

OUTLINES
OF
ROMAN HISTORY

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PREFACE TO FOURTH EDITION.

IN this new edition, apart from minor corrections and additions, larger space has been given to the history of the Flavian Emperors and of Trajan. The annexations of territory beyond the Rhine effected by the former, and the Dacian and Parthian campaigns of the latter, have been more fully treated.

H. F. PELHAM.

OXFORD, November, 1905.

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PREFACE.

THIS book is a reprint, with many additions and alterations, of the article "Roman History," which appeared in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and my best thanks are due to Messrs. Black for the ready courtesy with which they acceded to my request for its republication.

My aim has been to give such a sketch of the general course of Roman history as might enable the reader to follow the main lines of movement, and grasp the characteristic features of the different periods. The lion's share of the space, some three fifths of the whole, has been devoted to the period which extends from the tribunate of the elder Gracchus to the fall of Nero (133 B.C.—69 A.D.), as being the period which it is most necessary for a student of Roman history to understand, and the one which is most fully illustrated by the extant ancient literature. It is also the period which probably, on these grounds, is most generally studied.

I have given throughout such references to the original authorities as were necessary to indicate the evidence on which the statements in the text are based. The references to modern books and dis-

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sertations may possibly be found useful, both by students who wish to make a more thorough study of the subject, and by teachers.

Of the debt of gratitude which I owe to a long list of scholars, English, French, and German, the footnotes are ample proof. I cannot, however, deny myself the pleasure of paying a special tribute of homage to the great master, in whose footsteps all students of Roman history are glad to tread. Fifty years have passed since Professor Mommsen wrote his monograph "*de collegiis et sodalitiis Romanorum*," and during that time there is no period of Roman history on which he has not set his mark, from the days of the kings to those of Theodoric, and no department of Roman antiquities in the study of which some work of his has not made an epoch.

My friend Mr. Warde-Fowler's admirable sketch of Cæsar did not appear until my own chapter on the dictator was in print. I am glad, however, to find that, on the nature and extent of the work which Cæsar accomplished, we are in close agreement.

HENRY PELHAM.

OXFORD, January, 1893.

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BOOK I.

**THE BEGINNINGS OF ROME AND
THE MONARCHY.**

THE BEGINNINGS OF ROME AND THE MONARCHY.

CHAPTER I.

THE TRADITIONS.

THE story of the beginnings of Rome and of the rule of the kings is told by Livy in the first book of his *Histories*, and by his contemporary, the Greek Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in the first four books of his *Roman Antiquities*. Both have essentially the same tale to tell, and we may assume that they give us what was in their time—that is, towards the close of the first century B.C.—the generally accepted tradition as to the early history of Rome. This tradition carried the narrative back far beyond the point at which Romulus built his city on the Palatine Mount. In remote times, so ran the story, the Sikels, from whom the island of Sicily afterwards took its name, dwelt on the hills by the Tiber. The Sikels were driven out by the Aborigines, who descended from their mountain homes in the Apennines, and made themselves masters of all the

lowland from the Tiber to the Liris. With this highland folk were united, as time went on, visitors from Greece, Pelasgi from Thessaly, Evander with his followers from Arcadia, and the comrades of the restless hero, Heracles. Later still, in the reign of King Latinus, from whom his people took the name "Latini," the fates brought to the shores of Italy and the fields of Lavinium the great Æneas himself, with his Trojan band. The visitors were made welcome, and on the death of Latinus, Æneas ruled in his stead over the united people, Trojans and Latins. From Æneas the sceptre passed to his son Ascanius, the founder of Alba, and of the long dynasty of the Alban kings. In the reign of the last of these kings, Numitor, the twins Romulus and Remus were born of an earthly mother, the Vestal Rhea Silvia, daughter of King Numitor, and of a divine father, the god Mars. Then followed the familiar tale of the exposure of the children, and of their miraculous deliverance, of their life among the herdsmen, of their recognition as the grandsons of Numitor, and of the foundation of Rome on the Palatine. From this point onwards the tradition described how, under Romulus and his successors, the historical city and state of Rome took shape. The gradual expansion of the city bounds, until all the seven hills were included within one great ring-wall, the development of a constitution, and the steady advance of Roman supremacy over the lowlands of Latium were all duly narrated, until, with the expulsion of the second Tarquin, this first chapter of Roman history reached its close.

Such, in brief outline, was the accepted tradition of the beginnings of Rome in the time of Augustus. What is its value as an historical narrative? In the first place it clearly cannot claim the authority of a contemporary written account, for the earliest references in literature to the history of Rome are found in Greek writers of the fifth century B.C.,¹ and no higher antiquity can be assigned even to the few native Roman records, which may have been older than the burning of Rome by the Gauls.² Moreover, if the beginnings of this written tradition cannot be carried back farther than the fifth century B.C., it is equally certain that it was not until long after the fifth century that it assumed the shape in which we now have it. It was only gradually that out of a number of conflicting versions one finally fought its way to general acceptance, that the undated fragments of tradition were fitted together, the gaps filled up, and the chronology settled. It seems probable, indeed, that something like an authorised version was already established by the time of the Punic wars, and that the main incidents and the order of events were given in much the

¹ According to Dionysius, i., 72, the landing of Æneas in Italy and the foundation of Rome were mentioned by the compiler of the chronicle of the priestesses of Here at Argos. The compiler is generally assumed to have been Hellanicus. See Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.*, i., 27; Schwegler, *R. Gesch.*, i., 3.

² Dionysius mentions two inscriptions, extant in his day, which were believed to date from the latter part of the regal period, that, namely, which recorded the foundation in the reign of Servius Tullius, of the temple of Diana on the Aventine, and that which preserved the terms of the treaty made with Gabii by the second Tarquin.

same way by the oldest Roman chronicler, Q. Fabius Pictor,¹ in the third century B.C., and by Livy in the first. What changes and additions were made in the interval cannot be accurately determined, though we know that it was by the elder Cato and by Varro that the chronology was finally settled,² and though we may suspect that it is to the labours of the lawyers and antiquarians of the first century B.C. that we owe much of what Livy and Dionysius tell us of the constitutional and religious institutions of primitive Rome.

It must be remembered, then, in reading Livy or Dionysius that we are dealing not with a simple tradition handed down whole and intact from the period of which it tells, but with a highly composite production gradually wrought into shape by a long series of writers, Greek and Roman, no part of which existed in a written form at all until the middle of the fifth century B.C., or some three centuries after the supposed date of the foundation of the city. And when to this is added the consideration that these writers were not assisted in the arrangement of their matter by any scientific system of chronology, or any exact canons of historical criticism, it becomes sufficiently clear that the narrative which their combined efforts have produced is many degrees removed from authentic history.

¹ The version given by Fabius was apparently given in much the same form by the chronicler L. Cincius Alimentus, and by the poets Nævius and Ennius, all of whom were contemporary with the second Punic war.—Peter, *Hist. Röm. Reliquiæ*; Schwegler *R. G.* i. 78, 399.

² Mommsen, *Röm. Chronologie*, 134, 599.

It is, indeed, a patchwork in which materials of the most diverse kinds have been ingeniously stitched together. In very many parts the handiwork of Greek writers is plainly traceable. From the time when Rome came into direct contact first with the Greeks of South Italy and then with those of Sicily, the history of the rising Italian republic increasingly attracted the attention of Greek scholars,¹ who made it their business to provide the new community, which had become a power in the civilised world of the Mediterranean, with a suitable pedigree. In thus endeavouring to find ancestors for the Romans among their own people, they seized eagerly on anything in the nature, traditions, usages, and monuments which could serve to show, as Dionysius puts it, that the Romans were "an ancient people and a Greek one."² In the Aborigines they recognised their own Pelasgi, and pointed in proof of the theory to the rude stone walls long known in Greece as Pelasgic.³ The name of the Palatine Mount was derived from Pallantium in Arcadia, and the god Faunus became the Greek Evander, who brought to the banks of the Tiber the arts of civilised life. The altar and worship of the Italian Hercules in the low ground near the river were made to prove that Rome had not been unvisited by the Greek Heracles. Odysseus and Circe

¹ For some account of these see Schweigler, *R. G.*, i., 35-99. The most important of them was the Sicilian Timaeus of Tauromenium (350-256 B.C.).

² Dionysius, ii., 30.

³ Dionysius, i., 14.

had already been brought as far on their travels as the bold headland which marks the southern limit of the Latin plain,¹ and from thence to the Tiber was a short and easy stage. But among all the roving heroes of Greek tradition none were more famous as founders of cities than those whom the fall of Troy scattered over the face of the Mediterranean, and of these the most famous was the Trojan Æneas, the son of Anchises and Aphrodite. At the time when Greeks began to interest themselves in Rome, his name and his reputation were widely spread. The course of his wanderings was traced by the cities he had founded, or by the temples raised in his honour, and in that of his goddess mother, while in more than one place a grave of Æneas was pointed out to the traveller.² When or by whom Rome was added to the list of the cities which honoured him as their founder we cannot say; we only know that the tradition existed at least as early as 400 B.C., and that by the time of the first Punic war it had been officially accepted by the Roman state.³ It is noticeable, however, that between the earliest form in which it appears and that in which it finally obtained currency there is a considerable difference. In the story as originally told

¹ The headland called "Circeii."

² Dionysius, i., 48-54, for a detailed criticism of the story of Æneas. See Schwegler, *R. G.*, i., 279, 399; Klausen, *Æneas v. D. Penaten*.

³ The ancestral connection of Rome with Troy was given by the senate as a reason for assisting the Arcanians, who alone of all Greeks had taken no part in the Trojan war. Justinus, xxviii., 1 (241 B.C.).

the connection between Rome and Æneas was close and direct, the foundation of the city being ascribed either to Æneas himself or to one of his sons.¹ But in the version given by Q. Fabius Pictor, and probably in that of the Sicilian Greek, Timachus (*circa* 300 B.C.), this direct connection has disappeared. Æneas founds Lavinium, his son Ascanius founds Alba, and between the foundation of Alba and that of Rome by Romulus and Remus an interval of some four hundred years is interposed. The cause of the difference is clear. It lay in the twofold necessity of reconciling the Greek story with native tradition, and the accepted date of the fall of Troy as fixed by Greek chronologers, with the date assigned by Roman reckoning to the foundation of the city. It was impossible to set aside the established belief in the ancient ties which connected Rome both with Lavinium and with Alba, and between the year of the burning of Troy and the year of the building of Rome there was an interval of more than four centuries, a gap which was rudely bridged over in the uncritical fashion of the time by the interpolation of a fictitious dynasty of Alban kings.

