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CHAPTER IV RICHELIEU
ON the death of Henry IV
his far-reaching designs were laid aside, and the energy of the Government of
France was expended for some years in shifts, expedients, and temporary
measures of self-preservation. The proposed invasion of Navarre was ignored by
the tacit consent of both the States concerned. The attack upon Milan was
abandoned, and the ambitions of the Duke of Savoy were frustrated. The French
Government contented itself with affording him so much support as preserved him
from the vengeance of Spain. The War of the Jülich Succession, which has been
narrated in a previous volume, was dexterously confined to the narrowest
limits. The great army which Henry IV had assembled for purposes of which he
alone had been fully cognizant was in part disbanded; and a small force of 8000
foot and 1200 horse joined the Dutch and German contingents in the siege of Jülich.
When the town had surrendered (September 1, 1610) this force was withdrawn; and
the disputed territories were left to Brandenburg and Neuburg,
"the Princes in possession." In stipulating for the maintenance of
the Catholic religion in the pacified duchies the French Government followed
perhaps the course which the late King would have approved, and certainly that
which was most likely to preserve the peace.
Meanwhile measures had
been taken to carry on the affairs of France. Immediately on the death of the
King, his Ministers, too cautious to take a definite decision on their own
responsibility, appealed to the Parlement of Paris; and that body, nothing loth to exercise a political function, at once declared the
Queen-Mother, Mary de Medici, to be the lawful Regent. This decree was
confirmed on the following day in a lit de justice, at which the little King, Louis
XIII, appeared (May 15, 1610). The new Regent retained her husband's Ministers
in their appointments. The routine business of State was transacted by Sillery (the Chancellor), Villeroy,
and Jeannin. Sully, on his master's death, bethought
him of the many enemies whom he had made, and retired for safety to the
Bastille. Reassured as to his personal security, he afterwards joined the Government
and retained his posts; his unpopularity, however, told against him; his
overweening temper alienated his colleagues; and early in 1611 he was
forced to resign his financial control, though retaining his offices of Grand
Master of the Artillery and of Commissioner for Ways and Communications, with
his government of Poitou. The finances were then put in commission under a
board of which Jeannin was the head.
The regengy in France But the old Ministry,
competent and even excellent under the direction of a strong King, was
incapable of governing, or of inspiring a weak ruler with method, resolution,
and wisdom. The Princes of the Blood and other magnates caballed against the
Regent, against each other, and against the Ministry. The Ministers in their
turn could devise only transitory palliatives. Discontented interests were
appeased by gifts of money, of places, and of pensions. Such appetites grow by
what they devour, and the hoards of Henry IV began to melt away. A chronic
deficit appeared in place of an annual surplus. The Ministers endeavored to
please everyone, and no one was satisfied.
In these conditions a
vigorous foreign policy was out of the question. Opposition to the Habsburg
Powers, Spain and Austria, could only lead to undesirable complications. The
Queen's Ministers aimed at an understanding with Spain. Early in 1612 plans for
a double marriage between the royal Houses of France and Spain began to be
seriously discussed. In August of that year it was settled that Louis XIII
should marry Anne, the elder Spanish Princess. This indication that old
hostilities were abandoned smoothed for the time the path of the French
Ministry. The Governments, acting together, maintained a precarious peace in
the north of Italy in spite of the restless ruler of Savoy. But the Protestant
and independent allies of Henry IV, the United Provinces, the German Princes,
Venice, and the minor Italian Powers were alarmed and alienated; the Huguenots
feared and resented the reactionary influence of Spain; and their Assemblies at
Saumur (1611), and La Rochelle (1612-3) pressed for an extension of safeguards
and privileges. The weakness of the Government invited contempt; its policy of
doles excited cupidity; real grievances were not wanting; and early in 1614
some of the most important Princes, the Prince of Condé, the Duke of Never, the Duke of Mayenne (son
of the famous leader of the League), the Duke of Longueville,
the Duke of Vendôme, and the Duke of Bouillon,
withdrew from the Court, and issued a manifesto against the Government,
charging it with incompetence, maladministration, and unconstitutional conduct,
calling in question the policy of the Spanish marriages, and demanding a
meeting of the three Estates.
The league of Princes
was a formidable combination. The Prince of Condé, though dissolute,
inexperienced, and worthless, was yet the first Prince of the Blood and
Governor of Guienne. The Duke of Nevers was Governor of Champagne. The Duke of Longueville,
descendant of the royal bastard Dunois, was Governor of Picardy. Vendôme, the illegitimate son of Henry IV, was Governor of Britanny.
The Duke of Bouillon was
the most experienced soldier of the kingdom; he was still a power among the
Huguenots; and his sovereign principality of Sedan was conveniently in touch
with his German friends. The Government determined to treat. Terms were
arranged at Sainte Menehould (May 15, 1614). Money compensations were freely distributed, and a meeting of
the Estates was to be summoned, which assembled at Paris in October. In the
interval an armed expedition to Britanny against the
Duke of Vendôme had shown that the Government still
held the master cards if they dared to use them. In September the King reached
the age of thirteen and his legal majority: but the Queen continued to exercise
the royal power.
1614-15 The Assembly of Estates,
of which such high expectations had been professed, led to little or no result.
The Third Estate, still mindful of the murder of Henry IV, and of the doctrines
set forth by Mariana and Bellarmin in books condemned
by the Parlement, put in the forefront of their
cahier a declaration of fundamental law: "The King holding his crown of
God alone, there is no power on earth, spiritual or temporal, which has any
right over his kingdom to deprive thereof the consecrated persons of the Kings,
or to absolve their subjects from the fealty or obedience which they owe, on
any ground or pretext whatsoever." The clergy resented this encroachment
upon their sphere, and some perhaps the direct attack on papal authority; a
violent quarrel ensued, in which the Parlement also took part; and the Government was compelled
to close the discussion without deciding the question. The nobles and the
clergy demanded the abolition of the Paulette,
thereby striking at the hereditary rights of the official members of the Third
Estate, who constituted the great majority of its representatives. In
retaliation, the Third Estate demanded the suppression of pensions and the
correction of abuses in the Church. The clergy demanded the publication of the
Decrees of the Council of Trent, which the Third Estate opposed. Confronted
with the urgent need of financial reform--for it appeared that the normal
expenditure was thirty-five millions against thirty-two millions of receipts,
and that the pension fund had increased from three millions to five and a half
since the death of Henry, and the general expenses by four millions--the
Estates proposed to suppress the Paulette, which involved a loss of a million
and a half per annum, to reduce the Taille, and abolish
the sale of offices; but no means were suggested to meet the existing or the
resulting deficit, except the institution of a Chamber of Justice to deal with
the malversations of financiers. The Spanish
marriages were generally approved. After waiting until March, 1615, for an
answer to their representations, the Estates were dismissed with a promise of
consideration, and a pledge that pensions should be diminished, a Chamber of
Justice set up, and the venality of offices abolished. But none of these
promises was put into effect. The Paulette was suspended for a time, but was
soon restored. The last assembly of the Estates
summoned before 1789 had been intended by some to embarrass the Government, by
others, perhaps, to relieve the real disorders of France. The embarrassment was
less than had been hoped; relief there was none.
Disappointed in the
results of the meeting of the Estates, the Opposition continued their
intrigues. Immediately after the dispersal of the delegates the Parlement of
Paris issued a decree, inviting Princes, Dukes, peers, and officers of the
Crown to attend a meeting of the Parlement and discuss measures to be taken for the service
of the King, the relief of his subjects, and the good of the State. This bold
intrusion into the sphere of government was promptly resented by the Ministers;
and a prolonged dispute followed in which the Parlement was not altogether
worsted. In the course of the discussion (May 22), the Parlement called for the
exclusion of foreigners from the government of provinces, and from military
offices. This demand gave the note of the ensuing struggle. The attack was now
unmasked. It became an open assault on the position of the Queen-Mother's
principal confidants, Concino Concini,
and his wife, Leonora Galigai, through whom his power
and influence had been obtained. Leonora had come to France in the suite of
Mary de' Medici at the time of her marriage. As her lady-in-waiting she had won
and successfully retained an unrivalled power over her mistress. The Italian
adventurer whom she married in 1602 had shared her ascendancy and had used his
power during the first years of the reign chiefly for the advancement of his
private fortune and that of his friends. It was reckoned later that the pair
had accumulated in seven years nine millions of livres.
One of the first acts of the Regent was to purchase for her favorite the
marquisate of Ancre, the governments of Peronne, Roye, and Montdidier, and the office of First Gentleman of the
Chamber. Later, he had received the government of Amiens, and the post of
Marshal (1613). This accumulation of offices and dignities and patronage had
aroused jealousy; and the Marshal was gradually forced, in order to protect his
private interests, to take a part in politics. His position in Picardy had
brought him into collision with the Duke of Longueville,
whom he wished entirely to supplant in that province, with an eye, perhaps, to
communications with the Spanish Netherlands, and he was personally odious to
most of the discontented Princes.
The Concini and their enemies Thus, when the Princes
in August once more openly raised the standard of rebellion, they designated Concini openly as the principal object of their enmity. The
Court, in spite of the gathering storm, had decided to start for the south to solemnize
the Spanish marriages and to exchange the Princesses. While the royal cortege
and its protecting army slowly moved on its way, Condé and Bouillon marched
through France, watched but hardly impeded by the Marshal de Boisdauphin, to Poitou. Meanwhile a Protestant assembly, authorised for Grenoble,
Concini's escape had been a
narrow one, and he felt that vigorous measures were needed. He determined to
set up a strong Ministry on which he could depend. Not only Sillery,
but Jeannin and Villeroy were to be superseded. The head of the new Government was Barbin,
a man of obscure origin, closely attached to the Concini,
capable and courageous. Condé was persuaded to return to Paris, that either his
moderation might assist the Government or his arrogance give them a pretext.
The pretext was not lacking; the Prince's insolence suggested that he was
aiming at the throne; he ostentatiously withdrew his protection from Concini, who retired to Normandy. But the counter-stroke
followed quickly; on September 1 the Prince was arrested at the Louvre, and
shortly afterwards he was imprisoned in the Bastille. The new Ministry had
shown its courage; its capacity was still to be proved.
Concini returned to Paris, where the mob had sacked his house. The arrest of Condé was followed by a general exodus of Princes. This time the Duke of Nevers in Champagne, abandoning his favourite project of a crusade against the Turks, with Bouillon and Longueville formed the centre of resistance. Barbin was the man to meet such emergencies, but he needed stronger backing. The Ministry was recast; and on November 30, 1616, Richelieu became Minister of State, charged with the departments of Foreign Affairs and War.
Richelieu Foreign Minister. 1602-1616 Jean Armand Duplessis de Richelieu was now in his thirty-second year.
On his father's side he was noble, of a Poitevin family; his mother was the daughter of an advocate in the Parlement of Paris. His father
had done good service under Henry III, and became Grand Provost of the royal
household, and Knight of the Holy Ghost. After his death in 1590, Armand, his
youngest son, was at first educated as a layman; but in 1602 he was called upon
to leave the "Academy," where he was receiving the usual soldierly
training of his class, and fit himself for the family bishopric of Luçon. In 1606 he was formally nominated to this bishopric;
in 1607 he went to Rome and was dispensed by the Pope from the canonical rule
of age; and in 1608 he took up his duties in the see.
Here, with a vigilant eye fixed on the Court and on politics, he performed his
pastoral duties, studied, wrote, and reflected, and formed some of his few
friendships. Here he met the Capuchin, François du Tremblay, better known as Père Joseph, with whom he was to be so closely associated
in later years, Duvergier de Hauranne,
later Abbé of Saint Cyran,
whom he afterwards found it necessary to imprison, and the family of Bouthillier, his faithful servants. His friends procured
his election in 1614 as delegate for the clergy of Poitou; and he was already
so far distinguished as to be chosen to make the final address on behalf of the
clergy when their cahier was presented. His first Court office was that of
Grand Almoner to the young Queen Anne, which he took up on her entry into Paris
in 1616. He was employed in the summer of 1616 to induce the Prince of Condé to
return to Paris. In six months he must have won the confidence of the
Queen-Mother and of Concini, as whose creature he
makes his entry on the great stage. But in the acts of his five months'
Ministry his own individuality is strongly marked.
