THE AUGUSTEAN EMPIRE (44 B.C.—A.D. 70)

CHAPTER XXIV

THE YEAR OF THE FOUR EMPERORS

I.

GALBA

WHEN Nero died in AD 68 nearly a hundred years had passed since the battle of Actium. During this period, though many wars had been waged on the frontiers, the Empire was saved from the civil strife which had darkened the last days of the Republic. The names of Pharsalus, Philippi, Perusia, and Mutina recalled such painful memories that many critics of the Principate were reconciled to its existence by the thought that, whatever its defects, it had secured for the Roman world the blessing of internal peace. The task of Augustus had certainly been rendered easier by the fact that the world was, in the words of Tacitus, ‘wearied of civil discord’, and was therefore prepared to welcome a strong government at almost any cost. It was this feeling which secured the continuance of the system which he had founded even under less able successors. Men were so well aware that a disputed succession would almost inevitably lead to civil war that they were prepared to accept as their ruler any candidate who could trace descent by birth or adoption from the deified Augustus. Although in theory the Principate ended on the death of each princeps, the hereditary principle had been recognized in practice, and the imperial family had come to occupy a position of unrivalled prominence in the State.

While it is a mistake to describe the early Principate as a military monarchy, there can be no doubt that the loyal support of the army was essential to the emperor. Tiberius came to the throne with an established reputation as a general, and even the unwarlike Claudius took a personal part in the invasion of Britain. As the princeps received the salutation of imperator when a victory had been gained by one of his generals it was only reasonable to demand that he should not be absolutely devoid of military capacity and experience. The reign of Nero had seen some remarkable military achievements in Britain and the East, but these achievements had been gained by Suetonius Paulinus and Corbulo, and the Emperor had never even visited in person the scene of operations. His musical performances and artistic ambitions put such a severe strain on the loyalty of the armies that the idea began to be entertained that more was required from an emperor than descent from Augustus, and that a more worthy holder of the office could be found outside the imperial family. If, when the situation became critical in the spring of AD 68, Nero had shown some personal energy and put himself at the head of an army, his authority might have been restored, for the forces arrayed against him were not very powerful, and he was not without friends and admirers. But his nerve collapsed and he found in suicide the only escape from his difficulties.

What had finally driven Nero to despair was the action of the Senate in declaring him a public enemy, but at such a crisis this body was not in a position to play a really decisive part. Though the higher officers of the army were to be found among its members, it had since the time of Augustus exercised no military authority, and had been compelled when the throne was vacant simply to ratify the choice of the soldiers. As has been shown above, the support given to Galba by Nymphidius Sabinus and the praetorians determined the action of the Senate in outlawing Nero. The troubled period which followed made clear the essential weakness of the Senate’s position: it could do nothing to influence events, and was compelled to confer the imperial titles on a succession of men who owed their success to the sword.

Discontent with the rule of Nero had been growing since the death of Burrus and the fall of Seneca had removed from his side the two men who had guided the policy of the Empire during the earlier part of his reign. The feeling which prevailed in senatorial circles had been shown in the Pisonian conspiracy, and soon the commanders of armies began to be alarmed for their own safety and to fear that they might share the fate of Corbulo and the Scribonii. But the first move came not from one of the great armies but from C. Julius Vindex, a romanized Gaul, who was at the time governor of one of the three ‘unarmed’ Gallic provinces, probably Lugdunensis. He got into communication with various army-commanders in the west, and sounded their feelings, and finally in the spring of 68 rose openly against the tyrant, whom in a manifesto he was bold enough to describe as among other things a bad lyre-player. In his place he suggested the name of Servius Sulpicius Galba, governor of Nearer Spain, one of the very few members of an ancient family who at that time occupied an important command. To him Vindex wrote offering to support him in a bid for the principate with an army of 100,000 Gauls and received a not discouraging reply. What were the ultimate objects of Vindex has been the subject of much controversy. It is possible that the idea of an Imperium Galliarum, independent of Rome, originated with him, but definite proof is to seek. In any case his influence in Gaul was limited. While some important tribes— notably the Aedui, Arverni, and Sequani—answered his appeal, an equally important group—the Treveri and Lingones—was prepared to take up arms against him. It seems probable that though the primary aim of Vindex was not the independence of Gaul or (as has been suggested) the restoration of the Republic, but rather the substitution for Nero of a more worthy successor, the legions on the Rhine regarded him as the leader of a nationalist movement whom it was their duty to crush. The rising of Floras and Sacrovir under Tiberius had shown that no Gallic revolt could succeed so long as it was opposed by the Rhine armies, whose twofold duty it was to protect the frontier against invasion and to keep an eye on the provinces of Gaul.

While Vindex was besieging the colony of Lugdunum, which remained faithful to Nero in contrast to the neighbouring city of Vienna, which gave active support to the rebel, he learned that Verginius Rufus, commander of the army of Upper Germany, was advancing against him with at least three legions and strong auxllia and with his raw levies drew out to meet him. Near Vesontio (Besançon) the two armies met. What followed is not quite clear, though afterwards Rufus claimed credit for the defeat of Vindex. It was said that the two leaders parleyed and actually came to an agreement, but that the legions insisted on fighting against the wish of their commander, who expressed sorrow when, after the loss of 20,000 of his troops, Vindex committed suicide. Probably this story was put into circulation after the accession of Galba, whose relations with Vindex were close, in order to protect Verginius. Tacitus always connects him with the defeat of Vindex, and it is probable that, as has been said, he thought it his duty to suppress what he took to be a movement against the integrity of the empire. Elated by their victory the troops immediately offered the principate to Rufus. Though now and subsequently he refused the honour, there is no reason to suppose that he was inspired by any devotion to Nero personally. He probably considered that he was disqualified by being the son of an eques. It is legitimate to regret his decision, for there can be little doubt that he would have been successful against Galba, whose military strength was so much weaker, and that his accession would have spared the Roman world the misery from which it was at last saved by Vespasian, a man who on grounds of birth had no greater claim to the throne.

Though the rising of Vindex ended in disaster to himself it was successful in bringing Nero’s rule to an end, for it is doubtful whether Galba would have thrown off his allegiance if the suggestion had not come from Gaul that he should come forward as a ‘champion of the human race’. He had indeed been warned that Nero was compassing his death, but the elderly governor of a province in which only one legion was stationed would scarcely have acted as he did unless he had hoped for armed support elsewhere. On April 2 he allowed himself to be hailed at New Carthage as Legatus senatus populique Romani, and prepared to make his action effective by raising in the province a new legion and auxiliary troops. In this he was supported by T. Vinius, the legatus of the Spanish legion, whom Galba dispatched to Rome to look after his interests, by M. Salvius Otho, governor of the neighbouring province of Lusitania, and by A. Caecina, quaestor of Baetica, who succeeded Vinius as legionary legate. When the news of the defeat of Vindex reached Spain, things looked black for Galba, and he retired to the remote city of Clunia, where he is said to have contemplated suicide. But about the middle of June his freedman Icelus arrived with the news that Nero was dead and that Galba had been accepted as emperor by the Senate and the praetorians.

It is not surprising that the candidature of Galba was welcome to the senators, for, unlike his possible rival Verginius, he was a man of ancient lineage who traced his descent from several leading nobles of the Republic. He had reached the consulship as far back as the reign of Tiberius, and at the time of his accession was 73 years of age. Under Gaius he had governed Upper Germany with vigour, and on the death of the Emperor in 41 had been considered as a possible successor. Since 60 he had been in Spain, where his administration had towards the close of his eight years of office shown a decline in energy. He was undoubtedly too old a man to perform adequately the difficult task to which he was called. Probably most of his supporters regarded him as a stop­gap, and it is in this sense that we should interpret the well-known epigram of Tacitus, ‘omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset.’ For there was nothing in his previous career to show that he possessed outstanding qualities of intellect or character, still less that elasticity of mind which would have alone enabled him to deal with so difficult a situation.