In the rest of the story, from the foundation of Rome to the expulsion of the Tarquins, the influence of Greek imagination is less strongly marked, since from this point onwards the comparative richness and precision of the native traditions left less scope for Greek ingenuity of combination and fertility of invention. Yet even in the account of the rule of

¹ Dionysius, i., 72, 73.

the kings the hand of the Greek improver can be occasionally traced. To Greek influence we may ascribe the shape given to the stories of the "asylum," and of the deification of Romulus, and it must have been Greeks who suggested that King Numa had been a pupil of Pythagoras, or that the Tarquins came originally from Corinth.

But, though, as the tale proceeds, the amount of native tradition which it contains increases, this native tradition is in itself a curious medley, in which fragments of genuine tradition are found side by side with the stories by which the people explained to themselves the origin of their ancient monuments, or their ancient institutions and usages, and with the crude, uncritical guesses of early chroniclers and antiquarians. To disentangle these various elements is a difficult matter, nor can the attempt be made here. But a few instances may be given to illustrate the method of doing it, and the kind of results which can be obtained. When we have set aside all that is clearly of foreign importation or of late date, the inventions and additions of Greek writers, or the chronological apparatus of Cato and Varro, we are face to face with a collection of tales, handed down from mouth to mouth among the people themselves. In such tales experience has taught us that it is not so much the contents of the tale, the names and personality of the actors, or the incidents related, as the motives which suggested it, the peg on which it was hung, that are historically valuable. Thus the story which connects Rome with Lavinium and with Alba implies an ancient belief among the Ro-

mans in their kinship with their Latin neighbours, and that they, with all Latins, recognised a common centre in the sacred mount which dominated the Latin plain. Similarly, behind the tales told of the growth of Rome lies the belief that Rome had not been "built in a day," but had been slowly formed by the fusion of separate settlements into a single city and state; and though the names of the kings, the years of their reigns, and the acts that they did give us little that is of value, existence of an underlying belief that, as Tacitus puts it, "in the beginning kings ruled in Rome,"¹ is a fact of importance. These ancient beliefs raise a presumption which we have, then, to confirm or reject by the test of positive evidence; the evidence of language, of monuments, or of fossil institutions and usages which are found surviving in later and better-known times.

In other instances the *motif* of the story is of a different kind, and historically less valuable. In some cases the starting-point can be discovered in an ancient usage or ceremony, the origin of which the story explains; in others the tale is attached to an ancient monument or a remarkable natural object; in others again it has no better basis than an apparent similarity in names, or a rude etymological guess at their meaning. Explanatory myths of this kind are of frequent occurrence in the early tradition of Rome. As instances we may quote the rape of the Sabine women, the building of the temple of Jupiter Stator, the story of Tarpeia, and of the priestly families of the Potitii and Pinarii. In these

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 1.

cases the myth is chiefly valuable in so far as its own antiquity as a tale proves the antiquity of the usage, institution, or monument to which it owes its existence. And here the modern critic has to avoid an error into which his ancient predecessors not unfrequently fell. Dionysius, for instance, points, in corroboration of the story that Æneas founded Lavinium, or that Romulus and Remus were suckled by a she-wolf, to monuments still extant in his day at Lavinium and in Rome. But these monuments, like the hut of Romulus on the Palatine, are the offspring and not the parents of the myth, and were erected to commemorate traditions already well established. They do not corroborate the story, but indicate that at the date of their erection the story was generally believed. Lastly the colouring and setting of these tales are often instructive. It is significant, for instance, that it is the Etruscan who figures as the dreaded enemy alike of Rome and of her Latin kinsmen, and that it is the Sabine highlanders, whose forays are repelled, and whose women are carried off.

Such, then, in brief, is the nature of the narrative which lies before us in the pages of Livy and Dionysius as the version of the earliest history of Rome current in the Augustan age, and current also, in much the same shape, when Fabius Pictor wrote his chronicles in the third century B.C. As a written tradition no part of it can be traced farther back than the middle of the fifth century, and it has, therefore, no claim to the authority of a contemporary record. In its materials of very various sorts

and kinds, and brought from very different quarters, are found side by side. Intermingled with fragments of genuinely old and native tradition we find pieces of world-wide folk-lore, such as the tale of the children cruelly exposed and miraculously saved, stories, some drawn from the inexhaustible stores of Greek legend, or invented by the scarcely less inexhaustible imagination of Greek chroniclers, others representing the naïve attempts of the soberer Roman mind to find an origin for the most ancient of their usages, institutions, and monuments. All these various materials were gradually combined and arranged by the efforts of successive generations; but the orderly and consecutive narrative, with its apparatus of names and dates, which was thus produced, had even less claim to be considered history than the mass of disconnected tales of which it was composed.

It follows, then, that neither the narrative as a whole, nor the separate incidents can be regarded as historical. On the other hand, both the ancient and genuinely Roman beliefs which underlie the story, and the colouring and setting of the tale, frequently afford a clue to the truth, which a study of the independent evidence supplied by the undoubted relics of antiquity to be found in the language, the institutions, the monuments of later Rome, enables us to follow out with success.

CHAPTER II.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CITY AND COMMONWEALTH.

THERE is fortunately no room for doubt as to the site of Rome, or as to the district which was the scene of her early history. Along the western coast of Italy from Civita Vecchia in the north, to Terracina in the south, stretches the famous lowland known for centuries as the Campagna. It is bounded to the north by the more hilly country of Northern Etruria, on the east by the mountain range of the Apennines, on the south by the Volscian highlands. This strip of lowland, nearly one hundred miles long, and nowhere much more than thirty miles wide, is in not an unbroken level. Its undulating surface is furrowed by watercourses, rent by volcanic fissures, and dotted over with abruptly rising hillocks. Viewed from the top of Soracte at its north-eastern extremity, or from the more famous Alban Mount, which rises out of the plain to the southward, its appearance has been compared to that of a stormy sea suddenly petrified. Of the streams which flow through it, two only, the Tiber and its tributary the

“headlong Anio,” have ever been important enough to deserve the name of rivers.

It is with the river Tiber, the waterway which connects the Umbrian and Sabine highlands with the sea, and with this lowland country that the beginnings of Rome are inseparably associated. It was on the low hills which rise from the left bank of the Tiber, some fifteen miles above its mouth, that Rome was built, and it was possibly from the river that it took its name.¹ It was among the communities of the lowland that Rome found her natural allies against the Etruscan to the north, or against the highland tribes to the east and south. The establishment of her ascendancy over the lowland marks the first stage in the growth of her empire, and centuries later when barbarians ruled to the north and east and south, this lowland remained Roman, and was ruled from Rome by Roman bishops.

It has been already said that the traditional account of the beginnings of Rome implies a fixed belief that both the city of Rome and the Roman commonwealth were gradually formed by the union of separate communities. Romulus built his city the “square Rome”² on the Palatine Mount. With the Palatine were united before the end of his reign the Capitoline and the Quirinal. Tullus Hostilius added the Cœlian, Ancus Martius the Aventine, while Servius Tullius included the Esquiline and

¹ *Serv. ad Æn.*, viii., 63, states that the Tiber was anciently called “Rumon”; for the connection between “Rumon” and “Roma,” see Corssen, *Vokalismus v. Betonung d. Lat. Sprache*, i., 279, 364.

² “Roma quadrata,” *Ennius ap. Testum.*, 258.

Viminal, and enclosed the whole area with a ring-wall. The growth of the people followed the same lines. To the followers of Romulus on the Palatine were added successively the Sabine settlers on the Quirinal, Albans transplanted by Tullus, Latins by Ancus, and lastly the Etruscan comrades of Cœles Vibenna.

The first point in this tradition, the fusion of a cluster of separate settlements into a single city, has a considerable amount of independent evidence in its favour.

In the time of Tacitus the boundaries of the "ancient Palatine town," as Varro calls it,¹ could still be traced,² and the memory of them was preserved by the annual race of the Luperci on February 15th. Of the wall which once fenced round this "city of Romulus," enough remains even now to show its direction and the method of its construction. It enclosed the whole crest of the Palatine, and belongs to an earlier period than that at which the Servian wall was built. On the Esquiline—Varro mentions an "ancient city" and an earthen rampart³; on the Capitol, on the Quirinal, and on the Cœlian remains have been discovered, indicating that each of these hills was also at one time the seat of a separate settlement, surrounded by its own rude

¹ Varro, *L. L.*, vi., 34.

² Tac., *Ann.*, xii., 24. For a full discussion of the exact limits of the Palatine city, see Smith, *Dict. Geog.*, s. v. "Roma"; Jordan, *Topog. d. Stadt Rom*, i., cap. 2; Gilbert, *Topog. u. Gesch. d. Stadt Rom*, i., caps. 1, 2.

³ *L. L.*, v., 48; cf. *ibid.*, 50.

wall.¹ Nor are we entirely without evidence of the gradual fusion of these distinct settlements into a single city. The festival of the Septimontium commemorated the union of the Palatine with the Esquiline Mount.² The union of these "mounts" with the Quirinal "Hill" left its marks on the institutions and ceremonies of the state, as for example in the double worship of Mars,³ and in the line taken by the procession of the Argei.⁴ Of the final stage in this process of amalgamation, the wall and *agger* ascribed to King Servius still remain as witnesses. But though we may safely believe that it was in this fashion that the city of Rome was formed, we cannot be equally confident as to dates; all that can be said is that the oldest tombs yet discovered on the Esquiline appear to belong to the early part of the eighth century B.C., when Greek traders were beginning to move westward, and that the Servian wall may be assigned approximately to the close of the seventh century.⁵

But is tradition right in representing this fusion of distinct settlements as a fusion also of communities of different race? Much of what it says on this point may be at once dismissed as fabulous. The tales of Æneas and his

Rome a
Latin city.

¹ Middleton, *Ancient Rome*, 37-58.

² Festus, 348; Jordan, i., 199; Gilbert, i., 161. The seven *montes* were the Palatine with the Velia and Germalus, the Subura, and the three points of the Esquiline (Fagatal, Oppius, and Cispius).

³ See Mommsen, *R. G.*, (7th ed.), i., 51.

⁴ Varro, *L. L.*, v., 45; vii., 44; Jordan, ii., 237.

⁵ Helbig, *Die Italiker in d. Poebene*, 136. A much later date (fourth century) is given by recent critics, e. g. Pais, i., 348.

Trojans, of Evander and his Arcadians, of the followers of Heracles, and of the still earlier Aborigines have no claim to a place in history¹; we cannot accept the story, to which the Romans clung with proud humility, of the asylum opened by Romulus, or believe that the ancestors of the Romans were a mixed concourse of outlaws and refugees,² nor while admitting the probability of the tradition that in remote times the "Sikels" had dwelt on the seven hills, can we allow them any part or lot in the historic Roman people.³

That the Romans were in the main of the same race with the neighbouring Latin communities is a conclusion which all the available evidence supports. These "Latini," as they were called, possibly from the plain land in which they dwelt, had probably, as their traditions affirmed, descended at some early period from the highlands of the Apennines, where their kinsmen, the Umbrians and Sabines, still dwelt. Driving out the earlier population, they planted their rudely fortified settlements wherever a piece of rising ground afforded protection against human foes and against the malaria. The communities thus founded formed the peoples (*populi*) of the Latin name. The ties of kinship, and probably also the common necessity of self-defence against Etruscan, Sabine, or Volscian foes, bound them together. They had

¹ For these traditions, see Dionysius, i., 31-71.

