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
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A HISTORY OF PISA

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A HISTORY OF PISA

ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES

BY

WILLIAM HEYWOOD

AUTHOR OF *A PICTORIAL CHRONICLE OF SIENA*,
PALIO AND PONTE, *A HISTORY OF PERUGIA*
AND OTHER WORKS

WITH A MAP AND SIXTEEN PICTURES

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

WILLIAM HEYWOOD, who lived so long in Siena and Perugia and whose books on medieval Italy are well known to all students and lovers of that time, died on June 26th, 1919, at the age of 62. The son of the Rev. Nathaniel Heywood, Rector of St Michael's, Bristol, he was born at Much Wenlock (Salop), where his father was then curate, on March 19th, 1857, and was educated at Clifton College, which he entered in 1869, and at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge (1875-1878). He read for the law, and for about three years was articled to a solicitor in Newcastle-on-Tyne. After his marriage in 1879 he threw up the law, however, for "the wild and woolly West," and went to America, when about twenty-five, as a cowpuncher. He owned a ranch in Buffalo, Wyoming, subsequently editing a Wyoming newspaper, threw this up for the law, was called to the American Bar, and at length became a Justice of the Peace. He returned to Europe in 1894 on account of his wife's health, and went to live in Siena, where he made a host of friends, English and Italian. Indeed it would be true to say that no one ever met him without being fascinated by his joyous and robust nature, his absolute sincerity, simplicity of character and good faith, his humorous outlook and enormous good nature and generosity. In many ways he may be said never to have grown up; he was an English Public Schoolboy to the day of his death. The richness of his nature, his gift for life, the overwhelming fullness of his temperament that would express itself in every sort of laughter and practical joking, his essential masculinity, too, together with his height and bigness generally, made up a figure that can never be forgotten and that was essentially English.

About 1904 Mr Heywood left Siena, where the greater number of his books were written—*Our Lady of August and the Palio of Siena* (1899), *The Ensamples of Fra Filippo* (1901), *A Pictorial Chronicle of Siena* (1902), *The Historical Guide to Siena* (1903), *Palio and Ponte* (1904). He went to Perugia in order to write

what proved to be his *magnum opus*, the *History of Perugia* (1910). The enormous care he expended upon everything he wrote, the absolute neatness and perfection even of his manuscript, the careful rewriting, sometimes four or five times, of every page, have given to all his works the priceless value of accuracy in fact, a virtue upon which he set the very greatest store. Whatever value his work may come to have in the future, it will certainly never be set aside on the score of inaccuracy. Profound student of medieval Italy though he was, his most passionate enthusiasm and love were given to Italy of to-day. It is true that he worshipped Siena and loathed Florence like a Sienese of the time of Montaperto, but he gave his whole heart to the new nation; and his whole attitude, so much in accord as it was with that of the young Italy of to-day, might be summed up in the famous last sentence of his *History of Perugia*: "Hygiene is greater than art, and facilities for locomotion and transit are more important to a modern city than the preservation of all the ancient palaces that were ever built. For myself, I am content to know that *Italia cammina*." To those who knew and loved him, Italy will seem to have lost a part of her delight now that he has gone. *Requiescat in pace*.

The book here given to the public was his last work. It was completed some time before his death, but the war prevented its publication during his lifetime. It was his last wish that it should be published after his death and it is appropriate that the Press of his old University, to which his library was presented, should have undertaken it.

E. H.

June 1921.

PREFACE

THIS book, which occupied my leisure hours from 1910 to 1917, was written in a Devonshire village under the difficulties which naturally confront one who lives far from great libraries. It had been my intention to return to Italy and to finish it in Pisa. The war prevented that. I am conscious of many deficiencies; but I think it better to commit my volume to the press rather than to await opportunities which, at my age, are unlikely to recur. For copies of numerous passages from documents and chronicles and for the verification of many references I am indebted to the unfailing kindness of my friends Mr Edmund G. Gardner, Mr Robert W. Carden, Mr Edward Hutton and, above all, Mr A. G. Ferrers Howell who has taken an interest in the work ever since its inception and has rendered me invaluable assistance in ways too various to particularise. The two modern writers to whom I owe most are Professor G. Volpe and Professor Camillo Manfroni. How greatly I have profited by their learning may be gauged by the frequency with which I have cited their works in my footnotes. The map which accompanies the book was prepared for me by Mr Donald E. Woollen.

WILLIAM HEYWOOD

CORRIGENDA

p. 14, l. 16, *for* Murangone *read* Marangone.

p. 206, l. 13, *for* Logoduro *read* Logudoro.

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CHAPTER THE FIRST

A FLOATING REPUBLIC

FROM the dim days before the Trojan War, when Pelops, coming from Pisa in Elis, founded the Italian Pisae on the marshy headland between the Arnus and the Ausar, the city's destiny was sealed beyond recall. Of the sea was she born, from the sea she drew her life-blood, and when the sea was lost to her she perished from inanition. This is the keynote of her history so long as she has a history at all that is worth recording; and he who would understand her weakness and her strength, her splendour and her ruin, must never altogether get the sound of the sea out of his ears nor the smell of the sea out of his nostrils.

Originally, no doubt, Pisa stood quite close to the shore; but, owing to the alluvial deposits of her two rivers, the land gradually gained upon the sea, until, in Strabo's time, the city was already two and a half miles from the coast. In the tenth century it was four, and to-day it is six miles inland¹. Yet the ever-widening strip of plain between Pisa and the sea did nothing to affect her status as a maritime city, since the Arno long continued to be navigable for all except the very largest vessels. Thus, in 525, we find Theodoric, the Ostrogoth, ordering the removal of certain *sepes* which the fisher-folk had set *in fluminibus navigeris diversis territoriis meantibus*, and among them in the Arnus, to the end that the free passage of ships (*navium cursus*) might not be impeded². Nearly six centuries later, the great fleet which sailed to the conquest of the Balearic Isles was built in the dockyards of Pisa, and, even in the 13th

¹ Dennis, *The Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria* ("Everyman's Library" edition), vol. II, p. 79, n. 1.

² Cassiodorus, *Var. v. Ep.* 17 and 20, in *M. G. H.* XII. See also Repetti, *Diz. geografico fisico storico della Toscana*, IV, 307, and Manfroni, *Storia della Marina Italiana dalle Invasioni barbariche al trattato di Ninfeo* (Livorno, 1899), p. 10.

century, long after the new *Porto Pisano* had been constructed¹, we have satisfactory evidence that the Pisans still caulked and repaired their ships “ab ecclesia sancti Viti versus degatiam tantum ex utraque parte Arni².”

In Roman times, there had been a regular harbour on the sea-coast (*portus etruscus*, *portus pisanus*, *portus Pisanorum*), one of the most frequented in the Tyrrhenian Sea, a starting place for expeditions to Marseilles, Sardinia or Spain³; but after the fall of the Empire it was abandoned and gradually silted up, until to-day its very site is doubtful⁴. That it was still of considerable importance in the fourth century of our era is proved by the fact that, in 398, the Imperial fleet, under the command of Mascezel, assembled there before sailing for North Africa against the rebel Gildo⁵. Eighteen years later, Rutilius wrote his celebrated description of the harbour, with its fringe of seaweed and the great Villa Triturrita jutting into it⁶. Thence he

¹ On the authority of P. Vigo, *Storia del porto pisano* (Roma, 1898), p. 7, Professor C. Calisse gives 1163 as the date of the first work done on the new *porto pisano*. Compare, however, *Arch. Stor. It.* T. VI. P. II. pp. 18, 28 and 32, and Repetti, *Diz.* cited, article “Porto pisano.”

² Bonaini, *Statuti inediti della Città di Pisa* (Firenze, 1854–1857), vol. I, p. 306.

³ F. C. Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice* (London, 1901), p. 235.

⁴ Some have identified it with Leghorn. Others place it at the mouth of the Arno. See Dennis, *ubi cit.*, p. 77, and authorities there cited.

⁵ Claudianus, *De bello Gildonico*, in *M. G. H. (Auct. Antiq.)*, vol. X, p. 71, vv. 479 *et seq.*:


Ut fluctus tetigere maris, tunc acrior arsit
 Impetus; arripiunt naves, ipsique rudentes
 Expediunt, et vela legunt et cornua summis
 Adsociant malis; quatitur Tyrrhena tumultu
 Ora, nec Alpheae capiunt navalia Pisae:
 Sic Agamemnoniam vindex cum Graecia classem
 Solveret, innumeris fervebat vocibus Aulis.
 Non illos strepitus impendentisque procellae
 Signa, nec adventus dubii deterruit Austri.
 ‘Solvite iam, socii,’ clamant, ‘aut rumpite funem.
 Per vada Gildonem quamvis adversa petamus.’

⁶ Rutilius Claudius Namatianus, *De Reditu suo*. Edited by C. H. Keene (London, Bell and Sons, 1907), Lib. I, vv. 527–540:

Inde Triturritam petimus: sic villa vocatur,
 Quae latere expulsis insula paene fretis.
 Namque manu iunctis procedit in aequora saxis,
 Quique domum posuit, condidit ante solum.



PANORAMA OF PISA



*Decorata al ritorno della città di Firenze nel 1800
dalla città di Firenze nel 1800
dalla città di Firenze nel 1800
dalla città di Firenze nel 1800*

THE RIVER ARNO

made his way to Pisa, situated, as in the days of Pelops, between the Arnus and the Ausar¹; and his visit affords us a last glimpse of the Roman colony before the dark night of Barbarian invasion settles down like a pall, hiding it from our eyes for more than six generations.

Subject to the Ostrogoths, Pisa gave herself voluntarily to Narses², and then, in the seventh century, fronts the Middle Ages, still a maritime city and practically self-governing³. Probably, indeed, all those fears which, previous to 603, Gregory the Great had manifested for the safety of the islands of the Tyrrhenian Sea, were inspired by the activities of the Pisans; and, in that year at any rate, we find them preparing a naval expedition in flat defiance of papal entreaties: "Ad Pisanos autem hominem nostrum dudum, qualem debuimus et quo modo debuimus, transmissimus, sed obtinere nil potuit. Unde et dromones eorum iam parati ad egrediendum nuntiati sunt⁴." That this expedition was directed against the Greeks is scarcely doubtful, but whether the Pisans who took part in it were mere pirates or tacitly leagued with the Longobards we do not know⁵. In either case those *dromones parati ad egrediendum* suffice to

Contiguum stupui portum, quem fama frequentat
 Pisarum emporio divitiisque maris.
 Mira loci facies. Pelago pulsantur aperto
 Inque omnes ventos litora nuda patent:
 Non ullus tegitur per brachia tuta recessus,
 Aeolias possit qui prohibere minas:
 Sed procera suo praetexitur alga profundo,
 Molliter offensae non nocitura rati;
 Et tamen insanas cedendo interligat undas,
 Nec sinit ex alto grande volumen agi.

¹ *Ibid.* vv. 565-570:

Alpheae veterem contemplor originis urbem,
 Quam cingunt geminis Arnus et Ausar aquis;
 Conum pyramidis coeuntia flumina ducunt:
 Intratur modico frons patefacta solo:
 Sed proprium retinet communi in gurgite nomen,
 Et pontum solus scilicet Arnus adit.

² Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 553.

³ Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, IV, 308: "...sul principio del secolo VII le città di Pisa e di Sovana in Maremma governavansi quasi a repubblica."

⁴ *Epistolae ex Registro Domni Gregorii* in *M. G. H. (Epistolarum* vol. II), XIII, 36. *Smeraldo Patricio et Exarco*.

⁵ See Hegel, *Storia della Costituzione dei Municipi Italiani* (Milano, Guigoni, 1861), pp. 247-248; Volpe, *Pisa e i Longobardi* in *Studi Storici*

prove that they were still a race of seamen; and the absence of all records probably conceals a long series of maritime enterprises, some of them possibly of considerable importance. May we not presume that there were Pisans among the *dromonarî* of Theodoric¹ and in the *ἄκατοι* of Totila²?

When and how the Longobards entered Pisa is a question which remains extremely doubtful. Apparently, however, the process was a gradual one, continuing through all the first half of the seventh century; while a further period seems to have elapsed before they established a regular government there. For more than two centuries we have no notice of public officials residing in Pisa³. The probability is that the Longobards occupied the city little by little without any violent conquest, joining in the maritime enterprises of the Latin population, half mercantile, half piratical. Yet, if their invasion was peaceable, it was none the less thorough, and ere long the Germanic element seems to have become the predominant one⁴. The assertion made by so many writers that the Longobards hated the sea is a generalization from insufficient data; and, although the annexation of Sardinia by Liutprand is nothing better than a myth⁵, they probably conquered Corsica and certainly maintained constant relations with it⁶. That these relations were not entered into from Genoa is obvious. Under the Romans, Genoa had been an important seaport since the Second Punic war, and up to the time of Rotharis it was free; after Rotharis it was scarcely more than an unwallèd village with a scanty population of fisher-folk⁷. Pisa was the only Longobard port in the Tyrrhenian Sea.

(Pisa), x, 370 *et seq.*; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 23; Besta, *La Sardegna Medioevale* (Palermo, A. Reber, 1908-9), I, 25; Villari, *Le invasioni barbariche in Italia* (Milano, Hoepli, 1901), p. 296.

¹ Cassiodorus, *Variarum* II, 31; IV, 15, in *M. G. H.* XII.

² Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 15-16, citing Procopius, *De bello Gothico*.

³ Volpe, *Pisa e i Longobardi, ubi cit.* pp. 374-375, 387. ⁴ *Ibid.* p. 384.

⁵ Besta, *La Sardegna Medioevale, op. cit.* I, 31-33.

⁶ See the very interesting details given by Volpe, *ubi cit.* p. 383.

⁷ Lumbroso, *Sulla Storia dei Genovesi avanti il MC.* (Torino, 1872), p. 32; R. W. Carden, *The City of Genoa* (London, Methuen, 1908), p. 2. The date A.D. 670, given by the latter writer, is obviously a misprint. In 670, Rotharis had been dead for nearly twenty years.

Afterwards, in the early years of the Frankish domination, we find the Pisans joining in the great struggle which Charlemagne and his immediate successors carried on against the Saracens; we possess some slight evidence that, about the year 808, an imperial fleet, manned in part by Pisans and Genoese, inflicted a defeat upon a Greco-Venetian fleet near Comacchio¹, while, if we may credit the chroniclers, the *parva classis* which, in 828, raided the coast of Africa between Utica and Carthage, under the command of Bonifazio, Count of Lucca and Prefect of Corsica, was almost wholly manned by Pisan mariners². The statement that there were Pisan galleys at the battle of Ostia, in 849, is, no doubt, romance and not history³; but the two thousand Tuscans who fortified the walls of Salerno, in 871, were almost certainly Pisans, since, as Sismondi justly remarks, Pisa was the only Tuscan city whose inhabitants had, as yet, devoted themselves to commerce or possessed ships⁴.

In 906 the Saracens, already masters of Sicily and of a great part of Southern Italy⁵, captured Frassineto, which seems to have been situated on the long peninsula that shuts in the bay

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 37-38. Compare Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 71 *et seq.* All the details of this war are highly conjectural.

² Roncioni, *Delle istorie pisane*, in "Arch. Stor. It." T. VI. P. I. p. 41 *et seq.*; Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia* (Firenze, Le Monnier, 1854), vol. I, pp. 276-278; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 42-43; Muratori, *Annali d'Italia, ad annum.*

³ Tronci, *Annali Pisani, rifiuti arricchiti di molti fatti e seguitati fino all' anno 1839* (Pisa, 1868), I, 140.

⁴ Anonymi Salernitani *Paralipomena*, apud Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* T. II. P. II. col. 256: "Aliam [turrim] namque Salernitani construxerunt, quae dicitur Mediana et secus illam turrim aditum civitatis fecerunt et ferris et ferris (*sic*) illam munierunt. Illam vero quae est ab ortu solis Tuscanenses operarunt, etenim illi illo in tempore ferè duo millia fuerunt." Compare Sismondi, *Storia delle Rep. Ital. dei Secoli di Mezzo* (Milano, Pagnoni), vol. I, cap. v, p. 120 n.

⁵ In this connection a few dates may prove useful. The conquest of Sicily began in 827. Palermo was taken in 831, Messina in 843 and Castrogiovanni in 859. Meanwhile, the Venetians were defeated off Taranto, Ancona was burnt and the Adriatic swept by Mussulman fleets. Another company took Bari and carried their ravages into Apulia. In 846, they menaced the very gates of Rome and burned a suburb. Retiring towards Fondi, they laid waste the country and besieged Gaeta, driving back, in headlong rout, even to Montecassino, the army which the Emperor had sent against them. For a time, after 866, Lewis II checked their advance; but his death, in 875, put an end to any organized resistance, and, in 878, Syracuse, the last Greek city of Sicily was taken by the infidels.

of Villafranca to the east of Nice¹. There they maintained themselves for over thirty years, pushing their plundering expeditions into Burgundy and Piedmont and ravaging all the neighbouring coasts². The terror-stricken Ligurians fled inland, carrying with them the relics of their saints and the ashes of their fathers—an emigration one of the results of which may be found in the jurisdiction which the *pievi* of the mountain districts then acquired over the maritime parishes, and, I believe, still continue to exercise³. From the Magra to the coasts of Provence the Riviera lay desolate, and, in 935, Genoa itself was sacked with horrible slaughter. Only the women and children were spared to become the slaves of the victors, who carried them away to Africa “together with the spoil of all the churches and houses of Genoa⁴.” Eventually, the incursions of the Saracens probably proved beneficial to Genoa, since the lesser towns of the two Riviere, unable to provide for their own defence, put themselves under her protection, and, in process of time, from the head of a confederation she became a sovereign⁵. For the moment, however, she was hopelessly crippled, and her weakness turned to the advantage of Pisa, which from thenceforward, so far at least as any Italian rivals were concerned, dominated the Ligurian Sea for over a century⁶. So

¹ Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 162.

² They were finally dislodged by Hugh of Provence, in 942. Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad annum.

³ Cantù, *Storia degli Italiani* (Torino, 1854), tom. III, cap. 71. In this connection it may be observed that a *Pieve* was a church in which there was a baptismal font—a Baptistery. Dependent on it were other parochial churches where the sacrament of baptism was not administered. The custom of baptising in *pievi* only, instead of in all parish churches, still exists in many Italian dioceses. (See Lusini, *I confini storici del vescovado di Siena*, in *Bullettino Senese di Storia Patria*, vol. v (1898), p. 345 n.)

⁴ The best account of the sack of Genoa is to be found in Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* II, 179–181. Cf. Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 61. The narratives of the elder Genoese historians, up to Serra and Canale, may, of course, be dismissed as fabulous.

⁵ Lanzani, *Storia dei Comuni Italiani dalle Origini al 1313* (Milano, Villardi, 1882), p. 120.

⁶ Machiavelli, *Istorie Fiorentine*, lib. I: “La città di Genova e tutte le sue riviere furono in questi tempi dai Saracini disfatte, donde ne nacque la grandezza della città di Pisa, nella quale assai popoli cacciati dalla patria sua ricorsero....”

greatly did she increase in power and importance that Luitprand, Bishop of Cremona, does not hesitate to speak of her as the Capital of Tuscany—*Tusciae Provinciae caput*¹—a title, be it observed, which, rightly considered, is a direct testimony to her maritime ascendancy. On land, as we shall see more fully hereafter, she was still crowded almost out of existence by the overgrown territory and diocese of Lucca. In the tenth century, her only claim to be called the capital of Tuscany lay in her naval and commercial supremacy; and that supremacy, so far from giving umbrage to the German Emperors and to the Marquises of Tuscany, seems to have met with their unqualified approval. Possessing no naval forces of their own, they were glad to profit by the initiative and enterprise of their seafaring subjects. On the sea Pisa was already practically free, and her fleets may be said to have formed a floating republic². Thereafter, the Commune was established on a solid legal basis by two, or perhaps three, Imperial diplomas, but the earliest of these was not granted until the second quarter of the 12th century, when the Pisans had already been ruled by their own Consuls for more than forty years. We may, therefore, regard them rather as recognitions of accomplished facts than as concessions of new political rights³.

¹ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 926.

² Amari, *Prime imprese degli Italiani nel Mediterraneo*, in the *Nuova Antologia*, vol. II (1866), p. 46: "I Pisani, fin dalla seconda metà del decimo secolo, compariscono nella storia liberi in mare e sudditi in terra." In this connection the concluding words of the celebrated *Concordia* of Bishop Daibert seem to me suggestive: "Volumus deinde vos scire, quod quisquis, superbia qualibet inflatus, hanc pacem et concordiam servare noluerit, ... propterea sit excommunicatus; et omnes custodite vos ab eo sicuti ab heretico damnato et ab ecclesia Dei separato, neque in ecclesia neque in navi cum eo aliquam communionem habeatis." (Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, *op. cit.* vol. I, pp. 17-18.) Instead of "neque in navi" we should have expected "neque in pisana urbe" or "neque in civitate." The Pisan Commune was still "in navi."

³ Of these diplomas that of Frederick Barbarossa alone remains to us (see Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* p. 32); but we possess documentary evidence of a diploma of Conrad II in a confirmation of Pope Alexander IV (1254-1261); while the existence of a still earlier privilege, granted by Lothair of Saxony about the year 1132, may, perhaps, be inferred from the phraseology of the diplomas of Frederick I and Henry VI: "retro a triginta annis..." "retro a sexaginta annis." Volpe, *Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa (Città e Consoli e Podestà)*, sec. XII-XIII, pp. 1-2 notes. See also, in addition to the authorities there cited, Bonaini, *Dipl. pis.* p. 104, doc. xxxiv.

Of the steps by which Pisa achieved her independence we know nothing in detail, though the general character of the movement is clear enough. As we have already seen¹, the Barbarian invasions had infused a strong strain of wholesome northern blood into the veins of the citizens; it was no weak southern race that built up the might of Pisa. Neither, perhaps, was the northern emigration yet over. If we may believe the chronicles, "the seven barons from whom were descended the seven great houses" only came southward in 972, in the suite of the first Otho². Judging from the long list of names to be found in the documents, not only was the population, from the eleventh century onwards, still largely Teutonic, but, what is even more material, the men in whose hands the Commune was, or, at any rate, the central and more important nucleus of it, were, beyond question of peradventure, men of Longobard, Frank or German origin³. In the aggregate they formed a compact group of families, the richest and strongest in the city, owners of all or nearly all the ships which went to make up the fleets of Pisa. United by common interests and by oaths which bound them to one another and to their chiefs, they early established those sea customs—*consuetudines quas habent de Mari*—which were approved in 1075 by Pope Gregory VII and confirmed, six years later, by the Emperor Henry IV⁴. At first, of course, these customs can have had no validity or coercive power except as between the associates themselves, and, even for them, only when engaged in maritime undertakings. They were, in fact, the laws of the floating republic I have spoken of above. But the associates were not only merchant adventurers: they possessed towers in Pisa and lands in the *contado*; and they

¹ P. 4 *supra*.

² *Cronaca pisana di Raniera Sardo*, in *Arch. Stor. It.* S. I, T. VI, P. II, p. 75: "Anni Domini novecentosessantadue, fue traslatato lo Imperio alli Alamanni, e venni a Pisa Otto primo, Imperatore Tedesco; e piacendogli lo stallo a lui e alla sua gente, rimansenci sette suoi baroni; delli quali dicesono le sette case; cioè quelli di casa Matti degli Orlandi e di Ripafratta e Gaitani e Duodi e Gusmani e Vesconti e Verchionesi; li quali tutti brevileggiò e a loro diede molti doni lo ditto Imperadore."

³ Volpe, *Pisa e i Longobardi*, *op. cit.* p. 384.

⁴ Muratori, *Antiquitates*, IV, 19.

must have quickly realized that that same oath-fellowship (*conjuratio*) which enabled them to achieve freedom and supremacy at sea might prove an equally effective weapon on dry land. Thus, side by side with the lawfully constituted powers of the state, we find a voluntary private association, continually growing in power and importance, gradually usurping public attributions, and, at last, blossoming into the free Commune¹.

Exactly when this change took place we do not know. According to the fabulous accounts of the elder writers, Pisa owed her liberty to the Carolingians and was governed by her own consuls in the ninth century². Professor Fumi, on the other hand, apparently attributes the institution of the consulate to the year 1033³; but even this would seem to be too early. The first documentary evidence which we possess of the existence of such a magistracy is, I believe, to be found in the so-called "Carta sarda" by which Mariano de' Laccon, Judge of Torres or Logudoro in Sardinia, granted certain commercial privileges and exemptions to his Pisan allies, "for the honour of Bishop Gherardo and of Viscount Ugo and of all the Consuls of Pisa and of all my friends in Pisa—*pro honore de xu piscopum Gelardu e de Ocu visconte e de omnes consolos de Pisas e ffecila pro honore de omnes ammicos meos de Pisas.*" Its date is fixed by the allusion to Gherardo who occupied the Pisan see from 1080 to 1085⁴. As yet, however, the Consulship was almost certainly nothing better than a temporary commission or *balìa*, appointed for a specified purpose and ceasing to exist when the work was

¹ In the almost total absence of Pisan sources, many valuable analogies may be drawn from the *Compagna* of Genoa. Compare, for example, C. Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *Caffaro e i suoi tempi* (Torino, Roux, 1894), cap. II: "Origine e costituzione del Comune," and Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 86-91. See also, on the subject generally, G. Volpe, *Questioni fondamentali sull' origine e svolgimento dei Comuni Italiani* (Lec. x-xiv), Pisa, Tip. Successori Fratelli Nistri, 1904.

² Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 41.

³ Fumi, *Codice dipl. della Città d' Orvieto* (Firenze, Vieusseux, 1844), p. iii: "Pisa ha memorie consolari non prima del 1033...."

⁴ It was first published by Tanfani, *Due Carte Inedite in Lingua Sarda dei secoli XI e XIII*, in *Arch. Stor. It.* S. III, T. XIII, p. 357. Compare Besta, *op. cit.* I, 83, and authorities there cited. At first sceptical, he is now disposed to accept the document as genuine, and its authenticity is, I believe, no longer open to question.

finished for the performance of which it had been called into being. The diploma which the Emperor Henry IV granted to the Pisans, in 1081, contains no mention of consuls, though we read of *hominum duodecim* elected by the associates in a general assembly, summoned by the sound of bells—in *colloquio facto sonantibus campanis*¹. Evidently, at that time, the Pisans had no consuls or they would have been mentioned. The same thing is true of the celebrated *Concordia* made by Bishop Daibert, in 1090; or, perhaps, even a year or two earlier, though, as Professor Villari justly remarks, all the elements of the Commune were then present². There was a *Commune Consilium* of *Sapientes* or *Boni homines*, a species of Senate, and a *Colloquium Civitatis* or General Assembly of all the citizens, afterwards to develop into the *Parlamentum* or *Arrengo*. Five “strenuous and wise men,” whose names are given in the document, sat in counsel with the Bishop³. These were the immediate precursors of the consuls, who, in 1094, are at last mentioned in another *Concordia* of the same Daibert, and to their authority he explicitly appeals: *hujus civitatis consulibus*⁴. Perhaps, however, the most striking proof of the advance which the associates had made towards autonomy is to be found in the fact that the first name in the list of the *strenui et sapientes viri* spoken of above is that of Pietro Visconte—*Petrus Vicecomes*⁵.

At the dawn of the communal era, the Visconte, as the deputy and representative of the Countess Matilda, shared with the Bishop the lawfully constituted government of the city. The office was an hereditary one, and, here as elsewhere, the official title was early adopted by the holders as their family name. As the foremost citizens of Pisa, the Visconti could by no means afford to stand aside from the life of the city, and since,

¹ Muratori, *Antiq.* IV. 20.

² Villari, *I primi due secoli della Storia di Firenze* (Firenze, Sansoni, 1898), vol. I, pp. 87–88.

³ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, *op. cit.* I, 16: “adiunctis mihi sociis viris strenuis et sapientibus Petro Vicecomite, scilicet Rolando et Stephano Guinezone, Mariniano, et Alberto.”

⁴ Muratori, *Antiq.* III, 1099; Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, III, 890–891.

⁵ See note 3 above.

as we have seen, the whole of the commerce and industry of Pisa, its fleets and its armies, were controlled by a private association of merchants and *armatori*, the Visconti early took advantage of their position to assume the leadership of the associates. Thus, in the African expedition of 1088, we have record of a Ugo Vicecomes filius Ugonis Vicecomitis, who is spoken of as *capud urbis*; while, in a document of 1114 referring to the Balearic War, the names of three members of the family appear in conjunction with those of the Consuls¹. By joining the associates the Visconte had, however, lost much of his original authority and had become merely *primus inter pares*. The last evidence which we possess of his appearance in a judicial capacity belongs, I believe, to the year 1116². On the other hand, the ancient office of the Gastaldo, the economic head of the royal and marchesal *curtis* of the city, had long been united to that of the Visconte, and, as Gastaldo, the Visconte still retained the right of levying *ripaticum*, dues in respect of the weighing of iron, and tolls payable by bakers, by vendors of wine and oil and, in fact, by all the *Arti*—a last survival of the tributes and *praestationes* which the *dominus* had been wont to exact from the half-free labourers and craftsmen of the *curtis*³. Up to 1153, the Visconti continued to enjoy all the rights and emoluments of the Gastaldato together with a preponderant position in the Consular College; but they never

¹ *Liber Maiolichinus* (edition C. Calisse, Roma, 1904), p. 139: "acta &c. sub Petro venerabili Pisane ecclesie archiepiscopo atque Gerardo, Petro, Gerardo Vicecomitibus, Athone, Ennrico, &c., consulibus."

² Volpe, *Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa*, *op. cit.* p. 3.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 3-4. The economic system established in Italy during the Longobard domination and known as the "sistema curtense" (*Hofsystem*) was based upon the patrimonial and administrative union of numerous subject territories directly dependent upon a dominant estate or edifice and governed by the proprietor (*dominus*) or by his representative (*gastaldus*, *actor*, *massarius*). The dominant estate was generally called the *curtis*, a word which equally indicates the enclosed space surrounding the edifice and the ideal union of all the rural dependencies, whether servile (*fundi servientes*), or simply dependent (*casae ingenuiles*, *massariciae*, *aldionales*). Nor were the cities excluded from this system. In the cities the Longobards planted the largest and most powerful of their *curtes*: the *curtes regiae*. See on the whole subject Solmi, *Le Associazioni in Italia avanti le Origini del Comune; Saggio di Storia economica e giuridica* (Modena, 1898), Cap. II, p. 35 *et seq.* and especially pp. 38-39, 44-45.

ceased to regret their lost supremacy nor to intrigue against the government of which they themselves formed so large a part. Finally, on the eve of the first descent of Barbarossa, they broke into open revolt, and, under the leadership of Alberto, "Vicecomes major," the head of the *consorteria*, fought fiercely through the streets and from the towers¹. In the end, however, the consuls were victorious, with the result that the Visconti were deprived of all their fiscal privileges, which from thenceforward inured to the Commune².

There remained the Archbishop; but with the Archbishop the Commune had, as yet, no quarrel; rather did it seek to advance beneath his aegis. In those days, an ecclesiastical sanction was the best guaranty, the surest foundation, the most authoritative title to all political power, without which even the Emperors could hardly hope to hold their own. The infant Commune had need of its Archbishop. The result of their alliance was a mixed government, ecclesiastical and lay, sovereign by a two-fold jurisdiction in the territory and the diocese, with attributions which, even if they were really separate, appear to us, at this distance of time, confused and blended³. The Commune had, in fact, succeeded to all the power of the Visconte, and, from the first decade of the twelfth century, we find the Consuls intervening in many transactions which affected the temporalities of the Pisan Church both in the city and in the *contado*. On the other hand, the Archbishop, and especially in the times which preceded and followed a naval expedition, exercised a political and administrative authority which, though resting upon no Imperial diploma, was none the less real and effective. That Bishop Gherardo (1080-1085) and Daibert

¹ For an excellent account of the Pisan towers, see Miss N. Erichsen's part of *The Story of Pisa* ("Mediaeval Towns" Series), pp. 126-140.

² Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, 18 (28 Oct. 1154, Pisan style): "Item, in totum illud quod prescripti Vicecomites de ripa terrae et aquae, et de pesa centenarii ferri, et de fornariis et venivendulis et oleariis, et de omnibus artibus soliti sunt habere et suscipere, et in castaldatum, eos sic in perpetuum condemnamus, ut nichil iuris eis ulterius habeant, et inde ab hora in antea nichil recipiant neque habeant; sed ea omnia nostrae civitatis iuri publico damus, concedimus et in perpetuum vendicamus."

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 9 et seq. Cf. Rondoni, *Sena Vetust* (Torino, 1892), p. 16.

(1089-1104) should have issued proclamations for the security of the city and the concord of the citizens, determining the height of the towers and the legal formalities to be followed in destroying the houses of the disobedient¹, does not surprise us: the Commune was yet in embryo; but the decree of Ruggiero I, in 1129, stands upon quite a different footing and proves, if proof be needed, that, even after their government had been firmly established, the Consuls still continued to work hand in hand with the Archbishop².

From the nature of the case, the Territorial jurisdiction of the nascent Commune had been purely voluntary, representing as it were the sum of all the fragments of authority which the associated families separately enjoyed and exercised. In process of time, however, as the associative nucleus acquired greater cohesion and stability, a vigorous collective life destroyed the personality of the individual associates, and, little by little, those jurisdictional rights which its members had previously exercised over their own allodial and feudal estates were transferred to the body politic³. Thus, almost from the first, the new-born Commune possessed considerable territorial jurisdiction, and this it naturally sought to consolidate and enlarge with the result that it was brought into immediate conflict with Lucca. During the Longobard period, Lucca alone of all the cities of Tuscany was governed by a Duke, who exercised surveillance over the other cities governed by Gastaldi⁴; at Lucca alone was money coined⁵; the Lucchese

¹ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, pp. 11, 33; and for the *Concordia* of Daibert, pp. 16-18.

² Bonaini, *Dipl. Pis.* p. 7.

³ Volpe, *Questioni fondamentali, etc., op. cit.* pp. 23-24. Considerations such as these enable us to understand how, in the early days of communal freedom, public ambassadors were sent on behalf of private citizens: see, for example, Del Vecchio e Casanova, *Le Rappresaglie nei Comuni Medioevali* (Bologna, Zanichelli, 1894), pp. 101-102.

⁴ Volpe, *Pisa e i Longobardi, ubi cit.*, p. 375. Professor Villari, *I primi due Secoli, etc. op. cit.* I, 64, records a "*Dux civitatis Florentinorum, Gudibrandus*," whom he believes to have been placed there by the Longobards. Professor Volpe, on the other hand, thinks that Gudibrandus was "assai probabilmente un Duca Carolingio, o detto dal partito franco negli anni di sfacelo del regno longobardo e riconosciuto, sebbene a malincuore, da Carlo."

⁵ There seems to have been Pisan money, but coined at Lucca. It bore the legend "*Flavia Pisa*." (Volpe, *ubi cit.* p. 389, citing G. Di S. Quintano, *Della Zecca e delle mon. lucchesi*, p. 30.)

territory increased enormously until its confines marched with those of Volterra, Populonia and Roselle; it would almost seem that Pisa became a part, albeit a distinct and separate part, of the Duchy of Lucca. Even in the ninth and tenth centuries, when Tuscany had become a true and proper territory of confines for defence against the Saracens, Lucca, though an inland town, continued to be the principal seat of the Marquises: a state of things which would be quite inexplicable except upon the ground of long custom and unbroken tradition. Meanwhile, the diocese of Lucca, though smaller than the political territory, had likewise grown exceedingly until the narrowed diocese of Pisa was cooped up and hemmed in on every side except towards the sea¹. When, at last, the Pisans began to aspire to territorial sovereignty, they found every avenue of peaceable expansion barred by the overgrown territories of Lucca. As early as 1004, Murangone tells us that “Pisani fecerunt bellum cum Lucensibus et vicerunt illos in Aqualonga”; while, in 1055, according to the same chronicler, “fuit bellum inter Pisanos et Lucenses ad Vacule. Pisani vero gratia Dei vicerunt illos².”

Born amid the clash of arms and cradled on the waves, what wonder if the Pisan Commune sprang, as it were at one bound, into full and vigorous life? Struggle is a necessary condition of evolution, and through continued struggle Pisa achieved the hegemony of Tuscany and supremacy in the Tyrrhenian Sea. What matter if her day was short? It was crowded with splendid hours, any one of which was worth living for³.

¹ Volpe, *ubi cit.* pp. 375-388.

² *Arch. Stor. It.* Serie I, Tom. VI, Parte II, pp. 4, 5. With regard to these dates it may, perhaps, be as well to remind the reader that, according to the Pisan method of computation, the year began with the 25th of March, dating *ab incarnatione*. This was the case also with the Sienese and Florentine calendars; but, while the two last mentioned peoples dated their year from the 25th of March following the beginning of the common year, the Pisans dated theirs from the 25th of March preceding the beginning of the common year.

³ Mr Howells, in his *Tuscan Cities*, calls the modern Pisa a “beautiful ghost.” She died in the fifteenth century. Of states and cities, as of men, the old Roman speaks sooth:

Soles occidere et redire possunt:
nobis cum semel occidit brevis lux,
nox est perpetua una dormienda.

CHAPTER THE SECOND

THE EXPULSION OF MOGAHID FROM SARDINIA

AT the beginning of the eleventh century the tide of Saracen invasion was at its height, and it seemed as though the Tyrrhenian Sea, nay, even the Mediterranean itself, was destined to be converted into a Moslem lake. Before its close the Communes of Pisa and Genoa had freed *their* sea from foreign invaders. Thereafter, they swept the coasts of Africa, and, sword in hand, imposed commercial treaties upon their old antagonists. The conquest of Sicily by the Normans and the victories of the Venetians in the Adriatic, with the consequent acquisition of trading privileges in the Levant, were contemporaneous with these achievements, and all of them prolegomenal to the Crusades.

Already, in the tenth century, the Pisans had fought the Saracens in Calabria¹, and, perhaps, also in Spain and Africa²; while, in 1004, a Moslem fleet sailed up the Arno and sacked a quarter of the city³. To avenge this insult and to defend their

¹ Marangone, *Cronaca pisana*, in *Arch. Stor. It.* S. 1, T. VI, P. II, p. 4: "DCCCCLXXI. Fuerunt Pisani in Calabria." Compare Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* II, 311, 313, and Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 64.

² Amari, *Prime imprese degli Italiani nel Mediterraneo*, *ubi cit.* p. 46.

³ *Chronicon pisanum* apud Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* VI, 107, and *Breviarium pisanæ historiae*, *ibid.* 167; Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 4, all in the Pisan year 1005. The *Breviarium*, which was compiled at the end of the thirteenth century, adds that the Saracens had previously menaced Rome, but this Amari believes to be a fable, invented to magnify the merits of the Pisans in the eyes of the Papal court and to bolster up the story of the cession of Sardinia. Later historians attribute this raid of the Saracens to the same year as the battle of Reggio and tell us that it took place during the absence of the Pisan fleet. In their pages, the terrible Mogahid (Musetto) appears as the leader of the infidels and the lady Cinzica or Kinzica as the heroine who aroused the Pisans to resistance. Compare Santoro, *La leggenda di Cinzica*, in *Studi Storici*, I, 251.

commerce, the Pisans attacked Reggio¹. No trustworthy details of the expedition have come down to us², though, according to a comparatively modern legend, it was undertaken at the instance of the learned French monk, Gerbert of Aurillac, who, after he had ascended the Papal throne with the title of Sylvester II, proclaimed a crusade for the deliverance of Jerusalem. On his invitation, the Pisans put to sea and assailed and slaughtered the first infidels they encountered. The story, however, appears to be quite without foundation³. The Pisans were above all else traders, and the reasons of all their wars and all their voyages were at the bottom economic reasons. Had it been otherwise, they would have differed profoundly from their fellow-men in every age of the world's history. Even the siege of Troy was, probably, undertaken less for the *beaux yeux* of Helen,

...the face that launched a thousand ships
And burnt the topless towers of Ilium,

than because that city commanded the entrance to the Euxine. If the Saracens had not interfered with Pisan commerce, it is

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 4: "MVI. Fecerunt Pisani bellum cum Saracenis ad Regium, et gratia Dei vicerunt illos in die Sancti Sixti."

² All that is known of the battle of Reggio will be found in Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* vol. II, lib. IV, cap. VII, p. 341, and vol. III, lib. V, cap. I, p. 3.

³ Amari informs us that the legend of the pious motive of the Pisan expedition arose as follows: "Among the *Epistolae* of Gerbert, published by the Benedictines of the Congregation of Saint Maur (*Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, T. X, p. 426, n. cvii), is one of 999, in which the Pope, lamenting the profanation of Jerusalem by the infidels, addresses the following exhortation to some unknown Christian: *Enitere ergo, miles Christi, esto signifer et compugnator, et quod armis nequis, consilii et opum auxilio subveni.* It is true that in these words we find an immature idea of a Crusade and a demand for oblations for the holy enterprise. The learned editors add a note to the effect that the Pisans responded immediately by putting out to sea and attacking the Saracens. In support of this statement they cite Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* III, 400; but, on referring to the passage in question, we find that the only source is, in fact, a modern municipal panegyric of the most exaggerated character, to wit the lengthy notes which Costantino Gaietani supplied to the *Lives of the Popes* of Pandolfo Pisano, printed in Rome in 1638 and republished by Muratori in that volume. We are therefore forced to fall back upon Tronci and worse, and all connection between the *Epistola* of Gerbert of 999 and the battle of 1005 vanishes away" (Amari, *op. cit.* III, 3 n.).

extremely doubtful whether the Pisans would have quarrelled with the Saracens.

The Moslem fleet which renewed the war, in 1011, and, in the evidently exaggerated language of Marangone, "destroyed" Pisa, issued from the ports of Spain¹; and from Spain also, four years later, came those Saracen corsairs who, under the leadership of the terrible Mogahid (the *Musetto* or *Mugetto* of the Italian chroniclers) occupied Sardinia and once more raided the Tuscan littoral, only to be routed in the end by the allied navies of Pisa and Genoa.

From the expulsion of the Carthaginians, in 231 B.C., to the Vandal invasions in the fifth century of our era, Sardinia had been a Roman Province, and when, after eighty years of barbaric rule, the Vandal Kingdom of Africa was destroyed by Belisarius she once more returned to the Empire, though now as a dependency not of Rome but of Constantinople. This was in 533. In 551, both Corsica and Sardinia were conquered by Totila, but the Ostrogothic Kingdom came to an end two years later, and the islands were once more added to the Empire.

After the expulsion of the Vandals, Sardinia formed one of the seven provinces governed by the *praefectus praetorio* of Africa, and, like Numidia and Mauretania, possessed her own *praeses* and her own *dux*. The former, as head of the civil administration, resided at Cagliari, the ancient capital of the island; the latter established his headquarters at *Forum Traianum* at the mouth of the Tirso. From the time of Justinian these officials were in perpetual conflict—"judices civiles et militares semper invicem contendentes"—and, little by little, the stratocracy invaded the province of the civil magistrates. As late as 627 we still meet with a *praeses* and it is by no means certain that he was the last. Eventually, however, the military authority wholly absorbed the civil, and it is probable that, before the end of the seventh century, Sardinia was organized as a *Theme*. Thenceforward the island was governed by a *Iudex Sardiniae* or "Ἀρχων, whose functions were both civil and military. In all the western dependencies of Byzantium, such

¹ "MXII. Stulus de Ispania venit Pisas et destruxit eam."

magistracies tended to be monopolized by particular families and to become hereditary. Such was the case with the Princes of Capua and Salerno, the Duke of Naples, the Archons of Amalfi and Gueta, all of them subject in name, rather than in fact. So far as Sardinia is concerned, this evolution probably completed itself while the Empire was occupied with the defence of Italy and Sicily against the Saracens, and certainly the tenth century saw the *δουλεία* of the Archon changed to alliance.

Hardly, however, had the Sardinians achieved their independence than the unity of the Archonship became a thing of the past and the island was divided into four separate and independent jurisdictions known as *Iudicatus* or Judgeships. Unhampered by any vestige of subjection, the power of the Judges was practically absolute. They assumed the title of *reges* and even of *imperatores*, styling themselves such *divina gratia*, or *gratia Dei*, or *boluntade de donneu deu*. One of them even went so far as to declare himself *a Deo electus et coronatus*—phraseology which might seem to imply that the crown was hereditary by divine right. Yet the elective principle interwove itself normally with the dynastic, and as late as the thirteenth century we still find traces of the ancient legal theory which recognized the sovereignty of the *iudices* as emanating from the people. Indeed, so ineffectual was the *ius haereditarium* alone to insure succession that we constantly see the son associated with the father in the government of the state—a practice which was obviously modelled upon methods adopted in Constantinople to secure the transmission of Imperial power. To the validity of this association, however, the consent of the people appears to have been necessary. Males took precedence over females, and, as a rule, the eldest son succeeded. If there were no males, the daughters inherited and their rights passed to their husbands. Thus the husband of the daughter who succeeded became the *iudex*—a state of things which enables us to understand that furious competition for the hands of Sardinian heiresses which early opened the way to foreign usurpation. For the rest, the *sistema consorziale*, so widely diffused among

the feudatories of the continent, was not indigenous to Sardinia, and if, before election, each male member of the dominant family had a chance of being called to the throne, after election, every claim to sovereignty was extinguished in all of them except the chosen *iudex* or *donnu*. Only those who had received the oath of the people—*sacramentum quod liberi et servi de Sardinia eorum dominis faciunt et facere consueverunt*—were the *donnos*; the other members of the reigning family bore the title of *donnicellos*. Even in the case of *condominii*, the ideal unity of the government was not destroyed: theoretically each of the *condominos* possessed the same powers¹.

Such was the political condition of the island when it was invaded by the Saracens under Mogahid.

Mogahid-ibn-Abd-Allah, who is said to have been born of Christian parents, was one of those servants of the Moslem Court who were known by the generic name of "Slavs²." His master, the famous Almansor ('Ibn-abi-'³Amir), not only emancipated him and trained him to arms, but also educated him in letters to such good purpose that, in after years, he passed as one well versed in philology and Koranic exegesis. He became a discriminating patron of learned men and a collector of codices treating of the various sciences³. The death of Almansor, in

¹ See on the whole subject Besta, *La Sardegna Medioevale*, *op. cit.*, and especially the first three chapters of the second volume. The legend which attributes the institution of the Sardinian Judgeships to the Pisans is, of course, the veriest fable, a product of the latter half of the Dugento, invented, like so many other legends of the same kind, to bolster up the claims of the Commune to Sardinian overlordship. Its absurdity has been so often pointed out that it might almost seem superfluous to refer to it in this place had not it once more been related as serious history by Mrs Janet Ross, *The Story of Pisa*, *op. cit.* pp. 9, 10.

² Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* II, 169; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. 55. Already Venetian dealers seem to have excelled all competitors in supplying the harems and slave-markets of the Mussulman world. Pola in Istria is mentioned as the principal seat of their trade; and we know that in the tenth century, the Caliph of Cordova had a body-guard of Hungarian slaves (Hodgson, *op. cit.* pp. 150, 151, and Gfrörer, *Byzantinische Geschichten*, I, pp. 85 and 274, there cited).

³ See Amari, *Prime imprese, etc.*, *ubi cit.*, p. 48, and *Notizie della impresa de' Pisani su le Baleari secondo le sorgenti arabiche*, by the same author. It is published in the *Liber Maiolichinus* (edition cited). The passage referred

1002, was followed by the fall of the Caliphate, and Moslem Spain rapidly split up into a number of independent principalities. With the extinction of the Omayyads (1036) the last semblance of unity disappeared: the Berber generals shared the south; the Slavs ruled the East, while the rest was divided either among successful adventurers or among the small number of noble families who had been fortunate enough to escape the blows which 'Abd-al-Rahmán and Almansor had struck at the aristocracy. Finally, the two most important towns, Cordova and Seville, were organized as republics¹. In this welter of war and anarchy Mogahid played a prominent part. Having escaped from Cordova, he occupied Tortosa, abandoned it and took Denia, where he set up a Cailiff of straw, a certain Abu-Abd-Allah al Mu'ayti, whom he proclaimed Commander of the Faithful and to whom he swore fealty in 1014. Together they passed over to the Balearic Islands, which had formed part of the Caliphate of Cordova since 937; and thence, in the summer of 1015, Mogahid sailed for Sardinia with 1000 horse and 120 ships, little and great².

Already, in 710, 752, 813, 816, 817 and 935, the Saracens had raided the island, but they had never wholly subjugated it. The difficult nature of the country, the frequent shipwrecks on its rocky coasts and the warlike character of its inhabitants inspired them with so much dread that, for over three-quarters of a century, they had let the Sardinians severely alone, holding them an indomitable folk from whom they were likely to gain more hard knocks than plunder³. Mogahid seems to have landed in the Cagliariitano, where he broke the islanders with terrible slaughter and captured a large number of prisoners,

to will be found on pp. xlix, l. In vv. 2635, 2636 of the poem itself, we read of a

Sarcina cartarum, quam vir tellure levare
Vix posset.

These, according to the learned editor, probably formed a portion of the codices collected by Mogahid.

¹ *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (ninth edition), vol. XXII, p. 315.

² Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* III, 4, 5.

³ See the Arab chronicles cited by Amari, *op. cit.* III, 6.

mostly women and children¹. From the low-lying regions of the coast, he extended his ravages to the mountains of the interior and not improbably joined hands with the *Barbaricini* who inhabited the Alpine country about M. Gennargentu². The whole island lay at his mercy.

Rex fuerat Balee Mugetus rexque Diane.
Invasit Sardos rabida prestantior ira.
His igitur propere violento marte subactis,
Omnia cum plano tenuit montana tyrampus³.

That same summer, either before or after the conquest of Sardinia, Saracen corsairs appeared off the coasts of Italy and sacked the ancient city of Luni⁴. The outrage aroused the Italians to a sense of their peril, and the merchant adventurers of Pisa and Genoa sailed to the rescue of Sardinia⁵. Even the nobles did not scorn to take their turn at the oar—

Tunc non erubuit quisquam de nobilitate
Viribus equoreas remos urguere per undas⁶—

and so great was their eagerness to join battle with the foe that the poet likens them to starving lions rushing on their prey⁷. According to the chroniclers, all this enthusiasm was due to the exhortations of Pope Benedict VIII⁸; but it is at least equally probable that, as in the case of the battle of Reggio, the prin-

¹ Amari, *Prime imprese, etc.*, *ubi cit.* p. 50; *Storia dei Musulmani, op. cit.* III, 7.

² The *Barbaricini* were the descendants of a Mauretanian colony established in Sardinia during the Vandal occupation, probably in the fifth century. The district which they inhabited was known as *Barbagia*. It is mentioned by Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, XXIII, 94, and by Fazio degli Uberti, *Dittamondo*, III, 12.

³ *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 924–927.

⁴ Ditmar (Theitmarus), *Chronicon* (in *Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum*), lib. VIII, c. 33. As Amari acutely remarks, Ditmar was unlikely to be misinformed as to the name of the city and province assailed by the Saracens. The rest of his narrative is evidently untrustworthy, representing the rumours which reached him in Germany. The sack of Luni is, probably, a fact (Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani, op. cit.* III, 8 n.; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 93).

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 4; *Chronicon Pisanum* and *Breviarium* apud Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* VI, 107, 167; under the Pisan year 1016.

⁶ *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 930, 931.

⁷ *Ibid.* vv. 934–938.

⁸ See, for example, Ranieri Sardo, *Cronaca pisana*, in *Arch. Stor. It.* S. I, T. VI, P. II, p. 76.

cipal reasons for the expedition were economic reasons. Neither the Pisans nor the Genoese can have failed to perceive how greatly their commerce must suffer if the Saracens were permitted to effect a permanent lodgment in Sardinia; and, therefore, they were determined to expel them at all hazards¹. Marangone chronicles the war with his usual impartial brevity: "Fecerunt Pisani et Ianuenses bellum cum Mugieto in Sardiniam, et gratia Dei vicerunt illum." Whether there was actually a battle we do not know. According to the *Liber Maiolichinus*, which, except for its deliberate silence with regard to the Genoese, seems to be fairly trustworthy, Mogahid abandoned the island on the approach of the Christian fleet, only to return with large reinforcements in the following year. He wreaked a terrible vengeance on the wretched islanders, forcing them to labour on a fortress (*civitatem*) which he was constructing, and then walling them up alive in the masonry². Meanwhile, however, his followers were becoming impatient of the toils of war in a different country with little to reward them in the way of booty, and when, in May, 1016, the fleets of Pisa and Genoa once more appeared, he resolved to evacuate the island. Attacked by the Italians as they embarked, the infidels were utterly defeated, and their ruin was completed by a tempest which drove many of their ships ashore. The crews were butchered by the Sardinians, and, though Mogahid himself made good his escape to Denia, his brother, his son Ali, and also, as some say, a favourite wife, were captured by the Christians. The victory was not only complete but decisive. Mogahid never again invaded Sardinia, and until his death in the year of the Hegira 436 (1044-1045 A.D.), his energies were fully occupied in the internecine wars which now lacerated Moslem Spain³.

¹ Amari, *Prime imprese, etc.*, *ubi cit.* p. 51 and note; *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* III, 7, 8; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 93.

² *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 940-952; Marangone, *ubi cit.* ad annum 1017.

³ Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* III, 9, 10, and *Notizie della impresa de' Pisani sulle Baleari secondo le sorgenti arabiche*, *ubi cit.* pp. li, lii; Besta, *op. cit.* vol. I, c. v: "La spedizione e la sconfitta di Museto." According to the *Cronaca pisana* of Ranieri Sardo (*ubi cit.* pp. 67-77) Mogahid (*Mugetto*) once more invaded Sardinia in 1021 "e caccionne li Pisani che v' erano,"

Sardinia was rich in flocks and herds and grain and slaves¹; its marshes afforded practically inexhaustible supplies of salt; its mountains were seamed with precious metals, and its coasts abounded in sponges and coral². Both Pisa and Genoa desired to exploit it commercially; neither could brook the presence of a rival and no sooner were the Saracens defeated than the victors turned their arms against one another. The Genoese seem to have been the aggressors and the conflict which they provoked

only to be expelled in his turn by the Pisans and Genoese. As a reward for their services the latter were allotted the whole of the spoil, leaving the island itself in possession of the Pisans: "e di piana concordia e patto alli Genovesi rimase lo tezero e alli Pisani la terra." Other wars followed. In 1028 Pisa itself is said to have been burned by Mogahid, "colli Saracini di Barbaria." Then, in 1030, he was taken prisoner at Carthage and carried to Rome, where "fu fatto cristiano dal papa, e fu coronato re di Cartagine; della quale città si fece poi Tunisi." Finally, in 1050, after he had been dead and buried for five or six years, "lo re Mugetto con suo isforzo prese la Sardigna, e fecevi città e castella e molte fortesse." The Pisans sailed to attack him but stopped to annex Corsica, whereupon "lo re Mugetto sentendo la loro venuta arse tutta la Sardigna, e poi si partì e andossene in Barbaria." (See also Roncioni, *ubi cit.* pp. 53-102.) On the other hand, the Genoese boldly maintained that they and they alone had reconquered Sardinia for the Empire; "et regem nomine Musaitum ceperunt et omnia sua, duxeruntque eum in civitatem nostram tamquam captum hostem, et consules episcopum, qui tunc Ianue erat, mandaverunt ad imperatorem Alamannie ducentem secum predictum regem Musaitum." (See *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori* (edition Belgrano, Roma, 1890), vol. 1, p. 161.) Such were the fables invented by the one Commune and the other in support of their respective claims to Sardinian overlordship. It was an age when almost anything was accepted as evidence and when even churchmen deemed it no crime "to manipulate ancient writings, to edit history in their own favour." As every reader will remember, the claim of our own Edward I to the throne of Scotland was "supported by excerpts from monkish chronicles." The Pisans and Genoese were only following the methods of their day; but the results of their inventive industry were disastrous to many generations of historians, until, thanks to the indefatigable labours of Professor Michele Amari, it at last became possible to test the veracity of the Italian chroniclers by comparison with Moslem sources.

¹ That the Church of Rome itself bought slaves from Sardinia as early as the sixth century seems clear from one of the *Epistolae* of Gregory the Great. In it he expresses his desire "Barbaricina mancipia comparare" (*M.G.H.* ix, 123; *Gregorius Vitali Defensori*). According to Prof. Volpe (*Pisa e i Longobardi, ubi cit.* p. 373) the *Barbaricini* were sold to the Pisans in such numbers that they gave its name to the suburb of Barbaricina. (Compare Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, vol. 1, p. 257).

² Besta, *op. cit.* 1, 68, 71; Volpe, *ubi cit.* p. 383.

ended in their expulsion¹. Our only authorities are the Pisan chroniclers, and the whole story may possibly be a fable², though no such inference can be drawn from the silence of the Genoese. It was not the habit of mediaeval chroniclers to record reverses. This much, however, is certain: the Pisans neither acquired nor sought to acquire dominion over the island, which continued to be ruled by its own judges. No hint of annexation is to be found in the most ancient sources, as yet uncontaminated by legendary elements; nor does the celebrated epigraph on the façade of the Pisan Cathedral necessarily imply more than they do³. The merchant adventurers who expelled their Genoese allies from Sardinia, in 1016, were still simply members of a voluntary private association which possessed no legal status because, in its corporate capacity, it had not yet entered the feudal fold⁴. If they had indeed conquered Sardinia, they could have exercised no dominion over it: all the advantages of the conquest must have inured to their liege lords, the Marquises of Tuscany⁵. Not until the last quarter of the century, after the Vicariate of Corsica had been granted by Gregory VII to

¹ Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* vi, 167: "...et eodem anno (1017) Pisani et Ianuenses cum in turritano iudicatu essent, Ianuenses voluerunt Pisanos de Sardinea expellere, et sibi eam retinere; sed quamvis ipsi bellum incoeperint, tamen devicti a Pisanis fuerunt, ita quod Pisani de tota Sardinea Ianuenses expulerunt." See also col. 108, and Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 4.

² Such is apparently the opinion of Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 95. See, however, Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 10, and Besta, *op. cit.* I, 68.

³ Besta, *op. cit.* I, 69, and authorities there cited, especially Vanni, *Di alcune iscrizioni della primaziale pisana*, in *Studi Storici*, IV (1895), pp. 121, 151. The epigraph referred to runs as follows:

HIS MAIORA TIBI POST HEC VRBS CLARA DEDISTI
VIRIBVS EXIMIIS CVM SVPERATA TVIS
GENS SARACINORVM PERIIT SINE LAVDE SVORVM
HINC TIBI SARDINIA DEBITA SEMPER ERIT.

⁴ Compare my *A History of Perugia* (London, Methuen, 1910), pp. 47-48 and notes.

⁵ Besta, *op. cit.* I, 69; Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 10-11, and notes. Thus at a much later period, when Mariano of Torres granted certain churches in his *iudicatus* to the Cathedral of St Mary of Pisa, a special clause was inserted in the instrument to prevent the Marquis of Tuscany taking advantage of the donation to lay claim to any jurisdiction over Sardinia. See Besta, *op. cit.* I, 81, and the *Liber iudicum turritanorum*, app. doc. 1, there cited.

Bishop Landolfo¹, did Pisa even begin to aspire to the political hegemony of Sardinia. The commercial privileges granted by Mariano of Torres, about the year 1084², were, perhaps, the earliest of those *securitates quas habemus cum Sardiniae iudicibus* for the maintenance of which the Pisans were afterwards so careful to provide³. Throughout the whole of the eleventh century, there is no hint of overlordship but only of alliance. The most that Pisa had secured was a commercial hegemony upon the basis of which a political hegemony might subsequently be erected⁴.

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 96; Besta, *op. cit.* 1, 82.

² Besta, *op. cit.* 1, 82, 83. This is the same document as is referred to on p. 9 *supra*.

³ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, 1, 10: *Breve Consulum Pisanae Civitatis*, ann. MCLXII.

⁴ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 96; Besta, *op. cit.* 1, 84; Volpe, *Studi sulle Istituzioni Comunali a Pisa*, *op. cit.* p. 122. In the treaties of 16 January, 1150, with ibn-Sâhid of Valencia, and of the 10 July, 1157, with ibn-Abi-Korasan of Tunis, Sardinia is still spoken of simply as a place frequented by Pisan merchants. Only in the last quarter of the century, in the treaties of June, 1184, with ibn-Alî, prince of the Balearic Islands, and of 15 November, 1186, with al-Mansûr of Tunis, does Sardinia finally appear as one of the islands of Pisa, or in other words as forming part of the Pisan *districtus*. Besta, 1, 150, citing Amari, *Diploma Arabi del R. Archivio fiorentino* (Firenze, 1863), pp. 239, 255, 275, etc.

CHAPTER THE THIRD

THE EXPEDITIONS AGAINST PALERMO AND MEHDIA

UNDER the year 1035 (Pisan style) Marangone records a new expedition, undertaken by the Pisans alone against the Saracens of Africa: "Pisani fecerunt stolum in Africam ad civitatem Bonam; gratia Dei vicerunt illos." Later chroniclers added the conquest of Carthage to that of Bona and asserted that the victors sent the crown of the Moslem king (afterwards confused with Mogahid¹) to the Emperor Conrad; while, finally, we are told that "in the year of our Lord one thousand and thirty-five, the Pisans took the Lipari Islands by force of arms and gave them to the Emperor of Rome, and thereafter for a time they rested²."

The substratum of truth which underlies these fables is to be found in an expedition against Moezz-ibn-Badîs, a powerful prince of the Zirite dynasty, who had built a fleet of warships at Mehdia (Almedia, Mahdíya) with which he infested the Mediterranean³. There seems to have been a naval engagement in the neighbourhood of Bona, which was subsequently sacked by the victors. Amari infers from an obscure passage in the

¹ See p. 22, n 3, *supra*. In *The Story of Pisa, op. cit.* pp. 9, 10, Mrs Janet Ross not only confounds Mogahid with Moezz-ibn-Badîs but sinks the personality of the former in that of the latter, thus reversing, instead of correcting, the mistake of the chroniclers. Indeed, her whole account of the maritime expeditions of this century is a hopeless jumble. She has blindly accepted the Pisan legends, embellished them with mistakes drawn from Sismondi, and then added more of her own. How, for example, could the Pisans, after taking Bona bring back "the Emir's crown as a present to the Emperor Henry II"? Henry II had been in his grave for over a decade.

² Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* vi, 167; *Arch. Stor. It.* S. I, T. vi, P. I, pp. 74-83; P. II, pp. 5, 77; Tronci, *Annali pisani* (Livorno, Gio. Vincenzo Bonfigli, 1682), pp. 17, 18; Sismondi (edition cited), vol. I, c. v, p. 123.

³ Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani, op. cit.* II, 363, 364.

chronicle of Rudolf the Bald that besides the Pisans there were Provençals and Genoese who took part in the battle¹. Be this as it may, it is certain that the Arab city which had risen on the ruins of the ancient Carthage was not attacked, that no crowns were sent to the Emperor, and that that Lamberto Orlandi who is said to have received the bâton of command from the Pisan Bishop is as much a product of the unbridled imagination of a later age as is the oration with which he is supposed to have animated his followers to the assault².

The next Pisan enterprise of which we have any knowledge is connected with the Norman conquest of Sicily. In 1061 Messina was lost to the Saracens³, and a great fleet which Moezz despatched to their assistance was scattered and destroyed by a sudden tempest off the island of Pantellaria⁴. Two years later, Temîm (the *Temino* of the chronicles), who had succeeded his father Moezz, sent another fleet and army, but with no better fortune, since, after the battle of Cerami (June, 1063), all hope of effectual intervention was perforce abandoned⁵. Thereupon, the Pisans, who perhaps had already had dealings with Robert Guiscard⁶, offered their aid for the conquest of Palermo, and, ready alike for commerce or for war⁷, the whole male population,

Omnes maiores, medii, pariterque minores⁸,

hurried on board their ships and put out to sea. Early in September, the *stolus* appeared off the northern coast of Sicily "in

¹ Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 13, citing Radulphus Glaber, *Historiarum* lib. I, cap. VII, in the *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, etc. T. x, p. 52.

² Manfroni, *op. cit.* 96, 97.

³ Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 66–70.

⁴ *Ibid.* III, 81, 82.

⁵ *Ibid.* III, 92–101; Manfroni, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

⁶ This may, perhaps, be deduced from Aimé, *Ystoire de li Normant* (Rouen, A. Lestringant, 1892), lib. v, cap. 28. Compare Amari, *op. cit.*, III, 102, n. 1, and Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 98.

⁷ Gualfredi Malaterrae *Historia Sicula*, lib. II, cap. 34, apud Muratori *Rer. Ital. Script.* v, 569: "Pisani mercatores qui sepius navali commercio Panormum lucratum venire soliti erant...commercialibus lucris, plusquam bellicis exercitiis, ex consuetudine dediti...."

⁸ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 5. The verse is taken from the commemorative inscription on the façade of the Pisan Cathedral.

portu vallis Deminae¹," whence orators were sent to Traina to invite the co-operation of Roger. Possibly the Pisans set too high a price upon their services, demanding, as became their habit in after years, commercial advantages and possession of a part of the conquered city. At any rate, the Normans delayed or refused their assistance, and, on the 20th September, 1063, the day of St Agapitus, the Pisans attacked alone².

At this time Palermo boasted no fewer than five hundred mosques and a population of between 300,000 and 350,000 souls, about two-fifths of whom inhabited the vast suburbs which extended to the west as far as the village of Baida, on the lower declivities of the mountains, and on the south-east to the Oreto, along whose banks the orchard-lawns and gardens of delicious villas sloped inland till they mingled with the vineyards at the village of Balharâ (now Monreale). In the centre of the town, along the line of the modern Via Vittorio Emanuele, rose the Cassaro or Città Vecchia, bathed by the waters of the harbour and strongly fortified with walls and towers. Over against it to the eastward, upon a peninsula with one side open to the sea, stood the Khâlesa, the *Neapolis* or new town of Polybius' day, likewise fortified but less strongly than the Cassaro. At the present time, all that remains of the mediaeval harbour is a small inlet, called "la Cala," which in the eleventh century formed its mouth; but the site of the two basins or lagoons into which it was divided may still be traced in the valleys on either side of the Via Vittorio Emanuele. Of these the basin to the north-west of the Cassaro, in the Quartiere

¹ Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* v, 569. As to the provinces of Val di Mazara, Val di Noto and Val Demone, see Amari, *op. cit.* I, 465-468. According to Edrisi, the harbours on the northern coast of Val Demone were, beginning from the West, *Caronia* on the confines of the province, *Oliveri* and *Milazzo*, while between the first two was the *spiaggia di S. Marco*, where we are told that ships used to be constructed. During the ninety years which elapsed between 1063 and the compilation of Edrisi no new harbours were made and, probably, none were destroyed. It therefore seems tolerably certain that we may identify the *Portus vallis Deminae* with one of the four above named. Compare Amari, *op. cit.* III, 102 n., and as to Edrisi, pp. 453 *seq.* and 669 *seq.*

² We get the date from Marangone, *ubi cit.*: "Pisani fuerunt Panormiam: gratia Dei vicerunt illos in die sancti Agapiti."



INTERIOR OF THE CATHEDRAL

degli Schiavoni, was the harbour of commerce, that to the east, in the Khâlesa, the arsenal¹.

The Pisans found the mouth of the harbour closed with a great chain², but drove the prows of their ships against it and broke it, after which they rowed into the western basin, and, in full view of all the captains and mariners of Palermo, cut out six great ships laden with merchandise. Though the Quartiere degli Schiavoni was unwallled, it does not appear that they made any attempt to land, being content to withdraw with the prizes they had captured, five of which they subsequently burned, after removing the cargoes to their own holds. We next hear of them at the mouth of the Oreto, where, after repulsing a sortie from the city, they pitched their tents among the suburban pleasancess and wasted all the country round with fire and sword. Lastly, they returned to their homes in triumph, there to devote a large part of the spoil which they had taken to the building of a new and splendid Cathedral in honour of Our Lady. "Constructa est Ecclesia beatae Virginis Pisanæ civitatis," writes Marangone; and, indeed, our best and most detailed authority for the expedition itself is to be found in the contemporary inscription which may still be seen built into the façade between the first and the second doors³.