Though Galba had been recognized by the Senate his success was not everywhere greeted with enthusiasm. On the death of Nero the German legions had made a second unsuccessful attempt to persuade Verginius to aim at the throne, and delayed some time before taking the oath of allegiance to the new emperor, who shortly afterwards recalled Verginius, treating him with cold respect. His successor was not likely to increase the popularity of Galba on the Rhine: Hordeonius Flaccus was a lame man of advanced years whose period of rule in Germany was destined to end in disaster. The governor of Lower Germany, Fonteius Capito, was suspected, perhaps unjustly, of designs against Galba, and was summarily murdered by two of his officers, one of whom, Fabius Valens, who was to play an important part in the events of the following year, expected more gratitude from Galba than he actually received. Trouble also arose in Africa, where L. Clodius Macer, legatus of Numidia, refused to recognize the new regime, raised a second legion, and threatened the corn-supply of Rome. His coins show that he posed as a champion of the Republic. Galba sent orders for his murder, which were promptly carried out.

In Rome itself the accession of Galba was marked by bloodshed. The prefect of the praetorians, Nymphidius Sabinus, who had persuaded his soldiers to renounce their allegiance to Nero, had evidently hoped to become the right-hand man and possibly the successor of the aged emperor. Accordingly when Cornelius Laco was appointed in his place he lost his head and actually attempted to seize the empire for himself. This was too much for the troops, who were not prepared to support the son of a freed­woman, even if he claimed to be an illegitimate son of Gaius, and he was cut down by them. Galba would have been well advised to show some appreciation of this proof of loyalty by paying the donative which Nymphidius had promised to the praetorians on his behalf, and which was commonly granted on the accession of a new emperor. His soldierly remark that he ‘chose his men and did not buy them’ was in the circumstances a tactless one. A bad impression was also made by the execution without trial of the consul-designate Cingonius Varro, who had stood in close relations to Nymphidius, and of Petronius Turpilianus, an ex-consul, whose only fault was that he had been chosen by Nero to command an army against the rebels.

Galba showed a similar want of sense in his policy in Gaul, where the situation called for tactful handling. The tribes which had joined Vindex were rewarded by gifts of citizenship and by reduction of taxes, while the Treveri and Lingones were deprived of territory, and Lugdunum was punished by confiscation of its revenues. The conduct of Verginius Rufus in refusing the throne met with no appreciation, and he was deprived of his command. Thus although the legions on the Rhine took the oath of allegiance, their support was half-hearted, and Galba’s behaviour produced discontent which was soon to burst out into open rebellion.

The unpopularity of the new emperor was increased by his choice of advisers. He was supposed to be entirely in the hands of three men, to all of whom Tacitus gives a very bad character, Titus Vinius, his legionary legate in Spain, who was chosen to be the colleague of the Emperor in the consulship, Cornelius Laco, the new prefect of the praetorians, and the freedman Icelus, who was given equestrian rank. Vinius was friendly with Otho, who accompanied Galba from Spain, and who was believed to be a suitor for the hand of his daughter. It must have been a disap­pointment to the Senate who had welcomed Galba’s accession that he chose his associates from men who were regarded with little respect.

It was not till the autumn of 68 that the Emperor, who had been met at Narbo by a deputation of the Senate and perhaps of the praetorians, entered the city of Rome. Outside the walls an unfortunate incident occurred. Galba was met by the former soldiers of the fleet whom Nero in his last days had trained for legionary service and who now appealed for recognition as a regular legion. Some dispute arose which led to bloodshed, and this was afterwards magnified into the statement that thousands of innocent men had been massacred.

The behaviour of Galba in Rome did nothing to remove the bad impression created by the events which have been described. With the laudable desire of restoring the finances of the State which had suffered from Nero’s extravagance, he took steps which caused offence without producing much revenue. A commission of thirty equites was appointed to recover from the recipients nine-tenths of the sums which Nero had lavished on his favourites, but the money had been spent and the efforts of the commission were futile. The Emperor’s meanness alienated both the population of Rome which had been kept in a good temper by Nero’s festivals, and the soldiers who failed to receive the promised donative. Though some of the less prominent members of Nero’s entourage were put to death, the notorious Tigellinus, who was held responsible for the worst actions of his master, was saved through the influence of Vinius and retired to a life of luxury at Sinuessa, until on the accession of Otho he was driven to commit suicide.

News of the unpopularity of Galba in Rome had reached the legions on the Rhine. Accordingly when on the first of January 69 they were called upon to renew the oath of allegiance the two legions stationed at Mainz overthrew the statues of the Emperor, imprisoned the centurions who opposed them, and called upon the Senate and People of Rome to choose a successor. When this news arrived in Rome a few days later Galba felt that he must take the step which was long overdue of adopting as his son a man who might support and eventually succeed him. In this matter he showed the want of tact which had characterized him throughout. On January 10 he announced that his choice had fallen on a certain Piso Licinianus, who was descended from Crassus on his father’s and from Pompey on his mother’s side, but who had no qualifications other than noble birth and a blameless and austere character. His family had been persecuted by Claudius and Nero, and he himself had just returned from exile. The praetorians received the news of the adoption of Piso without enthusiasm, though their prefect Laco had been his principal supporter, but from the Senate he had naturally a more cordial reception.

Piso was destined to occupy the position of heir-apparent for not more than five days. His selection by Galba had been a great blow to Otho, who had hoped to succeed him, and whose prospects of doing so had seemed up to the present distinctly good. Not only had he the support of Vinius, but he was on cordial terms with Galba himself, who often dined at his house: on these occasions Otho had taken the opportunity of acquiring popularity with the soldiers by making gifts of money to the troops who accompanied the Emperor. Among the praetorians he had two agents who by gifts and promises had prepared the way for the step which he had no doubt for some time considered that it might be necessary to take. When the adoption was announced Otho felt that the time had come for immediate action and that otherwise he would be in imminent danger of bankruptcy if not of death or exile.

The fifteenth of January 69 was fixed for the attempt. On the morning of that day Otho was called away while attending on Galba, who was sacrificing before the temple of Apollo. At the ‘golden milestone’ in the forum he was met by 23 praetorians, who placed him in a litter and hurriedly conveyed him to the camp, where he was hailed emperor by the soldiers with such enthusiasm that the officers did not dare to resist. In a speech he inveighed against the cruelty and avarice of Galba and his subordinates and called for their death.

The position of the Emperor was now quite hopeless. There were indeed in the city a few troops other than the praetorians, the remnants of a force raised by Nero for the wars in the East which he had been planning at the end of his reign, drawn from the legions of Germany and the Danube. Of these the German troops were not ill-disposed to Galba, who had treated them well, but when it came to the point they did not fight for him, and the Danubian soldiers were actively hostile. The legion which he had raised in Spain he had rather rashly sent off to Pannonia1, and the soldiers of the fleet (now Legio I Adiutrix) had not forgotten their reception on his arrival. Literally the only troops at the emperor’s disposal were a single cohort which was on duty at the palace. It was difficult for him to know what had actually happened. A rumour reached him that Otho had been killed, and a soldier arrived waving a bloodstained sword and claiming to have done the deed. These reports encouraged Galba, contrary to the advice of Vinius, to descend into the forum and see what he could do by his personal influence. The buildings which surrounded the forum were thronged with people who looked on with horror at the last scene in the life of the Emperor. When Otho heard that he had left the palace he ordered his troops to act. ‘And so Roman soldiers, as though they were seeking to expel Vologeses or Pacorus from the ancestral throne of the Arsacids and not to massacre their aged and unarmed emperor, scattered the plebs before them and trampled on senators, as with threatening arms they galloped into the forum.’ The few soldiers who accompanied Galba deserted him. He fell from his litter near the Lacus Curtius, and was killed as he lay on the ground. His death was followed by the murder of Vinius in spite of his protests that he was Otho’s friend. The unfortunate Piso was struck down in the temple of Vesta, where he had taken refuge, and Laco and Icelus soon shared his fate. The heads of the murdered men were fixed on poles and carried among the military standards but were afterwards secured by the relations of the dead and given burial. The body of Galba was buried by one of his slaves in his private gardens.

Such was the tragic end of Galba. During the seven months of his reign he had committed a succession of blunders, and can fairly be considered responsible for his failure. But the task which he had too lightly undertaken was one of incredible difficulty, which could only have been successfully performed by a man of outstanding brilliance. Galba was, in the words of Tacitus, ‘of mediocre ability, rather lacking in bad than endowed with good qualities.’ It is true that Vespasian succeeded in establishing a stable government though his birth was low and his character prosaic. But in the months which had elapsed since the death of Galba Italy had twice experienced the horrors of civil war, and was prepared to accept almost any ruler who could give it peace.

