READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

HISTORY OF ROME . THE WAR FOR SUPREMACY IN THE EAST

CHAPTER VII.

THE CONQUEST OF NORTHERN ITALY. THE WARS WITH THE GAULS, LIGURIANS, AND ISTRIANS.

It is not the only defect in all historical writing, that, owing to the imperfect nature of all records, past events can be but imperfectly understood and represented, a defect which we must feel especially with regard to ancient histories. In addition to the incompleteness of the picture we must remember that the historic scene is usually history scene is usually too vast to be surveyed at one glance. Whilst our eyes are directed towards one part, much escapes us that is going on at a short distance to the right and to the left, and we have not the least idea of what lies behind us. Thus, even that part which we are enabled to study, we fail to understand fully whenever it is influenced, either directly or indirectly, by what happens in another part not exposed to our view. History, therefore, gives us not so much a picture as a panorama, and the impression left on our minds is not complete until we have cast our eyes in every direction, and are able to place simultaneous events side by side, or to judge of their relation to one another. Since, with the enlargement of the empire, Roman history extended to the Hellenic East, to Africa and Spain, we have several times found ourselves called upon to point out the connexion of the events which took place in the various quarters of the world; but this was not possible in detail, for otherwise the thread of the narrative would at every moment have been broken, and the comprehension of every single fact would have been lost. It is impossible for modern writers to adopt the annalistic plan of Livy and Polybius, as our narrative must pass by many incidents which are of less importance to us than to the ancient reader, and it is, therefore, only by gathering together in one continuous narrative all that has reference to each particular country, that we can obtain clear and interesting pictures of the leading events. We shall pursue the same course now in considering the events which took place in Italy itself simultaneously with the wars in Macedonia, Greece, Asia, Africa, and Spain, from the time when the second peace with Carthage was concluded (201 BC) up to the complete destruction of the Macedonian kingdom and of Greek independence (146 BC) to the annihilation of Carthage (146 BC), and to the subjection of the rebellious tribes in Lusitania and Celtiberia (133 BC).

The wars with the Gauls and Ligurians settled in Italy resembled, as we might expect, those which the Spanish barbarians waged with so much determination and perseverance. Of these wars also it is impossible to give a continuous account, although we are less troubled with one of the main difficulties that we meet with in Spain. The Roman annalists understood the geography of northern Italy somewhat better than that of Spain. Hence we are enabled to find the dwelling-places of various tribes and the situation of towns mentioned by the narrator, with an accuracy which we cannot carry into the history of the Spanish wars. But we are still obliged to gather our information from the writings of Roman historians, and these are derived from the falsified reports of Roman generals, who almost invariably vaunted their own exploits to the utmost. We must be content, therefore, if we succeed in following the gradual progress of Roman arms in general, and in understanding the character of the warfare on both sides, without attempting to ascertain the particulars which might enliven and diversify the vague and uncertain outlines.

The Hannibalic war had brought the Roman conquest in northern Italy to a standstill. The extreme Roman outposts on the Po, the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona, were for some time almost completely isolated and exposed to continued attacks, not only of the Gauls, but also of their Carthaginian allies. Mutina, which was intended to secure the communication between these towns and Ariminum could not be fully fortified as a colony. If the Gallic tribes had had the political instinct of the Romans, they would have made use of the Hannibalic war to weaken Rome permanently. It appears that they were, for the present, content not to be molested, and they enjoyed the short period of quiet which Hannibal’s victories secured for them, without steadily supporting him. But immediately after the conclusion of peace between Rome and Carthage they suddenly put forth an unexpected and astonishing degree of vigour which, had it been shown at the right moment, would most probably have given a different issue to the Hannibalic war.