The Pisans seem to have taken no further interest in the conquest of Sicily, but their attack upon Palermo proves that they had now definitely turned the tables on the Saracens, and were able to repay in kind the insults and outrages to which they had

¹ See Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, II, 68, 296 seq.; III, 118-120 et passim, and compare the article "Palermo" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (edition cited), XVIII, 169.

² This was the usual way of closing a harbour. Some interesting details will be found in Hodgson, *Venice in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (London, Geo. Allen and Sons, 1910), p. 122. See also Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant* (Leipzig, 1885), vol. 1, p. 345 n. 3, there cited.

³ Amari, *op. cit.* III, 102, 103, and authorities there cited. See also Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 98, 113, 114. The inscription referred to has been often published, e.g. in Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 5, 6, and in Morrona, *Pisa illustrata nelle arti del disegno* (2d edizione), T. 1, pp. 157, 158. The later chroniclers indulge in the usual exaggerations. Thus for instance Ranieri Sardo (*Arch. Stor. It.* T. VI, P. II, p. 77) asserts that "li Pisani passonno in Cicilia...e per forza preseno Palermo."

so long been subjected. It is, moreover, tolerably clear that, at this time, Genoa was still weaker than her rival. Her name appears more rarely in the history of the maritime exploits of the period, and generally as the ally and auxiliary of Pisa. Neither is it improbable that her comparative weakness tempted the Pisans to a too arrogant exercise of their thalassocracy to the detriment of Genoese interests, and especially in Sardinia¹. In 1066 hostilities broke out between the sea-faring population of the two cities and continued intermittently for almost twenty years. According to Marangone (the Pisan chroniclers are once more our only authority) the Genoese were the aggressors and presented themselves at the mouth of the Arno *cum stolo*². Roncioni speaks of two separate raids—one, apparently, in 1066 and another in 1070—a bloody battle, a Pisan victory and the capture of seven galleys³; but who can believe him? Next, we read of a Pisan expedition, in 1072, which was dispersed by a tempest off Portofino; “et fuerunt in gravi periculo, iudicio Dei, non hominis,” says Marangone. In 1077 a Genoese attack on Vada was repaid with interest by the burning of Rapallo and the carrying into captivity of such of the inhabitants as were not put to the sword⁴. In the following year a Genoese fleet once more appeared at the mouth of the Arno, only to seek shelter in Porto Venere as soon as the Pisans made ready to attack it. “Ianuensis stolus usque ad fauces Arni occulte devenit. Tunc strenui Pisani concite in eos surrexerunt, et fugaverunt illos usque ad Venerem Portum.” In spite of the assertions of Tronci and Roncioni, it is doubtful if, throughout the whole of this war, there was a single naval battle, properly so called. The ships which in the aggregate made up the *stolus* of either city were the property of private individuals; the Communes of Pisa and

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 99.

² *Arch. Stor. It.* T. VI, P. II, p. 6.

³ *Arch. Stor. It.* T. VI, P. I, p. 118 *seq.*

⁴ The account given by Marangone (*ubi cit.*) is as follows: “MLXXVII. Ianuensis populus per latrocinium ad Vadense castrum devenit, et tunc Pisani ad Rapallum viriliter perrexerunt, et castrum igni succenderunt, et plurimos eorum gladio interfecerunt; viros ac mulieres, manibus post tergum ligatis, captivos tripudianter perduxerunt. Tunc Pisani hoc triumpho revertentibus Ianuensibus oblitati sunt et pene, et usque domos eorum fortiter illos infugaverunt. Hoc fuit tertio idus Madii.”

Genoa were still rudimentary, and neither Pisa nor Genoa as political entities took part in the conflict. The belligerents were the merchant adventurers of the two cities, and the war which they fought was a war of reprisals, of raids and counter-raids, intermittent and indecisive. In the end it is said that Pope Victor III intervened to make peace between them, and, a few months later, we once more find them allied against the common enemy.

In the introduction to his *Diplomi Arabi*¹, Amari maintains that, between 1070 and 1080, the dynasty of the Zirites concluded a series of commercial treaties or conventions with the maritime cities of Italy; and, although no documentary evidence of this fact has come down to us, it is unquestionable that, in the second half of the eleventh century, the merchants of Genoa and Pisa visited the ports not only of Africa proper but also of Maghreb². A great tolerance, founded upon reciprocal commercial interests, seems to have existed between Christians and Arabs; and certainly, where the paramount question of international trade was concerned, mere religious differences can have had little or no weight. Witness the bitter indignation of Matilda's monkish chronicler, when he saw the city which contained the bones of the Countess Beatrice thronged with unbelievers from all the shores of the Mediterranean:

...Dolor heic me funditus urit,
 Quum tenet Urbs illam, qua non est tam bene digna.
 Qui pergit Pisas, videt illic monstra marina.
 Haec Urbs Paganis, Turchis, Libyeis quoque, Parthis,
 Sordida, Chaldæi sua lustrant littora tetri³.

Yet, after all, their seeming amity was, in fact, little better than an armed truce; Christians and Mussulmans alike stood ready to draw the sword on the smallest provocation, and of provo-

¹ *I Diplomi Arabi del R. Archivio Fiorentino*. Testo originale con la traduzione letterale e illustrazioni di Michele Amari (Firenze, Le Monnier, 1863), Introduzione storica.

² The "Ifrikia" or Africa of the Arabs extended from the great Acaba, which rises between Barca and Alexandria, to Bugia. The territory from Bugia to the Atlantic received the name of Maghreb or "West." See Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* I, 122.

³ Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* v. 364; *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1076.

cation there can have been no lack. The vengeance of Othello on the Turk of Aleppo was probably typical.

Moreover, the merchants of those days, though primarily traders, were also pirates and slave-dealers, lawless and violent men who shrank from nothing which would bring them gain of money. In 1063 a ship of Gaeta, though laden with relics and carrying a company of Benedictine monks from Montecassino who had been sent for by Barisone of Logudoro to found a monastery in Sardinia, was seized by Pisan corsairs off the island of Giglio. The ship was burned, the spoil divided, and such of the monks as were not killed were put ashore with nothing but the clothes that they stood up in¹. No doubt this outrage may have been due in part to political motives. Leo of Ostia speaks of the Pisans as "maxima Sardorum invidia ducti"; but it is sufficiently obvious that men who could thus treat their fellow-Christians and more especially the Religious, were unlikely to feel any scruples about despoiling the infidel. Commercial treaties might be useful so long as the merchantman lay at anchor beside the wharves of Sfax or Mehdia, but, once out of sight of land, there were other ways of getting a cargo than by buying it: dead men tell no tales, and the methods of Chaucer's shipman were as old as sea-faring itself². To be a roving corsair on the deep water was well nigh as respectable a vocation as that of a knight-errant on land, and belated craft, whether Christian or Saracen, were exposed to other and greater perils than those of the elements. In the eleventh century as in the sixteenth, piracy was an inseparable incident of Mediterranean life, and the normal depredations of individual adventurers were no more regarded as acts of war entailing the rupture of a peace than were the cattle-lifting raids on the Anglo-

¹ Leonis Marsicani et Petri Diaconi *Chronicon Monasterii Casinensis*, in *M.G.H.* VII, 713-715. See also Besta, *op. cit.* I, 76, 77.

² *The Canterbury Tales*, The Prologue, vv. 398-400:

Of nycé consciēce took he no keepe.
If that he faught, and hadde the hyer hond;
By water he sente hem hoom to every lond.

Compare Franco Sacchetti, *Nov.* 254.

Scottish frontier¹. The matter, however, assumed another aspect when Temîm converted his strong capital of Mehdia into a veritable nest of pirates and systematically harried the coasts of southern Europe.

Hic cum suis Saracenis
 Devastabat Galliam,
 Captivabat omnes gentes
 Que tenent Ispaniam;
 Et in tota ripa maris
 Turbabat Italiam,
 Predabatur Romaniam
 Usque Alexandriam.

Non est locus toto mundo,
 Neque maris insula,
 Quam Timinus non turbaret
 Orrenda perfidia;
 Rodus, Cypus, Creta
 Simul et Sardinia
 Vexabatur, et cum illis
 Nobilis Sicilia.

Situated upon a peninsula between the gulfs of Hammamet and Gabes, and fortified with walls and towers², Mehdia became an object of terror and detestation to all the Western peoples, who knew that it contained thousands of Christian captives groaning in harshest servitude.

Sita pulcro loco maris
 Civitas hec impia,
 Que captivos continebat
 Plus centena milia.

Hinc captivi Redemptorem
 Clamabant altissime,
 Et per orbem universum
 Flebant amarissime;

¹ E. J. Kitts, *In the days of the Councils* (London, 1908), p. 143; E. Armstrong, *The Emperor Charles V* (London, 1902), II, 238.

² As to the fortifications of Mehdia see Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, II, 139, 140, 364; III, 80.

Reclamabant ad Pisanos
Planctu miserabili;
Concitabant Genuenses
Fletu lacrimabili.

So sings the Pisan poet¹; but neither Pisa nor Genoa were at all likely to be induced by motives of mere altruism to attack what was, perhaps, the most formidable military harbour in all the Mediterranean², and the tears of the prisoners probably had but little effect. On the other hand, the fact that Temîm was interfering with their trade and rendering all the waterways insecure was a very serious matter, and the more so that, at this time, they had, perhaps, begun to cast their eyes towards the Orient³. So long as Sicily remained in Mussulman hands, voyages to the Levant were probably rare and iso'ated⁴; but the Norman conquests opened the Straits of Messina to Christian merchantmen, and the day had now arrived when a great pirate sea-port of the north coast of Africa could no longer be tolerated⁵. It was resolved to abate it as a common nuisance.

For this expedition, which seems to have taken place in the

¹ *Carmen in victoria Pisanorum, Genuensium aliorumque Italiensium de Timino Saracenorum rege, ducibus Benedicto, Petro, Sismundo, Lamberto, Glandulpho, de expugnatione urbium Sibia et Madia die S. Xisti*, in *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, IV, ccxvi et seq. It has been published repeatedly; but this is the most recent edition.

² See A. Main, *I Pisani alle prime Crociate* (Livorno, Meucci, 1893), p. 7, and *Carmen in victoria Pisanorum, ubi cit.* p. ccxvii, n. 1. Up to the sixteenth century, when it became the headquarters of the Moslem pirate Dragut-Reis, Mehdiâ continued to be by far the strongest city on the littoral of Northern Africa. See E. Hamilton Currey, *Sea Wolves of the Mediterranean*, chaps. xv, xvi.

³ Thus we have record of a fleet of Genoese merchantmen (*stolus navium Januensium*) which touched at Jaffa in 1051, and brought the English Ingulf, Abbot of Croyland, back to Europe after a pilgrimage (*Ingulfi Croylandensis Historia in Rerum Anglicarum Scriptorum Veterum* I, 74). In 1094 or 1095 Godfrey of Bouillon is said to have sailed to Alexandria in a Genoese ship "que Pomella vocabatur" (Caffaro, *De Liberatione civitatum Orientis Liber*, edition Belgrano, p. 99). Of Pisan commerce with the East we have, as yet, no direct evidence. See, however, Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant* (Leipzig, 1885), I, 124.

⁴ Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice, op. cit.* p. 237; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 138.

⁵ Compare Villari, *L'Italia da Carlo Magno alla morte di Arrigo VII*, (Milano, Hoepli, 1910), p. 261.

summer of 1087, the authorities are sufficiently numerous. It is mentioned by Malaterra in his *Historia Sicula*¹, and by Deacon Peter, in the chronicle of Montecassino²; there is a brief account of it—the original nucleus around which all the inventions and amplifications of the later Pisan writers have accumulated—in Marangone³; and a large number of scattered notices from Arab chronicles have been collected by Amari in his *Biblioteca Arabo-Sicula*. Finally, in the *Carmen in victoria Pisanorum*⁴ we have a contemporary or almost contemporary narrative which is evidently of Pisan authorship and probably bears much the same relation to the actual facts as does the ballad of “Chevy Chase” to the Battle of Otterburn. Yet, even as “Chevy Chase” brings home to us the spirit of the border forays, “the daring and defiance which stirred Sidney’s heart ‘like a trumpet,’” so the *Carmen in victoria Pisanorum*, far more than all the prose chronicles, enables us to understand the spirit which inspired the Pisan *armatori* in those devil-may-care days, when a handful of private adventurers was ready to make war upon a nation.

The Normans refused their aid⁵, and, beyond giving his approval and blessing to the Italian merchants who took part in the enterprise, the Pope can have had little or nothing to do with it⁶. The story of a papal squadron under Pietro Colonna seems to be altogether fabulous⁷. The organizers and leaders of

¹ *Ubi cit.* lib. IV, c. III.

² *Chronicon Mon. Cassinensis auctore Petro* in *M.G.H.* VII, 751.

³ *Arch. Stor. It.* T. VI, P. II, p. 6.

⁴ See p. 34 *supra*, n. I.

⁵ According to Malaterra (*ubi cit.* lib. IV, c. III, pp. 590, 591), while Roger Guiscard was besieging Syracuse, the Pisans, in revenge for some injury, attacked and occupied the capital of Temîm, but were unable to take the citadel. They thereupon offered their conquest to Roger, who refused it, in order to keep faith with Temîm with whom he was negotiating a treaty. As a matter of fact, the Pisans did not capture Mehdia till 1087, and, therefore, if they did request assistance from the Normans in 1086, it was assistance in attacking Mehdia itself. See Amari, *Prime imprese*, etc., *ubi cit.* p. 56.

⁶ Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 169; *Prime imprese*, *ubi cit.* p. 57. Pope Victor III died in September, 1087, and the last few months of his life were far too fully occupied at home to leave him time or inclination to take part in distant expeditions against the Saracens.

⁷ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 100, citing Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, I, 213-234.

the expedition were the Pisans, and to them the Pisan poet attributes all the glory of its successful issue:

Inclitorum Pisanorum
 Scripturus historiam,
 Antiquorum Romanorum
 Renovo memoriam;
 Nam extendit modo Pisa
 Laudem admirabilem,
 Quam olim recepit Roma
 Vincendo Cartaginem.

With them were the Genoese, and, apparently, a small contingent from Amalfi:

Et refulsit inter istos
 Cum parte exercitus
 Pantaleo malfitanus¹,
 Inter Grecos² Sipantus.

In the Arab sources we read of Pisans, Genoese, "and all the other Rûm." It would seem, however, that the Pisans alone outnumbered the rest of the allies³.

The Arab writers tell us that the preparations continued for four years and that the fleet consisted of three or four hundred sail; the Pisan poet asserts that a thousand ships were equipped in six months:

Et componunt mille naves
 Solis tribus mensibus,
 Quibus bene preparatus
 Stolus lucet inclitus.

The other sources are silent, and from cyphers so discordant it is impossible to arrive at any definite conclusion⁴. Still, when

¹ Heyd (*op. cit.* 1, 100-108) mentions a Panteleon, an Amalfitan merchant, who lived in great magnificence at Constantinople and bore the Byzantine titles of Patrician and Consul. Cf. Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice, op. cit.* p. 235.

² "To wit Apulians and Calabrians," according to Belgrano, *Carmen*, p. ccxx, n. 1.

³ Main, *I Pisani alle Prime Crociate, op. cit.* p. 9.

⁴ I need hardly remind the reader that "historians who have been accustomed to examine their materials critically have usually learned that no statements must be received with so much caution as those which relate to numbers." I do not myself believe that even the lower Arab estimate can be accepted as free from exaggeration. Here, as in the case of the Balearic expedition, vain-glory on the one side and terror on the other magnified the size of the Christian armadas.

we remember the growing power and importance of the maritime cities and the fact that, now for the first time, all the Italian mariners of the Tyrrhenian Sea were leagued together for a common end, we may safely conjecture that, whatever the precise number of those who took part in it, the expedition was on a far larger scale than any which had preceded it; while, as directed against the infidels and sanctified by Papal benediction, it assumed, in retrospect at any rate, all the character of a holy war:

Nos conduxit Jhesus Christus
 Quem necabat Africa,
 Et constrinxit omnis ventus
 Preter solum Japiga;
 Cherubin emittit illum
 Cum aperit hostia,
 Qui custodit Paradisum
 Discreta custodia.

Pantellaria was the mustering place: a fertile island with convenient harbours, standing, like the pier of a gigantic bridge, between Sicily and Africa¹, strongly fortified and garrisoned by a large body of Mussulmans:

Hic est castrum ex natura
 Et arte mirabile,
 Nulli umquam in hoc mundo
 Castrum comparabile;
 Duo milia virorum
 Hoc tenebant oppidum,
 Qui nec Deum verebantur
 Nec virtutem hominum.

Siege castles were constructed, and the place was taken by storm:

Accesserunt huc e contra
 Mirandi artifices,
 Et de lignis nimis altis
 Facti sunt turrifices²;

¹ Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, I, 165: "Pantellaria...situata come pila d' un ponte che dovesse congiungere la Sicilia e l' Affrica, a sessanta miglia dalla prima e quaranta dalla seconda."

² As to these siege towers compare Archer and Kingsford, *The Crusades* ("The Story of the Nations" Series, 1899), pp. 352, 353.

Destruerunt, occiderunt
Sicut Deus voluit,
Et fecerunt quod a mundo
Numquam credi potuit.

Apparently, however, the defenders found time to warn Mehdia of its danger:

palumbos
Emittunt cum litteris.

writes the poet, and again,

Alios mandant palumbos,
Qui factum edisserant.

Temîm was absent from the city with the flower of his army, engaged in repelling a Bedouin incursion¹, and his lieutenant proved unequal to the occasion. Unprepared, pusillanimous and discordant, the Saracens were still quarrelling with one another when the Italians anchored in the roadstead of Mehdia on the day of S. Sisto (6 August, 1087).

Inter hec regalis stolus
Discedit et navigat,
Et jam videt illas urbes
Quas Timinus habitat,
Mare, terra, muri pleni
Paganis teterrimis,
Quos conduxerat Superbus
Ab extremis terminis.

In the verses of an Arab poet, who was probably an eye-witness, we have a vivid picture of the terror caused by the appearance of the Christian armada:

They assailed our city in such numbers that they seemed
clouds of locusts or swarms of maggots.

¹ Main, *I Pisani alle Prime Crociate*, *op. cit.* p. 10. When, about 1050, Moezz transferred his allegiance to the Abbasid Caliphs, the Fatimites let loose upon Africa a vast horde of Bedouins from Egypt, the ancestors of the modern nomads of Barbary. Though unable to conquer the towns, they continually ravaged the open country. In the words of Amari (*op. cit.* III, 80), "la dinastia Zirita, sopraffatta dagli Arabi d' oltre Nilo, avea perduta la terra, non il mare." Compare the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (edition cited), XXIII, 619, 620, Article "Tunis."

Twenty thousand and half as many more gathered on every side. Ah me, the fierce muster!
 Suddenly they swooped upon a handful of men, unskilled in arms and ignorant of war,
 Accustomed to all the comforts of life and unused to stand continually upon guard.
 Wherefore, awakening out of sleep, fierce eyes and keen brands met their sight;
 Upon galleys that looked like mountains save only that their summits bristled with spears and swords,
 Gently the breezes wafted them whither they would go.
 Alas, for us it was a tempest!
 When the wind had fallen, their oars propelled them, so that they came upon us like serpents¹.

The Saracens endeavoured to treat with the invaders, offering to liberate their Christian captives but in vain.

Jam armati petunt terram
 Cum parvis naviculis,
 Et temptabant maris fundum
 Cum astis longissimis;
 Se demergunt ut leones
 Postquam terram sentiunt,
 Aquilis velociores,
 Super hostes irruunt.

They landed in the unwallled suburb of Zawila (Sibilia) to the southward, and in the peninsula of Mehdia itself to the northward², occupying all the city except the fortified palace or *cassarum*, butchering men, women and children, robbing, burning and destroying:

Occiduntur et truncantur
 Omnes quasi pecudes,

¹ I translate from the Italian of Amari, *Prime imprese*, etc., *ubi cit.* pp. 62, 63. See also *Biblioteca Arabo-Sicula* (Torino e Roma, E. Loescher, 1881), II, 391.

² So Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 170, and *Diplomi Arabi*, Introd. p. xix. Marangone (*ubi cit.* p. 6) tells us that the Pisans and Genoese "ceperunt duas munitissimas civitates Almadiam et Sibiliam." Shaw identifies Sibilia with the ancient *Turris Annibalis*, some two leagues to the south of Mehdia on the same coast (see Michaud, *History of the Crusades*, English translation, London, 1852, I, 40 and note). There can, however, be but little doubt that Amari is right. He is followed by Manfroni (*op. cit.* p. 101), who asserts that the Christians "sbarcarono a viva forza nel sobborgo di Zavila."

Non est illis fortitudo
 Qua possint resistere;
 Perimuntur in momento
 Paganorum milia,
 Antequam intrarent portas
 Et tenerent menia.

Postquam desuper et subter
 Intrarunt fortissime,
 Pervagantur totam urbem
 Absque ulla requie,
 Occiduntur mulieres
 Virgines et vidue,
 Et infantes alliduntur
 Ut non possint vivere.

Non est domus neque via,
 In tota Sibia
 Que non esset rubicunda
 Et sanguine livida;
 Tot Saracenorum erant
 Cadavera misera,
 Quae exalant jam fetorem
 Per centena milia¹.

Temîm, as soon as he learned what had happened, hastened to the defence of his capital, but arrived too late to turn the tide of war, and was compelled to take refuge in his fortified palace, whence he looked on helplessly at the sacking of the city². The mosques were desecrated and the priests beheaded; even the mules and horses in the royal stables were slaughtered by the

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.*: "...Saracenis fere omnibus interfectis." *Chronicon Mon. Cassinensis, ubi cit.* cap. LXXI: "...interfectis de Saracenorum exercitu centum milibus pugnatorum."

² In his despair, he ordered, as a last resource, that his lions should be turned loose; but the lions only ate the Saracens:

Jussit portas aperire
 Et leones solvere,
 Ut turbarent Christianos
 Pugnantes improvide:
 Sed conversi sunt leones
 Ad honorem glorie,
 Nam vorarunt Saracenos
 In laude victoriae.

victors; the arsenal was ruined and the ships towed out of the harbour and burnt upon the shore:

Alii petunt meschitam
 Pretiosam scemate,
 Mille truncant sacerdotes
 Qui erant Machumate;
 Qui fuit heresiarcha
 Potentior Arrio,
 Cujus error jam permansit
 Longo mundi spatio.

Alii confundunt portum
 Factum mirabiliter,
 Darsanas¹ et omnes turres
 Perfundunt similiter;
 Mille naves trahunt inde
 Que cremantur litore;
 Quarum incendium Troje
 Fuit vere simile.

Alii irrumpunt castrum,
 Atque turres diruunt,
 Equos regios et mulas
 Omnes interficiunt;
 Aurea vexilla mille
 Trahunt et argentea,
 Que in Pisa gloriosa
 Sunt triumpho premia.

The *cassarum*, however, proved impregnable:

Super hunc procere turres
 Ad nubes altissime,
 Ubi vix mortalis homo
 Jam possit aspicere,
 Scale facte circumflexe
 Faciles contendere,
 Ubi nullus neque valet
 Neque scit ascendere.

¹ *Darsana* (from the Arabic *dârçanah* = house of industry) is the derivative, through the Italian, of our "arsenal." In Dante's day it had already lost its initial letter and become *arzanà* or *arsenà*. See *Inferno*, XXI, 7, and compare Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice*, *op. cit.* p. 251.

And, either there or at the storming of Mehdia itself, Ugo Visconte—*Ugo Vicecomes filius Ugonis Vicecomitis*¹—was slain in a rally of the Saracens, after performing incredible prodigies of valour. Our poet dedicates seventy verses of bitter lamentation to his untimely end:

Hic evenit tibi, Pisa,
Magnum infortunium,
Nam hic perdis capud urbis
Et coronam juvenum.
Cadit Ugo Vicecomes
Omnium pulcherrimus,
Dolor magnus Pisanorum
Et planctus miserrimus.

The body was embalmed and carried to Pisa for burial.

Finally, Temîm capitulated, undertaking to liberate all Christian captives, to concede trading privileges to the Pisans and Genoese, and to pay a huge indemnity:

Donat auri et argenti
Infinitum pretium,
Ditat populum Pisanum
Atque Genuensium².
Juravit per Deum celi,
Suas legens litteras,
Jam ammodo christianis
Non ponet insidias,
Et non tollet teloneum³
His utrisque populis,
Serviturus in eternum
Eis quasi dominis.

Having thus achieved their object, the allies accepted the terms which were offered them, loaded their galleys with gold and

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* Compare p. 10 *supra*.

² The precise amount is doubtful, being stated by different Arab writers at from 30,000 to 100,000 *dinâr* of gold. Amari (*Prime imprese, ubi cit.* p. 57) thinks the larger sum the more probable, in view of the diminished value of precious metals in Africa in the eleventh century. Cf. *Storia dei Musulmani*, II, 362.

³ “*Teloneum* seems to be the generic word for all taxes levied on goods imported by sea.” Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 100 n.

silver, with liberated Christians and Moslem prisoners and returned each of them to his own city.

Captivorum persolverunt
 Plus ad centum milia,
 Quos recepit Romania
 Jam ex longa misera;
 Saracenos et captivos
 Ducunt sine numero;
 Qui est totum tuum donum,
 Jhesu, sine dubio.

Of the treasure they had gained the Pisans dedicated a great part to the service of the Queen of Heaven, whose Cathedral they adorned with new magnificence:

Sed tibi, Regina celi,
 Stella maris inclita,
 Donant cuncta pretiosa
 Et cuncta eximia;
 Unde tua in eternum
 Splendeat ecclesia
 Auro, gemmis et margaritis,
 Et palliis splendida.

In gratitude to the Saint on whose festival they had won their victory, they erected the church of S. Sisto in Cortevicchia¹.

The overthrow of Temîm not only put an end to Arab piracy in the Mediterranean but so crippled the maritime power of the Saracens that from thenceforward the control of the sea passed to the trading communities of Italy. Yet, in after years, economic causes were forgotten and men learned to regard the expedition of Mehdia not only as preparatory to the Crusades but as in itself a Crusade, and the credit of it was naturally attributed to the Holy See. Even the Pisan poet speaks of a Papal Legate, Benedictus,

illuminatus
 Luce Sancti Spiritus,

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.*: "...magnam predam auri, argenti, palliorum et amentorum abstraxerunt. De qua preda thesauros Pisanae Ecclesiae in diversis ornamentis mirabiliter amplificaverunt, et Ecclesiam beati Sixti in Curte Veteri aedificaverunt."

who, cross in hand, incited the Christian warriors to scale the walls of the new Jericho. We are further told that Temîm agreed to hold his dominions as a fief of the Church:

Terram jurat Sancti Petri
Esse sine dubio,
Et ab eo tenet eam
Jam absque colludio.

It has been said that, in the Middle Ages, "religion, politics and commerce were so closely intertwined that it is almost impossible to disentangle them¹."

Before the Crusades began, the Pisans and Genoese took part in another joint expedition, for the expulsion of Roderigo Ximines, the Cid, from Valencia. They were leagued with Alphonso VI of Castile; and a fleet of four hundred ships was collected. Unfortunately, the Pisans and Genoese quarrelled, and the former abandoned the enterprise and returned to their homes. Thereupon, the latter, too weak to have any hope of capturing Valencia, attempted to surprise Tortosa, but were repulsed by the infidels. This was in 1092. No Italian writer except Caffaro has left us any notice of the expedition, and he only just mentions it². Our authorities are the chroniclers quoted by Amari in his *Diplomi Arabi*³.

¹ J. W. Welsford, *The Strength of Nations* (London, 1907), p. 31.

² *Annali Genovesi* (edition Belgrano), p. 13: "in primo exercitu Tortuose."

³ *Diplomi Arabi*, *op. cit.* Introd. pp. xix, xx.

CHAPTER THE FOURTH

THE FIRST CRUSADE

DURING a great part of the eleventh century, Bari, and in a lesser degree Trani, Brindisi and Taranto, had traded with the East; while so long as Amalfi remained nominally subject to the Greek Emperors, she enjoyed special advantages which enabled her to compete successfully with all her rivals. Only after her submission to Robert Guiscard, in 1073, was she forced to yield the premier place to Venice, which for the next two decades possessed what was practically a monopoly of the Levant trade¹. Scarcely, however, had the supremacy of Venice been established than it was challenged by Genoa and Pisa. Having swept the infidel from the Western Mediterranean, they were ready for fresh enterprises, and the preaching of the First Crusade pointed to the East.

At this time Pisa stood high in the favour of the Holy See. In 1091, at the prayer of the well-beloved daughter of St Peter, the Countess Matilda, of Bishop Daibert and of the Pisan nobles, Urban II leased the island of Corsica to the Pisan Church for an annual rent of fifty pounds of Lucchese money, payable at the Lateran Palace². In the following year the diocese of Pisa was erected into an Archbishopric with jurisdiction over the prelates of Corsica³. In his bull Urban belauds the devotion of the citizens to the Apostolic See, quoting the words of the prophet: *Honorificantes me honorificabo*⁴, and speaks of the City of Pisa as exalted above its neighbours (*prae provincialibus*) by its victories over the Saracens. The newly created

¹ Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice*, pp. 234, 235. See also Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 82-84.

² Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* p. 270; Bonaini, *Dipl. pis.* No. v, p. 2.

³ Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* pp. 198-200; Bonaini, *Dipl. pis.* No. vi, pp. 2-3.

⁴ 1 *Samuel*, ii, 30.

Archbishop was present at the Council of Clermont, where to the cry of "God wills it!" the first Crusade was proclaimed by Urban (1095). On his return to his diocese, Daibert exhorted his fellow-citizens to take up arms for the delivery of the Holy Sepulchre, and finally captained their fleets himself: "Quorum rector et ductor Daibertus Pisanae urbis archiepiscopus extitit¹."

Like the rest of Christendom, the Pisans no doubt believed in the necessary existence of a conterminous world-empire and world-religion², and were moved to poignant grief by "the shame of Jesus Christ³"; but there was no lack of secular reasons for their devotion. With the innate shrewdness of traders they perceived what profits must accrue to those who were

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 7.

² E. J. Kitts, *In the Days of the Councils*, *op. cit.* p. 6: "It was this belief in the necessary existence of a conterminous world-empire and world-religion which made the earlier Crusades so popular and universal: it was its decadence which rendered the later crusades so petty and abortive."

³ Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 355. Compare the "Crusading Song" of Guiraut de Bornelh in A. Kolsen, *Sämtliche Lieder des Trobadors Giraut de Bornelh* (Halle, a. S. 1910), No. 60, p. 384, vv. 2 and 3:

E consir me meravilhan
 com s' es lo segles endormitz,
 e com be'n secha la raïtz,
 e'l mals s' abriv' e vai poian;
 qu' er' a penas prez' om ni blan
 si Deus es antatz ni laiditz
 c' als Arabitz
 trafas ses lei
 rema Suri' en patz
 e sai tenson entr' els las poestatz.

E pero ges no m'es semblan
 c' om valens d' armas ni arditz,
 pos a tal coch'er Deu falhitz,
 ja ses vergonha·lh torn denan:
 mas cel c'aura pretz de so bran
 de grans colps e dels seus feritz
 er acolhitz
 si de so rei
 que's tenra per paiatz
 qu'el non es ges de donar issaratz.

On the subject generally see Villari, *L' Italia da Carlo Magno alla morte di Arrigo VII*, *op. cit.* p. 238, and H. O. Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind*, I, 535 *et seq.*

ready to take advantage of that tremendous emigration of Europe to the shores of Palestine. The mariner, the soldier, the constructor of siege-machinery, the merchant of timber and of victuals, could find no surer and swifter gain than in aiding the armies of the Cross; while, possibly, to a few acuter minds the idea may have already occurred of recalling the trade of Asia to its ancient and natural outlets—Antioch, Tyre, Sidon, Beyrout, Acre, Laodicea—whence it had been diverted towards the Bosphorus by the Moslem conquests, to the manifest advantage of Amalfi and Venice¹. If, at one and the same time, a man may save his soul and fill his pockets, what need he ask for more? In the maritime republics the crusading spirit was metamorphosed to commercial enterprise.

According to Tronci the Pisans were present at the siege of Nicaea, in the spring of 1097²; and Archbishop Baldericus asserts that, during the march of the Christian army from Antioch to Tripoli, “Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese, and the inhabitants of the shores of the Ocean and of the Mediterranean, covered the sea with ships, laden with arms and men, with siege machinery and provisions³.” Finally, the Pisan chroniclers attribute the capture of Jerusalem itself to the valour of their fellow-citizens: “cujus victoriae Pisanus populus fuit et caput et causa⁴.” The boast is, however, an empty one⁵. The great Pisan armada under the leadership of Daibert only reached Laodicea in the autumn of 1099, some two months after the fall of Jerusalem; and, from this circumstance, “il soccorso di Pisa” has become a synonym for assistance so tardily rendered as to be

¹ Finlay, *History of the Byzantine Empire from 716 to 1057* (“Everyman’s Library” edition), pp. 195, 196; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 137; C. Imperiale di Sant’ Angelo, *Caffaro e i suoi tempi* (Torino, Roux, 1894), pp. 83, 84.

² Tronci, *Annali pisani* (Livorno, Gio. Vincenzo Bonfigli, 1682), p. 34.

³ Balderici, *Historia Hierosolymita*, IV, 18, in *Recueil des historiens des Croisades*: “Veneti quoque et Pisani et Jenuani et qui vel Oceani vel Maris mediterranei littus incolebant, navibus onustis armis et hominibus, machinis et victualibus mare sulcantes operuerunt.” See G. Müller, *Documenti sulle relazioni delle Città Toscane coll’ Oriente Cristiano e coi Turchi fino all’ anno MDXXXI* (Firenze, Cellini, 1879), p. 367.

⁴ Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* VI, 160. See also Tronci, *Annali pisani*, p. 35, and Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 144.

⁵ Muratori, *Annali d’ Italia* ad ann. 1099; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 151, 152.

well-nigh useless¹. As late as February, 1098, the Pisans hired two great ships to the Volterrani, only stipulating that they should be returned within a year, or, in other words, in time to take part in the expedition led by Daibert².

Nevertheless, it is well to remember that the Pisan Commune was still in its infancy. The associated families who had created it, the aristocracy of the ships and of the towers, had as yet by no means abandoned their right to private initiative in many fields which would appear to modern ideas to belong exclusively to the State. Even on land they still insisted on the right of private warfare³; while, at sea, "every little fleet was practically an autonomous republic, every ship an independent dominion, and every captain a sovereign who made war and peace at his own good pleasure⁴." In these circumstances, it is perfectly possible that there were Pisans who took part in the earlier victories of the crusaders: private adventurers who came with arms or provisions or belated recruits. Individual Pisans may even have fought at the taking of the Holy City. Cucco Ricucchi may not be altogether a myth⁵. The twelve galleys and the *sandalo* which sailed from Genoa in July, 1097, were equipped and manned by private citizens⁶, and so too were the Genoese ships which arrived at Jaffa in June, 1099, and lent such valuable assistance to the Christian army before Jerusalem⁷. The maritime republics, as such, were determined to run no needless risks and

¹ See Tronci, *Annali pisani rifiuti, etc.*, *op. cit.* I, 181 note.

² Tronci, *Annali pisani* (Livorno, 1682), *op. cit.* p. 35; Maffei, *Storia Volterrana* (Volterra, Tip. Sborgi, 1887), p. 46.

³ Thus we learn from the *Breve Consulium* that the Commune was under no obligation to indemnify a citizen for the loss of his war-horse if "in sua vel amicorum suorum guerra mortuus vel macagnatus fuerit." Bonaini, *Statuti Pisani*, I, 6.

⁴ Volpe, *Istituzioni comunali a Pisa*, *op. cit.* p. 125.

⁵ A sufficient account of the Pisan legend will be found in *The Story of Pisa*, *op. cit.* pp. 13, 14, though in Mrs Ross' version the miracle is ignored. According to the earlier writers, the words which she puts into the mouth of Cucco Ricucchi were spoken by the Crucified Christ: "E mentre egli [Cucco Ricucchi] è tutto alla battaglia intento...quel santo Crocifisso voltò la faccia verso la sua, girandoli l' asta in mano, e ad alta voce disse: 'Seguitate, O cristiani, chè avete vinto.'"

⁶ Caffaro, *Liberatio Orientis* (edition Belgrano), p. 102; C. Imperiale di S. Angelo, *op. cit.* p. 85.

⁷ Caffaro, *ubi cit.* p. 110 and n. 2.

awaited the successful issue of the enterprise before associating themselves with it.

The expedition under Daibert consisted of 120 sail, whether galleys or ships of transport we do not know¹, and comprised many Italians besides the Pisans². It seems to have sailed round the heel of Italy to Apulia, and thence after crossing the Straits of Otranto, along the Greek coast to Cape Matapan, never venturing out of sight of land. On its way, it is said to have sacked the islands of Leucadia and Cephalonia *quia Hierosolimitanum iter impedire solebant*³; and its first exploit in Syrian waters was directed not against the Infidel but against the Greek Emperor Alexius Comnenus, whose city of Laodicea Bohemond was besieging in defiance of the wishes of the other leaders. Ere long, however, Daibert became convinced that that war was an unrighteous one, and he prevailed upon his followers to abandon it⁴. A little later, we find him journeying southward in the company of Bohemond, the two Roberts and Raymond of St Gilles, whose discords had been healed by his intervention⁵. At Bethlehem they were welcomed by Godfrey of Bouillon with his knights and clergy, and to him Daibert presented himself in his capacity of Papal Legate—*cum auctori-*

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.*: "Populus Pisanus jussu domini papae Urbani II, in navibus cxx ad liberandam Ierusalem de manibus paganorum profectus est." Tronci (p. 38) speaks of "120 Galere e altri legni per condurre li vetto-vaglie." Sardo (*ubi cit.* p. 78) gives no precise number, but merely tells us that "li Pisani andonno per mare con grandi navili."

² Balderici, *Hist. Hieros.* II, 550; Müller, *Documenti*, *op. cit.* p. 364: "Applicuerat in portu Laodicensi archiepiscopus quidam Pisanus nomine Daimbertus et cum eo Itali plures atque Tusciani." So too we read, in the *Gesta Francorum*, of "Daimbertus, Pisanus episcopus, multique alii Pisani et Ravennenses, qui portui Laodiciae applicuerant."

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.*; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 140.

⁴ Albertus Aquensis, *Histor. Hieros.* lib. VI, cap. 55-58, apud Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, I, 290, 291. The passage is quoted *in extenso* by Müller, *Documenti*, pp. 364, 365.

⁵ See the letter written by Daibert, Godfrey of Bouillon and Count Raymond of St Gilles to Pope Paschal II, in Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* pp. 80-82: "Comes S. Egidii et Robertus comes Northomanniae et Robertus comes Flandriae Laodiciam reversi sunt: ibi classem Pisanorum et Boamundi invenerunt. Cumque Archiepiscopus Pisanus Boamundum et Dominos nostros concordare fecisset, regredi Jerusalem pro Deo et fratribus suis Regimundus disposuit." Compare Michaud, *History of the Crusades*, *op. cit.* III, 362-364, App. No. 9.

tate Legati a latere. Learned and eloquent¹ and accustomed to difficult missions², his influence was enhanced by the almost unlimited authority he exercised over the Pisans and Genoese who had followed him from Laodicea³. Ere long he was chosen Patriarch of Jerusalem in the place of the Norman Arnulf, whose election was declared irregular⁴; and at his hands the chief leaders of the Crusade,

The worthy champions of our God,
The honourable soldiers of the highest,

voluntarily accepted the investiture of their Syrian fiefs⁵. As God's vassals they had won them from the infidel, and the homage which they owed to their Celestial Lord they did to the Legate as His representative. But Daibert demanded more than this: in the Holy City, at any rate, the sovereignty of the Church must be immediate and absolute; where God had suffered for mankind none but God's vicar must bear rule. Nor was precedent lacking for such a claim. Already, in 1063, the Soldan of Egypt, Abu-Tamin-Mostanser-Billah, had assigned to the Christians a special quarter of Jerusalem, and over that the Patriarch, if we may credit William of Tyre, had ruled supreme⁶. His jurisdiction, in fact, had been coincident with the Christianity of the population, and, now that the entire city instead of only a single quarter of it, was Christian, it was but logical that his authority should be proportionately in-

¹ "Vir in litteris potentissimus atque eloquentissimus."

² Main (*I Pisani alle prime Crociate*, *op. cit.* p. 27) tells us that Daibert had represented the Holy See at the Court of King Alphonso VII of Castile.

³ *Gesta Francorum*, p. 519, *Recueil* cited: Müller, *Documenti*, p. 360: "Erat et aliud quo eum magis retinuerunt: Pisanos enim et Ianuenses, cum quibus ipse Daimbertus venerat, in sua quasi potestate habebat, ut quicquid ipse vellet, ipsi vellent et facerent. Ideoque necessarium et valde opportunum reipublicae suae duxerunt, si talem virum haberent, cujus industria et sollertia civitates super mare sitas navigio caperent."

⁴ Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* p. 84: "...reprobum hominem Arnulphum nomine, qui per simoniae labem in Jerosolimitanam sedem intrudere sese praesumebat."

⁵ Gibbon, chap. lviii; Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 239.

⁶ Gul. Tyr. ix, 18; Müller, *Documenti*, p. 363: "...praedicta pars civitatis quarta alium non habuit iudicem vel dominum, nisi patriarcham, et eam quasi propriam ecclesia sibi perpetuo vindicavit."

creased. Daibert, therefore, called upon Godfrey to "restore" to him the whole of Jerusalem together with the port of Jaffa—*civitatem sanctam Deo adscriptam et eiusdem civitatis praesidium, simulque urbem Ioppensem cum suis pertinentiis*. To yield was to strip himself of almost all his infant kingdom, but the pious Godfrey dared not offer that "firm and generous refusal" which the historian of a later age would seem to have expected of him¹. "Vir humilis erat et mansuetus ac timens sermones Domini," says the chronicler; and that which he had conquered for God he would not deal with as his own². On the day of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin (2 February, 1100) he ceded to the Church a fourth part of the town of Jaffa, and, on the following Easter, "he resigned the City of Jerusalem with the Tower of David and all its appurtenances into the hand of the Lord Patriarch³." Ere long, the beaked ships of Pisa and of Genoa came from Laodicea to Jaffa⁴, and, at the invitation of their Archbishop, the Pisans lent their aid to the Crusaders in rebuilding the walls and towers of the war-wasted Jerusalem⁵.

In the autumn of 1099 a second expedition of fifty galleys seems to have sailed from Pisa, but only to be attacked and defeated by a far larger Venetian fleet which was wintering at Rhodes on its way to Palestine. The whole incident is obscure; but we may probably assume that the Venetian attack was instigated by the ambassadors of Alexius, who were then in Rhodes and seized this opportunity of avenging the sack of the Ionian Islands in the preceding summer. The Venetians made use of

¹ Gibbon, *ubi cit.*

² Cf. Wycliffe's Bible: 2 *Tim.* ii. 4: "No man that holdeth knighthood to God inwlapith silfe with wordli redis."

³ "Postea, die sancto subsequentis Paschae in praesentia cleri et populi, qui ad diem festum advenerant, urbem Hierosolymam cum turri David et universis ejus pertinentiis in manu domini patriarchae resignavit." It would seem, however, that Daibert only obtained immediate possession of one quarter of the city with an eventual reversion in the rest should Godfrey die without issue. Gibbon, *ubi cit.*; Michaud, 1, 269, 270; Main, *op. cit.* pp. 29, 30.

⁴ *Gesta Francorum*, p. 524; Müller, *Documenti*, p. 366: "...stolus navium rostratarum Ianuensium et Pisanorum de portu Laodiciae exeuntes applicuerunt Ioppen."

⁵ Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* vi, 100: "ibique Pisani morantes per aliquantum temporis et inopem urbem reaedicantes ad propria regressi sunt."

their victory to exact conditions which, had they been observed, would for ever have debarred the Pisans from establishing commercial relations with the Eastern Empire; and it is clear that, whatever their pretext may have been, the real motive of their attack was the dread of Pisan rivalry in the markets of the Levant¹. Nor is it impossible that the infinite leisureliness of their movements, when they at last resumed their voyage towards Palestine in the spring, may have been due to fear of Pisan reprisals. Not until June, 1100, did they cast anchor in the harbour of Jaffa, and by that time it is probable that the Pisan fleet which had been led by Daibert was already on its homeward way². It once more ravaged the Ionian Islands, and, if Venice escaped punishment, Alexius did not³.

The sojourn of the Venetians in Syrian waters was of the briefest, and immediately after the fall of Caifa, in August, 1100, they returned to their lagoons⁴; but the conquest of the Syrian seaboard was not arrested by their departure. Arsûf and Caesarea were taken in 1101, Tortosa in 1102, Acre and Gibellet (*Byblos*) in 1104; and in all these sieges, if we may credit Roncioni, the Pisans as well as the Genoese played an important part⁵. That the Genoese did so is beyond dispute; the intervention of the Pisans is more doubtful. Less fortunate than their rivals, they found no Caffaro to record their achievements, and modern writers are inclined to believe that the share of the Pisans in the first Crusade was practically confined to the expedition under Daibert⁶. So far as the Commune is concerned this was almost certainly the case; but it can hardly be doubted

¹ See Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 141-143, where all the authorities are cited and discussed.

² Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 144.

³ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 152; Sardo, *Cronaca Pisana, ubi cit.* cxi, in *Arch. Stor. It.* T. VI, P. II, p. 79.

⁴ Hodgson, *op. cit.* pp. 240, 241.

⁵ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 153 *et seq.* He is apparently speaking of a fresh expedition despatched after the return of the fleet which had been led by Daibert: "In questo mezzo i Pisani, avendo fatto gran preparamento...deliberarono ritornare in Soria. Per la qual cosa, l'anno MCI, cavarono fuori l'armata; e sotto il governo d' Ildebrando Visconti consolo, la mandarono in ajuto e soccorso di Terrasanta."

⁶ Müller, *Documenti*, p. 367; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 151, 152.

that there were Pisan *armatori* in the Christian fleets; and it is admitted that a considerable number of those who had come with Daibert remained in Palestine under his protection¹. Albert of Aix mentions the Pisans repeatedly, and, in the *Gesta Francorum*, we read that after the fall of Acre, "Januenses et Pisani nostrique de spoliis eorum ditati sunt²." In the *Liber Iurium* of Genoa³ we have record of a certain "Gandolfus Pisanus filius Fiopie" whose services were rewarded by the same exemption from imposts as Baldwin granted to the Genoese. Pisan corsairs joined in the attack on Sidon, in 1108⁴; and a document of the same year proves that the Pisans had already obtained substantial privileges from Tancred both in Antioch and Laodicea "pro auxilio quod ei fecerunt ad devincendos Grecos." In the former city he had given them the quarter of San Salvator (*vicum Sancti Salvatoris undique*); in the latter the church of St Nicolas and a street of arcades (*voltas Prodromi*) running down to the sea, together with free use of the harbour, *sine aliquo munere ac consuetudine*⁵. The value of these concessions will be realized when we recall the fact that Antioch was famous for its silk-weaving and for the manufacture of glass, and that the port of Laodicea formed the terminus of one of the principal trade-routes to the remoter East⁶. It is further possible that Pisans took part in the siege of Tripoli, in 1109⁷; but, from thenceforward for more than a decade, we have no record of their presence in Syria. The Balearic expedition and the war with Genoa occupied all their energies.

The commercial activities of Pisa were, however, no longer

¹ Müller, *Documenti*, p. ix.

² *Gesta Franc.* p. 537. Cf. Albert Aquen. ix, 27, in the collection of Bongars; Müller, *Documenti*, p. 367.

³ *Liber Iurium Reipub. Ianuensis*, I, 16, cited by Müller, p. 369.

⁴ Albert Aquensis, x, 45; Müller, p. 370: "...Balduinus rex contractis undique copiis a mari et terra ex diversis nationibus regni Italiae, videlicet Pisanorum, Genuensium, Venetorum, Malfetanorum, omniumque eorum qui more praedonum expugnare et expoliare solent navigantes...."

⁵ Müller, *Doc.* I, p. 3; Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* p. 85.

⁶ Müller, pp. ix, 372-375, and authorities there cited.

⁷ Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 242; Müller, p. 370.

confined to the Western Mediterranean, and ere long she obtained a footing in Constantinople itself. Alexius knew her strength for he had felt the weight of her vengeance, and no sooner was he threatened by the crusade which Bohemond preached against the Byzantine Empire¹ than he resolved if possible to convert her from an enemy into an ally. After protracted negotiations the Imperial *Curopolata*², Basileus Mesimerius, was sent to Pisa and, on the 18th of April, 1111, the Republic entered into a solemn undertaking to abstain from hostilities against the Empire and to make no alliance with its enemies. In the following October, Alexius and his son, John Porphyrogenitus, published a Chrysobulum (*χρυσόβουλλον*), or Golden Bull³, whereby the Pisans were exempted from all import and export dues except an *ad valorem* duty of four per cent., and were granted a special quarter in Constantinople with a *scala*, or landing-place, where they might load and unload their cargoes: “Scala dabitur vobis in qua debeant naves vestrae applicare et honera eorum deponi.” From other documents we learn that this *scala* was double—*quae et apparet et dicitur Duplex*—and that it was fenced off from the public road by wooden palings, six cubits high⁴. Hard by were the *ἐμβολον*, or bazaar⁵, and houses for the colonists to dwell in: “locus negotiandi aptus et conveniens cum habitaculis ut reponatis merces vestras et habitetis.” Situated on the southern shore of the Golden Horn, opposite Galata, the Pisan of all the Latin quarters was the nearest to the Point of the Seraglio (*promontorium arci sultaninae*), and, therefore, the first to be reached

¹ Hodgson, *Early Hist. of Venice*, *op. cit.* p. 349 n., and Fulcherius Carnotensis in *Recueil*, etc. III, 418, there cited.

² As to the *Curopolata* (*κουροπαλάτης*) see Gibbon (ed. Bohn, 1855), vol. VI, ch. 53, and note on p. 201.

³ The *Chrysobulum* itself no longer exists, but it is textually reported in a document of 1192, published by Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* xxxiv, pp. 43-45, 52-54. See also Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* pp. 151-155.

⁴ Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 48, 57.

⁵ Hodgson (*Venice in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, p. 29 n.) tells us that the word *ἐμβολον* (*embolum*, *embulum*) “seems properly to mean a street lined with arcades, but it was extended so as to comprehend the area occupied by such street or bazaar and the houses round it.” Compare Heyd, *op. cit.* I, 248, 249, and authorities cited.

on entering the gulf (*in sinu Ceratico*¹). To the westward lay the Venetian quarter, at the so-called Πέραμα, the principal ferry over the harbour, where the Galata Bridge now stands²; and, possibly, it was this contiguity which rendered necessary the clause in the Chrysobulum guaranteeing protection against Venetian insolence and aggression—*atrox dedecus vel turpem iniuriam*. The battle of Rhodes was not forgotten, and the Venetians naturally regarded the Pisans as dangerous interlopers. Only after the Genoese had obtained a footing in Constantinople³ and established themselves at Coparia⁴, did the Pisans and Venetians agree to bury their differences⁵.

In addition to the concessions which refer to Pisan commerce, the Chrysobulum of Alexius contained provisions conferring special honours upon the Republic and its representatives in Constantinople. Seats were reserved for them in St Sophia and in the Hippodrome, and the Emperor promised to present the sum of 400 *yperpera* annually, together with two *palii* (βλαττία δύο) to the Pisan Cathedral, sixty *yperpera* and a *palio* to the Archbishop, and a hundred *yperpera* to “Lamberto iudici, Carlotto et Antonio,” which were to be transferred to the Cathedral on their decease—*et post obitum horum dabuntur Ecclesiae*⁶. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to go quite so far as Sismondi, who seems to regard these offerings of *palii* as a tribute—“un tribut de parade humiliant pour celui qui le paye, et glorieux pour lui qui le reçoit⁷”—but their presentation at least proves how anxious Alexius was to live at amity with the Pisans; and it is certain that he could have found no surer way of ingratiating

¹ See Müller, *op. cit.* p. 423.

² Hodgson, *Early Hist. of Venice, op. cit.* p. 222 n.

³ In 1155. See p. 137 *infra*.

⁴ *Coparia* from κώπη, an oar—“*ubi molendina sunt et remi fiunt.*” See Hodgson, *Venice in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, p. 34 n.

⁵ They entered into a confederation in 1170, which was renewed in 1175 and again in 1180 (Müller, *Illustrazioni to Doc. xviii*, pp. 399–401); but, in the last decade of the century, the old enmities blazed out afresh. (*Ibid.* p. 430, and authorities cited.)

⁶ Müller, *op. cit.* p. 53, col. 1.

⁷ Sismondi, *Histoire des Républiques Italiennes du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1826), T. II, ch. XI, p. 181. As to the presentation of *palii* in token of vassalage see my *Palio and Ponte*, pp. 6, 7, 59, 60.

himself with his new allies. For the mediaeval Italian the *Major Ecclesia* of his native city was the symbol and embodiment of all he held most sacred, of home and civic liberty and glory. We have already seen how the spoils of Palermo and Mehdia were dedicated to the construction and embellishment of the Cathedral, and, in like manner, after the Pisans had established themselves in Constantinople, all the public revenues of the colony—*embolum et scalas et stateram*—were granted to the Opera del Duomo¹.

The situation of Constantinople invited the commerce of the world. So populous was it that it is said to have contained more inhabitants than there were in all the country between York and the Thames²; and Villehardouin declares that, in the three fires which occurred during the siege of 1204, "more houses were burned than are in the three best cities of the Kingdom of France³." Thither came all the divers kinds of merchandise which poured into Babylon the great, the mighty city of John's apocalyptic vision⁴. What wonder if, in spite of the hatred of the Greeks and the persecutions and exactions of the Emperors, Pisan merchants "waxed rich through the abundance of her delicacies."

Yet important though the trade of Constantinople was, it by no means monopolized the energies of Pisa. By the Chrysobulum of Alexius, all the harbours of the Empire had been thrown open to her commerce. A Pisan colony was early estab-

¹ This was in 1160, and, two years later, the donation was confirmed by an instrument executed by the ambassadors Bottacio and Cocco in Constantinople itself. The collection of these revenues was entrusted to the Prior of the Pisan churches of S. Pietro and S. Nicolò in Constantinople (*Prior sanctorum Petri et Nicholay Pisanorum de Constantinopoli*) whose duty it was, after deducting the sums necessary for the conservation of the Pisan buildings in that city and for the payment of the salaries of the officials of the colony to transmit the remainder to the treasury of the Fabbrica del Duomo in Pisa. Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* VII, VIII. See also Main, *op. cit.* pp. 41, 42. The embassy of Cocco and Bottacio is mentioned by Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 26.

² Hodgson, *Early Hist. of Venice*, *op. cit.* p. 398, n. 2.

³ Villehardouin, *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ch. 106. The passage referred to will be found on p. 64 of Sir Frank Marzials' translation in the "Everyman's Library" edition.

⁴ *Rev.* xviii, 12, 13. Compare Hodgson, *op. cit.* pp. 151, 152.

lished at Almyro in the Gulf of Volo¹, and she seems to have possessed houses and a warehouse (*domos cum fundaco*) in Salonika²; while even before the long war with Genoa was ended by the intervention of Innocent II, in 1133, there are indications of a renewal of Pisan activity in Syrian waters.

¹ Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* III and *Illustrazioni* on pp. 369, 370.

² Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* p. 169; Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* XLIV, p. 72, col. 1 (at top). From time immemorial, a great trade-route led from the Danube valley and the plains of Hungary to Salonika. Passing up the Morava valley and down the Varada valley, it followed the same course as that taken by the Serbian railway to-day.

CHAPTER THE FIFTH

THE BALEARIC EXPEDITION

A CENTURY after the expulsion of Mogahid from Sardinia the Saracens still maintained themselves in the Balearic Islands¹, whence they continually ravaged the coasts of Catalonia and menaced the ports of southern France. After the preaching of the first Crusade, their audacity was increased by the departure of the flower of the Italian marine for the Levant, and they seem to have pushed their forays as far south as Sicily and even to have crossed the Ionian Sea and harried the shores of Greece². The terror of the Pisan name sufficed to protect the sea-board of Tuscany from invasion, but the western basin of the Mediterranean was once more overrun by Mussulman pirates³; the inhabitants of the islands and especially of Sardinia lived in constant peril of attack; Majorca was crowded with Christian captives⁴, and, in 1113, the Pisans, whose commerce had suffered severely, resolved to put an end to a state of things which was rapidly becoming intolerable. With them were leagued the Counts of Barcelona and Montpellier and the Viscount of Narbonne⁵; while, because their enemies were also the enemies of the Cross, the enterprise received the Papal benediction⁶.

For this expedition our principal authority is the *Liber Maior-*

¹ See Amari, *Notizie della impresa de' Pisani su le Baleari secondo le sorgenti arabiche*, published by Prof. Carlo Calisse in his edition of the *Liber Maiolichinus de gestis Pisanorum illustribus* (Roma, 1904), pp. xlix-lv. The volume forms one of the series published by the Istituto Storico Italiano and entitled *Fonti per la Storia d' Italia*.


² *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 8, 13, 275.

³ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 162.

⁴ *Liber Maiolichinus*, v. 26; *Brev. pis. hist.* apud Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* vi, 169.

⁵ Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* III, 376; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 164.

⁶ Marangone (*ubi cit.* p. 7) asserts that the expedition was undertaken "at the commandment of the Pope—*iussu Domini papae.*" Compare Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 162, and Tronci, *Annali pisani*, p. 43.



CHURCH OF S. PIERINO



PORTA PRINCIPALE DEL DUOMO.

GIOVANNI DA BOLOGNA

lichinus, a contemporary poem, formerly attributed to a certain Laurentius Veronensis or Vernensis¹, but evidently the work of a Pisan, and of a Pisan who was himself an eye-witness of many of the events which he describes². Roncioni speaks of him as "Enrico capellano dell' arcivescovo di Pisa³," and it is highly probable that we may identify him with the *Henricus presbiter plebanus* of the poem⁴. Nevertheless, his testimony must not be accepted blindly. Entirely apart from the fact that the poem is based upon classical models and written in classical hexameters by one who would have found himself far more at home with the ecclesiastical cantilena of his own day⁵, it is obvious that to expect meticulous accuracy in matters of detail would be to expect an anachronism⁶. The object of the poet was a striking composition with grand outline, such as might worthily perpetuate the glories of his native city; he has no notion of impartiality, and he embroiders his facts without scruple; the incidents of the combats he describes and the speeches which he puts in the mouths of the leaders of the Christian host are, no doubt, often pure inventions; but a solid foundation of fact remains; and, with all its blemishes, the *Liber Maiolichinus* is the best and fullest source we possess for the history of the Balearic War. If due allowance be made for the licence of the poet and for the natural bias and prejudice of the Pisan, we need not fear to use it.

On Easter Sunday, Pietro Moriconi, the Archbishop, ascended the pulpit of the Pisan Duomo and preached a crusade for the delivery of the Christian captives in Majorca, promising,

¹ See the versions of the poem published by Ughelli (*Italia Sacra*, x, 127 seq.) and Muratori (*Rer. Italic. Script.* vi, 111 seq.).

² In addition to such definite statements as those which are contained in vv. 960, 2484, etc., the phraseology adopted constantly produces the impression that the poet is describing what he actually saw with his own eyes, e.g. the *Corsica sub velis fuerat* of v. 188.

³ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* pp. 100, 165.

⁴ v. 3165.

⁵ See Prof. Calisse's remarks on p. xiv of the Preface to the *Liber Maiolichinus*.

⁶ It has been truly said that the old or artistic style which was invented by the Greeks remained the ideal of history till quite recent times. Its aim was perfection of literary form, weight and dignity of language. Mere accuracy was a very secondary consideration (*Ency. Brit. Art.* "History").

like his predecessor Daibert, to lead the fleets of the Republic in person¹. Twelve consuls were elected from the noblest families of the city² and the Archbishop headed an embassy to Rome, where he received the cross at the hand of Pope Paschal II³. Thus, in a moment of crisis, we see the Archbishop assume his rightful position as head of the State: head not only on the ground of his ecclesiastical authority, but also by feudal prerogative. All the principal families of the city were his vassals, to say nothing of the numerous Cattani from the *contado*. The Visconti, the Da Parlascio, the S. Cassiano, the Pellari, the Gualandi, the Caldera, the Familiati, the Lanfranchi, all consular names, formed his Curia and owed him fealty⁴. The twelve consuls who were elected for the conduct of the war were elected *ad hoc*, and apparently on his motion. It would be difficult to find a better example of the fact that the *Balia* was the original form in which the political life of the Communes manifested itself. All the magistracies were in their inception nothing more than provisional commissions which in process of time became permanent⁵.

Preparations for the expedition were pushed forward with

¹ *Liber Maiolichinus*, v. 39 et seq.

² *Ibid.* v. 49.

³ *Ibid.* vv. 71-75:

...clari cum presule digno
Legati Romam vadunt, quos papa colendus
Nomine Paschalis multo suscepit honore,
Pontifici tribuendo crucem, romanaque signa
Militie ducibus, que presens Atho recepit.

With this we may compare the *Breviarium* in Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* vi, 169: "Et nota quod pontifex supradictus, quando Pisani iverunt Maioricam, suis manibus dedit vexillum vermileo, unde ex tunc Pisana civitas vermileo utitur ubique colore." The *Croce bianca in campo rosso* is the arms of Pisa to this day. See Passerini, *Le Armi dei Municipi Toscani* (Firenze, 1864), p. 208. As to the "romanaque signa," in the penultimate line quoted above, we may, I presume, take it, with Roncioni (*ubi cit.* p. 163), to mean the Roman Eagles, which continued for many years to be used as a Pisan emblem. Compare my *Palio and Ponte*, *op. cit.* p. 13, n. 1.

⁴ See Volpe, *Istituzioni Comunali a Pisa*, *op. cit.* pp. 192, 193, and documents there cited. In the *Costituto dell' uso*, where the question of the rights and duties of feudatories are dealt with at length, there are special provisions with regard to the Archbishop who was certainly the principal feudatory of the city. See the chapter "De Feudis" in Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, II (Constit. usus), p. 957 seq.

⁵ Compare my *A History of Perugia*, p. 31, and ch. XIX *infra*.

feverish activity, and from half the towns of Central Italy and beyond "an innumerable folk" thronged to join the muster: Romans, Florentines, Sienese, Lucchesi, Volteranni, Pistoiesi and Lombards¹: feudal seigniors and civic levies². Pisa was still the acknowledged *Tusciae Provinciae caput*, and her neighbours did not disdain to fight beneath her banners in the cause of Christendom. Only Genoa held aloof: partly, no doubt, through jealous hatred of her old ally³, but partly also because her energies were fully occupied in the conquest of her southern *riviera* and the fortification of Porto Venere⁴.

Of the building of the Pisan fleet our poet gives a vivid account. Thinned by the construction of previous armadas, the pine-woods in the neighbourhood of the city proved insufficient for the purpose, and the forests of Luni, of Corvara and even of Corsica were laid under contribution, while spars and oaken beams were floated down the Arno from the Mugello⁵. In the dockyards of Pisa, on either bank of the river between Porta Legatia and the Church of S. Vito⁶, the shipwrights laboured

¹ The Romans and the Lucchesi are the only auxiliaries mentioned by name in the *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 133, 134:

Interea veniunt quidam de gente remota,
Romaque cum Luca mittunt solatia pugne.

However, the words "aliarum Tusciae urbium populos" which occur in the *Gesta triumphalia*, etc. (Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* vi, 101), are confirmed and explained by a document published by Prof. Calisse, in his edition of the *Liber Maiolichinus*, App. 1, p. 138. From it we learn that the treaty of September 7, 1114 (Pisan style), between the Count of Barcelona and the Pisans was entered into "coram marchionibus, comitibus, principibus Romanis, Lucensibus, Florentinis, Senensibus, Vulterannis, Pistoriensibus, Longobardis, Sardis et Corsis, aliisque innumerabilibus gentibus, que in predicto exercitu aderant." The Sardinians, as we shall see, joined the expedition when the fleet reached Capocaccia.

² The *proceres*, or feudal seigniors who joined the expedition at the head of their vassals, are frequently mentioned in the *Liber Maiolichinus*.

³ *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 135, 136; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 164.

⁴ Caffaro, *Annali* (edition cited), p. 15. ⁵ *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 98-103.

⁶ As we have already seen (p. 2 *supra*) there is satisfactory evidence that the Pisans still caulked and repaired their ships "ab ecclesia sancti Viti versus degatiam tantum, ex utraque parte Arni," at a much later period. The Church of S. Vito stands at the extreme west of the city, and the Porta Legatia appears to be identical with the Porta a Mare. Thus, at the time of which I am writing, these dockyards were outside the city walls. See Tronci, *Annali pisani*, *op. cit.* p. 40, and L. Simoneschi, *Della vita privata dei Pisani nel medio evo* (Pisa, Tip. Citi, 1895), pp. 17-19.

continually, and by the end of July all was ready: swift galleys of a hundred oars, each with its deck-tower and bulwarks ranged about with shields; larger galleys called *Gatti* or Cats, steered by two great lateral oars, one on either side of the poop, and furnished with rams for breaking the sides of the enemies' ships; huge horse-transporters or *uscieri*¹, with doors in their sterns which opened outwards and downwards so as to form a bridge over which the horses could be led in and out; skiffs and cruisers for landing and scouting²; the poet enumerates them all³. Neither was there any lack of siege-towers, scaling-ladders, battering-rams, catapults and other military engines⁴; the smiths never ceased from their toil till all the iron in the city had been exhausted⁵. Some of the ships seem to have been so heavily laden that they found considerable difficulty in crossing the shallow bar at the Arno's mouth⁶. It was the most powerful fleet ever equipped by the Pisans⁷, and, according to some historians, was manned by no fewer than forty-five thousand fighting men⁸.

¹ The *huissiers* of Villehardouin and the older French writers.

² As to the ships of the Middle Ages generally, see Manfroni, *op. cit.* App. C, I, "Costruzione navale," and compare Hodgson, *Early Hist. of Venice, op. cit.* p. 250, and Archer and Kingsford, *The Crusades, op. cit.* p. 365.

³ *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 106-119:

Gatti, drumones, garabi, celeresque galee,
 Barce, currabii, lintres, grandesque sagene.
 Et plures alie variantes nomina naves.
 His ponuntur equi, sunt quedam victibus apte,
 Ingentes alie possunt portare catervas,
 Servitiis norunt possuntque subesse minores.
 He numquam metuunt vicinas tangere terras,
 Adducunt latices, homines ad litora vectant;
 Iura galearum iuvenum sunt apta lacertis,
 Harum quamque solent centum propellere remi,
 Ordine qui bino plana nituntur in unda,
 Et freta scindentes fugiunt sic atque sequuntur
 Ut celeres capreas et aves superare volantes
 Veloci valeant undosa per equora cursu.

⁴ *Ibid.* vv. 120-126.

⁵ *Ibid.* v. 127: Nec cessant fabri: ferrum consumitur omne.

⁶ *Ibid.* vv. 165-168.

⁷ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 164.

⁸ *Liber Maiolichinus*, p. 13, n. 2.

The crusaders put out to sea on the 6th of August, the festival of S. Sisto, a memorable day in Pisan annals, and steered a south-westerly course, between the islands of Capraia and Elba. After skirting the coast of Corsica, they touched at S. Reparata, in the neighbourhood of the modern S. Teresa, on the most northerly headland of Sardinia, and, passing through the strait of S. Bonifacio, cast anchor at Porto Torres, the capital of the Giudicato Torritano¹. Here they were welcomed by the reigning Judge, Costantino I, who, like his father, Mariano, before him, showed himself consistently friendly to Pisa. His friendship was, however, a friendship of alliance, not of vassalage. Our poet dignifies him with the title of *Rex*², and Roncioni's assertion that he bore rule in Torres "as the representative of the City of Pisa³" is a gratuitous assumption which is flatly contradicted by the results of modern research. The influence of Pisa was, no doubt, very great; through fear of it Pope Paschal II had been induced to recommend the legates whom he sent to Sardinia, in 1100–1101, to the Genoese⁴; even the art of Pisa had already begun to penetrate the island⁵; but the Judges were still practically independent⁶.

