople.

M. PAUL CAMBON, FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.

quarters where the reminder was sorely needed; while friends of England rejoiced to see that the British Navy, which they regarded as the solidest guarantee of liberty and justice in the world, should have been ready at a moment's notice to emphasise the principle that wanton wrong-doing on the high seas shall not go unpunished. The *Tribuna* of Rome went further, and declared that England had acquired a new right to be considered the natural champion of justice and humanity. "Such a result," it observed, "is well worth a slight sacrifice of *amour-propre*; one may say that England has won two battles, of which certainly the most glorious is that which she has won over herself."

Even Germany was not behindhand in acknowledging that the issue of the negotiations redounded to the credit of the British Government, "which had an altogether exceptionally strong case, but exercised the greatest moderation and wisdom in pressing it upon the Russian Government." At the same time the feeling was expressed in some circles in Berlin that England had lost a golden opportunity of crushing her traditional enemy, that the outrage would leave behind it a residuum of unsatisfied rancour, and that in any case it was somewhat doubtful whether Russian methods of evasion and procrastination would not hinder a really satisfactory outcome of the present arrangement.

The last day of October saw matters between England and Russia in a fair way towards amicable settlement, the understanding being that a portion of the Russian Fleet would remain for the present at Vigo, and that no time would be lost in making the necessary preparations for the assembling of the International Commission agreed upon. But

the early days of November brought certain complications, which, for a fortnight at least, produced on all sides a feeling of great uneasiness lest, after all, the situation should again become acute. Public opinion, even in Great Britain, was not a little stirred by the occurrences of this anxious period, which seemed to indicate a weakening tendency on the part of the British Government, notwithstanding the continued vigilance and readiness of the British Fleet. The latter maintained its imposing attitude, both in home waters and at Gibraltar. At Portland on November 1st the eight battleships and four cruisers of the Home Fleet were ready for action, together with four of the ships of the Cruiser Squadron, a squadron of eight cruisers and torpedo-gunboats and fifty-nine destroyers and torpedo boats of various types, in all one hundred and three ships of war. At Gibraltar or in the neighbourhood there were on the same date fourteen battleships, thirteen first-class armoured and other cruisers, and a strong flotilla of torpedo-boat destroyers.

During the past few days a portion of the Russian Baltic Fleet had been assembled at Tangier pending the inquiry which was to take place at Vigo, and which, in this country, was expected to last some little time. To the general surprise it was suddenly announced that on November 1st all the Russian warships remaining at Vigo had left the harbour, merely leaving behind them four officers, one a Captain Clado, said to be the bearer to St. Petersburg of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's detailed official report, the remainder being three lieutenants detailed to give evidence before the International Commission of Inquiry. On November 3rd it was known that Admiral Rozhdestvensky had

arrived with his battleships at Tangier, and a few days later the Russian Second Pacific Squadron proceeded calmly on its way to the Far East, some of the ships making their way through the Straits of Gibraltar with the evident intention of going through the Suez Canal, the others proceeding to the South with a view to rounding the Cape of Good Hope.

This was not at all what the British public had been led by the firm language of Mr. Balfour to expect, and a good deal of indignant surprise was expressed at the turn which affairs had taken. It was felt, and not altogether, perhaps, unreasonably, that Russia was treating the matter of the International Inquiry somewhat

perfunctorily by leaving only three or four witnesses, none of them of high rank, to give evidence before it. It was also clear that, except by "shadowing" Admiral Rozhdestvensky's ships for the remainder of their voyage, Great Britain would lose the control of the situation, which she had enjoyed so long as the Russian Fleet, or even an appreciable portion of it, remained in the

neighbourhood of Gibraltar. It was also thought that Admiral Rozhdestvensky was escaping rather too easily from the consequences of an act of which he had assumed the full responsibility. It was argued that before the world Great Britain

would seem to have made a great deal of noise and to have put itself to a great deal of expense and inconvenience in order to secure what was apparently a very trifling result. It must be admitted that some of the irritation thus expressed was justified by the rather mocking references of certain foreign journals to the fact that Russian methods were likely in this instance to prove successful, since Great Britain could hardly now hope to secure much more than the indemnity which Russia had from the first been willing to pay.

Matters were in this unsatisfactory state when at the Guildhall Banquet on November 9th the Marquis of Lansdowne

was enabled to make a statement which, to some extent, induced a calmer frame of mind on the part of the British public. Speaking of the fewness of the witnesses left behind at Vigo by the Russian Fleet, the Foreign Secretary said that the responsibility for the selection lay with the Russian Government, and it would be a great mistake to relieve them of it. "But," he continued, "we have



COUNT BENKENDORF, RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR
IN LONDON.

within the last day or two received from them a distinct assurance that the officers detained were those actually implicated in this disaster, and we have received a further supplementary assurance that if it should result from the investigations of

the International Commission that other officers were culpable, those officers also will be adequately punished."

Unfortunately this pronouncement, while it soothed British susceptibilities, produced a fresh complication by aggravating the growing annoyance in Russia on the subject of the punishment of the offenders. The Russian view was that for one Power to dictate to another the punishment of the latter's officers was an arrogant and unjustifiable proceeding. It was further pointed out that Admiral Rozhdestvensky's report, to which full credence was attached at St. Petersburg, had introduced the question whether the Russian naval officers who directed the firing were not fully justified in their action, and whether Great Britain had not, in fact, brought the North Sea outrage on herself by lending assistance to the mysterious torpedo boats.

For a time the feeling aroused in Russia on this punishment question would seem from the language of the Press to have been fully as bitter as that caused in England by the calm resumption by the Baltic Fleet of its voyage after the hasty inquiry at Vigo. But the real truth seems to be that much of the acrimony imported into the controversy on this account was carefully manufactured. It is suggested that the Tsar and Count Lamsdorf would willingly have

agreed to promise the punishment of the officers concerned in the firing, had, in point of fact, entered into a provisional undertaking to this effect, but were subsequently induced to adopt a different attitude by the representations of the Russian Admiralty. Once again the efforts of that headstrong department, or rather of the personages at the head of it, were directed to bringing about a breach between Russia and Great Britain, and they cannot have fallen very far short of success. Ultimately the question was settled by the modification of one of the Articles of the proposed Convention—Article II.—so that



Photo: Russell & Sons, Baker Street, W.

SIR CHARLES HARDINGE.

the possible responsibility not only of Russia but of Great Britain, or some other country, should form the subject of inquiry.

It remains to bring a long story to a close by giving the official translation of the Agreement eventually signed at St. Petersburg by our Ambassador, Sir Charles Hardinge and Count Lamsdorf. The terms of this historic document were as follows:—

"His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial Russian Government having agreed to entrust to an International Commission of Inquiry assembled conformably to Articles IX. to XIV. of the Hague Convention of the 29th July, 1899, for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the task of

elucidating by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation, the questions of fact connected with the incident which occurred during the night of 21st-22nd (8th-9th) October, 1904, in the North Sea (on which occasion the firing of the guns of the Russian Fleet caused the loss of a boat and the death of two persons belonging to a British fishing fleet, as well as damages to other boats of that fleet and injuries to the crews of some of those boats), the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have agreed on the following provisions :

ARTICLE I.

“ The International Commission of Inquiry shall be composed of five members (Commissioners), of whom two shall be officers of high rank in the British and Imperial Russian Navies respectively. The Governments of France and of the United States of America shall each be requested to select one of their naval officers of high rank as a member of the Commission. The fifth member shall be chosen by agreement between the four members above mentioned.

“ In the event of no agreement being arrived at between the four Commissioners as to the selection of the fifth member of the Commission, his Imperial and Royal Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, will be invited to select him.

“ Each of the two high contracting parties shall likewise appoint a Legal Assessor to advise the Commissioners, and an agent officially empowered to take part in the labours of the Commission.

ARTICLE II.

“ The Commission shall inquire into and report on all the circumstances relative to the North Sea incident, and par-

ticularly on the question as to where the responsibility lies, and the degree of blame attaching to the subjects of the two high contracting parties or to the subjects of other countries in the event of their responsibility being established by the inquiry.

ARTICLE III.

“ The Commission shall settle the details of the procedure which it will follow for the purpose of accomplishing the task with which it has been entrusted.

ARTICLE IV.

“ The two high contracting parties undertake to supply the International Commission of Inquiry to the utmost of their ability with all the means and facilities necessary in order to enable it to acquaint itself thoroughly with and appreciate correctly the matters in dispute.

ARTICLE V.

“ The Commission shall assemble at Paris as soon as possible after the signature of this agreement.

ARTICLE VI.

“ The Commission shall present its report to the two high contracting parties, signed by all the members of the Commission.

ARTICLE VII.

“ The Commission shall take all its decisions by a majority of the votes of the five Commissioners.

ARTICLE VIII.

“ The two high contracting parties undertake each to bear, on reciprocal terms, the expenses of the inquiry made by it previous to the assembly of the Commission. The expenses incurred by International Commission after the date of its assembly, in organising its staff,


and in conducting the investigations which it will have to make, shall be equally shared by the two Governments.

“In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present agreement (declaration) and affixed their seals to it.

“Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, 25th November, 1904.”

At this point we may leave the episode of the North Sea outrage for the present. Admiral Rozhdestvensky with the major portion of his fleet is now steaming along the west coast of Africa; the remainder of his ships are preparing to enter the Suez Canal. The British Navy is gradually assuming its ordinary aspect, and the British public has regained its calm. Diplomacy has reasserted its sway, and for the present it only remains to await the assembling of the International Commission with patience and good temper. But, whatever the outcome may be, the actual happenings of the past month will be long in fading out of men's minds. The mere fact that Russia and Great Britain were literally on the brink of war is alone sufficient to invest the whole of this anxious period with peculiar interest for the readers of this narrative. The participation of the Baltic Fleet in what occurred, the alleged implication of Japan also as the real

fons et origo mali, the questions of neutrality incidentally involved, are all points of added interest. But these are of small significance compared with the certainty of the frightful consequences which must have ensued had the limit been transgressed, and the Russo-Japanese War been converted into what might have swiftly become a World-War, more terrible, more devastating than any yet recorded in history. That moderate counsels, tactful statesmanship, and the kindly intervention of a third great Power did much to avert that unspeakable calamity may be readily granted. But for many it will be an abiding conviction that what really kept the peace was the British Fleet. Be this as it may, it is not likely that the civilised world will readily forget the part played by that tremendous institution in asserting Great Britain's angry refusal to allow the lives of her humblest citizens to be trifled with. Incidentally it may be remarked that, while land forces as large as those marshalled by Russia and Japan on the Sha-ho have previously operated in time of war, no such assemblage of fighting ships has ever yet cleared for action as that which, in this side-issue of the Russo-Japanese struggle, came into business-like being under the glorious White Ensign of England.



CHAPTER LXX.


PORT ARTHUR ONCE MORE—SUBSIDIARY DEFENCES—THE GREAT FORTS ATTACKED—
FOUR DAYS OF FRENZIED FIGHTING—BLOCKADE-RUNNERS—INSIDE THE FORTRESS—
THE “BIRTHDAY ATTACK.”

AT the close of Chapter LXVIII. our narrative of the Siege of Port Arthur had been brought down to September 15th, by which time the Japanese had advanced to a line represented roughly by the arc of a circle starting in the northern portion of Pigeon Bay, and running through Shui-shi-ying to a point in Ta-khe Bay about four miles north-east of Golden Hill.

It is now more than ever necessary to understand the difference between the main and subsidiary defences of Port Arthur. Terrible as has been the fighting up to date, fearful as the losses suffered by the Japanese unquestionably are, substantial as is the progress which they have made in the accomplishment of their tremendous task, it must be remembered that as yet the attackers have not captured a single one of the series of greater forts, the positions of which are indicated in the Plan on page 152 of the present Volume. Accordingly, the work which now lies before them is even yet more grim and deadly than that which for the past three months has made such heavy and constant demands upon their magnificent stock of reckless courage and tenacity.

At the same time it would be a grave error to suppose that the Japanese have only, so far, touched the fringe of the Port Arthur defences. Although between the main line of forts and the outer line of works a sharp distinction must be drawn, the latter in the case of

Port Arthur are of such great strength, and occupy such an enormous area, that it is hardly too much to say that their reduction is literally, as well as metaphorically, half the battle. Of these outer defences no plan which will be available for a long time to come is likely to be really accurate, for the simple reason that, even after the siege commenced, fresh works appear to have been constructed, and great efforts made to strengthen those already in existence until their character had, largely speaking, been altered. As a rule there is a marked difference between advanced works and those constituting the main line of a fortress's defence, the former often hardly being worthy to be regarded as coming under the head of “permanent fortification.” But at Port Arthur some of the auxiliary works were really of immense strength. A correspondent of the *Times* gives an interesting description of the outer forts lying close to Shui-shi-ying which may be taken as an example of this auxiliary system. “Two lunettes or flanked redans, each in plan forming the equal sides of an isosceles triangle, with shorter perpendiculars at their unjoined ends, were constructed. Deep moats, in which were built bomb-proof defences, roofed with steel plates covered with earth, surrounded them. In front, connecting the apices of the lunettes, which measured thirty yards across their open bases, was a vast crown work. It extended like a



HOW THE JAPANESE TIGHTENED THEIR GRIP UPON PORT ARTHUR.
 Sketch map showing the successive stages of the investment, from the victory of the Nan-shan Heights to the beleaguering of the fortress itself.

hollow square across the valley-head between Fort Er-lung-shan and Pan-lung-shan. The parapets or walls were of earth not less than twenty-five feet thick. Behind these, balks of timber, iron plates, etc., covered with many feet of earth, constituted shelters safe from fire for the garrison. This great work was defended by no fewer than two field guns, two mortars, three quick-firing guns, and four machine guns, disposed in the west lunette and east and west rear lunettes. Besides these inner defences, three great *fougasses*, or mines, filled with huge stones, to explode by electricity, were dug and carefully hidden in front of the crown work. Inside, again, were torpedo tubes, fish-torpedoes, and, last but not least, 1,000 stout Siberian riflemen."

The fact that the Japanese had already captured several works of this description must surely be taken as strong evidence of their capacity for dealing in due course with the greater forts of the main line.

It will also be readily understood that in a progressive siege—as distinct from one in which the besiegers merely sit round a place and wait for starvation to produce surrender—the advantages attached to a strong inner line of defences are often sensibly decreased by the wear and tear of the incidental fighting, as well as by the insidious approach of the determined enemy. As long as the auxiliary line is held there is every cause for hopefulness, for a variety of things may happen, if not to bring the siege to an end, at any rate to render it easier to keep the attackers at arm's length. But, when one by one the advanced works fall, and are promptly occupied by an enemy which refuses to be turned out, or, if turned out, comes

back again time after time until a final foothold is gained, the moral and material effect upon the defence begins to become serious. However scientifically constructed the inner forts may be, the fact that they constitute, practically speaking, a last resort is apt to be strangely impressive, and its significance is enhanced by the greater frequency and accuracy with which the enemy's shells come dropping into the heart of the defence, mostly to no purpose it may be, but here and there doing real damage and discounting seriously the chances of the final struggle.

Casualties, too, may sap the confidence of the besieged in their main line of defence. Of course, to garrison a contracted ring of forts does not require as many men as are needed to hold a greater outer circle, or semi-circle, or arc of scattered works. But, when fighting in the advanced line of defences has been so desperate as has been the case at Port Arthur, the sadly attenuated garrison cannot but be, to some extent, depressed by the thought that perhaps twice their number have already been killed or wounded in the attempt to resist an enemy who will not be repulsed, and whose striking power is maintained by constant reinforcements.

All these considerations must be carefully weighed in order to grasp the significance of the stage at which the siege of Port Arthur had arrived about the middle of September. For now, to all intents and purposes, the attack has passed out of the intermediate stage dealt with in Chapter LVIII., and an organised attempt is about to be made to wear down the resistance of some of the main line forts. By this we must not infer that all the auxiliary defences have been captured and occupied, for, as will be gathered

from the succeeding narrative, there are yet important positions held by the Russians in front of their greater works, positions which it will cost the Japanese weeks of fierce fighting to gain. Also it will be understood that the line we have roughly drawn to represent Japanese progress up to this point must not be followed too precisely, especially, perhaps, as regards Shui-shi-ying. From some accounts it would appear that the latter was still in the Russian hands about this time, and in one map, purporting to be highly authoritative, the Japanese are represented as being on August 28th still north of Shui-shi-ying, while on September 21st they are an equal distance to the south of it. The truth seems to be that, while the tide of success in this quarter ebbed and flowed a good deal during August and September, a portion at least of Shui-shi-ying was pretty steadily held by the Japanese from, at any rate, about the middle of August.

In this connection the relative positions of Shui-shi-ying and Wolf's Hill may have caused some dubiety in the minds of the readers of this narrative. It will be remembered that we have hitherto located Wolf's Hill about half a mile south of Shui-shi-ying, and this is where it is marked on the maps printed in the *Times* on August 18th, and again on September 17th. But in later maps the position of the hill has been shifted to the north or north-west of Shui-shi-ying. The discrepancy is not of first-class importance in a narrative like this, in which some corrections by the light of later information are inevitable. But it will serve to show the occasional difficulties which the conscientious compiler even of a popular war history has to face. It should also support the present writer's plea that,

if in this detail he has erred, he has at least erred in excellent company!

Let us now endeavour to pick up the thread of our fighting story. It will be recalled that at dawn on September 15th the Japanese bombardment from Shui-shi-ying, Pa-li-chwang, and Pigeon Bay was redoubled in intensity. This now appears to have been due to the bringing up of some exceedingly powerful siege guns, 11-in. howitzers, which are heavier than any artillery the Japanese have hitherto had in position. Having placed these monsters in battery, the Japanese now proceed with what is known as the sap advance against the great forts which are now their main objective. In sapping, a trench is first dug under protection of a sap-roller or iron screen; from this another trench is pushed forward diagonally to a convenient distance, when another trench is dug parallel to the first, and so on. By this means the attackers can approach closer and closer to their objective without exposing themselves unduly to the defenders' fire, until the time comes to issue from the last parallel and make a final rush at the fortification which it is hoped to capture.

On September 19th commenced the big assault foreshadowed in Chapter LVIII., of which Er-lung-shan and Chi-huan-shan (sometimes called Ki-kwan-shan) were the principal objectives. These are the Nos. 5 and 6 on the Plan on page 152. Simultaneously an effort was to be made to capture two new forts which had been built on what is known as Metre Range to cover the approach to the I-tzu-shan and An-tzu-shan forts (Nos. 1 and 2 on the Plan). There were also four lunettes south of Shui-shi-ying which had to be dealt with before any real headway could be made.

Of the operations immediately south of

Shui-shi-ying a very vivid account is furnished by Mr. B. W. Norregard, the War Correspondent to the *Daily Mail* with the Japanese Army before Port Arthur. Mr. Norregard writes:—

“To take Er-lung-shan it was necessary first to capture Lung-yen redoubt, which, together with the lunettes, had been unsuccessfully attacked on August 19 and 20, the positions forming a large wedge in the investing lines, making attacks on I-tzu-shan from the east and Er-lung-shan from the north impossible.

“The whole line of forts was shelled from early in the morning, but the main bombardment was concentrated on the above-mentioned fortifications at two in the afternoon. The lunettes were constructed at the corners of the large parallelogram connected with the trenches. Those on the north-west side were strongest, being armed with two quick-firers, one field gun, and three machine guns.

“Two regiments were detailed to attack them. Two battalions in the evening and twice in the night assaulted the strongest lunette, which had in front of it a deep trench and a deep wall stopping the advance. A standing fight took place under the breastwork, both sides using hand grenades effectively. Two companies attacked a small lunette on the north-west, but all attacks were repulsed.

“From dawn on September 20 for many hours a tremendous shrapnel fire was poured on all the lunettes. Saps had been constructed to within fifty yards, and from the strongest a whole regiment which had been concentrated at this point rushed the lunette at nine o'clock in the morning, using scaling ladders. After a fierce hand-to-hand struggle, the Japanese rushed into the connecting trenches and took three other

lunettes after a brief resistance. The shrapnel fire of the Japanese demoralised the defenders.

“Simultaneously Lung-yen was attacked by four battalions. This position was held by two companies with three field guns and several machine guns. It was surrounded by a fifteen-foot deep moat, with almost perpendicular sides, the walls being very steep. There were two strong kaponiers inside, and the redoubt was loopholed and protected by sandbag trenches.

“On the evening of September 19th two battalions attacked the north-east corner, where a breach had been made by shells. One battalion attacked the eastern and the other the western trenches, but both were repulsed.

“After several hours' bombardment the attack was renewed at noon. The Japanese advanced through a breach, and a fierce and protracted hand-to-hand fight took place inside the redoubt.

“The kaponiers were smashed by hand grenades in the attack on the trenches, but the Japanese made little headway, and were unable to cut off the retreat of the Russians, who saved their machine guns and destroyed the large guns. They retreated at 4.30 o'clock. The Japanese casualties were over a thousand.”

Not less difficult and desperate was the assault delivered against the Russian defences on Metre Range. Here, as noted above, were two works of recent construction on hills known as 180 Metre and 203 Metre Hill respectively. On the former was a plateau round which ran trenches fronted by wire entanglements. The work on 203 Metre Hill was of much greater strength, forming a large parallelogram 100 yards by 500. Its trenches were revetted—*i.e.* their slopes were



THE WEARINESS OF STRIFE: THE DAWN
OF ANOTHER DAY AT PORT ARTHUR.



strengthened—with sandbags, and overhead protection was afforded by steel plates covered with additional layers of timber and earth. This work, which was also protected by wire entanglements, mounted two heavy guns, three field guns, and three machine guns.

The trenches on 180 Metre Hill appear to have been carried with little difficulty after an extremely severe artillery preparation. But the other work offered a much more serious resistance. Mr. Norregard says:—

“The saps were carried to the foot of 203 Metre Hill from the south-west. On the 19th there was no attack. On the 20th one regiment made an assault from the saps, but was unable to reach the breastwork owing to the furious fire. A battalion from another regiment attacked from the west side, and had to pass over an open field about 300 yards in extent. Two bodies of men, each numbering about sixty, tried to cross by spreading out and running at top speed. The shrapnels from 203 Metre Hill killed every man. This was the best artillery practice seen in the war.

“On September 21st, at dawn, both regiments made a combined assault from the south-west. They gained a position close under a fort, when a false report that the hill had been taken stopped the artillery fire at a critical moment, giving the Russians the opportunity for repulsing the attacking force with heavy losses.

“At noon one regiment succeeded in taking the north-west corner, and held it for hours in spite of a tremendous shelling. . . . On Russian reinforcements arriving, the Japanese were forced out later. Attacks on September 23rd and 24th failed, and the attempt was relinquished, the Japanese, however,

holding 180 Metre Hill, though they were unable to stay on the plateau.”

Of the fighting during the four days from September 19th to 23rd a separate report is submitted to the Tsar by General Stoessel, who claims, with some justice, that the main Japanese assaults were heroically repulsed. He admits, however, that two field redoubts—the Temple Redoubt and the Reservoir Redoubt—remained in the enemy's hands, and that the Japanese destroyed the reservoir. The Temple Redoubt may be identical with the Lung-yen of Mr. Norregard's narrative. The Reservoir Redoubt seems to be one of several forts named after Kuropatkin. This one is said to have been situated to the south of Pa-li-chwang and to the north-east of the Parade Ground, having been built for the purpose of protecting the main water supply. The loss of this work did not, of course, deprive the garrison of all chance of procuring fresh water, as there were springs inside the fortress, and plenty of machinery for condensing sea water. But the destruction of the reservoirs must have been severely felt.

The total casualties in the assault on Metre Range were 2,400, of which 2,000 were incurred on 203 Metre Hill. Brigadier-General Yamatoto was among those killed in the 180 Metre Hill affair. “The Japanese,” says Mr. Norregard, “showed great gallantry in storming strong positions, while the Russians stubbornly resisted the onset of overwhelming forces and the tremendous shelling, manfully awaiting the charges, fighting to the bitter end, and even making vigorous counter-attacks. The greatest individual bravery was displayed by the Russians in spite of the awful stress of the long siege.

Both sides used hand grenades filled with gun-cotton, and with a fuse that burns for fifteen seconds. These grenades were often picked up and re-thrown. They proved very effective. Latterly, also, they have been fired from light, bamboo-hooped mortars, whose range varies from 50 to 200 yards with a regulated charge. Both Russians and Japanese frequently threw stones at one another. It is generally impossible to cut the wire entanglements.

"A strong electric current runs along the wire. Now and then the poles are cut, but this is a difficult and dangerous task. Sometimes the men, covered with bullet-proof shields, cut the wire, but more frequently they fasten ropes to the poles, hauling at them from the saps. When it was discovered that the poles were wire-braced, they were often blasted by long bamboos filled with black smoke-giving powder. These were often used in the attacks on the kaponiers and bomb-proof shelters inside the forts, choking the defenders and screening the attackers from view.

"It most often happens that the men creep by night to the entanglements, and, lying on their backs, cut, and even bite, the wire. When the searchlights are turned on them the men pretend to be killed or wounded. When this ruse was discovered the Russians, finding it impossible to distinguish between the living and the dead, fired on the wounded in the ambulances."

In addition to the Temple and Reservoir Redoubts, the Japanese, during this series of assaults, captured some supplementary works, the possession of which enabled them to bring fresh guns into position, and so continue the sap advance to good purpose. From details furnished officially to St. Petersburg correspondents

of leading Paris journals, it would seem that the Russians did not regard these successes very seriously, in view of the belief that the garrison still numbered 12,000 men in good health, and that provisions were abundant. On the other hand, it was admitted that ammunition was falling low, and that the Canet guns with which some of the forts were armed were no longer working well.


As regards the provisions, incidental information available about this period indicates that the garrison had for the present a sufficiency of food, but that the tinned meat supplies were nearly exhausted. Thirty donkeys were now being slaughtered daily for fresh meat, which was worth about 5s. a pound. Eggs cost 10d. each.

Before resuming our narrative of the land operations, it should be mentioned here that on the night of September 18th the Japanese suffered a somewhat serious loss by the sinking of the armoured gunboat *Hei-yen*. This vessel was engaged in guard duty in Pigeon Bay when at dusk a storm arose and heavy seas were encountered. The *Hei-yen* was endeavouring to return to her base, when she suddenly struck a floating mine, which exploded under her starboard side amidships. The vessel began to sink, and an attempt was made to lower the boats. These, however, were swamped, and all but a handful of the ship's company were drowned, the total loss being 197.

During the remainder of September the garrison of Port Arthur enjoys, to use General Stoessel's words, comparative tranquillity. But the Japanese were gradually drawing closer, and on September 28th they commenced shelling not only the greater forts but the ships in the harbour, several of which were badly

knocked about. The *Pobieda* was hit once, the *Retvisan* four times, the *Peresviet* four times, and the *Poltava* five times. Some smaller craft were sunk or

they were trying to capture the heavy guns which the Japanese had mounted in that vicinity. They were in considerable force, with field artillery. and made



A FLAG OF TRUCE.

set on fire. The battleships were observed to be working their pumps, and using junks for landing their crews.

On September 28th and 29th severe fighting is reported on the west shore of Liau-ti-shan near Pigeon Bay, the Russians being the aggressors. Apparently

several ineffectual sorties from the western forts.

On the night of October 8th the Japanese landed a force in Ta-khe Bay, the Russians retiring in the face of superior numbers. On the next day the Japanese were driven out by the Russian



A HUMAN PYRAMID.

In the great ditches of the Port Arthur forts terrible struggles were necessary to surmount the frowning escarps or sides of the ditches nearest to the defenders. When scaling ladders were not available human ladders were formed after a fashion sometimes practised in our own Army.

artillery, one gun which the Japanese had already mounted being, according to Russian reports, destroyed.

Trivial as the last-mentioned incidents may appear when compared with the major operations of the siege, they are of interest as showing how general was the fighting all round the fortress at this stage, how careful the besiegers were to exercise a steady and continuous pressure, and how alert the defenders to contest, wherever possible, the gradual advance of the enemy. Particular attention may be paid to the Russian sorties, which, although not always effective, were carried out with commendable vigour and gallantry. Sorties are the habitual accompaniment of every well-conducted defence, and serve the double purpose of harassing the attack and enabling the besieged from time to time to shake off the demoralising influences which are apt to creep over men who for months have been fighting under cover.

During October and November the attempts to run cargoes of provisions, ammunition, and coal into Port Arthur became increasingly frequent, and sensational accounts are given of the daring displayed by those engaged in these exploits, and of the inducements offered to adventurers of various nationalities, Great Britain, one is sorry to say, included, to take the very serious risks involved. At one time it is said that no fewer than six firms were systematically engaged in the extremely profitable business of blockade-running. The craft usually employed were junks, of which an average of one in three was generally captured or sunk by one of the Japanese guardships, the prices obtained for the two remaining cargoes covering the loss and leaving a big margin of profit.

Vigilant as the Japanese were, it was impossible for them to prevent supplies reaching the enemy in this way. Their only consolation lay in the fact that Russia was being made to pay dearly indeed for the assistance thus afforded the beleaguered garrison. It is stated in this connection, that a German steamer, which cleared from Tsing-tau with a cargo of coal ostensibly for San Francisco, had been privately chartered for blockade-running purposes on terms which indicate meaningfully the risks and possible profits of such enterprises. The Russians are declared to have paid 60s. a ton for the coal, besides depositing in the bank the appraised value of the ship, plus a 25 per cent. bonus, and a special bonus to the captain of £250. Incidentally, of course, the fact that such prices were even regarded as probable shows clearly that the scarcity of coal in Port Arthur was thought to be growing most serious.

Meanwhile the Japanese have been receiving reinforcements, and the bombardment from the newly emplaced 11-in. howitzers continues daily, careful balloon observations being taken of the effects of the fire. To those unacquainted with the attributes of modern siege guns it may seem strange that balloons should be needed for this purpose when, under ordinary circumstances, a telescope in the hands of a standing officer should suffice. But it should be understood that in modern sieges almost all the artillery fire on the part of the attackers is "curved," the idea being not to strike directly some visible object, but to pitch, as it were, great shells filled with high explosives into the inner defences of the place which is being besieged. It was the introduction of accurate curved fire which not so very many years ago revolutionised siege

operations, and made it necessary to build fortresses on an entirely new plan. Of course, in the old days curved fire was not unknown, the means employed being the mortar, a stout, dumpy little gun, from which shells were "lobbed" into the air and descended at a high angle, often with considerable effect, into the enemy's lines. But mortar-fire, which was largely a matter of chance, and could only be employed at short ranges, could hardly be compared with the fire from a modern howitzer of large calibre, which can cast a shell with surprising accuracy into a small area several miles distant. It must be remembered, too, that the shells used in modern siege operations are of infinitely greater destructive capacity than those formerly used. Very long in proportion to their diameter, and of forged steel, they carry an explosive several times as powerful as gunpowder, and, accordingly, when they descend at a high angle upon the works of a fortress their wrecking effect is enormous. Hence the necessity for cover of quite a different sort from that which served in the old days, when a shelter could be rendered "bomb-proof" with a very few inches of earth.

In the third week of October the Japanese devoted their attention largely to the great Er-lung-shan fort on the northern face of the main line of defence. Several minor positions near Er-lung-shan were captured, after fierce fighting, on the 16th. Both on Wolf Hill and on the section from Pa-li-chwang to Ta-kushan fresh guns of large calibre were brought into position, some of these, it is said, having been removed for the purpose from the fortifications of Tokio Bay. Sapping and mining went on incessantly, and everything pointed to the early delivery of another great assault.

A private letter received at Shanghai on October 28th, and dated from Port Arthur a week earlier, gave a lurid account of the state of affairs inside the fortress. It ran as follows:—

"General Stoessel has telegraphed to the Tsar and Court: 'I now bid you all good-bye for ever. Port Arthur will be my grave.' General Stoessel has imbued the garrison with an heroic spirit, and they are ready to prefer a glorious death to capitulation.

"The Japanese shells are inflicting great damage on the fleet and harbour works. The arsenal and all the ammunition and small arms which it contained have been destroyed. The water supply having been cut off, wells are now being sunk. Provisions are scarce, and only tinned meats are left. A meal made off the horses killed by shells is regarded by the soldiers as a banquet.

"General Smirnoff is jealous of General Stoessel, and would have surrendered the fortress had he not been overruled. The Polish and Jewish soldiers in the garrison are being closely watched in case they should desert or show treachery. The field and naval hospitals are crowded, and hygienic conditions are becoming deplorable. The bombardment is at times so incessant that it is impossible to dig graves of any depth for the dead. Over one-half of the original garrison is dead, wounded, or sick. The high-angle fire of the Japanese has practically destroyed the new town. When the fleet attempted to break through the blockade, the garrison was to have made a desperate sortie, with the object of inflicting as much damage as possible, and then, if necessary, capitulate, but the failure of the fleet to escape frustrated the plan.

"The besiegers are pressing closer daily. It is hard to say how long we

can hold out. When the end comes there will be a desperate fight, and thousands of the enemy will perish, as everything is mined."

The letter was entrusted to a native boatman, who ran the blockade and despatched the letter from Chifu. The recipient of the news was a prominent Continental merchant, who had a representative at Port Arthur.

On October 26th commences what is sometimes called the "Birthday Attack" on Port Arthur, owing to the evident anxiety of the Japanese to produce a really marked impression upon the fortress, if not to complete its capture, by November 3rd, the birthday of the Emperor of Japan. By October 25th the Japanese saps had been carried up to within easy distance of the counterscarps of the Er-lung-shan, Sung-shu-shan, and East Chi-huan-shan (Ki-kwan) forts. At 8.30 a.m. on the following morning these forts were heavily bombarded with siege guns and naval ordnance, 250 shells taking effect. From the official despatches we learn that the parapet of Er-lung-shan fort was demolished, and openings were made in it; while several portions of the cover were destroyed. Two of the most important covers to Sung-shu-shan fort were also wrecked, and three guns dismantled or damaged. From two o'clock in the afternoon the remaining Japanese siege guns were directed against the trenches on all the slopes of Sung-shu-shan and the neighbouring works, all of which were observed to have been badly knocked about. At five in the afternoon a portion of the Japanese right wing charged against the Sung-shu-shan trenches, and a portion of the centre against Er-lung-shan, and effected a lodgment. On the slope of Er-lung-shan a large mine exploded

without, however, killing a single Japanese soldier. During these proceedings the Russian artillery responded briskly to the bombardment, but their shells were defective, and did not cause much damage. This interchange of big gun fire produced, as may be imagined, an impressive and dramatic scene.

On the night of October 26th, with the object, as the Japanese despatches are careful to state, of preventing repairs, the Japanese siege and naval guns shelled Er-lung-shan, East Chi-huan-shan, Sung-shu-shan, and also the Russian warships and the town. The Russians holding Sung-shu-shan and Er-lung-shan made several night sorties, under cover of shell and rifle fire, but were successfully driven back.

The Japanese despatches, which alone could be relied on for both comprehensiveness and accuracy at this stage, go on to state that on October 27th the bombardment was continued, the fire being directed against Sung-shu-shan, I-tzu-shan, An-tzu-shan, Pei-yu-shan, Er-lung-shan, the dockyard, and warships.

"Of the results of our bombardment, those deserving special mention are the effect realised against the fort East Chi-huan-shan, where a gun carriage was completely demolished, the destruction of a banquette lying between the east and north fort and the centre of Er-lung-shan fort, the scattering of the cover of that fort, the destruction of two small guns, and the demolition of a gun on the east front of the same fort.

"Several of our shells took effect in the south-eastern corner of the same fort, destroying the cover and smashing two machine guns into pieces. A gun placed on a projected point on Sung-shu-shan was dislocated. A twelve-centimetre gun placed on the centre of the left wing was



NIGHT TURNED INTO DAY AT PORT ARTHUR.

The Russians resorted to an ingenious method of illuminating the ground outlying their forts during the Japanese attacks, star shells being made to aid the more ordinary searchlights in disclosing the dispositions and numbers of the attacking forces. The one seen on the left is falling and dying out.

demolished, while the covers were also destroyed.

“In the course of the same night our Engineer Corps was sent against the northern part of East Chi-huan-shan, and it succeeded in destroying the outer casemate at a projected point.

“During the night the enemy resorted to every means to obstruct our work, assaulting and using bombs. At the same time, the Russians worked energetically, effecting repairs on the portion damaged by our shells.

“On October 28th the bombardment with heavy and other siege guns was continued with good effect. Two hundred and eighty-five effective shells have been counted, besides several other shells, which took effect on forts An-tzu-shan and I-tzu-shan, the 203 Metre Hill, and Pei-yu-shan.

“The naval guns were directed chiefly against Tai-yan-ku, I-tzu-shan, An-tzu-shan, the warships in the east harbour, and the western portion of the city.

“Effects deserving special mention were on Er-lung-shan, banquette and buildings inside the fort destroyed, and vital portions of the fort considerably damaged. The enemy had placed a row of sandbags on the banquette destroyed by the previous bombardment. On the northern portion of East Chi-huan-shan the magazine exploded, and a field gun was destroyed. On Shan-shu-shan a twelve-centimetre Canet gun and another were hit. On I-tzu-shan the carriage of a twelve-centimetre Canet gun was overturned and another heavily damaged. On 203 Metre Hill two covers and the wire entanglements and trenches were considerably damaged.

“On Fort Tai-yan-ku the guns and works were heavily damaged. A conflagration occurred in the old town, and

a second conflagration was observed at a factory to the north-east of the base of Golden Hill, which lasted for three hours. A machinery building near the harbour was bombarded by our guns, as were the protected engineers' works.”

On the night of October 28th the mine directed against Er-lung-shan reached the outer limit of the fort, and a portion of the advance defences was blown up. On the same night dynamite was twice applied to the outer casemate of the eastern point of the fort lying north of East Chi-huan-shan and caused wide openings, killing several of the enemy inside the casemates.

On October 29th and 30th the bombardment was continued with increased vigour and effect, heavy damage being inflicted on several of the forts, and the magazine on Tai-yan-ku being exploded. On the morning of the 29th the Russians made desperate attacks on the Japanese mines directed towards Er-lung-shan and Sung-shu-shan, and in the case of the latter effected a temporary and partial capture. In the afternoon, however, the Japanese succeeded, with the aid of artillery, in regaining possession.

At 1 p.m. on October 30th the troops on the Japanese right and part of the centre advanced, and by sunset occupied the glacis and “covered ways” of Sung-shu-shan, Er-lung-shan, and the north fort of East Chi-huan-shan, destroying some of the caponieres and the enemy's outer ditch. Here we may resume our quotation of the Japanese official despatches:—

“Simultaneously, another part of our right charged against the fort standing midway between East Pan-lung-shan and the north fort of East Chi-huan-shan, capturing it at 2 p.m. in spite of the enemy's heavy fire. We then formed intrench-

ments. During the night, however, the enemy made several counter-attacks, one of which, at 10.30 p.m., drove our men out of the fort, but Major-General Ichinohé himself led the firing line, and at 11 p.m. recaptured the fort, which from that time was firmly held.

"At 1.5 p.m. our left also moved against East Chi-huan-shan and the adjacent forts, capturing the fortified position north-west of East Chi-huan-shan.

"At 5 p.m. on October 31st our left, charging the north fort of East Chi-huan-shan, reached the crest of the eastern parapet, where they intrenched. Meanwhile, steps were taken to secure our tenure of the two forts captured on the previous day, and at the same time the saps in other parts were proceeded with rapidly.

"On October 31st some of the heavy siege guns and naval guns were trained on the harbour mouth and dock, and by this means the *Giliak* was hit several times; two steamers were sunk, and a conflagration was caused near the wharf.

"From 8.30 p.m. the enemy made repeated frontal attacks on our extreme left, all of which were repulsed.

"On November 1st our heavy guns sank two steamers of about 3,500 tons in the western harbour, and one of 3,000 tons on November 2nd.

"At about 11 a.m. on the 2nd two heavy explosions, probably of powder magazines, were heard at the north end of the old town.

"In the first fort captured on October 30th we found three field guns, two machine guns, three fish-torpedoes, and 40 Russian dead.

"From noon on November 3rd our naval guns directed a heavy fire against the dock and other parts of the eastern harbour, causing a great conflagration at 12.15 p.m., which continued until 4 a.m. on the next day. Our heavy guns on November 3rd inflicted much damage on the fort 300 metres north-west of Wang-tai, and also put the field guns out of action in the gorge of East Chi-huan-shan."

Thus ended the great "Birthday Attack" upon Port Arthur, the results achieved falling very far short of that complete triumph which the Japanese had anticipated, but the progress made being still very considerable. Now for the first time have the Japanese made good their footing in the immediate front of some of the greater forts, and now at last the fire of the besiegers' big guns is beginning to tell heavily. It is part of the plan of the present work to anticipate ultimate results as little as possible, but it may be said here that from the defenders' standpoint the crisis of the siege of Port Arthur was reached when the 11-in. howitzers of the Japanese came effectively into play, which they may be said to have done with particular emphasis during the period from October 26th to November 3rd. For the rest, it is sufficient to say that Port Arthur, having escaped the intended honour of being handed to the Mikado as a birthday present by his devoted soldiery, was to continue for another two months a scene of continued carnage, an exhibition of almost superhuman tenacity on the part both of desperately brave attackers, and of a heroic defence.

CHAPTER LXXI.

JAPAN'S WINTER OUTLOOK—PROVISION AGAINST WAR WASTAGE—A NEW MILITARY SYSTEM—NAVAL PREPARATIONS—HOME-MADE BATTLESHIPS—A PAINFUL EPISODE—FINANCIAL PROSPECTS—FOREIGN RELATIONS—BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND AMERICA.

A JUNCTURE has now been reached at which it will be not only expedient, but also very interesting, to examine rather carefully the attitude and resources of the two combatant nations in regard to the continuance of the war through the winter months. Such an examination must necessarily be on broad lines, and there is no occasion to dwell on many details which, in the case of some previous campaigns, have been regarded as of special significance.

The mere fact, for instance, that winter is in prospect, and winter, too, of an exceptionally severe sort, has not anything like the same influence upon the warlike situation in the Far East as it has had even in comparatively recent operations in other parts of the world. In the first place, of course, this particular war commenced in the winter, and both sides have already had some experience in tackling one another to the trying accompaniment of blinding snowstorms and icy blasts. In one respect, moreover, winter in Manchuria is a very favourable season for military operations, since the roads, hard with the continued frost, are often more practicable than for heavy transport than at any other time of the year. In considering, therefore, the positions of Japan and Russia respectively at, say, the beginning of October, 1904, there is no need to lay undue stress upon the change of climatic conditions, or to take it for granted that there should be any serious

cessation of activity because for a time the greater portion of Manchuria may be exposed to rigours which might compel some Western troops to have recourse to the old-fashioned, sometimes very detrimental, expedient of "winter quarters."

Of course, apart from generalities, there are, even in this connection, some details which make for instructive contrast between the two opposing nations, but these are mainly such as will readily occur to the intelligent reader. In a naval sense, winter is on the whole at this stage of the war more favourable to Japan than to Russia, since it renders the harbour of Vladivostok for the time being a negligible quantity. On the other hand, the later blocking of the mouth of the Liao river with ice may cause a serious interruption of the sea transport of stores by that convenient route, which the occupation of the port of Niu-chwang, of Old Niu-chwang, and Liao-yang has rendered of so much greater significance than it was in February and March last.

Again, from the military standpoint, Japan may be expected to score a few additional points during the awful cold weather by reason of the extraordinary completeness of her organisation, and her close and continuous attention to details affecting the welfare and comfort of her soldiers in the field. At various past stages of the operations this proposition has been illustrated, and in Chapter

LXIV. a special account was given of the Japanese soldier's winter outfit, several points of which, notably the design of the winter greatcoat, afford strong evidence of the most careful forethought, and

But it is not every army that both takes such lessons to heart and adapts them to the purposes of war on a very much larger scale. In this connection it may be mentioned that the Japanese military authori-



SHOOTING BELOW THE WATER-LINE: SUBMERGED TORPEDO-TUBE IN ACTION.

The aiming is done from the deck by swinging the ship round. The ship's side has been here partially removed to show the water line and the distant enemy.

shrewd appreciation of requirements, in this direction. Doubtless the less credit is due to the Japanese on this score in that they had a very illuminating experience of winter campaigning in Manchuria when fighting the Chinese in 1894-95.

ties have already anticipated the winter in a very practical fashion, as far as all semi-permanent occupations are concerned, by sending out double-walled wooden huts in sections which can be quickly put together as required, and are

an invaluable supplement to such rude Chinese structures as are locally available.

But the real interest of the situation for Japan, as for Russia, does not depend upon details of this sort. It is bound up with far larger considerations, among which may be reckoned such big subjects as the extent of the "war wastage" up to date, the development of the enemy's fighting capacity, the possible increase of home resources, the financial aspect, and relations with foreign countries, who are now spectators merely, but may, at almost any moment, be tempted or forced to take a hand in the game. Such considerations, always significant, are rendered peculiarly so by the signs that Russia is now tardily beginning to realise the nature of the struggle in which she is engaged, and to take measures, incommensurate perhaps with the actual necessities of the case, but still sufficiently impressive to demand attention, more especially from a combatant literally fighting for existence.

The question of war wastage is far more complex than it seems to those who regard it as a mere matter of numbers. In various ways it has been elaborately discussed by numerous military writers, but for the purposes of this narrative an extract from a letter written by the Special Correspondent of the *Times* at Tokio will both show what different things war wastage may mean, and what steps Japan was taking as far back as the middle of July to meet deficiencies which in October would otherwise have been very severely felt.

"The waste in every army long in the field," writes this correspondent, "must always be great; it can be scheduled under half a dozen heads: contact with the enemy, disease, communication requirements, loss of sea transports, etc.

Now you can put your standing army into the field fairly fit at all times, at least if your army system is a workable system. But if your standing army only totals some 150,000 men, and you require to take the field with 250,000 men, it requires considerable executive manipulation to keep pace with the wastage of so large a force, and to place the selections from the second and third reserves in the field in every way as physically prepared as the standing army had been. The majority of the older men who answer the call to arms have long lost the habit of a life so rigorous as that required from the soldier serving with the colours; moreover, many of the technicalities of drill and armament have undergone considerable changes since the reserves were themselves serving with the colours. No one would have anticipated that the Japanese would be blind to the requirements of a protracted campaign. Therefore, although we know that over 200,000 men have left Japan, yet from the activity which exists at all the military centres it would be difficult to realise that the fighting strength in the country had been reduced by a single infantryman. You miss, it is true, both cavalry and artillery; that is only natural, but in the matter of their infantry there appears to have been no reduction in the home establishments, and the scheme for reinforcement is prepared for a far heavier wastage than has as yet taken place.

"Since my return to Tokio," says a *Times* correspondent, "I have spent much of my time on the parade-grounds of the military centres in the capital. The training to which each batch of reservists is put as it comes up for service is interesting and instructive. They roll up from every walk in life. The farm labourer, bent with con-


stant stooping in the paddy fields; the jinriksha coolie, as fit as nature ever allowed a man to be; the potter, the cook, the photographer—they all come up in turn, the majority soft from the sedentary life into which the Japanese so easily falls. But this is nothing. It is an easily eradicated evil when it is balanced against that commanding asset that is paramount in every Japanese, that asset which is responsible for the history of the last six months. There is ingrained in the heart of every Japanese, be he prince or pauper, a patriotic desire for discipline, which has made the nation the military Power that it is. This is the secret. Where we in the West find ourselves obliged to devote most of the soldiers' time with the colours to the labour of instilling discipline into his nature, the Japanese instructors have only to train their men to apply their natural desire for discipline to the best teaching in the requirements of modern warfare. It is this same quality which has made our Indian Army so good, only the native of India has not the qualifying temper of a national patriotism, which is the main religion in Japan."

With reference to the "qualifying temper of a national patriotism" of which this writer so suggestively speaks, it is worth recalling that a few weeks later another contributor to the *Times*, its able and accomplished military critic, created a distinct sensation by giving under the heading "The Soul of a Nation" a very remarkable account of *bushido*, the wonderful code of moral and ethical principles which prevails in the Samurai families of Japan, and which is partially reflected in the exalted patriotism displayed even by the lowest classes in that astonishing country.

As the article in question has been

reprinted, and can be procured for a few pence from Printing House Square, it is not fair to lay it under contribution here. But the singular impression caused by this exposition of a prominent factor of Japan's success both in holding her own against Russia, in dealing that gigantic adversary a succession of terrific blows, and in providing for the continuance of the campaign, will not lightly fade out of Western minds, and may almost be regarded as one of the events of the war.

After this brief digression we may usefully return to the description furnished by the Tokio correspondent above referred to of the training given to the Japanese reservist when he rejoins the colours as a preliminary to taking his share of supplying the wastage in the Regular field army: "His first training is purely physical. He has to be hardened. The first week is spent in marching in light marching order, the distances covered increasing as the men's wind improves. For the following week much of the route marching is at double time. At the end of a fortnight the men are fit enough to have the weight they carry increased. Also the time has arrived for a little more strenuous work than is to be found on the flat. Upon every drill ground in Japan is a miniature steeplechase course, which, though an idea borrowed from the Germans, will bear description. The course is about 250 yards long. The first obstacle is an open ditch 9 feet wide, which has to be jumped. Then follows a stone wall 4 feet high. The next is a deep, open fosse, 30 feet wide, with half a dozen poles lying athwart it. These poles are less than 1 foot in diameter, and are for the men to walk across. The following obstacle is a palisade of pointed stakes—this is 8 feet high. The final obstacle is meant



A WAR CORRESPONDENT'S PASSPORT IN THE FAR EAST.

Note the numerous stamps which had to be impressed at each military station through which the holder passed.

to represent the face of a defended position. There is a deep 10-foot fosse, 20 feet in breadth, then a parapet revetted with stone, the whole surmounted with a mound. It is no mean achievement to negotiate this course at the double, yet the whole squad must negotiate it to the satisfaction of the inspecting officer before it is passed fit to undertake musketry instruction. As soon as the detachment is passed as physically fit, ordinary company training is proceeded with, and hitherto amongst the reservists I have seen nothing beyond company training. Battalion training doubtless takes place at other centres which I have not seen. Anyway, as soon as the men have done about two months at the divisional centres they are drafted off to one of the large camps near the embarkation ports, and are lost sight of."

A drawback from which the Japanese Army must have suffered considerably in regard to the training of these reservists was the lack of officers and non-commissioned officers for purposes of drill and discipline. But in the Japanese Army a little is made to go a very long way. Practically all the higher non-commissioned officers are quite able to discharge the duties of company officers, as indeed many were compelled to do in the fighting, more especially round Liao-yang. It is noteworthy, however, that the Japanese Army are averse from the Continental plan of giving numbers of non-commissioned officers commissions on the outbreak of a big war. As regards the drilling of reservists, this, it was found, could safely be entrusted to privates of the Regular Army, and accordingly the training of this immense mass of valu-

able material was accomplished with the very minimum of borrowing from the badly-needed strengths of Regular battalions.

Some idea of the vital necessity for providing a reserve against war wastage alone may be gathered from an instructive statement telegraphed from Tokio by Reuter's Agency at the end of September, 1904. According to the unofficial estimates in this message, the number of sick and wounded at that time under treatment in Japan was not less than 45,000. The military hospitals in Tokio, Osaka, and Hiroshima were said to contain 10,000 patients each. Nine thousand had recovered sufficiently to be sent to mountain health resorts. Such figures as these are of themselves sufficient to

indicate the tremendous drain upon the manhood of Japan which had commenced, and which must continue, at any rate as long as the garrison of Port Arthur held out behind its deadly fringe of forts and guns.

Beyond this question of war wastage lies that of the development of the enemy's resources, to which we shall refer more particularly in the succeeding chapter. But already we have seen the Russians awaking to a sense of the magnitude of the task before them, and taking at least one practical step towards supplying their present deficiencies. In Chapter LX. the creation of a Second Russian Army in Manchuria under General Gripenberg was foreshadowed, and subsequently it transpired that yet



A SADLY FAMILIAR SCENE AT TOKIO.

The more severely wounded Japanese soldiers are carried on stretchers from Tokio Railway Station to the Red Cross Hospital. A third "boy" accompanies each stretcher, so as to fan the invalid or attend to other small duties.

a Third Army was in contemplation. The Japanese, striking as had been their success hitherto, even when the numerical odds were not in their favour, could not afford to disregard such a dangerous symptom as this of their adversary's return to sanity. The prospect of such enormous increases to the Russian forces in the field was the more disquieting in view of the certainty that the new armies to be formed would fight as well as, if not better than, that which Japan had already encountered, and that no insuperable difficulty would probably be experienced in raising a Fourth or Fifth Russian Army if necessary. Accordingly Japan lost no time in preparing an effective reply to the new menace, and the smoothness and rapidity with which her Government acted seem to indicate that she had long ago realised the possibility that some such sacrifice would be necessary.

Under the Japanese military system in force at the outbreak of the war, service with the colours commenced at the age of 20, and lasted for three years, at the expiration of which term the men passed into the reserves for a period of nine years, and then into the Territorial Army, which is not liable to service abroad, for a period of eight years, a total period of 20 years' liability to military service. Japan's reply to the formation of the Second Russian Army in Manchuria was to extend the period of service in the reserves to 14 years, leaving only three years to be spent in the Territorial Army. As the new system became operative on the day it was promulgated, all men who served with the colours from 1887 to 1891 were added to the strength of the active Army, for, of course, all the Reserves were now considered to belong to the latter. "Statistics," writes a Tokio correspondent, "show the actual number

of such men to be 331,816, from which, deducting 10 per cent. for ordinary wastage, there remain 300,000 actually available. This calculation is necessarily based on returns of earlier date than the programme for the extension of Japanese armaments of 1896, which programme as now modified will ultimately give an increment of about double the above figures, thus making the total war strength of the army over 1,000,000."

It will be understood that this calculation of increased military strength must not be taken as representing with absolute exactitude the advantage secured. It is quite possible that the allowance for wastage by death and from other causes should be placed much higher than 10 per cent., and in a very great many cases it would be impossible to recall to the colours men who, having been for some years enrolled merely in the Territorial Army, had passed into an obscurity in which they could not easily be traced. The problem, again, of providing these new reserves with officers and non-commissioned officers would be a really difficult one. On the other hand, the efforts made by some Continental critics to disparage this counterblast to the formation of the Second and Third Russian Armies in Manchuria seem rather futile when we consider how careful the Japanese have always shown themselves in the matter of estimating their own strength, as well as in gauging that of their opponents. Hitherto they have never failed to put into the field at any given point as many men as were required for the purpose in view, and in all their preparations there seems to have been ample margin allowed for contingencies. This precise habit of mind has been illustrated with great clearness by the method adopted in the case of reinforcements. While it has

naturally been necessary to send many fresh units to the front, a principal object has been to keep those already in the field at war strength, a process which taxes even a first-class organisation very severely, but which, when satisfactorily carried out, is a notable proof of warlike efficiency.

While, then, it is quite possible that something under 600,000 men have thus by a stroke of the pen been added to the active military forces of Japan, there is, as an expert observes, no reason to doubt that "the field army is in process of expansion to half a million, at least, in order to compete on level terms with the similar deployment which Russia proposes and hopes to display in the spring." It must be remembered, too, that Japan has a marked advantage over Russia in this case by reason of her shorter line of main communications. Theoretically, of course, numbers must tell in the long run, but, practically speaking, the fact that Tokio is within a week of Liao-yang, and is connected with it by several routes, while it still takes a single battalion anything from four weeks to seven to get from St. Petersburg to Mukden, is of immense significance.

Before leaving this subject of Japan's special preparations for continuing the land campaign during the winter months, it may be interesting to place on record the fact that at this period the Japanese military authorities seem to have been particularly active in supplementing from abroad their vast stocks of kit and supplies of every description. It may be mentioned, for instance, that in October we hear of a London firm purchasing at Gouda, on behalf of the Japanese Government, 2,000,000 Dutch cheeses for Army supply purposes. It is also recorded that the Japanese placed large orders for win-

ter cloth and for tent canvas with Scottish manufacturers, who were urged to expedite delivery. Truly "a nation terribly in earnest," Japan showed clearly by her vigorous and ample policy of preparation in such matters that she realised to the full the complicated strain to which she would still, in any case, be subjected for months to come.

Nor were the Japanese less alert and busy in their endeavours to anticipate the naval requirements of the coming winter. Here it is not easy for us to give many details, for the Japanese were far more reticent in regard to their Fleet arrangements than in regard to those affecting the Army. But it is evident that, far from ignoring the possibility that the Baltic Squadron might eventually find its way into Japanese waters, and thus modify very materially the naval situation, the Mikado's Government kept a most vigilant eye upon the progress of Admiral Rodhjestvensky's ships from their outset, and were fully prepared with plans for their reception. They did not fail, incidentally, to expostulate with countries which afforded the Fleet a freer harbourage than the laws of neutrality would seem to justify, but they certainly did not allow the making of such diplomatic protest to divert them from the consideration of the more practical points at issue. Not only were the authorities at Tokio kept fully aware of every movement of the Russian Squadron, not only were adequate arrangements made for watching the approaches to the China Sea, but orders were evidently conveyed to the forces round Port Arthur to redouble their efforts to destroy the Russian ships in harbour, in order to leave Admiral Togo free to engage the newcomers. Although everything was done as quietly as possible, there is reason to

believe that in the later stage of the siege the Japanese Fleet was very little in actual evidence outside Port Arthur, the blockade being maintained by a few second- and third-class cruisers, and by gunboats and destroyers, the bulk of the squadron remaining in readiness at the naval base. Formerly Admiral Togo had been quite willing to adventure his precious ships in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur, and in the earlier stages of the siege his guns had on several occasions been used with marked effect against the coast fortifications. But there have been "accidents," possibly one or two besides those which were made public, and the oncoming of the Baltic Squadron made it doubly foolish to run risks. Accordingly we may take it that during the close of 1904 the Fleet of Japan was mainly engaged in resting, and in testing every joint in its armour, in order to prepare for what might prove a heavier struggle by far than any in which it had yet taken part.

Just as in the case of the Army, the Japanese Government did not restrict its naval preparations to mere obvious precautions. With equal thoroughness and watchfulness it anticipated a number of requirements in the way of material, sending, for instance, three experts to Fiume to watch over the construction of the torpedoes to be delivered during the following three years.

On October 13th, too, it was reported from New York that a Russian order for thirty submarines had been promptly followed by a Japanese order for fifty of these craft. In this connection it is interesting to recall the circumstance that, at the commencement of the war, a well-known Japanese naval officer had declared his countrymen to be averse from the adoption of submarines, which

were quite unlikely ever to be used by Japan. It is possible that the evident inclination of Russia to take advantage of this latter-day development may have modified the views of Japanese naval officers on the subject. But it is more likely that British naval manœuvres demonstrating the possibilities of submarine warfare, and the fact that this country was now building submarines with a rapidity which a few years ago would have been scouted as preposterous, had produced in Japan a sudden resolve to be up-to-date in this as in every other respect. It should be mentioned that, while the Russian order placed in New York is said to have been for submarines on the *Protector* model, the Japanese favoured the *Holland* type, a modification of that adopted by the British Navy.

But of even greater significance than its attention to torpedoes and submarines was the movement of Japan in another naval direction, a movement which was foreshadowed as far back as Chapter XLIV. of the present narrative. On page 546 of Vol. I. was reproduced Admiral Yamamouchi's statement to those who visited the Kure Arsenal in the course of the tour of the *Manchu Maru*, that in a few months Japan would be ready to start on the construction of battleships, and that it was hoped that very early in 1905 the keels of two large war-vessels would be laid. That statement was made in June, and in September it became known that Japan had given an order to the Carnegie Steel Works for 7,500 tons of the finest nickel steel plates, evidently intended as armour for new battleships or for very large armoured cruisers.

Japan had therefore lost little time in putting her intentions into practice, and the fact that the order would take about three months to execute, and that the



Photo: "Collier's Weekly."

RUSSIAN PITFALLS: AN INGENUOUS DEVICE FOR ARRESTING THE IMPETUOUS ATTACKS OF THE JAPANESE.

These pitfalls have been habitually used by the Russians as a method of defence of fortified positions. Those shown in the illustration were constructed at Liao-Yang and the Japanese are seen searching among them for their dead.

great armour-plate rolling mill at Kure was expected to be ready by January, points to a very accurate forecast of working possibilities.

