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THE SELEUCID EMPIRE. 358-251 BC. HOUSE OF SELEUCUSCHAPTER 22. THE INTERVAL OF
PEACE
The history of the
Seleucid dynasty up to the battle of Magnesia has been one of almost continuous
war. “At the return of the year, at the time when kings go out to battle”, says
the record of the old Hebrew monarchy, and in the Seleucid kingdom too it had
come to be the normal thing for the King to march out at the end of every
winter and spend his summer in the field. For the first time this activity is suspended
after the stunning fall given Antiochus III by the adversary with whom he had
rashly closed. For fourteen years after Magnesia there is a lull. Then new
commotions begin, and cease only with the ceasing of the dynasty. It is the
negative quality of these fourteen years which makes them remarkable.
It has hitherto
been misleading to speak of the Seleucid kingdom as “Syrian”. Till the time of
Seleucus II Kallinikos, Asia Minor, as we saw, was the land where the kings
were most at home, and although by the division in the family itself the court
of the elder king, Seleucus II, was fixed east of the Taurus, the Seleucid
house was always straining towards the west, and in the last years before
Magnesia we saw Antiochus residing as much in Ephesus as in Antioch. But now
Asia Minor was barred against the house of Seleucus for ever; the empire, which
had almost been the empire of Alexander, was become the kingdom of Syria. Let
us see in what environment this kingdom found itself, with what neighbours it would
have to do.
But in the first
place we should observe that although the long wars of Antiochus III ended in
the collapse of Magnesia, they were not altogether without fruit. Two
provinces, which at his accession were politically separate from Syria, he left
united with it—Cilicia and Coele-Syria (Palestine). The realm had thus to some
degree gained in compactness what it had lost in extent. It embraced the whole
country of Aramaic speech.
Asia Minor had
passed from Seleucid rule, but the Seleucid kingdom must still be affected by
its fortunes and maintain close relations with the powers that ruled there. For
some time after Magnesia no one knew what the outcome of the battle would be.
The Seleucid power had been thrust back across the Taurus; but Rome did not
immediately intimate what she intended to do with the vacated territory. The
following winter (190-189) was one of a great diplomatic scramble From every
part of Asia Minor envoys hastened to Rome. All the states interested were
eager to put their particular views before the Senate.
After the Peace of
Apamea (188) the ten commissioners who had fixed its conditions proceeded to
make the great territorial settlement in Asia Minor, which lasted with slight
modifications till the extinction of the Pergamene dynasty sixty years later.
Rome took nothing for herself; she trusted to influence rather than direct
sovereignty. The net result of her arrangements was to put Eumenes of Pergamos
in the place of the Seleucid King; almost the whole of the Seleucid domain fell
to him as King of Asia.
It was not quite
the whole of the Seleucid domain which Eumenes got. In the first place, Caria
south of the Meander and Lycia were made subject to the other great ally of
Rome, to Rhodes; the seaport of Telmessus only, on the confines of Lycia and
Caria, was made over to Eumenes. In the second place, the Romans, having come
to Asia with such high professions of freeing the Greeks, were bound to do
something to make them good. They could hardly take away from Eumenes the cities
which were his, and to satisfy at once his claims as an ally and the claims of
the cities as Greek states was not a simple matter. The Romans found a
practical way out of the difficulty by deciding that all those cities which
formed part of the inherited domain of Eumenes should continue tributary to the
Pergamene king. To these were to be added those cities which had held by Antiochus
till after the battle of Magnesia. This “enslavement” of them could be
justified as a punishment, although in many cases it must probably have been
known that the city had had little choice in the matter, shaping its policy
under the eyes of a garrison. All those states which had renounced their
allegiance to Antiochus before the battle of Magnesia were to be free. Even so
the new realm of Eumenes included some of the most illustrious cities of Asia
Minor—Sardis, the old capital; Ephesus, the great harbor and commercial centre;
Magnesia under Sipylus, Tralles, and Telmessus. Pamphylia, which the Seleucid
court maintained to lie on the southern side of the Taurus, was ultimately
assigned by the Senate to Eumenes.
There are now then
four kingdoms in Asia Minor with whom the Macedonian houses of Seleucus and
Antigonus have to treat on a footing of equality—the kingdom with its capital
at Pergamos, the kingdom of Bithynia, the kingdom of Pontic Cappadocia, and the
kingdom of southern Cappadocia. Besides the territories ruled by these four
kings there are the continental domain of Rhodes, the territories of the
independent Greek cities, certain petty principalities, and the lands held by
barbarian tribes, such as the Pisidians and Gauls.
