CRISTO RAUL.ORG

READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

OCTAVIUS CAESAR AUGUSTUS :

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE FOUNDER OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

CHAPTER III.

THE INHERITANCE

The news of his great-uncle’s death reached Octavius at Apollonia in the afternoon, just as he and his suite were going to dinner. A vague rumour of some great murder misfortune quickly spread through the town, and many of the leading inhabitants hastened to the house with zealous friendliness to ascertain its truth. After a hasty consultation with his friends, Octavius decided to get rid of most of them while inviting a few of the highest rank to discuss with him what should be done. This being effected with some difficulty, an anxious debate was carried on into the night. Opinions were divided. One party urged Octavius to go to the army in Macedonia, appeal to its attachment to Caesar, and call on the legions to follow him to Rome to avenge the murdered Dictator. Those who thus advised trusted to the impression likely to be made by Octavius’s personal charm and the pity which his position would excite. Others thought this too great an undertaking for so young a man. They argued that the many friends whom Caesar had raised to positions of honour and profit might be trusted to avenge his murder. They did not yet know that theirs were the very hands which had struck him down. After listening to the various opinions Octavius resolved to take no decisive step until he had reached Italy, had consulted his friends there, and had seen the state of affairs with his own eyes.

Preparations for crossing were begun at once, and in the few days before the start farther details of the assassination reached Apollonia. The citizens begged Octavius to stay putting all the resources of the town at his disposal; and a number of officers and soldiers came from the army with tenders of service, whether to guard his person or to avenge the Dictator. But for the present he declined all offers. He thanked the Apollo and promised the town immunities and privileges—a promise which in after years he did not forget. He told the officers and soldiers that he would claim their services at some future time. For the present he did not need them: “only let them be ready when the time came”. The conduct of the Martia and Quarta a few months later showed that these feelings were genuine and lasting.

Octavius had a poor vessel and a stormy crossing, but landed in safety, probably at Hydruntum (Otranto), the nearest point in Calabria, and in fair weather only a five hours’ voyage. That fact and the state of the wind may have influenced the choice of the port. But he was also too much in the dark as to affairs in Italy to venture upon such a frequented landing place as Brindisi, where he might have found himself in the midst of political enemies or hostile troops. From Hydruntum he went by land to Lupiae, rather more than halfway to Brindisi. There he first met some who had witnessed Caesar’s funeral, had heard the recitation of his will, and could tell him that he was adopted as Caesar’s son, and (with a deduction of a liberal legacy to the citizens) was heir to three-quarters of his property, the remaining fourth being divided between Cesar’s two other grand-nephews Q. Pedius and Lucius Pinarius. He learnt also that the Dictator’s funeral, which by his will was to be conducted by Atia, had been performed in the Forum amidst great popular excitement, caused partly by the sight of his wounded body, partly by Antony’s speech, and had been followed by attacks on the houses of the chief assassins, who, after barricading themselves for three days on the Capitol, had found it necessary to retire from Rome, first to the villa of Brutus at Lanuvium, and then to Antium, in spite of the amnesty voted in the Senate on the 17th of March.

Though deeply moved by this story Octavian did not allow his feelings to betray him into taking any false or hasty step. Satis celeriter quod satis bene was his motto now as in after life. He went on to Brindisi, having ascertained that it was not occupied by enemies, and there received letters from his mother and stepfather confirming what he had already heard. His mother begged him to join her at once, to avoid the jealousies roused by his adoption. Philippus advised him to accept neither inheritance nor name, and to hold aloof from public business. The advice was, no doubt, prompted by affection, and was natural in the circumstances. But though Octavian never blustered, neither did he easily turn aside he wrote back declaring his determination to accept. His own friends henceforth addressed him “Caesar”, his full name now being Gaius Iulius Caesar Octavianus. The adoption indeed was not complete without the formal passing of a lex curiata; but though that was delayed for more than a year, the new name was assumed at once. He complied with his mother’s wish that he should visit her first, and he soon had the satisfaction of feeling that though Philippus was still opposed, her heart was with him in the manly resolve to sustain the great part which Caesar’s affection had assigned to him. Cicero mentions in a letter of April 11th that Octavius had arrived in Italy, and on the 18th that he had reached Naples. On the 19th Balbus—the Dictator’s friend and agent—called on him and learned from his own lips his resolve to accept the inheritance. On the 22nd Cicero met him at his stepfather’s villa near Puteoli, and anxiously watched for any indication of his political aims. He was only partly satisfied.