As has already been pointed out, a new departure of the very highest significance and interest is here indicated. Hitherto Japan has had to be content with the home construction of torpedo craft and an occasional small cruiser, such as the *Niitaka* and *Tsushima*, and she may well be proud of having attained even these modest results after such a short apprenticeship to the shipbuilding art. Now she is about to attempt developments which, if successful, will enable her to compete with the naval powers of the West in a vitally important direction, and will gradually remove the one drawback under which she has laboured, and laboured heavily, in respect to the present war. A long period must elapse before Japan's first home-made battleship can take the water, but the mere fact that she will soon have one or two under construction may at no distant date have a very serious bearing upon the continuance of the struggle. For, with such enthusiasm, skill, and industry at work as are to be found among the Japanese, we may be sure that the biggest ships will be turned out far more speedily at Kure and Yokosuka than on the banks of the Neva; ships, too, whose rivets are not of painted wood, whose sea-plugs are not "accidentally" left open, and whose design is as sound as experience, combined with the shrewdest assimilation of foreign ideas, can make it.

But it must not be supposed that Japan's condition as regards the coming winter operations has been one of alert and busy preparations only. Her anxieties have been numerous and considerable, and in more than one direction she has

had to combat untoward influences even among her own countrymen. Speaking generally, the people of Japan have been affording a magnificent example of unity and pertinacity combined, and the Press of Tokio has borne eloquent witness to the steadfastness and genuineness of the prevailing patriotic sentiment. But there have been "little rifts within the lute" which have needed careful treatment to prevent their widening out and causing real mischief. A good deal of bad feeling, for instance, has been generated by aspersions directed against two prominent members of Tokio society, Count Matsukata and Count Inouye, who founded during the early stages of the war an Imperial Association for the relief of widows and families rendered destitute by the death or absence on service of husbands and relatives.

When Japanese feelings are aroused on a subject of this sort the expression of them is apt to become forcible to the verge of violence, and, accordingly, when statements appeared alleging a fraudulent misappropriation of the funds of this society, public indignation rose to a high pitch. Happily an answer was forthcoming to these aspersions in the shape of a declaration on the part of a former President of the Bank of Japan showing that the amount collected by the Imperial Relief Association—some £50,000—had been securely deposited in various good banks, and was earning interest sufficient to pay the expenses of management. There had been delay in distributing the fund because the Government and local societies were successfully caring for the destitute. All may have been well that thus ended well, but it is conceivable that not a little lasting soreness was created by this incident which might well have been avoided by the ex-

hibition of a little tact and common-sense.

Of another and more serious matter it is difficult to speak with complete freedom. The story—an extremely painful one—is told in a letter sent by a *Daily Express* correspondent from Tokio under date September 19th. It relates to the sinking of the transport *Hitachi Maru* and the shelling of the *Sado Maru* by the Vladivostok Squadron as narrated in Chapter XXXII. From what has since transpired it would appear that the loss sustained by Japan on that occasion was not confined to hundreds of valuable lives. The *Hitachi Maru* is said to have been loaded with the largest and best siege guns in Japan, and also to have carried two armoured trains and railway plants. The siege guns were, of course, intended for use against Port Arthur, and it is easy to understand that their loss contributed in no small degree to the delay in the reduction of the fortress.

The interception of the two transports by the Vladivostok Squadron produced a painful sensation at Tokio, where the details of the disaster were eagerly discussed and very free opinions were expressed as to the culpable parties. Miss McCaul, in whose bright book, "Under the Care of the Japanese War Office," is a vivid description of the incident as related to her by two of the survivors during her stay at Hiroshima, makes special mention of the "grave criticisms" passed on Admiral Kamimura for not having prevented such a serious blow. That gallant sailor has long ago been exonerated from the charge even of want of vigilance, but it would seem that a brother admiral on the staff at Tokio, who later incurred suspicion of a different kind, has been found guilty of an infamous connection with the disaster

of June 15th, and paid a terrible penalty for his treacherous act.

The story as related by the *Express* correspondent is to the effect that the Japanese admiral in question received a bribe of £12,000 from the Russians for telegrams, which were despatched first to Fusan and thence by wireless telegraphy to the Vladivostok Squadron, and which enabled the latter to locate the transports soon after they left Moji. When on investigation the admiral's treachery leaked out, the vengeance of the Naval General Staff was swift and, according to our Western ideas, horrible. The doomed man having formally been found guilty, the sentence of death was read out to him by his intimate friend and comrade. Then followed a scene over which we need not linger. "The Staff assembled and entered the room, which had been cleared of all furniture. The prisoner was made to take off his uniform. He was then beaten to death by his comrades."

Let us turn hastily from this ghastly episode to other considerations connected with this period. It is not the business of the present historian to discuss closely great questions of finance, but this is a juncture at which the "sinews of war" cannot be wholly disregarded in any fair survey of the warlike situation. As regards Japan, there is no sort of question that the financial outlook continues quite extraordinarily favourable, in spite of the terrific expenditure which has been, and is being, incurred. "The strain of the war and the drain upon the country's resources," says Reuter's well-informed correspondent at Tokio, "are not felt to any extent among the people. Some businesses have suffered, but the aggregate foreign and domestic trade exceeds that of last year, and the crops, particu-

larly the rice crop, are the largest ever grown." This statement was made at the end of September, and a few days later was amplified by an important pronouncement by the Japanese Minister of Finance, Count Okuma, whose survey of the financial position was distinctly optimistic notwithstanding several frank admissions. He pointed out that if the war lasted another two years the total cost to Japan would probably be from 1,200 to 1,300 million yen, or from 120 to 130 millions of pounds sterling. Therefore, with the present debt and the cost of the *post bellum* undertakings, the country's liabilities would aggregate £200,000,000. Russian war-outlays over the same period would approximate, he thought, 400 to 500 million pounds sterling. Even assuming Japan's indebtedness to rise to a couple of hundred millions, that would only amount to £4 per head of the population. There was no reason why Japan should regard such a prospect with dismay, provided she husbanded her strength and resources, and did not resort too freely to foreign loans, the result of which would be to depreciate her securities.

On the day on which Count Okuma made this statement, the Prefectural Governors were having a conference with the Cabinet, at which some interesting conclusions were arrived at. Since the outbreak of the war the prefectural expenses had been reduced by no less than two millions sterling, and now other retrenchments were being effected in order to strengthen the national finances. A striking instance this of the readiness of all classes of the population to make sacrifices in aid of the prosecution of the war to the bitter end. For we may be sure that these reductions in prefectural expenditure affected the pockets not only

of leading provincial officials, but of far humbler employes. Fair comparisons in such a case are difficult, but it may be doubted whether any similar process of retrenchment could be carried out in any Western country with such apparent absence of irritation on the part of those affected. For of all forms of taxation the reduction of small official salaries and perquisites is, perhaps, the most unpopular, and, taken all round, the hardest to be borne.

The old saying that Heaven helps those who help themselves seems likely to be exemplified in the case of Japan by an incident which, although of doubtful historical value, seems worthy to be chronicled in passing. War time, and especially during such a war as that which is now absorbing Japan's best energies, is hardly a favourable season for developing or exploiting the mineral wealth of a belligerent country. But it may happen that Japan's financial responsibilities during the coming winter—to say nothing of subsequent periods—may be a little lightened by an interesting discovery made about this time of goldfields situated in the Kesen district of the Rikuzen Province, in Government property. The fields were promptly inspected by Government engineers and a proclamation issued entirely reserving the mining rights. According to an early estimate transmitted by the *Times* correspondent, the fields were believed to be of considerable extent and richness, and capable of producing gold to the value of two or three millions sterling annually. Many a far richer country than Japan would welcome such a pleasant windfall.

It remains to say a few words as to Japan's relations with foreign countries at the commencement of the winter campaign. In the first place, it is pleasant



THE GREAT STRUGGLE ON THE SHA-HO: FIGHTING
IN THE STREETS OF LIN-CHIN-PU.



to notice that, notwithstanding the efforts of sundry Continental journals to the contrary, the good feeling between Japan and her ally, Great Britain, continued unabated, and that from time to time the confidence of the Japanese in the steadfast character of British sympathy found very happy and frank expression in all the more influential organs of public opinion. As to the Continental Press campaign referred to, it is sufficient to say that it consisted chiefly of a systematic endeavour to twist British recognition of Russian valour into a sign of waning regard for Japan and growing preference for her adversary. As was pointed out earlier, there was such persistence and method about these silly insinuations that it was impossible not to think that they were in some measure inspired, the object being the twofold one of disheartening Japan and discrediting British diplomacy. Fortunately Japan and England are alike in their capacity for admiration of high courage and military skill, and while the London papers were applauding Kuropatkin's masterly retreat from Liao-yang, and the dogged tenacity of his brave soldiers, the Tokio papers were doing just the same thing. There was, then, no chance of misunderstanding on this point, and, even if there had been, it would doubtless have been neutralised by the other and substantial proofs given by Great Britain of her goodwill. The very considerable fund raised in this country for the Japanese wounded, alone, to say nothing of the marked public satisfaction displayed whenever news arrived of a Japanese success, would have been sufficient, if necessary, to convince the Island Nation of the Far East that the friendship of the other Island Nation was of the right enduring sort.

Of the North Sea incident, it may be said in passing that the Tokio Press took a singularly sane view, refraining, in particular, from any sort of expressed wish that Great Britain should be forced into the conflict against her will. Warm-hearted sympathy with the victims of the outrage was generally exhibited in Japan, and, as we have seen, the Mayor of Tokio was at pains to cable direct to the Mayor of Hull the sincere condolences of himself and his fellow-citizens upon what had occurred. Of what Japan thought about Britain's naval preparations in connection with the outrage it might savour of self-complacency to speak at length. But it may safely be said that the spectacle of her ally's magnificent readiness to assert, if necessary, her maritime supremacy in Europe was not lost upon a nation which had herself given the world such a striking object-lesson in the value of sea-power.

Another foreign country Japan's relations with which were of unusual interest at this stage was Germany. There is no question that for the first six or seven months of the war Japan had viewed Germany's, or rather the German Emperor's, pro-Russian tendencies with grave suspicion, and even now the assistance lent in the matter of coaling the Baltic Fleet was not unnaturally creating a good deal of resentment in Japanese minds. But some modification of this bitter feeling took place at the end of September and the beginning of October in consequence of the visit of Prince Karl Anton of Hohenzollern to Tokio, preparatory to proceeding to the front. Prince Karl arrived at the Japanese capital on September 25th, and received a notable welcome, several of the leading papers taking the opportunity of emphasising the friendship between Japan

and Germany. At a farewell banquet on October 2nd one of the Japanese Princes, in proposing the health of the Kaiser coupled with that of Prince Karl, remarked that the despatch of so distinguished a member of the German Imperial family to accompany a Japanese army constituted a strong proof of the friendship cementing not only the two Courts, but also the two Empires of Germany and Japan.

It is not suggested that these amenities should of themselves be taken very seriously, and, as hinted above, there are still reasons, and cogent reasons, why Japan should not regard Germany with special lovingkindness. To those reasons may be added the strong commercial rivalry which has already arisen, and which cannot fail to become still stronger in the future, between two countries who have never disguised their intention to have a finger in the China pie. But it is none the less noteworthy that in October, 1904, a marked improvement in the relations between Japan and Germany took place, the mere fact of which may prove to be of some historical significance.

It is a singular instance of Russia's diplomatic methods that she should have stooped about this time to seek to create in the United States an uneasy feeling that Japan's continued success would jeopardise America's position in the Philippines. As the *Times* correspondent at Tokio observed, nothing could be more chimerical, since it is very doubtful whether even England holds a higher place in Japan's esteem and affection than America. In explaining that this sentiment is of long and unchecked growth the correspondent quoted indulged in a short historical retrospect, and added a note on the present relations between the

two countries so admirably lucid and to the point that an extract is subjoined *verbatim*:—

“America first among Occidental States agreed to relieve Japan from the indignity of alien tribunals administering foreign laws within her borders; and although this concession, inexpressibly prized by the Japanese, had no immediate practical value because of an arrangement which made its operation conditional on the concurrence of other Powers, the reservation, having been suggested by the Japanese themselves, did not in any sense detract from the grace of the act. America, again, by restoring her share of an indemnity wrested from Japan under painful circumstances, greatly strengthened her place in the Island Empire's heart; and, when to this record is added the fact that in the demeanour of the average United States citizen towards the Japanese there has always been a subtle something which differentiates him from the generally condescending and too often contemptuous representative of other Western nations, it becomes comprehensible that among all her Occidental friends there is none more cherished by Japan than the American. These considerations alone should suffice to show how extravagant is the suggestion that Japan would ever resent the floating of the Stars and Stripes over the Philippines. And there is the further cardinal fact that, although Japan is actually allied in this war with only one section of the Anglo-Saxon race, she believes herself to be theoretically allied with the whole of Anglo-Saxondom, since she is fighting for the British-American programme of equal opportunities for all peoples in an independent China, and for the Anglo-Saxon ideal of constitutional liberty against the sway of despotic mili-



THE ASSAULT ON THE KEY TO THE RUSSIAN CENTRE AT LIAO-YANG.

This illustration, drawn from a sketch made upon the battlefield, represents the attack of the 3rd (Okta's) and 5th (Nowa's) Divisions of the Japanese forces upon the enormously strong Russian redoubt, seen crowning the high hill on the left of the picture, and its necessary defences. One of the latter, called "The Round Top," shown in the immediate foreground, was the scene of constant fighting; its trenches were found filled with dead. Below this foreground hill and in the middle distance are seen the wire entanglements and pitfalls which cost the Japanese so many lives. The low hill on the right of the picture is the Chinese graveyard where Okta's men hugged the ground the whole of one day, and lost 30 per cent. of their number under cross-fire. In the cone-field beyond, the Japanese screened 300 of their guns. The anti-like figures scaling the slopes of the further hills are the attacking Japanese. The ground explosions seen at the front of these hills are the land-mines which the Russians fired by electricity. On the extreme right of the picture, but not shown, lies a cone-covered plain through which the Japanese advanced on a four-mile front, charring every Russian position at once. Kuroki's position in the hilly country seen in the distance was marked by continuous strophnet smoke bursts.

tarism. America's withdrawal from the Philippines would be regarded by the Japanese as little short of a calamity, since her presence there constitutes a guarantee for the continuance of her wholesome interest in the affairs of the Far East."

The only other foreign relations with which Japan is seriously and specially concerned at this moment are with China, and here the considerations involved are so numerous and complex that they must be left for separate treatment, should occasion arise, in a future chapter. It is sufficient to say here that at present no cause for particular anxiety exists in this direction, and that, accordingly, neither in the East nor West is there any immediate indication that Japan will be hampered in her prosecution of the war by extraneous contingencies. This circumstance gives added point to the simple

but impressive appeal addressed by the Mikado to his people in the second week of October. "Since the outbreak of the war," said his Majesty, "our Army and our Navy have demonstrated their bravery and their loyalty, while both officials and people have acted in unison to support the Cause. So far, success has attended our Cause, but, the end being yet very far distant, it is necessary to be patient and steadfast in the pursuance of our action, and thus aim at the final accomplishment of our purpose."

Well may the Japanese have paid respectful heed to such a message, knowing as they did how earnestly and tactfully their noble Emperor was working to lessen the strain of the war by careful conservation of the national resources, and by the maintenance of studiously friendly intercourse with all neutral nations.




Photo: Urban, Ltd.

NATIVE QUARTER, HARBIN.

CHAPTER LXXII.

RUSSIA IN OCTOBER—ARMIES IN MANCHURIA—SIBERIAN RAILWAY—DISCONTENTED RESERVISTS—FRESH WARLIKE PREPARATIONS—DARDANELLES QUESTION REVIVED—FEELING IN ST. PETERSBURG—EFFECT OF THE WAR ON TRADE—FINANCIAL OUTLOOK.

IN seeking to do for Russia in this chapter what was done for Japan in the last, namely, to examine her condition and resources at the commencement of the winter operations, a somewhat less grateful task is encountered. In the case of Japan the prospect, by no means one of unmixed freedom from care and apprehension, was relieved by many bright features. In particular we saw an enlightened monarch loyally supported by a united people in a policy of persistent and self-sacrificing endeavour. We saw, too, a splendidly efficient Navy and Army, not only maintained at a glorious pitch of enthusiasm and achievement by their own valour and endurance, but backed up to the utmost by the sedulous efforts made at home to keep them well furnished with supplies and war material. The inevitable strain of a costly and devastating conflict we found to be both sensibly relieved by wise administration of the nation's finances, and notably assisted by the circumstance of a record crop and an encouraging maintenance of trade prosperity.

When we turn to Russia's winter outlook we shall meet with much less cheering symptoms. But, before we proceed to discuss these in detail, a word of warning is necessary. While in relation to the actual winter operations themselves, the condition of Russia may be shown to be little short of deplorable, while figures might easily be cited to prove that the

blow already dealt to Russia's finance and commerce, to say nothing of her world-prestige, has been an extraordinarily heavy one, it would be very foolish to generalise too freely from any statements of this kind. Russia, in October, 1904, presents a very imposing figure, notwithstanding the fact that she has been handled during the past eight months by Japan much in the same way as a big-framed Western wrestler is sometimes handled by an undersized professor of *ju-ji-tsu*. She must still be reckoned a very great Power, temporarily, perhaps, taken at a disadvantage, but still an adversary of giant strength and literally immense resources. What a country like Russia can do in the way of fighting can never be measured by a few months of war. Over such a vast area, where such enormous possibilities and reserves of wealth and other aids to resistance are concerned, powers of self-recovery may come into play, of which history has already provided some instructive examples. France, while she was being humbled by Germany, did wonderful things, and, her humiliation over, recovered herself with extraordinary swiftness. Russia herself did the same after her war with Turkey in 1877. Again, Russia's very weakness as a nation may prove, as Turkey's has done, her strength as a fighter.

If, then, we proceed somewhat ruthlessly to examine Russia's position in re-

gard to the continuance of the war during the winter months, let us do so with our eyes open to big historical and political facts. Rome was not built in a day, and for that very reason did not decline in a day, although the causes of her ultimate fall were such as would have brought about a speedy collapse in any less strongly-based empire. But Russia is even less liable than Rome in her later days might have been to feel the full weight of such a hammering as she has received. For Russia is not only an Empire which has been a long time growing, but one which has not done growing yet, as far as internal development, at any rate, is concerned. There are more signs of coming emancipation than of imminent decadence about Russia, and this is one of those considerations which has to be reckoned very seriously when estimating the reserve of fighting strength possessed by a belligerent nation at any stage of a great war.

With these few words of caution, based on purely historical arguments which need not be elaborated here, let us turn to the matter directly in hand, and try to gauge fairly the effect upon the winter's work which Russia's special preparations, and the conditions under which she is making them, were likely to have. In the first place we have to deal with the Russian Army on the spot, and here, before we proceed to projects of expansion, one or two serious points present themselves. In the first place there can be no question that the Russian cause has been helped to an almost incredible extent by two circumstances both of a personal nature, one the recall of Admiral Alexeieff, the former Viceroy of the Far East—which has been dealt with at length in Chapter LXVII.—the other the magnificent efforts of Prince Khilkoff,

the Minister of Public Works and Communications, to maintain and increase the carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway.

We have already seen how the recall of Alexeieff, the "heavy-handed intriguer" of the Far East, has coincided with the formation of a Second Russian Army in Manchuria under General Gripenberg, the original idea being that Kuropatkin should have supreme control of these two armies only. But the formation of armies is a fascinating process, and only a few weeks after the notion of a Second Army a Third Army began to be contemplated, and shortly afterwards became an accomplished fact. It is not necessary to go into the preliminary details of this new organisation. A simpler plan will be to anticipate the state of affairs at the end of the year, when we find the Russian military strength in Manchuria scheduled by a military expert as follows:—First Army (General Liniévitch) — First, Second, Third, and Fourth Siberian Army Corps, say 150,000, to the east of the great Manchurian Road. Second Army (General Gripenberg) — First, Tenth, and Seventeenth Russian and Fifth Siberian Army Corps, perhaps 140,000 strong, to the west of the same road. Third Army (General Kaulbars)—Eighth and Sixteenth Russian Army Corps (even in January not completely mustered at the front), and the Sixth Siberian Army Corps, say, 80,000 men. To the above must be added the cavalry under General Rennenkamf, which is directly under the Commander-in-Chief.

It will thus be seen that, thanks to the extraordinary energy of the Minister of Works and Ways, the Russians had no lack of men at the front both at the beginning of, and during, the winter. Also, according to General Kuropatkin,

the Commissariat Department was working well, at any rate, in the autumn, for in September the Commander-in-Chief made special mention of the manner in which the Commissariat officials had carried out their duties hitherto, and

note that at the commencement of the winter operations the question of food supplies does not seem to have caused any particular anxiety. The only serious deficiency seems to have been in the matter of forage, which had run very



GENERAL KAULBARS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE THIRD RUSSIAN MANCHURIAN ARMY.

asked that their services might be brought directly under the notice of the Tsar. It is true that later accounts seem to indicate that this praiseworthy efficiency was not well maintained. But we are dealing in this chapter with the winter prospect, and it is important to

short since the Russian evacuation of Liao-yang, where the bulk of the forage stores had been accumulated since the commencement of the campaign. Even the Harbin depôt appears to have been rapidly exhausted, with the result that cavalry leaders were beginning to com-

plain loudly of the restrictions thus placed on their movements.

But it is when we come to look into other circumstances at the front that we begin to discover signs of a pinching shoe. We have already seen how, through want of proper winter uniforms, the Russian troops were compelled to wear Chinese clothing. It is further stated that there was a serious lack of boots, a grave matter indeed at the commencement of a Manchurian cold season. Another significant drawback is the condition of the hospitals, some of which for months past have been in an appalling state.

of people suffering from dysentery those in authority hide, and then excuse themselves on the plea that the matter has not been reported to them."

The chance of any improvement in this painful condition of affairs is very small. Some indication has previously been given of the scandalous misappropriation of funds subscribed in Russia for the alleviation of the sufferings of the sick and wounded. To this may now be added the testimony of one of the Russian correspondents of the *Times*, who



Photo: Urban, Ltd.

THE RAILWAY STATION, HARBIN.

Writing from Mukden, a Russian officer, under date July 20th, had drawn a terrible picture of the situation in this respect. "In the railway hospital cases of diphtheria and scarlet fever are lodged in the same building as surgical cases. There is literally not a vacant spot. . . . Splendid Royal trains for the wounded go half empty. But men suffering from dysentery are carried on straw in goods waggons at the rate of twenty-five sick men to a waggon, or in bunks of two tiers. And all this arouses little interest. When some wretched train arrives full

says: "Very little confidence is now felt that money given to the Red Cross Society will ever reach the Russian sick and wounded at all, and in the circumstances this is not surprising. But even those who are willing to make and pay for their own arrangements find the task no easy one. An association of nobles in the south of Russia wished to equip a special ambulance for the war, and although all preparations had been completed and the train was ready to start, the requisite official permission was repeatedly and inexplicably delayed. At

last one of the members of the association went himself to St. Petersburg to try to accelerate matters. After being passed on from office to office and obtaining nothing but evasive replies and unsatisfactory promises, he discovered that the cause of the trouble was a certain highly placed military official, who would not give the permission until he had received a substantial *douceur*. This having been provided, all difficulties vanished and the ambulance was allowed to proceed.

“ Another instance of peculation which occurred out at the seat of the war was related to me by a Russian who had had to do with the equipment of one of these private hospitals. A chief of police at Kronstadt, who had been dismissed and imprisoned for peculation some years ago, was appointed to an important position in the Red Cross Society, and entrusted with a sum of 600,000 roubles (£60,000) to be expended in the Far East. He went out there, and soon the whole sum had disappeared, but nothing had been spent on the object for which it was intended. The affair came to light and the ex-chief of police was recalled, but actually given another appointment in the Red Cross Society’s headquarters at St. Petersburg.

“ Although most of the nurses have behaved with the greatest gallantry and self-sacrifice in their task at the front, the conduct of others has been less praiseworthy, and 25 per cent. of them have been ordered back to Russia for scandalous misbehaviour.”

It is a relief to be able to turn from these unpleasant stories to the details of the working of the Siberian Railway, to which approving allusion has been made above. In this connection the personality of Prince Khilkoff is particularly

interesting. He is described by Mr. John Foster Fraser, in his “ The Real Siberia ” (Cassell & Co.), as an elderly gentleman with the easiest of manners, and nothing Russian or official about him. He studied engineering as a young man in Birkenhead and afterwards in America. According to Prince Khilkoff’s own account he is “ just a working man, you know—a sort of blacksmith.” But he is something very much more than that. Not only is he a striking combination of intellect, vigour, and industry, but he is one of the few men who have been able successfully to cope with the blight of corruption and peculation which is such a frightful hindrance to the proper development more especially of great Russian engineering enterprises. One after the other he has weeded out the higher officials of the vast Siberian line, until a staff has been formed upon which real reliance can be placed. Moreover, there is little chance of backsliding, for the Minister of Communications, having set his headquarters at Irkutsk, is constantly travelling up and down the line, personally superintending the strengthening of the permanent way and the badly-wanted construction of new sidings. The result has been that, in spite of heartrending difficulties, there has not only been no serious breakdown, but the carrying capacity of the line has been sensibly increased.

Brief mention has been made in preceding chapters of the opening of the Circum-Baikal extension, by which the voyage across the lake is satisfactorily avoided. Of this extension, which was opened for traffic on September 26th, some interesting details are now available. The line was actually commenced in 1899, but, until the outbreak of the war, the progress made was very slow

owing to the almost insuperable natural obstacles encountered. The railway is about 150 miles long, and no fewer than thirty-three tunnels had to be cut through the mountains with dynamite, the ultimate cost being nearly six millions sterling. Some idea of the value of the line for purposes of reinforcement may be gained from the statement that ten trains, each of thirty carriages, can be run on the extension daily, whereas the ice-breaker *Baikal*, formerly the only link between the Cis-Baikal and Trans-Baikal

convert the railway as far as Lake Baikal into a double line, and a first credit of ten million roubles had been opened for the purpose.

While on the subject of the transport of Russian troops to the Far East a glance may be given at the passage up from Southern Russia to the Moscow terminus of the Siberian line. Here is an interesting picture taken from a



THE TRANS-SIBERIAN
RAILWAY UNDER
CONSTRUCTION.

lines, making three trips across the lake every day, could only carry twenty-five carriages each trip.

But even with this important improvement the carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway falls very far short of actual requirements. The real desideratum is a second line of rails, and it is significant of Russia's greatness that the tremendous task of meeting this demand does not deter her responsible officials from making a start at the commencement of this busy winter. By the third week in October it had been decided to

letter written about the middle of October:—

“ On a recent journey between Ekaterinoslaff and Odessa I counted no fewer than seven military trains full of troops going eastward. They formed part of the Odessa Army Corps which has been mobilised and is being sent out to the front. Each train consisted of twenty to thirty cars, each of which contained about thirty men or eight horses. At the station of Znamenka there was a particularly busy scene, as three trains were there simultaneously, and a number of soldiers, both infantry and cavalry, were scattered about the platforms. Most of the men wore dark uniforms, save a few

who had jackets of a light greenish-khaki colour. They were small in stature, but seemed well set up and strong. They had very swarthy skins, and were evidently to a great extent of non-Russian extraction—Tartars, Circassians, etc. One of the officers, too, a Mahomedan, wore a red fez. They appeared to be cheerful enough, and some were even dancing on the platform wild fantastic Oriental dances, interspersed with curious shrieks, to the tune of a violin played by a musical warrior in one of the cars. These antics aroused considerable curiosity and amusement among the ordinary passengers and lookers on, who formed circles round the performers.

“The cars in which the troops travelled were ordinary goods vans taken from all the railways of the Russian Empire. A good many, by the way, belong to the Eastern Chinese Railway, the name of which is painted on them in Russian only. In each van several planks had been placed crossways and lengthways so as to form benches for the soldiers, but they were so arranged that they could not be of much comfort to any one wishing to sleep, and the men usually slept, or tried to sleep, on the floor. Owing to the fatiguing nature of the journey, the troops are allowed a day’s rest after three days’ travelling. There seemed to be very little in the way of kit in the cars, but possibly the belongings of the troops were in other vans. A number of cars had a small iron stove for heating in winter. Where cavalry or artillery was being transported, the horses were placed at each end of the car, with the saddles piled up in a pyramid in the intervening space, which was also occupied by a few soldiers. In each train there were two or three second-class cars provided with sleeping couches for the officers.”

It was particularly noticed by the correspondent who penned the above graphic description that, although a number of the inhabitants of the various towns along the line assembled at the stations to see the troops pass, there appeared not to be the slightest enthusiasm, and not a single cheer was heard as train after train full of soldiers steamed off. This brings us to the contemplation of the state of affairs and of public feeling in Russia itself as regards the war, and more especially with reference to the continued calling up of reservists in connection with fresh mobilisations. That the later mobilisation orders issued have caused serious discontent, particularly in Southern Russia, there is abundant evidence. Here the standard of intelligence is, at any rate among those engaged in commerce, comparatively high, and even the lower classes have kept themselves fairly well informed as to the real progress of the war. Nor have officially organised lectures and other propaganda caused them to take a less critical view of the position of Russia in respect to this disastrous conflict, which has already had such a grave effect upon trade, and in which they have already seen so much Russian blood and treasure expended. Small wonder, then, that the receipt at Odessa, for instance, of the order to mobilise should be followed by some remarkable scenes, of which the following is an instructive example:—The Commander-in-Chief of the forces in South Russia was haranguing, according to custom, a large detachment of soldiers assembled for despatch from Odessa by military train. The men listened sullenly to the speech until the General thought fit to remind them that the call to arms was an honour of which they should show



A REMINISCENCE OF THE EARLY
DAYS OF THE WAR.

*The rush of Russian reinforcements to the
Far East: troops crossing Lake Baikal.*



their appreciation. This was too much for the patience of men whose sorrow at being torn from their homes had been aggravated by the refusal of the Governor to allow their wives, and other relations and friends, to see them off at the station. A murmur ran through the ranks, and one of the men shouted, "Davolno!"—"enough." The occurrence of such an incident at such a time is striking proof that neither the usual patriotism of the Russian public, nor their just fear of the iron discipline which pervades the military system of the country, could repress their dislike of the war and their indignation at being thus ruthlessly forced to take personal part in it.

Considerable cruelty is inflicted upon the lower classes in the matter of the horse mobilisation, the calling up of privately owned horseflesh for cavalry, artillery, and transport purposes. The custom is to commandeer horses freely alike from wealthy traders in the towns and from poor moujiks, or peasants, on their farms, a sum being paid by the military authorities which represents, as might be expected in Russia, a fraction of the real value of the animal taken. Also, as might be expected in this hot-bed of corrupt practices, the system leads to many abuses. A wealthy man has little difficulty in evading the requisitions by temporarily taking into use during the horse mobilisation period a few old crocks whose seizure he can regard without a pang, his better animals being kept discreetly out of the way. The connivance of the military authorities may be required, and is readily obtained for a consideration. "The poorer land-owners and eternally oppressed moujiks have no such means at their disposal for evading the law. The better the mou-

jik's horse the less chance there is of its escaping requisition. Moreover, he must take what the Government offer him for it. He weeps, appeals, offers his insignificant *baksheesh*, and mumbles curses by turns as he stands with hundreds of others in the market-place 'concentration' enclosure. Half his land must remain unploughed until he can add enough out of his own pocket to buy a new horse with the slender dole he may get as compensation from the authorities."

A startling feature of the discontent in connection with the mobilisations was the broadcast distribution among the reservists themselves of pamphlets prepared by the revolutionary party. These pamphlets are described as beautifully printed and got-up, their tone being studiously moderate, in that no attempt is made to encourage outrages or even active resistance to authority. Passive resistance on a wholesale scale to the mobilisation orders is counselled, and a very careful effort is made to represent the war in its true colours. It is pointed out that the Russian people never have had, and never can have, any interest in Manchurian affairs, and that the war has been engineered solely in the interests of the governing classes. "Even a successful issue could only result in a fresh crop of Grand Ducal concessions." Somewhat curiously a point is made of the suggestion that Russia's prestige has already suffered through her failure to keep her promises as to the evacuation of Manchuria, a strange position, indeed, for the writer of a Russian pamphlet to take up.

Such discontent so skilfully fostered could not but produce an important effect among not only those liable to be called up, but also among those actually sent

to the front, and able to see for themselves the difficulties under which the Russian Army is prosecuting this ill-starred campaign. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Russian

In spite of disturbances the work of reinforcement is carried on steadily, and unit after unit goes to the front more or less completely equipped for active service, and doubtless containing a fair pro-



RUSSIAN MOUJIKS.

(From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia.")

of the lower classes is, as a rule, either a very light-hearted or a very patient individual, and the close *camaraderie* of active service is often an effective solvent of those political grievances which these manifestoes of the revolutionary party have sought to produce.

portion of willing and capable, if not of enthusiastic and highly-trained, fighters. The strain as yet is hardly felt as regards the non-commissioned ranks, but it is noticeable that towards the end of August it had been found expedient to issue an Imperial Army Order by which over

2,000 cadets were raised to the rank of officer. Such a step would hardly be taken unless the shortage of officers had not already become as embarrassing to mighty Russia as it did to ourselves at one period of the South African War.

Here and there, no doubt, some warlike fervour was exhibited on the departure of regiments for the front. Such may well have been the case when the Minsk and Volhynia Regiments were assembled at Balachovka station and were addressed by the veteran General Dragomiroff in the following characteristic speech:—

“My brothers, do not forget each other. Remember that by dying yourselves to save your comrades you will be doing a good deed. Spare your cartridges, do not waste them. Do not fire to no purpose. Attention! Once more, spare your cartridges, spare them, spare them. If you fire well, twenty regiments of the enemy will not be able to beat you.

“You, officers, spare your reserves. They are your cartridges.


“My brothers, I have instructed your fathers, and now I speak to you. In attacking in line do not close up in masses; keep your ranks clear of each other. Advance boldly. ‘Take care, enemy, I am marching on you!’ Officers, take care not to give orders to fire at long range. It would be foolish and would be a useless waste of cartridges. In night encounters do not make a clamour. In silence all goes well. Let the enemy shout, but you rush in with the bayonet. Spare your cartridges, spare your reserves. At night dead silence. ‘Ura’ (hurrah) is a grand Russian word, but to shout it at the wrong time would be foolish. We have had such cases.

“Give my greetings to the men of Podolia and Jitomir. May God grant

you success with your bayonets. Brothers, strike hard! Remember!”

Apart from mobilisation, the Russian Government, like that of Japan, was very busy at this period in procuring fresh warlike stores, for a considerable proportion of which it was necessary to draw upon foreign sources. Russia is fortunate in being able to manufacture most of what she requires for military purposes at home, but in the matter of guns and ammunition the expenditure and losses have been so enormous that it is not surprising that free advantage was taken of the enterprising disregard of the laws of neutrality displayed by not a few foreign firms. A favourite port for the loading of such goods appears to have been Antwerp, from which the sailing of a steamer for Libau with a full cargo of heavy guns and ammunition excited at the time little comment, although possibly some awkward questions on the subject may arise hereafter in this and similar cases.

But Russia had naval as well as military preparations to make, and contingencies to provide for, at this juncture. The despatch of the Baltic Fleet has been separately dealt with, but a few words may be added here with reference to the submarines which may or may not have accompanied Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron on its adventurous voyage. There is no doubt that Russia was now freely ordering submarines. The order placed in America for a number of boats of the *Protector* type has already been mentioned, while in the German Socialist papers it was freely averred that several submarines were in course of construction in the Germania Shipbuilding yards. But in connection with the Baltic Fleet an incident arose which is rather an entertaining example of up-to-date enterprise in the contraband supply of war



A RUSSIAN FORT THAT COST THE JAPANESE 3,000 MEN; THE SEMI-PERMANENT REDOUBT ON THE LEVEL PLAIN, ONE MILE SOUTH OF LIAO-YANG.

This redoubt was one of eleven similar earthworks forming the inner line of defence. General Stackelberg's rearguard held it until 11.30 p.m. on Saturday, September 3rd. This is the spot where many companies of Okhr's 3rd Division were nearly annihilated, and 3,000 Japanese fell in the night attack on this one position.

material to belligerent nations. While the Baltic Fleet was preparing to set out, an American steamer arrived at Kronstadt with three submarine boats on board, which were promptly offered to the Russian naval authorities with a choice of alternative terms and conditions. Either the boats would be sold outright for a lump sum, or the vendors would undertake to man them with their own crews, requiring only one Russian officer on board each submarine as supervisor, etc. In the latter case, the Americans would require 25 per cent. of the registered value or cost of each Japanese vessel sunk to be paid to them.

The cream of the proposal soon came to the top. "You may arrest us, if you like," said the Yankee negotiators, "but, if you do, we can tell you that your Baltic Fleet, with which we are anxious to co-operate, will be at a serious disadvantage, because we have sent another steamer, with three other submarines of the same kind, to the Japanese, who will certainly take them!"

In addition to submarines the Russian Government was careful to order large fresh consignments of torpedoes for immediate use, and to extend as far as possible her ship-building programme by placing contracts for the construction of new cruisers and torpedo-craft in foreign yards. Here, of course, no breach of neutrality is immediately involved, since delivery in the case of such orders may not take place until long after the war is over. But it is rather interesting that Russia should not have allowed the warlike preoccupation of the moment to divert her from keeping a steady eye on future naval requirements. We may have something to say later of her new naval programme; for the present it may be recorded that quite at the end of Sept-

ember the French *Compagnie des Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée* received an order for eleven destroyers of the latest pattern, and that further orders were expected to be given very shortly for four cruisers of the *Bayan* type.

But these were by no means the only signs that in some Russian official quarters the mere despatch of the Second Pacific Squadron was not regarded as a conclusive bid for the recapture of naval supremacy in the Far East. In October there began to be heard with growing distinctness those suggestive murmurs as to the unfairness of bottling up a large portion of the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea, the echo of which is from time to time wafted over Continental Europe.

There would seem to be some question whether this time there was not more bluff than seriousness about the Russian attitude concerning that long-standing grievance. For the Black Sea Fleet was now in a very bad state, and there would have been the greatest difficulty in putting any appreciable portion of it on a war footing. The ships' companies had been heavily drawn upon, more especially in regard to the engine-room staffs, for the purpose of supplying deficiencies in the Baltic Squadron, and there had recently been an exhibition of wholesale insubordination amounting almost to open mutiny. But, these drawbacks notwithstanding, the old, old question was warmly revived, "Ought the passage of the Dardanelles any longer to be closed to the warships of Russia, and was Great Britain justified in maintaining her inconveniently stubborn opposition to Russia's national wishes on this point?" At one moment it seemed possible that the controversy might assume a critical shape, and that, following on the complications created by the North Sea incident,

fresh and yet more serious trouble would be created by a Russian attempt to force the matter to an issue.

We are not likely for many years to come, if then, to know the exact course of Anglo-Russian diplomacy in regard to the raising of the Dardanelles question in the autumn and early winter of 1904. It may be that the Russian Government took no direct hand in the matter, and contented itself with merely looking on while its agents, volunteer and other, flew their little *ballons d'essai* through the windy columns of a certain section of the Press of Europe. But it will not be surprising if some day we learn that the British Government was about this time formally approached on the subject of the Dardanelles, an intimation being conveyed to it that neither Germany nor France would object to a revision of the international treaties on this point. Still less astonishing would it be to discover that Great Britain, having given definite assurances to her ally, Japan, had categorically and uncompromisingly declined to be a party to any alteration of the existing agreement. Be this as it may, the discussion even in the Press dropped with some suddenness. Russia would doubtless have been delighted to steal a march upon both Japan and Great Britain in this matter, but the absurdity of attempting to do so with the certainty that the Black Sea Fleet, on emerging from the Dardanelles, would find the British Mediterranean Squadron waiting for it, was sufficiently obvious.

It is now time to turn to a brief survey of the condition of affairs in Russia itself as regards not merely the mobilisation orders, and other measures for the continuance of the operations, but also with reference to public opinion on the war generally, and to observed results upon

Russian society and trade. The picture we shall have to draw will be somewhat gloomy, but not without some bright features. Of these, by no means the least pleasing is the growing Russian tendency to admire their enemies. That this tendency has travelled beyond the ordinary bounds of respect which one combatant generally feels for an adversary who has quite unexpectedly given him a number of bad falls, may be gathered from the curiously changed tone of the Russian organs of public as distinct from official opinion. Here is an illuminating quotation from the *Russ*, one of the most popular papers in St. Petersburg:—

“‘Monkey’ was the most frequent expression heard at the beginning of the war concerning the Japanese. The application of such a term to a brave enemy was both undignified and shabby. Most of our travellers who have not devoted their entire attention to the Geishas reported the Japanese as imitators. That seemed to be the opinion at the outbreak of the war. But the English knew better, and making an ally of the ‘monkey’ was on their part a master-stroke of diplomacy. All the stories told of the brutality of the Japanese have been shown to be unfounded. Our soldiers who have been prisoners and escaped are unanimous as to the kindness shown them by the Japanese. And the same feeling is expressed in letters coming from our soldiers, prisoners of war. Thousands of Japanese who have so heroically sacrificed their lives in front of Port Arthur have more than wiped out the first perfidious attack upon our ships. A feeling of mutual respect has grown up between ourselves and the Japanese with the common acknowledgment of the great sacrifices which each of us has made. Such

sentiment has grown and become rooted. Our opinion of the Japanese has completely altered. Probably the opinion of our enemies is also altered towards us. Amid the horrors of war we have learnt to understand one another, and it is earnestly to be hoped that the awful price we and the Japanese alike have paid for that knowledge will form the basis for future peaceful relationship."

These enlightened sentiments were largely fostered, no doubt, by the official reports of the singular scrupulousness displayed by the Japanese in regard to personal property found on the bodies of Russian officers and soldiers. For months past the General Staff at St. Petersburg had been receiving through the intermediary of the French Embassy large numbers of carefully fastened packets forwarded by the Japanese military authorities, and containing objects of value of all kinds, such as jewels, cigar cases, purses, watches, gold crosses, and sums of money—sometimes even single rouble pieces. Even to the most simple-minded Russian the knowledge that the Japanese were behaving in this high-minded fashion could not fail to appeal with the greater force since Russian officialdom is often callous to the verge of brutality in such matters.

On the other hand, it must be added in the interests of historical accuracy that some particularly painful discoveries of Japanese espionage made in September must have gone some little way towards counteracting the pleasant tendency noted above. Before the outbreak of the war there were a good many Japanese in Russia, and among them two who were employed in commercial houses in St. Petersburg. One had gone so far as to join the Greek Catholic Church and had married a Russian lady. From docu-

ments seized at their residences it appeared that they were both naval officers and were acting as spies. Russians themselves sometimes go to considerable lengths in the matter of espionage, but a good deal of bitter and profound indignation must have been caused by these particular exhibitions of cynical disregard of religious and domestic scruples.

For the rest the social effect of the war in Russia can as yet be only dimly understood. A little later we shall see signs, if not of an upheaval, at any rate of a disturbing tendency to make the war an opportunity for pressing on the Tsar administrative reforms of which the better educated Russian has long been dreaming, and which it is hardly likely that he can be much longer denied without producing a genuine revolution. But this movement and its sequel hardly belong to the stage of which more particularly we are now speaking. Apart from the opposition to the mobilisation orders, and a good deal of rather more open murmuring than is usually heard in such a police-ridden country, there was still sufficient interest in the war to render the public keenly susceptible to the least rumour of success; and, as long as this feeling continues, so long we may be certain will revolution hang fire.

The spirited defence of Port Arthur heartened some, the despatch of the Baltic Fleet encouraged others, and if there had come news that Kuropatkin had won, or was within easy distance of winning, a marked success, the war might have become almost popular, so ignorant are the masses, and so completely are they under the thumb of the bureaucracy, the official class, which constitutes at once the nobility and the ruling influence in the Russian Empire.

In passing, the last proposition de-



SOME RUSSIAN CARICATURES OF THE JAPANESE.

The outbreak of hostilities was the occasion of the dissemination in Russia of a flood of caricature, many of the prints being of a crude and gross nature, belittling their opponents and anticipating an easy and humiliating conquest. Events have proved how greatly public opinion in Russia had been deceived.

mands a word of explanation. It is not, perhaps, sufficiently understood in this country that while in Russia there is, of course, a hereditary nobility, a hereditary title by itself commands no respect. As Mr. Geoffrey Drage points out in his "Russian Affairs," the man who in Russia is *ipso facto* noble is the State official. Again, inasmuch as the State official owes his position indirectly if not directly to the favour of his Sovereign, it is his business to support the Sovereign in everything. An independent attitude may be assumed by the Grand Dukes, but there are not many of these exalted nuisances, and it is as impossible for the ordinary hereditary nobility of Russia to play the part of the old barons of England as it is for a sturdy-minded official to be "agin the Government" after the fashion permissible where there are "parties" and "an Opposition." It will readily be understood that under such a system it is not easy for the aspirations and passions of the lower classes to find an outlet, and that Russia might wage a frightfully unpopular war for many months before the bulk of the nation would denounce it, and insist upon an end being put to it, as would certainly happen in Great Britain and France, and probably in Germany also.

For the present, then, we see most of the Russian non-official classes angry and discontented with the reports of constant failures in the Far East, but still upheld to some extent by the prolonged resistance of Port Arthur, by confidence in Kuropatkin, and by vague hopes that the Baltic Fleet may gloriously adjust the naval balance now so heavily depressed in favour of Japan. But there is one class which is under no illusions as to the present effect of the war, namely, the commercial class, which has already

suffered heavily, and has little chance of recovering itself as long as hostilities continue. In Moscow, where the commercial influence is able to assert itself more freely than in St. Petersburg, the war is regarded in the light of a terrible plague, and no effort is made to conceal its ravages. The trouble is aggravated by its many-sidedness. For while a great shopkeeper complains that his sales have fallen off by fifty per cent., a large manufacturer points to the withdrawal from his factories of hundreds of usual hands called up as reservists to go to the front. A merchant, again, with interests over the half of Europe, sees his business wrecked by the dislocation of the railway traffic owing to the constant passage of troop trains and the engrossing transport of military supplies. Of the effect of the war upon Russian trade in detail this is not the place to speak. But a solitary instance may be given from official figures, published as far back as August, of the extent to which in one district trade has suffered owing to the conflict in the Far East. In the Government of Moscow alone 13 establishments with about 1,300 workmen have ceased work altogether; 14 factories with 6,000 workmen have reduced their output, throwing some 1,600 workmen out of employment; and 4 factories with 10,000 workmen are working reduced time. In other parts of the country the situation is even worse. In Lodz there are said to be 40,000 men out of work, and in Warsaw 30,000.

As yet there have been no very definite signs of war taxation beyond a sort of "benevolence" raised for the purposes of the Red Cross Society, a toll which, insignificant as it was, created considerable dissatisfaction. The extraordinary expenses of the war have hitherto ap-

parently been met chiefly by sweeping reductions of the expenditure previously assigned to public works, the Tsar himself having, it is said, made some extremely large contributions towards naval requirements out of his private purse.

But it became quite clear that foreign loans to carry on the war would be inevitable ; and negotiations on the subject were opened ; but it is whispered that the German bankers, evidently acting under official inspiration, have been strangely careful to include in their terms certain politico-commercial conditions connected with freedom for German enterprises, particularly in Turkish territory. Such conditions are distinctly impressing to Russia, but it remains to be seen whether the absolute necessity of meeting in some way or another the tremendous drain upon the national resources occasioned by the war disbursements will not produce a feeling of resignation on this subject, even in haughty Russia.

In connection with the provision of funds must be noticed the persistent rumours that the Russian Treasury might even find it necessary to draw upon the property of the Russian Church, which, it is reported, received a suggestion to the effect that it should voluntarily offer some of its valuables to the State. It goes without saying that the bare prospect of such a proceeding is viewed with widespread dismay. Not only is the bulk of the Church treasure

in such a form—priceless mosaic work, ikons, and sacred paintings—that it could never be replaced, but the gifts which the Church has received have come from the middle classes and the peasantry as much as from the Tsars and the nobility, and to throw them down the sink of Far Eastern war expenditure would be a blow severely felt and strongly resented in the most remote corners of the Empire.

This rapid survey of Russia's winter outlook must now be closed. The condition of affairs revealed is not a pleasant one, but, as has been urged, it is not by any means an altogether gloomy one, and, even if it were, the time has not come yet for the onlooker to prophesy too freely as to Russia's early humiliation, or the conclusion by her of an inglorious peace. Her resources, though strained, are still enormous ; her supply of fighters, practically speaking, inexhaustible. She has not yet lost her greatest stronghold in the Far East, she has a great and steadily increasing army in the field, and she has despatched a second, and, in point of size and armament, formidable fleet. She is busy with continued preparations, her ruler is tenaciously clinging to the idea of ultimate success, and her foreign credit is still considerable. Even internally her condition is hardly such as to inspire real anxiety in a Government so inured to popular discontent, so ready with weapons of repression, as that of twentieth century Russia.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

VIADIVOSTOK—JAPANESE RAID IN KAMCHATKA—THE DAMAGED SQUADRON—INTERRUPTED COMMUNICATIONS—IMPROVED DEFENCES—WINTER PROSPECTS—THE BALTIC FLEET—AN ANXIOUS OUTLOOK.

THE position of Vladivostok during the first eight or ten months of the war certainly falsified a very large number of intelligent and even, to some extent, inspired predictions. There must have been few who, at the commencement of the war, did not anticipate that Vladivostok would be "Ladysmithed," like Port Arthur, at a very early stage in the operations.

Almost equally certain at one time, as we have sought earlier to show, seemed the prospect of a Russian irruption on a large scale from Vladivostok into Korea. Neither of these things happened, and in their place events, in the shape of performances on the part of the Vladivostok Squadron, occurred which could not easily have been foreseen, and which came as an unpleasant shock even to the watchful and look-ahead Japanese.

With the sinking of the *Rurik* and the terrible battering of the *Gromoboi* and *Rossia* on August 14th, as described in Chapter L., the career of the Vladivostok Squadron came temporarily to a sudden close, and, no other striking instance of naval or military activity having been recorded at the port during September and October, it might be imagined that the "Sovereign City of the Far East" was likely to settle down into a sort of Sleepy Hollow as far as the war was concerned.

But there was little real chance of this; and Vladivostok is still so full of interesting possibilities that it must not be lost sight of by the careful student of the campaign. There is evidence, moreover, that in the autumn of 1904 not only was there a good deal being done at Vladivostok by the Russians with an eye to future attempts upon it, but that the Japanese also were by no means inclined to let this corner of the theatre of war fade from their memory.

Before proceeding further in this direction the opportunity may be taken to make passing allusion to the sequel of some of the Vladivostok Squadron's achievements in the way of captured ships sailing under neutral flags. There is no necessity to go at all closely into the matter here, since it is but a side issue of the war. But it may be recorded that, in one or two important cases, the Appeal Court in St. Petersburg reversed the decision of the Vladivostok Prize Court with reference to captured ships and cargoes, and some strong hints on the subject were doubtless conveyed to the Vladivostok naval authorities. At any rate, there was a notable cessation in the former frequent announcement of British vessels, either sunk offhand, or haled off to Vladivostok on the charge of carrying contraband of war, a cessation which cannot be attributed wholly to the temporary disablement of the *Gromoboi*



A LULL DURING THE FIGHTING: A RUSSIAN ENTRENCHED POSITION ON THE MANCHURIAN HILLS.

and *Rossia*. For there were several destroyers still at Vladivostok, and these, we may be sure, would have cheerfully continued the work of interfering with British commerce had it been possible to do so with comparative impunity.

There is another matter to which allusion may conveniently be made here, as, although it does not concern Vladivostok, it has to do with that north-eastern section of the theatre of war of which Vladivostok is the most important station. We have already included in the same section the island of Sakhalin (see page 56 of the present volume), which has since witnessed (Chapter LII.) the end of the *Novik*, and now we must, for a brief space, jump across the Sea of Okhotsk, in order to tell the story of a queer and rather obscure performance in that dreary and sparsely populated peninsula of Eastern Siberia known as Kamchatka. This region, of which the chief settlement is Petropavlosk, where there is a Russian fort overlooking a splendid harbour, and a resident population of a few hundreds only, is the object of numerous fishing and fur-hunting expeditions, and from the end of May various Japanese schooners had from time to time appeared as usual in the Kamchatkan estuaries. But towards the middle of June a vessel turned up, the crew of which proceeded to indulge in "fishing operations" of a very questionable sort.

It would appear that the little northern Japanese colony of Shimushu rejoiced in an enterprising headman, styled Captain Bunji, who was so inflamed by the news that war had broken out between his mother-country and Russia, that he determined to take a hand. Accordingly, at the end of the first week in June he set out with a number of others on what purported to be a fishing expedition in a

sailing ship of 100 tons called the *Toba Maru*. The exploits of this expedition are variously described, but there is reason to believe that it landed near Javino on the west coast of Kamchatka, and proceeded to make itself a serious nuisance. According to the Russians, Captain Bunji's gentle fisherfolk plundered the adjacent villages, expelled the inhabitants, and issued proclamations calling upon the people to recognise Japanese sovereignty. One of these proclamations pasted on the chapel at Javino, on the roof of which the Japanese flag was hoisted, is said to have run as follows:—"This territory henceforth belongs to Japan; anyone not recognising this shall be killed!"

Captain Bunji's career as a patriotic filibuster was, however, destined to be a short one. News came to Petropavlosk of these happenings, and the commander of the fort took prompt and effective measures. There happened to be a sailing vessel in the harbour, and on this a hundred Russian militia were sent round to the west coast under Lieutenant Shab of the Reserve, while another detachment of 100 men under a non-commissioned officer marched overland from a place called Bolsheretsk. The two forces joined hands near Javino, and, with the help of some of the villagers, proceeded to lay a trap for Captain Bunji. The latter, thinking he had only the villagers to deal with, consented to a conference, was surrounded by the Russian soldiers, and taken prisoner, seventeen of his men being killed. The *Toba Maru* slipped her cable and disappeared, whereupon the Russians proceeded to take vengeance upon several other Japanese vessels, said to be innocent fishing craft, which they burnt, killing a number of the men on board. The latter proceed-

ing was strongly criticised at Tokio, and may have been indefensible. But, if Captain Bunji's operations were as reported by the Russians, and as more or less admitted by the Japanese, it is not to be wondered at that Lieutenant Shab's soldiers did not discriminate at all carefully between the fighting adventurers and their fellow trespassers on what, after all, is unquestioned Russian territory.

The whole incident is, of course, trivial, but it has an interest as showing how comprehensive are the tentacles of that grim cuttlefish War; and it is, moreover, rather a quaint illustration of the filibustering spirit as applied to a tiny community with which one would have thought the idea of self-preservation would have weighed more seriously than that of annexing a neighbouring peninsula.

Reverting to Vladivostok we find that no time was lost in setting to work on the repairs of the *Gromoboi* and *Rossia*, which, as we have seen, were very badly knocked about in the fight with Kamimura's squadron on August 14th. Meanwhile, the loss of the *Rurik* had been partially compensated in the minds of the Russians by the floating of the stranded *Bogatyr*, and by the end of August Admiral Skrydloff is said to have declared, somewhat prematurely it would seem, that the repairs to all three ships would be completed in ten days' time, and that they would then proceed to Japanese waters. A month later there was a report that the *Gromoboi* and *Rossia* had actually sailed in the direction of Gen-san, but even at the St. Petersburg Ministry of Marine no credence was attached to this flattering tale. According to trustworthy intelligence received at Tokio in November, the *Gromoboi's* repairs were actually completed, and in

due course she went out on a trial trip. But ill-luck pursued the big cruiser. She ran on a rock, was seriously injured, and was barely floated off with the assistance of a number of lighters. A correspondent who left Vladivostok on November 20th, and arrived a few days later at Nagasaki, reported that the *Gromoboi*, presumably in this adventure, had twenty-five frames broken, and that she was so badly strained that her repairs would take some months. The cruiser *Bogatyr* he mentioned as not in dock, but unseviceable and supported forward by pontoons. The condition of the *Rossia* had previously been reported as hopeless. It would seem, then, that, at any rate for the rest of the year, the larger ships of the Vladivostok Squadron could hardly be described as a "fleet in being."

This notwithstanding, there is still naval activity of a sort to be observed in the "Golden Horn." On September 23rd a despatch was received at St. Petersburg to the effect that two Russian destroyers had just returned to Vladivostok, having captured a Japanese transport and a sailing vessel. More interesting is the later announcement that several submarines had been despatched by train from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, and had arrived safely. By the middle of November they had completed their trials satisfactorily, and, as they bid fair to be the first submarines ever employed in actual warfare, their appearance on the scene of actual hostilities is of peculiar interest.

The tenacious belief of the Russians in the immortality of their warships seems to be demonstrated by the steps taken from Vladivostok to do all that is possible towards salving the unfortunate *Novik*. As explained in Chapter LII., the ship lay off Korsakovsk, in Sakhalin

Island, her hull entirely submerged with the exception of a small portion of the bows. The Japanese evidently regarded her as a complete wreck, and the Russians themselves may have despaired of ever again floating the gallant little ship. But this did not prevent them from sending divers from Vladivostok to ascertain accurately the condition of the vessel, and

Russians are so extraordinarily skilful—and experienced—in the art of raising sunk warships, that one begins to wonder whether the ship herself may not one day be restored to the Navy of which she was once such a brilliant ornament.

Another Russian peculiarity is reflected in Vladivostok annals about this date. At times official Russia displays towards



From a Native Drawing.

ROYAL SOLICITUDE FOR THE SUFFERING.

Her Majesty the Empress presiding at a meeting of the Council of the Ladies' Branch of the Red Cross Society of Japan. Making bandages for the wounded.

to remove her guns and shell ammunition. We learn that towards the end of September the diving apparatus was damaged, and it would have been necessary to suspend operations had not one of the divers volunteered to make repeated descents without a diving dress, receiving the Order of St. George for his devoted conduct. Many, if not all, the *Novik's* guns seem to have been recovered, and the

the war in the Far East a sort of mental detachment which is not without a certain impressiveness, although it may create here and there a smile. At the end of August, for instance, it was solemnly announced at St. Petersburg that Vladivostok had again been constituted a free port, and there was much speculation as to whether this decision would only hold good as long as the war lasted, or



SONGS ON THE WAY TO THE BATTLEFIELD: A COMMON INCIDENT ON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.



whether on the conclusion of hostilities the Customs system would still be held in abeyance, and Vladivostok be given a chance of regaining its former prosperity. A Government financial expert had, it is said, been recently despatched to the town to confer with the local departments on this momentous question, and one would suppose from the references made to the subject that the matter of customs dues was really that in which Vladivostok and those connected with it were at the moment most profoundly interested.

This discussion took place less than a fortnight after the Vladivostok Squadron had been knocked almost to pieces by Admiral Kamimura's guns, and the really serious point at issue seemed to be, not whether Vladivostok would continue to be in one sense a free port, but whether in a short time its freedom in another sense would become extremely problematical. Never, perhaps, was Russia's calm confidence in her ultimate success more curiously, some might say more fatuously, displayed than in her speculations as to Vladivostok's commercial future at a time when there was a fair prospect of its being subjected, like Port Arthur, to a most rigorous siege; at a time, too, when nowhere in the whole field of operations had Russia shown any signs whatever of making headway against her active and vigorous enemy.

It is possible that this strange indifference to the realities of the situation may have been partially due to the singular isolation of Vladivostok as compared with Port Arthur—in spite of its hostile cordon—and Liao-yang. It is not quite easy to understand the reason for this, since the railway communication with Harbin is sufficiently direct, and there should have been little difficulty in maintaining it. But there seem to have been many inter-

ruptions, and on September 2nd it was stated at St. Petersburg that the mail had arrived on that day at Vladivostok after a break of ten days! It may be surmised that such gaps were due to a variety of causes. There were probably still a good many Japanese disguised as Chinese coolies in the Amur District, and these we may be sure were always on the look-out to blow up a bridge, or otherwise wreck the line at inconvenient points. It may also be taken for granted that most of the rolling stock formerly available for the Harbin-Vladivostok portion of the line had been absorbed into other sections for troop-carrying and transport purposes. None the less, having regard to the continuity of communication elsewhere, this isolation of Vladivostok must be regarded as somewhat singular, and doubtless it contributed all along to the somewhat "feckless" optimism apparently indulged in by many of its inhabitants, as well as in the Russian capital, which was seldom well informed as to the real state of Vladivostok affairs.

