H. Manandyan

TIGRANES II AND ROME

Annotated Translation and Introduction
by
George A. Bournoutian

Tigranes II 95-55 B.C., known in Armenian historiography as Tigranes the Great, is the sole Armenian monarch who not only succeeded in unifying all the lands inhabited by the Armenians, but extended Armenian rule into Syria and northwestern Iran. In the first century B.C. he created an Armenian empire which lasted for some two decades, taking the title of "King of kings," which until then was only held by the kings of Parthia.

Armenians, not surprisingly, revere Tigranes. In their pride, some Armenians endow him with modern nationalistic traits and ignore the fact that Tigranes possessed a more Hellenistic and, occasionally, Persian, outlook, rather than that of a modern Armenian. Tigranes' greatness, as will be evident in this study, was in his attempt to forge an independent and powerful state and to break away from the constraints imposed upon Armenia by its geography. Together with Mithridates Eupator, the king of Pontus, he tried to free Asia Minor from Persian military and political threats in the east and those of Rome in the west.

About the Translator

George Bournoutian is Professor of East European and Middle Eastern History at Iona College. He is the recipient of the IREX, NDEA, and Mellon Fellowships. He is the author of numerous books and articles and has taught Armenian and Iranian history at UCLA and Columbia University. He taught the first Armenian history courses at New York University, Tufts University, University of Connecticut, Rutgers University, Ramapo College, and Glendale Community College.

Cover: Images of Tigranes II, Mithridates Eupator, and Pompey on contemporary coins

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Hakob Manandyan

Tigranes II and Rome

A New Interpretation Based on Primary Sources

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Translator's Introduction

Tigranes II (95-55 B.C.), known in Armenian historiography as Tigranes the Great, is the sole Armenian monarch who not only succeeded in unifying all the lands inhabited by the Armenians, but extended Armenian rule into Syria and northwestern Iran. In the first century B.C. he created an Armenian empire which lasted for some two decades, taking the title of "King of kings," which until then was only held by the kings of Parthia.

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Hakob Hamazaspi Manandyan (1873-1952) was one of the major Armenian historians of the twentieth century. Scholars and students continue to use his articles, monographs, and books as definitive sources on a variety of topics. In undertaking a serious study on Tigranes, Professor Manandyan tried to avoid patriotic sentiment and concentrated mainly on Greek and Roman primary sources. He also examined modern European scholarship on Tigranes and concluded that Roman imperialism could not tolerate strong independent states in Asia Minor and did everything to undermine the new Armenian and Pontic states.

Only one of the many works of Manandyan has been translated into English. Some four decades ago, Professor Nina Garsoïan published an excellent translation of the revised edition of *The Trade and Cities of Armenia in Relation to Ancient World Trade.*[1]

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[1] H. Manandian, *The Trade and Cities of Armenia in Relation to Ancient World Trade* (Lisbon, 1965).

The current translation presents another major work of Manandyan to the English readers interested in the history of Armenia, Pontus, and Rome. Although a French translation by Hiranth Thorossian[2] was published in 1963, it is difficult to obtain and incomprehensible to those who cannot read French. In addition, his notes are those of Manandyan and do not reflect recent scholarship included in the notes and bibliography of this translation. Moreover, his use of French translations for the classical and other sources in the text is of little value to the English reader. For the English version of the classical texts quoted by Manandyan, I have used, when available, the Loeb Classical Library series (changing the English spelling into common American usage). In order to enable English readers to check sources in German and French, which Manandyan has cited in their Russian or Armenian translations, I have used the available English translations. To assist readers familiar with classical sources and to make the translation useful for English readers, I have retained (except in the quotations) the classical spellings of the *Cambridge Ancient History* series: hence, *Tigranocerta* (instead of *Tigranakert*), Tigranes (instead of Tigran), *Artaxata* (instead of *Artashat*), *Araxes* (instead of *Arax*), etc.

The Armenian version has been used for this translation,[3] but I have also consulted the Russian[4] and French versions. Except for tightening some of Manandyan's repetitive or verbose sentences and stylistic adjustments, no other alterations have been made to Manandyan's text. The reader has to remember that the work was originally written in 1940; hence terms such as "Roman slave-owning classes," and other similar Marxist terminology should be viewed as commonly accepted descriptions of that period. Readers may find Manandyan's acceptance of some passages from certain classical sources, but rejection of other passages from the same sources, to be inconsistent. Despite such shortcomings, the conclusions presented in the text are sound and shed new light on the history of Armenia and Pontus in the first century before Christ.

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[2] H. Manandian, *Tigrane II & Rome: Nouveaux éclaircissements à la lumière des sources originales* (Lisbon, 1963).

[3] H. Manandyan, *Tigran II ev Hṛomê: Nor lusabanut`yamb êst skzbnaghbyurneri* (Erevan, 1940).

[4] Ya. Manandian, *Tigran Vtori i Rim, v novom osveshchenii po pervoistochnikam* (Erevan, 1943).

Since Manandyan chose parentheses for his insertions, I have chosen brackets for my additions or corrections within the text. In order to distinguish my notes from those of Manandyan, I have underlined mine. Rather than use the Soviet-style designation of "Before the Common Era" and "After the Common Era" (a habit since picked up by "politically correct" historians in the West), I have retained the more traditional form; hence, B.C. instead of B.C.E. and A.D. instead of C.E. used in the original text. Unless noted, all dates are B.C. Finally, I have adopted the Library of Congress transliteration system for the Russian and Armenian letters; hence Manandyan and not Manandian and Adonts and not Adontz (except where they appear as Manandian and Adontz in Russian or in previously published works in French and English).

I am indebted to a number of individuals and institutions. Part of the publication cost was provided by NAASR and the Hovanessian, Nazarian and Sevazlian families. Dean Alex Eodice and the Iona College Faculty Travel Committee provided the necessary travel funds. The staff at CELTIC helped to format the text, while Jason Kattenhorn of the Iona Graphics Department prepared the cover and the eleven maps based on my (maps 1-2) and Manandyan's (maps 3-11) original renditions. Edward Helmrich of Ryan Library at Iona College obtained many hard-to-find volumes and Butler Library at Columbia University provided access to other rare books. Aris Sevag meticulously performed the difficult task of copyediting and proofreading. Finally, my wife, Ani, read the various drafts. I am, of course, responsible for any flaws that remain.

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1
Preface

The history of ancient Armenia during the period of Tigranes II has been studied only in a cursory fashion by those European scholars who were primarily interested in the history of Rome or the kingdom of Pontus and not in the history of Armenia. Among these are the works of three major historians: Theodor Mommsen,[1] Théodore Reinach,[2] and Guglielmo Ferrero.[3] In addition, there is a detailed examination of Lucullus' incursions into Armenia by the young German scholar Kurt Eckhardt, a student of Ferdinand Lehmann-Haupt, which was published in the German periodical *Klio*.[4]

Almost all studies by Armenian historians, as well as the French and Russian works by Noël Dolens and A. Khatch,[5] François Tournebize,[6] Kévork Aslan,[7] Jacques de Morgan,[8] Grigor Khalat'iants,[9] and others, have relied exclusively on the studies of Mommsen or Reinach for their information on the era of Tigranes II. The exceptions are the works of the Armenian historians Mik'ayēl Ch'amch'eants'[10] and Harut'iwn Asturean,[11] who have also utilized ancient Greek and Latin sources and who have demonstrated the unreliability and shortcomings of certain passages therein.

European historians themselves rightly point out that the information provided by the primary sources was written some one hundred years or even several centuries after the era of Tigranes II and Mith-

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[1] T. Mommsen, *The History of Rome*, IV-V (New York, 1903).

[2] T. Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator roi de Pont* (Paris, 1890).

[3] G. Ferrero, *The Greatness and Decline of Rome* (New York, 1909).

[4] K. Eckhardt, "Die armenische Feldzüge des Lucullus," *Klio*, IX, 4 and X, 1&2 (Leipzig, 1909-1910).

[5] N. Dolens & A. Khatch, *Histoire des anciens Arméniens* (Geneva, 1907).

[6] F. Tournebize, *Histoire politique et religieuse de l'Arménie* (Paris, 1900).

[7] Kévork Aslan, *Études historiques sur le peuple arménien* (Paris, 1909).

[8] J. de Morgan, *The History of the Armenian People* (Boston, 1965).

[9] G. Khalat'iants, *Ocherk istorii Armenii* (Moscow, 1910).

[10] M. Ch'amch'eants', *Patmut'iwn Hayots'*, I (Venice, 1784).

[11] H. Asturean, *K'aghak'akan veraberut'iwnner ĕndmĕj Hayastani ew Hṛovmay, 190-ēn n. K'. minch'ew 428 h. K'.* (Venice, 1912).

ridates. Such sources cannot be accepted as totally reliable, especially since the material presented therein is partial to and favors the Romans. It is well known that Rome routinely and masterfully encouraged a biased historiography which focused on and exaggerated its military successes, while keeping silent about historical facts that were not favorable to the Republic.[1]

The tendentiousness of Roman historians was, as we know, even noted in the first century AD by the celebrated ancient historian, Josephus Flavius. In his preface to *The Jewish War*, he states that even eyewitness Roman accounts had a strong tendency to either alter the facts in Rome's favor, or to praise the Romans, while defaming their enemies.[2]

It must be noted that Armenia and Pontus had their own historians in this period. Plutarch, Strabo and others mention a history of Tigranes II entitled *Misoromaeus* ("He Who Hated the Romans"), written by Metrodorus of Scepsis, whom they considered a brilliant and talented author.[3] There is also some information about important historians such as Heraclidus, Teucros of Cyzicus, Apollonidus, Diophantus[4] and others, all of whom were partisans of Mithridates. Naturally, after the defeat of Armenia and Pontus and the destruction of Hellenistic culture in the region, only works by authors who favored Roman victories were preserved. Had the work of the above-mentioned historians of Pontus and Armenia been saved, the history

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[1] See Cicero, *Pro Lege Manilia, De Imperio Cn. Pompei*, (London, 1927), IX, 25. The Russian translation (p. 6) has the following additional sentence: "Cicero in one of his speeches states the following, Permit me to follow the example of our poets and historians and be silent about our defeats.'" Cicero's exact text reads as follows: *At this point, gentlemen, allow me to use the license customary with poets writing of Roman history and to pass over our disaster*; Cicero, IX, 25.

[2] The passage in Josephus reads as follows: *Of these, however, some, having taken no part in the action, have collected from hearsay casual and contradictory stories which they have then edited in a rhetorical style; while others, who have witnessed the events, have, either from flattery of the Romans or from hatred of the Jews, misrepresented the facts, their writings exhibiting alternatively invective and encomium, but nowhere historical accuracy, The Jewish War* (London, 1956), I, 2-3.

[3] Plutarch, *Lives*, II, *Lucullus* (London, 1948), XXII, 3-4; Strabo, *Geography* VI (London, 1969), Bk. XIII, i, 55.

[4] He wrote a treatise called *Pontica*.

of the Tigranes-Mithridates period would certainly appear in a very different light.

Despite the aforementioned shortcomings of Roman chroniclers, European historians such as Mommsen, Reinach, and others, as my research will demonstrate, have relied heavily upon them. In addition, they have also used the *Lives* of Plutarch, which not only gives an inaccurate description of Tigranes' period, but, as we shall see, portrays Tigranes as a grotesque caricature and ridicules the "feudal" nature of his kingdom. Unfortunately, European historians have ignored the fact that the evidence of Roman historians can frequently be challenged by the more impartial Hellenistic historians of Asia Minor, who describe the period in question in a more accurate and objective manner.

In the present study I shall examine the history of Armenia during the reign of Tigranes II as recorded by all of the above-mentioned historians but I shall scrutinize these primary sources with a more critical eye than has been done previously.

European historians have shown another shortcoming: they have not only relied upon the questionable and unreliable data from Roman historians, but they have also displayed an enmity to the East and its people. Their political outlook is in sympathy with that of Rome and its historians; they openly idealize the slave-owning Roman Republic. For example, the Italian scholar Ferrero, considered one of the greatest bourgeois historians, comments that Lucullus, a plunderer who destroyed large and wealthy [Hellenistic] cities and the Hellenistic culture of Pontus, demonstrated "his respectful admiration for Hellenic culture."[1] Ferrero adds:

> *After ransacking store upon store of oriental treasure, he [Lucullus] yet enjoyed playing the part of the great patron of Hellenism, and playing it in his own characteristic fashion by a capricious extravagance of generosity unparalleled in the military history of Rome.*[2]

Mommsen and Reinach not only ignore the progressive and cultural reforms of Tigranes II in Armenia, but they also ignore the founding of the Hellenistic city of Tigranocerta, which was to serve as a center of Hellenism and its cultural growth in Armenia. Instead, they view Tigranes' efforts as the capricious and arrogant obstinacy

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[1] Ferrero, I, 199.

[2] *Ibid.*, 200.

of a tyrant. In his *History of Rome*, Mommsen's antipathy to the East and its people is evident in the statement that "the subject resembles the dog alike in fidelity and in falsehood."[1] In his opinion, "the Asiatic [has a] servile willingness to perform any executioner's office at the bidding of the sultan."[2] It is significant that Mommsen likens Mithridates and Tigranes, both of whom possessed the progressive spirit of Hellenism, to "sultans."[3]

The idealization of Rome and the degradation of the East are clearly evident in the work of the European historians cited in this study. These tendencies, which are without any historical evidence, would obviously not be used to praise the Tigranes-Mithridates era.[4]

We should also categorically reject the prevalent notion of Western historians who view the Roman-Pontic wars and the Roman-Armenian wars of that period as a revolt of the barbarians of the East against the civilized West. Mommsen declares that these wars were the beginning of the "national reaction of the Asiatics against the Occidentals."[5] Reinach also states that these wars symbolized "the antagonism of Asia to Europe."[6]

In reality, the purpose of these wars, which the generals of the Roman Republic waged in the East, was primarily pillage and financial gain. The wars were not against two Eastern barbarians, but against two cultured monarchs with progressive ideas, who not only were trying to foster Hellenistic culture, but also wanted to expand trade, crafts and manufacturing in their respective countries and throughout the Middle East.

We should consider the following pertinent observation on this subject of the French scholar, Jacques de Morgan:

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[1] Mommsen, IV, 8.

[2] *Ibid.*, 32, 317.

[3] M. Cary also refers to Tigranes as "sultan," see, "Rome and the East," *Cambridge Ancient History*, IX (Cambridge, 1971), 356.

[4] Russian translation (p. 8) reads, "Such a low view of the 'subjects' of the East and the clear idealization of Lucullus and Pompey, as well as toward the slave-owning Roman Republic, are evident in the anti-scientific works of Mommsen, Reinach, and Ferrero on the history of Rome in the East during the period of Tigranes II."

[5] Mommsen, IV, 10.

[6] Reinach, xi.

By crushing Mithridates and Tigranes, the Romans had put an end to Macedonian civilization in Asia, for nothing remained of all the States born of Alexander's conquests but mere ruins, petty kings quite unable of sustaining the Hellenistic name. The two great kings of Pontus and Armenia were the last who could ever have revived in their lands the splendid civilization of Greece.[1]

This indicates that the main responsibility for the cultural decline of the Middle East falls to Rome. The imperialistic Republic not only pillaged and depopulated the Middle Eastern states during its campaigns, but also ruined them through heavy financial and usurious exploitation after their submission. It is well known that riches and treasures of the East were sent to Italy and Rome, while its peasant, worker, and artisan population was taken as slaves. It is not difficult to conclude that the reason for the antagonism and the deep rift between the East and West during the Tigranes-Mithridates period was the enslavement of the East by Rome and the usurious economic policy of the latter.

In conclusion, we must note that whereas the works of Mommsen, Reinach, and Ferrero present the history of Tigranes II in a superficial and condensed manner, and tie it to the history of Rome or Pontus, our study examines it, for the first time, primarily within the framework of the history of Armenia itself, with which these foreign historians were not sufficiently familiar.

In addition, in order to critically evaluate and compare primary sources, our recently published historical-geographical study[2] will be used to indicate precisely the routes of Lucullus' and Pompey's incursions into Armenia and present arguments which would not have been possible before. That is why special maps have been prepared for this work to indicate the exact ancient military routes.[3]

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[1] J. de Morgan, 97-98.

[2] Manandyan refers to his *Hayastani glkhavor chanaparhnerê êst Petingeryan kartezi* (Erevan, 1936); "Krugovoi put' Pompeia v Zakavkaz'e," *Vestnik drevnei istorii* (4, 1939); "Marshruty pontiiskago pokhoda Pompeia i put' otstupleniia Mitirdata v Kolkhidu," *Vestnik drevnei istorii* (3-4, 1940).

[3] Russian translation (p. 10) reads, "We do not consider it superfluous to add that with the aid of our recently published historical-geographical study of the ancient roads of Armenia, where we have examined the various names and stations mentioned in the Roman Map "*Tabula Peutingeriana*," we have, for the first time, discovered the routes taken by the Roman army

2
The Political and Economic Conditions of Western Asia Minor[1] Prior to Tigranes II

The rule of Alexander of Macedon[2] and the Seleucids[3] not only initiated the major economic growth and the swift cultural rise of Western Asia Minor, but also gave rise to its social transformation.

Macedonian domination marked a period of exceptional prosperity in Western Asia Minor, specifically in the area of crafts, commerce, and manufacturing through its numerous Hellenistic colonies and cities. It also marked the birth of Hellenistic urban culture, which opened new avenues for the development of the future Middle East.

During the years 334-330, the Hellenistic West, after conquering and establishing a mighty empire in the Middle East, planned to transform the rich area between the Indian Ocean and northeastern Iran into a series of autonomous Hellenistic colony-cities and unite them to the West. This same policy of Hellenization was pursued, after Alexander of Macedon and his [immediate] successors, by the Seleucids, especially during the first part of their reign.

This policy to Hellenize, as well as to eventually unify with the vast East, turned out, however, to be a difficult enterprise for the generally inadequate and weak forces of the Hellenic [Seleucid] rulers.

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in Armenia and Transcaucasia, and have prepared seven maps of the campaign routes of Lucullus and Pompey."

[1] Manandyan's term *Arajavor Asiayi* refers to the anteriormost part of Asia. The French translation reads *Asie Antérieure* and the Russian *Perednei Azii*. I have chosen the more appropriate term of *Western Asia Minor* in this translation.

[2] Manandyan, like some other classical scholars and especially Soviet historians, does not use the term Alexander the Great, but prefers to call him Alexander of Macedon.

[3] The Seleucid dynasty was founded by Seleucus I Nicator (305-280), a commander of Alexander, who took over the East, or the regions from India to Asia Minor. The Seleucids, for a time, controlled Syria, Cilicia, Iran, and Armenia. The Seleucid defeat at the battle of Magnesia (190) allowed Rome to enter Asia Minor. After that, the Seleucid Empire began to lose its eastern territories to the Parthians and the western regions to Romans. Seleucid rule in Iran ended in 130/129 and the last Seleucid ruler in Syria, Antiochus XIII, was killed in 67. Rome then took over Syria in 64.

The process of the dismemberment of the large Seleucid Empire started even during the reign of their mightiest kings. First, around the year 305, the Seleucids lost their Indian possessions. Then, around the year 255, Bactria and Soghdiana were separated from their empire. In that same period, Cappadocia, Pontus, Armenia and Atropatene gained their autonomy or independence. Finally, during that and the following century, new and powerful adversaries, the Parthian Arsacids and Rome, confronted the Seleucids and eventually took over the entire Seleucid Empire.

Arsaces I, from the nomadic group of Aparni or Parni (Abars),[1] is considered to be the founder of the Parthian kingdom. Around the year 250,[2] he gathered his followers and rebelled against the Seleucids. The [Seleucid] satrap was killed. After the death of Arsaces, his brother and heir, Tiridates or Arsaces II,[3] won a decisive victory against Seleucus II Callinicus (248-210) and firmly established himself in Parthia. Soon thereafter, he seized Hyrcania (Gurgan) and its center, the city of Zatragarda, present-day Astarabad.

The Parthian kingdom, which was formed on the northeastern border of the great Seleucid kingdom, did not, as we know, comprise a large state at first. Its transformation into a great power and the beginning of the end of Seleucid rule, as well as the advancement of Hellenism into the Iranian East, began with the reign of Mithridates I (ca. 171-138). Taking advantage of internal discord among the Seleucids, Mithridates conquered their eastern regions, from the Caucasus up to the Euphrates River and to the borders of Cappadocia.[4] Western Hellenism was thus forced to surrender its political and cultural position to Eastern Iranianism. Only northern Syria and Cilicia remained under the rule of the Seleucids.

In that same second century, when the Parthians were seizing the eastern provinces of the Seleucids one after another, Rome began to

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[1] For more details on the origin of the Parthians, see *The Cambridge History of Iran*, III [1] (Cambridge, 1983), 27-29.

[2] According to more recent chronology, the Arsacid era began in the year 247. Arsaces I revolted in 246 and was in control of all of Parthia by 238. See *ibid.*, 98.

[3] *Ibid.*, Arsaces II (217 or 214-ca.191).

[4] Justin, *M. Juniani Justini Epitoma historiarum Philippicarum Pompeii Trogi*, (Leipzig, 1915), XLI, v, 8.

move against the Seleucids and other small Hellenistic states in the west.

Roman expansion into the lands of the eastern Mediterranean began after the Second Punic War (218-201). The decisive victory of Rome against Antiochus the Great in the battle of Magnesia in 190 enabled it to reaffirm its influence over the small states of Asia Minor. As in Greece, here too, Rome appeared at first as the protector and liberator of the small states and oppressed peoples. In reality, however, it pursued its own political objectives, which were to cause a rift among these friendly states, weaken them, and establish Roman domination.

After becoming the complete master of Greece and Macedon, Rome removed its mask of the disinterested liberator, and in the year 133 penetrated Asia Minor and took over Pergamum. The intense and adroit diplomatic activity of Rome probably contributed to the last will of Attalus III, the king of Pergamum, who bequeathed all his kingdom and treasury to Rome. After that, Pergamum became a Roman province, known as the "province of Asia [*de provincia Asia*]."

The appearance of an imperialistic Rome in Asia, began, as we shall see, the great ruin, destruction and depopulation of the region, and had catastrophic consequences for the economic and cultural development of the Hellenistic East.

While it is true that the East was conquered and exploited by the Hellenic warriors as well, they, as noted above, founded hundreds of cities and colonies and contributed to the progress of the region by encouraging commerce and manufacturing, and by sponsoring artisans. The rule of the Roman Republic in the first century, on the other hand, was a period of economic and cultural regression for the Eastern states, with the Romans seizing immense treasures, taking innumerable slaves, and pillaging and destroying local Hellenistic cities and states.

It must be noted that the destruction and plundering of Asia were accomplished not only by the generals of the Roman Republic and the officials and tax-farmers who arrived in the East after them, but by the so-called "progressive" politicians as well. For example, at the suggestion of the people's tribune, Caius Gracchus, a series of laws was promulgated in the years 123-122, most of which had nothing to do with the East, but which resulted in a heavy exploitation of the province of Asia. Specifically, the "wheat law" (*Lex frumen-*

taria), which allowed the citizens of Rome to buy bread at a cheaper price in that city, also enabled Gracchus to add new and heavy direct and indirect taxes on the province of Asia. Moreover, in order to gain the support of the wealthy cavalry officers against the patricians, Gracchus granted them, by a special decree, the power to farm taxes in Asia. More damaging was the Sempronia Law (*Lex Sempronia judicaria*),[1] enacted in the same year of 123, which gave the said officers judicial powers over criminal matters.

It would be correct to say that the province of Asia declined and bled to death economically under these arbitrary Roman tax farmers and moneylenders, because of such legislative measures.[2] The unbearable conditions of this province, as well as other small Asian states allied to Rome, are candidly noted by Livy, who states:

> *Where there was a contractor, there either the ownership by the state elapsed, or no freedom was left to the allied people.*[3]

Large and small moneylenders, as well as agents of Roman banks, harshly exploited not only the province of Asia, but also the small Roman allies in Asia Minor such as Bythinia, Galatia, and Cappadocia. Sooner or later, even these allies of Rome had to renounce their independence, becoming victims of the voracity of Roman imperialism.

The German historian Mommsen has left the following vivid and accurate account of Roman rule in Asia:

> *[the seizure] of the property of the soil in the province of Asia by Gaius Gracchus, in the Roman tenths and customs, and in the human hunts which the collectors of the revenue added to their other avocations there—the Roman rule, barely tolerable even from the first, pressed so heavily on Asia that neither the crown of the king nor the hut of the peasant there was any longer safe from confiscation, that every stalk of corn seemed to grow for the Roman decumanus, and every child of free parents seemed to be born for the Roman slave-drivers...and in these peaceful lands, [amidst these effeminate nations], strange and terrible things*

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[1] Also known as *Lex Sempronia de provincia Asia.* See *The Cambridge Ancient History*, IX (Cambridge, 1971), 64.

[2] V. Chapot, *La province romaine proconsulaire d'Asie* (Paris, 1904), 41-49.

[3] Livy, *History*, XIII (London, 1961), Bk. XLV, xviii, 4.

might happen, if once there should appear among them a man who knew how to give the signal for revolt.[1]

Indeed, as we shall see below, a great revolt sprang up first in Asia Minor and then in Greece, which gradually became a social revolution. The instigator of these tremendous historic events was Mithridates of Pontus, the implacable adversary of Rome.

The Pontic kingdom (the main participant of these great events) was situated on the southern shore of the Black Sea, between Bythinia, Galatia, Cappadocia, and Armenia Minor [Lesser Armenia][2] [see map 1]. During the Achaemenid period, this country and its population, composed of Semites, Aryans, and native peoples of Asia Minor, came under the strong influence of Iranian traditions and culture. But in the coastal cities of Pontus; that is, in Sinope, Amisus, Trapezuz (Trebizond/Trabzon), and others, Greek colonies had been established even before the appearance of the Achaemenids, and became strongholds for the spreading of Greek language and culture. The Persian nobility (which ruled over the land) formed the main segment of the ruling class, from whence came Mithridates I (302-266), who is considered the founder of the Pontic kingdom.

This young kingdom, which managed to widen its territory even during the reign of the early successors of Mithridates I, reached its height at the beginning of the first century, during the reign of Mithridates [VI] Eupator, called the Great (111-63). In a short time, this powerful ruler conquered Colchis up to Dioscurias and present-day Suram, Kherson of Tauride and the neighboring Scythian lands in present-day southern Russia. He also conquered Armenia Minor, located southeast of Pontus, which up to then had its own government. As a result of these conquests, Pontus became a vast state in Asia Minor and a major adversary of Rome [see map 1].

South of Pontus and Armenia Minor was Cappadocia, which bordered the ancient Armenian Sophene and which touched Cilicia in the south, Lycaonia in the west, and Galatia in the northwest. During the reign of the Seleucids, Ariarathes II (ca. 301-280) founded a separate state in Cappadocia, as had been done in Pontus. Like Mithridates I, he came from Persian nobility. Ariarathes II, according to

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[1] Mommsen, IV, 6.

[2] Armenia Minor will replace Lesser Armenia throughout the text, except in quoted material.

Diodorus Siculus,[1] managed to conquer Cappadocia with the help of the Armenian king, Ardoates (*Ἀρδοατης*), who supplied him with additional forces. The ruling class of Cappadocia, as well as Pontus, came, for the most part, from Persian nobility. Cappadocia, from the time of the Achaemenids, was under the influence of the Iranian State and its culture. However, here too, Hellenism became established in the cities and took hold of the upper strata of society.

In addition to Pontus and Cappadocia, Bythinia and Galatia also took part in the events of the Mithridates-Tigranes period [see map 1].

Bythinia was located in the northwestern corner of Asia Minor by the shore of the Black Sea, the Bosporus and Propontis and stretched out to Paphlagonia in the east, Galatia in the southeast, and to Mysia in the south. The country derived its name from the Bythinians of Thrace, who, together with other tribes, immigrated to Asia Minor from Thrace and the Balkan Peninsula. The immigrants formed their own state of Bythinia, which was semi-autonomous during the reign of the Achaemenids and became independent at the beginning of the third century. Bythinia, as were other western regions of Asia Minor, was strongly influenced by Greek culture.

Galatia was located in the center of Asia Minor. It bordered Bythinia, Pontus, and Cappadocia. Its name was given by the Galatians or Celts, who arrived in the years 277-276 in Asia Minor through Thrace and settled down in Phrygia. These bellicose immigrants, who formed three different races, each with separate and distinct clans, could not form a united state and thus became a toy in the hands of Roman diplomacy.

Galatia, and the kingdoms of Bythinia, and Cappadocia, as shall be seen below, became obedient allies of aggressive Roman policy and together with the Roman armies took part in all the major Ponto-Roman and Armeno-Roman wars.

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[1] Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, XI (London, 1957), Bk. XXXI, xix, 5.

3
The Artaxiad Dynasty and Tigranes II

After the fall of Achaemenid[1] Persia, neither Alexander of Macedon, nor the Seleucids managed to control Armenia firmly or permanently.

Instead of the two Persian satrapies which formed Armenia during the Achaemenid period,[2] there emerged three separate principalities—Armenia Minor, Tsop'k' (Sophene),[3] and Greater Armenia, the rulers of which were either the descendants of previous satraps or local Armenian princes. Although these Armenian principalities were viewed as satrapies of the Seleucid State, their vassal status vis-à-vis the latter was, for the most part, nominal.

The defeat of Antiochus the Great[4] at Magnesia (in the year 190),[5] not only served as a signal for the general independence movements in Asia Minor, but also awakened the entire Armenian Plateau. According to Strabo, following the defeat of Antiochus the Great, two of his commanders, who, with his consent, ruled Greater

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[1] Cyrus the Great (559-529) founded the Achaemenid or the first Persian Empire in ca. 550. The empire fell to Alexander the Great when he defeated King Darius III Codomannus in the year 331 at the battle of Gaugamela.

[2] Armenia is connoted by a single entry (Armina) in the preamble of the Behistun inscription (ca. 520) of Darius I (the Great). It is listed as the tenth land/people (*dahyava*) paying tribute to Persia. Other lists at Persepolis and Naqsh-e Rostam mention one Armenian province as well. It is Herodotus, who first mentions two *nomoi* (provinces): the thirteenth and the eighteenth, Herodotus, *History* (London, 1957) III, 93-94. Xenophon also mentions two Armenias during his retreat in the year 401. The first, composed of the entire basin of the western Tigris and that of Euphrates/Arsanias rivers, was governed by the satrap of Armenia, Orontas/Orontes (Erwand); the second, the region north of the Taurus mountains (western Armenia) was governed by Tiribazuz, *Anabasis* (London, 1961), Bk. III, iv, 13; Bk. IV, iii, 4; iv, 4.

[3] Sophene will replace Tsop'k' throughout the text.

[4] Antiochus III (223-187), who managed to restore Seleucid power in Asia Minor and Syria.

[5] The battle at Magnesia ad Sipylum between the Romans and the Seleucids was probably fought in January of the year 190.

Armenia and Sophene,[1] joined the Romans and declared themselves independent sovereigns.[2]

During the first half of the second century, the Armenian lands remained divided into three separate states, each with its own ruler. Armenia Minor was ruled by a certain Mithridates, an ally of Pharnaces of Pontus (190-169);[3] Artaxias (Artashēs) ruled in Greater Armenia; while Sophene, Acisene, Odomantis, and a number of other districts were ruled by Zariadris (Zareh) [see map 2].

Greater Armenia, judging from the attention paid to it by the Greek historian Polybius, was the largest and strongest of the three kingdoms. Referring to Artaxias, Polybius calls him "the ruler of the greater part of Armenia."[4] Strabo confirms this as well:

> *According to report, Armenia, though a small country in earlier times, was enlarged by Artaxias and Zariadris...and [they] jointly enlarged their kingdoms by cutting off for themselves parts of the surrounding nations,—I mean by cutting off Caspianê and Phaunitis and Basoropeda from the country of the Medes; and the country along the side of Mt. Paryadres and Chorzenê and Goga-*

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[1] In the year 212, Antiochus in order to force Armenia to pay tribute, marched on the capital, Arsamosata. The king of Armenia (Xerxes, son of King Arsames) submitted immediately. Antiochus exacted a large tribute (300 talents and 2,000 horses and mules) and sealed the new alliance with the wedding of his sister to the Armenian king. Following the death of Xerxes (according to one source, he was killed by his wife), Antiochus divided Armenia between two native princes as royal governors.

[2] The original version has no reference to the Armenian generals joining Rome. It reads as follows: *...Artaxias and Zariadris, who formerly were generals of Antiochus the Great, but later, after his defeat, reigned as kings (the former as king of Sophenê, Acisenê* [Acilisene], *Odomantis, and certain other countries, and the latter as king of the county around Artaxata)...* Strabo, V, Bk XI, xiv, 5. The independence of the Armenian provinces must have occurred in the year 188, after the peace of Apamea (in the year 189) between Rome and the Seleucids.

[3] Pharnaces I is credited with the rise of Pontus. He is mentioned as early as the year 183, when, following the downfall of the Seleucids, he tried to enlarge Pontus at the expense of his neighbors, Pergamum and Bythinia. Although his efforts were not very successful, he did manage to take and keep Sinope. The exact year of his death is unknown, but it is generally thought to have occurred around the year 170/169.

[4] Polybius, *The Histories*, V (London, 1954), Bk. XXV, i, 12.

renê, which last is on the far side of the Cyrus [Kur River], *from that of the Iberians; and Carenitis and Xerxenê, which border on Lesser Armenia or else are parts of it, from that of the Chalybians and the Mosynoeci; and Acilisenê and the country round the Antitaurus from that of the Cataonians; and Taronitis from that of the Syrians...*[1]

Such evidence indicates that Artaxias conquered the Caspian lands or P'aytakaran (*Κασπιανή*), Vaspurakan (*βασοροπέδα*) Phaunitis (?), the districts situated on the slopes of Paryadres (that is, Tayk'), Kghark' (Chorzene-*Χορζηνή*),[2] Gugark' (Gogarene-*Γωγαρηνή*), the province of Karin (Carentide-*Καρηνῖτις*), Derjan (Derxene-*Ξερξηνή*),[3] and Tmorik' (*Ταμωνῖτις*).[4] Zariadris conquered the province of Ekeghyats' (Acilisene-*Αχιλισηνή*), and the lands situated around the Anti-Taurus. Strabo adds that, in his day, the inhabitants of these lands spoke the same language;[5] that is, they spoke Armenian. Strabo's statement should be viewed with some reservation, for it is well known that in various regions of Armenia, as late as Sasanian times and even after that, some of the population used languages other than Armenian. Strabo's comment should be interpreted to mean that, in his day, the primary and dominant language was Armenian.

During the second century, in addition to Greater Armenia and Sophene, Armenia Minor also expanded its borders. It had subjugated western Paryadres and the northeastern regions of Pontus and had thus extended its borders to the Black Sea. Strabo writes:

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[1] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv, 5.

[2] Markwart proposes that Chorzene (*Χορζηνή*) should be read as Cholarzene (*Χολαρζηνή*); see *Eranschahr nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Xoren* (Berlin, 1901), 116.

[3] According to Pliny's text (*Natural History*, V, xx, 83), *Ξερξηνή* should read *Δερξηνή*--Derxene, Derzene); see H. Hübschmann, "Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen mit Beiträgen zur historischen Topographie Armeniens," in *Indogermanische Forschungen Anzeiger für indogermanische Sprach-und Altertumskunde*, XIV (Strassburg 1904), 213.

[4] Strabo's Greek text reads *Ταμωνῖτις*, it should read *Ταμωρῖτις*; see Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 170.

[5] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv, 5.

This country is fairly fertile. Lesser Armenia, like Sophene, was always in the possession of potentates, who at times were friendly to the other Armenians and at times minded their own affairs. They held as subjects the Chaldaei and the Tibareni, and therefore their empire extended to Trapezus and Pharnacia.[1]

Thus, instead of a monolithic state, Armenia and northern Cappadocia were divided into three independent kingdoms. Naturally, it is understandable that the dispersion and division among the Armenians served as a barrier for their unity and cooperation.

The necessity to unite the Armenian lands was especially recognized during the time of their political development. We know that Artaxias I, after expanding the borders of Greater Armenia, was preparing to conquer neighboring Sophene. Neither Pontus nor Cappadocia wished to face a strong Greater Armenia. Armenia Minor and Sophene, threatened by the mighty Artaxiads, sought the help of the non-Armenian states. According to Diodorus Siculus, Artaxiad I did not succeed in annexing Sophene due to the intervention of King Ariarathes V of Cappadocia. For when Mehruzhan (Mithrobuzanes), son of Zariadris, learning of Artaxias' move toward Sophene, fled to Cappadocia, Ariarathes was responsible for restoring him as the ruler of Sophene.[2]

Ancient historians have, unfortunately, left only occasional and fragmentary information about Greater Armenia. The information left by Strabo and Plutarch regarding the capital city of Artaxata,

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[1] *Ibid.*, V, Bk. XII, iii, 28.

[2] Diodorus Siculus, XI, Bk. XXXI, xix. 22. It seems that there were two claimants to the throne of Sophene. Mithrobuzanes sought refuge with Ariarathes, while the other sought refuge with Artaxias. Diodorus writes, "After Ariarathes had restored Mithrobuzanes to his ancestral domain, Artaxias, the king of Armenia, abating not a whit his original rapacity, sent envoys to Ariarathes, urging him to make common cause with him, and proposing that they should each put to death the young man who was at his court, and divide Sophenê between them. Ariarathes, to whom such villainy was completely foreign, rebuked the envoys and wrote to Artaxias, urging him to abstain from such actions. When this result was achieved, Ariarathes in consequence enhanced his own reputation in no slight degree, while Mithrobuzanes, thanks to the admirable good faith and nobility of his sponsor, succeeded to the throne of his fathers."

founded by Artaxias I, probably in the year 166, is therefore, especially valuable.[1] Strabo states:

> *The cities of Armenia are Artaxata, also called Artaxiasata, which was founded by Hannibal for Artaxias the king, and Arxata, both on the Araxes River, Arxata being near the borders of Atropatia, whereas Artaxata is near the Araxene plain, being a beautiful settlement and the royal residence of the country. It is situated on a peninsula-like elbow of land and its walls have the river as protection all around them, except at the isthmus, which is enclosed by a trench and a palisade.*[2]

Plutarch also states that Artaxata was built with the help of Hannibal:

> *It is said that Hannibal the Carthaginian, after Antiochus had been conquered by the Romans, left him and went to Artaxias the Armenian, to whom he gave many excellent suggestions and instructions. For instance, observing that a section of the country which had the greatest natural advantages and attractions was lying idle and neglected, he drew up a plan for a city there, and then brought Artaxias to the place and showed him its possibilities, and urged him to undertake the building.*[3]

Most historians consider it doubtful that Artaxata was constructed on the advice of Hannibal, or that Hannibal sought refuge in Armenia. Nevertheless, the above sources are extremely valuable, for they, without a doubt, confirm the fact that the city was founded in the second century, during the reign of Artaxias I. In addition, Strabo's account is of special interest, for it indicates the location of the city and its fortifications.

The founding of Artaxata in the Ararat Valley can be considered one of the most important acts of Artaxias I. From then on, the Ararat Valley became the center of the political and cultural unification of Armenia.

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[1] W. Fabricius, *Theophanes von Mytilene und Quintus Dellius, als Quellen der Geographie des Strabons* (Strassburg, 1888), 32, 131.

[2] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv, 6.

[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXI, 5. Plutarch goes on to say, "The king was delighted and begged Hannibal to superintend the work himself, whereupon a very great and beautiful city arose there, which was named after the king, and proclaimed the capital of Armenia."

The selection for the location of the city was favorable both from the military and economic point of view. Set in the center of the Armenian Plateau, the Ararat Valley was protected from enemy attacks, as opposed to the outlying regions of the Armenian Plateau. Furthermore, the great trade route from Central Asia and China to the ports of the Black Sea passed through this plain and Artaxata.

The founder of the Artaxiad dynasty also established Greater Armenia, which even in his lifetime became a sizable state stretching to almost the limits of its natural borders, from northern Mesopotamia to the Cyrus River and from Atropatene to Sophene and Armenia Minor. Becoming one of the most powerful states of Western Asia Minor, Greater Armenia, from the second century, had a special role in international relations. Polybius, who has left an account of the war fought by Pharnaces of Pontus and King Mithridates of Armenia Minor against the kings of Pergamum, Cappadocia, and Bythinia, in the year 180, describes the peace treaty concluded among them and states:

> *Artaxias, the ruler of the greater part of Armenia, [and Acusilocus] was included in the treaty.*[1]

The rise of a united and independent Armenia under the Artaxiads was viewed as a threat by the Seleucids, the former suzerains of the Armenian lands. Around the year 165 Antiochus IV (175-164),[2] according to Diodorus Siculus and Appian, marched into Armenia.[3] Artaxias I suffered a defeat in that campaign, but managed to restore his position soon afterwards.

