

THE HISTORY  
OF  
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC,

FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS TILL THE TIME OF SYLLA.

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WITH

AN INTRODUCTORY DISSERTATION

ON

THE CREDIBILITY OF EARLY ROMAN HISTORY,

BY THE LATE

THOMAS ARNOLD, D.D.

## P R E F A C E.

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The reader will find in this volume an order of arrangement similar to that adopted in "The Early History of Greece." The same grouping of legendary events followed by a gradual emancipation from the dominion of fiction will be found to characterize our history of the progressing power of Rome. The historical deductions drawn from these sources, and firmly established as facts by the researches of Niebuhr, Arnold, and other illustrious scholars, will, it is hoped, be found collated with a perspicuity consistent with the plan of this work. A very comprehensive account of Sicily in connection with Carthage, and their subsequent connection with Rome, displaying the resources and political tendencies of the great African Republic, and thereby conveying just notions of the vast power which the ambition of Rome encountered and subdued, is next presented to the reader. The noble treatises on the First and Second Punic Wars, from the pen of the lamented Dr. Arnold, and his Introductory Essay upon "The Credibility of Early Roman History," greatly enhance the value of this portion of the work; while the masterly sketch of the "External Advancement of the Roman Empire," the "Lives of the Gracchi," and of "Cornelius Sylla," by the same distinguished scholar, leave nothing to be desired in dignity of treatment or in vigorous research. The contributions of Sir T. N. Talfourd and other celebrated writers, whose names adorn the work, will be found equal to the importance of their subjects. To the Editor has fallen the duty of recording the

Early Roman Legends, and of presenting a concise view of the historical or political facts thence deduced and established by successful investigation. The authorities followed have been those most generally esteemed by the classical student of history. The Editor, however, takes this opportunity of observing, that additional information, elucidating the darker periods of Roman history, drawn from independent sources, will shortly be published.

The continuation of the history of Rome, from the age of Sylla to the subversion of the Western Empire, will be completed in two other volumes, which are now nearly ready for publication. They will contain contributions by the late Dr. Arnold, the Rev. Professor Jeremie, the Rev. Dr. J. H. Brooke Mountain, the Rev. J. B. Ottley, the Rev. Dr. G. C. Renouard, and the late Bishop Russell. These treatises are unusually copious; and from their distinguished authorship, and as developing the germs of the civilization, jurisprudence, and feudal power of Europe in the Middle Ages, they offer great advantages to the historical student.

E. POCOCKE.

LONDON, *November*, 1851.

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The Treatises have all been revised for the present Edition by their respective Contributors, with the exception of those by the late Dr. Arnold and Bishop Russell, which are reprinted from the former edition.

The Chapters by the Editor have been written expressly for this Edition.

The dates have been reduced throughout the work to one uniform system.

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[ VASE.—*Real Museo Borbonico.* ]



## INTRODUCTORY DISSERTATION :

ON

### THE CREDIBILITY OF EARLY ROMAN HISTORY.

IN laying the foundation of those general rules which induction has established in natural philosophy, the multitude of reported facts which present themselves to the inquirer, are carefully weighed and distinguished. Some may seem utterly at variance with all former theories; others may bear a character of internal probability; while a third class may be of a neutral kind, neither inviting nor repelling belief. But the true philosopher presumes not to judge of their truth by their internal evidence; he proceeds to examine the external testimony on which they severally rest. Some, then, which in themselves were most likely to gain credit, he finds reported on mere hearsay, by one who had neither the means to come at the truth, nor yet judgment to sift the stories which others related to him. These may, hereafter, be confirmed by competent witnesses; but at present, nothing can be drawn from them; and for the purposes of establishing a theory, they are utterly useless. On the contrary, some of those facts which seemed most improbable, are found to rest on the most unexceptionable evidence, that of intelligent eye-witnesses, or of men impartial, and judicious, and inquisitive, well practised in the art of scrutinising the loose reports of common informers. The philosopher, therefore, wisely admits them; they are recorded in the journals of science, and serve to modify the theories

Course of  
Investigation  
in Natural  
Philosophy

which a less universal experience had too hastily formed, and to excite a general desire for additional facts, illustrative of the same subject, on whichever side they may be likely finally to turn the scale.

But if the student in natural philosophy, for philosopher we could not call him, should class under one common name all reports of facts, from the mere rumours of a newspaper, to the positive affirmation of the most judicious and scientific eye-witness, and should speak collectively of their credibility or want of credibility; what should we think of his powers of discrimination that could thus confound together things the most dissimilar; or of the soundness of that understanding, which in its reasoning should ascribe to a whole made up of parts so discordant, the peculiar character of one only of its constituent members?

Want of  
discrimina-  
tion in  
historians.

Yet this which we have imagined as a merely possible case in natural philosophy, has actually occurred in examining the facts which relate to the actions and fortunes of men. One common name of history has been applied to all accounts of the past deeds and condition of mankind; and while some, maintaining the authority of history, have considered as true the tales of the most incompetent witnesses; others, with equal simplicity, have set up their own limited knowledge as the judge of truth, and have rejected the statements of men most honest and most sensible, because they have not been in accordance with their own previous opinions of probability.

These are not imaginary errors: an indiscriminate belief of all testimony caused the writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to report, as authentic, the tales of Livy and Plutarch, and of many of the ecclesiastical historians. And Voltaire, fancying his own wisdom could of itself distinguish truth from falsehood, presumed to ridicule the statements of Herodotus, of Arrian, and of those writers who record the creation of the New Forest by William the conqueror.

Value of  
internal and  
external  
evidence.

These faults should be carefully avoided, if we wish to establish the great doctrines of history on the same sure base with those of natural philosophy. Every portion of the annals of mankind should be judged of by an examination of the credibility of its relaters. If this be very great, we may delay the decision how far internal improbability should overpower external evidence, till it can be shown what facts there are, reported by really good witnesses, which appear improbable upon a due consideration of all the circumstances:

On the other hand, if the external evidence be very low, internal probability must not lead us to mistake a vague report for a fact. It may be true, but there exists no sufficient testimony of its truth to allow us to use it as a ground for any general conclusion. This to a sanguine and generalising mind, may be a painful sacrifice; but it is one which the principles of true philosophy fully demand.

Without further preface, we proceed to apply the method above stated to such facts as are reported of the Romans, from the foundation of the city, to the beginning of the first Punic war. That is, we shall call before us the witnesses by whom they are related, and examine both their means of acquiring information, and their capacity and disposition to make the best use of them.

The only detailed and connected account of the first centuries of the Roman history, is to be found in Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Particular periods are described by Plutarch, in his lives of Romulus, Numa, Publicola, Coriolanus, Camillus, and Pyrrhus. Incidental mention of particular facts, occurs in Polybius, and in various parts of the works of Cicero. Other writers it is needless to mention, as they mostly either lived at a much later period than any above named, or were poets, and, therefore, concerned themselves little with the truth of their descriptions. Of all this number, we will first examine the pretensions of LIVY. This Livy. writer flourished in the time of Augustus Cæsar, about 250 years later than the very close of the period with which we are now concerned. He, therefore, must have derived his accounts solely from the information of other writers, assisted, perhaps, by inscriptions still remaining on ancient monuments, by the genealogical records of private families, and possibly by some public registers preserved under the care of the officers of the state. Here, then, are four distinct sources of information of very unequal value; yet it is only in one or two instances that Livy explains from which of them he is copying; still less does he acquaint us when he is not copying from any one, but writing merely on his own authority. This neglect at once destroys the weight of his whole evidence; as it leaves us with no means of distinguishing between that which is well, and that which is ill supported. But we will go a little further. The principal writers whom Livy quotes in the first ten books of his work, are Fabius Pictor, Calpurnius Piso, Claudius, L. Cincius, Early historians of Rome. Authors quoted by Livy.

and Valerius Antias. Of these, Claudius and Valerius Antias appear, by Livy's own testimony, to have exaggerated on several occasions, even to extravagance. Cincius is only once quoted in the first ten books, and he is then praised as a careful antiquarian; but this praise is somewhat neutralised by a passage in the twenty-first book,<sup>1</sup> where he is described as guilty of a strange confusion in a matter that happened in his own times, and which he might readily have understood. Piso is recorded as the author of one exaggeration of the most monstrous kind;<sup>2</sup> and Fabius, the most ancient of them all, and the one whom Livy prefers to all the rest, is noted by Polybius as a writer of low credit, owing to his excessive partiality towards his own countrymen.<sup>3</sup>

Authorities  
for history.

Inscriptions remaining on ancient monuments are undoubtedly an excellent authority in many respects; but we should be well assured of their genuineness and correct transcription before we can place full reliance on them at second-hand. Livy, however, does not often appeal to them, and where he does,<sup>4</sup> we may allow their evidence; although it does not appear that either of the monuments were extant in his time, and the plate in the capitol,<sup>5</sup> probably perished when the capitol was burnt, A. U. C. 670. But the facts which can be thus reported are necessarily few, and can be given with none of the accompanying circumstances.

Effects of  
family  
vanity.

The genealogical records of private families are useful to an historian in settling the chronology of events; and as they contained an account of the offices which each individual had filled, we might expect them to furnish a faithful list of the persons who at any given period had the direction of public affairs. But even here we have no sure ground to rest on. Family vanity, it seems, had corrupted these memorials to such a degree, that fictitious honours and exploits were ascribed by each family to its own ancestors; and this affords an argument that none of these genealogies were really handed down from early times; for the most unblushing impudence would not embolden a cotemporary to impute to any man imaginary titles and victories. Nor is there greater certainty in many of the public documents preserved in the temples or public offices, such as the lists of consuls and other magistrates for every year. For, first, it does not

<sup>1</sup> c. xxxviii.

<sup>2</sup> Lib. i. c. 55.

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. Lib. i. c. 14. Lib. iii. c. 8, 9.

<sup>4</sup> As in Lib. ii. c. 33. Lib. vi. c. 29.

<sup>5</sup> Lib. vi. c. 29.

appear that those books or records of magistrates, which were formerly kept in the temple of Juno Moneta, were extant when Livy wrote; at least he only refers to the reports of their contents in earlier writers; and as he mentions one instance,<sup>1</sup> in which two of these writers quote them differently, without telling us which was the correct reading; we may fairly conclude, that he either could not, or did not, examine them himself. In the next place, not only must these books have been very unfaithfully examined by one or both of those writers, whose report Livy has transmitted to us, but in one memorable instance, the authority of the books themselves seems highly questionable. They, with all other early annals, represent A. Cornelius Cossus as not having been consul when he killed Tolumnus, the king of Veii, A. U. C. 318; yet Augustus Cæsar declared that he had read the inscription on the very spoils of Tolumnus, in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, and that Cossus there asserted that he had won them as consul. Either, then, the books must be of doubtful authority and of later date, or there must have been such a general uncertainty in the records of earlier times existing in the days of Augustus, that none of them are fairly entitled to that belief which is commonly given with justice to such official memorials.

Amidst this chaos, it was, perhaps, possible for a well-informed and patient antiquarian, with such facilities for examining every ancient record as his situation in the emperor's family must needs have given him, to have distinguished between what was genuine and what was forged, and to have told posterity all that was known, on good authority, of the early history of his country. But it is too plain that Livy has done nothing of all this. Although aware of the scantiness, if it were not rather the non-existence, of all cotemporary records, and the unfaithfulness of the compilations of later times, his narrative is as detailed as if he were relating the events of his own age. How much of this was his own invention, and how much he copied from the invention of his predecessors, we cannot exactly tell; but that it must be for the most part invention, is even certain.

Again, Livy did by no means well understand the early state of his country: in proof of this may be given, his leaving, without explanation, the extraordinary fact, that the Romans, so familiar with bloodshed in all their wars, and so perpetually inflamed by the most

<sup>1</sup> Lib. iv. c. 23.



violent provocations to engage in internal seditions, should yet, in the first centuries of the republic, have been so careful of taking away each other's lives. Again, his ignorance of the ancient manner of warfare appears clearly in his account of the engagement of the Cremera, in which all the Fabii were slain. According to him, the whole Roman force, on this occasion, amounted to no more than three hundred and six men, all of them, he tells us, patricians of the Fabian family; and as the same number is mentioned to have been killed at the Cremera, which originally set out from Rome a year before, we must suppose that in repeated actions with the Veientians, during a whole year, not a single man had been lost. He seems to have forgotten that the three hundred and six Fabii, constituted only the heavy-armed men of the army, and, therefore, were alone counted by early writers; but that they would be attended by a great force of their vassals, or poor clients, who all carried missile weapons, and though not thought worthy of notice as soldiers, were yet very effective auxiliaries in a plundering warfare. Long before Livy's time, the use of the sword and large shield having superseded the old distinction of heavy-armed and light-armed troops, the nominal and real force of an army was the same as with us at this day; but in Greece, as in the early times of Rome, it was not so; and we must always make a large addition to the numbers mentioned by the cotemporary historians, if we would estimate the real strength engaged on either side. A cotemporary historian, writing about a thing perfectly familiar to him, naturally omits to offer an explanation of it, except it be given incidentally; but when a writer in after ages copies his language, without such an explanation as is become necessary to *his* readers, it is a sure sign that he does not understand it.<sup>1</sup> But the most remarkable instance of Livy's combined ignorance and carelessness, is to be met with in his details of the battles fought in the first periods of his history. In his description of the divisions and arms of the Roman army,<sup>2</sup> he says that anciently, before pay was given to the soldiers, that is, before the year of Rome 349,<sup>3</sup> they used the round shields, clypei, and the close phalanx of the Greeks; their

His account  
of the Fabii.

Instances of  
Livy's  
ignorance  
and  
carelessness.

<sup>1</sup> Even Dionysius of Halicarnassus shows on this occasion, a knowledge and attention which are wanting in Livy; for he expressly tells us, that the army of the Fabii consisted of four thousand men; the majority, he says, consisting of their clients and followers, but of the Fabian family itself, there were three hundred and six men.—*Antiq. Rom.* lib. ix. c. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Lib. viii. c. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Vide Livium, lib. iv. c. 59.

principal effective weapon being the long spear, hasta; as we learn, both from the universal practice of troops drawn up in the order of the phalanx, and also from Livy's express words,<sup>1</sup> where he is describing the arms of the several classes instituted by Servius Tullius. Yet, in all his history, there is not the slightest allusion to the use of such arms or tactics in the description of a single battle; on the contrary, he writes as if the divisions and weapons of the legion had always been employed; and talks continually of legions, manipuli, triarii, centurions, names which have no connexion with the order of the phalanx; nay, he describes the soldiers as throwing their pila or javelins, and then coming to close action with their swords; a manner of fighting practised, indeed, in the Punic wars, but utterly unknown to troops who fought in compact array, and decided their battles by charging with their levelled spears. This, alone, affords a decisive proof that Livy's accounts are not only unfounded, but clumsy and ignorant inventions; being got up with much less pains to preserve probability, than would now be tolerated, even in the descriptions of past times, which are given by the poet or the novelist.

His military descriptions.

It is only in deference to the character which Livy has obtained among the learned, because they think him eloquent and picturesque in his narrative, that we have thought it needful to quote so many proofs of his insufficiency as an historian. One more only shall be added. The pretended defeat of the Gauls by Camillus, and the recovery of Rome by the sword, instead of a ransom, which Livy has given in the utmost detail, are in all probability mere inventions of Roman vanity, to palliate the disgrace of having bought their safety by the payment of money to their victorious enemies. Polybius, mentioning the subject incidentally, says, that the Romans made a treaty with the Gauls for the termination of hostilities on such terms as the Gauls thought good; and, afterwards,<sup>2</sup> speaking of it more expressly, informs us, that the cause of the retreat was an invasion made by the Veneti on the territories of the Gauls, during their absence, upon which they concluded an agreement with the Romans, and gave them back their city, and returned home;<sup>3</sup> nor was it till

Testimony of Polybius.

<sup>1</sup> Lib. i. c. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Lib. ii. c. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Compare also Polybius, book ii. chap. 22, where he makes one of the Gaulish chiefs encourage his countrymen to attack the Roman territory, by reminding them of the glorious and profitable issue of their first invasion.

forty two years after this event, although the Gauls had, in the interval, made a formidable irruption as far as Alba, that the Romans were able to meet them in the field. No competent judge can hesitate for an instant in preferring the authority of Polybius, in such a matter, to that of Livy; so that we have here an instance of a signal falsification of one of the most memorable events of Roman history, followed by a series of other falsehoods, where Livy ascribes to his countrymen, no fewer than five victories over the Gauls, some of them of the most splendid kind, won within that period in which they were not strong enough in reality even to venture a battle.

Considering, then, the deficiency of all good materials, the very indifferent character of those which were in his power, and the instances given of his own ignorance, carelessness, and deviation from truth in points of importance, it is not too much to assert, that Livy's evidence, as far as concerns the ten first books of his history, is altogether unworthy of credit. Many of the facts reported by him may be true, and many are probable; but we have no right to admit them as real occurrences on his authority. The story of many well-written novels is highly probable, yet we do not the less regard it as a fiction; and the narrative of Livy, even where its internal evidence is most in its favour, is so destitute of external evidence, that although we would not assert that it is everywhere false, we should act unwisely were we anywhere to argue upon it as if it were true.

Livy's  
evidence  
unworthy of  
credit.

Dionysius of  
Halicar-  
nassus.

The testimony of DIONYSIUS of Halicarnassus is next to be considered. As he was contemporary with Livy, his means of information must have been nearly the same; and as we have already seen how imperfect these were, we need say no more on that subject. We must inquire, then, whether his personal qualifications were such as to render him a more respectable witness than the Roman historian. And here a strong presumption against him arises on a mere survey of the bulk of his work: the minute detail in which Livy indulges, was stated as an argument against his credibility; but this is applicable to Dionysius in a more than three-fold proportion, for the events, which, in the Roman writer, occupy three books and a few chapters of the fourth, are by the Greek expanded, so as to fill no fewer than eleven; so that he must have supplied himself from his own invention, or that of others, even more plentifully than Livy. Then for his judgment, it is worthy of notice, that he is the author

of a criticism on Thucydides which has never been surpassed for its absurdity : and that while he charges Polybius with writing carelessly and inaccurately upon mere hearsay, he names, among the writers from whom his own work is borrowed, that of Valerius Antias, of whom Livy himself is obliged to confess, that he knows no limit to his falsehoods. He also shows the same ignorance of the early state of the Roman army that we have before observed in Livy : speaking of legions, centurions, triarii, &c., long before such divisions, or titles, were in existence. His whole work bears the marks of having been written in order to extol the character of the Romans, and to give the most favourable account possible of their origin and early history : and on the whole, his evidence does not deserve to be placed on a higher rank than that of Livy, which we have already pronounced to be insufficient.

PLUTARCH lived more than a century later than Dionysius or Livy, Plutarch. and was consequently still further removed from the original sources of information. Besides, as he wrote the lives of individuals, and not the history of the nation, he contented himself with following the commonly received accounts, selecting from them such stories as would most adorn the characters of his several heroes. Thus, in the life of Camillus, he adopts Livy's tale of his defeating the Gauls, and delivering his country from the disgrace of paying a ransom : for had he examined into the truth of the facts thus related, the result would have reduced the subject of his biography nearly to insignificance. Moreover, we have the means of judging, from his Grecian lives, of the indiscriminate manner in which he compiles his narrative from the best and the worst authorities ; not unfrequently giving the preference to the latter. So that he must needs be a very unsafe guide, where we have no remaining standard by which we can try him, and thus separate what is worthless from what is true.

Had CICERO ever performed the task which his friends it seems Cicero. wished him to undertake, and had he given us the fruits of a careful examination into the early history of his country, his evidence would have deserved our most respectful attention. But as it is, he has only introduced particular facts, as they were commonly reported, to illustrate his argument ; without by any means giving us reason to think that he had thoroughly ascertained their truth. Nothing is more unsafe than to rely on the correctness of historical facts quoted

by philosophers, in illustration of their immediate subject. Not writing as historians, they take them as they find them related, and use them for their own purposes, without strictly inquiring upon what foundation they rest. In referring to Bacon's *History of Henry the VIIth*, we may consider his judgment to have been passed deliberately in favour of the truth of his statements; but we should do him a great injustice, if we were to expect the same accuracy in all the historical examples introduced in his *Instauratio Magna*.

Polybius.

The authority of POLYBIUS is of a very different kind from that of any of the writers hitherto considered. Living at a much earlier period, he might have had fuller means of information; and those which he had, he certainly seems to have weighed far more sensibly. The fables which in after times obtained general circulation, were for the most part confined to the misrepresentations of family traditions, or to the pages of a few writers, whose assertions had not yet been copied often enough to pass for truth. But Polybius does not profess to explore the antiquities of Rome. Its actual state, both civil and military, he had carefully studied; and the events of his own age, or of the one immediately preceding it, he has investigated fairly and fully. Of more remote times, he has spoken briefly and incidentally, and he has shown, in several instances, that the traditions respecting the early state of Rome were far less corrupted when he wrote, than they became shortly afterwards. We may particularly remark this in the famous story of Horatius Cocles. Polybius,<sup>1</sup> after noticing his brave resistance to the enemy, and his desiring his friends to cut away the bridge behind him, adds, that when he saw the bridge destroyed, he threw himself, armed and wounded as he was, into the river, and willingly died for his country. Livy, on the contrary, reports that he swam across unhurt, and lived to receive the applauses and rewards of his countrymen. It is in such additions as this that we perceive how the real glory of the Roman people has been in fact injured by the clumsy falsehoods of their own historians. The story of Cocles, as Polybius tells it, is a striking instance of heroism, but is in no way improbable, and may be paralleled in the authentic history of other nations. As told by Livy, the marvellousness of the escape of Cocles throws a suspicion on the whole achievement, and

The story of  
Horatius  
Cocles.

<sup>1</sup> Book vi. c. 55.

might incline us to regard the whole as a mere romance. But a foreigner, whose time was busily employed on other pursuits, could not hope to unravel the various records, always imperfect and often contradictory, which professed to relate the origin of the city, its early fortunes, and the causes which led to the foundation of some of its principal institutions. On these points, then, Polybius has said nothing, as other writers have said nothing, that is satisfactory.

It results from this view of the authorities on which the early part of the Roman history rests, that they must be considered quite insufficient to establish its credibility. Much of it is doubtless true; but we have no clue to enable us to distinguish between the true and the false; and when we find that so remarkable an event as the first invasion of the Gauls has been so totally misrepresented, a general suspicion and uncertainty is thrown over the whole narrative. Able men have endeavoured to find some sure ground in the midst of this treacherous morass, by availing themselves of the authentic histories of other nations; and from seeing what has been the progress of society elsewhere, they have conjectured what it was at Rome. But such reasonings, although they may be highly useful in supplying a knowledge of particular points, where the general state of a country may be learned from positive evidence, become, we think, rather hazardous, when they must furnish the whole of the picture, almost to its faintest outline. We too could form our theories, and present to our readers speculations which seem to us recommended by much internal probability. These, however, are not to be offered in the place of history: and while there has been given in this work a transcript of the popular account of the first four hundred and ninety years of the Roman story, we shall content ourselves with having shown its utter want of trustworthiness, and shall leave our readers to select from it such portions as they may choose to think probable, instead of offering ourselves as their guides on an undertaking so desperate.

The  
authorities  
for early  
Roman  
History  
insufficient.

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It was not till the preceding pages were completed, that the writer of them met with an essay by M. de Beaufort, "*On the Uncertainty of the Roman History, during the first Five Hundred Years;*" as well as with the attempt made by Hooke,<sup>1</sup> to answer M. de

<sup>1</sup> In the fourth volume of his Roman History. 8vo edit.

Beaufort's arguments. In the former work the author has gone somewhat further than appeared necessary to the argument maintained in our *Encyclopædia*: for without entering into the question, whether Livy and Dionysius, had they been sensible men, could, from the materials existing in their days, have compiled a credible narrative, it is sufficient for all practical purposes to show, that the narrative which they have actually left us is not credible: their own ignorance, carelessness, and want of judgment being so excessive, that their testimony can give us no reasonable ground of assurance. Another signal proof of this, in addition to those we have adduced, may be here given from M. de Beaufort. The two most memorable events in the early military history of Rome, are the wars with the Gauls and with Porsenna. How completely the former has been falsified by the Roman historians, we have already shown; and it appears that the latter has been reported no less untruly. M. de Beaufort quotes Pliny to prove that Porsenna dictated terms of peace to the Romans, one of which debarred them from the use of iron, except in agriculture: a remarkable condition, which evidently implies the dependent state to which the Romans were reduced; and which is exactly the same with that imposed by the Philistines upon the Israelites, recorded in the *First Book of Samuel*, chap. xiii. 19, &c. Pliny quotes this stipulation expressly from the treaty itself; (*in fœdere nominatim comprehensum invenimus*;) and it is strongly confirmed by a passage in Tacitus; where that historian, speaking of the burning of the capitol in the reign of Vitellius, deploras the event as one which neither Porsenna had accomplished, when the city was surrendered to him, (*deditâ urbe*,) nor the Gauls, when it was taken by assault. Now, if the two most notorious wars in which the Romans were engaged in the early periods of their history, are reported to us by Livy, in a manner totally false, what credit can be attached to his authority in any thing? We repeat again, that we do not pretend to assert the whole contents of Livy's first ten books to be untrue, but merely that Livy's relating them, is no reason at all that they should be true; in other words, that the facts, being quite unsupported by good evidence, ought not to be admitted among historical truths.<sup>1</sup>

Arguments  
of M. de  
Beaufort.

<sup>1</sup> For Dr. Arnold's extended Dissertation on the Historians of Rome, see "The History of Roman Literature in this Encyclopædia."—*Editor*.



[The Tiber, from a Statue in the Vatican.]

## CHAPTER I.

### LEGENDARY HISTORY OF ROME.

ONE of the chief sources of obscurity in the early historians of antiquity, is to be found in their repeated attempts to render plausible, that which the advancing judgment of their countrymen condemned as inconsistent with fact. Old legends, once received with implicit faith, were remodelled, and from time to time reduced to something resembling historical proportion. But this process, while continually removing the original basis, for which it merely substituted plausible fiction, still left untouched the national fable of a divine original.

Chief sources  
of obscurity  
in early  
history.

To illustrate this singular tendency in the people of Rome, as well as to set forth the usual substitute for their early history, the reader is presented with the popular

#### LEGEND OF ÆNEAS.

Æneas, the Trojan prince, and Anchises his father, appalled by the fate of Laocoon, whom the gods had slain by two serpents, for striving against the fates in defence of his native city, fled from its impending ruin, piously taking with them the gods of their country. The star of Venus, the mother of Æneas, shone out brightly as they sailed over the sea towards their new home, and continued to guide them till they reached the land of the west, where it vanished, betokening the arrival of the Trojans in the prophetic land. Æneas had

Legend of  
Æneas.





The sow with the thirty young.

been directed by an oracle to follow an animal which should guide him to the site of his new city. The Trojans had landed, and were about to sacrifice to their gods a milk-white sow, when the intended victim escaped from the altar. Being pursued by the Trojan prince, he came upon her where she had farrowed a litter of thirty young. It was a barren and sandy spot. Æneas remembered the oracle, but was still doubtful, when a voice was heard exclaiming, "the thirty young are thirty years, when these are passed, thy posterity shall remove to a better land; obey then



the gods, and build where they bid thee." Here then the Trojans built.

Latinus receives the Trojans kindly.

Latinus was the king of the country where they had landed. This prince treated the strangers with the greatest kindness, and assigned to each man a liberal portion of land. Soon, however, quarrels arose, and the foreigners having plundered the neighbouring lands, Turnus, king of the Rutulians, was called in by Latinus to his assistance. In the course of the war that ensued, king Latinus was killed and his city stormed. The conqueror, Æneas, married Lavinia, the daughter of the late king; and thus reigning jointly over both his own followers and the natives, the united people were called Latins.

Æneas marries Lavinia.

Disappearing in the Numicius, is worshipped as Jupiter Indiges.

Mezentius was king of the Etruscans. This prince was now called in to the aid of Turnus, who, shortly afterwards engaging in battle with Æneas, on the banks of the Numicius, was killed, while Æneas, having plunged into the river, was never seen again. His faithful people built an altar to his honour on its banks, and he was worshipped as "the god of the land," and invoked under the name of "Jupiter Indiges."

#### LEGEND OF ASCANIUS, THE SON OF ÆNEAS.

Mezentius slain by Ascanius.

Notwithstanding the death of Turnus and the disappearance of Æneas, the war still raged between Mezentius and Ascanius. At length the Etruscan king fell, slain in single encounter by the hand of the youthful Ascanius, who received the name of Iulus, or the "Soft Hair," because, though with the soft down of youth upon his cheeks, he had slain the warlike Mezentius.

Alba Longa built

The prophetic thirty years soon came to a close, and Ascanius now built a city upon the slope of a mountain, commanding wide prospects, and overlooking a lake situated at its foot. The hill upon which the Trojan prince had built was steep, and its summit narrow, hence the city, from its site, and in allusion to the white sow, was called Alba Longa, or "White Longtown."

## LEGEND OF ROMULUS.


In Alba Longa reigned a prince whose name was Procas. His two sons were called Numitor and Amulius. On the death of the old king of Alba, Amulius the younger son seized on the kingdom, leaving to Numitor nothing save the private inheritance of his father. To this act of wickedness succeeded the murder of the only son of his brother. His brother's daughter Silvia he compelled to become the virgin priestess of the goddess Vesta. The god Mars, however, had seen and loved the beautiful vestal, and when it was discovered that she was about to become a mother, Amulius commanded that the issue should be cast into the river, and the vestal be buried alive. She gave birth to two infants. By chance, just then the river had overflowed its banks, and when they were thrown into the stream, their basket floated to the foot of the Palatine Hill, and there, beneath a wild fig-tree, was cast upon the land. At this juncture a she-wolf came to the waters to drink, and on seeing the children, carried them to her cave, and there gave them suck. A woodpecker, too, went and returned from the cave, bringing them food. Faustulus, who was the royal herdsman, at length espied the wolf caressing the children; he approached them, and the animal fled. Then taking these infants home to his wife, Larentia, they were brought up with the sons of Faustulus, and were named Romulus and Remus. Not far from the Palatine Hill, where the twins were reared, was Mount Aventinus, where the herdsmen of Numitor were wont to stall their cattle.

Procas, king of Alba.

Wickedness of Amulius.

Silvia's children thrown into the river.

A wolf carries them to her cave.



They are brought up by Faustulus.

Remus carried to Alba.

Between the herdsmen of these two hills there sprang up a feud, and Remus, falling into an ambush, was seized and carried off to Alba. No sooner was the young shepherd brought before Numitor, than, struck with his noble aspect, he desired to learn his parentage, and Remus, having related the prodigies attending his birth, together with his own and his brother's escape from death, Numitor, much astonished, imagined that this must be the offspring of his own daughter.

Faustulus and Romulus now assembled a band of the young men who had been wont to accompany them, by whose aid Romulus took the city; and Amulius perished in the assault. Numitor, now made king, acknowledged Romulus and Remus as his grandchildren. Thus wonderfully preserved, brought up, and acknowledged, the twin brothers resolved to build a city upon the hill, near the banks of the river, where they had been reared. And leaving Alba, they

Amulius slain.

demanded of the gods, by augury, who should be the ruler and name-giver of the new city. The partizans of Romulus were called Quintilii, those of Remus, Fabii. Long and patiently did they wait for the answer of the gods; the morning, evening, and the returning morning of the second day, found them at their watchful post, when at length, as the sun was rising, Remus espied six vultures. But while they were announcing this to Romulus, twelve vultures made their appearance; and a vehement dispute began as to which of the two auguries conveyed the surest sign. At length, Romulus, being supported by the majority of favouring voices, began to build his new city on the Palatine Hill. Remus, observing the ditch and rampart now carried about the space allotted to the city, contemptuously overleaped them both, exclaiming, "and shall such safeguards as these protect your city?" Scarcely had he uttered this exclamation, when Celer, who was superintending the building, struck Remus dead with the spade which he held in his hand. On the hill Remuria, near the banks of the Tiber, the spot he had loved so well, was Remus buried. Remorse now seized upon Romulus; he refused all consolation; nor was he satisfied till, by instituting the Lemuria for the souls of the departed, he had appeased the manes of Remus. Ever afterwards, by the side of Romulus, was placed an empty throne, a crown and sceptre, to give a fictitious honour to the slain Remus.

Romulus  
builds his  
city.  
B.C. 722.

Remus slain  
by Celer.

Romulus  
institutes the  
Lemuria.

Sets apart an  
asylum.

Romulus soon found that the number of his people was small; he therefore set apart an asylum for fugitives. Many flocked to this place of refuge. Here the outlawed, the shedders of blood, the banished, and men of low degree, who had fled from their masters, found security. Though this plan filled the city with inhabitants, yet the neighbouring nations scorned every offer of Romulus to form matrimonial alliances with them. Romulus therefore resolved to compass his object by force. He proclaimed a great festival to the god Consus, to which he invited the Sabines and Latins, his neighbours. The sports and games drew numbers together, attended by their wives and children; and the people of Cœnina, Crustumerium, and Antemnæ, swelled the multitude of the spectators. Suddenly, as their visitors were intently gazing upon the games, forth rushed the Roman youth, and carried off the virgins. To avenge this daring outrage, the inhabitants of three Latin border towns, Cœnina, Antemnæ, and Crustumerium, took up arms. The troops of Cœnina were the first in the field; but they were vanquished, and their king, Acron, slain by the hand of Romulus. His arms and armour were dedicated to Jupiter. Crustumerium and Antemnæ were crushed. But a most formidable array was at hand. Titus Tatius, king of the Sabines, advanced at the head of so mighty an army, that Romulus, unable to withstand this powerful chief, drew off into the city. The summit of the Saturnian hill, afterwards

The Sabine  
virgins  
carried off.

Acron slain.

Advance of  
the Sabine  
army.

called the Capitoline, had been garrisoned and fortified. Between this and the Palatine hill, lay a low and swampy valley. Tarpeia, the daughter of the chief who held this fortalice for Romulus, watched the goodly array of the Sabines as they drew near; she marked with admiration their golden bracelets, and longing for



[Titus Tatius, King of the Sabines.—*Iconografia da Canini.*]

these splendid ornaments, bargained to betray into their hands the strong fort held by the chieftain her father, provided they would give her their glittering insignia, or, as she expressed it, what they carried on their left arms. During the night the deed of treachery was consummated. Tarpeia threw open the gate, and the enemy entered. She claimed her reward, and each man, as he advanced, threw upon the traitress, not only his bracelet, but his shield, and thus crushed her to death. Her tomb was shown in later days, and her memory rendered still more infamous, by naming that rock the Tarpeian, whence ever afterwards traitors were hurled. The Sabines now held the fortress, which the Romans endeavoured to recover. A fierce battle ensued in the valley below. The Sabines pressed the Romans so hard, that the latter were driven close up to one of the city gates. This was shut by the people within the city, but it opened of its own accord. Again and again did they close it, but again did it open, and the Sabines were rushing in, when lo! a vast torrent burst forth from the Temple of Janus, and swept all traces of the Sabines from before the city! Hence the Temple of Janus was to stand ever open in time of war, that the god might aid the people of Romulus. Again, in the valley, there was a fierce fight, and the Romans being driven before the enemy, Romulus prayed to Jupiter to stay their flight. His people halted, and

Tarpeia  
crushed to  
death

Miraculous  
repulse of the  
Sabines.

The Sabine women promote peace.

firmly faced the Sabines, and the strife was more furious than ever. At this juncture the Sabine women, who had been carried off by the Roman youth, rushed in between their husbands and their fathers, and prayed them to be reconciled. Their entreaties were listened to, peace was made, and the two nations became one people. While



Altar of Venus Cloacina. 1

The Comitium.

the Romans, under Romulus, continued to occupy the Palatine hill, the Sabines built a new town upon the Quirinal and Capitoline hills, where they were governed by their king, Titus Tatius. The valley between Palatinus and Saturnius was the place of meeting, "the Comitium," where the kings and their counsellors met to consult on common affairs. Shortly after this, Titus Tatius, having refused satisfaction to the inhabitants of Laurentum, whom some of his kinsmen had wronged, was slain at a festival in that town, whereupon Romulus became sole king over both nations, who were styled respectively, Romans and Quirites.

Character of Romulus.

Romulus was just, yet mild, towards his people, whom, if guilty of wrongs, he did not condemn to death, but adjudged to pay fines of oxen or sheep. His uniform success in war served to increase the wealth of his people, to whom he devoted the spoil of their enemies. After having reigned thirty-seven years, the term of his sojourn on earth drew near. One day, when he had convoked his people in the field of Mars, near the Goat's Pool, there arose a fearful storm. On a sudden the heavens were dark as night, the thunder, the lightning, and the rain, were terrific, and the people fled. On the return of light, they came again to the field of Mars, but Romulus had disappeared, for Mars had carried him up to heaven in a fiery chariot. The people grieved for the loss of their king; but their grief was calmed into religious awe, when Julius Proculus announced to them, that as he was coming from Alba to the city, Romulus appeared to him in more than mortal beauty, and in a form of more than mortal stature. "Go," said he, "and tell my people that they no longer mourn for me; bid them to be brave, bid them to be warlike; they shall thus become the lords of the earth; I will watch over them as their guardian god Quirinus." Thus did the people know that Romulus was now a god. To him, therefore, they built a temple, and offered sacrifice; adoring him henceforth under the name Quirinus.<sup>2</sup>

Disappearance of Romulus.

Announcement of Julius Proculus.

<sup>1</sup> Where the Romans and Sabines are said to have purified themselves, after they had been persuaded to lay down their arms at the entreaties of the women.—*Denarius of the Gens Mussidia.*

<sup>2</sup> The Quirinalia were celebrated on the 17th of February, in honour of Romulus.



[Numa Pompilius and Ancus Martius.—Iconografa da Casini.]


LEGEND OF NUMA POMPILIUS.

Now that Romulus was removed from among his people, the senators would not allow the election of a new king: they therefore divided themselves into decades; every decade was to hold the kingly power for five days in succession. Thus passed one entire year. The people, however, demanded a king to protect them from the oppression of the senators. For this purpose, therefore, an election took place. As the Romans and Sabines equally wished the king to be selected from their own body, a vehement dispute arose, which only subsided by an agreement that a Sabine should be elected, but that Romans should be the electors. Numa Pompilius, thereupon, was chosen, for all agreed that he was just, wise, and holy. Many said that he had obtained his great wisdom from Pythagoras, the Grecian philosopher; others, that he gained his vast knowledge from no stranger. He consented to be king, should the gods, by augury, show such to be their pleasure, for from

B. C.  
715-673.

Government  
of the  
Senators.


Numa chosen  
king.



[Sacrificial Implements.]

Consults the gods by augury.

first to last he had




[The Albogalerus, or Characteristic Cap of the Flamen Dialis.]

reverence for them. The auguries were favourable, and the first act of the pious prince was to divide amongst the people the lands which Romulus had conquered. He then founded the worship of Terminus. He next laid down laws for religion. Many did he appoint to minister in holy things. Some were Pontifices; these were overseers of the sacred rites of the gods, maintaining their faithful observance. Others were Augurs; these, from the flights of birds, and from other sources, foretold the will of the gods concerning the future. The Flamens were to perform holy duties in the temples; the virgins of Vesta to guard the ever burning fire; whilst the Salii were priestly dancers and singers of solemn hymns, who, on holy days, honoured Mars by processions through the city; they kept the sacred shields (*Ancilia*) which fell down from heaven.



[Temple of Vesta.—Denarius of the Gens Cassia.]



[Anellia.—Denarius of Augustus.]

Hard by a spring that gushed out from a rock, within a hallowed grove, the pious Numa was wont to consult the nymph Egeria. She taught him his duty to gods and men; and the king revered the holy Nymph so greatly, that she took him for her husband.

In a grove upon the hill Aventinus, dwelt the gods Picus and Faunus. These divinities knew how to obtain from Jupiter the knowledge of his will, either by the flight of birds, or by lightnings. By the advice, therefore, of the nymph Egeria, Numa succeeded in ensnaring them, and thus learned the means of ascertaining the pleasure of Jupiter; and further, to give all men a sign that he had received this counsel from Egeria, he invited to supper many Romans, before whom was set, in earthen vessels, a frugal meal. "And now," said he suddenly, "Egeria is come to visit me;" and forthwith the dishes became gold, the couches magnificent, and the food plentiful and delicious. Numa revered the gods, and delighted to do them honour, yet he would have no blood shed upon the altars, nor permit any images of the gods, nor would he have costly sacrifices; for the offerings of the people were to be the first-fruits of the earth, cakes of flour, roasted corn and meal.

Numa ensnares Picus and Faunus.

Shows the Romans a miracle.

Numa's mode of sacrifice.


As for the lands which the great Romulus had won, they were portioned out amongst his people, for Numa would have them live by husbandry, and each man enjoy his own lot in happiness and contentment. For this purpose land-marks were set up on each inheritance, which the god Terminus had in charge; and should any one remove a land-mark, that man was to be held accursed. There were, however, many men of the city who did not till the soil, for the lots of the conquered land were not sufficiently numerous for them all. These inhabitants, therefore, were divided into nine guilds, each apportioned to its separate craft. In the prosperous days of Numa, the great gates of the temple of Janus remained closed, for the Romans were at peace. And further, the Roman king built a temple to the goddess Faith, and in order that his people might be true, and just, and honest, he ordained for her service solemn rites and sacred worship. At last, after living justly and piously to the great age of fourscore years, he gradually declined, and died. The hill of Janiculum, over the Tiber, was his burial place, and near him, in another tomb, were deposited his books of sacred laws and holy rites.

Appropriation of conquered lands.

City crafts or guilds instituted.



[Temple of Janus.]



[Head of Janus, from an ancient Roman Coin.]

LEGEND OF TULLUS HOSTILIUS.

B. C.

On the death of Numa, the senators, after some time sharing among themselves the royal power, elected for their king, Tullus Hostilius, whose ancestors had come from Medullia, a Latin city. He was a valiant prince, and very different from his predecessor. Soon after he came to the throne, he appointed those who had no houses to settlements upon the Cælian hill, and there too he himself took up his dwelling. Nor was he forgetful of the poor, for he divided his own lands amongst those who had none.

673-641.  
Election of Tullus Hostilius.

His division of lands among the poor.



Close to the Roman border lay the district of Alba, of which Caius Cluilius was dictator. This chief had led his forces against Rome, to avenge various insults offered to his nation, and was already encamped within five miles of the city, when he died. In his place, however, Mettius Fufetius was chosen dictator. Tullus Hostilius, disregarding the encampment of Fufetius, pressed on towards Alba. The Alban dictator then turned upon his steps, and came up with the Roman king; but instead of a general battle, a proposal was made and accepted, that the decision of the quarrel should rest with three champions, chosen on each side. It happened that in the Roman army there were three brothers called the Horatii, and three others in the Alban army, who were called the Curiatii. These were the champions. It was in the sight of both armies that the fierce encounter took place. After long fighting, all the Curiatii were wounded, and of the Horatii two were slain. The surviving warrior, conscious that he was unequal to encounter the three united, pretended to fly, and the Curiatii, each as he was able, pursued. No sooner did Horatius perceive that his pursuers were at a great distance from each other, than suddenly turning upon them, he slew the foremost, the second fell in like manner, and the third was a still easier conquest. Thus victorious, the Romans returned in triumph with Horatius marching at the head of the army, bearing the triple spoils. As they were approaching the Capenian gate, his sister came out to welcome him, but she no sooner beheld her brother decked in the very cloak which she had wrought with her own hands for one of the Curiatii, to whom she had been betrothed, than bursting into a flood of tears, she wept aloud. Horatius, excited to wrath by the sight, drew his sword, and stabbed his sister to the heart, exclaiming, "So perish the Roman maiden who shall weep for the enemy of her country."

This was a deed which, in the opinion of all men, demanded punishment; the young Horatius was, therefore, dragged before the judges, who gave a decision in accordance with the law, which was thus laid down:—

"The Duumviri shall give judgment on the shedder of blood. If from their decision he shall appeal, let that appeal be heard. If their judgment be confirmed, cover his head; hang him with a halter on the accursed tree; scourge him either within the pomerium<sup>1</sup> or without." Thus did the Duumviri give sentence on Horatius. And now he was about to die a shameful death, when he appealed to the whole body of the Romans. The appeal was tried. His countrymen would not condemn him, for he was the victorious champion of their army. His father likewise pleaded in his behalf, and affirmed that the maiden had been lawfully slain. But

<sup>1</sup> The sacred limit of the city, *vide* Ramsay's "Roman Antiquities."

Mettius  
Fufetius  
Dictator.

Combat of  
the Horatii  
and Curiatii.

All the  
Curiatii  
wounded.

The Horatii  
victorious.

Horatius is  
met by his  
sister.

She is slain  
by him.

Horatius  
brought to  
trial.

Is sentenced.

Appeals and  
is acquitted.

blood had been shed, and it was necessary an atonement should be made. The Romans, therefore, gave a sum of money to offer sacrifices to remove the pollution of blood, and these sacrifices were thenceforward faithfully performed by the Gens Horatia.

An atonement made by the State.

Mettius Fufetius, the chieftain of the Albans, who were thus brought into subjection to the Romans, was called upon by Tullus Hostilius to assist him with all his forces in a war against the Veientes and Fidenates. The Alban chief, though ostensibly on the side of the Romans, gave no real help; and in the heat of the battle which ensued, held aloof. Such treachery drew upon him a fearful retribution. No sooner had the Romans won the victory, than Hostilius convoked the Albans, as though to address them. They attended as they were wont on such occasions, without their arms; the Romans gradually surrounded them, and no chance remained of escape. Tullus now seized on Mettius, and after binding him between two chariots, drove them apart, and thus tore the traitor asunder. The Romans were forthwith sent to Alba, fully empowered to destroy the defenceless city, and to drive the inhabitants to Rome. Alba was ruined, and rendered totally desolate, and the exiled inhabitants were allotted Mount Cœlius as a place of settlement, where they took up their abode, and at length blended with the Romans. But the achievements of the warlike Tullus were not yet ended. He encountered the brave Sabines, over whom he gained a victory; but this was his last triumph. Manifest signals of the wrath of the gods were displayed; his people were stricken with a plague, and the king himself brought low with some lingering malady. Possibly Tullus, amid incessant occupation, had neglected the worship of the gods. He now called to mind the pious Numa; he remembered how the gods in the days of that just prince had granted great prosperity to Rome; how they had graciously revealed their will to him, by signs which had never failed, whenever that prince inquired of them. Tullus therefore deemed this a fitting time to consult the will of Jupiter, but failing duly to inquire of him, the god was indignant, and displayed his anger by sending forth such lightnings as burned to ashes Tullus and his house. Taught by this terrible example of the power of the gods, the people of Rome chose a king who should follow the pious rites and customs of Numa. Ancus Martius, therefore, the grandson of Tullus, was elected to succeed him.

Mettius Fufetius called in to the Roman aid.

Mettius torn asunder and Alba destroyed.

The Albans settle on the Cœlian mount.

Tullus smitten with illness.

Tullus consults the will of Jupiter.



[Supposed representation of Voters passing along the Pons into the Septim.—Denarius of the Gens Hostilia.]


## TALE OF ANCUS MARTIUS.

B. C.

641-617.

Copies of the  
Laws hung  
up in the  
Forum

The new king, Ancus Martius, re-established and fully published the religious ceremonies of the pious Numa. By the command of Ancus, these were copied out upon white boards and hung up round the forum, for the information of all. The Latins, with whom he waged war, were conquered, brought to Rome, and their dwellings fixed upon Mount Aventinus; their lands were divided amongst the



[The Tullianum of Ancus Martius.]

Romans, and their forests, which bordered the sea coast, became the property of the state. This king built the prison "Tullianum." Hard by the Tiber's mouth, at Ostia, Ancus founded a colony; on the Mons Janiculus he built a citadel, while by means of a wooden bridge thrown across the river, he united that hill to the city. A vast dike—"the dike of the Quirites"—running along the valley, protected its lower parts, while beneath the hill Saturnius

Death of  
Ancus  
Martius.

arose a prison for the numerous offenders against the law. After an active reign of twenty-three years, died Ancus Martius, the restorer of the institutes of the pious Numa.

B. C.

617-578.

Demaratus  
settles at  
Tarquinii.


## TALE OF LUCIUS TARQUINIUS PRISCUS.

The ancestor of Tarquinius was Demaratus, a noble Greek, who had fled from the oppression of Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth. Tarquinii in Etruria was the city where he settled. Here his mercantile connections, and the commerce which he carried on, extended his influence and increased his wealth. In this city he married an Etruscan lady of noble family, by whom he had two sons, Lucumo and Aruns. The latter died during the life-time of his father, and Demaratus left the whole of his property to Lucumo. Notwithstanding this great accession of wealth, and his marriage with Tanaquil, a lady of one of the noblest families in the city, Lucumo, in consequence of his foreign descent, was deprived of all power and political influence. He therefore left Tarquinii, and urged by his wife, repaired to Rome, where there were great facilities for attaining distinction. As Lucumo came near Rome, and as he was already approaching the gates, seated in his chariot with Tanaquil his wife, an eagle swooping down seized his cap, and after soaring aloft, again descended, replacing it upon his head. Tanaquil, rejoiced at the sight, declared this to be an omen of the favour of the gods, as well as of the future greatness of her husband. The

Lucumo  
marries  
Tanaquil.Proceeds to  
Rome.Marvellous  
omen of the  
eagle.

prophetic words of Tanaquil, who was versed in all the mysteries of Etruscan augury, were soon verified. No sooner had the stranger reached the thriving city of Rome, than the fame of his riches opened an easy path for his advancement. Here he was styled Lucius Tarquinius; and after proving himself brave in action and prudent in council, faithfully serving king Ancus both in peace and in war, on the death of that prince, (by whom he had been held in great honour,) he was named guardian of the children of Ancus. Notwithstanding the will of the late king, such was the popularity of the Etruscan stranger, that he was, both by the senate and people, unanimously elected to the throne. His reign was distinguished by great achievements in war, and still more by great and costly works in peace. The Latins and the Sabines felt the power of his arms. The wealthy city of Apiolæ, a possession of the former, and Crustumerium, Medullia, Camera, Ameriola, Corniculum, and Nomentum, considerable towns of the latter, were captured by his forces.

The defeat of the warlike Sabines was decisive; they had advanced to the very gates of Rome, but were repelled after a desperate struggle, and finally overthrown with great slaughter upon the banks of the Anio. The fruit of this victory was the cession of Collatia, in which



[Lapides Capitolini.—Tiranesi.]

town a strong garrison was posted. In this war, the king's son, a youth of tender age, slew one of the enemy with his own hand. The reward of the royal youth was a robe bordered with purple and a golden bulla—the subsequent distinctive ornaments of the patrician youth. So powerful did Tarquin become, that a league of twelve important cities of Etruria was entirely crushed, and their people compelled to submit to his authority. They presented to him, as their supreme lord, a golden crown, a purple tunic and gold-embroidered robe, an ivory throne and sceptre, and various other insignia of royal dignity. In time of peace the energy of Tarquinius was great and nobly directed. Between the Palatine and Aventine Hills, and between the Palatine and the Capitoline, he constructed vast drains; and after carrying off the water, he formed in the Palatinian valley the great chariot course of the circus; while the space between the Capitoline and the Palatine was filled up by the forum or market-place, the surrounding ground being marked out for shops and stalls, and a covered walk carried round it. The

The Etruscan league does homage.

The race course and forum.



[The Capitulum.—Large brass of Vespasian.]

massive foundations of a temple on the Capitoline, and a wall entirely surrounding the city, were the additional works of this active prince. His political genius was displayed by adding to the senate a hundred new senators; he at the same time doubled the number of the equites or horsemen in the centuries of the Ramnes, Luceres, and Titics, the result of which was, distinguished success in the subsequent war. He also increased

the number of the vestal virgins from four to six. It had been the original intention of Tarquinius to create three entirely new centuries of horsemen, and to dignify these troops with his own name. Attus Nævius, however, the celebrated augur, forbade this innovation. The king, thus thwarted in his plans, and wishing to ridicule the religious art in which Nævius excelled, exclaimed, "Now then, augur, tell me by thy auguries, if the thing which I now have in my mind may be effected or not?" Hereupon Attus Nævius consulted the will of the

Attus Nævius the augur, and the king.



[Altar under which the Razor and Whetstone of Attus Nævius were buried.—Denarius of the Gens Scribonia.]

Augury prevails and is adopted for purposes of state.

gods by his art, and the answer was, "It may." "Now," said the king, "it was my intention for thee to divide this whetstone with this razor; fulfil the augury if thou canst." Attus Nævius, taking the razor, cut boldly, and divided the whetstone. Thus persuaded, the counsel of Attus prevailed; no new centuries were created, and henceforward, in all things, the will of

the gods was consulted by augury, and their intimations obeyed. Long and prosperous was the reign of Tarquinius, but he perished in the end through the treachery of the sons of Ancus. In the household of king Tarquinius was brought up a certain young man, of whose parentage strange tales were told. Many considered him the son of a god, while some said that his father was one of the king's dependants, and his mother a slave. Notwithstanding his dubious origin, great was his favour with the people, and as he had honourably served the king, he had been promised his daughter in marriage. Servius Tullius, for that was the name of the politic courtier, thus became an object of detestation and jealousy to the sons of the late king Ancus. They consequently resolved to slay the old king, in order to prevent his nominating to the succession the young favourite who would thus debar them from the throne. At their instigation, two shepherds undertook the murderous commission. They repaired to the palace of the king, and, under pretence of desiring the arbitration of Tarquinius in a mutual quarrel, they gained an interview with that prince. While the king was listening to the complaint of the one, the other struck him on the head with his axe. The assassins immediately fled. The sons of Ancus, however, did not reap the reward of this desperate villany. Tanaquil, the king's wife, proclaimed that the king was not dead, but merely stunned by the blow; and she intimated, that Tarquinius had appointed Servius Tullius to rule until he should recover. Thus supported, Servius Tullius proceeded from the palace with the insignia of royal power, deciding the suits of the people, and in all respects acting as king. Soon, however, it was known that the king was dead, but such was the popular favour displayed towards Servius Tullius, that he was permitted peaceably to assume the throne. The sons of Ancus, now convinced of the hopelessness of their claim to the crown, fled from Rome, and thus for ever became exiles from their native country. Tarquinius had reigned thirty-eight years at the period of his assassination. He left two sons, Lucius and Aruns Tarquinius, who married the two daughters of Servius Tullius.


Origin of Servius Tullius.

The sons of Ancus plot the death of the king.

Tarquinius is assassinated.

Artifice of Tanaquil.

Servius Tullius king.



[Sacrificial Knives, from the Frieze of the Temple of Jupiter Tonans at Rome]

## THE TALE OF SERVIUS TULLIUS.

B. C.

578-535.

Prodigies  
attending the  
birth of  
Tullius.

General  
character of  
Servius.

His laws.

Buildings  
and temples.

Division of  
the people  
into  
centuries.

Servius  
elected king  
by the  
people.

Is hated by  
the nobility.

Tradition of  
the Sabine  
cow.

Many prodigies preceded the birth of Tullius, and others did not fail to accompany his youth; with these, as in the case of Tarquinius, Tanaquil the Etruscan augur is closely associated. On one occasion, as Tullius was sleeping at mid-day, in the palace porch, lambent flames were seen to play around his head, which Tanaquil forbade to be extinguished, for the prophetic princess thence foretold the high destiny of the boy. Tullius shortly after awoke, and the flames disappeared. Henceforward Servius was brought up with the highest expectations of future eminence, which were amply fulfilled; indeed, he had already gained distinction in a great battle fought near the gates of Rome. The character given to Servius is that of a just and a good king, and the same popularity which he had attained before his accession to the throne, accompanied him ever after. Many were the wise and good laws enacted by him to maintain the cause of the poor, and to curb the oppressions of the rich. His war with the Etruscans, his adding to the city the Quirinalian and Viminalian hills, the vast mounds which he raised to unite these hills with the Esquiline, covering them from the assaults of an enemy, the Temple of Diana built by him for the common sacrifices of Romans, Latins, and Sabines, in which the former maintained the chief dignity, prove the activity of the hero and politician.

The subdivision of ranks which he introduced into the state, appears to have been very complete. The city population was divided into four tribes, that of the country into twenty-six, who were all distributed into classes, regulated by the value of their property. These classes were again divided into centuries, who provided themselves with arms corresponding to their rank and order. The rich had complete armour; the poorer centuries furnished themselves with darts and slings. Servius now convoked the people, and inquired if it was their pleasure that he should be their king, to which they unanimously assented. The faction of the nobility, notwithstanding this general unanimity, was jealous of the popularity of Servius; while a law which he had enacted, forbidding the kingly government after his death, and instituting the annual rule of two men elected by the people, rendered him still more the object of patrician hatred. Unchecked by the jealousy of this powerful faction, Servius continued his peaceful labours. He made an important league with the cities of Latium, of which Rome formed a distinguished member; which, by the extension of its ancient boundaries, now covered a space of five miles in circumference. The great temple reared for the Romans, Sabines, and Latins, became the scene of an occurrence celebrated in tradition. A Sabine countryman had a cow of unusual size and beauty. The soothsayers had affirmed, that whichever

nation should sacrifice this cow, would gain the supremacy. The sacrifice was to be performed upon Mount Aventine. Eager to secure the superiority of his own nation, the Sabine was just about to immolate the animal before the altar, when he was sharply rebuked by the astute Roman priest, for presuming to offer it with unwashed hands. During the absence of the Sabine for the purpose of purification, the Roman sacrificed the cow, and thus surreptitiously realised the terms of the prophecy.

Though king Servius had no son, he had two daughters, whom we have before noticed as being given away in marriage to the sons of Tarquinius. These unfortunate unions were productive of the most horrible crimes. Aruns Tarquinius was of a mild and gentle spirit; his brother Lucius proud, and very revengeful; and these were severally united to wives of an opposite character to themselves. The younger, Tullia, scrupled not to slay her husband, while Lucius privately assassinated his wife, after which a guilty marriage was effected, and free course given to all the wickedness of their hearts, the effects of which we shall shortly contemplate.

Such was the benevolence of the king, that he discharged the debts of the indigent poor, and instituted laws depriving the creditor of the power to seize the person of the debtor, permitting the caption of his goods alone. To these generous actions he added allotments of lands out of the conquered territory. But whilst he thus liberally legislated for the plebeians, the king strongly distrusted the patricians; and to such an extent did he carry this feeling, that he took up his abode upon the Esquiline hill, while he assigned to them the valley of the "Patricius Vicus." The steady, long, and increasing popularity of the Roman king, had almost deprived

L. Tarquinius of any reasonable hopes of succeeding to the throne; the patricians, also, stung by the memory of their ancient supremacy, which they were eager to recover, united with Tarquinius in a conspiracy to assassinate the king; and the young nobility banded themselves into sworn brotherhoods, whereby they bound themselves to support each other in daring acts of violence and tyranny. The treacherous Tarquin only waited a favorable time to put into execution his blood-thirsty schemes. The harvest season, when the plebeians were absent in the fields getting in their stock of corn, presented a favourable opportunity. Followed

into the forum by a band of armed men, Tarquinius audaciously seated himself on the royal throne, fronting the senate house, the very spot whence Servius was wont to give judgment to the people. Messengers ran hastily announcing this to the king. Forthwith the aged prince hurried to the forum, and, on perceiving the intruder, indignantly inquired why he had dared to sit upon the king's seat, at the same time ordering him to descend from it. Tarquinius replied that it was the throne

The daughters of king Servius and their husbands.

Generous legislation of Servius.

The Patricians and Tarquin unite in a conspiracy.

Treacherous action of Tarquin.




Barbarous  
scene in the  
forum

of his father on which he was seated, to which he had more right than Servius. Tarquinius now sprang forward, seized the aged prince, and dashed him rudely down the stone steps, then, to complete the indignity of the insult, repaired to the senate house, and, as though already king, convoked the senate. Meanwhile, the aged king, covered with blood, had arisen, and was hastening home, when he was overtaken near the Esquiline hill by the servants of Lucius, whom he had sent in pursuit; there was the old king slain, and left weltering in his blood in the middle of the highway. Tullia now drove to the senate house, totally unabashed by the presence of the multitudes who thronged the place, and calling her husband out of the senate, saluted him king with transports of joy. Lucius was struck with horror, and bade Tullia return home. As she was proceeding thither, the charioteer pointed out the body of the old king, her father, lying a piteous spectacle full in their way. He would have turned aside, but Tullia, urged on by inward furies, bade him drive onwards. The chariot rolled over the body of the father, whose blood spurted over the chariot and the dress of the wicked Tullia. Thenceforward, that street ever bore the name of the Vicus Sceleratus, or the wicked street. The corpse of the old king lay unburied, and the scoffing impieties of Tarquinius upon this occasion, earned him the name of "Superbus." Long was the memory of the good king Servius cherished by the commons, and his birthday was celebrated upon the nones of every month.

The king  
murdered.

Tullia drives  
over the  
body of her  
father.



[Head of Jove on a Semis, copper coin of the age of Servius Tullius.]

### THE TALE OF LUCIUS TARQUINIUS SUPERBUS.

B. C.

535-510.

Distresses of  
the  
Plebeians.

The violent usurpation of Tarquinius allowed of none of the forms of election, and his position was seized and maintained rather as a recovered inheritance than as a tame succession. Soon were the plebeians made bitterly aware of their change of masters. Their privileges were abolished, their meetings forbidden, their civil equality abrogated, and the poor condemned to taskwork on the magnificent buildings. So great were their hardships, and so hopeless their condition, that numbers of the wretched commons put an end to their miserable existence. Tarquinius despised the senate,

and slew many of that body, confiscating their wealth to his own uses, and studiously omitting to replace the number of those whom he had banished, or who had died in the course of nature. Thus did this assembly become continually less powerful.

Tarquin's  
tyranny  
over the  
Senate.

While thus tyrannical at Rome, he neglected not to forward his influence amongst foreign states. With the Latin chiefs he formed alliances, while he gave his daughter in marriage to Octavius Mamilius the Tuscan, a powerful chief, by whom his influence was much extended throughout Latium. So powerful, by these and other means, did he become in foreign states, that Turnus Herdonius, a chieftain of Aricia, having been bold enough to speak against him in a public assembly of the Latins, Tarquinius, by charging him with plotting his death, and by confirming the charge by an array of perjured witnesses, compassed his destruction, for Herdonius, being adjudged to be guilty, was condemned to be drowned. By this terrible example of despotic power, the Latins were induced to form a league with Tarquinius, of which he assumed the supreme headship. On the Alban Mount, the Roman tyrant sacrificed on behalf of the confederates, distributing to them the flesh of the victims.


His influence  
over foreign  
States.

Herdonius  
doomed to  
die.

The military force of both Romans and Latins was now completely amalgamated. Every maniple in the army was made up by the troops of each nation, and to crown this powerful league, the Hernici and two Volscean cities entered into the confederacy. Reinforced by this grand alliance, Tarquinius now made war upon the rest of the Volsci, captured Suessa Pometia, and forty talents of silver was a mere tithe of the booty. But vast as were the spoils, they were unequal to the building of the Capitoline Temple, an edifice which the father of Tarquinius had vowed to erect. Mighty works now began to rise in Rome; immense drains were constructed to carry off the impurities of the lower grounds of the city; and the buildings commenced by Tarquinius Priscus, the father, were finished by the son. But, in their completion, his people were ground down by taxation and incessant task-work. Many sacred places of the Sabine gods had been built upon the projected site of the Capitoline Temple. Tarquinius, therefore, consulted the gods by augury, to know if he might remove these, to give space for his own temple. Permission was granted, two sacred places excepted; these were the Sacellum of the god of youth, and that of Terminus, the god of boundaries. This the augurs affirmed to be a good omen; for the youth of the city

Powerful  
League,  
headed by  
Rome.

Immense  
Works of  
Tarquin.



[Mouth of the Cloaca.]

these, to give space for his own temple. Permission was granted, two sacred places excepted; these were the Sacellum of the god of youth, and that of Terminus, the god of boundaries. This the augurs affirmed to be a good omen; for the youth of the city

Permission  
granted to  
remove the  
Sacella.

Omens upon  
the  
Capitoline  
Hill.

The Sibyl  
offers the  
Sacred  
Books.

Tarquin  
makes war  
upon Gabii.


Stratagem of  
Sextus.

Gabii joins  
the Latin  
League.

Oppressive  
Government  
of  
Tarquinius.

should be eternal, and its boundaries never removed by conquest. As they were digging the deep foundations of the temple, a human head was discovered—a sign that the Capitoline Hill should be the head of all the world. The mighty temple thus reared by Tarquinius was consecrated to the great Etruscan divinities, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno. Just about this time, a woman of strange appearance presented herself to king Tarquinius, offering him nine books of the prophecies of the Sibyl, for three hundred pieces of gold. The offer was contemptuously refused; whereupon the prophetess burned three of the books, and offering the remainder for the same price, these were again scornfully refused. The Sibyl then retired, and having burnt three other books, again returned, asking the same price for the remaining three. The king, much amazed, demanded of the augurs what he should do. They said that he had acted unwisely in refusing them, and commanded him by all means to purchase the remaining books. The sacred volumes were put into a stone chest, which was deposited under ground in the Capitol, and two persons, called the guardians of the sacred books, were appointed in charge of them. Soon after this, Tarquinius being desirous of forcing into the Latin league the town of Gabii, laid siege to it. Gabii, however, offered so vigorous a resistance, that, unable to take the town by open force, Tarquinius was compelled to have recourse to stratagem. His son Sextus, therefore, pretending to have been ill treated by his father, and covered with bloody stripes, fled to Gabii. His plausible tale was believed, and at length so much confidence did the inhabitants repose in him, that they gave him the command of their troops.

Sextus now sent a messenger to his father for further instructions. On his arrival, it happened that the king was walking in his garden. To the inquiries of the envoy, the king made no reply; but continued striking off the heads of the tallest poppies with his stick, and then bade the messenger relate to his son what he had seen him do. Sextus comprehended his father's meaning. On false charges he either banished or put to death all the principal men of the city, and the people, thus bereft of their leaders, soon submitted to the power of his father. Tarquinius ruled with policy the state which he had so craftily gained. He gave to the people of Gabii the rights of Roman citizenship, and secured the same privilege for his own people in the city of Gabii, which now held firmly by the league. By these means Tarquinius became a great and mighty king, but he scorned every observance of moderation towards the plebeians. Such tyranny could not long endure, and his fall, forewarned by many prodigies, happened soon after. The glory of expelling from Rome this dreaded tyrant fell to the lot of Lucius Junius Brutus, with whose noble career the remainder of the life of Tarquinius is closely connected.



[Head of Minerva—from an Ancient Roman Coin.]

CONDITION OF THE ROMAN PEOPLE AT THIS EPOCH.

We must now pause for a short time from the contemplation of legendary lays, which formed the boast of a proud city, and covered with their gorgeous colouring many a bitter defeat and many a deep humiliation,—what indubitable history is to be extracted from even such documents of the national vanity of Rome, has been shown by the researches of the immortal Niebuhr. Dr. Arnold after presenting these lays in a connected and singularly simple form, being desirous not altogether to omit legends so famous, yet anxious, by his very style of narration, to distinguish them from the trustworthy character and dignified position of history, makes the following important remarks. “But what is the real history, in the place of which we have so long admired the tales of Romulus and Numa? This is a question which cannot be satisfactorily answered. . . . We know that for all points of detail, and for keeping a correct account of time, tradition is worthless. It is very possible that all Etruscan rites came in with the Tarquini, and were falsely carried back to an earlier period. But the mixture of the Sabines with the original people of the Palatine Hill cannot be doubted; and the stories of the asylum, and of the violence done to the Sabine women, seem to show that the first settlers of the Palatine were a mixed race, in which other blood was largely mingled than that of the Latins. We may conceive of this earlier people of Mamers, as of the Mamertine of a more historical period: that they were a band of resolute adventurers from various parts, practised in arms, and little scrupulous how they used them. Thus the origin of the highest Roman nobility may have greatly resembled that of the larger band of adventurers who followed the standard of William the Norman, and were the founders of the nobility of England.”

Researches of Niebuhr.

Dr. Arnold's Remarks on the Roman Legends.

Mixed population of the Palatine Hill.

Probable origin of the Roman Nobility

“The people or citizens of Rome were divided into the three tribes of the Ramnenses, Titienses, and Luceres,<sup>1</sup> to whatever races we may

<sup>1</sup> For full particulars of the government, tribes, religious rites and subdivisions of the people of Rome, see “Ramsay's Roman Antiquities.”

Composition  
of the Legion  
in war.

suppose them to belong, or at whatever time, or under whatever circumstances they may have become united. Each of these tribes was divided into ten smaller bodies called *Curia*, so that the whole people consisted of thirty *Curia*: these same divisions were in war represented by the thirty Centuries, which made up the legion, just as the three tribes were represented by the three centuries of horsemen, but that the soldiers of each century were exactly a hundred, is, apparently, as unfounded a conclusion as it would be if we were to argue in the same way as to the military force of one of our own Hundreds."

Original  
population of  
Rome.

Long previous to the time of Romulus, if such a prince ever existed, there stood on the Palatine Hill a Pelasgian or Tyrrhenian town, around which on the neighbouring heights dwelt the Aborigines. That the Sabines constituted a very considerable part of the population, is evident, from the many Sabine religious ceremonies introduced by Tatius. To the Sabines belonged the towns of Collatia and Regillum; and their arms were felt to a considerable distance along the course of the Tiber. An Etruscan population was equally a component of Rome, to which her religious rites and gorgeous insignia of power bear testimony. The much oppressed though important order of Plebeians existed as early as the time of Romulus, and they have been occasionally confounded with the Clients. But the earliest distinct notice we have of the plebeians is in the character of conquered Albans, who were gradually incorporated with the Roman population, though they did not obtain civil power. They were excluded from the tribes—had no right of voting—could not take any part in the business of the State—could not hold any magistracy—nor contract any legal marriages with the privileged citizens. As a conquered race,—they had to shed their blood for a state by whom they were contemned, and for tyrannical patricians, with whom they maintained a persevering struggle for centuries—a struggle finally crowned with complete success. The Aventine Hill was more especially their habitation. In the reign of Ancus Martius the plebeians had been considerably increased; yet, during the government of that prince, as well as of Tullus Hostilius, their entire body had been left without any decisive settlement of their position with respect to the patricians. Tarquinius, indeed, had formed a plan for ameliorating their condition; but the jealousy of the patricians thwarted his generous intentions, few only being raised to the dignity of their oppressors. At length Servius Tullius, essentially the "Commons' King," gave to the plebeians an independent organization. The worthier part of them was classed with the twenty-six country tribes, who were engaged in agriculture; with the early Romans an honourable occupation; while the supposed less dignified position of trade and manufactures embraced all the members of the city tribes.

The  
Plebeians.

Their  
distressing  
position.

Tarquinius  
tries to raise  
their order.

To carry out a complete system, Servius created a property standard as the means of attaining rank, and thus secured to the plebeians an influence in legislation, and in the election of their magistrates. Until the time of Servius, the king, senate, and assembly of the *Curix* divided among them the powers of government;—the monarchy was elective, and though the sons of the later kings claimed a right of succession, that right was never acknowledged.—The king was the commander-in-chief, principal judge, and the national high priest. His insignia were the fasces or bundle of axes, the curule chair, and the *Toga Prætexta*, while his income was derived from the public land, and his share of the spoils of war. But whatever had been the tyranny or rapacity of the kings of Rome, they were far surpassed in both passions by the whole body of the patricians, who, when Tarquinius was expelled, crushed most cruelly the unfortunate body of the plebeians. A vivid picture of their distresses, under their unrelenting task-masters, is presented to us by Dr. Arnold. After contrasting the benevolent objects contemplated for the Israelite by the year of Jubilee, he observes, "A far different fate awaited the plebeian landowner at Rome. When he found himself involved in a debt which he could not pay, his best resource was to sell himself to his creditor, on the condition that unless the debt were previously discharged, the creditor, at the expiration of a stated term should enter into possession of his purchase. This was called in the language of the Roman law the entering into a *nexum*, and the person who had thus conditionally sold himself, was said to be *nexus*. When the day came, the creditor claimed possession, and the magistrate awarded it; and the debtor, thus given over to his purchaser, *addictus*, passed, with all that belonged to him, into his power; and as the sons were considered the father's property, they also, unless previously emancipated, were included in the sale, and went into slavery together with their father. Or if a man, resolved not by his own act to sacrifice his own and his children's liberty, refused thus to sell himself, or, in the Roman language, to enter into a *nexum*, and determined to abide in his own person the consequences of his own debt, then he risked a fate still more fearful. If no one offered to be his security, he was given over to his creditor, and kept by him in private custody, bound with a chain of fifteen pounds weight, and fed with a pound of corn daily. . . . On the third market day, if no friend appeared, he was either to be put to death, or sold as a slave into a foreign land beyond the Tiber, that is, into Etruria, where there was as yet no interchange of franchise with Rome, amidst a people of a different language. Or, if there were several creditors, they might actually hew his body in pieces, and whether a creditor cut off a greater or

Property Standard of Servius Tullius.

Insignia of the king.

Patrician tyranny.

The *Nexum*.

Perilous position of the "*Nexus*."

His terrible penalty.

smaller piece than in proportion to his debt, he incurred no penalty."<sup>1</sup>

Struggle  
of the  
Plebeians.  
for freedom.



Such was the terrible position of the descendants of a vanquished race. That position, however, gradually yielded to the indomitable vigour of men urged on to the recovery of their lawful rights, by the double force of their own sufferings, and the spectacle of Patricians luxuriating in the licentious exercise of uncontrolled authority. The complete emancipation, however, of the crushed and detested Plebeians was not effected but by many long years of unmitigated toil and fierce struggles for the rights of freemen.

The position  
of the  
Plebeians  
analogous to  
that of the  
Saxons under  
the Normans.

Alternately trampled on, soothed, cajoled, or destroyed by the artifices of the Patricians, their position presents a striking analogy to that of the Saxons under the cruel sway of their Norman conquerors. Like them they followed in the ranks of their conquerors, to make new conquests, of which they were allowed to reap no substantial rewards. Like them, they could not hope to attain any dignity or office of the state; and while their sinews were tasked to the uttermost in unrequited toil, their blood was lavished only to maintain the supremacy of their tyrants.

Such episodes in historical legend, as those of "the good king Servius Tullius," "Brutus," "Virginia," and many others, demonstrate, on the one hand, the paucity of their early political privileges, and on the other, the avidity with which every incident was made a stepping stone to the temple of freedom.

<sup>1</sup> History of Rome, Vol. I.



[The Curule Chair and Fasces.]



Brutus condemning his Sons—drawn by SARGENT, from a Painting by GUILLOU LETHIERE in the Luxembourg.]

## CHAPTER II.

### LUCIUS JUNIUS BRUTUS.

FLOURISHED ABOUT B.C. 509.

IN tracing the illustrious career of Lucius Junius Brutus, B.C. 509. we have to contemplate the mighty change in the government of Rome, from the regal to the consular state, in which he took so striking and heroic a share. The qualities of the Roman citizen, which had now assumed a marked distinctiveness of character, would scarcely have suffered a longer duration of the kingly power, even though it had not been tyrannically exerted. The stern and savage virtue of the early Romans would have prompted them, at no distant period, to require a larger share in the direction of their country, for whose glory alone they were contented to live, and in whose defence they thought it happiness to die. The oppressions, however, of Tarquin and his sons, precipitated the great revolution which the fierce and warlike spirit of the people had been silently preparing.

Lucius Junius Brutus, who was destined to awaken his countrymen to a sense of their injuries and their rights, was descended from an ancient and noble family. His father, Marcus Junius, was one of the most distinguished of the patricians, for his ample estate and his personal virtues, and had been honoured with the hand of a His family misfortunes.



B.C. 509. daughter of the elder Tarquin. These circumstances rendered him peculiarly obnoxious to the haughty monarch, who obtained the throne by the murder of Servius, and who, conscious of the atrocity of the deed by which he won it, thought it could be only rendered secure by the removal of all the chief men in the state whose virtues might silently reproach him. Excited by this apprehension, and anxious to secure the princely fortunes of his victim, Tarquin caused Marcus Junius to be assassinated, together with one of his sons. Lucius Junius would, doubtless, have shared the fate of his father and his brother, had he not counterfeited idiocy, and thus procured himself to be regarded as harmless, while he cherished in secret the purpose of revenging, on the first favourable occasion, the death of his murdered relations.

Counterfeits  
idiocy.

Accompanies  
the king's  
sons to  
consult the  
Oracle at  
Delphi.

In the mean time, the king enjoyed the patrimonial estate of Lucius Junius, who, from his apparent deficiency in understanding, received the appellation of Brutus, and was suffered to become a companion of the princes. While Tarquin was engaged in completing the great public works at Rome, and in sending colonies to Segnia and Circæum, a dreadful pestilence broke out in the city, and a serpent was observed to glide from a wooden pillar, and spread terror throughout the palace. Alarmed at these events, the monarch despatched his sons, Titus and Aruns, to the oracle at Delphi, in order that they might inquire the proper mode of appeasing the anger of heaven. On this long and perilous expedition they were attended by Brutus, from whose idiocy they expected to gather materials for laughter. Like his companions, he carried with him an offering to Apollo, which appearing to be nothing but a common staff of wood, excited universal derision. In reality, however, he had concealed a piece of gold within it, so that the derided present was not only of intrinsic value, but an expressive symbol of the donor's condition, who possessed a high and noble mind beneath a contemptible exterior. On their arrival at the shrine, the youths having fulfilled their commission, inquired of the oracle which of them should succeed to the crown, and received for answer, that he should have supreme authority in Rome who should first kiss his mother. Titus and Aruns, understanding the reply literally, determined to conceal it from their brother Sextus, and agreed either to cast lots which of them should fulfil the oracle, or to embrace the queen at the same moment on their return home, that they might reign jointly on the death of their father. But Brutus, conceiving the meaning of the response to be allegorical, pretended to fall by accident as he left the shrine, and kissed the earth, the common mother of all things. The incident, if true, serves to prove that, during the whole of his assumed idiocy, he meditated the revenge of his own private injuries and the deliverance of his country from oppression.

A new outrage, committed by one of the royal house, soon B.C. 509. afforded a fit occasion for the accomplishment of these designs. Finding his treasury almost exhausted by the erection of magnificent edifices, and the people discontented with the long drudgery of mechanical labour, Tarquin resolved to lead his forces against Ardea, a city of the Rutuli, about twenty miles from Rome, where a rich booty might be expected. He first attempted to take the place by storm, but, meeting with a vigorous resistance, he was compelled to blockade it. As the siege was protracted, he was obliged to lay fresh imposts on the citizens to provide for the expenses of the army, instead of regaining their affections by a division of plunder, and thus caused their minds, already inflamed, to be still more alienated from him. The young princes and patrician officers who were engaged in the siege spent much of their time in revelling. On one of these festive occasions, a dispute arose in the tent of Sextus Tarquinius between the sons of the king and Collatinus, the grandson of Egerius, who was nephew to the elder Tarquin, respecting the comparative merits of their consorts. Inflamed by wine, they resolved to settle the contest by instantly riding to their homes, and discovering how their wives were employed during their absence. In pursuance of this intention, they first proceeded to Rome, where they found the ladies of the princes engaged in festal amusements, and little pleased at the sudden return of their husbands. But when they arrived at Collatia, the residence of the family of Collatinus, they found his wife Lucretia spinning among her maidens, and ready to give them, notwithstanding the lateness of the visit, a polite and cheerful reception. Her beauty, rendered more attractive by the softness of her manners, incited in Sextus the determination to seduce her, which, although he could not execute on this occasion, he did not resign. A few days after this visit, the prince took an opportunity of leaving the camp before Ardea, unknown to his comrades, and arrived at Collatia, attended only by a single slave. There he was hospitably entertained by the unsuspecting Lucretia as the friend of her husband, and in the evening conducted to his chamber. Hence he stole, in the dead of the night, to the apartment of his victim, with his sword drawn, and awakened her by placing his hand on her bosom, and declaring that he would instantly put her to death if she dared to cry out for succour. He then declared his passion to the astonished lady, and mingling the most terrible threats with the most vehement entreaties, strove alternately by flattery and terror to influence her to yield to his desires. Finding at last, that none of these arts had the least power to shake her resolution, he declared, that if she continued her resistance he would not only kill her, but despatch one of her slaves, and place him beside her on the couch, that it might be believed he had put them to death to revenge the injured honour of her husband. The

Siege of Ardea.

The princes visit the house of Lucretia.

Outrage on Lucretia.

B.C. 509. dread of infamy prevailed over a mind upon which the fear of death had no power; and Lucretia yielded. In the morning the ravisher left her for the camp, exulting in his guilty triumph.

She writes to her husband and father.

Innocent as Lucretia had been in intention, she was unable to survive the indignity she had been compelled to endure. The stern prejudices of her Roman education prevented her from justly discriminating between physical and moral pollution. She wrote immediately to her husband and father, entreating them to hasten to her, with a few chosen friends, as she had a terrible misfortune to relate. She then dressed herself in mourning, and, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, proceeded to Rome; although Livy informs us that she awaited at Collatia the arrival of those to whom she had despatched her summons. Her request was immediately complied with; and her father, Collatinus, with Lucius Publicola, and other illustrious patricians, assembled with great anxiety to hear her complaint. They found her sitting pensively in her chamber, and observed her burst into tears on their arrival, on which her husband eagerly demanded if all was well. "Oh no!" she passionately exclaimed; "for what can be well with her whose chastity is gone? A stranger, my dear husband, has defiled your nuptial couch! But this body alone has been violated, my soul is unspotted, as my death shall testify. Give me your hands in solemn pledge that this crime shall not be unrevenged. It was Sextus Tarquinius who last night violated the sanctities of hospitality, and by force obtained the gratification of his lust—a deed fatal to me—and to himself also, if ye dare to act like men!" All present immediately plighted their faith to avenge the wrong, but strove to console her by assurances that she was herself guiltless, and ought yet to live to see justice overtake the author of her sorrows. Their consolations and remonstrances were in vain. "I leave you," she replied, "to visit the crime on Sextus; for myself, although I am free from the guilt, I will not avoid the consequences of my fall; no woman, in future times, shall ever survive her chastity, and point to Lucretia as her example." With these words she suddenly drew a poignard from beneath her robe, which she plunged into her bosom, and fell lifeless amidst the astonished assembly.

Their interview with Lucretia.

Character of Brutus developed.

The father and husband of the heroic lady immediately gave way to the bitterest affliction. But Brutus, finding that the moment of retribution so long waited for, had arrived, seized the dagger from the mortal wound, and solemnly raising it to heaven, exclaimed, "I swear by this blood, most chaste till defiled by royal infamy, and call you, O gods! to bear witness, that I will pursue Tarquin, his accursed wife, and all his polluted family with fire, sword, and every instrument of vengeance; and that I will never suffer them or any other person to wear the crown of Rome!" He then delivered the bloody dagger to Collatinus, Lucretius, Valerius, and all who were present,

who bound themselves by the same oath, amazed to find Brutus, B.C. 509. hitherto regarded as an idiot, inspired by so noble an energy. Like him, they changed their grief into an aspiration for revenge, and followed him as their leader in the great enterprise of destroying the regal power. By his direction, the body of Lucretia was brought into the forum, where, by virtue of his authority of tribune, or master of the horse, which office Tarquin had bestowed on him, because he supposed it impossible that he should use it against the royal authority, he ordered the Comitia to be assembled. The people naturally ran in crowds to see the melancholy spectacle, which aroused in their minds not only sympathy for the departed, but the remem-



[Lucius Junius Brutus.]

brance of those individual wrongs which each attributed to the house of Tarquin. On Brutus they looked with amazement, as on one inspired by the gods, and on the venerable and childless father with burning grief, which nothing but revenge could subdue. By consent of the latter, whom the king had left governor of the city, the gates were shut, and a guard placed upon them, that no intelligence might be conveyed to the camp of the tumults at Rome. Brutus, in the mean time, standing beside the corpse, addressed the people in a passionate speech, calculated to inflame them against the monarch and his family. He not only set forth, in glowing colours, the atrocious outrage which had caused the lamentable tragedy before them, but glanced rapidly at all the tyrannous acts of the king, from the murder of Servius; set before them the inhuman barbarity of Tullia, who drove, to meet her husband, over her father's corpse; dwelt on the oppression which had degraded the conquerors of all their foreign enemies to the low drudgery of mechanics; and incited them, by vivid pictures of the various deeds of injustice imputed to the reigning family, to root out their name and their power for ever from among them. This discourse was received with acclamations and demands for arms; and a decree, hastily passed by the senate, was solemnly confirmed by the people, which deprived the king of his authority, declared him and his family perpetual exiles, and pronounced a dreadful curse against any Roman who should, by word or action, attempt to recall them. Tullia, finding that it was in vain to oppose the popular excitement, left the palace in dismay, and fled through the city, without experiencing any personal violence, but followed by universal execrations.

Brutus  
addresses the  
people.

Tullia quits  
the city.

Brutus now gave arms to a number of noble youths, who offered their services in the cause of freedom, and, leaving Rome to the

B.C. 509. government of Lucretius, marched with them for Ardea, in order to incite the army to join him. The king having, in the mean time, heard of the transactions at Rome, set out for that city, in order to suppress the tumult; so that, according to Livy, Brutus passed him on the road, having turned aside to avoid an encounter. On his arrival before Rome, he found the gates shut against him, and learning that himself and his family were condemned to exile, retired, without endeavouring by force to obtain an entrance. Brutus, meanwhile, was received in the camp with the most lively expressions of joy, and the sons of the king were compelled to fly, while the troops united in the work of freedom with their fellow-citizens.

Brutus  
completes  
the expulsion  
of the  
Tarquins.

Thus did Brutus, by a single stroke, and without the least effusion of blood, put an end to the monarchy of Rome, after it had subsisted for two hundred and forty-three years. The revolution appears to have taken place precisely at the most favourable juncture for the rising grandeur of the state. In the earlier times, the citizens being collected from various regions, and unused to social regulations, would have been incapable of joining in the domestic contentions incident to a republic, without producing the total disorganization of the state, and returning to a barbarous condition. Beneath the fostering influence of the regal power they became gradually united, and those common feelings grew up among them which all the tumults of party were unable to destroy. That ardent and exclusive patriotism which ultimately became the means of subduing the world, had gathered strength in successful wars and in glorious peace, till it became an impulse so grand and inspiring, that those who cherished it had too lofty a consciousness of their own personal worth to endure the yoke of a sovereign. Had the Romans now learned to repose beneath a pacific monarchy, and to rest satisfied with their conquests, the energy which aimed at universal sway must have perished, and Rome have remained one of the smallest kingdoms of Italy.

Character of  
Tarquin.

Of the oppressive acts of Tarquin and his sons, which were the immediate causes of the revolution, we can scarcely judge with impartiality, from the colouring thrown over them by the Roman historians. These writers, though they flourished when the liberties of their country had decayed, seem to have written with quenchless ardour respecting their origin; and to have given vent to the feelings they dared not express on present transactions, in dwelling on the glories of the past. Even from their representations, however, it is manifest that Tarquin was not destitute of great talents, or of spirit to employ them in magnificent designs. "His conduct," observes Montesquieu, "before his calamities, which it is evident he foresaw, his gentleness and humanity towards the conquered, his beneficence to the soldiers, the arts by which he engaged such numbers to attempt his preservation, the edifices he

raised for the public use, his courage in the field, the constancy and B.C. 509. patience with which he bore his misfortunes, a twenty years' war, which he either carried on, or caused to be carried on, against the Romans, though deprived of his kingdom, and in great poverty—these things, and the resources he perpetually found, prove manifestly that he was no contemptible person."

The family of Tarquin being expelled from the city, the Romans were called on to choose the form of government by which they would be ruled. In this important choice they appear to have been determined by the wisdom of Brutus. He proposed that two persons should jointly be intrusted with the supreme power, that they might check injustice and ambition in each other, and that, still further to prevent the abuse of their authority, the office should last only for a year. This proposition was adopted by the people assembled by curiæ; the new governors were called *Consuls*; the term *Kingdom* was changed to *Republic*; and the title of King, no longer bestowed on a temporal magistrate, was given to a priest of high rank, who was termed *Rex Sacrorum*, and enjoyed dignity inferior only to the Pontifex Maximus. As the kings had been accustomed to perform some of the public ceremonies of religion, this officer was appointed to discharge that part of the regal duties, and to preserve the venerable name which had been consecrated at the foundation of the city, without being permitted to interfere with the civil rights of the people. Indeed, so jealous were the Romans of the title which their prejudices would not suffer them wholly to abolish, that they absolutely prohibited the individual who bore it from all interference with the public concerns, so that in the Comitia of the people, where he presided at the opening sacrifice, he was compelled to withdraw the moment that solemnity was concluded.

The form of government thus fixed, Lucretius, who had governed the city during the interregnum, caused the people to be summoned to the Campus Martius, to the first election of Consuls. On his proposition, Brutus, and Collatinus the husband of Lucretia, were chosen to the new dignity, and immediately entered on its exercise. They are said, by Livy, to have possessed all the powers, and to have been surrounded by all the ensigns of authority which had been assumed by the kings,

New form of government adopted.



[A Lictor.]

B.C. 509. excepting that only one of them was attended by the lictors with the fasces at a time, an honour which they enjoyed alternately for a month during their consulate. As Brutus had been most active in abolishing the kingly power, his colleague readily conceded to him the right of being first attended by the lictors. In the mean time, Titus Herminius and Marcus Horatius, who had taken the command of the army before Ardea on the expulsion of Tarquin and his sons, made a truce for fifteen years with the inhabitants of that city, and led the troops to Rome to take part in the solemnities by which their countrymen sought to secure and to consecrate their freedom. On their arrival, Brutus and Collatinus again convened the people, by centuries, in the Campus Martius, exhorted them to union, and procured the confirmation of that decree by which, a few days before, Tarquin and his family had been condemned to exile. Still further to bind all orders of men to the lasting exclusion of royalty, they, on this occasion, took solemn oaths before the altars that they would never recall the Tarquins, or invest any one with the kingly office; and their example was followed by the senators and the people. At this assembly, the first *Rex Sacrorum* was also elected, and the citizens were gratified by the restoration of the laws of Servius Tullus, of which they had been deprived by the ambition of the exiled sovereign.

Brutus  
Consul.

Laws of  
Servius  
Tullus  
restored.

The Senate.

Brutus appears next to have directed his attention to the supplying of those vacancies in the senate which had been occasioned by the jealousies of Tarquin. Considerable difference of opinion has existed on the question whether these renovations were directed by the will of the consuls, or the votes of the people in centuries, the chief magistrates merely advising and superintending the election. Some have contended that, even during the regal state, the senators were always elected by the citizens—first in the *curiæ*, and afterwards in centuries, as directed by the institutions of Servius. Others suppose that the senate was always filled up by the monarch, and that this authority being transferred to the consuls, was exerted by them on this occasion. The words of Livy, taken literally, imply the latter; and those of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, though not so express, do not contradict this hypothesis, which, on the whole, appears the more probable. In after-times, indeed, when the ranks of the senate were filled, for the most part, from those who had passed through the series of offices from *quæstor* to consul, the people might be said virtually to choose those who attained senatorial power; but as no historian of this period has given any account of a popular election, it seems most likely that, as yet, in the infancy of freedom, the ruling spirits of the time assumed the right of making those arrangements which they thought necessary for the peace and welfare of the new republic. The senators now added to the body were selected from the equestrian order, and called *conscripti*, in con-

tradistinction to the elder members, who were originally denominated *B.C. 509.*  
*patres*; whence the appellation *Patres Conscripti* was subsequently  
 employed to designate both classes of senators. Dionysius, indeed,  
 applies the epithet to the first senate of Romulus, but he is, in this  
 respect, at variance both with Plutarch and Livy. It is, however,  
 by no means certain whether the term *conscripti* was given to those  
 who were added by Tatius, the Sabine king, and to those who were  
 created by Tarquin the elder, or was first applied, on the establish-  
 ment of the republic, to the elders who were supplied from the  
 choice of the people or the nomination of Brutus.

The  
*conscripti.*

While these important arrangements were being made in the city,  
 Tarquin was not inactive. According to Livy, he first retired with  
 two of his sons to Caere, a city of Etruria, while Sextus, the imme-  
 diate author of his family's ruin, endeavouring to find a retreat at  
 Gabii, of which he had once treacherously become master, fell  
 a victim to the vengeance of the people. Other authors represent  
 the father as seeking refuge among the Gabini, and as retiring thence  
 into Etruria, in the hopes of finding the friends of his mother's  
 relations ready to espouse his cause. Dionysius speaks of Sextus as  
 surviving the expulsion of his family fourteen years, and falling, at  
 the end of that time, in the battle of Regillus. We shall leave,  
 however, these contradictory statements, and pass over the incon-  
 sistencies of the historians respecting the number and fates of the  
 exiled princes, to relate the formidable conspiracy at Rome in favour  
 of the Tarquins, which gave occasion to that triumph of stern  
 patriotism over paternal love in the conduct of Brutus, which his-  
 torians, painters, and poets have delighted to celebrate.

The austerity of the new government, under which nothing but  
 virtue could hope for distinction, was naturally felt by many of the  
 patrician youths as an intolerable evil. The distinctions of rank  
 and fortune commanded respect no longer. Failings which royal  
 favour had been well contented to pardon, while they rendered the  
 monarchy more secure, could obtain no indulgence from the  
 republic. The young men, who were addicted to pleasure, remem-  
 bered with affection their princely companions who were doomed to  
 exile, from whom they had received those courtesies which the  
 station of their patrons rendered peculiarly grateful. Aware of the  
 existence of these feelings, Tarquin sent ambassadors to Rome, who  
 were apparently charged with the moderate request that he might  
 be permitted to enjoy his patrimonial fortunes. But while the  
 senate were hesitating as to their reply to this demand, which they  
 at length referred to the people, by whom it was granted, the  
 emissaries of the king found means to engage some of the noblest  
 youths of Rome, among whom were three noblemen of the Aquilian  
 family, nephews of Collatinus, two nephews of Vitellius, and Titus  
 and Tiberius, the sons of Brutus, in a conspiracy to restore the

Conspiracy  
 in favour of  
 the Tarquins.

The sons of  
 Brutus  
 active in it



B.C. 509. Tarquins. These met together in the house of one of the conspirators, and bound themselves to fidelity by a dreadful oath, confirmed by touching the entrails of a man newly slain, and drinking his blood. At one of their meetings, however, a slave, named Vindicius, overheard the whole of their discourse, and hastened to give information of the discovery he had made—according to Livy, to the consuls; but, as others assert, to Valerius, as he feared the ties of natural affection would induce the chief magistrates to spare the traitors. Certain it is that they were immediately seized, the letters which they had given the ambassadors for Tarquin secured, and preparations made for their trial. Early on the following day, the culprits were brought before Brutus and Collatinus, who were seated on the tribunal. The sons of the former were first arraigned, and their guilt proved by the testimony of Vindicius and the production of their letters. With unbroken firmness, Brutus three times demanded if they had any defence to offer, but they replied only by their tears. All the spectators were moved by commiseration for their inexperienced youth, and called upon the father to spare them; but he, rising from his seat with the same unshaken constancy, directed the lictors to perform their office. Upon this dreadful command, the youths, in the fervour of agony, implored their judge to save them, and the people joined their entreaties; he alone remained unmoved, and saw his children scourged and beheaded without a sigh. But Collatinus was little prepared to follow his example. He made an effort to save his nephews, which appears to have been frustrated by the firmness of his colleague, though the historians differ considerably respecting the circumstances under which his merciful intentions were defeated. Vindicius was rewarded with a sum of money, his emancipation from slavery, and the privileges of a citizen of Rome. The ambassadors were dismissed from reverence to the sacred character which they bore, though they had forfeited their claim to its protection; and the property of the king, now confiscated for his treachery, was divided among the people, who were thus bound by an additional motive to resist all attempts for his return. The Campus Martius alone was reserved for the public use; and having been consecrated to Mars, was devoted to those exercises by which the Roman youths were prepared for victory. Livy relates, that as the people thought it unlawful to use the corn reaped from this field, they threw it in bundles into the Tiber, where it floated in the shallows, and, mingling with other substances, became the foundation of an island, which, in after times, was covered with temples.

He sentences  
them to  
death.

Procures the  
exile of  
Collatinus.

The zeal of Brutus for the complete abolition of all relics of the Tarquin race, seems to have become a passion which not only overcame his dearest affections, but perverted his sense of individual justice. He was unable to endure the continuance of his colleague

in the supreme power, who bore that name which he desired that all should hold accursed. The people, indeed, were not destitute of similar feelings, and murmured against Collatinus as favouring the exiled king. Observing these emotions in the populace, Brutus convened a public assembly, in which he read the oath taken by the people against the recall of their late sovereign, and called on them scrupulously to guard those liberties which they had confirmed by so august a sanction. He observed, that he addressed them with grief on account of Collatinus, to whom he referred, and that nothing but the love he owed to his country should have induced him to break silence. But the people felt that while one of the race of Tarquin remained, and held high office, they were unable completely to enjoy their freedom. Then, addressing himself to his astonished colleague, he exclaimed, "Of your own accord, O Lucius Tarquin, remove these inquietudes from us; we have not forgotten that you cast out the tyrants; complete your claim on our gratitude; deliver us from the name of the kings we have rejected. I will advise the citizens not only to leave you all your possessions, but if needful, liberally to augment them. Depart in amity and peace; deliver your country even from groundless fears. We shall feel that we are free indeed, when the last member of Tarquin's house has departed from us." At this address Collatinus was bewildered with surprise, while the chief men in the city pressed around him and entreated him to retire. At last, on the entreaties of Lucretius, the father of his heroic wife, he resigned the consular dignity, and retired to Lavinium, where he died, after a peaceful life, at an advanced age. Collatinus quits Rome Livy places this incident before, and Dionysius after, the exhibition of the inflexibility of Brutus on the punishment of his sons. The latter historian relates the circumstances in fuller detail, and represents the conduct of Brutus in still harsher colouring. He puts into his mouth a vehement harangue against the object of popular resentment, and makes him declare that Rome might select between himself and Collatinus, as both of them should never continue consuls. According to this authority, the people were so incited by the furious discourse of the popular orator, that they were about to depose Collatinus with ignominy, when Lucretius interposed, entreated his son-in-law voluntarily to retire, and besought his adversaries not to heap disgraces upon him. There is a great inconsistency in the latter part of the statement of this historian. He informs us that the illustrious exile retired, calling on the gods to witness the ingratitude of his friends, and immediately after represents him as accepting twenty talents from the public treasury, and five from the private fortunes of Brutus. The account of Livy, which we have followed, appears the most consistent with itself, and the least unworthy of the parties to whom it relates. From the little we can gather respecting Collatinus, his virtues seem to have

B.C. 509. been of too gentle a cast for the stern republicanism of Rome. He doubtless made a happy exchange of the turbulence of contending factions for the repose in which he spent his age. It is greatly to his honour that he never united with the enemies of his country, like Coriolanus in after times, in order to revenge his private wrongs. He left, if not a glorious, at least an unspotted name.

If, in the banishment of Collatinus, Brutus had manifested an indifference to private feeling, his subsequent conduct at least proved that he was not instigated by personal ambition. He immediately convened the people for the election of a consul, who might rule jointly with him in the room of the exile. On this occasion they voted in centuries, and their choice fell on Publius Valerius, whose subsequent conduct in extending the rights of the people procured for him the name of Publicola. He was a man of great eloquence, generosity, and benevolence, addicted, from the earliest age, to the studies of philosophy, and filled with a deep sense of the rights arising from the common humanity of all. He was no sooner chosen, than a general amnesty was decreed to all who had followed the fortunes of the exiled prince, on condition that they should, within twenty days, return to the city. This prudent measure caused many noble patricians to join the republic, who had at first retired from the belief that the revolt against the Tarquins would shortly be dissolved, and bring ruin on those who had assisted in its progress.

Publius  
Valerius the  
new Consul.

Exertions of  
Tarquinius  
for his  
restoration.

But Tarquin, though deserted by most of his friends, did not resign his hopes of regaining his throne. He forgot his sorrow for the defeat of his schemes in the fervent desire of vengeance; and, resigning all plans for subverting the commonwealth by treachery, resolved to attack it in open war. In order to procure the means for this contest, he appeared as a suppliant in the cities of Etruria, and urgently besought the Veientes and Tarquinienses to assist in his restoration. He besought them, with the most pathetic entreaties, not to suffer a king, united to them by ties of blood, after enjoying such a kingdom, to linger in poverty and exile, and to see his children perishing around him in the blossom of their youth. He reminded them, that while others had been sent for from foreign regions to fill the kingly office at Rome, he had been driven thence by an accursed conspiracy of his relatives, in the midst of his exertions to adorn the city; contended that the supreme power had been divided because no one was found worthy to enjoy it, and that his goods had been distributed among the people that all might participate in the injustice and the crime; and declared his resolution to recover his throne, and take vengeance on the ungrateful citizens. He further incited them to join him, by calling them to revenge, at the same time, their individual wrongs, the defeats of their armies, and the loss of their territories, of which Roman cupidity had deprived them. His exertions were successful; the Veientes joined

him in the hope of recovering the lands they had been compelled to resign in former wars, and the Tarquinienses from affection to a family sprung from among them, and the ambition of seeing one exercising supreme power at Rome with whom they could claim kindred. The combined forces of these states speedily entered the territories of the republic, and the consuls, at the head of the troops, advanced to give them battle. The cavalry were under the direction of Brutus, and the infantry, drawn up in a square battalion, were commanded by Valerius, his colleague. As Brutus was proceeding, Aruns, the son of Tarquin, who was at the head of the horse soldiers of the royal army, observed him, surrounded with the lictors, and exclaimed with fury, "There is the man who has driven us forth to exile! There is he, proudly decked in those ensigns of dignity of which he has spoiled us! O gods! the avengers of injured kings, assist me!" With these words, he set spurs to his horse, and rode fiercely to attack the consul. Brutus, inflamed with equal animosity, rushed to meet him. Both combatants were inspired by so terrible an ardour, that each lost all thought of self-defence in the eager hope of destroying his adversary, and thus each desperately rushed on the spear of his foe, and both fell at the same instant. The issue of the battle which was followed was at first doubtful; the Veientes were overcome by the Romans, and the Romans opposed to the Tarquinienses were defeated. The latter, however, speedily retired, and left the field to their foes. According to Livy, they were panic-struck, by hearing, in the night, a voice which was thought to be that of Silvanus, come from a wood, shouting that the Etrurians had lost one man in the battle more than the Romans, and, therefore, that the latter were victorious. The body of the fallen hero was brought with the spoils to Rome, and there honoured with as splendid a funeral as could be prepared in those rude and simple times. Valerius delivered an oration in his praise over his remains; whence the custom arose at Rome of paying this tribute of respect to departed greatness. But the most touching mark of lamentation for his death was afforded by the matrons, who wore mourning for him a whole year, in gratitude for the vengeance he had exacted for an outrage on female honour.


B.C. 509.  
Is joined by  
the people of  
Vel.

Death of  
Brutus.


Thus fell Brutus, at the moment when he seemed to have attained his utmost desires. His public life, from the hour when he threw off the appearance of an idiot, was but a few months in duration; but his conduct during that period decided the fortunes of his country, and affected the condition of the civilized world for ages. Not only was he the instrument of effecting a mighty change in the institutions of Rome, but he stamped for ever on her character that stern and savage grandeur to which every adversary was compelled to yield. He had seen his aged father and his brother slain, his estate confiscated, and himself treated as a mark for derision; and

Character of  
Brutus and  
its influence.

B.C. 509. during years of contumely and disgrace, he had existed but for vengeance. One emotion—a burning hatred to tyranny took entire possession of his soul. His tender affections, all his loves, but for his insulted country, withered and died away within him. His course, therefore, was as decided as his energy was sublime. As he was placed in the most conspicuous point of the Roman annals, his sacrifice of all human emotions to his country's freedom became the model which a nation of warriors delighted to imitate. From his example the impulse was given to that illustrious succession of heroes who were “lavish of their mighty souls” in the service of a state resolved on universal empire.



[Insula Tiberina in its present state.]



[Horatius Cocles, from the *Museum Florentinum*.]

## CHAPTER III.

### WAR WITH PORSENNA.

B.C. 508.


Soon after the last battle with the Romans, Tarquinius had taken refuge with Porsenna, the Lar or great chieftain of Clusium in Etruria. This prince, at the instigation of the exiled king, led a formidable force against the republic, and the danger became so pressing, that the patricians were compelled to exert themselves to the utmost to gain the popular favour, since they could only withstand this powerful foe by the aid of the great body of the people. Notwithstanding all resistance, the Janiculum was soon taken, and its garrison driven into the city, on which the Etruscans were rapidly advancing, when they found their way barred at the Pons Sublicius, or the wooden bridge, by Horatius Cocles, Sp. Lartius, and Titus Herminius. The two latter at the command of Cocles returned to the city, while he alone continued to resist the enemy. The bridge was torn down by the Romans, the advance of the Etruscans cut off, and Cocles swam in safety to the other side of the Tiber. Notwithstanding this act of heroism, Rome was soon so closely blockaded by the Etruscans, that a famine ensued; but another act of fierce valour again saved the city. Caius Mucius, a noble youth, having determined to slay Porsenna, swam across the Tiber. He advanced to the royal tent, but mistaking the king's secretary for the king himself, slew him, and attempting to force his way back again through the

Horatius  
Cocles  
defends the  
"Pons  
Sublicius."

Tale of Caius  
Mucius  
Scævola.

B.C. 508.

B.C. 508. surrounding troops, was seized and brought before the king. Mucius dauntlessly declared his intention, and by way of replying to a threat of torture by fire, thrust his right hand into the flame




[Caius Mucius Scaevola.—*Museum Florentinum.*]

Peace with  
Porsenna.

which was then burning on the altar. Mucius then informed Porsenna that three hundred young Romans had sworn his destruction. The Etruscan king, alarmed at this, proposed terms of peace, which, after some time, were agreed to. The Romans consented to surrender to the people of Veii the districts which they had taken from them, but would hearken to no terms for the restoration of Tarquinius.

In the year B.C. 501, an important war broke out with the Latins, which was distinguished by the memorable battle of Lake Regillus,

B.C. 499, in which the exiled king Tarquinius was present. In this great battle the popular lays of Rome represent Castor and Pollux (the Dioscuri) as appearing in the fight, under the form of two gigantic youths mounted on white horses, and fighting in the Roman ranks. With this battle ends the mythical period of Rome.



[The Dioscuri, from a Denarius of the gens Postumia.]

Dr. Arnold  
on the Story  
of Porsenna.


It is the opinion of the best critics, that notwithstanding the legendary acts of heroism connected with this war, Rome was completely subdued by the Etruscan king. Dr. Arnold observes: "That war which has been given in its poetical version as the war with Porsenna, was really a great outbreak of the Etruscan power

upon the nations southward of Etruria, in the very front of whom lay the Romans. In the very next year after the expulsion of the king, according to the common story, and certainly at some time within the period with which we are now concerned, the Etruscans fell upon Rome. The result of the war is, indeed, as strangely disguised in the poetical story, as Charlemagne's invasion of Spain is in the romance. Rome was completely conquered: all the territory which the kings had won on the right bank of the Tiber was now lost. Rome itself was surrendered to the Etruscan conqueror; his sovereignty was fully acknowledged; the Romans gave up their arms and recovered their city and territory, on condition of renouncing the use of iron, except for instruments of agriculture. But this bondage did not last long; the Etruscan power was broken by a great defeat sustained before Aricia; for after the fall of Rome the conquerors attacked Latium, and while besieging Aricia, the united force of the Latin cities, aided by the Greeks of Cumæ, succeeded in destroying their army, and in confining their power to their own side of the Tiber. Still, however, the Romans did not recover their territory on the right bank of the river, and the number of their tribes, as has been already noticed, was consequently lessened by one third, being reduced from thirty to twenty. Thus, within a short time after the banishment of the last king, the Romans lost all their territory on the Etruscan side of the Tiber, and all their dominion over Latium."

B.C. 508.

Subjection of Rome.

Defeat of the Etruscans before Aricia.

[Part of the Servian Wall.—*Gell's Topography of Rome.*]





[Roman Triumph, from an ancient Painting found in Pompeii.—Real Museo Borbonico ]

## CHAPTER IV.

### CAIUS MARCIUS CORIOLANUS.

FLOURISHED ABOUT B.C. 490.

B.C. 490. THE family of Caius Marcius was one of the noblest and most venerable in Rome. He was descended from Ancus Martius, the fourth of the Roman kings, and numbered many illustrious patricians among his ancestors. He lost his father in his early childhood; but this misfortune was amply compensated by the care of his mother Volumnia, who not only devoted her life to his education, but strove to inspire him with that martial ardour which alone could lead to the highest distinctions. He returned her love with the most respectful yet devoted affection; and the hope of adding to her joys was the strongest impulse which animated him in his career of victory. He learned early to excel in all the robust exercises which were preparatory to the exploits of the field; and acquired in these so great an excellence, that scarcely any one of the youths of his own age dared to enter into competition with him. From this decided superiority, so early recognised, it is probable that that unbending pride and stern spirit of defiance had their origin, which threw so dark a shadow over his character in maturer years.

Marcus was early permitted by his heroic mother to encounter

the dangers of battle. His first opportunity of displaying those great qualities with which he was endowed, was in the fiercest engagement in which Rome had yet conflicted for the preservation of her freedom. Tarquin, unsubdued by his numerous misfortunes, prevailed on the Latins to espouse his cause; and, although far advanced in age, marched with the army, which was commanded by Mamilius. The Romans, under the conduct of Posthumius, the dictator, hastened to meet them, and hearing that the exiled king and his sons were among the hostile forces, rushed with ferocious ardour to give their enemies battle, and met them on the borders of the lake Regillus. Here a combat the most sanguinary ensued, in which the generals, carried away by their ardour, fought hand to hand among the soldiers. Tarquin himself, feeble with age, concentrating all his energy for a single effort, spurred his horse to attack the dictator, but received a wound in his progress, and was borne from the field by his allies. Mamilius and Valerius were both killed, after performing the most astonishing feats of valour. At length, the Roman fortune prevailed, and the Latins fled, after a resistance in which scarcely a soldier escaped unwounded. In this remarkable contest the prowess of young Marcius was conspicuous. As he saw one of his comrades struck down at a little distance from him, he rushed between his countryman and his foe, and maintained the combat till he slew the aggressor. For this exploit, Posthumius crowned him with an oaken garland—the reward of him who preserved a citizen. On his return to Rome, after this success, he married, but continued to reside, together with his wife and family, in the house of his revered and beloved mother.

Coriolanus  
at the battle  
of Regillus.

His early  
valour.

It would have been well for Marcius had his mind been devoted entirely to the acquirement of additional fame in defending the state in foreign warfare, and the enjoyment of those domestic pleasures, in the intervals of combat, of which he was so well deserving; but the high-born pride of his spirit, and his disdain of the populace, were unfortunately developed in the contests between the senate and the people, by which the commonwealth was now distracted. It will be proper to take a concise view of the origin of these struggles, in which he took a share so ruinous to his happiness and injurious to his honourable fame.


When the regal government was abolished at Rome, its place was supplied by an aristocracy, which allowed but a small share in the direction of the state to the people. This, however, was not the principal grievance of which they had to complain. The law respecting debtors, which allowed the creditor to treat the insolvent as a slave, and even to whip and torture him, pressed on them most severely; especially as wealth was distributed with great inequality, and the most exorbitant interest was exacted for the loans which extreme poverty often compelled them to request of the patricians.

Law of  
Debtor and  
Creditor.

B.C. 490. Their sense of this oppressive regulation was aroused by the appearance of an aged man in the forum, covered with bruises, and in the most piteous condition, who related the story of his wrongs and his sufferings. He alleged, that while fighting the battles of his country, he had lost all his little stores by the incursion of the foe; had been forced to borrow money to pay the taxes imposed on him; had given up his paternal estate to satisfy the enormous demands of his creditor; and, after all, had been seized, in his age and sorrow, and tortured in a dungeon. Moved by this tale and the miserable appearance of the speaker, the people ran tumultuously through the city, and when the consuls, Appius Claudius and P. Servilius, attempted to appease them, burst forth into expressions of vehement indignation against their oppressors. They demanded that the senate should immediately assemble to redress their wrongs, and when they found the greater part of that body absent from terror, they became still more incensed and tumultuous. At length the senators, thinking it safer to meet the danger than to neglect it, repaired to the place of deliberation, as the populace had required. But here the opinions were far from unanimous as to the course it would be proper to take in this important crisis. Some, with Appius, recommended the seizure of the most active in order to terrify the rest into submission; while others, with Servilius, were inclined to soothe and conciliate the unruly. In the midst of the discussion, news arrived that an army of the Volscians were advancing to besiege the city, which the people received with joy. The commons now determined to obtain revenge for their wrongs by totally refusing their services. This course decided the senate to lay aside their animosities for the present, and to empower Servilius to forbid the detention of any citizen in prison or in chains, so as to prevent him from joining the consular levies, and to prohibit the seizure of the lands or arrest of the families of any who should take up arms during their absence. This measure had the effect desired, since a great number of debtors availed themselves of the protection offered, and, in the battle which ensued, exerted themselves with more energy, as if inspired by the ruin of their fortunes. The truce between the contending parties of the state was occupied by a brilliant succession of victories. The Volscians, after an ineffectual attempt on the Roman encampments, were completely routed, and the city of Suessa Pometia, to which the fugitives from the battle escaped, taken and given up to plunder. An army of the Sabines, which had suddenly advanced to ravage the open country, was overtaken, and cut to pieces in a single day. The Aruncians, who had sent deputies to demand that the Romans should withdraw from the Volscian territories, and whose legions, at the same time, set out to enforce the negotiation, were arrested by bands who rushed forth eagerly to destroy them; and before the senate could

Disputes  
between the  
debtors and  
creditors at  
Rome.

The  
Volscians  
routed.



[The Forum — *Forum*.]

B.C. 490. be regularly consulted, or an answer given to the ambassadors, the army was defeated, and the war terminated by the Roman prowess. The Ecetrans also, terrified by the successes of the Romans, sent an embassy to sue for peace, which was only granted on the cession of their lands.

The people, whose valour had gained these signal triumphs, naturally expected that the return of peace would bring them a solemn investigation and redress of their grievances. They were, therefore, indignant when they found, not only that this duty was entirely neglected by the senate, but that the old laws respecting debtors were enforced even against those who had been protected from the grasp of their creditors when the danger of the republic required that they should be at liberty to hazard their lives in its service. Those who fought under the banners of Servilius, when they were seized, applied to him to assist them and redeem his plighted faith, accused the hardness of their fate, and displayed the wounds they had received when supporting him in battle. The consul, although he was disposed to render them justice, remained irresolute, through fear of Appius and the senators, who were determined to resist all the demands of the people. Thus he so lost their affections, that when it was referred to the commons to nominate a person who should have the honour of dedicating a temple to Mercury, they elected M. Lætorius, the first centurion of a legion, for the purpose of irritating Appius, whom they had cause to hate, and Servilius, whom they began to despise. After this conduct of the plebeians, the breach between the higher and lower orders continued rapidly to widen. When a debtor was arrested, he was rescued by force, and the consuls' decrees were prevented from being heard or obeyed, by clamour and tumultuous riotings. While this state of disturbance continued, the Sabines threatened the city with war, and the people, remembering the rewards of their former exertions, refused to shed their blood for the defence of those who had shown themselves ungrateful. At this juncture, the year of Appius and Servilius expired, and A. Virginius and T. Volusius were appointed to the consular dignity. The new magistrates, urged by the senate to violent measures, ordered one of the leaders of a tumultuous assembly to be apprehended, but not only saw their lictors repulsed by the people, but encountered a struggle, which, although not deadly in itself, was of a nature to excite the most serious alarm. The senate immediately assembled in great confusion, and it was long before the consuls could restore that order which was necessary even to the appearance of deliberation among the members. Three opinions were then asserted with great zeal; Virginius, the consul, proposed that effect should be given to the promises of Servilius, and all those soldiers released who had fought under him. Titus Larcus urged the justice and expediency of a total abrogation of debts, as

Cruel  
position of  
the Debtors.

the only mode of healing the divisions; and Appius violently insisted that the sedition arose not from oppression, but too much freedom, which the right of appeal secured, and that the only mode by which the senate could preserve its dignity, was the adoption of firm proceedings and the appointment of a dictator. The latter recommendation was adopted; but, happily for the peace of Rome, the author of the measure was not chosen to that office, on which the salvation of the state depended. The choice of the senators was prudently fixed on M. Valerius, brother of the man who had assisted in expelling the house of Tarquin, and who had given to the people those laws by which all those rights were secured that they were yet allowed to enjoy. As the memory of his relative was still dear to them, they listened to his promises, when he made them the same offers as those by which Servilius had beguiled them; and enlisted in such numbers that an army of ten legions was raised, being a greater force than the Romans had ever yet been able to embody. All their troops were, however, needed; for three powerful foes appeared at once in arms—the Æqui, the Volsci, and the Sabines; all probably expecting to find great advantage in the intestine divisions of Rome. The first had made incursions on the territories of the Latines, who entreated the Romans either to protect them, or allow them to arm against their invaders; and as the former course was judged the most prudent, Vetustus, the consul, was sent to their assistance, and soon drove their foes into the fastnesses of the mountains. The other consul marched to attack the Volsci, whom he found ardently desirous of a battle, as, from their superior numbers, they were confident of obtaining the victory. As they rushed forward with shouts and acclamation, the Romans waited in silence to receive their charge; and then, being fresh and unfatigued, returned the attack with so much vigour, that the Volsci, exhausted with the anticipations of success, fled in great disorder. The victors followed them closely, drove them from their camp to the city of Velitræ, and entered that place, together with the defeated battalions. After great carnage, the few who survived threw down their arms, and received the mercy of the conquerors. The dictator, in the mean time, obtained a great victory over the Sabines, who were the most formidable enemies of Rome. And the consul Vetustus, being incited by the clamours of his army to the bold attempt of dislodging the Æqui from their mountainous position, struck so great a terror into the foe by the boldness of the act, that when they might have attacked him with every probability of success, they deserted their camp and fled into the valleys. A rich booty was thus obtained without effusion of blood, and the army returned in triumph.

Valerius  
dictator.

Defeat of the  
Volsci.

Immediately on the return of the soldiers, Valerius, anxious to redeem the pledge he had given, proposed a law for the relief of those who were insolvent. The proposition was unhappily rejected,

B.C. 490. and the virtuous dictator retired from office in disdain, amidst the acclamations of the people whom he had vainly endeavoured to serve. Marcius now appears to have taken a decided part against the popular requisitions. He contended that the grievances respecting debtors were the mere pretexts of a seditious spirit, which must be crushed by resolution in its infancy, or it would totally destroy the rights of the senate and patricians. These councils, however, were frustrated by a new mode which the people adopted to make the nobility feel how much they were dependent on those whom they affected to despise. Conducted by Sicinius, they left their employments, and peaceably entrenched themselves, according to some authors, on the banks of the Anio, and to others, on the Aventine hill, taking nothing but those things which were necessary for the supply of their immediate wants. This measure struck more dismay into the hearts of the patricians than they had felt in the most violent tumults, and soon produced a resolution to concede any thing which might induce the people to return. For this purpose, Menenius Agrippa, a man of excellent character, and endowed with that rude species of humour which is always acceptable to the populace, was sent to treat with them; and, in order to show the folly of their secession, related to them the celebrated fable of a sedition by the members of the body against the stomach, in which, though they succeeded in starving the object of their aversion, they found that, in their success, they lost all their own energy, and were brought near to destruction. The adaptation of this happy idea to the state of parties among the Romans, had its desired effect, and the seceders agreed to treat for a reunion. At length they consented to return, on condition of being allowed five tribunes, to be chosen from their own body, who were to protect them against the powers of the senate and consuls, whose persons were to be esteemed sacred, and who were to be allowed a solemn VETO on every proposition, before it became a law to bind their constituents. These officers had, however, no voice in the senate, no share in the administration of justice, and no splendid or august habit to distinguish them from their fellow citizens. But, shortly after their appointment, they obtained the consent of the senate to the appointment of two functionaries, to be their assistants, who, in subsequent times, were called plebeian ædiles, and had the care of the public buildings, and many other duties confided to them. Sicinius and Brutus, two of the most vehement opponents of the patrician encroachments, were among the first number of tribunes.

Conduct of  
Marcius in  
these  
disputes.

The tribunes  
chosen.

Marcius witnessed these concessions with regret, but saw that it was in vain to oppose them. He shortly found a more congenial sphere for the development of his energies, in the war against the Volsci, who seem to have risen from every defeat with unabated resolution and prowess. He attended the consul Cominius to the

field, against these formidable adversaries, and having shared in B.C. 490. defeating the Antiates, and capturing Longula and Polusca, proceeded to assist in the siege of Corioli, a strongly fortified town, which the enemy regarded as their capital.

Animated by the danger of their principal city, the Volsci collected a large force, with which they resolved on attacking the besiegers from the rear, in the hope of compelling them to retire. To meet this detachment, Cominius drew off a great part of his forces, and left Titus Larcus to command those which still lay before the town, among whom was Caius Marcius. On this movement, the troops within the city sallied forth on the diminished battalions, and drove them to their entrenchments. At this critical moment, the spirit of Marcius burst forth to save and conquer; while he desperately opposed himself to the pursuers, he called to the Romans, with a voice like thunder, to turn on them, and roused their courage, while he struck dismay into the troops which had hitherto been victorious. Not satisfied with repulsing the foe, he hastily followed them; now struggling with the enemy, now animating his own battalions, and calling out to them that Corioli was theirs. With astonishing enterprise, followed only by a few soldiers, he burst with the fugitives into the city, and rushed through the streets, putting hosts of enemies to flight, who were so confounded at his surprising valour, that they thought not of cutting off his retreat, or of steadily opposing his progress. While he thus seemed to burst like lightning through the city, Larcus had time to enter without opposition, and to secure the conquest which Marcius had achieved, almost as swift as thought, by the might of his single arm. The soldiers immediately began to disperse themselves throughout the city, for the purposes of plunder. But Marcius, sternly rebuking them, called to them to follow him instantly to the assistance of Cominius, who might even then be struggling with hosts of their foes. A few noble spirits only obeyed him, and with these he hastened, without a moment's pause, to join the consul. He arrived at the very moment when the armies were about to engage; scarcely told the issue of his exploits, and covered already with dust and with blood, seized eagerly on the post of the greatest danger, carried defeat and terror wherever he moved, and forced the Volsci, with great loss, to retire. Even yet he refused to listen to the entreaties of those who besought him to take repose. As if gifted with more than mortal powers, he led on the pursuit of



[Roman Hastatus. — Museum Florentinum.]

Brave conduct of Marcius at Corioli.

Joins the force of Cominius.



B.C. 490. the fugitives, and never stopped till all the troops were routed and the camp of the Volsci taken. On the day after these wonderful successes, Cominius, after giving thanks to the gods, rapturously eulogized Marcius, attributing all the glory to him alone, and entreated him to accept a noble horse, and to choose a tenth part of the spoils. The hero received the praises bestowed on him with graceful modesty, accepted only the horse offered by the consul, and declining any share of the booty, requested only, as his reward, that a Volscian who had once hospitably entertained him, might be allowed his freedom. This moderation and generosity gave a finishing grace to his triumph. The assembly, as he refused all the more substantial gifts they desired to shower upon him, unanimously gave him the surname of CORIOLANUS, in testimony of his astonishing valour. At Rome he was received with the warmest admiration, as the consul, with eminent magnanimity and justice, gave him the whole merit of the war, and delighted to set forth his praises.

Derives his surname from the place.

The peace which ensued, however, was dangerous to Rome, and fatal to the glory of Coriolanus. At first, indeed, all animosities seemed buried in the common joy; a new treaty of peace was made with the people of Latium, and a third day added to the *Feriæ Latinæ*, in commemoration of the happy reunion of the senate and the plebeians. But the death of Menenius Agrippa, whose qualities ensured him the respect of all, removed one great support of the public harmony. This excellent person died without leaving sufficient property to defray the costs of a public burial. As his relatives were about to inter his remains in privacy, the people, to whom he had greatly endeared himself, raised a fund, by the payment of a sextans each, for the purpose of bestowing on him splendid obsequies. When the senate heard of this intention, they refused to allow so noble a patrician to be buried at the cost of the plebeians, and decreed him a magnificent funeral from the public treasury. The people, however, refused to take again their subscriptions, but presented them to the children of Menenius, to comfort them in their poverty, and stimulate them to the cultivation of virtue. Soon after the death of this popular senator, a famine, which arose from the want of tillage during the secession of the people, occasioned fresh commotions at Rome. The people, with that misdirected passion which their extreme misery alone could excuse, reviled the senate as the authors of the scarcity, which manifestly originated from natural causes. All the exertions used by this body to purchase corn, having afforded only temporary relief, they were disposed to assent to a request from the citizens of Velitræ, to send a colony thither to replace the greater number of its inhabitants who had lately been cut off by a terrible pestilence. When, however, they directed a number of the common people to set out for the desolate town, the tribunes, Sicinius and Brutus,

A public funeral decreed to Menenius Agrippa.

incited the latter to great discontent, by affirming that the place was infected, and that the patricians only sent them there as to a lingering grave. On this occasion, Coriolanus was unable to repress his feelings of disgust, and openly inveighed against the tribunes, and the spirit they succeeded in arousing. In this instance the senate prevailed, and despatched colonies both to Velitræ and Norva, a city of Latium, but were entirely disappointed in the hope that this measure would render the city tranquil. The tumults continued under the direction of Sicinius and Brutus, who took advantage of the general distress to procure a law forbidding any one to interrupt the tribunes while speaking, under grievous penalties. The senate and the people continued to act in political opposition, each refusing to confirm or acquiesce in the decrees and resolutions passed in the assemblies of the other, and many accepted the invitations of neighbouring states, and emigrated from Rome. At length the fathers resolved on sending an army against the Volsci, in order to employ and unite the turbulent and miserable citizens. But they followed the advice of the tribunes, and refused to take arms. On this, Coriolanus, indignant, set forth on the expedition, attended only by his own dependants, a few noble patrician youths, and a small number of plebeians, who joined him when they observed the spirit with which he was actually departing. This enterprising party advanced to the gates of Antium, collected large spoils, with abundance of cattle and food, and returned with the booty, which the generous leader divided, without reserve, among his followers. After this excursion, Coriolanus became candidate for the office of consul. At first the people were inclined to forget his opposition to their cause, in his noble qualities and splendid success, but the senate supported him with so injudicious a warmth, that they withdrew their suffrages from him, and chose Minucius and Sempronius to his exclusion. Conscious of his own merits, he deeply felt, and bitterly resented this injury; and he had, unfortunately, too soon an occasion for displaying the rancour which he condescended to cherish.

B.C. 490.  
Disputes  
with the  
tribunes.

Coriolanus is  
rejected as  
consul.

Corn arrived from various quarters, nearly at the same time, for the relief of the distresses in Rome. Not only had considerable stores been purchased in Italy, but the fleet which had been despatched to Sicily returned heavily laden with grain, half of which had been purchased on low terms, and half freely presented to the state by Gelo, the king of Syracuse. As these timely provisions were at the disposal of the senate, the question was earnestly agitated in that body whether they should be gratuitously distributed among the people, or on what terms they should be allowed to enjoy them. On this occasion, Coriolanus took the opportunity vehemently to inveigh against the plebeians and the tribunitial power, and intimated that the exigencies of the time should be improved to

B.C. 490. abolish those privileges which had been so unwisely conceded. Many of the young and haughty patricians, who felt an insuperable distaste to the vulgar harangues of the popular orators, strongly supported these declarations; but the more mild and aged of the senators opposed them, sensible either of the impolicy of provoking a tumult, or of the want of generosity which would be shown in compelling the people to resign their privileges in order to obtain the means of satisfying hunger. While the matter was eagerly debated, the tribunes, who were present, burst into the most severe invectives against Coriolanus, calling out on the fathers to condemn him to death or exile, and threatening that, in case they refused, they themselves would wreak their vengeance upon him. Unappalled by these denunciations, Coriolanus defied their power, and threatened, unless they desisted, himself to chastise their insolence. As they found the majority of the senate inclined to support the object of their hatred, they hastened to the assembly of the people, whom they alarmed by apprehensions that the abolition of the tribuneship was intended, and persuaded them to send into the senate-house for Coriolanus to come and be arraigned in their presence. The messenger was dismissed with scorn. At length the tribunes, with a body of their most resolute supporters, surrounded the doors of the senate-house, in order to seize their great adversary, at the close of the discussions. When, therefore, he appeared, attended with many noble youths, who greatly admired him, the ædiles were ordered to seize him; a fierce contest ensued, which the consuls were scarcely able to appease. Both parties, at length, quietly departed, and Coriolanus returned home in safety.

The tribunes threaten Coriolanus.

Formidable attacks against him.

Early the next morning, the tribunes assembled the people, and the city was disturbed, in every part, by tumultuous proceedings. The senate, after long debate, resolved on conciliatory measures, and desired the consuls to sooth the people, and entreat them to carry their animosities against Coriolanus no further, whom the patricians seemed determined not to resign. With these views, Minucius made a long and very judicious speech, in which he assured the assembly that there was not the slightest intention of depriving them of any of their privileges, or of withholding from them the corn which had been procured for the relief of their distresses, and proved to them the injustice of their desiring to call a senator to account as a criminal for advice he had given in his legislative character. He even implored them, that, if they thought they had powers to try Coriolanus, or a disposition to punish him, they would pardon him in consideration of his gallant services, or as a favour to the patricians. This address inspired gentler thoughts in the people; but the tribunes insisted on hearing Coriolanus make his own defence and apology, before they would consent to absolve him. He came forward, therefore, to speak, and was received with deep attention.

Instead, however, of pursuing the course which Minucius had marked out for him, he refused to submit to be questioned by the plebeians, and sternly inveighed against the whole policy of his accusers. This bold and imprudent course secured to the tribunes all the advantage they were on the point of losing, and caused the fiercest uproar. Sicinius availed himself of the popular rage, condemned the accused to death, and ordered the ædiles to seize and cast him from the Tarpeian rock. He stood unmoved, still breathing forth defiance and contempt on his judges. His friends protected him, and the whole body of the nobles threw themselves among the crowd, and resisted the execution of the sentence. In this commotion the consuls interfered, and so great was the veneration which their presence inspired, that the contending parties retired, and Coriolanus was once more rescued from the foes whose malice, but for his pride and fierce demeanour, must have been weak as it was pitiful.

B.C. 490.  
Bold  
demeanour  
of  
Coriolanus.

Although the immediate danger was thus appeased, the tribunes insisted on the appointment of a day for the trial of Coriolanus by the people. The senate hoped, at first, that an incursion of the Antiates would have diverted the popular attention, till animosities had, in some degree, subsided, but in this they were disappointed, as peace was restored before the time which had been named for the formal accusation of the illustrious senator. Earnest debates took place among the fathers whether they should suffer the proceeding; Appius Claudius strenuously urging them peremptorily to forbid it, and Valerius as forcibly entreating them to yield. During the discussion, Coriolanus demanded of the tribunes of what they intended to accuse him; and as they were afraid in the senate-house to allege against him the speech which he had made within its walls, they replied, that they charged him with aiming at tyranny. Conscious of his own integrity on this point, he consented to yield to the investigation required, on condition that his accusers should confine themselves to this single accusation. Livy, indeed, is totally silent on this consent, as well as on all the circumstances alleged by Dionysius and Plutarch to have taken place between this period and the retirement of Coriolanus from Rome; and, on the contrary, affirms that he altogether refused to acknowledge the authority of those who presumed to try him, and was condemned to banishment in his absence. This account seems far most probable, from his character; and there are several inconsistencies in the statements of the more minute historians, which incline us to give credit to Livy. We shall, however, state the substance of the particulars which Plutarch and Dionysius have related.

The tribunes  
insist on his  
being  
brought  
to trial.

When the time appointed for the trial arrived, a fresh dispute arose, whether the people should give their votes by centuries or tribes, a highly important question, because, if the voices of the

B.C. 490. people were collected by the first means, the patricians were certain of success; whereas, if the latter mode were agreed to, they were reduced to their numerical strength, having no more votes than the lowest of the plebeians. After a fierce contention, this point was also conceded to the tribunes; and, when the senate acquiesced in the demand, the cause was virtually decided. The patricians, indeed, condescended to entreat and to supplicate the people in behalf of the man whom they either wanted the courage or the power to defend; and seem still to have entertained hopes that their prayers, and the memory of his own noble actions, would secure for him an acquittal. At length the expected day arrived, and immense multitudes were collected in the forum, in anxious expectation of the issue. Minucius first addressed the assembly, entreating them to waive the trial as a boon conceded to the entreaties of the senate; and, finding that he could not obtain this favour, reminded them that they were bound to confine their allegations to the support of the charge of tyranny. If, however, the tribunes did not in terms relinquish this accusation, they continued in their harangues, to bring forward all the political offences of Coriolanus as proof of a constructive treason. After they had apparently exhausted all their invectives, the party accused, with a noble assurance, presented himself to the crowd; and scarcely condescending to notice the particular complaints brought forward by his foes, recounted his exploits in the service of the state, even from his boyhood; displayed the crowns which he had won by his astonishing valour, especially in preserving the lives of the citizens, and uncovered the wounds which he had received in battle; and then triumphantly appealed to the audience, whether he could have intended in peace to destroy those for the preservation of whose lives he had a thousand times perilled his own? The people, who came resolved to condemn, felt abashed before him, and cried out for his acquittal. But Decius, one of the tribunes, now brought forward a new charge, which was totally unexpected, that he had divided the spoils he had taken among his soldiers, to conciliate their affections, instead of bringing them to the public treasury. It is said that Coriolanus was unprepared to reply to his accusation, which was calculated to rouse the animosities of those who had envied the troops those riches which they had dearly won. Pursuing their advantage, the tribunes collected the suffrages, and Coriolanus was condemned to exile by a majority of three votes, twelve having voted against him, and only nine in his favour. All these proceedings wear, however, the appearance of historic fiction. It is not probable that, on such an occasion, the senate would resign all material distinction between themselves and the people, by abandoning the ancient right of voting in centuries; it is unlikely that Coriolanus would consent to recognise what he regarded as insolent encroachments, and

Day of trial.

Appeal of  
Coriolanus  
to the  
people.

His  
banishment  
decreed.

submit to be tried by the people, merely because he thought his B.C. 490. adversaries had taken a ground which they could not maintain; still less is it to be believed that he would condescend to exhibit his scars and his trophies before those whom he held in inexpressible disdain; or that he should be confounded by a charge which he might have so readily turned on his accusers. Certain, indeed, it is, that he was condemned to perpetual exile; but it seems most probable that the people were exasperated to this injustice by his steady refusal to appear before them.

As soon as the result was known, the patricians were struck with the deepest sorrow. Coriolanus alone betrayed no symptom of regret; but the injury sunk into his inmost soul. He embraced his wife and children, and the mother whom he had so tenderly revered, and, after exhorting them to bear their distresses with constancy, left Rome, attended by a few clients only, who resolved to share his misfortunes. Many of the senators followed him to the gates, but he received the expressions of their grief with a haughty silence. After a few unquiet days spent in the country, during which he was divided between his love for Rome and his desires of vengeance, the feelings of resentment assumed the complete mastery. In pursuance of his determination to make his enemies feel his power, he resolved to throw himself into the arms of the Volsci, in whose defeat he had obtained the most signal renown. For this purpose, he covered himself with a habit which disguised him, and proceeded, in the evening, to the house of Attius Tullus, the most celebrated of the Volscian generals, whom he had repeatedly overthrown in battle, and whom, therefore, he supposed to cherish a great animosity towards him. He entered the hall of his rival without being discovered, and placed himself on the hearth sacred to the household gods, which all the states of Italy feared to violate. The servants, awe-struck by the grandeur of his form, and the majesty of his deportment, hastened to call their master, who was at table, that he might question the mysterious stranger. Tullus immediately entered the room, and demanded to know his name and purpose; when Coriolanus, throwing off his disguise, replied, "If you remember me not, I must declare to you that my name is Caius Marcius—the bitterest foe of the Volsci—to which my surname, Coriolanus, would witness. That is all which is left me now. The envy of the people, and the cowardice of the senate, have banished me from Rome, and forced me to become a supplicant here—not for life—but for vengeance. If you will accept my services against my ungrateful country, this affliction of mine may become the means of your triumph; if not, I desire to live no longer. My fate is in your hands; destroy one who, if you receive him not into friendship, cannot exist but at your peril." Astonished at his magnanimity, Tullus gave him his hand in pledge of faith, assured him that he would

Seeks refuge with the Volscian general Tullus.

His interview with Tullus.

B.C. 490. receive the highest respect from the people among whom he had sought refuge; and conducted him into the inner apartments, where he was hospitably entertained, and consulted as to the best means of renewing the war with Rome, in which he might satisfy his desires of revenge.

In the mean time, the Romans were engrossed in superstitious observances, little suspecting the danger preparing for them. An old man, having procured himself to be conveyed in a couch to the senate, declared that Jupiter had appeared to him in a dream, and signified his displeasure at the person who had danced before the public games, and that these must be celebrated afresh, or the republic must dread the anger of heaven. He added, that he had at first neglected this intimation, and in consequence, by disobedience, had lost one of his sons, while his sleep had been haunted by the same vision, threatening him with further evils if he refrained from making the disclosure. He affirmed, that while he still hesitated, he was seized with a severe distemper, and lost the use of his limbs, so that he could only be brought to the senate-house in a litter. While he delivered this discourse, it is said, that he gradually recovered his strength, and, at its conclusion, walked home, leaving the senate astonished at the prodigy. On inquiry, they found that a slave had been whipped by his master through the forum, on the morning of the games, which they presumed had given offence to the gods; and having set a fine on the offender, they prepared with great magnificence again to celebrate the festival.

War between  
the Volsci  
and Rome.

Tullus resolved to take advantage of this occasion, to inflame his countrymen against the Romans, especially as the consuls chosen for the ensuing year, by the influence of the plebeians, were known to be men of no talents for war. For this purpose, he encouraged a number of the Volsci to repair to Rome, to witness the approaching solemnities; and then gave secret intimation to the senate that he expected some disorder would ensue from their presence. On receiving this communication, the fathers ordered all the Volsci to depart from the city, who were met on their journey home by the treacherous instigator of their dismissal, and incited to regard it as an unparalleled outrage. The Volsci, however, on the advice of Coriolanus, sought a more plausible reason for breaking the truce then subsisting between the nations, and sent deputies to Rome to demand the restoration of the cities and the land which had been wrested from them. To this demand the senate indignantly replied, that if the Volsci would be the first to take up arms, they would be the last to lay them down. As the Volsci expected this answer, they were prepared to act on it, and having chosen Coriolanus and Tullus to command the forces, immediately took the field.

The army was divided into two portions, each of which was led by one of the generals. Tullus, with his battalions, invaded the

territories of the Latins, to prevent them from affording succour to their allies; while Coriolanus burst immediately into the Roman domains, and acquired great spoils. The former having also taken considerable booty near Latium, remained to guard the frontiers, while the latter advanced to meet the consuls. These magistrates did not, however, seem eager to contend with their injured countryman, who continued to ravage the country without opposition, entering Circæum without resistance, and retaking not only Satricum, Longula, Polusca, and Corioli, which he had so mainly contributed to subdue, but a number of cities belonging to the Latins, who in vain supplicated the assistance of their usual protectors. In his progress, he spared the estates of the patricians, either from old friendship, or a desire to raise jealousies between that order and the plebeians. Such was, at all events, the consequence of his forbearance; and the senate were even charged with having secretly encouraged the exile to make war, for the abolition of the tribunitial power. All was confusion within the city, as the parties distrusted each other, and feared both the abilities of their foe and the incapacity of the consuls. In the mean time, Coriolanus was rapidly advancing, and having taken Lavinium, pitched his camp at the Cluilian trenches, within five miles of the city. The people, who had doomed him to exile, now in terror besought the senate to meet him; but, with a truly Roman spirit, they refused to sue to him as a master, whom they had strenuously defended as an equal. When, however, they found that he had broken up his camp, and was actually preparing to invest the city, they consented to send deputies to him, to negotiate for peace. Minucius, Cominius, and three other senators of consular dignity, were appointed to conduct this important mission. They entreated him by the memory of their former love, to forget the past, and to return to the city, which would be most joyful to receive him. He replied, with austerity, that he would grant peace only on condition that the senate would restore all the possessions they had taken from the Volsci, and grant to that people the same rights of citizenship which they had conferred upon the Latins. For himself, he expressed his astonishment that he should be requested to return to a people, who had so injuriously treated him, and against whose future vengeance he could never be secure. He granted, however, a truce of thirty days, that they might have time to consider the offers he made them, as general of the Volsci; and, in the mean time, drew off his troops from the city, and employed them in taking possession of several other towns in the territories of Latium.

B.C. 490.  
Coriolanus  
invades the  
Roman  
territory.

Consternation  
at  
Rome.

A Deputation  
entreats for  
peace.

Although the greatest apprehension prevailed at Rome, the senate resolved never to submit to the terms proposed by the invader. At the close of the period allowed them for deliberation, they sent ten of their number to Coriolanus, charged to assure him that the



B.C. 490.

Haughty  
conduct of  
Coriolanus.

Romans would never yield to demands thus enforced, and, at the same time, to entreat him to withdraw his troops, and afterwards to negotiate for a union. On hearing the speeches of these deputies, he replied, that the senate had no alternative but restitution or war; and though as general of the Volsci, he had no other answer to return; as one of the citizens of Rome, he would advise them to ask no longer, terms to which he could never listen. He yet allowed them three days to decide on the course they would finally adopt, Their resolution, however, on this point seems never to have wavered, though they were afraid even to send forth an army to oppose the enemy's progress. Still hoping to move Coriolanus to a compliance with their wishes, they despatched the priests and ministers of religion, in their sacred vestments, to conjure him to retire. He heard their entreaties, and without relaxing his determination, dismissed them. As a last hope, all now exerted themselves to the utmost, to prepare for that siege which was instantly to be expected. The women ran distractedly about the forum, clinging to the statues of the gods, and the sacred altars, and imploring in agony the assistance of heaven. Suddenly, Valeria, the sister of Valerius, ascended the steps of the temple of Jupiter, in the capitol, and called these wretched suppliants around her, as if inspired with a divine energy for their relief.

His mother  
and family  
go out to  
conciliate  
him.

She assured them that one hope of saving their country yet remained through their means, and exhorted them to entreat the mother of Coriolanus, who had devoted her life to his happiness, to join with them in a last effort to prevail on her hitherto inexorable son. Having persuaded them to accede to this proposal, she conducted them to the house of Volumnia, whom she found in the deepest affliction, and earnestly entreated her assistance. The noble matron, after expressing her fear that nothing could divert her son from his purpose, agreed to make the attempt if the senate would afford it their sanction. After some opposition from those who feared that Coriolanus would detain the ladies in his camp, the opinion of those who knew that they were secure in the honour of his character, prevailed, and the train set forth, in mourning habits, without any guard, in chariots provided by the consuls.

Coriolanus observing the melancholy procession, sent to inquire its meaning. When he heard that his mother, wife, and children, with the noblest of Roman matrons, were coming towards the camp, he resolved to deny their request with as firm a resolution as he had done that of less moving embassies, and called the chief of the Volscian officers around him to witness his firmness; but when they came into his presence, the feelings of nature, in spite of his determination, rushed back upon his heart, and he was melted to tears. He first embraced and supported his mother, then fondly revived the spirits of his wife, and caressed his children. Volumnia then took

advantage of this moment of tenderness to urge her request. She B.C. 490.  
entreated him, by the most sacred considerations—by his duty to  
that land where he had been nurtured in childhood—and by his  
gratitude for her maternal care, to withdraw his troops, and grant a  
peace for a year, during which period a solemn treaty might be  
agreed on and ratified. She assured him that if he would persist in  
ravaging and destroying the temples of his country, she would never  
live to be reproached with having given him birth, but he should pass to  
his unnatural triumph over the corpse of her who had borne and  
nourished him. He listened to this speech in silence, torn by con-  
tending emotions. At length Volumnia, perceiving that he was  
moved, added still more urgent supplications, besought him to  
recompense all her love by one sacrifice, which would, indeed, save  
him from eternal reproach, and breaking off with passionate sorrow,  
threw herself at his feet, together with his wife and sons. Affection  
then became triumphant: he raised his mother, and pressing her  
hand, said, in a solemn tone, “Oh, my mother! you have gained a  
victory, indeed, for your country, but it is to the ruin of your son!”  
He then took them apart, and after consenting to all that they  
required, suffered them to return. The news of their success was  
received at Rome with unbounded joy. Crowds came out to meet  
and conduct them to their houses; and the people were at a loss to  
find adequate expressions of their delight and gratitude. The  
temples were all thrown open as on a splendid victory. When the  
senate offered to their deliverers any recompense they would demand,  
they only requested permission to erect a temple to female fortune,  
which should afterwards be provided with sacrifices and priests from  
the public treasury. This modest request was readily granted, but  
the fathers insisted on defraying the whole expense from the national  
funds; upon which the ladies added a statue at their own cost,  
which was believed, by the superstitious, to have uttered an exclama-  
tion expressive of their heroic virtue. Plutarch, after a laborious  
investigation of this prodigy, rejects it as beyond belief; for, though  
he thinks the deities might suffer statues to perspire, or drop blood,  
in manifestation of their will, he cannot think they could make them  
utter articulate sounds without organs to pronounce them.

Consents to  
draw off his  
forces.

The day after the interview with his relatives, Coriolanus retired  
with his forces. Although he liberally divided all his spoils among  
the soldiers, it soon appeared that the apprehensions he had ex-  
pressed to Volumnia, when he granted her request, were not  
unfounded. Tullus, who had long since been led to repent of his  
generosity towards him, by envy of his superior fame, was resolved  
to make this abandonment of the siege the occasion of his downfall.  
When, therefore, Coriolanus arrived with the army at Antium, he  
charged him with treason against the people who had succoured  
him, and required him to resign his command preparatory to his

Coriolanus  
retires.

