CHAPTER XXI.

MAZARIN.

 

Before his death Richelieu had himself designated Giulio Mazarini, called Mazarin in his adopted country, as the man best qualified to carry on his policy. Born in Sicily of humble parentage, Mazarin had nevertheless received an excellent education at Rome and in Spain. For a short time he had followed the profession of arms, but soon found his true vocation in the diplomatic service of the Court of Rome. Before Casale, in 1630, he had negotiated an arrangement between France and Spain, which ultimately brought the Mantuan War to a conclusion. From 1631 to 1636 he served as Nuncio Extraordinary in France, and in 1639 he formally entered the service of France and was naturalized. He did good work, especially as an envoy in Piedmont, and was rewarded in 1611 by the Cardinalate. The King now called him to his councils and announced his choice to the Parlements of France.

Louis at first made a point of showing that the death of Richelieu caused no change. A sudden rupture would have implied that the dead Minister had been the true ruler of France. The existing officials were retained in power. The late Cardinal’s offices were distributed among his relations. Armand de Wignerod, now Duke of Richelieu, became General of the Galleys and Governor of Havre. Armand de Maillé-Brézé, now Duke of Fronsac, received the office of Superintendent of Navigation, and the command of Brouage. The Marshal de La Meilleraye inherited the government of Britanny. But the difference was soon felt. The Cardinal’s enemies were, liberated from their prisons, or returned from exile. Gaston of Orleans appeared at Court and was later allowed to be reunited to his wife, Margaret of Lorraine. The families of Vendome and Guise came back to France. The body of the late Queen-Mother was brought from abroad and interred at Saint-Denis. The new rule was milder and more conciliatory.

The foreign policy of France was not changed. Great efforts were made to continue the war with vigour, especially on the northern frontier, where the King himself proposed to take the command. Guébriant was strengthened and encouraged to propose an effective plan of action on the Rhine. The conquest of Catalonia was to be pressed; Prince Thomas of Savoy was assured of continued French support; and an expedition against Franche Comté was planned.

The new Minister meanwhile was strengthening his position. Supple and elusive, he masked his advance with consummate skill. Of Richelieu’s creatures those whose rivalry was most to be feared were Sublet de Noyers, the able Minister of War, and the younger Bouthillier, now Comte de Chavigny. Sublet de Noyers was first pushed aside, and Michel Le Tellier, Mazarin’s dependant, took his place. Meanwhile the King’s health was breaking; a long minority, a long Regency were in view. Without exciting suspicion, without haste or eagerness, Mazarin succeeded in winning his way to the Queen’s confidence. Now a cipher, she must later become a power. His beauty, his grace, his exquisite address, facilitated his task. Yet, when the plans for the Regency were discussed, Mazarin was careful on the one hand not to thwart the King’s intention of closely limiting his wife’s authority, and on the other to secure that the odium of these measures should fall upon others, especially upon Chavigny. In April, 1613, the King’s plan was announced. Anne of Austria was to be Regent, the Duke of Orleans her Lieutenant-General; but both were to be controlled by a permanent Council, irremovable, deciding all questions and filling its vacancies by a majority of votes. In this Council the Queen’s vote or that of Orleans was to count for no more than those of the other members—Condé, Mazarin, the Chancellor Seguier, and the two Bouthilliers. Peace and war, finance, and appointments to all important posts, were expressly reserved for the Council. Two persons alone were excluded from the general amnesty, the Duchess of Chevreuse, and the unfortunate Châteauneuf. The former was to remain in exile, the latter in prison until the end of the war. Th:-- declarat-ion was communicated to the Parlement at a lit de justice and registered (April 20, 21).

On May 14 the King expired; and measures were at once taken to defeat his last intentions. The consent of the principal persons was obtained; the magistrates were sounded; and on May 18 the Queen and the young King appeared in the Parlement. The chief councillors were present but Mazarin was conspicuously absent. Orleans, Condé, and the Chancellor, demanded that the recent declaration should be cancelled, and the sovereign authority of the Queen Regent recognized. After the stern repression of Richelieu, the Parlement rejoiced to find its intervention in matters of high government not only tolerated but invited. The necessary resolutions were speedily passed; and the declaration registered by the express command of the late King was expunged from the Records. A fresh declaration was issued, vesting the royal power and the care of the young King in the Queen as Regent, with Orleans as her Lieutenant-General, and Condé as his Deputy. The same evening the Queen confirmed Mazarin in his post, of Chief Minister.

The new rule began propitiously. Francisco de Melo had crossed the frontier and was besieging Rocroi. The French army, which Louis had intended to lead in person, had been entrusted to the young Duke of Enghien, son of the Prince of Condé, with the Marshal de L'Hôpital to supplement his lack of experience. Enghien marched to the relief of Rocroi, and, in spite of L’Hôpital, resolved to risk a general engagement. The Spanish General, eagerly pressing his siege and expecting no such bold move, allowed the French army to approach, and neglected to protect his forces by entrenchments. On May 18 the two armies confronted each other: the Spaniards numbering between 24,000 and 26,000, including five tercios of the redoubtable Spanish infantry: the French inferior by some 3-4000 men, the proportions of cavalry and infantry being similar in the two armies. A rash forward movement on the French left nearly led to disaster, but the mistake was remedied before Don Francisco had seized his opportunity. The day was now far advanced, and the contest was deferred till the morrow.

During the night word came to the French leader that Melo expected reinforcements in the morning. The attack must be made at once if at all. Before dawn the French moved forward. Enghien and Gassion on the right overthrew the Flemish cavalry which opposed them. On the left once more La Ferté, advised by L’Hôpital, advanced rashly, was taken in flank, and thrown into disorder by the German horse. The French artillery was captured and was turned upon the French centre, which began to retreat. At this moment Enghien rallied his victorious cavalry and fell upon the flank and rear of the Spanish centre. The Walloons and the Germans were driven in flight. The Spanish infantry still remained unshaken. On the other hand the French retreat was arrested, and their centre once more advanced. The French left reformed; the Spanish right was attacked in front and behind. Enghien left his victorious wing, and led the infantry of his centre against the tercios viejos. Three times they repulsed the attack. the fourth time their steadfast ranks were broken; when the slaughter had been with difficulty arrested the Spanish infantry was no more; of 6000 men present at the battle only 1500 escaped. The victory was complete; and the main credit of it fell to the young commander, though the services of Gassion with the cavalry on the right, and of Sirot , in checking the retreat of the centre, had also been conspicuous.

A great general, who was also a Prince of the Blood, had come upon the scene. The decision to attack was his; the admirable dispositions of the approach and before the battle, the brilliant inspiration in the heat of combat, the final and crushing blow, all these were due to him. At the age of 21, Louis de Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, had proved himself to be one of the boldest and most skillful commanders of the time. How would his Government regard him? With jealousy, fear, and suspicion, or as the fittest instrument to fulfill the destinies of France? It must be reckoned to the credit of Mazarin that Enghien seldom failed to receive his full support and confidence until he had incurred suspicion through the rebellion of his relatives.

Mazarin saw the necessity for cooperation between the army of the Low Countries and that of the Rhine. As a preliminary step towards this end, he accepted Enghiens proposal to lay siege forthwith to Thionville (Diedenhofen) on the Moselle. The army of Champagne was ordered to assist. Guébriant was strengthened and commanded to give occupation to the Bavarians and other German forces in the south. On June 14 the investment of Thionville began; but, before it was complete, a force of 2000 men contrived their entry and raised the garrison to adequate strength. The siege was vigorously pushed; and, in spite of accidents, Thionville was forced to capitulate on August 10. Sierck was then taken, and Enghien advanced even to the gates of Luxemburg. His task in this direction was now completed, and he availed himself of permission duly granted to return to Court. Had he waited a few days, orders would have reached him cancelling his leave and bidding him march to Guébriant’s succour in Alsace. The time wasted in Paris was precious; and, when at length Enghien had joined Guébriant handed over to him the requisite reinforcements, and sent turn forth to find his winter-quarters elsewhere than in Alsace, winter had almost begun. Disaster and death came to Guébriant, and the Bernardines were left without a leader. Turenne was at once chosen to command the broken and demoralized army. It can hardly have been only good fortune that led Mazarin in his first year of power to choose for high command two generals so different in stamp from those employed by Richelieu. It was certainly more than good fortune that caused him to use them and support them after their high qualities had been proved.

Older by ten years than Enghien, Henry de La Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne, younger brother of the Duke of Bouillon, was at the head of a regiment in 1630, had recently held a command in Italy, and became Marshal of France in 1643. Patient, laborious, and thoughtful, Turenne attained by slow degrees the eminence which Enghien reached more rapidly. The task now before him was arduous. He had to restore order where all discipline had ceased, to reconstruct an army out of mutinous units, to conciliate the jealousy of the Bernardine captains. This work was not completed until the following June.

Meanwhile Mazarin had been gaining strength. At first he was regarded as a temporary stop-gap, and hardly taken seriously. The easy liberality of the Regency in its early months confirmed this opinion. A Government which refused nothing could not in the nature of things last long. Ambition saw an easy path to power. Even the Protestants seemed once more to be a danger; and the mission of Turenne to Italy had in part at least the object of removing from France their most illustrious leader. Their strength was, however, small, and their grievances in reality slight; a little firmness and tact and the punctilious observance of the edicts allayed the disquiet. Personal ambitions were more dangerous. Condé and Orleans could be kept in check by playing off one against the other. But a clique was soon formed among those who had espoused the Queen’s cause in the days when her friendship was perilous, and who now claimed the reward of their fidelity.