Diodorus Siculus also records that, after the Seleucid satrap Timarcus revolted and proclaimed himself king of Media (in the year 161), he made an alliance with Artaxias I, and with his help widened the borders of his own domain up to Seleucia and Zeugma.[4]

These few passing references obviously do not provide a clear and detailed picture of the major changes which took place in Armenia during the reign of Artaxias I. However, they indicate that the independent and powerful Artaxiad state had begun a new era in the history of ancient Armenia.

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[1] Polybius, V, Bk. XXV, i, 12-13.

[2] He is also known as Antiochus Epiphanes (the Illustrious).

[3] C. Müller ed., *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, II (Paris, 1841-1851), x; Appian, II, Bk. XI (*Syrian Wars*), 45.

[4] Müller, *Frag. Hist. Graec.*, II, xii.

It is interesting and important to note that the major historical events of that period have found their reflection in ancient epic songs and folk legends, which were used by Moses of Khoren. Moses of Khoren states that he learned that Artaxata was founded by Artaxias, "from songs which were sung in Goght'n."[1] As I have already stated in one of my previous works,[2] Khoren's history mentions certain events and battles which occurred in Armenia during the time of Orontes-Erwand and Artaxias I, and which were also known to him via legends or through ancient tales. Greek inscriptions, found in Armavir, may also serve as a source of information on this period, but unfortunately they have not been studied as yet.[3]

We have almost no information on Greater Armenia or the kings who ruled between the reign of Artaxias I [189-ca. 160] and Tigranes II (95-55). From a valuable record by Justin, it is known only that the great Parthian kingdom gradually conquered the Seleucid territories adjoining Armenia and began a war against the Armenian king Artavasdes. This Artavasdes [ca. 160-115] is the same one who is mentioned in the Armenian history by Moses of Khoren as the son and successor of Artaxias I.[4] In the aforementioned book, Justin states:

> *Artabanus*[5] *was followed by his son, Mithridates,*[6] *called the Great because of his exploits...With great courage he conducted numerous campaigns against his neighbors and united many people to the Parthian state. He also led a number of successful campaigns against the Scythians and avenged the previous affronts to his family. Finally, he also fought with the King of the Armenians, Artavasdes.*[7]

From not only this source, but from texts of other historians it is known that the Parthians succeeded in fully annexing Mesopotamia and Atropatene during the reign of Mithridates II, the Great (123-

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[1] Moses Khorenats'i, *History of the Armenians* (London, 1978), Bk. II, chap. 49.

[2] H. Manandian, *The Trade and Cities of Armenia in Relation to Ancient World Trade* (Lisbon, 1965), 85.

[3] Several years later Manandyan studied these inscriptions, see his *Armaviri hunaren ardzanagrut'yunnerê nor lusabanut'yamb* (Erevan, 1946).

[4] Khorenats'i, Bk I, chap. 30; Bk. II, chap. 50-53, 55, 61-62.

[5] King Artabanus I of Parthia (ca. 127-123).

[6] King Mithridates II of Parthia (ca. 123-90).

[7] Justin, XLII, ii, 3-6.

88). It can be stated for certain that the campaign of Mithridates the Great against Artavasdes occurred after the conquest of the lands neighboring Armenia, and that the Parthian army invaded through Atropatene and, according to Markwart, with the participation of the king of Atropatene, who was an ally and a vassal of the Parthians.[1]

Although during this Armeno-Parthian war the Parthians did not succeed in conquering Armenia, they defeated the Armenians, and, according to Justin and Strabo, took Tigranes II as a hostage.[2]

The fact that Armenia was not conquered during the invasion of Mithridates the Great is clearly stated by Strabo:

> *Now the Parthians rule over the Medes and the Babylonians, but they have never once ruled over the Armenians; indeed the Armenians have been attacked many times, but they could not be overcome by force, since Tigranes opposed all attacks mightily, as I have stated in my description of Armenia.*[3]

Appian and Strabo have important information about Tigranes, who was a hostage in Parthia. According to Appian, Tigranes II was not the son of Artavasdes, but of Tigranes [I].[4] Strabo, writing about Artaxias I and Zariadris, states that Tigranes II was descended from Artaxias I.[5]

Recent historical works have a different opinion about the descendants of Artaxias I and the parentage of Artavasdes and Tigranes II. According to Reinach, Appian is correct when he states that Tigranes II was the son of Tigranes I [ca. 115-95], while Artavasdes was the latter's brother.[6] Historians and critics should note that Appian's view of Tigranes II's lineage is similar to that of Moses of Khoren and is confirmed in his history. Khoren, as noted above, has recorded the names of the kings of Artaxias' lineage which were known to him through legends or ancient tales. Relying on these,

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[1] J. Markwart (Marquart), *Eransahr (Eranschahr) nach der Geographie des ps. Moses Xorenac`i: mit historisch-kritischen Kommentar und historische und topographischen Excursen* (Berlin, 1901), 109.

[2] Justin, XXXVIII, iii, 1; Strabo, V. Bk. XI, xiv, 15.

[3] Strabo, VII, Bk. XVI, i, 19.

[4] Appian, II, Bk. XI (*Syrian Wars*), 48.

[5] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv, 15.

[6] Reinach, 104; Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 173.

Khoren states that the son and heir of Artaxias, Artavasdes, had no children, and after Artavasdes, his brother, Tiran, ruled in Armenia.[1]

This valuable evidence recorded from the father of Armenian history, is, as we see, the same as that of Appian. Based on this, I think we can ascertain that Artaxias' son, Artavasdes, succeeded him; after that his brother Tigranes I, and following him, the latter's son Tigranes II.

As noted above, we have more detailed information about Greater Armenia only with the start of the reign of Tigranes II.

Tigranes, the former hostage of the Parthians, ascended the throne in the year 95. The date of the start of his reign is known to us through Plutarch. According to him, in the year 70, when Appius Claudius came as an ambassador [of Rome] to Tigranes, the former had already been on the throne for 25 years.[2]

In order to buy his freedom and gain his father's throne, Tigranes, according to Strabo, handed the Parthians seventy valleys,[3] which according to Markwart was the territory conquered by Artaxias I in Atropatene.[4]

Freed from captivity, Tigranes returned home and, according to Appian, placed the royal crown on his head in the same place in Armenia where he later founded the city of Tigranocerta. From Appian's comment, it is clear that the ancient province of Aghdznik' (Arzanene), which is, at present, the location of Farkin,[5] is considered the site of the ancient city of Tigranocerta, which is not in Sophene, but within the borders of the Artaxiad kingdom, in Greater Armenia.[6]

The first act of Tigranes, after ascending the throne, was the annexation of neighboring Sophene. The king of Sophene, Artanes, in

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[1] Khorenats'i, Bk. II, chap. 61.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXI, 1.

[3] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv, 15.

[4] Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 109.

[5] Also called Mayafarkin or Mayafarikin; it is the present-day Silvan.

[6] J. Markwart, *Südarmenien und die Tigrisquellen nach griechischen und arabischen Geographen* (Vienna, 1930), 119. The premise that the city of Amida (Diarbekir) is the site of Tigranocerta (Tigranakert) is false. See E. H. K'asuni, *Amid (Diarbek'ir) Tigranakert (Farghin) shpot'ê hay patmagrut'ean mech* (Beirut, 1968).

the year 94, could not count on assistance from his ally and friend, the king of Cappadocia, for Cappadocia was, at that time, maintaining its nominal independence with the help of Rome. According to Strabo:

> *Tigranes was a descendant of Artaxias, who ruled Armenia, which bordered Media, Albania, and Iberia, up to Colchis and Cappadocia by the Black Sea. Artanes of Sophene was a descendant of Zariadris, who ruled the southern and, more importantly, the western parts of Armenia. He was defeated by Tigranes, who became the ruler of all the territory.*[1]

Thus eastern and western Armenia became united under the rule of Tigranes. They were separate and autonomous regions during the Achaemenids and Seleucids. The third Armenian kingdom, Armenia Minor, which was within the borders of the Armenian highlands, was, at the end of the second century, prior to Tigranes' conquest of Sophene, conquered and annexed to the Pontic kingdom by Mithridates Eupator.

With the annexation of Sophene, the mighty and vast state of Tigranes bordered Cappadocia and Pontus on the west. The neighbors of Greater Armenia to the south and east were the small states of Osrhoëne (Edessa), Gordyene, Adiabene and Atropatene, all under the suzerainty of Parthia. To the north it [Armenia] bordered [Caucasian] Albania and Iberia.

After the year 94, a long struggle commenced between Rome and Pontus in the East; a war in which, as we shall see, the mighty state of Tigranes also took part.

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[1] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv, 15.

4
The Armeno-Pontic Alliance and Tigranes' Forays into Cappadocia

At the start of the first century, Pontus, as mentioned before, became a large and powerful state and greatly expanded its borders during the reign of Mithridates [Eupator], called the Great

Pontus, or ancient Pontic Cappadocia, was, at the time of the Achaemenids, part of Cappadocia proper or Greater Cappadocia. It was connected to the latter not only by culture and religion, but also by certain ethnic ties. In addition, neighboring Cappadocia had a great strategic value for Pontus, for its vast northeastern frontiers bordered Armenia Minor and almost reached the confines of Pontus itself. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why Mithridates the Great tried in every possible way, to annex this territory, which had the same ethnic and religious background as Pontus, to his kingdom.

In the year 99, Mithridates succeeded in effectively taking over Cappadocia, where he installed his eight-year-old son as King Ariarathes IX. But, soon after, in the year 95, he was forced to accept the decision of the Roman Senate. Pontic troops left Cappadocia and Ariobarzanes I, known as Philoromanus, was proclaimed king of Cappadocia.

During the reign of this same "Friend of the Romans," in the year 94, Tigranes conquered Sophene, which, as stated, was contiguous with Cappadocia and which for a long time had friendly ties and agreements with the Ariarathic kings. It is not surprising that Tigranes viewed Cappadocia, the former buffer and protector of the Zariadric kingdom of Sophene, as a dangerous neighbor for Greater Armenia. For the same reason, it is also understandable that the presence of Ariobarzanes I, the obedient and loyal vassal of Roman policy, was a major obstacle to the realization of the political objectives of Pontus, objectives which Mithridates Eupator could not renounce.

At the start of the first century, Tigranes and Mithridates had to consider Cappadocia as a common enemy and, naturally, they had to unite their forces against this neighboring kingdom.

In my work, *The Trade and Cities of Armenia in Relation to Ancient World Trade,* I agreed with Reinach's theory, which states that the amicable policy of Pontus, especially that of Mithridates Eupator vis-à-vis Armenia, Atropatene and Iberia, is explained by the great

trade interests of Pontus.[1] The friendship of these states was very important for Pontus, for the large ports of Pontus served as the focal point for the great world trade and international transit routes that stretched from the Far East and Central Asia, passing through Ecbatana and Artaxata, and went mainly to the Pontic cities of Amisus and Sinope.

The friendly relations between Pontus and Greater Armenia became even closer during the reign of Tigranes. In the vital interests of both their counties, Tigranes and Mithridates Eupator concluded a treaty in the year 95 (or 94), not in order to prepare for an Armeno-Pontic war against Rome, as stated tendentiously and with contradiction by Justin, but mainly in order for Tigranes to give military aid to Mithridates against neighboring Cappadocia. By this treaty—strengthened by Tigranes' marriage to Mithridates' daughter, Cleopatra—both sides agreed that the captured cities and provinces would go to Mithridates, while the prisoners and movable property to Tigranes [see map 2].

It is imperative that I include the complete extract from Justin on this treaty:

At the time, the king of Armenia was Tigranes, who for a long time was a hostage in Parthia and had only recently returned to his ancestral kingdom. Mithridates strongly desired to have him as an ally who opposed the Romans, against whom he had planned a war for a long time. Although the Romans had never caused Tigranes harm, Mithridates, nevertheless, managed to persuade him through Gordius, to attack Ariobarzanes, who was very weak. In order to deflect any suspicion of his cunning, he married his daughter Cleopatra to Tigranes.[2] *At the first appearance of Tigranes, Ariobarzanes gathered his belongings and fled to Rome. Thus, through Tigranes' help, Mithridates' rule was established over Cappadocia. At that same time Nicomedes (the king of Bythinia) died and Mithridates dethroned his son, also named Nicomedes, and pushed him out of that kingdom. When the latter appeared in Rome and asked for help, the Senate decided that both kings should be reinstated on their thrones. In order to accomplish this, two legates Manius Aquilius and Manilus Maltinus were dispatched as envoys. When Mithridates*

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[1] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 52; Reinach, 78, 234.

[2] On the marriage, see Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXII, 1; Appian, II, (*Mithridatic Wars*), 104.

learned of this, he concluded an agreement with Tigranes, in order to start a war with the Romans. They agreed that the cities and lands would belong to Mithridates, while the population and everything that could be moved would go to Tigranes.[1]

Justin's words have served as a debatable conclusion in European historiography, which Reinach very accurately views as so convoluted as to arouse suspicion.[2]

In reality, the events of the years 93-89, which were recorded by Justin summarily and in a confusing manner, happened in the following fashion according to other texts.

In the year 93, immediately after the annexation of Sophene, Tigranes, at Mithridates' instigation, attacked Cappadocia, as described in Justin's account, and seized the entire country. Ariobarzanes fled to Rome and Mithridates' young son, Ariarathes, whose guardian was Gordius, was placed on the throne. Handing the conquered Cappadocia to Mithridates' son, Tigranes returned to Armenia. I think that this fact in itself demonstrates that the agreement cited above by Justin, according to which the conquered cities and lands were to belong to Mithridates, was obviously concluded before the year 93.

Soon afterwards, according to Plutarch, the praetor of Cilicia, Sulla, was sent to Cappadocia by the order of the Roman Senate. He defeated the troops of Tigranes and Gordius and restored the throne of Cappadocia to the Roman ally, Ariobarzanes I. In the year 92, while Sulla lingered on the banks of the Euphrates River, he was visited by Orobazus, an ambassador of the Parthian king, Mithridates II.[3] The latter, according to chroniclers, discussed [the possibility] of friendship and alliance with Sulla and proposed to establish the frontier between their states along the route of the Euphrates River.[4] These accounts clearly demonstrate that Eckhardt is mistaken when he states that Tigranes' wars against Parthia, as well as the Armenian

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[1] Justin, XXXVIII, iii, 1-5.

[2] Reinach, 115, note 3.

[3] Plutarch, *Lives*, IV, *Sulla* (London, 1950), V, 4. Mithridates II ruled from ca. 124/123 to ca. 90. Plutarch erroneously calls the Persian king Arsaces.

[4] Plutarch, *ibid.*; Florus, *Epitome of Roman History*, Bk. I (London, 1966), xl, 12-13; Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 57.

annexation of Mesopotamia and the minor vassal kingdoms of Parthia occurred prior to the year 92.[1]

Immediately after the departure of Sulla, probably in the year 91, Mithraas and Bagoas, who appear to have been commanders of Tigranes, invaded Cappadocia anew. Ariobarzanes again fled to Rome and his throne was once more occupied by Ariarathes, the son of Mithridates.[2]

In the same year of 91, following the death of Nicomedes II [of Bythinia], a struggle occurred over succession. Rome appointed the eldest son of Nicomedes II, Nicomedes III, as the new king. Meanwhile, the younger son of Nicomedes II, Socrates, asked the assistance of Mithridates and, with the help of the Pontic army, seized all of Bythinia without the consent of Rome.

The two kings, Ariobarzanes I and Nicomedes III, both driven out of their kingdoms, once more asked Rome for help, according to Justin and Appian. This time, the Roman Senate dispatched Manius Aquilius to the East, who, in the year 89, without any war or any resistance, restored the fugitive kings to their respective thrones.[3]

These facts prove without a doubt that Justin's comments on the events of the years 93-89 not only are very condensed, but parts of it also doubtful and arguable.

Hence, Justin mentions only the first invasion of Cappadocia by Tigranes and is silent on the second attack by Tigranes' generals, Mithraas and Bagoas. His account gives the inaccurate impression that Nicomedes III, as well as Ariobarzanes I, fled to Rome in the year 93. Finally, ignoring the accounts of the cooperation between the two kings in the above campaigns, Justin asserts that the alliance between Tigranes and Mithridates was not in effect during the campaigns of 93 and 91, but came into being in 88, during the Roman-Pontic wars, in which, as will be seen below, Tigranes did not participate at all.

European historians, relying on Justin's doubtful account, have, in my opinion, described Tigranes' participation in the events of the years 93-84 in a questionable fashion. First of all, in my opinion, the widely held notion that Tigranes was a docile and mute instrument in the hands of Mithridates Eupator for the latter to enhance his politi-

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[1] Eckhardt, *Klio*, IX, 4, 403.

[2] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 10.

[3] Justin, XXXVIII, iii, 4; Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 10-11.

cal designs, is false.[1] I have already stated above that Tigranes' participation in the conquest of Cappadocia in the year 93 derives from the fact that, after the annexation of Sophene to Greater Armenia, Cappadocia became a dangerous neighbor on its western border. It is also not difficult to ascertain that the second invasion [of Cappadocia], in the year 91, was very important as well, for, as Plutarch states, the king of Cappadocia, Ariobarzanes I, also took part in the friendly discussions of Sulla with the Parthians.[2] An agreement of friendship between Rome, Parthia, and Cappadocia was not obviously something desired by Tigranes. It is also understandable that, by handing Cappadocia to Ariarathes and Gordius, Tigranes assured the security of his western flank and also strengthened his political position in the upcoming war against the Parthians.

One has to also consider as totally erroneous Mommsen's, Morgan's, and others' opinion that the treaty between Tigranes and Mithridates Eupator concerned, in addition to Cappadocia, the great wars of the years 88-84 between Rome and Pontus, which Tigranes and Mithridates had supposedly prepared for a long time.[3] Following this line of argument, they blame Tigranes for breaking the treaty he had made with Mithridates.[4] As we shall see below, at the end of the year 90, neither Mithridates nor Tigranes could have had any plans to fight Rome. It is also very improbable that Tigranes would have started a senseless and risky war against mighty Rome during the Armeno-Parthian conflict.

I think that we can consider it more than probable that the Roman source, using Justin, placed the conclusion of the agreement between Mithridates and Tigranes to coincide with the time following the arrival of Manius Aquilius in the East and the Roman-Pontic wars of the years 88-84. Thus, he squarely puts the blame for the conflict on Mithridates and Tigranes. Actually, as we will see below, the provocation for this major war came from Manius Aquilius and not Mithridates. Tigranes, who did not take part in this conflict at all, is unjustly accused of breaking his agreement [with Pontus]. According

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[1] Reinach, 105; Eckhardt, *Klio*, IX, 4, 403-404, Dolens & Khatch, *passim*.

[2] Plutarch, *Sulla*, V, 4.

[3] Mommsen, IV, 18, 27; J. de Morgan, 88-89; V. Briusov, *Letopis' itoricheskikh sudeb armianskogo naroda* (Moscow, 1918), 24, *passim*.

[4] For example, see Reinach, 311.

to the above agreement, he had assumed obligations only in regard to Cappadocia and not in any conflict between Rome and Pontus.

As shall be seen, Justin's errors and his tendentious comments regarding this treaty will be shown by the historical facts.

5
The First Mithridatic War (88-84)

It is my hope to examine in my next work Mithridates' war against Rome, which in my opinion, was a major social revolution in the East and in Greece. For now I would like to discuss the fact that some European historians, Spiegel and Mommsen among them, wrongly include the Greater Armenia of Tigranes in this war.[1]

There is a prevailing opinion that Mithridates Eupator seriously prepared for the war of 88-84 and armed himself against the Romans in order to drive them out of Asia. It is for that reason, it is believed, that he concluded an alliance with Tigranes.

Such a thesis, in my opinion, requires new examination. The available data fully support the fact that Mithridates did everything possible to avoid this terrible war. He spent huge sums of money in Rome bribing senators in order to obtain a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The cause of the constant strife with Rome was not only the question of Cappadocia, but also that of Bythinia. Pontus was keen to seek the friendship and neutrality of Bythinia, for the Straits of the Bosporus was located near Bythinia's northeastern borders. For Mithridates the wealthy and splendid Hellenistic cities, major centers of transit for world trade, as well as the question of the Straits through the Black Sea, were of capital importance.

That Mithridates did not desire war with Rome in the year 88 is indicated by Rome's own historians. Through them, we learn that despite the great political and economic importance the Cappadocian and Bythinian questions had for Pontus, Mithridates tried to avert war and did not oppose the restoration of Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes to their respective thrones.

Blame for the war of 88-84 should not be placed on Mithridates, but rather on the Roman ambassador, Manius Aquilius. It was he who convinced Nicomedes to attack and pillage the northeastern provinces of Pontus as far as Amastris. It was also he who forced Nicomedes to repay his Roman financiers for the expenses incurred for his return to the throne from the loot taken from the people of Pontus.

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[1] F. Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumskunde*, III (Leipzig, 1878), 92; Mommsen, IV, 18, 27.

Even after this felonious attack of Nicomedes, Mithridates chose not to retaliate and avoided war. He continued to negotiate for peace with Rome and asked only that he be allowed to defend his land against Nicomedes. It was only after the Roman ambassadors refused even this request, that he came to the conclusion that more talks would be fruitless and that the only road to self-defense was war. He said:

> *Is it not a fact that when a bandit appears everyone runs for weapons; if not to save life, at least to avenge it?*[1]

Mithridates' efforts at peace, as Mommsen correctly observed, did not constitute a cunning diplomatic maneuver, but were the manifestation of a sincere desire to avoid a war which he did not want and which he considered difficult and dangerous. Mommsen states:

> *Although neither the Roman Senate nor king Mithridates nor king Nicomedes had desired the rupture, Aquilius desired it and war ensued.*[2]

Although Mommsen acknowledges the fact that Mithridates did not want a war with Rome, he, nevertheless, thinks that even before the start of the war, Mithridates concluded a new and more solid alliance with Tigranes and received a supporting army from him.[3]

Mommsen's theory on the subject of the new treaty is based on the aforementioned and inaccurate comments by Justin. The improbability of such a treaty, as well as Mommsen's notion that Mithridates received an army from Tigranes even before the war, has been rejected by Reinach in one of his articles.[4]

In addition to Mithridates' army, which consisted of 250,000 infantry and 40,000 cavalry, Appian also mentions the participation of the 10,000 cavalrymen of Armenia Minor.[5] This cavalry, as noted by historians, was led by Ariarathes, the son of Mithridates, and probably by the Armenian general, Nemanes or Naymanes. They participated in two large and victorious battles by the Amnias River and Protopachion. This group was thus not an army provided by Ti-

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[1] Justin, XXXVIII, v, 2.

[2] Mommsen, IV, 27.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] T. Reinach, "Noms méconnus," *Revue des études grecques*, II (8, 1889), 384. Mommsen, IV, 27.

[5] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 17.

granes, but cavalry from Armenia Minor, which at that time was evidently part of the Cappadocian kingdom of Ariarathes.[1]

After the first victories of Mithridates at the Amnias River at Protopachion, the war in Asia Minor gradually took on the character first of a national and later, a social revolution. The triumphal entrance of the Pontic army into Western Asia Minor created great enthusiasm, principally among the Hellenophiles, and especially democratically minded individuals. The latter had particular enmity against the harsh rule of the Romans, who had abolished the independence of the Hellenes and, while protecting the nobles and plutocrats, used them to help oppress the masses. The harshness of their oppression is attested to by Roman historians. For example, Cicero notes that the word "Roman" alone brought a reaction of hatred in Asia,[2] as the taxes, tithes, and custom duties had severe consequences on the population there.

Before the war Mithridates had secretly traveled around Asia Minor and was familiar with its internal conditions. From the very start of the war he became the protector of the exploited masses of Asia Minor. He not only freed those soldiers of Asia Minor [who had fought against him] but also sent them home, providing them with money for their travel expenses.

In the year 88, Mithridates conquered almost all of Asia Minor within a relatively short period. The population received him with open arms as a liberator and a new "Dionysus." Like Alexander of Macedon, he was considered the founder of a new Helleno-Asiatic empire.

The merciless forty-year exploitation by the Romans had created an implacable hatred toward that empire, and especially toward its tax farmers and moneylenders. We can thus consider very plausible the assertion of the English historian, Merivale, that the massacre of

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[1] Reinach, 122, note 1.

[2] The passage is as follows: "Words cannot express, gentlemen, how bitterly we are hated among foreign nations owing to the wanton and outrageous conduct of the men whom of late years we have sent to govern them. For in these countries what temple do you suppose has been held sacred by our officers, what state inviolable, what home sufficiently guarded by its closed doors? Why, they look out for rich and flourishing cities that they may find an occasion of war against them to satisfy their lust for plunder." Cicero, *Pro Imperio Pompei*, XXII, 65.

80,000 Italians in Asia Minor has to be viewed primarily through this feeling of indigenous hatred and anger toward Rome, rather than the secret instructions of Mithridates.[1]

Already, in the year 88 the flame of rebellion spread over all Asia Minor and the liberated territories like a force of nature. Great social revolutions were ignited, which then spread into Greece.

In the summer of the same year 88, the Athenians rose in rebellion. Their envoy in Asia Minor declared that they should throw off the Roman yoke, along with their debts, and reinstate their former democracy and freedom.

At the end of the year 88, the Pontic army, under the command of Mithridates' son, Ariarathes, who was at the time the king of Cappadocia, and apparently [the ruler] of Armenia Minor, entered Europe and occupied Thrace and part of Macedonia, together with the aforementioned Armenian cavalry. Soon after the uprising of the Athenians, almost all the small states of Hellas, including all the islands of the Aegean Sea (except Rhodes), in addition to Thrace and part of Macedonia, came over to the side of Mithridates.

It should be noted that European historians have written about these great historic events and presented the main actors of the Mithridatic period in a very tendentious manner. Ironically, it is the Romans, the mortal enemies of Mithridates, who present him in a more objective and impartial manner than modern Western historians. Cicero compares Mithridates Eupator to Alexander of Macedon and considers him the greatest king after Alexander.[2] Justin attests that Mithridates, in his grandeur, surpassed all the kings of his era, as well as the subsequent period.[3] On the other hand, Mommsen calls Mithridates "an Oriental of the ordinary stamp, coarse, full of the most sensual appetites, superstitious, cruel, perfidious, and unscrupulous."[4] Reinach considers him a barbarian who wore only the mask of Hellenism and hated Mediterranean civilization.[5]

These and similar observations on the personality of Mithridates given by modern European historians are unfair and have no founda-

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[1] C. Merivale, *General History of Rome* (New York, 1875). For a different view, see Velleius Paterculus, *Compendium of Roman History*, II, xviii.

[2] Cicero, *Academica*, II (London, 1994), I, 3.

[3] Justin, XXXVII, i, 7.

[4] Mommsen, IV, 9-10.

[5] Reinach, 299.

tion. It is not difficult, however, to guess their reasons for such antipathy toward him. It is explained in part by the fact that Mithridates tried to end Roman imperialism not only by force of arms, but also through social and class revolution and this, to most historians, is an unforgivable sin against civilization.

From the very beginning of his reign, Mithridates wished to alleviate the grave economic conditions in Asia Minor. That is why he cancelled all the arrears in the territories he conquered and exempted them from any taxes for the next five years. Mommsen considers even this humanitarian gesture of Mithridates as foolish.[1] The social and economic measures of Mithridates in the years 87 and 86 had, in fact, great significance, in that his actions were against the local plutocrats, who were allied with Rome in exploiting Asia Minor and who were supporters of imperialistic Roman rule.

As a defender and protector of the people of Asia Minor, Mithridates gave freedom to the cities that were subdued by him. He gave the right of citizenship to both the native and foreign population. He ordered all debts annulled and land distributed to the poor. All slaves were manumitted.

As noted by historians, some 15,000 freed slaves joined the ranks of the Pontic army that was sent to Greece to fight the Romans. It is important to note, however, that the inhabitants of the island of Chios, who were allies of Rome, were sent to Colchis as slaves.

As a result of the uprising, the war with Rome now continued parallel to the civil war and class struggle. Soon, at the rear of the Pontic army, the ruling classes of Asia Minor and Greece, that is, the nobles and plutocrats rose against Mithridates.

At the start of the year 87, when the army of Sulla came from Rome to Boeotia, a large part of Greece, together with its strong antidemocratic elements allied with Rome. Sulla's victories and the success of the Roman armies in Asia Minor were due not to their professional and trained forces or to the betrayal of the Pontic general, Archelaus,[2] but to the interior counter-revolutionary rebellions against Mithridates. The great hatred of the landowners toward Mithridates can be ascertained through contemporary accounts and by the

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[1] Mommsen, IV, 33.

[2] Reinach, 197, contends that the withdrawal of his garrisons by Archelaus, as well as the surrender of the warships under his command, was part of a secret agreement between Sulla and the Pontic general.

fact that 1,600 individuals were executed in Asia Minor for participating in plots to assassinate Mithridates.[1]

The first war with Mithridates ended in 84 and, according to the verbal agreement concluded in Dardanus, Mithridates renounced all his conquests and was obliged to pay Sulla an indemnity of 2,000 [silver] talents and give him seventy to eighty warships.[2]

The historians who claim that Tigranes participated in this war find it strange and incomprehensible that Greater Armenia is not mentioned in the accord of Dardanus. Mommsen [explanation] reads:

> *The relations of the Romans with Tigranes, king of Armenia, with whom they had de facto waged war, remained wholly untouched by this peace. Tigranes had with right regarded this as a tacit permission to bring the Roman possessions in Asia under his power. If these were not to be abandoned, it was necessary to come to terms amicably or by force with the new great-king of Asia.*[3]

This observation of Mommsen is clearly based on a misinterpretation and therefore cannot be accepted. Tigranes, as was stated above, did not participate in that war in any way, nor did he assume any responsibility to do so. Clearly, therefore, the Romans had no basis to include him in the Dardanus agreement.

The reestablishment of Roman rule in Asia Minor had terrible consequences for its inhabitants. The revolution was squashed in an extremely harsh way. A number of cities were totally depopulated and pillaged. Countless slaves were driven to Italy and Rome. As "punishment" for its disloyalty, Asia Minor had to pay an indemnity of 2,000 talents. In addition, it had to repay in full the lapsed taxes of the past five years (88-84). The Roman troops lived in comfort for almost six months in the cities of Asia Minor. The population was obliged to house them, feed them well, and pay each soldier forty-fold his usual pay.

In this manner, starting in the year 84, Asia Minor became a place of exploitation and pillage. It was forced to sell off all its riches and

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 48.

[2] *Ibid.*, 55; Plutarch has seventy ships; see, *Sulla*, XXII, 5; Memnon has eighty ships; see *Historiarum Heracleae Ponti* (Leipzig, 1816), Chapter 35. See also Velleius Paterculus, II, xxiii.

[3] Mommsen, IV, 305-306.

even its most qualified workers as slaves. Nevertheless, it could not pay its colossal debts and did not manage to pay even the interest.

We have found it necessary to write this brief narrative on the First Mithridatic War, because its vague memories are preserved in Moses of Khoren's *History* and *Geography*. The account is important and I have included it in its entirety herein:

1. From the *History*, Bk. II, chapter 12:

   But Artashēs [Artaxias] having subdued the land between the two seas, filled the ocean with the multitude of his ships, wishing to subject the whole west. Because great tumults were occurring in Rome, no one offered him strong resistance. But I cannot say from what cause arose a fearful turmoil, and the innumerable troops slaughtered each other. However, Artsashēs fled and was killed, as they say, by his own army. He had reigned for twenty-five years. He also took from Hellas images of Zeus, Artemis, Athena, Hephaistos, and Aphrodite, and had them brought to Armenia. But before they arrived in our land the sad news of Artashēs' death was heard. [Those bringing them] fled and brought the images to the fortress of Ani. The priests followed and stayed with them.[1]

2. From the *History*, Bk. II, chapter 13:

   Before arriving in Asia, he (Artashēs) was announced in the fortress of Attica.[2]

3. From the *Geography*:

   The large island of Ewbiu (Euboea) and near the small island of called Atalant, which they say were occupied by the troops of the Armenian King Artashēs, so that the ships would not suffer difficulties from lack of provisions, while besieging the fort of Zarmanali ("marvelous"), for the tide here had a constant ebb and flow, and as they say Artashēs perished here.[3]

As Markwart correctly observed, in these accounts of Moses of Khoren, the Zarmanali fort was in the city of Athens,[4] which at that time was besieged by Sulla. The large island of Euboea was indeed taken by the forces of Mithridates. It is also true that, in the year 88, during the [Pontic] conquest of Thrace, Macedonia, and Hellas,

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[1] Khorenats'i, 148-149.

[2] *Ibid.*, 150.

[3] Movsēs Khorenats'i, *Ashkharhats'uyts'* (Venice, 1881), 17.

[4] Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 4.

Rome could not "vigorously resist" the Pontic army because of internal violent upheavals.

Not being familiar with Greek and Roman sources on the Mithridatic wars, Moses of Khoren naturally could not describe the historic events of that period exactly and assumed that the account took place at the time of King Croesus and Artaxias the Conqueror.

In the first paragraph above, Moses of Khoren describes the taking of the statues of Zeus, Artemis, Athena, Hephaistos, and Aphrodite from Hellas to Armenia. Regarding these statues, the French scholar, Carrière is of the following opinion:

> *The introduction of Greek idols into Armenia was not based on facts, but is the product of the imagination of Moses of Khoren.*[1]

This assertion of Carrière, in my opinion, is strongly debatable. From the accounts of Agathangelos and Moses of Khoren, it is known that the statues of Zeus, Artemis, Athena, and Hephaistos were found in the city of Ani-Kamakh, Erez, T'il, and Bagaṛij, which in the time of the Mithridatic war were not yet annexed to Armenia and were part of the Pontic realm of Mithridates.[2]

It is therefore very possible that these statues were brought from Greece during the First Mithridatic War, and the account found its way in the above historical writings of Moses of Khoren.

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[1] A. Carrière, *Les huit sanctuaries de l'Arménie payenne, d'après Agathange et Moïse de Khoren* (Paris, 1899), 27.

[2] J. Markwart, "Die Genealogie der Bagratiden und das Zeitalter des Mar Abas und Ps. Moses Xoren" *Caucasica*, 6-2 (Leipzig, 1930), 63.

6
The Conquests of Tigranes II

At the end of the 90s, Tigranes, as we have seen, concluded a treaty of friendship with Mithridates Eupator and thereby secured his rear flank.

After concluding this alliance, and after the end of his Cappadocian campaigns of the years 94-91, Tigranes, taking advantage of the internal struggles in Parthia that followed the death of King Mithridates II [of Parthia] (in the year 90 or 88), began his successful wars against his enemies and rivals, the Parthian Arsacids. The precise dates of these wars and the chronological order of Tigranes' campaigns are often confused and inaccurate in the historical accounts.

Tigranes first took back the seventy valleys which he had ceded to the Parthians in order to free himself from being held hostage at the Arsacid court. These valleys, according to Markwart, were the regions conquered by Artaxias I in northwestern Atropatene.[1] From the valuable account of Strabo, we learn that, in addition to the seventy valleys, Tigranes also conquered the province of Greater Aghbak, which is situated around present-day Bash-Kale.[2] This province was later taken back from the Armenians by Atropatene in the year 33.[3] Strabo's text actually reads *Συμβάχη*; Markwart suggests that it should be corrected to read *Ἀλβάχη* (Aghbak). Strabo writes:

> *They [the Medians of Atropatene] have powerful neighbors in the Armenians and Parthians, by whom they are often plundered. But still they hold out against them and get back what has been taken away from them, as, for example, they got back Aghbak from the Armenians when the latter became subject to the Romans; and they themselves have attained to friendship with Caesar.*[4]

The occupation of Aghbak probably took place during Tigranes' expedition against the province of Adiabene and his devastation of the regions around Ninus and Arbela.[5] It is especially interesting to note Strabo's account that Armenians had established themselves

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[1] Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 109.
[2] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiii, 2.
[3] Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 109.
[4] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiii, 2.
[5] *Ibid.*, xiv, 15.

even in this faraway land, where they formed a large part of the inhabitants. Strabo writes:

> *Now as for Adiabenê, most of it consists of plains; and though it too is a part of Babylonia, still it has a ruler of its own; and in some places it borders also on Armenia. For the Medes and the Armenians, and third the Babylonians, the three greatest of the tribes in that part of the world, were so constituted from the beginning, and continued to be, that at times opportune for each other would attack one another and in turn become reconciled.*[1]

Defeating and subjugating Adiabene and Media-Atropatene, Tigranes continued his march southeast, where he reached the capital, Ecbatana, the summer residence of the Parthian Arsacids. Here he set fire to their fort Adrapana, which was ten kilometers from Ecbatana.[2]

As a result of the defeat of the Parthians, the neighboring states of Armenia, that is, Adiabene, Gordyene, and Media-Atropatene, which up to that time were vassals of the Parthian Arsacids, were forced to accept Tigranes' suzerainty, pay him taxes, and supply him with troops in time of war. Dio Cassius attests that [yet another] Mithridates, the king of Atropatene, was married to Tigranes' daughter.[3]

The Parthians, defeated in war, were not only had to accept the status quo, but were also forced to cede to Tigranes all of Mesopotamia, together with its regions of Mygdonia and Osrhoëne. At the same time, according to Justin, they concluded a special treaty of alliance and renounced their title of "King of kings," ceding it to the king of Armenia.[4]

Conquering Mesopotamia, which lay on the southern borders of Armenia, Tigranes transferred to the region of Osrhoëne nomadic Arab tribes from southern Mesopotamia. According to Plutarch and Pliny, he entrusted them with the guarding of the transit trade routes.[5] They had to collect custom duties for Tigranes' treasury, principally at the crossings of the Euphrates, west of Zeugma. In the neighbor of Osrhoëne, Mygdonia, whose city of Nisibis was of great

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[1] Strabo, VII, Bk. XVI, i, 19.

[2] "Isidori Characeni Stathmoi Parthicoi," § 6; in C. Müller, *Geographi Graeci Minores*, I (Paris, 1855), 250.

[3] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, xiv, 2.

[4] Justin, XL, iii.

[5] Plutarch, *Lucculus*, XXI, 5; Pliny, VI, xxxii, 142.

strategic importance, Tigranes established a special principality which he gave to his brother, Gouras.

The Armeno-Parthian wars and Tigranes' conquests, as we can ascertain from the sources, took place primarily during the period of the First Mithridatic War, that is, approximately during the years 89-85. Asturean is incorrect when he states that the defeat of the Parthian lands occurred after the annexation of Syria and after the year 84.[1] Gutschmid is absolutely correct when he states that the occupation of Syria, which did not border Armenia, could have only been possible after the defeat of the Parthians and only after the conquest of Mesopotamia.[2]

After the Armeno-Parthian wars, approximately in the years 84-83, Tigranes was able to take all of northern Syria, except for the city of Seleucia, located near Antioch. The following account of Justin on the occupation of Syria is of interest:

When, as a result of extreme hatred between two brothers, and the enmity of their parents which continued between their sons, the kings of Syria were affected by the stubborn wars and the Kingdom of Syria itself was weakened, the people began to seek outside help and looked for foreign kings. A part of the population wanted to invite Mithridates of Pontus; others, Ptolemy of Egypt; others said, "Mithridates is engaged with a war against Rome and Ptolemy has always been an enemy of Syria." However, they came to the decision to bring the King of Armenia, Tigranes, who had his own forces, was an ally of the Parthians, and the son-in-law of Mithridates.[3]

The account of Strabo regarding the question of Syria and Phoenicia is especially valuable. Contrary to Justin, Strabo states that Tigranes took over Syria not in a peaceful manner but by force of arms:

> *The changes of fortune experienced by Tigranes were varied, for at first he was a hostage among the Parthians; and then through them he obtained the privilege of returning home, they receiving as reward therefore seventy valleys in Armenia; but when he had grown in power, he not only took these places back but also devastated their country, both about Ninus and that about Arbelas;*

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[1] Asturean, 39.

[2] A. von Gutschmid, "Untersuchungen über die Geschichte des Königreichs Osroëne," *Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de Saint-Pétersbourg* (St. Petersburg, 1887), 20, note 4.

[3] Justin, XL, i, 1-3.

and he subjugated to himself the rulers of Atropatene and Gordyaea [Gordyene], and along with these the rest of Mesopotamia, and also crossed the Euphrates and by main strength took Syria itself and Phoenicia.[1]

This account of Strabo is seemingly contrary to that of Justin, who states that Tigranes took Syria at the spontaneous invitation of the population. Asturean has a plausible explanation. In his opinion, both of these statements can be correct, since in order to accept the invitation of one faction, Tigranes had to forcibly subjugate the other.[2]

The city of Antioch and its merchants, who were interested in the international transit routes, were on the side of Tigranes. The annexation of Syria to Armenia had major economic benefits for them, given that after the submission of Mesopotamia, the principal trade route of the [ancient] world, which passed through Zeugma, was in Tigranes' hands.