As early as 201, the consul Publius Aelius Paetus marched at the head of a strong army into the country of the Boians, between the middle course of the Po and the Apennines. This tract of land was naturally the first object of the attack of the Romans, because it lay between the ancient portion of Italy and the line of the Po, and threatened the fortresses Placentia and Cremona in the rear. But the Boians were the most powerful of all the Gallic tribes in Italy, and maintained for a long time a stubborn resistance. They surprised a detachment of the consul’s army under Caius Ampius, who commanded the allies, and killed about seven thousand men. After so promising a beginning, the Boians, in conjunction with the Insubrians, their kinsmen north of the Po, and even with the enomanians, who had at an earlier period been on most friendly terms with the Romans, and several neighbouring Ligurian tribes, made an attack upon the Roman fortresses in their country. A Carthaginian officer of the name of Hamilcar, who had remained behind from Mago’s army, conducted the military operations of the barbarians so successfully that Placentia was taken by them, and only two thousand of the Roman inhabitants escaped. One great triumph was thus obtained, greater than any that even Hannibal had been able to accomplish; and now Hamilcar undertook the siege of Cremona, the sister town of Placentia. We must recollect that in this year (200 BC) the war with Philip of Macedonia was undertaken, that the Roman people at first refused to sanction this war, and could only with difficulty be induced to reverse their vote. The loss of a Roman colony was a far more serious matter than the destruction of an army. It signified the ruin of a large number of families, the death or slavery of women and children, the destruction of property, and the annihilation of a town that was, as it were, a daughter and an image of Rome herself. “It was a matter of great concern to the Roman people”, Livy remarks, even with reference to the Samnite wars, “that their colonists should be safe.’’  We can therefore fully understand what impression the conquest of Placentia produced upon Rome. The first thought was naturally to look to the safety of Cremona. This town was relieved by the praetor Lucius Furius Purpureo. who defeated the Gauls, blockading the town.

But when in the ensuing year an army under Cn. Baebius Pamphilus invaded the country of the Insubrians, it was almost entirely destroyed. It was not possible to secure the colonies against repeated attacks. The discouraged colonists left their homes in great numbers, and fled to safer regions. The consul Sextus Aelius Paetus spent almost the whole of the year 198 in the work of reorganising the colonies, into which the fugitives were compelled to return.

On account of the danger with which the Gauls threatened Rome in the year 197, the year of the battle of Cynoscephalcae, both consuls were sent to Cisalpine Gaul, where the Insubrians and Cenomanians north of the Po, and the Boians and Ligurians south of the river, had conjointly taken up arms. The consul Caius Cornelius Cethegus gained a great victory over the Insubrians, which turned out the more disastrous to them, as during the battle their allies, the Cenomanians, deserted and joined the Romans. Minucius, the other consul, carried on operations against the Ligurians and Boians, and succeeded in preventing their union with the Insubrians. But he accomplished this only by means of a great sacrifice of men, and as he could not boast of any memorable exploit, the senate refused to accord him a triumph, though that honour was bestowed upon his colleague. Minucius defied the resolution of the senate; he declared that he had earned a claim to the honour, and he actually celebrated a triumph on the Alban Mount, following in this matter the precedent of previous consuls, and availing himself of his military imperium, which was unlimited beyond the precincts of the town.

But neither this triumph on the Alban Mount nor the legitimate triumph of the other consul on the Capitol was justified by complete subjection of the enemies. In the following year both consuls were again obliged to march against the Insubrians and Boians, the former of whom inflicted on the consul M. Claudius Marcellus a defeat in which he lost three thousand men, among them officers out of the first families, a Sempronius Gracchus, a Julius Silanus, an Ogulnius, and a Claudius. It is surprising that after so unfavourable a beginning Marcellus was able to penetrate further into the land of the Insubrians, leaving behind him the victorious Boians, and to fight a great battle near Comum, in which he killed forty thousand enemies, according to the reports of Valerius Antias, who, it is true, is utterly untrustworthy. The consul Lucius Furius Purpureo, who in his capacity of praetor four years previously had gained so signal a victory, meanwhile entered the country of the Boians, joined his colleague, and then so effectually defeated the Boians that scarcely one man escaped to carry the news. We cannot be certain that this battle was one of those fictitious exploits of which Cato speaks; but if such a glorious victory was really and truly gained, it seems strange that Furius obtained no triumph, an honour of which the senate was by no means chary, and which was accorded even to Marcellus for his victory of Comum in spite of his previous defeat. Serious doubt, at any rate, seems justified; for the war continued with undiminished force in the following year (195), and occupied the attention of one of the consuls, Lucius Valerius Flaccus, whilst Cato, the other consul, was fighting in Spain. Flaccus defeated the Boians, and in the beginning of the next year, as proconsul, he also routed their allies the Insubrians; but he appears to have succeeded so little in breaking the power of the Gallic tribes that, in the year 194, both consuls had again to be sent against them, and one of them, Tiberius Sempronius, was so unsuccessful that he could only defend himself with great difficulty in his camp against the attacks of the Boians, and lost five thousand men.

