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CHAPTER 19
THE DUTCH REPUBLIC.
THE consequences of the assassination of William the Silent were not so
momentous as his enemies had expected. The task undertaken by him had been so
far accomplished, that his death in no way impaired the firm resolution of the
revolted Provinces to maintain to the end their desperate struggle against the
Spanish tyranny. On the very day of the murder (July 10, 1584), the States of
Holland, sitting at Delft, passed a resolution "to uphold the good cause
with God's help without sparing gold or blood"; and this resolution was
at once forwarded to all officers in command on land and sea. The people,
though stirred to indignation by the crime, everywhere preserved a calm and
determined attitude. There was no panic, nor was submission thought of for a
single instant.
William's death had left the government of the country in an amorphous
condition. It would indeed be more correct to say that no government existed.
When the authority of Philip II had been finally abjured, the sovereignty
reverted to the several Provinces, and by their delegation was vested in the
States General. But that body had only been anxious to find someone able and
willing, under proper guarantees, to step into the place forfeited by the
Spanish King. Failure and disappointment had attended their first efforts; and
they had only been saved from ruin by putting trust in the leadership of the
Prince of Orange, who, although he had steadily declined any offer of
sovereignty, had guided them by his courage and sagacity through the long years
of their desperate struggle. At length, in 1584, William had, though
unwillingly, accepted for himself the Countship of
Holland and Zeeland, and had secured for the Duke of Anjou, despite his
misdeeds, the lordship over the other Provinces. By their almost simultaneous
deaths the sovereignty reverted once more to the States General. It was an
extraordinary state of affairs; for, when we speak of the sovereignty being
vested in the States General, it must be remembered that the States General
themselves were possessed of no real authority. They were composed of delegates
from a number of Provincial States, each of them sovereign. These delegates
were simply the mouthpieces of the particular States which they represented,
and the opposition of a single Province was sufficient to paralyse the action of all the rest. These Provincial States again were practically
representative of the municipal corporations (vroedschappen)
of the great towns. But these vroedschappen were
close, self-coopting burgher aristocracies, with
immunities and privileges which made them almost independent; and they were
very jealous of their rights. Moreover, instead of there being anything
approaching an equality of real power among the sovereign Provinces represented
in the States General, Holland and Zeeland had not only borne the brunt of the
war, but were, especially the former, the richest, the most energetic, and the
most prosperous among them. They contributed some four-fifths of the charges
and furnished the formidable fleets which formed the chief defence of the
country. These two, while content to work together, though with many bickerings, looked upon the inland Provinces rather as
protected dependencies than as allies and equals. Gelderland, Utrecht, and
Overyssel naturally resented such an assumption; but, now that the great
Provinces of Brabant and Flanders could no longer be reckoned upon as a bulwark
on the southern frontier against the military power of Spain, they found
themselves compelled to choose between the bond uniting them to the overbearing
Hollanders or submission to Parma. For, in the course of the year that followed
William's death, resistance to the Spanish forces south of the Meuse had been
practically extinguished by the military and diplomatic skill of their great leader.
One after another all the chief towns of Brabant and Flanders, Bruges, Dendermonde, Vilvoorde, Ghent,
Brussels, and lastly Antwerp, had fallen before the victorious general of King
Philip. The seaports, Ostend and Sluys, alone
remained in the hands of the patriots.
1685-6] Negotiations with France and England.
Thus it is not to be wondered at that
the States General should have believed their only hope of safety to lie in
securing some foreign potentate as their sovereign, who would be able to lend
them armed assistance, and give unity of purpose to their councils. The only
two Powers to whom they could turn were the same with whom they had already
been in correspondence upon the subject, France and England. Elizabeth,
however, had shown so strong a disinclination to embroil herself with Philip
for the sake of the Netherlands, that, despite the deep offence which Anjou had
given, negotiations were again on foot at the time of the Duke's death for his
return to the country as sovereign with strictly limited powers. The States
General therefore determined to adhere to William of Orange's policy on this
head, and in the first instance to offer the protectorship of Holland and Zeeland and the sovereignty of the other Provinces conditionally
to Henry III of France. An embassy was despatched accordingly. But the form of the offer displeased the King; and he was
preoccupied with the serious discords in his own kingdom and the dangers which
threatened his own throne.
He refused to consider the proposal, unless the sovereignty of all the
Provinces were laid at his feet. The negotiation therefore came to nothing
(1585).
All this time an influential party in Holland, at whose head was the
Advocate Paul Buys, was in favor of an English alliance. But Elizabeth was
quite as coy as her brother of France. She received the Dutch envoys with fair
words; but, partly on principle, partly from prudence, declined the proffered
sovereignty. All she would undertake was to give a limited amount of military
aid on characteristically commercial terms. The towns of Flushing, Brill, and Rammekens were to be handed over to her, as pledges for the
repayment of her expenses. In the matter of bargaining the Dutch on this
occasion certainly met their match in Queen Elizabeth, who after the treaty was
agreed upon, August 10, 1585, still spent some months in haggling over petty
details. But the fall of Antwerp, which she had not anticipated, hastened her
decision. She agreed to despatch at once 5000 foot
and 1000 horse, together with garrisons for the cautionary towns, under the command
of her favorite, the Earl of Leicester. He landed at
Flushing on December 19, and received everywhere an enthusiastic welcome, even
the States of Holland, afterwards his foes, writing to the Queen, "that
they looked upon him as sent from Heaven for their deliverance". There was
an eager desire to confer sovereign powers on him; and he was nothing loth. Without consulting Elizabeth he allowed himself,
February 4,1586, in the presence of the States General and of Maurice of
Nassau, to be solemnly invested with almost absolute authority, under the title
of Governor-General. Practically the only restrictions placed upon him were
that the States General and Provincial States should have the right of
assembling on their own initiative; that the existing Stadholders should be irremovable; and that appointments to offices in the several
Provinces should be made from two or three names submitted to him by the
States. A new Council of State was created in which two Englishmen had seats.
But Leicester was disappointed. His correspondence clearly shows that he wanted
to be, for a time at any rate, in the position of a Roman dictator, though not
from mere vanity or for the purpose of robbing the Netherlander of their
liberty, but as a means to an end. But with good intentions he had little
sagacity or tact, and he speedily found that his ideas conflicted not merely
with those of a people obstinately attached to their time-honored rights and liberties, but with those of his royal mistress herself. Elizabeth
received the news of his inauguration to office as Governor-General with high
indignation. Leicester was ordered to resign his dignity; and Lord Heneage was despatched to Holland
to rate both him and the States General for their conduct. Not till July did
the Queen's favorite succeed in appeasing her wrath,
or obtain her consent to his being styled Governor-General, and being addressed
as "Excellency."
Leicester as Governor-General. [1584-6
The new Governor, who could speak no Dutch and knew nothing of the
people with whom he had to deal, speedily found himself in difficulties. On
April 4, 1586, he issued a placard forbidding, on pain of death, all commercial
intercourse with the enemy. The exportation of grain, provisions, or other
commodities to all countries under the sway of Philip II was henceforth
absolutely prohibited. The Spaniards were dependent upon the Dutch for the
supply of the necessaries of life; and, if only these could be effectually cut
off, the armies of Parma would be starved out. In this reasoning, however,
Leicester left out of account the vital importance of this traffic to the
merchants of Holland and Zeeland. The purse of Holland and Zeeland furnished
the sinews of war, and equipped the fleets and paid for the armies; and it was
their great carrying and distributing trade which filled the purse. The inland
districts, which were constantly exposed to the destructive ravages of the
enemy's troops within their borders, were jealous of the greater prosperity of
the maritime Provinces. Already in 1584, under pressure from their representatives,
the States General had attempted to stop the grain traffic with the enemy in
the interests of the country at large; but Amsterdam, supported by the States
of Holland, had refused to obey the edict, and had carried the day. The yet
more stringent prohibition proposed by Leicester at the instigation of the
democratic party at Utrecht, who had a special grudge against the Hollanders,
brought upon him their lasting hostility. The course rashly adopted by him was,
in fact, really impracticable.
Meanwhile, Parma continued to advance further northwards; in June
Grave, and in July Venloo, fell into his hands.
Leicester was too much engrossed with the difficulties of internal
administration to conduct the operations of war with the necessary vigor. His efforts towards curbing what he regarded as the
contumacious opposition of the Holland merchants and regents to his authority
only made the breach wider. He surrounded himself with a circle of advisers
from the southern Netherlands, the three most prominent members of the favored group being Jacques Reingoud and Gérard Prouninck surnamed Deventer, both Brabanters, and Daniel de Burchgrave, a Fleming. On June 26 Leicester surprised the
Council of State by the sudden announcement that he had created a Chamber of
Finance, to which he had handed over the control of the Treasury. One of the
special duties of this Chamber was to see that the placards against trading
with the enemy were stringently enforced; and to effect this it was proposed
to arm it with inquisitorial powers, extending even to the inspection of the
books of suspected merchants. At its head was placed the Count von Neuenaar, Stadholder of
Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overyssel, with Reingoud as
treasurer-general and de Burchgrave as auditor. Leicester's
arbitrary act deprived the Council of State of one of the most important of its
functions, while foreigners were appointed to offices of financial control.
Paul Buys, to whom the post of Commissary had been offered, refused to serve
under Reingoud, and notwithstanding his English
sympathies became one of Leicester's most pronounced opponents. Oldenbarneveldt, his successor as Advocate of Holland,
likewise exerted his great influence with the States of that Province to resist
the invasion of their rights.
The Governor on his part leant more and more on
the support of the democratic party of Utrecht, who with the help of Neuenaar had deprived the old burgher oligarchy of the
reins of power. Leicester secured the election of his confidant Deventer as
burgomaster of the town, though as a foreigner he was disqualified from holding
such an office; and the burgher captains and Calvinist preachers were his
staunch partisans and allies. It was highly impolitic for the Governor-General,
whose special task was to give unity to the national opposition to Spain, thus
to accentuate the differences which divided Province from Province. But he was
resolved to try conclusions with his adversaries; and Paul Buys was arrested
at Utrecht and imprisoned.
1586] Mistakes and difficulties of Leicester.
West Friesland had long been merged in the Province of Holland and was
known as the North Quarter. Leicester now resolved to revive the
semi-independency of former times by appointing Sonoy Stadholder of West Friesland, thus openly ignoring
the fact that that office was already held by Maurice of Nassau, who, as
Admiral-General, also had supreme control of the naval forces of Holland and
Zeeland. The Governor, however, took upon himself to erect three independent
Admiralty Colleges of Holland, Zeeland, and the North Quarter, thus, to the
great detriment of the public service, creating a system destined to last as
long as the Dutch Republic. He made himself still more unpopular by violently
espousing the cause of the extreme Calvinist preachers and zealots, and allowing
a so-called National Synod to meet at Dort (June, 1586), whose aim was the
suppression of all rites and opinions but its own, including those of the large
"Libertine" or moderate party, at the head of which stood Oldenbarneveldt, the inheritors of the principles of
William of Orange. As the year 1586 drew to its close Leicester became more and
more dissatisfied with his position. He had to draw largely on his private
resources to meet his expenses; and his forces were so weak that Parma could
have overrun Gelderland and Overyssel with ease, had his master but given him a
free hand. Philip's attention, however, was absorbed in preparations for the
invasion of England, an enterprise for which the cooperation of Parma's army by
land was essential. So soon as England had been conquered, the Netherlands
could speedily be coerced into submission.
Disgusted at the many rebuffs he had suffered, Leicester, towards the
end of November, determined to return to England and represent his difficulties
in person to the Queen. The exercise of authority during his absence was left
in the hands of the Council of State. But this body was merely the executive of
the States General, and therefore in reality depended upon the support of the
States of the sovereign Provinces. Besides, distrust was felt at the presence
in the Council of two Englishmen, and of Leicester's foreign nominees; and
this distrust was speedily intensified by the traitorous surrender to the enemy
of Deventer and Zutphen by their English Governors, Stanley
and York. The defection of these two adventurers, both of them Catholics
formerly in Spanish service, threw suspicion on all Englishmen. Neither the
death of the chivalrous Sidney on the field of Warnsfeld,
nor the proved gallantry of the Norrises, Cecils, Pelhams, and Russells were allowed to atone for these base and damning
acts of treachery, which delivered the line of the Yssel into Parma's hand. At the instigation of Oldenbarneveldt the States of Holland and Zeeland determined to act independently both of the
States General and the Council. A Provincial army was formed; a new oath to
the States was imposed on the levies; and additional powers, with the title of
"Prince", were given to Maurice, under whom the experienced Count Hohenlo was appointed Lieutenant-General. In West Friesland Sonoy was forced to acknowledge his subordination to
the Stadholder of Holland. Such was the influence of Oldenbarneveldt, that he was able to obtain for his
measures the concurrence of the States General, and of the Council, which was
purged of objectionable members. A remonstrance drawn up by him was sent in the
name of the States General to Leicester, in which the faults and mistakes of
the absent Governor were relentlessly exposed.