B.C. 490. trial. He replied that he was willing to lay all his conduct before the general assembly of the nation, from whom he had received his powers, but refused to yield to the sentence of the Antiates alone, over whom he knew that his rival had peculiar influence. At length, Tullus, not choosing to wait the legal decision even of his own countrymen, sent a summons to Coriolanus to appear in the public assembly and make his defence, and procured a number of his partizans to assassinate him before he could be heard. On the day appointed, the accuser set forth the charges against Coriolanus in glowing colours, and tried by every art to rouse the passions of the auditors against him. When he rose to reply, the greater number, however, were disposed to hear him with respect; but the friends of Tullus rushed forward to prevent him, exclaiming that he was a traitor, and overwhelmed him with stones till he fell. No sooner was it discovered that he had expired, than all present, even those who had contrived his destruction, were touched with the remembrance of his noble qualities, and filled with remorse for his murder. The Volsci honoured him with a splendid funeral, and built a magnificent tomb over his remains. Dionysius affirms, that on the arrival of the news of this catastrophe at Rome, all the people put on mourning; but Plutarch describes the Romans as receiving the intelligence without any indication either of sorrow or joy, but, granting the request of the women that they might wear mourning for the space of ten months, in token of regret for one whose death had been occasioned by yielding to their entreaties.

Assassinated  
by the  
Volscians.

Although both Dionysius and Plutarch represent Coriolanus as having thus fallen, on his return to Antium, Livy appears to have entertained a different opinion respecting his fate. He quotes Fabius, whom he speaks of as by far the most ancient of the Roman historians, as affirming that this hero lived to old age, and, in his declining years, as accustomed to complain that exile, always grievous, was most oppressive to the aged. From an expression of Cicero, in Lælius, it appears to have been his opinion that Coriolanus terminated his days by his own hand.


His  
character.

There is no hero of ancient Rome who fills so large a space in our imaginations as he whose life we have traced. He seems to have been cast in nature's grandest mould. The effects of his power in rallying defeated armies, striking panic into his foes, rushing from battle to battle, and carrying victory for ever with him, give us an impression of a form, voice, and energies, more than mortal. Nor are his moral qualities—his contempt for wealth—his generosity in rewarding his soldiers—his noble frankness and unshaken resolve, less worthy of admiration than his physical resources. To all these elements of a sublime character he added a filial reverence and a conjugal love, which seem to give the finishing grace to his more brilliant virtues. One fatal defect he had, which not only obscured

the lustre of his rare endowments and heroic deeds, but rendered them the instruments of his ruin. He wanted that genial wisdom which sees the excuses which exist for the deficiencies of less noble natures, and traces out the good and kindly feelings which are blended with the errors and the vices of men;—and the absence of this sweetener of greatness destroyed him. A man of less intellectual grandeur could better have afforded to be destitute of this nice lack of humanity. Qualities like his, required more than ordinary gentleness towards the failings of others, to prevent them from seeming to place him beyond the sphere in which men could claim kindred with their possessor. Holding the populace in contempt, he felt compelled, by his noble openness, to express his emotion, which they were unable to forgive. He was exempted, at least, from the faults of an ordinary ambition. He acted from the simple impulses which he never chose to disguise; careless of any approbation but that of his own thoughts, and almost rejecting any other, as if no one but himself and his mother were worthy even to applaud him. He was “himself alone.” He would have been the greatest and most perfect hero of antiquity, had he only learned to love and respect his species. B.C. 490.



[Rome seated on the Seven Hills.—From a large Brass of Vespasian.]



[Mount Palatine, East.—*Overbeke, les Restes de l'ancienne Rome.*]

## CHAPTER V.

### STRUGGLE FOR ASCENDANCY BETWEEN THE PATRICIANS AND PLEBEIANS.

B.C. 488 to B.C. 463.

B.C. 488. NOTWITHSTANDING Coriolanus had drawn off his troops, the Æqui and Volsci are said to have re-entered the Roman dominions, and nothing but a vehement quarrel between these two nations, saved the Romans from a dangerous war. A league was concluded with the Hernicans, B.C. 486, in the third consulship of Sp. Cassius, one of the most distinguished men of that age; and for a considerable period from this date the triple confederacy of Romans, Latins, and Hernicans acted together in the field, and divided proportionately the plunder and conquered lands.

Triple  
confederacy  
of the  
Romans,  
Latins, and  
Hernicans.

B.C. 485. In the year B.C. 485, the jealousy of the patricians caused the impeachment of Sp. Cassius, the proposer of the Agrarian law, before the assembly of the Curia; he was beheaded, and his house destroyed. This law, by which a fair division of the conquered lands had been proposed, was still (B.C. 481) evaded by the patricians.

From time to time the tribunes vainly attempted to carry it into effect; and the plebeians also equally failed in arraigning the consuls for opposing their wishes. B.C. 485.

The year B.C. 477 is remarkable for the complete destruction of the whole family of the Fabii and their dependants, who perished by an ambuscade of the Etruscans, with the exception of one son, who, from his tender age, had been left at Rome. This noble family had offered to carry on the war against Veii, at their own expense. Their offer was gladly accepted by the senate, and the Fabii, three hundred and six in number, with a band of clients four thousand strong, took post upon the banks of the Cremera. Here, rendered rash by repeated victories, they fell into the snares of the Etruscans. The latter following up this success, shortly afterwards defeated the Consul Titus Menenius, who had been sent against them, and got possession of the Janiculum; part of them even crossed the Tiber, and pillaged the whole of the Roman territory on the left bank of the river; but after repeated conflicts, attended with varied success, they were at last hemmed in by the Roman troops and entirely cut off. Destruction of the Gens Fabia. B.C. 477.

The struggle between the patricians and plebeians for political power, still continued as fiercely as ever. The latter had been obstinately and gradually working their way to considerable influence. Impeachments by the tribunes were occurring every year. In B.C. 475, Caius Servilius was arraigned for carelessly sacrificing the lives of the citizens in the attack on the Janiculum. Unable to check the spirit of investigation, the patricians basely attempted to intimidate their opponents by acts of violence, and scrupled not to cause the assassination of the tribune Genucius, for legitimately exercising his official power. The tribunes being by this deed awed into submission, a proclamation was forthwith issued for a levy of soldiers. According to some, it was the intention of the patricians to enlist the most illustrious plebeians, and to execute them in the field, or let them fall a prey to the enemy. While the levy was proceeding, lictors were sent by the consuls to seize a distinguished plebeian of the name of Volero Publilius, who had insisted that, having been a centurion, he could not be compelled to enlist as a common soldier. Publilius resisted, and drove back the lictors, and then throwing himself among a crowd of plebeians, called upon the tribunes for help. The tribunes continuing silent, he next turned to those of his own order, who, responding to his appeal, kept the lictors at bay. The young patricians hastened to the spot, and a rencounter between them and the plebeians took place, in which the former, after a short time, were driven from the forum. In the following year, (B.C. 472,) Volero, in spite of the great opposition of the patricians, was elected tribune. He forthwith promulgated an address to the people, declaring that they had a right to Increasing power of the tribunes. B.C. 475. B.C. 473. Volero elected tribune. B.C. 472.

deliberate on matters of state, on the motion of a tribune; and, moreover, that the tribunes ought no longer to be elected by the centuries, but by the tribes. These propositions were calculated to diminish materially the influence of the patrician order.

- The tribunes continued doggedly for the next four years to struggle on against the deep-seated abuses of the patricians; and the indignant plebeians, (B.C. 468,) defeated in their purpose to carry into effect the Agrarian law of Cassius, scorned to take part in the election of the consuls, who in this year were chosen by the patricians. The year B.C. 465, is memorable for the third campaign of the Romans against the Æqui. In the following year the town of Ectra declared war against the Romans, who at this time suffered fearfully from scantiness of provisions and a crowded population, as vast numbers of the country people had taken refuge within the city walls. This, with the summer heats, and the multitude of beasts driven into the city, brought on a pestilence, which carried off thousands of the population (B.C. 463). The virulence of this plague appears to have been great, for no active military operations are recorded during the two following years.

B.C. 468.  
B.C. 465.  
Ectra  
declares war,  
B.C. 464.

B.C. 463.  
Great plague  
at Rome.

To revive the glory of the Roman name was reserved for Cincinnatus, whose exploits and virtues will now be the subject of our narrative.





[Cincinnatus summoned from the Plough.—Rossi, *Gemme Antiche*.]

## CHAPTER VI.

### LUCIUS QUINTIUS CINCINNATUS.

FLOURISHED ABOUT B. C. 460.

LUCIUS QUINTIUS CINCINNATUS, who, of all the ancient Romans, B. C. 460. has left behind him the most spotless fame, does not appear to have taken any prominent part in the affairs of the state until past the meridian of life. We do not find him mentioned in the repeated disputes respecting the Agrarian laws, which Cassius had first enkindled, and which were not extinguished by the violent death to which they brought their author. Equally passive does he appear to have been, during the violent contests respecting the conduct of the consuls to Volero, and the law for substituting the *Comitia Tributa* for the *Comitia Curiata*, in the choice of popular officers proposed by that spirited plebeian. During all the earlier struggles between the senate and the people, he seems to have declined taking a decided part, although believed to favour the patricians. From the nature of his influence, when afterwards called to active exertion in the service of his country, it appears that his daily life and deportment were distinguished by excellences which all parties agreed in revering.



B.C. 460. While the consuls were absent from Rome on an expedition against the Æqui and Volsci, whom they completely overthrew, a most important proposal was made by Terentillus, one of the tribunes: he complained, in the assemblies of the people, that the rights of individuals were protected by no certain laws, since, with the exception of a few sacred books, to which none but the patricians had access, no written regulations existed, but all depended on the judgment of the consuls. He therefore demanded that five men, the most worthy of the office, should be chosen to frame a code, in pursuance of which the magistrates should be compelled to administer justice. The senate, feeling that the adoption of this measure would greatly limit the powers they at present exercised, vehemently opposed it, and, by the address of Q. Fabius, the tribunes were prevailed on to defer its discussion till the return of the consuls. When, however, Lucretius and Veturius had enjoyed their triumph, and their successors, P. Volumnius and S. Sulpicius, had entered on the discharge of their duties, the tribunes unanimously pressed for the speedy compilation of settled laws, and required that ten of the most venerable citizens should be deputed to frame them. The patricians seem to have resorted to superstition in order to terrify the people from their design, as strange prodigies are said to have intervened; and, when these failed of success, they pretended that the Æqui and Volsci were about to invade the territories of Rome, at which the tribunes did not conceal their derision. Violent contests frequently took place in the public assemblies, where the most daring of the patrician youth, with no small degree of pride and imprudence, opposed the plebeians. The most distinguished of these was Cæso, son of Cincinnatus, a man of great corporal strength, courage, and eloquence, who exerted all these faculties with equal zeal in opposition to the tribunes. By his acts of violence, he rendered himself so obnoxious to the populace, that they insisted on his being brought to trial. Upon the day appointed for the investigation, he was defended by his uncle, F. Quintius, and his father, neither of whom attempted either to deny or excuse the acts of impetuosity of which he was accused; but the former attempted to procure his pardon by setting forth his noble qualities and early prowess in the field, and the latter by imploring the people to treat the errors of youth with compassion, and to absolve his son as a favour to him, whom none of them had reason to accuse. The assembly, who felt the deepest respect for the virtues of Cincinnatus, were inclined by these entreaties to acquit his son; but Virginius replied, that he had no doubt the father was himself ignorant of the atrocities of the man for whom he was pleading, which were only heightened by his having disregarded the example of such a parent. He then called on a person in attendance, named Volscius, who affirmed that Cæso, returning from an entertainment with riotous companions, insulted his brother; and,

Conduct of  
Cæso, son of  
Cincinnatus.

receiving a merited retort, proceeded to strike him to the ground, and so bruised him, when in a state of imperfect recovery from the disease then prevalent, that his death was the consequence of his injuries. On hearing this charge, the people rushed on the party accused, to kill him, without hearing his defence, but were restrained by the interposition of the consuls. Virginius demanded that he should be secured in prison till he could be brought to trial on this accusation, which affected his life; but the other tribunes proposed, that on giving security for his appearance, he should be suffered to remain at large during the interval. Ten sureties were required, and the senate fixed the sum for which each should be bound at 3,000 asses. This security being given, on the first occasion such a proceeding took place at Rome, Cæso withdrew, and the same evening retired into Etruria, not choosing to hazard the event of a trial. As the sureties were then called on for the sums which they had engaged to pay in case he refused to appear, Cincinnatus resolved they should not suffer for their kindness to his son, sold the chief part of his little estate, and retired, with virtuous constancy, to a small cottage on the banks of the Tiber, where, with his own hands, he cultivated the small plot of ground which this act of justice had left him.

Paternal  
sacrifice of  
Cincinnatus.

While Cincinnatus continued in this honourable retirement, contentions still divided the city. The tribunes continued vehemently to demand the laws which should define the rights of the people and the limits of the judicial power, and were resolutely opposed by the young patricians, whom the exile of Cæso seemed rather to inflame than to terrify. Thus baffled, the popular officers had recourse to various stratagems to effect their purpose; they affirmed, that Cæso was actually concealed in the city, ready to strike some blow against their rights, and even, according to Dionysius, forged a letter, warning them of a plot by some of the Roman senators and knights, to murder all who had exerted themselves in behalf of the commons, and sought, by this absurd device, to procure a decree from the senate, giving them judicial powers against the conspirators. This last incident, however, is not alluded to by Livy, and has all the appearance of fiction. While the contentions between the orders of the state remained unappeased, the senate were thrown into the greatest alarm, by the bold and sudden seizure of the capitol by a Sabine, named Herdonius, at the head of a numerous band of outlaws and slaves. This desperate chieftain, having put to the sword all who refused to join him, except a few who escaped to give the alarm, marched into the city, proclaiming liberty to the slaves, demanding the recall of the exiles, and threatening to bring the Sabines and Veientes to assist him, in case the Romans should oppose the execution of his purposes. The patricians were struck with dismay, since, on the one hand, they dared not arm the populace, and,

Enterprise of  
Herdonius.

B.C. 460. on the other, expected the states who yet smarted beneath their defeats, would take this opportunity to obtain vengeance. A rising among the slaves, who had often too much cause for retaliation, was also to be expected. In the mean time the tribunes increased the confusion, by loudly declaring the whole invasion an artifice projected by the senate, in order to prevent the people from obtaining the laws which they were determined to exact. In this exigency, the consul Valerius rushed into the forum, and passionately conjured the people to forget their intestine divisions until the temples of the gods and the sanctuaries of their fathers were recovered from the foe; and solemnly demanded that they should follow him to this sacred enterprise, on pain of being treated as the open enemies of Rome. To all these remonstrances, they at first answered only by repeating their demand. At length the earnest persuasions of the consuls prevailed, and the citizens agreed to enlist for the recovery of the citadel, on the promises of Valerius that he would never interfere with the popular assemblies. Before, however, the great effort was made to expel the sacrilegious intruders, an army from Tusculum appeared in the city to aid the Romans in their peril, and joined the ranks of the citizens. The combined forces then with great ardour forced their way up the ascent, and after a sanguinary struggle, in which Valerius was slain, retook the capitol by storm. Herdonius fell in the contest, the Tusculans received the thanks of their allies, and the temples were purified by solemn lustrations.

After the deliverance of the state from this danger, the contests between the senate and the people were revived, as Claudius seemed unwilling to perform the engagements of his late colleague, and suffer the proposition of the Agrarian law. The patricians earnestly desired that Cincinnatus should be chosen to the consulate in the room of Valerius, and, by great exertions, succeeded. The new consul, relying on the veneration felt for the austere simplicity of his character, began his administration with vigour. He reproached, with equal freedom, the irresolution of the senate and the turbulence of the people. "It is your fault, O fathers!" exclaimed he, in addressing the senate, "that the same tribunes, year after year, bear absolute sway over the distracted city, as in a house given up to ruin, by their speeches and their crimes. With my son Cæso, all valour, all constancy, all the qualities which can adorn youth in war or in peace, have been utterly banished from Rome. You suffer the most hollow and seditious talkers, for a second and a third year, by the basest arts, to rule with the authority of kings. What! does A. Virginius deserve less punishment for not being in the capitol, than Herdonius for seizing it? If we look upon his conduct rightly, he merits severer vengeance. Herdonius was, at least, an open foe, who warned you to take up arms, whilst the tribune took away our weapons, and exposed us naked and defenceless to exiles and slaves. Why—with

Cincinnatus  
is chosen  
consul.

Speech of  
Cincinnatus.

reverence for Claudius and the deceased Valerius I ask it—why did you march to expel your foes from the capitol before you had driven those bitterer enemies from the forum? How are we disgraced before earth and heaven, that when a leader of exiles and slaves was in the citadel, when the sanctuaries of Jove were polluted, when all things dear and sacred were given up to profanation, the Tusculans should have been aroused before us!—that it should be matter of doubt whether a Tusculan general or the Roman consuls wrested our citadel from the invaders!—that we, who once would not suffer the Latins to arm in their own defence, should now, but for the spontaneous assistance of these Latins, have been taken captive and blotted out from nations! Is this, O tribunes, the succour you afford the people, to give them up unarmed to be slaughtered by their foes? What! if one of the lowest of your plebeians—of those whom you have broken off from the rest of the commonwealth, and formed into a distinct order—if one of these should tell you that his house was surrounded by an armed force, you would instantly afford him help: and yet, when Jupiter, the first and best of beings, was encircled with troops of the basest slaves, you thought him unworthy of your assistance! You would surround your own persons with an inviolable sanctity, which you deny to the Gods. And do you think, immersed as you are in crimes against man and God, that you shall this year obtain the law you would extort? If this could be endured, accursed would be the day on which I was made consul; more accursed and calamitous than that on which Valerius fell. No! my colleague and I will lead our forces against the Æqui and the Volsci, since, from what cause I know not, the deities are more propitious to us in war than in peace. We had better have merely to imagine what we should have endured from these nations, had they known that our capitol was in the possession of a desperate band, than actually to feel it.”

The senate began to take courage at this display of firm resolution in the consul; but the tribunes treated him with derision, and asked whence the soldiers would be procured for the campaign, since they were resolved to prevent a levy. “We need none,” was the prompt reply of Cincinnatus; “the troops who enlisted under Valerius for the recovery of the capitol, are bound by a solemn oath to assemble at the command of the consuls, and never to lay down their arms without their permission. On the obligation of this oath, we command every soldier by whom it was taken to meet us to-morrow at the lake Regillus.” This line of conduct on the part of the consuls threw the tribunes into confusion, though they endeavoured to prevail on the people to evade the oath, by contending that, as Cincinnatus was not consul at the time when it was taken, it could not bind them to obey his orders. The consciences of the people were not, however, thus to be satisfied; and so great was the respect with which they regarded the sanctity of an oath, that they aban-

Effect of his address.

Assembles a powerful army.

B.C. 460. doned all thought of setting aside the orders of the consuls by any other means than that of prevailing on them by concession, not to force them to a winter campaign. At length a compromise was agreed to, whereby the tribunes waived the proposition of their law for the year, and the consuls laid aside their design of calling the army to the field. After this, the tribunes, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the senate, who passed a decree, declaring it inconsistent with the public welfare that the same individuals should, year after year, fill magisterial offices, were re-elected by the people. The patricians then, that they might stand on an equality with the commons, proposed to continue Cincinnatus in the consular authority for another year. But this the virtuous senator refused, with expressions of indignation and disdain. "Can I wonder," said he, "that your authority is set at nought by the people, when you yourselves destroy it? What! because the commons have broken your decree by continuing their magistrates in office, must you set it at defiance, that you may not be outdone in temerity? It is more pitiable folly to trifle with your own laws than those made by others. You, conscript fathers, are imitating the inconstant mob that you despise, and following, instead of setting an example. But, for myself, I will not stoop to mimic the tribunes, nor suffer myself a second time to be chosen. And I admonish you, C. Claudius, to drive away this licentious spirit from Rome; and rest assured that, so far from offending me by opposing my nomination, you will truly increase my renown, and preserve me from that envy which I must endure, were I to be re-elected consul." The senate, convinced by this address, immediately decreed that no one should nominate Cincinnatus on the approaching election for the consulate, and that, if any one persisted in offering his suffrage in his favour, the vote should be rejected. Cincinnatus then once more retired into private life, after having, by the firm consistency of his actions, obtained the esteem even of those against whom his efforts were directed.

Refuses to  
be re-elected  
Consul.

In the succeeding consulate of Q. Fabius Vibulanus and L. Cornelius Maluginensis, war again broke out between the Æqui and Volsci and the Romans. While Fabius with an army, of which one-third only were Romans and two-thirds Hernici and Latins, completely defeated the main army of the foe near Antium, a detachment of the Æqui took possession of the Tusculan citadel by surprise. This incident caused the war to be protracted for several months; but, at length, famine compelled the besieged to submit, who were forced to pass under the yoke, and were afterwards cut off by Fabius. The other consul, who had remained at Rome, then marched into the enemy's country, and both he and his colleague returned laden with spoils. After these escapes, a treaty was concluded with the Æqui, by which they were left in possession of

their cities, on condition of paying tribute to their conquerors, and furnishing them with troops when they should require their services. During this time, the tribunes did not openly bring forward their measure, but procured themselves to be a fourth time elected to the office. In the next year, when L. Minucius and C. Nautius were consuls, they resolved to propose the Agrarian law, but consented to allow two months to the consuls, during which period they might state fairly to the people the objections they entertained against it. Before this interval had expired, the Æqui revolted, and the Sabines invaded the territories of the republic at the head of a numerous army. Nautius marched against the latter, and not only compelled them to retire, but followed them into their own domains, and obtained considerable plunder. But his colleague, Minucius, who was sent to oppose the Æqui, met with very different success. Either from terror, or rashness, he suffered himself to be completely surrounded by the enemy, so that he had no means of escaping or of obtaining provisions, and anticipated nothing but an unconditional surrender. When the news of his critical situation arrived at Rome, the senate resolved on the appointment of a dictator, who might take such strong and decided measures as the exigency of the case demanded. Nautius, who had been sent for on the news, immediately proposed that Cincinnatus should be chosen for this arduous service, and his nomination was confirmed with ardour by the unanimous voice of the senators.

Disasters of  
the Romans.

The man thus selected to the absolute control of the state was, at this time, engaged in cultivating with his own hands, the little remnant of his patrimonial estate. When the deputies, sent to apprise him of the decision of the senate, arrived at his farm beyond the Tiber, they found him either following the plough, or digging a ditch with a spade, and covered with perspiration occasioned by toil. After the common salutations had passed, they requested him to put on his toga and hear their commission, which they prayed might be attended with favourable auspices. Having eagerly inquired whether all was well in the city, he desired his wife Racilia, to bring his toga from the cottage; and, after wiping the dust from his face, attended to their errand. They informed him of the peril into which the army of Minucius had fallen, saluted him dictator, and entreated him immediately to accompany them to Rome, and prepare for the execution of his high functions. He yielded directly to their wishes, and was conveyed across the river in a vessel despatched by the senate to receive him. On landing upon the opposite shore, he was received with great joy by his three sons, his intimate friends, and a long train of patricians, and preceded by four-and-twenty lictors to his abode. The commons ran in crowds to see him, but scarcely looked on him with cordial affection, as they

Cincinnatus  
called from  
his farm to  
the  
Dictatorship.

B.C. 460. remembered his former sternness towards them, though they were awe-stricken by the majesty of his virtues.

Repairs to  
the Forum.

Early in the morning the new dictator repaired to the forum, and with characteristic discrimination, appointed for his master of the horse a patrician named L. Tarquinius, who was esteemed the bravest of the Roman youths, though from his great poverty, he had always served as a foot soldier. With this associate, he mounted the rostrum, commanded a suspension of all business, and of all judicial proceedings throughout the city, and ordered all who were capable of bearing arms to attend him before sun-set in the Campus Martius, each with provisions for five days, ready dressed, and twelve stakes for a palisade. He also directed every man whose age rendered him incapable of active service, to prepare the food for the soldier who lived nearest to him, while he employed the interval in procuring stakes and completing his armour. These commands were implicitly obeyed, and the Roman youths having taken stakes wherever they could be found, without requiring permission, met the dictator at the place appointed, in the evening. The arrangements for the hurried march were soon made, and the troops, completely equipped, left the city in good order, commanded by Cincinnatus and Tarquinius. One general desire to deliver their fellow citizens, and obtain vengeance on their foes, animated the whole. The leaders incited the troops to hasten on, by reminding them that a Roman consul and his army were in a state of siege, that they had been three days invested, and that a night, even an hour, might determine their fate beyond the power of redemption. The soldiers, at the same time, called on the ensigns to proceed faster, and incited their comrades to follow them. By these exertions they arrived, by midnight, at the Algidus, within a small distance from the enemy.

Marches to  
the relief of  
the Consul.

His victory  
over the  
Æqui.

B.C. 458.

Cincinnatus having desired his army to halt, and taken the best view of the camp of the Æqui which the darkness of the night permitted, drew up the lines so as to enclose the trenches of the foes, in the same manner as they had done those of Minucius. The soldiers, then, by his commands, raised a loud shout, and, in good order, began to dig a trench, and raise up a pallisade before them. The Æqui, finding a new enemy had arrived, and were endeavouring to protect themselves by fortifications, hastened to prevent them from completing the work, and hoped to fall on them in confusion. But, in the mean time, the shout of the dictator's forces had reached the camp of Minucius, where it was not only heard with joy, as the signal of approaching deliverance, but was considered as the cry of actual battle. Encouraged, therefore, by the belief that his countrymen were charging the besiegers from the other side, the consul hastened, on his part, to attack them, and thus kept them engaged during the night, while the entrenchments of the dictator were

completed. At day break, Cincinnatus led his forces from the lines B.C. 458. to actual combat, while the consular army continued to harass the foe. The Æqui, finding themselves entirely surrounded, threw down their arms and entreated the conquerors to spare them. Cincinnatus, after ordering them to evacuate the city of Corbio, and to send him their general, Gracchus Clælius, and their chief officers, in chains, informed them that he had no desire to take their lives, but would suffer them to depart after passing under the yoke, in token of their subjection. To this hard condition they assented, and two spears being fixed in the ground, and a third laid across them, the whole army passed beneath this symbol of disgrace, and retired without further injury.

When the dictator met the troops whose deliverance he had thus happily accomplished, he reproved them in severe terms for suffering themselves to be thus encircled, and addressed their leader in terms of peculiar severity. He gave all the booty to his own soldiers, absolutely refusing to the consular bands any share of the spoils, and commanded Minucius to abdicate the authority of consul, of which he had shown himself unworthy, and remain with the legions in the capacity of lieutenant-general. This command seems to have been obeyed without a murmur, and Quintus Fabius soon after arrived from Rome, to supply the place of the unfortunate consul. Indeed, so great was the influence of the character of Cincinnatus, and so deep the sense of his justice as well as valour, that the battalions whom he had reproved and excluded from all share in the plunder, presented him with a crown of gold, and, on his departure, saluted him with the title of Preserver. On his return to the city, a triumph is decreed a triumph. was decreed him, which was celebrated with all the rude magnificence of that early period. His chariot was preceded by the military standards and the captive chiefs, and followed by his victorious army, laden with their spoils. All the citizens gave themselves up to joy; in the streets were spread entertainments which were gladdened by festive songs, and concluded with dancing. On the same day Mamilius, the Tusculan general, who had so nobly assisted in recovering the capitol from Herdonius, was presented with the freedom of Rome. According to Livy, before Cincinnatus resigned his office, he caused Volscius, the accuser of his son Cæso, to be brought to trial for perjury, when he was convicted and banished to Lanuvium; but this circumstance seems contrary to the tenor of other historians. Certain it is, that though the dictator had been chosen for six months, he laid down his authority at the Again retires to private life. termination of sixteen days, and hastened to resume his daily labours in the cultivation of his little farm, from which he had been taken.

After the acts of this short dictatorship, we find no mention of Cincinnatus in the Roman story for nearly twenty years. Although this period was eventful, comprising fresh contests between the



B.C. 458. senate and the people—the appointment of the Decemviri—the establishment of the laws of the twelve tables—the tyranny of Appius Claudius and its tragical close, on the death of Virginia by the hand of her father—the establishment of military tribunes—and the appointment of a censorship, he does not appear to have taken any active share, either in foreign or domestic politics. Age stole on him in his retreat, without impairing his energies or diminishing the veneration and gratitude of his country. At length, he was once more called from his farm to assist the state by a last effort of his decision and virtue.

B.C. 439. In the year B.C. 439, when Proculus Geganius Macerinus and Lucius Menenius Lanatus were consuls, Rome was afflicted with a terrible famine. Each party of the state accused the other of having given occasion to this calamity; the people attributing it to negligence in the consuls, and want of foresight in the senate; and the patricians imputing it to the indolence of the people, who chose rather to spend their time in revelling and listening to the inflammatory harangues of the tribunes, than in tilling the lands. At length Lucius Minucius, a man of great integrity and zeal, was appointed, by the consent of both parties, to procure and superintend the distribution of provisions for the relief of the distressed citizens. His endeavours for a long time appeared fruitless. The misery which had been a little relieved by a small supply of corn from Etruria, appeared daily to increase. Many of the people, in despair, threw themselves into the Tiber, in order to avoid the horrors of a lingering death by hunger. Soon, however, the cause which had frustrated the efforts of Minucius became apparent. Spurius Mælius, a Roman of great wealth, of the equestrian order, had conceived the idea of raising himself, by means of the distresses of his country, to the supreme power. For this purpose, at the beginning of the scarcity, he had bought up all the grain he could procure in the neighbouring provinces, and, when the wants of the people were the most urgent, distributed his stores, with great profusion, to those whom he thought likely to favour his designs. At first he appears only to have aimed at the consulate; but, as he found that he could not obtain this dignity, except in open defiance of the patricians, he resolved on aspiring at once to be absolute master of the state, which he thought would require scarcely greater energies, or a more daring spirit of enterprise. When, therefore, the elections for the new consuls arrived, he does not appear publicly to have advanced his pretensions, and Titus Quintius Capitolinus, brother of Cincinnatus, and Agrippa Menenius, were chosen. Mælius continuing to acquire fresh popularity by his largesses, prepared for exerting his influence to attain his object, by collecting arms at his house, and holding frequent assemblies there of all on whom he could prevail to favour his purposes. At this time Minucius, who had long watched his proceed-

Ambitious  
aims of  
Mælius.

ings, for which the nature of his office afforded him opportunities, acquainted the senate with his conspiracy, and even charged the tribunes of the people with having been bribed to assist him in reducing his country to bondage. On this disclosure, the senate began to censure the consuls of the past year, and those who were then in office, for their remissness in permitting a plot of so dangerous a kind to assume so formidable a character before its suppression. To this reproach Quintius replied, that the blame ought not to be attached to the magistrates, but to the laws, which limited their power, since any steps they could take against a popular traitor might be frustrated by an appeal to the people. He, therefore, earnestly recommended the appointment of a dictator, who would have power to dispense with the laws, as the only means by which the plans of Mælius could be overthrown, and the offender brought to justice, and advised the election of his brother Cincinnatus, as the senator best fitted to meet and overcome the danger. Universal approbation followed this proposal; but, when the wishes of the senate were communicated to Cincinnatus, he entreated that he might be allowed to decline the office, as being now past eighty years of age, he feared he should prove too feeble for the performance of his duties. When, however, he was assured that the citizens had far more confidence in his wisdom and courage than in that of all other patriots, he consented to give them his services; and having implored the gods that they would not permit the commonwealth to suffer through the infirmities of her guardian, once more left his cottage and appeared at Rome.

Is again  
appointed  
Dictator.

No sooner was he appointed dictator, that he chose C. Servilius Ahala, as his master of the horse, and actively prepared to crush the designs of Mælius. He placed guards in all parts of the city, as if he expected the invasion of a foreign enemy. In the morning he repaired to the forum and while the people were inquiring with astonishment, what new danger had caused the appointment of a dictator, and called forth a man in extreme old age, to direct the state, he ordered his master of the horse to send to Mælius, and command him to appear in his presence. Struck with terror at the idea of confronting the virtuous dictator, Mælius entreated the protection of his friends to cover his retreat, and when an officer laid hold on him to compel his obedience, they rescued him by force from his hands. He then ran through the forum, entreating the people to defend him, who was persecuted by a senatorial conspiracy because he had relieved the wants of the commons in their greatest need. While he spoke these words, Servilius Ahala rushed on him, and slew him; and then, returning to the tribunal of Cincinnatus, sprinkled with the blood of the slain, he reported that Mælius, having refused to obey the summons, and attempted to raise an insurrection, he had summarily executed justice upon him. "You have done

Mælius  
slain by  
Ahala

B.C. 438.

B.C. 438. bravely Servilius; you have saved the state," was the prompt reply of the dictator.

As some of the people murmured at the sudden destruction of Mælius, Cincinnatus convened a public assembly, and there developed the treasons of the slain, and justified the conduct of his officer. He affirmed, that even had Mælius been innocent of the offences imputed to him, he would have been justly killed for setting at nought the august authority by which he was commanded to appear at a tribunal, where he would have met with an impartial trial. He set before the people, in glowing colours, the offence of which the traitor had been guilty, in attempting to enslave a city which had forcibly banished its kings; which had seen the sons of its first deliverer put ignominiously to death, for conspiring to restore the regal authority, and had sent Collatinus into exile merely because he bore the name of the family who had occupied the throne. He reminded them of the fall of Cassius, and the Decemviri, for striving to establish tyranny, and represented the deeper dye of his offence, who, without the pretensions of birth, or high exploits, and from the mere recommendation of wealth, hoped to obtain absolute power. He declared the crime to be of so aggravated and monstrous a kind, that nothing which had been used to accomplish it, ought to be permitted to survive: and therefore decreed, that the house where the conspirators had assembled, should be destroyed, and the goods which had been amassed to purchase empire, forfeited. This order was carried into prompt execution. The house of Mæhus was levelled with the ground, his goods sold, and the proceeds given to the treasury; while the corn found on his premises was sold to the people at a very low price by Minucius. This officer, who had contributed so much to the destruction of the conspiracy, was rewarded, according to some writers, with an ox with gilded horns, and to others, with a statue. His duty thus performed, Cincinnatus once more laid down his powers, and retired to spend his few remaining days in honourable repose. We are unacquainted with the particulars of his death, which was probably gentle. His vigour, both of body and mind, preserved by a course of healthful labour and an unsullied conscience, seems to have been undiminished till his long life was nearly concluded. If he inclined too decidedly to the senatorial party against the plebeians, he erred only from honest principle. His character, if somewhat hard, inflexible, and severe, stands almost alone in ancient annals for venerable simplicity, calm decision, and an energy of virtue, which alone had power to inspire the despairing with confidence, or abash the most resolute in their crimes.



[Death of Virginia.—From a Picture by Fuger of Vienna.]

## CHAPTER VII.

### APPIUS CLAUDIUS.

B C. 451—447.

WE have now to survey Rome under the government of a Decemvirate, or "the board of ten," in which the plebeians insisted that their order should be represented by five. To this proposal, however, the patricians would not consent; the decemvirs were, therefore, taken exclusively from the latter body. What abuse they made of their power, will be seen in the history of Appius Claudius, which we now proceed to relate.

Appius Claudius, the decemvir, was the son of that Appius Claudius whose hostility to the power of the tribunes made him a favourite with the senate, and odious to the populace. His son, after having constantly maintained a firm attachment to the patrician interests, and a resistance to popular encroachment as severe and unbending as that by which his father and grandfather were distinguished, seemed suddenly to abandon the principles of his family, and to court popularity by promoting a measure for which the popular party was then extremely urgent. This was the nomination of *ten magistrates*, called, from their number, *decemviri*.

Appius  
Claudius.

B.C. 451.

Nomination  
of the  
Decemviri,opposed by  
the  
Patricians,promoted by  
the Consuls  
elect,

and carried.

Appius  
Claudius and  
nine others  
appointed,

About ten years before the period of which we are now speaking, Caius Terentillus Arsa, one of the tribunes of the people, had proposed, after a vehement declamation against the despotic power of the consuls, to commission *five men* of unexceptionable character, to draw up a code of laws by which the consuls should in future be obliged to regulate their decisions. This proposition, which seemed the more unobjectionable, as the tribunes only demanded that a portion of "the legislative body" should be chosen from the plebeians, gave great umbrage to the patricians. The younger part of that body even proceeded to acts of violence, and led on by Cæso, son of Cincinnatus, dispersed the assembly of the people, when on the point of passing the law. A variety of favourable circumstances, however, concurred to strengthen the popular cause, and after many ineffectual attempts on the part of the plebeians to carry their point, and many struggles on the part of the patricians to frustrate the design, it was at length finally agreed, that commissioners, to be chosen by the senate, should be deputed to Athens, for the purpose of selecting such of the laws and institutions of that celebrated republic, as might appear fitted for the adoption of the Romans. Upon the return of these commissioners, the people were naturally clamorous for the nomination of the magistrates who were to draw up the code that was to be compiled from the materials thus collected. The consuls, however, still resisted; and the tribunes, in consequence, appealed to the consuls elect, Appius Claudius, our present subject, and Titus Genucius. To their surprise, no less than to that of the patrician body, the former immediately stood forward, a strenuous advocate for the measure. Genucius likewise declared himself in its favour, though not so zealously as Appius, and by their joint entreaties they prevailed upon one of the consuls to assemble the senate for the purpose of nominating the decemvirs. Notwithstanding a considerable opposition, the eloquence or intrigues of Appius prevailed, and the senate passed a decree for the appointment of ten magistrates who were to be invested, for one whole year, with the supreme power, and supersede all the ordinary magistracies. During the reign of the decemvirs, the authority of the consuls, tribunes, ædiles, and quæstors was to cease; and an almost unlimited power was vested in those newly created legislators. But the senate, when the time fixed for the election of the decemvirs had arrived, successfully resisted a demand of the tribunes, for the admission of candidates from among the plebeians; and of the ten who were chosen in a full assembly of the people, the first was Appius himself, now a great favourite with the people, as might easily be conjectured from the active part which he had taken in promoting this measure.

At the commencement of their reign, the decemvirs conciliated the affection of their fellow citizens, by the utmost moderation and courteousness; and none of them more than Appius, whose former seve-

ity and reserve were favourably contrasted with his present mildness and affability. Before the year had expired, the work for which these magistrates had been appointed was completed. Their laws were engraved on ten tables of oak, fixed up in the forum for the inspection of all, and ratified by the unanimous assent of the whole Roman people. But as it was thought by many leading men in the state, that laws sufficient to fill two more tables ought to be added; the government of the decemvirs was continued for another year, and senators ordinarily most hostile to the pretensions of the people, condescended on this occasion to court their favour by every artifice, in hopes of being chosen at the election of decemvirs for the ensuing year. Appius did this so openly, that he excited the jealousy of his colleagues; they appointed him in consequence president of the Comitia, or Assembly of the people, who were to elect the new magistrates, with the intention of excluding him from the number of candidates. But by boldly taking a step upon which they supposed he would not venture, he effected the purpose which they were anxious to frustrate.

Contrary to every rule of decency, according to the sentiments of the Romans, he named himself as the first candidate, and immediately obtained the suffrages of the people. He went, also, still further; and in contradiction to the known principles of his family, and almost of the whole body of patricians, named three candidates from among the plebeians. So far from being defeated by the scheme of his adversaries, it only served to increase his power and influence; for he artfully availed himself of his right as president to nominate the candidates, not only for the purpose of introducing his friends, but of excluding all those whom he could not control. The consequences of his success were soon felt. The new decemvirs, as soon as they entered upon their office, assumed the authority and ensigns of royalty. Their administration was now as unjust and oppressive as that of their immediate predecessors had been equitable and liberal; and the people, to whom these tyrants owed their power of doing mischief, were the marked objects of their contempt and hatred. When the period for which they had been elected had expired, instead of assembling the people, and proceeding to a new election, they produced the two additional tables, which, added to the others, completed the TWELVE, which were ever after held in such estimation by the Romans, as to be considered by them as the basis of all their jurisprudence. The decemvirs now threw off the mask, and boldly retained the power intrusted to them, in defiance both of the people and the senate.

The discontent prevailing in Rome raised the hopes of its enemies; the Sabines and the Æqui seized the opportunity to make an incursion upon the Roman territory. It was therefore necessary to assemble an army; but the more respectable members of the senate,

B.C. 451.

and  
re-elected.Decemvirs  
complete  
the Tables of  
the Laws,and become  
unjust and  
oppressive.

B.C. 449.

B.C. 449. when convened by the decemvirs, in order to decree a levy of the troops, refused to accede to their proposal, till the consular government should be restored. The arts and creatures of Claudius, however, succeeded in silencing his opponents. A levy was at length made, and this new triumph only increased the insolence and audacity of the decemvirs. Appius himself more especially denounced those who retired from the city, in order to be no longer witnesses of his tyranny, as enemies of the republic, and enriched his own partisans by the confiscation of their property.

Conduct of  
Claudius.

B.C. 448. The war against the Æqui was carried on with no advantage; for the troops, who had been levied by the sole authority of the decemvirs, were so ill-disposed to their leaders and to the persons in power, that they made no serious resistance to the enemy.

His vices the  
cause of his  
subsequent  
ruin.

Story of  
Virginia.

Appius, in the mean while, who remained with another of his colleagues to overawe the city, was at length hurried by his uncontrolled appetites into one of those excesses, which at length drew down upon him the vengeance which his tyranny had long merited. He conceived a violent passion for a very beautiful girl, whom he had casually seen. Her name was Virginia; her father, Virginius, had distinguished himself in the army on several occasions; and had promised his daughter to Icilius, who had been one of the tribunes of the people. Appius was unable to gratify his passion by a legitimate union, not merely because he was married, and had not a sufficient plea for divorcing his wife; but also because Virginia was a plebeian, and he had himself passed a law prohibiting any alliance between noble and ignoble families.

Thwarted by these obstacles, he devised a scheme the most atrocious; he employed one of his clients, M. Claudius, to seize upon Virginia, and claimed her as a daughter of one of his slaves, and therefore his property. The populace, roused by her shrieks, rescued her from the hands of M. Claudius and his abandoned followers; but when cited to appear before the tribunal of the decemvir, which she could not refuse, Appius, who was alone upon the bench, would have immediately adjudged her to the claimant, had not the people cried out with one voice, that her relations ought first to be heard. The decemvir dared not openly to resist compliance, but, by an artful evasion of the acknowledged law, contrived to place her in the hands of his own creature till her reputed father could return from the camp to make his claims good. The object of this evasion was too manifest to escape observation. The women present surrounded Virginia, and seemed resolved to shield her from the decemvir, when Icilius, to whom she was promised, rushing forward, threw his arms round her and called upon the gods to protect her innocence. It was in vain that Appius ordered his lictors to seize upon Icilius. Finding it inexpedient to attempt force, he had recourse to artifice—resigned Virginia to the care of her friends and

relations, and made Icilius give security for her appearance before the tribunal on the following day. It was then that Virginius, with all the dignity of conscious and injured innocence, appealed to his fellow citizens against the claim of his adversary. Icilius inveighed, with all the vehemence which a tumult of passion could inspire, against the tyrannical proceedings of the decemvir; and the silent tears of the women who accompanied Virginia, contributed more than even the powerful eloquence of her father and her lover, to move the compassion and rouse the indignant feelings of the multitude.

Appius on entering the forum, was astonished to find Virginius there, for he had spared no pains to prevent the possibility of his appearance at the appointed time. His project, however, was too well prepared to be easily disconcerted. The evidence of the false witnesses, suborned by Claudius, was completely parried by the unexceptionable testimony adduced by Virginius; but when the spectators were looking for a decree in his favour, the decemvir declared that, as guardian of Claudius, he had long known the facts alleged by him, but had suppressed the mention of them, as unnecessary, unless his ward should wish to put in his claim. He therefore, on that ground, set aside the evidence produced by Virginius, and adjudged his daughter to the other claimant. Her father again made an appeal to the multitude, whose cries and shouts showed their willingness to serve him; but the imperious authoritative tone of the judge, and perhaps the number of his known adherents, overawed them. Virginia was left alone, abandoned, as it seemed, to the worst designs of her enemy.

Her father, as his last and only resource, assuming a milder tone, entreated the decemvir at least to allow him to question her nurse in presence of his supposed daughter, that he might be completely undeceived as to her birth. This request Appius readily granted, and Virginius, taking the woman aside to a shop in the neighbourhood, seized a butcher's knife, as he passed along, and plunging it into Virginia's bosom—"Receive," he said, "thy liberty, my daughter, by this the only method by which I can now ensure it to thee!" and turning towards the tribunal, he added—"By this blood, Appius, I devote thy head to the infernal deities!" He repelled the lictors, who endeavoured to seize him, with the weapon reeking with his daughter's blood, and rushing through the crowd, made his way to the camp. The other friends and relations of Virginia remained near her body, and excited the sympathy of the multitude.

This tragic event led shortly afterwards to the subversion of the decemviral usurpation; for the troops, animated by the heroism of Virginius, and already irritated against their oppressive rulers, seized their ensigns, and having marched back in a body to Rome, entrenched themselves on the Aventine hill, declaring that they would not lay down their arms till the decemvirate was abolished.

B.C. 448.

Virginius  
defends his  
claim,

and sacrifices  
his daughter.

Decemvirate  
abolished.



B.C. 448. They were soon joined by the remainder of the army, and elected out of their own body twenty *military tribunes*, under whose orders they placed themselves. The senators, unwilling to abolish the decemvirate, occupied themselves in useless debates. The army, in the mean time, retreated to its favourite post the *sacred hill*, and was joined by such numbers, that the decemvirs themselves at length offered to resign their authority as soon as consuls should have been elected. This offer enabled the senators who had departed to the army, to make a proposition which was soon accepted. The senate issued a decree abolishing the decemvirate. These magistrates formally laid down their authority, and, after an interval of three years, the consular government was restored.

Consuls  
restored.

The tribunate was revived on the re-election of consuls; and the father, uncle, and lover of Virginia were the first upon whom the choice of the people fell. It was not to be supposed that Virginius would fail to use the opportunity, which now presented itself, of avenging the memory of his injured daughter. He lost no time in bringing Appius to trial for infringing upon the liberty of a free-born and guiltless woman. He threatened him with immediate imprisonment, if the charge were not directly repelled. "I appeal," said Appius, "to the Roman people, who will not forget the many services they have received from the Claudian family; the many which they owe to me; the zeal for the public good which I have invariably shown, and most particularly the excellent laws of the Twelve Tables, in the compilation of which I had so great a share. I claim the protection of the laws; and appeal from the sentence of the tribune, to the assembly of the people." Virginius could not resist this appeal, which was founded upon a law passed by the newly elected consuls, but he refused to admit him to bail, and caused him to be confined in a prison erected by his own orders. The friends and family of Appius left no means untried to appease the indignation of the people: but before the day appointed for his trial had arrived, Appius was no more. He was found dead in his prison, whether by his own hand, as asserted by the tribunes, or by secret orders from them, it is impossible to determine: though from the conduct and character of the man, the former is, on the whole, the most probable supposition.

Appius  
accused by  
Virginius.

His death

and  
character.

Appius Claudius seems to have inherited the prejudices and vices of his family, with some of their good qualities; and though his crimes and atrocities cannot be recorded without exciting detestation and disgust, the more favourable parts of his character, and the real services which he did to the Roman state, should not be passed over unnoticed. In the first year of the decemvirate, before he was intoxicated by success, his conduct was temperate and popular. His talents, which were great and various, were diligently exerted in the performance of his official duties; and he might justly appeal

to the laws of the Twelve Tables, as a lasting monument of the care and judgment with which he and his colleagues had used the materials brought to them from Greece. B.C. 447.

That celebrated compilation, which is praised by Cicero as containing the substance of all legislative wisdom, was small in compass, but comprehended all the great objects for which laws ought to be instituted. 1. It provided the mode of bringing offenders to trial, and laid down the rules by which impartial justice should be alike administered, both to plaintiffs and defendants. 2. Contained the law against thefts and robberies. 3. Limited the power of creditors over their debtors. 4. The power of parents over their children. 5. Prescribed rules for the regulation of inheritances and guardianships. 6. Defined the limits of property of every kind. 7. Guarded against the commission of damage and trespass. 8. Made regulations for the security of property beyond the walls of the city. 9. Secured the rights of the great body of the people. 10. Prescribed the legal mode of interment. 11. The rites and ceremonies of religion. And 12, secured the sanctity of marriage and the rights arising from the married state. The publication of these laws may justly be considered as an era in the Roman state. The mutual rights and relations of the different classes of society were from that time strictly defined: the weak and inferior citizens were not only more secure against encroachments from the higher and more powerful members of the commonwealth, but against arbitrary or unjust decisions of the magistrates themselves. The Tables throughout, insufficient when the territory and population, and with them the various relations of society, had increased, were an excellent foundation for that noble superstructure which has survived the wreck of ages; and is, with some modifications, to this day, the dispenser of justice and equity to a very large portion of the civilized world.<sup>1</sup>

Laws of the  
Twelve  
Tables,

their  
excellence.

We have now to contemplate the Romans engaged in a long and severe struggle with the city of Veii, whose magnitude, wealth, and influence, made her a formidable competitor for the headship of any league that might be formed in Etruria. The history of Roman success in the capture of Veii, is best studied in connection with the life of the illustrious Camillus.

<sup>1</sup> The Roman law is more or less embodied in the codes at present used in Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, and Poland. It is also the foundation of our own civil and ecclesiastical law.

Liv. Hist. 9. 58. iii. 58. Dion. Hal. x. p. 652-684. xi. p. 684-727. Flor. i. 24.



[Rome Overthrown by the Gauls.—*Overbeke.*]

## CHAPTER VIII.

### MARCUS FURIUS CAMILLUS.

B. C. 446-363

B. C. 446-363. **MARCUS FURIUS CAMILLUS** was born of a patrician family of Rome, about the middle of the fifth century before the Christian era; and soon after the commencement of the fourth after the building of the city, according to the calculation of Varro. None of his ancestors had ever distinguished themselves so as to render their house illustrious; but it was his fortune to give promise of his future greatness, at a very early age. When serving under the dictator Posthumius Tubertus, in his celebrated defeat of the Æqui and Volsci, Camillus, who was not more than seventeen years old, though severely wounded in his thigh by a javelin, deliberately plucked it out and continued in the foremost ranks of the combatants. A youth of patrician rank, who could thus early give proof of such undaunted resolution, could not fail to be esteemed by his countrymen; and accordingly we find that at a later period of his life, the highest honours of the state were not so much obtained by him, as forced upon his acceptance, by the admiration and confidence of his fellow citizens. It may be remarked, however, that Camillus never enjoyed the honours of the consulate, because soon after the period of his birth, the functions of that magistracy had been transferred to the military tribunes. The causes which led to the suspension of the consular authority in Rome, at the period of which we are now speaking, were few and simple. As their numbers increased, the people of Rome gradually became more conscious of their own strength; and from resisting the unjust

Suspension  
of the  
Consular  
power.

encroachments of the patricians, proceeded to trench upon their legitimate privileges. Concessions had been made to the plebeians from time to time, and as is always the case in concessions wrung by fear or necessity, from a party unwilling to grant them, they only led to further demands and bolder advances. The dispute between the adverse parties seemed, at last, to threaten a commotion; when one of the Claudian family proposed, in order to rescue the consular office from the indignity of being filled by plebeians, to substitute for the consuls three magistrates, chosen partly from either class of citizens, and called "military tribunes," invested with consular authority. This proposition was received with applause by both parties: it increased the power of the one, without requiring the sacrifice of any exclusive privilege from the other: and an important change in the form of the Roman government was thus effected without a struggle. Nearly a century elapsed before the office of consuls was again filled, and that is precisely the period in which Camillus flourished.

Of all the measures which tend to produce a gradual and silent revolution in the political condition of a nation emerging from a state of barbarism, none is more powerful than the commutation of personal service in the army for the performance of military duties by a hired substitute. It at once releases a large portion of the population from an oppressive burden, promotes the discipline and efficiency of the army itself; and gives the executive government a power which it never before possessed. That measure was adopted by the senate and approved by the Roman people, when Camillus was in the vigour of his age, and contributed indirectly to prepare the way for some longer reason to apprehend any difficulty, in continuing the war, from the want of new levies or an unwillingness in the troops to keep the field, they resolved at once to extend the dominion of the republic over some of the neighbouring states; and to commence operations by attacking the Veii, whom they justly regarded as their most dangerous rival.

The capital of this people, which bore the same name, was placed in a commanding situation on the summit of a rocky hill, extremely difficult of access. It was, as Plutarch informs us, considered as the bulwark of Etruria, and was not inferior in power and resources to Rome itself. In the earlier periods of the republic, the Veientes had contended for supremacy with the Romans; but now, humbled by many severe defeats, they relied upon the natural strength of their position, and the fortifications by which that advantage had been greatly improved. They filled their magazines with an abundant supply of stores and ammunition, and fearlessly sustained the attacks of the Roman armies. As long, indeed, as their enemy was obliged to quit the field at the commencement of winter, the people of Veii were not liable to all the evils of a regular siege; but after the senate

B.C. 446.

B.C. 444.

B.C. 366.

B.C. 406.

War between the Romans and Veientes.

B.C. 406. had acquired a more absolute command of their troops, by making them, in fact, stipendiaries, the Roman army was required to pass the winter as well as the summer in the enemy's country.

B.C. 398. Towards the close of the seventh year of the war, so little progress had been made against the enemy, that the commanders were much censured, and the senate recalled them; and with the concurrence of the people, required them to resign their offices of military tribunes before the usual time. Among those who were elected to succeed them was Camillus, who then the *second*<sup>1</sup> time received that distinguished honour. It was his lot during this year to command the expedition against the Capenates, whose principal town lay between Veii and the Tiber, and consequently enabled them to make powerful diversions in favour of the Veientes. Camillus attacked them with so much vigour, that they dared no longer stir beyond their walls. In the same year the lake of Alba, in the midst of a peculiarly dry season, rose above the rising grounds by which it had been previously confined, and descended in a torrent towards the sea. This singular phenomenon appeared wholly unaccountable, and was universally spoken of; when an Etruscan soothsayer, who had formed an acquaintance with one of the soldiers encamped before Veii, intimated that, if properly understood, it might secure the success of the Roman arms. The soldier imperceptibly drew his friend beyond the reach of his towns-people, took him up in his arms and carried him into the Roman camp. He there made the same declaration; adding, that if the Romans should give a right course to the waters of the lake, it would be fatal to his native city. The senate not trusting entirely to this interpreter of the prodigy, sent a deputation to Delphi, who, after having consulted the oracle, returned the following year, bringing a highly encouraging answer, commanding them to prevent the waters of the lake from uniting with the sea; to continue the siege of Veii with the greatest resolution, and after the termination of the war, to present an ample offering at the shrine of Apollo. In obedience to this command of the god, the people immediately set about diverting the course of the waters from the lake, and formed that remarkable subterranean canal, which still attests their obedience to the injunction of the oracle.<sup>2</sup>

When the fall of Veii had been thus prepared by compliance with the prescribed condition, the senate determined to commit the completion of their great design to one on whom they could place implicit

<sup>1</sup> The *third* according to Livy; who dates these events *one* year later than the Capitoline Tables, which we have followed.

<sup>2</sup> It was called the *Emissarium*, and extends for nearly two miles. It is still perfectly entire. The bed of the lake itself appears to be the crater of an extinct volcano, and the collapse of some of its internal caverns, will readily account for the prodigy recorded by the ancient historians. See Riccy, *Memorie storiche di Alba Longa e dell' Albano Moderno*, Roma, 1737.

Camillus  
Military  
Tribune.

The Senate  
send to  
Delphi.

reliance, and to invest him with such authority as should prevent any error that could arise from competition. They therefore appointed Camillus dictator. Before he left Rome, he offered up solemn vows to the gods, entreating them to give prosperity to his arms, and engaging to celebrate games, and consecrate a temple in their honour, if he should return a victor. He then marched against Falerii, and routed the people of that place, together with their allies the Capenates. Having thus secured himself against the danger of a diversion, he turned his whole force against Veii, and finding it impracticable to take that city by assault, he commenced a blockade, opened his works, and caused a mine to be carried on under such a cover as completely concealed it from the enemy. It was a work of the greatest magnitude and labour; but by apportioning the time during which each man was employed, with rigid impartiality and exactness, Camillus was enabled to keep his men at work day and night, till they made their way into the citadel itself. When every thing was prepared, the army from without made a furious assault at the very time that the miners from within secretly made their way into the temple of Juno, which was in the citadel. The inhabitants thus unexpectedly assailed on all sides, and from a quarter where they least expected it, could not long or effectually resist; and the Romans, rushing from the citadel, were soon able to throw open the gates to their comrades. The slaughter was necessarily great, but it was checked by the dictator as soon as all danger of resistance was past. The Etruscans were a more civilized and commercial people than the Romans, and far exceeded them in wealth. Camillus was so struck when he beheld from the citadel, the treasures which his troops were everywhere collecting, that he burst into tears; and, when congratulated by his friends on his success, lifting up his hands to heaven, uttered this prayer,—“Jove, most high! and ye gods who are the observers of our good and evil actions, ye can bear witness for us, that we have not attacked this city unjustly, but through necessity and in our own defence, against men who were our foes, and had broken their engagements. But if this success must be compensated by some reverse of fortune, let the severity of it, I beseech you, fall upon my head: but let the people and army of Rome be spared.”

The conduct of Camillus, soon afterwards, was not worthy of the patriotic and disinterested spirit of this prayer. The splendour of his triumph gave offence to the people; his having driven through the city in a chariot drawn by four white horses, a distinction previously reserved for “the sovereign and father of the gods” alone, was considered as highly unbecoming. But probably the more immediate cause of the displeasure which he at that time incurred, was the part which he took in thwarting a proposal of the tribunes of the people, to transfer one half of the inhabitants of Rome to Veii;

B.C. 398.

B.C. 396.

The capture  
of Veii.

B.C. 395.

Prayer of  
Camillus.

B.C. 395. a proposal strongly condemned by the senate, and checked by the delays and evasions of Camillus.

Camillus  
breaks his  
vow,

The real foundation of his unpopularity at this period was, however, his conduct with regard to the division of the plunder. He had, on his march to Veii, made a vow that he would, if victorious, dedicate the tenths to Apollo; but, either forgetting this vow, or unwilling to disappoint his troops, he had, in the sequel, suffered them to carry off the whole. The senate, when the case was laid before them, decreed that each soldier should declare upon oath the value of what he had seized, and produce a tenth of the amount. This decree was warmly resented by the soldiery, who justly considered it as a peculiar hardship to be deprived of so large a portion of their prize, and that at a time when many of them had already spent the fruit of their hard-earned toils. Camillus, distressed by their complaints, had recourse to apology, declaring that he had forgotten his vow. The tenths were however collected; and it was decreed that a vase of massy gold should be sent as an offering at the shrine of Delphi. The Roman women gave up their golden ornaments, in order to enable the government to execute this decree, and were, in consequence, indulged with the privilege of using chariots on great and solemn festivals. A deputation of three from the first patrician families, was sent to bear the sacred offering to Delphi.

and  
displeases  
the soldiers.

B.C. 394. The Falisci were still at war with the Romans, and the command of the army sent against that town was intrusted to Camillus, who had again been elected one of the military tribunes. He immediately marched his forces into the enemy's country, and laid siege to Falerii their capital, well aware that it was likely to occupy him for a considerable time. It was indeed the constant policy of the Roman government to engage the people in long and arduous enterprises, in order to prevent them from caballing together, and raising those internal tumults which had sometimes threatened the subversion of the commonwealth.

Falerii  
attacked.

The inhabitants of Falerii, who, like the rest of the Etruscans, were further advanced in civilization than the Romans, and therefore felt the importance of education, had adopted the Grecian custom of sending their children to one common school, where all might, from their earliest years, be accustomed to the same discipline, associate with the same companions, and form attachments and intimacies which would accompany them through life. The master to whose care these children had been confided, accustomed them to exercise and amuse themselves outside the town, at no great distance from the Roman out-posts. By degrees he led them further and further, till at length he seized an opportunity of delivering them up in a body to the advanced guard, in order that they might be conducted to Camillus. When carried into his presence, he told the Roman general, that preferring his favour to the interest of

Treachery of  
the School-  
master of  
Falerii.

these children, he had brought them to him, and by them, delivered the city of Falerii into his hands. Camillus was astonished when he heard this declaration, and turning to those around him, observed that war is indeed cruel and productive of much violence and injustice; but that men of honour acknowledge some laws even in war, and victory is not to be purchased at the expense of what is base or unprincipled; that a great general builds his hope of success upon his own courage, not upon the baseness of others. He then ordered his attendants to strip the traitor, tie his hands behind him, and then having furnished his boys with rods and scourges leave them to inflict punishment on him by driving him back into the city. Its inhabitants had already discovered the treachery, and the walls and gates were crowded with men and women of rank, who were bewailing their loss, like persons distracted; when the boys were seen returning, flogging and driving their naked master before them, and calling Camillus their deliverer, their god, their father! This spectacle filled all the inhabitants of Falerii with admiration; and, assembling together immediately, they sent a deputation to Camillus, offering to give up themselves and their city to his clemency and justice. He sent the deputies on to Rome, and, when presented to the senate, they declared that the Romans, by showing that they esteemed justice more than victory, had taught them to consider subjection as preferable to independence: though they did not consider themselves so much their inferiors in power as in virtue. The arrangement of the terms on which the peace was to be concluded, was left by the senate entirely to Camillus, who withdrew from their territory, after having received an indemnification for the expenses of the war, and concluded a treaty of alliance with all the Falisci.

How  
punished  
by Camillus.

The Falisci  
capitulate.

The common soldiers were not inspired with the equity and magnanimity of their commander; they had calculated upon the plunder of Falerii, and were therefore disappointed at thus returning empty-handed. They made no scruple to charge Camillus with designs hostile to the people, and a desire to prevent the poor from having their condition improved. Their feelings were exasperated by his strenuous opposition to the proposal for transferring half of the inhabitants of Rome to Veii. That measure was now renewed by the tribunes of the people, and when put to the vote in an assembly of the people, thrown out by a majority of one tribe only: a result as gratifying to the patricians as it was displeasing to the leaders of the plebeian party; and considered by both as in great measure due to the vehement and persevering opposition of Camillus. So strong was the irritation of the people against him at this time, that a severe domestic affliction with which he was then visited, the loss of one of his sons by a natural death, did not at all mitigate their clamour and hostility. The mildness and goodness of his disposition

B.C. 393.

Camillus  
loses his  
son.



B.C. 392. also prevented him from bearing up against his affliction with Roman fortitude; and instead of appearing in public to counteract the designs of his enemies who had brought an impeachment against him, he shut himself up in his house with the women of his family, abandoning himself to his affliction.

The crime laid to his charge was the embezzlement of a part of the Tuscan spoils: particularly some brazen gates, a part of those spoils, which were said to have been found in his possession. The exasperation of the populace was such, that it was plain they would seize upon any pretext for his condemnation. He assembled his friends, and besought them to use all their exertions and influence to save him from becoming the victim of the false accusations and rancour of his enemies. After due deliberation they declared that they had no hope of succeeding, but promised to assist him in paying the fine to which he might be condemned. Indignant at the thoughts of such treatment, he resolved to withdraw and go into a voluntary exile. After embracing his wife and children, he went in silence from his house to the gate of the city; but stopping there and turning round, exclaimed, as he stretched forth his arms to the Capitol, "Grant, ye gods! if I am driven out, not by any misconduct on my part, but by the passion and jealousy of the Roman people, that they may soon repent, and make it manifest to all the world that they have need of Camillus and are anxious for his return!"

This prayer might well be considered by the Romans as having been favourably received by the gods; for in less than two years they suffered the greatest calamity and disgrace which ever befell their country: the invasion and capture of the city by the Gauls. That nation, like the other free and hardy tribes who inhabited the northern parts of Europe, was well calculated by its warlike habits and overflowing population to prove more than a match for the more civilized, but less robust and enduring people of the South: and as soon as they had once passed the barrier of the Alps, swarms from the Southern or Celtic Gauls poured down like a resistless torrent over the fertile plains of Italy: tribe after tribe coming to dispossess the Etrurians, who had long been established in the country on each side of the Po, and from the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian sea. One of these tribes, the Senones, who at this time occupied the country upon the Adriatic between Ravenna and

B.C. 387. Ancona, laid siege to Clusium, one of the chief cities in Etruria, anciently the residence of Porsenna, and barely 100 miles to the north of Rome. The appearance of the Gauls, remarkable for their size, light hair, and fair complexions, so unlike the swarthy nations of Greece and Italy; the ferocity of their manners, and strangeness of the weapons with which they were armed; but more especially their vast numbers and the report of their successes against the Etruscan

Accused by  
the Romans.

Description  
of the  
Gauls.

troops, all contributed to fill the people of Clusium with alarm. B.C. 388. Though unconnected with Rome by any former tie of friendship or alliance, and having no claim upon the good will of the Romans, except from their perfect neutrality with respect to their countrymen the Veientes, the Clusini sent an embassy to Rome, entreating its aid against the Gauls. The Romans were willing to act as mediators, though they had no intention to send any men to the assistance of their new friends. The three sons of Marcus Fabius Ambustus, a man of one of the most distinguished families, were despatched to hold a communication with the Gauls, and put an end to the war if possible, by negotiation.

The strangers, when the Roman envoys had delivered their message, replied, that all they desired was a portion of the waste lands belonging to Clusium, upon which they might settle: if that were granted, they would immediately make peace; but if it were refused, they would endeavour to show by their exploits how much the Gauls surpassed all other nations in valour. The Etrurians were highly displeas'd with this request, and the conference served only to exasperate each party. An engagement immediately ensued; and the Roman envoys, in violation of the common law of nations, took arms in favour of the Etrurians. A principal chieftain among the Gauls was killed by the hand of one of them; and when ambassadors were sent by the barbarians to Rome to demand satisfaction for this unprovoked attack, the intrigue and influence of the Fabian family, together with the perverseness of the people, completely prevented any concession from being made; the Gauls therefore returned to their camp breathing nothing but vengeance and extermination.

The Roman  
Ambassadors  
take arms  
against the  
Gauls.

The councils of Rome might well seem to the ancients to be influenced by an unhappy fatality at this momentous period; for corruption in the different classes of citizens, ambition and family interest in the higher, turbulence and faction in the lower ranks, had driven able and deserving men from the posts of trust and distinction, and the management of the impending war was left to those very persons whose rashness had drawn this new and formidable enemy on their country. The three envoys to Clusium were B.C. 390. elected military tribunes, before the Gallic messengers returned to their camp; and still no extraordinary preparation was made for a war, which to any who were not blinded by their passions must have appeared to threaten no ordinary degree of danger. They had often on former occasions, when engaged with a much less formidable enemy, appointed a dictator to give that vigour and efficiency in the conducting of the war which cannot be obtained under a divided command. On this, the guidance and direction of the troops were on the contrary intrusted to a greater number of generals than usual, and unanimity in their councils was therefore rendered highly

Inefficiency  
of the Roman  
Councils.

B.C. 390. improbable. But the greatest evil of all, was the absence and disgrace of that very man who alone, perhaps, was able to save the city from the impending ruin.

B.C. 389. The honours lavished upon those of whose conduct the Gauls thought they had so much reason to complain, turned their arms immediately against Rome itself. They advanced with a rapidity which hardly allowed the Romans time to prepare for their own defence; and it was only with a very hasty and irregular levy that they could meet them near the eleventh mile stone, at a short distance above the confluence of the Allia and the Tiber. The numbers of the enemy greatly surpassed those of the Romans; their wild songs, discordant shouts and savage appearance contributed not a little to spread dismay through the army, ill qualified by experience and discipline, or the prudence of its leaders, to make up for the disadvantages under which it then laboured. The defeat was so complete, that the left wing was entirely destroyed; the centre, which fled under cover of the night to Veii, suffered severely; and the right wing, which retired to the hills at the beginning of the contest, was the only part of the Roman army which escaped without very great loss. The day of the Allia was ever afterwards marked by the Romans in their calendars as one of the most unfortunate days in the whole year.

Battle of  
Allia.

The consternation of the Romans was such as would have made Rome an easy prey to the Gauls, had they immediately followed up their success, but with the improvidence natural to savages they stopped to revel in the plunder of the Roman camp, and allowed their enemy time to fortify his strong-holds, and prepare for a steady resistance. The city was not in a condition to be defended against the invaders; the army therefore retired to the Capitol, fortifying it as strongly, and replenishing its stores and ammunition as much as was possible. Almost all the other inhabitants fled for safety to the surrounding country; but the oldest and most distinguished among those of senatorial and consular rank resolved, if we may believe Plutarch, rather to die than quit the sacred city. Clothed in their official robes, and seated in their ivory curule chairs in the forum, they waited calmly the arrival of the enemy. On the day after the battle, the barbarians reached the city, and finding the Collina Gate open and unguarded, entered without any resistance. Every thing was silent and deserted; the very solitude of the place terrified them; and when they came into the forum and saw so many men sitting each in the vestibule of his house, and bearing, from his age, his aspect, and his dress, the impression of more than human majesty, they took these venerable men for statues of the gods; nor were they undeceived till Marcus Papirius by striking of one of the Gauls with his ivory sceptre, provoked the anger of the savage, and immediately, with his colleagues, fell a sacrifice to their fury. The

The Senators  
slain by the  
Gauls.

slaughter of the senators was the signal for universal pillage, murder, B.C. 389. and devastation.

The conflagration of their houses, the cries and shrieks of the wounded and dying, the desolation of their temples, of every thing which they held dear or sacred, took place immediately, under the eyes of the Roman army and its commanders, who were shut up in the Capitol: their position was so strong by nature, and so well fortified by art, that the Gauls had no means of dislodging them, as long as their stock of provisions held out. The numbers of the invading army, and the small space occupied by the Capitol, enabled Brennus, the Gallic chief, to keep up a rigorous blockade; and had his followers been more provident, they would perhaps have for ever extinguished the Roman name; but, elated by their success, and unused to provide for future contingencies, they trusted to their foraging parties for supplies, and diminished their strength by sending out detachments in many different directions. One of these happened to go towards Ardea, a town of Latium, in alliance with Rome, about twenty miles to the south. There it was that Camillus was living in great retirement, "more afflicted," as the historian says, "by the calamities of his country than by his own;" and only anxious to seize some opportunity of raising it again from its fallen condition. When he found that the inhabitants had called an assembly to deliberate upon the best mode of repelling the Gauls, whose approach had created the greatest alarm, he went thither, and entreating them not to give way to their fears, proposed to attack the enemy by night, when they would be overcome by sleep and wine, the fruits of their plunder, and would fall an easy prey to a resolute and vigilant foe. The reasonableness of this plan, as well as the character of him who proposed it, caused its immediate adoption. As soon as night came on they silently marched out, under the command of Camillus, and found the camp of the Gauls exactly as he had predicted, entirely open and unprotected; no sentinels at their posts—all drowned in sleep and intoxication. The slaughter was unbounded; and a large portion of the few who escaped fled into the territory of Antium, and were cut to pieces by the people of that town.

Camillus attacks the camp of the Gauls.

The Romans had now, more than ever, reason to exult in their conquest of the city of Veii. The Gauls, in their eagerness to attack Rome itself, left the Tuscan cities on their way unattempted; this, therefore, now afforded a refuge and a place of rendezvous to most of the Romans who had retired before the arrival of the enemy. Their numbers were recruited by volunteers continually coming in from the neighbouring states, whose lands were plundered by the foraging parties from Rome. All were eager to make a diversion in favour of the party blockaded in the Capitol, and endeavour at least to dislodge the enemy; but they had no leader on whose judgment

B.C. 388.

B.C. 388. and authority they could rely. The very place in which they were, was calculated to remind them of Camillus: and they resolved to send a deputation to him, to entreat him to take them under his command, and lead them, as they were confident he would, to victory. He refused, unless recalled by the members of the senate, shut up in the Capitol, for he considered them as the legal representatives of the government, and did not think himself justified in resuming his rights as a citizen without their sanction.

Pontius reaches the Capitol.

This answer to their request threw them into the greatest perplexity, till Pontius Cominius, a youth of humble rank, but of an enterprising spirit, offered to make his way into the Capitol, and communicate their wishes to the senators who occupied it. Supporting himself on a piece of cork, he was carried down the Tiber by the stream, to the foot of the Capitoline Hill; and landing at a place where the rock was almost perpendicular, and therefore not watched by the enemy, he succeeded in clambering up to the summit; was recognized by the sentinels, admitted into the fortress, and carried to the magistrates, to whom he declared the object of his mission. The senate immediately issued a decree, authorising an assembly of the people, for the purpose of recalling Camillus from banishment, and appointing him dictator. Cominius had the good fortune to return, as he had approached, unobserved: messengers were instantly despatched to Camillus at Ardea, and he returned with them to resume the command of those who had so lately treated him with such base ingratitude.

Camillus recalled by the Senate.

The Gauls, in the meantime, were gaining possession of the last strong-hold of Rome, the Capitol itself; for having discovered a path not before tried, perhaps that near the Carmental Gate, by which Cominius had ascended, they scaled it in the dead of a dark night, without alarming the dogs, usually so vigilant, or being discovered by the sentinels, who were buried in sleep, and had nearly got a firm footing on the summit of the rock, when the geese, consecrated to Juno, whose hunger had increased their vigilance, heard their steps, and taking alarm, began to cackle and clap their wings. This, fortunately, waked Marcus Manlius, who had been consul three years before, and was distinguished by his military prowess. He seized his arms, roused his companions, and just reached the rampart in time to thrust a Gaul, who had mounted it, headlong down. This man carried those immediately behind along with himself in his fall; and before the rest of his party could recover, the whole garrison of the Capitol was assailing them with missiles from above, so that the Gauls had much difficulty in making good their retreat.

The Capitol preserved by the cackling of geese.

From Ides of July B.C. 389 to Ides of Feb. B.C. 388.

This was but the beginning of their disasters: the putrid effluvia from heaps of dead bodies, the exhalations from the marshes near Rome, the heat of the climate to which the Gauls were unused, and their indulgence in the luxuries of Italy, all contributed to bring on

a pestilential disease, which swept away great numbers; while the activity and vigilance of Camillus cut off their supplies, and reduced them to great scarcity of provisions. But the besieged were not in a better condition: threatened with absolute famine from within, and ignorant of the success of their friends without, their spirit was at length broken down, and they began to think of capitulation. The siege had already been continued more than six months, and the besiegers were not unwilling to come to terms; so that a convention was soon made between the two parties, by which the Gauls engaged to evacuate the city on receiving solid gold to the weight of a thousand pounds. This was not the only humiliation which the Romans had to suffer; for when they complained that the weights used by the Gauls had been purposely falsified, in order to give their scale the preponderance, Brennus insultingly threw in his sword, adding, when asked what it meant—"What can it mean but woe to the conquered!" The Romans were so indignant at this fresh insult, that, distressed as they were, they felt inclined to break off all further intercourse with their enemies; and were debating the point among themselves, when Camillus most opportunely appeared at the gate of Rome; ordered the conference to be immediately closed, and declared, that a convention made without his authority was illegal, and that, as dictator, he now annulled it. Brennus resented this interference on the part of the Roman general in the warmest manner; a skirmish ensued on the spot; but as streets encumbered with ruins were ill adapted to the movements of an army, Brennus withdrew his forces in the ensuing night, and encamped about eight miles to the east of Rome on the road to Gabii. Camillus came up with him early on the following morning, and routed his troops after a short conflict. Many of the fugitives were killed in the pursuit, and many who escaped the swords of the victors were slain by the inhabitants of the towns and villages in the neighbourhood. Camillus returned to the city in triumph, amid the shouts of his soldiers, hailing him, not without reason, as the father of his country and second founder of Rome.<sup>1</sup>

After offering up costly sacrifices to the gods, in gratitude for their assistance, and the restoration of their temples, Camillus urged the people to commence the rebuilding of the city. The vastness of the undertaking, the recollection of what they had suffered from the Gauls, which was recalled by the very sight of Rome, the despon-

B.C. 388.  
Distress of  
the besiegers  
and besieged.

Legend of  
Camillus and  
the Gauls.

From  
Ides of July  
B.C. 389  
to  
Ides of Feb.  
B.C. 388.

Camillus  
defeats  
Brennus.

<sup>1</sup> The appearance of Camillus precisely at the moment when his presence might save the honour of Rome, to say nothing of the improbability of his risking the salvation of his country upon a mere point of form—a decree of the senate—which there was so little prospect of obtaining—has so much the appearance of romance, that the truth of this part of the Roman history might justly be suspected, even if we had not something very like an express testimony on the part of Polybius that the Gauls retired unmolested, with the ransom of Rome in their hands. Polyb. Proem.

B.C. 388.  
The people  
desirous of  
quitting  
Rome, are  
prevented by  
Camillus.

dence which so complete a humiliation would naturally occasion, all combined to make the people disinclined to begin that great work, and willing to listen to their factious leaders, who took this opportunity of again persuading them to insist upon being removed to Veii. But that measure was thought so fatal by the senate, that they would not allow the dictator to lay down his office, at the termination of the half-year, as all his predecessors had done: and while they secured themselves against the intrigues of demagogues, by extending the period of his absolute authority, they left nothing undone to reconcile the populace to the laborious task which they had now to perform, and to offer every possible alleviation of their sufferings. Camillus, finding the people so extremely averse to the undertaking, assembled the senate in order to have the question deliberately put to the vote; and entreated his countrymen, by every thing that was sacred, not to desert the spot where the ashes of their forefathers reposed, the favourite abode of their gods, the site which had been marked by prodigies as the head of their dominions. Just as they were about to give their votes on the question, while it was yet extremely dubious which opinion would preponderate, a centurion marching a body of soldiers by the house where the senate was assembled, called out to his ensign—"Fix your colours here; this is the best place for us to remain in." The omen was instantly hailed by the senate, and the people willingly assented to a decision sanctioned, as their superstition taught them, by an authority from heaven. The senate granted permission to cut wood and work the quarries, without paying the usual charges, to all who would engage to finish their houses in the course of the year; but they neglected to prescribe any rules for the place of the buildings, so that the new city bore lasting marks of the haste and precipitation with which it was built.

Impeach-  
ment of  
Fabius.

His death.

The tribunes of the people, probably in this year, commenced an impeachment which was far more deserving of praise than were most of their suits against the agents of government; it was a charge against Q. Fabius for his breach of the law of nations in taking up arms against the Gauls, who were not at war with the republic. The crime was too notorious to be denied, and the consequences of it had been too serious to leave any hope of an indulgent sentence from the people: it may therefore be reasonably supposed, that the criminal preferred a private and voluntary to a public and ignominious death; for before the day fixed for his trial had come on, his friends announced that he had been carried off by a short and sudden illness. To the Romans, who looked upon suicide as no crime, and especially to a member of a haughty patrician family like the Fabii, such a termination of life appeared far preferable to the disgrace of a condemnation by the people.

Soon after these events, the nations who lived on the confines of

the Roman territory seemed as if actuated by one common spirit of hostility, and resolved to crush the republic while rising from her ashes. The Æqui, Volsci, and Latini invaded them from the east and south, almost at the same time that the Tuscans laid siege to Sutrium, a town in alliance with Rome, on the north-west. The Roman camp, near Lanuvium, was surrounded by the Latins, and the military tribunes who had the command there, sent to Rome for immediate succours, to extricate them from the imminent peril in which they were placed. Camillus was, on this occasion, a third time appointed dictator. He immediately made a new levy, and divided his army into three parts, one of which, under Manlius Capitolinus, was encamped before the city, another, under the command of Æmilius Mamercinus, was sent against the Etruscans, and the third, led by Camillus himself, marched against the Volsci. They had flattered themselves that all the youth of Rome had perished under the swords of the Gauls, but the very name of Camillus filled them with terror; they therefore barricadoed their entrenchments with trunks of trees heaped up, to prevent the passage of the enemy. Camillus, perceiving this, ordered burning torches to be thrown upon their works, and as there was fortunately a very high wind at the time blowing directly on the enemy's quarters, the Volsci were so alarmed and overcome by the flames and smoke, and crackling of the green timber, that the Romans had less difficulty in scaling the rampart and entering the camp, than they had previously experienced in crossing the enclosure already consumed by the fire. The Volsci were completely routed, their camp was taken, their fugitives were pursued, their country was laid waste, and Volsci, their capital town, given up. The Æqui, their neighbours, immediately afterwards experienced a similar fate; they were defeated by Camillus at Bolæ, and their town, as well as their camp, were taken at the first onset.

Romans  
attacked by  
the  
neighbour-  
ing nations,

who are  
defeated by  
Camillus.

The successes of the republic in the south and east were counter-balanced for a time by the misfortunes of their allies at Sutrium. They had been compelled by the superior numbers of their enemy, the fatigues and losses sustained in a close siege, and the failure of their resources, to evacuate their town on capitulation, and the hard condition of retiring in search of another place of abode with nothing more than the clothes upon their backs. Camillus met them, on his march to Sutrium, going in this wretched condition towards Rome. The whole multitude threw themselves at his feet, bathed in tears, and representing to him in the most moving language the misery to which they were reduced. He desired them not to despair, but to return with him, and they should be avenged upon their enemies. He marched onwards with such expedition, that he took the Etruscans, as he expected, completely by surprise. The gates of Sutrium were open, there were no sentinels at the outposts, every one was

Sutrium  
taken,

B.C. 387.

and  
recaptured  
by Camillus.



B.C. 387. intent upon rifling the houses of the inhabitants who had just been expelled. The victors had no time to rally, they everywhere fell into the hands of their unexpected foes, and had scarcely leisure to seize their arms, much less to unite and form themselves into a body which could have made some resistance. Thus was Sutrium taken and retaken in the same day: and Camillus, by a wise precaution, having ordered his men to close the gates as soon as they had entered, completely cut off the retreat of the Etruscans, while by guaranteeing the lives of all who should lay down their arms, he humanely prevented the bloodshed which a contest within the town must have occasioned. The town was restored before the night, to its former possessors.

Insurrection  
at Antium.

The valour, promptitude, and judgment of Camillus were so decidedly the chief causes of the success which attended his arms in these three expeditions, that the malevolence of his enemies was for once silenced, and never was a triumph more unanimously hailed with acclamations than this, the third which he had the honour of celebrating. He seems to have enjoyed his well earned honours with less interruption from the jealousy and envy of his detractors, at this than at any previous period. But his quiet was soon disturbed by an insurrection among the people of Antium, a city of the Volsci, the old and obstinate enemies of Rome. He happened to be then one of the military tribunes, and such was the confidence inspired by his character and exploits, that his colleagues voluntarily resigned the supreme power to him, giving him the authority, though not the title of dictator. When the army had reached Satricum, a colony of the Antiates, they found a much larger force prepared to receive them than they had expected. It was not merely the youth of Antium, but a vast body of Latins and Hernici, whose numbers had been recruited by a long period of peace, and who were encouraged by that circumstance, to throw off their allegiance to Rome. The soldiers were much discouraged on perceiving the strength of the enemy, but Camillus, seizing the nearest standard-bearer by the hand, rushed with him upon the enemy: when his men saw this, they instantly followed him, ashamed of showing less vigour and alertness than their general, whose age might have excused him from taking so active a part in the contest. The Antiates, who were in the foremost rank, were unable to stand the shock, and the panic was rapidly communicated to their allies. The very name and presence of Camillus struck the Volsci with terror: and when they had nearly turned his left wing, his coming suddenly up, though ill mounted and insufficiently armed, gave his own men courage to rally, and turned the fortune of the day against the enemy. The battle, or rather, the carnage, was at length stopped in the evening by a heavy storm, and the next day the Latins and Hernici returned home, leaving the Volsci to bring the war to a close, in the best

manner they could, without their aid. They, therefore, shut themselves up within the walls of Satricum; and as they made no effort to interrupt the works carried on by Camillus in order to establish an effectual blockade, he judged that they would not have spirit enough to repel a more direct attack. He, therefore, ordered his men to scale the walls on all sides, and took the city by storm, without any extraordinary loss. B.C. 384.

On his return to Rome, immediately after the capture of Satricum, he proposed to the senate to lay siege to Antium itself, the capital of the Volsci; but when they were on the point of acceding to his proposal, intelligence was received from Sutrium and Nepete, of their having been attacked by the Etruscans, and immediate want of a powerful succour from Rome. He was therefore obliged to abandon his plan for the present, and repair immediately to the towns on the confines of Etruria, which had made such a pressing application for aid. Those towns were considered as the gates and keys of Etruria, and were therefore the first objects of both the Romans and Etruscans, whenever they had designs of invading each other's territories. The latter had already got possession of Nepete and a part of Sutrium, before Camillus and his colleague Valerius came to the assistance of their inhabitants. By a judicious distribution of his troops, Camillus soon drove the Etruscans out of Sutrium, and pursued them till night with great slaughter. Nepete, which was entirely in the power of the Etruscans, was taken by assault, and the tribunes led back their victorious army to Rome, with the glory of having recovered from the enemy two cities in alliance with the republic.

Camillus  
recovers  
Sutrium.

That turbulence and ambition were vices not confined to one class of the Roman people, was clearly proved by a conspiracy against the state, soon afterwards discovered. It originated from a quarter whence it was least expected—a man of patrician family and distinguished patriotism, M. Manlius Capitolinus; who, while he held the other leading statesmen in contempt, was envious of one who, like Camillus, was rendered illustrious by his virtues as well as by his honours. Manlius, by estimating his own merits too highly, was led to depreciate those of Camillus; and not finding the senate willing to favour his pretensions, began to pay court to the multitude, and ingratiated himself with them by arts unworthy of his rank and character. The expenses in which the destruction of the city had involved the poorer citizens, had increased the burden of their debts to an extraordinary degree; and the oppressive power with which the Roman laws invested the creditor, was consequently more than ever felt by the great body of the people. Manlius, therefore, by defending the cause of plebeians who had been seized for their debts, and by taking an active part in all the popular assemblies, promoted, by his vehement harangues, the factious measures of the dema-

Manlius  
Capitolinus

B.C. 384. gogues, and obtained an almost unparalleled share of popularity, which gave such umbrage to the senate, that they thought it expedient to create a dictator. Aulus Cornelius Cossus was the person chosen for that high office, and he appointed T. Quinctius Capitolinus his master of the horse.

A Dictator created.

The Volsci who, though checked by the victories of Camillus, were far from subdued, were again in arms; the first act of the new dictator, therefore, was an engagement with them, in which they were completely defeated and their camp taken; most of the many captives taken on this occasion were Latins and Hernici, and it appeared from the rank of the prisoners, and the confessions extorted from them, that their countrymen had certainly entered into a secret alliance with the enemies of Rome. Cossus, therefore, remained in the field, expecting instructions from the senate, directing him to make war on those states; but a danger nearer home soon called him back to the capital. Manlius had proceeded so far as to excite a tumult, and encourage the populace in releasing a debtor from the officers of justice, who were carrying him to prison; and he was continually setting on foot reports of the senate's having embezzled the gold recovered from the Gauls. The passions of the multitude had been so inflamed by the violence of his harangues, and their leaders so emboldened by his daring attack on the ministers of justice, that every thing seemed ripe for an open insurrection.

Manlius excites the popular discontent.

In this emergency, the senate recalled the dictator; and the next day, in the place where the popular assemblies were held, the senate being assembled, he cited Manlius to appear before him. He came, accompanied by a crowd of his adherents, to whom he had given a clear intimation that they ought to prepare for a contest. The dictator told him, in a few words, that it was currently reported, that he charged some of the senators with having embezzled a sum sufficient to release the Roman people from the burden of their debts. "So far from wishing to throw obstacles in your way, M. Manlius," continued the dictator, "if you can make such a charge good, I earnestly exhort you to produce your proofs immediately. But if you fail to produce them, or it appear that you were yourself an accomplice, I shall immediately commit you to prison, and not suffer the Roman people to be any longer deluded by your fallacious promises." Manlius, instead of directly producing his evidence, or even engaging to do so, evaded the main point, and dwelt upon all those circumstances which gave the appearance of truth to his assertion; that the war against the Volsci was merely a specious pretence, and that the dictator had been, in reality, appointed solely to keep the people in subjection. Cossus again called upon him to come directly to the point, and prove the charge which he had made; to which he replied, that he should not enter into any proofs where his enemies were to be the judges of their validity. On this,

the dictator ordered his officer to carry him immediately to prison; and such was the awe in which that magistrate was held, that not a murmur was heard or an angry look seen. Yet so completely was Manlius become the idol of the people, that a very large number assumed the garb of mourning, and crowded round his prison with every demonstration of grief. The popular irritation was now too violent to be calmed even by concessions; little effect was produced by a division of some of the public lands among them, and the establishment of a colony of two thousand citizens at Sutrium: but soon after the dictatorship of Cornelius Cossus had terminated, Manlius was liberated by order of the senate, and again became, as might be expected, the leader of the disaffected.

At the close of that year, Camillus was again, for the sixth time, chosen one of the military tribunes, invested with consular authority. The liberation of Manlius had so increased his audacity, that he now openly exhorted the people to vindicate their invaded rights, to level the different magistracies with the ground, and establish the supremacy of the people beyond the possibility of its being violated. He would be their adviser and leader, and the more dignified the title with which they should honour him, the more effectually should he be able to obtain what they desired. This language was too plain to leave any doubt of the intentions of Manlius, and justly alarmed all those who had any regard for the constitution of the Republic; so much so, that even the tribunes of the people felt the necessity of checking such seditious proceedings, and two of them entered a charge of sedition against him, appointing a day for hearing his defence. His guilt was so apparent, that even his own family and nearest relations did not assume the habit of mourning, or make any effort to obtain a favourable sentence. When brought to trial, he made such a powerful appeal to the great actions by which his life had been distinguished, the many most essential services for which his country was indebted to him, and most especially the salvation of the Capitol, which was solely due to his courage and vigilance, that the tribunes felt it would be impossible for any judges to pronounce sentence against him, while that fortress was in sight. They, therefore, adjourned his trial to a future day, and fixed on a grove near the Nomentane gate, from whence the Capitol was not visible, where the people, unable to doubt a crime proved by incontrovertible evidence, gave a tardy and reluctant vote for his condemnation. He was thrown by the tribunes from the Tarpeian rock, and the same place became an eternal monument both of his glory

B.C. 382.

B.C. 381.

Manlius impeached



[Tarpeian Rock.]

and condemned.

B.C. 381. and his disgrace. His house was rased with the ground, and a decree was passed that no patrician should in future inhabit the Capitol. The Manlii were likewise forbidden to give the name of Marcus to any of their children. The people soon began to regret the sentence which a sense of justice had wrung from them; and ascribed a pestilence, which raged some time afterwards, to the wrath of the gods, who were indignant at seeing his blood shed, who had saved the Capitol, and snatched their temples out of the hands of the enemy.

The fidelity of the Latian States had long been suspected by the Roman government, and in the years immediately following the events just related, even some of their colonies in that quarter showed a manifest inclination to join their enemies; particularly Velitræ, whose inhabitants made head against a Roman army, and were supported by their neighbours, the people of Præneste. The Roman generals abstained from storming a town which was a Roman colony, but declared war against the Prænestini, who next year, in conjunction with the Volsci, took Satricum, another colony, by storm, and treated the captives with great barbarity. This demanded a prompt and severe chastisement; and Camillus was for that reason not only chosen a military tribune, for the seventh time, but appointed, out of the regular order, commander of the troops sent against the Volsci. He had already reached the age which exempted him from the necessity of undertaking such services, and would have availed himself of that circumstance, had not the people strongly pressed him to take the command. His colleague was Lucius Furius, a member of the same family, but very inferior in character and ability, as soon afterwards appeared. They marched on the following day to Satricum, where the enemy awaited with a considerably larger force, so confident of success from superiority of numbers, that they used every stratagem to draw the Romans into an immediate engagement. The soldiers became extremely impatient of delay; and Furius, who was deficient in judgment and self-command, at the same time that he was rash and daring, increased the discontent of his men, by blaming the dilatoriness of his colleague. At length he urged him to consent to their attacking the enemy, and not to oppose his single will to the united wishes of all the others. Camillus replied with the firmness and dignity which became his years, and a gentleness and modesty, which reflect the brightest light upon the great qualities by which he was so peculiarly distinguished. He said, that "he had never had reason to repent of his councils, or complain of his fortune; but his colleague had an equal authority with himself, and the advantage of youth and vigour; with respect to the army, he was more used to command than to be commanded; that he would not prevent his colleague from taking the lead, and hoped the gods would be propitious; he only requested

Camillus  
sent against  
the Volsci.

His prudence  
and bravery  
save the  
Roman  
army.

that, from indulgence for his age, he might be excused from placing himself in the front rank; and he would not fail in those duties which might justly be required from a man of his advanced years." Furius willingly assented to this proposal, he led on the van, while Camillus in the rear took charge of the reserve, placing it in a strong post in front of their camp, and taking a station for himself on a rising ground, whence he could be an attentive observer of the engagement. The enemy scarcely made a stand at all, but retreated precipitately to their own camp; the Romans, elated with their success, pushed on heedlessly up a rising ground, when a strong reinforcement marched out of the enemy's camp, and joined by those who appeared to be flying, charged the troops of Furius with all the advantage of fresh men and a higher ground. The latter had been completely entrapped by the feint of the Volsci; and were so confounded by their unexpected return to the charge, that they were soon put to flight themselves, and endeavoured to regain their camp in the greatest haste and confusion. Camillus desired his attendants to place him on his horse, the moment he saw the turn in the fortune of the day, and, advancing with the reserve, hastened to meet the vanguard, and encourage them to rally. The sight of this venerable commander, rendered illustrious by so many triumphs, exposing himself in the foremost ranks, shunning neither labour nor peril, recalled the spirit and resolution of the soldiers, and filled them with shame for their disgraceful flight. Furius, who now gladly submitted to the superior judgment of his colleague—hastened, by his desire, to recover the cavalry from their panic, while Camillus, at the head of the infantry, sustained the charge of the enemy. The dismounted cavalry soon came to their assistance, and it was not long before the Volsci felt what the Romans were capable of effecting under such a general as Camillus. The troops and their commanders seemed all resolved never to be surpassed in energy and valour; and the Volsci, who had fled as a mere feint at the beginning of the contest, were completely routed at the close of it. Their loss was immense, their camp was stormed and taken by the Romans, and great as was the number of the slain, it was exceeded by the number of the captives.<sup>1</sup>

Defeat of the  
Volsci.

Among them, there were found some natives of Tusculum, and on inquiry, it appeared that the Tusculans had maintained a secret correspondence with the Volsci, and meditated a war with Rome. The danger from a foe thus near at hand, appeared to Camillus so imminent, that he determined to return to Rome immediately with the captives, leaving his colleague in charge of the army. The senate were of opinion that war ought immediately to be commenced

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch's account of this affair differs considerably from that of Livy, here followed as the more probable one.

B.C. 381. against Tusculum, and intrusted the conducting of it entirely to Camillus; he only asked to have one coadjutor in that service, and was allowed to choose one of his colleagues; when, by naming, contrary to the expectation of all, Lucius Furius; he gave at once the most convincing proof of his own extreme moderation and candour; and, by thus palliating the disgrace of his colleague, added a brighter lustre to his own glory.

Camillus  
enters  
Tusculum.

When he entered the territory of Tusculum, he found every thing wearing the appearance of profound peace; the fields were full of husbandmen and shepherds, occupied in their ordinary labours; the gates of the town were open, and many inhabitants of the higher classes came to show their respect to the generals; supplies were sent very readily into the camp, both from the town and country. Camillus encamped his men before the gates of the town, and on entering it, found every thing in a similar state; doors open, shops well filled with goods, tradesmen hard at work, children repeating their lessons aloud in the schools, women and lads going to and fro wherever their business called them; not the slightest indication of fear, or any thing that intimated a thought of war. Though not convinced of the sincerity of the Tusculans, Camillus was so well pleased with the care which they had taken to remove the impression produced by their correspondence with the enemies of Rome, that he encouraged them to go in a body to deprecate the wrath of the senate. They lost no time in complying with his suggestion, and their appearance as suppliants, together with the humble strain in which they acknowledged their offence, had so powerful an effect in appeasing the displeasure of the senate, that they were not only left unmolested for the present, but soon afterwards admitted to the privileges of Roman citizens. The legions were then recalled from Tusculum; and with the year the magistracy of Camillus terminated; a magistracy in which his skill and valour in the war against the Volsci, his happy success in the expedition against Tusculum, and his forbearance and moderation towards his colleague on all occasions, rendered him more than ever deserving of admiration.

B.C. 380.

Rome in a  
state of  
disquiet.

After the close of this war against the Tusculans, a very turbulent period ensued. The tribunes, who were ever stirring up the people to make some claim which they were sure the senate would refuse to grant, availed themselves of the distress occasioned by the pressure of the debts owing to the wealthy patricians, and exhorted the people not to serve in the army till some remedy had been found for the evils under which they laboured. The inhabitants of Præneste, at the same time meditated an invasion of the Roman state, and, when they learned that the people refused to enlist, that Rome was almost in a state of insurrection, they expedited their own levies, entered the Roman territory, and carried their devastations to the very gates of Rome. A dictator, as was usual in such emergencies,

War with  
Præneste.  
B.C. 378.

was appointed, the populace did not dare to resist his authority; the levies were completed; the Prænestini defeated near the river Allia, eight of their towns taken, and their city given up. Titus Quinctius Cincinnatus, the dictator, returned in triumph. These successes served but for a short time to silence the factious and disaffected. The old grievances, real or imaginary, were revived; but a temporary expedient, exemption from the claims of the creditor while the debtor was in actual service, quieted the apprehensions of the poorer citizens for the present, gave them a motive for entering willingly into the service, and enabled the tribunes to lead a considerable force against the Volsci and Latins, again in arms against the Republic. The Romans, successful in this as in the preceding wars, continued gradually, though slowly, to enlarge the bounds of their territory. But, though successful abroad, they were still disturbed by intestine tumults at home. B.C. 378.

A daughter of Marcus Fabius Ambustus, who was married to a plebeian, happened to be visiting at the house of one of her sisters, whose husband was a military tribune and a patrician, when, on his return from the forum, his lictor struck the door of his house with his rod, to announce his master's return. The noise alarmed the plebeian sister, unused to such thundering knocks, and ignorant of their meaning. The other laughed at her for being so ignorant: but "great events," it has been said, "often arise from trifling causes;" and that laughter threw Rome almost into a state of anarchy for several years. Her sister's ridicule sank so deeply into the mind of the one who had thus betrayed her plebeian habits, that, when she saw her father, she could not conceal her vexation from him. He consoled her by saying, that "she should soon have the satisfaction of enjoying all the honours which her sister could claim." Her husband, Caius Licinius Stolo, was next year elected one of the tribunes of the people; and, urged on by his father-in-law, he, in conjunction with an ambitious colleague, Lucius Sextius, proposed three laws, of which the sole object was depression of the higher and elevation of the lower classes. These laws would, in fact, if once established, have completely subverted the constitution of the republic. The first was, that the capital of every debt should be paid off by instalments in three years, *the interest* already paid having been first deducted from the original capital; the second, that five hundred acres (*jugera*) should be the largest quantity of land which it should be lawful for any individual to possess; and the last, that no military tribunes should be in future created, but that one of the consuls should always be a plebeian. B.C. 375.

These three laws, in the opinion of the senators, struck at the very vitals of the constitution: they therefore persuaded the colleagues of Licinius and Sextius to put a veto on their proposition whenever it was brought forward. The latter, in their turn, threatened to use Laws in favour of the Plebeians proposed.

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B.C. 374. the same expedient for preventing the election of the magistrates; and for the next five years they realized their threats, by allowing none to be elected except the ædiles and the tribunes of the people. The impediment which this resistance offered to the forming of the military levies was a very serious evil, which the military tribunes elected under an officer called *interrex*, were not able to stem: and it seemed to demand the interposition of a dictator, whose power was so absolute as to enable him instantly to check any symptoms of disobedience to his orders. Camillus was again fixed upon to fill that important office.

Camillus  
appointed  
Dictator.

B.C. 367. This was contrary to his own wish, as well as opposed to the inclinations of the people. He felt that he was considered as created merely to silence their demands; and that those who had often followed him to conquest, could with truth affirm, that he was more indebted to their confidence and obedience in war, than to the support and concurrence of the patricians in peace. The jealousy of his enemies might also be secretly at work, endeavouring the more surely to effect his ruin, by placing him in so conspicuous and difficult a station, that it was scarcely possible for him to succeed in repressing the claims of the people without being guilty of great oppression; and if he failed, he would plainly have no friends to save him, in either party. In order to disconcert the plans of the tribunes, he summoned all the people to a general muster in the field, at the day and hour fixed for their assembling in the forum to vote upon these laws, threatening to punish disobedience to his orders with a heavy fine. But before that time had arrived, Camillus resigned his office, in consequence of an unfavourable appearance in the auspices. Publius Manlius, the succeeding dictator, appointed Licinius Stolo his master of the horse; and the second of the three objectionable laws, that which restricted the state of each individual to five hundred acres, was carried soon afterwards. It is remarkable that Stolo himself was afterwards convicted of transgressing his own law.

He resigns.

But the great question respecting the election of consuls still remained undecided; and the apprehensions of the senate had not been removed, when intelligence was received that the Gauls were again advancing from the coasts of the Adriatic, with an immense force. They were desolating the country through which they passed, and many of the terrified inhabitants sought for refuge within the walls of the city. The alarm created by this unforeseen danger arrested the progress of internal dissensions, and some of the more popular senators having proposed Camillus as dictator, he was immediately created as it were by acclamation. Notwithstanding his great age, for he was now nearly eighty years old, he did not hesitate to undertake the office conferred upon him. He would not suffer any personal consideration to interfere with the claims of his

But is again  
elected on the  
approach of  
danger.

country; and, without claiming any indulgence for the infirmities of age, immediately made his levies, and entered upon his official duties. By helmets of polished iron, which would break a sword, or make it glance aside, and by a rim of brass round the shield, which would resist the cut of a sabre, by which the wood unarmed would have been cleaved, Camillus equipped his men with arms peculiarly adapted for warfare with the Gauls, who depended chiefly on their swords and the fury of the onset. He also armed his men with long pikes, which were calculated to check the effect of the enemy's swords, and prevent them from coming to such close quarters. B.C. 367.

The Gauls had reached the river Anio, and were only a few miles from Rome, when they first came in sight of the Roman army. Camillus had formed an encampment on a broken and rising ground, where there were many ravines and recesses among the hills, which enabled him to conceal the greater part of his men; while the remainder was posted at the top of an easy ascent, as if afraid to descend into the lower ground and encounter the enemy. In this position the Romans could watch the motions of the enemy, and, by the dictator's command, remain quiet spectators of the depredations and carousals of the Gauls: and when he had observed that part of them were dispersed through the country in foraging parties, he sent out a body of light-armed infantry, before the day had dawned, to harass the enemy, and prevent them from forming in a line; and as soon as daylight appeared, led his heavy-armed troops into the plain, and drew them up in battle array. Advance of  
the Gauls.

The calculations of Camillus, as might be expected from so cautious and experienced a commander, all proved correct. The desultory skirmishing of his light-armed troops continually harassed the Gauls in different quarters, and compelled them to advance in great confusion; and when they rushed tumultuously upon the heavy-armed men, in the main body of the army, their swords were bent or broken by the resistance of the Roman shields and helmets, and their targets pierced by the pikes. Finding their own weapons of so little service, they endeavoured to seize those of the enemy; but their naked bodies had no protection against the swords of the Romans, who therefore soon made great havoc among them. The contest was not long continued: the Gauls fled precipitately over the plain, (for the heights had been secured by Camillus,) and left their camp, open and unguarded, a prey to their enemies. This victory was of importance to the Romans, not merely on account of its immediate consequences, in removing their apprehension of being again overwhelmed by the barbarians; but inasmuch as it taught them no longer to fear those dreaded hordes, and to rely more upon their own superior skill and coolness. Till after this battle, they had considered the Gauls as almost invincible, and had ascribed their Their defeat.

B.C. 367. former successes to a prevailing sickness, or other accidental circumstances injurious to the Gauls, rather than to any superiority of their own.

Triumph of  
Camillus.

A triumph for this victory was decreed to Camillus by the mutual consent both of the senate and people; but a contest awaited him at home which he was less prepared to engage in, than that which he had so happily brought to a termination abroad. The people, presuming upon their late services in the field, insisted more urgently than ever upon having one of the consuls chosen from among the plebeians. The senate was as obstinately resolved not to concede what it considered a violation of a fundamental principle in the constitution of the republic; and, considering the authority of the dictator as useful in repressing the turbulence of the people, they refused to permit Camillus to lay down his office. At length, as he was sitting at his tribunal in the forum, determining causes brought before him, an officer, sent by the tribunes of the people, summoned him to attend them, and laid his hand upon him as if about to carry him by force. This was resented by the patricians present as a most bare-faced insult: the populace vociferated against their driving away the tribunes' officer; and the dictator, to allay the tumult, led the patricians away to the senate. On entering it, he turned towards the Capitol, and made a vow he would dedicate a temple to Concord, if the Gods should bring the prevailing dissensions to a happy conclusion.

After a long and warm debate, the patricians at length yielded to the wishes of the people; and in return required their consent to the appointment of a supreme magistrate within the walls of the city—the prætor—who was always to be chosen from among the noble families. The people, when these decrees of the senate were communicated to them, received them with great satisfaction, and accompanied the dictator to his house with acclamations.

Temple of  
Concord  
erected.

Thus was concord at length re-established, after so long a period of endless contests; and the prayers of Camillus seemed to have been favourably heard. The people passed a vote, fixing upon a spot opposite to the forum, where they held their assemblies, for the site of the temple to Concord, which the dictator had vowed to consecrate: and the senate decreed the celebration of most magnificent games in honour of the Gods, who had, at length, granted internal as well as external peace to the republic.

B.C. 366.

Camillus, in obedience to the decree of the Senate, called an assembly of the people for the election of consuls, after the long suspension of that office under the military tribunes invested with consular authority. The latter office was now finally laid aside; two consuls were chosen, one of whom, Lucius Sextius, who had so long persevered in endeavouring to obtain a decree, by which persons of his rank should be rendered admissible to that honour, was the

One of the  
Consuls  
chosen from  
the Plebeians.

first plebeian by whom it was enjoyed. This was the last public act of Camillus; for, in the following year, Rome being visited with a dreadful pestilence, which carried off most of the magistrates and

B.C. 365.



[Temple of Concord, Rome.—*Venuti, Antichità di Roma.*]

multitudes of the people, he also fell a victim to the malady, not the less sincerely regretted, though his death was so far from premature. His loss was justly considered as irreparable: for he was indeed unrivalled, whether in prosperous or adverse fortune. Before his banishment, he had deserved the highest distinctions; but after his exile, he became still more illustrious, as well by the earnestness with which his countrymen besought him to return, as by the peculiar happiness of being, when returned, the restorer of his country. He not only attained higher honours, and a larger share of glory than almost any one before or since: but, what more rarely happens to those whose eminence and occupations peculiarly expose them to a reverse of fortune, enjoyed the esteem and admiration he so justly merited, through a long course of years; and to the last period of his life, was enabled to exert his talents, virtues, and influence in the service of the state of which, even during his lifetime, he had the glory of being named the second founder.

Death of  
Camillus.

We have hitherto considered rather the public than the private character of Camillus; but the latter was such as has seldom been rivalled, and never surpassed. His boldness and intrepidity were not alloyed by obstinacy or rashness; his magnanimity made him humble in prosperity, and patient under adverse fortune; his patriotism remained unshaken by the ingratitude of his countrymen; his generosity led him to conceal the failings of his opponents; and his piety, though strongly marked, does not appear to have been tainted by superstition. Often placed in a trying position, where his own prejudices, and those of his friends and relations, were likely to give a bias to his judgment, he seems always to have kept

His  
Character.

B.C. 365. the middle path, and secured the rights of the patricians without ever oppressing the plebeians, whose intemperate conduct seemed almost to call for severity. His unbroken equanimity, moderation, and candour, added a brighter lustre to all his other great qualities, and commanded a degree of veneration from his contemporaries, which it has rarely been the lot even of the most virtuous statesmen to enjoy.

During the whole of the long period throughout which Camillus had so large a part in the administration of the Roman government, the public peace was disturbed, either by external wars or internal tumults. He had the happiness before the close of his life, to usher in the commencement of a brighter era; when mutual concessions allayed for a while the ferment of party spirit, and the republic, already recovered from the severe shock sustained by the Gallic invasion, was secure against the hostile schemes of the petty states around her. In the short period of two-and-twenty years after the death of Camillus, so much had the fame and power of the Romans

B.C. 343. been augmented, that their alliance was courted by the Carthaginians; and the people of Campania, placing themselves under their protection, became in fact the subjects of the republic.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Liv. v.—vii. 30. Plutarch in vita Camill. Anc. Univ. Hist. x. 176—224.



[Rome Triumphant — *Franest.*]



[Curtius Leaping into the Gulf.—From a Basso Relievo at the Villa Borghese, Fossi. *Raccolta di Statue.*] 1

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE SAMNITE WARS.

B. C. 365-290

THE great pestilence of which Camillus died continued to B.C. 365. rage; to this calamity was added an overflow of the Tiber, which deluged the lower parts of the city. In cases of public calamity, the Etrurians, it was said, had averted the wrath of the gods, by driving a nail into the temple wall. To perform this ceremony, the Romans specially appointed Lucius Manlius dictator, who took advantage of his position to declare war against the Hernicans; he was, however, obliged to resign his office. (B.C. 363.) To this year is referred the famous legend of M. Curtius. An earthquake had produced a deep gulf in the forum; and vain were all the efforts of the people to fill it up. As the soothsayers had declared, that to effect this, Rome must cast into the chasm the most precious thing she possessed; M. Curtius, a youth who had highly distinguished himself by his bravery on former occasions, declaring that there was nothing more precious than valour, mounted his war horse, and uttering a prayer to the infernal gods, plunged into the gulf, which instantly closed above him, and in its place arose the Curtian lake.

The Legend  
of M.  
Curtius.  
B.C. 363.

Towards the closing years of the great Camillus, and for many

B.C. 363. years succeeding his death, the power of the plebeians gained rapid development. The Licinian law gave them the consulship in

The Licinian Law.  
B.C. 367. In B.C. 356, C. Marcius Rutilus, a plebeian, was raised to the dictatorship; in 351, the same individual gained the censorship; Q. Publilius Philo, was the first plebeian prætor, B.C. 337, while the high dignities of pontifex and augur were opened up to the plebeians,

B.C. 300. B.C. 300, by the Ogulnian laws.

It was fortunate for Rome, that during several of these internal struggles, no powerful enemy was in the field against her. A war, however, against the Hernicans and the Etruscans of Tarquinii sprung up in the year B.C. 358, and the Gauls were soon after added to the number of their enemies. The latter were defeated by the dictator Sulpicius, and the former were finally reduced B.C. 306.

The war with the Etruscans continued to rage for several years. The ingenuity of this people is apparent, from their having put to a practical purpose the terrors of the mythological world. In their campaign against Fabius Ambustus, their army assumed the appearance of the furies, carrying snakes and torches in their hands; and so terrified were the Romans at the appalling spectacle, that they took to flight on the first charge. But on their commander ridiculing their childish fears, they rallied, and repulsed their enemies. The Etruscans after this sustained several defeats, their camp was captured, 8000 prisoners taken, and the rest killed or dispersed. The

The Etruscan and Furies.  
B.C. 345. year B.C. 345, was signalized by the terrible vengeance of the Romans; vast numbers of the Etruscan captives were slaughtered, while three hundred and fifty-eight of the most distinguished, were selected, and hurried off to Rome, where they were scourged and beheaded in the forum. This act of retaliation the Romans committed, to revenge the slaughter of three hundred and seven of their soldiers, whom the Etruscans had taken prisoners and then butchered in cold blood.

The Roman vengeance on the Etruscans.  
The Gallic hordes had not yet made an end of their bold incursions into the Roman territory. Once more did a vast band of these hardy marauders make their appearance in the vicinity of Rome. If driven from one encampment, even with loss, they speedily formed another, and from the mountains where they had taken up their winter quarters, poured down on the neighbouring plains, carrying off much booty. A check was finally put to their depredations by the consul Lucius Furius Camillus, who, with a combined force of Romans and Latins, moved forward to the Pomptine lands, where he encountered and defeated them, B.C. 349. It was in this engagement that the legendary fame of M. Valerius was acquired. This young military tribune had accepted the challenge of a gigantic Gaul to single combat. In the conflict, it is said, that a raven settled upon the helmet of the Roman chief, and by assailing the Gaul with his beak and wings, materially contributed to his victory,

The Defeat of the Gauls.  
B.C. 349. The Legend of Valerius Corvus.

The Defeat of the Gauls.  
B.C. 349. The Legend of Valerius Corvus.

who thenceforth received the surname of Corvus, or "The Raven." This young hero again distinguished himself greatly in a war against the Volscians, B.C. 346, in which, as commander-in-chief, he defeated their army, and stormed the town of Satricum, their stronghold, to which he set fire, after receiving the submission of a body of 4000 soldiers who had taken refuge in that place.

## FIRST SAMNITE WAR.

It was fortunate for Rome, that she had now, by a continual succession of wars, brought into action the great elements of her military grandeur. Her native hardihood had proved itself from the earliest times; the enemies she had encountered were not more various than their modes of fighting, and four centuries of victories and reverses had been consolidating her power, and building up her confidence. Her fullest energies were now to be tasked by a bold and warlike nation. The Samnites, who inhabited a large extent of country, had colonised Lucania and Campania, and surpassed Rome in population and number of allies. Four cantons formed their confederation, which was rendered still more powerful by its steady unity of action. The Sidicinians upon whom the Samnites had made war, had called in the aid of the luxurious Campanians, who being at once defeated in battle, retreated within the walls of Capua. The Samnites, after gaining a vast booty in this rich neighbourhood, and cutting off the best troops of the Campanians, returned homewards with their plunder. The Romans, now called in by the Campanians, who offered to submit to the sovereignty of Rome, made their first appearance in the field B.C. 343. While the consul M. Valerius Corvus proceeded to Campania, A. Cornelius Cossus his colleague, advanced on Samnium. The treacherous defiles of the Appenines proved a perilous track for the army. Suddenly the mountain heights were crowned with the Samnite host, ready to rush down to the valley beneath, where there seemed no hope of escape for the Romans; and their whole force must have been annihilated, had not the devoted bravery of P. Decius Mus and his heroic band held the Samnites in check, by obtaining possession of an important height which commanded their camp, and thus afforded the consul time to draw off his army to more advantageous ground. Decius and his gallant troops had the good fortune on the following day to rejoin the consul, by whom they were received in triumph.

The army of Campania, under Valerius Corvus, fought a still more important action with the Samnites. Corvus had encamped upon Mount Gaurus, where the sovereignty of Italy was decided in favour of the Romans. Notwithstanding the fall of thousands, the Samnites, with indomitable bravery still bore up against the practised hardihood of the Romans till near the close of the day, when a

B.C. 346.

B.C. 343.

Position of  
the  
Samnites.Advance of  
the ConsulsBravery of  
Decius Mus.The action  
on Mount  
Gaurus.



- B.C. 343. furious charge drove them back in disorder to their camp, which they deserted on the ensuing night. The eyes of the Romans, they said, seemed to dart fire, and their features were clothed with the fury of maniacs, an aspect so terrible, that they could not stand before it. The broken Samnite army fell back upon Suessula, and again, with recruited ranks, poured down upon the Campanian plains. It was in this neighbourhood that the two Roman armies, after forming a junction, fell upon the enemy while scattered over the country in foraging parties. Resistance was vain, one vast rout was the result; and 40,000 shields, and 170 standards, bore witness to the greatness of the Roman victory. The consuls were honoured with a triumph; and to crown the glory of the state, ambassadors came from Carthage to congratulate the Romans on their victory, and to present them with a golden crown in token of their valour. The year B.C. 342 was remarkable for a conspiracy of the Roman garrison of Campania, against the wealthy city of Capua, whose inhabitants they designed to murder, and then to found a new state; but happily their scheme was defeated by M. Valerius Corvus, who had been appointed to the office of dictator on this occasion.

Total defeat  
of the  
Samnites.

B.C. 342.  
Conspiracy  
of the  
Roman  
Army.

The whole resources of Rome were now to be called forth in a war against the Latins a nation speaking the same language, and having the same discipline with herself, whose forces had often fought side by side with her own. The Latins, while insisting upon enjoying the same senatorial privileges with the Romans, were, at the same time, desirous of avoiding hostilities by an amicable arrangement; but the proposals of their ambassadors were scornfully rejected by the senate, and the consul Manlius was even heard to declare, that should the Romans suffer Latins to take part in the senatorial deliberations, he himself would cut down the first of that nation whom he saw there.

War against  
the Latins.  
B.C. 340.

War declared  
against the  
Latins.

The Romans, joined by the Samnites, who were now their allies, moved forward against the enemy. The Latin army had taken up a strong position near Mount Vesuvius, and as not a few of their body were intimate with many of the Roman soldiers, the consuls, Manlius and Decius, apprehensive of some treachery, had strictly forbidden any single combat. It happened that a Tusculan officer had insulted and challenged Titus Manlius, the son of the consul, who was in command of a detachment of cavalry. Forgetful of the consul's edict, he accepted the challenge, and in the encounter that followed, the haughty Tusculan chief fell before his lance, and the youthful Manlius laid the spoils at his father's feet. His reception was terrible. The consul, unmoved by paternal feelings, or the generous bravery of the action, sternly condemned his son to death for this breach of military discipline. The main armies soon afterwards joined battle. In the engagement, the superstitious spirit of the age was strongly exemplified. A vision, it was said,

Manlius  
put to  
death.

B.C. 340.

had appeared to both consuls, who agreed, that victory could not be secured without the sacrifice of that commander whose forces should first give way. In the heat of the engagement, the consul Decius seeing his troops waver, after solemnly devoting himself to the infernal gods, rushed amongst the Latins, and fell pierced with innumerable wounds.<sup>1</sup> The Romans, inspired by this patriotic devotion, gained a decisive victory, in which scarcely a fourth part of the enemy escaped. The national resistance of the Latins, however, still continued by the isolated defence of their towns, till, in the year B.C. 338, their subjugation was completed, and their towns were occupied by Roman garrisons.

[Roman Consul.<sup>1</sup>]

## SECOND SAMNITE WAR.

Constant acts of faithlessness and overbearing authority had characterised the conduct of the Romans towards the Samnites, from the year B.C. 340 till B.C. 326, when, on the refusal of the latter to withdraw their garrison from the Greek town of Palæpolis, with which they had long been in alliance, the Romans declared war against them. The command of the army destined to act against Samnium, was undertaken by the dictator, Lucius Papirius Cursor, whose master of the horse was Q. Fabius Maximus. During the absence of the dictator at Rome, Q. Fabius gained a brilliant victory, the Sabines being defeated with the loss of 20,000 men. As Fabius had fought contrary to the express orders of the dictator, he would, but for the powerful defence of the whole army, senate, and people, have been condemned to suffer the extremity of military rigour. The Samnites now obtained a truce for one year; after which the war continued with results unfavourable to them, till the spring of the year B.C. 321, when Rome suffered a terrible defeat in the valley of Caudium. The Samnites had completely surrounded the dangerous defiles of the neighbourhood with immense bodies of troops, and in the fearful engagement that ensued, the Romans too late discovered that there was no passage by which to escape. Half their number was cut to pieces on the spot, and the remainder compelled to capitulate to C. Pontius, the Samnite general. His conduct was worthy of his success. He made the most generous proposals, although he held the Romans completely in his power. The terms accepted by the consuls, who swore in the name of the

The Romans declare War against the Samnites.

B.C. 326.

The Romans defeated at the Caudine Forks.

<sup>1</sup> See Ramsay's *Roman Antiquities*, page 452.

B.C. 305. republic to make peace, were shamefully violated by the Romans. A succession of hard won victories, and some severe occasional reverses, characterised the progress of the Roman arms till the year B.C. 305, when the Samnites, now completely overpowered, acknowledged the supremacy of Rome, and dissolved their alliance with the nations on their frontier. The republic, after signaling its arms by great victories over the Etruscans in the years B.C. 311-312, granted a brilliant triumph to the great Fabius.

The Samnites crushed in the Second War.

### THIRD SAMNITE WAR.

B.C. 298. The Samnites had refrained from war solely because their resources were utterly exhausted, and now in the year B.C. 298, they made an attempt to recover the sovereignty of Lucania, and by proposing treaties of alliance with other nations, endeavoured to strengthen their power. They overran Lucania, and, after defeating the people of the country in several battles, were drawn into a war with Rome. The chiefs of Lucania had placed themselves under the protection of the Romans, who, by their ambassadors, insisted upon the evacuation of that country by the Samnites, and hence the declaration of war by that people. As there was now a truce with Etruria, the two consular armies were enabled to move simultaneously on Samnium B.C. 297, when Q. Fabius encountered the whole force of the Pentrian Samnites, who were defeated with the loss of 4,700 men, while Decius Mus, his colleague, gained an easy victory over the Apulians who had revolted. But the perils of Rome seemed to be ever increasing, only to be ever overcome. A dangerous alliance of the Umbrians and Etruscans, who had engaged in their service large bodies of Gallic mercenaries, and who were to be further assisted by the march of a Samnite army into their territory, rendered very perilous the situation of the Roman army; a favourable battle, however, fought by the united forces of Appius Claudius and L. Volumnius, relieved the fears of the republic. After a series of minor, but hard-fought engagements, a great battle was fought in Umbria. Here the heroic example which had signaled Decius Mus in the war of the Latins, was successfully imitated by his son, who, under the guidance of the pontiff M. Livius, devoted himself to the infernal gods for the good of his country. The Romans, animated by this heroism, utterly routed the crowded masses of the Samnites. This great victory over Gauls and Samnites, of whom 25,000 lay dead on the field of battle, and 80,000 were taken prisoners, was purchased by the loss of 8,200 men. The power of the Samnites, though stubbornly exerted in defence of their country, was every year declining before the persevering attacks of Rome. Another great effort was made by them, under the command of their noble-hearted general, C. Pontius, who had so signally defeated the Romans at the Caudine valley. C.

The Romans insist upon the evacuation of Lucania.

Powerful Etruscan Alliance.

Decius sacrifices himself for his country.


Pontius, though now an aged man, abated none of the prudence in counsel or energy in the field, by which he had been so distinguished. The army of Q. Fabius was disgracefully defeated, and would have been utterly annihilated, had not the excessive caution of the victors weakened the effect of their valour; and Fabius would have been deprived of his command, but for the intercession of his illustrious father, Q. Fabius Maximus.

B.C. 298.  
Q. Fabius defeated by Pontius.

The last great struggle for Samnite independence was made under the eye of their noble general, C. Pontius. The Samnites fought with the fury of despair, and, but for the high military genius of the venerable Fabius, who served in the army of his son in the capacity of legate, must have been victorious. The Roman reserve, under his command, advanced, and turned the fortunes of the day, at the very moment when the forces of the consul were overpowered. The slaughter of 20,000 Samnites, and the capture of 4,000, among whom was the heroic C. Pontius, closed the Samnite war, although a desultory resistance continued during the two following years. Fabius triumphed B.C. 291, when the noble C. Pontius was led in chains, and afterwards beheaded—a foul blot upon the character of the Romans, and a base return for the generosity of Pontius towards the republican army at the peace of Caudium. The interval of peace which ensued after the close of the Samnite war, was soon broken in upon by the war with the Gauls and Etruscans, whose combined forces were defeated with vast slaughter near Lake Vadino. Close upon these eventful scenes, followed the wars with the Lucanians and Bruttians, which were closed only to make way for that with the Tarentines, by which the struggle was transferred from that luxurious people to the warlike Pyrrhus, whose history we are about to relate.

Defeat of the Samnites, and execution of Pontius.  
B.C. 291

Lucanian, Bruttian, and Tarentine War.



[Roman Quadrans.]



## CHAPTER X.

### PYRRHUS.

B. C. 320—272.


Description  
of Epirus.

THE country which gave birth to this celebrated warrior, is formed by nature to be the land of heroes, though few of its natives have found a place in the page of history; for the same physical causes, which rendered the inhabitants of Epirus hardy and enterprising, made them turbulent and ferocious; little disposed by position or habits, to peaceful arts and institutions. In such a country, civilization can only advance by slow degrees; and, though it may produce many an Achilles, will be long before it has a Homer to immortalize his exploits. The whole of Epirus, which stretched from the mountains of Illyricum to the Ambracian gulf, and from the Ionian sea to the borders of Thessaly, is intersected by chains of lofty mountains and innumerable mountain-streams, some of which are considerable rivers, and all present barriers, that, even in modern days, would prove an almost insurmountable obstacle to an invading

army. It was principally occupied by two Pelasgian tribes, the B.C. 320.  
 Thesprotians and the Molossi. The former occupied the northern,  
 the latter the southern, part of the country. Among the latter, Ancestors of  
 according to ancient traditions, Neoptolemus or Pyrrhus, the son of Pyrrhus.  
 Achilles, established himself, and the sovereigns of Epirus pretended  
 to trace their genealogy up to him. Whatever might be their  
 real origin, they appear to have been sunk in the deepest  
 barbarism, till Arybas, the grandfather of him whose history we are  
 now relating, introduced among his subjects the more polished  
 customs, together with the laws and learning of Greece. Arybas B.C. 380.  
 was succeeded by his son Æacidæ, but the Molossi, it seems, gave  
 the preference to the cousins of that prince, son of his paternal uncle  
 Neoptolemus. They dispossessed Æacidæ, placed his nephews on the Design  
 throne, and endeavoured to extirpate his branch of the royal family. against the  
 They did not, however, succeed; for some faithful adherents life of  
 conveyed his infant son, Pyrrhus, with imminent peril and difficulty, to Pyrrhus.  
 Megara, a town of Macedonia; and thence to the court of Glaucias, B.C. 316.  
 the king of Illyria, whose queen was of the family of the Æacidæ.  
 The child, by kneeling in a suppliant posture before the king, and  
 throwing its little arms round the altar dedicated to the household  
 gods, as if imploring their protection, softened the heart of that  
 prince, and made him abandon the thought of giving up the fugitive  
 to his enemies. On the contrary, he rejected an offer of two  
 hundred talents from Cassander, one of the successors of Alexander,  
 and a foe to the Æacidæ, for the surrender of the child, ordered him  
 to be brought up with his own children, and, when he was twelve  
 years old, replaced him on the throne of his ancestors.

But the life of Pyrrhus was a series of vicissitudes. Scarcely five  
 years had elapsed after his restoration to the throne, when his  
 turbulent subjects taking advantage of his absence in Illyria, pillaged Driven from  
 his treasury, and proclaimed his former rival king. Having again his throne,  
 to seek his fortune, Pyrrhus placed himself under the protection of B.C. 301.  
 his brother-in-law, Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, and fighting  
 under his banners at the battle of Ipsus, showed proofs of courage  
 and strength beyond his years. He remained faithful to Demetrius  
 in his adverse fortune, and, in compliance with the treaty between  
 that chief and Ptolemy, went as a hostage to Egypt. Here his many  
 good qualities and powers both of body and mind, recommended  
 him so strongly to Ptolemy and Berenice, his queen, that they gave  
 their daughter Antigone in marriage to him, in preference to many  
 other suitors. This marriage enabled him to recover his throne. which he  
 Through the interest and exertions of Antigone, he obtained recovers.  
 resources, together with a force sufficient for a descent upon the  
 coast of Epirus; and when he had reached it, found his subjects  
 ready to receive him with open arms; for the tyrannical conduct of  
 his rival, had made them desirous of changing masters. Pyrrhus,

- B.C. 297. who well knew the unsteady character of his countrymen, had too much prudence to trust entirely to their present zeal in his favour; instead of endeavouring to expel Neoptolemus he made a treaty
- B.C. 295. with him, by which he associated him with himself in the kingdom. Their friendship, however, did not last long,—Pyrrhus discovered that Neoptolemus was secretly plotting his assassination, and being assured that the chief people in Epirus wished to see him sole regent, did not hesitate to despatch his rival at an entertainment to which he had incautiously come.



[Greek Table arranged for a Feast —Bardon.]

- The removal of his colleague left Pyrrhus entire master of the power and resources of his kingdom, and a wider field soon presented
- B.C. 324. itself for the development of his ambitious views. At the division of the empire among his generals, after the death of Alexander,<sup>1</sup> Macedonia was assigned to Antipater, and his son Cassander succeeded to the sovereignty about ten years after the death of his father, by vanquishing Polysperchon whom Antipater had appointed
- B.C. 311. his successor. His son Antipater, who succeeded him, put to death his mother, Thessalonica, sister of Alexander the Great, on account of her attachment to the interests of his brother Alexander, and drove that prince out of his kingdom. Alexander applied for
- B.C. 297. assistance to Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, who was then sovereign of the greater part of Asia Minor. Demetrius could not

<sup>1</sup> Vide Life of Alexander in the History of Greece and Macedonia.

immediately give him the aid he wanted: he therefore turned to Pyrrhus, who bargained for all the sea-coast of Macedonia, together with Ambracia, Acarnania, and Amphilochia; the latter countries not originally belonging to Macedon. Pyrrhus first secured those places, for the cession of which he had bargained, and then continued to drive Antipater before him, and put Alexander in possession of the conquered places. Lysimachus, to whom Thrace had been allotted in the division of the empire among the generals of Alexander, would willingly have aided Antipater, had his other engagements allowed it. He, however, forged letters from Ptolemy to Pyrrhus, urging him to receive 300 talents, and evacuate Macedonia. The latter immediately detected the forgery, but listened to the proposal. The princes met together to ratify the peace by a sacrifice; but Pyrrhus refused to take the oath required, in consequence of the sudden death of one of the victims, which was interpreted by his diviners as foretelling the death of the three sovereigns. This prediction was soon verified; for Demetrius, who had now leisure to attend to Alexander's request, came to offer the assistance no longer needed. His presence, therefore, created suspicion, instead of gratitude; and, after a few days had passed, the two chiefs began to devise schemes for the destruction of each other: Demetrius was the most vigilant, or the most fortunate of the two, and anticipated the blow prepared for him, by putting Alexander to death, and proclaiming himself king of Macedon.

B.C. 296.  
Conquers  
part of  
Macedon.

B.C. 295.

This was an unpropitious event for Pyrrhus, as he had claims on the gratitude of Alexander, but none on that of Demetrius, who was in other respects a formidable opponent, already provoked by his inroads into Thessaly. He was, indeed, the brother-in-law of Demetrius, and had in early life been his faithful adherent, but after the death of Deidamia, the sister of Pyrrhus, the former bond of amity was broken, and Macedon, of which each claimed a part, was now the source of unceasing contention. They both set out with the intention of attacking each other, but each inadvertently mistook his adversary's route; and Pyrrhus, falling in with Pantauchus, a general left by Demetrius in command of his forces in Ætolia, defeated him after a severe battle, in which the two commanders engaged in single combat, and Pyrrhus gained extraordinary applause for his strength, skill, and resolution. Pantauchus, who was the most celebrated of all the officers of Demetrius, would have fallen, had he not been rescued by his friends before Pyrrhus could strike the last blow. The subjects of the latter, or rather his soldiers, for they were the only subjects which such princes as Pyrrhus and most of his contemporaries took into account, were delighted by the spirit and enterprise of their sovereign; and called him "an Eagle," in consequence of his victory over Pantauchus.

Attacks  
Demetrius.

B.C. 291.

Battle with  
Pantauchus.



B.C. 291. He modestly answered, "If I am an eagle it is you who have made me one; for it is on your wings that I have soared."

Overruns  
Macedon.

A report of Demetrius's being dangerously ill, soon afterwards led Pyrrhus to overrun a great part of Macedon, but it was only a predatory incursion, and did not give him an opportunity of augmenting his territories. Demetrius, almost as soon as his enemy had retired within his own limits, concluded a peace with him, being anxious to turn his whole attention to the recovery of his hereditary dominions. But that unexpected measure, together with the vast preparations made by Demetrius, alarmed the princes whom he meant to attack, and they prevailed upon Pyrrhus to join them in the invasion of his territory. Ptolemy, by a powerful naval armament, made a diversion in the maritime states of Greece; Lysimachus invaded the northern part of Macedonia, from Thessaly:

B.C. 290.  
Takes  
Beræa.

and Pyrrhus having marched across the country to Beræa, took it and established his head-quarters there. When intelligence of these movements reached Demetrius, he found that a spirit of disaffection had crept into his army, and fearing to oppose a Macedonian chief of high reputation, such as Lysimachus was, he changed his course, and marching back to the south, prepared to attack the Epirotes: but the emissaries of Pyrrhus were already at work, and the Macedonian army showed a strong disposition to place itself under his orders. Demetrius, in short, after receiving some intelligible hints of the fate which awaited him, thought it prudent to retire from his camp, concealed in a very humble disguise. His whole army immediately submitted to Pyrrhus without striking a single blow.

Divides  
Macedon  
with  
Lysimachus.  
B.C. 289.

But he did not long continue sole possessor of the kingdom of Macedon. Lysimachus, whose claims to the attachment of the Macedonians had been considered by Demetrius himself as stronger than those of Pyrrhus, was not disposed to waive them, merely because that prince had fled before he came up; and Pyrrhus, who felt the very insecure tenure by which he held his newly-acquired dominions, did not venture to provoke the rivalry of such an opponent. They, therefore, by mutual agreement, divided the kingdom of Macedon between them; and by that measure, for the present, avoided any rupture. Though, as Plutarch justly observes, it was but a temporary expedient; and it was impossible for two men of such ungovernable and unrestrained ambition, to remain long, when near neighbours, without cause for mutual complaint and jealousy.

Shortly after the division of Macedonia with Lysimachus, we find Pyrrhus opposing the reviving power of Demetrius, and then soon afterwards concluding a peace with him; when he had regained possession of a part of Macedon. But no sooner had he returned into Asia, than Pyrrhus, at the persuasion of Lysimachus, again seduced the Macedonians from their allegiance; and continued in

possession of Thessaly till the final overthrow of Demetrius in Syria, B.C. 289. enabled Lysimachus to turn his forces against the ally who had assisted him in depressing his rival. He found Pyrrhus encamped near Edessa; distressed him by cutting off his supplies; and soon prevailed on the Macedonians to transfer their allegiance from a prince who was a foreigner, to himself who had been the friend and companion of Alexander. Pyrrhus, having himself experienced the willingness with which the Macedonians listened to such suggestions, B.C. 286. withdrew in time with his Epirotes and auxiliaries, and lost Macedonia exactly in the same manner as he had gained it not very long before. Loses it to Lysimachus.

He might now have cultivated the arts of peace; but from those arts, fortune, habit, and disposition, had alike estranged him: and it must be acknowledged that the nature of the country, as well as the character of the people whom he was born to govern, were not such as could be expected to suggest pacific views; and circumstances soon opened to him a sphere for the exercise of his warlike talents and inclinations, admirably suited to his enterprising character. In order to understand the events which we are now about to relate, it will be necessary to turn our eyes to Italy, and recapitulate the transactions which had intervened between the death of Camillus and the time upon which we are now entering. State of Italy The Roman republic, which a little more than a century before, had been nearly overwhelmed by the Gauls (see Camillus), and had several times appeared to be on the point of sinking under intestine discord, had now become one of the most powerful of the Italian states; engaged as a neighbour or an ally, in war or amity, with the remotest of the numerous powers which occupied the peninsula. This sudden B.C. 290. rise of the republic from the narrow limits and contracted sphere to which her power and influence had been hitherto restricted, was owing, in a great measure, to the prudent concessions of the patricians; which strengthened the bonds by which the different orders in the state were united, reconciled the Roman people to their magistrates, and by securing them against internal enemies, enabled them to turn all their energies against their foes from without, who soon yielded, one after another, to their victorious armies. But it B.C. 353. was particularly towards the south, that the territories and dominion of the republic were enlarged. Some of the towns in that quarter, voluntarily submitted to her authority; and the Samnites sought her alliance. But eleven years afterwards, the people of Campania, having been defeated by the Samnites, their immediate neighbours, threw themselves on the protection of Rome: this dissolved the B.C. 342. former alliance between the Romans and the Samnites, and involved Samnite War. them in a war which was carried on at intervals for more than sixty years. It was at length terminated by the submission of the Samnites after the loss of Pontius, their able general, and repeated defeats.

B.C. 290. The terms upon which the Romans granted the peace, which the Samnites solicited, are not known; but the character and condition of the parties, as well as the subsequent events in the south of Italy, clearly show that they were such as secured the preponderance of Rome.

Tarentum. The country to the east of Samnium, was occupied by colonies from Greece; and Tarentum, a city in Iapygia, on the coast of what has been called the heel of Italy, was at that time in a very flourishing state. Its inhabitants were originally Spartans; but not having adopted the rigorous laws of the mother country, they were attached to the arts and luxuries of the more polished states of Greece, and if the accounts of the Roman writers are to be trusted, were immersed in the most wanton voluptuousness. The mountains of Apulia might have long been a sufficient protection to a state separated by them from Campania and the other countries to the west; but the progress of the Roman arms, and probably the severe character of the Roman people, awakened the jealousy and hostility of the Tarentines. Before any direct cause of hostility had arisen, the people of Tarentum endeavoured, by secret intrigues, to involve the Romans in a state of warfare with all their immediate neighbours; and when the Roman admiral accidentally appeared with a fleet before the entrance of their harbour, they attacked him without any provocation, took several of his ships, and made a great slaughter, the admiral himself being among those who fell. The Romans immediately sent a deputation to demand satisfaction for this unprovoked injury; but the Tarentines received them, or rather dismissed

Aggression  
of the  
Tarentines.

B.C. 281. them, unheard, with the grossest insults. Posthumius, the head of the Roman deputation, withdrew, uttering these indignant words, "Laugh on now, inhabitants of Tarentum, the time will soon come when your laughter will be changed into tears. It is not a few drops of blood which will suffice to wash away these insults." Conscious of their own inability to avert the vengeance of Rome, the Tarentines sent an embassy to ask the assistance of Pyrrhus, and finding him disengaged by any war at home, they readily obtained what they hardly dared to expect.

Apply to  
Pyrrhus.

Cineas, the Thessalian orator, a disciple of Demosthenes, not unworthy of his master, was despatched by Pyrrhus to Tarentum, with three thousand infantry under his command; and twenty thousand more, together with three thousand cavalry, two thousand archers, five hundred slingers, and twenty elephants, were soon afterwards embarked on board a large fleet of transports sent by the Tarentines to receive them. This vast armament was dispersed in the mid-channel by a violent gale of wind from the north. The vessel which carried Pyrrhus himself, with great difficulty made the Italian shores; but was met by an adverse breeze from the land, as she stood in, and was in imminent danger of being again driven out

to sea. Pyrrhus, impatient of being thus thwarted, boldly threw himself overboard, and very narrowly escaped, in a stormy sea, on a dark tempestuous night. By break of day, however, he and his friends reached the shore, where they were assisted by the Messapians, inhabitants of that coast, and joined by the crews of a few of his ships, so that he was enabled to march on to Tarentum at the head of a small force, about two thousand foot, some cavalry, and a couple of elephants.

Pyrrhus at  
Tarentum.

Cineas, who had not been idle while waiting for his master, but had prevailed upon the Tarentines to give him possession of their citadel and the supreme command of their troops, marched out, as soon as he heard of the approach of Pyrrhus, to meet him. The Tarentines, though rejoiced to receive their great ally, were little inclined to make any considerable sacrifice in order to ensure success in the war; and instead of troubling themselves more about it, were contented with declaiming against the enemy in their popular assemblies or their public walks, leaving the whole management and labour of the campaign to Pyrrhus and his generals. As soon as his scattered ships were pretty well re-assembled, and most of his troops had been safely landed, he began to assume a severer tone with his new friends, whose good will he had hitherto cultivated by an entire acquiescence in their wishes; and finding that they would never be brought to a serious attention to the state of their affairs, so long as they could indulge in the luxurious pleasures to which they were devoted, he caused the public places of amusement to be closed, and even abridged their hours of private relaxation. Musters and reviews were substituted for spectacles and banquets; and the Tarentines found that the orders of the king must be implicitly obeyed. So little were they accustomed to such a rigorous system, that many of them abandoned the place, considering such an abridgment of their habitual indulgences as a most intolerable slavery.

Supineness  
of the  
Tarentines.

The Romans, in the meantime, were preparing to punish the insolence and temerity of these Grecian colonists. The consul, Lævinus, marched at the head of a large army into Lucania, desolating the country through which he passed. The Tarentines had promised, when they asked for the assistance of Pyrrhus, to collect an army of more than three hundred thousand men; but they seemed little likely to realize these splendid promises. Few, if any, of their confederates appeared; nevertheless, he determined to take the field with the small force he had, rather than suffer the Romans to advance. But before he commenced hostilities, he sent a herald with a letter to the consul, offering, in haughty terms, to act as mediator between the citizens of Rome and Tarentum. Lævinus answered, that the Romans neither accepted his mediation, nor feared his hostility. Pyrrhus, therefore, advanced immediately, and

Activity of  
the Romans.

B.C. 280.

B.C. 281. cantoned his army on the plains which extend obliquely across the peninsula, from Heraclea on the eastern to Pandosia on the western sea. The Romans were not far off, stationed on the other side of the river Siris; and when Pyrrhus reconnoitred their camp, he expressed his surprise to Megacles, one of his generals who accompanied him, observing, that "the order of these barbarians was far from barbarous; but," he added, "we shall soon know what they are indeed." He now perceived that it would be necessary to wait for his allies, and stationed outposts on the river, to prevent the Romans from effecting a passage. This, however, they succeeded in doing, and the outposts of the army were obliged to retreat upon their main body, in order to avoid being cut off. Pyrrhus, when informed of this, advanced with his cavalry, in number about three thousand, hoping to surprise the Romans before they had recovered from the disorder occasioned by their passage over the river: but when he beheld their shields glittering in the sun above the surface of the water, and their cavalry passing the stream in regular order, as if on land, he discovered his error, and immediately commenced the attack. His cavalry was probably inferior in numbers to that of the Romans, and though he himself was in the heat of the engagement, encouraging his men by extraordinary acts of valour and presence of mind, yet his troops began at length to give way.

Battle near  
the Siris.

B.C. 279. On this he sent orders for his infantry to advance: and after a very long and dubious struggle, having been victorious and repulsed seven times, they turned the fortune of the day against the Romans. They were indebted, in all probability, more to the confusion and alarm occasioned by their elephants, which the horses of the Roman cavalry could not be brought to face, than to any superiority of valour, skill, or numbers. With respect to the latter, Pyrrhus had probably, as was before observed, the disadvantage; and that supposition is corroborated by the accounts of the numbers who fell in this action, where the excess on the side of the Romans, according to all accounts, is very great, and such as could scarcely have arisen, in so hard fought a battle, had not their forces been much the most numerous at the onset.

Coolness of  
Pyrrhus.

Pyrrhus, on this occasion, gave abundant proofs of that coolness and intrepidity for which he has been so much celebrated. Though constantly in the hottest of the engagement, he never lost his presence of mind, but gave his orders and changed his station as deliberately as if he were merely a spectator of the action. The splendour and peculiar beauty of his armour rendered him extremely conspicuous, and in the earlier part of the battle, he had many narrow escapes. Leonatus, the Macedonian, having observed one of the Italians very intent upon his master, always watching his movements, following him wherever he went, and letting every one else pass unnoticed—came up to Pyrrhus, and entreated him to be

on his guard against this man: and while he was cautioning the king, the Roman spurring his horse, and coming towards them at full speed, threw a spear, which missed Pyrrhus, but struck his horse: Leonatus, at that very instant struck the horse of the Roman, and both horses fell at the same time. Pyrrhus was immediately removed by his friends, and his opponent hewn in pieces. This imminent peril rendered Pyrrhus somewhat more cautious, and he exchanged his armour and accoutrements with Megacles, one of his favourite generals. The latter now became the great object at which most of the Romans aimed, and it was not long before he was brought to the ground. His robe and helmet were immediately carried to the consul, who had them passed along the ranks, as in triumph. The Roman army was filled with exultation, the Epirotes with consternation and grief, till Pyrrhus, informed of their alarm, rode about uncovered, calling out to his soldiers, and encouraging them by the well-known sound of his voice.

The Romans were obliged to abandon their camp, and make an immediate retreat; many of their confederates went over to the enemy, or were plundered by his victorious army; and he advanced to Præneste, within forty miles of Rome; but it was a dear-bought victory, for he lost many of his best troops and most able generals, a loss which he could never replace. Besides this irreparable injury, he was now removed to a distance from the coast, and surrounded by allies on whom little dependence could be placed. The Roman government, on the other hand, was not at all dismayed by this reverse of fortune, but made fresh levies with renewed alacrity, and assumed even a more menacing tone. Pyrrhus, therefore, was more inclined to terminate the war by a peace, creditable to himself, such as it was likely the Romans would, at the present conjuncture, grant, than to attempt their subjugation, for which his army and actual resources were not adequate. In consequence of these views, he commissioned Cineas to proceed, as his ambassador to Rome, and empowered him to enter into a negotiation with the Senate. The terms he offered were extremely favourable: the release of all his prisoners without ransom, and his assistance to the Romans in the conquest of Italy, on condition of obtaining their friendship for himself, and security for the Tarentines. The speciousness of these terms inclined many of the senators to listen to them favourably; the more so, as several of the southern states of Italy had already joined Pyrrhus, and his success was likely to increase the number of his adherents: but the question was decided by the firmness and energy of one man, Appius Claudius. His family and character placed him high in the estimation of his fellow citizens; but his great age and loss of sight had caused him to withdraw from attendance on public business: his appearance, therefore, in the Senate, into which he was led by his children,

B.C. 279.

Romans  
retreat.Mission of  
Cineas.Romans  
listen  
favourably  
to Pyrrhus.

B.C. 279. raised an anxious expectation in the whole body, who listened with eager attention to the sentiments which he uttered. He told them that "he should rejoice, were he now as deaf as he was blind, and unable to hear the shameful reports of their intended measures, so destructive of the glory of Rome. That it was now in vain for them to boast that, had Alexander invaded Italy instead of Asia, his career would have terminated in disgrace, since they were panic-struck by Chaonians and Molossians, who had always been vanquished by the Macedonians. That it was equally vain to hope for advantage from an alliance with this man, who could not keep even a part of Macedon by the aid of that force, with which he now talked of conquering Italy.—Nothing, therefore, could be expected from an alliance with Pyrrhus except insult and contempt; for who would not despise Rome, if she suffered him to escape unpunished for his insolence, and gave up to him the Samnites and Tarentines as a compensation for his audacity!"

Romans  
reproved by  
Appius  
Claudius.

Mission of  
Fabricius

This spirited appeal had an instantaneous effect, and produced an unanimous vote for the continuance of the war; Cineas was desired to tell his master "that if he wished to obtain the friendship of the Romans, he must first quit Italy; but that he would be opposed with all their force, as long as he continued there in arms, though he should defeat ten thousand Lævinus's." Soon after the dismissal of Cineas, they sent Fabricius to treat with Pyrrhus for the ransom and exchange of prisoners: such was his confidence in the honour of his enemies, that he allowed his captives to accompany the envoy back to Rome, on condition that they should return after having celebrated the Saturnalia, if the Senate still refused to enter into terms with him. They proved themselves worthy of his confidence, and subsequently owed their final liberation to that generous disdain of a secret and treacherous warfare, which distinguished the Romans of those days so advantageously from their more polished neighbours the Greeks. Fabricius, soon afterwards, returning from his mission to Pyrrhus, was made consul, and, while in office, sent a letter to that prince, enclosing one from his physician, offering to rid them of their enemy by administering a dose of poison to him, if a suitable compensation should be made. Pyrrhus, who was not wanting either in generosity or gratitude, was now, more than ever, desirous of making peace with the Romans; and again despatched Cineas to make a fresh proposition to the Senate. He also delivered up all his prisoners without requiring any ransom. The Senate still refused to listen to any terms till the Greek troops had been withdrawn from Italy, and Pyrrhus had returned to Epirus; but to show their unwillingness to receive a reward for a mere act of integrity, sent back an equal number of Samnites and Tarentines in exchange for the Romans whom he had liberated.