“Octavius here treats me with great respect and. friendliness. His own people addressed him as ‘Caesar’, but as Philippus did not do so, I did not do it either. I declare it is impossible for him to be a good citizen! He is surrounded by such a number of people who actually threaten our friends with death. He says the present state of things is intolerable.”

It was not Octavian’s cue as yet to break openly with the aristocrats. The first struggles for his rights were likely to be with Antony, in which the aid of Cicero and his party would be useful. At the same time he was too cautious and self-controlled to commit himself or betray his real intentions, which remained an enigma to the emotional orator, who hardly ever spoke without doing so. Cicero consoled himself by the reflection that at any fate Octavian’s claims must cause a quarrel with Antony. Yet he was indignant that this stripling could go to Rome without risk, while Brutus and Cassius and the other “heroes” of the dagger could not. Octavian’s journey to Rome was for the twofold purpose of giving formal notice to the praetor urbanus that he accepted the Inheritance, and of making a statement of his intentions as administrator of the will at a public assembly. For the latter he needed to be introduced to the meeting by a tribune. For this service he relied on Lucius Antonius. All three brothers, were in office this year—Marcus consul, Gaius praetor, Lucius tribune; and as supporters of the late Caesar they could not in decency refuse him this opportunity of declaring his sentiments.

Octavian reached Rome in the first week of May, duly accepted, the inheritance, and was introduced to a contio by Lucius Antonius about the 10th of that month. The speech was not satisfactory to the Ciceronian party. He declared his intention to carry out his “father’s” will as to the legacy to the people, and to celebrate the games at the dedication of the temple of Venus promised by Caesar. Preparations for them were begun at once, two of the Dictator’s friends, Matius and Postumius, being selected to superintend them. But though confining himself to expressions of Veneration for his “father’s” memory, and uttering no threats against anyone, Octavian had not given up for a moment his resolve to punish the murderers. The amnesty voted in the Senate he regarded as a temporary expedient. All that was needed was an accuser, and he did not mean that such a person should be long wanting. But meanwhile his first business was to secure his own position and the possession of Caesar’s property. This at once brought him into collision with Antony.

The financial arrangements of the late Dictator were to a great degree to blame for this. He seems to have introduced the system of the fiscus. though without the name known in later times: that is, large sums of money were deposited in the temple of Ops to his order, separate from the public aerarium of the temple of Saturnus, and not clearly distinguished from his own private property. It was as though a Chancellor of the Exchequer paid portions of the revenue to his private banking account, and were to die suddenly without leaving any means of distinguishing between public and private property. Cicero says that this money (700,000,000 sesterces) was the proceeds of the sale of confiscated properties, and there was, it seems, much other property in lands and houses from the same source. The claim by an heir of Caesar would be met by a double opposition—from the government, which would regard the whole as public; and from the owners or their representatives, who might have hopes of recovering parts of it. For at Rome confiscation did not bar claims under marriage settlements, or for debts secured on properties. The large sum at the temple of Ops had been taken over entirely by Antony the Consul, nominally as being public money, really—as Cicero affirms—to liquidate his own enormous debts. It is very likely that Antony shared the spoil with others, perhaps with his colleague Dolabella, and they may have satisfied their consciences with some partial use of it for public purposes. At any rate it was not forthcoming when Octavian put in his claim. Even in regard to such property as was handed over to him he was constantly harassed by lawsuits. Claimants were instigated, as he believed, by one or other of the Antonies; while Gaius Antonius, acting praetor urbanus for Brutus, would often preside in the court. He was resolved, however, to carry out Caesar’s will, even if he had to sell his own paternal estate and draw upon his mother’s resources. But it seems, after all, that the property of Caesar which he did manage to get, or his own wealth, was so ample, that he was able to do this without crippling himself. Pinarius and Pedius got their shares, but handed them over to him, perhaps as being too heavily weighted with legacies to be of much value to them, or thinking that his great future made it a good investment. At any rate the legacies were paid, the games given, and when some months later he proceeded to enroll two legions of veterans he was able to pay each man a bounty amounting to something like £20 of our money. At no time in his career does he seem to have had serious money difficulties. No doubt his resources were always large, but he must also have had the valuable faculty of husbanding them in small matters, while always having enough for large outlays.