In this manner the war continued. In the following year (193) the consul Cornelius Merula was attacked by the Boians on his march to Mutina, and lost five thousand men. Nevertheless he sent reports of a splendid victory to Rome, and had the face to demand a triumph. He almost succeeded in obtaining it; but the senate was informed of the true state of affairs through a letter sent to Rome by the former consul Marcus Claudius Marcellus, now serving as legate under Merula. In this letter Marcellus said that it was due not to the consul, but to the good fortune of the Roman people and to the courage of the soldiers, that the affair had not ended worse. He added that the consul was responsible for the loss of many men and for the escape of the enemy, who might have been annihilated. Thus Merula was deprived of his triumph, and the senate resolved in the following year (192) to send once more both consuls against the stubborn Boians, in order to crush them at length by an overwhelming force.

It seems that the Romans now succeeded in separating the Boians from their Gallic countrymen. The Cenomanians were already won over to the side of Rome. Since the battle of Comum the Insubrians had also remained inactive. Only the Ligurians, of whom we must speak presently, were continually in arms against Rome. But as the strength of the Ligurians depended chiefly upon their wild mountains, they could accomplish little out of their country, and the Boians, left to their own resources, were confronted by the whole force of Rome.

From this time forward the resistance of this once so powerful people grew weaker. In the continuous wars they must have sustained great losses which they could not repair without help from their neighbours. Hence we hear that in the year 192 many of them surrendered to the Romans, and when, in the following year (191 BC), the consul Scipio Nasica attacked them again, and routed them in a great battle, the remainder of the nation also submitted to the conquerors.

Steps were now taken to insure the permanence of Roman dominion over the Boians. Almost half of the country was confiscated for distribution among Roman colonists. The establishment of new colonies was decreed, one of which, Bononia, was founded in the year 189. Placentia and Cremona, the two oldest frontier fortresses in that part, which, since 218, had been exposed to so many sieges, and which, having rendered such important services, had suffered most severely, had already been supplied with new colonists, six thousand families having been sent out to them. This policy was continued. In the year 184 the colonies of Pisaurum and Potentia were founded in the country south of Ariminum, which had long been secured from enemies; and in the following year the colonies of Mutina and Parma were established on the straight line which connected Ariminum by Bononia with Placentia. Here M. Aemilius Lepidus had begun in the year 187 to construct a military highway, called after him the via Aemilia, which conferred upon the whole of this tract the name of Aemilia, a name revived in our own time. In the same year (187 ) C. Flaminius made a road across the Apennines from Arretium to Bononia, a continuation of the via Cassia, which led from Rome to Arretium. Thus a double line of communication was established between Rome and Bononia : one direct line through Etruria by Arretium and Florentia; and a second line, the via Flaminia, through Umbria as far as the Adriatic, and continued, under the name of via Armilia, to Bononia, and further by Mutina and Parma to Placentia on the Po. From this time forward the latinization of the Gallic parts of North Italy made rapid progress. The country, though fertile, had up to this time been but thinly peopled. When peace was re­established it became filled with emigrants from Italy, who introduced Roman laws and institutions and the Latin language.

After the subjection of the Boians the Romans had no more difficulty with the tribes living north of the Po. They were satisfied with compelling them to recognise their authority, without forcing upon them an oppressive provincial government, or taking from them their old institutions. It was more advantageous to entrust them with the defence of the Alpine passes against the northern tribes than to drive them to an alliance with these tribes by demanding tribute or otherwise oppressing them.