II.

OTHO

The new emperor received a cordial welcome from those elements in the population of the city which had resented the austerity and meanness of Galba’s rule, for he had at one time been a close intimate of Nero, and had not yet attained the age of thirty-seven. Otho was a man of good though not of ancient family. His grandfather had entered the Senate under Augustus, and his father had been given patrician rank by Claudius. His friendship with Nero had come to an end in 58 when a quarrel arose between them over his beautiful wife Poppaea, as a result of which the young husband, though only of quaestorian rank, was appointed governor of the province of Lusitania in order that the Emperor might monopolize the lady, who afterwards became his wife. It is not surprising that after this treatment Otho, who had governed his province in quite a creditable fashion during ten long years, gave his support to Galba when he rose against the tyrant. There is some evidence that his character had matured, and that in happier circumstances he might have proved not unworthy of the high position to which he attained. But his reign, which had begun amid scenes of brutal assassination, was destined to last only three months, and he was to fall a victim to the hostility of the German armies, for which not he but Galba was responsible.

After the horrible scenes of January 15 Otho showed considerable moderation in the exercise of his power. He rescued from the praetorians the eminent soldier Marius Celsus, who had remained faithful to Galba to the last, and treated him with great respect. He realized that tact was required in his dealings with the Senate, which had obediently conferred on him the tribunicia potestas and the other customary powers, for he knew that this official recognition would increase his prestige in the provinces. With his brother he held the consulship till March 31, when he was succeeded by Verginius Rufus. He allowed the praetorians to choose two prefects to succeed Laco, and settled some long-standing grievances about the conditions of service. When a body of soldiers, who had heard a rumour of a plot against his life, burst into the palace demanding a massacre of senators, he dealt with the matter firmly but without undue severity.

Otho must have been well aware that he could not retain his power without fighting for it. It is true that the legions of the Danube and the Euphrates at once took the oath of allegiance to him and that he hoped to secure the loyalty of Spain, where he was known and on some communities of which he bestowed favours. But on the Rhine the situation had developed so rapidly that a conflict with the German armies was inevitable, and Otho would have been well advised to make preparations for the defence of Italy sooner than he did.

As has been said, the news of the refusal of the legions of Upper Germany to swear allegiance had reached Galba about a week before his death, though it is uncertain whether he ever knew of the extent of the disaffection. Immediately after his accession Otho must have been informed that another claimant to the throne had been proclaimed on the Rhine. The news of what had happened at Mainz had reached the army of Lower Germany on January 2 and called for immediate action. About a month earlier the command had been taken over by Aulus Vitellius in succession to the murdered Fonteius Capito. Vitellius was the son of a distinguished senator who had held the consulship three times, had rendered valuable military services to Tiberius, and had been the colleague of Claudius in the censorship1. Though, as events were to show, no more unsuitable candidate for the principate could have been found, he had made himself popular with the soldiers since his arrival by removing some of their grievances. Accordingly he was hailed as emperor by his own troops and immediately afterwards by those of Upper Germany also.

The principal agents in this movement were not Vitellius himself but two legati legionum: Alienus Caecina and Fabius Valens. Caecina was one of the numerous people whom Galba had alienated. As quaestor of Baetica he had supported him and been given command of Legion IV in Upper Germany, but more recently the Emperor had earned his hostility by accusing him of embezzling public money. Valens, legatus of Legion I at Bonn, was an older man, who had been responsible for the death of Fonteius Capito and had kept Galba informed about the doings of Verginius, services which he thought had not been adequately appreciated. The neighbouring tribes, the Treveri and Lingones, who deeply resented their treatment by Galba after the defeat of Vindex, welcomed with enthusiasm the action of the armies, and it was not long before the governors of the adjacent provinces, Belgica, Lugdunensis, and Raetia, signified their adherence. Aquitania, the Spanish provinces and Gallia Narbonensis hesitated for a little, but eventually decided for Vitellius, and Britain was nomin­ally on his side, so that he had the support of all the western part of the Roman Empire. On the other hand, the legions of the Danube and Euphrates and the provinces of Egypt and Africa declared at once for Otho, not, says Tacitus, from any party feeling but because he held the city and had been recognized by the Senate. The stage seemed to be set for a great struggle between East and West.

The advance of the German armies to Italy had begun before the news arrived of the death of Galba and the accession of Otho. The new emperor was personally unknown in Germany, but it cannot have been forgotten that he had supported Galba at the time of the rising of Vindex. The fact that he owed his success to the praetorians would not endear him to the legionaries, who felt towards the garrison of Rome a mixture of dislike and envy. In any case things had gone too far to stop. Otho made advances to Vitellius, offering him a peaceful place of retreat, but the energetic supporters of the latter took good care that they were refused.

The forces which were to invade Italy were divided into two armies under the command of Caecina and Valens, while Vitellius himself was to follow with a third army. Caecina, who had at his disposal some 30,000 soldiers of the army of Upper Germany, was to advance through Switzerland over the so-called Pennine Alps by the Great St Bernard Pass. A somewhat larger body of troops under Valens took the much longer route through Gaul to Lyons and thence down the Rhone and over the western Alps to the Plain of Lombardy. This army consisted of large detachments from the legions of Lower Germany, and another legion (I Italica) which happened to be at Lyons joined it when that city was reached. Eight Batavian cohorts, which normally were attached to Legion XIV, and were at the time quartered in the territory of the Lingones, were put under Valens’ command, and proved a somewhat troublesome element in his forces. The army with which the Vitellian leaders invaded Italy must have numbered about 100,000 men, to whom Otho without the assistance of the Danubian legions could oppose merely the city troops and one legion (I Adiutrix) which had been raised quite recently and was without experience of active service. Great as was the prestige of the praetorians, they had seldom seen service in the field.

The advance of Valens through Gaul was a terrifying experience for the tribes which had joined Vindex, for they could only escape from plunder and massacre by giving active assistance to the Vitellians. Even as it was, a panic broke out in Metz which caused the death of 4000 men. The colony of Vienna, which had been the headquarters of the rebellion, barely avoided destruction. Cities and individuals paid large sums to Valens in order to avoid giving house-room to his troops. Even more unpleasant incidents marked the progress of the army of Caecina. On its way to the Alps it had to pass through the territory of the Helvetii, where it came into conflict with the local militia, which was on bad terms with Legion XXI at Vindonissa and was not inclined to support Vitellius. Fury was not unnaturally roused by the conduct of the Helvetii in arresting a party of soldiers under a centurion which had been sent to invite the legions of Pannonia to throw off their allegiance to Otho. The result was that the territory of the tribe was laid waste, many thousands killed, and the capital Aventicum with difficulty saved from destruction by an appeal to Vitellius himself.

While Caecina was still north of the Alps he received good news from Italy. The ala Siliana, which had served under Vitellius in Africa, and was glad to do him a service, declared for him and secured the adherence of the principal cities north of the Po.

Though Caecina was tempted to cross the Arlberg Pass and gain the support of Noricum before crossing the Alps he decided that delay would be dangerous and that his first duty was to occupy North Italy before Otho was able to do so. Accordingly he led his whole army through the snow of the St Bernard Pass and by the beginning of March had reached Cremona, which was inadequately defended by a single cohort of Pannonians. The city of Placentia on the south bank of the river Po had already been occupied by the Othonians.

Otho was now in a difficult but not entirely hopeless situation. The provinces which had sworn allegiance to him contained seventeen legions, but most of these were far away and time was on the side of his opponents. In the East the Jewish war was only in suspense, and in Moesia the situation was such that it would probably have been dangerous to reduce the garrison. At this very time the province was invaded by 9000 cavalry of the Roxolani, and though they were annihilated by M. Aponius the governor, the presence of a strong body of Roman troops on the lower Danube was obviously desirable. On the other hand the four legions of Pannonia and Dalmatia were not far from Italy, and there was every reason to hope for their support if the communications with the north-east were kept open and the Vitellians prevented from closing the roads which ran south-west from Aquileia. Several experienced generals were at Otho’s disposal, Suetonius Paulinus, who had crushed the rebellion of Boudicca, Marius Celsus, who had served under Corbulo, and Annius Gallus. But the troops actually in Rome were unlikely without reinforcement to prove a match for the German legions. Their number cannot have exceeded 25,000 and they were lacking in military experience. Otho was actually reduced to arming a body of 2000 gladiators.