But it was not only in regard to money that Octavian found himself thwarted by Antony and his brothers. A tribune, probably Lucius Antonius himself, prevented the formal passing or the lex curiata for his adoption, with a view of weakening his claims upon the inheritance. When he wished to be elected tribune in the place of Cinna, who had fallen a victim to the mob in mistake for L. Cinna, a praetor who had spoken against Caesar, he was prevented by the partisans of Antony. There was indeed a legal obstacle in the fact that he was now a patrician, was under age and had not held the quaestorship, though this last was a breach of custom rather than of law. Lastly Antony treated him with studied disrespect, keeping him waiting in his anteroom; while Lucius Antonius and the other tribunes forbade him to place Caesar’s gilded chair in the Circus at his games.

It was clear that a breach between the two was imminent. The younger man was not abashed by the years or high office of the other: and though some formal reconciliation was brought about by common friends or by military officers, Octavian seems to have allowed the Ciceronians to believe that he intended to join them in opposing Antony. His attentions to them became more marked after the meeting of the Senate of the 1st of June. To this meeting the Constitutionalists had been looking forward as likely to bring the uncertainty to an end. At it the question of the provinces was to be settled; the two consuls, with the aid of a committee, were to report on what were the genuine acta of Caesar; and some means were to be found to enable Brutus and Cassius to carry on their duties as praetors in Rome with safety.

Meanwhile Antony had been availing himself of the papers of Caesar as though the committee had already reported. He had also been securing himself—as he thought—Caesar’s acta and by visiting the colonies of Caesar’s veterans in Campania, and by gradually collecting a bodyguard. This had now assumed sufficiently formidable proportions to overawe the Senate. It is true that he had experienced difficulties at Capua, where the existing coloni resented his attempt to plant others in the same territory; but, on the whole, he seems to have improved his position by his tour in April and May. Then again Lepidus had visited Sext. Pompeius in Spain, and was reported to have induced him, on condition of recovering his father’s property, to return to Rome and place his naval and military forces (amounting to more than six legions) at the disposal of the consuls. This, thinks Cicero, would make Antony irresistible; and so no doubt thought Octavian also.

Nor did the meetings of the Senate in June effect anything these fears. What was done for Brutus and Cassius satisfied neither party. They were offered the cura annona, superintendence of the corn Supply—Cassius in Sicily, Brutus in Asia—which would give them a decent pretext for being absent from Rome for the rest of the year. They, however, regarded this offer as an insult. So also in regard to the provinces: Brutus and Cassius were deprived of Macedonia and Syria, which Caesar had assigned to them respectively, and were offered the unimportant governorships of Crete and Cyrene. But Antony in the same meetings secured still greater military strength for himself by an arrangement with Dolabella. The latter was appointed to Syria and the command against the Parthians by a lex; and he then induced the Senate to give Macedonia to himself, with the command of the legions stationed there, one of notice which he had bargained with Dolabella to hand over to him. These decrees having been passed, he sent his brother Gaius over at once to announce the fact to the legions in Macedonia and to give them that they might at any time be summoned to Italy. For Antony himself had no intention of going to Macedonia. His private resolve was to hold Gallia Cisalpina with the largest force possible, as giving him most hold on Italy. He had only accepted Macedonia in order to get these legions into his hands. At the same time he carried a repeal of Caesar’s law confining the tenure of a province for a propraetor to one, and for a proconsul to two years.