After the occupation of northern Syria, Tigranes also took the eastern part [of Syria], that is the Cilician Plain (*Cilicia Pedias*), which constituted the northeastern part of the Seleucid kingdom and a small part of the kingdom of Commagene, which lay east of the Cilician Plain.

In this way, Tigranes, through the western borders of his conquered territories, became a neighbor of the Romans, who had, in the year 102, conquered Mountainous Cilicia (*Cilicia Tracheia*).

Antioch, the capital of the Seleucids, with its half a million inhabitants, became the main royal residence of Tigranes in the south. Impressive coins bearing his name and image were struck in this city in large numbers, which have survived to this day in museums. Seleucid Syria was transformed into a prefecture where, according to Appian, Tigranes appointed as governor one of his generals, Magadates (Bagarat).[3] According to Armenian tradition preserved by Mar Abas [Catina], Markwart asserts that this same Bagarat is the ancestor of the Armenian *nakharar* (feudal nobles) Bagratid family.[4] Already, in the year 83, after the conclusion of the treaty between Sulla and Mithridates, the Syrian chroniclers, according to Momm-

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[1] Strabo V, Bk. XI, xiv, 15.

[2] Asturean, 34, note 3.

[3] Appian, II (*Syrian War)*, 48. Text reads *Μαγαδάτησ*=* *Βαγαδάτησ.*

[4] Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 174.

sen, consider Tigranes to be the master of all their lands, and regard Cilicia and Syria as an Armenian satrapy under the rule of Bagarat [the lieutenant of the great-king].[1]

Reinach's observation on the Armenian rule over Syria is interesting:

> *Syria sighed freely; for although it accepted the humiliation of being ruled by foreigners, it enjoyed fourteen years*[2] *of peace and prosperity.*[3]

From occasional and fragmentary accounts of sources, one can ascertain that Tigranes, after the conquest of Syria in the years 84-83, continued to fight for a long time in the eastern parts of Asia Minor and Phoenicia, mostly against impregnable fortified cities. In Phoenicia and southern Syria, the Seleucid queen, Cleopatra, also called Selene, organized a resistance against Tigranes. It is possible that these parts of Syria and the coastal cities of Phoenicia were conquered by Tigranes only gradually, after prolonged battles.

After the death of Sulla (in the year 78) and up to the Third Mithridatic War (in the years 74-71), Tigranes, once again, marched against Cappadocia, it seems, at the instigation of his father-in-law, Mithridates. Tigranes, according to Appian, drew a cordon around Cappadocia this time, and invaded it not only from the direction of Sophene, but also from Commagene and Cilicia.[4] During this invasion Tigranes managed to occupy the capital of Cappadocia, Mazaca, and many other Hellenistic cities, from where he transported some 300,000 souls to his new city of Tigranocerta.[5]

Therefore, one can consider as improbable Mommsen's assertion that even before this expedition, the city of Melitene and its environs were annexed by Tigranes to Sophene,[6] an idea which was accepted

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[1] Mommsen, IV, 317.

[2] The 14 years are from 83-69. See Appian, II (*Syrian Wars*), 48. Tigranes' reign in Syria, according to Justin, was 17 years, Justin XL i, 4. Niese (Nize) thinks that Justin's number is a transcription error (17 instead of 13), B. Nize, *Ocherk rimskoi istorii i istochnikovedeniia* (St. Petersburg, 1910), 288. According to Reinach, Justin's number is calculated to the year 66, that is, Tigranes' final defeat, 312, note 6.

[3] Reinach, 312.

[4] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 67.

[5] *Ibid.*, 67; Strabo, V, Bk. XII, ii, 9.

[6] Mommsen, IV, 315-316.

by Khalat'iants[1] and others. For, according to the accounts of Sallust and Tacitus,[2] it is known that in the year 69, during Lucullus' campaign, the city of Melitene and its province, which lay west of the Euphrates, were not within the boundaries of Tigranes' kingdom, but within the kingdom of Cappadocia.

In addition to the inhabitants from the Cappadocian cities, people from the Plains of Cilicia and part of the coastal city of Soli were also sent to Tigranocerta and Armenia.[3]

Tigranes' campaigns in Phoenicia, and especially his occupation of Ptolemais, are mentioned by Josephus Flavius. The conquest of Ptolemais took place not in the year 74, as indicated by Mommsen,[4] but in the year 70, prior to Lucullus' campaign in Armenia.[5] Josephus Flavius account is reproduced here in its entirety:

> *About this time news came that Tigranes, king of Armenia, with an army of three hundred thousand men had invaded Syria and was coming against Judea. This naturally frightened the queen and her people. And so they sent many valuable gifts and envoys to him as he was besieging Ptolomais. For Queen Selenê, who was also called Cleopatra, was then ruling over Syria and she induced the inhabitants to shut their gates against Tigranes. The envoys therefore met with him and asked him to grant favorable terms to the queen and her people. Thereupon he commended them for coming so great a distance to do homage to him, and gave them reason to hope for the best. But hardly had Ptolemais been captured when news came to Tigranes that Lucullus, who was pursuing Mithridates, had failed to catch him, as he had fled to the Iberians, and had therefore ravaged Armenia and was besieging the capital. And when Tigranes learned of this, he withdrew to his own country.*[6]

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[1] Khalat'iants, 160.

[2] Sallust, *The Histories*, II (Oxford, 1994), iv 60; Tacitus, *Annales*, XV, 27.

[3] Plutarch, *Lives*, V, *Pompey* (London, 1955), XXVIII, 4; Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, xxxvii, 6.

[4] Mommsen, IV, 316.

[5] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXI, 2

[6] Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*, XIII, xvi, 4; also his *The Jewish War*, I, v, 3.

According to Strabo, during one of his battles in Syria and Phoenicia, Tigranes captured Queen Selene. He imprisoned her in the fortress of Seleucia, built across from Zeugma, and, in the year 69, before Lucullus' invasion, he ordered her execution.[1]

In the first twenty-five years of his reign (in the years 95-70), Tigranes, as we have seen, expanded his kingdom, which by the end of the 70s stretched from the Black Sea and the Cyrus River to the Mediterranean Sea and the borders of Egypt, and from the Great Media up to Roman Mountainous Cilicia and Cappadocia. Palestine, as recorded by Josephus Flavius, though it did not experience Tigranes' invasion, also accepted his suzerainty to a certain measure. The account of Appian in this matter is important, for according to him all of Syria up to the borders of Egypt recognized Tigranes' authority.[2]

After occupying Cilicia and Commagene, Tigranes had already entered Asia Minor and became, as noted above, the neighbor of Roman Mountainous Cilicia. The ally of Rome, Cappadocia, found itself surrounded by Pontus, Sophene, Commagene, and Lower Cilicia. Its unfavorable strategic situation made it basically indefensible.

The conquests of Tigranes along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and especially his damaging attack on Cappadocia, an ally of Rome, naturally discredited the prestige of the Roman Republic in the lands of the East. Despite this, Rome kept its neutrality and did not defend even its ally, Cappadocia.

The neutrality of Rome is understandable and explained by the conditions of the time. Tigranes' conquests happened both during the Mithridatic wars and during the bloody dictatorship of Sulla, when Rome was torn and weakened by internal dissention. Tigranes had, of course, no intention of fighting the Romans, especially since they did not interfere in his affairs and did nothing to block the way of the expansion of Armenia.

It was under these favorable conditions that, during a period of twenty-five years (95-70), Armenia was gradually transformed into a strong and powerful state.

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[1] Strabo, VII, Bk. XVI, ii, 3.

[2] Appian, II (*Syrian Wars*), 48-49.

7
The Expansion of Hellenism in Armenia and the Founding of the City of Tigranocerta

Tigranes' vast empire, which was a mixture of diverse races, languages, and cultures, could by no means be considered a homogeneous and stable state. United under Tigranes' rule were not only tribal, patriarchal, and feudal states, but also Hellenistic cities with their own particular structure.

The neighboring states, which had recognized the suzerainty of the "King of kings," Tigranes, had to pay him tribute, and, in time of war, send military aid in the form of troops. However, each of the royal vassal states and each of the autonomous Armenian principalities kept its own former institutions and state organizations.

The principal administrative role in this vast Armenian state of Tigranes was performed by the Armenian nobles, who possessed large estates, and who played an important function in state affairs and the military victories mentioned above. Indeed, as noted, his brother Gouras was appointed as the prefect of the strategically located city of Nisibis and the Armenian prince Bagarat was made the governor of Antioch.

The strengthening of the military and landowning nobility, and especially the rapid political and economic development of Armenia, can be probably explained by the dizzying success of Tigranes and his military expansionism. Khalat'iants correctly states:

> *The key to the success of Tigranes the Great must be sought in the enormous reservoir of economic strength built up in Armenia over the centuries, during the peaceful rule of the Persians (519-336), under the Seleucids (312-190), and later.*[1]

In my work, *The Trade and Cities of Armenia*, I have noted in detail that Armenia's poor demographic and economic situation following Pompey's victory in the year 66 was a result of it becoming a buffer state between two large rival empires, one in the West and the other in the East. In contrast, during the peaceful time of the Achaemenids, as well as during the era of the Seleucids and Tigranes' predecessors, the political conditions were very propitious,

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[1] Khalat'iants, 161.

both for the growth of population and for the rapid development of the economy.[1]

One can, with absolute certainty, state that the population of Armenia during the reigns of Artaxias I and Tigranes II was much larger than that of later centuries. In fact, according to Strabo, the Armenians not only populated the entire Armenian highlands, but also formed a large part of the population of Adiabene and northern Mesopotamia.[2]

This population increase, as well as the political and economic development during the previous centuries, became even more significant as a result of Tigranes' military expansion.

In one of my previous studies, I also proposed another explanation: already during the reign of Artaxias I, Armenia was probably experiencing the early stages of feudalism and it already possessed the rudimentary seeds of a proper feudal regime.[3] Pliny (AD 23-79) states that in his time:

> *Armenia was divided into 120 prefectures, which he calls strategias, that is, military commands.*[4]

Most of these districts, in all probability, existed during the time of Tigranes and were, as noted by Adonts, *nakharar* estates, in which the predominant political and economic role was in the hands of the landed nobility;[5] and not as much through the labor of slaves, but, in my opinion, through that of semi-free and free peasants.

In addition to Pliny's account, the following account of Plutarch on the four kings who served Tigranes merits our attention:

> *Many were the kings who waited upon him, and four, whom he always had about him like attendants or body-guards, would run on foot by their master's side when he rode out, clad in short*

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[1] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 53-54.

[2] Strabo, VII, Bk. XVI, i, 19, 26.

[3] H. Manandyan, *Fiodalizmê hin Hayastanum* (Erevan, 1934), 248-251.

[4] Pliny, VI, x. 2. The exact text reads as follows: "It is a well-known fact that it [Armenia] is divided into 120 administrative districts [L. *praefecturas*] with native names, called in Greek military commands [*quas strategias vocant*], some of which were formerly actual separate kingdoms."

[5] N. Adontz, *Armenia in the Period of Justinian* (Lisbon, 1970), 332-333.

blouses, and when he sat transacting business, would stand by with their arms crossed.[1]

Markwart interprets Plutarch's exaggerated caricature of a feudal ceremonial behavior differently. In his opinion, the four kings were probably the four *bdeshkh*[2] of Armenia, who originated probably during the reign of Tigranes II.[3] Adonts also considers it probable that the four *bdeshkh* of Armenia, who are mentioned in detail by Agathangelos, P'awstos,[4] and Moses of Khoren,[5] are former kings of ancient small autonomous states, who during Tigranes' reign had accepted the political supremacy of the Armenian kings.[6]

Unfortunately the incidental and superficial accounts of ancient historians do not permit us to study all the aspects of Armenian life prior to the Arsacid period. It is known only that the major initiatives of Tigranes consisted of the founding of the city of Tigranocerta and especially in the diffusion of Hellenism and urban Hellenistic culture. Tigranes understood that the Hellenistic city, the center of trade, manufacturing, and crafts, was well suited to the economic and cultural progress of Armenian patriarchal society.

It has to be noted that Hellenophilism, was, in that period, generally accepted by all states which bordered on Armenia. Already in the second century, Ariarathes V, the king of Cappadocia (163-130), who had traveled for a long time in Italy and Greece, invited Greek artists and writers to his homeland. He transformed the main cities of his realm, Mazaca and Tiana, into autonomous Hellenistic cities. According to Strabo, Mazaca even adopted the laws of Charondas.[7]

Hellenistic culture and the institutions of the Hellenistic cities in particular were widely spread throughout Pontus as well, especially during the reign of Mithridates Eupator, whom European historians compare to Peter the Great.

The coastal cities of Pontus, Amastris, Sinope, Amisus, and Trebizond, and other smaller Greek colonies, were, from ancient times,

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXI, 5.

[2] The Armenian term translates as titular princes.

[3] Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 171-173.

[4] It refers to *The Epic Histories* attributed to P'awstos Buzand.

[5] Manandyan, *Fiodalizme*, 34-35.

[6] Adontz, 222-223.

[7] Strabo, V, Bk. XII, ii, 9. These laws, written in verse, were formulated by Chorandas in Sicily sometime around the 5th century.

the main centers of the dissemination of the Greek language. These cities developed considerably during the reign of Mithridates Eupator and were transformed into wealthy central ports for major international trade. Just prior to their conquest by the Romans, these cities, according to Reinach, not only attained a very high level of prosperity and culture, but also were responsible for the economic development of Pontus and Greater Cappadocia, and for spreading the stimulating influence of Hellenism.[1]

Through Mithridates' generous aid and concern, magnificent structures were built in all the cities of Pontus, entire quarters where Hellenistic art and science were under the special and fervent attention of the monarch. Mithridates gradually and consistently transformed his state and disseminated Hellenistic culture throughout the land. During his reign, not only the ancient capital city of Amasia, but other settlements as well were transformed into Hellenistic cities. The Pontic cities of Comana, Cabiria, Gaziura, Pimolisa, and Talaura minted their own copper coins with Greek inscriptions and Greek mythological images.

Mithridates, like Alexander the Great, intended to reconcile and combine western Hellenic culture with that of eastern Iranian culture, which still maintained a strong influence over Pontus. With this goal in mind, he gradually rebuilt a new economic and cultural life in his state.

In order to create a cultural union between Iranianism and Hellenism, it was necessary, before anything else, to equate the local Pontic divinities with those of the Greeks; for example, Ma and Ormozd with Artemis and Zeus, respectively. One of the best examples of this attempt at union during the reign of Mithridates was the appointing of the Greek Dorylaüs as the chief priest of the temple at the sacred Pontic sanctuary in the city of Comana.[2]

The life of the great geographer, Strabo (ca. 64 B.C.-19 AD), illustrates that parallel to the cultural and religious assimilation, there was a mixing of the diverse racial groups with the Greeks. Strabo was born in the Pontic city of Amasia and, among his Greek ancestors, he also mentions Moaphernes the Persian and Tibios the Paphlagonian.[3]

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[1] Reinach, 246.

[2] Strabo, V, Bk. XII, iii, 33.

[3] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, ii, 18; Bk. XII, iii, 33.

The realm of Mithridates Eupator thus realized the great work started by Alexander of Macedon, whose goal, according to Diodorus was to create "a common unity and friendly kinship" between Asia and Europe.[1]

Tigranes practiced the same policy of spreading Hellenistic urban culture in order to reform and raise the economic prosperity of Greater Armenia. As I have noted in my study *The Trade and Cities of Armenia*,[2] this movement had already commenced before Tigranes, primarily in Sophene, which was the immediate neighbor of the Seleucid kingdom. The great progress of Sophene was due to the immense economic and cultural development which took place in Syria and Mesopotamia. It was indeed in Sophene that the first Hellenistic cities of ancient Armenia, Arsamosata and Carcathiocerta, were founded.

The influence of Hellenism from Sophene and Media[3] naturally penetrated the northern provinces of Greater Armenia. Greek inscriptions from the Seleucid period found in Armavir are clear evidence of that influence. Here, on the Plain of Ararat, as we have seen, Artaxias founded the city of Artaxata. However, the wider and decisive expansion of Hellenism and Hellenistic culture in Greater Armenia took place in the period of Tigranes II.

It was obviously more difficult to realize these changes in Armenia than it was in Pontus, which already had many Hellenistic cities. In order to develop cities and expand urban culture it was necessary to transport entire cities from neighboring states; this had to be accomplished by force. That is why Tigranes was obliged to resettle foreign merchants, artisans, and skilled workers in Armenia. They were to establish the foundations of Hellenism and urban culture, and were to serve as a base for the economic and cultural development of the country.

With this goal in mind, as we have seen, he forcibly settled into Armenia the population of the Hellenistic cities of Cappadocia,

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[1] Diodorus Siculus, XVIII, iv.4. The actual text reads: *to establish cities and to transplant populations between Asia and Europe and in the opposite direction from Europe to Asia, in order to bring the largest continents to common unity and to friendly kinship by means of intermarriages and family ties.*

[2] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 33-36.

[3] Russian translation reads "Mesopotamia."

Cilicia, and probably Syria, Gordyene, and Adiabene, which were conquered by him during the aforementioned campaigns.[1]

In addition to the above sources, there is also an interesting account by Strabo:

> *Exalted to this height, he also founded a city...and having gathered peoples thither from twelve Greek cities which he had laid waste, he named it Tigranocerta.*[2]

Strabo also adds:

> *But Tigranes, the Armenian, put the people [of Mazaca] in bad plight when he overran Cappadocia, for he forced them, one and all, to migrate into Mesopotamia; and it was mostly with these that he settled Tigranocerta. But later, after the capture of Tigranocerta [by the Romans], those who could, returned home.*[3]

Regarding these immigrants, who settled not only in Tigranocerta, but also in Artaxata and other centers of Armenia, we also have the accounts of P'awstos and Moses of Khoren,[4] which have been examined in detail in my *Feudalism in Ancient Armenia*.[5]

Tigranocerta, founded by Tigranes, was to be the political and cultural center of his vast empire. Neither Artaxata, the capital of Armenia, nor Antioch, the royal residence of the Seleucids, could do the job, since both were on the fringes of his empire. If he chose Antioch as the permanent seat of his government, he risked losing his ties with Greater Armenia, which was his main base of power and the principal reason for his military success.

Greek and Roman sources describing Lucullus' campaign in Armenia, and the siege and taking of Tigranocerta, have left a great deal of information about this city.

The city of Tigranocerta, according to Appian,[6] was surrounded by a wall, which was more than fifty cubits high. It was so wide that stables for horses and storage facilities were built within its walls. A strong and impregnable citadel was also located in the city. Outside the ramparts, Tigranes had built himself a magnificent palace, around

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXVI, 2

[2] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv.15.

[3] *Ibid.*, V, Bk. XII, ii, 9.

[4] P'awstos, IV, chap. 24, 55; Khorenats'i, II, chap. 16, 19, 49, 65; III, chap. 35.

[5] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 216-219.

[6] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 84.

which were set gardens, parks for hunting, and ponds for fish. He also constructed a solid fortress nearby.

Not only were the inhabitants of these Hellenistic cities forcibly brought to Tigranocerta, but the nobles and grandees of Armenia, under the threat of confiscation of their goods, settled there as well. According to Plutarch, both the nobles and common city folk tried to comply with the king's directive and assisted him in the construction and development of the city.[1]

Mommsen, as well as many Armenologists who use his *History of Rome*, compare ancient Tigranocerta to Nineveh and Babylon.[2] Lehmann-Haupt also thinks that Tigranocerta, in its plan and model, resembled Assyrian cities.[3] However, this assertion, as I stated in my study *The Trade and Cities of Armenia*, is erroneous.[4] Babylon and Nineveh, neither in their plan nor model resembled, or can even be considered the same as the cities built by Hellenistic states. According to the description of sources, Babylon and Nineveh were located along wide cultivated plains, with separate quarters for plowing fields, meadows, vineyards and fruit orchards. The main occupation of their citizens was not trade and handicrafts, but agriculture. Nineveh, according to the Prophet Jonah, "was an exceedingly large city, a three days' walk across."[5] According to Herodotus, the circumference of Babylon was 480 furlongs (85 kilometers).[6]

It is clear that Tigranocerta, which was surrounded and besieged in the year 69 by a relatively small force of Lucullus, cannot be compared or identified with the above cities. Both by its plan and its commercial and manufacturing character, it resembles only cities of the Hellenistic type.

Scholars have greatly differed in their opinion as to the exact location of Tigranocerta. This is explained by the fact that the disagreement is already to be found in ancient sources. The oldest

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXVI, 3. The text reads: every private person and prince vied with the king [Tigranes] in contributing to its [Tigranocerta's] increase and adornment.

[2] Mommsen, IV, 317.

[3] Lehmann-Haupt, *Armenien einst und jetzt*, 396-399.

[4] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 58.

[5] Jonah 3.2.

[6] Herodotus, *History* (London, 1990), I, 178.

among them, Strabo, locates Tigranocerta in Mygdonia;[1] Ptolemy, in Gordyene;[2] Eutropius and P'awstos, in Arzanene.[3] Tacitus' opinion is of particular importance. He states that Tigranocerta was definitely at a distance of 37 Roman miles (55 kilometers) from Nisibis.[4]

Using Strabo and Tacitus, Mommsen,[5] and other scholars, place Tigranocerta south of Mt. Massius and the Tigris River and north of Nisibis. Kiepert felt that Tacitus' text was altered, and that *septem et triginta* (37) should read *centrum et tringinta* (130). He placed the location of Tigranocerta among the ruins of the ancient city of Arzen (near present-day Sghert),[6] which is located not south, but north of the Tigris River.[7]

In addition to these primary sources, Pliny's work and ancient geographical maps are also valuable sources in determining the location of Tigranocerta. In examining these, one finds, first of all, that the Nicephorium River, which, according to Tacitus, flowed by Tigranocerta, is mentioned together with the Parthenias River, as a tributary of the Tigris, flowing to its left.[8] Thus, according to Pliny, Eutropius, and P'awstos, Tigranocerta is located left of the Tigris River in ancient Aghdznik' (Arzanene). The same is confirmed by the ancient maps of Ptolemy and the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, which place Tigranocerta north of the Tigris River.

Using these and other historical data, the German scholars Lehmann-Haupt and Belck, after examining all the above locations, concluded that ancient Tigranocerta was situated north of the Tigris River in the present-day city of Farkin.[9] It is interesting to note that, even before this, the German field-marshal, von Moltke, had come to the same conclusion, from a purely strategic point of view.[10]

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[1] Strabo, VII, Bk. XVI, I, 23.

[2] Ptolemy, *Breviarum*, V, xiii, 22.

[3] Eutropius, VI, ix, 1; P'awstos, IV, 24.

[4] Tacitus, XV, 5.

[5] Mommsen, "Die Lage von Tigranocerta," *Hermes*, IX (1875).

[6] It is now called Siirt.

[7] H. Kiepert, "Über die Lage der armenischen Haupstadt Tigranocerta," *Monatsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1873.

[8] Pliny, VI, xxxi, 3.

[9] Lehmann-Haupt, 381-429, 501-523.

[10] H. von Moltke, "Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten," *Türkei 1835-1839* (Berlin), 287.

That ancient Tigranocerta had to be in present-day Farkin is now confirmed by recent topographical observations of the stations of Zanserio and Cymiza on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, which were located north of Tigranocerta. The Cymiza station on the Roman map, as is indicated in my study *The Principal Routes of Ancient Armenia*,[1] is identified with present-day Kildiz (*CYΛΔIZA=CYMIZA*). It is situated on the road between Tigranocerta and Artaxata, at a distance of 50 Roman miles or about 75 kilometers from Tigranocerta-Farkin, as indicated on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*.

The choice of the location of Tigranocerta has to be viewed as successful and expedient, not only from a political, but also from a strategic and economic point of view. In fact, present-day Farkin lies in the center of Tigranes' Empire; situated on the southern slopes of the Taurus mountain chain, it was sufficiently defensible. The location of Tigranocerta was even more positive from the commercial point of view, for it lay near the vast royal highway of the Persian Achaemenids and had close links with major trade centers.

The newly founded city was destined to become the center of not only international trade, crafts, and manufacturing, but also Hellenistic science, arts, and literature. According to Plutarch, the famed orator Amphicrates, who was banned from Athens, was invited to Armenia.[2] He scornfully declined the invitation of the Seleucids and lived at the court of Tigranes. Metrodorus of Scepsis,[3] the famed philosopher and writer, whom Pliny called *Misoromaeus*,[4] was a major political figure, first in Pontus and then in Armenia. As is known, he wrote a detailed history of Tigranes II, no trace of which unfortunately has survived. According to Plutarch, a theater was constructed in Tigranocerta, where Greek actors were invited from all over.[5] In another part of his work, Plutarch states that Artavasdes, Tigranes' son, composed tragedies, orations, and histories in Greek, some of which survived into his time.[6]

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[1] H. Manandyan, *Hayastani glkhavor*, 90-92.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXII, 5.

[3] *Ibid.*, XXII, 3-6; Strabo, VI, Bk. XIII, i, 55; see also, "Apollonius of Rhodes," in *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, IV, 133.

[4] Pliny, XXXIV, xvi, 2.

[5] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIX, 4.

[6] *Ibid.*, *Crassus*, XXXIII, 1.

It is important to note that, in Armenia and Pontus, as well as in other Hellenistic states, religious assimilation occurred. Armenian pagan divinities were identified with Greek gods: Aramazd with Zeus, Mihr with Hephaistos, Anahit with Artemis, Nanē with Athena, Astghik with Aphrodite, Tir with Apollo, and Vahagn with Hercules. This religious influence was so strong that, during the reign of Tigranes, as we have indicated, statues of Greek gods were carried away from Greece and Asia Minor and placed in Armenian pagan shrines.

Based on the evidence of Tigranes' reforms, one can conclude that, not only in Cappadocia and Pontus, but also in neighboring Armenia, a movement against Iranian cultural domination was taking place and the foundations of Hellenism were replacing the old way of life.

These same facts make it difficult to accept Mommsen's assertion that the Armeno-Roman and Ponto-Roman wars must be seen as a reactionary movement against the West. It is even more difficult to accept his notion that Mithridates led the Asian reaction against Hellenism.[1]

Tigranes' era was an exceptional period for the political power and the cultural and economic development of ancient Armenia. This can be understood by the fact that the historical events of that period have found their way into oral traditions and folk tales. Stories and songs of that era have been preserved for many centuries.

Some popular accounts regarding Tigranes were alive even during the time of Moses of Khoren. A literary work, called "Four Rhapsodies," was written in verse by an author who probably used ancient songs and historical legends. However, the Tigranes mentioned in these poems, who is undoubtedly Tigranes II from the line of Artaxias, is identified in Moses of Khoren's erroneous chronology as an ally of the Persian King Cyrus.[2]

As M[anuk] Abeghean indicated, the many recollections about Tigranes in chapters 24-31 of Bk. I of Moses of Khoren, are, for the most part, historical accounts gathered from Greco-Roman sources.[3]

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[1] Mommsen, IV, 10-11.

[2] Khorenats'i, Bk. I, chap. 22, 24.

[3] M. Abeghean, *Hay zhoghovrdakan aṛaspelnerê* (Vagharshapat, 1901), 448-474 and H. Gelzer, "Armenien," *Realenzyklopäedie für protestanische Theologie und Kirche* (Leipzig, 1897).

In fact, not only his account of the conquest of Media, but the following account, relate to Tigranes:

> *But let us now pass on to discuss Tigranes and his deeds, for he, of all our kings, was the most powerful and intelligent and the most valiant of these and of all others. He assisted Cyrus in overthrowing the dominion of the Medes, and he brought the Greeks into subjugation to himself for no little time. He extended the borders of our territory and established them at their extreme limits in antiquity. He was envied by all who lived in his time, while he and his epoch were admired by posterity...*[1]
>
> *He was supreme among men and by showing his valor he glorified our nation. Those who had been under his yoke he put in a position to subject and demand tribute from many. He multiplied the stores of gold and silver and precious stones, of garments and brocades of various colors, both for men and women, with the help of which the ugly appeared as wonderful as the handsome, and the handsome were altogether deified at the time. The infantry was carried on the shoulders of horses; the slingers were all skilled archers; those with clubs were armed with swords and lances; the unarmed were entirely protected by shields and iron garments. The mere sight of them assembled in one spot, with the shining rays of their armor and weapons, was sufficient to disperse the enemy. The bringer of peace and prosperity, he fattened everyone with oil and honey...*[2]
>
> *This too is told; that after these successful events he sent his sister Tigranuhi with royal pomp and a large escort to Armenia to the city that Tigranes had built and called after his own name, Tigranocerta...*[3]
>
> *So they [the wheeled machines] demolished and threw down the walls [of Tigranocerta] that head [sic] been firmly raised by Tigranes, the descendant of Haik...*[4]

In the first excerpt cited above, Tigranes' short-lived reign over the Greek Seleucid kingdom is clearly and accurately reported.[5] What is of particular interest in the second excerpt is the reorganiza-

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[1] Khorenats'i, Bk. I, chap. 24.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*, Bk. I, chap. 30.
[4] *Ibid.*, Bk. III, chap. 28.
[5] Abeghean, 454.

tion of the Armenian army and the immense riches accumulated in Armenia during the era of Tigranes. The third and fourth excerpts also attest to historical facts about the construction of Tigranocerta in Aghdznik'.

The account in the second, excerpt which states, "He fattened everyone with oil and honey," as I have already indicated in my study *The Trade and Cities of Armenia*, is an exaggeration and rhetorical embellishment and only applies to the ruling classes.[1] It is entirely possible and more than probable that, as a result of the strengthening of the class of landed proprietors and its privileges, the process of formation of a bound peasant population must also have accelerated.

As to the historical accuracy of Moses of Khoren's account of the accumulation of monetary wealth and other riches in Armenia attested to by Plutarch's accounts of the immense sums taken by Lucullus and Pompey from Armenia, as we shall see below.

[1] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 63.

8
The Third Mithridatic War and Mithridates' Flight to Armenia

The First Mithridatic War, as we saw, ended with the agreement between Sulla and Mithridates in Dardanus in the year 84. This verbal accord was more like a provisional armistice than a permanent peace. The fragility of this agreement was already evident one year later.

In the year 83, Murena, the Roman governor of Asia Minor, ignoring the Dardanus agreement, and without the sanction of the Roman people and Senate, renewed the war against Mithridates. This Second Mithridatic War, which continued for some three years (83-81), was ended by order of Sulla, but only after the Roman army was defeated and forced to retreat from Pontus.

After the conclusion of this second war, Mithridates, who genuinely desired peace, sent special envoys to Rome in the year 79-78. He asked to reaffirm the oral agreement at Dardanus with a written treaty ratified by the Roman Senate. Only after his two appeals proved useless did he unwillingly come to the conclusion that war was inevitable.

The reason the Third Mithridatic War started only five years after these unsuccessful talks and not sooner was because of the internal political upheavals in Rome. After the death of Sulla, in the year 78, the democratic faction rose against the government in Rome. A similar rebellion took place in Spain, under the brilliant command of Sertorius, which placed the Roman oligarchy in a dangerous situation.

Mithridates used this five-year interim to prepare for a war which he could not avoid. During the previous wars, he had come to the conclusion that a small, but well-prepared and powerful army was undoubtedly better in comparison with large Eastern armies, which, despite their numbers, were incapable of fighting the trained Roman legions. Mithridates now concentrated all his efforts on arming, training, and organizing his army in the Roman manner. Italian immigrants, who had sought refuge in his domain after the civil war, helped him in this effort. Mithridates' new army was now smaller than his previous one, but its quality was not inferior to that of the Roman legions.

Apart from reorganizing the army, Mithridates, according to Appian, ordered [his subordinates] to construct numerous ships, to

manufacture the necessary armaments, and to gather two million *medimn* (approximately 5 million *puds*[1]) of grain.

According to Appian, in addition to his regular forces, Mithridates had allies in this war: the Chalybes, Armenians, Scythians, Taurians, Acheans (Greeks), Heniochi, White Syrians (Leucosyrians), and the Amazons, whose domain was in the region of the Thermodon River.[2]

The Armenians listed in Appian's account after the Chalybes, are obviously the Armenians of Armenia Minor, who, as noted above, also took part in the First Mithridatic War.

It is important to note that Tigranes, as he had done at the start of the First Mithridatic War, again undertook a campaign against Cappadocia,[3] from whence, as was noted, he had removed the population of Mazaca and other cities and resettled them in Armenia. The campaign against their common foe, Ariobarzanes I, was obviously urged at the request of Mithridates to protect his rear from Cappadocian attacks. As noted above, the Cappadocian kingdom was an ally of Rome and had important military value for the latter; it also posed a great danger for Pontus as well as Armenia.

As was also noted, the Armeno-Pontic alliance concerned only Cappadocia and had nothing to do with the Roman-Pontic wars. Although it is the opinion of some historians that the alliance obliged Tigranes to fight the Romans along with Mithridates, and that during the Third Mithridatic War, he breached his agreement and did not aid Mithridates, this opinion has no foundation and cannot be confirmed by a critical and careful study of the primary sources.

Mithridates' ally in the Third War was not Tigranes, whose empire had just been founded and was not yet secure against invasion from Parthia, but the leader of the Roman democratic faction, Sertorius, who had gathered a strong, organized army in Spain against the conservative government in Rome. Mithridates understood perfectly well that the formidable Roman Empire was almost undefeatable. That is why he decided not to make war simultaneously on both Roman parties, as he had done in the First War. He hoped to save his domain from the threat facing it, mainly by concluding an agreement

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[1] Russian *pud* equals 16.385 kg.

[2] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 69.

[3] Reinach (313) has it as the year 77.

and alliance with the democratic group against the government in Rome.

Mithridates managed to come to an agreement with Sertorius by sending two special Roman officers for this mission: Lucius Fannius and Lucius Magius, both fervent enemies of Sulla and his party who had sought refuge in Pontus. The alliance with Sertorius was concluded on the following terms: the Asian province would remain under Roman rule; Bythinia, as well as Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, which were the bones of permanent contention between Rome and Pontus and which were of vital importance to Pontus, were to go to Mithridates. The latter dispatched forty ships and 3,000 talents in cash to Sertorius in Spain.

The pretext for the Third Mithridatic War was the Roman annexation of Bythinia. At the end of 74, the king of Bythinia, Nicomedes, died[1] and left his kingdom and all his wealth to Rome. Bythinia, which was for a long time exploited and oppressed by Roman tax-farmers and moneylenders, had fertile fields, mines, rich towns, harbors, and a lucrative income from its custom duties. It is obvious that interested Roman financiers did not want to lose these assets. They tried and gained the approval of the Senate to occupy Bythinia, even though the occupation disturbed the political equilibrium, was against the agreement of Dardanus, and signaled a declaration of war against Mithridates.

Affirming its rule in Bythinia, Rome became not only the immediate neighbor of Pontus, but also the master of the Black Sea Straits. It could close them at any given moment and disrupt the economic life of the large trading cities of Pontus and the Bosporus.

In the spring of the year 73, when the Romans still did not have a sufficient number of troops in Asia Minor, Mithridates unexpectedly and without a declaration of war moved his armies, one against Cappadocia and the other against Bythinia. His ships were sent via the Bythinian coastline to the Straits. The army thrown against Cappadocia was to defend the rear of Pontus from the south, that is, from

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[1] The controversial questions regarding the chronology of the Third Mithridatic War have been examined at the end of the first volume of Ferrero, I, 168-170; II Appendix B, 365-369. However, I consider Reinach's observations and his precise chronology more plausible, Reinach, 321, note 1.

the direction of Roman Cilicia. The second, the main army, had orders to occupy Bythinia and to take over the Straits.

In a very short time, this second large army entered Bythinia through Paphlagonia and Galatia, appearing quite unexpectedly in Bythinia, and caused the panicky flight of Roman financiers and officials, who were hated by the local population. The Roman army in Bythinia, under the command of its general, Proconsul Cotta, was entrenched in the city of Chalcedon on the coast of the Bosporus. The other Roman general, Proconsul Lucullus, who together with Cotta was in charge of the war, and who was with his army in Phrygia, rushed to the aid of his colleague.

However, Cotta did not wish to share the victory with Lucullus. Relying totally on his own troops, he did battle by the walls of Chalcedon and the Bosporus. The Roman army suffered a great defeat both on land and sea during this encounter, including the destruction of its entire naval flotilla, consisting of more than sixty ships. With no ships left in Propontis, Mithridates' ships could freely cross the Straits and go into the Aegean Sea. Thus, as a result of this decisive victory, all of Bythinia surrendered to Mithridates.

The other Pontic army occupied Cappadocia with the same speed. They now had to conquer the Asia province, and by the agreement with Sertorius, establish the rule of the Roman democrats there.

After the victory near Chalcedon, it seemed that even this enterprise had a good chance of success. During this war, unlike the first one, the Pontic army entered Roman provinces not as conquerors, but as allies of Sertorius. General Marcus Marius, appointed [by Sertorius] as the governor and proconsul of the Asia province, accompanied them.

As in the first war, Mithridates again tried to ignite class conflict in Asia Minor, to raise the exploited and oppressed masses against the harsh reign of Sulla. With this in mind, he dispatched speedy cavalry squadrons, who indeed provoked a rebellion in the south of Asia Minor, in Roman Cilicia, Isauria and Pisidia. Proconsul Marcus Marius had some success in the northwestern regions of the Asia province. Some cities surrendered to him: Lampsacus, Parium, Priapos, and others. Entering these cities, Marcus Marius granted them freedom in the name of Sertorius and abolished a portion of their taxes.

It must be noted that, this time, the revolution did not turn into a speedy and widespread movement, as it had done in the first war. The nobles and the wealthy of the population sought a way to impede and take preventive measures against a revolt. Thus none of the large cities, where the upper classes were powerful revolted. For Lucullus, who, after the defeat of Cotta, had to defend Roman Asia alone, the loyalty of these cities and their aid was naturally of great importance.

After the major battle near Chalcedon, Mithridates' army moved southward and entered the Asia province, where it occupied the city of Lampsacus and camped along the Propontis and Hellespont. Lucullus, carefully following the movement of Mithridates' army, decided to avoid a decisive battle. He knew that the enemy troops were not inferior in their fighting skills to the Romans and were superior in numbers. Since the weakness of Mithridates' army lay in its difficulty in obtaining provisions, Lucullus, realizing that an open battle was dangerous, decided to hamper and disrupt the supply of provisions to the enemy.

In this, he was indeed successful. Supplying Mithridates' army via land proved very difficult. Supplies through the sea via Lampsacus were insufficient for the needs of the army. Because of the difficulties with provisions, Mithridates had either to retreat to his ports in Pont-Euxin, or conquer another large port in Propontide, where it was possible to unload the provisions and supplies that came from Pontus.

The proud and brave king, instead of retreating, decided to besiege and occupy the city of Cyzicus, a large port and a well-fortified site on the shores of the present-day Sea of Marmara. However, here, in front of Cyzicus, his luck turned. Right from the start of the siege, Mithridates' war machines were severely damaged by a strong storm, and the ships containing troops, which encircled the town, were swallowed by the waves. In addition, due to constant storms, the supplies coming by sea were delayed and the troops besieging the city began to perish from hunger and disease. In the end, the Pontic army had to abandon the siege and retreat to Lampsacus and Bythinia. Then, as they retreated, Lucullus' troops followed, inflicting terrible losses.

In the spring of the year 72, Mithridates had to seek refuge in the cities of Lampsacus and Parium, with the remains of his once-large

army. But misfortune followed him here as well. Hundreds of Pontic ships were drowned in a storm near the cities of Cyzicus and Parium. Nevertheless, Mithridates continued to wage war at sea for almost six months. It was only after the decisive defeat of his navy that he was forced to retreat to Pontus.

However, even this retreat proved disastrous and fatal for his forces. More than sixty of his ships and nearly ten thousand of his troops became victims of a storm while exiting the Bosporus. Almost alone, he returned to his domain with difficulty as a result of these events. His own land, that is, Pontus proper, was now left almost defenseless.

In the second half of the year 72, Lucullus entered the western provinces of Pontus, where he allowed his soldiers to ravage and pillage the rich and fertile region. According to Plutarch,[1] the war booty here was so great that an ox sold for only a *denarius* (drachma) and a male slave for only four in the Roman camp.[2]

From there, Lucullus' army moved further and besieged two Pontic ports, Amisus[3] and Themiscyra.[4]

Mithridates left his cities to their own defenses, while he, himself, entrenched in the mountainous regions of his land, began to gather new forces and organize new resistance. Meanwhile, he also asked his son Machares, the viceroy of the Bosporus, as well as the Parthians, the Scythians, and Tigranes II, to come to his aid.

However, after the heavy losses suffered by the Pontic armies, no one had any confidence in the new undertaking. Many Pontic nobles now sided with the enemy, including Mithridates' own ambassadors. Even his son not only did not aid him, but waited for an opportune moment to conclude a separate peace with the Romans.