Though much precious time was wasted by Otho during the first weeks of his short principate, when he decided on action he showed a true appreciation of the military situation. It was indeed too late to close the Alpine passes or to recover the western part of the plain of Lombardy, but he saw that the line of the Po must be held at all costs. Accordingly the army which was dispatched (probably early in March) under Annius Gallus and Vestricius Spurinna was instructed to occupy the important city of Placentia, where the Via Aemilia crossed the river, and to keep open the lines of communication with Aquileia. Spurinna established himself in Placentia, and Gallus probably crossed the Po at Hostilia and occupied Mantua or Verona. Soon after Otho himself left Rome with the rest of his army accompanied by Paulinus and Celsus. The large number of senators who followed him did not go farther than Mutina, a considerable distance south of the river.

A part of Otho’s inadequate forces was employed on an enterprise which, if it had been better timed, more efficiently led, and organized on a larger scale might have proved very embarrassing to the invading army. A body of troops was dispatched by sea to Narbonese Gaul with the object of hampering the advance of Valens. It is possible that Otho supposed that the Vitellians would approach Italy along the Ligurian coast, but in any case if a large army had been landed at Frejus and had marched rapidly up-country it might have delayed Valens long enough to enable Otho to defeat Caecina before the arrival of his colleague. But the campaign was hopelessly bungled. The force employed was far too small and was under the command of officers of low rank for whom the troops had no respect. The expedition was dispatched too late to hinder the advance of Valens. As the fleet sailed up the coast it burned villages and plundered the inhabitants. The town of Albintimilium, the capital of the Maritime Alps, was sacked. When the news of these doings reached Valens, who may already have crossed the Alps, he felt that some action was necessary, and detached certain auxiliary troops including a squadron of Treveri under Julius Classicus, who was soon to be well known as a leader of the revolt against Rome in Gaul. Some of these troops occupied Frejus, while the remainder moved east against the Othonians. In the battle which followed the Vitellians were defeated, but instead of advancing inland Otho’s soldiers retired to Albingaunum in Liguria, while the Vitellians occupied Antipolis. The army of Valens had not been seriously weakened nor delayed: on the other hand the Othonian army on the Po had been deprived of some troops which could ill be spared.

The operations in the north of Italy began in a way which was not discouraging for Otho. The small force—three praetorian cohorts, 1000 legionaries, and some cavalry—which had occupied Placentia showed an aggressive spirit that Spurinna found quite embarrassing. But the arrival of Caecina at the head of his army convinced the soldiers that they could not expect to do more than hold the city for Otho. This they did successfully, so that Caecina was compelled to abandon all hope of securing the crossing and to content himself with the occupation of Cremona. The reinforcements which Gallus was bringing to Placentia were able to return as their services were not required. The body of gladiators under Martius Macer took up a position opposite Cremona and made raids across the river which did great execution among Caecina’s troops. Here also the officers incurred unpopularity by restraining the eagerness of their men. Rightly or wrongly their loyalty to Otho was distrusted, and this suspicion affected the Emperor himself with unfortunate results.

The greater part of the Othonian army took up its position at Bedriacum, a village on the Via Postumia about twenty-two miles east of Cremona, at a point where it was joined by the road from Verona, along which reinforcements from the Danube were expected to arrive. Some troops, both legionaries and auxiliaries, had already reached Bedriacum from Pannonia and Dalmatia, so that Otho’s forces were probably not greatly inferior in numbers to the army which Caecina had brought from Germany. Caecina was annoyed by his failure to capture Placentia and was eager to gain some success before the arrival of Valens. But the plan which he adopted nearly involved him in disaster. He hoped by a feint attack to entice the Othonian army into an ambush which he had placed in the woods which lined the Via Postumia at a point about twelve miles from Cremona. Unfortunately for him, this rather simple plan was betrayed to the enemy, who turned it to their own ends. When Caecina’s cavalry retired the army of Paulinus and Celsus followed, but halted before reaching the point where the Vitellian ambush was stationed. The soldiers emerged prematurely from their hiding place and poured out on to the road. By a skilful series of movements the Othonian generals drew them into a position where they were completely surrounded. If Paulinus had at once given the order to attack a very serious blow would have been inflicted on Caecina’s army, but he delayed and thus enabled the Vitellians to escape, though considerable execution was done on them as they retired. The battle of Locus Castorum, as it was called, discredited Caecina and did not increase the popularity of Paulinus with his men. Skilful as his dispositions had been during the battle, his failure to make full use of his success encouraged his enemies to suggest disloyalty. But he was probably wise not to lead his wearied army to Cremona, where he would certainly have encountered fresh troops.

Soon after this the situation was altered to Otho’s disadvantage by the arrival at Cremona of the army of Valens. His advance had been delayed by a serious mutiny which nearly cost the commander his life: his proposal to detach the Batavian cohorts for the defence of Narbonese Gaul had aroused the fury of the soldiers. Another mutiny was nearly caused by the news of Caecina’s misadventure at Locus Castorum which reached the army at Ticinum. The combined Vitellian forces at Cremona must have numbered nearly 100,000 men. Both sections were eager for battle, the army of Caecina in order to wipe out the memory of its reverses, the army of Valens in order to silence the complaints about its late arrival. The generals decided however that a frontal attack along the Via Postumia was undesirable. They hoped that the enemy would take the offensive, and in the meantime started work on a bridge over the Po close to Cremona, which when completed would enable them to turn the position of the Othonians.

A council of war was now held at Bedriacum at which Otho himself was present. Strong arguments in favour of delay were put forward by Suetonius Paulinus, who pointed out that the enemy’s forces had reached their maximum strength, while they themselves had everything to gain by waiting for reinforcements. Their communications, he said, both with the capital and with the East were secure, and their emperor enjoyed the advantage of having been recognized by the Senate and People of Rome. On the other hand, the enemy would soon find it difficult to obtain supplies, and if the war lasted till the summer the German troops would suffer from the heat. Though similar views were expressed by Celsus and Gallus, Otho pressed for an immediate attack, and was supported by his brother Titianus and by Proculus, the prefect of the praetorians, who considered that use should be made of the undoubted enthusiasm of the soldiery before it had time to grow cold. The Emperor had his way and it was decided to attack at once. The army was put under the command of Titianus, and the more experienced generals were subordinated to him. Otho withdrew across the Po to Brixellum, taking with him a considerable body of troops. There seems to be no good reason against accepting the opinion of Tacitus that the absence of the Emperor from the battle weakened the morale of the soldiers, who were devoted to him and distrusted their other commanders.

The so-called first battle of Bedriacum has been the subject of much controversy. There is some reason to think that the original intention of the Othonians was not to march direct to Cremona but to reach a point where they might threaten the communications of the enemy. However this may be, the intention was not carried out and the conflict took place not far from the walls of the city. When the army halted for the night some six miles from Bedriacum, Paulinus and Celsus strongly opposed a farther advance but were not listened to by Titianus and Proculus, who received urgent messages from Otho ordering an immediate attack. The result was that when Otho’s troops came into touch with the enemy they were weary after a long march over difficult country, distrustful of their leaders, and demoralized by rumours that the Vitellians were prepared to make peace. Their opponents on the other hand were warned of their approach and had plenty of time to make preparations. The battle consisted of a number of separate encounters, in one of which Otho’s new legion (I Adiutrix) distinguished itself by capturing the eagle of the veteran XXI Rapax. But elsewhere things went badly for the Emperor. Legion XIII from Pannonia proved no match for V Alaudae, and the praetorians failed to justify their reputation. The arrival of the Batavian cohorts, fresh from a defeat of the Othonian gladiators, finally decided the result of the battle. The whole of Otho’s army took to flight along the Via Postumia, and was cut down as it fled by the pursuing Vitellians. Paulinus and Proculus slipped away, but the other generals tried to rally the troops, though they recognized that the situation was hopeless. The praetorians murmured that they had been betrayed, that much of the army was still at Bedriacum or with Otho and that the legions of Moesia had not yet arrived. When the Vitellian army reached a point five miles from Bedriacum it halted, hoping, as proved to be the fact, that it would be spared the necessity of assaulting the camp. The next day surrender was offered and before long the soldiers of the two armies were fraternizing with each other.