Though this increasing power of Antony was naturally calculated to alarm Octavius, he was, on the other hand, opposed to Decimus Brutus—one of the assassins—retaining Gallia Cisalpina. He therefore supported Antony in carrying a law conferring that province on him at the end of his consulship. The Senators now saw that they had been tricked. They had given Antony the Macedonian legions without conditions, and he would now use them in another province given him by a lex—over which they had no control. Suggestions were made to remove Gallia Cisalpina from the list of provinces, and incorporate it (as was afterwards done by Augustus) in Italy, thus doing away with any pretext for a proconsul residing there with legions. But for the present the law stood which assigned it to Antony for BC43. It appears to have been passed by the beginning of July, and he at once sent word to his brother to bring the legions over. They were expected in July, but did not actually arrive till nearly three months later. Meanwhile a war of recriminations was maintained between Antony the consul and Brutus and Cassius the praetors by letters or edicts. Antony accused the praetors of collecting forces hostile to the government, the praetors accused Antony of making it impossible for them to come to Rome by denouncing them in speeches and edicts, in breach of his promise. On the 1st of August L. Calpurnius Piso—father-in-law of the late Caesar—inveighed against Antony in the Senate, ending with a hostile motion, of the exact nature of which we are not informed. But he could get no one to speak or vote with him, so completely cowed were the Senators by Antony’s military force! On the other hand, Antony was uneasy at the growing popularity of Octavian, especially among the veterans. He had himself made a bid for their favour by two commissions for assigning land to them both in Italy and the provinces. But the veterans were suspicious; they had expected some signal act of vengeance for the murder of Caesar; and at the same time Antony’s lavish grants of public land to unworthy favourites impoverished the exchequer and diminished the amount available for distribution. They lowered his popularity with the veterans as much as they annoyed the Senators, who yet did not venture to oppose him.

The friction between the two men—varied by occasional reconciliations—became more and more acute, until about the end of September it was rumoured that Octavian had suborned men to assassinate Antony. Of course Octavian disclaimed it, and upon Antony giving out that certain men had been found in his house with daggers, he went openly with an offer to serve along with his friends among his bodyguards. The popular belief was that Antony had invented the whole story to discredit him; but Cicero and others of his party both believed and approved, and subsequent writers are divided in opinion. Nicolas of Damascus probably gives Octavian’s own version, according to which Antony was unable to produce the pretended assassins to a council of his friends, or to induce them to advise active retaliation upon Octavian. Appian points out that it was not to Octavian’s interest just then that Antony should disappear, for it would have been a great encouragement to the party of the Assassins, of whose real sentiments towards himself he was no doubt aware.

For with this party his alliance was a matter of great doubt. In June Cicero had said of him:

“In Octavian, as I have perceived, there is no little ability and spirit; and he seems likely to be as well disposed to our heroes as I could wish. But what confidence one can feel in a man of his age, name, inheritance, and upbringing may well give us pause. His stepfather, whom I saw at Antium, thinks none at all. However, we must foster him, and, if nothing else, keep him estranged from Antony. Marcellus will be doing admirable service if he gives him good advice. Octavian seems devoted to him, but has no great confidence in Pansa and Hirtius.”

Philippus was not a man for whom Cicero had a great respect. But Marcellus, the husband of Octavia (ob. BC50), was a sound aristocrat and a trustworthy man. Still Octavian had done nothing since to identify himself with the conservative party, in spite of his differences with Antony. With Cicero himself he kept up friendly communications; yet at the final breach between Cicero and Antony in September, it does not seem to have occurred to Cicero to put forward Octavian as Antony’s opponent; nor does he mention him in the first two Philippics. It was Octavian’s own independent action which first showed that he was ready and able to assume that position, and Cicero viewed this at first with anxiety and almost dismay.

Antony left Rome on the 9th of October to meet the Macedonian legions at Brindisi. Octavian no longer hesitated. Sending agents to tamper with the loyalty of the newly arrived legions, he himself went a round of the veterans in Campania, offering them a bounty of 500 denarii, if they would enlist again. In doing this he acted wholly on his own initiative and without authority from Senate or people, and without holding any office giving him military command. In after years Augustus regarded this as the first step in his public career, the first service rendered to the State: “When nineteen years old I raised an army on my own initiative and at my own expense, with which I restored to liberty the republic which had been crushed under the tyranny of a faction.” And not only did he reckon this his first public service; the wording of this statement is a declaration that he thereby adopted the policy and was continuing the work of his “father”, for he uses the very phrase which Caesar had used in justifying himself. This phrase illustrates another point also. Ostensibly the enrolment of veterans was to protect himself against Antony. Perhaps he did not yet see how it was to be done, but at the bottom of his heart was the purpose of checkmating, if not destroying, the clique which had caused Caesar’s murder, though for the moment he was with them in opposition to Antony, and was eager to have Cicero’s support and approval. Yet how doubtful and uneasy the orator felt is shown by two letters in which he tells what Octavian was doing.