Abroad the situation was
more menacing than it had been since the death of Henry IV. Venice was at war
with Archduke Ferdinand of Styria. Milan was threatening Savoy. Before the end
of December Lesdiguières, Governor of Dauphiné, acting on his own initiative, crossed the Alps
with an army to aid Savoy against the Spaniards. A breach with Spain seemed
imminent; and, on the other hand, the old allies of France had been alienated
by the Spanish marriages. Into these complications Richelieu had not time to
introduce order; but his first acts are significant. He sent envoys to Germany,
Holland, England, and Switzerland, to explain away the Spanish marriages. He
asserted with more vigor than judgment French interests in the Valtelline. He
tolerated the action of Lesdiguières. Subservience to
Spain was at an end.
At home, equal energy
and determination were shown. Three armies were quickly mustered and directed
against the confederates in the east. A stinging manifesto set their action
before the public in its true light. It was pointed out that in six years Condé
had received three millions and a half, Nevers a million and a half, Longueville one million two hundred thousand, Mayenne two
millions, Bouillon one million, Vendôme six hundred
thousand livres from the royal treasury. The policy
of the Regency was vindicated; and Richelieu, as in duty bound, formulated a defence of Concini, a more
difficult task. The presence of the Duke of Rohan with the royal troops showed that nothing was at present to be feared from the
Huguenots. The real weakness of the confederates was soon seen. Pushed back and
with their principal strongholds beleaguered, they would soon have been
compelled to surrender at discretion, when the Barbin Ministry fell with a crash. The King, under the influence of his favourite, Luynes, asserted his
royal will. Concini was murdered, Barbin imprisoned, and the Queen-Mother ordered to retire to Blois (April, 1617).
Richelieu had been sufficiently adroit to win some favor or indulgence from Luynes; but there was no place for him in the new régime.
He decided to follow the fortunes of the Queen-Mother, and became for a time
the accredited head of her Council at Blois.
The rise of Luynes. 1617
The sudden stroke which
overthrew the favorite, drove the Queen-Mother from power, and brought the King
to the exercise of the royal authority, was the work of a poor gentleman,
Charles d'Albert, afterwards Duke of Luynes. Born in 1578, he was introduced to the service of
the King by Concini, who thought that his humble
position would make him powerless for harm, while the difference of age
rendered any dangerous intimacy between him and the young King improbable. But
his skill in all the arts of falconry won him the King's affection, which was
strengthened by his engaging manners, his handsome person, and his supple tact.
He soon obtained that absolute ascendancy over the young King which a man can
sometimes obtain over a boy. Louis was now old enough to resent the humiliating
control of his mother, and the still more humiliating rule of Concini. He made Luynes the
confidant of his grievances, and learnt from him the way to power and revenge;
the plot was secretly contrived between them and successfully carried into
effect. The young King showed considerable resolution and reticence in this,
the first responsible act of his public life. Vengeance did not cease when Concini was dead; from his wife also the utmost penalty was
pitilessly exacted.
On receipt of the news
of Concini's death the rebellious Princes laid down
their arms and were admitted to pardon, or, rather, their meritorious conduct
was duly recognized. But it was soon seen that, though the principal personages
were changed, little else was altered. The old Ministers were recalled to the
Council. The policy of shifts and expedients was revived. The quarrels of Savoy
and Milan were once more allayed by an unstable peace (Treaty of Pavia, October
9, 1617). An assembly of Notables was called to give some official recognition
to the results of the revolution and to the new order. The old reforms
were recommended, and the old promises were renewed; but nothing was done.
Condé was kept in prison. However, the time was at hand when expedients would
no longer meet the situation. In 1619 the Bohemian revolt gave France the
opportunity which Henry IV or Richelieu would have seized, if not to strike a
telling blow against Austria, at least to interpose an effective mediation. But
the influence of France was so used that, by the Treaty of Ulm (July, 1620)
between the League and the Union, Austria and Spain were left free to throw
their whole force and that of their Catholic allies on Bohemia and the
Palatinate. The initial advantage thus surrendered was not recovered by France
until after many years of war and negotiation.
At home the family of Luynes alone benefited. The favorite became a Duke and Peer; he succeeded to the dignities and to the spoils of Concini, even to his plans of aggrandizement in Picardy; in 1621 he became Constable of France. He married a beautiful lady of the House of Rohan, afterwards famed as the Duchess of Chevreuse. His brothers shared his prosperity and rose in their turn to ducal rank. The old jealousies and discontents were thus awakened, and rebellion was always in the air. Private animosities and disappointed interests were reinforced by
religious passions. For one of the first acts of the new rule was to issue an
edict restoring to the Church the ecclesiastical possessions in Béarn which had
been for half a century in the hands of the Protestants. This was a measure
that could only be executed by force, and the King had to acquiesce for a time
in the open disobedience of the provincial authorities.
All discontents found a
focus in the little Court of Blois. The contemptible intrigues of a discredited
woman and her worthless adherents would deserve little notice had they not
served as Richelieu's opportunity. The only hold which the Bishop of Luçon still retained on power was through the influence he
had established over the mind of Mary de Medici. He hoped by dexterously using
his ascendancy to win the confidence of the King and of Luynes.
But he soon saw that this double game was dangerous. He left the Court at Blois
to its own devices and retired to his bishopric. He still continued to
correspond with the Queen-Mother, but with caution and reserve. When a
correspondence became known which she had imprudently carried on with Barbin in prison, Richelieu, though not directly implicated,
fell under suspicion; and in April, 1618, he was ordered into exile at Avignon.
Hence he was suddenly recalled in March, 1619, to deal with a new situation.
1619-20 Under the influence of
the adventurers who swayed her mind in Richelieu's absence, the Queen-Mother
had taken a step which inconvenienced the Government. She had appealed to Épernon to release her from the species of captivity which
she endured at Blois. While the old courtier was hastening secretly and by
forced marches from his stronghold of Metz to meet the
Queen-Mother in his government of Angoumois, the plans were laid: and on
February 22 Mary descended by night from a window of her castle, and on the
same day was with the Duke at Loche. It would have
been easy to crush the revolt by arms, but the King and the favorite preferred
a less invidious course. Richelieu was summoned to bring the Queen to reason.
His share in the long negotiations that followed at Angoulême proved how
indispensable he was. Everything was arranged to the satisfaction of the
Government. The Queen gave up her nominal government of Normandy, received
Angers for her residence, with Ponts de Cé and Chinon; and Richelieu was
established as her principal adviser. The councilors who had prompted the
escapade were removed. In September the King and his mother met, and a formal
reconciliation followed. Luynes and Richelieu
continued on terms of veiled hostility--Luynes on the
defensive, Richelieu on the watch for an opportunity. Condé was released to
serve as a makeweight against the Queen-Mother. The shadowy hopes of a
Cardinal's hat which had been held out to Richelieu remained, and seemed likely
to remain, unfulfilled. But no opposition was offered to his predominance at
Angers, where all the chief posts were filled by his relatives and friends.
Thus in May, 1620, when
the periodical rising of Princes recurred, Richelieu found himself dragged into
rebellion. The malcontents appeared at the Queen's Court. They controlled
Normandy through Longueville, and Britanny through Vendôme, while Angers commanded the Loire.
South of the Loire, Rohan in Poitou and Epernon in Angoulême joined hands with Mayenne in Guienne. There were hopes of Montmorency's accession carrying Languedoc; and the Protestants were expected to be
sympathetic. It was a promising rebellion-on paper; and Richelieu did not or
could not prevent it. But the King had the troops and the power, and he was not
afraid to use them. He marched straight on Angers; the forces of the
confederates were crushed and scattered in a single battle near Ponts de Cé (August 7), and the
whole house of cards fell to pieces. But Richelieu knew how insecure the
position of the favorite was, and snatched victory from defeat. In the
conference at which he represented his mistress he procured for her and for all
concerned a complete amnesty with restitution of captured places, merely
promising on her part friendly relations for the future with Luynes. Richelieu had not been far from the scaffold; he
emerged from his disasters with increased prestige, and the definite promise of
nomination as Cardinal, which Luynes so long as he
lived was careful to render nugatory. But the marriage between the niece of
Richelieu and the nephew of the favorite indicated at least a desire for better
relations between the pair.
1620-1. War against the Hugonotes The settlement of the
dispute between the King and his mother set Louis free to intervene in Béarn. His
ardor for military enterprise had been stimulated by
the rapid success of his recent expedition. He now marched into Béarn, where he
met with no armed opposition. The fortress of Navarreins was surrendered without a blow. The edicts for the restitution of Church
property were enforced. Béarn was united with Navarre, and both with the
territories of the King of France. The Protestants were angry and alarmed, but
no open resistance was attempted for the moment. However, in December, 1620, an
unauthorized assembly of the Protestants met at La Rochelle to consider their
grievances and propose measures for their redress. The Assembly determined to
sit in permanence until their demands had been met. Their demands were
presented, turning chiefly on the fulfillment of stipulations of the Edict of
Nantes, but also requiring the restoration of former conditions in Béarn; they
were, however, rejected by the King on the ground that the Assembly had no
permission to meet. The delegates then proceeded to divide France into eight
military districts, to each of which a leader was to be assigned. Their
weakness then became apparent. Lesdiguières supported
the Court. Bouillon would take no active part. The other leaders suggested were
without credit or talent. Among all those named the Duke of Rohan alone had capacity, resolution, and zeal.
The Court was eager for
war. In April the King took the field. Moving westwards he seized the Huguenot
fortresses north and south of the Loire. St Jean d'Angely, Rohan's own command, resisted under the Duke of
Soubise, his brother, for three weeks, and then surrendered. Meanwhile other
armies under Condé in the centre, Mayenne in Guienne, and Epernon in Béarn,
were operating; and everywhere the Huguenot strongholds were rapidly reduced.
The first serious check which the royal arms received was at Montauban, where a regular siege was begun in August, 1621. Rohan had made all the preparations necessary to
enable the town to withstand a siege, while he himself collected men and
supplies for its relief in Languedoc and the Cevennes. His efforts were
successful, and in November the siege was raised. This was a great blow to the
credit of the Constable, who endeavored to repair it by attacking the little
place of Monheurt. The place was taken and burned;
but two days later (December 14) Luynes died from a
fever which he had contracted during the siege. An obstacle had been removed
out of Richelieu's way; but he was still far from the attainment of that high
power on which his ambitions were immovably fixed.
During the period which
followed the death of Luynes, the King relied
principally on the old Minister Sillery and his son Puisieux, who had won the support of Condé. But Richelieu
took a definite step forwards when the Queen-Mother was admitted to the
Council, where, acting under his advice, she observed an attitude of dignified
reserve, taking advantage, however, of suitable opportunities to put forward
propositions of policy, carefully framed and supported by argument, in
which the hand of Richelieu might be easily discerned. Yet another stage was
marked in Richelieu's progress when the long-standing promise was fulfilled,
and he became a Cardinal (September, 1622).
Meanwhile the war with
the Protestants was renewed. Soubise was decisively beaten at the Isle of Riez in Poitou (April, 1622); the danger threatened by the
advance of an army under Mansfeld into French
territory was successfully avoided; and after a number of minor successes the
siege of Montpellier was begun. Here royalist prosperity ceased; but both
parties were ready for peace, and on October 9 a formal treaty between the King
and the Protestants was concluded. Montpellier surrendered and its
fortifications were demolished. Protestant assemblies were forbidden for the
future. The exercise of both religions where it had been previously permitted
was restored. Of the two hundred strongholds conceded to the Huguenots by the
Edict of Nantes only two, Montauban and La Rochelle,
were allowed to remain in their hands. The old Huguenot Lesdiguières saw that the game was up; and in July he had purchased the Constable's sword
by reconciliation with the Church.
Richelieu Chief Minister.1622-4 An inglorious war was
now followed by a period of still more inglorious inaction. Sillery and Puisieux were the most incompetent of the old
cabal. Burning questions were pending abroad, and the Ministers were men of
protocols and not of action. At length the King grew weary of them, and tried a
change. In January, 1624, La Vieuville, who had been
introduced to the finance department by Sillery's influence, succeeded in ousting and replacing his patrons, and became Chief
Minister. But his period of supreme power did not last long; he soon found
himself forced to make advances to Richelieu, who was able to dictate his own
terms. In April, 1624, the Cardinal entered the Council, and as Cardinal
immediately claimed precedence over the other Ministers. In August La Vieuville was dismissed and imprisoned, and Richelieu
became Chief Minister.