When the news of the defeat reached Otho at Brixellum he abandoned all hope, and although the praetorians who were with him and envoys of the Moesian legions tried to persuade him that success was yet possible he decided to put an end to the bloodshed by taking his own life. After destroying all papers which might compromise his adherents he retired to his room and the next morning was found dead. Otho seems to have had the power of inspiring personal devotion, for some of the praetorians committed suicide at his tomb, but, on the whole, it is difficult to pass a favour­able judgment on him or to agree with the view that Tacitus has done him less than justice. There are indeed a few obscurities in the narrative of the historian, but he seems to have been well informed about the details of the campaign, for which good sources of information were available. Otho can hardly be excused for lingering two months in Rome before setting out to face the Vitellians and for taking no effective steps to secure that the Danubian legions should reach Italy in time to be of use. The dispatch of an ade­quate force to North Italy in January might have stopped the advance of Caecina before it reached the Po. Even Placentia does not seem to have been occupied until the very last minute. The expedition to Narbonese Gaul, which shows some trace of military imagination, was badly mismanaged and did little to hamper the movements of Valens. Finally at Bedriacum he distrusted the able generals, whose services he was fortunate to command, and by removing himself to a distance from the battle failed to gain the full advantage from the personal attachment of the troops which was his chief asset.

III.

VITELLIUS

When the news reached Vitellius of the success of his generals before Cremona and of the death of Otho he was still in Gaul preparing to advance into Italy. He had held a levy for the purpose of reinforcing the depleted legions on the Rhine and had summoned from Britain a detachment of 8000 men. At Lyons he was met not only by Caecina and Valens but by Suetonius Paulinus and other generals of Otho, who disgraced themselves by pleading that the battle had been lost through their treachery. All were pardoned by Vitellius and Marius Celsus was even allowed to hold the consulship to which he had been nominated by Galba. It would have been wise to show the same clemency to certain centurions who were put to death in cold blood, an act which infuriated the Danubian legions, whose support it might at this stage have been possible to secure.

The first problem to be settled was how to treat the defeated troops. Vitellius decided to send Legion I Adiutrix to Spain and Legion XIV, which had arrived in Italy soon after the battle, back to its old quarters in Britain. The Batavian cohorts, who had quarrelled violently with their former associates when both were stationed at Turin, were dispatched to Germany, where they were soon to give further trouble. Of the Danubian legions VI and XI were sent back to their provinces, while XIII, all of which had been engaged at Bedriacum, was given the humiliating task of building amphitheatres at Cremona and Bononia. The detachments of the Moesian legions which had reached Aquileia returned to their province in a very bad temper. Vitellius was probably unwise in disarming and discharging the praetorians who had fought for Otho, and in creating sixteen new cohorts drawn entirely from the soldiers of the German army. This humiliation of what had regarded itself as a corps d'élite was deeply resented, and Vespasian was to find enthusiastic supporters among the ex-praetorians. In dealing with his own army Vitellius showed an unjustifiable confidence in the strength of his position. Many Gallic auxiliaries were sent back to their own country, and from motives of economy recruiting for the army was stopped and soldiers were invited to ask for discharge.

It was, however, a large army, amounting to 60,000 men, which accompanied Vitellius to Rome. About the end of May he reached Cremona in order to visit the scene of the battle, where bodies were still lying unburied, and after attending gladiatorial shows in the new amphitheatres at Cremona and Bononia he proceeded south. During his advance the troops were given the same license to plunder as they would have enjoyed had they been marching through hostile territory. Not only did they often use their weapons against the peaceful inhabitants but they quarrelled among themselves, legionaries taking up arms against auxiliaries. Seven miles from Rome some citizens who out of curiosity had come to meet the advancing army were nearly massacred because they had treated the soldiers with what was considered undue familiarity. Vitellius entered Rome like a conqueror, escorted by four legions with their eagles and by detachments of four others, as well as by twelve alae of cavalry and thirty-four cohorts, of auxiliary infantry. The conditions under which the troops lived in the city completed the process of demoralization which had begun during the advance. They were quartered all over Rome in temples and porticoes, subject to no kind of discipline. Many Germans and Gauls died of disease contracted in the low-lying region of the Vatican during the hot Italian summer.

Vitellius had been unduly elated when the news arrived that the Eastern legions had sworn allegiance to him, and did not realize that his army would soon be required to fight again. In Rome he showed a certain geniality in his behaviour, supporting in person his candidates for the consulship and attending regularly the meetings of the Senate, where he allowed views opposed to his own to be expressed. He refused at first the title of Augustus, and his power was crumbling before he allowed himself to be called Caesar. Caecina and Valens were appointed consuls for September and October, but the Emperor did not hold the consulship himself, though at the very end of his life he adopted the style of consul perpetuus. He posed as the successor of Nero, to whose shades he made offerings. But his personal character earned for him nothing but contempt, and his gluttony was such that it cost the State 900 million sesterces during his short reign, though he declared himself unable to find the money necessary for important purposes. His freedman Asiaticus was as prominent as Icelus had been under Galba. Caecina and Valens did nothing to enhance the prestige of the new régime, and vied with each other in ostentation, seizing property which rightly belonged to the exiles who had returned under Galba and Otho.

While Vitellius was feasting in Rome, attending games and gladiatorial shows, and allowing his army to lose its efficiency, events were occurring which were soon to bring his reign to a dishonourable close. The legions of the Danubian provinces were restless and discontented. They would probably have supported Verginius Rufus if he had been willing to aim at the throne on the death of Nero, and might even have joined the Rhine armies in fighting for Vitellius if the invitation to do so had reached them in time. As it was they had taken the oath of allegiance to Otho, and were indignant that the battle of Bedriacum had been fought before they arrived in full strength. The treatment by Vitellius of Legion XIII, which had taken part in the battle, was regarded as an insult: the people of Cremona were soon to pay a heavy price for the amphitheatre built for them by the soldiers. The detachments of the Moesian legions which had reached Aquileia when the news of Otho’s death arrived had behaved with such violence that they feared the vengeance of Vitellius.

If any of the governors of the three Danubian provinces— Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia—had been a man of high birth or personal distinction it is almost certain that the army would have set him up as a rival to Vitellius. But, as it happened, all three were complete nonentities, and one of them, Tampius Flavianus, governor of Pannonia, was related to the Emperor. The most vigorous personality among the legionary officers, Antonius Primus, legatus of Legion VII, was only of praetorian standing. It was accordingly necessary to look elsewhere for a leader, and he was found in T. Flavius Vespasianus, governor of Judaea. The armies of the Danube and the Euphrates were united by fairly close ties. One of the Moesian legions—III Gallica—had come quite recently from the East, and three of the eastern legions had been transferred by Nero from the Danube to the Euphrates.

The prestige of the army of the East had been considerably increased by its achievements under Corbulo, and its reputation now ranked high. Normally the supreme command had been in the hands of the legatus of Syria, but on the outbreak of the Jewish revolt Nero had appointed as governor of Judaea Vespasian, a man of consular standing, giving him command of three legions, while the remaining three were under C. Licinius Mucianus, governor of Syria. Except in Judaea the eastern frontier was now peaceful, for Nero’s settlement of the Armenian question had established good relations between Rome and Parthia. It is therefore a little surprising that the oath of allegiance had been taken by the eastern legions to Galba, Otho, and Vitellius. Vespasian had even sent his son Titus to Rome to salute Galba on his accession.