The head of this clique was the Duke of Beaufort. Vain, showy, and incapable, his ambitions were in direct proportion to his ignorance of affairs. All the malcontents gathered about him. His followers, Saint-Ibal, Montrésor, Béthune, and Fontrailles, pluming themselves upon their merit, received the name of Les Importants. Their object was no doubt to displace the Cardinal and open a fair field for the display of their own supposed capacity. They formed an alliance with the Bishop of Beauvais, who seemed most likely to supplant Mazarin in the Queen’s confidence. They were hostile to Richelieu’s heirs and Richelieu’s agents. They drove from the Council the two Bouthilliers, thereby in fact removing from Mazarin’s path two Ministers whose experience, and ministerial record marked them as his rivals. But for the moment Mazarin seemed to stand almost alone, and his fall was daily expected. The Duchess of Chevreuse, that indefatigable intriguer, returned to Paris and counted on reassuming her former ascendancy over the Queen. She allied herself with Châteauneuf, n whom his contemporaries recognized high qualities and capacities, which he never had sufficient opportunity to prove. Her policy was reconciliation with Spain; and she remembered that the Queen was a Spaniard. She remembered also the treatment which she had received from Richelieu, and, by pressing the claims of the Vendome family to Britanny, was preparing an alliance with Beaufort and a blow at her enemy’s heirs.

Amid these intrigues Mazarin steered his way patiently and skillfully, steadily increasing his personal ascendancy over the Queen’s mind. Owing to a quarrel with Madame de Longueville, Condé’s beautiful daughter, the Duchess of Montbazon was ordered to leave the Court. The Duke of Beaufort, at that time her lover, resolved to avenge the insult to his mistress. In August, 1613, it would seem, he determined to attempt the assassination of the Cardinal. Several schemes having failed, the design became known: and the Duke of Beaufort was arrested on September 2 and imprisoned on the following day at Vincennes.

It seems probable that there was a plot; had there been none, it would still have been useful to invent one. With Beaufort in prison, the cabal of the Importants, was easily scattered. Châteauneuf, Madame de Chevreuse, and the Vendome family were banished from the Court; other supporters of the party retired, fled, or were disgraced. Mazarin felt himself strong enough to recall Chavigny to the Council. The Queen took up her residence at Richelieu’s palace, henceforward known as the Palais-Royal, where she was constantly accessible from Mazarin’s own dwelling. This act marked the establishment between the Queen and her Minister of still more intimate relations. The remaining adherents of the Important party were gradually dispersed or reduced to impotence. Mazarin even succeeded in procuring the recall of Goring, the British Ambassador, on account of his friendship with Madame de Chevreuse.

The summer of 1644 was devoted to a campaign such as Richelieu affected. An overwhelming force, commanded by Gaston of Orleans, undertook the siege of Gravelines, supported by the Dutch fleet. Enghien had only an inferior command, and had to be pacified by the gift of the government of Champagne. Meanwhile the Dutch were to undertake the siege of Sas-van-Gent. The siege of Gravelines was begun in May, and the town capitulated on July 28. Sas-van-Gent held out until September. When the fall of Gravelines appeared certain, Enghien was allowed to join Turenne; and the two generals advanced together against Mercy and fought the three vigorous actions in the neighborhood of Freiburg (August). Mercy was forced to retreat; and the French armies, working down the Rhine, seized Philippsburg. Speier and Worms placed themselves under French protection; Mainz opened its gates; Landau was taken; and the whole of the left bank of the Rhine from Breisach to Coblenz was thus in the possession of France (September, 1644).

Though Orleans, when policy required his employment as a commander, followed on the old lines, wherever Enghien or Turenne commanded, bold and rapid movements, intrepid attacks, took the place of Richelieu’s cautious strategy, his tedious sieges This was even more evident in the following year, when the defeat of Turenne at Herbsthausen near Mergentheim was avenged by Enghien and Turenne near Nördlingen (August 3, 1645). The campaigns in Bavaria, 1646, 1647, and 1648 forced the Elector Maximilian first to temporise and finally to yield. These operations, described elsewhere, prove either that the generals had escaped from the control of the Government, or that the conduct of the war was no longer mainly regulated by the fears of the Minister for his own personal ascendancy. The latter is more probably the case. Mazarin was secure in the royal favour as Richelieu had never been; victories enhanced his credit; France and her Government needed peace; and peace could only be won by a vigorous offensive. Enghien, who in 1646 became by his father’s death the Prince of Condé, was more dangerous in inactivity than at the head of victorious armies; Mazarin trusted his own influence and his own astuteness to defeat the claims of all possible rivals. Such may have been his calculations; yet the glory of these six years of almost unbroken success must in part belong to the Minister who was not afraid of victory.

Conquests in Flanders.—The Dutch make peace. [1645-8

In Flanders the summer of 1615 was devoted to another campaign under the Duke of Orleans. A number of places were seized in the direction of Dunkirk—Mardyk, Linck, Bourbourg; but the Duke did not venture to besiege Dunkirk itself, which was covered by Piccolomi. The French army then turned aside and occupied various strongholds on the Lys, among others Béthune. A separate army laid siege to one of the few uncaptured fortresses in Lorraine, la Mothe-en-Argonne, and took it. After the Duke of Orleans had left the front his lieutenants continued this petty warfare until late in the autumn. Lens, Orchies, and Arleux were occupied. Gassion even crossed Flanders between Ghent and Bruges and joined hands with the Dutch, who captured Hulst. However, the results of great efforts and expenditure during these two years were hardly adequate.

A different spirit pervaded the campaign of 1646. Political reasons suggested that the armies of the north should be divided. Orleans and Enghien received separate commands. But the two rivals united their forces and Enghien infused more energy into their joint operations. Courtrai was taken in the face of the united forces of Lorraine, Piccolomini, Beck, and Lamboy. The Dutch were beginning to be jealous of the French advance, and refused to cooperate in a joint campaign. After the recapture of Mardyk, lost during the previous winter, Orleans left the army and Enghien was in sole command. The difference was soon felt. On September 19 the siege of Dunkirk was begun. This place was the chief arsenal of the Spaniards in these parts and the base of their maritime raids. The Dutch, whose desire to protect their commerce for the moment outweighed their fears of France, ordered Tromp to blockade the port while Enghien vigorously pushed the attack by land. On October 11 Dunkirk surrendered. The French frontier was thus moved forward in this direction to nearly its present line, including also Fumes and Courtrai, which now form part of Belgium.

Battle of Lens.—Catalonia.

The danger to Dutch trade from the possession of Dunkirk by the French, the proposal of France to exchange Catalonia for the Spanish Netherlands, the declining health of Frederick Henry and his death in March, 1647, all contributed to stimulate the Dutch desire for peace. Their cooperation in 1645-6 had been but slight; they now seriously prepared to treat. Though their Treaty of Minister was not concluded until January, 1648, it had been settled in principle more than a year before; and the year 1647 saw the French left alone in their northern struggle with Spain. In this year Louis de Bourbon, now Prince of Condé, was occupied in Catalonia, and Turenne was detained in Germany by the revolt of the Bernardine troops. France was exhausted, and the conquests of Dixmuyden in Flanders and La Bassée between Béthune and Lille were compensated by the loss of Menin, Armentières, and Landrecies. In October Gassion was killed at the siege of Lens. In 1648 Condé, recalled from Catalonia, was nominated to the command in Flanders. A final effort was to be made to extort peace. Ypres had been taken and Courtrai lost, when a July he was summoned to Paris in consequence of the opening troubles of the Fronde. Once more at the front, and joined by Erlach with 4000 men from the army of Breisach, he advanced to the relief of Lens, which he found had already surrendered to the Archduke Leopold. Retreating towards Béthune, he enticed the Spaniards to leave their entrenchments, and a general engagement followed according to his desire (August 20). The French army, though its right wing at first was roughly handled, was completely victorious. Both wings of the Spaniards were driven in flight. Beck was wounded and captured, refused all assistance, and died of his wounds. Leopold and Fuensaldaña fled to Douai. The Spanish infantry, no longer maintaining the tradition of those who had fallen at Rocroi, surrendered in thousands. The Spanish loss was 8000 men, 30 cannon, all their baggage, and 120 banners. Six days later Paris was in revolt. Many years were to pass before a similar victory was gained by the arms of France.

The great successes of France were won in fields where Condé or Turenne commanded. In Catalonia the occasional gains were outweighed by the repeated failures. In 1643 the whole of Catalonia, with the exception of Rosas and Tarragona, was in French hands. The war was to be vigorously pursued by land and sea. La Mothe Houdancourt commanded by land, the young Admiral de Brézé by sea. Brézé did his part. A fleet convoying provisions to Rosas was attacked and defeated with the loss of six vessels. A little later (September 8) the main fleet of Spain suffered a disastrous reverse off Carthagena, and the French became masters of the western Mediterranean. The complete conquest of Catalonia and perhaps further acquisitions seemed to be in sight. But La Mothe Houdancourt did nothing, leaving the blame, as if would seem unjustly, on Michel Le Tellier, the Minister of War. The following year he was defeated before Lerida, which the Spaniards were besieging; and, when at length he undertook the siege of Tarragona, he was forced to raise it (September). The general was recalled, and Harcourt, with brilliant record from Casale and Turin, was sent in his place. Siege was to laid to Rosas (April 2, 1615), which at length, after a glorious resistance, capitulated (May 28). Fleix was lost, but afterwards recovered, and Balaguer surrendered after a prolonged investment (October 20). The discontent of the Catalans was for the moment appeased. Harcourt in May, 1646, laid siege to Lerida, and endeavored to reduce the fortress by famine. But in November it was still holding out when the Spanish army attacked and surprised the French in their lines. Supplies were thrown into the beleaguered town; Harcourt was forced to raise the siege, abandoning his heavy artillery and his baggage. Catalan complaints broke out again; and, perhaps to show the province that France was in earnest, Condé himself was sent to take command as Viceroy.