These last still
constituted a danger for civilization. It was the Gauls who had furnished
Antiochus with the most formidable part of his armies. In the year following
Magnesia (189) the consul Gnaeus Manlius had made an expedition into Pisidia
and the Galatian country, and inflicted upon the Gauls defeats so severe and
sanguinary as must keep them quiet for some time to come. This was part of the
necessary work of pacification which the Romans must do before they left Asia
Minor to their allies.
Farther east also,
the battle of Magnesia introduced a new state of things. We have seen before
how events at one end of the Empire reacted upon another. And such a blow
destroyed the prestige upon which the supremacy of the Seleucid house in all
outlying lands rested. Already at the time of the repulse of Antiochus from
Greece a great fear, according to the Ptolemaic envoys in Rome, had run through
Asia Minor and reached even to Syria. And now to all the whispering multitudes
under him the King was disgraced. “A commander had caused the reproach he
offered” to the strong people of the West “to cease; sevenfold had his reproach
been required”. The Empire which Antiochus had spent his life in reforming
instantly dissolved.
In Armenia at the
time of the battle Artaxias or Artaxas was ruling over one part of the country
and a certain Zariadris over another part. They ruled as the strategoi of Antiochus, and had evidently replaced the old Armenian dynasty, which had
used the style of kings, and claimed, like the other royal houses of Iranian
origin, to be descended from one of the Seven. Xerxes, to whom Antiochus had
given his daughter in 212, had been afterwards assassinated at the instigation
of the Seleucid court. The old line came to an end, according to Strabo, in an
otherwise unknown Orontes. Kings were replaced by strategoi—a sign that
Armenia had been brought into straiter subjection. Whether Artaxias and Zariadris
were native Armenian chiefs or whether they had come in from elsewhere by the
appointment of Antiochus, we do not know. Their names at any rate show them to
have been Iranians by race or culture. Magnesia made them renounce the
Seleucid supremacy. They declared themselves friends of Rome, and the strategoi in their turn became kings. Northern Armenia formed the kingdom of
Artaxias, the southern region, called Sophene, that of Zariadris. Artaxias
built a new city in the valley of the Araxes, calling it, after his own name,
Artaxata, to be the capital of his realm. According to the general belief, the
site had been chosen and the laying out of the city directed by the great
Hannibal, who in his wanderings after the defeat of Antiochus had come as far
as the court of the new Armenian king.
In Iran itself
Magnesia probably at once undid the work of Antiochus twenty years before.
About the same time that Antiochus was making his last stand in Asia Minor, the
Parthian king upon whom he had imposed his suzerainty, Arsaces III, was
succeeded by Arsaces IV Phriapatius. The change of ruler perhaps meant a fresh
declaration of independence.
Antiochus, hurled
back from Asia Minor, turned his thoughts once more to the field of his old
glories, the East. It was thence he had drawn the riches and the renown which
he had dissipated in the war with Rome. And now that his coffers were empty and
his armies broken, was it impossible that from the East he might again renew
his strength, as Antaeus did from repeated contact with the earth?
As soon as the
peace with Rome had been finally concluded and sworn to (summer 188), Antiochus
left Seleucus in Syria as joint-king and plunged into the East. The
Mediterranean lands never saw him again. The tidings came back to Antioch that
he had adventured himself with a body of troops in the Elymaean hills (mod,
Luristan), where the temple of some native god promised great spoil of silver
and gold, and had been overwhelmed by the fierce tribesmen. That was the
generally received version of his end. “He shall turn his face toward the
strongholds of his own land: but he shall stumble and fall, and shall not be
found” (187).
Seleucus IV
Philopator, who now reigned as sole king, was not without experience of
affairs. He had borne an active part in the war with Rome. The rôle which he
inherited could hardly be a dazzling one, but it might be not unhonorable— to preside
over the slow recovery of the kingdom from the day of Magnesia. The most
serious consequence of that defeat was the empty coffers. It was an evil which
could only be cured by time; and that it might be cured, a period of rest and
the avoidance of all complications was absolutely necessary. The inaction of
Seleucus Philopator’s reign has led to his being regarded as a weak ruler;
hardly justly, since an ambitious policy would have been madness just then.