The terms of this document gave
great offence to Elizabeth; but it did not suit her policy to abandon the cause
of the Netherlands, and an accommodation was patched up. In July, 1587,
Leicester returned to his post, welcomed by his partisans, but coldly and
suspiciously received by the Holland leaders. His success or failure depended
now upon his attitude towards the States of Holland and the States General, in
which Holland was dominant. He came back determined to master them, but his
conduct had already raised a question, which for two centuries was to divide
the Dutch people into opposing parties: the question of the sovereignty of the
Provinces. Elaborate arguments were brought forward to show that the sovereign
power, formerly exercised by Charles V and Philip II, had by the abjuration of
his sovereignty become vested in the States of each several Province. Hence it
would follow that Leicester, as Governor, was subordinate to the States as
Margaret of Parma had been to King Philip. This assumption of the States of
Holland was historically indefensible; but Oldenbarneveldt had offered to resign his post as Advocate in April rather than yield on this
head. He thus founded a party with whom the question of Provincial sovereignty
became a principle; and the unwise attempts of a foreigner to erect a
democratic dictatorship at the expense of the burgher oligarchies intensified a particularism, which was for many years to prejudice
the national action and the best interests of the country. Leicester's motives
were probably good, and his supporters were numerous and active; but he had not
in him the makings of a statesman. One of the first effects of his continuous
struggle for supremacy with the States of Holland was the failure to relieve Sluys, which important seaport, on August 5, fell into the
hands of Parma. Had Farnese not been occupied with other projects, it is indeed
difficult to see how, in this time of division and cross-purposes amongst his
opponents, his further advance could have been arrested. Leicester would have
been powerless to offer an effective resistance. His political efforts, though
backed by such skilful and influential partisans as Deventer at Utrecht, Sonoy in the North Quarter, and Aysma in Friesland, failed against the firm resolve of the States of Holland and their
able leader. All his attempts to create a revolution by the overthrow of the
supremacy of the regents in the principal towns miscarried. Dispirited at last
by a fruitless struggle, and in broken health, he on August 6,1587, finally
turned his back definitely on the country, which had, as he thought, treated
him so badly. "Non gregem, sed ingratos irmitus desero" was the motto inscribed on a medal struck upon
the occasion. He came back a poor man.
Oldenbarneveldt and the Province of Holland, [1576-88
The position of the States at the
beginning of 1588 appeared all but desperate. Their army was weak in numbers
and in discipline, and without leaders of repute. The Provinces themselves were
split into contending parties and jealous of each other. They had no allies to
whom they could turn for help. Opposed to them stood the first general of his
time, at the head of a large and seasoned force, which he had led to repeated
triumphs. Already the whole country to the east of the Yssel and to the south of the Meuse and the Waal was practically in his hands. His
plans were laid for completing the work so well begun; and, had he been
unhampered, Parma would have in all probability in a couple of campaigns
crushed out the revolt in the northern Netherlands.
He was not, however, destined to have a free hand. King Philip had set
his heart upon the conquest of England by the Invincible Armada. In vain Parma
urged that the subjugation of the rebel States was now in the King's power, and
that it was not only wise, but necessary, to finish the one task before
embarking upon another. The Duke was ordered to collect an immense fleet of
transports at Sluys and Dunkirk, and to hold his army
in readiness for crossing the Channel, so soon as the Great Armada appeared in
the offing to act as his convoy. The story of what ensued is told elsewhere.
The weary months of waiting, and the failure of Parma to put to sea in the face
of the swarms of Dutch privateers that kept watch and ward to oppose his
egress, gave breathing time to the Provinces, and at the same time filled the
mind of the suspicious Philip with distrust of his nephew.
Moreover, the scheming brain of the Spanish King, undeterred by the
crushing disaster of his "invincible" fleet, was already busy with
projects of aggrandizement in France; so that,
instead of being able to devote his energies to the reconquest of the
Netherlands, during the remainder of his life Parma was chiefly occupied with
futile expeditions into French territory. Thus, just when it seemed that
nothing could avert the complete subjugation of the United Provinces, the
attention of their adversary was fixed on other costly enterprises; and the
resources of Spain, already gravely crippled, were drained to exhaustion.
After the departure of Leicester it seemed as if the loose federation of
the United Provinces must fall apart through its own inherent separatist
tendencies, and the utter lack of any workable machinery of government. The
executive power was nominally vested in the Council of State; but the presence
upon it of the local English commander and of two other English members
weakened its authority, and rendered it unacceptable to the Provinces,
especially to Holland, whose representation upon it in no way corresponded to
her position and influence. Gradually, therefore, the States General curtailed
its powers, and consulted it less; until a few years later it complained that
all the most important affairs of the Provinces were determined and carried out
without its cognisance. The driving-wheel of the
government was now to be found in the predominance of the Province of Holland,
as personified in the person of her Advocate, Oldenbarneveldt.
This great statesman, the real founder of the Dutch Republic, as it was known
to history, with consummate ability took advantage of the interval of
comparative repose which followed the withdrawal of the English Governor, in
order to gather into his own hands the reins of administration.
Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547– 1619) |
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Johan van Oldenbarneveldt was born at
Amersfoort in 1547. After he had begun practice as an advocate at the Hague, he
became a fiery adherent of Orange, and bore arms at the time of the sieges of
Haarlem and Leyden. In 1576 he was appointed Pensionary of Rotterdam, and thus became a member of the States of Holland. His industry
and powers of persuasion, and his practical grasp of affairs, soon won him his
prominence; and, having in 1586 been chosen Land's Advocate in succession to
Paul Buys, he filled that important post for the next thirty-two years, thus
exercising a commanding influence on the affairs of his country, and upon
general European politics. For though the Advocate was nominally only the paid
servant of the Provincial States of Holland, yet the permanency of his office,
and the multiplicity of his functions, gave to a man of great ability a
controlling voice in all discussions, and almost unlimited authority in the
details of administration. As practically "Minister of all affairs", Oldenbarneveldt became in a sense the political
personification of the Province whose servant he was, and of which he was the
mouthpiece in the Assembly of the States General. Thus it came to pass that a
many-headed system of government, whose divided sovereignty and hopelessly
complicated checks and counter-checks appeared to forbid united action or
strong counsels, acquired motive power, which enabled it to work with a certain
degree of smoothness and efficiency. The voice of Oldenbarneveldt was that of the Province of Holland; and the voice of Holland, which bore more
than half of the entire charges of the Union, was dominant in the States
General.
But the Dutch Republic, in these first years of its consolidation as a
federal State, required the services of the soldier quite as much as those of
the statesman. Fortunately in Maurice of Nassau a great commander arose, who
possessed precisely the qualifications needed. Maurice was only seventeen years
of age at the time of his father's murder, and was at once appointed in his
place Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, and also
first Member of the Council of State. During the next few years he had busied
himself in the study of mathematics, and in acquiring both technical and
practical acquaintance with the art of war. He served in several campaigns
under Hohenlo, and from the first devoted himself
seriously to the task of gaining a thorough knowledge of military tactics. He
was a born soldier; politics had no attraction for him. In August, 1588, he was
created Captain-General and Admiral of the Union by the States General, and in
succession to Neuenaar, who died in October, 1589, he
was elected by the Provinces of Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overyssel to be their Stadholder. All the stadholderates,
with the single exception of Friesland, of which his cousin, William Lewis of
Nassau, was Stadholder, were thus united in the
person of Maurice. As in addition to this he was charged with the supreme
control in military and naval affairs, Oldenbarneveldt found ready to his hand an instrument capable of carrying out his plans, and of
translating policy into action. Many years were to pass before there arose even
the faintest suspicion of jealousy or opposition between these two men, both so
capable and ambitious. Their spheres of interest were distinct ; and the
younger man was content to leave in the hands of his father's trusted friend
the entire management of the affairs of State; his own thoughts were centred on the training of armies and the conduct of campaigns.
The Stadholder of Friesland, William Lewis of
Nassau, the son of John, was the cousin and life-long confidant and adviser of
Maurice, who owed to him his first instruction in military knowledge, and who
could always rely on his far-sighted prudence and discretion. Of blameless
life, sincerely religious, a firm adherent of the Reformed faith, William Lewis
was at the same time broad-minded and statesmanlike in his views of men and
things, like the great uncle whose daughter he married. He was a reformer of
military science on principles drawn from a study of Greek and Roman writers, a
commander of far more than ordinary ability, yet modest withal, aiming always
at the good of the common cause rather than at his own personal fame or
advantage. It was by his counsel and persuasion that the States General at
length consented in 1590 to alter their military policy. Hitherto it had been
assumed as a kind of axiom that the troops of the States could not oppose the
Spaniards in the field; and the efforts of the Netherlanders had been strictly
confined to the defensive. But the army of the States had been transformed by
the assiduous exertions of Maurice and William Lewis both in discipline,
mobility, and armament, and, though composed of a medley of nationalities,
English, Scotch, French, and Germans, as well as Netherlanders, had become, as
a fighting machine, not inferior in quality to its adversaries. William Lewis
had for some time been urging upon the States to take advantage of Parma's
embarrassments by the adoption of offensive in the place of defensive tactics;
and at last, in 1590, at the time of the first expedition of the Duke into
France, the joint efforts of both Stadholders to this
end at length overcame the timidity of the burgher deputies.
1592-5] Death of Parma.—Stadt en Landen.
The tide of the
Spanish advance had already begun to turn in the spring of that year. On March
3, a body of 78 Netherlanders, concealed in a vessel laden with peat, had taken
Breda by surprise. In the autumn Maurice, at the head of a small column, after
failing to capture Nymegen by a coup de main, raided
the whole of North Brabant and took some dozen small places from the enemy. The
year 1591 was a year of surprising triumphs. Zutphen,
unexpectedly attacked, fell into the hands of Maurice and William Lewis after
a five days' siege, on May 20. Deventer was next beleaguered, and, though
gallantly defended by Herman van den Bergh, a cousin of Maurice, surrendered on
June 20. The army then moved upon Groningen; but, on hearing that Parma was
besieging the fort of Knodsenburg, Maurice hastened
to its relief, routed the enemy's cavalry, and compelled him to retire. A
sudden movement southward to Zeeland brought the Stadholder before the town of Hulst in the land of Waas, which surrendered after three days' investment. Then
returning upon his steps the indefatigable leader finished up an extraordinary
campaign by the seizure of Nymegen, October 21. At
the age of twenty-four years, Maurice now took his place among the first
generals of his time.
The next year, 1592, saw Parma once more marching into France for the
relief of Rouen; and the way lay open to the Stadholders for freeing Friesland and the Zuiderzee from the hold of the Spaniard. The
Spanish forces in the north were under the command of their old chief Verdugo, who regarded the two fortresses of Steenwyk and Koevorden as quite
impregnable. The English auxiliaries under Vere had
been sent to France, and Maurice's army was thus weakened. But the Stad-holder's scientific skill in the art of beleaguering
was able to accomplish what was regarded as impossible. Steenwyk fell on June 5, after a gallant defence; and, despite the utmost efforts of Verdugo to raise the siege of Koevorden,
that place also surrendered on September 12.
Shortly afterwards, on December 3, the most redoubtable adversary of the
States was removed by the death of Parma. Broken in spirit, and ill from the
effects of a wound, he had retired to Spa. He had long forfeited the confidence
of the King, and died while on his way to meet the Count of Fuentes, who had
arrived at Brussels with a royal letter of recall Until the arrival of the new
Governor, Archduke Ernest, his post was filled by the old Count of Mansfeld.
The great event of Maurice's campaign of 1593 was the siege and capture
of Geertruidenburg, the only town of Holland in the
possession of the Spaniards which closed important waterways. The conduct of
this siege, sometimes called "the Roman leaguer" from the
astonishing scientific skill with which the methods of the ancients were applied
in the construction of the besieger's lines and approaches, put the crown upon
Maurice's fame. Despite the neighborhood of Mansfeld
with an army of 14,000 men, the town was taken, June 25, after a siege of three
months' duration. In the following year the Stadholder's attention was once more turned to the north. After a two months' siege
Groningen surrendered, under the so-called "treaty of reduction".
This defined the terms on which the town, with the Ommelanden,
became a Province of the Union known as Stadt en Landen. William Lewis was appointed its Stadholder.
Maurice's four offensive campaigns had practically cleared the soil of the
federated Provinces from the presence of the Spanish garrisons; and the
authority of the States General was now established within the defensible
limits of a well-rounded and compact territory.