Second  
Mission of  
Cineas

B.C. 278.

There is no period, perhaps, in the whole of their history, when

the excellences of the Roman character were more strikingly exemplified than that in which these events took place; and to a prince like Pyrrhus, who was animated by a congenial spirit, those admirable qualities must have shone with a still brighter lustre, when contrasted with the vices which almost universally disgraced the Grecian courts established on the ruins of the Macedonian empire. Policy, as well as curiosity, prompted him to wish for an intimate acquaintance with the government and manners of the Romans; his envoy, Cineas, was commissioned to seize every opportunity of obtaining information on those points, and his report only increased the surprise and admiration of his master. "The Senate," said Cineas, "appears like an assemblage of kings: and the men capable of military service are so numerous, that the consul has already on foot an army twice as large as that which you defeated, and leaves multitudes behind him capable of making up for any loss." But the fearlessness and disinterestedness of Fabricius, still further increased the esteem which Pyrrhus felt for the national character of his adversaries. He had been told by Cineas, that this illustrious Roman was as poor as he was intrepid and upright. The king, therefore, hoped to gratify him by the offer of large sums, "as a pledge," he said, "of his regard, not with any sinister design." But Fabricius, proud of his poverty, rejected the offer. On the following day, Pyrrhus, at a conference held with the Roman envoy, caused his largest elephant, concealed behind a curtain, to be suddenly disclosed completely armed, and caused by its keeper to roar, as it waved its trunk over the head of Fabricius. Though he had never before seen one of those huge animals, neither the suddenness nor the novelty of the sight occasioned any emotion, but turning to Pyrrhus, who was aware of the predicament in which he was placed, said, with a smile, "Your gold could not move me yesterday, nor can your beast to-day!" Pyrrhus was so much struck with the judgment and integrity of his guest, that he privately urged him to come, after having concluded the treaty, and settle in Epirus, promising to give him the first command in his army, and make him his most confidential friend. To this Fabricius very calmly replied, "But this would be of no advantage to you, O king; for when they, who now honour and admire you, had known me by experience, they would rather have me than you to reign over them." Pyrrhus received this answer as became a man of a great mind, without the paltry resentment or mortification which a tyrant would have felt, and related it to his friends as a fresh proof of the exalted sentiments of Fabricius. When it is considered in what courts Pyrrhus received his education, and what examples he had continually before his eyes, his own temper and magnanimity in listening (without impatience) to such truths, are hardly less worthy of our admiration than the sublimer virtues of Fabricius himself.

Magnanimity  
of Fabricius.



B.C. 278.  
Battle of  
Asculum.

The consuls to whose lot it fell to carry on the war against Pyrrhus, found him encamped near a small town in Apulia, called Asculum. As each party was equally willing to try their fortune, it was not long before an engagement took place; but historians differ so much in their accounts of this battle, that nothing respecting it can be ascertained with certainty, except its having been nearly a drawn battle, fought with great obstinacy on both sides, but terminated rather in favour of Pyrrhus than of the Romans. His final success in this as well as the former engagement, has been ascribed to the terrors with which his elephants struck the horses of the Roman cavalry. He had not however much cause for exultation, and, when congratulated by his officers on his success, exclaimed, "Another such victory and we are undone!" He had, indeed, a far less cheering prospect before him, than that which consoled the Romans for their defeat. His confederates were cold and heartless; his faithful soldiers and adherents, with the exception of a small number, had fallen; and he was far from his own kingdom, which alone could replace his losses: while the Romans were backed by all the vast resources of the republic, and seemed only to gather fresh strength and ardour from every disaster.

A battle so doubtful in its results afforded no encouragement to either party, and both seemed inclined, for a time at least, to suspend hostilities. At that conjuncture, Pyrrhus received an invitation

Invited to  
Sicily.

from Sicily, to assist in driving the Carthaginians out of that island: a proposal flattering to him in every respect, and the more gratifying, as it would give him a plea for attacking the Carthaginians, whose subjugation, on the first favourable opportunity, he had long projected. He received,




[Coin of Sicily.—*Hunterian Museum.*]

at the same time, accounts of the death of Ptolemy Ceraunus, who fell in a battle against the Gauls, and of the defenceless state of Macedonia under the successors of that prince. Sound policy would certainly have prompted Pyrrhus to return immediately to Epirus, where he might have indulged his thirst for glory and power, by adding Macedonia to his hereditary dominions: he could thus have obtained a territory of considerable extent, and far more capable of being preserved entire, than any conquests at a distance from Greece. But his ambition was of too vast and enterprising a character to be checked by considerations of prudence and expedience; he therefore, not without hesitation, and much regret at

being unable to engage in both enterprises at once, gave the preference to Sicily; despatched Cineas to prepare the Sicilians for his reception, and set sail after placing a strong garrison in Tarentum, much against the will of the citizens, who had now discovered their folly in calling in the assistance of a prince perpetually engaged in schemes of conquest and ambition. B.C. 278.

Syracuse, the capital of the island, Agrigentum, midway between its southern and western extremities, and the city of the Leontines, a little to the north of Syracuse, had been offered to Pyrrhus by the ambassadors sent to invite him over from Italy. The remaining places not possessed by Carthage, submitted to him with little difficulty, and he was soon at the head of an armament consisting of thirty thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and a fleet of two hundred sail. With this powerful force he was enabled B.C. 277.  
State of  
Sicily.



[Ancient War Fort and Battering Ram, after *Bardon*.]

to drive the enemy before him, and resolved to storm Eryx, the strongest fortress which the Carthaginians possessed in the island. When the scaling ladders were fixed, he was the first who mounted, Eryx taken. and, what appears incredible, received no injury, though in the hottest of the assault. The numbers who fell by his hand are said to have been so great as to form a complete rampart around him. The city was taken, and magnificent games in honour of Hercules

B.C. 277. were celebrated in fulfilment of a vow made by Pyrrhus at the commencement of this enterprise.

This was not the only signal success which attended the arms of Pyrrhus in Sicily. Of all the inhabitants of that island, there were none who opposed a more formidable barrier to the advancement of the Grecian colonies, than the Mamertines established near Messena. The name of this tribe, which was derived from *Mamors* or *Mavors*, (Mars) indicated their warlike character. After having taken Eryx, Pyrrhus turned his principal force against this people; seized and put to death the agents appointed to collect their revenues; defeated their troops in a pitched battle, and shut them up within the walls of Messena.

Prepares to  
invade  
Carthage.

The Carthaginians had now only one fortress left in the island Lilybæum, near the western promontory; they were therefore anxious to secure what yet remained by a timely sacrifice; and made an offer of peace on very advantageous terms; but Pyrrhus, who was more inclined to conquest than negotiation, spurned their offers, and answered that no terms would be received short of their entire evacuation of Sicily. His favourite plan of invading the territory of Carthage, seemed now on the point of being realized; and instead of endeavouring to complete the liberation of Sicily from foreign and domestic enemies,—the object for which he had been invited into the island; he turned his whole attention to the equipment of a fleet for the invasion of Africa. He had a sufficient number of ships, but wanted seamen; and proceeded to levy mariners from all the maritime towns with extreme rigour, inflicting a severe punishment on those who did not comply with his demands. At his first arrival in the island, he had pursued the same line of policy in Sicily, as he had previously done at Tarentum: charming every one by his pliancy and affability, and apparently earnest desire to second all their views and projects. This produced the effect he intended, and obtained for him an unbounded confidence: but as soon as he thought his power sufficiently established, he threw off the mask, and began to govern according to those principles of military despotism, which may secure the obedience, but can never conciliate the affection of the subject. The Sicilians were little disposed to submit without murmuring, to such tyrannical conduct. They perceived that he was now pursuing his own measures, not theirs; that their troops were going to fight his battles, and that in case of any reverse, they should be still liable to the evil of being hemmed in between two enemies, as neither the Carthaginians nor Mamertines had been completely expelled. But his conduct towards Thænon and Sostratus, the two popular leaders at whose suggestion he had been invited into the island, was that which justly raised the suspicion and indignation of the Sicilians to the highest pitch. To the friendship and influence of those two

men Pyrrhus owed all his power in Sicily; but that very influence excited his suspicion, he determined therefore to compel them to accompany him in his expedition against Carthage. Sostratus withdrew before these intentions could be executed; but Thænon, who had been still more serviceable, was seized by Pyrrhus as an accomplice in a conspiracy with Sostratus, and condemned to death. These iniquitous proceedings completely changed the face of his affairs; some of the Sicilian towns joined the Carthaginians; others united with the Mamertines; he was deserted by all but his Epirotes; and instead of being able to attempt the subversion of Carthage, he was glad to avail himself of an application from his allies in Italy, for assistance, as a creditable excuse for retiring from Sicily. He is said, when looking back, as he sailed away from the island, to have exclaimed, "what a field are we leaving for the Romans and Carthaginians!"

Pyrrhus  
evacuates  
Sicily.

His passage to Italy was disastrous: the Carthaginians took several of his ships; and ten thousand Mamertines, posted in the defiles of the mountains through which he had to march in his way to Tarentum, harassed his rear, cutting off two of his elephants. He hastened back to their assistance, and exposed himself in the most daring manner, though aware of the experience and rancour of the enemy. Having received a sabre-wound on his head, he was obliged to withdraw from the action for a short time, when one of the Mamertines, remarkable for his bulk and the splendour of his arms, advanced considerably beyond his own party, and dared Pyrrhus, if alive, to engage with him in single combat. The king, incensed in the highest degree, instantly returned with his guards, and with his face crimson with blood, and a terrific expression of countenance, rushing through the midst of his men, before the barbarian could raise his arm, aimed a blow at his head with such strength of arm, and so excellent a blade, that he severed his enemy's body at one blow, the two halves falling on opposite sides at the same instant. This achievement filled the barbarians with astonishment and terror; Pyrrhus appeared to them like some superior being, and they did not dare to advance a step further. He was, therefore, enabled to pursue his march without molestation. He reached Tarentum at the head of twenty thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry; and having taken the best of the Tarentine troops, marched, without halting, into the country of the Samnites, where the Romans were encamped.

B.C. 275.  
Returns to  
Italy.

Combat with  
the  
Mamertine.

During his absence, the consuls had several times defeated the Samnites, so that their spirit was almost broken; they likewise resented the treatment they had experienced from Pyrrhus, who left them a prey to their enemies while he was pursuing his schemes of conquest in Sicily: few therefore joined his standard when he returned into their country. One of the consuls was at this time

State of  
Samnium.

B.C. 275. encamped near Beneventum, in the country of the Hirpini; the other was further to the south, in Lucania. Pyrrhus, therefore, sent a detachment from his army in that direction to occupy the attention of the one, while he marched with the main body to attack the other, who was stationed in Samnium.

As the Epirotes and Tarentines could have no chance of final success, unless they made an attack before the consul was joined by his colleague, that was the first and great object which they had to effect. Pyrrhus, therefore, having selected the bravest of his men and his best elephants, marched forward under cover of the night, in hope of taking the enemy by surprise. But the circuitous route, and wild woody country through which it lay, together with the darkness of the night, after the lights were extinguished, so impeded his progress, that the dawn had appeared before he reached the heights surrounding the Roman camp. The sudden appearance of the enemy threw the Romans at first into a considerable alarm, but as the auguries were favourable, the consul, Manlius Curius, sallied forth to meet the enemy without delay, attacked his vanguard, and put it to flight. Dismay and confusion spread rapidly through the army of Pyrrhus: some of his elephants were taken, and he lost a considerable number of his men. Manlius was encouraged by his success to hazard a regular engagement, and drew up his men in the plain. One of his wings defeated the enemy, but the other was borne down by the elephants; and driven back to the entrenchment before the camp. The consul, in this emergency, called forth his reserve, who, from the heights where they were stationed, pouring a shower of javelins upon the enemy's elephants, in the plain below, compelled them to fly. The retreat of those vast animals was as fatal to the force upon which they retreated, as their advance had previously been to the Romans. The victorious troops of Pyrrhus were driven back and thrown into disorder; while the Romans, taking advantage of their confusion, pressed onwards till they remained complete masters of the field. The valour and struggle of that day, as Plutarch justly remarks, not only secured to the Romans present victory, but subsequently, the empire of the world; for they thenceforward learned to consider themselves, and were considered by others, as invincible.

B.C. 274. By this defeat, the flattering hopes of conquest and dominion with which Pyrrhus had entered Italy, were for ever cut off. His army, after all his losses, was still considerable; and he is said to have returned to Epirus at the head of more than eight thousand men. But the resources of his hereditary states were not equal to the expense of maintaining such an army; he was, therefore, driven to the expedient of engaging in another war, for the purpose of replenishing his treasury; and the circumstances in which the northern parts of Greece and Asia were at this time placed, afforded

Battle of  
Beneventum.

Pyrrhus  
returns to  
Epirus.

him an opportunity of executing his wishes. Those fine countries B.C. 274. were, at the period which we are now engaged in describing, in a state of much confusion, from large, but scattered tribes of Gauls, who had migrated thither in that and the preceding age, and had, while Pyrrhus was employed in Italy, committed extensive ravages in Greece. He now associated with his troops one of the largest of these barbarian hordes, and placing himself at their head, marched into Macedonia, at that time under the government of Antigonus.

His views, as had often been the case, were altered by the circumstances in which he found himself placed. The conquest of several towns, and the unexpected increase of his army by two thousand men, who deserted from Antigonus, encouraged him to attack the king of Macedon. He found him in a narrow defile in the mountains; succeeded, after a severe conflict with a body of Gauls in the Macedonian service, in getting possession of his elephants; engaged the phalanx, the flower of the Macedonian army, to come over to him, by calling upon them as friends and companions in arms, and reduced his adversary to the necessity of flying with the wreck of his army. Thus was Pyrrhus, who had entered Macedon solely with the intention of making a predatory incursion and retiring with his booty, once more unexpectedly master of that kingdom. A few of the maritime towns which still preserved their allegiance to Antigonus, were soon afterwards taken by Pyrrhus; and he was now more entirely sovereign of Macedonia than he had ever been before. Such were the continual vicissitudes of his fortune, and so frequently were those unhappy countries then exposed to the evil of a change of masters, with all its concomitant train of new favourites to be gratified, new contributions to be raised, new levies to be furnished, and new armies to be maintained.

The uncertain tenure by which Macedonia was held, and the B.C. 273. advantages which its proximity to Epirus afforded, were circumstances which would have led a more cautious prince to turn all his attention to the consolidation of his newly acquired territories, by conciliating his subjects, and repairing the injuries which they had sustained during so long a period of warfare. But prudent and prospective measures seldom formed a part of the system of Pyrrhus. His expedients were usually such as the exigency of the moment suggested. Thus he draughted some of his Gallic auxiliaries upon the town of *Ægæ*, the burial place of the kings of Macedon; and those barbarians, stimulated by their love of gold, plundered the royal sepulchres, and disturbed the remains of the dead. Pyrrhus, however, either did not dare, or was not able to punish the sacrilege. This apparent disregard of an outrage peculiarly painful to the Macedonians, was deeply resented: and yet was their new sovereign so elated by his success, so little apprehensive of a reverse of fortune,

Conquers  
Macedon.

Disgusts the  
Macedo-  
nians.

- B.C. 273. that he called Antigonus, whom he had dispossessed of the throne, "a shameless fellow, for daring still to wear the purple."

Invades  
Laconia.

War was to Pyrrhus a game in which he was always eager to take a part; he therefore willingly assented to a proposal from Cleonymus, the Spartan, who came to ask for his assistance against the people of Lacedæmon. The principal cause of his complaint against his fellow-citizens was the preference which they had given to Areus, whom he considered as not having so good a claim to the throne as himself; but it does not appear that the laws of Sparta had been violated by the rejection of Cleonymus,—and still less is it easy to justify Pyrrhus for taking a part in this quarrel. His real intentions were sufficiently manifested by the magnitude of the army with which he commenced his campaign; 25,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and twenty-four elephants. To the ambassadors from Sparta, who met him at Megalopolis, he gave assurances, that his object was merely to liberate the cities which had been subdued by Antigonus, while he expressed the greatest esteem for the character and customs of the Lacedæmonians; but he spoke and acted in a very different manner as soon as he had entered the Spartan territory. He began by ravaging and plundering the country in every direction; and, when reminded by the ambassadors that he was commencing hostilities before he had made any declaration of war, he tauntingly replied, "did we ever know you Spartans to tell any one beforehand what you intended to do?"

- B.C. 272. Sparta, to which Pyrrhus now advanced, was at this time in a most defenceless state. Areus, the king, was, with all his best men, in Crete, assisting the Gortynians; and the approach of the Epirotes had been so rapid, that the Spartans who remained in the city, were taken quite unprepared. Had Pyrrhus listened to the advice of Cleonymus, and attacked the city immediately upon his arrival, it probably would have fallen into his hands; but his contempt for so feeble a resistance as the Spartans could present, made him defer his attack till the following day. He encamped quietly before the city, and the friends of Cleonymus were so sanguine in their expectations of his success, that they prepared an entertainment at his house, in honour of his great protector. The other Spartans were not, in the mean time, inactive; and their women, whom they had proposed to remove to Crete, took a most zealous and effectual part in the arduous work which was immediately commenced. That was to cut a wide and deep trench parallel with the enemy's line, and at each extremity of it, to sink waggons up to the axle-tree, so as to impede the progress of the elephants. The trench, which was six feet deep, nine in width, and eight hundred in length, was finished before the morning. The advantage it gave, was greater than even the Spartans anticipated. The Epirotes, under Pyrrhus himself, could neither pass the trench, nor find a firm footing on the loose

Attacks  
Sparta.

earth so lately thrown up on each side of it. The waggons presented an impenetrable barrier to the Gauls under Ptolemy, the son of Pyrrhus: and when they began to drag them out by the wheels, Acrotatus, son of Areus, king of Sparta, marching round with three hundred men, by some covered way through the hills, attacking them in the van, compelled them to wheel round and act upon the defensive. The contracted space and disadvantageous ground on which the troops under Ptolemy stood, were circumstances much in favour of Acrotatus, and enabled him, after a sharp conflict, entirely to defeat his enemy. The contest was now severe where Pyrrhus himself commanded, and several of the Spartans showed a spirit worthy of their nation, particularly one named Phyllius, who, after having slain numbers who attempted to force the post which he defended, when he found himself ready to faint from loss of blood, resigning his station to an officer near him, withdrew, that he might die among his countrymen, and save his body from falling into the hands of the enemy. The combat was continued without intermission till night, and renewed again at break of day. The Spartans fought with the resolution of men determined to save their country or perish; their enemies, with the confidence of superior skill and numbers. While one party was labouring to fill up the trench, and the other to defeat their efforts.

But, when the fortune of Sparta seemed at its last ebb, the hope and spirit of her brave citizens were revived by the unexpected arrival of Aminias the Phocian, one of Antigonus's generals, with a body of foreign auxiliaries from Corinth; and almost at the same time by the return of Areus, their king, from Crete, at the head of two thousand soldiers. Pyrrhus, who delighted in struggling with difficulties, and was rather spurred on, than repelled by increasing perils, was now more than ever ambitious to make himself master of Sparta. But a continued series of losses at length compelled him to abandon the siege, and content himself with ravaging the country. It was his intention to pass the winter in Laconia, and resume his siege of the city in the following spring; but events, which he could not foresee, produced an alteration in his plans, and delivered the Spartans from the scourge of his predatory bands. The people of Argos were then divided, as was usually the case with the Grecian states, by opposite and intemperate factions. Antigonus, who was in possession of Corinth and other places on the borders of Argolis, was suspected, by Aristeas, head of one of those parties, to be secretly in correspondence with Aristippus, leader of the opposite faction. In order, therefore, to strike a blow before the plans of his rival had been matured, Aristeas solicited the assistance of Pyrrhus, to whom such a proposal must then have been peculiarly acceptable, as it liberated him at once from his unsuccessful warfare in Laconia, and opened a new career for his ambition in a quarter

B.C. 272.

Return of  
Areus.State of  
Argolis.



B.C. 272.  
Pyrrhus  
marches to  
Argos.

where he was almost certain of success. He therefore immediately commenced his march towards Argos. But the Spartans did not suffer him to withdraw unpunished. His rear was harassed by parties posted in the narrow defiles; and he incautiously ordered his son Ptolemy to go with a detachment of his guards to their relief, while he pressed forward to disengage the main body of his army from those dangerous passes. The young prince was encountered by a chosen body of Spartans under the command of Eualcus, and while closely engaged was laid dead by one blow from a Cretan, named Oresus, famed for his strength and swiftness. The death of their leader damped the courage of his men; they fled, and the Spartans, in the ardour of exultation, heedlessly pursued them into the plain, where they were met by Pyrrhus himself, and the whole body of his army. He had already learned the fate of his son, and stimulated by grief, dreadful and invincible as he always appeared in battle, he now out-did his former exploits. He rode at full speed towards Eualcus, who, moving aside as he came up, aimed a blow which, just missing his bridle hand, cut the reins asunder; but Pyrrhus at the same time that he run him through with his spear, leaping from his horse, and fighting on foot, spread destruction and slaughter among the bands who surrounded Eualcus.

Avenge his  
son's death.

Reaches  
Argos.

Pyrrhus having thus avenged the death of his son, marched on to Argos. He there found the heights, commanding the plain, occupied by Antigonus; and for that reason posted his own army near the town of Nauplia. He challenged that prince to a single combat, in abusive terms, to which Antigonus calmly replied, that it was not so much upon his own arms as the seasonable use of them, he relied; but that if Pyrrhus was tired of life, there were plenty of roads to death open to him. The Argives sent an embassy to each of these chiefs, entreating them to retire and not to suffer the city to be taken possession of by either, as a measure for which there was no ground, since it was equally well inclined to both. Antigonus yielded to their solicitations, and sent one of his sons as an hostage. Pyrrhus promised to retire, but as he gave no security for the performance of his promise, was suspected of entertaining no honourable intentions.

Enters  
Argos.

When it was extremely dark, he drew close to the walls, and finding the gate called *Diaperes* opened for him by *Aristeas*, advanced with his Gauls, as far as the forum before he was perceived. But as the gate was not high enough to admit his elephants, it was necessary to have them removed, and replaced when the gate had been passed. This occasioned a delay, and could not be done in the dark, without making a noise and confusion; in consequence of which the citizens discovered their danger; an alarm was given, and some ran to the citadel, called *Aspis*, and to other places of safety, while others sent to call Antigonus to their aid. He hastened into

the immediate neighbourhood of the town, and remained there, watching his opportunity, but sent in his son and some of his generals with a considerable body of troops to oppose Pyrrhus. Areus, with a thousand Cretans and the most active of the Spartans, arrived just at the same time, and joining the troops of Antigonus, attacked the Gauls, and threw them into great disorder. Pyrrhus himself entered by Cylarabis, a plain outside the city, used for gymnastic exercises: but the shouts by which the Gauls answered those which his men made on entering, appeared to him indicative of alarm and discouragement. He therefore advanced as rapidly as possible, but the intricacy of the streets, the frequent occurrence of drains, and the darkness of the night, made it impossible to preserve any order; and his cavalry, more particularly, was so hampered by these obstacles, that both parties were compelled to wait for the return of day-light.

B.C. 272.  
Opposed by  
Antigonus  
and Areus.

At the break of dawn, Pyrrhus perceived that the Aspis was full of armed men. This sight gave him considerable alarm, but he was struck with consternation, when, on looking over the forum, he observed, among many other sculptures, the figures of a wolf and a bull fighting together; for it immediately recalled to his memory, an ancient oracle, which declared, that he was destined to die, whenever he should see a wolf and a bull fighting together. Under this impression, and not seeing any thing in the present position of his men to encourage a hope of success, he determined to retire, and sent orders to his son Helenus, who had been left with the main body of his army outside the walls, to make a breach in them, as the narrowness of the gates might present an obstacle to their progress. These orders were imperfectly heard and erroneously delivered, in consequence of the hurry and confusion of the moment; so that Helenus entered the town, instead of taking measures to facilitate his father's retreat. Pyrrhus in the mean time was coming in an opposite direction through the same narrow street, which led from the forum to the gate. It was in vain that he called out to his men to retire; those who were near enough to hear and obey his orders, were carried forwards by the throng behind them. The largest of the elephants had fallen in passing the gate, and blocked up the passage; and one of those already within the walls, while endeavouring to recover his driver, who had been wounded and fallen off, turned round upon the retreating party, and drove them back among their adversaries; till, having found the body, he took it up with his proboscis and supporting it on his tusks, carried it away, treading down every thing he met, as if raving with madness. In so great a pressure the soldiers of Pyrrhus, heaped as they were upon each other, moved like a closely compacted body, unable to use their weapons without wounding each other, and fell almost without resistance before the enemy in their rear.

Retreats  
from Argos.

B.C. 272. Pyrrhus, to check the progress of the assailants, rode in among them, after having removed the ornament by which his helmet was distinguished: and having received a slight wound in his breast from the spear of an Argive, turned to cut down the man who had wounded him. The mother of his adversary, a poor and aged woman, was standing with other women on the roofs of the houses, a spectator of the combat. She was watching her son, and terrified at his peril, lifted up a tile with both her hands, and let it fall upon the head of his adversary, Pyrrhus. It struck him just below his helmet, and injured the vertebra at the bottom of his neck. His sight instantly failed, his hands lost the reins, and he fell from his horse. He was not known by any of the surrounding multitude; but one Zopyrus who served under Antigonus, and two or three other persons running up, recognised him and dragged him into a gateway hard by, just as he was recovering from the blow by which he had been stunned, and there severed his head from his body.

Killed.

Compassion  
of Antigonus.

The fact, in the interim, had become generally known; and Alcyoneus, the son of Antigonus, hastening to the spot, asked for the head, as if he wished to look at it, but seizing it, rode off to his father, who was sitting among his friends, and threw it at his feet. Antigonus, when he had looked at the head, recognised it, and reproving his son for his barbarity, drove him from his presence, then covering his eyes with his robe, shed tears, recollecting the fate of his father Demetrius, and his grandfather Antigonus, domestic examples of the mutability of fortune! The remains of Pyrrhus he caused to be burnt on a funeral pile, with the honours due to his rank; and when Alcyoneus, with a kind attention, presented to him Helenus, the son of Pyrrhus, whom he had found deeply humiliated, and clothed in mean attire; "This is better, my son," said Antigonus, "than the beginning was, but you have not yet done enough; for you have not removed that garment, which is more disgraceful to us who consider ourselves as victors, than to him who assumes the habit of the vanquished." He afterwards kindly entertained Helenus, and sent him to Epirus in a style suitable to his birth.

Character  
of Pyrrhus.

Such was the end of Pyrrhus; his person was athletic and commanding; and when the Macedonians compared him to Alexander, it was more in allusion to his mental qualities than to any resemblance in his features or person to that prince. His strength and power of bearing the severest fatigue were such as called forth the admiration of those who knew him. Those qualities contributed to raise him in the estimation of Ptolemy, while he was a hostage with him in Egypt, and often had a large share in securing the success which usually attended his arms. The turn and character of his mind corresponded with such powers of body; and he seemed to be formed for war as much by his spirit of enterprise and resolution, as by his skill in the use of arms, and power of bearing privations.


His patience was not merely the endurance of physical evils; it was a moral quality of a much higher value; which showed that he had not naturally an arbitrary or tyrannical disposition; and it was admirably exemplified in the calmness with which he bore the reproofs of Cineas, and the pleasure he took in listening to the rough and homely truths uttered by Fabricius. His admiration of the Romans arose as much from his veneration for their probity, as from astonishment at their resoluteness; and though his policy sometimes partook of the tortuous character of the Greek and Asiatic courts, in action, he was always magnanimous. This great quality showed itself even in his domestic intercourse with his friends, and checked that ardour and quickness which, without it, would have made him a tyrant as well as a conqueror. Fierce as he was in battle, he was mild and gentle to his subjects and adherents; not allowing himself to be easily provoked, and more eager to requite a kindness than to resent a wrong. "A pecuniary debt," he observed, "may be repaid to the heirs of the creditor; but as a return of kindnesses can only be made while our friends are yet living, a good and upright man will severely regret his having lost the opportunity of requiting them." The whole of his history shows, that he was misled by passions not sufficiently controlled, but that his understanding was powerful, quick, and acute. His rapidity indeed in projecting and executing, hurried him into excesses; and he seldom allowed himself time enough for deliberation and judgment: hence it was, that he might be said to deserve the sarcastic remark of Antigonus, who compared him to a gambler, "who makes many good throws, but never seems to know when he has the best of the game." If his religion was sometimes tinged with superstition, it must be ascribed to the circumstances in which he was placed, the age in which he lived, and the art or credulity of the priests by whom he was attended; for his reply to his friends, who had pronounced a dream which he related to them, to be ominous, plainly showed how little he was himself the slave of such fears: "Things such as these," he said, "are only fit to guide the idle multitude, and are full of uncertainty: let it be your business to say within yourselves, (parodying a verse of Homer,) when your arms are in your hands, that—

‘To fight for Pyrrhus is the best of omens.’”


That this confidence in his own power was not ill-founded, is evident from the opinions of his rival Antigonus and of Hannibal himself; the former of whom said, that "if he lived to be old, he would be the greatest general in the world;" and the latter, that "he was in skill and genius, the first whom the world had ever beheld."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Plutarch in vita Pyrrhi. Dionys. Halicarn. de Legat.; Livy, vii. 29; Epit. xii.—xiv.; Flor. i. 18; Justin, xvi.—xviii. xxiv. xxv.; Anc. Univ. Hist. vii. 126, viii. 85, ix. 52, x. 72, xvii. 475.

B.C. 272. As the island of Sicily forms the point whence diverge the histories of Greece, Carthage, and Rome, it will be necessary for us to take a comprehensive view of its chief annals, which throw a powerful light upon the resources of the great African and Italian republics. For this purpose, we shall take a retrospective glance at the condition of that wealthy and fertile island under the government of Dionysius and his successors, (B.C. 427—365.)



[Greek Warrior, from a *scutellata* Vase.]



[Cave of Dion, (Dionysius's Ear.) Cavern in the Lautumia of Neapolis.—*V' Univers pittoresque.*]

## CHAPTER XI.

### DIONYSIUS THE ELDER.

FROM B.C. 427 TO B.C. 365.

THE island Omothermon, originally peopled by the enterprising B.C. 427. voyagers of Phœnicia, and subsequently by a migration of the Siculi from southern Italy, was colonized from Corinth, under the auspices of Archias, of the Heraclean family, and received the name, by which it is well known in history, of Ortygia, the island of the Quail, or of Latona. This island, lying close to the main land, and extending itself half way across the great bay into which the river Anapus discharges itself, forms two of the finest and most commodious harbours in the world; an advantage highly appreciated by a maritime people, as the immediate source of political importance and commercial prosperity. The colony founded in so favourable a situation rapidly extended itself to the main land, where another and a larger town Achradina, and soon afterwards a third named Tycha, was built; and in a subsequent age, Neapolis was added to them. These four towns constituted the great city of Tetrapolis, or Syracuse, (so

B.C. 427. called from the rich fen pastures in its vicinity,) which, with the fortifications of Epipolæ, erected by the great Dionysius, covered an area twenty-two miles in circumference, and contained a population of about three hundred thousand free citizens, which, at a very moderate computation, would make the whole number of its inhabitants little less than two millions.<sup>1</sup>

Syracuse was doubtless indebted for much of its internal prosperity and foreign influence to the policy and virtue of the patriotic Gelo; and for much of its beauty to the taste and magnificence of the Olympic conqueror Hiero; nor must it be forgotten how highly the honour of the national character was advanced by the incorruptible virtue, and the extraordinary talents, of the brave, though unfortunate, Hermocrates.

But it was during the administration of the elder Dionysius, that the Syracusans attained that height of power and splendour which excited the admiration of surrounding nations, and has appeared incredible to some modern historians.

Opinions  
concerning  
the character  
of Dionysius.

Of the real character and conduct of this illustrious prince, it is by no means easy to form a decided and accurate judgment. The greater part of those writers to whom we are indebted for the scanty and scattered materials of his biography, were warm advocates of the Ciceronian doctrine, that the whole genus of tyrants ought to be extirpated from the earth, and held up to universal execration; and tyrannicides are seldom scrupulous respecting the means of effecting either object. Yet amidst all the misrepresentation and fiction, to which the extravagant violence of the democratic spirit pushed the party writers of Greece and Rome, the substantial truth of history survives; and a moderate share of industry and discernment has served to strip such patriots as Harmodius and Dion of their ill-earned popularity, and to wipe off many stains from the great objects of their ferocious hostility.

But whilst we make all due allowances for the effect of republican zeal in most ancient authors, and of republican dishonesty in not a few; and find a generous pleasure in detecting the inconsistencies and absurdities of those preposterous stories of folly, and wickedness, and cruelty, which are related by them of almost all princes, whom they indiscriminately denominated tyrants; it is the duty of the historian to avoid espousing the cause even of the calumniated with too much eagerness; and to remember that he is not to become the advocate of any party, though that party may have been injuriously treated, but to adhere with strictness to the impartiality of his judicial character.

One of the greatest modern authorities upon subjects connected

The  
historian's  
duty.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus says that at Agrigentum the free population was only *one-tenth* of the whole.

with Grecian history, appears occasionally to deviate from this B.C. 427. obvious line of duty.

In his laudable zeal to vindicate the character of great and good princes, and the administration of monarchical or aristocratical governments from unmerited obloquy, Mitford has exercised his peculiar acuteness and uncommon learning in casting discredit upon almost every authority which records their vices and mismanagement; whilst he has adopted, with somewhat more eagerness than might have been expected from his soundness of judgment, the slightest testimonies in their favour: so that in availing ourselves of his able assistance to lift up the dusky veil of political prejudice, it will be well to remember that he who thus displays the picture, throws upon it, from his own lamp, the lights which he esteems most advantageous. Of this disposition the most striking example occurs in the history of Sicily during the reign of the great Dionysius, whom Diodorus and Plutarch, and other ancient writers, concur in representing as an unprincipled usurper, governing an unwilling people in the most arbitrary manner, by the most oppressive means, and stained with almost every vice of which human nature is capable: but who has been represented as the popular leader of a commonwealth, brave, politic, and eminently virtuous; obtaining his authority by steps perfectly unexceptionable, retaining it solely through the affection and confidence of the people, and exercising it with unprecedented wisdom, mildness, and generosity.

An impartial review of facts admitted on all sides, will lead us to a conclusion more probable than either, supported by a brief, but masterly sketch of the character of Dionysius, from the pen of Cornelius Nepos. "The first Dionysius of Sicily was conspicuous for personal prowess and military skill; and, what is rare in a tyrant, he was by no means profligate; neither was he luxurious nor avaricious; covetous, in short, of nothing, unless of monarchical and permanent power, and only in pursuit of that object cruel. For in the maintenance of his government he spared the life of no man whom he supposed to entertain designs of treachery against him. He obtained the direction of affairs by his merit, and kept it with peculiar good fortune to the end of his life."<sup>1</sup>

With his political career, indeed, the history of his life commences, Early life. for Diodorus tells us nothing but that he was the son of Hermocrates,<sup>2</sup> and other authorities are equally silent respecting his family and early life. It may be gleaned, however, from some casual hints, principally of the orators who have attacked or panegyri-  
zied

<sup>1</sup> This passage is quoted by Mitford, who allows due credit to the impartiality of Cornelius Nepos.

<sup>2</sup> Some copies have *Thermocrates*. Dionysius having married the daughter of *Hermocrates* may not improbably have been called by Diodorus *ἰερακράτης* through inadvertence. Yet Wesseling believes that there were two persons of the same name, one the father, the other father-in-law, of Dionysius.



B.C. 427. him, that his birth was in no way remarkable, either for elevation or meanness. But that his fortune was ample, his education that of a young man of distinction, and his connections the first in the state, are facts not denied even by those who would impute to him as a reproach the mediocrity of his hereditary rank. The political party to which he was attached in early life may be inferred from his having been severely wounded, and left for dead, in the tumult, when the virtuous and gallant Hermocrates lost his life, as well as from his intimacy with Philistus the historian, and with the other opponents of Diocles, and of the democratic faction.

Designs  
of the  
Carthagi-  
nians on  
Sicily.

After the untimely death of Hermocrates, there remained no man who had the ability, if indeed any of the seditious party, then successful, had the wish, to provide for the safety of all Sicily, by uniting its numerous independent Grecian settlements, in a common confederacy against the ambitious designs of the Carthaginians, who, partly by negotiation, and partly by arms, never ceased to aim at the subjugation of the whole island, till the overwhelming power of Rome laid both countries in the dust. No sooner was an opening offered, by the temporary triumph of the faction of Diocles, than a vast armament, naval and military, was intrusted to the command of Hannibal, to be employed in reducing Sicily to what was termed the alliance of Carthage; and in order to combine the vigour of maturity with the experience of age, Hamilcar, the son of Hanno, was appointed to act with them.

Agrigentum.

These preparations, though their destination was sufficiently understood, were met by no corresponding activity on the part of the Sicilian Greeks, distracted by factions, and discouraged by disasters. The Syracusans tried negotiation, and failed; the other states made no united nor effectual efforts to avert the storm; the African army landed without material opposition, and commenced at once a regular siege and blockade of Agrigentum, at that time second only to Syracuse in power and greatness, and scarcely its inferior in wealth and population. The Agrigentines had long ceased, however, to dispute the supremacy of the rival city, and a friendly alliance was maintained between them till the period of the assassination of Hermocrates, when the prevalence of the democratic party in Syracuse occasioned a coolness between the government in that city and the ruling powers at Agrigentum, who were in the Lacedæmonian, that is, in the aristocratic or oligarchical interest. But the alliance, though no longer cordial, remained unbroken; and the Syracusan leaders, at length awakened to the greatness of their danger, determined on sending prompt and effectual relief to the besieged. They accordingly summoned their other allies in Sicily and Italy to furnish troops, and despatched Daphnæus with a collective force of thirty thousand foot, and five thousand horse. The operations of the siege had fortunately been delayed by the

prevalence of sickness in the Carthaginian army, and by the death of Hannibal; and Daphnæus arriving at this juncture, engaged the enemy, and obtained a decisive advantage.

But in Agrigentum, as in most Grecian towns, the opposition of parties was too nearly balanced to admit of any thing resembling consistency in public measures. The people rendered unruly by the prospect of deliverance, rose upon their generals and murdered them; democratic influence was once more re-established, and produced its usual consequences; so that although the zeal of their Syracusan allies was sharpened by the revolution which had been effected, no due advantage was taken of the favourable circumstances which occurred; and after a siege of eight months, Hamilcar became master of Agrigentum.

Hamilcar  
takes  
Agrigentum.

This event caused the utmost consternation throughout Sicily. Many took refuge within the walls of Syracuse; and some embarked for Italy, carrying with them their families and fortunes. The Agrigentines who had escaped from their city murmured loudly against the conduct of the Syracusan leaders; and a general discontent prevailed among the Sicilian Greeks, that men so unfit should have been appointed to the administration of affairs. A popular assembly being held at Syracuse, and no one, in the general dissatisfaction, venturing to make any specific proposal, Dionysius, who had acquired great popularity by his courage and activity under Daphnæus against the Carthaginians, boldly accused the generals of corruption, and moved that the people should not await the period of their command appointed by law, (when their conduct would regularly come under consideration,) but should inflict instant punishment upon their venality.

The government, in return, declared Dionysius guilty of sedition, and proceeded to impose a fine upon him; but the influence (or according to Diodorus, the suretiship) of his friend, the historian Philistus, procured for him a second hearing; and he urged the popular topics of invective against the men in power with so much effect, that the administration were compelled to resign, and Dionysius himself, as he probably anticipated, was elected among their successors, at the age of twenty-four.

Election of  
Dionysius  
to the  
supreme  
power.

From this moment he became, in fact, the autocrat of Syracuse; for his colleagues in office, whether willing to intrust the whole power of the state in his hands, or wanting the talents and popularity to oppose his measures, appear to have taken little part in the government, or in the military arrangements which followed; and it seems probable that an ambitious young man would not be unwilling that they should quietly sink into insignificance.

His first care was to recall the citizens who had been exiled, or who had fled from their country, at the period of the banishment of Hermocrates; and this being obviously a measure of sound

B.C. 406. policy, in the present exigencies of the state, as well as of justice and humanity, it was in vain objected by a few, who already dreaded the establishment of a tyranny, that Dionysius would thus surround himself with a powerful body of men wholly devoted to his interest, and of principles confessedly hostile to an unlimited democracy.

Dionysius  
proceeds to  
Gela.

About this time, despatches arrived from Gela, soliciting an augmentation of the force sent for its defence against Hamilcar; and Dionysius went thither in person, with two thousand foot and four hundred horse. He found the town, as was usual, distracted by dissensions between the aristocratic and popular factions; and Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian, who commanded the auxiliary forces, unable to procure the stipulated payment for his troops: an assembly of the people took place, and order was restored by the condemnation to death of some of the most seditious among the wealthier citizens; and Dionysius had influence enough to procure a decree, that the funds arising from the confiscation of their property, should be applied to discharge the arrears due to Dexippus; at the same time, to secure the fidelity of the troops he had brought with him, he promised them that he would, at his own cost, double their pay. The Geloans, thus restored to order, were profuse in their gratitude, and sent ambassadors to Syracuse to report their satisfaction with the conduct of Dionysius, upon whom they had conferred peculiar marks of honour, entreating him to continue among them till the apprehended danger from the Carthaginians should be over. Dionysius, however, had a more important charge at home; and promising the Geloans to watch over their safety, he departed for Syracuse.

Returns to  
Syracuse.

On his arrival, it happened that the people were coming from the theatre, and a crowd was immediately collected about him, eagerly inquiring for news respecting the enemy. He took occasion to reproach them with their supineness and indifference in being occupied in festivities, while Hamilcar was actively engaged in preparing for the siege of their city; and he announced his own intention to resign his command on account of the incapacity and corruption of his colleagues, who, he insinuated, had been tampered with by Hamilcar, and with whom he should, in consequence, decline to act any longer.

It is probable that Dionysius had reserved this bold measure till he felt his own popularity sufficiently established to overwhelm any opposition which could be raised to him, either by the friends of the accused, or by the democratic party, who were always hostile to power in the hands of a single person, especially if that person were eminent for ability and virtue; and the result fully answered his expectations. So rapidly was the report spread of the approach of the enemy, and the treachery of the generals, and so universal was the panic excited by it, that upon his calling an assembly of the

people the next morning, his colleagues were denounced as traitors to their country; were deprived of their office; and the consideration of their punishment reserved for a special meeting: the example of Gela, and the dread of sharing the fate of Agrigentum, sufficing to induce the people to commit the whole power of the state to Dionysius, with the title of general autocrator; an office, it should seem, less absolute, but more permanent than that of dictator at Rome, comprising all the duties and authorities of a governor-general and commander-in-chief. Plutarch asserts that Hipparinus, a man of the highest rank and largest fortune in Syracuse, was associated with Dionysius in power; and the assertion appears to derive confirmation from the manner in which Aristotle speaks of their joint authority; but if it were so, Hipparinus played the part of the slave in a Roman triumph.

B. C. 406.

Is associated with Hipparinus.

————— Et sibi consul  
Ne placeat, curru servus portatur eodem.<sup>1</sup>

The responsibility and the power belonged to Dionysius; his colleague served only to remind him that he was not a monarch; nor is the period of his death noticed in any extant history.

To secure himself in this invidious station, the favour of the populace, and especially of the army, was indispensable; and accordingly he began by proposing to double the pay of the soldiers; assuring the assembly that the revenue of the state could well afford it. Of the wisdom of this measure, on public grounds, it is difficult to form an opinion, in the uncertainty in which we are left respecting the sources and amount of the public income, and the sum received by the soldiers; but it is not improbable that at Syracuse, as at Athens and other Grecian states, in proportion as the military system became more regular, and the service consequently more completely interrupted ordinary employments, the small stipend originally allowed, was found insufficient for the soldier's comfort.

His next measure appears more exceptionable: having imitated Pericles in his manner of ingratiating himself with the military, he adopted the artifice of Pisistratus to obtain, for his personal security, the invidious protection of a body guard; which though, perhaps, rendered necessary by the unusual mildness and liberality of his administration, which permitted his political adversaries to live unmolested in the city, was universally reprobated throughout Greece, as the badge and support of arbitrary power, and imposed upon him the unpopular appellation of tyrant; a word, in its origin, of no opprobrious signification, and simply denoting a chief;<sup>2</sup> but degraded by the democratic prepossessions of Greece and Rome, (as *villain* has

Raises a body guard.

<sup>1</sup> Lest the consul should feel too much self-satisfaction, a slave rides in the same triumphal car.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Jupiter, without any irreverence, was called tyrant of heaven.

B.C. 406. been by an opposite prejudice in modern Europe,) to become a term of reproach.

Having ordered all the troops under forty years of age to prepare a month's provision for a march to Leontium, which, though an independent ally, was garrisoned by Syracusan refugees and other foreigners, he encamped for the night in the fields: in the dusk, a violent tumult arose; and the domestics of the general crying out, that he had been treacherously attacked, he fled with all expedition to the citadel of Leontium, where he called to arms, and kept up watch-fires till the morning; when an assembly of the people being convened, voted him a guard of six hundred men, to be selected by himself from among the soldiers most devoted to his person.

His enemies, of course, treated the whole affair as the contrivance of Dionysius, and represented him as having called an assembly of the people at Leontium, in order that it might be composed more of his own creatures than of the respectable inhabitants of Syracuse; but though it is not unlikely that he wished to give his enemies an opportunity of attacking him, and for that purpose thought proper to pass a night on the road, it appears that Daphnæus and Demarchus, and some other leaders of the party in opposition, were, at this time, actually implicated in a treasonable plot against him; and the two former suffered death by the laws of their country. The Lacedæmonian Dexippus, labouring under strong suspicion of having shared in their crime, was ordered to quit the city.

Preparation  
for a war  
with  
Carthage.

Dionysius certainly neglected no means of strengthening his authority, or of conciliating popularity; and he applied himself diligently in preparations for the expected contest with Hamilcar. The democratic writers, as usual, attribute every measure which his military skill and foresight adopted, (even the necessary expedient of engaging a mercenary force, and the advantageous position which he selected for his camp,) to his determination of establishing himself in absolute power. But if his bold and active spirit was not insensible to the allurements of ambition, nor his virtue always proof against its temptations, there is, at least, abundant proof in his whole conduct, that his ambition was that of a great and generous mind, and was uniformly directed to promote the safety, the glory, and the prosperity of his country; all of which, in a great measure, depended upon his retaining the reins of government. To confirm his connection with the noblest and most popular families of Syracuse, he married, about this time, (B.C. 405,) Arete, the daughter of that enlightened patriot, Hermocrates; and he bestowed the hand of his own sister, Theste, upon another relative of the same family.

Hamilcar, meanwhile, having wintered his army in Agrigentum, continued to make great preparations for the reduction of Gela in the spring; and Dionysius was neither deceived in his object, nor remiss in his endeavours to obviate it. He enrolled every Syracusan

capable of bearing arms; he called out the contingent forces of the Sicilian allies; and obtained succours from the Greek states in Italy; and still further, he augmented his army by engaging mercenary troops; the whole amounting, according to the most probable account, to thirty thousand foot, a thousand horse, and a fleet of fifty ships. With this force he marched to the relief of Gela; and on his arrival, pitching his camp near the sea, in order to maintain a communication with the fleet, he endeavoured to intercept the supplies of the Carthaginians by sea and land, and to reduce them to the necessity of abandoning their lines. And with this view he remained quietly in his position for twenty days. B.C. 406.

But the temper and constitution of a Grecian army, trained in republican principles, and accustomed to submit to control only in active service, was ill adapted to protracted operations; and Dionysius became sensible that it was absolutely necessary to lead his men into action with as little delay as possible. Watching his opportunity, therefore, he formed his infantry in three divisions, who were to advance by different routes, and to commence an attack on the three points of the camp at once; the cavalry had orders to act as a reserve, and the fleet to assist in forcing the lines next the shore. But although the plan was ably arranged, either the distances had been miscalculated, or some disaffection among the troops occasioned a defect of communication, for the Italian allies, after conducting themselves with great gallantry, being unsupported, were repulsed with severe loss, and were only preserved from entire destruction by the protection of the fleet; the Sicilians, overpowered by numbers, retreated into the town, leaving six hundred slain on the field; and Dionysius himself, met with so many unexpected obstructions in advancing through the streets with the division under his immediate command, that he arrived only in time to witness the defeat of his army, and to retire within the walls.

His army  
defeated by  
Hamilcar.

A council of war was immediately held, and in order to gain time, a herald was sent to Hamilcar, with a request that the Greeks might be permitted to bury their dead. During the cessation of hostilities which this occasioned, Dionysius prepared to evacuate the town, now no longer deemed defensible; and leaving two thousand light troops to kindle the fires, and keep up other appearances of habitation, he withdrew the whole population of Gela during the night, and sent them forward in safety towards Syracuse. He himself, meanwhile, went to Camarina, and directed all the citizens, with their wives, children, and moveable property, to prepare for an immediate removal; and so convinced were they of the necessity of the measure, that the greatest promptness was manifested in obeying his orders; and in a few hours they also were on the road to the only place which now appeared to offer any security from the invading army.

Dionysius  
evacuates  
the town.

B.C. 406. But Dionysius was not exempt from the usual consequences of failure, though the measures which he adopted to save the inhabitants of the two cities from total ruin and destruction, were undeniably well planned and ably executed. Some few, from age or sickness, or obstinacy, were left behind, and their complaints produced a strong sensation of pity, not unmingled with indignation; others, whose feebleness was ill calculated for a march, necessarily rapid, were overcome by fatigue and vexation; and there were not wanting disaffected persons in the army to inflame these natural discontents, and to represent the whole transaction as a scheme of the general for increasing the population of his own city, and establishing a despotic power over Sicily, by means of the Carthaginians. The Italian allies, fired at the idea that their exposure to extreme danger had been preconcerted, immediately crossed the island and returned home; and the Syracusan cavalry, by whose inactivity or treachery, the defeat at Gela seems partly to have been occasioned, and most of whom were of the violent democratic party, would have murdered Dionysius on the march, had not his body guard been vigilant and faithful. Failing in this design, they deserted and hastened to Syracuse, where forging a tale which suited their purpose, and asserting that the whole army had conspired against the tyrant, they obtained ready admission within the fortifications; and proceeding (with such friends to their cause as they could collect) to the house of Dionysius, not only pillaged and destroyed his property, but wreaked their vengeance on his innocent wife, the hapless Arete, who, like another Lucretia, disdained to survive her involuntary shame.

The cavalry  
desert.

The general, meanwhile, informed of the desertion of so large a body of cavalry, and suspecting it to be their intention to raise a sedition against him, resolved, if possible, to anticipate their arrival in the city. Taking with him his body guard of six hundred infantry, and one hundred horse, on whose attachment he could rely, he marched fifty miles with extraordinary speed, and arrived about midnight at one of the gates of Acradina. Finding it closed against him, he set fire to it by means of some fuel which accidentally lay near, and while this was doing, collected together such of his followers as had been unable to keep up with him. The gate at length giving way, he rushed through Acradina, and finding a party of his principal enemies collected in the forum, and the people in general not disposed to interfere, he put them all to the sword; and passing immediately through the city, he executed, or forced into exile, the partisans of the atrocious conspiracy. Early in the morning the remainder of the mercenary troops, and all the Sicilian allies, arrived in good order at Syracuse; but the Geloan and Camarinean emigrants, alarmed by the suggestions of the disaffected, had turned aside to take refuge among the Leontines.

Syracuse, thus weakened and distracted, appeared to offer an easy prey to the victorious army of Hamilcar; but untoward circumstances, among which was the spread of a pestilential disorder among his troops, induced the Carthaginian general to send a flag of truce to Dionysius, reminding him that the conqueror was making overtures to the conquered. His proposals were gladly received; and it being equally the interest of both parties to put an end to the war, a treaty was soon concluded, the terms of which considerably extended the dominion of Carthage in Sicily, whilst it deprived Syracuse of all her dependencies. The prisoners and ships taken in the course of the war, were exchanged; and Hamilcar immediately conducted home the remainder of his army, diminished, according to Diodorus, by half its number; carrying with him an infection which spread rapidly in Africa, and not only wasted the territory of Carthage, but depopulated the neighbouring states; and for many years weakened the power of the empire.

Dionysius thus freed from the pressure of a foreign enemy, employed all the activity of his extraordinary genius in consolidating his government, and in augmenting the resources and power of his country; and in the measures which he adopted to secure these objects, he displayed that political sagacity and patriotic liberality, which led Scipio to rank him among the first of statesmen and commanders, and Isocrates to recommend his conduct for the imitation of Philip of Macedon. With a noble and enlightened ambition, he endeavoured to render himself master of Syracuse and of Sicily, by making himself necessary to its glory and prosperity; and it appears clearly, even in the accounts handed down to us by writers devoted to the adverse faction, that he triumphed over them rather by means of a majority who were sensible of the advantages of his government, than by the vigour with which he repressed the designs of the disaffected, and punished those who could neither be gained by moderation, nor trusted with safety. Though he is accused of employing foreign influence to establish his despotic power, the charge is wholly unsupported by evidence, and is satisfactorily refuted by the line of conduct which he invariably pursued towards foreign powers, as well as by the system which he followed at home; the very reverse of that narrow and selfish policy, generally adopted by tyrants in Greece, who were afraid of encouraging among their people a spirit of enterprise, lest it should be employed in the recovery of their liberties; and who sacrificed the honour and welfare of the state, to the maintenance of arbitrary power.

The ascendancy of Syracuse over the other states of Sicily, and its safety from the invasion of the continental nations, obviously depended, chiefly, upon its marine, which Dionysius determined to place immediately upon a footing of unprecedented strength and magnificence. Surrounding the island of Ortygia, which separates

B.C. 406.  
Peace  
concluded  
with the  
Carthaginians.

Dionysius  
consolidates  
his power.

Fortifications  
of Syracuse  
strengthened.



E.C. 406. the great and lesser harbours, with prodigiously strong and lofty walls surmounted by numerous turrets; he fortified both entrances to the Laccian port, which was shut in by gates, admitting no more than one ship at a time; the interior was adapted for receiving sixty ships of war, and boat-houses were erected to shelter them from the weather. The entrance on the land side was protected by a strong citadel, (called Pentapyle, or Five Gates,) surrounded by splendid porticoes, calculated for the accommodation of a large army, in a climate where sudden transitions from the heat of the afternoon sun, to the chilling damps of the evening, are particularly injurious to men exposed to the open air. It is even said, that the bottom of the harbour was paved with large flat stones, and an aqueduct laid under it, which supplied the fortress with fresh water; but this story, as its authority seems questionable, and the utility<sup>1</sup> of the design doubtful, is scarcely deserving of credit. The whole fortification and naval arsenal were certainly so complete as to be impregnable by any arts of war then known; though, being commanded by higher ground in the district of Achradina, it has yielded to modern<sup>2</sup> improvements in science. The younger Dionysius maintained himself within it, at a later period, long after the other divisions of the city were occupied by different enemies, each more popular and powerful than himself, and capitulated at last on favourable terms; and even the all-conquering Roman arms, under the conduct of the great Marcellus, having gained possession of the other parts of Syracuse, were indebted to treachery for the reduction of the citadel; and when once master of it, the prætor became so sensible of its strength and importance, that he compelled all the natives to remove to the other quarters of the town.

Prudence of  
his  
administra-  
tion.

Having thus provided for the security of his navy, Dionysius employed a number of workmen in ship building; and to increase his own popularity, as well as the strength and population of the place, he divided the land which had escheated to the state<sup>3</sup> among all classes of freemen, including resident foreigners, and manumitted slaves, whom he admitted to the rights of citizens, under the appellation of Neapolites; and it is probable that this class of persons principally inhabited the district of Neapolis, which appears scarcely to have existed at the time of the Athenian siege,<sup>4</sup> but grew into a large and handsome town under the auspices of Dionysius.

In this division of land, as was natural, and by no means reprehensible, Diodorus asserts, that those who had been faithful and active in the service of the governor-general obtained the fairest

<sup>1</sup> There are fresh springs in the island.

<sup>2</sup> It was taken by the Spaniards, A.D. 1735.

<sup>3</sup> There seems nothing in history to warrant the idea that any thing like an Agrarian law, or any invasion of private property took place.

<sup>4</sup> Ol. 91.

portions; and that in assigning the habitations of the new citizens, B.C. 406. he took care to people with his most steady adherents the strong fortress of the island, which he made his own residence, and decorated with beautiful sculpture and magnificent gardens; where his son afterwards erected a splendid monument to his memory.

These peaceful occupations, congenial to the taste and talents of Dionysius, were interrupted by a renewal of that factious spirit which Military insurrection. so unhappily blighted the prosperity of almost every Grecian State. A detachment, which had been sent against a marauding party of native Sicilians, having murdered their commanding officer, sent to the Syracusan refugees, whom the moderation of Dionysius had permitted to establish themselves in the garrison of *Ætna*, on the south side of the mountains, for a troop of cavalry; and having readily obtained what, in all likelihood, had previously been promised, they marched back to Syracuse under the conduct of the assassins, with the intention of effecting a revolution. In the meanwhile they solicited from Rhegium, in Italy, and from Messena, (now, though an oligarchical state, brought over to the seditious party,) a naval force to co-operate in the recovery of their liberty; and a hundred and twenty ships of war were despatched to their assistance. The land force immediately seized *Epipolæ*, a craggy and precipitous eminence, commanding great part of the city; and the measures of the rebels were conducted with so much promptitude and ability, that Dionysius thought it prudent to retire within the fortifications of the island, to which he thus early became indebted for the preservation, not merely of his power, but of his life. A large reward was proclaimed for his head, and every inducement was offered to his troops to desert him, and, if we may believe the democratic historian, not without effect. Blockaded now by sea and land, the battering engines planted against his walls, and all communication with his own party in the other quarters of the city being cut off, the governor-general held a council<sup>1</sup> of war, the result of which was, a proposal made to the rebels that he should surrender the citadel, on condition of being permitted to quit Sicily with as many of his followers, and as much of his property, as could be conveyed in five ships of the line. His real object, however, appears to have been to gain time, and to open the means of intercourse with his friends in the city, and with his Sicilian partisans. By this artifice he contrived to introduce reinforcements into the island; and very shortly succeeded in expelling the insurgents from the remaining parts of Syracuse, and in completely re-establishing his authority.

Stratagem of Dionysius.

In the tumult which unavoidably accompanied this counter-revolution, Diodorus himself admits that Dionysius rode up and down restraining his troops from bloodshed, and that he bestowed

<sup>1</sup> The accounts of what passed in the council bear strong marks of fiction.

B.C. 406. the honourable burial of citizens indiscriminately upon all who fell of both parties; an act of piety and generosity, as well as of liberal policy, which republican gratitude rewarded by praying that "his opponents might speedily have an opportunity of returning the favour." The governor-general, however, persisted in his endeavours to conciliate the people, offering free pardon to all who would return to their homes, and receiving such as availed themselves of his clemency with every mark of favour.

Dionysius thus restored to power, and apparently confirmed in it, was regarded by all the commonwealths of Greece with an eye of jealousy; and Aristus was deputed as ambassador from Sparta, with instructions, as it appears from the sequel, to engage the stronger party in the Lacedæmonian interest. With this view he at once flattered the court, and tampered with the people; till finding that the influence of Nicoteles, a secret agent of the Corinthian government, prevailed over his own among the disaffected party, he entered warmly into the views of Dionysius, assisted in detecting an extensive conspiracy which was forming with the sanction of Corinth, and denounced Nicoteles as a traitor. The measures which followed partook strongly of Spartan severity; and though apparently called for by the dangerous spirit of the times, were rather submitted to than willingly embraced by the liberal temper of the governor-general. Nicoteles was condemned to death; several of the most violent partisans of sedition were banished; and, during the ensuing harvest, the people were deprived of their armour. Most of the Grecian settlements, like some of our own colonies, were destitute of country habitations; and a system of tillage, imperfect indeed, but sufficient, in the fertile soil and genial climate of Sicily, to produce an abundant crop, was carried on by the inhabitants of fortified towns, who, except during harvest, seldom slept in the fields. But at that season, booths and arbours supplied the place of more durable shelter, and the whole labouring population evacuated the cities, and lived for a time in the open air. Advantage was taken of this custom to search the houses for arms, and thus to give a secure ascendancy to a military government.

System of tillage.

The exiles taking refuge in *Ætna* rendered that place so populous and so formidable, that no permanent tranquillity could be expected, whilst an inveterate enemy should continue to hold a post every way calculated for the encouragement of plots and conspiracies in Syracuse. It was therefore resolved to level it with the ground, and to disperse the inhabitants. Most of them, it is supposed, found a welcome reception amongst the Rhegians, who persevered to the last

B.C. 404. in their hostility against Dionysius.

These vigorous measures produced a temporary cessation of war and sedition, and allowed leisure for the advancement of the extensive plans formed by the genius of Dionysius for the

aggrandisement of his native city, in prosecution of his favourite B.C. 404. object to make Syracuse the metropolis of Sicily, and the rival of Carthage.

That powerful state had been so weakened by the extensive desolation of the pestilence which drove Hamilcar from Sicily, as to be incapable, at this period, of interfering with effect in foreign affairs; and Dionysius eagerly availed himself of the opportunity, thus unexpectedly afforded, to bring many of the smaller Grecian and Sicilian towns again into alliance with Syracuse, and even to extend his influence among the independent states in Italy; and so rapid was the growth of his political power and commercial prosperity, as to excite the envy and astonishment of cotemporary nations, and the incredulity of modern critics.

It could not, however, escape the sagacity of the governor-general, that the supineness of the Carthaginians was not likely to continue long; and that the fame of his success must speedily rouse them to avenge his infraction of the treaty, and his contempt of their authority. He was perfectly aware that the storm was not to be averted by concession, nor to be resisted by any thing short of the most extensive and complete preparations. Profiting by past experience, he determined to fortify the commanding site of Epipolæ, (which had repeatedly been the source of danger to the town,) and convert it into a fortress for its defence.

The rock is precipitous, and nearly inaccessible on the north side; and the plan adopted was to crown it with a strong citadel, and by a long wall, surmounted with towers, to connect it with the walls of the town; an extent of building, altogether, of above thirty furlongs, (about four miles,) the remains of which are still reckoned the finest existing specimen of ancient military architecture. "We were quite astonished," observes an intelligent English tourist, "at the magnitude of the subterranean passages, from whence both infantry and cavalry might make their sallies, and retreat again under protection of the fort. We admired the huge square towers of solid masonry; the excellent contrivance of its gateways for every purpose of defence; the vast blocks of its parapets, which lay upon the ground, bored with grooves, by which melted pitch or lead were poured down upon the assailants. Nor did the art and judgment fail to strike us with which the walls were built. Constituted of immense blocks, without cement, they varied in thickness, as the situation required: where nature herself had assisted in forming the rampart, they measured from seven to nine feet in breadth; but in more unguarded situations, they were fifteen, of that species of building which the ancients called *emplecton*."<sup>1</sup> In order to accomplish this great work with as little delay as possible, Dionysius

Fortifies  
Epipolæ.

<sup>1</sup> Hughes's Travels in Sicily, &c. vol. i.

B.C. 404. engaged sixty thousand citizens to labour unremittingly in building, exclusive of an immense number of artists of various descriptions, employed in squaring the stones, and fitting the materials, and a multitude of labourers at work in the quarries.<sup>1</sup> Six thousand oxen were required to draw the huge stones of which the wall was constructed; and it has ingeniously been conjectured, that the materials of the great works thrown up near this spot by Nicias during the Athenian invasion, contributed to facilitate the present undertaking. The new fortress obtained the name of Hexapyle, (Six Gates,) and, though it does not appear to have been inhabited, occasioned the name Tetrapolis to be exchanged for Pentapolis.

From the eminence of Epipolæ, Dionysius must have enjoyed a noble prospect of the whole city, with all its palaces, and temples, and gardens, its impregnable fortresses, and magnificent harbours, filled with the preparations for war, and the occupations of peace; and it is easy to conceive the exultation of spirit with which he viewed the scene of splendour and prosperity before him, so much the work of his own generosity and genius. In this enjoyment he passed much of his time during the building of the Hexapyle, mingling freely with all classes of the people, encouraging industry, rewarding talent, assisting personally on any emergency, and laying aside, like the great czar Peter, not only the guards and attendance, but the manner of royalty, to render his instructions to the workmen more familiar, and his design more popular; and so great was the zeal with which his people worked by night as well as by day, that the undertaking was completed in three weeks.


Fictions of  
historians  
refuted.

It is obviously impossible to reconcile the accounts of the conduct of the governor-general on this and similar occasions, with the stories related by Plutarch, and even by Diodorus, of his arbitrary violence, despotic system of government, and excessive dread of popular fury or private revenge. It is quite clear that he who could thus trust himself unarmed and unattended among nearly an hundred thousand of the people indiscriminately assembled, must have felt assured, that they were neither dissatisfied with his administration, nor aggrieved by private wrong; and it is not to be believed that a man so secure in the midst of the populace, could be cruel and suspicious at home. We are justified, therefore, in rejecting the anecdotes told of his having his hair and beard trimmed with a live coal, lest his barber should cut his throat; of his obliging all who approached him to strip and change their clothes in the vestibule of his apartment, lest they should have concealed some weapon in their dress; of his rage against his own brother for

<sup>1</sup> These *lautumiæ* were excavated so regularly as to form magnificent and secure prisons, (as the Athenians found to their cost,) and excited the great admiration of Cicero, who calls them *opus vere regium*—a truly royal work. They are open at top, and are now laid out into gardens and pleasure grounds.

raising a spear to point out a distant object; and a number of similar tales, which republican bitterness delighted to heap upon a great and successful tyrant, not a few of which have been related of others besides Dionysius. To him alone, however, belongs the celebrated story of the feast of Damocles, which, if true, implies nothing more than that Dionysius, by a practical allegory, conveyed an important lesson on the troubles and dangers of royalty to a man who ignorantly envied the splendour and luxuries of the palace. It is certainly difficult to conjecture the design of that extraordinary cavern in the lautumixæ of Neapolis, generally known by the name of the Ear of Dionysius, and vulgarly believed to have been made by him for the purpose of listening to the conversation of the numerous prisoners confined in it by his jealous timidity; but there is no authority for referring its construction to the time of the excavation of the lautumixæ; and although the cavern possesses some amusing properties for the conveyance of sound, it is incapable of answering the purpose for which the tyrant is said to have designed it.

Dionysius's  
ear.



[Cave of Dion.—L' Univers pittoresque.]

There were, undoubtedly, some periods of his life when the violence and treachery of the republican faction must have rendered extreme caution indispensably necessary; and when an enormous reward was offered for his assassination, common prudence would oblige him to be circumspect in admitting strangers to his presence. But these precautions, whatever they might be, ceased with the occasions that gave rise to them; and Dionysius lived more unguardedly among the citizens of Syracuse than is usual with popular princes in limited monarchies.

After a short season of unexampled tranquillity and prosperity in Syracuse, when faction everywhere paused from its continual agitations, as if to become a spectator of the bold undertaking of Cyrus, and the wonderful return of his Grecian army, the Rhegian people—the staunch promoters of revolution, urged by the Syracusan exiles who had taken refuge among them, affecting to commiserate the fate of their kindred, the inhabitants of Naxos and Catana, who had entered into the alliance of Dionysius,—fitted out a fleet of fifty ships of war, and embarked an army of six thousand infantry, and six hundred cavalry, in what was then, as now, denominated by the cant of party, “the sacred cause of liberty;” but in reality for the overthrow of an established, peaceful, and flourishing state, by means of stimulating the worst passions of the lowest people.

The  
Rhegians  
fit out a fleet.

B.C. 399.

B.C. 399. The Rhegians contrived to engage in this attempt the oligarchical administration of Messena, who sent them a reinforcement of four thousand foot, four hundred horse, and thirty ships of the line; but the government of Syracuse was at this time so popular in Sicily, that the Messenian soldiers, on learning the object of the expedition, refused to obey their generals; and the Italians, deprived of their assistance, and unable alone to meet the forces which Dionysius had led out to oppose them, were glad to obtain peace on easy terms.

The consequence of this ill-conducted scheme was the extension of the Syracusan empire, (for so the Greek historians are accustomed to term the supremacy of the first state in a confederacy,) not merely in Sicily, but in several of the Greek settlements in Italy; so that Dionysius, from this period, was not unusually called "the tyrant of Sicily and Italy," being at the head of the Greek nation, both in the island and on the adjoining continent. Nor did he remit his exertions to strengthen his interest, and to combine the whole Grecian name in one league against the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily.

Architectu-  
ral plans of  
Dionysius.


He had now leisure to resume those prodigious preparations against invasion which have excited the admiration of all succeeding ages, and of which the native historian observes, that each of his numerous undertakings appears sufficient to have absorbed the whole resources of the state. By what means he raised such enormous sums, without any apparent diminution of individual wealth among the citizens, any oppression of the allies, or any known opportunity for considerable plunder, no ancient writer now extant has left us a satisfactory account. We learn, however, that<sup>1</sup> one source of revenue was a kind of poll-tax, the origin of which is deserving of notice. Dionysius, foreseeing that he might probably want large supplies of money on some future emergency, when his credit and popularity might be less productive, gave out that it was necessary to raise an immediate and general contribution for a secret service, the nature of which could not, consistently with its object, be disclosed. The tax was readily granted, and paid; and soon afterwards public notice was given, that circumstances having occurred to prevent the execution of the projected plan, the money which had been raised would be repaid on application at the treasury. So great was the confidence gained by this artifice, in the integrity of the administration, that, when the real necessity arose, the supply was obtained without any difficulty.

Such, indeed, was the universal popularity of the scheme for driving the Carthaginians out of Sicily, that the government received frequent voluntary contributions of labour, materials, and money.

<sup>1</sup> It is also mentioned by Aristotle, that Dionysius endeavoured to establish a composition for the tithes of cattle as due to the state; but that the measure was too unpopular to be very productive.

In the last essential supply Dionysius seems to have abounded. B.C. 399. He not only paid the numerous artisans whom he engaged from all quarters of the world in the most liberal manner, but stimulated their activity, and rewarded their ingenuity, by giving splendid prizes to the best executed designs. By these means he drew to Syracuse all who possessed either skill or industry in mechanical operations, and he displayed the most consummate genius in directing and superintending the works. The existing fleet of a Sicilian navy. hundred and ten ships was speedily put into complete repair, and two hundred additional vessels were built, some of which were upon a new construction, and on a larger scale than any yet known, and having two more banks of oars than the ordinary trireme, obtained the name of quinqueremes. To secure this powerful navy from the effects of the weather, the number of boat-houses in the harbour was doubled, and many of them made capable of containing two ships. While, with a policy utterly irreconcilable with the despotic system attributed to him, Dionysius used all his influence to engage the citizens of Syracuse in the naval service, and actually succeeded in half manning his fleet with a class of sailors whom no tyrant, ruling against the will of the people, could have trusted within the walls of the arsenal.

Diodorus asserts, that the battery (*το καταπέλτικόν*) was at this



[Catapulta for discharging Stones — Calmet.]

period first invented at Syracuse; meaning, not the art of battering fortifications by a variety of engines, which had been practised long before in Greece, and was carried to great perfection in Africa, but the contrivance of annoying a naval force by machines planted upon

Battery of  
Dionysius.



B.C. 399. the walls of a fortress, and discharging huge blocks of stone, and beams of wood, headed with masses of iron, which Archimedes afterwards improved, to the great discomfiture of the Romans, under Marcellus. The most ingenious mechanics were assiduously employed in the construction of these batteries for the protection of the port; while an incredible number of armourers filled every vacant space in the city with their forges and workshops; and so eager were the citizens in forwarding the wishes of the governor-general, that multitudes voluntarily contributed their personal labour in the fabrication of arms; and upwards of a hundred and forty thousand suits of armour were soon ready for service.

Confederacy  
of the Sicilian  
cities.

Pursuing his view of uniting in one confederacy against Carthage the whole Grecian name in Sicily and Italy, Dionysius was particularly anxious to conciliate the hostile parties at Messena and Rhegium, who were more than suspected of inclining to take part with the enemy in the event of war. The former he secured by conceding to them a considerable tract of border land which had been the subject of dispute; and to the latter he made a proposal, contrary indeed to the narrow policy of the democratic states of Greece (which forbade alliance by marriage with any other republic,) but perfectly accordant with the more liberal notions which he had early imbibed from the excellent Hermocrates. He offered to grant the Rhegians an increase of territory<sup>1</sup> adjoining their borders, and to provide for the commercial interests of their city, upon receiving in marriage the daughter of a Rhegian citizen. Republican prejudice, however, prevailed; the proposed alliance was rejected by an assembly of the people; and, according to a report not apparently well authenticated, but by no means improbable, the refusal was accompanied with a vulgar insult. Persevering in his design, he instructed his ambassadors to make a similar offer at Locri, where it was well received, and Doris, the daughter of Xenetus, the most illustrious citizen of Locri, was espoused to him: one of the newly-built quinqueremes, richly fitted up with gold and silver furniture, conveyed her to Syracuse; and she became the mother of the second Dionysius. It is stated by Diodorus, Plutarch, and Ælian, that on the same day the governor-general married Aristomache, (or Aristænete, as the last mentioned author calls her,) the daughter of his colleague Hipparinus; and that he conducted her to the palace in an equipage no less splendid than the galley of Doris. It is even added, that both ladies were perfectly happy in his impartial kindness, one enjoying the advantage of being his countrywoman, and the other of blessing him with a son; and Plutarch affirms, that the mother of Doris, who had accompanied her daughter to Syracuse, being suspected of administering potions to Aristomache to render her barren, was put

<sup>1</sup> It is nowhere stated by what means Dionysius had the disposal of this land.

to death by Dionysius; after which the birth of the younger Hipparinus completed the felicity of the family. B.C. 399.

The whole of this account has been rejected, simply on the ground of its improbability; it is conjectured that Doris died soon after the birth of her son, and upon her death the connection took place with the daughter of Hipparinus. However this may be, the governor-general took the opportunity of his nuptials to ingratiate himself with the people by splendid entertainments, and by the most engaging familiarity and clemency; so that even those historians who generally represent him as an odious tyrant, maintaining himself in power by a mercenary force, are compelled to acknowledge that he was at this period extremely popular; though Diodorus, with singular inconsistency, attributes at the same time to the Syracusans a violent desire for a revolution.

His vast preparations being now completed, Dionysius was unwilling to afford time to Carthage for recovering from the ravages of the plague; and assembling the people, highly delighted with the nuptial shows and banquets, he addressed them at great length in favour of an immediate war; a topic already popular, which he took care to enforce, by holding out such immediate as well as contingent advantages, that the measure was carried without hesitation; and an instant confiscation, or rather pillage, followed, of all the Carthaginian property in the town and harbour: the example was quickly adopted by the other Sicilian towns, not without some violence to the persons of the unfortunate Carthaginian traders; and in the towns which were subject to Carthage, the populace rising upon the garrisons, exercised upon them the most cruel revenge for the former plunder of their houses by Hamilcar. In the beginning of the succeeding year, Dionysius sent a formal embassy to Carthage, declaring war, unless, upon condition, that the Carthaginians should evacuate all the Grecian towns in Sicily. The letter containing this alternative was read to the senate and people; and although the previous conduct of Dionysius must amply have prepared them to expect such a result, the declaration of it appears to have occasioned general alarm. No idea of concession, however, was entertained; and the dismissal of the herald was the signal for the commencement of actual hostilities. B.C. 398.

The governor-general lost no time in effecting a junction with the allied forces of the Agrigentine, Geloan, and other Grecian states, amounting, with his own army, to eighty thousand infantry, and between three and four thousand cavalry, attended by a fleet of nearly two hundred ships of war; about five hundred transports followed, conveying some of his newly invented batteries, and abundance of naval and military stores. Most of the cities in the Carthaginian interest, unsupported against so overwhelming a force, hastened to submit to Dionysius; but the inhabitants of Motya,

B.C. 397. always faithful to Carthage, and on that account entitled to expect little moderation from the Syracusans, made vigorous preparations for defence, hoping to protract the siege till the arrival of succours from Africa. Five other towns followed the example; and the governor-general, leaving his brother Leptines to prosecute the operations against Motya, hastened to plunder their territories, and laid vigorous siege to *Ægesta* and *Entella*.

Hamilcar  
conducts the  
war in Sicily.

In the mean time, Hamilcar was again appointed at Carthage to take the command in Sicily; and in the pressing circumstances of the Sicilian allies, he resolved immediately to attempt a diversion for their relief. Despatching a squadron of only ten fast sailing vessels, he directed them to enter the harbour of Syracuse by night, and to destroy the ships of war remaining there. His orders were executed with little difficulty, and the adventurous squadron returned in safety. But although the damage was considerable to the Syracusan navy, the plan did not operate to the advantage of the Motyans; on the contrary, raising the siege of the two inferior places, Dionysius applied his whole force to the reduction of Motya, trusting to the vigilance of the garrison in *Ortygia* to prevent a repetition of the surprise at the arsenal.

Hamilcar, thus disappointed, and destitute of means for openly opposing the powerful fleet and army of the Greeks, employed all the resources of his active and enterprising genius to supply the deficiency. Collecting a hundred ships, he sailed by night, and doubling the *Lilybæan* cape, hove in sight suddenly off Motya, at daybreak. Attacking the guard-ships, which were afloat without the harbour, he burnt and sunk most of them; and passed on into the fort before Dionysius had time to man his fleet, which was drawn up on the beach, or to push a single ship into the water. Perceiving at once the extent of the danger, and the disadvantage to which his vessels would be exposed in a naval action, from the narrowness of the channel, the Syracusan general instantly ordered his men to draw the ships over the mole into the sea, on the other side; and covering the pier with his land forces and portable batteries, he did such execution, and spread so much alarm among the Africans, to whom these engines were new and strange, that Hamilcar found it necessary to retire to Africa, and leave Motya to its fate.

Capture of  
Motya.

The siege was consequently pressed on every side; and though the Motyans made a most gallant defence, and fought to the last with desperate valour, they were in a few days overwhelmed by superior numbers, aided by the extraordinary machinery and military stratagems of Dionysius. The slaughter was immense; and the inhabitants would in all probability have been exterminated, had not the general sent a herald to proclaim that they might take sanctuary in the temples of the gods worshipped by the Greeks: an

act of humanity which the prejudiced historian attributes to the B.C. 397. most sordid motives. The city was given up to plunder; and all the inhabitants who had escaped from the sword were sold into slavery: a Greek named Dæmenes, and some others of the same nation who had sided with the Carthaginians, suffered crucifixion, as traitors to the country; which, under all the circumstances of the case, must be deemed a cruel policy. The governor-general, leaving a fleet of a hundred and twenty ships, under the orders of his brother Leptines, to guard the coast, and to keep in check the people of Ægesta and Entella, and having garrisoned Motya with Syracusan and native<sup>1</sup> Sicilian troops, returned home with the main body of the army.

Early in the following spring, Dionysius marched to the scene of action, and having accepted the submission of the Haliceans, he opened the campaign by investing Ægesta, and laying waste its territory where he met with no opposition. But the Ægestans, warned by the fate of Motya, resolutely defended their town, and sallying by night, surprised and set fire to the camp of the besiegers. A small party hastening to extinguish the flames were cut off, and the conflagration spreading rapidly, destroyed a number of horses.<sup>2</sup>

This check was followed by intelligence which could not surprise Dionysius; but which, after success so little corresponding with his own great preparations, and with the comparatively defenceless condition of the enemy, at the commencement of hostilities, must have occasioned him serious alarm. The Carthaginian government, resolved to vindicate its dominion in Sicily by a great effort, collected an army (according to the most credible authority,<sup>3</sup>) of a hundred thousand men well equipped, who were joined, as soon as they landed, by thirty thousand Sicilian allies, and a fleet of four hundred ships of war, and six hundred transports. The armament was commanded by Hamilcar, who was on this occasion raised to the rank of Βασιλευς, or commander-in-chief: an officer, under the ancient constitution of Carthage, invested with unlimited civil and military powers during the continuance of his command, but accountable, at its termination, for his conduct to the senate and people.

The Carthaginian fleet sailed with a fair wind, the commander of each vessel bearing sealed orders from Hamilcar, which were not to be opened till they should be under weigh. According to these orders, the ships of war coasted along shore, while the transports

<sup>1</sup> Σικελιοι. Sicilian Greeks, Σικελιωται.

<sup>2</sup> Wesseling renders ιππων, *equitum*, as if the men were burnt in their tents; a most improbable supposition, and no way supported by any authority.

<sup>3</sup> Timæus, cited by Diodorus. Other accounts make the African army alone to have consisted of above three hundred thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and four hundred armed chariots.

B.C. 396. sailed directly across the channel, both, however, bound for Panormus. Dionysius, who was on the watch for any favourable occurrence, observed that the transports, profiting by the breeze, had run too much ahead of the convoy, and he despatched Leptines, with thirty ships of the line, to sink as many of them as possible. The gale continuing to rise, the Syracusan men of war, built for fast rowing, and unmanageable in a heavy sea, could not easily come up with the round-built transports, which sailed best before the wind when it blew hard; but even with this disadvantage, the admiral succeeded in running down fifty of them, having on board five thousand troops, and two hundred chariots, the whole of which were lost.

Hamilcar  
lands at  
Panormus.

Hamilcar, however, landed safely, and without opposition, at Panormus, with a force which Dionysius could not venture to meet, either by land or at sea; and he recovered with little opposition the places formerly in the Carthaginian alliance. The governor-general of Syracuse having endeavoured by liberal offers, but with very indifferent success, to recruit his forces from among the Sicanian natives, retired hastily to prepare for the defence of Syracuse. The Carthaginian general, thus left in undisputed possession of the western district of the island, resolved to make his first attempt upon Messena, with a view to the shelter which would be afforded by its fine harbour to his fleet, consisting altogether of between six and seven hundred sail.

In his way thither, he made himself master, by voluntary submission, or by force, of all the petty states on that side of the country, exacting subsidies from those who offered any resistance. Messena, meanwhile, always distracted by faction, was now divided by a warm dispute respecting an ancient prophecy, "that the Carthaginians should draw water in the city;" which one party interpreted to foretell the triumph, another the defeat and consequent slavery of the enemy. The latter prevailed, and hasty preparations were made for a vigorous defence; the women and children were sent away, with the most valuable moveable property, to places of security; and troops occupied the shore, to prevent the landing of the enemy's foraging parties. Hamilcar immediately perceived their error, and took advantage of it; profiting by a favourable wind, he sailed boldly into the port without previously attempting to land any of his forces; and the town, ill fortified towards the sea, and weakly garrisoned, fell an easy prey.

Of the inhabitants, some sought a noble death in hopeless resistance; some were interrupted in an attempt to escape over land, and were put to the sword; a few succeeded in reaching friendly fortresses; above two hundred flung themselves into the sea, with the desperate design of swimming to the opposite shore; and it is asserted, that nearly a fourth part of the number reached Italy in safety. The towers, however, which defended the city on the land

side, remained impregnable, and Hamilcar, eager to push his advantages, would not consume time in their reduction; but he levelled the walls with the ground, and so completely razed and burnt the houses, that, in the words of the historian, "it was difficult to ascertain where the town had stood." B.C. 396.

The native Sicilians, as well as the Sicanians, had now, with very few exceptions,<sup>1</sup> gone over to the Carthaginians; and so many of the Grecian towns were either subdued or gained, that Hamilcar commanded much more than half the island, and the resources of Dionysius were proportionably narrowed. In this emergency he was not, however, discouraged, nor wanting in exertion to make the most of the means yet remaining to him. He manned sixty ships with manumitted slaves, thereby making the number of his fleet a hundred and eighty sail, of which but a small proportion were ships of the line; and having obtained a reinforcement of a thousand heavy armed mercenaries from Sparta, or more probably from some neighbouring Lacedæmonian garrisons, he had a disposable land force of about thirty thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry, with which he resolved to occupy the strong line of country between Mount Ætna and the coast, and there either to arrest the progress of the enemy, or compel Hamilcar to attack him to disadvantage.

The Carthaginian general, meanwhile, continued his march along the coast, so as to preserve his communication with the fleet; but his progress was suddenly stopped by an eruption of the volcano, and the descent of a large stream of burning lava into the sea, which rendered it impossible for the army to proceed. Obligated, therefore, to take the difficult and tedious circuit of the mountain, and dreading the event of a naval action in his absence, he ordered Mago, his admiral, to proceed directly with his fleet to the harbour of Catana, about half-way between Messena and Syracuse, and there to await his arrival. Dionysius, ever on the watch, and urged by the impatience of some of his allies, and the doubtful fidelity of others, to strike a decisive blow, made a bold attempt to intercept the enemy's fleet, and marched, with a strong division of the army, to support the attack made upon Mago, by the squadron under Leptines, and to oblige the Carthaginians to keep the sea.

Apparently the arrangement of the Syracusan admiral was not judicious. Selecting thirty of his best ships, he rushed impetuously into the enemy's line, which he threw into disorder, and sunk several of their largest vessels; but being soon surrounded and pressed by the multitude of their men-of-war, he lost the advantage of his superior naval tactics, and his men, compelled to fight hand

Success  
of the  
Carthagi-  
nians.

The defeat  
of the  
Syracusan  
fleet.

<sup>1</sup> Among these is mentioned a tribe of Assorines, a name evidently of Oriental extraction: the Sicanians and Sicilians migrated into Sicily from Italy, driving out the older inhabitants, who were a colony of Phœnicians, and of whom the Assorines were probably descendants.

B.C. 396. to hand, were overpowered by numbers. With great difficulty he broke through the crowd of shipping, and escaped to sea, at the expense of leaving the main body of his fleet to the enemy, who sunk and captured more than half the Syracusan navy, and killed twenty thousand men. Their own loss was considerable, both in ships and men; but they succeeded in securing the port, where they ostentatiously displayed and repaired their numerous prizes.

Hamilcar, soon afterwards, having completed his arduous march round the foot of mount *Ætna*, reached the fertile plains of *Catana*, and immediately took advantage of the success which had been obtained in his absence, to form the siege of *Syracuse*. While *Mago* entered the great port, and covered its ample space with ships of war and transports, the army invested the city on the land side, and plundered the country for thirty days, in the most barbarous manner; endeavouring by every possible provocation, to induce the Syracusans to attempt a sally, either by sea or land. This design was frustrated by the prudence and firmness of *Dionysius*; but he could not prevent the Carthaginians from possessing themselves of the suburb of *Acradina*, less strongly fortified than the other divisions of the city; where *Hamilcar* suffered his soldiers to plunder the temples of *Ceres* and *Proserpine*. "Of which crimes," says *Diodorus*, "he speedily and providentially suffered the due reward; for immediately his affairs grew daily in a worse condition:" "the Syracusans" he adds, "made a successful sally; nightly panics alarmed the camp; and the plague again made its appearance among the men." *Hamilcar*, however, only advanced his operations, and in the progress of his works destroyed the tomb of the illustrious *Gelo* and his consort, an offence which we should be disposed to visit more severely than the pillage of the temples.

Exertions of  
*Dionysius*.

In the meanwhile, *Dionysius* continued to use every exertion for the preservation of his country. His relative *Polyxenus*, was despatched through *Italy* to *Lacedæmon*, and *Corinth*, to solicit supplies, and to represent everywhere the impolicy and cruelty of suffering the Grecian name to be exterminated in *Sicily*; commissioners were sent to *Greece*, with orders to engage mercenary troops at any price; and merchant ships were engaged to transport corn from *Sardinia* and *Africa*. It was probably at this time that necessity suggested many of those financial expedients, which are referred, by *Aristotle* and other writers, to the administration of *Dionysius*. He is said to have adopted the scheme, in modern times so familiar, of a forced circulation of tokens, coined of a base metal; and the more questionable measure, of doubling the nominal value of the current coin of the realm. He passed a decree, that all the jewels of the ladies should be consecrated to *Ceres*, and that they who would continue to wear them should pay the hire of them, according to their value, into the treasury of the goddess, for the use of the

public; and the first example of compliance is reported to have B.C. 396. occurred in his own family; he had recourse also, to what in our country have been termed "*benevolences*;" but finding the excuse of poverty often pleaded against the claim for voluntary contributions to the public service, he declared that his own private resources were exhausted, but that he would set some of his property to sale: the best bidders, as he had anticipated, were among the recusants, and by general acclamation, in this instance fairly exerted, the money was exacted for the treasury, but the goods were restored to the governor-general.

At this period, also, Dionysius had recourse to the precious metals deposited in the temples; and possibly to some of the rich ornaments with which the piety of more prosperous times had decorated the shrines of the deities. It is reported that he endeavoured to reconcile the people to these liberties, by facetious though somewhat irreverent jests; such as, that "the golden robe of Jupiter was too cold for winter, and too heavy for summer, and that a woollen cloak would be more comfortable at all seasons;" and that "it was very unbecoming in Æsculapius to sport a long golden beard, whilst his father Apollo was still a beardless youth." It is not to be supposed that there existed among the Greeks that awful respect for the objects of their degrading worship, which Christians naturally feel for every thing pertaining to the service of a pure and sublime religion. The rites of heathen idolatry, and the personal character of the divinities, were the permitted subjects of the grossest ridicule, not to say of the most offensive ribaldry, on the stage, as well as in the jocular intercourse of the mob; and it would not have been regarded as any mark of impiety, if Dionysius had really seasoned an unpopular act with the undignified drollery, which has more probably been invented by some compiler of anecdotes, like Plutarch or Ælian.

Pecuniary  
aids of  
Dionysius.

The truth is, that the treasures in the ancient temples were deposited there as in places of security, and dedicated to the gods, by way of additional precaution; but it was generally understood, that they might be in part, or wholly withdrawn, to relieve the necessities of the depositor; the practice of extending this right, even to the costly decorations of the sacred edifice, was not only sanctioned by most respectable precedents in Greece, but by the example of the truly great king of Israel, the pious Hezekiah,<sup>1</sup> under circumstances very similar to those of Dionysius.

The siege still continued with little progress, when Polyxenus returned from his embassy with thirty ships of the line, under the command of a Lacedæmonian admiral; Dionysius and Leptines took the opportunity afforded by the arrival of an officer of so high rank, to leave the city, and sail with a squadron to convoy the expected

Siege  
continued.

<sup>1</sup> Vide 2 Kings xviii. 15, 16, 17.



B.C. 396. supplies of corn. During their absence, the citizens observed a vessel laden with wheat, hastening to the enemy's landing place, and boarding her with five boats, took her. The Carthaginian admiral, endeavouring to retake the prize, was beaten off by the whole Syracusan fleet hastily launched to relieve the boats; twenty-four of his men of war were sunk, and the flag-ship was taken. The victorious fleet towed their prizes triumphantly into port, and offered battle to the enemy; who, astonished at the boldness of their attempt, declined to hazard an action. In the moment of exultation, Dionysius entered the harbour, and immediately calling an assembly of the people, congratulated them warmly on their achievement, and assured them that the city should soon be delivered from its besiegers. Having made this confident assertion from private information which he had received of the state of the Carthaginian army, he was about to dismiss the assembly, when Theodorus, a man holding some command in the cavalry, and possessed of considerable influence among the lower class of citizens, rose, and addressed the assembly. After taxing the governor-general with the most arbitrary and oppressive tyranny, under which freedom of speech was absolutely denied, he exercised the privilege, of which he thus deplored the loss, with the utmost license, in heaping upon Dionysius to his face, every abusive epithet which party rage could dictate. He enlarged upon the unsuccessful expeditions which had been undertaken; the ruinous wars that had been brought upon the country; the chicanery and impiety by which money had been raised to supply a lavish expenditure; the interests of the state sacrificed to private ambition; the disastrous condition to which they were reduced; the incapacity, in short, and the personal cowardice of the general, who thus commanded them against their will; nor did he fail to represent, that no sooner was Dionysius absent, than the ancient glory of their fathers had again graced their arms. "Wherefore, my countrymen," he concluded, "if the tyrant will voluntarily abdicate his power, let us permit him with his family to quit the city unmolested; if not, we have now a glorious opportunity for recovering our liberty. We are all met together; arms have been unavoidably put into our hands; we have friends who are ready to assist us, not only in the Italian Greeks, but in the allies from Peloponnesus. And let the provisional government be formed either from Corinth, our mother country, or of the Spartans here present." To this audacious proposal, Pharacidas, the Lacedæmonian admiral, rose to reply; and the friends of Theodorus were not without hope, that he would take part with the opposition. But he stated, with the dignified simplicity of a Spartan, that his commission was to assist the government against the Carthaginians, not to concur in a revolution, which would probably terminate in the loss of the city. And the friends of

Abusive  
Speech of  
Theodorus.

Dionysius appearing to have a decided majority in the meeting, the assembly was peaceably dismissed; nor was any other notice taken of what had passed, except that some of the disaffected party received marks of kindness and favour from the governor-general. B.C. 396.

The plague, meanwhile, increased rapidly in the Carthaginian army, and became so dreadfully infectious, that few could be found to administer to the sick; none to bury the dead; the putrefying corpses corrupted the water, and tainted the air; and the celebrated pestilence of Athens, described with such touching fidelity by Thucydides, and so beautifully painted by Lucretius, seems scarcely to have exceeded in violence that which now spread dejection and death through the gallant and triumphant army of Hamilcar. Appearance of the Plague among the Carthaginians.

Dionysius availed himself of this distress in the enemy's camp to make a sally with his whole force by sea and land. Leptines and Pharacides succeeded beyond their hopes in destroying and burning a great part of the fleet; and the governor-general, who commanded the army in person, gained a considerable advantage over the enemy, and took possession of two strong places, which enabled him to entrench himself beyond the Carthaginian lines, and to place them between his own camp and the fortifications of the town. In the rencontre by which this was achieved, a Syracusan detachment, consisting chiefly of the disaffected party, was cut off to a man, not without suspicion of having been designedly exposed to danger.

Hamilcar thus pressed on all sides, and seeing his numerous forces daily sinking under the ravages of disease, sent an officer to Dionysius, proposing to give up his military chest, still worth three hundred talents, (about £60,000,) in return for permission to withdraw with his remaining troops and fleet to Africa. Diodorus labours to represent this as the offer of a private *douceur* to the governor-general, and attributes his subsequent conduct to a desire of preserving a remnant of the Carthaginian army, in order that the apprehension of hostilities might<sup>1</sup> enable him to keep his command. For the former suspicion there is not the smallest ground; the military nature of the office, and the constant state of military preparation or actual warfare, in which Dionysius kept the people employed, will be thought to afford some colour to the latter supposition. The jealousy of the Corinthian or republican party, rendered it extremely difficult to treat on liberal terms with a fallen enemy, or even to observe the conditions of any treaty which might be concluded. Dionysius, however, agreed that on payment of the three hundred talents, the Carthaginian citizens alone should be The siege raised.

<sup>1</sup> This seems the fair construction of the passage, lib. xiv. c. 75, which has been understood very differently, as if Diodorus supposed that Dionysius was supported in power by the direct influence of Carthage.

B.C. 396.

Retreat of  
Hamilcar.

suffered to depart; and accordingly the mighty Hamilcar stole away by night, with the miserable remains of his proud armament, pursued by the insults of the Syracusan rowers, and the execrations of his deserted allies; and meeting at home with nothing but scorn and neglect, he ended a miserable existence by voluntary famine; "a signal example," observes the historian, "of the just indignation of the deities, whose temples he had profaned; nor did the Carthaginian nation cease to feel the vengeance of Ceres and Proserpine, till the crime was publicly expiated."

The native Sicilians, who had joined Hamilcar, taking advantage of their local knowledge, shifted for themselves, and reached their respective towns in safety; the African allies, attempting to escape, were either cut off, or being overtaken, threw down their arms, and begging for quarter, were seized for slaves. The Spaniards alone, true to each other, and to the gallant spirit of their country, continuing embodied under arms, demanded honourable terms; and were received into the alliance and pay of Syracuse.

So great, however, had been the expenses of the war, that the three hundred talents paid by Hamilcar, did not enable Dionysius to satisfy the demands of the Grecian mercenaries, whom he had hired on their own terms; and these men, generally bitter republicans, were ready, on the slightest discontent, to join with the disaffected party in promoting a revolution. Decision in this case was necessary—violence would have been dangerous. The governor-general perceiving that the insubordination of the troops was secretly encouraged by their commander Aristotle, a Lacedæmonian, he ordered him to be arrested, and sent home to be tried by his own country. He then offered the mercenaries the town and territory of the Leontines, left desolate by the enemy, as a compensation for their services; which the fertility of the soil, and the advantages of the situation, induced them readily to accept.

Measures of  
Dionysius to  
repair the  
ravages of  
the war.

Tranquillity being thus restored, Dionysius immediately employed himself in repairing the wreck of his empire, and in restoring the prosperity of his country. He rebuilt ruined towns, and repopled deserted countries; offering an asylum to the numerous exiles, the victims of faction in the republican states of Greece. Among the rest, he settled six hundred families of the ancient Messenian race, expelled from Peloponnesus by the cruel oppressions of Sparta, in the Sicilian Messena; being particularly anxious to plant a powerful and friendly colony there, as a check to the hostile machinations of the Rhegians on the opposite shore. But the inveterate malignity of Lacedæmon pursued the Messenians even across the seas; and Dionysius was obliged so far to comply with their prejudices against the revival of Messena, as to remove the whole people to a fertile territory on the nothern coast of the island, where they founded Tyndaris, and extending their influence, partly by conquest, and

partly by negotiation, among the neighbouring tribes, became a B.C. 396. considerable and flourishing state. Dionysius, meanwhile, by no means relinquished his plan of rendering the port and fortifications of Messena formidable to Rhegium; and he endeavoured to establish a connection between the garrison there and the new settlement of Tyndaris. The Rhegian government meanwhile was not inactive: collecting the exiles, whom Dionysius had expelled from Naxos and Catana for revolting to the Carthaginians, they fixed them at Mylæ, so as to intercept the communication between the colonies friendly to Syracuse; and they encouraged a party of Naxians who had seized the strong-hold of Taurominium, to persevere in maintaining it against Dionysius. Having by these means, as they supposed, engaged the attention of the Syracusan troops nearer home, they ventured upon open hostilities, and laid siege to Messena. But Dionysius saw at once the advantage thus opened to him; and marching without delay, he defeated the Rhegian general, took Mylæ, and established a friendly intercourse between the new colonists and his own allies on the coast; so that the measures of the Rhegians only tended to confirm the strength opposed to them. B.C. 394.

Returning to the petty but vexatious contest at Taurominium, Dionysius blockaded the place, in the expectation that the enemy would evacuate it on the approach of winter; but these brave people, looking upon the Greeks as invaders, who had robbed the native Sicilians of their fertile plains, were resolved to be masters at least of the wild mountain fastnesses; and they held out against all the efforts of the Syracusans, though their fortifications were covered with snow.

Dionysius trusting to the darkness and inclemency of a mid-winter night, resolved on attempting to carry the fortress by storm. The storming party, conducted by the general in person, having with great toil and difficulty surmounted the craggy path, rendered almost impassable by the depth of snow, succeeded in surprising the citadel, and opening the gate to their comrades. But unfortunately, Dionysius received a wound in his face, and his eyes became suddenly inflamed by the frost; at this moment the garrison made a sudden and successful attack upon him; he was thrown down by a blow upon his gorget, and narrowly escaped being taken prisoner; the assailants, alarmed and missing their commander, made a precipitate retreat, with the loss of above six hundred men, and leaving behind them most of their accoutrements. Dionysius himself, it is reported, brought away no part of his armour but the gorget, to which he owed his life. The intelligence of this disaster made an unfavourable impression throughout Sicily, and occasioned a change of administration in Agrigentum, which seceded from the Syracusan alliance. Worsted at  
Tauromi-  
nium.  
  
Dionysius  
defeated.

B.C. 394. Upon this, Mago was despatched to head the Carthaginian party in Sicily; and assembling an army of natives, he ravaged the territory of Messena,<sup>1</sup> and after collecting a great booty, he pitched his camp near the friendly city of Abacenum. The active governor-general of Syracuse, however, soon came up with him; and defeating him in a pitched battle with considerable slaughter, obliged him to leave the island without delay. Not many days afterwards, Dionysius sailed with a hundred ships of war, to chastise the Rhegians; and arriving unexpectedly, set fire to the city, and applied his scalding ladders to the walls. The inhabitants, eager to save their houses from the flames, left the defence of the walls to a very insufficient force, and the place would unquestionably have fallen, had not Heloris their general exerted himself to prevail on them to let the conflagration take its course, and to unite in repelling the enemy. Dionysius, by these means, disappointed of his object, plundered and laid



[Mago.]

waste the country; and, concluding a truce for a year, returned to Syracuse.

War  
continued by  
Carthage.

In the next spring, the Carthaginian government renewed their efforts in Sicily; and Mago, with an army of not less than eighty thousand men, overrunning several Sicilian states of the Syracusan confederacy, encamped in the territories of the Aggrinæans, near

B.C. 392. the river Crysa. Aggris, however, at this time, next to Dionysius, the most powerful prince in Sicily, remained proof against intimidation or allurements; and Mago thought it prudent to advance no farther. Dionysius hastened to the assistance of his ally, and concluded a treaty with him, by which Aggris was to be put in possession of a considerable territory at the close of the war; and engaged in the meanwhile to support the troops from Syracuse at his own expense.

The two princes, having intelligence that Mago was destitute of supplies, and in great distress for provisions, determined not to risk a battle; upon which a large detachment of the Syracusan army, ever impatient of a protracted campaign, mutinied and returned home. Dionysius, not discouraged, supplied their place as well as

<sup>1</sup> It has been observed, that this fact proves the error of our copies of Diodorus, which join Messena with Agrigentum in the preceding sentence.

circumstances would allow, by arming their slaves; and the Carthagini- B.C. 392.  
 ans soon afterwards furnished an ample justification of his conduct, by sending to treat for peace, on terms quite as favourable as could have been expected from a decisive victory; namely, that the belligerent powers should stand as they did by the former treaty, excepting, that the native Sicilians were to be annexed to the confederacy under Dionysius, and that he should be put in possession of Taurominium.

It deserves remark, that on his return to Syracuse, the governor-general appears to have instituted no proceedings against his refractory soldiers; on the contrary, he restored to them their slaves whom he had enlisted to serve in their place. His mercenary troops, to whose steadiness the success of the war was in a great measure attributed, were rewarded with the town and territory of the exiled Taurominians.

During the short season of tranquillity which followed these transactions, the influence, or as it was called, the empire of Syracuse, extended itself not only throughout Sicily, but also once more to a considerable extent over the Grecian settlements in Italy. Relying upon support from some of these states, Dionysius fitted out an armament for the reduction of his ancient enemies the Rhegians; and though his attack upon the town failed, and a storm which arose occasioned some loss of ships and men, it was more than compensated by the plunder of the country, and by a treaty of alliance formed with the Lucanians, a native Italian people, between whom B.C. 390.  
 and the Rhegian confederacy, the most bitter animosity existed.

About the same time, the Syracusan interest was further strengthened in Italy, by the liberal conduct of the admiral Leptines, towards a body of unfortunate Thurians, allies of Rhegium, who had been defeated and driven into the sea by the Lucanians. He not only permitted them to take refuge in his fleet, towards which they had fled, under the idea that it was a squadron of their allies, but ransomed them at a considerable sum. Thurium was consequently detached from the league against Dionysius; but the Rhegians and Crotonians continued to manifest the most determined hostility to his government. Diodorus insinuates that Leptines, in consequence of this humane action, was superseded in his command, and his brother Thearidas appointed to succeed him; but the behaviour of the admiral was not only consonant to the line of policy generally pursued by the governor-general, but was imitated by him very shortly afterwards on an occasion, which the same historian calls the most glorious of his life. It must have been for other reasons, therefore, that we find Thearidas commanding the fleet, which, in the succeeding year, attended another expedition B.C. 389.  
 against the Rhegian confederacy. After some successes at sea, Dionysius invested Caulonia; and the Rhegian and Crotonian

Interval of tranquillity.

Syracusan influence in Italy.

B.C. 389. governments intrusted the command of the allied army to Heloris, a banished Syracusan, who had before been defeated in the battle at Messena, and whose principal recommendation appears to have been his inveterate hatred of the tyrant. With superior numbers he marched immediately to oblige the Syracusans to raise the siege; but advancing with more eagerness than skill, he was easily routed, and lost his life fighting bravely to the last. A considerable slaughter ensued; but a detachment of ten thousand men, taking refuge on an eminence, where they were surrounded by the Sicilian army, demanded to surrender on conditions. The general insisted upon their surrendering at discretion; and distress, and want of water obliged them to comply; they marched down, therefore, with the sullen resolution of men who disdained to supplicate where they expected neither generosity nor forbearance. But in proportion as their hope of mercy had been forlorn, their joy and thankfulness were extreme, when Dionysius, having counted their number, informed them that they were all free to depart unransomed, whithersoever they thought fit. Golden crowns were sent to him as tributes of gratitude, from the friends and countrymen of the liberated prisoners; and the fame of his popularity contributed to alarm the Rhegians, now in a great degree deprived of their allies, and unable to resist the victorious army which was daily expected to surround their walls. They sent, therefore, to offer submission, and to solicit that he would impose upon them moderate terms. Dionysius exacted a fine of three hundred talents; deprived them of their whole navy; and took an hundred hostages. Then, razing Caulonia, he assigned its lands to his friends the citizens of Locri, and removed the Caulonians to Syracuse; where he admitted them to the freedom of the city, and exempted them for five years from bearing any share in the public burdens.

Defeat  
and death of  
Heloris.

Dionysius  
passes into  
Italy.  
B.C. 388.

In the next year, Dionysius again crossing to Italy, adopted the same measure with the Hipponians, and gratified the Locrians with their land. A dispute having arisen with the Rhegians, respecting a supply of provisions with which they were bound to furnish the Syracusan army, the last hope of establishing any permanent treaty with that obstinate people vanished, and it was resolved to make a fearful example of them. Disdaining, however, every unmanly advantage, the governor-general set their hostages at liberty before the commencement of hostilities.

The siege of Rhegium immediately followed, and was pressed day and night with unremitting exertion; but the inhabitants, ably directed by their general, Phyto, and despairing of any treatment from the enemy better than slavery or death, defended themselves with astonishing perseverance, for eleven months; till they had eaten, not only their horses and other beasts of burden, but had even boiled down their leathern hides for food, and ventured out by

stealth to collect the herbage that grew wild beneath their walls. B.C. 388. Of this last resource they were deprived by the vigilance of Dionysius, who, though suffering from a severe and dangerous wound, remitted nothing of his activity; and hoping now to reduce the town by famine, he destroyed every trace of vegetation around it. The miserable Rhegians at length opened their gates, and displayed to the conqueror a horrid spectacle of numbers dead or dying of hunger, while the survivors presented a scarcely less squalid and emaciated appearance. Six thousand prisoners were sent to Syracuse, where those who could redeem themselves at a silver mina, (about £3,) for each man, were permitted to reside as freemen; the rest were sold for slaves. Phyto and his son alone, suffered death; with circumstances, according to the democratic writers, of atrocious barbarity. The town itself was given to the small party in it who had been friendly to Dionysius, and the population being augmented by colonization, Rhegium shortly became a flourishing ally of Syracuse.

Rhegium  
reduced by  
famine.  
B.C. 387.

It was during the operations of this siege, according to the Sicilian historian, that Dionysius made his first unsuccessful attempt to rival his magnificent predecessor, Hiero, at the Olympic games; and sent his brother, Thearidas, in a style of unusual splendour, to superintend the recitation of his prize poems, and the running of his horses in the chariot-race. The imposing effect of royal grandeur was, however, no match for the vehement eloquence of the Athenian orator, Lysias, who endeavoured to excite a tumult against "the presumption of the impious tyrant;" and either by some contrivance of the hostile party, or from the mismanagement of the drivers, some of the chariots were driven out of the course, the rest were broken by running against each other, and the horses failed of obtaining the honour which their swiftness appears to have merited. The same prejudice occasioned the rejection of his verses with marks of the most insulting contempt; though we may infer, from his having succeeded in the more arduous contest for a tragic prize at Athens, that he could not be altogether deficient in poetic talent.

Dionysius  
contends in  
the Olympic  
games.

But Dionysius devoted his leisure to pursuits more beneficial to his country, and more conducive to his own lasting fame. In the interval of peace which followed the reduction of Rhegium, he began to extend his connections, and to found colonies along the coasts of the Adriatic and Ionian seas; and deriving from these sources vast commercial advantages, and a plentiful supply of materials, he repaired and enlarged the city wall, so as to make it the greatest work of the kind then known in the world; he greatly improved the docks; and erected the magnificent gymnasia on the banks of the Anapus. The city was, at the same period, enriched and adorned with numerous temples and other public edifices.

The extended commerce of Syracuse suffered greatly from the B.C. 384.



B.C. 384.  
Expedition  
against the  
Pirates of  
Tuscany.

pirates of Tuscany; and in the following year, Dionysius undertook an expedition against them; which Diodorus attributes to his desire of plundering a rich temple at Agylla, (as he does the commercial connection with Epirus and Illyria, to a preposterous scheme for pillaging the temple at Delphi.) The probable truth is, that the Agyllæan pirates made use of the temple of Leucothea as a depository for the produce of their predatory excursions; and that Dionysius was perfectly justified in pursuing the recovery of his own property, even within the limits of the sanctuary. The spoil found in it is said to have amounted to five hundred talents, (£100,000,) and to have been very acceptable to him in the exhausted state of his treasury.

On this occasion, suspicion arising that some of the soldiers had secreted part of the precious utensils, the general, in order to discover the delinquents, issued an order, that every one who had taken part of the spoil to his private use, should pay half its value. The soldiers concluding that this payment would operate to secure the remainder, came forward to avail themselves of it, and were immediately seized and deprived of the whole.

Endeavours  
to unite the  
Sicilian  
states.

B.C. 383.

On his return home, Dionysius continued to pursue his favourite policy of uniting all Sicily in the alliance of Syracuse, and by negotiation and benefits, succeeded in detaching several small states from the Carthaginian interest. The government of Carthage, having in vain expostulated with him on the injustice and impolicy of renewing hostilities, raised Mago to the same high office of commander-in-chief formerly enjoyed by Hamilcar, and instructed him to carry his attack upon the allies of Syracuse, into Italy and Sicily at the same time. This obliged Dionysius, also, to divide his forces, and a variety of skirmishes ensued, with no very important results. At length a decisive action took place, in which the Carthaginians were routed with the loss of ten thousand slain, and five thousand prisoners, and Mago himself, after signalising himself by his personal bravery, fell covered with wounds. The army, deprived of their leader, and disheartened by their defeat, desired conditions of peace; but Dionysius would hear of nothing less than the complete evacuation of Sicily, and the payment of all the expenses of the war by the Carthaginians.

In this instance he appears to have miscalculated the resources of the enemy, who had no other intention than to gain time for the reinforcement of their troops, and the re-organisation of their materiel, under the able management of the son of Mago, who was chosen to succeed his father. So that while the Syracusans were exulting in the expectation of becoming sole masters of the island, they were attacked and defeated with great slaughter; and the gallant and generous Leptines lost his life in the action.

The Carthaginian general, as prudent in using his victory as he

had been skilful in obtaining it, withdrew immediately to Panormus, B.C. 383. and sent to propose peace on reasonable terms: namely, that with some trifling exceptions, the respective territories should remain in statu quo ante bellum, and that Dionysius should pay a thousand talents (£200,000) for the expenses of the campaign.

Both powers were now convinced of the impracticability of reducing the whole Sicilian states under one dominion; and for the first time a peace was concluded, which neither intended immediately to violate. Dionysius, secure in power, and fatigued with incessant warfare, eagerly embraced the opportunity of cultivating those arts of peace, which displayed his talents to the best advantage. The great undertakings, already mentioned, for extending the commerce and political interests of his country towards ancient Greece, flourished under his superintendence; the city became the rival<sup>1</sup> of Athens in extent and in magnificence; and the Syracusan empire presented the singular spectacle of a Grecian confederacy in the full enjoyment of prosperity, uninterrupted by domestic faction or foreign hostilities.

In his private life, during this happy period, the ambitious and active spirit of Dionysius sought for exercise in those literary and gymnastic contests in which he is said to have engaged, even amidst the toils and dangers of war. He was assiduous in improving the breed of horses, and had establishments for that purpose in Italy as well as at home; and he continued to court the Muses, though, it is reported, without very general success. In the conversation of men of letters he passed much of his time, and, according to the custom of an age when printing was unknown and writing laborious, he frequently recited his poetry to his friends, and availed himself of their criticism. Their judgment would of course generally be favourable, and a prince of his temper would not much relish severe animadversions. Yet though he was, perhaps, sometimes offended by the frankness of his intimates, his anger was easily appeased by submission, or averted by some facetious excuse. When Philoxenus, himself a poet, was sent to prison for speaking contemptuously before company of the prince's verses, he was almost immediately released and restored to favour; and so little did he apprehend any serious consequences from the offended vanity of his master, that on the next recitation, being asked for his opinion, he called out to the attendants—"To prison with me;" and the implied censure was well received. On another occasion, the same friend ventured to say of some elegiac complaint, composed by Dionysius, that the verses were "truly pitiful," and the pun met the approbation of the royal author.

The authority for these, and for similar tales respecting Philistus, Leptines, and others, is, however, of a questionable nature. The

<sup>1</sup> Cicero.


B.C. 383. literary men of that age were for the most part hostile to monarchical governments; and, like the savans of France, while they gladly sheltered themselves under the patronage of the court, were always eager to embrace any occasion of insulting the sovereign, or bringing his administration into disgrace. Plato himself was repeatedly entertained by Dionysius, who took particular pleasure in his conversation; but finding that he was diligent in propagating republican doctrines, and had warped the allegiance of Dion, the son of his late colleague, Hipparinus, (afterwards the asserter, as Plutarch calls it, of the liberty of his country,) he seized and sold him as a slave, that he might learn the difference between real and imaginary grievances. But the men of letters resident at court, subscribed to redeem him, and sent him home in safety. This account, however, does not appear entitled to much credit.

The domestic comfort of Dionysius, and the prospect of transmitting his power to his posterity, were clouded by the thoughtless profligacy and wild freaks of his son, who inherited his father's taste and magnificence, without his military talents or political virtues. As he was reprimanding him one day for his excesses, and observing that he had set a very different example, the youth replied, "True, sire; but you were not the son of a prince."—"Even so," said the father, "nor will you be father of one."

Death of  
Dionysius.  
B.C. 368.

During sixteen years, Dionysius took no part in the commotions which agitated the rest of the world, except that on two pressing occasions he sent some assistance to his constant allies, the Lacedæmonians. But he was once more tempted by the state of affairs in Africa, to attempt the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily.<sup>1</sup> The plague had again desolated the territories of Carthage, the tributary states had taken advantage of its distress to assert their independence, and a conflagration had destroyed the greater part of the navy. The Syracusan army and fleet, therefore, proceeded for a time with little opposition to possess themselves of some strong places, and to collect plunder. But the genius of the Carthaginian government, ever fertile in resources, assembled an hundred and thirty ships of war before Dionysius was aware of their preparation, and unexpectedly attacking his fleet, of more than double that number, took the greater part, and dispersed the rest. A truce was immediately concluded for the winter; and Dionysius, returning to Syracuse, fell sick and died, in the thirty-eighth year of his administration, and the sixty-second of his life. With him expired the vigour and glory of the Syracusan empire; and although the strength and wealth which it had acquired by his extraordinary talents and industry, preserved it from immediate and sudden decay, its decline may be dated from the year in which it lost its noblest ornament—in the genius, the valour, and the patriotism of Dionysius.

<sup>1</sup> About Ol. 103, 1.



[Temple of Concord, Agrigentum.]

## CHAPTER XII.

### DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER.—TIMOLEON.

FROM B. C. 368 TO B. C. 335.

DIONYSIUS the first, commonly called the tyrant of Sicily, left at B. C. 368, his death two sons, Hipparinus and Nisæus, and two daughters, Sophrosyne and Arete, by his third wife, Aristomache, the daughter of his colleague, Hipparinus, and sister to the celebrated Dion. The former of these princesses had been given in marriage to the younger Dionysius, the son of Doris, and the latter to her uncle Dion.<sup>1</sup>

When the illness of the tyrant became alarming, and the physicians gave little hope of his recovery, Dion was anxious to represent to him the claims of his sister's children to a share in the succession, expecting, probably, as they were yet very young, to secure for himself the reins of government; but in this design he was anticipated by the vigilance of the eldest son, who prevailed upon the medical attendants to prevent the interview. Hence arose a jealousy between the two branches of the family, which, though suppressed

<sup>1</sup> Corn. Nep. The account of Plutarch differs from that of Cornelius Nepos and Diodorus in some particulars.

B.C. 368. for the present, occasioned ultimately the revolution, in which Dionysius the second lost his power; and Syracuse and all Sicily suffered for many years the ruinous consequences of anarchy.

Accession of  
Dionysius  
the Younger.

At first, however, all went on smoothly. Dionysius assembling the people, informed them of his father's death, and pleaded his own cause with so much success that he succeeded to power without opposition; and after celebrating the funeral with becoming solemnity, entered upon the dignities and duties of his high office, and became master of the most flourishing and powerful empire then in Europe. His first measure was to conclude a peace with Carthage; and though he is severely censured by Diodorus and Plutarch for deserting the policy of his father, and making terms with barbarians, the impartiality of posterity has done justice to the wisdom of his administration, in avoiding an unnecessary rupture with the only power from which danger was to be apprehended, and which had so often been more than a match for his active and warlike predecessor.

In a petty war with the Lucanians in Italy, Dionysius showed that he was neither deficient in personal courage nor in military skill; and the vigour with which he repressed the pirates who infested the Adriatic, did honour to his government.

But for the maintenance of his authority and the regulation of affairs, he appears to have been much indebted to his able counselors, Philistus (the venerable and accomplished friend of his father) and to Dion, who, to a princely fortune, added great dignity of manners, and uncommon talents for command both in the council and in the field. The former was a warm advocate for the continuance of the monarchy, subject, as the supreme power was, to the ultimate control of a popular assembly; and the latter was a determined aristocrat, equally adverse to power placed in the hands of an individual or vested in the democracy. The prince, fond of ease and pleasure, but by no means deficient in ability, contrived for a time to reconcile the discordant views of these eminent statesmen, and throwing upon them the principal weight of business, gave himself up to literary leisure and to voluptuousness; and assembling round him all who were most distinguished for wit and conviviality, he lost, in the gaieties and excesses of a luxurious life, that respect and confidence with which the Syracusans had been accustomed to regard his father.

The decline of his popularity opened a prospect which the penetrating ambition of Dion did not fail to improve. Severe in his own morals, and haughty in his manners, he encouraged the growing disgust against the licentiousness of the court and the thoughtless familiarity of Dionysius, and gradually withdrawing from his government the support of public opinion, prepared the way for its entire subversion. In these views he was seconded by Heracleides, who

had the command of the cavalry, and was in high favour with the lower class of citizens, to whom the austere dignity of Dion was less engaging than the courtly urbanity of the master of the horse. B.C. 368.

It is generally believed that these discontents were inflamed by the arrival of Plato, on a visit to Dionysius. The habits of the philosopher were more congenial with the sober gravity of Dion, than with the riotous dissipation of the prince; and he is reported to have entered warmly into his interests, and to have offended the courtiers by the boldness of his lectures, and the undisguised avowal of his political principles. Dionysius, however, delighted with his learning, eagerly cultivated his society, treated him with every mark of favour and distinction, and, from respect to his character, imposed a decent restraint upon the libertinism of his companions. It is even said that he became a convert to many of the maxims of government then prevalent among men of letters in Greece; and Philistus, perceiving the dangerous tendency of this new influence, exerted himself to support the sinking power of the prince, almost equally endangered by the machinations of his ministers, and by his own vacillating facility.

Arrival of  
Plato at  
Syracuse.




[Plato.]

Dion having, in the beginning of this reign been sent as ambassador to Carthage, had used all his art to ingratiate himself among the leading men in that state, with the purpose of strengthening his interest in Sicily by so powerful a connection. And now, hoping that his ambitious schemes were in a promising train, he renewed his correspondence with his friends in Africa, through the medium of their dependencies in the island. Some of his letters, accidentally intercepted, were brought to Dionysius, and served, for a time, to open his eyes to his danger, and to rouse him to something like vigour and decision. B.C. 358.

Sending for Dion, to speak with him on the rampart of the citadel next the sea, he upbraided him with his treachery, and observing that it was impossible they could both continue in safety at Syracuse, obliged him to embark in a ship which lay under the wall prepared for the purpose, and to go into exile at Corinth; where he permitted him to receive the vast income of his Sicilian estates, and to live in a style of splendour before unknown in Peleponnesus. At the same time, from information probably contained in the intercepted letters, he banished Heracleides from Sicily, and bestowed the vacant offices in the state among the friends of Philistus. Banishment of Dion and Heracleides.

B.C. 358. But neither the proud unbending temper of Dion, nor the unprincipled duplicity of Heracleides, were likely to be won with the generosity and clemency of Dionysius. The first object of both was to employ the large resources left in their power to raise troops in Greece for the purpose of effecting a revolution at Syracuse; and though there could be no cordial co-operation between two men who agreed in nothing but in enmity to the existing government of their country, they were each unremittingly active to engage in their interest banished Sicilians of the revolutionary party, and malcontent adventurers of all countries, and in hiring mercenaries for the expedition.



[Port of Corinth.]

As soon as intelligence of these proceedings reached Sicily, Dionysius confiscated the property of Dion; and obliging his wife, Arete, to repudiate him, gave her to another; and took her son under his own care, admitting him to share in his excesses, at an age when his education ought to have been religiously severe. Himself, accompanied by Philistus, went to Italy, to provide against the approaching conflict.

Meanwhile the success of Dion in Peloponnesus was not answerable to his great means and active exertions. Of the Sicilian exiles, only twenty-five, chiefly Naxians, from Taurominium, engaged in his service; and the whole force collected by him did not exceed eight hundred men. These he embarked in two transports, accompanied by three small craft, and avoiding the usual track, arrived in safety at the Carthaginian settlement of Minoa, of which the gover-

Dion and  
Heracleides  
invade  
Sicily.

nor Synalus, or Pyralus, received him with every demonstration of B.C. 358.  
friendship, and assisted him by all the means in his power.

“With less means,” observes Diodorus, “than any one ever employed before him, he most unexpectedly overthrew the greatest dynasty in Europe. Who would believe that a man sailing with two transports should subdue a potentate who possessed four hundred ships of the line, and commanded an army of a hundred thousand foot, and ten thousand horse; having such supplies of arms and provisions, and all other necessaries as were suitable to one enjoying such power and wealth; besides occupying the greatest of Grecian cities, with ports and arsenals, and impregnable fortresses, supported too by numerous and powerful allies.”

The wonder, however, in some measure ceases, when we read that Dionysius and Philistus were still in Italy; and the despatch sent to recall them, through treachery or accident, miscarried, so that they did not return to Syracuse until Dion, by means of the disaffected party, had been several days in possession of the city on the main land. On their arrival in the citadel negotiations were attempted, and for some time hopes were entertained of an amicable arrangement; but the haughty temper of Dion, exasperated by domestic injury, and inflamed by good fortune, precluded the possibility of peace on reasonable terms; and the siege of Ortygia continued to be pressed, with various success, but in every rencontre with the loss of many citizens, and with great injury to the town. Success of Dion.

Heracleides, in the mean time, arrived with a force very superior to that which had accompanied Dion to Sicily, and possessing great advantages, from his popularity among the lower classes, who were offended by the aristocratic manners and sentiments of his competitor.

It became immediately evident that neither of these chiefs would B.C. 356.  
submit to act a subordinate part; and though present necessity obliged Heracleides to be content with the rank of admiral, while Dion commanded the city, he was equally active in undermining the popularity and power of his colleague, and in co-operating with him for the destruction of Dionysius.

In one of the numerous skirmishes by sea and land, which now B.C. 355.  
daily depopulated and ruined Syracuse, Philistus was killed; and his body falling into the possession of his enemies, was treated with those gross and brutal insults which mark the uncivilized barbarian in civil wars. Dionysius, shocked and disheartened, once more attempted to negotiate; and it is said, that Dion was desirous of hearkening to terms; but it was now the flood-tide of revolutionary violence, and Dion's influence was overborne by Heracleides, the unprincipled flatterer of the mob. The overtures of the prince were accordingly rejected; but he succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the admiral, and escaped to Locri, the native city of his mother, in Italy, leaving Death of Philistus.



B.C. 355. the citadel under the command of his son, Apollocrates. His influence among the Greek states, in Italy, enabled him to send a powerful reinforcement to Syracuse, under the conduct of an able commander; and after some temporary, but important successes, Apollocrates surrendered the citadel to Dion, upon honourable terms; and with his friends and private property followed his father to Locri.

The natural consequences of rebellion and anarchy fell heavily upon the unhappy Syracusans. Having paid so dearly for the name of liberty, they could trust neither of the competitors for power, by whose means they had overthrown the government.

Heracleides plotted against Dion, and evinced the basest treachery and ingratitude. Dion, after some forbearance, finding his popularity on the decline, murdered Heracleides; and suffering a remorse of conscience, which disordered his understanding, was himself, not long afterwards, assassinated by an Athenian, Callicrates, or Calippus, whom he had received into his confidence. Calippus was successful in his attempt to seize the supreme direction of affairs; and, like the blood-stained demagogues who preceded him, exercised his power with the most oppressive tyranny, and taught the citizens, in late repentance, to call the days of Dionysius the golden age of Syracuse. After a very short reign, whilst he was absent at the siege of Catana, the city was seized by Hipparinus, son of the elder Dionysius; and Calippus was soon afterwards murdered by the partisans of the family at Rhegium.

Disorders in  
Syracuse

The condition of Sicily was not improved by the accession of Hipparinus to power; he held it only about two years; and an interval of complete anarchy followed, such, that the lately flourishing and populous island became a scene of universal wretchedness and desolation; commerce was suspended; agriculture at a stand; property plundered; palaces and temples fell to decay, and were tenanted by wild beasts and venomous reptiles. The mercenary troops, in the absence of all regular government, finding neither employment nor pay, subsisted by the most audacious robbery, and infested every district in the island with hordes of banditti.

Authority of  
Dionysius re-  
established.

B.C. 346.

During all this period, Dionysius remained peaceably in Italy, enjoying great consideration and influence, if not legitimate power, among the Greek states attached to his family; but at length, solicited by a large party among his countrymen, who were wearied with the endless succession of revolutions, and encouraged by the readiness of his Italian friends to engage in his cause, he returned, after an absence of ten years, and was restored to a dominion, exhausted indeed by intestine discord, and curtailed by the revolt of the allies, but rendered much more absolute than before by the lawless violence of republican leaders. The democratic party, however, were by no means disposed to acquiesce in the re-establishment

of the former dynasty; nor were there wanting numbers who, either from personal vanity, political prejudice, or a dislike to the restraints of regular government, were ready to join in any scheme for renewing the reign of tumult and sedition. Of the neighbouring chiefs, the two most powerful, Icetes, of Leontini, the friend of Dion, and Andromachus, who had assisted in the expulsion of Dionysius, and had made himself master of Taurominium, were staunch friends to that nominal freedom, under which they exercised unlimited authority; and were eager at all times to lend their assistance to the revolutionary faction, who exclusively called themselves the people. Icetes, in particular, had acquired such an ascendancy among the Syracusans, many of whom had taken refuge under his protection, that he is called by Diodorus, "the Dynast of the Syracusans," at the very time that Dionysus is said to have been "Lord of Syracuse."

But the dread of a Carthaginian invasion, which at this time threatened the entire subjugation of the Grecian states in Sicily, gave rise to a proposal by no means agreeable to the ambitious views of Icetes, though he found himself under the necessity of appearing to concur in it. The idea is said to have originated with the Taurominians; but it was eagerly embraced by all parties, the friends of Dionysius alone excepted; and, accordingly, an embassy was despatched to Corinth, the mother city, and foundress of Syracuse, to desire that, according to ancient Grecian custom, a Corinthian general might be sent out to take the command of their armies against the enemy, and to settle their domestic disturbances by the establishment of a permanent and free constitution. Icetes, meanwhile, indifferent by what means he promoted his own designs, privately treated with the Carthaginians, and offered to put Syracuse into their hands, on condition of being appointed to the government; and he held out hopes that the difficulties under which Corinth was known to be labouring at home, might prevent the administration from attending to the claims of the colony. In this expectation he was deceived: the Greek republics, proud of their colonies, and deriving great advantages from them both in war and peace, were always glad to avail themselves of every opportunity to keep up their connection, even with inconsiderable settlements formed of their own citizens; and it was the obvious policy for the Corinthians to preserve their influence in Syracuse, whose power and resources were so much greater than their own. The Sicilian embassy was, therefore, well received; and a decree passed, "that it was the duty of Corinth to send succours to her colony." The question was then put, who should command the expedition; and a person in the crowd proposing Timoleon, the son of Timanctus,<sup>1</sup> he was unanimously appointed to the office.

Embassy to  
Corinth from  
the Sicilian  
states.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch says that his father's name was Timodemus, that of his mother Demariste, both of noble family.

B.C. 346.  
Timoleon.

In the amusing romance which Plutarch has given us, under the title of Timoleon, he describes that bold and active genius as having, for twenty years previous to this event, moped in his own garden, "under the shade of melancholy boughs," broken in health and spirits by the displeasure of his mother, who could not be persuaded that the assassination of a brother was "a glorious achievement."<sup>1</sup> The truth rather appears to be, that very shortly before the arrival of the Sicilian ambassador, Timoleon was instigated, by the fury of political zeal, either to stab his elder brother, Timocrates, with his own hand, or at least to assist the conspirators who took away his life. Timocrates had, by the means most usual in Grecian republics, by courting the populace and the military, attained the supreme direction of affairs, and acquired the appellation of tyrant at Corinth; and Timoleon, having vainly attempted to persuade him to relinquish his power, was led, by the doctrines then current in Greece, to conclude, that patriotism required the sacrifice of private affections, and that it was his duty to deliver his country from slavery. That there was no personal enmity between the brothers appears likely, from its being related, that the younger had, not long before, saved the life of the elder at the imminent risk of his own, in a battle with the Argians; and it is by no means consistent with the determined temper, and sanguine energy which characterise all the actions of Timoleon, to suppose, that he ever suffered himself to repent of what he had once resolved on public motives to execute. Nor is it material whether Timocrates fell by the dagger of his brother, in the forum,<sup>2</sup> or whether a remnant of decent respect for kindred blood induced the author of the deed to hide<sup>3</sup> his face, or to be absent<sup>4</sup> from the apartment while the assassins committed it in the palace. Whatever might be the sentiments of the family and their friends, it is clear that the majority of the Corinthian people regarded Timoleon as the deliverer of his country, and concurred with his biographers<sup>5</sup> in heaping praises on the patriotic fratricide. It is indeed most probable, that to this horrid crime he was entirely indebted for his appointment to command the Sicilian expedition; for he was told, that the construction to be put upon his late act, must depend on his displaying, in his new station, the same remorseless hatred of tyranny which was pleaded as his justification.

B.C. 345.

Timoleon  
sails for  
Corinth.

Timoleon immediately set about the preparations for his arduous undertaking; and, with the spirit of a man resolved to devote himself to a life of adventure, embarked the whole of his property in his outfit, and bade a final farewell to Greece. The zeal of his countrymen was heightened by intelligence from Icetes, who endeavoured to dissuade them from the enterprise, alleging that he would himself, with the assistance of the Carthaginians, undertake to expel the

<sup>1</sup> Corn. Nepos.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch.

<sup>4</sup> Corn. Nepos.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch and Corn. Nepos.

tyrant from Syracuse. The Corinthians had no intention to permit either to supersede the parent state in the deliverance of their colony, and they hastened the departure of Timoleon to check the ambitious designs of Ictes. But Corinth was, at this time, by no means rich or powerful; faction at home, and wars in Peloponnesus, had so much drained its resources, that Timoleon sailed with only seven hundred mercenary troops, besides volunteers, on board four ships of war, converted into transports for the occasion, and convoyed by three more cleared for action: passing Corcyra, he was joined by two Corcyrean and one Leucadian man-of-war, and with this little fleet of ten ships, he ventured to cross the Ionian channel. He was too good a general to have omitted to call in the powerful aid of superstition: the oracle at Delphi had promised him success, and a crown of victory had fallen upon his head as he was quitting the temple; Ceres and Proserpine signified their intention of accompanying the expedition, and accepted the dedication of the flag-ship; and when the fleet got under weigh by night, the presence of the goddesses was indicated to all on board, by meteors or fireworks in the heavens, which continued to move before the admiral, directing his course, and reconciling the crews to the bold measure of keeping the open sea.

B.C. 345.

Timoleon was already off Metapontum in Italy, when he fell in with a Carthaginian man-of-war, with ambassadors on board, who hailed him, and delivered their commission, protesting against his interfering in the affairs of Sicily, or landing upon the island. Upon this, he hastened to Rhegium, where he was secure of a friendly reception, and took refuge in that port till he could ascertain the state of things at Syracuse, and form his own plans accordingly.

Lands at  
Rhegium.

His prospect was sufficiently discouraging. The Carthaginian general, Hanno, commanded an army of fifty thousand men, well furnished with supplies and engines of war, and attended by a fleet of a hundred and fifty sail; he had been joined by the forces under Ictes, and the siege of Syracuse was regularly formed. Dionysius continued to hold out against the allied army, till observing Ictes withdraw towards Leontini for supplies, he made a sally, and pursued him; the enemy turned upon him, and after considerable slaughter, the Syracusan troops fled in confusion into the city, and the allies rushing through the gates at the same time, became masters of the whole, excepting the impregnable fortress on the island, three days before the arrival of Timoleon at Rhegium, where his little squadron was presently blockaded by twenty Carthaginian ships of war: they prohibited all egress from the harbour, but were instructed to offer no violence to the Corinthians, unless they should attempt the passage to Sicily.

Timoleon having many friends in the city, soon arranged his plan, and executed it with great promptitude and good fortune. An

B.C. 345. assembly of the people being called in the forum, the crews of both fleets, as was usual, left their ships, to assist in the deliberations. Timoleon spoke at considerable length, while his men, one by one, left the meeting, and quietly embarking pushed out from the harbour; the flag-ship alone remained, but under weigh, the men lying on their oars. When the Carthaginian commodore rose to reply, Timoleon gently sank down among the friends who surrounded him, and, creeping under their garments, slipped away, and in a few minutes was safe at sea.

Arrives at  
Tauromi-  
nium.

The Carthaginians did not immediately discover the stratagem; and in the pursuit which they afterwards attempted, they failed to come up with the Corinthian fleet, which reached its destination without interruption, and was received with open arms by the friendly Taurominians. The Carthaginian commodore immediately sent an officer to Andromachus, their chief, requiring him to give up his allies "on pain of having his town destroyed;" but the envoy was ordered instantly to quit the port "on pain of having his ships destroyed:" and here the affair rested. Icetes finding in the mean time that he could make no impression upon the citadel of Syracuse, where Dionysius made good his defence, led about five thousand men to besiege Adranum, a Syracusan colony, founded by the elder Dionysius, and consecrated to the tutelary deity Adranus, but now disposed to side with the Corinthian party. Timoleon having information of his movements, set out by night with only a thousand<sup>1</sup> or twelve hundred<sup>2</sup> men, and marching above forty miles with extraordinary speed, fell upon the enemy at dinner the next day, and putting them completely to the rout, took possession of their camp, and was joyfully received by the Adranites, who declared that prodigies had announced the will of heaven in his favour. Scarcely allowing time for refreshment, he led his troops immediately to Syracuse, and arriving there before Icetes, seized Tyche and Epipolæ, almost without opposition.

B.C. 344. The Syracusans were now reduced to despair, seeing their city occupied by three belligerent powers, each hostile to the other, and the harbour blockaded by a fourth: for Dionysius still held the fortress of Ortygia; Icetes was in possession of Acradina and Neapolis; Tyche, and the fortifications of Epipolæ, were garrisoned by the Corinthians; whilst the Carthaginian fleet filled the port, and their army lay encamped along the shore. Nor could they look with confidence to any of the contending parties for protection; but after suffering the multiplied ravages of so complicated a war, expected to become at last the prey of the victor.

The star of Dionysius was, however, evidently on the decline, and it was fortunate for Syracuse that circumstances arose which deter-

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch.

mined him to surrender his remaining power into the hands of Timoleon, from whom he expected better treatment than he could hope from the treacherous Ictes, or from Hanno, the hereditary enemy of his family. The rapid successes and able conduct of the Corinthian general, and his known abhorrence of tyranny, had prevailed with many of the small garrisons which were held for Dionysius, to make overtures to him; and he thus obtained the command of great part of the country surrounding Syracuse. Mamercus, chief of Catana, a man of great military talents, well supplied with troops and money, openly declared in his favour, and marched to reinforce him. About the same time, nine<sup>1</sup> or ten<sup>2</sup> ships of war well manned, arrived from Corinth, with a considerable remittance. These favourable events enabled Timoleon to press his advantages with great vigour; and the Carthaginians, without striking a blow, embarked their troops, and retired within the territories of their ancient allies. The Messenians, thus left to themselves, entered into the alliance of Corinth, and Ictes, unable to contend with the extensive combination forming against him, took refuge in Leontini. A negotiation ensued, by which the port and citadel were given up to Timoleon, who sent Dionysius to Corinth in a merchant ship of no great burden, with few friends, and but a scanty provision for his future maintenance. Of what then befell him, the accounts remaining to us are neither authentic nor consistent. His literary talents enabled him, for a time, to make a considerable figure in the first society of Greece; but finding himself an object of the most vigilant jealousy, he prudently shrouded his powers and his means under the guise of childish frivolity and sottish poverty; by which artifice he escaped the fate of his family, who were all cut off in the indiscriminate and relentless licentiousness of national hatred. He is said to have supported himself at last by keeping a school, (an occupation congenial to his love of letters, and to his habits of command,) and to have ended his days in the wilds of Epirus.

B.C. 344.

B.C. 343.  
Fate of  
Dionysius.

Timoleon, thus master of Syracuse, immediately declared the constitution to be a commonwealth, and promised that the supreme power should be lodged in the hands of annual magistrates, chosen by the people, and that all the strong-holds of tyranny should be destroyed. But in the present exhausted and distracted state of the city, he could neither carry his measures into effect, nor provide the means of supporting his army, which it would have been impossible to disband. He undertook, therefore, a kind of crusade against tyrants; hoping by the plunder of the petty chieftains, who exercised monarchical powers in many of the Grecian towns, to satisfy the demands of his mercenaries, and to gratify his volunteers; and

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> Diodorus.

B.C. 343. willing to confirm the character which he had brought with him into Sicily, as the determined enemy of kingly power.

His first attempt was upon Leontini; but Icetes was in too great force to afford him any hope of speedy success; and Timoleon, aware that his circumstances would not bear delay, raised the siege, and marched hastily to Engyum, and, in his own phrase, delivered it from the tyranny of its governor Leptines, whom he despatched to Corinth as a second specimen of a deposed tyrant.

Apollonia, which was dependent upon Engyum, submitted at the same time to the conqueror.

But the Grecian states, harassed by incessant wars and revolutions, were at this period too poor to repay the labour of their liberation; and, influenced by the ardour of republican principles, Timoleon resolved to extend the free institutions to the colonies of Carthage. As this measure would unavoidably lead to a war with that formidable power, it appeared desirable to begin by securing the means of conducting it; and detachments were accordingly despatched under trusty leaders to plunder the richest provinces of the Carthaginian alliance. The produce of this predatory warfare, enabled the general not only to settle with his troops, whose pay had been long in arrear, but to provide abundantly for the siege of Entella, which he took with less difficulty than might have been anticipated from its strength, and from the resolute defence, which had formerly baffled all the power and skill of the first Dionysius.

Attempts of  
Timoleon.

Fifteen of the principal inhabitants were sentenced to death for their faithful adherence to their masters; the rest were informed that "they were free," under the military despotism of the Corinthian general. Numerous other towns, foreseeing little prospect of successful resistance, hastened to avert from themselves the fate of the fifteen Entellans; and even some of the native settlements accepted liberty at the hands of Timoleon.

But the government of Carthage, always high spirited and fertile in resources, was not likely to acquiesce in the encroachments of an adventurer whose power was as yet so little confirmed. The provincial commanders who had tamely suffered his aggressions, were superseded; and a powerful armament was fitted out to recover the lost credit and territory of the empire.

Force of the  
Carthaginian  
armament.

The army is stated by Diodorus to have amounted to seventy thousand men, chiefly barbarian mercenaries; and the fleet consisted of two hundred ships of war, with a proportionate number of transports. Timoleon had in his pay no more than four thousand mercenary soldiers, and the number of Syracusan citizens was so much reduced since the reign of Dionysius, that, instead of thirty thousand, able and willing to bear arms, scarcely three thousand could be prevailed on to march against the Carthaginians. The democratic historians, unwilling to admit the desolating consequences

of faction, attribute the deficiency to a general panic; but the admission of Plutarch that hay was made in the forum, accords but ill with his flourishing account of the population at this period. B.C. 343.

Whilst Timoleon was engaged in the siege of Engyum, Icetes had made an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Syracuse, and was obliged to retire hastily with great loss; from that time he appears to have relinquished the hope of making himself master of the city, and to have dropped his connection with Carthage. In the present emergency, therefore, the Corinthian general sent a proposal for an accommodation, which was so well received, that Icetes marched to reinforce him with five thousand men.

His whole force, thus augmented, scarcely amounted to twelve thousand men; yet, relying on his own talents, and the superior discipline and courage of his troops, he held out to them the most confident hopes of success, which could only be realised by carrying the attack at once into the enemy's country, and by watching opportunities to harass and surprise their large army during the march; a mode of warfare in which the Greeks particularly excelled, and to which Timoleon was indebted for all his victories. B.C. 340

Advancing rapidly with this design, he had reached the Agrigentine territory when a tumult was raised among the mercenary troops by one Thrasius, a voluble and impudent fellow, who had been guilty of sacrilege in Greece, but had escaped the punishment that overtook most of his accomplices; this man, addressing his comrades, declared that "the general must be insane, to lead his men thus to inevitable destruction. The enemy's army is six times as numerous as ours, and complete in all their arms and accoutrements; yet he talks of winning a battle, as if he had a right to set our lives on the cast of a die; and because he is bankrupt and cannot discharge our arrears of pay, our blood is to be gambled away at his convenience. No, comrades, let us return to Syracuse, and quit this mad expedition."

Seditious  
speech of  
Thrasius.

The seditious harangue took effect, and a tumult arose among the mercenaries, who began to demand satisfaction; but Timoleon, whose peculiar excellence appeared in the readiness with which he provided for sudden emergencies, immediately repaired to the meeting, and after pointing out, in strong language, the probability and advantages of success, assured the soldiers, that all who were of a different opinion, and were willing to relinquish their share in the expected booty, were at liberty to depart, and that he would give them an order on his treasurer at Syracuse, for the pay due to them. About a thousand availed themselves of his offer, and ranged themselves under the conduct of Thrasius; Timoleon, turning to the rest, declared that he heartily rejoiced at what had happened, since he was now rid, in good time, of all those whose want of courage and enterprise might have impeded his design.



B.C. 340.

The army  
eager to  
advance.

His ardour rapidly communicated itself to the army, and they returned to their ranks in high spirits, eager to be led against the enemy; but when they began their march, a trifling incident threatened to damp that sanguine temper upon which all the expectations of the general were founded. A company of muleteers met them, conveying loads of parsley, which was used in the camps as litter for the servants and cattle. As it was usual to crown the sepulchres with that herb, and the custom had given rise to a proverb, "He has nothing to look for but parsley," implying that certain death was to be expected, Grecian superstition readily interpreted the meeting with such a quantity of the sepulchral herb on the eve of battle, as a fatal omen, and the soldiers were immediately reminded of the prediction of Thrasius. But Timoleon, seizing a handful, and hastily twisting it into a chaplet, crowned himself with it, crying out exultingly, "The gods, the gods themselves have sent us Isthmian crowns of victory!" The Corinthians present, being familiar with those games where the victors were, at that time, crowned with wreaths of parsley, eagerly embraced the interpretation; and the soothsayers concurring in it, the tide of feeling was instantly turned throughout the army, by the ready recollection of the general, and every man was shortly adorned with a similar garland.

Ingenuity of  
Timoleon.

In this happy temper they gained an eminence, from which they looked down upon the deep and marshy vale divided by the river Crimesus. The day was showery, and a heavy cloud threw the Greeks on the hill into shade, while the sun glittered on the burnished armour of the Carthaginians below, who were in the act of crossing the stream. Timoleon's plan was quickly formed; he halted till as many of the enemy had passed the ford as he chose to engage, and then giving the signal for attack, fell on them as they were forming on the bank of the river, and after a sharp conflict broke and defeated them. While this was doing, the Carthaginian general had passed over the rest of his army, and was advancing in good order, to take Timoleon in flank; but at this moment a violent storm came on, accompanied with thunder and hail, driving directly in the faces of the Carthaginians, who could neither see nor hear, whilst the Greeks, who had the wind on their backs, rushed upon them with redoubled fury. All order was presently lost; the word of command was drowned in the rage of the elements; the African breastplates, ill-contrived, held quantities of water, which, added to the weight of their heavy armour, and the deep and slippery soil, occasioned them to slide, and to throw each other down, as they attempted to make good their retreat across the river. Under these disadvantages they offered a very ineffectual resistance, and great numbers were slain by the Greeks; more were drowned; many prisoners taken, and multitudes, throwing

away their shields, fled from the field. The total loss must have been very great if it be true, as stated by Diodorus and Plutarch, that nearly three thousand of the highest rank, consisting entirely of Carthaginian nobility, lay dead on the plain; but if this number was computed by the shields taken, which appears not improbable, the circumstances of the action will account for a large proportion of them, without supposing the slaughter to have been so prodigious.

B.C. 340.  
Defeat of the  
Carthaginians.