² For a criticism of the myth of the asylum, see Schwegler, *R. G.*, i., 465 *sq.*, who, however, exaggerates the mixed character of the Roman people. Hegel, *Phil. d. Gesch.*, 345, takes the story seriously.

³ Dionysius, i., 9; Thuc., vi., 2; Dionysius, i., 16; ii., 1.

their federal council, their federal leaders, and a common federal sanctuary on the sacred Alban Mount. The affinity between Rome and these Latin peoples is implied in the Roman traditions themselves. King Faunus, who rules the Aborigines on the Palatine, is Latin; Latini is the name assumed by the united Aborigines and Trojans; the immediate progenitors of Rome are the Latin Lavinium and the Latin Alba. The evidence of the language, the religion, the institutions, and the civilisation of early Rome points to the same conclusion. The speech of the Romans is from the first Latin¹; the oldest gods of Rome—Saturn, Janus, Jupiter, Juno, Diana, etc.—are all Latin; *rex*, *prætor*, *dictator*, *curia*, are Latin titles and institutions.² Geographically, too, the low hills by the Tiber form a part of the strip of coast-land from which the Latini took their name, and the primitive settlements, with their earthen ramparts and wooden palisades planted upon them, are only typical of the mode of settlement which the conditions of life dictated throughout Latium.³ But tradition insists on the admixture of at least two non-Latin elements, a Sabine and an Etruscan. The question as regards the latter will

¹ The theory that Latin was a "mongrel speech" is now discarded. See Schwegler, i. 190.

² The title *rex* occurs on inscriptions at Lanuvium, Tusculum, Bovillæ; Henzen, *Bulletino dell. Inst.*, 1868, p. 159; *Corp. I., Lat. vi.*, 2125. For *dictator* and *prator*, see Livy, i., 23, viii., 3; cf. Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, i., 475; for *curia*, Serv. on *Æn.*, i., 17; Marquardt, i., 467.

³ Helbig, *Die Italiker in d. Poebene*; Pohlmann, *Anfänge Roms.* 40; Abeken, *Mittel-Italien*, 61 sq.

be more fully discussed hereafter; it is enough to say here that there is no satisfactory evidence that any one of the communities which combine to form Rome was Etruscan, or that there was any important Etruscan strain in the Roman blood.¹ With the Sabines it is otherwise. That union of the Palatine and Quirinal settlements, which constituted so decisive a stage in the growth of Rome, is represented as having been in reality a union of the original Latins with a band of Sabine invaders, who had seized and held not only the Quirinal Hill, but the northern and nearest peak of the Capitoline Mount. The tradition was evidently deeply rooted. The name of the Quirinal Hill itself was said to be derived from the Sabine town of Cures.² The ancient worships connected with it were said to be Sabine.³ One of the three old tribes, the Tities, was believed to represent the Sabine element⁴; the second and the fourth kings were both of Sabine descent. We may follow the great majority of modern writers in accepting the substance of the tradition, the fusion of a body of Sabine invaders with the original Latins, as histori-

The Sabines
in Rome.

¹ The existence of a Tuscan quarter (*Tusculus vicus*) in early Rome probably points to nothing more than the presence in Rome of Etruscan artisans and craftsmen. The Etruscan origin ascribed to the third tribe, the "Luceres," is a mere guess: see Schwegler, i., 504, and Lange, *Röm. Alterth.*, i., 85.

² Varro, *L. L.*, v., 51.

³ Varro, *L. L.*, v., 74; Schwegler, i., 248 *sq.*; but Mommsen (*R. G.*, i., 53) points out that most of these so-called Sabine deities are at least equally Latin.

⁴ Varro, *L. L.*, v., 55; Livy, i., 13.

cal, but with certain qualifications.¹ A Sabine invasion, if it took place at all, must, at any rate, have taken place far back in the prehistoric age; it must have been on a small scale; and the Sabine invaders must have amalgamated easily and completely with the Latin settlers; for the structure of the early Roman state, while it bears evident marks of a fusion of communities, shows no traces of a mixture of race; nor is it easy to point to any provably Sabine element in the language, religion, or civilisation of primitive Rome.² That there was ever a Sabine conquest of Rome is a theory which can hardly be maintained in the face of the predominantly Latin character of both people and institutions. On the other hand, the probability of a Sabine raid and a Sabine settlement, on the Quirinal Hill, in very early times may be admitted. The incursions of the highland Apennine tribes into the lowlands fill a large place in early Italian history. The Latins were said to have originally descended from the

¹ Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 43. Schwegler (*R. G.*, i., 478) accepts the tradition of a Sabine settlement on the Quirinal, and considers that in the united state the Sabine element predominated. Volquardsen (*Rhein. Mus.*, xxxiii., 559) believes in a complete Sabine conquest; and so does Zöllner (*Latium u. Rom.*, Leipsic 1778), who, however, places it after the expulsion of the Tarquins. Gilbert (*Topogr.*, i., cap. 5) accepts the Sabine settlement, but holds rightly that in the union the Latin element decisively predominated.

² See Mommsen, i., 43. The Sabine words in Latin, if not common to both dialects, were probably introduced later, or are Sabinised Latin (Mommsen, *Unterital. Dialecten*, 347). Schwegler's attempt to distinguish Sabine features in the Roman character is ingenious but unsatisfactory.

mountain glens near Reate.¹ The invasions of Campania and of Magna Græcia by Sabellian tribes are matter of history, and the Sabines themselves are represented as a restless highland people, ever seeking new homes in richer lands.² In very early days they appear on the borders of Latium, in close proximity to Rome, and Sabine forays are familiar and frequent occurrences in the old legends.

Leaving behind us the dark period of the making of Rome, we pass on to consider what can be known of its constitution and history in the earliest days of its existence as a single united community.

The *populus Romanus* was, we are told, divided into three tribes, Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres,³ and into thirty *curiæ*. The three tribes probably represented a primitive clan division, older than the Roman state itself. They survived in later times only as divisions of the corps of "knights" (*equitum centuriæ*), the representatives of the ancient cavalry of Rome, and even in the accounts of the earliest constitution they have ceased to serve as a political division of

¹ Cato ap. Dionysius, ii., 48, 49.

² Cato ap. Dionysius, ii., 48, 49. For the institution of the *curiæ* see Schwegler, *Röm. Gesch.*, i., 240; Nissen, *Templum*, iv.

³ The tradition connecting the Ramnes with Romulus and the Tities with Tatius is as old as Ennius (Varro, *L. L.*, v., 55). Mommsen (i., 41) explains Ramnes as = Romani, but this etymology is rejected by Schwegler and by Corssen. As regards the Luceres there is little to add to Livy's statement (i., 13), "*nomini et originis causa incerta est.*" See, on the whole question, Schwegler, i., 505, and Volquardsen, *Rhein. Mus.*, xxxiii., 538.

the people.¹ Of far greater importance was the division into *curiæ*. In Cicero's time there were still curies, curial festivals, and curiate assemblies, and modern authors are unquestionably right in regarding the *curia* as the keystone of the political system. It was a primitive association held together by participation in common *sacra*, and possessing common festivals, common priests, and a common chapel, hall, and hearth. The members of a *curia* were very probably neighbours and kinsmen, but the *curia* seems to represent a stage in political development midway between that in which clanship is the sole bond of union, and that in which such claims as those of territorial contiguity and ownership of land have obtained recognition. As separate associations the *curiæ* are probably older than the Roman state, but,² however this may be, it is certain that of this state, when formed, they constituted the only effective political subdivisions. The members of the thirty *curiæ* were the *populus Romanus*, and the earliest known condition of Roman citizenship was the *communio sacrorum*, partnership in the curial *sacra*. Below the *curia* there was no further political division, for we cannot believe that the *curia* was ever formally subdivided into a fixed num-

¹ They are traditionally connected only with the senate of 300 *patres*, with the primitive legion of 3,000, with the vestal virgins, and with the augurs (Varro, *L. L.*, v., 81, 89, 91; Livy, x., 6; Festus, 344; Mommsen, i., 41, 74, 75; Genz, *Patricische Rom*, 90).

² It is possible that the *curiæ* were originally connected with separate localities; cf. such names as *Foriensis*, *Veliensis* (Fest. 174; Gilbert, i., 213).

ber of *gentes* and *families*.¹ Nor can we assent to the view which would represent the *curiæ* as containing only the patrician *gentes*. The primitive Roman people of the thirty *curiæ* included all the freemen of the community, simple as well as gentle.²

At their head was the *rex*, the ruler of the united people. The Roman "king" was not simply either the hereditary and patriarchal chief of a clan, the priestly head of a community bound together by common *sacra*, or the elected magistrate of a state, but a mixture of all three.³ In later times, when no "patrician magistrates" were forthcoming to hold the elections for their successors, a procedure was adopted which was believed to represent the manner in which the early kings had been appointed.⁴ In this procedure the ancient privileges of the old *gentes* and their elders, the importance of maintaining unbroken the continuity of the *sacra*, on the transmission and observance of which the welfare of the community depended, and, thirdly, the rights of the free men, were all

¹ Niebuhr's supposition of ten *gentes* in each *curia* has nothing in its favour but the confused statement of Dionysius as to the purely military *δέκαδες* (Dionysius, ii., 7; cf. Müller, *Philologus*, xxxiv., 96).

² The view taken here on the vexed question of the purely patrician character of the *curiæ* is that of Mommsen (*Röm. Forschungen*, vol. i.).

³ Rubino, Genz, and Lange insist on the hereditary patriarchal character of the kingship, Ihne on its priestly side, Schwegler on its elective. Mommsen comes nearest to the view taken in the text, but fails to bring out the nature of the compromise on which the kingship rested.

⁴ Cic., *De Leg.*, iii., 3; Livy, iv., 7.

recognised. On the death of a king the *auspicia*, and with them the supreme authority, reverted to the council of elders, the *patres*, as representing the *gentes*. By the *patres* an *interrex* was appointed, who in turn nominated a second; by him, or even by a third or fourth *interrex* a new king was selected in consultation with the *patres*. The king-designate was then proposed to the freemen assembled by their *curiæ* for their acceptance, and finally their formal acceptance was ratified by the *patres*, as a security that the *sacra* of which they were the guardians have been respected.¹ Thus the king was in the first instance selected by the representatives of the old *gentes*, and they ratified his appointment. In form he was nominated directly by a predecessor from whose hands he received the *auspicia*. But it was necessary also that the choice of the *patres* and the nomination of the *interrex* should be confirmed by a solemn vote of the community.