Plutarch has the following account about the ambassador sent to Tigranes:

[Metrodorus] had been sent as an ambassador from Mithridates to Tigranes, with a request for aid against the Romans. On this

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XIV, 1.

[2] According to Hultsch, the drachma equaled 0.702 German gold marks; see F. Hultsch, *Griechische und römische metrologie* (Berlin, 1882), 711. The French text equates it to 0.864 gold francs, while the Armenian text has 35 gold kopeks.

[3] Present-day Samsun.

[4] A plain and city near the mouth of the river Thermodon.

occasion Tigranes asked him, "But what is your own advice to me, Metrodorus, in this matter?" Whereupon Metrodorus, either with an eye to the interests of Tigranes, or because he did not wish Mithridates to be saved, said that as an ambassador he urged consent, but as an adviser he forbade it.[1]

Memnon has also an interesting account of Mithridates' appeal to Tigranes:

Mithridates sent envoys to the Scythian kings, to the King of Parthia, and to his son-in-law, the Armenian Tigranes. However, he received a refusal from the first two; Tigranes, constantly bothered by the pleas and tears of Mithridates' daughter [his wife], finally promised help.[2]

Tigranes' promise was apparently an empty one. We not only do not find any evidence of any real aid or assistance on Tigranes' part in the primary sources, but, on the contrary, find evidence of his neutrality, which these authors consider an unpardonable error. According to Reinach, the following words, which he attributes to Sallust, best describe Tigranes' folly:

non tu scis, si quas aedes ignis cepit acriter, haud facile sunt defensu quin et comburantur proximae (Don't you know that if fire envelopes a building it is difficult to stop it from spreading and consuming the neighboring structures)?[3]

Reinach also thinks that the following line by Horace is probably influenced by the above:

tua res agitur paries cum proximus ardet (When the neighbor's wall is on fire the danger concerns you as well).[4]

Recent historical studies also consider Tigranes' neutrality as his biggest political mistake, for the destiny of not only Pontus, but Armenia and all of Western Asia Minor was at stake.

This evaluation of Tigranes' behavior is, of course, accurate. But those who condemn him have to take into consideration the difficulty of his position. If he marched against the Romans, he had at the same time to fight against his mortal enemies, the Parthians.[5] In addition,

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[1] Plutrach, Lucullus, xxii, 3-4.

[2] Memnon, Chapter 43.

[3] Reinach, 335, note 1.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Gutschmid states that when, in 70 B. C., Mithridates' envoy arrived and asked for help, Tigran's war with the Parthians had not yet been con-

one cannot forget that cunning and deceitful Roman diplomacy, as one can easily deduce from Plutarch, gave Tigranes the impression of Rome's peaceful intentions.[1]

The war against Mithridates recommenced in the spring of the year 71 in the central regions of Pontus, near Cabiria (present-day Niksar or Neo-Caesarea), by the banks of the Kelkit (Lycos) River, where Mithridates had managed, in a short time, to gather and organize an army from local inhabitants and Scythian mercenaries.

Lucullus' move into Cabiria faced grave difficulties, for Mithridates' cavalry, stronger and more numerous than that of the Romans, hampered his march and disrupted needed supplies and provisions.

Although Mithridates had some initial successes near Cabiria, he was soon betrayed by a number of his generals who were bought by Lucullus. In the summer of the year 71, the Pontic army suffered a major defeat at Cabiria, and Mithridates, together with a small corps, barely escaped to Comana, from where he came to Armenia, through an undetermined pass in Talaura, and sought assistance and refuge from his son-in-law.

Armenia indeed gave him refuge. However, Tigranes, wishing to maintain his neutrality, did not invite him to his court, but ordered that he be provided with royal entertainment and kept in one of his distant estates.[2]

Some historians, trusting Plutarch's biased account, blame Tigranes for refusing to meet and aid his unfortunate relative and in keeping him in a marshy and unhealthy area.[3] In fact, this, like many other accounts of Plutarch, is not corroborated by other sources and is probably exaggerated.[4]

Tigranes' behavior was, in reality, dictated by political considerations. During the Third Mithridatic War and after Mithridates' final defeat, Tigranes wanted to avoid conflict. He hoped that, by demonstrating his continued neutrality, he could maintain peace with Rome.

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cluded; A. von Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans und seiner Nachbarländer von Alexander dem Groseen bis zum Untergang der Arsaciden* (Tübingen, 1888), 82-83.

[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XIV, 4-6.

[2] Memnon, Chapter 46; Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 82.

[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXII, 1.

[4] Plutarch's view has been adopted by Reinach, 347-348; Eckhardt, *Klio*, IX, 4, 402, *passim*.

The immediate future would, however, prove the enormous error of his political calculations.

9
Lucullus Demands the Extradition of Mithridates and Prepares for War

Following the final defeat of Mithridates, the Roman army occupied the central and eastern regions of Pontus and all of Armenia Minor. Almost all the local nobles and functionaries surrendered to the Romans and handed over their wealth. Only the large Hellenistic cities continued to struggle against the Romans and offered resistance.

Lucullus spent the winter of 71-70 in the newly conquered city of Cabiria, in the palace of Mithridates, who had fled to Armenia. Following the great battle near Cabiria, Lucullus, probably at the end of the year 71, sent his brother-in-law, Appius Claudius, to Tigranes, demanding that he deliver the king of Pontus.

Plutarch has a detailed account of this embassy in his biography of Lucullus, in which he is not only content to glorify him as a hero, but also to humiliate and discredit his adversaries. Unfortunately Plutarch's comments are repeated, in many recent historical studies; whereas, upon careful examination, it is not difficult to see Plutarch's distortions.

We have included, without abridgement, those passages of Plutarch which are in need of re-examination:

> *After subduing the Chaldeans and the Tibareni, he [Lucullus] occupied Armenia Minor, reducing its fortresses and cities, and then sent Appius to Tigranes with a demand for Mithridates. He himself, however, came to Amisus, which was still holding out against the siege.*[1]

He adds:

> *Appius Clodius (Claudius), who had been sent to Tigranes (Claudius was a brother of the then wife of Lucullus), was at first conducted by the royal guides through the upper country by a route needlessly circuitous and long. But when a freedman of his, who was a Syrian, told him of the direct route, he left the long one which was being trickily imposed upon him, bade his Barbarian guides a long farewell, and within a few days crossed the Euphrates [River] and came to Antioch by Daphne. Then, being ordered to wait [for] Tigranes there (for the king was still engaged in*

[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XIX, 1-2.

subduing some cities of Phoenicia), he gained over many of the princes who paid but a hollow obedience to the Armenian. One of these was Zarbienus, king of Gordyene. He also promised many of the enslaved cities, when they sent to confer with him secretly, the assistance of Lucullus, although for the present he bade them to keep quiet.[1]

He adds:

As soon as he obtained an audience, he [Appius] told the king plainly that he was [sic] come to take back Mithridates, as an ornament due to the triumph of Lucullus, or else to declare war against Tigranes. Although Tigranes made every effort to listen to this speech with a cheerful countenance and a forced smile, he could not hide from the bystanders his discomfiture at the bold words of the young man. It must have been five and twenty years since he had listened to a free speech. That was the length of his reign, or rather, of his wanton tyranny. However, he replied to Appius that he would not surrender Mithridates, and that if the Romans began war, he would defend himself. He was vexed with Lucullus for addressing him in his letter with the title of King only, and not King of Kings, and accordingly, in his reply, would not address Lucullus as Imperator. But he sent splendid gifts to Appius, and when he would not take them, added more besides. Appius finally accepted a single bowl from among them, not wishing his rejection of the king's offers to seem prompted by any personal enmity, but sent back the rest, and marched off with all speed to join the Imperator."[2]

We have to consider the above observations of Plutarch as pure invention. First of all, the comment that, upon receiving a negative reply from Tigranes, Appius Claudius declared war cannot be true since the Roman Senate had not empowered Lucullus to declare war on Tigranes. Moreover, it is inconceivable that, at the end of the year 71, when the large Pontic cities were not yet vanquished and the Roman rear flank was unsafe, Lucullus would embark on a war with Tigranes at all. Finally, how could Lucullus have such a lack of foresight as to declare war a full year and a half before it actually commenced, allowing Tigranes time and opportunity to prepare his armies?

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[1] *Ibid.*, 1-2.

[2] *Ibid.*, 6-7.

The inaccuracy of Plutarch is so obvious that his comments do not appear in the works of Mommsen, Reinach and others. They are found, however, in the studies of Eckhardt,[1] Asturean,[2] and Dolens and Khatch.[3]

A more reliable account of Appius Claudius' audience in Antioch can be found in Memnon of Heraclea, since the latter is one of the group of Greek authors of Asia Minor who, unlike Roman historians, was free from bias against Rome's enemies. It is interesting to note that Memnon is totally unaware of the declaration of war by Appius. However, he has a detailed account of Tigranes' appropriate reply to Appius, which is not mentioned by Plutarch and other Roman historians. Memnon states:

> *Lucullus sent Appius Claudius as an ambassador to Tigranes, demanding that he hand over Mithridates. However, Tigranes refused to hand him over, saying that the whole world would blame him if he handed over the father of his wife to Lucullus. That Mithridates was a bad man was known to him as well, but he could not defame and shame himself in front of his family. He also wrote a letter to Lucullus, reiterating these words."*[4]

After a careful examination of the remaining statements of Plutarch, it is not difficult to conclude that his claim that the guides provided by Tigranes purposely took Appius on a needlessly circuitous and long route is not true. In fact, it was [probably] Appius himself who cunningly arranged a prolonged tour within Armenia with the intention of reconnoitering the region.

From Plutarch's comments, one can also with certainty conclude that Appius had secret instructions to incite the Greek cities of Syria and other foreign subjects of Armenia against Tigranes. Plutarch, in order to mask the spying nature of the Roman envoy in Armenia, presents the clumsy and absurd explanation that Tigranes' men purposefully guided Appius through a maze of roads.

Judging from these comments of Plutarch, Appius successfully carried out Lucullus' instructions. Along his journey, he probably brought some of the malcontent princes, together with Zarbienus, the king of Gordyene, to the Roman side. He also convinced other cities

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[1] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 1, 74-75.
[2] Asturean, 27-28
[3] Dolens & Khatch, 128.
[4] Memnon, Chapter 46.

of Syria, which had promised to rebel against Tigranes, to await the arrival of Lucullus.

During the time that Appius was in Armenia, the siege of the main Pontic cities, Amisus and Sinope, continued. They had firmly decided not to surrender to the Romans and had offered fierce resistance. This loyalty and devotion of Mithridates' Hellenistic cities is proof positive that Mithridates was indeed the defender and protector of Hellenism and Hellenistic cities. His aforementioned Hellenophile and progressive policy and his efforts to expand Hellenistic urban culture were, of course, not welcomed by the conservative landowning nobility of Pontus. This explains why some of these nobles betrayed Mithridates and, without any serious resistance, handed the forts and treasures of the country to the Romans.

In the spring of the year 70, after a long siege, Rome occupied the ports of Heraclea[1] and Sinope. In the autumn of that same year, they also took Amisus. After the fall of these cities, Rome became the master of all of Pontus, and the war with Mithridates can be regarded as over.

The conquered country, especially its vast and wealthy Hellenistic cities, were given over to merciless pillage. Roman troops burned and totally emptied the rich and magnificent city of Heraclea, as well as the famed and beautiful Amisus, which was considered the Athens of Pontus. It is surprising, therefore, that Lucullus, the great looter and plunderer, who completely destroyed the rich and grand Hellenistic culture of Pontus, is portrayed in some modern histories as the defender of Hellenistic civilization and one who revered the memory of Hellenism.[2]

After taking these cities, Lucullus returned from Pontus to the Asia province in that same year of 70. It is interesting that, prior to his march into Armenia, he found it necessary to alleviate the desperate economic condition of Roman Asia.

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[1] It refers to Heraclea Pontica; see map 1.

[2] See for example, Ferrero, I, 176. The influence of such sources can also be found in Kovalev's work, where he considers Mithridates as a "cunning and sly barbarian with a Greek education," while Lucullus was "a very wealthy aristocrat, who was renowned for his excellent hospitality ('banquets of Lucullus')"; and "Lucullus was an amiable man." See S. I. Kovalev, *Istoriia antichnogo obshchestva: Gretsiia, ellinizm, Rim*, I (Leningrad, 1936), 192, 207.

Because of its disloyalty to Rome, after the First Mithridatic War (88-84), this area had to hand over, as noted above, not only the taxes for the previous five years, but also a war indemnity of 20,000 talents. It paid an exorbitant interest on the accumulated debt and was driven to total bankruptcy. Roman financiers who had loaned money to this poverty-stricken land, confiscated homes, fields, vineyards, and public buildings on account of interest owed. They plundered and took to Italy statues, paintings, household goods, and items made of gold and silver. Furthermore, they took the children of the debtors, or the debtors themselves, as slaves to Italy. Despite the country's total bankruptcy, its original debt of 20,000 talents was, after the year 84, not only not decreased but, rather increased and, by the year 70, had reached 40,000 talents. According to Hultsch, the talent of that time equaled approximately 4,200 German gold marks; hence the entire debt of the Asian province amounted to 168 million marks or 84 million golden rubles.[1]

Roman Asia was in no condition to pay this enormous sum and accumulated interest. The population, weighed down under such a heavy burden, was stirred against the Romans and their rule. Lucullus considered it imperative to soften the discontent of the population and tried to alleviate the intolerable economic conditions. [Although] he imposed taxes on immovable property and slaves, as well as a twenty-five percent income tax,[2] he forbade the taking of more than twelve percent interest a year on personal loans. He also forbade compounded interest and eliminated all interest that exceeded the principal. The lender could not take more than one-fourth of the borrower's income.[3]

Many European scholars, including Ferrero and Chapot, place these financial measures of Lucullus at the start of the Third Mithri-

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[1] Hultsch, 298, 711.

[2] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 83.

[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XX, 3. The actual text reads: In the first place, he ordered that the monthly rate of interest should be reckoned at one per cent, and no more; in the second place, he cut off all interest that exceeded the principal; third, and most important of all, he ordained that the lender should receive not more than the fourth part of his debtor's income, and any lender who added interest to principal was deprived of the whole. Thus, in less than four years' time, the debts were all paid, and the properties restored to their owners unencumbered, XX, 3-4.

datic War, that is, in the year 73.[1] There is no evidence for this; since both Plutarch and Appian, the main sources of information on these events, clearly state that Lucullus' return to Roman Asia, as well as his above-mentioned reforms, took place after he occupied the city of Amisus, and after he dispatched Appius Claudius to Armenia.[2]

It is significant that Lucullus felt that it was important and necessary to carry out his pacification and reforms in Asia Minor prior to his march into Armenia. This fact is neither noted nor paid much attention in historical studies. It is clear that, having decided on a war with Tigranes, Lucullus had to secure his rear in the west and thus made certain concessions to the hopeless and exhausted population of Asia Minor.

Historical studies also completely ignore Lucullus' insidious and perfidious plan against Armenia, a plan, which is not difficult to piece together by a careful examination of the primary sources.

Lucullus organized his campaign against Tigranes in complete secrecy. He wanted to lull Tigranes into complacency and, in my opinion, planned to crush him with an unexpected invasion, before the latter had time to assemble his dispersed army and organize a defense.

It is completely natural and understandable that Roman sources, especially Plutarch, who wrote not simply a biased biography, but rather a panegyric to Lucullus, would have difficulty in admitting the fact that Lucullus' aggression against Tigranes, with no declaration of war, was a grave transgression of the norm. We do, however, find clear hints of this fact in Appian, who seems to have used not Roman, but impartial Greek sources from Asia Minor for this part of his history.

According to Appian's unabridged account, given below, it is clear that Lucullus, upon his return to Asia Minor[3] in the year 70, tried to give the impression that the war was over and then suddenly marched quickly against Armenia. Appian states:

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[1] Ferrero, II, Appendix B, 365: *The Chronology of the Wars of Lucullus;* V. Chapot, *La province romaine proconsulaire d'Asie* (Paris, 1904), 40-41.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus* XIX, 2; Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 83.

[3] Lucullus' return to Asia Minor occurred not in the year 71, that is, prior to the taking of the cities of Sinope and Amisus, as Plutarch, Reinach (152) and Mommsen (VI, 197) contend, but, according to Appian, in the year 70, that is, after the taking of the two cities.

After thus desolating and repeopling both Sinope and Amisus, Lucullus entered into friendly relations with Machares, the son of Mithridates and ruler of the Bosporus, who had sent him a crown of gold and demanded the surrender of Mithridates from Tigranes. Then he went back in person to the province of Asia, which still owed part of the fine imposed by Sulla, and imposed on it a twenty-five percent tax on crops, and taxes on slaves and house-property. He offered a triumphal sacrifice to the gods, as though he had brought the war to a successful issue [sic]. After the sacrifice had been performed, he marched with two picked legions and 500 horse[men] against Tigranes, who had refused to surrender Mithridates to him.[1]

Sallust and Memnon also provide proof that Lucullus had planned his sudden move against Armenia in secret. I think that it is mainly because of the secret [nature] of this invasion that Lucullus is remembered, albeit by a different name, so negatively in Armenian popular culture. He is remembered under the name of "Vaykun." It is said that Vaykun, being a brigand, disturbed the peace of the Armenian land and forced Tigranes to return from the city of Ptolemais to Armenia.[2] This ancient tradition about Lucullus-Vaykun appears in the following passage of Moses of Khoren's history:

Immediately thereafter he attacked Palestine to seek vengeance from Cleopatra [daughter] of Ptolemy for the crimes of her son Dionysius against his own father. He took many captives from among the Jews and besieged the city of Ptolemais. But the queen of the Jews, Alexandra—also known as Messalina—who was the wife of Alexander, son of John, son of Simon the brother of Judas Maccabaeus, and who at that time held the throne of the Jews, by giving him many presents turned him back. For he had heard a report that a certain brigand called Vaykun was causing a tumult in Armenia, holding the inaccessible mountain that up to now is called Vaykunik', after the name of the brigand.[3]

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 83-84.

[2] Khalat'iants' notion that the title of Vaykun the Brigand was given to Lucullus by Moses of Khoren is wrong. In my opinion, Moses of Khoren based it on popular Armenian tradition. See G. Khalat'iants, *Armianskie Arshakidy v istorii armenii "Moiseia Khorenskago"* (Moscow, 1903), 64, 375.

[3] Khorenats'i, Bk. II, chap. 14.

That Lucullus' march into Armenia was sudden and without a declaration of war, as will be seen below, is an absolutely uncontestable fact.

10
The Sudden Attack of Lucullus and His First Encounter with the Armenians

As mentioned previously the sudden, unexpected attack on Tigranes and the war against him was planned and prepared by Lucullus in a secretly and treacherously.

Tigranes did not anticipate or sense the great danger which menaced his country. All appearances indicated that the Roman Senate would not invest Lucullus with the power to start a new war in Armenia. It was also clear to him that the Roman Senate, viewing war with a strong Armenia dangerous, would not want to get entangled in the affairs of Syria and would certainly not wish to see the legitimate Seleucid heirs regaining the [Syrian] throne. The non-threatening intentions of the Roman Senate, as well as the festivities organized by Lucullus in Ephesus to celebrate the end of the war [with Mithridates], must have reassured Tigranes; he considered the danger of a war with Rome averted. Therefore, he not only did not prepare for war, but on the contrary, calmly and peacefully occupied himself with the work of completing the construction of Tigranocerta.

His naive optimism was a major political mistake, which, as we shall see, had fatal consequences for his empire. It is very difficult to excuse Tigranes' error, since Mithridates, sources tell us, warned him about Roman imperialism and the inevitable invasion of Armenia. Actually, sooner or later, Rome had to have a reckoning with Tigranes for his conquest of Syria and his depopulating of Cappadocia, both allies of Rome. Rome, naturally, could not tolerate an organized and mighty empire, such as Armenia, on the easternmost border of its Asia Minor colonies—in Commagene, Eastern Cilicia, and on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Such a state would constitute a permanent danger to Roman rule in the East.

We can see how the presence of the bellicose Roman Republic on its western borders was far more dangerous for the newly created Armenian Empire than the weak and unstable Parthian state on its eastern borders. For this reason, Tigranes, in his own interest, as the Roman sources point out correctly, should not have allowed the collapse of Pontus, which had secured his western border. He should have, even before the battle of Cabiria, helped his father-in-law, Mithridates, by sending him an auxiliary army.

In the spring of the year 69, Lucullus on his own initiative marched on Armenia without a declaration of war and without the approval of the Roman Senate. According to Sallust,[1] he traversed Cappadocia by a forced march and swiftly moved to the Euphrates River, [the latter of] which separated the kingdom of Ariobarzanes from ancient Sophene, which had been annexed to Armenia. Here, near Melitene (Malatya),[2] the king of Cappadocia had secretly constructed unobtrusive dams during the winter,[3] over which Lucullus easily crossed the Euphrates and entered Sophene. Sallust and Memnon both attest that Lucullus crossed the Euphrates unexpectedly and secretly.[4]

From Melitene to the banks of the Euphrates, the Roman army undoubtedly marched along the ancient caravan route which is indicated in detail on the *Tabula Peutingeriana.* This route runs right through present-day Izoglu (also known as Izoli) and the famous ancient fortress of Tomisa, which lies on the western bank of the Euphrates. According to Strabo, Lucullus presented the fortress of Tomisa to Ariobarzanes I, the king of Cappadocia, in exchange for the help he had given to Lucullus during his march [see map 3].[5]

Plutarch is silent about these historical facts. In all probability, he wanted to hide the clandestine nature and the plunder of this incursion, which did not bring any honor to Lucullus. Rather than relate the actual events, which were known to him through Sallust, he gives a legendary and fictional account, whose source, according to Reinach,[6] was probably the poetic epic by Archias of Antioch.

I do not think it is superfluous to reproduce Plutarch's account in full, as it is frequently cited in various historical studies:

But Lucullus advanced by forced marches to the Euphrates. Here he found the stream swollen and turbid from the winter storms, and was vexed to think that the delay and trouble which it would

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[1] Sallust, iv, 60.

[2] Tacitus, *Annales*, XV, 26-27.

[3] Mommsen's contention that Tigranes had also conquered Melitene is not accurate.

[4] Memnon in Chapter 56 states, "Lucullus entered Cappadocia, where the ruler Ariobarzanes was a friend and unexpectedly crossed the Euphrates."

[5] Strabo, V, Bk. XII, 2. 1.

[6] Reinach, 442.

cost him to collect boats and build rafts. But at evening the stream began to subside, went on diminishing through the night, and at daybreak the river was running between lofty banks. The natives, observing that sundry small islands in the channel had become visible, and that the current near them was quiet, made obeisance to Lucullus, saying that this had seldom happened before, and that the river had voluntarily made itself tame and gentle for Lucullus, and offered him an easy and speedy passage.

Accordingly, he took advantage of his opportunity and put his troops across, and a favorable sign accompanied his crossing. Heifers pasture there which are sacred to Persia['s] *Artemis, a goddess whom the Barbarians on the further side of the Euphrates hold in the highest honor. These heifers are used only for sacrifice, and at other times are left to roam about the country at large, with brands upon them in the shape of the torch of the goddess. Nor is it a slight or easy matter to catch any of them when they are wanted. One of these heifers, after the army had crossed the Euphrates, came to a certain rock which is deemed sacred to the goddess, and stood upon it, and lowering its head without any compulsion from the usual rope, offered itself to Lucullus for sacrifice. He also sacrificed a bull to the Euphrates in acknowledgment of his safe passage.*[1]

Although Plutarch's comments are totally devoid of historical truth, they appear in some historical studies in place of the facts and more trustworthy accounts.[2]

After crossing the Euphrates River, the Roman army, under the command of Lucullus, again marched through Sophene to the Tigris River, with the intention of catching Tigranes off guard and suddenly attacking Tigranocerta. The inhabitants of Sophene not only did not show any resistance to Lucullus, but apparently voluntarily submitted to him as well. They supplied the Roman army with necessary provisions and greatly facilitated its progress toward Tigranocerta.

The route of the Roman army through Sophene is detailed in the following accounts by Appian and Plutarch, who agree each with the other:

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIV, 4-8.

[2] See Leo, *Hayots' patmut'iwn*, I (Tiflis, 1917), 406, *passim*; Dolens & Khatch, 131-132.

[Appian] *Having crossed the Euphrates, he [Lucullus] only required the barbarians, through whose territory he passed, to furnish necessary supplies, since they did not want to fight, or to expose themselves to suffering, but preferred to leave Lucullus and Tigranes to decide the issue by themselves.*[1]

[Plutarch] *Then, after encamping there during that day (on the left bank of the Euphrates), on the next and the succeeding days he advanced through Sophene. He wrought no harm to the inhabitants, who came to meet him and received his army gladly. Nay, when his soldiers wanted to take a certain fortress, which was thought to contain much wealth, "Yonder lies the fortress which we must rather bring low," said he, pointing to the Taurus in the distance; these nearer things are reserved for the victors.' Then he went on by forced marches, crossed the Tigris, and entered Armenia.*[2]

It has to be noted that, in another passage of his account, Plutarch informs us that, in addition to the Arabs and the Gordyeni, the population of Sophene also joined Lucullus' side.[3] From these accounts we can conclude that both Gordyene and Sophene agreed to help Lucullus while the Roman envoy Appius Claudius, visited Armenia. It is obvious that the betrayal and cooperation of these two countries, situated on the route of the Roman army, was a major factor in the success of Lucullus' incursion.

The route taken by the invading army from the Euphrates to the Tigris is precisely indicated in historical studies. These indicate that this part of Lucullus' itinerary went toward the Tigris River on a line from the present-day Plain of Kharpert through Arghana in the direction of Amid-Diarbekir [see map 3]. The route, thus, went along the ancient road which was part of the "Royal Highway" of Achaemenid Persia,[4] and corresponds to the *Melitene ad Tygrem* of the *Tabula Peutingeriana.*

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 84.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIV, 8.

[3] *Ibid.*, XXIV, 8.

[4] See my study *Trade and Cities of Armenia*, 24-25.

The Roman army, according to Plutarch,[1] invaded Armenia by crossing the Tigris.[2] This important note has not been studied sufficiently up to now by scholars, and remains one of the very obscure questions of the historical geography of ancient Armenia. Plutarch considers Sophene, which was annexed to Greater Armenia by Tigranes, as a separate country, whose border with Armenia proper was the eastern Tigris River.[3] Thus, despite Hübschmann's and Markwart's contention,[4] the province of Arzanene-Aghdznik', in which Tigranocerta was located, must have been situated on the eastern bank of the Tigris River, that is, not within the domain of Zariadris of Sophene, but within one of the southern provinces of Artaxiad Armenia.

This supposition is indirectly confirmed by Appian, who states that the city of Tigranocerta was founded on the place where Tigranes first placed the crown of Armenia on his head.[5] From this account, it is evident that Appian, like Plutarch, considered the province of Arzanene-Aghdznik', with its city of Tigranocerta as an integral part of Artaxiad Armenia. In this regard, one has to pay special attention to the fact that in the Armenian tradition, preserved in the historical works of Mar Abas Catina and Moses of Khoren, the ancient land of the ancestors of the Armenians was also in the same province, located south of the Armenian Taurus. Thus, it becomes clear that the southern frontier of Greater Armenia during the time of Tigranes the Great was indeed, as affirmed by Plutarch, the Tigris River. The distance from the Tigris River to Tigranocerta, to which the Roman army hastened, is only 150 kilometers [see map 3].[6]

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIV, 8.

[2] According to Eckhardt, the Roman army crossed the Tigris, in all probability, approximately 20 km north of present-day Amid-Diarbekir, near the present-day town of Shabian; see *Klio*, X, 1, 87-88.

[3] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 1, 83.

[4] Hübschmann, 249; Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 178. Compare this to Markwart's more accurate opinion in his *Südarmenien*, 119.

[5] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 67.

[6] The route of the Roman army from the Tigris River to the city of Farkin-Tigranocerta is indicated wrongly in the works of Mommsen, Khalat'iants, and others, because these authors have placed Tigranocerta incorrectly.

Lucullus' treacherous plan, as we see, was executed with great success. As the enemy was already approaching Tigranocerta and the terrible menace to Armenia was imminent, Tigranes was totally unaware of it and had not gathered his forces.

The news of the unexpected invasion of the Roman army was met with total incredulity in Tigranocerta. Tigranes, according to Appian, considered the messenger as an agitator and provocateur. According to Appian:

> *No one told Tigranes that Lucullus was advancing, for he had hanged the first man who had brought such a report, considering him a disturber of the good order of the cities.*[1]

Plutarch's account of the circumstances of the execution of this messenger is doubtful, and despite its apocryphal nature is repeated in the works of Armenian historians.[2] Plutarch states:

> *Since the first messenger who told Tigranes that Lucullus was coming had his head cut off for his pains, no one would tell him anything, and so he sat in ignorance while the fires of war were already blazing around him, giving ear only to those who flattered him and said that Lucullus would be a great general if he ventured to withstand Tigranes at Ephesus, and did not fly incontinently from Asia at the mere sight of so many myriads of men.*[3]

The above passage of Plutarch is interesting, mainly because it makes it clear that Tigranes' court was convinced that Lucullus was, at that time, still in Ephesus. I think that this account of Plutarch indirectly confirms our assertion that Lucullus came to Armenia not from Pontus, as was assumed up to now, but from Ephesus.

The confirmation of the appearance of the Roman army caused alarm and confusion in Tigranocerta. Tigranes, not prepared for war and caught unawares, was forced to partially evacuate the city and to retreat to a safe place. In order to gain time, he left a small detachment with one of his generals, Mehruzhan (Mithrobuzanes),[4] and or-

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 84.

[2] Leo, I, 407; Dolens & Khatch, 132.

[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXV, 1.

[4] The older editions of Plutarch and Appian spell his name in this manner (newer editions have Mithrobarzanes). However, Markwart, after studying the original manuscript of Appian, considers the correct spelling to have been Mithrobarzanes, J. Markwart, "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte von

dered him to stop the enemy's advance toward Tigranocerta in any way possible.

As noted above, Appian, using an unbiased historian of Asia Minor as his source, describes Tigranes' hope and trust in Mehruzhan's force against the Roman army in this manner:

> *But when at last he* [Tigranes] *learned the truth, he sent Mithrobarzanes forward with 2,000 horse* [cavalry] *to hinder Lucullus' march. He entrusted to Mancaeus the defense of Tigranocerta.*[1]

Plutarch mentions the heroic death of Mehruzhan during a bold but unequal battle. Although his account is based on historical sources, some of the details are absurd inventions through which he, as usual, tries to denigrate Tigranes. He states:

> *The first of his friends who ventured to tell him the truth was Mithrobarzanes, and he too got no very excellent reward for his boldness of speech. He was sent at once against Lucullus with three thousand horsemen and a large force of infantry, under orders to bring the general alive, but to trample his men under foot. Now part of the army of Lucullus was already preparing to go into camp, and the rest was still coming up, when his scouts told him that the Barbarian was advancing to the attack. Fearing lest the enemy attack his men when they were separated and in disorder, and so throw them into confusion, he himself fell to arranging the encampment, and Sextilius, the legate, was sent at the head of sixteen hundred horsemen and about as many light and heavy infantry, with orders to get near the enemy and wait there until he learned that the main body was safely encamped. Well then, this was what Sextilius wished to do, but he was forced into an engagement by Mithrobarzanes, who boldly charged upon him. A battle ensued, in which Mithrobarzanes fell fighting, and the rest of his forces took to flight and were cut to pieces, all except a few.*[2]

This passage of Plutarch, in which Mehruzhan was ordered to capture Lucullus alive and destroy the formidable Roman army with his small force, is an invention. Mehruzhan, as we have noted, was ordered to keep the Roman army at bay and halt their unimpeded ad-

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Eran," I, *Phililogus* (54-55), 68-69. Markwart also equates that name with the Armenian Mehruzhan.

[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 84.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXV, 2-4.

vance on Tigranocerta. Not surprisingly, even this absurd invention of Plutarch's has found its way into historical works as a true and incontestable fact.[1]

Plutarch's passage is also false in the sense that it states that Tigranes sent Mehruzhan against Lucullus in order to punish him, for Mehruzhan, even after the execution of the messenger, had also dared to remind him of the appearance of the Roman army. Mehruzhan, as Markwart has noted, was a descendant of the royal family of Sophene.[2] It is perfectly understandable, therefore, why Tigranes chose him to march against Lucullus, who was advancing though Sophene. According to Plutarch:

> *Upon this, Tigranes abandoned Tigranocerta, that great city which he had built, withdrew to the Taurus, and there began collecting his forces from every quarter. Lucullus, however, gave him no time for preparation, but sent out Murena to harass and cut off the forces gathering to join Tigranes, and Sextilius again to hold in check the large body of Arabs which was drawing near the king. At one and the same time Sextilius fell upon the Arabs as they were going into camp, and slew most of them; and Murena, following hard upon Tigranes, seized his opportunity and attacked the king as he was passing through a rough and narrow defile with his army in long column. Tigranes himself fled, abandoning all his baggage, many of the Armenians were slain, and more were captured.*[3]

Lucullus' plan to catch Tigranes unprepared, as seen from this account, was entirely successful. The Roman army was already near Tigranocerta, in Armenia proper, while Tigranes was unprepared for war or a counterattack.

The great success of the Roman general and Rome's diplomatic tactics in deceiving and completely confounding Tigranes doubtless explain the scornful tone of the Roman sources.

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[1] See for example, Reinach, 359, Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 1, 90, and others.

[2] Markwart, *Eranschahr*, 176.

[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, xxv, 5-6.

11
The Siege of Tigranocerta and Tigranes' Meeting with Mithridates

Lucullus' rapid advance toward Tigranocerta caused great panic in the city. Tigranes' own flight from the city was so swift and hasty that he did not even manage to take his harem and treasury.

Retreating via the Taurus Mountains,[1] probably through present-day Nercik and Shenik,[2] in the northern and central provinces of his realm, Tigranes entrusted the defense of Tigranocerta to his general, Mancaeus. He ordered the latter to resist the enemy and to retain the city until he had gathered armed men from throughout the kingdom and came to his assistance.

The unexpected attack by Lucullus and his appearance near Tigranocerta took place in the spring of the year 69 and not in the summer, as stated by Reinach.[3] Taking into account that the distance from the Euphrates River to Tigranocerta-Farkin was some 300 kilometers, we can assume that the Roman army, after crossing the Euphrates River (in the spring of the year 69), through forced marches, could have reached Tigranocerta in not more than two weeks' time, that is, no later than the month of May. Thus, we can say that, in all probability, the Romans besieged Tigranocerta in the spring of the year 69. Lucullus entrusted the preparations of the siege to Sextilius, who, according to Appian:

> *...shut up Mancaeus in Tigranocerta; plundered the palace, which was not fortified; drew a ditch around the city and fortress, stationed engines against them, and began to undermine the wall.*[4]

The garrison of Tigranocerta was composed from among the recent immigrants sent there [by Tigranes] from Cilicia and Cappadocia, mainly Greeks and Cilicians, who were granted the rights of citizenship.

All Roman efforts to take the city by storm or with the help of siege machines proved fruitless. The garrison, commanded by Man-

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXV, 7.

[2] The Tigranocerta-Taron-Artaxata route, based on the ancient Roman geographical map, is precisely indicated in my *Hayastani*, 85-114.

[3] Reinach, 359.

[4] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 84.

caeus,[1] vigorously resisted the Romans, showering them with a hail of arrows, while the siege equipment of the Romans was destroyed by flaming *naphta*, poured from above.[2] Tigranocerta remained impregnable in this way for a number of months, until Tigranes returned with his newly organized army.

It is noteworthy and indeed characteristic that Plutarch does not consider it worthwhile to recount Roman failure before the walls of Tigranocerta. Nor does he mention the victorious assault of the Armenian cavalry, described by historians of Asia Minor, and used widely by Memnon and Appian.

From these trustworthy sources it is clear that Tigranes, at the start of the siege of Tigranocerta, sent a corps of elite cavalry there, with orders to save his harem and his valuable treasury. I include here, without abridgment, the accounts of Memnon and Appian [of this incident], on which the Roman sources are silent:

> [Memnon] *When Armenia was surrounded from many sides, Tigranes sent a messenger to Mithridates and invited him to come to him. At the same time he dispatched an army to Tigranocerta, where his harem was located. Arriving by the city, the army fired arrows from their bows, halted the Romans from leaving their camp, and under the cover of night removed first his harem and the more valuable items of Tigranes' treasury. At daybreak, the Romans, together with the Thracians, fought valiantly, killed many Armenians, and took prisoners those who had remained alive. However, the treasures which were taken out were saved and returned to Tigranes.*[3]
>
> [Appian] *While Sextilius was doing this [occupied with the siege of Tigranocerta], Tigranes brought together some 250,000 foot and 50,000 horse[men]. He sent about 6,000 of the latter to Tigranocerta, who broke through the Roman line to the tower, and seized and brought away the king's concubines. With the rest of his army Tigranes marched in person against Lucullus. Mithridates, who was now for the first time admitted to his presence,*

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[1] According to Adonts, the name Mancaeus corresponds to the Armenian name of Mamik, an ancestor of the Mamikonean family. He asserts that the general was an Armenian from the Mamikonean family. See Adonts, Justinian, 411, 415.

[2] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, i, b.

[3] Memnon, Chapter 56.

advised him not to come to close quarters with the Romans, but to circle round them with his horse only, to devastate the country, and to reduce them by famine if possible. In the same way that he himself had been served by Lucullus in Cyzicus, where he lost his army through exhaustion without fighting.[1]

Both Memnon and Appian, as we can see, are entirely in agreement that the detachment sent by Tigranes successfully carried out his instructions, cut the chain of the Roman army besieging Tigranocerta, and took out his harem and treasury. Asturean mistakenly assumes that these events occurred in Sophene, where the Romans had surrounded the fortress of Bnabegh.[2]

Plutarch does not mention this victory of the Armenian cavalry, probably because, as Reinach[3] remarks, he considered it shameful for Lucullus.

In the second account, Appian describes the night attack of the Armenian cavalry as having taken place in the autumn of the year 69 during Tigranes' counterattack. Eckhardt, however, relying on the more accurate account of Memnon, proposes that the attack took place in the spring of the year 69, immediately after Tigranes' exit from Tigranocerta. Eckhardt proves reasonably well that it was relatively easy to enter Tigranocerta at the beginning of the siege of the city, when the encirclement had not been yet completed.[4]

One has particularly to note that the above accounts of both Memnon and Appian, who relied on historians of Asia Minor, agree that Mithridates was invited by Tigranes not before Lucullus' invasion of Armenia—as Plutarch, as well as all foreign and Armenian historians incorrectly assert—but after the beginning of the war, when Tigranes was in the interior provinces of his kingdom and was preparing for war, that is, in the spring or summer of the year 69.

Appian, as we can see (in the second account), clearly states that Mithridates met Tigranes for the first time before Tigranes' counterattack on Lucullus. The account of Memnon above also states that Tigranes invited Mithridates after the siege of Tigranocerta, although the detailed account of this meeting is found in his 55th chapter.

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 85.
[2] Asturean, 29.
[3] Reinach, 360 note 1.
[4] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 1, 92.

Despite these reliable reports of Appian and Memnon, historians, as we said, prefer to cite Plutarch's account. They do not pay heed to the fact that Plutarch himself, or his original sources, intentionally distorted historical truth in order to hide the treacherous nature of Lucullus' invasion and create the illusion that Tigranes and Mithridates conducted secret talks before Lucullus' march, and preparing for and initiating the military operations themselves.

The accuracy of this new explanation regarding Tigranes' meeting with Mithridates is found in another valuable passage of Memnon cited below, which has not been sufficiently examined or utilized by historians:

> *Remaining for a year and eight months within the borders of Armenia, Mithridates was not yet presented to Tigranes and had not met him. When Tigranes asked that Mithridates come to him, he received him with pomp and accorded him royal honors. They deliberated secretly for about three days, after which Tigranes presented him with magnificent robes, gave him a 10,000-man cavalry, and sent him to Pontus.*[1]

Therefore, Tigranes' meeting with Mithridates, according to Memnon's account was twenty months after the latter had arrived in Armenia. We have noted that Mithridates came to Armenia in the summer or fall of the year 71.[2] Thus, his meeting with Tigranes, according to the same account, had to have taken place not before, but after the war; that is, as we have noted above, at the end of spring or in the summer months of the year 69.

It is perfectly understandable why Tigranes received Mithridates with full royal honors only now, after almost two years. After the unexpected invasion of Lucullus and the commencement of war, the prudent policy and the neutral political approach to avoid war which had been adopted by the Armenian king toward Rome had lost all its meaning. Naturally, Tigranes now realized his political mistake and felt that it was imperative to seek the aid and cooperation of Mithridates.

Plutarch has left a scatting and questionable account of Tigranes' meeting with Mithridates:

> *There, in secret conference, they [Tigranes and Mithridates] strove to allay their mutual suspicions at the expense of their*

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[1] Memnon, Chapter 55.