The victory, at all events, was decisive; the enemy's camp became the prize of the victors, and the spoil richly rewarded all who had borne a part in the action; a magnificent trophy, the work of three days, was erected, and specimens of the enemy's armour, remarkable for its richness and workmanship, were sent round to all the allies in the island: while the choicest selection, bearing an appropriate inscription, was despatched to decorate the temples of the gods at Corinth.

The shattered remains of the African army fled in disorder to the strong-hold of Lilybæum, whence they sent home an account of their defeat, not venturing, from some motive of superstition, to trust themselves on board the fleet. The news is said to have created a greater alarm at Carthage than any disaster which had ever befallen the state; but with their accustomed energy and prudence, while they sent ambassadors to treat for peace, the administration exerted itself to prepare for a renewal of hostilities. Gisco, the son or brother of Hanno, an officer of consummate ability, was recalled from banishment; and the Carthaginians having experienced the inferiority of their own troops to the Grecian mercenaries, they employed commissioners to engage in their service an army of Greeks.

Timoleon, leaving his mercenary troops to watch the motions of the enemy, returned to Syracuse, where the glory and wealth which he had acquired gave him increased influence, and enabled him, in the absence of their comrades, to call to account the detachment who had left him at the instigation of Thrasius. He was satisfied with dismissing them from his service as deserters, and commanding them to quit Sicily—a sentence which, as it branded them with a mark of degradation, excluded them from being received into the pay of any other state; so that being reduced to subsist by plunder, they were all, not long afterwards, executed as robbers on the coast of Italy. In the meantime, a number of settlers from Corinth arrived at Syracuse, and receiving from Timoleon allotments of the vacant houses and lands, on condition of military service, added greatly to the strength of his army, and to the population and prosperity of the city.

Timoleon  
returns to  
Syracuse.  
B.C. 339.

Mamercus and Ictes now too late discovered that nothing but temporary necessity had induced Timoleon to seek their alliance; and that in his indiscriminate zeal for the abolition of tyranny, he designed to effect a revolution in Leontini and Catana, as well as in all the other monarchical states, and to make every Grecian town in

B.C. 339. Sicily a free republic, dependent on the supreme commonwealth of Syracuse. Incensed at his perfidy and ingratitude, they withdrew from his confederacy, and again entered into negotiation with Carthage: but Timoleon, aware of the formidable force collected under Gisco, and of the extensive league formed against himself by the petty chieftains of the Sicilian towns, concluded a peace with the Carthaginians, by the terms of which he relinquished to them the province beyond the Lycus,<sup>1</sup> on condition that they should permit all the Grecian settlements to be governed by their own laws, and should take no part in the war of extermination, which Syracuse had declared against tyrants.

Narrow  
escape of  
Timoleon.

It was probably at this time that an incident occurred, referred by Plutarch to an earlier period. While Timoleon was engaged in offering a sacrifice, two men mingled with the crowd, intending to stab him. Just as they were exchanging signals to commence the attack, a bystander cut one of them down with his sword, and instantly fled to an eminence, from whence he earnestly begged to be heard; the confederate assassin, clinging to the altar for protection, confessed the purpose for which they had been hired by Ictes. When the tumult was somewhat appeased, the person who had slain the assassin obtained a hearing, and declared that having recognized him as the man who had not long since murdered his father at Leontium, he had struck him dead to avenge the blood of his parent, without any suspicion of the present design. So singular an escape was regarded as a manifest interposition of the gods to preserve the life of Timoleon; and the man whose private feud had, in a fortunate moment, arrested the hand of treachery, was liberally rewarded for a very questionable action.

While these things were passing at Syracuse, Hippo, the chief of Messena, was expelled, or, according to Plutarch, massacred by the garrison placed by Timoleon in that city; and Mamercus also appears to have obtained some advantages over the Corinthian troops stationed in his neighbourhood; though the whole matter is hastily passed over by the partial biographer, in that confused manner, which results from his anxious desire to conceal the disasters which befell his hero, and, at the same time, to provide an excuse for his subsequent violence towards his enemies. Timoleon lost no time in preparing to punish these insults, and to extend, on all sides, the Syracusan confederacy. Even the republican town, Ætna, refusing to acknowledge the supremacy of the imperial city, was destroyed, and its inhabitants either put to the sword, or sold into slavery. Nicodemus, chief of the Centuripini, terrified by the threat, that he should suffer the fate of a tyrant, fled from his fortress, and Centuripa was declared free, under the usual conditions of alliance

<sup>1</sup> Or Halycus.

with the superior state. The Corinthian general next compelled Apolloniades to abdicate his power over the Aggrians, and conferred upon that people the freedom of the city of Syracuse, in consideration of their ready adoption of his political system. In prosecution of the same design, he was besieging Calaura with a small force, when Icetes took advantage of his absence to plunder the Syracusan territory; and returning laden with spoil, passed within sight of the Corinthian lines. Timoleon, whose favourite manner of fighting was by a sudden onset, suffered him to pass without permitting his men to move from their posts; but when the enemy had ceased to



[Remains of the House of Timoleon at Syracuse.—*L'Univers pittoresque.*]

apprehend an action, he called out his cavalry and light infantry, and unexpectedly fell upon their rear. Icetes, by a skilful manœuvre, formed his line so as to interpose a small stream, with steep and rugged banks, between himself and the enemy; but nothing could damp the ardour of the republican army; they crossed the ravine with eagerness, each contending to be first; and the Leontines, astonished at their boldness, took to flight, and were pursued with considerable slaughter.

This victory led almost immediately to the capture of Leontini, where democracy was, of course, proclaimed. Icetes, his son Eupolemus, and Euthymus his master of the horse, were all put to

Victory of  
Timoleon  
over Icetes.

B. C. 339. death, "as traitors against the sovereignty of the people."<sup>1</sup> It is said that the last, a brave soldier who took little part in politics, would have been spared, had not some person maliciously reported a sarcastic joke formerly passed by him on the effeminacy of the Corinthian soldiers. Icetes was buried with military honours; the unhappy females of the family were reserved to gratify the barbarous fury of the Syracusan populace, to whom it was industriously represented, that these were the wife and daughters of the very man who was suspected of procuring the shipwreck, in which the family of Dion had perished. On this account they were condemned to die; nor did Timoleon interfere to prevent the execution of the sentence.

Mamercus was destined to be the next victim. He is reported by Plutarch to have received a considerable reinforcement from the Carthaginian general, Gisco; and to make this offence against the Grecian interest appear probable, and thereby to palliate the severities exercised upon him, the treaty between Timoleon and the Carthaginians is represented as subsequent to the battle of the Abolus; in which the Catanians were defeated, and Mamercus compelled to take refuge on board his fleet. The democratic spirit prevailing among the crews occasioned a mutiny, and with some difficulty he escaped to Messena; where disaffection still spreading, and Timoleon investing the place by sea and land, he attempted to embark with Hippo for Italy; but the infuriated mob seized both princes, and delivering Mamercus to Timoleon, exposed their own chiefs naked in the public theatre; a holiday was granted to all the schools in Messena, and the children were assembled in the theatre, where, to imbue them early with a relentless hatred of monarchy, they were encouraged to scourge the miserable Hippo to death. Mamercus was permitted, at his own earnest desire, to plead his cause before the national assembly at Syracuse, where he strongly represented to the people the service he had performed for Timoleon, and the cruel treatment with which his friendship had been requited. But the many-headed tyrant was deaf to remonstrance; and the appeal to justice and generosity called forth only groans and hooting. Upon this he endeavoured to anticipate the malice of his enemies, by dashing his head against one of the columns in the forum; but he was merely stunned by the blow, and his body being taken up and nailed to a cross, he expired amid the savage acclamations of the surrounding crowd. Andromachus alone, of all the tyrants of Sicily, was permitted to enjoy his power with the favour of Timoleon, because, as it is asserted by his son the historian,<sup>2</sup> "he governed his people with mildness and equity, and allowed them to live under equal laws." He had the sagacity to perceive, that while avowed

Hippo put to death.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *vit. Tim.*

<sup>2</sup> Timæus, quoted by Plutarch.

monarchy would not be endured, a popular demagogue might easily acquire and exercise the most despotic power. B.C. 339.

It cannot fail to excite surprise that Plutarch should conclude his account of the atrocious, and often unprovoked cruelties, sanctioned if not encouraged by Timoleon, with remarking, that he was the only man among all the worthies of Greece, whose glory was untarnished by a single action which could afford room for censure or repentance; and he quotes after Timæus a verse of Sophocles, which appears singularly inapplicable to the subject of his panegyric.

“What goddess of beauty, what spirit of love, inspires him in every deed.”

When all the tyrants were expelled, and the free towns had submitted to the Syracusan alliance, Timoleon employed his activity in remodelling the constitution, and in restoring the prosperity of the confederacy. His first measure was to assemble the people, and with every demonstration of public rejoicing, to demolish the citadel and palace of Ortygia, and every fortress in which a tyrant could be likely to defend himself against the will of the people. The superb sculpture with which Dionysius and his predecessors had decorated the city shared the same fate, the statue of Gelo alone being exempted from the general destruction: upon the ruins of the royal residence was erected a common hall, for the accommodation of the national assembly; the houses and lands not already disposed of, were declared public property; the former were allotted to the mercenary troops, and to the Corinthian and other Grecian colonists; and the latter were put up to sale, (a preference being allowed to any of the ancient proprietors who might desire to return to Syracuse,) and the produce was paid into the treasury.

But the spirit of faction had so possessed the Syracusans, that the slightest cause was sufficient to excite the most violent commotion. The old citizens were dissatisfied with the preference evidently bestowed by the Corinthian general upon the new settlers; tumults and bloodshed ensued; Laphystius, a revolutionary demagogue, entered an action against Timoleon for malversation in his office, and required bail for his appearance to take his trial; the Corinthian party interfered in a violent manner to quash the proceedings; but Timoleon very prudently compelled them to desist, alleging that he had sustained so many labours, and faced so many dangers, only in order that every citizen might be equally amenable to the laws. The people were flattered; and the trial, of course, came to nothing. But the old Syracusan faction was not so easily suppressed; another accuser was found, and the general was impeached for tyranny; he escaped a second time in a similar manner, disdaining to reply to the virulent invective of Demænetus, otherwise than by thanking the gods that his endeavours were at length crowned with success,

Action at  
law against  
Timoleon.

B.C. 339. since complete liberty of speech was evidently established in the commonwealth.

But although these were the public sentiments of Timoleon, his vigilance and sagacity were by no means remitted; and he continued fully determined to control the seditious temper of the original inhabitants by the strong hand of power. His plan was ably devised, and readily carried into effect: proclamation was made throughout Greece, that Timoleon would bestow dwellings and estates, with the freedom of the city, upon all adventurers who would settle in Sicily. Fourteen thousand colonists immediately embraced the proposal, and the population of Leontini was, at the same time, transferred to Syracuse. By these means the Corinthian party acquired such an ascendancy, that we hear no more of any attempt, on the part of the ancient citizens, to assert their rights; they sunk into poverty and insignificance; and all the offices of the state, civil and military, were bestowed upon Corinthian emigrants.

Having thus provided for the tranquillity of the republic, Timoleon announced his intention of sending for his wife and children, and of settling for life at Syracuse: this intimation was received by the citizens with unbounded joy; and the national assembly not only sent a deputation to conduct the family in the most honourable way from their native country, but assigned Timoleon a magnificent villa<sup>1</sup> in the district of Neapolis, with a suitable demesne, in consideration of his services to the state.

At the same time he requested that commissioners might be sent out from Corinth, to assist him in the revision of the ancient laws of the Syracusan constitution; but whether this committee merely revived the code of Diocles, the regulations of which, as far as they related to the distribution of property, had never been formally abrogated, or whether they introduced any innovations founded on the policy of their own state, is not distinctly explained. The penal statutes appear to have undergone considerable changes, and to have partaken largely of that severe spirit which unavoidably characterises the criminal enactments of a popular government. The constitution seems to have been reduced to a very simple form, of which the outline is so slightly traced, that it is scarcely distinguishable from other democracies: its only remarkable feature was the election of an annual officer as president of the assembly, whose title was minister<sup>2</sup> of Olympian Jupiter; and the office continued to exist through many changes in the state, for nearly three centuries.

Timoleon now became, without any definite title, or any power recognised by the constitution, as completely master of Sicily as the first Dionysius had ever been; and some writers have not hesitated

Timoleon  
Master of  
Sicily

<sup>1</sup> Now an episcopal palace.

<sup>2</sup> The first minister was Callimenes.

to call him tyrant or king<sup>1</sup> of Syracuse. He had the art, by dis- B.C. 339.  
claiming all authority, and affecting the utmost deference for the will of the people, to enforce all his edicts without exciting popular jealousy, or sharing in the odium of severe measures; whilst he was so fortunate as to gain credit and popularity by every vote which tended to promote the prosperity of the city, or the indulgences of the citizens. Under his auspices, the temples and other public edifices were repaired and beautified; an effective police was established; commerce was restored; agriculture flourished; and the blessings of peace rapidly brought back to Syracuse much of the wealth and splendour of former times. As the people became accustomed to order and tranquillity, the severity of the administration was imperceptibly relaxed; and the declining days of Timoleon were spent among a grateful nation, who loved and honoured him as a father; so that it became customary to point him out to strangers, as the glory and ornament of Syracuse. During the latter part of his military career, a cataract was observed to be forming in one of his eyes, and for some time before his death he became totally blind; this infirmity, however, neither damped the energy of his character, nor prevented his taking an active part in all the public deliberations, and directing by his influence the votes of the assembly. He was carried to the town hall on the shoulders of the citizens, who contended with each other for the honour of bearing his litter; and he frequently spoke at considerable length on the subject in debate.

The precise period of his death is uncertain. By Diodorus it is placed in the last year of the 110th Olympiad, but the numerous events in which he is recorded to have borne a part, subsequent to the second year of the same Olympiad, lead to a suspicion, that there must be some error in the MSS., and that he lived considerably longer. His popularity continued to the last, and he expired of a gentle decay of nature in the bosom of his family. The national assembly voted two hundred minæ (about £700) for the expenses of his funeral, which was solemnized in the most sumptuous manner, the whole body of citizens joining in procession, and carrying the corpse round the city, through the scenes of his most popular actions. His sepulchre was built in the forum at the public cost; and a magnificent portico, gymnasium, and palaestra, named altogether the Timoleontæum, were erected in honour of his memory, where annual games were celebrated, after the manner of similar institutions in Greece, on the day of his nativity, which was said to be also the anniversary of his most important victories.

Timoleon possessed more consistency of character, and was less Character.  
actuated by vanity and ostentation, than any of the revolutionary

<sup>1</sup> Corn. Nepos, &c.



B.C. 339. chieftains of Greece, who attained to despotic power under the pretext of establishing liberty and equality. He was not naturally cruel, nor destitute of liberal affections; but he never hesitated to commit any atrocity in furtherance of his objects. His talents were unquestionably of the first order. As a general, the rapidity of his movements, the novelty of his stratagems, the singular boldness and vigour of his attack, enabled him to oppose numerous and well conducted armies with a very inconsiderable force; to baffle Carthage, and subdue Sicily, without ever having led into the field more than ten thousand men. He was a keen and sagacious politician; an enlightened and prudent legislator; and though not scrupulous in the means of acquiring power, he was public-spirited and moderate in its exercise.

From the expulsion of Pyrrhus to the First Punic War, the Romans were steadily engaged in consolidating the enormous conquests they had made in Southern Italy. Rest was indispensable, if they were to prosecute with success the terrible strife they were soon to wage with Carthage. Tarentum, however, which had been secretly negotiating with that state, soon fell into the power of Rome, and the last expiring effort of Samnite resistance was made in the year B.C. 268. Within two years the Sallentines were reduced, B.C. 266. At this period the whole of the Italian states, from the river Macra on the north, to the straits in the south, were under the sway of Rome. But by this extension of her power and her influence in the south, she was brought into inevitable collision with Carthage. The course of that eventful struggle will be found faithfully recorded in the lives of the heroic family of Hamilcar Barca.

Sway of  
Rome over  
Italy.



[Zeus; with Statue of Victory.—*Hope's Costumes.*]



[Regulus returning to Carthage.]

## CHAPTER XIII.

### HAMILCAR BARCA.—FIRST PUNIC WAR.

FROM B.C. 264 TO B.C. 240.

THE fame of Hamilcar and Hannibal has so far surpassed that of B.C. 264. all the other individuals engaged on either side in the contest between Rome and Carthage, that although both were at last <sup>TO</sup> B.C. 240. unfortunate, they naturally attract our chief attention at the period of history on which we are now about to enter. On the side of Carthage, indeed, they stand not only most prominent, but almost alone: the struggle was supported by the genius of one family, with little assistance from the institutions or exertions of their country, and still less from the ability of its government. The Punic wars afford one memorable instance of extraordinary individual character, contending long with doubtful success against the power, zeal, and united ability of a great nation: and the result in this, as in a more recent case, has shown, that in such a contest, although the individual may win the brighter glory, yet the final triumph will rest with his enemies.

We would fain learn what was the state of Carthage when she

B.C. 264. first encountered the adversary by whom she was afterwards destroyed. We would anxiously inquire what were the manners of her people; what progress they had attained either in the great arts of government and legislation, or in those which add comfort and refinement to our daily life. But our curiosity cannot be gratified. Time, or the jealousy, or carelessness of their conquerors, has deprived us of all the information which Carthaginian writers might have afforded us; and what remains in the works of Greeks or Romans, is mostly of so late a date, and comes from so fettered or so prejudiced a source, that it is little worthy of our attention. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with combining the scattered notices of Carthage, that are to be found in those early Greek writers, who were near in time, although remote in place, and who certainly appear to have had no temptation either to exaggerate or diminish the fame of the Carthaginians.

Origin and  
Character of  
Carthage.

We know that Carthage was a Phœnician<sup>1</sup> colony, and the maritime habits of the mother country, as well as its enterprising commercial spirit, were fully inherited by the new settlement. With the usual ascendancy of a civilized people over barbarians, the Carthaginians soon widely extended their power over the surrounding country; and at an early period carried on a profitable trade, and had established colonies on the coast of Sicily and Spain. They had penetrated through the Straits of Gibraltar, and had not only a familiar acquaintance with the western<sup>2</sup> coast of Africa, for many leagues to the southward, but had accomplished, or at least asserted that they had done so, the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope;<sup>3</sup> and had ascertained that Africa was on every side surrounded by water, except where it is united by the narrow Isthmus of Suez to the adjoining continent of Asia. When the Persians, under Cambyses, first effected the conquest of Egypt, Carthage<sup>4</sup> became one of the next objects of their ambition; but they were disappointed by the refusal of the Phœnicians to lend their assistance against their own descendants; and the attempt would have been hopeless, when the support of the Phœnician navy was withdrawn from it. Yet Carthage at this time, or within a few years afterwards, possessed itself an empire that might have seemed secure against the attacks of the most powerful enemy: for we read of their sending an immense army into Sicily, at the time of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, which consisted<sup>5</sup> of native Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Sardinians, and Corsicans, in addition to the citizens of Carthage. Their military discipline, however, and probably their naval tactics also, were at this period very inferior to those of the Greeks; and thus we are told by the high authority of

Carthaginian  
Army in  
Sicily.

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, Thalia, c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Herodot. Melpomene, c. 196

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. Melpomene, c. 43. <sup>4</sup> Herodot. Thalia, c. 19. <sup>5</sup> Herodot. Polymnia, c. 165.

Thucydides,<sup>1</sup> that had the Athenians effected the conquest of Syracuse, they would have soon turned their arms against Carthage; and Hermocrates<sup>2</sup> encouraged his countrymen to hope for the assistance of the Carthaginians, because they, as well as themselves, regarded with alarm the restless ambition of Athens. But this was probably a fear peculiarly awakened by the extraordinary successes, and unrivalled reputation of the Athenian navy: exaggerated, moreover, it is likely, from the effect of distance. Certainly the Carthaginians had no fear of the power of Syracuse, which had destroyed the finest expedition ever sent forth from Athens; on the contrary, within five or six years of the defeat of Nicias, they were busily employed in carrying on schemes of aggression upon the Greek cities in Sicily; and had taken two of the greatest of them, Agrigentum and Selinus, the latter the close ally of Syracuse, before the end of the Peloponnesian war.

The operations of the Carthaginians in Sicily, during the reigns of the two Dionysii and the administration of Timoleon, have been already related. It will be sufficient to observe, in reference to our present subject, that at the commencement of the first Punic war, the possession of the island was divided between the Carthaginians, who occupied the western parts of it, and the Greek kings of Syracuse, who were sovereigns of the greater part of the eastern coast.

But the connection between Carthage and Rome deserves to be traced more carefully. As early as the reign of Cyrus,<sup>3</sup> that is to say, about twenty or thirty years before the establishment of the commonwealth at Rome, the Carthaginians and Tuscans possessed the joint dominion of that part of the Mediterranean which is bounded by the coast of Italy on the east, and embracing the islands of Corsica and Sardinia, extends southward as far as the northern coast of Sicily. The interference of the Greeks within these limits seems much to have resembled the first enterprises of the English in Spanish America: on the one hand there was probably much oppressive jealousy, and a spirit of piracy on the other. Thus the Phocæans, when on their way to the foundation of their famous settlement of Marseilles, provoked the two great powers of Tuscany and Carthage, by their piracies, to attack them with their united fleets; and a few years later, another small Phocæan squadron, flying from the second conquest of Ionia, in the reign of Darius, carried on a buccaneering warfare in the Sicilian seas; abstaining from attacking their own countrymen, but plundering the Tuscans and Carthaginians without scruple.<sup>4</sup> A power then like Carthage, whose fleets were so familiar with the coasts of Italy, would be soon led to form some connection with the more consider-

B.C. 264.  
TO  
B.C. 240.

Connection  
between  
Rome and  
Carthage.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. lib. vi. c. 90.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. Clio, c. 166.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen, lib. i. c. 1. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Herod. Erato. c. 17.

B.C. 264. able of the Italian states, and this would be the more friendly, if  
 TO there was nothing in those states to excite any fears of naval or  
 B.C. 240. commercial rivalry. Rome, it appears, as early as the first year of  
 the commonwealth, enjoyed considerable influence, and was strong  
 enough to be the head of a confederacy of dependent neighbouring  
 allies, the well-known mark of national importance in the political  
 relations of the ancient world. A treaty was accordingly concluded  
 between the Romans and Carthaginians, in the consulship of<sup>1</sup> L.

<sup>1</sup> Several points in this treaty having been made use of by M. de Beaufort, to show the incorrectness of the common accounts given by the Roman historians, it appeared needful to Hooke, in his answer to M. de Beaufort already noticed, to impeach the genuineness of the date affixed by Polybius to this treaty, and to insist that it was, in fact, far more modern than that historian represents it, and must have been made after the year of Rome 415, instead of in the year 244. The testimony of Polybius is so excellent, that any attempt to overthrow it, demands a strict examination. Let us see then on what grounds Hooke ventures to doubt it on the present occasion. First, the treaty, as translated by Polybius, or Polybius himself, in his introduction to it, describes M. Horatius as the colleague of L. Junius Brutus; whereas Livy, Dionysius, Plutarch, &c., agree in representing him as the colleague of Valerius Publicola, appointed after the successive deaths of Brutus and Sp. Lucretius. Hooke, therefore, supposes either that Polybius mistranslated the names of the consuls which he found in the original treaty; or that the names were defaced, and supplied partly by conjecture; or that the date was added altogether by Polybius, from other information, which, in this instance, misled him. Now the mistranslation of names is a thing hardly conceivable; and that they were defaced and supplied by conjecture, is a mere supposition of no weight, and an unlikely one, as no part of the treaty is spoken of as obscure or obliterated. Still less is it likely, that the treaty itself should have furnished no evidence of its own date; for was there ever any treaty in ancient or modern times, that did not contain the names of the magistrates, whether annual or perpetual, under whose administration it was concluded? But Hooke argues, that the second treaty between Rome and Carthage, as given by Polybius, contains not the names of the consuls by whom it was concluded; therefore, it is probable that the first did not. It is more natural to believe, that the persons in whose consulship the second treaty was made, were then of little celebrity; and that Polybius, therefore, omitted their names, because they would have given a Greek reader no notion at all of the date of the record. But the first consulship of the republic was a remarkable era, which it was very proper to mention. In short, as all treaties necessarily contain their own date in them, as Polybius quotes the original treaty, describing its form, and the place where it was deposited; and then gives the date, though not in the precise words of the official instrument; as it is next to impossible for any man to mistranslate proper names, let his knowledge of a language be ever so scanty; and as it is a mere wild fancy to suppose that the writing was defaced, which Polybius, who saw it with his own eyes, translates, without expressing the least doubt of the true reading—it seems that there is no alternative but to admit the treaty as genuine and indisputable evidence, or to charge Polybius with a wilful and circumstantial falsehood, which we consider a complete *reductio ad absurdum*. If the treaty be genuine, it is quite clear, as M. de Beaufort argues, that it is evidence sufficient to convict Livy, and Dionysius, and twenty such writers, if they could be found, of falsehood, wherever their statements contradict it so as not to admit of being reconciled with it. But Hooke says that it is contradicted by two other treaties, quoted by Livy, (book ii. c. 33, and book iv. c. 7,) which are treaties of alliance between Rome and Ardea, and Rome and the Latins; whereas, the treaty quoted by Polybius describes Ardea and some of the cities of Latium as the subjects of Rome. By this it appears that Hooke did not know, or had forgotten, the nature of alliances in ancient times between a stronger power and a weaker. For in fact, the “*Fœdus Ardeatinum*,” of which Livy speaks, was like the treaties between Athens and Lesbos, or Lacedæmon and Athens, after the Peloponnesian war, when alliance was in reality the subjection of

Junius Brutus and M. Horatius, which Polybius has translated into Greek from the original record, engraved on a brazen plate, and preserved to his time in the capitol.<sup>1</sup> By the terms of this treaty, the Romans are restricted from all intercourse with the more remote parts of the Carthaginian possessions in Africa, and if driven there by stress of weather, they were to depart within five days, and were not in the interval to buy or take any thing, except for the refitting of their vessel, or for sacrifice. On the other hand, the Carthaginians were to build no forts in Latium, nor to injure any of those Latin states that were subject to Rome. In a later treaty, the date of which is not given, the Romans, by a sort of navigation act, were debarred from all trade with any part of the Carthaginian dominions, except Carthage itself, and Sicily: they were neither to trade, settle, or plunder, on the coast of Africa. But in Carthage itself, and in Sicily, they were allowed to trade on the same footing with Carthaginian citizens. The Carthaginians were to enjoy similiar privileges at Rome; and were not to settle on the coasts of Latium, although they might carry off the inhabitants and the moveable property of any city not subject to the Romans. This last article, we may observe, was calculated to magnify the benefits of the Roman alliance in the eyes of their weaker neighbours, as it afforded them protection against the kidnapping and piracy which in old times were unscrupulously practised towards all weaker states, when not secured by an express compact.

B.C. 264.  
to  
B.C. 240.

Treaty  
between  
Rome and  
Carthage.

When the ambition of Pyrrhus, and his enterprises both in Italy and Sicily, excited general alarm, the Romans and Carthaginians confirmed, by a third treaty, the articles of their former convention, and added a clause, in which they provided for the way in which they were to assist each other, should the attacks of Pyrrhus lead them to unite in their common defence. It was agreed, that whichever party should require aid, the ships were to be furnished by Carthage, but that each nation should pay its own seamen; and the crews should not be forced to serve on shore. This clearly shows the insignificance of the Romans as a naval power, and, at the same time, the desire of the Carthaginians to keep their fleet under their own command, and the jealous care of avoiding every shadow of dependence, in the succour they might lend their allies.

Scarcely had ten years elapsed from the date of this treaty, when the parties who had signed it began to turn their arms against each other. The internal state of Rome at this period, the form of her government, her institutions and manners, may be gathered suffi-

the weaker ally to the stronger. Thus, as is always the case, two really good authorities can easily be reconciled with one another. When Livy quotes an actual treaty, his statements agree with those of Polybius; when he follows his usual guides, it is unlikely that his narrative should accord with the account of a sensible and well informed historian.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. l. iii. c. 22.

B.C. 264. cially for our present purpose, from what has been said of them on  
 to former occasions. Of those of Carthage I am here to offer such a  
 B.C. 240. view as can be collected, either from the direct or incidental infor-  
 mation afforded by credible authorities.

Aristotle's  
 account of  
 Carthage.

Aristotle, who wrote about forty or fifty years before the begin-  
 ning of the first Punic war, has left us, in his politics,<sup>1</sup> one entire  
 chapter on the Carthaginian constitution, from which our chief  
 knowledge of it is to be drawn. Unfortunately, he does not give a  
 detailed account of it, but rather comments upon some of its princi-  
 pal points; either supposing it to be generally familiar to his readers,  
 or having described it more particularly in one of those parts of his  
 work which have not descended to our times. From him, however,  
 and from Polybius,<sup>2</sup> we learn that the government was of a mixed  
 nature, and that its effects seemed to prove its excellence; for, when  
 Aristotle wrote, it had never experienced any serious interruption,  
 either from sedition or usurpation. The principal authorities were  
 two officers, called by the Greeks, kings, who were elected from  
 certain families or clans, but not according to primogeniture; and  
 who were required to be men of wealth as well as of personal merit.  
 In early times, it is clear, that they enjoyed their power for life;  
 and probably possessed, like the kings of Sparta, the chief military  
 command, and the supremacy in all matters of religion. But before  
 the second Punic war, they seemed to have been made annual  
 magistrates, like the archons at Athens; and the chief military  
 power was transferred from them to an officer called the general or  
 prætor, elected by the people without any restrictions; and resemb-  
 ling the strategus or general of the commonwealth, who was  
 appointed by the Athenians, when the polemarch archons had lost  
 most of their authority. There was a council of elders, which  
 originally had, together with the kings, the sovereign power in the  
 state: but if the kings and the elders differed, the matter was  
 decided by the popular assembly. This, of course, made an opening  
 for the democratical interest to become in time very considerable;  
 and thus another council was instituted, distinct from the council of  
 elders, and probably of a more popular composition, which, in  
 many points, tempered or superseded the power of the more aristo-  
 cratical assembly; just as the council of five hundred at Athens  
 eclipsed the Areopagus, more and more in proportion as the govern-  
 ment grew more and more popular. This council, which Polybius  
 simply calls Σύγκλητος, or "the convocation," may possibly have  
 been the same with the council of the hundred, or hundred and  
 four, which Aristotle compares to the Lacedæmonian ephori, and  
 which was invested therefore, we must conclude, with great controll-  
 ing powers over every department of state. Its members were

Carthaginian  
 Councils.

<sup>1</sup> Lib. ii. c. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Lib. vi. c. 51.

chosen by certain bodies called courts of five, who had themselves, it seems, several important privileges; such as filling up all vacancies in their own body, and retaining some of the authority or immunities of office, after its actual duration was expired. By the old constitution, also, the whole judicial authority of the state was placed in the hands of the magistracies, or, according to Livy, of one particular court or college, whose members held their places for life. An alteration in this part of the law we shall find hereafter ascribed to the great Hannibal. But in our ignorance of the practical details of the Carthaginian government, we can convey little satisfactory knowledge by repeating the mere names of its several offices: we may better observe, that an undue regard to wealth as a qualification for the highest places in the commonwealth, tended to much corruption in the choice of magistrates; and, consequently, to frequent malversation in their after conduct; they being naturally apt to make their office reimburse them for the sums they have expended in procuring it. Of the domestic life and manners of the Carthaginians we know nothing; nor are we much better acquainted with the state of literature, or of the arts among them. There is still extant, indeed, a Greek translation of a narrative, written by Hanno, of a voyage along the western coast of Africa; and it is mentioned that a Carthaginian work on agriculture was so esteemed by the Romans, that the senate ordered it to be translated into Latin for the public benefit. The great Hannibal also is said to have written one or two historical works in Greek, relating to the events of his own time. But such scanty fragments of information on a subject so curious, are more fitted to excite curiosity than to satisfy it.

B.C. 264.  
TO  
B.C. 240.

Relics of  
Carthaginian  
Literature.

Return we then to the course of our history, and let us proceed at once to describe the causes and events of the first Punic war. A few years before the period at which we are now arrived, some Campanian<sup>1</sup> soldiers in the service of Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, having obtained admission into the city of Messena on friendly terms, took advantage of this opportunity to drive out or massacre the inhabitants, to seize the wives and children as slaves, and so to take possession both of the town and its adjacent territory. The Mamertines, for so they called themselves, soon began to annoy their neighbours, the Syracusans and Carthaginians; and for awhile their affairs went on prosperously: for they had very useful allies in some of their countrymen in the service of Rome; who being sent to garrison Rhegium during the war with Pyrrhus, had treated that town exactly as the Mamertines had treated Messena; and being united by the double ties of country, and a community of wickedness, they were likely to remain firm

B.C. 262.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. c. 7.



B.C. 262. friends to each other. But when the Romans, so soon as the departure of Pyrrhus had left them at liberty, had besieged and taken Rhegium, and after inflicting a signal vengeance on their guilty soldiers, had restored the town to its lawful owners, the situation of the Mamertines was materially altered. Hiero,<sup>1</sup>



[Hiero II. King of Syracuse.]

a man of considerable ability, had lately raised himself to the throne of Syracuse; and not brooking the neighbourhood of a people such as the Mamertines, he marched against them, defeated them and took their principal leaders prisoners. They now found themselves obliged to look out for assistance: some<sup>2</sup> of them applied to the Carthaginians, and actually put the citadel of Messena into their hands; but others sent to request the aid of the Romans, with whom, as being themselves Italians, they claimed something of a national connection. The senate, it is said, could not be prevailed upon openly to espouse a cause, exactly the

same with that which they had so lately combated: but the people, when the question was submitted to them, were less scrupulous. Fear of the rapid growth of the Carthaginian power, which from the acquisition of Messena was likely soon to extend itself over the whole of Sicily, overcame every other consideration: the Mamertines were received as allies of the Romans; and Appius Claudius, one of the consuls, was ordered to cross over to their support. His coming was welcomed with the utmost joy: means<sup>3</sup> were found to expel the Carthaginian governor from the citadel; and Appius was admitted into the town in his room. This step provoked the Carthaginians to lay siege to Messena by sea and land; and Hiero marched from Syracuse to co-operate with them. The Roman consul first made proposals to the allies, that they should leave the Mamertines unmolested; and on their refusal, he at once acted on the vigorous policy of his country, and attacked king Hiero's army. We are ignorant how far the numerical strength of the two armies contributed to the event of the battle; but the Syracusan heavy-armed infantry were never much esteemed; and in later times, the general use of mercenary troops, which had been only just laid aside by Hiero, would have lowered still more the value of the native soldiers. However, the Romans won the victory, and Hiero immediately raised the siege, and returned to Syracuse. Encouraged by this success, Appius next attacking the Carthaginians, beat their army so completely that they were driven to seek refuge in the several

The Carthaginians defeated.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 8, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. c. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 11, 12, &c.

cities of the neighbourhood; and having thus established his superiority in the field, he employed himself during the rest of the campaign in laying waste the Syracusan territory, and even ventured to lay siege to Syracuse itself. Nothing more was done indeed, so far as appears, than to intercept the usual supplies of the town by encamping before it; but Hiero had reason to apprehend more serious attempts in the next campaign; for both the consuls, with the entire army of the state,<sup>1</sup> four legions of Romans, and an equal number of Italian allies, were sent into Sicily. Very many cities immediately revolted to them, both from the Carthaginians and Syracusans; and Hiero despairing of resisting them with any effect, hastened to conclude a separate peace. Under his circumstances, peace was only another name for a dependent alliance: he was to support the Romans in their wars, with men, money, and provisions; and his aid in this last point was most important, for a large army could not be subsisted upon plunder, and if the Carthaginians should wisely use their naval superiority, the communication with Italy would be rendered very uncertain, if not impracticable.

It was now plain that the war was become a contest between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily. Both parties accordingly prepared vigorously for the ensuing campaign. The Carthaginians had raised a large army of Ligurians, Gauls, and Spaniards, and had despatched it into Sicily: they also selected Agrigentum as their principal magazine of arms and provisions, and as the base of their operations. The Romans, on their part, sent the two new consuls, with four legions; and they immediately, disdainful of all meaner objects, marched against Agrigentum, established themselves on two separate sides of the town, with lines of communication between them, and thus kept the garrison within their walls. The blockade continued for five months, when the governor in great distress for provisions, sent to Carthage to request supplies. A large force was raised, and sent off to his assistance; and Hanno its commander, acting on the exterior of the besiegers' lines, cut off their supplies, and took up a strong position in their neighbourhood, as if intending to reduce them by famine in their turn. Why Agrigentum was not supplied easily and abundantly by sea, we are not informed; this however was not done, and the garrison therefore having been blockaded so much longer than the Roman army, was unable to wait the issue of Hanno's system, but entreated him to try a speedier means of relieving them. He accordingly marched to attack the Romans, and they having suffered themselves a blockade of two months, and labouring under a great scarcity of food, gladly hastened to meet him. Hanno was defeated with the loss of most of his elephants and all his baggage; and the

B.C. 262.

Preparations  
of both sidesDefeat of  
of Hanno.<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 16, &c.

B.C. 262. governor of Agrigentum, despairing now of relief, could only save his garrison by escaping through the Roman lines, when the joy and fatigue of their late victory had rendered the besiegers less watchful than usual; and the town, with an immense plunder, was abandoned to the enemy without resistance.


Thus in three campaigns that had hitherto passed, the Romans had first delivered themselves from their defensive situation, and carried the war into the country of their enemies; they had next reduced one of their opponents to the necessity of making a separate peace on such terms as gave them the use of his whole power; and had now lastly deprived their remaining adversary of the most important town that he possessed in the island for which they were contending.

But although the Carthaginian<sup>1</sup> navy does not seem to have rendered its countrymen all the services of which it was capable, its aid was yet so important against a state which had no navy at all, that the Romans found it absolutely necessary to make an effort to oppose it. When the capture of Agrigentum brought many of the inland towns in Sicily to submit to them, a greater number of those on the coast, overawed by the Carthaginian fleet, revolted from them; and whilst the coast of Africa enjoyed a perfect security, that of Italy was exposed to continual ravages. The Romans resolved therefore to create a navy; for although they had in former times possessed trading and privateering vessels,<sup>2</sup> such probably as were used in Greece in the Homeric ages, they had for a long time so entirely devoted themselves to inland affairs, that they now had not

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 20.

<sup>2</sup> The testimony of Polybins on this point has been questioned, and Hooke does not hesitate to affirm that "he is undoubtedly mistaken," (*Dissertation on the Credibility, &c.*, vol. iv. p. 57, 8vo edit. 1766,) and that his account does not accord with his own comment on the first treaty between Rome and Carthage, where it is implied that the Romans had ships of war as early as the first year of the republic. It is rather provoking that men should not consider more carefully, before they venture to dispute the assertions of such a writer as Polybins. We find from the two first treaties between Rome and Carthage, Polyb. lib. iii. c. 22, 24, that Roman citizens possessed some of those ships of war which were anciently used for privateering purposes; and there is a stipulation limiting the distance beyond which this privateering was not to be carried on on the coast of Africa. But vessels of this kind did not form a national navy; nor was there any likelihood that ships belonging to the state, or employed in its service, should have ever cruised on the coast of Africa. In process of time, from causes which would be better known if we possessed any real history of the early ages of Rome, trade and privateering fell alike into disrepute, and appear to have been nearly discontinued at the beginning of the Punic wars. Indeed, so far as we recollect, the treaties preserved by Polybins are the only record of the existence of naval habits amongst any part of the people of Rome before their contests with Carthage; so completely had the Romans, for some time before that period, bestowed their whole attention to inland matters. So that it is highly probable that when they first sent over an army into Sicily, in the beginning of the first Punic war, they should have been obliged to borrow ships, as Polybins relates, from the maritime Greek states in their neighbourhood, having at that time none of their own.

a single vessel of war in their dominions. There were, moreover, B.C. 262. considerable differences between the different classes of ships of war. The Italian Greeks, who at this time were the nearest maritime people to the Romans, still used only the ships of smaller size, called triremes and penteconters, which had formed the naval force of the free republics of old Greece. But the Carthaginians, and the great kingdoms of Egypt and Syria, which had been founded by the successors of Alexander, had generally adopted vessels of a larger kind, called quinqueremes, which are supposed to have had five



[Roman Ship.]

banks of oars on each side, as the triremes had three. Of these the Romans had no knowledge; but it so happened, that a Carthaginian ship of this class had run on shore in the Straits of Messena, when the fleet was endeavouring to obstruct the passage of the first Roman army under Appius, and thus falling opportunely into the hands of the Romans, furnished them with a model. They now availed themselves of it, and built a fleet of a hundred quinqueremes, and twenty triremes; and in order to lose no time, they enlisted and trained their men whilst the ships were building, and

The Romans  
build a navy,  
B.C. 260.

B.C. 260. taught them to manage their oars, and to keep time with one another, by placing them on benches ashore in the same manner that they were to be arranged at sea, and then making them go through their different movements at the word of their officer.

Constitution  
of the crews.

Being sensible, however, that ships and men thus hastily prepared, must be very inferior in activity and skill to their enemies, they endeavoured to supply this defect by a contrivance for grappling and boarding their adversary's ships,<sup>1</sup> and thus to make the victory depend on the courage and discipline of their fighting men rather than on the manœuvres of their sailors. For as the ancient ships of war were worked almost entirely by oars, and the labour of the oar was considered both irksome and degrading, the seamen were chosen from amongst<sup>2</sup> the slaves or the lowest class of free citizens; who would not have been thought worthy of a place in the regular infantry or cavalry of the state, and who, even on board their ships, had no other duty but to work the vessel, or to discharge arrows and darts upon the enemy. But whenever a ship ran on board its antagonist, the contest then depended on a certain number of regularly armed soldiers, who formed a part of the complement, and who fought with the same arms, and nearly in the same manner, as if they had been on shore. This part of the crew would naturally rise or fall in importance according to the skill or ignorance of the seamen. With the Carthaginians, as with the Athenians before them, their confidence in the rapidity of their manœuvres, and the excellence of their ships, made them less value the assistance of these naval soldiers; but the Romans, inured to conquest by land, and inexperienced in naval operations, had probably strengthened to the utmost that part of their force to which alone they could trust for victory.

This constitution of the crews of the ancient ships of war, will partly account also for the immense magnitude of the naval armaments of the Romans and Carthaginians in the first Punic war, when compared with that of their land armies. None were eligible to serve in the national army, except they possessed a certain property; but the poorest citizens, and even slaves, were freely employed in the navy. Men, therefore, could be obviously procured for the one service in much greater numbers than for the other; their maintenance, also, would be less expensive; for the simplest fare would be held good enough for those who formed the seamen of the state; and as the ancient fleets were mostly fitted out for some particular service, and not kept at sea like ours, for months, or even years, there would be no more required than enough to furnish the men with provisions during the limited period for which they were kept in actual employment.

Such being the nature of ancient naval warfare, it is not unnatural


<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. lib. vi. c. 19. Aristot. *Politic.* lib. vi. c. 7.

that, in the first general action between the two parties, the Romans, B. C. 260. having succeeded by their grappling machines in boarding their enemies' ships, should have gained a complete victory. Several cities in Sicily were the reward of this advantage, and the Romans, never slow in improving their good fortune to the utmost, from this time began to make attempts upon Sardinia, where they soon after gained another naval victory over their enemies.

From the moment that the two powers had become opposed to each other at sea, it was evident that the possession of Sicily would ultimately belong to that party which could establish its naval superiority. The war on shore languished, while the utmost preparations were made on both sides for a more vigorous prosecution of hostilities by sea. The Romans, too, longed for an opportunity of carrying their usual system of war into effect, by attacking their enemy in his own country; and the Carthaginians, knowing the

weakness of their power at home, were equally anxious to keep the scene of action at a distance. Accordingly,<sup>1</sup> about four years after the first naval battle, the Roman consuls, L. Manlius and M. Attilius Regulus, at the head of a fleet of three hundred and thirty ships, crossed over to Messena, thence coasted the eastern shore of Sicily, doubled cape Pachynus, and then advanced along the southern coast of the island, till they should reach the point from which the passage was usually made to Africa. They were met at Ecnomus, near Agrigentum, by a Carthaginian fleet of three hundred and fifty ships, commanded by Hanno and another officer of the same name with the subject of this narrative. It was a trial of strength on both sides, and was long and obstinately contested; the Romans having taken on board a large detachment of their army, with a view to their projected descent in Africa, had thus on board each ship three hundred rowers, and a hundred and twenty fighting soldiers. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were very ill pro-



[Column of Duilius, the first Roman who gained a Naval Victory.]

The consuls cross over to Africa.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 25.

B.C. 256.  
Naval victory  
of the  
Romans off  
Ecnomus.

vided with soldiers, but they had a force of seamen amounting to about a hundred and fifty thousand men. The battle ended in a complete victory on the part of the Romans, who, with a loss of twenty-four of their own ships, destroyed thirty, and took sixty-four of the enemy's, with all their crews.

The invasion of Africa, the great object of their wishes, was now put within their power, and they instantly carried it into execution. The fleet was<sup>1</sup> re-victualled, the captured ships refitted for service, and the armament, having first made the land under the cape called Mercury, from thence ran along the shore till they reached the town of Aspis, or Clypea, or, as we should interpret it in English, Shield. Here the army was landed, and the town besieged, and soon after taken. Meantime, the beaten Carthaginian fleet, not doubting the further intentions of the Romans, had sailed home directly to Carthage, and was stationed in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, to cover it from the expected attack. But the plan followed by the enemy disconcerted this measure, and the chief attention of the government was now turned to the protection of the country on the land side. The Romans, after the reduction of Aspis, sent home for further instructions; and, in the meanwhile, overran the country, and besides other valuable plunder, carried off more than twenty thousand persons to their ships, who, being sold for slaves, were the most profitable fruit of the expedition. These were safely despatched to Rome, when L. Manlius, in pursuance of the senate's orders, returned home with the greater part of the armament, leaving his colleague, M. Attilius Regulus, with 15,000 foot, 500 horse, and forty ships, to prosecute the war in Africa. Little opposition, it seems, was expected in the field, and the expense of maintaining more than three hundred ships in actual service, was too great to be borne for more than a very short period.

Regulus left  
in Africa.

The campaign that followed, shows remarkably the ill policy of confining national feelings within the walls of a single city, and making the inhabitants of the surrounding region the subjects, instead of the equals of the citizens of the capital. Carthage, on the coast of Africa, was like the European settlements on the coast of India: the Africans were not incorporated with the Carthaginians as one people, nor were they governed with that wisdom and equity, which in India has made the native population so trusty and firm a bulwark of the British government. On the approach of the Roman army, the Numidian tribes joined them, and exceeded them far in the extent of the mischief they committed in the country. Out of Carthage itself, there seemed nothing capable of organising a national defence. The inhabitants of the neighbouring districts fled thither in dismay for shelter, and besides adding to the general

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 29.

alarm, such an addition to the population speedily caused a scarcity of provisions. A battle ventured by the Carthaginian generals, was lost through their incapacity; and after this, the Roman consul marched everywhere without fear, and at last took Tunis, and there encamped in a position close to the capital, and advantageously placed for cutting off its communications with the country.

Negotiation was then tried by the Carthaginians; but the consul's demands were so exorbitant, that the government, desperate as their condition seemed, disdained to accept them; and a slight circumstance soon changed the face of their affairs. A Carthaginian<sup>1</sup> officer returned about this time from Greece, with a number of Greek

The Carthagini-  
ans  
negotiate.

soldiers whom he had been commissioned to enlist for pay in that country. Amongst these was a Lacedæmonian named Xanthippus, who had been trained in the Spartan discipline, and had acquired some military experience. He being informed of the state of affairs, said, freely amongst his friends, that the disasters of the Carthaginians were owing solely to the ignorance of their generals, who had rendered their chief strength—their cavalry and elephants—quite useless, by fighting on hilly ground instead of on the plains. His words being



[Greek Warrior setting out for the Wars.—  
*Panof. Bild. Antik. Leb.*]

reported to the government, he was called before them; and there so justified his statement, that the army was put under his direction, though not, as far as appears, under his command as general-in-chief. Having practised the troops for a few days in manœuvres, and having inspired them with great confidence, he accompanied the generals into the field, with an army of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse, and one hundred elephants.

The Romans, though surprised at the sudden boldness of the enemy, yet were not slow in marching to meet them; while, the Carthaginians, full of ardour, called upon Xanthippus to lead them instantly to battle, and were drawn up by him, the generals in all things deferring to his ability. His dispositions—and no higher praise can be given them—were very nearly the same with those adopted afterwards by Hannibal at Zama; the elephants in the front, the cavalry on the wings, and the main body of the Carthaginian infantry in reserve a little behind the elephants: and the

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 32.



B.C. 256. different result of the two battles may be ascribed to the superior ability of Scipio, who, at Zama, left open passages at several points through the whole depth of his infantry, through which his light infantry fled when pursued by the elephants, and thus led them off the field, diverting their attention from the masses of the heavy-armed soldiers: besides which, Massinissa and his Numidians fought at Zama on the Roman side, and thus gave them the superiority in cavalry. But now it was quite otherwise: the Roman

Regulus  
defeated by  
Xanthippus.

B.C. 255. infantry, drawn up in the usual manner, the manipuli of each alternate line covering the intervals left by those of the line before them, were broken through by the weight of the elephants' charge; the cavalry, far inferior in number, was chased off the field at the first onset; and the army, surrounded on all sides, was put to the sword, with the exception of about two thousand men who escaped to Aspis, and five hundred who, together with the consul, were made prisoners.<sup>1</sup>

Xanthippus,<sup>2</sup> who had won for Carthage this signal victory, soon after sailed back to his own country, having secured, probably, enough from the Carthaginian government to enrich him for ever as a soldier of fortune; and wisely foreseeing, that by remaining in Africa he was more likely to excite jealousy, than to add either to his wealth or reputation. The battle which he had gained, restored to the Carthaginians all that they had lost in Africa, except the town of Aspis, where the relics of the Roman army made so brave a defence, that they baffled all attempts against them. Early in the following spring an immense fleet was sent from Rome to bring them off; and this armament having defeated with great loss a Carthaginian fleet which was too hastily raised to oppose it, effected its purpose; and taking on board the garrison of Aspis, put to sea again, in order to return to Sicily.

For three or four years consecutively, the constancy<sup>3</sup> of the Romans was severely tried by several heavy losses from shipwreck; more than four hundred and thirty of their ships being thus destroyed; so that they could only raise a fleet of sixty ships, for the purpose merely of furnishing their army in Sicily with sup-

<sup>1</sup> After an imprisonment of five years at Carthage, Regulus was despatched on an embassy to Rome, with proposals for peace, and a promise of his liberty if successful. With unparalleled magnanimity, far from availing himself of this favourable opportunity of obtaining his liberation, by advising his countrymen to accept the offers of the Carthaginians, he strenuously opposed every proposal of accommodation, and urged the Romans to continue the war with unabated vigour. As he had thus failed in his mission, by virtue of the compact which he had made before leaving Carthage, he once more, amid the regrets of his friends, returned to bondage. The Carthaginians, exasperated with the advice he had given to his countrymen, are said to have put him to death with the most cruel tortures; a statement, however, which appears to be destitute of historical foundation.—*Editor*.

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 36.

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 39.

plies. By land, too, they were under great difficulties; for although since their defeat in Africa they had taken several towns from the enemy in Sicily, and among the rest, Panormus, or Palermo, one of their oldest and most important settlements; yet the common soldiers were so terrified at the elephants, that they dared not venture a battle on level ground, and would thus be soon distressed for provisions, if their supplies by sea were interrupted. It became absolutely necessary, therefore, to make another effort to regain the command of the sea, and they were building a new fleet for this purpose, when they were informed of the total destruction of the very part of the enemy's force which they most dreaded, by the ability of the consul Cocilius, who by a feigned retreat, had drawn the elephants after him close under the walls of Panormus, and there overwhelmed them with missile weapons from the towers, and from the soldiers with whom he had lined the trenches. This success restored the spirits of the army, and the fleet was fitted out on a larger scale, proportionate to the increased confidence of the government. Accordingly, in the fourteenth year of the war, the consuls C. Atilius and L. Manlius, sailed with two hundred ships for Sicily; and there taking the command of the legions, proceeded to besiege Lilybæum, a town near the south-western extremity of the island, and, except Drepanum, the last place of importance which the Carthaginians possessed in that island.

The  
Elephants  
destroyed by  
Cocilius.

The action of this memorable<sup>1</sup> siege consisted in every variety of attempt by land and by sea that could be made by either party, to raise works against the town, and to destroy them; to maintain, and to elude the blockade of the harbour. At last, towards the expiration of the year, the garrison succeeded in completely destroying the towers and engines of the besiegers, with a great slaughter of the workmen and defenders, of them at the same time; so that the Romans turned the siege into a blockade, and determined to trust to famine for the result. In the next two years they suffered great losses again at sea, P. Claudius, the consul, losing ninety-three ships in an engagement with Adherbal off Drepanum, several more being taken or burnt off Lilybæum by Carthalo; and one hundred quinqueremes, together with eight hundred transports, on their way to Lilybæum with supplies for the army, being totally destroyed by a storm in the following year, off the southern coast of Sicily. A second time, therefore,



[Ship on a Tomb at Pompeii.]

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 42, &c.

B.C. 255. The Romans give up the Sea in despair. the Romans gave up the sea in despair; but being still superior by land, they continued the blockade of Lilybæum; and L. Junius, the consul, whose fleet had been so unhappily wrecked, made some amends for this disaster, by seizing the strong position of mount Eryx, between Panormus and Drepanum, on whose summit was the temple of Venus Ericyna, the richest and most famous in Sicily. The town was a little below the summit, and was still maintained by the Carthaginians; but the Romans being masters of the heights above it, and occupying also the approaches to it below from Drepanum, flattered themselves that it must soon fall into their hands.

Hamilcar Barca, general.

B.C. 247. life we know nothing, nor at what age he first began to take an active part in public affairs. But from the time that history first notices him, as commander of the Carthaginian fleet in the eighteenth year of the first Punic war, to the final close of his career in Spain, his whole conduct was a series of distinguished services to his country in the most critical circumstances, and was equally marked by courage, sound judgment, and enlarged and enterprising views. His first measure was to carry the evils of war into Italy, a step ominous of the zeal and perseverance with which his son was afterwards to strike at the heart of the Roman power; and he ravaged with his fleets the coasts of Locris and Brutium. From thence returning to Sicily, he put to shore on the northern coast, between Eryx and Panormus, and there occupied a high table mountain near the sea, called Eiretè, or "The Close;" surrounded on almost every side by precipitous cliffs, and affording on the top a plain of nearly ten miles in circumference, and capable of cultivation. From this plain there arose in one part a smaller eminence, which served as a sort of citadel to the whole district: whilst towards the sea the position commanded an excellent harbour, with an abundant supply of fresh water. To complete its value, it had only three points of approach, two from the land side, and one from the sea; all of them presenting great difficulties to an assailant. Such a post in the hands of so able a general was a source of infinite mischief to the Romans. He used frequently to put to sea with his fleet, and ravage the coast of Italy as far as Cumæ near Naples; while by land he was continually engaged with the Romans who were quartered in the territory of Panormus, and harassed them with incessant hostility for the space of nearly three years.

Strong position of Hamilcar Barca.

B.C. 246

Nothing can more clearly show the state of exhaustion to which both parties had been reduced by this protracted war, than the failure of any attempt on either side to bring the contest in Sicily to a conclusion. Instead of availing themselves of the opening afforded

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 56.

them by the total renunciation of all efforts by sea on the part of the Romans, the Carthaginians only laid up their own fleet, to relieve their expenditure, and left Hamilcar to depend solely on his own resources. On the other hand, the Romans, accustomed to overbear all opposition, and so anxious to complete the conquest of Sicily, suffered themselves to be kept in check for three years by the ability of a single man, unsupported as he was by any reinforcements from Carthage; and to bear the shame and loss of seeing the coasts of Italy ravaged without resistance. And the same state of things, with a slight change of the scene of action, continued for two years more. Hamilcar left his position at Eiretè, for what reason we know not, and threw himself into the town of Eryx, while the Romans were in possession both of the summit of the mountain above him, and of the passes below him, which communicated with the neighbouring country. In this new station<sup>1</sup> he maintained himself for two years, defying all the efforts of the enemy, and enabling the government at home, had not their inability or incapacity been excessive, to despatch such an additional force to Sicily as would at once have changed the face of affairs in that island. The government, however, did no more than to keep up an occasional communication with the general, and to supply him with provisions, which otherwise, as the Romans were masters of the country, he could scarcely have obtained. But, at length, the Romans were the first to rouse themselves for one last and decisive effort. A fleet, they saw, was required to cut off Hamilcar from all support by sea; and to create this fleet, as the public treasury was insufficient, individuals united their means; two or three persons combining to equip a ship of war, on condition that they should be repaid, if the armament were fully successful. It is mentioned too that the ships were built after an excellent model; a Carthaginian quinquereme of superior construction, having been taken during the siege of Lilybæum. In this manner, two hundred ships were completed; and the consul, C. Lutatius, taking the command, sailed to Sicily early in the season, occupied the harbour of Drepanum, and secured all the anchorage for a fleet off Lilybæum, the Carthaginians having no force at sea to oppose him. Surprised, however, at this sudden expedition, they at once resolved to prepare a naval armament, which should, in the first instance, re-victual their troops at Eryx, and then, having taken Hamilcar and the flower of his soldiers on board, should give battle to the enemy. Lutatius, informed of their intentions, awaited for them near the islands called Ægusæ or Ægates, that is, Goat Islands, which lie a little to the westward of Lilybæum. He had carefully employed every portion of his time in exercising his crews, and preparing them for the approaching

The Romans  
equip a Fleet.

B.C. 242.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 58.

- B.C. 242. conflict; and although the weather was boisterous and ill suited for an engagement, when the Carthaginian fleet first came in sight, yet he very wisely judged that no danger could be so great as that of allowing the enemy to disembark the stores with which they were now laden, and to receive on board Hamilcar and his veterans in their room. He therefore attacked them, and won an easy victory: fifty ships were sunk, and seventy, with more than ten thousand men, were taken: and the conqueror sailed to the roadstead of Lilybæum, to join the army still employed in the siege of the town, and there refitted his prizes, and disposed of his numerous prisoners.

Victory of  
Lutatius.

B.C. 241.

Treaty of  
Rome and  
Carthage.

At such a period of the war a disaster like this was irretrievable.<sup>1</sup> The Carthaginian government felt that it was decisive, and at once commissioned Hamilcar to enter into negotiations for peace. Lutatius, on his part, received the overtures with no less alacrity; and a treaty was concluded, which, after some alterations made by the Roman people, consisted finally of the following terms: "That the Carthaginians should evacuate Sicily, and all the islands between that country and Italy; and that they should commit no act of hostility against the Syracusans, or any of their allies. That they should restore all their prisoners to the Romans without ransom; and pay to Rome, within ten years, the sum of three thousand two hundred Euboic talents.<sup>2</sup> That neither party should molest the allies of the other. That neither should command any post, nor erect any public building, nor enlist soldiers in the dominions of the other; and that neither party should receive the allies of the other into any connection with itself."

On the conclusion<sup>3</sup> of this treaty, Hamilcar led his troops from Eryx to Lilybæum, and there resigned the command to Gisco, the governor of that town, who was to transport them, with his own garrison, over to Africa. Their united numbers exceeded twenty thousand men, and as they had been very irregularly paid of late, the sum now required to satisfy all their claims was likely to press heavily on the exhausted treasury of Carthage. Gisco therefore wisely sent them over in small detachments at a time, in order that the government might pay and send to their homes those who first landed, before the whole body should arrive, and form a mass sufficiently strong to create alarm or disturbance. But the government, hoping that the soldiers might be prevailed upon to remit some part of the arrears due to them, detained the first detachments that arrived, in Carthage, till the whole should have crossed over. Meantime a multitude of needy foreign soldiers being naturally guilty of many acts of violence while quartered in a wealthy capital, their officers were desired to march them away from Carthage to the neighbouring town of Sicca; and that there might be no temptation

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 62.

<sup>2</sup> About £620,000.

<sup>3</sup> For the whole mercenary war, see Polyb. lib. i. c. 65, 88.

to allure them back, they were obliged reluctantly to carry with them their families and all their baggage. B.C. 241.

In their new quarters at Sicca, whilst waiting to be joined by their comrades, they amused themselves with calculating the sums that were due to them, and with dwelling on the splendid promises that their generals had formerly made them on occasions of extraordinary danger. Every man flattered himself with a speedy return to his own country in affluence: when, after the arrival of all the detachments from Sicily, the commander of the forces in Africa, whose situation at home had kept him from ever having witnessed their services, or shared their dangers; came to them, not with the liberal recompense that they expected, but with a statement of the distress of the treasury, and an appeal to their indulgence to remit some part even of that pay, which by the very letter of their bond was due to them. Carthaginian  
Army at  
Sicca.

Universal dissatisfaction arose in the army on such a proposal. The soldiers of the different nations of which it was composed, Gauls, Spaniards, Ligurians, Greeks of half caste, mostly slaves, deserters, and native Africans, all formed into small groups, and clamoured in their several languages, against the injustice with which they were treated. The study of foreign languages made so little a part of the system of education amongst the ancients, that Polybius treats it as impossible for the general himself to have understood and been able to converse in the different dialects used in his army; and to address such a mixed body in a public assembly through the medium of several interpreters, appeared productive of endless delay, impatience, and confusion. It was necessary, therefore, to treat separately with the soldiers of each nation, through their own national officers; but misunderstandings and misrepresentations, unintentional and wilful, rendered this mode of proceeding fruitless; till at last, resolved to make their actions speak an intelligible language, and incensed that none of their old commanders were sent to them, but a man who was a stranger to them, and whom they could not tax with the promises formerly made to them in their campaigns; they broke up from Sicca, hastened towards Carthage, and encamped at Tunis, about twelve miles distant from the capital.

The Carthaginian government was alarmed, and too evidently showed that they were so: they were lavish in promises, which only led to additional demands on the part of the insurgents. Many of these were complied with, and for the rest it was agreed that they should be left to the decision of one of the late commanders in Sicily. Hamilcar was unpopular with the army, because he had so readily resigned his command over them; they fixed accordingly upon Gisco, the late governor of Lilybæum, as the arbiter in their differences. This officer went to their camp, and by his personal influence, and the actual payment of the money that was due to

B.C. 241. them, was proceeding happily to extinguish the mutiny, when a  
 Rebellion of the Mercenaries. Campanian slave, named Spendius, who had deserted from the Romans, and a native African, of the name of Matho, alarming the African soldiers in particular, by telling them, that, when their comrades were dismissed to their respective countries, the whole vengeance of Carthage would fall upon them, enkindled afresh the spirit of rebellion. Spendius and Matho were appointed generals of the army, and soon after, on some slight provocation, Gisco, and all the Carthaginians with him were seized, and the money with which they were paying the troops was plundered. Then considering this act as a declaration of war, the mutineers bound themselves to one another by horrible oaths, and sent round to the tribes of native Africans, inviting them to join their standard. The invitation was almost universally complied with; large supplies both of men and money were sent to the army; and the rebels proceeded to besiege the towns of Utica and Hippo, because their inhabitants had refused to participate in the revolt.

This sudden and formidable rebellion, by which Carthage was at once reduced to the utmost danger of its very existence, abundantly accounts for the final event of the Punic wars. The native Africans, by their taxes and levies of soldiers, were the main support of the Carthaginian power; and in time of war were grievously oppressed by the Carthaginian officers, who carried on this conscription with the utmost rigour, and who were approved by their government in proportion to the strictness with which they executed its orders, and to their neglect of the distress of its subject. Far from feeling any zeal in the cause they were thus forced to serve, they were ready, therefore, on the first opportunity to take up arms against it; and the women in particular, most exasperated at seeing their husbands and parents dragged away to fight their masters' battles, now entered with the most lively ardour into the revolt, and gave up even their personal ornaments for the pay of the army. Thus in an instant the Carthaginians found themselves confined within the walls of their city, and liable to be besieged so soon as they had ceased to be masters of the field. Had Rome stood equally alone in Italy, and had its colonies and Latin allies regarded its government as a tyranny, whose interest was directly at variance with their own, the valour and wisdom of its people would have been displayed in vain after the battle of Cannæ, and the results of that memorable day would have been as important as those of the battle of Zama.

The Carthaginians took all possible measures to meet the danger with which they were threatened; they armed their own citizens who were of an age to serve, and raised a fresh mercenary force; but they appointed Hanno to the chief command, the very man who was most obnoxious to the Africans, as having been one of their worst oppressors, and who had first carried to the mutinous soldiers

the proposals that they should give up a part of their arrears. B.C. 241. Active and remorseless in raising contributions, and enforcing conscriptions, Hanno was as a general totally incompetent; and his misconduct exposed him to one bloody defeat, and caused him to neglect several opportunities of winning a victory. The rebels, by their position before Utica, and their occupation of Tunis, commanded the isthmus which connected the city of Carthage with the main land: they had, besides, fortified the passes of the hills, and occupied the only bridge over the river Bakara, which was an additional barrier to any possibility of escaping from Carthage into the open country. But all difficulties were overcome by the genius of Hamilcar, who, after full experience of Hanno's incapacity, was nominated to succeed him in the command. He watched his opportunity when a particular wind had choked the mouth of the Bakara with sand, and had raised a bank of shingles between its now impeded waters and the sea. He then led his army along this bank by night with the utmost caution, till he had thus got across the river, and when daylight came, he appeared in the rear of the enemy's position, and hastened to surprise the troops who were stationed at the bridge; but being discovered, he was opposed by them on one side, and by the army employed in the siege of Utica on the other. His able dispositions, however, defeated both these opponents with great loss; then following up his victory, he attacked and carried the fortifications at the bridge, drove its defenders into Tunis, and afterwards overrunning the country, recovered a great many places either by force or terror, to the Carthaginian dominion.

Superseded  
by Hamilcar.

Upon this, Matho, who seems to have been the chief among the rebel generals, ordered Spendius, with six thousand soldiers of different nations, and Autaritus, a Gaul, with two thousand of his countrymen, to follow and watch the movements of Hamilcar; while he sent to the Africans and Numidians, requesting them not to fail in giving their earnest co-operation. They, accordingly, took the field in two different quarters; and both marching to join Spendius, came unexpectedly upon the front and rear of Hamilcar's army, while Spendius was hanging on his flank. Thus surrounded, on ground which was besides unfavourable to his escape, Hamilcar was delivered in a remarkable manner from the danger. A young Numidian chief named Narava, who had inherited from his father a friendly disposition towards Carthage, was struck with a romantic admiration of Hamilcar's character; and went over to the Carthaginian camp, with a request to be introduced to the general. Finding that his motives were at first suspected, he left his horse and javelins with his followers, and entered the camp unarmed; his fearless confidence removing all suspicion, and filling the Carthaginians with admiration. When he was brought before Hamilcar, he told him, that he longed to become his friend, and was now come in the

Narava the  
Numidian.



B.C. 241. hope of being admitted to share truly in all his counsels and actions. Hamilcar, delighted with his frankness, gladly welcomed him, and promised to give him his daughter in marriage, if he should approve himself to the end true to Carthage. Narava then went away and soon returned, bringing over two thousand Numidians with him. With this seasonable aid, Hamilcar no longer hesitated to meet the enemy; and they on their part, having united all their forces, marched down into the plain to engage him. They were defeated with great loss: chiefly owing to the elephants in the Carthaginian army, and to the distinguished conduct of Narava. Ten thousand men were killed, and four thousand taken prisoners, many of whom enlisted in the victorious army; whilst the rest were called together by Hamilcar, and received a free pardon, accompanied only with a threat of certain punishment, if ever they should be again taken in rebellion.

Hamilcar  
defeats the  
rebels.

Nothing so much alarmed the rebels, as this merciful behaviour of the Carthaginian general. To obviate the effects of it, they resolved to involve all their associates so deeply in guilt, that pardon to all should be hopeless. Letters were accordingly forged and read to the soldiers, as if from their comrades in Sardimia, (for there, too, the mercenary troops had mutinied, murdered all the Carthaginians in the island, and taken possession of it themselves,) informing them, that some amongst them were plotting to release Gisco, and those who had been seized with him at Tunis. Spendius and Autaritus then urged, that death was the only sure keeping for their prisoners, that thus all intrigues for their deliverance would at once be blasted, and the Carthaginians would see, that none would be deceived by their fair appearances of mercy. Many of the soldiers then came forward, to plead in their several languages for Gisco's life; but when it was generally known what they prayed for, a cry arose of "Shoot them! stone them!" and they were all instantly massacred. This taste of blood, as is natural, made the appetite for it the keener. Gisco and his fellow prisoners, to the number of seven hundred, were dragged out to a short distance from the camp, and there were put to death, with all the circumstances of horrible torture.

Gisco  
murdered.

The soldiers were now ready to go all lengths with their commanders. The bodies of the victims were refused to the Carthaginians for burial. Proclamation was made, that no herald or flag of truce should be received; and it was resolved that every Carthaginian whom they should take, should be put to death in tortures, and every foreign auxiliary should be sent back to Carthage with his hands cut off. Eager to put a stop to such a scene of horrors, Hamilcar united his forces to those of Hanno, who still, it seems, held a command; and now no quarter was given, but those of the rebels who were taken alive, were thrown to the elephants. The

junction of the two generals, however, was an unfortunate measure ; B.C. 241. for their mutual animosity was so great, that the public service suffered from it, neither of them acting cordially with the other. Possibly this failure of vigour at so critical a time, encouraged the towns of Utica and Hippo to take part with the rebels, by whom they had been so long besieged ; for not content with opening their gates to them, they warmly espoused their cause, and sealed their alliance by murdering the Carthaginian soldiers who had been sent to assist in their defence ; after the example of their new confederates, refusing the bodies to their friends for burial. Thus strengthened, Matho and Spendius proceeded at once to blockade Carthage : but Hamilcar was still in the field commanding an army in their rear ; and being now freed from the interference of Hanno, who had been recalled, according to the choice allowed the soldiers by the government, of deciding which of their two generals should remain with them ; and being ably and zealously supported by his friend Narava, he cut off all the supplies that were going to the rebels from the country, and reduced them to a worse state of distress, than that which they inflicted on Carthage.

The towns of Utica and Hippo side with the rebels.

The command of the sea, indeed, enabled the capital to support its blockade, by receiving without difficulty the supplies sent by foreign powers. Hiero, king of Syracuse, knowing how much it concerned his safety, that Rome should not be left without a rival, was liberal in his succours : and the Romans allowing their subjects to supply the Carthaginians freely with every thing, forbade them to hold any communication with the rebels. They did more than this ; for they refused to listen to the overtures of the rebels in Sardinia and Utica, when they severally offered to put those places into their hands. Thus Matho and Spendius, suffering severely from famine themselves, were obliged to raise the blockade : and Spendius and Autaritus having selected fifty thousand of the best soldiers in their whole army, took the field again, to watch and harass the army of Hamilcar. But they were no match for such an adversary. He sometimes cut off their detached parties ; sometimes led them into ambuscades ; and by his wonderful activity often surprised them with sudden attacks, and routed them : and every prisoner that he took was uniformly thrown alive to his elephants. At last he hemmed them up in a position which neither allowed them to fight or fly : and here he blockaded them, vainly looking for aid from Tunis, till in the extremity of their hunger, they began to devour each other. Spendius and Autaritus, dreading to be given up by their soldiers, went themselves, with eight other principal officers, to Hamilcar ; and a treaty was signed between them, stipulating that the Carthaginians might select any ten of the rebels for punishment, and should let all the rest go with a single garment each. Hamilcar instantly said that he selected the ten officers then present with him ; and

Matho and Spendius harass Hamilcar.

B.C. 241. they were immediately arrested. Their soldiers, ignorant of the terms of the agreement, ran to arms; and Hamilcar surrounded them with his elephants and the rest of his force, and easily put the whole of them to the sword. Above forty thousand rebels were thus destroyed.

Forty  
thousand  
rebels  
destroyed.

This great victory was followed by the submission of most of the revolted towns of the Africans; and Hamilcar soon afterwards proceeded to blockade Matho and the remains of the rebels in Tunis. It appears that the nature of the ground obliged him to divide his army; and while he himself encamped on one side of the town, his colleague Hannibal took post on the other; nor was the communication between them direct and easy. Of this the rebels availed themselves, and attacked Hannibal's quarters, having observed that he was less on his guard than Hamilcar. They were completely successful, took the Carthaginian camp, with all the baggage of the army, and made Hannibal himself prisoner. An opportunity of a bloody revenge was now in their power. Spendius, and the other rebel chiefs who had been seized with him, had been brought before Tunis, and crucified in sight of the walls. To this spot Hannibal was dragged; the body of Spendius was taken down from the cross, and thirty of the most distinguished Carthaginian prisoners were slaughtered around it, while Hannibal was fastened to the cross in its room. The siege of Tunis was now raised, and Hamilcar moved towards the mouth of the river Bakara, to maintain his communication at once with Carthage and with the sea.

After this new disaster, the Carthaginian government armed their remaining free population, and sent them out under the command of Hanno. Thirty members of the council of elders accompanied this army, who were charged to effect a reconciliation between the two generals in the name of their common country. Their endeavours succeeded, and both henceforward acted cordially in concert with each other. The war was now soon brought to a successful end. After several partial defeats, the rebels collected all their forces, and put their fortune on the risk of one decisive battle. They were defeated with a terrible slaughter: those who escaped from the field were soon after obliged to surrender, and Matho himself was taken alive. Utica and Hippo, despairing of mercy, still resisted, till being besieged, one by Hamilcar and the other by Hanno, they were forced to submit at discretion. How their aggravated rebellion was punished, we are not told; but Matho and the prisoners taken with him, were led in triumph through the streets of Carthage, and put to death in torments. In this manner, Carthage recovered the whole of her former dominion in Africa, after a war of unequalled horror, which had lasted for three years and four months.

The rebels  
finally  
defeated.

B.C. 238. Scarce had the Carthaginians escaped this danger, when they were threatened with another, which in their present state of weak-

ness they would have found it impossible to resist. We have seen B.C. 238. that at the height of the late rebellion, the Romans had refused the offers of the rebel soldiers in Sardinia, to take the island into their own hands. But since that time the rebels had been driven out by the native Sardinians, and had fled to Italy for refuge: and the Roman government was now<sup>1</sup> prevailed upon to listen to their requests, and to send a force to take possession of the island as a Roman province. The Carthaginians considering that their rebellious soldiers could not bestow a right on others which they had not themselves, were proceeding, as soon as the war in Africa was ended, to despatch an expedition for the recovery of Sardinia; when the Romans, insisting that the expedition was designed to act against them, declared war against Carthage. That power could not possibly at such a time enter upon a new contest: her government, therefore, was obliged to concede to what was well understood to be the object of Rome: and not only was Sardinia given up, but twelve hundred talents were paid, in addition to the sums stipulated by the treaty of peace, as a sort of bribe to the Romans, not at present to renew hostilities. This conduct on the part of Rome was every way calculated to excite deep resentment in a mind like Hamilcar's. It betrayed not only an alarming, but an insulting and ungenerous ambition; and plainly showed that the late war had left behind it, in one party at least, feelings of rivalry which were not likely to be soon forgotten. From henceforward Hamilcar, it is said, determined<sup>2</sup> steadily to pursue the object of obtaining for his country such resources, as should enable her at no distant period to renew the contest with her adversary. It was no common spirit of policy by which he was actuated, but a principle of hatred to Rome, which he intended to carry with him to his grave, and to instil with great strength into his children. His own eminent services, aided by his great family interest, and political sentiments, for it appears he favoured the popular party in Carthage, which was every day becoming more powerful, all contributed to give him an influence over the direction of affairs almost unlimited; and the same causes continuing afterwards to operate in behalf of his son, the whole administration of Carthage appears for many years to have been in the hands of his party, and its foreign policy almost to have been left at the sole disposal of himself, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, and his son Hannibal.

The Romans  
declare War.

Excluded from Sicily and Sardinia, Hamilcar turned his attention to Spain. There the Romans had not yet pretended to control his movements: and there the mines of the country would abundantly supply him with money, and its bold and numerous population with soldiers, for carrying into effect his ultimate views. Immediately,

Hamilcar  
directs his  
attention to  
Spain.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. i. c. 88.

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. lib. ii. c. 1; lib. iii. c. 10.

B.C. 238. therefore, on the conclusion of the war in Africa, he prepared to cross the straits of Gibraltar with an army. A solemn sacrifice was performed, as usual at the commencement of an expedition, to propitiate the favours of heaven; and towards the close of the ceremony, Hamilcar desired all the assistants to withdraw a little, and called to him his son Hannibal, then a child of only nine years of age. He then asked him, whether he should like to go with him to the army? and when the boy seemed delighted at the offer, and begged that he might be allowed to go, his father led him to the altar, and bade him swear, with his hand upon the sacrifice, that he would never bear a good will to the Romans. This story Hannibal himself related at the court of Antiochus, as a security for his unchanged attachment to all the enemies of Rome; and it strongly marks the feeling that was most powerful in Hamilcar's mind; and that whilst he was going to carry on war in Spain, his heart was already in Italy.

Oath of  
Hannibal.

Of his subsequent operations nothing is recorded in detail; we are only told<sup>1</sup> that partly by arms, and partly by conciliation, he reduced a great number of the native tribes under the Carthaginian dominion. At last, in the tenth year of his command, he was engaged in battle with one of the fiercest and most powerful people in Spain, and finding it needful to set an example of personal daring, so exposed himself, that he was killed on the spot. His son-in-law, Hasdrubal, who had for some time served under him, succeeded him in the command of the army, and in the prosecution of his designs for rendering the whole peninsula a valuable province of Carthage.

Character of  
Hamilcar.

The character of Hamilcar can only be gathered from his public conduct; as nothing is known of his private life and manners. As a statesman and soldier, his abilities appear to have been of the highest order, and his ascendancy must have been generally acknowledged, since it could excite such an enthusiastic admiration in the young Numidian chief, Narava, and lead him to abandon a cause generally popular amongst his countrymen, from his respect for the personal merit of the Carthaginian general. It would be difficult to find any single family, which in only two generations produced three such men as Hamilcar and his sons Hannibal and Hasdrubal; if his son-in-law Hasdrubal be added to the number, the talent concentrated in the house of one man may be well considered unparalleled.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. ii. c. 1.



[Hannibal.—Visconti.—Iconogr. Græc.]

## CHAPTER XIV.

### HANNIBAL.—SECOND PUNIC WAR.

FROM B.C. 218 TO B.C. 202.

THERE are very few instances in which biography so closely B.C. 218. unites itself with general history, as in the life of Hannibal. If we were to profess to relate the story of the age in which he lived, his actions and character so influenced the affairs of the civilized world, that we should find ourselves forced to make him the prominent figure in our narrative, to which all others must be drawn as more or less subservient. While on the other hand, the biographer could not possibly convey a just notion of his genius, without a full description of the state of things in which he was called to perform a part so extraordinary.

Under the eye of his father, Hannibal had for nine years been trained to all the duties of a soldier; and when his brother-in-law, Hasdrubal, succeeded to the command, he was between eighteen and nineteen years of age, and was soon able to render himself equally the admiration and the love of the general and the soldiers. During eight years more he had abundant opportunity to perfect himself in all the qualifications of a subordinate officer, and to learn those which were required of a general-in-chief, as well as of a politician and statesman. Hasdrubal<sup>1</sup> extended the power of Carthage chiefly by his talent of

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. ii. c. 13, 36.

B.C. 218. conciliating the native princes of the Spaniards; he endeavoured also to provide for its security by founding the city of New Carthage, the situation of which was chosen with excellent judgment. This town, which in its present name of Carthagena still retains the memory of its founders, commands<sup>1</sup> the best, and for the purposes of ancient seamanship almost the only harbour that was to be found on the eastern coast of Spain. It was a deep bay, whose entrance looked towards the south, and was protected from the open sea, by a small island which lay across it. In the centre of this bay, there ran out a bold tongue of land, falling down its southern extremity to a flat shore, but terminating in steep and lofty cliffs on the east and west, and on the north side where it joins the main land, presenting a chain of three rocky and rugged eminences; each bearing its own distinct appellation. The southern and eastern sides of this promontory were washed by the sea: between its western side and the opposite coast of the bay, there was a large extent of shallow and nearly stagnant water, such as is not uncommon in sheltered and land locked recesses of the Mediterranean, and which may be particularly remarked in the lagune of Venice. From this there was an artificial cut made through the isthmus to the sea on the east; a bridge forming the communication between the peninsula and the adjoining country. Thus the town, which was built on the southern part of the point of land above described, in the hollow between the hills, combined the double advantages of security and an excellent harbour, most favourably situated for communicating with Africa. The foundation of this place, and the growing influence of Hasdrubal among the natives of Spain, so alarmed the Romans, that they accused themselves of great neglect in not having interfered sooner; and being unable at present to go to war, because an invasion of the Gauls gave them full employment at home, they tried to gain their ends by negotiation, and concluded a treaty with Hasdrubal, by which he engaged not to carry his arms beyond the Ebro. To this they trusted for the present, hoping soon to be able to oppose a barrier more substantial than any stipulation, to the increasing power of their rivals.

About one-and-twenty years had now elapsed since the conclusion of the first Punic war; Hannibal had completed his twenty-sixth year; and Hasdrubal had for eight years been successfully advancing the interests of his country, and the great designs of his family, when he was assassinated by night in his own quarters by a Gaul, whom he had exasperated by some personal injury. Great as such a loss was in itself, it was materially lessened by the prospect of a successor such as Hannibal. It appears that at this period the Carthaginian armies were often consulted<sup>2</sup> in the appointment of generals, and

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. x. c. 8, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. i. c. 82; lib. iii. c. 1.

had an important share in their nomination. On the present occasion the voice of the soldiers instantly bestowed the command on Hannibal; and the influence of his party, and the general animosity against Rome, that now prevailed in the public mind, easily procured the ratification of this appointment from the popular assembly at home. The new general, in the vigour of youth, and already all accomplished in the experience of a soldier's life, resolved to delay his great design no longer, but at once strike a blow which should announce to the world in thunder the ripeness of his family's long meditated plans of vengeance.

B.C. 221.  
Hannibal  
appointed  
General.

At this period, on the eve of commencing the history of the second Punic war, it seems a proper opportunity to suspend for a while the course of our narrative, and to give a sketch of the situation of the principal countries, which, in the sequel, became involved in this wide spreading contest.

Our first attention in this survey will be naturally directed to Italy. It is well known that the Romans appropriated that name in strictness only, to so much of the peninsula as extended southwards, beyond Ravenna on the Adriatic, and the eastern limit of the late republic of Genoa, on the Mediterranean. All the country between these boundaries and the Alps, with the exception of the Genoese territory, which was still possessed by the native Ligurians, and of a small territory around the head of the Adriatic, where the Veneti continued to maintain themselves, had been overrun at different periods by successive hordes of Gauls from beyond the Alps, and was generally known to the Romans by the name of Cisalpine Gaul. Having expelled the Tuscans, who are mentioned as the earliest occupants<sup>1</sup> of this region, the Gauls gradually pushed further and further southwards: assailed the Tuscans, even in that more southern part of their dominion, which still retains their name, and were in the course of their incursions brought into contact with the Romans, and in their first war with that people, had well nigh destroyed them for ever. For many years after their famous occupation of the city of Rome, they renewed at intervals their invasions of its territory: at first the Romans dared not oppose them in the field; but in process of time they learned not only to meet them on equal terms, but to vanquish them; and at length they became the invaders in their turn, and gradually<sup>2</sup> began to expel the Gauls from the most southerly of their settlements, and to occupy the ground with Roman colonies. The more northern tribes, fearful of experiencing the same fate, procured large assistance from their countrymen beyond the Alps, and during the period that Hasdrubal commanded in Spain, made a most formidable attack on the Roman dominion. But being entirely cut off in this attempt, the consuls for several

Hostile  
Attacks of  
the Gauls.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. ii. c. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. ii. c. 19.



B.C. 221. succeeding years, extended their conquests over the Cisalpine tribes, and immediately before the arrival of Hannibal in Italy, the Roman<sup>1</sup> colonies of Placentia and Cremona were founded on the banks of the Po; whilst the natives, though so often defeated, still kept up an incessant harassing warfare against the new settlers.

Political  
Position of  
Italy.

The north of Italy, then, in the modern extent of the word, although nominally forming part of the Roman dominion, was yet likely in fact to give the most zealous support to the first invader who should hold out hopes of deliverance from its yoke. Etruria or Tuscany, Umbria, and Picenum, contained some Roman colonies, but their population and their cities appear to have been inconsiderable, in comparison with the more southern provinces. The main strength of Rome lay in the numbers and courage of its own citizens, and its Latin allies, whose fidelity might be depended on to the last extremity, and whose population, of an age to bear arms, amounted, together with that of Rome, to about three hundred and sixty<sup>2</sup> thousand men. Further to the south the mountain districts of the Apennines in the interior, and the coasts of Campania, Lucania, and Apulia, in ordinary times, furnished the Romans with multitudes of hardy soldiers, or supplies of corn and money. But the allegiance of these provinces was less certain, in case a victorious enemy should tempt them with a favourable opportunity of revolting; they had been more recently conquered, and some of them retained the recollection of long and obstinate struggles which they had sustained against Rome in defence of their liberty; whilst others, as the Campanians, and the Greek cities on the south-eastern coast, proud of their wealth and refinement, felt the hard service to which the Romans compelled them, at once galling and degrading. Accordingly, when Hannibal was absolute master of the field in Italy, it was in the south that he received the warmest support, and was enabled, after many disappointments, to maintain himself so long against all the efforts of the enemy.

Of Sicily.

Sicily, since the last war with Carthage, was divided between the Romans and their firm ally Hiero, king of Syracuse; so that all the resources of that fertile island were in fact destined to strengthen the Roman power.

To the eastward of the Ionian gulf, we find in the account of Polybius, a state of things very different from that which Xenophon, the next oldest in point of time of all the remaining contemporary Greek historians, presents to us. Names, which in his narrative scarcely find a place, in the days of Polybius were become the most eminent in Greece. The Macedonian kingdom, though greatly shrunk from its meridian greatness, was still very considerable; and embraced not only the ancient dominions of Perdicas and Archelaus,

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. iii. c. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. ii. c. 24.

but in addition, the whole of Thessaly and the coast of the *Ægean* B.C. 221. as far as the Hellespont; with an authority and influence, still more difficult to be exactly defined, either in geographical extent or in degree, over the adjacent country of Epirus, and the tribes of the neighbouring Thracians. It possessed besides the important position of the citadel of Corinth, which enabled it to command the entrance into Peloponnesus, and the island of Eubœa, the most valuable of all the dependencies of Athens in the days of Athenian greatness. The Of Macedon. throne of Macedon was now occupied by Philip, son of Demetrius, who had just succeeded Antigonus, the regent of the kingdom, and the conqueror of Cleomenes at Sellasia. Next to Macedonia, the *Ætoli*ans seem to have held the second rank. In the days of Thucydides, they were little better than savages, living in scattered villages, and destitute of any political union; but now, although they still retained the plundering, cruel, and faithless character of barbarians, they were greatly changed in power and importance. Naupactus, so long held by the Athenians, and Ambracia, a Corinthian colony, and since the capital of Pyrrhus, were now held by the *Ætoli*ans; and their ambition was continually looking out for occasions of aggrandizing themselves in Peloponnesus. The third principal power in Greece was one which had been equally inconsiderable in earlier times, the Achaian league or confederacy. The Achaians were the old inhabitants of Sparta and Argos, and were driven from thence by the Dorians, at the time of the return of the Heraclidæ to Peloponnesus. In their turn they expelled the Ionians from the north-western coast of the Peloponnesus, and settled themselves in twelve towns, all of which were bound to one another by a federal union, while none was of sufficient importance to form, like Athens, the acknowledged head of the whole nation. They preserved this form of government down to the age of Alexander, when the Macedonian powers influencing more or less every state in Greece, the Achaian union was dissolved; and some of its towns were garrisoned by Macedonian soldiers, and others were subjected to tyrants from among their own citizens. But some years afterwards, a little before the first Punic war, the league began to be renewed, and at first subsisted between four towns only; others, however, gradually joined it, and not only from Achaia, but from many other parts of Peloponnesus. Its principal members, at the period of which Achaian League. we are now speaking, appear to have been, in addition to the cities of Achaia itself, Sicyon, Argos, Megalopolis, Phlius, and Corinth; although the citadel of Corinth was in the hands of the kings of Macedon.

It was the object of the Achaians to extend their union over the whole of Peloponnesus, but to this scheme there were two states strongly opposed, Elis and Lacedæmon. The Eleans claimed to be of *Ætolian* extraction: their country, in the great revolution caused

B.C. 221. by the return of the Heraclidæ, having been possessed by Oxylus, an Ætolian prince, who assisted the Dorians, and the followers of Heracles in their enterprise. This circumstance would lead them to a friendly connection with the Ætoliæ, and combined with the jealousy which nations usually entertain towards their nearest neighbours, will account for their having both the will and the power to refuse their accession to the Achaian union. Lacedæmon, accustomed of old to the sovereignty of all Peloponnesus, and being still the mistress of a considerable territory, could not be prevailed upon to sink its name and independence, by becoming a single member of a confederacy whose united strength she could more than equal: on the contrary, aspiring always to regain her ancient dominion, and regarding the Achaians as her most formidable rivals, she naturally became connected with their enemies; and thus Ætolia, Elis, and Lacedæmon formed one party in Greece, whose policy was in decided opposition to Macedon in the north and the Achaian union in the south. On the other hand, the Macedonian princes being constantly embroiled with the Ætoliæ, who were their most formidable neighbours, were glad to conciliate the friendship of the Achaians, who, like themselves, were the enemies of Ætolia; and the Achaians on their part found in Macedon, their best protection against Ætolia on one side, and Elis and Lacedæmon on the other.


of  
Lacedæmon.

Of Athens.

The fame of Athens must awaken our interest, even in the lowest decline of her political importance. Her navy and her foreign dominion had long been no more; in the ebb, however, of the Macedonian power she had recovered her independence; and her situation lying remote from the usual seat of war between Macedon, Ætolia, and the states of Peloponnesus, she appears to have taken little or no part in their contests. The glory of her eloquence and philosophy still procured a value for any honours bestowed by the people of Athens; but this tribute of respect was abused to serve the purposes of interested flattery; and those kings whose friendship or enmity the Athenians most prized or feared, were courted by complimentary decrees, conferring on them extravagant titles, and admitting them to the still proud distinction of becoming citizens of Athens.

Historical  
Sketch.

The mention of the eastern kings leads us to describe the state of that large portion of the ancient world which, in the days of Thucydides and Xenophon, composed the Persian empire; and which afterwards formed the principal part of the eastern empire of Rome. It was, at the beginning of the second Punic war, divided chiefly between the kings of Syria and Egypt. Of these, Antiochus, the younger son of Seleucus Callinicus, had lately succeeded his elder brother Seleucus on the throne of Syria. His kingdom, the most extensive of all those which Alexander's successors had divided amongst them,

[Athens Restored.—*G. F. Sargent.*]

embraced the provinces of Persia, Media, Mesopotamia, Armenia, B.C. 221. and Syria, together with the greater part of the peninsula of Asia Minor. On the coast of this latter district, indeed, there were one or two independent sovereignties, whose influence upon the transactions that followed was often considerable. Attalus, king of Pergamus, possessed many towns in Ionia and Æolia, as well as a naval power of some eminence. On the north was the kingdom of Bithynia, held by Prusias; and that of the maritime Cappadocia, or Pontus; which was still in the hands of its native prince, Mithridates. He was descended, according to the boast of the family, from that Mithridates who had been one of the seven Persian noblemen engaged in the conspiracy against Smerdis the magian; but his name owes its renown, in modern ears, to his great descendant, who maintained so long and obstinate a struggle against the Romans. On the northern side of Asia Minor, a little removed from the sea coast, numerous hordes of Gauls had lately settled themselves, and given the name of Galatia to their new country; being a part of one of those immense swarms from the north, which, even at this early period, had alarmed and overrun the civilized countries of the south; and whilst one division had been mostly cut off in Greece,

Of the  
Position and  
Resources

B.C. 221. others of them had found an establishment in the neighbourhood of Byzantium, and others on the opposite coast of Asia. To the south of Asia Minor, the island of Rhodes was celebrated for the wisdom of its government; and, in the decayed state of the Greek republics, was deemed to possess a considerable navy. Finally, the most noted towns and harbours along the whole coast of Asia Minor, from Pamphylia to the Hellespont, formed part of the dominions of Egypt.

That famous country, which at this time shared the empire of the east with the kingdom of Syria, after having remained nearly two hundred years under the power of the kings of Persia, and after having been conquered from them, after the victory of Issus, by Alexander the Great, had been erected into an independent kingdom, after his death, by Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, one of his generals. Since that period, the kings of Egypt had been among the most fortunate combatants in the various wars that had arisen between the successors of Alexander. Their territories extended along the north coast of Africa, till they reached the limits of the Carthaginian dominion; including the once independent and flourishing city of Cyrene. They possessed the island of Cyprus; the most valuable stations on the southern and western coasts of Asia Minor, as already mentioned; and the towns of Ænos and Maronea, with some others on the northern shore of the Ægean sea. On the side of Asia, they were masters of Palestine, and of the district called Cœlè Syria, or the vale or basin of Syria; a tract of country lying immediately to the north of Galilee. This the kings of Syria claimed as their own; and at the time of which we are now speaking, a war was about to commence between Antiochus and Ptolemy, to determine the possession of it.

With the names of Syria and Palestine, that of Judæa is closely associated. But the history of the Jews, from their return from Babylon to the time of their resistance to the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes, is almost a blank. They followed the revolutions of the great empires around them, but still enjoyed their own law, and the free exercise of their worship. Possibly their long subjection to the Persians, who were themselves so zealous against the use of images, may have confirmed them in that abhorrence of idolatry which their law inculcates, and from which, after their return from the captivity, they are never known to have departed. But though they were thus firm in their outward obedience to God, yet they were never further from fulfilling the spirit of the commandments, to love God and their neighbours; nor were they at any period less fitted to perform one great end for which they had been separated from the rest of the world—the showing forth in their lives the proper fruits of their knowledge of their Maker and of his will, and thus, by the excellency of their example, leading other nations to aspire after the same means of imitating it in themselves.

Of the  
Members.

Of ancient  
Govern-  
ments.

This sketch, imperfect as it is, will still serve to give the reader some knowledge of the state of the principal countries bordering on the Mediterranean, at the time when Hannibal first took the command of the Carthaginian army. That event seems to have taken place in the middle of the season for military operations; and Hannibal resolved immediately to attempt some enterprise of importance. He accordingly attacked and<sup>1</sup> subdued the tribe or nation of the Olcades; and returning to New Carthage to pass the winter, he availed himself of the spoil gained in the campaign to pay his soldiers; and accompanying this payment with promises for the future, he put his army into high spirits, and established himself in their regard. The next season was marked by successes still more brilliant; insomuch that the whole peninsula within the Ebro, excepting only the city of Saguntum, was so far reduced as to be incapable of offering Hannibal any disturbance while he should be engaged in his expedition to Italy. After this second campaign, he again returned to New Carthage, and put his troops into winter quarters.

Here he found an embassy from Rome, which had been sent, on the repeated solicitations of the Saguntines, to provide for their safety, and to watch over the Roman interest in Spain. The ambassadors charged Hannibal not to attack the Saguntines, for they were allies of the Romans, and were consequently included in the article of the treaty made with Hamilcar, which forbade either party to molest the allies of the other. They also warned him not to carry his arms beyond the Ebro, as he would by so doing violate the more recent treaty concluded with his brother-in-law, Hasdrubal. With regard to crossing the Ebro, Hannibal made no answer; as for Saguntum, the Romans, he said, had unjustly interfered in its domestic affairs, had put to death some members of the government, and had invested a party of their own with the supreme authority. It had ever been the practice of the Carthaginians to right the oppressed; and he could not, therefore, tamely pass over such an act of tyranny. At the same time he complained to his own government at home, that the Saguntines, emboldened by their alliance with Rome, were committing acts of aggression on the subjects of Carthage; and he desired to be instructed what he should do. It is too plain that Hannibal, on this occasion, sought to justify, by frivolous excuses, a measure which could only rest its defence on very different grounds. He could not attack Saguntum without injustice, unless he should first openly declare war against Rome and her allies; and this he might have done with fairness, if the Romans had refused to restore Sardinia to Carthage, which they had only wrested from her by shamelessly availing themselves of her inability to resist them.

The Roman  
Embassy  
at New  
Carthage.


<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. iii. c. 13, &c.

B.C. 221.  
They  
proceed to  
Carthage.

On receiving Hannibal's answer, the Roman embassy proceeded to Carthage, in the hope of meeting there with a more favourable reception. But as no overt act of hostility had yet been committed, the ambassadors could only caution the Carthaginians as to the future, and had at present nothing to complain of. Meantime, with the return of spring, Hannibal attacked Saguntum. That city is said to have been a Greek colony from the island of Zacynthus;<sup>1</sup> but with the original settlers there had been mixed, in process of time, a multitude of inhabitants from different nations, so that little of the Greek character remained, except the tendency to internal political quarrels, which had led them to call in the Romans as mediators in some of their differences, and thus rendered themselves the allies, or rather the dependents of Rome. Being attacked by the Carthaginians, they defended themselves vigorously for eight months; till the town was at last taken by assault. Their brave defence had engrossed the whole attention of Hannibal for one entire campaign, and thus delayed till another year his march into Italy: but the valuable plunder of all sorts which he found in the place, enabled him at once to gratify his army by liberal distribution; to captivate the public mind at Carthage by the splendid spoils which he sent home; and to provide himself with a large supply of money for his own intended expedition.

Siege and  
Capture of  
Saguntum.

B.C. 219.



[Morvedro, the ancient Saguntum.]

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, lib. iii. 8. p. 168. Edit. Xyland.

During the siege of Saguntum, the Romans had been employed in a war with Demetrius of Pharos, the sovereign of some strong fortresses on the coast of Illyria. Their arms were, as usual, triumphant; and the consul, L. Æmilius, gained the honour of a triumph for his victories. But they had lost time irrecoverably, and had suffered their only ally of any importance in Spain to be destroyed; and their most powerful enemy to begin a new war against them with all the reputation and advantage that attend a first and brilliant success. They now sent to Carthage with a denunciation of immediate war, unless Hannibal and his principal officers should be surrendered to them for punishment. The council of Carthage, still wishing to gain time, endeavoured to justify the conduct of their general, and to avoid the alternative proposed to them; till at last, the chief member of the embassy, taking up a fold of his gown, exclaimed, "that here he brought them peace and war; and he would shake out and leave them whichever they bade him." The head of the council desired him to shake out which he pleased; and on his replying, "that he shook out war," several voices at once cried out, "that they embraced the present which he gave them." The ambassadors then left Carthage, and returned to Rome.

War  
declared.

It does not appear that Hannibal's measures were in the least affected by the event of this embassy. He had long been carrying on his designs, secure of the support of his government, and well aware that the actual declaration of hostilities would neither retard or quicken the course of his great attempt. After the fall of Saguntum he had again marched back to New Carthage; and there the winter was passed in making various preparations for the approaching war. He first allowed the Spaniards of his army to return to their several homes during the winter, attaching them the more firmly to his service by this attention to their natural wishes. The security of Spain was next provided for, by sending over from Africa an army of about fourteen thousand men, and intrusting the command of it to his brother Hasdrubal, whom, at the same time, he furnished with ample instructions for his general conduct. Then, lest Africa itself should be left defenceless, a Spanish army of about fifteen thousand men was appointed to serve in the provinces, and in Carthage itself; and this interchange of their respective troops, secured at once the allegiance and safety of the Carthaginian dominions, both in Spain and Africa. Hannibal now only waited to receive his expected reports of the nature of the country, and the dispositions of the inhabitants, both in the Alps themselves, and in Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul. To the tribes of this latter country in particular he looked for zealous co-operation, so soon as he should have crossed the Alps; and this hope, probably, was one of his chief reasons for determining to make his first attack on the north of



B.C. 219. Italy. The Gauls in that quarter were exasperated against the Romans by the successive extermination of so many tribes of their countrymen, and particularly by the attempt now actually in progress, to plant Roman colonies even on the banks of the Po. Their territory then, as now, was eminently fertile, and likely to offer abundant supplies to a friendly army. Their forces were strong in numbers, and under the command of an able general, might acquire the discipline and perseverance which at present they most wanted. Hannibal, therefore, had sent repeatedly to the chiefs of the Alpine and Cisalpine tribes, and had made them liberal promises, in order to secure their friendship. It was towards the end of the winter that he received their answers, reporting that they were expecting and wishing for his arrival amongst them; and that the passage of the Alps, though laborious and difficult, was, yet, not to be considered impracticable. He communicated to his army the encouraging tidings of the friendly dispositions of the Gauls; he extolled the fertility of the country into which he was going to march; he represented the indignity offered them by the Romans, in demanding that himself and his principal officers should be surrendered up to them; and finding the temper of his soldiers to be in accordance with his views, he finally named a day, on which he desired them all to hold themselves in readiness, to begin the march.

Allies  
himself with  
the Gauls.

Hannibal  
advances on  
Italy.

B.C. 218.

It was late in the spring of the year of Rome five hundred and thirty-five, about two hundred and eighteen years before the christian era, that Hannibal set out from New Carthage with an army<sup>1</sup> of ninety thousand infantry, and twelve thousand cavalry, and actually commenced the second Punic war. As far as the Ebro he marched in peace; from thence to the Pyrenees he had to fight his way, and subdued successively the intermediate tribes, though not without sustaining severe losses in these operations. Before he crossed the Pyrenees, he left Hanno with a detachment from his army, amounting to eleven thousand men, to retain possession of his late conquests; and in his care he left the heavy baggage of the troops who were to march with himself into Italy. He dismissed an equal number of his Spanish soldiers to their own homes, considering such a diminution of his numbers of no importance, when compared with the advantages of conciliating the Spanish tribes on the eve of his departure, and of giving the rest of his troops ground to hope that they also would be released from their service, so soon as their general could safely dispense with their assistance. In this manner, together with the losses sustained in battle, the army, when it passed the Pyrenees, consisted of no more than fifty thousand infantry, and nine thousand cavalry.

The Romans, meanwhile, so soon as they learned that the council

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. iii. c. 35, &c.

of Carthage had rejected their demands, and that war had been, in consequence, declared by their ambassadors, prepared to carry hostilities, as usual, into the enemy's country, and assigned Spain and Africa as the provinces for the new consuls, P. Cornelius Scipio, and T. Sempronius Longus. Each of these officers was to have under his command two Roman legions, amounting to eight thousand infantry, and six hundred cavalry, besides a large force of the Latin allies; but about the time that these troops were ready to take the field, intelligence arrived in Rome of the revolt of the Boii and Insubrians, two of the most powerful tribes of Cisalpine Gaul, with the addition that the new Roman settlers had been driven in great alarm to Mutina, and that M. Manlius, the prætor, who had attempted to protect them, had been himself beaten, and was actually blockaded by the Gauls in the village to which he had retreated. This danger seemed so pressing, that Scipio's army was immediately transferred to the command of one of the prætors, and sent off to Cisalpine Gaul; whilst the consul was detained at Rome till his troops could be replaced by new levies. At last he set out, and sailing from Pisa to the eastern mouth of the Rhone in five days, he there landed his soldiers; being aware that Hannibal had reached the Pyrenees, but calculating that his farther progress would be greatly impeded by the resistance he would meet with from the Gauls. In this hope, however, he was disappointed: Hannibal won his way partly by force, and partly by dint of presents, with astonishing rapidity; and before P. Scipio had recruited his troops after the effects of a sea voyage, he learned that the enemy was preparing to cross the Rhone. Even then, so strong was his sense of the danger of leading an army into the field before they had recovered the tossing<sup>1</sup> and confinement of a passage in transports, he himself remained quiet; and only sent forward a body of cavalry, guided and supported by some Gauls in the pay of the city of Marseilles, to reconnoitre the position of his antagonist. Meantime Hannibal had arrived on the Rhone, near the site of the modern village<sup>2</sup> of Roque-

B.C. 218.  
Military  
preparations  
of Rome.

Hannibal on  
the Rhone.

<sup>1</sup> Conf. M. Matthieu Dumas, *Campagne de 1799*.

<sup>2</sup> Vide "Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal," &c. Oxford, 1820.

B.C. 218. a detachment to ascend the right bank of the river, and cross wherever they could find an opportunity; Hanno, who commanded this detachment, after marching about three-and-twenty miles, found a spot where the stream was divided by an island; and having halted, and constructed with all expedition a sufficient number of boats and rafts from the materials that he found growing near at hand, he crossed without opposition, and halted his troops for the remainder of the day in a strong position which he found on the left bank. At night they were again put in motion, and began to descend the river towards the point where the enemy were encamped. Their approach was announced to Hannibal early in the morning, by a smoke which they raised as a signal; and he immediately, having his army in complete readiness, began to effect his passage. The Gauls left their tents, and crowded down to the edge of the river to obstruct the landing; when Hanno suddenly appeared, and at once began to set fire to their camp, and to attack their line in the river. Then the first divisions of the main army rapidly threw themselves on the opposite bank, and attacked the enemy in front: so that the Gauls, confused and disordered, presently fled, and all the infantry of the army passed over without any further difficulty.

Passage of  
the River.

It was on the day following that on which the passage had been effected, while Hannibal was still remaining near the river in order to bring over his elephants, that Scipio's party of cavalry met, within a short distance of the Carthaginian camp, a body of Numidian horse, who had been detached by Hannibal on a similar service with themselves. A warm skirmish ensued, and the Numidians were worsted, and chased back to their camp; after which the Romans hastened back to their general, to inform him of the situation in which they had found the enemy. Immediately Scipio, having sent his heavy baggage on board the fleet, commenced his march up the left bank of the Rhone, in hopes of bringing his antagonist to an engagement. But Hannibal, on the very day after the skirmish, had sent forward his infantry, still ascending by the left bank of the Rhone, while he waited with the cavalry to cover the passage of his elephants; and as soon as that operation was effected, he set off to overtake the line of march, the cavalry and elephants now serving to protect its rear. In this manner Scipio's hopes were disappointed. With all the exertions he could make, he did not reach the scene of Hannibal's passage till three days after the Carthaginians had resumed their march, and despairing any longer to overtake them, he returned to his fleet; and having intrusted the bulk of his army to his brother, Cneus Scipio, and sent him off to Spain to carry on the war in that country against Hasdrubal, he himself sailed back to Pisa. There he landed, and set off through Tuscany, to take the command of the legions which were employed under the prætors Manlius and Attilius, in opposing the Cisalpine Gauls; and

Hannibal  
eludes Scipio.

with this army he advanced to the Po, ready to meet Hannibal as soon as he should begin to descend from the Alps into the plains of Lombardy. B.C. 218.

On the day of the skirmish between the Numidian and Roman cavalry, Hannibal had assembled his army, and had introduced some chiefs of the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul, who had just arrived with fuller assurances of the support of their countrymen; and who engaged to guide the Carthaginians in their march over the Alps. This being reported to the soldiers by Hannibal, and its effect heightened by some further encouragement from himself, the army resumed their march, as we have already mentioned, in high spirits. After four days they crossed the Isère, at its confluence with the Rhone; and in the plains between the two rivers, they found two brothers engaged in a contest with one another for the sovereignty of the country. Hannibal was pressed by the elder of them to espouse his cause; and his assistance speedily decided the quarrel. In return for this service, the prince, whom he had placed on the throne, supplied him abundantly with provisions, with arms, and with clothing, particularly with shoes, a most important article for their approaching marches through the snow. Besides this, he himself escorted the Carthaginian army for several days, till they reached the point where the mountains begin to bound the course of the Rhone, a little to the north of Les Echelles; and by his presence entirely secured them from any attacks which the petty chiefs of the country would otherwise have made on them.

At their entrance upon the mountains, at the confluence of the little river Ouiers Vif with the Rhone, the Gaulish prince left them, and returned home: and from this point the passage of the Alps may properly be said to commence. The rout of the army, which has been so often disputed, has been at last fixed with certainty by the researches of General Melville, M. de Luc, and the author of "A Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal over the Alps," published at Oxford in 1820. This last work has been closely followed in the present narrative; and no authority can be more satisfactory, from the union of acuteness, sound sense, scholarship, and personal knowledge of the scenes described, by which it is distinguished. It appears then, that Hannibal, after crossing the Mont du Chat at the little village of Chevelu, descended to the edge of the lake Bourguet, and passing through Chamberri, came upon the valley of the Isère at Montmeillan. From thence he regularly ascended the right bank of the Isère, till he arrived at the Little St. Bernard, at which place he crossed the central ridge of the Alps. He immediately descended into the valley of the Dorea Baltea, under mount Cramont, and followed the course of that river by Aosta to Ivrea; at which place he found himself in the territory of the Insubrian Gauls, and arrived completely at the end of his march over the mountains.

Route of  
Hannibal  
over the  
Alps.

B. C. 218. plishing this passage, about eighteen or nineteen days were employed; during some of which, however, the army halted; either to refresh itself, and to wait for stragglers, or to overcome the difficulties of the road. On two occasions, great loss had been sustained from the attacks of the natives; and immediately under mount Cramont, on the descent from the Little St. Bernard, a most formidable natural obstacle presented itself. The road ran along the side of the mountain, above the river Dorea Baltea; and for a distance of about three hundred yards, it had been totally carried away by avalanches from the mountain above. To find any circuitous route by which the army could pass, was impracticable: it was the latter end of October, and a recent fall of snow had so filled the torrent beds and hollows, as to render them impassable. It happened also that the snow of the preceding winter had remained unmelted through the summer, and had now the hardness and slipperiness of ice; so that many men, in attempting to walk over it, fell, and being unable to stop themselves, were carried down precipices; and many of the beasts of burden, being heavily laden, broke through the ice partially, when they fell, or in their struggles to rise, were there held fast, and could not be extricated, or enabled to rise again on their legs. The troops therefore were obliged to halt and repair the road; and this was soon done sufficiently to allow the cavalry and beasts of burden to pass; but three days elapsed before it could be made safe for the elephants; and in this interval those animals suffered greatly from hunger, there being nothing capable of yielding them subsistence in that high and icy region. Indeed the whole army had found hunger one of their greatest evils: they had not the means of transport for such a stock of provisions as might have supplied them sufficiently during their march over the Alps: and much of what they had carried with them had been lost at different times with the beasts of burthen: nor ought we to imagine that the temperature and fertility of the Alpine vallies in the days of Hannibal were at all such as they now are. They were habitable, it is true; and produced, it is probable, pasture for cattle; but the cattle would be most likely driven away at the approach of an enemy: and the plunder of such dwellings as might be met with near the central ridge of the mountains, would afford but a poor support to a numerous army. In short, Hannibal estimated his whole loss, from the time he crossed the Rhone to his arrival amongst the Insubrians, at eighteen thousand foot, and two thousand horse; and adding to this nearly thirteen thousand men, whom he professed to have lost between the Pyrenees and the Rhone, his army, when he entered Italy, amounted, by his own account, to no more than twenty thousand foot, and six thousand horse. The Roman writers, as was natural, rated the numbers with which he began the campaign on the Po, at an amount considerably greater; and we think that Hannibal's statement does appear some-

Difficulties of  
the Passage.

Losses of  
Hannibal.

what exaggerated; and that a loss of thirty-three thousand men B.C. 218. between the Pyrenees and the Po is much more than the details of his march can satisfactorily account for.

There is another circumstance, also, in the history of this first year of the war, which appears extraordinary. Hannibal, we are told, arrived among the Insubrians at the very latter end of October, such being the period assigned by Dr. Maskelyne to the setting of the Pleiades, the date given by Polybius. It appears, also, that his whole march from New Carthage, had occupied about five months; so that he could not have opened the campaign at the earliest, before the latter end of May. Allowing then for the length of time that must necessarily have passed in his wars with the Spanish tribes, between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, we cannot suppose that he could have entered Gaul earlier than the latter end of July. And yet it was not till after that time that the Roman consul reached the mouth of the Rhone to oppose him. It is true that the army which he was originally intended to command, was taken from him and sent into Cisalpine Gaul; and he was thus obliged to wait till two other legions were raised. Yet when we consider that the consuls went into office about the middle of March, and that the enlistment of soldiers was usually one of their first duties, and was a business that was soon completed; it certainly does appear, that with a little exertion, a Roman army might have reached Spain in time to support their allies the Bargusians, and possibly to prevent Hannibal from ever crossing the Pyrenees. At least it must be acknowledged, that the Romans were scarcely, on any other occasion, so late in bringing their troops into the field, as they were now, when unusual activity was so highly needful to them.

After his passage of the Alps, Hannibal halted for some time<sup>1</sup> amongst the Insubrians to recruit his army; and as soon as he was in a condition to move, he attacked the Taurini, a neighbouring tribe of Gauls, who were at variance with the Insubrians, and not well affected to himself; and in three days stormed their principal town, Turin, and put the defenders to the sword. This exploit presently led to the submission of the neighbouring people; but the majority of the Cisalpine Gauls, though anxious to join him as they had promised, were so overawed by the Roman army under P. Scipio, which was now in the heart of their territory, that they dared not make any movement; and some were even forced to serve in the consul's army. It became necessary, therefore, for Hannibal to lose no time in marching towards the enemy; and as Scipio was equally desirous to stop his progress, the two armies first approached one another in the angle formed by the junction of the river Ticinus with the Po; the Romans having just crossed the Ticinus in their march

Halts among  
the  
Insubrians.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. iii. c. 60, &c.

B.C. 218. to the westward, ascending the left bank of the Po. Here an action took place between the light troops of both parties, in which the Romans were defeated and the consul wounded. It was thus proved that the Romans could not maintain themselves with advantage in the flat country, near the Po, against the superior cavalry of the enemy; they hastily, therefore, fell back, recrossed the Ticinus, descended the left bank of the Po, and having passed that river also, took up a position in the neighbourhood of Placentia. Hannibal pursued them as far as the Ticinus; but there finding that they had broken down the bridge behind them, he despaired of overtaking them; and retracing his steps up the Po, he found a spot where he could throw a bridge of boats across the river, by which he passed over his soldiers; then, descending rapidly along the right bank, he soon appeared in sight of the Romans, and took up a position within six miles of theirs.

The retreat of the consul immediately emboldened all the Gauls to offer their services to the Carthaginians; and to assist them both with men and provisions. So general, indeed, was this disposition amongst them, that two thousand of them who were serving in the Roman army, went over to Hannibal by night, after having killed and wounded a number of the Romans who were quartered near them. This so alarmed Scipio, that he was anxious to provide for the security of his soldiers by taking up a stronger position. He therefore left the neighbourhood of the Po, and abandoned his communications with Placentia; and retreating to the southward, he halted on some strong ground situated apparently on the southern, or right bank of the river Trebia, not far from the modern town of Bobbio, and probably where the last hills of the Apennines begin to sink down into the plain of the Po. He was followed by Hannibal as far as the Trebia, and his rear sustained some loss in effecting its retreat; but the main army having reached its intended position, the Carthaginians halted on the north side of the river, and encamped at the distance of about five miles from their opponents. In this situation, Hannibal was supplied with every thing in abundance by the Gauls, and he found them ready to give him a zealous support in all his enterprises.

Meantime, on the very first intelligence that Hannibal was arrived in Cisalpine Gaul, the Roman government had recalled Sempronius from Sicily, where he was preparing to carry the war into Africa, and ordered him to join his colleague on the Po. He despatched the fleet to Rome without delay; but, in order to avoid the expense of transporting the army, he dismissed the soldiers, binding them by oath to meet him again at Ariminum, on a day that he appointed. In this manner it became their business to provide themselves with a passage, and to maintain themselves on the march; but so strict were their notions of military duty, that in forty days after they left

Lilybæum, they assembled, according to their oath, at Ariminum, B.C. 218. and from hence were immediately led by Sempronius to join the army of his colleague on the Trebia.

About this time the town of Clastidium, where the Romans had a magazine of provisions, was surrendered to Hannibal by its governor, a native of Brundisium. Clastidium surrendered to Hannibal. This was a welcome event, as it gave him hopes that the cause of the Romans would not be considered that of the Italians in general; he therefore conferred signal rewards on the Brundusian officer, and treated the garrison, which consisted, probably, of Brundusian soldiers, with great humanity. Still he could not, with safety, rest contented with his present advantages. The moment that he paused in his advance, the Gauls began to doubt his ultimate success; and some of them, though in alliance with him, kept up also, he found, a communication with the Romans. He chastised this double dealing by a severe military execution on their territory; and the Roman cavalry being ordered to protect them, some skirmishes ensued, which ended rather to his disadvantage; although their result, by heightening the ardour of Sempronius to venture a battle, proved highly favourable to him. It was now the very end of December, or beginning of January; and in addition to the natural wish of a Roman general not to appear afraid of his enemy, Sempronius was anxious to finish the war before the new consuls should supersede him in his command. His colleague was not yet recovered of his wound, and could, therefore, take no active part; and this too he regarded as a fortunate circumstance, thinking that he should thus enjoy the undivided glory of the victory, which he doubted not soon to gain.

The ground between the Trebia and the Carthaginian camp was flat and open, but intersected in one point by a small streamlet, whose banks were steep and overgrown with brushwood. Here Hannibal concealed about two thousand of his best soldiers in the night; and early the next morning, he sent his light cavalry across the Trebia, with orders to insult the Romans in their lines, and provoke them, if possible, to follow them; when, in pursuance of their instructions, they should re-cross the river, as if in flight. Battle of Trebia. Meantime, his infantry were ordered to take their usual meal in their tents, to get ready their horses, and to arm themselves by the fireside. The Romans, on the contrary, no sooner saw the Numidian cavalry approach, than their own horse first sallied out to engage them; and then the whole army was hastily formed, and, without waiting to take any food, began to ford the Trebia, in order to attack the enemy. The day was cold and snowy, and the river so swollen by the rain of the preceding night, as to be up to the breasts of the soldiers; they arrived, therefore, on the opposite bank drenched and chilled with the cold, and began, moreover, soon to feel weak from their want of food. In this *state* they encountered



B.C. 218. the Carthaginians, who were in full strength and spirits, and who had not left their tents till the Romans had effected their passage of the river. Still their courage and their great superiority in numbers, (for the Romans had six-and-thirty thousand infantry to oppose to not more than twenty thousand,) enabled them to maintain the contest for some time; till their cavalry being chased off the field, and themselves attacked in flank by Hannibal's victorious horse, and in the rear by the detachment that he had concealed in ambush, their two wings were put to flight, and driven back to the Trebia. Ten thousand men, who formed the centre, cut their way through the enemy, and escaped to Placentia; and the greater part of the cavalry, and those of the infantry who got off the field, joined them, and fled to the same place of refuge; but the largest portion of the army was cut to pieces; for it had snowed and rained so incessantly during the day, that to recross the Trebia was impossible; and the fugitives were slaughtered on the banks by the Carthaginian cavalry and elephants. The loss of the conquerors in the action was inconsiderable, and fell chiefly upon the Gauls, who were the least valued part of the army; but the severity of the weather, while it hindered the flight of the Romans, was heavily felt, also, by the Carthaginians; for many men and horses perished from the cold, and of the elephants, one only remained fit for service after the battle.

Defeat of the  
Roman  
Army.

Thus did Hannibal triumphantly conclude his first campaign in Italy. The whole resources of Cisalpine Gaul were now secured to him; and the remains of the Roman army were shut up in some of the towns on the Po, deriving all their supplies by water from the sea. This state of things convinced the senate of the greatness of their defeat, which the consul, in his despatches, had endeavoured to conceal. Efforts were instantly made proportionate to the danger; the newly elected consuls, Cnæus Servilius and C. Flaminius, were busily engaged in raising soldiers, and magazines were formed at Ariminum and in Tuscany, on the two sides of the Apennines, where the two consular armies were destined respectively to act. Nor were the other parts of the empire neglected; on the contrary, troops were sent to Sardinia, Sicily, and Tarentum, that the enemy might find no point unguarded, if he should attempt a diversion in favour of his main enterprise. Assistance, moreover, was applied for, and obtained, from king Hiero; and a fleet of sixty ships was got ready to maintain that naval superiority which, since the event of the last war with Carthage, the Romans had enjoyed without interruption.

Hiero assists  
the Romans.

Hannibal, on his part, rested for a short time in Cisalpine Gaul; and in pursuance of his plan of distinguishing between the Romans and their Italian allies, he detained all his Roman prisoners in confinement, and kept them on a moderate allowance of food; while to

the Italians he showed all possible kindness, and sent them away without ransom; assuring them that he was come into Italy as their deliverer, and that he hoped that they would not fail to join their arms with his, to assert their freedom. He was anxious to open the campaign with the least possible delay; for the Gauls were impatient to remove the seat of war out of their own country into that of the enemy, and it was not his interest to disoblige them. The consuls were moving to their respective stations, Servilius to Ariminum, and Flaminius to Arretium; and Hannibal had resolved, first to turn his arms against the latter. But here again the direct way into Tuscany presented great natural difficulties. The numerous streams that flow from the Apennines towards the Po, were an insufficient drain for all the water which descended from the mountains; and before it was carried off by the artificial channels which in later times were formed for its reception, it used to stagnate, and spread over a large tract of country. This marshy region, however, was not only the nearest way into Tuscany, but that by which he should be most likely to surprise his enemy; so that Hannibal, whose army was accustomed to overcome every obstacle, determined to penetrate through it. The operation could not be completed in less than four days and three nights; in which the soldiers suffered dreadfully from want of sleep; for all around them was water or bog, and they could only sometimes snatch a partial rest, by throwing themselves down upon the beasts of burden, which having fallen with their load, and being unable to rise, were the only objects appearing above the level of the marsh. Hannibal himself rode on the only remaining elephant; but the damp air produced an inflammation in one of his eyes, which, as he had neither leisure nor means to pay it proper attention, terminated in the entire loss of the sight of it. At length he reached the Apennines, and halted for a time in the neighbourhood of Fæsulæ, partly to rest his troops, and partly to make himself more fully acquainted with the nature of the country before him, and the character of the enemy's general.

C. Flaminius, who commanded the Roman army in Tuscany, might, in an ordinary war, have ended his consulship with a triumph, like so many other Roman consuls whose talents were no way superior to his, but who were more fortunate in their antagonists. He had been consul six years before, and had, in fact, then obtained a signal victory over the Insubrians in Cisalpine Gaul; the excellence of the Roman military system supplying the want of ability in the general in a struggle with such an enemy. Since that time he had been censor, and distinguished himself by making the road from Rome to Ariminum, which was long celebrated under the name of the Flaminian way. He seems to have been a rash and headstrong man, and in his former consulship had incurred the censure of the senate for his contemptuous disregard of the religious ordinances of

Hannibal  
forces his  
way through  
the Marshy  
District.  
B.C. 217.

B.C. 218.

B.C. 217. of the commonwealth. This affront made him espouse the popular party with more violence than ever; for before this he had been known as the proposer of an Agrarian law, when the Senones were dispossessed of their settlements in Picenum by the Romans. Alone, of all the senate, he supported a law which was to debar the senators from engaging<sup>1</sup> in commerce; and in his present consulship, he had left Rome in an irregular manner, without having performed the ceremonies which were required by law; and had since slighted the orders of the senate when they had sent to recall him from the army. Hannibal, having become acquainted with his character, did not doubt that he should soon provoke him into the commission of some gross error; and, therefore, as soon as he could put his army in motion, he advanced boldly through Tuscany, left the Roman camp behind him, as if in contempt, and pursued his march towards Rome, laying waste the country around him with fire and sword. Flaminius, as he expected, immediately set out to follow him; regardless of all the cautions of his officers, and only anxious to overtake and engage the enemy. Hannibal, meantime, passed by Cortona on his left, and the lake Thrasymenus on his right; and then entered on a deep valley, which extended some way from the lake into the surrounding hills, and was at last closed by their meeting each other at the upper end of it. On these hills which bounded the head of the valley, Hannibal took post with his African and Spanish infantry; while the Gauls, the light-armed troops, and the cavalry, were concealed behind the hills on both sides of the defile, and reached as far as its junction with the lake. These positions he had occupied during the night; and at day-break the next morning, Flaminius having passed unmolested along the whole length of the lake, entered the valley at the end of it, by which he supposed the Carthaginians had emerged to the higher grounds, on their march to Rome. A thick fog hung upon the hills, and more effectually concealed the movements of the enemy. All at once he found himself attacked on every side, and after such a resistance as could be made under circumstances so unfavourable, he himself fell, and almost the whole of his army were either killed or made prisoners.

Battle of  
Thrasymenus.

Defeat of  
Flaminius.

This second victory cost Hannibal no more than fifteen hundred men, of whom the greater part, as before, were Gauls. In his treatment of his prisoners also, he observed the same distinction as after the battle of the Trebia; again dismissing the Italians without ransom, and repeating that his cause was the same as theirs. Nor did his good fortune end here; for within two or three days of the battle, his cavalry and light troops cut off an entire detachment of Roman horse, amounting to four thousand men, whom Cn. Servilius had sent from his own army to strengthen his colleague. His pros-

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxi. c. 63.

pects seemed most encouraging, and, after some consultation with his officers, and a short halt to refresh his troops, he began more fully to commence that system of warfare which was best calculated to bring the war to a triumphant issue. It consisted in overrunning the richest countries of Italy, enriching his army with the plunder, and weakening the resources of his enemy: above all, in thus giving an opportunity to those Italian nations who were disposed to join him, of doing it with safety. For it should ever be remembered, that the question to be tried was, not whether an army of thirty thousand men could conquer Italy, for that would have been the hope of a madman; but whether it could so stagger the power of Rome, by one or two vigorous blows, as to enable the nations of Italy to resume their old struggle for independence, and to place Carthage instead of Rome at the head of the Italian confederacy. With this view, Hannibal marched through Umbria and Picenum to the shores of the Adriatic, ravaging the country as he passed, and putting every Roman that he found on his way to the sword. When he had reached the coast, he moved on slowly to the southward, making long and frequent halts, that both the men and horses of his army might recover all the effects of their past hardships in the abundance and comfortable quarters which they now enjoyed. Here too he paid a high compliment to the excellence of the Roman manner of arming the soldier; for he availed himself of the vast quantities of arms taken in the preceding battle, to equip his African troops with the large shield and stabbing sword used by the Roman infantry. He took advantage also of his neighbourhood to the sea, to send despatches to Carthage; where the news of his victories determined the government to make every exertion to carry on the war with vigour. At length, after having laid waste successively the lands of the Prætutii, the Hadriani, Marrucini and Frentani, he entered Apulia, and was beginning the same devastations there, when the new Roman general appeared in the field, and took up a position within a short distance of the Carthaginian camp, in the neighbourhood of Æca and Arpi.

Hannibal  
equips his  
Soldiers with  
the Roman  
Arms.

This new antagonist was the famous Q. Fabius Maximus, whom the Romans after their defeat at the lake Trasymenus had appointed dictator.—Attributing the disasters of Flaminius to his contempt for the religion of his country, Fabius was careful before all other things to order such sacrifices, and vows, and solemn ceremonies, as might lead the people to hope for the favour of heaven. When this duty was discharged, he took the field with M. Minucius, his master of the horse, at the head of four Roman legions, and the usual contingent from the Italian allies. This army consisted of two legions newly raised, and two which had been under the command of the consul Servilius at Ariminum, for that officer after the defeat of his colleague, had fallen back upon Rome in order to cover the capital;

B.C. 217. and his authority being now superseded by the appointment of a dictator, his legions were transferred to Fabius, and he himself was sent to command the naval force in the neighbourhood of Rome, with a general commission to oppose any attempts of the enemy to annoy the republic by sea.

Fabius in  
command.

Successes of  
Hannibal.

The campaign that followed has been often related, as displaying the wise caution of Fabius, the rashness of Minucius, the magnanimity with which the dictator rescued his rival from destruction, and the liberality with which the master of the horse acknowledged his own inferiority, and the wisdom of that system which he had hitherto condemned. Considered in a military point of view, it was highly advantageous to the Romans in giving them a respite from defeat, and in teaching them to regain in some measure their confidence in themselves. Yet Hannibal was able to pursue his plan of warfare without interruption. From Apulia he crossed the Apennines; laid waste the Samnite territory, took the town of Venusia; and then descended into the rich plains of Campania, which he overran and plundered without opposition. Here he provided himself with abundant stores for the maintenance of his army during the winter; and retreated with his plunder in defiance of all the endeavours of Fabius to intercept him. He returned to his former quarters in Apulia, and having taken the small town of Geronium, he fortified it as his principal magazine for the winter; and as it was now the season of harvest, his formidable cavalry were daily bringing in the corn of the surrounding country. And although some of these foraging parties were occasionally cut off by the Romans, yet the supplies they collected were amply sufficient to support the Carthaginian army through the winter in a state of plenty. In one great point, indeed, Hannibal had hitherto been unsuccessful; none of the Italian states had as yet joined him; but the last campaign had showed that the Romans were unable to protect the territory of their allies; and a continuance of his system of ravage, with the manifest inability of the enemy to prevent it, might at once urge and encourage those who suffered from it, to unite themselves to his cause as the line of conduct most favourable, both to their present and future interests.

Capture of  
Cannæ.

During the latter end of the autumn, and through the whole of the winter, the Roman army had been commanded by Servilius, who had left the fleet in Sicily, and M. Attilius Regulus, who had been chosen consul in the room of Flaminius, to act when the six months, the usual term of the dictator's office, should be expired. But the change of commanders made no difference in the state of affairs; Servilius and Attilius followed the system of Fabius, and the season of the year forbade any active operations. Early in spring, however, Hannibal opened the campaign by the capture of the post of Cannæ, where the Romans had laid up their principal

supplies of provisions. The distress to which their troops would thus be subjected, and the effect which Hannibal's unchecked successes were likely to produce upon the minds of their allies, urged the Roman generals to consult the senate as to the measures they were to pursue. It was deemed advisable to risk a general engagement; but in order to ensure a favourable issue, the Roman army of four legions, now in the field, was to be doubled by the addition of four new legions, to be raised by the new consuls, L. Æmilius Paulus, and C. Terentius Varro. Meantime Servilius and Attilius were ordered to remain on the defensive, till they should be joined by the intended reinforcements, and the new consuls should arrive to take the command. B.C. 217.

When the whole army<sup>1</sup> was united on the banks of the Aufidus, opposed to Hannibal, it presented the most formidable force that Rome had ever sent out on one single service. There were eight Roman legions, at their full complement; amounting to forty thousand foot, and two thousand four hundred horse; and of these one half were well acquainted with the enemy, as having been actively employed against him during the whole of the preceding year. The Italian allies amounted to an equal number of infantry, and to nearly four thousand cavalry; half of these also, as well as of the Romans, having been practised by the last year's service; of the generals, one, indeed, Terentius Varro, is represented as a man of low birth, rash, ignorant, and self-willed: but Æmilius was an officer of approved ability, and Servilius and Attilius, who still acted as lieutenants under the consuls, were both men of good reputation. It was hoped, therefore, that whilst the caution of Æmilius would secure the army from any such acts of ignorant rashness as had before proved so fatal, the courage of the Romans when engaged in the open field, and with numbers nearly double those of the enemy, would not fail of obtaining its usual result, a complete and decisive victory.

The Roman commanders Varro and Æmilius.

The inconvenience, however, of a divided command, and the folly of Varro, marred all these fair prospects. Æmilius instantly perceived that the open country near the Aufidus was a field of battle ill-suited to the Romans, while the enemy possessed so great a superiority in cavalry. He wished therefore to remove to more uneven ground; but the command was held by the two consuls alternately, day by day; and when Varro commanded, he brought the army to a position so near that of Hannibal, that to retreat without fighting was henceforth impracticable. At length after a few days, Varro's impatience, which was fully shared by his soldiers, could no longer be restrained; and when it came to his turn to be the acting general, he crossed the Aufidus, and formed his troops in

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. iii. c. 107, &c.

B.C. 217. order of battle on the right bank of the river, fronting southwards; the infantry being drawn up in a single line of unusual depth, and the cavalry covering the two wings. Hannibal was not slow in crossing the river to oppose them. He too stationed his cavalry on the wings; the Gauls and Spaniards on his left, and the Numidians on his right: but his infantry, instead of presenting a straight line, formed a crescent, whose convex side was towards the enemy; and of this crescent the central and more advanced troops consisted of Gauls and Spaniards, while its extremities, which fell back almost behind the centre, were composed of Africans, who were now armed with the sword and shield of the Roman legionary soldiers.

Battle of  
Cannæ.

B.C. 216.

After some skirmishing of the light troops, the cavalry on both sides engaged: and the Gauls and Spaniards, having soon defeated the Roman horse opposed to them, moved round to the right, and decided the contest which was going on there, between the Numidians and the Italian allies. Meantime the Roman infantry advanced to the attack, and although their front was already too narrow in proportion to their numbers, yet the zeal of the soldiers on the right and left narrowed it still more; for finding themselves with no enemy immediately in front of them, owing to the falling back of the extremities of Hannibal's line; they crowded upon their own centre in order to share in the contest with the Gauls and Spaniards, the only part of the Carthaginian infantry that was hitherto engaged. Thus the Roman army became one solid and unmanageable column; which broke through the Gauls and Spaniards by the mere weight of its charge, but pressing forward by the impulse given by the rearmost soldiers to those in the front, it was attacked on both flanks by the Africans, who were armed like the Romans, and who were fresh and in perfect order. Every one knows the utter destruction to which an attacking column of infantry is exposed, when it is itself assailed on the flank. Such was now the condition of the Romans: and their numbers only served to cramp their movements, and to expose them to slaughter without defence. Still the battle was obstinately maintained, till the Gaulish and Spanish horse, having already achieved two victories in the course of the day, now came up and fell upon the rear of the Roman infantry. Then followed a slaughter of which modern warfare can give no adequate notions. Whether the vanquished scorned to ask for quarter, or the victors refused to give it, the whole mass of the Roman and allied foot that were in the field, to the amount of seventy thousand, were cut to pieces, with the exception of three thousand, who escaped to some of the adjacent towns. Ten thousand men had been left by the consul Æmilius in his camp, with orders to surprise if possible the camp of the enemy, during the action. They found, however, that Hannibal had provided for it a sufficient defence; and they spent the day in fruitless efforts to take it, till the battle was decided, and the approach

Slaughter  
and total  
Defeat of the  
Romans.

of the victorious army obliged them to fly to their own camp for safety. There they were presently attacked by Hannibal, and were soon obliged to surrender themselves as prisoners. The destruction of the cavalry was hardly less complete; only seventy men escaping with Varro to Venusia; and about three hundred of the allied horse getting safe to the different towns in the neighbourhood. Of the officers, one of the consuls, L. Æmilius, the two consuls of the preceding year, Servilius and Attilius, and, according to Livy, Minucius, the late master of the horse, were among the slain. Nor was so great a victory purchased by a heavy loss on the part of the conquerors; four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred of the cavalry, were all that fell; so that the army was not incapacitated from prosecuting its success immediately.

Some of the states of Italy after the battle of Cannæ began to incline to the cause of the conqueror, and to look out for opportunities of surrendering their towns to him. Campania, and most of the Greek cities of the south of Italy, shortly after revolted from Rome, and actively assisted Hannibal. But the predominant feeling, especially amongst the higher ranks, was an aversion to an army made up of Africans, Gauls, and Spaniards; and a disposition, partly from love and partly from fear, to maintain their old connection with Rome. Besides there were<sup>1</sup> no fewer than thirty cities in Italy which were Roman colonies: and their support might be depended upon by the senate, almost as surely, as any of the governments of modern Europe could rely upon the inhabitants of their provincial towns. It should be considered also, that the ancient system of warfare gave a security to citizens in defending their walls, which the use of cannon and mortars has totally destroyed. A besieging army by means of a bombardment could in a few days inflict such misery on a large and wealthy city, as the firmest courage could scarcely withstand: whereas any of the populous towns of Italy had nothing to fear from Hannibal, but the slow process of a blockade, or the seducing some of their own citizens to open the gates to him. It may be readily understood, then, how utterly fruitless would have been the attempt to besiege Rome itself, while the Roman fleets commanded the seas; whilst so many Roman colonies were scattered over the adjacent country; and whilst the Carthaginian army could not have formed the blockade of so large a city without exposing itself to be overwhelmed by superior numbers, on whatever quarter the Romans should think proper to make a sally.

But in thus stating the means of resistance which Rome had still in her power, we must not forget to do justice to her firmness, in resolving to use them all to the utmost. Few nations have ever

Revolt of the  
Southern  
Cities to  
Hannibal.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxvii. c. 9, 10.



B.C. 216. exhausted all the resources which they possessed: they have generally hesitated to risk their last stake, and have availed themselves of the chances yet remaining in their favour to procure more tolerable terms from their enemy. This policy the Romans utterly scorned; they seem on all occasions to have abhorred nothing so much as giving their own consent to the diminution of their empire: they knew no alternative between a peace whose terms they could dictate, and a war of extermination. Other nations would have thought, that although they might make a successful resistance, yet the evils they must inevitably suffer in the course of it, more than counterbalanced the sacrifices to be made in a disadvantageous treaty: they would have judged the deliverance of Italy from the scourge of Hannibal's army, cheaply purchased by the cession of Spain, or Sardinia, or Sicily. Or at any rate, they would have abandoned those distant possessions for the present, and concentrated all their forces in the defence of their own country. But the judgment of the Romans being never warped by fear, they steadily saw how small a force was indispensable for the preservation of their city, and they did not waste upon that object a single superfluous soldier. They saw that it was possible to protect Rome, and at the same time to maintain their foreign possessions; and being possible, they boldly determined to attempt it. They therefore finally triumphed:—for it rarely happens that men do every thing for themselves which is within possibility, without finding such honest and resolute exertion rewarded with success.

Policy of the Romans.

This undaunted spirit was of great service to the Romans on two occasions which shortly followed: the defection of their allies the Syracusans, and the confederacy formed between Hannibal and the king of Macedon. Had the Roman legions been recalled from Sicily after the battle of Cannæ, the Carthaginians, aided by their party which was now predominant in Syracuse, might have recovered the whole island to their dominion, and from thence have been able to co-operate with the army of Hannibal in the south of Italy. But from having the ordinary military establishment of a province ready

Reduction of Syracuse.



[Archimedes.]

on the spot to check the first symptoms of revolt among the Sicilian cities, the Romans, under the command of M. Marcellus, were able to act on the offensive, and by the reduction of Syracuse<sup>1</sup> itself, secured to themselves a more absolute

<sup>1</sup> This celebrated city withstood a siege of three years, being defended chiefly by the contrivances of the celebrated mathematician, Archimedes, who, on the taking of the town, to the great regret of Marcellus, was slain through the carelessness of a Roman soldier, while intently studying a mathematical problem.

mastery over the whole of Sicily than they had ever possessed B.C. 216. before. In like manner, they no sooner were informed of the hostile intentions of the king of Macedon, than they began to organize a coalition against him in his own neighbourhood, and even assisted it with a force of their own, which, though small, was still a sufficient warrant for their earnest interest in the war, and served to keep their name and power continually in the minds of their allies. And thus they hindered Hannibal from ever deriving any assistance from the Macedonians; and amused Philip with a desultory and indecisive hostility, till having finished their contest with Carthage, they had ample means to take vengeance on him for his ill-timed interference in the quarrel.



[Marcus Marcellus.—Rossi, *Raccolta di Statue Antiche.*]

The reader will perceive that our narrative is no longer given in the same detail as it was up to the battle of Cannæ. The fact is, that owing to the loss of the greater part of the history of Polybius, we are left without any regular account, worthy of credit, of the subsequent years of the war. It is a mere waste of time to copy Livy, and Appian, and Plutarch, through all the inconsistencies, and improbabilities, and idle tales, which their utter ignorance of military affairs, their want of judgment, and their carelessness, have heaped together for the entertainment of children, and the provoking disappointment of sensible men. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with giving only such a sketch of the remainder of the war, as may illustrate, to the best of our power, the causes of its final issue.

After the violence of grief and consternation had subsided, the Roman senate began to take the necessary measures for the safety of the commonwealth. Troops were raised from among the youngest citizens arrived at the military age; from the Latins and the other Italian allies; and even from slaves and criminals; and thus an army

Vigorous  
efforts of the  
Republic.

B.C. 216. was provided without recalling any of the legions from the provinces. To pay and equip these soldiers, the direct taxes of the state were for one year doubled; but such an expedient could only be temporary; and it appears that the expenses of the war were in general defrayed by the ordinary taxes, assisted by large loans from wealthy individuals, chiefly from those who had amassed large fortunes by undertaking the government contracts<sup>1</sup> on former occasions; and who were now called upon to assist the state with some of that money which they had gained at its expense. Three companies, consisting of nineteen individuals each, were accordingly formed, and continued to provide the armies of the republic with all the articles which they required; on condition that while thus employed, they should be exempted from military service, and that if any of the stores furnished by them should be taken or lost at sea, the government should ensure them from being the sufferers. Some supplies also of corn and money were given on one occasion by king Hiero, for the support of the troops in Sicily; and by the cities of Sardinia<sup>2</sup> for the legion stationed in that island. This deserves notice, as it explains the manner in which the Romans could keep up their armies in the provinces, even when their treasury was in such extreme distress. With that ample discretion which was so generally given to the Roman magistrates, the pro-consuls and prætors applied the resources of their province without scruple to the support of their troops, whenever the government at home could not conveniently assist them. Besides the supplies of corn which were regularly brought in to head-quarters, and sold at a certain price affixed by the Roman officer, the means were not wanting to draw large sums from the wealthy provincials, by representing to them the absolute necessity of paying the troops, in order to prevent such disorders as a needy soldiery would unavoidably commit; and sometimes, it appears, men were demanded as well as money. It is true, the inhabitants of a country thus oppressed, might carry their complaints to Rome; but if it appeared that their oppressor had been actuated by no personal motives, he was sure to find not only pardon but favour, for the vigour with which he had promoted the service of the republic. Admitting, however, that the legions in the provinces were maintained at little expense to the government at home, still the armies that were employed in Italy, and the fleets which were required to protect the coast from the ravages of the enemy, rendered, as we know, a heavy burthen of taxation necessary; and it becomes a curious question, how individuals were enabled to support it; or in other words, from what sources the Romans at this period derived the wealth. Their chief resource doubtless was agriculture; and this might be carried on in Tuscany, Umbria,

Its  
Commis-  
sariat and  
Pecuniary  
means.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxiii. c. 48, 49.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. c. 21.

Picenum, and in the immediate neighbourhood of Rome itself, with little direct interruption from the plundering parties of the enemy. Some commerce there was, but it was not very considerable; nor does it appear what return the Romans could have made, under so severe a pressure of war, for the commodities of other nations. However, there were no means of bringing into the country a sufficient supply of specie to meet the constant demands of the war; and therefore the copper currency<sup>1</sup> which was the standard of all payments, was depreciated to a prodigious amount: the pound of copper, which since the first Punic war had been coined into six asses, being now coined into twelve; and the denarius, a silver coin usually equivalent to ten asses, passing now in ordinary dealings for sixteen:

Pecuniary  
Distress of  
Rome.



[Roman Denarius.]

although in the government payments of all sums reckoned by denarii, it was still rated at its nominal value. After all, the want of money was so great, that<sup>2</sup> six years after the battle of Cannæ, the higher ranks contributed all their plate, and almost all their personal ornaments of gold or silver, for the service of the state; so that had not the war about that period began to take a more favourable turn, and the capture of New Carthage brought some of the resources of the Spanish mines into the treasury, it is difficult to conceive how the armies could have been paid for the future. In considering the great efforts made by the Romans, we must recollect, in order to render them credible, what immense sacrifices were required to make them. There is scarcely any limit to the military exertions of a people, when they will consent to give up every luxury and almost all the conveniences of life; and require to retain nothing but food, habitation, and clothing. The term "ruin," as applied to the finances of a nation in modern times, denotes a state of comparative affluence to that which existed in Rome, during Hannibal's invasion; and the amount of capital in the poorest and most devastated country of modern Europe, has always far exceeded that which the Roman republic possessed at the moment of some of its most brilliant victories.

In commencing, as it were, a new act of the war, after the battle of Cannæ, it was above all things important, that the Romans should not again risk the loss of so large a portion of their population, as had lately been cut off by the enemy. Their system, for the future, consisted in defending vigorously the several towns that adhered to their interests: and whilst they still kept an army in the field to

System of  
Roman  
tactics.

<sup>1</sup> Plinii *Historia Natural.* lib. xxxiii. c. 3.  
[R. H.]

Livy, lib. xxvi. c. 36.

B.C. 216. watch Hannibal's motions, they took care that it should never expose itself, by venturing into the plains, to the certainty of defeat, from the superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry.<sup>1</sup> For it seems, so high a confidence was still placed in the excellence of the Roman infantry, that they had no apprehensions of being attacked in positions where cavalry could not act; and still less of being forced in their camps or intrenchments. Yet, unless they could employ a force so superior in point of numbers, that while one part of it was watching Hannibal, another might be acting elsewhere, supporting the faithful, and chastising the revolted, allies of the republic, they could not hope for final success. Happily for Rome, the successful resistance of some small towns which Hannibal besieged soon after his victory at Cannæ, disposed the Italians in general to think more favourably of the Roman cause, and contributed to prevent the other allies from following the example of the Campanians. Thus the Romans were soon in the condition of a nation contending against an army, which though not without partisans, yet found them only an inconsiderable minority of the whole people. Thenceforward Hannibal's movements were often cramped by the necessity of providing for the subsistence of his own army; when the country immediately around him was purposely laid waste by the enemy; and his communications with more remote quarters were rendered almost impracticable by the numerous armies or garrisons with which he was on every side surrounded.