It is only fair to the military authorities of Vladivostok to observe that they at least were under no illusions as to their position, and took very active and comprehensive measures towards putting the place into an improved state of defence. At the close of Chapter L. mention was made of a visit made by Admiral Alexeieff to Vladivostok, and of the probability that the Viceroy was already looking to the northern stronghold to take the place of Port Arthur. A little later Alexeieff addressed a flattering Order of the Day to the Vladivostok squadron, stating that the works undertaken since the commencement of the war for strengthening the defences of the fortress have been successfully carried out.

"These works," the order continues, "have been pushed on with indefatigable energy and zeal by all members of the garrison. If the fact that the greater part of the work was carried on under bad climatic conditions is taken into consideration, the success which has attended it testifies to their absolute devotion and self-sacrifice. I have found the garrison of the fortress to be in a perfect state of efficiency. I consider it an agreeable duty to express my deep gratitude to General Liniévitch, commanding the Military District of the Amur, and to tender my sincere thanks to the commandant of the fortress of Vladivostok, as well as to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the land and sea forces composing the garrison who have taken part in the construction of the works intended to strengthen the defences of the fortress."

Independent confirmation of this complacent assurance was forthcoming through the special correspondent of one of the Paris papers who had a friend in Vladivostok at this time. This friend, a Major Eletz, had personally inspected the defences, and had found the town surrounded by an unbroken line of fortifications. The wood had been cut on the hills, and excellent roads connect the various forts. "You may telegraph to Paris," said Major Eletz, "that the Japanese may come if they like. They will find us superbly defended. Vladivostok is another Port Arthur."

Doubtless there was some authority for the last statement, but it is difficult to see how even Russian military engineers, among whom are to be found some of the most skilful professors living of the art of permanent fortification, could in a few months have transformed the rather second-rate defences of Vladivostok into

such a marvel of strength as Port Arthur. Still it must be remembered that General Liniévitch had had at his disposal a good many thousands of men with nothing to do in the way of fighting, and it is astonishing what massive and powerful works can be constructed in a short space of time when there are plenty of workers available, even if there be little else besides earth and timber in the way of materials.

Apart from the fortifications, which began many miles out of the town, and, as at Port Arthur, grew stronger as the city is approached, the harbour being heavily mined for a distance of seven miles, four miles with contact and three with electric mines. The location, however, of these must have been rather uncertain, for it is said that a Russian torpedo-boat was sunk and a German steamer damaged by them.


About the beginning of October the presence of Japanese cruisers in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok was reported by several correspondents, and it is evident that the inhabitants were in expectation of an attack, which, however, was not delivered. Indeed, knowing, as they must have done, of the strenuous efforts which had been made to improve the defences of the places, the Japanese, pre-occupied, moreover, by the siege of Port Arthur, would have been foolish indeed to risk their ships against the new forts and mines. Doubtless their visit was merely for purposes of reconnaissance, or in the hope of intercepting some of the foreign vessels which were known to be running contraband cargoes into the Golden Horn.

The "runners," however, appear to have had little difficulty in eluding the Japanese warships. Thus, a German steamer which left Tsing-tau (Kiao-chau)

in the second week of September with a general cargo for Vladivostok, returned



PRISON BARGE ON THE AMUR.



DOWN THE AMUR IN TIMES OF PEACE.*

on October 7th, having easily escaped observation. She reported that a number of large ships had recently arrived at Vladivostok bringing stores of coal and ammunition. Captain Halversen of the *Tungus*, which left Vladivostok on November 1st, and reached Chi-fu six days later, also commented on the frequent arrival of ships laden with food, ammunition, guns, and all sorts of military supplies. Five vessels were in port unloading cargo when the *Tungus* left. A huge supply of coal from the neighbouring mines had, he said, been stored. By this time, too, communication with Harbin had been completely restored,

and mail trains were arriving and departing daily.

A supplementary word or two may here be given to General Liniévitch, who for the first eight or nine months of the war was Commander of the Military District of the Amur, and of whose previous service some details were given in the First Volume of this work (Chapter X.). General Liniévitch at the beginning of the winter was appointed, as we saw in the

preceding chapter, to the command of the First Army in Manchuria, under Kuropatkin as Generalissimo; but it was to be doubted whether in his new capacity he would do any better work for his country than he had done at Vladivostok, for he had more Court influence than is commonly supposed, and it was thought that Alexieff, then at St. Petersburg, would seek to play him off against Kuropatkin.

General Liniévitch, by the way, is not of Russian blood, but comes of a well-known Polish Catholic family, which at one time had large estates in the Russian provinces of Volhynia and Tchernigoff. The family has fought well for Russia, the father of the present General having served with distinction in the army. General Liniévitch himself, whose portrait appears on page 120 of

* We are indebted to Mr. Foster Fraser for permission to include the above illustrations and those on the opposite page, from his book entitled "The Real Siberia."

the First Volume, is known to the Chinese by the expressive nickname, "The Manchurian Wolf."

Vladivostok was also about to lose Admiral Skrydloff, who was being recalled to St. Petersburg for work in connection with the despatch of naval reinforcements to the Far East. Certainly there was now more scope for his abilities in the capital than at Vladivostok, but it must be admitted that Admiral Skrydloff was beginning to be regarded with very mixed feelings by his compatriots at home, many of whom considered that he had failed miserably to realise the expectations raised by his appointment


isolation of the latter before he had time to reach, by very easy stages, the Far East, rendered it impossible for him to exercise any very active jurisdiction over the Port Arthur Fleet, but it was felt that, apart from the fiasco of August 1894, Skrydloff was much to blame for the very inglorious, and ultimately disastrous, career of the Vladivostok Squadron. He had, no doubt, many obstacles to contend with, but, at any rate, he had at one time a certain amount of naval force at his disposal, and it is hardly to the credit of one who professed so much that he personally should have stuck like a limpet to Vladivostok, without any better result in the way of plans and orders to his subordinates than the sinking of the *Rurik*, the disablement of the *Rossia* and *Gromoboi*, and the raising of some very serious complications between his country and Great Britain.

We may leave Vladivostok for the present to her own resources as far as



THE WOODED BANKS OF THE AMUR.

to succeed the gallant Makaroff. It will be recalled that in taking up his post he was both leisurely in his movements and somewhat sanguine in his anticipations of what he proposed to do by careful conservation of his ships and a well-ordered distribution of his time between Vladivostok and Port Arthur. The



COSSACK CAMP ON THE AMUR.

the immediate winter prospect was concerned. Her defences had been considerably strengthened; the fortress had, it would seem, a strong and capable Commandant in the person of General Vorognetz, and there was every prospect that, if the Japanese attacked it in the same fashion as that which they were compelled to adopt in the case of Port Arthur, they would find the process a laborious and costly one. But it is instructive to remember that, whatever happened, the strategical situation remained the same. The really vital question was whether, on the capture of Port Arthur, the Japanese would not forthwith concentrate their attention upon an attempt to get first to Mukden and then to Harbin. A Japanese occupation of the latter would render the position of Vladivostok very precarious, and, strategically speaking, its land fortifications would not be of much more value than if they had been built of cards. For Vladivostok, unlike Port Arthur, had no detaining value. Nor could it any longer be used as a military base. The idea of a Russian invasion of Korea from Vladivostok had been clearly abandoned as hopeless. Moreover, most of the Vladivostok troops, supplementary to the garrison of the fortress, were being requisitioned for the formation of the Second and Third Russian Armies round Mukden.

Vladivostok's only hope, then, whether of offering an effective passive resistance or of developing a capacity for active offence, lay upon the sea, and here again its prospects were not rosy. There was little chance that the *Gromoboi*, *Rossia*, and *Bogatyr* would ever again become such a terror on the high seas as the Vladivostok squadron of a few months back had contrived for a short time to

render itself. But there was still a hope that the whole or part of the reinforcing squadron under Admiral Rozhdestvensky might reach Vladivostok in safety, and thus pave the way for a future naval campaign. Unfortunately, as we shall see in a future chapter, this chance was almost immediately to be minimised by the destruction of the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, and the consequent liberation of Admiral Togo's ships, which were thus enabled to take their choice of blockading Vladivostok or of sallying forth to meet Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron.

The prospects of Vladivostok were thus complicated by at least three serious risks. First, there was the risk—a not very probable one—of immediate attack. In any case the Japanese were not likely to do anything in this direction until Port Arthur fell, and even then the fact that preparations must be made to meet Admiral Rozhdestvensky had to be taken into consideration, as well as the circumstance that the entrance to the Golden Horn would soon be only practicable by means of ice-breakers. Nor would troops be readily available for an attack by land, since the whole of the forces released from the investment of Port Arthur, and many more, were being required to cope with the steadily growing reinforcement of Kuropatkin's great army on the Sha-ho.

Next, there was the risk that the Japanese might get to Harbin or drive a wedge between Harbin and Vladivostok which, in conjunction with a naval blockade, might render the eventual reduction of the fortress a mere matter of time and supplies.

Finally, there was a risk that a portion of the "Second Pacific Squadron of the Russian Navy" might succeed in making

Vladivostok, a portion not large enough to be of much practical use, but sufficiently large to make it an object with Japan to lay siege to Vladivostok on the same deliberate lines as those followed at Port Arthur.

It was probably felt by many, even at Vladivostok itself and at St. Petersburg, that these risks were sufficiently grave to cause some anxiety. But Russian op-

timism, especially of the official sort, is a plant of hardy growth, and there was a general tendency to attach more and more importance to Vladivostok, regardless of the lesson taught by the approaching fall of Port Arthur, between which and Vladivostok, whether as a military stronghold or a naval base, there never has been, nor can be, any sort of comparison favourable to the latter.




Photo: C. Cozens, Southsea.

THE JAPANESE BATTLESHIP *ASAH*.



Photo: Urban, Ltd.

HARBIN.

CHAPTER LXXIV.

ON THE SHA-HO—THE JAPANESE AND YEN-TAI—MUKDEN FORTIFIED—CAPTURE OF WAI-TAU-SHAN — CORDIAL INTERCOURSE — KING'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION — DESULTORY FIGHTING—ATTACK ON RUSSIAN LEFT—WINTER—THE THREE RUSSIAN ARMIES.

IN Chapter LXVI. we left the main Russian and Japanese armies confronting each other to the south of Mukden, the Sha-ho serving to some extent, though not completely, as a dividing line. As pointed out on page 260, the Japanese on their extreme left, that is, to the west of the railway, held several important positions on the right bank of the river; while, on the other hand, a little to the east of the railway the Russians retained a small *enclave*, about three miles long, of the left bank. We have hitherto followed German accounts in placing the famous One-Tree Hill within this enclave, but later references in Kuropatkin's despatches render the location a little doubtful. It is, however, certain that the Russians held at least one eminence south of the river as a post of observation, namely, Wai-tau-shan or Outer Head Hill, which, like the position so brilliantly forced by Colonel (now Major-general) Putiloff, was soon to be the scene of a very brisk encounter.

After the incidental fighting of October 16th-18th, which formed the immediate sequel to the real battle of the Sha-ho, both armies remained for a couple of days in a condition of almost complete inactivity, largely due to sheer exhaustion on both sides. The hostile lines were on an average less than half a mile apart, and in some places a still smaller interval separated the trenches. There was occasional firing, but to very little purpose, the Japanese repeatedly tricking the Russians by displaying their caps on the points of their bayonets, in order to draw the enemy's fire. The Russian artillery was also moderately active, having, it would seem, the advantage of the Japanese in the matter of commanding positions.

Both armies had now for some little time to come a good deal to pre-occupy them besides the actual business of fighting. The Japanese had advanced their position considerably, and, while the bank of a river can often be held to ad-

vantage under such conditions as were here present, there were, in this case, circumstances which made it necessary to observe the greatest caution and vigilance. The fact that a considerable Japanese force was already across the river, in extremely close and continuous touch with the Russian right, was in itself a source of anxiety; and it is not surprising that, within a few days of the conclusion of the big Sha-ho battle, the Japanese should have been busily erecting earthworks, evidently of some strength, round the village of Li-mun-tun, the occupation of which was described on page 259. Still more serious was the work to be done in rear of the fighting line, and very seriously do the Japanese seem to have taken it in hand. Not only was the fortification of Liao-yang steadily carried

forward, but a brisk effort was made to work the Yen-tai coal-mines, from which sufficient coal was soon obtained for all military purposes. The gauge of the railway, also, was now being changed as far as Yen-tai, and quantities of supplies and ammunition were being brought up on the altered line to within a few miles of the Japanese headquarters.

In passing, it may be said that in the whole history of warfare there is scarcely a more striking instance than this of the rapid and complete adoption to a field army's requirements of advantages wrested from an enemy by sheer fighting. The process was the more remarkable in that the Japanese position could hardly be termed absolutely secure. The enemy had been badly foiled, it is true, in his last attempt to sweep back the



THE ENORMOUSLY STRONG PALISADE ERECTED BY THE RUSSIANS AT LIAO - YANG WHICH THE JAPANESE HACKED DOWN AT GREAT LOSS.

slowly advancing tide of Japanese advance towards Mukden, but he was being strongly reinforced, and was clearly still full of fight. Liao-yang was a useful point on which to fall back if necessary, but hardly one on which complete reliance could be placed if the Russians once succeeded in assuming an effectual offensive. That, in the face of these large and impressive facts, the Japanese should have acted as they did, is a singular proof of combined self-confidence and business-like anxiety to make the most of successes already won. It shows, too, to what a curious extent the mere capacity of first-class troops to hold what they have won may be presumed on, even in the intermediate stages of a campaign, when as yet no decisive action has been fought, and there has not been time to consolidate a position by elaborate defences, or by taking advantage of some tremendous natural obstacle. To work a captured coal-mine as well as a captured railway almost in the presence of an unbeaten enemy requires, no doubt, a good deal of nerve. But self-possession of this kind can be made to pay in war as in most other pursuits, and hereafter we may often see generals in the field profiting directly by the example set them by the Japanese at Yen-tai.

While the Japanese were thus making excellent use of what had been but a few weeks before Russian property, the Russians were finding the difficulties of their position sensibly increased by the approach of winter. In particular the dearth of fuel began to make itself felt severely, while the number of wounded from the Sha-ho battle must have rendered even Mukden a most dreary place of residence. But, in spite of recent discouragements, the spirit of the troops seems to have been fairly well main-

tained, and the utmost confidence was evidently felt in the capacity of Mukden itself to resist any sudden attack. Certainly no pains had been spared to render the place almost, if not quite, as strong as Liao-yang. Some interesting details of the fortifications were given about this time in a private letter from the Director of the Military Hospital at Mukden, who described the line of works as extending for nine miles, with several forts and redoubts to each mile. The redoubts were masked in such a manner that they could not be recognised even at a distance of 100 paces. Before every work had been dug deep, covered-up ditches, with stakes at the bottom, and there were three lines of these ditches. In front of the ditches there were barbed wire entanglements, and in front of these again mines were laid. Finally, there was a line of felled trees, with the crowns turned towards the enemy and connected with barbed wire. This whole space was exposed to gunfire from three sides.

The Russian extreme right appears to have been bent back so as to rest on the Lower Hun-ho; but the actual contact with the enemy began to the westward in the neighbourhood of Lin-shi-pu (see map on page 253). The line then followed the river—with a break a little to the east of Sha-ho-pu, where the Wai-tau-shan post lay south of the river as noted above—and terminated in the hills to the north-west of the Tumen Pass. On the Russian left some daring reconnaissances continued to be made after the fighting on October 16th-18th, and on October 20th some 200 Russian cavalry were reported by Marshal Oyama to have actually crossed not only the Sha-ho, but the Tai-tse to the south at a point east of Pen-si-hu, and to have moved for some little distance northwards. There is

some ground for the belief that this may have been part of a general Russian forward movement which was planned for the night of October 20th-21st, but had to be abandoned owing to the swollen state of the Sha-ho.

After rather more than a week of this indeterminate warfare the Japanese, on the 27th, managed to score a very considerable success by the capture of Wai-tau-shan or Outer Head Hill, to which reference was made in the opening paragraph of this chapter. Wai-tau-shan is a hill bare of vegetation, surmounted by a temple, which is situated about ten miles east of the railway, to the extreme left—from the Russian standpoint—of the enclave south of the Sha-ho, which the Russians had been holding. It must have served as a very useful post of observation, to which the Russians evidently attached considerable importance, for they had occupied it with a regiment and five machine guns. These were well placed, a first and second position having been marked out with separate lines of trenches. It was clearly desirable for the Japanese to clear the enemy out of this troublesome post, and accordingly orders were given to the Right Army under General Kuroki to take the necessary measures of eviction.

At seven o'clock in the morning of October 27th two Japanese batteries opened fire on the Russian trenches on Wai-tau-shan, and the bombardment continued until about midday, when an infantry attack was commenced by the stealthy advance of two companies of the 18th Rifles up the steep slope. The enterprise was a dangerous one, for there was little or no cover, and the Russians were evidently bent on offering a determined resistance. The artillery preparation had, however, been effective, and in

two hours the Russians were forced back from their first line of trenches. The Japanese had now been reinforced by the remainder of the battalion detailed for the attack, and the Japanese artillery reopened fire on the second line of trenches.

It is not difficult to realise the scene at this juncture, which was rendered the more interesting by the somewhat exceptional nature of the circumstances. This was now not only the sole point south of the Sha-ho which the Russians still held, but literally the southern terminal of Russian occupation in the whole of the Far East, with the solitary exception of closely beleaguered Port Arthur, now within nine weeks of its fall. Nor was the hill a mere isolated post, since in that case the Japanese would certainly have crushed to pulp the detachment holding it a week ago. It was a little Russian cape running out into a Japanese sea, and communication with the main Russian position was evidently easy. In these circumstances it might seem strange that the Russians did not heavily reinforce the regiment holding the hill, and drive the Japanese back by sheer superiority of numbers. Probably it was to prevent this that the Japanese showed so little of their strength, and doubtless the Russians imagined that a full regiment with five machine guns would have very little difficulty in repulsing with serious loss a single battalion compelled to creep to the attack up a bare steep slope.

The result was that this autumn afternoon saw what was little more than a desperate struggle between a regiment of Russian infantry with machine guns against a Japanese battalion supported by two batteries for the possession of a hill which marked to all intents and purposes the southern limit of Russia's

active authority in Manchuria. Very full of grim suggestiveness must have been the spectacle at the moment when the retiring Russians were settling into their second line of trenches, and the Japanese, now occupying the first line, and rapidly gathering their strength, were watching the effect of their own shrapnel in order to seize a favourable moment for resuming the attack.

We may take it that the Russians were beginning by this time to realise the seriousness of the situation. The pressure brought upon the first line of trenches had evidently been severer than had been anticipated, for two hours was but a short time to hold such a position against two companies. But the hail of shrapnel had been continuous for six or seven hours, and the Japanese infantry advance had been steady and determined. Still graver was the position now with an entire Japanese battalion at no great distance, and the shrapnel bullets once more falling thick into the trenches.

It was about four o'clock when the Japanese artillery ceased firing, and a thousand Japanese bayonets came sparkling up to the second Russian position on Wai-tau-shan. It had been a weary wait of nearly two hours for the impatient battalion of the 18th Rifles, and one can understand the gleaming satisfaction with which the line of eager little infantrymen sprang from their temporary shelter and sped up the remaining slopes that led to the summit of the hill.

The Russian rifles were crackling all along their line, the machine-guns were vomiting lead to the accompaniment of that queer "pup-pup-pup" which always seems such a trivial noise compared with the death-dealing process with which it is connected, and at one instant of the Japanese rush a passing

tremor shook the attacking line as it does sometimes even in the most brilliantly successful assault. Those are the moments when the defenders' hearts are steeled into sterner resolve, when their rifles are held straightest, when the feeling is strongest that those in the trenches are meting out punishment, not in any danger of receiving it. But the tremor was but momentary, and any satisfaction it created was short-lived. For on came the Japanese, and with irresistible *élan* poured into the trenches, where, for a time, raged the bitter hand-to-hand fighting that has terminated so many infantry attacks in this war. It seems a little strange that even at this stage the Russians could not gain the upper hand. For they should have been still in some numerical superiority, since their casualties up to this time had not been in any way serious, and the Japanese themselves had suffered about equal losses in the two stages of their advance. But when first-class troops have made their way into the heart of a position, where they are not exposed to flanking fire or other fresh odds, they are seldom to be denied, and so it was in this case. Bayonets crossed bayonets in deadly earnest, revolvers spat, here and there a clubbed rifle wielded by a burly Muscovite may have smashed a Japanese skull; but in the end the Russians broke and ran, leaving behind them two of their machine-guns and a number of dead. Crowning the crest of the hill, the Japanese fired on the enemy as they retreated down the farther slope and across the river, and did further execution among their scattered ranks.

The Japanese were now to find their success, for the moment, discounted by the exposed nature of the ground they had gallantly won. No sooner was the Japanese flag hoisted on the temple at the



THE JAPANESE ADVANCE IN MANCHURIA: A NIGHT ATTACK ON A RUSSIAN POSITION.

top of the hill than the Russian batteries across the river began to speak, and a storm of shrapnel came hurtling about the ears of the victors in the recent action. The crest of the hill was thus rendered untenable, but the Japanese had evidently made good their foothold in spite of the Russian official despatch to the contrary. For the Russian artillery steadily bombarded the hill all the next morning, which they would hardly have done had no signs of occupation been visible. In the afternoon of October 28th the large Russian force which was concentrated among the hills across the river disappeared rather suddenly. Subsequently a small detachment of Russian chasseurs attempted, on the night of the 29th, a counter-attack on Wai-tau-shan, but this was easily repulsed.

The Russian casualties at Wai-tau-shan were estimated at 200, the Japanese at 170—an insignificant butcher's bill, of course, which seems of itself to stamp the action as one of comparative insignificance. But, as the foregoing narrative seems to show, Wai-tau-shan was really a remarkable little fight, and must have come as rather an unpleasant surprise to the Russians, for whom now the Sha-ho along, practically speaking, its whole length was a definite obstacle. Nor could the Japanese fail to be heartened greatly by a success which demonstrated once more, and with vivid clearness, the right of Japanese commanders to regard their gallant fellows as, if anything, individually more than a match for the fittest and most seasoned soldiers of the Tsar.

The closing days of October, and nearly the whole of November, proved an uneventful, but by no means an idle, time for the confronting armies. For the most part the fighting consisted of pretty

continuous artillery firing, with frequent but unimportant infantry collisions, usually at night. The Russian cavalry reconnaissance work on both the Japanese flanks appears to have been well carried out, and on the extreme Russian left, where General Rennenkampf was in command, the Cossacks are shown to have been particularly active. On October 30th a party of the famous Cossacks of the Don—a division of which had recently joined the Army of Manchuria—for the first time took a part in the operations, and, with some infantry detachments, attacked a body of Japanese cavalry along the Hun River. This introduction of the Don Cossacks to Far Eastern warfare does not seem to have been particularly auspicious, the attack being promptly repulsed, and the Russians leaving behind them twenty dead men and thirty horses.

The weather was now improving, as far as the rain was concerned, and the days were fine and moderately warm. But the nights were growing colder, six degrees of frost having been recorded at the end of October, and ten a little later. The Russian troops were in good health, and supplies of food and warm clothing were coming in very satisfactorily. The better condition of the roads enabled reinforcements to detrain at stations further up the line, and to march thence to Mukden, thus relieving to a marked extent the pressure on the railway. Indeed, it would seem that, notwithstanding the recent reverses on the Sha-ho, and the absence of any compensating success, the condition of the Russian Army in, at any rate, the first half of November, was in pleasant contrast to the sufferings entailed by the long retirement which terminated in the evacuation of Liao-yang, and was also

free from many of the hardships afterwards undergone in the depth of winter.

At Mukden itself a rather quaint state of things was reported by Mr. C. E. Hands, the war correspondent of the *Daily Mail*. Here the Russians were actually spending money freely on Japanese productions. "The shops at Mukden," wrote Mr. Hands, "are packed with Japanese merchandise of all kinds, which throngs of soldiers are eagerly purchasing. In particular, they buy up the little comforts which troops so much appreciate, namely articles of food, drink, clothing, canned milk, cheese, butter, beer, cognac, rum, whisky, champagnes, Bordeaux, woollen goods, and gloves. Almost without exception these goods are adulterations and imitations. The Japanese imitate everything European, including labels, for which there is a great demand in China. All these articles are freely imported *viâ* Sinminting by Chinese merchants and Greek sutlers, and are distributed everywhere among the troops. Thus, curiously enough, the war has provided a new and rich market for Japanese commerce."

But Mukden luxuries were, of course, far out of the reach of a very large portion of Kuropatkin's brave soldiers, many of whom had not left the trenches for three weeks. For these the daily ration had to suffice, and, where close contact with the enemy existed, the ration was often not a daily, but a nightly one, which had to be eaten cold, since fires would be a guide to the ever-watchful enemy. But the Russian fighting man's cheerfulness was proof against these discomforts, and M. Dru, of the *Echo de Paris*, in particular, was greatly impressed with his high spirits. Another correspondent mentioned that the Russians have taken a leaf out of the Japanese book, and have slightly

improved on the time-honoured methods of drawing fire by exposing stuffed mannikins as a target for the Japanese marksmen.

It is pleasant to add that the cordiality which has so often been observed in similar circumstances, during previous campaigns, prevailed at this period at many points along the opposing lines, where the outposts were in particularly close touch. Cigarettes and other little luxuries were freely exchanged by the gallant fellows who had already, perhaps, met a dozen times in deadly conflict, and might at any moment do so again. Among various stories told is one of a sort of cave which used to be occupied by a Russian picquet during the day, and by a party of Japanese at night, or *vice versa*, in accordance with the outpost schemes of the respective combatants. Quite a little friendship sprung up between the two picquets, messages being left by the retiring party, and grave complaints made if the retreat was not left in good order!

An honourable understanding was also established in regard to water. The wells along the railway line having failed, both armies were compelled to use the water of the Sha-ho for drinking purposes. No difficulty was experienced as to this, for a simple arrangement was made that the water should be fetched from the river by unarmed men, and it was made a point of honour not to fire upon these. Such amenities of warfare are common to all first-class armies, and it is gratifying to chronicle their occurrence at this period of the Russo-Japanese War.

Like the Russians, the Japanese were at this time busily engaged in bringing up reinforcements, and the Russian Intelligence Department was able to ascer-

tain that a proportion was coming by way of Feng-hwang-cheng as well as from the south. It was supposed that a concentration was being effected for the purpose of assuming a brisk offensive, and this may well have been the case, since there is reason to believe that the Japanese were now confidently expecting the early fall of Port Arthur, and that they would have been extremely glad if they could have pushed on to Mukden before the really hard weather commenced. But week after week passed before it was possible to make any decided move, and by the third week in November the cold was beginning to be sufficiently sharp to render any general advance more and more difficult. On both sides the line of entrenchments was now dotted at intervals with great burrows, into which the men crept for shelter as much from the biting frost as from the artillery fire. When entrenchment has reached this point an advance always becomes improbable, for, even if one side succeeds in ejecting the other from its "dug-outs," it is prevented from making the occupation good if the frost turns the earth to iron, and puts it out of the question to throw up fresh cover. Accordingly, the Japanese soon abandoned the idea of a general advance, and began to make themselves as comfortable as the conditions would permit, even, it is said, going so far as to provide their dug-out shelters with camp beds and stoves.

A pleasant interlude is recorded as having occurred in the Japanese lines on November 9th. Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson, the British Military Attaché at Japanese headquarters, had been compelled to retire to Tokio on account of ill-health, but there were still several British officers present with the

force, the senior being Colonel Tulloch. To the latter, on our King's birthday, Prince Nashimoto, Marshal Oyama, General Kodama, General Oku, General Fukushima, and General Okubo sent representatives to offer their congratulations, and to wish long life to the King. An entertainment was also given to the British officers and war correspondents, a notable feature being an exhibition of Japanese national sports. The spirited participation of the war correspondents in the primitive Japanese dances enhanced the success of this pleasing function, and the utmost cordiality and good-fellowship prevailed.

But the Japanese did not allow these pre-occupations to divert them in any way from the more warlike business in hand. Wherever they were in contact with the enemy the utmost vigilance was displayed, and, indeed, was necessary, for the Russians made a number of small attacks, the effect of which must occasionally have been somewhat alarming. Especial care was taken to render Sha-ho station as strong as possible, the idea apparently being to construct a semi-permanent work to cover the railway line in case of a forced retirement. The task of fortification was carried out under grave difficulties, the Russians making strenuous efforts to frustrate the Japanese plans by throwing shells from their big guns, of which they now had a large number in position, into the space in which the enemy were working. On November 13th, for instance, more than 500 Russian shells fell in the vicinity of the station, the bombardment lasting from dawn till evening. After such an experience the poor little Sha-ho station can surely claim to rank honourably with any of the country-houses, farm-buildings, churches, or other peaceful



CELEBRATING THE BIRTHDAY OF THEIR ALLIES' KING.
On King Edward's birthday the Japanese soldiers decorated the quarters of the foreign attachés in Shi-li-ho, the village in which they lived. The Union Jack and the device of the Rising Sun were crossed over the gateway in token of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. After a cold lunch the soldiers gave an exhibition of wrestling. The proceedings terminated with a national dance, accompanied by wild and barbaric songs.

structures which have won immortal fame through being pressed into the grim service of war.

Another point to which both Russians and Japanese were compelled to pay close attention was the village of Lin-shi-pu, of the early fighting round which, on October 14th, mention was made on page 254. It is extremely typical of the operations subsequent to the Battle of Sha-ho, that for weeks the Japanese should only have remained in possession of part of this village, the remainder being so tenaciously held by the Russians that it was impossible to turn them out.

About the middle of November the rivers began to freeze, and several of the foreign Military Attachés and war correspondents left the front and returned to Europe, confident that there would now be no serious fighting until the spring. This view was evidently taken by Kuropatkin, who continued to devote himself to the task of organising his greatly increased forces. He had just been joined by General Liniévitch from Vladivostok, who had assumed the command of the First Manchurian Army under the new scheme of Russian military commands.

Kuropatkin himself seems to have been spending his time at this period very much as he did at Liao-yang, when the latter was still in Russian occupation. He still lived in a railway car, a light burning in his office all night, and officers being summoned to confer with him at all hours. His tours of inspection along the thirty-five mile Russian front were accomplished in a high-speed motor car, which was regarded by the Chinese with immense superstitious awe. Kuropatkin had, after careful enquiry, ordered, in addition to this car, twenty others specially constructed to carry ammunition speedily in case of emergency.

While our Army can certainly claim to have led the way in the matter of heavy motor traction in South Africa, it must be placed to the credit of the Russians in Manchuria that they were the first to make use of the high-speed car for the carriage of ammunition in the field.

For several weeks both armies carried on a series of more or less desultory operations, only here and there relieved by performances of distinct tactical interest or significance. Perhaps the most serious movement recorded is that made by the Japanese on November 24th against the extreme left of the Russian position, which, as we have seen, lay among the hills in the vicinity of the Ta-ling, General Rennenkamf being in command. The movement is described as an attempt to turn the Russian left, but more probably it was a mere diversion intended to disturb the Russians, and to check the activity of their reconnoitring parties. Certainly, there is no sign of a definite turning movement such as would undoubtedly have been designed on a much larger scale, and carried out with very much greater vigour and persistence. The chief fighting took place near the village of Sin-ho-cheng, at the base of the Ta-ling mountains, some sixty-five miles, as the crow flies, north-east of Liao-yang. The Japanese, according to Russian accounts, commenced the attack with a brigade of infantry and twelve guns, but seem to have made no headway either on the 25th or any of the four following days. On the 25th the Japanese, having been reinforced, attacked at noon, and again, under cover of a fog, at about 4 o'clock, but the Russians held their own manfully. On the 26th the fighting was renewed, with the same result. In the evening a very daring reconnoissance was made on the Russian

side by Captain Maukovsky, who, with seven volunteers belonging to his company, crept up so close to the enemy's outposts, that the Captain himself was able to take prisoner a Japanese non-commissioned officer who had left his picquet. On the 27th the Japanese never got closer to the Russian position than 600 paces. Half-way through the fighting there was a blinding snowstorm, which caused a suspension of hostilities. When the weather cleared, about 3 p.m., the wily Japanese were seen to be creeping round the right of the Russian position. The movement was frustrated in time by the accurate fire of the Russian artillery, and about 6 p.m. the fighting ceased.

On the 28th the engagement was resumed, but closed at 11 a.m. There being no signs of any further attack, the Russians set to work to collect the Japanese dead, with a view to giving them honourable burial. By midday they had found 230 bodies, all of men of the 7th Reserve Regiment of the 9th Reserve Brigade. A large quantity of rifles, ammunition, and entrenching tools fell into the hands of the Russians, who were thus in a position to claim a considerable success, more especially as their own losses appear to have been slight. In the afternoon of the 28th the Japanese troops engaged in this affair began slowly to retire. The Russians pursued, and finding the Japanese, on November 30th, halted in a pass seven or eight miles south-east of Sin-ho-cheng, General Renenkampf took the offensive. Part of the Russian force effected a turning movement round the pass, while the General himself, covered by artillery, attacked from the front. "The fighting," says a Mukden telegram, "was short and sharp. The Japanese retired south of the pass,

after burning their stores. Detachments of Chasseurs and Cossacks pursued the Japanese through the village of Seidun to the Tai-tse River, destroying the Japanese field telegraph. The Japanese burnt their depôts at two other villages in the valley of the Tai-tse. The Russian sotnias rejoined the main command, leaving, however, a strong post at Seidun. The Japanese lost about 50 killed and 100 wounded. The Russians found 23 bodies of Japanese soldiers, and made seven prisoners."

The fighting in the Russian left lasted fitfully into December, and produced at least one rather gruesome incident, of which an account taken from the *Russkiva Viedomosti* was transmitted from St. Petersburg by the Central News. The following is the translation furnished by the latter agency:—

"The attack was made from Udutun, a village on the right bank of the Sha-ho, surrounded by a grove, with a few rocky hillocks behind and before it.

"The order of battle chosen by the Russian colonel was original—three lines of deployed ranks, five companies, then three, and then four, with the regimental banner.

"In this order the regiment had to descend to the river, cross it, cross two large ravines occupied by infantry, then attack a steep but low hill, crowned by a redoubt, and encircled by trenches. The assault was accomplished by the 19th Rifle Regiment of three battalions, which formed the right flank of the attacking line.

"Those who fell remained where they dropped until the end of the battle. All who could keep on their feet rushed impetuously on the enemy. They dashed past the ravines, the trenches, and the redoubt without stopping, trod down two

batteries, and rushed after the enemy, who fled in a panic.

“The village with the Japanese still firing from the fansas, remained in the rear. With great difficulty the soldiers were forced to return. Fortunately, the 20th Regiment hurried up from the reserve. The village was surrounded and set on fire.

“Darkness set in, and the violent battle proceeded in the light of this huge torch. The Japanese, seeing themselves surrounded, had no strength to resist. The majority committed suicide. Many preferred burning to prison, and rushed into the fire.”

Colonel Sychevsky, who was in command, thus described the affair to the *Viedomosti* correspondent. “I only cried the word of command, and the regiment marched on as though on parade. After crossing the river, I had not sufficient strength to walk. I cried, ‘Hurrah!’ and ran.

“Before the trench, at a distance of from ten to fifteen steps, we stopped—ourselves and the Japanese. It was a tragic moment. One false step, and the tables might be turned. But all was decided by Lieutenant Alexander—a man of mad intrepidity. He was torn to pieces by bayonets before our eyes, and they finished him with the butts of their rifles.

“Cracking, slashing, howling, shrieking—on the attacking party went irresistibly. I could not run so fast, and could not shout. I was choking, but the men ran on and on. When I ordered the halt the soldiers murmured, and would not return. Fortunately the commander of the 3rd Battalion—an experienced man—held them back near the banner.

“The 19th Regiment lost about 400 men, but all died with their arms in their

hands. It was worse with the Japanese. The fansas were still smoking, spreading a horrible smell of burnt flesh—the bodies of the suicides!”

Into further details of the collisions along the lines of outposts, collisions in the accounts of which the names of the villages of Lin-shi-pu and Li-mun-tun have perhaps the greatest prominence, it is not necessary to enter. More to the point is it to chronicle the on-coming of the true Manchurian winter, and to glance at the progress of the great organic changes which are taking place at Russian Army headquarters. As to the first, a correspondent with General Kuroki's force telegraphed, on December 11th, that on the previous night the thermometer had fallen to six degrees below zero, Fahrenheit. The days were cold also, but sunshine and the absence of severe winds made life tolerable. The hills were covered with snow, which was also lying an inch thick on the plains. All the streams were frozen over. Both armies were now living almost exclusively in subterranean shelters protected by pits, wire entanglements, and here and there by semi-permanent redoubts. There were now places where the distance between the opposing lines was only 400 paces, and it is said that never were the positions of two forces so close together along such an extended front.

To this period belonged a recrudescence of activity on the part of the Chunchuses, to whom the rigours of the season mattered less than to the regular troops of the two armies in the field. It is recorded that 1,500 of these brigands, with sixteen guns, appeared some twenty miles to the west of Tie-ling, which lies on the railway to the north-west of Mukden. They are said to have been repulsed by the Frontier Guard, and to

have lost 200 of their number. But it is significant that in the first week of December a Harbin despatch should have mentioned the blowing up of the railway line between Harbin and Mukden by Chunchuses, and there is no question that throughout December the latter were causing considerable uneasiness in Russian military circles by their swift and sudden raids.

By the middle of December all the three generals who were to have Army commands under Kuropatkin as Generalissimo, had arrived at Mukden. General Liniévitch, commanding the First Army, had under him the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Siberian Army Corps, with Lieutenant-Generals Stackelberg, Sassulitch, Ivanoff, and Zarubaieff as Corps Commanders, and Major-General Kharkevitch as Chief of the Staff. To Lieutenant-General Gripenberg, commanding the Second Army, the 8th, 16th, and 21st European Army Corps, and a Siberian Corps appear to have been assigned.

The Third Army, under Lieutenant-General Baron Kaulbars, with Major-General Martson as Chief of the Staff, is said to have consisted of the 1st, 10th, and 17th European Army Corps, under Meyendorf, Tserpitzky, and Bilderling respectively, and a Siberian Corps, probably the 6th.

Of the new generals in chief command, the most self-assertive was General Gripenberg, of whom a striking portrait was given on page 193 of the present volume. In addressing one of his regiments at the time he took over command of his Army he said: "I am sure you will not give way to the enemy. There will be no retracting now. If any one of you abandons his position I will kill him. If I order you to retreat, kill me." A little later the Commander of the Second Army in Manchuria was to realise both the futility of such language and the doubtful security of a position for which it became evident that he was by temper and military capacity badly fitted.



Photo: *Nouvelle, Paris.*

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS BARTERING WITH CHINESE STREET VENDORS.

CHAPTER LXXV.

THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR—SUGGESTIONS OF SURRENDER—THE *RAZTOROPNY* INCIDENT—DRAMATIC SEQUEL—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GREAT FORTS—ATTACK BY JAPANESE SWORDSMEN—FIGHTING ROUND METRE RANGE—COSTLY ASSAULTS—FINAL ADVANCE—CAPTURE OF 203 METRE HILL.

AFTER the termination of the "Birthday Attack" on Port Arthur, of which an account was given in Chapter LXX., the Japanese, though somewhat disheartened by the limited success attained, made steady progress both with their sap work and with the bombardment. On November 6th the heads of the sap were within from 100 to 300 yards of the big forts, except in the case of those on Liau-tie-shan. The bombardment also continued with unabated vigour, and on November 8th the great Er-lung-shan and Sung-shu-shan forts were reported, for the first time, to have been silenced. The shells dropped, too, so incessantly into and round the dockyard, that repairing work had to be practically abandoned. Citizen volunteers and police were now reinforcing the regular garrison.

Increased attention was henceforth paid to I-tzu-shan, a particularly difficult fort to assail owing to the peculiar topography of the country in the immediate neighbourhood, which prevents direct artillery fire against it. On the mornings of November 5th and 6th fierce assaults were made against this powerful work, the Japanese advancing in both cases from behind distant hills in as great force as the ground would allow. But the absence of direct artillery preparation, and the long distance which the infantry had to traverse in the face of the

defenders' machine guns, crumpled up the attack, though not until the Japanese had reached and broken through the wire entanglements set close up to the fort. A lurid instance of the frantic tenacity displayed in these attacks was afforded by the spectacle of one unfortunate soldier, who, though his leg had been torn off by a piece of shell, was seen trying to bite through the wires in order to make the passage easier for those behind him.

During the assault on November 6th a shell soaring over the hills from the eastward plumped into a mine-controlling station in I-tzu-shan, and set off a quantity of high explosives, with the result, it is said, that between 600 and 700 Russians were killed and wounded.

About this time the Japanese were reported to have made a rather singular effort to induce the Russian soldiers in Port Arthur to surrender without consulting General Stoessel. A Russian prisoner, taken on October 26th, had declared that his comrades were sadly dispirited, and that they clearly realised the hopelessness of the struggle in which they were engaged. General Nogi, upon hearing the man's story, caused a letter to be drafted for circulation among the Russian soldiers. In this a statement was given of Kuropatkin's retreats, and his failure to make any impression upon Oyama's forces. It was pointed out that the Baltic Fleet had only just

started, that the advance of the Japanese against Port Arthur, if slow, was sure, and that the capture of the great forts was only a matter of time. In conclusion, the letter offered kindly treatment to all who surrendered, and urged the inhumanity of further useless slaughter. Several copies of this letter were written in Russian, and given to the above-mentioned prisoner, who, under cover of the darkness in the early morning of November 4th, regained the Russian lines unobserved by his officers. The man returned the same night, saying that his comrades would answer within a few days. He remarked that the men did not like the idea of an unofficial surrender, but that they were evidently impressed by the tone of the letter, which dispelled the idea, fostered by the Russian officers, that a Japanese entry into Port Arthur would be followed by a massacre. According to this man's statement, his own battalion, formerly 800 strong, had now dwindled to thirty men only.

Like a good many other of the circumstantial stories told about the siege of Port Arthur, this one may be of defective authenticity, but it can hardly be an entire invention, and, although no tangible results of any such offer as that indicated were forthcoming, it may be that a proportion of the besieged garrison were sensibly influenced in this way. According to old-fashioned notions of military propriety, the offer, if made, was highly objectionable; but the case of Port Arthur is, in some respects, exceptional, and the Japanese plea that a prolonged resistance meant only a senseless and futile waste of brave lives, and that, accordingly, some contravention of honourable military usage was permissible, must not be lightly dismissed.

Copies of the Port Arthur journal, the *Novy Krai*, were now beginning to find their way pretty regularly to Chi-fu, being carried thither by the blockade-running junks. Some of the glimpses of life in the beleaguered fortress are very interesting, although by this time it is necessary to discount rather heavily the comparative cheerfulness of the earlier numbers. There is no longer any fun to be got out of the chicken-hearted apothecary who, for a fortnight, played a prominent part in the columns of the *Novy Krai*. This useful person had found the siege so trying, that he closed his shop and vanished, but was pursued with such editorial taunts and reproaches for having left a part of the town deprived of its medicines, that he eventually advertised his new address. In November, again, there are no more anxious enquiries as to the whereabouts of a missing monkey, or offers to purchase a horse and carriage.

Yet, even up to within a few days of the period to which we have now arrived, the Port Arthur journalist was occasionally enabled to supplement the bare record of the siege by some highly romantic "copy." Here, for instance, is the sensational story of a Russian woman who served with valour in many fights until she was killed. "Her husband was serving in Port Arthur, and she, dressing herself as a man, arrived there just before the siege began. Enlisting in her husband's regiment, she took part in several sorties, and helped in the defence of Corner Hill. Though her sex was soon discovered, her record for bravery and attention to the wounded won her permission to remain in the ranks, where she had an excellent moral influence on the soldiers. Her husband fell wounded while fighting by her side.

She nursed him through the critical points of his illness, and then returned to the front, where she became a messenger to Captain Gouzakofsky, of the 13th Regiment, riding fearlessly to and from the various positions, unaffected by the din and danger of battle. On October 16th, when she was visiting the trenches with despatches, a huge shell struck the earthworks, and killed her together with eight others."

Reverting to the November chronicle of the siege, we find an incident recorded as having taken place on November 14th, the story of which, though not officially confirmed, was vouched for by an *Express* correspondent as having been obtained from an absolutely reliable source at Shimonoseki, one of Japan's principal naval stations. The details are as follows: On the night of the 13th three Russian destroyers put to sea from Port Arthur with despatches from General Stoessel in triplicate. Two of the vessels carried officers who were so badly wounded that it was deemed advisable to send them at any risk to Chi-fu rather than keep them in the crowded hospitals at Port Arthur. The fate of all destroyers was sufficiently tragic.

One was intercepted by the Japanese cruiser *Kasuga* and sunk, only four members of the crew being rescued, one of whom died subsequently.


The second was sunk by the *Matsushima* about twenty-five miles from Port Arthur. This vessel managed to hit the *Matsushima* with a torpedo, which, however, did very little damage.

The third destroyer was chased by two Japanese torpedo gunboats from midnight until four o'clock in the morning, when the fugitive's engines gave out off Liau-tie-shan. She pluckily hove-to for battle, but was promptly torpedoed, and

sank immediately with all on board. In all three cases the Russians on board the destroyers were admitted by the Japanese to have behaved with reckless bravery.

We now come to an incident which created at the time a very considerable sensation, and which was fully expected—though, as we shall see, the expectation was not realised—to create serious international complications. Two nights after the three destroyers just mentioned had come to grief, a fourth destroyer, the *Raztoropny*, commanded by Captain Pelem, weighed anchor in Port Arthur harbour, and, in the teeth of a blinding snowstorm, ran out to sea. Owing to the heavy weather she was unable to make more than ten knots, but, even at this pace, thanks to the snow-storm, she succeeded in evading the Japanese ships on blockading duty, and early on the morning of the 16th she steamed into Chi-fu, and anchored near the Russian Consulate. Later she moved further inshore among the shipping.

The crew of the *Raztoropny* may well have been gratified by the sensation which their arrival created. An early visitor was Captain Ching, of the Chinese cruiser *Hai-Yang*, who came aboard and notified Captain Pelem that he would be compelled to disarm within twenty-four hours. The Aide-de-camp to the United States Admiral on the China station also had a short interview with Captain Pelem, and several Press correspondents followed, eager to seize such an exceptional opportunity of gleaning really up-to-date information concerning Port Arthur. These last found the commander of the *Raztoropny* and his officers most communicative. As to Port Arthur, everything there was going on swimmingly: plenty of food, no chance of the



A MODERN SPARTAN: GENERAL NOGI, THE INDOMITABLE BESIEGER
OF PORT ARTHUR.

General Nogi sacrificed both his sons in the investment of the stronghold, one having fallen at Nanshan and the other at Metre Hill.

water supply failing, the troops and residents in first-rate health and spirits, the warships steadily undergoing repair, and some of them likely to put to sea in the near future. Altogether an almost idyllic state of things considering the circumstances. Nor did the appearance of the *Raztoropny* and her crew belie these cheering statements. The officers and men were fit and well fed; there was a comfortable odour of steak, which was being cooked for breakfast; beer and tobacco were in evidence, and an added touch of repleteness was lent by a "fat, contented-looking bull pup," who "walked the deck with unsteady movements." But, notwithstanding these assurances, the optimism of the officers was thought to be a little strained, and the whole picture appeared to have been carefully arranged with a view to creating a desired impression.

The continued presence of the armed *Raztoropny* in the harbour of Chi-fu was, of course, out of the question, and it seemed clear that this time the Chinese would take the necessary steps to enforce the observance of the port's neutrality. The cruiser *Hai-yang* having cleared her decks for action, moved to a position commanding every part of the harbour, and dramatic events were naturally anticipated.

Meanwhile the *Raztoropny* lay anchored, with full steam up, in the midst of seven Japanese coasting steamers and two vessels flying the Chinese flag but owned by Japanese. The despatches brought by Captain Pelem had been taken off by the Russian Consul, and Captain Pelem had himself gone ashore. Towards evening it was understood that the Russians had agreed to disarm, but that it would be impossible to remove the guns immediately, owing to the heavy seas in

the roadstead. About seven o'clock the officers and crew of the vessel came ashore, and, when all had landed, a line was formed, kit-bags were placed on the ground, and officers and men stood to attention with their faces turned seawards towards the ship.

In a few moments there were three explosions heard in rapid succession, and, when the smoke cleared away, the *Raztoropny* was seen to settle down and sink. The last man who had left her had ignited slow fuses, which had done their work with completeness, and settled once and for all the question of the *Raztoropny's* disarmament. It was afterwards learnt that towards evening three Japanese destroyers had been seen at the entrance to the harbour, and there seems little doubt that their appearance had precipitated the blowing-up of the *Raztoropny*, the commander probably fearing a repetition of the incident of the *Reshitelny*, which took refuge (see Chapter LI.) in Chi-fu harbour after the action of August 10th, and was unceremoniously haled forth by the Japanese on the plea that she had not been duly disarmed.

The Japanese destroyers on the present occasion watched the entrance to the harbour all night, and came in the next morning to look for the *Raztoropny*. Although some indignation was expressed at the deception practised by the Russian commander, to which it was believed that the Chinese were parties, the fact seems to be that the Japanese were rather relieved than otherwise at the turn which affairs had taken. They were by no means anxious for a repetition of the *Reshitelny* incident, which would have aroused a good deal of ill-feeling, and yet, if they had not behaved again as they did in that case, it might be construed

into an admission that their previous action had been unjustifiable.

Later some argument occurred as to the small arms taken ashore by the crew of the *Raztoropny*, and also as to the disposal of the men themselves, but the controversy was not serious, and was eventually settled by the confiscation of the weapons, and conveyance of the crew in the *Hai-yang* to Shanghai.

Returning to the land fighting round Port Arthur, we find the Japanese, at the end of the second week of November, resuming their vigorous attacks on Er-lung-shan and East Chi-huan-shan, and also redoubling their efforts against Metre Range in general and 203 Metre Hill in particular. What specially characterises this stage of the advance is the improved success of the Japanese in retaining positions they have won, a circumstance illustrating, it would seem, a feature in the Russian scheme of defence which has hitherto been of advantage to the defence, but is now being used to their detriment. In the old days of Chinese occupation Port Arthur had what is termed a reciprocal system of defence, that is, the forts were all constructed to help one another, so that, if one were attacked, the forts on the left or right could bring a heavy flanking or cross fire on the assailants. The objection to this system sometimes is, and certainly was in the case of old Port Arthur, that, although it renders the capture of any individual fort a very serious matter, the fall of that fort may speedily result in the fall of others connected with it.


That was what happened in the first Japanese siege of Port Arthur, one fort proving the key to all the others. But the fortifications of Russian Port Arthur have been constructed on a totally different plan, as the Japanese found to their

cost at an early stage of the present operations.










No longer was there any hope that the capture of a single important stronghold would mean the prompt reduction of the rest. It became necessary to treat each of the great forts as a separate objective, and hence the appalling loss of life and the protracted nature of the siege. On the other hand, an analysis of the attacks does not convey the impression that there was any reciprocal defence to speak of, and, accordingly, when a foothold was obtained close up to any of the great forts, it was easier to retain it than would have been the case if the guns from the forts on the right and left could have been used to render the besiegers' new position untenable.

On November 15th the Russian troops defending 203 Metre Hill, who had already distinguished themselves by their stubborn resistance, made a sortie, but were driven back, leaving twenty-six dead. A day or two later a Russian magazine was destroyed after an expenditure of 200 shells. The Japanese now began to widen their saps, and to use them to move guns forward, a sure sign that a very intense stage of the siege operations was about to commence.

On November 17th the Japanese blew in the counterscarps of the Er-lung-shan and Sung-shu-shan forts. They had also mined into the counterscarp galleries at North Chi-huan-shan, but found it unnecessary to fire the mine, as the enemy had evacuated the galleries. It may be explained in passing that, in the case of a great permanent fort, the ditch with its steep, often perpendicular, sides dotted with "galleries," cannot be entered by the attackers issuing from their last parallel without some special preparation. The counterscarps, the sides of the ditch



Section of the front of a modern fortress.



DIAGRAMS ILLUSTRATING METHODS OF ATTACK UPON, AND DEFENCE OF, A FORTRESS.

nearest to the attack, have to be breached in order to make a descent into the ditch possible, and this can be done in one of two ways: either long shells of large capacity are fired at the crest of the glacis until that and the top of the counterscarp are cut down and blown into the ditch, or resort is had to mining. In the latter case, which alone was practicable at Port Arthur, mining galleries are run forward from the most advanced parallel, and, when sufficient progress has been made, the mine is fired and the counterscarp blown in. The mining plan is always liable to be upset by the besiegers' countermines, and it involves an immense amount of labour. But when it is successful the results are generally excellent, and, at the worst, a sort of crater is formed, which forms an admirable cover in advance of the regular trenches.

Whatever may have been the actual case at Er-lung-shan, Sung-shu-shan, and North Chi-huan-shan, there was yet a great deal of work to be done before those mighty defences fell into Japanese hands.

After more than a week of desultory fighting, during which considerable progress was made in sap and mine work, a general attack was commenced on November 26th against Er-lung-shan, Sung-shu-shan, and 203 Metre Hill. The attack against the two first-named forts was carried out by a specially picked body of troops armed with swords under Major-Generals Nakamura and Saito, and must have been one of the most thrilling performances of the whole siege. Unfortunately very few details are available. The probability is that the attackers rushed forward to the edges of the great ditches, forty to fifty feet, and cut out of the solid limestone rock, seeking, in the

first instance, the practicable slopes made by the blowing in of the counterscarps. Those who were not lucky enough to find their way into the ditch by this means doubtless lowered themselves by means of ladders, and, once they were in the ditch, a terrible struggle must have ensued.

It is difficult to realise such a scene, more especially with the aid lent by the use of swords in such hands as those of the Japanese. But, deadly as cold steel properly handled may be in hand-to-hand fighting, it has its limits, and probably there were many flanking defences in these ditches from which machine guns were brought to bear with fearful effect upon the masses of Japanese swordsmen. Whether from this cause, or because the ladders were too few or not long enough, or as the result of an overwhelming rush on the part of the defenders, the attack failed, and the swordsmen were compelled to retire after suffering terrible losses, General Nakamura himself being among the wounded.

But better fortune attended the Japanese efforts against 203 Metre Hill. Of the previous fighting on Metre Range an account was given in Chapter LXX. This may now be usefully supplemented by an extract from a lengthy and important letter from the *Times* correspondent with the Japanese Army before Port Arthur, which was published on January 28th, and which for a long time to come will probably remain the standard description of the operations against Metre Range, or to use another name, which includes both the 203 and 210 Metre peaks, Royusan. It should be explained, in reference to this extract, that Namaokayama is evidently the Lung-yen of Mr. Norregard's narrative quoted on page 316, and the "Temple Redoubt" of General Stoessel's despatches.

“ On September 19th-20th an assault was made on the hill of Namaokayama, called by the Russians Temple Hill, which is situated a little to the north-west of 203 Metre Hill, and separated from it by a valley. The occupation of Namaokayama was a success of the highest importance for the Japanese, for, although the view from its summit did not come up to expectations, nevertheless the ships in Port Arthur were obliged to retreat into the eastern half of the inner harbour, and could not venture out without their every movement being known. On the day on which Namaokayama was taken, an assault was also made on 203 Metre Hill from the foot hill on its west front, and also from the south-west. The Japanese never fought better than they did on that occasion. There were no parallels leading down from the slopes, behind which they were encamped, across the little valley dividing them from 203 Metre Hill, and none leading up the steep slopes of that mountain. From the moment they left their camps there was not a particle of cover from the dreadful rifle fire from 203 Metre Hill and the hill further to the north known as Akasakayama.

“ From my position I could only obtain an imperfect view of the attack, but I did see the manner in which whole groups of men were wiped out by shrapnel coming down the slope of the foot hill into the valley. In spite of all these obstacles, the infantry climbed the slopes at night, and obtained a lodgment on the south-west corner, which is known as 210, and also on the north-east corner, which is known as 203. The Russians, however, remained in possession of the crest, and could not be driven out. Probably at that time they knew better than their stubborn enemy the importance of retaining their hold on the hill. In spite

of the inadequate manner in which the mountain was fortified, they made up by their devotion for the incompetency of those who had been responsible for leaving it without permanent fortifications. The forts behind played such sad havoc with the infantry who had gained a lodgment just below the crest, that on the day following the Japanese were forced to evacuate the ground they had won, after losing an immense number of officers and men. With the repulse in September all active operations against 203 Metre Hill ceased until November 26th.”

On November 27th the Russians held the whole of Royusan, both the 203 Metre Hill to the north-east, and the 210 peak to the south-west. The former is, with the exception of the Liau-tie-shan peaks, the highest mountain of those round Port Arthur. Royusan is described by the *Times* correspondent as being very steep. “ On its west front, about two-thirds of the way up, the rocks buttress out, causing a sheer drop of about thirty to forty feet. It is possible to climb up this, but the feat is not an easy one. Above this natural obstruction comes the first of the artificial ones, in the form of a deep and broad trench running completely round the hostile front of the mountain. This was the first of the positions held by the infantry. On the crest there are numerous trenches and cross passages dug fairly deep and made of sand-bags. The summit is, in fact, divided into what might be called a number of little shell-tight compartments—that is to say, although it was impossible to prevent shells bursting among the infantry on the crest, an effort had been made to localise their effects as far as possible.”

Although for some time after the failure

of the assault on September 19th-20th it had been doubtful whether any fresh attack would be directed against this formidable stronghold, the Japanese engineers were directed, as a measure of precaution, in case it should be found desirable to resume operations in this quarter, to run a series of parallels leading from the foot-hills, behind which the Japanese infantry were encamped down into the valley, and thence up the south-west corner of 203 Metre Hill towards the 210 Metre peak. At the close of November it became evident that the occupation of 203 would be of quite extraordinary significance to the besiegers, not only by reason of the serious gap which would be made in the system of defences, but also because the fleet in the harbour would then be entirely at the mercy of the Japanese guns. This would enable the blockade to be carried out by a few gun-boats and destroyers, leaving Admiral Togo's Battle Fleet free to make adequate arrangements for the warm reception of the Second Pacific Squadron under Admiral Rozhdestvensky.

Accordingly, a scheme of general attack was prepared, of which we have already seen a portion put into unsuccessful execution. As the magnitude of the operations against Royusan is revealed, it becomes clear that the rush of swordsmen into the ditches of Er-lung-shan and Sung-shu-shan was intended largely to serve as a diversion, or, to put it in another way, a pre-occupation, which would serve to hinder the Russians from prompt and effective reinforcement of the garrison of 203 Metre Hill.

The preparations for the attack on 203 were supervised, we are told, not only by General Nogi, but also by Generals Kodama and Fukushima, who had come down specially from the north to ascer-

tain the state of affairs at Port Arthur. A new division of fresh troops not before employed in the war was detailed to assist in the attack, parallels were already in existence, and six of the largest howitzers ever used on land were in position at favourable points.

Throughout November 27th Royusan was steadily bombarded by the great 11-in. siege guns, the infantry remaining among the foot-hills until General Nogi should come up and take over command of the operations.

On the 28th a determined attack was launched against the 210 Metre peak at the south-west corner of Royusan, eleven companies of infantry issuing at eight o'clock in the morning from their parallels, having left three companies in reserve behind an eminence called by the *Times* correspondent 174 Metre Mountain, which, apparently, is distinct from the 180 Metre Hill of Mr. Norregard's narrative (pp. 316, 318), having been occupied as far back as August 22nd. Simultaneously with this advance two battalions were sent against Akasakayama, the hill to the north, from which an attack on 203 can be subjected to an enfilading fire. The idea was that, if a lodgment could be effected on 210, the men holding it could keep down the fire of the Russian infantry on 203; an attack on the latter thus supported, and not harassed, by the enfilading fire from Akasakayama—the garrison of which was to be kept busy by the two battalions sent against them—would have an excellent chance of getting home.

The plan failed. The two battalions sent against Akasakayama were repulsed with heavy loss. The attack on 210 was at first more successful. The advance was toilsome, and the attackers suffered severely from the fire of the Russian sharpshooters. But by 2.30 in the after-

noon about 150 Japanese soldiers won the crest of 210, and for a time remained established there. Unfortunately this encouraged the belief that the moment had arrived for a general advance up the west side of Royusan against 203 Metre Hill on the north-east. That attack was duly delivered, but presently the whole plan fell to pieces. The little group which had gained a foothold on the crest of 210 could not maintain it, owing to the dreadful fire to which they were subjected, and, with their disappearance from the crest, and the repulse of the two battalions sent against Akasakayama, the attempt on 203 was foredoomed to costly failure.

