READING HALLTHE DOORS OF WISDOM |
HISTORY OF ROMETHE WAR FOR SUPREMACY IN THE WEST
CHAPTER II.SICILY.
THE island of Sicily seems
destined by its position to form the connecting link between Europe and Africa.
Whilst almost touching Italy in the north-east, it stretches itself westwards
towards the great African continent, which appears to approach it from the
south with an outstretched arm. Thus this large island divides the whole basin
of the Mediterranean sea into an eastern and a western, a Greek and a barbarian
half. Few Greek settlers ventured westward beyond the narrow straits between
Italy and Sicily. Etruscans and Carthaginians were the exclusive masters of the
western sea, and in those parts where their power was supreme they allowed no
Greek settlement or Greek commerce. The triangular island had one of her sides
turned towards the country of the Greeks in the east; while the other two
coasts, converging in a western direction, extended into the sea of the
barbarians, and almost reached the very centre of Carthaginian power. Thus it
happened that the east coast of the island and the nearest portions of the
other two coasts were filled with Greek colonies; while the western part, with
the adjacent islands, remained in possession of the Phoenicians, who, it seems,
before the time of the Greek immigration, had settlements all-round the coast.
The greater energy of the Greeks seemed destined to Hellenise the whole island.
No native people could obstruct their progress. The aborigines of Sicily, the Sikeli or Sikani, no doubt a
people of the same race as the oldest population of Italy, were cut off by the
sea from their natural allies in a struggle with foreign intruders, and, being
confined to their own strength alone, they could never become dangerous, as
the Lucanian and Bruttian barbarians were to the Greeks
in Italy. Only once there arose among them a native leader, called Duketius, who had the ambition, but not the ability, to
found a national kingdom of Sicily. On the whole, Sicily was destined, from the
beginning of history to modem times, to be the battlefield and the prize of
victory for foreign nations.
The origin and the development
of the Greek towns in Sicily belong, properly speaking, to the history of
Greece. Their wars also with Carthage, for the possession of the island, have
only an indirect relation with the history of Rome. We cast on them, therefore,
only a passing glance. It will suffice for us to see how, in consequence of the
unsteady policy of the quarrelsome Greeks and the aimless, fitful exertions of
the Carthaginians, neither the one nor the other attained a complete and
undisputed sovereignty over the island, and how each successively had to
succumb to the judicious policy and the persevering energy of the Romans.
In the west of the island the
Carthaginians had ancient Phoenician colonies in their possession, of which Motye, Panormus, and Solus were the most important. The
Greeks had ventured on the south side as far as Selinus,
and on the north as far as Himera, and it seemed
that, in course of time, the last remaining Punic fortresses must fall into
their hands. Carthage desired a peaceful possession for the purposes of trade
and commerce, and until the fifth century before our era had not entered upon
any great warlike enterprise. At the time of the Persian war, however, a great
change took place in the policy of Carthage. Taking advantage of the internal
dissensions of the Greeks, they sent for the first time a considerable army
into Sicily, as if they contemplated the conquest of the whole island. This
attack on the Greeks in the west happened at the time when there was every
prospect of their mother country falling a victim to the Persians. But at the
very time when Greek freedom came out victorious from the unequal struggle at
Salamis, the Sicilian Greeks, under the command of Gelon,
the ruler of Gela and Syracuse, defeated the great Carthaginian army before Himera, and thus put an end for a considerable time to the
Carthaginian plans of conquest.
Syracuse from this time became
more and more the head of the Greek cities. The rulers Gelon and Hiero, distinguished not less by their military
abilities than by their wise policy, understood how to curb the excitable,
active, and restless Greeks in Sicily, and to govern them with that kind of
steadfast rule which alone seemed salutary for them. As soon, however, as the
firm government of the tyrants gave place to what was called freedom, all wild
passions broke loose within every town in the confederacy of the Sicilian
Greeks. The empire of Syracuse, which under princes as vigorous as Gelon and Hero might probably have been extended over the
whole of Sicily, was broken up. Every town again became independent. The
arbitrary measures of the Syracusan princes were upset, democracy
re-established, the expelled citizens brought back, and the friends of the
tyrants banished. In spite of these revolutions, involving confiscation of property
and confusion of all kinds, Sicily enjoyed great prosperity for half a century,
and the Carthaginians made no attempt to extend the bounds of their dominion in
the island. It was only after the unhappy termination of the Athenian
expedition against Syracuse, when this town, victorious but exhausted, and
distracted by internal dissensions, continued the war against Athens in the
Aegean Sea, that the Carthaginians, seventy years after their great defeat at Himera, again made a vigorous attack on the Greek cities of
Sicily.
Segesta, which was only
partially Greek, and had already caused the interference of the Athenians in
the internal affairs of the island, invoked Carthaginian aid in a dispute with
the neighbouring town Selinus. Hamilcar, the grandson
of the Hannibal who had fallen at Himera, landed in
Sicily with a large army, and conquered in quick succession Selinus and Himera, destroying
them with all the horrors of barbarian warfare. But the greatest blow for the
Sicilian Greeks was the fall of Akragas or
Agrigentum, the second town of the island, whose glorious temples and strong
walls were overthrown, and whose rich works of art were carried away to Carthage.