From Porto Torres the armada stood across the Gulf of Asinaria to Punto Falcone and then followed the coast-line southward to Capocaccia (*Caput Album*), where it was joined by a body of Sardinians under Saltaro, the son of Costantino, and Torbeno *qui quondam regnum censebat Calaritanum*⁷. They

¹ *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 184–196.

² *Ibid.* vv. 197, 198:

...rex clarus, multum celebratus ab omni
Sardorum populo.

³ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 165: Costantino giudice turritano, che in vece della città di Pisa quivi risiedeva ed amministrava ragione."

⁴ Besta, *La Sardegna Medioevale*, *op. cit.* I, 88. Compare Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* p. 84.

⁵ Besta, *op. cit.* I, 92, 93; II, 253.

⁶ Compare Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 122.

⁷ *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 202–205. Durbino, or Torbeno, ruled the Giudicato di Cagliari during the minority of his nephew Mariano II. See Besta, *op. cit.* I, 88. The auxiliaries who accompanied him were obviously Sards, and Mrs Ross' assertion that the Pisans visited Sardinia "to embark recruits among the Pisan nobles who held fiefs in the island" (*Story of Pisa*, *op. cit.*

were accompanied by the Archbishop of Cagliari, who, like his Pisan brother, was minded to share the toils and glories of the Holy War¹.

On leaving Capocaccia, the crusaders encountered a terrible tempest which drove them out of their course towards the shores of Catalonia. They cast anchor at Blanes, and, supposing that they had reached Minorca, prepared to devastate the country, but, on discovering their mistake, sent Ildebrando Orlandi, one of the twelve Consuls, to announce their arrival to the Count of Barcelona². That prince had long desired alliance with the Pisans and seems to have actually visited Italy in person to seek their assistance and that of the Genoese³. In these circumstances, the Pisan envoy received a cordial welcome, and, on the 7th September, a solemn treaty was entered into "in portu Sancti Felicis prope Gerundam," the modern San Feliu de Guixols. In the presence of the crusading host and of the nobles and prelates of Catalonia, the Archbishop of Pisa fastened a Cross to the Count's shoulder and presented him with a banner "to the end that, whenever the Pisans should make war against the Saracens of Spain, he might be their standard-bearer and leader." In return the Count promised protection to Pisan merchants throughout his jurisdiction, exemption from all imposts, and immunity for their goods and persons in case of shipwreck. Finally, that no formality might be lacking, two of the consuls, "in the place and stead of the other consuls and of the whole of the Pisan people," received investiture at the hand of

p. 18) seems to be entirely without foundation. Quite apart from the fact that the Pisans as yet possessed no dominion in Sardinia, it is extremely doubtful whether, at this early date, feudalism had been introduced into the island. See Besta, *op. cit.* vol. II, cap. XVII.

¹ *Liber Maiolichinus*, v. 1590.

² *Ibid.* vv. 217-263.

³ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 169, and authorities there cited. In the document published by Prof. Calisse (*ubi cit.* p. 137) we read of many embassies which had passed between the Count and the Pisans: "ab utrisque partibus multis transmissis legationibus." Nor is it impossible that the poet's statement that the Pisans were driven out of their course towards Catalonia is a fable invented to conceal the fact that, anterior to the departure of the expedition, negotiations had been entered into with the Spanish princes. It seems likely, as Manfroni insists (pp. 170, 171), that they went to Barcelona because they had stipulated that they would do so.

the Count "per quoddam missile quod vulgo bulcionem vocamus¹."

As a result of this treaty, reinforcements poured in from all the principal towns of Gallia Narbonensis: Arles, Roussillon, Béziers, Nîmes; the Count of Montpellier came with twenty ships, the Viscount of Narbonne with as many more, and the Count of Ampurias and Raymond, "cui Balcius extat origo," with seven². On the other hand, the greater part of the Lucchesi abandoned the crusade and returned to their homes. Unused to maritime enterprises, the tempestuous weather which they had encountered after leaving Sardinia had completely demoralized them, and they had been grumbling ever since. Our poet speaks of them with contempt, as tillers of the soil, fit only to follow the plough and tread the winepress³, and his opinion seems to have been shared by the Catalonian and Provençal allies. "Let them go," said Count William of Montpellier. "For every one of them who leaves you, we will give you four, and four who are capable of enduring more toil than any six of them⁴." In these circumstances, their defection was doubtless rather a source of relief than of discouragement; but the season was now so far advanced that it was resolved to postpone the

¹ *Liber Maiolichinus*, App. I, pp. 137-139: "Trattato di alleanza fra il conte di Barcellona e i Pisani." A thirteenth century copy of the document is still preserved among the Pisan archives.

² *Ibid.* vv. 427-444; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 169; Tronci, *Annali pisani*, *op. cit.* pp. 46, 47; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 171.

³ *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 394-402:

Hosque piget venisse quidem, qui rura solebant
Vertere, qui curvis incumbere semper aratris,
Cunctaque consumunt vertendo tempora glebas.
Et modo, cum nequeant sua semina tradere sulcis
Aut conculcato pedibus procumbere musto,
Nocte dieque moras istas casusque queruntur,
Inque domos migrare suas fortasse minantur.
Vile genus hominum, quorum miserabilis etas
Presenti populo nullam gerit utilitatem.

This passage is quite in keeping with the gibes which one still hears thrown at Lucca and the Lucchesi by the other Tuscans: for example, the quite unprintable enquiry which the modern pension-keeper in that pre-eminently agricultural city is supposed to address to his or her prospective guest before closing the bargain.

⁴ *Ibid.* vv. 678-682.

attack upon Majorca until the following spring, and the Pisans prepared to winter in Catalonia. They had, indeed, already delayed too long for safety; while they were unloading and beaching their ships in the harbour of Barcelona, a sudden hurricane destroyed no fewer than sixty of them¹. So far from being disheartened by this misfortune, they immediately set about building new ships to replace those which they had lost, and despatched thirty galleys to Pisa to demand reinforcements², with the result that a second expedition of eighty galleys was fitted out and sent to Catalonia as soon as the winter was over, by way of Genoa and Marseilles³. The manning of this new fleet must have emptied Pisa of almost all her able-bodied citizens, and, if Villani's statement that a Florentine army was sent to protect the women and children and old men who were left behind has any foundation in fact, it must almost certainly be referable to this time, and not, as is usually supposed, to the preceding August⁴. So long as the Lucchesi who had joined the Crusade remained with the Pisan fleet, they practically served as hostages for the good behaviour of their fellow-citizens at home, whereas, after their return, they may well have been eager to take revenge for the indignities to which their cowardice had subjected them. They had departed amid a storm of insult and derision; and, in those days, insult and derision were not easily forgotten. Nor were more tangible grounds for animosity lacking. A few years earlier, Lucca had been at war with Pisa for the possession of Ripafratta on the Serchio, and, after some initial successes, had been badly beaten. "In eadem guerra vicerunt Pisani Lucenses tribus vicibus in campo, et castellum Ripafractam recuperaverunt, et ripam, unde lis fuit, retinuerunt⁵." Still, if the story of Floren-

¹ *Liber Maiolichinus*, v. 713; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 172; Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 8; Tronci, *op. cit.* p. 47.

² *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 725-734.

³ *Ibid.* vv. 1165 *et seq.* The poet does not fail to have a fling at the Genoese:

Urbs igitur Ianue celeres mirata paratus
Livida demisso spectabat carbasa vultu.

⁴ G. Villani, iv, 31. Everything which can be said in favour of the veracity of the story has been said by Prof. P. Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc., op. cit.* i, 95, 96.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 7.

tine protection be true, it is strange that no reference to it is to be found in the *Liber Maiolichinus*.

In March, 1114, galleys were sent from Barcelona to reconnoitre¹, and, in June, after the arrival of the second Pisan expedition, the allied fleets, now numbering no fewer than five hundred sail, weighed anchor and, after following the Spanish coast-line to the mouth of the Ebro, steered southward past the Columbretes to the island of Luiza, the most westerly of the Balearic group². Here the crusaders effected a landing and, though the Saracens resisted valiantly, the survivors were forced to surrender at discretion on the 10th of August³. The town of Iviza was razed to the ground and the victors turned their prows towards Majorca, where the Emir Mobascer, the *rex Nazaredeolus* of the poem⁴, was awaiting them with the flower of his troops. Aided by their allies the Pisans beleaguered the capital city of the island for the remainder of 1114 and the first three months of the following year.

Of the details of this siege it is impossible to speak with any certainty. It is true that the *Liber Maiolichinus* gives a full account of the war, describing the furious sallies of the Saracens and the persistent valour of the Crusaders, but it is just in such matters as these that our poet is least trustworthy. At first it seemed that the enterprise might prove beyond the strength of the allies. Warned by the fate of Iviza, the garrison fought with all the courage of despair and inflicted grievous loss upon the besiegers. Ere long dissensions arose within the ranks of the Christians; the Spanish princes grew weary of the war, and when the Moslems of Denia invaded Catalonia⁵, the Count of Barcelona, alarmed for the safety of his own dominions, entered into negotiations with Mobascer, who promised to pay an indemnity and to liberate the Christian

¹ *Liber Maiolichinus*, vv. 975 et seq.

² *Ibid.* v. 1192 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* v. 1513.

⁴ "Nazaredeolus" is, doubtless, a phonetic rendering of "Nâzir ad dawlah" (Champion of the State), a title assumed by Mobascer (Mubasir) when he ascended the throne. See *Liber Maiolichinus*, p. 38, n. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.* vv. 2386 et seq. and n. 2 on p. 92.

captives. These terms fulfilled the avowed object of the Crusade¹, and the Count was anxious to accept them; but the Pisans proved obstinate. Their crusading zeal was always subservient to their mercantile interests, and they were bent upon the destruction of a nest of pirates whose continued existence was a perpetual peril to their commerce. Moreover, the Pisans were warmly supported by the bishops and clergy who had accompanied the expedition and, after their kind, showed themselves implacable towards the unbelievers². The negotiations were broken off, and, with the approach of spring, the siege was pushed forward with renewed vigour. The outer circuit of walls was stormed on the 6th February, 1115, the second on the 22nd of the same month, the third on the 4th March, the citadel on the 3rd April³. More than fifty thousand Saracens are said to have been put to the sword and thirty thousand Christians liberated⁴. The booty was enormous, much of it consisting of crosses of gold and silver, of chalices, candlesticks and other ecclesiastical ornaments which, in their many predatory excursions, the pirates had shipped from Christian churches, and especially those of Spain and Provence⁵. There too were those pillars of porphyry which, if we may credit the legend, were given to the Florentines in gratitude for their defence of Pisa, though it would seem more reasonable to suppose that they received them as part of their share of the spoil. There was, as we have seen, a Florentine contingent in the allied army. Mobascer had died during the siege, but his successor 'Abû Rabîah (Burabé) together with his wife and son fell into the hands of the Christians⁶. They were carried captive to Pisa to swell the

¹ "Pro christianorum ereptione captivorum" (Treaty of 7th Sept. 1113, *ubi cit.*).

² *Liber Maiolichinus*, v. 2712.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 119, 123, n. 2; 126, n. 1; 131, n. 1.

⁴ *Breviarium Pis. hist.* apud Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* vi, 169: "Pisani ultra quinquaginta Saracenorum millia occiderunt; et Christianos ibi captos per diversa tempora ipso die de carceribus liberaverunt, qui numero inventi sunt triginta millia."

⁵ *Gesta triumph.*, *ubi cit.*, col. 104; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 214.

⁶ Apparently, Mrs Ross (*Story of Pisa*, *op. cit.* pp. 19, 20) would have us believe that the wife and little son of Mobascer fell into the hands of the Pisans. This is, however, somewhat difficult to accept when we recall the

triumph of the victors¹. The epitaph of "the Queen of Majorca" may still be seen among the inscriptions on the façade of the Duomo².

On their homeward voyage, the Pisans touched at Marseilles, and there, in the Church of St Victor without the walls, they buried their dead: "the leaders in fair tombs of marble, with their arms sculptured thereupon; the others all together in a great sepulchre which they digged in the midst of the church; and there for an eternal memorial were carved these verses:

VERBI INCARNATI DE VIRGINE MILLE PERACTIS
ANNIS POST CENTVM BIS SEPTEM CONNVMERATIS,
VINCERE MAIORICAS CHRISTI FAMULIS INIMICAS
TENTANT PISANI, MACVMETI REGNA PROPHANI.
MANE NECI DANTVR MVLTI; TAMEN HIS SOCIANTVR
ANGELICAE TVRBAE, COELIQVE LOCANTVR IN VRBE.
TERRA DESTRVCTA, CLASSIS REDIT AEQVORE DVCTA,
PRIMVM OPE DIVINA, SIMVL ET VICTRICE CARINA.
O PIA VICTORVM BONITAS, DECVNCTA SVORVM
CORPORA CLASSE GERVNT, PISASQVE REDVCERE QVERVNT.
SED SIMVL, ADDVCTVS NE TVRBET GAVDIA LVCTVS,
CAESI PRO CHRISTO TVMVLO CLAVDENTVR IN ISTO³."

Thence, across the Ligurian Sea they sailed to the mouth of the Arno.

All Europe rejoiced at the successful issue of the Crusade; and when, in June, 1116, at the request of the Pisan ambassadors, the Emperor Henry V granted the *corti* of Livorno and Pappiana to the Fabbrica del Duomo, he declared that he did so, not only from reverence to the Church, but because he esteemed worthy of singular favour the men who, with infinite toil and danger, had destroyed the powerful city of Majorca, "to the no small glory of our Empire and of Christendom⁴." Pope Paschal II wrote

fact that Mobascer was a eunuch: "tyrannus crudelis et pessimus licet eunuchus." Compare Amari, *Notizie della impresa de' Pisani su le Baleari secondo le sorgenti arabiche, ubi cit.* p. liii.

¹ As to the various legends regarding the captives, see *Liber Maiolichinus*, p. 132 and notes.

² It has been repeatedly published, e.g. by Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 218; Damorrone, *op. cit.* I, 157, and Calisse, *Liber Maiolichinus*, App. VI, p. 144.

³ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 215; *Liber Maiolichinus*, App. IV, p. 143.

⁴ Bonaini, *Dipl. pis.* No. x, p. 5; *Liber Maiolichinus*, App. VIII, p. 144.

in equally laudatory terms to the Count of Barcelona¹; and, in 1118, Gelasius II confirmed the rights of the Pisan Archbishops over Corsica². Moreover, the prestige of her victories vastly increased the influence of the Republic in Sardinia; the old alliances were renewed, and, probably, with fresh privileges³. The commercial hegemony of Pisa tended to transform itself into sovereignty⁴. Yet, so far as the Balearic islands themselves were concerned the effect of the war was but transitory. The expedition had been one of destruction and vengeance, not of colonization, and scarcely had the allies returned to their homes when the Almoravid Ali-ibn-Iusuf occupied Majorca and rebuilt the capital. Within a few decades it once more became a nest of pirates; and, in 1151, negotiations were opened with a view to a fresh crusade⁵.

¹ *Liber Maiolichinus*, App. XI, p. 149.

² Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 220; Muratori, *Annali*, ad ann.; Besta, *op. cit.* I, 98.

³ Besta, *op. cit.* I, 95 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 117.

⁵ *Liber Maiolichinus*, p. 132, n. 4. Cf. App. IX, X, XII, pp. 145, 146; Besta, *op. cit.* I, 112.

CHAPTER THE SIXTH

WAR WITH GENOA

THE year 1119 marks the definite beginning of the long struggle between the Communes of Pisa and Genoa. The immediate cause of the war seems to have been the privilege of Gelasius II¹; but, in no circumstances could hostilities have been long averted. The Tyrrhenian Sea was too narrow for more than one mistress; the interests and ambitions of the two cities clashed continually, and, thanks to the prestige which Pisa's earlier triumphs had won her, Genoa was being steadily relegated to a position of commercial inferiority. There was but one alternative: she must either destroy the sea-power of Pisa or be herself destroyed by it. And here her geographical position served her well. The barren mountains which cut her off from territorial extension inland also formed a well-nigh impregnable rampart against attack²; strategically she was to all intents and purposes an island, and, once she had established her authority over the two Riviere, the only outlet which was left to her was the sea. Nature had forced upon her an unity of aim which did much to insure success. The case of Pisa was very different. Without a single great natural harbour and with no mountain barrier on the landward side, she was continually tempted to territorial acquisitions and continually distracted by land warfare. Lucca and Florence hung upon her flanks; the very sea to which she

¹ See p. 70 *supra* and authorities cited in note 2.

² Guarnia è de streiti passi,
E de provo e de loitan
De montagne forti xassi
Per no venir in otrui man:
Che nixum prince nè baron
Uncha poe quela citae
Meter in sugigacion,
Ni trar de soa francitae....

(*Rime Genovesi* cited by Bartoli, *Storia della letteratura italiana*, II, 106).

trusted fought against her and betrayed her, silting up her ports and leaving her, at the last, stranded and forsaken, an inland city. The maritime power of Pisa was an artificial creation, and, in the long run, could not compete with a rival power of natural growth. Valour and wisdom struggled in vain against geographical disadvantages, and the first really great reverse which Pisa sustained destroyed the whole of her resources. Had Genoa been defeated at Meloria, the entire sea-faring population, from Porto Venere to Nervi, from Voltri to Ventimiglia, would have thronged to man fresh fleets and to renew the conflict; but for Pisa there was no recovery; she lacked reserve force and, once her navies had been annihilated, and the flower of her citizens carried into captivity, she could find no new material: the desolate Maremma over which she ruled furnished neither sailors nor soldiers. Her sea-power withered away as swiftly and inevitably as a tree withers when its roots are severed¹.

To-day, with the experience of the centuries behind us, these things may sound like truisms; but they were far from being truisms in the twelfth century. To all but the most far-sighted the bearding of the might and majesty of Pisa must have seemed an act of suicidal rashness. For the conqueror of the Balearic Islands with all her laurels fresh upon her who could dream of aught but victory?

The privilege of Gelasius was, as we have seen, given in September, 1118, and in the following spring the war began: "Incepta fuit guerra Pisanorum; et capti fuerunt Pisani in Gaulo cum magna pecunia, a galeis. xvi. Ianuensium, mense madii, M.C.XVIII²." Such is Caffaro's account of the matter, and by *Gaulo* he very probably means the river *Golo* in Corsica. From Pisan sources we learn that the ships which were captured were merchantmen returning from Sardinia³. There

¹ Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *Caffaro e i suoi tempi*, *op. cit.* pp. 144, 145; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 166, 167. In this connection, it may be interesting to note that the late Captain Mahan thus enumerates the four principal conditions affecting the sea-power of nations: (1) Geographical position, (2) Physical conformation, (3) Extent of territory, (4) Number of population. In all of these Pisa was at a disadvantage as compared with Genoa.

² *Annales Ianuenses* (edition Belgrano), p. 16.

³ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 221. Cf. Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 173.

seems to have been no declaration of war, and we may, perhaps, infer that the sixteen Genoese galleys had been despatched to Corsica to prevent the Pisans from seeking to take advantage of the papal concessions. The capture of the merchantmen, as they were peacefully returning homeward along their accustomed route¹, was an act of piracy, pure and simple.

In the following year (1120) the war assumed a different character. The Genoese (we are told) collected an army of 22,000 fighting men and appeared at the mouth of the Arno with 80 galleys, 35 *gatti*, 28 *golabii*, and four great transports carrying siege machinery "and every manner of instrument necessary for war²." These figures are, however, undoubtedly exaggerated; even in the days of her greatest splendour Genoa never sent forth such a fleet as that³. Nor is the rest of the narrative less open to suspicion. Having first imagined a quite impossible fleet, the good Caffaro next proceeds to inform us that the mere sight of it so terrified the Pisans that they forthwith abandoned their claim to Corsica and liberated the Genoese prisoners⁴. The question naturally arises: What prisoners? Thus far we have heard no word of any battle in which Genoese prisoners could have been taken. The chronicler, if he is not simply lying, must quite obviously have suppressed some material facts. Marangone, on the other hand, tells us that, in the year 1120 (Pisan style: corresponding to the year 1119 of our reckoning), "on the festival of S. Sisto, the Pisans defeated

¹ Compare the route of the Pisan fleet on its way to the Balearic Islands. P. 63 *supra*.

² *Annales Ianuenses* (edition cited), p. 16. *Golabio* (*gorabio*, *currabo*, *carabo*, *golafro*) from the Arab *Ghorâb* (*corvus*), a small galley or galliot.

³ As we learn from the *Liber Maiolichinus*, a galley was propelled by 100 oars. Therefore 80 galleys would require 8000 rowers. *Gatti* being larger than galleys, we may probably take it that the 35 *gatti* would account for at least another 4000 rowers, and the 28 *golabii* for 1400 or 1500 more. We have still to provide crews for the four transports; and we shall, I think, be well within the mark if we put the grand total at 15,000 rowers, to say nothing of the 22,000 fighting men. Even at the end of the thirteenth century, when Genoa was undisputed mistress of the two Riviere, the greatest number of rowers she could provide was 12,000. See Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 173, n. 5, and compare the Tables published by R. W. Carden, *The City of Genoa*, *op. cit.* App. II, pp. 272-279.

⁴ *Annales Ianuenses* (edition cited), p. 17.

the Genoese at Porto Venere¹”; the appearance of the Genoese fleet *ad fauces Arni* he postpones to the Pisan year 1122. That date is no doubt wrong; but the rest of his narrative seems to be fairly trustworthy. From it we learn that the number of the Genoese galleys was not eighty, but twenty-eight; no mention is made of any *gatti* or *golabii*, and the Pisans, so far from accepting a humiliating peace, “*iverunt contra illos et pugnando eos vicerunt.*” Six galleys were taken and brought to Pisa “*cum magno triumpho,*” while the remainder only saved themselves by headlong flight.

The battle of Porto Venere satisfactorily accounts for the existence of Genoese prisoners, though it is extremely doubtful whether they obtained their liberty in the way that Caffaro says they did. When the Genoese fleet arrived at Bocca d’ Arno Calixtus II was in Pisa, and, in view of his subsequent conduct, it is highly improbable that he would have confirmed, as he did², the privilege of Gelasius II if the Pisans had been defeated almost under his very eyes. It is certain that he would not have done so had they themselves been willing, as Caffaro says they were, *de lite corsica pacem in voluntate Ianuensium iurare*. All the evidence tends to show that the Pisans were victorious both at Porto Venere and Bocca d’ Arno, and, in these circumstances, we can hardly wonder that the Genoese grew weary of the war and endeavoured to gain by corruption what they had ignominiously failed to achieve by force of arms. It might well be more easy to buy the Pope and his Curia than to fight the Pisans. In pursuit of this new policy Caffaro was sent to Rome to treat with his Holiness about the matter of Corsica.

The occasion was propitious, for the authority of Calixtus was not yet firmly established, and, when money was most needed, the Papal Treasury was empty. The Genoese promised to fill it if the Pope would consent to revoke the concessions which he had made to the Archbishop of Pisa. Calixtus seems to have jumped at the offer, and Caffaro and his colleague Barisone spared no pains to obtain the support of the Roman Curia. A contemporary document leaves no doubt as to the

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 8.

² Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 224.

methods employed. Cardinals, bishops, patricians, bankers were all bribed: "To Pietro, Bishop of Porto, 303 ounces of gold; to Pier di Leone 100 silver marks; to his wife an emerald: to Leone Frangipane 40 marks: to the Prefect of Rome 100 marks; to Stefano Normanno 25 marks," and so on, through a long list of illustrious names¹. This is doubtless the business which, in his annals, Caffaro boasts that *pro servitio civitatis sue honeste et sapienter tractavit*². On the 3rd January, 1121, Calixtus published a Bull, directed to the Bishops of Corsica, whereby he deprived the Archbishop of Pisa of every jurisdiction over them and decreed that from thenceforward they were to receive their consecration at the hands of the Pope³. Two years later, he endeavoured to throw a cloak of decency over this scandalous business by obtaining a ratification of his decree from the First Lateran Council. A special commission of twelve Archbishops and twelve Bishops was appointed to examine into the matter, and, although their decision was, of course, a foregone conclusion, all the outward forms of impartial justice were strictly observed. The sentence of the Commission was pronounced on the 5th April, 1123, in the presence of three hundred bishops, abbots and archbishops, by Gualtiero of Ravenna, a bitter personal enemy of the Archbishop of Pisa. In the name of his associates, he advised the Pope *ut archiepiscopus Pisanus, deinceps Corsicanas consecrationes dimittat, et ulterius de illis non se intromittat*. Caffaro, who was present as the representative of Genoa, thus describes the final scene: "When the Pope had heard this counsel, he arose and said: 'Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, Cardinals, doth this counsel please you all?' Whereupon they arose and said three times: '*placet, placet, placet.*' Then the Pope said: 'And I on behalf of God and the blessed Peter and myself approve and confirm it;

¹ The document still exists in the R. Arch. di Stato di Genova, *Materie Politiche, Trattati*, mazzo 1. It has been published by Belgrano in his edition of the *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 20, 21, and by Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* App. 22, pp. 387-390.

² *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 19, 20.

³ This Bull is published by Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* App. 20 pp. 380-383.

and to-morrow, in full council, with all of you I will a second time approve and confirm it.' Now, when he had heard these words, the Pisan Archbishop, who was sitting among the other Bishops, was exceeding wroth, and he cast his ring and mitre at the feet of the lord Pope and said: 'No longer will I be Bishop and Archbishop of thine.' But the Pope forthwith spurned the mitre away with his foot and said: 'Brother, ill hast thou done, and in good sooth I will cause thee to repent it¹.'" The Bull *Quot mutationes*, which was published on the following day, imposed perpetual silence on the Pisans touching the question of Corsica under pain of excommunication².

Meanwhile hostilities continued, and, according to Caffaro who is now our only contemporary authority, the Genoese were everywhere victorious. As a matter of fact, there was probably no great naval battle: the war had become a war of piratical excursions and chance encounters, and, every time that a Pisan prize was brought into the port of Genoa, Caffaro records it with unction. He is careful to say nothing about Pisan reprisals. Indeed, he denies that there were any: "Magnum enim ac mirabile fuit quod, in toto tempore guerre, Ianuenses semper de partibus Pisanorum galeas et naves, viros et pecuniam capiebant. Pisani vero, toto tempore guerre, in partes Ianuensium non venerunt, nisi cum galea una que in Provincia a Ianuensibus capta fuit³." Had there been a Pisan Caffaro, we should, doubtless, have heard a very different story. At the same time it is not impossible that upon the whole, Fortune favoured the Genoese. When we recall the fact that, between 1126 and 1128, the energies of Pisa were hampered and distracted by a land war with Lucca⁴, we shall hardly feel disposed to deny that she

¹ *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 19.

² Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* App. 21, pp. 384-387.

³ *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 24. Such exaggeration is too much for even the robust faith of the biographer and panegyrist of Caffaro. See Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* p. 174, and compare, for a critical examination of Caffaro's statements with regard to the war, Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 176-179.

⁴ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 234; Tommasi, *Sommario della Storia di Lucca* in *Arch. Stor. It.* x, 29. The siege of *Castrum de Aghinolfo* is also recorded by Ptolomaeus Lucensis, *ad ann.* 1128, though he says nothing of its having fallen into the hands of the Pisans (*Documenti di Storia Italiana* (Firenze, 1876), T. VI, p. 49).

may have suffered greater damage at the hands of the Genoese than she was able to inflict. Her prestige, however, was still undimmed and her commercial prosperity unimpaired. Enough to prove it are the terms of the treaty which she concluded with Amalfi, in 1126¹; while the fact that, in 1127, a large number of Pisan artificers were employed by the Milanese to build ships and wooden castles and mangonels for the siege of Como² is in itself sufficient evidence that the navies of Pisa were still capable of holding their own. That a nation whose fleets had been scattered and destroyed should be willing to diminish the personnel of its arsenals and dockyards is inconceivable. Neither should it be forgotten that, in the war with Lucca, Pisa received valuable assistance from her Archbishop Ruggero, a scion of the powerful Pisan family of the Upezzinghi. Anterior to his elevation to the Archbishopric of Pisa, Ruggero had been bishop of Volterra, and thenceforward he ruled the two dioceses contemporaneously. The Bishops of Volterra were great temporal princes, rich in fiefs and in immunities secured to them by a long series of Imperial diplomas³, and the feudatories whom Ruggero sent to the aid of the Pisans against Lucca constituted a by no means negligible body of fighting men⁴.

Moreover, the Papacy was no longer in the pay of Genoa.

¹ *Arch. Stor. It.* S. III, T. VIII, p. 1 *et seq.*: "Due Carte pisane-amalfitane."

² Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann.; *De bello Mediolanensium adversus Comenses* in *Rer. Ital. Script.* v, 452, vv. 1822-1831.

³ See A. F. Giachi, *Saggio di Ricerche Storiche sopra lo Stato Antico e Moderno di Volterra* (seconda edizione, 1887), P. II, cap. IV, p. 254 *et seq.*

⁴ It may be interesting to note in passing that this Ruggero is the same of whom it is recorded under the year 1127 that "a Sanensibus captus est Archiepiscopus Pisanus" (see Benvoglianti's notes to the *Cronica Sanese* apud Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* T. xv, col. 14). It would appear that, in order to take revenge for the part which the Siense Bishop, Gualfredo, had played in the matter of the Papal decision regarding Corsica, Ruggero leagued himself with Arezzo and Florence and invaded the territories of Siena at the head of his vassals. He was, however, taken prisoner and held captive for more than a year. See Volpe, *Istituzioni Comunali a Pisa*, *op. cit.* p. 12, and A. Lisini, Prefazione al *Costituto del Comune di Siena volgarizzato nel MCCCIX-MCCCX* (Siena, Tip. Lazzeri, 1903), vol. 1, p. vi. According to the *Cronica di Pisa* apud Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* xv, 975, Ruggero was taken prisoner a second time, in 1139 (*sic*), when he fell into the hands of the Lucchesi, but was almost immediately rescued by the Pisans.

After the death of Calixtus, Honorius II reinstated the archbishops of Pisa in all their rights over Corsica, declaring that they had been despoiled of them *sine praecedente ipsorum Pisanorum culpa et absque iudicio*¹. At the same time, he admonished the belligerents to make peace with one another and to turn their arms against the Saracens whose insolence was increased beyond measure by their dissensions².

The chagrin of Genoa was extreme; she had expended vast sums in corrupting Calixtus and his Curia³, and, for all that she had gained, she might as well have thrown them in the sea. The intervention of Honorius only served to fan the flames of war, and the year 1126 was, if we may credit Caffaro, marked by unusual activity on the part of the Genoese. They came "cum stolo" to the mouth of the Arno, where they landed in force, "et vexilla et tentoria in terra posuerunt, et bellum cum militibus et peditibus Pisanorum fecerunt"; they sacked Vada and Piombino, and, crossing over to Corsica, stormed "Castrum sancti Angeli," capturing three hundred Pisans who formed the garrison; "multaque alie victorie supra Pisanos in hoc anno facte fuerunt⁴." Verily, Honorius must have echoed the words of the Psalmist: "I labour for peace, but when I speak unto them thereof, they make them ready to battle." Nevertheless, the Genoese were, at heart, weary of a struggle which, whatever its vicissitudes, seemed likely to prove interminable, and when, after the death of Honorius, his successor interposed to put an end to the war, he found them no longer intractable.

According to Tronci, Innocent II owed his salvation to the good offices of the Pisans, who, when they heard how he was besieged by the partisans of Anacletus, "set in order certain galleys and went to Rome and drew him out of the hand of his enemies, together with all the Cardinals and Prelates of his obedience, and brought them prosperously to the City of Pisa, where they abode for many days⁵." From Pisa Innocent be-

¹ It is printed by Tronci, *op. cit.* pp. 61-65. The date is August, 1126.

² "...et debaccando in Christianos Saracenis multa crevit audacia."

³ See Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* p. 389 n., and compare App. 11, pp. 325-330.

⁴ *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 23.

⁵ Tronci, p. 66.

took himself to Genoa, and, before he left for France, he had prevailed upon the Genoese to agree to a suspension of hostilities until his return to Italy. In August, 1130, a truce was solemnly sworn by the representatives of both communes¹. Innocent had discovered a means of satisfying Genoa without humiliating Pisa.

Although, as we have seen, the privilege of Gelasius had been the immediate cause of the war, it was in reality little better than a pretext: the *invidia* of Genoa was no fiction of the Pisan chroniclers, and Honorius spoke the simple truth when he declared that "Ianuenses honori pisani populi invidientes et eorum incrementum aequo animo non ferentes, huius rei sumpta occasione, guerram contra Pisanos moverunt²." They envied them their influence in Sardinia; they envied them the glory of their victories over the Saracens, and, perhaps more than aught else, they envied them their archbishop. It was by promising to erect the See of Genoa into an archbishopric that Innocent bent them to his will.

It does not seem that the truce was scrupulously observed: Caffaro speaks of the capture of a Pisan galley off Cagliari, in 1132³; but that was the last flicker of an expiring flame. In October, Innocent, now recognized as the lawful Pope by the kings of France and England and by the Emperor Lothair, once more visited Pisa, and thither, at his bidding, came the representatives of Genoa. The truce became a peace, and, in March, 1133, a Bull was despatched from Grosseto to the Bishop of Genoa conferring upon him the dignity of Archbishop together with the Cross and the Pallium, and assigning to him as his suffragans the Bishops of Bobbio and of Brugnato on the mainland, with those of Mariana, Nebbio and S. Pietro d' Atto in Corsica. The other half of the island, containing the dioceses of Aiaccio, of Aleria and of Salona, was left to the Archbishop of Pisa; while, to the end that the political division might correspond to the ecclesiastical, the northern half of Corsica was

¹ *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 26.

² See the Bull of Honorius in Tronci, p. 62.

³ *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 26.

granted in feud to the Genoese and the southern half to the Pisans¹. At the same time the Primacy and the Legation of Sardinia were bestowed upon the Archbishop of Pisa, and his jurisdiction was extended over the diocese of Populonia². By a second Bull of equal date it was provided that all future dissensions between the rival cities should be submitted to a Court of Arbitration consisting of four Pisans and four Genoese, "wise and discreet men," who were to swear to uphold *honorem, salvamentum et bonas antiquas consuetudines tam Ianuensium quam Pisanorum*. The four Pisans were to be chosen by the Genoese and the four Genoese by the Pisans. The decision of the majority was to prevail. In the meantime, all the booty taken during the late war was to be restored, and that the peace might be perpetual it was to be renewed upon oath every twenty years³.

Some two months later, Pisan and Genoese galleys joined in attacking Civitavecchia, thus preparing the way for Innocent's return to Rome⁴; but the old jealousies still rankled, and ere the twenty years were ended, Genoa, "cum periurio nefandissimo," renewed the war. Innocent's Court of Arbitration was no more effectual to keep the rivals from flying at one another's throats than were the Hague Conventions to preserve the peace of Europe in our own day or than the "League of Nations" will be in those of our descendants. The only lasting results of the Papal intervention were of a very different character.

As yet, the two maritime Communes had allowed the main stream of Italian politics to sweep by them unheeded. Intent upon extending their commerce and securing *scali* and colonies at the further end of their trade-routes, they had held aloof from the great struggle between the Spiritual and Temporal Heads of Christendom, doing loyal service to both by ridding

¹ Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* App. 23, pp. 392-395; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 179.

² Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1132. Apparently, the Legation of Sardinia was already his. See Besta, *op. cit.* p. 84.

³ Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* App. 24, pp. 395, 396.

⁴ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann.; Gregorovius, *Storia della Città di Roma nel Medio Evo* (Roma, Società Editrice Nazionale, 1900), vol. II, lib. VIII, cap. III, p. 470; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 181.

the seas of the Saracens and guarding the coasts of Italy. Now, however, all this was changed: the infeudation of Corsica had made them vassals of the Church; by their origin they were vassals of the Empire, and they were soon to learn the impossibility of serving two masters. For the moment, all was well. Lothair and Innocent were in full accord, and fealty to the one was not inconsistent with fealty to the other; but when the perennial conflict was renewed, Pisa sided with the Empire and Genoa with the Papacy; political animosity was wedded to commercial rivalry, and the wars of Guelf and Ghibelline were waged on sea as well as land.

CHAPTER THE SEVENTH

THE WAR WITH THE NORMANS

NO sooner was the war with Genoa ended than the Moorish princes of Spain and Africa sought to tie the hands of the Pisans by treaties and concessions. In June, 1133, two galleys appeared at the mouth of the Arno bearing ambassadors from Abu-Ibn-Iusuf, Emir of Morocco, from the Emir of Flemcen and from the head of the tribe of the Beni Meimûm (the *Gaido Maimone* of the chronicles), lord of Almeria. With them a "pax" and confederation was entered into, whereby a vast stretch of African sea-board and the richest of the Spanish States were thrown open to Pisan commerce¹. In the following September, Innocent, finding himself insecure in Rome, where the partisans of Anacletus still occupied almost all the towers and fortresses of the city, once more took refuge in Pisa², and there, on the 30th May, 1134, a General Council was assembled: "Tertio Kalendas Iunii, celebratum et incoeptum est Concilium, domino et summo pontifice Innocentio papa praesidente, cum multitudine patriarcharum, archiepiscoporum, episcoporum, abbatum et sacerdotum, clericorum." Among the rest was St Bernard of Clairvaux. The Council of Pisa consolidated the power of Innocent; many recalcitrant bishops were deprived of their sees, and even Milan abandoned the cause of his adversary. The peaceful conquest of that city was the work of St Bernard and constitutes the greatest of his many triumphs. The welcome which he received at the hands of the citizens was, perhaps, the most splendid spectacle of the century. The whole popula-

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 8; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 241; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 194. Compare as to the tribe of the Beni Meimûm, Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 377-379, notes.

² St Bernard wrote to the Pisans: *Assumitur Pisa in locum Romae, et de cunctis nobilibus terrae ad apostolicae sedis culmen eligitur* (*Ep. cxxx*). Compare Roncioni, *ubi cit.* pp. 242, 243, and Tronci, *Annali*, ad ann.

tion, men, women and children in their thousands, issued forth from the gates to meet him and to do him reverence. They kissed his feet; they struggled for fragments of his habit; he scarcely escaped alive from their adoring violence. All Italy north of the Tiber acknowledged Innocent as the canonically elected Pope; only Rome, the Campagna and the Norman states of the south remained faithful to his rival¹. Personal friendship and policy alike bound the King of Sicily to Anacletus whose complacency had enabled him to assume the royal title with all the legality which an anti-pope could bestow². The overthrow of Roger was therefore a necessary preliminary to the deposition of Anacletus, and the aegis of the Papacy was extended over the revolted baronage.

Already in 1133, before Lothair and Innocent had withdrawn from Rome, Robert of Capua and Rainulf of Alife had come thither to implore their assistance against Roger, and the former had subsequently passed by sea to Pisa³. Jealous of the growing maritime power of Sicily, the Pisans lent a favourable ear to his petition, and, on the receipt of three thousand pounds of silver, undertook to equip a hundred ships by the following March. The Genoese also promised their co-operation; but they were either bought by the Norman king, or, as a letter of St Bernard's would lead us to suppose, had never had any real intention of taking part in the expedition, being rather minded to attack the territories of Pisa as soon as the departure of the Pisan galleys had left them defenceless. Thus the Genoese not only sent no ships themselves but also prevented the Pisans, who had got wind of their treachery, from sending anything like the number they had promised. Instead of a hundred galleys, a tiny fleet with two consuls and a thousand men was all the succour that

¹ Gregorovius, *op. cit.* vol. II, lib. VIII, c. III, pp. 471, 472; Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad annum.

² The royal style in the early years of the reign was *Sicilie Apulie et Calabrie rex*; the final form was *rex Sicilie ducatus Apulie et principatus Capue*. For all that concerns the conquests and administration of Roger II see the first two chapters of Miss E. Jamison's "The Norman Administration of Apulia and Capua," published in the *Papers of the British School at Rome*, vol. VI, p. 221 *seq.*

³ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann.

arrived in Neapolitan waters¹. Naples, indeed, beat off her assailants, but the Principality of Capua fell into the hands of Roger, while Robert was away at Pisa endeavouring to hasten the despatch of the long-expected fleet². What wonder if Marangone dismisses the whole matter in a single sentence: “Anno Domini MCXXXIII, in mense Septembris, incoepa est lis a Pisanis cum rege qui dicitur Rogerius.” All the vast expense incurred by Sergius of Naples and Robert of Capua had been incurred in vain. They had even pledged the ornaments of the churches to pay for the assistance of Genoa and Pisa.

Meanwhile Innocent despatched letter after letter to Lothair, beseeching him to come to the help of the Church. With the Pope was Robert of Capua who, after the loss of his Principality, had taken refuge in Pisa, where he spent his days in urging the citizens to carry out their obligations and to furnish him with the promised aid. Finally, his efforts were rewarded, and, in April, 1135, twenty Pisan galleys set out to sea and entered the Bay of Naples. Duke Sergius thereupon put himself at the head of the rebels; Aversa threw off the yoke of the oppressor and recalled her rightful lord, while the Pisans attacked the towns and castles on the shores of the bay. Roger, however, acted with his usual promptitude. On the 5th June he landed at Salerno, and, after sacking and burning Aversa, drove in the forces of Sergius and invested Naples. The approach of a powerful Norman fleet compelled the Pisans to retire, but no sooner had they been reinforced by the arrival of twenty-six more galleys than they attempted to create a diversion by attacking Amalfi. Nearly all the galleys of the Amalfitani were with the Norman fleet and their fighting men were with the army of Roger. The city lay at the mercy of the Pisans and was sacked and ruined in a single day: “Pridie nonas Augusti fuerunt Pisani cum xlvi galeis super Malfim, et ipsa die capta est, et cum septem galeis et duabus navibus, et cum aliis multis navibus combusta est, et prorsus expoliata est³.” In the version of the chronicle published by Muratori⁴ this statement is preceded by

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 186.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 9.

² Jamison, *op. cit.* p. 249.

⁴ *Rer. Italic. Script.* VI, 170.

the words: "De mandato Summi Pontificis," but we may be permitted to doubt whether, in fact, Papal injunctions had anything to do with the matter. Entirely apart from their desire to liberate Naples, the Pisans were, doubtless, only too ready to seize so favourable an opportunity of destroying the last remnants of the maritime power of ancient rivals who still enjoyed many exemptions and privileges in Eastern waters¹.

On the same day, the neighbouring Atrani was taken, and, on the following morning, the Pisans marched inland and, "divina favente clementia," stormed Scala, Ravello and other places. On the third day, however, while they were besieging Fratta, Roger suddenly swooped upon them from the mountains with seven thousand men and drove them to the sea in headlong rout. Many Pisans were slain in the battle and the remainder hurriedly took to their ships. If we may credit Marangone, a Norman fleet of sixty galleys, *gatti* and sailing vessels which had been lying in wait for them, did not dare to attack; but Alessandro di Telese tells a very different story. According to him the Pisans owed their salvation to the fact that the admiral of Roger, who had hastened to the rescue as soon as the news of the attack upon Amalfi reached him, did not arrive in time to intercept them and they thus succeeded in making good their escape to the port of Naples. It is, to say the least of it, difficult to believe that a fleet of sixty ships was afraid to give battle to a fleet of forty-six, manned with crews disheartened by recent defeat, and heavy with the pillage of Amalfi. A few days later, the Pisans once more succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Norman fleet, and, after devastating the Island of Ischia, rowed homewards, leaving Naples to its fate².

During the year 1136 a great league was organized by the Papacy for the destruction of Roger, and among the ambassadors sent to Germany were Robert of Capua and Richard the brother of Rainulf. Lothair agreed to descend into Italy and lead the invading armies in person; the Venetians and the Eastern Emperor, who viewed with alarm the increasing power

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 188.

² *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann.; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 188, 189.

of Roger in the Mediterranean¹, offered help, and the long promised *palii*² were at last sent from Constantinople to Pisa: "Pridie Idus Augusti, venerunt Imperatoris Constantinopolis nuntii, qui Pisis miserunt cc de palatio palia, et unum auro textum mirabile, qui altari dedicavit duo auri et argenti turibula pretiosissima³." It would seem, however, that Roger found no difficulty in detaching the Venetians from the league by the promise of valuable commercial advantages. "In a privilege of William II, of 1175, mention is made of another and earlier privilege granted to the Venetians by Roger, and, albeit the date of this earlier privilege is uncertain, it is," says Professor Manfroni, "highly probable that it should be referred to the year 1136. We may, therefore, regard it as representing the price paid for Venetian neutrality⁴." The assistance given by the Emperor John Comnenus was apparently limited to a large monetary subsidy, and the Pisans, in spite of the prayers of Duke Sergius who came in person to beseech them to move to the help of Naples, made no attempt to renew the war during the whole of 1136. This is accounted for by Muratori on the hypothesis of some secret emissary of King Roger in Pisa who paid them for their inaction⁵; but it is only fair to remember that, at this time, they were once more involved in hostilities with Lucca⁶, and the five ships loaded with provisions with which they furnished Robert of Capua for the relief of the beleaguered city may, in the circumstances, have represented all that they were able to do.

In September, Lothair arrived in Italy but met with so much opposition at the Chiusa d' Adige, at Guastalla, at Cremona,

¹ He was already master of Malta, and, after the departure of the Pisan fleet in September, 1135, he conquered the fertile island of Jerba in the Gulf of Gabes. See Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* III, 399, 400.

² See p. 55 *supra*.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 9; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 250; Müller, *Documenti*, *op. cit.* p. 415.

⁴ Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 190, 191, citing Tafel und Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig* (in the *Fontes rerum Austriacarum*), vol. I, p. 111, where the document is printed.

⁵ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann.: "Qualche segreto emissario dovea avere il Re Ruggieri in quella Città, che con regali distornò l' affare."

⁶ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 10; Tommasi, *Sommario della Storia di Lucca*, *op. cit.* p. 30.

at Pavia, and in other cities, that he was unable to move southward until the spring. He then advanced by the Adriatic route; Robert of Capua and Rainulf of Alife were already with him; Naples still held out, and no sooner had he invaded the territories of Roger than he was joined by all the old elements of disruption within the kingdom. Many of the counts of the northern and central regions, notably William of Loritello and Roger of Ariano, flocked to his standards¹, and, in June, a hundred Pisan galleys entered the Bay of Naples. Roger had abandoned the siege and withdrawn with his army to Sicily. Never were his fortunes at a lower ebb.

After taking Ischia and Sorrento, the Pisans fell a second time upon the luckless Amalfi, extorted an enormous ransom from the inhabitants and forced them to swear fealty to the Emperor and to Pisa. Atrani surrendered at discretion; Ravello was stormed "and for three days they wasted it, and they burned it with fire and the men and women thereof they led away captive to the sea." Scala also was sacked and Fratta, "and all the duchy of the Amalfitani was placed under tribute." The whole coast of Campania fell into the possession of the victors who, according to Professor Manfroni, had undoubtedly stipulated with the Emperor for a share of the territories they conquered. There is an old legend that Naples itself was held by the Pisans for seven years².

On the 24th July the Pisans presented themselves before Salerno which had been invested by the Imperial army since the 18th. Muratori, on the faith of the Saxon annalist³, asserts that the Pisan fleet had been reinforced by eighty Genoese and three hundred Amalfitan galleys⁴; but the statement is difficult to believe. As regards the Genoese, the silence of Caffaro, to say nothing of their previous and subsequent conduct, tends to prove that, in spite of the exhortations of St Bernard and of

¹ Jamison, *op. cit.* p. 251.

² *Arch. Stor. It.* T. VI. P. II, p. 11 n.: "...et totum Ducatum Malfitanorum sub tributo posuerunt et inde habuerunt Pisani Pandettam, et tenuerunt Neapolim per vii annos." Compare also the letter of St Bernard of Clairvaux to the Emperor Lothair. Dal Borgo, *Dissertazioni sopra l' Istoria Pisana*, Parte II, p. 192 n.

³ Annalista Saxo, *M.G.H.* VI, 774.

⁴ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad annum.

their promises to Robert of Capua, they still obstinately held aloof. Amalfi, after the treatment which she had so recently suffered at the hands of the Pisans, can hardly have been in a position to furnish thirty galleys and much less three hundred. The idea is little short of ridiculous¹. Moreover, neither Romoald nor Falco, nor any other Italian sources, speak of the Genoese or Amalfitani as taking part in the siege of Salerno. The Pisans were undoubtedly alone.

Beleaguered on every hand and "strongly besieged for fifteen days with mangonels and siege-castles and battering-rams," the Norman commandant finally entered into negotiations with a view to preserving the city from sack, and himself retired to the citadel. According to Marangone, the surrender was made "to Lothair and to the Pisans²." Be this as it may, the Pisans were dissatisfied. Either they had desired to pillage the city and were indignant that it had been admitted to terms, or they were corrupted by the promises of the Norman king, or they were irritated by the failure of the Emperor to send troops to their assistance when a great siege-tower that they had made was attacked and set on fire by the enemy. Whatever the cause of their displeasure, they broke off relations with Lothair and sent a galley to make separate terms with Roger. On their departure for Pisa, the rebels lost the command of the sea, and the great league so laboriously organized by Innocent suddenly crumbled into ruin. Within fifteen days the army of Lothair was in full retreat³.

¹ Even Professor Pasquale Villari, who follows Muratori so far as the Genoese are concerned, by omitting any mention of the Amalfitani, tacitly admits the absurdity of that part of the fable. See *L' Italia da Carlo Magno alla morte di Arrigo VII*, *op. cit.* p. 255.

² "...tandem eos intus civitatem incluserunt. Quae per quindecim dies fortiter obsessa cum manganis et castellis et gattis, tandem reddidit se imperatori Lothario et Pisanis."

³ The three main sources for this war are Falco Beneventanus, *Chronicon*, in *Rer. Ital. Script.* vol. v, and in *Cronisti e Scrittori Sincroni Napoletani* ed. Del Re (Napoli, 1845); Romoaldus Salernitanus, *Annales* in *M.G.H.* vol. xix; and Alexander Telesinus, *De rebus gestis Rogerii*, in *Rer. Ital. Script.* v, and in *Cronisti e Scrittori Sincroni Napoletani*, above cited. The *Ignoti Monachi Cisterciensis S. Mariae de Ferraria Chronica*, published by A. Gaudenzi (Napoli, 1888), may also be consulted. With the exception of Marangone, the Pisan chronicles throw very little light on the subject. The best modern narrative with which I am acquainted is that of Professor C. Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 185-193.

CHAPTER THE EIGHTH

INTO THE VORTEX

DURING the greater part of the twelfth century, Pisa was in a permanent state of war with Lucca; but, though the chroniclers of both cities record the vicissitudes of the struggle, it is by no means easy to arrive at a definite opinion with regard to anything but the general results. The most inaccurate of modern historians is relatively at the mercy of his material; in the Middle Ages the material lay at the mercy of the chronicler. If, however, the details of the conflict are confused and doubtful, the conditions which produced it are fairly obvious. We have already seen how, during the Longobard and Frankish periods, the diocese of Lucca had been enlarged at the expense of the diocese of Pisa¹. The prolonged dissensions which resulted reproduce, in many of their essential features, the earlier and more celebrated dissensions between the Bishops of Siena and Arezzo²; and even after questions of episcopal jurisdiction had developed into questions of communal sovereignty, the bishops did not abandon the contest. Indeed, the solidarity of their interests with those of their respective cities was so complete that, at first sight, it is difficult to discern whether the wars between Pisa and Lucca were, in fact, episcopal or communal wars³.

¹ See pp. 13, 14 *supra*.

² Pasqui, *Documenti per la Storia della Città di Arezzo nel Medio Evo* (Firenze, Vieusseux, 1899), vol. 1; Lusini, *I confini storici del Vescovado di Siena*, in the *Bullettino Senese di Storia Patria*, v, 333-357; vii, 59-82, 418-467; viii, 195-273. Some slight account of this quarrel will be found in F. Schevill, *Siena, The Story of a Mediaeval Commune* (New York, Scribner's Sons, 1909), p. 22 *seq.*, and in Langton Douglas, *A History of Siena* (London, 1902), p. 15 *seq.*

³ Compare the formula of the oath sworn to the Bishop of Lucca by the Pisan consuls in pursuance of the terms of the peace of 1181:

“Et relinquam Episcopo luc. etc. libere habere et possidere *episcopatum suum quod est in fortia mea et districtu meo* etc.; clericos suos corrigere et habere potestatem in iis etc. et possessiones suas et pensiones etc., et manentes

Until, by virtue of Imperial diplomas¹, the commune, in its corporate capacity, acquired a recognized position among the feudatories of the Empire, the co-operation of the bishop continued to be necessary in order to give validity to acts the legal performance of which would have been impossible for citizens under the feudal law. Thus, it was the bishop who received the submissions of the towns and villages of the *contado* and the oaths of vassalage of the seigniors, little and great, who, having felt the weight of Pisan arms, bowed their heads to become the "homines," not of the commune but of the bishop, undertaking at the same time, in the usual formula of the period, "to save and defend" the people of Pisa. It is true that the commune was represented in these transactions by a certain number of citizens—in the twelfth century they were generally the consuls—who signed their names as witnesses, consenting to or participating in the juridical act; but, if only *pro forma*, the bishop was the grantee².

Later on, however, questions of episcopal jurisdiction were gradually relegated to a position of secondary importance. The antagonism between Pisa and Lucca in the twelfth century was, in its essence, a commercial antagonism. The very limited river traffic of the Lucchesi, along the Serchio and in the port of Motrone, was not such as to produce a conflict of interests³. It was the larger question of the exclusion of the Pisans from so much of the foreign trade of Tuscany as was carried on by land which embroiled them with their neighbours. Situated on the great Via Francigena, Lucca was in a position to profit by *et fideles suos et albergarias habere et distringere sicut dominus suos fideles et manentes distringere debet. De jurisdictione vero et districtu, quam vel quem lucana civitas, vel lucenses Consules in lucana fortia vel districtu pisani episcopatus quoquo modo habent etc., neque guerram, neque discordiam faciam etc.*" A like oath was sworn by the Consuls of Lucca to the Archbishop of Pisa. See Volpe, *Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa, op. cit.* p. 9 n.

¹ See p. 7 *supra*.

² The commune was, in fact, for all practical purposes, the *cestuy que use*. See Santini, *Studi sull' antica costituzione del C. di Firenze*, in *Arch. Stor. It.* S. v, T. xvi, p. 25 *et seq.*, and, for a long list of towns and villages which the bishop thus acquired, Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 11.

³ "Homines qui introierint in fluvio Serculo vel in Motrone cum navi sive cum navibus causa negotiandi cum Lucensibus..." Dipl. of Henry IV to the Lucchesi, ann. 1081, cited by Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 150, n. 1.

the constant stream of traffic which flowed between the Ultramontane nations and the capital of the Catholic world¹, and, while her streets were thronged with merchants and pilgrims, Pisa stood as it were in a back-eddy. It is true that, not far from Viareggio, where the Via Francigena turned inland towards Lucca, it was joined by a branch road which led, through Pisa and the Maremma, to Rome; but that road, though somewhat shorter than the Via Francigena, was but little frequented, passing as it did through woods and marshes and exposed to all the dangers of the coast². Neither had Pisa any such attraction to offer as the *Volto Santo*; and what pilgrim journeying to Rome for his soul's health would willingly fail to visit so great a miracle as that³? The Lucchesi, however, so far from being content with their natural advantages, grudged the Pisans even the tenuous trickle of commerce which reached them by the branch road. The long war which began in 1143 was largely caused by their interference with the Via Francigena: "propter iniuriam de Castro Aghinolfi et de Strata Francorum et Arni⁴," and, when they momentarily got the upper hand, they forced the Pisans to agree that from thenceforward all ultramontane merchants who used the Via Francigena should come first to Lucca; only after they had paid import duties in that city were they to be permitted to transfer themselves to Pisa⁵. On the

¹ After traversing the Cisa pass and descending to Pontremoli in Lunigiana, the Via Francigena ran through Villafranca, Sarzana, Luni, Lucca, Altopascio, Certaldo, Poggibonsi, Staggia, Siena, Buonconvento, S. Quirico, Radicofani, Acquapendente, Bolsena, Montefiascone, Viterbo and Sutri, entering Rome by the Porta Castello. See Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, vol. v, pp. 715, 716.

² When Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, journeyed from Rome to Lyon between 1103 and 1104, he preferred to take the inland route, "non per breviorē sed per tutiorē viam usque ad securitatem." Volpe, p. 150, n. 3, citing Davidsohn, *Geschichte*, p. 285, n. 6. Of the care taken by the Pisans to maintain and repair the road through the Maremma we may judge from the *Breve Communis* of 1286, lib. iv, rubr. 17 (Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, 491).

³ For an excellent account of the legend and cult of the *Volto Santo*, see Mrs J. Ross, *The Story of Lucca*, *op. cit.* pp. 5-10.

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 11. See also Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 152, and authorities there cited.

⁵ De stradis vero sub nomine iuramenti ita precipimus videlicet ut omnes homines qui sunt ex hac parte Cisae permittantur venire Pisas per qualem-

other hand, Pisa held the mouths of the Serchio and the Arno; she monopolized the sea-borne trade of Tuscany, and levied import and export dues at her own good pleasure, to the manifest detriment of the product of the looms of Lucca on foreign markets¹. The aims and interests of the two cities were absolutely incompatible and clashed at every turn². Hence the stubbornness of the struggle about Fucecchio and on the Arno, where the Lucchesi were able to beset the road from Pisa to Florence—the main artery between Porto Pisano and the interior of Tuscany—and to obstruct the navigation of the river to the advantage of the port which Lucca possessed upon the Arno³. Hence too the complicated and varied policy of the rival cities towards the feudatories of the Lunigiana and Garfagnana; a policy which, in its details, is about as confused and perplexing as it is possible to imagine, though in its general purpose it is simple enough. The multitude of petty seigniors who, from their strong fortresses of Corvara, Vallechia, Montemagno, Aghinolfi and the rest, swooped hawklike upon the Via Francigena to levy *pedagium* and *maltollectum* on passing merchants⁴, were so many pawns in the great game that was being played between Lucca and Pisa. Now conquered, now lured by blandishments, they submitted first to the one commune,

cumque partem antiquitus fuerunt soliti venire; et haec antiqua consuetudo cognoscatur per tres homines de episcopatu lunensi ex concordia electorum utriusque partis ad hoc vocatos. Lombardi omnes ex hac parte Seusae veniant per Lucam libere ad pisanam civitatem cum rebus suis si ipsi Lombardi voluerint. *Franceschi et Tedeschi et omnes ultramontani veniant prius Lucam quando veniunt de terra sua et solvant ibi suas merces sine fraude infra octo dies. Post octo dies permittantur venire Pisas sine impedimento personarum et suarum rerum.* De strada vero Arni precipimus sub nomine iuramenti ut quicumque voluerit ire Pisas et per aquam et per terram non impediatur. Bonaini, *Dipl. pis.* p. 30, Doc. xv. B.

¹ As to the manufacture of silks in Lucca at an early period, see Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 222.

² See the whole of the treaty cited on p. 91, n. 5 *supra*. The date given by Bonaini is 1158, but Professor Volpe (p. 160), n. 1, corrects it to 1155 on the authority of Davidsohn, *Forschungen*, p. 99.

³ The diploma granted by Frederick I to the Bishop of Lucca, in 1164, recognizes the dominion of the Lucchesi "in aquis seu in portu de Arno." Stumpf, *Acta Imperii ined.*, p. 199, cited by Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 150.

⁴ Compare my *The "Ensamplers" of Fra Filippo* (Siena, Torrini, 1901), p. 143.

then to the other, only to revolt on the morrow of their submissions; but the value of their friendship was enhanced a hundredfold when the Genoese, firmly established in Porto Venere, strategically the most important harbour on all the Ligurian coast, were able to join hands with Lucca against the common enemy. Then the mountains of the Lunigiana, of Garfagnana and of Versiglia became a true debateable land, rich in diplomatic intrigues, and important for the equilibrium of a vast region¹. Moreover, inasmuch as the war between Pisa and Lucca could not be segregated and fought out in a cockpit, it soon became confused and mingled with other wars of other cities. Maritime Pisa was irremediably sucked into the vortex of continental politics; and, because a proper appreciation of this fact is essential to any real understanding of her subsequent history, I shall make no apology for dealing briefly with the general conditions of Tuscany at this period.

In the first quarter of the twelfth century, the lesser aristocracy, the *Lombardi* and *Cattani* of the rural towns and villages, had already begun to submit themselves to the cities; but the power of the feudatories of the Empire was still unbroken, and the great houses of the Guidi, the Alberti and the Aldobrandeschi were able to treat on terms of equality with the infant communes. Of the three, the most formidable were, perhaps, the Aldobrandeschi, who are said to have possessed more fortified places than there are days in the year². Their *Contea* included all the modern Sienese Maremma, with most of Monte Amiata and its valleys. Grosseto was theirs and Campagnatico, and many another town and village as far northward as Cecina, Radicondoli, Belforte and Monteguidi. Even in the Trecento, after they had been broken in turn by Orvieto and by Siena³, they continued to maintain much of their pristine

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 151. Compare chap. XIII *infra*.

² *Gli Assempri di Fra Filippo da Siena* (edizione Carpellini, Siena, 1864), cap. 34, p. 116: "...si diceva che solevano avere più castella che non sono di nell' anno."

³ See Berlinghieri, *Notizie degli Aldobrandeschi*, Siena, O. Porri, 1842; Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, App. cap. XII, pp. 55-63; Aquarone, *Dante in Siena* (Città di Castello, Lapi, 1889), p. 95 *et seq.*; Rondoni, "Orvieto nel

independence and were still a source of danger to the communes¹. Almost if not quite as powerful as the Aldobrandeschi were the Guidi, who, in addition to extensive dominions in the Fiesolan-Florentine territory, possessed numerous fiefs in the Tuscan Romagna, in the *contadi* of Bologna, Faenza, Forlì and Ravenna, and in a great part of the Casentino of Arezzo. Speaking of one of them, Count Guido the Old, the Florentine Sanzanome does not hesitate to declare that *per se quasi civitas est et provincia*². They were bound by ties of blood to the ancient Margraves of Tuscany, and it was from their house that the Countess Matilda chose her adoptive son, the Count Guido Guerra. The Alberti ruled in Prato, and from it they took their title of the Alberti of Prato; they possessed lands and villages in the Val di Bisenzio, the Val d' Elsa, the Val di Pesa and the Val di Greve; their castles studded the western confines of the ancient Florentine *contado* and diocese, and they shared with other branches of their family considerable feuds in the Bolognese, the Volterrano and the Maremma Massetana. We find them associated with the Guidi in Pistoia and with the Aldobrandeschi in Colle di Val d' Elsa³.

So long as the Countess Matilda lived, the Guidi were careful to maintain friendly relations with Florence⁴; Siena had as yet made no definite movement towards the Maremma⁵, and

Medio Evo," in *Arch. Stor. It.* T. xviii (1886); Fumi, *Codice Dipl. di Orvieto*, *op. cit.* The best English account of the Aldobrandeschi with which I am acquainted is to be found in E. Hutton, *In Unknown Tuscany* (1909), chap. x.

¹ Enough to prove it the despairing cry of the poet to "German Albert" (*Purgatorio*, VI, 109-111):

Vien' crudel vieni, e vedi la pressura
De' tuoi gentili, e cura lor magagne
E vedrai Santafor com' è sicura.

See also my *A History of Perugia*, in Index, s.v. "Aldobrandeschi."

² Sanzanome, *Gesta Florentinorum* (Florentine edition), p. 129.

³ Santini, *Studi sull' antica costituzione del C. di Firenze, Contado e politica esteriore del Sec. XII* (Estratto dall' *Arch. Stor. Italiano*, S. v, T. xxv, xxvi, anno 1900), pp. 9-11, and the map at the end of the volume. See also Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, App. cap. VII and x.

⁴ Santini, *op. cit.* p. 23.

⁵ Both the Val d' Orcia and the Val di Merse were outside the Siense *contado* which, though long, was narrow, and, in the direction of the Maremma, scarcely passed the point where the Arbia joins the Ombrone. Berlinghieri, *op. cit.* p. 14.

it was not until 1160 that the Aldobrandeschi were brought into conflict with Pisa owing to the seizure of certain ships by retainers of the Count Ildebrandino¹. The Alberti, however, were early embroiled with the Florentines, who, favoured it would seem by Matilda, sought to exercise jurisdiction over a part of their territories. Their resentment was naturally great, and, when the quarrel between the Church and the Empire divided Tuscany into two hostile camps, the Alberti, together with the Pisans, espoused the cause of the Emperor². As a result, the Florentines attacked and "destroyed" Prato in the summer of 1107³, their success, no doubt, being largely due to the presence of Matilda in the besieging army⁴. During this war, if we may credit Marangone, the Pisans routed the Lucchesi in three pitched battles, and recovered the castle of Ripafratta in the Val di Serchio⁵. A little later, when Henry V was preparing to descend into Italy, the Alberti once more took up arms, but were defeated by the Florentines in the Val di Pesa on the 26th of May, 1110⁶. In 1113, however, Gottifredo, one of the sons of Count Alberto, became Bishop of Florence, and, thereafter, for more than two decades, the relations between the Alberti and the commune remained comparatively friendly⁷. At the bidding of the Emperor, Pisa had made peace with Lucca, in 1110⁸, and ere long all her energies were absorbed in the prosecution of the Balearic expedition⁹. Until the death of Matilda, in 1115, Tuscany enjoyed a brief period of repose.

Already sufficiently violent, the controversy between the Pope and the Emperor was embittered a hundredfold by the testament of the Great Countess, who, on the 17th of November,

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 23, 24.

² Santini, *op. cit.* p. 17.

³ G. Villani, lib. IV, cap. 26.

⁴ "Dum in Dei nomine Domina inclita Comitissa 'Matilda, Ducatrix, stante ea in obsedione Prati, etc. Anno 1107." See Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc.*, *op. cit.* 1, 92; Napier, *Florentine History*, 1, 95.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 7, and compare p. 66 *supra*.

⁶ Santini, *op. cit.* p. 18. The Alberti are not mentioned by name: *Florentini iuxta Pesa Comites vicerunt*. Cf. Villari, *op. cit.* 1, 92.

⁷ Santini, *op. cit.* pp. 21, 22.

⁸ Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* VI, 168; *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1111. The chronicle of Marangone, *ubi cit.*, places this event in the Pisan year 1107.

⁹ See chap. V, *supra*.

1102, at Canossa, bequeathed the whole of her vast territories to the Church. The donation was, on the face of it, illegal. Whatever right Matilda may have had to dispose of her allodial property, she can have had none to dispose of her hereditary fiefs. Those she held of the Empire, and, on her decease without issue, to the Empire they escheated. The Pope, however, laid claim to the unconditional possession of the whole inheritance, while the Emperor, who, as the nearest kinsman of the deceased, believed himself entitled to the allodial property as well as the feudal, promptly declared the act of donation null and void. Crossing the Alps, in 1116, he took possession of the whole of the disputed territories. Insecure even in Rome itself, Paschal II was in no position to assert his pretensions by force of arms, and, on the approach of his enemy, fled to Montecassino and thence to Benevento. On the throne of St Peter Henry established his creature, the Anti-pope Burdino (Gregory VIII).

The rebellion of Matilda against her suzerain was a lesson not to be easily forgotten, and, to the end that no future marquis should be able to follow in her footsteps, it was resolved to divest the office of its hereditary quality. Tuscany became directly dependent upon the Empire and was governed by a succession of Imperial Vicars who, although they retained the title of marquis, seem to have been removable at the pleasure of their master. The first of these was a certain *Rabodo* "ex largitione Imperatoris Marchio Tusciae¹." He established himself at S. Miniato al Tedesco, thenceforward the centre of Imperial administration in Tuscany, and, putting himself at the head of the feudal nobility of the province, formed a German party, the members of which are frequently spoken of in the documents of the period under the generic name of *Teutonici*². They were naturally unwilling to recognize the large jurisdictional authority which had been exercised by Florence with the connivance of Matilda; and the Florentines prepared to defend their usurpations by force of arms. When, in 1119, Rabodo

¹ Santini, *op. cit.* p. 26; Villari, *op. cit.* I, 102.