But Catalonia was the grave of reputations. Condé determined to lay siege once more to Lerida. After a month even he was forced to acknowledge that the difficulties of climate and locality were insurmountable, and the siege was abandoned. He was recalled, and Mazarin’s brother Michel, now a Cardinal, was nominated to succeed him. But after long delays he did no more than visit Barcelona, and speedily returned to Rome. Schomberg, who took his place, was fortunate enough to carry Tortosa by assault, and to force its citadel to open its gates (July 18, 1648). Events in France then put an end to French efforts in this region. Catalonia had been chiefly valued as a possible exchange for the Spanish Netherlands. Had such a bargain been possible, the Catalans would have been unhesitatingly left to their fate. But this project, if ever seriously entertained by Spain, was frustrated by the opposition of the Dutch; and the waste of men and treasure thus found no adequate compensation.

Designs upon the Italian coast.

In Italy alone the power of Spain remained substantially unshaken. France kept her hand upon Savoy, but the futility of attacks upon the Milanese had long since been demonstrated. The war of Parma (1642-4) divided the possible friends of France and weakened those Italian Powers which still retained a formal independence. When France had succeeded in bringing this war to a conclusion, she suffered another blow in the election of Giambattista Pamfili to the papal chair as Innocent X (1644). He was not only well-disposed to Spain, but a personal enemy of Mazarin, as was soon seen when he refused to make the Minister’s brother a Cardinal, though his suit was warmly pressed.

The chief hope of France in this direction lay in the disaffection of Naples and Sicily, overtaxed in a cause which was not their own. Here the naval power which Richelieu had created might be used to full advantage. This Mazarin saw, but he failed to find fit instruments to execute his policy, and perhaps to formulate that policy with clearness and precision. He made his first advance against the Spanish presidi on the coast of Tuscany and in Elba, the maritime outposts which linked Naples with the dependent Republic of Genoa and so with the Milanese. The neutrality of the Grand Duke of Tuscany was secured. The fleet was entrusted to Admiral de Brézé, a bold and skillful seaman (1646). Prince Thomas of Savoy was to command on land, part of the troops being drawn from Piedmont and shipped at Savona. The enterprise was mismanaged. Telamone and San-Stefano were seized; but, instead of Porto-Ercole, Orbitello was then attacked, an inaccessible fort girt with malarial swamps. The Spanish fleet came up and was beaten off by Brézé; but, to the great loss of France, the gallant Admiral himself was killed by a cannon-shot (June 14, 1616).

His lieutenant, Du Daugnon, pretending that his fleet required repairs, hurried off to Provence, where he left his ships and made for Brouage. This important command was vacant by Brézé’s death. Du Daugnon seized and held it in defiance of the Government; and, owing to the rivalries of Condé and Vendome, the post of Admiral remained unfilled. Meanwhile the Spaniards entered Porto-Ercole, whence they directed attacks against the besiegers. Other reinforcements came by land through papal territory. Prince Thomas was forced to raise the siege and return to Piedmont by land.

The design, but for the malarious climate of the Tuscan Maremma, was not unpromising. It failed, owing to the death of Brézé, the treachery of Du Daugnon, and the incompetence of Prince Thomas. Mazarin resolved to try again. In September a fresh expedition set forth under La Meilleraye, and at Oneglia took up troops from Piedmont commanded by du Plessis Praslin. Piombino was seized and Porto-Longone on the island of Elba was captured after a brief siege. A firm base was thus acquired for operations in the kingdom of Naples, should such appear desirable.

Mazarin was reckoning on disorder in Naples and Sicily. He was looking for a King to replace King Philip; and Thomas of Savoy had perhaps been chosen to lead the first expedition as the fittest person for such a post. Condé himself was sounded but refused. Fontenay Mareuil was sent to Rome to learn what could be learnt and to encourage a Neapolitan revolt. When the rebellion (described in a subsequent chapter) occurred, its course was uniformly unpropitious for Mazarin. It was a popular rebellion, whose leaders had no solid authority, and were not supported outside Naples. The nobles, even the middle class, were hostile. No Government was established with which the French King could treat. The intervention of the Duke of Guise was ill-judged and unwelcome. The French fleet appeared before Naples, but could not act in concert with Guise; its own operations were hesitating and indecisive; and it finally returned to Provence without attempting any serious action. The rebellion collapsed, and the places seized on Elba and in Tuscany were left isolated and insecure. Mazarin had seen what sea-power might do against Spain in Italy, but he failed to realize his vision. These failures seriously shook his prestige; and the enterprise against Milan which he undertook in conjunction with Savoy and Modena during the winter 1647-8 was equally unsuccessful.

Negotiations in Westphalia. [1643-8

Mazarin’s authority was shaken; but, before the ground actually crumbled beneath his feet, he was able to achieve one capital effort of statesmanship. He was a born negotiator; indeed his enemies averred that he was apt to negotiate when action was required. More than once his diplomatic action influenced the course of the great German War. When hostilities between Denmark and Sweden had for a time diverted one of the chief members of the coalition to easier fields of conquest, Mazarin was instrumental in bringing about the Peace of Brömsebro (1645). War between Poland and Sweden was another danger which he averted; and he secured French influence in Poland by arranging the marriage of Mary di Gonzaga with her King. He stirred up Rakoczy of Transylvania against Austria. He concluded at Copenhagen (1645) a separate treaty with Denmark which secured free passage for French commerce through the Danish straits. But the Peace of Westphalia was the great triumph of his diplomacy.

The preliminaries of a double Congress had been arranged in 1641; but no actual conference took place until 1644. The French envoys, d'Avaux and Servien, were dispatched in October, 1643; but their first mission was to the Hague, where they renewed the alliance with the United Provinces and bound the States General once more to conclude no separate peace (1644). Preliminaries were slowly advanced, and meanwhile the efforts of Mazarin were directed to securing the support, of the Imperial towns of Germany. He represented France as the champion of German liberties against the encroachments of the Emperor. He worked at the same time upon the German Princes, and, following Richelieu’s tradition, especially upon the Elector of Bavaria. After negotiations had definitely begun, the Duke of Longueville was sent, in order that a person of greater dignity and position might supplement the trained ability of Servien and d'Avaux and keep their jealousies in check.

Nothing could be more complicated than the conflict of forces and interests. On the side of France, satisfaction for the Swedes, the restoration of the Palatinate to its rightful lords, the demands of the United Provinces, the obligations incurred towards Catalonia and Portugal, the protection and support of the lesser German States—all these had to be borne in mind simultaneously with the claims of France to territorial extension in Alsace, the Sundgau, Breisach, Philippsburg, and in Flanders. On the other hand, the efforts of Spain were directed against peace; and, through her influence, at the end of 1646 the United Provinces were detached from the common cause; and in 1647 the Emperor seemed inclined to suspend negotiations. The secession of the Dutch, however, while making peace with Spain almost impossible, rendered the remaining problems more manageable; and, after the Elector of Bavaria had a second time been brought to his knees, after the battle of Lens had crippled for the moment the influence of Spain, Mazarin, whose position at home was becoming more and more precarious, made his last effort; and in October, 1648, peace was concluded between Sweden and France on the one hand and the Emperor on the other. Longueville had returned to Paris, and d'Avaux had been recalled; and thus Servien, who was in Mazarin’s complete confidence, was left alone to conduct the final negotiations. The Austrian rights and possessions Alsace and the Sundgau, with Breisach and Phihppsburg, were ceded to France. The three bishoprics of Toul, Metz, and Verdun, were abandoned in all sovereignty to France, who had held them by the right of the strongest since the time of Henry II. The French were to surrender the forest towns of Sackingen, Waldshut, Laufenburg, and Rheinfelden, and to pay an indemnity of three million livres to Archduke Ferdinand and Charles.

The terms secured for the allies of France have been detailed elsewhere. The Emperor abandoned the cause of the Duke of Lorraine, whose territories remained in French occupation. Duke Charles was forced to throw in his lot with Spain, while the Empire was debarred from affording any further assistance to the Spanish Power. The recognition of the right of the several Estates of the Germanic body to conclude separate treaties with foreign Powers left France at liberty to ally herself with any of the German Powers, or with any combination of them. The King of France was thus established as patron of Germanic liberties, which meant in effect of German particularism. The war of 1870 was needed to efface completely the consequences of this treaty.

Peace was indeed necessary for France, where discontent was rapidly coming to a head. The Spanish statesmen encouraged the rising insubordination, by which they hoped to profit, now that their account with Holland had been closed. Hence they declined the terms of Mazarin and did their best to break his treaty with the Empire. A Spanish garrison still held Frankenthal in the Palatinate; the Spanish Habsburgs had claims upon Alsace. That fortress and those claims they refused to surrender; and thus the Austrian House in compensation had to forgo the indemnity promised for Alsace, and to leave the cities of the Black Forest in the hands of France. Hard as these additional concessions were, to continue the war was even harder; in spite of the efforts of Spain, the Peace of Westphalia was ratified in February 1619.

The Fronde. The Parlements.