It is useless to attempt a precise definition of the prerogatives of the king when once installed in office. Tradition ascribes to him a position and

¹ "*Patres auctores facti*," Livy, i., 22; "*patres fuere auctores*," *Id.*, i., 32. In 336 B.C. (Livy, viii., 12) the Publilian law directed that this sanction should be given beforehand, "*ante initum suffragium*," and thus reduced it to a meaningless form (Livy, i., 11). It is wrongly identified by Schwegler with the "*lex curiata de imperio*," which in Cicero's day followed and did not precede election. According to Cicero (*De Rep.*, ii., 13, 21), the proceedings included, in addition to the "creation" by the *comitia curiata* and the sanction of the *patres*, the introduction by the king himself of a *lex curiata* conferring the *imperium* and *auspicia*; but this theory, though generally accepted, is probably an inference from the practice of a late time, when the *creatio* had been transferred to the *comitia centuriata*

powers closely resembling those of the heroic kings of Greece. He rules for life, and he is the sole ruler, unfettered by written statutes. He is the supreme judge, settling all disputes, and punishing wrongdoers even with death. All other officials are appointed by him. He imposes taxes, distributes lands, and erects buildings. Senate and assembly meet only when he convenes them, and meet for little else than to receive communications from him. In war he is absolute leader,¹ and, finally, he is also the religious head of the community. It is his business to consult the gods on its behalf, to offer the solemn sacrifices, and to announce the days of the public festivals. Hard by his house was the common hearth of the state, where the vestal virgins cherished the sacred fire.

By the side of the king stood the senate, or council of elders. In the descriptions left us of the primitive senate, as in those of the *rex*,
The senate. we can discover traces of a transition from an earlier state of things, when Rome was only an assemblage of clans or village communities, allied indeed, but each still ruled by its own chiefs and headmen, to one in which these groups have been fused into a single state under a common ruler. On the one hand the senate appears as a council of chiefs, with inalienable prerogatives of its own, and claiming to be the ultimate depository of the supreme authority and of the *sacra* connected with it. The senators are the *patres*; they are taken from the leading *gentes*; they hold their seats for life; to them

¹ For the references, see Schwegler, i., 646 *sq.*

the *auspicia* revert on the death of a king; they appoint the *interrex* from their own body, are consulted in the choice of the new king,¹ and their sanction is necessary to ratify the vote of the assembled freemen. On the other hand, they are no longer supreme. They cannot appoint a king but with the consent of the community, and their relation to the king when appointed is one of subordination. Vacancies in their ranks are filled up by him, and they can but give him advice and counsel when he chooses to consult them.

The popular assembly of united Rome in its earliest days was that in which the freemen met and voted by their *curiæ* (*comitia curiata*²). The assembly met in the *comitium* at the north-east end of the forum,³ at the summons and under the presidency of the king, or, failing him, of the *interrex*. By the *rex* or *interrex* the question was put, and the voting took place *curiatim*. The vote of each *curia* was decided by the majority of individual votes, and a majority of the votes of the *curiæ* determined the final result. But the occasions on which the assembly could exercise its power must have been few. Their right to elect magistrates was apparently limited to the acceptance or rejection of the king proposed by the *interrex*.

¹ If the analogy of the *rex sacrorum* is to be trusted, the king could only be chosen from the ranks of the *patricii*. Cic., *Pro Domo*, 14; Gaius, i., 122.

² Cic., *De Rep.*, ii., 13; Dionysius, ii., 14, etc.

³ Varro, *L. L.*, v., 155. For the position of the *comitium*, see Smith, *Dict. Geog.*, s. v. "Roma," and Jordan, *Topog. d. Stadt Rom*; Petersen, *Comitium* (Rome, 1904).

Of the passing of laws, in the latter sense of the term, there is no trace in the kingly period. Dionysius's statement¹ that they voted on questions of war and peace is improbable in itself and unsupported by tradition. They are indeed represented, in one instance, as deciding a capital case, but it is by the express permission of the king and not of right.² Assemblies of the people were also, and probably more frequently, convened for other purposes. Not only did they meet to hear from the king the announcement of the high days and holidays for each month, and to witness such solemn religious rites as the inauguration of a priest, but their presence (and sometimes their vote) was further required to authorise and attest certain acts, which in a later age assumed a more private character. The disposal of property by will³ and the solemn renunciation of family or gentile *sacra*⁴ could only take place in the presence of the assembled freemen, while for adoption⁵ (*adrogatio*) not only their presence but their formal consent was necessary.

Such in outline was the political structure of the Roman state at the earliest period known to us. It is clear that it belongs to a comparatively advanced stage in the development of society, and that a long previous history lies behind it. Traces of an older

¹ Dionysius, *l. c.*

² Livy, i., 26; Dionysius, iii., 22.

³ Gaius, ii., 101.

⁴ Gell., xv., 27.

⁵ Gell., v., 19, "*Comitia præbentur, quæ curiata appellantur.*" Cf. Cic., *Pro Domo*, 13, 14.

and more primitive order of things still linger in the three ancient shadowy tribes, in the *curiæ* and *gentes*, in many of the features noticeable in the senate; but they are traces of an order that has passed away. The supremacy of the state is established over the groups out of whose fusion it has grown, and such of these groups as still retain a distinct existence are merely private corporations. Private differences are settled and wrong-doers punished by the state tribunals, and even within the close limits of the family the authority of the head is limited by the claims of the state upon the services of the sons and dependants.

CHAPTER III.

ROME UNDER THE KINGS.

A HISTORY of this early Roman state is out of the question. The names, dates, and achievements of the first four kings are all too unsubstantial to form the basis of a sober narrative¹; a few points only can be considered as fairly well established. If we except the long eventless reign ascribed to King Numa, tradition represents the first kings as incessantly at war with their immediate neighbours. The details of these wars are no doubt mythical; but the implied condition of continual struggle, and the narrow range within which the struggle is confined, may be accepted as true. The picture drawn is that of a small community with a few square miles of territory, living in constant feud with its nearest neighbours, within a radius of some twelve miles round Rome. Nor, in spite of the repeated victories with which tradition credits Romulus, Ancus, and Tullus, does

¹ By far the most complete criticism of the traditional accounts of the first four kings will be found in Schwegler's *Röm. Geschichte*, vol. i.; compare also Ihne's *Early Rome*, and Sir G. C. Lewis's *Credibility of Early Roman History*; and Pais, *Storia di Roma*, vol. i.

there seem to have been any real extension of Roman territory except towards the sea. Fidenæ remains Etruscan; the Sabines continue masters up to the Anio; Præneste, Gabii, and Tusculum are still untouched; and on this side it is doubtful if Roman territory extended to a greater distance than the sixth milestone from Rome.¹ But along the course of the Tiber below the city there was a decided advance. The fortification of the Janiculum, the building of the *pons sublicius*, the foundation of Ostia, and the acquisition of the salt marshes near the sea may all be safely ascribed to this early period. Closely connected, too, with the control of the Tiber from Rome to the sea was the subjugation of the petty Latin communities lying south of the river; and the tradition of the conquest and destruction of Politorium, Tellenæ, and Ficana is confirmed by the absence in historical times of any Latin communities in this district.

With the reign of the fifth king, Tarquinius Priscus, a marked change takes place. The traditional accounts of the last three kings not only wear a more historical air than those of the first four, but they describe something like a transformation of the Roman city and state. Under the rule of these latter kings the separate settlements were for the first time enclosed with a rampart of co-

The Tar-
quins.

¹ The *fossa Cluiliæ*, five miles from Rome (Livy, ii., 39), is regarded by Schwegler (i., 585) and by Mommsen (i., 45) as marking the Roman frontier towards Latium. Cf. Ovid, *Fast.*, ii., 681; Strabo, 230, "μεταξὺ γούν τοῦ πέμπτου καὶ τοῦ ἕκτου λιθῶν . . . τόπος Φῆστοι . . . ὄριον τῆς τότε Ῥωμαίων γῆς."

lossal size and extent.¹ The low grounds were drained, and a forum and circus elaborately laid out; on the Capitoline Mount a temple was erected, the massive foundations of which were an object of wonder even to Pliny.² To the same period are assigned the re-division of the city area into four districts and the introduction of a new military system. The kings increase in power and surround themselves with new splendour. Abroad, Rome suddenly appears as a powerful state ruling far and wide over southern Etruria and Latium. These startling changes are, moreover, ascribed to kings of alien descent, who one and all ascend the throne in the teeth of established constitutional forms. Finally, with the expulsion of the last of them—the younger Tarquin—comes a sudden shrinkage of power. At the commencement of the republic Rome is once more a comparatively small state, with hostile and independent neighbours at her very doors.

It is difficult to avoid the conviction that the true explanation of this phenomenon is to be found in the supposition that Rome during this period passed under the rule of powerful Etruscan lords.³ Who the people were whom the Romans knew as Etruscans and the Greeks as Tyrrhenians is a question which, after centuries of discussion, still remains unanswered; nor in all probability will the answer be found until the lost key to their language

The Etruscans.

¹ Livy, i., 36.

² Livy, i., 38, 55; Plin., *N. H.*, xxxvi., 15.

³ This is the view of O. Müller, and more recently of Deecke, Gardthausen, and Zöller; it is rejected by Schweigler. Mommsen accepts the Etruscan origin of the Tarquins, but denies that it proves an Etruscan rule in Rome.

has been discovered. That they were regarded by the Italic tribes, by Umbrians, Sabellians, and Latins, as intruders is certain. Entering Italy, as they probably did from the north or north-east, they seem to have first of all made themselves masters of the rich valley of the Po and of the Umbrians who dwelt there. Then crossing the Apennines, they overran Etruria proper as far south as the banks of the Tiber, here too reducing to subjection the Umbrian owners of the soil. In Etruria they made themselves dreaded, like the Northmen of a later time, by sea as well as by land. Their pirate galleys swept the Tyrrhenian Sea, while roving bands of Etruscan warriors established themselves at one place after another in the districts south of the Tiber, built their strongholds, and ruled as conquerors over the subject peoples. In the latter half of the seventh century B.C., at the period to which the erection of the Servian wall may be assigned, their power was at its height. It extended far beyond Etruria proper. The Kelts had not yet seriously threatened their supremacy in the valley of the Po,—and they were still masters of the rich Campanian plain,—from which the Samnite highlanders were to oust them some two centuries later. It is, on the face of it, improbable that a power which had extended its sway from the Alps to the Tiber, and from the Liris to Surrentum, should have left untouched the intervening stretch of country between the Tiber and the Liris. Nor are we without evidence of Etruscan rule in Latium.¹ According to

¹ Zöller, *Latium u. Rom*, 166, 189; Gardthausen, *Mastarna* (Leipzig, 1882); Cuno's *Verbreitung d. Etr. Stammes* (Graudenz, 1880) is highly fanciful.