² Villari, *op. cit.* I, 97.

occupied Montecascoli in the Val d' Arno¹, they forthwith took the field. The castle was stormed and the marquis, who seems to have conducted the defence in person, lost his life in the fight². He was succeeded by a certain Conrad, who may, according to Professor Santini, have been a member of the house of Scheiern. The new marquis was accompanied from Germany by a mere handful of troops, and we learn from the documents of the period that he sought to ingratiate himself with such of the cities as had shown imperial leanings, and, by the confirmation of ancient privileges and the concession of new favours, to conciliate the feudatories, both ecclesiastical and lay. He succeeded in collecting an army at the head of which he passed through the territories subject to his jurisdiction, *pro iustitia facienda*³. Among his adherents were the Guidi who, now that the commune could no longer shelter itself beneath the aegis of Matilda, were resolved not to submit to Florentine insolence and aggression. They took advantage of the friendship of the marquis to put their fiefs in a better condition of defence, and, at Empoli, for example, where their confines marched with those of the Alberti, they compelled the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages to take up their residence about the *pieve* of S. Andrea, and to fortify the new town with walls and towers⁴. In October, 1120, Conrad laid siege to Pontormo⁵, a feud of the Alberti, on the left bank of the Arno, and, six months later, we find him encamped in the Val di Pesa. So far as we know, the Florentines made no effort to come to the help of their allies; but in the following year the improved relations between the Empire and the Papacy seem to have had their natural reaction in Tuscany.

After the elevation of Calixtus II to the throne of St Peter (1119) the fortunes of Burdino rapidly declined, and, though Conrad, in obedience to the orders of his master, still con-

¹ See Repetti, *Dizionario*, I, 507, Art. *Cascioli (Monte)*.

² Villari, *I primi due secoli*, *op. cit.* I, 102. Villani (lib. IV, c. 29) recounts the siege of Montecascoli under the year 1113.

³ Santini, *op. cit.* p. 28.

⁴ Santini, *ubi cit.*; Repetti, *Dizionario*, II, 57.

⁵ See Repetti, *Dizionario*, IV, 511, Art. *Pontormo*.

tinued to uphold the cause of the Antipope, even such staunchly imperial cities as Pisa and Lucca hastened to acknowledge the canonically elected pontiff. When Burdino fell into the hands of his enemies at Sutri, on the 22nd of April, 1121, all Italy was already on the side of Calixtus. Henry himself was obliged to come to terms, and the quarrel over Investitures was ended on the 23rd of September, 1122, by the Concordat of Worms which reconciled the Empire and the Papacy on a basis of mutual concessions. A month later, on the 24th of October, the archpriest and provost of the Cathedral Chapter of Florence appeared before the Marquis Conrad, then in the Florentine *contado*, to demand justice against a certain Bonifacio di Tegrino, who had occupied their *corte* of Campiano. Judgment was given in favour of the canons; and the fact that the Florentine Church, still ruled by Gottifredo degli Alberti, was willing to plead before such a tribunal would seem to prove that, after the Concordat of Worms, the city, the bishop and the Counts Alberti composed their differences with the marquis and recognized his jurisdiction in Tuscany as legitimate.

The Guidi, however, who still stood high in the favour of the marquis, continued on ill terms with Florence, and it is by no means improbable that the destruction of Fiesole was due to a well-founded suspicion that they were plotting to occupy the place¹. The *rocca* was already garrisoned by certain *cattani* with a following of bandits and outlaws², and once in possession of that lofty vantage ground, the Guidi might have dictated terms to the upstart city in the plain beneath. They possessed numerous feuds to the east of Fiesole, and it was certain that the Fiesolani themselves would be only too ready to take an active part in humbling a neighbour whose yoke they detested. The Florentines therefore resolved to strike the first blow, and, when the marquis was temporarily absent from Tuscany and Count Guido was engaged in military operations in the Romagna, they laid siege to Fiesole and reduced it by famine (1125). The massive Etruscan walls³, which the men of that day believed to

¹ Santini, *op. cit.* pp. 30-32.

² Villani, lib. iv, c. 32.

³ Dennis, *The Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria* ("Everyman's Library" edition), II, 107.

have been built of old time by the hands of giants¹, were razed to the ground, and it was decreed that never from thenceforward should a fortress be builded on Fiesole. According to Sanzanome, the siege lasted for three years; and, before it was ended, the Count Guido had passed away, possibly killed in the war in Romagna (1124). He left only minor children, and, during the rule of his widow Imellia, the enmity of the Guidi ceased to be a source of danger to the commune².

Meanwhile, between 1126 and 1127, Pisa was at war with Lucca³; Siena, already embroiled with Arezzo over ancient questions of episcopal jurisdiction⁴, endeavoured to extend her dominion to the northward and so came into conflict with Florence. Ruggero degli Upezzinghi, Archbishop of Pisa and Bishop of Volterra, leagued himself with the Bishop of Arezzo and invaded the territories of Siena, only to be defeated and made prisoner⁵; but the victory remained with the Florentines, who recovered the *castello* of Vignale in the Val d' Elsa as well as other places which had been taken and fortified by the Siennese (1129)⁶. In 1131, on the eve of the Emperor Lothair's descent into Italy, we find that a certain Rempotto had succeeded to Conrad in the Marquisate of Tuscany. Deprived of its hereditary character, the office had however rapidly lost credit, and Rempotto appears to have been a mere figure-head, without influence or authority⁷.

On the death of Henry V, in 1125, the electors had passed over the claims of Frederick of Hohenstaufen, Duke of Suabia⁸,

¹ "Erat enim super asperum montem sita et undique circumdata muris et saxis ultra modum appositis in eisdem, cuius opifices, cum in cor hominis ascendere non posset magisterium, dicuntur fabulose fuisse gigantes."

² Sanzanome, *Gesta Florentinorum* (edition cited), pp. 126-128; Villani, IV, 32; Santini, *op. cit.* pp. 30-32; Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc., op. cit.* I, 103.

³ See p. 76 *supra*.


⁴ Pasqui, *Documenti per la Storia della Città di Arezzo, op. cit.* I, 569.

⁵ *Annales Sen.* in *M.G.S.* XIX, p. 225, and see p. 77, n. 4 *supra*.

⁶ Santini, *op. cit.* p. 34.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 35.

⁸ The father of Frederick Barbarossa:




and had chosen in his stead Lothair of Supplinburg, Duke of Saxony. War followed; but, by the marriage of his daughter Gertrude to Henry the Proud, a grandson of that Guelf whom Henry V had made Duke of Bavaria, Lothair procured a powerful ally. His cause was also espoused by Honorius II, who succeeded Calixtus in 1124, and by Innocent II, who succeeded Honorius in 1130. The election of the Antipope Anacletus by a faction of the Roman nobility had driven Innocent to take refuge in France¹; and, when the Lombard communes, the Hohenstaufen and the Normans declared for his rival, he and Lothair found themselves confronted by the same enemies. The bases of an accord between the Empire and the Church were established at Liége and at Roncaglia. Lothair promised to expel Anacletus and to make war upon the Normans; Innocent abandoned the right of investiture with ring and crozier, and the allodial possessions of the Countess Matilda were granted to the emperor's son-in-law, Duke Henry of Bavaria, who was to do homage for them to the Church. Henry was, however, still in Germany, where he was fully occupied with the war against the Hohenstaufen, and, in 1135, he sent, as his lieutenant, a certain Engelbert or Ingilbert. Engelbert reached Pisa while the Council was in session², and there he was solemnly invested by Innocent with the Marquisate of Tuscany³.

The termination of the controversy concerning the inheritance of Matilda probably created no apprehensions in Pisa; her interests were still mainly maritime and she stood high in the favour both of Pope and Emperor. For the other cities, and for Florence in particular, the situation was full of peril. Since the strong hand of Matilda had been removed, they had been able, like Aesop's fox, to help themselves to the carcass, while the lion and the bear were fighting for it. Now, however, the lion and the bear were reconciled, and if Henry of Bavaria succeeded in establishing an hereditary sovereignty in the Tuscan Mark, the days of communal expansion would be over. The future of Tuscany would lie with the feudatories, not with the


¹ P. 79 *supra*.

² P. 82 *supra*.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 9.



PALAZZO GAMBACORTI



PALAZZO DELL' OROLOGIO IN PIAZZA DI CAVALIERI

cities. It is therefore hardly to be wondered at if Engelbert almost immediately found himself involved in disputes with Florence and with Lucca, while, at the same time, his cause was warmly espoused by Bishop Gottifredo and the Alberti¹. The immediate ground of their defection may, perhaps, have been the destruction of Montebuono in the Val di Greve, which, according to Giovanni Villani, was besieged by the Florentines in June—the month in which Engelbert received investiture at the Council of Pisa. Montebuono was an episcopal feud and was held by the Buondelmonti as vassals of the bishop². A similar fate befel Montegufoni, a feud of the Alberti³; and, since their friendship with Florence had never been anything more than a friendship of expediency, it is not surprising that it failed to survive so harsh a strain.

A little later we find Engelbert engaged in hostilities with Lucca for the possession of Fucecchio. The Bishop of Lucca had long enjoyed vested rights in that town⁴; but it seems, at this time, to have been under the civil jurisdiction of the commune, and, when Engelbert laid claim to it in the name of the marquisate, the Lucchesi forthwith took up arms. He sustained a severe defeat at their hands and came to Pisa to beseech assistance. “Ut eum auxiliarentur lacrimas multas effudit,” says Marangone. The Lucchesi in their turn were routed by the Pisans; but they seem to have retained their hold upon Fucecchio⁵.

In 1136 Lothair returned to Italy at the head of a great army, and with him came the Duke of Bavaria, prepared to assume the Marquisate of Tuscany in his proper person, and to complete the work which had been begun by his lieutenant. On the 6th of November, at Roncaglia, by the advice of the

¹ See p. 95 *supra*.

² Villani, iv, 36. On the authority of the *Annales Flor.*, in Hartwig, Professor Santini (*op. cit.* p. 38) gives the date of the destruction of Montebuono as October, 1135. If this be correct, the action of the Florentines was the result and not the cause of the defection of Gottifredo and of the Alberti.

³ Sanzanome, *Gesta Florentinorum*, p. 128. Montegufoni is situated upon a little hill between the Pesa and the Virginio. See Repetti, *Diz.* III, 403.

⁴ Repetti, *Dizionario*, II, 351.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 10; Santini, *op. cit.* p. 41.

archbishops, bishops, dukes, marquises, counts palatine and other nobles there assembled, the Emperor promulgated his celebrated *Constitutio de feudorum distractione*¹, whereby every alienation of fiefs made by vassals without the consent of their lords was declared *ipso facto* null and void. A heavy blow was thus struck at the cities which, by assuming the protection of the lesser feudatories against the greater had induced them to transfer their allegiance to the communes, and had forced both the one and the other to recognize the jurisdiction of the civic magistrates within their dominions.

After the restoration of the imperial authority in Lombardy, Lothair divided his army into two parts. With one of these he passed along the Adriatic route to the war with the Normans². The other, under the command of Duke Henry of Bavaria, marched upon Tuscany. On entering the Mugello, he was opposed by the young Count Guido Guerra, son of that other Guido who died, as we have seen, in 1124. For some reason unknown to us, Guido Guerra had been on ill terms with Engelbert, but the destruction of three of his castles quickly induced him to make submission, and, during the rest of the campaign, we find the count and his retainers in the Imperial army. Florence was next attacked, and Bishop Gottifredo, who had been driven into exile by the citizens, was reinstated in his see. Pistoia offered no resistance, and, after taking S. Genesio and Fucecchio, Henry advanced upon Lucca. The Lucchesi, thereupon, purchased their pardon with a large sum of money, and, in spite of the intrigues of the Pisans, were admitted to the grace of their suzerain. All Tuscany was reduced to obedience³.

In December, 1137, Lothair died on his way back to Germany, and, among the candidates for the vacant throne was Duke Henry of Bavaria. The alarm of the Tuscan cities was naturally great. As king and emperor, Henry would inevitably have found means to convert the marquisate into an hereditary appanage of the royal house, and the fate of the communes would have been an evil one. Forgetful of all lesser jealousies,

¹ *M.G.S.*, T. IV (*Legum*, T. II), p. 83.

² See p. 87 *supra*.

³ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1137; Santini, *op. cit.* pp. 39-41.

the Consuls of Pisa, Lucca and Florence assembled at Borgo S. Genesio to concert measures for the common defence¹. Fortunately, however, Henry's claims were ignored by the electors, and Lothair was succeeded by Conrad of Hohenstaufen, Duke of Franconia. Civil war ensued between Henry and the new emperor; and for nearly two years the Tuscan cities were able to follow their own devices. Indeed, it would seem that, when Henry went northward, he left no vicar behind him. His old lieutenant Engelbert had certainly relinquished the office. In the following May we find him in the retinue of Conrad².

The new Emperor took up the same position with regard to the inheritance of Matilda as had been maintained by Henry V. Tuscany was an imperial fief; the rebellion of the Duke of Bavaria had worked a forfeiture; the marquisate had escheated to the empire. It was resolved to revert to the old plan of governing the province through the agency of officials directly responsible to the crown and removable at the will of the sovereign. In 1139 Ulric of Altems was sent from Germany to reassume the marquisate. His coming was welcomed by the principal cities. They had, as we have seen, combined together at S. Genesio to oppose the Duke of Bavaria, and though Henry was now dead, the pretensions of his house to the crown of Germany and to the inheritance of Matilda were not abandoned. There was, therefore, good reason to hope that both the Emperor and the new marquis would be too anxious to secure the support of the communes to interfere with the jurisdictional rights of the civic magistrates in their respective *contadi*. Nor did the event belie these expectations. After confirming ancient privileges and conferring new ones in Lucca and in Pisa, Ulric entered Florence in August. He was received with enthusiasm by the consuls; Bishop Gottifredo did homage to his authority, and, under his auspices, the Alberti were altogether reconciled to the commune³. The Florentines naturally endeavoured to make capital out of so fortunate a conjunction of circumstances, and hastened to take vigorous steps for the final subjugation of

¹ Santini, *op. cit.* p. 42.

² *Ibid.* p. 43, citing Ficker, *Forschungen*, etc. III, 310.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 45, 46.

the whole of their *contàdo*. Unfortunately, however, the boundaries of the *contadi* had not as yet been authoritatively delimited¹.

Broadly speaking, the extension of the *comitatus* was identical with that of the *episcopatus*²; but in many cases episcopal claims were as much in conflict as were those of the communes themselves, and between the acknowledged territory of each city and the acknowledged territory of its neighbour there generally lay a strip of country which formed a veritable debatable land, fruitful of interminable disputes and bloodshed. In such circumstances, it is clear that, if the marquis was to govern at all, he must adjudicate upon conflicting claims, and, since he had no sufficient army of his own with which to enforce obedience, he must either submit to see his decisions flouted and set at naught, or he must put himself at the head of the levies of the city whose claims he favoured and enforce them *vi et armis* against the city whose claims he disallowed. In other words, he must either be content to be a ruler in name only, or he must become the partisan and perhaps the puppet of a particular commune. He chose the latter alternative, and in 1141 he allied himself with Florence against Siena.

The cause of the quarrel was the gradual advance of the Sienese in the Val d'Elsa; and, when they reached Marturà (Poggibonsi) and prepared to annex it, the Florentines took the field. Here as elsewhere ecclesiastical and civil claims were inextricably mingled; for though the Church of S. Agnese in Mortennano had been subject to the Bishops of Siena since the eleventh century, their jurisdiction had always been disputed by

¹ A comparatively modern example of a similar state of things which will at once occur to the English reader is to be found in the dispute concerning the Abbey of Sadingfeldt on the edge of the Calais Pale. (See Froude, *Edward VI*, p. 184, "Everyman's Library" edition.) Curious results sometimes ensued. Thus, as late as the fifteenth century, when after the sale of Borgo S. Sepolcro to the Florentines, officials were sent by the Pope and by the commune to delimit the new frontiers, their labours resulted in the birth of the little republic of Cospaia. Instructed to follow the course of the torrent Rio, one party followed the northern branch, the other the southern; and the Cospaiesi, finding themselves included in neither territory, proclaimed themselves free. Their insignificance protected them, and only in the nineteenth century did they finally lose their autonomy. See F. Natali, *Le Stato libero di Cospaia* (1440-1826), Umbertide, Tip. Tiberino, 1892.

² Santini, *op. cit.* pp. 4, 5.

the Bishops of Florence¹. Marturi itself was a feudal possession of the Guidi, who seem to have connived at the action of the Sienese. Probably, Bishop Gottifredo had but little difficulty in persuading the marquis to support his pretensions; and, when the Florentines marched against Siena, Ulric of Altems went with them; "and, coming even unto the gates of the city, they set fire to the suburbs and burned a great part thereof²." The Sienese, who were already leagued with the Guidi, besought assistance from the Lucchesi, and the Florentines, in their turn, allied themselves with the Pisans. All Tuscany blazed out into war. On the one side were Pisa, Florence, Prato and the Counts Alberti; on the other, Siena, Pistoia, Lucca and the Count Guido Guerra, assisted by feudal levies from Lombardy, Romagna and the March of Ancona. "Ex omni parte Lombardie, Tuscie, Marchie et Romaniole milites congregavit," says Sanzanome³. The Pisan Archbishop Balduino, a large part of whose diocese in the Val d' Era was still in the hands of the Lucchesi, did everything in his power to promote the war, and after his death, in 1145, he was seen in a vision by a Sardinian priest, unable to escape from purgatory, "quoniam propter ipsum inter pisanos atque lucenses populos diuturna jam guerra versatur⁴." Many were slaughtered on either side and many taken prisoner. Several years afterwards Otto of Frisingen saw the Lucchese captives "wasted, squalid and miserable in the dungeons of Pisa, drawing tears of compassion from the eyes of every passing stranger⁵." The marquis was helpless in the face of the conflagration he had helped to kindle; nobody obeyed him or indeed paid any kind of attention to him, and ere long he left Tuscany⁶. Both the Pope and the Emperor

¹ See Repetti, *Dizionario*, I, 58, Art. "Agnese (S.) in Chianti"; Pecci, *Storia del Vescovado della Città di Siena*, p. 190; Santini, *op. cit.* p. 47, citing Lami, *Memorab. Eccl. Flor.* IV, p. 8.

² Tommasi, *Historie di Siena*, Parte I, p. 133; Villari, *op. cit.* I, 120; Santini, *op. cit.* p. 47.

³ Sanzanome, *Gesta Florentinorum* (edition cited), p. 130.

⁴ Ughelli, *Italia Sacra*, III, 392. For the details of the war, see Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 11-13, and Roncioni, *ubi cit.*

⁵ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1144; Napier, *Florentine History*, I, 107.

⁶ We know that he was in Germany in 1146, in 1149 and in 1151. He is, however, spoken of in the documents as *Marchio Tusciae* up to the last mentioned date. See Santini, *op. cit.* pp. 49 and 51.

intervened to make peace, and a short truce seems to have been actually concluded in 1148. The only indication of anything of the kind to be found in the contemporary chronicle of Marangone consists, however, in a regrouping of the various alliances. From thenceforward, Florence, Prato and Lucca were leagued against Pisa, Siena, Pistoia and the Guidi. In the following year the *cattani* of Garfagnana changed sides and sold themselves to the Lucchesi¹.

Meanwhile, the Emperor Conrad resolved to renew the war with Roger of Sicily; an alliance was concluded with the Emperor of the East, and every effort was made to gain the friendship of the maritime republics of Italy. Genoa was in no position to take part in the projected enterprise; the expedition of Almeria and Tortosa had utterly exhausted her resources², and the hopes of the allied emperors were therefore centred upon Pisa. The negotiations would seem to have been conducted by Greek envoys, and the Pisans, while professing themselves willing to give their aid, insisted that they must first have peace with Lucca and her allies. In 1151 Conrad wrote “*consulibus, capitaneis et universo populo pisano*” that all his thoughts were bent “*ad res Italie ordinandas et pacandas*”; he sent his legates, the Archbishop of Cologne and Abbot Vibald, to take counsel with the Pisans and with the Pope touching the preparations for the common enterprise, and instructed them to mediate between the warring cities. His desire naturally was that Pisa should emerge from the struggle as powerful as possible, and he seems to have openly favoured her pretensions. “*Nos,*” wrote the Pisans, “*Dei gratia benivolentie vestre largitate perfusi prospere agimus, viriliter incedimus, super hostes victores existimus.*” It is said that a peace was actually concluded; but, on the death of Conrad, in February, 1152, the war was renewed with fresh fury³. Only in 1155, after the descent of Barbarossa into Italy, did hostilities actually cease⁴.

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 13.

² Compare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo *op. cit.* p. 233.

³ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 217; Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 154, 155, and authorities cited.

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 159.

CHAPTER THE NINTH

PISAN COLONIES

IN 1146 tidings of the fall of Edessa reached Italy; a new crusade was preached by St Bernard of Clairvaux, and Pope Eugenius III, journeying northward through Lucca and Pisa, invoked the assistance of the faithful. At Whitsuntide, 1147, at St Denis, he presented a scrip and staff to the French king, as the emblems of his pilgrimage. Both Louis VII and Conrad III took the Cross, and at Metz the French were joined by the English and Normans under Bishop Arnulf of Lisieux. According to Roncioni the Pisans sent "a passing great fleet¹"; while Sardo informs us that they were accompanied by the Genoese². Such fables are, however, unworthy of credit, being attributable to the patriotic fantasy of a later age. Neither Pisans nor Genoese had any share in the second crusade. The latter were fully occupied with their expedition against Almeria and Tortosa³; the former, though doubtless ready to lend an ear to the exhortations of a pope who was not only a fellow-citizen but had also shown his good will towards them by confirming the jurisdictional rights of their archbishops over Sardinia and Corsica⁴, were far too much hampered by their war with Lucca to be able to take any effective part in distant enterprises⁵.

¹ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 272: "una grossima armata dei Pisani, guidata da Rineiri Bottacci."

² Ranieri Sardo, *ubi cit.* p. 83: "E li Pisani e li Genovesi per mare e per Terra Santa pervennero in Grecia. Alli quali li Greci dienno pane con calcina viva, unde molti ne morinno e altri funno presi dalli Turchi; e fenno nella Terra Santa molte battaglie, pogo acquistonno."

³ Caffaro, *Ystoria captionis Almarie et Turtvose ann. MCXXXVII et MCXXXVIII* (edition Belgrano), pp. 79-89. See also Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* cap. v.

⁴ Bonaini, *Diplomi pisani*, Doc. XII. B, p. 14.

⁵ In the contemporary chronicle of Marangone (*ubi cit.*) the crusade is not so much as mentioned. His pages are entirely occupied with the vicissitudes of the war with Lucca and her Florentine allies. So far as I have been

Nevertheless, if the Pisans lent no assistance to the crusaders, they had by no means abandoned their commercial activities in Eastern waters, and, so far from losing such foothold as they had won, they had consolidated and increased their colonies in Syria. Thus, although we have no direct evidence that they took part in the siege of Tyre, in 1124, we find that, after its capitulation—probably almost immediately after its capitulation and certainly before the middle of the year 1131¹—they obtained from Baldwin II a grant of five houses close to the harbour², together with exemption from all import and export duties. Later on, this privilege was confirmed and enlarged by Baldwin III, who, in 1156, not only granted to the Pisans “carrucatas quinque de bona terra³ juxta Tyram et in Tyro furnum unum,” but conferred upon them the *vicecomitatus* by virtue of which they acquired the right to live in Syria under the protection of their own laws and to be governed by magistrates sent for that purpose from their native city⁴. Two years earlier (10th May, 1154) they had received similar privileges and exemptions from Raynald of Antioch and Costantia, his wife, with a specific declaration that all such disputes as might arise between the Pisans themselves should be adjudicated “non in

able to discover, the only modern writers who still believe that the Pisans took part in the second crusade are Dott. Angelo Main (*I Pisani alle prime crociate, op. cit.* pp. 50, 51) and Mrs Janet Ross (*The Story of Pisa, op. cit.* p. 25). The opinion of the former can have but little weight since, throughout his book, he unhesitatingly accepts the most doubtful legends as of equal value with documentary proof (compare Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 25); while as to Mrs Ross, it is probably sufficient to point out that the treaty, a passage from which she paraphrases, was not made between the Pisans and Genoese as preparatory to the crusade but after the return of the latter from their expedition against Almeria and Tortosa, when their treasury was empty and their strength exhausted. Compare Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 215, 216. The document is printed in Dal Borgo, *Diplomi pisani*, pp. 311–313.

¹ Baldwin II died in August, 1131.

² “in ruga iuxta portum quinque domos.” According to Hodgson (*Early Venice, op. cit.* p. 255, n. 3) we may find in *ruga* the origin of the French *rue*.

³ A *carrucata terrae* is defined by Coke as a “ploughland.” “Una hida seu carucata terrae which is all one as a plow-land, viz. as much as a plow can till.” Elsewhere he informs us that “a ploughland may containe houses, milles, pasture, meadow, wood, etc., as pertaining to the plough” (*Co. Lit.* 5a, 86b).

⁴ Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* v, P. 1, pp. 6, 7.

curia nostra sed in sua iuxta statuta eorum¹”; while, in 1157, Amalric, Count of Ascalon, granted them one-half of all his revenues in Jaffa (*dimidium totius iuris*² *quod ad me pertinet*), free ingress and egress for their merchandize, a building-site (*platea*)³ on which to erect houses and a bazaar (*forum*), and, subject to the consent of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, a site for a church⁴.

In the feudal state which was established by the crusaders in Syria there were three distinct classes, namely, (1) the feudal aristocracy, consisting of knights and nobles, (2) the burgesses, and (3) the so-called Syrians, the native Christians of the East. Each of these classes had its own court of justice: the *Haute Cour* for the feudatories, over which the king presided in person; the *Cour des Bourgeois* for the burgesses, presided over by a Justiciar with the title of Viscount (*vicecomes*), and the *Cour des Suriens* for the Syrians, presided over by the *Reïs*. In addition to these, there was the *Cour de la Chaîne* for the trial of questions regarding import and export duties, instituted by Amalric I, and so called from the chain with which, in the Syrian sea-ports, the harbour was commonly closed⁵; and lastly, the *Cour de la Fonde* (*Funda*), which, as the name implies, possessed jurisdiction in commercial cases⁶, and was created “por le seurté dou seignor e por ce qu’il est tenu de maintenir les a dreit vienent tos les marchans en son poeir

¹ Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc. IV*, P. 1, p. 6.

² Müller, in the glossary at the end of his volume, states that *Ius* is equivalent to *imposta* = impost, tax, duty, custom.

³ *Platea* is, according to Heyd (*op. cit.* 1, 152), a building site, not what we now call a piazza. Compare Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 255, n. 3.

⁴ Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc. VI*, P. 1, p. 8; Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pis.* p. 89.

⁵ See Hodgson, *Venice in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, *op. cit.* p. 122, n. 1. “Import and export duties were taken at an office adjoining the chain, whence we have the expressions ‘introitus catenae,’ ‘dricum cathaniae’ for the duty, ‘curia cathenae’ (*Cour de la Chaîne*) for the court that tried questions as to its payment. The name ‘catena’ was extended to the street or district adjoining the chain: we have ‘in vico qui dicitur catena’ in a deed quoted in note 3, p. 345, of vol. 1 of Heyd.”

⁶ The following definition is given by Müller, *op. cit.* Glossario, *s.v.*: “*Funda* locus ‘in quem conveniunt mercatores de rebus suis et commerciis invicem acturi’; the bazaar, the market-place, known also as *fundacum*.” Compare Hodgson, *Early Venice*, p. 256, n. 1, and *Venice in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, p. 317.

vendre et acheter." It was also the special tribunal of the Syrians for matters of minor importance, where the amount involved did not exceed the value of a silver mark.

In the absence of special privileges, Italian merchants who settled in Syria belonged to the burgess class¹, and when, as members of a colony, they acquired the right to live according to their own laws, their social condition remained unchanged: they were still burgesses, but burgesses who, by the exercise of the royal prerogative, had been exempted from the jurisdiction of the royal courts. The consuls whom the Pisans sent to govern their colonies were subrogated *pro tanto* to the authority of the viscounts, and, from the point of view of the Syrian princes, were simply Pisan viscounts presiding over a Pisan *Cour des Bourgeois*—facts which enable us to understand why a colony which was erected by royal grant into a self-governing community was said to receive a *vicecomitatus*.

The fact that, like the other Italians, the Pisans paid lower custom duties than the subjects of the kingdom naturally made them independent of the *Cour de la Fonde* and the *Cour de la Chaîne*². Thus the grant of the *vicecomitatus* even in its most limited form enabled those who received it to establish their own courts on Syrian soil for the trial of civil actions arising among themselves; while at its fullest it altogether ousted the jurisdiction of the royal courts except in cases of homicide, treason, heresy or other grievous crime, and converted the area

¹ Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* xxxii, P. I, p. 38: "De domibus autem burgen-sium Pisanorum extra honorem Pisani comunis positus consules Pisani possint de eis talem recipere...." *Ibid.*, *Doc.* xxxvii, P. I, p. 60: "Si Pisanus aliquis teneat a me burgesiam, aud burgesiam quam de me tenet mihi relinquat et sit tunc liber, ut alii Pisani, aud si vult tenere meam burgesiam, sicut alii burgenses mei mihi teneatur." See also *Illustrazioni*, pp. 379, 380.

² Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* xxiii, P. I, p. 27; Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 101: "Et concedo eis vicecomitatum sive consulatum pro regenda curia et eorum honore in Tyro; et concedo eis, ut pro suo communi ponant homines pro suo velle ad cathenam et fundum et portas civitatis Tyri, qui habeant curam de omnibus Pisanis et de his qui Pisanorum nomine censentur; et ut nullus homo regis se intromittat de aliquo Pisano vel de his qui Pisanorum nomine censentur, aut de eorum avere ad katenam vel fundum vel portas civitatis intrando vel exeundo" (*Privilege granted by Conrad of Montferrat to the Pisans in 1187*).

set apart for the residence of the foreign merchants into a practically independent state.

Of the government of the Pisan colonies at this period it is difficult to speak with any degree of certainty. All the earlier *brevi* of the colonial magistrates have long since disappeared, and almost the only documentary evidence we possess is contained in a single rubric of the Statute of 1286: *De consule Accon et totius Syrie*¹. From it we deduce that the chief magistrate of the colony was the Viscount or Consul, a Pisan citizen and elected by the Pisan Commune: "per consilium majus generale pisane civitatis, in ecclesia majori, ad scrutinium secretum." His jurisdiction over the colonists extended to all causes, whether civil or criminal, except capital offences and questions of feudal law². He was assisted by a notary, elected at the same time and in the same manner as himself, and by two counsellors, one a jurisconsult and the other a public merchant, nominated by the Anziani of Pisa. There also appears to have been a local Council or Senate (*consilium senatûs*) which was probably composed of members of the colony. The Pisan quarter possessed its own church, in which Pisan clergy officiated; its own bakehouse, bath, and sometimes also its own mill; houses for the habitation of the merchants and their dependents, and naturally also for their magistrates; its own shops and magazines. By the grant of Conrad of Montferrat the colonists further acquired rural possessions, the so-called *casalia* in the neighbourhood of Tyre and of Acre³; but it was only by the grant of a sovereign prince that such acquisitions were possible. In a feudal state the possession of land necessarily entailed personal military

¹ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. 1, pp. 334, 335; *Breve pisani communis MCCLXXXVI*, lib. 1, rubr. 177.

² See Müller, *op. cit.*, *Illustrazioni*, pp. 378, 379, and *Doc.* XXIII, p. 27: "Concedo ut omnes Pisani et qui Pisanorum nomine censentur tam scapuli quam burgenses seu etiam milites et comites seu cujuscumque conditionis laici in Pisanorum curia judicentur de omnibus causis et factis et forisfactionibus que dici vel excogitari possunt, preterquam de feodis et assisiis et que ad feoda et assisias pertinent, de quibus omnibus in dominorum curia judicentur. De nulla autem alia re Pisanus judicetur in regali curia in Tyro et ejus partibus, nec etiam in toto regno."

³ *Ibid.*, *Doc.* XXVII, XXVIII, P. 1, pp. 33, 34, and *Illustrazioni*, p. 408; Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 104-108.

service, and it was but natural that the law should forbid the alienation of realty to ecclesiastics and to commercial communities: *gens d'Iglise ou de reigion ou de comunes*. The Italian merchant who desired to acquire real estate could only do so by abandoning his rights as a colonist and becoming a subject of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. If he was to hold realty at all, he must hold it of the king as his burghess—*come son bourgeois*¹. Such lands and tenements, however, as the colonists possessed by royal gift they possessed absolutely, and free from any tax or service; they were probably bound to contribute to the defence of the cities in which they lived; but that obligation had nothing feudal about it; the Pisan colonists remained citizens of Pisa, the allies, not the vassals, of the princes of Syria².

From the very beginning of the Holy War, there had been those among the crusaders who regarded the conquest of Egypt as the surest means of securing the dominion of the Christians in Syria. Even before the siege of Jerusalem, voices had been raised at the Council of Ramleh in favour of an immediate march on Alexandria; and when, in 1163, Amalric of Ascalon succeeded his brother Baldwin III, he resolved no longer to postpone an enterprise which every year rendered more inevitable. Though the kings of Jerusalem had established a naval service of their own and maintained arsenals in Tyre and Acre³, they were still largely dependent on the fleets of the Italian republics⁴, and it was but natural that Amalric should do all in

¹ Müller, *op. cit.* p. 379. Compare also *Doc. IX*, p. 11, from which we learn that, after Amalric had granted and confirmed to the Pisans *spatium illud terre, quod est supra portum Tyri, inter civitatis domos et aquam portus*, they still had to buy out a private owner: *Propter hanc libertatem Pisani Petro, siniscalco Archiepiscopi, quadringentos bisancios dederunt, quatinus domum suam quam in eadem terra edificatam habuit auferret....* Had they purchased the house anterior to the royal grant, they would have acquired no legal title. Under the feudal system the fief of the feudatory was not his own to alienate it as he would; he had but an estate in it, and any attempt to alienate it without the consent of his lord—*sanz l'otroi de son seignor, et autrement que par l'assise ou l'usage dou reaume de Jerusalem*—would simply have operated to work an escheat.

² Compare Volpe, *Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa*, etc. *op. cit.* p. 220.

³ Archer and Kingsford, *The Crusades*, *op. cit.* p. 364.

⁴ Thus Jacques de Vitry declared that the Italians "Terrae Sanctae valde sunt necessarii, non solum in praeliando, sed in navali exercitio, in merci-

his power to retain the goodwill of the Pisans. To this end he granted and confirmed to them a piece of land situated "above the harbour of Tyre, between the houses of the city and the waters of the harbour¹." In return, they sent their consul Burgense with ten galleys (Roncioni says forty) to join in the attack on Alexandria. "And," says Marangone, "they made castles and divers fortresses (*moenia*) and engines of war round about the said city, and approved themselves valiant above the rest in the siege thereof....Wherefore the Pisans had great praise beyond all other folk through all the land of Egypt and of Syria." Alexandria surrendered in August, 1167, and the king sent a special embassy to announce his victory to his allies and to ask for further assistance. The envoy reached Pisa in January, 1168, but, involved as they were in hostilities with Genoa and Lucca, the Pisans excused themselves². They had long traded with Egypt, where they seem to have paid lower duties than other Christian merchants; they possessed a bazaar in Alexandria, and, in 1153, they obtained one in Cairo³; while so completely was their crusading zeal subordinated to their desire for gain that they made no scruple about selling arms and contraband of war to the infidel⁴. In these circumstances, we

moniis et peregrinis et victualibus deportandis." See Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 370, 371.

¹ Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* IX, p. 11; Dal Borgo, *Diplomi pisani*, p. 90. The date is 15th March, 1165.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 51; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 356. See also Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 385 *seq.*, where all the authorities are cited and discussed.

³ Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 508, 509, and Amari, *Dipl. Arabi*, there cited. In this connection, Mrs Janet Ross (*The Story of Pisa*, *op. cit.* p. 18) tells us that the Pisans "bargained indiscriminately for privileges with Christians or with Moslems, obtaining from the Moslem ruler of Egypt a free market in Alexandria and the right of building warehouses and a court of law at Cairo. They also secured the site for a *fondaco*, or exchange, a free market and their own court of justice as far east and inland as the city of Babylon." The phraseology of the last sentence is unfortunate, as the ignorant reader may not improbably think that the Babylon referred to by Mrs Ross is Babylon of Assyria. For the mediaeval Italian *Babilonia*, of course, meant either Egypt, or, more frequently, Old Cairo (*Fostât*). See Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, *op. cit.* in Index, *s.v.* "Babilonia," and Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* XII, p. 15, where both *Babilonia* (*Fostât*) and *Caharia* (Cairo) are mentioned. Compare also *Il Decamerone*, x, 9; *I Fioretti di S. Francesco*, cap. XXIV (p. 38 of my translation), and Fazio degli Uberti, *Il Dittamondo*, lib. VI, cap. 1, 2. It would, of course, be easy to multiply examples.

⁴ Thus in the privilege which he granted to the Pisans, in 1156 (see p. 108

can readily understand that they may have thought it hardly worth their while to give any further help to Amalric; but they speedily changed their minds when, in September, 1169, he granted them liberty of commerce in all the territory which God should give him in Egypt; their own court, church, bake-house, mill and baths in Fostât (*Babilonia*), Cairo and Rosetta, and finally, a thousand byzants out of the royal customs (*in funda mea*), either in Fostât or Cairo, payable annually until he should have established them with full commercial privileges in Alexandria, Damietta and Tamnis¹. As a result of this concession, they took part in the expedition of 1170, “cum galeis et quibusdam militibus et sagitariis².” Their hopes were, however, doomed to disappointment: the Christians did not conquer Egypt, and the only real advantage which the Pisans obtained in return for their services to Amalric was the diploma of May, 1168, given “pro bono servitio quod in obsidione Alexandria Pisani mihi exhibuerunt,” and in virtue of which they were enabled to establish themselves at Acre³. Already one of the principal emporia of Syria after the loss of Jerusalem, Acre became the seat of government and the centre of all the commerce of the kingdom⁴. There the Pisans acquired a piece of ground on which to build a church, and there they were granted the coveted *curia* or *vicecomitatus*⁵. In August, 1182, the privilege of Amalric was confirmed by Baldwin IV, who further gave them a street leading down to the harbour in which to construct an arcade (*voltas*)⁶. In the same year they purchased two houses in Tripoli⁷, adjoining a house which they already *supra*), Baldwin III, after promising them protection, “tam in personis quam rebus eorum,” inserted the following exception: “Excipio tamen eos quos mei homines invenerunt portantes ferrum aut lignamen aut picem seu arma ad vendendum in terra Egypti....”

¹ Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* XII, p. 15; Muratori, *Antiquitates*, II, 907; Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 92, 93.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.*, p. 54.

³ Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* XI, p. 14; Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 91, 92.

⁴ As to the enormous commercial importance of Acre, see Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 391 *seq.*, and especially the documents published on pp. 393, 394.

⁵ “Concedo etiam ei [Communi Pisarum] ibidem curiam contra omnes homines me excepto....”

⁶ Muratori, *Antiquitates*, II, 909; Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 96; Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* XIX, p. 23.

⁷ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 84–86; Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* XX, p. 24.

possessed there—the gift of Count Raymond to the Cathedral and Archbishop of Pisa in 1179¹. Thus, in less than a century from the expedition under Daibert, they had colonies in Laodicea, Antioch, Tripoli, Tyre, Acre, Jaffa, and probably also in Jerusalem and Cæsarea².

Neither was it in the East alone that the Pisans possessed colonies. They seem to have enjoyed a larger share of the trade of Morocco than any other Italian state and possibly than all the other Italian states together. In 1167 they had already established *fondachi* at Zawila, and ere long they obtained foothold in Bona, Tripoli, Sfax, Bugia, etc.³. In Messina they had consuls and a *fondaco*⁴; at Cagliari in Sardinia there was a numerous Pisan colony⁵, and in southern France they established themselves in various cities, both on the sea-coast and on the banks of the Rhone and its tributaries: at Saint Gilles, at Fréjus, at Narbonne, and especially at Montpellier. There we find a “domus Pisanorum” in which, in 1177, Ildebrando, “Pisanorum Consul et in Provincia legatus,” signed a treaty between Montpellier and Pisa⁶. In the quarter of Arizica there existed a special hospice (*albergaria*) for the entertainment of Provençals sojourning in Pisa⁷: an almost necessary complement to extensive commercial relations in an age when public inns did not exist.

If the story of Pisan colonization is, for the most part, a sordid

¹ Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 95; Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* xv, p. 17.

² That the Pisans possessed property in Jerusalem and Caesarea may be inferred from a document of 1156, which speaks of the differences that had arisen between them and the Patriarchs of Jerusalem, the clergy of Caesarea and the Abbot of S. Maria de Latina: “...querelas...de honoribus suis contra dominum Hierosolimitanum patriarcham et clericatum Caesariae et Abbatem et monachos Sanctae Mariae de Latina...” See Tronci, *op. cit.* p. 91; Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 87; Müller, *op. cit.*, *Doc.* v, p. 7, and compare Main, *op. cit.* p. 57.

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 220; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 509–511.

⁴ In the Arch. di Stato in Pisa, *Perg. Certosa*, 9 Ott., 1190, there is a document which was drawn “nell’ ospizio dei Consoli dei Pisani di Messina.” Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 221, n. 2.

⁵ Thus in the treaty of 1212 we read of “Consules hominum Pisanorum et ejus districtus existentium in Karali.”

⁶ Germain, *Hist. du commerce de Montpellier*, I, 113, 234 seq., 395, cited by Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 221, n. 6.

⁷ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, *op. cit.* vol. I, p. 15.

chronicle of commercialism and greed, the pages on which it is written are indelibly watermarked with patriotism and valour. No war was ever waged nor any colony planted for material ends alone. Not the cry of "New markets" merely, but the adventurous heart of the race, lured on by the magic of the sea, its receding horizons, its danger and its change, spread the glory and the terror of the Pisan name from the shores of Syria to the Pillars of Hercules¹.

¹ See J. A. Cramb, *Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain* (Murray, 1915), p. 115.

CHAPTER THE TENTH

FREDERICK BARBAROSSA

ON the 4th of March, 1152, Frederick Barbarossa, nephew of the late king and son of Frederick Duke of Suabia, was elected Emperor at the Diet of Frankfurt, and crowned in the same month at Aix-la-Chapelle. Allied through his mother to the Guelfs of Bavaria, and anxious to put an end to the enmity which existed between the families of Guelf and Hohenstaufen, he began his reign by promising to secure the Duchy of Bavaria for Henry the Lion, and by investing Henry's uncle, Count Guelf, with the Marquisate of Tuscany and the Duchy of Spoleto. Envoys were sent to Pope Eugenius III and to all Italy announcing his election, and, six months later, at the Diet of Würzburg, Robert of Capua, and other seigniors of Apulia, who had been despoiled of their territories by Roger of Sicily, presented themselves before the Emperor, beseeching justice and aid. Frederick promised to reinstate them, and ordered all the feudatories of the German kingdom to make ready to follow him to Italy, within two years at the furthest. In the autumn of 1154 he appeared on the plains of Roncaglia on the Po at the head of a great army.

It was a very ancient feudal custom that the kings of Italy should summon all the vassals of the kingdom to a *parlamentum* at Roncaglia. The assembly was not only a solemn recognition of regal authority and a general review of the forces of the state; it was also a great court of justice, a supreme tribunal, before which all disputes between feudatory and feudatory, all doubtful and obscure questions which an imperfect legislation multiplied indefinitely, were brought for decision. For where could men hope to find a higher judge than the sovereign in whom were united all the powers of the state? In October, 1154, however, far graver issues had to be determined. Side by side

with the marquises, counts and barons, the consuls of the communes appeared before the Imperial tribunal, and the former demanded justice against the latter on the ground of usurpations committed by the cities, not only against themselves, but also to the prejudice of the Imperial authority. The decision of the Emperor was a foregone conclusion. He was, for all practical purposes, both plaintiff and judge. Yet, such is the reverence for institutions consecrated by immemorial usage that, though many of the representatives of the cities might have refused to recognize the sovereign, none of them dreamed of taking exception to the judge. In the Emperor they saw not only the head of the feudal hierarchy, the official representative of one of the noblest ideals to which mankind has ever aspired¹, but also the recognized symbol of that unity of civilized humanity which was believed to exist in such a way as to underlie and almost reduce to insignificance national, racial or local differences. "There is," wrote Engelbert, Abbot of Admont, "only one commonwealth of all Christian folk; therefore, there will be of necessity one only head and king of that commonwealth²." The authority of the Emperor, as Emperor, was above and apart from his authority as a great feudal sovereign. "He was to kings as the Pope is to bishops: and we know that the Pope stands aloof in the ecclesiastical system of ranks. To say even that he holds the highest rank is to misrepresent the mediaeval conception. The Pope is outside all ranks. And so also the Emperor stood in an absolutely unique relation, both to the source of all power who is God, and to the kings of the earth³." His authority extended in some ill-defined way even

¹ Feudalism was at its highest an ideal of service, and the duties of property were more considered than its rights. William Morris represented the revolution of John Ball and mediaeval Socialism in saying that "no man is good enough to be another man's master." The ideal Feudalism, on the contrary, held the no less noble gospel that "no man is too good to be another man's servant." The conception was that of a state "in which every man knew his place and the higher rank held its place by service to all its dependants." See C. D. Burns, *Political Ideals, their nature and development* (Oxford University Press, 1915), p. 121.

² *De Ortu Progressu et Fine Imperii Romani*, cited by Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire* (London, 1906), p. 98 n.

³ Burns, *op. cit.* p. 107.

to England, where he certainly exercised no feudal jurisdiction¹; and where, as in Italy, he was both Emperor and suzerain, his sovereignty was absolute. All those who exercised authority, kings, feudatories, counts, marquises, heads of communes, consuls, were in theory only his delegates. He was the sole lord, the sole master of the lives and property of his subjects; the soil, the waters of the lakes and rivers, the shores of the sea, were inalienably vested in him alone; he might grant the use of them, an estate in them, but never the absolute dominion. "All that the most submissive jurists of Rome had ever ascribed to their monarchs was directly transferred to the Caesarian majesty who had inherited the name." Frederick himself entertained no misgivings as to his rights; by the rest of the world they were not denied, and they were accepted in fervent faith by his German and Italian partisans².

The position of the representatives of the communes at Roncaglia was one of extraordinary difficulty. They were vaguely conscious that, if the letter of the law was against them, justice was on their side; that those actions which Frederick called usurpations were, in fact, simply the vindication of natural rights; but none of them dared, perhaps none of them knew how, to formulate such an idea. For them feudalism was an inevitable environment; they even thought of the Almighty Himself in terms of feudalism, and with the feudal system, as a system, they had no kind of quarrel. On the contrary, their highest ambition was to obtain for their respective communes admission to the feudal fold³. How then could they consistently oppose the commands of him who "held direct from God," the very head and crown of feudalism? To resist one who, in addition to the power to enforce his will, had at least the appearance of right on his side, might seem an almost hopeless enterprise; to yield, on the other hand, meant the renunciation of communal existence, the loss of all that the citizens had won in two centuries of continual struggle.

¹ Bryce, *op. cit.* pp. 183-185.

² Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* pp. 239-242; Bryce, *op. cit.* p. 170.

³ Compare my *A History of Perugia*, *op. cit.* pp. 47, 48.

The envoys of Pisa and of Genoa were well received¹; the Emperor had need of their fleets; but from the Lombard cities, and from Milan in particular, he demanded unqualified submission. On the 5th of December he published a decree whereby he sanctioned and confirmed the Constitution promulgated by Lothair, concerning the division and alienation of feuds², which he declared to be retrospective in its operation. No prescription might be alleged against it, and any attempt to evade its provisions worked a forfeiture of the feud³. Thus, by a single stroke of the pen, the cities were deprived of all their acquisitions and the feudatories reinstated in all their original rights.

The principle laid down, Frederick proceeded to put it into practice. The task of re-establishing his authority appeared to offer no insuperable difficulty; the cities were divided among themselves; and he, no doubt, confidently expected to subdue all Lombardy in a single campaign. The friends of Milan were the first to be attacked, and, after destroying Asti and Chieri, he sat down before Tortona. The citizens defended themselves heroically for two months but were finally forced to surrender, and Tortona was demolished. The magnitude of the undertaking had, however, now become apparent; the punishment of Milan was postponed to a more convenient season. On the 17th of April, 1155, Frederick assumed the iron crown at Monza. He celebrated Whitsuntide at Bologna and then passed southward through Tuscany to his coronation at Rome. The Pisans, who, in spite of the gracious reception they had received at Roncaglia, had been hastily fortifying their city with wooden walls and towers *pro timore Frederici regis Romani venientis*⁴, were ordered to get ready their fleets for the expedition against the Normans⁵; and it was probably due to the good offices of the Emperor that peace was at last made with Lucca⁶. So long as the Pisans were

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 15; Caffaro, *Annales Ianienses* (edition Belgrano), pp. 38, 39.

² P. 102 *supra*.

³ *M.G.S. T.* IV (*Legum*, II), p. 96; Santini, *op. cit.* p. 55.

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 17; Sardo, *ubi cit.* p. 83; Tronci, *Annali pisani*, ad ann. 1154.

⁵ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann.

⁶ See p. 106 *supra*.

distracted by hostilities on land, they could not put forth all their energies in his service.

In February, 1154, Roger of Sicily had passed away and had been succeeded by his son William I. In December, Anastasius IV, after occupying the Papal throne for something less than eighteen months, had been succeeded by Hadrian IV; and the new Pope, Barbarossa and Manuel Comnenus leagued themselves together against William. It seems that the Pisans, at the instigation of the Emperor, intrigued successfully with the Fatimite court of the Sultan of Egypt to sever the friendly relations which had heretofore existed between him and the Normans¹; William was excommunicated and the barons of Apulia rose in insurrection. Nevertheless, the league encountered serious obstacles. The policy of Barbarossa was not such as to conciliate the maritime republics; and without their aid the enterprise could not be carried out. The assumption by Count Guelf of the title of "princeps Sardiniae, Marchio Tusciae et Corsicae," etc., must have created uneasiness both in Genoa and Pisa², while the Genoese were still further alienated by the Imperial claim to absolute sovereignty in Italy. They had no mind for an alliance which might ere long be converted into servitude³. The Venetians, in addition to their fear of Frederick⁴,

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 218, citing the learned monograph of G. B. Siracusa, *Il Regno di Guglielmo I* (Palermo, 1895). We know that, in 1154, the Pisans sent ambassadors to the Sultan of Egypt to exculpate themselves from an accusation of piracy, and that they were granted a *fondaco* and other commercial privileges in Alexandria on the understanding that they should abstain from favouring the kingdom of Jerusalem, and should convey to Egypt the merchandise its inhabitants most needed: wood for building purposes, iron and pitch. Compare p. 113, n. 4 *supra*. I believe that Amari (*Storia dei Musulmani, etc., op. cit.* III, 465, 466) was the first to conjecture that the rupture between the Sultan and the Normans was due to Pisan influence.

² Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1153; Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 155. Upon what grounds the Emperor based his claim to Corsica and Sardinia it is difficult to decide, but it is probable that it was believed that they formed part of the inheritance of the Countess Matilda (see Besta, *op. cit.* I, 113), and, in any case, the rights inherent in him as universal sovereign might, notwithstanding the Donation of Louis the Pious, be held to constitute a sufficient title.

³ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 219. See also Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* pp. 244-249.

⁴ *Cronaca Altinate*, in *Arch. Stor. It.* S. I, T. VIII, p. 159 (at bottom).

were alarmed at the prospect of the transformation of the Adriatic into a Greek lake and resolutely refused to link their fortunes with those of the two Emperors¹. In October, 1155, the partial co-operation of Genoa was at last obtained by the concession of what she had so long and vainly desired: *Constantinopoli embolum et scalas, cum commercio et omni iure in eis pertinentibus sicut Pisani habent*²; but it was then too late. Shortly after his coronation (18th June), the increasing heat and the consequent mortality among his followers compelled Frederick to hurry northward. Manuel Comnenus and Hadrian were left to continue the struggle alone. The battle of Brindisi (28th May, 1156), followed by the loss of Bari, extinguished their hopes of success. In June the Pope granted the triple investiture of Sicily, Apulia and Capua to the Norman king, and in October Genoa entered into a treaty with William, whereby she obtained special privileges in Sicily and the exclusion of the Provençals from all the ports of the kingdom³.

The diametrically opposite policy pursued by Genoa and Pisa from this time forward was no doubt largely due to their respective geographical positions. Both of them aspired to maritime dominion, and when the Emperor laid claim to the great islands of the Tyrrhenian Sea and to Southern Italy, both of them were confronted with the same problems; but the fact that Pisa was forced to divide her energies, to wage war on land as well as on water, made her situation a very different one from that of her rival. The constant hostility of Lucca and the frequent hostility of Florence rendered the support and co-operation of the Emperor well-nigh indispensable to her; whereas Genoa, being, as we have seen, strategically an island, could very well do without them. When Frederick demanded tribute and hostages from the Genoese, they refused them on the ground of the virtually insular character of their city: “cum de terra imperii non habeant unde vivere possint vel se aliquo

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 220; Hodgson, *Early Hist. of Venice*, pp. 264, 265.

² See the documents published by Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* pp. 411-413.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 414-417.

modo retinere;...fidelitatem igitur solam debent habitatores Ianue, et non possunt de reliquo appellari¹.”

Having chosen her course, Pisa pursued it resolutely. “She set herself unhesitatingly on the side of the Emperor, posing as the defender of his supreme majesty in Tuscany”; and when, in 1158, he once more entered Lombardy, she sent the noblest of her sons to fight beneath his banners. For his sake she renounced her ancient allegiance to the Church and even risked the shipwreck of her commercial interests in Constantinople. In those days a tradition of Imperial policy was established which permeated the whole life of the city and informed with its spirit the very character of the race. What wonder if, as Marangone declares, “Pisana civitas, et legati ejus, honorem habuit super omnes civitates Tusciae”?

Meanwhile, the departure of the Emperor had been the signal for renewed hostilities. The Count Guido Guerra had many injuries to avenge. While passing unsuspectingly through Florence, his mother, the Countess Imellia had been arrested and detained for several days²; and when he himself had accompanied the Emperor Conrad to Palestine, the Florentines, in violation of their sworn engagements, had given his strong castle of Monte di Croce to the flames³. The Imperial Constitution of the 5th December, 1154, however, encouraged him to hope that his hour of revenge was at hand; and, in 1155, he entered into alliance with the Sienese. On the 4th of April, in the following year, he granted them an eighth part of the newly constructed fortress of Poggibonsi (*Montis qui dicitur Bonizi*⁴), and, on the same day, the Marturensi swore fealty to the commune⁵. On the 9th the Florentines who had advanced against

¹ Caffaro, *Annales Ianuenses* (edition cited), pp. 50, 51.

² Sanzanome, *Gesta Florentinorum*, p. 129.

³ *Ibid.* p. 130. As a result, Eugenius III placed Florence and its *contado* under an interdict, from which, however, the territories of the Count Guido and his vassals were excepted (September, 1148). Santini, *op. cit.* p. 51.

⁴ R. Arch. di Stato in Siena, *Caleffo Vecchio*, c^{te} 2, 2^t; Malavolti, *Historia de' fatti e guerre de' Sanesi* (Venetia, 1599), c^{ta} 30; Tommasi, *Historie di Siena*, Parte I, lib. III, p. 141.

⁵ R. Arch. di Stato in Siena, *Caleffo Vecchio*, c^{ta} 8^t.

the place, were defeated by the allied forces of the Count and the Sienese¹. Nor were the other Tuscans passive spectators of the conflict. The young Count Alberto of Prato, who had been reinstated in all his ancestral domains by an Imperial diploma of the 4th of June, 1155², was no longer minded to submit to Florentine usurpations and leagued himself with the Pisans and the Pistoiesi. His vassals of Prato put themselves under the protection of Florence; Lucca, of course, sided against Pisa. Only in 1158, when the news came that the Emperor was once more about to cross the Alps, did the combatants begin to think of peace. The negotiations lasted for nearly three months, June, July and August; and then, on the Vigil of the Assumption, a truce was proclaimed between Pisa and her allies (the Count Guido Guerra, the Sienese, the Pistoiesi and the Count Alberto) on the one part, and Lucca and her allies (the Florentines, the Pratesi and the *cattani* of Garfagnana) on the other. On the following day, through the initiative of the Consuls of Pisa and Lucca, peace for twenty years was made between the allies of either city. "De qua tregua et pace," says Marangone, "Pisani magnum habuerunt honorem et laudem et gloriam per omnes eorum amicitias, et bonam famam per totam Tusciam³." With what sincerity the Lucchesi had entered into the truce may be judged from the fact that, scarcely more than a year later, they signed a treaty with Genoa providing for united action in the eventuality of a war with Pisa (10th September, 1159)⁴.

The quarrel between the Church and the Empire came to a head in 1159. Frederick's departure for Germany, in June, 1155, had destroyed at one blow all the hopes that Hadrian had

¹ Santini, *op. cit.* p. 58.

² *Ibid.* p. 55. By this privilege the Florentines were deprived of the jurisdiction which they had arrogated to themselves over the territories of the Alberti within their *contado*; and the Counts once more became exclusively dependent on the Emperor for all their fiefs, in whatsoever diocese or *contado* they might be situated.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 19, 20. Compare Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I (*Breve Consulum*), p. 28.

⁴ Santini, *op. cit.* p. 66 n.; Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 162, citing *Atti Accad. lucch.* x, p. 84.

built upon his coming. Not only had he abandoned the expedition against the Normans, but he had failed to reduce Rome to subjection. The Pope was still in exile¹; and it is possible that his change of front (June, 1156) was due almost as much to indignation at Frederick's desertion as to the hopelessness of prolonging the contest. If, however, Hadrian was incensed against Frederick, Frederick was even more incensed against Hadrian. The investiture of William I not only conferred the kingdom of Sicily upon an enemy, but was a deliberate usurpation of the suzerainty claimed by the Empire. Next followed the quarrel about the use of the word *beneficium*², and Hadrian's childish anger because his name was placed after that of the Emperor in one of Frederick's letters³. The old controversy concerning investitures was revived in a slightly different form, and the Pope was preparing to launch the thunders of the Church against his adversary when he died at Anagni, on the 1st of September, 1159. A papal schism followed. Barbarossa supported the Antipope who assumed the name of Victor IV; and Alexander III, the canonically elected Pontiff, was forced to take refuge in France (1162).

The end of the insincere and factitious alliance between the Empire and the Papacy placed the Tuscan communes in a difficult position. Heretofore, they had not hesitated to send their levies to the assistance of Frederick. Not only Pisans, but Sienese, Lucchesi and, it would seem, even Florentines, had taken part in the siege of Milan (1158⁴). Indeed, the main object of the Emperor's diplomatic activities in Tuscany, from the time when he passed through that province on his way to his coronation at Rome, had been to make peace between the various cities, in order that he might be able to count upon their co-operation. Their bishops, however, without exception, sided

¹ He was only enabled to enter Rome, in November, 1156, through the good offices of William I. See Gregorovius, *op. cit.* vol. II, lib. VIII, cap. v, § 3, p. 548.

² "Si maiora beneficia excellentia tua de manu nostra suscepisset...." See Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1157.

³ "Fridericus Dei gratia Romanus imperator semper Augustus Adriano Ecclesiae Catholicae summo pontifici."

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 161; Santini, *op. cit.* p. 62.

with the legitimate Pope Alexander, a Sienese by birth, and, previous to his elevation to the Papacy, a canon of Pisa¹. No Tuscan bishop was present at the Council of Pavia², where the Emperor recognized the Antipope Victor (February, 1160); and it is probable that the majority of the citizens sympathized with their bishops. The great consular families who monopolized the government were thus faced with the prospect of a serious divergence of opinion between themselves and the rest of the citizens. The consuls, however, were not disposed to be guided by sentimental considerations. In most of the cities, the jurisdictional contests with the heads of the dioceses had already become sufficiently troublesome, and the opportunity of stripping the bishops of their temporal authority was too good to be neglected. At the same time, the pretensions of the Emperor afforded grave cause for apprehension, since, if he succeeded in exercising the prerogatives to which he laid claim, the stream of communal progress would be turned backward and dammed at its source³. The consuls, therefore, adopted an attitude of watchful inactivity, which might well appear the result of feebleness and indecision, did not subsequent events prove that it was, in fact, dictated by the shrewdest foresight.

At Pisa the Archbishop Villano was an ardent partisan of Alexander III, who, during his residence in the city, had won golden opinions from all classes; and when, early in 1160, an unfortunate prelate came to Pisa on his way to the Council of Pavia, he was grievously maltreated by the mob⁴. The consuls, on the other hand, though they were determined not to break with the Emperor, had as yet not committed themselves with regard to the ecclesiastical question, and, on the 20th of March, they were still able to act in unison with the Archbishop, with whom and with the Count Gherardo Gherardesca, they ap-

¹ See Ugurgieri, *Le Pompe Sanesi* (Pistoia, 1649), P. 1, p. 13.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 165, n. 1.

³ The *Constitutio pacis* of November, 1158, had made the position taken up by the Emperor absolutely plain. If there had been any doubt about his pretensions before, there was no longer the slightest room for misconception. See Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann., and Santini, *op. cit.* pp. 62 *et seq.*

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 165, n. 2, citing *M.G.H. (Legum)*, S. IV, T. 1, p. 268; *Encyclica concili: febr. 1160.*

peared at the Diet of Borgo S. Genesio as the representatives of the commune¹. That Diet had been called together by the Marquis Guelf: "Guelfus dux Spoleti marchio Tusciae," as Marangone styles him, carefully omitting his further title of "rector" or "princeps Sardiniae." Invested by Frederick in the first year of his reign², he had consented to receive a second investiture at the hands of Hadrian³, and, although he had been present at the Council of Pavia, he had, perhaps, already decided to return to the traditional policy of his house and to espouse the cause of the Church against the Hohenstaufen. His ambiguous position probably served him well, when, strong in his double investiture, Imperial and Papal, he convoked the Diet of S. Genesio, and saw all the great feudatories of Tuscany as well as the representatives of the cities assemble at his summons. Among those who refused to take the oath of fealty at S. Genesio were the Pisans; but they invited him to Pisa to receive it. He came thither on the 26th of March and was welcomed "cum magno honore et triumpho et processione"; and there the Pisans "securitatem et fidelitatem fecerunt, et dux pisanus (the expression is sufficiently significant) juravit salvare homines pisanos in personis et havere." Thereafter, on the 31st of March, he returned to S. Genesio to receive the oaths of fealty of the other cities and vassals of the Mark; and all the cities did him honour and swore fealty "pro honore a Pisanis ei collato, et timore." Nevertheless, the Diet was disturbed by scenes of violence and bloodshed. The Count Guido, whom we have seen leagued with the Sienese against the Florentines, in 1156, had died at Montevarchi in the following year, and the son who succeeded him was still a boy⁴. The young count was present at S. Genesio with the other feudatories; and, for some reason unknown to us, a quarrel arose between him and the Florentines and Lucchesi. His lodging

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 21: "et ibi fuerunt Consules pisani, cum comite Gerardo et cum Archiepiscopo Villano Pisanae ecclesiae Sanctae Mariae."

² See p. 115 *supra*.

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 166, n. 1; Santini, *op. cit.* p. 67, citing Ficker, *Forschungen*, etc., II, § 331.

⁴ Santini, *op. cit.* p. 59, n. 1.

was assailed by armed men, and his life was only saved by the interposition of the marquis, at whose feet he cast himself, beseeching protection. The Pisans thereupon came to his aid, and “*bellum magnum contra Lucenses et Florentinos pro adiuvando comite fecerunt.*” They seem to have had the best of the fight, but, on learning that the Lucchesi were gathering reinforcements, they left the Diet¹. Apparently, there was no immediate renewal of hostilities; but the incident must have tended to harden the conviction of the consuls that, compassed about as they were by so many enemies, their best hope of salvation lay in loyalty to the Emperor. In the following year two of their number were sent to Constantinople to negotiate “*concordiam et conventionem*” with Manuel, only to be met by a demand that they should swear not to enter into any league with Frederick to the detriment of Byzantium. This they absolutely refused to do, with the result that, for many years, Pisan colonists and merchants in Constantinople were subjected to sanguinary persecutions at the hands of the populace².

Meanwhile, the Archbishop Villano remained stubbornly loyal to Alexander, and, in 1161, near Volterra, he found means to have speech with Bishop Giulio of Florence, who, in defiance of the Imperial edict ordering the bishops to give their support to Victor, was almost as warm a partisan of the lawful Pope as Villano himself³. What the two prelates said to one another we do not know; but no sooner was Alexander compelled to leave Rome than we find Villano setting forth with an armed galley (18th December) to meet him at Terracina⁴. There they celebrated the Christmas festival together, and thence they came to Piombino, where Villano, among vassals who had sworn fealty to him, “*magnum honorem domino Alexandro exhibuit.*” Any hopes which they may have entertained of entering Pisa were, however, dissipated on their arrival at Leghorn by the prompt action of the consuls who “*consilium de non recipiendo*

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 21, 22.

² *Ibid.* p. 26; Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant, op. cit.* I, 213.

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 167, n. 5, citing Davidsohn, *Geschichte*, p. 475.

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 26.

Alexandrum habuerunt, propter amorem et pavorem imperatoris Frederici." They therefore made all haste to Porto Venere, reaching Genoa on the 21st of January, 1162. Trumpets sounded and bells rang, as the archbishop, the consuls and the whole body of the citizens magnificently "welcomed the Apostolic Pope, giving praise to God and exalting His Name, even as it is written in the Book of Psalms: 'Young men and maidens, old men and children, praise the name of the Lord; for his name only is excellent.' And verily (says Caffaro) the name of the Lord was exalted on that day, when the Genoese received the Apostolic Alexander, in the Lord's stead¹." Frederick sent peremptory orders that the fugitive should be delivered into his hands; but the Genoese indignantly refused to obey them; and, on the 25th of March, Alexander pursued his journey to Provence. He was escorted by a Genoese fleet of twenty-five galleys and accompanied by the Archbishop of Milan, and by the Archbishop of Pisa on his own galley². The further presence of a Sicilian galley would appear to indicate that an understanding existed between the Genoese and the Normans, and that the maritime policy of the Italian states was already definitely settled. On the one side stood the Pisans, the supporters of the Emperor, on the other the Norman-Genoese alliance, reinforced, if not by actual treaty, at least by a common hostility, and probably by a tacit understanding with the Greek Emperor. Only Venice stood aloof. She wished well to Alexander and she desired the ruin of Frederick, but she suspected Genoa, she suspected William, and above all the rest she suspected Manuel who favoured Ancona and menaced her dominion in the Adriatic³.

The attitude which the Pisan consuls had assumed towards Archbishop Villano and the Pope had been forced upon them by the irresistible logic of circumstances. Pisan troops were taking part in the siege of Milan, and, in March, a triumphant

¹ Caffaro, *Annales Ianuenses* (edition cited), p. 63.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 27.

³ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 228; Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 168. Compare Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice, op. cit.* pp. 271, 272.

letter from Frederick announced its surrender¹. Next came the diploma of the 6th of April, glittering with splendid concessions and yet more splendid promises². Not only was the whole littoral from Civitavecchia to Porto Venere granted to Pisa together with the right to exclude hostile merchants from all the bays and ports of the coast, but also extensive inland territories. From a point not far from Empoli, her new frontiers ran through Torre Benni (Bastia), Canneto, Barbialla, along the course of the Evola to Monte Tignoso, and then, by way of Buriano, Querceto, *Castrum Corniae* (a vanished stronghold in the valley of the same name) and Scarlino, to Port' Ercole³. In addition to all this, half of Naples, Salerno, Messina, Palermo, including their ports and territories, the whole of Gaeta, Mazzara and Irapani were given to the Pisans in feud, "et in unaquaque alia civitate quam Guillelmus detinet rugam unam cum domibus convenientem pisanis mercatoribus." Pisan merchants were to be free to travel, by land or by water, through Sicily, Calabria, Apulia, the Principality of Capua, "et per totum imperium nostrum," without paying toll or custom; and the Emperor undertook not to make peace or truce with William without the consent of such of the Pisan consuls as should take part in the expedition. In return, the Pisans swore fealty and promised to send a fleet to the war against the Normans and to aid the Emperor if he should lay siege to Genoa. In that case, Porto Venere was to be taken from the Genoese and given to the Pisans.