Mazarin was the heir of Richelieu, of his policy, of his system, of his debits and his credits. That policy had led to war by sea and by land, to north, south, east, and west. That system had mortgaged the future to meet the present, needs. The strain of six more years of war had not improved the financial situation. At Richelieu’s death the revenue for three years had been anticipated. It does not appear that the position was materially worse in 1648 than it had been in 1642. But every source of revenue had been pledged; the traitants or contractors had amassed enormous wealth; and each draft that the Government made upon the public revenue necessitated a new and a ruinous bargain with the great financiers. Against the territorial gains secured by the Treaty of Westphalia, we must, place an impoverished nation, an empty treasury, the domination of usury, the paralysis of law a precarious tyranny. Debts and assets alike Mazarin had inherited; he had not improved, he had not sensibly impaired his heritage. But, unlike Richelieu, he was unable to avoid the reckoning. The conflict, which began in 1648, was only a symptom of the deep- seated disorders of the State.

Mazarin’s opponents were desultory and irresolute, and, from their resemblance to the schoolboys who slung stones in the moats of Paris, and ran away when the authorities appeared, received their name of Frondeurs. The Fronde, which paralyzed the Government of France for five years, was the outcome of many forces, political, constitutional, social, and personal. In essence it was a revolt against the lawless despotism established by Richelieu. But the French kingdom, the French people, were not so organized as to offer much hope of reform by way of revolution. Of all French institutions the monarchy alone had the vitality required for the reconstruction of society. That was to be the task of Louis XIV and Colbert; they laid the foundations on which the Constituent Assembly and Napoleon built. Yet constitutional aspirations existed, and were stimulated perhaps by the example of rights successfully asserted beyond the Channel. The English Parliament was forced to use, to test, and to develop its powers. It had proved capable of successful warfare and of government, France also had her Parlement of Paris, her provincial Parlements, similar indeed in name alone to the two Houses of the English people, and representing but one narrow class, but invested with powers which were capable of considerable extension, possessed of a high and venerable tradition, the recognized exponents of the law, the would-be arbiters between King and people. Besides the Parlements, there were other “sovereign” bodies, the Cour des Aides, the Chambre des Comptes, the Grand Conseil, with definite though inferior functions, indispensable to the lawful action of the Government.

Richelieu had set himself to confine the Parlements to the adjudication of causes between party and party. In 1641 he had caused a declaration to be registered at a lit de justice, expressly forbidding the Parlement to take cognisance of any matter touching the State, its administration, or its government; edicts on such matters were to be registered and published without comment; and financial edicts could only be the subject of respectful representations; they could not be rejected or amended. But at the very beginning of the new reign the aid of the Parlement had been needed to ratify the reversal of the dispositions for the Regency made by the late King. The edict of 1641 had been treated as a dead letter. Richelieu had coerced the Parlement by exiling or imprisoning obnoxious councillors, and by depriving the contumacious of their offices. Mazarin, always averse from strong measures, had endeavored to reach his ends by conciliation and accommodation. The magistrates had ceased to fear; disorder and discontent produced a cumulative effect; until at length the Parlement was moved to attack the whole problem of government and to raise the most vital issues.

Since 1643 sedition had been growing. In that year revolts against oppressive taxation broke out in Poitou, Saintonge, Angoumois, Rouergue. In the following year there were risings in Alençon, in Dauphiné, a' Montpellier, and at Valence. The Controller-General, Particelli d’Éméry, showed considerable ingenuity in creating new debts to liquidate the old, in alienating revenues and domains, and inventing new offices to sell. But fresh sources of income were needed, and in 1644 the toisé was proposed. An old edict, which forbade the erection of buildings in a zone surrounding the walls of Paris, had been disregarded; and flourishing suburbs had grown up. The King’s Council issued an edict (January, 1644), imposing a tax of 40—50 sous on each square fathom (toise) covered by the illegal buildings. The occupants resisted, and the Parlement took up their cause. The tax was suspended for the time; and in its place a new proposal required all wealthy persons to contribute to a forced loan. But the Parlement insisted in the first place on exempting all members of the four sovereign Courts; and eventually so many restrictions were introduced that the forced loan, if levied, would have fallen on the financiers alone. The Government could not afford to offend the great financial interests; and in the end, after a struggle lasting over nearly two years, both toisé and taxe des aisés were abandoned. During the contest four members of the Parlement were exiled, or imprisoned; but the Government, was forced to recall the exiles, and the victory rested with the Assembly.

In 1647 a new tariff' was drawn up of dues to be levied on goods entering Paris, and was sanctioned by the Cour des Aides. This measure, if successful, would have been extended to the other towns of the kingdom. But the Parlement again intervened; and the struggle began once more and lasted through the year. In 1648 the expiration of the period for which the Paulette had been established seemed to give an opportunity of exacting concessions from the Parlement in return for its continuance, which involved the recognition of the heritable property of the magistrates in their offices. A lit de justice was held on January 12, 1648, at which edicts were registered revoking the tariff and the taxe des aisés, imposing new imposts, creating new offices, and especially twelve posts of maîtres des requêtes. The other maîtres des requêtes, resenting the consequent diminution of their individual profits, appealed to the Parlement; and the Parlement took up the examination of this and the other edicts, although they had already been registered. The Government, at its wits’ end for funds, proposed, in return for the continuance of the Paulette, to require four years’ salary from the magistrates concerned. The exemption of the Parlement from the effects of this measure did not suffice to win its support. The Parlement made common cause with the other sovereign corporations; and on May 15, 1648, it was agreed that representatives of each should be deputed to meet in the Hall of Saint-Louis, and discuss the general situation.

Thus the financial disorder had its political effect. Extraordinary measures were needed, for which the cooperation of the Parlement was indispensable. The ruinous nature of the expedients usually chosen could not escape observation. Remonstrance grew to expostulation, thence to resistance; and at last the four sovereign bodies united to take their stand, as protectors of their own interests in the first place, but incidentally as champions of the poor, as critics of the Government, and as defenders and reformers of the Constitution. For these functions, excepting that of criticism, these judicial bodies were ill-fitted. They knew nothing of the wider problems of government; they had never felt its responsibility; they possessed no legal power of initiative, no executive authority except that of administering and enforcing the law. Thus they were insensibly led to exceed their legitimate functions; their new activity found them without experience; and they eventually became the tools of selfish interests and ambitions.

Even their earliest efforts presented a medley of philosophic reform and impracticable conservatism. By July 12, twenty-seven articles had been prepared by the Assembly of the Hall of Saint-Louis, and had been laid before the Parlement for consideration, amendment, and adoption. These articles proposed such vital changes as the suppression of the intendants, the revocation of all contracts dealing with the tallies, and the reduction of the tailles by one-quarter. No edict imposing new taxes or creating new offices was henceforward to be valid without the consent of the Parlement voting freely; no person was to be detained in prison for more than twenty-four hours without being brought before his natural judges. Another article forbade the creation of new offices in the sovereign companies, and any change in their constitution, while others suppressed all commercial monopolies and privileges, and established a special Court of justice to deal with financiers. Finally the advances already made by the traitants were not to be repaid to them.

The union of the Chambers had been at first rigorously opposed by the Government. Some of the deputies were exiled, others imprisoned. But in June Mazarin ceased to resist the movement; the prisoners were delivered, the exiles recalled; and the Paulette was conceded to all the companies on the old conditions. Éméry was dismissed, and La Meilleraye, who knew more about siege-works than about finance, took his place (July). The intendants were abolished, except in the frontier provinces of Champagne, Picardy, Burgundy, Provence, Languedoc, where they were to be retained for military purposes only. The taille was diminished, and a Chamber of justice was established to investigate financial abuses. The uncertainty as to all bargains with the financiers led to a partial bankruptcy. The Government seemed to have capitulated.

Declaration of Saint-Germain.

But Mazarin was only temporizing. Condé was summoned to Paris in July; terms were no doubt then arranged with him, and a course of action was settled. An open rupture with the Parlement was to be avoided until a victory had been won; then the army of the Netherlands was to restore the royal authority. On the news of the victory of Lens the execution of this plan was begun. Two of the most uncompromising councillors of the Parlement, one of them named Broussel, were arrested. But the Government had reckoned without the mob of Paris, among whom de Retz, who now first comes to the front, had secretly established a powerful influence. On hearing of the arrests the people rose in arms; and during the night of August 26-7 innumerable barricades were raised and manned. The Government was helpless; Broussel and his colleague were released; and order was for the moment restored.

On September 18 the Court left Paris and retired to Rueil. To strengthen his own position and remove his rivals Mazarin procured the exile of Châteauneuf and the imprisonment of Chavigny. The Court was preparing to resist the Parlement, whose decrees were cancelled, when suddenly this course was abandoned, and negotiations were opened at Saint-Germain. Condé, who was now at Court, seems to have been the prompter of this change of policy. The envoys of the Parlement were admitted to treat; and on October 24 the Declaration of Saint-Germain was registered, which embodied the chief part of their demands, including a clause exempting all officers of justice from imprisonment under lettres de cachet, and one providing that no subject should be treated as a criminal otherwise than by legal process. The victory of the constitutional party seemed complete. But government was impossible on these terms. The revocation of the intendants crippled the administration; the remission of taxes meant bankruptcy; and the restrictions on fresh financial legislation were likely to cut off all sources of fresh revenues. The Declaration of Saint-Germain registered at Paris, and the Treaty of Westphalia signed at Münster on the same day, show the diverse results at home and abroad produced by the Richelieu-Mazarin policy.

With the Declaration of Saint-Germain the constitutional interest of the Fronde ends. France needed a strong Government. That principle was inadequately, unworthily perhaps, embodied in Mazarin. The monarchy needed settled principles, respect for law and justice. That need the Parlement dimly perceived. Had these two powers been able to work together, an orderly and law-abiding Government might have been established. But the Minister saw in law only the limitation of authority; the Parlement saw in Mazarin’s Government only the negation of law. Both might be excused for holding such views. But in consequence the principles formulated in the Hall of Saint-Louis remained a dead letter; the monarchy set itself steadfastly to nullify the concessions made to law and justice. Thus Mazarin did not dare to restore the intendants, but he employed commissioners drawn from parliamentary families with similar powers and for similar duties, and so enlisted individual councillors in the service of absolutism, which collectively they had condemned.