Anxious eyes in
Syria watched every turn in the politics of the Mediterranean states; the
Seleucid court continued to catch all whispers from Asia Minor, from Macedonia,
from the Greek republics. It was a time when the thoughts of men were agitated
by a great transition. The paramount city of Italy had interfered with a strong
hand in the eastern Mediterranean. Rome had come in as the ally of some states,
as the enemy of others, as the champion of Hellenic autonomy, but not
ostensibly as a conqueror. It had annexed no territory east of the Adriatic. But
now in the lull after Magnesia men became aware of the real significance of the
clash of arms that they had witnessed. The allies, as well as the enemies of
Rome, began to feel the impalpable bands grip them faster than the acknowledged
supremacy of Macedonian kings. And with the feeling a great revulsion swept
through the Greek world, a nightmare agony to escape the thing that was closing
upon them before all power of resistance was gone.
This feeling was
common to both the allies and the enemies of Rome, but it was not enough to do
away the old division. It was alloyed in the enemies of Rome by nothing but the
fear of Rome’s vengeance; in the allies of Rome it was alloyed by the desire
for Rome’s continued support. They could not refrain under the pressure of the
moment from carrying their quarrels to the Senate and soliciting Rome’s word on
their behalf, although by so doing they wound themselves deeper and deeper in
the toils.
Certainly at no
previous moment could any one who stood forward as an antagonist of Rome have
counted on such general sympathy in the eastern Mediterranean. And before long
the eyes of men began to turn to the king of Macedonia. Philip was filled with
resentment at the inadequate reward he had got for his help against Antiochus, and
it became known that he was preparing on a vast scale for another fight. He
died in 179, but his plans and preparations were carried on by his illegitimate
son, Perseus, who succeeded to the Macedonian throne.
In such a time no
one found himself in a more delicate position than King Eumenes. There was too
much shrewdness at the Pergamene court for the inconveniences and dangers of
the Roman patronage to be ignored. He could not, of course, do without it; he
must not suffer his staunchness as the main ally of Rome to be clouded; but he
saw the importance of giving Rome as little opportunity as possible to
interfere in Asia.
On this principle
Eumenes seems to have made his ideal a state of family concord between the
Asiatic kings. Magnesia left him in a somewhat chill isolation. He alone
among the kings was the friend of Rome. No sooner, therefore, was the house of
Seleucus reduced to a position in which it ceased to threaten him, than Eumenes
was ready with the hand of friendship. The envoys of Antiochus who came to the
Roman camp after Magnesia were astonished to discover that the Pergamene king
had apparently blotted all trace of past soreness from his mind. But the great
diplomatic success of Eumenes was in Cappadocia. Ariarathes IV, linked both by
his mother and his wife to the Seleucid house, had not only sent his troops to
fight with those of Antiochus at Magnesia, but had even in the following year
supported the Galatians against Manlius. After the Roman victory he made his
submission, and was amerced in 600 talents of silver. Now Eumenes saw his
opportunity. He offered the Cappadocian king his friendship, and asked the hand
of his daughter Stratonice. On condition that he complied, Eumenes undertook to
use his influence to get the fine reduced. Ariarathes was probably glad enough
to close with such terms. Eumenes married Stratonice. The fine was lowered to
one-half of the original amount Ariarathes and the Cappadocian people were
received among the friends of Rome.
But the pacific
policy of Eumenes was frustrated in other quarters. It was indeed almost a
hopeless task to keep in with Rome and with the enemies of Rome at the same
time. In proportion as the feeling against Rome in the Greek world grew
stronger, more odium attached to the Pergamene house, which had served the
alien with such zeal.
Presently it
appeared that in Asia Minor also there was a power which might form the nucleus
of an anti-Roman group. Since Antiochus III had fetched his bride from northern
(Pontic) Cappadocia in 222 we have heard nothing of that kingdom. Its history
during the rest of the reign of Antiochus III is for us a blank. Mithridates
II, who appears to have died about the time of the battle of Magnesia, after a
reign of some sixty years, is not mentioned as taking any part in the broils of
his son-in-law, the Great king. But those unrecorded sixty years may have been
years of steady internal consolidation. In 183, five years after the Peace of
Apamea, the Greek world was horrified by the news that Sinope had been suddenly
attacked and seized by Pharnaces, the son and successor of Mithridates. This
was rapidly followed by fresh conquests along the northern coasts, till even
Heraclea felt itself insecure. Pharnaces was thought to cherish large designs
of aggression. He had found an ally in Mithridates, the satrap of Lesser
Armenia. Asia Minor was at once divided into two camps. Eumenes, Ariarathes, and
even Prusias II of Bithynia—the allies of Rome— took up arms in defence of the status
quo.