The diploma was brought to Pisa, on the 17th of April, by the ambassadors who had been with Frederick⁴; and they re-

¹ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, xvii A, pp. 39, 40.

² Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 32-39; Tronci, *Annali pisani*, ad ann.

³ "Et concedimus et damus in feodum vobis Comitatum vestro districtui sicut tenet turris Benni ad Arnum et ad Cannetum et inde ad Barbiallam, et sicut trahit ab Ebula ad Montem Tiniosum et ad Burrianum et Quercetum et ad Castrum Corniae, inde ad Scherlinum, et sicut trahit marina ad Portum Erculis; ab alia parte fluminis Arni, sicut trahit Planesule, et comprehendit curia Cintoriae, et sicut trahunt confinia inter vos et lucenses usque ad pontem Mogioniae, et inde sicut sunt confinia districtus pisanae civitatis." (Compare the *Breve Consulium* of 1164, in Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, 1, 23.)

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 27: "Pisanorum legati cum consilio senatorum et civium ad imperatorem Fredericum mense Martii iverunt...quos Im-

turned "cum honore et cum vexillo, dato et largito ab imperiali maiestate, et spada pro investitione imperatoris Frederici habenda et retinenda super omnes civitates Tusciae." The phraseology of the annalist might almost appear to be mere rhetorical exaggeration were it not that we possess another Imperial diploma, probably attributable to this period¹, which contains corresponding expressions of Frederick's goodwill towards the Pisans. Not only does he promise to place under the ban of the Empire all those who shall have the temerity to take up arms against them when they shall be engaged in his service, but he declares his intention to set the city of Pisa above all the cities of Italy: "ita fovere sublimare et conservare ut inter alias civitates longe vel prope positas ipsa sola obtineat principatum²."

The Pisans were, however, by no means disposed to rely solely upon the prestige of their Imperial alliance, and immediately took steps to possess themselves of the territories which had been granted them. In May Count Ildebrandino degli Aldobrandeschi of Soana renewed "universo populo pisano" the oath of fealty which he had made two years before "in publico parlamento pisano" to the Archbishop Villano, swearing "to save Pisan men, whether whole (*sanos*) or shipwrecked, and their goods, on land and on sea, and in every place within his governance." Thereafter, he accompanied the Pisan delegates who were sent to receive oaths of his vassals through all the towns and villages of his dominions³. In the following month the consuls "made a great army of knights and foot-soldiers and archers," and went into the Valdera to tame the *cattani* of Peccioli who had long been a thorn in the side of the commune⁴. These feudatories were able to take the field with four hundred horse and three thousand foot, and their stronghold of Peccioli was deemed well-nigh impregnable. "Castrum

perator cum gaudio recepit, et tantum honorem eis exhibuit quantum nemo audivit nec vidit."

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 177, n. 1.

² Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, XVI B*, p. 39.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 23, 24, 28, ad ann. 1161, 1163 (Pisan style).

⁴ "Quod castrum cum aliis longo tempore multas iniurias Pisanis intulerat."

erat tutissimum, vallo et muro fortissimum." Nevertheless, Peccioli surrendered on the Vigil of St John, and "the Pisans burned it with fire round about and the suburbs thereof, and therewithal they destroyed a great part of the walls and fortifications." Next they stormed *castrum Pavae* (Pieve a Pitti) "quod erat rocca fortissima," and burned it likewise. "And two other castles did they burn with fire; and every other walled place in the Valdera even unto Volterra surrendered to the Pisans." Wherefore, they returned home, "cum magno honore," on the 27th of June. A few days later the *cattani* of Peccioli swore fealty; whereupon "the Pisan consuls gave them a piece of land to be holden in feud, hard by the church of S. Cassiano in Cinzica, that they might build them houses thereon," and become citizens of Pisa¹. It is curious to note that neither in the Imperial diplomas nor in the conventions made with the Legates of the Empire is there to be found any reservation, whether express or implied, of the rights of the feudal seigniors of the *contado*². By the privilege of the 6th of April, Pisa had been definitely admitted to the ranks of the Great Feudatories of the realm; the lesser feudatories of her *contado* had become arrièrè vassals, owing her fealty and service. By bringing them into subjection she was actually furthering the policy of the Emperor. That which, in the case of the Commune of Florence, an unrecognized and unlawful association³, would have been flat rebellion, was, in the case of Pisa, not only lawful but praiseworthy. Accordingly, we find that, two years later, Rainald, Archbishop of Cologne, who had been sent by Frederick to re-order the administration of Tuscany, actively assisted the Pisans to carry on the good work. The enlargement of their *contado* to the south and south-east had narrowed the borders of the Volteranni⁴, and it is probable that obstacles had been

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 31, 32; cf. Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I (*Br. Consulium*), p. 38.

² The subject is discussed at length by Prof. Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 172 *seq.*

³ The *Constitutio pacis* had definitely forbidden every assembly, every sworn association, every *consorteria*, whether within or without the city walls. See Santini, *op. cit.* p. 63.

⁴ See Cecina, *Notizie Storiche di Volterra* (Volterra, Tip. Sborgi, 1900), p. 13. This is the only edition of the book which I possess. It is a cheap

placed in the way of Pisan jurisdiction. Rainald, therefore, deputed the German "Gualdanus," *comes Volterratorum*, to accompany the consuls on circuit through the newly acquired territories, and to make, as it were, a personal act of transfer to the representatives of the commune, the new seignior¹. With the consuls and the *Teutonicus* of Volterra was Bernardo Marangone, the annalist; and he faithfully records their visit to all the towns of the Maremma, "pro iustitiis et vindictis faciendis, usque ad castrum qui dicitur Scarlinum." Everywhere they received the oath of fealty from the inhabitants, reconciling differences and regulating the relationships between the various communities².

reprint and contains none of the notes which add so much to the value of the work. If my memory serves me, the notes to the particular passage referred to are well worth reading.

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 179.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 35, 36.

CHAPTER THE ELEVENTH

EXPULSION OF THE GENOESE FROM CONSTANTINOPLE

THE assumption by Count Guelf of the title of *rector* or *princeps Sardiniae* had, as we have seen, given equal offence to Genoa and Pisa, and when, in 1158, Frederick invited them to convey Imperial Legates to Sardinia, they did not hesitate to disobey him¹. If the occasion was vital enough, even the faithful Pisans knew how to separate their own policy from that of the Emperor; and, apparently, the only result of his attempt to exercise authority in Sardinia is to be found in a temporary rapprochement between the communes.

In the summer of 1160 two Pisan galleys and four *saettie* encountered two Saracen galleys on their way to Denia with a great Genoese merchantman which they had captured. The Pisans attacked, put the Saracens to flight and convoyed their prize to Pisa. Thereupon, ambassadors were sent from Genoa to ask that the ship should be given up to them "amore pacis et societatis." Nor did they ask in vain. After taking counsel with the principal citizens, the consuls "navem cum toto aere pro amore et donatione Ianuensibus reddiderunt"; wherefore they gat them home again "cum amore et laetitia, et gratias ingentes referendo²." The incident is, of course, ignored by Caffaro. The very last thing that we should expect him to do would be to record an act of Pisan magnanimity; and, after all, the anecdote is only noteworthy as tending to prove that, at this time, the relations between the cities were not only peaceful but cordial. Some two months later, Costantino, Judge of Cagliari, who would seem to have been on very friendly terms

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 161; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 226, 227; Besta, *op. cit.* I, 114.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 23; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 299.

with Genoa¹, was welcomed in Pisa "cum honore." The consuls had sent galleys to escort him thither, and when, together with his consort, he set out thence on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, the *donicella*, his daughter, remained behind as the honoured guest of the commune².

The growing good-will between the two cities was, however, viewed with anxiety by the Pope; and when, in January, 1162, Pisa closed her gates against him³, he determined to take steps to put an end to the injuries and *obprobria* which were being committed in Sardinia by those who sought to withdraw the island from the dominion of St Peter⁴. He made use of his sojourn in Genoa to arouse the latent hostility against the Pisans and enlisted the good offices of the archbishop to induce the consuls and the citizens to embark upon an enterprise which, by humbling the power of Pisa, would further the policy of the Holy See. To this end, he granted many important privileges to the Cathedral Church of S. Lorenzo, which, in the words of the annalist, "multifarie multisque modis studuit sublimare⁵." His efforts were no doubt aided by other and purely secular causes of disagreement; but, when we recall the machinations of Alexander, and the part which he played in sowing discord between the communes, Caffaro's attribution of the war which resulted to the Devil would seem, to say the least of it, in doubtful taste⁶.

Meanwhile, the fall of Milan and her punishment had overawed men's minds, and the Genoese began to mistrust the protective efficacy of those walls of which their official historiographer had so recently boasted that "unless God should hinder it, they could withstand unharmed the shock of all Italy and Tuscany and the Germans⁷." They knew that the Pisans

¹ The return of a Genoese ship "amore Ianuensium," in 1154, is evidence of this. See Caffaro, *Annales Ianuenses* (edition cited), pp. 38, 39.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 23.

³ See p. 129 *supra*.

⁴ Besta, *op. cit.* I, 117.

⁵ Caffaro, *Annales Ianuenses* (edition cited), p. 66.

⁶ "Unde diabolus, humani generis inimicus, inter Ianuenses et Pisanos... his temporibus fomitem seminavit discordie."

⁷ Caffaro, *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 51.

were busily building for the Sicilian expedition¹ galleys which might be used against themselves. A clause in the Imperial diploma of the 6th of April provided for such an eventuality²; and, at the eleventh hour, they perceived that, if they were attacked by the united forces of Pisa and the Emperor, the fate of Milan must be their fate also. They, therefore, resolved to humble themselves. An embassy composed of nine of their noblest citizens, including two of the consuls, was sent to Frederick at Pavia³; they declared themselves ready to obey his commands and to swear fealty, and they promised to aid with their navies in the Sicilian expedition. On these terms a treaty was entered into, on the 9th of June, whereby, in return for their services, they were to receive, at the end of the war, the city of Syracuse with its environs, two hundred and fifty fiefs in the Val di Noto or in the territory of Count Simeon, a natural son of Roger, and in every city a street and a *fondaco* together with complete exemption from imposts. Provençal merchants were to be excluded from Sicily and Calabria, and the Venetians also, unless they first made their peace with the Emperor. Finally, Genoese dominion of the sea-coast from Monaco to Porto Venere was recognized as legitimate⁴.

In this connection Professor Manfroni asks the pertinent question: "Were the Genoese acting in good faith when they accepted the terms? Caffaro would have us believe that they were, but it is exceedingly difficult to credit it. Could they, so jealous of the Pisans, content themselves with the single city of Syracuse, when half of Messina, Salerno, Naples, Palermo, the most important ports in the kingdom, had been promised to the Pisans? They had certainly heard of the Pisan treaty concluded two months earlier, and would never have consented to play a second part while the first was assumed by their hated rivals. Moreover, they were far too well informed of the con-

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 27: "Anno Domini MCLXIII, in mense Madii. Pisani Consules, pro honore imperatoris Frederici et Imperii et Pisanæ urbis, galeas xl facere incoeperunt, et per totum mensem Martium completæ fuere."

² See p. 130 *supra*.

³ Caffaro, *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 65.

⁴ Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 229, 230.

ditions of Lombardy to believe in the possibility of immediate action against the Normans; they knew what storm was brewing in the March of Ancona, what plots against the Emperor were being woven in Sicily and at the court of the exiled Alexander III." Certain it is that their alliance with Frederick does not appear to have impaired their friendly relations with William. When, a few months later (October, 1162), all the Pisans in the Kingdom of Sicily were despoiled and imprisoned "propter magnum apparatus galearum quem pro faciendo imperatoris Frederici servitio fecerunt," not a hair of a Genoese head was touched¹. The good or bad faith of the Genoese was not, however, destined to be put to the proof, since events almost immediately occurred which prevented the Sicilian expedition and liberated them from the engagements into which they had entered.

A few days after the treaty of Pavia, news reached Genoa that the Pisans in Constantinople had taken up arms and expelled the Genoese colony, few in numbers and but recently established there. The assailants had been joined by a great multitude of Venetians, Greeks "et aliorum iniquorum"; the Genoese *fondaco* had been sacked and a young nobleman, the son of a certain Ottone Ruffo², had been killed in cold blood. On the arrival of the fugitives in Genoa, the city was moved to fury; twelve galleys were equipped in a single day, and, thirsting for revenge, the crews prepared to put out to sea. The consuls, however, would not hear of their departure until formal letters of defiance had been sent to Pisa. The text of these *litterae diffidentiae* has been preserved for us by Caffaro³; and in them the *expulsio Sardiniae* and the *detentio* and *invasio* of certain writings are alleged as more or less proximate causes of the rupture. It would be interesting both from an historical and juridical point of view if we could ascertain the meaning of these phrases. Certainly, the *expulsio Sardiniae* can hardly be supposed to refer to the more or less mythical conflict which

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 31.

² Ottone Ruffo had been one of the consuls in 1151.

³ *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 68, 69.

followed the defeat of Mogahid¹. That is completely ignored by the Genoese chroniclers; and the *expulsio* complained of may mean nothing more than the gradual exclusion of the Genoese through the increasing influence of Pisa². As to the writings which, "summa violentia," were seized and detained, it is less easy to offer any plausible conjecture. They may have contained ancient agreements between the communes, delimiting and defining their respective spheres of interest, or they may have been records of conventions with Sardinian judges on which Genoa relied as evidence of her claim to overlordship. Be that as it may, it is interesting to note that now, and for the first time, the rights of Genoa in Sardinia are based upon its *liberatio de manibus Sarracenorum*: the very grounds upon which Pisa rested her own title to dominion³.

There is no doubt that such letters were actually sent to Pisa. The fact is admitted by the Pisan annalist⁴; but the avenging galleys would seem to have arrived almost as soon as the envoys, and the Pisans, who had probably had no news of the disturbances in Constantinople, were completely taken by surprise: "Pisanis in pace commorantibus, et nullum apparatus triremium habentibus, Ianuenses xxv galeas habentes, diffidentiam per litteras eorumque nuntios indixerunt, et rupto pacis foedere, cum periurio nefandissimo guerram crudelissimam cum eis ex improvise incoeperunt." Nothing could have been more providential for the enemies of Frederick. Coming to the mouth of the Arno, the Genoese sank three great ships which lay at anchor there; they burned three more in Porto Pisano and destroyed with their mangonels the tower of the harbour "in the sight of all the men and women of Pisa." Another squadron devastated Capraia and captured many richly laden ships and among the rest a galley coming from Sardinia with the consul Bonaccorso on board. "Of the men of those ships and of that galley Ottone Ruffo and his associates slew many of the noblest to avenge the murder of his son; and the

¹ "Pisani de tota Sardinea Ianuenses expulerunt." See p. 26 *supra*.

² See the next chapter.

³ Compare Besta, *op. cit.* I, 117, 118.

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 29.

consul Bonaccorso and many others they sent captive to Genoa together with the booty." Thereafter, the Genoese galleys retired to Porto Venere, the fortifications of which had been restored with great care a few months earlier.

No sooner had the raiders departed than the Pisans took steps to protect their port against fresh attacks. They stretched a great chain across the mouth of the harbour "from one tower to the other, and they closed and reclosed the port for the protection of mariners, and fortified and set in order the towers thereof." Next, they armed ten galleys and eleven *saettie* "ad modum galearum," and sent them to devastate Capo Corso. On their return, as they were cruising off Pianosa, they "captured two great and very rich merchantmen coming the one from Syria and the other from Constantinople. Sixty-two Genoese they killed: some they beheaded, and others they slew with the sword. Thereafter, on the 12th of July, they took another ship coming from Sicily. The value of the merchandise on the said ships was more than twenty thousand pounds," or four times the value of the captures made by the Genoese. "Now, when they heard these things, the Pisans were fulfilled with great joy and gave praise to God. And straightway they made ready fourteen *saettie* after the manner of galleys"; and the Genoese galleys which abode in Porto Venere came even unto the port of Populonia to give them battle; but, when they drew nigh unto the Pisan fleet, they fled before it. Wherefore, the Pisans "returned to Pisa with honour and gladness, with captured ships and merchandise and with fifty-five Genoese prisoners."

By taking the Pisans unawares, the Genoese had, indeed, gained a momentary advantage; but, after their first unexpected onset, the fortune of war turned against them. The Pisans were, probably, in a far more favourable position than they were for protracted hostilities. With a view to the Sicilian expedition they had raised large sums by the sale of custom dues¹; and

¹ "Praedicti Consules duanam salis et ripam, et ferri venam pro libris quinque milibus quingentis in xi annis, pro galeis faciendis, et civitatis expensis, vendiderunt."

some at least of the forty galleys which they had laid down in May must have been nearing completion. Neither were they satisfied with the punishment that they had already inflicted. Soon the news reached Genoa that they were preparing a fresh fleet for an attack on Porto Venere, "et pro vastanda tota Marcha Ianue usque ad portum civitatis ipsius." In their terror the Genoese sent envoys to implore the intervention of the Emperor on their behalf, and vast sums of money (*magna pecunia*) to be expended in bribing the officials of his court¹.

Such is the story told by Marangone, and, until the tide of war begins to turn against Genoa, Caffaro corroborates him. Thenceforward, however, there is a distinct divergence between the two chronicles. Caffaro would have us believe that it was the Pisans and not the Genoese who begged for peace, and that, at their prayer, Rainald of Cologne, who was then in Pisa, "pietate commotus," sent his chaplain to Genoa to arrange a truce, beseeching that the Consul Bonaccorso and the other prisoners should be given up to him "pro amore Dei." Neither Marangone nor Caffaro can be regarded as impartial witnesses; but the testimony of the former is less open to suspicion than that of the latter. Caffaro was at this time over eighty years old, and he no longer wrote of the expeditions and conquests in which he had personally borne a part. All that was left to him was his semi-official position as Chronicler of the Victories of Genoa². It was no part of his duty to record reverses. Moreover, he had by this time acquired some of the vices of the mere man of letters, embellishing his narrative with fine phrases and far-fetched similes. Galleys sweep out of the harbour of Genoa in search of revenge "sicut sitientes ad aquam," and hover round an enemy fleet "veloces uti falcones." He has altogether emancipated himself from the "cold and monotonous impersonality" which so often characterizes the mediaeval writer, and has become the old man garrulous, intent only on magnifying

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 29, 30; Caffaro, *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 62-72.

² In 1152 Caffaro had presented his work to the consuls and the Council, who ordered the public scrivener "ut librum a Cafaro compositum et notatum scriberet et in comuni cartulario poneret, ut deinceps cuncto tempore futuris hominibus Ianuensis [civitatis] victorie cognoscantur."

the deeds of Genoa and belittling those of her enemies. The chronicle of Marangone, on the other hand, is a mere register of events, possibly intended for no other eye than his own and certainly without official recognition. So far is he from suppressing damaging facts that we sometimes obtain a more unfavourable view of Pisan conduct from his pages than we do from those of the Genoese themselves¹. Bonaini's "scrittore di fede incorrotta"² is no exaggeration when applied to Marangone; and I am satisfied that no one who is accustomed to weigh the relative value of evidence can study the two chronicles without reaching the conclusion that Marangone is, on the face of it, a more trustworthy witness than Caffaro³. Then, too, in the case in point, his is the more probable narrative, for why should the Pisans seek for peace when their galleys were triumphantly riding the open sea and the Genoese galleys were cowering beneath the fortress walls of Porto Venere? Add to all this that the war had been begun by Genoa at a time when she was supposed to be preparing, and when Pisa was actually preparing, to aid the Emperor in his projected expedition against the Normans. Her conduct had wrecked his most cherished designs, and it was only natural that she should send envoys to the Imperial Court to excuse herself. Her probable line of defence is indicated by Caffaro when he tells us that the twelve galleys which raided Pisa were armed and provisioned "sine iussione consulum"; but such an excuse as that would avail nothing to mitigate the wrath and suspicion of Frederick unless he could be convinced that the Genoese earnestly desired peace. Their only chance of so convincing him was to beseech his intervention on their behalf "pro acquirenda pace vel tregua

¹ Thus, for example, we may compare Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 67, with the continuator of Caffaro, Oberto Cancelliere, *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 255. The detail that "Pisani...satis vilissime fugierunt" is recorded only by the former.

² *Arch. Stor. It.* S. I, T. VI, P. I, p. xxiv.

³ This does not, of course, affect the great value of Caffaro's chronicle to the student of mediaeval Italy. There is, so far as I am aware, no other annalist of the twelfth century who throws so much light on the manners and customs and modes of thought of his day and generation. Even if Caffaro be the liar I take him to be, it is pleasant to be able to study a mediaeval liar of his calibre at close quarters.

cum Pisanis.” Neither did they let the grass grow under their feet, and when the Pisan ambassadors reached Turin, the money which the Genoese had lavished on the officials of the Imperial court seems to have produced its effect. Marangone complains that Frederick refused to hear any proof of their horrible crime and perjury: “et praedicti sceleris et periurii probationem noluit Imperator suscipere.” By his command, a truce was concluded which was to be binding on both cities “usque ad adventum suum in Tusciam¹.”

When Frederick returned to Italy in the following year, the attitude of Genoa was completely changed. A feudal reaction had placed the government in the hands of an oligarchy which looked for support to the Empire, and the promises and conventions which had been entered into through fear in 1162, were willingly renewed in 1163². Yet if, through the violence of a faction or for momentary interest, Genoa seemed to have renounced her anti-imperial policy, her hatred of Pisa had not abated; and, in seeking to provide fresh troubles for her rival, she indirectly created new obstacles to the Sicilian expedition. The re-opening of the Sardinian question frustrated all the designs of the Emperor.

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 30, 31.

² Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 233; Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* cap. VII.

CHAPTER THE TWELFTH

BARISONE OF ARBOREA

THE glorious issue of the Balearic war had naturally tended to increase the influence of Pisa in Sardinia. In three of the four Judgeships, Gallura, Torres and Cagliari, the ancient alliances were confirmed, and probably with fresh privileges. As to the Judgeship of Arborea we only know that foreign settlers, *esitizos*, were numerous, and that the judges were wont to make generous concessions in their favour. Whether these *esitizos* were preponderantly Pisan or Genoese we have no means of ascertaining; but it may be accepted as certain that the privilege of Gelasius II, in 1118¹, was not in conflict with the actual conditions of the island.

During the long war between Pisa and Genoa (1119–1132) Sardinia was something more than a disinterested spectator; and Professor Besta is inclined to believe that the fact that, in 1125, a great Pisan ship which was attacked by Genoese galleys in the straits of S. Bonifacio attempted to reach the Arno, instead of seeking refuge in a Sardinian port², may be taken as evidence that the inhabitants of the northern shores of the island were no longer on the side of Pisa. Be that as it may, we know that, after the death of Judge Costantino, in 1127 or thereabouts, Logudoro was a prey to intestine discords. The heir Gonnario was a mere child; and the powerful family of the Athen not only aspired to the honours and emoluments of the regency, but by their violence and intrigues seem to have endangered the life of Gonnario. To withdraw him from the perils which surrounded him, Ithoccor Gambella, an old and

¹ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 220: "Confermò Gelasio a Pietro Arcivescovo tutto quello che era stato prima concesso a' suoi antecessori, e massime da Urbano due; e fecelo patriarca di tutta la Sardinia e di Corsica ancora." Cf. Besta, *op. cit.* 1, 98, and see p. 69 *supra*.

² Caffaro, *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 22.

faithful friend of the deceased Judge, smuggled him away to the port of Torres, where there were already quarters entirely occupied by Pisan merchants; and thence he made good his escape to Pisa. At Pisa he remained until he was eighteen, having married the daughter of his host and protector, Ugone di Pagano Ebriaci, a member of one of the most influential of the consular families, belonging to the *consorteria* of the Visconti. When the time came for him to lay claim to the Judgeship of Torres, the commune was easily persuaded to lend its aid, and, in 1130, he returned to Logudoro accompanied by four Pisan galleys. He found many adherents; but the Athen resisted desperately, making head at Puthumaiore. Many of their chiefs fell beneath the walls of the strong fortress of Goceano on the slopes of Monte Rasu; others were put to the sword in the church of S. Nicolò di Trullas, and Gonnario was firmly seated on the throne of his fathers. In return for the assistance of the Pisans, he assigned to the Opera di S. Maria the corte di Castel d' Erio in La Nurra and that of Bosove in the *curatoria* of Romania, together with half of Monte dell' Argentiera; he promised the Pisans to do them justice *secundum usum Sardiniae terrae*, or, in other words, to invest them with all the legal rights of native-born Sardinians, and he swore fealty to the Opera and to Archbishop Ruggero¹.

The Genoese were naturally alarmed; they had probably favoured the Athen, and they hastened to enter into an alliance with Comita of Arborea, who apparently aspired to the sovereignty of Sardinia. He shortly afterwards attacked Logudoro, but without success; and, about the year 1133, he disappears from the scene, to be succeeded by his brother Torbeno and later on by Torbeno's son Orzocorre². Meanwhile, Comita de Spanu had succeeded Ithoccor de Gunali on the throne of Gallura, and, on the 20th of June, 1131, the new Judge leagued himself with the Pisans, agreeing among other things not to divulge the secrets of the commune, whether they should be communicated to him by letter or by envoys, and to save *pro*

¹ Besta, *op. cit.* I, pp. 101-103.

² *Ibid.* pp. 103, 104.



CHURCH OF S. NICCOLA



PULPIT OF NICCOLÒ PISANO

suo posse the inhabitants of Pisa and of the suburbs of Cinzica. The terms of this convention were infinitely more favourable than those concluded with Ithoccor de Gunali in 1113, and show how completely Pisan influence had insinuated itself into the political life of the judgeship. Those unrevealable secrets have all the appearance of orders, more or less disguised, perhaps, but none the less for that requiring punctual performance¹. The relations of Pisa with Cagliari had long been of a cordial character, and the conduct of the Genoese with regard to the Judge of Arborea had naturally served to make them even more intimate than heretofore. The ambitious designs of Comita menaced all his fellow judges alike; and when, in 1133, the Archbishop of Pisa was reinstated in the Legation of Sardinia², the Pisans seemed in a fair way to convert their commercial hegemony into a political one.

Unfortunately, however, the enmity between the Judges of Arborea and Torres continued unabated, and if, for a little while, they laid aside their arms, they soon resumed them. The fortune of war seems to have gone against Gonnario, and on the 10th of November, 1144, in the presence of Archbishop Balduino, the Pisan consuls, among whom were two of the Visconti, swore to aid the Judge Gonnario with all their power against the attacks of his enemies and to assist him in regaining that which he had lost. The same oath was to be taken by the people of Pisa in full *parlamentum*, with the obligation not to recognize as consuls those who refused to renew it annually³. In 1145 Eugenius III ascended the Papal throne, and, on the 29th of May, he confirmed the jurisdictional rights of the Pisan Church in Sardinia and Corsica⁴. In his capacity of Papal Legate, Archbishop Balduino excommunicated and deposed the Judge of Arborea, and, on the advice of St Bernard of Clairvaux, his

¹ Besta, *op. cit.* p. 105. The document in question has been published by Professor Besta, in his *Per la storia del giudicato di Gallura*, pp. 9, 10.

² P. 79 *supra*.

³ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 260. The document has, I believe, been published by Professor Besta, *Il liber iudicum turritanorum con altri documenti logudoresi* (Palermo, 1906), App., Doc. II.

⁴ P. 107 *supra*.

action was approved by Eugenius¹. The deposed Judge was succeeded by Barisone, the son of Comita, who, in the earlier years of his reign was *amicu* to Pisa. For a few years Sardinia was at peace; and, in 1147, Gonnario was at last able to follow his mystical inclinations and to set out on a pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre. Shortly after his return, he took the cowl and retired to the Abbey of Clairvaux².

Genoa, however, had not abandoned her ambitious designs, and even when, in 1149, exhausted by her expedition against Almeria and Tortosa, she entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Pisa, a special clause was inserted in the document excluding Sardinia from the operation of the treaty³. The Genoese were already firmly established in Corsica, and if they could have further acquired a preponderant influence in Sardinia, the relations of Pisa, not only with Provence and Spain but also with Morocco, would have been seriously compromised. The prize for which they contended was nothing less than a monopoly of the carrying trade of the Western Mediterranean. What wonder that, even in time of peace, the war between the communes continued in the form of intrigues and reprisals? Next, to increase the confusion caused by their rivalry, came the attempt of Frederick Barbarossa to establish the Imperial authority in Italy and in the great islands of the Tyrrhenian Sea; the machinations of Pope Alexander; the disturbances in Constantinople, and the Genoese attack on Pisa (June, 1162). We have already seen how ill the aggressors fared in the war which followed, how they were forced to humble themselves before the Emperor and to beg for peace. Nevertheless, they were by no means minded to accept their failure

¹ Besta, *La Sardegna Medioevale*, I, 109, citing Bern. Clarav. *Opera omnia* (Lyon, 1867), I, n. 108, op. CCXLIV: "quod bone memorie Balduinus pisanus archiepiscopus fecit in Sardinia de excommunicatione arvorensis iudicis; quia non nisi iuste hoc virum bonum fecisse credimus, vestra auctoritate ratum et inconcussum manere rogamus."

² Besta, *op. cit.* I, 110, 111.

³ Dal Borgo, *Diplomi pisani*, pp. 311-313: "Hec omnia que superius scripta sunt observabo sine dolo et fraude in laude meorum consulum EXCEPTO DE SARDINIA, DE QUA PISANIS NULLO MODO HOC SACRAMENTO TENEBOR, QUIN ET ME ADIUVARE POSSIM ET EIS NOCERE, SI VOLUERO."

as final, and resolved to achieve by craft that which they had not been able to gain by force of arms. In Barisone of Arborea they found an instrument ready to their hand.

So late as 1151, Barisone had still been on excellent terms with Pisa, and in the summer of that year we find him acting as intermediary between the commune and Count Raymond of Barcelona with a view to a fresh crusade against the Saracens of Majorca¹. Only after his marriage with Agalbursa, the daughter of Ponsio, Viscount of Basso, in whose veins ran the blood of the royal house of Aragon², did he begin to meditate those ambitious designs which eventually made him the puppet of Genoa.

In 1163 Costantino of Cagliari died, leaving three sons-in-law³: Pietro di Torres, Oberto di Massa and Tedice di Donoratico. There seemed to be a probability of a disputed succession, and in a disputed succession Barisone of Arborea saw opportunities of aggrandisement. He hastened to set up another pretender, Barisone the son of Torbeno, a relative of his own; the Cagliari was invaded, and Pietro, who, as the husband of the eldest sister, would seem to have already ascended the throne, was obliged to flee for his life. He took refuge with his brother Barisone of Torres. As sons of Gonnario, the brothers were related through their mother with the powerful family of the Ebriaci⁴, and the intervention of the Pisans completely changed the aspects of the war: "Anno Domini MCLXV, in mense Aprilis. Parason iudex Turritanus, cum fratribus et avunculis suis pisanis, Barile, Gainello, Paganello et Paulo, et Donicellus Petrus iudex de Callari, frater iudicis Parasonis de Turri, fecerunt exercitum magnum supra Parasonem iudicem Arboreae, pro multis iniuriis sibi illatis, et mense Aprili in Arboream intraverunt, palatia et domos multas destruxerunt et igne cremaverunt, viros et mulieres et spolia multa inde abstraxerunt⁵." Barisone of Arborea himself narrowly escaped falling into their

¹ See p. 69 *supra*.

² Besta, *op. cit.* I, 121.

³ As I have already pointed out, when a judge died, leaving only daughters, the daughters inherited, but their rights passed to their husbands, and the husband of the daughter who succeeded became the *Judex*. See p. 18 *supra*.

⁴ P. 143 *supra*.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 36.

hands, and was compelled to take refuge in the stronghold of Cabras. Finding his position well-nigh hopeless, he sent ambassadors to Genoa and to the Emperor, imploring assistance and offering to pay four thousand silver marks¹ in return for the investiture of the whole of Sardinia.

The Genoese, who had in all probability instigated the attack on Cagliari, warmly supported his petition, hoping in return for their services to obtain the commercial hegemony of the island; and when Ugo, Bishop of S. Giusta in the *giudicato* of Arborea, appeared before the Emperor at Parma², he was accompanied by two of the most eminent political personages of Genoa³. Genoese ambassadors were already at the Imperial Court, having followed it from Fano, whither they had come to ascertain the Emperor's good pleasure regarding the Sicilian expedition. Frederick was naturally anxious to ingratiate himself with the powerful republic which, now for the first time, seemed willing to yield him unquestioning obedience, and he was always sorely in need of money. He therefore lent a willing ear to the words of Bishop Ugo, and announced his intention of sending legates to Sardinia to bring Barisone to his presence. The Pisans flatly refused to lend their assistance; they told the Emperor to his face that that which he was about to do was "against the honour of their city," and declared that "*Ianuenses nullo modo portabunt iudicem in Sardinia contra velle nostrum*⁴." The Genoese, on the other hand, were only too willing to carry out Frederick's wishes; they armed seven galleys and a galliot to convey the legates to Sardinia, returning in May with

¹ According to the *Annales Ianuenses* (edition cited), p. 159: "quatuor milia marcarum argenti." Marangone, on the other hand, speaks of "xv milia librarum inter aurum et argentum."

² The Emperor was already in Parma on 13th March, and remained there till the 17th April.

³ Besta, *op. cit.* I, 124; Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* p. 289; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 234; Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 180.

⁴ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses* (edition Belgrano), pp. 157-159. Oberto Nasello, called Oberto Cancelliere because he was chancellor of the commune, was instructed by a decree of the consuls, in 1169, to continue the annals of Genoa. Beginning with the year 1164, he carried the narrative down to the end of 1173. In his proemium he records the death of Caffaro, in 1166, "anno eiusdem etatis octuagesimo sexto."

Barisone himself. Apparently, no attempt was made to prevent his departure, but a fleet of eight galleys put out from Pisa “pro guardia maris et Sardineae” under the command of Raniero Alferoli, one of the consuls, with instructions to watch the Genoese, and to see that neither they nor the Imperial legates attempted any “vindictam” or “offensionem” in the island. Another consul, Ildebrando di Ranuccio Janni, was deputed “pro sedanda discordia iudicum”; and at his command a truce was entered into “usque ad redditum iudicis Arboreae¹.”

Genoa prepared to give Barisone a royal welcome. Accompanied by a vast multitude, the consuls of the city, “cum quibusdam sapientibus viris,” betook themselves to the seashore to escort him to his lodging with all due ceremony. Unfortunately, however, just as he was about to land, a quarrel arose between the followers of two Genoese nobles, Falco di Castello and Rolando Avvocato. Stones were thrown and arrows flew; three men of note were slain and many were wounded; and all the time that Barisone sojourned there, the city was on the verge of civil war². Accompanied by Guglielmo Doria, by Gionata da Campo and by the *iudices* Bigotto and Guido of Lodi, “pluresque alios secum ducentes,” he reached Pavia at the end of July, and, early in August, was solemnly crowned, in the Church of S. Siro, with a crown which Genoa had given him³. The Pisans, thereupon, left the court in high dudgeon. If they had permitted Barisone to leave Sardinia, they had none the less determined to use every means to prevent his coronation; and, after his arrival in Pavia, they had pushed their opposition to the furthest limits, protesting, in full Diet, that not only was Frederick about to grant a crown and a kingdom to one who was their serf and vassal, and therefore unworthy, but that he was giving away that which was not his to bestow, since Sardinia belonged to Pisa: “Domine imperator, salvo honore ves-

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 36.

² Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 160. See also Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *op. cit.* p. 290 *et seq.*

³ According to Marangone, Barisone was crowned “quarto idus Augusti”; whereas Oberto Cancelliere gives the date as “prima die lunemensis Augusti,” namely the 3rd August, 1164.

tro, non debuissetis facere quod vos facitis sine nostro consilio. Datis enim isti nostro rustico et nostro homini coronam et regnum; et certe non est persona cui tanta dignitas conveniat. Iniuste enim, si placet, facitis, quia Sardinia nostra est, et ipsum regem facitis de alieno.” “To which things,” says Oberto Cancelliere, “our Consuls made answer openly in full court: ‘Lord Emperor, that which the Pisans assert is wholly false, and they lie; for neither is he [Barisone] serf nor vassal of theirs but most noble. Rather are the Pisans themselves, for the most part, his vassals; and every year they go unto his land for such things as are needful for them; and scarcely might they live without the fruit and use of the land of this king. And when they say that Sardinia is theirs they lie with shameless insolence; for it is ours, and that we both assert and will make good. Hear now the truth. Of old time did we subjugate it with our arms; and in the Judgeship of Cagliari were our kinsfolk and ancestors with an army; and they conquered that Judgeship; and the king thereof, Musaito by name, they took and all that was his. Thereafter, they brought him even unto our city, as a captive enemy; and the Bishop of Genoa, that then was, did the Consuls send to the Emperor of Germany and with him the said king Musaito, to the end that the Roman sovereign might know that the kingdom of that king was newly joined and added unto the dominion and authority of the Roman Empire by the hand of his feudatories and vassals the Genoese.’ And when, by reason of these words, strife should have increased among them, the Emperor made answer to the Pisans, saying, ‘I know not that that land, the island of Sardinia, is yours. Neither do I believe that ye speak sooth. Rather do I think that it belongeth unto the Empire. Neither do I hold the king to be your man. As to my making a grant to him and thereupon creating him a king, I do it by the counsel of my Court; and this I deem to be absolutely within the right of the Empire¹.’” Such is the narrative of the official annalist of Genoa, and, although we may well doubt whether the Pisans blushed for shame (*erubuerunt*) at the words

¹ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 161, 162. Compare Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 37.

of the Emperor¹, as he says they did, we may probably take it that his account is in the main a truthful one.

Neither the Pisans nor the Genoese were able to escape from their feudal environment, and the arguments adopted by their respective representatives are of considerable interest as indicating how the political conceptions of the Middle Ages were applied to a concrete case. It is, however, not altogether easy to understand on what grounds the Pisans ventured to assert that Barisone was their *rusticus* and *homo*, unless, indeed, they based their contention wholly upon the right of conquest. Even if Barisone had not already left Sardinia when Ildebrando di Ranuccio Janni came thither "pro sedanda discordia iudicum" and "fecit omnes iudices Sardineae omnia praecepta sua et sociorum iurare²," such oaths, in the absence of express words of fealty and homage, could hardly be construed as oaths of vassalage. At the same time it is by no means impossible that there may have been express words; Marangone definitely states that Barisone "securitates et omnia praecepta et fidelitatem Pisanis Consulibus fecerat³." The Genoese, on the other hand, were in a strong position when they contended that "Pisanorum maior pars vassali sunt ipsius [Barisonis]"; for it is clear from the *Breve Consulium Pisanae Civitatis* of this very year that many individual Pisans had actually entered into relations of vassalage with the Sardinian judges; or how should each of the consuls on taking office be compelled to swear: "Nullorum namque Sardineae iudicum, eorumve filiorum aut uxorum vel fratrum, sum vel ero fidelis vel vassallus aut donicaliensis toto tempore mei consulatus⁴"? The story of the capture of *Musaitus* (Mogahid), and of his journey to Germany in the custody of the Bishop of Genoa, was, of course, a fiction; but it was hard to disprove it, and inasmuch as it practically admitted the Imperial suzerainty, it sounded pleasantly in the ears of Barbarossa, who was the first of the Emperors to attempt to deprive the Papal See of its jurisdiction in Corsica and Sardinia⁵.

¹ Is it possible that they blushed, but blushed for the Emperor's Latin?

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 36.

³ *Ibid.* p. 37.

⁴ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, 24.

⁵ *Annali Genovesi*, etc., a cura di L. T. Belgrano, *op. cit.* p. 162 n.

Barisone's troubles were, however, only just beginning. When Frederick demanded payment of the four thousand silver marks which had been agreed upon as the price of his coronation, he was unable to produce them; and the newly crowned king narrowly escaped being incarcerated till he should have paid the debt. In his extremity he was compelled to throw himself upon the self-interested generosity of the Genoese. They lent him the money, but upon terms which destroyed his political independence and laid him at their mercy. On the 16th of September, he swore, in consideration of the services which had been rendered him "in perceptione coronae et in confirmatione ipsius," to uphold the honour of Genoa, to build himself a palace in the city, on a site to be assigned to him by the consuls, and to dwell there one year in every four; to pay, in his capacity of citizen, an exceptional war contribution of a hundred thousand pounds, as well as an annual tax of four hundred marks; to protect the goods and persons of the Genoese and to grant them full liberty of commerce in the territories which he already possessed or should thereafter acquire; to concede such number of *corti* and *albergherie* as should be necessary for the carrying on of their trade, and specifically, enough land for the building of a hundred houses in the port of Oristano (*Aureum stagnum*). He further undertook to despoil the Pisans of the *donnicalie* already granted to them, and to make common cause with the Genoese in expelling them from the island, paying half the expenses of the war and victualling the fleets and armies which were sent to prosecute it. Finally, he undertook to use every means in his power to procure that the Primacy and Legation of Sardinia should be taken from Pisa and given to Genoa. Neither did these concessions avail to liquidate the debt which he owed in respect of the four thousand marks which had been paid by the Genoese citizens to the Emperor, and of the other expenses incurred in connection with his coronation. For the integral performance of these obligations his whole realm was pledged to the Genoese, while, as an immediate guaranty of good faith, he agreed to deliver up the walled towns of Arcolento and Marmilla¹.

¹ Besta, *op. cit.* I, 128, 129, and authorities there cited.

Meanwhile, all Sardinia had risen in arms. Barisone's claim to be "solus rex" had naturally irritated and alarmed his brother judges; and, when they learned that the Genoese were preparing "a great army of knights well nigh two hundred, of footmen and of archers, with eight galleys and three great transports to convey the said army into Arborea, to recover the land and to subjugate all Sardinia to his rule and governance," the Judges of Torres and Cagliari invaded Arborea. Their uncle Gainello degli Ebriaci came to their assistance with a galley, and the greater part of the *giudicato* was ruthlessly devastated. Only the citadel of Cabras, where the royal treasure had been deposited, resisted the onslaught: "Maiorem partem Arboreae igne cremaverunt, oves et boves et equos occiderunt, et inde abstraxerunt cum multa spolia." At the same time the Pisans sent six galleys to Cagliari "pro eius defensione et guardia et totius Sardineae¹."

Finally, on the 22nd of November², the fleet which was to convey Barisone, now a tributary and vassal of Genoa, to his dearly bought kingdom, put out to sea. Unfortunately for him, however, he was already suspected of treachery; the Genoese fully realized how unconscionable was the bargain which they had driven, and, to make matters worse, a few days after the treaty of September 16th, certain Pisans had come to Genoa, "quasi dominum suum desiderio videre cupientes," and had spoken in secret with Barisone and the "nequissimus" Bishop of S. Giusta. A commission of "wise men" was therefore appointed "ut vigilarent in custodia ipsius regis ut in terram nullo modo eundem regem ponerent³." After a prosperous voyage, during which they captured four Pisan *saettie* off Longo Sardo⁴, the Genoese galleys cast anchor in the bay of Oristano. Barisone once more beheld his kingdom; the members of his suite, the *milites iudicis* of the Pisan chronicler, were sent ashore to obtain the ratification of the treaty and the cession to the Genoese of

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 37.

² "Iudex [Parason] denique...Ianuam reversus est,... et ibi moratus est usque ad decimum Kalendas Decembris."

³ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 166.

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 39.

the towns which had been pledged; but neither arguments nor entreaties availed anything with the Consul Pizzamiglio or the "sapientes." Barisone himself was not permitted to land.

The question of ratification appears to have offered little difficulty¹; but the Genoese were determined not to let their debtor out of their hands until he had repaid the whole of the money lent him. This he was unable to do, and the inexorable result of his insolvency was his return to Genoa. Moreover, further delay was felt to be dangerous. No sooner had the Pisans heard of the capture of their *saettie* than they armed eleven galleys and dispatched them to Sardinia "ad expellendos Ianuenses." News came to Oristano of a Pisan fleet at Torres, of another at Cagliari, of the approach of the eleven galleys from Pisa, and of a great army which was advancing by land under the command of a consul. Then, too, a Pisan emissary had been sent to Barisone, though it is not clear that he was permitted to have speech with him²; Agalburza refused to allow the Genoese to take possession of Arcolento unless she was first permitted to see her husband³; and it seemed as though the negotiations were being wilfully protracted until the trap should be ready to close upon the Genoese⁴. Wherefore, says Marangone, "relictis militibus et negotiatoribus et navibus et sagittis, pro timore Pisanorum, cum iudice usque Ianuam fugierunt; qui septimo idus Februarii Ianuam applicuere; de quo facto Ianuenses magnam habuerunt tristitiam, et iudicem in carcere tenuerunt. Pisani itaque Consules qui in Sardinea erant, milites et negotiatores Ianuensium cepere, et totam Sardineam sub tributo et fidelitate, expulsis Ianuensibus, posuerunt⁵."

The clumsy edifice which the Genoese had so laboriously reared on a foundation of fraud and usury fell to pieces about the ears of its architects; and the Emperor once more changed

¹ Besta, *op. cit.* I, 130, and authorities there cited.

² "Et Marzucus pisanus, missus eorum, iam ad regem pro eis venerat."

³ "Domine rex, baiuli vestri et etiam uxor non dimiserunt nos ascendere castrum, neque solutionem facient, donec primo vestram personam viderint." The conjecture that the "castrum" in question was Arcolento is Professor Besta's (*op. cit.* I, 132, n. 46).

⁴ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 167.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 39.

his policy. His contempt for a mere "scrap of paper" was worthy of any modern German Kaiser, and the *privilegium* which Barisone had been so careful to obtain from him¹ availed him nothing. On the 17th of April, 1165, at Frankfurt-on-Main, Frederick annulled the investiture of the previous August and granted *totam insulam Sardiniae* in feud to the commune of Pisa². The gift, however, was not gratuitous. In the preceding November, Christian, Archbishop of Mayence, had visited Pisa³, and had received thirteen thousand silver pounds as the price of investiture⁴.

Pisa had triumphed, but the end was not yet. The Sardinians fully realized that, unless the struggle between the two great maritime cities finished like the battle of the Kilkenny cats, they were inevitably destined to become the vassals of the victors. The maintenance of the Balance of Power was an unalterable condition of their security. To resist the pretensions of Barisone, the other judges had ranged themselves on the side of Pisa; against a too powerful Pisa, laying claim to the suzerainty of the whole island, they were prepared to ally themselves with Genoa; and it is probably to this change of attitude that we may attribute the apparently wanton attack made by the Pisans on Torres, in the following month: "Pisani qui in Turri erant cum xi galeis, praedictis Pisanorum Consulibus invitis et contradicentibus, infra terram ad villas Turris iverunt, easque predabantur et devastabant." The outrage was, however, speedily avenged. On the 12th of May, the Vigil of the Ascension, no fewer than eighty Pisans were put to the sword by the Sardinians. Barisone of Torres, with the Judges of Cagliari and Gallura, hastened to deny all complicity with the action of the populace; Barisone came to Pisa to exculpate himself, and, in a *parla-*

¹ "Cui rex respondit, *Domine imperator, gratia Dei et vestri et dominorum Ianue, omne michi completum est sicut legati vestri michi promiserunt, excepto privilegio regni. Statim imperator mandavit notario, et iussit continuo privilegium scribi et sigillari*" (*Ann. Ianuenses*, p. 162).

² Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 38; Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 38.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 38.

⁴ Oberti Cancellarii *Ann. Ianuenses*, p. 194.

mentum convened in Borgo S. Michele, swore upon the gospels that he had had no part, either material or moral, in the massacre. He admitted that he held his judgeship in feud from the commune and promised, in addition to paying a tribute of a hundred pounds, to present twelve pairs of falcons annually in sign of vassalage¹. Nevertheless, the ancient amity of the Sardinians for Pisa had sustained a shock from which Genoa could hardly fail to reap advantage.

Moreover, as the century grew older, the relative positions of Pisa and Genoa became ever more and more favourable for the latter. The intoxication of enthusiasm, the illusions and ambitions inspired by the identification of the policy of Pisa with the policy of the Empire, were doomed to a bitter awakening; for the resources of Pisa were not equal to the strain to which they were subjected. As we have already seen, her *contado*, though vast in extension, was neither rich enough nor populous enough to bear the continual drain demanded by her maritime enterprises. In the main, the city itself was compelled to supply the city's need of seamen. For a century, thanks to its enormously rapid development, this continued to be possible; but a period of arrest followed; and arrest, while yet the energies and capacities of her enemies were not fully developed, was equivalent to decline. Ere long Genoa easily surpassed her in material resources, and only by the indomitable vigour and daring of her children was Pisa any longer able to hold her own. As wholly maritime in character, the territory of Genoa shared the sentiments and ambitions of the city; and Genoa was able, even in the twelfth century, to complete that transformation of the commune in regard to its relations with the *contado* which elsewhere was only attained under the rule of the despots. Already, the *distrettuali* of Genoa were called "Genoese" and were every whit as much Genoese as were the inhabitants of the city itself. That city had become simply a particular point in the civic territory. Between 1150 and 1180 Genoa completed the work of subjecting, conciliating and binding to herself the cities of her two Riviere: Savona in 1153, and shortly

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 39, 40.

afterwards Noli; Ventimiglia, Porto S. Maurizio and S. Remo in 1166 and 1167; Albenga in 1179. Each and all of them became part "de compagna civitatis Ianue," and a series of treaties placed their maritime forces at the disposition of the Republic¹.

¹ See Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 178. I do not, of course, wish to imply that the subjected cities were all of them contented with their lot. For more than two centuries rebellions were not infrequent (see Carden, *The City of Genoa, op. cit.* pp. 8, 9), but the fact remains that, from the last quarter of the twelfth century, the resources of the two Riviere were at the disposition of Genoa.

CHAPTER THE THIRTEENTH

RAINALD OF COLOGNE

IN 1162 Frederick sent Rainald, Archbishop of Cologne, with the title of *Italiae archicancellarius et imperatoriae maiestatis legatus*, to re-order the administration of Tuscany on a new plan. The dissolution of the Margravate was accepted as an inevitable fact, and it was resolved to reassume the direct government of its various parts by means of German Counts or Potestà, as had already been done in Lombardy. Many fortresses were garrisoned by German troops and others were constructed. S. Miniato al Tedesco, with its tower on the hill-top and the unwallèd village of S. Genesio below, became the centre of the new administration¹. At the same time, an attempt was made to reconcile the rights of the Empire with the jurisdiction which the communes had so long exercised in their respective *contadi*. None of them denied the right of the Emperor to demand the oath of fealty, to confirm in their offices the magistrates freely elected by the citizens, to levy tribute and to raise troops. The cause of their discontent lay in the difficulties which the Imperial potestà interposed to the exercise of civic jurisdiction over the entire territory of the *contado* and diocese of each city. Legally speaking, the potestà were in the right. In every case, except that of Pisa, the jurisdiction exercised by the communes was abusive. One or two of the more favoured of them had, it is true, obtained concessions which enabled

¹ Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc., op. cit.* 1, 121. We have record of these German counts or potestà in the territories of Florence, Siena, Arezzo, Volterra, Pistoia, Prato, Chiusi. Among the rest we may recall a *potestas Florentiae Pipinus*, a *Guilielmus de Asio* (Wilhelm von Aachen) in the Senese, the centre of whose jurisdiction was S. Quirico d' Orcia, and that *Gualdanus comes Volterratorum*, whom we have already mentioned. See Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* pp. 73, 74.

them to assert their authority over certain limited areas¹; but none of them had confined their activities within those areas. To meet this state of affairs, Rainald seems to have adopted the expedient of treating the communes in their corporate capacities as so many officials of the Empire whose business it was to assist the potestà in the performance of their duties. Thus, for example, by the *concordia* of the 10th of July, 1162, stipulated in the name of the Emperor between the Archchancellor and the commune of Lucca, it was agreed that, in return for an annual tribute of four hundred pounds of gold, all the Imperial regalia except the *fodrum* should be left in the hands of the citizens, who, for their part, swore to assist the Emperor loyally in the defence and preservation of his crown, his honour, the city of Lucca, its *contado*, and of all the Imperial regalia within and without the walls, and to aid him to collect the *fodrum* in the diocese and *contado*, whenever they should be thereto requested by a properly authorized *missus*. In other words, the jurisdiction of the commune, if only as the agent of the Emperor, was recognized over the whole of its *contado* and diocese. The Florentine consuls were present at the ratification of the agreement; and, although the *concordia* with Lucca is the only one which has come down to us, it is practically certain that similar conventions were entered into with other cities². For a time, the relations between the German potestà and the communes became less strained, and had it not been for one fatal defect, the system introduced by Rainald might well have achieved all that he hoped from it. In the *concordia* with Lucca no reference had been made to the great feudatories whose domains were situated within the diocese. According to feudal law they held direct from the Emperor and owed no allegiance to any other. Even had he desired to do so, it was beyond the power of the Archchancellor to give the

¹ See, for example, the *privilegium* of Frederick to the Sienese in 1158 (R. Arch. di Stato in Siena, *Caleffo Vecchio*, c^{ta} 8, 8^t) and the diploma granted by Guelf to the Lucchesi in 1160 (Tommasi, *Sommario di Storia Lucchese*, *ubi cit.* p. 32).

² Tommasi, *Sommario della Storia di Lucca*, *ubi cit.* p. 33; Santini, *op. cit.* p. 71. The document is published in *M.G.S. Legum* (Sectio IV, T. 1), p. 302.

communes authority over them. He therefore simply ignored the matter. The citizens, on the other hand, assumed that there were no implied exceptions, and pretended to exercise jurisdiction over every foot of their *contadi* by whomsoever occupied.

During the whole of his sojourn in Tuscany, Rainald received unwavering support and assistance from Pisa, and when, in the spring of 1163, he journeyed through Tuscany, Romagna and the March, collecting tribute from the cities—"tributa et dona plurima et infinitam pecuniam"—and compelling the bishops to swear obedience to the Antipope Victor, he was accompanied by a Pisan consul and two Pisan jurisconsults. Marangone attributes the success of his mission to the fear inspired by the power of the commune. In September Rainald returned to Pisa, "et in ecclesia Sanctae Mariae laudes magnas contulit Deo et imperatori Frederico et pisano populo de tanto honore quod ei dedit, timore Imperatoris, et obtentu pisani populi¹." After holding a Diet of the representatives of all the Tuscan cities at Sarzana he rejoined the Emperor in Lombardy; and, a month later, at Lodi, the Pisan and Genoese ambassadors were ordered to make ready their fleets for the Sicilian expedition in the following spring (1164). It had been Frederick's intention to come himself to Pisa to superintend the final preparations; but, owing to his illness, that enterprise was once more delayed, and Rainald was ordered to return to Tuscany².

Meanwhile, however, Archbishop Villano had reappeared in Pisa, and although it is certain that he did not follow the example of those Tuscan prelates who had acknowledged the Antipope, he appears to have been allowed to exercise his episcopal functions without molestation. At Eastertide Pisa was deprived of the usual baptismal rites because her Archbishop refused to receive the Sacred Chrism at the hands of Victor, and, although the Archchancellor himself entered the city on Easter Eve, no steps seem to have been taken against Villano³. It is moreover curious to note that when, a little later, a Diet

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 32, 33.

² *Ibid.* pp. 33, 34.

³ *Ibid.* p. 34. As to the administration of baptism on the Vigil of Easter, during the Middle Ages, compare L. Zdekauer, *La vita privata dei Senesi nel Dugento* (Siena, Tip. Lazzeri, 1896), p. 9.

of all the Consuls, Counts and Valvassors of Tuscany assembled at Borgo S. Genesio, under the presidency of Rainald, the recusant Archbishop was not only permitted to take his seat among the representatives of Pisa, but did so with the goodwill of the Commune—"cum amore civitatis¹." An able man was Rainald, "more imperial than the Emperor" it may be², but high enough up in the ecclesiastical hierarchy to be able to wink with his brother augurs, and a good deal more of a statesman than a priest. His rôle was that of a conciliator, and he was quite prepared to be blind to Villano's insubordination, if anything could be gained by such a course. In any other city it might have been dangerous, but, in Pisa, where loyalty to the Empire was little less than a religion, it could be safely ignored. Everything was being done that could be done to further the Emperor's administrative reforms and to prepare for the Sicilian expedition³. If the Archbishop were given rope enough, he was quite likely to hang himself. Why then hasten the *dénoûment* at the manifest risk of arousing popular sympathy and indignation?

While the Diet of S. Genesio was yet in session, news came that Victor had died at Lucca. Rainald hastened thither and, without consulting the Emperor, caused the schismatic cardinals to elect a new Antipope. Their choice fell on Guido of Crema, who was proclaimed as Paschal III; and the Lucchesi, both priests and laymen, were ordered to assemble in public parliament and to make oath to obey him and to hold him "pro papa catholico⁴." The reasons which led Rainald to such precipitate action are unknown to us. Though Archbishop-elect of Cologne since 1158, he had postponed his consecration in hopes of being able to receive it from a Pope of unquestioned authority; Frederick himself had for some time been anxious to put an end to the schism, and, so far as we know, his principal

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 34.

² "Più imperiale dell' imperatore." The phrase is Gregorovius' (*op. cit.* II, 557).

³ "Praedicti consules x galeas eo anno fecerunt et quatuor dermones pro equis portandis in exercitu Imperatoris facere inceperunt."

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 35.

advisors were of the same mind¹. He, nevertheless, accepted the election of Paschal as a *fait accompli*.

From Lucca, Rainald returned to S. Genesio, where the sittings of the Diet were resumed. It was, however, daily becoming more and more obvious that the new system of administration which he had inaugurated was not working satisfactorily. The concessions that had been made to the cities had not gained their goodwill. They had accepted them on the principle that half a loaf is better than no bread, but they had by no means abandoned their aspirations to complete autonomy. Many even of the Consuls were secretly in sympathy with Alexander, and the native Counts and minor vassals openly manifested their dislike for the German potestà, against whose rapacity and violence they found it no easy matter to defend their immunities. On taking counsel with Rainald, who after the dissolution of the Diet of S. Genesio had once more returned to Lombardy, Frederick reached the conclusion that any further attempt to conciliate the cities would be mere waste of time and labour, and resolved, from thenceforward, to rely exclusively upon the feudatories of the Empire, among whom he of course reckoned the faithful Pisa. Fresh privileges were granted to the Guidi and the Alberti²; and, in the following autumn, another distinguished prelate, Christian, nominated a little later Archbishop of Mayence, succeeded Rainald as Frederick's representative in Tuscany. Accompanied by the Antipope, he entered Pisa on the 30th of November, the day of St Andrew the Apostle³.

Violent and mercenary, Christian seems to have possessed none of the virtues enumerated by St Paul as necessary for him who "seeketh the office of a bishop," and we can hardly wonder that the good Muratori continually speaks of him in terms of disapproval. The maxims of the Apostolic age had, however, been forgotten long ago, and from the eleventh century to the fifteenth, a bishopric was commonly regarded by the religious as one of the surest roads to damnation; bishops

¹ Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 274.

² Santini, *op. cit.* pp. 77-79.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 38.

lay in hell like sheep¹, and Frederick's great ecclesiastical statesmen and generals were, probably, neither better nor worse than their brother prelates. Christian at any rate served his master zealously, and he is described by the chroniclers as the most capable man of that age whether in political or military affairs. He spoke six languages, was as fine a horseman as any knight of the period, wore a cuirass beneath a cloak of hyacinth colour, and, because shedding of blood was forbidden to churchmen, he carried a huge mace in place of a spear or sword. With it he had killed ten enemies. In his license and in his magnificence he was a typical bishop-baron. His mistresses and his horses alone cost him more than the whole of his court cost the Emperor².

The moderation of Rainald had, as we have seen, enabled him to reconcile a vigorous imperial policy with tacit concessions to the sentiments of respect and affection which the citizens entertained for their Archbishop; but with the advent of Christian all such temporising ceased. He was no Naaman to bow himself in the house of Rimmon for the sake of expediency; Villano must either acknowledge the Antipope or leave Pisa, and he accordingly retired to the island of Gorgona, consoled, it would seem, by the moral solidarity of his clergy and the sympathy of his flock³. The phraseology of Marangone:

¹ Franciscan records tell how a thirteenth century scholar of Paris, being led down into hell in a vision, asked news of his lately deceased uncle the Bishop. The demon replied, "I know him not; so many Bishops come hither daily that I wot not of whom thou speakest." See Coulton, *From St Francis to Dante* (2nd edition), pp. 95 and 284; Ferrers Howell, *S. Bernardino of Siena* (Methuen, 1913), pp. 164-167, and my *Palio and Ponte*, p. 73.

² Lanzani, *Storia dei Comuni Italiani*, *op. cit.* p. 254, note 4. Compare Gregorovius, *Storia della Città di Roma*, *op. cit.* vol. II, lib. VIII, c. VI, § 3, p. 587. Christian, was in fact, one of those warrior-priests whom the mediæval ballad writers delighted to satirise:

Pro virga ferunt lanceam,
pro infula galeam,
clipeum pro stola...

(*Carmina Burana*, 15, cited by Bartoli, *Storia della Lett. Ital.*, *op. cit.* I, 283).

³ See the letter of Cardinal Otto of Brescia to Thomas Becket—*Materials for the History of Thomas Becket* (Rolls Series), vol. v, epist. LXXXII, pp. 158, 159—"Archiepiscopus recessit, clerus aufugit, totus populus ipsum Guidonem contemnit."

“cuius adventu Villanus Pisanorum archiepiscopus, quia nolbat ei obedire, secessit ad Gorgonam,” might seem to imply that his departure was more or less voluntary; but the documents leave no doubt about the matter. He was, in fact, expelled by the Consuls¹: an act, in view of the impending war with Genoa, of sound imperial policy, but, none the less for that, a rebellion of vassals against their seignior². This, it will be remembered, was the time when the Pisans were bargaining with Christian for the investiture of Sardinia³, and doubtless the banishment of Villano was made a condition precedent to any consideration of their claims. Moreover, the Consuls were tired of their subjection to the Archbishop. He had grown in power as the Commune had grown⁴, and, at first, he had been useful and even necessary to its development. When, however, by the Imperial diploma of 1162, the Pisans, in their corporate capacity, had obtained admission to the feudal hierarchy⁵, they no longer needed his services. The episcopal aegis which had served to protect the nascent republic had now become an obstacle to its further growth.

In May, 1165, a great Diet was held at Würzburg, where all the princes of the Empire, lay and clerical, swore to be faithful to Paschal and never to recognize Alexander. It was Christian's mission to enforce the decrees of the Diet in Central Italy, and, after conducting Paschal to Viterbo, he passed into the Roman Campagna at the head of an army, forcing the popula-

¹ “...a tempore expulsionis domini Villani”...“de civitate pisana iussione consulum recessit,” etc. See Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 196, note 3.

² See p. 60 *supra*.

³ P. 155 *supra*.

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 186: “Quando si vorrà rifare la storia delle giurisdizioni temporali dei Vescovi in Italia, bisognerà comprendere in essa tutti i dignitari di tale grado, perchè tutti più o meno—anche là dove più si è soliti non veder quasi traccia di diritti e poteri giurisdizionali del Vescovo... ebbero una notevole ingerenza negli affari del Comune, eliminata tuttavia sempre più, a mano a mano che esso conquistava la propria autonomia civile ...*Qui [cioè in Toscana] le giurisdizioni vescovili non precedono, come generalmente si dice, il Comune, ma ne accompagnano il nascimento e lo sviluppo, conformandosi da esso, acquistando maggiore o minore ampiezza a seconda della maggiore e minor forza vitale del comune stesso. Sono due istituzioni che vivono accanto, svolgendosi in correlazione, ingerendosi l'una nelle cose dell'altra....*”

⁵ Compare H. W. C. Davis, *Medieval Europe*, p. 92.

tion to swear obedience to the Emperor and the Antipope. He was, however, unable to enter Rome, and, in August, after eluding the vigilance of the Pisan fleet¹, Alexander landed at Messina. Thence he was convoyed to the mouth of the Tiber by Sicilian galleys, and, in November, was once more installed in the Lateran. Christian's mission had failed completely, and it was resolved to take immediate steps to force Alexander to abdicate. In October, 1166, Frederick once more invaded Italy; in November, at Lodi, the Italian dignitaries followed the example of Germany by swearing to the Würzburg decrees, and, in March, 1167, Rainald reappeared in Pisa.

Heretofore, as we have seen, he had dealt gently with Villano; but he was now convinced that nothing but vigorous measures could put an end to the schism. At the Diet of Würzburg he had been one of the first to take the oaths, and he had consented to accept consecration at the hands of an adherent of Paschal. At his bidding, the Pisan Consuls swore to join the "felicem exercitum" which the Emperor was preparing for the following summer; to hold Pope Paschal "pro catholico," and to compel all the clergy of Pisa to swear to obey him, to refuse to receive Villano unless he was prepared to make submission, and to elect another Archbishop in his stead. Accordingly, on the 25th of March, Benincasa, a canon of S. Maria Maggiore, was chosen to fill the vacant see. Accompanied by two of the Consuls and by "wise men," both clerical and lay, he betook himself to Pope Paschal, and, on Easter Eve, received consecration at his hands, returning with great honour to Pisa on Easter Monday. He was promptly excommunicated by Rolando "qui papa Alexander vocatur²."

More fortunate than his brother bishop, Ranieri of Siena, who died in exile "expulsus a scismaticis³," Villano was permitted to return to his see a few years later; but the temporal authority of the Pisan Archbishops had received an irreparable shock. Already, in 1163, the Consuls had laid hands upon the

¹ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 47.

³ R. Davidsohn, *Siena interdetta sotto un papa senese*, in *Bullettino Senese di Storia Patria*, v (1898), 63-70.

riparian dues which formed part of the episcopal revenues and had used them for the benefit of the Commune¹; while no sooner had Villano retired to Gorgona than all those who held lands from the Archbishopric by precarious tenures hastened to appropriate them “*dolo malo ac violenter*,” refusing to pay rent and transmitting them to their heirs as though they had, in fact, been seized of the realty. They maintained the legality of their usurpations before the Courts on the ground of prescription, and, because the syndic of the Archbishop did not appear, sentences of contumacy were passed against Villano². A little later, in order to pay certain debts which one of the Consuls had been obliged to incur with Pisan merchants and bankers in Provence, a commission was appointed to appraise the possessions of the Archbishop with a view to their sequestration³. As security for other debts, the Consuls, on the 7th of March, 1166, gave to Marzucco di Gaetano⁴ and Alberto di Barioco all that appertained to the Archbishop in the *castello*, court and district of Piombino, and, in compensation for the expenses which the custody of the place must necessarily entail, the entire tribute until the extinction of the debt⁵. It was, however, in the *contado* that consular usurpations were destined to produce the most lasting effects. Over many of the towns and villages the Pisan Church had heretofore enjoyed undisputed dominion, possessing not only “*droit seigneurial*” but “*droit foncier*,” and exercising both High and Low Justice. The title of *Vicecomes* or *Vicedominus*, which during the second half of the twelfth century was assumed by the ancient *sindacus* of the Archbishop, is not without significance⁶, and the Consuls not

¹ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, 39 (*Breve Consulum*, ann. MCLXIV): “...et universum redditum ripae quam archiepiscopus detinuit, in ipso Podio [Vallis Sercli] construendo expendere faciam....”

² As to the procedure in episcopal causes, see Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I (*Breve Consulum*), 9, 31, 32, and II (*Constitutum usus*), 848.

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 196, 197, and authorities there cited.

⁴ Marzucco was several times Consul; he is frequently mentioned in the Pisan chronicles (*e.g.* Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 37, 49, 60) and we have already seen him acting in the capacity of emissary to Barisone.

⁵ Arch. di Stato in Pisa, *Atti pubblici*, 7 Marzo, 1166, cited by Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 197. See also Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, 38.