Dionysius there was a time when the Latins were known to the Greeks as Tyrrhenians, and Rome as a Tyrrhenian city.¹ When Æneas landed in Italy the Latins were at feud with Turnus (Turrhenos? Dionysius, i., 64) of Ardea, whose close ally was the ruthless Mezentius, lord of Cære, to whom the Latins had been forced to pay a tribute of wine.² Cato declared the Volsci to have been once subject to Etruscan rule,³ and Etruscan remains found at Velitræ,⁴ as well as the second name of the Volscian Auxur, Tarracina (the city of Tarchon), tend to confirm his statement. Nearer still to Rome was Tusculum, with its significant name, and at Alba we hear of a prince *Ταρχέτιος*,⁵ lawless and cruel like Mezentius, who consults the "oracle of Tethys in Tyrrhenia." Thus we find the Etruscan power encircling Rome on all sides, and in Rome itself a tradition of the rule of princes of Etruscan origin. The Tarquini come from South Etruria; their name can hardly be anything else than the Latin equivalent of the Etruscan Tarchon, and is therefore possibly a title (= "lord" or "prince") rather than a proper name.⁶

¹ Dionysius, i., 29.

² Livy, i., 2; Dionysius, i., 64, 65; Plut., *Q. R.*, 18.

³ Cato ap. Serv., *Æn.*, xi., 567.

⁴ Helbig, *Ann. d. Inst.*, 1865.

⁵ Plut., *Rom.*, 2, *παρανομότατος καὶ ὀμότατος*; cf. Rutulian Tarquinius, Virg., *Æn.*, x., 550.

⁶ Müller-Deecke, i., 69, 70; Zöller, *Latium u. Rom.*, 168; cf. Strabo, p. 219; Serv. ad *Æn.*, x., 179, 198. The existence of an independent "gens Tarquinia" of Roman extraction (Schwegler, i., 678) is unproven and unlikely. Nor can "Tarquinius" mean "of Tarquinius"; this would require "Tarquiniensis" as a cognomen.

Even Servius Tullius was identified by Tuscan chroniclers with an Etruscan "Mastarna."¹ There are two other features in the story of the last three kings of Rome which point the same way. The Etruscans are not represented in tradition as moving in great masses, and their advance is not the migration of a whole people. We hear rather, as in the case of the Northmen, of roving bands of warriors led by powerful chiefs who carve out principalities for themselves with their own good swords, and rule as conquerors over alien and subject populations,² and it is a raid and a conquest of this kind, not an immigration, that the tradition suggests. Here, as elsewhere, the Etruscans were not the people, but the rulers. Nor is this all. That Etruria had, under the sway of Etruscan lords, forged ahead of the country south of the Tiber in wealth and civilisation is a fact which the evidence of remains has placed beyond doubt. It is therefore significant that the rule of the Tarquins in Rome is marked by an outward splendour which stands in strong contrast to the primitive simplicity of the native kings. The great *cloaca*, the Servian wall, the Capitoline temple, were monuments which challenged comparison with those of the emperors themselves, and they can hardly have been built by any but builders from Etruria, under the magnificent patronage of Etrus-

¹ See speech of Claudius, *Tab. Lugd.*, App. to Nipperdey's edition of the *Annals* of Tacitus, "*Tusce Mastarna ei nomen erat.*" For the painting in the François tomb at Vulci, see Gardthausen, *Mastarna*, 22 sq.; *Annali dell. Instit.*, Rome, 1859.

² Cf. the traditions of Mezentius, of Coeles Vibenna, Porsenna, etc.

can lords. Nor do the traces of Greek influence upon Rome during this period¹ conflict with the theory of an Etruscan supremacy; on the contrary, it is at least possible that it was thanks to the extended rule and wide connections of her Etruscan rulers that Rome was first brought into direct contact with the Greeks, who had long traded with the Etruscan ports and influenced Etruscan culture.²

These Etruscan princes are represented, not only as having raised Rome for the time to a commanding position in Latium, and lavished upon the city itself the resources of Etruscan civilisation, but also the authors of important internal changes. They are represented as favouring new men at the expense of the old patrician families, and as reorganising the Roman army on a new footing, a policy natural enough in military princes of alien birth, and rendered possible by the additions which conquest had made to the original community. From among the leading families of the conquered Latin states a hundred new members were admitted to the senate, and the *gentes* to which they belonged thenceforth ranked as patrician, and became known as *gentes minores*.³ The changes in the army begun, it is said, by the elder Tarquin

The Servian reforms.

¹ Schwegler, *R. G.*, i., 679 *sq.*

² Schwegler, i., 791, 792. He accepts as genuine, and as representing the extent of Roman rule and connections under the Tarquins, the first treaty between Rome and Carthage mentioned by Polybius (iii., 22); see, for a discussion of the question, Vollmer, *Rhein. Mus.*, xxxii., 614 *sq.*; Mommsen, *Röm. Chronologie*, 20; Dyer, *Journ. of Philol.*, ix., 238.

³ Livy, i., 35; Dionysius, iii., 67; Cic. *De Rep.*, ii., 20.

and completed by Servius Tullius were more important. The basis of the primitive military system had been the three tribes, each of which furnished 1,000 men to the legion and 100 to the cavalry.¹ Tarquinius Priscus, we are told, contemplated the creation of three fresh tribes and three additional centuries of horsemen with new names,² though in face of the opposition offered by the old families he contented himself with simply doubling the strength without altering the names of the old divisions.³ But the change attributed to Servius Tullius went far beyond this. His famous distribution of all landholders (*assidui*) into tribes, classes, and centuries,⁴ though subsequently adopted with modifications as the basis of the political system, was at first exclusively military in its nature and objects.⁵ It amounted, in fact, to the formation of an enlarged army on a new footing. In this force, excepting in the case of the centuries of the horsemen, no regard was paid either to the old clan divisions or to the semi-religious, semi-political *curiæ*. In its ranks were included all landholders within the Roman territory,

¹ Varo, *L. L.*, v., 89.

² Livy, i., 36; Dionysius, iii., 71.

³ The six centuries of horsemen were thenceforward known as "*primi secundique Ramnes*" (Fest., 344; cf. Schwegler, i., 685-7). It is possible that the reforms of Tarquinius Priscus were limited to the cavalry.

⁴ Cic. *De Rep.*, ii., 22; Livy, i., 42; Dionysius, iv., 16.

⁵ This is recognised by Mommsen, Genz, and Soltau, as against Niebuhr, Schwegler, and Ihne. Even in the later *comitia centuriata* the traces of the originally military character of the organisation are unmistakable.

whether members or not of any of the old divisions, and the organisation of this new army of *assidui* was not less independent of the old system with its clannish and religious traditions and forms. The unit was the *centuria* or company of 100 men; the *centuriæ* were grouped in "classes," and drawn up in the order of the phalanx.¹ The centuries in front were composed of the wealthier citizens, whose means enabled them to bear the cost of the complete equipments necessary for those who were to stand the brunt of the onset. These centuries formed the first class. Behind them stood the centuries of the second and third classes, less completely armed, but making up together with those of the first class the heavy-armed infantry.² In the rear were the centuries of the fourth and fifth classes, recruited from the poorer landholders, and serving only as light-armed troops. The entire available body of landholders was divided into two equal portions, a reserve corps of *seniores* and a corps of *juniores* for active service. Each of these corps consisted of 85 centuries, or 8,500 men, *i. e.* of two legions of about 4,200 men each, the normal strength of a consular legion under the early republic.³ It is noticeable also that the heavy-armed centuries of

¹ The century ceased to represent companies of one hundred when the whole organisation ceased to be military and became exclusively political.

² The property qualification for service in the first class is given at 100,000 asses (Livy), for the second at 70,000, third at 50,000, fourth at 25,000, fifth at 11,000. It was probably originally a certain acreage in land, afterwards translated into terms of money; *cf.* Mommsen, *Röm. Tribus*, 115.

³ Polybius, vi., 20; Mommsen, *Röm. Trib.*, 132 sq.

the three first classes in each of these legions represented a total of 3,000 men, a number which agrees exactly with the number of heavy-armed troops in the legions as described by Polybius. Attached to the legion, but not included in them, were the companies of sappers and trumpeters. Lastly, to the six centuries of horsemen, which still retained the old tribal names, twelve more were added as a distinct body, and recruited from the wealthiest class of citizens.¹ The four "tribes" also instituted by Servius were probably intended to serve as the basis for the levy of landholders for the new army.² As their names show, they corresponded with the natural local divisions of the city territory,³ and included also the citizen population resident within it.⁴

The last of these Etruscan lords to rule in Rome was Tarquin the Proud. He is described as a splendid and despotic monarch. His Fall of the
monarchy. sway extended over Latium as far south as Circeii. Aristodemus, tyrant of Cumæ, was his ally, and kinsmen of his own were princes at Collatia, at Gabii, and at Tusculum. The Volscian highlanders were chastised, and Signia, with its massive walls, was built to hold them in check. In Rome itself

¹ Livy, i., 43. Dionysius (iv., 18) and Cic. (*De Rep.*, ii., 22) ascribe the whole eighteen to Servius. But the six older centuries remained distinct as the *sex suffragia* of the *comitia centuriata* (Cic., *De Rep.*, ii., 22).

² Dionysius, iv., 14, *εἰς τὰς καταγραφὰς τῶν δερατιωτῶν.*

³ Livy, i., 43. The four were Palatina, Surburana, Esquilina, and Collina.

⁴ E. Meyer, *Hermes*, xxx., 12,

the Capitoline temple and the great *cloaca* bore witness to his power. But his rule pressed heavily upon the Romans, and at last, on the news of the foul wrong done by his son Sextus to a noble Roman matron, Lucretia, the indignant people rose in revolt. Tarquin, who was away besieging Ardea, was deposed; sentence of exile was passed upon him and upon all his race; and the people swore that never again should a king rule in Rome. Freed from the tyrant, they chose for themselves two yearly magistrates who should exercise the supreme authority, and thus the republic of Rome was founded. Three times the banished Tarquin strove desperately to recover the throne he had lost. First of all the men of Veii and Tarquinii marched to his aid, but were defeated in a pitched battle on the Roman frontier. A year later Lars Porsena, prince of Clusium, at the head of all the powers of Etruria, appeared before the gates of Rome, and closely besieged the city, until, moved by the valour of his foe, he granted honourable terms of peace and withdrew.¹ Once again, by Lake Regillus, the Romans fought victoriously for their liberty against Tarquin's son-in-law Mamilius, prince of Tusculum, and chief of the Latin name. Mamilius was slain; Tarquin in despair found a refuge at Cumæ, and there soon afterwards died.