Still, the day's work had not been entirely barren of results. On their withdrawal from the crest of 210 the Japanese infantry had pertinaciously halted a little distance down the slope, and in this apparently dead, or partly dead, angle had stubbornly ensconced themselves. Towards the point in question the sap was now pushed forward, so that it became possible for large bodies of infantry to "wind their way like a long snake through the parallels up the face of the south-west corner, and there debouch for a further advance against the crest."

November 29th was spent by the Japanese in consultations, and at 10 a.m. on the 30th the struggle was reopened by a fresh attack on 210. The Japanese guns had by this time rendered the crest of 210 untenable by the Russians, and a company of Japanese infantry were accordingly enabled to push forward from the point already occupied to one just below the crest, where a high wall of sand-bags was immediately built. The Russians responded by returning to the crest, upon which it was now impossible for either the Russian or Japanese artillery to

fire for fear of hitting their own men. Consequently there ensued a continuous fight between the opposing bodies of infantry, who, in the intervals of "potting" one another with their rifles, used bayonets and hand-grenades freely.

"Throughout the day," writes the *Times* correspondent, "203 remained in undisputed possession of the Russians, and no attack was made in that quarter, but at 2 p.m. a regiment (I am not allowed by the rules of the censorship to make specification of names and numbers) advanced against Akasakayama. The attack was repulsed all along the line, except in one place, the centre of the first Russian trench below the crest of that hill. A party of Japanese soldiers drove out the defenders, and established themselves in their place, and for some time remained there unmolested. Then a curious thing happened. A party of forty or fifty Russian soldiers, either in sheer foolhardiness, or because they thought the Japanese holding the centre of the trench had evacuated the ground or had been killed, left their trenches on the crest of Akasakayama, and delivered a counter-attack on the Japanese in their front. They charged down the slope, and were allowed to get quite close to the trench; some of them actually entering it before the Japanese soldiers showed their hand; then a fight at close quarters settled the matter, for the Russians, knowing that to go back would be fatal, preferred to jump into the trench among their opponents and to die fighting. This they did. Not a man appeared again, so it is presumable that they were all killed.

"The turn of the Japanese came shortly afterwards, for their own field artillery, either in ignorance of the true state of affairs, or because they could not see, opened a fierce shrapnel fire all over



THE RUSSIAN NIGHT ASSAULT ON THE JAPANESE SAPPLERS AND MINERS WHEN CUTTING PARALLLS ON FANFUZAN (FAN-LUNG-SHIAN).
OCTOBER 2, 1904

Nearly every night the Russians attempted to stop the Japanese advancing their trenches, and sometimes the fighting lasted many hours under the searchlight and searchlights of the enemy.

Akasakayama, sweeping the crest and the trench in which their own infantry were taking cover. These unfortunate men were so badly mauled by this fire that they took a choice of evils, and decided to evacuate the position, and run down the slope under the fire of the Russian marksmen on the crest, rather than be shot to pieces by their own guns. Naturally many were slain, and the day's fighting closed with the combatants occupying the same positions as on the previous day, not a yard of ground having changed hands."

During the night of the 30th the Japanese engineers ran a shallow trench at right angles to their most advanced parallel up the face of 203, and, just before daybreak, a party of infantry rushed forward out of this to the foot of the steep side of 203, and hastily constructed several shelter trenches parallel to, and just below, the first Russian trench. Being thus established close up to the crests of both 203 and 210, the Japanese decided to deliver another attack on both the two peaks in the afternoon of December 1st. Great preparations were made for this movement, and all was in readiness for a grand rush from the parallels when a strange incident occurred, which upset the planned movement altogether. The party which was holding the advanced shelter-trenches just under the crest of 203 suddenly, and without warning, bolted back, amid a storm of Russian bullets, upon the nearest parallel. This extraordinary, unforeseen, and unexplained occurrence determined the fate of this attack, which was forthwith abandoned, no further effort being made until an interval of three days had elapsed.

During December 2nd, 3rd, and 4th the Japanese artillery pounded away

ceaselessly at the crest of Royusan, occasionally dropping shells over the crest on to the reverse slope in order to hinder the approach of reinforcements. During the night the engineers constructed parallels up the centre of Royusan at a point where there was a slight dip in the ground which afforded some protection against the fire of Akasakayama. By the morning of December 5th these trenches had been pushed forward as far as was practicable, and a final infantry attack was decided on.

The preparations made by the Japanese for this final attack—for such it was understood to be in any case, since, in the event of failure, the enterprise would almost certainly have been abandoned—were characteristically thorough and complete. As a matter of course, from an early hour in the morning of the 5th, every gun that could possibly be brought to bear upon Royusan came into action against the two peaks. Howitzers of 11-in. calibre, throwing shells of 500 lbs., naval guns of great size, and field artillery are mentioned as taking part in that terrific bombardment, causing such a disturbance of earth and atmosphere, that Royusan is said to have resembled a smoking volcano, not an inch of the crest and near slopes escaping the tremendous cannonade save a small angle of the south-west corner, where the advanced parties of the Japanese held their ground ready to spring forward in the final rush.

By a happy inspiration the enthusiasm of the bulk of the attacking force, which had been lying in wait behind Namaokayama, and in the valley of 174 Metre Hill, was raised to the highest pitch by a very simple and soldierlike ceremonial, of which the *Times* correspondent appropriately makes careful mention. The execution of the attack had been en-

trusted to Major-General Saito, doubtless in recognition of his brilliant gallantry in the fighting to the eastward on November 26th. His command included eight battalions of infantry, and between 1 and 2 p.m. these began to fall in for the attack. As they marched down the little valley leading to the front line of trenches they passed a little group of officers standing on their left, and holding the regimental colours. As each battalion came level with these glorious emblems it was halted, faced to the left, and the word was given to salute. Colours have played a grand part on many a hard-fought field, and not a few are averse from the modern regulation which prevents their being taken into action by the British Army. Surely the noble and inspiring use to which they were put on this momentous occasion is an argument as forcible as any which previous history affords—which is saying a great deal—of the value of colours on the battlefield as a moral factor outweighing the considerations which have banished the colour-party from our own battle formation.

The end was now near at hand. When the most advanced parallel had been reached, as many men as could be packed into the trench leading up the face of Royusan were drafted into it, the remainder lining the parallels in eager expectation. At half-past three the soldiers behind the sand-bag wall on 210 pressed on, and, having encountered very little resistance, were soon in possession of the crest.


Five hundred men were now seen to leap forward from the trench leading up to 203, and to dash at the first Russian trench about thirty yards away. The spectators held their breath while the nimble Japanese disappeared into the trench, and then for a few minutes there

was a fearful pause. The Japanese artillery broke out into a roaring bombardment of the summit of the peak, and when this had ceased the Japanese soldiers were seen to be moving forward from the first captured trench. It was a terrible moment of suspense, for this was the stage which had proved so fatal in previous attacks. But the soldiers went steadily on, and hardly a shot was fired. Simultaneously the men on 210 moved forward; in a few moments the Japanese infantry were over the crest of both peaks, and Royusan had fallen! Only three live Russians had been found on the summit, the remainder having been killed where they stood by the bursting shells, or retreated down the reverse slope along a covered way to one of the forts in the rear.

The Japanese lost no time, as we shall see in a succeeding chapter, in making good use of the magnificent coign of vantage they had won at such tremendous cost. But their first care was to render the Russian post on Akasakayama untenable, and to this end they swiftly brought up heavy guns, and subjected that hill to a deadly plunging fire. On the evening of the following day the Russians could no longer stand this terrible punishment, and withdrew, the Japanese following them the same night in occupation of the position.

This chapter cannot be better concluded than with a final extract from the account given by the *Times* correspondent, to whom every student of military history must feel indebted for his admirably lucid, coherent, and often extremely picturesque description of one of the most intensely interesting operations ever recorded in the annals of war:

“ I will not dwell on the appearance of Royusan the days following its capture;



MAP OF THE MAIN DEFENCES OF PORT ARTHUR.

Illustrating the attack upon 203 Metre Hill, and showing how its capture weakened the defence in allowing the Japanese to dominate the harbour and destroy the Russian war vessels.

- References.
- A. Inner Anchorage
 - B. Dock
 - C. Arsenal & Graving Dock
 - D. Searchlight Station.
 - E.E. Torpedo Depôts.
 - F. Waterworks.

FI = Fort.

no mountain has probably ever contained, contracted into so small a space, so much of the horrors of war. The crest had been absolutely smashed to pieces; and one could not even trace the lines of the original defences. Among this confused jumble of rocks, sandbags, shells, charred timber, broken rifles, bits of uniforms, and soldiers' accoutrements of every description, the dead lay in hundreds, many smashed beyond all recognition or resemblance to the human form. On the east side of the mountain lay the Russians, on the west the Japanese; the summit was sacred to both. It was freezing during the days of the attack, and the bodies were perfectly preserved, and had bled little; some seemed to have died a natural death, from the ease of their posture and the contented expression of their faces; but the majority, especially the Japanese, who had been struck down while advancing up a steep

slope, had their teeth clenched and a look of fierce resolve written on their faces. The Russians, who for the most part, had met death while sitting in their trenches on the summit, bore a pained and even surprised appearance. In one place a dozen soldiers were sitting in a square shelter of sandbags, their rifles stacked against the side, when a big shell or shells landed in their midst and killed them all. The defences had been so completely smashed up that they had been temporarily repaired from time to time, and often one would see the body of a soldier taking the place of a sandbag in these improvised walls. Many of the dead on the mountain had been killed as far back as September, their bodies had remained unburied, and were in all stages of decay; but what struck me more forcibly than anything else was the manner in which the big shells had smashed everything to a pulp."



Photo: T. Ruddiman Johnston.
GENERAL NAKAMURA.

CHAPTER LXXVI.

SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR CONTINUED—SEQUEL TO THE CAPTURE OF METRE RANGE—
DESTRUCTION OF THE RUSSIAN FLEET—TORPEDO ATTACKS AGAINST THE *SEVASTOPOL*
—A GRAND NAVAL RECORD—THE LAND OPERATIONS—THREE PRINCIPAL FORTS
TAKEN BY ASSAULT.

THE extraordinary advantages derived by the Japanese from the occupation of Metre Range were almost immediately to become apparent. It will be remembered that the Japanese had long ago secured a position—Wolf's Hill—from which it was possible to throw shells into a part of the Port Arthur harbour, a circumstance which the Japanese had turned to the best possible account. But 203 Metre Hill is a mile nearer to the harbour than Wolf's Hill, and from it a much more extended view is obtained. With two such gun positions in the hands of the Japanese, the fate of the Russian vessels in the harbour was, practically speaking, sealed. Either they must sally forth and do battle with the fresh and superior fleet of Admiral Togo, or they would be sunk at their moorings as soon as the Japanese could bring sufficient big guns to bear on them.

It is very natural that, with this depressing prospect opened out before them, the Russians should have made frantic efforts to recapture, more especially, 203 Metre Hill. Time after time they dashed themselves undauntedly against that peak of terrible memories, only to find that, with the rôles of attackers and defenders reversed, their losses were now far more serious than those of the enemy. It is believed that in these attempts 3,000 Russians were sacrificed, and to no sort of useful purpose. For

the Japanese clung to what they had won with the same pertinacity they had shown during the ten days' attack, and by the end of the first week in December it was evident that Nogi's men on Royusan had come to stay.

While the Japanese infantry were foiling the persistent Russian attempts to regain these advantageous heights, the artillery and engineers were busy bringing up and emplacing fresh guns wherewith to intensify the effect of those already firing from Wolf's Hill. The latter appear to have been very large calibre weapons brought from Tokio, where they had at one time formed part of the reserve armament of the forts in Tokio Bay. These guns had already done some damage on December 3rd, but this was nothing compared with the wholesale destruction which was now to ensue. For the possession of 203, as well as of Metre Hill, meant not only a much greater intensity of fire, but also much reciprocal benefit in the way of direction and observation of results.

The first use to which the Japanese put their guns on 203 Metre Hill was, as we have seen, to render the Russian position on Akasakayama untenable, and, when this had been easily accomplished, the storm of fire broke over Port Arthur harbour, and lasted for several days. It would not be easy to describe the experiences of the hapless Russian ships

during this awful interval. Fully exposed to the pitiless rain of shells, and, practically speaking, unable to reply—for the enemy, posted almost invisibly on a hill nearly 700 feet high and three and a half miles away, presented an almost hopeless mark—their situation soon became desperate, and one after another, succumbing to repeated hits, either sank or otherwise showed signs of having been completely incapacitated. On December 8th observations made by the officer commanding the artillery of the Japanese Naval Brigade showed that the Russian battleship *Peresviet* was down by the stern, and that the water was up to the stern walk, while the central funnel was smashed. A little later on the same day she took fire. The *Poltava* was submerged, the water reaching to the upper deck; the *Retvisan* had a list to starboard, and was submerged nearly to the upper deck, as was also the *Pobieda*. The cruiser *Pallada*, lying between the battleship *Retvisan* and the torpedo-transport *Amur*, was apparently down by the head. The *Bayan's* deck had been burning since the forenoon.

It may readily be imagined that these striking results of their hard-won success afforded the Japanese extreme gratification. Yet it may be that it was not without an accompanying spasm of regret that they saw a succession of fine warships thus cruelly smashed up, any one of which would have proved a most welcome addition to their own powerful but limited navy. It is on record that a British general, at the close of a hard fight, seeing the enemy withdrawing guns upon the capture of which he had fully reckoned, indignantly called out, "They are taking away *my* guns." Almost keener may have been the feelings of the Japanese as they themselves poured

shell after shell into what were to all intents and purposes their ships. Yet they could not, of course, afford the risk of leaving the ships undamaged, while, even if they had done so without detrimental results to themselves, there remained the certainty that the Russians would not allow sound battleships to fall into Japanese hands after taking such pains to blow up even a destroyer like the *Razoropny*.

By December 11th the Japanese guns had rendered completely useless the four battleships, two cruisers, one gunboat, and one torpedo-transport, besides wrecking the wireless telegraph station at Golden Hill, and setting fire to the Arsenal. The only large vessel now left was the *Sevastopol*, which had managed to escape from the harbour by night, and was now lying with some torpedo-craft outside the entrance. To this scanty remnant attention was promptly devoted by Admiral Togo, whose long vigil was now approaching a gloriously successful termination.

As previously indicated, the blockading fleet had recently been but lightly engaged, their principal duties consisting in attempts, not always successful, to check the activity of the blockade-runners from Chi-fu and, possibly, Kiaochau. During the land attack on Metre Range this not very exciting programme had been unpleasantly diversified by a disaster, not of very great significance, but still of sufficient seriousness to emphasise the fact that even blockade-duty nowadays is occasionally hazardous. On November 20th the small cruiser *Sai Yen*, 1,344 tons, Captain Tajima, was approaching Port Arthur, in order to strengthen the blockade and assist the land operations, when she struck a Russian mechanical mine, and was im-

mediately enveloped in smoke. The gunboat *Akagi*, which was engaged in shelling the enemy's position, ceased fire and steamed towards the *Sai Yen*, which sank forthwith. Launches from the *Akagi* and another gunboat saved 191 officers and men, but 39 were lost, including the *Sai Yen's* commander, Captain Tajima.

On December 12th there commenced a series of torpedo operations against the battleship *Sevastopol*, which recall in striking fashion the repeated attempts made against the Russian Fleet in the first six months of the war. The series was opened by an attack, delivered half an hour after midnight on the 12th, by a torpedo division under Captain Kasama. No marked results having been attained, two torpedo-boats under Commander Masado ran up under a hot fire, and discharged several torpedoes, the shock of whose striking was felt, but the *Sevastopol* remained unmoved.

"On the night of December 14th," wrote Admiral Togo in an official report, "several torpedo-boat squadrons carried out a bold attack on the enemy's ships. The various squadrons about midnight reached Port Arthur harbour, the leading squadron and a special squadron advancing for the purpose of reconnoitring. Our boats attacked at 1 a.m. in the face of searchlights and a heavy fire from the enemy's ships and batteries. One torpedo-boat was struck once, and another four times. In the latter three men were killed, and one man was wounded.

"Afterwards all the squadrons concerted a plan of attack. The first squadron was to break the enemy's obstructions and divert the searchlights, while the second, third, fourth, and fifth squadrons, following up, were to deliver attacks in succession. This programme was bravely put into execution between

2 and 3 a.m., the third squadron notably displaying much dash, but all closed up and discharged torpedoes at very short range and then retired in order.

"During the retirement one boat suddenly received many hits. The commander and five men were killed, and one man was wounded. The boat became unmanageable, but was taken in tow by a consort amid a hail of shot. The tow-rope was cut by a shell; the consort was hit once, one man being killed, while the boat which was being towed was again struck several times, and, being in a sinking condition, was unavoidably abandoned.

"After rescuing the survivors another boat of the same squadron was struck twice. A boat of the fifth squadron was also struck once, two men being killed, and a lieutenant and two men being wounded. Yet another boat was hit once, one man being killed and five wounded. The boat was temporarily disabled, but was towed away safely by two of her consorts. All the other boats, though exposed to a heavy fire, happily escaped uninjured."

It is worthy of note that this extremely spirited attack was carried out in a blinding snowstorm which, combined with the warm reception given to the torpedo craft by the gunners on board the great *Sevastopol*, must have rendered the operation fully as perilous and exciting as any in which the "mosquito fleet" of Japan had as yet been engaged.

On the following morning it was observed that the *Sevastopol* was down by the head, and was no longer swinging with the tide and wind. Anxious to complete the work, Admiral Togo on the night of the 15th ordered the torpedo squadrons once more to attack the *Sevastopol*, the gunboat *Otvajni*, and



UNDERGROUND FIGHTING BEFORE PORT ARTHUR.
Frequently during the siege, when the Japanese sapped the Russian defenses the adversaries would get to such close quarters that the breaking in of an earthen partition brought them face to face in a deadly grapple.



several destroyers, all of which were now grouped under Cheng-tau-Shan, the southernmost fort on the promontory which ends in the "Tiger's Tail." A number of officers and the whole of the crews of the Japanese destroyers volunteered for this attack, which was delivered in the teeth of another heavy snowstorm, and the difficulty of which was enhanced by the extraordinary precautions which the Russians had adopted. Not only had they put out the usual screen of torpedo nets, but they had shielded the *Sevastopol's* bows with a specially constructed boom composed of logs and iron, bound together with cables and heavy chains interlaced and entangled.

Admiral Togo's official report is, again, the best description available of the ensuing operation. "The leading squadron," he says, "passed in between the *Sevastopol* and the destroyers, and at 4.30 a.m. discharged torpedoes against the *Sevastopol* and *Otwajni* at close range. Every one was observed to strike. Moreover, the squadron engaged a destroyer at a range of 100 metres and inflicted more or less damage. One torpedo seemed to strike the destroyer. Throughout the attack the enemy maintained a hot fire, but, perhaps owing to the shortness of the range, the squadron was wholly unhurt.

"The second squadron attacked next. At least three torpedoes were seen to explode. This squadron also engaged the destroyers and then steamed out. Two men were killed and two wounded. One boat of this squadron, being delayed while making repairs, advanced to the attack alone. She approached the battleship and discharged torpedoes. The commander was killed and one man was wounded, but the boat remained uninjured."

With this fine performance, Admiral Togo's Fleet before Port Arthur may be said to have completed its appointed task. A few days later the Admiral reported that, though efforts were being made by the Russians to pump out the *Sevastopol*, her repair was, in the circumstances, hopeless, and she was "certainly unfit to fight or navigate." There now remained only the *Otwajni* and a few destroyers, and accordingly on December 24th Admiral Togo was able to announce the release of a section of the blockading squadrons, inasmuch as the bulk of the Russian Fleet in Far Eastern waters was now completely out of action. With characteristic generosity, the gallant Admiral put the army first in detailing the causes and agents which had produced this brilliant result.

In his summary of the operations up to this point, Admiral Togo made a suitable acknowledgment of the splendid work so unostentatiously done by some who were not privileged to take part in the actual fighting. "During the blockade," he observed, "all the ships under my command have splendidly accomplished the work and duty assigned to them. It is especially to be noted that some were engaged in the difficult and risky task of blockading; others untiringly accomplished the work of laying mines in the presence of the enemy; others, braving all dangers, were engaged in the work of clearing mines, and others were posted to watch the enemy and keep guard against the enemy's ships. Their combined work strongly contributed to the accomplishment of the blockade. I deem it my duty specially to mention for recognition the valuable service rendered by officers and men."

In the report of the blockade, mention was also made of the vessels un-

fortunately sunk or blown up since the commencement of the naval operations. The *Miyako*, *Hatsuse*, *Yoshino*, *Kaimon*, *Hei-yen*, and *Sai-yen* were enumerated. The circumstances attending the loss of all these, with one or two minor exceptions, have been described in the preceding narrative.

As may be imagined, the Emperor of Japan did not long delay in acknowledging the receipt of this magnificent record of arduous work thus superbly brought to a finish by his gallant sailors. An Imperial rescript was at once issued addressed to Admiral Togo, in which the Mikado said:—

“ We hear with great satisfaction that our torpedo flotillas engaged in the work required of them at Port Arthur have gallantly and successfully accomplished the duties they were called upon to perform, and in so doing have had to brave the dangers of storms and shells by day and night, and that, notwithstanding difficulties, they have succeeded in discharging their duties without the least confusion, rendering mutual assistance. We especially note their brave and loyal performance of the duties required of them, and express our approbation of their gallant behaviour.”

Returning to the record of the land operations, a personal allusion must now be made to Admiral Togo's gallant associate, General Nogi, whose satisfaction in the capture of Metre Range had been marred by a sad bereavement. Among the officers killed had been his second and only surviving son, the first having fallen at the storming of Nanshan. It is characteristic of the Japanese character that the stricken General, instead of betraying the natural emotion which must have been caused by this second blow, expressed his patriotic

pride in having been able to give two sons to the service of his country and his Sovereign. In commenting upon this circumstance, a Japanese correspondent pointed out that such an attitude was only to be expected from a leader of “ the old-fashioned Samurai school, whose adherents counted it honour to die sword in hand.” It was further mentioned that General Nogi had some time previously resigned a divisional command, purely because an officer who had formerly served under him had brought himself into some disgrace. So punctilious was the General in everything in which military discipline was concerned, that he regarded the misbehaviour of a subordinate as reflecting on his own ability and character.

Certainly General Nogi did not allow his bereavement to influence his conduct of the operations against Port Arthur. Even while the attacks on Metre Range were in progress, the siege works against the forts to the eastward were pushed on by day and night, and on December 4th, the day before 203 Metre Hill was won, the Japanese captured two quick-firing guns in the kaponier of Er-lungshan. A little later they commenced to follow up their capture of Metre Range by working an advance along the shores of Pigeon Bay, on comparatively level ground, against the I-tzu-shan group of forts—notably I-tzu-shan itself and Antzu-shan—and also against the Tai-yanku Fort, nearly due west of the town. The approaches were said to be easy, and the support of the guns now mounted on 203 Metre Hill was invaluable, but the forts were enormously strong, and much difficulty was experienced in pushing forward the saps through the frozen ground.


On December 15th and 16th an exchange of courteously-worded communi-

cations took place between Generals Nogi and Stoessel, the latter having complained that the Japanese were firing upon hospitals in Port Arthur, the Red Cross flag flying over which, he thought, should be observable from the Japanese positions. He trusted that this would cease in the interests of honourable warfare, and out of consideration for the brave soldiers, Japanese as well as Russians, who were lying wounded in the hospitals in question.

General Nogi replied that the Japanese had never during the whole of the siege intentionally trained their guns on any building or ship flying the Red Cross flag. But much of the interior of Port Arthur was invisible from their gun positions, and, moreover, the deviation of the

places which otherwise the Japanese would have gladly respected. General Stoessel now suggested that the Japanese should refrain from firing on the whole of the new town, and on the north-east quarter of the old town, limitations to which, of course, the Japanese could not consent. A friendly compromise was eventually arrived at, the Russians promising to furnish a plan showing the positions of the hospitals.

A good deal of the fighting round Port Arthur during the first fortnight of December is very difficult to follow, owing to the troublesome reduplication which occurs in the nomenclature of some of the minor forts and hills. Thus there is a Wang-tai Fort in the I-tzu-shan group, and another a long way to the



RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP SEVASTOPOL.

guns had naturally extended—a subtle compliment this—in consequence of the protracted and valiant resistance of the Russians. It was therefore impossible to guarantee that no shells should reach

east of the railway. Pei-yu-shan and the East Pei-yu-shan Forts are similarly separated by a considerable distance, while, as has been before noted, the great Chi-huan-shan Forts to the north-east of

the town have no topographical connection whatever with the South Chi-huan-shan Fort on the Tiger's Tail promontory. Not much importance, however, is attached to the incidental operations of this period compared with the great work now in hand of reducing some of the larger strongholds in the main ring of defence.

On December 18th a fresh general assault was launched against Er-lung-shan, Sung-shu-shan, and the north fort of East Chi-huan-shan (Kee-

kwan), the result being a triumphant occupation of the last-named. This was an extremely well-constructed work, with a ditch forty-two feet wide at the bottom, twenty-one feet wide at the top, and twenty-seven feet in depth, not so formidable, it would seem, as some of the other forts, but still a very hard nut to crack. The Japanese had some time back sapped close up to the counterscarp, and for the past six weeks had been busily engaged in driving under the parapet itself two shafts forty feet in length, with four branches, in which seven mines were laid.

On Sunday, December 18th, the volunteers for the attack were assembled in two parties, one wearing red, the other white badges. At 2.15 p.m. the mines

were exploded, and a large section of the parapet was blown into the air. The red badge volunteers charged out across the ditch prematurely, and about fifty

of them were killed by the falling *débris*. The white badge party followed, forcing their way through the gap caused by the explosion, and were immediately met by a most stubborn resistance on the part of the garrison, who used their machine guns with deadly effect against the crowded attackers. The onslaught was



CAPTAIN ESSEN, WHO FIRST COMMANDED THE *NOVIK* AND
AFTERWARDS THE *SEVASTOPOL*.

thus temporarily checked, but at 7 p.m. the veteran Lieutenant-General Samejima, himself leading the reserves into the counterscarp gallery, advanced into the fighting line. A final grand charge was delivered, and a little before midnight the Russians retired, covering their retreat by blowing up some mines which they had placed near the "gorge" of the fort. The fighting from half-past two to half-past eleven is described as "awful," bayonets and hand grenades doing terrible work. The Russians brought up 300 men as reinforcements, and fought most bravely, but the Japanese were persistent, and were evidently in considerable strength. It is mentioned that the storming parties wore grey jerseys and drawers over their dark uniforms, and

carried only rifles, bandoliers, and hand grenades. General Samejima, who led the last charge, recalled the example of the great Skobelev by appearing in a new uniform, his breast covered with medals and orders. The fine old soldier is said to have stood at the head of one battalion, sword in hand, and to have sworn solemnly to capture the fort or die in the attempt.

The North Fort of East Chi-huan-shan was the first permanent work captured by the Japanese. Although said to be the strongest of the Eastern Ridge Forts it did not yield much in the way of useful spoil to its captors, only four large quick-firing guns having been taken, of which two were usable, together with four machine guns, five field guns, and a moderate quantity of ammunition. But the moral effect of the capture was undoubtedly very great, and the Japanese, having rapidly made good their occupation, lost, as usual, no time in making the best possible use of their new position.

On December 22nd the Japanese commenced a determined movement against the Russian advanced posts in the direction of Pigeon Bay. The Russians resisted manfully, but were gradually dislodged from their various positions, and by December 25th the Japanese had sensibly contracted the ring of their investment, and were able to concentrate their attention upon Er-lung-shan and Sung-shu-shan, which were now the two vitally important objectives for the attack.

Parenthetically, it is convenient to mention here a heavy calamity which had overtaken the Port Arthur garrison during the fighting on Metre Range, and news of which had now been carried to the besiegers by prisoners captured at the storming of North Chi-huan-shan.

This was the death in action of General Kondratchenko, who had often been mentioned in General Stoessel's despatches for distinguished bravery, and to whom many thought that credit for the stubborn defence of Port Arthur was even more clearly due than it was to General Stoessel. General Kondratchenko had only reached middle age, having been born in 1857. He had previously been Chief of the Staff in the Ural District, and at the time of his death was the idolised commander of the Seventh East Siberian Rifle Division. His death cast a gloom over the sorely pressed garrison, and may well have hastened the fast approaching end. It is further stated that about this time General "Seven Devils" Smirnoff was wounded, and that General Stoessel himself had been injured by a fall from his horse.

In other ways the position of the garrison since the capture of 203 Metre Hill had become gravely worse. There was still a sufficiency of provisions, although even dogflesh sold at 8d. a pound, a turkey cost £18, and eggs were £7 a hundred. There was, however, a lack of fuel which was greatly felt, owing to the intense cold; and communication with the outside world, even by carrier pigeon, was now infrequent.

Reverting to the besiegers, December 28th brought another glorious triumph to Nogi's patient army. For many weeks at Er-lung-shan, as at North Chi-huan-shan, the Japanese had been tunnelling through the solid rock, until at last they had driven a branched shaft under the north parapet of the fort. Before daylight on December 28th a large force was pushed forward into the advanced trenches, and seven mines containing two tons of dynamite were laid at the end of the tunnelled shafts.

Er-lung-shan was an extraordinarily powerful work, standing at an elevation of some 270 feet above the sea. It was arranged on two levels. On the lower were the infantry trenches with machine-gun trenches in rear. On the higher level were the quick-firers and heavier guns, and behind these the barracks, magazines, and kitchens of the garrison, built of concrete.

Reuter's correspondent with the Japanese Army before Port Arthur gave a striking account of the actual *finale* of the attack on Er-lung-shan. At ten o'clock in the morning of the 28th the mines were exploded. "The spectacle was magnificent. The entire front of the walls of the fort seemed to be lifted into the air shrouded in a huge opaque curtain of earth and *débris* of all kinds. There was no preliminary bombardment to give the enemy a hint of what was in store for them. Half the garrison perished in the explosion and in the subsequent charge of the besiegers. The force of the explosion was tremendous. The entire hillside was covered with earth and *débris*, and the moat was filled level with the broken fragments of the walls of the fort."

As soon as the mines were fired, the besieging artillery concentrated upon the fort a tremendous fire, under cover of which the force in the nearest Japanese trenches rushed out over the filled-in ditch, and attacked the line of infantry trenches on the lower level. The Russians, to their everlasting credit, although thrown into confusion by the tremendous explosion in which many of their number had perished, stuck nobly to their posts, and worked their machine guns on the swarming Japanese with steady gallantry, but to no successful purpose. After twenty minutes of desper-

ate fighting the infantry and machine gun trenches fell into the hands of the irresistible attackers.

"When the assailants captured the lower level at the first spirited charge, they were unable," writes Reuter's correspondent, "to advance any further, but with splendid courage they maintained their position in face of the awful concentrated fire of the artillery from Antzu-shan and I-tzu-shan forts across the gorge of Shuishi valley, and made a trench line from the broken walls of the fort in order to capture the machine-gun trenches. All this time the Japanese artillery kept up a bombardment on the rear of the fort and the Chinese wall, to prevent reinforcements from being sent. At four o'clock in the afternoon the assailants massed and captured the machine gun trenches and the lower section of the fort. Pressing forward, they charged the walls on the higher level, swarming up by twos and threes until a large body had gained the crest of the north-eastern corner. Before dark the walls on the higher level were black with men, who gained the interior in small parties notwithstanding the fierce fire poured upon them.

"In the meantime another body of Japanese had gained the higher level from the gorge on the west side of the fort, and an attack in overwhelming numbers was made on all sides. The remnant of the garrison continued the fight with splendid courage, contesting every inch of the interior of the fort. Under cover of the darkness the Japanese were reinforced, and captured the last works at three o'clock in the morning. One hundred and fifty of the garrison escaped through the connecting trenches in the rear of the fort, which they destroyed by mines to prevent pursuit. Three

prisoners only were taken, and the rest of the garrison was killed. The losses of the assailants during the daylight attacks were about 1,000 killed and wounded."

Among the spoils at the capture of Er-lung-shan were four large calibre guns,

Once more, at ten o'clock in the morning, a deafening explosion rent the air, the Japanese infantry rushed in armed with bayonets and hand grenades, and an hour after the explosion the fort was virtually in possession of the Japanese.

In retreating, the enemy exploded a



Photo: A. Lavrantieff.


THE ENGINEER WHO FORTIFIED PORT ARTHUR.

General Kondratchenko—who by universal testimony proved himself the "life and soul of the defence." He is here seen superintending the construction of land mines on the Wolf Hills. The harbour of Port Arthur and the Tiger's Tail will be recognised in the dim background.

seven small calibre guns, thirty 37 millimetre guns, and two machine guns.

On December 31st the great stronghold of Sung-shu-shan, which is seventy feet higher than Er-lung-shan, fell to a Japanese attack on almost identical lines with those followed in the case of Er-lung-shan and North Chi-huan-shan.

mine within the fort, which apparently had the disastrous effect of entombing a number of their comrades who were within the bombproof gallery of the gorge. It is pleasant to be able to add that, immediately the capture of the fort was assured, the Japanese dug a passage into the gallery, and succeeded in saving two



THE GHOSTLIEST POST BEFORE PORT ARTHUR: THE THIRTY-MINUTE TRENCH.

The upper part of the Banjushan (Pan-lung-shan) position formed a bone of contention between the combatants. In some places the enemy's works were so near that the dead of the last assault could not be removed. This fact and the nearness of the Russians, who were less than a hundred yards away, made the trench very perilous and ghastly. The men who occupied it were therefore relieved every thirty minutes.


officers and 160 men. A hundred and fifty others are said to have been smothered and killed.

With the fall of Sung-shu-shan the very last stage of the siege of Port Arthur may be said to have been reached. Our narrative of the operations may, therefore, advantageously be suspended at this point, the story of the actual fall of the fortress being deferred to a future chapter. In the meantime it may be regarded as one of the curiosities of military chronology that the close of the last day of this eventful year should have witnessed what, to all intents and purposes, was the final operation in a long and crowded series which virtually began when General Oku's Army landed at Pitsu-wo, on the east coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, as far back as the beginning of May.

It is not difficult to realise the added gloom which the capture of Sung-shu-shan must have cast over the beleaguered garrison. From details available after the fall of Port Arthur it is evident that in many ways the condition of affairs within the fortress was becoming deplorable, even as regards discipline and *moral*. Wrangling between Generals Stoessel and Smirnoff became frequent,

even in public, and the drunken behaviour of the officers of what their scornful military comrades called *la flotte peureuse* was gravely scandalous. Even the men were becoming unmanageable, instances having occurred of forcible entry into spirit stores with serious results in the way of excess and insubordination.

It is an interesting fact that the first public note of despair was sounded in the *Novy Krai*, hitherto consistent in its efforts to inspire the garrison, just before the capture of Er-lung-shan. The numbers for December 24th and 25th are full of lurid pen-pictures of the condition to which the town had been reduced, more particularly since the capture of 203 Metre Hill and the destruction of the Fleet. Speaking of the rain of 800-lb. shells, the *Novy Krai* asks: "Who but Providence can save us from these thunderbolts?" and adds with desperate pessimism, "We do not expect the Baltic Fleet. We do not look for relief, but we can fight to the death. What Port Arthur goes through it is impossible to describe, but Russia will know what her sons have suffered, and yet it is past the power of human genius to paint or to describe Port Arthur's sufferings as they really are."



CHAPTER LXXVII.

THE SECOND PACIFIC SQUADRON—AN INSTRUCTIVE VOYAGE—THE THREE DIVISIONS—SHAMEFUL BEHAVIOUR IN CRETE—PASSAGE OF THE SUEZ CANAL—OFF MADAGASCAR—JAPANESE PREPARATIONS—THE KLADO INCIDENT—A THIRD SQUADRON—NEW RUSSIAN NAVY.

IT is expedient now to take up the story of the progress of the Baltic Fleet, or, to give it its official name, the Second Russian Pacific Squadron, at the point at which we left it in Chapter LXIX. It will be remembered that in the first week of November (pp. 307-8) it became known that the Squadron had left Tangier in two divisions, one proceeding eastwards with the evident intention of making its way through the Suez Canal, the other going south with a view to rounding the Cape of Good Hope. In ordinary circumstances the transmission of reinforcements to the theatre of war is not a process of any particular interest, or even of significance, to others besides the combatant parties. But from this particular voyage depended such remarkable issues, and it was accompanied by so many risks of international import, that it is desirable to record it somewhat fully, more especially as it was, in itself, a naval operation of quite extraordinary magnitude, and one conveying some serious strategic lessons.

With the indignation aroused in this country by the departure of the Squadron from Tangier before, as it seemed, any adequate arrangements had been made for the punishment of those responsible for the North Sea outrage, we are no longer concerned. The whole of that question had passed almost immediately,

as has been narrated in Chapter LXIX., into the region of diplomatic settlement, and henceforth in this narrative a clear distinction will be drawn between the progress of the Second Pacific Squadron and the course of what came to be known as the North Sea Inquiry. But it is only fair to Russia to point out that the deplorable Dogger Bank episode went a long way towards obscuring the credit due to the Russian naval authorities for what was, after all, if only by virtue of its amazing audacity, a very remarkable performance.

Even a first-class Naval Power might well have hesitated to send a numerous and extremely valuable fleet on such a voyage with such certain difficulties ahead in the way of coaling, and the fact that Russia did not only despatch the Second Pacific Squadron, but got it as far even as Madagascar, must be accounted no mean feat.

Reflections on the elasticity of the neutrality laws which made the achievement possible are, of course, permissible. But the hard fact that a Power without any coaling stations *en route*, many of whose ships can only carry a very limited supply of fuel, was able to send a powerful squadron all these thousands of miles, is a lesson which other Powers with widely scattered colonies cannot afford to disregard.

AURORA.

KLEBER.



AN INTERNATIONAL SCENE AT TANGIER DURING THE RUSSIAN FLEET'S STAY AT THE MOROCCAN PORT.

To the left is the Russian cruiser "Aurora." To the right is the French cruiser "Kleber" (with four funnels), whilst in the foreground is the galley of H.M.S. "Diana" bringing the captain on board the "Bruiser" in order to confer with Lord Charles Beresford, who had gone from Gibraltar in the latter vessel.

Thus early, then, may attention be drawn to the circumstance that, while at first no ridicule seemed too keen, no criticism too harsh for the Second Russian Pacific Squadron, as time wore on the mere fact of its continued existence as a "fleet in being" extorted some respect from those who understood the true possibilities of the situation. There was one great nation of keen naval critics to whom the performance especially appealed, since it had for them a piquant retrospective suggestiveness. Had the Spanish-American War taken place after Russia had sent her Second Pacific Squadron to the Far East, trusting to colliers to take the place of coaling-stations, there is very little doubt that the United States Navy would have profited by the example, and perhaps have attempted some curious alterations in the

political geography of Europe by actually despatching a squadron to the coasts of Spain.

Apart from these considerations, the voyage of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet was marked by a very curious feature. It is not often that an intended reinforcement becomes the main force itself. Yet this, as we have already seen, was what was soon to happen to the Second Pacific Squadron. Originally designed for the relief of Port Arthur, it was not only to lose the chance of making that harbourage, but the Fleet which it should have reinforced had ceased to be before much more than half the distance from Libau to the Sea of Japan had been compassed. By the capture of 203 Metre Hill the Japanese not only paved the way to the fall of the fortress, but they practically converted the Second

Pacific Squadron into the First, a transition the dramatic completeness of which must always rank as one of the curiosities of naval history.

Let us now turn to the actual journeying of the Russian ships after their departure from Tangier. The first division, that which went south, remained under command of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, and consisted of the battleships *Kniaz Suvaroff* (flagship), *Alexander III.*, *Orel*, *Borodino*, and *Ossliabya*, the cruisers *Dmitri Donskoi*, *Admiral Nakimoff*, and *Aurora*, various transports, a water tank condensing steamer, a hospital ship (also called *Orel*), a scout tug, and an interesting addition in the shape of a French "restaurant steamer" named *Espérance*.

Working its way cautiously down the west coast of Africa, this rather variegated squadron eventually, after giving the Cape a pretty wide berth, turned up at St. Mary's Island, on the east coast of Madagascar above Tamatave, at the end of December.

During this seven weeks' voyage the Russian warships were coaled from colliers, often in very trying circumstances. Several of the colliers were reported to have been badly knocked about during the operations alongside, and all, or nearly all, received some damage. In some cases it was found impracticable to bring the colliers alongside at all, and the latter had to lay off and work into

the fleet's boats, which transferred the coals to the ships, a truly troublesome and tedious process.

It is not unlikely that in a fleet so constituted as Admiral Rozhdestvensky's some rather untoward incidents occurred during the voyage down the coast of Africa. It is a well-known fact that Russian naval officers are not guided by such strict disciplinary rules as those sailing under most other flags, and that the consumption of "strong waters" on Russian warships is, as a rule, on a very extensive scale. For the truth of one episode reported in the *Echo de Paris* it is impossible to vouch, but the dissemination of such a yarn in an allied country was not without significance. The story

was to the effect that three officers of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron offended so seriously in the matter of drunkenness that they were reported to the Admiral himself, who, after investigating the circumstances, is said to have devised a very Draconian punishment. The three officers were merely placed in a small boat with money and food—marooned, in fact—and told to get home as best they could



REAR-ADMIRAL FÖLKERSAHM.

by sail or oars, whichever they preferred.

Meanwhile, the second division of the Squadron under command of Admiral Fölkersahm had steamed eastwards. This division consisted of the battleships *Sissoi Veliky* and *Navarin*, the cruisers

Svetlana and *Almaz*, seven destroyers, and several transports.

On November 7th a supplementary division of the Baltic Fleet left Libau, and, cautiously avoiding the Dogger Bank, proceeded to follow leisurely in the wake of Admiral Fölkersahm's ships. This division consisted of two armoured cruisers, the *Oleg* and *Izumrud*, three auxiliary cruisers, the *Rion*, *Dnieper*, and *Terek*, and a torpedo-flotilla, the whole under the command of Admiral Botrovosky. It is interesting to note that two of the auxiliary cruisers, the *Rion* and the *Dnieper*, were simply our old friends the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, of Red Sea renown, under new names! The voyage of this supplementary division was unattended by any remarkable incident beyond the breaking down of one of the destroyers, which, however, was successfully repaired at Brest, the French Government having decided that this proceeding would involve no breach of the laws of neutrality.

This decision, a somewhat important one, was based on the fact that the damage to the vessel was of a nature to involve the safety of the crew and the proper navigation of the ship. It is not surprising that the incident aroused some indignant criticism at Tokio, but the matter did not become one of diplomatic gravity. France could claim that in this and other cases she acted according to the rules she formulated during the Spanish-American War, and there was a general feeling that, making some allowance for her natural sympathy with her allies, she was acting throughout as befitted a high-minded and chivalrous nation, not fussily scrupulous as to the letter of the law, but frankly observant of it in spirit.

Somewhat sensational was the early

progress of the second division of the Baltic Fleet under Admiral Fölkersahm. Arriving at Canea, the capital of Crete, some of the officers and men of the squadron went ashore, and behaved in the most disgraceful fashion. In a case of this kind suspicion of partiality is best avoided by quotation of chapter' and verse. Telegraphing on November 22nd, Reuter's correspondent said: "There were constant scenes of drunkenness, in which, unfortunately, several officers took part, and frequent brawls occurred every day. One Russian seaman was killed by his comrades, and several others were severely wounded.

"Some drunken seamen stripped their clothes off in the principal square of Canea.

"The wife of the manager of a foreign agency was insulted on the public promenade, and her husband, who tried to protect her, was subjected to ill-usage.

"The authority of the officers was utterly disregarded, no sort of discipline being observed. Many shops windows were broken.

"The population of Canea and its environs have lost all respect for the Russian sailors, who, it is considered, are completely demoralised. Many seamen have been left behind, having either lost their way or deserted."

Against this must be set Admiral Fölkersahm's subsequent assertion that the trouble was only trifling, that no one was killed or wounded, and no desertions took place. Russian official contradictions, however, have always been regarded as open to question, and the testimony of Reuter's correspondent is so plain and circumstantial that it is likely to be accepted as the permanent record of a very shameful episode.

The passage of the Suez Canal was

effected without mishap, but with an accompaniment of precautions which were simply ludicrous, and recalled in striking fashion the nervous apprehensions of Rozhdstvensky in regard to the Dogger Bank fishing fleet. The squadron was preceded by three yachts said to have been chartered for the purpose of exploring certain reefs in the Gulf of Suez in advance of the warships. Early in the morning of November 25th seven destroyers acting as scouts steamed at eight knots through the first section of the Canal. The battleships and cruisers followed with the men at gun stations, and Admiral Fölkersahm and his officers anxiously scanning the banks. Wireless telegraphic communication was maintained between the various vessels, and when, towards evening, Ismailia was reached, the risks of a night attack from the desert were considered so great that the plan of allowing the battleships and cruisers to proceed with the assistance of their searchlights was abandoned, and the squadron accordingly dropped anchor in the Bitter Lakes. Although assured by the officials that no other vessels were in the Canal Admiral Fölkersahm sent out launches on patrol duty, and during the night the searchlights of the battleships and cruisers swept the Lakes.

Meanwhile, quite a large international fleet of liners and merchant ships was assembling at Suez owing to the delay caused by the passage of the Russian vessels through the Canal. "Irate skippers," wrote an *Express* correspondent, "steaming in from the Red Sea and learning that they must wait until the squadron had passed out of the Canal, commented upon the fears of the Russians in a variety of languages.

"Police and coastguard launches, manned by painfully zealous Egyptian

officials, patrolled the harbour, and, when the seven Russian destroyers arrived this afternoon, escorted them to an anchorage. The crews were still at gun stations.

"Two destroyers made an hour's reconnoitring tour of the harbour. All merchant ships were carefully scrutinised."

Of all the many and varied passages in the history of the Suez Canal this must surely be accounted as one of the most interesting, and that, too, for reasons some of which do not lie upon the surface. The precautions taken by the Russians were, of course, preposterous in the circumstances, since, even had Japan been disposed to attack the Russians at this point, and could have made secretly the necessary elaborate and extremely difficult preparations, she would hardly have dreamt of provoking the ill-will of Great Britain, France, and Germany by interfering in such a warlike fashion with an international fairway. The fact seems to be that Russia here, as in many other instances, gauged the possible conduct of her adversary by the measure of methods which she herself would not scruple to adopt, and subsequently, if necessary, repudiate as quite foreign to her open and bland disposition.

It is generally understood that at a certain critical juncture in European politics a Russian tramp steamer was sent through the Suez Canal under orders to spring a sudden leak, if a certain signal were observed, the idea, of course, being that she would settle down in a very narrow part of the "Ditch," and that the navigation would thus be effectually impeded for some days. A nation capable of a device of this sort would be naturally fearful when using the same canal for the passage of a naval reinforcement, and,

after what occurred in the North Sea, it is not, perhaps, surprising that excusable apprehensions were fantastically magnified into visions of stealthy attacks by Japanese disguised as Bedouins, or skirmishing round the Bitter Lakes in submarines.

That there were Japanese agents at Port Said and Suez goes without saying. No combatant nation would lose such a

a rather contemptuous smile, especially when Russian naval negligence at Port Arthur is recalled.

At Suez the Russian squadron came into friendly contact with two British cruisers, the *Hermione* and *Fox*, with which visits were exchanged. It was reported that the two British vessels had been detailed to keep an eye on Admiral Fölkersahm's division until they were



THE RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP *KNIAZ SUVAROFF*: ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY'S FLAG-SHIP.

chance of watching the movements and "sizing up" the strength of an appreciable portion of the enemy's naval forces, and we may take it for granted that long and interesting reports of the condition of the ships and crews were at once cabled to Tokio. But the bare suggestion that any attack was contemplated may be scouted as absurd, and it will probably be many years before the story of Admiral Fölkersahm's impressively cautious navigation of a naval highway which was really not more dangerous to his ships than the mouth of the Neva fails to raise

clear of the Red Sea, and this, coupled with similar suggestions with reference to Admiral Rozhdestvensky's ships, led to the angry assumption that the British Navy was "shadowing" the Russian reinforcements. The idea was repudiated, and, indeed, with the facilities which this country possesses for watching and recording the movements of any ship or ships over about three-quarters of the ocean surface of the globe, any deliberate "shadowing" of a fleet belonging to a country with which we were not at, or on the point of, war, would be unnecessary

as well as objectionable. But it could hardly have astonished the Russians if, after what had occurred, more especially with regard to the seizure and sinking of British vessels, our Admiralty had not made some provision for subjecting to occasional scrutiny the passage of these divisions through waters in which we

of a good deal of international intrigue. Conflicting accounts were forthcoming as to the methods adopted in obtaining coal and supplies, but it seems probable that here as elsewhere the laws of neutrality as regards coaling were successfully circumvented by sending in the "neutral" colliers to obtain coal which was after-



RUSSIAN BLUEJACKETS: DRINKING THE ADMIRAL'S HEALTH ON BOARD SHIP.

have enormous commercial and political interests.

Having made their way down the Red Sea and through the "Gate of Tears," the squadron commanded by Admiral Fölkersahm, and, later, the supplementary division under Admiral Botrovosky, made a brief sojourn at the French port of Jibutil in Tajurra Bay, that great inlet of the sea which in times past, like most of the Somali coast and the African littoral of the Red Sea, has been the scene

wards transferred to the Russian war-ships at sea.

It is not necessary to go further into the details of the journeying of the Russian ships prior to the junction of Admiral Fölkersahm's division with the main squadron under Admiral Rozhdestvensky off the coast of Madagascar. It is sufficient to say that early in the new year Admiral Fölkersahm's division was at anchor in the Bay of Passandava, while Admiral Rozhdestvensky's ships,

in order to avoid the bad weather in the Mozambique Channel, had doubled Cape St. Mary, and proceeded to Antongil Bay. Both divisions had sent several vessels to Nossi Bé, Majunga, and Tamatave, where they had made large purchases of stores, particularly of champagne, which has hitherto been an apparently indispensable adjunct to all Russian naval movements. At that time the supplementary division was about to enter the Suez Canal. A fortnight previously Admiral Rozhdestvensky had received at one of the Madagascar ports telegraphic communication of his appointment as Commander-in-chief of the entire reinforcing Fleet. This was doubtless accompanied by tidings of the destruction of the Russian ships at Port Arthur, tidings which, in due course, would be followed by an announcement of the final capture of the fortress.

It was officially stated that Rozhdestvensky was prepared for these events, and that no change in his plans would be rendered necessary by them. But it must have been a serious blow to the whole Fleet to learn that the last ray of hope had vanished, and that Vladivostok was now the only harbour in the Far East which could possibly be reached by naval reinforcements. Grave indeed was the prospect thus opened out. Assuming that the concentration were effectually and completely carried out, Admiral Rozhdestvensky would have at his disposal seven battleships, eight or ten cruisers, some of them merely converted liners, and sufficient torpedo-craft to make, perhaps, three flotillas. On paper this seems a most formidable force, but, as we have seen, it was by no means a homogeneous one, either as regards speed or armament, and it was entirely dependent for coal upon colliers which

might themselves become a serious encumbrance, if they did not fall an easy prey to a smart enemy.

Of course, as long as this was purely a reinforcing Fleet, and the best part of the Japanese Navy was tied to Port Arthur, Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his officers were buoyed up with all sorts of brilliant possibilities, including an off-chance of knocking loudly at the door of Tokio itself. But with the whole battle Fleet of Japan let loose, the utmost that could be looked for was a terrific combat with Togo's ships, which had already given such deadly proof of their fighting efficiency, and which would soon be emerging fresh and splendidly ready for action from the well-equipped dockyards of Japan.

Even in point of tonnage, number of guns, and crews the Russian Fleet was now in a condition of serious inferiority. Indeed, according to a Russian calculation the tonnage of the Baltic Fleet was only 95,000 against the 216,000 tons representing the Japanese Navy, while of heavy guns the Russians had only 36 against the 63 mounted by the Japanese ships. The Russian crews, again, only numbered 8,500, as compared with the 14,400 carried in the Japanese Fleet. Of course, such comparisons are by no means conclusive—far from it. But in their way they are instructive, more especially as at the outset Russia relied largely on such figures.

We may take it, then, that Admiral Rozhdestvensky spent some very bad quarters of an hour off the coast of Madagascar during January. It was continually reported at the time that he was being recalled, but whether these reports were false, or whether, as is suggested, the Admiral simply refused to retrace his steps, the Russian Fleet continued in this

neighbourhood, somewhat to the dissatisfaction of the French, who were beginning to fear that a very delicate situation might arise. Here, for the present, we will leave the "Second Pacific Squadron" to its sombre reflections and its stores of champagne, and turn first to the preparations which Japan had been making to receive the newcomers, and next to Russia's further efforts to regain her former boasted naval superiority in the Far East.

As a matter of course the Japanese took time by the forelock in the matter of their arrangements for giving Admiral Rozhdestvensky a warm welcome. As far back as November 14th the Emperor presided over a long conference of the Military and Naval General Staffs at the Palace, the proceedings of which were secret, but were clearly understood to be connected with the approaching advent in Eastern, if not Far Eastern, waters of the Baltic Fleet. Doubtless in consequence of this great council-meeting the attacks on Metre Range were renewed with fresh vigour, with the result already chronicled that, before another six weeks had elapsed, the naval authorities were free to deal on broad and vigorous lines with the new situation. It is characteristic of Japanese methods that the problem was not regarded as affecting the Fleet alone. The long-headed advisers of the Mikado even anticipated the rather remote possibility that the new Russian squadron would make a descent on Niu-chwang with a view to cutting the Japanese communications with the Liao-tung Peninsula. So carefully was even this contingency forestalled, that arrangements were made by which the Japanese armies in Manchuria could hope to carry on the campaign, if necessary for months, without communications from home.

As usual, the exact nature of the Japanese naval preparations was shrouded in the strictest secrecy, and for some little time the only indication that any movements at all were taking place was the receipt of telegrams from Manila, Singapore, and Penang, stating that cruisers had been sighted or had made a hurried call. It soon became evident that these were merely scouting ships to which had probably been entrusted the further task of establishing a network of naval intelligence over the whole of the Malay Archipelago. There was early talk of a squadron of powerful cruisers which was reported from Shanghai to have gone south actually to meet Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet, and on January 25th the Navy Department at Tokio formally announced the formation of a Special Service squadron, no details being given. It was not, of course, in the least likely that the Japanese would adventure their cruisers against the Russian battleships, but it is very possible that a considerable detachment was despatched very shortly after the capture of 203 Metre Hill in the hope of picking up a Russian straggler or two, and still more, with a view to cutting off some of the attendant colliers.

Returning to Russia, it now becomes necessary to place on record an incident arising out of the despatch of the Baltic Fleet, which, while unconnected with the actual progress of the war, has a distinct bearing upon it, since it materially influenced public opinion as to the naval situation. It may be remembered that on page 307 of the present volume mention was made of a Captain Clado or Klado, who had been left behind at Vigo with three other officers to bear testimony at the forthcoming inquiry concerning the North Sea outrage. Captain Klado was said to be the bearer to St. Petersburg

of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's official report, but no one imagined for an instant that in the course of the ensuing few weeks this officer would spring into quite extraordinary prominence and popularity by reason of his own plainness of speech with reference to the naval situation generally.

Arrived at St. Petersburg, Captain Klado set himself at once to agitate for the speedy despatch of a Third Squadron to reinforce Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet. He had evidently formed strong and accurate opinions as to the importance of the part to be played by the Russian Navy in deciding the question of Russia's position in the Far East. "However great our Army may be," he said in a lecture on December 6th at the residence of Admiral Birileff, Commander-in-chief at Kronstadt, "however rich our resources, it is impossible to expect a definite victory, even if Port Arthur does not fall, if our Fleet does not gain the upper hand in the Pacific. If the Japanese capture Port Arthur, the rôle of our Fleet will become still more important."

There was nothing to which exception could reasonably be taken in this frank, but by no means original, statement of one of the elementary principles of the Command of the Sea theory. The question of despatching a Third Squadron had already been anxiously considered by the naval authorities, and it is said that on the day following the delivery of Captain Klado's lecture at Admiral Birileff's house an authoritative decision on the subject was arrived at.

But Captain Klado, unfortunately from some standpoints, did not confine himself to the enunciation of sound naval doctrine in an atmosphere of official encouragement. For some time past he had been

contributing to the *Novoe Vremya* a series of articles on the naval situation, and in these he now began to reveal the weakness of the Second Pacific Squadron, and to formulate serious charges against the Ministry of Marine. The Ministry retaliated by an Order of the Day, accusing Captain Klado of having consciously misrepresented the facts and garbled the truth, and condemning him to fifteen days' arrest. From his seclusion the high-spirited Captain sent a letter to the papers warmly repudiating as a deliberate falsehood the charge brought against him of having distorted facts which he had obtained from a trustworthy source. He declared that the accusation was a stain not only upon his position, but also on his personal honour. Such charges, he added, should only be made by legal process, and, accordingly, he asked to be brought before a Court-Martial.

To this last request no reply was forthcoming, and as if by magic Captain Klado leapt into a popularity comparable with that of "le brav' Général" in the very palmiest days of Boulangism. Over 500 people called to see him at the house where he was undergoing detention, all of them being refused admittance, and letters and telegrams from all parts of Russia poured in upon him in shoals. As an "exalted personage" remarked to a French correspondent in St. Petersburg, the incident was beginning to occasion great anxiety in Government circles. "Klado is becoming the head of a party of malcontents, and Heaven knows that there are many of them. His punishment has made a martyr of him."

But the sudden popularity of Captain Klado was not the only difficulty. The Ministry of Marine, by its Order of the Day accusing the outspoken officer of deliberate falsehood, had placed the whole

Russian Government in a most awkward position. Captain Klado was not only the idol of the hour in St. Petersburg; he was also the chief Russian witness in the forthcoming inquiry into the North Sea incident. To brand him officially as a liar was to invite the obvious suggestion that his testimony before the Commission was worthless. The dilem-

Grand Admiral of the Navy, directing his release. This order being understood to have its origin in the Tsar himself, was held to have cancelled the previous Order of the Day entirely, and was thus supposed to clear Captain Klado, without the awkward formality of a Court-Martial, from the charges levelled against him. The gallant Captain on his release



ADMIRAL DIRILEFF.

ma thus created was unmistakable, and in Paris especially the position was discussed with much freedom, and, perhaps, some humorous appreciation of its perplexity.

The Russian Government were not long in grappling with the difficulty. Captain Klado had not undergone half of his prescribed punishment when another Order was issued by the Grand Duke Alexis,

attended a meeting at the City Hall, where a tremendous reception awaited him, and his subsequent appearance at the Naval and Military Club was the signal for a burst of cheering. A subscription was at once set on foot for the foundation of a Klado scholarship at the Naval College, and contributions came flowing in from many towns, notably Moscow and Nijni Novgorod. But by this time the Inter-

national Commission of Inquiry into the North Sea incident was getting to work, and accordingly on December 17th Captain Klado was packed off to Paris by the Russian Government, who were doubtless heartily glad to be rid for a time of his inconvenient presence.

The Klado incident may be variously regarded, and there will not be wanting those inclined to qualify the Captain's passionate assertion of his unblemished accuracy by references to his evidence concerning the presence of torpedo-boats among the North Sea fishing smacks. But the real significance of the affair had not a great deal to do with Captain Klado personally. It lay chiefly in the clear indication thus provided of a growing anxiety on the part of the Russian public to know what there was to know about the situation, to the exclusion of Grand Ducal and other bureaucratic efforts at concealment and misrepresentation. The vigorous encouragement given to Captain Klado was a healthy sign of better times in Russia, and the fact that the Government found itself unable to disregard the incident was one which may some day receive historical recognition.

As will be seen, the world was yet to hear more of Captain Klado's views on the naval situation generally, but in the meantime it was evident that his vigorous demand for the despatch of a Third Squadron had galvanised the Russian Admiralty into a spasm of real activity. He had himself suggested that an immediate reinforcement of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet should be made with certain ships which he declared were ready at Libau to take the sea at any moment.