Many years later Richelieu, reviewing the course of his policy, declared that, when entering on his office, he promised his master to employ all his industry and all the authority bestowed upon him in destroying the Huguenot party, abasing the pride of the magnates, and raising the King's name to its proper place among the foreign Powers--a triple task, each part of which would tax the wasted resources of the kingdom. Nor could the several elements be isolated and separately handled. Discontented magnates would not sit idly by while the Government was at grips with the Huguenots. Those whom religion or ambition had made rebels could rely on help from the foreign enemies of France. External dangers pressed; and measures to meet them could not be postponed until France had restored order and authority at home. Fourteen years had passed since the death of Henry IV; and the policy of shifts and expedients had allowed trivial questions to become serious, and serious questions to become dangerous. The House of Habsburg was united in its policy; its enemies were isolated, enfeebled, discouraged. Spanish troops held the line of the Rhine from Strasburg to Rees. The Rhenish Palatinate was in the hands of their Bavarian allies. The Dutch truce had expired in 1621, and the United Provinces were hard pressed from the Spanish Netherlands. The old allies of Henry IV looked with suspicion upon France, regarding her as the confederate of Spain. In Germany there was no military force to face the Habsburg coalition, except the levies of Mansfeld and his associates.
The efforts of the
opportunist Ministers of Louis had been devoted to curbing the ambitions of the
Duke of Savoy, and had forced him to conclude the Peace of Asti in 1615 and
that of Pavia in 1617. The marriage of Louis XIII's sister Christina to the
Prince of Piedmont in 1619 had shown a desire to preserve this valuable
friendship for France; but, in default of more material benefits, Charles
Emmanuel was discontented with his French allies, and ready, if occasion
offered, to make common cause with Spain. Most urgent of all was the question
of the Grisons and the Valtelline, where all the currents of European policy
met.
The valley of the
Valtelline, as shown in a previous chapter, was under the control of the three
Grison Leagues, whose alliance with France exposed them to the constant and
watchful hostility of Spain. In 1620 a revolt of the Catholic inhabitants of
the Valtelline gave Spain her opportunity; the valley was seized, the Grisons
were invaded and the convention of Lindau was signed
(1620-2). France again met force by negotiation, with the result that when
Richelieu came to power the Valtelline fortresses had been entrusted to the
custody of the Pope pending a settlement. But no peaceful settlement was likely
to result which did not leave to Spain the right of
passage through the Valtelline.
1626.The Treaty of Monzon Richelieu at once began
to strengthen the French position. Even before the fall of La Vieuville, aid in money and men had been promised to the
Dutch. Mansfeld was subsidized; and an annual grant
was promised to Christian IV of Denmark, on his taking up arms in Germany. All
this was part of a deliberate policy of thwarting the Habsburgs without
committing France to open intervention. It was part of the same scheme to
detach Maximilian of Bavaria from the Habsburg coalition, and to win him for
the French cause. Negotiations were at once set on foot to procure this result,
which in spite of repeated failures Richelieu never seems to have despaired of
attaining. A marriage was arranged between Henrietta Maria of France and the
Prince of Wales, who, when the marriage was solemnized (May, 1625), had become
King Charles I of England by the death of his father. In the Valtelline
diplomatic methods were not by themselves sufficient. The Marquis de Coeuvres was accordingly sent to collect Swiss troops, and
with their aid in the last months of 1624 he seized the fortresses of the
Valtelline and drove out the papal garrisons. Richelieu could now
negotiate from the vantage-ground of possession. Savoy, Venice, and England
were leagued with France. Desultory operations took, place in Savoy and in the
direction of Genoa. But the real campaign was waged on paper; and in May, 1626,
under the influence of Pope Urban VIII, a treaty, the Treaty of Monzon, was concluded between France and Spain. The forts
constructed by the Spaniards in the Valtelline were to be handed over to the
Pope for destruction. The old treaties were revived whereby France recovered
her sole right of passage through the valley. The
treaty was favorable to French pretensions, but her allies were not even
consulted before its signature; and Richelieu's first important act of policy
left Venice, the Grisons, and especially Savoy, profoundly mistrustful and
justly discontented.
Whatever other
considerations may have hastened Richelieu's action in this matter, he had in
fact obeyed the law of necessity. Troubles crowded upon him at home. The
finances were in complete disorder. Temporary relief had been obtained by means
of an enquiry into the conduct of the financiers, who were forced for fear of
worse things to disgorge ten millions. But in June, 1626, when the Marquis d'Effiat took over the Surintendance,
the revenue of the current year had already been spent, the revenue of the
succeeding year had been largely anticipated, and a floating debt of
twenty-seven millions demanded liquidation. In January, 1625, the Huguenots
renewed the civil war by seizing the port of Blavet in Britanny with the royal ships that lay there.
Soubise, with the fleet thus acquired and the navy of La Rochelle, ranged the
western coast and intercepted commerce. Rohan at Castres was raising troops. Montauban was in revolt. La Rochelle loudly demanded the destruction of Fort Louis, a
fortress intended to hold its harbour in check, whose
demolition, as the citizens alleged, had been informally promised at the time
of the Peace of Montpellier. Against the navy of Soubise Richelieu collected
English and Dutch vessels, which he manned with French seamen. By their help
Montmorency was enabled to scatter the forces of Soubise (September, 1625), and
to seize the islands of Ré and Oleron,
which commanded the harbour of La Rochelle. Soubise
was forced to seek a refuge in England. The districts about Montauban and other rebellious places were ruthlessly devastated. But English and Dutch
opinion resented the use against Protestants of the vessels lent to France;
the ships were recalled; and Richelieu was fain to use the good offices of the
English ambassadors to conclude a treaty with the Huguenots (February, 1626).
Little was conceded, but the English were thereby in some sort constituted
protectors of the Protestants in France.
1626-7. The Assembly of Notables
This danger past, Richelieu thought it opportune to vindicate his own authority by a vigorous demonstration. The conspiracy which he chose to discover centred about the Duke of Anjou, the King's brother. The Government intended to marry this Prince to Mademoiselle de Montpensier; the Prince himself was disinclined to the match; and he found friends and supporters among the discontented magnates. This attempt at opposition to the Cardinal's will was represented as a dangerous, even as a murderous, enterprise. The Prince's governor, the Marshal d'Ornano, was thrown into prison, where he died. The Duke of Vendôme and his brother, natural sons of Henry IV, were seized and imprisoned. A young noble, Chalais, who under the influence of Madame de Chevreuse had taken part in the cabal, was brought to trial and executed. Madame de Chevreuse was driven into exile in Lorraine. The Duke of Anjou was forced into the marriage originally proposed, and received the title and appanage of Orleans. It was proved that opposition was a crime, and intrigue a game dangerous even for the greatest. Gaston of Orleans made his peace in characteristic fashion by betraying his friends, but the Count of Soissons had to retire to Turin for safety. The Assembly of Notables, summoned in
December, 1626, was inspired to propose new measures against rebellion. No
communication was to be allowed between French subjects and foreign ambassadors;
even the Nuncio was not excepted from this ruling. The mere fact of taking up
arms was to be sufficient cause for forfeiture of all offices. Seditious libel,
a form of literature which the Cardinal himself had patronised when in opposition, was now to be severely punished. No one was to be permitted
to collect arms or munitions or to levy funds from the King's subjects without
authority. "These proposals were gladly received and speedily registered
as edicts. The Cardinal's position was further strengthened by the suppression
of the office of Admiral of France, compensation being paid to the Duke of
Montmorency, and by the creation in Richelieu's favour of a new office of Superintendent of Navigation and Commerce. With this charge
the functions of the Duke of Vendôme as Admiral for Britanny were united. On the death of Lesdiguières in September, 1626, the office of Constable was also suppressed, and thus the
supreme direction of military forces devolved also upon the Minister. Even favorites
were not tolerated; and Barradas, a young gentleman
on whom the King's too conspicuous favor had rested, was driven from the Court.
Richelieu had composed his difficulties with Spain; and in April, 1627, a treaty of alliance was concluded with this Power, in view of the strained relations between England and France. The secret conditions of the English marriage had proved impracticable. Charles and Buckingham were not strong enough to protect the Roman Catholics in England. Trouble arose between the royal pair, which resulted, in August, 1626, in the ignominious expulsion of the Queen's French household. The Parliamentary situation in England made some action on behalf of the French Protestants a desirable political move; and Buckingham's own wounded pride prompted a similar policy. As an envoy to the Court of Paris at the time of Charles' marriage, the favorite had not hesitated to make open love to the Queen of France.
Consequently, his proposals
for a further visit were coldly received, and he was made to understand that
his presence would not be welcome. Thus he was ready enough to court popularity
by a French war. The friction caused by the marriage contract and the
oppression of French Protestants supplied the occasion. The aid of Lorraine and
Savoy and vigorous support from the Huguenots were expected. Accordingly
extensive preparations were made, and in June, 1627, a great armament set forth
from Portsmouth. On July 20 the troops were landed on the island of Ré, off La
Rochelle.
Buckingham The island was protected
by two fortresses, St Martin and La Prée; and the garrison was commanded by Toiras, a brave soldier though ill regarded by the
Cardinal. Before Buckingham moved up his troops to attack, these places were
hastily put in a state of defence, and the English
were forced to proceed to a regular siege of St Martin. Meanwhile the King had
fallen ill; and the Cardinal, distracted by fears for his own safety, had to
direct from his bedside measures of defence and
relief. An army was sent to hold in check La Rochelle, which did not at first
declare itself for Buckingham, but afterwards openly adopted the cause of the
invaders. Had the city granted the request of Buckingham and admitted his army
within their walls, the issue might have been different. But the citizens were
fighting for independence, not to change one master for another.
In 1625 the King had
been forced to wage war with borrowed vessels; in 1627 Richelieu had already
created a fleet, whose headquarters were at Brouage.
Moreover, shipping and boats were collected from all parts to aid in the task
of transporting men and provisions. The Cardinal advanced money from his own
treasury to meet the necessary expenses. At length the King was well enough to
travel, and on October 2 he arrived in the camp before La Rochelle. Toiras' provisions were almost exhausted and on October 7
St Martin made proposals for surrender. But the very next day a convoy fought
its way in with provisions for a month. The reinforcements promised from
England did not arrive. On October 30 a first detachment of French troops
landed at La Prée; and on November 6 Buckingham delivered a last assault on St
Martin, which was repulsed. He then gave orders to embark his forces, but
meanwhile the enemy had assembled in the island in considerable strength. The
English were attacked while retreating by a narrow causeway to their ships and
suffered heavily. On November 18 the fleet sailed for England, its original
complement reduced to less than one-half by battle, capture, and disease.
Richelieu was now free
to push his project for annihilating the political privileges of the Huguenots.
Just grounds for action were not wanting. La Rochelle had openly assisted
Buckingham. Rohan had raised troops in Languedoc. Walter
Montague, an English agent, accredited to Savoy and
Lorraine, had visited Rohan and had been seized by
the Cardinal with all his papers on the soil of Lorraine. The objective was
also plainly indicated. La Rochelle had been for several years the centre of
all Huguenot disaffection. Virtually independent, it offered ready access to
the heart of the kingdom for foreign enemies coming by the sea, and was
protected by a powerful and piratical fleet. So long as this city remained unsubdued, the King could not regard himself as master in
his own house. Condé was sent with an army to hold Rohan in check, while the Cardinal and the King undertook the operations against the
Huguenot capital. In November the siege was opened on the landward side; the
royal fleet was brought up under the Duke of Guise to assist in the maritime
blockade; and from either side of the harbour mouth
the laborious construction of a stone dyke was begun, with the intention of
closing the port to all supplies and succour from the
sea. The Spanish navy came up to give some formal satisfaction to treaty
obligations, but Richelieu wisely determined to place no reliance on its
support, and trusted wholly to the fleet which he had created and collected.