All these
developments on either side of the Aegean had been watched by the Seleucid
court. An incidental notice shows us that Seleucus IV, if debarred from active
interference in the west, was at any rate concerned to maintain close
diplomatic relations with the states of Greece. Polybius describes a meeting of
the Achaean Assembly held in the year following Seleucus’ accession, at which
his ambassadors presented themselves to renew the amity subsisting between the
Achaeans and the Seleucid house, and to offer them a present of ten ships of
war (in the year 187-186). The amity was renewed but the ships declined. It is
only the deficiency of our records, no doubt, which prevents us from seeing
similar embassies at work to sound their master’s name in the ear of the other
Greek states.
There could be no
question that the sympathies of the house of Seleucus were with the antagonists
of Rome. And as the anti-Roman movement defined itself more and more in the
years following Magnesia, it was not an impossible contingency that Seleucus
might compromise his neutrality. When the war between Pharnaces and the other
three kings broke out in Asia Minor (183-179), Seleucus seemed at one moment
about to intervene on the anti-Roman side. He marched with a considerable force
towards the passes of the Taurus, but his nerve failed before he had taken the
decisive step. He suffered Pharnaces to go down unaided before Eumenes and his
allies. It was about this time that Titus Flamininus came in the quality of
ambassador to the Seleucid court, and we may connect his presence there with
the abortive schemes of Seleucus.
The hopes of all in
the Greek world who wished to be rid of the Roman incubus were fixed, as has
just been said, upon Macedonia, and in Perseus, who succeeded his father Philip
in 179, it may have seemed that the hour had brought the man. Macedonia had
armed to the teeth, and Perseus worked unremittingly at amassing all the means
of victory. There was, of course, no overt hostility to Rome, but everybody
knew for what cause Perseus stood. It was therefore significant of the general
temper in the eastern Mediterranean when Seleucus Philopator made haste, upon
the accession of Perseus, to press upon him the hand of his daughter Laodice,
and when the Rhodians escorted the new queen of Macedonia with a great display
of their ships.
It was perhaps in
consequence of the suspicions which were entertained of Seleucus in Rome that his
brother Antiochus, who had been kept since 189 as a hostage, was exchanged
before 175 for his son Demetrius. The name Demetrius, we may stop to notice,
now appears for the first time alongside of Seleucus and Antiochus in the
Seleucid family. It was, of course, a declaration of its consanguinity with the
house of Antigonus through Stratonice, the daughter of the great Demetrius. The
adoption of the name by the Seleucid house might have two objects. It might be
intended as a mark of friendship to their cousin in Macedonia at an hour
when the two houses must draw together against the foreigner; or it might be a
notice to the world, when the reigning Antigonid king had only one legitimate
son, that the kings who reigned in Antioch were the next heirs by blood.
Of the internal
administration of Seleucus Philopator we know only that the necessities of the
time made its first object the replenishing of the empty treasuries. The
war indemnity paid by annual instalments to Rome was a continuous drain. The
country had now to pay the bill for the grandiose enterprises of Antiochus III,
and it was squeezed at a time when it had not even the imaginative compensation
of seeing its king in the lustre of military glory. For the first time the
inhabitants of Syria saw the Seleucid King sitting, year in, year out, at home.
Such a king was not worth paying for, and yet he made them pay more heavily than
they had ever paid before. “And there shall rise up in his (Antiochus III’s)
place an exactor, who shall cause the royal dignity to pass away, and in a few
days he shall be broken, but not in battle array or in war”.
The government
appeared to be merely a vast machine for expressing money, and the working of
it was in the hands of the chief minister Heliodorus the son of Aeschylus, a
citizen of Antioch. An inscribed base declares that the statue once upon it was
that of Heliodorus, put up in Delos by a mercantile association of Laodicea in
gratitude for his benefits. This may show that the administration of Heliodorus
was adroit in encouraging commerce; it may, of course, only mean that the
merchants sought to win his favor by such honors. A Jewish work gives us a
picture of him making a progress through the cities of Palestine, accompanied
by his bodyguards. His great position tempted Heliodorus to aspire still
higher. He formed a conspiracy against the King, and in 176-175 Seleucus
Philopator was suddenly murdered in the quiet of his kingdom. With Seleucus the
quiet also came to an end.
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