These were the *General Admiral Apraksin*, of 4,200 tons, 15 knots, built in 1896; the *Admiral Seniavine*, 4,126 tons, 16 knots, built in 1894; the *Admiral*

Oushakoff, 4,126 tons, 16 knots, built in 1893; the *Vladimir Monomach*, 6,061 tons, 15.2 knots, built in 1882; and the *Khrabry*, a sea-going gunboat, 1,735 tons, 14 knots, built in 1895. Captain Klado had specially recommended the last-named vessel on account of her up-to-date armament. As he afterwards explained at Paris to a representative of the *Times*, he considered that a great mistake had been originally made, largely owing to the weakness of Admiral Rozhdestvensky in not demanding the despatch of the entire naval forces of Russia to the seat of war. But the initial blunder having been made, Russia must repair it as best she could. Clearly his idea was that no time should be lost in sending out the ships actually available at once, his hope being that even such a *petit paquet*—to use his own expression—as the above would give Admiral Rozhdestvensky the needful superiority.

While accepting in principle the necessity for sending out a Third Squadron forthwith the Russian Ministry of Marine preferred to attach at least one battleship to the cruisers and gunboat mentioned by Captain Klado, and accordingly orders were given to push on the preparation for sea of the *Imperator Nikolai I.*, a turret ship of 9,700 tons launched in 1889, and now incapable, it was said, of maintaining under service conditions a greater speed than 13 knots. There was a new battleship approaching completion, the *Slava*, which might have been made available, but unfortunately it had been heavily drawn upon to supply deficiencies in its sister ships, the *Alexander III.*, *Borodino*, *Kniaz Suvaroff*, and *Orel*, which had gone forward with the Second Squadron. Thus, when the *Orel's* engines and machinery were found in the summer of 1904 to be faulty, duplicate

parts in their place were taken from the *Slava* as she stood, a system of robbing Peter to pay Paul which is eminently characteristic of the Russian naval system.

Simultaneously with Captain Klado's departure for Paris, Admiral Birileff, Commander-in-chief at Kronstadt, left St. Petersburg for Libau to superintend the formation and despatch of the Third Squadron. Before he went he addressed to the *Novoe Vremya* a letter, inviting that journal to cease its polemics in connection with the despatch of naval reinforcements now that the step in question had been decided upon, and the work of getting ready the ships had actually commenced. Such agitation was to be deprecated, as was any attempt to dictate to Admiral Rozhdestvensky what line of action he should take.

Admiral Birileff further made a strong effort to allay public anxiety respecting the Second Pacific Squadron, upon the weakness of which Captain Klado had expatiated so forcibly. It was, he contended, an enormous force, well constituted, and equal in strength to the Japanese Fleet, which it had every chance of crushing in a fleet action. "The intelligent, firm, brave, and persevering commander of this squadron will shelter himself behind no instructions, but will seek and destroy the enemy. He will not look for a co-efficient of the opposing forces, but will adopt the Russian maxim that strength does not lie in material force, but in brave resolve and love for the Fatherland."

It is typical of the mental crisis through which Russian public opinion was passing that these "prave 'orts," as Fluellen would have called them, were not allowed to pass unchallenged. Captain Klado, who, only three weeks before, had

been lecturing at Admiral Birileff's house, wrote from Paris, accusing the Commander-in-chief at Kronstadt of endeavouring to console the Russian people by painting the state of the Second Pacific Squadron in rosy colours, as though he were soothing a petulant child. He would have been better advised, said the uncompromising Klado, to use the language of figures, and, not shrinking from the logic of facts, frankly to admit the superiority of the Japanese Fleet over Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet in ships and men.

"As it can no longer rely on the Port Arthur and Vladivostok squadrons, Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet," adds Captain Klado, "has not all the chances of success that we might desire. Admiral Birileff should have contented himself with exhorting the people to act promptly and energetically with a view to hastening the despatch of the Third Squadron, delay in which would be criminal, and should not have undertaken to hoodwink the Russian public."

A little later, in interviews with Parisian journalists, and in further communication to the *Novoe Vremya*, Captain Klado continued to illuminate the naval situation from the Russian standpoint with characteristic frankness. His remarks are so valuable for what they admit as well as for what they reveal, that they may be freely quoted from the paraphrases given in the *Times*. Thus, in conversation with an interviewer from the *Matin*, he unhesitatingly dismissed Admiral Birileff's contention that the Japanese Fleet must now be suffering from exhaustion, and from deterioration of its guns and machinery. The Japanese Fleet was, he said, in excellent condition. New guns had been substituted for those too long in use. . . . "It is also

said that the Japanese have no more cast shells, that their powder is inferior, and a number of other absurdities are uttered. The Japanese have an abundant supply of all they require. . . I have the best information, and I know that the fighting value of the Japanese is about equal to what it was at the beginning of the war."


Writing, in the middle of January, to the *Novoe Vremya*, Captain Klado combated the rumours that Admiral Rozhdestvensky would return or would delay his voyage until he could be joined by the Third Pacific Squadron. Neither of these alternatives was practicable, and Captain Klado's explanation is a luminous proof of the fact that he was under no illusions as to the French view of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's stay off Madagascar, nor was, by any means, attempting to frighten his compatriots into clamouring for peace.

"To wait at Madagascar is impossible. The French have already done everything that they could do without transgressing the limits of benevolent neutrality." A return "would involve the necessity of organising afresh the vast and complicated scheme of coal supply during a second voyage round Africa, and the abandonment of the arrangements already made for the voyage across the Indian Ocean. It appears to me that the return of the Fleet would be equivalent to the conclusion of the war, and in present circumstances that is unthinkable. No, the die is cast, and we must drain our cup to the dregs. We must help the Second Pacific Squadron by every means at our disposal; we must display all the energy of which we are capable in order to compensate for the weakness which was not prevented at its departure—but there can be no going back. I repeat—

that would mean the end of the war. It cannot be denied that a fleet divided is weaker than a fleet united, but half a fleet is much weaker when alone than when there is another half behind it, even at a great distance. We have only ourselves to thank for the position in which we are placed, and there is no way out of it; we must take the consequences of our mistakes. We should have been glad, indeed, to have the assurance of success, but we have no more than a hope. . . All we can do, therefore, is to foresee the possibility of failure now, and at once to make energetic preparations for counteracting its consequences."

The nature of those preparations Captain Klado discussed in a subsequent article, the main point of which was that particular attention should be paid to Vladivostok even at the risk of subordinating to its claims those of the army. This suggestion fits in well with the estimate given of the situation as regards Vladivostok in Chapter LXXIII. But it is of further interest and significance as a final illustration of Russian inferiority, in comparison with Japanese methods, where co-ordination of naval and military action is concerned. It is a seriously instructive fact that at this stage of the war a Russian naval officer should be pleading for a clearer recognition of the essential requirements of the Fleet, while the Japanese naval and military plans of campaign were continuing to work in the most perfect harmony, and without the slightest indication of any desire on the part of either fighting service that the other should temporarily forego its claims to paramount consideration.

Reverting to the preparations for the despatch of the Third Squadron, these were, from the first, hampered by almost hopeless deficiencies in the supply of



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**OUTSIDE PORT ARTHUR: METRE RANGE
FROM HOOZAN HILL.**

203 Metre Hill is the double peaked eminence seen in the right middle distance, and marked on the left flank by a white tent. The rent condition of the upper slopes bears witness to the destructiveness of the Japanese fire. The Russian trenches can be distinguished on the intervening slopes.



engine-room artificers. This difficulty had already been severely felt in connection with the Second Squadron, for which heavy drafts had been made on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Admiralty was now getting down to the bed-rock in this matter, and into the ships of the Third Squadron were drafted heterogeneous batches of engineer cadets, engineer reservists, who for many years had not sailed the sea at all in charge of a marine engine, and reserve artificers, while an urgent call for artificers was made on various private Russian shipping companies. Nor does the supply of seamen appear to have been much more abundant. A correspondent writing to the *Times* at the end of January stated that a batch of 200 reservists had been called up from Archangel, and that this batch exhausted the seasoned reservists from the northern and Baltic area. Further requirements would have to be filled by raw conscripts. Here again was a most unfavourable contrast with the state of affairs in Japan, which had an immense reserve of fisherfolk and other men inured to the sea to draw upon for the supply of deficiencies in her fighting ships.

It is rather characteristically impressive of Russia that, surrounded by these serious disabilities, she should have not only pushed ahead with the work of getting ready a Third Squadron, and talked confidently of despatching a Fourth in April, but that her thoughts should turn to the construction of an entirely new and powerful navy. A building programme had been in contemplation at the commencement of the war, and in March, 1904, it had been practically agreed that two battleships should be laid down, and the contingency of having to lay down four was discussed.

In July and August the naval commission engaged on the subject recognised that at least four, and possibly five or six, new battleships would have to be started at once, but the Navy Department continued to procrastinate, the officials being "unable to shake off entirely their optimism in regard to the outcome of the situation at Port Arthur." In December, after the capture of Metre Range and the destruction of the ships in Port Arthur harbour, it was proposed to lay down a minimum of eight first-class battleships, and a minimum of five first-class armoured cruisers. But not until the last day of the year was Reuter's correspondent at St. Petersburg able to announce that the Tsar had sanctioned the expenditure of £160,000,000 for rebuilding the Russian Navy, the programme of construction occupying ten years. According to Reuter, the ships which it had already been decided to build, and the delivery of which had been provided for in three years, were sixteen first-class battleships; six cruisers of the *Bayan* type, six improved *Noviks*, and six *Bogatyr*s; 50 destroyers of 500 tons, 100 destroyers and torpedo-boats of 150, 240, and 350 tons; 10 mine-layers of the type of the ill-fated *Yenisei*; and 4 floating workshops.

The financial obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of so vast a project might be thought to be insuperable. But it soon became evident that no serious difficulty need be anticipated on this head, since foreign dockyards were ready to commence the proposed construction immediately if Russia would consent to pay interest on outstanding amounts due. Not even a foreign loan would thus be rendered necessary. A useful lesson this on the difficulty of wearing out the financial resources of a really great Power. But there still remained the question of


personnel as to which even the highest Russian naval authorities began to express some doubts. One of them in discussing the question let out the interesting fact that in Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron an officer of the Grodno Hussars had to be employed! With which "side-light" we may fitly conclude a re-

view of the naval situation at a stage which, though only intermediate, is of the greatest interest and importance in relation not only to the prosecution of the war, but also to Russia's place among the armed strengths of Europe, and to the balance of naval power throughout the whole world.



Photo: G. Burger, St. Petersburg.

CAPTAIN KLADO.



"THE GRIM ESCARPMENT OF PILUSAN."

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

MORE FIGHTING ROUND PORT ARTHUR—THE BEGINNING OF THE END—NEGOTIATIONS FOR CAPITULATION—HISTORIC MEETING OF DELEGATES—TERMS OF SURRENDER—THE FORTRESS FALLS—PRISONERS AND SPOILS—NOGI AND STOESEL—DEPARTURE OF THE RUSSIANS—VICTORS AND VANQUISHED—STRIKING CONTRAST—REJOICINGS AT TOKIO.

THE New Year opened with a brisk renewal of the operations against the remaining great forts. For reasons which will immediately be apparent, there is no need to enter closely into the details of these attacks, but it may be recorded that in the course of January 1st the Japanese left and centre operated vigorously against Wang-tai—not the fort of that name in the I-tzu-shan group, but another to the east of Sung-shu-shan—and, skilfully taking advantage of the accompanying bombardment, pushed home their charge, and captured the fort and four guns between three and four in

the afternoon. Meanwhile sharp fighting in the direction of Pigeon Bay had resulted in the steady progress of the Japanese right.

On January 1st, too, a proclamation was issued over the signature of Admiral Togo diminishing the extent of the Port Arthur blockade. The new blockade line was to begin at the south head of Tali-en-wan, and run in a north-westerly direction, clearing Dalny to the south head of South Bay. It had evidently been intended to open Dalny gradually to foreign shipping, but the naval as well as military situation was on the point of



Photo : J. Rosenthal of Uribanora.

THE WEST ERHLUNG FORT AFTER ITS CAPTURE, DECEMBER 31, 1904.

This photograph shows the immense destruction wrought by the powerful explosives laid underneath the fort by the Japanese, after long and arduous mining operations. The entire Russian garrison was killed, with the exception of about 150 who escaped and 3 prisoners.

being altered in such a way as to put all these plans and precautions on a very different footing.

Our story of the actual fighting round Port Arthur may be concluded with a brief reference to a number of explosions which took place in the forts on January 2nd from shortly after midnight until a little past noon. It was afterwards found that the Russians were now beginning to blow up their magazines prior to further evacuations, a wholesale destruction by dynamite also taking place among the ships in the harbour. To the appropriate accompaniment of the gloomy reverberations caused by these explosions, the existence of Port Arthur as a Russian stronghold was hurrying to a close.

On the morning of January 1st a telegram was received at St. Petersburg from General Stoessel in which, according to Reuter's Agency, he gave an account of the loss of Sung-shu-shan, and added:—"The greater part of the eastern front is in the hands of the Japanese. We shall not be able to hold our new positions long, and when they fall we shall have to capitulate.

"But everything is in the hands of God. We have suffered great losses. Two regimental commanders, Gandourine and Semenoff, are wounded, the hero Gandourine very grievously. The commander of No. 3 Fort, Captain Seredoff, perished in the explosion.

"Great Sovereign! Forgive! We have done all that was humanly possible. Judge us, but be merciful. Eleven months of ceaseless fighting have exhausted our strength. A quarter only of the defenders, and one-half of these invalids, occupy twenty-seven versts of fortifications without support, and without intervals for even the briefest repose. The men are reduced to shadows."

The events of January 1st deepened General Stoessel's despondency and hastened the final step. At 9 p.m. on that date General Nogi received a letter from General Stoessel, which ran as follows:—

"Considering the conditions within the belligerent area the further resistance of Port Arthur is useless. Therefore, in order to avoid needless waste of life, I desire to open negotiations for the evacuation of the fortress. If your Excellency agrees, I beg you to appoint delegates, and to indicate a place whither I also may send delegates to discuss terms and details of evacuation."

According to the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, this letter was dated December 31st, which would indicate that it was written before the above-quoted telegram to the Tsar. The point, however, is immaterial as regards practical results, and is only interesting as an example of the discrepancies which cluster round great historical episodes of which one would have thought the details would be forthcoming with photographic accuracy.

To General Stoessel's missive General Nogi replied:—"I have the honour to express assent to your Excellency's proposal to hold a conference with reference to the terms and details of the evacuation of the fortress, for which purpose I have appointed as delegate Major-General Ijichi, Chief of the Staff, to whom are attached certain staff officers and secretaries. They will meet delegates from your army at noon of January 2nd at Shui-shi-ying. The delegates of both sides should be invested with plenipotentiary authority to conclude an agreement for the evacuation of the fortress, which should become operative immediately upon signature without awaiting ratification. These plenipotentiary cred-

entials, attested by the Commander-in-chief of each side, will be exchanged."

Having despatched this reply, General Nogi telegraphed to Tokio what had occurred, and received from Field-Marshal Yamagata a prompt acknowledgment, in which the following striking passage occurred:—

"When I reported to the Emperor General Stoessel's proposal to evacuate the fortress, his Majesty expressed high appreciation of the loyalty and endurance displayed by General Stoessel on behalf of his country, and desired that all the honours of war should be extended to him."

Of the meeting of the delegates to discuss the conditions of the capitulation a deeply interesting account was furnished by the correspondent of the *Times* with the Japanese Army before Port Arthur. This account, published on March 1st, we shall now proceed to lay under contribution as affording a standard description of a historic episode. Unfortunately, as the correspondent himself complained, the scene was not one which lent itself to picturesque description, and there was nothing in it of such a dramatic nature from the spectator's standpoint as was afforded, for instance, by the epoch-making capitulation after Sedan.

The meeting of the delegates took place at the village of Shui-shi-ying, the name of which has so often figured in the preceding narrative. It lies nearly due north of the town of Port Arthur, and the house at which the delegates met was a rude thatched hut in the centre of the village, with a large open space before it, "forming a sort of village green." Hither came about one o'clock the Russian *parlementaires*, consisting of Colonel Reiss, Chief of the Staff

to General Stoessel, three other colonels, the captain of the *Retvisan*, Lieutenant Maltschenko, and a midshipman who spoke English. The party was attended by an escort of a non-commissioned officer and eight Cossacks, one of whom carried a long pole with a square of ordinary linen as a flag of truce.

The weather was perfect, the finest day, it was remarked, in the whole course of the siege, and, as a suspension of hostilities had been arranged, the open space in front of the house of peace was soon thronged with eager onlookers. Inside the house the Japanese delegates had been for some time awaiting the arrival of the Russian party. They were General Ijichi, Chief of the Staff to General Nogi, Major Yamaoka, an excellent Russian scholar, Captain Tsunoda, Mr. Iwamura, clerk in the Foreign Office, Dr. Ariga, a celebrated international lawyer, and several official interpreters. When the Russian *parlementaires* arrived they immediately passed into the house, leaving the escort outside, and the proceedings began behind the closed doors. Meanwhile, on the sunlit open patch in front of the house an interesting scene was being enacted. Mention has already been made of the Cossack bearing the Russian flag of truce. Seated with his comrades on a little bank, he was joined by a Japanese cavalry trooper holding a similar pole with a similar square of linen. "Everyone took his cue from these two soldiers, and the utmost good nature was written on the child-like faces of the Japanese privates, and on the fair countenances of the broad-shouldered, well-set-up Cossacks, who showed no sign of hardship or privation as they met the gaze of their adversaries and commented on their appearance, frequently indulging in laughter as some point in

the dress or the bearing of the Mikado's soldiers struck them as comical. The Japanese soldier also apparently found something irresistibly funny in the Cos-sacks, and so the afternoon passed in much good-humoured chaff, from which all trace of animosity was absent. A mile to the south of the meeting-place

valley 200 yards in width separated the combatants. To the west the Russians still remained in full possession of their forts, those which had not been attacked during the siege."

Inside the house the negotiations were being carried on, it is interesting to note, in English, "with occasional asides in



PALLADA.

POBIEDA.

USELESS FOR THE FIGHT: THE SUNKEN *POBIEDA* AND *PALLADA* IN HARBOUR OF PORT ARTHUR.

one's eye rested on the late scene of strife, only finished at 2 o'clock that very morning, on Shojusan still smoking; on the grim escarpment of Nilusan, the embodiment of determined defence succumbing to the repeated assaults of soldiers who knew not defeat; on the other hills and forts swarming with black-coated Japanese soldiers; while on the ridges beyond, the Russians came out for the first time from their trenches, and a narrow

Russian." There were some fluent English scholars among the Japanese, but on the Russian side the only capable interpreter was the midy, who is probably the youngest commissioned officer who has ever assisted so importantly at such a tremendous function. The proceeding commenced with the presentation of the Japanese terms, General Ijichi stating that they were absolute, but that he and his colleagues would be glad to consider

any suggestions the Russians might have to make. The Russians asked for several privileges, as, for instance, that they might take their horses, but these were necessarily refused. Three separate con-

ferences took place, and the crowd waiting outside began to feel some needless apprehensions lest hitches of a serious nature had taken place. occurred to break the monotony. Fires broke out in various parts of the town, and General Ijichi pointed out to Colonel Reiss that this was a gross breach of the terms of the armistice. The Colonel im-



From Stereograph Copyright, 1905, Underwood & Underwood, London and New York.
 GENERAL IJICHI (IN CENTRE) WITH MEMBERS OF GENERAL NOGI'S STAFF.

ferences took place, and the crowd waiting outside began to feel some needless apprehensions lest hitches of a serious nature had taken place.

"At 3.30 in the afternoon," writes the *Times* correspondent, "a little incident

mediately wrote a note to General Stoessel, and came himself to the outside of the cottage to deliver it to an orderly, with orders to carry it as fast as possible to Stoessel. Each Cossack entering Port Arthur had to be accompanied by a Jap-

anese cavalry soldier, and on this occasion a race took place between the chosen champion of either side. The Cossack got off first and tore down the street, sitting his horse with beautiful ease, and proving himself a born equestrian. The sturdy Japanese soldier was after him in a minute, and pursuing him down the shell-covered street of Shui-shi-ying. The Japanese soldiers shouted out encouragement to their man, and the Cossacks to their comrade. As they rounded a bend in the street there was nothing to choose between the two, and, when the riders disappeared, the spectators rushed across an intervening valley and ascended some high ground, when the horsemen again came into view; they were still at it, racing for all they were worth down a steep slope, and in imminent danger of breaking their necks. With good humour like this in the air it was impossible for the negotiations to fail."

The conferences were continued far into the evening, and quite at the close a slight delay occurred in connection with the stipulation that the officers should take the oath not to serve again. The Russians said that there was no law in Russia on the subject, and that they could not take a binding oath without the consent of the Tsar, to whom they asked that they might be allowed to despatch a telegram. This was agreed to on the understanding that the message was written clearly in English.

At 9.45 p.m. on the evening of January 2nd the agreement for the capitulation of Port Arthur was signed, first by Colonel Reiss, and then by Major-General Ijichi. From a despatch transmitted by General Nogi to Tokio on the following day we learn that these were the terms agreed upon:—

"Article 1. All Russian soldiers,

marines, and volunteers, also Government officials at Port Arthur garrison and harbour, are taken prisoners.

"Article 2. All forts, batteries, warships, and other ships, boats, arms, and ammunition, and horses and all materials, all Government buildings, and all objects belonging to the Government shall be transferred to the Japanese Army in their existing condition.

"Article 3. On the preceding two conditions being assented to, and as a guarantee for the same, the garrisons of the forts and batteries of I-tzu-shan, Antzu-shan, and the line of eminences south-east therefrom shall be removed by noon on the 3rd inst., and the same shall be transferred to the Japanese Army.

"Article 4. Should the Russians be deemed to have destroyed the objects named in Article 2, or to have caused an alteration in any way in their condition as existing at the time of the signing of the compact, the negotiation shall be annulled, and the Japanese army will take free action.

Article 5. The Russian military and naval authorities shall prepare and transfer to the Japanese army a table showing the fortifications of Port Arthur and their respective positions; maps showing the location of the mines underground and submarine and all other dangerous objects; a table showing the composition and system of the army and naval services of Port Arthur; a list of the army and navy officers, with the name, rank, and duties of the officers; a list of the army steamers, warships, and other ships, with the number of the crews; a list of the civilians, showing the number of men and women and their race and occupation.

"Article 6. Arms, including those carried on the person, ammunition, war

materials, Government buildings, objects owned by Government, horses, warships, and other ships, including their contents, excepting private property, shall be left in their present positions, and commissioners of the Russian and Japanese armies shall decide as to the method of their transfer.

“ Article 7. The Japanese army, considering the gallant resistance offered by the Russian army honourable, will permit the officers of the Russian army and navy, as well as the officials belonging thereto, to carry their swords, and take with them private property directly necessary for the maintenance of life. The previously mentioned officers, officials, and volunteers, who will sign a written parole pledging their word that they will not take arms, and will in no wise take action contrary to the interests of the Japanese army until the close of the war, will receive the consent of the Japanese army to return to their country. Each military and naval officer will be allowed one servant, such servant to be specially released on signing his parole.

“ Article 8. Non-commissioned officers and privates of both the army and navy and of volunteers shall wear their uniforms, and, taking their portable tents and necessary private property, and commanded by their respective officers, shall assemble at such place as may be indicated by the Japanese army. The Japanese Commissioners will indicate the necessary details for this.

“ Article 9. The Sanitary Corps and accountants belonging to the Russian army and navy shall be retained by the Japanese while their services are deemed necessary for the purpose of caring for the sick and wounded prisoners. During such time such corps are required to render service under the direction of the

Sanitary Corps and accountants of the Japanese army.

“ Article 10. The treatment to be accorded to residents, the transfer of books and documents relating to municipal administration and finance, and also the detailed files necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this compact, shall be embodied in a supplementary compact, the supplement to have the same force as this compact.

“ Article 11. One copy each of this compact shall be prepared by the Japanese and Russian armies, and shall have immediate effect upon signature.”

After the signature of the agreement the delegates immediately fraternised and sat down to dinner together in a very friendly spirit. It was a little unfortunate that the information now volunteered by General Stoessel's Chief of the Staff as to the desperate straits to which the garrison had been reduced should have afterwards been found wildly inaccurate, but doubtless it served some present purpose in enhancing the respect of the Japanese for their late antagonists, and thus promoting the cordiality of a very remarkable gathering.

The celebration of their great triumph, which took place among the troops of the investing army, was in itself a curiosity. It lasted two hours, was over before midnight, and the next morning not a trace of the festivities could be seen. But during the two hours in question the enthusiasm is described as intense. “ Fires were lit on every hill along the crest of the Russian positions, and for miles in the rear of the army these beacons marked the site of some post in the commissariat camp. Round these fires the soldiers congregated, and shouted themselves hoarse, singing patriotic songs, uttering ‘ banzais,’ as they joined hands

and danced round the flames. If you happened to be an Englishman or an American you would be sure of a great reception, and the soldiers would insist on your joining in their festivities and drinking their *saki*, which that night was freely served out to the troops. To a spectator standing on one of the numerous hills, the country presented an extraordinary spectacle, for it was lit up for over twenty miles with innumerable fires, looking more like some great city half hidden by mist than open plains and hills. The shouts of 'banzai' resounded from every side, for, as one camp uttered the national war cry, it would be taken up all along the line, until it became lost miles to the west, almost in Pigeon Bay."

On the following day—January 3rd—a transference of I-tzu-shan and other forts took place as a guarantee of capitulation, and the Japanese forthwith began to take steps for the maintenance of order in the captured fortress. It was at once discovered that, while there was no urgent scarcity of provisions, there was a total absence of medical necessaries. The Japanese speedily set to work to supply this deficiency, and to give all possible succour to the sick and wounded.

In this connection an incident took place which, although it had a somewhat unfortunate ending, deserves to be recorded as an instance of British good-feeling. Acting on his own responsibility, Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, the Commander-in-chief of the British China Squadron, on hearing of the fall of Port Arthur promptly despatched from Weihai-wei the cruiser *Andromeda* with supplies, medical appliances, and comforts for the Russian sick and wounded. In the ship were carried two surgeons and nearly the entire staff of the Government

hospital, 80 tons of stores, including 350 beds, and 100,000 lbs. of provisions. By some inadvertence the Tokio authorities were not duly advised of the despatch of the *Andromeda* on this humane mission, and when she arrived at her destination she was refused admittance, and not even allowed to anchor in the neighbourhood; on the ground that she might run risks from mines. This refusal caused some soreness, but was diplomatically explained, and none but pleasant memories need be retained of this striking instance of the impartial generosity of the British Navy, which elicited from the Russians a warm expression of grateful appreciation.

A number of Japanese prisoners were found in Port Arthur, and released by their comrades amid scenes of great enthusiasm. Some of these were soldiers who had been captured during the recent sorties of the garrison, but others had been imprisoned for months, being blue-jackets who had been unable to regain their ships during the early attempts to block the harbour. There was special joy over the recovery of these men, who were believed to have been drowned or killed.

We shall examine presently the condition of the Russian ships in the harbour after the attempts made by the Russians to destroy them, but meanwhile it may be mentioned that General Stoessel's action in blowing up the ships, after offering to surrender, was warmly condemned by the Japanese Press. In Japanese naval circles, on the contrary, the opinion was freely expressed that the action, if not morally justifiable, was quite natural, and would have been taken by Japanese officers in similar circumstances. It may be added, on the authority of a *Daily Mail* correspondent, that, so far

from exhibiting any resentment in consequence of this proceeding, the Japanese, on January 3rd, paid a singularly handsome tribute to the Port Arthur garrison

caped to Kiao-chau. On January 3rd, says Mr. Norregard, four more destroyers—which, by the terms of the capitulation, were now Japanese property—left



THE ANGEL OF THE SIEGE

Madame Stoessel, who took upon herself the whole direction of the hospitals. Not only did she give to the wounded her untiring services, but she pleaded for them with her pen.

by allowing several of their destroyers to escape. Four of these craft had already got away during the night of January 1st to Chi-fu, where they were disarmed, and two torpedo-boats had es-

Port Arthur, "their departure being known and observed by the Japanese Fleet. The Japanese Navy would not move against them or attempt to stop them, word having gone from ship to

ship that, in consideration of the bravery the Russians had shown, the boats were to be allowed to escape."

The flag of the Rising Sun now floated over Port Arthur, and the captors were able at their leisure to count their prisoners and reckon up their spoils. To their surprise they found the number of the former far in excess of what even Colonel Reiss, Major-General Stoessel's Chief of the Staff, had led them to expect by his statement after the signature of the capitulation agreement. Excluding some 15,000 wounded, and about 4,000 non-combatants—many of whom were volunteers—no fewer than 878 officers and 23,491 men were afterwards found to be within the fortress. Of these eight were generals, four admirals, while there were 57 colonels and majors, and about 100 naval captains and commanders.

When the list of captures had been completed it was found that 59 permanent forts and other works had surrendered. There were 54 large guns taken, 149 of medium, and 343 of small calibre, with over 80,000 rounds of gun ammunition. Among other spoils were some 35,000 rifles, over 2,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, and nearly 2,000 horses.

Special interest was, of course, attached to the ships found in the harbour, of which the official return was as follows:—Battleships, 4 (excluding the *Sevastopol*, which was entirely sunk); cruisers, 2; gunboats and destroyers, 14; steamers, 10; steam launches, 8; various vessels, 12. All of these were sunk or injured, but there were 35 additional steam launches which could be repaired. In view of the extraordinary significance of any possible addition to the Navy of Japan, the following special account of the condition of the ships, which was published in the *Times*, is deserving of at-

tentive study. According to this valuable authority, the *Sevastopol* was sunk in water 150 feet deep, and there was no hope of raising her.

The *Retvisan* was terribly damaged above and below. Her superstructure was riddled with shell, and her turrets had been blown up. Her deck was visible at low tide.

The *Pobieda* had a heavy list to starboard. Her masts were broken short, and hanging over the side. She was much damaged below and burnt above.

The *Retvisan* and the *Pobieda* had suffered more than any of the other ships, and both appeared unfit for further use.

The *Peresviet* was slightly damaged below. The superstructure and the funnels were much injured, and both fighting tops were gone.

The *Poltava* was the least damaged both above and below.

Both these two vessels could easily be refloated.

The *Pallada* and *Bayan* were apparently not seriously damaged, and could be refloated.

With the exception of the *Retvisan*, the ships were not much damaged by shell fire. Their main armour had hardly been pierced, and their conning towers were intact except where they had been burnt; the howitzer shells had inflicted only slight damage.

Three days before the capitulation the ships had been set on fire with kerosene oil, and mines had been exploded alongside.

To sum up, there was hope that the *Peresviet*, *Poltava*, *Pallada*, and *Bayan* might be saved at great expense, but the difficulties would be very great, as there was no dock for the battleships. The case of the *Retvisan* was considered hopeless, that of the *Pobieda* was doubtful.

As regards armament, the turret guns had all been destroyed by explosion before the surrender. Some of the guns of the secondary armament were intact, and most of the small guns had been removed to the forts.

The Russians stated that the Fleet was unfit for further service after the engagement on August 10th. Coal had been abundant, and had been used to protect the decks against howitzer shell. On the capture of Rojushan, the ships were sunk by opening their sluices in order to protect them from the Japanese fire.

The reference to the abundance of coal is quite at variance with the reports of scarcity which reached Chi-fu at earlier stages of the siege. It is said that there were 70,000 tons in the dockyard alone, including more than 32,000 tons of Cardiff coal in the large coal-sheds. At the same time it is quite possible that at one time the supply ran somewhat short, and that the later sufficiency was due to the persistent blockade-runners, who would hardly have been encouraged to run such risks if there had all along been ample coal in the dockyard and fortress for both naval and military requirements.

The allusion to the absence of a dock for the repair of the battleships also needs some explanation. It appears that the Russians had ingeniously blocked the great dry dock at Port Arthur before surrendering. They had towed the transport *Amur* inside the dock, where they blew her up. The vessel turned turtle, and sank with her hull lying across the dock. The dock gate was then blown up.

It was found that the stories of scarcity of provisions inside the fortress had been strangely exaggerated. "There was ample food," says a very high authority after close personal investiga-

tion, "for three months, even if we assume that the supplies would not be replenished by junks from the mainland." One large building in the Naval Dockyard contained 6,000 tons of flour, and many private stores were full of provisions.

Of the damage to the buildings some interesting details were given by Dr. George Morrison, the famous Peking correspondent of the *Times*, who knows Port Arthur well, and who visited the captured fortress immediately after the surrender. He says: "Practically no buildings in the whole of the New Town are injured, nor has any injury been done to the fine barracks in Torpedo Bay. No buildings from the dockyard eastward to the sea have been damaged. The Japanese, with rare humanity, directed their fire on the docks, workshops, and ships in the harbour, wasting little ammunition on the buildings. It is true that the Old Town between the eastern end of the railway and the engineer's residence and the creek were subjected to a severe bombardment; but, even in the midst of the destruction, Clarkson's offices and other buildings remained habitable. Only two shots struck the Viceroy's house, inflicting trifling damage, while one shell exploded near the church. General Smirnoff's and General Stoessel's residences, and many others round about are entirely uninjured. Practically no damage has been inflicted on any of the large buildings. On the road to the racecourse there was much destruction, especially at the end of the street which leads to the quay, and in which the offices of the *Novy Krai* are. Altogether the number of damaged buildings is so small, especially the number of inhabited buildings, that the success of the Japanese fire could not have been the

reason for surrender. Many buildings are marked with the Red Cross; but in only one could I find any appreciable damage, the hospital which is in an exposed position above the railway, and in a direct line with the dockyard, being struck by one shell. Stories about the Red Cross buildings being wrecked by Japanese fire are admitted by reputable residents to be pure fabrications spread to excite sympathy."

We need not now pause to examine the rather mixed sentiments which were aroused when it became evident that Port Arthur, at the time of its surrender, was by no means in such straits as regards defenders, provisions, fuel, and shelter as had been imagined. For the present it is sufficient to say that on January 4th the work of taking over the property inside the fortress was energetically continued, and preparations made for clearing the mines as soon as the Russian mine-charts should be handed over.

It was very typical of Japanese forethought that thus early General Nogi should have been enabled to contemplate seriously the repair of the battered fortifications of Port Arthur. It transpired that for months past agents had been at work recruiting an army of Chinese coolies for this purpose. Vast quantities of timber and cement had been accumulated on the Yalu, and steel plates and other manufactured material was being held in readiness in Japan. "What we have we'll hold" was clearly the new view regarding Port Arthur among those into whose hands it had fallen for a second time, and, although any attempt on the part of Russia to regain possession of the stronghold seemed a rather remote contingency, the Japanese plans provided not only for re-fortification, but also for a renewal of the stores of ammunition,

food, and medical supplies on a scale sufficient to last the new garrison for years.

On January 5th a meeting took place between Generals Nogi and Stoessel, a meeting which, in a sense, was historic, but the record of which it is not easy to invest with all the dignity that could be desired. The place chosen was the rude hut in Shui-shi-ying where the capitulation had been arranged, a building romantically designated in some accounts "Plum Tree Cottage." By mistake General Stoessel was before his time, and was received on arrival by a junior officer. He had dashed up mounted on a beautiful grey Arab, and attended by his Chief of the Staff, two other officers, and a small Cossack escort. A big man with heavy features and a masterful air, he was dressed in full uniform, and he and his officers made a brilliant patch of colour as they remained on horseback awaiting General Nogi's arrival. The latter having been summoned by telephone, came up at the trot on a bay waler accompanied by General Ijichi and three other officers, and preceded by a couple of troopers. The first personal encounter of the two generals who had for months been engaged in such a constant conflict was interesting. "They at once," says the *Express* correspondent, "raised their hands in a ceremonious salute. There was the slightest moment of hesitation, as if each general wondered whether the other desired to shake hands. Then, with a smile, General Nogi alighted from his horse, and General Stoessel dismounted also. They walked to the cottage, chatting easily together, and at the rude doorway General Nogi politely gave precedence to his opponent."

In the one bare room of the hut, the walls of which had been roughly papered,

LIEUT.
MALTSCHENKO,
Staff Interpreter,
3rd Siberian Corps.


LIEUT. NEVELSKY,
Stoessel's
Aide-de-Camp.

COLONEL REISS,
Stoessel's
Chief of Staff.

CAPT. TSUNODA,
Aide-de-Camp.

GENERAL IJICHI,
Chief of Staff
to Nogi.

M. KAWAKAMI,
Interpreter
to Nogi.



STOESSEL,

NOGI.

THE PLEDGE OF HONOUR: NOGI AND STOESSEL DRINKING TO EACH OTHER'S HEALTH
AFTER ARRANGING THE TERMS OF CAPITULATION OF PORT ARTHUR.

with Japanese newspapers, the sole furniture consisted of a table and a few Vienna chairs. The two generals now did shake hands, General Nogi saying that he was proud to do so with such a gallant soldier. After various amenities General Nogi read the telegram from the Emperor of Japan, in which he had been ordered to treat General Stoessel with all possible honour, and said that in consequence of this message the Russian officers had been allowed to wear their swords. General Stoessel expressed gratitude to the Mikado for thus saving the honour of his family. His descendants would appreciate the thoughtful kindness of the Mikado. The same was true of his officers. He also expressed his gratitude for the despatch of a message to the Tsar, and the transmission of his Majesty's reply, which ran as follows :—

“ I allow each officer to profit by the well-merited privilege to return to Russia under the obligation not to take part in the present war, or they may share the destinies of their men. I thank you and the brave garrison for your gallant defence.”

After compliments on the bravery of the Russian and Japanese soldiers had been passed and reciprocated, General Stoessel condoled with General Nogi on the loss of his two sons. General Nogi replied : “ One son gave his life at Nanshan, the other on 203 Metre Hill. Both these were positions of the greatest importance to the Japanese army. I am glad that the sacrifice of my sons' lives was made at the capture of such important positions, as I feel that the sacrifice has not been made in vain. Their lives were as nothing compared with the objects sought.”

General Stoessel now asked if he might

present his charger to General Nogi as a token of appreciation, but the latter replied that, as he considered all the horses of the garrison to be the property of Japan, he could not accept this gift. He promised, however, that when the charger was handed over it should be treated with special consideration out of respect for its former gallant owner. He went on to desire that General Stoessel should remain in residence at Port Arthur until arrangements were completed for his return—he having given his parole—to Russia. Various other expressions of cordial good-feeling were exchanged, and, after luncheon at which the two Generals sat together, a group photograph was taken, and General Stoessel rode back to Port Arthur.

While these interesting tokens of newly-born amity were being given and received, the exodus of the Russian garrison from Port Arthur was taking place, the prisoners being removed in batches to a village called Lahutse close to Pigeon Bay, where they were given temporary accommodation until proper arrangements could be made to convey them to Dalny, and thence to Japan. On January 7th a first instalment was marched from Lahutse to the railway station at Cherashi, some fifteen miles distant. Of this march and the subsequent entraining some notable descriptions are available, but none finer than that of the same *Times* correspondent to whom we are indebted above for details concerning the signing of the capitulation agreement.

“ Wonderfully picturesque,” he says, “ was the appearance of the procession of prisoners along the high roads. First came some officers, some mounted, and others trudging along carrying their swords. The officers were all splendidly dressed,

and looked, in their light blue overcoats and patent leather boots, as if they had come off an Emperor's parade, rather than just having gone through a siege of six months. As for the soldiers, their clothes, and especially their boots, were in poor condition, and many wore Chinese costumes and sheepskin coats, but physically they appeared in excellent condition, and in the best of health. Never were prisoners more lightly guarded. At intervals in the column, raising a cloud of dust as it passed along, you could catch a glimpse of a few little khaki-clad figures, with red blankets on their backs, and carrying rifles, apparently swallowed up in the dense column of Russians. These were the soldiers sent with the prisoners to guard against any attempt to escape. It seemed almost comical to see these few Japanese soldiers guarding these thousands of Russians, but the latter, although they could have scattered all over the country, knew perfectly well that to leave the peninsula was an impossibility, and were therefore content to walk along to their prison in Japan, not, for the most part, dissatisfied with the change in their lot.

Perhaps the most disagreeable part of the journey for them was when they passed through the streets of the Chinese villages, and heard the jeering remarks of the Chinese; for, the last time they had passed that way, they had passed as a retreating, but not as a defeated, army, and were still masters. Now the spell was broken, the glory had departed from them, and the Chinaman, unable to preserve the soil for himself, at least was not going to miss the opportunity of having a laugh at the expense of those who had so ruthlessly made themselves his masters. The Chinese were enjoying a few days of comparative freedom


between the exit of the one Government and the installation of the next.

"A camp was formed at Cherashi station, and here the prisoners were housed, pending the arrival of the trains to convey them to Dalny. Here, also, was food served out to them with no stinting hand, each soldier having as many tins of meat and as many packages of army biscuits as he could possibly desire. All were apparently in excellent humour, and none seemed to feel their positions very keenly. The officers paraded the platforms smoking cigarettes and joking as if the surrender of the strongest fortress ever known was nothing but an everyday event. This callousness of the Russian officers to the disgraceful defeat their country had suffered has been the most marked feature of the surrender, and perhaps explains better than anything else the reasons for that defeat."

But at least some credit was due to the officers who took part in this humiliating performance. They had elected to go into imprisonment with their men rather than give their parole and return to Russia, and both in Russia and Japan this conception of duty was warmly applauded. General Stoessel, as we have already seen, had already given his parole, and his example was followed by about 400 officers, most of whom also were entrained at Cherashi for Dalny on January 12th. With them were a number of women and children, a few officers' wives, the families of some of the civilians and non-commissioned officers, and a number of maids. "One poor woman had three children to look after, one only a few months old; they were crying, and too much for her to manage; but no helping hand was held out to her by the crowd of officers whose privations

*Town and Harbour of
Port Arthur.*

*Eastern
Range of
Russian
Forts.*



*Swichi Valley
with Railway.*

*Japanese
Trench.*


A PANORAMA OF THE RUSSIAN
Sketched by Mr. Frederick Villiers,

she had so bravely borne. They laughed and they talked, they brushed by her, and took not the slightest notice. Then it was that the Russian soldier showed his superiority as a gentleman to his officer, as he had so often done as a soldier in the field. One dirty ill-kempt man, a humble peasant, perhaps unable to read, went up and took one of the children in his arms, and kept him until the train moved off. This is only one little incident, but there were many more like it in this truly miserable scene."

For in many ways it was a miserable scene, indeed, more particularly as regards the behaviour of the officers, which, it was evident, aroused the keenest feelings of disgust and contempt in the minds of their captors. They strutted about the platform, and received the polite assistance of the Japanese officers

in sorting their baggage and arranging their effects with an arrogance so utterly out of place that the sympathy of the onlookers evaporated into an irritated conviction that any such kindly feeling would be wasted on men so strangely forgetful of their true position.

Among those who were to travel to Dalny by this particular train were General and Madame Stoessel, the latter accompanied by five children whose fathers had been killed during the siege, and whom she and the General had adopted. Every sort of respect was paid to General Stoessel by the Japanese present, but it was noticed that the salutations of the Russians present were none too cordial. As he was making his way to his carriage the General caught sight of a little group of Russian soldiers. He turned towards them and offered his hand

Tanshian
Heights.203
Metre Hill.Pigeon
Bay.Japanese War
Balloon.Japanese Naval
Battery in Action.Japanese Reserve
Ammunition in Ravine.

POSITIONS AROUND PORT ARTHUR.

the only artist before Port Arthur.

to one. The men were curiously unresponsive. "Possessing not the slightest regard for their General, and, totally unaccustomed to be shaken by the hand, they merely gazed on his friendly advances with a look of mingled awe and stupidity. Stoessel turned on his heel and entered the train.

"Then occurred a scene which those who witnessed it will never forget, and will ever remember with shame and disgust. Even third-class carriages are scarce on the Dalny-Port Arthur line; one has to be content to make the journey in open trucks; but on this occasion there was a saloon for Stoessel with a few carriages for women and children. Directly the General and his wife had entered the train one expected to see the women and children led forward and assisted into the remaining vacant seats;

but no, the crowd of generals and officers pushed forward and entered the carriages, pushing past the women and children without paying the slightest regard to them. Soon every single carriage was packed with these gentlemen, and the women and children were left on the platform, sitting on their luggage. The indignation of every foreigner present, and every Japanese, was instantly aroused by this last exhibition of callousness and brutality. 'They treat their women like so many beasts,' was the comment of one. Some of the station officials and Japanese officers intervened, and assisted the helpless ones into the most empty of the open trucks, which were already nearly full of the officers' servants, who, taking the cue from their masters, were not going to wait for the women and children to be seated first.

Some of the women found seats in the trucks, intermingled with the dirty soldiers and the luggage of the officers in the closed carriages. One beautiful widow whose husband had been killed in the siege, whose very appearance one would have thought might have aroused a spark of dormant gallantry in the breast of one of the Tsar's chosen warriors, was left wandering about, and would have missed the train had not General Nogi's A.D.C., Captain Matsuda, cleared out some of the soldiers and found room for her in a truck.

"Then, with a last whistle, the train moved slowly off, carrying with it the true cause of Russia's downfall in the Far East, and leaving seated on the platform, to await for hours the arrival of the next train, the majority of the women and children. It was a miserable scene, and dissipated the last remaining feeling of regret for the misfortunes of the garrison."

It is a relief to turn from this scathing account of a disgraceful episode to the much more pleasant contemplation of the attitude of the Japanese in victory. Attention has already been drawn to individual acts of courtesy and consideration, and it now remains to chronicle a crowning piece of forbearance on the part of General Nogi towards a foe who would certainly have behaved very differently in similar circumstances. It has been mentioned that General Stoessel took train for Dalny on January 12th, and no allusion has yet been made to any formal entry of the conquering army into Port Arthur, for the simple reason that General Nogi deferred this proceeding until the

day after General Stoessel's departure out of sheer deference to Russian susceptibilities. Few more striking instances of magnanimity are on record, and the world will not readily forget the contrast between Japan and Russia at this moment of well-earned triumph on the one part, and well-deserved humiliation on the other.

In another chapter we shall give the story of the entry into and occupation of Port Arthur, together with some remarks on the changed situation and the opinion of the outside world on the surrender and its consequences. But it seems appropriate to conclude now with an allusion to the rejoicings in Tokio, and to the Rescript issued by the Emperor of Japan on January 7th, thanking General Nogi and the Third Army, and Admiral Togo and the combined Fleet, for their services in the capture, or rather, recapture, of Port Arthur. Of the jubilation at Tokio it is sufficient to say that festivities were already in progress before the actual surrender, owing to the return of Admiral Togo, whose task had come to an end in the destruction of the Russian ships by the fire from 203 Metre Hill. The news of the final fall of Port Arthur naturally aroused a fresh burst of rejoicing, and so for a week the Japanese capital was ablaze with joyous enthusiasm. The celebration terminated fitly on the day of the Emperor's Rescript, the closing episode being a banquet given to 500 of those who had been wounded before Port Arthur, but had recovered sufficiently to permit of their removal from the hospitals for the purpose of being publicly fêted by their admiring fellow-countrymen.

CHAPTER LXXIX.

JAPANESE ENTRY INTO PORT ARTHUR—A NOTABLE PROCESSION—THE KAISER DECORATES NOGI AND STOESSEL—FOREIGN OPINIONS ON THE FALL OF THE FORTRESS—THE NEW SITUATION—WAS SURRENDER JUSTIFIED?—OPINION IN RUSSIA—A TRIBUTE FROM THE TSAR.

GLORIOUS sunny weather marked the formal entry of General Nogi's Army into Port Arthur on January 13th. But it should be understood that the event was impressive more from the sentimental than from the spectacular standpoint. In particular the entry must be divested in the mind of the reader from any idea that it was a triumphal one of the sort commonly associated with a decisive victory, or the return of the troops after a long and harassing campaign. The Japanese themselves recognised the doubtful propriety of indulging in any such official demonstration while the war was still in progress and the main army in Manchuria was still by no means assured of complete success. Again, there were practical difficulties in the way of holding a really comprehensive review of all the very numerous troops which had taken part in the siege. Accordingly, what really took place on January 13th was a procession, one, moreover, restricted to representative detachments, each infantry regiment sending a company, each cavalry regiment a troop, each artillery brigade a battery. The true character of the display was emphasised by an interesting detail noted by the *Times* correspondent: "Even the commissariat trains, to whose lot had fallen some of the most arduous and also some of the most dangerous work—the conveying of daily

supplies to the fighting line along roads fully exposed to the artillery fire of the enemy—were not forgotten, and the little carts, unloaded, from every commissariat train, if they looked somewhat incongruous alongside the other troops, thoroughly deserved their place in the procession."

The representative detachments paraded at 10 a.m. on the road leading into the city, and an hour later the column, headed by General Nogi, who was attended by his Staff, the Foreign Attachés, and the band, marched slowly through the streets of the city and of the new town, which lies to the west of the harbour, until an open space in front of the harbour was reached. Here General Nogi and his *entourage* took their places at a saluting point, and the detachments marched past in order of divisional numbers, the 1st, 7th, 9th, and 11th Divisions, followed by the two independent reserve brigades from Kobe. The spectators were comparatively few in number. Besides the Foreign Attachés there were only the remaining inhabitants of Port Arthur and a few ladies, mostly nurses from the still crowded hospitals.

"There was nothing very showy," writes the correspondent above-quoted, "about this review, there was an almost entire absence of colour, and the music was about as poor as one could com-



Photo: I. Rosenthal.

THE FIRST JAPANESE TO ENTER PORT ARTHUR AFTER THE CAPITULATION.

fortably stand; the salutes were often badly given, and many of the troops had apparently forgotten their drill, as such a long time had elapsed since it had been required. The efforts made by the stubborn little infantrymen to conquer once more the intricacies of the German goose-step were often ludicrous, as also were their endeavours to keep in line and to march in step. Their uniforms were not up to much, and sadly in need of repair, their boots were very worn, and even their rifles not very clean. The regimental buglers, who had been ordered to attend in full strength, also made sad noises in entire conflict with the efforts of the band, which got on the nerves of the Chief of Staff, General Ijichi, who often left his post to stop the discord. But, in spite of these defects, did ever anyone see a spectacle which impressed them more or even so much? I certainly never did, and the absence of parade effect, so essential in times of

peace, only served to emphasise the hardships and exigencies of war, and showed up on a finer background what these men had just accomplished and what they had gone through during the past five months."

The 1st Division was led by Lieutenant-General Matsumara, and consisted of representatives from the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 15th Regiments. It was followed by detachments from the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th Regiments, constituting the 7th Division, under command of Lieutenant-General Osaka, with whom was Major-General Saito, of Metre Range renown. Next came the famous 9th Division, some of the colours of which had been so badly worn in the constant fighting that they had recently been replaced, while the remainder were the most tattered of all that went by the saluting point. The commander of this Division was Lieutenant-General Baron Oshima, one of the most popular fighting leaders

in the Japanese Army. The Division consisted of the 6th and 18th Brigades, the former made up of the 7th and 35th Regiments, and led by Major-General Ichinoye, described as the real hero of the siege, one who went into the firing line with his men and remained always well to the front even at the trying times when the Russians were making the most desperate efforts to regain lost positions. The 11th Division marched past with General Samejima at their head. Mention was made on page 414 of the present volume of this fine veteran in connection with the capture of North Chi-huan-shan (December 18th), on which occasion he led the assault in person. General Samejima had succeeded General Tsuchaya, the former commander, who had been severely wounded. The Division consisted of the 12th, 22nd, 43rd,

and 44th Regiments, but the two first had been practically wiped out by losses incurred in constant direct attacks upon the strongest positions.

After the review General Nogi with the Staff, the Foreign Attachés, all the mounted officers, and the correspondent, passed through the town, halting for lunch at General Stoessel's former official residence. The latter may well have been grateful to be spared participation in a function so terminated, and one to which, perhaps, no more appropriate reflection could apply than *sic transit gloria!*

The formal entry into Port Arthur was followed by a memorial service for the dead, at which General Nogi was present and paid a glowing tribute to the devotion of those who had fallen during the siege. "Death or victory," had been, he said, their guiding principle, and he




Photo: A. Lavrantieff.

THE FORTRESS IN THE BALANCE: GENERAL STOESSEL'S STAFF INSPECTING THE FORTS.

himself desired to share the honour of victory with the spirits of those who had died in order to achieve success.

Intercourse with the remaining inhabitants of Port Arthur now began to reveal certain features of the siege to which guarded allusion has already been made in this narrative, but which from this point onward may be discussed with greater freedom. In the first place it is necessary to emphasise the painful certainty that although conspicuous heroism was exhibited possibly by the majority of the garrison, the behaviour of a large number was such as to deprive the defence of much of the glory with which it should have been surrounded.

As already stated, the naval officers were distinguished by drunkenness and incapacity, complete demoralisation having set in after the death of the gallant Makaroff. Many of the military officers, too, were useless, applying for leave on days when there were attacks, and leaving sergeants to do their work for them. It goes without saying that such shameful performances reflected the gravest discredit not only on the worthless cowards themselves, but on the superior officers who permitted such gross shrinking from honourable duties.

It is not easy to discriminate among the recriminations, the assertions, the charges, and the excuses, which were forthcoming in rank abundance shortly after the conclusion of the siege. But a piece of credible, because impartial, evidence is forthcoming in the shape of a communication from one of the Russian Admirals who was taken and remained a prisoner, to Reuter's correspondent at Tokio. Very eloquently did this Admiral expatiate upon the gallant part which, as previously indicated in Chapter LXXVI., is known to have been played

by General Kondratchenko throughout the operations.

"General Kondratchenko, until he fell, was the life and soul of the defence. Further, he possessed in large measure the qualities of a peacemaker. He intervened in all cases where divisions arose in the garrison, eloquently pleading that the cause of the Tsar and the needs of the defence must have priority above all private differences. His ceaseless energy, patience, and courage won the confidence of the higher officers of the Army and Navy, as well as of the rank and file, and, fortunately for the defenders, he was able largely to direct the policy of the defence. General Stoessel left much to him, and the officers of the Navy recognised him as the one man capable of reconciling the discordant elements. Day and night Kondratchenko visited every portion of the positions, constantly risking his life. He was our inspiration. No Russian need be ashamed of the defence made by the garrison while Kondratchenko lived."

But of the end the Russian Admiral spoke very bitterly. It was, he said, worse than a mistake, it was a disgrace. If Kondratchenko had been alive the fortress would have held out for months longer, since he was the only man whose tremendous earnestness influenced General Stoessel. The Admiral declared that there was enough food and ammunition for another month at least. He proceeded to give an account of the Council of War held on December 29th, at which the first proposal to surrender was made. "For nearly two weeks it was known to the officers through the gossiping of General Stoessel's servants that the Commander-in-Chief and his Chief of Staff, General Reiss, were preparing to surrender. The soldiers were aware of what was coming, and, brave as they

were, the knowledge destroyed their enthusiasm. A Council of War was held three days before the capitulation, twenty-two higher officers of the Army and Navy being present. General Stoessel represented to the Council that if the place was taken by assault there would be fighting in the streets, and possibly a massacre. He referred to the

and felt, and how the men viewed their surrender, will all be known later, but I say now, and I believe that the majority of the officers of the garrison will support me, that it was a disgrace to Russia."

As a matter of fact, unpleasant revelations had already been made of the behaviour of the Russian soldiers on hearing of the surrender. Disgraceful



GENERAL KONDRATCHENKO.

women and children of the garrison, and said he thought it was their duty to avoid such a possibility. In spite of the commander's arguments, only three officers, General Reiss and two others, also on the Staff, spoke in favour of capitulation. General Stoessel's note to General Nogi came without warning, and to say we were surprised inadequately describes our state of mind on hearing of it, after the sentiments expressed by the majority of the Council. What the officers said

scenes were enacted, the men breaking into the warehouses and looting vodka in complete defiance of their officers. From one store 5,000 bottles of this potent Russian spirit were seized, and disgusting orgies at once took place in the streets, the revellers being joined by the troops sent to quell the disturbances. Artillery destroyed their guns, and infantry threw their rifles and ammunition into the harbour, shouting that the fortress had been given away.

It is only fair to General Stoessel to say that the statements of the capacity of Port Arthur to hold out much longer were qualified by others drawing attention to very grave drawbacks. Further reference will be made to this matter later, but in the meantime it must not be forgotten that the garrison were terribly disheartened not only by the death of Kondratchenko but also by the receding prospect of relief. When hope of a rescue by Kuropatkin had disappeared, there were many who for a long time daily expected the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, and it was even said that several Russian soldiers were killed on the hill-tops while looking vainly for the squadron from home which was to put a glorious end to their present hardships.

As to provisions there was certainly plenty of flour and a quantity of tinned meats in the private stores, to say nothing of nearly 2,000 horses, out of which the garrison, profiting by the example set at Ladysmith, might have produced up-to-date preparations in the way of sausages and "chevril," without being reduced to coarser styles of hippophagy. But there must have been some scarcity, since towards the end of the siege a chicken fetched £2, a goose £6, and a pig £30. There was no milk and there were no vegetables, and the absence of the latter caused a raging outbreak of scurvy, with which the doctors found it impossible to cope successfully. There seems no question as to the grave deficiency of medical supplies, and it was said that at the end the wounded had to be bandaged with dressing obtained by unravelling cables.

As to the ammunition, some generous allowances need to be made. Two and a quarter million rounds of rifle ammunition was really not more than would have


availed the entire fighting force at Fort Arthur for a single important action. Again, as to shells, the Japanese themselves shot away more shells in each of the two battles of Liao-yang and the Sha-ho than were found in the fortress, and both shells and rifle ammunition must have been so scattered that it would have been difficult for General Stoessel to obtain an exact return. Also it may be urged by the Russian officers after the surrender that much of the ammunition that was surrendered was of little use, as it did not fit some of the more important guns, the supply of cartridges for which had been quite exhausted.

Whether General Stoessel was or was not premature in his capitulation, he was destined to receive, in common with his adversary, a particular mark of distinction at the hands of a very important critic of military performances. The German Emperor, who, it will be remembered, conferred the order of the Black Eagle upon Lord Roberts at the time of the South African war, was prompt to mark the close of the siege of Port Arthur by a characteristic acknowledgment of the military virtues of the protagonists. To the Tsar at Tsarkoe Selo the Kaiser telegraphed as follows:—

"The defence of Port Arthur will ever remain an example for the soldiers of all nations. The hero who commanded your troops is admired by the whole world, and especially in my Army, and by me. In order to give expression to our sympathy and admiration for General Stoessel and his gallant troops, I hope to have your consent when I confer upon him our highest military distinction, the Order 'Pour le Merite' founded by Frederick the Great. I intend to bestow the same tribute of honour upon his gallant adversary, General Nogi."

To the Mikado the Kaiser wired :—
 “ The siege and capture of Port Arthur
 have exhibited General Baron Nogi as a
 gallant and skilful leader whose heroic

when I confer upon General Nogi, as an
 outward token of my admiration, the
 highest Prussian military distinction, the
 Order ‘ Pour le Merite,’ which was



PERILS OF RED-CROSS WORK BEFORE PORT ARTHUR.

As it was impossible to move the injured during the day, and very difficult during the night, the Red-Cross workers had to crawl up the slope and feign death whenever the searchlight was upon them. After it had passed on, the wounded were taken by the legs and gently dragged or pushed down the slope to the Japanese trenches, where first aid was administered to the sufferers.

deeds, like those of his troops, will ever excite the admiration of all soldiers, and particularly that of myself and my Army. I hope that your Majesty will approve

founded by my forbear, Frederick the Great, for bravery in the field. His gallant adversary, General Stoessel, has received the same distinction.”

The replies of the Tsar and the Mikado were as follows :—

“ To his Majesty the Emperor, Berlin.

“ In the name of my Army I thank you for the high distinction which you intend to confer upon General Stoessel. He gallantly did his duty to the last at the head of his brave garrison. Your sympathy and that of your Army and your recognition of his conduct are profoundly appreciated by me.”

“ To his Imperial Majesty the German Emperor, Berlin.

“ I am very grateful for your Majesty's admiration for the capture of Port Arthur. As regards your Majesty's kind desire to bestow upon General Baron Nogi the highest distinction of the Prussian army, I gladly agree.”