All through the winter the blockading lines were closely guarded, and the dykes
were steadily pushed forward. When the King grew tired and returned to Paris
(February, 1628), the Cardinal was obliged to choose between two risks. He
determined to hazard the effect of any hostile influences on his master, and to
push the siege in person at whatever cost. In April the King returned. The
dykes were by this time well advanced; the passage between them was blocked by
sunken ships and guarded by palisades and moored vessels; and the dykes
themselves were protected with guns.
1727-8. Capitulation of La Rochelle In May the
long-hoped-for aid from England arrived, a fleet of thirty vessels under Lord
Denbigh. The rumor of its coming had driven away the Spaniards; but Richelieu
had not depended upon their support. The English fleet was ineffective and
ill-found, the seamen were unwilling; and after a futile demonstration
against the guardships and the forts, Lord Denbigh
sailed off again, leaving the city to its fate. In July another armament was
begun, and in spite of the assassination of Buckingham, September 2 (N.S.), it
set sail on September 17 under the Earl of Lindsey. But no serious attempt was
made to force the passage; and the citizens, wasted by extremest famine and despairing of succor, concluded their capitulation on October 29 in
sight of the English fleet. The city lost all its privileges, its walls were
destroyed, the Catholic religion was restored to its rights; but the persons
and the property of the citizens were spared, and the free exercise of
Protestant worship in the city was permitted. On November 1 the King rode into
the city. On November 11 the English sailed away.
Meanwhile warfare had
been proceeding in Languedoc; but, so long as La Rochelle held out, the King's
troops attempted nothing decisive, and Rohan, whose vigour, devotion, and ability alone maintained the existence
of his party, was not strong enough to take a vigorous offensive. Such forces
as remained to the Protestants were concentrated in the district between
Toulouse and the Rhone. Partly by persuasion, partly by conviction, partly by
compulsion, Montauban, Nîmes, Uzé, Castres, Milhau, Privas, besides a number of lesser towns, still held for
the Huguenots; and the strong defensive position of the Cevennes afforded a
place of muster and equipment, an arsenal, and a final retreat. But Rohan's authority was precarious, and he failed in an
attempt to surprise Montpellier. On the other hand, Condé, who had become a
firm adherent of the Cardinal, had received the promise of Rohan's confiscated estates, and commanded the King's troops in this district, could
not or would not force the Protestants to a serious engagement; and operations
were confined to petty sieges and systematic devastation of Protestant
districts, with occasional reprisals on the part of the Huguenots. When La
Rochelle had surrendered, the suppression of the remnants of Protestant liberty
was no longer the most urgent task that demanded the Cardinal's attention.
1627-9. The Mantuan succession On December 26,1627,
Duke Vincent II of Mantua had died, leaving no nearer male heir than Charles di Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers, a
Frenchman by education and sympathy. Vincent before his death, acting under
French influence, left his duchy by will to Charles, and married the daughter
of his brother Francis, who had died in 1613, to Charles' son, the Duke of Rethel. Charles at once took possession of his duchy. But
Spain was not willing to acquiesce in the establishment of a French prince in
Italy. Other claimants were encouraged to put forward their claims; the Duke
of Savoy was glad to have the chance of reviving his pretensions to Montferrat;
the Emperor refused his investiture and formally sequestered the duchy; and
Savoy and Spain, acting in concert, occupied Montferrat, with the exception of
the important fortress of Casale, to which Gonzalez
de Cordoba, the Governor of Milan, laid siege. So long as La Rochelle held out,
France was unable to act, except by diplomacy; and force was needed. But Casale outlasted the Protestant capital; and, so soon as La
Rochelle had fallen, Louis and Richelieu determined if possible to save Casale. The Duke of Savoy was requested to allow passage
for the French troops; he bargained, but did not conclude; and on March 6,
1629, the French army crossed the frontier in his despite and seized the town
of Susa. The Duke of Savoy then came to terms and made an agreement which
allowed the French to relieve Casale. The Spaniards
retired, and the immediate object of the expedition was achieved. But much
still remained to be settled, and the French retained Susa as a guarantee. A
league was formed between France, Venice, Mantua, and Savoy for the defence of Italy; the hands of France were freed by the
conclusion of peace with England (April 24, 1629); Louis returned to France;
and the Cardinal remained for a while at Susa with a considerable force to
watch over the Duke of Savoy, whose intentions were highly dubious, and to
guard the interests of the Duke of Mantua.
The King was now at
liberty to deal with the Huguenots. In his despair, Rohan had been forced to appeal to the enemies of France; English promises had proved
delusive; and, about the time when England made peace with France, the King of
Spain consented to accept Rohan's offer of service
and promised him an annual subsidy. But the promise came too late. Operations
began by the siege of Privas, at which the Cardinal
joined the King, having left the Marshal de Créquy in
command at Susa; and the conclusion of peace with England was announced (May).
Deprived of this last hope, the Huguenots might yet have sold their liberty
dear. But discord was rife in their party, and resistance was irresolute. Privas surrendered, and was pillaged and burnt contrary to
the capitulation. The fortresses of the Cevennes were soon in the King's hands. Rohan was forced to treat. On June 28 peace was made; the Huguenots submitted; the fortifications of their remaining strongholds
were razed; and the last remnants of independent military power given up. There
could never again be a militant Protestant party in France. Rohan was treated with indulgence; the property of his family was restored; but he
himself was sent into exile at Venice. On August 20 the Cardinal made his
triumphal entry into Montauban, and the wars of
religion in France were formally concluded. Toleration for Protestant worship
was maintained; the chambres mi-parties of the Edict
of Nantes continued to sit; but the conversion of the Huguenots, which had
already begun, proceeded hereafter more rapidly, and was the object of the
efforts of numerous Capuchin missions, in which Father Joseph took great
interest.
At no time in his career
did Richelieu manifest greater qualities of resolution, promptness, and
resource than during the years which immediately preceded the landing of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany
(June, 1630). While La Rochelle still held out, the Cardinal was preparing for
an extension of the field of his activity and meditating plans of attack,
direct and insidious, on the Habsburg power, then at its height. When La
Rochelle had fallen, though armed rebellion was still on foot in Languedoc, Casale was hastily relieved. This accomplished, the
Huguenots were taken in hand without delay. Meanwhile Christian IV of Denmark
had been reduced to negotiating for the peace which he concluded in May, 1629.
It was impossible for Richelieu to prevent this defection; but he felt that
its consequences must be by some means counteracted. Charnacé,
who was sent as an envoy to influence the peace negotiations, was also charged
to visit Bavaria and endeavor to detach Maximilian from the Habsburg coalition,
and finally to mediate if possible a truce between Sweden and Poland. This last
part of his mission was successful (September, 1629); and the way was thus
cleared for a new and more dangerous enemy of the Habsburgs in
Germany. While this move was maturing, and while the final operations against
the Huguenots were proceeding, the temporary settlement of the Mantuan affair had broken down. The Duke of Savoy did not fulfill his engagements, seeing better prospects of gain in
the Habsburg alliance; the Imperial troops, freed by the favorable turn of events in Germany, entered the Valtelline in May, 1629. In October Spinola was in Milan, and shortly afterwards he led the
Spanish troops into Montferrat, while Imperial forces invaded the Mantuan territory. Casale was
besieged by Spinola, Mantua by Wallenstein's
lieutenant Colalto; and the Duke of Savoy occupied
his allotted share of Montferrat. The resistance of Casale and Mantua gave Richelieu a scanty respite, and enabled him to deal with urgent
troubles at home.
1629. Richelieu and Louis XIII No factor in Richelieu's
career is more difficult to estimate than the exact influence of Louis'
character on the Minister's policy. Louis was not a nonentity; he had a large
share of obstinacy, his determination once formed had to be respected, his
moods were variable and dangerous. Possessed of good average ability, some
industry, and a sense of kingly duty, he could be convinced and influenced, but
he could never be neglected. He appears to have long resisted the introduction
of Richelieu into the ministry for fear of his commanding personality. To the
end of his days he chafed under Richelieu's predominance. But he loved military
glory and success; he hated to feel the burden of his functions pressing on his
capacity. So long as Richelieu provided the King with success, so long as he
made the burden seem light, so long as he showed him the way and found for him
the means to meet every difficulty, so long in fact as Richelieu was
indispensable so long he was safe. But, had events ever proved too strong for
the Cardinal, had he ever failed to find the solution of the enigma, the magic
for dispersing danger, the way to a conspicuous and intelligible end, then his
day was over, his life was forfeited. For such a man could not be allowed to
return to private life; he was too dangerous. Meanwhile Louis regarded him as
a schoolboy regards his schoolmaster, with a certain awe, with a certain
dislike-above all, it may be guessed, with a certain humiliation as one who was
greater than the King.
The longer the
Cardinal's ascendancy lasted, the safer he became by proved success, by
indispensable competence, by use and wont. But the King's moods were always to
be feared. The Cardinal had seen him with his favorites, exacting as a woman,
inconstant, petulant, intolerable. He was careful not to become a favorite, but
to preserve a certain distance and austerity, to avoid the friction of intimate
relations. But yet he could never feel secure against a sudden act of temper, a
momentary betrayal. His rivals helped him here. Their incompetence was
conspicuous, their exactions harassing, their claims humiliating. Above all
others, the Queen-Mother had become his rival. Richelieu had
climbed to power by her aid; he intended to wield it alone. Moreover, there
were differences of policy. The Queen-Mother represented the Catholic party,
with whom the interests of religion came first. Richelieu followed the
tradition of Henry IV, and with him the interests of the State were at all
times paramount. This difference began to be marked from the first. The English
marriage, the temporizing treatment of the Protestants, the Dutch
alliance--these showed the spirit of the Cardinal. The Queen-Mother, after one
knows not what scenes and recriminations with her former favorite, broke
definitely with him, and threw herself into the arms of the Cardinal de Bérulle, the founder of the Oratory, the leader of the Catholic
faction. From the time of the siege of La Rochelle, her enmity could never be
ignored. Fortunately for Richelieu, Mary de Medici was neither practical nor
tactful. She could not show an alternative to his policy, or find a substitute
for his guidance. She wearied the King with her complaints, her assertion of
maternal authority, her tempers, and her reproaches. But she was a danger.
Gaston of Orleans was
another danger, to the King no less than to the Minister. Louis was childless
as yet; his wife's hopes of offspring had been twice frustrated. His own
excellent health had been ruined by harassing medical treatment. Gaston, as his
heir, looked forward to the succession, and meanwhile made opposition after the
fashion of heirs-apparent. In himself he was not a dangerous opponent, and the
preference shown to him by the Queen-Mother weakened their joint influence.
Dissolute, inconsequent, faithless, he had a name and a position, and could
hazard rebellion without risking his life; nor had his followers yet realized
that he could not and did not care to confer similar immunity upon them. In
1627 he had lost his first wife in child-bed. He turned his eyes on a Mantuan Princess, resident at the French Court. This match
did not please the Queen-Mother, who disliked the Mantuan House ; and, while the King and Cardinal were in Piedmont (1629), she thought
it necessary to imprison Mary di Gonzaga. Foiled in
his whim, Gaston thought to take revenge upon the Cardinal. He intrigued and
gathered adherents; and in September, 1629, he left the Court and retired to
Lorraine, whose Duke had already shown some willingness to take advantage of
the difficulties of France, and to join her enemies. Time which should have
been given to preparations for intervention in Italy had to be spent in
quieting this malcontent. He was at length persuaded to accept the government
of Orleans, and an increase of pension. In December the Cardinal was able to
turn his mind to the Italian war, though Gaston was not formally reconciled to his
brother until April, 1630.
1630-1. War in Piedmont. The "Day of Dupes". The Cardinal's personal
supervision was needed to forward the lagging military preparations. The army
was ready in March, 1630; after negotiations had failed the Cardinal led it
into Piedmont; on March 25, by an unexpected stroke, Pinerolo was seized, and the approaches to this
important fortress were then occupied in force. In May the King invaded Savoy. Chambéry was taken, and the whole of Savoy was occupied by
the end of June. In July his forces passed Mont Cenis, and joined the army of
Piedmont. On July 26 Charles Emmanuel died; his son and successor had married a
French Princess, and might be expected to be more favorable to French projects.