Archdukes Ernest and Albert. [1595-6
In January, 1595, Henry IV of France had declared war upon Spain, and
sought a close alliance with the United Provinces. Thus Archduke Ernest, as
Viceroy of the Netherlands, found himself in a most difficult position. He had
hostile armies on both sides of him; and the resources of Spain were already
so exhausted, that no money was forthcoming for the payment of troops. In these
circumstances Philip urged the Archduke to make an effort for peace with the
States on equitable conditions upon the lines of the Pacification of Ghent. But
the States were in no mood to accept any conditions which recognized in any
shape the sovereignty of Philip; and the King was unwilling to recognize their independence. The negotiations came to
nothing.
The arrival of Archduke Ernest in the southern Netherlands had been
greeted with enthusiasm. Rumor pointed to his
marriage with the Infanta, and to the establishment
at Brussels of a national government under their rule. But these expectations
were speedily doomed to disappointment by the sudden death of the Archduke
(February 20,1595). His place was taken ad interim by the Count of Fuentes, a
Spanish grandee of the school of Alva, but a very capable commander. His year's
administration of affairs was attended by more success in the field than had
attended the Spanish arms since 1587. The efforts of the allies in Luxemburg,
and along the southern frontier at Cambray and Huy, ended in failure, all the advantages of the campaign
rested with the Spaniards. A serious disaster had meanwhile occurred to a
portion of the States' army under Maurice. The Stadholder had made an attempt to seize Groenloo by surprise,
but the veteran Mondragon had hastened to its relief. For months the two armies
lay watching one another, but without coming to a decisive action. In a chance
encounter, on September 1, a small troop of cavalry, sent out by Maurice to
intercept a body of Spanish foragers, was completely defeated; and its leaders,
Philip of Nassau, brother of the Stadholder of
Friesland, and a brilliant scion of his House, and his cousin Ernest of Solms, were killed. Ernest of Nassau, Philip's brother, was
taken prisoner.
At the beginning of 1596 Fuentes was replaced as Governor by
Cardinal Archduke Albert of Austria, the favourite nephew of Philip, a far more capable man than his brothers, both as statesman
and soldier. He brought with him reinforcements and some money, and, finding
the army well disciplined and ready for action, he resolved to emulate, if
possible, the successes of the previous year. But Fuentes had departed; and
both Verdugo and Mondragon had died immediately
before his arrival. In the lack of Spanish generals of repute, Albert gave the
command to a French refugee, the Seigneur de Rosne.
At this time a considerable body of the States' troops were with Henry IV, who
was besieging La Fère. His lines were so strong that
it seemed hopeless to attempt to raise the siege by a direct attack. But, acting
on the advice of Rosne, Albert's army suddenly
advanced upon Calais, which was unprepared and quickly surrendered to the
Spaniards. It was a heavy and humiliating loss to the French, for which the
capture of La Fere offered scant compensation. The
Archduke, by the recapture of Hulst, followed up this
striking success. Maurice had been so weakened by the detachment of his troops
serving in France, that he had been unable to attempt any offensive operations.
Nor was he able to prevent the powerful Spanish army from effecting the capture
of Hulst, dearly purchased by 5000 lives, including
that of Rosne himself.
Albert, like his predecessor, had begun with futile peace overtures. The
States General on the contrary were at this time engaged upon other negotiations,
the issue of which marked a stage in the history of the United Provinces.
Before the close of the year there was concluded between England, France, and
the States, a triple alliance, which had to be purchased by hard conditions,
but which proclaimed the recognition by England and France of the United
Provinces as a free and independent State. The States General undertook to
maintain an army of 8000 men in the Netherlands, to send an auxiliary force of
4000 men to France, and lastly to give up the privilege, so important to the
mercantile classes in Holland, of free trade with the enemy. The consent of the
States of Holland to this requirement was obtained only with the greatest
difficulty; and after it had been conceded it was systematically evaded. The
traffic with Spain and Portugal was still carried on clandestinely; and, as
the alliance was but of short duration, the forbidden
trade was soon almost as vigorous as ever. The States in fact quickly found
that their allies had agreed upon a secret treaty behind their backs, and that
it was necessary for them to look carefully to their own interests.
1596-8] The great campaign of 1597.
Meanwhile,
it was not the fault of the Netherlanders that the results attained were not
more considerable. At hardly any stage of his career did the brilliant military
talents of Maurice shine more conspicuously than in the campaign of 1597. It
began with the astonishing victory of Turnhout. Near
that village lay a considerable force under the command of an officer named Varax, which ravaged the neighborhood far and near. In January, while the armies were still in their winter quarters,
Maurice, at the head of a body of troops rapidly collected from various
garrison towns, set out with such secrecy and despatch that he arrived quite unexpectedly within a few miles of Varax camp. The Spanish General determined to effect a retreat under cover of the
night. Maurice set out in pursuit with his cavalry only, and a couple of
hundred musketeers mounted behind the riders, less than 800 men in all. He came
up with the enemy, just in time to prevent their making their escape behind a
morass, and at once gave orders to charge. Varax did
his utmost to draw up his wearied troops in order of battl; but no time was
given him, and the rout was complete. In half-an-hour all was over. Out of a
force of some 4500 men, 2000 were killed, among them Varax himself; 500 prisoners were taken and 28 standards. Maurice lost only eight or
ten men, and was back at the Hague within a week, having freed North Brabant
and Zeeland from the incursions of the enemy.
The summer campaign was one long succession of triumphs for the States.
The Archduke had not enough money to maintain a large army on both his northern
and his southern frontier, and had resolved to direct his chief attention to
the French side. Henry IV was in even worse want of means; and the capture by
the Spaniards of Amiens, with a quantity of stores, was a severe blow to him.
But the way was now open to Maurice for prosecuting siege after siege without
fear of interference. Rheinberg, Meurs, Groenloo, Breedevoort, Enschede, Oot-marsum, Oldenzaal, and Lingen all fell
into his hands, and a very large district was added to the territory
acknowledging the authority of the States General.
The advantages of the French alliance, however, had ceased before the
opening of another campaign on May 2, 1598. Henry concluded peace with Philip
at Vervins. In vain the States had done their utmost
to prevent this result. They were more successful with Elizabeth, to whom they
sent an embassy, in which Oldenbarneveldt personally
took part. She consented to continue the war with Spain on condition that the
States repaid by instalments her loan to them, and
agreed to send a large force to England in case of a Spanish invasion. On the
other hand she consented henceforth to have only one representative on the
Council of State, and to allow the English troops in the service of the
Netherlands, including among these the garrisons of the cautionary towns, to
take the oath of allegiance to the States General.
Marriage of Albert and Isabel. [1598
It had been for some time
the intention of Philip to marry his eldest daughter, Isabel Clara Eugenia, to
her cousin, Archduke Albert, and to erect the Netherland Provinces into a
sovereign State under their joint rule. Philip wished to conciliate the
Netherlander by conceding to them the appearance of independence; but the
contract, and a secret agreement which accompanied it, was intended not only to
secure the reversion of the Provinces to the Crown of Spain in case the
Archduke should be childless, but to keep them in many respects subordinate to
Spain, and under Spanish suzerainty. Philip was undoubtedly prompted to take
this step, in the first place by affection for a daughter to whom he was deeply
attached; and in the second place by his sincere zeal for the Catholic faith.
Both Albert and Isabel possessed many qualities which fitted them for the
difficult task.
In May the instrument was signed which erected the old Burgundian
Provinces into a separate State under the rule of a descendant of Charles the
Bold. In September Philip II died. In November the Archduke Albert, who had
resigned his ecclesiastical dignities, was married by proxy to the Infanta, who was still in Spain. The old régime had passed
away.
The hopes of reunion and of peace placed upon the advent of the
Archdukes were speedily dissipated. Even in the south the new sovereigns were
received without enthusiasm and with suspicion. It was felt that a government
was being set up, imbued with Spanish ideas, guided by Spanish councillors, and relying on Spanish garrisons. The war and
the Inquisition had effectually crushed out all life and enterprise in the
southern Provinces; and the mere presence of a resident Court and
well-intentioned rulers at Brussels could do little to restore a ruined and
desolate land. Very different was the state of things north of the Scheldt.
Here the long struggle for existence had filled the people with a new spirit,
and, so far from bringing in their train exhaustion and misery, the very
burdens of the war had been productive of unexampled prosperity. Nothing in
history is more remarkable than the condition of the United Provinces, and
especially of the Provinces of Holland and Zeeland, at the end of thirty years
of incessant warfare.
1587-1601] Prosperity of the United Provinces.
They had become the chief trading country of the world. The riveting of
the Spanish yoke upon Brabant and Flanders by the arms of Parma had driven the
wealthiest and most enterprising of the inhabitants of Antwerp, Bruges, and
Ghent to take refuge in Holland and Zeeland, whither they brought with them
their energy, their commercial knowledge, and their experience of affairs. The
Hollanders and Zeelanders were above all things
sea-faring folk; and their industries had up to the time of the revolt been all
connected with the sea. Their fisheries, and especially the herring fishery,
employed many thousands of boats and fishermen, and were a great source of
wealth. They were the carriers whose ships brought the corn and the timber from
the Baltic, the wines from Spain and France, the salt from the Cape Verde
Islands, to the wharves and warehouses of the Zuiderzee and the Meuse, and
again distributed them to foreign markets. Had the Hollanders and Zeelanders not been able to keep the seas open to their
ships, the revolt must have collapsed very speedily. As it was, their trade
with each succeeding year grew and prospered. Even the Spaniards themselves
were dependent upon their hated enemies for the very necessities of life; and
the Dutchmen did not scruple to supply their foes when it was to their own
profit. Thus trade thrived by the war, and the war was maintained by the wealth
poured into the country, while the crushing burden of the taxes was lightened
by the product of the charges for licenses and convoys, which were really paid
by the foreigner. Commerce became a passion with the Hollanders and Zeelanders; and eagerness after gain by the expansion of
trade possessed itself of all classes. The armies commanded by Maurice were
mainly composed of foreigners; the Netherlanders themselves made the sea their
element. In 1587 800 vessels passed through the Sound for corn and timber. In
1590 the Dutchmen, not content with carrying the corn as far as Spain
southwards, penetrated into the Mediterranean and supplied Genoa, Naples, and
other Italian towns with their commodities; and shortly afterwards they made
their way to Constantinople and the Levant, under a permit from the Sultan
obtained by the good offices of Henry IV. So greatly had this trade grown by
the end of the century that in 1601 between 800 and 900 vessels sailed from
Amsterdam for the Baltic to fetch corn within three days. Scarcely less remarkable
was the expansion of the timber trade. In 1596 the first saw-mill was erected
at Zaandam. During the decade that followed, the shores of the Zaan became the staple of the timber trade of Europe. At
the neighbouring ports of Hoorn and Enkhuysen shipbuilding attained a perfection unknown in other lands. The cloth and the linen trades also flourished, introduced by
the skilled Flemish weavers, who fled from persecution to Leyden and Haarlem.
English cloth was imported to Holland to be dyed, and was sold as Dutch.
Nor was the enterprise of this nation of traders confined to the
European seas. The Gold Coast of Africa, both the Indies, and even distant
China, allured adventurers to seek in these distant regions, at the expense of
the hated Spaniard, who claimed the monopoly of the Oceans East and West alike,
fortunes surpassing those which were made in Europe. A certain Balthasar de Moucheron, a
merchant of French extraction, who had been settled at Antwerp and fled from
that city to Middelburg at the time of
its capture by Parma, was the pioneer in these first efforts at a world-wide
expansion of commerce. His earliest attempt was directed to the opening out of
trade with Russia. In 1584 he established a factory at Archangel on the White
Sea. This intercourse with the far North led to a scheme for reaching China and
the East by the route of northern Asia, for which, after laying his plans
before the Stadholder and the Advocate, Moucheron secured the support of the States of Holland. In
1594 two small vessels sailed from the Texel under Willem Barendsz; they succeeded in passing through the Waigaats in
open water, but were quickly stopped by ice. Undeterred by the failure a larger
fleet, under Heemskerk and Barendsz,
in 1596 essayed the same venture. Amidst incredible sufferings the winter was
passed on the inhospitable shores of Nova Zembla. Barendsz himself perished, but a remnant under Heemskerk made their escape home. The effort again was
fruitless; but the story of these brave men's wintering in the frozen polar
seas fascinated their contemporaries.
Jan Huyghen van Linschoten (1563- 161) is credited with copying top-secret Portuguese nautical maps thus enabling the passage to the elusive East Indies to be opened to the English and the Dutch. This enabled the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company to break the 16th century monopoly enjoyed by the Portuguese on trade with the East Indies. |
|
The first voyage to the Gold Coast of Guinea was undertaken by Barent Erikszen of Medemblik, in 1593; and from this time forward an ever
increasing number of ships made their way to the various river mouths of the
bight of Guinea, and established friendly relations and a lucrative trade with
the natives of the country. The first actual conquest on this coast was made by
a large expedition despatched in 1598 by Balthasar de Moucheron for the
seizure of the island Del Principe. But, before this, the daring enterprise of
the two brothers Houtman had carried the Netherlands
flag to the shores of India and the Malay Archipelago. The way thither was no
secret, for numerous Dutch sailors served on Portuguese ships, and had thus
learned the route to Mozambique, Goa, and Molucca.