Extremely characteristic are the personal acknowledgments, the one so modest, the other so flamboyant, of Nogi and Stoessel. The former, to whose brilliant qualities as a leader the Kaiser had made particularly gracious allusion, said :—

“ I present my profound thanks for the kindness exhibited by your Majesty towards me in the bestowal of the Order ‘ Pour le Merite ’ notwithstanding the slightness of my services. In accepting your Majesty's Order with the most profound gratitude, I would in humble duty express my entire respect for your Majesty.”

General Stoessel was more grandiloquent :—

“ Your Majesty's telegram reached me in the darkest hour of my life. I and the garrison of the fortress are profoundly touched and honoured by the bestowal of the high Prussian Order, which will be an honour to me till the end of my days. May your Majesty be convinced of my appreciation of the gracious favour ex-

tended to me. I have the honour to send your Majesty my greetings and those of my soldiers.”

In justice to General Stoessel we must not forget to note a detail with reference to the capitulation, which has a special significance from a Service standpoint. It is said that the destroyers which escaped just before the fall of the fortress carried with them all the regimental and naval colours to Chi-fu.

It is only necessary to add here a few words concerning the subsequent movements of the defender of Port Arthur and of the officers who returned with him on parole to Russia. General Stoessel himself was received in Japan with great deference, and very friendly treatment was also accorded to his comrades. Eventually all were shipped off to Europe, most of them in a French ship, the *Australien*, the officers of which gave a doubtfully complimentary account of the conduct of their passengers during the voyage. In fact publicity of any sort seems to have suited these heroes very badly, and it was easy to see that the French sailors were anything but favourably impressed by the gross habits and arrogance of their fellow-voyagers on this interesting occasion.

Arriving in Russia, General Stoessel, according to various conceptions of poetic justice, should have been at once either loaded with honours or immured in a prison. But matters of grave moment were occurring to distract the attention both of the authorities and the public, and General Stoessel retired, temporarily at any rate, into the background with a suddenness quite surprising when it is remembered how completely he had “ filled the stage ” during his performance of what some will always consider to have been a rather theatrical part.

Let us now return to Port Arthur, where the Japanese were extremely busy in clearing the surrounding hills of corpses, and in otherwise restoring the fortress and its environs to their normal state. Such details as the repair of the railway and the telegraph and telephone system were speedily attended to, and the work of sweeping the sea for mines within a radius of forty miles was prosecuted with such vigour that in the first ten days of January some four hundred of these engines had been exploded or destroyed by Togo's indefatigable seamen.

In a rough estimate given by General Oshima, it was reckoned that the spoil captured at Port Arthur, including the actual value of the ships, was three millions sterling. But, of course, this did not represent anything like material loss to Russia. An interesting calculation in a Russian journal about this date shows that the Russian vessels lost at Port Arthur from first to last represented an aggregate cost, including armaments, of between nine and ten million pounds! This did not include the damage done to the disarmed battleship *Tsarevitch* and the cruisers *Askold* and *Diana*.

This seems an appropriate juncture at which to refer to the cost in lives which the transfer of the fortress entailed upon victors and vanquished. Detailed statistics are out of the question, and will probably never be available, at any rate in Russia, where the cynical tardiness in publishing the casualty returns excited grave resentment. But one authoritative estimate of the Russian losses states that during the siege 10,000 were killed or died of sickness, while, as has already been mentioned, about 15,000 sick and wounded were found in the hospitals after the surrender. The total number of soldiers, seamen, and civilians in Port

Arthur at the beginning of the siege is said to have been 55,000.

The Japanese casualties since the battle of Nan-shan were reported to have been 55,000, of whom one-fifth were killed. These are the figures as cabled to the *Times*, and if some day they come to be confirmed officially it will be regarded as an extremely curious coincidence that the number of killed on either side should have stood in such a close ratio as ten to eleven.

It is now a matter of historical necessity, and of historical interest and instructiveness as well, to examine the effect which the fall of Port Arthur had upon the outside world in general, as well as upon the warlike situation. Upon the opinions expressed on the subject in this country it is needless to dilate. Throughout the war the strong British sympathy with Japan had always been tempered by British appreciation of the fighting qualities of the Russian Army, and at the back of the rejoicing caused by the success of our gallant allies there was a distinct tendency to gratified reflection on the goodness of the fight and the manful resistance offered by a white army to a yellow one. Conversely, in France the capitulation awakened much feeling favourable to Japan, whose behaviour, especially in connection with the surrender, had appealed strongly to a nation which in similar circumstances would probably have treated a similar adversary with identical courtesy and consideration. Most of the Paris journals, in dealing with the event, coupled praise for the Japanese with enthusiasm for France's allies. "The splendid behaviour of the Japanese troops before Port Arthur," wrote a Paris correspondent, "aroused irresistible admiration among the French people, who are too generous and, in their calm moments, too

just to deny even to the enemies of 'the friendly and allied nation' a tribute of frank admiration. It is indeed," this same correspondent went on to observe, "not the least singular feature of this in many ways most extraordinary war that it has not excited fanatical partisanship

a day telegrams giving news from the seat of war were posted in the Casino. They were read in silence. Officers and civilians, as also priests, of whom there were a large number, scanned the grave intelligence from the Far East with hardly any comment, and therefore I am




Photo: J. Rosenthal.

MEN OF THE JAPANESE 9TH DIVISION AWAITING THEIR TURN IN THE "THIRTY-MINUTE" TRENCH.

anywhere. After the first engagements had been fought, and the emotion caused in France by the one-sided version of the sinking of Russian ships at Port Arthur had subsided, the French watched the war, if not with indifference, at all events with nothing more than conceivable interest for their allies. I was at Vichy this summer during the exciting battle of Liao-yang. There were people there from all parts of France, and four times

little surprised to find there is nothing like excitement at the fall of Port Arthur."

The comments of important papers like the *Temps*, the *Siècle*, and the *Journal* contained some shrewd and accurately prophetic estimates of the results of the surrender. The *Temps* was prompt and clear in its statement that the Russians would never recover Port Arthur without previously recovering the supremacy of



CHAMPAGNE AND SHELLS: OFFICERS' CONVIVIALITY INTERRUPTED AT PORT ARTHUR.



the sea. M. Cornély, writing in the *Siècle*, anticipated an inevitable reaction upon the domestic situation in Russia. The convulsions, he hinted, might even be such that the Tsar would need all his armies at home. Such a frank statement from a French pen was not without a peculiar significance. The *Journal*, like the *Temps*, emphasised the difficulty which the Russians would experience in dislodging the Japanese from this new base as long as the latter retained command of the sea. While recognising the advantages secured by Japan, which would now be able to concentrate her attention upon Kuropatkin's Army, the *Journal* still nourished hopes of a Russian triumph, and added, "If, as we firmly hope, the friendly and allied nation issues victorious from this severe trial, it must not forget the heroes of Port Arthur, whose self-sacrifice will have prepared that revenge."

The German Press was somewhat academic in its reflections upon the fate of Port Arthur, and the opinions of military experts as to whether Japan had been justified in locking up so many of the troops in order to secure the capture of the fortress were permitted to crowd the columns of the papers to the partial exclusion of broader and more practical views. Still, it was frankly recognised that the capture of Port Arthur was a great moral and material success, and here and there was observable a renewed tinge of apprehension lest German interests in the Far East might not suffer through the masterful manner in which Japan had regained possession of a stronghold almost inconveniently adjacent to the cherished centre of German interests in the Far East, Kiao-chau.

There was little else in the European Press of striking commentary on the new

situation. But a characteristically strong note of satisfaction was sounded in America, which, indeed, had a special right to speak freely on the subject of Port Arthur, since she had never failed to express the strongest opinion on the conduct of Russia, France, and Germany in robbing Japan nine years before of the fruits of her victory over China. For the rest, the people of the United States took it for granted that Japan would keep Port Arthur for all time, and they were content, in the interests of peace, to have it so. But, putting Tsardom, in other words "irresponsible despotism," aside, there was no want of sympathy with Russia as a great Power and a great people, and genuine anxiety was felt lest the continuance of a disastrous struggle in Manchuria might now lead to worse disaster in St. Petersburg.

It would have been fortunate for Russia if the loss of Port Arthur had no more damaging effect upon her prestige than was indicated in the Press of Europe and America. But it goes without saying that far more real detriment was done to her as a World Power by the influence which the surrender had upon the numerous peoples with which Russia directly or indirectly came into contact by reason of her expansion in Asia.

The effect in China was, it is needless to say, immediate. The native Chinese Press may not, according to Western ideas, sway the minds of the nation to any remarkable extent, and, even with such a proof of Russian inferiority before them, the Chinese editors did not think fit to expatiate upon the weakness of a Power which had made itself unpleasantly felt throughout the Celestial kingdom in the past, was still very much in evidence, and might again be able to render the lives of pig-tailed journalists—never

very secure—extremely precarious. The “note” of the Chinese Press was accordingly cautious. The fall of Port Arthur was held to demonstrate not the weakness of Russia but the strength of Japan, and China was urged to follow in the Japanese footsteps and to become equally great. Other straws showed which way the wind blew. At Shanghai, for instance, the local Chinese officials suddenly took a firm stand in regard to the murder of a Chinaman by a Russian sailor, and they even went so far as to demand the surrender of the sailors implicated, in order that they might be tried by a special Chinese court! The astonishment of the Russian consul at this demand must have been instructive to witness.

But Russia looms large in Asiatic connections outside the sphere of her interests in China, and far beyond the circles reached by the quaint little sheets which represent native journalism in the East.

Throughout India, especially northern India, it soon became known that, in addition to previous reverses which might have been accounted for by unpreparedness, Russia had just been compelled by main force to give up a fortress deemed impregnable, and defended by a numerous army, a strong fleet, and many guns. And who were those who had made the “Ooroos” yield up this mighty place of arms? Not the one white people comparable with Russia, not only in greatness and power but also in singular capacity to bend the nations of the East to its will. Not the English had taught the “Ooroos” this lesson, but the Japanese, who until five years ago no one but *pundits* and, possibly, a few *babus* fed up with useless knowledge, had ever heard of.

What wonder if the tidings of this marvellous happening crept swiftly along the Indian borderland and crossed the frontier; provoking hoarse comment among the fanatics in the Kabul bazaars; received with wonderment in the pleasant Persian valleys; and wafted northward until in Bokhara, and Merv, and Khiva it became known that the mysterious Japanese had dealt a terrible blow against the mighty Power which had so long and so assiduously courted the friendliness of the Ameer and the Shah, and had brought into such complete subjection the strongest khanates of Central Asia, the wildest tribes of Turkestan.

The comments of Asiatics on the fall of Port Arthur were, naturally, exaggerated, while it is hardly too much to say that, speaking generally, Continental criticism, at any rate, was either partial or narrow-minded. The real effect of this great event upon the campaign may be said to lie about midway between these two estimates, since, in truth, it was equally remote from the annihilation assumed by the one and the peaceful anticipations of the other. Port Arthur in the hands of Japan continued to be, as it had been in the hands of Russia, of far greater naval than military importance.

The fall of the fortress released some 60,000 to 80,000 Japanese troops, while it added not a man nor a gun to the forces under Kuropatkin, and could not but have a moral effect upon his already somewhat disheartened legions. But none the less the news of the capitulation must have come to Kuropatkin as a distinct relief. Strategically speaking, he was already freed from any real responsibility as regards Port Arthur. He had been pressed against his better judgment to attempt to raise the siege, and he had

failed. For months past there had been imposed upon him the heavier duty of securing the position of his own army, and hitherto that had given him enough work and to spare.

Port Arthur had been "stewing in its own juice," and now the Japanese had lifted the vessel from the fire and transferred the contents to their own plates.

ment, and, although he could not but view the imprisonment of 25,000 brave Russian soldiers with deep regret, it is questionable whether at this juncture such a reinforcement would not have been a frightful strain upon his commissariat.

When, then, the matter comes to be examined closely and dispassionately, the military significance of the fall of Port



Photo: J. Rosenthal.

JAPANESE BATTERY OF 11-INCH GUNS FIRING THE TERRIBLE 500-POUND SHELLS INTO THE DOOMED FORTRESS.

That was unfortunate, and, of course, Kuropatkin knew well that in many parts of Russia he would be blamed for what had occurred. But there must have been some compensation in the thought that the problem before him was one to which he could now give undivided attention. As long as Port Arthur had held out he had been compelled to take it, at any rate sentimentally, into account. Now it had gone there was an end to that embarrass-

ment, and, although he could not but view the imprisonment of 25,000 brave Russian soldiers with deep regret, it is questionable whether at this juncture such a reinforcement would not have been a frightful strain upon his commissariat. When, then, the matter comes to be examined closely and dispassionately, the military significance of the fall of Port Arthur from the Japanese and Russian standpoints does not present any striking divergence. The Japanese had got what they wanted, but the price they had paid had been extremely heavy, exactly how heavy it is not easy to compute. For it must always be a question whether, if the Japanese had been content merely to blockade Port Arthur, they could not have smashed Kuropatkin before he had time to obtain such substantial reinforcements

as he did eventually obtain and made more or less good use of. Then Port Arthur and Vladivostok too might have been worried or starved into submission

classical example of the way in which the value of a fortress may be artificially inflated by sentiment on the part of the attackers as well as on that of the defence.



THE COST OF CONQUEST: THE SCENE AFTER AN ATTACK UPON THE COCKSCOMB FORT.

Facsimile of sketch made on the spot by Mr. Frederick Villiers.

with very little difficulty, assuming that Japan had remained masters at sea.

If Japan was satisfied with the bargain she actually secured, there is not much more to be said on the subject, but to many it will always seem that here was a

From the naval point of view, of course, a totally different set of considerations comes into force. With the command of the sea, Port Arthur is a stronghold indeed. It was so, hypothetically, to Russia at the commencement

of the war, and might again have become so at a much later period if the Russian Navy had not shamefully neglected its duty. If, even after Japan had temporarily asserted her naval supremacy, the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur had been handled solely with a view to crippling the Japanese battleships, the importance of the place might have even been intensified. For, on the subsequent arrival of the Baltic Fleet, which might then have been rendered possible, the value of such a naval base to Russia would have been incalculable. But the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, save for Makaroff, never had a man over it who could rise to the situation. Vitoft's heart failed him at a critical moment, Uhtomsky exhibited what could only be politely described as excess of prudence, and one by one the ships of the Port Arthur Fleet were either sunk, or were disarmed at neutral ports, or fell into Japanese hands, and all this with little or no damage to the naval strength of Japan.

It is not difficult to be wise after the event, but even in Russia there were wise heads in which the conviction was strong that Port Arthur should have been abandoned when once it was clear that, temporarily at any rate, the naval game was "up." Had a really resolute effort been made to evacuate Port Arthur at a comparatively early date there is no question that a certain proportion of both ships and men would have been saved, and that the chances of regaining possession of the fortress, chances which were quite ethereal at the time of the actual surrender, would have substantially improved.

Into the question whether the surrender was a discreditable one it is not necessary to enter judiciously, if only for

the reason that here the question is one largely of national sentiment. The duration of a siege, like the plan of a campaign, cannot always be gauged with accuracy by strict military rules, and many will be disposed to agree with the Japanese that, taking everything into consideration, General Stoessel deserved far more praise than blame. The indictment formulated by Dr. Morrison, the Peking correspondent of the *Times*, whose memorable despatch headed "Discreditable Surrender" created such a painful sensation some three weeks after the surrender, was a formidable one. It ended with these scathing words:—

"All accounts agree in condemning General Stoessel, who, if he had not been checked by the resolution of General Kondratchenko, would have capitulated weeks before. All accounts agree in condemning the majority of the Russian officers, who had more fear of the failure of other comforts than of ammunition. All accounts praise the courage of the Russian rank and file, who were in too many cases shamefully commanded by their officers. All accounts agree that no man who ever held a responsible command less deserved the title of hero than General Stoessel.

"Those who have witnessed the condition of the fortress, contrasting the evidence of their eyes with the astounding misrepresentation of General Stoessel, had their sympathy turned into derision, believing that no more discreditable surrender has been recorded in history.

"Had the Kaiser waited until he had received the reports of the German and other military attachés, he could never have conferred the Order 'Pour le Merite' upon General Stoessel."

This is a hard saying, and coming from the pen of an acute and brilliant

critic, who himself had undergone the perils of a siege at Peking, it is entitled to every respect. But it is impossible to deprive General Stoessel of all the credit of what was unquestionably a great achievement. A siege may be a tremendous strain upon the nerves and resources of a commander, even if he has not to cope with starvation and has still a few rounds of ammunition left. The ordeal to which Port Arthur was subjected had had no parallel in history, if we take into combined account the alarming vigour of the operations against the harbour, the awful intensity of the artillery fire, and the frantic fury of the infantry assaults. It is easy to draw scornful pictures of untouched buildings and well-filled cellars of champagne, but 15,000 men in hospital constitute in themselves a drawback of no common seriousness, and one which the severest critics of poor General Stoessel seemed to treat with singular levity, if not complete forgetfulness.


On the subject of the actual surrender the evidence already quoted of one of the Russian admirals may be regarded by some as even more damning than Dr. Morrison's scornful diatribe. But here again a few pleas may be entered on behalf of one who did not actually capitulate until he had gone through a very protracted and terrible experience with very few rays of comfort or encouragement.

It must first be remembered that General Stoessel was altogether wrongly placed as the responsible chief of a fortress which it would have been far better to have placed under the supreme command of a naval officer. As it was he had to suffer greatly for the incompetence and inactivity of the fleet, while the perpetual bickering among his naval and military subordinates was anything but conducive to enthusiasm and effici-

ency. Secondly, we do not know, shall probably never know, how much in the way of replenishing the stores and of strengthening the defences had to be done after the siege had commenced, and how far the knowledge of deficiencies in the last line of defence contributed to the final surrender.

Finally, there is the broad fact that, even if Port Arthur had held out another month or two no useful purpose could have been served, and it was pretty clearly apparent at the end of December that this was the case. There was no earthly hope of relief, and no possible chance that Port Arthur could afford shelter to the Baltic Squadron. For 24,000 Russians to leave 15,000 sick and wounded behind them and attempt to cut their way out through a cordon of 80,000 Japanese would simply have been to invite a massacre. Many weeks before the Tsar had been criticised for not commanding Stoessel to surrender in the interests of common humanity. Stoessel himself had been called names for his obstinate refusal to consider his garrison. It was not altogether reasonable that, when capitulation came as the almost inevitable result of almost unparalleled pressure, a chorus of indignation should have arisen because it had been found that possibly Port Arthur might have held out, though with precisely the same result in the end, a few weeks longer.

We have left to the end of this chapter the few words we have to say on the reception of the news of the fall of Port Arthur in Russia. A painful feature was the stupefaction produced among the lower classes, who had been carefully educated into the belief that such a disaster was not possible, and whose simple religious convictions were shocked by the loss of a place for which their Emperor



A NEAR VIEW OF 203 METRE HILL FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE, BEFORE ITS CAPTURE.
The destructive character of the Japanese shells is evidenced by the enormous rents in the surface of the hill. In the foreground are some gruesome indications of the severity of the struggle.

had said so many prayers. Among the shop-keeping classes it was thought that the chariot-wheels of internal reform would be accelerated by a calamity for which bureaucracy was so clearly to blame. In official and military circles there was at first a marked disposition to praise General Stoessel for having acted according to dictates of humanity, after compelling the admiration of the whole world by his protracted resistance. Later, these sentiments undoubtedly underwent modification, but certainly the earlier reception of the news by the bureaucracy savoured little of humiliation or despair. Not that emotion of one sort or another was not freely exhibited. The St. Petersburg correspondent of a Paris paper declared that he saw officers weeping freely at the club. To the office of the General Staff came relatives and friends of officers in the garrison "trembling with anguish" to ask for news. They all wanted to telegraph for details, and to know what fate was reserved for the prisoners.

On January 13th at Tsarkoe Selo, in the presence of the Tsar, the Tsaritsa, and the Imperial Family, a solemn requiem was celebrated in memory of those who fell at Port Arthur, and on January 14th the Tsar issued an Order of the Day to the Army and Navy with reference to the loss of the fortress. It ran as follows:—

"Port Arthur has fallen into the hands of the enemy. The struggle for its defence lasted eleven months, and for over seven months the glorious garrison was cut off from the outside world. Deprived of help and without murmuring, the garrison endured the privations of the siege and moral tortures, while the enemy

continued to gain successes. Unsparring of life and blood, a handful of Russians sustained the enemy's furious onslaughts in the firm hope of relief. With pride Russia witnessed their deeds of heroism, and the whole world bowed before their heroic spirit. The resources gave out, while the onset of fresh hostile forces was constant; and the garrison, its deed of heroism accomplished, had to yield to superior numbers. Peace to the ashes of the dead, and eternal memory to the never-to-be-forgotten Russians who perished in the defence of Port Arthur! Far away from Russia, you died for Russia's cause, filled with love for the Emperor and the Fatherland. Glory be to you the living! May God heal your wounds and give you the strength and the patience to bear your sore trials!

"Our enemy is bold and strong, and the struggle with him at a distance of 10,000 versts from the sources of our strength is indescribably hard. But Russia is powerful. In the thousand years of her life there have been still harder trials, still more threatening dangers. Every time she emerged stronger and with fresh power from the struggle. Our failures have been severe. While we lament our losses we will not allow ourselves to be led into distraction. With all Russia I trust that the hour of victory will soon dawn, and pray to God that He may bless my dear troops and fleets in order that, united, they may overthrow the enemy and uphold the honour and glory of Russia."

With this Imperial tribute to the gallant defenders, a tribute marked by no little eloquence and dignity, our story of the siege and fall of Port Arthur may appropriately be closed.



RUSSIAN PEASANT TYPES.

CHAPTER LXXX.

TROUBLE LOOMING IN RUSSIA—THE BLESSING OF THE NEVA—SENSATIONAL INCIDENT—STRIKES AT ST. PETERSBURG—FATHER GAPON—PETITION TO THE TSAR—RED SUNDAY — SHAMEFUL SLAUGHTER — FURTHER REPRESSION — SPREAD OF THE MOVEMENT.

IT would be erroneous to suggest that the fall of Port Arthur was primarily responsible for the startling series of events at St. Petersburg which followed it. At the same time it is impossible not to suppose that this gigantic disaster, so obviously due to an unhappy mixture of Imperial obstinacy and bureaucratic bungling, did not have a serious influence upon a public now at last beginning to see the war in its true light, and already wavering in its former blind allegiance to the idea of an all-powerful Russia and a wholly beneficent Tsar. For many weeks before the surrender of the fortress a growing tendency to call a spade a spade had been observable in the Russian capital, and, though the actual loss of Port Arthur came as no surprise, and was attended by no particular demonstrations against

the ruling powers, there can be no question that it intensified the resentment of the working classes against the Government, and stiffened their determination to make some sort of firm and combined stand against their cynical and overbearing masters.

The storm did not burst suddenly. As far back as the second week of December serious riots had taken place in St. Petersburg in furtherance of what had come to be known as the Russian Reform movement, which was, in plain language, an agitation for a Constitution, and a Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen. On December 25th the Tsar had issued an Imperial Ukase to the Senate, in which a revision of the peasant laws was ordered, ostensibly with the idea of enabling the peasant community to enjoy to the full the rights of

a free and privileged country people. Judicial reforms were also indicated, and hopes held out that persons of all classes should be equal before the law, and that the independence of all judicial authorities should be assured. But these high-sounding promises came too late to stay the course of a movement which was being rapidly merged into the semblance, if not the reality, of a revolution. A public, which a few months before might have been pacified by a few kindly words from the Tsar, now dared to discuss his "reform proposals" in a very independent and unfriendly spirit.

A marked sensation was created by the publication of a letter addressed to the Minister of the Interior by Prince Troubetskoi, President of the Moscow Zemstvo, or Elective Municipal Council, in which attention was frankly called to the state of internal unrest, and to the fact that what had occurred was not merely the result of youthful effervescence, but rather the reflection of the existing general condition of society. In this remarkable communication it was urged that the Tsar should allow himself to be approached by those who represented the great forces at work, and so avert an almost certain revolution.

Although no steps were taken to punish Prince Troubetskoi for this outspoken letter, the authorities made strenuous efforts in other directions to combat the growing agitation. Meetings were suppressed, demonstrations checked, but the violence employed tended only to rouse the revolutionary element to reprisals. An attempt was made on the life of the Chief of Police at Ekaterinoslaf, and fatal riots took place at Warsaw, in which the troops were fired upon from the crowd, and a non-commissioned officer of the *gendarmerie* was shot dead.

At St. Petersburg the disaffection took the form of extended strikes, more especially among the *employés* at the great Putiloff, the Neva ship-building, and other leading works, and by January 18th the number of strikers in the Russian capital was estimated at 50,000.

While matters throughout Russia were in this generally combustible state an incident occurred which drew the attention of the whole civilised world very forcibly to the possibilities of the situation. On January 18th the Tsar took part in the annual ceremony of Blessing the Neva, which marks the Epiphany in the Russian Church Calendar. The ceremony, as usual, was one of great impressiveness, taking place in the immediate vicinity of the Winter Palace, opposite to the grand entrance of which a small wooden chapel had been built on the ice near the river banks. Steps from the chapel led down through a hole cut in the thick ice. The ceremony consists in the thrice-repeated immersion by the Metropolitan of his great gold Cross. The Metropolitan then stoops over the opening in the ice, and makes the gesture of dipping into the river his gold chalice, which has previously been filled with water from the Jordan. The chalice is then handed to the Tsar, the Metropolitan pronouncing a prayer that the river may not overflow its banks, and that the Divine blessing may rest upon the ships which ride upon the Neva's waters. The Emperor raises the chalice to his lips, a signal rocket is fired to show that the ceremony is over, and an Imperial salute is fired from a battery of guns posted on the Bourse Quay at a distance of about 400 yards on the other side of the river.

From the description furnished to the *Daily Mail* by its special correspondent, Mr. Hands, we learn that up to the

moment of the firing of the salute the ceremony had passed off with its accustomed stately calm. About noon the Tsar, attended by his Personal Staff, inspected detachments from every regiment in the St. Petersburg military district, which, after inspection, fell in with their colours behind the Imperial party. At one o'clock a procession was formed, which, moving out from the Palace, crossed the quay to the chapel on the ice-bound river. The Tsar and his Staff, in which were included many members of the Imperial Family, were received at the chapel by the Metropolitan gorgeously arrayed in tall gold-fronted headgear, and vestments heavily embroidered with gold and jewels. The military detachments ranged up on three sides of a square to form a guard, and, when the Epiphany Service had been chanted by the priests, the Metropolitan performed the blessing ceremony detailed above, and the Tsar drank the Jordan water from the golden chalice.

As the guns on the opposite bank thundered forth the Imperial salute it was noticed that the third report was harsher in sound than the two first, and simultaneously one of the line of *gendarmerie* guarding the pavement on the Palace Quay was seen to fall forward on his face. It was at first thought that the man had been overcome by the cold, but on raising him he was found to be bleeding from a wound in the head. A little later it transpired that several windows in the Palace had been broken, and the façade above the grand entrance damaged by bullets, and the ugly fact became apparent that these bullets must have come from a round of shrapnel or "case" fired from one of the guns of the saluting battery.

Thanks largely to the demeanour of

the Tsar, who did all he could to affect disregard of the incident, no public excitement immediately followed. The ceremony was solemnly concluded, the Tsar walked back with his suite to the Palace, and there held a reception, conversing with the ladies of the Court and with various diplomatists, and endeavouring in every way to inspire those around him with the belief that what had happened was merely an untoward incident. Meanwhile a messenger had galloped over the bridge which here spans the Neva, and prompt steps were taken to place the whole of the officers and men of the battery which had fired the salute under arrest. The battery in question belonged to the Horse Artillery of the Guard, and was commanded by Captain Davydoff. An official inquiry into the circumstances was immediately ordered, and a reassuring official statement was issued to the effect that an "accident" had occurred, resulting in the wounding of a policeman and the shattering of a few windows.

The finding of the Court-Martial appointed to try those concerned in this remarkable occurrence may be anticipated to the extent of saying that the absence of malicious intent was held to be definitely proved, but that all the battery officers and two of the gunners were sentenced to various punishments for neglect of duty. But, even had this official conclusion been arrived at forthwith, it is unlikely that it would have gone far to diminish the sensation which had been created by the news that shots from a gun supposed to be firing blank cartridge and belonging to a battery of the Artillery of the Guard had passed within a few feet of the sacred person of the Tsar. For some time even the Russian police openly held that the occur-




Photo: Druzh.

THE CEREMONY OF THE BLESSING OF THE NEVA.



rence was the result of a deliberate attempt on the Tsar's life, and, despite the finding of the Court-Martial, it will always remain to the outside world a singular coincidence that a loaded shell should have been in this particular gun at the suggestive moment when it happened to be pointed in the direction of the spot on which the Tsar must have been clearly seen by the gunners to be standing.

Incidentally it is rather interesting that the Captain Davydoff who was concerned in this strange episode, and who was subsequently sentenced by Court-Martial to dismissal from the Army and internment in a fortress for a year and a half, was the great grandson of one of the famous aristocratic revolutionaries known as "Decembrists" or "Decabrist" who, in 1825, assembled in front of the Winter Palace shouting, "Down with Nicholas! Long live Constantine!" That demonstration was quickly crushed by Nicholas, who ordered artillery to be taken on the roof of the Palace in order to fire on the rebels. Davydoff, among others, was transported to Siberia. The Captain Davydoff of the Neva incident was the son of a well-known judge, and nephew of the celebrated composer Tchaïkovsky. He was much esteemed, and the Tsar is said to have entertained a strong personal liking for the ill-starred Guardsman.

The crop of rumours and surmises concerning this supposed attempt on the life of the Tsar might have been even more luxuriant than it was had not another Russian happening of much more tragic significance intervened to occupy the attention of Europe. Allusion has already been made to the progress of the strikes in St. Petersburg, and, without going into details, it may be briefly stated that at the close of the third week in January

the movement had attained positively threatening dimensions. Some of the strikes were distinctly serious from a patriotic standpoint, since they involved the stoppage of naval construction and other urgent work in connection with the preparation of war material. Apart from this, the attitude of the men was very disquieting, a strong disinclination to listen to reason, and a tendency to resort to violent measures being everywhere observable, notwithstanding demonstrations on the part of the police and the military.

At the Putiloff works the negotiations with the management were conducted on behalf of the strikers by Father Georges Gapon, whose name was destined to become very prominent in connection with the domestic history of St. Petersburg during the next few days. This man, who was about thirty-five years of age, was the son of a peasant, and was by birth a Ruthenian; that is to say, he belonged to that branch of the Little Russian division of the Slav race which dwells on both sides of the Carpathians, in Galicia and North-West Hungary. While a student at the Theological Academy in St. Petersburg he had taken a very active part in the work of an institution having for its object the dissemination of religious knowledge and ethical teaching among the working classes, and, as head of one of the branches of this institution, he had visited many of the factories, and had been appalled by the conditions of life he found existing there. After leaving the Academy he had founded a Workmen's Union, and since 1898 he had laboured in the interests of this organisation, preaching and teaching in the suburbs of the capital, and winning much popularity among the factory hands. He is

described as a man of commanding personality, with flashing eyes, and of a fiery eloquence.

On Friday, January 20th, a strange scene was witnessed in St. Petersburg. At daylight the strikers from the Putiloff works marched through the industrial suburbs, calling upon the men in the various factories on the way to join them. Swollen by fresh contingents, the procession drew along the left bank of the Neva, and then crossed over the frozen river to the great industrial quarter known as Vassili Ostroff, where further factories contributed their quota, and many establishments were hurriedly closed through fear of pillage. But there was no violence on the part either of the strikers or the police. Having accomplished their purpose of calling out the men from practically all the great factories in the capital, the organisers of the procession ordered a peaceful dispersal, after arranging for a monster demonstration on Sunday, at which it was proposed to present a petition to the Tsar. From the paraphrase of this petition which was telegraphed by Reuter's correspondent, the following are typical extracts:—

“Sire,—We have arrived at the extreme limits of endurance. We have reached the terrible moment when death is to be preferred to the continuation of our intolerable sufferings. We have left our work, and declared to our employers that we will not resume till our demand is conceded. We have not asked much. We have asked but the means of livelihood, without which life is a burden and labour a continual torture.”

After begging for an investigation into their case, and pleading for an eight hours day and other concessions, the petitioners continued—

“We have been exploited, and we shall continue to be exploited under your bureaucracy. Any one of us who dared to raise his voice in the interests of the people and the working classes has been thrown into prison or transported. Kindness and good feeling have been treated as a crime. The bureaucracy has brought the country to the verge of ruin, and by a shameful war is bringing it to its downfall. We have no voice in the heavy burdens imposed upon us; we do not even know for whom or why this money is wrung from the impoverished people, and we do not know how it is expended. This state of things is contrary to the Divine laws, and renders life impossible. It were better that we should all perish, we workmen and all Russia; then good luck to the capitalists and exploiters of the poor, to corrupt officials and robbers of the Russian people.

“Assembled before your Palace, we plead for our salvation. Refuse not your aid, raise your people from their tomb, and give them the means of working out their own destiny. Rescue them from the intolerable yoke of officialdom; throw down the wall that separates you from your people in order that they may rule with you the country which was created for the happiness of the people—a happiness which is being wrenched from us, leaving us nothing but sorrow and humiliation. Receive favourably our demands, inspired as they are with a desire for your and our own good, and by the knowledge of the necessity of emerging from the intolerable situation. Russia is too great, and her needs are too diverse and manifold, for officials alone to rule. National representation is indispensable, for the people alone know its real needs. Do not reject its assistance, accept it, and order at once the convocation of re-

representatives of all classes, including the working classes. Let all be equal and free in the right of election. Direct, therefore, that the elections for the Constitutional Assembly be made by general secret ballot. That is our chief demand. Everything is contained therein; it is the sole balm for our wounds, which will otherwise bring us promptly to our death. But one measure alone will not suffice to heal all our wounds, and consequently we point out to you, frankly and openly as to a father, other measures in the name of the whole Russian working classes."

On Saturday, January 21st, a deputation of three workmen proceeded to Tsarkoe Selo with the futile intention of delivering a copy of this petition to the Tsar in order that he might have a day on which to consider it. As a last appeal Father Gapon despatched to the Tsar the following letter:—


"Sovereign,—I fear the Ministers have not told you the full truth about the situation. The whole people, trusting in you, have resolved to appear at the Winter Palace at two o'clock in the afternoon in order to inform you of their needs. If, vacillating, you do not appear before the people, then you tear the moral bonds between you and the people. Trust in you will disappear, because innocent blood will flow between you and the people. Appear to-morrow before your people, and receive our address of devotion in a courageous spirit. I and the representatives of labour and my brave working men comrades guarantee the inviolability of your person."

During the Saturday the strikers behaved with complete moderation, the demonstrators who crowded the streets making no attempt to interfere with the traffic, and abstaining carefully from any-

thing like violence. Fifty men were told off to act as bodyguard to Father Gapon, and a further picked body of 400 was sworn in to act as a guard to the Tsar in the event of his Majesty consenting to confer with the strike leaders.


Meanwhile the authorities had been busy with measures contrasting painfully with the touching confidence of the strikers in the magnanimity of their autocratic Sovereign. All the cavalry regiments had been called in from the districts round St. Petersburg with the object of forming a cordon round the Palace, and an infantry division was also brought from Reval to aid the normal garrison of the capital in dealing with the poor wretches who so fondly hoped that an appeal in the name of common humanity would have some effect upon the "Little Father" of an oppressed race.

The morning of Sunday, January 22nd, broke fine and cloudless, and until ten o'clock there was little in the aspect of the city to betoken a coming tragedy. There were as yet no troops even in the Palace Square, the bridges across the Neva were still open to traffic, church bells were ringing, and St. Petersburg, in its cloak of fresh-fallen snow, presented everywhere the aspect of outward peace. But at the hour named a general movement of troops began to take place, detachment after detachment marching out of quarters, and passing along the thoroughfares of the industrial suburbs. Soon at every point where there were cross-roads detachments were posted, and all the bridges, especially those leading to Vassili Ostroff, were strongly held. A little later, into the great square in front of the Winter Palace regiments of the Guards trooped out from the Palace courtyards, the Czarina's own Regiment



FATHER GAPON'S FRUITLESS APPEAL.

The industrial quarter of Yassili Ostroff was the scene of several attacks by the troops both on "Red Sunday" and on the following Monday. Many men round Father Gapon were killed and wounded.



THE PRECINCTS OF THE WINTER PALACE, ST. PETERSBURG.

of Cuirassiers, mounted on black horses, the Preobrajensky, Paulovsky, and Grenadersky Guards in their striking uniforms, the officers conspicuous by their glittering appointments, and the spectacular element still predominating in the whole display. But the last regiment had hardly wheeled into its place in the Square when elsewhere in the city the conflict had begun which was to make a Red Sunday of this beautiful white morning, and to befoul the name of the master of these resplendent soldiers with undying horror.

At ten o'clock a procession of about 15,000 workmen left the neighbourhood of the Putiloff works, and marched towards the Narva Gate, where a body of troops and police were concentrating. With the men walked Father Gapon, escorted by his bodyguard, and dressed in his ordinary clothes, it having been his intention to array himself in his vestments at a later stage in the march, so certain was he that the procession would not be impeded. With Father Gapon were attendants carrying holy pictures

and the Tsar's portrait. At the head of the procession marched two priests in vestments, and carrying crosses in their hands. The demonstrators comforted themselves with the thought that even if anything in the nature of a collision with the soldiery took place the latter would take no serious action. "Why should soldiers harm us?" they said; "they are our brothers, they think as we think." In the ranks were women and children, for the workers had said the night before, when Father Gapon had warned them that the Government was obdurate, that they would go with their wives and children to the Winter Palace to bespeak their Sovereign's gracious intervention in the quarrel with their immediate masters. "Our Tsar is a good man. He has little children of his own," they said, "and he will see we have justice." And so they trudged on singing, "God save Thy people. Give victory to our Orthodox Emperor."


At eleven o'clock the procession was brought to a halt at one of the bridges by two sotnias of Cossacks, who were

drawn up in five rows completely barring the way. The Cossacks tried to turn the strikers first with whips, then with the flat of their sabres, but the procession showed no signs of backing, and the order was given to fire three volleys of blank cartridge. At this some of the strikers fled over the ice on the Neva, but the remainder stood firm, and implored the Cossacks to let them pass, urging that the reforms which they were seeking would improve the lot of the Cossacks as well as their own. But the Cossacks were obdurate, and sent back a galloper for reinforcements. Fresh troops came up, rifles were loaded with ball cartridge, a bugle rang out, another volley was fired, and the head of the strikers' column became in an instant a ghastly huddled mass of dead and wounded. One of the priests at the head of the procession was wounded, and the holy pictures and the portrait of the Tsar were riddled with bullet-holes. Some of the leading demonstrators who had been wounded or thrown to the ground—

Father Gapon among them—crawled into neighbouring houses, and the remainder fled, leaving, according to one account, 300 dead and 500 wounded.

What happened here was repeated in several other quarters. Every procession found its way barred, and on attempting to advance was met by volleys, which mowed down scores of unarmed men, and many women. Only in one instance did the soldiers show any reluctance to fire upon the strikers. A crowd coming from Vassili Ostroff was stopped by a strong force of cavalry and infantry. The strike-leaders appealed to the soldiers, not to fire upon their brothers, and a number of infantry laid down their rifles. But the cavalry, obeying orders, charged the demonstrators, and wounded many with their swords. Between eleven and twelve there were half a-dozen collisions, all resulting in volleys or charges in which the wretched strikers were killed or wounded with little or no attempt at reprisals.

Meanwhile, a terrible climax had also



THE GRAND ENTRANCE, WINTER PALACE, ST. PETERSBURG.

been reached in the Palace Square. Here the workmen had been gathering by twos and threes, until some thousands were assembled in close proximity to the troops. About noon the officer in command ordered the crowd to disperse, and, no movement being apparent, tried the usual expedient of firing blank volleys. Some of those in front tried to retreat, but were pressed on by those behind. The cavalry now tried to push back the crowd by pressing forward their horses at a walk. This again proved useless. A volley with ball cartridge followed, and the strikers, not pent up here as at the bridges, and maddened at the sight of the dead and wounded, still pressed on with a roar of anger. The cavalry drew their swords and charged, another volley was fired, and soon the Palace Square was a reeking shambles. The snow was trampled into blood-stained slush, and not until half-past two was the place cleared of the populace, now quite infuriated and heedless of the weapons of the soldiery.

Throughout the afternoon and early evening the carnage continued, more charges were delivered by the Cossacks down the great Nevsky Prospect, and another deadly volley was fired on the Palace Bridge. In Vassili Ostroff there was incessant fighting, the workers dragging down the telegraph poles, making entanglements across the streets with wires, and using the poles as weapons against the troops. Stones were hurled especially at the officers, who were hooted and asked with angry jeers why they were not fighting the Japanese instead of their own countrymen. Of ghastly incidents there was a grim abundance. An aged general was dragged from his sledge and beaten and trampled to death. Twenty-six children who were

playing on the ice in the Alexander Square were killed or wounded by the firing.

Night fell on a city terrorised by slaughter, and the next morning the whole civilised world shuddered at the news of the awful punishment inflicted by an irresponsible despotism upon hundreds of poor wretches whose only crime had been a childlike yearning to lay their grievances before their mighty ruler. The disgust, the withering contempt, of most dwellers in free countries were intensified when it transpired that this puissant Autocrat, not content with hiding himself from his people behind a cordon of soldiery, well knowing that the latter had been ordered to slay or maim all who sought nearer access to the Palace, had fled to Tsarkoe Selo in the hope of placing a yet more comfortable interval between him and his hapless subjects. No Sovereign ever had a greater opportunity of proving himself great than was offered to Nicholas of Russia on the morning of this Red Sunday. No Sovereign could have more completely forfeited than he did the goodwill of those at home and the respect of all thinking and honourable men abroad.

Coupled with outspoken expressions of horror and reprobation throughout Europe and America there were many sinister prophecies as to the inevitable result of this frightful massacre. But for the moment, the shocking severity with which the authorities dealt with the situation was effective as far as checking the progress of the revolution in St. Petersburg was concerned. On the night of January 22nd the capital was in a condition of terrible suspense, accentuated by the fact that the strikers had been joined by the *employés* at the electric light works, and that consequently many quarters of the city were plunged in dark-

ness. It was feared that the revolutionaries might next morning obtain arms, and that further and still more sanguinary conflicts might ensue. But, although

between St. Petersburg and Moscow ceased; in Moscow itself another large strike was commenced, and news of serious disturbances in other parts of



NEVSKY PROSPECT, ST. PETERSBURG.

there was still a good deal of incidental rioting, and a general state of panic prevailed, there was no organised opposition on a large scale to the military measures which continued in force. The newspapers were stopped, the train service

Russia was fitfully circulated. Although unconnected with the industrial strike movement, a simultaneous outbreak of mutiny among the sailors at Sevastopol, resulting in the wholesale destruction of naval works and barracks, created a most

serious impression of extended disorder. But for the time being the revolutionary movement, at any rate in St. Petersburg, had been strangled, and in another week,



"MAXIM GORKY."

despite all gloomy forebodings and some disquieting incidents, the city had resumed its normal aspect.

During the week in question the Government policy of repression was pursued with unflinching vigour. On January 24th an Imperial Decree was issued, creating the new post of Governor-General of St. Petersburg, to which General Trepoff, ex-Minister of Police at Moscow, was forthwith appointed. This official had an unenviable reputation for arrogance and heavy-handedness, and his selection for the newly-formed office was at once accepted as the signal for a series of indiscriminately harsh measures. General Trepoff's performances did not belie the popular anticipation. The mili-

tary having maintained their occupation of all the principal strategic points, and an attempt on the part of a mob to march to Tsarkoe Selo with a fresh petition having been sharply checked, the police were given special orders to "act with energy," orders which they carried out with characteristic alacrity and thoroughness. Arrests were freely made among persons of the better class who were suspected of revolutionary tendencies, and who had taken part in meetings, or had been connected with propaganda antagonistic to the Government and its methods. By this means a number of inconveniently loud voices were silenced, and, the system being extended, many troublesome critics were brought into Trepoff's net, including, among others, the famous Russian author, "Maxim Gorky," who was arrested at Riga, and brought to St. Petersburg. As "Maxim Gorky" had somewhat freely identified himself with the workmen's cause, General Trepoff was at first inclined to give him short shrift, but eventually, owing perhaps, in some measure to strong protests in the European Press against the summary removal of a literary genius of such international value, he was released from prison, and sent back to Riga under strict surveillance.

To the strikers a special proclamation was issued in which strong allusion was made to the "evil-disposed persons" who, for the execution of their own designs, and "by means of false and impossible promises," had led the workmen astray. The proclamation went on to say that the Government was now, as ever, ready to listen attentively to the just desires of the working classes, and to satisfy their demands as far as possible,

But an indispensable preliminary to any action in this direction was a return of the strikers to their employment. The proclamation was accompanied by police intimations to the effect that those who did not within a very short space of time resume work would be deported to the villages. These pronouncements soon had a marked effect. The strikers perceived that for the present they were powerless to cope with the forces which the Government could readily bring against them, and, accepting the inevitable, the majority returned to work, and the great strike was over.

But it must not be supposed that the triumph of Autocracy was final, or even temporarily complete. Not only did disturbances continue for many weeks to arise in other parts of Russia ; not only did a later lurid incident at the capital show how bureaucracy, and especially that section of it with which the Grand Dukes were personally connected, was still an object of dangerous detestation among the lower orders of the Russian people. An even more serious blow to Imperial Russia was the loss of the confidence formerly placed by the proletariat in the Tsar. Father Gapon had written on the evening of Red Sunday, "There is no Tsar now. Innocent blood has flowed between him and his people. Long live the struggle for freedom!" Not all that a Government with such a weapon as Trepoff in its hands might do could obliterate the memory of that awful day when St. Petersburg ran with the blood of unarmed workmen and their

wives and the children, while an Emperor hid himself in cowardly seclusion out of reach of the entreaties of those who merely prayed the rights of citizenship ; out of hearing of the shrieks of those cut down and shot because they vainly fancied they would get simple justice from the "Great White Tsar."

In connection with the spread of the revolutionary movement in Russia certain incidents occurred in which this country was directly interested, and the occurrence of which at such a juncture was



GENERAL TREPOFF.

sharply indicative of a very bitter feeling against Great Britain among the Russian official classes. At Moscow the police thought fit to post in all the streets copies

of a telegram purporting to come from the *Agence Latine*, of Paris, in which the extraordinary statement was made that the disorders at the Admiralty works in St. Petersburg, Libau, and Sevastopol, and at the coal-pits in Westphalia, had been provoked by the Japanese, assisted by their Allies in Europe! It was suggested that the object of the Anglo-Japanese league was to hinder the naval

ment. The latter promised that an inquiry should be instituted, and steps taken to prevent any repetition of such publications. With much *bonhomie* the officials at the Ministry ridiculed the idea that any such charge as that contained in the objectionable telegram would meet with general acceptance. "Unfortunately," said one of them pleasantly, "they are our own Japanese who are at



WORKMEN OF ST. PETERSBURG.

reinforcements, and it was added that enormous sums of money had been sent to Russia from England in order to organise a workmen's revolt.

The mere publication of such a monstrous charge in a country the Press of which is so well under control as it is in Russia would have savoured of unfriendliness. But that the telegram should have been deliberately disseminated by the police was a serious matter. The British colony in Moscow immediately informed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg of what had occurred, and he forthwith made a strong representation on the subject to the Russian Govern-

ment. The latter promised that an inquiry should be instituted, and steps taken to prevent any repetition of such publications. With much *bonhomie* the officials at the Ministry ridiculed the idea that any such charge as that contained in the objectionable telegram would meet with general acceptance. "Unfortunately," said one of them pleasantly, "they are our own Japanese who are at the bottom of the disturbances." But meanwhile, the Prefect of Odessa had issued a proclamation to the local workmen, in which the calumnies of the *Agence Latine* were repeated. A day or two later placards similar to those exhibited in Moscow were posted in Libau, bearing the signature of the Governor of Courland. This was manifestly intolerable, and, accordingly, Sir Charles Hardinge's protest was renewed in a very vigorous fashion. He pointed out that such proceedings could not but have a deplorable effect, and hinted plainly that the existing friendly relations were being wantonly endangered.



MARTYRS IN THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM.

On the Palace side of the Neva Cossacks and gendarmes guarded the avenues to the Trinity Bridge. One of the earliest collisions occurred here between the military and the people, and 200 strikers were shot dead.

The Russian Government now took action, and every trace of the telegram was removed. It transpired that the *Agence Latine* was a hole-and-corner affair of no standing, and it was generally regretted that such a trivial institution should have been afforded the opportunity of doing so much genuine mischief.

this fresh outrage was that the soldiers had got completely out of hand, and that a combination of excitement and vodka had made them incapable of discriminating between rioters and the official representatives of a foreign Power.

In Poland the disturbances continued for many weeks almost without inter-



GRAND DUKE VLADIMIR.


Another untoward incident of the outbreak in Russia took place in Warsaw on January 28th. In the course of the rioting Mr. Murray, the British Consul-General, and the pro-Consul were attacked by soldiers, and the pro-Consul, who was a Russian subject, was injured by a sword-cut. Here, again, pressing representations were made by Sir Charles Hardinge. The explanation offered for

rupture. But there is no need here to follow further the progress of the outbreak, sufficient having been said to indicate the character of the movement and the extent of its influence upon the war. There is little doubt that it was at one time almost universally expected that a general revolution throughout Russia would overthrow the reigning dynasty, and bring the war to a dramatic and

sudden end. That it did not do so was attributed by some not so much to the stern measures of repression adopted by the Government as to the fact that the Russian masses were not yet fitted for a Constitution.

But at this point the relation of earlier aspects of the outbreak to the war ceases, and the painful narrative of internal disorders may, accordingly, be checked, to be resumed later by the discussion of a fresh episode so startling and tragic as to afford a new standpoint from which to view these extraordinary embarrassments of a belligerent nation. Meanwhile, it will be understood that, moral

influence apart, the outbreak reacted materially upon Russia's warlike resources, delaying as it did the preparation and despatch of supplies and stores, and effectively hindering the mobilisation of reinforcements. In a sense it was even more disastrous to Russia's chances of success, for it made the Tsar and his Grand Ducal advisers anxious to create a diversion, and led to the imposition upon Kuropatkin of a line of action fraught with the gravest consequences at a critical moment when a patient and persevering regulation of the forces available at the front might have produced very different results.



BRITISH EMBASSY, ST. PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LXXXI.

ON THE SHA-HO—CONDITION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES—KUROPATKIN'S GOOD SPIRITS—
TYPICAL ENCOUNTERS—TRYING TO PIERCE THE LINE—MISHTCHENKO'S RAID—
RAILWAY WRECKING—ATTACK ON A STORE DEPOT—CHINESE NEUTRALITY VIOLATED.

IN Chapter LXXIV. the story of the operations in the region of the Sha-ho was brought down to about the middle of December. The ensuing six weeks which are covered by the present chapter constitute a period not, perhaps, of sensational importance, but extremely interesting for a variety of strong reasons. The military significance of this interval was twofold. In the first place there were two enormous armies in close touch along an immense front, armies so powerful and alert that, notwithstanding the severity of the season, and the natural reluctance to take costly risks, the revelation of any distinct weakness on the one side would inevitably have been followed by a swift attempt on the other to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered. Secondly, as we shall see, this period was actually marked by a very striking example of the cavalry raid. But, apart from these military considerations, we have to remember that from the middle of December to the end of January events were taking place far away from the banks of the Sha-ho, which could not but gravely influence morally, if not materially, the progress of the operations in that direction.

For the correct weighing of this last reflection the two previous chapters have been a useful preparation. The writer has already expressed the belief that, all things being considered, the news of

the fall of Port Arthur must have come as something of a relief to Kuropatkin personally. But, none the less, the positive tidings of such a disaster could not fail to produce throughout his army a feeling of very grave depression, if not of utter gloom. The Russian authorities at home were evidently apprehensive of this result, for, with singular fatuity, they withheld all news of the capitulation from the army at Mukden, and the announcement of the loss of Port Arthur was made to the Generalissimo of the Russian armies in the field by his immediate antagonist. According to the Mukden correspondent of the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger*, Marshal Oyama addressed a letter to General Kuropatkin, in which he announced the surrender of the fortress, and expressed his admiration for its gallant defenders. The correspondent added that the effect of the news was overwhelming, since, during the last few days, information had been received which seemed to warrant the hope that the defence would be prolonged. "The impression created was, therefore, that of a sudden disaster, which it was felt must inevitably influence the situation on the Sha-ho."

Of the effect created upon the army at the front by such news as was permitted to reach it concerning the outbreak at home it is impossible to speak clearly and conclusively, but it goes without say-



Photo: Collier's Weekly.

IN DEFENCE OF MUKDEN: THE QUARTERS OF THE TOMSKY REGIMENT AT KU-AN-SHAN.

This picture, taken in the late autumn of 1904, shows that the Russians had already made preparations for the winter by excavating "burrows" in the ground. These subterranean chambers were covered with millet stalks, as here shown, and formed a tolerable protection against the cold.

ing that the troops, a large proportion of whom were reservists fresh from home, were profoundly moved by the terrifying intelligence of the strikes and their results. What made the situation more dreadful was the fact, to which the war correspondent of one of the Russian papers drew particular attention, that from the start the Russian soldiers in the field had been keenly interested in the prospect of domestic reform. About the middle of December they were beginning to talk of little else. They seemed to understand thoroughly the meaning of the reforms, and it was rather a pathetic circumstance that these simple fighting-men should attribute the movement to the desire to reward the army for the hardships it was enduring. "The idea," said the correspondent of the *Russ*, telegraphing from Mukden, "has infused new life into them, together with the desire to finish off the Japanese quickly in order to get home to live as men with liberties." The revulsion of feeling produced by the news of "Red Sunday," and the deepening conviction that the immediate prospects of internal Russia lay rather in the direction of anarchy than in that of reform, can be better imagined than described.

As to the state of the Japanese troops in Manchuria during this period, there is little or no information available beyond what has already been utilised in Chapter LXXIV. In a telegram from Reuter's correspondent with General Oku's army, which was despatched by way of Fusan on December 18th, a serious shortage of fuel and food was regarded as imminent; but if the Japanese soldiers suffered in this way, they kept the fact to themselves, and there is certainly no indication of exhaustion or privation in their subsequent performances.

As to the actual condition of the Russian armies there were conflicting reports. According to one authority, the frightfully cold nights worked havoc with General Kuropatkin's forces, 700 men being reported to have died from exposure. "Messages to the highest quarters have been received from General Kuropatkin, bitterly complaining of the tardiness of the commissariat department in sending supplies necessary to the soldiers, who are insufficiently clothed to meet the rigours of a winter campaign, and insisting that until there is better organisation military operations are impossible. The supplies which are arriving are of an exceedingly poor quality, and are insufficient in quantity. General Mavis has, by special order of the Tsar, gone to Moscow, empowered to examine all stores sent to the Far East. His first examination of a trainload of goods showed the necessity of his presence. A large portion of the stores were reported as useless, and much of the rest as not of a particularly high character. Eleven hundred pieces of clothing described as 'warm overcoats' delivered by a Moscow firm had to be rejected. General Mavis is remaining at Moscow to continue investigations."

Here is another and different picture:—

"The Russian camps present a picturesque appearance. The sides of the hills and the fields around the villages are dotted with mud huts and the little chimneys of the dug outs, from which the smoke is rising. Even more comfortable than the officers' quarters in Chinese houses are the huts of the private soldiers, which are well built and roomy, with small glass windows, and provided with sheet-iron stoves. The men have every comfort possible, including great

quantities of warm clothing and heat-producing food.

“The transport is working well, as the roads are frozen hard, and are in excellent condition. Large supplies of hay and grain are being brought from Western Manchuria by the roads, several of which extend direct to the southern and eastern positions of the army.”

According to this writer, the stores at Mukden were stacked with every class of goods, although prices were high, and some depreciation in the value of the rouble had taken place. On the whole, there seems no reason to doubt that for the greater part of the period with which we are dealing the Russians were very fairly well fed and cared for, but towards the end of January a falling-off doubtless began to be observable, owing partly to the disturbances at St. Petersburg and Moscow, and the increasing difficulty of getting supplies started on their way to the front.

Unhappily, the very well-being of the Russian troops meant a fearful drain upon the surrounding country, and accounts agree as to the misery inflicted upon the hapless inhabitants of the country round Mukden by the unceasing demands of the Russian soldiery. Here is a telling extract from a private letter published in the *Times* :—

“Latest reports from Mukden say that the villagers have been flocking in there by tens of thousands. The country along the railway and for a wide radius has been utterly devastated. Nothing remains. The most populous and best-cultivated section of Manchuria is a complete wilderness. Thousands of pretty and thriving villages and market towns are in ruins. All the fine groves of trees are gone. Furniture, doors, windows, and every vestige of the woodwork of the

houses the Russians have burned for fuel. Crops were cut down—thousands of acres—by Russia's two hundred and more thousand troops as forage. Further afield, the stacks of corn have been all seized or destroyed, and not a cent paid or even promised as some compensation to the innocent sufferers. Far and wide the crops were raided, eaten, or trampled down. Food is rising in price, even in places unaffected directly. Millet has been fixed as to price by the Chinese local governors, but it must rise in spite of this. Cattle are decreasing or becoming extinct in wide areas.

“Ponies and mules are being sacrificed by hundreds to meet the military demands. Animals leave their homes, never to return; or, if so, often overstrained and useless.”

From another letter written by a foreign officer who had just left the Russian forces in Manchuria we obtain some useful details concerning the military position towards the latter end of December. In the estimation of this evidently competent authority the Russian army was stronger than the Japanese by some thousands, although according to the Russian Intelligence Department, the strength of the two forces was about equal. All the Siberian reserves, including the 61st Division, had arrived, as well as the whole of the 8th Army Corps and a division of the Don Cossacks. Reinforcements, moreover, were coming through regularly. It took about six weeks for a corps to arrive from Russia. One important new development was that General Mishtchenko had been given the command of all the cavalry, to be formed into an enormous division, *Rennenkampf* and *Samsonoff* retaining their former cavalry commands. There was a grand total of 1,087 guns, includ-

ing two batteries of 6-in. mortars of four guns per battery, and two or three 6-in. position artillery batteries. General Kuropatkin told the military attachés that any of them anxious to take a month of two's leave could do so without fear of missing a battle, and several did so. Kuropatkin was living at Kuchiatye, a small village on the Fu-shun line about one hour and fifteen minutes' ride from Mukden.

At this particular period Kuropatkin appears to have been in capital health and spirits, and quite hopeful of success. Mention has already been made of his tours of inspection in a high-speed motor, and now tales were beginning to be circulated of his *bonhomie* when actually under fire in the course of the miscellaneous and protracted fighting along the Sha-ho. Here is a typical scene, as pictured by the famous Russian war correspondent, M. Nemirovitch Danchenko, which shows the Generalissimo in a very pleasant light. Kuropatkin was in one of the front positions, and was advancing still further into danger. Some of his staff wanted to prevent him.

"Prince Gagarin went to him, and said: 'Your Excellency.' 'Well, what is it?' answered Kuropatkin. 'The enemy's fire is violent here. Will you have the kindness—'

"Kuropatkin took the Prince softly by the hand. 'My dear Prince, you are commanding my escort, and not commanding me,' was his response.

"Then Abadzieff, an old Skobelev man, essayed the same thing. 'Your Excellency, you can't go there.' Kuropatkin smiled. 'Your department is the Ossouritz,' he said, 'and not looking after me.'

"I also," added M. Danchenko, "tried to interfere, but he answered:


'We have been with you in worse places than this.' Then, looking at my broad figure, he said: 'In case of danger I shall stand behind you.'

"There was general laughter."

Kuropatkin is said to have been greatly encouraged by the improving quality of the troops which had recently been arriving from Russia, and in one despatch he is described as looking as fresh and young as he did when he was at Plevna. Against this must be set some ugly reports which were now reaching Tokio of increased bickerings among the Russian generals, and a tendency among the subordinate commanders to view the Commander-in-chief with lessened confidence. Of both of these aspects of the situation, of an excess of cheery optimism on the part of the Generalissimo, and a tendency to discord among those junior to him, there was soon to be a striking exemplification.

Before, however, we arrive at this point a short space may be devoted to the chronicle of events from about December 15th, on which date, it may be remarked in passing, there were 14 degrees of frost. The Japanese seem to have suffered quite as much from the cold as the Russians, if not more; for about this time there were several prisoners taken who were evidently suffering greatly from exposure. In one case a party of Orenburg Cossacks, who captured a Japanese patrol of six men, found four of them so badly frost-bitten that two had to have their legs amputated. The same Cossacks surrounded on another occasion seventeen Japanese who were not even capable of firing their rifles.