It may here be reasonably asked, why the government of Carthage did not make every effort to reinforce their general, and enable him to carry on one operation without necessarily neglecting every other. The want of a cotemporary Carthaginian historian, prevents us from giving any satisfactory account of the domestic politics of Carthage: but we may conjecture, that for a long time after the battle of Cannæ, the government, in their admiration of Hannibal's talents, imagined that he could do every thing for himself; and that their attention was more needed in other quarters, in Spain, in Sicily, or Sardinia, where their affairs were not conducted by men of the same extraordinary ability. And, indeed, in spite of all his difficulties, Hannibal continued for so many years to gain such frequent advantages, that all on his side might have seemed secure; and thus the temptation might have been greater to endeavour to turn the scale in other parts of the contest, where defeat might be considered as an event less impossible. At last, when the sudden restoration of the Roman affairs in Spain by P. Scipio rendered the Carthaginians more doubtful than ever of speedy success in that country, Hasdrubal, another son of Hamilcar, set out from Spain, following the track of his brother, and designing to lead an army that might co-operate

Hasdrubal  
marches  
to join  
Hannibal.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. ix. c. 3, 4.

with him into Italy. Hannibal was prepared to expect him, and was not likely to disconcert their joint plans by any failure of exertion on his part. But it appears that the speed with which Hasdrubal crossed the Alps, and arrived in Italy, was quite unlooked for by his brother; who, recollecting the delays of his own march, had thought it impossible that Hasdrubal could accomplish his passage before the season was considerably advanced. The natives, however, now aware that they were not the object of attack, had listened to Hasdrubal's professions of peace, and had allowed him to pass unmolested; so that it is said he performed in two months the same march which had occupied Hannibal during five. Livy adds, that he lost much of the time which he had thus gained, in a fruitless siege of Placentia; and that Hannibal, having heard that he was thus occupied, delayed setting out to join him, from an expectation that he would not soon be able to take the town. Be this as it may, the Romans succeeded in intercepting some messengers whom Hasdrubal had sent to apprise his brother of his movements; and thus it was that C. Clāudius Nero, the Roman consul who was opposed to Hannibal in Bruttium, formed the bold design of marching secretly with a part of his army to join his colleague in the north of Italy, and of thus overwhelming Hasdrubal with his united forces. So ably was this operation effected, that Hannibal's vigilance was completely eluded, and Nero, unknown to him, carried with him from the camp in Bruttium seven thousand men, who being reinforced by other troops on the road, brought to the consul M. Livius an overpowering accession of force. The two consuls then attacked Hasdrubal on the banks of the little river Metaurus, in the country of Sena Gallica, and succeeded in destroying him and his army.

Is defeated  
and slain on  
the  
Metaurus.

This severe blow reduced Hannibal to the necessity of acting entirely on the defensive. It had been for some time evident, that his single army could not overthrow the supremacy of Rome in Italy; still, while the fate of the war was balanced in Spain and Sicily, and while he was looking forward to the arrival of his brother to co-operate with him, he might be justified in making himself as troublesome as possible to the enemy, even though he might sometimes by so doing incur the danger of some loss to himself. But now his policy was altered: to maintain his ground in Italy, till another effort could be made by his government to support him, was now his most important duty. He was obliged to abandon several towns which had revolted to him from the Romans; and the inhabitants of others he forced to desert their cities, and to retire with him into the remotest part of Bruttium. The superiority of his personal character was so great, that the Romans never dared to attack him; and thus he might repose himself, as it were, for a while, watching for the first favourable opportunity of issuing from his retreat, and attempting once more to accomplish the design with

B.C. 207.

Diversion of  
Mago in  
Italy.

which he had originally invaded Italy. The death of Hasdrubal had not extinguished all his hopes: Mago, another of his brothers, after the total wreck of the Carthaginian interest in Spain, was ordered to attempt a diversion in Italy; and he, transporting with him, by sea, a small force, landed in Liguria, and surprised the town<sup>1</sup> of Genoa. The name of his family urged the Gauls and Ligurians to flock to his standard; and his growing strength excited much alarm among the Romans, and obliged them to keep a large army in the north of Italy to watch his movements. The details of his adventures are unknown; nor are we informed what cause prevented him from attempting to penetrate into Tuscany. We only find that he became so formidable an enemy, as to maintain an obstinate contest against an army of four Roman legions, a very few weeks before the final evacuation of Italy by Hannibal; nor were the Romans certain of victory till Mago was mortally wounded, and obliged to leave the field. From the scene of the battle, which is said to have been in the country of the Insubrian Gauls, he retreated, with as much expedition as his wound would allow, to the coast of Liguria; and there he found orders from Carthage, that he should immediately return to Africa, to oppose the alarming progress of P. Scipio. He accordingly embarked with his troops, and commenced his voyage homewards: but his exertions and anxiety of mind had proved too great for his strength; and he had scarcely passed the coast of Sardinia, when he expired. So unwearied was the zeal, and so great the ability, with which the sons of Hamilcar maintained, almost solely by their personal efforts, the cause of their country, against the overbearing resources and energy of the whole Roman people.

Mago dies of  
his wound  
off Sardinia.

When the Carthaginian government sent for Mago from Italy, they also recalled Hannibal. We have already said, that there exists no satisfactory account of his operations after the battle of Cannæ; but this applies, with peculiar force, to the three or four years that immediately preceded his return to Africa. The Roman writers have transmitted to us some reports of victories obtained over him in Italy, too audacious in falsehood, for even themselves to believe. But in truth, the terror with which he continued to inspire his enemies, after his career of success was closed, is even more wonderful than his first brilliant triumphs. For four years after the death of Hasdrubal, he remained in undisputed possession of Bruttium, when the Romans had re-conquered all the rest of Italy. Here he maintained his army without receiving any supplies from home, and with no other naval force at his disposal, than such vessels as he could himself build from the Bruttian forests, and man with the sailors of the country. Here, too, he seems to have looked

Formidable  
character of  
Hannibal.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxviii. c. 46; lib. xxx. c. 18.

forward to the renown which awaited him in after times; and, as if foreseeing the eager interest with which posterity would follow his progress in his unequalled enterprise, he recorded many minute<sup>1</sup> particulars of his campaigns on monumental columns, erected at Lacinium, a town situated in that corner of Italy, which was so long like a new country acquired, by conquest, for himself and his soldiers. It is said, also, that he retained one or two Greeks in his army, for the purpose of preserving a full detail of his exploits in that, which was the universal language of the civilized world. At length, when it was plain that no new diversion could be effected in his favour, and when the dangerous situation of his country called for his presence, as the last hope of Carthage, he embarked his troops without the slightest interruption from the Romans, and moved only by the disasters of others, while his own army was unbroken and unbeaten, he abandoned Italy fifteen years after he had first entered it, having ravaged it with fire and sword from one extremity to the other, and having never seen his multiplied victories chequered by a single defeat.

Embarks for  
Carthage  
without  
opposition.  
B.C. 203.

It is now necessary to trace the circumstances which enabled the Romans to carry the war into Africa, whilst Hannibal still remained unvanquished in Italy. When P. Cornelius Scipio, himself hastening to meet the Carthaginians on the Po, after their descent from the Alps, despatched the greater part of his army to Spain, to restore the interests of the Romans there, he paved the way, by this wise and vigorous step, for the future victories of his son, and the final triumph of his country. Had Spain been resigned to the Carthaginians without a struggle, Hasdrubal would have followed his brother into Italy after an interval, not of years, but of a few months; and a succession of armies, raised with the utmost ease from the numerous and warlike population of Spain, would have been poured across the Alps, and crowned the utmost wishes of Hannibal. But the resolution of P. Scipio obliged the enemy to contend for the possession of Spain, instead of marching into Italy; and in the long and varied struggle that ensued, the great superiority of the Roman military discipline, and the unyielding vigour of their policy, obtained for them, in the end, complete success. It would be most unjust, however, not to attribute the rapidity with which the conquest of Spain was at last achieved, to the great personal qualities of the Roman general, the famous P. Scipio Africanus. With every allowance for the favourable disposition with which his character and actions are described, not by the Roman writers only, but even by Polybius himself, from his connection with the younger Scipio, it is still evident that his merit far surpassed that of all his own countrymen of his time, and rendered him

Scipio's  
victories in  
Spain.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. iii. c. 33, 56.



B.C. 207. no unworthy antagonist of Hannibal. He took the command in Spain<sup>1</sup> at an early age, and when the defeat and death of his



[Scipio Africanus.]

father and uncle, after an able, and for the most part, a prosperous career of six years, had almost destroyed the hopes of the Romans in the peninsula. In these circumstances, his first step gave evidence of the most masterly judgment, and the most decisive vigour. Availing himself of the dispersion of the enemy's armies, he marched immediately against New Carthage, and carried that important place before the Carthaginian generals were aware of its danger. He found in it, besides a great variety of military stores, the hostages whom the Carthaginians had taken from the principal Spanish tribes, as

securities for their allegiance. These he sent to their respective homes, having given them each some present out of the plunder of the city; and, in this manner, he greatly inclined the Spaniards to come over to the side of the Romans. And being afterwards delivered from his ablest antagonist, by the march of Hasdrubal into Italy, he so completely defeated the other Carthaginian generals, that in five years after his arrival in the province, he dispossessed the enemy of every town they had held in it, except the city and island of Gades, situate in its most remote extremity.

After these important services he returned to Rome, hoping to be elected consul, and to be allowed to carry into execution the design which he had for some time conceived, of forcing Hannibal to leave Italy by attacking the Carthaginians in Africa. In both these points his wishes were fulfilled: but according to the invariable policy of Rome, he was desirous of securing the aid of some ally in the country which he was going to make the seat of war. For this end he had, during his command in Spain, opened a communication with Syphax, the most considerable of the Numidian princes; and, according to Livy, had actually concluded a treaty with him. But Syphax was won over to the interests of Carthage by the charms of Sophonisba, the daughter of one of the noblest Carthaginians: and a short time before Scipio crossed over into Africa, he sent to inform him of his new connection, and to dissuade him from his intended expedition, as now, far from giving him assistance, he should be obliged to join the Carthaginians in opposing him. Scipio, however, was not yet without the prospect of finding allies in Africa: Masinissa, another Numidian chief, had deserted the Carthaginian cause

Scipio crosses  
over to  
Africa.

B.C. 205.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. x. c. 2, &c.

after its repeated disasters in Spain; and had privately pledged himself to support the Romans on the first opportunity. Since that time, he had been deprived of his paternal dominions by the united efforts of Syphax and the Carthaginians; but though his power was thus reduced, his zeal in the cause of Rome was likely to be the more heightened; and as his personal character was high amongst his countrymen, many of them might be expected to join him, when they saw him supported by a Roman army. Accordingly, he did unite himself<sup>1</sup> to Scipio, so soon as he had landed in Africa: and his activity, and perfect familiarity with the country and its inhabitants, made him a very valuable auxiliary. The landing had been effected within a few miles of Carthage itself; and after some plunder, amongst which eight thousand prisoners to be sold for slaves are particularly specified, had been collected from the adjoining country, the army formed the siege of Utica, whilst a considerable fleet co-operated with it on the side of the sea. But the approach of Hasdrubal and Syphax at the head of two immense armies of Carthaginians and Numidians, induced Scipio to raise the siege, and to remove his troops to a strong position near the sea, where he proposed to remain, as winter was fast approaching; and secure of subsistence through the co-operation of his fleet, to wait for some favourable opportunity of striking a vigorous blow.

His first hope was<sup>2</sup> to win over Syphax again to the Roman cause; and with this view his emissaries were continually going and returning between the Roman and Numidian camps. Their temptations to Syphax were ineffectual: but their report of the manner in which the Carthaginian and Numidian armies were quartered, suggested to Scipio the possibility of ensuring success by other means than negotiation. They related, that the Carthaginians were lodged in huts constructed of stakes or hurdles, and covered with leaves: and that the Numidian quarters were composed of similar materials, of reeds, thatch, and dried leaves. Upon this intelligence, Scipio conceived the plan of setting fire to both the camps of the enemy: and in order to gain a more perfect knowledge of their situation, and the approaches to them, he pretended to listen to the terms of peace that Syphax had before proposed to him in vain; and, under pretence of negotiation, he was for some months in



[Masinissa.]

Scipio raises  
the siege.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxix. c. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. lib. xiv. c. 1, &c.

B.C. 205. constant correspondence with the Numidian king, and disguising some of his most intelligent soldiers in the dress of slaves, he procured them an easy entrance into the enemy's camp, as forming part of the suite of his officers who were employed in the negotiation. At last, when the season for military operations was returning, and his seemingly sincere desire of peace had thrown the enemy into a state of perfect security, he suddenly broke off all communication with them, declaring, that however disposed he himself was to agree to the proposed terms, the other members of the military council were fixed in rejecting them. This sudden rupture disappointed Syphax, but neither he nor the Carthaginian general had any suspicion of the real designs of Scipio; when suddenly the Roman army marched out by night in two divisions, the one commanded by Scipio, and the other by Lælius, his second in command, and advanced against the camps of the enemy, which were not more than six miles from their own. Lælius, assisted by Masinissa, first silently approached the encampment of the Numidians, and set fire to the first tents that he met with. The flames spread so rapidly, that the Numidians were soon precluded from approaching the quarter where they had first broken out; and having thus no suspicion that they had been kindled by the enemy, crowded together in the utmost disorder to effect their escape out of the camp. Numbers were trampled to death in the confusion at the several outlets; numbers were overtaken by the flames and burnt to death; and the rest, on reaching the open country, found themselves intercepted by Masinissa, who had posted his troops in the quarter to which he knew that the fugitives were most likely to direct their flight. In this manner the whole Numidian army, amounting to sixty thousand men, was, with the exception of Syphax himself and a few horsemen, completely destroyed or dispersed.

The Numidian Encampment set on fire.

The Numidian Army destroyed.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, when they first saw the camp of their allies on fire, not doubting that it was occasioned by accident, began partly to run with assistance to the Numidians, and the rest rushed hastily out of their tents, without their arms, and stood on the outside of the camp, contemplating with dismay the progress of this fearful conflagration. In this helpless state they found themselves attacked by the enemy, under the command of Scipio in person; some were instantly cut down; and the rest driven back into their camp, and saw it presently set on fire by their pursuers. They then at once understood the whole extent of the calamity which had befallen their allies and themselves; but resistance and flight were alike impracticable; the fire spread with fury to every quarter, and every avenue was choked up by a struggling crowd of men and horses, all with the same distracted efforts striving to effect their escape. In this attempt, Hasdrubal and a few followers alone succeeded: thirty thousand men, who had composed the Carthaginian

The Carthaginian Forces are totally cut off.

army, perished. The annals of war contain no bloodier nor more B.C. 205.  
horrible tragedy.

Hasdrubal, hopeless of delaying the progress of the enemy, continued his flight to Carthage; while Syphax had retreated in the opposite direction, towards his own dominions, and was endeavouring to rally the wrecks of his army. After much debate in the Carthaginian supreme council, it was resolved that the fortune of war should be tried once more. Syphax was prevailed upon to join his troops to theirs, instead of confining himself to the defence of Numidia; and the recent arrival of four thousand Spaniards, who had been enlisted by Carthaginian agents in Spain, encouraged the two confederates to hope for a successful issue. Scipio was so engrossed with the siege of Utica, which he had pushed with additional vigour after his late victory, that he allowed the enemy to unite their forces, and appear again in the field with no fewer than thirty thousand men. But when he heard of their junction, he lost no time in advancing to meet them; and engaging them a second time, in little more than a month after the destruction of their former armies, he again totally defeated them; and obliged their two generals to fly once more, Syphax to Numidia, and Hasdrubal to Carthage.

The united  
Armies of  
Carthage  
again  
defeated.

The victors now divided their forces; Lælius and Masinissa were despatched in pursuit of Syphax; and in a short time Masinissa recovered his father's kingdom; and Syphax, having risked a third battle, was not only defeated as before, but was himself made prisoner, and his capital fell into the hands of the enemy. Scipio, meantime, overran the country towards Carthage, receiving or forcing the submission of the surrounding towns, and enriching his soldiers with an immense accumulation of plunder. The chief part of this, in order to lighten his army, he sent back to his winter quarters before Utica; and then he advanced as far as Tunis, and finding that important place abandoned by its garrison, he there posted himself, hoping by his presence in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, to terrify the Carthaginians into complete submission. But they had not yet abandoned more resolute councils; and instead of suing for peace, they determined to send messengers to Italy, to recall Hannibal and Mago, and, in the meantime, to make an attempt to raise the blockade of Utica, by destroying the Roman fleet. The attempt was made, and was partly successful; but this slight advantage was so far overbalanced by the defeat and capture of Syphax, intelligence of which reached Carthage about the same time, that the further prosecution of the war appeared desperate, and a deputation of some of the members of the council of elders was sent to Scipio to solicit terms of peace. It is said that these deputies forgot their own and their country's dignity in the humbleness of their entreaties: they moved Scipio, however, to dictate such con-

B. C. 205. ditions as he might well deem a sufficient recompense of his victories; conditions which, by obliging the Carthaginians to evacuate Italy and Gaul; to cede, finally, both Spain and all the islands between Italy and Africa; to give up all their ships of war, except twenty; and to pay an immense contribution of corn and money; sufficiently declared the complete triumph of the Roman arms. Hard as they were, the Carthaginians judged them sufficiently favourable to be accepted without difficulty. A truce was concluded with Scipio, and ambassadors were sent to Rome to procure, if possible, the ratification of the senate and people.

Submission  
of Carthage.

With regard to the transactions that followed, we are more than ever obliged to regret the want of a Carthaginian historian. Wherever the family of Scipio is concerned, the impartiality of Polybius becomes doubtful; and besides, we have only fragments of this part of his narrative, so that we cannot fix exactly the dates of the several events, a point which here becomes of considerable importance. According to our only existing authorities, the Carthaginians, emboldened by the arrival of Hannibal, or, according to Livy, by the mere expectation of his arrival, wantonly broke the truce subsisting between them and Scipio, by detaining some Roman transports which had been driven by a storm into the bay of Carthage; and then denied satisfaction to the officers whom Scipio sent to complain of this outrage; and lastly, in defiance of the law of nations, endeavoured to seize the officers themselves on their way back to the Roman camp at Utica. By such conduct the resentment of Scipio is described to have been very naturally provoked; and the war was renewed with greater animosity than ever. This, no doubt, was Scipio's own report of these transactions, which Polybius, the intimate friend of his adopted grandson, and deriving his information, in part, at least, as we know, from Scipio's own associate, Lælius, in all probability sincerely believed. But it is probable that a Carthaginian narrative of the war in Africa would so represent the matter, that posterity should esteem the behaviour of the Carthaginians, in breaking off the truce when it suited their purposes, as neither more nor less dishonourable than the conduct of Scipio himself, when he set on fire the camps of Syphax and Hasdrubal; and that although the success was different, yet that the treachery in both cases, whatever it may have been, was pretty nearly equal.

Hannibal  
lands at  
Leptis.

Hannibal, we are told, landed<sup>1</sup> at Leptis, at what season of the year we know not; and after refreshing his troops for some time at Adrumetum, he took the field, and advanced to the neighbourhood of Zama, a town situated, as Polybius describes it, about five days' journey from Carthage, towards the west. It seems that Scipio was busied in overrunning the country, and in subduing the several

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxx. c. 25, &c. Polyb. lib. xv. c. 1, &c.

towns; and he was interrupted in these operations by the approach of the Carthaginian army. He is said to have detected some spies sent by Hannibal to observe his position; and by causing them to be led carefully round his camp, and then sent back in safety to Hannibal, he so excited the admiration of his antagonist, as to make him solicit a personal interview, with the hope of thus effecting a termination of hostilities. The report of this conference, and of the speeches of the two generals, savours greatly of the style of Roman family memoirs; the most unscrupulous in falsehood of any pretended records of facts that the world has yet seen. However, the meeting ended in nothing; and the next day the two armies were led out into the field for the last and decisive struggle. The numbers on each side we have no knowledge of; but probably neither was in this respect much superior. Masinissa, however, with four thousand Numidian cavalry, besides six thousand infantry, had joined Scipio a few days before the battle; while Hannibal, who had so often been indebted to the services of Numidians, had now, on this great occasion, only two thousand horse of that nation to oppose to the numbers, and fortune, and activity of Masinissa. The account of the disposition of both armies, and of the events of the action, was probably drawn up by Polybius, from the information given him by Lælius, and perhaps from the family records of the house of Scipio. And here we may admit its authority to be excellent. It states then, that the Roman legions were drawn up in their usual order, except that the manipuli of every alternate line did not cover the intervals in the line before them, but were placed one behind another, thus leaving avenues in several places through the whole depth of the army from front to rear. These avenues were loosely filled by the light-armed troops, who had received orders to meet the charge of the elephants, and to draw them after them down the passages left between the manipuli, till they should be enticed entirely beyond the rear of the whole army. The cavalry, as usual, was stationed on the wings; Masinissa, with his Numidians, on the right, and Lælius, with the Italians, on the left. On the other side, Hannibal stationed his elephants, to the number of eighty, in the front of his whole line. Next to these were placed the foreign troops in the service of Carthage, twelve thousand strong, consisting of Ligurians, Gauls, inhabitants of the Balearian islands, and Moors. The second line was composed of those Africans who were the immediate subjects of Carthage, and of the Carthaginians themselves; while Hannibal himself, with his own veteran soldiers, who had returned with him from Italy, formed a third line, which was kept in reserve, at a little distance behind the other two. The Numidian cavalry were on the left, opposed to their own countrymen, under Masinissa; and the Carthaginian horse on the right, opposed to Lælius and the Italians. After some skirmishing

B.C. 205.

Great battle  
of Zama.

B.C. 202.

B.C. 202. of the Numidians in the two armies, Hannibal's elephants advanced to the charge; but being startled by the sound of the Roman trumpets, and annoyed by the light-armed troops of the enemy, some broke off to the right and left, and fell in amongst the cavalry of their own army on both the wings; so that Lælius and Masinissa, availing themselves of this disorder, drove the Carthaginian horse speedily from the field. Others advanced against the enemy's line, and did much mischief; till at length, being frightened, and becoming ungovernable, they were enticed by the light-armed troops of the Romans to follow them down the avenues which Scipio had purposely left open, and were thus drawn out of the action altogether. Meantime, the infantry on both sides met; and after a fierce contest, the foreign troops in Hannibal's army, not being properly supported by the soldiers of the second line, were forced to give ground; and in resentment for this desertion, they fell upon the Africans and Carthaginians, and cut them down as enemies; so that these troops, at once assaulted by their fellow soldiers, and by the pursuing enemy, were also, after a brave resistance, defeated and dispersed. Hannibal, with his reserve, kept off the fugitives, by presenting spears to them, and obliging them to escape in a different direction; and he then prepared to meet the enemy, trusting that they would ill be able to resist the shock of a fresh body of veterans, after having already been engaged in a long and obstinate struggle. Scipio, after having extricated his troops from the heaps of dead which lay between him and Hannibal, commenced a second, and a far more serious contest. The soldiers on both sides were perfect in courage and in discipline; and as the battle went on, they fell in the ranks where they fought, and their places were supplied by their comrades with unabated zeal. At last Lælius and Masinissa returned from their pursuit of the enemy's beaten cavalry, and fell, in a critical moment, upon the rear of Hannibal's army. Then his veterans, surrounded and overpowered, still maintained their high reputation; and most of them were cut down where they stood, resisting to the last. Flight indeed was not easy, for the country was a plain, and the Roman and Numidian horse were active in pursuit; yet Hannibal, when he saw the battle totally lost, with a nobler fortitude than his brother had shown at the Metaurus, escaped from the field to Adrumetum. He knew that his country would now more than ever need his assistance; and as he had been in so great a degree the promoter of the war, it ill became him to shrink from bearing his full share of the weight of its disastrous issue.

Total defeat  
of Hannibal.

The battle of Marengo forms, in many points, an exact parallel with that of Zama. The Austrians having routed the advanced divisions of the French army, commenced an entirely new action with the reserve, which Bonaparte, like Hannibal, had kept at a

distance from the scene of the first engagement. The struggle, B.C. 202. which was obstinately maintained, was decided, as at Zama, by a timely charge of cavalry on the flank of the enemy's infantry; but the victorious cavalry in the two battles did not belong to the armies whose situations correspond with one another; for at Zama the reserve was defeated by the charge of Lælius; while it was victorious at Marengo, owing to the attack made by Kellerman.<sup>1</sup>

On the plains of Zama twenty thousand of the Carthaginian army were slain, and an equal number taken prisoners; but the consequences of the battle far exceeded the greatness of the immediate victory. It was not the mere destruction of an army; but the final conquest of the only power who seemed able to combat with Rome on equal terms. In the state of the ancient world, with so few nations really great and powerful, and so little of a common feeling pervading them, there was neither the disposition nor the materials for forming a general confederacy against the power of Rome; and the single efforts of Macedonia, of Syria, and of Carthage herself, after the fatal event of the second Punic war, were of no other use than to provoke their own ruin. The defeat of Hannibal ensured, in fact, the empire of the ancient civilized world.

The only hope of the Carthaginians now rested in the forbearance of Scipio; and they again sent deputies to him, with a full confession of the injustice of their conduct in the first origin of the war, and still more in their recent violation of the truce; and with a renewal of their supplications for peace. The conqueror, telling them that he was moved solely by considerations of the dignity of Rome, and the uncertainty of all human greatness, and in no degree by any pity for misfortunes which were so well deserved, presented to them the terms on which alone they could hope for mercy. "They were to make amends for the injuries done to the Romans during the truce: to restore all prisoners and deserters: to give up all their ships of war, except ten, and all their elephants: to engage in no war at all out of Africa, nor in Africa, without the consent of the Romans: to restore to Masinissa all that had belonged to him or any of his ancestors; to feed the Roman army for three months, and pay it till it should be recalled home: to pay a contribution of ten thousand Euboic talents, at the rate of two hundred talents a year, for fifty years: and to give a hundred hostages, between the ages of fourteen and thirty, to be selected at the pleasure of the Roman general." At this price the Carthaginians were allowed to hold their former dominion in Africa, and to enjoy their independence, till it should seem convenient to the Romans to complete their destruction. Yet Hannibal strongly urged that the terms should be accepted; and

Terms  
granted  
to the Car-  
thaginians.  
B.C. 201.

<sup>1</sup> Vide Gen. Matthieu Dumas, *Campagne de 1800*, and *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*, tome xiii.



B.C. 201. even rudely interrupted,<sup>1</sup> it is said, a member of the supreme council at Carthage, who was speaking against them. He probably felt, as his father had done under circumstances nearly similar, that for the present resistance was vain; but that by purchasing peace at any price, and by a wise management of their internal resources, his countrymen might again, at some future period, find an opportunity to recover their losses. Peace, accordingly, was signed; the Roman army returned to Italy; and Hannibal, at the age of forty-five, having seen the schemes of his whole life utterly ruined, was now beginning, with equal patience and resolution, to lay the foundation for them once again.

Conduct of  
Hannibal at  
Carthage.

From the scanty notices that we possess of the succeeding years of his life, we learn that his conduct, as a citizen, displayed great wisdom and great integrity. He is said to have reduced the exorbitant<sup>2</sup> power of an order of perpetual judges, whose authority was very extensive, and had been greatly abused. He turned his attention also to the employment of the public revenue, much of which he found to be embezzled by persons in office, while the people at large were heavily taxed to raise the yearly contributions due to the Romans by the last treaty. When a man of such high character raised his voice against an abuse so gross, there was yet vigour enough in the popular part of the Carthaginian constitution to give him effectual support; and it appears that the evil was removed, and the public revenue henceforward was applied to public purposes. Hannibal, however, as was natural, had thus created to himself many powerful enemies; and they found, ere long, an opportunity of gratifying their hatred. The war between Rome and Macedonia had been lately concluded; and the success of the Romans, and their commanding interference in the affairs of Greece, awakened the fears and jealousy of Antiochus, king of Syria, whose kingdom was the greatest ever possessed by any of the successors of Alexander. He seemed disposed to take up the contest which Philip, king of Macedonia, had been compelled to resign; and the Romans were either informed, or fancied, that Hannibal was using all his influence at Carthage to persuade his countrymen to join him. Accordingly, a commission was sent to the Carthaginian government, requiring them to punish Hannibal, as a disturber of the peace between the two nations. Hannibal knowing that he should be unable to resist the efforts of his domestic enemies, when thus supported by the influence of Rome, seems at last to have surrendered his long cherished hopes of restoring his country to her ancient greatness. He found means to escape from Carthage, and procured a vessel to transport him to Tyre, where he was received with all the honours due to a man who had shed such glory on the Phœnician name, and from whence he easily reached the court of

He escapes  
to Tyre.


<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. xv. c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, lib. xxxiii. c. 45, 46, &c.

Antiochus, at Antioch. Finding that the king was already set out B.C. 196. on his way towards Greece, he followed after him, and overtook him at Ephesus; and being cordially received by him, he contributed powerfully to fix him in his determination to declare war on the Romans, and was retained near his person, as one of his most valuable counsellors.

The ability of Hannibal was displayed again on this new occasion, by the plans which he recommended for the prosecution of the war. He first and most strongly urged that he should be sent<sup>1</sup> with an army into Italy; there, he said, the Romans were most vulnerable; and an attack made upon their own country, might distract their councils, and at least lessen their means of carrying on hostilities in Greece or Asia.

When this measure was finally abandoned, owing, as it is said, to the king's jealousy of the glory which Hannibal would gain by its success, his next proposal was,<sup>2</sup> that the alliance of Philip, king of Macedon, should be purchased at any price. Macedon was a power strong enough to take a substantial part in the war, and would be too important to escape, as the little second or third-rate states might do, by forsaking its ally so soon as he should experience any reverses. This counsel was also neglected, and Philip united himself with the Romans against Antiochus; so that Hannibal, employed only in a subordinate naval command, a duty for which his experience had no way fitted him, could render the king no essential service; and in a short time, when the Romans had brought the war to a triumphant end, he was obliged to seek another asylum, as Antiochus had agreed, by one of the articles<sup>3</sup> of the treaty of Rome, to surrender him up to the Roman government. His last refuge was the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia. With that prince he remained about five years; and it is mentioned by Cornelius Nepos, that he gained a victory, while commanding his fleet, over his old enemy Eumenes, king of Pergamus. All his own prospects had been long since utterly ruined; and the condition of such a man, reduced to the state of a dependent exile, under the protection of so humble a sovereign as Prusias, might have satisfied the most violent hatred of the Romans. But it seems they could not be free from uneasiness while Hannibal lived; and on the occasion of a Roman embassy being sent to the court of Prusias, that king, whether spontaneously, or at the solicitation of the ambassadors, promised to put their great enemy into their hands. His treachery,



[Tyre]

Plans recommended by Hannibal.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxxiv. c. 60.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. xxxvi. c. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. lib. xxi. c. 14.

B.C. 196. however, was suspected by Hannibal; and when he found the avenues to his house secured by the king's guards, he is said to have destroyed himself by a poison which he had long carried about with him for such an emergency. Some particulars are added by Livy and Plutarch, which not being credibly attested, nor likely to have become publicly known, it is needless to insert here. It is sufficient to say, that Hannibal died by his own hand, to avoid falling into the power of the Romans, at Nicomedia, in Bithynia; and, as nearly as we can ascertain, in the sixty-fourth year of his age.

Hannibal dies by Poison, to escape the Roman power.


High Political Character of Hannibal.

If the characters of men be estimated according to the steadiness with which they have followed the true principle of action, we cannot assign a high place to Hannibal. But if patriotism were indeed the greatest of virtues, and a resolute devotion to the interests of his country were all the duty that a public man can be expected to fulfil, he would then deserve the most lavish praise. Nothing can be more unjust than the ridicule with which Juvenal has treated his motives, as if he had been actuated merely by a romantic desire of glory. On the contrary, his whole conduct displays the loftiest genius, and the boldest spirit of enterprise, happily subdued, and directed by a cool judgment to the furtherance of the honour and interests of his country; and his sacrifice of selfish pride and passion, when, after the battle of Zama, he urged the acceptance of peace, and lived to support the disgrace of Carthage, with the patient hope of one day repairing it, affords a strong contrast to the cowardly despair with which some of the best of the Romans deprived their country of their services by suicide. Of the extent of his abilities, the history of his life is the best evidence: as a general, his conduct remains uncharged with a single error; for the idle censure which Livy presumes to pass on him for not marching to Rome after the battle of Cannæ, is founded on such mere ignorance, that it does not deserve any serious notice. His knowledge of human nature, and his ascendancy over men's minds, are shown by the uninterrupted authority which he exercised alike in his prosperity and adversity over an army composed of so many various and discordant materials, and which had no other bond than the personal character of the leader. As a statesman, he was at once manly, disinterested, and sensible: a real reformer of abuses in his domestic policy; and in his measures, with respect to foreign enemies, keeping the just limit between weakness and blind obstinacy. He stands reproached, however, with covetousness by the Carthaginians; and with cruelty by the Romans. The first charge is sustained by no facts that have been transmitted to us; and it is a curious circumstance, that the very same vice was long imputed by party violence to the great duke of Marlborough, and that the imputation has been lately proved by his biographer to have been utterly calumnious. Of cruelty, indeed, according to modern principles, he cannot be acquitted; and his putting to death all the

Romans whom he found on his march through Italy, after the battle of the lake Thrasymenus, was a savage excess of hostility. Yet many instances of courtesy are recorded of him, even by his enemies, in his treatment of the bodies of those generals who fell in action against him; and certainly, if compared with the ordinary proceedings of Roman commanders, his actions deserve no peculiar brand of barbarity. Still, it is little to his honour, that he was not more careless of human suffering than Marcellus or Scipio; nor can the urgency of his circumstances, or the evil influence of his friends, to both which Polybius attributes much of the cruelty ascribed to him, be justly admitted as a defence. It is the prevailing crime of men in high station to be forgetful of individual misery, so long as it forwards their grand objects; and it is most important, that our admiration of great public talents and brilliant successes, should not lead us to tolerate an indifference of human suffering.

We know nothing of Hannibal's private character as a son, a friend, or a companion; nor have we any memorials of his temper or conversation. Here, therefore, we shall close our account of his life, which contains also the most memorable period in the course of the several contests by which the Romans acquired their dominion. A brief sketch will suffice to describe their wars with Macedonia and Syria, the third Punic war, and generally, their transactions with foreign nations, till the time of their first engagements with the Parthians. Our principal attention will be directed to their internal affairs; and chiefly we shall endeavour to illustrate the growth of those parties and principles which were opposed to one another in the civil wars; and the condition of society, and the state of morals and of knowledge in the age immediately preceding the first preaching of the Gospel. The materials for our inquiry are in many respects so imperfect, and are often to be sought for in detached passages of so many different authors, that the indulgence of the reader may be craved for the defects and omissions which doubtless he will find in our narrative.





[Fountain at Zaghuwan near Carthage.—From a Sketch by Sir Grenville Temple]

## CHAPTER XV.

### SKETCH OF THE EXTERNAL ADVANCEMENT OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, FROM THE END OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE INVASION OF THE CIMBRI.

FROM B. C. 201 TO B. C. 102.

B. C. 201. THERE are certain portions of the history of mankind, in which military operations assume a character of such predominant importance, that the historian is bound to assign to them the principal place in his narrative. At other times there may be long and bloody wars, by which great changes have been produced in the state of the world, which yet deserves no more than the most cursory notice; whilst our main attention is bestowed on the progress of society, the rise of literature, or the origin and struggles of domestic factions. The period to be comprised in this sketch belongs to this latter class: it was full of wars; it was marked by decisive victories and extensive conquests; yet its military history is totally uninteresting, from the great inequality of force between the Romans and their several enemies; and from the scarcity of those signal displays of valour and ability, which have, on other occasions, thrown lustre on the resistance of the humblest power. Besides, except the *Fragments* of Polybius, we have no political nor military history of these times, the authority of which can be relied on with any satisfaction for the detail of events. No more then will be here attempted, than briefly

to trace the succession of the Roman conquests, and to notice the B.C. 201. causes which rendered them so unbroken and so universal.

No sooner was the second Punic war ended than the senate of Rome determined to crush the power of Philip, king of Macedon. He had joined Hannibal in the most critical period of the late war, when the destruction of Rome seemed inevitable; he was the most considerable potentate in the countries neighbouring to Italy on the east; and the fame of his armies, derived from the conquests of Alexander, was not yet extinguished. These were considerations sufficient to point him out as the next object of hostility to the Roman arms; and, although peace had been concluded with him two or three years before, yet the grounds of a new quarrel were soon discovered. He<sup>1</sup> was accused of having attacked the Athenians and some others of the allies of Rome; and of having sent some Macedonian soldiers to the assistance of Hannibal in Africa. A Roman army was instantly sent over into Greece, and a Roman fleet co-operated with the naval force of Attalus, king of Pergamus, and the Rhodians; these powers, together with the Ætoliens, being constantly enemies to Macedon, and the present war being undertaken by the Romans chiefly, as was pretended, on their account. The barbarous<sup>2</sup> tribes on the north and west of Macedonia were also led by the temptation of plunder, to join the confederacy; and their irruptions served to distract the councils and the forces of Philip. Yet, under all these disadvantages, he maintained the contest with great vigour for three years; till being defeated in a general action at Cynocéphale in Thessaly, and his whole country, exhausted as it already was by the war, being now exposed to invasion, he was reduced to accept peace on such terms as the Romans thought proper to dictate. These, as usual, tended to cripple the power of the vanquished party, and at the same time to increase the reputation of the Romans, by appearing more favourable to their allies than to themselves. Philip was<sup>3</sup> obliged to give up every Greek city that he possessed beyond the limits of Macedonia, both in Europe and in Asia; a stipulation which deprived him of Thessaly, Achæa, Phthiotis, Perrhæbia, and Magnesia, and particularly of the three important towns of Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias, which he used to call the fetters of Greece. All these states were declared free and independent; unless that the Romans (pretending that Antiochus, king of Syria, threatened the safety of Greece) retained, for the present, the strong places of Chalcis and Demetrias

First  
Macedonian  
War.

Battle of  
Cynocéphale.  
B.C. 197.



[Denarius, B.C. 197.]

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxx. c. 42. lib. xxxi. c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, lib. xxxi. c. 28, 38, 41, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Polybius, lib. xviii. c. 27, *et seq.* c. 17. and lib. xvii. c. 2.

B.C. 197. in their own hands. Philip was forced also to satisfy the several demands of Attalus, of the Rhodians, and of the other allies of Rome, except those of the Ætolians, whom it was now the policy of the Romans to humble; as the depression of Philip had left them the principal power in Greece. In addition to these sacrifices, he was to surrender almost the whole of his navy, and to pay to Rome a thousand talents.

Immediately<sup>1</sup> after the conclusion of this treaty followed the memorable scene at the Isthmian games, where it was announced to all the multitude assembled on that occasion, that the Romans bestowed entire freedom upon all those states of Greece which had been subject to the kings of Macedon. The Greeks, unable to read the future, and having as yet had no experience of the ambition of Rome, received this act with the warmest gratitude; and seemed to acknowledge the Romans in the character which they assumed, of protectors and deliverers of Greece.

War with  
Antiochus  
the Great.

The kingdom of Macedon being now humbled, there was no one in a condition to dispute the power of the Romans in Greece, except Antiochus, king of Syria. This prince had lately<sup>2</sup> enlarged his dominions by reducing those cities on the coast of Asia Minor, which, in the course of the many wars between the successors of Alexander, had been gained by the kings of Egypt. He now pro-

posed his intention of crossing into Europe, and reuniting to his empire those cities and parts of Thrace which had been conquered from Lysimachus by one of his predecessors; and which had since been wrested from the crown of Syria by the kings of Egypt and Macedon. But the Romans having now brought their war with Philip to an end, resolved at once to stop the progress of Antiochus; and their ambassadors, who found him at Lysimachia, required him to restore every place that he had taken from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and to leave those cities independent, which having lately belonged to Philip, were



[Antiochus.]

now destined by the Romans to enjoy their liberty.

Antiochus replied, that the Romans had no more concern in the affairs of Asia than he had in those of Italy: and the ambassadors departed without gaining their demands. In this state of things, the

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. xviii. c. 29, *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* lib. xviii. c. 32, 33, and Livy, lib. xxxiii. c. 19, 38.

Ætolians,<sup>1</sup> who were now totally alienated from the Romans, in consequence of the neglect with which they had been treated in arranging the terms of the peace with Philip, eagerly solicited the king of Syria to enter Greece, encouraging him to hope, that with their assistance, he might destroy the influence of Rome in that country altogether. He accordingly crossed over with a small force, and was admitted, through the intrigues of the Ætolians, and the inclination of the inhabitants, into several places of importance; but<sup>2</sup> the Achæans, and Eumenes, who had lately succeeded Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, declared against him, and their forces occupied Chalcis in Eubœa, to secure it from his attacks. Philip, king of Macedon, also decided on taking part with the Romans; yet, notwithstanding, Antiochus succeeded in reducing Chalcis, and the whole of Eubœa, and won besides several cities in Thessaly, whence he returned to Chalcis to pass the winter. The consul Manius Acilius Glabrio arrived in Epirus in the ensuing spring; and having marched thence into Macedonia to concert measures with Philip, and afterwards advancing into Thessaly, Antiochus took post at the famous pass of Thermopylæ to oppose his farther progress. He was easily dislodged, however, by the Romans; and that with such severe loss, that he thought it prudent at once to abandon Greece, and to return to Asia by sea from Chalcis, leaving the Ætolians to bear, as they best could, the whole weight of the Roman vengeance.

Antiochus  
dislodged  
from  
Thermopylæ.

They were accordingly attacked by the consul, Manius Acilius,<sup>3</sup> and after seeing some of their towns taken, they implored and obtained an armistice for a certain period, in order to allow them time to send ambassadors to Rome. But the demands of the senate being more exorbitant than they could yet bring themselves to accept, the war was again renewed, and Manius<sup>4</sup> was actively employed in besieging Amphissa, when the arrival of his successor, L. Cornelius Scipio, afforded the Ætolians another respite. The new consul, who was wholly bent on crossing over into Asia, to finish the war with Antiochus, was easily persuaded to grant the Ætolians a truce for six months: and their affairs were in so desperate a state, that even this doubtful favour seemed to them most acceptable.

Having thus freed himself from the possible danger of leaving an enemy in his rear, L. Scipio set forward for the Hellespont,<sup>5</sup> accompanied by his brother, the famous Scipio Africanus, who acted under him as his lieutenant. The march of the army was facilitated to the utmost by Philip, king of Macedon; who seems vainly to have hoped that by a faithful and zealous observance of the treaty of peace, he

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxxv. c. 12, 33, 43, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. xxxv. c. 50, 51. lib. xxxvi. c. 14, *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. lib. xxxvi. c. 22—35.

<sup>4</sup> Polyb. lib. xxi. c. 1, 2, &c.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, lib. xxxvii. c. 1, 7.



B.C. 197. might soften the remorseless ambition of the Romans.<sup>1</sup> A naval victory, won by the Roman fleet, ensured the safety of the passage into Asia; and Antiochus, distrusting his own strength,



[Thyatira.]

abandoned the sea coast, and concentrated his army near Magnesia and Thyatira. Here he was attacked by the Romans, and totally defeated. Sardis and several other places surrendered immediately after the battle; and Antiochus, completely<sup>2</sup> panic struck, sent ambassadors to the consul and his brother, soliciting peace on their own terms. He was ordered accordingly to resign his pretensions to any dominion whatever in Europe, and to cede every thing that he possessed in Asia westward of Mount

Taurus: to pay fifteen thousand talents to the Romans within twelve years, to reimburse them for the expenses of the war: to pay to Eumenes, king of Pergamus, four hundred talents in



[Sardis.]

money, and a certain quantity of corn, which he had engaged by treaty to pay to the late king Attalus: to give up Hannibal and some other individuals who were obnoxious to the Romans: and to give twenty hostages immediately as a pledge of his sincerity, to be selected at the pleasure of the consul. These terms were accepted by Antiochus, and hostilities ceased, therefore, on both sides. Ambassadors were then sent to Rome by Antiochus, to procure a ratification of the peace from the senate and people;

and by Eumenes, the Rhodians, and almost every state within the limits ceded by the vanquished king, to court the favour of the new arbiters of the fate of Asia, and to gain for themselves as large a share as possible of the spoils of the Syrian monarchy. After the several embassies had received an audience

Conditions of Peace offered by the Romans to Antiochus.

of the senate, the peace with Antiochus was ratified, and ten commissioners<sup>3</sup> were appointed to settle all disputed points in Asia; with these general instructions, that all the dominions ceded by the king of Syria to the Romans should be given to Eumenes, with the exception of Lycia and part of Caria, which were bestowed

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxxvii. c. 30, 31, 33, *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. lib. xxi. c. 13, &c.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* lib. xxii. c. 7.

on the Rhodians; and those Greek cities which had paid tribute to Antiochus, and which were now declared independent. But before these commissioners arrived in Asia, the Roman arms had been employed in another successful war. Cn. Manlius<sup>1</sup> Vulso, who succeeded L. Scipio in the consulship, and in the command of the army in Asia Minor, anxious to distinguish himself by some conquest, had attacked the Galatians, or Asiatic Gauls, on the pretence that they had furnished assistance to Antiochus; and, after several engagements, had obliged the different tribes to sue for peace. Their ambassadors came to him, towards the close of the winter, to receive his answer; and, about the same time, Eumenes and the ten commissioners arrived from Rome. A definitive treaty of peace was then concluded with Antiochus, in which, besides the concessions formerly mentioned, he agreed to give up almost the whole of his navy, and all his elephants, and not to make war in Europe, or in the islands of the Ægean.

B.C. 197.  
Defeat of the Galatians.

The Galatians, having been already plundered to the utmost during the war, were only warned to confine themselves within their own limits, and not to molest the kingdom of Eumenes; and Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, who had also given assistance to Antiochus, was obliged to deprecate the anger of Rome by the payment of six hundred talents; half of which, however, was afterwards remitted to him at the intercession of Eumenes. This last Prince received a great increase of territory, both in Asia and in Europe; and, together with the commonwealth of Rhodes, was in appearance the greatest gainer from the victory of the Romans. However, in the mere act of giving away kingdoms at her discretion, Rome plainly declared the pre-eminence of her own power: and she soon after showed, that she could resume her gifts as easily as she had made them, whenever the conduct of her allies began to excite her jealousy.

It has been already mentioned, that L. Scipio, when marching towards Asia, granted a truce for six months to the Ætolians;<sup>2</sup> but as they could not yet be induced to surrender at discretion to the mercy of the Romans, the war was again renewed, and M. Fulvius Nobilior, the colleague of Cn. Manlius in the consulship, crossed over into Greece to complete their subjugation. He first laid siege to Ambracia, which was vigorously defended; but the Ætolians, now convinced of their inability to maintain the contest, sued for peace through the intercession of the Rhodians and Athenians; and terms were at length granted them, which besides diminishing their territory, and obliging them to pay a sum of money, reduced them to a state of entire dependence on Rome, by obliging them to follow the Romans in all their wars, and to acknowledge and obey the

Conquest of Ætolia.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. xxii. c. 16, 24, *et seq.*; Livy, lib. xxxviii. c. 12, *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Livy, lib. xxxvii. c. 49. lib. xxxviii. c. 3, *et seq.*; Polyb. lib. xxii. c. 9, *et seq.*

B.C. 197. power and sovereignty of Rome. Their fate excites the less compassion, when we remember that they first invited the Romans into Greece, and that their faithless and ambitious policy had mainly contributed to prevent the union of the Greeks in one powerful state, which might have been able long to maintain its independence against every enemy.

Intrigues  
of Philip.

Eleven years had not passed since the conclusion of the last war with Macedon, when it became apparent that another was likely to commence. In the late war with Antiochus, Philip, as has been seen, sided with the Romans; and thus took from the king of Syria the towns of Ænus and Maronea, and some other towns and fortresses on the coast of Thrace; and from the Ætolians several cities which they had occupied in Thessaly and Perrhæbia. All these places, at the conclusion of the war, he proposed to retain in his possession; but on one side, Eumenes laid claim<sup>1</sup> to the towns of Thrace, insisting that the Romans had given to him that portion of the territories conquered from Antiochus; and on the other, the Thessalians and Perrhæbians demanded the restoration of the cities taken possession of by Philip in their country; urging that the Ætolians had unjustly seized them, and that on their expulsion they ought to revert to their original and rightful owners. The senate, as usual, appointed commissioners to hear and to decide on this question; and sentence was given, as might have been expected, against the pretensions of Philip. He had no intention, however, to yield without resistance; but not being yet prepared for war, he sought to gain time by sending his son Demetrius<sup>2</sup> to Rome to plead his cause. This prince had formerly been one of the hostages given by his father for his faithful execution of the terms of the last treaty with the Romans; and he had then so won the favour of many of the Roman nobility, that Philip trusted much to the influence he might possess on the present occasion. Nor was he disappointed; for Demetrius was sent back with renewed expressions of the kindness entertained for him by the senate; and<sup>3</sup> with a promise, that out of regard for him, a fresh commission should be appointed to reconsider the points in dispute between Philip and his opponents. Yet the new commission confirmed the judgment of the former one, and Philip was obliged to withdraw his garrisons from all the contested towns both in Thrace and Thessaly: nor did the favour shown by the Romans to Demetrius produce any other result than his destruction. A suspicion arose that he aspired to succeed to the throne, through their support, to the exclusion of his elder brother Perseus. This produced an open enmity between the brothers; and after many mutual accusations of each other, Philip, it is said,<sup>4</sup> was

Tragical end  
of his Son  
Demetrius.


<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. xxiii. c. 6, 11; Livy, lib. xxxix. c. 23 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. lib. xxiii. c. 14.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* lib. xxiv. c. 2, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, lib. xl. c. 24, 55, 56.

induced to order the death of Demetrius by poison; but according to the Roman writers, being afterwards convinced of his innocence, he intended to deprive Perseus of the succession, in abhorrence of his treachery towards his brother. He died, however, before his intentions could be carried into effect, and Perseus ascended the throne without difficulty. This account of the private affairs of the royal family of Macedon, as it relates to matters not likely to be known with certainty by the public, and as it comes to us from writers disposed to believe every calumny against Perseus, merits very little attention. It is only known, that the Romans were disposed, from the very beginning of his reign, to regard the new king of Macedon with aversion; and that he, foreseeing that a war in defence of the independence of his crown would soon be inevitable, took every method of rendering himself popular in Greece, and of strengthening the internal resources of his kingdom.



[Denarius of Lepidus M. Æmilius.]

Accession of Perseus. B.C. 179.

The Romans alleged<sup>1</sup> as the causes of their quarrel with Perseus, that he had made war on some of their allies; that he had endeavoured to draw away others to a connection with himself, incompatible with their duty to Rome; and that he had hired assassins to make an attempt on the life of king Eumenes, when returning from Rome, whither he had gone to instigate the senate to declare war against Macedon. In answer<sup>2</sup> to these charges, Perseus replied, that his hostilities with the allies of Rome were purely defensive: and the charge of intended assassination he strongly and flatly denied. With regard to his endeavouring to seduce the allies of Rome from their fidelity, he is made by Livy to refer to a former justification of himself on that point, which is not at present to be found in Livy's history. However, it is evident that the Romans were determined on war, and that the king of Macedon took every step, consistent with the independence of his crown, to avoid it. Although the Romans<sup>3</sup> had accused him of making great military preparations in time of peace, and he was, in fact, in a far better condition to commence immediate hostilities than they were, yet he lost the opportunity thus afforded him from his anxious desire to negotiate

Second Macedonian War.



[Perseus.]

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<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xlii. c. 30, 40.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. xlii. c. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. lib. xlii. c. 43.

B.C. 179. with the enemy; and when he was actually driven to take up arms, and had gained some advantage over the consul Licinius, he instantly renewed his<sup>1</sup> offers of peace, consenting to the same terms which his father had only submitted to after his total defeat at Cynocephale. The most open and unprincipled ambition in modern times, would hardly dare to avow such an answer as that made by the Roman general to a proposal so conciliatory. He replied,<sup>2</sup> that Perseus must submit himself to the discretion of the senate, and allow it to decide on the state of Macedon, as it should think proper. In other words, the time was now come, when the Romans, in their career of conquest, had reached the kingdom of Philip and Alexander, and nothing could induce them to delay, far less to renounce, their resolution of sacrificing it to their lawless and systematic ambition.

Reflections  
on the War  
policy of  
Rome.

This refusal to negotiate after a defeat, was a general maxim of Roman policy, and has often been extolled as a proof of heroic magnanimity. It should rather be considered as a direct outrage on the honour and independence of all other nations, which ought, in justice, to have put the people, who professed it, out of the pale of all friendly relations with mankind. In a moment of madness, the Freuch convention, in 1794, passed a decree, that the garrisons of the four fortresses on the northern frontier, then in the possession of the allies, should be put to the sword if they did not surrender within twenty-four hours after they were summoned. To this decree, a notice of which accompanied the summons of the besieging general, the Austrian governor of Le Quesnoy nobly replied, "No one nation has a right to decree the dishonour of another: I shall maintain my post so as to deserve the esteem of my master, and even that of the French people themselves." In like manner, a refusal to make peace, except on their submission, was to decree the dishonour of every other nation; nor had Rome any right to insist, that whatever were the events of a war, it should only be terminated on such conditions as should make her enemy the inferior party. Had other nations acted on the same principle, every war must necessarily have been a war of extermination; and thus the pride of one people, would have multiplied infinitely the sufferings of the human race, and have reduced mankind to a state of worse than savage ferocity. The avowal of such a maxim, in short, placed Rome in a condition of actual hostility with the whole world; and would have justified all nations in uniting together for the purpose of forcing a solemn and practical renunciation of it; or, in case of a refusal, of extirpating utterly the Roman people, as the common enemies of the peace and honour of mankind.

After the refusal of the consul Licinius to negotiate with Perseus, the war was protracted for two years more without any decisive

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. xxvii. c. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. xxvii. c. 28.

success; the Roman officers who were employed in it displaying little B.C. 179.  
 ability or enterprise, and disgracing themselves by flagrant<sup>1</sup> acts of  
 extortion and oppression towards their allies. At last L. Æmilius  
 Paulus, son of the consul who was killed at Cannæ, and himself  
 inheriting his father's reputation for wisdom and valour, was chosen  
 consul; and the province of Macedonia falling to his share, he took  
 every method to bring the war to a successful issue. Great care  
 was<sup>2</sup> observed in the appointment of the officers who were to serve  
 under him; and when he arrived in Greece and took the command,  
 he greatly reformed the discipline of the army, and brought it into  
 a high state of order and activity. His exertions were soon rewarded  
 by the battle of Pydna, of the details of which we have only the  
 account of Plutarch, but the event is abundantly known. The  
 Macedonian army was totally destroyed, the cities of the kingdom  
 successively surrendered to the conquerors, and Perseus himself  
 shortly after gave himself up to the consul's mercy. He was taken  
 to Rome with his family to adorn the triumph of Æmilius; and,  
 according to Paterculus, died about four years afterwards at Alba,<sup>3</sup>  
 which was assigned as the place of his confinement. His principal  
 nobility, and every man<sup>4</sup> who had ever held any office under him,  
 were ordered to transport themselves into Italy on pain of death;  
 lest they should disturb the new settlement of their country.  
 Macedonia was then divided into four districts; each of which was  
 to be under a republican government. Half the tribute formerly  
 paid to the king was henceforward to be paid to the Romans, who  
 also appropriated to themselves the produce of all the gold and  
 silver mines of the kingdom. The inhabitants were forbidden to fell  
 timber for ship-building; and all intermarriages and sales of land  
 between the people of the several districts were forbidden. With  
 these marks of real slavery, they were left, for the present, nominally  
 free; and Macedonia was not yet reduced to the form of a Roman  
 province.

Battle of  
Pydna.End of the  
Kingdom of  
Macedon.  
B.C. 168.

It is curious to observe how, after every successive conquest, the  
 Romans altered their behaviour to those allies who had aided them  
 to gain it, and whose friendship or enmity was now become indiffer-  
 ent to them. Thus, after their first war with Philip, they slighted  
 the Ætolians; after they had vanquished Antiochus, they readily

Conduct of  
Rome to her  
Allies.<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xliii. c. 4, 5, 6, &c.

Ibid. lib. xlv. c. 21, 34.

<sup>3</sup> Vid. Vell. Patercul. lib. i.—But it would be nearer the truth to say, that Perseus was murdered by the Romans; for after having suffered such cruel treatment in the dungeon to which he was at first consigned, that Æmilius Paulus complained of it in the Senate as a national disgrace, he was removed to a less miserable prison; and there having offended the soldiers who guarded him, they, in revenge, harassed him night and day, and never allowed him to sleep, till he expired under their persecutions.—Vid. *Fragment*. Diodor. Sicul. lib. xxxi. p. 893, edit. Rhodom:—and *Mithridatis Epistolam*, apud *Fragm.* Sallust.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, lib. xlv. c. 32. 29.

B.C. 168. listened to complaints against Philip; and now the destruction of Macedon enabled them to use the language of sovereigns rather than of allies to their oldest and most faithful friends, Eumenes, the Rhodians, and the Achæans. The<sup>1</sup> senate first tampered with Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, hoping that he might be persuaded to accuse his brother, and to petition for a share of his dominions; but when they found him deaf to their temptations, they retracted some promises which they had before made him, in the hope that he would listen to them. Afterwards, when Eumenes himself landed in Italy, on<sup>2</sup> his way to Rome, with the view of removing the suspicions entertained against him, the senate, aware of his purpose, issued an order, that no king should be allowed to come to Rome; and despatched one of the quæstors to announce it to him at Brundisium, and to command him to leave Italy immediately. The Rhodians had offended by declaring, openly, "that they<sup>3</sup> were tired of the war with Perseus; that he, as well as the Romans, was the friend of their commonwealth; that they should wish to see the contending parties reconciled; and that they would themselves declare against those whose obstinacy should be an impediment to peace." This declaration, which was received at Rome most indignantly, had been privately recommended by Q. Marcius, the Roman consul, to one of the Rhodian ambassadors, who had visited him in his camp, in Macedonia, during the preceding year: and Polybius<sup>4</sup> reasonably conjectures, that Marcius, confident of a speedy victory over Perseus, gave this advice to the Rhodians, with the treacherous purpose of furnishing the senate with a future pretence of hostility against them. However, their fault was punished by the loss of Lycia and Caria,<sup>5</sup> which the senate now declared independent; and the individuals who were accused of favouring Perseus were given up to the Romans,<sup>6</sup> or, at the instigation of Roman officers, were put to death by the Rhodian government. Nor should it be<sup>7</sup> omitted, that a general inquiry was instituted throughout Greece into the conduct of the principal men in the several states during the late war. Those who were accused by their countrymen, of the Roman party, of having favoured Perseus, were summoned to Rome to plead their cause as criminals; and some were even put to death. But if the mere opinions and inclinations of individuals were thus punished, the states which had actually taken part with Macedon met with a still heavier destiny. Let it be for ever remembered, that by a decree<sup>8</sup> of the senate, seventy towns of Epirus were given

Offence of  
the  
Rhodians.

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. xxx. c. 1, *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* lib. xxix. c. 7; Livy, lib. xlv. c. 14.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* lib. xxx. c. 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* lib. xlv. c. 32.

<sup>8</sup> Polyb. lib. xxx. c. 15; Livy, lib. xlv. c. 34; Plutarch, *in Vitâ Emiliî Pauli*, c. 29.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* c. 17.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* lib. xxviii. c. 15.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, lib. xlv. c. 10.

up to be plundered by the Roman army, after all hostilities were at an end; that falsehood and deceit were used to prevent resistance or escape; and that, in one day and one hour, seventy towns were sacked and destroyed, and one hundred and fifty thousand human beings sold for slaves. The instrument employed on this occasion was L. Æmilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedon, and one of those whom we are taught to regard as models of Roman virtue. There is no reason to doubt his sincere affection for his country, his indifference to money, and his respectability as a citizen, husband, son, and father. But it is useful to see what dreadful actions the best men of ancient times were led unhesitatingly to commit, from the utter absence of a just law of nations, and the fatal habit of making their country the supreme object of their duty. Nor is it possible that these evils should be prevented, unless truer notions have insensibly established themselves in the minds of men, even of those who are least grateful to the source from which they have derived them; and if modern Europe be guided by purer principles, the christian historian cannot forget from what cause this better and happier condition has arisen.

B.C. 168.  
Cruelty of  
the Romans.

It remains now that we speak of the conduct of the Romans  
The Achæans.



[View of Achaia, after Williams, by Sargent.]



B.C. 168. towards the Achæans. The early history of the Achæan league, and the leaning of its councils towards a friendly connection with Macedon, has been already noticed. In the war between the Romans and Philip, however, the Achæans were persuaded to join with the former; a step which Polybius<sup>1</sup> describes as absolutely necessary for their safety; whether it were altogether equally honourable, we have hardly the means of deciding. But their new connection, whatever may be thought of its origin, was ever afterwards faithfully observed: insomuch, that the Romans, though sufficiently adroit in finding matter of complaint, when they were disposed to do so, and though offended by the free and independent tone which the Achæan government always maintained towards them, could yet obtain no tolerable pretext for attacking them. There was, however, a traitor amongst the Achæans named Calliocrates,<sup>2</sup> who, jealous of the popularity of the ruling party in the councils of his country, endeavoured to supplant them through the influence of Rome; and to ingratiate himself with the senate, by representing his opponents as despisers of the Roman authority, which he and his friends vainly endeavoured to uphold. After the Macedonian war, his intrigues<sup>3</sup> were carried to a greater extent than ever. He accused a great number of the most eminent of his countrymen of having favoured the cause of Perseus; and although the conduct of the Achæan government towards Rome had been perfectly blameless, and nothing was found among the papers of the king of Macedon which confirmed the charge, even against any of its individual citizens, yet, on the demand of the Romans, more than a thousand of the most eminent men in the commonwealth were arrested and sent into Italy, under pretence that they should be tried for their conduct at Rome. On their arrival in Italy, they were confined in the different cities of Tuscany, and there remained nearly seventeen years. The senate repeatedly refused the petition of the Achæan government, that they might either be released, or else be brought to trial. It is added, that whoever among them were at any time detected in endeavouring to escape, were invariably put to death. At last,<sup>4</sup> after most of them had died in captivity, the influence of Cato the censor was exerted in behalf of the survivors, at the request of Scipio Æmilianus; who was anxious to serve one of their number, his own familiar friend, the historian Polybius. But the manner in which Cato pleaded their cause deserves to be recorded. He represented the Achæan prisoners as unworthy of the notice of the senate of Rome: "We sit here all day," said he, "as if we had nothing to do, debating about the fate of a few wretched old Greeks, whether the under-

1000 arrested  
and sent to  
Italy.

B.C. 167.

<sup>1</sup> Poly. lib. xvii. c. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. xxvi. c. 1, *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. lib. xxx. c. 10; Pausanias, Achæa, c. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Polyb. lib. xxxv. c. 6.

takers of Rome or Achæa are to have the burying of them." We B.C. 167. have dwelt the more fully on this treatment of the Achæans, because it sets in the clearest light, the character of the Roman government; and enables us to appreciate the state of the world under the Roman dominion, when such men as Polybius were subject to the worst oppression and insolence, from a nation which boasted of Cato the censor as one of its greatest ornaments.

Hitherto, however, Achæa and the rest of Greece still enjoyed a Importance of Andricus. B.C. 148. nominal independence, notwithstanding the real supremacy of the Roman power. But within little more than twenty years from the overthrow of Perseus, even these poor remains of freedom were destroyed. A man<sup>1</sup> of low condition, named Andricus, availing himself of his personal resemblance to the royal family of Macedon, assumed the name of Philip, and pretending that he was the son of Perseus, was joyfully received by the Macedonians. After a short contest, he was defeated and led prisoner to Rome by Q. Cæcilius Metellus; and from henceforward Macedon was placed entirely on the footing of a Roman province. The fall of Achæa followed almost at the same time. It appears<sup>2</sup> that a party had lately acquired an Achæan war. ascendancy in the Achæan councils, warmly inclined to throw off the control of Rome; but without the wisdom or integrity which had enabled Philopœmen and Lycortas to command respect from the Romans, while they avoided giving them the slightest pretence for attacking their independence. The party now in power, on the contrary, seemed bent upon provoking a war with Rome. They attacked Lacedæmon,<sup>3</sup> which, although obliged to become a member of the Achæan confederacy, was on all occasions ready to break off its connection; and when the Lacedæmonians appealed to Rome, and commissioners were sent as usual to give their judgment, the Achæan government treated them with the utmost indifference, and took the most violent measures for exciting popular feeling throughout Greece against the arbitrary interference of the Romans. The ferment was at its height when the commissioners, who had arrived at Corinth,<sup>4</sup> pronounced it to be the pleasure of the senate, that not only Lacedæmon, but Corinth also, and Argos, and several other states which had been united with the Achæans, should now be separated from them, because they had originally formed no part of Achæa. Nothing can be said in excuse of this decision, which was alike insolent and unjust; yet, where resistance is so evidently hopeless, as it was at this time in Greece, it must ever be condemned as a useless aggravation of a people's sufferings. The whole frame of society was loosened by the Achæan leaders; and great immediate evils were occasioned with no reasonable prospect of their leading

<sup>1</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. xlix. 1; Florus, lib. ii. c. 14; Jornand. lib. i.

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. lib. xxxviii. c. 1, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias, Achaica, c. 8, *et seq.*

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias, Achaica, c. 14.

B.C. 148. to permanent good. Slaves<sup>1</sup> were set at liberty, and enlisted, to swell the Achæan army; debtors were protected from their creditors; and heavy requisitions were laid on all individuals, male and female, to contribute to the wants of the commonwealth. But there was no corresponding spirit in the people; and these strong measures which, if adopted voluntarily, often produce effects so wonderful, were considered vexatious and oppressive, when enforced by an unpopular government. Metellus, at this time, commanded in Macedonia; and wishing to win the double glory of being the pacificator of Macedon and Achæa, he was anxious to persuade the Achæans to submit before Mummius the consul should arrive to take the command against them. His advances were slighted, because they were attributed to fear; and an Achæan army<sup>2</sup> marched towards Thermopylæ to oppose his march into Greece. But so totally unequal were the Greeks to the maintenance of this contest, that they abandoned their ground on the first approach of Metellus; and, being overtaken on their retreat, were immediately and completely routed. Metellus then advanced towards Corinth, having reduced Thebes and Megara on his march; and his offers of peace being again rejected, he was obliged to surrender the task of finally subjugating Greece to L. Mummius, who about this time arrived from Italy. The new commander finished the war in a single battle, under the walls of Corinth. Diaeus, the Achæan general, fled to Megalopolis, and there destroyed himself by poison; the Corinthians, for the most part, abandoned their city, and Mummius entered it with little or no resistance. But every horror that follows the most hardly won capture of a town by storm, was practised with deliberate cruelty. Most of the citizens were slain; the women and children were sold for slaves; the temples and houses were alike ransacked; and Corinth, finally, was burnt to the ground. The Achæan league was then dissolved, and Greece was henceforward treated as a province, was subjected to tribute, and was governed by a Roman Proconsul or Prætor.

Capture of  
Corinth.  
B.C. 146.

We have thus related the final overthrow of Grecian independence, somewhat more particularly than the difficulty of the conquest or its particular importance might seem to demand. Something, however, is due to the memory of illustrious names; and interested as we are from our childhood in the fortunes of Greece, the story of its fall cannot be read without attention. It now remains that we turn to a scene in itself far more striking, and presenting a still more painful picture of misery and atrocious ambition, the third Punic war, and the destruction of Carthage.

State of  
Carthage.

Since the time at which Hannibal was obliged to abandon his country, by the animosity of those whose corruptions he had exposed

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. xl. c. 2. lib. xxxviii. c. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Pausanias, Achaica, c. 15, 16.

and checked, and by the jealousy of the Romans, Carthage seems to have rested quietly in the state of humiliation to which the event of the second Punic war had reduced her. Forbidden as she was, by the terms of the treaty of peace, to take up arms against the allies of the Roman people, she was obliged to suffer repeated aggressions on the part of Masinissa, King of Numidia; and when, as her only resource, she applied to Rome<sup>1</sup> for protection, she found a tardy and insufficient redress. She observed, however, faithfully, the conditions of her submission; and Carthaginian ships formed a part of the Roman fleet, in the wars with Antiochus and with Perseus. But when some years had elapsed after the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy, the Romans, having no other enemy to attract their attention, felt their hatred of Carthage revive; and it was openly professed by some members of the senate, that the very existence of that commonwealth<sup>2</sup> ought no longer to be permitted. The resistance which the Carthaginians had been at last driven to make to the continued encroachments and hostilities of Masinissa, furnished the Romans with a pretext for declaring war; and the two consuls, with two consular armies and a large fleet, were despatched to Sicily, in order to cross over from that island into Africa as soon as possible. The Carthaginians had tried every means of pacifying the Romans, without throwing themselves entirely upon their mercy; but when they found that an army was actually on its way to attack them, and that Utica,<sup>3</sup> the most important of all their dependencies in Africa, had already offered an entire submission to the Romans, the danger seemed too great for any further hesitation; and their ambassadors at Rome announced to the senate, that Carthage yielded herself up entirely to its disposal. In return, they were promised the enjoyment of their laws and liberty, and the uninterrupted possession of their lands and moveable property, on condition that they should send over to Lilybæum, within thirty days, three hundred children, of the first families in Carthage, as hostages, and that they should obediently receive the commands which the consuls should deliver to them on their arrival in Africa. A vague suspicion of the fate that awaited them possessed the Carthaginians on the return of their ambassadors; still they resolved to persevere in their submissions. The hostages were sent to Lilybæum, and then were despatched to Rome; and a deputation waited on the consuls soon after their landing at Utica, to know the final pleasure of the senate, and to express the readiness of Carthage to obey it. The consuls commanded that all arms, offensive and defensive, and all engines of war, should be surrendered to them; and even this was complied with.<sup>4</sup> A number of members of the supreme council, of priests, and of other individuals of the

Submission  
of Carthage.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *Punica*, c. 68, 69.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, lib. xxxvi. c. 42. lib. xlii. c. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, *Punica*, c. 69, *et seq.*; Polyb. lib. xxxvi. c. 1, *et seq.*

<sup>4</sup> Appian, *Punica*, c. 80, *et seq.*

B.C. 149. greatest distinction in Carthage, followed the long train of waggons in which the arms were carried to the Roman camp. They hoped to move compassion, by the sight of all that was most noble and most venerable in their country reduced to the condition of suppliants. But one of the consuls, L. Marcius Censorinus, having arisen, and composed his countenance, says Appian, to an expression<sup>1</sup> of sternness, briefly told them, "That they must abandon Carthage, and remove to any place more inland, that should be about nine or ten miles distant from the sea; for Carthage," said he, "we are resolved to raze to the ground." This declaration was received by the Carthaginians who heard it, with the most lively emotions of rage and despair; they vented curses against the Romans, as if wishing to provoke them to forget the sacred character which they bore. To this burst of passion the deepest grief succeeded; they bewailed the fate of their country with such agony of sorrow, that it is said even the Romans were moved to tears; and they attempted even yet to obtain from the consuls a mitigation of their sentence. But when Censorinus repeated that the orders of the senate must be performed, and *that* immediately, and when the lictors began to drive the deputation from the consuls' presence, they begged to be heard again for a few moments; and then said, that they only entreated the Romans to advance with their fleet instantly to the city, to prevent the people from provoking their utter destruction by some act of despair. Censorinus accordingly moved forward with twenty ships, and remained off the mouth of the harbour, while the Carthaginians brought back the report of their doom to Carthage.

Cruel  
decision of  
Censorinus.

Third Punic  
war.

The tidings were received with one common feeling of indignation by the supreme council and by the people. Generals were chosen immediately; and when the consuls refused to grant a truce for thirty days, in order that ambassadors might be sent to Rome, war was at once resolved on; and the whole population, men and women alike, began to labour night and day in the fabrication of arms, to supply the place of those which they had surrendered. The consuls, after waiting some days, to see if the ferment would subside, at length marched towards Carthage, and the operations of the siege commenced. But such was the strength of the fortifications, and such the spirit of their defenders, that, notwithstanding their want of arms, they repulsed every attempt of the enemy; and the Roman army, baffled by the Carthaginians, and suffering from sickness, saw the year draw to a close without having obtained any other success than such as the extreme wickedness of the cause deserved.<sup>2</sup> Nor were the consuls of the following year more fortunate; and the spirits of the Carthaginians, encouraged by their long resistance, began to anticipate a final deliverance. Masinissa, the old ally of

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *Punica*, c. 80.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* c. 105, *et seq.*

Rome, was lately dead; and his sons, among whom his dominions B.C. 149. were divided, whilst promising succours to the Roman army, evidently showed no real disposition to assist it.

But in the third year of the war, P. Scipio *Æmilianus*, the son of *Æmilius Paullus*, but adopted into the family of Scipio by the son of the famous *Africanus*, was elected consul, and appointed to the command in Africa by an especial vote of the people. He had greatly distinguished himself under the former consuls, when serving as a military tribune; and there was besides a superstitious persuasion among the people in his favour, that the Scipios were destined to be the conquerors of Carthage. On his succeeding to the command, his first care was to restore the discipline of the army, which had suffered greatly from the misconduct of the last consul; and by his ability in this respect, as well as by his skill in the conduct of the war, he soon destroyed all the hopes of the Carthaginians. The situation of Carthage, from this time, began to resemble the picture left us of the miseries of Jerusalem in its last siege by Titus. Numbers died of famine through the strictness of the blockade; numbers deserted to the enemy; while *Hasdrubal*, who commanded the principal military force in the town,<sup>1</sup> was himself rioting in luxury, and exercising the greatest tyranny over his countrymen; his conduct as a general, at the same time, being totally destitute of courage and wisdom, and marked only by savage cruelty towards the prisoners who fell into his power. Yet<sup>2</sup> the city continued to hold out during the year of Scipio's consulship; and the winter was employed by him successfully in reducing the strong-holds which still remained in the power of the Carthaginians in the neighbouring country. In the following spring, his command being still continued, he resumed the siege with vigour; and, by a combination of assaults, succeeded in forcing his way into one of the quarters of the city, when famine had enfeebled the bodies and the spirits of its defenders. But the *Byrsa* or Citadel still remained untaken; and six days were consumed in a horrible struggle from street to street, and from house to house; in the course of which, fire and the sword, and the ruin of falling buildings, combined to carry on the work of destruction to the uttermost. At last the remnant of the inhabitants sued for mercy, and it was granted them; such mercy as was practised in ancient times, when hopeless slavery, without distinction of sex or age, was the lot of all whom the sword had spared. Fifty thousand individuals were thus made prisoners, to enrich their conquerors by the price to be paid for them in the slave market at Rome; and the victorious army was then allowed to plunder the city for several days. Shortly after, a commission<sup>3</sup> of ten senators was sent from Rome, as usual, to determine the future

Scipio heads  
the Roman  
Army.

Capture

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. xxxix. c. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, *Punica*, c. 126, *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Appian, *Punica*, c. 135, *et seq.*

B.C. 149. condition of the conquered country. By their orders, whatever part of the buildings of Carthage had survived the siege, was now levelled with the ground; and curses were imprecated on any man who should hereafter attempt to build on the spot. The territory was subjected to a tribute, and governed henceforth as a Roman province; with the exception of certain portions which were given to the people of Utica and Hippo, as a reward for their timely desertion of the Carthaginian cause. Thus was the great rival of Rome totally destroyed, only a few months before the final conquest of Greece, in the year of Rome 608, and about a hundred and forty-six years before the Christian era.

And  
destruction  
of Carthage,  
B.C. July,  
146.

Progress of  
the Roman  
arms

In Spain.

It will now, perhaps, be most advisable to trace the progress of the Roman arms in Spain and Gaul; then to notice the accessions to their empire gained in Africa by the conquest of Jugurtha; and to conclude with a general view of the extent of their dominion at the period which forms the limit of the present sketch. The end of the second Punic war had left the Romans no other enemies in Spain to contend with than the natives themselves: but these were of so stubborn and warlike a temper, that it was not easy to effect their subjugation. It may be asked, what claim of right could be advanced by the Romans in attempting this conquest; and no answer can be given, except that a civilized nation, in its intercourse



[Denarius, B. C. 144.]

with an uncivilized one, easily finds grounds of quarrel, while it exacts from men, ignorant of all law, an observance of those rules which men, in a more advanced state of society, have agreed to call the law of nations. Those Spanish tribes that had been subject to Carthage were

treated by the Romans, on the defeat of the Carthaginians, as a conquered people, were subjected to a tribute, and governed with the usual arbitrary authority of the Roman provincial magistrates. If they attempted to shake off the yoke, it was not unnatural that some warriors of those tribes, which were yet independent, should join the armies of their countrymen: and this afforded the Romans a pretext sometimes for demanding hostages from the people whose citizens had been found in arms against them; or, sometimes, for requiring the surrender of their arms; conditions which, since in their eyes they implied degradation, were generally refused, and thus gave occasion to war. If, on the contrary, they were acceded to, the Romans would proceed to exercise some acts of sovereignty which would provoke the tribe to take up arms; or the mere detention of their hostages was a continual irritation to their minds, which at last would break out in open hostility. Or, if this pretence

Political and  
Military  
system of  
Rome.

failed, there was another which could scarcely ever be wanting. If B.C. 146. the vanquished soldiers of any tribe engaged in war with Rome received from their countrymen the ordinary succours of humanity, if they were entertained or sheltered, this was called assisting the enemies of the Republic, and was supposed to justify a Roman general in demanding satisfaction from those who had been guilty of it. This was the original cause of the quarrel between Rome and Numantia.<sup>1</sup> Thirdly, if there were any tribes whose situation or whose caution had preserved them from any sort of connection with the enemies of the Romans, some dispute amongst themselves was likely, sooner or later, to arise; and the vanquished party was always sure to find in the Romans willing and effectual supporters. The Roman<sup>2</sup> generals instantly interfered as arbiters; and if their decision was not submitted to, they presently proceeded to enforce it by arms. A system like this steadily pursued amongst a warlike and independent people, naturally furnished the Romans with an occasion of attacking, in their turn, the inhabitants of every part of the Peninsula. Of all these, the most obstinate and successful in their resistance were the Lusitanians and Numantians. The first, Lusitanian war ends under<sup>3</sup> the command of Viriathus, a chief of remarkable enterprise and ability, maintained the contest for several years, and defeated several of the Roman officers; till their leader was assassinated by three of his followers, at the instigation of Servilius Cæpio, the B.C. 140. Roman general, then commanding against him. Numantia has Numantian war. acquired still greater fame, by the disgraces which its inhabitants inflicted on the Roman arms, and the desperation of their final defence. They obliged a Roman consul,<sup>4</sup> C. Hostilius Mancinus, to purchase the safety of his army by an unfavourable treaty; and when the senate, in contempt of the public faith, refused to ratify the terms, and ordered Mancinus to be given up to the enemy to expiate his act with his own life, the Numantians refused to accept him: and the Roman writers record, without a blush, this contrast between the honour of the barbarians and their own perfidy. At last Scipio Æmilianus, the conqueror of Carthage, was elected consul, on purpose to carry on the war with Numantia. With an army of sixty thousand men, he blockaded the city, the male population of which had never exceeded<sup>5</sup> eight thousand; and fearing to encounter the despair of the inhabitants, he hemmed them in with lines of circumvallation, and waited patiently till famine should do his work for him without danger to himself. The Numantines tried to obtain tolerable conditions; but they had been too formidable to find mercy from an enemy like the Romans, who never had any sympathy with

<sup>1</sup> Florus, lib. ii. c. 18.<sup>2</sup> Appian, *Hispanica*, c. 51.<sup>3</sup> Appian, *Hispanica*, c. 61, *et seq.*; Florus, lib. ii. c. 17; Vell. Paterculus, lib. ii.<sup>4</sup> Appian, *Hispanica*, c. 80, 83; Vell. Paterculus, lib. ii.; Florus, lib. ii. c. 18.<sup>5</sup> Appian, *Hispan.* c. 97. Florus makes them only four thousand, lib. ii. c. 18.



B.C. 133.  
Destruction  
of Numantia.

courage from which they themselves had suffered. Finding that they had no hope left, the besieged mostly destroyed themselves and their relations, and a few only surrendered alive to the conqueror. He selected<sup>1</sup> fifty of their number to adorn his triumph, the rest he sold for slaves, and then levelled Numantia to the ground; and for such a victory, so hardly won, over an enemy so inferior in numbers and resources, he was extolled with the highest praises at Rome, and received the surname of Numantinus. Still, even after the destruction of Numantia, the Spaniards continued, at various times, to maintain the struggle for liberty; nor were they fully reduced to obedience till a much later period than that with which we are now concerned.

In Gaul.

The Romans were first led to carry their arms into Transalpine Gaul, by an application from the people of the Greek colony of Marseilles, to protect them against the assaults of some of the native tribes in their neighbourhood. An embassy to this effect remains recorded in one of the "Fragments"<sup>2</sup> of Polybius, and appears to have taken place as early as the year of Rome, 600; but no important consequences seemed to have followed from it immediately. About twenty-eight years afterwards, however, on a new complaint from the people of Marseilles, a Roman army attacked and conquered the Salyes,<sup>3</sup> a tribe of Transalpine Gauls; and after their defeat, the Allobroges and Arverni, their neighbours, were accused of having given them assistance, and of having offered injuries also to the Ædui, another Gaulish tribe, which had before obtained the friendship of Rome. Several victories were gained over these new enemies, and one or two colonies were founded in Gaul; such as<sup>4</sup> Aquæ Sextiæ, or Aix, in Provence, planted by C. Sextins, and Narbo,<sup>5</sup> or Narbonne, the origin of which is fixed a little later. By these means, the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, on both sides of the Rhone, from the Alps to the Pyrenees, and extending inland as far as the Jura<sup>6</sup> and the mountains of Auvergne, were reduced to the form of a Roman province, about the year of Rome, 632.

Sketch of the  
history of  
Jugurtha.

While the republic was thus extending its dominion in Spain and Gaul, its empire in Africa received an important addition in the conquest of Numidia. After the destruction of Carthage, the principal part of the territories of that commonwealth were at once subjected to the Roman government; and thus the Romans were brought into close contact with the kings of Numidia; whose dominions lay to the west and south-west of Carthage, and stretched along the coast of the Mediterranean, till they were bounded by the

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *Hispan.* c. 98.

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. *lib.* xxxiii. c. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Florus, *lib.* iii. c. 2; Livy, *Epitom.* *lib.* ix. lxi.; Appian, *Gallica*, c. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, *Epitom.* *lib.* lxi.—Cassiodori *Chronicon*.

<sup>5</sup> Vell. *Patercul.* *lib.* i.

<sup>6</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* *lib.* iii. c. 4.

confines of Mauritania. The name of Numidians, borrowed from the Greek term Nomades, signifies a people who live by pasturage; and has accidentally become the peculiar appellation of the native tribes in the west of Africa; although, under the government of Syphax, Masinissa, and Micipsa, they seemed to have been, in many respects, advanced far above a mere pastoral life. Micipsa,<sup>1</sup> the son of Masinissa, divided his kingdom between his sons Hiempsal and Adherbal, and his nephew Jugurtha; but on his death, Jugurtha, who was much older than his cousins, and who had acquired military experience and high distinction, by serving in the Roman army at the siege of Numantia, at once proceeded to assassinate Hiempsal, and then openly invaded the dominions of the surviving prince, Adherbal. He easily overcame him, stripped him of his territories, and obliged him to fly to Rome for refuge and redress. But dreading lest the Romans should avail themselves of so fair a pretext to seize upon the kingdom of Numidia for themselves, he strove to deprecate their



[Jugurtha.]

enmity by employing bribery, to a large extent, among the members of the senate; and thus nothing was done in favour of Adherbal, except the sending a commission of ten senators to Africa, to divide the kingdom between him and Jugurtha. It is said,<sup>2</sup> however, that this commission was also corrupted by Jugurtha, and thus was induced to assign to him by far the most valuable share of Micipsa's inheritance. Of this he took advantage, and in a short time he again attacked Adherbal, defeated him, shut him up in the strong town of Cista, and there besieged him for some months; till the Italian soldiers, who formed the most effective part of the garrison, persuaded Adherbal to surrender himself to his rival, and, stipulating only for his life, to rely for every thing else on the interposition of Rome. But no sooner had he given himself up, than Jugurtha ordered him to be put to death in torments.

Adherbal put to death.

Sallust, the warm partisan of Cæsar, and anxious, therefore, to villify to the utmost the character of the senate, asserts,<sup>3</sup> that even this flagrant crime would have been passed over with impunity, owing to the influence which Jugurtha had obtained, by his bribes, among the nobility, had not one of the tribunes roused the feelings of the people, and denounced the scandalous motives to which, as he said, the senators were sacrificing the honour of their country.

<sup>1</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurthin. c. 9, *et seq.*<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* c. 16.<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* c. 27.

B C. 111.  
Jugurthine  
war.

However this be, war was declared against Jugurtha; and L. Bestia Calphurnius, one of the consuls, was sent over to Africa to commence hostilities against him. Still, we are told,<sup>1</sup> Jugurtha continued to employ his usual arts: and the consul, after suffering the campaign to be protracted in fruitless negotiations, at last granted his enemy peace, on condition of his laying down his arms, and submitting himself and his kingdom to the Romans. But only a small part of Jugurtha's resources were in fact surrendered; and the consul returning to Rome to preside at the elections for the ensuing year, the war was as far from conclusion as ever. The succeeding season was equally unproductive of any decisive event; but towards the close of it, when the consul Sp. Albinus had, as usual, returned to Rome, the army which he left under the command of his brother sustained a severe defeat from the enemy, and was reduced to such difficulties, as to purchase its retreat by a promise of evacuating Numidia within ten days; and, it is added, by concluding a treaty of peace. But Jugurtha, who had served at Numantia, must have remembered how lightly the senate could violate the stipulations made by its officers; and he could not, reasonably, calculate on gaining any other advantage from his agreement, than the getting rid of the Roman army for the present. The treaty, as he might have expected, was immediately disavowed at Rome; and the new consul, Q. Cæcilius Metellus, was likely to prove a far more formidable adversary than those whom he had hitherto encountered. Metellus was bent on prosecuting the war in earnest. He reformed the discipline of the army, which is always described as faulty, when the usual career of Roman victory was delayed or interrupted; but he did not scruple, at the same time, to tamper<sup>2</sup> with the several officers whom Jugurtha sent to him to propose terms of peace, and to tempt them to betray, or even to assassinate their master. He evaded giving any decisive answer to the offers made to him, but continued to advance into the heart of Jugurtha's country; and had deprived him of a large portion of his resources, before the Numidian perceived that his enemy was merely amusing him, and that he had nothing but the sword to trust to. In the course of the campaign, Metellus gained some advantages, but he received also several severe checks from the activity of Jugurtha, who turned to the best account his own perfect knowledge of the country, and the peculiar excellence of his subjects in desultory warfare. Experience, however, taught Metellus to guard more completely against this kind of annoyance; and his intrigues were so successful with the principal officers of his enemy, that Jugurtha found those whom he had most trusted engaged in a conspiracy against his life; and although he escaped the immediate danger by

Metellus  
restores the  
Roman  
discipline.

<sup>1</sup> Bell. Jugurthin. c. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. c. 46.

putting them to death, his prospects for the future were overcast with fear, and he regarded every one about him with suspicion. Meantime the famous Caius Marius,<sup>1</sup> who had served with distinction under Metellus, as his second in command, impatient of holding an inferior station, and coveting to himself the glory of conquering Jugurtha, had obtained leave to go to Rome, and offer himself as a candidate for the consulship. He was a man of low birth, and totally illiterate; but active and able, with power sufficient to make him feared by the nobility, and with an inveterate hatred against them, because their scorn of his mean condition galled his pride, and impeded his way to greatness. By depreciating<sup>2</sup> Metellus, and promising soon to end the war if the command were in his own hands, he won the favour of the multitude; for invectives against high birth and station, joined to an unabashed self-assurance, are powerful pleaders with the low and the ignorant; and he was elected for the first time to that office which he afterwards filled more frequently than any other Roman; and in which he was the author of as signal military services, and as great domestic injuries, as any one individual has ever been known to bring upon his country.

B.C. 111.  
Rise of Caius  
Marius.



[Caius Marius.]

Marius, soon after his election, received from the people, in spite of a contrary resolution of the senate, the command of the army in Numidia, and the conduct of the war with Jugurtha. On his arrival in Africa, he found that some of the most important towns in Numidia had been taken by Metellus, and that Jugurtha had implored and obtained the assistance of Bocchus, king of Mauritania, so that he had an additional enemy to encounter. But Bocchus, having no direct interest in the quarrel, did not refuse to listen to the overtures of the Roman general; and promised himself, if the fortune of war should prove adverse, to secure his own interests, by surrendering Jugurtha to his enemies. However, for the present, the two kings were in close alliance with each other; and Marius, in hopes of bringing them to action, employed himself in besieging some of the most valuable towns and fortresses in the Numidian dominions. It is worthy of notice, that at Capsa,<sup>3</sup> a strong place in one of the remotest parts of the country, after it had been surrendered, the whole male population was massacred, the women and children were sold for slaves, and the city was plundered and burnt; for no other reason than because the place was inconvenient for the Romans to garrison,

His first  
Consulship.

He is  
appointed to  
command  
against  
Jugurtha.  
B.C. 107.

<sup>1</sup> Bell. Jugurth. c. 63, 64, & c.

<sup>2</sup> Sallust, c. 64.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 91.

B.C. 107. and the people were not thought trustworthy. If we remember how strong a sensation has been excited in our own times, by the massacre of the Turkish prisoners at Jaffa, and then observe how Sallust excuses<sup>1</sup> the conduct of Marius at Capsa, we shall somewhat understand how dreadful were the atrocities of Roman warfare, and how degraded the condition of Roman morality.

The loss of these towns drove Jugurtha and Bocchus, as Marius had hoped, to try their fortune in the field; and he defeated them in two battles with severe loss. This disposed the king of Mauritania to open a communication with the Romans; the management of which, was intrusted by Marius<sup>2</sup> to L. Cornelius Sylla, his quæstor; and after much debate, Bocchus consented to win the favour of Rome, by betraying Jugurtha. Accordingly, having allured both Sylla and Jugurtha with the hope that he was going to deliver their enemy into their hands, he proposed that they should have a meeting with each other, to discuss the possibility of concluding a peace; and when the appointed time came, he ordered Jugurtha to be seized, and delivered him bound to Sylla. He was by him taken to the head-quarters of Marius, and from thence conducted to Rome, led in triumph<sup>3</sup> with his two sons before the chariot of the conqueror, and then put to death in prison. His own crimes had well deserved his punishment; but they in no way lessen the iniquity of the Romans in inflicting it, by no other right than that of conquest.

Betrayal of  
Jugurtha by  
Bocchus.

Death of  
Jugurtha.  
B.C. 106.

Extent of  
Roman  
dominion.

By the event of this war, Numidia was added to the list of Roman provinces. It was not till a somewhat later period that the Republic acquired Cyrene and its dependencies, by the bequest of their king, Ptolemy Apion; and Egypt and Mauritania remained unconquered till the times of the Cæsars. In the year of Rome 652, the date at which the present narrative closes, the dominions, formerly subject to Carthage and the kingdom of Numidia, were all that the Romans possessed in Africa; and these extended, to speak generally, along the coast of the Mediterranean from the greater Syrtis<sup>4</sup> to the river Ampsaga, or the town of Sardis, corresponding nearly with the limit between the modern governments of Tunis and Algiers. Their limit, towards the interior, it is impossible precisely to ascertain; and indeed, in fixing the extent of the Roman empire at any one period, minute accuracy, if attainable at all, would not repay the labour of arriving at it: because, our materials for the history of Rome are by no means full and uninterrupted; and many countries were at one time given away to some ally, and then again united to the empire, and thus are sometimes included amongst the provinces, and some-

<sup>1</sup> *Id facinus, contra jus belli, non avarità neque scelere Consulís admissum: sed quia locns Jugurthæ opportunus, nobis aditu difficilis: genus hominum mobile, infidum, neque beneficio neque metu coer citum.* c. 91.

<sup>2</sup> Sallust, c. 102, *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Livy, *Epitom. lib. lxxvii.*

<sup>4</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural. lib. v. c. 2, 3; Strabo, lib. xvii. p. 972. edit. Xyland.*

times spoken of as independent. Again, in some parts, as for example, B.C. 106. in the countries between Macedonia and the Danube, continual warfare was carried on for ages between the Romans and the natives; and whilst a victory would nominally extend the bounds of the empire, by leading to the submission of various tribes, any change of circumstances would presently contract them, by exciting the new subjects to revolt. Besides, the imperfect state of ancient, and we may add, of modern geography, makes it difficult, if not impossible, with regard to many quarters of the Roman empire, to fix the limits of provinces or of countries loosely inhabited by barbarian tribes; and even where there is any great natural division spoken of as the boundary, such as the Rhine and the Danube, at a later period, or the chain of Mount Taurus, after the war with Antiochus, there might be natural fastnesses, and wild districts, even within the general frontier, which defied the Roman authority, and furnished the provincial officers with occasions of victories and triumphs. These considerations may excuse the imperfections, or even the inaccuracies, of that sketch of the extent of the empire, which we now propose to offer.

What has been already said in the course of the narrative, will sufficiently show the nature and extent of the Roman power in Africa, Spain, and Gaul. The Balearian<sup>1</sup> islands were conquered Balearian  
Isles  
conquered. by Q. Metellus about the year 630, complaint having been made that the inhabitants infested the sea with piracies. Sardinia and Sicily had been gained from Carthage, as has been mentioned in a former part of this history, before the second Punic war; and Corsica had been conquered at the same time with Sardinia, but it seems to have been considered of little importance; and there is no mention of any attempt having been made on it, by either party, during the war with Hannibal. Melita, or Malta, of which we speak only on account of its modern celebrity, was first taken, according to Livy,<sup>2</sup> in the very first year of the second Punic war; and at the end of that war, was finally ceded by the Carthaginians, together with their other islands in the Mediterranean. View of the  
Roman  
conquests. The whole of Italy, in the modern sense of the term, was already subject to the Romans; although the Ligurians and Istrians were still probably in a state of imperfect obedience. To the eastward, the countries between the Danube and Greece offer, as we have said, the most indistinctly marked portion of the empire. A part of the eastern coast of the Adriatic had been conquered, even before the second Punic war; or rather underwent the first introduction to conquest, in becoming<sup>3</sup> allied to the Romans. In the second Macedonian war, Gentius, a king<sup>4</sup> of a large part of Illyria, having allied himself with Perseus,


<sup>1</sup> Strabo, lib. iii. p. 177. edit. Xyland; Florus, lib. 3. c. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, lib. xxi. c. 51.

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. lib. ii. c. 11; lib. iii. c. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, Illyrica, c. 9.

B.C. 106. paid the penalty of losing all his dominions. Dalmatia, to the north-west of Illyria, skirting the eastern coast of the Adriatic, had



[Malta, the ancient Melita.]

been first attacked and partially subdued by C. Marcius Figulus<sup>1</sup> and P. Scipio Nasica, in the years of Rome 597 and 598; but triumphs continued to be earned, by victories in Dalmatia, even down to the time of Augustus: and the same may be said of Thrace, and the other countries to the north of Macedonia, which remained so long in a wild and unsettled state, that we read of revolts in Thrace<sup>2</sup> even in the reign of Tiberius Cæsar. If we turn to the southward, Macedonia,<sup>3</sup> Thessaly, and Epirus, are said to have been reduced at one time to the form of a province, at the end of the third Macedonian war, in the year of Rome 608. The southern states of Greece were also subjected to the government of a Roman Prætor, by the decree of the ten commissioners, who, as usual, were sent to determine<sup>4</sup> the future condition of the country, after the destruction

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *Illyrica*, c. 11; Livy, *Epitom. lib. xlvii.*

<sup>2</sup> Tacitus, *Annal. lib. ii. c. 64; lib. iv. c. 46, et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Rufus Festus. *Jornandes.*

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias, *Achaica*, c. 86.

of Corinth. By their decision, the popular assemblies were everywhere abolished, and the local administration was made strictly oligarchical; but afterwards, the old assemblies were restored, when the power of Rome was so securely established, that such empty shows of liberty might be granted without danger.

By the termination of the war with Antiochus, Rome, as we have seen, gained to herself, nominally, no dominion in Asia. But as she claimed<sup>1</sup> the right of resuming at pleasure such gifts of territory as she awarded to her allies, she may thus be considered the actual sovereign of Lycia and Caria, which she bestowed on the Rhodians, and of Phrygia, Lydia, and several other provinces, which were given to the king of Pergamus. The first actual province,<sup>2</sup> however, which the Romans formed in Asia, consisted of the dominions of their oldest allies; of those very kings of Pergamus who had given them such useful aid in all their wars with the Greek princes and commonwealths, from the first contest with Philip, king of Macedon, to the final overthrow of the Achæan confederacy.<sup>3</sup> Attalus, the son of Eumenes, dying in the year of Rome 620, left his dominions by will to the Roman people. But Aristonicus, a natural brother, as some say, of the late king, endeavoured to obtain the kingdom for himself, and at first met with some success; but was afterwards defeated and taken, and, according to the usual practice of the Romans, was led in triumph, and afterwards put to death.<sup>4</sup> It is mentioned by Florus,<sup>5</sup> that Manius Aquilius, by whom this war was brought to an end, did not hesitate to poison the wells, in order to reduce some of the revolted cities to submission; nor does it appear that for so dreadful a crime, his conduct was ever called in question by his government. In this manner, by the overthrow of Aristonicus, the kingdom of Pergamus was reduced into the form of a province, which was called peculiarly the province of Asia. Along the southern shore of the Euxine, the kingdoms of Bythinia, Cappadocia, and Pontus, still subsisted under their native sovereigns; and from the last of the three was soon to arise an enemy, only second to Hannibal in the abilities and obstinacy with which he so long combated the Romans—the famous Mithridates. To the south of the province of Asia, the countries of Lycia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia, were not yet formally annexed to the empire; although Lycia and Pamphylia, having been among the districts ceded by Antiochus, enjoyed their liberty only as a gift from Rome. Further to the eastward, the Romans, as yet, had made no advances: Crete and Cyprus were untouched; and Rhodes, taught<sup>6</sup> by the treatment it

<sup>1</sup> Appian, Numidica, sect. 3, edit. Schweighæuser.

<sup>2</sup> Jornandes, lib. i.; Florus, lib. ii. c. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 721, and lib. xiv. p. 744, edit. Xyl. Livy, Epit. lib. lix.

<sup>4</sup> Paternulus, lib. ii.; Strabo, lib. xiv. p. 744; Orosius, apud Sigoniam, Comment. in Fest. et Triumph. Romanorum.

<sup>5</sup> Florus, lib. ii. c. 20.

<sup>6</sup> Rufus Festus. Jornandes.



B.C. 106. received after the war with Perseus, had been since careful to purchase its municipal independence by the utmost deference to the will of the senate and its officers.

Causes of the  
Roman  
conquests.

Great as was the empire which the Romans had by this time acquired, none of their conquests, since the end of the second Punic war, were such as can at all surprise us. The ascendancy of a well constituted army, and a good system of military policy, over the utmost perfection of rude courage or individual ability, is so well known, that the gradual reduction of Spain, of Gaul, of Thrace, and of Illyricum, as well as the subjugation of Numidia, may be considered as matters of course. Carthage, at the time of its final struggle, was hardly more than a single city; and the long disuse of arms had taken away all the opportunities by which good officers, and an efficient military system are created; to which, we may add, that the Carthaginians helped their own ruin, by the surrender of their arms and engines of war, at the very moment when they were most needed. Antiochus was a prince of little ability or courage, and the event of the first general battle frightened him into submission; nor can the issue of that battle in itself appear wonderful, when we remember how little skill and discipline have ever been found in the organization of Asiatic armies; and that the kings of Syria were, by this time, fully infected with the ignorance and weakness of Asia. It is only in Greece and in Macedon that we might have expected a longer and a more doubtful contest. The country which first sent forth regular armies to war, and the infantry of which had long maintained so complete a superiority over the soldiers of all other nations, ought not, we may think, to have bowed beneath the yoke of Rome, without signaling its fall by some heroic effort, and yielding to its enemy a dearly purchased victory. The posterity of Xenophon, of Epaminondas, and of Alexander, might surely have inflicted on Rome a second Cannæ, before they suffered defeats more humiliating than that of Zama.

Over Philip.

But, in fact, the circumstances of the Macedonian and Achæan wars abundantly explain the easiness with which the Romans obtained their successes. In their first contest with Philip, they hemmed him in on every side with enemies, and the resources of Macedon were exhausted by the plundering parties of the Ætolians and Dardanians on one side, and, on the other, by the united fleets of Rome, Pergamus, and Rhodes, which infested the coasts; and by the main consular army, the ranks of which were swelled by the contingents of half the states of Greece. The battle of Cynocephale was the only regular action in the whole war; and its result laid open to the victorious army the whole of Thessaly, and the entrance into Macedon itself. As for the event of that battle, there is no reason to dispute the judgment of Polybius, who pronounces the Macedonian tactics to have been unable to compete with the Roman;

and Hannibal's authority ought to have determined all other commanders to oppose the Roman legion with troops armed and organized in the same manner. Neither Philip nor Perseus were able generals; and the monarchy of Macedon was so rudely constituted, that all depended on the personal character of the sovereign; nor could the king have seen, without jealousy, and probably without danger, the actual control of his armies in the hands of a subject, whose ability might supply his own deficiencies. Had Hannibal been the general of the Macedonians, his genius would probably have so modified the Grecian tactics, as, without forfeiting their own peculiar advantages, to have given them some of the improvements of the system of their enemies, and thus he might have changed the fortune of particular battles; but, where the force of the two contending powers was so unequal, he could scarcely have hoped to alter the event of the war.

With regard to the Greek republics, in addition to the inferiority of their tactics, which they shared in common with the Macedonians, they laboured under a defect peculiar to themselves, and arising naturally from their inconsiderable extent and power, and the insignificant scale on which they had been used to see military operations conducted. Though much individual courage existed amongst the generals and soldiers, yet war had assumed a character of less horror, from the balanced strength of the several commonwealths, the habit of avoiding extreme measures on either side, and the comparatively little slaughter with which their battles were accompanied. The Romans, on the contrary, made it a part of their policy to give war its most terrible aspect. Their battles were decisive and bloody; the very wounds which were inflicted by their favourite weapon—a heavy sword, equally calculated for stabbing or for cutting—wore an appearance of peculiar ghastliness; and in the storming<sup>1</sup> of towns, they added to the usual horror of such scenes, by deliberately lopping the limbs off the dogs and other animals which fell in their way, on purpose to exaggerate the impression of the destruction occasioned by their arms. A large army of twenty or thirty thousand men, conducting a campaign on this system, and regarded, besides, with that terror which civilized nations usually feel towards those whom they consider barbarians, filled the minds of the Greeks with fearful imaginations of its superior strength and ferocity; exactly in the same manner, and from the same causes, as the little states of Italy, in the fifteenth century, trembled before the impetuous<sup>1</sup> courage of the French; when they found that the field of battle was made the scene of actual and terrible slaughter, and not, as in their own insignificant encounters, a mere stage for the display of their arms and their manœuvres.

Thus victorious over every enemy, and removed, as it might have

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. lib. x. c. 15.

Over the  
Greek  
Republics.

B.C. 106.

B.C. 106.  
 Sketch of the  
 Nations  
 inhabiting  
 the north of  
 Europe.

seemed, far above any apprehension of danger, the Roman republic was suddenly obliged to struggle for its very existence; and amidst all its warlike population, could find one man alone to whose guidance it could venture to trust its armies in this alarming emergency. The reader will perceive that we are alluding to the invasion of Italy by a vast swarm of barbarians from the north of Europe, known by the various names of Cimbri, Teutones, Ambrones, and Tigurini. And here we cannot but remark a striking peculiarity in the state of the most civilized of the ancient nations, which widely distinguishes them from the empires and kingdoms of modern Europe. The Greeks and Romans saw almost before their eyes the limits of that world with which alone they were concerned, and beyond which they knew nothing. The Alps and the mountains of Thrace were like the enchanted barriers of romantic story, beset with so many various perils, that the inhabitants of the region which they enclosed attempted not to surmount them. A few vague reports, brought by some enterprising trader, and collected amidst the difficulties of imperfectly understood dialects, from the fabling ignorance of barbarians, were the only information which could be gained concerning those vast countries, which are now the seat of so many mighty empires, from the Danube to the Frozen Ocean, from China to the British Isles. Yet this unknown region was not like the sands of Africa, the unpeopled and impracticable wastes of which afford the countries, on which they border, their best security against the attacks of an enemy; on the contrary, the north of Europe teemed with inhabitants, and might be likened to a volcano, the inward workings of which cannot be seen, nor the causes of its eruptions traced; but which, from time to time, pours forth upon the cities at its base a sudden and unforeseen destruction. In this manner the earliest Greek historian<sup>1</sup> records the irruptions of Cimmerian and Scythian tribes into the more civilized parts of Asia, the dominions of Lydia and Media; and the earliest memorials of Italy bear testimony to similar invasions of the Celts or Gauls, who sometimes overran, and sometimes permanently occupied, the countries to the south of the Alps. In process of time, as the Roman power extended itself, Gaul became better known, and it was found that inroads from that quarter were no more to be dreaded; for the Gauls were now become a settled people, and, instead of wandering forth to prey on others, had acquired those comforts which began to induce their more barbarous neighbours to prey upon them. But if Gaul had ceased to inspire alarm, it was not so with the wide tract of country, which from the Rhine and the Alps extended eastward and northward, far beyond the knowledge, or even the reasonable conjectures of the Romans. Amidst the forests with which Germany was then over-

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, Clio. c. xv. 103.

spread, there was nurtured a race of men, bold, strong, hardy, and totally uncivilized, delighting in war, and despising the confinement of a settled habitation; numerous, from the unchecked instinct of population, where nothing more was coveted than a bare subsistence, yet still occasionally multiplying to such a point that even this could not readily be found; and then pouring forth upon wealthier countries, to gain by their swords, in a manner to them most welcome, indulgences which not even the labour that they hated could have procured for them at home. We are now to record the first assault made by this people on the dominions of Rome; from which period the Romans, as their power increased, for a long succession of years were in their turn the assailants, and advanced the limits of their empire and their knowledge from the Alps to the Danube. Beyond that river they could never penetrate; and soon after they had ceased to go forward with their conquests, the Germans renewed their old incursions upon them, till the empire was totally dismembered, and Italy itself, together with its provinces, submitted to the sceptre and the laws of a northern conqueror.

It was just at the close of the war with Jugurtha, that the alarm of the Cimbri and Teutones was at its height in Rome. They had been first heard of about eight or nine years before, when they attacked the province<sup>1</sup> of Illyricum, and there defeated Cn. Papirius Carbo, one of the consuls, with a consular army. After this victory they turned their course into another direction, and are said to have attacked several nations<sup>2</sup> of Gaul, and even to have penetrated into Spain; but being repelled from that country, they presented themselves on the frontiers of the Roman province of Transalpine Gaul; and requested admittance, as settlers, into some part of the Roman dominions, offering to employ their arms in the service of the Republic, as a return for the lands which they should hold. On receiving a refusal, they proceeded to gain their ends by force; and in two successive years, they defeated two other Roman consuls in Gaul; but with the caprice of barbarians, instead of following up their successes, they were allured in pursuit of some other objects, and left the Romans for two years unmolested. But in the year of Rome 648, they again fell upon them, and defeated two consular<sup>3</sup> armies united, with such terrible slaughter, that the capital itself was filled with alarm, and all men concurred in raising Marius to the consulship, as the only commander capable of saving his country. Fortunately, perhaps, for his reputation, the Germans again forbore to cross the Alps, and moved off into Spain; and being a second time driven back by the natives, they recrossed the Pyrenees, and spent another year in wandering over

The Cimbri  
and  
Teutones.  
B.C. 101.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, Gallica, c. 13; Livy, Epitom. lib. lxiii.

<sup>2</sup> Cæsar, Bell. Gallic. lib. vii.; Florus, lib. iii. c. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Sallust. Bell. Jugurth. c. 114; Livy, Epit. lib. lxvii.

B.C. 101. Gaul; while Marius had been re-elected a third and a fourth time to the consulship, and had thus the rare advantage of becoming thoroughly acquainted with his army, and inuring them to exertion<sup>1</sup> and implicit obedience by the strictest discipline, and by employing them in some of those laborious works, which afterwards became so familiar to the Roman legions in all parts of the empire. Thus when, in his fourth consulship, the Cimbri, reinforced by some other German hordes, attacked the Romans at once in Transalpine Gaul, and towards the north-eastern side of Italy, Marius not only completely destroyed the multitude by which he was assaulted in Gaul, but hastening immediately after his victory to the support of Lutatius Catulus, his colleague, engaged the other division of the enemy in conjunction with him, and gave them a second overthrow as complete as the first, in the neighbourhood of Verona. By these battles their force was entirely broken, and the alarms which had so long disturbed the minds of the Romans were totally dispelled.

Here then this portion of our narrative closes. From the period at which we are now arrived, ten years only elapsed before the beginning of the war between Rome and the states of Italy, and thirteen before the first expulsion of Marius, and the commencement of the civil war. These transactions, together with some of an earlier date, such as the seditions of the Graechi, and the revolt of the slaves in Sicily, will form a fit introduction to that history of the domestic affairs of the Republic, upon which we now propose to enter.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 13, *et seq.*



[Roman Legionary.—From Trojan's Column.]



[Roman Citizens, Rich and Poor.—Bardon.]

## CHAPTER XVI.

### TIBERIUS GRACCHUS.

B.C. 133.

THERE are few portions of history more deserving our attention B.C. 133. than that to which we now return, the civil wars of the Romans. The origin of these wars arose from the conflict between the interests of the two great divisions of society—the rich and the poor. The characters and events which marked their progress, possess every quality most fitted to awaken a lively interest in the reader; and their final issue, in establishing a monarchy as the government of the civilized world, may possibly have exercised an influence over the fate of Europe, which we feel even at this day. They are most remarkable also, as they exhibit the state of mankind at the period immediately preceding the promulgation of Christianity: when, therefore, if experience be the measure of knowledge, the world must have attained to the highest point in intellectual and moral discoveries which it has ever reached without the assistance of revelation. It will surely be no uninteresting inquiry to collect, so far as we can, the general amount of human virtue and happiness antecedently to the great revolution introduced by the preachers of the gospel; in order that we may judge of the probable result of

B.C. 133. the destruction of Christianity, which some avowedly, and many indirectly, consider as desirable.

The Civil Wars of Rome.

The period, then, of the civil wars of Rome, which comprises somewhat more than a hundred years, from the tribuneship of Tiberius Gracchus to the final establishment of monarchy, in the person of Octavius Cæsar, divides itself naturally into two portions. The first of these, ends at the death of Sylla, and the ascendancy of the aristocratical party, which was effected by his government. And it is upon this first division that we now prepare to enter.

At Rome, as in many other countries, the original distinctions between the different ranks of society were wholly arbitrary. The patricians and plebeians were two separate castes, between which insurmountable barriers existed. No wealth, nor talents, nor virtues, could raise a plebeian to the rank and privileges of a patrician; and as all intermarriages between the two classes were unlawful, the government was a hereditary oligarchy, from which the bulk of the nation, with their posterity for ever, were by law utterly excluded. The details of the particular events by which this system was overthrown, belong to the unknown period of Roman history. Before the Punic wars, however, it was entirely subverted; all offices of state were laid open to the plebeians, while the tribuneship was still, as before, exclusively their own: and a more liberal aristocracy was formed, in which nobility began to be derived from the possession of high political dignities, instead of being the necessary previous qualification for obtaining them. But a third caste in the commonwealth still subsisted, composed of those persons who, either by birth, or by captivity in war, or by the violence of regular slave traders, were doomed to the condition of slavery. The fortune of this caste was not so totally without hope as that of the old plebeians, because a slave might be enfranchised; and when once a freeman, the course of time, or extraordinary personal merit, might remove the taint of slavery from his blood, and raise his posterity to honours and power. But so long as he remained a slave, his degradation was complete; he was not considered as a member of the commonwealth; he could hold no property except by his master's sufferance; and his protection from the extremity of personal violence was little better than nugatory. The little notice which the ancient writers have paid to this class of men, has perhaps prevented us from sufficiently estimating their effect on the state of society. We cannot, however form a correct notion of the relative situations of the rich and the poor at Rome, without keeping in mind the existence of so large a proportion of the whole population in the condition of slavery. The numbers of slaves increased greatly with the increasing dominion of the republic; we have already seen how many were carried off from Africa, in the descents made on that coast in the two first Punic wars; fifty thousand more are mentioned

Vast number of Slaves.

as having been taken at one time in the destruction of Carthage; and no fewer than a hundred and fifty thousand were sold for the benefit of the army that had defeated Perseus, collected from the sack of seventy towns in Epirus. These were purchased in large multitudes, and probably at a low price, by the great landed proprietors of Italy; and generally superseded the use of free labourers, as their work was much cheaper, and could be exacted with greater severity. In consequence of this, the lower orders of freemen were reduced to great distress, and their numbers were rapidly diminished; insomuch, that in process of time, there was no such thing as a free peasantry to be found in some parts of Italy; slaves being used almost exclusively as agricultural labourers, and forming probably by much the largest proportion of those employed in trade or manufactures. At the same time, the legions were filled with none but freemen; and they whose swords gained the republic her conquests, were impatient at seeing the fruits of their victories pass into the hands of others, while their own condition was absolutely rendered worse by the consequences of their own valour. For we must not attribute our own notions on public matters to the citizens of the ancient commonwealths. The states of antiquity being for the most part only single cities, political association was regarded very much in the light of a commercial partnership, of which national property formed as it were the stock; and any acquisitions made by the national arms, were looked upon as the profits of the trade, in which every partner ought to share. Thus, when territory was gained in war, the bulk of the people wished to have an immediate division of it made amongst them; whilst the government, or managing partners, were anxious that it should still be employed in advancing the joint interests of the whole body, instead of enriching the individual shareholders. In other words, they wished it to be sold to the highest bidder, and the price to be thrown into the treasury to supply the usual wants of the public service. This in fact was the system usually adopted at Rome; and thus large landed estates came into the hands of the rich, whilst the poor fancied that they did not gain in their due proportion from the growing greatness of their country. To remedy the evil, a popular tribune in the early ages of the republic, C. Licinius, had proposed and carried the famous law which bears his name; and which limited the amount of land which any citizen might possess, to 500 jugera, calculated by Arbuthnot as equal to 330 English acres. But this law was sometimes evaded, by land being held for the proprietor under other names;<sup>1</sup> and was sometimes openly disregarded. During the second Punic war, however, and the period that followed it for several years, the nobility enlarged their estates without opposition; partly, perhaps, because

Licinian  
Law.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Vita Tib. Gracchi, c. 8.



B.C. 133. the aristocratical interest was at this time all-powerful; and partly, because as the lands were alienated by regular sale, so long as the former owners could find employment as tenants or labourers, and were not superseded by the general substitution of slaves, the change in their condition was patiently borne. But when they found themselves everywhere supplanted by a class of men whom they so thoroughly despised, they either saw themselves debarred altogether from rearing a family, or they were forced to migrate to Rome, and swell the multitude of needy citizens in that city. The temptation thus offered to them to disturb the existing order of things, was peculiarly strong. As individuals, the poor often suffered from the grasping and oppressive spirit of the rich: yet, as members of the popular assembly, they formed a part of the sovereign power in the state, and might amply retaliate on the higher orders for the losses they had suffered. And here it becomes an exceedingly curious question, what was the general character of the popular party at Rome; what was their station in society, and what were their moral and intellectual attainments; as it is on a knowledge of these points that our judgment of the disputes which so long distracted the commonwealth must mainly depend. For if the Comitia were no better than an ignorant and profligate rabble, no true friend to liberty can possibly sympathize with their cause: but if they consisted of men, industrious though poor, of men whose views were directed towards a reasonable and definite object, whose private morals were fair, and who respected law and order, we shall then not brand them with the name of anarchists, merely because the reform which they proposed to effect, could in our days be attempted by none but the most desperate enemies of the peace of society.

Roman  
Plebeians.

The Roman plebeians, or all those citizens not of patrician extraction, whose property did not entitle them to be ranked among the equestrian order, may be divided into two classes; those who lived habitually in Rome, and those who were settled as small landed proprietors, as tenants of national property, or as labourers, in different parts of Italy. The former were naturally those who chiefly composed the popular assemblies, and they consisted of shopkeepers and mechanics, and of that lowest description of populace by which great towns in a genial climate are especially infested; where shelter and fuel and clothing being less important, they can more easily live without regular employment, as having fewer wants to provide for; and where even the food required is of a lighter quality, and consists of articles procurable at the cheapest rate, such as fruit, vegetables, oil, and the light wine of the country. These men would have all the qualities fitted to make them mischievous: idleness, improvidence, a total absence of all the feelings of honest independence, and a great sense of their own importance, both as freemen, while so many who enjoyed far more personal comforts were slaves, and as

members of a body whose power was the greatest in the world. B.C. 133. Nor must we at all judge of the shopkeepers at Rome by those of London or Paris. The sale for their goods would lie chiefly among the common people, because the rich supplied themselves with most of the articles they consumed, from the produce of their lands and the labour of their slaves. Their profits, therefore, were not likely to be very considerable, and their rank in society would be proportionably low. If we then remember the illiterate state of the Roman people in general at the period of which we are now speaking; and if we reflect besides, that whatever literature did exist, must have been confined almost exclusively to the higher orders from the expensiveness of books; we cannot ascribe much general or political information to the plebeians of the city. Last of all, we know what the morals of the lower classes in large cities are at this day, when their opportunities of being rightly taught are far greater than could possibly have been enjoyed at Rome. Without descending to the mere idle and dissolute populace, we should probably have found in the bulk of the plebeian inhabitants, a sense of their own interest generally predominant, a violent and cruel spirit towards those whom they looked upon as their opponents, and an obstinacy in maintaining blindly their own notions, mixed at the same time with many kind and generous affections towards their families and friends, and an attachment to the name and institutions of their country, which was liable indeed to be misled or overpowered for a time, but which was in the main strong and sincere. The plebeians of the country are generally spoken of by Roman writers, as a more respectable class than those of the city. They were more steadily industrious, as having less to call off their attention from their own employment: they were more domestic in their habits, and not only less apt for political contests from their manner of living, but in their houses and fields they possessed a property which they were less willing to hazard in civil commotions. The beautiful picture which Virgil gives of the simplicity and happiness of the small landed proprietors of Italy, although of course highly embellished, was doubtless not altogether imaginary; and it may be added, that the hard-heartedness to the general welfare of the poor, which is so often the fault of our farmers, was less called into action among the Romans; in whose country there were no poor rates nor parochial offices to excite a continual soreness in an uneducated mind; and where the farmer had scarcely any connection with more than his own household and labourers; a class of people whom it is most natural and obvious to treat with kindness and familiarity. Yet the agricultural plebeians must have been ignorant, and were likely to inherit the violence and obstinacy by which ignorance is ever accompanied. They must have entertained, too, a peculiar jealousy of the great nobility, by whom their own

Shop-keepers at Rome.

Singular picture of Rural Life.

B.C. 133. rank in society had been in so many instances overwhelmed; and when they came to the Comitia in the city, they were incapable of resisting the eloquence of popular orators, ever ready to encourage their angry feelings against the rich, to flatter their self-importance, and to persuade them that their interests were the same with the public good. Above all, the nature of mankind is such, that even the best and most highly educated individuals, when assembled together in a numerous body, are apt to be more swayed by passion and less by principle, than if they were deliberating alone, or in a small society. Much more is this the case when the inhabitants of a great city are promiscuously crowded together; for then the evil predominates with a fearful ascendancy, and a physical and moral excitement is created, which destroys the exercise of the judgment, and drowns the voice of moderation and self-restraint; leaving the mind open to any unreasonable impression that may be produced, whether of ridicule, of indignation, of compassion, or of pride.

Popular  
party in the  
time of  
Gracchus.

It results then, from this view of the state of the plebeians, that the popular party in the times of Tiberius Gracchus was made up of very heterogenous elements; that one division of it, the mere city populace, was thoroughly worthless; but that others were composed of industrious and often well-meaning men, whose great misfortune it was to have a power placed in their hands collectively, far more than proportioned to their knowledge. On the other hand, the aristocratical party consisted of materials not less discordant. Among those who had engrossed the landed estates of Italy, there were many who in the command of armies or in the government of provinces, had given the utmost proofs of cruelty and rapacity, and who displayed the same temper to their poorer countrymen at home. Others again sought merely to gratify the pride of nobility by the enjoyment of a large fortune and influence: these were men whose selfishness was passive, so long as it was indulged to the utmost, but who could behave with the most unscrupulous cruelty towards any who should attempt to restrain it. A third class consisted of those whose minds were loftier, and whose ambition was of a nobler character: men who delighted in conducting the councils or heading the armies of the state; who wished to promote the greatness of their country, perhaps without being conscious to themselves how far a love of their own individual greatness mingled in the wish; and who felt the besetting vice of great abilities, contempt for the ordinary race of mankind. Such persons, like the magnanimous man of Aristotle's philosophy, having done the state great service, thought it just that their station in it should be pre-eminent; and scorned the thought of admitting the lower classes of the people to a participation in their grandeur, as an outrage on the majesty of Rome. So complicated are the motives by which we are actuated, and so hard is it where our own welfare coincides with what we deem the public good, to

decide how much of a selfish bias determined us in forming our opinion. There yet remained a fourth description of supporters of the aristocracy, in those who by their own merit had raised themselves to a fair and honourable affluence; those who had inherited, or acquired by commerce, a respectable but not an overgrown fortune; those who content with little had obtained consideration by their eloquence, their military services, or their tried integrity; and those of the nobility themselves, who though poor were without covetousness, and were more aristocratical from the influence of birth and connections, than inclined to take the popular side from their poverty. Amongst this last class were numbered the majority of the equestrian order; and some of the most eminent individuals in Roman history; Scipio Æmilianus, in the times of the Gracchi, and at a later period M. Cicero and M. Cato. B.C. 133.

Many years had now passed since Rome had been disturbed by civil dissensions. We are told indeed, that when the senate, immediately on the conclusion of the second Punic war, proposed to begin a fresh contest with the king of Macedon, the people were strongly disinclined to the measure,<sup>1</sup> and complained that the nobility sought to involve the nation in perpetual hostilities, for the gratification of their own ambition. But when the seat of war was removed far away from Italy, and an uninterrupted succession of conquests flattered at once the national vanity, and often enriched the soldiers by the plunder which it threw into their hands, the popular aversion to war probably subsided. It was likely to be changed into fondness for it, from the period that the acquisition of the revenues of Macedon, added to the large income derived from other provinces, relieved the citizens of Rome from taxation altogether. Those changes indeed in the state of property, which were afterwards to occasion such fatal quarrels, were in the meanwhile silently being effected; but they were not yet so great as to call off the public attention from subjects of more immediate interest; and it has ever been the case, that the gradual approach of financial troubles has been unheeded, till the moment when the clouds have covered the whole face of the sky, and the storm has burst in thunder.

Changes in  
the state of  
Property,  
gradual.

It has been already mentioned when speaking of the war with Numantia, that C. Mancinus, one of the consuls employed in that service, was obliged to purchase the safety of his army by an unfavourable treaty; that the senate violated the agreement thus made, and ordered the general who had concluded it to be delivered up to the enemy, as if the perfidy of the government could be so atoned for. The officer who had been particularly employed in drawing up this obnoxious treaty, was the consul's quæstor,<sup>2</sup> Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus; and it was said that the Numantines

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxxi. c. 6.

Plutarch, Vita. Tib. Gracchi, c. 5.

B.C. 133. were chiefly induced to treat, from their respect to his name: his father having served in Spain, and by his honourable conduct having won the esteem and regard of the natives. When then the senate resolved to surrender to the Numantines not only the consul but all his principal officers, the popular assembly interfered; and considering that Gracchus had done no more than save the lives of many thousand citizens, when the consul's misconduct had exposed them to destruction, it determined that all the other officers should be exempted, and that Mancinus should be given up alone. The different treatment which Gracchus on this occasion received from the senate and from the people, is said to have predisposed him to thwart the one, and to enlist on the side of the other. About three years afterwards, in the year of Rome 621, he was elected one of the tribunes of the people.

Gracchus struck by the accumulation of Slaves in Italy.

The great accumulation of slaves in Italy, and the consequent dearth of free labourers, was now become a serious evil. Gracchus had been struck with it, we are told, as he passed through Tuscany on his way home from Spain; observing, that the visible population consisted for the most part of foreign slaves, who were working in fetters under their taskmasters. The dangers of this system had been also made manifest by an insurrection which had lately broken out among the slaves in Sicily; for the immense estates possessed in that island by Roman or Latin citizens,<sup>1</sup> were, like those in Italy, cultivated entirely by slaves, whose numbers became so formidable, that being roused to arms by one of their body, they maintained a long and bloody war with the Roman government, spread devastation over the whole island, and defeated no fewer than four Roman prætors, who were sent against them. Plutarch tells us besides, that Gracchus being known as a young man of enterprise and ability, was called upon in many addresses written upon the walls in different parts of the city, to stand up in the cause of the poor, and to recover for them the public lands which the rich had monopolized.

Remedial measures of Gracchus.

Thus instigated at once by the pressing evils of the existing system, by personal predilections, and by the allurements of an evident popularity, Tiberius Gracchus entered on his unfortunate career. The remedy which he proposed for the growing distresses of the poor, consisted in a revival of the Licinian law, with certain modifications: that is to say,<sup>2</sup> he allowed a father of a family to hold five hundred jugera of public or conquered land in his own right, and two hundred and fifty more in right of each of his sons: but any man who possessed more than this amount, was to restore it to the nation on receiving a price for it from the treasury. To this proposition was added, that the lands thus recovered, should be divided among the poorer citizens, and that it should be unlawful at any

<sup>1</sup> Florus, lib. iii. c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Vita Gracchi, c. 9; Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 9, 10.

time that any of these allotments should be sold: and finally, in order to provide for the execution of the law, three commissioners were to be appointed annually, with powers to see it duly carried into effect, and its enactments observed unbroken. It is said by Plutarch, that in proposing these measures Gracchus acted with the concurrence of some individuals of distinguished rank, and of great legal knowledge; such as P. Crassus, then Pontifex Maximus, and P. Mucius Scævola, one of the consuls; both of whom are often mentioned by Cicero<sup>1</sup> as eminent for their acquaintance with the civil law, as well as for their general eloquence and ability. If this be true, it is a proof that the mischievous tendency of an Agrarian law was not so palpable to the Romans as it is to us, and the apparent extravagance of Gracchus's conduct is much lessened. Indeed we should remember, that he only professed to enforce, even in mitigated severity, an actually existing law; and that though time had seemed to sanction the encroachments of the rich, he might yet not un-naturally think that the people could never lose their rights by mere disuse; and that his proposed indulgences to the holders of national property, abundantly compensated for any wrong they might sustain by the sudden revival of a long dormant claim. It is not possible that we, with the added experience and knowledge of more than nineteen centuries, can hesitate to condemn his scheme as pernicious and impracticable; nor indeed did it appear otherwise to calm and sensible men at that very time; for C. Lælius, known by the name of the Wise, endeavoured in his tribuneship a few years before, to remedy the evils arising from the accumulation of estates; but finding that they could not be removed without greater mischief, he abandoned the attempt altogether. But still, although the conduct of Gracchus was violent and unwise, it does not imply in him such a degree of profligacy or folly, as would be justly imputed to a similar proposal now.

The aristocracy in general warmly opposed the projected law; and Gracchus, impatient of any opposition to a scheme which he deemed so beneficial, at once lost his temper; and dropping the more conciliatory clauses, proposed merely that the holders of national lands beyond the legal amount, should be obliged to give them up immediately.<sup>2</sup> This only added to the vehemence of the opposition against it; and the question being one of such universal interest, great crowds of people flocked to Rome from all quarters of Italy, to take part with the friends or enemies of the law.<sup>3</sup> But the aristocratical party, well knowing how the tribes were likely to vote if it were left to their decision, had secured the negative of M. Octavius, one of the tribunes: and this being resolutely interposed, whenever the measure was brought forward, it was impossible for

Opposition of  
the  
Aristocracy.


<sup>1</sup> De claris Orator, c. 26; De Oratore, lib. i. c. 50, 56; De Officiis, lib. ii. c. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Vita Gracchi, c. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 10.

B.C. 133. Gracchus, according to the forms of the constitution, to carry his point. He too, however, availed himself of his power as tribune to embarrass his opponents; for he suspended by his negative the functions of every officer in the state,<sup>1</sup> and sealed up the doors of the treasury; thus stopping all issues or receipts of money for the public service. So strange was the extent of the tribunitian authority, that Gracchus in these violent proceedings was acting agreeably to law; and the nobility, unable to resist him, went into mourning to show their sense of the distressed and dangerous state of the republic.

Still, while Octavius persisted in his opposition, the law could not be carried.<sup>2</sup> Gracchus, therefore, resolving to overbear every obstacle, and having endeavoured to win over his colleague by entreaty, as he was personally well known to him, and by the utmost efforts of his eloquence; at last finding him immovable, openly declared, that two men so opposed to one another ought not to continue in office together: that either Octavius or himself ought therefore to be forced by the people to lay down the tribuneship. And with a mockery of fairness, he desired Octavius first to submit to the Comitia the question, that Tiberius Gracchus should be no longer tribune. When this was declined, he announced his own intention of proposing a similar resolution on the following day with regard to Octavius. Accordingly, when the assembly met, Gracchus,



[Denarius of the Gens Hostilia.]

M. Octavius degraded from the Tribunate.

after another personal appeal to his colleague, entreating him to yield to the wishes of the people, and finding him still resolute in his refusal, proposed to the tribes the sentence of degradation. Seventeen successively voted for it; and as the total number of the tribes was thirty-five, the votes of one more would constitute a majority. At this point, then, Gracchus paused, and once more conjured Octavius to spare him the necessity of proceeding to such a painful extremity. Octavius, it is said, was staggered; but the sight of the nobility, who anxiously watched his behaviour, and the shame of being intimidated by personal considerations, gave him fresh firmness: and he told Gracchus to do whatever he thought proper. The eighteenth tribe then gave their votes for his degradation; and the measure being carried, Gracchus sent one of his officers to drag Octavius down from the seat which he occupied as tribune. When this had been done, and Octavius had been thrust out among the people, the mob immediately fell upon him; and although Gracchus tried to check them, he found that a demagogue has little power in restraining his followers from violence; and Octavius with difficulty escaped

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Vita Gracchi*, c. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* c. 11, 12; Appian, c. 12.

from their fury, by the efforts of the nobility, and the zeal of his B.C. 133.  
own slaves, one of whom lost his eyes in defending his master.

After such an example, no tribune ventured any more to impede the progress of the law; which was passed immediately without difficulty. But it appears that Crassus and Mucius were either disgusted at the late conduct of Gracchus, or that he began now to throw himself entirely into the arms of the common people; for neither their names, nor those of any other distinguished senator unconnected with the tribune, were to be found among the commissioners appointed to carry the law into effect. The list consisted of Gracchus himself,<sup>1</sup> of his younger brother Caius, a youth of only twenty years of age, and at this time serving under Scipio in Spain, and of his father-in-law Appius Claudius. It was evident that the real power of the commission would rest solely with Tiberius Gracchus; and this circumstance was likely to embitter still more the feelings of the senate towards him. Their hatred betrayed itself in a manner at once impolitic and mean; for they refused him the usual allowance granted to a public commissioner,<sup>2</sup> and reduced it to a denarius and a-half, or about one shilling a-day. Both parties were full of suspicion against each other; a friend of Tiberius happening to die suddenly, the appearance exhibited by his body was attributed to the effects of poison; and Tiberius himself, as if afraid for his own life, put on mourning, and with his young children in his hand, went round among the people, recommending his family to their protection, in case he himself should fall a victim to his enemies. On the other hand Gracchus began to incur the imputation which had proved so often fatal to former demagogues, that of aspiring to make himself tyrant of Rome.<sup>3</sup> Attalus, the last king of Pergamus, was lately dead; and one of his ministers had arrived in Rome with his will, by which he bequeathed his dominions and treasures to the Roman people. Gracchus immediately proposed a law, that the treasure should be divided among those citizens who should receive allotments of land under the new commission, in order to enable them to stock their farms; and that the disposal and management of the kingdom should be lodged exclusively with the popular assembly. Under the odium which such conduct excited, any accusation against him was readily listened to; and a senator, whose house was next to that of Gracchus, stood up in the senate, and asserted on his own knowledge, that the minister of the late king of Pergamus had presented Gracchus with a diadem and a scarlet robe, preparatory, as he insinuated, to his usurping the regal state of which those decorations were the insignia.

The Com-  
missioners.

Charges  
against  
Gracchus.

But his conduct towards Octavius afforded his enemies a surer ground of censure. Even many of the people, it is said, were struck

<sup>1</sup> Appian and Plutarch, *ubi supra*.      <sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Vita Gracchi, lib. xiii.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *ubi supra*.      Vell. Paternul. lib. ii.



B.C. 133. with the unprecedented violence of that measure; and Gracchus thought proper to justify himself at some length, and endeavoured to show that the sacredness of the tribunitian office was destroyed, when a tribune turned his power to the injury of that part of the people whose interests he was especially appointed to guard. What effect his arguments produced on the minds of his hearers cannot be known; but in the judgment of posterity his conduct has appeared indefensible. The negative of the tribunes was their peculiar and constitutional privilege; and it had often been exerted in defence of individuals against popular violence, as well as in behalf of the interests of the commons collectively against the encroachments of the aristocracy. To set it aside whenever it opposed the inclinations of a majority of the Comitia, and far more to degrade the tribune who interposed it, was a direct injury to the personal liberty of every citizen, and left him absolutely without defence against the wildest tyranny which the popular assembly might be excited by its orators to commit. It was a violation of the letter of the constitution, not on the plea of necessity, but merely of expediency; and it furnished a pretence for the more flagrant violation of it, of which the opposite party, in their turn, were soon proceeding to be guilty. Meanwhile the crowds who had flocked to Rome, during the discussion of the Agrarian law, had left the city and returned to their homes, elated with their triumph.<sup>1</sup> It was possible that Gracchus might not always be able to command a majority in the Comitia; and in that case, he had the prospect before his eyes of impeachment, condemnation, and exile. He resolved, therefore, to avail himself of his present popularity, for the purpose of being re-elected tribune for the following year; and he trusted that his supporters from the country would re-assemble on such an occasion, and would secure his election. To win still more the favour of the multitude, he allured them with the hope of a number of popular measures, which he proposed to carry in his next tribuneship: the term of military service,<sup>2</sup> to which every citizen was bound by law, was to be shortened; the judicial power in ordinary criminal causes, which had hitherto been confined to senators, was to be shared with the equestrian order; and Paterculus adds, that he promised to procure the freedom of Rome for all the inhabitants of Italy. These were indeed the proceedings of a dangerous demagogue; but it is impossible to decide whether Gracchus desired a second tribuneship as a defensive or an offensive measure; whether he wished it only as a protection for himself, or

Aims at the  
Tribunate.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, c. 13, seems to speak of these laws as actually proposed by Tiberius Gracchus; but as the one which regards the judicial power is ascribed, both by Paterculus and Appian, to his brother Caius, and no one mentions any of these measures among the actual offences of Tiberius, I have thought it most probable that they were only talked of by him, and were never carried into effect.

whether he meditated plans still more subversive of all good govern- B.C. 133.  
ment than those which he had already avowed. But fear has been justly numbered among the causes which led them into injustice; and acts which he might have deemed necessary to his own safety, might have been of a nature no less violent than such as the most deliberate treason against his country would have dictated.

The season of election was now approaching;<sup>1</sup> and the friends of the aristocracy insisted, that the same person could not legally be appointed tribune two years successively. Accordingly, on the day of election, a demur on this point was made by the tribune who presided at the Comitia, and who accepted or refused the votes of the citizens. He was requested to resign his office to Mucius or Mummius, a warm partizan of Gracchus, and the man who had been lately elected to fill the place of Octavius. But the other tribunes objected to this arrangement, and a dispute ensuing, the friends of Gracchus perceived that the result was likely to be unfavourable to them, and contrived to protract the discussion to so late an hour, that the assembly was obliged to be adjourned to the following day. During the remainder of the afternoon and evening, Gracchus again went about in mourning with his children, appealing to the compassion of the people; and so strong a sentiment was excited in his behalf, that a great crowd watched through the night around his house, in order to secure him from the violence which he affected to dread. He himself meanwhile was concerting with his friends the measures to be pursued on the morrow; and a signal was agreed upon amongst them,<sup>2</sup> to be used in case it should be necessary for them to employ force. The capitol was occupied by his party while it was yet dark; and in the morning he left his house to join them, and was received with the loudest acclamations; a crowd of his friends ranging themselves around his person, in order that no one on whom they could not depend might approach too near him.

Gracchus  
appeals to  
the  
compassion  
of the  
People.

From this point the relations of Plutarch and Appian vary; nor have we any contemporary account which might teach us how to reconcile them with each other, or assist us in judging which of the two we ought to follow. We shall attempt to compose such a statement as may be probable in itself, and not inconsistent with either of our authorities. At the first outset, the tribunes who were opposed to Gracchus,<sup>3</sup> and the partizans of the nobility, endeavoured to interrupt the election, on the ground which had been urged on the preceding day, that a tribune could not be re-elected for the following year. A disturbance thus arose among the multitude;<sup>4</sup> and at the same moment, Fulvius Flaccus, a senator attached to the popular party, arrived in haste from the senate; and making signs that he wished to speak to Gracchus, obtained a passage through the crowd.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch and Appian, *ubi supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch and Appian.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, c. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, c. 18.

B.C. 133. He brought information that the nobility, being unable to procure the sanction of the consul, were preparing of themselves to attack the Comitia; and had armed for this purpose a considerable body of their friends and of their slaves. The popular faction, already in a high state of agitation, were roused to the utmost by these tidings. They tucked up their gowns to prepare for action, seized the staves from the hands of the ordinary officers who kept order in the Comitia; broke them and distributed the fragments amongst their own party; and when Gracchus gave the concerted signal,<sup>1</sup> by raising his hand to his head, they at once fell upon the tribunes who had opposed them, and on the rest of the supporters of the senate, and drove them from the place of assembly. All now became tumult; the priests of Jupiter shut the gates of the temple in the capitol; and a thousand vague and exaggerated rumours were carried to the senate: some saying that Gracchus was deposing the other tribunes from their office; others, that he was nominating himself to a second tribuneship, without waiting for the votes of the people; while a third set, who had from a distance seen him raise his hand to his head, affirmed that he was instantly to be appointed king, and that he actually signified his desire to receive from the people a crown.

Tumult at Rome.

These several reports reached the senators who were assembled in the Temple of Faith. P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, a man of the highest nobility, of great landed property, and of a stern and determined temper,<sup>2</sup> called upon P. Mucius, the consul, to take instant and vigorous measures for the destruction of the tyrant. To this Mucius answered, that he would not set the example of shedding blood, nor destroy any citizen without trial; but if the people were seduced or terrified by Gracchus into any illegal resolutions, he should consider such resolution to be of no authority. Nasica then exclaimed, "The consul deserts the republic; let those who wish to preserve it follow me." At once the senators arose, wrapped their gowns around their left arms as a shield, and proceeded in a body towards the capitol. Nasica led them, with a fold of his robe thrown over his head; and the train was swelled by the friends and slaves of the senators, who had provided themselves beforehand with clubs and sticks. On the approach of this band, consisting of all the nobility of Rome, the people made way before them, and fled in all directions. The senators seized the staves which their opponents dropped in their flight, or armed themselves with the fragments of the benches which had been broken down in the confusion of the crowd. With these weapons they attacked all who fell in their way; and Gracchus himself endeavouring to escape, and stumbling over those who had already fallen, was killed by repeated blows on the head. About

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, de Officiis, lib. i. c. 30. De Claris Orator. c. 28.

three hundred of his friends shared his fate, being all killed by clubs or bludgeons, which were the only weapons employed. The bodies of all the slain, including Gracchus himself, were ordered to be thrown into the Tiber; and the senate following up their victory, put to death afterwards several of the partisans of the late tribune; some of them, it is said,<sup>1</sup> with circumstances of atrocious cruelty.

B.C. 133.  
Gracchus  
and his  
adherents  
slain.

It throws a remarkable light on the notions entertained by the Romans on political justice, that Cicero, a man whose moral principles were far purer than those of his countrymen in general, speaks more than once of the murder of Gracchus in terms of the warmest praise.<sup>2</sup> So accustomed were the Romans to have recourse to the plea of necessity or public utility, to justify the violation of the existing laws of the commonwealth. Now, as it is obvious that these abstract principles are of a far more pliable nature than written forms of law can be, all parties, in turn, might appeal to such an excuse with plausibility, when the laws, if duly observed, would have passed on each a just condemnation. No doubt there is an extreme on the other side; and a blind devotion to the letter and forms of the constitution on all occasions, may really compromise those great interests for the sake of which alone forms are valuable. But there cannot be a question that the adherence to rules, and the respect for particular institutions, which remarkably distinguish our English lawyers, are a most valuable security to personal liberty, and that they serve to subject the fury of contending factions to one impartial and unimpassioned decision. At Rome, public expediency was successfully appealed to, to justify the degradation of Octavius and the death of Gracchus; whereas a truer knowledge of the interests of justice and liberty would have taught them to abhor both those actions as illegal and tyrannical; the last, as is usual in cases of retaliation, far exceeding the former, by which it was provoked, in violence and atrocity.

Cicero's  
opinion on  
this act.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Vita Tib. Gracch. c. 20.

<sup>2</sup> De Officiis, lib. i. c. 22, 30.



[Denarius of the Gens Didia, with representation of the Villa Publica.]



[Caius Sempronius Gracchus.—*Museum Florentinum.*]

## CHAPTER XVII.

### CAIUS GRACCHUS.

FROM B.C. 133 TO B.C. 121.

B.C. 133. THE murder of Tiberius Gracchus was so much a sudden and isolated act, that it did not at all interrupt the execution of those laws which he had proposed and carried in his tribuneship. His death occasioned a vacancy among the commissioners for carrying into effect his Agrarian law; and P. Licinius Crassus,<sup>1</sup> who was nominated to succeed him, perishing shortly after in the war against Aristonicus,<sup>2</sup> in Pergamus; and Appius Claudius,<sup>3</sup> another of the original commissioners, dying also about the same time, the commission finally was composed of C. Gracchus, the younger brother of Tiberius, C. Papirius Carbo, and M. Fulvius Flaccus. But the extreme youth of C. Gracchus, and possibly the impression produced on his mind by the fate of his brother, prevented him from immediately taking an active part in public affairs. His colleagues, however, were well disposed to make up for his absence; and they proceeded to fulfil the duties of their appointment in that summary and absolute manner which was so familiar to the magistrates of Rome. They readily received accusations against any persons who were charged with holding national lands;<sup>4</sup> and decided on all these cases by their own sole authority. It often happened that property alleged to be public was intermixed with estates lawfully belonging to the inhabitants of the allied states of Italy; and now the present

Inquiries  
of the  
Tribunitian  
Commission.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Tib. Gracch. c. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. 59.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

commission extended its inquiries to the titles by which these estates were held; and their owners were called upon to show how they had acquired them; and to produce either the deeds of the purchase or the grants by which they had received them from the Roman government. Sometimes these documents were not to be found; and then the commissioners decided at their discretion upon the property of the land; and removed at pleasure from their estates men who had peaceably inherited them from a remote period. It appears, also, that for the encouragement of agriculture, permission had been given to individuals on former occasions, to enclose and cultivate the waste lands in their neighbourhood, on the payment probably of a rent, scarcely more than nominal, to the treasury. In process of time, the distinction between the freehold and rented parts of an estate was forgotten; the boundaries between the two were removed; and the whole was looked upon as held by the same tenure. But no prescription was any security against the new commissioners; all public land whatever was to be recovered out of private hands, and to be divided amongst the poorer citizens, according to the provisions of the Sempronian law. Nor was the distribution of the lots to be thus assigned less arbitrary.<sup>1</sup> The law allowed an individual to hold five hundred jugera of national property; but it seems that the commissioners might allot them to him in whatever part of Italy they thought proper. Many persons, therefore, were deprived of the lands which they held adjoining to their own estates; and received in exchange an allotment often less valuable in itself, and generally far less conveniently situated. Men obnoxious to the commissioners, either on political or personal grounds, were thus subjected to numberless vexations; while their partisans, their creatures, and their friends, might be most unduly favoured. It is probable, indeed, that the most industrious and peaceable among the poorer citizens would be by no means the greatest gainers from the distribution of land;<sup>2</sup> but that the opportunity would be seized to reward the most violent supporters of the democratical party in the popular assembly; and to encourage the riotous and seditious for the future, with the hope of earning for themselves a similar prize, by an active and unscrupulous obedience to the prevailing demagogues of the day.

It strongly marks the character of the Roman constitution, that at the very time when a commission so favourable to the wildest claims of the democratical party was actually in existence; the consuls,<sup>3</sup> P. Popilius and P. Rupilius were proceeding to inflict the penalty of banishment on several of the partisans of Tiberius Gracchus, by no other authority than a vote of the senate, and in

<sup>1</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Conf. Cicero, de Lege Agraria contra Rullum; Orat. ii. c. 29, 31.

<sup>3</sup> Velleius Patercul. lib. ii. Plutarch, in C. Gracch. c. 4.

B.C. 133. manifest contempt of the Valerian law. This, as was natural, was on a future occasion strongly resented by the popular party; and thus in the tyrannical powers which both sides in turn allowed themselves to exercise, there never were wanting to either pretences of retaliation, whenever they could gain the ascendancy.

P. Scipio  
opposes the  
Commission-  
ers of the  
Agrarian  
Law.

Meantime the proceedings of the Agrarian commissioners excited a general indignation amongst the inhabitants of the provinces of Italy,<sup>1</sup> many of whom had been dispossessed of estates to make room for some of the poor citizens of Rome. In looking out for a man who might espouse their cause with effect, they were led to fix their eyes on P. Cornelius Scipio Æmilianus, who was distinguished for his military services, and had lately returned to Rome, after having effected the destruction of Numantia. Scipio had become acquainted with many of the Italians, when serving under him as allies in the Roman army, and was well able to appreciate their value; he was inclined also of himself to oppose the popular party; and he came forward therefore with complaints of the excessive power vested in the hands of the commissioners; and proposed that all points in dispute between them and the occupiers of land, should be decided, not by themselves, but by a more impartial jurisdiction. This seemed so fair, that it was acceded to; and C. Sempronius Tuditanus, one of the consuls, was appointed judge of all appeals against the measures of the commissioners. But this officer, disgusted with the difficulties of the office, soon resigned it, and departed to his province of Illyricum; whilst as no one acted in his place, the commissioners again were enabled to defy all opposition. The attempt however to lessen their power had rendered Scipio odious to their party; nor

B.C. 131. was this the only way in which he offended them; for he had on a former occasion procured the rejection of a law brought forward by Carbo,<sup>2</sup> and supported by Gracchus, to allow the same person to be

B.C. 130. re-elected tribune, as often as the people should choose. He did not abate in his opposition to their power as commissioners, till on the night preceding the day on which he was going to address the people fully on the subject, he died suddenly in his bed:<sup>3</sup> and his death was attributed by the violence of party to the contrivances of Carbo and Gracchus. But the general and the most probable account was, that his death was natural;<sup>4</sup> nor indeed is secret assassination a crime consistent with that which we know of the character of the Roman political quarrels at this period of the republic.

Death of  
P. Scipio.

The Agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus, which had arisen immediately out of the relative situation of the rich and poor citizens of Rome, began now in its operation to affect other interests, and to

<sup>1</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lix. Cicero, de Amicit. c. 25.

<sup>3</sup> Appian. c. 20. Vell. Patercul. lib. ii. Livy, Epitom. lib. lix.

<sup>4</sup> Vid. Patercul.

bring forward new claims, and new changes. It has been mentioned, B.C. 130. that the landholders among the allied states of Italy felt themselves particularly aggrieved by it, and that they had applied to Scipio to undertake the defence of their cause. After his death they continued their opposition to it,<sup>1</sup> in conjunction with the aristocratical party at Rome; and thus the execution of the law was delayed and impeded, and its supporters might have despaired of ever carrying it into full effect, while there were such powerful interests arrayed against it. Upon this a scheme was devised, which should at once conciliate one part of the opponents of the laws, and set them at variance with the other part. Hopes were held out to the Italian allies, that they should be admitted to all the privileges of Roman citizens; and in return for so splendid a gift, it was expected that they would renounce their opposition to the Agrarian law. Besides, the popular leaders might probably calculate on making the strength of their party irresistible; if so many thousand members, indebted to them for their right of voting, should be added to the popular assembly; and as the number of citizens would then be so great, that an actual meeting of the whole people in one place would be impracticable; the Comitia were likely to consist of an assemblage of the idlest and most worthless of the community; to be more than ever incapable of reason, and more than ever liable to become instruments of mischief in the hands of their favourite orators. However, the proposed grant of citizenship completely answered the views of the popular leaders: the Italians, forgetting the Agrarian law in the seducing prospect now opened to them, crowded to Rome to witness the decision of the question, and to influence it in their favour by every means in their power. While on the other hand, the senate considering this new measure as more dangerous than even the division of the national lands, prepared vigorously to oppose it; and M. Junius Pennus,<sup>2</sup> one of the tribunes, brought forward a law under their authority, commanding all aliens to depart from Rome, and prohibiting them generally from access to it. The law was carried, and the success of the senate in this previous struggle deterred, as it seems, the popular leaders from bringing on the main question for the present. At this time also they lost one of their number, C. B.C. 127. Gracchus; who having been elected quæstor, was sent into Sardinia with L. Aurelius Orestes<sup>3</sup> one of the consuls, to quell some disturbances in that island.

The popular Leaders conciliate Italian allies by the hope of obtaining the rights of Roman Citizens.

The scheme defeated by the Senate.

In the succeeding year M. Fulvius Flaccus, one of the commis- B.C. 126. sioners of the Agrarian law, was elected consul; and availing himself of the power of his office, he threatened to bring the question concerning the Italian allies to an issue. The senate conjured him, Renewed unsuccessfully by M. Fulvius Flaccus.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Ciceron. de Claris Orator. c. 28. De Officiis, lib. iii. c. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 1.



B.C. 126. it is said,<sup>1</sup> to desist from his purpose; and finding that he treated them with contempt, they averted the evil for the time by sending Fulvius on foreign service;<sup>2</sup> availing themselves of the opportunity afforded by the Salyes, a tribe of Transalpine Gaul, who attacked the dominions of the city of Marseilles, an ally of the republic. But the hopes which his proposed measures had excited in the minds of the Italians could not be at once forgotten; and some among them were disposed to assert their claims by force, without depending on their friends at Rome. The people of Fregellæ are mentioned as having revolted from the Romans; and Cicero goes so far as to speak of the "war with Fregellæ."<sup>3</sup> But the war which a single city could maintain against the Roman empire could not have been very serious. Fregellæ was betrayed by one of its citizens;<sup>4</sup> and the prætor, L. Opimius, who was employed on this occasion, after having killed so many of the inhabitants as to encourage him to claim a triumph,<sup>5</sup> received the submission of the survivors,<sup>6</sup> and razed their city to the ground.

First  
Tribuneship  
and  
character of  
C. Gracchus.

It was late in the succeeding year when C. Gracchus, after an absence of about two years, returned from Sardinia, without the permission of his general, intending at the ensuing elections to offer himself as a candidate for the tribuneship.<sup>7</sup> His conduct in thus leaving his province was complained of, and was noticed by the censors; but he defended himself successfully both on this and on other occasions, when he was accused of having been concerned in the revolt of Fregellæ. He obtained also the office of tribune which he desired, but was so vigorously opposed by the senatorial party, that he could only obtain the fourth place in the list. He was now about thirty years of age, and possessed all the qualifications requisite in a popular leader. His eloquence was of a very high order,<sup>8</sup> at once sensible and commanding; his education<sup>9</sup> had begun early under the care of his mother Cornelia, and exceeded that of most of his contemporaries: his activity and diligence were great, and the fate of his brother, as well as the circumstances of his early political life, marked him out as a determined enemy of the senate, and partizan of the popular cause. Accordingly, his tribuneship was marked by a succession of acts, all prompted evidently by party views, and which appear to have originated far less in honest feelings of compassion for the sufferings of the poor, than the laws of his brother Tiberius. The truth is, that there were now two parties in the state more distinctly formed: and men under such circumstances

<sup>1</sup> Valerius, Maximus, lib. ix. c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 34. Livy, Epitom. lib. lx.

<sup>3</sup> De Lege Agrariâ, lib. ii. c. 33.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, De Finibus, lib. v. c. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Valerius Maximus, lib. ii. c. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lx.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Cicero, De Claris Orator, c. 33, 58.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

are too apt to believe that the good of their country can only be promoted through the medium of the ascendancy of their party. B.C. 126.

In the accounts which we are now to give of the measures pursued by C. Gracchus, the want of a good contemporary historian whom we may follow with confidence, will be severely felt. And here it may not be improper, once for all, to acquaint the English reader with the nature of those materials from which our knowledge of this part of Roman history is derived: for this is not made sufficiently clear by the generality of modern compilers, and their narrative proceeds with as little hesitation, as if they were copying from the fullest and most respectable authorities. The most detailed account of the times with which we are now engaged, is to be found in Plutarch's *Life of Caius Gracchus*. Now, from whom Plutarch chiefly copied, he does not inform us; and neither his knowledge of the Roman laws and forms, nor his general accuracy, nor even his object in writing, are such as to render him a valuable guide in stating the provisions of particular statutes with exactness, or the order in which they were proposed. Appian, who has written more briefly, is equally silent as to the authorities for his history, and quotes the enactments of the different laws too vaguely. It is to be observed, that he relates several facts in a different order from that followed by Plutarch. We should remember, then, that the writers whom we must chiefly consult were two foreigners, who lived more than two hundred years later than the period for which we refer to them—in whose times a totally new order of things had succeeded to the old government, and who appear to have had a very superficial knowledge of the laws and constitution of the republic. In addition to Plutarch and Appian, we have the sketch of Roman history drawn by Velleius Paterculus, in which the acts of Gracchus are enumerated all together without any detail of circumstances: we have the epitomes of the lost books of Livy, which are also a mere sketch, and compiled by an uncertain author, and we have the meagre outlines of the life of Gracchus given by Florus and Aurelius Victor. When these writers differ from one another, we know not to whose statements we ought most to listen, unless the point be determined incidentally by some allusion to it in an earlier writer; or unless we venture to decide by internal probability. The voluminous works of Cicero do indeed often throw light on the affairs of the times preceding his own; and his legal and constitutional knowledge make his authority highly valuable. But it is easy to understand, how very insufficient such scattered fragments of information must be towards giving a full and connected history of any transaction. We proceed then, but with hesitation and doubt, to offer the best account in our power of a period which well deserves to have been commemorated by able and more careful historians.

Sketch of the Authorities for this part of Roman History.

According to Plutarch, C. Gracchus commenced his career as

B. C. 124.  
Laws of C.  
Gracchus.  
Leges  
Sempronie.

tribune, by inflammatory addresses to the people, in which he bewailed continually the fate of his brother, and painted the iniquity of his murder. He then brought forward two laws, the one, to disqualify any magistrate who had been deprived of his office by the people, from being afterwards appointed to any other post of authority; the other, making it a crime cognizable by the popular assembly, if any magistrate banished a Roman citizen without trial. The former of these was merely a fresh mark of the hatred of the popular leaders towards M. Octavius, who had been degraded from the tribuneship, as has been already mentioned, for his opposition to the Agrarian law when first proposed by Tiberius Gracchus: and the unworthy feelings in which the measure originated were so evident, that C. Gracchus himself was persuaded by his mother to procure its rejection. The second law was particularly directed against P. Popilius, who, as we have seen, had, during his consulship exercised the vengeance of the senate against several of the partisans of Tiberius Gracchus. Popilius, fearful of being brought to trial, withdrew from Rome; and Gracchus then carried a law,<sup>1</sup> by which he was forbidden the use of fire and water in Italy, the usual form of passing a sentence of banishment. After these preparatory acts, intended, perhaps, to intimidate the friends of the aristocracy, Gracchus brought forward such measures as, by gratifying the common people, were likely to bind them to support him in all his future proceedings. The Agrarian law, passed during the tribuneship of his brother, Tiberius, was again confirmed;<sup>2</sup> and some provisions were probably made to ensure its execution. By another law it was ordered,<sup>3</sup> that the soldiers should be provided with clothing without deducting from their pay the money thus expended; and that no one should enlist under seventeen years of age. A third enacted, that corn should be distributed monthly to the people,<sup>4</sup> at the price of five-sixths of an as for the modius or peck; which would make the value of the quarter nearly 1s. 8d. of our money. What quantity was thus to be given to every citizen, we have not been able to find: but whether it were much or little, the injustice and impracticability of this Roman poor-law are equally striking; for its operation would, in the end, have fed the Roman people at the expense of the subject provinces; and, by discouraging industry and encouraging population, would have filled Rome with a mere multitude of idle paupers, incapable of government, and so completely worthless, that the rest of the world would not long have endured their dominion, or their existence. This law was warmly opposed by the aristocratical party, and, amongst the rest,

Corn Law  
Lex Fru-  
mentaria.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, pro Domo sua, c. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lx.; Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 21; Livy, Epitom. lib. lx.

by L. Calpurnius Piso,<sup>1</sup> who had been consul during the year in which Tiberius Gracchus was killed. It passed, however, in spite of their opposition, and soon after Piso was seen amongst the crowd of poor citizens, who came to receive their portion of corn. Gracchus observing him, charged him with inconsistency, for taking the benefit of a law which he had so strongly opposed; to which Piso replied,—“I should very much object to your giving away my property amongst the people; but if you were to do it, I should certainly try to get my share of it.” In addition to all these acts, another was passed to gratify the Italians,<sup>2</sup> by granting them the right of voting in the assemblies at Rome; but without communicating to them the other privileges of Roman citizenship. But the most formidable attack upon the senate still remained to be made: the judges who sat with the prætors, for the ordinary trial of criminal causes, had hitherto consisted of senators alone:<sup>3</sup> and in the strong party feeling which bound the members of the different orders of the republic to the support of each other, a senator when tried by senators was likely to meet with more favour than justice. This was particularly the case when officers of high rank were tried for corruption or misconduct in the provinces: and instances of partiality had lately occurred in the acquittal of L. Aurelius Cotta and Marcius Aquilius, the former of whom had been accused by P. Scipio Æmilianus,<sup>4</sup> and had been brought before the court eight successive times; and the latter may be well judged capable of any crime, since he has been already mentioned as guilty of poisoning the wells, when engaged in the war against Aristonicus in Asia. The odium excited by these cases favoured the wishes of Gracchus; and he succeeded in introducing a most important change in the constitution, by transferring the judicial power from the senate to the equestrian order; either by ordering that the judges should henceforth be appointed solely from the latter; or, as the account of Livy’s “*Epitomizer*” leads us to suppose, by providing, that for every senator among the judges there should be henceforth named, in addition, two equites or knights, thus giving a decided majority to their order. Plutarch here gives us an instance of his ignorance respecting the simplest facts in the history of the Roman constitution. For he tells us, that whereas there were before three hundred judges, all senators; by the law of Gracchus, three hundred from the equestrian orders were added to them, so that the influence of the two orders in judicial proceedings was henceforward equal. He confounds the Sempronian law with the laws of Plotius and Lirius, which were passed on purpose to alter its provisions. Of the effects

Law concerning the Judicial Power.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan. Disputat.* lib. iii. c. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *in C. Graccho*, c. 5; Appian, c. 23.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 22; Velleius Patercul. lib. ii.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, *Divinatio in Cæcil*, c. 21; Valerius Maximus, lib. viii. c. 1.

B.C. 124. of this alteration it is difficult to judge: Appian asserts, that the judges of the equestrian order soon became as corrupt as the senators,<sup>1</sup> and were as unjustly severe towards all senators who were tried before them, as the former judges had been unduly partial. Whereas, Cicero declares,<sup>2</sup> that during the whole period of nearly fifty years, in which the law of Gracchus continued in force, there had never arisen even the slightest suspicion against the integrity of any of the judges. It should be remembered, however, that this is said in the course of his pleadings as an advocate; and on such

occasions the greatest allowance must be made for the wide deviations from truth, continually practised both by the orators of Greece and Rome.



[The Esquiline Gate.]

These popular acts raised Gracchus to a height of influence and consideration among the people, such as rendered him almost absolute. To increase the number of his dependents at the same time that he was throwing lustre upon his administration, he brought in several laws for making roads,<sup>3</sup> constructing bridges, erecting storehouses for the corn that was to be distributed among the people, and executing various other works

Gracchus promotes many Public Works.

of ornament and utility. As Gracchus, from his present popularity, enjoyed the power of appointing the persons who were to be employed in these undertakings, he was constantly surrounded by a crowd of contractors, artificers, engineers, public officers, men of science, and workmen of various descriptions, all courting his patronage, soliciting his judgment on their several proposals, and ready to support him, meanwhile, in all his enterprises. The activity of his mind, and the versatility of his talents, enabled him to enter into the views of all; the depth of a statesman's knowledge on scientific or common subjects is not very strictly scrutinized by those who are flattered with his attention in noticing them at all; and thus Gracchus obtained the character of a man of universal information, who could at once understand and feel interested in those humbler pursuits, which persons in high power and station are generally suspected of despising.

The year was meanwhile drawing towards its close, and the law

<sup>1</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, actio prima, c. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 6; Appian, lib. i. 23.

as it now stood prevented Gracchus from offering himself a second time as a candidate for the tribuneship. But it appears from Appian,<sup>1</sup> that the force of this law was partly rendered null, by the people possessing the power of an unlimited choice, in case fewer than ten candidates should offer themselves. It happened on the present occasion that the requisite number of candidates did not come forward: the strong tide of popular feeling towards Gracchus deterring perhaps many from attempting to exclude him; and thus he was again elected, although his own mother, in a letter still extant,<sup>2</sup> dissuaded him most forcibly from taking the office. His career continued to be the same as before: he now moved that colonies of poor Roman citizens should be planted in several parts of Italy,<sup>3</sup> and that the Latins should be admitted to all the civil rights of Roman citizenship. Finding it hopeless to oppose him in a direct manner, the senate engaged Livius Drusus, another of the tribunes, to bring in measures still more popular under the sanction of the aristocracy, hoping thus to rival the credit of Gracchus, and to conciliate the affections of the multitude to themselves. Drusus proposed to send out no fewer than twelve colonies, a number much exceeding that mentioned by Gracchus; and the colonists were to be exempted from the rent usually paid by them to the treasury for the lands assigned to them.<sup>4</sup> This liberality, which Drusus ascribed entirely to the concern felt by the senate for the welfare of the common people, so far won the gratitude of the multitude, that he ventured boldly to interpose his negative on the other measure brought forward by Gracchus, respecting the grant of citizenship to the Latins.<sup>5</sup> Besides, Drusus carefully avoided assigning to himself any office in the new colonies; and kept himself clear from any suspicion of desiring places of patronage or emolument; thus offering his own conduct as a strong contrast to that of Gracchus, who had taken so large a part in the direction of all the public works

B.C. 124.

Second  
Tribuneship  
of Gracchus.

B.C. 123.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 21. The words are these, *τις ἤδη νόμος κειμένω, εἰ δὲ μάχης ἐνδῖα καὶς παραγγελίαις, τὸν δῆμον ἐκ πάντων ἐπιλέγεσθαι.* We have no doubt that Schweighæuser in his note on this passage has given the true interpretation of it, which we have expressed in the text; but, at the same time, we are ignorant what law it is that Appian alludes to, or at what period it was enacted.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Epistolæ Cornelie, apud Fragmenta Corneli Nepotis.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 23. Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 8. Patercul. lib. ii.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 23. One concession, however, of considerable importance was made to the Latins by a law of Drusus, to which the senate gave their support; and which enacted that the Latins when serving in the Roman army, should be exempted from flogging on ordinary occasions. So says Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 9. We have added the words "on ordinary occasions," because otherwise the statement is untrue; for it appears from Sallust, that Metellus ordered one of his officers to be scourged and put to death, which he might do, "because," says Sallust, "the man was a citizen of Latium." Vid. Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. c. 69. But we are by no means clear that Plutarch has not again mistaken a law passed by another Livius Drusus, u.c. 662, for one passed by his namesake, the opponent of Gracchus.

- B.C. 123. executed in compliance with his laws. Thus the credit of Gracchus was somewhat lessened, and to prevent him from regaining his influence by popular speeches, or by any new popular laws, the senate contrived to procure his nomination as one of the commissioners for planting a colony in Africa, near the site of Carthage; for in the present emulation among the tribunes, which should go farthest in gratifying the people, one of them, named Rubrius,<sup>1</sup> had carried a law, by which this new addition was made to the number of colonies already to be founded under the acts of Gracchus and Drusus. During the absence of Gracchus, his opponents were enabled, as they had hoped, to supersede him more and more in the affections of the people; and they found also a way to attack his measures, by representing it as impious to build again the walls of Carthage, which Scipio had solemnly devoted to perpetual desolation. It was reported also, that several supernatural accidents had delayed the progress of the work; and on these grounds the party of the senate having gained a zealous and active leader in L. Opimius,
- B.C. 122. the new consul, determined to propose to the people, That the law of Rubrius for planting a colony on the site of Carthage should be repealed.<sup>2</sup> Gracchus had returned to Rome some little time before; and the year of his tribuneship having expired, he was reduced to the condition of a private citizen. What course his own inclinations might have led him to follow, is doubtful; but unfortunately for himself, he chose to associate himself in the counsels of M. Fulvius Flaccus, one of the commissioners for the execution of the Agrarian law, and a man whose character was respected by no party in the republic. The reputation of Gracchus had already suffered from his connection with Fulvius; and now he took part with him in designs which can be considered as nothing less than treasonable. Charging the senate with spreading false reports in order to alarm the religious scruples of the people, the two popular leaders assembled a numerous body of their partisans armed with daggers; and being thus prepared for violence they proceeded to the capitol, where the people were to meet in order to decide on the repeal of the law of Rubrius. Here,<sup>3</sup> before the business of the day was yet begun, a private citizen, who happened to be engaged in offering a sacrifice, was murdered by the partisans of Fulvius and Gracchus, for some words or gestures which they considered as insulting. This outrage excited a general alarm; the assembly broke up in consternation; and the popular leaders, after trying in vain to gain a hearing from the people, while they disclaimed the violence committed by their followers, had no other course left than to withdraw to their own houses. There they concerted plans of resistance, which, however they might believe them to be justified on the plea of self-defence,

Cabals of  
Gracchus  
with Fulvius  
Flaccus.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 25. Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 13.

were justly considered by the bulk of the people as an open rebellion against the government of their country. The consul,<sup>1</sup> exaggerating perhaps the alarm which he felt from the late outrage, hastily summoned the senate together; the body of the murdered man was exposed to the view of the people, and the capitol was secured by break of day with an armed force. The senate being informed by Opimius of the state of affairs, proceeded to invest him with absolute power to act in defence of the commonwealth, in the usual form of a resolution, "That the consul should provide for the safety of the republic." At the same time Gracchus and Fulvius were summoned to appear before the senate, to answer for the murder laid to their charge. Instead of obeying, they occupied the Aventine Hill with a body of their partisans in arms, and invited the slaves to join them, promising them their liberty. They sent the son of Fulvius, a youth under eighteen years of age, to the consul with proposals of negotiation; but were answered, that they must first lay down their arms; and till they did so, the senate would hold no intercourse with them. The son of Fulvius, however, was sent back once more in the hope of better success; but Opimius arrested him, as having come in defiance of the declaration of the senate; and then without further delay proceeded to attack the rebels. He was followed by the senators and the members of the equestrian order, who, with their dependents, had armed themselves by his order; and he had also with him a body of regular soldiers, amongst whom some Cretan archers are particularly noticed.<sup>2</sup> In the meantime the behaviour of Gracchus was that of a man irresolute in the course which he pursued, and with too much regard for his country to engage heartily in the criminal attempt into which he had suffered himself to be drawn. He had left his house, it is said,<sup>3</sup> in his ordinary dress; he had been urgent with Fulvius to propose terms of accommodation to the senate, and now when the Aventine was attacked, he took personally no part in the action. The contest indeed was soon over; the rebels were presently dispersed; Fulvius was dragged from the place to which he had fled for refuge, and was put to death; while Gracchus, finding himself closely pursued, fled across the Tiber, and taking shelter in a grove sacred to the Furies, was killed at his own desire by a single servant who had accompanied his flight. His head, together with that of Fulvius, was cut off and carried to the consul, in order to obtain the price which had been set upon both by a proclamation issued at the beginning of the engagement; and the bodies, as well as those of all who perished on the same side, were thrown into the river. In addition to this the houses of Gracchus and Fulvius were given up to plunder, their property was confiscated, and even the wife of Gracchus was deprived of her own

B.C. 122.  
They openly  
resist the  
authority of  
the  
Government.

But are  
defeated and  
put to death  
by the Consul  
L. Opimius.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 25. Plutarch, c. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in C. Graccho, c. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 15.



B.C. 122. jointure. But a yet more atrocious cruelty disgraced the victorious party; for Opimius ordered the son of Fulvius,<sup>1</sup> whom he had detained in custody, to be put to death; an act of party vengeance as unjust as it was inhuman. It is said that in this sedition there perished altogether of the partisans of the popular leaders about three thousand, partly in the action, and partly by summary executions afterwards, under the consul's orders.

The career of the two Gracchi was in many respects so similar, and the circumstances of their deaths bore so much resemblance to each other, that it is not wonderful that historians should have comprehended both the brothers under one common judgment, and have pronounced in common their acquittal or their condemnation. But the conduct of Caius admits of far less excuse than that of Tiberius; and his death was the deserved punishment of rebellion, while that of his brother was an unjustifiable murder. It is true, the aristocratical party were likely to overturn all the measures which he had carried in his two tribuneships; but the ascendancy which they had suddenly gained, was the fruit of no illegal acts or violence; it arose simply out of the natural revolutions of popular feeling, and from the conciliatory laws which the senate had of late been forward to encourage. If the popular assembly was disposed to take part with the consul Opimius; if not even a single tribune could be found to interpose his negative against the proposed repeal of the law of Rubrius; by what pretence of right could Gracchus and Fulvius appear in the capitol at the head of an armed body of partisans? and still more, when a murder had been committed by some of their friends, and they were called before the supreme council of the state to answer for their violence; by what right could two private citizens defy the authority of their government, and take up a military position with an armed force in the heart of the capital to maintain their disobedience? Under such circumstances, although there is much in the character of Gracchus to awaken compassion for his fate, he yet only paid the just penalty for conduct which was treasonable in fact, and which on the most favourable construction of his motives, was criminally rash and intemperate. Still, however, the triumph of the senate was more that of an enraged party than of a firm and impartial government: the execution of the son of Fulvius was an act of gratuitous cruelty; and the severities exercised after the sedition was over, were conducted without any forms of law, and had no other limit than the inclination of the aristocratical leaders. So bad indeed was the constitution of Rome, that the laws for the punishment of state criminals were uncertain and inadequate; and necessity was thus supposed to allow the correction of an evil by summary and illegal

Reflections  
on the  
Gracchi.

<sup>1</sup> Velleius Patercul. lib. ii. Appian, c. 26. Plutarch, c. 17.

means, because the legal means could not always be depended upon. B.C. 122. It may be safely pronounced, that there is no surer criterion of an ill-framed and barbarian government, than the admission of irregular acts of violence by any party on the plea of the public safety.

It is an important inquiry, to find what effect was permanently produced on the condition of the poor by the laws of the two Gracchi; or how long any of their measures were allowed to survive their authors. The Agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus was indirectly subverted by a law which permitted the poor to sell the shares of land allotted to them;<sup>1</sup> and which thus exposed them to the temptations of the high prices which the rich could afford to offer them, or of the various vexations by which a powerful neighbour might drive them to give up the land he coveted. But who was the proposer of this law, or at what precise period it passed, we have no information; we can only suppose that it was carried soon after the death of C. Gracchus, when the power of the aristocracy was likely to be most predominant. By two subsequent laws<sup>2</sup> the state of property was restored nearly to what it was before Tiberius Gracchus commenced his career; the first, forbidding any further division of lands, and securing the actual possessors in the enjoyment of the estates which they held; but transferring the rent which they had been accustomed to pay to the treasury, and ordering that it should henceforth be distributed among the poorer citizens: the second, reversing this last provision, and depriving the poor of all share either in the property or income of the national lands. There is great difficulty in settling the precise date of these two laws; but we may suppose them to have been carried before the year of Rome 649, when a new Agrarian law<sup>3</sup> was proposed, but soon given up, by L. Marcius Philippus; at which time he asserted in one of his speeches, that there were not two thousand individuals in the commonwealth who were worth any property. The duration of the act of C. Gracchus for the distribution of corn appears to have been much longer; though it is hardly possible to conceive that it was always fully executed. It was repealed by M. Octavius;<sup>4</sup> and, as far as can be made out from the scanty information remaining to us, the repeal took place about the year of Rome 678;<sup>5</sup> the new law still providing

The Laws of the Gracchi are mostly eluded or repealed.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, *Loco citato*.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, de Officiis, lib. ii. c. 21.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, c. 60.

<sup>5</sup> Vide Marci Licinii Oration. apud Fragm. Sallust. However, whether the law alluded to in that speech be the Octavian law or not, is certainly a mere matter of conjecture. But Ferguson must be wrong in fixing the Octavian law in the year immediately following the death of Gracchus; for Cicero expressly ranks Octavius with Cotta, Sulpicius, Curio, and others, who flourished after the sedition of Saturninus, u.c. 653, and continued to be distinguished as orators down to a much later period. In Plutarch's Life of Marius, it is said that Marius, when tribune, u.c. 634, opposed with success a law for the distribution of corn among the people. But Plutarch is so little to be trusted for accuracy in such matters, that nothing can be concluded from his statement. Possibly the attempt which Marius resisted was

B.C. 122. that some support should be given to the poor at the public expense, but reducing it to a much smaller amount. But it is probable, that the law of Gracchus had long ere this become obsolete; and that the act of Octavius, although far less liberal in its grants, was welcomed as a popular measure; inasmuch as it substituted an actual distribution of corn for one which had been long since abandoned as impracticable. In short it appears that the reforms proposed by the Gracchi were in the issue most injurious to the interests of the common people; for we are told that<sup>1</sup> for some years after the death of C. Gracchus the oppression and corruption of the aristocracy prevailed to a greater extent than ever; insomuch that the liberties of the people were well nigh extinguished; and allowing something for the prejudices of the writer from whom this statement is taken, it is yet too consonant to the usual revolutions of parties to be in the main rejected.

one to confirm and enforce the corn law of C. Gracchus; in the same manner as Gracchus had brought in a law to confirm and enforce the Agrarian law of his brother Tiberius, although it had never been repealed since its enactment.

<sup>1</sup> Oratio C. Memmii, apud Sallust. Bell. Jugurth. c. 31.



[Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva, in an ancient style of art, from a bas relief in the Capitol.]



[Remains of the Capitol.]

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### SKETCH OF THE INTERNAL STATE OF ROME FROM THE DEATH OF CAIUS GRACCHUS TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SOCIAL WAR.

FROM B. C. 121 TO B. C. 92.

THE ascendancy acquired by the party of the senate after the death of C. Gracchus is marked by a striking fact. C. Papirius Carbo, one of the commissioners under the Agrarian law, and formerly so distinguished as a popular leader, deserted his former friends, and was chosen one of the consuls for the ensuing year. During his consulship he undertook the defence of his predecessor in office, L. Opimius, who was impeached by one of the tribunes<sup>1</sup> for punishing citizens in the late tumults in an illegal manner. The trial came on before the people; and Carbo, in the defence of his client, maintained that the resolution of the senate by which the consul had been charged to provide for the safety of the republic,<sup>2</sup>

B.C. 121  
TO  
B.C. 92.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxi.  
[R. H.]

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. ii. c. 31, 32.  
2 A

B.C. 121. fully justified him in dispensing with all the usual forms of law  
 to  
 B.C. 92. And this dispensing power in the senate was so far recognised by  
 The Senate enjoys a complete ascendancy. the assembly, either from conviction or fear, that Opimius was  
 acquitted. Carbo, however,<sup>1</sup> was accused soon afterwards by L  
 Crassus, then a very young man; and was charged by him with  
 insincerity in defending Opimius, while the manner in which he had  
 constantly lamented the fate of Tiberius Gracchus, the pernicious  
 laws which he had brought forward in his tribuneship, and above all  
 his share in the murder of Scipio, sufficiently demonstrated his real  
 principles. For what particular crime he was accused, we cannot  
 discover; but he was condemned, and destroyed himself in order to  
 escape sentence. It is remarkable also that Crassus might venture  
 to charge him with the murder of Scipio; although no inquiry had  
 ever been instituted respecting that event, nor was it ever proved  
 that Scipio was murdered at all.

Character of  
 the Roman  
 Nobility at  
 this period.

During the few years which elapsed between the death of C.  
 Gracchus and the war with Jugurtha, the Roman nobility appear to  
 have been plunged in a state of extreme corruption. The govern-  
 ment of the empire was in their hands, and there were no circum-  
 stances of peculiar difficulty to render great public virtues necessary,  
 or to tempt ambitious men in the hope of distinguishing themselves to  
 relinquish the pursuit of selfish enjoyments. Commands in the pro-  
 vinces were sought for as a means of acquiring wealth, either by  
 direct extortion and oppression, or by provoking a war with some  
 neighbouring tribe of barbarians, and acquiring plunder and spoil,  
 together with some military renown. At home the rich nobles  
 stood aloof from the bulk of their countrymen, being separated from  
 them by the immense disparity of their fortunes; and having little  
 occasion for their services, while their own numerous slaves supplied  
 them with labourers, tradesmen, stewards, agents, nay, even with  
 instructors for their children. In such a state of things it mattered  
 little, that the people as a body could exercise the most absolute  
 power, and sometimes could enact laws which were very injurious  
 to the interests of the rich. Their force when united was but a  
 poor compensation for their individual weakness: and many a mem-  
 ber of the sovereign assembly, when he had left the forum, and  
 became no more than a single poor citizen, was treated by the rich  
 with a pride and oppression, from which the humblest labourer in  
 England is secure. The causes of this are to be found in the want  
 of a graduated scale of society, and of an enlightened public opinion.  
 The different parts of the commonwealth were too distinct and too  
 dissimilar to blend together; and too many of the intermediate links  
 in the chain were wanting. And there being thus nothing to answer  
 to that which is with us so emphatically called "the public," public

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. ii. c. 39.

opinion could scarcely exist; and at a distance from the capital it had no means of making itself heard, nor of gaining the information by which alone it can itself be formed. This, it will be observed, is exactly the state of society fitted to breed violent revolutions. A people smarting under individual degradation, ignorant of the true means of delivering themselves from it, and possessing as a body the most sovereign power, were likely, when roused by some active leader, to exert their strength in blind and furious acts of vengeance. An aristocracy, on the other hand, equally ignorant of the real evils of the existing order of things, and seeing nothing but the dangerous violence of the tribunitian seditions, were anxious to keep the people quiet, sometimes by bribes, sometimes by flattery, and sometimes by coercion, that so they might preserve their own ascendancy, and maintain the actual constitution of the republic. Selfishness on both sides, an habitual familiarity with bloodshed, and a general absence of a pure morality with sufficient sanctions, easily gave to the civil wars that ensued, that character of ferocity and rapacity which marks them so peculiarly.

The indifference shown by the nobility towards the crimes of Jugurtha, an indifference ascribed by the people to the effect of his bribes, first interrupted that ascendancy which the aristocratical party had enjoyed since the death of Gracchus. An active tribune,<sup>1</sup> C. Memmius, availed himself of the favourable opportunity; the people, roused by his invectives against the corruption of the nobility, began to re-assume their share in the management of affairs; their voice forced the senate to declare war against Jugurtha; and the misconduct of the generals employed in the first campaigns giving additional strength to their complaints of corruption, a formidable court of inquiry, consisting of three members, was instituted,<sup>2</sup> with a general commission to investigate all cases of public delinquency. The inquisitors conducted themselves with the utmost rigour; and five persons of the highest rank,<sup>3</sup> amongst whom was L. Opimius, were on this occasion found guilty of corrupt practices, and were either condemned to pay heavy fines or were banished.<sup>4</sup> Soon after Q. Cæcilius Metellus, a man of spotless reputation, was appointed to take the command in Africa; and by his ability, and that of his successor C. Marius, the war with Jugurtha, as has been mentioned in a former part of this work, was brought to a triumphant end.

But we must not omit to notice here a memorable change introduced by Marius, when consul, in the constitution of the Roman army. Hitherto the old aristocratical principle, so universal among the commonwealths of Greece, had been carefully observed; and none were admitted to serve in the regular infantry of the legions,

B.C. 121.  
to  
B.C. 92.

The popular  
party begin  
to recover  
their  
strength.

B.C. 112  
to  
B.C. 111.

Marius  
changes the  
character of  
the Army.

<sup>1</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. c. 27. 30, 31.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. c. 40.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, c. 34.

<sup>4</sup> Opimius was banished, as appears from Cicero, in Pisonem, c. 40.

- B.C. 112. except they possessed a certain amount of property;<sup>1</sup> the poorest citizens, unless under circumstances of urgent necessity, were only
- B.C. 111.<sup>to</sup> employed in the naval service. But Marius,<sup>2</sup> when raising soldiers to accompany him into Africa, disregarded the usual practice altogether; and enlisted into the legions citizens of the lowest and most indigent classes of society. His motives for this unprecedented measure are variously stated; but it may be, most probably, imputed to a mingled feeling of personal ambition, and of hatred towards all those who were any way distinguished for birth or fortune. Himself sprung from the lowest of the people, and having forced his way to the high station which he filled amidst the scorn and aversion of the nobility, it was his delight to be the consul of the populace, and as he had risen by their favour, to show that he cared for the support of no order in the state besides. He knew, moreover, that an army formed out of those who have no property to lose, becomes the ready instrument of its general's ambition, and easily transfers to him the duty and affection which it owes to its country and its government. Marius stands conspicuous among those who have risen to greatness by favouring the envy and hatred of the dregs of the community towards all above them, and who have purchased the forgiveness of the multitude for their crimes and their tyranny, because every thing most noble, most exalted, and most sacred, has been especially the object of their persecution.
- B.C. 107. About the end of the Jugurthine war, Q. Servilius Cæpio, being then consul,<sup>3</sup> procured an alteration of that law of C. Gracchus, which Q. Cæpio alters the Law of Gracchus concerning the Judicial Power. had committed the whole judicial power to the equestrian order. By the new law, the judges were to be chosen jointly from the senate and the knights. The character of Cæpio seems to render it probable, that the tribunals as at that time constituted, were very strict in the punishment of corrupt and oppressive magistrates; and that he wished, by restoring a share of the judicial authority to the senate, to secure a greater chance of impunity for such offenders. At least, it is remarkable, that during his command in Gaul,<sup>4</sup> where he was stationed to oppose the expected invasion of the Cimbri, he committed a robbery of the sacred treasure belonging to a temple at Toulouse, which was held by the inhabitants in particular veneration. Nor was his ability as a general greater than his integrity; for he was accounted the principal cause of the bloody defeat sustained by the Romans in the following year, when the united armies of himself and his successor in the consulship, Cn. Mallius, were overthrown by the Cimbri, with the loss of eighty thousand men. The popular cry was loud against him, and he was accused
- B.C. 106.

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, lib. vi. c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. c. 86.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, c. 43; De Oratore, lib. ii. c. 49; Cassiodorus, Chronicon.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo, lib. iv. p. 204. Edit. Xyland.

sometime afterwards by C. Norbanus one of the tribunes;<sup>1</sup> but the aristocratical party made a strong effort to save him, and his condemnation was only procured by actual violence. It appears that his trial was attended by a furious riot, in which M. Æmilius Scaurus, the first on the roll of the senate, was wounded by a stone; and two of the tribunes, who were preparing to interpose their negative on the proceedings of the judges, were driven by the populace from the court. In this manner Cæpio was condemned and banished; and it is said that his sentence was accompanied by the unusual disgrace of having his property confiscated by order of the people.<sup>2</sup>

The war with the Cimbri and the other northern tribes was not yet finished, when the most profligate of demagogues, L. Appuleius Saturninus, made himself for the first time conspicuous. His animosity to the senate is attributed by Cicero to a personal slight which he received when he was quæstor;<sup>3</sup> for at a period of scarcity, the charge of superintending the supply of the markets was taken away from him, and given to M. Æmilius Scaurus, one of the most distinguished of the nobility. He had been one of the tribunes for the year of Rome 650, and in the following year Q. Metellus,<sup>4</sup> who was then censor, noticed him for the infamy of his general life, and would have degraded him from his rank by virtue of his censorial power, if his colleague in the censorship had not refused to concur with him in the sentence. In the year next succeeding, when Marius was in his fifth consulship, Saturninus declared himself a second time candidate for the tribuneship; but finding himself rejected, he waylaid one of the successful candidates, A. Nonnius, on his way home from the place of election; drove him into an adjoining tavern, and there by the aid of an armed rabble murdered him. His partisans, availing themselves of the general consternation, assembled early on the following morning, and elected him tribune without opposition; and such was the state of things at Rome, that this mockery of all law was submitted to, and Saturninus was recognised in the character which he had usurped by murder. He was not however without associates; they were C. Servilius Glaucia, who was at this time one of the prætors, and C. Marius, who, still unsatisfied with the honours he had gained, was now aspiring to a sixth consulship; and was glad to acquire the support of a man so popular with the multitude as Saturninus. It is said that Marius gained his election as little from the unbiassed choice of the people as his friend Appuleius had done:<sup>5</sup> but that bribery was unscrupulously used, and that his old soldiers at the same time were introduced into the city to overawe by their tumults the decisions of the Comitia. In

Career of L.  
Appuleius  
Saturninus.

B.C. 106.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. ii. c. 49.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. 67.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, pro Sextio, c. 17.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 28.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 28.



B.C. 106. this manner the cause of the factious and worthless part of the people obtained an unusual triumph, and might well anticipate the gratification of its wildest hopes, when Rome beheld at the same moment C. Marius a consul, C. Servilius Glaucia a prætor, and L. Appuleius Saturninus a tribune of the people.

B.C. 102. His  
Tribuneship  
and Policy. The proceedings of the following year seem hardly consistent with the faintest shadow of regular government; for both parties in turn had recourse without hesitation to measures of open violence. But we may observe that Saturninus did not tread in the steps of the Gracchi, nor was it the interest of the poor citizens of Rome that he professed to espouse. He seems to have adopted a policy yet more mischievous, and to have framed his laws to enrich the needy soldiery who had served under Marius in his successive consulships, and who might easily be induced to raise their favourite general to the utmost height of his ambition. He proposed an Agrarian law,<sup>1</sup> for the division of certain districts in Gaul, which, having been overrun by the Cimbri, had after their defeat fallen into the hands of the Romans: and he added to the law a clause, by which the senators were bound to swear obedience to it, within five days after it should have passed the assembly of the people. But it was apprehended that the soldiers of Marius were likely to be the only gainers from the projected allotment of lands: and among these there was a large proportion of citizens of the allied states of Italy, and also of the agricultural labourers; a class of men which offered an excellent supply of hardy soldiers; and of which Marius had largely availed himself, enlisting, we are told,<sup>2</sup> slaves as well as freemen. Many of these men had received, from their general, admission to the rank of Roman citizens,<sup>3</sup> for their gallant behaviour in the late war: for example, he had at one time conferred this reward on a thousand soldiers<sup>4</sup> of Camerinum and its district, and had defended himself, when charged with having acted illegally, by saying that the din of arms had prevented him from hearing the still voice of the laws. So that the party of Marius and Saturninus consisted not so much of the citizens of the capital, as of a country and provincial interest: and in the disturbances that followed, the inhabitants of Rome espoused generally the side of the aristocracy; as feeling that the projects of the three associates were as little favourable to them as to the senate itself. On the other hand a multitude of citizens,<sup>5</sup> or of men who hoped to become such, flocked in from the country to support the proposed laws of Saturninus; and as force seemed likely to be more employed than any legal methods, many came to Rome on this occasion, who, although they could not vote in a lawful assembly, were yet able to give their party a powerful support by

<sup>1</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, pro Balbo, c. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 28.

clamour and violence. It was by these arms indeed that Saturninus triumphed. Bæbius,<sup>1</sup> one of his colleagues, who interposed his negative on the Agrarian law, was driven from the place of meeting by showers of stones; and when some of the aristocratical party exclaimed, "that they heard thunder," a sound which according to the custom of the Romans should at once have broken up the assembly, Saturninus replied, "that it would hail presently, if they were not quiet." The people of the city, incensed at this open violence, endeavoured to maintain their ground by force, but they were overpowered by the armed mob at the disposal of Saturninus, and being obliged to abandon the field, the law was passed amidst the shouts of the victorious party. Other laws in the same spirit were carried in the same manner; one, decreeing a division of lands in Africa to the veteran soldiers, and assigning a hundred jugera to each man; another, ordering that colonies should be planted in various parts of Sicily and Greece; and a third, appropriating the treasure plundered at Toulouse by Q. Cæpio for the purchase of lands to be distributed amongst the poor. To these laws, as already mentioned, the senate was ordered to swear obedience within five days; a step concerted by Marius and his associates to procure the destruction of Q. Metellus, whose undaunted integrity they knew would never allow him to consent to a measure which he deemed mischievous, or to submit to a usurped and unlawful authority. Saturninus and Glaucia hated him, because he had noticed them both when he was censor for the infamy of their lives. Marius had been patronised by him and his family in early youth,<sup>2</sup> and had since deprived him of the honour of finishing the war with Jugurtha by his intrigues and calumnies. A vile nature hates none so much as those from whom it has received kindness, and whose kindness it has recompensed with injury; there was enough, therefore, besides the constant antipathy which evil bears to good, to make Marius the determined enemy of Metellus.

The  
Agrarian  
Law passed.

As soon as the law was passed, Marius,<sup>3</sup> in his quality of consul, expressed his indignation against it in the senate, and declared that he would never submit to take the oath required. Metellus made a similar declaration, and the senate, applauding their firmness, was prepared to offer a unanimous resistance to the oath. But on the evening of the fifth day, Marius hastily called the senate together, and told them, that it was too dangerous openly to oppose the will of the people; he judged it expedient, therefore, to take the oath with a qualification, swearing to obey the law so far as it was lawful. They would thus pacify the people for the moment, and when the multitude of citizens from the country should have returned to their homes, it would be easy to show, that the law had

<sup>1</sup> Auctor de Viris illustribus, in Vita Saturnini.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 30.

B.C. 102. not passed legally, the assembly having continued to vote after thunder had been heard; and thus the obligation of the oath would be null and void. Confounded by this display of the consul's treachery, at a moment when there was no time left to concert any new plan of proceeding, the senators listened to him in silence; and he, without giving them leisure to recover themselves, led them out instantly to the temple of Saturn, and there was himself amongst the first to take the oath. The rest of the senate followed his example, no man being willing to expose himself, as an individual, to the fury of the multitude, with the single exception of Metellus. With admirable firmness, that excellent citizen resisted all the arguments and entreaties of his friends, and persisted in his refusal to swear; saying to those around him,<sup>1</sup> "that a good man was distinguished by his adherence to what was right in defiance of personal danger." On the following day Saturninus exhorted his followers,<sup>2</sup> who now usurped the functions of the Roman people, to pass an act of banishment against Metellus, and to order, that the consuls, by a public proclamation, should interdict him from the use of fire and water within the limits of Italy. The citizens of the capital wished to make another attempt on this occasion to shake off the tyranny under which they were labouring; and offered Metellus to oppose, to the utmost, the sentence that was to be proposed against him. But he, rightly judging it the duty of a good subject to submit peaceably to physical force, as much as it had been to refuse active obedience to an illegal command, declined their proffered assistance; and telling them, "that he never would permit the safety of his country to be endangered on his account," withdrew quietly from Rome. The law of banishment passed without opposition, and Marius had the gratification to proclaim it, and to utter the usual prohibition of the use of fire and water.

Banishment  
of  
Q. Metellus.

It is mentioned that Saturninus, amongst his other laws,<sup>3</sup> proposed also to confirm the corn law of C. Gracchus, by which corn was to be distributed monthly to the people at five-sixths of an as for the modius or peck. This sufficiently shows that the law of Gracchus had tacitly become obsolete. Its renewal was resisted strongly by the aristocratical party, and some of the colleagues of Saturninus interposed their negative upon it. But he, disregarding all legal impediments, proceeded to put it to the vote; when Q. Servilius Cæpio, one of the quæstors, and son to the consul who had fallen a victim to the indignation of the people, on account of his ill success against the Cimbri, made an attack upon the assembly, at the head of a body of citizens attached to the senate, overthrew the balloting urns, dispersed the multitude, and prevented the passing of the law. So wretched was the condition of Rome, that those

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Rhetorica ad Herennium, lib. i. c. 12.

who called themselves the friends of order, were driven to support B.C. 102. the constitution by acts of illegal violence.

Another law, as is probable,<sup>1</sup> was proposed and carried by C. Servilius Glaucia, to repeal the late act of the consul Q. Cæpio, and to restore the judicial power entirely to the equestrian order, according to the law of C. Gracchus. The knights were thus won over to favour the pretensions which Glaucia was now making to the consulship; and their support, together with that of the popular party, was likely to decide the election in his favour. Saturninus also intended to offer himself a third time as a candidate for the office of tribune; and together with himself he brought forward a man of the lowest rank, named Equitius,<sup>2</sup> who professed to be a younger brother of Tiberius and C. Gracchus; and although his claim had been utterly rejected by the family, it yet won him some favour with the people, who regarded the name of Gracchus with great affection. When the elections came on, Saturninus and Equitius were chosen tribunes; but the hopes of Glaucia were in danger of being disappointed, for M. Antonius, so famous for his eloquence, easily obtained his nomination as one of the consuls, and C. Memmius was a formidable competitor for the place of the other. But Saturninus had committed so many outrages with impunity, that he seemed now to bid defiance to the laws; and an armed party, acting under his orders, assaulted and murdered Memmius in the midst of the election, and at once dispersed the people from the Comitia in consternation at this new crime. But this last violence awakened the senate, and M. Æmilius Scaurus,<sup>3</sup> the first on the roll of the senators, and the same person who twelve years before had moved that the consul Opimius should defend the republic against the party of Gracchus, now again persuaded the senate to commit the same authority to the consuls Marius and Valerius Flaccus, and to give them the usual solemn charge to provide for the safety of the commonwealth. Alarmed at this resolution, Saturninus, Glaucia, Equitius, and a body of their followers in arms, seized the capitol, and declared themselves in open rebellion. Marius, their old associate, and still secretly their friend, could not however avoid acting upon the orders of the senate, and summoned every citizen to maintain the cause of the republic. All


Rebellion of  
Saturninus.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero says in his treatise, *De Claris Oratoribus*, c. 61, that Glaucia had attached to himself the equestrian order by the law which he had carried in their favour; "Equestrem Ordinem beneficio Legis devinxerat." It is supposed that this law was a repeal of that lately passed, v.c. 647, by Q. Cæpio; because it appears from Cicero, *de Oratore*, lib. ii. c. 49, that the equestrian order were again in possession of the judicial power at the trial of C. Norbanus, which must have taken place within four or five years of the prætorship of Glaucia; and Livius Drusus, v.c. 662, attempted once more to give the senate a place among the judges, which in his time they did not enjoy.

<sup>2</sup> Valerius Maximus, lib. iii. c. 8, 5, 6; Appian, lib. i. c. 32.

<sup>3</sup> *Auctor de Viris Illustribus*, in *Vita M. Æmilii Scauri*.

B.C. 102. the tribunes,<sup>1</sup> except Saturninus; all the prætors, except Glaucia; all the senators, all the equestrian order, and all the most respectable citizens in Rome, assembled at the consul's call, and formed a force so formidable, that Marius was reduced to the condition of an unwilling instrument in their hands, employed by them against a party with which in his heart he entirely sympathized. The rebels, however, resisted for some time, till Marius cut off the pipes by which the capitol was supplied with water,<sup>2</sup> and thus obliged them to surrender. They submitted themselves to him with no great reluctance, relying on his known dispositions in their favour; and he, anxious to save their lives, promised them their safety,<sup>3</sup> without the authority of the senate, and restraining the indignation of his



[Remains of the Curia Hostilia.]

followers, shut them up in the Curia Hostilia,<sup>4</sup> the building originally appropriated for the meetings of the senate, under pretence of reserving them for an impartial trial hereafter. But the armed citizens under his command, mistrusting the lenity of the consul, assaulted the place of their confinement, and mounting upon the roof of the building, they took off the tiling,<sup>5</sup> and destroyed with missile weapons the whole of the defenceless prisoners below. It is almost peculiar to Roman history, that the vengeance finally inflicted even on so great a criminal as Saturninus, should more resemble a murder than a legal execution.

He and his  
Partizans  
are put to  
Death.

The late popular leaders were by no means regretted by the people as the Gracchi had been; for not only was their conduct so desperate as to have disgusted all but the most profligate, but their measures, as has been observed, had been less immediately directed to the advantages of the citizens of Rome. It appears rather that Saturninus was generally regarded as an enemy to his country;

His Memory  
is held in  
detestation.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, pro Rabirio, c. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. c. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 10.

<sup>5</sup> Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii.

and two remarkable instances of this feeling are recorded, which B.C. 102. deserve to be noticed as illustrative of the arbitrary and violent spirit by which the administration of justice at Rome was characterized. C. Decianus,<sup>1</sup> a man, it is said, of the utmost respectability, was accusing P. Furius, of whom more will be added presently, before the people. In the course of his speech, he happened to complain of the manner in which Saturninus had been put to death; and for this offence he not only lost his cause, although Furius was notoriously a man of most infamous life, but was himself brought to trial and condemned, whether to a fine or to banishment is not stated. Sex. Titus also was tried and condemned,<sup>2</sup> for having a statue of Saturninus in his house. Now it is obvious that there could have been no law by which either of these acts was made a crime, and they were punished merely on the principle, that a man might be found guilty for any thing which his judges chose to consider as criminal, whether it were an offence defined by law or not. The fate of Furius, who escaped, owing to the imprudent speech of his accuser, was, according to Appian,<sup>3</sup> in itself sufficiently extraordinary. He was one of the tribunes for the year which followed the sixth consulship of Marius: and when after the death of Saturninus attempts were made to procure the recall of Metellus from banishment, he interposed his negative upon them all. The son of Metellus threw himself at his feet in vain before the assembled people, and with tears entreated him to relent. But the people, we are told, affected by this scene, decreed that Metellus should return in spite of the tribune's opposition; and felt so much indignation against Furius, that when he was accused before them for his resistance to their will, the multitude without waiting to hear his defence, fell upon him and tore him to pieces. This story, however, is only related by Appian, and does not seem altogether probable. So unusual a burst of popular fury is not likely to have been excited by such a cause, when the lapse of some months must have effaced the impression at first produced by the sight of the treatment shown to the prayers of a son in behalf of his father. But here, as in so many other instances in Roman history, the want of good authority, and the imperfection of all existing reports of the times, render it impossible to attain to a knowledge of the truth.

Recall of  
Q. Metellus.

About this time, Marcus Aquilius, who commanded in Sicily as proconsul, concluded a bloody war which had long devastated that island. We speak of the insurrection of the slaves, to which we have before briefly alluded, and which may here deserve to be noticed somewhat more particularly.

The termination of the second Punic war had left the whole of Sicily in the quiet possession of the Romans. The inhabitants, Revolt of the Slaves in Sicily.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, pro Rabirio, c. 9; Valerius Maximus, lib. viii. c. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero and Valerius Maximus, *ubi supra*.

<sup>3</sup> De Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 33.

B.C. 102. when the immediate evils of the contest were over, were on the whole mildly treated. Some of them had indeed adhered throughout to the cause of the Romans; and even in those states which had most vigorously opposed them, there were several considerations which might move the conquerors to forbearance. They had long been the zealous allies of Rome during the reign of Hiero; their revolt had been of short duration, and the bulk of the people had been either deceived or forced into taking a part in it; besides that the importance of the island to Rome, and its neighbourhood to Carthage, rendered it expedient to conciliate the inhabitants as much as possible to the Roman government. Accordingly, whilst some of the Sicilian states were exempt from all taxes whatsoever,<sup>1</sup> the great majority were subject only to the same burthen which they had supported under their native princes; the payment namely of a tenth part of the produce of the soil; and the collection of this tax was so well regulated by law, that the farmer was fully protected from paying more than a just tenth, or from suffering any thing vexatious in the manner of payment. Land, thus comparatively unincumbered, and enjoying the highest reputation for fertility, became a desirable object of purchase to the wealthy citizens of Rome and Latium: large estates were accordingly bought up by them,<sup>2</sup> and were stocked with vast numbers of slaves; the use of whom at this time, as we have already noticed, began almost entirely to supersede that of free labourers. In order to derive from them the greatest possible profit,<sup>3</sup> they were miserably fed and clothed; and were thus driven to support themselves by robbery; their manner of life as shepherds, in which service a large proportion of them was employed, affording them great facilities in the practice of plunder. It is said, moreover, that the governors of the island were deterred from punishing these offenders by the wealth and influence of their masters, who were well pleased that their slaves should provide for their own wants at the expense of the public.

First revolt  
headed by  
Ennus.

In this state of things,<sup>4</sup> the slaves began to entertain projects of a general insurrection, and a leader was not long wanting to call them forth into action. Eunus, a Syrian by birth, was the slave of a citizen of Enna named Antigenes; and had acquired great influence amongst his companions in bondage by pretending to divine inspiration, and particularly to a knowledge of the future. Amongst many guesses into futurity, some were likely to be verified by the event, and these established his reputation; so that at last he professed himself to be favoured with constant communication from heaven;

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, lib. iii. c. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Florus, lib. iii. c. 19; Diodorus Siculus, lib. xxxiv. *Ecloga secunda* Edit. Rhodoman.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus Siculus, lib. xxxiv. *Ecl.* 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid. ubi supra.*

and it is said that he used to secrete in his mouth some lighted B.C. 102. combustible substance, and thus amazed the vulgar by seeming to breathe forth smoke

and fire, as if under the immediate impulse of the god who spoke from within him. The belief in his miraculous endowments was so general, that the slaves of another citizen of Enna, named Damophilus, unable to bear the cruelty with which they were



[Castro Giovanni, the ancient Enna.]

treated both by their master and his wife, and bent on revenging themselves, applied first to Eunus, and inquired of him if the gods would grant success to their attempts. He eagerly caught at the opportunity thus offered him; assured them of the favour of heaven, and exhorted them to execute their purpose without delay.<sup>1</sup> The slaves employed on the several estates in the neighbourhood of Enna, were excited by the call of the slaves of Damophilus; a body of four hundred men was collected; and they entered the town under the command of Eunus himself, whose trick of breathing fire is said to have produced a great impression on the minds of his followers. The insurgents were instantly joined by the slaves in the town; and an indiscriminate massacre of the free inhabitants followed, in which men, women, and children, were treated with equal cruelty. Damophilus and his wife were seized at their country house, dragged in triumph to Enna, and there murdered; but their daughter was saved by the slaves, in gratitude for the kindnesses which they had always met with at her hands. Meantime, Eunus spared out of the general slaughter such of the citizens of Enna as understood the manufacture of arms, and compelled them to labour in order to supply his followers with weapons. He also took to himself the title and the ensigns of a king, while he bestowed those of queen on the female slave who lived with him; and he formed a council consisting of those of his associates most eminent for their courage or ability. In three days he was at the head of six thousand men tolerably armed, besides a great multitude provided only with hatchets, spits, or any other weapons which they could find: and the number of the insurgents daily increasing, he was enabled to overrun the country, and several times to encounter with success

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus Siculus, lib. xxxiv. Ecl. 2.



B.C. 102. the Roman forces which attempted to oppose him. The example presently became contagious: a Cilician slave, named Cleon, took up arms in another part of the island; and far from attempting to rival Eunus, he immediately acknowledged him as king, and acted in every thing by his orders. L. Hypsæus, one of the prætors, who arrived from Rome about a month after the commencement of the revolt, brought a regular army of eight thousand men against the insurgents, but was outnumbered by them and defeated. Several other Roman officers met with the same bad fortune; and the slaves made themselves masters of many of the towns of that island. Their career was first checked by M. Perpena, one of the prætors,<sup>1</sup> and afterwards finally stopped by the consul P. Rupilius,<sup>2</sup> who has been already noticed as the author of measures of extreme severity against the partizans of Tiberius Gracchus. This officer first recovered the town of Taurominium, after a long blockade, in which the slaves were reduced to the utmost extremities of famine; and having put to death all those who fell into his hands, he proceeded to besiege Enna, the first scene of the revolt, and the principal strong-hold of the insurgents. The sure process of blockade rendered the condition of the besieged desperate; Cleon was killed in a sally; and the place was in a short time betrayed to the Romans. Eunus escaped from the town; but was soon afterwards taken, and died, it is said, in prison of a loathsome disease; after which Rupilius proceeded to regulate the state of the island, and ten commissioners were sent from Rome to assist in the settlement,<sup>3</sup> exactly in the manner which we have seen regularly practised by the senate after the conclusion of its wars with Antiochus, Perseus, Achaia, and Carthage.

The revolt  
quelled by  
P. Rupilius.

The revolt was thus apparently suppressed; but the cause of the insurgents found everywhere so many who sympathized with it, that similar attempts were made within a few years in several other parts of the empire. One of these deserves notice from its singularity. A Roman knight of the name of T. Minucius,<sup>4</sup> having incurred a debt beyond his means, and being pressed for the payment of it, purchased five hundred suits of armour, and having conveyed them secretly into the country, employed them in arming his slaves; and then usurping the style and dignity of a king, invited the slaves in general to join him, and murdered his creditors, whom he contrived to get into his power. Ridiculous as this leader was, he assembled round him above three thousand followers, and was not reduced by the prætor who was sent against him without maintaining an obstinate struggle. But a far more serious disturbance soon broke out for the second time in Sicily. When C. Marius was looking for troops in every quarter to oppose the invasion of the Cimbri,<sup>5</sup> a decree of

Second revolt  
healed by  
Athenio.

<sup>1</sup> Florus, lib. iii. c. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, lib. xxxiv. Ecl. 2. Livy, Epitom. lib. lix.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, lib. ii. c. 13, 16.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus Siculus, lib. xxxvi. Ecl. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. lib. xxxvi. Ecl. 1.

the senate empowered him to demand assistance from the more distant allies of the republic; and he sent accordingly to Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, requiring of him a certain contingent of soldiers. Nicomedes excused himself by saying that so large a portion of his subjects had been carried off and sold for slaves, in different parts of the empire, that he was unable to raise the force demanded of him. Upon this the senate issued an order, that no freeborn native of any state in alliance with Rome, should be kept as a slave in any of the Roman provinces; and the provincial magistrates were desired to institute inquiries, and to liberate within their several jurisdictions all those who came within the terms of the senate's decree. Licinius Nerva, the prætor of Sicily, began accordingly to set at liberty above eight hundred slaves within a few days; but he was soon persuaded by the rich slave-owners in the island to suspend his proceedings, and he in future referred all those who applied to him for their liberty to the decision of their own masters. The slaves thus suddenly disappointed of the hopes which they had felt themselves encouraged by the senate itself to entertain,<sup>1</sup> resolved to obtain their freedom for themselves: insurrections broke out in several parts of the island, and although at first partially suppressed, revived again with redoubled fury. Sabrius and Athenio were two of the chief insurgents: and the latter displayed considerable military talents, paying more regard to the quality than to the numbers of his army, and accustoming his men to regular discipline. He also, like Eunus, appealed to the superstition of his followers; and declared that the stars had foretold that he should be king over all Sicily. Several Roman prætors were defeated with loss in successive attempts to reduce the revolters; and the whole of Sicily became a scene of plunder and destruction; many free inhabitants of the poorer class availing themselves of the general confusion, and carrying on an organized system of devastation throughout the country. At length Marcus Aquilius, the colleague of Marius in his fifth consulship, was sent against this obstinate enemy. He followed the example of Rupilius, by shutting the insurgents up in their strong-holds, and surrounding them with lines of circumvallation till famine obliged them to surrender. Many, however, had fallen by the sword in several previous engagements; and those who at last submitted were sent to Rome, and destined there to afford sport for the populace by being exposed to fight with beasts in the amphitheatre. But it is said that they preserved their fierceness to the last, and instead of combating with the beasts, turned their swords against one another, and shed their blood upon the altars appointed for the sacrifices usually performed at the games,

Quelled by  
Marcus  
Aquilius.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus Siculus, lib. xxxvi. Ecl. 1. It may be observed that the testimony of Diodorus is more than usually valuable in his account of these transactions, from his being himself a Sicilian, and always showing a lively interest in events that happened in his own country.

B.C. 102. the last survivor completing the slaughter by killing himself. The peace of the island thus with difficulty restored, was maintained for the future by regulations of extreme severity. No slave was allowed to carry a weapon;<sup>1</sup> and on one occasion when a boar of remarkable size had been sent as a present to L. Domitius, at that time prætor of the island, he inquired who had killed it; and finding that it was a slave employed as a shepherd, he summoned the man before him, and asked him how he had contrived to destroy so large an animal. The shepherd replied, that he had killed it with a boar spear; upon which Domitius ordered him immediately to be crucified for having used a weapon in defiance of the law. In consequence of this arbitrary system, we read of no more revolts of the slaves in Sicily for a very long period.

Trial and acquittal of Aquilius.

B.C. 100.

But whatever were the military services of Manius Aquilius, in subduing the insurgent slaves, his conduct as a man too much resembled that of his father whom we have seen poisoning the wells in Asia, and afterwards tried for his corruption and oppression. His son was in like manner brought to trial on a similar charge; and it appears that his guilt could not be denied; for M. Antonius, the orator, who acted as his advocate, could only save him by a violent appeal to the feelings of the judges.<sup>2</sup> He contrasted the former honours of the accused with his present condition; and at last he tore open the dress of his client, and exposed the wounds which he had received in the course of his services as a soldier. So little were the duties of a court of justice observed at Rome, that this most irrelevant mode of defence was completely successful; and Aquilius escaped condemnation. How hard it is for good government and equal justice to exist among a people who allow their feelings to influence them against their reason in the discharge of a solemn duty!

B.C. 99.  
The Cæcilian and Didian Law.

In the following year an attempt was made to check the violent measures sometimes proposed by the tribunes, and which the people were used to approve without due consideration. A law was passed which bears the names of both the consuls, Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos, a cousin of Q. Metellus Numidicus, and T. Didius; and by which it was enacted, that every law should be published on three successive market days,<sup>3</sup> before it could be submitted to the votes of the people; it was also provided that the people should not be obliged to accept or reject any clause of a law contrary to their wishes, as was often the case at present, when several enactments being contained in one law, and proposed to the votes of the assembly all together, it was necessary either to approve or to negative the whole without discrimination.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, lib. v. c. 3.


<sup>2</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. ii. c. 48; In Verrem, lib. v. c. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. Philipp. v. c. 3. Pro Domo, c. 20.

The year of Rome 656 is marked by some discussions which arose on the subject of sumptuary laws. In a constitution which permitted the magistrates to interfere with the private life of every citizen to the extent practised by the censors, the expenses of the table were not likely to escape the control of the law. We read of various statutes passed from time to time, with a view to restrain what was called luxury :

B.C. 99.  
Origin and  
Progress of  
Sumptuary  
Laws.

in the year 538, only a year after the battle of Cannæ, C. Oppius, one of the tribunes,<sup>1</sup> brought forward a law to regulate the degree of ornament which might be allowed in female dress, and forbidding the ladies of Rome to use a carriage within the city, except in their attendance on the public sacrifices. But after the end of the second Punic war, it was contended that such provisions were fitted only for a season of national distress, and the Oppian law was repealed. Of the laws directed particularly against the expenses of the table, the first in order of time is fixed about the year 571,<sup>2</sup> and was proposed by Orchius, one of the tribunes, on the recommendation of the senate. It limited the number of guests at any entertainment, and ordered, as we are told, that the doors of the house should be left open during the meal to guard against any violation of its enactments. A little more than twenty years afterwards, in the interval between the overthrow of Perseus and the third Punic war, the attention of the senate was again directed to the same subject. By a decree of that assembly,<sup>3</sup> the principal citizens, who were in the habit of giving entertainments to one another, during the celebration of the games in honour of Cybele, were obliged to make oath before the consuls that they would not expend on any meal more than a hundred and twenty asses, or 7s. 9d. sterling, exclusive of the sum paid for bread, vegetables, and wine; that they would use no other wine than that made in Italy, and that they would not have more than a hundred pounds weight of silver displayed at their table. Afterwards, in the same year, a law was passed bearing the name of C. Fannius,<sup>4</sup> one of the consuls,



[Roman Chariot.—Preserved in the Vatican.]

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<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxxiv. c. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Macrobius, Saturn. lib. ii. c. 13; Apud Facciolati Lexicon, in Voce "Orchia."

<sup>3</sup> Gellius, lib. ii. apud Sigonium, Commentar. in Fast. et Triumph.

<sup>4</sup> Macrobius, Saturnal. lib. ii. c. 13; apud Facciolati Lexicon, in Voce "Fannia."

B.C. 99. which restrained the expense of meals still more. On the greatest festivals no man was allowed to exceed an hundred asses, 6s. 5¼d. : on ten other days in every month he might go as high as thirty asses, or 1s. 11¼d. ; and at all other times he was limited to no more than ten, about 7¼d. of English money. By the same law,<sup>1</sup> also, the consumption of poultry and all kinds of birds was expressly forbidden, with the exception of a single hen at each table, and this, it was added, must not have been regularly fatted. This was repeated as a favourite clause in all future laws on the same subject ; and other articles of food were prohibited by successive enactments ;—as for example, M. Æmilius Scaurus, one of the consuls in the year 638, excluded dormice from the table,<sup>2</sup> which little animals the Romans, it appears, were accustomed to catch in great numbers, and regarded them when fatted as a peculiar delicacy. It is natural enough that men of small or moderate fortune, who could not indulge in the magnificence of splendid villas, numerous slaves, or costly furniture, should bear with great impatience these restrictions upon that peculiar gratification which was to them most accessible ; besides that, they looked upon any interference in such matters, as an encroachment on their just liberty of doing what they chose with their own money. We find accordingly that M. Dronius, one of the tribunes,<sup>3</sup> procured the rejection of a new sumptuary law brought forward about the year of Rome 656, to enforce the provisions of the law of Fannius. For this action, Dronius was shortly after expelled from the senate by the censors M. Antonius and L. Flaccus ; and a sumptuary law was in fact carried by the consul P. Licinius Crassus,<sup>4</sup> limiting the quantity of meat which might be brought to table on ordinary occasions, but still permitting an unrestricted consumption of vegetables. There is in one of Cicero's letters,<sup>5</sup> testimony to show that these regulations remained in force for many years ; and that their intention was completely evaded by the arts of cookery, which found means to provide a luxurious and expensive meal out of the common productions of the garden.

Dronius  
expelled  
from the  
Senate

Decree for  
the abolition  
of Human  
Sacrifices.

In the consulship of P. Licinius Crassus, and Cn. Lentulus, is also dated a decree of the senate for the abolition of human sacrifices.<sup>6</sup> When the republic was engaged in any dangerous war, the superstition of the Romans believed, that to bury alive, in the midst of Rome, an individual of the adverse nation, was a powerful charm to secure victory. This had been put in practice in the second Punic war ; and although now forbidden, was repeated afterwards,

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. x. c. 50.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* lib. viii. c. 57.

<sup>3</sup> Valerius Maximus, lib. ii. c. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Aul. Gellius, lib. ii. c. 24 ; apud Facciolati in Voce "Licinius."

<sup>5</sup> *Epistol. ad Familiares*, lib. vii. ep. 26.

<sup>6</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. xxx. c. 1.

on more than one occasion, till long after the first preaching of B.C. 99. Christianity.<sup>1</sup>

It is with pleasure that we are now called to contemplate two rare instances of integrity and humanity—Q. Mucius Scævola, and P. Rutilius Rufus. Q. Scævola filled the office of consul in the year of Rome 658, together with L. Licinius Crassus, so celebrated as an orator. On the expiration of the year, he was appointed as pro-consul to the government of the province of Asia;<sup>2</sup> by which name the Romans meant to express those countries on the western side of Asia Minor, which had formerly composed the kingdom of Pergamus. P. Rutilius attended him as his lieutenant,<sup>3</sup> and cordially co-operated with him in all his proceedings. He only held his command for nine months;<sup>4</sup> but during that short period he so endeared himself to the people whom he governed, by the equity of his administration, and by the firmness with which he protected them against the oppressions of the farmers of the revenue, that a festival was instituted in commemoration of his goodness,<sup>5</sup> and continued to be observed for many years afterwards in Asia; while at Rome, his name became identified with that of an upright and merciful magistrate,<sup>6</sup> and his conduct was long held up by the senate as a model which officers appointed to similar stations should diligently endeavour to copy. Q. Mucius was happy, moreover, in never being exposed to the malice of those whose interests had suffered from his pure and incorrupt government. But his lieutenant, P. Rutilius, was less fortunate. The judicial power, according to the law of C. Gracchus, (which, after a short interruption, had been lately put in force again by C. Servilius Glaucia,) was, as we have stated, vested entirely in the equestrian order. This class of men was closely connected with the farmers of the revenue, and entered warmly into their complaints of the treatment which they had received from Mucius and Rutilius. Rutilius was accused of corruption in his province, perhaps by some of those very individuals whose own corruption he had repressed; and was brought to trial before a court consisting entirely of citizens of the equestrian order. His conduct on his trial was consistent with the high principles of his general life. He refused to employ any celebrated orator in his defence,<sup>7</sup> nor would he suffer any attempts to be made to work upon the feelings of the judges. His friend, Q. Mucius, spoke in his behalf, confining himself only to a clear and simple statement of the truth. But the tribunal which had so lately acquitted the guilty

Just  
Administra-  
tion of  
Q. Mucius in  
Asia.

Trial of  
P. Rutilius.

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, lib. xxviii. c. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. 70. Others place his government of Asia about four years earlier, and say that he obtained the province as proprætor.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. 70.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, lib. v. ep. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. in Verrem, lib. ii. c. 21.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. in Cæcilium, c. 17; Valerius Maximus, lib. viii. c. 15.

<sup>7</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. i. c. 53.

B.C. 99. Aquilius, when defended by an appeal to its passions, now condemned a man of the most spotless innocence, who disdained any support but that of reason and justice. Rutilius was banished, and retired to Smyrna,<sup>1</sup> in the country which was the scene of his alleged corruption, but which was, in truth, the best witness of his virtue. The people whom he was accused of misgoverning, sent deputies from all their several towns to welcome his arrival once more amongst them; nor did they show less respect to him in his exile than when invested with the authority of a Roman officer.<sup>2</sup> The citizens of Smyrna gladly gave him the freedom of their city;<sup>3</sup> and in this adopted home, Rutilius spent in peace the remainder of his life; nor could the solicitations of Sylla, when dictator, ever prevail with him to return to Italy.

Censorship  
of Domitius  
and Crassus.

In the year of Rome, 661, some curious particulars are recorded of the censorship of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and L. Licinius Crassus. The study of eloquence daily becoming more popular at Rome, there arose a number of persons who professed to teach it, and who opened schools for the instruction of young men in this accomplishment. Of these teachers some were Greeks, and if they only interpreted and expounded the works of some of their distinguished countrymen, they must have communicated to their hearers much new and valuable knowledge. An acquaintance with the rhetoric of Aristotle must have opened an unknown world to the mind of a young Roman, and have furnished him with innumerable subjects of thought, while it led him to examine the motives of actions, and the causes of feelings; while it embraced, with wonderful conciseness, the principles of almost every argument that could be used in all questions, judicial and political; and while with intuitive good sense it displayed the excellences to be aimed at, and the faults to be avoided, in the language and arrangement of a writer or an orator. But besides these Greek instructors, some of the Romans themselves professed to open schools of rhetoric: and being for the most part men of little education, and delivering their lessons probably on cheaper terms than the Greek teachers, their scholars consisted chiefly of the poorer class of citizens, and particularly, we may suppose, of those individuals, who wished to qualify themselves for the part of noisy and factious leaders of the populace. It was on these grounds, as Cicero makes Crassus himself affirm,<sup>4</sup> that the censors, in the exercise of their arbitrary power, thought proper to put a stop to the proceedings of the Latin teachers of eloquence: because, in the language of Cicero, "they could teach their pupils nothing but impudence." In the course of the year, the two censors are said to have had a very unbecoming quarrel with each other: the expensive habits in which Crassus indulged in his manner of living, appearing to his colleague

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, de Republicâ, lib. i. c. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Valerius Maximus, lib. ii. c. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Tacitus, Annal. lib. iv. c. 43.

<sup>4</sup> In the Dialogue, De Oratore, lib. iii. c. 24.

to be unworthy of his censorian dignity. It appears that Crassus B.C. 99. had six date trees in his garden,<sup>1</sup> of remarkable size and beauty, which he valued very highly; and four pillars of the marble of Mount Hymettus in his house,<sup>2</sup> a material which had not hitherto been used in any public building at Rome, and which, in a private house, was thought to argue excessive luxury. Another ridiculous charge was brought by Cn. Domitius against his colleague;<sup>3</sup> that he had gone into mourning on the death of a favourite fish, which was kept in one of his fish-ponds. Crassus, we are told, confessed the truth of the story,—saying, “that he had indeed wept at the loss of a fish; but that Domitius had borne the loss of three wives without shedding a tear.” The history of Rome presents us at once with instances of the strangest extravagance of conduct in some characters, combined with a most complete intolerance of every thing eccentric, in the general feelings of the magistrates and the spirit of the laws.

The succeeding year, in which Sextus Julius Cæsar and L. Marcius Philippus were consuls, witnessed the origin of the Italian war. But B.C. 91. as the parties formed on this occasion were not without their effect in the civil war that followed; and as Sylla took a distinguished part in the contest maintained by Rome against her revolted allies, we shall include our account of these transactions in the narrative of that individual's life, which we are now preparing to lay before our readers.

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural. lib. xvii. c. 1.*


<sup>2</sup> *Ibid. lib. xvii. c. 1.*

<sup>3</sup> Macrobius, *Saturnal. lib. ii. c. 1.*



[Grecian Philosopher.  
*Hope's Costume of the Ancients.*]





[Marius Sitting upon the Ruins of Carthage.—Sargent, after a Picture by Coignet.]

## CHAPTER XIX.

### LUCIUS CORNELIUS SYLLA.

#### PART I.

FROM B.C. 138 TO B.C. 88.

B.C. 138  
Antiquities  
of the  
Cornelian  
family.

THE Cornelian family was one of the most ancient and honourable in Rome; and two of its branches, the houses of Scipio and Lentulus, furnished the commonwealth with a long list of distinguished officers, in the several departments of state. A third branch bore the surname of Rufinus; but although its members occasionally appear on the lists of magistrates, none of them, till a much later period, rose to any high personal eminence. In the second Punic war, in the year of Rome 540, P. Cornelius Rufinus, being then prætor, celebrated for the first time<sup>1</sup> the “Ludi Apollinares,” or games in honour of Apollo, which the Sibylline books had directed the senate to institute; and from this circumstance he is said to have changed his name of Rufinus, for that of Sibylla;<sup>2</sup> which was afterwards corrupted into the shorter appellation of Sylla. His great grandson was L. Cornelius Sylla, the subject of our present narrative, who was born<sup>3</sup> about the year of Rome 616, in the consulship of M.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxv. c. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Macrobius, apud Faccioli Lexicon, in Voce “Sulla.”

<sup>3</sup> Velleius Patercul. lib. ii. c. 17.

Æmilius Lepidus, and C. Hostilius Mancinus, four years before the death of Tiberius Gracchus. B.C. 138.

The father of Sylla did nothing to promote either the honour or the wealth of his family, and his son was born with no very flattering prospects either of rank or fortune.

We know not by whom his education was superintended; but he acquired, either from his instructors, or by his own exertion in after life, an unusual portion of knowledge; and had the character of being very profoundly versed in the literature<sup>1</sup> of the Greeks. But intellectual superiority affords no security for the moral principles of its possessor: and Sylla, from his earliest youth,<sup>2</sup> was notorious for gross sensuality, and for his keen enjoyment of low and profligate society. He is said to have lived in lodgings at Rome,<sup>3</sup> and to have rented



[Sylla.]

one floor of a house, for which he paid 3000 nummi, or about £24 4s. 4½d. a year: a style of living which seems to have been reckoned disgraceful to a man of patrician family, and to have inferred great indigence. For his first advancement in life, he was indebted to the fondness of a prostitute, who had acquired a large sum of money, and left it all to him by her will; and he also inherited the property of his mother-in-law, who regarded him as her own son. He was chosen one of the quæstors in the year of Rome 646, and accompanied Marius, then in his first consulship, into Africa; where, as has been mentioned elsewhere, his services were very remarkable, and it was to him that Jugurtha was at last surrendered by Bocchus, king of Mauritania. This circumstance excited, as it is said, the jealousy of Marius: but Sylla<sup>4</sup> nevertheless acted under him as one of his lieutenants in the war with the Cimbri; where he again greatly distinguished himself. But finding the ill-will of his general daily increasing, he left him, and served in the army of Lutatius Catulus, the colleague<sup>5</sup> of Marius: and in this situation, being charged with the duty of supplying the soldiers with provisions, he performed it so well that the army of Catulus was in the midst of abundance, while that of Marius was labouring under severe privations. This still further inflamed the animosity with which Marius already regarded him.

Character  
and position  
of Sylla.

For some time after this period, Sylla seems to have lived in the mere enjoyment of his favourite pleasures of intellectual and sensual excitement. At length, in the year of Rome 657, he became a

<sup>1</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. c. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. in Syllâ, c. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Velleius Patereul. lib. ii. c. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 4.

B.C. 138. candidate for the office of prætor, but without success. He attributed his failure, according to Plutarch,<sup>1</sup> to the disappointment of the people at his not first suing for the Ædileship; it being a long-established custom that the Ædiles should exhibit shows of some kind or other for the amusement of the multitude, and Sylla's friendship with the king of Mauritania seemed to promise that he would procure from Africa an unusual number of lions and other wild beasts, to be hunted in the amphitheatre. However, in the following year, Sylla was elected prætor, without the previous step of going through the office of ædile: and not to deprive the people of the gratification they expected, he exhibited no fewer than a hundred lions; the first time, it is said, that the male lion<sup>2</sup> was ever brought forward in the sports of the circus. On the expiration of his prætorship, he obtained the province of Cilicia;<sup>3</sup> and was commissioned to replace on his throne Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, who had been lately expelled by Mithridates. This he easily effected; for Mithridates was not yet prepared to encounter the power of Rome: and it is further mentioned, as a memorable circumstance in the life of Sylla, that while he was in Cappadocia, he received the first communication ever made to any Roman officer by the sovereign of Parthia. Arsaces, king of that country, perceiving that the Romans extended their influence into his neighbourhood, sent an embassy to Sylla to solicit their alliance. In the interview between the Roman prætor and the Parthian ambassador, Sylla<sup>4</sup> claimed the precedence in rank, with the usual arrogance of his countrymen; and by this behaviour, in all probability, left no very friendly feeling in the mind of Arsaces; and rather encouraged than lessened that jealousy of the Roman power, which the Parthians, in the sequel, were often enabled to manifest with more success than any other nation since the time of Hannibal.

Sylla obtains  
the  
Prætorship.

His  
proceedings  
in his  
Province.

On Sylla's return to Rome, he was threatened with a prosecution for corrupt proceedings in his province,<sup>5</sup> but the matter was never brought to a trial. It is said also that Bocchus, king of Mauritania, presented to the Romans about this time a group of figures in gold, representing himself betraying Jugurtha into the hands of Sylla. This excited anew the jealousy of Marius, who is represented to have attempted in vain to hinder the figures from being received and dedicated in the capitol.

Consulship  
of L.  
Philippus,  
and Sex. Jul.  
Cæsar.  
B.C. 92.

We are now arrived at the memorable consulship of L. Marcius Philippus and Sextus Julius Cæsar. Since the death of Saturninus the state of affairs at Rome had been generally tranquil; and the accounts given of this period in ancient writers are proportionably

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural. lib. viii. c. 16.*

<sup>3</sup> Auctor de *Viris illustribus*, in *Vitâ Syllæ*. Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 5. Livy, *Epit. 70.*

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* in Syllâ, c. 5, 6.

scanty. But to this calm a terrible storm was now to succeed, and Rome, for the first time since the second Punic war, was to be engaged in a desperate contest in the very heart of Italy. It appears that the senate bore<sup>1</sup> with impatience the great power enjoyed by the equestrian order in possessing the whole judicial authority in the commonwealth. To attack this formidable body it was necessary that the senate should effect a coalition with the popular party, and court it by a series of popular enactments. M. Livius Drusus was at this time one of the tribunes; the son of that M. Drusus who had been one of the colleagues of C. Gracchus in his tribuneship, and who had greatly undermined the popularity of Gracchus, by proposing, with the authority of the senate, laws even more grateful to the multitude than his. His son was now prevailed upon to act a similar part, and to bribe the people at almost any price to assist in the meditated attack upon the equestrian order. But Drusus was not of a temper to be the mere instrument of the designs of others. He is described as a man of great talents and great pride: insomuch, that during his ædileship,<sup>2</sup> when one of his colleagues suggested something as beneficial to the state, Drusus scornfully replied, "What business have you to interfere in the affairs of our commonwealth?" and when he acted as quæstor in Asia, he disdained the usual insignia of the office, as if his own personal dignity needed not any external marks of honour. In his tribuneship he was willing to promote the popularity of the senate, but not so as to resign to it all the credit that his measures might acquire: he rather aspired to be, as it were, the moderator of the republic, to balance the claims of contending factions, and to secure to himself the respect and gratitude of all. The imperfect accounts of these times which remain to us, do not allow us to arrange the order of his proceedings with exactness: but it appears that he at first attempted merely to restrain any abuse of power in those who filled the stations of judges,<sup>3</sup> by making them responsible for their verdicts; and liable to be tried, if there were any grounds for accusing them of corruption. Three of the most eminent individuals of the equestrian order, amongst whom we find the name of C. Mæcenas, an ancestor of the famous minister of Augustus, opposed the law of Drusus in behalf of the whole body to which they belonged; and their arguments, as recorded by Cicero,<sup>4</sup> are too remarkable to be omitted. They insisted that the Roman knights, in declining to sue for those offices which might have raised them to the rank of senators, had deliberately sacrificed their ambition to their love of security; that the high dignities which a senator enjoyed, were fairly compensated by his greater liability to have his

Tribuneship  
of M. Livius  
Drusus.

Laws of M.  
Drusus,

<sup>1</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. 70. Vell. Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Auctor de Viris illustribus, in M. Druso.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, pro Rabir. Postumo, c. 7. pro Cluentio, c. 56.

<sup>4</sup> Pro Cluentio, c. 56.

B.C. 92. conduct called in question: while, on the other hand, the equestrian order, which was obliged by law to undertake the office of judges, ought not to be exposed to prosecution for the manner in which they discharged it. Strange as this reasoning appears to us, it was admitted as just at Rome: the plebeians fully sympathized with the knights, and they succeeded in rejecting the proposed law, and in repelling all inquiry into the conduct of the judges, however great might be the iniquity of their decisions. Thus baffled, Drusus had recourse to a stronger measure, and proposed to restore the law of Q. Servilius Cæpio, by which the judicial power had been divided between the senate and the equestrian order. By a curious coincidence, one of his warmest opponents was a son of the very man in whose steps he was treading, Q. Cæpio.<sup>1</sup> Common report assigned a ridiculous cause to their mutual opposition, by tracing it back, in the first instance, to a dispute at a public sale about a valuable gold ring, which each of them was eager to purchase. Personal motives may very possibly have added virulence to their political differences; but Q. Cæpio, as a member of the equestrian order, was naturally disposed to resist the measures of Drusus; and the same vehemence of temper which induced him, on a former occasion, to defy the power of the tribune Saturninus, would lead him to take an equally prominent part on the side that he now espoused. The proposed law met with another powerful antagonist in the consul L. Philippus. He seems to have been actuated by a settled feeling of opposition to the aristocracy; as we have seen him, when tribune, eager to bring forward an Agrarian law; and now, as consul, he continually, in his speeches to the people, inveighed against the senate<sup>2</sup> with the utmost severity. On the other hand, Drusus pursued his schemes with the overbearing violence to which the pride of his nature prompted him: on one occasion he threatened Cæpio,<sup>3</sup> that he would order him to be thrown from the Tarpeian rock; at another time, when Philippus was speaking against him in the forum, he caused him to be seized and dragged to prison; and when, from the tightness with which the officer grappled him, the blood burst forth from his nostrils, Drusus exclaimed, in allusion to the supposed luxuriousness of his manner of living, "that it was the pickle of his favourite fish." In order to further his views, he proposed a new corn law, and a law for the establishment of several new colonies, to conciliate the common people; and to win the favour of the Italian allies, he renewed the hopes formerly held out to them, by C. Gracchus and M. Fulvius Flaccus, of obtaining the privileges of Roman citizens. The senate, for a long time, cordially supported him; and this circumstance gave occasion to

Opposed by  
Q. Cæpio and  
L. Philippus,

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, pro Domo, c. 46; Florus, lib. iii. c. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. i. c. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Auctor de Viris illustribus in M. Druso.

the violent speech of the consul, L. Philippus,<sup>1</sup> "That it was impossible for the republic to go on with such a senate." But, at length, their zeal in his cause began to cool: while he professed to defend their dignity, he almost pretended to act as their patron; and on one occasion,<sup>2</sup> when they sent for him into the senate house, he replied, "That the senate should rather adjourn to the Curia Hostilia," anciently used as the place of their meetings, "that so they might be near him while he was addressing the people, if they wanted him." It is said that the senate actually complied with his proposal; but such an instance of his pride must have taught it, that it was possible to buy too dearly its deliverance from the arbitrary power of the equestrian order. Meanwhile the laws of Drusus were successively carried: the judicial power was to be divided between the senate and the equestrian order; new colonies were to be planted; corn was to be sold at the rate fixed by the Sempronian law; all the several parties whom Drusus had courted, had received the benefits which he had promised them, excepting only the Italian allies. To their admission to the rights of citizenship, all orders in Rome were equally averse; and they seemed likely to meet the usual fate of strangers who interfere in domestic quarrels, and whose interests are sacrificed to promote the reconciliation of the contending parties. But finding that Drusus was unable to satisfy their expectations, and that nothing was to be looked for from the freewill of the Romans, they prepared to apply themselves to other measures. A conspiracy is said to have been formed by the Latins<sup>3</sup> to assassinate the consul, L. Philippus, whom they considered as one of their greatest enemies, while he was performing a sacrifice on the Alban Mount. Drusus, aware of their design, warned Philippus to provide for his own safety, and the plan was thus frustrated; but the public mind, throughout Italy, was in the highest state of agitation, and every thing seemed to presage an impending contest.

B.C. 92.

But are mostly carried.

It was at this time, when all parties were united in their invectives against Drusus, as the author of these disturbances, that one day, when he was returning home from the Forum,<sup>4</sup> encircled by an immense crowd of his followers, he was murdered at the door of his own house by some unknown assassin, who stabbed him, and left the knife sticking in his side. He was carried in immediately, and soon after expired; and such was the state of the times, that no inquiry was made to find out the murderer. But it was commonly asserted that Q. Varius Hybrida,<sup>5</sup> a vehement enemy of the senate, was the perpetrator of the crime.

Drusus is murdered.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. iii. c. 1.<sup>2</sup> Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 5.<sup>3</sup> Auctor de Viris illustribus, in M. Druso.<sup>4</sup> Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 14; Cicero, pro Milone, c. 7.<sup>5</sup> Cicero, de Naturâ Deorum, lib. iii. c. 33.

B.C. 92.  
And his Laws  
repealed.

After the death of Drusus, the general feeling ran so strongly against his measures, from the sense entertained of his criminal rashness in encouraging the claims of the Italian allies, that the senate now concurred with the consul Philippus in declaring all his laws invalid;<sup>1</sup> grounding this decision on the authority of the consul, who was also one of the augurs, and who alleged that they had been passed without due attention to the forms of religion in observing the auspices. It is remarkable, that the law for the regulation of the judicial power, which the senate had so strong an interest in maintaining, was, notwithstanding, annulled, together with the rest; as if the aristocracy had not dared to retain any benefit from the support of a man, who was now considered as an enemy to his country by all parties equally.

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The allies, however, had not yet broken out into open hostilities when the new consuls, L. Julius Cæsar and P. Rutilius Rufus, entered upon their office. In the mean time the equestrian order having thus successfully repelled the attack made against it, resolved to follow up its victory, and to terrify its enemies by an unsparing exercise of that judicial power of which it had been vainly attempted to deprive it. A law was proposed and carried by Q. Varius Hybrida,<sup>2</sup> the reputed assassin of Drusus, and now one of the tribunes of the people, that an inquiry should be set on foot in order to discover what persons had given encouragement to the pretensions of the Italians, and that all who had done so should be held guilty of a treasonable offence. This was a favourite method of annoying the nobility; and we have seen it practised already with success at the beginning of the war with Jugurtha. The knights promised themselves the same results from it on the present occasion. Accusations were brought against M. Æmilius Scaurus,<sup>3</sup> the first on the roll of the senate; against M. Antonius,<sup>4</sup> the famous orator, against C. Cotta,<sup>5</sup> Q. Pompeius, L. Memmius, and several others of the senators. But the majority of those whom we have named obtained their acquittal; and the whole proceeding had little other effect than that of exasperating the Italians still further, when they saw that to have shown any encouragement to their petitions was considered at Rome as a crime. Accordingly the different cities of Italy<sup>6</sup> entered into a secret league with each other, and began to make an interchange of hostages. Their intrigues were first discovered at Asculum, a town of Picenum; and Q. Servilius, with proconsular authority, was sent thither to punish the offenders. But not being supported by a sufficient military force, he provoked the inhabitants to proceed at once to open violence; and they accordingly massacred him and his

Confederacy  
among the  
Italian  
States.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, de Legibus, lib. ii. c. 6, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Valerius Maximus, lib. viii. c. 6. Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 37.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, Fragm. Orat. pro M. Scauro.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. Tuscul. Disput. lib. ii. c. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. de Claris Orator. c. 56, 89.

<sup>6</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civili, lib. i. c. 38.

lieutenant Fonteius,<sup>1</sup> together with all other Roman citizens who happened to be found in Asculum. Immediately after the perpetration of this outrage, the Italians with one consent flew to arms: the Marsi,<sup>2</sup> the Peligni, the Samnites, the Lucani, the Vestini, the Manucini, the Picentes, the Hirpini, and the Japygians; almost every nation in Italy, except the Latins, Tuscans, and Umbrians, took part in the confederacy. They fixed upon Corfinium as their seat of government,<sup>3</sup> giving it the name of Italicum; and there a senate was formed out of the principal individuals in the several states; and two officers were elected with the title of consuls to conduct the operations of the war; each, in imitation of the practice of the Romans, having one half of Italy assigned him as his province, and six generals, with the title of lieutenants, to act under his command. A deputation was sent to the Roman senate, representing the reasonable claims of the Italians to enjoy their share of the privileges of a city, whose greatness was in so large a proportion the work of their own courage and fidelity; but an answer was returned with the usual spirit of the Romans, that no proposals would be received until the Italians should express contrition for their rebellion, and return to their obedience. Thus an end was put to all negotiation, and the war was commenced on both sides with the utmost vigour and animosity.

B.C. 91.  
Revolt of the  
Italian Allies.

That the reader may more fully understand the nature of this quarrel, and of the connection which subsisted between Rome and the different nations of Italy, it will be proper to refer to the history of an earlier period, and to notice that system of alliance between the stronger and weaker powers, which is one of the most peculiar points in the political relations of antiquity.

Of the nature  
of the ancient  
system of  
Alliance  
between a  
stronger and  
a weaker  
power.

Nothing can be imagined more miserable than the condition of the weaker states in those ages of barbarism which subsisted both in Greece and Italy long after the establishment of political societies or commonwealths. That superior power conferred a right of dominion, and that foreigners might be freely plundered, unless protected by some particular treaty, were two principles generally acted upon; and which exposed all small communities to the double evils of oppression from their neighbours, and of kidnapping and robbery from any one who had the means of occasionally reaching them. Their only resource was to form a connection with some nation strong enough to defend them; and the protection of which they purchased by binding themselves to serve it faithfully in all its wars, or, in other words, by surrendering their national independence. Unhappily, the system of government which prevailed in those times led them to preserve their municipal independence, and substituted the connection of alliance, for that of union under the

Reasons why  
Alliance was  
preferred to  
a complete  
Union.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, pro Fonteio, c. 14.      <sup>2</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 39. Livy, Epitome, lib. 72.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus Siculus, Eclog. lib. 37.



B.C. 91. same executive and legislative power. The origin of most of the cities of Greece and Italy resembled that of the European settlements in America; they were the colonies of a more civilized people seating themselves in the country of barbarians; and thus instead of freely naturalizing themselves and spreading over the face of the land, they advanced timidly and slowly beyond the walls of their first fortified habitation, and were accustomed to contract their feelings of patriotism within the limits of a single city. The spirit of a town is naturally somewhat republican; men are thrown more completely together, they live in the sight of one another, and all are readily summoned together to consider on any thing that may affect the common interest. Thus the principle of representation does not suggest itself to their minds; where all can meet to consult for themselves, they are not likely to intrust others with the power of acting for them. In this manner, it came to be considered as an axiom amongst the political writers of antiquity, that where any portion of liberty was enjoyed, there some points at least must be subject to the decision of the collective body of the people; and even where property was made a qualification, and the poorest citizens were excluded from the public assemblies, still those who had a voice in the commonwealth always exercised it in their own persons collectively, and not through the medium of representatives; and thus the national council, if so it might be called, was always a considerable portion of the whole population, and formed too large a body to be contained within the walls of a single building. This circumstance rendered it impossible for the dependent allies of a state to become incorporated with it: the inhabitants of many towns could not habitually meet together in one common assembly, and the citizens of the capital or seat of government would then in effect hold in their hands an absolute sovereignty over all the rest of the nation. Whereas, by retaining a municipal independence, the allied cities still enjoyed an entire freedom in their internal government, lived under their own laws, held in their own hands the administration of justice, and confined to themselves all offices of civil honour and emolument. But at the same time their interests were thus kept distinct from those of their protecting ally; they were regarded always as subjects and not as fellow-citizens, and were liable to have their property taxed, their trade shackled, and their people called to serve as soldiers, whenever it suited the policy or pleasure of the sovereign state.

Causes which placed the Romans at the head of an Alliance.

The invaluable histories of Thucydides and Xenophon afford a complete picture of these alliances among the Greeks; and it is from these that we must derive our knowledge of the same system, as it was practised in Italy. We find that Rome,<sup>1</sup> so early as the first

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, lib. iii. c. 22.

year of the commonwealth, was strong enough to act as the protecting ally of several small adjacent cities, among which Ardea, Antium, Laurentum, Circeii, and Tarracina, are particularly mentioned. They were thus secured against the descents which the Carthaginians often made on the coasts of Italy, for the purposes of plunder, and especially of carrying off the inhabitants as slaves; for Rome being of importance enough to treat with Carthage, stipulated that all her own dependent allies should be secured from molestation: but with regard to all the other cities of Latium, it was provided, that if the Carthaginians took any of them, they might carry off the people, and the moveable property, but might not convert the towns into establishments or garrisons for themselves. Thus they were allowed to plunder all who did not put themselves under the protection of Rome; and this permission was doubtless intended to exalt the benefits of the Roman alliance in the estimation of the neighbouring states. In process of time the Romans found means to include all the nations of Italy in the number of their allies, and thus to place all the military force of the peninsula at their own disposal. They actually were preparing to call it into action when the Gauls invaded Italy between the first and second Punic wars; they caused returns to be made to them of the whole number of citizens able to bear arms in the several states of their confederacy.<sup>1</sup> In every war, the troops of the Italian allies formed one half of the Roman army; they were levied by orders from the consuls,<sup>2</sup> who named the states from which the contingents were to be drawn, the number of them to be raised, and the time and place at which they were to be ready to put themselves under the command of the Roman generals. They had officers of their own,<sup>3</sup> and their own paymasters, but these were entirely subordinate to generals appointed by the Romans to command them, with the title of prefects of the allies. The prefects had the power of punishing by fine or by flogging; and the consuls, as appears from a passage in Sallust, to which we referred on a former occasion, might even condemn any of the soldiers of the allies to death.<sup>4</sup> It is more difficult to state exactly what was the power of Rome over the Italian nations in time of peace. Generally speaking, the Roman laws were not binding on the allies, unless they themselves chose to adopt them:<sup>5</sup> but a large reservation was made of all such things as the Romans held to concern their dignity or prerogative, and in all these their decisions were of paramount authority to any municipal laws of their allies. For example, it was held that the senate or people of Rome, or that any of their generals, might confer the freedom of Rome on any meritorious individuals in the allied states;<sup>6</sup>

Their  
authority  
over their  
Allies,  
1. In war.

2. In peace.

<sup>1</sup> Polybins, lib. ii. c. 23, 24.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. lib. vi. c. 21, 26, 34.

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, pro Cornelio Balbo, c. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. vi. c. 21.

<sup>4</sup> Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. c. 69.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. c. 9.

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The Allies are  
anxious to  
obtain the  
privileges of  
Roman  
Citizenship.

although it seems that the Italians viewed the exercise of this power with some jealousy, probably because they thought that it gave the Romans too great an influence among them. But with whatever reluctance they might see the rights of Roman citizenship conferred on individuals amongst them by the patronage of Roman magistrates, the allies had long entertained a wish to share universally in these rights, and to find the road open before them to the command of armies, to the administration of provinces, to a participation in short in all the dignities and emoluments so largely enjoyed by the citizens of Rome. The Latins, or at least some states among them, possessed indeed the right of voting in the Roman assemblies; but it appears that they were all comprehended in one of the Roman tribes,<sup>1</sup> and could influence consequently no more than a thirty-fifth part of the whole number of voters; so that there was little inducement for them as a body to interest themselves in the business of the forum. The rest of the Italians did not enjoy even so much political consequence as this; and both were alike incapable of being elected to any magistracy at Rome, or to any military command in the provinces. It is no wonder therefore that they bore with impatience such a state of exclusion: and a modern reader may be surprised that their efforts were directed towards obtaining a closer union with Rome, rather than towards asserting their complete independence; and he may think it strange also, that the Romans should have risked the very existence of their commonwealth, rather than adopt a measure which promised to strengthen it by the accession of so large a number of citizens, whose interests would from henceforth have been identified with that of Rome. But the allies on their part considered, that if they became independent, they would lose the fruits of all those conquests which they had so largely helped the Romans to acquire. Instead of being a sovereign nation, exempted from taxes, and deriving a large accession of wealth every year from its subject provinces, they would have relapsed into the condition of poor and petty republics, none of which had any claim to become a centre of union to the rest, while their separate strength would have been utterly incompetent to withstand the power of Rome, by which, long before it had reached its present eminence, they had already been successively overwhelmed. On the other hand, the pride of the Romans induced them to revolt at the notion of raising their inferiors to the rank of their equals. The senate, besides, by admitting so many new competitors, diminished each individual senator's prospects of obtaining honours and emoluments: the equestrian order dreaded lest their exclusive possession of the judicial power should be invaded, or their profits, as farmers of the taxes, wrested from them by the competition of some of the wealthy Italians: whilst the

<sup>1</sup> Livy, lib. xxv. c. 3.

bulk of the people were unwilling to lessen the value of their votes B.C. 91. in the public assembly, by extending the right of suffrage so largely. All parties in the commonwealth trusting to the well known discipline of the Roman armies, to the superior experience of their generals, and to the usual dissensions and weaknesses of confederacies, resolved to hazard the issue of a war; not without the hope perhaps of establishing their power over their allies on a firmer basis, and silencing for ever all their claims to a participation in the rights of Roman citizenship.

Accordingly, the two consuls, L. Julius Cæsar and P. Rutilius Rufus, took the field; having under them, as their lieutenants, all the officers of highest reputation in the commonwealth.<sup>1</sup> Under Rutilius were employed C. Marius, who seems to have rested in inactivity since the sedition of Saturninus; Cn. Pompeius, the father of Pompey the great; Q. Servilius Cæpio, who had made himself conspicuous by his opposition to M. Drusus during his late tribuneship; C. Perpenna and Valerius Messala. Under L. Cæsar were Licinius Crassus, P. Lentulus, Titus Didius, and L. Sylla. These several officers acted in their different quarters against the generals of the confederate Italians; but as we have no account of the war written by a contemporary, or by a military historian, we know not what were the plans for the campaign on either side; and the reports which we possess contain little more than an unconnected list of battles and sieges, devoid alike of information and of interest. It is mentioned, that the consul, L. Cæsar,<sup>2</sup> was joined by an auxiliary force of Gauls and Numidians; but that the latter were rendered useless to him by an able expedient of the Italian commander, C. Papius. Oxyntas, a son of the famous Jugurtha, had been detained a prisoner in Italy since the death of his father; and now falling into the hands of Papius, was by him invested with the ensigns of royalty, and studiously presented to the sight of his countrymen in the consul's army. Numbers of them immediately deserted to him, looking upon him as their king; and L. Cæsar, suspicious of those who remained, was obliged to send them back into Africa.

In the first year of the war, the Romans<sup>3</sup> met with some severe losses: the consul P. Rutilius, and Q. Cæpio, one of his lieutenants, were, on separate occasions, defeated and slain. L. Postumius, one of the prætors, was killed at Nola; and that town, which had been so faithful to Rome in the second Punic war, now fell into the hands of the Samnites. Several other cities were either taken by the Italians, or were encouraged to join their cause of their own accord; and towards the close of the year the Umbri and the Tuscans showed evident signs of their intention to follow the general example. This last danger seemed so alarming, that the Romans were driven

The Italian  
war.  
First  
campaign.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. i. c. 42.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 43, 44; Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxiii.

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to avert it by concession; and they passed a law, admitting all the Italians who had continued faithful to Rome to the rights of citizenship.<sup>1</sup> This fixed the Latins to their cause, and stopped the Tuscans from revolting as they had meditated; the Umbri, however, probably not being aware of it in time, actually joined the confederates. Yet although Rome had thus been obliged to concede in some measure, her strength in the field had been too resolutely and successfully exerted to allow the enemy to calculate on the speedy attainment of his object by force of arms. Sylla and Marius had obtained a great victory over the Marsi;<sup>2</sup> L. Cæsar had defeated the Samnites, and Cn. Pompeius, having obtained some advantage over the Picentes, was enabled to lay siege to Asculum. On the other hand, the Romans were so pressed for want of soldiers, that they enlisted even freedmen into the legions;<sup>3</sup> and as their victories had been fully counterbalanced by defeats, it became evident that concessions must be made, and the difficulty consisted in disarming the resentment of the enemy without seeming to be actuated by fear; to yield the point in dispute without sacrificing the national honour.

Second  
campaign  
B.C. 90.

The military events of the next campaign tended however in a great degree to preserve the reputation of the Romans; and enabled them to extricate themselves without degradation from this alarming war. L. Porcius Cato, and Cn. Pompeius Strabo, were chosen consuls; and the latter brought the siege of Asculum to a triumphant issue;<sup>4</sup> an event which was peculiarly welcome to the Romans, as that town had set the first example of revolt, and had accompanied it with the massacre of two Roman officers, and a number of Roman citizens. Cn. Pompeius gained also a victory over the Marsi, and reduced that people, together with the Vestini, Peligni, and Marrucini, to make a separate peace. Possibly some intimation was given them, that the object for which they were contending would be granted them on their submission; for we find that the states which first withdrew from the confederacy, were rewarded by receiving the right of citizenship immediately. The seat of government of the Italians was now removed from Corfinium to Æsconia,<sup>5</sup> in the country of the Samnites; that bold people resolving to continue the struggle as obstinately as their ancestors had done in the days of Pontius and Papirius Cursor. But they had to contend with one of the most formidable of the Roman generals, in the person of Sylla; whose exploits in this second campaign had raised him to the highest distinction. The forces under his command were increased early in the season,<sup>6</sup> by a mutiny which took place among the troops of A.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 49; Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 46; Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxiii. lxxiv.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 49; Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxiv.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxv. lxxvi.

<sup>5</sup> Diodorus Siculus, Eclog. lib. xxxvii.

<sup>6</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxv.; Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 6.

Postumius Albinus, another of the consul's lieutenants. That officer, B.C. 90. being suspected of treason, was murdered by his own soldiers, who then joined themselves to the army of Sylla; nor did he scruple to receive them, but observed, "that they would only fight the better, in order to atone for their crime." Thus strengthened, he took and destroyed the town of Stabia,<sup>1</sup> in Campania, defeated a large army with immense loss near Nola, reduced the Hirpini to subjection, and then, invading Samnium, defeated the Samnite general, Papius Mutilius, with severe loss in the field, drove him into Æsconia, and attacked and took the town of Bovianum. These successes encouraged him to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship; for which purpose, towards the end of the campaign, he returned to Rome.

A circumstance, which is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus,<sup>2</sup> served, in all probability, as a powerful inducement to the Romans to reward the submission of the Italians as early as possible with the privileges which they so earnestly desired. It appears that the confederates had applied for aid to Mithridates, king of Pontus, whose power and ambition were now disposing him to enter into a contest with the Romans. Either his pride, or his want of sufficient information, dictated to him his most ill-judged answer, and led him to commit a fault in policy which the ability and vigour of all his after life could never repair. He told the Italians that he would lead his armies into Italy as soon as he had secured the dominion of Asia Minor. But the fortune of his intended allies could brook no delay; and a bare suspicion of so formidable an accession to their enemy's force, would dispose the Romans to hasten their measures of conciliation. Accordingly the Italian war vanishes almost instantaneously from our notice; one state after another submitted, and received in return the gift of Roman citizenship; and after the close of the second year of the contest we only find some faint sparks remaining of the vast conflagration which had so lately involved all Italy. Nola still refused to yield,<sup>3</sup> and the relics of the Samnites and Lucanians were yet in arms, either in their own country or in the extremity of Bruttium, almost in the same quarter where Hannibal had so long maintained himself under circumstances nearly similar.

The war which we now have been recording was undertaken for a definite and intelligible object, and naturally ended when that object was attained. But as it had sprung out of the internal dissensions of Rome, so it was lost in them again, and the different interests which had been engaged in it, although no longer the leading points in the civil wars that followed, yet became easily connected with the respective parties, and served to prolong and exasperate their quarrel. It is

Mithridates refuses to assist the Italians.

End of the Italian War.

Its connection with subsequent events should be observed.

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, *Historia Natural.* lib. iii. c. 5; Appian, lib. i. c. 50, 51.

<sup>2</sup> *Eclog.* lib. xxxvii.

<sup>3</sup> Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii.; Diodorus Siculus, *Eclog.* lib. xxxvii.

B.C. 90. here that we again deeply feel the want of a contemporary or a sensible historian to guide our researches. Reduced to connect, as well as we can, the facts incidentally mentioned by the writers whom we are obliged to follow; and forced to supply, often by conjectures, the chasms in their most unsatisfactory narratives, we can only hope at best to present our readers with an imperfect picture, and may be forgiven if it be in some respects even an erroneous one. The name of Marius has scarcely occurred to our notice in the second campaign of the Italian war; whereas the services of Sylla were most eminent. We have seen that Sylla went to Rome to stand for the consulship, and the prospect of his attaining that dignity was most galling to the jealousy of Marius; especially as a war with Mithridates now appeared certain, and if a general of Sylla's reputation filled the office of consul, his claims to the command of the army employed in the contest would prevail over all others. C. Julius Cæsar and Q. Pompeius were the two other candidates; the former of whom could not legally offer himself,<sup>1</sup> as he had never gone through the

Sylla a candidate for the Consulship. B.C. 89.



[Gaius Sulpicius.]

Rise, character, and proceedings of the Tribune Sulpicius.

previous office of prætor, and on this account his election was vigorously opposed by P. Antistius and P. Sulpicius, tribunes of the people. Sulpicius was one of the ablest orators of his time,<sup>2</sup> and had lived in habits of familiarity with L. Crassus, with M. Antonius, and particularly with the late tribune, M. Drusus. He is introduced by Cicero as one of the speakers in the dialogue, "De Oratore," and is said to have been regarded by the elder part of the nobility as a man likely to be one of the best supporters of the aristocratical cause. One of his first public acts was the accusation of C. Norbanus,<sup>3</sup> for a riot and sedition in his tribuneship, and this was considered as a favourable omen of his future attachment to the laws and to good order. His opposition to the illegal pretensions of C. Cæsar gained him great popularity,<sup>4</sup> without any prejudice to his character in the opinions of the nobility; but it appears that the favour with the multitude, which he had thus honourably gained, accompanied perhaps with an excessive confidence in his own talents as a speaker, excited in his mind a fatal ambition, and led him to tread in the steps of the Gracchi, of Saturninus, and of his friend Drusus, in assuming the character of a popular tribune. Other circumstances may have contributed also to the same effect: he had a violent personal quarrel with Q. Pompeius,<sup>5</sup> who, together with Sylla, proved the successful

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, c. 62.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. c. 49. 55; De Oratore, lib. i. c. 7. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. ii. c. 21. 49.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. de Hauruspic. Respons. c. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. de Amicitia, c. 1.

candidate in the consular election; and he had, perhaps, already formed that connection with Marius, which his subsequent conduct so clearly discovered. The measure which he principally endeavoured to carry seems to have been a favourite one with all the popular leaders since the days of Tiberius Gracchus; and Sulpicius, in the course of his intimacy with Drusus, probably learned to regard it with peculiar attachment. This was an unlimited communication of the right of citizenship to all the inhabitants of Italy; a project essentially popular in its principle, as it tended to render the government less exclusive; and which, though abhorred by the aristocracy, and viewed with jealousy by a large portion of the people at large, possessed, notwithstanding, great attractions for the very lowest class of citizens,<sup>1</sup> as well as for the turbulent and enthusiastic of all classes; for not only was it recommended by being of a spirit entirely democratical, but it was obvious that the indiscriminate admission of all the Italians to the privilege of voting at Rome, would greatly lessen the influence of the richer class of Roman citizens, and by rendering the assembly of the people so immoderately numerous, would, in fact, reduce it to little better than a mere mob, the ready tool of an eloquent and ambitious leader. Nor had the late grant of citizenship to the allies entirely satisfied their wishes; for in order to prevent them from exercising a power in the Comitia proportionate to their numbers, they had been all admitted into eight only of the thirty-five tribes;<sup>2</sup> and as all questions were decided by a majority of tribes, and not of individual votes, their weight in the assembly was still much less than they thought themselves entitled to claim. Accordingly Sulpicius now professed himself the advocate of their complete equality with the natives of Rome; and proposed that they should be admitted into all the tribes without distinction. Finding his project resisted by the aristocratical party, he became only more violent in his proceedings; he knew that if it became a question of physical force, his partizans were likely to prevail, provided only that he could give them organization as well as numbers, to prevent them from being seized with a panic in the time of danger, and leaving him personally

<sup>1</sup> The history of the Catholic question in our own times will greatly illustrate the account given in the text. The cause of the Catholics has been espoused by the popular party, because the principle of abolishing laws of exclusion, and rendering all men equally eligible to a share in the government, is in itself a popular one. Yet considerations of danger or loss to themselves from the consequences of the measure, have often strongly influenced the multitude to oppose it, and to inveigh against its supporters; although, after the ferment was over, they have not liked their leaders the less for continuing to be its advocates. Thus Drusus may be said to have fallen a sacrifice to something like the outcry of "No Popery;" yet Sulpicius, only two years afterwards, could tread in his steps, not only without forfeiting the affections of the people, but as if the side of the question which he espoused, were the one which a popular leader would naturally adopt.

<sup>2</sup> Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii.



B.C. 89. exposed to the fate of the Gracchi and of Saturninus. He prepared, therefore, a body of three thousand gladiators,<sup>1</sup> whom he kept always about him; and he is said besides to have been attended by six hundred young men of the equestrian order, whom he called his Anti-Senate. While we start at such a systematic defiance of the forms of regular government, we should remember that acts of outrage and violence were not confined to the popular party; for only two years before this time a riot had been excited by a class of men necessarily removed far above the mere rabble,<sup>2</sup> those who had large debts due to them; who had assaulted and murdered A. Sempronius Asellio, one of the prætors, in open day, because, in his judicial capacity, he had issued some decrees for the protection of insolvent debtors. In the mean time news arrived that Mithridates had actually attacked and overrun the Roman dominions in Asia Minor. War was therefore declared against him at Rome, and Asia and Italy being named as the provinces of the consuls, the latter fell to the lot of Q. Pompeius,<sup>3</sup> and the former to that of Sylla. The army which Sylla was to command was at this time employed near Nola, as that city still refused to submit to the Romans: but he himself remained in the city with his colleague, endeavouring to baffle the projects of Sulpicius, by proclaiming frequent holidays, and ordering consequently a suspension of public business. But Sulpicius,<sup>4</sup> on one of these occasions, attacked the consuls with his armed force, calling upon them to repeal their proclamation for the festival; and on their refusal a riot ensued, in which Q. Pompeius escaped with difficulty to a place of concealment, his son was killed, and Sylla finding himself in the power of his enemies, complied with their demands, and annulled his late edict. Then, unwilling to expose himself to similar insults, he instantly left Rome to join the army. Sulpicius carried his favourite measure, and the Italian allies were placed by law on a footing of perfect equality with the Romans in the right of voting.

Sulpicius procures the command of the Army, destined to act against Mithridates, to be transferred from Sylla to Marius.

Sylla had already shown that he possessed none of the virtuous courage of Metellus, who had preferred banishment to a compliance with the illegal demands of the popular party in the time of Saturninus. It was soon to appear that he resembled that excellent citizen as little in the readiness with which he had sacrificed his own interests and dignity, rather than endanger the peace of his country. Marius was now to reap the advantage which he had proposed to himself from his connection with Sulpicius, and from the late triumph of the Italian allies. It should be recollected that he had supported the interests of the Italians in the tribuneship of

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 35, in Syllâ, c. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxiv.; Appian, lib. i. c. 54.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 55.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. de Bello Civili, lib. i. c. 56; Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 8.

Saturninus, and that he in return relied upon their devotion to him in promoting his views of ambition. His own low birth, his want of education, and the inherent coarseness of his character had prevented him from ever blending cordially with the aristocracy; he was besides himself a native of a country town, Arpinum, and could have no invincible prejudices in favour of the exclusive possession of power by the inhabitants of Rome. Accordingly, soon after the admission of the Italians into all the tribes, a law was passed in the Comitia, by which the people transferred the command of the army, destined to act against Mithridates, from Sylla to Marius;<sup>1</sup> and two military tribunes were sent to notify this change to Sylla. His soldiers are said to have been as indignant as himself at this decree: they had been fighting for two campaigns against the revolted Italians; and now the enemy whom they had vanquished in the field had acquired an ascendancy in the councils of the state, and would probably deprive them, as well as their general, of the spoils and honours which all anticipated from an Asiatic war. The violence of the Comitia was imitated in the camp; the two military tribunes were murdered,<sup>2</sup> and the army, consisting of six legions, immediately broke up from its quarters, and began to move towards Rome. But it is said,<sup>3</sup> that almost all the superior officers, unwilling to fight against their country, resigned their commands, and hastened to escape into the city.

Sylla  
marches  
towards  
Rome.

In retaliation for the murder of the two military tribunes, several of Sylla's friends were murdered by the popular party at Rome. The senate was completely overawed, and none of the many illustrious persons whom it contained, are recorded as making any attempt to meditate between the parties, or to prevent the violence that was impending. Sylla was joined meantime by his colleague Q. Pompeius, and the two consuls continued to advance, disregarding the repeated deputations that were sent to stay their march. At last, when they were already in the neighbourhood of Rome, they received a final address, entreating them, in the name of the senate, not to approach within four miles of the capitol.<sup>4</sup> Sylla pretended to comply, and gave the usual orders to measure out the ground for his camp on the spot on which the deputation had met him. But while his antagonists were thus thrown off their guard, he sent off a detachment to follow close after the returning deputies,<sup>5</sup> and to occupy one of the gates of the city. This was effected, and he and his colleague putting themselves instantly in motion with the main army, and stationing troops on several quarters of the town, proceeded to force their way into the streets. Marius and Sulpicius,

<sup>1</sup> Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii.; Appian, c. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, c. 57; Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 9; Appian, c. 58.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 57.

B.C. 89. having in vain tried to strengthen their cause by inviting the slaves to join them, with a promise of freedom, attempted for a time to



[Marius and the Assassin.—Sargent, after a Picture by Drouais. 1]

Assaults and  
takes the  
City.

resist with such a force as they had been able to raise and arm, and with the aid of many of the inhabitants, who annoyed the assailants with stones and arrows from their houses. But Sylla without scruple ordered his men to set fire to the quarters from whence they were thus annoyed; and at the same time prepared to assail the city in an opposite direction, and at once to distract the plans of the defenders,

and to menace them with cutting off their retreat. Then it was that Marius, Sulpicius, and their principal friends, gave up the contest, and consulted for their safety by flight; whilst the conquerors, halting in the Sacred Way, took instant measures for securing their victory, punished severely some of their soldiers<sup>2</sup> who were beginning to plunder, stationed guards in the most important positions, and were on the alert the whole night to prevent any new disorders, or any further hostile attempts on either side.

Marius and  
Sulpicius are  
declared  
Traitors.

On the following morning the Romans, for the first time since the invasion of the Gauls, awoke to the sight of a victorious enemy in possession of their city. Sylla proceeded to assemble the senate, and proposed that Marius,<sup>3</sup> Sulpicius, and their adherents should be declared public enemies, and a price set on their heads. A decree was passed accordingly to that effect; and Sulpicius being betrayed by one of his slaves, was put to death by the consul's orders, and his head exposed upon the Rostra. Marius, after a series of romantic adventures, succeeded in escaping from his pursuers, and sought a refuge for the present in Africa; so that the popular party, deprived of its leaders, and controlled by the presence of a military force, submitted without resistance to the storm. What measures were

<sup>1</sup> Obligated to avoid, by flight, the revenge of his cruel adversary, Marius hid himself in the marshes of Minturnæ, but being discovered, he was dragged to that town, and there shut up. A Cimbric soldier then undertook to kill him, to get the reward promised to whomsoever should bring the head of the proscribed warrior: According to Plutarch, he went forth with a drawn sword, and the spot where Marius was resting being very dark, it appeared to the man-at-arms that he saw two vivid flames flash from the eyes of Marius, and he heard from that dismal place a voice, which said to him, "Now, man! darest thou kill Caius Marius?" The barbarian immediately left the chamber, and throwing away his sword, he fled, exclaiming, "I dare not kill Marius."

<sup>2</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 60; Cicero, de Claris Oratore, c. 45.

taken by Sylla to secure the power of the aristocracy for the future, B.C. 89. it is difficult to decide;<sup>1</sup> nor is it material, for they were all reversed in the counter-revolution that immediately followed. The laws of Sulpicius were, as might be expected, declared invalid: and the Italians were thus again debarred admission into more than eight of the tribes. But the *Epitomizer* of Livy tells us,<sup>2</sup> that Sylla at this time planted several colonies, in order as we may suppose to reconcile some of the poorer citizens to his party; and he so abstained from interfering in the elections, that L. Cornelius Cinna, a man notoriously devoted to the popular interest, was chosen consul for the following year, together with Cn. Octavius, a partisan of the aristocracy. It is said that he bound Cinna<sup>3</sup> by the most solemn oaths not to disturb the order of things which he had established, a precaution so little likely to be of any avail, that we may almost wonder that Sylla should have adopted it. In fact, no sooner did Cinna come into office, than he began to declare his real sentiments; and induced one of the tribunes to threaten Sylla with a prosecution for his late violent assault on the city, and usurpation of the government.<sup>4</sup> It is probable that Sylla now saw too late how incomplete and short-lived was the victory that he had gained; still, secure of the attachment of his army, he trusted that the senate might be able to maintain their own cause till he should return in triumph from Asia; and to prevent all chance of again being deprived of his command, he at once left Rome, rejoined his soldiers whom he had some time before sent back to Campania, and then proceeded without delay to sail with them into Greece, there to check, if possible, the alarming career of Mithridates.

Election of Cinna and Octavius to the Consulship.

Sylla sails with his Army to Greece.

His colleague in the consulship, Q. Pompeius,<sup>5</sup> had been also confirmed by the senate in his appointment to the command of the army, which was still kept on foot to oppose the remnants of the Italian confederacy. He accordingly set out for the quarters of the troops, which were at this time in the country of the Marsi. But Cn. Pompeius, the general whom he was going to supersede, considered the possession of an army too valuable to be easily relinquished; and the soldiers, at his instigation, as is stated in all our accounts of these times, murdered their intended commander as soon as he arrived among them. Cn. Pompeius thus retaining his station, aspired perhaps to act the part of Sylla, and to become, like him, the defender

Q. Pompeius is murdered by his Soldiers.

<sup>1</sup> Appian says, that he restored the old custom of voting by centuries instead of tribes; that he revived the practice that nothing should be submitted to the decision of the people, unless it had first passed the senate; and that the senate itself was swelled by the nomination of three hundred new members from the different orders of the state to be placed on its rolls. But the reality of such important changes must not be admitted on the sole authority of such a writer as Appian.

<sup>2</sup> Epitome, lib. lxxvii.


<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. in Syllâ, c. 10; Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, c. 48.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, c. 63; Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii.; Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxvii.

B.C. 89. of the senate against the enemies who were preparing to assault it: but it was not decreed that his crime should be so successful; and the author of an act, unexampled till now in the Roman history, was not permitted even to reap that poor renown which attends on prosperous wickedness.

We here suspend our narrative of the domestic transactions of Rome, in order to trace the fortunes of Mithridates, against whom Sylla now directed his arms.



[ Roman Instruments of Torture. ]



[Pompey the Great.]

## CHAPTER XX.

### MITHRIDATES.

FROM B. C. 123 TO B. C. 63.

THE kingdom of Pontus, originally tributary to the crown of B. C. 123. Persia, but, after its recovery from the successors of Alexander, an independent sovereignty, descended, at the death of Mithridates the Sixth, who had been the steady ally of Rome,<sup>1</sup> to his son of the same name, a child then only eleven years of age. The family traced their origin to Artabazes,<sup>2</sup> one of the seven noble Persians who conspired to destroy the usurper Smerdis, and who received from Darius the government of Cappadocia and Pontus,<sup>3</sup> to be held as a fief of the empire.

Character  
and Talents  
of  
Mithridates.

To the extraordinary abilities and endowments of the young Mithridates, distinguished by the surname of Eupator,<sup>4</sup> and usually called "the great," the Roman historians bear ample testimony; nor could they do otherwise without reflecting discredit upon

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. Excerpt. cxxxv.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. v. 43; Appian, de Bell. Mithrid. Gryph. p. 1082.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. Sic. xix. 45; Xen. Anab. Florus, iii. 5.

<sup>4</sup> And Dionysius, Appian, p. 1084.

B.C. 123. the arms and councils baffled by his courage



[Mithridates.]

Birth and Accession of Mithridates VII.

Conspiracy against his Life during his Minority.

of Rome, so often defeated and so long and policy:<sup>1</sup> but if justice had been done to his talents, his enemies have laboured to compensate for this admission, by holding him up to the detestation of posterity as a monster of cruelty and treachery. A careful comparison of the slight sources from which the common notions respecting this accomplished prince have been drawn, will lead us to suspect that, according to the moral opinions of his time, he was as much distinguished for virtue and for his amiable and generous temper, as for wonderful powers and acquirements both of body and mind.

His birth, if we may believe the authority of Justin,<sup>2</sup> and his accession to the throne, were indicated to the world by the appearance of a comet of prodigious magnitude and brilliancy. But if any such phenomenon occurred at those periods, it was not regarded by the guardians of the youthful prince as an unequivocal declaration of the peculiar favour and protection of heaven; for his early years were passed in continual danger from their machinations against his life. Of the precise object of these treasonable practices, history affords us little intimation; but if his mother followed the example of his grandmother Laodice,<sup>3</sup> who is said to have destroyed five of her six children, in order to perpetuate her own power, it would account for the fact mentioned by Appian,<sup>4</sup> that he caused both his mother and brother to be put to death; if indeed any credit is to be attached to the assertion of the historian who, in the same book, states that he came to the throne after the decease of both his parents.

But whoever was the instigator of the various plots devised against the young prince, they appear to have been carried on with great cunning and perseverance, and to have been frustrated entirely by his prudence and intrepidity. And this is all that can with any certainty be inferred, from the loose and contradictory accounts handed down to us of his early life. It is indeed related<sup>5</sup> that, with a view to his destruction, the guardians of his minority encouraged him to make use of dangerous weapons, mounted upon a high mettled and unbroken steed, but that in consequence of his extraordinary activity and skill in horsemanship, the plot miscarried. Such a report is likely enough to have arisen from the bold and enterprising temper of Mithridates, who, according to Appian,<sup>6</sup> was

<sup>1</sup> See Prideaux's Connect. part ii. book 5.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xxxvii. 2. *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Justin, loc. cit.

<sup>4</sup> De rebus Mithridaticis.

<sup>5</sup> Justin, loc. cit.

<sup>6</sup> Reb. Mith.

particularly addicted to equestrian exercises, and excelled all other B.C. 123.  
men in strength and agility: he could ride a hundred and twenty-five miles in one day on horseback, and drive sixteen horses in his chariot, even when age had somewhat impaired his vigour; and in the use of all the warlike weapons of his time, but especially in throwing the javelin, he was singularly expert.<sup>1</sup> Having failed in these indirect practices, the conspirators attempted, it is said, to take him off by poison; but the prince suspecting the danger, had invented a celebrated antidote, or, as Pliny affirms,<sup>2</sup> a variety of antidotes, which he was in the daily habit of taking, and afterwards of swallowing active poisons, till his constitution became inured to the operation of the most violent drugs. The antidote, called from him Mithridate, was in great repute in the days of Pliny,<sup>3</sup> and is mentioned by writers of all ages down to the present time. It has for some time been excluded from the Pharmacopœia, as being a needless compound of a great variety of botanic extracts, and is said, by the highest medical authorities, to have been incapable of producing the effects attributed to it, which are altogether beyond the powers of medicine.

The early life of Mithridates was spent in the assiduous cultivation of those talents and habits which rendered him, in the words of Pliny,<sup>4</sup> the greatest prince of his time, or, in the stronger language of Cicero,<sup>5</sup> the greatest monarch that ever reigned. He accustomed himself at all seasons to lie in the open air, and to depend upon his success in the chase for a precarious meal. He exposed himself to dangerous conflicts with the larger and fiercer wild animals, and exercised his speed and dexterity in pursuit of the smaller.<sup>6</sup> He studied profoundly the physics and philosophy of the age, and made himself master of all the languages, or more properly perhaps of the dialects, spoken by the nations with whom he was likely to have any intercourse in peace or war, so that he could receive ambassadors, and issue despatches without the intervention of an interpreter.<sup>7</sup> The language of Pontus, in his time, had become a corrupt mixture of Greek and Getic; and it is probable that different modifications of the same jargon formed the dialects of most of the neighbouring states: but though the vernacular tongue was thus barbarous, a purer Greek appears to have been the language of the court; for the coins of Mithridates bear Greek inscriptions, and his "Treatise on Botany" was composed in Greek.<sup>8</sup>

Having spent seven years in these exercises, and having attained a growth much exceeding the common stature of man,<sup>9</sup> he assumed

Early  
Proficiency  
in Arts and  
Arms.

Mithridates  
comes to th  
Throne

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. Excerpt.

<sup>2</sup> Lib. xxv. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Lucullus, sive Acad. Quæst. ii.

<sup>6</sup> Justin, xxxvii. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Pliny, vii. 24. Mithridates duarum et viginti gentium rex, totidem linguis jura dixit, pro concione singulas sine interprete affatus.

<sup>8</sup> Pliny, xxv. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Appian, Reb. Mith.



B.C. 123. the government of his dominions in his eighteenth year,<sup>1</sup> and immediately devoted his whole attention to improve and extend the interests of his country. It is difficult, in the dearth of accurate histories, to trace the progress of his conquests, or even to define his patrimonial dominions; and still more so to vindicate his character from the improbable calumnies heaped upon him by the Romans. Eutropius and Orosius<sup>2</sup> speak of him as reigning over Armenia Minor, (now Aladulia,) the kingdom of his son-in-law Tigranes, and the whole tract of country bounded by the Euxine sea and the Bosphorus. His complete subjugation of the Scythians, who had baffled the attempts of so many mighty monarchs, is noticed by Justin<sup>3</sup> as having enabled him to secure himself in the possession of "Pontus and Cappadocia," (the former of which he inherited from his father,) and it was probably therefore his first exploit. By what means he overcame the ferocity, and maintained the fidelity of that wild people, is left wholly to conjecture; but we may conclude that he derived no small advantage from his own hardy habits and personal prowess in gaining the affections of the savage tribes of the north.

We shortly afterwards find him engaged in the reduction of Sinope,<sup>4</sup> in which attempt he gave repeated proofs of his great talents, both as a diplomatist and as an engineer. The success of the siege was for a time prevented by succours supplied from Rhodes, and Mithridates in vain endeavoured to gain the Rhodians to his party by presents and promises;<sup>5</sup> but the able disposition of his artillery finally prevailed, and Sinope,<sup>6</sup> reduced to obedience, became the principal residence of the king.

Marries his  
Sister  
Laodice.

It must have been about the same period that, according to the custom of many Oriental nations, he married his sister Laodice,<sup>7</sup> a name common to the females of his family; but he did not long remain at home to enjoy the scanty dominion so little suited to his bold and aspiring genius. Disguising himself as a private person, he made the tour of Asia Minor, and returned through Bithynia, noting carefully, in every state, the means of defence which it possessed, and the facilities which were open for exciting disaffection towards the predominating power of Rome. He was met, on his arrival in his own country, with the welcome news that his wife had in his absence given birth to an heir; but the festivities, with which he celebrated this completion of his wishes, were interrupted by the timely discovery of a plot to poison him, in which his queen and several of the principal officers of his household were implicated. It appeared, by

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xxxvii. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Lib. v.; Orosius, vi. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Lib. xxxvii. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Polyb. iv. 56.

<sup>5</sup> Polyb. v. 90.

<sup>6</sup> Sinope was first added to the kingdom of Pontus by Pharnaces, B.C. 183; See Strabo, lib. xii.

<sup>7</sup> Justin, xxxvii. 3.

the testimony of a faithful domestic, that Laodice, affecting to conclude from his prolonged absence that he was no longer alive, had been guilty of infidelities so numerous and so notorious, as to leave her little hope of concealment; and to prevent the consequences of discovery upon his return, the guilty parties had resolved on the death of the king. Their guilt being fully proved, the queen and her associates were put to death.<sup>1</sup> B.C. 123.

The king now devoted his whole attention to politics, and endeavoured to form an alliance with every description of power which could be rendered available against Rome; so that there was no kingdom, no republic, scarcely a band of robbers or pirates, from Pontus to the columns of Hercules, hostile to the Romans, which was not more or less connected with him.<sup>2</sup> In the celebrated social war, the progress of which we have just traced,<sup>3</sup> the Marsians, as we have seen, sent ambassadors to treat with the king of Pontus, and to solicit a reinforcement of ships and men. The wary monarch received them in the most gracious manner, and assured them of his cordial good wishes; but observed that "it could not consist with his safety to attack the Romans in Italy, till he should first have driven them out of Asia;"<sup>4</sup> and that he should best consult the interests of the allies, as well as his own, by creating a powerful diversion in the east.

Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, who had married Laodice, another sister of Mithridates, died, not without suspicion of having been poisoned by his prime minister and illegitimate brother Gordius; and Justin, with strange inconsistency, imputes the contrivance of this murder to Mithridates; who, as he relates the story,<sup>5</sup> employed the same wicked instrument to destroy the heirs to the throne, his own nephews; although he admits that the sole object of the war which ensued with Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, who had married the widow and seized the vacant kingdom, was to assert the claim of the young Ariarathes to the dominions of his father. The truth appears to be, that Laodice, like her sister of the same name, was an unprincipled woman, and entered readily into the proposal of Nicomedes to unite the kingdoms of Cappadocia and Bithynia, to the exclusion of her own sons. Mithridates, shocked at such unnatural justice, and desirous that Cappadocia should not pass out of his family, raised a powerful army, and seizing all the strong places on the frontier, soon placed Ariarathes the Eighth in peaceable possession of his paternal rights. The cause of the quarrel which ensued between the uncle and nephew, is involved in great obscurity. By Justin it is attributed to the arbitrary tone assumed by Mithridates in a negotiation for the pardon and restoration of Gordius, whose guilt was never proved, and whose experience and sagacity might

Restores his  
Nephew to  
his  
Kingdom.  
B.C. 92.

<sup>1</sup> Justin imputes this act of justice to Mithridates as an atrocious crime; *Loco. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Appian. *Reb. Mith.*

<sup>3</sup> Vide pp. 115—118.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus Siculus, xxxvii. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Lib. xxxviii. 1.

B.C. 92. have proved highly valuable to the youthful king. But Ariarathes, suspicious of his uncle's views, resisted his wishes, and a war was the consequence, in which he was defeated and slain.<sup>1</sup> The throne, thus again vacant, descended rightfully to the family of Mithridates, who gave it to his own son, now eight years of age, with the surname of Ariarathes, and appointed Gordius regent during the minority. But the Cappadocians, attached to their own branch of the royal family, revolted from the bastard Gordius, and proclaimed another Ariarathes the Ninth, (the brother of the late king,) whose title they defended with great obstinacy, but with little success. The king of Pontus dispersed the forces of the insurgents, and the young pretender died, shortly afterwards, of a broken heart.<sup>2</sup>

Nicomedes  
brings  
forward a  
Pseudo-  
Ariarathes.

Nicomedes, meanwhile, alarmed at the increasing power of his rival, prevailed upon his queen to forge a tale of a third son of her late husband, whom, for certain reasons of state, she had kept in concealment till the death of his two brothers; but whose claim to the throne they now thought it their duty to lay before the senate of Rome; for which purpose Laodice in person accompanied the ambassadors, and boldly declared the pseudo-Ariarathes to be her own son, and the legitimate heir of Cappadocia. Mithridates, unwilling to be drawn prematurely into hostilities with Rome, sent Gordius thither to defend the cause of his son, and to remind the senate that "he was the descendant of that Ariarathes who fell in battle defending the Romans against Aristonicus:" but aware that money would prevail among the senators more than gratitude or justice, he directed his envoy to make magnificent presents to all the leading men in the city.<sup>3</sup>

It is probable that Nicomedes had not neglected the same precaution; for the decree of the senate deprived Mithridates, or rather his son, of the kingdom of Cappadocia; and, "to compensate for the loss,"<sup>4</sup> took away Paphlagonia from Nicomedes, declaring both those countries free republics, and allies of Rome; in plain terms, usurping them to themselves. But the Cappadocians, unwilling to become dependent upon the caprices, and subject to the extortion of Roman governors, refused to accept their freedom, and bluntly declared that no nation could properly be said to exist without a king: upon which the senate, hoping to retain their influence in the country by means of a creature of their own, appointed Ariobarzanes to be king.<sup>5</sup>

Mithridates  
refuses to  
obey the  
Senate.

But Mithridates was far from acquiescing in a decree which tended so completely to disappoint his hopes of acquiring the empire

<sup>1</sup> It is scarcely worth while to notice the preposterous and indecent story mentioned by Justin, in which Mithridates is made to assassinate his nephew, xxxviii. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 2. These are the same two princes whom Justin states to have been before murdered by Gordius.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus Siculus, Excerpt. xxxiv

<sup>4</sup> Justin, *loco citato*.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, Vit. Syllæ.

of the east. He had long cultivated a close alliance with Tigranes, B.C. 90. satrap of Armenia, who was, equally with himself, hostile to the insolent pretensions of Rome; and he now induced him, by the offer of giving him his daughter Cleopatra in marriage, to make war upon the sluggish and cowardly monarch whom, for their own purposes, the senate had given to Cappadocia.<sup>1</sup> Little resistance was made: Mithridates, in person, taking possession of the kingdom, mulcted the people in a heavy fine for their submission to Ariobarzanes; and, hearing that Nicomedes was dead, and that his son of the same name had succeeded to the throne of Bithynia, he advanced into that country, and expelling the young king, made himself master of all that part of Asia, and laid the towns under tribute.<sup>2</sup> The deposed kings, Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes, immediately departed for Rome, and appeared in the form of suppliants before the senate, who, proud of such illustrious suitors, and indignant that any monarch should presume to wage a war without their sanction, peremptorily decreed the restitution of the exiled princes, and sent Aquilius<sup>3</sup> and Manlius Maltinus<sup>4</sup> to see their decree carried into effect.

The die was now cast. Mithridates, aware that he must either War begun. relinquish his acquisitions altogether, or boldly defend them against B.C. 88. the Roman legates, received the commissioners with great haughtiness, made an ostentatious display of his resources, and replied to their commands by complaints of the injustice and arbitrary proceedings of the senate;<sup>5</sup> and though the two princes were formally restored to their dominions, he never suffered them to enjoy peaceable possession. Upon this the Roman officers in Asia, without waiting for further instructions from home, collected all the troops in the service of the republic throughout the provinces, and moved in three divisions to enforce obedience to their commands. The first division was commanded by L. Cassius, proconsul of Pergamus; the second by Aquilius; and the third by Q. Oppius, proconsul of Pamphylia.<sup>6</sup> Each division consisted of about forty thousand men; and a fleet of observation moved at the same time towards Pontus. With these forces they had to contend against a monarch who, according to Appian,<sup>7</sup> was then master of four hundred ships of war, fifty thousand cavalry, and two hundred and fifty thousand infantry,<sup>8</sup> all equipped in the most complete



[Tigranes.]

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 3.<sup>2</sup> Orosius, vi. 2.<sup>3</sup> Al. Acilius, et Attilius.<sup>4</sup> Al. Altinius.<sup>5</sup> Dion. Cassius, Excerpt. xxxii.<sup>6</sup> Athenæus, v.; Memnon, xxxiii;<sup>7</sup> Florus, iii. 5; Diod. Excerpt.<sup>8</sup> Reb. Mithrid.<sup>8</sup> He elsewhere says 200,000.

B.C. 88. manner, and accompanied by formidable trains of artillery; and who had at his command the powerful army of Tigranes,<sup>1</sup> and reinforcements from several others of the independent Asiatic princes.

Nicomedes  
invades  
Pontus.

In the meantime, Nicomedes, relying upon the assistance of the Roman army, boldly invaded Pontus, and laid waste the whole country as far as Amastris, by which he acquired an immense booty. Mithridates, hoping that the senate might be induced, by this aggression on the part of the Bithynians, to withdraw its interference, retired before the enemy, and sent an envoy to the legates, desiring that they would at least permit him to repel the invasion of his own territory. The legates, as Appian<sup>2</sup> himself acknowledges, were ashamed to take part with Nicomedes; and they returned an evasive answer, that "they neither wished Mithridates to be injured by Nicomedes, nor could they suffer Nicomedes to be overcome by Mithridates; since it was against the interests of Rome." Upon receiving this reply, the king no longer hesitated to send his son, Ariarathes, with a strong force to take possession of Cappadocia; at the same time, he once more despatched his envoy, Pelopidas, to excuse the necessity of this proceeding to the Romans. But they peremptorily refused to listen to his expostulations, and ordered him to quit the camp and return no more.<sup>3</sup> Hostilities were now inevitable; and a battle shortly afterwards took place near the river Amnias, in which Mithridates and Nicomedes commanded in person: the victory was for some time doubtful, the Bithynians being very superior in numbers; but the skill and courage of Mithridates finally prevailed, and a great booty, with a prodigious number of prisoners, most of whom were Romans, fell into his hands. The king, willing to set an example of a humane and generous mode of warfare, set all the captives at liberty without ransom, and furnished them with provision for their journey home.<sup>4</sup>

This decisive action was followed by a number of skirmishes, in all of which the Romans suffered severely; but, whenever they were taken prisoners, they were treated by the victor with the greatest liberality: the same conduct was observed towards the Bithynians, and all the native Asiatics whom the fortune of war compelled to surrender themselves to the clemency of Mithridates; whose name became so popular, that, wherever he advanced, the cities hastened to throw open their gates, and begged to be taken under his protection. The Romans were universally detested in Asia for their avarice and cruelty; and so eager were the natives to escape from their oppressive exactions, that Mithridates, without

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* eod.

<sup>2</sup> *Reb.* Mithrid.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* eod.; *Diod. Sic. Excerpt.* xxxvii.

further contest, became master of Phrygia, Mysia, Lycia, Pamphylia, and all the country as far as Ionia. The Laodiceans, rising upon the proconsul Oppius, delivered him bound to the king of Pontus, and a similar fate soon afterwards befell Aquilius. B.C. 88.

Mithridates would not refuse his new allies the pleasure of seeing their tyrants paraded through their cities in a kind of mock triumph; and the populace everywhere pursued them with threats and execrations, till, in cruel derision of their insatiable avarice, Aquilius was put to death by pouring melted gold down his throat, and Oppius shared his punishment. Nothing can justify such severity of vengeance; but Pliny and Velleius Paterculus, as well as other Roman writers,<sup>1</sup> admit that it was richly merited by the sufferers. "Hæc paulatim exarsit rabie quâdam, non jam avaritia sed *fames* auri . . . nec jam Quiritium aliquo, sed universo nomine Romano infami, rex Mithridates Aquilio duci capto aurum in os infudit."<sup>2</sup>

Conduct of  
Mithridates  
to the Roman  
Generals.

Having established satraps in the newly acquired provinces, the king advanced to Magnesia, Ephesus, and Mitylene, all of which joyfully submitted to him: the Ephesians, in testimony of their loyalty, broke down all the statues of the different Roman generals in their city, for which offence, on the arrival of Sylla in Asia, a most barbarous revenge was inflicted upon them. Returning from Ionia, he took Stratonice, and laid the town under contribution: and here it was that he met with the beautiful and accomplished Hypsicratea,<sup>3</sup> whose romantic attachment to him induced her to undergo fatigues and perils so little suited to her age and sex. At the same time the Cyclades, with the islands of Delos, Lesbos, and Eubœa<sup>4</sup> were given up to his lieutenant, Neoptolemus; and Athens itself, by the treachery of the Athenian governor Aristion,<sup>5</sup> fell into the hands of Archelaus, another of his generals, who shortly after contrived to draw over to his master's interest the greater part of Greece.

In the meanwhile, Mithridates, perfectly aware that the senate would speedily make a powerful effort to recover their dominions in Asia, saw the necessity of expelling from the countries now in his power that numerous body of Roman citizens who were at any moment ready to act under the orders of the republic.<sup>6</sup> A decree

Banishes all  
Romans from  
Asia.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, Diodorus, &c.

<sup>2</sup> "Now by degrees, not merely avarice, but a species of ravenous appetite—a famishing eagerness for gold—inflamed Aquilius, the Roman general; infamous not merely in the opinion of any individual Roman, but of their whole body; down this man's throat king Mithridates poured molten gold." Plin. xxxiii. 3; Velleius Paterculus, ii. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Valerius Maximus, lib. iv. c. 6, de amore conjugali.

<sup>4</sup> Florus iii. 5; Velleius Paterculus, ii. 18.

<sup>5</sup> Eutropius v.; Plutarch (Sylla) calls him Aristion.

<sup>6</sup> This is the only probable account of the transaction; and though the massacre is stated by most writers to have been expressly ordered by Mithridates, Appian,

B.C. 88. was accordingly framed, commanding all Romans immediately to depart from Asia under pain of death, and rendering it penal for any persons to harbour or to conceal them: a reward was also offered by proclamation to such as should give intelligence against offenders. The Asiatics, burning with hatred and revenge against Rome, eagerly took the opportunity thus afforded to avenge the wrongs they had suffered, and a vast number of Italians, (eighty thousand according to some authors,<sup>1</sup> and one hundred and fifty thousand if we believe Plutarch,<sup>2</sup>) perished in a few days. The Roman writers do not hesitate to impute this atrocious massacre to the express order of the king; but upon comparing the different accounts which they have given us of it, and considering that which the exigency of the case, the character of Mithridates, and the state of public feeling at that period combine to render probable, we are forcibly led to the conclusion, that his intention did not exceed the necessary precaution of excluding the subjects of Rome from his newly-acquired dominions.

Seizes a  
Treasure at  
Coos.

Intelligence having been received that the Jews of Asia had remitted eight hundred talents<sup>3</sup> (about £150,000) to Coos, in the way to Jerusalem, for security, Mithridates sailed thither, and seized not only that sum, but a considerable treasure in money and jewels, the property of Alexander, grandson to Cleopatra queen of Egypt; the young prince also fell into the hands of the conqueror, who, with his accustomed generosity, treated his prisoner in a manner suitable to his rank, and bestowed on him an education truly royal.<sup>4</sup>

Siege of  
Rhodes.

While Mithridates was engaged at Coos, L. Cassius the proconsul, with a considerable body of the Italians who were exiled from Asia, had thrown himself into Rhodes, and prepared to defend the city with great vigour. The suburbs were razed, artillery was mounted on the walls, and the fleet was manned under the orders of Demagoras, who attempted to engage the royal squadron, commanded by Mithridates in person, as it approached the harbour; but being nearly surrounded by an able manœuvure of the king, he retired into the port without loss, and in good order. A blockade was immediately formed; and the Rhodians, having obtained some advantage in a sally, were encouraged again to attempt a naval action, in which, though nothing of importance was effected, Demagoras gained great credit, and Mithridates became dissatisfied with his captains: so that a tempest shortly

who gives a detailed history of it, acknowledges that it was occasioned by the hatred of the Asiatics to the Romans: "Clarè intueri licuit Asiam non tam metu Mithridatis quam odio in Romanos sic impiè crudeliterque desævuisse." *Reb. Mith.*

<sup>1</sup> Appian, *loc. cit.* Velleius Paterculus, ii. 18.