Henceforward principles recede more and more into the background. The struggle becomes a sordid conflict of individual ambitions with hardly a gleam of redeeming virtue. The various forces, personal and collective, group themselves variously at various times, and produce a complexity of disorder which hardly admits of simple exposition. But, neglecting minor complications, we may yet endeavor to fix the chief factors of the problem, and to indicate the principal issues at stake during the Fronde.

The central figure is Mazarin; the principal issue is his predominance. His strength lay partly in his elusive wealth of resource, his supple insistence, his unscrupulous opportunism, his patience and perseverance, but still more in the fidelity of his friends, especially that of the Queen-Mother. It seems impossible to believe that a simple relation of mistress and servant existed between the two; affection and trust seldom inspire such resolute attachment; the theory of a secret marriage, though not proved, is highly probable. Thus the cause of Mazarin, though not perhaps essentially the cause of the Monarchy, was always the cause of the Court, and could always rally to it the forces of loyalty and traditional obedience. The firm support of his able adherents, Servien, Lionne, Le Tellier, and the Fouquets, with many other humbler agents, also did much to win for him the ultimate victory.

The Duke of Orleans played in the Fronde a part not unlike that which he had played under Louis XIII. After the Queen he stood by right of birth highest in the realm. His name gave a semblance of legality to seditious action: his opposition diminished the credit of the Government. Thus each party made efforts and sacrifices to win him which far exceeded his personal value. He was governed by councillors who used his prestige to accomplish their selfish ends. The Abbé de La Rivière hoped by his means to win a Cardinal’s hat, and played fast and loose with Mazarin, to whom he owed his place; in the struggle he went down and de Retz for a time controlled the Duke. His romantic and headstrong daughter, Anne-Marie-Louise de Montpensier, la Grande Mademoiselle, had at one time hopes of marrying her cousin, Louis XIV, and more than once, acting in her father’s name, turned for the moment the course of events.

Condé stood second by birth in the hierarchy of princes, but his military talents and repute seemed to justify a boundless ambition. Several of the French regiments were raised by his family, and many of the officers obeyed him rather than the King. By instinct he supported the Crown; he was averse from the constitutional notions of the Parlement, and hated mob-rule. His many generous qualities were disfigured by arrogance; his biting tongue made him many enemies; in debate he was hasty and intemperate; he could not bear to be overruled, hardly to be questioned. His brother was now Governor of Champagne; he himself had Burgundy and Berry; in 1648 he received Stenay, Jametz, Clermont-en-Argonne, spoils of Lorraine, and other gifts. But he was not satisfied, and demanded further concessions for himself and his relations. His claims were inconsistent with the royal authority; and this, as much as his personal rivalry with Mazarin, drove him at length into rebellion. He was much influenced by women; and the counsels of his sister, Madame de Longueville, and of Isabelle de Montmorency, Duchess of Chatillon, had a great share in determining his course of action. His brother, Conti, without his talents, was a useful figure-head in the rebel camp, and was completely swayed by Anne de Longueville, who in her turn was governed by her lover, the Prince de Marsillac, afterwards Duke of La Rochefoucauld and author of the Maxims. Chavigny was firmly attached to the Condé interest, and, when this star was in the ascendant, was regarded as the natural successor of Mazarin. Châteauneuf, on the other hand, another aspirant to the post of Chief Minister, was pursued by the undying hatred of the House of Condé for his share in the condemnation and death of Montmorency (1632). He was therefore supported by the enemies of Condé.

The head of the illegitimate House of Vendome had but little part in these events. But the rivalry of his family with the House of Condé was an important factor, and had been clearly shown when the post of Admiral was vacated by the death of Brézé. His elder son, the Duke of Mercoeur. was won by Mazarin and married the Minister’s niece, Laure Mancini, in the critical year of 1651. His second son, Francois, Duke of Beaufort, escaped from Vincennes about the beginning of the troubles. He came to Paris before the time of the Barricades and was made the idol of the Paris Halles, and thus was closely associated with de Retz and the leaders of the Parisian Fronde. The populace of Paris was at first, enlisted in the cause of the parliamentary Fronde; afterwards it was used to coerce the Parlement, or the municipal government of Paris, as happened to suit the immediate ends of de Retz, or Beaufort, whose personal charm made him a power, while his stupidity made him the tool of cleverer men.

Paul de Gondi, better known as de Retz, Coadjutor to his uncle, the Archbishop of Paris, had as such a seat in the Parlement of Paris. There, by his insight and skill in guiding assemblies, he played an important part; in spite of his disorderly life he had considerable influence with the Church and especially with the clergy of Paris; he spared neither pains nor money to win the favour of the Paris mob. His ambition aimed first at the cardinalate and through that dignity at the post of Chief Minister; for this end he even endeavored to rival Mazarin in the Queen’s affections. Closely linked from the first with Madame de Chevreuse, and, according to his own statement, the lover of her daughter, he shifted his alliance as events suggested, working even will Mazarin, whose power was incompatible with his own ambitions; and his quarrel with Condé in 1651 did more than anything else to wreck the fortunes of the Fronde, then at the hight of its power. His memoirs assign to him a more important place in history than he really filled; but he was probably the ablest, as he certainly was among the least scrupulous, of the conspirators. He saw, perhaps more clearly than any, the political and constitutional needs of France; but he was willing to sacrifice every principle to his own advancement.

Over the army the Queen and the Chief Minister never completely lost control; even the prestige of Condé could only divert a few regiments from their allegiance; Turenne’s influence with Bernard of Weimar’s soldiery yielded to Mazarin’s gold. Turenne himself and his brother the Duke of Bouillon, though more than once they joined the rebels in the hope of recovering Sedan, were induced to accent compensation in other parts of France, and rallied to the Crown (1652). Thenceforward the Government had a leader of hardly inferior qualify to oppose to Condé and his Spanish allies.

The general and just discontent of France gave considerable strength to the rebels; the feeling against Mazarin outweighed for a considerable period all other considerations; but, apart, from personal rivalries, this feeling only found expression in the Parlements, and among the mob and the bourgeoisie of Paris. The provincial Parlements supported, though not firmly, the constitutional movement. That of Bordeaux, through its quarrel with Épernon, the Governor of Guienne, was dragged furthest into the revolutionary course; those, of Aix and Rouen were chiefly influenced by a personal grievance, the additional posts that had been created therein for financial purposes. The bourgeoisie came by degrees to see that the Princes cared even less for their interests than Mazarin had done. The lovers of peace and order gradually rallied to the Government; the nation possessed no alternative organization; individual leaders, one by one, lost credit or were reconciled; and at the last Condé was left, almost alone, to fight with foreign aid against his country and his King.

Space does not permit us to dwell on the women of the Fronde, whose activity gives to that movement its character of romance, inconsequence, and frivolity. But besides those mentioned above a place must be found for Claire-Clemence de Brézé, Condé’s slighted wife, who developed during his captivity unexpected qualities of fortitude and energy; and Anne di Gonzaga, wife of Edward, a son of the Elector Palatine Frederick V, who throughout the disturbances exercised a controlling and moderating influence. An able judge of political possibilities, she was the councillor of all and betrayed none, and eventually threw all her weight on the side of the Queen, contributing not a little to the final reconciliation.

Treaty of Rueil.

The course of events can only be briefly summarized. After the Declaration of Saint-Germain the Court returned for a time to Pars. The Parlement continued its attacks upon the Government; claims were put forward by Madame de Longueville on behalf of her husband and her younger brother which Mazarin was unable to concede; financial difficulties were chronic; the rentes were not paid; the Parlement grew more pressing; de Retz stimulated its opposition; the war of pamphlets, characteristic of this struggle, began to rage; and in January the Court decided to leave Paris and to bring the capital to reason by blockade. In this short war (January 6 to Apr 1, 1619) Condé stood firm by the Crown, and even Orleans remained with the Court; but Madame de Longueville, Conti, the Dukes of Beaufort and Bouillon, Marsillac, and de Retz, placed themselves at the head of the rebels in Paris, while Longueville raised Normandy. Negotiations were opened with Spain. Turenne was won for the rebellion, and was preparing to march with the army of Germany to its aid, when his troops, bought by Mazarin’s agents with money provided on the security of Condé’s jewels, deserted him, and he was forced to take refuge in Holland. Harcourt kept Longueville in check; the Spaniards sent an ambassador, who was received by the Parlement, but their army was slow to move; Rantzau, commanding at Dunkirk, who was suspected of treason, was seized and imprisoned: Condé directed the blockade, which became more and more pressing; the Parisian levies could not face the regular troops; and finally the rebels were forced to treat (March 4). On April 1 the Treaty of Rueil was registered in the Parlement. Arms were laid down; the Bastille and the Arsenal were surrendered; a complete amnesty was conceded; and no general meetings of the Parlement were to be held till the end of the year. The Declaration of Saint-Germain was confirmed; and the decrees against Mazarin were annulled. Efforts were made to meet the exorbitant demands of the rebel leaders; but they remained unsatisfied, and the peace was only a truce.

The provincial risings on this occasion were not dangerous. Movements at Rheims, in Anjou, Poitou, Maine, were easily suppressed. The members of the Parlement of Aix, who had attacked their Governor, the Comte d’Alais, were for the time satisfied by the suppression of the new posts in their Court, but sporadic conflicts continued Provence throughout the period. The Parlement of Normandy came to terms, and Longueville was fain to accept the amnesty. At Bordeaux, after the general cessation of hostilities, the city and the Parlement continued to make war on the Duke of Épernon; but for the present this conflict seemed to have only local and personal significance.