⁶ See Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, 31, 32, and II, 848, 849.

unnaturally regarded the existence of such an *imperium in imperio* with increasing disfavour. They were determined to co-operate, by means of the officials of the Commune, in the exercise of ecclesiastical justice, in the same way as, under the reforms of Rainald, the Imperial ministers had co-operated with those of the cities in the administration of the country districts; and thenceforward, the *Treguani* of the Republic showed themselves reluctant to give way to the *Vicecomites* of the Archbishop. Of the conflicts produced by this mixed jurisdiction we obtain a clear idea from a document of the following century which, however, records events that took place when Ubaldo occupied the Pisan see (1175).

The document in question contains the depositions of various witnesses with regard to the archiepiscopal possessions of Nuvola, Villa di Abbazia, Cugnano, Cafaggio, etc., in the Colline Livornesi. From it we learn that, when a crime had been committed, either the Visconte (*vicecomes*) of the Archbishop or the Treguano of the Commune, whichever arrived first upon the scene or first captured the offender, was entitled to deal with the case. So soon as either of them had given judgment or had even arrested the criminal, the jurisdiction of the other was *ipso facto* ousted. In consequence of an affray between certain *consorti* of Cafaggio and others of the neighbourhood, the Visconte Enrico di Montemagno sequestered their property and took the culprits to Nuvola "pro vindicta facienda"; and there one of the witnesses "vidit eos ligatos tunc ad columnam Curiae Archiepiscopi que est in Nubila." In a case of malicious wounding at Nuvola, the Treguano of the Commune hastened thither and had already begun to pull down the house of the delinquent when Archbishop Ubaldo arrived and put a stop to the demolition on the ground that his representative had previously taken the house as security, "non contradicente sibi suprascripto treguano vel aliqua persona." In short, at Nuvola, Abbazia, Cugnano, etc., it is common report "that, if the Archbishop or his nuncio takes upon himself to do justice, the Pisan Commune or its agents do not intervene, and *vice versa*"; and this rule, according to another witness, was observed "et alibi

in terris archiepiscopatus.” Nevertheless, the officials of the two powers sometimes disputed one another’s jurisdiction and even came to blows, and that in the presence of the poor wretch who was about to become the subject of their so dispassionate justice. Thus, upon one occasion, when certain brothers of Cafaggio, who had been guilty of wounding, were brought to Nuvola and tied to the customary column, the Treguano Buonaggiunta arrived too late, and full of despite against the Visconte who had forestalled him, “multa verba cum eo inde habuit in Nubila et ad spatias inde etiam venerunt.” It was, as one sees, a curious method of enforcing the law, or, to speak more correctly, the will of the rival authorities¹.

Thus, long before it was able to establish its own exclusive jurisdiction in the towns and villages of the *contado*, the Comune associated itself with the Archbishop in the exercise of his authority. Nor does there seem to have been any explicit regulation of their respective spheres of action. Certain it is that, in after years, their not always peaceful rivalry was transmuted into open and violent antagonism. The poet’s vision of Ugolino gnawing on the head of Ruggieri is but a later manifestation of ancient enmity, immortalised by its transference to the after-life².


Meanwhile, the quarrel between the Archbishop and the Consuls was complicated by and interwoven with another quarrel between the Archbishop and the Cathedral Chapter, provoked, it would seem, by the pride and obstinacy of Villano, who desired to deprive the Canons of time-honoured privileges which rendered them a practically autonomous college. Most of the Canons were members of the Consular families of Pisa and strong in their wealth, and in the support of their kinsmen, they presented a solid front to the aggressions of the Archbishop. He, on the other hand, asserted that the Cathedral was built upon land belonging to the Archbishopric and laid claim to all

¹ Arch. Mensa Arciv., Pisa, perg. n. 831, 9 luglio 1222. For this reference I am indebted to Professor Volpe, as also for my account of the document. See Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 198, 199.

² *Inferno*, xxxii, 125.



PORTA A DESTRA DELLA FACCIATA. CATTEDRALE
GIOVANNI DA BOLOGNA



BAS-RELIEF. S. MARTIN DIVIDING HIS CLOAK WITH A BEGGAR.
CHURCH OF S. MARTIN

the rights which such a fact might be held to entail. This, of course, once more brought him into conflict with the Comune which regarded the Mother Church of the city as its own: *Ecclesia beatae Mariae Virginis Pisanae civitatis*¹. Nor is it without significance that that Benincasa who supplanted Villano in the Archbishopric was selected from among the Canons of the Cathedral².

¹ Such was the case in nearly all the cities of Italy. Compare my *A History of Perugia*, p. 353.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 184, 185, and authorities there cited.

CHAPTER THE FOURTEENTH

GENOA AND LUCCA AGAINST PISA

ON the 17th of May, 1165, just one month after Frederick had annulled the investiture of Barisone of Arborea and granted Sardinia to Pisa¹, there was a sea-fight between the Pisans and Genoese in the Bay of Porto Venere. In the previous February news had reached Genoa that a Genoese merchantman returning from Ceuta had been shipwrecked off Asinara and captured by the Pisans. The truce between the Communes was still nominally in force, and ambassadors were forthwith sent to the Emperor, "conquerentes de treugua quam Pisani fregerant." The adjustment of the matter was entrusted to Conrad, Frederick's chaplain, and the representatives of Pisa and Genoa met in the island of Palmaria². A long and acrimonious debate followed³, and, unfortunately, when the exasperation of both parties was at its height, the galley of the notorious corsair Trapilicini entered the Bay of Porto Venere⁴. Formerly a Pisan subject, Trapilicini was now in the service of Genoa, and the Pisans would have given a good deal to lay their hands on him. The Genoese Consul seems to have endeavoured to pour oil on the troubled waters, but he received no assistance from Trapilicini himself who told the Pisans to their faces that he was setting out "pro capiendis vestris et vestrorum rebus et personis, et pro nasis obtruncandis vestratum, nisi cum consule Ianue concordiam feceritis." That night a messenger was secretly sent to Pisa, and a galley was fitted out in all haste for the capture of the pirate: "Anno Domini MCLXVI, decimosexto

¹ See p. 155 *supra*.

² "...habentes simul colloquium in insula ad sanctum Iohannem." Compare Repetti, *Dizionario*, cited, II, 606.

³ See Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 170-175.

⁴ Trapilicini is mentioned in the *Breve Consulum* of 1164 (Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, 24): "...exceptis illis qui sceleratissimum et abhominabile in navi Trapilicini de Saracenis maleficium commiserunt."

Kal. Iunii. Pisanorum Consules miserunt unam galeam bene armatam ad Portum Veneris, pro capienda galea Trapilicini; quam galeam pisana galea viriliter expugnavit, et eam cepisset nisi Consul Ianuensium, qui ibi erat cum Uguccione, Pisanorum Consule, pro pace componenda, in auxilium Trapilicini cum *buthettis* et aliis navibus super Pisanorum galeam occurrisset¹." According to Oberto Cancelliere, who gives a long and detailed account of the battle², the Pisans, so far from capturing Trapilicini, were themselves captured by the Genoese, and though such of them as had come "pro pace" were permitted to return to their homes, the Pisan galley was taken in triumph to Genoa.

War followed, and in July the Pisans armed ten galleys, seven of which steered southward towards Sicily "pro Ianuensibus capiendis"; and, off the island of Ischia, they took a galliot and other ships. The remaining three galleys "went to Provence, and captured a great Genoese ship with all her cargo, and very many other ships and seven Genoese *buthettos* coming from Spain; and so, with much honour and with thirty-seven great citizens of Genoa whom they had taken prisoners, they returned to Pisa on the 21st of July." While they were in Provençal waters, they had, however, narrowly escaped being surprised by a Genoese fleet of fourteen galleys which had been sent to intercept them under the command of the Consul Amico Grillo. Learning that they had ascended the Rhone to St Gilles, he followed them thither and would certainly have captured them had they not been warned betimes of his coming and made good their escape through another branch of the delta³. The Genoese thereupon burned some unladen merchantmen which were lying at the wharves of St Gilles, with the result that, when a little later they desired to victual their galleys there,

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 40.

² Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 175-178.

³ Now that we are no longer dependent upon Caffaro for the Genoese side of the story, we find the chroniclers of the two cities in substantial agreement. Between the accounts of this war given by Marangone (pp. 41-43) and Oberto Cancelliere (pp. 180, 181) there is scarcely more discrepancy than exists between the three Synoptic Gospels; a fact which goes far to justify the belief I have already expressed in the substantial accuracy of the *Cronaca Pisana*.

“homines sancti Egidii queque necessaria illis prohibuerunt.” They returned to Genoa on the 1st of August. A few days afterwards, a fleet of thirty-one Pisan galleys sailed for Corsica; they ravaged Cap Corse (*Caput Corsi*), and then, standing across the Ligurian Sea to Albenga, took it by storm and burned it to the ground (21 August)¹. Leaving nothing but smoking ruins behind them, they once more put out to sea, and falling in with a richly laden fleet of twenty-eight merchantmen on their way to Genoa, captured them all; “and,” says Marangone, “through all the Genoese Riviera even unto Montpellier, they destroyed very many ships.”

Meanwhile, the Genoese, “valde irati” at the burning of Albenga, equipped some forty-five or fifty galleys and went in search of the Pisan raiders. Learning that they had entered the Rhone “per fauces Caprae²” and were lying at anchor at St Gilles, they rowed up the river after them, and, with the intention, it would seem, of delivering a night attack, continued to press on after the sun had gone down. When, however, they were between Fourques (*Furcas*) and St Gilles, with scarcely more than a mile to go, some of the galleys ran aground, and those that followed, crashing into them in the dark, broke many of their oars. In the morning, before they could clear away the wreckage, they were informed by the magistrates of St Gilles that, if they violated the neutrality of that city, the inhabitants would not hesitate to join forces with the Pisans. The Genoese thereupon sent ambassadors to Raymond of Toulouse, “comes sancti Egidii,” who was then at Beaucaire³, promising to pay him one thousand three hundred marks if he would aid them against their enemies. Each of the Communes had its own partisans in Provence. At Narbonne, the Viscountess Ermen-gard was favourable to Pisa, while Raymond leaned towards Genoa⁴. His friendship, however, was not proof against cor-

¹ Oberto Cancelliere is our authority for this fact: “quam igne combusserunt et destruxerunt.” Caffaro would have carefully kept silence.

² Namely that mouth of the Rhone which was known as *le grau de la chèvre*. See Belgrano, *Annali Genovesi, etc., op. cit.* vol. I, p. 180, note 1.

³ The city of Aucassin and Nicolette.

⁴ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 236 n.

ruption, and although he accepted the offer of the Genoese, he did not scruple to betray them as soon as the Pisans made a higher bid for his assistance. Relying upon his co-operation, the Genoese landed in the territory of St Gilles and attacked the Pisans. Oberto Cancelliere says that the battle was stopped by the coming on of night. Marangone, on the other hand, speaks of a Pisan victory: "Magnum bellum in terra iuxta Rodanum fecerunt, et gratia Dei Pisani vicerunt illos: de quo bello multi Ianuenses capti et interfecti sunt, et omnia moenia eorum destruxere." There is nothing necessarily inconsistent in the two narratives; and if the Provençals ranged themselves on the side of the Pisans, the defeat of the Genoese is not to be wondered at. Nevertheless, it is by no means necessary to postulate a Pisan victory in order to account for the departure of the Genoese. The news that the Pisans were arming twenty galleys for a raid on Genoa itself was alone enough to make them hurry home again. "Iudicio Dei marisque," that raid was never made; for, when the Pisans were off the promontory of Portofino, a sudden tempest drove them southward to Porto Venere. There they landed, and after devastating the country up to the walls of the town, returned to Pisa on the 7th of September. Finding that there was as yet no news from Provence, they equipped a second expedition of twenty-five galleys, and once more started for Genoa. On the 13th they reached Levanto and burned the unwallled suburbs, though there seems to have been no attempt to take the fortress (*castrum*)¹. Then another violent storm forced them to abandon all hopes of reaching Genoa, and they ran for shelter to the Bay of Porto Venere. "Vix cum magno labore reversi sunt," says Marangone. They disembarked, first on the Island of Palmaria and then on the mainland, but retired to their ships when the Marquis Malaspina and the men of Vezzano came to the help of the Portoveneresi.

¹ Manfroni (*op. cit.* p. 237) asserts that the Pisans "distrussero il castello di Levanto"; but the sources do not bear him out. Manfroni (p. 42) tells us that "totum in circuito devastaverunt," and Oberto Cancelliere (p. 186) that "burgum igne combusserunt." The *castello* was evidently not destroyed.

Other episodes of this war were the capture, off Elba, on the day of St Michael the Archangel, of a richly-laden Genoese merchantman coming from Alexandria¹; the burning of the Pisan quarter in Torres by three Genoese galleys under the eyes of the Pisan Consul², and finally, the destruction of a large part of the Pisan fleet as it was returning from Provence. Driven out to sea by a terrible tempest which began on the 29th of October and raged with unabated fury for two days and nights, some of the galleys foundered in mid-ocean, others were shipwrecked on the shores of Sardinia and Corsica, and one, which succeeded in reaching the coast of Africa, was captured by pirates and taken to Bugia, where most of the crew were murdered in cold blood. Of thirty-one galleys, nineteen only returned to Pisa³. According to Oberto Cancelliere, the Genoese displayed a chivalrous desire not to take advantage of the misfortunes of their enemies. "Having taken counsel, we sent (he says) to Pisa that we were grieved at their unheard of calamity, and, lest they should deem that our pride was thereby exalted, we were content, if it so pleased them, to abide by the conventions entered into at Lerici [*sic*] between us and them⁴." Probably, however, the altruism of the Genoese was not so great as the annalist would have us believe. Ever since the collision between the followers of Falco di Castello and Rolando Avvocato, the city had been torn by intestine discords, and now things had come to such a pass that the whole thought of the magistrates was "how they might best, if not altogether at least in part, extinguish civil war⁵."

The overtures of the Genoese therefore met with no response and the Pisans set about repairing their losses with admirable energy. More than thirty-six thousand pounds were borrowed

¹ "Unam navem Ianuensium et burgensium Panormi, venientem de Alexandria."

² Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 185.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 43.

⁴ P. 187. The words "factum ad Ilicem" are evidently a slip of the pen. What are referred to are obviously the negotiations at Porto Venere in the preceding May. No conventions had been entered into at Lerici.

⁵ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 187.

by the Consuls, and during the ensuing year (1166) no fewer than forty-seven galleys were equipped. Hostilities re-opened in Sardinian waters, and, on the 23rd of May, a great ship which the Genoese had sent to Oristano "to carry merchandise for the payment of the debt of the Judge of Arborea" was captured by the Pisans. On the 24th, off Capocaccia, they intercepted another richly-laden merchantman from Garbo (Algarve); "and so they returned to Pisa with honour and great glory and triumph." Marangone estimates the value of the two prizes at over eight thousand pounds¹. In June news came that the Genoese had dispatched eight galleys under the command of the Consul Recalcato, "pro subiuganda Sardinia," and seventeen galleys were sent in pursuit of them. The enemy were sighted off the coast of Cagliari, but succeeded in making good their escape, "usque Ianuam" according to Marangone. Oberto Cancelliere, however, tells us that, when Recalcato had out-distanced the Pisan galleys with as much ease as if they had been heavily laden merchantmen, he steered for Porto Pisano and "combussit ibi naves²." And here it may be remarked that it is by no means impossible that the assertion of the Genoese annalist is true and that the Genoese galleys actually "dimiserunt illas Pisanorum tamquam ligna aliquibus mercibus honerata." Only when the rowers were comparatively fresh, was it possible for the galley to obtain a high rate of speed, and if, as appears to have been the case, the Genoese were riding at anchor when they were sighted by the Pisans, already wearied with rowing, it would have been strange indeed had they failed to draw away from their pursuers³. In any case, the raid on Porto Pisano, if it ever took place, was the only success that the Genoese could boast during the whole of 1166. A short truce

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 43: "quae naves plus octo milibus libris valuerunt."

² Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 191.

³ "The speed of a galley was calculated by the French engineer Forfait to be in the most favourable circumstances, that is to say in a flat calm, but four and a half knots for the first hour, and two and a quarter to one and a half miles per hour for subsequent hours; the exhaustion of the rowers consequent on their arduous toil would not admit of a greater speed than this." See E. Hamilton Currey, *Sea Wolves of the Mediterranean* (Nelson and Sons), p. 250.

followed, during which the representatives of the two Communes met at Porto Venere, but were unable to come to any agreement, and the war was renewed with fresh violence.

On the 25th of July seven Pisan galleys encountered a like number of Genoese galleys off the Island of Elba, and, after a furious battle, took two of them and put the rest to flight. The loss of the Genoese was very heavy; many were slain with the sword, many drowned, and no fewer than three hundred and twenty were taken prisoners. Meanwhile, five Pisan galleys had been sent to Provence, where "they took forty ships both great and small, and burned them all with fire and sank them in the abyss of the sea; and so, with forty Genoese prisoners and two thousand five hundred pounds of good money, they returned to Pisa with triumph and great joy, on the 4th of August¹."

"Now, when the Genoese had heard of the victory which the seven Pisan galleys had gotten on their galleys and of the five galleys which had gone to Provence and of the great damage that they did, they were vehemently moved at that shame and loss; and incontinently they manned six galleys with the noblest and bravest of Genoa, whereof Baldovino Guercio was captain." And "when they could not find the Pisans in Provence, they went to Corsica and through all the islands, seeking them; and so they came to Elba." There they were joined by a galley of Porto Maurizio; and "when they were nigh unto Vada, six Pisan galleys issued forth against them, and they fled before them. Whereupon, another galley, which was at Castiglione², beholding their flight, hastened and came to the help of the six galleys. And for well nigh twenty miles did the Genoese craftily (*dolose*) flee before the Pisans across the open sea, until, at the last, Baldovino Guercio with his men turned, raging for battle, upon the pursuers. Then, prow to prow, the seven Pisan galleys and the seven Genoese galleys shocked together; long and doubtful was the battle, and many on either side were slain and wounded. Yet, in the end, by the grace and power of God,

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 44, 45.

² Castiglione Mondiglio, now Castiglioncello di Rosignano. See Repetti, *Dizionario*, I, 591.

the Pisan galleys conquered the galleys of the Genoese; and two of them they captured, wherein were Baldovino Guercio and the best of the Genoese; and many of them they slew with the sword. The other five galleys fled away" (20th August). The annalist tells us that the dissensions which rent the city of Genoa were equally violent on board the galleys—"sicut odium erat infra urbem, sic in galeis"—and the desertion of Baldovino was probably due rather to treachery than fear. Yet the fact remains that for Pisa the year 1166 was a year of almost unbroken victory, and Oberto Cancelliere is constrained to admit that, albeit the Genoese sent out many galleys, they did not succeed in taking a single Pisan ship¹. Neither had Pisa put forth all her strength. After half ruining the commerce of her rival and twice defeating her in open battle, she turned to rid her seas of Saracen corsairs and rendered powerful assistance to the Arch-chancellor Rainald in the war which he was waging against Pope Alexander. Pushing southward as far as Terracina, her galleys inflicted serious losses on the Papal partisans; and, on the 9th of September, the Pisans stormed and took Civitavecchia "pro honore imperatoris²."

Finding themselves no longer able to cope with their enemy single-handed, the Genoese besought the help of Lucca, and Lucca was only too ready to give it. Not only did she long to possess a seaport where Viareggio now stands, but the ever-increasing circulation of Pisan money had added a new item to the long list of grievances which she treasured up against her hated neighbour. In June, 1155, the Emperor had confirmed to the Lucchesi their ancient right of minting money, forbidding the imitation of their coinage under the severest penalties³; but, in the following month, he seriously diminished the value of that concession by renewing the privilege granted by Conrad to the Pisans of coining money which should be current throughout Italy. Inasmuch as the Pisans were accustomed to copy the coinage of Lucca, the diploma of Frederick practically sanc-

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 45; Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 191-193.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 45, 46; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 239.

³ Tommasi, *Sommario della Storia di Lucca, ubi cit.* p. 31.

tioned that abuse, and ere long we find the money of Pisa competing with that of Lucca, not only in Florence but also in Umbria and the March¹. Fresh fuel was thus added to the smouldering fires of ancient enmity, and at least twice since the truce of 1158, the Pisans and Lucchesi had met with arms in their hands: once at the Diet of S. Genesio, in 1160, and once in the summer of 1165, when the Pisans had driven the Lucchesi in headlong rout from the Bagni di Monte Pisano even unto Massa². What wonder if the proposals of Genoa were eagerly welcomed? By the treaty of October 7th, 1166, the Genoese promised to pay an annual subsidy and to build the tower of Motrone on the sea-shore, some two miles to the south of Pietrasanta. In return the Lucchesi were to wage war on the Pisans by land, while the Genoese assailed them by sea³.

An alliance between cities belonging to different provinces and differing widely in the habits and characteristics of their inhabitants was, in those days, unusual. Even in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when intercourse between the Communes had increased enormously, the alliances entered into were generally between Communes belonging to the same region. Occasionally, no doubt wider leagues were formed, but only when some powerful enemy menaced all alike: the Companies of Adventure, for example, or the Dukes of Milan. As a rule, the geographical factor was the determining one. Lucca and Genoa, on the contrary, were not only distant from one another, but there was no natural bond of union between them; they had simply banded together to crush Pisa. The other Tuscan cities seem to have looked on with disapproval; and when, in 1168, the Lucchesi consigned to the Genoese the

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 160, 161, and authorities there cited. Compare also Ptolemaei Lucensis *Annales*, ad ann. 1155 and 1158, pp. 53 and 54 of the Florentine edition.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 40. The Massa here spoken of is, of course, Massa Pisana.

³ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, p. 193; Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 46; Tommasi, *Sommario della Storia di Lucca*, *ubi cit.* p. 38. The text of the treaty has been published by Cordero, *Atti intorno al commercio dei Lucchesi coi Genovesi*, in *Atti della R. Accad. Lucchese*, Tom. x, p. 86.

Pisan prisoners whom they had captured at Asciano, indignation was universal. "Unde Lucenses malam famam per totam Tusciam habuerunt quia Pisanos captos in aliam provinciam transmiserunt," writes Marangone¹; and the point of view was natural enough. The old Roman roads which had bound men together had gone from bad to worse²; travel was less and less easy, and the physical features of the country were making themselves felt. "People living on different sides of a mountain chain, a river, or sea, saw so little of one another that in a few generations their languages were mutually unintelligible, and by intermarriage or contact with different environments their physical features began to differ³." For a Tuscan of the twelfth century a Ligurian was every whit as much a foreigner as was a Frenchman or a Spaniard, and he was a great deal better hated⁴.

The alliance between Lucca and Genoa not only increased the military efficiency of the enemies of Pisa, but threatened her commercial interests as well. She had heretofore enjoyed a practical monopoly of the sea-borne trade of Tuscany; if the Lucchesi were permitted to acquire a port at Motrone and to carry their merchandise in Genoese bottoms, that monopoly would be seriously infringed. In these circumstances, she besought the help of the Emperor whom she had served so faithfully. If Frederick could be prevailed upon to insist that the rights which he had conferred by the diploma of April, 1165, should be respected, and that the Genoese should cease from

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 53; Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 151, 152. It would appear from the testimony of the Genoese annalist that the Lucchesi themselves were reluctant to commit so great a crime. See Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, p. 208.

² On the Roman roads and all that they implied see the opening pages of C. F. Keary, *The Vikings in Western Christendom* (London, 1891).

³ C. D. Burns, *Political Ideals, op. cit.* p. 181.

⁴ The Tuscan hatred of the Genoese voiced itself in the saying: "Mare senza pesce, montagne senza alberi, uomini senza fede, e donne senza vergogna." Compare also the well-known lines in the thirty-third canto of the *Inferno*:

Ahi Genovesi, uomini diversi
D' ogni costume, e pien d' ogni magagna,
Perchè non siete voi del mondo spersi?

troubling Sardinia, Pisa's hands would be freed to deal with the new danger.

In October, 1166, Frederick returned to Italy. A Diet was held at Lodi in November; and either there or at Pavia, where he celebrated the Christmas festival, Pisan envoys appeared before the Imperial Curia and demanded that the Genoese should be forbidden to intermeddle in Sardinia. They were naturally supported by the Archbishop of Mayence, for it was to him that they had paid the price of investiture, and at first the Emperor seemed disposed to grant their petition as a matter of course. Rising to his feet, he charged the Genoese upon their fealty to desist from molesting the Pisans. Hardly, however, had he finished speaking when Oberto Spinola bluntly declared that, if any such injunctions were laid upon his fellow-citizens they would not obey them. The investiture made to the Pisans was, he asserted, null and void. Sardinia belonged to the Genoese by right of conquest; as conquerors they held it in the name of the Emperor, and as conquerors they intended to hold it. If the Pisans, relying on the words just spoken by Frederick—"pro hac, non sententia, sed voce tantum imperatoris"—dared to set foot in the island, the Genoese would cut off their noses and gouge out their eyes¹. The legend of Mogahid was once more put forward as serious history; while, in proof of the continued overlordship of Genoa, it was alleged that the merchants of Gaeta and Naples, when they visited Sardinia, were wont to offer, to such of the Genoese as they found there, "a shield full of loaves, two glass jars, called *miuolia*, full of pepper, and two barrels of wine, *loci potestate non prohibente, sub cuius fidutia insule Sardinee applicuisse videntur.*" At Easter, even the Judge of Cagliari himself presented a huge cheese, so heavy that it took a yoke of oxen to draw it; and Cagliari, when the Genoese first conquered it, "erat caput tocius Sardinie²."

The Pisans apparently made no attempt to refute these argu-

¹ "Nos illorum nasos et oculos de capitibus eiciemus, si in eadem insula invenerimus illos."

² Compare Besta, *op. cit.* 1, 135, and *Atti della Soc. ligure st. pat.* XVIII, p. 210, there cited.

ments. Sardinia was theirs by Imperial concession, and confident in their own loyalty, they were content to look to their suzerain to perform the duty he owed them. "Lord Emperor," they cried, "you see how the Genoese despise your sentence and your words. Do then that which you deem to be to the honour of your Curia. Never will you find vassals more faithful than we; and we maintain that the Genoese would not have united to come thus meekly to your feet save only for fear and by reason of the might of the Pisans. That this is so you ought to believe by manifest proof; for twice in this year have we vanquished them and had justice upon them, with seven galleys against seven." A great uproar followed and the Court was adjourned till the next day.

The feudal contract was a reciprocal one; the same faith and loyalty which the vassal owed to his seignior was owed by the seignior to his vassal, whom he was bound so to guard and defend that none should do him wrong. As the head of the feudal hierarchy, Frederick had no superior over him to whom an injured feudatory might cry for justice, and his duty was clear. By every motive of righteousness and honour he was held to protect the Pisans in the possession of Sardinia. On the other hand, care for his own interests seemed to demand that he should win over the Genoese. He was probably aware that there had recently been *pourparlers* between them and the brother of the Queen Regent of Sicily, Sancho VI of Navarre, and that, lured by the promise of magnificent commercial concessions, they were meditating an alliance with the Normans¹. Such a disaster must be averted at any cost, and the same specious plea of necessity which led a later Kaiser to decree the devastation of Belgium, led Frederick to betray the staunchest of his vassals. The loyalty of Pisa had been tried and tested, and would doubtless bear the strain of Imperial injustice. Genoa was disloyal and must therefore be conciliated.

The next morning, without hearing any further arguments, the Emperor peremptorily ordered the Pisans to release all their Genoese prisoners. They replied that they had taken them as

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 240.

enemies in open fight and were bound by no law to let them go; but Frederick was inexorable, and the Court gave judgment "ut omnes capti, honore imperii, liberarentur." The Pisans loudly protested against the injustice of the sentence; high words followed, and Uguccione Bononi gave the lie direct to one of the Genoese envoys and challenged him to ordeal by battle. The challenge was promptly accepted, and two Pisans and two Genoese were sworn upon the Gospels *facere bellum* at the commandment of the Emperor. It does not seem, however, that the champions ever met. The Genoese were doubtless willing enough to fight, but the result of such an arbitrament must at the best be doubtful; they preferred to gain by cunning what they could not be certain of winning by force. "Lord Emperor," said Oberto Spinola, "you know that both we and the Pisans must be with the army in your service. We have sworn to them that, neither while we shall be there, nor for a month after our return, will we offend either their possessions or their persons, and that, when that time is over, we will make no complaint to any one touching any injury which they may thereafter do us. If they will make the same oath in your presence, we will give you a thousand silver marks." Even had the oaths of the Genoese been likely to bind them, the Pisans, by accepting such conditions, would have despoiled themselves of all the advantages gained in two years of successful warfare. They, therefore, held their peace; and, says the annalist, "when they answered not, the Lombards shouted with one voice: *Mortui sunt Pisani*¹. In the morning it was resolved in the Curia that the Archbishop Rainald should go to Genoa and the Archbishop of Mayence to Pisa. And upon the third day it was decreed that all the prisoners should be released. Nevertheless the said Archchancellor Rainald obeyed not the word of the Emperor but went to Pisa. Whether he was corrupted by prayer or money I know not¹." Meanwhile, Frederick favoured the Genoese in their cause against William of Montferrat and the Marquis of Gavi², and did everything in his power to win their

¹ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 194-200.

² Oberti Cancellarii *Annales* cited, pp. 193, 194; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 241.

friendship; but all his pains were wasted because the Pisans obstinately refused to let the prisoners go. Hostilities were resumed in March, 1167.

In the same month, as we have already seen¹, Rainald once more appeared in Pisa, and the Consuls swore to join the "happy army" which was gathering for the invasion of the Kingdom of Sicily. The scurvy treatment which they had received at the hands of their suzerain had not diminished their loyalty, and it was probably due to the whole-hearted assistance they gave him that they were unable to repeat their victories of the preceding year. The *magnus stolus* which they equipped for the Imperial expedition, and the ten galleys which had gone to the siege of Alexandria under the Consul Burgense² must have left but few ships available for any other purpose, and, in 1167, Fortune seems upon the whole to have favoured the Genoese. They sent four galleys under the command of the Consul Rodoano³ to blockade the mouths of the Rhone, and in May the king of Aragon entered into a treaty with them whereby the Pisans were excluded from all the ports of his kingdom⁴. There was, however, no important naval engagement, and in July the Pisans made overtures "ad pacem inveniendam et componendam." Five representatives from each city were appointed to discuss terms; but the negotiations came to nothing⁵. The Pisans, probably, never intended that they should come to anything. What they wanted was a truce during which they might fulfil their promises to Frederick.

On the 11th of January the Emperor left Lodi and took the way of the Via Emilia towards the Romagna, intending first to conquer Ancona, and then to advance on Rome through central Italy. Ancona had acknowledged the authority of Manuel Comnenus and had received a Greek garrison, and it could not safely be left untaken in the rear of the Imperial army. As to the cities of the Veronese Mark, Frederick no

¹ P. 165 *supra*.

² P. 113 *supra*.

³ "In quibus [galeis] Rodoanus consul fuit a sociis dominus preelectus."

⁴ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales* cited, p. 205. Compare Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 241, citing the *Liber jurium*, vol. 1, col. 227. Treaty of May, 1167.

⁵ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, p. 202.

doubt calculated that he could deal with them at his leisure after he had subdued Alexander and William II of Sicily. Even when the Congresses of Bergamo, Cremona and Pontida (February–April, 1167) had given birth to the Lombard League, he still believed that the surest way of taming the insurgent cities was to crush the Pope and the Normans. Deprived of those allies, the Lombards would lie at his mercy¹. Ancona, however, offered an unexpectedly vigorous defence. There were Pisan knights in the Imperial army²; but fear of the Genoese delayed the arrival of Pisan galleys, and the sea remained open³. A constant stream of reinforcements, munitions and provisions was poured into the city by the Greeks. Frederick reluctantly reached the conclusion that valuable time was being wasted, and learning that Rainald of Cologne and Christian of Mayence had fought a battle with the Romans, and that the army of William of Sicily was advancing to the help of Alexander, he raised the siege and hastened towards Rome (July, 1167). The Leonine city was soon occupied, and, after an obstinate resistance which piled the pavement with corpses and stained the walls and altars with blood, St Peter's itself fell into the hands of the Germans. There, on the following Sunday, the Antipope Paschal celebrated high mass, and there Frederick was once more solemnly crowned. Alexander and his partisans were besieged in the Colosseum and in the houses of the Frangipani⁴.

In May eight Pisan galleys had co-operated with Rainald in the taking of Civitavecchia⁵, and now eight more galleys, under the command of the Consuls Teperto Duodi and Bulgarino Anfossi, ascended the Tiber, devastating the churches and villas on either bank. Their presence doubtless contributed to the submission of the Romans. Marangone would have us believe that they were the actual cause of it. "When," says he, "one of the Pisan galleys, with the Consuls and *sapientes* on board

¹ See Butler, *The Lombard Communes*, *op. cit.* pp. 129 *et seq.*

² "Et convocatis Pisanis qui secum militibus iverant." Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, p. 203.

³ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 242.

⁴ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 48.

and with many banners displayed, came *ad romeam ripam prope pontem*¹ and anchored there, the Romans, for the great fear that they had, cast themselves at the feet of the Emperor and swore to do his commandment².”

It seemed as though the *ignis fatuus* of Sicilian conquest which had so long danced before the eyes of Frederick was at last within his reach; but the Pisans, who had prepared “a great fleet of fifty galleys and thirty-five *saettie* and many other ships,” bluntly told him that, if he permitted the Genoese to take part in the expedition, they would have nothing whatever to do with it. The Genoese, on the other hand, once more raised the question of the prisoners and made their release a condition precedent to any assistance from them. In these circumstances, Frederick did not hesitate to throw over the Genoese, who had, it would seem, as yet made no preparations of ships or men³. But he had already delayed too long. His army was annihilated by a terrible pestilence⁴, which appeared to that age the direct vengeance of heaven for the attack on the Holy City and the lawful Pope⁵. Among the victims was the Archchancellor Rainald. Nothing was left but precipitate retreat, and, on the 6th of August, the Emperor struck his tents and hurried northward. In September he was in the neighbourhood of Lucca, and seems to have visited both Lucca and Pisa⁶. The Pisans, no doubt, received him with all due deference; we are told that the keys of the city were offered to him by the magistrates in a silver basin, while all the people shouted “Empire! Empire!”;

¹ “Ripa Romea” is identified by Gregorovius (*op. cit.* vol. II, lib. VIII, c. v, p. 576, note 80) with the “Ripa Grande” of later times.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 49.

³ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 203, 204.

⁴ According to Dr Raymond Crawford (*Plague and Pestilence in Literature and Art*, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1914, p. 104) the pestilence which destroyed the army of Barbarossa “seems to have been bubonic plague.” See, however, Gregorovius, *op. cit.* vol. II, lib. VIII, c. v, p. 565.

⁵ Compare Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 354, where the “*deforme tempus*” which followed is attributed to the wrath of God. The imperialist Marangone (*ubi cit.* p. 50) makes no such assumption, but simply records the facts. It is, perhaps, not without interest to note that, in January, the Arno was frozen over “*et certamina magna libere fecerunt.*” Compare my *Palio and Ponte*, p. 104.

⁶ “*Et Pisanam civitatem et Lucam visitavit.*”

but the shattered remnant of the great army, no longer strong enough to face even the Lombard League, must have created a painful impression. The splendid dream of a virtual co-partnership with the Empire in a conquered Sicily was perforce abandoned, and no sooner had Frederick gone northward by the Via Francigena than the Consul Bulgarino Anfossi and two *sapientes* were sent to treat for peace with King William. He, however, was not minded to pay too dearly for Pisan neutrality, and the negotiations were speedily broken off¹. During the ensuing winter, Frederick was reduced to such extremities that he even thought of recognizing Alexander as Pope, and when, in March, 1168, he fled from Italy with a mere handful of followers, Lucca and Genoa, rejoicing as at a victory won by their own prowess, set about the work of crushing Pisa. Moreover, the catastrophe which had overtaken the Emperor injuriously affected the internal conditions of Pisa itself. The question of the Archbishop once more agitated men's minds, and it soon became manifest that popular sympathy for Villano was as active as ever. Then too, the disaffection of the Visconti seems to have become a serious danger. They had not forgotten their defeat at the hands of the Commune, and were eager to take revenge upon their despoilers. The betrayal of Agnano to the Lucchesi in the following year was certainly an act of retaliation².

The war opened in Provençal waters, and on the 24th of April, just before daybreak, four Pisan galleys, which had separated from the main fleet and put into Agde to obtain supplies, were surprised and captured by the Genoese, "hominibus in eis dormientibus et nichil sentientibus³." After a long series of disasters, the Genoese had at last achieved a considerable naval success, and they were proportionately elated. The good news

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 49, 50.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 54: "Anno Domini MCLXVIII, Indictione II. Tancredus Vicecomes castrum de Agnano pecunia a Lucensibus sibi conventa, scelleratissime Lucensibus ipso die Kal. Martii tradidit, et eos intromisit." Compare Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 201.

³ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 207, 208; Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 51, 52.

was forthwith sent to Lucca, and the Lucchesi determined to strike at once. On the 13th of May they attacked and burned Quosa, and thence, on the 16th, "bene parati militum, peditum et sagittariorum," they advanced to Asciano. The garrison, though a mere handful and taken unawares, boldly sallied forth and put the enemy to flight, slaying many of them and taking a few prisoners. Unfortunately, however, they continued their pursuit too far, and the Lucchesi, perceiving how few they were, took heart of grace and turned upon them. Overwhelmed by superior numbers, the Pisans were hopelessly routed. Twenty knights of noble birth and thirty-nine foot-soldiers were led captive to Lucca¹. During the last three years, hundreds of Genoese had died of starvation and misery in the dungeons of Pisa, but hundreds still survived; and no sooner did tidings of the victory of Asciano reach Genoa than it was resolved to make every effort to get possession of the Pisan prisoners, and especially of the noblest of the knights. With that precious pledge in their hands, the Genoese might reasonably hope to obtain the release of their fellow-citizens. Ambassadors were accordingly sent to Lucca, and after some delay, twelve of the chiefest and bravest (*de maioribus et fortioribus*) of the Pisan knights were delivered to them at Viareggio². The prisoners passed the night "in fundo turris, ubi erat aqua fetens et vermes," and in the morning they were put on board a galley which had come from Porto Venere to convey them to Genoa. The tables were now completely turned. Not only was the actual number of the Pisans in Genoa greater than that of the Genoese in Pisa—the taking of the four galleys at Agde had more than redressed the balance³—but the individual importance of the captives was all in favour of the Genoese. As a result the Pisans agreed to an exchange of prisoners⁴. Mean-

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 52; Ptolemaei Lucensis *Annales, ubi cit.* p. 57. See also Tommasi, *Sommario della Storia di Lucca, ubi cit.* lib. I, cap. IV, pp. 38, 39.

² "Quos Lucenses cum multis militibus usque ad turrim de mare duxerunt."

³ "Nam fuerunt Pisani numero .DCC. Ianuenses vero .CCCXXXIII."

⁴ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 209.

while, the Genoese attacked the island of Pianosa and destroyed a great part of the fortifications which had been constructed there; they sent eight galleys to intercept seven Pisan galleys which were convoying the Imperial Chancellor to Fréjus, and chased them across the Ligurian Sea¹; in August, they captured a Pisan galley off Savona².

Through the good offices of Archbishop Villano who betook himself to Genoa, and "in the Church of S. Lorenzo the Martyr preached humbly and wisely of peace," negotiations were once more entered into, and the envoys of Pisa, Lucca and Genoa met at Porto Venere. Not only Villano but the Archbishop of Genoa and the Bishop of Lucca took part in their discussions, and at one time it seemed that peace was assured. An indenture³, containing the terms agreed upon by the representatives of the three Communes was actually drawn up, when, at the last moment, the Pisans refused to sanction its execution⁴. Nevertheless, if Villano's intervention failed of its immediate object, it resulted in his own reinstatement. All the sentences which had been pronounced against him during his banishment were annulled by the Consuls; his possessions were restored to him, and Benincasa, or, as Pope Alexander called him, Malincasa, was expelled from the Archbishopric. It seems that the Canons, who had been among the bitterest enemies of Villano, warmly advocated his restoration⁵.

By large pecuniary sacrifices and larger promises, Pisa succeeded in persuading the *cattani* of Versilia and the Garfagnana to break with Lucca⁶; and when the war was resumed, it was waged by land and by sea, in the Pisan mountains and about the fortresses of Corvaja and Flaminga; in Provence, in Sardinia and along the coasts of Elba. In those years the Pisans put forth

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 53; Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, pp. 209, 210. The former calls the Imperial Chancellor "Philippus," namely Philip, the successor of Rainald in the Archbishopric of Cologne; the latter "Cancellarius Frederici imperatoris, nomine Christianus."

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 52.

³ "Verba...in scripto redacta et per abecedarium divisa."

⁴ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, pp. 210-212.

⁵ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 201, 202.

⁶ Bonaini, *Diplomi pisani*, XVIII A*, pp. 47-50 (October, 1169).

all their strength and gave marvellous proof of their tenacity of purpose and of the greatness of their military and economic resources, thus reaping the reward of a policy relatively straightforward and consistent, and especially so with regard to the Empire. The flower of Tuscan feudality flocked to their standards, and with the aid of the Count Ildebrandino of Soana, of the *nobilis militia* of the Bishop of Volterra, of the Count Alberto of Prato and of many other Counts of the house of Gherardesca, they were able, in this their hour of need, to put into the field a larger army than had ever yet been seen in Tuscany¹. Their principal object was to take and destroy the fortress of Motrone and the towers which the Lucchesi and Genoese had constructed on the sea-coast from the mouth of the Serchio northward of Viareggio. Motrone dominated the Via Francigena and formed the only certain means of contact between Genoa and Lucca, giving practical value and liberty of initiative to an alliance which was otherwise subject to the arbitrary caprices of the feudatories of the Garfagnana². Around Motrone, in the autumn of 1170, were concentrated the forces of Pisa, Lucca and Genoa. Even for those who were extraneous to the quarrel, the victory of the one side or the other must necessarily entail important consequences, and, at the last moment, the Florentines sent ambassadors—*consules et aliae religiosae personae*—with the professed object of inducing the belligerents to lay down their arms. For four days they negotiated “de pace et concordia facienda”; but it would be doing injustice to the subtle Florentine intellect to suppose that either the ambassadors or those who sent them can have had much hope that mere words could effect anything when the hostile armies were already drawn up in battle array and only awaited the signal for onset. Their real object doubtless was to watch the course of events at close quarters, and, perhaps, if opportunity served, to sell their aid to the highest bidder.

The battle joined on Thursday, the 27th of November, and “by the power of God who exalteth the humble and casteth

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 57, 58.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 203, and see p. 179 *supra*.

down the proud, the Pisans got a glorious victory on the Lucchesi and the Genoese, pursuing them even unto the wooden tower which standeth upon the road which is called Regia¹. More than three hundred knights and more than seven hundred foot-soldiers were taken prisoners together with three Consuls. And verily many more of the Lucchesi would have been taken had they not proclaimed themselves Pisans with loud voices during the battle. Many were wounded and many slain; many perished in the marshes; they lost well-nigh a thousand war-horses and over a thousand palfreys and mules. An innumerable multitude of asses was captured by Pisan citizens.” In those days the meadows of Arsula must have been overstocked². “Banners, shields, corselets, and all manner of weapons, tents, pavilions, fortifications (*castra*) and all the spoils of the Lucchesi fell into the hands of the victorious Pisans. Neither is it doubtful that that would have been the last day of the city of Lucca if the Pisans had stayed betimes from following after the fugitives. On the same day whereon the battle was fought, the Genoese, who were there with a galley, beholding the victory which the Pisans had, were sore grieved and gat them thence. On the next day, the Pisans took the aforesaid tower of wood, and from the forests and marshes they drew forth the bodies of the Lucchesi who had been slain, together with their arms and with much spoil. On the third day, the which was the 29th day of November, they went to the fortress of Motrone with mangonels and battering-rams and wooden castles³ and catapults; and they compassed it round about. Four days did they assail it with the machines aforesaid and with others. Now, that fortress was builded upon the sea-shore, and a moat had been digged about it, and it stood four-square with a passing strong tower at each

¹ This *Via Regia* must not be confused with the *Via Francigena*. See p. 192 *infra*.

² Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, 14: “Prata de Arsula, quae fuerunt equorum pisanorum pascua.” Compare Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, I, 148.

³ These wooden castles had, it would seem, been previously employed in the battle: “In prima acie fuerunt pedites omnes et sagittarii et milites octingenti, et sex castella lignea fortissima, quorum unumquodque quatuor curribus deferebatur; in qua acie comes Ildebrandinus miles signifer et capitaneus extitit....”

of the corners thereof. In the midst was a great tower, sixty cubits high, wherein were eighty men of war with twenty archers. But, when it had been long time besieged, they perceived that they might not hold it further, because the wall had been breached by the battering-rams and the tower by the mangonels. Wherefore, on the 2nd day of December, they surrendered themselves to the Pisans, and in the space of three days that fortress was destroyed even to its foundations and levelled with the ground. After the fight was ended, the Genoese came thither with five galleys, and seeing the ruins of it, departed with their grief redoubled. Then the Pisans returned to the aforesaid wooden tower and burned it with fire. Never, in good sooth, for a hundred years or more, hath any man seen or heard of so fair and ordered a battle or so great a victory as this which the Pisans gat upon the Lucchesi and Genoese. Thereafter, on the 4th day of December, they returned in triumph to Pisa with praise and glory, singing with jubilant voices: 'Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us the glory, but unto Thy Name for ever and ever. Amen¹.'"

The Lucchesi were once more cut off from the sea; but the possession of the strong castle of Corvaja, which they had captured in the previous year², enabled them to keep open their communications with Genoa. Corvaja was, in those days, a place of considerable importance, for it not only defended the narrow gorge of the Versilia but also commanded the Via Francigena³, and the Pisans fully realized that, if they could retake it, much would have been done to secure the isolation of the Lucchesi. They accordingly sat down before it, and had the *cattani* of Versilia and the Garfagnana remained faithful to their obligations, all would have been well. Unfortunately, however, the *cattani* had very little more love for Pisa than they had for Lucca; their policy was to preserve their own independence by playing the one Commune against the other, and no sooner did the Lucchesi and Genoese offer them a sufficient bribe than

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 58, 59.

² Ptolemaei Lucensis *Annales*, p. 56.

³ Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, I, 825.

“that same avarice which took captive Judas took captive those wicked traitors of Versilia and Vallechia¹.” Their defection was a serious blow to Pisa, and the spring of 1171 found the enemy relatively but little weaker than they had been before their defeat in the preceding November.

The first care of the Lucchesi was to regain free access to the sea-coast. To this end they purchased large tracts of land from private individuals between Montramito and the mouth of the Serchio²; and in May, with the help of the Genoese, they began to build a new tower “in litore maris ad Viam dictam Regiam³.” According to Oberto Cancelliere, the name *Via regia* was given to a causeway (*iactus petrarum*) which extended for two miles across the marshes to the sea-shore; and he tells us that the “*turris de Via Regia*” was built at the end of this causeway (*in capite iactus*), or in other words where the city of Viareggio now stands. It seems to have been made of wood⁴, but was surrounded by lofty walls and defended by a barbican; and it could, we are told, be clearly seen from the mouth of the Arno⁵. Like the earliest castles of Normandy and England⁶, it no doubt stood upon an artificial mound thrown up from a deep moat at its base, and was approached by a great drawbridge leading from the further side of the moat to the second storey. In such structures the ground floor had no entrance from without and was used either for stores or for the custody of prisoners. In the case of the Tower of Viareggio, since the site was marshy and the *fundus turris* all awash with water, it was probably used exclusively for the latter⁷. Finally, the landward side of the

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 59.

² Ptolemaei Lucensis *Annales*, p. 57: “Eodem anno Lucense commune invenitur emisse a Truffa Mezolombardi boscum et totam terram super qua est aedificata turris quae est in faucibus Sercli, et a faucibus maris usque Milliarinum et a mari usque ad Mentraventum.”

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 60.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 66.

⁵ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 245. Compare Tommasi, *Sommario della Storia di Lucca*, *ubi cit.* pp. 42, 43.

⁶ C. H. Haskins, *The Normans in European History* (Constable, 1916), p. 151. Wooden fortresses of this type are well known from contemporary description, and are clearly discernible in the Bayeux Tapestry, which gives rude pictures of the strongholds of Dol, Rennes, Dinan and Bayeux.

⁷ See p. 190 *supra*.

causeway was commanded by the castle of Montramito (“*mons Gravantus*,” “*Montraventus*”), the seat of the “*fili Ubaldi*,” *cattani* in alliance with Lucca¹.

Enormous efforts were made to collect a sufficient force to overwhelm Pisa and to finish the war. “The Genoese,” says Marangone, “sought help from Barcelona even unto Lombardy”; they promised to send four thousand knights to the aid of Lucca, and “threatened with vain words to lay waste all the Pisan coasts².” Overtures were made to the Tuscan cities, and Tolomeo of Lucca records the terms of a treaty entered into with the Pistoiesi whereby they undertook to provide a hundred and fifty knights, and five hundred foot-soldiers and *balistarii*³. The Count Guido also and the Siense showed themselves disposed to join the league against Pisa⁴. Even Florence hesitated⁵; but her interests lay rather in an alliance with Pisa than in her destruction, and, when sufficiently advantageous terms were offered her, she hastened to accept them. The treaty of the 4th of July, 1171⁶, marks a definite epoch in the history of the relations between the two Communes. In return for Florentine assistance, the Pisans promised to “save and guard” the men of the Florentine state on land and on sea; to furnish a contingent of four hundred knights whenever the Florentines should be engaged in war in any part of Tuscany, except against the Bishop of Volterra, the Count Ildebrandino of Soana and the Count Alberto of Prato; not to make peace or truce with Lucca without the consent of the Florentine Consuls; to transport the goods and persons of the

¹ Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, I, 604.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 60. See also Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 204, and *Liber iurium*, I, 256 and 258 (1 May, 1171) there cited.

³ Ptolemaei Lucensis *Annales*, p. 57; Salvi, *Delle Historie di Pistoia* (Roma, MDCLVI), T. I, P. II, lib. II, p. 97.

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 60; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 370.

⁵ Santini, *Studi, etc.*, *op. cit.* pp. 88, 89.

⁶ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 60, 61; Ammirato, *Istorie Fiorentine* (Firenze, Batelli e Compagni, 1846), T. I, lib. I, p. 106. The document is published by Dal Borgo, *Diplomi pisani*, pp. 307, 308, and by Santini, *Documenti dell' antica costituzione del comune di Firenze* (Firenze, Vieusseux, 1895), P. I, doc. IV, pp. 5, 6. See also G. Arias, *I Trattati commerciali della Rep. Fiorentina* (Firenze, Le Monnier, 1901), vol. I, pp. 18, 19.

Florentines by sea on the same terms as the wares of the Pisans themselves were transported; to grant special exemptions with regard to riparian dues within the territories of Pisa; to provide a *domus* for the accommodation of Florentine merchants "in Forisporta" and two shops upon the bridge over the Arno¹. The alliance was to last for forty years and it was duly recorded in the *Breve consulum* and *Breve Populi*, to the end that it might be guaranteed by oath by each succeeding magistracy on taking office².

The Pisans were well content with a bargain which delivered them from imminent peril, and Marangone tells us that "eodem anno terram et totum comitatum et mare cum vigore tenuerunt³." Still contending for doubtful confines, and cramped within an iron ring of feudal fortresses, crowning every hill-top and commanding every outlet⁴, Florence, to whom no Emperor had ever yet conceded any privilege⁵, must have seemed the last of Tuscan cities from which commercial rivalry was to be feared; the advantages granted to her in 1171 were but as crumbs from the rich man's table. Later on, however, the bonds with which the Pisans had bound themselves began to fret and hamper them, and they sought in vain to break them. Florence never retraced her first resolute step towards the sea, nor suffered the door which had been opened to her to close again. Though she had not lost a single man nor spent a single *denaro*, but had only awaited the propitious moment to intervene and grasp every kind of advantage, she and she alone was the victor in that war⁶.

¹ As to the history of the Ponte Vecchio, see my *Palio and Ponte*, *op. cit.* pp. 108-110.

² Compare my *A History of Perugia*, pp. 32, 33.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 61.

⁴ Between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the number of feudal castles in the territory of Florence is said to have increased to 205; whereas, up to the year 900, the documents record one only. See R. Caggese, *Un Comune libero alle porte di Firenze nel secolo XIII* (Firenze, Seeber, 1905), p. 12.

⁵ Santini, *Studi*, *op. cit.* p. 130.

⁶ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 206.

CHAPTER THE FIFTEENTH

CHRISTIAN OF MAYENCE

ALTHOUGH the usual proviso: SALVA FIDELITATE IMPERATORIS was duly inserted in the treaty with Florence, it was qualified by the addition of a clause which practically provided for the maintenance of the alliance even in the face of Imperial disapproval: ITA TAMEN VT IMPERATOR NON POSSIT LIBERARE NOS A PREDICTIS SACRAMENTIS¹. Neither did that alliance stand alone. Already, in 1169, the Pisans had made peace with William of Sicily², and, in 1168 or 1169, they had sent ambassadors to Constantinople to treat with Manuel Comnenus. The negotiations were long and difficult, lasting, as Marangone tells us, for over three years³; and only when they had agreed to annul every pact inconsistent with their loyalty to the Eastern Empire, with whomsoever entered into—*coronato vel non coronato*⁴—were the Pisans at last permitted to re-occupy the quarter from which they had been expelled some ten years earlier.

This change in Pisan policy was eagerly seized upon by her enemies as affording an opportunity to discredit her with Barbarossa; and, in the late autumn or early winter of 1171, “rogatu et suasione et precibus Lucensium et Ianuensium⁵,” Christian of Mayence was appointed Imperial Legate of all Italy, and unexpectedly appeared in Lombardy. He traversed the territories of the revolted Communes with all possible speed, avoiding the more frequented roads, and, after fording the Tanaro near Alessandria, reached Genoa in safety⁶. The object of his mission was to re-establish the prestige of the Empire in

¹ Dal Borgo, *Diplomi pisani*, p. 308; Santini, *Documenti*, *op. cit.* p. 6.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 56.

³ *Ibid.* p. 62.

⁴ Müller, *op. cit.*, doc. xxxiv, p. 40 *et seq.* The oath of the Pisan ambassadors in 1170 is reported on pp. 45 and 54.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 62.

⁶ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 245, 246.

Tuscany and to restore order; but since he had brought with him no sufficient army with which to enforce obedience, he was compelled to trust to his own dexterity to guide the Imperial bark among the intricate and opposing currents of Italian political life. Like the rest of his fellow-countrymen, he was constitutionally incapable of understanding the psychology of the Communes, each of them a separate nation, dowered with a patriotism all the more intense, fierce, jealous, intolerant, because of its diminutive size. Every attempt at political reconstruction was shattered on the rock of communal particularism. Instead of making peace between the warring cities, he found himself compelled to take sides and to join in the conflict, and thenceforward he had no settled policy but lived as best he could from hour to hour. For all his energy and zeal, he became little better than the sport of circumstance.

He was warmly welcomed by the Genoese, who were loud in their professions of loyalty, declaring that, unlike the Pisans, they had scorned the gifts of Manuel Comnenus and had rejected the overtures of the King of Sicily, lest the honour of the Empire should be thereby diminished¹. Christian either was or pretended to be deceived by their protestations. Like the dog in the fable, he was ready to risk the loss of the solid meat of Pisan friendship while snapping at the Genoese shadow; and before he started for Tuscany, he had promised to use every means in his power, short of putting the Pisans under the ban of the Empire or making war upon them, to obtain the liberation of the Genoese and Lucchese prisoners². From that moment his hands were tied, and when he reached Lucca in January, 1172, he came rather as a partisan than as an arbiter. Only by renouncing his agreement with Genoa, and forfeiting the great sum of money which had been fixed as the price of his services, could he hope to regain freedom of initiative. Money was, however, the last thing he was likely to give up, and his belief in the sincerity of the Genoese may well have been

¹ As to the reasons which induced the Genoese to seek a *rapprochement* with the Emperor at this juncture, see Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 247, 248.

² Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, pp. 247, 248.

strengthened by the fact that the Communes of the Lombard League immediately took steps to punish them for their adherence to the Empire. Export of wheat to Genoa was strictly prohibited, and for six months the city seems to have been on the verge of famine¹.

On the 3rd of February Christian appeared in Pisa, where, says Marangone, he was "magnificently received²." At his bidding, the Consuls of Pisa, Florence, Genoa and Lucca assembled at Borgo S. Genesio, and there he announced the object of his mission, which was, he assured them, the pacification of Tuscany. To that end he demanded that they should entrust the adjustment of their differences to him "sine omni conditione." As a preliminary, the prisoners were to be delivered into his hands. The Genoese and Lucchesi, of course, desired nothing better, but the Pisans refused on the ground that they had no authority to enter into an unconditional undertaking with regard to the prisoners, and must first lay the matter before their fellow-citizens. Twenty days were given them in which to make up their minds, and, in the following month, at a great Diet of all the Consuls and Feudatories of Central Italy, assembled at Siena, they flatly refused to accept the arbitrament of the Imperial Legate. In vain Christian swore that he had not entered into a secret understanding with the Genoese and had received no money from them. The perjury was too gross to deceive the Pisans for a single moment, and, irritated at their incredulity and obstinacy, he yielded to the ever-increasing urgency of the Consuls of Genoa and Lucca, and, on the 6th of March, bound himself by oath to pronounce the Ban of the Empire against Pisa; to annul all Imperial privileges which had been granted to her in the past; to cause the Count of Siena and the Count Macharius of S. Miniato to make war upon her and to close the roads to travellers going to or coming from the city. Finally, he undertook himself to lead an army to Porto Pisano and to devastate the *contado*. If the Pisans submitted, he proposed to divide Sardinia between them and the Genoese, and to leave Viareggio in the hands of the allies that it might constitute as

¹ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, p. 246.

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 62.

it were a sentinel at the gates of Pisa¹. The Pisans did not submit; and desiring, as he himself expresses it, to show forth the “contumaciam et superbiam Pisanorum,” on the one hand, and the “humilitatem atque justiciam” of Lucca and Genoa, on the other, Christian kept his oath. On the 28th of March, in the Campo of Siena, “in conspectu prefecti urbis Romanorum, et coram marchionibus anconitanis, Conrado marchione de Monteferrato, comite Guidone, comite Aldobrandino, et quam pluribus aliis comitibus, capitaneis, valvassoribus, consulibus civitatum Tuscie, Marchie et vallis Spolitane et superioris atque inferioris Romanie, et infinita populi multitudine,” Pisa was placed under the Ban of the Empire. All the privileges granted by Frederick and his predecessors were annulled and specifically those concerning Sardinia and the sea-coast, *fodrum* in the city and its *contado*, and—a grateful sop to Lucca—Pisan money, which it was forbidden either to tender or to accept under heavy penalties. “Multo etiam his plura,” so wrote the Imperial Legate, in a characteristic letter to his Genoese allies, “multo etiam his plura addidimus in confusione eorum que vobis nequaquam promiseramus sicut ab amicis vestris Lucensibus luce clarius cognoscetis.” He admonished them to prepare fifty galleys, twenty of which were to be held in readiness at Genoa, and twenty at Porto Venere. The remaining ten were to proceed towards the Maremma, where the Prefect of Rome had undertaken to place at their disposal the harbour of Civitavecchia and the ports of the Count Ildebrandino of Soana. Naturally, however, all this could not be accomplished without considerable expenditure of money. Christian complained that he was already deeply in debt—“multis tenemur debitis”—and exhorted the Genoese to fulfil their promises and to replenish his empty coffers².

In response to this appeal five hundred pounds were sent to him at Lucca; and a fleet of six galleys, to say nothing of corsairs from Rapallo, Sestri Levante and Porto Venere, had

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 208, citing Tola, *Cod. dipl. Sardo*, p. 242. Compare Besta, *op. cit.* I, 145.

² Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, pp. 251, 252.

already put out to sea¹, when he suddenly held his hand and re-opened negotiations with Pisa. The Pisan chroniclers would have us believe that in so doing he was influenced by “the evil report of him which was noised abroad through all Italy²”; but a more probable reason for his change of attitude is to be found in the fact that, in March, 1172—the very month in which he had placed Pisa under the Ban of the Empire—Barbarossa re-opened the question of the Sicilian expedition, at the Diet of Worms³. Philip of Cologne was writing to the Italian cities, and the Pisan Consuls were in direct communication with the Imperial Court⁴.

On the 28th of May, at Borgo S. Genesio, “in generali parlamento,” the Pisans were absolved from the ban and reinstated in all their rights and privileges⁵. A thousand citizens from each of the four Communes, Pisa, Florence, Lucca and Genoa, swore to observe such terms of peace as should be agreed upon⁶, and on the same day Christian came to Pisa. There, on the 29th of May, he presided “in magno Pisanorum parlamento.” The Consuls of Florence, Genoa and Lucca “cum eorum sapientibus” were also present, and it was agreed that two men should be appointed by each Commune “qui omnes discordias terminarent⁷.” “To the end that peace might be the better completed and kept, the Pisans, at the command of the Imperial Legate, sent to Florence a hundred of the knights of Lucca which had been in prison in Pisa, and the Lucchesi sent to

¹ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, pp. 253, 254.

² “Considerante Archiepiscopo Magentino...malam famam quae per totam Italiam de se insonaverat, Pisanos...a banno absolvit.”

³ *M. G. H.* xvii, *Annales colonienses maximi*, ann. 1172, 26 March.

⁴ *M. G. H.*, *loc. cit.* p. 784. The Consuls to Philip of Cologne.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 63; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 378.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 64; Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, p. 254; Tommasi, *Sommario della Storia di Lucca*, *ubi cit.* p. 44; Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 210.

⁷ In giving May as the month in which the Pisans were absolved from the Ban of the Empire and received to the grace of the Imperial Legate, I have followed Bonaini (*Arch. Stor. It.* T. vi, P. 1, p. 378 n.), and his opinion seems to be confirmed by a document published by Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 309–311. Other writers, on the contrary (*e.g.* Belgrano, *Annali Genovesi*, *etc.*, *op. cit.* vol. 1, p. 253, note 1), tell us that these events took place in June. Compare Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1173; Villari, *I primi due secoli*, *etc.*, *op. cit.* 1, 125; Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 210.

Pistoia fifteen Pisan knights and forty foot-soldiers which had been in prison in Lucca." Thereafter, Christian ordered the Consuls of the said Communes to follow him to Borgo S. Genesio. Bad faith, however, was in every heart. On the 10th of June, while the terms of peace were being discussed, Christian secretly renewed his promises to Lucca and Genoa¹, and then, on the 4th of August, seized the Consuls of Florence and Pisa and cast them into prison². If we may credit the Genoese annalist, this step was taken "by reason of the treason which the Pisans and Florentines purposed to commit concerning the fortress of S. Miniato³"; and we know that a secret agreement had, in fact, been entered into with certain Samminiatesi who had been expelled from their native town as rebels of the Empire by the Count Macharius⁴. On the 5th of May, at Florence, in the palace of the Bishop, the exiles swore not only to make common cause with the Pisans and Florentines, but to deliver to them the fortress of S. Miniato, if they should succeed in recovering it, and that even if the donjon still remained in the hands of the Germans⁵. Several of the principal citizens of Florence were present, among them one of the Uberti, and it is impossible to suppose that the Pisans were kept in ignorance of the transaction. Indeed, according to Pisan sources, they were themselves the first to open negotiations with the Samminiatesi⁶, and it is obvious that the possession of S. Miniato would have been of enormous advantage to the allies. Not only did it dominate the Arno, the Via Francigena and the road to Porto Pisano, but, in the hands of Pisa and Florence, it would have enabled them to close the Val d' Elsa to the Lucchesi and to

¹ Belgrano, *ubi cit.*: "actum in pontili plebis de Pontefessii .MCLXXII. indictione quarta, decimo die iunii."

² Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 64.

³ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, pp. 254. 255.

⁴ Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc., op. cit.* pp. 125, 126.

⁵ "Castrum autem intelligimus recuperatum etiam sine superiori in-castellatura." The agreement is published in its entirety in Santini, *Documenti*, Parte III, doc. 1, p. 363.

⁶ Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* VI, *Breviarium*, 185: "Pisani...procuraverunt interim quod homines et comune S. Miniatis cum Florentinis secum essent; et salva fidelitate Imperii iuraverunt, etc."

hinder the military co-operation of Siena, allied with the Imperial Legate in this war.

The capture of the Consuls broke up the Diet of Borgo S. Genesio, and, after sending the prisoners to Lucca, Christian prepared to take the field. The discovery of the conspiracy had freed his hands, and he no longer feared to incur the displeasure of his master by fulfilling his promises to Genoa and Lucca. He, however, took good care to be well paid for his services, and, before he would consent to put Florence as well as Pisa under the Ban of the Empire, he exacted a thousand pounds from the Genoese and fifteen hundred pounds from the Lucchesi¹. All Tuscany was under arms. On the one side were the Sienese, the Pistoiesi and the Lucchesi; on the other the Pisans and the Florentines. With the former was the Count Guido, with the latter were the Count Ildebrandino of Soana, the Alberti, and many of the lesser feudatories. In a war in which the Sienese were engaged the Aldobrandeschi could have no doubt where their interests lay, and although Ildebrandino had, as we have seen², taken part in the Diet of Siena, he seems never to have broken with the Pisans³.

With few, if any, troops of his own, and dependent, as he was, upon his allies, it was obvious that some little time must elapse before the Imperial Legate could assume the offensive, and the Pisans and Florentines hastened to take advantage of the delay. The former, anticipating an incursion of the Lucchesi into the Val d' Era⁴, marched up the Arno and encamped above Pontedera, while the latter posted themselves at Castel Fiorentino to await the coming of the Sienese⁵. A few days

¹ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, p. 255.

² See p. 198 *supra*. The "comes Aldobrandinus" there mentioned is, of course, Ildebrandino of Soana.

³ In July the Pisans had sent 140 knights to his assistance when "pro iniuria quam ei fecerat Bernardus Stratume de pecoribus Garfanensium suae fidantiae custodiaeque commissis, magnum exercitum pro eis recuperandis contra eum preparavit, et auxilia a Pisanis petiit." Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 63.

⁴ The diploma of April, 1162, and the subsequent subjection of the Val d' Era by the Pisans (pp. 130-132 *supra*) had not been effectual to destroy the aspirations either of the Commune or Bishop of Lucca with regard to that region. See Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 211.

⁵ As to Castel Fiorentino see the article of M. Cioni, in the *Misc. Storica*

later Christian commenced operations. On the 16th of August he stormed and burned Ventrignano, a stronghold of the Counts Gherardesca, whose castles and lands extended almost to the gates of S. Miniato, and then, leaving the Pisans to be dealt with later, advanced with the Lucchesi along the Via Francigena to Castel Fiorentino where he hoped to effect a junction with the Sienese and to overwhelm the Florentines. No sooner did the Pisans hear of his departure than they sent two hundred and twenty-five knights to the aid of their allies, and then, on the 17th of August, invaded the territories of Lucca, devastating the country on either side of the Serchio from the Lunata to Ponte S. Pietro. The Lucchesi, "timentes de civitate," thereupon deserted the Imperial Legate and hurried homewards¹. An attempt on Castel Fiorentino failed, and when Christian turned once more to attack the Pisans, the Sienese, who had fortified themselves in Colle di Val d' Elsa which they had taken from the Alberti², had no mind to follow him, leaving an undefeated Florentine army in their rear. Freed from any immediate apprehensions on their own account, the Florentines seem to have considerably relaxed their efforts³; but their intervention had sufficed to prevent Christian from uniting his forces; and, so long as the Pisans had only the Lucchesi and the Count Guido to deal with, they found no difficulty in holding their own. It does not seem that the Pistoiesi took any active part in the war.

On the 19th a skirmish took place at Ponte Flesso, the modern Montuolo, in which the Lucchesi were worsted, and on the 28th an attempt was made by Count Guido and one of the Lucchese Consuls, at the head of two hundred knights, to

della Valdelsa, anno VI (1898), p. 159 *et seq.* At this time it was governed by the Bishop of Florence.

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 65.

² Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* p. 93.