The Itinerarium of the famous traveller,
Jan Huyghen Linschoten, a
native of Enkhuysen, who spent five years in the East
Indies, aroused universal interest. Already during the period of the Leicester
régime Linschoten found many of his countrymen
occupying positions of trust in various parts of the far East. Linschoten, in 1594, went out as Commissary of the States
of Holland on the first expedition sent by Moucheron to discover the North-West Passage; and at this very time another expedition
was being prepared by certain Amsterdam merchants to sail direct for the Indies
by the usual route round the Cape. The moving spirit of this voyage was Cornelis Houtman of Gouda (1565–1599), who,
like Linschoten, had been in the Portuguese ships,
and who, as upper commissary, was in command of the four vessels which set sail
on April 2, 1595. They visited Madagascar, Java, Goa, and Molucca with varied fortunes, and after many dangers and hardships reached Amsterdam
once more in July, 1597. Several small Companies were now formed for exploiting
the rich regions which had for so long been the preserve of the
Portuguese: three at Amsterdam, two at Rotterdam, two in Zeeland, one at Delft.
In 1598 no less than eight large East India merchantmen were despatched by three of these Companies. A new source of
national wealth had been discovered, and the only fear was that the trade would
be ruined by the unlimited competition. Hitherto the principle of Dutch
commerce had been that of absolute free trade.
|
1593-1601] Foundation of the East India Company.
Now for the first time a
monopoly was created under the auspices of Oldenbarneveldt,
and by the efforts of the States of Holland a Charter was, on March 20, 1601,
granted to an East India Company for twenty-one years. This Company received,
under certain restrictions, the exclusive right of trade to the East Indies
under the protection of the States General, and was allowed to erect factories
and forts, and to make alliances and treaties with the native princes and
potentates, appoint governors, and employ troops. The Company was divided into
Chambers, corresponding to the various small Companies, which had been
amalgamated. The supreme government lay with a body, known as the Seventeen, on
which Amsterdam had eight representatives, Zeeland four, the Meuse and North
Quarter each two, the last three having the right of jointly electing a third
member. This great Company thus came into existence a short time before its
English rival, and has the distinction of being the first of all Chartered
Companies, and the model imitated by its many successors.
Not content even with
this extension of the sphere of their commercial enterprises and its vast
possibilities, the eyes of the keen and eager traders were already turning
westward as well as eastward. Netherlanders had first made acquaintance with
the West Indies and Brazil in the Spanish or Portuguese service; and in 1593 Barent Erikszen, in his voyage to
Guinea, had proceeded across the Atlantic to Brazil. It was, however, the fame
of Ralegh's voyages, and his account of the Golden
city of Manoa and the fabled riches of Guiana that
spurred on the imagination of the adventurous Hollanders and Zeelanders with feverish dreams of untold wealth, and led
them to follow in his steps. Moucheron was again
among the pioneers; and Dutch trading ships laden with articles of barter were
to be found entering the Amazon, coasting along the shores of Guiana, and
returning with cargoes of salt from the mines of Punta del Rey beyond the
Orinoco. A certain Willem Usselincx, also a Flemish
refugee, first began to make his name known in the last decade of the sixteenth
century as a strenuous advocate for the creation of a chartered West India
Company. He did not succeed at this time; but for a quarter of a century he
gave himself unceasingly to the task of urging upon the authorities the
advantages and profits to be obtained by the establishment of colonies upon the
American continent.
Thus, then, their war for life and death had stirred the sluggish blood
of the Dutch people, and had aroused in them a most extraordinary spirit of
energy and enterprise. Peace overtures, unless accompanied by the concession of
all their demands, were unlikely to find acceptance among traders thriving at
the expense of their enemies, and dreading lest the cessation of warfare should
close to them their best markets.
The Archdukes in Brussels. [1599-1600
Albert and Isabel did not make their joyeuse entrée into Brussels until the close of 1599.
During the absence of the Archduke the Spanish armies had been under the
command of the Admiral of Aragon, Mendoza, who, making the duchy of Cleves his
head-quarters, had mastered Wesel, Rheinberg and
other strong places on the Rhine. The eastern Provinces were still mainly
Catholic, and contained many Spanish sympathisers;
but, in spite of disputes and discontents in Friesland, and still more in
Groningen, Maurice at the head of a small army more than held his own. The
difficulty of raising taxes in these Provinces, and also in Drenthe,
Overyssel, and Gelderland, inclined the States General and the States of
Holland during 1599 to content themselves with defensive warfare. In the
following year, however, it was determined to raise a large force for offensive
operations, and to undertake an invasion of Flanders with a view to the capture
of Dunkirk. This seaport had for years been a nest of audacious pirates, who,
by lying in wait for the Dutch merchantmen in the narrow seas, had become a
constantly increasing menace and danger to navigation. All efforts to check the
corsairs by armed force had proved in vain, though in the fierce fights which
took place no quarter was given or taken. For the extirpation of the pirates by
means of a land attack, an army of 12,000 men was embarked at Rammekens June 21, 1600, under the command of the Stadholder. The plan was to convey the troops by sea direct
to Ostend, which had always throughout the war remained in the hands of the
States, and was their sole possession in Flanders; hence to march straight
along the sea-shore and, after capturing Nieuport, to
use it as a base for the further advance on Dunkirk.
Curiously enough, this bold scheme of operations was proposed and
carried out by the States General-in other words, by Oldenbarneveldt,
who was supreme in that Assemblyn, in spite of the opposition of Maurice and
William Lewis, both of whom, together with all the other experienced military
leaders, were adverse to so extremely hazardous an enterprise. Oldenbarneveldt had persuaded their High Mightinesses that the moment was opportune for such a
stroke, because a large part of the Archduke's troops were in open mutiny for
lack of pay, and it was known that he had no funds for satisfying them.
Maurice, on the other hand, believed it unsafe to denude the United Provinces
of their entire field army, and expose it, when far away from its base in an
enemy's country, to the risk of being cut off and possibly destroyed. The
States General, however, persisted; and Maurice now set to work with his usual
thoroughness. At his request, however, a deputation of the States General took
up their residence in Ostend, to share the responsibility of the commander.
Difficulties arose from the outset. Prevented from sailing by contrary winds,
the army was forced to land in Flanders at Sas de
Ghent, and to march by land to Nieuport. On June 27,
the fort of Oudenburg was taken, and a garrison left
in it; on July 1, Maurice reached Nieuport and
proceeded to invest the town.
1600] Campaign against Dunkirk.
Meanwhile the Archdukes had not been idle. By
lavish promises Albert and Isabel succeeded in winning back the mutineers; and
with great rapidity 10,000 foot and 1500 cavalry were gathered together, all of
them seasoned troops. With this army the Archduke quickly followed on the
tracks of Maurice, seized Oudenburg by surprise on
July 1, and thus cut off the communications of the Stadholder with Ostend and the United Provinces. The news of the rapid approach of the
enemy was brought to Maurice by a fugitive. It found the States' army separated
into two parts by the tidal creek which formed the harbour of Nieuport, and which could only be crossed at low
water. A few miles to the north a small marshy stream over which on the
previous morning Maurice had thrown a bridge at Leffingen,
entered the sea. He now despatched his cousin Ernest Casimir with 2000 infantry, Scots and Zeelanders,
and four squadrons of cavalry, to seize the bridge and hold it against the
Archduke, until he was able to extricate the main body of the States' army from
their dangerous position. When Ernest Casimir arrived
at Leffingen, the bridge was already in Albert's
hands; but he drew up his small force in battle order on the downs to check
the further advance of the Spaniards. Then ensued one of those unaccountable
panics which sometimes seize the bravest soldiers. The Dutch cavalry turned
their backs at the first onset; and their example infected the infantry, who,
throwing away their arms, rushed along the downs and on to the beach in
headlong flight. Upwards of 800 were butchered or drowned, the chief loss
falling upon the Scots. The sight of vessels putting out of the harbor of Nieuport, and the
argument that never yet had Netherlanders withstood
the Spanish veterans in the open field, determined Albert to give the order to
advance. Meanwhile the ebb had enabled Maurice to march his troops across the
haven and draw them up in line of battle on the downs. The ships that had been
seen by the Spaniards were his transports, sent by him out of the harbor probably to save them from the risk of being set on
fire by the garrison of Nieuport, while he and his
army were fighting on the downs. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of July 2 the
battle was formed. A brilliant charge of the States' cavalry under Lewis Günther of Nassau opened the proceedings, and then the
solid mass of the Spanish and Italian foot, veterans who had conquered in many
a hard-fought field, fell upon the vanguard of Maurice's army, consisting of
2600 English and 2800 Frisians under Sir Francis Vere.
For more than three hours every hillock and hollow of the sandy dunes was
contested on both sides hand to hand; backwards and forwards the conflict
flowed, until at last the gallant Vere himself was
carried from the field severely wounded. Then the Englishmen and Frisians
slowly gave way, foot by foot, with their faces still to the foe.
Lewis Gunther's cavalry attempted to relieve
them by a fierce charge; but it was driven back in confusion, and when the
Archduke, who had been in the thick of the fight all day, ordered up his
reserves, the States' army began to retire in disorder. All seemed lost. But
Maurice, conspicuous by his orange plumes, threw himself into the ranks of the
fugitives, and succeeded in rallying a portion of his troops. The effect was
instantaneous, for their adversaries in their turn were thoroughly worn out by
their two battles in the same day. A momentary pause in their advance enabled
Maurice, with the keen eye of a great captain, to hurl upon their flank three
squadrons of cavalry that he had kept as a last reserve. Scarcely offering any
resistance the army of the Archduke fell into inextricable confusion, turned
their backs and fled. Albert himself only just succeeded in making his escape
to Bruges. Of his army 5000 were killed, above 700 were made prisoners, among
them a number of distinguished officers, including Mendoza, and 105 standards
were taken. Thus Maurice and his army were saved from the very jaws of
destruction. But though the fame of the victory, which showed that even in the
open field the dreaded Spanish infantry were not invincible, spread through
Europe, it was in reality a barren triumph. In spite of the opposition of the
States, Maurice resolved to run no more risks. He led back his army to Holland,
and attempted no further active operations. At this time were sown the seeds of
the unhappy dissension between the Stadholder and the
Advocate.
During the next three years the siege of Ostend (July 15, 1601-September
20, 1604) occupied the energies of both combatants. The Archduke Albert had
made up his mind to capture this seaport, which in the hands of the Dutch was a
perpetual thorn in the side of Flanders. But the town was open to the sea, and
was continually supplied from Zeeland with provisions, munitions, and
reinforcements. Its first Governor, Sir Francis Vere,
was followed by a succession of brave and capable men, the majority of whom
died fighting. Never was a more valorous defence, never a more obstinate
attack. It was a long story of mines and counter-mines, of desperate assaults
and bloody repulses, of fort after fort captured, only to find fresh forts and
new lines of defence constructed by the indefatigable garrison. The efforts of
Maurice in 1601 were confined to the recapture of the Rhine fortresses, Rheinberg and Meurs. In 1602 the
important stronghold of Grave on the Meuse surrendered to him after a two
months' siege. In the autumn of 1603 Marquis Ambrosio de Spinola assumed command of the Spanish forces
before Ostend. He was a rich Genoese banker, who, though without any experience
of war, had offered his services and his money to the Archdukes, promising them
that he would take Ostend. He kept his word. With a reckless expenditure of
life, what was left of the town fell piece by piece into his hands. At length,
in April, 1604, the Stadholder yielded somewhat
sullenly to the pressing requests of the States General, and led an army of
11,000 men into Flanders, seeking to relieve the pressure upon Ostend, by
laying siege to the equally important seaport of Sluys.
It fell into his hands in August. Ostend was now at its last gasp, and the Stadholder was ordered to essay its relief by a direct
march against Spinola's investing army. Maurice and
William Lewis protested, but their protests were overruled. Before, however,
they began to march southwards, Ostend had been surrendered, September 20. The
town had already ceased to exist; and Spinola found
himself after all the master of a heap of confused and hideous ruins. The siege
had lasted three years and seventy-seven days, and had cost the Archdukes,
according to some authorities, the lives of more than 70,000 soldiers. The
gallant defenders had succeeded in draining away the main strength of the
Belgian forces, and in exhausting the resources of the Brussels treasury; and
before they had surrendered the poor little town on the sand dunes with its
miserable harbor, the States had in Sluys possessed themselves of another Flemish seaport, far
more commodiously situated, arid enabling them to command the southern entrance
to the Scheldt. Sluys was strongly garrisoned; and
Frederick Henry, Maurice's younger brother, now twenty years of age, was
appointed its Governor.