All the principal persons were ostensibly reconciled with the Court; even Beaufort and de Retz paid their visits of ceremony in August; but discontent was only repressed, not cured; and thus, for the Minister no less than for France, peace was much to be desired. But to secure peace with Spain on tolerable terms some striking success was needed to counterbalance the effect produced by the internal troubles. An effort was accordingly made in the north, and the Court went to Amiens to support it; but the best leaders were ruled out, Turenne by his recent treason, Condé by the attitude of his family. Harcourt, who received the command, proved an inferior substitute; siege was laid to Cambrai and afterwards abandoned; the results of the campaign were insignificant. Condé might have extorted peace; confidence and employment might have kept him steady. By slighting and suspecting him the Government gave to Madame de Longueville and her friends their opportunity; the Prince was surrounded by youthful and arrogant nobles, the petits- maîtres, who exacerbated his passions and stimulated his ambition. When the Court returned to Paris in August Chavigny reappeared; in September an open quarrel occurred between Mazarin and Condé over the proposed marriage between the Duke of Mercoeur and Laure Mancini; Mazarin was not yet ready for an open breach and in October consented, in return for Condé’s promise of support, to make no important appointment without consulting him. The honors which Condé procured for his friends and their wives excited jealousy at Court, not unwelcome to Mazarin.

In December the rentiers, whose interest was not regularly paid, appointed deputies to press their claims; and a pretended attack upon one of these deputies was got up by de Retz to discredit the Government. By accident or design, in the disorder which followed, a shot was fired into one of Condé’s carriages; and the Prince brought forward in the Parlement a formal charge of attempted murder against Beaufort, de Retz, and Broussel, the leaders of the old Fronde.

Mazarin’s enemies were now divided. Condé affronted the Queen by protecting the Chevalier de Jarzé, who, as she thought, had personally insulted her: by assisting the Duke of Richelieu, a minor, to a secret marriage the Prince showed designs upon Havre, of which the Duke was titular Governor, and offended Madame de Chevreuse, for whose daughter the Duke had been intended by his guardian, and Mazarin who had hoped that he would marry one of his nieces. The cup was full; Mazarin adopted the course long urged by de Retz and Madame de Chevreuse; in order to secure Orleans La Rivière was dismissed; and on January 18, 1650, Condé, Conti, and Longueville were arrested and imprisoned at Vincennes. Madame de Longueville fled to Normandy; driven from Dieppe, driven from Arras, she at length reached Stenay, where Turenne had taken refuge. Tavannes took command of Condé’s troops in Burgundy. But the alliance of Mazarin and the old Fronde, supported by Orleans and the Vendome family, seemed strong enough to face any opposition. As a symbol of the new policy, Châteauneuf was recalled and received the seals. Chavigny was ordered to leave Paris.

The course of events was in fact favourable for a time. Marsin, who was at the head of the army of Catalonia, and devoted to Condé, was arrested at Perpignan. Gaston was left to conduct the Government at Paris under the guidance of Le Tellier and Servien, while the Court made a series of military expeditions. Normandy was completely subdued, and Longueville’s officers were displaced. Richelieu was obliged to give up Havre. Condé’s fortresses in Bar were recovered except Stenay. Tavannes was forced to surrender Bellegarde in Burgundy, and his army was disbanded. Turenne concluded a treaty with Spain (April 30), but some time elapsed before he could act vigorously. At Bordeaux the principal resistance concentrated; hither repaired Claire-Clemence, Condé’s wife, with her little son, Bouillon with forces drawn from his county of Turenne, La Rochefoucauld with the levies of Poitou. After a visit to Compiegne, to provide for the defence of the northern frontier, the Court at length returned to Paris (end of June) and prepared for the main expedition, that of Guienne, where La Meilleraye with the King’s forces was already confronting the rebels.

On August 1 the Court was in the neighborhood of Bordeaux, having purchased the neutrality of Du Daugnon at Brouage, by confirming him in the irregular command which he had held since 1646. Negotiations were at once begun, but were interrupted owing to some unnecessary severities, which led to reprisals on the part of the rebels; and prolonged operations were needed to bring the town to reason. An amnesty and peace were at length granted to Bordeaux on easy terms (September 29). The Princess of Condé, Bouillon, and La Rochefoucauld, received liberty to retire whither they pleased. The King and the Court entered Bordeaux, and the south-west appeared pacified. In the south, Provence alone still gave cause for anxiety. Montrond, the last stronghold of the Princes in the centre of France, surrendered towards the end of October. But, when the Court returned to Paris in November, Mazarin still saw work to be done.

While the Court was before Bordeaux, the Spaniards under Turenne had advanced into Champagne, captured Rethel and Château Porcien with other places, and defeated Hocquincourt near Fismes (August 26). This advance had terrified Paris, and necessitated the removal of the Princes to Marcoussis, a castle to the south-west of Paris near Limours. Mazarin was anxious to restore his prestige by recovering the lost places; and, after patching up an accord with Orleans and removing the Princes to Havre for greater security, he set out in December, and successfully accomplished his task, defeating Turenne. But, while he was away, a conspiracy that had long been preparing gained strength.

Mazarin had found his allies of the Fronde exacting. The nomination as Cardinal, which Retz had demanded, he thought it impolitic to concede. During his absence the Coadjutor had won more and more influence over the Duke of Orleans, and now saw his way by an alliance with the imprisoned Princes to clear Mazarin from his path to power. This alliance had been prepared by the Princess Palatine, and involved the exile of Mazarin, the liberation of the Princes, the post of Chief Minister for Châteauneuf, and the marriage of Conti to Mademoiselle de Chevreuse; it was not, however, concluded till the end of January. In December a petition for the release of the Princes was presented to the Parlement, who proceeded to consider the question. Just before Mazarin’s return de Retz declared for liberation; and during the whole of January the Chief Minister, deprived of the Queen’s effective aid by her illness, maintained an unequal fight to prevent the union of his enemies. On February 1 Retz announced to the Parlement that Orleans had decided for the release, which was voted a few days later, together with a demand that Mazarin should be dismissed. On the night of February 6-7, 1651, Mazarin quitted Paris, leaving the Queen to extricate herself and protect his interests. But she was detained by force, and became practically a prisoner in the hands of the Fronde. In vain Mazarin tried to win credit by releasing the Princes from prison (February 13). For the moment the game was up, and the Minister fled through Picardy and Lorraine to Bouillon, and thence to Brühl, in the diocese of Cologne.

The alliance of the two sections of the Fronde did not last long. Mazarin from his place of exile corresponded constantly with the Queen through Lionne, Servien, and Le Tellier; and his friends, though for a time he thought otherwise, served him well. The elements of discord were skillfully utilized. The nobility and clergy assembled at Paris and demanded a meeting of the Estates General, a proposal distasteful to the Parlement. It was found necessary to break up the assembly of the nobles after promising a meeting of the Estates when the King should have attained his majority. The Parlement demanded that all Cardinals should be excluded from the King’s Council, as owing allegiance to a foreign Power. Both Châteauneuf and Retz, as aspirants to that dignity, were menaced by this decision. The pretensions of Condé were equally incompatible with their ambitions. The dismissal of Chateauneuf and the substitution of Chavigny seemed to show that Condé had abandoned Retz, and was determined to reign alone. The announcement made the same day (April 15), of the rupture of the marriage between Conti and Mademoiselle de Chevreuse proved at least that he cared little if this was believed, or what other persons he might offend. Orleans was thereby alienated; and the Princess Palatine, whose plighted word had been treated as null and void, was bitterly aggrieved.

The supremacy of Condé, though temporary, was for the moment complete. He held Burgundy and Berry besides his strong places in Bar. His brother was Governor of Champagne. His friends were installed in the governments of Limousin, Saintonge, Angoumois, Anjou, and Bearn. The Condé regiments were united in the north under Tavannes. He now obtained Guienne in exchange for Burgundy, and claimed Provence instead of Champagne for his brother, two provinces chosen as discontented and accessible to Spanish naval aid. It was indeed desirable to remove Épernon and d'Alais; but, prompted by Mazarin, the Court resisted Condé’s demands. Retz approached the Queen’s advisers to urge the murder or arrest of Condé. Condé was warned; in July he left Paris and exacted as the condition of his return the dismissal of Le Tellier, Servien, and Lionne, which was reluctantly conceded; but Chavigny at the same time was removed from office. The Parlement intervened (August) to reconcile Condé and the Queen, but to no purpose. In despair she turned to Retz. A new Ministry was formed. Châteauneuf was restored. The seals were given to Matthieu Molé, the intrepid and independent First President of the Parlement; the finances to La Vieuville, as a reward for the services of his friend, the Princess Palatine, who was drawing closer and closer to the Queen. Retz was to have the Cardinal’s hat; and Mademoiselle de Chevreuse was to marry the young Mancini. The new alliance had only one bond of union— hatred of Conde, which reconciled for the moment the incompatible interests of Retz, Chateauneuf, and Mazarin. Each party to the treaty had the firm intention of duping the others; and Retz did well to obtain an effective nomination (September 21) and to take his own measures at Rome to hasten the action of the Holy Father, while the unstable coalition lasted.