³ See Sanzanome, *Gesta Florentinorum* (edition cited), p. 131, where the failure of Christian before Castel Fiorentino is the last event which is recorded of this war. On the other hand, some writers attribute the destruction of the fortress of Montegrossoli, held by the Firidolfi, adherents of Christian, to this year. See Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* p. 93, note 3, and compare Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc., op. cit.* I, 131.

surprise Pontedera. After a bloody conflict, they were repulsed by the Upezzinghi and the men of Calcinaia and Vicopisano, who drove them in headlong rout as far as Montecalvoli. Marangone tells us that many of their war-horses were slain or wounded¹. The struggle between the Communes was, as usual, complicated by the intervention of the nobles of the Garfagnana, always ready for new alliances and new defections. When the majority of the *cattani* had sold themselves to Lucca, in 1170², a few had remained faithful to their obligations with Pisa³, and these now entered into negotiations with the "filii Ubaldi," who, after the manner of their kind, were willing once more to change sides in consideration of a sufficient bribe. Lords of Montramito, which commanded the causeway leading across the marshes to the tower of Viareggio, and of the castle and district of Bozzano, they agreed to betray them both; and, on the 17th of September, they kept their word. A strong force was sent from Pisa, Montramito and Bozzano were occupied and the tower itself was vigorously assailed. Unfortunately, however, the garrison was succoured by a Genoese galley and by "a great army of knights, footsoldiers and bowmen" which arrived with all speed from Lucca. A battle followed which lasted almost the whole day; the two fortresses fell into the hands of the Lucchesi and Montramito was burned to the ground⁴. The Genoese, meanwhile, seem to have done but little to assist their allies. In September they raided Pianosa with eight galleys, and, in the following month, they surprised and captured three Pisan galleys which were lying at anchor in Porto S. Lucia in Corsica⁵; but there were no other naval operations worth recording.

Finding that the Lucchesi alone could accomplish nothing against the Pisans, Christian resolved to create a diversion by attacking the Count Ildebrandino of Soana, and, in December, he invaded the Maremma at the head of an army composed of

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 65; *Chron. Var. Pis.* in Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* VI, 187, 188.

² See p. 191 *supra*.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 59.

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 66; Ptolemaei Lucensis *Annales*, pp. 57, 58.

⁵ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, pp. 254, 255; Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 66, 67.

Sieneſe levies and retainers of the Count Guido. At firſt he met with ſome ſucceſs—“duo caſtella cepit”—but the arrival of a hundred and fifty Piſan knights put a ſtop to his further progreſs. Afraid to riſk a pitched battle, he retreated “in diſtrictu Urbis Romae,” and abandoned his ill-ſtarred attempt to impoſe “pacem et concordiam” on Tuſcany¹. His operations againſt Ancona, in the following year, were equally unfortunate. Though aſſiſted by forty Venetian galleys, he failed to overcome the reſiſtance of the inhabitants, and, after a ſiege of over ſix months, was compelled to retire before an army of Lombards and Romagnuols (October, 1173²).

The Piſans, in the meanwhile, “fearing leſt anything ſhould have been reported to the Emperor to the prejudice of the Piſan people by the ſaid Archbiſhop or by any other,” deſpatched Count Gherardo Gherardesca and Maſter Ruberto Grugni to the Imperial Court to complain of the injuries done them by the Legate. Frederick, who was preparing for a freſh Italian expedition, received the envoys graciously and “ſent them back with joy and with his good favour³.” The war in Tuſcany languiſhed, and the Genoese, whoſe energies were diſtracted by a quarrel with the Malaspina⁴, were no longer able adequately to protect their ſea-borne traffic. Six richly laden merchantmen were captured by Piſan privateers⁵, and, in Auguſt, Teperto di Duodo, who had been ſent with a galley to renew the alliance with the King of Majorca⁶, “inflicted great damage on the Genoese as he returned along the coaſt of Provence, capturing their ſhips and ſinking them in the abyſs

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 67; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 383.

² *Arch. Stor. It.* Tom. VIII, p. 172 (*Cronaca Altinate*), p. 264 (*Cronaca di Mario*); Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 264; Hodgson, *The Early Hiſt. of Venice*, *op. cit.* pp. 293, 294; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 254–256.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 68; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 385.

⁴ Oberti Cancellarii *Annales*, pp. 255–257.

⁵ “Quidam ex nobilibus Piſanorum civibus galeas ſuper Ianuenses viriliter armaverunt, etc.” Compare Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 214: “L’ iniziativa privata era ſempre il principio e la molla di tutto; poteva un momento rallentarsi in tempi ordinari, ma al primo biſogno, eſſa ripullulava ſu da mille piccole ſorgenti, ed allora il comune non era più il governo, ma i cittadini, ſoli o aſſociati.”

⁶ Amari, *Storia dei Muſulmani*, *op. cit.* III, 519, note 1.



IL TRIONFO DELLA MORTE. CAMPO SANTO.

ANDREA ORCAGNA



THE CAMPANILE

of the sea¹." Neither did warlike operations monopolise the energies of Pisa. It was in this very year that the foundations of the Leaning Tower were laid and that Bonannus, the first architect, began to build².

In 1174 the Count Macharius of S. Miniato made peace with the Florentines and Pisans, and the exiles were permitted to return to their homes. "Unde," says Marangone, "Lucenses magnam habuerunt tristitiam³." Their alliance with Siena could profit them little if S. Miniato was in the hands of their enemies, and to make matters worse, in July the Sienese were utterly routed by the Florentines beneath the walls of Asciano⁴. Moreover, the increased activity of the Genoese, during the summer of 1174, can have done but little to redress the balance. The Pisans suffered no greater damage than they themselves inflicted. If they lost "a great new ship" and two galleys, one on its return voyage from Sardinia and another, which was manned by Pisan pirates, off Marseilles, they were able to set down on the credit side of their account "duas naves magnas et alias quam plures naviculas," a ship with a cargo of over three thousand pounds in value, and a great galliot coming from St Gilles, laden with cloth and hides⁵. The combatants were weary of a war in which neither of them could hope to gain any permanent advantage, and, in the autumn of 1175, in that same Pavia where the coronation of Barisone of Arborea had added fresh fuel to the flames of discord, the representatives of Pisa, Florence, Genoa and Lucca appeared before the Imperial Curia and accepted a compromise imposed upon them by the Emperor. By the treaty of the 6th of November, it was stipulated that Sardinia should be divided between the Pisans and the Genoese;

¹ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 68.

² *Ibid.* p. 69: "Anno Domini MCLXXIIII. Indictione VI, quinto idus Augusti. Campanilis Sanctae Mariae rotundus fundatus est. Sequenti anno, factus gradus unus in circuitu." Compare Da Morrona, *Pisa illustrata, etc., op. cit.* I, 407.

³ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 69.

⁴ Sanzanome, *Gesta Florentinorum*, p. 134; G. Villani, *Cronica*, lib. v, c. vi. The Asciano here spoken of is, of course, Asciano in Val d' Ombrone (see Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, I, 151) and must not be confounded with the Asciano at the foot of Monte Pisano.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 70, 71.

that the tower of Viareggio should be destroyed, and that the Pisans should desist from falsifying the money of Lucca¹. Otobono Scriba would have us believe that the Genoese thus definitely obtained that *medietatem Sardinee* which they had so long desired; but, after the concession and revocation of so many privileges, a new Imperial grant may well have been regarded by the Pisans as a matter of very little importance, intended rather to emphasize the status of Sardinia as a province of the Empire than to bring about a change in the political conditions. There seems to have been no material division of the island, no delimitation of confines, and it is probable that the treaty simply recognized existing facts. At the moment, Pisa was predominant in the Logoduro and in Gallura, Genoa in Arborea and in the Cagliariitano². As to the clause concerning the coining of money, the Pisans would appear simply to have ignored it³. To obtain the destruction of the Tower of Viareggio, it was well worth their while to agree to terms which, from the nature of the case, it was impossible for their enemies to enforce. What the Lucchesi actually did gain was the return of numerous villages and churches which had been taken from them during the war. A few weeks after the conclusion of peace, Damiano and Pandolfo, Canons of the Cathedral of Lucca, received from the Pisan Consul Ildeprando possession of the *pievi* of Miliano, Tripalle, Monte Castello, Aqui, Forcoli, Ceuli, Capanoli, Cerreto, etc., all of which belonged to the Bishop of Lucca and had been occupied by the Pisans⁴.

¹ Otoboni Scribae *Annales Ianuenses*, in *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori*, a cura di L. T. Belgrano e di Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, vol. II, pp. 8, 9; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 249; Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 215. Compare also Ptolemaei Lucensis *Annales*, p. 58: "Eodem anno invenitur sententia lata per imperatorem Fredericum contra Pisanos de moneta non cudenda ea forma et cuneo, qua et quo Lucenses cudere possunt."

² Besta, *op. cit.* I, 146, 147.

³ Ptolemaei Lucensis *Annales*, p. 58, ad annum 1176.

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 216, citing *Mem. e doc. lucch.* IV, II; doc. 134, ann. 1175.

CHAPTER THE SIXTEENTH

THE COMMUNES DEPRIVED OF THEIR *CONTADI*

UNFORTUNATELY for the Sieneſe, they ſeem to have taken no part in the compromise of Pavia, and the Florentines were thus enabled to preſs home the advantage that the battle of Asciano had given them. By the treaty of March, 1176, in which not only the Emperor but alſo Chriſtian of Mayence and Count Macharius were expreſſly named, the Florentines were acknowledged as the legitimate maſters of the whole *contado* of Fieſole and Florence, and obtained one-half of the poſſeſſions of the Sieneſe in Poggibonſi. Several of the conditions were particularly harſh, and the Commune which was deſtined ſoon to become the firm ally of Piſa was terribly crippled¹. Florence was ſlowly achieving a poſition of aſcendency in Tuſcany, and, ere the century closed, many of her neighbours had learned to regard her with much the ſame feelings of miſgiving as Germany inſpired in the other European nations between 1906 and 1914, and as the United States ſtill continues to inſpire in the Latin republics of South America². That time, however, was not yet, and the cordial relations which exiſted between Piſa and Florence were not immediately impaired by the Peace of Pavia. It had not yet occurred to the Piſans that the friendſhip of Florence was a dangerous thing; and the Florentines, who were anxious to reap the full benefit of the treaty of July, 1171, ſcrupuloſly lived up to their part of the contract. When they dictated terms to Siena, the intereſts of their allies were

¹ R. Arch. di Stato in Siena, *Caleffo Vecchio*, c^{te} 9^t, 12; Rondoni, *Sena Vetuſ o il Comune di Siena dalle origini alla Battaglia di Montaperti* (Fratelli Bocca, Torino, 1892), p. 41; Villari, *I primi due ſecoli, etc.*, *op. cit.* 1, 127; Santini, *Studi, etc.*, *op. cit.* pp. 100–103.

² Compare “The Shadow of the Coloſſus,” in *The Times Literary Supplement* of Auguſt 3rd, 1916, p. 361.

not forgotten, and the use of Pisan money was imposed upon the vanquished¹.

Nevertheless, so unnatural a union could not long endure. The price which the Florentines had demanded for their assistance was a very high one, and now that the imperative need of that assistance was over, the Pisans began to perceive that they had been made the victims of a most unconscionable bargain. Their situation was, in fact, analogous to that of a man who had borrowed money to tide over a momentary embarrassment, and finds himself called upon to pay usurious interest for the rest of his life. Then, too, the very different positions occupied by the allies with regard to the Empire were, in the long run, bound to create discord between them. Pisa had already received all the juridical sanctions necessary to invest her with a definite political existence and to give her a recognized place in the feudal hierarchy, and no sooner was the brief period of anarchy produced by the intervention of Christian in Tuscany at an end than she returned to her old allegiance and lived for the old hopes and the old ambitions. Florence, on the other hand, was, in the eye of the law, still nothing better than a voluntary private association; and though, from time to time, Imperial ministers had condescended to treat with her, they had done so not with any intention of extending a tacit recognition to her usurpations, but only because accomplished facts were stronger than legal rights. Between a city the welfare of which was intimately bound up with that of the Empire and a city which would concede the Empire nothing and regarded it with perpetual distrust, lasting friendship was impossible.

For the moment, however, there was no violent clashing of interests. The battle of Legnano (May 29, 1176) had turned the thoughts of Frederick towards peace, and after long and difficult negotiations in which the Archbishop of Mayence played a prominent part², he was reconciled to the Pope on the 24th

¹ The Sienese swore to "accipere vel tollere in arrenge" the Pisan money which the Florentines then had or should thereafter have. See Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 216, note 4.

² The best English account of these negotiations with which I am acquainted is to be found in Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice*, *op. cit.* pp. 306-315.

of July, 1177, at Venice. Eight days afterwards the terms of peace were solemnly sworn to in the Patriarch's palace, the Emperor, the Pope and a crowd of great princes and prelates being present at the ceremony. A Venetian chronicler tells us that the city was thronged with dignitaries from Germany, France, England, Spain, Hungary and all Italy. There were the Archbishop of Cologne with four hundred men, the Patriarch of Aquileia and the Archbishops of Mayence and Magdeburg with three hundred men each; the suite of Count Leopold of Austria numbered a hundred and sixty, and three hundred and thirty followed Count Roger of Andria, the second envoy of the King of Sicily¹. Among the rest were the representatives of Pisa and Florence. The former sent her Consuls with a retinue of knights; the latter the Archdeacon Ruggero². Early in the new year (1178) Frederick came to Tuscany³, sojourning for a few days at S. Miniato and visiting both Lucca and Pisa⁴. He was welcomed with enthusiasm by the Pisans, and, on the 30th of January, before leaving the city, in the presence of the Marquises of Montferrat and Malaspina, of Macharius Count of S. Miniato, and of Count Gherardo Gherardesca and other feudatories, he confirmed the Canons of the Cathedral in all their ancient privileges⁵. Florence, which was then disturbed by the insurrection of the Uberti⁶, he did not visit, and Florence of all the Tuscan Communes showed itself the least inclined to manifest any signs of rejoicing at the conclusion of the peace.

In June the Emperor crossed the Alps on his return to his Burgundian Kingdom, leaving the Archbishop of Mayence as his Legate in Italy. Christian is said to have burned the pallium which he had received from Paschal, and to have accepted a

¹ *Cronica Altinate*, in *Arch. Stor. It.* Serie I, Tom. VIII, 173, 177-183.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 218, on the authority of Pertz, *Historia ducum veneticorum*, p. 87.

³ According to Hodgson (*op. cit.* p. 323), "the Emperor spent all the winter in Central Italy, keeping Christmas at Assisi and passing into Tuscany early in the new year"; but we know from the *Annales Ianuenses (ubi cit. p. 12)* that "mense Ianuarii venit in Ianuam."

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 218, citing Gottifred of Viterbo (Pertz, xxii, 330).

⁵ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 67, doc. xx B.

⁶ Villani, lib. v, cap. ix; Santini, *Studi, etc.*, *op. cit.* pp. 106-108.

fresh one from Alexander. It is certain that he was now hand and glove with the Pope whom he had reinstated in Rome on the 12th of March. In August, Calixtus, the third of Frederick's Antipopes, made submission. Nevertheless, Christian's reconciliation with the Papacy did nothing to allay the ill-will of the Florentines, and it was probably largely due to their influence that, in 1179, Pisa, Lucca, Pistoia and many of the feudatories of Tuscany joined with them in a league against the Imperial Legate, under the leadership of Conrad of Montferrat, the friend of the Pisans in the East. On the side of Christian were the Count Guido and the Sienese; but he was taken captive by the allies and imprisoned for many months, in defiance of the protests and threats of the Emperor¹. Two years later he died beneath the walls of Rome in the service of Lucius III, who had succeeded Alexander in 1181. The grateful Pope lamented him as *vir valde providus et magnificus*, and ordered that prayers should be said for his soul in all the churches of Germany². He appears to have fallen a victim to the same malarial fever which had carried off his great colleague Rainald fourteen years before.

The co-operation of the Pisans and Lucchesi in the war with the Imperial Legate seems to have done much to obliterate the memory of ancient wrongs, and, in 1181, negotiations were entered into with a sincere desire of settling all outstanding differences. A treaty of alliance satisfactory to both Communes was sworn to on the 16th of June, in the church of S. Prospero in Seturiano³. Three years later another treaty was made between Lucca and Florence⁴, with the result that, when Frederick revisited Tuscany, in 1185, he found that the cities, no longer at war with one another, had seized the opportunity to oppress

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 218, on the authority of Ilgen, *Corrado di Monferrato*, trad. Cerrato (Casale, 1890), p. 54 *et seq.* See also Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* p. 109.

² Gregorovius, *op. cit.* vol. II, lib. VIII, c. VI, p. 601, note 28.

³ Tommasi, *Sommario della Storia di Lucca, ubi cit.* pp. 47-49; Tronci, *Annali pisani*, ad ann. 1182; Roncioni, *ubi cit.* pp. 399-403; Ptolemaei *Lucensis Annales*, p. 60. See also Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 82-84, doc. XXII B, XXIII A, XXIII A*.

⁴ Santini, *Documenti*, No. XIV, p. 20.

and subjugate the feudatories of the Empire. Already, on the 5th of March, at Castellarano, he had granted a diploma in favour of the *cattani* of Garfagnana and Versilia, taking them under his protection and ordering the Lucchesi to rebuild the fortresses which they had demolished¹. On his arrival at S. Miniato, in July, the nobles of the *contado* flocked to do him homage and to complain of the usurpations and oppressions of the Communes. On the 25th he liberated many of them from the jurisdiction of Lucca². On the 31st he entered Florence. There he was once more assailed by the lamentations of the feudatories who declared with one voice that "the Commune of Florence had forcibly taken and occupied many of their towns and castles, against the honour of the Empire³." The case against the Florentines, at any rate, was too clear for doubt. They had subjugated the Cadolinghi, humiliated the Guidi, and, after despoiling the Count Alberto of his strong fortress of Mangona, had flung him into prison (October, 1184)⁴. It is not impossible that the news of their aggressions had hastened the coming of the Emperor, and he dealt with them sternly and promptly. According to the chroniclers, it was then that all the cities of Tuscany, except Pisa and Pistoia, were deprived of their *contadi*⁵. Pisa, for all her backsliding, was still the most loyal city in Tuscany, and Pistoia was no doubt spared because she was situated between Lucca and Florence and was at enmity with them both. Probably too, she possessed a powerful advocate in the Count Alberto whose cause she had been willing to espouse against the Florentines, until their alliance with Lucca made her intervention too hazardous⁶.

¹ Tommasi, *op. cit.* pp. 54, 55.

² Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc.*, *op. cit.* I, 133.

³ G. Villani, lib. v, c. 12.

⁴ See Santini, *Documenti*, I, xv, and xvi, p. 26, l. 5: "postquam ego comes Albertus exiero de prescione."

⁵ As to this matter there has been much difference of opinion. Some modern scholars accept the statement of the chroniclers without demur; others regard it as little short of a fable. For a long discussion of the question, see Santini, *Studi, etc.*, *op. cit.* pp. 123-133. Compare also Villari, *op. cit.* I, 133 *et seq.*, and N. Rodolico, *Introduzione alla Cronaca fiorentina di Marchione di Coppo Stefani* (Città di Castello, 1903), pp. lii, liii.

⁶ See Santini, *Studi, etc.*, *op. cit.* pp. 118, 119.

After remaining in Florence long enough to pass sentence, Frederick shook the dust of the city off his feet, and journeyed southward¹ to complete arrangements for the marriage of his son Henry with Constantia of Sicily². The Peace of Venice had been an undoubted personal triumph for Alexander III, but it had brought with it unexpected consequences. The fifteen years' truce then concluded with William II had ripened into a permanent peace, and, to the alarm of the Papacy, Germany and Italy were about to be dynastically united. The wedding took place in Milan, on the 27th of January, 1186, and there Frederick conferred the crown of Italy upon the bridegroom. He remained in Lombardy till the following June, and then crossed the Alps for the last time, rejoicing in the thought that the Empire would soon include Naples and Sicily. Meanwhile, Henry had appeared in Tuscany, intent upon carrying out the policy of his father for the humiliation of all the Communes except Pisa and Pistoia. This he endeavoured to accomplish under the specious form of privileges confirmed or newly granted to the cities, full of professions of affection and good will, but, in fact, tending only to limit the authority of the civic magistrates³. Thus, on the 30th of April, at Borgo S. Donnino, after belauding to the skies the fidelity of Lucca to the Empire, he confirmed to her the "most ancient privilege" of coining money, and jurisdiction within the city and for six miles outside the walls, excepting, even in that restricted area, the fiefs

¹ He passed through Poggibonsi on the 2nd of August, and, after visiting Siena, reached Montalcino on the 8th. According to Villani (v, 13), this was the occasion upon which "il detto Federigo assediò la città di Siena ma non l' ebbe"; but as a matter of fact the siege of Siena took place in the following year, "Anno Domini 1186. Obsedit Rex Henricus, qui postea fuit Imperator, Civitatem Senensium, et in proximo anno praeendenti Fredericus pater ejus eandem intravit Civitatem." *Cronica Sanese*, in Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* xv, cols. 11 and 16. This was the occasion of the fabulous victory of Rosaio. See Rondoni, *Sena Vetus*, *op. cit.* pp. 20, 21.

² Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1185. In September Frederick was in the Ducato. See my *History of Perugia*, p. 59.

³ Santini, *Studi, etc.*, *op. cit.* p. 139 *et seq.* In view of the considerations there set forth, I am disposed to believe that, in my *History of Perugia*, p. 60, I may have overestimated the argument to be deduced from the cordial expressions used by Henry in the privilege which he granted to the Perugians on the 7th of August, 1186.

of the nobles¹. In October, by a similar diploma, the jurisdiction of the Sienese over their *contado* was reduced to the narrowest limits², and then, in June, 1187, came the turn of Florence. Florence, who had never sought the grace of any King or Emperor, was to have a privilege forced upon her which would confirm and sanction that *diminutio capitis* decreed against her by Frederick. Accordingly, at Ortricoli in the territory of Viterbo, Henry declared that, "in consideration of the devoted services rendered by our faithful citizens of Florence to our most serene father Frederick, Emperor of the Romans," he was minded to single out, maintain and amplify the city and all the inhabitants thereof, to which end he granted them jurisdiction, with rights equal to his own, over the city of Florence itself and outside it, within certain limits, to wit, towards Settimo and Campi for three miles; towards Fiesole for one mile, and in the other parts around Florence for ten miles, "excepto ac salvo iure nobilium et militum, a quibus etiam volumus ut Florentini nichil exigant." In recognition of this "magnificent concession," the citizens were to offer every year, on the Kalends of May, a good samite (*bonum examitum*) to the King³. Thus was the ancient dependence of Fiesole on the Commune of Florence abrogated and the Bishop of that diocese reinstated in all his feudal rights. The Bishop of Florence also, regained his old immunities with complete exemption from civic control, and the Alberti and the Guidi once more came to their own. At the same time, Henry provided for the administration of the various *contadi* of Tuscany by the appointment of new officials. An *Anselmus* of Königsberg is recorded in the documents as *Praeses Tusciae* and as *comes teutonicus*. In 1186 *Henricus Faffus* is mentioned as Count of Arezzo and Siena; while a *Henricus teutonicus, comes florentinus* appears among the witnesses who attested the confirmation of the privilege by which,

¹ Santini, *Studi, etc. op. cit.* p. 140; Tommasi, *Sommario di Storia Lucchese, ubi cit.* p. 56.

² R. Arch. di Stato in Siena, *Riformagioni*, Perg. del Ottobre, 1186; Lisini, *Inventario delle pergamene conservate nel diplomatico dall' anno 736 all' anno 1250* (Siena, Lazzeri, 1908), Parte I, p. 105; Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* p. 141.

³ Santini, *Documenti, etc., op. cit.* p. xxxvii; Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc., op. cit.* I, 133-137.

in 1185, Frederick had liberated Borgo a Moriano from the jurisdiction of Lucca¹.

It is probable that, so long as Henry remained in Italy, these officials exercised a more or less effective control in their several districts; but after his departure for Germany, at the end of 1187, their authority rapidly declined. In 1191 Conrad of Lüzelhard, who had already administered the Romagna, was invested with the Marquisate of Tuscany²; and, in 1195, after Henry, now Emperor, had achieved the subjugation of the Two Sicilies, he bestowed the inheritance of the Countess Matilda on his brother Philip of Suabia³. In the same year the autonomy of the city of Florence itself was violated by the arbitrary appointment of the Pisan Raniero Gaetani to the office of Potestà⁴. This was no doubt rendered possible by the fact that the destruction of feudal castles, combined with voluntary immigration, had established a considerable number of lesser feudatories within the city walls who were determined to share the emoluments as well as the burdens of citizenship, to oppress rather than suffer oppression. The feudal contest had, in fact, been transferred from the *contado* to the city itself, and, as in the *contado* so in the city, the feudatories looked for assistance to the Emperor. During the eight short years of his reign, Henry acquired a degree of authority to which none of his predecessors had ever attained⁵, and it is not impossible that, but for his early death, he might have succeeded in subverting the liberties of the Communes. His system of government, however, endured so short a time that, even if it had been less vexatious than it actually was, it had no opportunity to take root in the affections of the people. Men's habits of thought and action are not easily changed, and in estimating the difficulties with

¹ Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* p. 141.

² *Ibid.* p. 157.

³ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad annum.

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 312, 313; Santini, *op. cit.* p. 175. This "Rainerius Gaetani had occupied many important offices in his native city, and is continually mentioned in the Pisan annals from the year 1161." See Marangone, *ubi cit.* pp. 24-49.

⁵ See Lanzani, *Storia dei Comuni Italiani, op. cit.* p. 274, and compare my *A History of Perugia*, pp. 61, 62.

which the Imperial officials were confronted, we must not forget to give due weight to the religious bond which existed between the cities and their respective *contadi*. In the minds of the inhabitants of the country districts, the sentiment of loyalty to the Commune was intimately connected with the sentiment of devotion to the Patron Saint of the City and to the *Chiesa Maggiore*. The Heavenly Hosts fought on the side of the citizens; and Our Lady of Siena and S. Giovanni of Florence were powerful allies of the free Communes¹. In mediaeval Italy, as in ancient Greece, men could not conceive of a State that did not appropriate the forces of religion as one of the principal institutions of the polity².

¹ See my *Palio and Ponte*, *passim*, and especially Chaps. II and III of Book I.

² Compare Emil Reich, *General History of Western Nations* (London, Macmillan, 1908), vol. I, p. 290.

CHAPTER THE SEVENTEENTH

PISA AND THE EMPEROR HENRY VI

WHILE the other Communes of Tuscany were thus humiliated and oppressed, Pisa was basking in the sunshine of Imperial favour, and dreaming dreams of a vast sea-born Empire. She had already entered into rivalry with Venice in the Adriatic¹, “in non modicam erecta audaciam,” as says the *Cronica Altinate*²; and, in 1188, a treaty was concluded with the rebellious Zara³. In Syria her prestige was growing apace, and the services which her sons, and especially the *Societas Vermigliorum*⁴, rendered to Conrad of Montferrat in the defence of Tyre (1187) were magnificently rewarded with praise and privileges⁵. In the same year an army was sent to Sardinia, where the Genoese had been intriguing with Agalbursa, the widow of Barisone of Arborea, and with the Judges of Cagliari and Torres⁶; “et mercatores Ianue omnes quoscumque [Pisani] invenerunt, bonis suis expoliarunt et de toto iudicatu Kalaris eiecerunt.” In revenge, the Genoese sent an expedition to Corsica and destroyed the fortress of Bonifacio⁷. It was, however, speedily rebuilt, and became a veritable nest of corsairs, who, under the tacit protection of Pisa, preyed continually on the commerce of Genoa⁸.

Meanwhile, the news that the Holy Sepulchre had once more fallen into the hands of the infidel re-awakened the old cru-

¹ That, before 1180, there had been conflicts between the Pisans and the Venetians at Almyro in the Gulf of Volo, and that the Pisans had afterwards penetrated into the Adriatic and espoused the cause of Ancona, is clear from Müller, *op. cit.* doc. xviii, pp. 20-23.

² *Arch. Stor. It.* Serie 1, Tom. viii, pp. 20-23.

³ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 96, doc. xxvii. Compare Hodgson, *Early History of Venice*, *op. cit.* pp. 337, 349.

⁴ As to the *Societas Vermigliorum*, see Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 407, 408.

⁵ Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 26-31, 31-35, docs. xxiii, xxiv, xxv, xxvii, xxviii.

⁶ Besta, *op. cit.* 1, 153, 154.

⁷ Otoboni Scribae *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 24, 25.

⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 54, 64-66. Compare Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 274 and note 1.

sading fervour throughout Europe. Our own Richard, then Count of Poitou, was the first to take the Cross, in November, 1187; the Kings of France and England were reconciled; and, resolving that the sunset of his life should be even more splendid than its noon, the Emperor Frederick, now nearly seventy years old, started for Palestine with a great army (1189).

Gregory VIII, who had been elected Pope on the 25th of October, 1187, journeyed to Pisa to make peace between the two great maritime republics; but died within a week of his arrival. His successor, who took the name of Clement III, was consecrated in the Pisan Cathedral on the 20th of December, and continued the good work with so much energy that, on the 13th of February, 1188, a thousand citizens of Pisa and a thousand citizens of Genoa, beginning with the Consuls, swore upon the Gospels to bury their differences and to obey the commandment of the Pope¹. With his own hands Clement gave the Banner of St Peter to Archbishop Ubaldo, "to the end that he might be the Standard-Bearer of the Army and of all Christians, and Legate of the Apostolic See over all Christians²." Fifty galleys were made ready, and to Pisa, still the acknowledged *Tusciae Provinciae caput*, crusaders flocked from half the towns of Central Italy. The Sienese alone sent five hundred fighting men under the command of Filippo Malavolti³. About the middle of September they put out to sea, and, after wintering at Messina, reached Tyre on the 6th of April, 1189. On the 28th of the following August Guy de Lusignan sat down before the city of Acre, with an army of seven hundred knights and nine thousand foot. The Pisans had long been famed for their skill in the construction of siege machinery⁴, an art in which

¹ Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 114-144.

² Muratori, *Rer. Italic. Script.* vi, 191: "Pontifex iste, in praefata Maiori Ecclesia Pisana, petiit, rogavit et exoratus est Pisanos ut succurrerent ad recuperandam Hierusalem Sanctam; et propriis manibus dedit vexillum Sancti Petri Domino Ubaldo, Pisano archiepiscopo, ut esset *Vexillifer exercitus et omnium Christianorum, et Legatus Apostolicae Sedis in omnes Christianos.*"

³ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* p. 417; Malavolti, *Historia de' fatti e guerre de' Sanesi*, *op. cit.* Parte 1, lib. 1, p. 37^t.

⁴ Nor was their reputation merely local. Thus, when Lisbon was taken from the Moors by Alfonso I, in 1147, we find a Pisan architect in the besieging army: "Quidam Pisanus natione, vir magnae industriae," who

they were unsurpassed by any other nation, and the chroniclers of the Third Crusade bear ample testimony to their efficiency and valour¹. Acre surrendered on the 12th of July, 1191, and the Pisans, Genoese and Venetians resumed possession of the streets, churches, warehouses and quays, acquired by former treaties, and now confirmed to them by a series of new privileges².

From the arrival of Richard Cœur de Lion in Palestine, the Pisans became his devoted adherents, and followed him in all his enterprises³. When he supported the claim of Guy de Lusignan to the Kingdom of Jerusalem, they unhesitatingly did the like; the Genoese, on the other hand, espoused the cause of Conrad of Montferrat; and, in February, 1192, while Richard was at Ascalon, the two nations came to blows in the streets of Acre. Both Conrad and the Duke of Burgundy hastened to the assistance of the Genoese; but the Pisans, “*virtute sua confisi et causa meliore*,” as says the English chronicler, more than held their own. On the news of Richard’s approach, Conrad withdrew to Tyre, taking the Duke with him. Although we know nothing of its terms, the *pacis unitas et concordiae* which the King of England imposed upon the combatants was, no doubt, satisfactory to his allies⁴. A little later Guy de Lusignan seems to have rewarded their services by “*grans dons et grans franchises*” in the island of Cyprus⁵; and, in 1192, in spite of the ruthless vengeance which they, together with the other Latins, had taken for the massacres of 1182⁶, the Pisans

built “*turrim ligneam mirae altitudinis*.” The Crusaders were a mixed body of Germans from Cologne, of English and of Flemings, who had started from Dartmouth for Palestine. On their way they landed at Oporto and joined forces with Alfonso. The Pisan seems to have come with the contingent from Cologne. Pertz, xvi, *Ann. Magdeburgenses*, p. 189.

¹ See the extracts printed by Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 411–414, 424, 425.

² Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 285; Hodgson, *op. cit.* p. 339, and, for the privileges granted to the Pisans, Müller, *op. cit.* docs. xxxii, xxxiii, xxxv, xxxvi.

³ Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 424–426, where a number of passages from the chronicles are printed *in extenso*.

⁴ *Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi*; auctore ut videtur Ricardo Canonico S. Trinitatis Londoniensis (ed. W. Stubbs), vol. 1, pp. 321–323.

⁵ Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 427, 470.

⁶ Gibbon, chap. lx; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 264, 265. The narratives of William of Tyre and of Nicetas will be found in Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 418–423.

were once more re-established in Constantinople by the Emperor Issac Angelus¹. In the absence of the Venetians, who took but little part in the Third Crusade, they were, at this time, the predominant maritime power in Syrian waters; and when, after the departure of Richard, the new King of Jerusalem, Henry of Champagne, attempted to punish them for intrigues against him, he learned to his cost that, even though he had leagued himself with the Genoese, the task was quite beyond his power. Deprived of their possessions in Acre, the Pisans promptly put out to sea and waylaid all merchantmen leaving, or entering the ports of Syria. Henry was helpless; and in January, 1194, they were reinstated in all their privileges². Little recked they that discord between Christians had wrought the ruin of the Third Crusade, or that a three years' truce and a narrow strip of coast, from Acre to Ascalon, were the sole results of an expedition which had drained the nobility of Western Europe³. So long as their wharves and warehouses were piled with spices and fine linen, with silks and purple and precious stones, their principal object was achieved. Their zeal for the Cross was always subservient to their desire of gain; and an ugly story is told of a Pisan merchant who hoarded his wheat while the besiegers of Acre were dying of hunger, until, at the last, by manifest judgment of God, his house was burned with fire and all the grain that was therein⁴. Yet, if they served Mammon faithfully, they sought to serve God also; and it was from this Crusade that their galleys returned deeply laden with the sacred dust of Calvary, for the better repose of those who should sleep their last sleep in the new cemetery that Archbishop Ubaldo was minded to build "for the love he bore his city⁵."

Meanwhile, in Italy, it seemed that the highest hopes of the Pisans were nearing fulfilment. While yet they were besieging Acre, William II of Sicily died (November, 1189) and Henry

¹ Müller, *op. cit.* doc. xxxiv, pp. 40-58.

² Müller, *op. cit.*, Illustrazioni ai documenti XL e XLV, p. 427.

³ See Archer and Kingsford, *The Crusades*, *op. cit.* p. 348.

⁴ *Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi*, *op. cit.* pp. 136, 137.

⁵ See *The Story of Pisa*, *op. cit.* pp. 197-201.

prepared to take possession of the Sicilian kingdom. Typically German in his brutality and bad faith, he had inherited much of his father's determination and energy, and was at least his equal in ambition; the fact that the Pope had bestowed the crown he coveted upon Tancred of Lecce only hardened his resolution; and even before the death of Barbarossa (10 June, 1190), Heinrich von Poppenheim, the Arrigo Testa of the Italian chroniclers, had been sent to Tuscany to gather troops and money for the coming conflict¹. Henry's main concern was, however, the maritime side of the expedition. Tancred possessed a powerful navy under the command of the celebrated Margaritus, "the King of the Sea," as men called him; and to obtain the ships with which to meet his enemy, Henry naturally turned for assistance to Pisa. Already in October, 1187, and again in August, 1190, he had shown his good will towards the Republic by confirming the privilege of 1162²; and when, after overcoming the opposition of Henry the Lion, he once more crossed the Alps to conduct the campaign in person, he was fully assured of Pisan co-operation. At this time, the government of the city was in the hands of Tedicio di Castagneto, the first "Potestas pisanae civitatis" whose name we encounter in Pisan annals, a member of the house of Gherardesca, and one of the most strenuous supporters of the Empire in Tuscany. Whatever the dangers from without, within the walls of Pisa the citizens were all devoted to the Emperor, and the Imperial policy was personified in Tedicio.

On the 11th of February, 1191, Henry was in Bologna, and on or before the 18th at Prato. Thence, without visiting Florence, he passed through Lucca to Pisa; and there, on the 1st of March, the Potestà made oath of fealty in the name of the Comune and formally promised the co-operation of the Pisan fleet. In return, Henry granted a new privilege under his own hand, whereby all the concessions of former Emperors were renewed and increased³. The Pisan *contado* was once more delimited and

¹ Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* p. 154; Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 293.

² Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* p. 154. See p. 130 *supra*.

³ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 104-114, doc. xxxiv. The privilege is also published by Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 24-28, though in an imperfect

defined, but with greater particularity of detail than heretofore; a large number of towns and villages which had formerly belonged to Volterra being specifically named as now belonging to Pisa. The citadel of Massa and Massa itself, with all its appurtenances, were granted to the Republic; Corsica was enumerated among Pisan islands: "*Ilba et Capraria et Gorgona et Planusia et Corsica*"; and, from Monte del Corbo¹ to the mouth of the Arno, from the foot of the mountains to the sea-shore, all persons save only the Pisans themselves were forbidden to construct "any building or fortification." Then followed the old magnificent concessions in the Norman kingdom: half of Palermo, Messina, Salerno, Naples, together with half of the products of their ports and territories; the whole of Gaeta, Mazzara and Trapani, and, "in every other city which Tancred holds, a street convenient for Pisan merchants." In Sicily, Calabria, Apulia and the Principality of Capua, "et per totum imperium nostrum," the merchants of the Republic were to be free to travel and to traffic without payment of custom, anchorage or other dues; while, in addition to all the rest, the Pisans were promised a third part of the accumulated Norman treasure: "dantis eis tertiam partem thesauri quem tenet Tancredus ut sit eorum²." Finally, Henry dangled before their eyes the prospect of Imperial assistance in a war with Genoa, and the possession of Porto Venere, once theirs, but now the bulwark of their enemies on the confines of Tuscany³. The humiliation

form and under a different date. He, however, gives a valuable analysis of the document, in the first volume of his *Dissertazioni sopra l' Istoria Pisana* (Pisa, 1761), Parte 1, pp. 159-167.

¹ "a loco dicto Corbo." See Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, I, 827, and compare Dal Borgo, *Dissertazioni, etc., op. cit.* I, 162. Monte del Corbo is mentioned by Fazio degli Uberti in his *Dittamondo*, III, 6:

Da questo fiume [la Magra] Toscana comincia,
Che cade in mare dal Monte del Corbo.

Petrarca, also, in his *Itinerarium Syriacum*, speaks of "Corvum famosum scopulum," and tells us that it was situated "contra extremos Januenses fines."

² As to the vast wealth of the Sicilian kingdom, compare Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani, etc., op. cit.* III, 552, 553.

³ See Repetti, *Dizionario* cited, IV, 624, and p. 61 *supra*. Apparently, when the Genoese occupied Porto Venere, the Pisans had not appreciated its value, and made no attempt to enforce their rights.

of Genoa; the humiliation of Venice; undisputed supremacy in the Tyrrhenian Sea, and maritime hegemony in all the Mediterranean; these were the prizes which might well be Pisa's, if Henry fulfilled his promises. What wonder that the enthusiasm of the citizens for the Sicilian expedition rose to fever-heat?

Meanwhile, the Tuscan levies were mustering at S. Quirico d' Orcia, the seat of Imperial administration in the Sienese *contado*. On the 6th of March Henry was at Siena, and thence, through S. Quirico and Montepulciano, he advanced to Rome. His enemy, Clement III, had died while he was yet in Tuscany, and Clement's successor, Celestine III, was too old and feeble to offer any effectual resistance to the arrogant demands of the German invader. On the 15th of April Henry received the Imperial crown at the hands of the reluctant Pontiff, and, in the following month, he sat down before the walls of Naples while the Pisan galleys blockaded the harbour. Captained by Richard of Acerra, the brother-in-law of Tancred, the citizens, however, offered an unexpectedly stubborn defence, and the Pisans found themselves hopelessly outnumbered by the Sicilian fleets. Taught by the experience of his father, Henry had, it would seem, as yet made no overtures to the Genoese; and he no doubt fully realised how improbable it was that they would long act in unison with the Pisans. Nevertheless, desperate diseases call for desperate remedies, and when it became clear that the Pisans alone were unable to cope with Margaritus, he no longer hesitated to send emissaries to their rivals. The promises made by Frederick, in 1162¹, were renewed; and the Genoese accepted the bait with avidity. On the 15th of August thirty-three galleys put out to sea; but for all their hastening, they came too late. Before their arrival, the siege of Naples had been perforce abandoned, and they narrowly escaped destruction at the hands of Margaritus whom they encountered off M. Circello with a fleet of over seventy galleys².

For the next two years Henry was detained in Germany by

¹ See p. 136 *supra*.

² Otoboni Scribae *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 38-41; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 286-290.

a Guelf rising, followed by a dangerous rebellion in the Lower Rhineland; but he never wholly abandoned his designs on Southern Italy. Even if the demand that, in addition to his ransom, Richard Cœur de Lion should provide "fifty galleys with all their equipments and twenty knights for the Emperor's service for one year" was subsequently dropped, it is none the less significant¹. Only for an expedition against the Normans could Henry require galleys.

In 1193 war was renewed between Venice and Pisa²; and when, after the death of Tancred, in February, 1194, the Emperor once more prepared to invade Sicily, he seems to have relied at least as much on the assistance of the Genoese as on that of the Pisans. Their cupidity was excited by the most lavish promises; and, in June, Henry himself appeared in Genoa. "If through you," declared the shameless German, "if through you, after God, I shall have acquired the kingdom of Sicily, mine will be the glory, yours the gain; for in it I may not abide with my Germans, but you and your descendants will remain there. Verily, that kingdom will be not mine but yours³." According to the testimony of their own official annalist, no doubt of the Emperor's good faith ever entered the minds of his dupes⁴; and "so magnificently did they bestir themselves that, about the middle of August, they issued forth from the harbour of Genoa with horse-transporters and galleys and arms and horsemen and with every other like thing which pertaineth unto an army." The Emperor, meanwhile, had prevailed upon the Pisans to co-operate with the Genoese, and, a few days later, the united fleets appeared before Gaeta. On the 23rd they reached Naples, and, on the 1st of September, they cast anchor in the harbour of Messina. Nowhere had they encountered any resistance; Gaeta, Naples and the islands of Ischia, Capri

¹ Hoveden, ad ann. 1193 (Riley's translation), vol. II, pp. 288, 296, 297.

² Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 290.

³ "Si per vos, post Deum, regnum Siciliae adquisiero, meus erit honor, set proficuum erit vestrum; ego enim in eo cum Theuthonicis meis manere non debeo, set vos et posteri vestri in eo manebitis; erit utique regnum illud non meum set vestrum."

⁴ Otoboni Scribae *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 46.

and Procida surrendered without striking a blow. Margaritus and the Norman navies have disappeared from the scene as if by magic¹. The only naval battle of the war was fought between the Pisans and Genoese in the waters of Messina. It is thus described by Ottobono Scriba:

“Now, after that they were come unto the city, it befell by the instigation of the devil that a very grievous battle was fought between the Genoese and Pisans. But, the contest having begun and continuing long, many Pisans fell on that day by the edge of the sword and were wounded even unto death. And the Genoese who fought with them on the seas took thirteen of their galleys and dispossessed them of them. Nevertheless, the Pisans took by force the *fondaco* of St John, wherein was but a little band of Genoese warriors; and such of the Genoese as they found therein they made prisoners; also they carried thence very rich booty. The houses, moreover, wherein they found any of the Genoese they took, together with the wealth that was therein; whereby it came to pass that their share of victory and of honour was greater than that of the Genoese, albeit it was less splendid. Also they took Giovanni Avvocato and other nobles who on that day had fought right valiantly for the common weal of the Genoese; and for divers days they held them captive in the palace which was of Margaritus², to the shame and infamy of the rest. Wherefore, on the following day [2nd of September], a very great number of the most valiant nobles and also of the people of Genoa bestirred themselves manfully by sea and land, to burn the ships of the Pisan corsairs and to assail them, to the end that they might avenge with the sword so enormous a dishonour and deliver the aforesaid nobles who were held captive...³.

“Wherefore, the [Imperial] Seneschal [Markwald of An-

¹ We have no information concerning the cause of Margaritus' inactivity. See Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 294.

² “in palation quod fuit Margarit.” This palace had been given to the Genoese by Roger II, in 1117.

³ In this place the original manuscript has been erased, and the following sentence inserted in another hand: “et insuper insurgentes Ianuenses super Pisanos, tredecim de galeis ipsorum ceperunt et retinuerunt, et maxima pars Pisanorum in galeis ipsis existencium ipsa die in acie gladii mortui fuerunt,

weiler] strove for divers days to make peace between the Pisans and the Genoese; and after that the aforesaid captives had been set at liberty with the good-will of the Pisans, he caused both the Pisans and Genoese to swear that they would return all that they had taken; and when oaths had been exchanged between them, the Genoese restored to the Pisans a thousand marks of silver and the whole of their galleys. But the Pisans, whom not without good reason the Genoese lightly esteem, restored these things to wit: one shield, one boiler for melting pitch, ten bundles of flax, and one small basket with a little cinnamon and a root of galangal. And they retained for themselves, in despite of their oaths, corselets and ships' tackle beyond all counting, silken raiment, ornaments, silver goblets and gold, and other riches innumerable. Moreover, such of the Genoese as they found in the city they despoiled in full view of the Genoese fleet, and sent them back to their fellows, naked and robbed and beaten. Meanwhile, it befel that the Pisans with their ships and corsairs from Porto Bonifacio, caring nothing for their oaths nor for the guarantees that they had given, pursued and captured before the eyes of the Genoese a very richly laden merchantman of Genoa, which was voyaging from Ceuta to Alexandria. Neither was there any who dared to say them nay, nor to defend that merchantman, by reason of the fear which they had of the aforesaid corsairs who bade them bear all these things peaceably for the love of the lord Emperor, lest perchance they should hinder his business. What more? So great and so many were the shames and injuries that scarcely would it be possible to tell them all. Whereby it came to pass that that valorous and worshipful man, Oberto di Olevano, potestà of Genoa, sickened and fell ill of a fever by reason of his perplexity and grief at so great infamies. And, as God willed it, he died thereof¹."

Of these events we have no contemporary Pisan record. The chronicle of Marangone ends with the year 1175, and the *Brevi-* et in Fario Mesine, ubi nulla est redemptio, cum lorice et armis submersi," —in substance, a mere repetition of what the annalist has already told us at the beginning of the paragraph.

¹ Otoboni Scribae *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 48-50.

arium contains nothing at all between 1187 and 1199. Obviously, however, on the admissions of their own annalist, the Genoese had, in the end, much the worst of the conflict, and they would seem to have lost their colony in Messina. Such a result was probably due to the more or less open connivance of Markwald of Anweiler who naturally favoured the Pisans with their long tradition of Imperial service¹. Ottobono's story of a Pisan plot to assassinate the Seneschal and of Pisan intrigues with Sibilla, the widow of Tancred, seems to be quite unworthy of credit. That the Pisans took no further part in the conquest of Sicily is no sufficient evidence of any change of policy on their part, nor of any lack of loyalty to the Emperor. After the Battle of Messina co-operation with the Genoese was no longer possible; and if the Pisans were prepared to return home with the booty they had gained, Henry was probably quite ready to let them go. The inactivity of Margaritus had rendered a large fleet unnecessary; and, in the circumstances, the Emperor may well have preferred the help of the Genoese. He would have felt it impolitic to break his promises to the Pisans. He still had need of them in Tuscany. The Genoese he could betray with impunity; and betray them he did, without scruple and without remorse. When their work was done and he had assumed the royal crown of Sicily in the cathedral of Palermo, so far from investing them with the fiefs he had promised, he scoffed at their pretensions, declaring that, now that their potestà was dead, there was none among them whom he could recognize as representing the Commune; he deprived them of all the rights and privileges they had enjoyed under the Norman kings; he expelled their merchants from the island, and even threatened the destruction of Genoa itself. In his bitter disappointment Ottobono borrows the phraseology of the prophet Jeremiah: "Behold, all men," he cries, "behold, therefore, and consider whether there be any sorrow like unto this sorrow, and whether from the beginning of time such like things were ever done by any vilest pagan or tyrant²."

¹ Compare Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1194.

² Otoboni Scribae *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 51-53.

The delight of the Pisans was, of course, proportionate to the indignation of the Genoese; and, even if their dream of virtual copartnership with the Empire in the newly acquired territories was not fulfilled, it is (*pace* Professor Manfroni¹) by no means improbable that they acquired something approaching commercial hegemony in the kingdom of Sicily. Pisan tradition points in that direction²; and it is certain that the friendly relations which existed between the Republic and the Emperor remained unimpaired. Enough to prove it is the selection of the Pisan Raniero Gaetani to carry out the Imperial policy in Florence³. Nevertheless, the favours which Henry showered upon his faithful lieges turned at the last to their disadvantage. To benefit them he had deprived the Bishop of Volterra of the right of coining money⁴, and had brusquely ordered the reluctant Florentines to aid them in acquiring complete possession of their *contado*⁵. By the diploma of 1191 he had, as we have seen, definitely excluded the Lucchesi, now closely leagued with Florence, from any possibility of access to the sea-coast; and when he died, on the 28th of September, 1197, the Pisans were cordially hated by almost all their neighbours. In the same year they were once more involved in war with Venice⁶; they had been at war with Genoa since the Battle of Messina⁷.

¹ Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 294-296. He apparently accepts the *Annales Ianuenses* for gospel, and, after recounting how the Emperor repudiated his promises to the Genoese, concludes as follows: "Quanto ai Pisani, è inutile dire che dopo il tentativo di Messina furono considerati quasi come nemici, checchè ne dica inventando il Roncioni." That, I confess, appears to me a gratuitous assumption and hard to reconcile with subsequent events.

² See Dal Borgo, *Dissertazioni sopra l' Istoria Pisana, op. cit.* T. I, P. I, p. 166.

³ P. 214 *supra*.

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 311; Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* p. 172.

⁵ Santini, *Studi, etc., op. cit.* pp. 172, 173.

⁶ Martin da Canal, *La Cronique des Véniciens*, pte 1, § 55, in *Arch. Stor. It.* VIII, 338.

⁷ Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 299 *et seq.*

CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH

“THE GREAT REFUSAL”

THE death of Henry VI led first to the abandonment and then to the total ruin of the Imperial system which he and his father had so persistently striven to establish in Central Italy. No sooner did the news of his decease reach Tuscany than the Samminiatesi destroyed the German fortress which had given to their town its title of *al Tedesco*¹; and, in Borgo S. Genesio, the Roncaglia of Tuscany, where feudatories and Consuls had been wont to do homage to the Emperor and to his Legates, the representatives of the greater part of the Tuscan cities assembled to organize a Guelf League, after the pattern of the Lombard League, for the vindication of their rights and liberties. On the 11th of November, 1197, in the Church of S. Cristoforo, in the presence of two Cardinal Legates “et eorum parabola et mandato,” the Bishop of Volterra, as seignior of his city, and the Consuls and rectors of Florence, Lucca, Siena, Prato, and S. Miniato, made oath to maintain it².

The terms of this alliance, its character and its scope, have been so often and fully discussed that it is necessary to deal with them in this place³. Suffice it to say that the main object of the confederated cities was to take advantage of the Emperor's decease to secure complete possession of their respective territories; and to this end it was necessary that Tuscany should be united. Unfortunately, however, Florence was permitted to take the lead, and Florence was, as usual, acting with cynical egoism. Subsequent events leave no doubt as to her true aims.

¹ Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc.*, *op. cit.* 1, 142.

² Santini, *Documenti, op. cit.* 1, XXI, 33. Compare Villari, *op. cit.* 1, 143, n. 2, and Lisini, *R. Arch. di Stato in Siena, Inventario delle pergamene conservate nel diplomatico* (Siena, Lazzeri, 1908), pte 1, p. 117.

³ See, for example, Santini, *Studi, etc.*, *op. cit.* pp. 179 *et seq.*

She promoted the League "in order that all Tuscany might aid her to regain speedy possession of her *contado*¹"; and, when that end was accomplished, she shamelessly violated her reciprocal obligations. The success of her designs depended almost entirely on the attitude adopted by Siena; and the most elementary prudence should have prevented the Sienese from having anything to do with the League. They must have known that the first object of the Florentines was the destruction of Semifonte, a strong castle of the Alberti, situated on the hill of Petrognano, some five or six miles to the north of Poggibonsi. Beneath its walls a considerable town had grown up; its population was increasing rapidly and already dreamed of rivalry with Florence². Semifonte bid fair to become a great Imperial stronghold in the centre of Tuscany; allied with Siena, no force the Florentines could bring against it could hope to subdue it; and, in friendly hands, it must have proved an almost insuperable obstacle to any invasion of Sienese territory by way of the Val d' Elsa. Nevertheless, Siena, as we have seen, adhered to the League; on the 2nd of December Arezzo followed her example, and in February the Guidi and the Alberti, finding themselves too weak to stand alone, reluctantly took the oaths, lest worse should befall them. By the terms of the League, they could only enter it as the dependants of Florence³; and their adherence therefore amounted to a virtual acknowledgment of the suzerainty of that Commune. The Florentines, moreover, expressly reserved the right to attack Semifonte and to compel the submission of Certaldo and Mangona, fiefs of the Alberti⁴.

Meanwhile, Pisa and Pistoia stood aloof, indifferent to entreaties and to menaces. The League could offer them nothing

¹ Villari, *op. cit.* I, 144.

² The following rhyme was current in the *contado*:

Firenze, fatti in là
Che Semifonte si fa città.

³ "Item non recipiemus ad hanc societatem vel securitatem aliquod castrum vel personam quod vel que sit de episcopatu vel comitatu vel districtu alicuius civitatis vel episcopi seu comitis, sine parabola consulum vel rectorum illius civitatis vel episcopi seu comitis vel castri, de cuius comitatu vel districtu vel episcopatu esset."

⁴ Santini, *Documenti, op. cit.* p. 38, and *Studi, etc., op. cit.* pp. 187-191.

which they did not possess already; unlike the other Communes, they had never been deprived of their *contadi*; and, but for the fatuous conduct of Siena, their refusal to join the confederated cities would have been an act of sound statesmanship. In the actual circumstances, they simply cut themselves off from the comity of Tuscan nations, and permitted Florence to arrogate to herself the direction of the League. The abstention of Pisa at this juncture has been characterized by Professor Volpe as "il gran rifiuto." Yet, it is difficult to perceive what other course she could have pursued with honour. The League was directed against the Empire, and under the Empire Pisa had won prosperity and freedom. To have thrown in her lot with the confederated cities would have been a deliberate abandonment of her political principles, an act of rebellion against her suzerain, a violation of her oath of fealty. Even Siena only consented to join the allies on condition that the Pope should absolve her "de fidelitate quam fecerat filio olim imperatoris¹." Moreover, at this time, Pisa was once more governed by a Count of the house of Gherardesca—probably the same Tedecio Gherardesca who had held office between 1190 and 1192²—and for such an one a confederation whose forces were about to be used for the humiliation and subjection of the feudatories can have been nothing but anathema. How could Pisa act in unison with the Bishop of Volterra, exasperated against her by the curtailment of his *contado* and the deprivation of the right of minting money; with Lucca, still coveting the possession of the Val d' Era; with Florence, closely allied with Lucca, and manifestly aspiring to supremacy in Tuscany?

Too late the Sienese were taught by bitter experience what had been the real object of the League. Hardly was the destruction of Semifonte accomplished than the Florentines turned upon them; and, on the 4th of June, 1203³, the iniquitous arbitration of Ogerio not only deprived them of all that portion of

¹ Santini, *Documenti*, *op. cit.* p. 37.

² Arch. di Stato in Pisa, *Atti Pubbl.* 22 e 27 sett. 1197: "Comes Tedicius Pisanorum noviter electus potestas," cited by Volpe, p. 321 n.

³ Santini, *Documenti*, *op. cit.* I, pp. 124-127, doc. XLVIII.

their *contado* over which their rights were fairly disputable, but also of much which was undoubtedly theirs. They were forced to relinquish their possessions in Poggibonsi, to forsake the lord of Tornano, their ally, and to see their northern frontiers pushed back to within a few miles of the walls of Siena¹. In scorn of their folly, the enemy who had overreached them labelled them for all time with the opprobrious nickname of *Besci* or *Besciolini*².

Such was the interpretation which the Florentines put upon the oath which they had sworn on the holy gospels of God to preserve firm peace and concord all the days of their lives between the members of the Tuscan League³. They had scarcely more excuse for attacking Siena, in 1202, than the Austrians had for attacking Serbia in 1914. Indeed, the German ethics of to-day are strangely reminiscent of the ethics of Florence from the twelfth century to the sixteenth, when, at last, Tuscany was mercifully delivered from her tyranny by the Grand Duke Cosimo de' Medici. To protect their new and straitened frontiers, the Sienese constructed the strong fortresses of Monteregioni and Querciagrossa; but their loyal observance of the arbitrament of Ogerio did nothing to avert the malignant hatred of their unscrupulous enemy. For over half a century Siena was subjected to the unprovoked and brutal bludgeonings of Florence. In vain, too late, she leagued herself with Pisa. Florence had become too strong for them both. It is true that, during the comparatively peaceful years which followed the disastrous war of 1207 and 1208⁴, the Sienese obtained a short breathing space; but the Florentines were not idle, and no sooner had they consolidated their authority over their *contado*

¹ Villari, *op. cit.* I, 148-150; Langton Douglas, *A History of Siena*, pp. 57-59. See also Santini, *Studi, etc.*, *op. cit.* carta III.

² See O. Porri, *Miscellanea Storica Sanese* (Siena, 1844), p. 13 n., and Manuzzi, *Vocabolario*, *s.v.*

³ "Nos iuramus supra dei sancta evangelia abhinc in antea toto tempore vite nostre firmam pacem et concordiam inter omnes personas huius societatis tenere, etc."

⁴ Rondoni, *Sena Vetus*, *op. cit.* p. 43; Santini, *Documenti*, cited, pp. 150-174; Sanzanome, edition cited, pp. 139, 140; Villani, v, 33, 34; L. Douglas, *op. cit.* pp. 59, 60.

than they initiated a policy of peaceful penetration which was hardly less dangerous than open hostilities. By the tireless energy of their merchants, they conquered the markets of Volterra, Colle, S. Gimignano, Pistoia, Prato and S. Miniato; the coinage of Pisa was gradually superseded by the coinage of Florence; judicious loans of money afforded specious pretexts for subsequent interventions, and a vast net was woven in the fine meshes of which the other nations of Tuscany were insidiously trammelled¹.

Meanwhile, the energies of the Pisans were devoted to the war with Genoa², to the invasion of Sicily, in which they assisted the Emperor Otho IV with a fleet of forty galleys³, and above all to the definite establishment of their overlordship in Sardinia. It was in those days that the strong fortress of Castel di Castro was constructed to dominate the city of Cagliari, and became the bulwark and centre of Pisan authority in the island⁴. Only after peace had been made with Genoa, in 1217⁵, were the Pisans at last able to turn their attention to the doings of Florence. There had as yet been no open quarrel. So late as 1214, a commercial treaty had been entered into between the Communes, eliminating the right of reprisals (*rappresaglie*), and relieving the merchants of both cities from the danger of arbitrary arrest or seizure of goods for debts for which they were neither sureties nor guarantors⁶; on the very eve of the final

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 355, and see G. Arias, *I trattati commerciali della Repubblica Fiorentina* (Firenze, Le Monnier, 1901), vol. I, pte I, cap. VI.

² There is no period of Pisan history concerning which the Pisan sources are so meagre as the first two decades of the thirteenth century. We are principally dependent on the Genoese annalist Ogerio Pane for the details of this war. See the *Annali Genovesi* (edition cited), vol. II, and compare Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 360 *et seq.*

³ Muratori, *Annali d' Italia*, ad ann. 1211; Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 363, 364.

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 345-353, and more fully in Besta, *op. cit.* vol. I, caps. X, XI.

⁵ Roncioni, *ubi cit.* pp. 478-481; Ogerii Panis *Annales Ianuenses*, pp. 142, 143.

⁶ Santini, *Documenti, etc., op. cit.* pte I, docs. LXI, LXII, pp. 175-179. The right of reprisals (*withernam*) also existed in England. See Lipson, *An Introduction to the Economic History of England* (London, 1913), in the Index, *s.v.*; and, as to Italian reprisals, the classical work of Del Vecchio and Casanova, *Le Rappresaglie nei Comuni Medievali* (Bologna, Zanichelli, 1894).

rupture we find a Pisan, Ugo Grotti, acting as potestà in Florence¹. Yet causes of friction were manifold; and as, day by day, the Pisans found themselves increasingly cramped and isolated by the expansion of the Florentine *contado*, and as the need of the Florentines for the communication with the sea became more and more imperative, it must have been sufficiently manifest that the apparently cordial relations which existed between the two cities rested upon very insecure foundations². If there be any truth in Giovanni Villani's story of the lapdog, it proves conclusively how great was the tension of men's minds, when so slight an occasion could produce such serious consequences³.

On the 22nd of November, 1220, Frederick II was crowned in Rome and the following year saw the Ghibellines of Tuscany drawing together. On the 2nd of October, through the influence of the Imperial Vicar, Conrad, Bishop of Spire, the Sieneſe entered into a league with the Aldobrandeschi⁴; and, in the same month, their ancient "societas" with Orvieto was renewed for a further term of twenty years⁵. Having annulled the cessions of Count Guido and the Sieneſe, Frederick confirmed the right of the Marturensi to elect their own Consuls and granted them full jurisdiction over the town and district of Poggibonsi. The Sieneſe were encouraged to ally themselves with the new Commune, and in September, 1221, they swore perpetual amity with the Marturensi⁶. Poggibonsi, "the navel of Tuscany," was to become an imperial stronghold like S. Miniato al Tedesco, a bulwark of the Sieneſe state against Florentine aggression, serving as Semifonte might have served had the Sieneſe been wiser. Meanwhile, Pisa had definitely

¹ G. Villani, *Cronica*, v. 42.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 355-357.

³ G. Villani, *Cronica*, vi, 2. His comment that "si può dire che fosse diavolo in ispezie di catellino, perchè tanto male ne seguì," would appear to impute a good deal of unnecessary painstaking to his Satanic majesty.

⁴ R. Arch. di Stato in Siena, *Caleffo Vecchio*, c. 122^t-126, 1221. See also Hutton, *In Unknown Tuscany*, *op. cit.* pp. 147, 148, and note on p. 233.

⁵ Fumi, *Codice diplomatico, etc.*, *op. cit.* p. 93, doc. CXLII.

⁶ Rondoni, *Sena Vetust*, *op. cit.* pp. 41, 42, and authorities there cited. See also Lisini, *Inventario delle pergamene conservate nel diplomatico* (Siena, Lazzeri, 1908), p. 169.

broken with Florence, and all the Florentine merchandise in the city had been confiscated¹. A year later, the Aretines also joined the Ghibelline league, promising that, so soon as their existing treaty with Florence should have expired, they would, instead of renewing it, enter into a formal alliance with the Sienese and assist them and Poggibonsi against the common enemy².

The confederation was a formidable one; but Florence was already too powerful for them all. On the 21st of July, 1222, the Pisans were broken at Montecorecio or, as some say, at Castel del Bosco³, before they could join forces with their allies; and from thenceforward the animosity between the rival cities increased with every decade. Pisa no longer fought for supremacy but for existence. The hegemony of Tuscany had passed from her, and the hegemony of the Tyrrhenian Sea was passing with it. The Tuscan League stands as a milestone marking the point at which her decline began.

¹ G. Villani, *Cronica*, VI, 2.

² R. Arch. di Stato in Siena, *Riformagioni*, Perg. 3 sett. 1222; Tommasi, *Historie di Siena*, lib. IV, pp. 213, 214.

³ The chroniclers are not in agreement as to the precise place where the battle was fought. See G. Villani, *Cronica*, VI, 3; Sanzanome (edition cited), pp. 144, 145; Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* xv, 22, 23, and Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 363.

CHAPTER THE NINETEENTH

PISA UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CONSULS

As we have already seen, the Commune was in its inception simply a private association; and a private association it long remained: tolerated by the Marquises of Tuscany and by the Bishops of Pisa, but, until its existence had been formally recognized by the Empire, undoubtedly illegal¹. The *armatori* and merchant adventurers who formed its constituent parts were rather an aristocracy than an oligarchy; and they were able to maintain and extend their authority because they were, in fact, not merely the best but also the only possible interpreters of the aspirations and ambitions of their fellow-citizens. There were, no doubt, craftsmen in Pisa long before the birth of the Commune; the fact that Pisa was the seat of a bishopric would alone have sufficed to produce a certain amount of trade; for in the Middle Ages churches and monasteries contributed greatly to the development of town life. If we look no further afield than our own country, we shall recall the ten traders who dwelt "in front of the door of the church" at Abingdon, and the "bakers, ale-brewers, tailors, washerwomen, shoemakers, robe-makers, cooks, porters and agents," who "waited daily upon the Saint and the Abbot and the Friars" at Bury St Edmunds². In the document which contains the first undisputed record of Consuls in Pisa we have also record of *Fabri*, who seem to have been employed in work upon the cathedral³, and appealed "humillimis supplicationibus" to Archbishop Daibert for pro-

¹ When Frederick Barbarossa prohibited "conventicolas omnes et con-iurationes in civitatibus et extra, etiam occasione parentele, et inter civitatem et civitatem, et inter personam et personam," he was simply declaring and re-enacting what had been the law ever since the time of the Longobards. See Solmi, *Le Associazioni in Italia avanti le origini del Comune*, *op. cit.*

² Lipson, *An Introduction to the Economic History of England* (London, 1913), p. 168; *Domesday Book*, I, 586; II, 372.

³ Villari, *I primi due secoli*, etc., *op. cit.* I, 88.

tection¹. Yet the fact remains that practically the whole of the trade and commerce of the city was in the hands of the associated families; they were far the largest employers of labour, and but for their energy and enterprise the greater proportion of the inhabitants would have lost the means of livelihood. To the mediaeval peasant or retainer or burgher, the existence of a governing class seemed natural and righteous. "It was tacitly agreed that chieftainship was a trade and that those who were brought up to this trade were on the average the best rulers." The mass of the citizens no more expected to be consulted with regard to the government of the Commune than they expected to be consulted with regard to the commercial or maritime undertakings of the individual merchants and *armatori* whom they served. For the greater part of the twelfth century there was no separation of interests between the rulers and the ruled. The associates were as free to frame their own laws and to choose their own officials as if the Commune had been nothing more than a private partnership.

When, however, they first bound themselves together in oath-fellowship, there were other laws than their own to which they owed obedience. If we ignore for the moment the official character of the Visconte, and his rapid loss of power practically justifies us in so doing², the Pisan state consisted of the bishop and of those who had sworn fealty to him, its territory of their fiefs, and, of course, of the domain of the bishop. The majority, if not all, of the associates were his vassals³, and as such they formed his curia. Thus, the Commune inherited from the feudal period certain magistracies and customs which, for the most part, no one ever thought of abolishing. From time to time, as need arose, fresh institutions and fresh magistracies were added to the old ones, but without any preconceived plan, almost one might say by chance, and merely as temporary expedients. Only after a long series of years did that which in its origin had been provisionary harden into permanency. Even the consulship, the first and only source of communal authority,

¹ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, III, 890, 891. Compare p. 10 *supra*.

² P. 11 *supra*.