[2] Reinach, 348.

friends, by laying the blame on them. One of these was Metrodorus of Scepsis, a man of agreeable speech and wide learning, who enjoyed the friendship of Mithridates in such a high degree that he was called the king's father. This man, as it seems, had once been sent as an ambassador from Mithridates to Tigranes, with a request for aid against the Romans. On this occasion Tigranes asked him: 'But what is your own advice to me, Metrodorus, in this matter?' Whereupon Metrodorus, either with an eye on the interests of Tigranes, or because he did not wish Mithridates to be saved, said that as an ambassador he urged consent, but as an adviser he forbade it. Tigranes disclosed this to Mithridates, not supposing, when he told him, that he would punish Metrodorus past all healing. But Metrodorus was at once put out of the way. Then Tigranes repented of what he had done, although he was not entirely to blame for the death of Metrodorus. He merely gave an impulse, as it were, to the hatred which Mithridates already had for the man. For he had long been secretly hostile to him, as was seen from his private papers when they were captured, in which there were directions that Metrodorus, as well as others, be put to death. Accordingly, Tigranes gave the body of Metrodorus a splendid burial, sparing no expense upon the man when dead, although he had betrayed him when alive.[1]

This lengthy account of Plutarch was intended particularly to denigrate Tigranes, and, in my opinion, is fictitious insofar as Metrodorus' death is concerned. Strabo's account makes it clear that Metrodorus died in the year 71. Thus he could not have been killed after Tigranes' meeting with Mithridates in the year 69.

I include here Strabo's full account:

...and later, came Metrodorus [also a native of Scepsis], a man who changed from his pursuit of philosophy to political life and taught rhetoric, for the most part, in his written works; and he used a brand-new style and dazzled many. On account of his reputation he succeeded, though a poor man, in marrying brilliantly in Chalcedon; and he passed for a Chalcedonian. And having paid court to Mithridates Eupator, he with his wife sailed away with him to Pontus; and he was treated with exceptional honor, being appointed to a judgeship from which there was no appeal to the king. However, his good fortune did not continue,

[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXII, 2-4.

but he incurred the enmity of men less just than himself and revolted from the king when he was on the embassy to Tigranes the Armenian. And Tigranes sent him back against his will to Eupator, who was already in flight from his ancestral realm; but Metrodorus died on the way, whether by order of the king or from disease, for both accounts are given of his death.[1]

As we see, Strabo clearly states that Metrodorus died on his way back to Pontus, returning from his visit with Tigranes and when Mithridates, pursued by Lucullus, was fleeing his domain, that is, in the year 71. Consequently, the accounts of Reinach, Eckhardt, and other historians[2] who, rely on Plutarch, and place the killing of Metrodorus after Tigranes' meeting with Mithridates in the year 69, are incorrect.

In my opinion, the accounts of Plutarch, as well as Strabo, regarding the murder of Metrodorus are suspect. These accounts, although contradictory [as to the date], both stem from sources who were opposed to Mithridates and who wished to discredit and defame him. More accurate I think is the opinion of the [second group of] historians used by Strabo, who had either no exact information on the death of Metrodorus, or who think that he died from illness.[3]

One has to also note the inconsistency of Plutarch's and Memnon's other, equally important accounts. Memnon states that after their three-day conference, Mithridates received a 10,000-man cavalry from Tigranes and left for Pontus. Plutrach, however, does not mention this. He does, in another part of his work, inform us that after their deliberations, Tigranes and Mithridates planned to attack Asia Minor from the direction of Cilicia and Lycaonia. He states:

Being informed now that Mithridates and Tigranes were on the point of entering Lycaonia and Cilicia, with the purpose of invading Asia before war was actually declared, he was amazed that the Armenian, if he cherished the design of attacking the Romans, had not made use of Mithridates for this war when he was at the zenith of his power, nor joined forces with him when he was strong, but had allowed him to be crushed and ruined, and now

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[1] Strabo, VI, Bk. XIII, i, 55.

[2] Reinach, 357; Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, I, 89, and others.

[3] Reinach, relying on an unknown source, claims that it is more probable that he died from taking poison, 357.

began a war which offered only faint hopes of success, prostrating himself to the level of those who were unable to stand erect.[1]

Plutarch's account, cited in old and recent works[2] as reliable, is, in fact, not only inaccurate, but incorrect. Tigranes, as we have seen, not only did not prepare for war, but did not even imagine that Rome would start a war against him. It is absolutely clear that Tigranes and Mithridates, whose meeting took place after Lucullus' invasion and the siege of Tigranocerta, could not make a plan to move into and invade Roman Asia Minor, before Lucullus' attack.

The fabrications of Plutarch and those historians who rely on his account, were apparently created in order to put the blame of war on Tigranes' and Mithridates' shoulders and to justify Lucullus' invasion of Armenia, which, in fact, was carried out clandestinely and without a declaration of war.

[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIII, 7.

[2] Mommsen, VI, 195; Reinach, 358; Khalat'iants, 191, and others.

12
The Great Battle of Tigranocerta

The city of Tigranocerta was besieged by the Romans in the spring of the year 69, but it resisted fiercely for several months, while waiting for relief from Tigranes, who was organizing a new army. Meanwhile, the Armenian king gradually gathered forces from various provinces, as well as from his vassal kings and princes. According to Plutarch,[1] these included the kings of Atropatene and Adiabene, as well as troops from [Caucasian] Albania, Georgia, Arabia, and other lands.

In the fall of the year 69, Tigranes and his troops went on the offensive and crossed the Taurus Mountains southward to deliver Tigranocerta from the siege. The route traversed by Tigranes, according to Eckhardt, started at the Plain of Mush and went to present-day Nercik, from where it turned to the left (southwest) and continued along the left bank of the Batman-Su River to the point where that river meets the Farkin-Su River.[2]

At the same time, according to Memnon and Plutarch, the envoys of Mithridates, together with the veteran general, Taxiles, approached Tigranes. They advised him to avoid a decisive battle, explaining that the well-trained Roman legions were practically invincible. They counseled him rather to harass them as much as possible, and disrupt their supply lines, thus starving them.[3]

However, Tigranes was loath to follow this advice, not wanting to prolong the fighting and sacrifice Tigranocerta, which needed immediate relief.

As we have seen, the construction of this new Hellenistic city was a major cultural endeavor, costing colossal sums and considerable labor. According to Tigranes' vision, the city was to be the cultural and manufacturing center of his kingdom and was to gradually transform and modernize the relative backwardness of his native land. In addition to contributing to the development of commerce and indus-

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXVI, 4.

[2] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, I, 94.

[3] Appian's contention (*Mithridatic Wars*, 85) that Mithridates was present at the battle of Tigranocerta and it was he who gave the above advice to Tigranes does not correspond to Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIX, 1 or to Memnon's (Chapter 58) account.

try in Armenia, Tigranocerta was to expand Hellenistic civilization and the Hellenic arts and sciences throughout the country. It is easy to understand why Tigranes did not follow the advice of Mithridates and his general, and instead rushed to lift the siege of Tigranocerta.

According to Plutarch, Lucullus, who had surrounded Tigranocerta,[1] anticipated that Tigranes would not tolerate a siege, and would certainly return and engage in a battle to save his new capital.

At the beginning of October of the year 69, Tigranes' army approached Tigranocerta and a clash with the Romans became inevitable.

The battle for Tigranocerta, as the primary sources tell us, took place by the Farkin-Su (Nicephorium) River, where, at a distance of 750 meters was a hillock of some size. According to Plutarch, the besieged citizens of Tigranocerta saw Tigranes' army and [in their enthusiasm inadvertently] indicated its location to the Romans.[2]

The German scholar Belck, relying on primary sources, and particularly on the account of Plutarch, places the location of the battle not far from present-day Farkin. It is worthwhile to cite some of his passages here:

After slowly descending to the vast valley of the Farkin-Su River in a southeasterly direction, and after traveling some twenty kilometers, we come to a great plain, which is the basin of the large Batman-Su River. This plain, in the north, begins at the large bridge which is at a distance of twenty kilometers from our location. It stretches southward for some 12-15 kilometers and then comes to an end. The width of the plain varies from place to place and is from one to three kilometers...

The plain is a flat, even terrain and is so wide that it can serve as a camping ground for a number of huge armies. The river...which Lucullus had to cross is 30, 40, or 50 meters. It is gentle and calm, but is also swift and deep and flows into the relatively small Diarbekir River...Across the Batman-Su...there is a large hill, which descends steeply westward in the direction of Batman-Su and is some five or six kilometers from it. From the southeastern direction, however, the terrain from the hill descends to the river not suddenly but gradually...Here, precisely on the gentle slope of this large hill, Tigranes' large army set up

[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXVI, 3.

[2] *Ibid.*, XXVII, 2.

camp. From this point, approximately some 150 to 200 meters high, they could see Tigranocerta and the tents of the besieging army. The besieged could also see Tigranes and his army, for from there one could clearly see the plateau, the slope of the hill, the Batman-Su, and the plain.[1]

The battleground by Tigranocerta, as indicated by Belck, and accepted by most historians, thus lies in the region southwest of the city of Farkin, in the valley situated at the present-day confluence of the Batman-Su and Farkin-Su Rivers [see map 4]. That the battle took place near present-day Farkin-Su is confirmed by the fact that the classical authors call the river Nicephorium or Nicephorios, which means "victorious." This name, according to Markwart, was given to it only after Lucullus' victory here.[2]

When the Armenian army neared Tigranocerta, Lucullus, according to Plutarch, decided to hold a war council.[3] Some of the participants advised him to give up the siege of the city and to attack the enemy with all of his forces. Others thought that it was dangerous to leave the garrison of Tigranocerta at their rear and advised him to remain near the city walls and fight.

Lucullus, according to Plutarch, rejected both proposals and decided to continue the siege with one part of his army, and to move against Tigranes with the other part. He left 6,000 men under the command of General Murena by the walls of Tigranocerta. Together with the rest of the army, which according to Plutarch included 10,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 1,000 lightly armed troops, he moved against Tigranes.

Recent studies indicate that Plutarch's estimate, as well as those of generally all the ancient historians on the number of the Roman and Armenian troops, are in need of careful examination and revision. Below we give detailed examples of the more important of these studies which, for the most part, contradict each other.

A) The size of the Roman army in Armenia

1. Plutarch (*Lucullus*, XXIV, 1)
   12,000 infantry; 3,000 cavalry
2. Eutropius (*Breviarium*, VI, ix, 1)

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[1] W. Belck, *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (Berlin, 1899), 272, *passim*. See map 4.

[2] Markwart, *Südarmenien*, 132.

[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXVII, 2.

18,000 soldiers (*milites*)

3. Appian (*Mithridatic Wars*), 84
   Two select legions and 500 cavalry

B) The number of Roman troops at the battle of Tigranocerta

1. Plutarch (*Lucullus*, XXVIII, 2)
   Twenty-four brigades (cohorts)—not more than 10,000 heavily armed men, 3,000 cavalry and 1,000 archers and slingers.
2. Frontinus (*Stratagems*, II, i.14)
   15,000 warriors (*armati*)

C) The number of Armenian troops at the Battle of Tigranocerta

3. Plutarch (*Lucullus*, XXVI, 9)
   20,000 slingers and archers; 55,000 cavalry (17,000 of which were mail-clad); 150,000 mail clad infantry; 35,000 sappers, bridge-builders, road-builders and other laborers
4. Appian (*Mithridatic Wars*), 85
   250,000 infantry and 50,000 cavalry
5. Eutropius (*Breviarium*, VI, ix, 1)
   7,500 armored cavalry; 100,000 infantry
6. Memnon (ch. 57)
   80,000 cavalry
7. Phlegon (*Olympiades*, Frag. 12, Muller, *Fragm Hist. graec*, III, 606).[1]
   30,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry

Among these sources, most historians[2] consider Plutarch the most reliable, since he used Roman primary sources—that is Sallust, Livy, and probably the official reports which were sent by Lucullus to the Senate after the battle. According to these numbers, provided by Plutarch and based on Livy,[3] Mommsen and subsequent historians[4] claim that the armed forces of Tigranes were twenty times larger than those of the Romans.

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[1] According to Eckhardt, Phlegon's numbers are for the battle of Tigranocerta and not the battle of Arzianene, *Klio*, X, I, 98, note 5.

[2] See Mommsen, VI, 203; K. V. Nitzsch, *Geschichte der römischen Republik*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1884-1885), and others.

[3] Plutarch states that, according to Titus Livy, every Roman faced twenty enemy troops, *Lucullus*, XXVIII, 7.

[4] Mommsen, IV, 339.

However, modern historians such as Reinach, Ferrero, Eckhardt, and others, consider Plutarch's numbers of the Armenian troops highly exaggerated.[1]

They cite the evidence from impartial historians of Asia Minor—Memnon and Phlegon of Tralles—that the number of Armenian troops was around 70,000 or 80,000 and not 260,000.

That the smaller numbers are more accurate is likely in the light of the practice of Roman generals to habitually and systematically give false and exaggerated numbers of enemy troops in their official reports. Challenging Plutarch's evidence, Eckhardt points out that it would have been virtually impossible to transport an army of 260,000 men through the narrow passes of the Taurus Mountains.

Almost all historians are in accord regarding the number of Roman troops. From the aforementioned data of Plutarch and Frontinus, the number of Roman troops which besieged Tigranocerta was around 14,000 to 15,000 men. However, Reinach and Eckhardt correctly note that there are contradictions in Plutarch's numbers.[2] As we have seen, Plutarch states that the Roman army surrounding Tigranocerta was composed of 6,000 warriors of Murena; 10,000 mail-clad infantry; 3,000 cavalry and 1,000 archers and slingers, for a total of 20,000 men. According to his earlier statement, however, the Roman army that invaded Armenia had only 15,000 men: 12,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Eckhardt notes that the 6,000 men of Murena and the 1,000 lightly armed troops are not included in this total. Thus Eckhardt concludes that the Roman army which invaded Armenia probably numbered not 15,000 but 22,000 men.

Even if we accept Eckhardt's correction in this instance, it is difficult, in my opinion, to accept that Lucullus planned his great war against Tigranes, who he well knew would be joined by Mithridates, with such an inadequate force. As Asturean[3] correctly points out, the Roman historians only mention the number of Roman troops proper and do not include the troops of the Roman allies in Asia Minor. The fact that troops of allied to Rome took an active part in the wars against Armenia is, in fact, evident in the works of Roman and other historians.

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[1] Reinach, 360; Ferrero, I, 198; Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, I, 96-100. Ferrero has 80,000 men.

[2] Reinach, 358, note 1; Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, I, 78-82.

[3] Asturean, 175-178.

Strabo, for example, has a valuable account which indicates that Lucullus apparently received an army from Ariobarzanes, the king of Cappadocia, in return for which Lucullus gave him the fortress of Tomisa in Sophene.[1] As will be seen below, light-armed cavalry units of Thracians and Galatians took part as auxiliary forces to the Roman army in the battle of Tigranocerta. Sallust also mentions auxiliary forces from Bythinia, which reached the banks of the Arsanias River in the fall of the year 68, before the other units of the Roman army.[2]

Clearly, the participation of auxiliary troops of Rome's allies in Asia Minor in the wars against Armenia is an incontestable fact. These additional troops, among whom were Thracians, Galatians, and Bythinians, formed a good part of Lucullus' army. Thus it would be incorrect to assume that the Roman army at Tigranocerta was only 15,000 or even 22,000, as noted by most historians; it must have been much larger than that.

Therefore, we can deduce that the above-mentioned correlation between the Roman army and that of Tigranes indicated by Mommsen, Nich [Nitsch] and other historians as being one to twenty is obviously wrong. If we agree that the number of allied auxiliary forces in Lucullus' army was not less than the number of Roman troops, it is not difficult to conclude that Tigranes' army was not twenty times larger than that of the Romans, but, was at best, twice as large.

As we know, the battle of Tigranocerta took place on October 6 of the year 69. Our most important sources on this great battle are Plutarch, Appian, Memnon, and Frontinus, who, although not in accord on certain fundamental points, are in total agreement with each other in other details.

Their conflicting evidence, however, as we will see below, is so crucial that it is impossible to reconstruct all the details of the battle. However, it is accurately described in many modern historical studies.[3]

The most detailed account of the battle is found in Plutarch. But his account is so full of theatrical and overly dramatized episodes

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[1] Strabo, V, Bk. XII, ii, 1.

[2] Sallust, iv, 72.

[3] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, I, 100-104; Drumann, *Geschichte Roms*, Bd IV, 147 (Berlin, 1899), 147, *passim*; E. Sachau, "Über die Lage von Tigranocerta," *Abhandlungen der Konig. Akad.* (Berlin, 1880), and others.

that it raises doubts on the authenticity of this author's narrative. This dubiousness starts from the very beginning of his account of the battle. According to Plutarch, even before the battle commenced, as Lucullus' army had set up camp near the river, Tigranes, glancing at the small Roman force, said, *If they are [sic] come as ambassadors, there are too many; if as soldiers, too few.*[1] This account cannot be considered true, for Plutarch's account of the Roman and Armenian forces is exaggerated, as we have seen. Plutarch then continues:

> *At daybreak Lucullus led out his forces under arms. Now, the Barbarian army lay to the east of the river. But as the stream takes a turn to the west at the point where it was easiest to ford, and as Lucullus led his troops to the attack in that direction first, and with speed, he seemed to Tigranes to be retreating. So he called Texiles* [Taxiles] *and said with a laugh, 'Don't you see that the invincible Roman hoplites are taking to flight?' 'O King', said Texiles, 'I could wish that some marvelous thing might fall to your good fortune; but when these men are merely on a march, they do not put on shining raiment, nor have they their shields polished and their helmets uncovered as now that they have stripped the leathern coverings from their armor. Nay, this splendor means that they are going to fight and are now advancing upon their enemies.*[2]

The great battle of Tigranocerta, which took place on the left bank of the river [see map 4], is, as noted, described by Plutarch, Appian, Memnon, and Frontinus. However, the details and essentials of the battle described by the first two of these historians are so confusing and contradictory that it is absolutely impossible to create an exact and full picture of the battle. To highlight these contradictory accounts, we shall cite, in a word-for-word translation, the description of the battle by these authors.

1. Plutarch (*Lucullus*, XXVI, 6-7; XXVIII, 1-6):

> *And so, with much tumult and confusion, his (Tigranes') multitude formed in battle array, the king himself occupying the center, and assigning the left wing to the king of the Adiabeni, the right*

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[1] Plutarch, Lucullus, XXVII, 4. This same statement is found in Memnon (Chapter 57). His account must have been based on the works of Roman historians.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXVII, 4-5.

to the king of the Medes. In front of this wing also the greater part of the mail-clad horsemen were drawn up.
As Lucullus was about to cross the river, some of his officers advised him to beware of the day, which was one of the unlucky days—the Romans call them "black days." For on that day Caepio and his army perished in a battle with the Cambri.[1] *But Lucullus answered with the memorable words: 'Verily, I will make this day, too, a lucky one for the Romans.' Now the day was the sixth of October.*

Saying this, and bidding his men be of good courage, he crossed the river, and led the way in person against the enemy. He wore a steel breastplate of glittering scales, and a tasseled cloak, and at once let his sword flash forth from its scabbard, indicating that they must forthwith come to close quarters with men who fought with long-range missiles, and eliminate, by the rapidity of their onset, the space in which archery would be effective. But when he saw that the mail-clad horsemen, on whom the greatest reliance was placed, were stationed at the foot of a considerable hill which was crowned by a broad and level space, and that the approach to this was a matter of only four stadia, and neither rough nor steep, he ordered his Thracian and Gallic horsemen to attack the enemy in the flank, and to parry their long spears with their own short swords. (Now the sole resource of the mail-clad horsemen is their long spear, and they have none other whatsoever, either in defending themselves or attacking their enemies, owing to the weight and rigidity of their armor; in this they are, as it were, immured.) Then he himself, with two cohorts, hastened eagerly towards the hill, his soldiers following with all their might, because they saw him ahead of them in armor, enduring all the fatigue of a foot-soldier, and pressing his way along. Arrived [sic] at the top, and standing in the most conspicuous spot, he cried with a loud voice, 'The day is ours; the day is ours, my fellow soldiers!' With these words, he led his men against the mail-clad horsemen, ordering them not to hurl their javelins yet, but taking each his own man, to smite the enemy's legs and thighs, which are the only parts of these mail-clad horsemen left exposed. However, there was no need of this mode of fighting, for the enemy did not await the Romans, but, with loud cries and in

[1] In the year 105.

most disgraceful flight, they hurled themselves and their horse, with all their weight, upon the ranks of their own infantry, before it had so much as begun to fight, and so all those tens of thousands were defeated without the infliction of a wound or the sight of blood. But the greatest slaughter began at once when they fled, or rather tried to fly [sic], for they were prevented from doing so by the closeness and depth of their own ranks. Tigranes rode away at the very outset with a few attendants, and took to flight. Seeing his son also in the same plight, he took off the diadem from his head and, in tears, gave it to him bidding him to save himself as best as he could by another route. The young man, however, did not venture to assume the diadem, but gave it to his most trusted slave for safe keeping. This slave happened to be captured, and was brought to Lucullus, and thus even the diadem of Tigranes became a part of the booty. It is said that more than a hundred thousand of the enemy's infantry perished, while of the cavalry only a few, all told, made their escape. Of the Romans, on the other hand, only a hundred were wounded, and only five killed.

2. Appian (*Mithridatic Wars*), 85:
   Lucullus saw a hill favorably situated in the rear of Tigranes, and accordingly stationed his cavalry for a frontal attack, to harass the enemy and draw him on against themselves, retiring voluntarily, so that the barbarians should break their own ranks in the pursuit; but he himself went round with his infantry to the hill and took possession of it unobserved. When he saw the enemy pursuing as though they had won the fight, and scattered in all directions, with their entire baggage-train lying at the foot of the hill, he exclaimed, "Soldiers, we are victorious," and dashed first upon their baggage-carriers. These immediately fled in confusion and ran against their own infantry, and the infantry against the cavalry. In a moment the rout was complete. After drawing their pursuer a long distance, the Roman horse[men]turned and cut them to pieces, and the baggage-train in their confusion came into collision with the others. And as they jostled each other in the crowd, and did not know with any certainty from what quarter their discomfiture preceded[sic],there was a great slaughter. Nobody stopped to plunder, for Lucullus had forbidden it with threats of punishment, so that they passed the bracelets and neck-

laces on the road, and continued killing for a distance of 120 stades [sic] until nightfall. Then they returned and betook themselves to plunder with the permission of Lucullus.

3. Memnon (chapter 57):
   He (Tigranes) gathered his 80,000-man army and moved down to take Tigranocerta from the enemy and drive it away. Wanting to quickly end this affair, and seeing the small numbers of the Roman army, he said with contempt, "If they have come as ambassadors, they are too many, if as enemies too few." Saying this, he set up camp on the plain. Lucullus, with great skill and care, prepared his army for battle and inspired them. He immediately put the right flank of the enemy to flight, then scattered the neighboring ranks and after that, in order, the rest of the enemy army. The Armenians panicked, fled, and their losses were in proportion to their numbers. Tigranes handed his royal tiara and the diadem to his son and fled to one of his fortresses.
4. Frontinus (*Stratagems*, II, i, 14; ii, 4):
   At Tigranocerta in Greater Armenia, Lucullus, in the campaign against Mithridates and Tigranes, did not have above 15,000 armed men, while the enemy had an innumerable host, which for this very reason was unwieldy. Taking advantage, accordingly, of this handicap of the foe, Lucullus attacked their line before it was in order, and straightaway routed it so completely that even the kings themselves discarded their trappings and fled.

   When Lucullus was planning to fight Mithridates and Tigranes at Tigranocerta in Greater Armenia, he himself swiftly gained the level top of the nearest hill with a part of his troops and then rushed down upon the enemy posted below, at the same time attacking their cavalry on the flank. When the cavalry broke and straightaway threw the infantry into confusion, Lucullus followed after them and gained a most notable victory.

A closer look at all of these accounts, demonstrates that the evidence on the battle of Tigranocerta that has reached us is of two types, based on two different sets of sources—one Roman and the other from Asia Minor. The Roman reports, preserved by Plutarch, utilized the historical works of Sallust and Livy, while the reports of the historians of Asia Minor are found in Appian, who, in his account of Lucullus' incursion, mainly relied on a Hellenistic source,

probably, according to Reinach, the historian Nicolaus of Damascus.[1]

The above [four] short accounts generally voice the Roman version. The account of Frontinus is undoubtedly based on Livy. Adhering to Livy, Frontinus states, also incorrectly, that Mithridates Eupator, together with Tigranes, took part in the battle of Tigranocerta. The same is true of the short account of Memnon, which is closer to the Roman account than to that of Appian.

The unfolding of the events of the battle of Tigranocerta, as well as the accounts of Plutarch and Appian, have been recently researched and examined in the work of Eckhardt,[2] who has noted Lucullus' precise movements during the battle. Disagreeing with Drumann and Reinach, who wanted to complete and correct Plutarch's version with the help of Appian, Eckhardt considers only Plutarch's account as accurate. Relying on it alone, he has drawn the following picture of the battle of Tigranocerta:

Crossing the river, Lucullus, as described in the above account of Plutarch, ordered his Thracian and Galatian cavalry units to attack the mail-clad cavalry of the enemy stationed on its right flank. He, himself, took two cohorts of infantry and rushed to take the nearby hill, which formed the main position at the rear of Tigranes' army. At the same time, he attacked the enemy's armed cavalry from the rear. Tigranes' slow-moving and tightly pressed cavalry, incapable of resisting the Roman attack to its rear and right flank, fled in disorder and trampled their own confused and panic-stricken infantry with their horses. Tigranes' entire army thus suffered a defeat before even engaging in combat. Eckhardt severely criticizes Appian's contradictory account, and calls it confusing and valueless [see map 4].

Appian, as we have seen, gives a totally different account of the battle. According to him, Lucullus, at the start of the battle, ordered his cavalry to attack the main front of the enemy. Then, feigning a retreat, he dispersed the enemy ranks. Lucullus himself, together with his infantry, circled unobserved into the rear of the enemy and occupied the nearby hill, at the foot of which lay the enemy's baggage train. Attacking the baggage train from the top of the hill, he forced it to flee and trample its own infantry, which, in turn, completely disheartened and confused, crashed into the cavalry. Ti-

[1] Reinach, 443-449.

[2] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, I, 100-110.

granes' entire army was thus defeated, before they even engaged in battle with the Romans [see map 5].

Can this account of Appian be rejected, considering that it was the basis of the only reliable source for Roman historians?

I propose that Eckhardt does not have enough data to judge Plutarch's account as clear and incontestable and that of Appian as incoherent and full of contradictions. On the contrary, Appian's simple account is more credible and merits more attention than Plutarch's account.

I think it entirely certain that, as Appian states, Lucullus sent his swift cavalry as a diversion to attack Tigranes' front, while the Roman infantry did not enter the field of battle, but skirted it, headed for the enemy's rear, and from there attacked the baggage train. I consider Appian's account more reliable than Plutarch's narrative, which has Lucullus going head on with his drawn sword into hand-to-hand combat, and, yet unseen by the enemy, reaching its rear.

Is it possible that Lucullus with his two cohorts of infantry, moved, while facing the enemy, to its rear and secretly took the hill? If the Roman primary sources do not mention Tigranes' baggage train and Lucullus' attack on it from the rear with the entire Roman infantry, this is very likely because such an attack was not considered brave or noble and would thus not bring special honor to the Roman general.

The exceptional character of Lucullus' victory is mentioned in one of the fragments of Sallust. In a letter from Mithridates to the Parthian king [Phraates III], recorded by Sallust, the following lines appear regarding the battle of Tigranocerta:

> *Because they [the Romans] kept at bay a huge force hemmed in by narrow defiles, they are now boasting of the outcome of Tigranes' imprudence as if it were a victory.*[1]

Regarding the question of maneuverability upon the field of battle, one has to note that Tigranes, in constructing his new capital, sought a defendable and mountainous region and thus could not find a more open and wide field of battle in the environs of Tigranocerta.

As to the losses suffered by the army of Tigranes, the accounts of the Roman authors totally differ from those of the impartial historians of Asia Minor. Probably basing his numbers on the official reports of Lucullus, Plutarch has left us an exaggerated account.

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[1] Sallust, iv, 67.

Tigranes' infantry, according to Plutarch, lost more than 100,000 men in this battle, while few survived from among his cavalry. Roman losses, on the other hand, were 100 wounded and five dead. We know that similar improbable figures were also habitually included in the official reports of Sulla. He also claimed that the Pontic forces in the battle of Cherone in the year 86 lost 60,000 men, while the Romans lost only 14. All historians are well aware of the value of such triumphant communiqués from the Roman generals and, therefore, do not rely on these numbers. Reinach, and his followers—Gaṛagashean, Daghbashean, and others—prefer to cite Orose (Orosius),[1] according to whom the number of Armenians dead is listed as only 30,000. However, Eckhardt, in his study, does not even accept this figure, which is based on Roman sources, probably Livy. In Eckhardt's opinion, the numbers given by Phlegon of Tralles, listing Tigranes' losses as 5,000, are even closer to the truth.[2] This smallest number appears most reliable to me as well, for it is based on the accounts of impartial historians of Asia Minor, which, as we have proven conclusively, are more believable than the tendentious and partial accounts of Roman historians. In addition to the above numbers, the account of the Roman historians concerning the royal diadem of Tigranes is, according to Mommsen, also invented and false.[3] This episode, as we have seen, is described differently by Memnon, Plutarch, and Frontinus.[4] Memnon, who in all probability utilized some Roman historian for that part of his account, states that Tigranes gave his diadem to his son while he himself fled to one of his fortresses. Plutarch adds that the son, refusing to wear the diadem, gave it for safekeeping to one of his more trusted servants, who, together with the diadem, was taken prisoner by Lucullus. Frontinus adds that not only Tigranes, but the other kings as well, threw off their crowns and fled.

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[1] Orose, *Orosii Pauli Historiarum adversus paganos*, VI (Leipzig, 1889), 3, 6; Reinach, 362; A.M. Gaṛagashean, *K'nnakan patmut'iwn hayots' êst noragoyn patmakan, lezuabanakan ew banasirakan teghekut'eants'*, II (Tiflis, 1895), 145; H. Daghbashean, *Stoyg hayots' patmut'iwn hamadzayn noragoyn hetazotut'iunneri* (Tiflis, 1914), 93, and others.

[2] Phlegon, Frag. 12; Müller, *Frag. Hist. Graec*, III, 606.

[3] Mommsen, IV, 340.

[4] This incident is absent from the work of Appian, who probably used the neutral Asia Minor historians for this part of his account.

These divergent accounts themselves cast doubt on these sources. Mommsen is absolutely correct, when he considers the above incident, as well as the number of Tigranes' losses, false inventions in the style of Sulla.

[Thus] Tigranes' defeat near Tigranocerta, is, as we have seen, greatly exaggerated in both the Roman sources and in the works of recent historians. In reality, the battle was not a bloody conflict; rather, ended, without a fight, in the disorganized retreat of Tigranes' army.

However, this defeat had major consequences for the newly established empire of Tigranes. The result of the defeat, as we shall see below, was the loss of the city of Tigranocerta and the destruction of the great Armenian state.

13
The Capture of Tigranocerta and the Collapse of Tigranes' Large Empire

As a result of the battle of October 6th and the defeat of Tigranes' army, Lucullus, with his rear secure, could continue the siege of Tigranocerta boldly and without fear.

The city, under the command of Mancaeus, valiantly resisted the Romans for five months, but eventually lost any hope of receiving aid from Tigranes. Nonetheless, it did not surrender and continued to defend itself against the enemy. The reason, as Appian, Plutarch, Memnon, and Dio Cassius have pointed out, that the Romans finally managed to take the city without bloody clashes and large losses was the rebellion and the betrayal of the mercenary Greek troops.

Although all these historians describe the betrayal differently, three of them—Appian, Plutarch, and Dio Cassius—agree with each other on the essentials.

We find the more detailed account of this event in Appian's work. After Tigranes' defeat, Mancaeus did not trust the mercenary Greek troops and ordered his troops them to disarm. The latter rebelled against their commander and occupied the area between the two towers on the walls of Tigranocerta. They started negotiations with the Romans, allowed them to enter, and handed the city over to the enemy. Plutarch limits his short description of this by stating that Lucullus was able to take the city, thanks to the revolt of the Greeks. Dio Cassius attributes the insurrection to the foreign residents of the city, particularly the Greeks brought from Cilicia, who let the Romans into the city during the night and handed it over to be pillaged. Memnon is silent on the betrayal of the Greek mercenaries. Rather, he holds the generals of Mithridates who were in the city, responsible for the fall of Tigranocerta. According to him, they betrayed it and handed it over to Lucullus in order to save themselves.

It is useful to include these accounts:

1. Appian (*Mithridatic Wars*), 86:

   When Mancaeus beheld this defeat [of the Armenians] from Tigranocerta, he disarmed all his Greek mercenaries because he suspected them. They, in fear of arrest, went about together and rested together with clubs in their hands. Mancaeus set upon them with his armed barbarians. They wound their clothing round

their left arms, to serve as shields, ran upon their assailants courageously, and immediately shared the arms of all those they killed. When they were thus, as far as possible, provided with weapons, they seized some of the spaces between the towers, called to the Romans outside, and admitted them when they came up. In this way was Tigranocerta taken and much wealth was plundered...

2. Plutarch, xxix, 3.
   But in the city of Tigranocerta, the Greeks had risen against the Barbarians and were ready to hand the city over to Lucullus; so he assaulted and took it.
3. Memnon, chapter 57.
   Lucullus returned to Tigranocerta and besieged it even more boldly. Mithridates' generals, in full despair, and in order to save themselves, handed the city to Lucullus.
4. Dio, II, Bk. XXXVI, ii, 3-4.
   Nevertheless he [Lucullus] seized Tigranocerta when the foreigners living in the city revolted against the Armenians; for most of them were Cilicians who had once been carried off from their own land, and these let in the Romans during the night. Thereupon everything was plundered, except what belonged to the Cilicians.

Of these accounts, as we can see, only the third disagrees with the others and attributes the taking of Tigranocerta to the betrayal of Mithridates' generals. As to "the generals of Mithridates," Memnon probably is referring to those commanders of Mithridates' army, who, after the fall of Pontus, entered into the service of Tigranes and were given high posts in the Armenian capital. The betrayal of the Pontic generals is found only in Memnon's account. Among modern historians, only Reinach accepts Memnon's assertion.[1] He proposes that Mithridates' generals were in charge of the Greek and Cilician troops in Tigranocerta. All the other modern historians ignore Memnon's account and accept the more accurate versions of Appian, Plutarch, and Dio Cassius, who unanimously attest that the city was handed over to the Romans by the Greek mercenaries and the new residents brought to Tigranocerta from Cilicia.

Entering Tigranocerta, the Romans, according to Plutarch, plundered it mercilessly.

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[1] Reinach, 363.

The royal treasures in the city he [Lucullus] *took into his own charge, but the city itself he turned over to his soldiers for plunder, and it contained eight thousand talents in money, together with the usual valuables. Besides this, he gave to each man eight hundred drachmas from the general spoils.*[1]

Eight thousand talents of silver, according to the German scholar Hultsch,[2] equal 34 million German gold marks, or around 17 million gold rubles. Eight hundred drachmas or silver *denarius* equal 560 gold marks or 280 gold rubles. These large figures indicate that Tigranocerta, despite being only recently founded, was an immensely wealthy city.

Plutarch also states that the many Greek actors, whom Tigranes had invited to his newly constructed theater, were now, after the fall of the city, employed for the celebrations and spectacles in honor of Lucullus' victory.[3]

The fall of Tigranocerta was a mortal blow to the great progressive enterprise of Tigranes, who planned to bring Hellenistic urban culture and civilization to the rest of Armenia. Lucullus returned the Greeks and other foreigners, who, as we have seen, were brought by Tigranes to his new capital, back to their own cities and lands.

We find evidence in Plutarch and Strabo on the repatriation of the Greeks and foreign residents:

1. Plutarch xxix, 5.

   The Greeks he sent to their native cities, giving them also the means wherewith to make the journey, and likewise the Barbarians who had been compelled to settle there. Thus it came to pass that the dissolution of one city was the restoration of many others, by the reason of their recovering their own inhabitants, and they all loved Lucullus as their benefactor and founder.

2. Strabo, V, Book. XI, 14-15

   Exalted to this height, he also founded a city near Iberia(?), between this place and the Zeugma on the Euphrates; and having gathered peoples thither from twelve Greek cities which he had laid waste, he named it Tigranocerta; but Lucullus, who had waged war against Mithridates, arrived before Tigranes finished his undertaking and not only dismissed the inhabitants to their

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIX, 3.

[2] Hultsch, 297, 299, 711

[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIX, 4.

> *several home-lands but also attacked and pulled down the city, which was still only half finished, and left it a small village.*

Ibid., Strabo, V, Bk. XII, ii, 9

> *But Tigranes, the Armenian, put the people [of Mazaca] in bad plight when he overran Cappadocia, for he forced them, one and all, to migrate into Mesopotamia; and it was mostly with these that he settled Tigranocerta. But later, after the capture of Tigranocerta, those who could, returned home.*

Of the above, Strabo's first account, that Lucullus pulled down Tigranocerta and left it a small village, merits special attention. In my opinion, this statement should not be taken literally. For, later historians[1] state that Tigranocerta, after Lucullus' campaign, was still considered a major city with a citadel and an important center with a large population. Tacitus mentions its impregnable walls in his *Annals*.[2] One can conclude from these accounts that the destruction wrought by Lucullus after the taking of Tigranocerta in the fall of the year 69 did not probably damage the city's ramparts and fortifications. This statement of Strabo can be interpreted as meaning that, following the exodus of the Greeks and other foreigners, Tigranocerta ceased to be a Hellenistic city—a *polis*, that is, an autonomously administered city. In other words, this magnificent city, which was designed to be a rival to the larger Hellenistic cities in Asia Minor, such as Seleucia and Antioch, after losing its stature and a large part of its population, as well as its urban character, was later referred to as a village or a town. As we know, Ctesiphon, the capital city of the Parthians, situated near the Hellenistic city (*polis*) of Seleucia, was also called a village or a town.

Lucullus' victory and the taking of Tigranocerta had extremely grave political consequences for Tigranes' grand empire. All the lands conquered by him, from south of the Taurus Mountain chain to the Tigris River, northern Mesopotamia, Gordyene, Commagene, Syria, and eastern Cilicia, were cut off from Greater Armenia and accepted Roman hegemony. Only a part of Mesopotamia, together with the city of Nisibis, temporary remained under the rule of Tigranes' brother Gouras.

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[1] For example, see Pliny, VI, 10.

[2] Tacitus, *Annales*, XV, 4.

According to Plutarch, after the fall of Tigranocerta, the Arab chiefs came and submitted to Lucullus.[1] The strongest among them was called by Dio Cassius Alchaudonius.[2] He is also identified by Strabo as Alchaedamnus, the chief of the Rhambaean nomadic Arab tribe.[3] Prince Antiochus of Commagene, the grandson of the Seleucid king, Antiochus Grypus, also submitted to Lucullus and was named the king of Commagene. The Seleucid Antiochus of Asia was also recognized as king of Syria by both Lucullus and the Roman Senate, when he returned to Antioch after the departure of Bagarat, the Armenian governor. This Antiochus was the son of the former king of Syria, Antiochus Eusebius and Cleopatra-Selene. According to Strabo,[4] this queen was imprisoned in the fortress of Seleucia, and later, during the Armenian withdrawal from Syria, was killed on Tigranes' orders.

After the fall of Tigranocerta, Lucullus and his army spent the winter of the year 69/68 in Gordyene. Gordyene and Sophene, as we have seen, had betrayed Tigranes during the embassy of Appius Claudius and had secretly gone over to the Roman side. Tigranes, even prior to Lucullus' arrival, was aware of the betrayal of Zarbienus, the king of Gordyene, and had given orders for him and his family to be killed. Hence, the Romans in a land now hostile to the Armenians could now not only winter peacefully and without fear, but also receive provisions and make use of its abundant grain supplies.

Lucullus conducted solemn funeral rites for his ally, King Zarbienus, and elevated a magnificent gravesite monument in his honor.

The account of the wintering of the Roman troops in Gordyene, described only by Plutarch, is given below:

> *The kings of the Arabs came to him, with proffers of their possessions, and the Sopheni joined his cause. The Gordyeni were so affected by his kindness that they were ready to abandon their cities and follow him with their wives and children, in voluntary service. The reason for this was as follows. Zarbienus, the king of the Gordyeni, as has been said,* (xxi.2) *secretly stipulated with Lucullus, through Appius, for an alliance, being oppressed by the*

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIX, 6.

[2] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, ii, 5.

[3] Strabo, VII, Bk. XVI, ii, 10.