From this time onward there were pretty constant encounters between the outposts, and on December 18th the Russians made a vigorous effort in the neigh-



DESOLATION!

One of the saddest effects of the war has been the suffering imposed upon the innocent Chinese natives inhabiting the ever-extending portion of Manchuria comprising the "theatre of war." Whole tracts of country have been devastated and the homes of the people destroyed.

bourhood of the railway bridge over the Sha-ho, towards which the Japanese had been steadily creeping with a view to effecting a passage in some force. For three nights the Russians sapped up towards the bridge, and then, getting within short range, they hurled gun-cotton bombs into the enemy's trenches communicating with the bridge, dislodging, at any rate temporarily, the occupants. These gun-cotton bombs were largely used by the Russians at this period, and appear to have been fairly effective. It will be remembered that similar projectiles were employed by the Japanese before Port Arthur for clearing the enemy out of kaponiers and other defences.

A somewhat curious revival is here indicated of the application of the old hand grenades, which were shells of metal about two and a half inches in diameter, filled with fine powder, and burst by means of a small fuse. They used to be thrown by the "Grenadiers" — who were the tallest and stoutest soldiers in the regiment, and were formed into a picked company, and posted on the right of a battalion — into places where the enemy stood thickly, and particularly into trenches or other places of lodgment. We ourselves had long ago discarded the grenade and the grenadier companies in our service, but the experience of this war may tend to the re-introduction of a weapon which, in these days of high explosives, can be made much more destructive than it used to be in the first half of the last century.

On December 25th a typical little combat took place at the village of Lin-shi-pu, which has been frequently mentioned before in connection with the Sha-ho fighting. This was the village, one end of which, it will be remembered, remained for weeks in the hands of the Japanese,

while the Russians remained in stubborn occupation of the other. Some huts in the Japanese end had been damaged by gun-cotton bombs on the night of the 22nd, and three nights later a Russian detachment made an effort to occupy these buildings. What followed is an instructive example of the difficulty of catching the Japanese napping in anything relating to soldiers' work. In the first place they were very much on the alert, and the Russian detachment, as it crept towards the coveted huts, came under a hot cross fire. When, moreover, the huts were reached, it was found that the walls facing the enemy's position had been thoughtfully razed to the ground. Instead, therefore, of settling down more or less comfortably in a roofed building, from the inside of which they could exchange fire with the enemy, the Russians simply gained the far side of a wall, and were again exposed, this time at a range of fifty yards, to a cross-fire from the enemy's trench. An officer and a couple of soldiers were promptly killed, and the rest got away as best they could to a less warm corner than the one they had aspired to occupy.

On New Year's Day a pleasant instance occurred of those amenities of warfare to which allusion has been previously made in connection with the Sha-ho operations. Two junior officers of the opposing forces had for some time past carried on a jocular correspondence by means of notes left in the huts alternately occupied by their respective detachments, and on New Year's Day it was resolved to extend this merry intercourse by a little friendly conversation. Arrangements were accordingly made for a meeting, and the two officers, each attended by an escort of two soldiers, came out into the open with refreshments, and a

two hours' chat was indulged in, at which, we are told, "war matters were not discussed."


For the first ten days of January the operations along the Sha-ho consisted almost entirely of minor affairs varied by occasional bombardments, and, indeed, until the end of the month the cavalry raid which we are about to describe formed the only real break in a somewhat monotonous series of petty skirmishes. But the importance of such spells of apparent inaction must not be underestimated. They are excellent tests of efficiency, and the fact that for such a prolonged period, along such an immense line, the Russians and the Japanese were shoving up against each other in such close contact, with so little way given on either side, is one of the most interesting instances of equally-balanced strength in military history. For by this time the objections to a forward movement on the part of either antagonist were fast disappearing. The Russians had obtained numerous reinforcements, and were becoming inured to the trying conditions under which they were working. For them the rupture of the Japanese line at any important point might have paved the way to an advance against Liao-yang, the possible recapture of which must have been in the mind of every one of Kuro-patkin's generals at this period.

To the Japanese, on the other hand, the thought of their enemy with Mukden at his back, and fresh relays of men and stores reaching him almost daily was a tantalising one. The extraordinary length of the Russian front—at one time in this period it must have extended over nearly a hundred miles—made any attempt to turn the flanks for the present out of the question. But there was still a chance of producing an impression at

one point or another, and the right sort of impression properly followed up might have led to further openings.

How the Russians attempted a diversion which, if successful, might have had important consequences, we shall see presently. But, judging by an account published in the *Novoe Vremya*, the Japanese seem to have been the first to make a serious effort to pierce the Russian line by a movement which, although in itself insignificant, may well have been intended as a prelude to a much more serious advance. On January 9th they opened a bombardment which lasted the whole day against the Russian positions on both sides of the railway. At two o'clock the next morning the offensive was taken by a whole regiment of infantry, which, even if we discount the rather one-sided report in the leading Russian organ, is a much larger force than had for a long time past been seen in warlike motion along the banks of the Sha-ho.

The Russian outposts were driven back, and the Japanese continued to advance in the teeth of a hot fire from the Russian artillery positions and infantry trenches. This time the Russians showed considerable wiliness, for their outposts, retiring slowly, lured the enemy on towards a concealed battery. At a range of only 400 yards the battery opened fire upon the advancing Japanese, and at the same time a party of Russian infantry attacked them in the flank. Taken at a complete disadvantage, the Japanese are said to have escaped annihilation by a precipitate and disorderly retreat, and with that completeness which sometimes artistically, sometimes rather crudely, marks the account of the most trivial Russian success, we are assured that the enemy were finally driven from their



A CHANGE OF SIDES: BIG RUSSIAN GUNS BEING USED BY THE JAPANESE ON THE SHA-HO. These three guns were captured by the Japanese at Nan-shan, and were brought up to the front by the railway. They were carried on trucks, which were pushed along the line by Chinese coolies.

original positions by their victorious adversaries.


We have now to give attention to an operation of a very different description from the foregoing, namely, a Russian cavalry raid, having as its object the cutting of the Japanese railway communications and the destruction of the Japanese supply depôt near the mouth of the Liao River. Not since Chapter XLII., in Volume I., has there been occasion to make more than incidental reference to the Japanese occupation of Ying-kau, the port of Niu-chwang, and to Old Niu-chwang, which lies some twenty-eight miles further up the river. But the despatch of stores by this route has been carefully kept in view, and it has gone without saying that, with their accustomed thoroughness, the Japanese have turned this important new base to the best possible advantage.

As a matter of fact, in addition to organising a vast emporium of warlike stores at Old Niu-chwang, they had constructed another great commissariat depôt at Niu-kia-tun, some three miles north of Ying-kau, with a view to the accumulation of as many stores as possible before the mouth of the Liao River should become ice-bound. The latter event took place towards the end of November, and it is thought that by the end of the first week in January most of the supplies accumulated at Old Niu-chwang must have been exhausted. But those at Niu-kia-tun are estimated to have been still worth nearly a million sterling in actual money, while, of course, in such warlike conditions as those which were present in Manchuria they were, practically speaking, priceless.

It must also be remembered in connection with the raid about to be de-

scribed, that the railway in rear of the Japanese position on the southern bank of the Sha-ho had, in the early part of January, a double significance. Not only

needed before Port Arthur to reinforce the main armies under Marshal Oyama. Any serious interruption of the railway communication could not but delay con-



A TYPICAL JAPANESE TRENCH IN MANCHURIA.

The suspension of large operations during the winter months did not permit of any laxity on the part of the antagonists. The outposts on each side were constantly in touch, and it was necessary to screen their movements as far as possible. Hence the necessity for these deep trenches, which permitted of easy inter-communication between the scattered forces and protected the men from rifle fire.

was it in constant requisition for the transport of warlike stores and supplies, but it was about to be subjected to an additional strain in the matter of bringing up the troops and guns now no longer

siderably the arrival of this numerous body of seasoned soldiers and this singularly important addition of far-ranging artillery of large calibre.

The Russians, then, had every induce-

ment to make a quick dash southward with a body of extremely mobile troops, and to endeavour to cause the enemy serious annoyance both by cutting his railway communications and by destroying his reserve supplies. Nor were the means wanting to this end. In the early part of this chapter an extract was given from a letter written by a foreign officer formerly with the Russians in Manchuria, in which mention was made of a significant consolidation of the large force of cavalry at Kuropatkin's disposal. Towards the end of December this huge body of mounted men was assembled at the extreme right of the Russian position, and a little later an indication was given that there was no intention of allowing it to remain idle.

At the same time, however favourable the juncture may have been for the execution of a raid, there was one serious drawback to any such attempt. We have seen that the Russian cavalry were drawn up in readiness on the Russian right, and it will readily be understood that this was the only flank on which they could be expected to operate to any good purpose. A big cavalry raid from the Russian left would have been foredoomed to failure, for the necessary *détour* would have been such a long one that, even had the objective been reached, the raiders would inevitably have been cut off before they could get back to the Russian line. On the other hand, a force operating from the extreme Russian right had only to traverse about a hundred miles in order to be in a position to inflict serious damage on both communications and supplies.

But there were two obstacles. To attempt to break directly through the Japanese left would have been suicidal, and Kuropatkin had already been taught by

experience that if here and there a gap seemed to exist in the Japanese hedge, there was generally an unseen obstacle on the other side to render any attempt to scramble through extremely risky. Theoretically, any idea of getting well round the extreme Japanese left was also out of the question, for here Chinese neutrality came into play. By agreement the Russians had no more right to cross the Liao River and operate on the other side than they had to use Peking as a base of supplies. And though it might be possible to dash down south without crossing the Liao, it was morally certain that it would be necessary to traverse purely Chinese territory on the return journey unless the raiding force were prepared to meet annihilation from the Japanese troops closed up to bar the way back.

Russian views on the subject of Chinese neutrality had already been proved to be very one-sided, notably at Chi-fu, where, as we have seen, Russian warships had sought refuge under very questionable conditions. The Russians had also, for weeks past, been drawing stores from the Chinese railway terminus at Hsin-min-tun or Sin-ming-ting, which lies about thirty-five miles to the west-north-west of Mukden, notwithstanding an express embargo placed by the Chinese Government on this traffic. They had been collecting ponies, too, in large numbers from Mongolia, and these experiments in violation of Chinese neutrality had proved successful, for the simple reason that China was impotent to check them, and no other Power but Japan would assist her to do so. The small additional risk to be encountered by making a convenience of the trans-Liao territory for the purpose of a cavalry raid was, accordingly, not sufficient to

deter Russia from an enterprise which a more scrupulous nation would have regarded as barred by considerations of simple honour.

At the end of the first week in January a large force of Cossacks had been collected in the neighbourhood of Sin-ming-ting by General Mishtchenko, the well-known cavalry leader, who had redeemed the early and not very sparkling reputation he made in connection with the Russian evacuation of Korea by his subsequent vigorous handling of his Cossacks on every available opportunity.

A portrait of this fine-looking officer is given on page 508.

The Japanese should not have been wholly unprepared for the movement of this force. For on New Year's Day a detachment of Cossacks, accompanied by some Chunchuses as guides, appeared suddenly on the railway a little to the north of Hai-cheng, which lies thirty-five miles south-west of Liao-yang. According to the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, who subsequently sent some interesting details of the larger raid, these adventurous troopers placed explosives at three points, one beside the rails, and the other two at the bases of telegraph posts, and they succeeded in firing these just at the moment when a train was passing. No damage was done, however, and the attempt being on a very small scale, did not attract any attention. A Cossack disguised as a Chinaman was captured by the railway guards, but nothing could be got from him.

Later it became evident to the Japanese that the little party must have belonged to a detachment some 300 strong which, on January 3rd, moved down the west bank of the Liao nearly as far as Old Niu-chwang, and then withdrew. It was quite plain, says the *Times* correspondent,

that these troopers had Chinese assistance, and that in riding down the west bank of the Liao they had openly violated Chinese neutrality. But it was supposed that a mere reconnaissance had been intended, and again no serious notice was taken of what was really a prelude to a very serious performance.

On January 8th General Mishtchenko crossed the Hun River from the main Russian position south of Mukden at the head of a cavalry division of Cossacks, Caucasians, and Dragoons in three brigades estimated to number about 6,000 mounted men, with six batteries of light artillery. This imposing force swept southward on a five-mile front. It was accompanied by only one foreign correspondent, Mr. Francis McCullagh, the representative of the *New York Herald*, to whose vivid description of the raid the writer is indebted for many of the details contained in the following account:—

The raiding force must have presented an extraordinary appearance as it dashed over the broad Liao Plain. Although its composite nature detracted from its fighting efficiency, it must have enhanced its picturesqueness, and it is doubtful whether any body of cavalry actually employed at one time in a warlike operation has afforded a more striking spectacle.

With the aspect of the average Cossack the reader of this history has been rendered familiar by numerous pictures, but there were many others besides ordinary Cossacks in this mixed division. There were Kirghiz, Kalmucks, Buriats, and Caucasians, who could not speak a word of Russian, the last named forming a Mohammedan brigade led by officers from the Russian Cavalry of the Guard. One can picture them, swarthy, bearded, rudely uniformed, and, as a rule, with tall hairy caps; their lean horses in the hard-

best condition ; their weapons bright with constant handling and that careful attention which most Asiatics bestow lovingly on all personal fighting gear ; many of them with a skinny fowl or other plunder already dangling from their saddles ; and all in high good humour at the prospect of further spoil. At the head of the three brigades rode Generals Samsonoff, Abramoff, and Tyelschoff.

The first two days of the march were uneventful, only a Japanese transport cart being snapped up. But it soon became evident that the progress of the division was becoming known to the Japanese, for, as night fell on the 9th, the Russians saw signal bonfires lit one after another, and stretching away into the far distance eastwards. During the remainder of the raid the Japanese or their Chinese agents kept up this method of signalling, even during the daytime, when dense pillars of smoke indicated the passage of the raiders more effectually than flames alone would have done.

At eight o'clock in the morning of January 10th the Russians met a band of 500 Chunchuses, and the latter opened fire, the first bullet killing a Russian captain. Thereupon the Begistan Regiment charged, according to Mr. McCullagh, with incredible swiftness and fierceness: The Chunchuses, who were armed with Mausers, resisted bravely, but were overcome, and lost 100 of their number. A Japanese flag was captured from them.

Towards evening on the 10th a brisk encounter took place between the Cossacks forming the rearguard of the left brigade and a company and a half of Japanese infantry. The Japanese were holding a village covering the railway, and on the approach of the Cossacks they occupied a factory, and prepared to offer a stubborn resistance. The Cossacks

under Lieutenant Nekrasoff approached the wall of the factory, and the Russian leader was first wounded in the head by a bayonet thrust, and then killed by two rifle bullets. A French lieutenant named Bertin was also killed.

As the Japanese, wrote Kuropatkin in reporting this affair to the Tsar, were found to be securely posted behind the strong factory wall, the Cossacks were compelled to summon artillery to their aid, and these opening fire at 400 yards, compelled the Japanese to evacuate the building. As the defenders retired they were dispersed by the Cossacks, and some were taken prisoners. But the encounter was hardly a fortunate one for the Russians, who lost two officers and seven men killed, and thirty-three soldiers wounded.

On January 11th the Cossacks advanced unopposed, and at noon entered Old Niu-chwang, which had been previously occupied by a company of Japanese infantry and two squadrons of cavalry. The majority of these retired, but fifty Japanese shut themselves in a house and refused to surrender. Some of them were killed, others were captured, and, according to the Russian official report, those who had previously retreated were followed up and severely dealt with. But the raiders had now to attend to other business besides that of inflicting insignificant casualties upon small detachments. During the 11th the Caucasian brigade destroyed about 600 yards of the railway north of Hai-cheng, and dragoons blew up the bridge at Tashi-chao. The telegraph and telephone lines were cut, and a train and two locomotives damaged. During the 10th and 11th 500 transport carts were captured.

The Caucasians and dragoons appear to



THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY RAID ON THE RAILWAY NEAR NIU-CHWANG.

have done their work of railway and bridge wrecking very badly, for, according to the Japanese report, the mischief was promptly repaired, and traffic even along the main line cannot have been interrupted for more than a day or two at most.

A striking instance, this, of the folly of entrusting work which ought to be scientifically and most thoroughly performed to half-trained irregulars. There is no question that if the Russians had used the opportunity now afforded them with real skill they would have caused the Japanese an infinity of trouble, and, moreover, would have done much to render the remainder of their enterprise a brilliant success instead of an almost complete fiasco. For Ta-shi-chao is, as was explained in the narrative of the advance of Oku's army up through the Liao-tung Peninsula, the junction for the branch line running to Ying-kau or the Port of Niu-chwang. As the latter was to be made one of the main objectives of the raid, the interruption of communication by this branch line should have been most carefully carried out with a view to preventing the swift reinforcement of the Ying-kau and Niu-kia-tun garrisons. But the dragoons who went to Ta-shi-chao must have scamped their work sadly, with the result that on the next day a train with reinforcements, as we shall see, got through to Ying-kau, and modified an extremely critical situation.

According to the Japanese report there was a sharp encounter in the forenoon of the 11th between a Japanese cavalry detachment and four Cossack sotnias to the westward of a place called Tungmasa, resulting in the dispersal of the Russians. There was further sporadic fighting which shows that during this day the raiders must have been a good deal split up.

On January 12th the culminating point of the raid was reached, General Mishtchenko dashing with the main body of his force to Niu-kia-tun, where, as has already been mentioned, there was a great commissariat depôt containing army stores to the value of £900,000. This valuable property was normally defended by about 500 Japanese soldiers, and when General Mishtchenko first appeared before the place at four o'clock in the afternoon of January 12th, he might have taken it by a *coup de main*, notwithstanding the failure of his dragoons to wreck the branch line from Ta-shi-chao with something like thoroughness. But, in any case, he was a quarter of an hour too late. For as he came within sight of Niu-kia-tun a train of sixteen trucks, each carrying thirty Japanese, steamed in, actually passing the Russians. By dint of great exertions this train had been got through from Ta-shi-chao with a reinforcement furnished by the garrison still maintained in the north of the Liao-tung Peninsula. The Japanese soldiers fired from the trucks on the Russians, and, on arrival at Niu-kia-tun, promptly joined the garrison, which now numbered about 1,000 resolute men well intrenched, and quite prepared to do battle with any number of Cossacks.

At first Mishtchenko did not despair of success, more especially as he had no intention of entering Ying-kau, but desired merely to destroy the Niu-kia-tun depôt. The six batteries of artillery were ordered to open a cannonade, 1,000 Cossacks were detailed to make a front attack, and the rest of the force attempted a diversion on the right. Some of the buildings in the depôt were set on fire by the artillery, and the Cossacks made three desperate charges, carrying on the attack for a short time after dark. But cavalry in

such circumstances are no match for infantry when the latter are intrenched, and know how to shoot straight. The Russians kept dropping to the well-aimed fire of the defenders, and eventually General Mishtchenko, fearing that, even if he partially succeeded in attaining his object, he would be heavily encumbered with wounded, gave the order to retire. It afterwards transpired that sixty-two dead and six wounded Russians were left on the field, and that the Japanese casualties amounted only to two killed and eleven wounded.

The accounts of the return of the raiders are a little confusing owing, doubtless, to the fact that the force did not keep together closely, and that detached parties were engaged in isolated encounters by the now thoroughly awakened Japanese. One such encounter was reported to have taken place on January 13th, when the Russians, in temporary occupation of Old Niu-chwang, were driven out in confusion.

On the following morning another engagement occurred to the west of Niu-chwang at a place called Sanchaho. The Russians were preparing to strike northward, when one column found itself outflanked by a strong Japanese detachment of all arms, which had crept round under cover of the mist. A smart running action ensued, from which the Russians claim to have retired in good order after losing five officers and fifty men killed and wounded. Marshal Oyama's account of the proceedings is somewhat different, his report stating that the enemy were driven back in disorder with over 300 casualties, and that they abandoned a quantity of weapons and other articles.

On the 16th the Russians, who were now once more moving in a pretty com-

pact mass, were spied by a detachment of Japanese cavalry moving in a north-westerly direction. They appeared to be thoroughly exhausted. It was noticed that some of the Russians wore Chinese overcoats and caps, while many of them were dressed entirely in Chinese costume, including pigtails.

Although it is not completely established that the Russians violated Chinese territory during the march southward, there can be no question that they did so on the return journey, in order to avoid the punishment which would certainly have been inflicted on them by the Japanese, who had made extensive preparations for intercepting them. This fact alone detracts largely from any value which the raid might otherwise have possessed as a military operation, for it is clearly impossible to deduce military lessons of first-class importance from a performance in which one side saves itself by departing from the rules of the game as it is ordinarily played by honourable nations.

But in any case Mishtchenko's raid could not have taken a very good place among the recorded operations of war. Even if its very conception had not been vitiated by the necessity of violating Chinese territory either in the march to the south or the dash for home, or both, the execution of the movement was very faulty. In the first place, the pace was much too slow; in the second, the work of demolition was most carelessly done; and thirdly, there was no excuse for the futile attempt upon Niu-kia-tun after the arrival on the scene of a strong reinforcement of Japanese infantry.

Unopposed, the raiders should not have taken more than two days to ride from the Russian right to a point from which Niu-kia-tun, the branch line from Ta-shi-

chao to Ying-kau, the main line, and Old Niu-chwang could have been, simultaneously, if necessary, threatened. Of the

soldiers made, of course, all the difference in the world, and with so many straight-shooting infantry in trenches—which, by



GENERAL MISHTCHENKO.

perfunctory fashion in which the railway-wrecking was carried out mention has already been made. As to the attack of Niu-kia-tun, the arrival of the 500 fresh

the way, were protected by obstacles in the way of barbed-wire entanglements and so forth—an attack on the part of dismounted irregular cavalry was bound

to be a costly failure. Some impression might have been made on the depôt by continuous artillery fire, or an attempt might have been made under cover of the darkness to set alight some of the buildings. But the actual measures taken were absurd.

The return of the raiders to their original position on the Russian right is shrouded in obscurity, but it is assumed that Kuropatkin sent out a supporting column to aid Mishtchenko's division in regaining the security of the Russian lines. In his reports concerning the operation the Russian Generalissimo did his best to enhance the value of the performance, which, he declared, had greatly alarmed the Japanese rearguard. His statement of the total casualties was to the effect that 7 officers and 73 men had been killed, 32 officers and 257 men wounded. In addition, there were 21 men missing. Of the horses, 69 had been killed and 75 wounded.

That the Japanese were somewhat disturbed by the raid goes without saying, but to represent them as greatly alarmed, or to reckon the damage they had sus-

tained as serious, is to pass from the region of cold fact into that of pure imagination. In view of the preceding reconnaissance, and the practical certainty that in that case also Chinese territory had been violated, the Japanese appear to have acted foolishly in not having strengthened the garrisons of Old Niu-chwang and Niu-kia-tun, but, when the larger raid had once developed, they acted with commendable vigour, and the total damage they inflicted on Mishtchenko's three brigades may well have been rather greater than appears from the Russian list of casualties, having regard to the sixty-two Russian corpses left in front of Niu-kia-tun alone. For the rest, the lesson had been learnt at no great cost that raids through Chinese territory were possible, and that in future not only would precautions be necessary, but no scruples need be felt by Japan herself as to restrictions which Russia had so openly ignored.

The return of the raiders brings us to about January 18th, at which point the narrative of the fighting along the Sha-ho will be resumed in the succeeding chapter.



EXAMINING PASSPORTS ON THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY IN TIMES OF PEACE.

By permission, from J. Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia."

CHAPTER LXXXII.

THE NORTH SEA INQUIRY—THE COMMISSIONERS—FIRST PUBLIC SITTING—BRITISH AND RUSSIAN CASES—THE EVIDENCE—QUESTIONABLE TESTIMONY—THE FISHERMEN EXAMINED—A BRITISH NAVAL EXPERT.

THESE is hardly any feature of this great war more significant and, withal, more self-assertive than the number of points at which it comes in contact with the politics of the outside world. Admirably as "the ring" was kept, we have already seen not only this country and France—the allies respectively of the two combatant nations—and China—to some extent the bone of contention—taking a more than sporting interest in the proceedings, but also Germany, the United States, Spain, and Holland, brought into closer connection with the conflict than is usually the case with spectators. For much of this the progress of the Russian Baltic Fleet to the Far East was directly responsible, and, of course, of all the complications and embarrassments created by that squadron's historic voyage none was more serious or surrounded by more tremendous possibilities than the trouble arising from the North Sea Outrage. In Chapters LXVIII. and LXIX. a careful account was given of the Outrage itself and its striking consequences in the way of British naval preparations and diplomatic action. Since then the fortunes of the Baltic Fleet up to about the end of January have been followed, without reference to the host of delicate questions and awkward contingencies it had left in its wake. The time has now arrived to devote a chapter to the circumstances of the holding of the great North Sea Inquiry, the

Agreement leading up to which formed the conclusion of Chapter LXIX.

Before proceeding to the actual narrative of events a few words may be said in the hope of inducing the reader to give such a chapter as this rather closer attention than he might otherwise be inclined to give to a record of a purely peaceful development sandwiched into a chronicle of lusty and exciting warfare. It is an old truism to say that peace, as well as war, has victories. More to the present point is the historical fact that probably in the annals of the world there was never a peaceful victory to which the smell of war clung more closely than it did to the Agreement upon which the North Sea Inquiry was founded. But the interest of the investigation did not end here by any means. Apart from its origin, apart even from its result, the Inquiry furnished a magnificent example of what can be done internationally to avert an international calamity. It was a triumphant application of "the commonsense of most" to the adjustment of a difficulty which a generation or two back would almost inevitably have led to terrific slaughter, and very possibly to a marked alteration in the map of the world. If the Russo-Japanese War had produced nothing else but the North Sea Inquiry it would, historically speaking, have been a great war, and it is by no means certain that the Inquiry will not hereafter come to rank in the minds of thoughtful men as of

graver significance to the welfare of the human race than the fall of Port Arthur or the battle of Liao-yang.

Nor is the Inquiry lacking in curious interest of its own, provided that those who read the record of it let their imagination loose in one or two directions in which it is impossible for the writer to be more than incidentally suggestive. There is something strangely impressive in the fact that not only Russian naval officers, but also humble British fishermen, had to be carried to Paris to take a prominent part in this great function in which the honour of two of the greatest of the World Powers was so intimately concerned. There is a perfect swarm of instructive associations clustering around the reception of the foreign delegates, representing three great Empires and an equally great Republic, by the modest son of a peasant proprietor whom the French nation had, with such admirable good sense, chosen six years before as the head of their Government. Paris herself has played more thrilling parts, has witnessed more dramatic scenes, than any other city on the face of the globe. But she never took a nobler rôle, never saw a fairer consummation of her best efforts, than was indicated in the holding and finding of the Commission which prevented the outbreak of a disastrous war between her ally and a nation with which her relations had latterly grown to be almost enthusiastically cordial.

To turn to our narrative—the Agreement respecting the Commission of Inquiry was signed, it will be remembered, on November 25th, and was promptly followed by the appointment of the Commissioners, and, in the case of the two Powers immediately concerned, of a Legal Assessor and an Agent. Great Britain in such matters is generally for-

tunate in possessing men whose special qualifications mark them as extraordinarily well fitted for the work in hand. As our Naval Representative on the Commission it would have been impossible to make a better choice than that of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. This well-known officer had recently been in command in Australian waters, having been transferred thither from the Pacific in order that he might be in personal attendance on the Prince of Wales during the Australasian portion of his Royal Highness's tour in 1901. He had previously been Director of Naval Intelligence, and the fact that he had also served as Naval Attaché both at Paris and St. Petersburg, and was thoroughly acquainted with the French language, made his selection a particularly happy one.

As Legal Assessor to the British Commissioner the Right Hon. Sir Edward Fry was selected, and in him, too, several special qualifications were united, for he had not only been a High Court Judge and a Lord Justice of Appeal, but was a member of the Court of International Arbitration at the Hague. Mr. Hugh O'Beirne, of his Majesty's Embassy at Paris, a First Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, was appointed as British Agent. Like Sir Lewis Beaumont, Mr. O'Beirne had been attached to the Embassy at St. Petersburg, where he had qualified in Russian.

The Russian Naval Commissioner originally appointed was Vice-Admiral Kaznakoff, for whom Vice-Admiral Dubassoff afterwards officiated. The latter had recently come into considerable prominence by reason of some rather indiscreet utterances having reference to an alleged intention on the part of Russia to patch up at no distant date a temporary



Photo: Maull & Fox, Piccadilly, W.
GREAT BRITAIN: VICE-ADMIRAL SIR
LEWIS BEAUMONT.



RUSSIA: VICE-ADMIRAL DUBASSOFF.

COMMISSIONERS
OF THE



NORTH SEA
INQUIRY.


Photo: Eug. Pirou, Paris.
FRANCE: VICE-ADMIRAL FOURNIER (PRESIDENT).



Photo: Eug. Pirou, Paris
AUSTRIA: ADMIRAL BARON VON SPAUN.



Photo: Eug. Pirou, Paris.
UNITED STATES: REAR-ADMIRAL DAVIS.



A BRITISH WITNESS BEFORE THE NORTH SEA INQUIRY COMMISSION.
Explaining the nature of the lights used by the fishing fleet.

peace with Japan in order to revise her resources and carry hostilities to a successful termination at her future convenience. To have blurted out such a tactless proposition was not the mark of high-class diplomat as most naval officers of flag rank are expected to be, but, in the event, Admiral Dubassoff proved himself an able and courteous coadjutor in the work of the Commission, injurious to his susceptibilities as some of the proceedings must necessarily have proved.

A special interest was naturally attached to the selection of the French delegate, and general satisfaction was expressed when it became known that the choice had fallen on Vice-Admiral Fournier, lately in charge of the French Higher Naval School. Admiral Fournier had previously been in command of the French naval division in the Far East, and had greatly distinguished himself after the French naval operations against China in 1884 by his diplomatic ability. Although he had to deal with the astute Li-Hung-Chang, he succeeded in procuring a treaty with reference to Tong-king which completely satisfied French requirements. Admiral Fournier was the inventor of an instrument for the regulation of ships' compasses, and the Paris correspondent of the *Times* raised a general smile by his witty suggestion that the Admiral's colleagues on the International Commission would doubtless deplore with him the fact that his invention was not used on board the Russian vessels which wandered from their bearings in the North Sea.

Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis was appointed by the President of the United States to act as American Commissioner. He was the son of the Admiral Davis who became famous in the Civil War, and was himself an officer of distinction

and wide experience, including active duty during the Spanish-American War. Admiral Davis had been Superintendent of the United States Naval Observatory, and had been connected with various scientific expeditions.

It will be recalled that under Article I. of the Convention respecting the Commission of Inquiry, a fifth member was to be chosen by agreement among the four original members, and that, failing an agreement, the Emperor of Austria was to be invited to make a selection. It is sufficient to say that by mutual consent the veteran Admiral Baron von Spaun was asked to join the Commission as fifth member.

Shortly before Christmas the original Commissioners assembled in Paris, and were formally received by the President of the French Republic. Two handsome salons in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs were set apart for the purposes of the Inquiry, one for the examination of witnesses, the other for the deliberations of the Commission.

The first plenary sitting of the Commission was held on January 9th, when the chair was taken by Admiral von Spaun. The latter, although his age and rank would have entitled him to the presidency, immediately proposed that Admiral Fournier should be elected to that post. "I am convinced," he observed, "that it is not only our duty to this hospitable country, but it is also essentially in harmony with our common end—namely, the transaction of our labours as promptly as possible, considering that independently of his personal qualities, Admiral Fournier has at his disposal the assistance of his numerous excellent coadjutors in the bureau." Such a tactful proposal could not fail of unanimous acceptance, and, accordingly, Ad-

miral Fournier took the chair, and delivered an admirable little homily on the delicate and important duties which the Commission was called upon to discharge, and upon "the great example of wisdom and moderation" given to the world by the institution of such an Inquiry.

For the first few days the Commission was occupied in drawing up rules of procedure, and it was not until January 19th that the first public sitting was held for the purpose of reading the text of the cases submitted by the two Governments chiefly concerned in the North Sea incident. On this occasion the room in which the Inquiry was held was filled with a distinguished audience, an enclosed space being reserved at the top of the hall for the five Admirals, who occupied a table in the centre. The British delegation was seated at tables ranged along the room on the right hand of the Admirals, the Russian delegation being on the left.

The presentation of the British and Russian cases was, of course, a matter of the most critical importance, and the documents respectively need to be very carefully examined in order to appreciate all the points raised. It is not, however, necessary here to do more than extract a few leading paragraphs, the whole incident having been so thoroughly dealt with in Chapters LXVIII. and LXIX.

Taking the British case first, attention was drawn to the fact that the Dogger Bank was well known as a fishing ground, and a clear statement was made as to the methods observed by the trawlers, the functions of the "Admiral" of the fishing fleet, and the regulation lights. The state of the weather was described, and the movements of the fishing fleet detailed. The statement went

on to say that at the time named, and in the circumstances recounted, two sections of war-vessels passed the fishing fleet, of which the second fired on the trawlers. Other cases of firing were mentioned; it was stated that the vessels which fired were warships of the Imperial Russian Navy, and attention was called to the fact that no assistance was given or offered to the trawlers by any of the Russian vessels.

The essence of the British case was in the concluding paragraphs, which were as follow:—

"16. No warships of any description other than those of the Imperial Russian Navy were among the trawlers or in the neighbourhood on the night in question, and no war vessels had been seen by any of the trawlers for some time before. There was no war material of any description on board any of the ships of the fishing fleet. There were no Japanese war vessels of any description in the North Sea at that time, nor were there any Japanese on board any of the vessels of the fishing fleet.

"17. As a result of the firing two men were killed and six were wounded, one trawler, the *Crane*, was sunk, and five other trawlers, the *Snipe*, the *Mino*, the *Moulmein*, the *Gull*, and the *Majestic*, were hit by shot and damaged. Other trawlers were damaged by the concussion caused by the explosion of shells close to them, and thus a number of British trawlers peacefully engaged in pursuit of a lawful calling on a well-known fishing ground in the North Sea were subjected to a violent interruption of a customary and properly conducted occupation of trade at a spot out of the way of the ordinary course of ships passing between the Skaw and the Straits of Dover, and were, without warning or provocation,

fired upon by men-of-war of the Imperial Russian Navy."

The Russian case opened with an account of the warnings which the Russian Government had received as to possible attacks by the Japanese upon the outgoing Baltic Squadron. The disposition of the Fleet with a view to this "alarming intelligence" was described, and the progress of the navigation recorded up to the night of the incident. In the following extracts giving the Russian statement of what occurred, the dates are given according to the Russian calendar; the dates according to the "New style" being in brackets. First we have the story of the famous torpedo-boats:—

"During the night from October 8th [21st] to October 9th [22nd] towards midnight the sky became clouded and the horizon misty. At 55 minutes past midnight, in lat. 55.18 north and long. 5.42 east of Greenwich, the first ship of the last section, the Admiral's ship, *Kniaz Suvaroff*, perceived ahead the outlines of two small craft approaching at great speed, all their lights out, towards the armourclads. The whole detachment at once began to work their electric searchlights, and as soon as the two suspicious craft came within the rays projected they were recognised as torpedo-boats. The armourclads directly opened fire on them.

"Immediately afterwards were seen near the Russian ships and within the zone lit up by their searchlights, first one and

then several small steamers resembling fishing smacks. Some of them did not show their regulation lights. Others only showed them tardily, and finally some of them placed themselves across the course being taken by the detachment. As it was clear in these conditions that the fire directed against the torpedo-boats might also hit the fishing boats, the necessary measures were taken as far as possible to prevent any injury to them. It was thus that the rays of the electric searchlights of the Admiral's ship *Kniaz Suvaroff* were alternately thrown on the fishing boats, and then

quickly raised 45°, which signified the order not to fire on the vessel thus pointed out. Nevertheless, the very distinct feeling of danger to which the armourclads were exposed, and the imperious duty of protecting them against the attacks of the torpedo-boats, necessitated the continuance of the cannonade, notwithstanding the evident risk of hitting not only the fishing boats, but also the ships of the squadron itself which might be, and actually were, within the zone of fire to port of the division of armourclads, as was proved by the presence, immediately discovered, of the *Dmitri Donskoi* and the *Aurora*."

The Russian explanation and vindication of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's performance were as follow:—

"Meanwhile the two torpedo-boats retired, and soon afterwards disappeared.




Photo: T. Fall, Baker Street, W.
THE RIGHT HON. SIR EDWARD FRY, D.C.L.,
F.R.S., BRITISH LEGAL ASSESSOR.

At that moment the division of armour-clads, on a signal given by the Admiral's ship, at once ceased firing. The cannonade had lasted altogether about ten minutes. Fearing, on the one hand, that some of the fishing boats had been damaged by the fire of the squadron, but, on the other hand, not being sure that all danger coming from the two torpedo-boats, or perhaps from some others, was completely over, Admiral Rozhdestvensky deemed it indispensable that the whole squadron should continue its course without stopping. In these conditions the vessel which, according to the first evidence of certain fishermen, remained until morning on the scene of the incident, and which was taken by them for a Russian ship, could not in any way belong to the division of armourclads and cruisers, and still less, to the detachment of torpedo-boats, as these last were at that moment very far from the scene of the incident.

"Considering the circumstances above recalled of the incident which occurred in the North Sea during the night from October 8th [21st] to October 9th [22nd],

1904—an incident which, as subsequently ascertained, caused the loss of a boat and the death of two persons belonging to an English fishing flotilla, as also damage to other boats and injuries to their crews—considering the proofs obtained in the matter, and the categorical testimony of the officers of the Imperial Navy who witnessed the incident, as also some further evidence subsequently supplied to the Russian Government by third persons of various nationalities, it may be affirmed that, in view of all the above circumstances, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, upon whom rested the heavy responsibility of providing for the security of the forces entrusted to him, and of maintaining them in their integrity, had not only the right, but was under the absolute obligation, of acting as he did—that is to say, that while quite clearly aware of the damage he might cause to inoffensive fishermen the subjects of a neutral Power, he was nevertheless obliged to use all the means in his power to destroy the torpedo-boats which had attacked his squadron."

RUSSIAN CRUISER *AURORA*.

In view of this fairly ample reproduction of the British and Russian cases, it is hardly necessary to go at all deeply into the detailed evidence of either side. But it is important to chronicle one remarkable circumstance in connection with the Russian testimony, which excited considerable sensation at the time, and the general view of which was anything but favourable to Russia. The Russians were so infatuated by the notion that they had actually seen torpedo-boats among the fishing fleet, that agents were despatched to Hull with the object of collecting further evidence on this point. Exactly by whom these agents were employed, and what instructions they received, cannot be traced, but it is clear that in the first place they were utterly unscrupulous, and in the second that they did their dirty work very clumsily. Their performance amounted to something very like an attempt to suborn witnesses from among the sailors of the fishing fleet, to whom they gave drink and money on the understanding that the men would sign a sworn statement that Japanese torpedo-boats had, in truth, been seen among the trawlers. The matter was taken up locally, the evidence thus questionably obtained was warmly repudiated, and the Russian agents narrowly escaped being thrown into the harbour for their pains.

It is not surprising that this discreditable attempt to collect false evidence in support of the Russian case should have been brought up before the Commission of Inquiry. On behalf of the British Government it was asked that the matter should be investigated by the Commissioners, and the British Agent, Mr. O'Beirne, was prepared with witnesses to substantiate his account of what had transpired. Ultimately the Commission

decided to discuss this question in private, at the same time exonerating the Russian Government from any knowledge of the highly objectionable performance complained of.

Indeed, there is no doubt that the Russian Government was very ill served by the agents who tried to collect evidence in England, and who seem to have primed the Russian authorities with a quantity of quite baseless information. For example, the Russian Government had evidently been told that there was a Japanese on board the Dogger Bank mission ship *Alpha*, and that he was masquerading under the name of Danielson. But the attempt to establish this statement by cross-examination of the British witnesses broke down completely. The surgeon of the *Alpha*, as well as the skipper, were closely questioned on the point. Dr. Colmer was asked whether before, during, or after the incident any Japanese was on board the *Alpha*. Never, he replied; indeed, he had never seen any Japanese in the North Sea, nor had he ever seen any person on board their vessel who could be mistaken for a Japanese. Did he know a man named Danielson? asked the Russian legal representative. No, replied Dr. Colmer, he had never heard of such a person. Mr. White, the skipper of the *Alpha*, said he had never seen any Japanese on board his ship, and he knew nobody of the name of Danielson.

Much interest was aroused by the manner in which the British fishermen gave their evidence. One of the best witnesses was Thomas Carr, the "Vice-Admiral" of the Gamecock Fleet, who was severely heckled by the Russian legal assessors as to some supposed discrepancies in his statements. Carr explained the vagueness of some of his own impressions

by the fact that he was running away at the time, and pointed out that the men were so frightened by the firing that some inconsistency in their estimates of its duration was not unnatural. On the whole, Mr. Carr, like his comrades, made an excellent witness, and his medal for saving life won him a graceful compliment on his "standing down" from Admiral Fournier. A similar compliment was paid by the President to Mr. John Brooks, skipper of the *Robin*, on his noble conduct in saving four ships' crews of forty hands in all. Speaking in the name of the Commission, Admiral Fournier said that the medal conferred on him ought to have been of gold.

On another occasion Admiral Fournier, whose tact and impartiality were the theme of universal admiration, rendered notable assistance to one of the British witnesses. John Thomas Fletcher, master of the steam-carrier *Swift*, was sharply cross-examined by the Russian legal representative, Baron Taube, as to the possible presence of Japanese torpedo-boats with the fishing fleet. Fletcher had said he was sure that no strange craft had joined the trawlers, but, as he had previously admitted that he could not see further than half a mile, he was asked how he could be sure that there were no strange craft beyond that limit. That was a poser for Fletcher, who did not understand it, while Admiral Fournier expressed the opinion that the question was embarrassing and superfluous. As Baron Taube, however, seemed to attach considerable importance to it, Mr. Acland, K.C., at the suggestion of Admiral Fournier, repeated the question in a more manageable form, which covered everything that Fletcher could answer. The reply was a comprehensive negative. Thereupon Admiral Fournier, who evi-

dently understands the sailor's way of thinking, observed that as Fletcher had said he could not see over three-quarters of a mile, it was no use asking him what lay beyond that distance.

This may be taken as a typical instance of the hair-splitting methods adopted by the Russians to discount the straightforward testimony of these simple fishermen, who naturally were at some disadvantage owing to the difficulty they experienced in understanding some of the questions put to them, and in expressing themselves with clearness and precision.

The British case was further supported by the evidence of the captain and the mate of the Swedish steamer *Aldebaran*, which, as narrated on page 301 of the present volume, had been chased by a Russian warship, and fired upon on the evening of October 21st a few hours before the fishing fleet was attacked.

The Russian witnesses were Captain Klado, and Lieutenants Walrond, Ellis, and Schramchenko. These witnesses did not take the oath, that being in Russia a strictly religious ceremony, but they pledged their word of honour for the truth of their testimony. Captain Klado was described by a correspondent as speaking very deliberately, though without hesitation or pause. "He is," the correspondent wrote, "a well-set-up man of forty-two, of medium height, and wears eye-glasses." The evidence offered by the four Russian officers was an amplification of the statements presented in the Russian case, and need not be recapitulated.

In consequence of certain professional opinions expressed by Captain Klado, the British representatives considered it desirable to procure the evidence of a British naval officer of great experience in the command of torpedo-boats. Accord-

ingly, Captain R. Keyes was called and examined by one of the British legal representatives, who elicited the fact that the gallant officer had spent five years in command of a destroyer, and had spent about half the time at sea, night and day. He had nearly always cruised in close company, sometimes with lights and sometimes without. He had also commanded torpedo-boat divisions in manœuvres—from fourteen to sixteen destroyers—and had acted as an umpire in torpedo-boat manœuvres. The evidence given by this officer was so extremely interesting and instructive, that the writer quotes *in extenso* the summary given in the Paris correspondence of the *Times*. In the opinion of Captain Keyes it was quite impossible for an officer, however experienced, to be quite sure in estimating distances at night either with or without searchlights. One was particularly liable to mistake in using the searchlights if the object was at such a distance that the whole of it could not be clearly illuminated. Without the searchlights one was liable to mistake a large ship at a distance for a smaller one nearer at hand. A large cruiser far off might well be said to have the same appearance as a destroyer at a shorter distance. If an object was at a distance of a mile and a half to three or four miles, according to the degree of the light, the searchlights would not only fail to illuminate it, but by lighting up a portion of the intervening space it would set up a sort of screen between the observer using the searchlight and the object. Small vessels between the observer and the object under the searchlight might be confounded with that object. The distance at which a searchlight would light up the whole of a vessel was very much less than was generally supposed. In torpedo attacks

he often fancied he was exposed, but afterwards found that the men using the searchlight had not seen him. A searchlight would not pick up a small object like a destroyer much further than a mile off, and he did not think it would be possible to identify her as a torpedo-boat at a greater distance than five or six cables.


Captain Keyes then mentioned numerous recorded cases at manœuvres, including one in which a flagship leading the British Mediterranean Fleet mistook a battleship for a destroyer. The battleship *Devastation*, which was about ten cables ahead, altered her course suddenly eight points to the south, which brought her in view on the starboard side of the leading vessel, which she took for a destroyer, and opened fire. Another case occurred at the manœuvres in 1902. The *Doris* observed through glasses what she thought to be a four-funnelled destroyer. The searchlight was directed on her, but failed to reveal anything. Yet in reality the boat thus taken for a destroyer was the four-funnelled cruiser *Andromeda*. He thought it quite possible at five or six cables to mistake any small vessel for a torpedo-boat if it were not clearly illuminated, but otherwise not. At night it would be easier to distinguish the outline of a small vessel a mile and a half or two miles off from a position five or six feet above the water than at forty-two feet, as her outline would be thrown against the sky. Captain Keyes maintained this opinion, although Admiral Fournier supported a contrary view. Captain Keyes thought that on an ordinary night a torpedo-boat could not be distinguished further off than a mile or three-quarters—an opinion in which Admiral Fournier agreed. The Admiral added that in the French Navy they could never distinguish the difference between a torpedo-

boat and a large vessel at much more than half a mile with the naked eye, or with glasses without a searchlight.

With this very *à propos* testimony, which drew special thanks and congratulations from the President, the hearing of the evidence was practically concluded. On February 4th it was announced that for the present there would be no more public

sittings, as the British and Russian Government Agents required some little time in which to draw up their conclusions, and the interval would be usefully spent by the Admirals in examining and appreciating the evidence.

The story of the termination of the Inquiry and the finding of the Commission must be reserved for a later chapter.



From a photograph supplied by the Royal National Mission to Deep Sea Fishermen.

THE HOSPITAL MISSION SHIP ALPHA.




Photo: J. J. Archibald.

SUPPLIES FOR THE RUSSIANS: COUNTRY PACK TRAIN COMING INTO A MANCHURIAN TOWN.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

IN THE SHA-HO REGION—SEQUEL TO MISHTCHENKO'S RAID—A LIKELY BATTLE-GROUND
—GRIPENBERG CROSSES THE HUN-HO—AN IMPRESSIVE MOVEMENT—THE BATTLE OF
HEI-KOU-TAI—DEFENCE OF SAN-DE-PU—JAPANESE ATTACKS—RUSSIANS DRIVEN BACK
—GRIPENBERG AND KUROPATKIN.

RESUMING the story of the operations in the Sha-ho region at the point at which we left it in the last chapter but one, we find that Mishtchenko's raid had left the relative positions of the opposing armies to all intents and purposes unaltered. At the same time such an extensive and suggestive movement was not likely to be wholly disregarded by those against whom it was directed, and we may take it for granted that an immediate result was the display of increased vigilance on the Japanese left, coupled with a shrewd anticipation of fresh developments in that quarter.

A second raid was hardly to be expected, at any rate for some little time, but Liao-yang still remained a natural objective for a great Russian attack, and it was practically certain that any serious movement against Liao-yang would be heralded by pressure from the Russian right, from which alone any sort of forward movement had for many weeks been possible. Accordingly, towards the end of the third week in January the Japanese left had been thrown back in a south-westerly direction from the village of San-de-pu so as to screen Liao-yang from an attack from the north-west.

It was soon apparent that these precautions were fully justified. About the middle of January Kuropatkin made certain important changes in the disposition of his forces as noted on page 389 of the present volume, with the evident intention of rendering his right capable, sooner or later, of a serious forward movement. According to a German military authority the Russian force in this quarter now consisted of the 1st, 8th, and 10th Army Corps, the 1st Siberian Army Corps, the 61st Reserve Division, and the 2nd and 5th Rifle Brigades, making with Mishtchenko's cavalry an effective fighting force of about 85,000 men with 350 guns. These troops constituted the Second Russian Army under General Gripenberg, and they were grouped along the right bank of the Hun-ho. The latter river flows in a south-westerly direction from below Mukden. At this time of year it is frozen to a thickness of three feet of ice, over which heavily-laden carts can travel safely. The course of the Hun in this region is in a well-defined bed, with steep and often overhanging banks from fifteen feet to twenty feet above the level of the ice.

Thirty miles down stream from Mukden lies the little fort of Chang-tau, said to have been once a thriving market town, but now composed of two small hamlets on either bank of the river, the town having been washed away by a flood some years since. The German authority above quoted makes Chang-tau the most southerly point occupied by the Russians at this period. To the south of Chang-tau, at a distance of four or five miles, lie Hei-kou-tai and San-de-pu, the latter a large village of some 100 houses. San-de-pu is described by a writer in the *Times* as being, like all the

other numerous villages around, "a collection of farmsteads with a caravanseraï for winter travellers. Each farmhouse is surrounded by high walls of sun-dried bricks well plastered with loam mixed with chopped straw. These walls can be neatly loop-holed, are about three feet thick, and form a splendid defence against bullets. The houses and farm-buildings have all their windows and doors opening into the large courtyards, the gables and rear walls are very thick, and built of the same materials as the compound walls.

"With rare exceptions, every house is thatched. The military would, however, especially the Japanese, probably cover the thatch very thickly with mud or earth to prevent fire. The roofs are of heavy timbers, resting on posts, and thus can support great weights. All buildings are low and one-storeyed. The country round San-de-pu is quite level and open, excepting for the villages and burial places, where there were groves of trees, which have now largely been burned for fuel. The villages are, roughly, about two miles apart, and vary from twenty to one hundred families."

From the above description it will be gathered that the Japanese posts, notably at Hei-kou-tai and San-de-pu, were by no means ill-placed for enabling a stout resistance to be made to a Russian attack even on a large scale, while the country generally is favourable for the movement of large bodies of troops, thus permitting the Russians, in the first instance, to develop an attack with fair rapidity and on broad lines, and, later, giving the Japanese an equal chance of bringing up fresh troops to relieve threatened points, and, eventually, to hurl back the oncoming enemy.

We may glean a further note from the

quoted source of information to the effect that the Russian line of retreat in case of failure was a somewhat advantageous one. For it not only terminated in the useful sandhills to the south of Mukden, but also lay through villages, many of them "quite well fortified with earth ramparts and moats by the robber bands which for two years after the Boxer outbreak held this region, guarding those villagers who paid them, and keeping out all other robber bands."


There were further indications which favoured the chances of another attempt on Kuropatkin's part to restore the prestige of the Russian arms. He had now received reinforcements fully sufficient to compensate the additions made to Marshal Oyama's force in consequence of the fall of Port Arthur, and in cavalry and artillery he seemed to enjoy a marked superiority over his adversary. By the judicious employment of the latter as a screen, he had been able to make the transference of at least one Army Corps to his right, and shortly after the middle of January it began to be openly stated that a strong effort was about to be made to force a decisive action in the plain between the Hun-ho and the railway.

A not unlikely, and, as it proved, a rather accurate forecast was even made of the course of the coming operations. General Gripenberg with four Army Corps and strong forces of cavalry and field artillery would, it was asserted, carry out an offensive movement in the Hun-ho Plain, while General Liniévitch and a portion of General Kaulbars's army guarded the Russian lines south of Mukden. The rest of General Kaulbars's force would harass the Japanese right, and General Kuropatkin would concentrate in the centre the main body to reinforce his wings when necessary. A

Russian success obtained in this way and in this region would, it was thought, force the Japanese to fall back, and render their retreat particularly difficult and dangerous.

As a rule the republication of such forecasts is, historically speaking, purely futile and entirely un instructive. But the present example is of rather singular interest by reason of the context. The above outline of what might be expected was received by the *Echo de Paris* from its St. Petersburg correspondent, and printed in its issue of January 18th. Such instances of the prediction in detail of an immense military operation are quite rare, and we may be sure that it was not the wish of Kuropatkin himself that his movements should be foreshadowed in this inconveniently previous fashion. It is true that he himself had been credited with having heralded the great battle of the Sha-ho by an absurdly unnecessary Order of the Day, but the evil consequences of that untimely pronouncement would alone have checked the repetition of such an error. Moreover, there is little or nothing to show that, although the Russian Generalissimo was undoubtedly preparing to take the offensive in some such form as that indicated, he judged the present a fit juncture at which to attempt a most difficult and risky task.

In all the circumstances it is difficult not to believe that here again a deliberate effort was made at St. Petersburg to force Kuropatkin into an advance before he was as fully prepared for it as he could have wished. On this hypothesis alone can the extraordinary clearness of vision enjoyed by the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Echo de Paris* be explained. Is it likely that anything but a desire, either to do Kuropatkin a bad turn or to force his hand, would have



From Stereograph Copyright, 1905, by Underwood & Underwood, London and New York.

A REMARKABLE SCENE OF ACTIVITY BETWEEN THE HILLS OF MANCHURIA: JAPANESE BUILDING THEIR DUG-OUTS, TRENCHES, AND TEMPORARY PLACES OF SHELTER.

prompted the premature publication of such important news as the fact that General Gripenberg would commence the attack with four Army Corps from the Russian right, while the feinting movements to the eastward would be made by only a portion of the army of General Kaulbars?

But not only has the existence of undoubted intrigues against Kuropatkin to be taken into consideration in this connection. The internal condition of the Russian capital was now becoming so obviously serious that both the Grand Dukes and the lesser bureaucrats may well have been intensely anxious for a diversion at the point calculated to distract the attention of a thoroughly disaffected populace from the excited contemplation of their own miserable affairs. This reflection brings us round to the fact that January 22nd was the "Red Sunday," of the probable influence of which upon Kuropatkin's soldiery something has been said in a previous chapter. It is not positively recorded that, as a result of that ghastly performance, the Tsar telegraphed to Kuropatkin at all hazards to take the offensive, but the fact that, three days later, the Russian Second Army was on the move lends a certain amount of colour to the suggestion.

To turn from the region of speculation to that of fact, the forward march of the Second Russian Army was commenced on January 25th, and was carried out by columns in the following order:—The first column, constituting the right wing, was composed of the cavalry and the 61st Division. It struck to the south-west, and crossed the Hun at two places only about fifteen or twenty miles to the north-west of Liao-yang. Its direction was nearly due east towards a place

called La-pu-tai, about midway on the road between Liao-yang and San-de-pu. The second column, consisting of the 10th Army Corps, marched by way of Hei-kou-tai on Lan-tung-kou, which lies between La-pu-tai and San-de-pu. The third column, composed of the 8th Army Corps and 2nd Rifle Brigade, marched on San-de-pu, crossing the Hun a little below Chang-tau; and San-de-pu was also the objective of the fourth column, which was made up of the First Siberian Army Corps and 5th Rifle Brigade, and started from Chang-tau itself. The fifth column, consisting of the 1st European Army Corps, and constituting the left wing of the Second Army, kept touch with the Third Army under General Kaulbars.

The weather was intensely cold, so cold that only two days previously the *Times* correspondent at Tokio had telegraphed that on this account no early movement seemed probable. But the Russian soldiery were becoming quite inured to the rigours of the Manchurian winter, and, from the standpoint of marching, the clay of the district was greatly preferable in its present frozen state, with a liberal "top-dressing" of snow, to the sloughs and morasses of the rainy season. We may take it, then, that the Army of General Gripenberg pushed forward with much briskness this bitter January morning, and that through every great column ran a thrill of satisfaction that once more there was a chance of getting at handgrips with the enemy, instead of bandying shots and shouts with him over the thin interval which had been separating most of their respective "burrows."

A very notable movement, too, was that indicated by the almost simultaneous passage of four out of these five columns

across the frozen Hun. At least two must have numbered over 20,000 cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and we in this country think ourselves fortunate if we can collect a single force of that size for important manœuvres. It is true that the intervening distances were sufficiently great, and the country sufficiently flat, to deprive the operation of any marked spectacular attributes. But the moral impressiveness implied by the actual movement of a body of troops which, at a low computation, must have been over 70,000 strong, and may well have been considerably larger, is none the less very great. With less than the half of 70,000 men Lord Kitchener smashed the Dervish tyranny at Omdurman; there were only about 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 60 guns actually engaged on the British side at Tel-el-Kebir; and, to soar to another plane, with between 67,000 and 68,000 men Wellington won the Battle of Waterloo.

Before we follow Gripenberg's columns in their forward march it is particularly important to realise, as far as possible, the nature of the enterprise on which they were engaged. The words "as far as possible" are used advisedly, since, as will be seen, there was a subsequent sharp difference of opinion between Gripenberg and Kuropatkin himself as to the real object of the operation. It may be that this very difference will bring us a little closer to the heart of things in regard to this curious action, emphasising, as it seems to do, the suggestion made above that Kuropatkin entered upon the operation almost as unwillingly as he did upon the attempted relief of Port Arthur by the force which, under General Stackelberg, came to such considerable grief at Telissu. The Commander-in-chief himself is said to have urged that,

in any case, he never intended this particular advance to be more than a preliminary movement, and his description of the commission entrusted to General Gripenberg was that the latter had been "entrusted with the execution of a raid with a considerable force." It will be easier to examine this all-important question now that we are standing at the entrances to the field of operations than it will be later on when the fighting has assumed a complex interest of its own. Let us, then, glance briefly at the direction of the various columns, as well as to the general idea that seems to underlie a thoroughly ill-starred, but not necessarily ill-conceived, effort.

In the first place, Kuropatkin's suggestion of a raid rather than a deliberate attempt to force a decisive action seems to be supported by the fact that the force engaged was not stronger by a couple of Army Corps than it was. Only by such a marked preponderance in this quarter could he have hoped to overcome Marshal Oyama's left wing sufficiently to render a subsequent descent on Liao-yang practicable. Assuming his total strength to have been between 300,000 and 350,000, he would surely have sought to place more than a quarter of this in the position where the decisive struggle for mastery would take place. It is quite conceivable that this is what he ultimately proposed to do, and might have done with some hope of success had he not been first hurried into this needless demonstration, and then saddled with the consequences of his subordinate's rashness.

The direction given to the third and fourth columns, again, does not favour the idea of an attempt to force a big battle. It points rather to an attempt to score a minor success by overwhelming

the Japanese post at San-de-pu with two Army Corps, the first and second columns being employed partly on raiding business, and partly to give timely warning of the approach of Japanese reinforcements from the east or south. Such a programme properly carried out would not have been a very splendid performance, but it would have been a very useful one, since it would have heartened the whole army at the front, created an excellent impression at home, and have afforded a valuable breathing-space for the development of plans of much greater import.

Whether all this was or was not at the back of Kuropatkin's mind in launching Gripenberg with 70,000 or 80,000 men across the Hun-ho, all trace of any such conception disappeared shortly after the leader of the Second Russian Army had put the river between him and his chief. From quite the first he acted as if he had been deputed not only to drive in the enemy's outposts, but to push forward, and bring him without more ado to instant and comprehensive battle.

Let us now follow the movements of the various columns in such detail as is procurable from the rather meagre sources of information at the disposal of students of this particular battle. In passing, the reader may be asked to remember that nearly all the newspaper correspondents were at this time a very long way from the front, the supposition being that no serious fighting could reasonably be expected for a good many weeks. Such representatives of Russian journals as may have accompanied General Gripenberg were naturally reticent on the subject of an operation so disadvantageous from the attackers' standpoint, and Marshal Oyama's despatches, though clear and eminently

soldierlike, can hardly be said to have done complete justice even to the remarkable qualities of resistance and recovery displayed by the Japanese when the latter had realised the nature of the Russian movement. In fact, it is hardly too much to say that of all the battles of the war this one, which, following the Japanese official designation, we shall call the Battle of Hei-kou-tai, is the least satisfactorily illuminated by the narratives of individuals engaged in it, or by the picturesque descriptions of the "Knights of the Pen."