But on July 18 Mantua was occupied by the Imperial forces, while Spinola had occupied the town of Casale and was pressing the citadel hard. Complicated negotiations followed, during
the course of which Spinola died. Father Joseph had
been sent to the Diet of Ratisbon (June, 1630) to
influence the Electors against the proposed election of Ferdinand's son as King
of the Romans. In this he was successful ; but as a proof of good faith he
agreed to a treaty dealing with the Mantuan question
(October 13). This treaty stipulated that France should give no aid, direct or
indirect, to the enemies of the Emperor, and Richelieu rejected it as made in
excess of powers; eventually, by the intervention of Giulio Mazarini, the papal envoy, an arrangement was made by which Casale was to be evacuated by the Spaniards, while
the French troops were withdrawn from the citadel. The last provision was
secretly evaded, and four hundred Frenchmen were retained as garrison in the
pay of the Duke of Mantua. The French troops in Savoy and Piedmont remained to
secure the restitution of Mantua, and the formal investiture of Duke Charles.
During this lull the
relations between Richelieu and the Queen-Mother reached their crisis. In
September Louis had fallen seriously ill, and it appears that during his
illness his wife and mother had persuaded him to hold out hopes of the
Cardinal's dismissal. On November 10, 1630, the Queen-Mother and Richelieu met
in the King's presence. A violent scene followed with no decisive result; but
when on the following day the King retired to Versailles the Cardinal's enemies
were convinced that his fall was certain. However, whether spontaneously or by
arrangement, the Cardinal followed him, and, before the "Day of
Dupes" was ended, was completely restored to favor.
On this day the Cardinal's ultimate victory became certain, but a final blow
was still needed. Meanwhile the Garde des Sceaux, Michel de Marillac, who
had lent himself to the cabal, was dismissed and exiled. His brother, Marshal
Louis de Marillac, was arrested in the midst of the
army of Piedmont, in which he held a command, brought to trial for malversation, condemned, and executed. No plot against the
Cardinal was allowed to pass without a victim.
In the course of 1631,
by treaties concluded at Cherasco, the affairs of
Mantua were brought to a satisfactory settlement. The Duke of Mantua received
his investiture and recovered his duchy. The Duke of Savoy received a small
territorial compensation. Montferrat was evacuated, and the
French troops were withdrawn from Savoy and Piedmont. France, however, retained Pinerolo and its approaches--the gateway of Italy--by
arrangement with the Duke of Savoy, who became her ally. This favourable settlement of a question, in which the honour and credit even more than the material interests of
France were involved, was an indirect result of Gustavus'
successes in Germany; for events at home would have prevented Richelieu from
acting vigorously beyond the Alps, had his opponents in northern Italy been in
a position to raise serious difficulties.
In January, 1631, Gaston took up his mother's quarrel, and acting in concert with her left the Court for Orleans. Richelieu determined to proceed to extremities. The King left Paris for Compiègne, and ordered his mother to follow him thither. On arriving at Compiègne she was asked to sign a written engagement to give no countenance to opponents of the established authorities. On her refusal, the King sent orders for her to retire to Moulins. This she declined to do; and, after remaining for some months under supervision at Compiègne, she escaped (July) to the Spanish Netherlands. Here she received honourable entertainment, and remained for eight years. She then removed to Holland, and afterwards to England, and died in 1641 at Cologne, to the last a bitter though impotent enemy of the man whom she had raised to power. Meanwhile the King had moved towards Orleans (March, 1631); and on his approach Gaston once more fled to Lorraine, where he remained for some months courting the Duke's sister, Margaret. A warfare of manifestos and pamphlets
followed; and the Parlement of Paris, which
protested against the summary condemnation of Gaston's adherents without form
of trial, was made to feel that no constitutional or legal safeguards could
prevail against the King's will. But other measures were also needed; and in
December the King was at Metz with an army; while Gustavus,
having in his victorious progress reached Mainz, was said to have thought of
invading Lorraine, whose Duke had raised men for the Emperor's service and had
allowed Imperial troops to occupy and fortify Moyenvic in the bishopric of Metz. But France reserved to herself the right of coercing
her neighbor, and invading Lorraine drove the
garrison from Moyenvic. The Duke hastened to make
peace (January 6, 1632), ceding Marsal to France;
but on January 3 Gaston had been secretly married to Margaret of Lorraine. He
was not, however, safe in the proximity of a French army, and was thus obliged
to leave his bride and join his mother in the Netherlands.
1632. Rebelion and death of Montmorency In June, 1632, he was
again in Lorraine, whence he entered France with a scanty force, and marched
through Burgundy, Bourbonnais, Auvergne, Rouergue, to
Languedoc, where at length he found an important supporter in the Duke of Montmorency
(August), The arrival of Gaston coincided with an injudicious attempt of the
Cardinal to abolish the ancient privileges of Languedoc and to take the
collection of all local contributions out of the hands of the
Estates by the establishment in the province of the royal officers known as élus. The Estates had already refused to accept his
arbitrary measures; and Montmorency, who was previously pledged to Gaston, must
have hoped to carry his province with him. A few notables joined the rebellion,
and among them five Bishops; but on the whole, in spite of provocation, the
province remained quiet; and Montmorency brought to Gaston practically no more
than his own paid military following.
The enterprise of Gaston
had been precipitated by the knowledge that the King was once more advancing
upon Lorraine. In June, Louis had put his army in motion. The places which he
passed on his route opened their gates; the forces which he met were dispersed;
and on June 23 he was before Nancy. The Duke once more hastened to make peace,
surrendered Stenay and Jametz,
and his disputed claim to the County of Clermont. The King did not need to take
the field himself against his brother. Schomberg and
La Force were detached from the army of Lorraine to keep the rebels in check;
and, while the King was preparing more substantial forces, Gaston's little army
came into collision with that of Schomberg near Castelnaudary. Montmorency, charging rashly and almost
alone, was wounded and captured; and Gaston's forces at once began to disperse.
He was admitted to terms, renounced all his foreign alliances and the cause
of his mother, abandoned all his followers to the King's mercy, and on these conditions
received a contemptuous pardon. Montmorency and the unfortunate gentlemen taken
in arms were left to pay the price. The trial, condemnation, and execution of
the generous Duke, the head of one of the most illustrious Houses of France,
was a merciless act of policy, well calculated to strike terror into all
rebels, and to expose the character of Gaston in its true light.
On the news of
Montmorency's death, which he had not attempted to prevent, Gaston took fright
for himself. The Lorraine marriage, which he had denied, was a dangerous
matter. If a Montmorency's head could fall on the scaffold, even the King's
brother might not be safe; he fled once more to Flanders (November, 1632),
where he remained for nearly two years. His despicable intrigues fill a larger
place in history than his character or capacity deserves; for it was not until
his power to harm had been completely destroyed that Richelieu felt free to
develop a vigorous course of action abroad; and his relations with Lorraine
determined in great measure the line which that action took.
Richelieu and Gustavus Adolphus. 1631-2
The death of Montmorency
and the third flight of Gaston were quickly followed by the news of Gustavus' death, November 16, 1632. His brief career in
Germany is treated elsewhere in this volume; so long as it lasted, European
events remained almost entirely out of the Cardinal's control. Richelieu had
facilitated Gustavus' expedition by promoting
the Polish truce; partly with a view to furthering it, he had rejected the treaty
negotiated by Father Joseph at Ratisbon; and above
all, he had, in the Treaty of Bärwalde (January,
1631) by a promise of financial support, endeavored to control the progress of the conqueror. He had his own scheme, which he
pressed upon Gustavus: to detach the great Catholic
States of Germany, and especially Bavaria, from the Habsburg alliance; to
procure for them, by his influence with Sweden, recognition and respect for
their neutrality; and thus to discharge the whole weight of Gustavus' attack upon the power of Austria. By extracting
from Gustavus the promise that the Catholic religion
should be maintained (where previously established) in the places he might
conquer, the Cardinal hoped to secure that the war should not become a war of
religion. But in all this he achieved but a limited success. Of the Catholic
Princes only the Elector of Trier, already intimately attached to France,
accepted the French protection; parties ranged themselves almost entirely on
religious lines; the heaviest blows fell, not on the Emperor but on the
Elector of Bavaria, whom Richelieu was specially anxious to save; and the new
danger brought the incalculable Wallenstein back to authority and to fresh
prestige. On the whole the redistribution of power consequent on Gustavus' successes was beneficial to France; and she
found profit, especially in Italy, Lorraine, and Trier, from his intervention;
while her principal adversaries, Spain and Austria, were correspondingly
weakened and hampered. Nevertheless, Richelieu must have been relieved by the
death of his great ally, as by the extinction of a mighty force whose action he
could neither control nor predict.
Gradually Richelieu had
been gaining strength. The Protestants had been crushed in France; his enemies
at home had learnt his power, and drekded his
implacable resentment; his action abroad, cautious and reserved at first in
the matter of the Valtelline and the Mantuan succession, had become gradually more confident and effective: from the death
of Gustavus he became more and more certainly the
arbiter of Europe. His will fanned the flames of war from the Oder to the Ebro.
Dangling before his deluded allies the prospects of a general peace, in which
all interests should be secured, ceaselessly impressing on all concerned that a
separate arrangement could be neither profitable nor trustworthy, he gradually
wore down the strength of the Habsburgs and recovered the ground lost in twenty
years of irresolution or of impotence. His death found his work still uncompleted; but he left a successor to pursue his tradition; and the Peace of Westphalia
was really of his making.
On the death of Gustavus it must have been clear to Richelieu that open war
with one or both of the Habsburg Powers could not long be postponed. He was
anxious, however, to defer it as long as possible. Internal troubles were not
yet completely removed. The Queen-Mother and the Heir-Apparent,
though in exile, were in exile at a hostile Court. In 1633 the Cardinal fell
seriously ill; and during his illness his creature, the Garde des Sceaux, Charles d'Aubespine,
Marquis of Châteauneuf, inspired by his mistress, Madame de Chevreuse,
and in suspicious intimacy with Anne of Austria, ventured to lay his plans for
the Cardinal's succession. The Cardinal recovered, and Châteauneuf expiated his
temerity by ten years of imprisonment. The resources of France were
considerable; but her military strength was undeveloped. Her armies and her
generals were ill-matched with the seasoned warriors and experienced commanders
of Spain and Austria, trained in incessant warfare through many years. Indirect
attacks must be preferred so long as indirect attacks would serve the purpose.
Meanwhile all efforts must be made to strengthen the French frontier towards
the Rhine.
Negotiations with Sweden and Germany In every direction
Richelieu sent out his envoys, and his envoys served him well. His old plan of
separating the Princes of the Catholic League from the House of Austria, of
inducing them to stand neutral in the coming struggle, and the Protestant
confederates to recognise their neutrality, was
pushed once more, and failed once more owing to the jealousies, animosities,
and suspicions of the rival parties. But Feuquières concluded on behalf of France a fresh treaty with Sweden, safeguarding as
before the interests of the Catholic religion so far as a treaty could secure
them, confining the assistance of France to a pecuniary subsidy, and engaging
the Swedish Power to continue the war (April, 1633). At Heilbronn the Protestant
Alliance was reorganised, with Oxenstierna, the
Swedish Chancelor, at its head, and measures were taken for a vigorous
campaign. Charnacé was able to persuade the United
Provinces to continue the war with the Spanish Netherlands, without pledging France
to direct and immediate intervention, which Richelieu was prepared to offer in
the last resort.
Towards the Rhine,
Richelieu offered to take over Mainz and the other fortresses on the left bank
then in possession of the Swedes. But this was refused. Similar proposals were
put forward with regard to Philippsburg and Elsass, and were similarly abandoned. His agents worked
among the petty Princes on both banks of the Rhine, endeavoring to create a Rhenish confederacy under French
protection. Already at the end of 1631 the Elector of Trier had placed his
territories under French protection; in June, 1632, French troops had entered
the Electorate; in August they drove the Spaniards from his capital and took
over Coblenz from the Swedes. Hopes of similar action on the part of the
Elector of Cologne were destined to be disappointed. The attitude of Lorraine
was still hostile; the question of Gaston's marriage was still unsettled; and
in 1633 France determined to support her allies by action in this direction.