Secure for the moment, of Retz and his friends, the Queen summoned on August 17 a great meeting of Princes, officials, the sovereign Courts, and the municipal authorities of Paris, and laid before them a formal indictment of Condé. Condé and Retz appeared in the Parlement, each supported by an armed force; and on August 21 a fracas occurred, in which Ret narrowly escaped murder at the hands of La Rochefoucauld. The Court seemed to hesitate; immediately before the ceremony of the King’s majority (September 7) the charges against Condé were withdrawn, and the banishment of Mazarin was confirmed. Rut Condé’s patience was exhausted; he left Paris on September 6, and, backed by Orleans, demanded that the establishment of the new Ministry should be deferred. When this was refused, he moved southward. On September 15 he was at Montrond, with his sister, Nemours, La Rochefoucauld, and a few other friends; and there they persuaded him to declare for open war. Conti joined him later.

Rebellion of Condé.

Condé relied upon Bordeaux, where the Parlement and above all the populace were still in open revolt; on the fleet at Brouage and La Rochelle, where Du Laugnon was Governor; on Marsin, who had been replaced a command of the army in Catalonia; on Tavannes, who was at the head of the Condé troops with the army of Picardy; on Stenay, one or two places in Burgundy, and the stronghold of Montrond in the Bourbonnais; on the influence of La Rochefoucauld in Poitou, of Rohan in Anjou, of La Force in Perigord; and above all on Turenne. He seized the public money in the districts where he was master, and levied the tallies. Marsin brought him four regiments from Catalonia; the rest were loyal. Tavannes collected the Condé regiments at Stenay. Orleans controlled a certain number of troops and might be won. But Torenne and his brother refused to fight against the King, now that there was no longer any Regency; and Condé was driven to make a disastrous alliance with Spain. In return for the promise of men and money he engaged himself to make no peace in which Spain should not be included. To “faith unfaithful falsely true”, he was held in bondage by this treaty; he could in consequence offer no terms which the Court could accept. His Spanish allies supported him when failure seemed imminent and withdrew their aid when complete success appeared possible; they loyally stood out for his complete restitution in 1659; but until peace was signed they used him as an instrument to weaken France; they did not desire to see him in power.

In the south during the winter Condé was steadily forced back by Saint-Luc and Harcourt. The Spanish fleet appeared in the Gironde and occupied Bourg. Negotiations were opened with Cromwell; and an extraordinary scheme for a republican government of France was drawn up under Condé’s name. Meanwhile Mazarin had been recalled; and on January 29, 1652, he reached Poitiers with a little army raised in Liege. The news of his return decided Orleans to join the rebels (January 21), but this defection was more than counterbalanced by the arrival at Court of Turenne and Bouillon (February 2); the duchies of Chateau Thierry and Albret, the counties of Evreux and Auvergne, were the compensation for Sedan, and the price of their adhesion. In February the rebels were driven from Anjou, and Angers fell, in spite of Beaufort;, who was commanding Gaston’s troops. In March Tavannes joined him with the Condé regiments from the north, and Nemours with a Spanish contingent. But Beaufort was incompetent and quarrelsome; the royal advance continued and the city of Orleans was only saved by the picturesque intervention of Mademoiselle de Montpensier (March 25). In these circumstances Condé, who had been struggling hopelessly in the south, decided to take command on the Loire; he left Agen with a few followers (March 23), and joined his army at Lorris on April 1. A week later he surprised that portion of the royal army which was commanded by Hocquincourt at Bleneau, and drove it in rout, capturing 1500 men. The Court at Gien was in danger but was saved by the skill of Turenne. But, instead of following up his success, Condé repaired to Paris, where he remained for some months; perhaps entangled by the Duchess of Chatillon, but also retained by the necessity of watching Orleans and de Retz.

Turenne reorganized the royal army, defeated the rebel army at Étampes (May 4), and laid siege to that town. To save it, the Spaniards detached the Duke of Lorraine; he crossed France, plundering and burning; but, unwilling to risk the army which was his sole possession, he contented himself with persuading Turenne to raise the siege, and, when threatened by that general, returned to the Netherlands. After his retreat Turenne occupied Saint-Denis with 12,000 men, menacing Condé’s army of 6000 at Saint-Cloud. Wishing to reach a safer position at Charenton Condé asked leave to pass through Paris, which was refused, and, while making for this point by a detour to the south, he was caught by Turenne at Saint-Antoine and forced to fight with his back to the gate among the houses of the suburb. After a fierce struggle, in which Turenne’s forces were roughly handled, artillery came up and Condé’s defeat seemed in view, when Mademoiselle de Montpensier extorted from her father permission to unbar the gates and the Bastille opened fire on the royal troops. The remains of Condé’s army took refuge in the city (July 2).

A rising had already taken place in Paris on June 25, in which some officers of the Parlement suffered violence. On July 4 the mob attacked the Hôtel de Ville, wither an assembly representative of all the interests of Paris had been called; some thirty of the deputies were killed or wounded and the Town Hall was burnt. The enemies of Condé alleged that he had instigated this outrage in order to force the city to join his cause. Amid growing dissatisfaction, on July 20, a provisional Government was established by authority of the Parlement, with Orleans as Lieutenant-Governor. Condé as Commander in-Chief, Beaufort as Governor of Paris, and Broussel as Provost of the Merchants. But this was the last effort of the Fronde. Money could not be raised. The army was melting. Disunion prevailed. Beaufort killed Nemours in a duel. On August 6, by royal decree, the Parlement was transferred to Pontoise, and the rival assembly there established steadily grew in authority and numbers. To facilitate an accommodation, Mazarin once more withdrew from France (August 19) and a general amnesty was offered.

Return of Louis and Mazarin.

On August 9 Vendome had defeated Du Daugnon and the Spanish fleet off Ré. Montrond capitulated early in September. The agents of Mazarin stimulated the Parisian populace against the Fronde, which was becoming more and more unpopular. The Spanish Government determined to make one more effort to support the faction; and early in September the Duke of Lorraine and Ulric of Wurttemberg, with 8000 men, set forth for Paris. Turenne met them at Villeneuve-Saint-George and held them in check all through September. Retz and Châteauneuf opened abortive negotiations with the Court; even Chavigny was willing to abandon Condé, but, crushed by his master’s wrath on hearing of his treachery, he fell ill and died (October, 1652). Towards the end of September the change of feeling in the capital became unmistakable; Broussel resigned; and the King was invited to come to Paris. The supply of provisions to the Duke of Lorraine was stopped. He was forced to retire, and Condé followed him. Beaufort resigned, and Gaston announced his intention of retiring to Blois. On October 21 the King entered Paris, and the Government was re-established. Beaufort, Chateauneuf, Rohan, Fontrailles, with ten councillors of the Parlement, and the Duchesses of Chatillon and Montbazon, were exiled; and an edict was registered forbidding the Parlement to concern itself with questions of State, administration, or finance. Orleans retired to Blois and ordered his troops to withdraw from Condé’s army. Retz was offered a mission to Rome; on his refusal he was arrested (December 19). He escaped in 1654 and went to Rome, where for a time the Pope supported him against Mazarin, who wished him to resign his claims to the archbishopric of Paris. Later, he was forced to leave Rome and became a wanderer. He resigned his see in 1662, and was permitted to live in France, but took no further part in affairs.

Mazarin’s return was delayed by the necessity of resisting Condé in Champagne, where he had firmly established himself. After recovering Chateau Porcien and some less important places, the Cardinal left Rethel and Sainte-Menehould in the hands of the enemy, and in February, 1653, returned to Paris, where he resumed all and more than all of his former power. Of his enemies and rivals, Condé was a proclaimed traitor and commander-in-chief of the forces of Spain, Retz a prisoner, Bouillon, Chavigny, and La Vieuville dead; Châteauneuf died in this year. The Parlement was humbled. Turenne was the King’s servant, and the King identified Mazarin’s authority with his own. Only a few outlying troubles remained to be remedied. Bordeaux, where Conti and Madame de Longueville had ruled by the aid of a violent faction, called the Ormée, had to be reduced to obedience. Harcourt, as Governor of Alsace, had taken advantage of the disorder to seize Breisach for himself and made overtures to Spain and Lorraine. Du Daugnon still held Brouage, and one or two other leaders were in possession of governments which they could not be permitted to retain. Mercoeur, the new-Governor of Provence, needed aid to establish his authority against the Comte d'Alais, now Duke of Angouleme, who had joined the party of Condé. Épernon, who had been assigned to Burgundy in place of Condi, had to reduce Dijon and Bellegarde. Bordeaux made terms on July 31, 1653. Conti received his pardon; Madame de Longueville returned to her husband and after his death entered a Carmelite convent; the Princess of Condé followed the Prince to Flanders; Marsin took refuge in Spain. Guienne was restored to the Duke of Épernon. When Harcourt came to terms and surrendered Breisach (March, 1654) the Fronde was ended.

End of the war between Spain and France.

During the troubles France had steadily lost ground in Italy and the Netherlands. In 1849 Ypres was taken by the Spaniards, and Modena made peace; in the following year Piombino and Porto-Longone fell. In 1651 Barcelona was captured, and on the Flemish frontier Fumes and Bergues-Saint-Vinox. In 1652 France was forced to abandon Gravelines, Mardyk, and Dunkirk, while Casale surrendered and was assigned to the Duke of Mantua as the price of his adhesion to Spain. From 1653 onwards the tide turned, slowly at first, afterwards more rapidly. The campaigns in which the genius of Condé was matched against the high ability of Turenne are full of interest to the military historian, but only the general results can be indicated here. Turenne had the advantage of the ungrudging support of his Government and that of undivided authority; and, though France was seriously embarrassed, her resources were yet superior to those of Spain. Condé on the other hand was hampered by the jealousy of his colleagues, and sometimes by the timidity of a superior. Moreover, owing to the clause in his treaty which gave him the sovereignty of any conquests he might make on the soil of France, the Spanish Government stood to lose by any reverse and not to gain by his success. Hence, in spite of some brilliant strokes, the fortune of war was on the whole adverse to him and his allies.