Notwithstanding the sixteen degrees of frost shown by the thermometer on January 25th, the passage of the Hun was effected with sufficient rapidity to enable some brisk fighting to be accomplished on the opposite bank before nightfall. The first column had a brush with the enemy shortly after crossing at Maminkai and Khailatosa, the latter being taken at the point of the bayonet. But the 10th Army Corps, constituting the second column, had a much stiffer task to capture Hei-kou-tai (which appears in some accounts as Kheigutaya), notwithstanding the fact that they must have greatly outnumbered the small garrison of that post. The Japanese fought most stubbornly, and Kuropatkin himself bears testimony to the gallant stand they made until ten o'clock at night, when, finding further resistance out of the question, they slipped away in the darkness. At another village called Tu-tai-tse, on the Hun-ho, about half-a-dozen miles below Chang-tau, the Russian advance was stoutly opposed, the Japanese not retiring until they had accounted for fifty of the enemy. In the struggle for the possession of these various villages the Russians took about 100 prisoners.

On the morning of January 26th the



A RUSSIAN BATTERY BAULKED BY THE SMOKE OF A VILLAGE PURPOSELY SET ON FIRE BY THE JAPANESE.

This device here illustrated has been by no means uncommon during the campaign. It was first practised during one of the great battles in Manchuria, when the Japanese, observing a Russian battery posted to leeward of a village, immediately set the houses on fire, so that the dense black smoke, carried directly into the faces of the gunners, practically put the artillery out of action. Meanwhile the Japanese, screened by the smoke but not impeded by it, crept up from a ravine below the guns and captured them.



fighting assumed another phase. By this time the 10th Russian Army Corps was in complete possession of Hei-kou-tai and the adjacent country, and had begun to take steps to defend the place itself against a Japanese counter-attack. Here was an early indication of Gripenberg's evident intention to assume an independent *rôle*, and to court the chances of a regular battle instead of adhering to the first principles of a raid. As has been explained above, there is reason to believe that the original idea was that the 10th Army Corps, after capturing Hei-kou-tai, should press on to the San-de-pu—Liao-yang road, where at least it should have been able to acquire some useful information of the enemy's strength and probable movements in this quarter, at the same time masking the attack on San-de-pu. By remaining at Hei-kou-tai the 10th Army Corps merely invited a Japanese attack, which was not long in coming, for Oyama, warned by the expelled Hei-kou-tai garrison, was now fully alive to the urgent requirements of the situation. By noon on the 26th, notwithstanding the driving snow, which greatly impeded the movements of the troops, a considerable Japanese force had advanced to within striking distance of Hei-kou-tai, and had commenced preparations for its recapture. To the further fighting in this quarter we shall return presently.

Meanwhile, either the first column or a detachment from the second had occupied Sa-erh-pau (which, in some accounts, is called Sha-ho-pu, and which seems to be identical with the Tao-pao of Oyama's general despatch) with a regiment of infantry and a brigade of cavalry with twelve guns. As Sa-erh-pau lies only about five miles to the south of Hei-kou-tai, the Russians were now

pretty strongly established on this line, and the semblance of preparation for an extensive battle was hourly becoming clearer.

We must now pay attention to the movements of the third and fourth columns in the neighbourhood of San-de-pu. Throughout the 26th the Russian offensive movement against that place was continued, suffering some interruption towards the afternoon, when a relieving column of Japanese troops sent up from the south and south-east by Marshal Oyama arrived on the scene, and vainly endeavoured to dislodge the Russians from their positions. The fighting round San-de-pu was of an extremely severe character, and must have severely tried the 8th Army Corps, which had only recently arrived from Russia, and had not previously been in action. This corps, by the way, was commanded by General Miloff, and consisted of two divisions, one the 14th, named after the veteran Dragomiroff, the other the famous 15th Division, which defended the Malakoff in the Crimean War. It was a terrible baptism of fire for these untried troops, for the Japanese garrison clung with the tenacity of wild-cats to San-de-pu, which had further been fortified with much skill.

By seven o'clock in the evening the Russians had gained possession of the greater part of the village, having lost 24 officers and 1,600 men killed and wounded in the process. But they now, to their chagrin, found themselves confronted in the north-eastern corner of San-de-pu by a strong redoubt, with a triple row of obstacles, which had been hardly damaged by the Russian fire, and was armed with field-artillery and quick-firers. It was clear that this hard nut could not be cracked without preliminary

bombardment, and, as a prolonged stay in the captured portion of the village would have meant costly exposure to the guns in the redoubt, the Russians set fire to some of the houses, and more or less gracefully withdrew.

then acquired a new battle front so clearly useful that Kuropatkin might have been induced to take advantage of it, even though his orders had been exceeded. But with San-de-pu still held by the Japanese, the Russian position



GENERAL DRAGOMIROFF.


The importance of this brilliant defence of San-de-pu against a greatly superior attacking force can hardly be overestimated. Had the Russians succeeded in establishing themselves at this point there is no question that the subsequent operations would have assumed a very different complexion, since, with Sa-erh-pau and Hei-kou-tai also in their occupation, the Russians would have

was by turns incomplete or precarious, or both.

Before closing the record for January 26th we must return for a brief space to the Japanese attempt to recapture Hei-kou-tai. It had been the original intention of the Japanese to deploy for the attack on the line from Su-ma-pao (a village on the San-de-pu—Liao-yang road two or three miles south-east of San-de-

pu) to Sa-erh-pau, but this was frustrated by the elementary fact that, as shown above, the Russians were now strongly holding the latter place. Accordingly, the deployment was carried out along the San-de-pu—Liao-yang road itself on the line Su-ma-pao—Wu-chia-tzu

The 27th was a day of hard and bitter fighting, and one which, but for their extraordinary tenacity, might have proved disastrous for the Japanese. For it soon became evident that, although the latter had now assumed the offensive, they were not in sufficient numbers to



SKETCH MAP OF THE BATTLE OF HEI-KOU-TAI.

(a village eight or ten miles north of Liao-yang), with the object of retaking Sa-erh-pau as well as Hei-kou-tai. The double task was no easy one, for the Russians had placed thirty guns skilfully round Hei-kou-tai, and with these they enfiladed the attackers at Sa-erh-pau. Nightfall on the 26th saw the Japanese still vainly struggling to dislodge the Russians from these two positions.

push it at present to a successful issue. Although, moreover, San-de-pu still remained in Japanese occupation, very large Russian forces were clustered around the place, and the Japanese were hard put to it to withstand the pressure. Still, they not only held on manfully to San-de-pu itself, which was vigorously bombarded, but kept hammering away at the 8th European and 1st Siberian Army

Corps, at the same time vigorously renewing the attack against Hei-kou-tai and Sa-erh-pau. But they suffered pretty heavily, especially at Su-ma-pao,

portion of the Russians," says the Japanese official account, "remained concealed at Su-ma-pao. On the morning of the 28th they fired into the rear of the



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WHAT MODERN WAR LOOKS LIKE. A FIERCE ARTILLERY ENGAGEMENT IN THE MANCHURIAN HILLS.

where a Russian force succeeded in catching and destroying a Japanese detachment. For this mishap, however, the Japanese obtained some compensation early on the following day. "A

Japanese centre. The Japanese turned and attacked, and practically annihilated the Russians, only 200 surrendering."

Throughout the 27th and 28th the tide of battle ebbed and flowed, many desper-

ate hand-to-hand encounters taking place, and small successes being scored by both sides. Two Russian generals, Mishtchenko and Kondratovitch, were slightly wounded, and the Japanese at San-de-pu suffered heavily from the continuous bombardment. During the 28th Sa-erh-pau was captured by the Japanese, and the Russian infantry position south of Hei-kou-tai was also seized. But Marshal Oyama was not yet by any means satisfied with the progress made. As he remarked in his despatch with reference to the fighting on the 28th, the Japanese object had not been attained, since, although the Russian advance had been effectually checked, it had not been repulsed, and the continued Russian occupation of any territory on the left bank of the Hun-ho in itself constituted some evidence of superiority. Accordingly, the word was given to the Japanese forces to have resort to night fighting, and throughout the night of January 28th-29th a series of attacks was delivered in the same spirit of reckless bravery which had distinguished so many previous Japanese onslaughts of the same character. "All the columns of the attacking parties," wrote Marshal Oyama, "expected annihilation. We attempted several attack movements, but suffered heavily from the enemy's artillery, and especially from his machine guns, but all the columns continued the attack with all their might. The enemy was unable to resist our vigorous attack, and began to retreat at half-past five in the morning. Our forces charging into Hei-kou-tai occupied the place firmly and entirely by half-past nine."

That spell of night fighting and the recapture of Hei-kou-tai decided the battle, and what remains of the operation is little else but the record of the Russian

retreat across the Hun-ho, and a somewhat confused tale of minor conflicts arising out of sporadic attempts on the part of individual Russian commanders to create a diversion by small and ineffectual counter-attacks. By their failure to gain possession of San-de-pu, the Russians had been forced to make Hei-kou-tai the key to their position, and that key once lost, there was nothing left but a general withdrawal. By midnight on January 29th the whole of the first two columns of the Second Russian Army were across the river, and only to the north of San-de-pu was there any attempt made by the Russians to carry on the conflict. To some extent the Japanese had pursued the beaten Russians across the river, but it was necessary to be cautious owing to the number of strong fortified villages on this bank, to the existence of which attention was drawn early in the course of this chapter, and a determined stand at any one of which might have caused the pursuers very serious loss. It must be remembered, too, that the Japanese were in no great strength on their extreme left, and must themselves have been considerably exhausted by the recent struggle. It is not, therefore, surprising to find them in the early days of February in positions little, if at all, in advance of those which they had occupied before General Gripenberg's passage of the Hun. It is clear, however, that the left had now been considerably and permanently strengthened, and when, on February 3rd, a Russian detachment ventured to make another attack on Hei-kou-tai it met with a very warm reception, and was driven back, leaving 160 dead.

No precise official account of the losses of the Russians in this great operation is available, but it is quite safe to reckon

them, as the Japanese did, at not less than 10,000. The Japanese themselves admitted a very heavy casualty list, 82 officers and 760 men being returned as killed, and 8,014 as wounded, including 271 officers, and 526 missing. There were no fewer than 505 cases in which officers and men were compelled to leave the fighting line owing to frostbite, and nearly half the wounded were also affected by frostbite, due to the freezing of blood round the wounds while the latter were being exposed for the purpose of being bandaged. Such returns from the admirably organised medical service of the Japanese army afford ground for the belief that the sufferings undergone by the unfortunate Russians must have been still more terrible owing to their much longer exposure and the greater distance over which the wounded had to be carried.

With reference to the Japanese "missing," it is painful to be obliged to add, on the authority of the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, that the profoundest indignation was caused in Japan by reports of Chinese eye-witnesses to the effect that 126 wounded Japanese, roped together like felons, had been led through the streets of Mukden on February 4th amid proclamations of a Russian victory. It might have been supposed that such a statement would have been at once officially and publicly contradicted by the Russian military authorities, but it remained unchallenged. Such an incident would, of course, be a foul blot on the honour of any civilised nation, and is almost incredible in the case of one whose own "missing" had always received such peculiarly handsome treatment at the hands of their high-minded adversaries.

The immediate sequel of the Battle of

Hei-kou-tai was largely of a personal character. It transpired that General Gripenberg had, on the 26th and 27th, demanded reinforcements to enable him to continue the battle in which he had become involved, and that General Kuropatkin had not only refused those reinforcements on the ground that to send them would weaken his centre, and pave the way for an immediate Japanese advance, but had, on the 28th, conveyed to the Second Army a peremptory order to retire. The rest of General Gripenberg's case may be briefly stated in his own words to a correspondent of the *Novoe Vremya*:—

"On the morning of the 28th we successfully repulsed four desperate Japanese attacks, but I was unable to advance owing not only to the want of reinforcements, but to the fact that I had not received permission to do so. Victory was in our hands, and I cannot tell you how anxiously I awaited men and authorisation to advance. Neither came.

"On the evening of the 28th General Kuropatkin ordered us to retire in view of a possible attack from the Japanese centre.

"It is not for me to criticise, but I must say that the Japanese could not possibly have attempted any serious attack on General Kuropatkin's centre. It is difficult to describe my feelings on receiving General Kuropatkin's order.

"On the night of the 29th we retired, carrying away all our wounded men, and even picking up broken bayonets. The men retired unwillingly with tears in their eyes. I decided that it was impossible for me to remain any longer at the front, and next day I reported myself to General Kuropatkin, asking him to relieve me of my command immediately. He did so."

After tendering his resignation,

General Gripenberg proceeded at once to St. Petersburg, where he was received in audience by the Tsar. The reports of his reception are hopelessly conflicting, some saying that it was extremely cool, and that the Tsar, who had in the meantime received the Commander-in-chief's explanation by telegram, made use of the words, "I am entirely of Kuropatkin's opinion." According to other accounts General Gripenberg was listened to attentively, and was subsequently treated by the Tsar with distinguished consideration.

As a matter of fact it is not of material importance to the present narrative to decide what was the Imperial estimate of the extraordinary line of action taken by the former commander of the Second Russian Army, having regard to certain subsequent happenings which completely modified Kuropatkin's relation to the Russian army in the Far East, and rendered past differences of opinion between him and Gripenberg of but secondary importance. Still, one would like to believe that the Tsar in this instance supported the absent Commander-in-chief, and blamed his subordinate, at any rate for leaving his post and exposing to the whole world, as a French correspondent plainly put it, "the dissensions and incapacity of the high command in Manchuria."

Of Kuropatkin's position in this unfortunate controversy it is not now necessary to say much more than was suggested in the earlier part of this chapter. Everything hinges on the precise commission entrusted to Gripenberg, and if Kuropatkin only intended that the latter should accomplish a species of raid, and gave him clear orders to that effect, the leader of the Second Army had not the slightest justification for deliberately

seeking, as he appears to have done, to fight a battle.

But to many the weak point of Gripenberg's case will seem to be the grave question whether, even supposing that he had been more or less justified in allowing himself to be drawn into a regular battle, his position was ever such that, even with considerable reinforcements, he could have hoped to accomplish anything really definite.

In his statement to the correspondent of the *Novoe Vremya* quoted above, he speaks as if he had already obtained substantial successes, and only needed a stiffening of his forces to carry all before him. But the truth is that, beyond capturing Hei-kou-tai and Sa-erh-pau, and repulsing a few Japanese attacks delivered by columns much smaller than his own, he had accomplished little or nothing. Even if he had been reinforced, he would still have had to take San-de-pu, which he had hitherto signally failed to do, although he had directed two whole Army Corps against that stoutly defended village. Judging, moreover, from the subsequent incoherence of the counter-attacks made by his subordinates after the loss of Hei-kou-tai, he had not his troops by any means sufficiently well in hand to warrant the belief that, with a moderate reinforcement, he could brush back the Japanese columns which were now so determinedly attacking him, and easily penetrate to a vital spot in Oyama's position.

Only the main points of a very large military argument are given above, but it may be hoped that these will serve to create some real interest in a very remarkable operation to which, as far as this narrative is concerned, a particular epoch-marking interest is attached. For it is at this point we arrive with suffi-



A RUSSIAN COLUMN IN RETREAT.

cient exactitude for all practical purposes at the termination of the first year of the Russo-Japanese War. To a line nearly level with this point the story of other developments connected with the war has been brought in preceding chapters, and with this account of Gripenberg's abortive attempt to restore Russian prestige by a big battle on the Hun-ho plain another large section of our war chronicle may be definitely closed with some degree of dramatic appropriateness. For, if it has had no other effect, the battle of Hei-kou-tai has, in one sense at least, proved a very effective "curtain." It marked the final disappearance of any hope that Russia would be enabled to

use Mukden as a base from which to regain possession of Liao-yang. Later we shall see this bald statement of the situation expanded into a development of tremendous significance, compared with which the Liao-yang, Sha-ho, and Hei-kou-tai battles will lose much of their prior importance. In a subsequent chapter the past course of the war and its lessons up to date will be lightly sketched. But for the subject matter of the last few pages it may be claimed that it represents at least the outcome of long and careful planning to bring the actual story of the first year of the war into a compact and logical system of arrangement.



Photo: J. J. Archibald.

CAPTURED CHUNCHUSES BEING TORTURED BEFORE A CHINESE MAGISTRATE'S YAMEN.

The combatants sometimes turn over their prisoners to be dealt with by the Chinese.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

A YEAR OF WAR—THE LESSON OF MAINTENANCE—AN EXCEPTIONAL STRUGGLE—
 DRAMATIC ATTRIBUTES—THE ACTORS—THE "SCENERY"—NAVAL AND MILITARY
 LESSONS.

A YEAR of war! There are at least half-a-dozen standpoints from which that phrase possesses a significance splendid, terrible, pathetic, cruel, instructive, or demoralising, according to the mental attitude in which the subject is approached.

For the purposes of this narrative, however, there is one great lesson, half military, half historical, which is conveyed by the duration of a war for twelve long months, and upon which particular emphasis should be placed by the thoughtful reader. This is the lesson of maintenance as opposed to the lesson of preparedness. It may be said that the one includes the other, and that the nation which is properly prepared for war should certainly be prepared to wage it for at least a year. That is true enough of some cases, but certainly not of all, since often the essence of preparedness consists in the capacity to strike one paralyzing blow at the outset.

In the Spanish-American and Greco-Turkish conflicts the United States and the Porte were sufficiently ready to bring matters to a logical conclusion after a short, sharp struggle, and there have been other and far greater wars in which, to all intents and purposes, the issue was decided at a very early date in the history of the actual fighting. In the case of the tremendous duel in the Far East there is extraordinary impressiveness in the

fact that a whole year of war both by land and sea, war vigorously waged with armies, at any rate among the largest that the world has ever seen, has left both combatants still in full fighting trim, still alert, still eager, still backed by no inconsiderable reserves.


Taking all things into consideration, another such example of sustained pugnacity cannot readily be quoted. The more closely, too, we look into the details of this monumental trial of strength the more amazing it seems that not one, but three or four intervening agencies have not sooner put an end to it. Apart from the question of foreign interference or complications, the circumstances of the war have been such that nothing but an exceptional tenacity and determination on both sides could for twelve long months have enabled a financial and physical strain so severe to be endured without the exhibition of signs of genuine exhaustion. If we take any great war of a century past, shall we find a single instance in which, after a whole year of pretty constant fighting, in which tens of thousands of casualties have occurred, many big warships have been sunk or disabled, very many millions of pounds have been spent, both opposing forces have still been so full of "grit and go," with fleets in being, and huge armies eagerly awaiting the chances of yet another violent collision?

This "lesson of maintenance," as we have ventured to call it, is, of course, the more striking in that it has reference to the simultaneous warfare by land and sea, which lends such a peculiar interest to this cataclysmal and prolonged rupture of the world's peace. We have to go back to the Napoleonic period to find anything like a resemblance to the conditions prevailing in the Far East during the struggle between Russia and Japan, and even here the similarity is only fragmentary and, to some extent, deceptive. Neither in the early days of the nineteenth century nor at any other period

can we find a true parallel to the beautifully sustained co-ordination of the Japanese naval and military systems on the one hand, and on the other, to the astonishing recuperativeness of the Russians as exemplified by what may almost be termed a succession of fleets.

To put the matter in a few words, it is impossible now to get away from the fact that the Russo-Japanese War has begun to stand in a class by itself as one of the most surprising, as well as one of the most instructive, wars which have ever been waged.

In its earlier stages it was easy to



SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1905, AND, BY THE SHADED PORTION, THE TERRITORY THEN IN THE HANDS OF THE JAPANESE.




Photo: A. Lavrantieff.

PORT ARTHUR'S HEAVY ARTILLERY: A BIG GUN READY FOR ACTION.

apply to it the ordinary canons of military and naval criticism, and to treat it as a by no means abnormal development of self-repeating history. But then the chance existed that at short notice the flame of war would suddenly dwindle in intensity, and, gradually diminishing, leave, at the end of a few months, nothing but smouldering embers, upon which the onlooking nations would be throwing buckets of peaceful water. The half-sturdy, half-ferocious maintenance of hostilities at such a high level of activity and striking power lifted, at any rate, the historical consideration of the war clean out of the region of mediocrity, and in February, 1905, even naval and military experts were beginning to wonder whether there were not more things about to happen in the Far East than

had hitherto been dreamt of in their philosophy.

Having sought to establish in a rudimentary fashion the exceptional character of the struggle with which this popular history deals, we may shortly pass to a general review of the leading events in this year of warfare, and a brief discussion of the outstanding lessons to be derived therefrom. But before doing this it will be well to touch lightly on the relation of this volume to the last, with a view to the correct estimation of the stages respectively arrived at, and the inter-significance of the various events.

The first large volume of this work carried the narrative of the war down to about the end of the last week in July, 1904, by which time Port Arthur had been effectively isolated beyond hope of relief,

at any rate by land, and co-operation between the three main armies of Japan had, to all intents and purposes, commenced. The condition of affairs thus disclosed pointed to two main developments, the struggle for Port Arthur and the struggle for Liao-yang, subordinate points of interest being the tightening of Japan's grip upon Korea, and certain possibilities connected with Vladivostok. An incidental feature of some current importance was the existence of a considerable state of tension between this country and Russia in regard to the latter's treatment of neutral shipping.

In the six months from the beginning of August, 1904, to the beginning of February, 1905, there ensued, at the same time, a very orderly sequence of events and some very astonishing developments. Both Port Arthur and Liao-yang fell in due course, and Korea passed completely under Japanese influence. Vladivostok, after playing a somewhat curious but not wholly unexpected rôle, was brought several stages nearer to the point at which its real fate would be decided.

The performances of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, and other outrages upon British shipping, were carried into the region of diplomacy with more or less satisfactory results in the way of peaceful adjustment. But other and very grave happenings combined to give this second six months of the war a special character quite outside such nearly foregone conclusions as the successful result of the concentrated effort against Liao-yang, and of the long succession of desperate assaults upon Port Arthur. The revolutionary outbreak in Russia disclosed possibilities of tremendous moment, and the despatch and arrival at Madagascar of the Baltic Fleet not only brought Russia once more within an ace of a rupture with

Great Britain, but introduced an entirely new factor in the conduct of the war itself.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the dramatic quality of the period covered by this volume of our history, quite apart from its noteworthiness on naval and military grounds, and the writer will, he thinks, be excused for drawing special attention to this peculiar attribute. In the earlier stages of the war there was, to be sure, no lack of stirring incident. The opening torpedo attack at Port Arthur; the Battle of the Yalu; the sinking of the *Petropavlovsk*; the storming of Nan-shan; the Battle of Telissu, and Oku's hard-fought progress up the Liao-tung Peninsula—all these contained adequate material for descriptions far more flamboyant than those which have been deemed appropriate to the purposes of this record, and more than one of them will doubtless, in due course, receive particular treatment at the hand of the artist, the poet, or even the playwright. But none of these episodes equals in tragic intensity the hell of slaughter which raged round Port Arthur for some weeks prior to its fall. The Battle of Telissu is an "affair" by the side of the Battle of Liao-yang. The sinking of the *Petropavlovsk* recedes into the background when the naval action of August 10th comes to be carefully considered. To turn to the "incidentals," there is only a strained comparison possible between the exasperation—keen as it was—which attended the exploits of the Russian Volunteer "cruisers" and the flaming indignation with which the people of Great Britain received the tragic news of the outrage in the North Sea. On an entirely separate plane the events leading up to "Red Sunday" constitute a chapter of the history not only of the war, but of the civilised

world, which for centuries to come will in men's minds leave much the same impression as has been left by St. Bartholomew's Day and other sanguinary instances of savage inhumanity backed up by kingly or Imperial weakness or want of scruple.

Taking the story in some detail, and laying a certain emphasis upon the order in which the bigger occurrences of the period in question have presented themselves, the dramatic aspect is enhanced, and the effect is almost the same as that created by the perusal of some great classic tragedy. As far as Liao-yang and Port Arthur were concerned, the closing months of 1904 were conclusive, and there will be little or no need to lift the curtain on either of these two scenes again. But the wonderful comprehensiveness and fecundity of history is finely shown by the manner in which other developments came to be interwoven with the battle-story, and not only added largely to the interest of the current months, but produced fresh situations, and introduced new factors tending to make the narrative quite as full of interesting contingencies at Chapter LXXXIII. as it was at Chapter XLVI.

Surely there never was a war in which the student was more naturally carried on from one point to another, and in which all the time the different movements and disturbances progressed more harmoniously on their appointed course. Such combined attractiveness and orderliness ought to be commonly characteristic of military history, but they very seldom are, and for the conspicuous example it affords in this respect the Russo-Japanese War may, in future, become more popular with both students and the general public than any other campaign, not excluding those of which Napier and

Kinglake have given us monumental chronicles.

A few words may usefully be given to the personal interest of the story during the phase covered by this large volume. It is not a little strange that, in spite of the widening area of the military operations, very few new actors should have come on the stage during the six months from August, 1904, to February, 1905. The case was very different with us in South Africa, and in most other great wars one generally has found that in the second half of the first year, even if no entirely fresh personalities are introduced, men became prominent who previously had been altogether obscure.

In the Far East, with the exception of Generals Liniévitch and Gripenberg on land, and Admiral Rozhdestvensky on sea, practically all the leading characters were sustaining much the same rôles in December, 1904, as they had been sustaining in the previous June. Kuropatkin was still in superior charge of the Russian Army in Manchuria, Oyama was still controlling the armies of Japan. Nogi was still pressing upon Port Arthur; Stoessel was still conducting a defence, the precise merits of which were subsequently called rather acrimoniously in question. Oku, Nozu, and Kuroki were still in charge of separate Japanese armies; Mishtchenko was still the foremost cavalry leader on the side of Russia. Each during the period under review acted much as was to be expected of him from his previous performances. Of the additions, only Gripenberg distinguished himself on the actual field, and his conception of a subordinate general's duties, as instanced by the Battle of Heikou-tai, hardly entitle him to much consideration. The veteran Liniévitch had not, as yet, come forward in his new

part as a commander of a field army, and Rozhdestvensky had yet to face any more dangerous foes than harmless British fisherfolk.

On the other hand, one figure disappeared from the front during the latter half of 1904, upon whom by far the most serious responsibility for two-thirds of what had occurred since the early days of February had undoubtedly rested. It is true that the recall of Alexeieff did not have all the useful results which were expected from it, and there is further reason to believe that "the arch-intriguer" was able at St. Petersburg to score quite as heavily against his great adversary, Kuropatkin, as he had been during his Viceroyalty of the Far East. But the removal of such a powerful agent for good or ill from the actual direction of affairs at the front was a feature of what may be termed the third phase of the war, to which it is necessary to assign a certain importance.

Having expatiated upon the dramatic quality of the period under review, and said a few words as to the *dramatis personæ*, some circumstances of time and place may now occupy our attention. Not a great deal need be said as to changed conditions of climate, since the effect of winter upon the conduct of both naval and military operations had been, to some extent, observed in connection with the earliest stages of the war. But there is no doubt that the cold experienced during, for instance, the Battle of Hei-kou-tai, was of a far more penetrating and numbing sort than that in which the upward march through Korea was conducted and the Battle of the Yalu fought. It is important, too, in this connection to remember how completely all the predictions that the Japanese soldiers would be shrivelled up by cold, to which Rus-

sian soldiers had been fully inured, were falsified. It is true that in the Battle of Hei-kou-tai—a typical instance—the Russians were not hindered by sixteen degrees of frost from attempting a very large and toilsome operation, and that the cases of frostbite in the Japanese forces engaged were very numerous. But everything of this sort is best judged by results, and the fact that the Japanese not only met, but checked, and finally drove back, the attackers is hardly suggestive of any serious paralysis of their fighting-capacity by cold as severe as they are likely to encounter at any period of the campaign.

From a warlike standpoint, scenery—to carry on our theatrical metaphor—chiefly means communications, and in this respect some very significant progress was indicated during the second six months of the war. Attention has already been drawn in the body of this work to the sturdy efforts made by the Japanese to push on the construction of the lines from Seoul to Wi-ju, and from the Yalu to Liao-yang, and now a word may be added as to the actual opening on December 27th of the line from Fusan, the southern part of Korea, to Seoul, a section of which some interesting details were given in the *Times* by a well-known Welsh gentleman, Mr. David Davies, who was one of the earliest travellers by this route. According to Mr. Davies this railway had been built by a company subsidised by the Japanese Government. When the work of construction was commenced it was not expected that the line would be open for traffic until 1906, but the exigencies of the war made quicker progress imperative, and by dint of tremendous exertions the task was finished a year earlier than had been anticipated. The line had a particular interest, as it



From Stereographs, copyrighted 1904, by Underwood & Underwood, London & New York.

THE HUGE SHELLS HURLED BY THE JAPANESE SIEGE ARTILLERY AGAINST THE RUSSIAN SHIPS AND FORTS.

These 11-inch shells produce an explosion equal to that of a small magazine, and it became known after the capitulation that gunners in the Russian forts were often killed by their concussion alone.

was to be, of course, linked up with the Seoul—Wi-ju extension, and thus eventually it might be possible to travel from Fusan, as well as from Port Arthur, direct to St. Petersburg.

In his account Mr. Davies confirms the general idea of Japanese thoroughness by the details he gives showing the care with which the line was constructed, notwithstanding the labour involved. The iron bridges, in particular, were extremely well built on stone foundations, while the part of the construction across the mountains is described as "a feat of engineering which reminds one of the railways of Switzerland. Two ridges have to be crossed, and in each case the line makes a wide curve gradually ascending the steep slopes, and half way up it enters a tunnel which pierces the mountain at a height of 2,000 feet." All the rolling stock was imported from the United States, the locomotives from Philadelphia, the cars from Delamere, and the 90-lb. rails from the Carnegie steel works.

It is a very striking reflection that Japan should have been pushing forward not only this line, but also those from Seoul to Wi-ju, and from the Yalu to Liao-yang—to say nothing of keeping the line from Port Adams to Liao-yang in constant active employment—all the time that she was hammering at the fortifications of Port Arthur, keeping Kuropatkin to the line of the Sha-ho, and preparing to give a warm welcome to the Baltic Fleet. The breadth of conception, the patience and thoroughness in execution, in circumstances in which it would not have been surprising if such enterprises had been temporarily abandoned are truly extraordinary, and calculated to make the student of history wonder whether some previous campaigns hitherto regarded as well-nigh perfect examples of the military

art would not have both assumed a different complexion and produced widely different results had the victors super-added to their military activity such energy in railway construction as was exhibited by the Japanese during the latter half of 1904.

In any case the emphasis that has here been laid upon this subject is more than justified by the obvious necessity which will arise in the future of taking this work of railway construction during hostilities most seriously into account. For years Russia fondly imagined that her railway extension southwards from Harbin to Port Arthur had given her a grip upon Manchuria which could be tightened at will, and the loosening of which was a contingency so absurd as hardly to bear thinking about. A year of war did more than merely expose this stupid fallacy. It put Korea in a fair way to become a really vertebrate country—for what better backbone can a peninsula have than a railway running its entire length?—and it saw marked progress made with a strangely important connecting link between the Yalu and Liao-yang, the influence of which upon the future strategic value of the latter may be immeasurable. At an early stage in this history the writer dwelt in simple language upon the strategic importance of forks. The fork which has its handle in the line from Harbin to Liao-yang, and its two prongs in the roads from Liao-yang to Port Arthur and the Yalu respectively, was always of distinct importance. But its strategic value was altogether altered when, instead of a mere mountain road, choked by at least one pass which might have been made formidable, a full-sized railway line was in course of construction, and meanwhile a narrow-gauge line for horse traction had enormously increased.

the facilities for the transport of supplies to the Manchurian front.

Before we finally leave this portion of our subject it will be interesting to note in relation with it the curiously important additions made during the second six months of the war to the resources possessed by Japan for the feeding of her troops in the field, and the transmission to them of reinforcements and fresh equipment, arms, and ammunition. During the first half-year, in which, as explained in the first volume, two phases were indicated, the Japanese had landed troops at Pi-tsu-wo and Ta-ku-shan as well as at Che-mul-po and Chin-nam-po, and had also used Port Adams, to some extent, as a base from which supplies could be furnished to General Oku's Second Army during the latter's further progress in the north of the Liao-tung Peninsula. But in the later period the occupation of Dalny and Niu-chwang made a most important difference both to the tenure of the Liao-tung Peninsula and to the continuance of the advance on Mukden.

The Russians, on the other hand, had not only acquired no new sources of supply, and had suffered considerably from the loss of the stores which they had been compelled to destroy or abandon at Liao-yang, but had been put to serious inconvenience by the Japanese entry into Niu-chwang, from which previously a quantity of supplies had been drawn for the use of Mukden. They had now a largely increased force, not only to feed, but to find in winter clothing, and the Siberian Railway still remained, practically speaking, the only means by which the absolute necessities for a huge and growing field army could be brought to the front. It would be foolish to reproduce all the rumours current at this period

of Kuropatkin's grave dissatisfaction with the manner in which his service of supply was being maintained. But there is little question that the commissariat problem, at all times a serious one for Russia, became during the winter of 1904 one of extraordinary difficulty, and to many it will seem that even its imperfect solution was a very remarkable feat, extremely creditable alike to those responsible for the maintenance and conduct of the railway, and to the capacity of the Russian soldier to fight splendidly on a very poorly-filled stomach.

It is now time to examine in some detail the naval and military aspects of the war up to date, without particular reference to the past six months, but rather with a view to seeing how the lessons of that period coincide with or confirm the lessons of the earlier phases.

Professionally or technically speaking, it is possible to deal with such a subject by one of two instructive methods. Either one can dwell on the eternal principles of strategy and the larger settled facts of tactics, and point out how, broadly speaking, the Russo-Japanese War, like every other war, illustrates these, and does not, mainly because it could not, present any marked divergences from the more or less mathematical certainties of war mathematically considered. There is much value, even if there be to the average student little attractiveness, in this method, because in any case it serves to keep things in focus, and to prevent our regarding incidental and purely topical lessons as modifications of established principles.


But such technical statements, however clear and accurate, would be out of place in a popular history which has to explain, as well as lay down, the law. Not less inappropriate would be the alternative

technical or professional process of studying minutely each operation of the campaign and culling from it particular lessons, without reference to their repetition elsewhere, and at the risk of boring everyone but the enthusiast or the student by constant quotations from, and comparison with, well-worn text-book examples.


To adopt a quaint rendering of a Latin saw, "the ibis is safest in the middle," and, accordingly, the attempt to give here some idea of the war up to date from an educational standpoint will only faintly resemble the more strictly critical methods. Yet it is to be hoped that by this middle course not much that is of serious significance will be lost, while the risk of tedium may, perhaps, be happily avoided.

The more closely we look into the strategy demonstrated by the first year of the war, the more surely are we brought round, time and again, to the cardinal question whether the lines which the Japanese have followed with, hitherto, such consistent success have been altogether justified. Justified, this should be understood to mean, not by the results secured, but by the situation reached, which may be a somewhat different thing.

The capture of Port Arthur and of Liao-yang, and the battles of the Sha-ho and Hei-kou-tai were all unquestionably splendid achievements conferring, both individually and collectively, very substantial advantages upon Japan. But time is often of the essence of the contract in the conduct of war as in business, and what we have to consider is not so



THE COST TO JAPAN OF THE CAPTURE OF 203 METRE HILL, PORT ARTHUR.

THE BATTERED *PERESVIET* IN PORT ARTHUR HARBOUR.

much whether Japan won useful victory after useful victory in the first year of her struggle with Russia, but whether she would have been in a better position at the end of that year if she had adopted other methods.

The historical and expert replies to this momentous question may be that the Japanese did everything for the best, but the subject must not be too hastily assumed to be unworthy of serious argument. For, although only a week or two later the position was to be importantly modified by another great Japanese success, we have to remember that at the beginning of February, 1905, the tables were liable to be inconveniently turned, and that even a partial reverse might conceivably have had the gravest consequences for the armies of the Mikado.

It is at this point that the associated but distinct lessons of preparedness and

maintenance, of which one aspect was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, assume another shape, and we begin to ask ourselves whether the Japanese did not actually lose in the first year of the war something of the advantage which their magnificent readiness gave them at the outset. It is now quite clear that Japan could easily have placed in Manchuria at a very early stage forces amounting to at least a quarter of a million men, exclusive of those required for the isolation of Port Arthur. Such a force could surely within the first three months of the war have forced its way even to Harbin had it been handled with vigour. It is, moreover, extremely probable that the process would have been found far less costly, as well as more effective, than the trying business of marching up the Liao-tung Peninsula and Korea, and then approaching Liao-yang

with an elaboration and precision of movement reminding one somewhat of the performances during the Marlburian epoch in the great Flanders quadrilateral.

For in those early days the Russian forces were in such an incoherent state, and, as regards Manchuria itself, were so fundamentally weak, that they could not have hoped to offer any but a trivial resistance to a swift convergence of superbly equipped and powerful Japanese armies upon the point from which the railway bifurcates to Port Arthur and Vladivostok. It would have been risky, of course, but the question is, and it must steadily be kept in mind, whether it was not much more risky to give Russia the chance of recovering from her first surprise, and collecting her enormous strength. This question has been lightly touched upon at previous stages of this narrative, and the discussion of it will not be laboured now. But no attempt to give even a hasty generalisation of the course of the war during the first twelve months would be worth anything that did not take into account the grave alternative here indicated.

The possibility that the Japanese originally intended to strike at Harbin, but that the treacherous disclosure of their plans made it difficult to put them into really successful execution, has also been briefly noted in this history; but by the end of a whole year of fighting a speculation of that sort has lost interest. More absorbing are two other considerations which may have directly influenced the Japanese plan of campaign. Japanese strategy was learnt in the school of German caution and thoroughness, and the Mikado's military advisers may have dreaded the chance of an initial repulse. Had, for example, two or three armies been sent at the outset against Harbin,

without reference to Liao-yang and Mukden, one of them might, very probably, have been a good deal knocked about *en route*, and the moral effect upon the people of Japan might have been serious. A patient game, consisting, in the first place, of well-ordered landings and the almost foregone conclusion of a victory on the Yalu, may have seemed to the Japanese military authorities to offer peculiar advantages, pending a clear demonstration that the Japanese soldier was man to man equal, if not superior, to his Russian adversary.

A much larger field of thought is opened up by the second of the two considerations to which reference was made above. It was said repeatedly by Japan herself during the early days of the war that she was engaged in a veritable struggle for existence, and this circumstance, without any embroidery, may have determined her cautious proceedings with regard to Korea and the Liao-tung Peninsula. She may have said to herself that a grip upon the Hermit Kingdom and upon Port Arthur would enable her to exist even if Russia, by pouring reinforcements into Manchuria, enabled the greater part of that province to remain in effective occupation by her soldiery. Port Arthur, defended not only by a Japanese garrison, but by a Japanese fleet, might prove as really impregnable as Gibraltar in the hands of Great Britain. Korea, with a line of Japanese fortifications stretched across it, and desperately held by Japanese troops, might not seem such a tempting morsel even to a partly victorious Russia as it did in 1903 to Alexeieff and others of the Forward Party. In other words, Japan may have thought it wise to make sure of winning a small stake, in addition to preserving her national independence, rather than

run the risk, however slight, of—to use an expressive American term—“biting off more than she could chew” during the first three or four months of the war.

But a year's experience of Japan's methods rather induce the reflection that this would be a narrow-minded construction to place even upon the cautious military counsels favoured by the Mikado's advisers. As, concurrently with the relentless pertinacity of the siege of Port Arthur, the armies of Japan gradually drove the enemy before them, and made good their foothold at point after point south of Mukden, it became more and more a question whether this, after all, might be the strategy, not of caution, not of a struggle for existence, but of resolute Imperial expansion, or, at any rate, of racial development. The time has not come to speak freely of the historical and political aspects of this proposition, but the argument in its military relation is allowable and full of instructive suggestiveness. To a nation seeking only to trip up a giant adversary, and to get even with that adversary in the matter of a one-sided deal ten years ago, and to write *Noli me tangere* in characters that would endure perhaps for a quarter of a century, one really smashing victory—such as might, perhaps, have been best attained by making Harbin a first and final objective—would doubtless have been sufficient. But there was much ulterior benefit involved in the utter eradication of the Russian element from every nook and cranny of what had previously been on the point of becoming a Russian province. The exhibition to China of the improving spectacle of large Russian forces driven back by Japanese armies of no greater strength at the point of the bayonet was calculated to impart some sort of backbone even to such a

flabby organisation as the Celestial Empire in the latter's future dealings with the nations of the West. In a word, if Japan was not only actuated by a stern resolve not to allow Russian designs upon Korea to endanger her own existence, but had also formed the conception of a permanent and exclusive Chino-Japanese dominion in the Far East, there was much advantage in her plan of gradual advance, and, so to speak, serial occupation of successive strategic points.

After this brief incursion into a realm of discussion which, as time goes on, will probably be the area of much learned and acrimonious controversy, let us seek a somewhat lower plane and, after a few words on the lessons of Port Arthur, endeavour to appreciate the two or three main tactical lessons of the campaign. As to Port Arthur there is very little to be said that is not almost obvious from the perusal of the actual narrative of the siege. The biggest lesson of all is, of course, the one which the Russians so carelessly disregarded—the fact, namely, that the chief value of such a fortress lay in its capacity to serve as a base for an active fleet. Beyond the fact that it locked up, in the sense of detaining, a good many more Japanese than Russians for a good many months, Port Arthur was of little real value to the Muscovites after the death of Makaroff, and of no value at all after the naval engagement of August 10th. On the other hand, the loss of such a stronghold, so obstinately clung to in the fatuous hope that mere fortifications would render it impregnable, was not only a more serious blow to Russian prestige than its abandonment would have been, but meant the imprisonment of Russian and the release of Japanese soldiers in sufficient numbers to create an important difference in the strategical

situation at a very critical juncture. It is not too much to say that the immediate issue of the capture of Port Arthur was twofold, since it not only allowed a prompt reinforcement of Oyama's armies—two of the divisions which had fought round Port Arthur were noticed in action at the Battle of Hei-kou-tai—but also paved the way for a vigorous movement against Vladivostok.

The actual fighting round Port Arthur presents no novel feature of first-class importance beyond the employment of siege-guns of unparalleled size and power, but the siege abounds in so many examples of extraordinary self-devotion and reckless gallantry that it will always seem to be a far more important performance than it was, at any rate from the educational standpoint. Literally, outside such comparatively minor details as the Russian types of land-mines, the extended use by the Japanese of hand grenades, and the free employment of searchlights, the records of the siege produce practically nothing which has not been partly anticipated if not better exemplified in previous similar operations of war.

Turning to cavalry and infantry tactics, one of the marked features of the first year of the conflict was undoubtedly the disappointment of the high hopes entertained of the Russian cavalry, more especially the Cossacks. It is little less than extraordinary that these far-famed mounted troops should have not only failed utterly to realise the expectations formed of them, but have made such a remarkably poor show on almost every occasion on which they were pitted against even the Japanese cavalry, of whom such an unfavourable estimate had been formed—chiefly, it is true, on the ground of their poor mounts—by apparently competent European critics. Here

and there some useful reconnaissance work was done by leaders like Rennenkampf and Mishtchenko, but there was little initiative displayed, and, in the case of Mishtchenko's raid, the damage inflicted was not one-fifth of what might have been inflicted by better trained and more intelligently controlled troops. The Japanese cavalry, notwithstanding their inferior mounts, closely approached the European standard, and it is probable that, with better horseflesh, their excellent equipment and scouting capacity will enable them in a future campaign to take a much higher place, and play a more prominent part. But the much vaunted Cossack at the end of the first year of the war was of far smaller reputation than he had been at the outset, and had shown that while, of course, he could never be trusted to act against really good European regular cavalry, he was of very doubtful use for any mounted infantry purposes save the incidental and occasional one of providing, by more or less unscrupulous means, food for himself and forage for his horse.

As regards the infantry fighting, the Russians taught us nothing, save the general lesson that the bravery and tenacity of the Russian soldier must still be respected, and that the Russian officer can be even more wanting in self-respect and self-control than was previously known to be the case. But from the Japanese we learnt much that was useful, as to the effect and cost of frontal attacks, and still more as to the value of night-fighting as a consequence, and in continuation, of fighting by day. The value of density in attack formations may be said to have remained an open question at the close of the first year of the war, since it appeared likely that some modification had taken place in the views



THE LAST DAYS OF PORT ARTHUR: THE BATTERED TOWN AND SUBMERGED SHIPS
IN THE HARBOUR.

The main thoroughfare here shown is Pushkin Street, and the ruined house half-way down on the right marks the site of the offices of the "Nory Krai" ("New World"), the newspaper of Port Arthur, which continued to appear up to the last day of the siege. Towards the end it was printed on brown paper of very small size.



which the Japanese had originally put into practice as the result of their German training. But on this particular point, as well as on the question of frontal attacks, a clearer estimate was to be anticipated at a subsequent stage of the operations.

As to the value of night attacks, not of the old text-book pattern, but following on repeated unsuccessful attempts to capture a position by daylight, the first twelve months of the Russo-Japanese War afforded sufficiently conclusive evidence. Our illuminating instance, that of the night attack at Ta-shi-chao, was dealt with in some detail in pp. 513-516 of the first volume of this history. Another and almost equally convincing case was that of the recapture of Hei-kou-tai, narrated in Chapter LXXXIII., when once again an object which could not be attained by a succession of desperate attacks by day was triumphantly achieved by a well-planned and extraordinarily resolute advance under cover of darkness. Both these examples are strangely instructive, and attracted the close attention of foreign military experts. It is obvious that, to some extent, the efficacy of such attacks may be discounted by the future efficiency of searchlights. But it is unlikely that searchlights will ever be freely carried in the field except by considerable bodies, and there must always be numerous cases in which comparatively small detachments with, perhaps, a few machine guns can ensconce themselves in such strong positions that their dislodgment, even by greatly superior forces, by day becomes an extremely difficult and costly, if not wholly impossible, process. In such circumstances highly trained troops will certainly profit by the lead given them by the Japanese at Ta-shi-

chao and Hei-kou-tai, which for a time, at least, must remain "sealed patterns" of night fighting of this class, just as Tel-el-Kebir remained for years the sealed pattern of the old style of "night attack," which was really not a night attack at all, but one at dawn ensuing on a night march.

The only other infantry lesson to which prominence need be given in a popular history is the use made by the Japanese not only of regimental colours, but of national flags on the battlefield. Some exceedingly sensible remarks on this point are made in the "United Service Magazine" for April, 1905, by Major Hampden Crawler, of the Essex Regiment, who recalls the fact that colours were last taken into action by British troops in European warfare in the Crimea, but were used in savage warfare as late as the Battle of Ulundi. In the Egyptian Campaign of 1882 they were taken to Egypt, but were left at the base. In the South African War the colours of units which were on the spot at the commencement were safely stored, and in other cases were mostly not embarked. This was due to our experience that, as hand-to-hand combats became rarer, the colours were less serviceable as rallying-points, and that, as a general rule, officers carrying the colours were shot down almost as soon as they were observed. It is significant that, after carefully weighing these considerations, the Japanese should have decided that the advantages of taking colours into action outweighed the disadvantages.

"In the present war," says Major Crawler, "in addition to regular regimental colours, it would appear that the Japanese troops are provided with a plentiful supply of national flags, and that these latter are useful in assisting

the artillery and infantry to support the advance of an attacking line without risk to the attackers, and also to inform the reserves below that a position is won. This information, it will be said, might be given equally well by signallers; it might, but would it? In the excitement of victory, would not valuable minutes often elapse before any message was sent? It is conveyed automatically when the victor's flags are seen on the crest line."

Of the artillery lessons to be gleaned from the first year of the war, and more especially from the second six months, it may be said that they are chiefly effective as confirming what we ourselves were taught by our experiences in South Africa. The central fact of all the artillery fighting in Manchuria is that the best gun has an advantage which, within reasonable bounds, highly superior mobility does not compensate, but highly superior training and judgment, to some extent, does. The Japanese field artillery was quite outclassed by the field artillery of the Russians, and it was only by their superior skill in gunnery that the Japanese were able to gain many important artillery successes.


The special correspondent of the *Times* with General Kuroki's force, after pointing out that the great artillery lesson learnt in Manchuria is that the most effective gun is the biggest gun compatible with the field artillery degree of mobility, goes on to say:—

"The Russian field-gun is a heavier piece than the Japanese, throwing a projectile 25 per cent. heavier 1,500 yards further, and, though not a quick-firer according to modern ideas, it is capable of being fired much more quickly than the Japanese weapon. The advantages of a heavier shell and a greater range are self-

evident. How often have I seen Japanese gunners sheltering from a storm of shrapnel poured upon them by guns which their own artillery was incapable of reaching. How often have I seen a Russian battery concentrate a rapid fire upon opposing batteries and silence them by rendering the opposing emplacements a hell in which gunners could not live."

But a little later he adds that the Japanese "proved themselves better range-finders, better shots, more cunning in concealment, more astute in choice of position, and more indefatigable in overcoming engineering difficulties. What would have happened at Liao-yang if the belligerents had exchanged guns (and horses and drivers) one can only conjecture. And what will happen when Japan fights again, her gunners increased in skill, and handling guns of the latest pattern?"

Turning to the naval lessons of the war, it would be difficult to conceive of a better summary of these than was contained in a speech by that brilliantly distinguished veteran, who had himself made history in the Far East, Admiral Sir Edward Seymour, who replied to the toast of the British Navy at the Royal Academy Banquet on April 29th, 1905. Sir Edward's first reference to the war was a general, but none the less pregnant one. The conflict appeared to him, he said, to justify fully both Lord Bacon's aphorism that "to be master of the sea is the abridgment of a monarchy," and also the wonderful lessons taught to the world by Captain Mahan. The actual naval lessons of the war, he went on to say, were, shortly, these: "First, that your lines of defence and offence are one, namely, on your enemy's coast; secondly, that a ship is a mobile fort, and is no use at all when it is tied to a har-



THE FORTIFIED HILL OUTSIDE PORT ARTHUR, CALLED BY THE RUSSIANS "THE EAGLE'S NEST," WHICH WAS CAPTURED BY THE JAPANESE ON JANUARY 1, 1905.

This photograph shows very clearly the bomb-proof shelters used by the defenders during the bombardment.

hour ; thirdly, that naval battles in future will probably be fought at increasingly long ranges, thus giving pre-eminence to our old friends, the guns ; and, fourthly, that submarine mines are extremely deadly weapons, but that the ordinary torpedo is not quite so fatal as it was expected to be."

Many will find this admirably lucid and convincing summary quite sufficient for every purpose, but a few added observations may be of assistance to others to whom the clear-cut phrases of such an *ex cathedrâ* pronouncement may seem a too brief dismissal of a copious and, to some extent, controversial subject. In the first place it seems desirable to point out how seriously the effect of such lessons as the two first enumerated by Admiral Seymour were impaired during the early stages of the war by Japan's inability to play the *rôle* for which she was

best fitted by the temperament of her naval officers and men, as well as by the fine quality of her ships. There will be many inclined to place in front of any professional and technical lessons to be derived from the handling of the Japanese and Russian fleets the solid fact that Japan could not do one-half of what she might have done, because she was fettered by the smallness of her navy. It is pre-eminently sound, of course, to talk of lines of naval offence and defence being one, and certainly for this country the frequent enunciation of this doctrine, fortified by every available example, is most strongly to be advocated and encouraged. But it has been patent at half-a-dozen points in the history of the first year's operations in the Far East that Japan was debarred from taking the right sort of offensive from the ever present fear lest her hardly won mastery of

the sea—only temporary and precarious—might be endangered by the loss of one or two of her precious battleships. Like other lessons, this has received passing attention in the course of the preceding narrative, and careful regard has been had to Japan's appreciation of her own disadvantages in this direction, and to the steps she is taking to rectify them. But the present is the right moment at which to emphasise the fact that the significance of naval lessons must always depend largely upon their degree of applicability to any particular navy, and to that navy's capacity to put such lessons into really businesslike and profitable practice. Let us, then, presume to subordinate Admiral Seymour's little catalogue entirely to the great postulate involved in his preliminary general reference, namely, that any struggle for a mastery of the sea should be conducted

with a sufficient margin to enable operations to be carried out at sea with not too rigidly cautious husbanding of resources.

Yet another departure may be made from the brief limits of this compact list of actual "lessons." It has been hinted in a previous chapter that the progress of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's fleet to the Far East was full of suggestiveness to a Power possessing, as Great Britain does, widely-scattered colonies, to the whole of which it would be impossible in time of war to afford complete naval or military protection. Hitherto the fact that only two great naval Powers, England and France, controlled a really useful chain of coaling-stations extending to most quarters of the world had been held to restrict the question of colonial defence within certain well-defined limits. It was assumed that no Power which could not count on being able to coal *en route*



THE CASEMATES OF FORT NO. II, PORT ARTHUR, WHERE GENERAL KONDRATCHENKO WAS KILLED.

would venture to send warships to trouble the enemy's distant colonies for fear lest the battleships, cruisers, or gunboats in question might be "hung up" in mid ocean with empty bunkers. This view was an extremely comforting one to the dwellers in rich, if remote, Colonial coast towns, who felt that the thousands of miles of sea which separated them from the nearest station at which a possible enemy's warships could draw a fresh supply of coal were a better protection to them than a small garrison of soldiers or a gunboat, such as at most could be spared them from the Mother Country's main armies or fleets.

The voyage of the Baltic Squadron to the Far East rudely shattered this illusion, and made it tolerably certain that in the next great war the more or less irresponsible collier would play a part, less dignified and important, of course, than that played by our Adens, Gibraltars, and Hong Kongs, with their mountains of coal, and their spacious harbours in which that sometimes priceless commodity can be easily and swiftly taken on board, but still a *rôle* of very great seriousness indeed. It was a very disquieting reflection that, unappalled by the risk of meeting with one of a powerful enemy's numerous warships, "auxiliary cruisers" might henceforth be expected to slip forth, attended by a collier or two, for the sole purpose of despoiling out-of-the-way colonial coast towns, and doing casual damage to commerce *en route*. It has always been difficult to prevent a "neutral" collier, with the means of paying handsomely for coal, from obtaining practically as much as it wants from one or other of the ready and obliging world-traders in this article. But the possibilities connected with the transshipment of the coal thus obtained to the warships of

a belligerent Power had never been clearly understood until the voyage of the Russian Baltic Fleet enlightened the whole world on this interesting subject.

It will be observed that Admiral Seymour did not reckon the preponderant value of the battleship or the employment of wireless telegraphy among his naval lessons, doubtless because he regarded the first from the standpoint of established conviction, and the second as still to some extent in the experimental stage.

As to the naval strategy displayed during the first twelvemonth of the operations, there was so little scope for the exhibition of higher qualities than those of ordinary discretion, and—as regards Japan—first-rate seamanship and dauntless courage, that it would be a mistake to labour the point at this stage. But with reference to the mistake which the Russians committed in not making better use of the Port Arthur ships, the following extract from a letter headed "Togo's Work," and sent to the *Times* by its correspondent at Tokio, is of very singular interest as giving the Japanese view of a very grave waste of splendid opportunities.

"Probably no incident in the whole war shook so signally Japan's faith in her enemy's martial sagacity. Her naval officers speak very plainly about the affair. It sets the seal, they say, to the indictment which events have steadily framed against Russia's strategy. From first to last she has shown herself lacking in offensive initiative. As a most signal instance of that defect they cite the pusillanimous pageant of June 23rd, when a noble fleet of six battleships and four cruisers, with full accompaniment of torpedo craft, steaming out of Port Arthur, caught sight of a solitary Japanese squadron on the horizon, and hastily

fled back to the shelter of the batteries. Had the Russians pushed on resolutely then, they could surely have won their way to Vladivostok with comparatively trifling losses. It was an apt preface to the vital error of subsequently offering themselves as an immobile target for the enemy's heavy siege-guns. As to this latter proceeding, Japanese expert opinion is that the Russians, having lost their great opportunity in June, lost themselves afterwards by failing to recognise the necessity for some signal sacrifice. When, after their abortive, but still not irrelative, attempt to escape on August 10, they returned to port more or less wounded and *minus* a battleship and three cruisers, they seem to have come to the conclusion that until their hurts were all healed no new sortie must be made. But the time never came when their hurts were all healed. No sooner was one repair effected than their active enemy created need for another, and finally even their capacity to effect repairs was destroyed. Granted that the vessels were then lame, they had still sea-going capacity as well as some fighting potentiality, and had they dashed out, thrown themselves on Togo's squadrons, and fought to kill or be killed, the command of the sea might still be within reach of recovery by Russia."

From this brief study of individual naval and military considerations it is easy for the intelligent reader to generalise. The conclusion of the whole matter of these volumes is that hitherto the best side has won because it deserved to win, because it spared no effort, no sacrifice, to attain its object, and because not only the leaders and soldiers were skilful, patient, and heroic, but the nation also as a whole rose with superb patriotism to a great occasion. On the other hand, Rus-

sia, in spite of terrible drawbacks, presented at the commencement of 1905 a figure by no means contemptible. Her Ruler had emerged from a great domestic crisis with a sadly tarnished name; her people were torn by internal dissensions and inflamed by revolutionary tendencies; her leaders were bickering, and her soldiers suffering from various privations of which a badly organised and inadequate medical service was not the least; and, finally, no real victory had relieved the ghastly monotony of a long and grievous chain of disasters and defeats. Yet she was fighting on proudly; her armies still presented an imposing array of men and guns along a great stretch of territory; a new fleet was on its way to replace that which had been lost at Port Arthur; and the Russian Government still held a place in the councils of Europe which not even the greatest of the Great Powers could affect to disregard. For the rest, with the exception of Port Arthur, no chapter of the active history of the war which had been opened could be considered closed, and even to Port Arthur the possibility of a consolatory sequel seemed to be indicated by the imminent movement against Vladivostok. Still could the Russian patriot say *tout peut se rétablir*, although, to be precise, the trend of Russian "patriotism" seemed rather to lie in angry denunciations of the war, and clamours that it should be brought by any means, however undignified, to an end.

Such conclusions and reflections apart, we come back to the point on which emphasis was laid at the beginning of this chapter, namely, the appalling magnitude of this terrific combat as it appears to the vision of the thoughtful student who has followed it throughout the first twelve months of its course. Many of

the former hopes concerning the duration and conduct of the war had vanished, many new fears had arisen, many intensely desirable limitations seemed on the eve of being broken down. The prolongation and intensity of the fighting were beginning to get on the nerves of Europe, and more than one onlooker nation counted afresh its chances of being drawn into the arena, and made characteristic precautions against that dreaded eventuality. Great Britain looked to placing the power and readiness of her Navy beyond question, and did all that was possible, by sending a mission into Afghanistan and levelling up her system of frontier defence, to guard against possible attack on India by the Russian legions concentrating in Central Asia. France found greater satisfaction in an *entente cordiale* with England than would have been remotely possible a few years ago, her abler politicians knowing well that, with an Ally so unscrupulous as Russia, awkward questions of neutrality must soon arise. Germany, restless at the thought of isolation, and doubtful as to the future of her pretentious schemes in China, sought refuge in diplomatic efforts to bring the newly-formed Anglo-French friendliness to a full stop.

But over these more selfish imaginings and actions on the part of individual nations towered the one tremendous fact that the war in the Far East was not only still raging, but was daily giving clearer evidence of the birth of a new world-force, with which not a nation of the earth could now say with confidence that it might not have, sooner or later, to reckon. Sane men could still laugh at the thought of a real "Yellow Peril," but no one who "dip't into the future far as human eye could see" could any longer fail to discern one object now beginning to stand out with growing distinctness on the shadowy courses of the coming years. That object was not the outstretched claw of the Russian Bear, not the mailed fist of the German Emperor, not the flapping wing of the American Eagle, not even the bristling mane of the British Lion. It was merely a small dark man waving a not very conspicuous flag on a high crestline, and, as one looked closer, the crestline seemed to indicate a tolerably lofty ridge of international ambition. The small dark man might be a soldier, sailor, or a civilian, it was uncertain which. But there could be no question as to his nationality, no shadow of doubt as to the identity of the emblem on the flag with the Rising Sun of Japan.