So, in brief, ran the story of the flight of the


¹ Livy, ii., 9-14. Pliny (*N. H.*, xxxiv., 14) and Tacitus (*Ann.*, iii., 72) imply the existence of a tradition, possibly that of "Tuscan annalists," according to which Porsena actually made himself master of Rome. The whole story is fully criticised by Schwegler (ii., 181 sq.) and Zöllner (*Latium u. Rom.*, p. 180).

kings, as it was told by the chroniclers whom Livy followed. Its details are most of them fabulous; it is crowded with inconsistencies and improbabilities; there are no trustworthy dates; the names even of the chief actors are probably fictitious, and the hand of the improver, Greek or Roman, is traceable throughout.¹ The struggle was doubtless longer and sharper, and the new constitution more gradually shaped, than tradition would have us believe. Possibly, too, this revolution in Rome was but a part of a wide-spreading wave of change in Latium and central Italy, similar to that which in Greece swept away the old heroic monarchies. But there is no room for doubting the main facts of the emancipation of Rome from the rule of alien princes and the final abolition of the kingly office.

¹ See the exhaustive criticism in Schwegler (ii., pp. 65-203); Pais, i. chap. 3.

BOOK II.

THE EARLY REPUBLIC—509-275 B.C.



THE EARLY REPUBLIC—509-275 B.C.

CHAPTER I.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE ORDERS.

MUCH of what has been said as to the nature and value of the traditional account of the be- ^{The tradi-} ^{tional ac-} ^{count.} ginnings of Rome and of the monarchy applies to that we possess of the early republic. It is true that there is, at first sight, a considerable difference. In passing from the first to the second book of Livy we are conscious of passing from poetry to prose. The narrative assumes at once the shape of a chronicle, in which events are set down in order, year by year, as they occurred, and in which the actors are men, and not gods or demi-gods. But this appearance of historical sobriety and consecutive-ness is, at least for the period before the sack of Rome by the Gauls (390 B.C.), somewhat delusive. For, in the first place, the dearth of contemporary documents relating to this period must have been almost as complete as in the case of the preceding

one. We may, indeed, grant that when Fabius Pictor, or Timæus before him, wrote, there existed in Rome written records, such as the annals of the pontiffs, or the consular *fasti*, purporting to carry back the chronicle of events and the list of magistrates to the first year of the republic. But these records, at any rate in their earlier portions, were in no sense contemporary authorities. They were compiled, probably in the fourth century B.C., out of a mass of confused tradition, which the compilers have only imperfectly succeeded in reducing to order. Moreover, what we know of the nature of these official records makes it certain that a great part of what Livy or Dionysius tells us about the early republic cannot have been directly or indirectly derived from them. It is evident that not only were they often altogether silent where Livy and Dionysius have much to say, but their notices of events were of the most concise and meagre kind. If they furnished the bare outlines of the story, the wealth of episode, with which these outlines have been filled in, must have come from elsewhere, and mainly, no doubt, from popular tradition. The early struggle for existence which the infant republic waged with her neighbours had left behind it an ample legacy of border legends, tales of feuds and forays, of valiant chiefs and heroic deeds, which were told and retold among the people, and cherished with especial care by the great patrician houses. Nor was the great domestic conflict between patricians and plebeians without its own stories of patricians who loved the people or oppressed them, of resolute

tribunes, of secessions and reconciliations. To piece together these stray stories, and to fit them into the rude framework supplied by the official records, was a work of time, and by each writer who took part in the work something was added with the view of removing inconsistencies, supplying omissions, or simply of giving life and colour to the narrative. And this tendency to retouch and even to recast the old material became gradually stronger. The chroniclers of the first century B.C. possessed an amount of literary skill, which at once encouraged and made possible a freer handling of the traditions. L. Calpurnius Piso, tribune in 149 B.C. and consul in 133 B.C., prided himself on reducing the old legends to the level of common-sense, and importing into them valuable moral lessons for his own generation. By Cælius Antipater the methods of rhetoric were first applied to history, a disastrous precedent enough. He inserted speeches, enlivened his pages with chance tales, and aimed, as Cicero tells us, at not merely narrating facts, but also at beautifying them. His successors carried still farther the practice of dressing up the rather bald chronicles of earlier writers with all the ornaments of rhetoric. The old traditions were altered almost beyond the possibility of recognition by exaggerations, interpolations, and additions. Fresh incidents were inserted, new motives suggested, and speeches composed in order to infuse the required life and freshness into these dry bones of history. At the same time the political bias of the writers and the political ideas of their day were allowed, in some

cases perhaps half unconsciously, to affect their representations of past events. Annalists of the Gracchan age imported into the early struggles of patricians and plebeians the economic controversies of their own day, and painted the first tribunes in the colours of the two Gracchi or of Saturninus. In the next generation they dexterously forced the venerable records of the early republic to pronounce in favour of the ascendancy of the senate, as established by Sulla. To political bias was added family pride, for the gratification of which the archives of the great houses, the funeral panegyrics, or the imagination of the writer himself supplied an ample store of doubtful material. Pedigrees were invented, imaginary consulships and fictitious triumphs inserted, family traditions and family honours were formally incorporated with the history of the state. But, in spite of all this, a history of the first two centuries of the republic is possible in a sense in which a history of the regal period, and still more of the mythical period which preceded it, is impossible. To the Roman even of the time of the Punic wars the pre-republican period was a sort of antediluvian age, separated from all that followed by a gap which no tradition completely bridged over, and of which only fossil relics, ancient monuments, or ancient institutions remained to excite the wonder and curiosity of later generations. But the early republic was connected with the republic of Cicero by a close and unbroken chain of continuity. Proofs of the reality of its conflicts with Volscians and Æquians, Etruscans and Gauls abroad, or between

patrician and plebeian at home were everywhere forthcoming, and the descendants of the chief actors, Valerii, Claudii, and Fabii, still sat in the senate-house or led the legions. Above all, in the constitution itself, in the ancient magistrates, in the senate or assembly, and in the venerable statutes which guarded the liberties of the citizen, or protected the privileges of the *plebs*, evidence survived by which tradition could be tested, and a reconstruction of the old political fabric made possible. We do not know,—it is not likely that we shall ever know,—how the revolution which ended the rule of kings in Rome was effected, nor in what way or by whom the republican government was established. But the substitution of two annually elected chief magistrates for the single king is a fact which is proved by all that followed. The incidents of the struggle between the orders, the personality of the actors, in many cases even the order of the events, are doubtful and uncertain; but if we had nothing to go upon but the position and powers of the tribunes of the *plebs* in the days of the Gracchi or of Cicero, we should still have indubitable evidence that such a struggle must have taken place. The same is the case with the long border wars between Rome and her neighbours. The details are historically worthless, but the reality of the wars, the gradual advance of Rome, and her final supremacy are beyond the possibility of doubt.

The establishment of the republic took place, according to Roman chronology, in the 245th year from the foundation of the city, or 120 years before

the sack of Rome by the Gauls, and it is said to have followed immediately on the expulsion of the Tarquins. But the date (509 B.C.) thus assigned to the "year one" of the republic was evidently conjectural, and it is very possible that the change from kings to consuls was only gradually made. However this may be, as to the form of government finally established, possibly towards the close of the sixth century B.C., there is no room for doubt. The supreme executive authority, hitherto wielded by the single king for life, was now transferred to two annually appointed magistrates, who jointly exercised for the year the powers (*imperium*) of the king, and who were styled *prætores* (leaders=Greek *στρατηγοί*), or possibly *prætores consules* (= "joint leaders").¹ There was not, however, any diminution of the kingly prerogative, nor, strictly speaking, any division of authority between the two prætor-consuls. They inherited the "regal *imperium*"² in all its plenitude, and each consul could singly exercise all the prerogatives attached to it. It was in the dual character of the new magistracy, and in the fact that it was held only for a year, that, to use

¹ That the consuls were originally styled *prætores* is expressly asserted by Varro *Ap. Nonium*, p. 23, and Livy, iii., 55; comp. Cicero, *De Leg.*, iii., 3, 8. The same title was borne by the chief magistrates in many of the Latin communities. When additional *prætores* (*prætor urbanus-peregrinus*) were appointed, the two originally *prætores* seem to have been distinguished as *maximi*. Hence Polybius' equivalent for "consuls" is either *στρατηγοί ὑπάτοι* (= *prætores maximi*), or simply *ὑπάτοι*.

² Cic., *De Leg.*, iii., 3, 8, "*regio imperio duo sunt.*"

Livy's phrase, the "beginnings of liberty" consisted.¹ It is characteristic of Rome that this change was made with the least possible disturbance of existing forms. Not only was the title of king retained, though merely as that of a priestly officer (*rex sacrorum*), but the consuls were always regarded as holding this *imperium*, and the right of taking the auspices by direct and continuous transmission from Romulus himself. Moreover, though they were rather elected or "designated" by a new assembly, by the army of landholders voting by their classes and centuries (*comitia centuriata*), yet it was still by a vote of the thirty *curiæ* (*lex curiata*) that the supreme authority was formally conferred upon them, and this vote of the *curiæ* had still to be ratified by the council of *patres* (*patrum auctoritas*). In the position and powers of the senate no formal change was made, although it is probable that before long plebeians were admitted to seats, and though its importance was gradually increased by the substitution of an annual magistracy for the life-long rule of a single king. Even the ancient assembly of the people by their *curiæ*, though cast into the shade by the new centuriate assembly, to which the designation of the consuls and the passing of laws now passed, continued to meet, and, as has been said, to confer the *imperium* under the old forms upon the magistrates designated by the centuries.

But the abolition of the monarchy brought with it a change of the utmost importance in the actual working of the constitution. Though the distinction

¹ Livy, ii., 1.

between patricians and plebeians was at least as old as the state itself, it was not until the establishment of the republic that it played any part in the history of Rome. No sooner, however, was the overshadowing authority of the king removed than a struggle commenced between the two orders, which lasted for more than two centuries. It was in no sense a struggle between a conquering and a conquered class, or between an exclusive citizen body and an unenfranchised mass outside its pale. Patricians and plebeians were equally citizens of Rome, sprung of the same race and speaking the same tongue. The former were the members of those ancient *gentes* which had possibly been once the leading families in the small communities which preceded the united state, and which claimed by hereditary right a privileged position in the community. Only patricians could sit in the council of *patres*, and hence, probably, the name given to their order.¹ To their representatives the supreme authority reverted on the death of the king; the due transmission of the *auspicia* and the public worship of the state gods were their special care; and to them alone were known the traditional usages and forms which regulated the life of the people from day to day. To the *plebs* (the multitude, *πληθος*) belonged all who were not members of some patrician *gens*, whether independent freemen or attached as "clients"² to one

¹ Cf. *adilis, adilicium*, etc.; Cic., *De Rep.*, ii., 12; Livy, i., 8. For a full discussion of other views, see Soltau, 179 *sq.*; Christensen, *Hermes*, ix., 196.