The military events of the next two years require but the briefest
notice. The States were now isolated. James I of England had concluded a treaty
of friendship with the Archdukes. Henry IV of France was lukewarm. Maurice was
now confronted by an active and exceedingly able young general, Spinola, whose army had confidence in its leader, and,
being regularly paid at his cost, followed him cheerfully. The policy of the Stadholder, who since the Nieuport campaign had been on far from friendly relations with Oldenbarneveldt and the States General, was strictly defensive. Yet such was the skill and vigour of Spinola that even in
this Maurice was scarcely successful. The two armies faced each other for some
time in the neighborhood of Sluys,
when, at the end of July, the Marquis made a sudden and rapid march northwards
towards Friesland. Spinola captured Oldenzaal and Lingen before
Maurice was able to relieve these towns; and, had he pressed on to Coewarden, it would probably have fallen into his hands,
and the north-eastern Provinces would have lain at his mercy. But he paused in
his march, perhaps from lack of supplies, and finally retreated towards the
junction of the Rühr with the Rhine. While halting
here, an attempt was made by Maurice on October 8,1605, to surprise an isolated
body of Italian cavalry. But a sudden panic seized the States' troops, and
despite the desperate exertions of Frederick, Henry, who, at the risk of his
life, succeeded in rallying some of the flying troops, a sharp and humiliating
reverse closed the campaign. The events of 1605 certainly damaged the Stadholder's reputation.
A severe illness kept Spinola from the front
the whole of the next spring; but in June he set out with the intention of
forcing the passage of the Waal or the Yssel, and
making an inroad into the very heart of the United
Provinces. He was thwarted partly by the skillful defensive positions taken up
by Maurice, but still more by a season of continuous rain, which turned the
whole country into a morass. Foiled in his main purpose Spinola laid siege in succession to Groll and Rheinberg, both of which were taken, without any attempt on
the part of Maurice to relieve them. His conduct throughout these operations
excited some censure both among friends and foes; but his Fabian tactics were
undoubtedly advantageous to the interests of the States. For the Brussels
treasury was empty, Spinola's personal credit
exhausted, and mutiny rife among his troops. Moreover it was on sea, and not on
land, that the most damaging blows could be struck at the unwieldy empire of
Spain.
The operations of the East India Company had been on a large scale, and
had been attended with much success. Not merely had the monopoly of Spain and
Portugal in the Orient been invaded, but their dominion there had been
seriously shaken. A great fleet of seventeen vessels under the command of
Admiral Warwyck and Vice-Admiral de Weert sailed in 1602, and was absent for more than five
years. All the principal islands of the Malay Archipelago, as well as Ceylon,
Siam, and China, were visited. In 1604 another expedition of thirteen ships,
under Steven van der Hagen, was sent to Malabar and
the Moluccas. Factories were established and ports built at Amboina, Tidor, and other places ; and the fleet returned in 1606
with a very rich cargo of cloves and other spices. On his return voyage van der Hagen met at Mauritius a third outward-bound fleet of
the Company, under Cornelis Matelief.
This force consisted of eleven small armed ships, manned by 1400 sailors. In
the summer of 1606 Matelief laid siege to the
Portuguese fortress of Malacca, situate in a commanding position at the
southernmost extremity of the Malay Peninsula. Here he was attacked on August
17 by Alphonso de Castro, the Spanish Viceroy of
India, at the head of a vastly superior fleet, consisting of eighteen galleons
and galleys, carrying 4000 to 5000 soldiers and sailors. A fierce but
indecisive action resulted in the first instance in the raising of the siege of
Malacca. On hearing, however, that de Castro had sailed away, leaving only ten
ships in the roadstead of Malacca for the defence of the place, Matelief returned, and, on September 31, fell Upon the
Spaniards. One of the most complete victories in naval records was the result.
Every single vessel of the enemy was destroyed or burnt, while the Dutch
scarcely lost a man. After visiting China, and establishing the authority of
the Company at Amboina, Tidor, Ternate, Bantam, and
other places, Matelief left the further conduct of
affairs in Eastern waters to Paul van Kaarden, who
met him at Bantam at the head of yet another fleet, while he himself returned
home with five ships, laden with spices, bringing into the midst of peace
negotiations the great tidings of his adventures and victories.
1606-7] Heemskerk's victory at Gibraltar. Peace negotiations.
Nor were the maritime triumphs of the Netherlander confined to distant
oceans. As their fleets returned, laden with rich cargoes, along the West Coast
of Africa, they had to run the gauntlet of Spanish and Portuguese squadrons,
suddenly putting out from Lisbon or Cadiz or other Iberian ports. After voyages
extending over two or more years the East Indiamen, by the time they passed the
Straits, were no longer in good seaworthy condition or fighting trim, and thus
ran a constant risk of falling an easy prey to their enemies. In 1607 news
reached the States of the gathering of a large Spanish fleet at Gibraltar,
supposed to be destined for the East Indies; and under pressure from the
directors of the East India Company the States determined to equip a large
expedition with the object of either intercepting this fleet or attacking it in
the Spanish harbor. Early in April twenty-six
vessels set sail under the command of Jacob van Heemskerk,
the hero of the Nova Zembla wintering, and one of the
bravest and most skillful of Dutch seamen. He was a man gentle and quiet in
private life, but the joy of battle was as the very breath of his nostrils. He
found anchored in Gibraltar Bay the entire Spanish fleet of twenty-one vessels,
ten of them great galleons, beside which the Dutch ships seemed mere pigmies.
The Spanish Admiral d'Avila was likewise an
experienced veteran, who had fought at Lepanto. Heemskerk at once gave the order to attack, and directed that each of the great galleons
should be assailed by two Dutch ships, one at each side. Heemskerk laid his own flagship alongside that of d'Avila, and
so opened the fight. At the very beginning of the struggle both Admirals were
killed. But Heemskerk's death was concealed, and his
comrades carried out his instructions, and fought with desperate resolution in
his own ship to avenge his loss, in the others as if the eye of their chief had
been still upon them. The victory was complete, and the Spanish fleet was
annihilated. Between two and three thousand of their crews perished. On the Dutch
side no ship was destroyed, and only about a hundred sailors were killed. This
crushing and humiliating disaster to the Spanish arms had a powerful effect in
hastening forward the negotiations for peace, in which both parties, now
thoroughly weary of war, were at the time seriously engaged.
The first step had been taken by the Archdukes, who secretly despatched Father Neyen, Albert's
Franciscan confessor, to open relations with Oldenbarneveldt and the Stadholder. The States, however, refused to
enter into negotiations of any sort, unless they were treated as a free and
independent Power. The Archdukes therefore at length consented to negotiate
with the United Provinces "in the quality and as considering them free
Provinces and States, over which they had no pretensions", subject to the
ratification of the King of Spain within three months. They offered to
negotiate either on the basis of a peace, or for a truce for twelve, fifteen,
or twenty years. Meanwhile, it was arranged that an armistice for eight months
should be concluded, Heemskerk's fleet recalled, and
no military operations of any kind carried on.
At the very beginning of the
negotiations it was clear that in the United Provinces there was much division
of opinion. On the side of peace stood Oldenbarneveldt, and with him a majority of the burgher regents, who believed that the
land could no longer bear the burden of taxation, and that the prosperity which
had attended commerce in war-time would be largely increased by peace, so long
as sufficiently favorable terms as to liberty of
trading could be secured. At the head of the war party was Prince Maurice, with
William Lewis of Friesland, the military and naval leaders, and a considerable
number of the leading merchants. Maurice had lived in camps from boyhood; his
fame had been won, not in the Council Chamber, but at the head of armies. Peace
for him meant enforced idleness and great loss of emoluments. Still, though not
uninfluenced by personal motives, both he and William Lewis were far too good
patriots not to put on one side any purely selfish reasons for opposing that
which they believed to be to the advantage of the land. But they and those who
thought with them did not trust the Spaniard. They did not believe that peace
could be obtained without closing the Spanish Indies, East and West, to Dutch
trade; and, with numbers of their countrymen, they dreaded lest the southern
Netherlands should once more become formidable commercial rivals, and Antwerp
again, as a seaport, vie with and perhaps surpass Amsterdam.
At last, in October, 1607, it was signified that the King agreed to
treat with the States as independent parties, but on condition that religious
liberty to Catholics should be conceded during the negotiations. The document
was in many points far from pleasing to the States, but by the exertions of the
French Ambassador, President Jeannin, and his
English colleague, difficulties were smoothed away, and at last, on February 1,
1608, the envoys from Brussels arrived in Holland, with a brilliant retinue. At
the head of the deputation were Spinola and Richardot, the president of the Archduke's Privy Council.
The stately procession was met near Ryswyk by the Stadholders, Maurice and William Lewis of Nassau, attended
by a splendid suite. The two famous Generals greeted one another with much
ceremony and courtesy, and side by side made their entry into the Hague. The
States General appointed as Special Commissioners to represent the United
Provinces, Count William Lewis of Nassau and Walraven,
Lord of Brederode, and with them were associated a deputy from each of the
seven Provinces under the leadership of Oldenbarneveldt,
as the representative of Holland. The envoys of France, England, Denmark, the
Palatinate, and Brandenburg took an active part in the discussions; and it was
largely owing to the skill and sagacity of Jeannin that in spite of almost insuperable difficulties an agreement was eventually
arrived at.
1608] Conferences and discussions at the Hague.
The admission of the independence and sovereignty of the United
Provinces met with less opposition on the part of the Archdukes than was
expected. Their policy, though not openly avowed, was to conclude a truce, not
a peace, and thus to leave the dispute as to the sovereignty over the Provinces
to the arbitrament of a future war. It was a
concession intended to be temporary, made with the object of gaining time for
recruiting their ruined finances and gathering fresh resources, so as to renew
hostilities at a favorable opportunity. Richardot raised no difficulties as to the declaration of
independence; indeed, he said plainly, that he had full powers to treat with
them "as free States," or as a kingdom, if they pleased so to name
themselves. The objection raised by the Dutch against the use of the seal of
the seventeen Provinces by the Archdukes caused more difficulty, but on this
point also Richardot at length gave way. The avowed
object was still to conclude a definite peace; for Maurice and his party had
declared themselves absolutely opposed to a truce, and the Spanish-Belgian representatives
were too clever diplomatists to show their hand at so early a stage of the
discussions. The two thorny questions related to freedom of trade in the
Indies, and to liberty of public worship to the Roman Catholics in the States.
At first the question as to religious liberty was allowed to fall into
the background; and for week after week the right of trading in the Indies was
acrimoniously discussed. Public opinion in the Provinces, and especially in
Holland, was deeply stirred; a long series of pamphlets issued from the
printing-press against the peace; the traders and the Calvinist preachers were
all strongly on the side of Maurice; and Oldenbarneveldt was roundly accused of being a traitor in the pay of Spain. Even had he felt
disposed to yield as to the Indian trade (and there is nothing to show that his
determination to uphold freedom of commerce ever wavered) the Advocate, with all
his self-will and firmness of purpose, dared not hold out against the public
voice. The Spaniards, on the other hand, would not yield in a matter touching
the traditional principles of their policy. A deadlock ensued. The time of the
armistice expired and had to be renewed. Several of the foreign envoys left the
Hague. President Jeannin went to Paris to consult the
King, and Father Neyen journeyed to Madrid. On his
return it was found that the King of Spain insisted on closing the Indies to
foreign traders, and also on the reestablishment of public Roman Catholic
worship. But on each of these points the deputies of the States were likewise
steadfast; the negotiations appeared to be broken off; and both sides were
preparing for a renewal of the war, when a proposal was made by the envoys of
France and England to act as mediators on the basis of a twelve years' truce.
The real author of the proposal was the resourceful President Jeannin. Peace was plainly impossible. But Jeannin hoped to induce the Dutch to agree to a truce on
condition that, so long as it lasted, the trade to India should remain free,
and the religious question untouched. He was probably aware that the Spaniards
were eager for such a proposal and would make sacrifices to obtain the respite
from war that was so necessary to them. The difficulty lay in the attitude of Maurice, who had from the first been
utterly averse to a truce; but on the other hand Oldenbarneveldt was heart and soul with the President. The skillful arguments of the French
envoy; and the powerful influence and persuasions of the Advocate gradually won
over the assent of the Provinces, though Zeeland was long recalcitrant; and at
last the Stadholder sullenly and doubtfully gave way.
The final discussions took place at Antwerp; and on April 9, 1609, the long
drawn out parleyings at length came to an end, and a
truce for twelve years was signed and sealed. Jeannin was able to inform the French King that his labors had been crowned with success "to the general satisfaction of every one,
and even of Prince Maurice."
The suspension of hostilities recognized the
status quo as regarded territorial possessions; and all points on which the
States had insisted were conceded. The treaty was concluded with them "in
the quality of free States over which the Archdukes made no pretensions".