The only wars of which we still hear in these parts took place on the extreme north-east frontier of the peninsula. Here the Romans founded the colony of Aquileia in 181, to protect the Italian frontier and to suppress piracy in the Adriatic. On this occasion a quarrel broke out between the Romans and the Istrians. The consul Manlius Vulso marched from Aquileia, without orders from the senate, along the coast into the land of the Istrians, accompanied by a Roman fleet of war and transport vessels; but, through his foolhardiness and incapacity, he sustained a reverse, disgraceful to the Roman arms, and injurious to the prestige of Rome among the barbarians. The Roman camp near the sea was unexpectedly attacked by the enemy, and the soldiers, instead of preparing for the defence, sought to save themselves by a disorderly flight to their ships. The enemy took possession of the camp, and the news, which accidentally arrived in Rome a short time after, spread a panic unworthy of Rome throughout Italy, and induced the senate to take precautions in all haste, as if the State were in the greatest danger. Fortunately the barbarians allowed themselves to be surprised while revelling and rioting in the conquered camp, and the temporary and inexplicable cowardice of the Roman soldiers was soon forgotten. The war with the Istrians was virtually finished when Caius Claudius Pulcher, the consul for the following year (177 BC), appeared with a new army, and secured the safety of Italy in this quarter.

By the side of the Gallic tribes in northern Italy there dwelt at that time the Ligurians on both sides of the Apennines. At an earlier time the Ligurians had been more widely spread; but they had been driven by the Gallic invaders into the mountains which surrounded the gulf named after them the Ligurian. There they lived in freedom and poverty as peasants and shepherds, in a wild and sterile mountain district, and sought to obtain by the sword in the rich neighbouring countries what their own barren land denied them. They were for a long time a dreadful scourge of northern Etruria, and their pirate ships scoured far and wide the western sea. By them the road between Piste and Massilia and the voyage along the coast were for a long time rendered dangerous. This was a state of affairs which Rome could not suffer after she had assumed the sovereignty over Etruria. But the Hannibalic war prolonged the independence of the Ligurians, although they seem hardly to have taken any part in it. When, after the peace with Carthage, Rome resumed the interrupted task of reducing northern Italy, the Ligurians found themselves in a similar position to that of the Gauls, and, therefore, frequently fought in conjunction with them. But a close and lasting alliance was out of the question in the case of barbarous tribes. It was not difficult for Rome to isolate her enemies and to attack them singly, especially as they thought only of defence, and generally remained quiet when not attacked—plundering expeditions, of course, being always excepted.

As early as the year 201, when the wars in northern Italy were breaking out anew, the consul Aelius Paetus succeeded in concluding a treaty with the Ligurian tribe of the Ingaunians. But after the year 197, Ligurian tribes appear regularly at war with Rome. They invaded the Roman territory, and finally, in the year 193, devastated the land round Luna, Pisaa, and Placentia. Extraordinary measures to oppose them became necessary. The consul Minucius Thermus had to defend Pisa against them, but did not venture to give battle, and when he was himself attacked in his camp, could scarcely hold his ground. Nay, he was even in danger of undergoing a disgrace similar to that of the Caudine passes. Shut in as he was by the bold mountaineers in a narrow valley, he escaped only through the courage of a body of Numidian horse, who fought their way through the enemy and forced them to retreat, by devastating the land in their rear. In the following year (192 BC) Minucius was more fortunate. He routed the Ligurians in a great battle near Pisae with a loss of nine thousand men, pursued them, and, it is said, took from them the booty which they had seized in Etruria. It is evident that this victory was, after all, not decisive, because in the following year the Ligurians again attacked the camp of Minucius. This time also he boasted of having gained a great victory, and even claimed a triumph, which, however, he did not obtain. In this way year after year passed with almost wearisome uniformity. Repeatedly both consuls were sent against the Ligurians with four legions, i.e. armies of forty thousand men, but were so far from being able to overcome the enemies in their mountains that Pisae and Bononia were several times threatened by them. The Roman generals had not the talent of forming, everyone for himself, a sensible plan for a campaign; still less, in the continual succession of annual commanders, did the earlier leaders keep in mind the necessities of those who were to follow them, and thus prepare the way for them by their own operations. Each commander was constrained naturally to begin the work afresh, and thus it happened that it remained so long unfinished. If we consider the small extent of the Ligurian mountain-land, its nearness to the Roman territory and the sea, and then place beside it the immense power of Rome in the second century before our era, we may justly assert that of all the enemies of Rome, no people, not even the Samnites, opposed to them a more resolute resistance than the Ligurians.