<sup>2</sup> Sylla.

<sup>3</sup> Josephus, xiv. 7. p. 165 vol. iii. of Whiston's translation.

<sup>4</sup> Prideaux's Connection, part ii.

afterwards having destroyed part of his fleet, he resolved to B.C. 88. press the siege of the city by land, and at the same time to attempt to force his way into the port. An enormous machine, called a *sambuca*, was erected upon two ships; deserters were engaged to conduct a party with scaling-ladders to a low and practicable part of the wall; and the two points were to be attacked simultaneously,

upon a signal given from within by a few who were to ascend in silence with the deserters, and to display a light from the temple of Jupiter. But the Rhodians, having intimation of the design, counterfeited the signal; and the attack, being prematurely made, miscarried. The *sambuca*, however, proved a most formidable assailant; rising nearly to a level with the batteries, it discharged



[Rhodes.]

tremendous showers of darts and iron bolts, and having thus cleared the way of all opposition, it afforded a ready means for planting ladders and covering an escalade. The Rhodians, meanwhile, behaved with great gallantry, till, from the increased pressure, the huge machine at once gave way, and fell with a dreadful crash, burying hundreds in its ruins. The citizens attributed their deliverance to the miraculous intervention of Isis, who was said to have burnt the beams which supported the *sambuca*; and Mithridates, unwilling to consume more time and men on a conquest so little important, retired to Patara, and is said to have forgotten for a time the cares of war in the society of his bewitching queen.<sup>1</sup>

Sylla being now appointed by the senate to conduct the Mithridatic war, arrived in Greece with five complete legions, and several battalions and companies, amounting in the whole to about fifteen thousand foot,<sup>2</sup> and fifteen hundred horse, and he was joined by a considerable body of the Italian refugees from Asia; but with this reinforcement he was in no condition to meet Archelaus in the field, who, including the forces under the command of his brother Taxiles, is said to have had with him in Greece above two hundred thousand men; and after the arrival of Dorylaus to his assistance, there had been altogether opposed to the Romans three hundred and ten

Sylla arrives  
in Greece.  
B.C. 87.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, Reb. Mith.; According to Plutarch (Sylla) he was at Pergamus.

<sup>2</sup> Prideaux, part ii.



B.C. 87.

thousand.<sup>1</sup> Sylla therefore resolved to commence the campaign with the siege of Athens; and having, in his way thither, brought over to his party the unstable citizens of Thebes, he marched directly into Attica, and made active preparations for the speedy reduction of the city.

Siege of Athens.

When Sylla surveyed the walls of the Piræus, at which point he intended to press the seige, he was struck with admiration of their prodigious height and solidity, and of the skill displayed in their construction; but, with the undaunted perseverance of a Roman, he was only stimulated to covet more earnestly the glory of taking so strong a place. Having in vain attempted the ordinary modes of scaling, and completely fatigued his men, he retired for a while to repose them at Eleusis and Megara, whilst he constructed new and vast machines, partly with materials brought from Thebes, and partly from the sacred groves of Academus, which resounded to the military axe, instead of the honied accents of Plato. He employed himself also in collecting great quantities of earth, stones, and refuse timber, for the purpose of raising a mound to the height of the wall; and he tampered with some of the profligate Athenian slaves to give him intelligence of all that passed in the city, by means of leaden epistles, folded up in the form of bullets, and shot into the lines from slings.<sup>2</sup> By these means, when the works were in progress, and Archelaus had planned a sally, his troops were trepanned into an ambush and suffered severely; so that the workmen continued their operations without further interruption. The mound being now nearly level with the wall, Archelaus erected towers in opposition to it; and expecting that the Romans would attempt to take the fort by storm, he sent for reinforcements from Chalcis, and armed and trained his rowers<sup>3</sup> to oppose them; a precaution which appears to throw very considerable doubt upon the credibility of the historians, who have stated the regular troops under his command to have so greatly exceeded in number the whole Roman army; indeed Appian expressly acknowledges that, at the beginning of the siege, the Roman forces were more numerous than those of the enemy.<sup>4</sup>

Finding himself now a match for the Roman general, Archelaus made a sally by night, and succeeded in burning and destroying the greater part of the machinery erected upon the mound; but Sylla having, in ten days time, repaired the damage, a turret was erected opposite to it upon the walls of the Piræus, and Andromichates arriving with fresh succours from Mithridates, the general drew out his men in order of battle under the city wall. A smart action

<sup>1</sup> Appian, eod. In these numbers great allowance should doubtless be made for Roman exaggeration.

<sup>2</sup> Appian *Reb. Mith.*; Plutarch, in *Syllâ*.

<sup>3</sup> Appian *loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid* eod.

ensued, in which the besieged had, at first, the advantage, and the Romans fled in some confusion; but being ably rallied by Muræna, they returned to the charge, and drove the enemy, with loss, into the fort. Archelaus, who had exerted himself with distinguished courage throughout the day, in his anxiety at last to secure the safety of his rear, was shut out of the gates, and would certainly have been taken prisoner, had not the soldiers on the wall let down a rope, by which he drew himself up into the fortress.

As the winter was now at hand,<sup>1</sup> Sylla made his head-quarters at Eleusis, and employed his men in connecting the outworks with the sea, by an immense dyke. In this operation they were continually harassed by the enemy, who, by frequent sallies, and by discharges of missiles from the batteries, killed and wounded a great number of soldiers every day; but Sylla,<sup>2</sup> anxious at any price to complete his conquest, in order that he might return to take part in the dissensions at home, finding his success retarded by the want of a fleet to prevent the entrance of supplies into the harbour, sent to Rhodes for ships. The Rhodians, however, refused to part with their navy, lest Mithridates should return and seize their town; and Sylla was obliged to despatch Lucullus to Egypt with orders to the different courts still adhering to the interests of Rome, to send all their fleets to Rhodes for the service of the republic. This mission was of no trifling danger and difficulty, at a moment when all the seas of the Levant swarmed with the cruisers of Pontus; but Lucullus performed it with admirable quickness and address.

Meanwhile Munatius having fallen in with Neoptolemus near Chalcis, a battle ensued, in which the latter received a severe wound, and his troops, disheartened by the fall of their general, were defeated with the loss of fifteen hundred men. That such a result should have materially weakened the power of Neoptolemus, is a powerful confirmation of the suspicion already expressed, that the Roman, like the Grecian historians, were in the habit of grossly overrating the numbers of their adversaries. Sylla, encouraged by this event, shortly afterwards made an attempt, by means of a portable bridge, to pass over by night from the battery upon his own mound, to the wall of the Piræus; and the Romans crossed the passage with so much secrecy, that they surprised the guards, and created great alarm in the fortress; but Archelaus hastening to the spot, the officer who commanded the storming party was killed, and his men hurled down from the wall. The besieged, instantly sallying from below, attacked the Roman lines, and would have destroyed all their works, had not the timely arrival of Sylla, with his whole army, compelled them to retire.<sup>3</sup>

The duty of watching the works became now extremely severe

<sup>1</sup> Appian. loc.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, in loco.

B.C. 87.

Sally of Archelaus.

Munatius defeats Neoptolemus at Chalcis.

B.C. 87. upon the besiegers, and scarcity began to be no less pressing within the city, so that both parties were equally anxious to bring the contest to a conclusion. The plans of Archelaus<sup>1</sup> for supplying the garrison with provisions, were generally rendered abortive by the intelligence which Sylla continued to receive in leaden bullets; and one of the largest towers which the besieged had erected on the wall was thrown down, and a number of soldiers were killed by the superior weight of the Roman artillery.

Ariarathes  
dies in  
Macedonia.

During these transactions, Ariarathes, or, according to others, Arcathias,<sup>2</sup> a son of the king, invaded Macedonia with the hope of creating a diversion; and having expelled all the Roman garrisons, and made himself master of the whole province, he was advancing to raise the siege of Athens, when he unhappily fell sick and died in a few days. The great defect of Oriental discipline, which even Mithridates did not correct, and which perhaps could not, consistently with Oriental maxims of policy, be corrected, was the dependence of the whole army, often of the whole conduct of the war, upon the life of one man. In this, as in a multitude of other instances, there was no second general upon whom the command of the army and the execution of the design could devolve; and the fall of Athens, in all probability, was occasioned by the death of this prince.

In order to increase the scarcity now prevailing in Athens,<sup>3</sup> Sylla became extremely vigilant to prevent any egress from the city, and Archelaus saw that no hope remained of being enabled to hold out much longer, unless, by some vigorous effort, he could open a communication with the surrounding country. For this purpose he carried a tunnel from within the fortress under the huge mound upon which Sylla had erected his batteries; and, having sunk a pit beneath it, contrived to withdraw the temporary wood-work which supported the roof of his excavation, so that the mound suddenly sunk down, with all its machinery, to the inexpressible consternation of the Romans. But the confusion occasioned by this incident was greater than the mischief: the industry of the soldiers speedily raised the mound to its former height, and repaired the broken engines; and Sylla, drawing a lesson from his enemies, began, in a similar manner, to undermine the walls of the fort. These operations were met by countermines on the part of the garrison, and frequent subterranean skirmishes took place in the dark, amid the falling in of earth and stones, and the thundering of cavalry above. A part of the wall, nearly opposite to the Roman works, having been shaken by these means, Sylla threw into the fortification such a quantity of fire-balls and heavy iron bolts, that he burnt the principal tower, erected by Archelaus, and effected a practicable breach. A body of picked

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in loco.

<sup>2</sup> Appian in loco.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. eod.

men were immediately ordered to advance, and, being cheered by the general in person, they entered the breach, and for a time drove back the guards stationed to defend it; but Archelaus coming up, and throwing himself into the thickest of the fight, the garrison renewed their efforts, and the assailants were repelled with loss, after an obstinate and bloody conflict. Sylla sounded the recall, and bestowed high commendations on the conduct and courage of his men, which could not but reflect still higher honour upon Archelaus and the garrison. B.C. 87.

In the course of the succeeding night the breach was so completely repaired, that Sylla, when he reconnoitred the field next morning, gave up all hope of storming the Piræus, and resolved to await the slower, but more safe and certain, effects of famine.

The garrison was indeed reduced to the last extremity: the horses and mules were all consumed; the very saddles and harness had been boiled down; human flesh, and even more disgusting substances were resorted to in the extremity of hunger;<sup>1</sup> the soldiers became too weak to mount guard; and Sylla having, either by treachery or by accident,<sup>2</sup> learned that no sentinel was posted at a weak point of the city wall, entered without opposition. A most barbarous scene ensued. The garrison and the inhabitants, too weak either for resistance or flight, were massacred without regard to age or sex; all the horrors of a captured city were fearfully enacted in every house; many, to escape the cruelty of the Romans, inflicted a voluntary death upon themselves; and when order was, in some measure, restored, scarcely a free person of any description was found alive. Sylla sold all the slaves, and, while he exerted himself to preserve the nobler edifices, he gave up all the property to pillage. Aristo, in the meanwhile, with a few followers, escaped to the citadel, where he continued to hold out for several days; but all his provisions being exhausted, and no hope appearing of relief, in the end he surrendered at discretion. Aristo, and the principal officers were put to death; but Sylla, satiated with blood, suffered a few of the inferior soldiers to depart unmolested. The treasure found in the citadel was immense, amounting to four hundred pounds weight of gold, and more than six hundred of silver.<sup>3</sup> It consisted principally of vessels of the most costly workmanship dedicated to Minerva; but superstition afforded these no protection from the avarice of the Roman general, already stained with the sacrilegious robbery of Delphi, and of almost every rich shrine in Greece.<sup>4</sup> Fall of Athens.

The Piræus still remained defended by Archelaus, who erected such a succession of walls between the fortress and the city, that Sylla, after having battered down the first with considerable difficulty,

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in loco.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, in loco.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ. His instrument in this business was the wretched Caphis, whose compunction he treated with the most hardened contempt.

B.C. 87. was completely disheartened at the hydra, which grew faster than he could lop it. But Archelaus, finding that the possession of the fort served no other purpose than to fatigue his men, embarked them safely in the harbour, and evacuated the place. Then passing through Bœotia, he appointed his rendezvous at Thermopylæ, where he was joined by the troops under Andronichates, by the army of the prince who died at Tydeus, and by fresh succours sent him from Asia; and he employed himself in exercising and training the recruits, and in providing for the ensuing campaign; whilst Sylla, now undisputed master of the Piræus, vented his rage upon that noble fortress, and destroyed all of it that could be consumed by fire, together with a vast accumulation of naval stores.

B.C. 86. The Roman general having refreshed his cohorts, lost no time in following Archelaus, who, on his approach, advanced into Phocis at the head of a mixed army of a hundred and twenty thousand men.<sup>1</sup> The numbers under Sylla, including the Greeks and barbarians, could hardly have amounted to half so many; so that he thought proper to avoid an action, and await a more favourable opportunity.


It is impossible to reconcile the different accounts given by the several historians who have related the circumstances of the action which followed. Plutarch, who professes to write with the commentaries of Sylla before him, has evidently no other view than to magnify the great actions of the Roman general by exaggerating the difficulties which beset him, and the numbers opposed to him; and, from the character of Sylla himself, we have little reason to rely on the fidelity of the source from which the partial biographer professes to draw his materials. It is, however, admitted by all, that Archelaus exposed the Roman general to great difficulties by the skilful manner in which he drew him on through a country exhausted of all supplies: and that the Roman legions were so much intimidated by the martial appearance and by the numbers of the enemy, that they could not for some time be prevailed on to take the field. Sylla, who felt the necessity of coming to a battle, and was impatient to finish the campaign, and who saw, with vexation, that Archelaus commanded the country, and sacked the neighbouring towns, whilst he was confined to his trenches, used every effort to bring on an engagement; and his desire was but too well seconded by the rashness of the generals who commanded under Archelaus.

The action commenced with an attempt, on the part of the Romans, to seize an eminence which commanded the enemy's lines, and soon became general. It was fought with great obstinacy on both sides, and the Roman army was, for a time, thrown into disorder, and compelled to give ground; but Archelaus, having been

Battle of  
Charonea.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in loco. It has already been observed, that little dependence can be placed on the accuracy of these numbers. Plutarch asserts, that Taxiles had now joined Archelaus; but this contradicts the narrative of Appian.

deceived by the clouds of dust which arose, lost the opportunity of surrounding the broken legions, and gave Sylla time to rally his men, and to make a desperate and effective charge. Archelaus, who saw his men waver, hastily ordered the entrance to his camp to be closed, B.C. 86.



[Charonea.]

and calling out to them that "they had no safety but in victory," rushed furiously among the enemy. The fight was, for a time, renewed; but the steadiness of the Romans prevailed, and the royal army fled towards their trenches, where they were slain in great numbers. The general now opened the gates, and the broken remains of his army took refuge within their intrenchments. Muræna, meanwhile, who commanded on the left, was exposed to extreme danger by the distance to which Sylla pursued the main body of the enemy; and, had the right wing of the Asiatic army maintained its ground, he must have been cut off, and completely destroyed; but, as has been before observed, the troops of the East depended almost entirely on the motions of their general in chief; and no sooner was the centre, under Archelaus, obliged to give way, than all the rest, though actually at that moment victorious, fled in confusion. In this battle, so bravely, and, for some hours, so doubtfully contested, the Roman writers have the hardihood to assert, that Sylla lost only twelve or fifteen men, whilst there fell of the barbarians a hundred and ten thousand.<sup>1</sup> If this statement, in any degree, resembled the truth, it would be worth while to inquire by what means Archelaus, with scarcely ten thousand men remaining, was enabled not only to embark in good order for Chalcis, in face of the victorious army of

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in loco. Plutarch, in Syllâ. Eutropius, v.

B.C. 86. Sylla,<sup>1</sup> but, while he made his head-quarters in that city, to plunder all the islands near the coast, and to await, without any interruption from the Roman general, the arrival of a fresh army from Asia.

Critical  
situation of  
Mithridates.

The intelligence of this disaster produced immediately, among the cities of Asia Minor, accustomed to change their masters and their political principles with every variation in the tide of success, the usual consequences of insubordination and revolution. Mithridates, anxious to lose no time in fitting out a fresh army against Sylla, found himself surrounded on every side with defections and conspiracies: he steered through these difficult and embarrassing circumstances with his customary ability, and, even by the admission of his adversaries, at least with a politic show of moderation and humanity. He first seized several tetrarchs of Galatia,<sup>2</sup> who had revolted on the news of the defeat of Archelaus, and having punished them as traitors, he appointed a satrap as governor-general over all their tetrarchies; but this officer had scarcely time to remit the public treasures to the king, before a general insurrection drove him from the country, which remained devoted to the Roman interest. The Chians had laboured under a suspicion of disaffection ever since the naval action at Rhodes; in which, as if accidentally, they had run foul of the flag-ship, which carried Mithridates himself. It was only from the presence of mind and powerful exertions of the king that she was saved from destruction. They were, therefore, at the present juncture, to be watched with great caution; and the king was strongly advised to make a severe example of them, since it was ascertained that several of the principal citizens had repaired to the camp of Sylla, in Greece, and that some Roman officers had been seen at Chios.<sup>3</sup> But Mithridates, unwilling to act with precipitation, despatched Zenobius to take hostages for their fidelity, and to disarm all who were suspected of correspondence with the Romans. This being effected without opposition, and the hostages being sent to Erythræ,<sup>4</sup> Zenobius proceeded to call an assembly of the citizens, in which he read a letter from Mithridates, addressed to the Chians, complaining of their treachery, and informing them that the privy council had passed on them sentence of death, which he was willing to commute for a fine of two thousand talents (about £387,500.) The fine being readily paid, the disaffected citizens were arrested, with their wives and children, put on board, under a strong escort, and conducted to the king, who sent them to colonize a fertile district on the shores of the Euxine.

Zenobius, in the meantime, returned to Ephesus, with orders to

<sup>1</sup> Appian.

<sup>2</sup> The Galatians, or Gallogræci, were a mixed race, descended from the Gauls, who sacked Rome under Brennus; and who afterwards, passing into Greece, and being there defeated by the Thracians, fled into Asia Minor, where they settled. Strabo, xii.; Livy, xxxviii. 12, 40.

<sup>3</sup> Now Scio.

<sup>4</sup> A city of Ionia. Pausanias, x. 12.

institute a strict inquiry into the conduct of its citizens, who were strongly suspected of favouring the Roman cause; but the Ephesians, taking advantage of his urbanity, prevailed on him to enter the city without his guards, and instantly seizing him, cast him into prison, and put him to death. The gates were, at the same time, closed against his followers, and the citizens were induced to declare for Sylla. This example was quickly followed by several of the neighbouring towns; but Mithridates, having punished some of the principal agitators, put a stop, for the present, to the further progress of disaffection, by proclaiming independence to all the Greek cities in Asia; at the same time ordaining a general remission of debts, (*novas tabulas*,) and the admission of metics (resident foreigners) and of freedmen<sup>1</sup> to the privileges of citizens.

B.C. 86.  
Zenobius put  
to death at  
Ephesus.

Order was scarcely restored among the dependencies, when a greater danger arose to the king from a conspiracy among his own officers, the leaders in which were Minion, Neoptolemus, Clisthenes, and Asclepiodotus. The last of these, whether from the outset faithful to his master, or repenting of his treason, timely betrayed the plot to the king, and the traitors suffered the penalty due to their crime. Upon their trial circumstances appeared, which led to the detection of a very extensive confederacy; and a strict inquiry being instituted,<sup>2</sup> a great number of malecontents were executed. It deserves remark that Sylla afterwards seized all the persons within his reach who had given information against the conspirators, and put them to death in horrid tortures.

These affairs being despatched, the king hastened the departure of Dorylaus to join the shattered remains of his forces in Greece; and, according to the best authorities, the whole royal army, after the junction, amounted to about eighty thousand men, though others have stated it at more than double that number. Dorylaus<sup>3</sup> assumed a very high tone in speaking of the late engagement, and declared that his only wish was to meet with Sylla as soon as possible; but Archelaus, aware of the advantages which he possessed in the command of the sea, exerted himself to moderate the ardour of his colleague; until Sylla, having moved his camp to the plain of Orchomenus in Bœotia, a situation remarkably favourable for the cavalry, in which the Asiatic army was very superior to the Romans,<sup>4</sup> the generals agreed to encamp on the opposite side of the plain, and to fortify their intrenchments as strongly as possible. Whilst the armies lay thus, in sight of each other, the Roman soldiers were employed in cutting trenches across the plain, in order to interrupt

Dorylaus  
goes to  
Greece.

<sup>1</sup> Appian and Plutarch call these persons "slaves;" but this must be understood as spoken invidiously of those who *had been* in slavery.

<sup>2</sup> Appian says, "sixteen hundred;" but this is wholly incredible. It is more likely that sixteen suffered death.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, in loco.



B.C. 86. and break the charge of the Asiatic cavalry. Archelaus made repeated sallies from his camp with small bodies of horse, and cut to pieces the parties employed in this work; and so great was the dread entertained by the Romans of the royal horse-guards,<sup>1</sup> that they could not be brought up to cover their own labourers. At length Sylla, enraged at his frequent losses, seized a standard, and springing forward towards the enemy as they were cutting down the unarmed workmen, he called out to his soldiers in a voice like thunder, "Go back, white-livered scoundrels, to Rome; and when you are asked, where you betrayed your general, reply, that you ran away, and left him among the enemy at Orchomenus." This artifice revived the spirit of honourable daring among the troops, and speedily brought on a general action. Both armies behaved with great gallantry, and suffered severely; a body of archers in the royal army, being charged so home by two Roman cohorts that they could not handle their bows, grasped their arrows in their hands, and using them like swords, forced the enemy to retire, leaving many of their number on the field.<sup>2</sup> Diogenes, the king's son, who commanded on the right, displayed a strength, courage, and address worthy of his father; and kept the whole left wing of the Roman army in check, till he fell covered with wounds: his fall proved the signal of retreat to the rest of the army, and they fled to their trenches with the loss, it is said, of twenty-five thousand men,<sup>3</sup> chiefly cavalry.

Battle of  
Orchomenus.

It is probable that the loss of the Romans was likewise great; for the number of killed and wounded is nowhere mentioned, and Sylla did not think it expedient to attempt to force the lines, but retired to refresh his men. The next day, apprehensive lest Archelaus should retire again to Chalcis, he began to draw a trench round the enemy's camp as if to prevent his escape; the royal army immediately sallied to interrupt the work, and for several hours, as Appian acknowledges, "the noblest feats of valour were performed both by Romans and by barbarians." The latter were at length driven in, after great mutual slaughter, and the Romans, entering their lines at the same time, slew them in such multitudes, that the dikes and rivulets of the plain flowed with blood. Archelaus, firm and undaunted in the midst of the confusion, provided for the safety of the survivors with a quickness and dexterity which won the admiration even of Sylla; and, embarking them in transports, retired to Chalcis. The Roman general, seeing no further advantage to be gained till the arrival of a powerful fleet under Lucullus, having ravaged the whole of Bœotia, went into winter-quarters in Thessaly.

Flaccus goes  
into Asia.

In the meanwhile, the faction at Rome, adverse to Sylla, sent Flaccus, who was consul with Cinna, into Asia, at the head of two

<sup>1</sup> This excessive terror could hardly have existed, unless the Romans had suffered very severely from the Asiatic cavalry at Chæronea.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, in loco.

legions, and with a considerable fleet; but the ships having been driven ashore by a gale of wind, were burnt by some of the king's soldiers, and Flaccus, who was an indifferent officer, and of a haughty and capricious temper, lost all control over his men, some of whom went over to Sylla in Thessaly, and the rest submitted to the orders of Fimbria, a private senator, who, without any commission from Rome, assumed the command, and barbarously murdered Flaccus. But, though a bad citizen, Fimbria was a good soldier, and having fallen in with the army under another son of Mithridates,<sup>1</sup> named after his father, he pursued him from place to place, till he forced him into a defile, from which he with difficulty escaped by sea to Mitylene.<sup>2</sup> B.C. 86  
B.C. 85.

These events disposed both parties to an accommodation. Mithridates, taught by experience to dread the Roman arms, sent instructions to Archelaus to treat for peace; and Sylla, jealous of the intentions of Fimbria, who was committing atrocious ravages in Asia, and still more alarmed by news from Rome, was glad of an opportunity to escape from the Mithridatic war. An interview accordingly was concerted, at which Sylla<sup>3</sup> proposed that Archelaus should place at his disposal, for the prosecution of the civil war which was impending, the army and navy under his command; and that in return for this service he should be declared king of Pontus and ally of Rome, in the room of his master, who was to be deposed and put to death. The brave Asiatic nobleman replied with becoming indignation, and bitterly reproached the Roman with his double baseness; but Sylla, hardened in guilt and treachery, only derided his scruples, and scoffed at the idea of fidelity to a barbarian and a king; and Plutarch, who relates the story, appears to think that Sylla had the best of the argument. Sylla treats  
with  
Archelaus.

Archelaus, however, thought otherwise; and the Roman general was obliged to propose terms less inconsistent with honour and loyalty.<sup>4</sup> These were, 1. That Mithridates should give up his fleet, consisting of seventy ships of the line, and all his prisoners. 2. That he should pay to Rome two thousand talents (£387,500) for the expenses of the war. 3. That he should confine himself to his hereditary dominions, ceding Asia Minor and Paphlagonia to the Romans, Bithynia to Nicomedes, and Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes. 4. That he should be styled, as his father had been,<sup>5</sup> the friend and ally of Rome.<sup>6</sup> Terms  
proposed.

Archelaus, unwilling to make such important concessions without

<sup>1</sup> Appian and Orosius relate, that it was the king himself who fled from Fimbria. Plutarch also speaks of a skirmish at sea between Neoptolemus and Lucullus, in which the former was worsted. (*Vita Luculli.*) Memnon, c. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, in loco.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ.

<sup>4</sup> Appian says, that Archelaus fell afterwards under suspicion of "Romanizing;" but his account of the matter is neither probable nor consistent. See also Plutarch.

<sup>5</sup> Polyb. Excerpt. cxxxv.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ; Appian, in loco.

B.C. 85. consulting Mithridates, agreed to give up all the places which he held in Greece, and to conclude a truce till the pleasure of the king should be known. In the interval he scrupulously abstained from action of every kind; while Sylla employed himself in plunder and exaction both in Greece and in Asia. At length the couriers who had been despatched to the king returned with his answer, agreeing to all the conditions proposed, except the cession of Paphlagonia; and stating that he could have made much better terms with Fimbria, if he could have condescended to treat with so ambiguous a character. Sylla, upon this hint, took the alarm, and desired to have an interview with the king; which accordingly took place on a plain between Pergamus and Cypseli, each party being accompanied by a few faithful followers.<sup>1</sup> After some altercation, during which Sylla is said to have behaved with great heat and insolence, Mithridates consented to all the conditions without reserve, and returned in peace to his narrowed dominions. The Roman general, on his return home, was allowed a magnificent triumph.<sup>2</sup>

A Treaty  
concluded.

It is judiciously observed by Florus,<sup>3</sup> that though Sylla formally concluded a peace with the king of Pontus, yet he left Asia under the influence of a conflagration, smothered, but not extinguished, and certain to break out afresh with increased violence. The renewal of hostilities is, by all the Roman historians, unblushingly imputed to the perfidy of Mithridates;<sup>4</sup> although it appears, from their own admissions, that he took up arms in self-defence, after remonstrance and negotiation had failed to repel the unprovoked and unauthorized aggressions of Muræna.

Renewal of  
the war with  
Rome.

A rebellion having broken out among the natives of Colchis<sup>5</sup> and of the shores of the Bosphorus, Mithridates went in person to reduce them to order; and finding that their discontents arose, not from disaffection to his family, but from a national pride which disdained dependence on the king of another country, he made his own son, Mithridates, king of Colchis, to the entire satisfaction of all parties. This young prince, however, forgetting the duty which he owed to his sovereign and his father, very soon began to aim at absolute independence; and the king was obliged to recall him, and to keep him under his own eye.<sup>6</sup> The Colchians showing a disposition to resent this interference, a powerful standing army became necessary to preserve those wild districts in subordination; and Muræna, affecting to consider this force as levied with a view to infringe the

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in loco. Plutarch says, that they met at Dardanus, and that Mithridates was followed by a splendid train and a great army, and Sylla by four cohorts and two hundred horse.

<sup>2</sup> Entropius, v. *sub finem*.

<sup>3</sup> Florus, iii. v.

<sup>4</sup> Vide Appian, Florus, Orosius, Velleius Paternulus, &c., in loco.

<sup>5</sup> Hodie Mingrelia.

<sup>6</sup> Appian relates, that the king chained his son with golden chains, and afterwards put him to death; but it appears that he was alive many years afterwards.

terms of the treaty with Rome, without any orders from the consuls B.C. 85. or the senate, and prompted by the insatiable and shameless avarice which was now the prevailing vice of the Roman character,<sup>1</sup> entered the territories of the king, and marching to Cumæ, a large trading seaport,<sup>2</sup> not only plundered it of an immense quantity of merchandise, but, having slaughtered the horse-guards who opposed his sacrilegious attempt, carried off the treasures deposited in the temple, which was one of the richest in Asia. Mithridates, unwilling to involve himself in a war, despatched ministers to Sylla and to the senate, complaining of the violence of Muræna; who, in the spring, renewed his ravages, and crossing the Halys, laid waste forty villages in the king's dominions, where no opposition was offered him, and returned loaded with booty into Galatia.

The senate, however, were not disposed to interfere with effect, and contented themselves with sending a message to the king, that they regretted what had occurred, whilst they took no steps to restrain Muræna from continuing his depredations. Mithridates, therefore, had no alternative but to defend himself against this freebooter by force; and, hoping that the senate would not consider his defensive operations as any breach of the treaty with Sylla, he despatched Gordius, with such forces as could immediately be spared, to protect the frontier, whilst he himself prepared to follow with fresh levies. The two generals met at the river Halys, and encamped on each side of the stream; and Gordius, observing that Muræna was occupied in fortifying his position, remained quiet till the king should come up to reinforce him. After the junction of the royal troops, Mithridates was still very inferior in numbers to the Romans,<sup>3</sup> whose line was formed in the most advantageous manner, having one flank defended by a broad and rapid river, and the other by a fortified eminence. But the king, perceiving that he could only hope for success from a *coup de main*, unexpectedly crossed the swollen stream with a chosen body of men, and took Muræna in flank, while the main body of his army, under Gordius, fording at a shallow place above, advanced to charge in front. The Romans made a brave defence; but being thrown into confusion by the sudden attack of the royal guards, and by the extraordinary personal prowess of the king, which seemed to inspire his whole army, they were beaten from their entrenchments, and fled, with great loss, to the mountains, where many more perished amidst the trackless woods from cold and hunger. Muræna himself escaped, with difficulty, into Phrygia, and all his garrisons in Cappadocia fell into the hands of Mithridates; who, thankful for so complete and glorious a victory, offered a sacrifice to the gods on such a scale, that it was impossible for some days to approach the

Gordius sent  
against  
Muræna.  
B.C. 84.

<sup>1</sup> See Velleius Paterculus, ii. 33.

[R. H.]

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, xiii.

2 E

<sup>3</sup> Appian, Reb. Mith.

B.C. 84. pyre. The flame was seen by night at the distance of above a hundred miles.<sup>1</sup>

Suspension  
of hostilities.

In the meanwhile Sylla, who was envious of the plunder collected by Muræna, wrote to him to abstain from further hostilities, and sent Gabinius into Pontus to pacify the king. Mithridates received him with the most splendid and generous hospitality, accepted his apology, and readily laid down his arms, on a promise that Muræna should do the same. He had now leisure to turn his attention to the Colchians, who continued to demand a king of their own, though they were perfectly willing to be governed by a son of Mithridates. He accordingly sent his younger son, Machares, to take possession of the throne; and at the same time gave one of his children, a boy of four years old, as an hostage to Ariobarzanes, for the faithful performance of all the stipulations in the treaty: but that prince, dissatisfied with what had been done for him, sent legates to Rome to poison the ears of the senate with groundless jealousies and unfounded complaints against the king of Pontus. Mithridates, on his return from an expedition into the north, in which his army had sustained a severe loss from the effects of the climate, endeavoured to counteract the mischievous designs of his neighbour, by sending Gordius to Rome, to assure the senate that he had no intentions contrary to his promises, or their will. But the ambassador easily discovered that, under fair professions, the senate entertained a determination to crush the power of his master; and on his return he completely satisfied the king that no dependence could be placed upon the friendship or the justice of Rome. He resolved, therefore, at all hazards, to prepare for the worst, and to strengthen himself against the impending danger; and for this purpose he sent privately to his son-in-law, Tigranes, (who had recently assumed the diadem, and had named the metropolis of Armenia Tigranocerta, after himself,<sup>2</sup>) desiring that he would prepare for the invasion of Cappadocia. That prince accordingly collected an immense<sup>3</sup> army from every part of his dominions. At the same time he made overtures to Sertorius, now openly at war with the government, who undertook to assist him in the recovery of Asia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, and Galatia,<sup>4</sup> and to confirm him in the sovereignty of all these kingdoms. The remainder of the summer, and the whole winter, were consumed in building ships, and in providing magazines of arms, stores, and provisions. Mercenary troops, to the amount of a hundred and forty thousand infantry,<sup>5</sup> were engaged, not only in every part of Asia, but among several European nations.

<sup>1</sup> Appian (Reb. Mith.) says a thousand stadia, viz., 125 miles at sea.

<sup>2</sup> He was at this time also king of Syria. Appian, in Syriacis; Justin. xl. 1, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Appian (Reb. Mith.) says three hundred thousand men.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. eod.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. Plutarch says a hundred and twenty thousand. (Vita Luculli.)

Early in the ensuing spring, the king marched into Bithynia. B.C. 84.  
 Nicomedes was now dead; and his kingdom being declared a Mithridates  
 Roman province, was governed by Cotta the prætor; who, being conquers  
 unable to resist the forces led against him, fled to Chalcis, without Bithynia.  
 striking a blow. Nudus, the admiral, attempting to make some  
 resistance, was defeated, with the loss of three thousand men, while  
 scarce twenty of the royal army were slain.<sup>1</sup> The whole kingdom  
 immediately submitted to Mithridates; Paphlagonia soon afterwards  
 followed this example; and the whole province of Asia, wearied  
 and exhausted by the exactions of the Roman usurers and publicans,  
 revolted once more, and declared for the king.<sup>2</sup>

Lucullus, who had been severely censured in the former war for Lucullus  
 refusing to co-operate with Fimbria,<sup>3</sup> and thereby permitting the appointed to  
 army of Mithridates to escape, when it might have been entirely conduct the  
 destroyed, desirous of recovering his reputation, procured himself war.  
 to be appointed to the conduct of the war, and arrived in Asia, with B.C. 75.  
 a powerful fleet and army, whilst Cotta was preparing to attack the  
 king. This general, mortified at being superseded, and anxious to  
 anticipate Lucullus in the glory of defeating the enemy, hastened  
 his operations unadvisedly, and was defeated by Mithridates, with  
 the loss of four thousand Romans slain, and of nearly the whole of  
 his fleet captured. The survivors escaped into Chalcedon, where  
 they were closely besieged by the enemy, and, but for the timely  
 arrival of Lucullus, must have fallen into their hands.

Mithridates immediately marched, with his whole army, to besiege Siege of  
 Cyzicus, a city on the Propontis, which formed the principal Cyzicus.  
 connection<sup>4</sup> between Bithynia and the province of Asia, and the  
 possession of which was consequently of the highest importance. It  
 would be useless, and indeed impracticable, to enter into any calcu-  
 lation of the actual numbers of his army, or of the troops opposed to  
 him under Lucullus; for Appian and Plutarch not only contradict  
 each other, but, in their eagerness to amplify the honour of their  
 hero, perpetually convict themselves of exaggeration; and there is  
 no other existing history upon which we can rely for information.  
 The probability seems to be, that both armies were numerous and  
 well appointed; and that there was no great disparity in any respect.  
 The siege of Cyzicus was regularly formed, and the harbour was  
 blockaded, when Lucullus arrived; and so completely was the sur-  
 rounding country occupied by the enemy, that the Roman general  
 could find no means of conveying the intelligence of his arrival to  
 the citizens, who, alarmed by the numbers of the besiegers, and by  
 the effect of their artillery, after a few ineffectual efforts to dislodge  
 the engines from the batteries and to burn the fleet, were ready to

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in loco.<sup>2</sup> Appian. Plutarch, in Lucullo. Epitome, Livii, lib. xciii.<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in Lucullo. · Orosius, vi. 2.<sup>4</sup> Strabo, xii.; Florus, iii. 5.

B.C. 75. surrender their town. At length a person was found who undertook to swim upon bladders<sup>1</sup> by night into the harbour, with letters to Pisistratus, the governor, and the Cyzicenes were induced to hold out, in the hope of being shortly relieved. In the mean time, the arms of the king were everywhere crowned with success: Manius, or Marius,<sup>2</sup> who had been sent to his succour by Sertorius, gained an advantage in a rencontre with Lucullus; and Eumachus, his lieutenant in Phrygia, defeated the Romans with great slaughter, and drove them out of the country, while he daily extended on every side, the alliances and resources of his master.

Mithridates raises the siege.

But Lucullus, aware of the difficulty which must arise to Mithridates in providing for so vast an army in a narrow territory, studiously protracted the operations of the campaign, till scarcity and its constant attendant pestilence began to be felt in the royal camp. The surrounding marshes also, exhaling unwholesome vapours, spread disease among the soldiers, and the necessity of changing quarters became every day more apparent. The king, disappointed by the obstinate resistance of the town, resolved to make one bold effort to storm the place before he would quit it; but the garrison, having notice of his design, contrived to set fire to the principal battery upon Mount Dindymus, which commanded the fortifications; and he was obliged to draw off his forces by night. This, however, was not effected without considerable loss: the Romans hung upon his rear, and severely galled his troops, already disheartened and exhausted, so that great numbers were slain, many were made prisoners, and most of the baggage and materiel was taken. The king, embarking for Parium, another town on the Propontis, sent his army overland to Lampsacus, whence he soon afterwards removed it, together with the inhabitants of the city, by sea, whilst he manned his fleet, under the command of Alexander and Dionysius, with twenty thousand picked men sent him by Sertorius.<sup>3</sup>

Disasters of Mithridates.

But fortune had once more changed sides, and nothing but disasters ensued. News arrived that Deiotarus, king, or rather tetrarch of Galatia, had attacked and defeated the several detachments of the royal army posted in his dominions:<sup>4</sup> the fleet, which had sailed for Lemnos, was pursued thither by Lucullus, and, in two naval actions, was completely broken; the two admirals and Manius were taken prisoners in a cave on the shore; Dionysius swallowed poison, Manius was put to death as a traitor, and Alexander was reserved to grace the triumph of the Roman general.<sup>5</sup> The king himself, in attempting to take advantage of the absence of Lucullus

<sup>1</sup> Orosius, loc. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Al. Varius.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, loc. cit. Prideaux, we know not on what authority, says ten thousand Part ii. lib. vii.

<sup>4</sup> Orosius, vii. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, in loco. Eutropius, vi.

to withdraw his fleet and army into Pontus, was overtaken by a violent storm, in which most of his ships were lost or damaged. The flag-ship,<sup>1</sup> a vessel of unusual burden, became unmanageable, and, not answering her helm, was in great danger of foundering at sea; and Mithridates was obliged to hail a privateer, which was fortunately in sight, and to intrust his person to the fidelity of a pirate, by whose assistance, after undergoing almost incredible dangers and hardships, he was landed at Heraclea, and thence made his way to Amisus, and subsequently to Sinope.<sup>2</sup> B.C. 75.

But the spirit of Mithridates seemed even greater in adversity than in the midst of success.<sup>3</sup> He scarcely gave himself a moment to recover from his fatigues, before he commenced the reparation of his losses. He sent immediately to Tigranes and to Machares, to levy all the troops they could command, and to march to his assistance; at the same time he despatched ambassadors to the Parthians and to the Scythians, requiring reinforcements. Diocles, who was charged with a large sum of money, as a subsidy to the former nation, and with some hostages whom the king now thought it expedient to restore to them, converted the gold to his own use; and, deserting to Lucullus, put the hostages into his hands. The levies meanwhile proceeded, and troops were continually arriving at head-quarters, so that in a short time the king once again had a formidable army<sup>4</sup> under his command, and was in a condition to offer battle to the Roman general. Lucullus, however, was anxious to protract the war; and though his encomiast, Plutarch, endeavours to make out a case in his favour, and represents him as defending his conduct in a council of war, with considerable ingenuity, we may gather, from several hints dropped by Appian<sup>5</sup> and other writers, that he was not exempt from the reigning vice of his country, and was in this instance sacrificing the real interests of Rome to his own love of plunder. Accordingly, he marched his army into the richest districts, and besieged the most opulent towns; nor would he suffer any of the cities to be taken by storm, lest the plunder should be destroyed or secreted by the soldiers. His activity and exertions  
B.C. 72.

During this period, Amisus and Eupatoria (which latter place Mithridates had recently built, and had named after himself, intending to transfer thither the seat of empire,) were rather watched than regularly beleaguered by the main body of the army under Lucullus; and Themiscyra, an important town on the river

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. eod. Plutarch, in Lucullo. Orosius makes the number of ships lost, eighty: Appian, sixty.

<sup>2</sup> Orosius, loc. cit.

<sup>3</sup> Florus, iii. 5; Appian, passim.

<sup>4</sup> It is idle to inquire respecting numbers among conflicting authorities; each so continually contradicts the others and itself, that one makes the king lose three times as many men in a retreat as he is stated to have led into the field. Appian; Plutarch, in Lucullo, &c.

<sup>5</sup> De Reb. Mith. Vide Memnon, cap. 45, 46, 47.



B.C. 72. Thermodon, was surrounded by a detachment commanded by Muræna, who pushed his operations with more vigour, though the workmen employed in throwing up the trenches were continually annoyed by wild beasts, let loose among them from the town, as well as by hives of bees flung over from the walls.<sup>1</sup>

Battles  
between  
Lucullus and  
Mithridates.  
B.C. 71.

Early in the spring, Lucullus, alarmed at the growing discontents of his soldiers, advanced to meet Mithridates, who lay encamped behind the mountains. An attempt, on the part of the Romans, to gain possession of the heights which command the passes through these wooded steeps, occasioned an action, in which Lucullus was defeated with great loss, and Pomponius, his master of the horse, was wounded and taken prisoner, while his troops fled with precipitation. This brave officer, being brought before the king, was asked "upon what terms he would serve Mithridates?"—"On condition that *he* serves Rome," replied the undaunted patriot. Some of the courtiers were disposed to resent this boldness; but the king nobly observed, "Integrity is rendered more respectable by adversity," and instantly ordered him to be set at liberty. Lucullus, upon this defeat, retired beyond the mountains; but, being distressed for want of provisions, he sent a strong escort, by a circuitous route, to convoy supplies from Cappadocia. The party, on its return, was descried by the king, who sent a troop to intercept it; but the Romans, making a more vigorous defence than was expected, repelled the assailants, and put them to flight. Mithridates immediately rushed from the eminence on which he was posted, and with loud shouts compelled his men to rally, and renew the charge; and such, it is said, was the terror inspired by his tremendous voice, and the fierceness of his onset, that the Romans fled in all directions, and the whole convoy remained in the hands of the victors. The Roman camp was now severely pressed by scarcity, as well as disheartened by defeat, and the men murmured loudly against their general, for having given the barbarians time to collect and organize a force which could no longer be opposed; while Mithridates, on the other hand, began to conceive hopes, by cutting off the supplies of the enemy, to oblige him to retreat, without hazarding a battle; a measure which would inevitably have led to the destruction of his army, amid the wilds of the country into which he had advanced.<sup>2</sup>

Total Rout of  
the Royal  
Army.

But in this expectation he was deceived by an unfortunate accident. A troop of horse, which had been detached to intercept some provisions going to the Roman camp, was, through mismanagement, engaged in a narrow defile, in which it had not room to act, and was completely routed; in consequence of this disaster, the right

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in loco.

<sup>2</sup> No notice is necessary of an absurd story related in this place by Appian and Plutarch, (one of whom has manifestly borrowed it from the other,) respecting an attempt made by Mithridates to assassinate Lucullus.

wing of the royal army became exposed to an attack in flank, and the king was obliged to order a hasty retreat. The army, imagining that the Romans were upon them, fled in the greatest confusion, without their baggage, and without waiting for orders of any kind; so that the king, with a few of his principal officers, vainly attempting to rally them, was left behind on foot, and Dorylaus was killed by the crowd, which he could neither stop nor reduce to order. Lucullus, astonished to see the enemy in full retreat, when no one thought even of a serious skirmish, hastily pursued; and the king would have been taken prisoner, had he not, with admirable presence of mind, driven back amongst the foremost of his pursuers a mule, laden with gold and silver, and scattered all the money and jewels he had about him on the road. While the soldiers were gathering up these treasures, and fighting with each other for the greatest share, he had time to recover his horse, and to escape beyond their reach.<sup>1</sup>

But the defeat, comparatively bloodless, was nevertheless completely ruinous to the affairs of the king; who now saw no resource but to collect his cavalry and light troops, and to retire, with all possible speed, into the dominions of his son-in-law Tigranes. Previously to his departure, he sent Bacchides,<sup>2</sup> the chief of his eunuchs, to inform the unfortunate ladies of his family of what had happened, and to recommend that they should rather die than fall into the hands of the enemy. One is said to have repined at this recommendation; but the rest, thanking the eunuch for his courtesy, and the king for his kind care of their honour, died by their own hands: Hipsicratea alone mounted her horse, and by means of most wonderful exertions overtook the king, and accompanied him in his flight.

Noble  
resolution  
of the  
Princesses.

Lucullus now took Cabira, in which he found abundance of treasure, and advancing through Paphlagonia into Pontus, he received the submission of the whole kingdom, except Amisus, which still held out for the king, under the command of the faithful and experienced general, Callimachus; till, after a siege of nearly two years, the town was surprised by a stratagem while the garrison were at dinner. Callimachus, in order to make good his retreat by sea, set fire to the houses, and embarking in haste escaped with all his men. The Roman general, mortified to have occasioned the destruction of so fine a city, ordered his soldiers to extinguish the flames; but they, in their eagerness to fly upon the spoil, paid no regard to the word of command; and although he tried, by threats, promises, and even bribes, to gain their attention, they were so occupied in securing their plunder, that Amisus was reduced to a heap of ashes.<sup>3</sup>

Successes  
of Lucullus.

<sup>1</sup> In this place, Appian, after saying that the king lost *nearly all* his cavalry, makes him retreat into Armenia with the same number of horse which he had when he first took the field.

<sup>2</sup> Al. Bacchus.

<sup>3</sup> This city, and Sinope, which shared a similar fate, were afterwards rebuilt and restored by Lucullus. Vid. Appian, Mith.

B.C. 71.  
Baseness of  
Machares.

Lucullus being thus undisputed master of all the dominions of Mithridates, Machares, who had been made king of the Bosphorians by his indulgent father, provided for his own safety, by purchasing a separate peace,<sup>1</sup> and was declared, as his grandfather had been, the friend and ally of Rome.<sup>2</sup> The Roman general, unable immediately to prosecute a war with Tigranes, at that time the most powerful monarch in Asia, sent an ambassador<sup>3</sup> to demand that he should deliver up the king of Pontus, on pain of being deemed an enemy to the Roman state. Tigranes, who was engaged at the siege of Ptolemais,<sup>4</sup> in Palestine, on receiving this message, hastened to conclude a treaty with Queen Alexandra, on terms more favourable than she had any reason to hope, in order that he might be at liberty to return to the defence of his own dominions; and he replied to the proposal of Lucullus with becoming indignation. His conduct on this, as on other occasions, sufficiently confutes the story related by Plutarch,<sup>5</sup> and retailed by the learned Prideaux,<sup>6</sup> that Mithridates met with a very cold reception in Armenia, and, through the insolent pride of his son-in-law, was not admitted to the presence for several months.

Lucullus  
marches  
into  
Armenia.  
B.C. 70.

The Roman general, meanwhile, having settled, to his satisfaction, the embarrassed affairs of the province of Asia Minor, and having also amassed vast wealth, collected all the troops he could muster in the East, and moved towards Armenia, leaving Sornatius with a strong division to keep Pontus quiet, and to watch Machares,<sup>7</sup> whose treachery to his father and benefactor precluded all reliance on his fidelity to his new engagements. Lucullus, advancing to the Euphrates, passed it in the midst of the rainy season, and plundering all the country between that river and the Tigris, crossed the latter stream without opposition, nearly opposite to the royal city Tigranocerta.<sup>8</sup> Tigranes, informed, at length, of the arrival of the enemy so near his metropolis, despatched Metrobarzanes to observe his motions, and to prevent his laying waste the country; but this brave and faithful statesman was an unskilful general; and Lucullus soon found an opportunity to surprise and cut him off, with the greater part of his army. The king was so much alarmed by his miscarriage, that he hastily quitted the capital, and took refuge in the strong-holds of Mount Taurus, leaving Mazeus to defend the palace and the city. The former, however, could not be maintained against the artillery of the Romans, directed by Sextilius, and Mazeus was obliged to abandon it to be plundered, after having

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in loco.

<sup>3</sup> Appian Clodius.

<sup>5</sup> In Lucullo.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Lucullo.


<sup>4</sup> Josephus, xii. 24.

<sup>6</sup> Part ii, book vi.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Tigranocerta was built on the east side of the Tigris, about two days' journey above the site of ancient Nineveh: it was prodigiously strong, and erected with all that attention to splendid luxury which characterised the despots of the east.

conveyed the princesses and the ladies of the court into the citadel, B.C. 70. in which he was closely besieged. Lucullus did not think fit to march in pursuit of the two kings, with so considerable a force in



[Amasia—the Birth-place of Mithridates.]

his rear;<sup>1</sup> and he therefore awaited the reduction of Tigranocerta. In the mean time, the king felt great uneasiness respecting the situation of the princesses; and he sent a chosen body of only six thousand of his guards, who advanced fearlessly to the gates of the city, took the ladies under their protection, fought their way back through the whole Roman army without material loss, and rejoined the royal camp in triumph. The siege continued to be closely pressed, it being the object of Lucullus to draw Tigranes to attack him on the plain, to which his anxiety for the safety of the city, and his natural impatience strongly inclined him. For a time he was restrained by the prudent advice of Mithridates, (who was now again recruiting in Pontus, and who entreated him, in every letter which he wrote, on no account to hazard a battle,) as well as by the representations of Taxiles, lately arrived at head-quarters with some reinforcements; but as his strength was daily augmented by the arrival of fresh troops to his assistance, and his anger was provoked by the harassing attacks of Muræna, who hung on his rear, and cut

Extraordinary  
gallantry of  
a small body  
of  
Armenians.

<sup>1</sup> Dion Cassius, lib. xxxv.

B.C. 70. off his convoys, he resolved to raise his standard, and march at once to the relief of Mazeus and the garrison.

According to the despatch sent to the senate by Lucullus, the king of Armenia brought into the field a hundred and fifty thousand infantry, seventeen thousand heavy cavalry, thirty-eight thousand light horse, and twenty thousand archers and slingers, besides an uncounted multitude of pioneers, artillerymen, and labourers. The Roman general, not intimidated by the sight of so vast an army, left six thousand men, under Muræna, to maintain the blockade of the city, and advanced to meet the enemy with about ten thousand heavy-armed troops, and a thousand light infantry. Observing that Tigranes came on without precaution, he detached a troop of horse, by a circuitous route, to occupy an eminence<sup>1</sup> in the rear of the royal army; and when, after a furious charge, the Romans gave way, and fled before the enemy's heavy horse, upon a concerted signal, the Roman cavalry rushed from their post, and, attacking the victorious troops in the rear, occasioned so sudden a panic,<sup>2</sup> that nothing was thought of but hasty flight; and Lucullus pursued them till nightfall with prodigious slaughter.<sup>3</sup> Tigranes himself escaped with difficulty, and his royal diadem, with a great quantity of rich plunder, fell into the hands of the conquerors. The Grecian mercenaries in the city, perceiving what had happened, mutinied; and, notwithstanding the exertions of Mazeus to disarm them, they overcame the native garrison, and opened the gates to the Romans.<sup>4</sup> The treasures found in Tigranocerta exceeded all the former spoils won by Lucullus, and in coined specie alone he is said to have taken eight thousand talents, nearly two millions sterling.<sup>5</sup> The soldiers revelling in every kind of luxury, became corrupted and enervated; and discipline was so little regarded, that they openly censured the measures of the general, and refused to obey such orders as did not meet their approbation.

Defeat of  
Tigranes,  
and capture  
of Tigrano-  
certa.

Mithridates  
joins the  
Army.

A few days only after this brilliant and decisive victory, Mithridates joined his son-in-law with the forces which he had been able to collect in his own dominions, where his levies had been greatly facilitated by the insubordination prevailing among the troops under Sornatius, who were even more refractory than the main army. Tigranes, now fully convinced of the soundness of the advice which he had before disregarded, committed the whole conduct of the war to Mithridates, and made him commander-in-chief of the forces. The king of Pontus immediately prepared to recruit the army by reinforcements drawn from every quarter in which the court of Armenia retained any influence; but his principal anxiety was to engage in his cause

<sup>1</sup> Appian, loc. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Lucullo.

<sup>3</sup> Memnon, 58, 59. Epitome Livii, 98.

<sup>4</sup> Dion, xxxv. Appian, in loco.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, in Lucullo.

Arsaces, king of Parthia,<sup>1</sup> who had formerly been defeated and rendered tributary by Tigranes. That wily monarch, whilst he flattered the Armenians with fair promises, made overtures at the same time to Lucullus, intending to afford assistance to neither, but to profit by their mutual hostility.<sup>2</sup> B.C. 70.

The Roman general, however, saw through his duplicity; and aware that the neutrality of Arsaces might eventually prove more dangerous than his enmity, resolved to suspend, for the present, his operations against Mithridates, and to March into Parthia. With this design he sent orders to Sornatius to evacuate Pontus, and to join him with all the forces under his command; but the soldiers there, insisting that the chastisement of the Parthian king was only a pretext for protracting the war, mutinied, and openly declared that they would return to Rome; and the same disorder extending itself to head-quarters also, the general was compelled to forego his Parthian expedition. Mutiny in the Roman Army.

The delay occasioned by these events enabled Mithridates to collect an army of seventy thousand chosen men, whom he daily exercised in the Roman manner of fighting, and trained to the most exact discipline; so that, by the middle of the summer, he was enabled to harass Lucullus with frequent skirmishes, and to cut off his foraging parties, whilst he carefully avoided a general action. The Roman commander, finding that he could not force him to a battle, made a demonstration upon Artaxata, where the princesses and the ladies of the court resided; and the impatience of Tigranes once more prompted him to disregard the prudent suggestions of his father-in-law, and to march out with his whole army to their relief; but when he came up with the enemy near the river Arsamia, his cavalry fell short of his expectations, and the Romans obtained a decisive advantage. The three Asiatic sovereigns, Tigranes, Mithridates, and Darius, king of Media,<sup>3</sup> fled from the field;<sup>4</sup> and, if Plutarch may be believed, Mithridates himself evinced symptoms of cowardice little consistent with his accustomed fierceness and dauntless intrepidity. Lucullus, encouraged by this success, advanced in pursuit of the fugitives, who led him into the wild and bleak districts on the north of Armenia, in which, as the autumn advanced, his men suffered severely from the climate, as well as from the hostility of the natives;<sup>5</sup> till at length they unanimously refused to advance farther.<sup>6</sup> Upon this he turned back, and, marching southward, passed Mount Taurus, and entered into Mesopotamia, where he sat down before Nisibis, one of the strongest fortifications in Asia, at that time well-garrisoned, and commanded by a brother Exertions and prudence of Mithridates. B.C. 68.

<sup>1</sup> Sallust, *Fragmenta*, lib. iv.

<sup>2</sup> Dion, xxxv.

<sup>3</sup> But Dion mentions Mithridates, prince of Media, lib. xxxv.

<sup>4</sup> Prideaux, ii. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Dion, xxxv. 3; Appian, *Mith.*

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, in *Lucullo*; Orosius, vi. 3.

B. C. 68. of Tigranes.<sup>1</sup> The city held out against all the efforts of the Romans for several months, but was at last taken by assault, during the darkness of a winter night, and rewarded the captors not only with abundance of prize-money, but with the comfort of excellent winter-quarters.

Successes of  
Mithridates.

Whilst Lucullus was thus occupied, Tigranes not only recovered the greater part of his hereditary dominions, but ventured also to make incursions into Cappadocia; and Mithridates, having obtained from him four thousand of his own best soldiers, fell upon the Roman garrisons wherever he could find them, and put them to the sword almost without resistance. So great was the terror inspired by the rapidity of his movements and the suddenness of his attacks, that he laid waste a considerable portion of the Greater Armenia,<sup>2</sup> and recovered most of the strong places which had been taken by the Romans. But being at length wounded in the knee by a stone from a sling, and by an arrow under the eye,<sup>3</sup> he was obliged to abstain from active exertion; and he took the opportunity which offered of returning into his own country, where his subjects received him with the most enthusiastic joy.<sup>4</sup> His wounds soon healed under the skilful treatment of an Agrarian surgeon; and he again eagerly took the field against the Roman generals commanding in Pontus. He had before defeated Fabius with considerable loss; and he now so distressed Sornatius and Triarius, that they sent to Lucullus, earnestly entreating him to come to their assistance.

Defeat of  
Triarius.

B. C. 67.

The spring was now approaching, and the refractory army in Nisibis being with great difficulty prevailed on to quit their quarters, were so dilatory in their movements, that they arrived too late to be of any service to their comrades: for Mithridates, having driven Triarius into a defile, attacked him at advantage, and would have cut off his whole corps in a marsh, had not a Roman soldier, assuming the dress of a native who had fallen, approached the king, and whilst he pretended to give him some private information, stabbed him in the groin.<sup>5</sup> The wound so unexpectedly inflicted, occasioned him to faint, and the army, alarmed for the safety of their king, suffered the enemy to escape. When Mithridates came to himself, he expressed his displeasure in strong terms against his officers;<sup>6</sup> and, notwithstanding his wound and his age, he prepared to renew the combat at daybreak the next morning. The contest was long and obstinate; but the courage and military skill of Mithridates prevailed, and Triarius was completely defeated, with the loss of seven thousand men slain on the field of battle, of whom a hundred and fifty were centurions, and twenty-four military tribunes.<sup>7</sup> This was the most fatal overthrow which the forces of the republic had

<sup>1</sup> Dion, loc cit.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, in loco.

<sup>6</sup> Dion Cassius, loc. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Hodie Turcomania.

<sup>4</sup> Dion, xxxv.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, loc. cit.

<sup>7</sup> Appian, in loco.

sustained for many years; and it succeeded, for the present, in putting an end to the war, and in securing Mithridates in the triumphant possession of his kingdom: for, when Lucullus arrived soon afterwards, and neglected to bury the slain,<sup>1</sup> he lost even the shadow of authority over his army, which became so entirely disorganized, that nothing more was attempted during that year.<sup>2</sup> B.C. 67.

In the meanwhile, the allies of the king were employed in expelling the Roman garrisons from their several kingdoms; and Mithridates the Mede,<sup>3</sup> son-in-law to Tigranes, having fallen in with a large detachment marching towards Pontus, routed it with great slaughter. The whole of Asia was now rapidly returning to the state in which Lucullus found it; and the effect of his long campaigns appeared only in his enormous wealth, the splendid library<sup>4</sup> which he had collected, and in the improvements which Mithridates had introduced into his own tactics and the discipline of his troops from frequent observation of the Roman military system. The affectionate loyalty with which this great prince was regarded throughout his dominions, enabled him to repair with unusual despatch the losses which he had sustained; and when Pompey arrived in Galatia, to supersede Lucullus in the command, the kingdom was not only completely reduced to order, but the treasury was replenished, and the king had taken the field at the head of an army, if not so numerous,<sup>5</sup> yet better calculated to meet the Roman legions than any which he had before opposed to them. Mithridates' Allies expel the Roman Garrisons.

Phraates, having succeeded Arsaces in the kingdom of Parthia, renewed his ancient friendship with Mithridates and offered to contract an alliance offensive and defensive with him. But no sooner did he learn that Pompey had taken the command of the Roman army, than his courage failed him; and he sent privately to assure the general that he would in all things obey the will of the senate. Mithridates, not aware of his perfidy, felt himself in a condition to refuse the humiliating terms proposed to him by Pompey; but soon afterwards, having received intelligence of all that had passed, he despatched ambassadors to the camp, and desired to treat for peace. The conditions, however, insisted upon were such as he could not admit either with honour or safety; for he was required, as a preliminary step, to disband his forces, and to deliver up all those persons in his camp who had ever sided with Rome, whom Pompey designated by the term "deserters," sufficiently implying the fate which would await them in his hands.<sup>6</sup> Arrival of Pompey in Asia. B.C. 66.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio.

<sup>3</sup> See Dion Cassius, lib. xxxv.

<sup>5</sup> Appian (Mith.) says, thirty-three thousand men. Plutarch (in Pompeio) says, that he lost ten thousand in the battle which followed; when, according to all the authorities, he was left nearly destitute of troops. This is only one among a thousand examples of the inaccuracy and inconsistency of these historians. Florus, iii. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvi.

<sup>2</sup> Dion, loc. cit.

<sup>4</sup> Isidor. Orig. vi. 3.



B.C. 66.  
Renewal of  
the  
Mithridatic  
War.

Negotiation having thus failed, the king intrenched himself in a commanding situation, where it was not practicable to attack him, and endeavoured to draw out the time in harassing skirmishes with the foraging parties. By these Pompey was so much distressed,<sup>1</sup> that he was obliged to withdraw his troops out of Pontus and Cappadocia into the Lesser Armenia for the convenience of supplies. Mithridates, in great hope of driving him into the provinces by pursuing the same mode of warfare, followed the camp at a distance, till he found an eminence on which he could securely establish his head-quarters, and whence he might advantageously annoy the enemy. He was unable long to maintain this post from the scarcity of water, and he retired to a greater distance; upon which the Roman general immediately occupied the deserted encampment, and, availing himself of the superior science of his country, sunk wells within his trenches, and procured an abundant supply.<sup>2</sup> But the royal troops still continued to infest the outposts, and provisions were obtained with difficulty; till at length Pompey, weary of such continual provocations and ashamed of his inaction, resolved to venture upon a general engagement. With this view he advanced towards the king's camp, who remained quietly behind his trenches, and suffered the Romans to besiege him above six weeks without attempting a sally; and when at last his provisions were exhausted, he succeeded in withdrawing through the enemy's lines by night without loss or interruption,<sup>3</sup> and pitched his camp on the western bank of the Euphrates. When Pompey discovered that the army had escaped, he hastily followed, and encamped in front of their lines; and being now severely pressed by famine, and afraid of being drawn on further into an exhausted country, if Mithridates should cross the river, he made an attempt to surprise him by night.<sup>4</sup> In this he was prevented by the vigilance of the sentinels, who gave timely notice that the Romans were in motion; and the king, with his usual rapidity, had armed himself, and drawn up his men in order of battle, when the vanguard of the enemy approached the intrenchments. It was now too late to retreat, and Pompey unwillingly gave the word to charge.<sup>5</sup> As the Romans advanced, the archers and slingers of the royal army discharged clouds of light missiles, and when they came still nearer, the light infantry hurled their thonged javelins; but the moon, which was near her setting,

Defeat of  
Mithridates.

<sup>1</sup> Entroph. vi.; Florus, iii. 5; Epitome Livii, lib. c.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio; Appian, in Mithridaticis.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch (eod.) accuses the king of having ordered all his sick to be slain. But at that season there could not have been many sick in six weeks; nor was the retreat effected with such haste and trepidation as to render a few invalids any considerable impediment.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch here gives us, according to his custom, a marvellous dream and a portent.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, eod.; Dion, xxxvi.

shone directly in the eyes of the king's troops, and so lengthened the shadows of the enemy, that they entirely miscalculated their distance, and their weapons fell without effect. The heavy-armed legions of the Romans thus appeared as if invulnerable; and the Asiatic troops, seeing not one man fallen amid so many missiles, were seized with a panic and fled; but being intercepted by the river, most of them were either slain or drowned in attempting to escape. Mithridates himself, after performing astonishing feats of strength and valour, and having in vain used every endeavour to save his army, broke through the Roman legions at the head of his body-guard of eight hundred chosen warriors, and handled all who opposed him so severely that no one dared to pursue him. Among this valiant corps was the Queen Hipsicratea, armed like a man, and mounted on a Persian charger of extraordinary beauty. This faithful lady not only fought by the side of the king in his greatest danger, but when he had lost all his servants, she attended like a groom upon his person, and even bestowed her care upon his horse, which she fed and rubbed down at night, and accoutred in the morning. Her attachment was ardently returned by Mithridates, who made her the partner of his inmost counsels, and often declared that whilst he continued to possess *Hypsicrates*, (for so he playfully called her from her masculine courage,) he should never cease to be a king.

Escape of the King and Queen.

Meanwhile, the Roman general pursued him so closely<sup>1</sup> that he was compelled to dismiss the few troops which had escaped with him; and, accompanied only by the queen and two faithful officers of his court, he reached the strong castle of Sinoria,<sup>2</sup> which he had erected between the greater and lesser Armenia,<sup>3</sup> and in which a considerable treasure was deposited. Hence taking with him six hundred talents, (about £120,000,) he hastened onward to the source of the Euphrates,<sup>4</sup> and directed his flight through Colchis towards the Bosporus. But fresh embarrassments awaited him: his son Machares, king of the Bosporians, was a zealous supporter of the Roman interests,<sup>5</sup> and showed no inclination to be involved in his father's danger; whilst Tigranes, profiting by past experience, not only refused to embroil himself with Pompey, but is even said to have proclaimed a reward for the capture of Mithridates.

It happened that the king of Armenia was, at this time, at war with his own son, (also named Tigranes,) the grandson of Mithridates. This prince, being conquered by his father, fled for protection to his

Conduct of Tigranes and his Son.

<sup>1</sup> Orosius, vi. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch calls this fortress Inora, and Appian Sinorega; but Strabo, (who in lib. xii. gives an account of all the fortresses built by Mithridates upon this boundary,) names it Sinoria.

<sup>3</sup> Hodie Turcomania and Aladulia.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio. Prideaux, loco citato; but Appian says, ad ostia Euphratis.

<sup>5</sup> Dion Cassius xxxvi. Appian.

B.C. 66. grandfather, who was then encamped between the rivers Euphrates and Araxes, on the spot where Pompey defeated him ;<sup>1</sup> but learning on the road the event of that action, he threw himself upon the mercy of the Roman general. His father, alarmed lest Pompey should take part with him, sacrificed the cause of Mithridates to his fears, and hastened to lay his diadem in abject submission at the feet of the conqueror, making a merit of his unnatural conduct in offering a hundred talents (nearly £20,000) for the head of his father-in-law. Pompey effected a temporary reconciliation between the rival suppliants ; but the young Tigranes proved as refractory to his new master as he was undutiful to his father, and he was shortly afterwards arrested, and sent to Rome to be reserved for the day of triumph.

Hardships  
endured by  
Mithridates

The king of Pontus, thus deserted by all upon whom he had been accustomed to rely, continued his flight<sup>2</sup> northwards, among the fierce nations who inhabited the countries near the Palus Mæotis, whom he found warmly attached to his cause, and ready to make every exertion that might impede the pursuit of Pompey. The Romans, passing near the great Caucasian range, arrived among the Albanians, whose king, Oræses,<sup>3</sup> availing himself of the Roman Saturnalia,<sup>4</sup> crossed the river Cyrus<sup>5</sup> with a powerful army to attack the camp in the midst of the disorders occasioned by that disgusting festival. But a Roman army under the great Pompey was not to be thus surprised by a barbarian chieftain ; and Oræses found a reception so different from his expectations, that he was glad to sue for peace, and to offer the Romans the best winter-quarters his dominions would afford, with abundance of all kinds of provisions.

B.C. 65. In the spring Pompey advanced against the Iberians, a warlike independent tribe, who boasted that they had never submitted to any foreign yoke, not even to Alexander of Macedon. These were zealously attached to the cause of Mithridates, or rather were excessively jealous of the encroaching power of Rome ; but, after some inconsiderable skirmishes, and frequent manœuvring on both sides, they were defeated in a great battle, in which they lost nine thousand killed, and ten thousand prisoners.<sup>6</sup> No sooner was this difficulty overcome than intelligence was received of the revolt of the Albanians ; and Pompey, not considering it prudent to advance any further with so powerful an enemy in his rear, marched back to reduce them. But Cosis, the king's brother, who commanded in chief, guarded the banks of the Cyrus with so much vigilance, that he had great difficulty in crossing the river ; and his army suffered very much in the wide desert which lies between the Cyrus and the

<sup>1</sup> Orosius ; Appian.

<sup>3</sup> Dion Cassius, xxxvi. al. Orodes.

<sup>5</sup> Strabo and Pliny write it Cyrus ; Plutarch and Dion Cynrus. Hodie Xur.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, in loco.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio.

Abas,<sup>1</sup> from the want of water. Having at length come up with the numerous but ill-disciplined and worse-armed horde led by Cosis,<sup>2</sup> a furious action ensued, in the course of which the Albanian chieftain had nearly concluded the war by a desperate blow aimed at Pompey

B.C. 65.



[Temple of Minerva, where Pompey deposited his Eastern Spoils.—Overbeck.—*Les Restes de l'Ancienne Rome.*]

with a javelin, which pierced the folds of his breast-plate. But the Roman general, recovering his seat in the saddle, thrust the barbarian through the body with his spear, and laid him dead at his feet. The Albanians fled, and their king was glad to purchase peace by submission, and by the payment of a heavy fine. But the difficulties to which Pompey was exposed were not yet exhausted. In an attempt to reach Hyrcania, by the shores of the Caspian, his army was so annoyed by venomous reptiles, that he changed his purpose, and advanced into the kingdom of Tigranes, where circumstances occurred which detained him several months at a distance from Mithridates.

Difficulties  
encountered  
by Pompey.

It may here be worth while to notice the statement of Plutarch,<sup>3</sup> respecting the private papers of Mithridates, said to have been found in the castle of Cænon, which contained a catalogue of the detestable yet childish enormities of his life. That any man should have preserved such useless witnesses of his own secret crimes is, in itself,

<sup>1</sup> This is the same stream called by Ptolemy the Albanus.

<sup>2</sup> Dion tells this story very differently. He makes Artoes, not Cosis, king of a different tribe of Albanians, and says not a word respecting the monomachy with Pompey, which is likely enough to be a fiction of Plutarch.

<sup>3</sup> In Pompeio.

B.C. 65. sufficiently improbable; and that a great warlike prince, who was also a philosopher and an author, should have amused himself with transcribing his own licentious love-letters, is at least equally difficult to be believed. But the biographer himself heedlessly flings discredit upon the whole account, in his zeal to defend Rutilius, who, according to Theophanes, was implicated, by the evidence of one of these letters, in the pretended massacre of the Romans in Asia Minor; for he alleges that this particular letter was probably an invention of Theophanes, if not of Pompey himself: a hint sufficiently explaining the origin of this absurd tale, which is only mentioned to show on what slight foundations the popular notions have been raised respecting the conduct and character of a prince who, whatever might be his faults, was not stained with the avarice, the treachery, the cruelty, and falsehood which so disgracefully characterise his enemies.

Whilst Pompey was led into the south, in pursuit of the schemes which he had undertaken for the conquest of Arabia and Judæa, Mithridates continued his progress towards the Cimmerian Bosphorus,<sup>1</sup> an object of respect and admiration even to his enemies, and of enthusiastic attachment to those who still adhered to him, and who daily witnessed the wonderful exertions of a spirit which fortune could not break, and of a frame which seemed proof against the infirmities of age. He had wintered at Dioscurias,<sup>2</sup> a town on the Euxine sea, and had employed himself actively in raising recruits; and, early in the next spring, he made his way through all the wild hordes of Scythians, which inhabited the country between that place and his son's dominions, partly by force and partly by persuasion. Machares, alarmed at his approach, sent ambassadors to entreat his pardon, and to represent that he had sided with Rome from necessity and not from choice; but the king, despising his falsehood, and indignant at his unnatural rebellion, vouchsafed him no reply; and the unhappy prince, finding his escape by sea precluded by his father's fleet, which blockaded all his ports, goaded by conscience, and distracted by fear, put an end to his own life.<sup>3</sup>

Mithridates, taking possession of the kingdom with all its treasures and resources, and finding his standard joined by large bodies of the warlike Scythians, formed the bold plan of marching through Thrace and Macedonia, by way of Pannonia, over the Trentine Alps, in order to carry the war into Italy itself, and extend the terror of his name to the gates of Rome, while the Romans were engaged in reducing the fortresses which still held out for him in Pontus, and

<sup>1</sup> *Hodie Crim Tartary.*

<sup>2</sup> Dioscurias was built upon the furthest part of the isthmus between the Euxine and Caspian seas. *Strabo, xi. Pliny, vi. 28.*

<sup>3</sup> *Appian, eod. Dion, eod. Orosius, vi. 5.*

in taking or destroying the younger branches of his family.<sup>1</sup> Had he been enabled to execute this design, in the distracted and defenceless situation of Italy at that time, he might probably have proved a more formidable invader than Hannibal himself. But all his measures were broken by the cowardice and treachery of his son Pharnaces, the heir to the crown, who had neither talents to appreciate his father's policy, nor energy of character to support him in difficulties. He therefore tampered with the soldiers, and represented to them in glowing language, the dangers of a march over such a vast extent of unknown country, intersected by deep and rapid rivers, to attack a people at home, whose power extended to the limits of the habitable world, and the least of whose generals was a match for the greatest of the Asiatic sovereigns.<sup>2</sup> Actuated by such representations as these, some of the principal officers formed a plot to depose the king, and to proclaim Pharnaces in his room. The conspiracy was, however, speedily detected, and its authors were put to death; but Mithridates, grieved by the loss of so many of his children, hesitated to condemn the prince, and, upon his submission, restored him to favour.<sup>3</sup>

Treason of  
the Prince  
Pharnaces.

This amiable weakness proved the source of his ruin. Pharnaces, apprehensive that he had lost his father's confidence, and had become an object of suspicion to the court, felt uneasy in his presence, and resolved to free himself from apprehension by plunging deeper into guilt. But, taking his measures with greater precaution, he first secured the Roman deserters, who dreaded nothing so much as a return to their own country; and then going privately by night among other parties in the camp, he brought over to his faction a large majority of the army, who, assembling at sunrise, proclaimed, with loud shouts, "Pharnaces is king!"<sup>4</sup> Mithridates, roused from sleep by the unwonted clamour, sent an officer to inquire the cause of it, and received for answer, that "it was time the youthful son should take the sceptre from the hands of an aged father, whose rashness and violence threatened to involve them all in ruin." The undaunted king, mounting his horse, rode out to address the mutineers; but his detestable son, pointing him out to his adherents, desired them to seize him. This, however, was attempted in vain; and the king, with a few loyal attendants, spurred up the side of a hill, from whence he beheld the great body of the army crowning

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in loco. Pompey carried five sons and two daughters of Mithridates to Rome to grace his triumph.

<sup>2</sup> They must have marched above two thousand miles through all those countries which are now called Tartaria Crimæa, Podolia, Moldavia, Wallachia, Transilvania, Hungaria, Stiria, Carinthia, Tyrol, and Lombardy; and over the three great rivers of the Boristhenes, the Danube, and the Po. Prideaux, part ii. book 6.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, *ibid.* It is here related by Appian that the king had cruelly put to death his son Xiphares, who was innocent of any offence against him, merely to vex his mother.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, *ibid.*

B.C. 65. Pharnaces with acclamations of joy. Perceiving the hopelessness of resistance, he despatched a messenger to the rebels with a request that he might be permitted to depart in safety; but Pharnaces would not suffer the bearer of the message to return: several more officers were sent in succession with the same petition, who were all, in like manner, detained; and some of them, who were known to be the king's particular friends, were put to death in his sight. Mithridates now perceived that his hour was come; and having resolved never to fall into the hands of his enemies alive, he drew from his scabbard a deadly poison, which he always carried about with him against such an emergency. A very touching scene followed. The two princesses, Mithridatia and Nissa, begged that they might first partake of the drug, in order that they might not look upon the death of their father. After some mutual entreaties, the king so far yielded to their tears that they all took the poison together. Its effect upon the tender constitutions of the youthful princesses was immediate, and they expired with scarce a struggle; but the robust habit of Mithridates resisted its operation, and he continued to walk backward and forward by the bodies of his daughters, in vain expectation of being released from his sufferings beside them. At last, impatient of delay, he desired Bititius, a loyal Celt, to put an end to his existence; and that brave officer, choked with weeping, averted his face, and presented his sword.<sup>1</sup>

Death of  
Mithridates.  
B.C. 63.

Thus died Mithridates the Great, in the sixty-eighth year of his age, and the fifty-seventh of his reign; and with him ended the Mithridatic war, after it had continued from the first commencement of hostilities, six or seven-and-twenty years.<sup>2</sup> Pharnaces made haste to send in his submission to Pompey,<sup>3</sup> and to declare that he held his hereditary dominions only at the pleasure of the senate. This base servility was well received by the Roman general, who probably thought, like the rest of his countrymen, that there was a merit in "*Romanizing*," sufficient to atone for all the crimes and treacheries of which mankind could be guilty.<sup>4</sup>

In this slight sketch of the life and actions of one of the greatest

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in Mithridaticis.

<sup>2</sup> "The continuance of the war, according to Justin, (xxxvii. 1,) was forty-six years; according to Appian, (Mith.) forty-two; according to L. Florus (iii. 5,) and Eutropius, (vi.) forty; and according to Pliny, (vii. 26.) thirty; but its exact duration is no more than twenty-seven years."—Prideaux, ii. 6.—Orosius reckons it thirty or forty years, lib. v. c. 19. Lempriere's Chronological Table makes it twenty-six years. Prideaux himself places the accession of Mithridates in the year B.C. 124, the commencement of the war in B.C. 89, and the death of the king in B.C. 64, which would make the interval only twenty-five years. But if Mithridates came to the throne B.C. 124, and reigned fifty-seven years, he must have died B.C. 67, which reduces the period of the war to twenty-two years. Such is the uncertainty of the chronology of this portion of history.

<sup>3</sup> Appian states, in addition, that this monster sent his father's body to Pompey.


<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the observations of Appian and Plutarch on the conduct and character of Machares and Pharnaces. (Mith.) (Pomp.)

princes of antiquity, it has been attempted to show how little reliance B.C. 63. can be placed upon the opinions of the Roman historians respecting his character, or even upon their representations in matters of fact. His great qualities have been universally acknowledged even by his enemies; and the mention of his imputed crimes and vices is attended with so much puerile violence, as lead the reader to suspect that, among the many inaccuracies and false statements abounding in the history of this war, these accusations are perhaps the least entitled to credit.<sup>1</sup> Appian, who records numerous instances of the kind, concludes his account of Mithridates with a singular declaration, that he had no fault but an excessive love of women. That the king, like other Oriental princes of every age, indulged in a plurality of wives, there can be no doubt; and he was sufficiently punished for this failing in its obvious consequences, the infidelity of two queens,<sup>2</sup> and the unnatural rebellion of several of his sons. The necessary punishment of these miscreants, so nearly allied to him, carries with it something of horror; nevertheless it may be gathered even from the prejudiced narratives, to which alone we have access, that Mithridates was generally indulgent and affectionate in domestic life, beloved by his faithful wives, revered by his household, and cherished by his subjects with devoted loyalty. His talents, his energy, and his courage, rendered him formidable to his adversaries; and the fear of base spirits is ever malignant. But, through all the vindictive calumnies with which he has been assailed, a feeling of awe and respect involuntarily breaks out, and throws a grand, though an indistinct, light upon the noble features of his character, which may be summed up in the lively language of Paterculus:—"He was a man neither to be mentioned nor passed over without caution; most valiant in war, of surpassing bravery, distinguished at one time by success, at all times by greatness of mind; a consummate general, an invincible soldier, and to the end persevering and consistent in his opposition to Rome."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Appian, in *Mithridaticis*.

<sup>2</sup> Laodice and Stratonice.

<sup>3</sup> "Quamquam fugiens et victus, venerabilis adhuc et tremebundus videbatur." Appian, *Mith. Gryph.* 1069. "Mithridates Ponticus Rex, vir neque silendus neque dicendus sine curâ, bello acerrimus, virtute eximius, aliquando fortunâ, semper animo maximus, consilii dux, miles manu, odio in Romanos Hannibal." Veil. Paterc. lib. ii. c. 18.



[Denarius of M. Antonius, with Roman Eagle.]





[The Colline Gate.—*Overbeck.*—*Les Restes de l' Ancienne Rome.*]

## CHAPTER XXI.

### LUCIUS CORNELIUS SYLLA.

#### PART II.

FROM B.C. 88 TO B.C. 77.

B.C. 88. Causes which led to a renewal of disturbances. THE former triumphs of the aristocratical party, over the Gracchi, and over Saturninus, had been followed by some years of comparative calm. But the popular cause had now gained an accession of strength, more fatally, indeed, to its adversaries than beneficially to itself, in the support of ambitious and powerful men, who hoped to turn its successes to the advancement of their own greatness. Besides this, the Italian war, while it had filled Italy with armies, had degraded the quality of the soldiery: for in the distress of the state, the Romans had enlisted freedmen into the legions; and this, combining with the example already set by Marius of admitting men to serve without any qualification of property, had rendered the troops readier instruments of the personal schemes of their generals. The Italians also, by coalescing with one of the great divisions of the Roman commonwealth, might hope for more complete success than when they had struggled against the united force of the senate and the people. Added to all this, the late violence of Sylla, although professing to be no more than a necessary retaliation of preceding outrages, yet furnished those who had suffered from it with abundant excuses for a new reaction on their part: while the

proscription of Marius, after the signal services he had rendered to his country, exasperated not only his own numerous friends, but a large body of independent citizens, who forgot the associate of Sulpicius, and remembered only the conqueror of the Cimbri. B.C. 88.

Immediately, therefore, on the departure of Sylla from Italy, L. Cinna again brought forward the law of Sulpicius,<sup>1</sup> which admitted the Italians into all the thirty-five tribes without distinction. Those whom this law was intended to benefit, crowded to Rome in great numbers, to support its author by their swords, rather than by their votes.

Cinna proposes to renew the Law of Sulpicius.

If we may believe Appian,<sup>2</sup> hardly a shadow of any constitutional form of proceeding was observed; and no sooner had some of the tribunes of the aristocratical party interposed their negative to stop the passing of the law, than a violent riot broke out, and the lives of the tribunes were threatened.



[L. Cinna.]

Upon this, Cn. Octavius, the other consul, broke into the forum with an armed force, and drove out the rioters; great numbers of whom were killed by his followers in their flight, but, as we are told, without his orders. Thus far the scene resembles the seditions of the Gracchi: but Octavius was of a mild and scrupulous temper, and had left the principal offender untouched; and Cinna, being fully prepared for the last extremities of civil discord, began to summon the slaves to his standard, in the hope of maintaining his ground in the capital. But finding himself disappointed, he fled from the city with his chief partisans; and the senate, by an act of authority hitherto unprecedented, declared that he had forfeited the consulship;<sup>3</sup> and the people being called on to proceed to a new election, L. Cornelius Merula, the Flamen of Jupiter, was appointed consul in his room.

He is driven from Rome, and deprived of the Consulship.

The Italian towns regarding the cause of Cinna as their own, received him with the utmost cordiality;<sup>4</sup> and encouraged by their support, and assisted by their supplies of money, he presented himself at the camp of the army, which still, it seems, was employed in the neighbourhood of Nola. Here, by bribes and promises, he persuaded the soldiers to acknowledge him as their lawful consul, and to take the military oath of obedience to him; and having thus secured a rallying point for his partisans, he was soon joined by many individuals of the popular party from Rome. But his most powerful auxiliaries were the different cities of Italy;<sup>5</sup> who, thinking that now they had a fair opportunity of resuming the contest

Is assisted by the Italians, and gains over a Roman Army.

<sup>1</sup> Velleius Paternul. lib. ii. c. 43.

<sup>2</sup> De Bellis Civilibus, lib. i. c. 64.

<sup>3</sup> Velleius Paternul. lib. ii. c. 43.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, c. 65.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, c. 66; Paternul. c. 43.

B.C. 88. with Rome under happier auspices, exerted every nerve in the cause, and not only furnished Cinna with money, but took up arms with such spirit and unanimity to join him, that he was able, in a very short time, to form an army of thirty legions, amounting, at the least, to a hundred and fifty thousand men. Already, too, Cinna had invited Marius, and the other exiles of the popular party to return to their country;<sup>1</sup> and Q. Sertorius and Cn. Carbo were actually holding commands in his army. Hoping, therefore, to imitate the example of Sylla, he moved immediately with his forces towards Rome.

The Senate apply to Cn. Pompeius for aid.

The senate had no hopes of withstanding this assault by the mere efforts of the citizens of the capital. They required the support of a regular army,<sup>2</sup> and implored Cn. Pompeius, who, as we have seen, still retained his command in Umbria, to employ his soldiers in their defence. But he, more anxious to make the troubles of his country an occasion of his own advancement, remained for some time in suspense, as if waiting to see which party would purchase his services at the highest price; and thus allowed Cinna and his faction to consolidate their force beyond the possibility of successful resistance.

Marius lands in Italy, and joins Cinna.

Marius in the meanwhile landed in Tuscany with a small body of adherents;<sup>3</sup> and studiously retaining all the outward marks of wretchedness and poverty in his person and dress, he appealed to the compassion of the people by contrasting his present miserable condition with his former triumphs and dignities. He is said to have raised by these arts a body of about six thousand men, and to have effected his junction with Cinna, so that their combined forces were capable of being divided into four distinct armies;<sup>4</sup> with two of which Cinna and Carbo took up their positions on both sides of Rome; while Sertorius, with a third, stationed himself so as to command the navigation of the Tiber above the city; and Marius, with a fourth, was master of the course of the river below, between Rome and the sea.

Progress of the Civil War.

In this state of things Cn. Pompeius at last resolved to espouse the cause of the senate, and marched towards Rome. A battle was fought between his army and that of Cinna, immediately under the walls of the capital;<sup>5</sup> but though the slaughter was great, the event seems to have been indecisive; and soon afterwards Cn. Pompeius was killed by lightning in his own camp. Both parties were suffering severely from the attacks of sickness; and this, probably, suspended their operations; while Marius was employed in destroying several of the towns in the neighbourhood of Rome,<sup>6</sup> from whence

<sup>1</sup> Patereulus, c. 44; Plutarch, in Sertorio, c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxix.; Appian, lib. i. c. 66; Patereul. c. 44.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 67; Plutarch, in Mario, c. 41.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxix.; Appian, c. 67.

<sup>5</sup> Patereulus, lib. ii. c. 44; Appian, c. 68.

<sup>6</sup> Appian, c. 67, 68.

the city might have been supplied with provisions; and a detachment occupied Ariminum to intercept the reinforcements which the senate hoped to receive from Cisalpine Gaul. One hope still remained to the aristocracy. Metellus Pius, the son of that Metellus Numidicus, whose name, combined as it is with the recollection of his virtues, is a beautiful contrast to those which we must now so often mention, was at the head of an army in Samnium; and was still carrying on hostilities against the people of that country, who, with hereditary obstinacy, even now kept alive the last sparks of the Italian war. He was desired by the senate to make the best terms in his power with the Samnites,<sup>1</sup> and to hasten to the relief of his country. But either some difficulties occurred in the negotiation, or the conditions which he granted were not so favourable as to prevent the popular leaders from turning his retreat out of Samnium to their own advantage. Marius promised to give the Samnites every thing which they required; and accordingly they instantly joined his cause, defeated a Roman officer whom Metellus had left behind him to watch their movements, and added their whole strength to that already overpowering confederacy by which the aristocracy of Rome was assaulted.

The  
Samnites  
join Marius.

The defenders of the old constitution, under the command of Octavius the consul, and Metellus,<sup>2</sup> had established themselves on the hill of Alba; and still presented a force which might have encountered any one of the enemy's armies with a fair hope of victory. But the generals dreaded to expose the whole nobility of the commonwealth, with their wives and children, to the consequences of a decisive defeat; besides this, their soldiers could not be fully depended on; for many of them preferred Metellus to Octavius,<sup>3</sup> and entreated him to take the supreme command; and when he refused and desired them to submit to the consul, who was their lawful general, they went over in crowds to the enemy. The very uprightness indeed of the aristocratical leaders contributed to the present success of their adversaries. Whilst Cinna was seducing the slaves to join him by promising them their liberty, Octavius refused to follow the example; declaring that he would not imitate that conduct which he had himself denounced in his antagonist as treasonable. Thus the consular army was continually diminishing by desertion, without being able to repair its losses; and the enemy had now established so strict a blockade, that the mass of the people were alarmed at the prospect of a famine, and impatient of a longer continuance of this hopeless struggle.

Deputies were accordingly sent Cinna by the senate to treat of peace.<sup>4</sup> But he insisted on knowing whether they were going to treat with him as consul, or as a private individual; and this diffi-

Cinna enters  
Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 68; Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxx.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 42.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, c. 69.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, c. 69.

B.C. 86. culty broke off the negotiation for the moment. But the desertion from the city to the besieging army daily increasing, the senate were obliged to yield; they consented to acknowledge Cinna as consul, and only requested him to swear that he would shed no blood after his victory. He received the deputies with all the state of a consul,<sup>1</sup> and refusing to take any oath, merely promised that he would not willingly be the author of any executions. But what little comfort the deputies might have derived from this assurance, was destroyed by the sight of Marius, who stood silently beside the consul's chair, and whose savage glances, rendered more fearful by the assumed wildness of his face, and the meanness of his attire, betokened nothing but executions and massacres. Metellus had in the mean time withdrawn from Alba, and retired towards the north of Italy;<sup>2</sup> but Octavius, partly actuated by a courageous sense of duty, partly trusting to the solemn assurances of safety which he received from Cinna and Marius, and partly led away by his prophets and soothsayers, who foretold that he should suffer no injury, and to whose predictions he was habitually too ready to listen, refused to quit his station, and still continued to wear the ensigns of his office, and to show himself in public in the city. Cinna had already entered the walls, and disguise being no longer needful, he sent a party of soldiers to murder his colleague. Octavius quietly waited their approach, refusing either to fly or to conceal himself: the assassins executed their task, and the head of this blameless consul was, by Cinna's orders, suspended over the rostra, as the first victim to his vengeance.

Marius enters Rome.

Rome, with every thing that was most noble and most distinguished within its walls, now lay at the mercy of the popular leaders. But Marius professed that as he had been declared an exile by the people,<sup>3</sup> he could not enter the city till his sentence should be regularly repealed: and the tribes were summoned in mockery, that their votes might enable their conqueror to avail himself of his own victory. His thirst of blood, however, could not brook the delay, which he had devised to enhance the delight of his triumph; and when two or three of the tribes had voted, he took possession of one of the gates, and entered the town at the head of a band peculiarly attached to his own person, and which consisted chiefly of the peasants or fugitive slaves who had joined him on his first landing in Tuscany. With these instruments he proceeded at once to the work of murder. The principal nobility were selected as his victims.

Massacres in Rome by order of Marius.

Some fell by their own hands to anticipate the stroke of their assassins; some were betrayed, and dragged from their places of concealment to death; some were discovered and slain in the houses where they had sought refuge; and others were butchered in the

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 70; Plutarch, in Mario, c. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. c. 80. Ibid. c. 42.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 43.

open streets, and gratified Marius with the sight of their agony. In the midst of this carnage, the wretches who were employed in it added to its horrors by all varieties of unauthorized crimes of their own devising. Fugitive slaves availed themselves of the opportunity to murder their masters,<sup>1</sup> to plunder their houses, and to commit the worst outrages on their families. The wife and children of Sylla were happy enough to escape this fate,<sup>2</sup> though they were especially sought after; they were concealed by some of their friends until means were found to convey them out of the city. That their property should have been confiscated, that all Sylla's laws should have been repealed, and himself declared, in his turn, a public enemy, seemed only the natural retaliation of a party which had so lately suffered at his hands a similar treatment. But the general scene of lawless rapine and murder which was everywhere exhibited, as it far exceeded any thing which Rome had hitherto witnessed, so it was far too dreadful to be palliated by any plea of former provocations, and has deservedly procured for those who were its actors, the unmitigated abhorrence of all posterity.

In this massacre there perished, by the orders of Cinna and Marius, L. Julius Cæsar,<sup>3</sup> who had been consul during the Italian war, and had distinguished himself by a splendid victory over the Samnites; together with his brother C. Julius Cæsar, whose ill-advised competition for the consulship had first provoked Sulpicius to enter on his career as a demagogue, and was now visited with death by the unforgiving jealousy of Marius. The heads of both these victims were exposed over the rostra; and near them was seen the head of M. Antonius,<sup>4</sup> the most eloquent citizen in the commonwealth, who had filled the offices of consul and censor, and who was respected as the able defender of all who applied for his aid in the courts of justice. His place of concealment was betrayed to Marius,<sup>5</sup> who, although he was then at supper, was on the point of starting up from the table, to be himself a witness of his death: but being restrained by his friends, he sent a party of soldiers instantly to destroy him, and bring back his head with them. P. Crassus,<sup>6</sup> the father of M. Crassus the triumvir, who had also, like M. Antonius, been both censor and consul, being now marked out for destruction, and having seen one of his sons murdered, killed himself. C. Numitorius and M. Bæbius,<sup>7</sup> both apparently men of some consideration, and the latter a name that occurs frequently in earlier periods of the Roman history, were murdered, and their bodies ignominiously dragged through the forum by the common executioners. These, with many others, were sacrificed by mere

M. Antonius  
murdered.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 74.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 22; Appian, c. 73.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. iii. c. 3; Tusculan. Disputat. lib. v. c. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. de Oratore, lib. iii. c. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Appian, c. 72.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero, de Oratore, lib. iii. c. 3; Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxx.; Florus, lib. iii. c. 21.

<sup>7</sup> Florus, lib. iii. c. 21.

B.C. 86. military execution to the first fury of the victorious leaders. But against L. Cornelius Merula, who had been appointed consul when Cinna was driven from Rome, and against Q. Lutatius Catulus, the colleague of Marius in his fourth consulship, and his companion in his great victory over the Cimbri, it was resolved to proceed with something of the forms of justice. Their condemnation they well knew was the necessary consequence of their trial: Merula, therefore, preferring to die by his own hands, opened his veins;<sup>1</sup> and as his blood flowed upon the altar of Jupiter, he, in his character of Flamen, imprecated the vengeance of his God upon the head of his murderers. Catulus, it appears, had actually co-operated with Sylla in procuring the expulsion of Marius and Sulpicius,<sup>2</sup> and causing them to be declared public enemies. For this, Marius was bent upon his death, and answered every solicitation in his behalf, by saying, "He must die:"<sup>3</sup> upon which Catulus, like Merula, to avoid falling by the executioner, shut himself up in a close room, and suffocated himself by burning charcoal.

Death of  
Merula and  
Catulus.

Often as the leaders of a popular party have made the interests of their followers subservient to their own ambition, yet never was this more shamelessly exemplified than in the behaviour of Cinna and Marius. After having plunged their country into a civil war, under pretence of supporting the just claims of the Italians to an equal share in the right of suffrage, the chiefs of the victorious party would not, or could not, rely on the gratitude of those whose cause they had upheld; nor would they allow the people to exercise the form of an election, even when they could have so certainly commanded the result. Cinna and Marius, by their own authority, declared themselves consuls for the ensuing year:<sup>4</sup> and it is mentioned of the latter, that on the very day on which he entered upon his usurped office, he ordered a senator, of the name of Sextus Licinius, to be thrown from the Tarpeian rock. The atrocities, indeed, which Marius was daily committing, and the excesses in which his band of fugitive slaves indulged themselves without remorse, at last awakened the shame or the jealousy of his associates. Cinna, instigated, as it is said, by Sertorius,<sup>5</sup> who beheld with indignation the crimes with which his party had disgraced themselves, finding all attempts to repress these disorders fruitless, assembled a body of his Gaulish auxiliary troops, and attacking Marius's band in their quarters by night, put the whole of them to the sword. Such an act was likely to have exasperated Marius against his colleague, had he been capable of revenging the affront; but his career was fast drawing to a close: he was now in his seventieth year, and plunging deeply into the utmost intemperance in his manner of living,<sup>6</sup> he contracted a

Sickness and  
Death of  
Marius.

<sup>1</sup> Velleius Patercul. lib. ii. c. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, Tuscul. Disputat. lib. v. c. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in Sertorio, c. 5; Appian, c. 74.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, c. 74.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxx.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, in Mario, c. 45, 46.

pleurisy, of which he died after a short illness, having enjoyed his seventh consulship for only seventeen days. It was reported that he became delirious before his death, and imagined himself to be commanding the army against Mithridates, which had so long been the object of his ambition, often shouting aloud, and expressing by the most violent gestures the liveliness of the impression which occupied his mind. But whatever were the scenes which accompanied his last hours, they could scarcely add any thing to the certain horror of a sudden death thus cutting him off amidst the perpetration of so many and such dreadful crimes; nor are any stories of his late remorse and agony of mind required to aggravate our abhorrence of a life which in the course of seventy years, presents an unvaried picture of evil passions, darkening more and more as he advanced in age, and growing to the deepest intensity of blackness as he approached the latest period of his earthly existence.

It is mentioned by Cicero,<sup>1</sup> that during the celebration of the funeral of Marius, C. Fimbria, a man whose ungoverned violence in speaking and in acting amounted sometimes almost to insanity, caused an attempt to be made on the life of Q. Mucius Scævola, one of the most virtuous citizens of his time. The assassin only wounded his intended victim; and Fimbria, when he heard that Scævola had escaped, declared that he would bring him to trial before the people. He was asked, what charge he could possibly invent against a character so pure as Mucius; to which he replied, "I shall accuse him for not having given my dagger a more hearty welcome." Such were the wretches whose crimes were now enjoying a full impunity in the triumph of the professed champions of the cause of liberty.

After the death of Marius, L. Cornelius Cinna remained in fact the sovereign of Rome. His power was little less absolute than that afterwards held by Sylla or Cæsar: and it is somewhat remarkable, that his usurpation should have been so little noticed by posterity, and that he himself should be so little known, that not a single trait of character, and scarcely a single personal anecdote of him, is to be found on record. His first step was to supply the vacancy in the consulship occasioned by the death of Marius; and for this purpose he fixed on L. Valerius Flaccus,<sup>2</sup> who had been the colleague of Marius in his sixth consulship, about fourteen years before. The massacres had now, for the most part, ceased; and it was intended that the usual forms of the constitution should still be observed. Nothing indeed appeared to dispute the power of the victorious leaders: many of the nobility had left Italy,<sup>3</sup> and sought a refuge in the camp of Sylla; some had retired to their estates in the country, and some still remained in Rome, anxious above all things to avoid participating in a civil war, and hoping that they might still

Cinna  
remains  
master of the  
Government.

<sup>1</sup> Orat. pro Roscio Amerino, c. 12.      <sup>2</sup> Appian, c. 75; Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 46.

<sup>3</sup> Patercul. c. 46; Plutarch, in Pompeio, c. 6.



B.C. 86. possess influence enough to prevent the return of such a calamity altogether. In this last class we find the names of Q. Mucius Scaevola,<sup>1</sup> of another L. Valerius Flaccus, and of L. Philippus, the famous antagonist of Drusus, and notorious, during his consulship,



[Cicero.]

for his opposition to the interests of the senate. But the usual freedom of speech allowed in the forum and in the courts of justice was so much abridged, that Cicero describes the three years which followed the victory of Cinna, as a period in which the republic was without laws and without dignity.<sup>2</sup> He himself remained during all this time at Rome,<sup>3</sup> and was employing himself in the study of eloquence and philosophy, attending the lectures of Philo, then a refugee from Athens, and of Molo of Rhodes, and preparing himself at leisure, during this cessation of opportunities for actual practice, for the splendid

career which the subsequent triumph of the aristocracy laid open to him.

The scanty reports of these times which remain to us, will assist but little in ascertaining the state of the people at large under the dominion of Cinna. An immense military force was kept on foot throughout Italy, so that even if the Romans were exempted from all share in its support, the burthen must still have pressed heavily on the Italians, in addition to the numerous excesses which troops, so little subject to discipline, would naturally commit in the districts in which they were quartered. In Rome itself there was a large proportion of debtors among the lower orders, who were insolvent either through poverty or dishonesty. To relieve them was judged a measure becoming a party professedly popular; and L. Flaccus the consul, brought in a law,<sup>4</sup> allowing a debtor to avoid all further claims upon him, on payment of a fourth part of his debt. It is one of the most difficult problems in legislation, to observe a just balance between severity to unavoidable distress and indulgence to wilful extravagance or fraud; but at Rome, in this case as in so many others, the scale vibrated from one extreme of injustice to the other, and the monied interest, who a short time before had murdered a lawful magistrate, because he had defended the poor against their oppressions, now saw their just rights sacrificed in return, because the government wished to conciliate the needy and the desperate.

Meanwhile, the several provinces of the empire submitted, as far as appears, without opposition to the party which prevailed in the

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, ad Atticum, lib. viii. epist. iii.

<sup>3</sup> De Claris Oratoribus, c. 89.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, c. 62.

<sup>4</sup> Vell. Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 46.

capital. Sylla alone remained an object of fear and jealousy. Far from seeking to disarm his enemies by concession, he is said continually to have avowed his intention of punishing them,<sup>1</sup> so soon as he should have finished the war with Mithridates; and his confidence in his army was so well grounded, that he had no fears of their allowing any other general than himself to be appointed to command them. L. Flaccus, indeed, was sent into Greece with a new army,<sup>2</sup> as the officer intrusted by the people with the conduct of the war; but he, not venturing to interfere with Sylla, who was at this time wintering in Thessaly, moved through Macedonia, and from thence crossed over into the northern parts of Asia Minor, to attack Mithridates in his own country. Here, however, he was soon assassinated by C. Fimbria, who had accompanied him from Rome as his lieutenant, and whose daring wickedness gladly caught at this opportunity of advancing himself. On the death of Flaccus he succeeded to the command, and carried on hostilities against Mithridates with some success: but when Sylla, having recovered the whole of Greece, crossed over himself into Asia, and there soon concluded a peace with the enemy, Fimbria was summoned to surrender the authority which he had unlawfully acquired;<sup>3</sup> and finding his soldiers yielding to the ascendancy of Sylla's reputation, and inclined to desert him, he, to avoid the punishment which he deserved, killed himself.

The death of Fimbria, however, did not take place till after the period at which we are now arrived. To resume, then, the regular course of our narrative, we must return to the conclusion of the year 667, when the time was arrived for the appointment of consuls for the year following. Cinna again re-elected himself by his own authority,<sup>4</sup> and chose as his colleague Cn. Papirius Carbo, a man whose very name was ominous of evil: for of the two individuals of his family who had hitherto been most conspicuous, one had, through his perfidy, embroiled the republic in a quarrel with the Cimbri, and had sustained from them a severe defeat in Illyria; and the other was deeply involved in the mischievous plans of the Gracchi, and when brought to trial, as has been already mentioned, by L. Crassus the orator, poisoned himself through fear of the sentence of his judges. The consuls, thus self-appointed, began to prepare themselves for the approaching contest with Sylla: they endeavoured to conciliate the rich by showing them unwonted attentions; they appealed especially to the Italian states, of whose interests they always professed themselves the advocates; and endeavoured to secure the coasts of Italy against the expected invasion, by collecting a considerable fleet from the different ports of Italy and Sicily.

B.C. 86.  
Sylla refuses to acknowledge the Government at Rome.

Cinna associates Carbo with himself in the Consulship, and prepares for War.

<sup>1</sup> Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, de Bell. Mithridatico, c. 51, 52; Patercul. lib. ii. c. 47.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, de Bell. Mithridat. c. 60.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 75, 76; Livy, Epitom. lib. 83.

B. C. 85.  
Attempts to  
prevent a  
Civil War.

In this interval of suspense, a motion was made and carried in the senate by L. Valerius Flaccus,<sup>1</sup> that deputies should be sent to Sylla to prevent, if possible, the evils of war; and Cinna and Carbo were desired to suspend their military preparations till the answer to this embassy should be received. The consuls promised compliance, and the deputies were sent over into Greece to treat with Sylla; but Cinna could not consent thus easily to relinquish the sovereignty he had gained, nor to treat on equal terms with an enemy whom he had injured beyond all hope of reconciliation. Once more, therefore, he re-appointed himself and Carbo to the consulship;<sup>2</sup> and both leaders then left Rome, and began themselves to press the levies of soldiers; intending no longer to remain on the defensive, but to cross the Adriatic in person, and to anticipate Sylla in beginning hostilities. But it seems that they had not a fleet sufficient to transport at one passage a force strong enough to maintain itself against the enemy. They resolved, therefore, to send over their troops in successive detachments from the neighbourhood of Ancona, to the opposite coast of Liburnia; a spot so distant from the intended scene of operations, that the whole army might be safely landed before Sylla could arrive to attack it. But the high reputation of the general against whom they were to act, rendered the soldiers very averse to the expedition: one detachment, after it had set sail, was driven back by a storm; and no sooner did the men find themselves again on Italian ground, than they deserted their standards, and returned to their several homes. This example decided the rest of the army, and they all refused to embark. Cinna called them together, and endeavoured to enforce obedience. They crowded round him with minds prepared for the last extremities, and when one of his lictors struck a soldier, in order to clear the way, the blow was returned by the man's comrade. Cinna called out to seize the offender; a general mutiny broke out at the word, stones were cast at him, and the soldiers who were nearest, drawing their swords, immediately stabbed and killed him. Carbo at once saw that the project of crossing the Adriatic was hopeless: he recalled the few men who had already effected their passage, and resolved to confine his care to the defence of Italy. The death of Cinna, however, and the avowed disposition of the soldiers, encouraged the ordinary magistrates of the commonwealth to resume somewhat of their lawful authority. Carbo was summoned by the tribunes to return to Rome, and to hold the Comitia for the election of a consul in the room of Cinna.<sup>3</sup> He obeyed, but on the first day that the Comitia were held, the auspices were unfavourable; and on the

Mutiny of  
the Soldiers,  
in which  
Cinna is  
killed.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxxiii.; Appian, c. 77.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, c. 77, 78; Paterculus, c. 48; Livy, Epitom. lib. 83; Auctor de Viris illustribus, in Vita Cinnæ.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 78; Paterculus, c. 48.

next, the meeting was broken off by a thunder-storm; so that the augurs forbade the election to take place till after the summer solstice; and Carbo thus remained sole consul.

B.C. 85.  
Carbo  
remains sole  
Consul.

About this time, the answer of Sylla to the deputation of the senate was received in Rome.<sup>1</sup> It stated that he would lay aside his purpose of invading Italy, if all those citizens whom Cinna had outlawed, were restored to their country and their honours. The senate, we are told, was disposed to accept these conditions; but the influence of Carbo and his party procured their rejection; and war now appeared inevitable. Some months, however, intervened before Sylla commenced his expedition to Italy; and this delay was occasioned in part by an illness which attacked him,<sup>2</sup> and which obliged him to go to Ædepsus, in Eubœa, to try the effect of the warm baths, for which that place was celebrated. Here he passed a considerable time, amusing himself with the society of actors,<sup>3</sup> and of those persons, then so common in Greece, who lived upon their several talents of disputation, of eloquence, of wit, or of buffoonery. But he might console himself for this interruption to his plans, by reflecting that the party of his antagonists was by no means rising in the public opinion, and that his own friends, on the contrary, were daily becoming more numerous; while the fate of Cinna sufficiently showed, that he was in no danger of being anticipated in his schemes of invasion, and of finding himself obliged to act on the defensive in the country which he now occupied.

In the meantime, Q. Metellus Pius,<sup>4</sup> who, in conjunction with Octavius, had unsuccessfully opposed Cinna and Marius in their attack upon Rome, and who, since their victory, had been living in one of the provinces in obscurity, now endeavoured to raise again the standard of the aristocratical party, and to obtain possession of the province of Africa. His attempt, however, was unfortunate: he was repulsed by C. Fabius the prætor; and from thence retired to Liguria, there to wait for a better opportunity of renewing the contest. The senate, though greatly overawed, was yet not entirely subservient to Carbo; for it is said that he was prevented by them from demanding hostages of all the towns and colonies of Italy,<sup>5</sup> as a security against their supporting Sylla. But in other points the interest of the popular leaders visibly prevailed. The right of voting was solemnly conferred, by a decree of the senate, on all newly-admitted citizens, of whom the late war had given birth to a considerable number; not consisting of the inhabitants of the states of Italy, but of enfranchised slaves or foreign soldiers, who had flocked to the standard of Cinna and Marius, and had contributed to their

Q. Metellus  
Pius  
supports the  
Aristocracy.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxxiv.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 26; Strabo, lib. i. p. 56, et lib. ix. p. 487, edit. Xyland.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 26.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxxiv.; Appian, c. 80.

<sup>5</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxxiv.

B.C. 85. triumph. These had not only the right of voting now given to them,<sup>1</sup> (whereas before they only enjoyed the personal liberties of Roman citizens,) but they were, moreover, allowed to be enrolled indiscriminately in all the tribes; that important point which, in the case of the Italians, had been so warmly contested, and which, in fact, had furnished Cinna with his first pretext for disturbing the public peace. In addition to these acts, a decree of the senate was also passed, commanding all military officers, in every part of the empire, to disband their forces. That Sylla should obey this order was scarcely to be expected; but Carbo probably hoped, by its apparent fairness, to throw upon him the odium of being the chief obstacle to peace, and of disobeying that body whose authority he professed to respect so highly.

Consulship of  
Scipio and  
Norbanus.

B.C. 84.

The year of Carbo's consulship now drew to an end, and as he could not, or would not procure his own re-appointment, two new consuls were chosen, C. Norbanus and L. Cornelius Scipio. We are not informed what circumstances could have connected the latter, a member of one of the noblest families in Rome, with the party of Carbo; or whether indeed he may not have been chosen by the most moderate citizens, as a man who might temper the violences of the times: and have been tolerated by the popular party on account of his want of the vigour and ability which might have made him dangerous to them. But C. Norbanus was a consul such as Carbo might have most desired. We have already noticed his seditious tribuneship, during which, at his instigation, a riot broke out at the trial of Q. Cæpio, and the condemnation of the prisoner was procured by actual force. For this crime he was accused by P. Sulpicius,<sup>2</sup> who was destined, at no remote period, to tread in his footsteps: he was defended by M. Antonius, whose murder, some years afterwards, might have been justified by the very arguments which he himself, on this occasion, taught the people to approve. It was against these consuls that Sylla now led his army from Greece. All his preparations were completed, his health was fully re-established, and the devotion of his troops had been just proved, by their taking an oath to abide by him when they should be landed in Italy,<sup>3</sup> and by their offering to raise, among themselves, a supply of money for his use. With soldiers so attached to him, and inured as they were to war, his force was far stronger than the proportion of his numbers seemed to promise; and though it is said that he landed in Italy with no more than forty thousand men,<sup>4</sup> while more than two hundred thousand were in arms against him, he might yet fairly calculate on meeting his enemies with at least an equal chance of victory.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, *Epitom. lib. lxxxiv.*

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in *Sylla*, c. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, *de Oratore*, lib. ii. c. 49.

<sup>4</sup> Vell. Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 48; Appian c. 79.

The expedition set sail from Patræ, in Achæa,<sup>1</sup> and arrived in safety at Brundisium. The inhabitants of that town received Sylla without opposition, and he immediately began to move forwards. On his march through Calabria and Apulia,<sup>2</sup> his army observed the strictest discipline; and his conduct thus confirmed his professions, that he was ever ready to listen to fair conditions of peace. It is said, that he sent deputies to the camp of Norbanus, to propose a negotiation,<sup>3</sup> and that it was not till they had been insulted and outraged, that he commenced his military operations. He fell upon Norbanus, who was encamped in the neighbourhood of Capua, and defeated him with considerable loss. Over the other consul, L. Scipio, he obtained a still more decisive advantage. With him, too, he offered to treat, and commissioners from the two armies actually met to deliberate on the terms to be agreed upon.<sup>4</sup> Of the particulars which followed, contradictory accounts are given by different writers, none of whom are of sufficient authority to be confidently followed. The result, however, admits of no dispute; the soldiers of the consular army were corrupted by those of Sylla,<sup>5</sup> and, at last, leaving L. Scipio and his son alone in the general's tent, they went over in a body to the enemy. Sylla then attempted to open a communication with the army of Norbanus; but finding that his design was suspected, and that no answer was returned to his proposals, he continued to advance towards Rome, and then, for the first time, began to lay waste the country through which he passed. He was not, however, yet in a condition to approach the capital; where Carbo's influence prevailed so far as to procure a decree of the people,<sup>6</sup> declaring all those who had joined Sylla to be public enemies. This denunciation was not issued on light grounds; for the nobility were flocking, on all sides, to the camp of the invader; and Q. Metellus had joined him with such troops as still adhered to him, and was zealously co-operating with him in the conduct of the war.

B.C. 84.  
Sylla lands  
in Italy.

It was at this time that Cn. Pompeius, the son of the late pro-consul of that name, first made his appearance as a public character. After the death of his father, and the establishment of Cinna's power at Rome, he had retired into Picenum,<sup>7</sup> where he possessed some property, and where his father's memory, hated as it was by the Romans, was regarded with respect and affection. To account for this, we must suppose, that during the long period of his military command in that neighbourhood, he had prevented his soldiers from being burdensome to the people, and had found means of obliging

Is joined by  
Pompey.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 79.

<sup>2</sup> Paterculus, c. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxxv.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, Philippic. 12, c. 11.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 28; Appian, c. 85; Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxxv.

<sup>6</sup> Appian, c. 86.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, c. 6; Patercul. c. 53; Appian, c. 80.

B.C. 84. or gratifying some of the principal inhabitants. Be this as it may, his son possessed so much influence in Picenum, partly hereditary and partly personal, that he prevailed on the people to drive away the officers sent among them by Carbo to enlist soldiers for the support of his cause; and succeeded himself in raising an army of three legions, or about sixteen or seventeen thousand men. With this force, having obtained also the necessary supplies for its maintenance from the zeal of the Picentes, he set out to join Sylla. He was at this time only twenty-three years of age, and had never filled any office in the state; but his appearance at the head of an army so collected, announced him as a young man of more than ordinary promise; and Sylla, as we are told, received him with the most flattering marks of distinction.

Whilst both parties were endeavouring to strengthen their forces, the season for action gradually passed away, and the armies mutually went into winter quarters. So imperfect are our accounts of this famous war, that we cannot tell how far Sylla had penetrated, nor what positions were occupied by him during the winter. His progress, however, had been such as to fill his antagonists with alarm: Carbo, therefore, caused himself to be appointed consul for the following year,<sup>1</sup> and selected, as his colleague, C. Marius the younger, the nephew and adopted son of the famous Marius, and who already, at the early age of twenty, seemed to have inherited all his father's wickedness.

Consulship  
of Carbo  
and the  
Younger  
Marius.

The winter was long and severe, and detained the armies on both sides for a considerable time in a state of inaction. Carbo meanwhile chose Cisalpine Gaul as his province,<sup>2</sup> and thus reserved the country to the north of Rome for the scene of his operations; while Marius lay between the capital and the main army of Sylla, on the confines perhaps of Latium and Campania. It was about this time that Sylla, to quiet the suspicions of the Italian allies,<sup>3</sup> who were afraid that he would rescind the concessions made to them during the ascendancy of Cinna, issued a declaration that he would respect all the privileges which they actually enjoyed; and on these terms concluded, as we are told, a treaty with them. But whether the Samnites were not among those to whom his promise extended, or whether they distrusted his sincerity, and thought they might do better by adhering to their old cause, it is plain that they were amongst his most determined enemies, and, as we shall see presently, did more than any of their confederates to render his victory doubtful. On the part of Sylla, Q. Metellus was opposed to Carbo on the side of Tuscany,<sup>4</sup> and after having gained an advantage over one of his lieutenants, was so hard pressed by the consul himself, that Cn.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxxvi.; Appian, c. 87.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, lib. i. c. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxxvi.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, c. 87; Plutarch, in Pompeio, c. 8.

Pompeius, or as his celebrity has caused his name to be Anglicized, B.C. 84. Pompey, was sent to support him; and these two commanders together kept the fortune of the war in suspense. To the south of Rome, Sylla first took the town of Setia;<sup>1</sup> and Marius retreating before him in the direction of Præneste, halted at a place called Sacriportum, situated apparently between Præneste and Setia, and there drew out his army in order of battle. Sylla instantly proceeded to attack him, encouraged, as it is said, by a dream,<sup>2</sup> which had visited him in the preceding night, and which had named the ensuing day as fatal to the family of Marius. The enemy had broken up the roads, and raised such obstacles to his march, that his soldiers, in their exertions to remove them, were worn down with fatigue, and many of them threw themselves on the ground, with their heads resting on their shields, to seek relief in sleep. It was in vain to persist in forcing them to action under these circumstances: and Sylla, however reluctant to contradict his dream, issued the order to halt, and to begin the usual works for the formation of a camp. But whilst his men were busied in digging the trench, the enemy's cavalry rode up, and began to annoy them; till, irritated into an entire forgetfulness of their fatigues, they at once left their work, and rushed on sword in hand to revenge the insults that had been offered to them. Their vehemence, however, might have proved fatal to themselves, had the soldiers of Marius done their duty: but on the first impression made by the assailants on the adverse line, five cohorts of infantry and two troops of cavalry deserted their standards,<sup>3</sup> and joined the hostile army; and this act of treachery presently decided the fate of the battle. The whole Marian army fled, and was pursued with great slaughter: the fugitives sought a shelter in Præneste; but the victors followed them so closely, that it became necessary to shut the gates in haste, and to exclude the greatest number of them, and even Marius himself was drawn up by ropes thrown down to him from the top of the wall.<sup>4</sup> Thus exposed to the swords of their conquerors, twenty thousand of them were said by Sylla, to have been slain, and eight thousand made prisoners;<sup>5</sup> while he acknowledged on his own side no greater loss than that of twenty-three men.

It was only a short time before the battle of Sacriportum, that the heads of the popular party added their last and most horrible act to the numerous provocations, which were soon to be so mercilessly repaid. At the commencement of the campaign, Marius had fixed on Præneste as the pivot of operations,<sup>6</sup> and as the intended refuge and bulwark of his partisans, in case they should be defeated in the field. The situation of the town was naturally strong,

Sylla takes Setia.

Battle of Sacriportum, in which Marius the Younger is defeated by Sylla.

B.C. 82.

Massacre committed at Rome by order of the Younger Marius.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 87.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 87.

<sup>5</sup> As quoted by Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 28.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Paternulus, c. 50.



B.C. 82. as it was built on the side of a projecting eminence,<sup>1</sup> connected only by one narrow ridge with that chain of hills, which rise immediately from the Campagna or great plain of Rome, at the distance of about twenty miles from the capital. Standing on the edge of this plain,



[Remains of Præneste.]

Præneste is a conspicuous object from the walls of the eternal city ; and a strong army occupying this position, might greatly impede or endanger the approach of an enemy towards the capital from the side of Campania. Marius, therefore, had strengthened the place to the utmost, by the assistance of art ; and had carried thither the treasure of all the temples in Rome,<sup>2</sup> to be converted into money for the payment of his soldiers. But the advance of Sylla still gave him considerable alarm ; and fearing that the aristocratical party in the capital might yet be able to exert itself with effect, should Sylla continue his progress, he sent instructions to L. Damasippus,<sup>3</sup> at that time prætor, to assemble the senate in the Curia Hostilia. When the members were met together, the avenues leading to the spot were secured by armed men, and the individuals most obnoxious to the popular leaders were then marked out to be massacred. Publius Antistius, the father-in-law of Pompey,<sup>4</sup> and C. Papirius Carbo, a relation of the consul, and the son of that Carbo who had shared in the proceedings of the Gracchi,<sup>5</sup> were murdered in the senate-house. L. Domitius was killed in endeavouring to escape ; of him little else is known, but that his name and noble family were likely to render him an object of suspicion to the enemies of the aristocracy. But the most distinguished victim was Q. Mucius Scævola, the Pontifex Maximus ; who had earned the purest and the rarest glory of any of his contemporaries, by his virtuous administration of his province of

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, lib. v. p. 261.


<sup>2</sup> Pliny, Hist. Nat. lib. xxxiii. c. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, Epitom. lib. lxxxvi. ; Patercul. c. 50.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, c. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. ix. epist. 21. de Claris Orator. c. 60.

Asia. Having brought home with him a character of spotless B.C. 82. integrity and benevolence, he stained it by no subsequent acts of infamy; his name is charged with no participation in the crimes of either party; but he continued to reside at Rome, and to make himself generally useful to all who asked his advice, by his unrivalled knowledge of the civil law. Though bound by birth, and station, and connections, to the cause of the aristocracy, and although the attempt made on his life by Fimbria, at the funeral of the elder Marius, might have warned him of the danger to which his virtues exposed him under the sway of the most profligate of mankind, he yet had refused to quit Rome, or to choose any part in the civil war, declaring that he would rather die than take up arms against his countrymen. Marius, however, was bent upon his destruction; and the soldiers of Damasippus advancing to murder him, he fled to the temple of Vesta,<sup>1</sup> and was overtaken and



[Haedes Vestae.—Temple of Vesta.]

butchered even within the sacred ground. His body, together with those of Domitius, Carbo, and Antistius, was thrown into the Tiber; and by this murder of the most virtuous of citizens, it was hoped that the ascendancy of the Marii, the Carbones, and the Norbani might yet be maintained.

But the issue of the battle of Sacripotum rendered this massacre as fruitless as it was detestable. Marius, the author of it, was now

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. de Naturâ Deorum, lib. iii. c. 32.

B.C. 82.  
Sylla  
recovers  
Rome, and  
obliges  
Carbo and  
Norbanus to  
fly from  
Italy.

blocked up in Præneste; and the road to the capital being left open, Sylla advanced towards it with one part of his army, while the other part, under the command of Lucretius Ofella,<sup>1</sup> was pressing the siege of Præneste. Rome received her new master without a struggle; and he who had so lately been regarded as an outlawed rebel, being now in possession of the seat of government, was in a condition to retort the charge of rebellion on his antagonists. He immediately ordered their property to be confiscated; and having then left the city to the care of some of his partisans, he again took the field, and hastened to Clusium in order to superintend the operations of the war in Tuscany and the north of Italy.<sup>2</sup> His arms were attended with equal success in every quarter: his lieutenants, Metellus Pius, Pompey, M. Crassus, M. Lucullus, and others, signalized themselves by several victories over Carbo and his adherents; and in proportion as the Marian party seemed declining, it suffered more and more from the treachery of its own members. Not only did the common soldiers often desert in large bodies to the enemy, but Albinovanus,<sup>3</sup> an officer of considerable rank, purchased his pardon from Sylla, by contriving the assassination of several of his colleagues in command; and Verres, on whom the eloquence of Cicero has bestowed such an infamous celebrity, and who was at this time quæstor in Carbo's army, abandoned his general,<sup>4</sup> and carried off with him a considerable portion of the money committed to his charge for the maintenance of the consul's forces. Attempts had been made in vain to raise the blockade of Præneste: and in this state of their affairs, Norbanus, being left almost alone at Ariminum by the desertion of his troops,<sup>5</sup> escaped by sea to Rhodes; while Carbo gave up the command of the army which he still possessed in Tuscany, and withdrew with some of his friends into Africa, hoping there to be able to renew the contest, and to obtain the assistance of Hiabas the king of Mauritania.

The  
Samnites,  
with the  
remains of  
of the  
Marian  
party, attack  
Rome.

At this late period of the war, when the victory of the aristocratic party seemed decided, one desperate effort was made to wrest it from them, which had well nigh altered the history of the world. The Samnites and Lucanians, alone of all the people of Italy, had not forgotten their own national grounds of hostility towards the Roman government; and whilst they supported the party of Marius against Sylla, they intended to make their assistance subservient to their own views, rather than to sink into the mere adherents of one of the factions of Rome. During the advance of Sylla, their armies rested securely amid their own mountains, and had seen the defeat of Marius at Sacriportum, and the blockade of the remnant of his forces in Præneste, without exerting their main strength in his behalf. Possibly they beheld without regret every field of battle

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 88.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. c. 89.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 91.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, lib. i. c. 13, *et seq.*

<sup>5</sup> Appian, c. 91, 92; Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxxiii.

covered with Roman dead; and may have rejoiced in the hope, that, when both parties were exhausted by mutual slaughter, they might themselves arise to wrest from their weakened hands the prize for which they were contending. But now, when the rapid victories of Sylla threatened them with a speedy termination of the civil war, their generals, Pontius Telesinus and M. Lamponius, saw that it was necessary for them to take a decisive part; and before Carbo and Norbanus had left Italy, the Samnites and Lucanians had endeavoured to relieve Præneste,<sup>1</sup> but were unable to force the strong positions occupied by the blockading army. Still they lingered in the neighbourhood, hoping that some opportunity might arise to facilitate the execution of their object. Meantime Carbo had retired to Africa, and the army which he had forsaken had sustained a bloody defeat at Clusium from Pompey; so that the remaining generals of the popular party, Carinas, Marcius, and L. Damasippus, the agent in the late massacre at Rome, resolved as their last hope, to effect a junction with the Samnites and Lucanians, and then to attempt once more to deliver Marius and his garrison. The armies were united, and the attempt was made, but still in vain; when the confederate generals conceived the plan of falling suddenly upon Rome, which they thought to find stripped of troops, and utterly unprovided with means to withstand their assault. At this very time they were threatened at once by two armies, that of Sylla on one side, and that of Pompey on the other; yet hoping to win the capital before their purpose could be discovered, they broke up from their camp in the night, hastened towards Rome, and halted till morning<sup>2</sup> at the distance of little more than a mile from the Colline gate. Day dawned, and discovered to the Romans the unlooked for sight of the Samnite and Lucanian army. Some parties of cavalry, consisting of the flower of the youth of the city, immediately sallied to observe and to check the enemy; but they were routed and driven back within their walls with severe loss. The panic then rose to the greatest height, when L. Balbus arrived with an advanced guard of seven hundred cavalry from Sylla's army; and hardly allowing his horses a moment's respite, he led them at once into action. Sylla himself followed soon after; he was well aware of the urgency of the danger, and had hurried with the utmost speed in pursuit of the Samnites, as soon as he learnt their object. His men were greatly fatigued, and his officers pressed him to postpone the action, for it was now late in the afternoon of a November day; but he refused to listen to them, and having ordered his men to eat their dinners as fast as they arrived from their march, he sent them to engage the enemy successively. Telesinus, on his part, forgetting his character as a partisan of Marius, and feeling only as Samnite general, rode

Battle at the  
Colline gate.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 90, 92.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch in Syllâ, c. 29.

B.C. 82. along the ranks repeatedly exclaiming,<sup>1</sup> that this was the last day of the Roman empire; and calling to his soldiers to pull down, to destroy the city, for that those wolves, who had so long ravaged Italy, could only be extirpated by rooting up the wood which used to shelter them. At length M. Crassus, who commanded the right wing of Sylla's army, routed the left of the enemy,<sup>2</sup> and pursued them as far as Antemnæ; but the wing which was led by Sylla in person, in spite of all the efforts of its general, was driven back under the walls of Rome, and was pursued even to the gates of the city. The gates were hastily closed to prevent the Samnites from entering together with the fugitives; and the Romans, thus obliged to defend themselves, continued the action till some time after it was dark, although with little hope of resisting effectually. Nay, so great was the general panic, that some of Sylla's soldiers flying from the field arrived at the lines before Præneste, and urged Lucretius Ofella, who commanded the blockading army, to raise the siege, and hasten to the rescue of his general and his country. Night at last stopped the engagement, and the Romans believed themselves completely defeated; when, about an hour after the close of the action, an officer arrived from M. Crassus, with the tidings of his success, and requiring supplies of provisions to be sent to him at Antemnæ. It then appeared that the enemy's loss had been even greater than that of Sylla; and the morning displayed more fully the real issue of the contest. Telesinus had fallen, and his soldiers, discouraged by his death and by the terrible slaughter of the battle, had abandoned the field, and had begun to retreat in all directions. Sylla then, to lose no time in improving his victory, set out at an early hour, and immediately joined Crassus at Antemnæ.

Victory of  
Sylla, at the  
Porta  
Collina,  
Nov. 1.

Sylla  
commences  
his  
massacres.

The Roman writers, whose accounts of these times remain to us, after following Sylla thus far in his career, and sympathizing in his victories over the popular party, all concur in turning away with unmingled abhorrence from his conduct after the decision of the struggle. One act of cruelty indeed follows another so rapidly in this part of his life, that a complete picture of his character cannot be drawn without satiating the reader with details of spoliation, and outrage, and massacre. On his arrival at Antemnæ, three thousand of the enemy sent to implore his mercy,<sup>3</sup> which he promised them, if they would deserve it by helping him to execute vengeance on their associates. Thus encouraged, they fell upon another party of fugitives from their own army, and began to cut them to pieces; and then surrendered themselves to Sylla, to receive his promised pardon. But they, with all the other prisoners taken after the battle, amounting together to eight thousand men, were conveyed to Rome, and orders were issued by Sylla that they should all be

The  
Samnite  
Prisoners  
Murdered.

<sup>1</sup> Velleius Paterculus, c. 51.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 29, 30.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 30.

put to the sword. The men thus doomed to be slaughtered were not the instruments of former massacres and proscriptions, wretches whose punishment, however shocking, might yet have worn the appearance of an awful retribution; but they were mostly Samnite soldiers,<sup>1</sup> who had fought fairly against the Romans in the field, and who were now to be sacrificed to the same atrocious policy which, in former times, had murdered their heroic countryman, C. Pontius; which had driven Hannibal, in old age and exile, to end his life by suicide; which had exercised every extremity of unmanly cruelty against the brave citizens of Numantia, and against the rival people of Carthage. In the meantime, while the massacre was perpetrating, Sylla, having returned to Rome, had assembled the senate in the temple of Bellona,<sup>2</sup> and was beginning to address the members upon the state of the republic. The cries of his victims mingled with his first words, and the senators started with horror at the sound; but he, with an unmoved countenance, desired them to listen to him, and not to concern themselves with what was passing elsewhere; what they heard was the correction bestowed by his orders on a few disturbers of the public peace. On the following day, Marcus and Carinas, two of the Roman officers who had joined the Samnite army previously to their attack on Rome, were taken in their flight, and being brought before Sylla, were by his orders put to death, and their heads, with the head of Telesinus, were sent to Lucretius Ofella before Præneste,<sup>3</sup> with directions that they should be carried around the walls of the town, to inform the besieged of the fate of their expected deliverers.

One signal act of justice was performed by Sylla at this time,

<sup>1</sup> Ferguson has ventured to describe those who were thus murdered, as "six or eight thousand of those who were supposed to have been the busiest instruments of the late usurpations and murders," who had been "taken prisoners in the war, or surprised in the city." It is not easy to say where Ferguson found his authority for this statement, as he appeals to no ancient writer to justify it; but it is a most blameable misrepresentation, to use the lightest term, as far as it labours to give a colour of retributive justice to a massacre dictated by mere policy and national hatred. In particular the words, "or surprised in the city," are inserted especially to palliate Sylla's conduct, in complete opposition to the truth. That the men who were murdered were soldiers, taken in battle, is the concurrent account of every writer whom we have been able to consult; and as it is a point of some importance, the references, by which any reader, who has means and inclination, may satisfy himself, are here subjoined.

Livv, *Epitome*, lib. lxxxviii.; *Auctor de Viris illustribus*, in Syllâ; Florus, lib. iii. c. 21; Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 2; Seneca, *de Beneficiis*, lib. v. c. 16.

All these writers agree in the fact, that the men who were massacred were soldiers, and soldiers who had surrendered themselves to the conqueror. Seneca's words are as follows: "Legiones duas, quod crudele est, post victoriam; quod nefas, post fidem, in angulum congestas contrucidavit."

In addition to these testimonies, Strabo declares that the victims were mostly Samnites, lib. v. p. 271. edit. Xyland, and Appian agrees with him, lib. i. c. 93, as does also Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 29, 30.

<sup>2</sup> Seneca, *de Clementiâ*, lib. i. c. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 93; Paterculus, c. 51.

B.C. 82.

which was received with general satisfaction. L. Damasippus,<sup>1</sup> the murderer of Mucius Scævola, had been taken after the late battle, and was instantly put to death. So great, indeed, were the crimes with which the chiefs of the Marian party were loaded, that men became reconciled to executions from the pleasure with which they regarded the fate of these flagrant offenders. But they soon were taught, that the wickedness of the sufferer ought never to lessen our hatred of bloody and illegal acts of vengeance. Numerous victims were every day murdered; some by Sylla's own order; but many more were sacrificed to the rapaciousness or personal enmities of his adherents,<sup>2</sup> whose excesses he took no pains to suppress. At last he was entreated to relieve the commonwealth from its present state of suspense, by assuring of their pardon those whom he did not intend to destroy; but one of his own retainers gave a different turn to this request,<sup>3</sup> by asking him only to name those whom he had marked out for punishment. Sylla answered, that he would do so; and immediately published his first list of proscriptions, containing the names of eighty individuals who were to be put to death; to this, on the following day, he added two hundred and twenty names more; and again, on the third day, the fatal list was increased by an equal number. "These," said Sylla to the people, "are all that I can at present remember; if I recollect any others who must be punished, I will proscribe their names hereafter." It soon appeared that he had good reason to stipulate thus for the further gratification of his vengeance. In proportion as he extended his massacres, reasons would arise for perpetually adding new victims to the catalogue of the proscribed; and the more he became deserving of a future retaliation upon himself and his party, the more anxious was he to rid himself of every person who might be likely to assist in effecting it. But it was the most dreadful part of this proscription that, by establishing the reign of wild and unbridled violence, and by trampling under foot not only the laws of the commonwealth, but even the most lax of all the restraints which men under a low system of morals still imposed on themselves, it emboldened every meaner criminal to participate in the license of which the present master of the republic set so large an example. The meanest office, in ordinary times, is obtained from a government, by its retainers, with less ease, than Sylla's followers could gain from their leader the gift of innocent blood. It is mentioned that one Q. Aurelius,<sup>4</sup> an inoffensive individual, who had never mingled in political quarrels, stopped one day in the Forum to read the list of the proscribed, and found his own name among the number. "Wretch that I am," he exclaimed, "my Alban villa is my death;" and

The  
Proscription-  
lists are  
published by  
Sylla.

Murder of Q.  
Aurelius.

<sup>1</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 51.<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in *Sylla*, c. 31; Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 51.<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, in *Sylla*, c. 31.<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

before he had gone far from the spot, he was followed, overtaken, B.C. 82. and murdered. Nor were these scenes confined to the neighbourhood of Rome, but extended over the whole of Italy. All who had rendered any assistance to the Marian party,<sup>1</sup> who had carried arms in their cause, or had supplied them with money; nay, those who had held any communication, even in the commonest civilities of life, with the enemies of Sylla, were exposed to the vengeance of the conquerors. It is natural to suppose, that subordinate officers, commanding in remote provinces, would exceed the wishes of their chief, and would gratify their cupidity or their cruelty with less scruple. We are told that M. Crassus,<sup>2</sup> who was employed in Bruttium, proscribed a wealthy individual, without Sylla's orders, in order to get possession of his fortune; and that Sylla, being informed of the fact, would never afterwards commit to Crassus any post of importance. But if this be so, Crassus might fairly complain of his ill fortune, for he had done no more than was practised by almost every one in similar circumstances; and these super-numerary crimes heightened still more the horrors of the original proscription. Murders, it is said, were sometimes perpetrated even in the presence of Sylla himself,<sup>3</sup> when some of the victims, condemned by his proscription, endeavoured to save themselves by a direct appeal to his mercy, and were slain in his sight by their pursuers, who never found any interruption to their work from any touch of compunction in his nature. His doors were beset with the executioners of his orders, who flocked thither with the heads of those whom they had murdered, to claim from him the promised reward: and it is said, that this sight so awakened the indignation of M. Cato,<sup>4</sup> who, being then a boy, was taken, by his tutor, to visit Sylla, that he could not forbear asking for a sword, with which he might himself despatch the tyrant. Yet, on one memorable occasion, the remorseless nature of Sylla listened to the intercession of his friends, and spared a man, whom, if he could have looked into futurity, he would, above all others, have desired to destroy. C. Julius Cæsar,<sup>5</sup> then quite a young man, had married the daughter of Cinna, and, during the ascendancy of his father-in-law, had been designed to fill the office of Flamen of Jupiter. He was further connected with the popular party through the marriage of Julia, his father's sister, with the elder Marius; yet, although thus doubly obnoxious to the victorious party, he refused to comply with the commands of Sylla to divorce his wife; and being exposed, in consequence, to his resentment, he fled from Rome, and baffled all attempts upon his life, partly by concealing himself, and partly by bribing the officer sent to kill him, till Sylla was prevailed upon, according to Suetonius, to

Indignation  
of M. Cato.

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 96.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Crasso, c. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Appian. c. 95.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, c. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Suetonius, in C. J. Cæsar, c. 1.



B.C. 82. spare him at the entreaty of some common friends. A story was afterwards common, that Sylla did not pardon him without great reluctance; and that he told those who sued in his behalf, that in Cæsar there were many Mariuses. Had he indeed thought so, his was not a temper to have yielded to any supplications to save him; nor would any considerations have induced him to exempt from destruction one from whom he had apprehended so great a danger.

Surrender of Præneste, death of the younger Marius, and massacre of the Prænestines.

Soon after the defeat of the Samnites before Rome, the garrison of Præneste surrendered. Marius attempted to escape from the town by a subterranean passage, communicating with the open country;<sup>1</sup> but his flight was intercepted, and he fell, either by the hands of the enemy's soldiers, or, according to the more common account, by the sword of his own slave, whom he requested to perform this last service. His head was brought to Rome, and presented to Sylla, who ordered it to be exposed in front of the rostra in the forum; and as if his triumph were now complete, he assumed to himself, from henceforward, the title of *Felix*, or the Fortunate. He might have justly claimed this title, says Paterculus, if his life had not been prolonged beyond the hour which thus crowned his victory. Immediately on the surrender of Præneste, Lucretius Ofella put to death several senators whom he found in the town,<sup>2</sup> and detained others in custody, to wait Sylla's decision on their fate. Sylla soon arrived, and having first ordered the execution of all whom Ofella had arrested, and selected from the whole number of his prisoners, some few whom he thought deserving of mercy, he divided all the rest into three parties, one consisting of Romans, another of Samnites, and a third of the citizens of Præneste. To the first he said, that though they deserved death, he nevertheless gave them their lives; but the other two divisions were indiscriminately massacred, to the number, as is said, of twelve thousand persons. The women and children were then dismissed, with what prospect of future provision we know not; and the town was given up to plunder. In like manner the towns of Spoletum, Interamna, Fluentia, Sulmo, Norba, Arretium, and Ariminum were plundered,<sup>3</sup> and deprived of their privileges, and their inhabitants were either sold for slaves or massacred. But the Samnites felt the heaviest weight of the conqueror's vengeance: for not satisfied with the slaughter of so many thousands of them in cold blood, both at Rome and at Præneste, he seemed bent on the utter extirpation of the whole people; and his subsequent proscriptions destroyed or compelled to emigrate so large a proportion of them, that in Strabo's time the ancient cities of Samnium had either been reduced entirely to ruins,<sup>4</sup> or were dwindled to the rank of mere villages.

<sup>1</sup> Paterculus, c. 51; Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxxviii.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, c. 94.

<sup>3</sup> Florus, lib. iii. c. 21; Appian, c. 94; Cicero, in Verrem, lib. i. c. 14, pro Cæcinâ, c. 33.

<sup>4</sup> Strabo, lib. v. p. 272.

Italy had been filled with murders and devastations from one end to the other, while the author of them was as yet uninvested with any legal authority. His partisans, however, were everywhere inflicting as summary vengeance upon his enemies, as if he had been the lawful sovereign of Rome. C. Norbanus, who had fled to Rhodes,<sup>1</sup> finding that he was proscribed, and fearing that he might be arrested by Sylla's order, even in this remote exile, killed himself. Carbo, after having abandoned Italy, had fled first to Africa;<sup>2</sup> but hearing that some attempts were making to rally his party in Sicily, he crossed over to that island, leaving the command in Africa to Cn. Domitius. But his hopes were blasted by the arrival of Pompey, who, having been despatched to Sicily by an order of the senate, soon crushed the beginnings of resistance there, and obliged Carbo again to fly to the neighbouring island of Cossura. He was pursued, however, and taken, and brought as a prisoner to Lilybæum, where Pompey then was. It is said that his treatment was that of a common criminal; that he was brought before the tribunal where Pompey sat as judge, and, after undergoing a short examination, was ordered away to immediate execution. By his death, added to that of Marius, the republic was left without consuls; and the senate accordingly appointed L. Valerius Flaccus to be interrex,<sup>3</sup> that he might hold the Comitia for the elections of the ensuing year. But the interrex, having received instructions from Sylla, instead of proceeding to the election of consuls, moved, that the office of dictator, which had been disused almost since the time of Q. Fabius Maximus, should now be revived, and intrusted to the hands of Sylla; proposing besides, that it should be given him for an unlimited period, till he should have restored the affairs of the commonwealth to a state of tranquillity and security. Nor was L. Flaccus contented with investing Sylla with absolute power for the future; but he proposed further, that all his acts up to the present time should be ratified;<sup>4</sup> thus giving the sanction of law to all his proscriptions and confiscations. The senate and people, however, felt that resistance was hopeless, and agreeing to both the proposed laws, Sylla was named dictator, and L. Flaccus was by him appointed his master of the horse. Having thus secured all real power to himself, Sylla was still willing that the year should be marked as usual by the names of two consuls; and, accordingly, M. Tullius Decula and Cn. Cornelius Dolabella were selected to wear the titles of the consular office.

In this manner the liberties of Rome were surrendered into the hands of a man, whose utter contempt of his fellow-creatures seemed to promise a dreadful exercise of that absolute power with which he was now in some sort legally invested. His dominion however did

B.C. 82.  
Deaths of  
Carbo and  
Norbanus.

Sylla is  
appointed  
perpetual  
Dictator.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxxix.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, lib. i. c. 95, 96; Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxxix; Plutarch, in Pompeio, c. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 98.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, de Lege Agrariâ, iii. c. 2.

B.C. 82. not extend over the whole space of the Roman empire. In Asia, the war with Mithridates, which had been imperfectly smothered by the treaty concluded just before Sylla's arrival in Italy, was now again breaking out; and in Africa the native force of Mauritania, always destined to assist the unsuccessful party in the civil wars of Rome, was supporting C. Domitius, and the last remains of the Marian fugitives from Italy, and was preparing to resist the arms of Pompey, to whom the task of establishing Sylla's authority was intrusted. But the most formidable enemy of the new government was to be found in Spain. Thither Q. Sertorius had retired after the first successes of Sylla over the consuls Scipio and Norbanus; and there he had organised a force, insignificant indeed at present, in its actual strength, but which became, by the extraordinary abilities of its general, an invincible obstacle for many years to the complete triumph of the aristocratical party. In Italy, however, the power of the dictator was undisputed: there a series of battles, massacres, and proscriptions, had almost annihilated the popular cause; and the commonwealth lay subdued and exhausted, incapable of resisting any remedies which Sylla might think proper to administer, in order to correct the evils from which it had suffered, and to infuse into it a principle of future health and vigour.

Laws of  
Sylla.

It is a most certain truth, that the leader of a victorious faction can never safely be intrusted with the task of reforming that which is faulty in the constitution of his country, and least of all when he has committed acts so violent as those of Sylla, in humbling the party of his opponents. The eyes of the dictator were blind to all grievances, except those under which the interests of his own friends had suffered: while he attributed all the disorders of the commonwealth to the turbulence and inordinate authority of the popular assembly and the tribunes. The great object of his measures, accordingly, was to strengthen the senate and the aristocracy, and to weaken the democratical part of the constitution. For this purpose he transferred the judicial power, which had been so often the subject of dispute,<sup>1</sup> from the hands of the equestrian order to the senate. He deprived the tribunes of the right of proposing laws,<sup>2</sup> and made it illegal for any one who had filled the office of tribune to be afterwards elected to any other magistracy. He increased the number of the pontifices and augurs,<sup>3</sup> and, repealing the law of Domitius, which had left the appointment of them to the people, he restored to them their ancient right of filling up the vacancies in their own body. He selected the most distinguished individuals of the

<sup>1</sup> Vell. Patercul. lib. ii.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxxix.; Appian. de Bell. Civili, lib. i. c. 100; Cæsar, de Bell. Civili, lib. i. c. 4, 6; Cicero, de Legibus, lib. iii. c. 9; Lepidi Oratio, Sallust.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxxix.; Cicero, Agrar. cont. Rull. ii. c. 7; Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvii. p. 46; edit. Leunclær.

equestrian order to recruit the numbers of the senate,<sup>1</sup> which had been greatly thinned by the civil wars and proscriptions; and he pretended to subject the persons, whom he thus named, to the approval or rejection of the assembly of the tribes. Added to these were a great variety of statutes, some amending and strengthening the code of criminal laws, others providing for the better administration of the provinces, and others again tending to promote the general regularity and security of the government. In these points, where the interest of the republic did not interfere with any personal or party views of the legislator, his wisdom and experience suggested to him regulations which were really excellent. Of his criminal laws, one was directed against forgeries of wills or any other instruments,<sup>2</sup> and against coining or adulterating money; and its object was partly, perhaps, to determine more carefully the penalty for such offences, and also, in the case of forgeries, to render them public crimes, for which any individual might lawfully prosecute. Another law, or rather another clause of the same law, denounced punishment against murders,<sup>3</sup> whether committed by poison or by actual violence; and a third clause rendered it criminal in any magistrate or senator to have conspired or concurred in procuring the condemnation of a citizen in a court of justice.<sup>4</sup> When we find so many various provisions comprehended in one statute, and many of them relating to the first and most natural subjects of criminal legislation, we might be apt to wonder how such enactments could be needed when the commonwealth had subsisted nearly seven hundred years, and must have possessed sufficient laws on all such points for many generations before the time of Sylla. But it seems that in all half-civilized countries, and in governments which have often been disturbed by seditions and acts of violence, the time at which a law is considered obsolete commences early, and it soon ceases to regulate the proceedings of the courts of justice, unless it be sanctioned and renewed at certain intervals by the authority of a more recent statute. In this manner we know that Magna Charta was confirmed often after its first enactment in several successive reigns; and thus, after such violent convulsions as the republic had lately sustained, Sylla might deem it expedient to republish and confirm anew the existing laws, on all points which he considered of importance. With regard to the provinces, Sylla limited the expenses allowed by the provincial cities to their deputies,<sup>5</sup> whom they were in the habit of sending to Rome at the end of every year to pronounce a compliment before the senate on the conduct of their late governor. He ordered also that every officer should leave his

B.C. 82.  
Selects  
Senators  
from the  
Equites.