Since the taking of Miletus by the Persians, such a dreadful misfortune had
happened to no Hellenic town. The Punic conquerors pushed on irresistibly along
the southern coast of the island towards the east.
The Syracusans had tried in
vain to arrest them at Agrigentum. The failure of their undertaking caused an
internal revolution, which overthrew the republic and gave monarchical power to
the elder Dionysius. But even Dionysius was not capable of stemming the further
progress of the Carthaginians. Gela fell into their hands and Camarina was forsaken by its inhabitants. The whole of the
south coast of the island was now in their power, and it seemed that Syracuse
would experience the same fate. At length Dionysius succeeded in concluding a
treaty, whereby lie gave over to them all the conquered towns, being himself
recognized by them as governor of Syracuse. The Carthaginians now permitted the
exiled inhabitants and other Greeks to return to the towns that had been
destroyed. It seems never to have occurred to them that it was desirable to
garrison the fortified places which they had taken, or to colonize them in the
manner of the Romans. Probably they fancied that, having entirely broken and
humbled their enemies in the field, they would be able, from their maritime
stronghold of Motye, to overawe the conquered
districts and to keep them in subjection.
But they had estimated the
energy of the Greeks too low. Dionysius, established in his dominion over
Syracuse, prepared himself for a new war against Carthage, and in 397 B.C.
suddenly invaded the Carthaginian territory. His attack was irresistible. Even
the island town of Motye, in the extreme west of
Sicily, the chief stronghold of Carthaginian power, was besieged and finally
taken by means of an artificial dam which connected it with the mainland.
The conquests of the Greeks,
as those of the Carthaginians, in Sicily, were but of short duration.
Dionysius retaliated for the destruction of Greek towns by laying waste Motye and severely punishing the surviving inhabitants;
but when he had done this he withdrew, to occupy himself with other schemes, as
if Carthage had been thoroughly humbled and expelled from Sicily. In the
following year, however (396 BC), the Carthaginians again, with very little
trouble, retook Motye, and advanced with a large army
and fleet towards the east of the island, where they conquered Messana, and, after driving Dionysius back, besieged him
in Syracuse.
So changeable was the fortune
of war in Sicily, and so dependent on accidental circumstances, that the
question whether the island was to be Greek or Carthaginian was almost within
the space of one year decided in two opposite ways, and the hopes of each of
the two rivals, after having risen to the highest point, were finally
dashed to the ground. The victorious career of Carthage was arrested by the
walls of Syracuse, just as, twenty years before, the flower of the Athenian
citizens had perished in the same spot. A malignant distemper broke out in the
army of the besiegers, compelling Himilco, the
Carthaginian general, to a speedy flight and to the disgraceful sacrifice of
the greater part of his army, which consisted of foreign mercenaries. Dionysius
was now again, as with one blow, undisputed master of the whole of Sicily, and
he had leisure to plan the subjection of all the Greek towns to the west of the
Ionian Sea. He undertook now his piratical expeditions against Caulonia, Hipponium, Croton, and Rhegium, which brought
unspeakable misery on these once-flourishing cities at the very time when they
were being pressed by the Italian nations, the Lucanians and the Bruttians. The bloody defeat which the Thurians suffered from the Lucanians, and the conquest of Rhegium by Dionysius,
accompanied with the most atrocious cruelty, were the saddest events of this
period, so disastrous to the Greek nation. If Dionysius had pursued a national
policy, and, instead of allying himself with the Lucanians to attack the Greek
cities, had marshalled the Greeks against Carthage, he would most probably have
become master of all Sicily. But the fainthearted manner in which he carried
on the war against the enemies of the Greek race stood out in strong contrast
with the perseverance which he exhibited in enslaving his own countrymen. After
short hostilities (383 BC), he concluded a peace with Carthage, in which he
ceded to her the western part of Sicily as far as the river Halycus.
Then, after a long pause, he attempted, for the last time, an attack on the
Carthaginian towns, conquering Selinus, Entella, and Eryx, and laying
siege to Lilybaeum, which, after the destruction of Motye,
had been strongly fortified by the Carthaginians and was now their principal
stronghold in Sicily. After he had been driven back from Lilybaeum, the war
ceased, without any treaty of peace. Dionysius died shortly afterwards.