It would be wearisome to follow the reports of the annalists in detail through year after year of Ligurian campaigns. Of the many Roman generals who carried on these wars with more or less success up to the year 166 BC, we need notice only two, whom we have already met elsewhere. Of these, one is Quintus Marcius Philippus, who, in the beginning of the war with Perseus (171 BC), managed to overreach him in diplomatic skill, and in the third year with reckless courage penetrated into Macedonia by a difficult mountain pass. Conducting a campaign against the Ligurians, in his first consulship, 186 BC, this same Marcius allowed himself to be enticed into a part where the enemy lay in ambush, and, having lost four thousand men and a number of arms and ensigns, escaped with great difficulty, and dismissed the remainder of his army as soon as he was beyond the reach of the enemy, in order to hide the extent of his reverses. But he could not prevent the people from speaking of the spot where he had been beaten as the Marcian forest (saltus Marcius), and thus perpetuating the memory of his disaster.

The second leader is Aemilius Paullus, the much extolled conqueror of Perseus. This man is known to us also from the wars in Spain, where he sustained a great defeat in the year 190, which he repaired shortly Liguria. When, after his first consulship, in the year 181, he was stationed as proconsul in Liguria, he was attacked in his camp, it is said, during a truce, and he defended himself bravely, but with great difficulty, for a whole day. He was in danger of being taken prisoner, with his whole army; for neither his colleague, who was near enough, in Pisae, but had no troops at hand, nor Marcellus, who was stationed in distant Gaul, could come to his rescue; and the hasty preparations which the senate made on receiving the alarming tidings, could not have saved the general from his peril. In this strait, despairing of aid, he made a bold sally, and succeeded in fighting his way through the blockading force.

On this occasion, as in many other similar difficulties, the fault of the general was repaired by the courage of the soldiers. The tribe of the Ingaunians soon after submitted and gave hostages. The Romans, on their side, had recourse to the severe measure of carrying off whole tribes in order to put an end to the war. Four thousand Ligurians were transplanted to Samnium, where public lands were allotted to them. The same thing was done (180 BC) with seven thousand more who were transported by sea to Naples, in order to join their countrymen in Samnium. But either these numbers are exaggerated, or the gaps which were made by the transportation of so many men were immediately filled up again by new immigrants. The war, at any rate, continued without any perceptible decrease of violence. The town of Pisae was so hard-pressed and had lost so many men, that it begged the senate to send out a reinforcement of citizens in the shape of Latin colonists, whom it offered to supply with land. The request was granted, and in the following year (179) both consuls were again se to Liguria. Although after the campaign one of the consuls celebrated a triumph, neither of them accomplished much. In the year 177 the colony of Luna was founded on the Macra, as an advanced post on the frontier of the hostile country. But in the same year the Ligurians had still courage and strength enough to undertake an expedition against the Roman colony of Mutina, and even to conquer it. They could not keep possession of the town, and probably did not even intend to do so, but were content with plundering and then devastating it. Accordingly, the senate thought it advisable in the following year again to send two consuls against them, and to direct the proconsul Caius Claudius, who commanded in Cisalpine Gaul, to co-operate with them. Thus the Ligurians were completely overpowered, and sustained a great defeat in 176. Yet, in the year 173 the senate again resolved to send both consuls against them; but only one of them, Marcus Popillius Laenas, actually went into the province. Of the manner in which he carried on the war something has been said already. Attacking the Ligurian tribe of the Statellates on the north side of the mountains, although they had as yet taken no part in the wars of their countrymen with Rome, he defeated them, as he asserted, in a great battle, disarmed them, when they had submitted to him, in the hope of lenient treatment, destroyed their town, and sold them into slavery. The senate disapproved of these acts, and ordered that those Ligurians who had been sold should be set free again. Thereupon a violent quarrel arose between the consul and the senate. Refusing to obey, the former actually continued the war, and sent a message to Rome that he had again defeated the Ligurians, and killed sixteen thousand of them. The consul’s brother, Caius Popillius, who succeeded him in the consulship, endeavoured to shield him from the anger of the senate; but he was obliged to give in to the threats of two tribunes, and to repair the injury by redeeming from slavery the ill-used Ligurians, and settling them in the valley of the Po. Marcus Popillius was impeached for misconduct; but his trial was not seriously proceeded with, and he escaped without punishment.