² For the *clientela*, see Mommsen (*Forsch.*, i.) and Schwegler, i., 638.

of the great houses. The plebeian was a citizen, with civil rights and a vote in the assembly, but he was excluded by ancient custom from all share in the higher honours of the state, and intermarriage with a patrician was not recognised as a properly legal union.¹

The revolution which expelled the Tarquins gave the patricians an overwhelming ascendancy in the state. The *plebs* had indeed gained something. Not only is it probable that the strictness of the old tie of clientship had somewhat relaxed, and that the number of the *clientes* was smaller, and their dependence on patrician patrons less complete, but the ranks of the *plebs* had, under the later kings, been swelled by the admission of conquered Latins, and the landholders among these had with others been enrolled in the Servian tribes, classes, and centuries. The establishment of the republic invested this military levy of landholders with political rights as an assembly, for by their votes the consuls were chosen and laws passed, and it was the plebeian landholders who formed the main strength of the *plebs* in the struggle that followed. But these gains were greater in appearance than in reality. The plebeian landholders commanded only a minority of votes in the *comitia centuriata*. In their choice of magistrates they were limited to the patrician candidates nominated by patrician presiding magistrates, and their choice required confirmation not only by the older and smaller assembly of the *curiæ*, in which the patricians and their clients predominated, but also by the patrician *patres*. They could only vote on laws pro-

¹ *I. e.* the children ranked as plebeian, even if the father was patrician.

posed by patrician consuls, and here again the subsequent sanction of the *patres* was necessary. The whole procedure of the *comitia* was absolutely in the hands of their patrician presidents, and liable to every sort of interruption and suspension from patrician pontiffs and augurs.

But these political disabilities did not constitute the main grievance of the *plebs* in the early years of the republic. What they fought for was protection for their lives and liberties, and the object of attack was the despotic authority of the patrician magistrates. The consuls wielded the full *imperium* of the kings. Against this "consular authority" the plebeian, though a citizen, had no protection or appeal, and matters were only worse when for the two consuls was substituted in some emergency a single, all-powerful, irresponsible dictator. In Rome, as in Greece, the first efforts of the people were directed against the arbitrary powers of the executive magistrate.

The history of this struggle between the orders opens with a concession said to have been made to the *plebs* by one of the consuls themselves, a concession possibly due to a desire to secure the allegiance of the plebeian landholders, who formed the backbone of the army. In the very first year of the republic, according to the received chronology, P. Valerius Poplicola carried in the *comitia centuriata* his famous law of appeal.¹ It enacted that no magistrate, saving only a dictator, should

Lex Valeria
de Provoca-
tione.

¹ Livy, ii., 8, *Lex Valeria de Provocatione*; Cic., *De Rep.*, ii., 31; *cf.* Livy, iii, 20.

execute a capital sentence upon any Roman citizen, unless the sentence had been confirmed on appeal by the assembly of the centuries. But, though the "right of appeal" granted by this law was justly regarded in later times as the greatest safeguard of a Roman's liberties, it was by no means at first so effective a protection as it afterwards became.¹ For not only was the operation of the law limited to the bounds of the city, so that the consul in the field or on the march was left as absolute as before, but no security was provided for its observance even within the city by consuls resolved to disregard it.

It was by their own efforts that the plebeians first obtained any real protection against magisterial despotism. The traditional accounts of the first secession are confused and contradictory,² but its causes and results are tolerably clear. The seceders were the plebeian legionaries recently returned from a victorious campaign. Indignant at the delay of the promised reforms, they ignored the order given them to march afresh against Volsci and Æqui, and instead entrenched themselves on a hill across the Anio, some three miles from Rome, and known afterwards as the Mons Sacer. The frightened patricians came to terms, and a solemn agreement (*lex sacrata*)³ was concluded between the orders, by which it was provided that henceforth the plebeians should have annual magistrates of their own (*tribuni plebis*), members of their own order, who should be authorised to

The first secession and the tribunate.

¹ Greenidge, *Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time*, pp. 344 sq.

² Schwegler, ii., 229 sq.

³ Schwegler, ii., 251, note; Livy, i., 33.

protect them against the consuls,¹ and a curse was invoked upon the man who should injure or impede the tribune in the performance of his duties.² The number of tribunes was at first two, then
 305 A.U.C. five, and before 449 B.C. it had been raised to ten. The fact that the institution of the tribunate of the *plebs* was the one result of the first secession, is strong evidence that the object of the seceders was not economic or agrarian reform, but protection against the consuls. The tribunate gave them this protection in a form which has no parallel in history. The tribune was not, and, strictly speaking, never became, a magistrate of the Roman people. His one proper prerogative was that of granting protection to the oppressed plebeian against a patrician officer. This prerogative (*jus auxilii*) was secured to the tribunes, not by the ordinary constitution, but by a special compact between the orders, and was protected by the ancient oath (*vetus jusjurandum*),³ which invoked a curse upon the violator of a tribune. This exceptional and anomalous right the tribunes could only exercise in person, within the limits of the *pomærium*, and against individual acts of magisterial oppression.⁴ It was only gradually that it expanded into the later wide power of interference with the whole machinery of government, and was supplemented by the legislative and judicial powers which rendered the tribunate of the last century B.C. so

¹ Cic., *De Rep.*, ii., 34, "*contra consulare imperium creati.*"

² Livy, iii., 55.

³ Festus, 318; Appian, *B. C.*, i., 138.

⁴ Gell., xiii., 12, "*ut injuria qua coram fieret arceretur.*"

formidable, and the *tribunicia potestas* so essential an element in the authority of the emperors.

But from the first, the tribunes were for the *plebs* not only protectors but leaders, under whom they organised themselves in opposition to the patri-
Lex Publilia.
 cians. It was the tribunes who convened as-
 semblies of the *plebs* (*concilia plebis*), and carried res-
 olutions on questions of interest to the order. This
 incipient plebeian organisation was materially ad-
 vanced by the Publilian law of 471 B.C.,¹
283 A.U.C.
 which appears to have formally recognised
 as lawful the plebeian *concilia*, and established also the
 tribune's right *cum plebe agere, i. e.* to propose and
 carry resolutions in them. These assemblies were *trib-*
unata, or, in other words, the voting in them took place
 not by curies or centuries, but by tribes. In them,
 lastly, after the Publilian law, if not before, the trib-
 unes were annually elected.² Thus the foundations
 were laid of that plebeian organisation, with its ple-
 beian magistrates, assembly (*concilium plebis*), and
 resolutions (*plebiscita*), which was in after days to
 become the strongest force in the state.

For the time, however, the *plebs* used the right
 granted them of free meeting and discus-
 sion, and of freely choosing their own leaders
Agrarian
agitation.
 for purposes of immediate importance to themselves.

Tradition is possibly right in dating from this
 period the commencement of the long-continued

¹ Livy, ii., 56, 60; Dionysius, ix., 41; Schwegler, ii., 541; Soltau, 493.

² For theories as to the original mode of appointing tribunes, see Mommsen, *Forsch.*, i., 185.

quarrel as to the disposal of the "common lands" (*agri publici*) of the state. The extent of these was rapidly increasing as Roman dominion extended, but the new lands had been reserved for the enjoyment of patricians alone. Against this monopoly the *plebs* protested, and demanded that a fair share of these lands should be assigned in small holdings to the plebeians, who had helped to win them.

But this agrarian agitation, though destined subsequently to play an important part in the ^{The} ~~decemvirate.~~ history, was for the time far less fruitful in results than the attack which was now renewed against the consular authority.

The proposal of C. Terentilius Arsa (460 B.C.) to appoint a plebeian commission to draw up laws restricting the powers of the consuls¹ was resolutely opposed by the patricians, but after ten years of bitter party strife a compromise was effected. A commission of ten patricians was appointed, who should frame and publish a code of law binding equally on both the orders. These *decemviri* were to be the sole and supreme magistrates for the year, and the law of appeal was suspended in their favour.² The code which they promulgated, the famous XII. Tables, owed little of its importance to any novelties or improvements contained in its provisions. For the most part it seems merely to have reaffirmed existing usages and laws. But it substituted a public, written code, binding on all citizens of Rome, for an unwritten usage, the knowledge of

¹ Livy, iii, 9.

² Livy, iii., 32.

which was confined to a few patricians, and which had been administered by this minority in their own interests. With the publication of the code the proper work of the decemvirs was finished; nevertheless for the next year a fresh decemvirate was elected, and it is conceivable that the intention was permanently to substitute government by an irresponsible patrician "council of ten" for the old constitution. However this may have been, the tyranny of the decemvirs themselves was fatal to the continuance of their power. We are told of a second secession of the *plebs*, this time to the Janiculum, and of negotiations with the senate, the result of which was the enforced abdication of the decemvirs. The *plebs* joyfully chose for themselves tribunes, and in the *comitia centuriata* two consuls were created. But this restoration of the old *régime* was accompanied by legislation which made it an important crisis in the history of the struggle between the orders. With the fall of the decemvirate this struggle enters upon a new phase. The tribunes appear as at once more powerful and more strictly constitutional magistrates; the plebeian *concilia* take their place by the side of the older assemblies; and, finally, this improved machinery is used not simply in self-defence against patrician oppression, but to obtain complete political equality. This change was no doubt due in part to circumstances outside legislation, above all to the expansion of the Roman state, which swelled the numbers and added to the social importance of the *plebs* as compared with the dwindling

Valerio-
Horatian
laws.

forces of the close corporation of patrician *gentes*. But the legislation ascribed to the consuls of 449 B.C. involved more than a restoration of the old form of government. One of their laws was plainly intended to prevent the recurrence of an irresponsible tyranny, such as that of the decemvirs. It reaffirmed the right of appeal granted by the Valerian law.¹ But it is to the others that the chief interest attaches. The first of them enacted that, whereas it had been a subject of dispute whether a resolution carried by the *plebs* in their own assembly could bind patricians, for the future—"what the *plebs* enacted by their tribes should bind the people."² That these words of Livy do not accurately state the purport of the law is generally agreed. It is utterly improbable that in 449 B.C. *plebiscita* should have been given, at once and without conditions, the force of law; but what the conditions imposed were it is impossible to say, though it is probable that among them was the requirement that the plebiscite should be ratified by the authority of the *patres*. In any case, however, the measure provided that, under certain circumstances, the hitherto informal resolutions of the informal *concilium* of the *plebs* might pass into law. It thus paved the way for the establishment of a plebeian machinery of legislation, and for the recognition of the plebeian magistrates and plebeian assemblies as part of the constitution of the state. In the same spirit, by another Valerio-Horatian statute, the

¹ Livy, iii., 55, "*ne quis ullum magistratum sine provocacione crearet.*"