[4] *Ibid.*, XVI, ii, 3.

tyranny of Tigranes. He was informed against, however, and put to death, and his wife and children perished with him, before the Romans entered Armenia. Lucullus was not unmindful of all this, but on entering the country of Zarbienus, and after adorning a pyre with royal raiment and gold and with the spoils taken from Tigranes, set fire to it with his own hand, and joined the friends and kindred of the man in pouring libations upon it, calling him a comrade of his and an ally of the Romans. Her also ordered that a monument be erected to his memory at great cost; for many treasures were found in the palace of Zarbienus, including gold and silver, and three million bushels of grain[1] *were stored up there, so that the soldiers were plentifully supplied, and Lucullus was admired for not taking a single drachma from the public treasury, but making the war pay for itself.*[2]

During his sojourn in Gordyene, Lucullus, according to Plutarch, Eutropius, and Rufus,[3] prepared a military action against the Parthians. According to Plutarch, he ordered Sornatius, his lieutenant in Pontus, to rejoin him in Gordyene with his Roman troops and to take part in the projected invasion. However, according to Plutarch, the expedition did not take place, due to the revolt of the Roman soldiers.

Memnon, Appian, and Dio Cassius are silent about this expedition against the Parthians, but Reinach, Ferrero, and others consider the account historically accurate.[4] On the other hand, Mommsen and Eckhardt consider it doubtful, with good reason.[5] It is indeed improbable that Lucullus would order the Roman garrisons in Pontus to leave their post, to expose his rear flank to Tigranes and Mithridates, and march on Ctesiphon to begin a new war. Plutarch's account is obviously an invention, probably fabricated by Plutarch himself. This historian, who sought to glorify Lucullus whenever possible, attributed to him the planning for a third war, probably to demonstrate that, like Alexander of Macedon, Lucullus would have accomplished great deeds, had it not been for the revolt of the Roman troops.

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[1] Equal to 120,000 tons.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIX, 6-8.

[3] *Ibid.*, XXX, Eutropius, VI, 9, Sextus Rufus, *De historia Romanorum* (Paris, 1566), chap. 15.

[4] Reinach, 266; Ferrero, I, 207.

[5] Mommsen, IV, 345, Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 2, 195.

We shall see below that Lucullus not only did not have any intention of fighting the Parthians, but on the contrary, in order to safeguard his rear, concluded a pact of friendship with them.

14
The Battles of the Year 68 in Armenia and Mesopotamia

At the conclusion of the battle of Tigranocerta, Tigranes, together with his royal guards, managed to escape the battlefield and seek refuge in one of the king's nearby fortresses.

The Armenian court was in despair. Tigranes' vast empire, which had stretched from sea to sea and built wars over a period of twenty-five years of immensely difficult warfare, was now already cut in half. All his enemies, first among them the Parthians, which had once been humiliated and shaken by Tigranes, could now rise against the "King of kings" and Armenia.

At that crucial moment, according to Plutarch,[1] Mithridates Eupator, who had just arrived on the battlefield with his cavalry, encountered bands of the surviving and wounded en route, and learning of Tigranes' defeat rushed to his side. Meeting Tigranes, he reassured him and encouraged him to hope for the future.[2] The two then began to prepare energetically for a new war.

According to Memnon and Appian,[3] Tigranes took into account Mithridates' great experience, gained in his wars against the Romans, and entrusted him not only with preparation for the war, but with the command of the military operations as well.

Becoming the closest and most intimate advisor of Tigranes, Mithridates first tried to reconcile his son-in-law with his sworn enemies, the Parthians. The Parthian king Sinatruces had died (in the year 70-69)[4] and had been succeeded by King Phraates III (ca. 70/69-57).[5] Tigranes, on Mithridates' advice, sent envoys to Phraates and agreed to cede all the lands he had taken from the Parthians—Mesopotamia, Adiabene, and the "grand valleys" (probably the sev-

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXIX, 1-2.

[2] Western historians, Mommsen (VI, 205-206); Reinach (363), and others, in describing the meeting between Tigranes and Mithridates, note Tigranes' lack of courage and his faint-heatedness. These insulting comments are without any foundation and do not agree with the comments of primary sources.

[3] Memnon, Chapter 58; Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 87.

[4] New chronology has 71 or 70, CHI, III (1), 98.

[5] New chronology has 71/70-58/57), *ibid.*

enty valleys mentioned by Strabo)[1]—and requested that Phraates unite with him against the Romans.[2] The envoys warned Phraates that if the Romans defeated Tigranes, they would then make war on the Parthians.

Regarding these negotiations, Sallust cites a letter from Mithridates to Phraates, which, although not authentic,[3] is nevertheless interesting and reflects the political climate of the time. In this letter, Mithridates describes the unceasing Roman march eastward, his own great battles against them, their unquenchable thirst for conquest and loot, and the inevitability that the Parthians would also eventually fall victim to it. Mithridates thus tried to convince Phraates to join Tigranes and him against their common enemy.[4]

Parthia's policy in this matter would certainly be of great importance for the two fighting sides. That is why Lucullus, learning of the Armeno-Parthians talks, dispatched envoys to Phraates from among his new allies (Antiochus and Alachaudonis) to bring him over to the Roman side. Lucullus, according to Dio Cassius,[5] gave Phraates better conditions, reminding him of the friendly agreement of the year 92 between Mithridates II and Sulla, and demanded that Phraates either conclude an agreement with him, or remain neutral and not get involved in the Armeno-Roman conflict.[6]

This cunning Parthian did not categorically reject Tigranes' and Mithridates' proposal, but at the same time told Lucullus that he was ready to conclude a friendly alliance with Rome. Lucullus immediately dispatched his lieutenant Sextilius to Ctesiphon to conclude the pact. However, the latter, being more of a soldier than a diplomat, aroused suspicion that he was sent as a spy, to reconnoiter the Parthian terrain and especially its military forces. Losing his trust in the Romans, Phraates decided against an alliance with them and an-

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[1] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv, 15.

[2] Memnon, Chapter 58; Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 87.

[3] Modern scholars doubt the authenticity of the letter and feel that Sallust made it up as an exercise in the "genre of deliberate oratory." See McGushin's commentary in Sallust, 173-174.

[4] Sallust, iv, 67. Text reads *regi Arsaci* and not "Phraates."

[5] Dio, III, XXXVI, iii, 1.

[6] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 87.

nounced his neutrality.[1] He concluded that it was advantageous to his own security if the two antagonists fought each other with equal force without his participation. This unexpected decision of the Parthian monarch was met with great satisfaction in Armenia. Tigranes could now, with some certainty, hope that during the upcoming war his rear forces would not be attacked by the Parthians.

Tigranes and Mithridates spent the entire winter of the year 69-68 speedily preparing for war. According to Appian,[2] they traveled throughout the land and gathered a new army, whose command was entrusted by Tigranes to his father-in-law, who was knowledgeable and experienced in the art of war. They gave orders to amass arms and war materiel and to stock provisions and grain in appropriate and fortified places.

At first, Mithridates, according to Appian, ordered the mobilization of all young Armenians, but later chose only the most robust among them for military duty. He divided the new army according to the Roman model into cohorts and detachments and ordered his Pontic military officers to train and teach them in the manner of Roman legions.[3] His experiences in past battles had convinced him that massive eastern armies were not only a detriment in battle, but also an obstacle for the maneuverability of more capable troops.

In the ranks of Tigranes' new army, in addition to Armenians, were the Iberians, the Mardi, and, especially, the Medes, who were commanded by their king, Mithridates Atropatene, the son-in-law and loyal vassal of the king of Armenia.[4]

The number of troops gathered by Tigranes and Mithridates, according to Appian,[5] came to more than 100,000 men—70,000 infantry and 35,000 cavalry.[6] According to Eckhardt,[7] these numbers,

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[1] Dio, III, XXXVI, iii, 3. Dio calls him Arsaces and not Phraates. Since Phraates was the Parthian king at that time, Dio's (as well as Sallust's) text reads *regi Arsaci*, which can be read also as the Arsacid king and not King Arsaces. This opinion is shared by McGushin; see Sallust, 174.

[2] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 87.

[3] *Ibid.*; Phlegon, Frag. 3.

[4] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXI, 9

[5] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 87

[6] Russian edition has 30,000 cavalry, 143.

[7] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 2, 197.

although smaller than the previous year's army, are nevertheless exaggerated.

The Armeno-Roman war of the year 68 is characterized by Mommsen and Reinach as a national and religious struggle of a united East against the West.[1]

Mommsen states:

> *From a war between governments it came to be transformed into a national and Asiatic conflict. The kings and peoples of Asia were forced to unite against the audacious and mighty conquerors of the West...It was not difficult to represent the war as a national one of the east against the west, for such it was; it might very well be made a religious war also, and the report might be spread that the object aimed at by the army of Lucullus was the temple of the Persian Nanae (Nane) or Anaitis (Anahita) in Elymais or the modern Luristan, the most celebrated and the richest shrine in the whole region of the Euphrates. From far and near the Asiatics flocked in crowds to the banner of the kings, who summoned them to protect the east and its gods from the impious foreigners.*[2]

This opinion of Mommsen is echoed and shared by many historians,[3] and has only recently been examined and rejected by Eckhardt.[4] The latter proves that in the year 68 the Armenians, for the most part, fought the Romans with their own forces and had relatively fewer allies than they had in the year 69. Most of the people of the East, such as the Gordyeni, Sopheni, Arabs, and Parthians, had either gone over to the Roman side or had remained neutral. Hence, as Eckhardt correctly notes, although it is possible and appropriate to mention the unification of the East in the religious wars of Islam, it is absolutely inconceivable to make the same argument for the ancient world, where every province had its own religious center.

Mommsen's and Reinach's erroneous view point is derived from a sole, but contested, passage from a speech by Cicero, which I translate here in full:

> *On the arrival of Lucullus and his troops in Armenia, yet other nations rose against our general; for fear had fallen upon those*

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[1] Mommsen, IV, 343; Reinach, 365.

[2] Mommsen, IV, 343-344.

[3] For example, see Khalat'iants, 191, Morgan, 75; Leo, I, 411.

[4] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, II, 195-197.

peoples whom Rome had never intended to attack in war or even to disturb: besides which, a strong and fanatical belief had become general among the barbarous nations that our army had been directed to those regions in order to loot a very wealthy and much-venerated temple. In this way many great peoples were roused to action by a new feeling of terror and alarm.[1]

This passage from Cicero, as we see, only mentions the fear and terror which seized the various peoples of the region during Lucullus' march, not in the year 68, as Eckhardt[2] correctly points out, but in the year 69. Regardless of this, it is difficult, in my opinion, to conclude from this short passage that the war of the year 68 had a religious and pan-Asiatic character. The pillaging of cities, temples, and wealth, as is well known, was always one of the main objectives of the Roman commanders and their troops during their campaigns. It is logical, therefore, that people's anxiety and worries about their religious centers was common during all such invasions. It is not possible for these historians to draw conclusions about the war of the year 68 from such information.

In the spring of the year 68, Lucullus, seeing that the Armenian king neither planned to engage in a new battle nor asked for peace, recommenced the war in the hope that if he penetrated the northern provinces of Armenia, devastated them, or menaced the capital city of Artaxata, he would force the Armenians into a decisive battle and conclude a final peace treaty.

At the end of spring of the year 68, the Roman army left the friendly and allied domain of Gordyene, where it had spent a peaceful winter with abundant supplies, and moved past Tigranocerta and through the Taurus Mountains into the Plain of Mush and the Euphrates-Arsanias valleys.

The route traversed from Gordyene to the north, as noted by Mommsen, Khalat'iants, and Leo,[3] passed through the Bitlis defile and the western shore of Lake Van. But Eckhardt, who has studied this question in great detail, concludes that a more accommodating route for troop movements was through Nercik-Shenik and not through Bitlis. In fact, this was precisely the route taken by Xenophon and his 10,000 Greeks during their retreat, as indicated by the

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[1] Cicero, *De Imperio Cn Pompei*, IX, 23.

[2] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, II, 196.

[3] Mommsen, IV, 346; Khalat'iants, 200; Leo, I, 413.

German scholar Karbe.[1] Eckhardt's and Karbe's conclusions are now confirmed by the *Tabula Peutingeriana*. On this map, as I have indicated in my work *The Principal Roads of Ancient Armenia*, the ancient military road in Arzanene goes through Nercik-Keldiz [see map 6].[2]

In the summer of the year 68, when Lucullus' army descended through the Taurus Mountains into the Plain of Mush, the wheat, according to Plutarch,[3] was still unripe, while it was already harvest time in Gordyene, which the Roman soldiers had left a few weeks before. This peculiarity of climate in the Armenian Plateau was unexpected by Lucullus and of great concern, as it made it very difficult to supply his army with provisions. In addition, he was also very discouraged by the new military tactics adopted by Tigranes and Mithridates, which were based on the advice of the experienced and resourceful older king.

We have already noted that Mithridates, to whom the command of the new Armenian army was entrusted, was most concerned not over the number of troops but their quality. The two allied kings not only increased the size of their infantry, but also made every effort to ensure that their cavalry surpassed the Roman army in both numbers and capability. On Mithridates' advice, Armenian military strategy was fundamentally changed to avoid a large decisive battle and instead to engage in skirmishes in the mountains and in small defensive battles. The two kings evidently wished to draw the Romans into the interior of Armenia, making it difficult for them to obtain supplies and provisions, and gradually weakening the enemy with surprise attacks from their strong and agile cavalry. According to Appian,[4] the two kings, in order to realize their plan, divided their army into two parts. Mithridates, who was in charge of the entire infantry and a small part of the cavalry, closely followed the Roman army. However, he camped in secure trenches in the hills and stubbornly avoided a decisive battle. Tigranes, together with the remaining part of the cavalry, frequently attacked the enemy, scattering its

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[1] H. Karbe, *Der Marsch der Zehntausend vom Zapates zum Phasis-Araxeses* (Berlin, 1898).

[2] H. Manandyan, *Hayastani glkhavor chanaparhnerê êst Pewtingeryan k'artezi* (Erevan, 1936), 90-94.

[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXI, 2; Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, iv, 2.

[4] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 87.

supplies and provisions, and inflicting serious losses on them. Thus, Lucullus found himself constantly between the troops of Tigranes and Mithridates, and was menaced from the rear by one or the other.

It is interesting to note that the Roman sources, for the most part, are completely silent about these battles of the year 68. Only Plutarch, the apologist and glorifier of Lucullus, attributes some unimportant successes to his hero:

> *After crossing the Taurus, he [Lucullus] was discouraged to find the plains still covered with unripe grain, so much later are the seasons there, owing to the coolness of the atmosphere. However, he descended from the mountains, routed the Armenians who twice or thrice ventured to attack him, and then plundered their villages without fear, and by taking away the grain which had been stored up for Tigranes, reduced his enemy to the straits which he had been fearing for himself.*[1]

These minor victories of Lucullus had no serious military significance, since they did not at all reduce the true force of the two allies. On the contrary, the Roman army, after repeated attacks by Tigranes' cavalry, suffered major losses according to historical accounts.

Lucullus, according to Plutarch and Dio Cassius,[2] tried to force the enemy to engage in battle, hoping that a decisive clash would crush their army. With this in mind, he ravaged the land in full view of the enemy. But it was in vain: the adversary stood his ground. Lucullus then encircled Mithridates' camp and began to dig trenches around it. But even this attempt ended in failure, for Tigranes immediately came to the aid of Mithridates, surrounded and menaced the Romans from the rear, and Mithridates, adhering to his plan, did not move from his location.

This difficult and fruitless expedition of Lucullus, during which he suffered more losses than his enemy, continued for at least two months around the northern shores of Lake Van. Autumn had arrived and the situation of the Roman army, not used to the cold climate of Armenia, was becoming gradually more and more desperate. If Lucullus decided to retreat now, it would be tantamount to a shameful defeat. Now, after wasting two months, he hurried toward Artaxata, the residence of Tigranes' wives and his young children.[3] He hoped

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXI, 2.

[2] *Ibid.*; Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, iv, 2.

[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXI, 2.

that, by conquering the ancient Armenian capital, he would restore his military glory and prestige, which were both beginning to wane. Moreover, he thought that, by threatening Artaxata he could force Tigranes to engage in a decisive battle.

Lucullus' supposition proved correct. Learning that Lucullus was advancing by a forced march toward Artaxata, Tigranes hurried after the Roman army, and, according to Plutarch,[1] caught up with him on the fourth day, cutting him off at the crossing by the Arsanias River. Lucullus, not having yet crossed the river, was on the left bank of the Arsanias when he came face to face with the Armenian army on the other side [see map 7].

Eckhardt[2] tried to pinpoint the exact location of the battle by the Arsanias River, as well as the route by which Lucullus and Tigranes had arrived there. He concluded rightly that Reinach's[3] hypothesis that the battle took place near present-day Manazkert (Manzikert) was incorrect. Crossing the river at this point, as Eckhardt rightly points out, would lead to Bassen and Hasan-Kale, but by no means to Artaxata. He asserts that the Roman army probably went north via Manazkert and reached present-day Kara-Kilise on the left bank of the Arsanias River. German scholars note that it was exactly by this route that Xenophon and his 10,000 men retreated.[4] I think it is more probable that Lucullus' route in the year 68, as well as that of the retreating Greeks, went through the ancient highway from Isumbo to Didyma, which is indicated on the *Tabula Peutingeriana* and is detailed in my *The Principal Routes of Ancient Armenia.*[5] According to this hypothesis, the site of the battle at Arsanias was not exactly at Kara-Kilise, but some 20-30 kilometers east of it, in the region of present-day Didem.

The sole sources at our disposal on the battle of Arsanias are Plutarch and Dio Cassius,[6] which, as we shall see below, fundamentally contradict each other. Both of these accounts, which are in need of serious and careful study, are translated in full below:

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 2, 221-226.

[3] Reinach, 368, note 1.

[4] W. Belck, (1899), 661, *passim.*

[5] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 103-114.

[6] There are also small fragments on this battle in Sallust, iv, 72-73.

[Plutarch] *When Lucullus marched against this city (Artaxata), Tigranes could not suffer it quietly, but put himself at the head of his forces, and on the fourth day encamped over against the Romans, keeping the river Arsanias between himself and them, which they must of necessity cross on their way to Artaxata. Thereupon Lucullus sacrificed to the gods, in full assurance that the victory was already his, and then crossed the river with twelve cohorts in the van, and the rest disposed so as to prevent the enemy from closing in upon his flanks.*[1] *For large bodies of horsemen and picked soldiers confronted him, and these were covered by Mardian mounted archers and Iberian lancers, on whom Tigranes relied beyond other mercenaries, deeming them the most warlike. However, they did not shine in action, but after a slight skirmish with the Roman cavalry, gave way before the advancing infantry, scattered to right and left in flight, and drew after them the cavalry in pursuit. On the dispersion of these troops, Tigranes rode out at the head of the cavalry, and when Lucullus saw their splendor and their numbers he was afraid. He therefore recalled his cavalry from their pursuit of the flying enemy, and taking the lead of his troops in person, set upon the Atropateni, who were stationed opposite him with the magnates of the king's following, and before coming to close quarters, sent them off in panic flight. Of three kings who together confronted the Romans, Mithridates of Pontus seems to have fled most disgracefully, for he could not endure even their shouting. The pursuit was long and lasted through the whole night, and the Romans were worn out, not only with killing their enemies, but also with taking prisoners and getting all sorts of booty. Livy says that in the former battle a greater number of the enemy, but in this more men of high station were slain and taken prisoners.*[2]

[Dio Cassius] *Lucullus entered upon his campaign when summer was already at its height, since in the spring it had been impossible to invade the enemy's country because of the cold. He devastated a part of their land, purposing to draw the barbarians imperceptibly into battle when defending it; but when even then they made no move, he marched against them. In this engagement*

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[1] This special disposition of Roman troops (*agmen quadratum*) is detailed in Chapot, *La frontiere de l'Euphrate* (Paris, 1907), 173.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXI, 4-8.

the opposing cavalry gave the Roman cavalry hard work, but none of the foe approached the infantry; indeed whenever the foot-soldiers of Lucullus assisted the horse, the enemy would turn to flight. Far from suffering any injury, however, they kept shooting back at those pursuing them, killing some instantly and wounding great numbers. Now these wounds were dangerous and hard to heal; for they used double arrow-points and moreover poisoned them, so that the missiles, whether they stuck fast anywhere in the body or even if they were drawn out, would very quickly destroy it, since the second iron point, not being firmly attached, would be left in the wound.[1]

Many European scholars, for example, Reinach, Niese, and Ferrero,[2] accepting Plutarch's account as accurate, conclude that Lucullus gained a victory at the battle by the Arsanias River, while Tigranes and Mithridates suffered a great defeat. In addition, Reinach, relying on the account of Phlegon,[3] which as we have noted describes the battle of Tigranocerta and not the clash by the Arsanias River, erroneously concludes that Tigranes lost 5,000 men and that a part of his army was taken prisoner.

Mommsen and Eckhardt[4] are more careful and reserved about Lucullus' victory; nevertheless, they are also influenced, in a certain measure, by Plutarch's account and do not sufficiently note the extremely difficult situation of the Roman troops, which is clearly discussed in the passage from Dio Cassius.

It is easy to deduce from Dio Cassius' account that Tigranes not only did not suffer a defeat at the Arsanias River, but on the contrary, inflicted a heavy blow upon the enemy. Tigranes' cavalry, as clearly stated by Dio Cassius, did not suffer any casualties, but themselves showered the pursuing Romans with arrows, inflicting casualties, and wounding many. Eckhardt correctly points out[5] that only Ti-

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[1] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, iv, 5. Dio Cassius does not mention the location of the battle, but Eckhardt in his study correctly assumes that, in all probability, it was by the Arsianas River, *Klio*, X, 2, 208.

[2] Reinach, 367; Nise, 136; Ferrero, I, 214.

[3] Müller, *Frag. Hist. Graec.*, III, 606.

[4] Mommsen, IV, 346; Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, II, 208-213.

[5] Eckhardt, *Klio,* X, 2, 210. Eckhardt's opposition to Mommsen and Reinach is absolutely correct, for their account of the battle does not corre-

granes' light cavalry took part in this battle and not his infantry. However, neither Plutarch nor Dio Cassius mentions this. We can accept the absence of the Armenian infantry, as well as that of Mithridates himself as fact, since Plutarch makes it clear that only Tigranes with his light cavalry caught up with the Romans. It is simply impossible that the slow-moving Armenian infantry could reach the banks of the Arsanias River at the same time as their cavalry.

From these historical accounts it can be observed that, in this battle, Tigranes also applied an old war tactic: unwilling to engage in a decisive battle with the enemy, he wanted to strike at Lucullus while he crossed the river. The flight of the Armenian cavalry was feigned, for during their retreat, the light cavalry, armed with bows, inflicted new losses on the enemy. This characteristic Eastern style of warfare was also later used by the Parthians against Crassus, who suffered a complete defeat in the year 53.[1]

In conceding that only Tigranes' light cavalry fought at the battle of Arsanias, it seems that Plutarch's account—according to which, the Romans pursued their enemy throughout the night, taking prisoners and that Mithridates of Pontus was the first to flee the battle—is fabrication, unsupported, and in complete contradiction of Dio Cassius' more impartial account.

The battle by the Arsanias River took place in mid-September of the year 68. The severe Armenian winter with its snowstorms was already approaching, while the Roman army had yet to have a decisive battle with the Armenian troops as opposed to a few insignificant skirmishes. The distance from the Plain of Mush to the upper flow of the Arsanias, that is, from the ancient city of Patrasauna to the crossing of Arsanias near Didem, where the Roman army was located, is around 250 kilometers, according to the line on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, as detailed in my geographical study.[2] It is curious that the Romans took approximately two to three months to cross such a relatively short distance. The fact that Roman sources do not inform us about the details of this long expedition is probably a sign that things

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spond to the accounts of primary sources, Mommsen, VI, 208-211, Reinach, 367.

[1] It refers to the battle of Carrhae, in which Crassus lost his life.

[2] Manandyan, *Hayastani*, 92-114. The distance from Patrasauna to Tsumbo, according to that map, is 114 Roman miles or around 170 km, and that from Tsumbo to the banks of the river near Didem is around 80 km.

did not go well for the Roman army. However, despite the silence of these sources, even from the few accounts that we have, it is possible to conclude that, during these two or three months, Lucullus' army was already exhausted and, as Eckhardt correctly observes, had suffered during the minor skirmishes more losses than it would have incurred in a major decisive battle.[1]

Crossing the river, Lucullus took his army toward Artaxata [see map 7]. However, after several days, according to Plutarch, his army categorically refused to continue its march and demanded that they return. Plutarch and Cicero explain this rebellion against Lucullus and his retreat from Armenia differently. Plutarch attributes it to the unexpected snowfall and early frigid weather, which began in Armenia during the fall equinox in the month of September. Cicero, who clearly alludes to this rebellion, asserts that the troops refused to advance further because they were too far away from their native land and were homesick for it.

I include here a full translation of the two accounts:

[Plutarch] *Elated and emboldened by this victory, Lucullus purposed to advance further into the interior and subdue the Barbarian realm utterly. But, contrary to what might have been expected at the time of the autumnal equinox, severe winter weather was encountered, which generally covered the ground with snow, and even when the sky was clear produced hoar frost and ice, owing to which the horses could not well drink of the rivers, so excessive was the cold, nor could they easily cross them, since the ice broke, and cut the horses' sinews with its jagged edges. Most of the country was thickly shaded, full of narrow defiles, and marshy, so that it kept the soldiers continually wet; they were covered with snow while they marched, and spent the nights uncomfortably in damp places. Accordingly, they had not followed Lucullus for many days after the battle when they began to object. At first they sent their tribunes to him with entreaties to desist, then they held more tumultuous assemblies, and shouted in their tents at night, which seems to have been characteristic of a mutinous army. And yet Lucullus plied them with entreaties, calling upon them to possess their souls in patience until they had taken and destroyed the Armenian Carthage, the work of their most hated foe, meaning Hannibal. But since he could not persuade*

[1] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 2, 207.

them, he led them back, and crossing the Taurus by another pass, descended into the country called Mygdonia...[1]

[Cicero] *Our own army, moreover, despite their capture of a city from the kingdom of Tigranes and their successes in battle, began to feel the extreme remoteness of their position and to long for home. Now I do not propose to say more about that: for the end of it was that our soldiers were more anxious for an early return from these regions than for a further advance.*[2]

Appian and Dio Cassius just mention Lucullus' retreat and do not discuss the embarrassing rebellion of the troops. Appian claims that winter was the reason for the retreat,[3] while Dio Cassius explains it by the large number of wounded and lack of supplies.[4] Mommsen, Reinach, and Ferrero consider Plutarch's account, which was borrowed from Livy, the more reliable of the two narratives quoted above.[5] Giving preference to Plutarch, they unfortunately neglected Dio Cassius' account, which, though it does not mention the rebellion of the Roman army, provides interesting and accurate data about the retreat. Sallust, a very sober and impartial historian among the ancient Roman chroniclers, is the source for this part of Dio Cassius' account.

In this regard, we have to accept Eckhardt's[6] remarks as completely correct. He states that the reason for the rebellion was not the unseasonably cold weather, as Plutarch asserts, but, as recorded by Dio Cassius, the great Roman losses, the huge number of wounded, and the lack of provisions. Asturean[7] is also correct when he states that the reason for the retreat and the demoralization and loss of spirit in the Roman army was its lack of success. If the reason were simply cold weather, then the Roman army would not have retreated, but, on the contrary, would have proceeded to Artaxata, which was close by and where they would find not only shelter from the cold but great war booty.

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[1] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXII, 1-3.
[2] Cicero, *De Imperio Pompei*, IX, 23-24.
[3] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 87.
[4] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, vi, 1.
[5] Ferrero, I, 215; Mommsen, IV, 349-350.
[6] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 2, 213-216.
[7] Asturean, 35 and *passim*.

In my opinion, the distance from the last Roman position to Artaxata can be precisely determined. From the crossing at the Arsanias River to Artaxata, as is shown on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, is only 170 kilometers. After the battle by the Arsanias, the Roman army, according to Plutarch, moved forward to Artaxata and marched into the interior of the country. At the moment of rebellion, he states, it had not yet reached the Plain of Ararat. Given the difficult conditions described by Plutarch, the Roman army could have only traveled during the several days after the battle at the Arsanias until the day of the rebellion, 50 to 70 kilometers at the most. It is not difficult to conclude, therefore, that Lucullus' army, traversing the military highway indicated on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, passed near ancient Bagavan and Aruj, and on its last marching day was probably on the most difficult part of the route, near the mountain pass of present-day Kujagh or Karavansaray, at a distance of only 100 kilometers from Artaxata.[1]

Eckhardt has examined in detail the route of Lucullus' retreat from Armenia to Mesopotamia.[2] The route, as we have seen, is also described by Plutarch. According to the latter, Lucullus did not take his army back by the aforementioned ancient route, but crossed the Taurus through another mountain pass and descended into Mygdonia through a totally different route. According to Eckhardt's hypothesis, this route went through present-day Khoi toward Bash-Kale and from there, via Julamerk, Zakho and Jezire, to Nisibis. It is difficult to determine exactly the route of Lucullus' retreat, for we do not have any other accounts, save that of Plutarch. It either went through the valley of Berki or passed through the ancient province of Artaz.

In northern Mesopotamia, where Lucullus descended from the Taurus Mountains in October of the year 68, it was still warm summer weather. Here, the Armenians held the fortress of Nisibis, which was a large and important military and strategic center, surrounded by two walls, an outer and an inner. The command of Nisibis, as we have seen, was handed by Tigranes to his brother Gouras.

It is curious that the rebellious Roman army that did not wish to march toward Artaxata now besieged the city of Nisibis without any

[1] See my study *Hayastani*, 17-46.
[2] Eckhardt, *Klio*, X, 2, 226-231.

protest. The siege,[1] however, did not yield results during the early months. The city, whose defense was led by the famed Greek architect Callimachus, resisted as stubbornly as had Tigranocerta.

The defenders of the city, according to Dio Cassius, were certain that the Romans would be forced to leave. But completely unexpectedly, during a dark rainy night, when nothing could be seen or heard, due to the storm, the Romans managed to approach the city and take its outer ramparts. After that, again because of the rain and darkness, it was impossible to defend the inner wall by shooting arrows or pouring burning *naphta*. The Romans filled the space between the two walls with firewood, and without much difficultly took the second wall as well. Gouras and the garrison of the fort, entrenched in the citadel, surrendered to the enemy with conditions and were then set free. Only Callimachus, who, prior to Nisibis, had defended Amisus with great success, was found guilty and put in chains.

The taking of Nisibis proved to be the last victory of Lucullus. After that, his star gradually faded and the Roman army, as we shall see below, left Armenia with neither honor nor glory.

[1] Details on the siege are in Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXII and Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, vi-vii.

15
The Victorious Advance of Tigranes and Mithridates and Lucullus' Retreat

While the Roman army was descending through the long and difficult roads of Mesopotamia and besieging the city of Nisibis, Mithridates and Tigranes, instead of pursuing the demoralized enemy, attacked the Roman army that had remained in Pontus and north of the Tigris River. They still continued to engage in small skirmishes, which, as we have seen, were successful and which resulted in the exhaustion and demoralization of Lucullus' army.

Mithridates, at the head of an 8,000-man army, half of which consisted of Armenians sent by Tigranes, arrived in Pontus and reestablished his rule there. Tigranes tried to regain the southern provinces of Armenia proper.[1] Here, in the region north of the Tigris River, which formed the southern part of Greater Armenia, Tigranes took back a number of provinces and laid siege to one of the local forts, where the Roman commander, Lucius Fannius, was entrenched with his troops. According to Dio Cassius, Lucullus came from Mesopotamia to help Fannius and managed to rescue him.[2]

Meanwhile, Mithridates at first penetrated the eastern provinces of Armenia Minor and caused terror among the dispersed and weak Roman contingents, destroying detachment after detachment, and occupied the eastern part of his kingdom with great speed. From here he appealed to his people to take up arms and rebel, promising to liberate all the people of Pontus who were working as slaves in Roman households. The people of Pontus, according to Dio Cassius,[3] full of hatred toward the Romans, and oppressed by its cruel governors, received Mithridates with open arms and gave him all possible assistance.

The moment Mithridates crossed into the interior provinces of Pontus from Armenia Minor, the Roman general Fabius Hadrianus marched against him. However, the former Thracian mercenaries of Mithridates, as well as the Pontic people serving as Roman slaves, made contact with Mithridates,[4] and in the heat of battle changed

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[1] Appian, II (Mithridatic Wars), 88; Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, viii, 2.
[2] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, x, 2.
[3] *Ibid.*, ix, 2.
[4] *Ibid.*, ix, 3-4.

sides and assisted him. Although this battle went against the Romans and they suffered great losses, the Roman general Hadrianus succeeded in saving his army and retreating, due to the fact that the enemy had to evacuate the wounded Mithridates[1] from the battlefield. The surviving Roman troops fled to Cabiria and fortified themselves in its citadel. Triarius came to the aid of Fabius Hadrianus and took over his command.[2] But he could not chase the enemy out of Pontus either and was forced to winter in Gaziura, facing Mithridates' army, which was encamped in the environs of Pontic Comana. Mithridates entrenched himself here, in the region south of the Iris River, and tried to reassemble new troops from Armenia Minor, which was now entirely free from Roman domination. Triarius, on his part, sought help from Lucullus and informed him of Hadrianus' defeat and the dangerous situation facing the Romans.

Learning this, Lucullus, in order to save the Romans in Pontus, decided to move his army from Mesopotamia and give up his conquests beyond the Euphrates. However, his legions, enjoying a tranquil life in their winter quarters, refused to move before spring.[3] This was already the second time that the Roman troops refused to obey their general and demonstrated their contempt for military discipline.

It should be noted that Lucullus' position was badly shaken after the unsuccessful expedition of the year 68. During the Armeno-Roman war, the democratic faction in Rome had once again gained power and tried to discredit and remove their military antagonist, Lucullus, who was an ally and partisan of Sulla. It should also be noted that the agitation on the part of the democratic faction and especially the propaganda campaign on the part of financiers and moneylenders during the years 69-68 had already resulted in the removal of Lucullus as the governor of Asia and Cilicia. The opposition and indignation against him only increased after the unsuccessful campaign in the year 68. The decline of his authority in Rome naturally affected the disposition of his troops as well. Rumors had already spread among the legions that Rome had decided to remove Lucullus. Thus, after the unsuccessful campaign of 68, acts of sedition and insubordination among his troops became even stronger. His soldiers now demanded that they be allowed to return home. Many of them,

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 88.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXIV, 5.

whose tour of duty had ended in the year 67, had managed to plunder many rich cities and provinces; they were no longer poor workers but men of substance. It is not surprising that they did not want to risk their lives in new battles but to return to their homes and live the rest of their lives in peace and prosperity.

Because of the resistance of his troops, Lucullus was forced to remain in Mesopotamia during the winter of the year 68-67. Only at the beginning of spring of the year 67 did he leave Tigranocerta and Nisibis, cross the Euphrates River, and rush to aid the Romans in Pontus. Mommsen correctly assumes that Lucullus, evacuating Mesopotamia and southern Armenia, gave up his bright hopes of mounting an incursion into Armenia.[1]

When Lucullus went to help Triarius, military operations had already begun in Pontus. Triarius, who had some 10,000 men, at first tried to avoid a battle with the enemy and embedded himself in his camp near Gaziura. However, the moment Mithridates besieged the fortress of Dadasa, where the booty and belongings of the Roman troops were stored, Triarius' troops forced him [Triarius] to relieve Dadasa's garrison. Leaving his fortified camp, Triarius was forced to engage Mithridates in battle in very dangerous terrain, between Gaziura and Zela. Despite the great resistance of the Romans against Mithridates, the Armeno-Pontic army succeeded in repulsing the Roman infantry on a field of clay, where they almost all perished. Only Triarius and his Roman cavalry managed to save themselves.

The Roman losses in this battle, according to Plutarch and Appian,[2] were twenty-four tribunes, 150 centurions, and some 7,000 troops.

Cicero's account of Triarius' major defeat is characteristic; he underscores that he, following other Roman historians, will be silent on this disaster. The defeat, according to Cicero, was of such magnitude that, "it was no messenger from the battle but the rumor of the countryside which brought the tidings of it to the general's ears."[3] The corpses of the dead remained there for three years and were only buried by Pompey in the year 64.

Lucullus was on his way to aid Triarius when he heard of his terrible defeat. He decided to fight Mithridates and to avenge Triarius.

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[1] Mommsen, IV, 348.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXV, 1-2; Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 89.

[3] Cicero, *De Imperio Pompei*, IX, 25-26.

But the king of Pontus refused to engage in battle, continued his war tactics, and waited for Tigranes to resume the small mountain skirmishes, which, as we have seen, had yielded excellent results in the year 68.

Mithridates quit the regions of Gaziura and Zela, where Triarius had suffered his defeat, and hurried back to Armenia Minor. He carried as many provisions with him as possible.[1] He destroyed whatever was too difficult to take in order to deny supplies to the enemy. According to Dio Cassius, he, together with his army, retreated to the mountainous province of Talaura,[2] fortified himself and awaited the arrival of Tigranes.

Meanwhile, Tigranes' son-in-law Mithridates, the king of Atropatene, fell unexpectedly on the Romans, and pursued and destroyed their small dispersed units.[3]

In the spring of the year 67, Lucullus entered Armenia Minor and faced Mithridates' army. At his rear, Tigranes, who had managed to regain the southern Armenian provinces, once again, as in the war of 68, came to the aid of his father-in-law and menaced the Roman commander. Lucullus and his army were in a difficult situation, for while the Armeno-Pontic forces were constantly strengthened by fresh reinforcements, the Roman army, suffering constant losses, was getting few new auxiliaries.

Realizing the need for replenishing his losses, Lucullus dispatched couriers from Armenia Minor to Quintus Marcius Rex, the newly appointed governor of Cilicia, and asked him for help. Marcius Rex, who had just arrived in his province and had reached Lycaonia, had three legions at his disposal. Lucullus was certain that Marcius Rex would not refuse him aid, especially since he belonged to the same political faction and was Lucullus' brother-in-law. But Lucullus' hopes were dashed, for Marcius Rex denied his request saying that his troops refused to go to Armenia.[4]

The news from Rome was not much better. The reports of the defeat of Triarius gave the political enemies of Lucullus in Rome new weapons against him. In the spring of the year 67, they finally succeeded in their main objective. Through a motion of Gabinius, the

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 90.

[2] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, xiv, 2.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Sallust, v, 12-13; Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, xv, 1; xvii, 2.

people's tribune, a new resolution was passed in Rome, which removed Lucullus from the command of the war against Mithridates. The governorship of Bythinia and Pontus were now handed to Consul Manius Acilius Glabrio. By the same resolution, all the legions under the command of Lucullus, whose tour of duty had ended, were obligated to return home. The new law stated that those who refused to obey would have all their property confiscated. This resolution, according to Appian,[1] was immediately publicized by heralds throughout Asia.

Thus, Lucullus, who had already been discredited throughout his army, even before this, due to the unsuccessful campaigns of the years 68 and 67, now completely lost his stature and authority. Realizing his grave situation, Lucullus clearly saw that he had no choice but to relinquish his command to Consul Glabrio, who had by that time reached Asia Minor. He asked the latter to accept from him, by the will of the people, the main command of the army. However, Glabrio, as well as Marcius Rex, refused his request and the responsibility, considering it too dangerous and difficult.

Left thus to his fate and in danger of being encircled by Mithridates and Tigranes in Talaura, Lucullus ordered his army to march against Tigranes, hoping to catch off guard the tired Armenian soldiers who had come to the aid of Mithridates and who were already in the proximity of the Euphrates River. At first, the Roman legions seemed to obey his order. However, when they left Armenia Minor and reached the main road, which on one side went to the Euphrates and on the other to Galatia, the legions refused to go against the Armenians and decided to return westward. Most of the legionnaires, whose tour of duty had ended, declared that, according to the resolution, they were freed from service and that Lucullus was no longer their commander.

Therefore, the sad and desperate Lucullus was left with only one option. According to Plutarch,[2] he went from tent to tent, entreating the legionnaires man by man, shed tears, begged them and actually going so far as to kiss their hands. But it was all in vain. The army remained unmoved and categorically refused to march against Tigranes and the Armenians. After that, Lucullus was forced to retreat

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 90, Sallust, v, 11.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXV, 3-4.

into Galatia.[1] Those troops who had obtained their leave agreed, however, to remain with the army until the end of summer. They declared that they would consider themselves free and would disperse if, by the end of summer, the enemy had not appeared and engaged in battle. Satisfied that the soldiers on leave agreed to stay even temporarily with the army, Lucullus accepted this condition. His army, following the agreement, remained idle in the eastern regions of Galatia, particularly in the land of Trocmes, throughout the entire summer of the year 67.