From this time the wars in Liguria gradually ceased. After an interval of several years, in 166 BC another war is reported, in which the Ligurians are said to have been entirely defeated. Twelve years later the Romans had penetrated beyond the Maritime Alps, and defended Massilia, which was on friendly terms with them, against the Axybian Ligurians, whose land they assigned to the Massilians. At length in the year 143, when the war with Numantia began, we find a Roman army in the extreme north-west of Italy at war with the Gallo-Ligurian tribe of the Salassians. This war, which concludes the long succession of Roman conquests in Italy, presents more than ordinary interest, on account of the conduct of Appius Claudius, the commanding consul, which throws a passing light upon the internal state of affairs, and confirms all that we have in this last period noticed of the imperiousness of the Roman aristocracy, and the impossibility of preventing the approaching revolution.

Appius Claudius was consul in the year 143 BC, together with Quintus Caecilius Metellus, the conqueror of Pseudo-Philippus of Macedonia. Inflated with family pride and goaded by the ambition not to be behind his colleague in military reputation, he sought some pretext for war. Italy, which had been allotted to him as his sphere of office (his provincia), enjoyed perfect peace. But Claudius was not disconcerted. The Salassians, who happened just then to have a dispute with their neighbours about a stream used for washing gold, applied to him to settle the matter amicably by acting as umpire. Instead of doing this, he attacked them with an armed force, but was completely beaten, and lost no less than ten thousand men. In a second battle he was more fortunate, and killed (as he asserted) five thousand enemies, the number which, according to a law recently passed, gave him a right to ask for a triumph. He accordingly determined to enjoy this honour, whether the senate or people consented or not. Without deigning to apply for leave, he only asked the senate to vote the necessary money. When this was refused he bore the expenses himself, and celebrated a triumph in defiance of all customs and laws. A tribune was about to pull him down from his triumphal chariot; but his daughter, who was a vestal virgin, clung to him and protected him with her sacred person. Thus far had the monarchic, or, rather, the despotic, element in the mixed constitution of the Roman republic gained the preponderance over the aristocratic and democratic element, that an audacious noble might, at least temporarily, succeed in playing the part of an absolute king without incurring any danger for his present safety. This same Claudius, who so contemptuously trampled upon the republican institutions, became in due time censor, and died as the leader (princeps) of the senate.

The first conquest which Rome had made beyond Italy after the Sicilian war was in Illyria, which had been compelled to recognise the sovereignty of Rome in two wars,  229 and 219 BC. This sovereignty was at first disregarded by the Illyrian people and princes as long as they believed themselves powerful enough, but it was changed into a complete dominion after the war with Gentius, the ally of Perseus. Between the Illyrian possessions and Istria dwelt several independent tribes, who, like their neighbours, were addicted to piracy, and, issuing from the narrow channels of a sea full of islands and creeks, were long a scourge of the adjacent country. These lawless practices could be brought to an end only by the subjection of the whole coast. In a war which lasted for two years (156-155 BC), the Romans conquered Dalmatia, and thus the whole east coast of the Adriatic, from Epirus to Istria, was in their possession.

The islands of Sardinia and Corsica had been seized immediately after the first war with Carthage, but were not entirely subjected, even at the end of the present period (133 BC). In the rugged mountains of the interior the natives preserved their independence, and lost none of their original barbarism. Only the towns and villages on the coast were in the safe possession of the Romans, and even these had to be continually defended by force of arms from the attacks of the mountaineers. From time to time these border hostilities assumed the proportions of wars, and gave the Roman generals opportunities for reports of glorious battles, and for triumphal honours. In the year 179 BC a serious revolt broke out in Sardinia, which Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus put down after a war of two years, with a strong consular army of two double legions (twenty-three thousand two hundred men). He celebrated a triumph, and caused a picture to be painted representing his victories, which he placed in the temple of Mater Matuta. In an inscription under this picture Gracchus proclaimed his own glory, and asserted that he had killed or captured over eighty thousand enemies. Nevertheless, similar wars occurred from time to time, as, for instance, in the years 126, 124,122, and 115 BC. The sister island of Corsica was treated in the same way. The resistance of the natives seems to have been still more stubborn, and it was prolonged, in fact, up to the time of the emperors.