“Puteoli, 2 November. On the evening of the 1st I got a letter from Octavian. He is entering upon a serious undertaking. He has won over to his views all the veterans at Casilinum and Calatia. And no wonder; he gives a bounty of 500 denarii apiece. Clearly his view is a war with Antony under his own leadership. So I perceive that before many days are over we shall be in arms. But whom are we to follow? Consider his name, consider his age! Again, he demands to begin with a secret interview with me at Capua of all places! It is really quite childish to suppose that it can be kept quiet. I have written to explain to him that it is neither necessary nor practicable. He sent a certain Caecina of Volaterrae to me, an intimate friend of his own, who brought me news that Antony was on his way to the city with the Alaudes, was imposing money contribution on the municipal towns, and was marching at the head of the legion with colours flying. He wanted my opinion, whether he should start for Rome with his legion of 3,000 veterans, or should hold Capua, and so intercept Antony’s advance, or should join the three Macedonian legions now sailing by the Mare Superum, which he hopes are devoted to himself. They refused to accept a bounty them by Antony, as my informant at least asserts. They even used grossly insulting language to him and moved off when he attempted to address them. In short, Octavian offers himself as our military leader, and thinks that our right policy is to stand by him. On my part I advised his making for Rome. For I think he will have, not only the city mob, but, if he can impress them with confidence, the loyalists also on his side. Oh, Brutus! Where are you! What an opportunity you are losing! I did not actually foresee this, but I thought that something of the sort would happen.”

“Puteoli [3] November. Two letters on the same day from Octavian! His present view is that I should Come to Rome at once, and that he wishes to act through the Senate. I told him that a meeting of the Senate was impossible before the 1st of January, and I believe it is so. But he adds also, ‘and by your advice’. In short he insists, while I suspend judgment. I don’t trust his youth, I am in the dark as to his disposition. I am not able to do anything without your friend Pansa. I am afraid of Antony succeeding, and I don’t like moving far from the sea. At the same time I fear some great coup being struck without my being there. Varro for his part dislikes the youth’s plan. I don’t agree with him. He has forces on which he can depend. He can count on Decimus Brutus, and is making no secret of his intentions. He is organising his men in companies at Capua, he is paying them their bounty money. War seems to be ever coming nearer and nearer”.

In spite of these half-hearted and doubtful expressions of Cicero, the Senate at his own suggestion was presently glad to approve Octavian’s action, and to accept his aid. For events now followed quickly. When Antony met the legions at Brundisium, sent over by his brother Gaius, he seems at first to have found them ready to obey him. But difficulties were presently promoted by the agents of Octavian, who offered the men liberal bounties, or scattered libelli among them denouncing Antony’s tyranny and neglect of Caesar’s memory, and urging Octavian’s claim on their allegiance. Signs of mutiny soon showed themselves, and after a stormy meeting at which some officers and men used insubordinate language, Antony arrested and put to death several of the officers as ringleaders, and about 300 men. These severities, followed by more liberal offers and some conciliatory language, seemed for the time to put an end to the mutiny. Selecting therefore a “praetorian cohort” from the legions, Antony started for Rome, ordering the rest to march in detachments up the coast road to Ariminum, where the via Aemilia through the valley of the Po begins. In Cicero’s letters of the 8th, 11th, and 12th of November are recorded the various rumours of his approach, and the anxieties as to what he intended to do at Rome. He arrived about the 20th in full military array, and entered the city with a strong bodyguard, the rest of his men being encamped outside the walls. He did not stay long however. Having summoned the Senate for the 25th, in an edict, in which he denounced the character and aims of Octavian, he went to Tibur, where he had ordered his new levies to muster. Here he delivered a speech, which Cicero afterwards described as “pestilent.” On the 25th, however, he did not appear in the Senate. A second edict postponed the meeting to the 29th. Cicero insinuates that his non-appearance on the 25th was caused by some extra debauch. But, in fact, the reason may have been the news about the legio Martia, which, instead of going to Ariminum, had turned off from the coast road and reached Alba Fucensis. It might be of course that the legion was on its way to join Antony at Tibur, to which there was a good road from Alba Fucensis (via Valeria). Antony therefore went to Alba, but found the gates closed, and was greeted by a shower of arrows from the walls. It was clear that this legion at least did not mean to serve him. He came to Rome for the meeting of the Senate on the 29th, but was informed just before it that the Quarta had followed the example of the Martia, and was at Alba Fucensis. He understood that these legions meant to join Octavian, and he no longer thought it possible to get Octavian declared a hostis, though one of his partisans was ready to propose it. Having therefore transacted some formal business—chiefly the allotment of provinces, in which his brother Gaius obtained Macedonia, and a supplicatio in honour of Lepidus, he hurriedly returned to Tibur. His friends and supporters visited him in great numbers; but within a few days he was on his march to Ariminum to join what remained of the five Macedonian legions.