But by the summer of 69 a strong feeling had arisen in the East that the rule of Vitellius could not be tolerated. Rumours had arrived about the situation in Italy, and the representatives sent by the Emperor made a bad impression. It was well known that the discontented legions on the Danube would gladly support a new claimant to the throne. The governor of Egypt, Ti. Julius Alexander, was eager for a change. Thus it seemed probable that not less than fourteen legions, half of the whole Roman army, together with auxiliary troops and the forces of client-kings, would be at the disposal of a new candidate. The only question was who this candidate was to be. Mucianus had not at first been on cordial terms with Vespasian, but the attractive Titus had won the heart of the childless governor of Syria, and the two were now good friends. If Mucianus had been willing he could probably have become emperor, but he preferred to be Vespasian’s right-hand man. He had literary and scientific interests and was lacking in ambition. Accordingly he used his influence with the troops in favour of Vespasian, who was at first very unwilling to accept the honour which was being thrust upon him, realizing as he did the difficulty of concentrating on Italy his large but scattered forces.

Vespasian is a good example of the type of man to whom the Principate provided a career in public life which would certainly have been closed to them under the Republic. His father was an undistinguished member of the equestrian order, who ended his days as a moneylender among the Helvetii, but this did not prevent his two sons from entering the Senate and rising to eminent positions. The career of Vespasian had been creditable but not specially distinguished. He had done well in Britain as legatus of a legion during the Claudian invasion and been awarded the insignia of a triumph. In 51 he had held the consulship, and since then had governed Africa, where he acquired much less popularity than Vitellius. Since 67 he had been dealing successfully with the troublesome Jewish revolt and had earned the admiration of his soldiers by his interest in them and his willingness to expose himself to danger.

The scruples of Vespasian were overcome by Mucianus, who pointed out that if he did not act he would be treated by Vitellius as Corbulo had been treated by Nero. Vitellius, he said, owed his success mainly to the bad generalship of Otho. The victorious army was rapidly crumbling, while he would have a large and enthusiastic force behind him. Egypt was the first province openly to declare for Vespasian. On July 1 the legions at Alexandria took the oath of allegiance to him, and their example was followed two days later by the army of Judaea. Before the middle of the month he was recognized in Syria, where Mucianus had cleverly spread the report that Vitellius intended to transfer the eastern legions to the Rhine, a suggestion which infuriated the troops, whose ties with the province in which they were stationed were very close. Vespasian was soon assured of the support of all the eastern provinces and of the client-kings of Sophene and Commagene, who commanded considerable forces. A conference was held at Berytus at which it was decided to send embassies to Parthia and Armenia to secure that no hostile action should be taken while the civil war was in progress. The command against the Jews was entrusted to Titus. Vespasian resolved to proceed to Egypt, the chief granary of Rome, hoping by control of that province and of Africa to starve the city into submission, while Mucianus set off for the West with Legion VI and 13,000 soldiers of other units. In the meantime money was raised by confiscating the property of the wealthier provincials, but Vespasian was careful not to show undue generosity in promising donatives to his men. A message was sent to the praetorians disbanded by Vitellius offering reinstatement if they joined Vespasian.

When Mucianus started on his march through Asia Minor to Byzantium his plan of campaign was still uncertain. Much would depend on the attitude of the Danubian armies which was not yet known. As the Pontic fleet was ordered to sail to Byzantium the possibility of an invasion of Italy by sea was evidently contemplated. The shortest route to Italy was by the Via Egnatia to Dyrrhachium and thence across the Adriatic to Brundisium, but this line of advance would only be possible if the Flavians controlled the sea. AS it turned out, the defection of the Ravenna fleet from Vitellius would have enabled Mucianus to reach Brundisium safely, but when he left Syria there was no reason to anticipate this favourable turn of events.

The news of Vespasian’s bid for power was received with enthusiasm on the Danube. In Moesia Legion III, which considered that it belonged to the army of Syria, declared for him at once, and won the support of the other two legions (VII and VIII). The governor of the province, Aponius Saturninus, followed suit in a half-hearted fashion. The two legions of Pannonia (VII Galbiana and XIII) took his side with alacrity. Their leader was the restless and energetic Antonius Primus, who was to be the most important agent in securing the success of Vespasian. He was a protege of Galba, who restored him to the Senate from which he had been expelled for forgery under Nero, and gave him command of the new legion which he had raised in Spain. In spite of this he offered his services to Otho, who rather unwisely failed to make use of him. Antonius found a keen supporter in Cornelius Fuscus, procurator of Pannonia, a man of senatorial birth who had voluntarily entered the equestrian order, and had been appointed to his present post by Galba. The governor of Pannonia took fright and slipped away to Italy, leaving the management of affairs in the hands of Antonius. In Dalmatia the single legion (XI) showed less eagerness to support Vespasian, and the decisive victory had been gained before it decided to do so.

A conference was held at the headquarters of Legion XIII at Poetovio to discuss the plan of campaign. The question to be decided was whether the army of the Danube should take the offensive at once against the Vitellians or wait for Mucianus to arrive. It was pointed out that Vitellius still possessed a large army, which had received reinforcements from Britain, and that their own troops were less numerous than those which had been defeated at Bedriacum, and it was urged that it would be wise to occupy the passes over the Julian Alps and wait for the Syrian army. On the other hand Antonius emphasized the fact that the Vitellian legions had been demoralized by their residence in Italy, and suggested that delay would give Vitellius time to bring reinforce­ments from the provinces which still supported him and to use his fleets against them. If, he said, the legions feared to advance, he was prepared to attack at the head of the auxiliaries alone. The enthusiasm of Antonius, who was supported by Fuscus, so inspired the soldiers that it was decided to do as he wished. Messages were sent to the governor of Moesia to bring up his legions with all speed. A detachment was sent to the valley of the Inn ko prevent the procurator of Raetia, who was faithful to Vitellius, from advancing over the Brenner. In order to secure the safety of the frontier it was decided to attach to the army of invasion the chiefs of the Sarmatae Iazyges, and also Sido and Italicus the joint kings of the Marcomanni, who occupied the territory just north of Pannonia. Accompanied by Arrius Varus, a veteran officer of Corbuio, Antonius advanced to Aquileia with a force of auxiliaries, and then occupied without opposition Opitergium, Altinum, Patavium, and Ateste. Not far from the latter town he was successful in a skirmish with a Vitellian detachment which had thrown a bridge across the Adige.

Vitellius had concealed as long as possible the bad news which reached him from the east and north, but at last even he had to realize that something must be done. Reinforcements were summoned from Germany, Britain and Spain, but without result. The only province which showed any enthusiasm for him was Africa, where his successful proconsulship was not forgotten. It soon became clear that he would have to trust to the troops which had invaded Italy earlier in the year, and to the generals Caecina and Valens who had led them to victory. Unfortunately for him Valens, the more trustworthy of the two, was ill when the army was dispatched from Rome, so that it had to be put under the command of Caecina, who was meditating treachery.

It was essential for Vitellius, as it had been for Otho, that the line of the Po should be strongly held. Now, however, the point of greatest strategical importance was Hostilia rather than Placentia, for the enemy was advancing from the north-east, and would attempt to cross the river at that city. It was accordingly to Hostilia that the greater part of Caecina’s army proceeded, while some auxiliaries, followed by Legions I Italica and XXI Rapax, were sent to occupy Cremona. Caecina had under his command four legions with their eagles and large detachments of four German and three British legions together with auxiliaries. All the sixteen cohorts of praetorians were left behind in Rome. This force was impressive in numbers, but its quality had greatly deteriorated during the last five months. It was, however, devoted to Vitellius, and under competent and honest leadership might have proved a match for the brilliant but headstrong Antonius.

On his way north Caecina visited Ravenna in order to confer with Lucilius Bassus, prefect of the fleet, who had a grievance against Vitellius because he had not been appointed prefect of the praetorians, and it was arranged that both should throw off their allegiance. In the meantime, however, they concealed their intentions and Caecina followed his army to Hostilia, where he took up a strong position north of the town, between the Po and the Tartarus. Tacitus is probably right in thinking that if he had attacked at once before the Flavian army had reached its full strength he would have had every prospect of success1. Instead of doing so he remained inactive waiting for the news of the defection of the fleet. This was secured without difficulty by Bassus, as most of the sailors were natives of the provinces of Pannonia and Dalmatia, which sympathized with Vespasian. Though Bassus made no secret of his own sympathies he was put under formal arrest and sent to Atria, where he was presently set at liberty. The command of the fleet was taken over by Cornelius Fuscus.