In 1653-4 he was driven from Rethel and Sainte-Menehould in Champagne and from Stenay and Clermont in Lorraine, and, defeated before Arras, had the poor consolation of making a skillful retreat. Mazarin’s intrigues with Lorraine led the Spanish Government to arrest Duke Charles (February, 1654); and his troops took service under the Ring of France in the following year. In 1655 Landrecies and other places were taken by the French, and treasonable intentions of Hocquincourt to surrender Peronne and Ham were discovered and frustrated. In 1656 negotiations for peace were opened, but the Spanish demands on behalf of Condé proved an invincible obstacle; Turenne’s defeat before Valenciennes (July 16, 1656) stiffened the resolution of Spain; and Mazarin broke off the discussion. Further successes were needed before he could obtain such terms as he desired. The Cardinal had already more than once approached Cromwell with a view to joint action against Spain; he recognized the Commonwealth in 1652; the peace of April, 1654, between the English and the Dutch seemed to offer hopes; but the Vaudois and other misunderstandings ensued, and the Treaty of Westminster (October 24, 1655), which established friendly relations between England and France, and led to the expulsion of Charles II and the Duke of York from French dominions, was only a step in the right direction. At length in March, 1657, by the Treaty of Paris, it was agreed that the two Governments should together undertake the conquest of Mardyk, Dunkirk, and Gravelines. Operations began in May, and Mardyk fell in September. The French arms, however, suffered a reverse before Cambrai (May 30); and it was not till 1658 that the allies got effectively to work. Dunkirk was invested (May); Don Juan of Austria and Condé were defeated at the battle of the Dunes by Turenne, whose force included 6000 English (June 14); the city surrendered a fortnight later and, with Mardyk, was handed over to England as agreed. Bergues-Saint-Vinox, Dixmuyden, and Fumes were then recovered in rapid succession. On July 29 Gravelines was invested, and a month later it surrendered. The conquests of Oudenarde, Menin, and Ypres followed.

The Peace of the Pyrenees.

In the same year Mazarin had succeeded in extorting from the new Emperor, Leopold, before his election, a promise to cease his clandestine support of Spain, and had joined the League which was formed to maintain the independence of the Princes of the Empire as secured by the Treaty of Westphalia. Deprived of the assistance which the Austrian House had been supplying, the position of Spain was becoming more and more desperate. A proposal to marry Louis to the daughter of the Duke of Savoy was perhaps intended as a lure; at any rate towards the end of 1658 Spain offered peace and the Infanta Maria Teresa. An armistice was concluded in May, 1659; but the Infatuation of Louis for Marie Mancini, one of the Cardinal’s nieces, threatened to ruin the plan. This obstacle was, however, removed, and negotiations proceeded with goodwill on both sides from August to November, when the Treaty of the Pyrenees was signed. France retained Gravelines but surrendered all her other Flemish conquests except Bourbourg and Saint-Venant. Between Bourbourg and Saint-Venant Spain kept Saint-Omer and Aire, but abandoned the rest of Artois. In Hainault France acquired Landrecies and Le Quesnoy: between Sambre and Meuse, Avesnes, Philippeville, and Marienbourg: in Luxemburg, Montmedy, Damvillers, and Thionville. The county of Charolais and a few French conquests in Franche Comté were given back to Spain. The Spanish King resigned all his rights in Alsace. The last forts in Catalonia were evacuated by France; and the Pyrenees became the frontier between France and Spain on this side. The King of France promised to give no aid to Portugal; the Dukes of Savoy and Modena were to be restored to the positions which they held before the war. To Condé the possession of all his rights was secured, together with his office of Grand Maître, and his government of Burgundy. In return he ceded his remaining fortresses, Rocroi, Le Catelet, Linchamp, to Louis XIV. Maria Teresa abjured all rights in the succession to the Spanish Crown; but a clause stipulating the payment of her dowry as a condition of this renunciation left a loophole for dispute hereafter. The peace contained clauses in favour of the Duke of Lorraine: but he refused the terms offered, and made his own peace in February, 1661. Bar was then restored to him on condition of homage: France received Moyenvic, Clermont, Jametz, Stenay, Sierck, Pfalzburg, Saarburg. The fortifications of Nancy were razed, and France retained the right of passage through Lorraine from Metz to Alsace. On these hard conditions his duchy was restored to him.

The last years of Mazarin saw other questions settled. The restoration of Charles II in 1660 took place without much assistance from France; Hyde’s party, then in favour with the English King, resented Mazarin’s caution, maliciously advertised such surreptitious aid as he provided, and did their best to counteract the influence of Henrietta Maria. In 1660 Gaston of Orleans died, Louis visited, and finally pacified Provence; and his marriage was celebrated at Fuenterrabia (June). The rash enterprises of Sweden, which Mazarin had viewed with alarm, were terminated by the death of Charles Gustavus; and peace was restored in the north-east of Europe by the Treaties of Oliva (May 3, 1660) and Copenhagen (June 6, 1660) under the influence of France. Henrietta of England was married in March, 1661, to the Duke of Orleans, brother of the French King; and France set on foot the scheme for the marriage of Charles II with the Portuguese Princess, Catharine of Braganza. When Mazarin died (March 9, 1661) he might claim that he left all in order, except the administration and the finances of France.

Even before the Fronde, war had ravaged the frontier provinces, and taxation had devastated the interior of France; Lorraine, especially, was a desert. In 1646 it is said that 23.000 persons were in prison for failure to pay the tailles. The gabelle furnished a third of the convicts. Troops protected the tax-collector, and the usurers gave him his orders. In January, 1048, Omer Talon said, “The country has been ruined for ten years”; and his testimony is supported by the sober judgment of Matthieu Molé. The Fronde brought war and the pillage of unpaid troops to almost every part of France. The environs of Paris and Bordeaux suffered most, but few regions escaped, except perhaps Britanny, the Lyonnais, and Dauphiné, on which the taxes fell with added weight. The Croats and other horsemen under Johann von Werth, the mercenaries of Charles of Lorraine, made destruction a fine art; but even among French troops discipline was impossible without pay. The charity of Saint-Vincent de Paul and of the votaries of Port Royal, hardly touched the fringe of the distress, which'continued long after the Fronde had ceased. The Mediterranean was given up to pirates; plague followed on famine; hard winters and inundations aggravated the misery; and 1658 and 1660 were years of more than usual scarcity. The cessation of civil war revived the rule of the usurers.

Mazarin owed much to the Fouquets. Basile Fouquet (the Abbe) was his chief of secret police, both during and after the Fronde. Nicolas was useful in the Parlement as procureur-general. Their services were rewarded by the installment of Nicolas at the head of the finances in 1653. Servien, nominally his colleague, became a cipher. Fouquet, charged with the receipt of revenue, had funds to meet such expenditure as he favoured, and none when payment did not suit his purpose. His influence with the financiers, in whose illicit gains he shared, made him useful to Mazarin, who shut his eyes to his defalcations, and perhaps had a part of his gains. The enormous fortune (thirty millions) left by Mazarin must have been almost entirely accumulated after the Fronde. Fouquet rendered no exact account of receipts, and bought up old claims at a low figure, which he then paid in full. On the death of Servien (1059), Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who managed Mazarin’s private fortune, denounced Fouquet’s transactions to his master, but Mazarin contented himself with a warning. Fouquet bought everyone who was worth buying. The money, which he made by fraud, he spent like a prince. Of men of letters he was the magnificent patron. At the death of Mazarin he was the most powerful man in France, and prepared, if necessary, to assert his power by civil war. The story of his fall must be reserved for a later volume.

It is said that Mazarin on his death-bed left Colbert as a legacy to his master, with the advice to rule in person and without a Chief Minister, two gifts that were more valuable than all the Cardinal’s fortune. Both Richelieu and Mazarin possessed transcendent gifts, but the task of universal government must always be beyond one man’s power, especially when complicated by the necessity of preserving a precarious ascendancy and defeating incessant intrigue. Neither Minister attempted to establish, perhaps neither dared to establish, machinery to supplement his individual deficiencies. Only a King can delegate power without impairing his authority. The inordinate, ambition of Louis XIV laid arduous burdens on his people; but his personal rule was at least free from the gravest defects that disfigure the brilliant record of the two Cardinals.

The personality of Mazarin fills his period no less than that of Richelieu the previous eighteen years. In both periods all serious public action in France was directed by or against the Chief Minister. But whereas Richelieu gave a new form to the polity of France, the energies of Mazarin were devoted to working out in his own way the formulas provided by his predecessor. In foreign policy he garnered where Richelieu had sown. At home he perpetuated Richelieu’s errors and supplied none of his omissions. The second period seems to repeat the first; only the means of action are different. While Rihelieu relied mainly on force for the accomplishment of his ends, Mazarin trusted to subtlety, adroitness, diplomacy, and tact. Forces which Richelieu would have crushed, at the risk of perishing in the attempt, Mazarin allowed to grow and work till they became dangerous; he then eluded, diverted, managed them, until their energy was exhausted. The brilliant victories of France, and the disorders of the Fronde, may alike be attributed to this more elastic policy; but in the result Mazarin, though always the central point of all observation, seems rather to follow than to direct the course of affairs. By adopting in every crisis the less detrimental of alternatives presented, he secured in the end successes more complete and substantial than his predecessor; but he added no new idea to the repertory of statesmen; the ends which he reached had already been indicated before his coming, a consummate opportunist, he left no distinctive and individual mark on the State or policy of France.