The Duke of Lorraine was summoned to do homage for his duchy of Bar, which he
held of the crown of France; and when he declined to risk his person at the
Court of his enemies, the Parlement of Paris declared the
duchy forfeit; in August, 1633, the French army advanced into Lorraine; and in
September the Duke was forced to renounce all hostile alliances, to place Nancy
in the King's hands, and to consent to the dissolution of his sister's
marriage. The Princess herself escaped to the Netherlands, where she joined her
husband. Duke Charles in January, 1634, resigned his duchy to his brother
Cardinal Nicolas Francis, and took the field as a soldier of fortune in the
service of the Emperor. The new Duke, to secure his rights, granted himself the
necessary dispensations, divested himself of his orders, and married his
cousin, the Princess Claude. Hereupon both he and his wife were arrested, but
in April, 1634, they escaped and made good their flight to Florence. Thus of
all the ducal family only the Duchess Nicole, the first discarded wife of
Charles, was left in Lorraine, which was occupied and governed by the French.
There remained Gaston's
marriage. The Pope did not favor the dissolution;
and accordingly the Parlement of Paris was called
upon to declare the civil contract null and void. This was effected in due
course, on the ground that the heir to the throne could not contract a legal
marriage without the consent of his natural guardian the King. There was still
the sacrament; and it was argued that, sacrament standing to contract as form
to matter, the form could not subsist without the matter in which it was
inherent. The contract being void, the sacrament was therefore non-existent. On
such grounds the decision of the French clergy assembled in Paris, July, 1635,
that such marriages were illicit, was held to conclude the question; and no
more regular dissolution was obtained. Meanwhile, towards the end of 1634, the
Duke of Orleans, fatigued by the impotence and humiliation of his position in
Flanders, where he had actually been persuaded to conclude a formal treaty with
Spain, took flight and returned to France, and was reconciled to his brother,
abandoning his wife with as little compunction as he showed in abandoning his
friends to the scaffold or to the Bastille.
The military events of
the year 1633 were on the whole favorable to the
allies of France. Not so those of the following year. The negotiations which
were opened during the summer of 1633 for the defection of Wallenstein and his
adhesion to France, were frustrated in February, 1634, by his assassination.
The allies suffered a series of reverses and finally a crowning disaster at Nördlingen (September 6). Thereupon Oxenstierna at once
agreed to the cession to France of all the positions for which she had long
been pressing, and in particular of Philippsburg,
Colmar, and Schlettstadt. The French thus held a
fairly continuous defensive position far in advance of their actual frontier.
In the south the Bishop of Basel had placed his territories under French
protection; and to the west of Basel the little principality of Montbeliard (Mümpelgard) had
been similarly handed over on behalf of Württemberg. In Alsace the French held Colmar and Schlettstadt; in Strasburg they were
endeavoring to establish connections, further north they had occupied a number
of positions, of which Hagenau and Zabern were the chief. In the Palatinate and the neighboring
bishopric of Speier they were masters of
Kaiserslautern, Speier, Philippsburg,
and Mannheim. Further north they garrisoned the Elector of Trier's fortress of Ehrenbreitstein.
1634. War with Spain Thus by the end of 1634
they had grasped a great block of Imperial territory, from Basel in the south
and Coblenz in the north to Lorraine in the west. Yet war had not been
declared. But, after keen bargaining at Paris and Worms and the passage of
envoys to and fro, among whom was the famous Hugo Grotius, in April, 1635, a
treaty was arranged at Compiègne by Oxenstierna in person, binding France to an
immediate rupture, and the allies to conclude no separate peace. In February of
the same year an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded at Paris
between France and the United Provinces, providing for the joint invasion and
partition of the Spanish Netherlands. The time for elusions and evasions was
past. If the coalition were to be maintained, it could only be maintained by
the vigorous intervention of France. Saxony, Brandenburg, the principal
Protestant Princes of Germany, and the chief Imperial towns, were preparing to
make their peace; and when the Treaty of Prague was published (May 31) and was
afterwards adopted by the chief part of Protestant Germany, it only recorded
results that had been long foreseen. Imperial troops had surprised Philippsburg (January 23-4); on March 26 the Elector of
Trier and his capital fell into the hands of the Spaniards; this last incident
supplied the pretext for the decision which had been already made; and on May
19 war was solemnly declared by France against Spain. Open war with the House
of Austria was not declared until 1638; but meanwhile hostilities with that
Power were hardly less effective because they were indirect and officially
ignored.
Richelieu's diplomacy Thus were the ulterior
designs of Henry IV put into effect. The simultaneous attack upon the
possessions of the House of Habsburg in all parts of Europe, the wide-spread
alliances, the universal conflagration--these Henry had dreamed; they now became
a reality. It is said and may be partly true that Richelieu initiated and
prolonged the war in order that his master might be saddled with
responsibilities which only the Minister could enable him to endure. It is true
that, throughout his long career, the maintenance of his own precarious
position was for Richelieu a prime care, that it assumed with him the
importance rather of an end than of a means. It is the fact that, so long as
the war lasted, Richelieu was or seemed indispensable to Louis. Yet little
motives never cause, though they may occasion, great results. A spark may fire
a powder-mine, but the powder must have been prepared and laid. The great
Habsburg war was the inevitable result of Richelieu's policy, of the policy
of those who preceded him. The Spanish alliance of the Regency, the weakness of Luynes, not less than the half-veiled hostilities
hitherto conducted by Richelieu himself, all led to this issue. Dynastically
the war was a new phase in the blood feud that began on the bridge of Montereau and was fought out at Morat,
Nancy, Pavia, and in all the chancelleries of Europe. But still more
fundamental as a predisposing cause were those blind and unconscious forces
that impel nations to complete their own existence, to achieve their own realisation, to hurl down whatever opposes or threatens to
encumber, to sacrifice all else that is most precious to the attainment of
self-determined organic unity. National forces were working--not only in
France--for the unification of Germany, for the centralization of the Iberian peninsula, even for the consolidation of Italy. But in the
countries swayed by the Habsburg coalition the racial impulses were less clear,
the national consciousness less distinct. And the dynastic bond which united
them was wholly artificial; it expressed no common national feeling; it could
only exploit, it could not satisfy, national aspirations; even in Austria and
Castile the Habsburg rule had something of the character of an alien
domination. Thus Spain was sacrificed to Milan and Naples, and above all to the
Netherlands. Germany was sacrificed to Austria, and Austria to the dream of a
Habsburg supremacy in Europe. Louis XIII, Richelieu, and their successors, were
fighting in a more legitimate cause, the cause of a national kingdom. To this,
more than to any wit of statesman or skill of soldiers, such success as they
achieved is due.
This becomes the more
clear when we observe the very moderate measure of wisdom which inspired the
counsels and the action of France in this momentous period. Of diplomacy,
indeed, Richelieu was a supreme master. Even in Italy he contrived to assemble
a respectable coalition of Savoy, Mantua, and Parma, to confront the
predominant Power. In Germany it was his object, we cannot doubt, to prolong
the war. This he could only do by the aid of Sweden. Sweden was invaluable to
him; yet he bought her aid at the paltry price of a million livres a year, to which was subsequently added a small
contingent of troops. Sweden was threatened on the east and the west by the
jealous Powers of Poland and Denmark. He persuaded Poland to refuse the
tempting offers made to her, and to conclude a twenty-six years' truce with
Sweden (1635). He kept Denmark quiet, and amused her King with the futile
duties of a self-important mediator. Sweden was anxious for peace, and would
have accepted it at any time if the possession of Pomerania, or perhaps a
substantial part of it, had been guaranteed to her. He succeeded in persuading
her that no terms which Austria could offer would be secure unless they were
safeguarded by a general peace, in which the interests of all the enemies of
Habsburg domination should receive due recognition.
In order to preserve the
illusion that such a settlement was within view, he maintained,
from 1636 onwards, continuous negotiations for peace. In his manœuvres to render these negotiations abortive, he was
materially aided by the real unwillingness of Spain and Austria to conclude a
general peace, or to negotiate with the hostile or unfriendly Powers as a
coalition. But he also used every weapon that the diplomatic armoury contains. Negotiations require preliminaries;
preliminaries raise questions which may seem formal although they are really
vital. Such was the question of safe-conducts for the plenipotentiaries of the
various Powers to be represented at the projected Congresses. Under this head
Richelieu contrived to raise the questions of the recognition of Dutch
independence, of the rights of the Duchess of Savoy as guardian of her infant
son, of the rights in Hesse-Cassel of the Landgrave's
widow, of the status of the parties to the Treaty of Prague, and, more
important still, of the right of the several Estates of the Empire to negotiate
on a footing of independence with the King of Hungary and Bohemia, who happened
to be also the Emperor. He also made capital out of such objections as could
be urged against the validity of the election of Ferdinand III. The discussion
of such matters kept the diplomats of Europe at work till 1641, when at length
a compromise on these points was reached, and it was agreed that the
plenipotentiaries should assemble and negotiate with those of the Emperor,
France and her allies at Munster, Sweden and hers at Osnabrück.
In the interval he had persuaded Sweden, in 1636, 1638, and 1641, to renew her
agreement against a separate peace. The first of the compacts was so precarious
that it never received ratification; the last was not for a term of years, but
until the end of the war. He had the less difficulty in persuading Sweden to
keep her engagements, since it gradually became clear that France desired at
any rate no separate peace. When Sweden demanded as the price of her alliance
that France should guarantee the Swedish conquests in Pomerania, Richelieu, or d'A vaux on his behalf, cleverly
countered by requesting a similar guarantee of the French conquests in
Lorraine. No more was heard of the inconvenient suggestion. When propositions
were made for a general truce, France insisted on the condition of uti possidetis, and refused to
maintain the full war subsidy during any period of truce. By these means the
coalition was preserved; Swedish arms kept the Emperor and his German allies
fully occupied; and the victories of Banér and Torstensson redounded to the profit of France.
With the United
Provinces similar methods were employed; but here the difficulty was less,
since Spain would not consent to the recognition of Dutch independence--the
indispensable condition of peace in this quarter.
But in the sphere of
military operations far less ability was displayed. France was acting on
interior lines, from a consolidated territory, against the scattered possessions
of Spain. Sea-power was thus a momentous factor; and France had
created, by the efforts of the Cardinal, an imposing navy. Yet for two years
(1635-7) France acquiesced in the occupation by Spain of the two islands of Lérins, which blocked the French Mediterranean trade. Her
naval achievements were confined to victories off Guetaria (near San Sebastian), August 28, 1638; off Genoa on September 2 of the same
year; and at Cadiz in 1640. None of these actions was of capital importance;
and the great victories were left to Van Tromp and the Dutch. No substantial
use was made of the naval superiority which these engagements seem to show. The
victory of Guetaria did not prevent the French defeat
at Fuenterrabia. The navy protected the land
operations in Roussillon and Catalonia; but little else can be placed to its
credit.
On land immense efforts
were made; five, six, or seven separate armies were kept up; some 150,000 men
were constantly in the field; money was ruthlessly extorted and recklessly
spent. But the general conduct of operations reveals no bold offensive, no
concentration on a skilfully chosen objective. At the
outset, indeed, Richelieu contemplated the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands
in cooperation with the Dutch, and with the aid of disaffected subjects of the
King of Spain. The Dutch were slow and cautious, and their conception of war
was a series of laborious sieges. Had they been left to make war after their
own fashion, they would yet have effected valuable diversions; while a more
enterprising enemy might have won the lion's share of the spoil. But, after the
failure of the first campaign French efforts in this direction, though costly
and exhausting, were never pushed with determination. In 1636, indeed, France
was hard put to it to defend her northern frontiers. French activity had been
transferred to Franche Comté and the Rhinelands. Taking advantage of the
opportunity thus offered, united Spanish and Imperial forces in July invaded
Picardy, captured La Capelle, Le Catelet, Roye, Corbie, and
threatened Paris itself. In due time they retreated, and the fortresses were
sooner or later recovered. Thenceforward Picardy was never without a strong
covering force; the expense of a vigorous offensive would have been little
greater. But the record of warfare on this side carries little to the credit of
the French. The siege of St Omer in 1638 was a disastrous failure. The
conquests of Cateau Cambrésis and Landrecies in 1637, of Hesdin in 1639, of Arras in 1640, after the Spaniards had been driven from the seas by
the Dutch, and of Bapaume in 1641, are all that the
French had to show for seven years of laborious campaigning in the north.