Caecina was less successful with his troops than Bassus had been. At a secret meeting he persuaded some of the officers to do as he wished, but when the common soldiers heard of this there was an outburst of indignation: they threw Caecina into chains and declared that they were confident of their ability to defeat the Danubian legions a second time. They chose as their leaders, instead of Caecina, Fabius Fabullus, legatus of Legion V and Cassius Longus, prefect of the camp. But the treachery of its commander had a demoralizing effect on the army, which decided to abandon its position before Hostilia and join its comrades before Cremona. Accordingly it threw open to the Flavian army the direct road to Rome by Hostilia and Bononia, and set out on the long march to Cremona by Mutina, Parma and Placentia.

The delay and treachery of Caecina had been a godsend to the Flavians, and had given Antonius time to collect an imposing army. After the two Pannonian legions had joined him at Patavium he advanced to Verona, which was made the base of operations, as the surrounding country was suitable for cavalry and the town commanded the road from the north over the Brenner. Here the army was increased by the arrival of the three legions from Moesia accompanied by the governor of the province, Aponius Saturninus. His presence in the city as well as that of the governor of Pannonia, who had rejoined his legions, was distinctly embarrassing for the de facto commander Antonius, who was no doubt consider­ably relieved when an outburst of indignation among the soldiers against the two consulars enabled him to secure their escape.

Antonius was now in command of an army which resented the duty of fortifying Verona and clamoured to be led against the enemy. In advancing beyond Aquileia he had acted in direct disobedience to the orders of Vespasian and Mucianus, who wished to postpone the offensive till the army of the East had arrived. Up till now fortune had been favourable to him, but he could only justify his disobedience by gaining a decisive victory. He therefore decided to attack the Vitellian army at Cremona before it could be placed under the command of Valens, for whose military capacity he had some respect. Valens had left Rome on the arrival of the news of Caecina’s treachery, accompanied, we are told, by a train of courtesans and eunuchs, and on hearing of the defection of the fleet had merely sent to Rome for reinforcements and awaited events. If he had hurried on to Hostilia his arrival might have restored the morale of Caecina’s army and proved fatal to the plans of Antonius. When three cohorts and a squadron of cavalry arrived from the city he was content to send them to garrison Ariminum, while he disappeared over the Apennines with the wild idea of making his way to Gaul and raising a new army against Vespasian. The unfortunate troops at Cremona were left without a leader.

When Antonius learned that Hostilia had been evacuated and that Caecina’s legions were on their way to Cremona he felt that energetic action was more than ever necessary, if the attack were to be delivered before the two armies had united. Accordingly there followed what has been described as a race to Cremona. In two days the Flavian army reached Bedriacum, where the legions were left to fortify the camp, while Antonius with 4000 cavalry advanced four miles along the Via Postumia. Arrius, who pressed on still farther, came into contact with the enemy, who drove him back in such confusion that a disaster was only prevented by the personal efforts of Antonius. By this time the Vitellian cavalry were exhausted, while the better led Flavians reformed their ranks and advanced a second time in the direction of Cremona, driving the enemy before them. Four miles from the town Legions I and XXI were drawn up in line, but they failed to shelter the retreating cavalry and merely held their ground till a fiery charge of the Moesian cohorts forced them to retire under the walls of Cremona. In spite of the setback earlier in the day the operations had begun well for the Flavians.

By this time the legions had arrived from Bedriacum and clamoured for an immediate attack although it was late in the afternoon and Antonius vigorously opposed the proposal, pointing oqt that all the advantages were on the side of the enemy. When it became known that the Vitellian legions had arrived after marching thirty miles in one day and in spite of their exhaustion were preparing to attack it was clear that the struggle would not be long delayed. The Flavian army was drawn up in battle order on both  sides of the Via Postumia, the Thirteenth Legion being in the centre. If Valens or some other competent general had been in Cremona he would undoubtedly have urged his soldiers to postpone the attack till the next day. The wearied troops would have passed the night in comfortable quarters, while their opponents would have had to bivouac in the open far from their base. But the Vitellians were even more eager than the Flavians to fight at once. The result was a confused battle which lasted the whole night. At times the Vitellians did well. Galba’s Legion VII was hard pressed, losing six of its leading centurions, and was only saved from destruction by the arrival of a body of ex-praetorians whom their treatment by Vitellius had rendered strong supporters of Vespasian. When the moon rose the Flavians had the advantage, for it shone full on the faces of their opponents. At dawn Legion III, as the Eastern custom was, saluted the rising sun. This action, which was misinterpreted by the Vitellians to mean that Mucianus and his army had arrived, led them to abandon their resistance and flee in confusion to their camp outside Cremona.

The next task of the victorious army was to attack this strongly fortified camp, for Bedriacum was too far away and there was no time to construct a camp of their own. The defenders put up a stout resistance and caused heavy casualties among the assailants, who only rallied when the rumour spread that the reward of success would be the sack of Cremona. At length part of the rampart collapsed and the soldiers of Legions III and VII forced their way through the gate which faced towards Bedriacum. The defenders flung themselves from the ramparts and the Flavian army occupied the camp.

The troops of Antonius were now prepared to assault Cremona itself, which was at the time crowded with civilians attracted by the annual fair, but the siege had scarcely begun when the Vitellian officers decided that nothing was to be gained by further resistance. They even released Caecina in the hope that he would secure for them better terms, and he issued from the gate wearing his official robes as consul and preceded by lictors. The traitor was protected from the fury of the soldiers by Antonius and sent to Vespasian, who spared his life and even took him into favour. He could do nothing to save Cremona from its fate. The defeated soldiers withdrew from the town, in which the victors were allowed to work their will. It had been twice in one year the headquarters of a Vitellian army and had been the scene of a gladiatorial show given by Caecina in honour of the first battle of Bedriacum. The soldiers of Legion XIII had not forgotten that they had been mocked by the inhabitants while building the amphitheatre. For four days the city was given over to murder, rapine, and lust, and at the end was burned to the ground. It was soon afterwards rebuilt, but its sufferings during these days were never forgotten.

As the result of the bold strategy of Antonius the ultimate victory of Vespasian was now assured. Vitellius could not hope to receive any reinforcements from the Rhine, where the rising of Civilis, for which Antonius was in part responsible, had already broken out, and in any case the Flavians controlled the Alpine passes. The attempt of Valens to cause trouble in the south of Gaul had proved fruitless, and he himself was taken prisoner near Massilia. The Spanish legions, led by I Adiutrix which had fought for Otho, took the oath of allegiance to the new emperor, and their example was followed by the troops in Britain, where Vespasian’s achievements were not forgotten. Much misery would have been avoided if Vitellius had followed the example of Otho, and, recognizing that his cause was hopeless, committed suicide. If he had possessed any courage or military ability he might with the considerable army which he still retained have at any rate delayed the Flavian advance, for the army of Antonius was demoralized and Mucianus was far from Italy. But, deprived of the two generals who had gained him the throne, he revealed his hopeless incapacity and his unworthiness of the devotion of the soldiers who were still prepared to die for him.

The news of the battle of Cremona was received by Vespasian and Mucianus with somewhat mixed feelings. They must have been relieved that the rashness of Antonius had not led to disaster, but Mucianus was not too anxious that the Flavian army should enter Rome before his arrival. His own advance had been delayed by the need of dealing with a serious attack on Moesia by the Dacians, who crossed the Danube at a time when they believed the province to be almost denuded of troops. It was fortunate for Rome that the army of Mucianus was at hand, for the situation on the Rhine was critical and a simultaneous rising on the Danube would have imposed a terrible strain on the resources of the empire. But Mucianus repelled the invasion successfully, a new governor was appointed, and the army of the province was reinforced from the defeated legions of Vitellius, which were thus usefully employed at a safe distance from Italy.

It was not thought desirable explicitly to forbid Antonius to advance towards Rome. The battle of Cremona had been fought at the end of October, and the weather was beginning to make campaigning difficult. There were floods in the valley of the Po and enough snow lay on the Apennines to hamper an invading army. There was therefore no time to be lost if the Flavian army were to cross the mountains before the road was blocked. The force which Valens had left in Ariminum was blockaded by the fleet, so that the whole of Italy north of the Apennines was now in Flavian hands. Antonius advanced with a picked force to Fanum Fortunae, where the Via Flaminia leaves the coast, sending back word to Verona for the remainder of his troops to follow at once. The condition of his army was none too good; like the Vitellians earlier in the year his soldiers were demoralized by the advance through Italy, and showed little respect for their officers. But, as Tacitus remarks1, the Flavian leaders were helped now as on other occasions not less by luck than by their own skill.