The Carthaginians took no
advantage either of the incapacity of his son, the younger Dionysius, or of the
feebleness of Syracuse in the Dionian revolution, to
extend their dominion further. It was only when Timoleon of Corinth ventured on
the bold scheme of restoring the freedom of Syracuse that we find a
Carthaginian army and fleet before the town, with the intention of anticipating
Timoleon and of conquering Syracuse for Carthage after the overthrow of the
tyrant Dionysius. Never did they seem so near the accomplishment of their
long-cherished hope. Being joined with Hiketas, the
ruler of Leontini, they had already made themselves masters of the town of
Syracuse. Their ships had taken possession of the harbour. Only the small
fortified island Ortygia, the key of Syracuse, was still in the hands of
Dionysius, who, when he could no longer maintain his ground, had the choice to
which of his enemies he would surrender, to Timoleon or to the Carthaginians
and Hiketas. The good fortune or the wisdom of
Timoleon carried the day. He obtained by agreement the possession of Ortygia
and he sent Dionysius, with his treasures, as exile to Corinth. Again the
Carthaginians saw the prize of all their efforts snatched from their hands.
They feared treason on the part of Hiketas, their
Greek ally; and their general Mago sailed back to Africa. There he escaped by a
voluntary death the punishment which the Carthaginian senate inflicted only too
often on unfortunate generals. His body was nailed to the cross.
Timoleon crowned his glorious
work of the deliverance of Syracuse and the expulsion of all the tyrants of
Sicily by a brilliant victory over a superior Carthaginian army on the river Krimesus. This defeat was disastrous to Carthage because
they lost in it a select body consisting of citizens from the first families.
Yet the result of this much lauded victory was by no means the expulsion of the Punians from Sicily. It seems not even to have
produced a change in the respective strength of the two belligerents or an
alteration of boundary between the Greek and Carthaginian territory.
Between the overthrow of the
second Dionysius and the dominion of Agathocles, the most noxious and most
hateful of her tyrants, Syracuse enjoyed, for twenty-two years, democratic
government and comparative rest, as well as peaceful intercourse with the
Carthaginians and with the other Sicilian Greeks. But the worthless Agathocles
had hardly seized the monarchical power which seemed to have been put down for
ever in Syracuse by the noble Timoleon, than the national war between Greeks
and Punians again broke out, and was carried on with
a violence and animosity hitherto unknown. After one decisive victory over
Agathocles, the Carthaginians for the third time besieged Syracuse with an army
and fleet, and for the third time they seemed on the point of gaining the last
stronghold of Greek independence in Sicily. Agathocles then, with true Greek
ingenuity and with the recklessness of despair, ventured upon an enterprise
which thwarted all the calculations of the Carthaginians. He burst forth with
his ships out of the blockaded harbour of Syracuse, and landed an army on the
coast of Africa. Attacked in their own country, the Carthaginians were
compelled to relinquish all thoughts of conquering Syracuse. For four years
Agathocles conducted the war in Africa with extraordinary success. He not only
conquered many of the country towns of the Carthaginians, and lived in luxury
from the rich spoils of that fruitful and flourishing land, but he took
possession also of the most important Phoenician towns under the dominion of
Carthage, such as Thapsus, Hadrumetum, and even Utica
and Tunis, in the immediate neighbourhood of Carthage. Internal foes joined
themselves to the foreign enemy, who attacked the state in its most vulnerable
part. The treachery of the general Bomilcar, and the
revolt of subjects and allies, reduced the proud Punian town almost to ruin. There was now no longer any trust in the power of money or
their foreign mercenaries. The citizens of the town themselves, and the men of
the noblest blood, were called out and courageously sacrificed. The
perseverance of Carthage prevailed. Agathocles escaped with difficulty to
Sicily, and two of his sons, with his whole army, fell as victims to a
recklessness which had not sufficient power to back it. Thus failed an
undertaking on which Regulus ventured in the first Tunic war with a similar
result, and which succeeded only in the second war with Rome after the strength
of Carthage was so completely exhausted that even a Hannibal could not restore
it.
The expedition of Agathocles
had no influence on the relative position of the Carthaginians and Greeks
in Sicily. After many fruitless struggles the treaty of peace left the
Carthaginians in possession of the western portion with the dominion over Selinus and Himera. Agathocles,
like his predecessors Hiero and Dionysius, now formed
other schemes than that of the conquest of all Sicily. He made several
expeditions into Italy and into the Adriatic Sea, conquered even the island of
Corcyra, causing destruction and ruin wherever he appeared, without gaining a
single permanent conquest. When at length, at a great age, he was murdered by
his grandson, new dissensions broke out, as was usually the case after the fall
of a tyrant. Sicily, now thoroughly exhausted, and retaining less and less of
her Greek nationality, sought a protector from Pyrrhus, king of the
semi-barbarous Epirots. How this last attempt to
unite the Sicilian Greeks and to free the island from Carthaginians failed has
been already related.
The freedom of the Greeks in
the mother country had already perished. To Sicily, too, its days were
numbered. But the prize for which the Carthaginians had contended so long was
not to be gained by them. A new competitor appeared. The conquerors of Pyrrhus
followed in his footsteps with more energy and success, and, after a long and
changeful struggle, gave to the afflicted Sicilians peace and order, in
exchange for their lost independence.
CHAPTER III.THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, 264-241 B.C. |