In that same year of 67, while Lucullus became the laughing stock of the Roman army and was simply a toy in the hands of the troops, Mithridates not only managed to retake his entire kingdom; his cavalry also made raids into the eastern provinces of Bythinia. Meanwhile, Tigranes crossed the Euphrates and overran Cappadocia,[2] which, he subjugated and ravaged together with his son-in-law Mithridates, the king of Atropatene. He once again chased away King Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, who received help neither from Lucullus, nor his successor Glabrio, nor from the governor of Cilicia.[3]

In the summer of the year 67, representatives of the Roman Senate came to Lucullus, at his request, to go to Pontus and to organize the affairs of that conquered land, according to the standard laws of the time.

However, given the current conditions, the presence of these plenipotentiaries made little sense, for, in the summer of the year 67, the Romans did not possess even a *t'iz*[4] of land. The country had to be retaken by force of arms.

By the end of the summer of 67, the troops who had completed their tour of duty began to leave Lucullus' army. Many young soldiers did not wish to remain with him either, preferring to continue

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[1] Mommsen (VI, 213) considers the return of the Roman army intact to Asia Minor a marvelous military exploit; surpassing the retreat of the 10,000 recounted by Xenophon. His appreciation is obviously exaggerated, since Lucullus carried out his retreat into Asia Minor primarily through friendly and allied states—Sophene and Cappadocia.

[2] Plutarch, *Lucullus*, XXXV, 5. Appian attributes the invasion of Cappadocia to Mithridates (*Mithridatic Wars*), 91.

[3] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, xvii, 1; Cicero, *De Imperio Pompei*, V, 12.

[4] It refers to an Armenian measure of length; a span; nine inches.

their military service under Consul Glabrio, who, as we have noted, was sent to Asia Minor as Lucullus' successor. In the words of Appian,[1] only a small number of destitute soldiers, who did not have the money to travel, remained with the great Roman general.[2]

Thus, the wars, which Lucullus had begun so brilliantly seven years before in Pontus and Armenia, ended without glory.
Reinach states:

> *In this way, after a relentless seven-year war, Lucullus' affairs had gone back to the beginning. His grand victories disappeared as if they had been dreams. The Roman eagles once again left the banks of the Euphrates River and the Taurus Mountains and from there to the Halys River, with the same speed that they had advanced forward. Cappadocia was already lost, Bythinia was penetrated, and the Asian Province was under threat.*[3]

Cicero, in his speech on the appointment of Pompey, describes the grave situation in Asia Minor at the end of the year 67. In it, Cicero notes that, in Bythinia, many villages were burned to the ground, and that all of Asia Minor awaited with terror the invasion of the two mighty kings, the cruel enemies of the Romans, to enter and ravage Roman territories. The danger, in his words, threatened the capital of Roman financiers who had invested in it in the hope of exploiting state taxes. He states:

> *What do you suppose is the state of mind either of those who pay us the taxes or of those who farm and collect them;...for they fear that a single cavalry raid can in an instant carry off the revenue of a whole year; when the tax-farmers feel that there is the gravest risk in keeping the large staffs which they maintain on the pastures and the corn lands, at the harbors and the coastguard stations?*[4]

The situation of the Roman Republic in the year 67 became grave not only in Roman Asia, but also on the sea, and in Italy itself. At that time, pirates became extremely powerful and were the real masters of the Aegean and the Mediterranean seas. They attacked not only individual ships but also military flotillas. They continually pil-

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 90.

[2] Russian translation (168) has added "the conqueror of Pontus," while the French (151) "the vanquisher of Tigranocerta.

[3] Reinach, 378.

[4] Cicero, *De Imperio Pompei*, II, 4-5; V, 12; VI, 16.

laged coastal regions and took even distinguished Romans and military men. Maritime travel became very dangerous. The price of bread in Italy, and especially in Rome, which received grain from foreign lands, soared. A terrible famine ensued.

Rome felt that the ordinary functionaries of the Republic were not enough to bring the country out of this critical situation. They needed exceptionally competent officials, who were invested with dictatorial powers.

During Lucullus' retreat, in that same year of 67, by a proposal of the people's tribune, Gabinius, Pompey was invested with the exceptional powers of dictator. He was entrusted with the destruction of the pirates and the assurance of maritime transportation. Pompey indeed managed to seize the forts of the pirates, crushed them, and forced their surrender.

After that, at the start of the year 66, through a proposal of Manilius, the people's tribune, [the Senate] gave Pompey extraordinary powers (*imperium majus*) to continue the war in the East.[1] By this decision, Marcius Rex and Manius Acilius Glabrio were recalled from the East and their responsibilities handed over to Pompey. Hence, by the statute handed to him by Gabinius, this old adversary of Lucullus not only became the supreme commander of the army in the future campaigns against Mithridates and Tigranes, but also received the unlimited right to declare war and conclude peace in the name of the Roman people.

Thus, in the year 66, military operations in the East were resumed under Pompey's command.

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[1] The bill was proposed by G. Manilius: "Pompey was to be invested with the supreme command, with unlimited resources, and without restriction of time or place." Although the people clamored for it, the Senate remained aloof. Cicero spoke in support of the proposal and it passed. The law came to be known as the *Lex Manilia*; hence the double title of Cicero's speech: *Pro lege Manilia* or *De Imperio Cn. Pompei;* see Cicero, 9-10.

16
Pompey's Incursion into Pontus and Mithridates' Defeat

At the moment the Roman Senate accepted the aforementioned motion of the tribune Manilius, Pompey was in Cilicia. Learning that his greatest ambition had been fulfilled and that the Pontic and Armenian fronts were entrusted to him, he immediately began to prepare for war.[1] He ordered those Asiatic cities and rulers who were allies of Rome to send him auxiliary troops, and even succeeded in assembling the veterans who had completed their tour of duty and had refused to serve any longer in Lucullus' army. In a very short time, he gathered a new army of more than 50,000 men in Cilicia, not including the three legions of Marcius Rex and the Asian auxiliaries.

In the beginning of the year 66, before he commenced his grand invasion, Pompey, with his customary prudence, prepared all the necessary diplomatic venues for his military campaign. He sent the refugee Metrophanes as an envoy to Mithridates in the guise of friendly negotiations, but in reality, according to Dio Cassius, for the purposes of reconnaissance and spying. At the same time, he sent another envoy to Ctesiphon to negotiate with Phraates and conclude an alliance against the kings of Pontus and Armenia. According to Dio Cassius,[2] Pompey succeeded in getting the alliance on the same conditions which were proposed to the Parthian king by Mithridates and Tigranes in the year 68; that is, Pompey promised Phraates all of Mesopotamia up to the Euphrates River, namely the lands seized from him by Tigranes in the south. At the same time he proposed that, as a Roman ally, Phraates should attack Armenia from the southeast.

According to new historical studies, Phraates accepted Pompey's proposal of alliance due to the fact that Tigranes the Younger, son of Tigranes II, had rebelled against his father in 66 and had fled to Ctesiphon.[3] I consider this generally accepted notion not only arguable but improbable. Dio Cassius' account clearly shows that the agreement with Pompey took place before the arrival of Tigranes the Younger in Ctesiphon. The latter tried to convince Phraates to help him to invade Armenia. Dio Cassius writes:

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[1] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, xlv, 1-2.

[2] *Ibid.*, 3.

[3] Reinach, 382; Mommsen, VI, 268-269; Khalat'iants, 208, and others.

Tigranes, the son of Tigranes, fled to Phraates, taking with him some of the foremost men, because his father was not ruling to suit them; and though Phraates, despite the treaty made with Pompey, hesitated about what he ought to do, he was persuaded to invade Armenia.[1]

Thus, the political events of the year 66 did not favor the allied kings, particularly since Mithridates, against whom Pompey was to begin his campaign first, could not count on the Parthians, or on Tigranes, whose land was rife with rebellions and internal discord.

According to Appian and Valerius Maximus, more than one plot was hatched against Tigranes. These authors describe the plots in such dramatic detail as to beg their veracity.[2] Even if true, they should be accepted with reservation. According to these authors, palace intrigues and bloody crimes were common in the court of Tigranes, who was married to Mithridates' daughter, Cleopatra. However, we know that such intrigues occurred on a grand scale in the Pontic, Seleucid, and other courts in the East as well.

According to Appian,[3] Tigranes had three sons from Cleopatra; each one of them sought royal power during his father's lifetime. The oldest son, Zariadris,[4] conspired to overthrow him with the help of Armenian princes who were unhappy with Tigranes. The conspirators, according to Valerius Maximus, took a loyalty oath, which according to local custom, was "letting blood from their right hands and sucking it in turn."[5] However, the conspiracy did not succeed, and Zariadris, together with his accomplices, was defeated and all killed. The middle son of Tigranes from Cleopatra, whose name has not survived in historical accounts, also wanted to occupy his father's throne, and attempted it in the following manner. The senior Tigranes went hunting with this middle son and the younger Tigranes. During the course of the hunt, the old man fell from his horse and lost consciousness. The middle son simply left his father thus, removed his royal crown, and placed it upon his own head. The

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[1] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, li, 2.

[2] Appian, II, (*Mithridatic Wars*), 104; Valerius Maximus, *Memorable Doings and Sayings*, II (London, 2000) Bk. IX, Chapter. 11.

[3] Appian, *Ibid.*

[4] Valerius Maximus calls him Sariaster, Bk. IX, Chap. 11.3. The name corresponds to Zareh in Armenian.

[5] *Ibid.* Only Valerius mentions the blood pact.

younger son, however, remained at his father's side and helped him. Regaining consciousness to, the king ordered his middle son executed and vowed to give the crown and the throne to the younger son. However, as we have seen, while Tigranes was in Cappadocia, the younger son too rebelled against his father.

Learning of his younger son's rebellion at the beginning of the year 66, Tigranes was forced to halt his victorious march to Cappadocia and return to Armenia. The rebellious son suffered a defeat in a battle against his father, and, together with his Armenian noble accomplices, fled to Ctesiphon and married the daughter of Phraates, the Parthian king.[1]

The rebellion of Tigranes the Younger, just at the start of Pompey's invasion, not only considerably weakened the strength and military forces of both kings, but also altered their alliance. The old Tigranes, according to Dio Cassius,[2] suspected that his father-in-law, Mithridates, had instigated the [younger] son to rebel against him. In reality, these suspicions were somewhat justified. King Tigranes, as we have seen, although an ally of Mithridates, followed his own independent political agenda. It was therefore more advantageous for Mithridates to have his young grandson, whom he could control and influence, on the throne of Armenia.

In the spring of the year 66, Pompey left the three legions of Marcius Rex to defend Cilicia, and he himself, together with his army, moved into Galatia to replace Lucullus and to take over from him the supreme command of the Roman forces. According to Strabo,[3] the meeting of the two generals took place in the fortress of Danala, located in the land of Trocmes. Despite the efforts of mutual friends to reconcile Lucullus with Pompey, the meeting of the two ended in insults and abuse. Pompey declared all of Lucullus' orders from the time he had arrived in Galatia null and void, took away almost all of his army, and left him with only 1,600 men to accompany him back to Italy. Upon his return to Rome, Lucullus, as it is known, ceased to play any political role. He led a somewhat useless life and became famous for his sumptuous banquets, known simply as "Luculli", or

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 104; Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, li, 1; see also, Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, 83.

[2] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, l, 1.

[3] Strabo, V, Bk. XII, v, 2.

"feasts of Lucullus," paid for with the wealth and plunder brought back from Pontus and Armenia.[1]

From the land of the Trocmes, which bordered the kingdom of Mithridates, Pompey, with his army of more than 50,000 Roman troops,[2] marched into Pontus. He ordered the navy, which consisted of 270 vessels, to guard the coastal regions and to assist the land forces in their advance. Against these superior forces of Pompey, Mithridates, whose land had been laid waste and depopulated during Lucullus' invasion, managed to gather only around 30,000 infantry and 2,000 to 3,000 cavalry.[3] He could not count on help from Armenia, for, as we have seen, Phraates and Tigranes the Younger had already started a war against the elder Tigranes.

Left on his own, Mithridates knew that the outcome of the war had already been decided by the superior forces of the enemy. Therefore, he did not engage in battle but sent his envoys to Pompey to start negotiations. An agreement was not reached, however, for Pompey, fully aware of Mithridates' difficult situation, demanded impossible conditions, namely that Mithridates return all Roman deserters in the Pontic army, and that he himself surrender to him without any conditions.[4]

In the spring of 66, the war with Mithridates began in earnest in Pontus. As in the years 68-67, Mithridates once again used the tactics of small mountain skirmishes, which had proven very effective against Lucullus. Mithridates continually retreated and raided, dispersing the troops of his enemy, ravaging his own domain, and attempting to cut off supplies to the Roman army.[5]

Tired of these continuous and futile marches, Pompey was forced to halt the pursuit of the enemy and moved into Armenia Minor,

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[1] Ferrero, I, 337-338.

[2] Mommsen puts Pompey's army at 40,000 to 50,000 men, not counting the auxiliary forces of his allies, VI, 269. Reinach estimates the Roman forces around 60,000, 382. Ferrero's 30,000 is obviously an error, for it does not correspond to Dio's numbers; Ferrero, I, 231.

[3] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 97; Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXII, 1. The small number of Mithridates' cavalry, in my opinion, should be contested, for in the battles of 67, his cavalry, as we have seen, numbered 8,000 horsemen.

[4] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 98; Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, xlv, 3-4.

[5] Dio, xlvii,1; Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 97.

where there were almost no Pontic forces, but where there was a great supply of provisions for his army. However, according to Dio Cassius,[1] Mithridates pursued him speedily into Armenia Minor, entrenched himself on a high and inaccessible mountain, and tried again to disrupt supplies to the Romans. The fast-moving Pontic cavalry units continuously descended into the open plain, harassed the Romans, and returned to their camp, taking Roman deserters with them. Soon, due to the absence of provisions, Pompey's position deteriorated. But, fortunately for Pompey, Mithridates was forced to abandon his advantageous position, due to the lack of water in this arid location. According to Plutarch,[2] once Mithridates left this mountain, rich springs were discovered[3] along the slopes which were used by Pompey's army.

Pompey pursued Mithridates, who retreated through the valleys and forest ravines of Armenia Minor, where the latter could not make good use of his cavalry. In their pursuit of the enemy, the Roman infantry and cavalry battalions ambushed Mithridates' cavalry and inflicted heavy losses.[4] After this, Mithridates, according to Strabo,[5] fearing new attacks by Pompey, occupied the "well-watered mountain near Dasteira in Acilisene." He fortified himself in his new position and once again began to raid the Roman camp in order to disrupt their supply lines.

However, this time, Pompey called in the three Roman legions that had remained in Cilicia, increasing the size of his army, and blockaded Mithridates' camp with a chain of guard posts stretching some 28 kilometers. Now, from his side, he began to cut off supplies to Mithridates' army.[6] The Roman army, meanwhile, received neces-

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[1] Dio, xlvii, 2, *passim*.

[2] Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXII, 2.

[3] Plutarch's text reads: "The king [Mithridates] was strongly encamped on a mountain which was difficult to assault, but abandoned it, supposing that it had no water. Pompey took possession of this very mountain, and judging by the nature of the vegetation and by the channels in the slopes that the place had springs, ordered his men to sink wells everywhere. At once, then, his camp was abundantly supplied with water...*ibid.*

[4] Frontinus, *Stratagems*, II, (London, 1993), v, 33; Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, xlvii, 4.

[5] Strabo, V, Bk. XII, iii, 28.

[6] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 99; Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXII, 3.

sary supplies from the Acilisene region, on the left bank of the Euphrates, which was occupied by Pompey's army.

The Pontic army, thus encircled by Pompey, found itself in a very difficult situation. Threatened by hunger, they were forced to kill and eat their horses. Mithridates clearly could not remain near Dasteira. After forty-five days, Mithridates, according to Plutarch,[1] ordered the weak and wounded soldiers in the Pontic army killed, and in the dark of night, quietly and carefully fled with his army,[2] unseen by the Roman chain of guard posts, and thereby saved his army from death by hunger. The next morning, Pompey pursued and caught up with him after three days, and once again encircled him in a narrow ravine. Now Mithridates could not refuse to fight. This final and decisive battle with Mithridates took place in a region south of the Lycos River, at a distance of some ten kilometers from Enderes, near present-day Piurk, in a place where the city of Nicopolis was later founded.

The Roman legions moved to the rear of the enemy, took over the nearby heights, and unexpectedly, in the quiet of the night, let out a terrible battle cry, showering the enemy with stones, arrows and spears. They then descended and massacred almost the entire terror-stricken Pontic army.[3]

Mithridates, however, managed, once again, to escape the battlefield. Accompanied by a small remaining detachment of his army and his beloved concubine, Hypsicrateia, who followed him and fought by his side in male attire,[4] he fled and took refuge in the fort of Sinoria near the borders of Armenia.[5] This time, he hoped for assistance from the elder Tigranes.

The topography of Dasteira and the route taken by Mithridates from that region to Sinoria is outlined in historical works confusingly and incorrectly. The confusion can be explained by the fact that even the primary sources disagree among themselves and give dubious or

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[1] Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXII, 3.

[2] Frontinus, *Stratagems*, I, i, 7.

[3] The account of the defeat is in Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 99-100, Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, xlviii, 3-5, xlix, 1-8; Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXII, 3-5.

[4] According to Plutarch that is why Mithridates called her by the male name of Hypsicrates, *ibid.*, XXXII, 8.

[5] Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXII, 6-7; *Valerius Maximus*, I, IV, 6.2; and Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 101.

inexact topographical information. I think that I have clarified all this in my geographical study *The Principal Routes of Ancient Armenia*, which is based on a careful examination of the *Tabula Peutingeriana*.[1]

Considering that my new explanations, cited below, are not only important for the historical geography of Armenia Minor and Greater Armenia, but also shed new light on the history of Pompey's campaigns and the ancient routes crossed by his army, I think it is not superfluous to examine here the primary sources which were not included in my study.

I include here, in full translation, the important accounts relating to the question relating to Dasteira, Sinoria, and Nicopolis:

1. Strabo, V, Bk. XII, iii, 28:

But when Mithridates Eupator had increased in power, he established himself as master, not only of Colchis, but also of all these places, these having been ceded to him by Antipater, son of Sisis. And he cared so much for these places that he built seventy-five strongholds in them and therein deposited most of his treasures. The most notable of these strongholds were these: Hydara and Basgeodariza and Sinoria; Sinoria was close to the borders of Greater Armenia, and that is why Theophanes changed its spelling to Synoria.[2] *For, as a whole, the mountainous range of the Paryadres has numerous suitable places for such strongholds, since it is well-watered and woody, and is in many places marked by sheer ravines and cliffs; at any rate, it was here that most of his fortified treasuries were built; and at last, in fact, Mithridates fled for refuge into these farthermost parts of the kingdom of Pontus, when Pompey invaded the country, and having seized a well-watered mountain (of Angolisene)*[3] *near Dasteira in Acilisene (nearby, also, was the Euphrates, which separates Acilisene from Lesser Armenia), he stayed there until he was besieged and forced to flee across the mountains into Colchis and from there to the Bosporus. Near this place, in Lesser Armenia,*

[1] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 68-73.

[2] The emphasis (underlined) is Manandyan's.

[3] According to Markwart (*Die Genealogie*, 60, note), some texts erroneously read Acilisene. Xylander's correction appears in Meineke's translation. The Loeb edition (p. 424, n. 1) indicates that some MSS read Angliosene.

Pompey built a city, Nicopolis, which endures even to this day and is well peopled.

2. Plutarch, *Pompey* xxxii, 3:

Next he invested the king's camp and walled him in. But after enduring a siege of forty-five days, Mithridates succeeded in stealing off with his most effective troops; the sick and unserviceable he killed. Then, however, Pompey overtook him near the Euphrates River, and encamped close by; and fearing lest the king should get the advantage of him by crossing the Euphrates, he put his army in battle array and led it against him at midnight.

3. *Ibid.*, 8-9:

They (Mithridates and his troops) came to a place called Sinora, which was full of the king's money and treasures...From thence he set out towards Armenia on his way to Tigranes; but that monarch forbade his coming and proclaimed a reward of a hundred talents for his person; he therefore passed by the sources of the Euphrates and continued his flight through Colchis.

4. Dio Cassius, xxxvi, chap. 48, 1-2:

When Pompey continued to procure these in safety and through certain men's help had become master of the land of Anaïtis (Anahita), which belongs to Armenia and is dedicated to a certain goddess of the same name, and many others as a result of this kept revolting to him, while the soldiers of Marcius were added to his force, Mithridates became frightened and no longer kept his position, but immediately set out unobserved in the night, and thereafter by night marches advanced into the Armenia of Tigranes.

5. *Ibid.*, xxxvi, chap. 50, 3:

The Roman leader [Pompey] colonized a city in the territory where he had been victorious[1] *and gave it over to the wounded and superannuated soldiers. Many also of the neighboring people voluntarily joined the settlement and later generations of them are in existence even now, being called Nicopolitans.*

6. Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 101:

Mithridates, forcing his way to the cliffs, accompanied only by his bodyguard, effected his escape, and fell in with a troop of mercenary horse[men] and about 3,000 foot [soldiers] who followed him directly to the fortress of Sinorex (Sinoria)...

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[1] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 105.

7. Orose VI, chap. 4, 3:
In Armenia Minor, near Mount Dastracus, Pompey surrounded the camp of the king (Mithridates).

In these accounts, as we can see, three main geographical sites in Armenia Minor are mentioned, where either battles took place or through which Mithridates retreated: Dasteira, Nicopolis, and Sinoria. European historiography has precisely identified only the location of Nicopolis, near present-day Piurk, where inscriptions were discovered which clearly include the name of the city of Nicopolis.[1]

However, many European scholars, such as Reinach, Markwart, and others, propose that Nicopolis was founded on the site of the battle and decisive victory of Pompey, as indicated by the name of the city—*Νικοπολις*, "city of victory"—and as is indicated by Dio Cassius in example number five cited above. However, they believe it was situated in Dasteira, as indicated by Strabo in example number one cited above.[2] In order to confirm his proposal, Markwart cites Plutarch (example number two), where the site of the night battle is near the Euphrates River. Thus, he believes that the decisive battle against Mithridates took place not far from the Euphrates River, in the ancient district of Acilisene.

The main objection to Reinach and Markwart, who at first glance appear to be correct, is Strabo's obscure and ambiguous account which cannot serve as corroborative proof. On the contrary, Strabo's account states that Dasteria is situated near "the Euphrates, which separates Acilisene from Armenia Minor." It is interesting to note that Strabo's placement, which does not agree with Reinach's and Markwart's, is cited in the new study by Adonts, a work which unfortunately has not received the attention of recent scholars.

Adonts correctly notes[3] that Strabo's Dasteira corresponds to present-day Dostal, situated between Kamakh and Akn on the right bank of the Euphrates River, and is located, according to Strabo, on the border between Armenia Minor and Acilisene near the Euphrates River. We must remember that in the period of Tigranes and Mithridates, Acilisene, as Adonts correctly notes, formed a vast district

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[1] J. G. Taylor, "Journal of a Tour in Armenia, Kurdistan, and Upper Mesopotamia," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, 38 (1868), 302.

[2] Reinach, 385, note 1; Markwart, *Die Genealogie*, 59-63.

[3] Adontz, 44.

which encompassed not only the Acilisene of ancient Armenia, but probably also Daranaghi, Mananaghi, Aghyun, and Mzur.[1] If the identification of Dasteira as ancient Dostal is correct, then my calculation of the distance between Dasteira and Nicopolis is confirmed beyond doubt.

It is important to note, first of all, that present-day Dostal is also mentioned by Taylor[2] as being a village located some twelve kilometers from Zimara on the road to present-day Piurk (Nicopolis). He indicated this in his study, "Journal of a Tour in Armenia, Kurdistan and Upper Mesopotamia." The road indicated by Taylor corresponds to the line from Nicopolis-Zimara indicated on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, which is noted by Adonts, as well as Konrad Miller in his explanatory map.[3] The distance between Nicopolis and Zimara, on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, is shown as being only 75 Roman miles, or 111 kilometers. It is absolutely clear that the distance from Piurk-Nicopolis to present-day Dostal was approximately 100 kilometers, and from Dostal to Zimara, 11 kilometers.

These distances are, without doubt, further proof in identifying Dasteira with Dostal. It is obvious that Pompey, in pursuit of Mithridates through forced marches from Dasteira-Dostal to Piurk-Nicopolis, caught up with him only on the third day, as indicated by ancient sources.

Therefore, we must consider the accounts of Dio Cassius and Appian as correct; that is, Nicopolis was founded not in Dasteira, as proposed by Reinach and Markwart, but in the place of Pompey's decisive defeat of Mithridates, on the site of present-day Piurk, which is at a distance of some 100 kilometers from Dasteira-Dostal.

The location of the third spot, Sinoria, mentioned in the above accounts, is also examined and clarified in my *The Principal Routes of Ancient Armenia*.[4]

The fortress of Sinoria, as indicated by Miller, corresponds to the Sinara station of the *Tabula Peutingeriana*. However, its location is incorrect in both Miller's work and in that of Kiepert.[5] According to

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[1] *Ibid*, 44-45.

[2] Taylor, *Journal*, 302.

[3] K. Miller, *Itinerarias Romana* (Stuttgart, 1916), 679-680.

[4] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 66-68.

[5] Miller, 676-677; R. Kiepert, *Atlas von Kleinasien in 24 Blättern* (Berlin, 1902-1906).

Miller, Sinoria was located in present-day Sênkaṛich, while Kiepert puts it near present-day Alaja. In reality, as I have indicated in my study, it was located some fifteen Roman miles, or about 22 kilometers, from present-day Gaghtaṛich, which corresponds to the Chalchdiaris station on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, and lay on the route from Gaghtaṛich to Sadagh, at a distance of some 15 kilometers northwest of Ashkale by the Euphrates River. Strabo's account (example one) on Sinoria is very valuable, for it indicates that it was a very fortified place during the time of Mithridates and was at the border of Greater Armenia and Pontus. From Strabo's account we can conclude that, at the time of Tigranes II, the southwestern border of Armenia reached the present-day mountains of Kop-dagh, on the southeastern slopes of which, near the Euphrates River, was the fortress of Sinoria, corresponding to the Sinara Station on the *Tabula Peutingeriana.*

That our conclusion on the location of Sinoria is correct is also confirmed by Markwart's study.[1] He also has arrived at the conclusion that, in the era of Mithridates and Tigranes, the district of Derchan probably belonged to Mithridates, and after his final defeat, "Acilisene and Derchan, and possibly even Carenitide, were annexed by Armenia." His hypothesis, as far as Carenitide goes, as we have seen, is probably not accurate. Carenitide, up to Sinoria and the mountains of Kop-dagh, as we have concluded, were part of Armenia.

All of this detailed discussion of topography is vital to the revision and correction of studies dealing with these events.

Thus, according to this new research, the route of Mithridates' retreat from Dasteira to Sinoria is clearly determined to have followed the ancient line of Zimara-Nicopolis and Nicopolis-Satala, shown on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, as well as Antoninos' road map, and is examined in detail in my study and that of Adonts.[2]

The fortress of Sinoria, to which Mithridates, together with his remaining small forces, fled, was one of his largest stores of treasure. Here, according to Appian and Plutarch,[3] 6,000 talents in coin (around 25 million gold German marks or 12.5 million gold rubles), as well as expensive objects and vestments, were stored. Mithridates

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[1] Markwart, *Die Genealogie*, 63.

[2] Adonts, 75-80; Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 66-81.

[3] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 101; Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXII, 6.

distributed money and gifts among his soldiers and sent envoys to Tigranes, asking for his hospitality. However, the older Tigranes, as noted above, was still suspicious—and not without reason—that it was Mithridates himself who was the main instigator of the rebellion of his son and the uprising against him. For this reason, he not only refused him protection and help, but arrested his envoys and handed them over to Pompey. In addition, he made it known that he had offered a reward of 100 talents (around 420,000 gold German marks or 210,000 gold rubles) for Mithridates' head.

The French scholars Tournebize and de Morgan, as well as the German Mommsen, propose correctly[1] that peace negations between Tigranes and Pompey had already begun during the flight of Mithridates.

Apparently, Mithridates himself did not count on his son-in-law's hospitality in Armenia, and therefore, without waiting for Tigranes' reply, he, together with his small group, moved away from Sinoria and went north. He hoped that once he reached the northern shores of the Black Sea, he would drive out his own rebellious son, who had rushed to make peace with the Romans, out of his former Bosporan kingdom.

Mithridates' route from Sinoria to Colchis is indicated in detail by Appian.[2] Exiting Sinoria, and moving upward by the flow of the Euphrates River, he reached the source of that river. Mithridates stayed three days there and organized his troops. He then moved northward through the district of Khotene[3] in Armenia, where inhabitants of that district, together with the Iberians, armed with bows and slings, tried to block his way.

However, Mithridates repulsed them and, moving further along the Chorokh River (Acampsis), reached Phasis (present-day Poti), and from there to Dioscurias. Sources indicate that Mithridates' route went through Ashkale, passed by present-day Erzurum, in the direction of T'ort'um (Olti) and then went through Artvin and Batumi, reaching Sukhumi (Sebastopolis).

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[1] Tournebize, 774; J. de Morgan, 78; Mommsen, IV, 410.

[2] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 101.

[3] Hübschmann , 212 proposes that the district of Khotene was located by the source of the Euphrates and the Apsaros River. According to Reinach, Khotene corresponds to Strabo's (V, Bk, XI, xiv, 5), Khozene (Chozene), 389.

Having considered his war with Mithridates at an end, Pompey led his army toward Armenia in that same year of 66.

17
The Conclusion of Peace between Tigranes and Pompey

While these events were occurring in Pontus, Armenia was being invaded as well. At the request of his son-in-law, Tigranes the Younger, and at the instigation of Pompey, the Parthian king, Phraates, began a war against Tigranes, his rival and irreconcilable enemy. Accompanied by the rebellious son of Tigranes and mutinous Armenian nobles, Phraates moved into Armenia, conquered its southeastern provinces and reached the capital city of Artaxata.

According to Dio Cassius,[1] the elder Tigranes, caught unawares, was forced to flee into the mountainous provinces of his domain. However, the city of Artaxata remained loyal to its king and resisted the enemy fiercely. As described by Strabo, Artaxata, thanks to its fortifications, was practically impregnable. According to Strabo:

The city is situated on a peninsula-like elbow of land and its walls have the river as protection all around them, except at the isthmus, which is enclosed by a trench and a palisade.[2]

The Parthians were inexperienced in laying siege to cities. Artaxata, thanks to its strong fortifications, was not easily taken and the siege dragged on.

According to Dio Cassius,[3] when the Parthian king saw that the siege would take a long time, he returned to his own country, leaving a part of his army to the son of King Tigranes. However, after his departure, Tigranes the elder gathered his armed forces who had remained loyal to him, attacked his traitor son and the rebellious Armenian nobles, vanquished and pursued their forces and reestablished his rule over the entire land. Tigranes the Younger was forced to flee from Armenia. He decided to join Mithridates and went to Pontus. Along the way he learned that his grandfather was defeated and was himself in need of help. Therefore, he changed his plan and went straight to Pompey. He hoped that, through this new betrayal, he could negotiate with the Romans and gain the throne and kingship of Armenia.

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[1] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, 11, 2.
[2] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv, 6.
[3] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, 11, 2.

According to Plutarch,[1] the meeting of Tigranes the Younger with Pompey, at the latter's camp, took place on the banks of the Araxes River, probably near present-day K'ep'rik'e (Kerkuk). Here, precisely on the road from Upper Armenia to Artaxata, on the banks of the Araxes River was the station of *Ad Confluentes* ("at the confluence"), as indicated in my study[2] and the *Tabula Peutingeriana.*[3]

The Roman general must have been pleased that the rebellious son of Tigranes, who had betrayed his father, sought the help and protection of the Romans. But Tigranes the Younger was too late. Realizing the impossibility of waging a war against the Parthians, with his son on one side and the Romans on the other, the elder Tigranes had already begun to negotiate peace with Pompey. Before the talks had even concluded, he had arrested Mithridates' envoys, handed them over to Pompey, and put a price of 100 talents (200,000 gold rubles) for his father-in-law's head.

Pompey was probably not disposed against peace, but profiting from the internal problems in Armenia, he naturally wanted to impose on Tigranes a peace agreement which suited his own policy. It is clear, according to Dio Cassius,[4] that in this regard Pompey was influenced, in large measure, by the machinations of Tigranes the Younger, who obstructed and delayed the talks. It was the enmity of the son, according to Dio Cassius, which was the reason that his father did not succeed in obtaining a more favorable peace treaty.

Hoping to receive his father's crown, Tigranes the Younger became the guide for the Roman army and took them by a direct route to Artaxata. The route of the expedition clearly followed that of the *Tabula Peutingeriana*; that is, the ancient road from Sinara-Bagavan-Artaxata [see map 8], which has been discussed in detail in *The Principal Routes of Ancient Armenia.* The Roman army traveled from Satagha (Satala) to Gaghtaṛich, and from there to K'ep'rik'e, and then reached the plain of Alashkert. From there, they entered the Valley of Ararat through the southern part of the Armenian Mountains or the [present-day] Aghri-dagh chain and the Kujagh mountains. From Dio Cassius'[5] valuable account we can deduce that Pompey, like

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[1] Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXIII, 1.

[2] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 60-62.

[3] The confluence of Araxes and Murtsa rivers.

[4] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, lii, 1.

[5] *Ibid.*

the later Corbulo, crossed the Araxes River into the Ararat Valley across at a ford near ancient Vardanakert[1] and approached Artaxata not from the right bank of the Araxes, but from the left [see map 8].

When Pompey approached Artaxata with his army, Tigranes, realizing that resistance was futile, decided to come to terms with Pompey at any cost. He, therefore, went to the latter in person and voluntarily surrendered to the Romans. Classical sources have supplied confusing information on this meeting of Tigranes with Pompey, which contradict each other on a number of important points. For example, although Appian agrees with Dio Cassius and Plutarch that Tigranes appeared before Pompey voluntarily, he adds that, according to some accounts, Tigranes came to Pompey at the latter's invitation.

In my opinion, Appian's evidence on this matter, which is overlooked in historical works, may be true. For, in Plutarch, we also find evidence that Tigranes, prior to going to Pompey, permitted a Roman garrison sent by Pompey to enter Artaxata. We thus have clear confirmation that Tigranes went to Pompey not on his own accord but in all probability at the special invitation of the latter, following preliminary negotiations, as well as the receipt of certain assurances from Pompey. Roman sources apparently tried to conceal the fact of a preliminary accord, and in order to elevate Pompey's honor, felt it necessary to note that Tigranes obediently and without any discussion gave himself up to the benevolence of the Roman general.

Sources indicate that the elder Tigranes, who was at that time 75 years old, came to Pompey mounted on a horse without his royal tunic and outer garment [of pure purple], but wearing his crown and diadem. Arriving at the gate of the Roman camp, he wanted to enter riding his horse according to the Armenian custom. However, at the request of Pompey's lictors, he dismounted, handed over his sword and entered the camp on foot, following the Roman custom. According to Dio Cassius,[2] when he came to Pompey, he took off his diadem and attempted to bow and salute him, but Pompey immediately arose, lifted him up and sat him by his side. After that, according to Dio Cassius, Pompey consoled the Armenian king and informed him that he would not only remain the king of Armenia, but would be considered a friend and ally of Rome.

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[1] Manandian, *Trade and Cities*, 45-46.

[2] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, lii, 3-4.

Having reassured and encouraged the old man, he then invited him to dinner. Tigranes' son, who witnessed this scene, sat on the other side of Pompey. He realized that he had been deceived and would not receive the throne of Armenia. He, therefore, did not attend Pompey's dinner, to which he had been invited. Dio Cassius' account of the meeting of Tigranes and Pompey, included here, may, as we have seen, be somewhat embellished and tendentious. It should be noted, as well, that the accounts of Dio Cassius, Appian, and Plutarch on this same subject differ considerably, as they are probably based on different primary sources. According to Reinach, Dio Cassius may have used Livy's account; Plutarch, the biography of Pompey by Theophanes of Mitylene; and Appian, Nicolaus of Damascus or Posidonius.[1]

I do not consider it superfluous to include in full translation the accounts of these three historians regarding Tigranes' meeting with Pompey:

1. Dio Cassius, xxxvi, 52, 1-4- 53.1

[When] Pompey had crossed the Araxes and drawn near to Artaxata, then at last Tigranes surrendered the city to him and came voluntarily to his camp. He had arrayed himself so far as possible in a manner midway between his former dignity and his present humbled state, in order that he might seem to him worthy both of respect and pity; for he had put off his tunic shot with white and the candys [outer garments worn by Persians] of pure purple, but wore his tiara and head band. Pompey, however, sent a lictor and made him dismount from his horse, since the king was riding up as if to enter the very fortification on horseback according to the custom of his people. But when he saw him enter on foot, cast aside his head-dress and prostrate himself on the ground to do him obeisance, he felt an impulse of pity; so springing up hastily, he roused him, bound on the head-band and seated him upon a chair close by, and spoke words of encouragement, telling him among other things that he had not lost the kingdom of Armenia, but had gained the friendship of the Romans. By these words Pompey restored his spirits, and then invited him to dinner. But the son, who sat on the other side of Pompey, did not rise at the approach of his father, nor greet him in any other way, and fur-

[1] Reinach, 452.

thermore, though invited to dinner, did not present himself, whence he incurred Pompey's most cordial hatred.

2. Plutarch, Pompey, xxxiii, 2-5:

King Tigranes, however, who had recently been crushed by Lucullus, but now learned that Pompey was rather mild and gentle in his disposition, received a Roman garrison into his palace, and taking with him his friends and kindred set out on his own accord to surrender himself. When he rode up to the Roman camp, two of Pompey's lictors came to him and bade him dismount from his horse and go on foot; for no man mounted on horseback had ever been seen in a Roman camp. Tigranes accordingly not only obeyed them in this; but also unloosed his sword and gave it to them; and finally when he came into the presence of Pompey himself, he took off his royal tiara and made as if to lay it at his feet,[1] *and what was most humiliating of all, would have thrown himself down and clasped his knees in supplication. But before he could do this, Pompey caught him by his hand and drew him forward, and after giving him a seat near himself, and putting his son on the other side...But his son was dissatisfied, and when he was invited to supper, said that he was not dependent on Pompey for such honors, for he himself could find another Roman to bestow them.*

3. Appian, chapter 104:

But Pompey's reputation among the barbarians for justice and good faith was great, so that trusting to it Tigranes the father also came to him unheralded to submit all his affairs to Pompey's decision and to make complaint against his son. Pompey ordered tribunes and cavalry officers to meet him on the road, as an act of courtesy, but those who accompanied Tigranes feared to advance without the sanction of a herald and fled back. Tigranes came forward, however, and prostrated himself before Pompey as his superior, in barbarian fashion. There are those who relate that he was led up by lictors when sent for by Pompey.

During Tigranes' meeting with Pompey, an agreement was reached between the two to put an end to the powerful and newly formed Armenian Empire. According to the conditions of that

[1] See also *Valerius Maximus*, I, V, 1.9). See a similar account based on Cicero's speech *Pro Sestio*, XII (London, 1984), XXVII, 58.

agreement,[1] Tigranes had to renounce all his conquests, which included Syria, eastern Cilicia, Phoenicia, Cappadocia, Gordyene, and Sophene, and remain the king of only one country—Greater Armenia [see map 2].[2] His younger son was to receive Sophene (and Gordyene, according to Appian),[3] and after the death of his father, would ascend the throne of Armenia. Relying on an uncertain source, Appian[4] states that Tigranes the Younger had received the crown of Sophene, prior to this, from his father.[5]

The elder Tigranes was forced not only to give up his conquered lands, but also had to give Pompey 6,000 talents in coin (some 25 million German gold marks or around 12.5 million gold rubles). In addition, he also agreed to give a present of 50 drachmas or *denarius* (around 35 gold German marks or 17.5 gold rubles) to each Roman soldier, 1,000 drachmas (350 gold rubles) to each centurion, and one talent (2,100 gold rubles) to each military tribune.[6]

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[1] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, liii, 2; Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXIII, 3-4; Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 104-105.

[2] Velleius Paterculus, in his *Compendium of Roman History* has the following version: Pompey accordingly entered Armenia in pursuit of both kings [Mithridates and Tigranes] at once. First a son of Tigranes, who was at variance with his father, came to Pompey. Then the king in person, and in the guise of a suppliant, placed himself and his kingdom under the jurisdiction of Pompey, prefacing the act with the statement that he would not have submitted himself to the alliance of any man but Gnaeus Pompeius, whether Roman or of any other nationality; that he would be ready to bear any condition, favorable or otherwise, upon which Pompey might decide; that there was no disgrace in being beaten by one whom it would be a sin against the gods to defeat, and that there was no dishonor in submitting to one whom fortune had elevated above all others. The king was permitted to retain the honors of royalty, but was compelled to pay a large sum of money, all of which, as was Pompey's practice, was remitted to the quaestor and listed in the public accounts...The sovereignty of the king was now limited to Armenia, (London, 1961), II, xxxvii, 4-5.