The extension of the Roman dominion over the chief countries round the Mediterranean resembles, more than the formation of any other great state in the old or new world, a spontaneous and natural growth determined by fixed laws. In the Persian and Macedonian kingdoms, as in those of Alexander’s successors, the founder himself was the chief agent. Religious fanaticism made conquerors of the Arabs. The maritime discoveries of the fifteenth century opened a road to splendid conquests in America and India to the enterprising spirit and the cupidity of the European nations. But the peasantry on the Tiber rose to the position of rulers over the surrounding country and the whole of Italy gradually and almost imperceptibly. They then crossed the sea almost simultaneously in all directions, as if urged on by an irresistible impulse, without any extraneous determining cause, even without the guidance of any eminent genius, or the influence of such emotions as religious fanaticism, commercial enterprise,  or a passion for emigration or colonisation. Their course could be arrested by no obstacle of nature, by no strength of will or mental power that opposed them. They crossed seas and mountains, wrestled victoriously with the genius of Hannibal, with the Macedonian phalanx, and Greek policy, with the unbroken force of savage tribes and their pathless mountains. Their frequent defeats were but pauses, rests on the way, giving time for new attacks and new victories. They advanced as if unconscious of their aim, urged on by an uncontrollable instinct, not encouraged but rather restrained by some far-sighted men, who were free from the passions of the vulgar.

This phenomenon is not sufficiently explained by the circumstance that the Romans were warlike and fond of conquests, and that they were trained to war by the necessity of constantly defending their independence. For Rome and every nation of antiquity was in the same position. It Italy was the normal policy of all peoples at that time to allow their neighbours only so much of independence as they could maintain by force of arms. The habit of living in peace with neighbouring nations, which is gradually becoming the rule in modern Europe, was as unknown in antiquity as it is now among the Anglo-Americans and the Red Indians. Only the weak were content to keep securely what they possessed. The right of the stronger, in its widest sense, prevailed among all nations, and was, even among the Greeks, hardly softened by the highest intellectual culture. From this point, therefore, the Romans could advance no further than the Spartans or Carthaginians, the Gauls or Macedonians. There must have been circumstances to facilitate the task which all nations alike had set themselves. One of these circumstances we have already pointed out. It was the central position of Rome in the long and narrow peninsula of Italy. If the city of Rome had been situated in Sicily, or in southern Italy, or on the Po, it could not, like a wedge, have divided the north from the south, and have successively subjected both. In the same way the central position of Italy was, in the decisive crisis of the Hannibalic and in the succeeding wars, the great obstacle to a combined attack upon Rome by all her enemies.

Still the favourable geographic position was not alone sufficient to raise Rome above Italy, and Roman Italy above all the countries round the Mediterranean. The most important condition of success was that political system and organization which was based upon the national character of the Roman people, and which they applied also to conquered nations. It was the willing submission to the authority of an established government, the sacrifice of the individual will to the national, that made them a nation of warriors, and thus the rulers of the world. Their distinguishing character was logical thought without imagination, consistent action without sentiment. These qualities early laid the foundation of a political constitution, which remained in its principle unchanged for ages. The “government of laws, and not of men,” was more fully realised in Rome than in any other state of the ancient world. It was a blessing also for the subject nations, and because it was felt to be a blessing, the subjects clung to the ruling city, as living members of one body politic. It was not until the abuse of power began to undermine these foundations of Roman greatness, that the republic broke down. But, even then, the empire, under a new system of legitimate order, preserved to the peoples of the world the blessings of peace for centuries.

Hence, to understand the greatness of Rome we must study its inner life, the moral and intellectual forces by which it was moved. On this task we have now to fix our attention. We must endeavour to trace the phases of development through which the people and the State passed after they had established their dominion over Italy.