The retention of
Lorraine was no doubt a point of prime importance in the Cardinal's scheme. Yet
the treaty with Duke Charles in 1641 seems to show that Richelieu hardly hoped
to retain it at the end of the war. And the places which were necessary to
cover it, Philippsburg, Mainz, Coblenz, Trier, were
allowed to fall into and remain in the enemies' hands. In this
connection the possession of Alsace was of vital
consequence. But its acquisition was due to luck and diplomacy rather than to
the French arms. Bernard of Weimar and his German army were taken into French
pay at an annual cost of 4,000,000 livres. His
victories in the Breisgau (1638) and his capture of Breisach, later in the same year, placed Alsace and the Upper Rhine under
his control. His death in the following year gave Richelieu the chance, which
he promptly seized, of taking over his army and securing his conquests. Charles
Lewis, the ex-Elector Palatine, while journeying through France incognito in
hopes that Bernard's army would hoist his flag, was seized and imprisoned until
everything had been settled according to Richelieu's desire.
Franche Comté might have seemed an easy prize; the territory was French, and formed a
natural addition to French dominions. In the wars of the sixteenth century the
protection of the Swiss had secured this province from attack. In this war the
Swiss appear to have taken little interest in preserving its neutrality.
Desultory inroads were made by French armies, and abortive sieges were
undertaken; but nothing of moment was effected.
The warfare in Italy and
Piedmont was perhaps the most futile and extravagant. No man in Europe knew
better than Richelieu the importance of the Valtelline. Here, at the outset,
the brilliant victories of Rohan secured for him the
necessary control. But, unsupported and neglected, the gallant leader was
forced in 1637 to surrender to the mountaineers whose freedom he was supposed
to be protecting. He had perhaps shown too much talent, and no further
employment was offered to him; in the following year he died. The loss of the
Valtelline controlled the situation in Italy. The death of the Duke of Savoy
(October 7, 1637) was a misfortune. The Duchess Christine, sister of the King
of France, was with difficulty kept faithful to the French alliance; and her
friendship was rather a burden than a profit. Prolonged efforts were necessary
to uphold her authority against her brothers-in-law, Thomas and Maurice, who
were backed by Spain. The death of the Duke of Mantua (September 24, 1637) left
his dominions under the regency of his wife, who was hostile to France; and
Mantua was only prevented from open secession by the presence of a French
garrison in Casale. Parma left the coalition in the
same year. Warfare never ceased in this region during these seven years; but,
in spite of the brilliant exploits of the Count d'Harcourt in 1640, achieved with very scanty resources, all that France could boast in
Italy was the imperfect maintenance of the status quo.
On the side of Spain,
the conquest of Roussillon was an obvious preliminary for more serious attack.
Yet this was not undertaken until it was practically forced upon France by the
revolt of Catalonia in 1640. Even then, Condé was allowed to fail before
Richelieu and the King took the task seriously in hand; they completed it in
1642, just before the Cardinal's death. Indirectly, the revolt of
Catalonia and the revolt of Portugal in the same year were results of the war,
and by weakening; Spain helped the cause of France. But they were still more
clearly the result of Spanish internal policy, the policy of concentrating
authority without fostering national unity. Thus the imperfectly compacted
kingdom yielded and split under the strain of war. On the frontier of Navarre,
the siege of Fuenterrabia in 1638 was an
ill-conceived and ill-executed enterprise, leading inevitably to disaster.
Thus at the Cardinal's
death in 1642 France had won little compensation for seven years of exhausting
warfare. Lorraine had been retained, and Elsass had
been acquired French armies had been trained in war, their tactics improved,
their personnel disciplined, the military organization developed. An effective
instrument had been created for ministers who had a definite objective, a
rational scheme of offensive, and above all the courage to use their resources
without reserve. But Richelieu was afraid of his generals. He divided their
commands, he hampered them with instructions. Any great enterprise required the
presence of Richelieu and the King, which meant that no risks would be taken,
and overwhelming forces would be used to achieve some ostensible success.
Military operations were always controlled by political considerations; and
political considerations meant the unchallenged supremacy of the Cardinal. In
these circumstances it is not surprising that no great general had appeared
before the Cardinal's death. Turenne and the Duke of Enghien (the great Conde) were trained in these wars; but
they held no independent commands until after his death. Enghien had already prepared his way to glory by marrying the Cardinal's niece, a
disparagement which he would certainly have refused had he foreseen the hour of
Richelieu's death. The only sure qualification for high command under Richelieu
was unquestioning submission and attachment to his person. Hence we find great
armies expended to no purpose under a Condé, a Cardinal de La Valette, a Brézé, a La Meilleraye, or a Guiche. The
circle of selection being limited to the Cardinal's relations, connections, and
humble adherents, these were perhaps the best that could be found. But little
more could be expected of them than was actually achieved. If equal
opportunities had been allowed to Rohan, or Guébriant, or even Harcourt, the issue might have been
wholly different.
No detailed examination
of campaigns is possible in this place; and indeed they present no features of
exceptional military interest. The foregoing summary may suffice to show the
policy, the objectives, and the results of the seven years of war for whose
conduct the Cardinal was responsible. Half-way through the seven years
(December 18, 1638) died that remarkable man, François du Tremblay, better
known to history as the Capuchin Father Joseph. The fact that no difference can
be observed in Richelieu's policy or action after the death of Father
Joseph is the best refutation of those fantastic legends which represent him as
a malign and dominating influence, inspiring Richelieu with unholy schemes, and
thwarting his excellent intentions. The fact seems to be that Father Joseph,
after a pious, blameless, and enthusiastic youth, which found expression in
mystical poetry of a high order, and in romantic schemes for a crusade of all
Europe against the infidel Turk, fell in middle life entirely under the influence
of Richelieu. After materially assisting his master in his progress to power,
he became his confidant, his secretary, his humbler self. He was, among other
things, a born politician; his knowledge, especially of German and Italian
affairs, acquired partly in the course of his crusading missions, was extensive
and valuable; he generally drafted the instructions intended for French agents,
which were then revised by the Cardinal, and transmitted through the ordinary
official channels ; he was employed by the Cardinal for negotiations, for
interviews, and on missions; his manner, alternating between unctuous suavity
and a delusive frankness, served as a useful mask; his unofficial standing made
it easy to disavow him, as for instance after the negotiations at Ratisbon ; while his confidential intimacy with the
Cardinal gave him weight and credit. Careful research has revealed many minor
differences of opinion between master and agent, but none was of permanent
importance, and in the end the views of the Cardinal as a rule prevailed.
Father Joseph remained to the last a faithful servant of the Church, of the
Order to which he belonged, and of the Order of Sisters which he founded; he
may have refreshed his zeal with the prospect of the great crusade that was to
follow when the Habsburgs had been crushed ; but he nevertheless became the
slave of a policy in which worldly considerations had undisputed supremacy, and
in which religion was always subordinated to statecraft. His own bent, in fact,
was entirely overruled by a more commanding personality.
Other personal episodes
belonging to this period may be quickly dismissed. We need not pause to
consider the subterranean influences which used the King's favourites,
Marie de Hautefort and Louise de Lafayette, to undermine
the Cardinal's power. From these, as from all other Court intrigues, Richelieu
emerged victorious. Spanish attempts to sway the King by secret correspondence
with his wife were hardly more dangerous. The unexpected, almost miraculous,
birth of an heir in 1638, and the birth of a second son in 1640, relieved the
Cardinal of his gravest apprehensions as to consequences which might follow the
sudden death of Louis. Orleans continued his desultory machinations, but he was
no longer dangerous. The other malcontent Bourbon prince, the Count of
Soissons, took refuge in 1637 at the Court of Sedan, where he was permitted to
remain. In 1641, Bouillon, Guise, and Soissons, in alliance with the Habsburgs,
thought the opportunity had come for a decisive blow. Supported by Lamboy with an Imperial army they
invaded France; the forces of Châtillon which confronted them were driven in
rout; but at the moment of victory the Count of Soissons was mysteriously slain
by a pistol-shot. The figurehead of the conspiracy thus removed, Bouillon made
terms and Lamboy retired. The Cardinal appears to
have thought the occasion favourable for testing the
fidelity of the Duke of Lorraine, who had recently made terms with Louis, and
commissioned him to aid in suppressing the rebellion. As may have been
expected, he preferred to support it, and by such action gave ground for the
reoccupation of Lorraine, which followed in due course. In the ensuing year a
more romantic plot had a tragical ending.
Henry, Marquis of Cinq-Mars, was the second son of the Marquis of Effiat, who had faithfully served the Cardinal in
diplomacy, war, and finance. On the father's death in 1632, Richelieu took the
boy under his personal protection, and introduced him to the Court in 1638, in
the hope that by his attractive personality he would win the King's favor, and counteract other inconvenient influences.
Before very long Cinq-Mars had become the King's
accredited favorite and constant companion. But the
position had its drawbacks. The young man loved pleasure, and had ambitions. He
found the King's amusements dull, his temper trying, and his company tedious;
he was under the vigilant supervision of his powerful patron, and was expected
to reveal to him the King's most intimate confidences. He fell in love with
Mary di Gonzaga, who disdained the love of a mere Grand Écuyer, but held out to him hopes if he
attained a more distinguished rank. Cinq-Mars, misled
perhaps by the willingness with which the King listened to and echoed
complaints against the Cardinal, formed the hope that by royal favor he might contrive to remove the Minister, and
succeed to his authority. He sounded Louis and found that he was not at any
rate prepared to take the necessary action himself. He therefore entered into
relations with Gaston, and with Bouillon. The three made a treaty with the King
of Spain (1642); Sedan was to be the base and refuge of the conspirators; but
what further action was to be taken was never certainly agreed. Assassination
was no doubt considered, but apparently rejected. The serious illness of
Richelieu during the summer of 1642 gave hopes of his removal by natural means; but to the Cardinal on his death-bed was brought through some mysterious
channel a copy of the treaty with Spain. Taking advantage of a temporary
improvement in his health, he arose, and carried the compromising document to
the King. Cinq-Mars and his friend and agent, de
Thou, the son of the famous historian and statesman, were seized, brought to
trial, condemned, and executed. Cinq-Mars at any rate
deserved his fate; sympathy is wasted on a man so worthless and unfit for
power. Bouillon was arrested in the midst of the army of Italy, where he was in
command, and escaped further penalty by the cession of Sedan.
Gaston, as usual, betrayed all; he was declared incapable of any office and
dignity, and on these conditions pardoned. The effort of this last struggle for
power appears to have exhausted the remaining strength of the Minister; and,
within three months from the death of Cinq-Mars,
Richelieu expired (December 4,1642). The succession of Mazarin to his authority
and the concluding months of Louis' reign will be treated in a later chapter.
Death of Richelieu. His administration. [1642 For eighteen years the
great Minister had ruled the kingdom of France. He had claimed for his master
and himself power over all persons and causes within the realm. He had elevated
absolutism into a principle. Existing institutions, existing traditions, had
been forced to give way before his will. Claiming so much, he must be brought
to account for all that he claimed. His great achievements in the field of
diplomacy, his personal triumphs over rivals and enemies, the creation of a
French army and a French navy, the lasting impression of his overmastering
personality, these things give him a great place in history. But he must also be
judged by his work as an administrator, and by the effects of his work on the
internal prosperity and development of France.
France needed a great
administrator. The development of her institutions had not kept pace with her
growth. The monarchy had accepted the heritage of a hundred feudal sovereigns;
it had undertaken the task of welding a dozen races into a nation; all the men
and all the treasures of the kingdom were at its disposal; the fund of loyalty
and national enthusiasm on which it could draw was almost inexhaustible; but
the machinery for the orderly execution of its purposes was still to be
created. We may also think, and consequences were to prove, that safeguards
against the abuse of its authority were needed; but we can hardly blame the
statesman who saw in Parlements and Estates General
only so many obstacles to efficiency. The materials for a constitutional
monarchy may have been present in France, though they were not very obvious to
view; but the materials for an orderly, law-abiding, and beneficent monarchy
were certainly present, and Richelieu did little or nothing for their organization.