[3] Appian, II, 105.

[4] *Ibid.*, II, 104.

[5] Asturean, 47.

[6] Strabo, V, Bk. XI, xiv, 10; Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXIII, 3-4, Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*) 104. According to Appian, the military tribunes did not receive one talent or 6,000 drachmas, but 10,000 *denarius* or drachmas of the Roman Republic. According to Hultsch, 250-252, 297-299, 711, a de-

Below are the literal translations of the aforementioned agreement:

1. Dio Cassius, xxxvi, 53, 2:

Now, on the following day, when Pompey had heard the claims of both, he restored to the elder all his hereditary domain; but what he had acquired later (chiefly portions of Cappadocia and Syria, as well as Phoenicia and the large district of Sophene bordering on Armenia) he took away, and demanded money of him besides. To the younger [Tigran] he assigned Sophene only.

2. Plutarch, Pompey, xxxiii, 4-5:

[Pompey] told him [Tigranes] that he must lay the rest of his losses to Lucullus, who had robbed him of Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia, Galatia, and Sophene; but that what he had kept up to the present time he should continue to hold if he paid six thousand talents to the Romans as a penalty for his wrongdoing; and that his son should be king of Sophene. With these terms Tigranes was well pleased, and when the Romans hailed him as King, he was overjoyed, and promised to give each soldier half a mina of silver, to each centurion ten minas, and to each tribune a talent.

3. Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 104-105:

He came and made explanations of the past, and gave to Pompey for himself 6,000 talents, and for the army fifty drachmas to each soldier, 1,000 to each centurion, and 10,000 to each tribune.

Pompey pardoned him for the past, reconciled him with his son, and decided that the latter should rule Sophene and Gordyene (which are now called Lesser Armenia) and the father the rest of Armenia, and that at his death the son should succeed him in that also. He required that Tigranes give up the territory that he had gained by war. Accordingly he gave up the whole of Syria from the Euphrates to the sea; for he held that and a part of Cilicia, which he had taken from Antiochus surnamed Pius.

4. Strabo, V, XI, xiv,10:

As for the wealth and power of the country [Armenia], the following is no small sign of it, that when Pompey imposed upon Tigranes, the father of Artavasdes, a payment of six thousand talents of silver, he forthwith distributed to the Roman forces as

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narius-drachma was equal to 0.70 gold mark or 35 gold kopeks (0.864 gold francs in the French translation).

follows: to each soldier fifty drachmas, to each centurion a thousand drachmas, and to each hipparch and chiliarch a talent.

Although historical sources claim that Pompey's attitude toward Tigranes was extraordinarily mild, the terms imposed on him, as we can see, were very heavy. It should be noted that the benign attitude of Pompey was characteristic of his personal, political, and military policy. Being a partisan of Roman financiers and moneylenders, Pompey, as we know, was himself one of the largest usurers in Italy. He, unlike the rash soldier Lucullus, preferred to realize the objectives of Roman imperialism not by force of arms, but through peaceful and less risky means. As we can see, he managed with great success both to break Armenian resistance and rob the country without bloodshed or losses.

The peace terms imposed by Pompey evidently did not satisfy Tigranes the Younger. He had hoped that the reward for his treason would not be merely Sophene, which had apparently already been given to him by his father prior to his rebellion, but the Armenian kingdom itself. In addition, he also considered it unjust that the huge war indemnity was to be paid principally from the treasury of Sophene, that is, from the reserves of his own kingdom.

Dio Cassius describes the great difficulties with which the gold was taken from the treasury of Sophene. We include below, *in extensor*, the account of this historian, which is noteworthy in that it informs us about the rules in use in Armenia concerning the storing of royal treasures.

Dio Cassius, xxxvi, 53.3-5:

And inasmuch as this was where the treasures were [in Sophene], the young man [young Tigranes] began a dispute about them, and not gaining his point, since Pompey had no other source from which to obtain the sums agreed upon, he became angry and planned to escape. Pompey, being informed of this in season, kept the youth in honorable confinement and sent word to those who were guarding the money, bidding them [to] give it all to his father. But they would not obey, stating that it was necessary for the young man, to whom the country was now held to belong, to give them his command. Then Pompey sent him to the forts. He, finding them all locked up, came near and reluctantly ordered that they be opened. When the keepers obeyed no more than before, claiming that he issued the command not of his own free will, but

under compulsion, Pompey was vexed and put [young] Tigranes in chains. Thus the old king secured the treasures.

The ancient sources differ on the subject of young Tigranes' arrest, mentioned in this account. Dio Cassius states that the reasons for the arrest were the difficulties caused by him and his resistance to Pompey's order to hand over the treasury. Appian claimed that Prince Tigranes had planned a new plot against his father.[1] Plutarch, whose account is translated above, states that, having been invited to dinner, he declined, and thus insulted and offended Pompey.[2] All these accounts, in part and in whole, are, in my opinion, true to some extent. Tigranes the Younger, who was dissatisfied and ill-disposed towards Pompey, could well have behaved insolently, and resisted the handing over of the money from the treasury of his own domain, as well as plotted against his father.

The arrest of Tigranes the Younger, who was, in point of fact an ally of Pompey, was not only a flagrant violation of customary law, but also a hostile and insulting move against his father-in-law, the Parthian king, Phraates. According to Plutarch:

Phraates the Parthian sent a demand for the young man, on the plea that he was his son-in-law, and a proposition that the Euphrates be adopted as a boundary between his empire and that of the Romans. Pompey replied that, as for Tigranes, he belonged to his father more than to his father-in-law; and as for the boundary, the just one would be adopted.[3]

Despite the protests of Phraates, who reminded Pompey of the treaty he had with the Romans, Tigranes the Younger, together with his wife and daughter,[4] were soon sent to Rome to participate in the triumphant cortege of Pompey.

This abrupt change in Pompey's relations with the Parthian kingdom is in keeping with the insidious and treacherous foreign policy of Rome. As long as the Pontic and Armenian kingdoms were the enemies of Rome and fought against the Republic, the latter presented itself as a friend of the Parthians. The Roman generals, Sulla and Lucullus, as well as Pompey, either conducted amicable negotiations, or else concluded agreements promising them [the Parthians]

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[1] Appian, II, (*Mithridatic Wars*), 105.
[2] Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXIII, 4.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*, XLV, 4.

Mesopotamia up to the Euphrates. But now that there was no longer a Pontic kingdom and Tigranes had become a friend and ally of Rome, the Republic did not want the presence of a great and mighty state nearby. It now became a protector of Tigranes and changed its policy vis-à-vis Phraates. A strong and independent Parthian state could not be tolerated by Rome, and, as we shall see, the old friendship turned into an implacable hatred.

It is also not difficult to guess why Pompey did not hand over the Armenian throne to Tigranes the Younger. For the Romans, the elder Tigranes, a mortal enemy of the Parthians, was a far more suitable ally than the young Tigranes, the son-in-law and friend of Phraates.

Having included Armenia in the Roman sphere of influence, Pompey, according to Plutarch,[1] left Afranius in charge of Armenia, and himself set out north against Mithridates of Pontus, who, with his small group of troops, had sought refuge in a secure place in Colchis. However, because of the onset of winter, he was forced to spend several months with his army near the Cyrus River, not far from the ancient military road going from Artaxata to Colchis [see map 9].

The Roman campground during the winter of 66-65 (as I have indicated in detail in my article regarding the precise routes of Pompey's incursion into Transcaucasia)[2] was not located along the upper sources of the Euphrates or the Cyrus rivers, as Mommsen hypothesizes,[3] but on the plains between present-day Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki. Mommsen's opinion is founded on Dio Cassius' statement that Pompey's army wintered in the Anahita territory near the Cyrus River.[4] However, this Anahita, mentioned by Dio Cassius, which corresponds to the ancient Armenian district of Acilisene, is, in fact, as noted in my study, located near the station *Caspiae* (present-day Khospis) on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, by the Cyrus River.

In the same study, the precise route of the Roman army from Artaxata to the winter camp is determined as well. The road, indicated on the *Tabula Peutingeriana* and indicated exactly in my study *The Principal Routes of Ancient Armenia*, went along the line of Ar-

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[1] *Ibid.*, xxxiv.1.

[2] Manandian, "Krugovoi put' Pompeia v Zakavkaz'e," *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii* 4 (1939).

[3] Mommsen, IV, 412.

[4] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, liii, 5.

taxata-Phasis, near present-day Ashtarak, Kondakhsaz, Ghanlija, and Khospia, along the right bank of the Cyrus River [see map 9].

According to Dio Cassius,[1] Pompey divided his wintering army into three parts and placed them at quite a distance from each other. He took the command of one of them upon himself, and entrusted the other two to his lieutenants, Lucius Flaccus and Metellus Celerus. Tigranes the Younger was kept under arrest in the camp of the latter.

Preparing his march into Colchis, where Mithridates was located, Pompey began negotiations with the king of the Iberians, Atroces, and the king of the Albanians, Oroezes, who promised to remain neutral and who consented to allow the Roman troops to cross their lands without any hindrance.[2] However, either at Mithridates' instigation, or, in order to free Tigranes the Younger, they instead planned to ambush and attack the Romans.

In mid-December, when Pompey's army was carelessly and tranquilly celebrating the Saturnalia festival, the Iberians and Albanians crossed the Cyrus River and unexpectedly fell upon the three parts of the Roman army, planning to massacre them separately. The attack, which could have been very dangerous for Pompey's army, was not successful. The troops of Atroces and Oroezes were repulsed with great losses, especially during the retreat and the crossing of the Cyrus River,[3] which, in all probability, was near the station of *Ad Metcurium* on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, not far from present-day Akhaltsikhe.

After the successful repulsion of this unexpected and dangerous attack, the Roman legions remained undisturbed near the Cyrus River until the spring of the year 65.

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[1] *Ibid.*, liv, 1.

[2] Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXIV, 2.

[3] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 102-103, Dio, III, Bk. XXXVI, liv, 1-2; Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXIV, 1-3.

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Armenia and Neighboring Countries after Pompey's Invasion

With the arrival of the spring in the year 65, Pompey, rather than marching forward toward Colchis, decided to secure his rear flank from the Iberians and therefore marched against them. Moving through the plain by the Cyrus River with no resistance, the Roman army approached the fortress of Harmozica, which lay south of the Cyrus River in present-day Metskhet'i. Pompey's campaign is described in detail in the work of Dio Cassius.[1]

According to Dio Cassius the Iberian king Artoces burned the bridge over the Cyrus River and fled to the left bank. Convinced that Pompey, having seized Harmozica, was preparing to cross the river and continue his pursuit, Artoces immediately began to negotiate for peace. He sent provisions to the Roman camp and rebuilt the damaged bridge.

However, after the Roman army crossed to the opposite side of the Cyrus, Artoces became frightened and fled deeper into his land until he reached the Pelore River. Crossing that river, he burned the bridge here as well. Just as during Pompey's prior pursuit, the Iberians once again suffered great losses when they crossed the Pelore River. Realizing that the Roman army was not stopping its advance and would cross the river, Artoces was forced to send gifts to Pompey, hand over his sons as hostages, and accept Pompey's terms for peace.

Having thus ensured its rear from possible attack, the victorious army of Pompey could finally continue its march against Mithridates Eupator. Passing through the district of Harmozica, they moved into the valley of the Cyrus River, through present-day Suram (Surami) and Shorapani, and reached the valley of the Rion River. From there they marched to Phasis, where the Roman flotilla was anchored. Pompey believed that Mithridates, who was encircled from the sea, was trapped. He was very surprised when he was told that his prey had already managed to escape. The stubborn old man, together with his small force, had crossed through some 700 kilometers of almost

[1] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVII, i, 2-5, ii, 1-7.

impassable roads and was in the Crimea, where he had already retaken his Bosporan kingdom.

Pompey considered it dangerous to pursue his subject via a sea invasion of the Crimea, where Mithridates had managed to reassume his power and fortify himself. From Colchis he [Pompey] returned to Armenia and from there went to [Caucasian] Albania.[1] He decided to punish the king of Albania, Oroezes, who, as we have seen, had attacked the Romans, probably at Mithridates' instigation, and to subject him to his rule as well.

Pompey's return route from Colchis to Armenia and his route against the Albanians, which was unknown until only recently, can now be determined exactly, thanks to new geographical studies. His route from Colchis to the present-day Aparan district, as noted above, can be ascertained from the military highway Phasis-Artaxata on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, which went through the present-day towns of Abast'uman, Khospia and Ghanlija. The road to Albania after that, in all probability, went through the ancient circular road of Artaxata-Armastica-Lazo of the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, as indicated in one of Markwart's studies.[2]

From present-day Ghanlija, the Roman army probably continued through present-day Kirovakan-Dilijan-Ijevan-Akstafa into the ancient district of Kambech, which lay north of the Cyrus, between the Alazan and Iora Rivers [see map 10].

The Albanian campaign of Pompey is described in detail by Dio Cassius and Plutarch.[3] Reaching the lower flow of the Cyrus River, the Roman army, according to their accounts, crossed it through a ford in the river bed, which had less water due to the summer heat. Crossing the Cyrus River, they entered the present-day Karayaz Steppe and moved in the direction of the Iora River, which is called the Cambys (Kambech) by Dio Cassius. After crossing this river, the Roman army continued in the direction of the present-day Alazan River, which in ancient times was called Abas or Abant, according to Dio Cassius and Plutrach. Because of the heat, the Romans crossed

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[1] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVII, iii, 3-4.

[2] J. Markwart, *Skizzen zur historischen Topographie und Geschichte von Kaukasien. Das Itinerar von Artaxata nach Armastica auf der römischen Weltkarte* (Vienna, 1928).

[3] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVII, iii, 3-6; iv, 1-4; and v, 1; Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXV, 1-2; see also Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 103.

this entire route during the night, suffering great difficulties due to thirst. They had some 1,000 water-skins, while the inhabitants of the Kambech district provided them with provisions.

The battle with the forces of the Albanian king took place on the left bank of the Alazan River, where the Roman army for the first time came into contact with the enemy. According to Plutarch, the Albanian army, led by Cosis, the brother of the king, was badly armed and most of their troops were covered with animal skins. Even before the battle, Pompey ordered his infantry to hide behind his cavalry. The Albanians, thinking that they faced only the Roman cavalry, immediately attacked it. At that moment, the Roman legions came out from behind the cavalry, smashed them, and scattered them into the nearby forests. Many of those who fled found their death in those forests, which at Pompey's orders were surrounded and set afire. After this carnage, Oroezes sued for peace. The king of Albania, like Artoces, the king of the Iberians, submitted to Pompey and accepted the nominal suzerainty of Rome.

According to Plutarch, the Roman army returned from Albania to Armenia and from there went to Armenia Minor [see map 11].[1]

According to Dio Cassius, Pompey spent the winter in the Aspis district[2] in the year 65/64, as he had previously done in 66/65. It is interesting that in this part of his narrative, Dio Cassius refers to it as Aspis, while in the earlier part he calls it the district of Anahita. As I have described in detail in my study "The Circular Route of Pompey in Transcaucasia,"[3] this district was called Aspis, or more probably Caspis, after the Caspiae station indicated on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*. It was the center of that region and was located near present-day Khospis. Apparently, the Anahita district was not only called Acilisene but Caspis as well. European sources, basing their information on Dio Cassius, hold that Pompey's winter quarters in the year 65/64 were in Armenia Minor, which is evidently erroneous.

Returning to Pontus from Armenia in the year 64, Pompey's army laid siege to and captured Mithridates' forts with their rich treasuries in Pontus and in Armenia Minor, as well as capturing the famed records (library) of Mithridates in Talaura, Nor Amrots' (New Fort),

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[1] Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXVI, 1.

[2] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVII, vii, 5. Fabricius suggests reading Anahita in place of Aspis.

[3] Manandian, *Krugovoi*.

Sinoria, and other locations. In these forts were thousands of gold inlaid onyx cups, huge numbers of vases, sofas, thrones, swords and armor, most of them covered with gold, or decorated with precious stones. All of these riches and all of the Hellenistic art objects of great value, which were not pillaged during Lucullus' invasion, were sent by Pompey to Rome.[1]

While Pompey was busy fighting the Iberians and the Albanians and capturing the Pontic forts, the Parthians occupied Mesopotamia, which, according to their treaty with Pompey, as we have seen, was to be theirs up to the Euphrates River. They also invaded Gordyene, to which both they and the Armenians laid claim.

However, Pompey demanded that Phraates evacuate Gordyene, stating that it belonged to Tigranes. Not waiting for Phraates' response, he ordered one of his deputies, Afranius, to occupy Gordyene and to hand it over to the Armenian king. That general, according to Plutarch,[2] drove out the Parthians from that country and pursued them up to the city of Arbela in Adiabene.

Afranius had to go from here, via northern Mesopotamia, to Syria, where Pompey was to arrive as well at that time, in the year 64. But in mid-winter of the year 65/64, according to Dio Cassius,[3] Afranius and his army lost their way, became confused, and could have faced death from the cold weather and lack of supplies in the Mesopotamian deserts, had not the Macedonian refugees [probably soldiers] from the city of Carrhae (present-day Kharan) come to his aid. They accorded great hospitality to him and his troops and guided them into Syria.

Despite Pompey's provocation and the unceremonious violation of the agreement which was to give all of northern Mesopotamia to the Parthians, Phraates decided not to go to war with the Romans. In the spring of the year 64, he went to Armenia and attacked Tigranes, who asked his Roman allies for help. This incident could have served as a good excuse for Pompey to start a war with the Parthians as

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[1] Pompey gave the Roman Republic the largest amount of money gathered from any of its foreign wars. After distributing 384 million sesterces among his soldiers, he gave 480 million sesterces to the treasury and augmented the annual tribute from Asia from 200 to 340 million sesterces; for more details, see *Cambridge Ancient History*, IX (Cambridge, 1971), 396.

[2] Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXVI, 1.

[3] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVII, v, 5.

well, a war which his officers and partisans had sought for some time. However, Pompey, who was circumspect and did not possess Lucullus' audacity, did not want to risk his victories and decided against war. He justified his action by stating that the Roman people had not given him a mandate for this war and that he had not yet completed his campaign against Mithridates of Pontus.[1] As we have seen, the Parthian king Phraates also refused to engage in a war with the Romans and lacking the courage openly to affront the Roman general, who had treacherously broken their agreement. He also relied on his newly dispatched envoys to Pompey, who informed him that Pompey would send three arbiters to resolve the conflict between him and Tigranes.[2] Tigranes and Phraates then ceased their fighting and agreed to abide by the decision of the judges.

After examining the complaints and demands of the antagonists, these judges decided to give the disputed provinces to Tigranes. By their decision, the Armenian king gained not only Gordyene, but also a part of northern Mesopotamia. It is interesting to note that, according to Dio Cassius,[3] Phraates did not object to the outcome and accepted it, hoping that in the future he would reconcile with the Armenians and receive their help against the Romans.

While these events were taking place, Mithridates of Pontus, having restored his rule over the Bosporan kingdom, proposed new peace terms to the Romans. He announced that he was willing to become a Roman vassal and tributary, if Pompey would agree to return the kingdom of Pontus to him. As in the year 66, Pompey again informed him that, prior to negotiations, Mithridates had to personally appear before him and submit to Rome. Peace thus became impossible. After this, Mithridates began to prepare for a new war with Rome and devised a bold new plan of war against the Republic. He decided to make a pact with the Scythians, Thracians, and Celts, and like Hannibal of Carthage, march into Italy along the Danube River and through the Alps. Such a tremendous campaign naturally required a colossal amount of men and material. Consequently, in the year 63, when Mithridates was finalizing his preparations for war, whose entire burden had fallen on the shoulders of the people of the

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[1] *Ibid.*, vii, 1.

[2] Appian, II (*Mithridatic Wars*), 106, Plutarch, *Pompey*, XXXIX, 3; Dio, III, Bk. XXXVII, vii, 3.

[3] Dio, III, Bk. XXXVII, vii, 4.

Bosporan kingdom, a sudden and violent rebellion ignited against him. Not only nearly all the cities, but also his troops, and even his own son Pharnaces rose up. Old Mithridates understood that he would receive no mercy and could not be saved. Besieged in his fortress in the city of Panticapaeum (present-day Kerch), he did not want to surrender to the rebels and ended his life by committing suicide (spring of the year 63). His corpse was sent via Pharnacia to Syria and was, on Pompey's order, interned in the Pontic royal sepulcher near Sinope. With Mithridates' death, the long and great war against him, which had begun 25 years before, was at an end.

The war in the entire East and Syria could also now be considered at an end. In the years 65 and 64, Pompey's commanders, Gabinius, Scaurus, Afranius, and others had already conquered Phoenicia, Palestine, and some other small principalities and cities of Syria and Mesopotamia. The borders of the Roman Republic now reached the deserts of Mesopotamia and nearly up to Egypt.

During the years 64 and 63, Pompey was occupied with the political organization of the conquered countries, regulating their internal administration and affairs. Already in the year 64, during his sojourn in Pontus, he had turned the kingdoms of Nicomedia, Bythinia, and the western part of the Pontic kingdom of Mithridates into Roman provinces. Prior to Pompey, Antiochus of Asia, as we have noted, was recognized as the lawful king of Seleucia by Lucullus and the Roman Senate. Now, however, Seleucid rule in Syria was abolished and that entire land became a Roman province. Antiochus became a Roman vassal and received the small kingdom of Commagene, with its capital at Samosate, in place of his domain in Syria. The famous crossing on the Euphrates, near the fortress of Seleucia (present-day Birejik), which had immense strategic and commercial importance, was located within the frontiers of this kingdom.

Ariobarzanes, the king of Cappadocia, a friend and ally of Rome, and Prince Deiotarus of Galatia, who had given great help to the Romans during the Pontic and Armenian campaigns, received new and vast territories. Pompey gave Ariobarzanes a number of districts detached from Cilicia and all of Sophene. He also possessed the important crossings on the Euphrates, as well as the Tomisa fortress. Prince Deiotarus received the title of king, as well as the eastern part of the former Pontic kingdom, with the coastal towns of Pharnacia and Trebizond, as well as Armenia Minor. Colchis, which lay north

of the kingdom of Deiotarus, became a separate principality and was given to Aristarchus, who name appears on some coins and is mentioned in numismatic studies.

East of the Euphrates River, it was not only Armenia which declared itself a friend of Rome. Atropatene, Iberia, Albania, and Osrhoëne, as well as a number of small Arab tribal regions in northern Mesopotamia, also recognized Roman suzerainty and came within its sphere of influence.

Armenia, having accepted the nominal hegemony of Rome, henceforth became an outpost of the Roman Republic. After this, Pompey's policy toward Armenia completely changed. Tigranes, like Ariobarzanes and Deiotarus, received from Pompey's hand or through his intercession, not only Gordyene and northern Mesopotamia, whose annexation to Armenia was already noted, but also Derchan and Acilisene,[1] the latter of which, in addition to the ancient Acilisene district, probably also included Daranaghi and Mananaghi, Aghiun, and Mzur.[2] Thus, Greater Armenia, during the time of Tigranes II, extended its borders south of the Armenian Plateau, as well as along the regions adjacent to Armenia Minor and Sophene.

Evidence of the new policy inaugurated by Pompey toward Greater Armenia was the return of the title of "King of kings" to Tigranes. This title had earlier belonged exclusively to the Parthian kings; after the fall of Tigranes' empire it had been given to Phraates. The title was now restored to Tigranes and Phraates was relegated to the simple title of "king."

The Parthian king was obliged to tolerate such obvious affronts and insults without complaint. This ally of Rome, who had been duped, now found himself between two fires, just as his rival, Tigranes, had done earlier in the year 66. On the border of Syria, in full readiness, stood the army of Pompey, while from the direction of Mesopotamia and Atropatene the Parthian king was threatened by the Armenian troops of Tigranes, the new ally of Rome. Phraates now understood that his alliance with Rome, just as Mithridates had warned him, had not only destroyed his neighbors but himself as well.

The failure of Pompey's exceptional prudence is that he did not take advantage of the favorable circumstances and attack the Par-

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[1] Markwart, *Die Genealogie*, 63 and my study *Hayastani*, 73.

[2] Adontz, 54-55.

thians, who were unprepared to wage a large war. At his rear he left intact the forces of his old humiliated and offended ally, who had time to prepare and choose a moment more suitable to take up arms and seek revenge. It goes without saying that, in this future, inevitable war, the friendship and aid of Armenia was to be of extreme importance both for the Romans and the Parthians. It is for this reason that Phraates, as we have seen, was forced to modify his hostile policy against Armenia and tacitly cede, in the year 64, not only Gordyene, but also northern Mesopotamia to Tigranes. The new policy of friendship with neighboring Armenia, as is evident during the reign of Artavasdes II, the son of Tigranes, made a political rapprochement and union between Armenia and Parthia possible.[1]

Upon Pompey's return to Italy (in the year 61), Tigranes continued to rule in Armenia peacefully and without rebellions until an advanced age, to the year 56 or 55. He was still alive in 56 and is mentioned in one of Cicero's speeches.[2] In the year 54, during Crassus' expedition to Armenia, we know that Artavasdes II, the sole remaining son of Tigranes, ruled Armenia. Tigranes, as indicated by Lucianus [Licinianus], died at the age of eighty-five, after a long life[3] Lucianus' account can be confirmed, since Tigranes was ten years older than Mithridates Eupator, who, according to Reinach, was born in the year 132. Tigranes was thus born in 141 or 142.[4]

Tigranes wife, Cleopatra, had apparently left her husband and gone to her father, Mithridates, during the rebellion of Tigranes the Younger. During Mithridates' suicide she was with him in the city of Panticapaeum.[5]

Tigranes' death ended the short period of Armenia's imperial ascent. It is very clear that this mighty king, who had transformed his realm into a great empire with the objective of developing Hellenis-

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[1] Mommsen's (vii, 177) and other historians' theory that Phraates' son Mithridates III (57-54) led a war against Artavazdes II, is without foundation. Justin's account on this subject (XLII, iv, 1), according to Gutschmid, concerns the war between Mithridates II of Parthia and Artavazdes I of Armenia, *Irans*, 86 n. 2.

[2] Cicero, *Pro Sestio*, XXVII, 59.

[3] Lucianus [Granius Licinianus], *Grani Liciniani quae supersunt* (Leipzig, 1904), Bk. XXXV.

[4] Reinach, 52.

[5] *Ibid.*, 405.

tic urban culture, and who desired to elevate his people, cannot be considered a mediocre or common man. Despite this, the image of this great and dominant historical figure is unfortunately distorted and misinterpreted in almost all foreign, as well as Armenian, historical studies.

This misrepresentation of Tigranes' character, as given in aforementioned works, should be rejected without any reservations. For, as we have seen, they are based primarily on the negative and invented accounts of Plutarch or his sources, which themselves have no historical value.

Tigranes II and Mithridates Eupator were, without doubt, monarchs in the Hellenistic mode, who vigorously pursued the great cultural work of Alexander of Macedon and his successors. The proof that Hellenistic culture was deeply rooted in Armenia is evident in that Tigranes' son, Artavasdes, as noted above, wrote tragedies, orations, and historical works in Greek, some of which were known to Plutarch.[1]

The campaigns of Lucullus and Pompey put an end to the reformist and progressive activities of both Tigranes and Mithridates. During its military campaigns, victorious Rome not only turned rich and populous cities and villages of Pontus and southern Armenia into deserts but, by permanently installing itself in Syria, gradually brought about the demise of Hellenistic culture in Armenia, as well as throughout Western Asia Minor, which led to a cultural regression there.[2] Hellenism and Hellenistic urban culture, particularly in Armenia and in the Parthian territories, gradually made way for the ancient Iranian traditions [the Sasanid Persian Empire] and way of life, which had especially deep roots in these lands.

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With the establishment of Roman imperialism on the banks of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers, ancient Armenia found itself in the difficult and torturous situation, that of a buffer state, for many centuries. Situated between two mighty antagonists, Rome and Iran, Armenia, despite the vital interests of its population, was forced to

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[1] Plutarch, *Lives*, III *Crassus* (London, 1951), XXXIII, 1.

[2] Eduard Meyer, *Blüte und Niedergang des Hellenismus in Asien* (Berlin, 1925), 62 and *passim*.

take part in violent and endless wars, which periodically flared up between its two great neighboring states.[1]

After that, the high Armenian Plateau became the object of a constant struggle between international rivals, and, very often, played a thankless role in the theatre of their military operations. For the belligerent states the domination of Armenia was of primary importance, not only because of its great northern highway for international trade, but also because of its strategic and military value. Thanks to its particular geographical and physical location, the high Armenian Plateau, as we know, is a giant natural citadel with a military value of the first order, both for offensive and defensive wars. Armenia, as a state friendly to the Parthians, presented a clear danger to the eastern provinces of Rome; as an ally of Rome, it was a great threat to the Parthian state. Therefore, from then on, political alliance with Armenia, or its submission by force, became a fundamental problem in the foreign policy of Rome, Parthia and [Sasanid] Persia.

This disastrous situation, created in Armenia after the victorious campaigns of Pompey, not only continued throughout the Roman-Parthian period, but also during the Byzantine-Sasanid era, the Byzantine-Arab period, and subsequent centuries. As a theatre of endless and bloody wars, Armenia was periodically ravaged and pillaged, and its population given over to fire and sword, or taken captive. Armenia's status as a buffer state became the main reason that it could not become the master of its own fate and why its political condition was continually determined by the interests of great powers.

Armenia could relinquish its status as a buffer state only if the frontiers of East and West and the theatre of constant wars were transferred somewhere else. Armenia would have, of course, preferred the reestablishment of the political and strategic conditions which it enjoyed in Western Asia Minor during the time of Achaemenid Persia or Alexander of Macedon.

But Armenia did not get that chance. For many centuries, the great conquering powers of the East and the West remained in their

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[1] The chronological table on page 177 not only indicates the dates of the major events outlined in this study, but is also a good illustration of the political problems of the Artaxiad Dynasty and Armenia, following the death of Tigranes II.

positions by the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. Armenia, having lost its former greatness and independence, became the eternal victim of the great rival Western and Eastern empires.



Map 1. Armenia, Pontus, and Asia Minor (ca. 100 B.C.).



Map 2. Tigranes' Conquests (86-69 B.C.).



Map 3. Lucullus' Route from Sophene to Tigranocerta.



Map 4. The Battle of Tigranocerta according to Plutarch and Eckhardt.



Map 5. The Battle of Tigranocerta according to Appian.



Map 6. Lucullus' Route from Gordyene to the Plain of Mush.



Map 7. Lucullus' Route from the Arsanias River toward Artaxata.



Map 8. Pompey's Route from Armenia Minor to Artaxata.



Map 9. Pompey's Route from Artaxata to Iberia and Phasis.



Map 10. Pompey's Route from Phasis to Caucasian Albania.



Map 11. Pompey's from Caucasaian Albania to Armenia Minor.

Chronological Table
(190 BC-AD 66)

190: Antiochus the Great is defeated by the Romans at Magnesia
189: Artaxias and Zariadris are proclaimed kings in Greater Armenia and Sophene, respectively
180: Artaxias I participates in the peace agreement concluded among the five kings in Asia Minor
166: City of Artaxata founded
ca. 165: Antiochus IV of Seleucia invades Armenia
142-141: Birth of Tigranes II
95: Tigranes II ascends the throne of Greater Armenia
95-94: Treaty between Tigranes II and Mithridates Eupator
94: Sophene is annexed to Greater Armenia
93: Tigranes' first campaign in Cappadocia
92: Sulla, the Praetor of Cilicia, reoccupies Cappadocia
91: New attacks by generals Mithraas and Bagoas against Cappadocia
89-85: Tigranes' victorious battles against the Parthian Arsacids and the submission of their western territories to Armenia
88-84: The First Mithridatic War
84: The verbal treaty at Dardanus
84-83: Tigranes subdues Syria and the plain of Cilicia
83-81: The Second Mithridatic War
73-64: The Third Mithridatic War
71 (summer): Metrodorus of Scepsis is sent as an ambassador to Armenia
71 (fall): Mithridates' defeat and his flight to Armenia
71 (end of): The envoy, Appius Claudius, demands the surrender of Mithridates to Lucullus
70: Lucullus' return to the Asian province and celebrations for the end of the war
69 (spring): Lucullus invades Armenia; Mithrobarzanes attacks the enemy; siege of Tigranocerta; the entrance of the Armenian cavalry into Tigranocerta
69 (summer): The meeting of Tigranes with Mithridates Eupator
69 (Oct. 6). The Battle of Tigranocerta

68 (summer): Armeno-Roman skirmishes by the Arsanias River
68 (September): The Battle of Arsanias
68 (end of): Lucullus besieges Mdzbin (Nisibis) and takes it
67 (spring): The Roman legions under Triarius suffer a defeat in Pontus
67 (summer): Lucullus' retreat from Galatia
66 (spring): Pompey's attack against Mithridates; rebellion of Tigranes the Younger against his father
66 (fall): Mithridates' retreat from Dasteira and his defeat at the Lycos River
66 (December 17-24): Iberian and Albanian troops attack Pompey
65 (spring): Pompey invades Iberia
65 (summer): Pompey invades Albania
65 (fall): Pompey returns to Armenia Minor
65-62: Reorganization of Asia Minor and Syria by Pompey
63: Mithridates Eupator commits suicide
56-55: Death of Tigranes II
55-35: Rule of Artavasdes II
53: Battle of Carrhae, Roman defeat, and death of Crassus
52-40: Armeno-Parthian rapprochement
47: Julius Caesar defeats Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates Eupator, at Zela in Syria (August 2)
40: Parthian domination of Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine
38: General Venditus defeats and kills King Pacorus of Parthia at Gindarus in Syria
37: Mark Antony and Artavasdes II in Iberia and Albania
36: Mark Antony and Artavasdes II fight the Parthians
35: Mark Antony arrests Artavasdes II
30-20: Artashes II rules in Armenia
20-ca.8: Tigranes III rules as a Roman client
8-5: Tigranes IV and Erato rule in Armenia
5-2: Artavasdes III ascends the throne with Roman help
2-AD 1: Tigranes IV and Erato are restored by Armenian rebels
2-4: Ariobarzanes of Atropatene rules Armenia as a Roman client
ca. 4-6: Artavasdes IV, son of Ariobarzanes, rules in Armenia
ca. 6: Tigranes V rules in Armenia
ca. 6: Erato rules in Armenia
11-16: Vonones of Parthia rules in Armenia
18-34: Germanicus appoints Zeno as king of Armenia

34: Arsaces, son of Artabanus II of Parthia, rules in Armenia
35: Iberian rule in Armenia
35: Orodes, the son of Artabanus II of Parthia, rules in Armenia
35-37: Iberian rule in Armenia
43-51: Mithridates of Iberia rules in Armenia
51-54: Radamistus of Iberia rules in Armenia
54: Armenia occupied by the Parthians
54-59: Corbulo's campaigns in Armenia
60-61: Tigranes VI rules in Armenia
61-62: Roman-Parthian War over Armenia
62: Peace of Rhandeia
64: Discussions between Rome and Parthia as to the future of Armenia
65-66 Tiridates, brother of the Parthian King, Vologeses I, goes to Rome and receives the crown of Armenia from Nero. The compromise finally brings peace to Armenia for several decades and establishes the Armenian Arsacid Dynasty (66-428).

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I. Contemporary Roman Sources

1. The official reports of Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey to the Roman Senate concerning the Treaty of Dardanus, the taking of Tigranocerta, and the death of Mithridates. These primary sources, which have not survived, were used by Cicero, Appian, Plutarch, and others.
2. The Memoirs of Sulla (*Commentarium rerum gestarum*). Although these memoirs are lost, they served as a source for Plutarch, Livy, and others. Certain fragments have survived; see *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquae*, H. Peter, ed. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1906-1914.
3. Sallust (86-34 B.C.). Sallust's work has been preserved only in fragments. These fragments are considered the best source for the campaigns of Lucullus. See Sallust: *The Histories*, P. McGushin trans. 2 vols. Oxford 1992-1994 and *Sallust*, J. C. Rolfe, ed. and trans. London-Cambridge Mass, 1985 (Loeb classical library).*
4. Cicero (106-43 B.C.). The following speeches and works of Cicero have material on Armenia and Pontus: *Pro lege Manilia s. de imperio Cn. Pompeii; Pro Sestio*; *Academica,* H. Grose Hodge; R. Gardner; and H. Rackham, eds. and trans. London-Cambridge Mass., 1966, 1984, 2000 (Loeb classical library).*

II. Contemporary Greek Sources

1. Poseidonius of Apamea (ca. 135-51 B.C.). His work is considered to be the continuation of Polybius' *History*. According to Reinach (*Mithridate Eupator*, 426), he probably wrote a history of Pompey's campaigns (see Strabo,

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[1] Sources marked by an asterisk have been added or substituted with a modern English version by the translator.

Bk. V, Bk. XI, i, 6). The surviving fragments have been published in volume III of the *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, C. Müller, ed. 4 vols. Paris, 1841-1851.

2. Theophanes of Mitylene.
   He was a client of Pompey who took part in his expeditions and wrote an account which is clearly biased in favor of Pompey. Fragments of it have been preserved and have been published in Müller's *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, vol. III.
3. Archias of Antioch.
   He accompanied Lucullus, took part in his campaigns, and composed an epic poem in honor of the general, who was his patron. It is interesting that even this poem, which is lost, was used as a historical source by Livy and Plutarch (see Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator*, 427).

III: Roman Sources of the Time of Augustus and Later Periods

1. Livy (59 B.C.-AD 17).
   From the works of Livy concerning the era of Tigranes II only a short list (*periochae*) has survived, extracts of which are preserved in the works of Florus, Eutropius, Orose, and others. See *Periochae omnium librorum, fragmenta Oxyrhynchi reperta Iuli Obsequentir Prodigiorum liber*. O. Rossbach, ed. Leipzig, 1910. See also Livy, *History*, Volume XIII, A. C. Schlesinger, ed. & trans. London-Cambridge, Mass., 1961 (Loeb classical library).*
2. Trogus Pompeius.
   He was a contemporary of Livy, who wrote the *Epitome of the Philippic History*. Its preface and table of contents are conserved in the work of Justin; see *M. Juniani Justini Epitoma historiarum Philippicarum Pompeii Trogi*, F. Ruehl ed. Leipzig, 1915.
3. Velleius Paterculus.
   A contemporary of Emperor Tiberius (AD 14-37), who wrote a short history of Rome; see *Compendium of Roman History*, F. W. Shipley, ed. & trans. London-Cambridge, Mass. 1961 (Loeb classical library).*

4. Frontinus.
A contemporary of Emperor Domitian (AD 81-96); see *Stratagems* C. E. Bennett, ed. &trans. London-Cambridge, Mass., 1993 (Loeb classical library).*
5. Florus.
He lived in the first half of the second century AD and wrote a history of the Roman wars during the period of Augustus based on the works of Livy; see *Epitome of Roman History*, E. S. Forster, ed. & trans. London-Cambridge, Mass, 1966 (Loeb classical library).*
6. Eutropius.
He lived in the fourth century and composed a short study on the history of Rome up to AD 364; see *Breviarium ab urbe condita.* F. Ruehl, ed. Leipzig, 1887.
7. Orose (Orosius)
A priest from Spain, who wrote a short history of the pagan world, which contains valuable details on the campaigns of Lucullus and Pompey, extracted from ancient sources; see *Historarium adversum paganos, libri VII.* K. Zangemeister, ed. Leipzig, 1889.
8. Rufus Sextus. *De historia Romanorum.* Paris, 1566.*

IV: Greek Sources of the Time of Augustus and Later Periods

1. Strabo (63 B.C.-Ad 10).
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2. Nicolaus of Damascus.
He was the secretary of Herod (37-4 B.C.) and wrote a universal history, only fragments of which remain; see Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (above). He is a source for Appian.
3. Plutarch (ca. AD 46-120).
Plutarch's *Lives* include the biographies of Sulla, Lucullus, Pompey, Sertorius, Crassus, and others. See vols. II-V. B. Perrin, ed. & trans. London-Cambridge, Mass. 1948-1958 and *Moralia*, vol. III. F. C. Babbitt, ed. and trans. London-Cambridge, Mass., 1961 (Loeb classical library).*

4. Josephus Flavius (b. AD 37-38 in Jerusalem).
He wrote *The Jewish War*, H. J. Thackeray ed. and trans., 9 vols. London, 1926-1965) and *Jewish Antiquities*, R. Marcus and L. H. Feldman eds. & trans., 9 vols. London, 1926-1965 (Loeb classical library).*
5. Phlegon of Tralles.
A contemporary of Emperor Hadrian (AD 117-138), who wrote a chronological study called *Olympiadum*, fragments (*De Olympijs fragmentum*) of which have survived; see Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (above).
6. Appian.
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7. Memnon.
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8. Dio [Cassius] (ca. AD 155-235).
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