No mention was made of granting liberty of worship to Roman Catholics; but, in
a secret treaty consisting of a single clause, the King of Spain promised that
during the truce he would cause no impediment to the traffic of the Dutch in
whatever place it might be carried on. To save Spanish pride the word "Indies"
was never mentioned, though it was implied. The concession of freedom of trade
thus wrung from Philip III was one that nothing but dire necessity would ever
have induced a King of Spain to grant.
The immediate effect of the truce was an increase of Oldenbarneveldt's influence over the policy and government of the new Republic, which now for the
first time took its place in the European system "as a free and
independent State". To the Advocate's statecraft had been very largely due
the building up of the Commonwealth during the quarter of a century after the
murder of William the Silent. He was now, during the opening period of the
twelve years' truce, by his consummate skill in the conduct of foreign affairs,
to secure for the United Provinces a weight and influence in the councils of
Europe out of all proportion to the size or population of the new-born State.
1609-10] The Jülich and Cleves succession.
A critical question arose for settlement almost immediately after the
signing of the truce. The death in March, 1609, of Duke John William of Jülich and Cleves without male heirs brought a number of
claimants for the vacant succession into the field; and the principal
competitors, the Elector of Brandenburg and the Count Palatine of Neuburg, came to an understanding to occupy the disputed
territory jointly, whence they were known as "the Possessors". The
Dutch, whose interest in the matter was clear, since the duchies lay upon their
borders, and it was important for their security that this territory should not
fall into the hands of a Spanish partisan, were willing to recognize "the Possessors" accordingly. But the Emperor had not acknowledged
their claims, and had allowed Archduke Leopold, Bishop of Passau, to enter the
duchies at the head of an armed force and seize the fortress of Jülich. Henry IV of France, who had long been meditating
war against the House of Habsburg, and who was at the moment exceedingly
irritated with the Archdukes because they had given refuge at Brussels to the
fugitive Princess of Condé, seized the occasion offered by the Jülich succession to hurry on his armaments, and he did
his utmost to induce the States to join him in overthrowing the power of their
hereditary enemies. The French armies were already marching to the Rhine and
the Pyrenees; and the States had agreed to support the invasion of Germany
with an army of 18,000 men under Prince Maurice, when the knife of Ravaillac terminated the career and the schemes of Henry on
May 14, 1610.
The new French government was well-disposed to Spain and Austria; and a complete change of policy took place. The States thus escaped being
drawn into a large war; but it was felt that it was impossible for them to
allow the duchies to fall into the hands of an Austrian prince. Maurice
therefore in the early summer marched into the country and laid siege to Jülich. Though the place was strong, it capitulated on
September 1; and the Archduke left the territory. Not till 1613 was the
interference of the Dutch in the affairs of the duchies again called for. In
that year, as was sooner or later to be expected, the "Possessors"
fell out; and Neuburg called in Catholic aid for the
maintenance of his rights. Hostilities ensued, and Maurice and Spinola once again found themselves face to face in the
field. There was, however, no actual fighting; and the dispute was settled
without serious consequences by the treaty of Xanten (November 12, 1614), by which a division of the duchies was made between the
two rivals.
Fishery disputes with England. [1609-18
The relations of the Republic with England had meanwhile required delicate
handling. The wide extension of Dutch commerce caused no small jealousy and
envy to Englishmen. English trade had also been growing, though to a far less
extent than that of their neighbours; and Dutch and
English traders had met in rivalry on many distant seas. At the time of the
signature of the truce, the burning question between the two nations was that
of fishing rights. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the herring
fishery employed more hands in the Provinces than any other occupation; and
many thousands of households lived by it. The right to fish on the English
coast had been conceded by ancient treaties, and had been unchallenged since
its confirmation by the well-known Magnus Intercursus of 1496. But since, in the last years of Elizabeth, English fishery had grown,
quarrels frequently arose between the fishermen; and the claims of England to
the dominium maris in the seas which washed its
shores began to be loudly disputed. The result was that in May, 1609, James I
issued an edict imposing a tax on all foreigners fishing in English waters. The
terms were general, but it was directed against the Dutch. An embassy was
accordingly sent to England in the spring of 1610, whose chief object was to endeavor to obtain the withdrawal of the fishery edict, or
at least a favourable modification of it. Friendly
relations with the States were at that time of importance to James, as a
counterpoise to the rapprochement between France and Spain after the death of
Henry; and after no small wrangling and controversy over the juridical points
raised in Grotius' treatise, Mare Liberum, published
in the previous year, the King consented to a suspension of the offensive tax.
The wranglings over the legal aspects of the question
went on, however, year by year; many pamphlets were written and public opinion
was strongly roused on both sides of the North Sea. At last, in 1616, James
then leaning towards a Spanish alliance, the tax was reimposed; whereupon serious collisions ensued, and actual fighting took place between
the royal officers who tried to collect the tax and the Dutch fisherfolk, who sturdily refused to pay. Nor was this the
only cause of dissension between the nations. Strife had arisen between the
traders of the rival East India Companies in the Indian seas, and Englishmen
had been killed by Dutchmen at Amboina.
In Russia, too, upon the shores of the
White Sea, the same struggle for commercial privileges was in progress. Off the
inhospitable coasts of Spitzbergen and Greenland the
whalers of the two nationalities had hostile encounters, and had to be escorted
by armed convoys. Such was the bitterness of feeling that, in 1618, another
important embassy to King James found great difficulty in arriving at an
understanding on most of the points in dispute. The skillful diplomacy of Oldenbarneveldt had for some years previously greatly
improved the relations of the States with England. The retention of the
cautionary towns by the English sovereign had always been a menace to the
security of the Provinces of Holland and Zeeland, and had cast a kind of slur
over the newly acquired independence of the Republic. In 1615 the Advocate took
advantage of the financial needs of James, always in want of money, to offer
him a sum of £250,000 for the restoration of the pledged towns (£100,000 in
cash, and £50,000 in three instalments at six
months' intervals). The amount was far less than the debt claimed by England,
but James was tempted by the offer, and Oldenbarneveldt at once closed with the King. In June, 1616, the English garrisons were
withdrawn.
The sphere of Oldenbarneveldt's diplomatic
activity was by no means confined to the immediately neighboring States. An alliance was concluded with the Hanse towns; and in 1615 an army of 7000 men under Frederick Henry advanced into
Germany and raised the siege of Brunswick, which was beleaguered by Christian
IV of Denmark. The object of this alliance was to secure a still greater hold
over the Baltic trade, and to compel the warlike King of Denmark to lower the
dues charged by him for the passage of the Sound. With this object embassies
were also sent to Sweden and Russia, and friendly relations established with
those countries. In 1614 a Russian embassy appeared at the Hague. The
Advocate's son-in-law, van der Myle,
was in 1609 despatched upon a mission to Venice. The
Venetians had been for some time friendly to the States; and in 1610 their
first ambassador, Tommaso Contarini,
arrived in Holland. The object was to free the Dutch trade in the Mediterranean; and a commercial treaty (1609) with Morocco and a mission to Constantinople
(1612) gave proof of Oldenbarneveldt's vigilant and
far-seeing foreign policy. Within a few years of the conclusion of the truce,
he had secured for the United Provinces a recognized position among European
Powers, and had established his claim to be consulted on all matters affecting
international politics.
A sad reverse to this picture of advancing influence
and prosperity is offered by the story, during the same period, of the internal
affairs of the Republic. It must be remembered that in 1609 there existed no
such thing as a Dutch nation, but, instead of it, only a congeries of provinces
and town corporations, each of them with sovereign attributes, held together by
the loosest political ties. Moreover, while this many-headed government knew no
supreme controlling authority, the great mass of the people had no voice in the
control of their own affairs. A large majority, possibly two-thirds, of the
entire population adhered to the ancient Catholic faith, and submitted to
exclusion by an intolerant Protestant minority from all political rights and
from the exercise of public worship. Nor had even this Protestant population
any real voice, as such, in the government of the country. There was no such
thing as popular election. The town corporations, the ultimate depositaries of
sovereign power, were close, self-coopting oligarchies, in no sense representative even of the Protestant inhabitants.
The situation was redeemed from impracticability, and the machinery of
public administration made to work, partly because the Dutch people were by
nature patient, plodding, and easily led, keen as to trade and material welfare
rather than politics, partly because the administrative and executive power had
during the years of stress and struggle, which followed the departure of
Leicester, come into the hands of two men, Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice of Nassau. The cessation of the war in 1609 found them face to
face, suspicious of each other's aims, and treating one another in their public
relations with a cold aloofness that might quickly be changed into open enmity.
But Maurice, slow and inert by nature, and averse from politics, was not the
man to take the initiative in opposition to the Advocate. Some years before
this he might have become sovereign of the Netherlands, with the help of Oldenbarneveldt himself and the universal assent of the
people, had he cared to push himself forward; and now he had no wish to
interfere with all those practical details of administration, which he knew
that the burgher Statesman with his unrivalled experience was better able to
discharge than any other living Netherlander. Probably no serious quarrel would
ever have arisen between them on merely political grounds; but a religious
crisis, which had long been threatening to reach an acute stage, arose; in the
fanatical bitterness of sectarian strife civil war broke out, and the force of
circumstances compelled the two leaders, though neither of them theologians or
violent religious partisans, to take opposite sides.
Gomarus and Arminius. [1585-1609
The Protestantism of the
northern Netherlands had always been Calvinistic, but not of one pattern. From
the first there had been two schools of opinion-the rigidly orthodox
Calvinists, who called themselves "Reformed" and were known by
those of the opposite party as "precisians"; and the liberal or "evangelical" party, who were commonly spoken of as
"Politicals" or "Libertines". To
this moderate "Libertine" school William the Silent himself had
belonged; and it counted among its sympathisers Oldenbarneveldt, and a considerable number of the
"regents". The adherence of these two great leaders to the
"Libertines" was due not so much to religious conviction, as to a
statesmanlike desire for toleration in matters of faith, so far as was
consistent with the national safety, in order to preserve the supremacy of the
civil power over Church and State. In opposition to this party stood the large
majority of the preachers and of the Reformed congregations throughout the
Provinces who held predestinarian doctrines of the
strictest type, and who, in the very spirit of absolute intolerance which they
had so loudly condemned when exercised against themselves by the Church of
Rome, would have persecuted and deprived of civic rights those who refused to
subscribe to the theological dogmas and tenets set forth in the Netherland
Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. The desire of this party was that a
National Synod should be summoned, which should decide authoritatively on all
points of controversy and create a Reformed State Church, which would have
supreme control of religion throughout the land. The "Libertines" on
the other hand dreaded such a consummation, and, relying upon the provisions of
Article 13 of the Union of Utrecht, insisted on the independence of the
Provincial Churches, and even in this case preferred that the
"classis" rather than the "synod" should be the
unit, and that the bond between the separate congregations should be loosened
rather than tightened.
From the days of Leicester the strife had gone on, until at last it was
brought to a head by the rivalry of two professors of theology at Leyden, Gomarus and Arminius, the protagonists of the two Schools. Franciscus Gomarus (1563-1641), had held his
chair already for eight years, when Prince Maurice through the influence of his
chaplain, the eloquent and learned Johannes Uyttenbogaert,
obtained from the Curators of the University in 1602 the nomination of Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609), for many years well-known as a preacher
at Amsterdam, to fill the chair vacant through the death of Franciscus Junius. The Prince, who did not pretend to be a
theologian or to feel interest in theological disputations, little foresaw the
consequences which were to follow from this appointment. Round each of these
leaders a band of disciples gathered; Gomarus in
lecture-room and pulpit assailed the teaching of Arminius, who on his part was
as ready in attack and as skillful in defence as his adversary. The chief
subject of contention and argument between them was the abstruse doctrine of
predestination; and as, with the course of years, the disputes became warmer,
so did their divergences of opinion tend to accentuate themselves and become
wider. Repeated demands were made for the convening of a Synod to settle the
disputed points and, if necessary, to revise the Confession and the Catechism;
but the States, in the midst of the long protracted peace negotiations, shrank
from taking a step sure to give rise to embittered feeling. In 1609, shortly
after the conclusion of the truce, Arminius died. Hereupon, however, under the
leadership of Uyttenbogaert, and with the connivance
of Oldenbarneveldt, the Arminians bound themselves together in a defensive league, and determined to appeal
against the Gomarists to the States of Holland. At a
convention held at Gouda, June, 1610, the famous petition known as the Remonstrantie was drawn up, which in five articles defined
the Arminian position; and an appeal was made to the
States to submit the questions raised to the judgment of a National Synod,
summoned by and under the control of the civil authority. These Articles
expressed the dissent of the Remonstrants (by which
name the Arminians were henceforth known) from the
cardinal tenets of the orthodox Calvinistic faith on the subject of
predestination, election, and grace. The Gomarists replied in a Contra-Remonstrantie (from which they
obtained the appellation of "Contra-Remonstrants"). They claimed that these matters could only be dealt with by a purely
Church Synod, and in seven Articles restated in their most stringent and
uncompromising form the stern dogmas of Calvin in regard to the points raised
by their opponents, accusing them of holding the heresies of the Socinians and Pelagians, and of
being allies of the Papists. These accusations, and especially the last, drew
to the side of the Contra-Remonstrants a large majority
of the Protestant portion of the population throughout the Provinces. But,
although the Remonstrants were thus numerically
weaker than their opponents, in nearly every part of the United Provinces they
had many adherents among the privileged burgher oligarchies, and could command
a majority in the States of Holland, Utrecht, and Overyssel.