His criminal  
Laws.

Regulations  
for the  
Provinces.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxxvix.; Appian, lib. i. c. 100.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, lib. i. c. 42.

<sup>3</sup> Seneca, de Providentiâ, c. 3; Cicero, pro Cluentio, c. 54.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero, pro Cluentio, c. 54.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. ad Familiares, lib. iii. epist. x.

B.C. 82. province within thirty days after the arrival of his successor,<sup>1</sup> and for the better prevention of bribery, it was enacted, that if a magistrate, condemned for this crime,<sup>2</sup> should not have property sufficient to refund all that had been corruptly received, the deficiency might be recovered from any other person who had shared in his unjust gains, or to whom any portion of them had descended. The general security of the government was consulted in some provisions of the law of treason, which also derive their origin from Sylla. By these, all provincial governors were forbidden to lead an army out of their



[Roman Governor, with Consular Ornaments — *British Museum.*]

province,<sup>3</sup> to carry on any war by their own authority, or to enter any foreign country without the orders of the senate and people, to endeavour to tamper with the soldiers of any other general, or to set at liberty any of the enemies of the republic. The last of these, indeed, was an offence of which Sylla could not be accused; but he who had crossed over from his province into Italy, with his army, who had made war upon the existing government of his country,

<sup>5</sup> Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. iii. epist. vi. . <sup>6</sup> Ibid. pro Rabirio Postumo, c. 4.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, in Pisonem, c. 21, pro Cluentio, c. 35, in Verrem, lib. i. c. 5.

and who had seduced the soldiers of the consul Scipio to desert their leader, had good reason to fear lest his own example should in turn be employed to his own disadvantage, and wisely desired to prevent others from imitating that conduct by which he himself had acquired the dictatorship. B.C. 82.

Such are the principal measures by which the new sovereign of Rome proposed to reform the defects of the existing order of things. It now remains to notice the price which the people had to pay for the benefits of his government. The property of all those whom he had proscribed was declared to be forfeited to the state,<sup>1</sup> and was ordered to be publicly sold before the calends of June. All persons, even near relations, were forbidden to support or to assist any who had been proscribed; and the children of the proscribed were excluded during their lives from the enjoyment of any public office or magistracy. Nor was the forfeiture of property confined to those only whose names Sylla had actually inserted in the lists of proscription. A clause in his law *de proscriptis* was intended to provide for any omissions into which he might have fallen,<sup>2</sup> by including amongst those who were to be stripped of their fortunes, all who had at any time been killed in any of the ports, garrisons, or lines of the adversaries. Yet even this did not carry the evil to its full extent. Long after the proscription-lists had been closed,<sup>3</sup> and the war had been generally ended, Sextus Roscius, a wealthy citizen of the town of Ameria, in Umbria, who had attached himself to the party of Sylla, was assassinated in the streets of Rome; his property was sold, and was bought at a price far below its value by L. Chrysogonus, Sylla's freedman. A deputation was sent by the magistrates of Ameria to acquaint Sylla with the merits of the case, and to intercede for the son of the murdered Roscius, who was thus deprived of his inheritance. But Chrysogonus, by his entreaties and assurances that he would satisfy their wishes, prevailed with them not to lay the affair before the dictator; and he found also several persons among the nobility, whom he persuaded to join with him in the same request and the same promises. The promises, however, were never fulfilled; and the fortunes of Roscius were divided between an individual of his own name, who was suspected of having procured his murder, and Chrysogonus, who was bribed with a share of the plunder to contrive and maintain the forfeiture. It is not likely that Sylla was ever aware of the particulars of this transaction; but his indifference to the sufferings of his fellow-creatures, and his pride, which regarded mankind as unworthy of his notice, naturally emboldened his creatures to commit numberless crimes in his name; and the fortunes acquired by his freedmen and low dependents, as they added the

Situation  
of the  
Proscribed.

Murder of  
Sextus  
Roscius.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, pro Roscio Amerino, c. 43, in Verrem, lib. i. c. 47, in Pisonem, c. 2; Vell. Patercul. lib. ii. c. 53.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. pro Roscio Amerino, c. 43.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. pro Roscio Amerino, passim.

B.C. 82. severest pang to the sorrow and indignation of the people, so they are alone sufficient to show how little of real patriotism or love of justice was mingled with the pretended reforms of Sylla.

We are told by Appian that Sylla also passed a law,<sup>1</sup> by which all candidates for the prætorship were obliged previously to have gone through the office of quæstor; and no one could be elected consul without having before been prætor. To this it was added, that a certain interval must pass before a man who had filled one magistracy could be again elected to another; and he could not hold the same office a second time till after the expiration of ten years. But this law was dispensed with in favour of his own adherents; as we find that L. Lucullus was appointed ædile when absent from Rome, and immediately afterwards succeeded to the prætorship.<sup>2</sup> Possibly Sylla found it necessary to grant this indulgence to his own principal supporters; for in one instance he had at first seemed resolved, in a remarkable manner, to enforce the law without distinction. Lucretius Ofella, who had commanded at the siege of Præneste, offered himself as a candidate for the consulship,<sup>3</sup> without having been either prætor or quæstor. Sylla commanded him to desist, and on his still continuing his canvass, ordered him to be slain by a centurion in the middle of the forum. The multitude instantly seized the centurion, and expressed great indignation at the outrage; but Sylla summoning the people before him, told them that Ofella had been put to death by his orders, and that the centurion must be released. Appian reports that he addressed the assembly on this occasion in a style characteristic of his deep contempt for those whom he governed. "A labourer, when at plough," said he, "was annoyed by vermin; and he twice stopped from his work, and picked them off his jacket. But finding himself bitten again, to spare himself any further trouble, he threw the jacket into the fire. Now I advise those whom I have twice conquered, not to oblige me the third time to try the fire." It was natural, however, that his chief officers should remonstrate strongly against such a precedent as the death of Ofella; and perhaps it was owing to his knowledge of their sentiments, that he afterwards especially exempted them from the restrictions of his general law.

Lucretius  
Ofella slain.

Victories of  
Pompey in  
Africa.

During the course of the year Pompey had completely destroyed all opposition to Sylla's government in Africa.<sup>4</sup> Hiarbas king of Mauritania, and Domitius his confederate, were defeated and slain: and Pompey, on his return to Rome, enjoyed the honour of a triumph, although he was not of senatorian rank, nor had ever filled any magistracy.

B.C. 81. When the nominal consulship of M. Tullius Decula and Cn. Dolabella was expired, Sylla, while still retaining the dictatorship, caused

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 100.

<sup>3</sup> Appian, c. 101.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, Academic. prior, lib. ii. c. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Livy, Epitome, lib. lxxxix.

himself and Q. Metellus Pius to be nominated as consuls for the year following. It appears that amidst the general submission of Italy, two towns remained unsubdued up to this time: Nola in Campania, and Volaterræ in Tuscany. The first of these had never been completely reduced since the Italian war: a Roman army had been employed against it at the period of Sylla's first consulship; and again, when Cinna was driven from Rome by his colleague Octavius, it was to the camp before Nola that he first applied for support, and in which his attack upon the government was first organized. Our knowledge, however, of the fate of this town, after so long a resistance, is limited to the simple fact mentioned by the epitomizer of Livy, that Sylla reduced Nola. Volaterræ had been occupied by the remains of one of the Tuscan armies defeated by Sylla in the late war;<sup>1</sup> and numbers of Romans, who had been proscribed, escaping thither and uniting with them, a force was formed amounting to four cohorts, or about 2,400 men. The situation of this town resembled that of the hill forts of India, or of those remarkable fortified heights which are to be seen rising in the midst of the valley close to Luxemburg. It was built on an insulated point rising abruptly on every side from a deep and narrow valley; on the top was a flat surface of considerable extent, which the town itself occupied; and the ascent was nearly two miles in length, and was everywhere rough and difficult. These natural advantages enabled the garrison to hold out for two years; and their resistance led Sylla himself to take the field against them,<sup>2</sup> and to preside in person at the siege. Even at last they would only surrender on a capitulation, by which they were allowed to leave the town unmolested; while the vengeance of the conqueror fell only upon the inhabitants, whom he deprived of their lately acquired privilege of Roman citizenship. It is remarkable that this alone, of all his measures, was maintained to be illegal,<sup>3</sup> as exceeding even the power of the Roman people to authorize. The right of citizenship, according to Cicero, could never be taken away from any one; and it is doubtful how far Sylla's laws on this subject were observed, even during his lifetime. Thus it is satisfactory to see, that the real and substantial rights acquired by the people of Italy survived the violence of the storm by which themselves and their party at Rome had been almost overwhelmed; and amidst such a succession of crimes and miseries, the cause of true liberty had yet gained an advantage which it continued permanently to enjoy.

It is however seldom at this period of history that any thing favourable to human happiness offers itself to our notice. If the privileges of Roman citizenship were secured to the Italians beyond the power of Sylla to take away, it was not so with their properties,

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, lib. v. p. 246.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, pro Roscio Amerino, c. 7, 37.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. pro Cæcinâ, c. 33, *et seq.*

B.C. 81.  
Reduction  
of Nola and  
Volaterræ.

Position of  
Volaterræ.

Violations  
of Property.



B.C. 81. over which he exercised the most absolute dominion. Large tracts of land had been wrested from different cities,<sup>1</sup> as well as from proscribed individuals; besides which there were considerable portions which had never been enclosed or appropriated; and of which Sylla now claimed the right to dispose as he thought proper. On all these he proceeded to settle the soldiers who had enabled him to attain to his present greatness. Their numbers are variously reported; the epitomizer of Livy stating them at forty-seven legions, while Appian, with far greater probability, limits them to twenty-three. To make room for 115,000 new proprietors,—for such, at the lowest computation, would be the number of soldiers whom Sylla rewarded with a settlement,—we may well imagine how large a proportion of the inhabitants of Italy must have been reduced to poverty, even when every allowance has been made for the probable amount of waste and unclaimed land which formed a part of the distribution. But as one individual case speaks a far clearer language than any general statement, let the reader consult the first *Eclogue* of Virgil, and he will there find a picture, drawn from reality, of the dreadful misery occasioned by these gifts of victorious leaders to their soldiers.

Liberation  
of Slaves.

Having thus interested so many and such formidable supporters in maintaining his various regulations, Sylla proceeded to secure to himself a party in the assembly of the people at Rome. He gave liberty to more than ten thousand slaves,<sup>2</sup> chiefly belonging to men of the opposite faction, who had been proscribed or had fallen in battle, and he allowed them to be enrolled freely among the tribes. These new citizens, according to the usual practice of the Romans, adopted the name of him who had given them their freedom, and were all called *Cornelii*; and they of course would be most anxious to resist any counter-revolution, which, by rescinding Sylla's act, would have restored them also to their former slavery.

Sylla  
resigns the  
Dictatorship.  
B.C. 79.

The persons nominated to the title of consuls for the following year, were P. Servilius and Appius Claudius. Sylla's government was now fully established, and the ascendancy of his party, and the validity of his measures, seemed no longer to depend on his continuing to hold the office of dictator. He himself had no fondness for the mere ostentation of power, so long as he possessed the reality; and his favourite enjoyments, the gratification of his sensual and intellectual appetites, might be pursued more readily if he relieved himself from the ordinary business of the administration of the commonwealth. Accordingly, having assembled the people in the forum,<sup>3</sup> he made a formal resignation of the dictatorship, dismissed his lictors, and, professing that he was ready to answer any charges against his late conduct, continued to walk up and down for some time, accompanied only by his friends, and then withdrew quietly to his own house. This

<sup>1</sup> Appian, c. 100; Sallust, Oratio Lepidi in Sullam.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, c. 100.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. c. 103, 104.

is that famous abdication which has been ever viewed as so remarkable a point in Sylla's character; and which has been sometimes adduced to prove, that he was actuated chiefly by a regard to the public welfare in all that he had done to gain and to secure the sovereign power. B.C. 79.

But if the preceding pages have faithfully represented the state of parties at Rome, and have truly related the origin and events of the civil war, we shall form a different estimate both of the act itself, and of the motives which led to it. Sylla was the leader of the aristocratical interest, and it was his object to raise that interest from the low condition to which Marius and Cinna had reduced it, and to invest it with a complete ascendancy in the commonwealth. This he had entirely effected. He had extirpated the chiefs of the popular party; he had plundered and almost destroyed several states of Italy, who were used to support the popular cause at Rome; he had crippled the tribunitian power; had given to the nobility the exclusive possession of the judicial authority; had enriched the most eminent families by the sale of the confiscated estates, which his principal partisans had purchased at a low price; and he had provided for the security of his triumph by immense grants of lands to the soldiers by whose swords he had won it. He had raised to wealth and honours a great number of his own personal dependents,<sup>1</sup> and he was himself in possession of a property amply sufficient to maintain him in a style of magnificence, and to give him the free enjoyment of his favourite pleasures. His pride had been gratified by the fullest revenge upon his own private enemies, and by the absolute control which he had exercised in the settlement of the republic, securing the interests of his party as he thought proper, without allowing them to direct or interfere with his measures. If his object, indeed, had been to convert the government into a monarchy, the resignation of the dictatorship might justly have surprised us; but viewing him as the chief of a party, whose ascendancy he endeavoured to establish, whilst he himself enjoyed a pre-eminent share of the glory, and power, and advantages of their success, his abdication appears to have been a sacrifice of—nothing. It is clear that he was still considered as the head of his party, and that he resigned no more than a mere title, with the fatigue of the ordinary business of the state, while he continued to act as sovereign whenever he thought proper to exert his power. This appears from a speech which Sallust ascribes to M. Æmilius Lepidus, who was consul the year after Sylla's abdication. It is supposed to be spoken during his consulship; and in it he continually inveighs against Sylla as the actual tyrant of the republic, without the least allusion to any resignation which he had made of his

Policy of  
Sylla.

<sup>1</sup> Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 51; *Oratio Lepidi in Sullam*.

B.C. 79. authority. And another speech, preserved among the "Fragments" of Sallust, and ascribed to Macer Licinius, tribune of the people, a few years afterwards, speaks of Sylla's tyranny as only ending with his life. "When Sylla was dead, who had laid this bondage upon us, you thought," says Macer to the people, "that the evil was at an end. But a worse tyrant arose in Catulus." It appears, then, that Sylla, while relieving himself from the labours of government, retained, at least, a large portion of his former power, and that, having completed his work, he devolved the care of maintaining it upon the other members of his party, while he himself retired to enjoy the pursuits to which he was most strongly addicted.

His manner  
of life after  
his  
Resignation.

Then it was, when the glare of the conqueror and the legislator were no longer thrown around him, that he sank into the mere selfish voluptuary, pampering his senses and his mind with the excitements of licentiousness and of elegant literature. His principal companions, according to Plutarch, were actors and performers of various kinds, some of whom, indeed, such as the famous Q. Roscius, were of unblemished reputation, but others were of the vilest class of those wretches who ministered to every appetite of their patrons, of those men of prostituted talents, who, above all others, are most deserving of contempt and abhorrence. The intervals which were not passed in such society, Sylla employed in the composition of his own "Memoirs;" a work in which he took great interest, and in which he brought down his history to within a few days of his death. It was about a year after he resigned the dictatorship,

His Sickness  
and Death.  
B.C. 78.

that he was attacked by the disorder which proved fatal to him; and which is said to have been one of the most loathsome that afflict humanity. We have, in truth, no very authentic accounts of his sickness; but it was the belief of the Romans, in the time of Pliny,<sup>1</sup> that he who had shed such torrents of blood was visited by an awful retribution of suffering; that vermin bred incessantly in his body, and that thus he was in time destroyed. The senate ordered that his funeral should be celebrated in the Campus Martius;<sup>2</sup> and by his own desire his body was burnt, contrary to the general practice of his family,<sup>3</sup> who were accustomed to commit their dead to the ground. But as he had ordered the grave of Marius to be opened, and his remains to be scattered abroad, he possibly departed from the custom of his ancestors to prevent any similar insults from being hereafter offered to himself. The members of his party, who owed their present greatness to him, testified their gratitude to their departed leader by lavishing every kind of magnificence on his funeral. The soldiers who had served under him crowded to Puteoli,<sup>4</sup> where he had died, and escorted the body in

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. xi. c. 33; lib. xxvi. c. 13; lib. vii. c. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, *Epitome*, lib. xc.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, *de Legibus*, lib. ii. c. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, c. 105, 106.

arms to Rome. All the ministers of the Gods, all the magistrates of the commonwealth, in their ensigns of office, all the senate, the equestrian order, and an immense multitude of the people, walked in the procession; and the ladies of the nobility vied with each other in offering perfumes to throw upon the funeral pile.<sup>1</sup> Such was the end of Sylla, in the sixtieth year of his age, six hundred and seventy-six years after the building of Rome, and seventy-eight before the Christian era. B.C. 78.

His character must sufficiently be collected from the events of his life. Some anecdotes are to be found in Plutarch respecting his behaviour in his family, which we cannot prevail on ourselves to copy on Plutarch's sole authority. It appears, however, that he was strongly attached to his wife Metella, although he is said finally to have divorced her, and to have married again only a few months before his death. The predominant feature in his character was an intense pride and a contempt for mankind, feelings which must ever be incompatible with a virtuous and noble nature. Indifferent to the ordinary duties and honours of the republic, he found a stimulus during his early youth and manhood in literature and sensuality; and to these he gladly returned in his last years, when he had fully satisfied the passions which led him to take part in political contests. But when circumstances drew him into public situations, his pride could be content with no second place; and when he found himself slighted and injured, the desire of ample vengeance and of establishing his superiority beyond all rivalry, prevailed in his mind over every other. He found himself individually opposed to a man whom he envied for his military glory, and despised for his low birth and ignorance: as a patrician, he felt an aristocratical contempt for the popular party; as a Roman, he looked down with habitual arrogance upon all foreign nations. It happened that Marius his enemy was leagued with the popular cause at Rome and with the Italian states, which were claiming an equality with Roman citizens; and thus his pride as an individual, as a noble, and as a Roman, was wounded beyond endurance by their victory. But when that victory was accompanied by crimes which awakened the abhorrence even of the most moderate men, Sylla set no bounds to his retaliation, and seemed bent upon effecting the utter extirpation of all the three parties who were united against him, Marius and his personal enemies, the popular interest, and the allied states of Italy. Careless of the means by which this end was to be accomplished, and utterly indifferent to the multiplied miseries with which it must be attended, he commenced a series of boundless cruelties, in which it is impossible to find any resemblance to the just severities of a lawful government exercised upon flagrant criminals. He did not apply himself to a

And  
Character.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Syllâ, c. 38.

B.C 78. calm review of the causes which had so long disturbed the peace of his country; nor, as some tyrants have done, did he forget in his elevation the character of a party leader, and being placed above all, learned to regard all classes of citizens with an eye of impartiality. No doubt he reformed many things that needed alteration; but they were the abuses of one side only that he removed, and all that he did was to provide for the security of his party, except in those points where the common sense of every government sees that in the prevention of ordinary crimes its own interest and that of society are identified. The inscription which he is said to have dictated for his own monument, well declares that constant thirst for superiority, or in other words, that unceasing pride, which we have called his characteristic quality. It contained, in substance, that no friend had ever outdone him in the exchange of good offices, and no enemy had done him more evil than he had rendered to him again in return.

His  
Monumental  
Inscription.

The character of Sylla moreover exemplifies a truth, most useful to be remembered, yet most often contradicted or forgotten. His life, and the lives of many others in every age, and not least in our own, show that a cultivated understanding is no warrant for virtuous principles and conduct; and that the old adage of,

“*Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,  
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros,*”<sup>1</sup>

unless a very strained interpretation be put upon the word *fideliter*, is widely at variance with the evidence of facts. Sylla had a general taste for literature; he was intimately acquainted with the writers of Greece; he delighted in the society of men of talent; and he was himself long and carefully engaged in recording the history of his own actions; yet no man was ever more stained with cruelty, nor was ever any more degraded by habitual and gross profligacy. Nor is this at all wonderful, if we consider that the intellectual faculties, like the sensual, are gratified by exercise; and that the pleasure derived from the employment of talent is quite distinct from the application of the lessons taught by the understanding to the government of the affections and the conduct. In all men, whose mental powers are at all considerable, the indulgence of them is as much an object of mere natural appetite, as the gratification of hunger and thirst is to the mass of mankind; and it is only because it is less common that it is regarded as conferring on the character a much superior value. Bad men, of good natural faculties, gratify therefore with equal eagerness their animal and their intellectual desires, and are equally ignorant of the government of either. It is the part of goodness to restrain both, and to convert them to their own purposes;

<sup>1</sup> To have learned the fine arts thoroughly, softens the passions, nor does it permit them to be brutal.

an effort which is as painful to pride in the one case as it is to the ordinary feelings of what is called licentiousness in the other: and it is the presence or absence of this effort which distinguishes talent from wisdom, and forms a perpetual barrier between men like Sylla, and those who have deserved the respect, and admiration, and love of posterity. B.C. 78.

It will form a proper conclusion to this part of our history, if we add here a short account of the disturbances that immediately followed the death of Sylla, and which originated in an attempt made by the popular party to procure the repeal of his various laws and measures. The consulship was at this time filled by M. Æmilius Lepidus and Q. Lutatius Catulus: the former of whom had governed Sicily some years before as prætor,<sup>1</sup> and had rendered himself infamous for his maladministration; the latter was the son of that Catulus who had been the colleague of Marius in his fourth consulship, when he overcame the Cimbri, and had afterwards killed himself when sentenced to die by the same Marius, at the beginning of Cinna's usurpation. During Sylla's lifetime, Lepidus had attempted to revive the popular cause, and had inveighed against the tyranny under which, as he said, the republic laboured. Upon the death of Sylla he endeavoured to deprive his remains of that magnificent funeral with which the aristocratical party proposed to honour them;<sup>2</sup> but in this, as we have seen, he failed; and Catulus, supported by Pompey, succeeded in paying the last tribute to the late dictator's memory. Lepidus, however, having now declared himself the enemy of the party in possession of the chief power in the state, at once proceeded to try his strength, and proposed that Sylla's acts should be rescinded,<sup>3</sup> which was, in other words, to move for a counter-revolution. Attempting to tread exactly in the steps of Cinna, he called on the Italians to support him,<sup>4</sup> as he was labouring to procure a restoration of the privileges of Roman citizenship for those states which Sylla had deprived of them. Disputes and contests, we know not of how serious a kind, were frequently occurring between his partisans and those of Catulus; the senate, however, bound both consuls by an oath, that they would not carry their dissensions into a civil war. Lepidus perhaps consented the more readily to take this oath, as he expected, on the expiration of his consulship, to obtain the government of a province, and consequently the command of an army; and he considered himself as only pledged to abstain from arms whilst he was actually consul. The senate, on their part, anxious to remove him from the capital, and either trusting to the obligation of his oath, or despising his means of injuring them by open rebellion, allowed him, on the expiration of his office, to

Sedition,  
Rebellion,  
and Death of  
M. Lepidus.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, in Verrem, lib. iii. c. 91.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, c. 105.

<sup>3</sup> Florus, lib. iii. c. 23; Livy, Epitome, lib. xc.

<sup>4</sup> Appian, c. 107; Sallust, Oratio L. Philippi contra Lepidum.

B.C. 78.  
Receives the  
Command of  
Gaul.

receive the command of the province of Gaul,<sup>1</sup> with the title and authority of proconsul. No sooner did he find himself at the head of an army than he threw aside all reserve; he endeavoured to raise partisans in Etruria, the quarter of Italy in which the latest resistance had been made to the power of Sylla; whilst from his station in Gaul he might easily connect himself with those remains of the Marian party which Sertorius yet kept in the field in Spain. Numbers also of the lowest and most profligate inhabitants of Rome flocked to join him; the same men who had aided the riots of Sulpicius, and had been ready agents in the massacres of Marius and Damasippus. Lepidus marched at once towards the capital, and approached almost as far as the very walls of the city; but the senate were prepared for their defence. Appius Claudius, the interrex, the consuls for the following year not being yet chosen, and Q. Catulus, as proconsul, were charged to provide for the safety of the state; and, by the forces which they collected, Lepidus was easily checked and defeated. Destitute of any further means to continue the war in Italy, Lepidus then retired to Sardinia,<sup>2</sup> where he was soon attacked by sickness, and died in the midst of his plans for renewing the contest. M. Brutus,<sup>3</sup> one of his officers, and the father of the famous assassin of Cæsar, was about this time taken and put to death at Mutina by Pompey; and thus the ascendancy of the aristocracy remained unimpaired, and was probably rather strengthened than injured by this rash and idle attempt to overthrow it. But the present leaders of the victorious party were men who have left behind them a purer character than most of their countrymen; and Catulus has the rare merit of sullyng his triumph with no cruelties,<sup>4</sup> and of remaining content with the suppression of the rebellion, without endeavouring to add any thing further to the powers and advantages of his friends, or to the depression of his antagonists.

His Sickness  
and Death.  
B.C. 77.

<sup>1</sup> Sallust and Appian, *locis citatis*.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, *Epitome*, lib. xc.; Plutarch, in *Pompeio*, c. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Livy and Plutarch, *ubi supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Florus, lib. iii. c. 23.



[Bacchantes.—From an Antique Gen.]



[Emblematic Head of Spain.]

## CHAPTER XXII.

### ANCIENT SPAIN.

FROM B.C. 234 TO B.C. 73.

BEFORE we proceed in the domestic history of Rome, it will be necessary to retrace our steps, in order to narrate the fortunes of some of her provinces. We begin with Spain. The historian of this quarter has uniformly had to lament the almost total want of information relative to its early inhabitants, as well as in regard to those rude beginnings of society and of government, which must have long preceded the times of the Carthaginians. It is generally believed that the Celtiberians, who were found by Hamilcar Barca in possession of Catalonia and the adjacent districts, were originally a Celtic tribe, who had migrated from the neighbouring provinces of France, either for the purposes of commerce, or for the more simple object of obtaining a home and securing personal protection among the friendly natives of Iberia. It has been imagined, too, that the Phœnicians, to whom all the shores of the Mediterranean were familiarly known, were acquainted, at a very early period, with the mineral riches of Spain; but the Greek historians, to whom we are indebted for nearly all our knowledge of the ancient world, seem not to have taken a sufficient interest in the commercial enterprise of their Syrian neighbours, either to record their discoveries, or to ascertain the limits of their conquests. There is a tradition among

B.C. 234  
to  
B.C. 73.

Early  
Inhabitants  
of Spain.



- B.C. 234. certain authors, that the people of Tyre fixed a mercantile establishment in the vicinity of the modern Cadiz: and Herodotus informs us, that a colony of Greeks, at a remote era, passed the pillars of Hercules; and, moreover, that, upon meeting with encouragement and protection from a native prince, to whom he gives the name of Arganthonius, they proceeded to build, or to occupy, the maritime city of Tartessus; where they continued to cultivate the arts of peace, and set an example of successful industry for many generations.

Early  
History of  
Spain, and  
Condition of  
the  
Aboriginal  
Inhabitants.

But it is, nevertheless, universally admitted, that very little is known of Spain until the period when the memorable contest between the rival republics of Carthage and Rome rendered her richest provinces the theatre of war; and which, by drawing the attention of the Latin historians to the progress of their arms, placed within their reach the means of becoming acquainted with the character of the people, with the general aspect of the country, and even in some measure with its natural productions. It is no doubt true, that the curious reader may glean from more ancient annals than those which record the events of the second Punic war, a few facts concerning the aboriginal inhabitants of Iberia; and learn from one author that they were brave but impolitic, ignorant of the arts of peace, and entirely occupied with the care of their armour and of their horses; the latter of which they are said to have valued more highly than their own blood. It is Strabo who tells us that the Spaniards painted or stained their bodies with various colours; that they delighted in long hair and in glittering ornaments of gold and silver; that their mountains abounded in mines of copper, as well as of the more precious metals; and that either from ignorance, or from the possession of uncommon wealth, they were observed to use large vessels and implements of silver for the most ordinary domestic purposes. Upon the whole, however, it is abundantly obvious, that the knowledge of the ancients, in regard to Spain, was extremely limited; and also that the few particulars which they had collected, relative to the inhabitants, denote a condition of the lowest barbarism; in which there was neither sufficient concert among the various tribes to prevent the invasion and settlement of foreigners, nor sufficient skill and docility to imitate the arts by which their several hordes were successively subdued.

Invasion of  
Spain by  
Hamilcar  
Barca.

- B.C. 234. It was soon after the conclusion of the first Punic war, and immediately upon suppressing the dangerous insurrection of the rebellious mercenaries, that Hamilcar Barca led an army into Spain, under the pretext, it is said, of protecting the Tyrian colonists, whom we have already mentioned, from the violence and injustice of their barbarian neighbours. This celebrated commander began by forming an extensive settlement on the coast, where he likewise built the town called Barceno, the modern Barcelona; and in the choice of a

situation he could not have selected one more conveniently adapted, B.C. 234. both for an easy intercourse with the mother country, and for securing at all times a large share of the metallic wealth of the Catalonian mountains. Polybius narrates that Hamilcar spent about nine years in Spain; in the course of which he extended very considerably the dominions and influence of Carthage. His policy and arms were equally successful; till, at length, engaging in battle with an army composed of the bravest and most warlike of the native tribes, and exceeding greatly in number all the troops that he could bring into the field, he was defeated and slain.

His Death.

Hasdrubal, the son-in-law of the great commander whose death we have just related, succeeded him in the management of the war, and in the general superintendence of the Carthaginian province. But of the events which marked the commencement of Hasdrubal's government, we are not enabled to give any details; and it is only from the effects which his military movements produced on the minds of the Roman allies in Spain, that we are led to the conclusion, which is also confirmed by other considerations, that he must have subdued the confederate chiefs who took the field against his predecessor, and even added to the conquests which that general had achieved. His progress awakened the fears of the people of Saguntum; a city which is understood to have derived its origin from the commercial establishment of some Grecian colony, and which, at the period in question, enjoyed the alliance of Rome, and was entitled to claim the protection of that powerful and jealous state.

Succession of  
Hasdrubal.  
B.C. 228.

In the life of HANNIBAL we have already detailed the principal events in Spain during the early period of his military career, till the fall of Saguntum, at sufficient length to prevent the necessity of recapitulating them here.

After the capture of this city, the senate at Rome did not enter- B.C. 216. tain the most distant suspicion that their own territory was about to be invaded, but raised two consular armies; of which, the one was destined to act in Spain, whilst the other was ordered to proceed against the African dominions of Carthage. Publius Cornelius Scipio was appointed to the command of the former; and this consul, together with his brother Cneius Cornelius, who had been named his lieutenant, was already on his passage to his province, when, happening to approach the coast of Gaul, he received the unexpected information that Hannibal, at the head of a powerful armament, was actually marching through that country on his way to Italy. Such news could not fail to influence the procedure of Publius. It now became his main object to intercept the Carthaginians, and, by bringing them to battle, to fix, if possible, the seat of war among the Gauls. For this purpose he immediately landed a part of the troops at Marseilles, and went in quest of the invader; instructing his brother to proceed with the remainder into Spain, to effect the

B.C. 216. reduction of that province, and to re-establish in it, by dint of arms and of negotiation, the interests of the commonwealth and the ascendancy of their allies.

Hasdrubal commands in Spain.

When Hannibal marched out of Spain, he left to the command of his brother Hasdrubal a considerable body of troops, with a fleet of sixty ships to protect the coast; whilst he committed to the charge of Hanno all the country between the Iberus and the Pyrenean range, to keep open the passes of the mountains, and to protect the heavy baggage of the Italian army, which it had been found expedient to leave behind.

Cn. Cor. Scipio lands in Spain and defeats the Carthaginian fleet.

Cneius Cornelius, having disembarked his soldiers at Emporium, proceeded along the coast, reducing several towns in his line of march, and restoring the confidence of such of the native chiefs as had been disposed to attach themselves to the fortune of Rome. He is said to have gained, in the beginning of the campaign, a considerable advantage over the Carthaginian fleet, under the immediate command of Hamilco, who had been sent to assist the councils of Hasdrubal. But if we may trust to the accuracy of Polybius, the success of Cn. Cornelius Scipio will appear to have been neither very brilliant, nor attended with any permanent effect. He assures us that as soon as Hasdrubal was informed of these transactions, he made haste to pass the Iberus with his army; and finding that the naval forces of the Romans had grown confident from their late success, were relaxed in their discipline, and forgetful of the usual precautions, he sent forward a body of eight thousand foot and a thousand horse; who, falling suddenly upon them, while they were dispersed over the face of the country, killed a great number, and drove the rest in confusion to their ships. Livy shows a strong inclination to magnify the exploits of his countrymen, and to exaggerate their triumphs; but Appian, who is on this occasion a more impartial authority, remarks, with an air of much truth and simplicity, that prior to the arrival of his brother Publius from Italy, the Roman commander achieved nothing that was worthy of being mentioned.

Publius Cor. Scipio joins his brother, and gains advantages over the Carthaginians.

The value of Spain was first made manifest to the people of Rome, by the important supplies of men and treasure which Hannibal appeared to draw from it. Determined to cut off from him this source of power, the senate resolved that Publius Cor. Scipio, to whom the province of Spain was first allotted, should immediately proceed to resume his command at the head of a considerable reinforcement both of sea and land forces; directing, in the mean time, their main attention to the hostile designs of their invader, who had already pitched his camp on the banks of the Po. Nor did Publius disappoint the hopes of his republic. Before this period the Romans had never attempted to carry their arms beyond the Iberus; thinking it sufficient to have obtained the nominal alliance of the

barbarous tribes who dwelt towards the north and west, or to have stipulated for their forbearance. But now, their warlike operations were planned on a larger scale; and Publius, crossing the wonted boundary of his province, is said to have subdued, or gained over to the cause of Rome, a great variety of nations, whose names and appearance were altogether new to his victorious troops. The present success of the Romans, however, was not confined to the progress of their arms; and there is an incident, connected with the fortune of the war, and mentioned by all the historians, which contributed not a little to strengthen their footing in Spain. B.C. 216.

When Hannibal was preparing for his Italian expedition, he thought proper to secure the fidelity of his Spanish allies, by demanding the children of the principal families, in order to detain them in a fortified place, in the capacity of hostages, until the Romans should be finally expelled from their territory. A crafty Spaniard, to whom Livy gives the name of Abilox, and whom the readers of Polybius will recognise under the similar appellation of Abilyx, contrived to remove this impediment to the negotiations of the Roman proconsul. He persuaded the Carthaginian general, Bostar, who acted as the lieutenant of Hasdrubal, that humanity and good policy alike required that, as his countrymen could no longer maintain their ascendancy by the terror of their arms, he should deliver up to their parents the youths whom Hannibal had shut up in Saguntum. Abilox was himself commissioned to carry this benevolent proposal into effect. Instead, however, of restoring the children immediately to their families, he carried them all to the Roman camp; reserving for Publius Scipio the pleasing and popular office of replacing the hostages under the roof of their fathers, and of thereby securing, for the interests of his country, the affections and co-operation of a large body of the native chiefs. Anecdote of Abilox.

History has not preserved to us any detail of the proceedings which diversified the war in Spain during the early part of the year which we have noted in the margin. The two Scipios continued to make considerable progress when Hasdrubal, who alone of all the Carthaginian generals appeared able to cope with them, received orders from his government to march into Italy to the relief of his brother, now beginning to be hard pressed by the consular armies. But the policy of the Romans required that Hannibal should not receive any reinforcements from Spain; and with this view Publius put his troops in motion to watch the steps of Hasdrubal, as he advanced towards the Pyrenees, brought him to an engagement in spite of his resolution to avoid it, and, finally, inflicted upon him so complete an overthrow, as to prevent him, for the present, from continuing his march into Italy. Hasdrubal defeated. B.C. 214.

But the prosperity of the Romans was doomed to experience a grievous interruption. Three years had hardly elapsed when the B.C. 211.

B.C. 211. Carthaginian force in Spain was so amply recruited, that they had no fewer than three armies in the field: one commanded by Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, the second by Hasdrubal the brother of Hannibal, and the third by Mago, who seems to have joined the first of the generals now named. The Roman leaders formed a plan for cutting them off separately, and in succession; and regarding Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, as by far the most formidable of their antagonists, it was agreed between the two Scipios that Cneius, with the greater part of the legionary soldiers and a portion of the allies, should attack him, whilst Publius, with the remainder, composed of Roman and Italian auxiliaries, should watch the motions of the other Hasdrubal and of Mago. This resolution proved fatal to the cause of Rome. Publius found himself unequal to the combined armies which he had to oppose; for, besides the troops which fought under the standard of Carthage, there was a powerful body of Numidian cavalry, commanded by their prince Masinissa, which galled the heavy-armed soldiers of the legion, and intercepted all the supplies of their camp. Livy describes, in language rendered eloquent by indignation, the annoyance and difficulties which were created by these barbarian horsemen. Nor were these the only dangers with which the Roman general had to contend. He was aware that Indibilis, one of the most spirited of the native chiefs, was at hand with seven or eight thousand men to increase the strength of the Carthaginians; and he could not fail to perceive that, were this junction once effected, he would be compelled to relinquish the field to an enemy so much superior to himself in numbers. Influenced by these considerations, he resolved to issue forth in the night and crush the force of Indibilis, before the latter could reach the encampment of the confederates; a measure which, as it failed to secure success, has been condemned as rash and inexpedient. A general engagement took place amidst the confusion of a nocturnal assault: the Numidian horse attacked the Romans whilst yet on their march, and the whole Carthaginian army, roused by the clamour of the onset, rushed from their entrenchments to support the arms of their allies. Publius fell in the battle, and his troops were put to the rout; of whom, says Livy, not one would have escaped, had not the approach of night saved the fugitives.<sup>1</sup>

The two victorious armies, having joined that which was under the command of Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, marched imme-

<sup>1</sup> Historians, like poets, are sometimes heedless; and the reader of this passage, in the twenty-fifth book of the work to which we are now alluding, must have some curiosity to learn, how a fight, which commenced at midnight, (*mediâ nocte profectus, cum obvius hostibus manus conseruit*) could be terminated by the arrival of evening twilight. It may, perhaps, be said, that the battle lasted during the night and part of the following day; and that the pursuit continued till evening. This, improbable as it is, appears to be the only mode of reconciling the contradiction. Livy, xxv. 34.

diately against Cneius, to put an end to the war by his defeat. He was already more than half vanquished by the desertion of the Spanish allies, who had been seduced by the Carthaginians, or recalled home by the news of a domestic quarrel. The battle which ensued was decisive of his fate. Attempting to retreat in the night, he was overtaken by the enemy, compelled to receive their attack in the most unfavourable circumstances, and ultimately defeated with the loss of his army and of his life. Appian informs us, that the Roman general, having fled with a few followers and taken refuge in a tower or fortress, was pursued by the furious barbarians and burnt to death within the walls; and Livy adds some probability to the same account, by stating, that the place in which Cneius had shut himself up, was reduced by means of fire; after which, he and all his attendants were cruelly butchered by the conquerors.

B.C. 211.  
The  
Carthagi-  
nian  
Generals  
unite and  
attack  
Cneius;

who is  
likewise  
defeated and  
slain.

Spain now seemed lost to the Romans; their best commanders being killed, and their armies either cut in pieces or dispersed. In this crisis of their affairs, a gallant young officer of the equestrian order, assumed the conduct of the war; and, collecting the remains of the broken legions, prepared to maintain his ground against the overwhelming power of the Carthaginians, who were again advancing, under Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, to complete the conquest of the Spanish territory. We have the authority of Livy for asserting, that this spirited youth soon afterwards succeeded in turning the tide of fortune in favour of his countrymen; that he attacked the Carthaginians, who had divided themselves into two camps, and were secure, as they imagined, from any attempt on the part of the Romans, killed thirty-seven thousand of them, took nearly two thousand prisoners, and brought off an immense quantity of plunder.

Good  
conduct of  
Lucius  
Marcius.

These events took place in the year 212 before the christian era; and as it was not till the following year that Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of Publius who had lately fallen in battle, was appointed to the command in Spain, there is an interval of more than twelve months, which appears like a blank in the page of history. Appian, it is true, supplies some information in regard to that period, which may be thought sufficient to connect, at least, the chain of events. He tells us that Marcellus, who had recently served with much distinction in Sicily, was sent, with M. Claudius, to assume the government in the Spanish province; but, he adds, their success was so very indifferent, that the strength of the Carthaginians was not only greatly increased, but that nearly the whole country had again fallen under their dominion, whilst the wrecks of the Roman army were confined to the fortresses of the Pyrenean mountains. Livy, it is proper to observe, makes no mention of these appointments; and the inquisitive reader, who examines carefully into dates, will unquestionably find some difficulty in reconciling the statement of Appian with the proceedings which are

B.C. 211.  
Sateament  
of Appian in  
regard to  
Marcellus  
and Marcus  
Claudius.

recorded of Marcellus, almost at the same moment, whilst exercising a command in Sicily. But, in whatever way this obscurity may be removed, there is no doubt that, in the course of the year we have already named, young Scipio appeared in the field, to revenge the death of his father; to revive the fallen hopes of the army, which had sustained so severe an overthrow; and to conquer for Rome that ascendancy in Spain which she continued to hold till her power was destroyed by the irruptions of the northern invaders.

Young Scipio  
elected  
Proconsul.

The Spanish province had now fewer attractions for the ambition of Roman leaders than at any former period; and as none but a person of great ability was fit for the command, so, when the day appointed for the election of a proconsul arrived, it appeared, to the great consternation of the people, that no candidate for this dangerous preferment had yet given in his name. Grief and dismay pervaded the whole assembly; when, on a sudden, a youth of twenty-four years of age presented himself to their choice, urging his pretensions with equal simplicity and confidence. The eyes of all the citizens were immediately attracted to Scipio, who, as the son of the late proconsul, whose death was still so recent, called forth at once their sympathy and admiration. The election of the aspiring soldier was unanimous. Not only did all the centuries agree in their votes, but, says Livy, every individual member of this popular assembly concurred in the decision, that the command in Spain should be conferred on Pnblus Scipio.

Character of  
Scipio.

This young man was already known by a variety of circumstances which recommended him greatly to public favour. At the age of seventeen, when just entering upon the military service, he had had the good fortune to rescue and preserve his father, who was on the point of being killed or taken by the enemy, on the river Ticinus. Being afterwards engaged in the battle of Cannæ, and one of a band of young men who had forced their way to Canusium, he prevented the execution of a design which they had formed to abandon Italy; obliging them all to bind themselves by an oath, that they would remain and contend for the fortunes of their country till the last.

He arrives in  
Spain and  
takes New  
Carthage by  
surprise.  
B.C. 210.

Upon the arrival of Scipio in Spain, with a reinforcement of ten thousand men and thirty armed ships, he found the remains of his vanquished countrymen shut up within a narrow compass in the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees. As the season was far advanced, he refrained from undertaking any military expedition till the ensuing spring; and satisfied himself with fixing his head quarters at the modern town of Tarragona, and with using the utmost exertion to obtain accurate intelligence, in regard to the strength and distribution of the enemy's forces. He learned that they had deposited their principal stores at New Carthage, which they had, at the same time, garrisoned with a thousand men; separating their army, for the present, into three divisions, of which none was nearer

the position of their magazines than a march of ten days. Scipio himself was, indeed, still farther from New Carthage than the distance just specified, being removed from it not less than three hundred miles. He nevertheless conceived the project of surprising it, trusting to the negligence of his enemies, and confiding in the hope that he would be able to accomplish the greater part of his march before his design could be suspected, or any measure adopted to prevent its success. His stratagem was crowned with the most complete triumph. The town fell into his hands, together with the immense stores which it contained; and the Carthaginians, finding themselves outwitted by a mere youth, began to perceive that they would have to contend anew for the possession of a country which they had allowed themselves to consider as a permanent nursery for their armies, and as one of the main sources of wealth to the parent state. B.C. 210.

It appears that about the time of Scipio's arrival in Spain, the Carthaginian generals were busily occupied in preparing a reinforcement for Hannibal in Italy. The best of their troops, with all the supplies and apparatus necessary for accomplishing an arduous march across the Pyrenees and the Alps, were collected and placed under the charge of Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar. The other Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, was likewise intrusted with the command of an army still more numerous, the object of which was to employ the attention of the Romans, and to aid the advance of the former towards the confines of Gaul. The position of Scipio at Tarragona, to which he had returned after the reduction of New Carthage, was regarded as a material obstacle to the accomplishment of this important measure. To withdraw him, therefore, from his station, the Carthaginian commanders set their whole force in motion towards the coast, apparently with the settled determination to recover New Carthage at every hazard, as being in itself a place of considerable consequence, and a necessary point of communication with the seat of government in Africa. Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, whose division of the army was farthest advanced, took a post on the river Bætis, with the seeming intention of commencing the siege, a movement which so much excited the apprehensions of the Roman general for his recent conquest, that he immediately began his march, in order to risk a battle with the brother of Hannibal, rather than relinquish the possession of a maritime city, whose name was connected with his earliest honours.

As the sole object of Hasdrubal's stratagem was to secure an undisturbed march to the Pyrenees, he allowed the semblance of a victory to Scipio, and retreated with a slow and measured pace before the Romans, who could not fail to be surprised at the facility of their triumph. Scipio, who to all the ardour of youth joined much of the caution of more advanced life, abstained from pursuing Defeats Hasdrubal, who had threatened New Carthage.  
Hasdrubal leaves Spain and carries his Army into Italy.



B.C. 210. an enemy who had evidently retired without being defeated; and being justly apprehensive that, by a forward movement, he might be placed between the lines of two powerful armies, each of which, he had reason to believe, was in correspondence with the other, he recalled his victorious soldiers to their standards, and resolved to await the progress of events. Meantime Hasdrubal crossed the Iberus, and directed his steps towards the Pyrenees; of which, as soon as the Roman general was aware, he despatched some light troops to watch the progress of his antagonist; and finding that there was no longer any doubt of his intention to reinforce Hannibal in Italy, he sent information to Rome, apprizing the senate that, if the passage through the Alps could be a second time accomplished, they would soon have to contend with another Carthaginian army, commanded by another son of the renowned Hamilcar.

In this transaction, Scipio may appear to have been overreached; and in respect to the address of his enemy, there is no doubt that, admitting the object they pursued to be of sufficient consequence to be preferred to the reputation of victory, and to be attainable even under the loss and discouragement of a defeat, the plan was by them ably laid and carried into execution. But even in this supposition, Scipio must be acquitted of any mistake or defect of conduct. He advanced to cover an important station, which the enemy might have seized, if he had not taken this measure. He took advantage of their separation to strike a decisive blow; and, probably, to disconcert any immediate project of offensive war. On a discovery of their march into Italy, what remained for him to do was not neglected; the enemy were carefully observed, and seasonable intelligence was sent to Rome of their apparent intentions.

Moderation  
and  
humanity  
of Scipio.

But the character of Scipio rests on a better foundation than the conjectural inferences of a historian, whose judgment was confined to the examination of a few unconnected events, without any knowledge of the particular views and motives whence they proceeded. His fame, as it respects the Spanish war, is supported on the ground of undisputed military talent, and on a series of splendid victories, which led, in the first instance, to the complete expulsion of the Carthaginians, and afterwards to the entire conquest of Spain. His moderation and humanity, too, have been highly extolled. His conduct towards the hostages whom he found at New Carthage, and that continence which has become proverbial towards the noble ladies who fell into his hands upon its reduction, is praised by all historians as a fine example of liberality and self-command; and is represented, at the same time, as having had a very great effect in paving the way for his subsequent progress as a conqueror.

B.C. 206. Having gained several advantages over the Carthaginian armies, both in person and also by means of the able services of his lieutenant Lælius, his success was exposed to a momentary interruption, owing,

as well to the disaffection of his troops, as to the revolt of Mandonius and Andobalis, (or Indibilis,) two native chiefs, who had formerly been guilty of the same perfidious conduct towards his enemies. Polybius, who seems to have felt great delight in describing any particular battle, as well as in expounding the principles of the military art at large, sets forth in the following terms, the arrangements of Scipio in his encounter with Andobalis. He informs us, in the first place, that the Roman general had resolved not to employ Spaniard against Spaniard, but to reserve the glory of finishing the war to the legionary soldiers under his immediate command. A march of ten days, says he, brought him to the banks of the Iberus, which, having passed, he immediately found himself in the presence of the enemy, with only a narrow valley in front to divide the camps. On the following day, after having instructed Lælius to hold the cavalry in readiness, he succeeded in bringing on an action, by tempting the well-known cupidity of the Spaniards; who, seeing a great number of cattle driven into the valley, rushed forth to seize the prey, and thereby exposed themselves to the meditated attack of the Romans. A sharp skirmish ensued with nearly equal success, when Lælius, who stood prepared with the horsemen, fell suddenly upon the barbarians, and slaughtered their scattered bands. The Spaniards, enraged by the loss which they had already sustained, and dreading the effect of it upon the minds of their impetuous but inconstant followers, formed the resolution of hazarding a general engagement on the same disadvantageous ground which they had already occupied. Scipio, on his part, was neither less prepared, nor less desirous to come to a decisive action. Guided, however, in his movements by those of his unskilful adversaries, he allowed them to descend into the plain and form their ranks; upon which he advanced with his veteran infantry to attack that part of the Spanish force which was stationed nearest to the foot of the mountains. Lælius, meantime, having conducted his cavalry along the hills that extended from the camp to the valley, assailed the enemy's horse in the rear, and kept them so closely engaged, that they could afford no aid to the foot, already pressed by the heavy-armed Romans. The barbarians, finding themselves thus mastered and confined by the superior tactics of Scipio, became at once furious with disappointed rage, and incapable of listening to command. The cavalry in particular, the most efficient portion of their army, pent up between the rocks and their own foot, and thrown into disorder by the difficulties of their situation, committed greater havoc upon the lines of their countrymen, than was inflicted by the Romans. The result of such a conflict could not be long in suspense. The Spaniards, who had descended into the valley, were nearly all destroyed; and it was only those who were drawn up at the foot of the hills who had it in their power to seek their safety in flight. Among these

B.C. 206.  
Gains several  
advantages,  
and brings  
the War to a  
successful  
issue.

Scipio  
ensnares the  
Spaniards.

B. C. 206. Andobalis found means to escape, and afterwards to convey himself and a small body of attendants to a fortified place, in which he eluded the pursuit of the conquerors.

Mandonius, the other leader of this revolt, made his peace with Scipio, on condition of paying to the conqueror a certain sum of money; and as the disaffected had no longer any hope of opposing with success the established ascendancy of the Roman power, the war was considered at an end, and the victorious general forthwith took his departure for Italy.

Recapitulation of minor events.

Capture of Astapa.

We have purposely omitted some of the minor incidents which diversified the progress of hostilities in Spain. We have not mentioned, for example, that Scipio found it necessary to cross over into Africa, in order to counteract the daring projects of Syphax, who had abandoned his alliance with the Romans, and attacked the kingdom of Masinissa; the latter having now likewise changed sides and turned his arms against the Carthaginians. Nor did we think it necessary to detain the reader with the sieges of Illiturgi and Castulo; in the former of which the Romans tarnished not a little the glory of their name, by the indiscriminate slaughter of the inhabitants as soon as the place fell into their hands. The reduction of Astapa, a town situated on the river Bætis, was, perhaps, more worthy of the reader's notice, as illustrating the ferocious character and invincible love of liberty which, at that period, distinguished the people of Spain. Having resisted the progress of the Romans with all the skill and bravery usually exhibited on such occasions, the inhabitants of Astapa resolved to die rather than yield to their more civilized foe: and with this view they bound themselves by an oath, to employ against their own lives the fire and the sword which might happen to prove ineffectual in their last desperate effort upon the camp of the besiegers. A furious sally was accordingly made from the gates, which even the steady valour of the Romans with difficulty resisted: and it was not till after a most bloody and obstinate conflict that such of the townsmen as survived returned within their walls to accomplish their tremendous vow. Their women and children were included in the horrible immolation; and whole families of unresisting females and tender infants were first mangled with the swords of their husbands or fathers, and then thrown in heaps on a pile of wood and consumed in the flames.

When Scipio returned from the Spanish campaign, he was met by the senate outside the walls, in the temple of Bellona, where he described to the conscript fathers the nature and extent of his services, the number of battles he had fought, the commanders against whom he had taken the field, and the happy condition in which he had left the province. He afterwards entered the city and deposited in the public treasury the sum of 14,342 Roman pounds of silver, besides a large amount in coin; and his merits in every

respect were accounted so high, both by the senate and the people, B.C. 206. that he would have obtained a triumph, had there been any instance of that honour having been conferred on a general not yet invested with a public magistracy.

The command in Spain was now intrusted to Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Acidinus; and these officers had soon to lead their troops into the field to quash a fresh insurrection on the part of the natives, who had been induced to take up arms by Andobalis. A single battle, however, terminated the war. The restless chief, whom we have just named, was killed at the head of his savage followers; whilst Mandonius and other leaders of distinction, who were known to have fomented the disaffection of the multitude, were delivered up into the hands of the Romans and punished with death. The vanquished Spaniards were further compelled, in order to obtain the peace which they now found it necessary to solicit, to pay double tribute for one year; to supply the army with corn during six months; to provide clothing and other conveniences for the soldiers who were quartered in the conquered districts; and to yield hostages for about thirty of their tribes or nations.

The Romans, nevertheless, were not allowed to maintain an undisturbed possession of any part of Spain; and so far were they from finding that the expulsion of the Carthaginians had secured the conquest of that strong country, that they soon perceived the war was only about to commence. They even found it necessary to divide the peninsula into two provinces, called the Nearer and the Farther Spain, and to appoint separate commanders for each; and yet, as Livy informs us, while Lentulus enjoyed an ovation for the success which he had gained in the latter, Sempronius the proconsul, who had led an army into the remoter districts, was defeated and slain, with a very heavy loss of officers and men.

During eight or nine successive years from the date last noted in the margin, the progress of hostilities was not marked by any great event. The Roman generals were for the most part annually relieved, and their armies annually recruited from Italy. But the natural strength of the country afforded many facilities to the hardy inhabitants both for defence and assault; and we accordingly find that, although the pages of the Roman history are crowded with triumphs and victories gained by their commanders in Spain, the course of war was seldom interrupted, and their success rarely permanent. Though often defeated, the Spaniards still renewed the contest. Concession on their part did not imply that they were vanquished; and even a formal treaty with their enemies did not dispose their minds to peace, or preclude them from seizing the earliest advantage which promised revenge, or even seemed to favour the restoration of their independence. Upwards of a hundred towns, on one occasion, tendered their submission to Tiberius Sempronius

B.C. 205.  
Death of  
Andobalis  
and  
Mandonius.

B.C. 198.  
Spain a  
country  
favourable  
for renewing  
and  
protracting  
war.

B.C. 198. Gracchus; and yet his successors in command found not that the number of their foes was diminished, or that the battles, in which they were successively engaged, were less frequent or less bloody.

Ambition of  
the Romans.

It has, indeed, been maintained by several writers on the affairs of Rome, that, till after the conquest of Macedonia, the western republic did not so much aim at the extension of her dominion in foreign countries, as at the defence of her own possessions in Italy; and that it was only in pursuance of the latter object that she was incidentally led to accomplish the former. In Spain, for example, where the Romans still continued to meet with a determined resistance, they had hitherto acted principally on the defensive; but after the defeat of Perseus, and the reduction of his kingdom, their ambition seems to have enlarged, and their avarice to have acquired new strength. The acquisition of a large revenue from Macedonia first taught them that war might be carried on without domestic taxation; and from this period, it has been remarked, their progress was distinguished by a succession of unprovoked hostilities, which they contrived to excite on their frontiers, not, as formerly, in defence of their own possessions, but for the enlargement of a territory already much too extensive. In Spain, more particularly, they now pressed upon the natives, and provoked their opposition, with no other view than that they might enrich themselves by plunder, and gratify the people of Rome with new accessions to their dominions, or by a swollen list of tributaries. The invading legions now advancing to the Tagus, endeavoured to penetrate beyond the mountains from which that river takes its source, till, by awakening the fears of the strong and resolute inhabitants of Lusitania and Gallicia, they involved themselves in a long train of sanguinary wars, the details of which are nowhere preserved, and which are only known to history by their general result.

Extortion  
of their  
Generals.

Placed at a distance from the inspection of the government, the Roman leaders, actuated not less by avarice than ambition, were ever seeking fresh occasions to quarrel with the natives, in order to get possession of their imaginary treasures; and in their negotiations, too, with the chiefs and townships, they had recourse to such acts of treachery, and to such flagrant breaches of faith, as clearly showed that what they could not gain by force of arms, they were determined to secure by deceit and extortion. For instance, a town having surrendered by capitulation to a Roman proconsul of the name of Lucullus, the inhabitants, notwithstanding, in open violation of the treaty, were plundered by his order, and many of them afterwards put to the sword. A similar act of perfidious cruelty was soon after perpetrated by Galba, who commanded in Lusitania, or what was called the Ulterior Province of Spain. This conduct, so disgraceful to the name of Rome, and so much at variance with the principles upon which the senate professed to regulate the

public actions of her representatives, instead of furthering the progress of their arms, roused against them the most formidable opposition, and soon thereafter shook the foundations of their power in both the Iberian provinces. B.C. 198.

No sooner were the Romans involved in the third Punic war, than the Lusitanians, incensed by the treachery of Galba which has just been alluded to, assembled in numerous parties under Viriathus, and made preparations for avenging the cause of their country. The chief now named had gained their admiration and confidence, first as a distinguished hunter, and afterwards as a captain of banditti; and the qualities of mind and body which fitted him for these hardy occupations, recommended him to the oppressed and desperate provincials, as the most proper person to lead their willing bands against their faithless invaders. Nor did this rude commander disappoint the hopes that were entertained of him. He knew so well how to employ the impetuous courage of his barbarian troops against the disciplined ranks to which they were opposed, that he converted their very deficiency, in those arts which constitute the excellence of a trained soldier, into the means of success in most of their operations. With him, an apparent rout was the ordinary prelude to a more violent attack; and he usually endeavoured, by pretended flights and disorderly movements, to draw his enemy into a rash pursuit, and then seized, with irresistible address and valour, the advantages which he himself had created. Appearance of Viriathus.  
His character.

The prætor Vitilius marched against him with about ten thousand men, but was almost immediately defeated and killed, together with not less than four thousand of his troops. Another prætor was forthwith despatched to quell this insurrection, intrusted with an army more numerous than the last, and including a powerful body of fifteen hundred horse. His success, however, was not more gratifying to the senate than that of his predecessor. He was overcome in a pitched battle, losing not only a great number of his men, but likewise a considerable extent of territory. A third commander, of the same rank as the two former, was ordered to proceed against the Lusitanian, and he, like the others, fell under the weight of his arms, or the success of his stratagems. At length, after the termination of the war with Carthage, the Romans thought it expedient to send the consul Quintus Fabius into Spain, in order to recover their affairs in the further province, and to deliver them from the increasing apprehensions which the progress of Viriathus had not failed to excite. The consular army was led with greater skill, or under better auspices; for Fabius is said to have obtained several important victories over his enterprising antagonist, and even to have reconquered much of the ground which the prætorian commanders had lost. Nor did the fortune of war forsake the consul by whom Fabius was succeeded. Quintus Cæcilius Metellus, an officer of He defeats Vitilius and other two Prætors.  
Q. Fabius checks his arms.

B.C. 198. great bravery and talent, followed up the advantages which had been already gained, and compelling Viriathus to act entirely on the defensive, he reduced under the Roman power a vast number of cities, as well as the whole of what was called Tarraconian Spain. But Metellus was not permitted to finish the war, which he showed himself so able to conduct to a successful issue. Intrigue, which now began to supersede at Rome the claims of merit and the most brilliant proofs of military skill, gave to Quintus Pompeius the command in Lusitania, and thereby revived the hopes and retrieved the affairs of the followers of Viriathus.

Quintus  
Pompeius  
unsuccessful  
in his  
attempt on  
the  
Numantines  
and  
Termantines.

The new consul, instead of directing his force to the subjugation of the Lusitanian hunter, who still kept the field, and was ever ready for the most desperate undertakings, had the weakness to provoke the hostility of the Termantines and Numantines, and thereby to involve himself in a quarrel which ultimately covered him with disgrace and defeat. These two small communities, which had hitherto remained independent, were desirous to continue in a state of neutrality, and for this purpose offered every fair and reasonable concession to the Roman general. But Pompeius declared that he would not be satisfied unless they delivered up their arms; as no other security, he said, could remove the suspicion which possessed his mind, that they intended secretly to cooperate with his enemies. War was the immediate consequence; and the consul made haste to punish the obstinacy of the Numantines, by investing their city with his whole army.

The proceedings of this Pompeius appear to have been equally inconsiderate in their origin and unsuccessful in their result. He was driven from before Numantia with considerable loss, both of men and of reputation. Upon this he removed his camp, and sat down under the walls of Termantia, where his operations were attended with still worse success. The people of that city sallied forth against him before his arrangements were completely formed, slew nearly a thousand of his soldiers, took a convoy which had been intended for the supply of his army, and destroyed a numerous detachment of horse, which they contrived to decoy into the passes of the mountains.

Servilius  
defeated by  
Viriathus.

Meanwhile, Servilius, who now served in Spain with the rank of proconsul, carried on the war against Viriathus; and this he did with so little ability, and with such a remarkable want of circumspection, that he allowed himself to be surrounded by that spirited chieftain, by whom he was soon compelled to sue for peace. The terms proposed by the Lusitanian were extremely moderate. He confined himself to the reasonable demand, that he should be permitted to retain whatever portion of the country he already possessed, promising to respect the claims of the Romans as masters of all the rest. Servilius gladly acceded to these conditions; and the

peace founded upon them was afterwards formally ratified by the senate and people of Rome. B.C. 198.

The following year, Pompeius, who was continued in his command, renewed his operations against the people of Numantia. He hoped to reduce the town by turning aside the course of the river Durius, or Douro, from which it was supplied with water; but in attempting to realize this project he lost so many of his men, that, finding himself unable any longer to contend with an enemy whose valour was more than equalled by their skill, he was content to make peace on much more unfavourable terms than they had originally offered to him.

Pompeius again falls in his attempt upon Numantia.

Viriathus had, in the mean time, assumed somewhat of the state and formality of a sovereign prince, observing faithfully his treaty with the Romans, and holding himself not unprepared to protect both the people and the territory which the chance of war had committed to his charge. Such a character at the head of an independent state could not fail to embitter the regret of the commanders whose arms he had baffled, and of the country whose ambitious schemes he had so long defeated. The Romans, accordingly, sought to create an occasion which might afford a pretext for the renewal of hostilities; and Quintus Servilius Cæpio, who is said to have courted this appointment, was sent against him at the head of a powerful army. Viriathus, whose forces were far inferior to those of the new consul, had recourse to negotiation; and seemed willing to avert the storm which impended over him, by making a considerable sacrifice to the cupidity of his adversaries. Cæpio demanded that he should surrender at discretion, and committ himself to the generosity or justice of the senate; a proposal which the Lusitanian chief spurned with the utmost indignation, and declared his resolution to abide by the hazard of the sword. But the fate of Viriathus was already determined. Two faithless attendants, won by the bribes and promises of the consul, murdered their master as he lay asleep; and in this way was brought to a conclusion, an eventful contest which had lasted more than fourteen years, and in which the native valour of the rude Iberian repeatedly triumphed over the discipline of the Roman legions, as well as over the experience and genius of some of their best commanders.

Assassination of Viriathus. B.C. 140.

While these events were occurring in the western parts of Spain, the eastern division was under the charge of the elder Cato, of the elder Tiberius Gracchus, and of other officers, who respectively endeavoured to secure what their countrymen had already conquered, and even to add to the extent of their dominions. As both Cato and Gracchus obtained a triumph, we are justified in concluding that there must have been several battles in the districts in which they commanded; but as the more minute facts and circumstances connected with these conflicts have eluded the industry of



B.C. 140. historians, it would be worse than a waste of time for us to attempt to supply the deficiency.

Brutus leads an Army into Gallicia. The death of Viriathus opened once more a wider field to the ambition and curiosity of the Romans. In little more than a year after that event, according to some writers, (though Appian places it a year or two before it,) Brutus conducted one of their armies across the Durius, and advanced even to the very coast of Gallicia: whence they reported, with more than the embellishment and exaggeration of ordinary travellers, that the sun, at his setting, was seen to sink into the western ocean, and to be extinguished in the waves with a mighty noise. But the principal undertaking which employed the Roman arms, after they were relieved from the opposition of Viriathus, was a renewed attack upon the city of Numantia. The consul Popilius was instructed to employ his troops in this nefarious service, in open violation of the treaty which his predecessor had contracted; and his success was such as to make a fit return for the treacherous views in which his attempt originated. The Numantines, rushing from their gates, inflicted such a discomfiture on the whole Roman army, that it was no longer able to keep the field; nor was the independence of that gallant people threatened with another siege, until a new consul and a fresh levy had restored courage to the enemy's hearts, and numbers to their ranks.

Popilius attacks Numantia and is repulsed.

Mancinus renews the attack, and is defeated with great Loss.

Consents to a Treaty which the Senate will not sanction.

Mancinus, who succeeded Popilius both as consul and commandant of the forces employed against Numantia, was doomed to sustain reverses still more severe than those which have just been described. The army under his charge, which consisted of more than thirty thousand men, was totally routed by less than one-third of their number. Twenty thousand fell in the battle; and the remainder, with their general, were surrounded by the Numantines in such a manner, that they could neither retreat nor advance, and consequently must all have perished by famine, or by the sword, had not their enemy, with more generosity than they were wont to experience from the Romans, set them at liberty, on condition that a treaty should be concluded and ratified by the senate. But the Roman government refused to sanction the stipulations of their consul. On the contrary, they not only declared the treaty to be null and void, but insisted, at the same time, upon delivering up Mancinus, together with Tiberius Gracchus his quæstor, into the hands of the Numantines, that they might suffer in their persons for the failure of an engagement which they had no power to fulfil. Gracchus appealed to the people, and was acquitted; whilst Mancinus, who acquiesced in the sentence of the senate, was presented naked and in chains at the gates of Numantia. But the citizens refused to receive the victim thus offered to their resentment. They denied that a breach of public faith could be expiated by the death of a single individual; and insisted that, if the treaty was not to be ratified, they had a


claim not for one man, but for the ten thousand whom, in reliance upon Roman honour, they had permitted to escape and to return to the service of their country. At length, after the consul had remained a whole day before the city, Furius, who now commanded in the Roman camp, ordered him to be brought back, but he himself did not think it prudent to hazard an engagement with the accomplished warriors of Numantia, either to avenge the disgrace of a friend, or to retrieve the reputation of the legions which had been so often compelled to turn their backs before the victorious weapons of a barbarous town. Neither did Calpurnius Piso, who succeeded Furius in Spain, venture to approach the walls of Numantia. He preferred the safer employment of driving away booty from the lands of the Pallantianians; and he spent what remained of his term of service in winter quarters, which he took up in the district of Carpetia. B.C. 140.

Fifty years had now elapsed since the commencement of those wars which the Romans found it necessary to wage with the natives of Spain, and in particular with Viriathus and the people of Numantia. This city, which makes so conspicuous a figure in the latter part of this history, was the capital of a small nation situated among the mountains of Old Castile, and containing no more than seven or eight thousand inhabitants. The town itself appears to have been placed on a strong point of land, where one of the tributary branches of the Douro forms its confluence with that river; both of which streams having very high banks, rendered the post on two of its sides of very difficult access, whilst, on the third side, it was fortified with a rampart and ditch. The inhabitants, though few in number, were greatly distinguished by their valour, were reputed the best horsemen in Spain, and were at least equal in the use of the pointed-sword and shield (weapons which were originally borrowed from that country,) to the Romans themselves. They had beaten several armies commanded by able generals, reduced two consuls to the necessity of suing for peace, and they had lately seen at their gates one of those distinguished magistrates, of whose life and liberty they were the acknowledged masters. Description  
of Numantia.

Mortified with repeated disappointment, as well as with the duration of a war, of which the difficulties increased in proportion to its length, the Roman people had now recourse to the tried abilities of Scipio Æmilianus, the conqueror of Carthage. Upon the arrival of this renowned soldier in Spain, he found, it is said, the Roman army at once extremely relaxed in courage, and sunk into a state of the greatest insubordination. Disheartened by numerous defeats, they were alarmed at the sight of the Spaniards, whose long hair, painted faces, and savage yells had made a deep impression upon their imaginations. Scipio  
Æmilianus  
appointed to  
the  
Command  
in Spain.

Scipio began by reforming the manners of the camp, and by

B.C. 133. reviving in the breasts of the soldiers that spirit and confidence of which late events had deprived them; himself setting the example of every military virtue, and being the first to submit to every necessary privation. Though at the head of superior numbers, he declined a battle with the triumphant Celtiberians; thinking it wiser to exhaust their ardent valour by expectation, and to drain their resources by a protracted contest. He had been joined on his march to Numantia by the celebrated Jugurtha, the grandson of Masinissa, who brought to the Romans a reinforcement of twelve elephants, with a considerable body of Numidian horse, archers, and slingers. But Scipio, though now at the head of sixty thousand men, did not attempt to storm the town. His object was to reduce it by famine, or to waste the strength of its defenders by useless sallies and constant watching; and in this line of policy his measures were so judicious, and his vigilance so unremittingly exercised, that no efforts of the enemy were able to divert him from his purpose, or to defeat his arrangements. Five aged warriors, attended each by a son, undertook to pass in the night through the lines of the besiegers, in order to solicit aid from the neighbouring nations; and having prevailed on the people of Lutia to embark in their cause, a hope was now entertained that Numantia might yet be saved. But Scipio,



[Tomb of the Scipios, Tarraconensis, Spain.—*L'Univers pittoresque.*]

who was informed of the intended relief, adopted effectual means to prevent its execution. He hastened to Lulia at the head of a competent force, surprised the inhabitants in their preparations, and demanding that four hundred of the young men should be delivered up to him, he gave orders that their hands should be immediately struck off. B.C. 133.

The Numantines, after this disappointment, pressed with famine, and having no longer any hopes of relief, addressed the Roman chief with the view of obtaining favourable conditions. He required an unrestricted submission; and would grant no terms that did not imply a complete surrender of their persons, their property, and their arms. This answer confirmed them in their resolution to die, either in defence of their walls, or amid the ramparts of their assailants. The end of the miserable scene, which was now fast approaching, is variously described by different authors; but it is agreed on all hands, that the inhabitants of Numantia, after having endured the most dreadful privations, perished almost to a man, rather than consent to see the Romans in possession of their city, or yield themselves the slaves of that detested nation. Their town was levelled with the ground; the spirit of the surrounding states was broken by the sight of the desolation with which that brave people was visited; and in the ashes of Numantia was extinguished the last spark of Spanish independence.

Fall of  
Numantia.

The tranquillity of the Roman government in Spain appears not to have suffered any interruption, except by the temporary inroad of the Cimbrian hordes, till the times of Marius and Sylla. The adherents of the latter commander, having obtained a complete ascendancy, attempted to destroy the powerful faction which had supported the pretensions of his rival: and as among those Sertorius had acted a conspicuous part under the consulate of Marius, he became an object of the bitterest jealousy and resentment to Sylla and his numerous followers. Sertorius had served in Spain in the capacity of prætor, and knew well the interests and views of that country; he no sooner perceived, therefore, that the cause of his patron was lost at Rome than he crossed the Pyrenees, unfurled his flag against the dominating faction, proclaimed protection to all his fellow-citizens, who, like himself, were dissatisfied with the condition of things at home, and declared his resolution to dispute with the ruling party the possession of the Spanish provinces.

Sertorius  
retires into  
Spain, and  
raises his  
Standard  
against Sylla.  
B.C. 77.

As soon as Sylla was informed of this rebellion, he sent into Spain a considerable army, under Caius Annius, with orders to crush the insurgent forces. Sertorius, aware that he would not be allowed to occupy in peace so important a province, despatched Julius Salinator with six thousand men to guard the passes of the Alps, and to watch the movements of his adversaries. Annius, having procured the death of Julius, made his way through the mountains, and appearing

B.C. 77. in the plain with an overwhelming preponderancy, compelled the prætor of Marius to seek for safety in Africa. Pursued by bad fortune, even to the wilds of Mauritania, Sertorius was reduced to the necessity of again putting to sea; but being unable to effect a re-landing in Spain, he strengthened his little fleet by the addition of some of the Cilician pirates, and made a descent on the island of Ivica, in which Annius had placed a small garrison. The lieutenant of Sylla made haste to succour his insular colony, and sailing for Ivica with a strong squadron of armed ships, was resolved to bring Sertorius to battle. A storm prevented the engagement; most of the ships were driven ashore, or swallowed up in the waves; and Sertorius, who had with difficulty escaped from the fury of the tempest, bore away with a few small vessels for the Straits of Gibraltar, and landing near the mouth of the Guadalquivir, refreshed his men on the shores of the Atlantic ocean. It was on that occasion that, fatigued by the vicissitudes of a hard fortune and filled with gloomy views as to the future, he is said to have listened to the romantic description of certain sailors, who charmed his ears with the delights and peaceful security which belonged to a group of happy islands lying scattered at a convenient distance in the western sea. He would have retired to that fabled paradise, had not the Cilician rovers, who preferred a more enterprising life, refused to accompany him, and sailed back to the coast of Africa.

Sertorius  
sails for  
Africa.

Sertorius in like manner returned into the Mediterranean, and commenced hostilities against an African prince whom he knew to be in alliance with the Romans. Having defeated this petty sovereign, whose name appears to have been Asculis, he was preparing to enjoy the fruits of his success, when he was informed that Pacianus, who had been sent by Sylla to assist the barbarian, was already marching to attack his conqueror. Upon this intelligence Sertorius put his troops in motion to meet this new enemy; and, although greatly inferior in number of men, he resolutely sustained the attack of Pacianus, and defeated him, with the loss of his life and the capture of nearly his whole army.

Is invited by  
the  
Lusitanians  
to command  
their Armies.

The reputation acquired by this victory retrieved the affairs of Sertorius. The Lusitanians, irritated by the conduct of Annius, resolved to throw off the yoke, and inviting the conqueror of Pacianus to assume the command of their army, they took the field against the deputy of Sylla, and set the whole power of Rome at defiance. The most brilliant success attended the arms of Sertorius. With two thousand six hundred men, whom he called Romans, (though of these seven hundred were Africans,) and an addition of four thousand light-armed Lusitanians and seven hundred horse, he carried on the war against four Roman generals, who had a hundred and twenty thousand foot, six thousand horse, two thousand archers and slingers, and cities without number under their command. Of the officers

opposed to him, he beat Cotta at sea, in the straits over against Mellaria, near the modern Trafalgar: he defeated Phidius, who had the chief command in Bætica, now Andalusia, and killed four thousand Romans, on the banks of the river from which that province takes its name. By his quæstor he vanquished Domitius and Lucius Manlius, proconsul of the Hither Spain: he likewise slew Thoranius, one of the officers sent against him by Metellus, and cut off the whole army under his command. Even Metellus himself, one of the most experienced and successful generals of his age, was not a match for Sertorius, in the species of warfare which the Lusitanians waged under his direction. Constantly changing his post, and flying from one fastness to another with a small body of active men, he cut off the Romans in every quarter, without allowing them time to make any arrangement for their defence, or even to see the enemy under whose hands their numbers were so rapidly reduced. If they began to march, says Plutarch, he was on the wing to harass them; and if they sat still, he galled them in such a manner that they were quickly forced to quit their ground. If they invested a town, he soon made his appearance, and by intercepting their convoys, besieged, as it were, the besiegers. In short, he combined in his character all the activity and hardness of savage life, with the policy and military skill of a Roman general.

B.C. 77,  
Gains  
advantages  
over the  
Romans.

Nor did Sertorius think it enough to fight the battles of the Spaniards: he also undertook to establish amongst them the habits and advantages of civilisation. He taught their soldiers all the more useful parts of Roman tactics; he founded schools for the education of youth; distinguished the meritorious by marks of his approbation; and even introduced among the higher orders the dress of Roman citizens. But his attention was soon called away from these pleasing occupations to encounter the pressure of an augmented host, conducted by the celebrated Pompey, who had been invested with the rank of proconsul, and sent from Rome to employ his splendid talents against this successful rebel.

He attempts  
to civilize the  
Spaniards.

The strength of Sertorius had been in the meantime considerably increased by the accession of an army of upwards of thirty thousand men, under Perpenna Vento, who had likewise intended to take refuge in Spain from the persecutions inflicted upon his party by the tools of Sylla. He was at the same time supplied with an additional motive to exert himself to the utmost; for, as Plutarch informs us, as long as he carried on the war against Metellus, his success was generally ascribed to the age and inactivity of his adversary, who had to contend with a bold young man, at the head of troops so light, that they might pass rather for a party of marauders than a regular army. But when Pompey had passed the Pyrenees, and Sertorius had taken post against him, every art of generalship, on both sides, was put in practice; and yet, even then, observes the

Is joined by  
the Army of  
Perpenna.

B.C. 77. same author, it appeared that, in point both of attack and of defence, Sertorius had the advantage. An opportunity very soon occurred which enabled the latter to exhibit a signal instance of his skill and resources. He had laid siege to Lauron, the modern Liria, which Pompey advanced with his whole army to relieve. The attention of both parties was fixed on the result; for, if Sertorius had earned a high name by his exploits in Lusitania, and by his repeated victories over Metellus, his opponent, on the other hand, had attained, under the discerning eye of Sylla, and even before he had reached the years of manhood, the appellation of Pompey the Great.

Takes the  
City of  
Lauron.

There was a hill at some distance from the walls of Lauron, the possession of which might be very annoying to the garrison of that city. Sertorius hastened to seize it, and Pompey to prevent him, but the former gained the post. Pompey, however, sat down near it with great satisfaction, thinking that he had been singularly fortunate in cutting the enemy off from the town; and under this impression he even sent a message to the Lauronites, assuring them that they might be perfectly easy, and sit quietly upon their walls and see him besiege Sertorius. When that warrior was informed of this boastful observation, he only laughed and said, "I will teach the pupil of Sylla, that a general ought to look behind him as well as before." At the same time he showed to the besieged a body of six thousand foot which he had in his camp to attack Pompey in the rear, while he himself advanced to assail him in front. Sertorius took the town and reduced it to ashes; and though Pompey (to use the strong expression of the historian,) was near enough to have warmed his hands at the flame, he dared not quit his post for fear of being surrounded, but was compelled to witness the discomfiture of his allies, and the utter demolition of their city.

Battle  
between  
Pompey and  
Sertorius.

But Sertorius, though successful wherever he commanded in person, sustained soon after the event now mentioned, a considerable loss in the defeat of his quæstor Herennius, whom Metellus overcame in battle with great slaughter. Afraid lest the conqueror should join the camp of Pompey, Sertorius made haste to attack the latter, who had taken up a position on the banks of the Sucro. Nor did the pupil of Sylla show any inclination to decline the combat: on the contrary, unwilling that Metellus should share in the honour of victory over so powerful an antagonist, he engaged in battle at the approach of night, though perfectly convinced that, whether successful or vanquished, the ensuing darkness could not but prove disadvantageous to him. Each general was victorious in that wing which he first commanded, and the issue of the fight seemed balanced in a doubtful equality, when Sertorius, having driven his immediate antagonist from the field, placed himself at the head of the division which had been repulsed by Pompey, and renewing the conflict with his usual valour, at length compelled that celebrated leader to consult

his safety by a rapid flight. Pompey had a very narrow escape, his horse being taken and himself slightly wounded by the African cavalry who pursued him. The victory, however, was not regarded by either army as decisive; and each was accordingly prepared to renew the struggle at the dawn of the following day. But Metellus had come up during the night; which when Sertorius observed, he commenced a retreat, observing, with a gay and sarcastic air, "If that old woman had not interposed, I would have flogged the boy well, and sent him back to school at Rome."

After a short interval, another battle was fought with similar success, though Pompey and Metellus had united both their arms and their counsels against Sertorius. On either side, signal acts of valour were performed. Memmius, Pompey's best officer, fell in the hottest of the fight. Sertorius, if we may believe Plutarch, carried all before him, and, through heaps of slain, made his way to Metellus, who manfully withstood him, and fought with a vigour above his years, till he was borne down by the stroke of a spear. The Romans, perceiving the danger of their general, rallied to save him, under the influence of shame as well as of humanity, and, renewing the fight with indescribable fury, they not only repulsed the victorious barbarians, but even succeeded in restoring the fortune of the day.

A second  
Battle.

Sertorius, upon this, found it expedient to occupy a stronghold in the mountains, whither he seems to have been followed by Pompey and Metellus. Escaping, however, from their pursuit, he made his way into Lusitania, where he once more raised such a powerful force as enabled him to appear again in the field, and to oppose himself to the united standards of his warlike countrymen. He recommenced his operations against them, both by sea and land, cutting off their convoys, hemming in their quarters, and waylaying their foraging parties, insomuch that the Roman commanders deemed it advisable to separate; the one retiring into Gaul, and the other taking up his winter station in the modern province of Biscay.

A fate similar to that of Viriathus was about to terminate the career of the more celebrated Sertorius, after having, for more than ten years, withstood successfully all the power of Rome. Perpenna, who had some time before led an army into Spain, and joined his ranks, at length conspired against him, and procured his death. This murderer, it should seem, was impatient of the ascendancy which his master had acquired, and more particularly of his boundless popularity among the troops; and, as his ambition aspired to the command of the brave soldiers who had so often foiled the arms of Pompey, and driven the combined army of Romans to the foot of the Pyrenees, he had no sooner accomplished his nefarious object, than he announced himself as the successor of Sertorius. But he

Murder of  
Sertorius,  
and Defeat  
of Perpenna.  
B.C. 73.



- B.C. 73. soon proved as unfit for the duties, as he was unworthy of the honour attached to that high office. Pompey, upon hearing that his formidable antagonist was no more, attacked the traitor, whom he easily defeated. He was taken prisoner, and afterwards executed as an enemy to his country; and in this way ended a war which, at one time, threatened the overthrow of the whole fabric of the Roman power in Spain.



[Roman Retiarium and Secutor.]

## CHRONOLOGY OF ITALY.

### LATIUM AND ALBA LONGA.

“The earliest known inhabitants of Italy are called by Cato and other writers, *Aborigines*, a term which, as Micale observes, must not be understood to signify a distinct race, native or foreign, but to apply to the tribes of Italy who were in the lowest state of civilization. These are said to have been first instructed in the simpler arts of social life by Janus, or Saturnus. Virgil ascribes the merit to the latter, and identifies him with the Greek Kronos, the father of Jove. \* \* \* \* \* The Siculi, who eventually gave name to Sicily, are said to have had their first seat on the banks of the Tiber, where they were sufficiently powerful to carry on long wars against the Umbri. The latter, however, at last prevailed, and the Siculi passed over into Sicily.”—*Sir John Stoddart*.

“It is supposed that the name Italia is deduced from Italus, one of the ancient kings of the country, or from the old Greek word *Ιταλος*, which signifies an *Ox*, the land abounding with this animal.”

<p>B.C. 2450 The Aborigines, under Saturn, found the kingdom afterwards called Latium. Long and bloody wars between the Umbri, Siculi, and other tribes. 1293 Migration of the Sicels into Sicily (? 1035.) Immigration of the Pelasgians from Greece into Italy. 1253 Settlement of Evander of Arcadia on the Palatine Hill (? 1244.) 1250 Agriculture extended and encouraged. Letters introduced by Evander. 1239 Latinus reigns in Italy. 1181 Æneas, from Troy, settles in Italy. The Heneti are settled in Upper Italy. The Argives in Lower Italy; and the exiled Trojans occupy the intervening country. 1152 Alba Longa founded by Ascanius, son of Æneas, the Trojan. Alba Longa flourishes. 1143 Sylvius Posthumus succeeds Ascanius. 1114 Æneas Sylvius reigns in Alba Longa. 1043 Latinus king of Alba Longa. 1038 Alba succeeds Latinus. 1002 Capetus, or Atys, king of Alba Longa. 976 Capys reigns in Alba Longa. 916 Calpetus, king of Alba Longa. 903 Tiberinus reigns in Alba Longa. 895 Defeat of Tiberinus near the river Albula, into which he throws himself, hence called the Tiber. Agrippa, king of Alba Longa. 864 Romulus, king of Alba Longa. 845 Aventinus, king of Alba Longa. 808 Procas reigns in Alba Longa. 800 Introduction of the Etruscan order of architecture.</p>	<p>B.C. 795 Numitor, king of Alba Longa. 794 Amulius seizes the throne of his brother Numitor, and condemns Ilia, his daughter, to perpetual celibacy. 771 Ilia, the vestal, is ravished. 770 Remus and Romulus born. Ilia buried alive; her twin children are sent adrift on the Tiber. Faustulus, a shepherd of Mount Aventine, rescues the children; and his wife, surnamed <i>Lupa</i>, nourishes them. 754 Romulus, grandson of Numitor, puts Amulius to death, and restores his grandfather. 753 Dispute between Romulus and Remus: the latter is slain by Celer. Remus buried on the hill Remuria. Romulus founds Rome. See <i>Rome</i>. 671 Cluilus, king of Alba Longa, sends ambassadors to Tullus Hostilius respecting a trespass upon his territory by the Romans. 670 The Albans invade the Roman territory; and the Romans retaliate upon theirs. Fight between the three Horatii and the three Curiatii, the latter are killed, one of the others only survives. Submission of the Albans to the Romans. 664 The Albans, wishing to regain their independence, incite the Veientes and Fidæneans to war with Rome. 665 Mettius, the general of the Albans, acts cowardly and treacherously in a battle between the Romans and Veientes, &amp;c. After the battle, Mettius is punished by being torn to pieces; Alba Longa is rased, and the Albans transferred to Rome. <i>End of the Kingdom of Alba Longa.</i></p>
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### MAGNA GRÆCIA, AND ETRURIA.

“Prior to the eminence obtained by the Romans, there were, in Italy, two main centres of that refinement which gradually spread over the Peninsula. These were the countries called Magna Græcia and Etruria. The Grecian adventurers who had landed on the south-eastern part of Italy (Magna Græcia) built, or seized from the natives, the towns of Metapontus, Corton, Sybaris, Tarentum, Locri, and others. The governments in all these were republican. They rapidly acquired wealth and splendour. The new Greek cities, in a short time, sent out colonies themselves to neighbouring lands; and the whole coast, from Tarentum on the Adriatic, to Cumæ near Naples, was studded with Grecian cities.”—*Sir John Stoddart*.

- 1710 A colony of Arcadians, under Cœnotrus, settle in Italy; they give the name Cœnotria to the country which is afterwards called Magna Græcia (? 1680.)
- 1030 Cumæ founded by colonists from Chalcis in Eubœa.
- ! Neapolis and Zancle settled by the Cumæans.
- ? Etrurian colonies in Campania.
- 800 Etrurian architecture famed.
- 774 Pandosia and Metapontus colonised.
- 749 Rhegium founded by the Chalcidians, or Milesians, under Alcidas.
- 721 Colonies of Achæans and Trazenians found Sybaris.
- 710 Crotona founded by the Achæans.
- 708 The Partheniæ, under Phalanthus, plant Tarentum in Apulia.
- 706 The Locri Ozolæ establish Locri Epizephyrii.
- 673 Locri founded, according to Eusebius.
- 660 Zaleucus gives laws to the Locri Epizephyrii.
- 600 Rise of Sybaris: the inhabitants indulge in great luxury.
- 564 Alalia, in Corsica, founded by Phocæans.
- 560 Ibycus, the poet of Rhegium, fl.
- 550 Pythagoras legislates for Magna Græcia.
- 511 Overthrow of Sybaris by the Crotoniatæ. Etruria about this time consists of twelve confederated cities.
- 508 Porsenna, king of Clusium, takes Rome, and greatly limits its territory.
- 506 War with Aricia; Aruns, the son of Porsenna, defeated; Porsenna quits Rome to fight against the Latins; Sybaris destroyed; Milo, with 100,000 Crotonians, defeat 300,000 Sybarians.
- The Etruscans expelled Upper Italy by the marauding Gauls.
- 504 Parmenides, phil. of Elea, fl.
- Incursions of the Gauls.
- 499 Death of Pythagoras (? 497; see 472.)
- 483 The Drama, Architecture, and Music, fl. in Etruria.
- 476 Death of Anaxilaus of Rhegium.
- Naval defeat of the Etruscans by the Carthaginians.
- 474 Etruria flourishes; civilization extends; fine arts cultivated; luxury succeeds.
- 472 Death of Pythagoras, the philosopher, at Metapontum, aged 99.
- 467 Anaxilaus' sons receive possession of their inheritance.
- 417 War with the Samnites, who seize colonies in Campania.
- 405 Siege of Veii by the Romans.
- 395 Veii taken by the Romans.
- The other cantons of Etruria continue to offer a vigorous resistance to the encroachments of Rome.
- 345 Twelve cities in Campania destroyed by an earthquake.
- 338 Archidamus of Sparta defeated and slain at Locri.
- 308 Battle of Lacus Vadimonis; the Romans victorious.
- 283 Etruria finally subdued to Rome.
- End of the Etruscan state.*

## CHRONOLOGY OF SICILY.

Tradition reports that the Siculi, when expelled Italy by the Umbri, drove the Sicani before them. This tribe, it is said, had arrived from Spain some years previously, and having destroyed or expelled the Aborigines, occupied their settlements. Dr. Stoddart imagines that both the Siculi and Sicani were one tribe. They probably had a common origin.

- B.C.
- 1293 The Sicels form colonies in the island. [Some ancient historians place this event in the year B.C. 1264, others at 1035.] The Greeks (Ionians and Dorians) settle on the eastern and southern shores.
- 753 Catania, at the foot of Mount Ætna, founded by a colony from Chalcis (? 735.)
- 735 The Ionians, under Theocles, plant Naxos.
- 734 A colony of Corinthians, under Archias, founds Syracuse.
- Actæon put to death by Archias and Chersicrates (? 769.)
- 730 Catana planted by Gnarchas (? 753.) A settlement commenced at Trotilas.
- 728 Colony of Megara Hyblæa.
- 713 Gela founded (? 690.)
- 690 Lacius plants Gela.
- 668 The Messenians arrive at Zancle, which they name Messene.
- 664 The Syracusans colonise Acraë.
- 648 Theron founds Himera.
- 644 Casmenæ founded by Syracusans.
- 632 Stesichorus, the poet, born at Himera.
- 627 Lipara colonized.—Eusebius (? 579.)
- 612 Stesichorus, the poet, fl.
- 599 Camarina founded by a colony from Syracuse, under Dascon and Meriecolus.
- 504
- B.C.
- 582 Agrigentum founded.—Thucydides.
- 579 Lipara founded.—Diodorus (? 627.)
- 571 Birth of Pythagoras.
- 570 Accession of Phalaris of Agrigentum.
- 553 Death of Stesichorus, aged 79. Camarina destroyed.
- 549 Death of Phalaris of Agrigentum.
- 540 Ibiens of Rhegium, poet, fl.
- 505 Cleander, tyrant of Gela.
- 500 Epicharmus the comedian.
- 498 Camarina ceded to Hippocrates.
- 497 Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela.
- The Gameraï expelled Syracuse by the Demonata.
- 485 Gelon becomes tyrant of Syracuse; he restores the Gameraï.
- 483 Epicharmus, the comic writer, comes from Megara to Syracuse.
- 480 Victory of Gelon over the Carthaginians and Persians at Himera; death of Hamilcar the elder.
- Gorgias, the orator, born in Leontium.
- 478 Hiero I. succeeds his brother Gelon. Æschylus at the court of Hiero.
- Syracuse celebrated for its flour.
- 477 Epicharmus, the poet, fl. at Syracuse.
- Pindar and Bacchylides, at Hiero's court.

- 476 Simonides patronized by Hiero.  
 474 Hiero's naval victory over the Tuscans.  
 472 Death of Theron of Agrigentum (? 476.)  
 471 Empirics instituted by Acron of Agrigentum (? 473.)  
 467 *Thrasylbulus* (another brother of Gelon) succeeds Hiero I.  
 466 Dethronement and expulsion of *Thrasylbulus* for cruelty.  
 Democratic form of government established.  
 461 Gelon restores *Camarina* (599 and 553.)  
 Syracuse the chief city of Sicily.  
 459 *Gorgias* of *Leontium*, fl. (480.)  
 456 Death of *Æschylus* the poet.  
 451 *Duceius* unites the Sicels under his sway.  
 450 *Empedocles*, the philos. fl. at Agrigentum.  
 446 Agrigentum reduced by the Syracusans.  
 444 *Empedocles* of Agrigentum, fl.  
 443 Death of *Epicarmus*.—*Lucian*.  
 440 Death of *Duceius*.  
 431 Birth of *Dionysius* the elder.  
 423 *Antiochus* of Syracuse brings down his history to this date.  
 417 The *Leontines*, at war with Syracuse, receive assistance from Athens.  
 415 The Athenians invade Sicily, and capture the city of *Catana*.  
 414 Syracuse besieged by the Athenians.  
 The Spartans, under *Gylippus*, come to the aid of the Syracusans.  
 413 The Athenians defeated at the time of a solar eclipse (? 414)  
 412 *Diocles* gives laws to the Syracusans; a republic and commonwealth established.  
 409 *Selinus* and *Himera* fall before the Carthaginians.  
 407 An army of 400,000 Carthaginians arrives in Sicily.  
 406 Agrigentum taken by the Carthaginians.  
*Phylistus* the historian promotes the interest of *Dionysius*.  
*Dionysius I.* becomes master of Syracuse.  
 399 War between Syracuse and *Rhegium*.  
*Catapultæ* invented by *Dionysius*.  
 398 *Dionysius* at war with the Carthaginians—*Hannibal* and *Himilco*.  
 Victories of Carthaginians over *Dionysius*.  
 396 Syracuse besieged; *Dionysius* reduced to great distress; a pestilence compels the Carthaginians to retire.  
 393 *Xenarchus* the poet flourishes in the court of *Dionysius*.  
 392 *Dionysius*, aided by *Agyris*, defeats the Carthaginians; they sue for peace.  
 391 *Dionysius* establishes a colony at *Messena*, as a stronghold against *Rhegium*.  
 League of the Greek cities in Italy against *Dionysius*.  
 390 Alliance of *Dionysius* with the *Lucanians*.  
 389 Victory of *Dionysius* at the river *Helorus*.  
 387 *Rhegium* taken by *Dionysius*.  
*Damon* and *Pythias*; their fidelity to each other causes *Dionysius* to spare *Damon*.  
 385 *Dionysius* represses the piracy on the *Etruscan* coasts.  
 He enters into alliance with the Spartans.  
 383 War again with the Carthaginians; they are defeated, and *Mago* slain.  
*Dionysius* defeated by the Carthaginians.  
 Peace with the Carthaginians.  
 379 The Carthaginians invade Italy.  
 368 Fourth war between the Syracusans and Carthaginians.  
 Treaty of peace.  
 367 *Dionysius I.* poisoned (?); his Son *Dionysius II.* succeeds.  
 360 Banishment of *Dion*.  
 357 *Dion* returns and seizes Syracuse.  
 356 Expulsion of *Dionysius* from Syracuse after twelve years reign.  
*Philistus*, who had espoused the cause of *Dionysius*, is defeated and slain.  
 353 *Calippus* murders *Dion*.  
 347 *Dionysius II.* regains the govt. of Syracuse.  
 344 Defeat of *Hicetas* and his Carthaginian allies by *Timoleon* of Corinth.  
 343 Syracuse taken by *Timoleon*.  
*Dionysius* sent to Corinth.  
 339 *Timoleon* obtains a victory over the Carthaginians at the *Crimesus*.  
 337 Death of *Timoleon* at Syracuse.  
 317 *Agathocles* usurps the government.  
 Syracusans and Carthaginians at war.  
 310 *Agathocles* is defeated in battle, and then besieged in Syracuse.  
*Agathocles* (during the seige of Syracuse) goes over to Africa, carrying war into the Carthaginian territory.  
 Defeat of the Carthaginians by *Agathocles*.  
 306 Peace with the Carthaginians.  
 289 *Agathocles* poisoned by *Mænon*, who assumes the government.  
*Hicetas* expels *Mænon*, and rules in Syracuse as *Prætor*.  
 278 *Thymon* and *Sostratus's* usurpation.  
*Pyrrhus*, of *Epirus*, lands in Sicily.  
 He defeats the Carthaginians, and gets possession of their towns.  
 275 *Pyrrhus* quarrels with the Sicilian princes; hence he departs for Italy.  
 270 Defeat of the *Mamertines* by *Hiero*.  
*Hiero II.* reigns in Syracuse  
 263 *Hiero* renounces his alliance with Carthage, and joins the Romans.  
 262 Agrigentum taken by the Romans.  
 260 *Corsica*, *Lipara*, and *Malta*, lost to the Carthaginians.  
 224 A *planetarium* constructed by *Archimedes*; by whom the measuring of solids, conic sections, &c., the properties of the lever, &c., is demonstrated.  
 216 *Hieronymus* succeeds *Hiero*.  
 215 War with Rome.  
 214 *Marcellus* besieges Syracuse.  
 212 Syracuse taken by the Romans.  
 Death of *Archimedes*.  
*Sicily a part of the Roman empire.*

## CHRONOLOGY OF ROME.

“The history of Rome, such as it has been popularly received down to our own times, opens with a fable, but without such a mixture of mythological fiction, as abounds in the wild traditions of the East. The traditionary *Romulus* is a mere symbol, or representative of a tribe who

occupied a fortified hill, which they (being perhaps of Pelasgic or Greek origin) called *Pápm*, *Roma*, the "strength," or "stronghold." Another tribe (of Latin or Sabine origin) were called *Quirites*, from the Sabine word, *quiris*, a spear, they being good spearmen."—*Sir J. Stoddart*.  
 "It is probable that the Latins belonged to that great race which, in very early times, overspread Greece and Italy, under the various names of Pelasgians, Tyrsenians, and Sicilians."—*Arnold*.

- B.C.  
 753 *Rome founded* according to Varro.  
 [Cato, 751; Polybius, 750; Fabius Pictor, 747; Cincius, 728.]  
*Romulus*, the first king, extends his dominions by military conquests.  
 He gives laws to his people.  
 The Constitution is based on agriculture.  
 The *Senate* consists of 100 members.  
 The three tribes, *Ramnes*, *Tities*, and *Luceres*, of 10 *Curie* each.  
 Clients the germ of the *Plebs*.  
 750 Rape of the Sabine women.  
 War with the Sabines.  
 747 The Sabines settle on the Capitoline and *Quirinal*; league with *Romulus*.  
*Tatius*, kg. of Sabines, slain at *Laurentum*.  
 War with *Veii*.  
*Earthenware* in use.  
 732 *Circensian games* established by *Romulus*.  
 716 Murder of *Romulus* by the Senators.  
 715 *Numa Pompilius*, founder of the national religion, succeeds.  
 Music at the time of sacrifice introduced.  
 713 January and February placed before March, by *Numa Pompilius*—increasing the year from ten to twelve months of 360 days.  
 710 *Angurs* and *vestals* instituted.  
 677 *Tullus Hostilius*, king (? 672 or 673.)  
 672 The *Albans* encamp near *Rome*; the ditch *Fossa Cluilia* thrown up.  
 671 Mutual outrages on property by the inhabitants of *Rome* and *Alba Longa*.  
*Tullus*, desirous of war, makes prisoners of the ambassadors from *Alba Longa*.  
 670 The celebrated and decisive fight between the *Horatii* and *Curatii*.  
 665 Treachery of the *Albans* in exciting the *Fidenæ* and *Veii* to revolt.  
*Tullus* defeats his enemies.  
 The *Romans* destroy *Alba Longa*, and transfer its inhabitants to *Rome*.  
 Rise of the *Plebeian* caste.  
 Wars with the *Fidenæ* and *Veii*.  
 League with the *Latins*.  
 The *Senate* increased to 200.  
 640 *Ancus Martius* king of *Rome*.  
 Great extension of *Roman* territory.  
 The port of *Ostia* founded.  
 Settlement of the conquered *Latins* on the *Aventine* hill; and establishment of the *Plebeian order*:—  
 [The inhabitants of the conquered towns, which *Tullus* and *Ancus* had removed to *Rome*, were formed into a class distinct from the *populus* or true *Roman* citizens.]  
*Dyrrbachium* in *Illyria* occupied.  
 621 Institution of the *Laurentalia* festivals.  
 618 *Tarquinius Priscus*, king, in whose reign *Rome* flourished.  
 Public works on an extensive scale.  
 616 The foundation of the *Capitol* laid.  
 The Sabines and *Latins* conquered.  
 The *Senate* increased to 300; the additional 100 named the "Minores Gentes."  
 The number of *Equites* doubled.
- B.C.  
 605 The *Circensæ* Maximus built.  
 600 The *Cloacæ* built.  
 578 *Servius Tullius*, sixth king of *Rome*.  
 The *Esquiline* and *Viminalis* added to the *City* tribes.  
 Money first coined at *Rome*.  
 566 First census of *Rome*: citizens, 84,700.  
 First *Lustrum* performed by *Servius*.  
 550 Constitution of *Servius*; he divides the people of *Rome* into six classes, according to their property; the *proletarians* alone exempted from taxes and military duties.  
 The thirty *Plebeian* tribes.  
 Institution of the *Comitia Centuriata*.  
 Army reviewed in the field of *Mars*.  
 Wall and ditch around *Rome*.  
 534 Murder of *Servius*; usurpation of *Tarquinius II.* (*Superbus*); who seizes the throne without election, and, at the same time, claims supremacy over other cities.  
 He abrogates the constitution formed by his predecessor; greatly oppresses the *Plebeians*, and persecutes the *Patricians*.  
 War against *Latium*; it is conquered.  
*Rome* is head of the *Latin* confederacy.  
 War with the *Volscians*; *Suessia Pometia* conquered.  
 Colonies sent to *Signia*, *Circeii*, and *Cora*.  
 520 The *Sibylline* books brought from *Cumæ*.  
 First appointment of the *Duumviri* to take care of them.  
 Temple of *Capitoline Jupiter* built in the *Tuscan* order.  
 510 Siege of *Ardea*; dispute between the king's sons and their cousins.  
 509 *Lucretia* violated by *Sextus*; invokes revenge, and stabs herself.  
 Conspiracy, headed by *Brutus*.  
*Tarquin* expelled; kingly government in *Rome* abolished.  
 Two *Consuls* appointed—*L. Junius Brutus* and *L. Tarquinius Collatinus*—by whom is established—  
 The *Roman Republic*.  
 Attempts of *Tarquin* to gain the kingdom.  
 War with the *Etruscans*; *Brutus* killed.  
 508 First commercial treaty with *Carthage*.  
 "Lex de *Provocatione*" of *Valerius Poplicola*—securing the right of appeal to all *Roman* citizens.  
 War with the *Tarquins* and their ally, *Porsenna* of *Clusium*.  
*Rome* besieged, and taken by *Porsenna*.  
 Diminution of the tribes to 20.  
 507 The *Capitoline Temple* dedicated by the *Consul Horatius*.  
 Census: *Roman* citizens, 130,909.  
 504 *Appius Claudius* comes to *Rome*.  
 503 Death of *P. Valerius Poplicola*.  
 502 War with the *Latins*.  
 501 Office of *Dictator* instituted; according to some, *M. Valerius* was the first appointed; other authorities mention the name of *Titus Lartius Flavinus* (? 498.)

- 501 Sp. Cassius Viscellinus the first *Magister Equitum*.
- 500 Commencement of the civil contests between the Plebeians and Patricians. Temple of Minerva built.
- 498 Titius Lartius, the first *Dictator*, according to some (see above, 501.)
- 496 Battle of Regillus; the Latins defeated by the Romans. Death of Tarquinius Superbus at Cumæ. [The mythical period of Roman history ends about this time.]
- 495 Addition of the tribus Claudia, which increases the tribes to 21.
- 494 First secession of the Plebs to Mons Sacer. *Tribunes* of the people, and *Ædiles* first appointed.
- 493 Cassius's treaty with the Latins.
- 492 The Volscians defeated; Corioli captured. Institution of the *Comitia Tributa*, or free assembly of the people (? 494.) Famine in Rome. "Lex Icilia," enjoining silence during the addresses of the *Tribunes*. Norba colonized.
- 491 Coriolanus, in exile among the Volscians, rises in importance.
- 489 Rome attacked by the Volscians under the command of Coriolanus.
- 488 Coriolanus withdraws the Volscians from Rome at the request of his mother.
- 486 Cassius's league with the Hernici. First "Agrarian law;" the lands of the conquered Hernici equally divided.
- 485 Cassius put to death. *Quæstors* first appointed.
- 483 War with Veii, and other states. The Fabia Gens in the ascendant.
- 481 Icilius, Tribune of the Plebs, re-introduces the Agrarian law of Cassius.
- 480 Battle with the Etruscans; Manlius killed.
- 479 Proposal of Quintus Fabius to distribute lands among the Plebs. The Fabii (305 in all) undertake the war against Veii; they establish themselves in the Cremera.
- 477 Fight between the Fabii and Veientes; heroic death of the former, one only (a child) survives. Menenius impeached and fined; he soon after dies of grief.
- 476 The Janiculum taken by the Veientes, and re-taken by the Romans.
- 475 Servilius impeached by the *Tribunes*, but is acquitted.
- 474 Truce with Veii for forty years.
- 473 The Tribune Genucius impeaches the Consuls of 474, for which the Patricians has him assassinated.
- 472 Publius Volero proposes that the *Tribunes* should be elected by the *Comitia Tributa*.
- 471 Publius Volero, again Tribune, carries the "Lex Publilia."  
[This extension of the popular prerogatives rendered the Plebeians comparatively independent of the Patres.] War with the *Æquians* and Volscians; the army deserts Appius Claudius.
- 470 Appius Claudius impeached. Death of Claudius before trial.
- 468 The Romans take Antium.
- 467 Antium colonized.
- 465 Census: 134,214 Roman citizens, capable of bearing arms.
- 463 A pestilence rages in Rome.
- 462 The demand for public written laws by the Plebeians becomes general. Victory over the Volscians and *Æquians*.
- 461 Terentillus, the Tribune, demands on behalf of the people that the consular power should be limited. Fixed code of laws proposed. Condemnation of Kaeso Quinctius. Earthquake at Rome.
- 460 Cincinnatus chosen from the plough-tail as one of the Consuls. The struggle between the Patricians and Plebeians continues. Herdonius takes advantage of the commotion to seize the Capitol; it is besieged and taken—the Consul Valerius killed.
- 459 Revolt of Antium; subdued. The Volscian war continues.
- 458 The *Æquians* and Sabines shut up the Romans under Minucius in their camp. Cincinnatus is chosen Dictator. He effects the deliverance of the Romans.
- 457 *Tribunes* increased from five to ten.
- 456 The "Lex Icilia;" Mons Aventinus assigned to the Plebeians.
- 455 The *Æquians* defeated. "Lex Aternia Tarpeia," by which magistrates might fine for contempt.
- 454 End of the contest respecting public laws; the Patricians submit:— Three ambassadors proceed to Greece to learn and report on the Grecian laws.
- 452 Return of the Ambassadors: resolutions based upon their report.
- 451 Institution of the *Decemviri*, as substitutes for the Consuls and the *Duumviri*. Laws of the X. tables compiled. Connubium between Patres and Plebs forbidden (see 445.)
- 450 Second appointment of the *Decemviri*. The law tables increased to XII.; they were chiefly compiled from those of Athens.
- 449 Outrage of Appius Claudius. Virginia killed by her father. Secession of the Plebs to Mons Sacer. Deposition of the *Decemviri*; the consular authority restored; flight of Claudius. The Sabines and *Æquians* defeated. "Leges Valeriæ," for the protection of magistrates from personal injury, &c.
- 448 "Lex Trebonia," a law regulating the election of the *Comitia*.
- 447 Election of the *Quæstors* by the people for the first time.
- 446 The *Tribunitia potestas* renewed.
- 445 The "Lex Canuleia," or jus connubii between Patricians and Plebeians. Appointment of the *Tribuni Militum* with consular power.
- 444 Election of three *Tribuni Militum*; they soon abdicate; their places filled by Consuls.
- 443 Appointment of *Censors*. [At first they only numbered the people, but afterwards their power was extended over the surveys and rates of the city, and the manners of the people.] The *Duumviri Navales* appointed. The Volscians defeated.
- 442 Ardea colonized.

- 440 Famine at Rome; Sp. Maelius, the first Præfectus Annonæ, distributes corn to the poor of the city.
- 439 Quinctius Cincinnatus II. Dictator. Sp. Maelius killed by C. Servilius Structus Ahala, magister equitum.
- 438 Revolt of the Fidæneans to Veii. The Roman ambassadors murdered.
- 437 Fidæne again subdued (? 435.) Victory over the Veientes.
- 434 War with the Tuscans.
- 433 "Lex Æmilia," limiting the duration of the censorship to eighteen months. The Temple of Apollo dedicated.
- 431 The Æquians and Volscians defeated at Mount Algidus, by A. P. Tubertius.
- 430 "Lex P. Mulctarum," instituting payment of taxes in money instead of cattle, &c.
- 427 War with Veii, declared by the Comitia Centuriata.
- 426 Revolt, capture, and destruction of Fidæne.
- 425 A twenty years' truce with Veii.
- 423 War with the Volscians resumed.
- 421 Four Quæstors elected instead of two.
- 420 The Campanians conquer Cumæ.
- 418 Lavici taken from the Æquians, and made a Roman colony.
- 414 War again with the Æquians; Bola and other places conquered. The power of the Samnites ascendant. Postumius put to death by the soldiers.
- 410 An Agrarian law proposed by the Tribune Maenius.
- 409 Three Plebeian Quæstors.
- 407 Battle with the Volscians, and defeat.
- 406 Anxur taken from the Volscians. Rupture again between Rome and Veii. Soldiery first paid, for which a war-tax is levied, also to maintain a standing army.
- 405 Siege of Veii commenced (396.)
- 403 "Æs Uxorum," a tax on old bachelors.
- 402 Defeat by the Veientes. The Volscians recover Anxur.
- 400 The Romans again take Anxur.
- 399 Pestilence at Rome; a Lectisternium (the first) appointed.
- 398 Embassy to Delphi to consult the Oracle.
- 396 Veii taken by Camillus, dictator.
- 393 The territory of the Veientes divided among the Plebs.
- 391 Banishment of Camillus.
- 390 Battle at Allia; the Gauls, under Brennius, defeat the Romans. The Gauls enter Rome, and burn it. Recall of Camillus, who dissuades the people from retiring to Veii. The Gauls evacuate Rome in seven months.
- 389 Rome rebuilt. Alliance of the Latins and Hernicians with Rome renounced. Victories of Camillus.
- 387 Four new tribes added, increasing the number to 25 (? 389.) Institution of the Ludi Capitolini.
- 386 The Etruscans, &c. defeated.
- 385 The Volscians defeated. A colony sent to Satricum.
- 384 Trial, condemnation, and execution of Manlius Capitolinus.
- 383 The Plebeians are given the district—Ager Pomptinus.
- 382 War between Rome and Præneste.
- 381 War with the Volscians renewed.
- 380 Q. Cincinnatus takes Præneste.
- 376 The three Licinian Rogations proposed by C. Licinius and L. Sextus (366.)
- 375 The passing of the three Rogations, opposed by the Patricians. The Tribunes prevent the election of Patrician magistrates till 371.
- 371 War with Velitræ. Consular Tribunes are elected by permission of Licinius and Sextus (? 370.)
- 367 The "Rogationes Liciniæ" are passed and adopted into the laws, by which one of the Consuls is to be a Plebeian. The office of Prætor instituted—to be confined to the Patricians. The Gauls defeated by Camillus. He dedicates a temple to Concordia, to celebrate the union of Patres and Plebs.
- 366 L. Sextus elected the first Plebeian Consul. [The tribunate of Sextus and Licinius had been renewed every year during the "Licinian" struggle—a period of 10 years.] L. Furius Camillus the first Prætor. Curile Ediles first elected. [The Patricians have now the privilege of choosing a Prætor and Curile Ædiles.]
- 365 Pestilence rages at Rome. Camillus dies. The Agrarian law of Licinius Stolo.
- 364 Institution of the Ludi Scenici, to appease the gods on account of the plague.
- 362 The Plebs for the first time elect half of the Tribuni Militum. Earthquake at Rome; romantic death of Marcus Curtius.
- 361 Gallic invasion; single combat—Manlius the Roman, victor; he is called Torquatus.
- 360 The Gauls and Tiburtines defeated by Servilius Ahala.
- 359 Unsuccessful attempt of the Tiburtines to enter Rome at night.
- 358 The Gauls and Hernicians defeated. Fabius repulsed by the Tarquinienses. Alliance with Latium renewed. "Lex Poetalia," against canvassing and bribery at elections, proposed. The tribes increased to twenty-seven.
- 357 "Lex Duilia," regulating the rate of interest. "Lex Manlia," imposing a tax on manumitted slaves. Invasion of Lower Italy by Alexander, the king of Epirus (332.) Privernum, in Latium, taken. Legal interest settled at 10 per cent.
- 356 C. Martius Rutilus, first Plebeian Dictator. The Etruscans defeated.
- 355 The two Consuls Patricians (367.)
- 354 The Consuls again Patricians (367.) Alliance with the Samnites. Etruscan prisoners put to death.
- 353 War with the Tarquini. Truce of 100 years with Caere.
- 352 Appointment of the Quinqueviri Mensarii for a general liquidation of debts.
- 351 C. Martius Rutilus, first Plebeian Censor. Truce of forty years with Tarquini.
- 350 Popilius, Consul, defeats the Gauls.
- 349 The Consuls again Patricians (367.) Camillus defeats the Gauls. Single combat; Valerius Corvus, victor.
- 348 Treaty with Carthage renewed.

- 347 Interest on money reduced to 5 per cent.  
 346 Ludi Seculares.  
 The Volscians lose Satricum.  
 345 Twelve cities in Campania destroyed by an earthquake.  
 War with the Aurunci.  
 344 Dedication of the *Ædes Monetae*.  
 343 The *Samnite Wars* commenced.  
 The Campanians under Roman protection.  
 Defeat of the Samnites by Valerius.  
 342 The army at Capua rebel—general insurrection of the Plebs.  
 Concessions of the Patres to the Plebs:—  
 “*Lex Genucia*,” abolishing interest on money; Valerius, Dictator, &c.  
 341 Peace with the Samnites.  
 340 War with the Latins; self-devotion of Decius, and defeat of the enemy.  
 339 “*Leges Publiliae*,” 1. the plebiscita made binding; 2. the decrees of the *Comitia Centuriata* rendered independent of the vote of the *Comitia Curiata*; 3. one of the Censors to be a Plebeian.  
 338 The Latins and Campanians subdued.  
 337 Q. Publius Philo, first *Plebeian Prætor*.  
 335 Peace with the Gauls.  
 Capture of Cales in Campania.  
 334 Cales a Roman colony.  
 332 The Ascerrani made citizens; but are denied the *Suffragium*.  
 The Roman tribes increased to twenty-nine.  
 War of the Samnites and Lucanians with Alexander of Epirus.  
 Romans make a treaty with Alexander.  
 Alexander of Epirus slain in Lucania.  
 330 Fundi and Privernum rebel.  
 329 Capture of Privernum; the *Civitas* conferred upon its inhabitants.  
 328 Fregellæ colonized.  
 327 The Samnite war renewed.  
 326 War with Palæopolis; it is taken.  
 “*Lex Poetelia Papiria*,” preserving to debtors their civil freedom and status.  
 324 The Samnites defeated.  
 323 League with the Apulians and Lucanians.  
 322 The Samnites again defeated.  
 321 The Roman army surrender to the Samnites at the Caudine Forks.  
 319 Papirius defeats the Samnites.  
 318 A two years’ truce with the Samnites.  
 The Roman tribes increased to 31.  
 315 The Samnites defeat Fabius.  
 314 The Samnites defeated.  
 Revolt of the Campanians: subdued.  
 313 Capua, Saticula, Suessa, and the isle of Pontia, colonized by Romans.  
 312 New war with the Etruscans.  
 Claudius constructs the *Via Appia*, the first of the Roman military roads; also, the *Gnomon* and *Aqua Appia*.  
 He distributes the “*Libertini*” among all the Roman tribes.  
 Calendar of the *Fasti* and *Nefasti* (? 304.)  
 311 Victories over the Etruscans and Samnites.  
 310 Etruscans and Samnites defeated, though at first victorious.  
 Claudius retains his censorship contrary to the *Lex Æmilia* (433.)  
 309 Victories over the Samnites and Etruscans.  
 308 League with the Umbrians.  
 War against Peligni and Marsi.  
 307 Battle of Alifan: Samnites defeated.
- 306 Revolt of the Hernicans subdued; and the Samnites defeated.  
 305 Bovianum taken fr. the Samnites; a truce.  
 304 Defeat of the *Æquians*.  
 Peace with the Samnites, Marsi, &c.  
 The “*Libertini*” classed with the four tribes of the city.  
 Dedication of temples without the consent of the Senate forbidden.  
 Calendar of the *Fasti* and *Nefasti* (312.)  
 The “*Civile Jus*” published.  
 303 Institution of the *Tribus Urbanae*.  
 Colonies of Alba and Sora.  
 302 The *Æquians* defeated.  
 300 The first Plebeian Priests, by virtue of the “*Lex Ogulnia*,” which increased the Pontifices to eight, and the *Augurs* to nine.  
 “*Lex Valeria*,” for the protection of Plebeian magistrates, ratified.  
 299 Two tribes added; now numbering 33.  
 Narnia colonized.  
 298 The third Samnite war.  
 Samnites and Etruscans defeated; the former at Bovianum, the latter at Volaterræ.  
 Carseoli colonized.  
 295 The Gauls, Etruscans, Samnites, and Umbrians defeated at Sentinum.  
 Self-sacrifice of Decius Mus.  
 294 Truce for 40 years with the Etrurian cities—Arretium, Perugia, and Volscinii.  
 293 Census taken: citizens, 272,300.  
 First sun dial seen at Rome; the day divided into hours.  
 292 The Samnites defeat the younger Fabius.  
 Victory of the elder Fabius; the Samnite general, Pontius, taken.  
 291 Cominium taken from the Samnites.  
 Venusia a Roman colony.  
 290 Final victory over the Samnites; they sue for peace (see 343.)  
 Painting introduced by Fabius.  
 289 Institution of the *Triumviri Capitales*.  
 Hadria and Castrum colonized.  
 286 “*Lex Hortensia*,” extending popular prerogatives; the *Comitia Tributa* independent of the Senate; to Plebeians; and Patricians equal rights. Thus ending the great struggle between Patricians and Plebeians of more than 300 yrs. duration (500.)  
 285 Defeat by the Gauls at Arretium.  
 283 The Gauls and the Etrurians defeated.  
 Annexation of Etruria to the Roman dominions.  
 282 War with the Boii; a peace.  
 Defeat of the revolted Samnites, the Lucanians, and Bruttians.  
 War with the Tarentines.  
 281 Pyrrhus, of Epirus, aids the Tarentines.  
 280 Battle of Pandosia, near Heracleia; Pyrrhus victorious.  
 279 Battle of Asculum; Pyrrhus victorious.  
 Pyrrhus goes into Sicily.  
 278 Roman arms victorious.  
 275 Pyrrhus returns; he is defeated at the decisive battle of Beneventum.  
 [In this war the Romans learned from Pyrrhus the plan of fortifying a camp.]  
 Quæstors increased in number to eight.  
 274 Pyrrhus places a garrison in Tarentum, and quits Italy.  
 273 Embassy from Alexandria arrives; treaty concluded with Ptolemy.



- 273 Posidonia and Cosa colonized.
- 272 Tarentum conquered, which concludes the war in southern Italy.
- 271 Rhegium taken.  
The Campanian soldiers who had seized Rhegium executed at Rome.
- 269 The Denarius (silver) first coined.
- 268 Defeat and submission of the Picentines. Ariminum and Beneventum colonized.
- 267 Brundisium taken by the Romans; all Italy subdued to Rome.
- 266 The defenders of Volsini put to death, and the city rased to the ground.
- 264 Popular decree for aiding the Mamertines in Sicily, which leads to the  
*First Punic War.*  
First Gladiatorial exhibition in Rome.
- 263 Peace with Hiero of Syracuse.
- 262 First Roman fleet.
- 260 First Naval victory—Duilius defeats the Carthaginian fleet.
- 257 Naval history of Tyndaris.
- 256 Roman fleet victorious at Ecnomus.
- 255 Regulus in Africa.  
Victory off Cape Hermæum.  
Naval disasters; the fleet wrecked return-  
from Africa.
- 254 Second Roman fleet built.
- 253 *First Plebeian High Priest*—T. Coruncanus.
- 252 The new fleet wrecked.
- 250 Metellus's victory at Panormus.  
A third fleet built.  
The third fleet wrecked.
- 248 The Carthaginians in Italy under Hamilcar.
- 247 Lilybæum and Drepanum besieged.
- 243 Fundanius defeats Hamilcar.
- 241 Naval Victory off the Ægeian Islands.  
Peace with the Carthaginians.
- 240 First Tragedy at Rome, produced by Livius Andronicus.
- 239 Birth of Ennius the poet.
- 238 Seizure of Corsica and Sardinia.  
The Corsicans oppose the Romans.  
Hamilcar proceeds into Spain.
- 234 War with the Corsicans, &c. continued.  
Cato born.
- 232 Agrarian law of C. Flaminius.
- 231 Conquest of Corsica and Sardinia.  
Divorces for adultery first introduced by Spurius Carvilius; 3,000 prosecutions enrolled within a few weeks.
- 229 War with Illyria; successful.  
Death of Hamilcar; Hasdrubal succeeds to the command in Spain.
- 228 Submission of Teuta, Queen of Illyria.  
Treaty with Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian.  
First Roman embassy to Greece.
- 227 The number of Prætors increased to four.
- 226 The Gauls invade Italy.
- 225 War with the Gauls; they are defeated at Clusium, and driven across the Po by Æmilinus; the Consul Atilius killed.  
Fabius Pictor, historian, fl.
- 224 Submission of the Boii (238.)
- 223 The Gauls (Insubrians) defeated by the Consul Flaminius.
- 222 Battle of Clastidium; Marcellus defeats the Gauls; they sue for peace.  
Conquest of Insubria and Liguria.  
The "Spolia Opima" gained by Marcellus.  
The province of Gallia Cisalpina formed.  
Plautus, the comic poet, fl.
- 221 Death of Hasdrubal, Carthaginian general.  
War with the Istri; successful.
- 220 Census: Roman citizens, 270,213.  
The "Via Flaminia" constructed, and the "Circus Flaminius" built.  
The "Libertini" are again classed among the four city tribes.  
Birth of the tragedian Pacuvius (? 219)
- 219 War with the Illyrians; the Consul Æmilinus defeats Demetrius Phalarius.  
Saguntum taken by Hannibal.  
Archagathus, from the Peloponnesus, the first professed surgeon in Rome.
- 218 *Second Punic War*: Hannibal arrives in Italy, and is victorious at the battles of the Ticinus and the Trebia.  
Cn. Scipio successful in Spain.
- 217 Battle at the lake Thrasymene; Hannibal defeats Flaminius.  
Hannibal winters in Apulia.
- 216 The two Scipios victorious in Spain.  
The Romans, under Varro, defeated at Cannæ by Hannibal.  
Capua and other cities revolt.
- 215 Hannibal defeated at Nola by Marcellus.  
Victories in Sardinia, and successes in Spain.  
"Lex Oppia," restraining the extravagant expenditure of Roman ladies.  
Treaty between Philip of Macedon and Hannibal.
- 214 First war with Philip of Macedon as an ally of Carthage.  
Operations in Sicily and Spain.
- 213 Hannibal's camp near Tarentum.  
War in Africa, Sicily, &c.
- 212 Tarentum taken by Hannibal.  
Death of the two Scipios in Spain.  
Sicily conquered; now subject to Rome.  
Institution of the "Ludi Apollinares" to propitiate the god Apollo.
- 211 Capua recaptured by the Romans.  
Treaty with the Ætolians, who had renounced their alliance with Macedon.
- 210 P. N. Scipio victorious in Spain.  
Marcellus brings from Sicily much of the treasures of Grecian art.  
Census: Roman citizens, 137,108.
- 209 Fabius re-takes Tarentum.  
Scipio's successes in Spain.
- 208 Defeat near Venusia by Hannibal; Marcellus is killed.
- 207 Italy entered by Hasdrubal; he is defeated and slain near the Metaurus.  
Ennius, the poet of Calabria, fl.  
Gold coin first struck in Rome.
- 206 Bruttii occupied by the Consuls.  
Spain conquered; Scipio crosses into Africa; his league with Syphax.  
Plautus, the comic poet of Umbria, fl.
- 205 P. N. Scipio elected Consul.  
Peace with Philip of Macedon.
- 204 Scipio goes into Africa.  
Hannibal defeated near Croton.  
Scipio defeats Syphax and Hasdrubal.  
Census: Roman citizens, 214,000.  
"Lex Cincia Muneralis" forbidding advocates to receive gifts, &c.
- 203 The Carthaginians and Syphax defeated; Syphax made prisoner.  
Hannibal leaves Italy for Africa.  
"Ludi Maculenses" in honour of Cybele.

- 202 Decisive victory of Zama; the Carthaginians agree to a peace advantageous to Rome, but ruinous to Carthage. Dictatorship ceases till B.C. 82.
- 201 Great extension of the Roman dominion over Italy, Sicily, part of Spain, &c.
- 200 Second war with Philip of Macedon. War with the Insubrians. Venusium colonized.
- 199 Wars with Philip and the Gauls continued. Narnia a Roman colony.
- 198 T. Q. Flaminius induces the Achæans to join the Roman interest.
- 197 Battle of Cynocephala. Victory of Flaminius over Philip. The number of Prætors increased to six. "Lex Porcia," exempting citizens from capital punishment and scourging.
- 196 Peace with Philip of Macedon. Hannibal at the court of Antiochus. The Boii and Insubrian Gauls defeated. Institution of the *Triumviri Epulones*, to preside over the ecclesiastical corporation, denominated *Epulum Jovis*.
- 195 War with Nabis, tyrant of Sparta. Cato restores order in Spain. The "Lex Oppia" repealed (see 215.) Birth of Terence.
- 194 Triumph of Flaminius and Cato. Colonies in Apulia, Bruttii, Campania, &c. Census: Roman Citizens, 143,704.
- 193 Ambassadors sent to Philip of Macedon. "Lex Sempronia de Fenore," forbidding citizens to lend money to foreigners in the name of the Socii.
- 192 War with Antiochus of Syria.
- 191 Victory of Acilius at Thermopylæ. Defeat and submission of the Boii. "Ludi Megalenses" regularly established.
- 190 Scipio Asiaticus victorious at Magnesia. Bononia a Roman colony. Peace with Antiochus of Syria (188.) Eumenes, king of Pergamus, comes to Rome.
- 189 Defeat of the Ætolians; a peace succeeds. Manlius victorious over the Galatians. Census: Roman Citizens, 258,318.
- 188 The peace with Antiochus ratified. The Thracians attack the Romans under Manlius on their return from Asia. Total eclipse; three days' supplication.
- 187 The two Scipios accused of embezzlement; the one by Cato, the other by Nævius. Through popular favour, Scipio Africanus is not brought to trial. His brother is condemned (though innocent); his property confiscated, &c. Voluntary exile of Scipio Africanus.
- 186 Discovery of the existence, and prompt suppression of, the Bacchanalian orgies. Restoration of Lucius Scipio (187.)
- 185 War in the territory of the Celtiberi. Death of Lucius Scipio. Death of Scipio Asiaticus.
- 184 Flaminius expelled the senate by Cato. Philip of Macedon summoned before the Roman ambassadors. The erection of a theatre in Rome prohibited by the Senate. Death of Plantus the comedian.
- 183 Death of Hannibal by poison. Death of Scipio Africanus.
- 182 Continuation of the Ligurian war.
- 181 "Lex Cornelia Baebia" against "canvassing" at elections. "Lex Orchia," limiting the number of guests at entertainments. The sacred books of Numa discovered in a stone coffin (? 179.)
- 180 Pisa a Roman colony. "Lex Annalis," fixing the ages at which a Quæstor and Consul might be elected.
- 179 Fulvius victorious over the Ligurians. The Celtiberians, in Spain, defeated by Tiberius Gracchus. Census: Roman citizens, 273,294.
- 178 The Sardinians and Corsicans rebel. Cæcilius, the comic poet, fl.
- 177 Roman arms victorious in Istria under Claudius, and in Sardinia under Tiberius Gracchus. Roman colonies of Lucca and Luna.
- 176 Defeat by the Ligurians; the Consul Petillius killed in the battle. The Sardinian revolt quelled.
- 175 Victory over the Ligurians. Triumph of Gracchus at Rome.
- 174 Cato's embassy to Carthage. The streets of Rome paved. Census: Roman citizens, 269,015.
- 172 Eumenes visits Rome a second time; he complains against Perseus of Macedon.
- 171 Third war with Macedon—against Perseus. Licinius commands the army.
- 170 Hostilius Mancinus in Macedonia.
- 169 Marcus commands in Macedonia. "Lex Voconia," regulating legacies, &c. Gracchus places the "Libertini" in the four city tribes. Census: Roman citizens, 312,805. Death of the poet Ennius (? 167.)
- 168 Victory of Æmilius at Pydna. Perseus made prisoner, and the Macedonian monarchy abolished. Illyria subdued after a 30 days' war. Death of the poet Cæcilius. Taxes on the citizens removed, the treasury being now full.
- 167 Death of Ennius, aged 72 years. Polybius, and about 1000 Achæan captives, arrive at Rome. The first public library at Rome; composed of books brought from Macedon. Limitation of the Tribunitian power.
- 164 The heir of Syria a prisoner at Rome. Census: Roman citizens, 327,032. Rapid decline in public morals.
- 163 Revolt and subjugation of the Corsicans.
- 162 Hipparchus of Nice lays the foundation of the science of Trigonometry.
- 161 Banishment of the philosophers and rhetoricians from Rome.
- 160 "Lex Fannia," limiting the expenses of entertainments, &c. The Pontine marshes drained. Terence performs his last play at the funeral games of Æmilius Paulus. Census: Roman citizens, 338,314. Water-clock of P.C. Scipio. Death of Terence.
- 157 Visit of Philopater to Rome.
- 156 War with the Dalmatians.
- 155 The Dalmatians conquered. Arrival of an embassy from Athens—Dionogenes, Carniades, and Critolaus.

- 155 Pacuvius, the tragedian, fl.  
 154 War with the Gauls.  
 Census: Roman citizens, 324,000.  
 153 War in Spain with the Celtiberians.  
 Cato accused of a capital crime.  
 152 Marcellus succeeds Nobilior in Spain.  
 Cruelty of Lucullus to a tribe of Celts.  
 151 Lucullus and Galba in Spain.  
 The former is victorious over the Cantabri;  
 but Galba, in a battle with the Lusitani-  
 ans, suffers a signal defeat.  
 The Achaean hostages sent back.  
 150 Galba treacherously murders the Lusitani-  
 ans who had surrendered.  
 149 *Third Punic War.*  
 Cato's Harangue, "*Delenda est Carthago.*"  
 The "Lex Calpurnia," providing for the  
 recovery of moneys obtained by the extor-  
 tion of magistrates.  
 Fourth Macedonian war:—Philippus.  
 The Achaean war.  
 Death of Cato, aged 85.  
 148 Metellus victorious in Macedon.  
 Defeat by Viriathus in Lusitania.  
 147 War with the Achaean.  
 P. Corn. Scipio (the younger) in Africa.  
 Census: Roman citizens, 322,000.  
 146 Epirus subdued to Rome.  
 Carthage overthrown by Scipio.  
 Corinth, Colchis, and Thebes taken and  
 destroyed by Mummius.  
 The first fine paintings seen in Italy are  
 received from Mummius—being part of the  
 spoils of Corinth.  
 145 Fabius Aemilianus sent against Viriathus,  
 commander of the Lusitani.  
 143 *The Numantine War* (133.)  
 Roman arms victorious over the Numan-  
 tines; unsuccessful against the Lusitani.  
 "Equites Publicani" in the provinces.  
 Hipparchus's new cycle of the moon.  
 Birth of M. Antonius, the orator.  
 142 Census: Roman citizens, 328,440.  
 141 Peace with Viriathus in Spain.  
 140 Cæpio succeeds Fabius in Spain.  
 Viriathus treacherously murdered.  
 Birth of Crassus, the orator.  
 139 "Lex Gabinia," against bribery at elections.  
 Pompeius succeeded in Spain by Popilius.  
 138 Cæpio and Popilius succeeded by Brutus  
 and Mancinus in Spain.  
 Brutus defeats the Lusitanians.  
 Lusitania annexed to Rome.  
 137 Peace with the Numantianians:—invalidated  
 by the Senate.  
 136 Census: Roman citizens, 323,923.  
 Defeat of Lepidus in Spain.  
 134 *Servile War in Sicily*; revolt of 70,000 slaves.  
 Scipio proceeds against Numantia.  
 133 Pergamus bequeathed to Rome; it is hence-  
 forth a Roman province.  
 Numantia destroyed—and  
 Close of the Numantine war (143.)  
 Spain a Roman province.  
 Civil disturbances; Tiberius Gracchus pro-  
 poses the revival of the "Lex Licinia."  
 Aristocratic tumult, headed by Scipio Na-  
 sica; Gracchus and 300 citizens are slain.  
 The Equestrian order instituted.  
 132 End of the Servile War in Sicily (134.)  
 Scipio's triumphant return.  
 131 War in Asia with Aristonicus.  
 131 Census: Roman citizens, 317,823.  
 Caius Gracchus advocates popular rights.  
 130 Elevation of the Tribunes to the Senate.  
 Death of Pacuvius, the tragedian.  
 129 Suspension of the "Lex Licinia" (365.)  
 Death of Scipio Africanus (minor) aged 56.  
 Pergamus a Roman province.  
 126 C. Gracchus sent as Quæstor to Sardinia.  
 "Lex Junia Pergrinns," for the removal  
 of aliens from the city.  
 125 Census: Roman citizens, 390,736.  
 Flaccus defeats the Gauls.  
 Fregellæ revolts; it is destroyed.  
 124 C. Gracchus returns from Sardinia.  
 123 Caius Gracchus appointed Tribune.  
 The Agrarian law revived (365.)  
 Carthage rebuilt, and a colony sent thither.  
 Metellus conquers the Balearic isles.  
 122 Aix the first Roman colony in Gaul, is a  
 province of Rome.  
 Gracchus appointed Tribune a second time.  
 He submits a proposal for admitting the  
 Italian allies to the freedom of Roman  
 citizens; and suggests a plan for estab-  
 lishing colonies beyond Italy.  
 121 *War of Classes in Rome*; C. Gracchus and  
 3,000 citizens slain (see 133.)  
 The Aristocratic party triumphant.  
 The Allobroges twice defeated.  
 Roman provinces in Gaul.  
 120 Opimius, the murderer of C. Gracchus, ac-  
 cused of high treason.  
 119 Accusation of Carbo by Crassus.  
 Carbo commits suicide.  
 118 Micipsa, k. of Numidia, dies.  
 Jugurtha assassinates Hiempsal.  
 Dalmatia a Roman province.  
 117 Escape of Adherbal, son of Micipsa, from  
 Numidia to Rome.  
 He is restored to his kingdom.  
 116 The "Libertini" restored by the "Lex  
 Aemilia" to the four city tribes.  
 Varro, the Roman historian, born.  
 115 Census: Roman citizens, 394,336.  
 Eras—of the philosopher, Anthemion; Cas-  
 tor of Rhodes, and Apollodorus of Athens,  
 chronologists; Lucilius, the satirist, and  
 L. C. Antipater, historian.  
 114 Birth of Q. Hortensius L. F. the orator.  
 113 *The Cimbrian War*: several tribes of Cim-  
 brians and Teutones, amounting to more  
 than 500,000 men, pursue the course of  
 the Danube, and approach Illyria.  
 Consul P. Carbo defeated in Styria.  
 112 Jugurtha murders Adherbal at Cirta.  
 The Cimbrians joined by several tribes of  
 Celts and Helvetii, march into Gaul.  
 War against Thrace successful.  
 111 *The Jugurthine War* commenced.  
 Calpurnius makes peace with Jugurtha.  
 "Lex Thoria"—an Agrarian law.  
 110 Gaul invaded by the Cimbrians.  
 War with the Thracians.  
 First Sumptuary law at Rome.  
 109 The Cimbrians defeat Junius Silanus.  
 Jugurtha defeats Aula, who thereupon  
 makes peace; which is not ratified.  
 Birth of Atticus Pomponius (32.)  
 107 Jugurtha defeated by Metellus.  
 Longinus and Scaurus defeated by the Cim-  
 brians and Teutones; Longinus slain.  
 106 Jugurtha captured; end of the war.

- 106 Numidia a Roman province. Bocchus, Hiabas, and Hiempsal divide Numidia between them. "Lex Servilia Judicaria." Births of Cicero and Pompey.
- 105 The Cimbrians defeat the Consuls Cn. Manlius Maximus and Q. Servilius Cæpio. They next proceed towards Spain.
- 104 "Lex Domitia," giving to the people the privilege of electing the priests. The Cimbrians repulsed in Spain by the Celtiberians. Appuleius Saturninus, Quæstor at Ostia, removed from office by the Senate.
- 103 The Cimbrians approach Italy.
- 102 The Standard of the Eagle adopted. Appuleius Saturninus, Tribune (104.) Marius defeats the Teutones near Aix. *Second Servile war in Sicily.*
- 101 Defeat of the Cimbrians by Marius and Catullus, near Verona. Ambassadors from Mithridates at Rome. Saturninus and the Plebs arrayed against the Aristocracy.
- 100 Marius, Consul the sixth time, by purchase. Appuleius Saturninus, Tribune (101, 104.) Agrarian law of Appuleius; Metellus Numidicus banished for refusing to sanction it. Memmius murdered by assassins hired by Saturninus. Saturninus, Glaucius, and Sanfeius, murdered by the populace. Caius Julius Cæsar born, July 12.
- 99 Return of Metellus (100.) Revolt in Spain (97.) Lusitania a Roman province. The slaves in Sicily subdued (102.)
- 98 The orators, Antonius and Cassius, inveigh against the oppressors of the provinces.
- 97 Didius successful in Spain. Cappadocia conquered by Mithridates.
- 96 Apion bequeaths Cyrene to Rome. Cyrenaica a Roman province.
- 95 Cappadocia declared free by Rome; Ariobarzanes elected king. Lucretius, the Epicurean, born. "Lex Licinia Mucia," &c. enjoining a rigid inquiry into the title of citizenship. [The carrying out of this law caused great discontent, and partly led to the Marsic war.]
- 92 Sylla settles the affairs of Asia Minor. Communication opened with Parthia.
- 91 *Marsian War* commenced (88.) [This was a struggle for the extension of the privileges of Roman citizenship to the other States of Italy; during which, the lives of 300,000 men were sacrificed.] Marcus Livius Drusus, Tribune of the Plebs, commences the struggle, by proposing certain popular leges; he is assassinated. Death of Crassus, the orator. Lucius Julius Cæsar, one of the Consuls.
- 90 "Lex Julia," extending the franchise.
- 89 Eight new tribes added.
- 88 The Marsian war ends in the concessions demanded by the Italian States. "Leges Sulpiciæ," recalling the exiles, expelling Senators who were in debt, &c. *First Mithridatic War*, (84,) which also involves the empire in *Civil War* between Marius and Sylla (82.)
- 88 The Athenians solicit aid from Mithridates against Sylla. The command against Mithridates is conferred upon Sylla by the Optimates; while Marius obtains it by forming an alliance with Sulpicius and the Plebs. Sylla leads six legions against Marius, who flees from Rome to Carthage. Proscription of Marius and his friends.
- 87 Sylla victorious in Asia Minor. Return of Marius to Rome; Cinna joins him; they massacre Sylla's friends. Rome pillaged; horrid tyranny. Death of Antonius the orator, and the Consul Octavius. Birth of the poet Catullus.
- 86 Death of Marius, aged 70; Flaccus succeeds. Sylla victorious in Greece; Athens reduced to famine—taken; its library sent to Rome. Fimbria assassinates Flaccus in Numidia. The Samnites receive the franchise. Birth of Sallust at Ancernum.
- 85 Fimbria's horrid cruelties in Asia Minor. Sylla's victories over Archelaus and Orchomenos in Greece. Mithridates conquers Bithynia and other provinces of Rome.
- 84 Sylla makes peace with Mithridates. He attacks the camp of Fimbria, who escapes to Pergamus, where he puts himself to a miserable death. Death of the Consul Cinna.
- 83 Sylla's return; *Civil War* between him and the party of Marius. Sertorius goes into Spain (78.) The Capitol burnt. Birth of Mark Antony. *Second Mithridatic War* (81.) Murena commands in Asia Minor.
- 82 Total defeat of the party of Marius, and the Samnites under Telisius. Horrid massacre of the Samnites. Rome captured by Sylla. First proscriptions in Rome; 150,000 perish. Sylla created perpetual Dictator. Sylla plunders the Delphian Temple. Pompey at war with the Marians.
- 81 Splendid triumph of Sylla. His legislation; oligarchical government; colonial system, &c. Valerius, Cato, and Cicero, fl. Decline of agriculture in Italy: corn supplied by the provinces.
- 80 *African War*: Domitius and king Hiabrus conquered by Pompey. C. Julius Cæsar at the siege of Mytilene. Zeno, of Sidon, the Epicurean, fl.
- 79 Abdication of Sylla. Metellus sent against Sertorius, in Spain. The height of the atmosphere calculated by Posidonius to be 800 stadia. Apellicon, fl. at Athens.
- 78 *War with the Lusitanians*, who are commanded by Sertorius (72.) Valerian Antias, historian, and Alexander Polyphistor, grammarian, fl. Death of Sylla, aged 60. Attempt of Lepidus to repeal Sylla's laws defeated by Catullus. War with the Mediterranean pirates.
- 77 Pompey sent into Spain to join Metellus against Sertorius.

- 77 Q. Hortensius, orator, and Photius Gallius, rhetorician, fl.
- 76 Sertorius, aided by M. Peperna, defeats Pompey and Metellus.  
Birth of Asinius Pollio (54.)
- 75 The Isaurian pirates subdued.  
Also the Dardani in Macedonia.  
Birth of Mæcenas, patron of Horace.
- 74 *Third Mithridatic War* (63.)  
Lucullus commands in Asia Minor.  
Nicomedes III., of Bithynia, bequeaths his kingdom to the Romans; from henceforth it is a Roman province.  
Library of Lucullus the Consul.  
Lucullus introduces the Cherry Tree into Europe from Asia.
- 73 *Servile war in Italy*; Spartacus at the head of 70,000 slaves (71.)  
Varro's Three Books on Agriculture.
- 72 Sertorius murdered by the treachery of his ally, Perpenna.  
Perpenna defeated and killed.  
Spain conquered by Pompey.  
Victory of Spartacus.
- 71 The Republic possesses mines of Gold in Sardinia, Gaul, Macedonia, and Asia Minor; and Silver mines in Spain.  
Crassus and Pompey end the Servile war; Spartacus is killed.  
War in Asia continued; Mithridates escapes into Armenia.
- 70 "Lex Aurelia," authorizing the election of Judges from among the Senators, Equites, and Tribuni Aërarii.  
The power of the Tribunes restored.  
Impeachment of Verres by Cicero.  
Birth of Virgil at Andes, near Mantua.  
A Water Mill near a residence of Mithridates in Asia Minor.
- 69 *War with the Cretans* (67.)  
The Capitol dedicated.  
Census: Roman Citizens, 450,090.
- 68 Lucullus successful against Mithridates.
- 67 "Lex Gabinia," investing Pompey with extraordinary authority for three years.  
Metellus conquers Crete.  
Pontus becomes a Roman province.  
*Piratical war*: Pompey in forty days subdues the Sicilian and Isaurian pirates (78.)  
"Lex Roscia," giving special seats at the exhibitions to the Equites.
- 66 Pompey succeeds Lucullus in Asia.  
Ebony first seen in Rome: obtained by Pompey after his defeat of Mithridates.  
First digest of the Roman laws, by Varro.
- 65 Pompey in the Caucasus.  
*Cataline's Conspiracy* (62.)  
Cicero's orations against Cataline.  
Foreigners expelled Rome, according to the Papiian law.
- 65 Birth of Horace in Apulia
- 64 Syria conquered by Pompey.  
Dejotarius, of Galatia, seizes Armenia Minor.  
"Lex Amphibia," conferring a crown of bay on Pompey at the games.  
Earthquake in the Bosphorus; several towns laid in ruins.
- 63 Second conspiracy of Cataline disclosed by Fulvia to Cicero.  
Agrarian law for purchasing lands upon which to locate the poor, proposed by Servilius Rullius—lost.  
Pharmaces made king of Pontus.  
Birth of Octavius (Augustus), Sep. 23.
- 62 Syria and Phœnicia united into one Roman province.  
Defeat of Cataline in Etruria by Antonius; Cataline slain.  
Return of Pompey to Rome.
- 61 Pompey's two triumphs, as the conqueror of 15 kingdoms and 400 cities.  
Clodius tried for sacrilege; he bribes his accuser and judge, and is acquitted.
- 60 *The first Triumvirate*; Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus, Triumvirs.  
Asinius Pollio's history commences.  
Era of—Cicero, orator; Apollonius, rhetorician; Andronicus, peripatetic ph. of Rhodes; Aristomedes, grammarian, of Crete; Sallust, historian; Lucretius and Catullus, poets.
- 59 The two Gauls and Illyria conferred upon Cæsar for five years.  
Birth of Livy at Patavium.  
"Lex Julia Agraria," disposing the public land—Ager Campanus.
- 58 Splendid marble theatre of the Ædile Scaurus, which accommodated 80,000 persons.  
Banishment of Cicero by Clodius; he retires to Athens.  
*Cæsar's Gallic campaigns* (50.)  
"Lex Gabinia," forbidding the raising of loans at Rome by foreign embassies.  
C. Manlius proposes to give the Libertini the privilege of voting.
- 57 Return of Cicero to Rome.  
Cæsar conquers the Belgæ.  
Pompey superintendent of the Aunona.  
Gylf created king of Sweden.  
The king of Egypt at Rome.  
Cæsar subdues the Aquitani.
- 56 Disunion between the Triumvirs.  
Adjustment of their differences at Lucca, where Cæsar winters.  
"Lex de Bonis Cedendis," securing to those debtors their personal liberty who gave up their property to their creditors.
- 55 Death of Julia, wife of Pompey, and daughter of Cæsar.