³ P. 46 *supra*.

the primal organism which included within itself all the other social elements, as yet amorphous and embryonic, was in its inception nothing more than a temporary commission or *balia*, appointed for the performance of some particular piece of business (*e.g.* to command a naval expedition¹). Individual associates continued, almost as a matter of course, to assume functions which, in a less loosely organized body politic, could only have been performed by the State, and the actions of the State were often the actions of private citizens carried out on their own initiative and responsibility. Owners of ships had the right to punish their crews; *armatori* fought at sea and in Sardinia to serve their personal ends, albeit, in the eyes of the Genoese and of the Judges, they doubtless represented the Commune. Private wars were waged and private treaties entered into. Even the fleets which took part in the Crusades, and went to the aid of the Emperors in Southern Italy, were in the main equipped and manned by private enterprise². The ideal unity of the Commune was not expressed in any magistracy, but in the Cathedral, in the Baptistry and in the Campanile. In Pisa as elsewhere, the mother church of the city was the "home, the fortress, the first palace of the people³," the symbol alike of spiritual hope and civic glory. There was celebrated the daily sacrifice of the Mass; there were brought the spoils of victory to be presented to the Queen of Heaven⁴; there the wars and conquests of the Commune were inscribed on deathless marble; there the Consuls gave ear to the complaints of the people⁵; and there, on the Vigil of the Assumption, offerings of wax candles were, perhaps, already beginning to be made by all the subject towns and villages of the *contado* in sign of vassalage⁶.

¹ P. 9 *supra*.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 123.

³ Tammasia, *Vita di popolo nei Secoli XIII e XIV*, in *Arte, Scienza e Fede ai giorni di Dante* (Milano, Hoepli, 1902), p. 36: "...la chiesa fu e rimane sempre la casa, la fortezza, il primo palazzo del popolo." Compare my *A History of Perugia*, pp. 379-381, and Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 125, 126.

⁴ Pp. 24, 29, 43 *supra*.

⁵ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I (*Breve Consulum*, 1164), p. 24: "Reclamationes omnes quae in die dominico mihi, vel alicui de meis sociis, in ecclesia Sanctae Mariae...fient, etc."

⁶ See P. Vigo, *Una festa popolare a Pisa nel Medio Evo* (Pisa, Tip. Mariotti, 1888), and compare my *Palio and Ponte*, *op. cit.* pp. 12-15.

Later on, as new needs and new and ever increasingly complex problems presented themselves, the consequent development of the political constitution, both administrative and judiciary, necessitated the substitution of a *lex scripta* for the old customary law. Here, too, however, the same haphazard methods were followed. The various attributes, duties and rights of individual magistrates were reduced to writing without any definite or general plan and merely under the pressure of immediate necessity. The result was the appearance of the so-called *Brevi* (Lat. *Brevia*). These, as their name implies, contained a brief summary of the duties which, upon taking office, the various magistrates swore to perform. At first, they were simply oaths of office, but were gradually swollen by additions until they developed into actual statutes. The different stages of this evolution are clearly visible in the *Breve Pisani Communis* of 1286, where, side by side with enactments pure and simple, we find rubrics which still continue to run in the form of an oath, while, in not a few instances, the enactment and the oath co-exist in the same rubric (*e.g.* lib. I, rubr. 182). All the organs of the Comune, whether administrative or judicial, and, indeed, we may almost say the whole population, participated in the formation of the law. The daily routine of communal business enabled the individual citizen to perceive where and how the existing statutes were defective¹; and, when the sense of the community was in favour of a change, the General Council, or the *Emendatori*, gave concrete form to the popular desire and embodied it in a new rubric². Often, too, public opinion, before becoming law, was voiced in the form of an ordinance (*ordinamento*) com-

¹ Compare L. Zdekauer, *La vita pubblica nel Dugento*, *op. cit.* p. 72, and S. Bongi, *Bandi Lucchesi del Secolo Decimoquarto* (Bologna, 1863), Bando 60, p. 37, and note on pp. 299, 300.

² Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I (*Br. Consulium*, 1164), p. 31: "Constitutata facta tam de usibus quam de legibus, firma tenebo, excepto quod sub sacramento a tribus legis prudentibus additum vel diminutum fuerit, etc." It was the duty of the *Emendatori* to revise the statutes which were continually augmented by fresh accretions and to co-ordinate the new material, distributing the laws decreed by the Council in the divisions appropriate to their subject-matter. It seems, moreover, that this *balia* could initiate legislation *motu proprio*. Compare L. Zdekauer, *Il Constituto del C. di Siena dell' anno 1262* (Milano, Hoepli, 1897), *Dissertazione*, pte 1, § 6, pp. xviii, xix.

piled or accepted by some *Balia* as a provisional measure, which, later on, was promoted to the dignity of a statute by the sanction of the Council. Each *Breve* comprised a definite field of law, but not infrequently individual *Brevi* exchanged particular provisions, so that one was increased and fattened on matter drawn from the other¹; while all of them served to provide material and aliment for the great central *Breve Consulum*. Afterwards, when the *Breve Consulum* had been transformed into the *Breve Pisani Communis*, it finished by absorbing all the others². At the period, however, with which we are at present concerned, that process of fusion had not even begun. In the opening years of the twelfth century, the *Breve Consulum* probably stood alone.

Sworn to by the Consuls on taking office, it was the first and most important of all the *Brevi*, representing, as it were, the ark of the covenant, wherein were preserved the political traditions of the city, the privileges of the Communes and of the head of the Pisan Church, handed down from generation to generation. Here were recorded the *securitates quos fieri fecit episcopus Gerardus et archiepiscopus Daibertus*, "capitoli perpetui," as the later statutes termed them³, withdrawn from the province of the *Emendatori* and increased, from time to time, by resolutions of the Councils and by the insertion of the fundamental clauses of political treaties with other cities⁴; thus insuring to the government a practical continuity which the short term of office of the Consuls might otherwise have impaired. The *Breve* contained no enacting clauses but simply an epitome of the duties of the Consular College, couched in the form of a solemn declaration,

¹ For a curious example of this process, see Fumi, *Codice diplomatico della Città d' Orvieto*, *op. cit.* p. 731.

² Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I (*Breve pisani communis*, lib. I, rubr. 46), p. 110: "Brevia aliqua vel statuta officiales pisane civitatis et districtus non patiemur neque permicemus habere, aut aliquibus brevibus vel statutis uti, nisi capitulis hujus Brevis, que servare teneamur."

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 126. Compare Zdekauer, *Il Constituto, etc.*, *op. cit. Dissertazione*, p. xix.

⁴ Thus, in the *Breve Consulum* of 1164 we find record of the peace which had been entered into with Lucca six years earlier (15th Aug. 1158), and of the convention with the *cattani* of Peccioli in 1162. Compare my *A History of Perugia*, pp. 32, 33.

written in the first person singular—"faciam," "observabo," "tractebo," "tenebo," etc.—and concluding with a form of oath, which, though it varied from time to time, was in substance as follows: "In the name of the Lord, Amen. I, the Consul, swear on the holy Gospels of God to observe all the things herein set down, without fraud, regarding neither love nor hate, reward nor prayer, both I and my colleagues, all the time of my consulship."

To the *Breve Consulum* corresponded the *Breve Populi*, a reciprocal oath, which served either to set the seal upon some weighty resolution taken in public *parlamentum*, as, for example, upon the sentence pronounced upon the Visconti, in 1153¹, or constituted the accepted formula with which, when the Consuls took their oath of office, the associates swore to obey them and to bear the burdens of citizenship—"sacramentum consulum," "sacramentum consulatui²." Taken in conjunction, these two oaths constituted an undertaking similar to that into which new citizens entered on being admitted "consortio civitatis³." To the *Breve Consulum* the Consuls swore severally; to the *Breve Populi*—a distinct and separate *Breve*, though identical in form and substance—the people swore all together, or one of them only in the name of the rest, "in communi parlamento, in anima populi," after he had received "parabolam" to do so⁴. This *Breve Populi*, which is mentioned in the treaty with Florence in 1171⁵, appears to correspond to the *Breve Compagne* of

¹ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, I, 19: "Haec omnia firma tenere predicti consules corporaliter in communi pretorio iuravere...recolimus populum in parlamentum jurasse suprascripta firma tenere, etc."

² In this connection Professor Volpe (*op. cit.* p. 127) quotes a document published by Olivieri, *Serie dei Consoli*, in *Atti Soc. Lig.* I, p. 272: "...quando populus pisanus iuraverit obedire consulibus de comuni et publico negotio nostre civitatis, [nos consules pisani] faciemus predicta sacramenta unicuique eorum iurare, etc." Compare Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I (*Br. Consulum* 1162), p. 9: "Eorum autem reclamaciones qui sacramentum consulatui non fecerint, etc."

³ Dal Borgo, *Diplomi pisani*, p. 186.

⁴ Compare the treaty with Genoa of 1150, in Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 311–313, and the peace with the Cornetani of 1174, in Muratori, *Antiquitates*, diss. 49.

⁵ Santini, *Documenti, etc.*, *op. cit.*, p. 5. Compare Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I (*Br. Consulum* of 1164), p. 29: "...breve ad quod sequentes consules et populus, omnesque officiales sint iuraturi...."

Genoa; the pact which bound the whole body of the members of the Commune to the sovereign power¹. It was, of course, as different from the *Breve Populi* of the second half of the thirteenth century as the *populus* of the Consular period was different from the *populus* which arose under the leadership of its Captain to oppose the *Magnati*².

The Consuls regarded the Consulate not only as a right but as a duty. Their salaries were derisory, scarcely indemnifying them for the expenses of their office; but they owned no less nor lower fount of their authority than the Almighty Himself, and did not hesitate to proclaim themselves Consuls "by the grace of God³." They lent money to the Commune⁴; they furnished it with galleys, and with war-horses bred upon their private estates; in their double capacity of sea-captains and *milites*, they gathered around them vast numbers of dependants, both in their towers and in their ships; they knew how to handle the oar, to build the siege-castle and to dig the moat, to lead in battle and to speak in the *Arrengo*. Many of them, no doubt, were quite illiterate⁵; but, they were wise with the wisdom of practical experience, and, unsoftened by book-learning, their minds were apt for the honour and exercise of arms⁶.

Much had they seen and known; cities of men
And manners, climates, councils, governments.

Their pride and self-reliance were hallowed by the great deeds of their ancestors and by the possession by each *consorzio* of kinsmen of its own private church, for prayer in life and burial after death. Their unity was thus invested with an almost sacred

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 128.

² Compare Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I, Proemio, p. xviii.

³ Thus, in a document of 1119: "Ildebrandus, nunc Dei gratia Pisanorum consul"; in another of 1153: "Nos in excellenti pisanæ urbis specula, disponente domino, consules constituti"; and in a third of 1164: "nos, etc., Consul Dei gratia Pisanorum." See Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 136, n. 1.

⁴ Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I (*Br. Consulum* of 1164), pp. 34, 38.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42 n.

⁶ Compare Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning* (Clarendon Press Series, 1873), p. 10, and *Essays*, lviii: "In the youth of a state, armes doe flourish; in the middle age of a state, learning: and then both of them together for a time; in the declining age of a state, mechanicall arts and merchandize."

character, akin to that of the Greek *φρατρία*, with its sacrifices and tombs in common. From their ranks issued nearly all the judges and jurists, as well as many of the higher clergy of the city, the canons, and often the Archbishop. Theirs was a small and exclusive society, the *εὐπατρίδαι* of Pisa, disciplined, homogeneous and even uniform. In it the individual lost himself. There is a lack of great political names in the twelfth century. Such names only begin to appear with the social upheaval which gave birth to the Lloyd Georges of the Middle Ages. The despots of the fifteenth century are a direct product of democracy: the negation of every class barrier and of every aristocratic tradition¹.

The Consuls elected their own successors as well as all the other officials, including even the Senators—"Consilarii," "Consilarii credentiae," "Senatores"²—and at first the Senate was a mere appendix of the Consulate, a consultative committee, and nothing more. In process of time, however, its powers were enlarged and it became a permanent organ of the State with extensive powers of veto. By the middle of the twelfth century, the making of war³, the preparation of galleys, the enlistment of troops, the division of the city into quarters⁴, the appointment of ambassadors⁵, the defence of the port of Piombino⁶, etc., were matters on which the Senate was entitled

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 129-131.

² Bonaini, *Statuti inediti*, vol. I (*Br. Consulum* of 1162), p. 4: "Eligam ...quadraginta senatores." Later on the Senators were chosen by a *balia* of three appointed by the Consuls (*Br. Consulum* of 1164, p. 25): "tres homines eligam; eosque jurare faciam ut...eligant...viginti quattuor consiliatores, etc."

³ "Non ero in consilio nec facto studiosus ut pisanus populus in gueram deveniat sine concordia senatorum..." (*Stat. inediti*, p. 10).

⁴ "De coaequatione ac divisione civitatis in quattuor partes facienda, et de militibus usque ad trecentos faciendis, et de galeis et scelis inceptis complendis, et praeparandis omnibus armentis, et de custodia eorum, et de guardia maris cum duabus aut pluribus galeis...consilium...coadunatis senatoribus, queram; et quod mihi sub nomine sacramenti omnes aut maior pars eorum consilium dederit de praenominatis causis, sequar" (*Statuti inediti*, p. 30).

⁵ "Missaticum neminem ultra Ianuam vel Civitavechiam in aliam provinciam mittam, nisi coram senatoribus...juret commissam sibi legationem, [vel] quae commictetur, sine fraude et fideliter portaturum" (*Statuti inediti*, p. 7).

⁶ *Statuti inediti*, I, 39.

to be heard. Moreover, its existence must have often proved a safeguard to the rights of private individuals. Thus, for example, "save with the advice of all the Senators or of the majority of them, given upon oath," the Consuls were unable to decree the construction of new roads to the detriment of private property¹, or, except in cases where their jurisdiction was voluntarily accepted by the parties to the dispute, to give judgment against a Pisan citizen in a civil suit for a larger sum than a hundred *solidi*². Nevertheless, the increased power of the Senate did nothing to weaken the authority of the Consular College. Rather did it reinforce and strengthen it; and, so far as the mass of the citizens were concerned, the Commune remained what it had been from the first: a narrow and exclusive private association. It is true that the associates in the aggregate had been formally recognized by the Empire, and that, as a result of that recognition, the Commune had become, in the eye of the law, a corporate feudatory, *une seigneurie collective populaire*; but its fundamental character was unchanged. The people were, no doubt, summoned from time to time to attend the *parlamentum* of the city, "apud maiorem ecclesiam," where the Consuls stood ready to hear their complaints³; but it is not likely that they were permitted to take any effective part in the proceedings. Like the people in the ancient Greek Ἀγορά, they were merely called together to hear what had been decided by their rulers and to express their feelings as a body.

Meanwhile, however, other lesser associations were growing up within the great central association of the Commune; and already, in the third quarter of the twelfth century, an attempt was made to suppress them. "Compagnias civium et villanorum, quas contra communem honorem factas cognovero destruem," swore the Consuls in 1162⁴, and, two years later, they included "compagnias magistrorum lapidum seu regularum" in the same condemnation⁵. Mediaeval groups were in their nature exclusive; they absorbed all the life and all the energies, economic, religious, political, of those who formed

¹ *Statuti inediti*, I, 13.

² *Ibid.* I, 13, 37.

³ *Ibid.* I, 24.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 39.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 36.

them, and they hardly ever coalesced¹. Not without good reason did Hobbes include among the things which weaken or tend to the dissolution of a Commonwealth “the great number of corporations which are as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man².” In the twelfth century, when the other groups were non-existent or weak, the Commune was strong. After the rise of the *Arti*, in the thirteenth century, a life and death struggle ensued between the Commune and the lesser communes—the sources recognize the *Arti* as communes³—and before their onslaught the old communal institutions fell to pieces. That day was as yet far off; but, even during the consular period, we may perceive the first blind gropings of the *populus* towards political recognition.

There were, as we have seen, craftsmen in Pisa at a very early date; the Cathedral, the work of many generations of artificers, had been founded over a quarter of a century before we have any certain notice of the existence of Consuls⁴; and other churches were rising in divers parts of the city: S. Paolo a Ripa d' Arno, S. Michele in Borgo, S. Frediano, S. Sepolcro, S. Piero in Vinculis, and, later on, the Baptistery and the Campanile. Even if we had no documentary evidence, we should know that there must have been *fabri* in Pisa, for the term is obviously a generic one, including many kinds of industries constructive and mechanical. I have already spoken of their appeal to Archbishop Daibert; and the diploma of Daibert was confirmed by Rogerio, in 1128, in almost identical terms⁵. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the *fabri* were as yet organized as an *Arte*. At the dawn of the communal era artisans and mechanics were still in a condition of semi-servitude⁶; and the “*murorum magistri capitanei*” of the statute⁷

¹ The *Monti* of Siena are a marked example of this fact. See my *Historical Introduction to L. Olcott's Guide to Siena* (Siena, Torrini, 1903).

² *Leviathan*, pt II, chap. 29.


³ *Statuti inediti*, III, 42 (*Br. Consulum, Curiae Mercatorum*, 1305, rubr. 65): “Et iuro quod cuilibet communi et universitati quorumlibet mercatorum seu artificum...dabo vel dare faciam Breve sue mercationis....”

⁴ See pp. 9, 29 *supra*.


⁵ *Statuti inediti*, III, 890–892.

⁶ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 246 n.

⁷ *Statuti inediti*, I (*Br. Consulum*, 1162), p. 11.



PIAZZA DEL DUOMO



FAÇADE OF THE CHURCH OF S. MICHELE

were probably chosen by the Consuls of the Commune, and not by the craftsmen. Only in the thirteenth century do we meet with "consules artis fabrorum¹."

As early as 1138 we have notice of apothecaries (*spetiarii*), who carried on their business in Borgo S. Paolo in Cinzica, and, though still in a state of quasi-feudal subjection, were united by common interests and common liabilities². The Levant furnished them with all manner of spices: cinnamon and pepper and incense and cassia and ginger, with unguents and with drugs. They compounded confections, electuaries and syrups³, and drove a thriving trade in essences and perfumes. Many of them acquired considerable wealth; and, as we shall see hereafter, one of the first Consuls of the Merchants was an apothecary⁴.

A third craft which attained to importance in Pisa, in the twelfth century, was that of the *Pellicciai* or furriers. In those days Northern Germany, Scandinavia and Russia were as prolific of the skins of wild animals as the Hudson's Bay territory was in more modern times; and furs were brought to Southern Europe not only by the great trade-routes leading to the head of the Adriatic, to Salonica and to Constantinople, but also by the Russian rivers which emptied into the Euxine. The Pisans obtained skins from the ports of the Black Sea, from Sardinia and from Africa, and, after they had dressed them, they exported them to inland Tuscany and to France⁵. In 1173 Marangone, when recording the increase of prices in a time of scarcity, mentions the cost of miniver and other furs⁶, a fact from which we may safely infer that, at this period, such articles were already in common use. In a document of 1194 we have record of a "Balduvinus pelliparius, capitaneus pellipariorum" who

¹ *Statuti inediti*, III, 893, ad ann. 1236.

² See the privilege of Conrad II, whereby he granted to Archbishop Balduinus, among other things, "Feudum spectariorum qui morantur in Burgo S. Pauli in Kinsica." Tronci, *Annali pisani rifiusi, etc., op. cit.* I, 243; Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 10.

³ *Statuti inediti*, III, 123, 326.

⁴ P. 248 *infra*.

⁵ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 240, 241; Hodgson, *The Early History of Venice*, p. 150.

⁶ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 69.

entered into an undertaking with the Archpriest Villano and the Canons of the cathedral¹. A few months later we find that certain furriers had recently constructed an "embulum" close to the Porta a Mare, where they dwelt and laboured at their trade, and had projected the building of a church "in qua divina possint audire cotidie misteria²." It was completed in the following year³. The *Arte* of the Pellicciai was evidently already in existence, albeit in a rudimentary form. The fact that it was governed by "Capitanei" instead of by Consuls raises a strong presumption that it had not as yet obtained full jurisdiction over its members⁴.

For several centuries the cloth trade was, probably, the most flourishing European industry; and it was favoured in Pisa by special conditions. Sardinia provided an abundant supply of wool; herds of sheep were sent from the Garfagnana to winter in the Maremma under the protection of some powerful seignior⁵, or in the woods and meadows of the Canons of S. Rossore, between the mouths of the Serchio and the Arno⁶. The Maremma itself furnished large quantities of wool, though not of the best quality. The water-soaked soil, overgrown with thickets, and the climate, torrid in summer and moist in winter, were not adapted to the raising of a good class of sheep; while the absence of enclosures and the use of the same pastures for different herds tended to deteriorate the breed. Fine wool was, however, obtained from Algarve and from France; the *Arte della Lana* flourished exceedingly and soon became practically autonomous; its privileged position being no doubt largely due to the vast number of workmen employed in the different processes which went to the production of the finished article: wool-carders, wool-sorters, wool-washers, weavers, fullers, dyers, etc., all of whom together with their duties are enumerated in the *Breve*

¹ *Statuti inediti*, III, 1092.

² *Ibid.* III, 1093.

³ *Ibid.* III, 1094, and compare III, 1062 n.

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 241, 242.

⁵ Thus we read of sheep from the Garfagnana "fidantiae custodiaeque commissae" of Count Ildebrandino. Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 63, ad ann. 1173.

⁶ In 1156 a witness deposed that he had seen "turmas pecorum de Garfagnana stare in ea [silva] prope Arnun per canonicos." Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 23. Cf. Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 77, n. 1.

*dell' Arte della Lana*¹. The Arno and the Ozari, to say nothing of the various canals and aqueducts which brought water from the hills, were of great assistance to the craft. It seems to have been carried on in all the four quarters of Pisa, and especially in Cinzica and Fuoriporta². So far as I have been able to discover, the first mention of the *Arte* in the documents is to be found in the "juramentum pacis" which was sworn by a thousand Pisans and a thousand Genoese in February, 1188³. There, however, we encounter three "Consules Artis Lane"; so that it is clear that, by that time, the *Arte* was definitely constituted; and we may infer with certainty that the cloth trade had existed in Pisa for very many years. A recognized *Arte* was the outcome of the united action of a long series of craftsmen.

Meanwhile, merchants were attracted to Pisa from all parts of Tuscany and beyond by the great annual fair of St Mary of mid-August, which would appear to have been instituted as soon as the authority of the Commune had been formally recognized by the diploma of Frederick I⁴. Booths and stalls were set up in the open fields, and the ordinary activities of municipal life were to a large extent suspended during the two weeks for which the fair lasted. Full freedom of traffic was accorded indifferently to citizen and foreigner; special officials were appointed to keep the peace of the fair, and a special tribunal, corresponding to our pie-powder court⁵, was set up to transact legal business and to settle disputes between traders⁶. On the

¹ *Statuti inediti*, III, 702 seq.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 235, 236.

³ Dal Borgo, *Diplomi pisani*, p. 115. See also p. 217 *supra*.

⁴ It is recorded only in the second *Breve Consulum*.

⁵ See *Blackstone's Comment.* vol. III, chap. 2, and *The Mirror of Justices*, lib. I, ch. 3: "...e qe de jour en jour se hastast droit destranges pleintifs en feires e marchiez cum pe poudrous solom lei marchande." Compare Lipson, *op. cit.* p. 223 *et seq.* The whole chapter is well worth reading.

⁶ *Statuti inediti*, I (*Br. Consulum* 1164), p. 29: "Ante kalendas februarii proximiores, quinque consules de negotiatoribus meliores quam cognovero, ad utilitatem et honorem pisanæ civitatis, eligam, eosque iurare faciam, mercatum sanctæ Mariæ mediantis augusti per vii dies ante ipsam festivitatem et septem postea, retinere in pratis iuxta podium et domum Sacchetti positus; et omnes artes quæ ad utilitatem mercati mihi pertinere videbuntur, ad ipsum mercatum ire, ibique per iam statutos dies stare faciam: et ante kalendas augusti in publico parlamento, et de ipso mercato faciendo, publice dicam; et quicumque ad ipsum mercatum venire voluerit, secure veniat,

other hand, Pisan merchants frequented the fairs of France and Lombardy, and more especially the fairs of Ferrara, one of the chief centres of the Adriatic region, connected by means of roads and canals with Milan and with the other cities of the Valley of the Po¹.

This rapid development of industry and commerce on terra firma naturally produced a class of wealthy merchants, distinct from the sea-captains and *armatori* who had monopolized the government of the infant Commune; and it soon became manifest that they could no longer be excluded from a certain limited participation in public affairs. The result was the creation of the Consuls of the Merchants. They first appear in the *Breve Consulum* of 1162: "Ante kalendas februarii proximiores quinque de negotiatoribus consules eligere faciam²"; and a document of the following year shows them to us in the exercise of their functions: "Nos Nicolaus speciarius et Giulicio q. Bellandi et Pisanus q. Lanfranchi et Rodulfus q. Andree a Consulibus Pisanorum mercatorum consules electi ad diffiniendas lites publicas vel privatas in nobis ad diffiniendum positas," etc.³. The number of Consuls is five in the *Breve* and four in the document; but, in both cases, the new officials appear as the appointees of the Consuls of the Commune. Their business was to determine commercial suits and to regulate the manifold activities of the *Arti*. This is precisely the direction in which we should have expected the barriers of class exclusiveness to yield most readily, for the Consuls of the Commune had never possessed extensive judicial powers. Theirs were the organization of the sea and land forces of the Republic, the conduct of its armies and its fleets; theirs the financial administration of the

exceptis homicidis et furibus et falsatoribus. Et hoc sine fraude per loca Tusciae, et alia de quibus mihi congruum videbitur, notum per nuntios vel litteras fieri faciam; et in ipso mercato duos consules, et provisos, et vigilem, et duos treguanos, pro iustitia facienda, per constitutos dies, praeesse faciam. Et vindictas, si necesse fuerit ad utilitatem mercati, fieri faciam; et nullam diricturam pro mercato tollam vel tollere faciam, nec quod tollatur consentiam."

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 222, and authorities there cited.

² *Statuti inediti*, I, 5. Compare p. 245 *supra*.

³ Arch. di Stato in Pisa, *Perg. Coletti*, 31 Dic. 1163. I quote it on the authority of Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 227.

Commune and the negotiation of political and commercial treaties with other cities and with foreign princes: all which things they not only superintended but executed personally, of their own initiative and by their own prerogative. "Consules fecerunt," "Consules miserunt," "Consules elegerunt," "Consules iusserunt," is the burden of the chronicle. Throughout the whole of its existence the Consulate preserves its original character of a power executive *par excellence*, possessing almost absolute liberty of initiative, and, therefore, occupied for the most part by men of war and of affairs. Occasionally, it is true, we encounter *judices* among the members of the Consular College; but they do not appear there in their character of Judges.

At the beginning of the twelfth century, when the tribunal of the Consuls had superseded the tribunal of the Marquis, it still retained its ancient title, and the procedure which it had inherited remained practically unchanged. Thus, in December, 1112, we find the Pisan *populus* assembled under the presidency of its Consuls to maintain the rights of the Archbishop against a usurper of his demesne lands "apud forum pisanae civitatis quae *Curia Marchionis* appellatur¹." The dispute in question was decided extra-judicially, and the defendant renounced his pretensions "communi consilio et decreto Consulum et totius populi." Where, however, legal points were involved, the Consuls, like the Marquises before them, simply presided over the tribunal and declared and confirmed² the decision of the judges, jurisconsults by profession, in whose hands was left the entire conduct of the proceedings. Only in cases of voluntary jurisdiction, or where the amount in dispute was comparatively trifling, did the Consuls themselves assume judicial functions³. Appointed by the Consular College, by the people, and not infrequently by the Archbishop, the judges were almost certainly Imperial Judges, though, even anterior to the diploma of 1132⁴, they are never designated as such. Rather do they appear as an emanation of communal power, without any indica-

¹ Muratori, *Antiquitates*, III, Excerpta, 31 Dic. 1112.

² "Hanc sententiam laudo et confirmo."

³ See p. 243 *supra* and *Statuti inediti*, I, 13, 37.

⁴ See p. 7, note 3 *supra*.

tion of the source from which they derived their authority: an illegality which the participation of the Archbishop was probably intended to render less glaring¹. In any case, that illegality was wholly remedied by the diploma of 1162².

In addition to the Imperial *Judices*, appointed for the trial of causes according to Roman or Longobard law, we also encounter another class of judges of a definitely civic character—Provisors, *provisores*—to whom was entrusted the decision of questions of customary law and of actions brought by foreigners: “ut ex equitate pro salute iustitie et salvamento civitatis, tam civibus, quam advenis et peregrinis et omnibus universaliter in consuetudinibus previderent³.” There seems, however, to have been no clear cut line of demarcation between the practice and jurisdiction of the various courts, and only when, about the middle of the twelfth century, the laws and customs of the Commune were reduced to writing in two separate codices, “*Constitutum Legis*,” “*Constitutum Usus*,” did the jurisdiction of the Judges and Provisors cease to overlap⁴. Between 1162 and 1163 the position of the judiciary was materially improved by an enactment which permitted complaints to be laid, not only before the Consuls as heretofore, but also before the Judges and Provisors⁵. These changes were accompanied by a specialization of functions in the Consular College itself, and, ere long, the supervision of the tribunals was entrusted to one of its members who assumed the title of Consul of Justice (*Consul justitiae*). It was his business to enforce the sentences of the courts by means of his *nuntii* or *treguani*, and the special duties of his office naturally tended to absorb the greater part of his energies. In the last decades of the century he probably participated but little in the ordinary activities of his colleagues; and his magistracy long survived the extinction of the Consulate⁶.

Thus, we perceive that the creation of *Consules mercatorum*

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 137, 138.

² Dal Borgo, *Diplomi pisani*, p. 34.

³ *Statuti inediti*, II, 813.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. I, Proemio, p. xvii; Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 139, 140.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 4, 24, 25.

⁶ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 140–144.

was part of a general system of reform; the result of two distinct and separate forces: one acting from below, and set in motion by the merchant class, already on its way to become a corporate body and desirous of a special court and special procedure; the other from above and due to the general policy of the Consuls, who were not unwilling to specialize yet further the functions of the Judiciary. Elected "pro bono civitatis" and possessing only a delegated authority, the Consuls of the Merchants were, at first, without political power, and, for more than a quarter of a century, they seem to have taken no part even in the commercial treaties of the Republic¹. Their first appearance in a collegial and official capacity belongs to the year 1188; but by that time their position was fully established. In the long list of Pisan citizens who swore to the peace with Genoa, the *Consules majores de Comuni* are immediately followed by three *Consules mercatorum*, Gherardo da Scorno, Odimondo Ciconia and Gherardo Cortevacqua, and by three *Consules Artis Lane*, Lamberto Bonone, Stefano Masca and Gualfredo Mele². Nor are these the names of unknown men. All of them were members of consular families, and all but one of them had actually held office as Consuls of the Commune³. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that, in the last quarter of the twelfth century, not only were the Consuls of the Merchants and the Consuls of the *Arte della Lana* the freely elected heads of two great mercantile corporations; but the merchants on terra firma had already succeeded in forcing their way into the sacred circle of the Associated families. The Commune no longer consisted exclusively of merchant adventurers and *armatori*⁴.

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 233, 234.

² Dal Borgo, *Diplomi pisani*, pp. 114, 115.

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 269, notes 1 and 2, and authorities there cited.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 267-270.

CHAPTER THE TWENTIETH

CONSORTERIE GENTILIZIE

DURING the latter half of the twelfth century the Italian cities exercised a marked centripetal attraction on the inhabitants of the country districts, though, in a large number of cases, the motive power, in so far as it affected the feudal seigniors, was nothing better than naked compulsion. Assailed by the citizens, they were forced to swear submission to the civic magistrates, to build palaces in the cities and to reside there for a specified period in every year. For the vanquished, citizenship was, in fact, a concomitant of vassalage. In Pisa, on the other hand, less violent methods were generally adopted. For historical and geographical reasons, the Pisans had, as we have seen, lived on unusually amicable terms with the feudatories of their *contado*, seeking rather to lure than to coerce them to the service of the Commune. As a result the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship were not infrequently voluntarily assumed.

In the eleventh century the Gherardesca of the Volterran Maremma descended the valley of the Era, with slow but continual movement; they established themselves in the valley of the Arno, from Ventrignano, near S. Miniato al Tedesco, to Settimo, at the gates of Pisa, and there they intermarried with the Visconti. Over Ventrignano they exercised feudal jurisdiction, and, after it had been destroyed by Christian of Mayence, they transferred their *curia* to Monte Bicchieri which had been built by the fugitives, who, however, remained subject to the "placita et banna" of the counts. Continually involved in territorial disputes with the Bishops of Volterra, the Gherardesca naturally sought assistance from Pisa, and, either as direct allies of the city or as vassals of the Aldobrandeschi, they played no inconsiderable part in the wars and foreign policy of the Com-

mune during the twelfth century¹. Meanwhile, however, the nature of some of the more vigorous scions of the civic aristocracy had been completely changed by contact with the neighbouring seigniors. Anterior to her marriage with Count Ugo, the last of the Cadolinghi², the Countess Cecilia, herself the daughter of a feudal family beyond the Apennines, had been the wife of one of the Upezzinghi of Pisa; and, when Ugo died without male heirs, in 1113, the Upezzinghi acquired part of the rich inheritance. Having established themselves in the plain and on the hills about the mouth of the Era, they extended their dominion to the fiefs of Calcinaia, Travalda, Pontedera, Bientina, and finally to Marti nella Valle³. So powerful did they become that, as we have already seen, they were able, in 1172, to repulse the Count Guido and the Lucchesi when they invaded the Pisan *contado*⁴. In the second half of the twelfth century they possessed their own court and their own consuls who administered justice to their dependants⁵.

As yet, neither Gherardesca nor Upezzinghi had permanently taken up their abode in Pisa; and the same is true of the great majority of the *Cattani* of Versiglia and Garfagnana who from time to time swore fealty to the Commune, and “venerunt Pisas pro servitio civitatis⁶.” Some of the Ripafratta, on the other hand, had already acquired land and constructed towers in the city; while, towards the middle of the century, the nobles of Caprona abandoned their ancestral castle and established themselves in Pisa⁷. In 1162 the *Cattani* of Valdera swore fealty to

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 259, 260, and authorities there cited. See also Repetti, *Dizionario*, cited, vol. I, p. 319, s.t. *Bicchieri (Monte)*, and vol. VI, app. c. XI, pp. 46–54.

² See Repetti, *Dizionario*, cited, vol. VI, app. c. IX, pp. 34–37.

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 260.

⁴ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 65: “Illustres et nobiles milites Opithingi cum Vicariensibus et aliis de Calcinaia fuerunt obviam eis, et cum eis bellum fecerunt, et gratia Dei, quinto Kal. Septembris, illos vicerunt...” Compare p. 203 *supra*.

⁵ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 58, doc. XIX: “Nos Vguicio quondam Vguicionis et Guttenacius quondam Alferii et Rainaldus quondam Bulimani et Vguicio quondam Gratticii Opettingorum et Cadulingiorum consules...”

⁶ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 48. See, however, Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 59, where we are told that “Gerardus de Vallechia, nobilis miles, Pisas cum uxore et filiis et familia venit habitare.”

⁷ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 261, and authorities there cited.

the Consuls and received at their hands "terram prope ecclesiam Sancti Cassiani de Kinsica in feudum, ... pro aedificandis domibus¹," together with a part of the *ripatico*². Towards the end of the century, certain feudatories of the mountainous region contested by Pisa and Lucca began to settle in the former city: for example, the Porcari and the da Corvara³. To these we may add the "lombardi" or "proceres" of S. Cassiano, and the nobles of Buriano, who, in 1195, possessed a tower and a shop in Pisa⁴. For the most part, they inhabited the new quarters of Cinzica, Fuoriporta and Ponte, where the new bourgeoisie of merchants on terra firma and the "populus" of the industries and the *arti* predominated over the *armatori* and sea-captains of the old régime.

Among the thousand citizens who swore, in 1188, to the peace with Genoa, over a hundred and thirty bear names which are taken from the towns and villages of the Pisan *contado*, and they no doubt represent the earliest type of immigration from the country districts; lesser feudatories and small landed proprietors, most of them apparently of Teutonic origin. They come especially from S. Cassiano, Cascina, Vico, Scorno, Oliveto, Vecchiano, Fagiano, Campi, Pontedera, Ceuli, Forculi, Capanori, Tripalle, Buti, Quosa, Asciano, etc.; neither do there lack Sardinians and Corsicans⁵. It is, moreover, a significant fact that of these hundred and thirty names no fewer than fifty-three are written in well-defined groups. After the Visconti come eight counts, of Donoratico, Cornino, Biserno and Castagneto; eight Upezzinghi, seven Capronesi and ten of the Ripafratta. Hitherto even the greatest of them has never attained to consular rank; they are citizens, but citizens "minoris iuris," and no Maremman count, no Upezzinghi can yet aspire to be admitted to that holy of holies. Very rarely, in the last years of

¹ See pp. 131, 132 *supra*.

² *Statuti inediti*, I (*Br. Consulum*, 1164), p. 39: "Et universum redditum ripae...expendere faciam, extracto Peciolentium feodo."

³ Among the citizens who swore to the peace with Genoa, in 1188, we find a Veltrus de Corvara and four Porcari (Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 117 and 123). One of the sarcophagi in the Campo Santo bears the inscription: SEPVLCRVM NOBILIVM DE PORCARI. (See Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 261, n. 6.)

⁴ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 262: "bottega della torre di Gualando da Buriano e consorti."

⁵ Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 114-126.

the century, we find a S. Cassiano, a da Caprona, or a Ripafratta among the Consuls¹.

Just as the "populus" found unity and strength in the commercial and industrial associations of the *Arti*, so did the nobles associate themselves in family groups (*consorterie gentilizie*) united by ties of blood and common interests. During the long period of anarchy which preceded the communal era, the State as a unifying social force had become little better than a phantom. The political unit was no longer the nation or the city, but the family. Compelled to provide for its own security, the family changed its character; patriarchal government was revived, and only such persons as were agnatically connected and subject to the same paternal power were recognized as kinsmen. Everything was sacrificed to the two essentials of unity and strength; women were deprived of nearly all their rights, the daughter passing from the *mundium* of the father to the *mundium* of the husband; real property was held in common; that the family might be always ready for defence and for offence, all its members, to the second and third generation, dwelt together beneath a single roof, and when, at last, the ancestral dwelling-place no longer sufficed to hold them all, new houses arose about the old one, and a little quarter of the city was entirely occupied by men of the same blood².

In an age when public authority was too weak to enforce the law or to afford adequate protection to the individual, the family, of necessity, avenged its own injuries; and it would hardly be too much to say that, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, revenge (*vendetta*) was the only form of punitive justice known to men³. The old Longobard system of personal vengeance had been greatly modified by the formation of the

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 263.

² See N. Tammasia, *La Famiglia Italiana* (Milano, Remo Sandron, 1910), cap. IV, and particularly pp. 110-113.

³ Statutes and chronicles alike speak of the punishment meted out for criminal offences as *vendetta*, and Dante uses the same word to express the justice of the Almighty Himself. See *Statuti inediti*, I, 36, 37; Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 36 ("iustitias et vindictas fecerunt"); *Inferno*, VII, 12; XI, 90; *Purgatorio*, XX, 95, etc., etc.

consorteria; and in the communal period the *vendetta privata* was carried on less by the individual than by the association. It thus assumed a certain dignity: and, given a sufficient cause, it was a sacred duty which could not be shirked. Its execution was looked upon as an obligation which was due not only to the honour of the family and *consorteria* of the offended person, but also to society at large, and the prosecution of such a vengeance, if legitimately accomplished, was no more felt to be a sin than is to-day the passing of the death sentence by the judge and its execution by the hangman. The *consorti* of the injured man were encouraged by the belief that God favours a just, prompt and courageous retribution of evil; they washed the blood of their vengeance from their hands with the good conscience which comes from paying a lawful debt, and realized as fully as Wordsworth realized how fair is Duty's smile when her mandate is not neglected and the task she sets is not deferred. The obligation of revenge was deeply rooted in the thought of the mediaeval Commune. The good name of the *consorteria* must be maintained always, at all costs, and by every possible means. If one of the *consorti* received an injury, or, worse still, was slain in an affray or by treachery, the other *consorti* were bound to restore the honour of their *casata* by taking a bold and virile vengeance, or, in the alternative, to submit to the sneers and gibes of their neighbours, who would insult them with the title of "donnicciuole" or offer to send one of their number, a stranger to the blood-feud, to *far vendetta* for them out of charity. Witness, for example, the case of that Jacopo of the Ghibelline faction, whose lack of courage had made him a common butt among the Guelfs, and against whom Rustico di Filippo, no mean poet and himself a staunch Ghibelline, hurled those jeering lines, which, for all their apparently good-natured banter, reveal clearly enough the scorn which inspired them:

A voi messere Iacopo comare
 Rustico si accomanda fedelmente,
 e dice, se vendetta avete a fare
 ch' e' la farà di buon cuor, lealmente.

At a period when it was considered an abiding disgrace to seek justice from the "legisto" instead of awaiting an opportune moment for revenge, such scoffs must have carried with them a cruel sting; and it will be remembered how steadfastly the Cerchi refused to declare who it was who had assailed and disfigured their Ricoverino, "aspettando farne grande vendetta¹."

At a very early period the father was held responsible for the offences of his sons, the "dominus" for those of the family²; but such enactments only operated to bind the members of the *consorteria* closer together and to convert their loyalty and solidarity from a rule of conduct, enforced by the sanction of public opinion, into a vital necessity. Their unity was maintained by an iron discipline. The whole clan stood ready to take up arms at the command of the "dominus," and in times of peace, baptisms, marriages, funerals, treaties, banquets, continually brought the kinsmen together in the "casa" or in the church of the *consorteria*. Every individual occupied the place which belonged to him according to his relationship to the head of the house; no important action of any member could hope to escape the vigilance of the rest; and conduct which threatened to bring dishonour upon the family was ruthlessly punished by imprisonment or in extreme cases even by death³.

In Pisa, as we have seen, the *consorterie* of the feudal immigrants were at first neither very strong nor very numerous. Divided between the city and the *contado*, and without much share in the maritime life of the Commune, their main interests

¹ Dino Compagni, *Cronica*, I, 22 (pp. 63, 64 of Benecke and Ferrers Howell's translation, Temple Classics). See, on the whole subject, Tammasia, *op. cit.* cap. II; G. Arias, *Le istituzioni giuridiche medievali nella Divina Commedia* (Firenze, Lumachi, 1901), and Del Lungo, *Una Vendetta in Firenze* (in *Dal Secolo e dal Poema di Dante*, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1898), p. 65 *et seq.*

² *Statuti inediti*, I (*Br. Consulm*, 1164), p. 36: "Ita tamen ut pater pro offensa filii, et dominus pro familia...teneatur."

³ Tammasia, *op. cit.* pp. 111-119; Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 258, 259. In the *Annales Ianuenses* of 1264 we read that when the "nobiles viri de progenie Guerciorum" heard that Guglielmo Guercio, Potestà of the Genoese in Constantinople, "civitatem constantinopolitam traditurus erat in manibus Latinorum, accesserunt in pleno consilio Janue, petentes, ex gratia speciali, quod Comune Janue jam dictum Guilielmum Januam pedibus et manibus ligatum faceret apportari et quod ipsum eundem iisdem traderet iudicandum, etc."

still centred in their ancestral estates, where they long continued to exercise much of their ancient patrimonial and feudal authority through the agency of their Consuls¹. In the city, on the other hand, they, like the lesser *Arti*², were generally represented by "Capitanei"; the title of "Consules" being reserved for the heads of Commune and of the great mercantile corporations of the *Arte della Lana* and the *Mercatanti*; a distinction which, probably, indicates a different grade of jurisdiction and a different relationship with the central government³. Meanwhile, however, the *Consorteria* had become the typical form of association of the maritime and consular aristocracy. "Domus" was the term used to denote the whole body of the "consorti"; and we find many of them in the list of jurants to the treaty of 1188. Among the rest we may recall ten names of Gaetani, six of Lanfranchi and eighteen of Gualandi⁴; while, in a document of the following century, nine "capitanei hominum domus Gualandorum" appear as patrons of a hospital, the administration of which they shared with the Archbishop⁵. On the 22nd of December, 1159, Ugo Visconti, Ugo da Parlascio, Ranuccino da S. Cassiano and Barile, "qui dicebantur consules et capitanei suorum consortum," together with many of their associates, in all no fewer than thirty persons, were cited by the Archbishop before the public judges. In the opinion of Professor Volpe, however, this *consorteria* was different in character from those already mentioned, resembling the associations so often entered into between two or more rural communities which had collectively received a feud or "livello" at the hands of a single seignior, and consequently assumed the characteristics of a *consorzio* in their relationship to him. Here, in fact, the *consorti* belong to different families: Visconti,

¹ In 1174 we have notice of "Consules Opettingorum et Cadulingorum." See p. 253, n. 4 *supra*. That the *consorti* of Ripafratta possessed consuls is proved by their *Breve*, published by Bonaini, *Arch. Stor. It.* T. VI, P. II, 808-812. Other examples will be found in Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 263, n. 3.

² See p. 246 *supra*.

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 263, 264.

⁴ Dal Borgo, *Dipl. pisani*, pp. 115, 116.

⁵ Arch. del Seminario, Pisa, *Contratti e testam.* T. I, n. 4, 26 febr. 1239 (cited by Volpe, p. 264, n. 1).

S. Cassiano, da Parlascio, Capronesi, etc.; and their *consorzio* seems to have been based upon their common possession of a marsh at Vecchiano which they had usurped from the Archbishop, possibly after holding it in "livello" for a long term of years¹. Thus we have a *consorteria* which is a federation of many lesser *consorterie*: a phenomenon which was destined to repeat itself also in the economic and commercial associations of the *Arti*. The larger *consorterie gentilizie* were formed for the most part by a successive aggregation of family groups about the central nucleus of a single powerful "domus" to which they were bound by intermarriage, by common commercial interests, and by common political aims. More than anything else, a "grandissimo parentado" enabled the *consorteria* to make its influence felt in public affairs².

At the end of the twelfth century, for example, although it would be possible to go back to a much earlier period, we have record of a *consorteria* consisting of Duodi and Gaetani who were in litigation with the canons concerning certain rights of piscary³; and, later on, we find the same *consorteria* composed of Duodi, Gaetani and Gusmari⁴. Next to the necessity of defending their common interests, the most powerful bond of union between the families who formed a *consorteria* was, perhaps, the patronage of a church together with the exercise of the rights inherent thereto; and certainly the foundation of a church was often one of their earliest collective actions. Thus the Duodi, Gaetani and Gusmari held the patronage of the church of the monastery of S. Vito sull' Arno⁵, ecclesiastically dependent on the Abbot of S. Gorgonio⁶, but erected upon land which they had granted, and endowed at their own expense. They intervened or wished to intervene, for their right to do so was not undisputed, at the election and installation of the

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 264, 265.

² Tammasia, *op. cit.* p. 116.

³ Arch. Canonici, Perg. 2 apr. 1193 (cited by Volpe, p. 267, n. 1).

⁴ Arch. di Stato, Pisa, *Perg. Certosa*, 20 apr. e 17 maggio 1213; 16 luglio 1229 (cited by Volpe, p. 267, n. 2).

⁵ See Morrone, *Pisa illustrata, op. cit.* T. III, pp. 204-206, and *The Story of Pisa* ("Mediaeval Towns" Series), *op. cit.* p. 304.

⁶ See Repetti, *Dizionario*, cited, II, 600, Art. "Isola della Gorgona."

Abbot, and they claimed the privilege of defending the church and its possessions against all who should seek to injure it, and especially on those occasions when the monks went to the Island of Gorgona to make choice of a new Abbot. In return they demanded that, on feast days, prayers should be offered up "coram populo" for the *consorti* and their ancestors, as patrons of the church, and that, when one of them died, the great bell should be rung "pro collecta hominum." In 1213 the Abbot of S. Vito contested their rights as an infringement upon his jurisdiction; but, on the *consorti* agreeing to make oath not to molest him, a compromise was arrived at whereby most of their claims were recognized¹. For the rest, it must not be supposed that the bonds which united the members of a *consorteria* necessarily deprived them of all capacity for other relationships. For every fresh collective enterprise it was possible to form new alliances between families belonging to different *consorterie*, and that without any weakening in the coherence of the pre-existing groups. A case in point will be found in the association, in 1182, of the Gualandi, Gaetani, Duodi and Galli, for the purpose of constructing a bridge across the Arno between the Via S. Antonio and the Via S. Maria. The project was, however, bitterly opposed by other powerful citizens; and no sooner was the work begun than they took up arms and not only destroyed during the night what had been built in the day, but sacked and burned a tower of the Gualandi². Later on, the undertaking was resumed and successfully carried through by the co-operation of the Gaetani, Duodi, Galli, Lanfreducci, Bellomi, Bocci, Gualandi and Biserno³.

The factions which tormented each Italian city, and, in their turn, wreaked wider and sterner vengeance on their adversaries than the members of any single house, however powerful, could hope to achieve, were merely larger *consorterie* composed of many *casate*, allied together for a common cause; and because the government of the Commune was, as a rule, the govern-

¹ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 265, 266.

² Roncioni, *ubi cit.* pp. 404, 405.

³ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 266; and see *Statuti inediti*, I, 645, 1 e 2 ottobre, 1258, Elezione del Pontonario in 1257.

ment of the predominant faction for the time being, public justice often took the form of a legalized *vendetta*, and patriotism was narrowed down to party spirit. Dante's traitors to their country, frozen in the solid ice of Antenora, were all of them traitors to their faction. Bocca degli Abati, he of Duera, Gianni de' Soldanieri and the rest betrayed their faction to the advantage of the adverse party. Not one of them betrayed his country in the modern meaning of the term. Moreover, Dante makes no distinction between party and party, but punishes equally all those sinners in the lowest region of the Inferno, since, according to the thought of his age, the traitor to his party was always vile. Therefore it was that, after the cult of the individual and the family, mediaeval honour demanded fidelity to the faction:

A me ed a' miei primi ed a mia parte¹.

That verse epitomizes not a man but the man of the Middle Ages². Neither is it impossible that, as Professor Arias suggests, the mediaeval conception of the solidarity of the family, of the *consorteria* and of the Commune may explain those terrible invectives against Florence, Pisa, Genoa and Pistoia. The sacrilegious robbery perpetrated by the Pistoiese Vanni Fucci arouses in the Poet the desire that all Pistoia may be burned to ashes (*Inferno*, xxv, 10); the abominable treason of Branca d' Oria provokes the fierce denunciation of the Genoese (*Inferno*, xxxiii, 151); and the cruel death of Ugolino that of Pisa (*Inferno*, xxxiii, 79).

¹ *Inferno*, x, 47.

² G. Arias, *op. cit.* pp. 114, 115.

CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FIRST

FROM CONSULS TO POTESITÀ

As the century grew older, the associated families which constituted the Commune gradually ceased to be the natural and inevitable representatives of their fellow-citizens. The merchants on terra firma, the *Arti*, the landed proprietors, had other ideals and other aspirations than those of the sea-captains and *armatori*; and, little by little, even the holy of holies of the Consulship was, as we have seen, invaded by men of a different class¹. Having lost its homogeneity, the ruling aristocracy was torn by conflicting interests²; and, in order to enable the Consular College to govern at all, it seems to have become necessary to elect a president or "primus consul³," a kind of ἀρχων ἐπιώνυμος, invested with authority to take action on his own initiative in the name of his colleagues⁴. In time of war, one, and rarely more than one, of the Consuls was appointed head of the army, and exercised almost unlimited jurisdiction both within and without the city; the numbers of the College tended to decrease; and the way was opened for the coming of the Potesità⁵. Meanwhile, the great feudal families of the *contado* began to aspire to a share in the government; and, after the descent of Barbarossa into Italy, we find the Gherardesca taking an ever-increasing part in public affairs. Together with the Consuls and the Archbishop, Count Gherardo represented the Commune at the Diet of S. Genesio, in 1160⁶; and in the Imperial diploma

¹ P. 251 *supra*.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 268 *et seq.*

³ See the inscription reported by Da Morrona, *op. cit.* III, 495:

AN. D. MCLVII. CHOCCVS QVONDAM GRIPHI PMVS CONSVL
PISANE CIVITATIS.

⁴ Compare Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 17: "Anno Domini MCLVII, duodecima Kal. Madii, incoepa est turris Meloriae, et totus girus est expletus *in consulatu Cocci, et ipse complevit et fecit....*"

⁵ Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 279, 280.

⁶ P. 126 *supra*.

of 1178 we find him described as “comes Gherardus de Pisa¹.” There was, of course, no feudal investiture; but the fact remains that the Gherardesca had achieved a privileged position in the State which must have habituated the minds of the citizens to the idea of a personal authority entirely distinct from that of the existing magistrates of the republic. The power of the Visconti, who, for many years, were virtually the heads of the Consular College, may well have contributed to the same result. Gherardesca and Visconti were, in fact, the first Pisan Potesità, elected and re-elected again and again².

It will be remembered how, after 1160, Imperial Counts or Potesità appeared in Siena, in S. Miniato, in Volterra and in Florence³; and, albeit in Pisa, caressed and favoured by the Emperor, we know nothing of any such officials, we soon begin to encounter curious phrases in the Pisan documents which deserve our careful consideration. Thus, in the agreement of October, 1169, between the Pisan Consuls and the “Cattani” of Corvara, the latter covenanted not to make peace or truce “sine parabola pisanorum consulum...vel sine parabola pisanorum rectoris vel dominatoris⁴”; in 1171 the Pisans swore to insert the terms of the treaty with Florence “in breve consulum vel rectoris⁵,” and, in 1174, those of the peace with Corneto in the future Breve “consulum vel rectoris aut dominatoris vel potestatis⁶.” In 1178, in a convention entered into between the Consuls of the Commune and the Operaio del Duomo the former undertook: “Et in brevi ad quod sequentes consules vel rectores aut rector aut dominatores aut potestas sunt iuraturi mittere faciemus predicta omnia...⁷.” These terms, “rectores,” “dominatores,” “potestas,” have never been used before; and it is impossible to regard them as mere notarial redundancies, synonymous with “consules.” At the same time, it is clear that they refer not to Imperial but to civic officials who were bound to follow the established tradition of civic government. The “rectores aut dominatores aut potestas” swear to a *Breve* and

¹ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 67.

³ See p. 158 *supra*.

⁵ Santini, *Documenti*, *op. cit.* p. 6.

⁷ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 63.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 281.

⁴ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 49.

⁶ Volpe, *op. cit.* p. 283.

can only transmit their authority to the Consuls or Potestà who succeed them, if they in their turn take a like oath. Neither is it difficult to understand how, when the Consular College was lacerated by internal discord, or when, as in Genoa in 1194, “universus populus factus est inobediens consulatui¹,” it became necessary to concentrate the whole authority of the State in the hands of an *αἰσυμνήτης*, a single powerful citizen, a stranger to their quarrels. Such an one was Oberto d’ Olevano, that “vir utique nobilis ac strenuus” elected by the Genoese to be “consul et potestas²”; and such, perhaps, was Scudocollo di Aldobrandino, “dominus Senensis Civitatis,” in 1151³. The new office was, at first, purely provisory, and the eventual re-establishment of the Consulship was always regarded as not only probable but certain; sometimes the two magistracies co-existed, and the Potestà seems to have simply exercised the authority of “primus consul⁴.” In no case was the introduction of the *potestaria* immediately destructive of consular government⁵. We have record of Consuls in Pisa at least as late as 1214⁶.

As we have already seen⁷, the first “Potestas pisanae civitatis” whose name occurs in the annals of the city was Tedicio di Castagneto, a member of the *consorteria* Gherardesca. To him, as representing the Commune, was granted the Imperial diploma of 1191—“tibi Theodicio Potestati pisano recipienti pro civitate pisana”—and it is interesting to note that, together with Tedicio, “Reinerius Gaitani, Albertus Vicecomes, Berenhardus Capitaneus, Iordanus Iudex, Albertus Walandi, Bulgarinus Vicecomes, Bulsus quondam Petri, Gaytanus Burgundi, Comes Regno et omnes consiliarij pisane civitatis et Comites de mare et alii quamplures” swore fealty to the Emperor⁸. Who

¹ Otoboni Scribæ *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 45.

² *Ibid. ubi cit.*

³ Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.* xv, 14; R. Arch. di Stato in Siena, *Caleffo Vecchio*, a c. 21.

⁴ Villari, *I primi due secoli, etc.*, *op. cit.* I, 141.

⁵ See my *A History of Perugia*, p. 31, and, on the whole subject, Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 283–289.

⁶ Santini, *Documenti, op. cit.* pp. 177–179, No. LXII. See also Volpe, *op. cit.* cap. v, and particularly p. 342.

⁷ P. 220 *supra*.

⁸ Bonaini, *Dipl. pisani*, p. 112.

or what the "Comes Regno" was I am unable to state. As to "Berenhardus Capitaneus," he may have been either captain of the knights, "capitaneus militum¹," or one of the Captains of the four administrative and judicial districts into which the *contado* was now divided: Valdera, Valdarno, Valdiserchio and Colline. Certainly these two offices were already in existence; the result of increasing specialization of functions in the Consular College and of the institution of the Potestà, many of whose duties were necessarily delegated to subordinate officials². Perhaps, however, the most important new magistracy of whose appearance we have evidence in this list of jurants is that of the "comites de mare" who may undoubtedly be identified with the "consules maris" of later documents.

At first sight, it may seem strange that, in a maritime city, Consuls of the Merchants and Consuls of the Arte della Lana should precede in point of time Consuls of the Sea. The explanation, however, is not far to seek. So long as the whole power of the State was centred in the Consuls of the Commune the Ordine del Mare had no possible *raison d'être*. Only with the coming of the Potestà did the consular aristocracy organize itself as a commune within a commune, thus returning to the conditions of the eleventh century, when the associated families of sea-captains and *armatori* constituted a "floating republic," leaving the government on dry land to the Bishop and to the Visconte. All the names of the "consules maris" of which we have record up to the middle of the thirteenth century are names of members of old consular families; Carletti, Modani, Sismondi, Gaetani, Orlandi, Duodi, Alfeo, Grasso, Assopardi, etc.³. As yet, however, neither the duties of the Potestà nor of the Consules Maris were definitely fixed. At the dawn of the Dugento the institutions of Pisa were in a state of flux; and it is probable that, in their origin, the "Comites de mare" were, like so many of the other magistracies, nothing more than a temporary *balia*.

¹ As to the term "milites," see my *A History of Perugia*, *op. cit.* p. 42.

² Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 295, 296, and authorities there cited.

³ On the whole subject see Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 296-305.

From the tenth century onwards, piracy was, as I have said, an ordinary incident of Mediterranean life. The right of reprisal (*rappresaglia*) was firmly rooted in the consciousness of the Middle Ages; and no sooner had a sea-captain or merchant adventurer suffered loss or injury than he hastened to arm one or more galleys, and put out to sea to take vengeance on the fellow-citizens of the offenders¹. Neither, in the majority of cases, was he over particular whom he attacked. Like the English and Huguenot corsairs who swarmed in the Channel and preyed upon Spanish commerce in the days of Elizabeth, he treated every ship with a valuable cargo as fair game, whatever its nationality; the crews were made to walk the plank and the booty was carried home in triumph². Naturally, such proceedings gave birth to new reprisals and new contests, until the entire seafaring population lived as much by rapine as by commerce. Many of the Italian mariners who came to the help of Baldwin I against Sidon, in 1108, were nothing better than pirates³; and, in the last years of the twelfth century, the evil increased beyond all measure. It seemed as though the maritime cities of Italy had destroyed the Saracen corsairs only to supplant and outdo them. After the treaty of Pavia⁴, few of those private *armatori* who, like the “nobiles viri de compagnia Deciaureria,” had fitted out galleys at their own expense to prey upon the Genoese⁵, were minded to abandon a mode of life which had brought them wealth and reputation; and they continued their depredations as though no peace had ever been made, playing a similar rôle at sea to that afterwards played on land by the Companies of Adventure in the Trecento. Bonifacio became an “abode of pirates, a den of thieves, who laid snares of Satan in the ways and passages of the sea to take

¹ The case of Ottone Ruffo is a good example. See p. 137 *supra*.

² Compare J. A. Froude, *The Reign of Elizabeth* (“Everyman’s Library” edition), II, 466 *et seq.*, and E. S. Beesly, *Queen Elizabeth* (Macmillan, 1892), pp. 79, 80.

³ See p. 53, n. 4 *supra*.

⁴ P. 205 *supra*.

⁵ Marangone, *ubi cit.* p. 61, and compare p. 68: “Anno Domini MCLXXIII. In Consulatu Ruberti etc...quidam ex nobilibus Pisanorum civibus galeas super Ianuenses viriliter armaverunt; et VI magnas naves Ianuensium sine aliis minutis prendiderunt cum maximo haveere.”

therein the merchants and travellers who went upon the sea¹." Their activities grievously imperilled the relations of the Comune with other maritime states and cities, and led to long and difficult diplomatic negotiations². Stringent enactments were passed against them³; but in time of war their services were indispensable. The statement of the Genoese annalist that all the hope and confidence of the Pisans rested on their corsairs and pirates was not without an element of truth⁴; and it is by no means impossible that the first appearance of the "comites de mare" may be due to this fact. What more likely, in view of the Sicilian expedition, than the appointment of a special *balia* to collect and organize the corsairs as an integral part of the sea-power of Pisa?

We have now followed the fortunes of the city through the period of its greatest triumphs, and henceforward the history of Pisa is, as I have said, a history of decline. That decline was, however, at first extremely gradual. Her great days were not yet done. Never were the Pisans nearer to obtaining the undisputed overlordship of Sardinia than they were in the first half of the thirteenth century; and, albeit their star was begin-

¹ See p. 216 *supra*, and Otoboni Scribae *Annales Ianuenses*, p. 54. The virtuous indignation of the annalist might lead us to suppose that the Genoese themselves were quite incapable of similar conduct; whereas, as a matter of fact, Guglielmo Porco, Guglielmo Grasso, Enrico Pescatore and Alamano da Costa were all of them pirates and all of them Genoese. So long as, officially speaking, there was peace between Genoa and Pisa, they seem to have been perfectly ready to enter into partnership with individual Pisans for the purpose of piratical enterprises. See Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 428, 429, and on the whole subject Manfroni, *op. cit.* pp. 262 *et seq.*

² Volpe, *op. cit.* pp. 303, 304; Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 262; Müller, *op. cit.*, doc. XLI, pp. 66, 67.

³ *Statuti inediti*, II (*Constitutum usus*), pp. 989-991. The date is 1190.

⁴ Otobono Scriba, *op. cit.* p. 64: "*Pisani...fecerunt quidem in longinquis partibus, videlicet in Siciliam et per alias partes, cursales et pyratas suos, in quibus eorum spes sistit atque fiducia, querere supplicantes, ut ciuitati Pisane in tanto necessitatis articulo subuenirent.*" And after all, when we come to consider the matter impartially, were maritime conditions so very different in the England of the sixteenth century? Of the hundred and ninety-seven English ships which encountered the Spanish Armada only thirty-four were Queen's ships; and who shall say that Drake and Hawkins and Frobisher were other than pirates? (See J. R. Hale, *The Story of the Great Armada*, and particularly Appendix II.)

ning to pale in the light of Genoa's sun, they won a great naval victory over their rivals in 1241, capturing and sinking more than two-thirds of the opposing fleet. In 1242 they forced the Genoese to abandon the siege of the revolted Savona, and in the following year they entered the harbour of Genoa itself and shot arrows tipped with silver into the city. They shared the glories of Montaperto¹,

lo strazio e il grande scempio
Che fece l' Arbia colorata in rosso;

and in 1264 they helped to humble Lucca in the dust and drove the Florentine Guelfs from their last refuge in Tuscany. Even after the battle of Meloria (1284), when so many of their noblest and bravest had been carried into captivity that it became a common saying that "to see Pisa you must go to Genoa," they were still unconquered and unconquerable. In vain the other Tuscan nations gathered, yapping and snarling, like curs about a wounded lion, thinking to feast themselves upon the carcass. Under the wise leadership of Guido da Montefeltro, the Pisans recovered much of their military prestige²; the coming of Henry VII, in 1312, re-kindled all their old Imperial enthusiasm; and, captained by Ugucione della Faggiuola, they broke the Florentines and their Guelf allies, Bolognesi, Sienese, Perugians, Romagnuols, Pratesi, Pistoiesi, Volteranni, Neapolitans, in the bloody battle of Montecatini (August, 1315). The Torre della Fame was crowded with prisoners, and men's mouths were filled with blasphemies against the Almighty, who, they declared, had become the vassal of the conqueror:

Eo non ti lodo Dio, e non ti adoro,
e non ti prego, e non ti rengrazio,
e non ti servo, ch' eo ne son piû sazio
che l' aneme di star en purgatorio,

¹ "...li Pisani vi mandonno trecento nobili cavalieri pisani e buona somma di valenti pedoni eletti della città e del contado." See C. Paoli, *La Battaglia di Montaperti* (Siena, Bargellini, 1869), p. 91.

² Ranieri Sardo, *ubi cit.* p. 92: "Dipo' questo tempo, Pisa racquistò tutta Maremma e Valdera e Collina e lo contado, per gran parte, e assai valorosamente si difese per mare e per terra; sicchè bene pareano valente persone e buoni discepoli che aveano imparato dal buono maestro, cioè dal Conte Guido preditto, lo quale lassoe lo mundo, e diventoe frate Minore." See also the *Cronica di Pisa*, apud Muratori, *R.I.S.* xv, 983.

perchè tu hai messi i guelfi a tal martoro
 ch' i ghibellini ne fan beffe e strazio.
 e se Uguccion ti comandasse il dazio
 tu e' pagaresti senza peremptoro¹.

If, however, Pisa was still warlike she was no longer free. In 1328 she was compelled to submit to the signory of Castruccio Castracane, and, after his death, was misruled by a succession of petty tyrants, until, in 1399, she was ignominiously sold to the Visconti of Milan. Through all the last half of the fourteenth century, her eventual ruin became yearly more inevitable.

Cervi, luporum praeda rapacium,
 Sectamur ultro quos opimus
 Fallere et effugere est triumphus.

The end came in 1406, when she fell at last into the hands of Florence; but even slavery to Florence could not break her courage nor destroy her patriotism. She regained her independence in 1494, and, between 1499 and 1505, withstood three sieges and repulsed three attacking armies. Of these things I hope to write hereafter, if I shall so long live.

¹ *Le Rime di Folgore da S. Gimignano* (Bologna, Romagnoli, 1880), p. 56, Sonetto xxxiii. See also xxxi and xxxii. These last have been translated by D. G. Rossetti, *The Early Italian Poets* ("The Temple Classics" edition), pp. 74, 75.

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
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R. Idice

R. Sarnano

R. Sieve

M U S E I O

Fiesole

FLORENCE (Firenze)

Montebubbini

Ceve

R. Greve

Semifonte

PRATO

R. Orsino

PISTOIA

Montese

Pontorme

Montecatini

Castelfiorentino

Certaldo

R. Panaro

R. Leo

Curigliano

S. Marcello

Montecatini

Empollo

Basilia

Barbialla

Vignale

R. Scolina

R. Lima

Borgo a Mozzano

Altopascio

Fucecchio

S. Miniato

Borgo S. Genesio

Canneto

R. Evisa

Peccioli

Piave a Piffi

R. Dragone

R. Dolo

Massa

Barga

Port of Motronea

Lunata

Massa Pisana

Asciانو

PISA

Bientino

Vicopisano

Sellino

Calcinaja

Pontederaso

Nugola

R. Serchio

Massa di Carrara

Cast. Aghinolfi

Mallechia

Corvoja

Pietrasanta

Montemagno

Montecatini

Montramito

Bozzano

Montebello

Riparatice

Arsula

R. Arno

PISA

LEGHORN (Livorno)

Villafranca

R. Madra

Via Francigena

R. Nora

Sarzana

Carrara

Corvo


Lerici

Porto Venere

Palmaria

Motronea

Tower of Viareggio



MAP OF PISA AND TUSCANY

•Castellina
in Chianti

•Poggibonisi

•Colle di Val d'Elisa

•Staggia

•Monteriggione

•Quercegrosso

SIENA

•Montequidi

•Radicondoli

•Bellorte

VOLTERRA

•Buriano

•Quercreto

•Messa
Marittima

•Scarlino

GROSSETO

Castiglioncello

Vada

Cecina

•Campiglia
Marittima

Plombino

Castiglione
della Pescaia

I. of Gorgona

I. of Capraja

I. OF ELBA



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