The Five Articles of Remonstrance
- Article I - That God, by an eternal, unchangeable purpose in Jesus Christ, his Son, before the foundation of the world, hath determined, out of the fallen, sinful race of men, to save in Christ, for Christ's sake, and through Christ, those who, through the grace of the Holy Ghost, shall believe on this his Son Jesus, and shall persevere in this faith and obedience of faith, through this grace, even to the end; and, on the other hand, to leave the incorrigible and unbelieving in sin and under wrath, and to condemn them as alienate from Christ, according to the word of the Gospel in John III. 36: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him," and according to other passages of Scripture also.
- Article II - That, agreeably thereto, Jesus Christ, the Savior of the world, died for all men and for every man, so that he has obtained for them all, by his death on the cross, redemption, and the forgiveness of sins; yet that no one actually enjoys this forgiveness of sins, except the believer, according to the word of the Gospel of John III. 16: "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life"; and in the First Epistle of John II. 2: "And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world."
- Article III — That man has not saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free-will, inasmuch as he, in the state of apostasy and sin, can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do anything that is truly good (such as having faith eminently is); but that it is needful that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, and renewed in understanding, inclination, or will, and all his powers, in order that he may rightly understand, think, will, and effect what is truly good, according to the word of Christ, John xv. 5: "Without me ye can do nothing."
- Article IV — That this grace of God is the beginning, continuance, and accomplishment of an good, even to this extent, that the regenerate man himself, without that prevenient or assisting; awakening, following, and co-operative grace, can neither think, will, nor do good, nor withstand any temptations to evil; so that all good deeds or movements that can be conceived must be ascribed to the grace of God in Christ. But, as respects the mode of the operation of this grace, it is not irresistible, inasmuch as it is written concerning many that they have resisted the Holy Ghost,—Acts vii, and elsewhere in many places.
- Article V — That those who are incorporated into Christ by a true faith, and have thereby become partakers of his life-giving spirit, have thereby full power to strive against Satan, sin, the world, and their own flesh, and to win the victory, it being well understood that it is ever through the assisting grace of the Holy Ghost; and that Jesus Christ assists them through his Spirit in all temptations, extends to them his hand; and if only they are ready for the conflict, and desire his help, and are not inactive, keeps them from falling, so that they, by no craft or power of Satan, can be misled, nor plucked out of Christ's hands, according to the word of Christ, John X. 28: "Neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand." But whether they are capable, through negligence, of forsaking again the first beginnings of their life in Christ, of again returning to this present evil world, of turning away from the holy doctrine which was delivered them, of losing a good conscience, of becoming devoid of grace, that must be more particularly determined out of the Holy Scriptures before they can teach it with the full persuasion of their minds
|
Oldenbarneveldt had been greatly perturbed by these Church
quarrels. As to the particular points of dispute, he probably had formed no
very definite conclusions. But all his sympathies, as statesman and politician,
were with the Remonstrants, in the first place
because theirs was the broader and more tolerant creed, and still more, because
they did not, like their opponents, set up the authority of the Church against that
of the State. He was inflexibly opposed to the claims of the ultra-Calvinists
on this head, and was determined to uphold the supremacy of the secular power
and its right to intervene in ecclesiastical disputes. Accordingly, in 1613,
the proposals of the Contra-Remonstrants for the
summoning of a National Church Synod were, through the influence of the
Advocate, rejected; and in January, 1614, the States of Holland passed a
resolution which forbade the preachers to treat of the disputed questions in the
pulpits, and imposing upon them moderation and diffidence in dealing with such
abstruse matters. The resolution was moved by the youthful Pensionary of Rotterdam, Hugo de Groot (Grotius), now rising
into fame through the extraordinary brilliancy of his intellectual gifts and
his many-sided learning; and it secured the votes of a majority of the States,
despite the violent opposition of several important towns, including Amsterdam.
The passing of this resolution, though undoubtedly intended to be a measure of
conciliation, acted as a declaration of war. Obedience was refused in Amsterdam
and elsewhere by the Gomarists, supported by the Town
Councils. A deputation was sent by the States to Amsterdam, with de Groot at its head, to secure obedience to the law in the
commercial capital; but by a small majority the Town Council refused to
cooperate. But, whatever the opposition, the Advocate was resolved to carry
matters with a high hand, and, where it should be necessary, in accordance with
the Church ordinance of 1591, to enforce obedience to the authority of the
State. The beginning of 1617 thus saw the country on the verge of civil war.
The Contra-Remonstrant Ministers were driven from Rotterdam and other places,
where the Town Councils were Arminian; and in the
Hague a well-known preacher, Rosaeus, being forbidden
the use of his pulpit, established himself, accompanied by his congregation,
close by at Ryswyk.
But now a difficulty confronted the Advocate. Popular riots broke out in
many places. It became evident that his policy could not be carried out without
the employment of military force, and military force could only be employed
with the consent and aid of the Stadholder, who was
Captain-General of the forces of the Union. But Maurice, after long hesitation,
had made up his mind to join the enemies of Oldenbarneveldt.
Despite the alienation which had been growing up between him and the Advocate
for a considerable number of years, Maurice was very loth to stir up civil war and to take up the sword against the great statesman, who
had been his father's friend, and whose weighty services to the national cause
he fully recognised. He was long undecided and halting between two opinions;
for his friend and Court Chaplain, Uyttenbogaert, was
the leading spirit among the Remonstrants, and he
himself is reported to have said on one occasion "that he was a soldier,
and not a theologian", and on another "that he did not know whether
predestination were blue or green". Moreover his step-mother, Louise de
Coligny, whom he was accustomed to consult, and to whom he always showed the
greatest respect and deference, favoured the Arminians, as did also her son Frederick Henry. But there
were powerful influences drawing him the other way, which slowly gained
complete supremacy over him. The first was that of his cousin, William Lewis,
who was a zealous and convinced Calvinist. William Lewis urged Maurice to take
up a decided attitude in defence of the cause of the Protestant religion, the
destruction of which he honestly held to be threatened by the action of Oldenbarneveldt and the States of Holland. The arguments of
William Lewis were reinforced and supported by those of Francis van Aerssens, who owed Oldenbarneveldt a grudge for the loss of his place as ambassador of the States at Paris, and of
Sir Dudley Carleton, who had lately arrived as English ambassador at the Hague.
Through the persuasive insinuations of Aerssens,
whose early advancement had been entirely due to Oldenbarneveldt,
and who had been his trusted friend for many years, Maurice learnt to distrust Oldenbarneveldt, and even to believe him to be in secret
collusion with the French King to the detriment of his country, and his
advocacy of the Truce to have been purchased with Spanish gold. Under these
influences Maurice openly proclaimed himself in favor of the Contra-Remonstrants and of their resistance to the authority of
the States of Holland. Oldenbarneveldt saw that
instead of receiving the support of the Stadholder,
and, therefore, of the army, he must count upon their active opposition; but
he was too long accustomed to rule, and too proud, to go back from the course
which he had marked out for himself. Perceiving civil war to be inevitable, he
resolved on a bold step, and in December, 1616, proposed to the States of
Holland that they should, in the exercise of their rights as a sovereign
Province, raise a force of 4000 men, who should be in their own service, taking
an oath of allegiance to them, and at the disposal of the magistrates for the
enforcement of order. After some delay the Advocate prevailed. The mercenaries
thus raised for special local purposes and not forming part of the regular army
were known as waardgelders. The proposal was,
however, not carried into effect until some months later, and then only
partially. In truth both sides, though determined not to yield, were afraid of
taking any decisive step which would entail a breach of the peace. Efforts were
made at conciliation; conferences were from time to time held between Maurice
and Oldenbarneveldt, still ostensibly friends; but,
as the months went by, men's minds became more and more exasperated, and the
country fell asunder into two hostile camps.
The situation was full of strange
anomalies. The two Stadholders working together, who
were determined that a National Synod should be summoned, commanded in the
States General the votes of four out of the seven Provinces. In May, 1617, the
States General agreed, by a bare majority, to hold the Synod; and the States of
Holland, again by a narrow majority, refused to accede. A powerful minority,
speaking in the name of six towns, chief among which was Amsterdam itself, was
strongly Gomarist, and was supported by popular
opinion throughout the Province.
The "Sharp Resolution." [1617
Maurice was at length provoked to declare
himself openly the champion of the Contra-Remonstrants.
On July 9 forcible possession was, by direction of the Prince, taken of the
Cloister Church at the Hague, for the use of the proscribed sect; and a
fortnight later, July 23, the Prince, accompanied by his cousin Count William
Lewis and a large retinue, attended divine service there. This direct challenge
to the States of Holland the Advocate did not hesitate to take up. On August 4
he proposed to the States a momentous resolution, known as the Scherpe Resolutie. It was passed
on the following day, the Prince himself being present in the Assembly, and was
a thorough-going assertion of the sovereignty of the Province of Holland.
Assent was refused to the summoning of a Synod, whether national or provincial,
as infringing the rights and supremacy of the States in matters of religion.
The regents of the cities were admonished to maintain the peace, and to enrol men-at-arms, when required for their security. All
officials, soldiers in the pay of the Province, deputed councillors,
and magistrates, were to take an oath of obedience to the States "on pain
of dismissal", and were to be accountable not to the ordinary tribunals,
but to the States of Holland only. Maurice was very angry, for as Stadholder he was the servant of the Provincial States, and
was bound to aid in carrying out their will. It was a reductio ad absurdum of the position that as Captain and Admiral-General of the Union he
was the servant of the States General, and bound to execute the orders of their
High Mightinesses. To complicate matters, the
minority in the States of Holland, headed by Reinier Pauw speaking in the name of Amsterdam, uttered a strong
protest against the action of the majority; and practically there was no power
but the sword to compel these recalcitrant corporations to carry out the
Resolution. Indeed, they openly announced their intention of disregarding it.
The "Sharp Resolution" passed, Oldenbarneveldt on the plea of ill-health betook himself to Utrecht, leaving de Groot and the deputed Councillors in charge of affairs at the Hague. There can be little doubt that his object
was to strengthen by his presence and counsel the hands of his supporters in
the States of the only Province which had continued firm on the side of
Holland. He did not return to the Hague till November 6. Meanwhile levies of waardgelders had been raised in several cities. This led to
action being taken by the States General. Urged by the two Stadholders,
their High Mightinesses sent letters of warning both
to the Provincial States and the several towns, in which they pointed out the
dangerous consequences that might follow. Still the levies went on, although
both sides hesitated to proceed to extremities. But the leaders were active; a
deluge of pamphlets, lampoons and caricatures poured forth from the press; and
the partisans of the Stadholder against the Advocate,
of Contra-Remonstrant against Remonstrant principles, of Provincial sovereignty
against the supremacy of the States General, were preparing themselves for a
struggle that had become inevitable. The most strenuous supporters of Oldenbarneveldt were the Pensionaries of Rotterdam, Leyden, and Haarlem, de Groot, Hoogerbeets, and de Haan; his
bitterest opponents were Francis van Aerssens and Reinier Pauw, burgomaster of
Amsterdam. To these two last-named were due in a large measure the violent
personal attacks persistently and publicly made upon the Advocate, who was
accused of many crimes and misdemeanours in both his
public and private life. To meet these calumnies Oldenbarneveldt published a lengthy defence of his life, character, and conduct, throughout the
whole of his career. This Remonstrantie he presented
to the States of Holland, sending a copy, accompanied by a conciliatory letter,
to Maurice. Though this document has served to clear the memory of the Advocate
from the aspersions of his contemporaries, it had practically no effect upon
minds poisoned and prejudiced by venomous charges and scurrilous abuse.
At last
the States General determined upon decisive action. Legally, they had no right
to enforce their will upon a sovereign Province; but matters had come to a
dead-lock; and on their side, in the ultimate resort, was the power of the
sword, in the person of the Prince of Orange, whose honored name and high deeds secured for him the willing obedience of the soldiery. On
July 9, 1618, the question of the waardgelders was
discussed at the Assembly of the States General, and on July 23 it was resolved
that a Commission, with Maurice at its head, should be sent to Utrecht to
demand and, if necessary, to compel the disbanding of the levy. In reply to
this challenge the States of Holland sent another Commission, headed by de Groot and Hoogerbeets, to support
the Utrechters and urge them to maintain their
rights. It arrived on July 24, followed on the next day by the Commissioners of
the Generality, with the Prince and a body of officers. As neither party showed
signs of yielding, Maurice, on the evening of July 81, entered the town at the
head of a body of troops. Early next morning he summoned the waardgelders to lay down their arms. He was at once obeyed.