While his soldiers had been fighting for him in North Italy Vitellius had shown a terrible lack of energy. ‘Hidden in the shade of his gardens like a lazy animal which lies torpid if you give it food, he paid no regard to the past present or future.’ The news of the treachery of Caecina brought him to Rome, but the reinforcements which he sent to Valens were quite inadequate. It was long before he admitted the truth about the disaster at Cremona, the details of which were reported to him by a centurion, who committed suicide in order to prove that he was telling the truth. Even now if he had acted with energy something might have been done. He had at his disposal sixteen praetorian cohorts, composed of his old German legionaries, four urban cohorts, and a legion (afterwards II Adiutrix) raised from the marines as well as a considerable body of cavalry. If this force, which was about as large as that which Otho had commanded, had advanced rapidly along the Via Flaminia and across the Apennines, it might well have given trouble to Antonius. As it was the greater part of it was sent to Mevania, about 80 miles north of Rome, where the road entered the mountains, and was followed by Vitellius himself, whose gross incompetence in military matters was here ludicrously displayed. When he heard that the fleet at Misenum had abandoned him he was stricken with panic and insisted on returning to Rome, taking with him seven of the praetorian cohorts. The remainder of the army was withdrawn from its advanced position and retired to Narnia, thirty miles nearer the city. This pusillanimous behaviour merely encouraged the rebels in the south, who were assisted by a rising in Samnium and elsewhere. L. Vitellius, the Emperor’s brother, who had been left in Rome, could probably have dealt with the rebellion with the troops at his disposal, and the six cohorts and 500 cavalry who were sent under him to Campania could have been more profitably employed in the north.

When the Flavian army had forced its way through the snow of the Apennines and descended into the plains it was astonished to find that it could proceed without opposition as far as Carsulae, ten miles from the diminished forces of Vitellius. There it halted for some time hoping for a proposal which would make fighting unnecessary. Petilius Cerialis, a distinguished officer who had escaped from the city, brought the news that Vespasian’s brother, Flavius Sabinus, prefect of the city, was negotiating with the Emperor. When the officers of the small Vitellian force at Narnia learned that the Flavian legions had joined the advance guard at Carsulae they considered that further resistance was hopeless and began to desert to the enemy. The flight to Rome of the two praetorian prefects convinced even the common soldiers, who had been prepared to fight, that there was no disgrace in surrender. Their last hope vanished when they were shown the head of Valens, who had been executed at Urbinum. The surrendering troops were received with honour and left at Narnia and Interamna in charge of a small detachment. After this success Antonius ought to have marched straight to Rome. Unfortunately he halted at Ocriculum in the hope that Sabinus would persuade Vitellius to resign and the troops in the city to surrender voluntarily. Cerialis was indeed sent on with a body of cavalry, but was instructed not to hurry. The Flavian leaders failed to realize that, however willing Vitellius might be to accept a peaceful settlement and to retire to a life of luxury in Campania, his soldiers would not tolerate such conduct and were prepared to fight to the end.

In the city Flavius Sabinus had rejected the advice that he should declare openly for his brother trusting to the urban cohorts whom he as prefect of the city commanded, and in the hope of avoiding bloodshed had preferred to negotiate with Vitellius. A conference was held in the temple of Apollo at which the Emperor agreed to abdicate. On December 18 when the news arrived that the army at Narnia had surrendered he descended from the palace in mourning attire accompanied by his family with the intention of laying down the insignia of office in the temple of Concord and of retiring to his brother’s house. But the crowd barred the way and forced him to return to the palace. Feeling was now so high that Sabinus was in great danger and thought it best to take refuge in the Capitol with a little band of adherents. During the night he brought there his own family and Vespasian’s son Domitian, and sent an urgent message to Antonius, but took no steps to summon the urban cohorts and arrange for an adequate defence. Probably he did not yet realize to what lengths the Vitellian soldiers were prepared to go. It was useless to protest to Vitellius that the compact had been broken, for he was “no longer Emperor but only a cause of war”.

Next day the Vitellians tried to force their way into the citadel. The defenders blocked the gate with statues and threw down stones and tiles upon the assailants, who swarmed over the roofs of adjoining houses. As both sides lacked artillery, firebrands were used freely, with the result that the famous temple caught fire and was burned to the ground. Domitian escaped, disguised as a temple-servant, but the unhappy Sabinus was captured and in spite of the protests of Vitellius murdered and thrown into the Tiber.

On receiving the message of Sabinus Antonius left Ocriculum, where his troops had been celebrating the Saturnalia, and on the evening of the day on which the Capitol had fallen reached Saxa Rubra, across the Mulvian Bridge, where he learned that Sabinus was dead. Vitellius was arming the mob to defend the city and simultaneously sending envoys to the Flavians asking for a settlement. Antonius would have been glad to postpone till the next day his entry into Rome, but his soldiers would not listen. The army advanced in three columns and was desperately opposed at every point, while the populace looked on, as at a gladiatorial show, cheering the victors and robbing the defeated. The baths and eating-houses were crowded with spectators. The Vitellians fought with a bravery worthy of a better cause till the survivors were driven back to the praetorian camp, where a last stand was made. Even now there was no talk of surrender and the defenders were cut down with wounds in front. Vitellius himself had tried to escape to his brother, who was at the head of an army at Tarracina, but fearing to expose himself he returned to the palace, where he attempted to lie in hiding. He was dragged from his hiding­place and, his hands tied behind his back, led through the forum past the place where Gal ba had fallen, to the Gemonian stairs where he was cut down among the jeers of the mob (Dec. 20, AD 69).

Vitellius had even fewer personal qualifications than Otho for the high position which he had for a few months occupied. He was simply an amiable and self-indulgent man who was unfortunate enough to be the instrument of other people’s ambitions. The devotion shown to him by his soldiers cannot be attributed to any respect felt for his personal, still less for his military qualities, but rather to the fact that he was the chosen nominee of the German armies. Rivalry between army-groups was, as has been pointed out elsewhere, one of the weakest features of the Augustan system. It was latent in ordinary times, but the victory of the Vitellians over Otho’s troops at Bedriacum had aroused in the Danubian legions a desire for revenge of which Vitellius was the unfortunate victim.

On the death of Vitellius ail resistance collapsed. When he heard of his brother’s death L. Vitellius, who was in Campania with six praetorian cohorts dealing with the rebels, realized that it was useless to continue the struggle. He surrendered with his cohorts to a force which had been sent to Bovillae, and on his arrival in Rome was put to death, a martyr to a cause unworthy of his merits. His troops were put under arrest, but later on some at least were permitted to remain members of the praetorian guard of the new emperor.

The behaviour of the Flavian army in Rome recalled its doings in Cremona, and Antonius was unable to prevent it from committing murder and robbery. Domitian devoted himself to pleasure and exercised no authority. It must have been a great relief to the population of the city when Mucianus, who before his arrival had been awarded the insignia of a triumph for his defeat of the Dacians, reached Rome in January 70. Vespasian and Titus were elected consuls for the early months of the year. Antonius had to be contented with the insignia of the consulship and Fuscus and Arrius with those of the praetorship, while Arrius was appointed prefect of the praetorians. The services of these men could not be overlooked, but Vespasian and Mucianus were determined to keep them in their place. For six months Mucianus was practically ruler of Rome, and it was not till the summer that the Emperor arrived in the city. By that time the Capitol had been rebuilt and dedicated, and a beginning had been made with the reconstitution of the praetorian cohorts.

The steps taken by Vespasian to re-establish the pax Romana will be described elsewhere. By the end of the year 70 the rising on the Rhine had been crushed and Jerusalem captured. His reign of ten years was one of comparative peace, and he was able to devote himself almost entirely to the work of reorganization. The ‘year of the four emperors’ left such a horrible memory that When Domitian met his end in 96 without an heir the armies were prepared to let the Senate choose a successor. It was not till 193 that the accession of an emperor was again the cause of civil war.

CHAPTER XXV

REBELLION WITHIN THE EMPIRE