Antony’s object was to attack Decimus Brutus, whose forces were concentrated at Mutina. But at any rate, he was gone from Rome, and Octavian had won the first trick in the game. Cicero attributes Antony’s lowered tone in the Senate, and his hurried departure, to Octavian’s promptness and success in raising the veterans, and inducing the Martia and Quarta to desert him. At first, however, he had not felt easy as to the young man’s intentions. Writing from Puteoli on the 5th of November he tells Atticus that he gets a letter from Octavian every day, begging him to come to Capua and once more to save the republic, or, if not, at least to go to Rome. Cicero is “shamed to refuse and yet afraid to take”; but owns that Octavian is acting with vigour, and will probably enter Rome in great force. But he doubts whether the young man understands the situation, or the terrorism established by Antony in the Senate. He had better wait, he thinks, till the new consulate begins on January 1st. About the 12th of November, he tells Atticus that if Octavian wins now, the fear is that he will confirm Caesar’s acta more completely than ever, which will be against the interests of Brutus, while, if he is beaten, Antony will become more despotic still. Early in December (or the end of November), he mentions with alarm the possibility of Octavian being elected for a chance vacancy in the Tribunate; and assents to a remark made by Atticus, that though Octavian had given Antony a notable check, “they must wait to see the end.” Again he says to Oppius, “I cannot be warmly on his side without having some security that he will cordially embrace the friendship of Brutus and Cassius, and the other tyrannicides.”

On the 9th of December, however, when he came to Rome after Antony’s departure, Cicero made up his mind that for the present all distrust was to be dismissed or at least concealed. Octavian had mustered his forces at Alba Fucensis, and after some communications with the Senate—which warmly welcomed his offer of aid—had started with his legions on the track of Antony; who before the end of the year began the investment of Mutina, upon the refusal of Decimus Brutus to quit the province.

Accordingly, on the 20th of December, Cicero himself proposed a resolution in the Senate authorising the Consuls-designate to provide for the safe meeting of the Senate on the 1st of January 5 approving of an edict of Decimus Brutus, just arrived, in which he forbade any one with imperium entering his province to succeed him; directing all provincial governors to retain their provinces till successors were named by the Senate; and, lastly, approving the action of “Gaius Caesar” in enrolling the veterans, and of the Martia and Quarta in having joined him. These resolutions were to be formally put to the Senate on the 1st of January by the new consuls. Accordingly on that and the following days, after somewhat stormy debates, these decrees were passed, as well as one which acknowledged the services of Octavian, and gave him the rank of propraetor with imperium. It was also enacted that in regard to elections to office he should be considered to have held the quaestorship. He thus became a member of the Senate, with a right of speaking among the praetorii, and consequently with a plausible claim to stand for the consulship, in spite of his youth. A second decree—after the battles at Mutina—gave him consularia ornamenta.

Octavian was now fully launched on his public career. He had shown both Antony and the Senate that he was no negligible quantity. Though the Senate neither liked nor trusted him, he had played his cards with such skill that it was forced to treat him as its champion; while Antony had contrived to put himself in such clear opposition to the constitutional claims of the Senate, that Octavian could attack him without thereby committing himself to the support of the Assassins, and had made himself so strong that (if he proved successful against Antony) he would hereafter be able to dictate his own terms. Cicero saw this clearly enough, but he hoped that the defeat of Antony would secure to the side of the Senate the governors of Gaul and Spain with their legions, and that thus supported they would be able to discard their youthful champion. “He was”, he said later on, “to be complimented, distinguished, and—extinguished.” We shall now see how the hopes of the sanguine orator were once more blasted, and how all these intrigues were baffled by the wary policy and cool persistence of “the boy.”

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONSULSHIP AND TRIUMVIRATE