The most crying need was
that for financial reconstruction. The influence of royal finance was
all-pervading, the needs of the royal treasury unceasing and progressive. The
income of Henry IV was some 40,000,000 of livres towards the end of his reign; his expenditure far less. The annual expenditure
of Richelieu in his last years was 160-180,000,000. Yet the financial organization that had served for Louis XI and Louis XII was
still maintained without improvement. There was still a separate machinery for
the collection and accounts of the faille, the aides, the gabelle,
and the domaine. The revenue was still diverted at
its sources to meet local expenditure so that hardly more than a half reached
the royal exchequer. The system of audit and accounts was still hopelessly
defective. A quarter of the revenue appears in the accounts in a lump sum,
acquits au comptant, cash expended on items
unspecified, the vouchers for which expenditure were burnt every three months.
The indirect taxes were still farmed. The expenses of collection were enormous.
It is estimated that the cost of levying the taille was 25 per cent., of levying the aides and gabelle not less than 40 per cent. Extraordinary resources were even more wastefully
procured. Offices to the value of 500,000,000 livres were sold during Richelieu's ministry, of which sum only 350,000,000 reached
the Treasury. Not only did such devices mean in effect the borrowing of money
at ruinous rates of interest, but the offices thus created hampered the public
machine at every turn. It was the rule and not the exception for three officers
to do the work of one, officiating in successive years. The interest of the
public debt under Richelieu rose from 2,000,000 to 21,000,000 livres. In the last years of the reign default was made on
the public debt and on salaries to the extent of three-eighths; and the
protesting rentiers were severely punished. In 1641
the clergy were forced by the most open coercion to contribute 4,000,000 livres in three years to the public revenue in addition to
their ordinary don gratuit. In 1639 the revenues from
the communal octrois were seized for the King; and
the communes were left without resources. At Richelieu's death the revenue for
three years had been anticipated. All this, except in the case of the clergy,
occurred by the simple fiat of the King. In 1636-7 the population of Limousin, Poitou, Angoumois, Saintonge,
Gascony, rose in rebellion and were put down by force. In 1639 the rebellion of
the Nupieds in Normandy was supported by the Parlement and the bourgeoisie of the principal towns.
Meanwhile financiers rapidly amassed enormous fortunes; Crown lands and Church
lands were sold; sources of revenue were pledged in security for loans; the
revenue raised by way of taitte rose from 14,000,000
to 69,000,000 livres; the oppressive gabelle produced 19,000,000, and the retail price of salt
amounted to four francs of modern money per pound; commerce languished,
agriculture starved, parishes were abandoned, lands went out of cultivation,
and the taitte was collected by armed men. For all
this Richelieu devised no single remedial measure.
The burden of taxation
was great; the distribution of it rendered its incidence even more galling. The
pays d'états, Languedoc, Provence, Burgundy, Britanny,
paid hardly more than one-third of their proper share. Richelieu endeavored indeed (1628-32) to assimilate the financial
conditions of some of these provinces to the rest of France; but here his
authority for once proved insufficient; and he had to compound with the freer
provinces for the restoration of their liberties. Dauphiné alone lost its privileges. Not only did the nobles and the clergy escape the
more burdensome forms of taxation; but the myriads of officials, whose numbers
were constantly growing, also avoided payment. Many professions were exempt.
Most of the chief towns paid a light composition for taille. It is estimated that a fourth of the population of
France went free of direct taxation on one ground or another. Moreover,
one-third of France escaped the chief part of the gabelle.
The burden of the unprivileged and especially of the peasants was the heavier
in consequence.
Richelieu himself,
though profuse, was not avaricious. His income from ecclesiastical benefices
was about a million and a half livres; and he
received as much more from property and pensions. At his death his fortune,
though large, was not large in proportion to his opportunities. That he himself
was no financier, need not be laid to his charge. But that he did not discover
and employ able financiers is largely due to the principles which governed his
public action. He required his men of finance to be as subservient as his
generals. His Bullions and Bouthilliers found him
money; he did not understand, he did not care to understand the means. More
capable ministers might have been less easy to control. Even their dishonesty
was valuable, as placing them more completely in his power, should they at any
time give offence.
In general
administration Richelieu made little systematic improvement. Local
administration, so far as it existed, was in the hands of the heads of the
five-and-twenty governments into which France was divided, and of the Parlements. The military local authority was in the hands
of the Governors, the civil authority in the hands of the Parlements.
In times of weak government the authority of Governors had frequently been used
in the cause of rebellion. Richelieu made it clear how slight that authority
really was, and it was proved that the rebellion even of a Montmorency was not
dangerous. But the Cardinal was naturally not inclined to increase the
importance of the Governors: and their office continued to be one rather of
dignity than of power. Only six months' residence was customary; and even this
was frequently evaded. With the Parlements he was
constantly in collision; they approved neither his financial edicts, nor his
manner of dealing with political offenders, nor his contemptuous attitude
towards the law. They were not suited for the work of administration; and, if
they had been, they would not have been suited to the Cardinal. His methods
were arbitrary and direct; he carried further the practice introduced by his
predecessors of despatching commissioners, maîtres des requêtes, to
districts where action was necessary; under the name of intendants de justice, de police, et des finances, these officers received the widest
authority to override every existing functionary or institution, to order all matters
at the pleasure of the central Government, to try persons and causes without
regard to the formalities of law. Similar officers accompanied the armies,
where their simple procedure and extensive competence proved of the highest
value in controlling and regulating expenditure and supply. Eventually a system
of intendants was created; but under Richelieu there
was no system; no law prescribed the duties of intendants or defined their powers; the despatch of each intendant was an act of arbitrary force; the intendants were the direct agents of a lawless autocracy.
In matters relating to
justice France was already well provided. The Courts of the présidiaux and the Parlements, with minor jurisdictions, covered
the field well; the complaint was rather of the excessive complexity of the
system and procedure, than of injustice or defect. But Richelieu made it a
practice in dealing with political offenders to disregard the ordinary Courts
of justice, and to proceed by the action of commissions of judges specially
chosen to try the particular case. By such tribunals, Cinq-Mars,
de Thou, Montmorency, the Marshal de Marillac, and
many others were condemned. If a first commission showed any hesitation, it was
dissolved, and a second appointed. However clear the offence, the Cardinal
would not allow the law to take its normal course. The Parlements protested; but their protests were disregarded.
In matters relating to
public order little progress was made. The nobility as a class neither required
crushing, nor were crushed. Impoverished by the high rate of customary
expenditure in the Court and with the army, and by the fall in the purchasing
power of the fixed dues which they received from their tenants, their chief ambition
was to win the favour of the Government and to secure
its patronage, rather than to thwart it. The destruction of royal fortresses
except on the frontier was a wise measure of economy. The destruction of the
fortified residences of the nobility may or may not have been necessary as a
precaution; but such residences, for the most part, were indefensible against
modern ordnance, and their destruction without indemnity was in any case an
injustice. The practice of the magnates to raise rebellion on any occasion of
discontent required severe repression; in the process of repression it became
clear how scanty were the actual resources controlled by such rebels. The
general security of ordinary citizens under Richelieu's rule was neither
greater nor less than it had been in earlier times, and left much to be
desired. The armies, whose pay became more and more irregular, lived upon the
country where they were quartered. To be treated as a conquered country implied
exceptional indulgence and not the reverse. In spite of the striking example
made of de Bouteville and des Chapelles,
the practice of duelling was hardly less prevalent
under Richelieu than it had been under Henry IV. The Cardinal's police was
admirable for the discovery of secret intrigues; for the security of common
people it was not intended. The almost complete freedom of the press that had
existed up to 1630 was in that year destroyed; for the indulgent control of
the Parlements and the Sorbonne was substituted a
rigorous censorship: and a government permit was required for every
publication. Of the press as a useful source of instruction to statesmen, he
had no notion. The official Gazette de France contained all the information
about public affairs which he thought desirable for the people.
Richelieu's friendship
for letters followed the same principle as his other efforts, the establishment
of a central and supreme authority. This was an age when literary and social
circles or cliques exercised a considerable influence. The dix-sept seigneurs assembled at the house of Bassompierre,
Messieurs du Marais in that of Madame de Rohan; the
Countess of Soissons, the Princess of Condé, held similar gatherings. The Hôtel de Rambouillet was the
centre for the précieux. One of these clubs met at
the house of Valentin Conrart to discuss literary questions. Richelieu heard of their discussions, and
offered them his protection and official recognition. Though somewhat
embarrassed, they had no choice but to accept, and in 1634 they were
constituted as the French Academy. The Parlement with
considerable reluctance registered their letters-patent in 1637. The number of
the members from the first was forty, of whom Balzac, Voiture, Chapelain, Vaugelas were
the most distinguished. They accepted their prescribed mission : to purify the
French language, and to determine its canons according to the best usage. For
this purpose in 1638 they began, at the suggestion of Chapelain,
the compilation of their Dictionary, in which the influence of Vaugelas was predominant. The later history of the Academy
is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The age of Richelieu was
an age of a great religious revival in France. The Cardinal de Bérulle founded the Oratory, and multiplied institutions
for the instruction of clergy. St Vincent de Paul founded his Sœurs de la Charité, and his
Congregation of the Mission. The Ursulines and the Visitandines took in hand the education of girls and women.
The Jesuit schoolmasters and professors were active everywhere. Richelieu
himself did something for the reformation of the religious Orders, and procured
his election as head of the three great Orders of Cluny, Cîteaux,
and Prémontré, partly with this object. He did good
service in composing the disputes between secular and regular clergy, in
requiring of the religious license to preach and to confess, and in subjecting
them to the authority of the Bishops. It was his ambition to become head of the
Church in France, as he was ruler of the State. When the Pope thwarted his
desire to be Legate for France, he dreamed of becoming Patriarch of a national
Church. Yet flagrant abuses went unremedied in the
Church. Non-residence, plurality of benefices, abbeys, and priories in lay
hands, the charging of lay pensions on ecclesiastical revenues, the employment
of Cardinals and Archbishops in military commands-these disorders the Cardinal,
himself a soldier and a pluralist, did not attempt to check.
He is seen perhaps at
his best in his treatment of the Protestants after their pretensions to
political independence had been finally suppressed. The toleration which was
accorded to them was real. The greatest consideration was shown for their
susceptibilities, and the hostility of the Catholic population was kept in
bounds. Their pastors were exempted from taille; a
subvention of 200,000 livres was accorded to them;
they were compensated for the loss of the property of the Church in Beam.
Richelieu was anxious to win over the ministers and prepare the way for a
general conversion. In this he was disappointed, but individual conversions
were frequent, and the Catholic clergy were taxed to provide pensions for
converted Protestant ministers. Of the growing influence of Jansenist opinions he showed himself less tolerant; he inaugurated the long struggle
between the monarchy and this sect by the imprisonment of the Abbé of Saint Cyran in 1638; for
reasons which are not altogether clear, he saw in these opinions a danger to
the State; but the time has not yet come to enlarge upon this theme.
Different estimates may
be formed of the military achievements of the Cardinal; as to the general
tendencies of his political action there is less room for doubt. Talents,
industry, perseverance, resolution, courage, these he possessed in the highest
degree. The game of politics, as he understood it and as it was generally
understood, he played with consummate ability. Though at a vast expense, he
checked the dangerous preponderance of the Habsburg coalition and kept for
France her proper place among the Powers. That a large proportion of the
sacrifices which he imposed upon his country for this end were unnecessary,
that the heritage of bankruptcy which he left to his successors was due to
misgovernment, that his habitual contempt of law and justice was impolitic as
well as immoral, that he created no system to take the place of that which he
destroyed, that the absolutism which he set up was lawless and disorderly, that
he seems to have never comprehended the true bases of national prosperity and
national power-these are defects which become the more flagrant the more highly
we estimate his gifts. The abasement of the magnates, the suppression of the
Huguenots, the Habsburg wars, even the maintenance of his personal power-these
were legitimate ends. But in his choice of means he was reckless and
improvident; in his choice of persons he looked for subservience rather than
for independent initiative; of more exalted aims he had no conception; of
mercy and justice he took no account; of creative and beneficent statesmanship
he had no share. Four-fifths of the field of political endeavour he left untouched, or touched only to encumber and destroy. If the Peace of
Westphalia and the Peace of the Pyrenees were of his making, so also was the
Revolution of 1789. He had revealed to the French monarchy the weakness of all
those traditional and conventional restraints which had limited the power of
earlier Kings for good, and more especially for evil; the autocracy was slow
to unlearn the lesson he had taught. The bonfires of rejoicing which celebrated
his decease were premature; his death was not to ease the bondage which his
living will had imposed on France.
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