There was no opposition. De Groot and his colleagues
hurried away; the members of the Municipal Council fled; and the Provincial Estates
gave in their submission. In his capacity as Stadholder the Prince at once proceeded to appoint a new Municipal Council of Contra-Remonstrants, and to effect changes in the constitution of
the States, which gave the majority to the same party. The vote of Utrecht was
henceforth in favor of the summoning of a National Synod. Holland was isolated
and stood alone.
Trial of Oldenbarneveldt. [1618-9
This was the beginning of the end. Obstinate spirits in the Remonstrant
towns of Holland were still for resistance. On August 20, however, a placard
was issued on the authority of the States General calling for the dismissal of
the waardgelders within twenty-four hours. The order
was obeyed. The power of the opposition had collapsed. On August 25 the States
of Holland gave a qualified assent to the summoning of the National Synod.
Their spirit was broken. On August 29 a final blow was struck. By virtue of a
secret resolution of the States General the Advocate, de Groot,
and Hoogerbeets were arrested when on their way to
attend a meeting of the States, and were confined in the Prince's apartments in
the Binnenhof. The arrest of Ledenburg,
secretary of the States of Utrecht, followed. Uyttenbogaert and other leaders of the Remonstrants fled. The
prisoners were treated harshly and allowed no intercourse with each other or
with their friends. The arrests had no sooner been made, than Maurice set out
upon a tour through the towns of Holland, attended by a strong retinue, and
proceeded to effect such changes in the magistracies as would secure Contra-Remonstrant
majorities in the corporations and in the Provincial States. Schoonhaven, Brill, Schiedam, Gorinchem, Oudewater, Delft, Leyden, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam
were visited in turn, and duly purged. When the States of Holland met in
November a vote of thanks was passed to the Prince, and full powers were
granted him for the completion of his work. Dissension had been crushed. The
holding of the National Synod was unanimously approved throughout the seven
Provinces. The Contra-Remonstrants were everywhere in
the ascendant.
1618-9] Trial of Oldenbarneveldt.—Synod of Dort.
During the months that followed the arrests, the Advocate, de Groot, and Hoogerbeets (Ledenburg had committed suicide) were kept in the strictest confinement. The trial began
in November. Each of the prisoners was examined separately before a Commission
appointed by the States General on all the events, not only of the past few
years, but of their whole public careers. The examination of Oldenbarneveldt was especially severe, and his treatment
cruelly unjust. He appeared more than sixty times before the Commissioners, and
was allowed neither to consult his papers nor to put his defence in writing. He
had to trust to his memory for all the complicated details of the public
affairs in which for upwards of forty years he had been the chief actor.
At last, on February 20,1619, the States General nominated a Court
composed of twenty-four judges. Half of them were Hollanders. It was not in any
sense a regular Court, and nearly all its members were personal enemies of the
accused. The Advocate strongly protested against its composition, and claimed
his right to be tried by the sovereign Province of Holland, whose servant he
had been. It was in vain; nor could anything have exceeded the rigor of the proceedings which followed. The prisoners
were allowed no advocates, nor the use of books, pen, or paper. The trial was
merely a preliminary to condemnation. On Sunday, May 12, sentence of capital
punishment was pronounced.
Simultaneously with the trial of the political prisoners the great
National Synod, whose convention they had so long and resolutely opposed, had
met at Dort. The Synod met for the first time on November 13, 1618, and held
154 sessions. It was an imposing assembly, consisting of more than 100 members
Twenty-eight of these were foreign divines from England, Scotland, the
Palatinate, Hesse, Switzerland, Geneva, Brandenburg,
East Friesland, and Bremen. The rest were Netherlanders, fifty-eight preachers,
professors, and elders, and eighteen commissioners of the States General. The
President was Joannes Bogerman,
preacher at Leeuwarden. One of their first steps was to summon before them
representatives of the Remonstrants, to make their
defence. On December 6 a deputation of twelve, with Simon Episcopius at their head, appeared; and a fierce and wordy contest took place between the
champions of the five and the seven points, which occupied nine sessions. But
the Remonstrants refused to acknowledge the authority
of the Synod as a Court competent to pronounce judgment on such doctrinal
matters, and after a long series of violent altercations they were ordered by
the President to withdraw. They immediately held what was styled an "anti-synod" at Rotterdam, and protested both loudly and publicly against
the opinions and the tyranny of their opponents. In their absence the work at
Dort proceeded steadily; and on April 28,1619, the Canons that had been drawn
up were signed by all the members. The Remonstrants were pronounced heretics and teachers of false doctrines, and unfit to fill any
post in the churches, universities, or schools. On May 1 the Netherlands
Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism were approved without change, as
setting forth, shortly but completely, the principles of the orthodox Reformed
faith. A week later (May 6) the results of the deliberations were proclaimed in
the Great Church before a vast gathering of people; and amidst festivities and
much speech-making the Synod was dissolved. There was indeed much ground for
rejoicing on the part of the Contra-Remonstrant party. They had crushed their
adversaries, and were henceforth dominant in the State. No less than 200
Remonstrant preachers were dismissed, and large numbers of them driven into
exile. Like the Catholics, the Arminians were now
placed under a ban, and were forbidden to hold meetings for public worship.
The condemnation of the Advocate followed immediately upon the close of
the Synod's labors. In the then embittered state of
party feeling probably most men expected that the sentence of the packed court
would be a severe one; but few were prepared for a sentence of death. Many of
the judges had hesitated long before pronouncing for capital punishment; but
the unbending attitude of the Prince of Orange proved decisive. Louise de
Coligny and the French Ambassador, du Maurier, did
their utmost to induce him to intervene on behalf of Oldenbarneveldt.
But Maurice's mind had been thoroughly poisoned against the aged statesman;
and, when he found that neither the Advocate nor his children would admit the
possibility of guilt by asking for pardon, he hardened his heart.
On the
evening of Sunday, May 12, Oldenbarneveldt was
informed that he was condemned to death, and that after a public reading of the
sentence execution would follow on the following morning. The prisoner received
the news with surprise and anger; but he soon recovered his calmness, and
asked for pen, ink, and paper, that he might write a farewell letter to his
wife and children. The greater part of the night he spent in earnest
conversation with the preacher Walaeus, who had been
sent from Dort to offer his ministrations. The Advocate remained firm in the
unqualified assertion of his entire innocence of the charges brought against
him, and protested in the strongest manner against the illegality of the Court
and the injustice of its sentence. He requested Walaeus to see Maurice and to ask the Prince to forgive him for any injuries that he
might have done to him, and to extend his protection to his children. For a
moment this message from the man who had been so many years his friend and counsellor touched the Prince, and he asked whether the
Advocate had said anything about pardon. Walaeus was
obliged to confess that he had not, and the interview closed. At 8 o'clock on
the Monday morning the prolix sentence recounting the grounds of condemnation
was read to Oldenbarneveldt in the ancient hall of
the Counts of Holland in the Binnenhof, in front of
which a rough scaffold had been erected during the night. The outer court was
densely crowded with people as the old man, leaning on a stick, appeared on the
scaffold. His head was struck off at one blow. His last words: "Men, do
not believe that I am a traitor to the country. I have always acted uprightly
as a good patriot, and as such I shall die", -express the verdict of
posterity upon his character and conduct.
The papers of Oldenbarneveldt all fell into
the hands of his deadly foes, and were by them closely scrutinized with a view to discovering some proof of his guilt. Not a single vestige of
evidence has ever been produced to show that the Advocate at any time was in
collusion with his country's enemies or betrayed its interests. On the
contrary, later researches and investigations have proved conclusively that Oldenbarneveldt in his forty-three years of service played
a part in the long struggle of the war of independence second only to that
played by William the Silent, and that he was one of the ablest and most
influential statesmen of his time. He had his faults. His enemies were not
without grounds in ascribing to him haughtiness, avarice, intolerance of other
people's opinions, greed of power. The force of circumstances drove him on to
take up a position and to commit acts which, though defensible from the
strictly legal point of view, undoubtedly tended to weaken the bond of national
unity, and to endanger the permanence of the Union. But he met his fate, not
because he so strenuously upheld the rights of provincial sovereignty, but
because he was in advance of his times in his opposition to the efforts of the Contra-Remonstrant
preachers to establish a religious tyranny in the State. His execution was in
fact a judicial murder brought about by the machinations of his personal
enemies, and will remain an indelible stain upon the memory of Maurice, and
upon the annals of the country which thus requited the services of the man to
whom in so large a measure she owed her very existence.
The sentence upon de Groot and Hoogerbeets was delayed
for a few days, in the hope that they might be induced to plead guilty and sue
for pardon. But though de Groot had in the earlier
stages of his imprisonment shown signs of weakness, both now stood firm, and on
May 18 were condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Some two years later (March
21, 1621) de Groot by means of an audacious stratagem
devised by his wife, succeeded in making his escape from the castle of Loevestein, and betook himself to France.
1619-22] Maurice supreme
The death of Oldenbarneveldt and the complete
overthrow of his party left the Prince of Orange (he had succeeded to that
title on the death of his brother Philip William in February, 1618) sovereign
of the United Netherlands in all but name. He might have had the title as well
as the power; but he was unmarried, and was indifferent about the matter. He
had never cared for the details of politics, and he now left the management of
affairs in the hands of those who had taken the leading part in the opposition
to the Advocate, foremost among whom were Francis van Aerssens and Reinier Pauw. These men
were determined to reap to the full the fruits of victory. All over the country
the Remonstrants were driven from their pulpits, and
prominent adherents of Oldenbarneveldt deprived of
their offices; the post of Advocate was abolished and never revived, his place
being filled by a functionary styled Raadpensionaris,
whose term of office was to be for five years instead of for life, and whose
powers were much restricted.
The year 1620 was marked by the death of two prominent members of the
House of Nassau. The widow of William the Silent, who had been deeply afflicted
by the tragic end of her old and faithful friend, died at Fontainebleau in
March. William Lewis expired suddenly in October, to the deep grief of Maurice,
who succeeded him in his dignities as Stadholder in
Groningen and Drenthe; in Friesland his place was
taken by his younger brother, Count Ernest Casimir of
Nassau.
In August, 1621, the Twelve Years' Truce came to an end, and after
certain overtures for peace had been made by the Archdukes, which contained
quite unacceptable conditions, war once more broke out, and Maurice took the
field against his old adversary Spinola. But owing to
the deaths in this year of Philip III, King of Spain, and of Archduke Albert,
operations dragged for some time sluggishly along. In 1622 Maurice gained the
only success of his last years, by relieving Bergen-op-Zoom, which Spinola was besieging. He sorely missed at the head of affairs
the vigorous hand and wise brain of Oldenbarneveldt, and himself confessed that
nothing went right after the Advocate's death. In this year a conspiracy was
discovered against the life of Maurice, in which two of Oldenbarneveldf's sons were implicated. The younger, William, Lord of Stoutenburg,
resented deeply being deprived of his post as Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom and having
his property confiscated; and he laid a plot for the assassination of the Stadholder, to which very unwillingly his elder brother, Régnier, Lord of Groeneveld, was
persuaded to become a party. The plot was betrayed, and many arrests were made. Stoutenburg himself contrived to escape, but Groeneveld and a number of others were taken and executed.
The health of the Prince of Orange was at this time seriously impaired; and he
neither showed the same endurance as before in bearing the fatigues of campaigning,
nor the same vigor and skill in his conduct of the
war. Misfortune dogged his steps; and in 1624 the town of Breda, an ancestral
possession of his family, was taken by Spinola under
his eyes. Deeply mortified, Maurice now fell seriously ill ; and it was evident
that his days were numbered. His last cares were to secure that his titles,
dignities, and estates should pass to his younger brother Frederick Henry, to
whom at his request the States General in the spring of 1625 had confided the
command of the forces. The two brothers, despite a temporary estrangement, due
to the leaning of the younger to the Remonstrant doctrines and the party of Oldenbarneveldt, had always been deeply attached to each
other. Neither of them had shown any inclination for wedlock; but now Maurice
on his bed of sickness used all his influence to bring about the marriage of
Frederick Henry with the Countess Amalia of Solms. He was anxious to secure the prospect of the family
succession, and is reported to have threatened even to disinherit his brother
unless he complied with his wishes. The preliminaries were quickly arranged ;
and the wedding took place at the Hague on April 4,1625. On the 23rd of April
Maurice died, in the 58th year of his age, prematurely worn out by the hardships
and privations of a life spent from his youth up in the camp and at the head of
armies. He was perhaps the most accomplished soldier of his time, but as a
politician weak, hesitating, and easily led, and he passed away under a cloud,
for the splendour of his great achievements was
overshadowed by the dark memory of the catastrophe of 1619.
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