² Livy, *ib.*, "*quod tributim plebs jussisset populum teneret.*"

inviolability of the tribunes, which had hitherto been secured only by the oath of the *plebs* to maintain it, was now guaranteed by law,¹ and the tribunes thus placed in this respect on a level with the magistrates of the state. Finally, by a plebiscite, the first passed under the new conditions, the permanency of the tribunate was secured.² The plebeian organisation was no longer merely tolerated, it was recognized as an integral part of the constitution. Its efficiency was amply proved by the events that followed. Only a few years after the Valerio-Horatian legis-
Lex Canuleia.
309 A.U.C.
 lation came the Lex Canuleia, itself a ple-
 biscite (445 B.C.), by which mixed marriages between patricians and plebeians were declared lawful, and the social exclusiveness of the patriciate broken down. In the same year with this measure, and, like it, in the interests primarily of the wealthier
Leges
Liciniæ
Sextiæ.
387 A.U.C.
 plebeians, a vigorous attack commenced
 on the patrician monopoly of the consu-
 late, and round this stronghold of patrician ascendancy the conflict raged until the passing of the Licinian laws in 367 B.C. The original proposal of Canuleius in 445 B.C., that the people should be allowed to elect a plebeian consul, was evaded by a compromise. The senate resolved that for the next year, in the stead of consuls, six military tribunes with consular powers should be elected, and that the new office should be open to patricians and ple-

¹ *Ib.*, "*religione inviolatos lege etiam fecerunt.*"

² *Ib.*, "*qui plebem sine tribunis reliquisset . . . tergo ac capite puniretur.*"

beians alike. The consulship was thus for the time saved from pollution, as the patricians phrased it, but the growing strength of the *plebs* is shown by the fact that in fifty years out of the seventy-eight, between 444 and 366 B.C., they succeeded in obtaining the election of consular tribunes rather than of consuls. A good omen for their ultimate success was a victory they won in connection with the inferior office of the quæstorship. Down to the time of the decemvirate the quæstors had been nominated by the consuls, but in 447 B.C. their appointment was transferred to the plebeian *comitia tributa*,¹ and in 421 B.C. the first plebeian was elected to the office.² Despite, however, these discouragements, the patricians fought on. Each year they strove to secure the creation of consuls rather than consular tribunes, and failing this strained every nerve to secure for their own order at least a majority among the latter. Even the institution of the censorship (435 B.C.), though rendered desirable by the increasing importance and complexity of the census, was, it is probable, due in part to their desire to discount beforehand the threatened loss of the consulship by diminishing its powers.³ Other causes, too, helped to protract the struggle. Between the wealthier plebeians, who were ambitious of high office, and the poorer, whose minds were set

¹ On the question of the identity of these *comitia tributa* with the *concilium plebis*, see *Dict. Antiq.*, s. v. "Comitia."

² Livy, iv., 43; Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, ii., 497.

³ Mommsen, *ib.*, 304.

rather on allotments of land, there was a division of interest of which the patricians were not slow to take advantage, and to this circumstance must be added the pressure of war. The death struggle with Veii and the sack of Rome by the Gauls absorbed for the time all the energies of the community.

In 377 B.C., however, two of the tribunes, ^{377 A.U.C.} C. Licinius Stolo and L. Sextius, came forward with proposals which united all sections of the *plebs* in their support. Their proposals were as follows¹: (1) that consuls and not consular tribunes be elected; (2) that one consul at least should be a plebeian; (3) that the priestly college, which had the charge of the Sibylline books, should consist of ten members instead of two, and that of these half should be plebeians; (4) that no single citizen should hold in occupation more than 500 acres of the common lands, or pasture upon them more than 100 head of cattle and 500 sheep; (5) that all landowners should employ a certain amount of free as well as slave labour on their estates; (6) that interest already paid on debts should be deducted from the principal, and the remainder paid off in three years. The last three proposals were obviously intended to meet the demands of the poorer plebeians, and to secure their support for the first half of the scheme.

^{387 A.U.C.} Ten years of bitter conflict followed, but at last, in 367 B.C. the Licinian *rogations* became law, and one of their authors, L. Sextius, was created the first plebeian consul. For the moment it was some

¹ Livy, vi., 35, 42; Appian, *B. C.*, i., 8.

² On the real date of this provision, see below, p. 209.

consolation to the patricians that they not only succeeded in detaching from the consulship the administration of civil law, which was entrusted to a separate officer, *prætor urbanus*, to be elected by the *comitia* of the centuries, with an understanding apparently that he should be a patrician, but also obtained the institution of two additional *ædiles* (*ædiles curules*), who were in like manner to be members of their own order.¹ With the opening of the consulship, however, the issue of the long contest was virtually decided, and the next eighty years witnessed a rapid succession of plebeian victories. Now that a plebeian consul might

Opening of
the magis-
tracies.

preside at the elections, the main difficulty in the way of the nomination and election of plebeian candidates was removed.

The proposed patrician monopoly of the new *curule ædileship* was almost instantly abandoned.

398 A.U.C. In 356 B.C. the first plebeian was made dictator, in 350 B.C. the censorship, and in 337

404-17 A.U.C. B.C. the *prætorship* were filled for the first time by plebeians, and lastly, in 300 B.C., by

454 A.U.C. the *Lex Ogulnia*, even the sacred colleges of the pontiffs and augurs, the old strongholds of patrician supremacy, were thrown open to the *plebs*.²

A no less important victory was that which formally secured the independence of the people in assembly. From the first the acts both of the people in the *comitia* of centuries, and of the *plebs* in their *concilium* had required ratification by the *patres*, and this check

¹ Livy, vi., 42.

² Livy, vii. 17, 22 ; viii., 15 ; ix., 6.

on the people's freedom of action was rightly regarded by the patricians as one of the main supports of their ascendancy.¹ But in 339 B.C. a plebeian dictator, Q. Publilius Philo, carried a law ^{415 A.U.C.} enacting that in the case of measures proposed in the *comitia centuriata*, the *auctoritas patrum* should be given beforehand.² A Lex Mænia, of uncertain date, extended the rule to elections in the same assembly. By another law of Publilius, followed some fifty years later by the famous Lex ^{Lex Horten.} Hortensia, the plebeian *concilium* was also ^{451, 467 A.U.C.} emancipated from the control of the *patres*.³ Thenceforward the *auctoritas patrum* became a meaningless form of words hurried over, as a matter of course, before the voting began.⁴ From 287 B.C., ^{467 A.U.C.} the year in which the Hortensian law was carried, not only the acts of the *populus* in the *comitia* of the centuries, but those of the *plebs* in the *concilium plebis*, were valid and binding without reference to any other authority in the state. So far as the law could do it, the sovereignty of the people in election and legislation was secured. With the passing of the Lex Hortensia the long struggle between the orders came to an end. The ancient patrician *gentes re-*

¹ Cic., *De Rep.*, ii., 32; *Pro Plancio*, iii., 8. Whether by *patres* we are to understand the senate as a whole, or only the patrician senators, is a disputed point. See *Dict. Antiq.*, s.v. *Senatus*.

² Livy, viii., 12, "ut . . . ante initum suffragium patres auctoritas ferent," cf. Livy, i., 17. For the Lex Mænia, see Cic., *Brut.*, 14; Soltan, 112.

³ Livy, viii., 12; for the Lex Hortensia, see Plin., *N. H.*, xvi., 10 Gell., xv., 27; Gaius, i., 3.

⁴ Livy, i., 17.

mained, but the exclusive privileges of the patriciate as a ruling order were gone. For the great offices of state and for seats in the senate the plebeians were by law equally eligible with patricians. The assemblies, whether of people or *plebs*, were independent of patrician control. In private life inter-marriages between patricians and plebeians were recognised as lawful, and entailed no disabilities on the children. Finally, great as continued to be the prestige attaching to patrician birth, and prominent as was the part played in the subsequent history by individual patricians and by some of the patrician houses, the *plebs* were now in numbers and even in wealth the preponderant section of the people. Whatever struggles might arise in the future, a second struggle between patricians and plebeians was an impossibility. Such being the case, it might have been expected that the separate organisation, to which the victory of the *plebs* was largely due, would, now that the reason for its existence was gone, have disappeared. Had this happened, the history of the republic might have been different. As it was, this plebeian machinery—the plebeian tribunes, assemblies, and resolutions—survived untouched, and lived to play a decisive part in a new conflict, not between patricians and plebeians, but between a governing class, itself mainly plebeian, and the mass of the people, and finally to place at the head of the state a patrician *Cæsar*. Nor was the promise of a genuine democracy, offered by the opening of the magistracies and by the Hortensian law, fulfilled. For one hundred and fifty

years afterwards the drift of events was in the opposite direction, and when the popular leaders of the first century B.C. endeavoured to make government by the people a reality, it was already too late.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONQUEST OF ITALY.

THE period occupied by the struggle between the orders is also that during which Rome slowly advanced to supremacy in Italy, for it was only twelve years after the passing of the Lex Hortensia that the repulse of King Pyrrhus left her the mistress of the peninsula. The steps by which this supremacy was won have now to be traced. Under the rule of her Etruscan princes Rome had spread her sway over the lowlands of Latium, and her arms were a terror to the warlike highlanders of the Sabine and Volscian hills. But with their fall this miniature empire fell also, and at first it seemed as if the infant republic, torn by internal dissensions, must succumb to the foes who threatened it from so many sides at once. It was only after one hundred and fifty years of almost constant war that Rome succeeded in rolling back the tide of invasion and in establishing her supremacy over the neighbouring lowlands and over the hill country which bordered them to the east and south. The close of this first stage in her external growth is conveniently marked by the first collision

with the Sabellian peoples beyond the Liris in 343 B.C.¹ In marked contrast ^{411 A.U.C.} with the slowness of her advance up to this point is the fact that only seventy-five years ^{411-85 A.U.C.} more were needed for the virtual subjugation of all the rest of the peninsula (343-269 B.C.).

The expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome, followed as it seems to have been by the emancipation from Etruscan supremacy of all the country between the Tiber and the Liris, entirely altered the aspect of affairs. North of the Tiber the powerful Etruscan city of Veii, after a vain attempt to restore the Tarquins, relapsed into an attitude of sullen hostility towards Rome, which, down to the outbreak of the final struggle in 407 B.C., found vent in ^{347 A.U.C.} constant and harassing border forays. The Sabines recommenced their raids across the Anio; from their hills to the south-east the Æqui pressed forward as far as the eastern spurs of the Alban range, and ravaged the plain country between that range and the Sabine mountains; the Volsci overran the coast-lands as far as Antium, established themselves at Velitræ, and ^{League with the Latins and Hernicæ.} even ravaged the fields within a few miles of Rome. But the good fortune of Rome did not leave her to face these foes single-handed, and it is a significant fact that the history of the Roman advance begins, not with a brilliant victory, but with a useful and timely alliance. According to ^{261 A.U.C.} Livy, it was in 493 B.C., only a few years after the defeat of the prince of Tusculum at Lake

¹Livy, vii., 29.

Regillus, that a treaty was concluded between Rome and the Latin communities of the Campagna.¹ The alliance was in every respect natural, and may very probably have been only the renewal of an ancient friendship. The Latins were the near neighbours and kinsmen of the Romans, and both Romans and Latins were just freed from Etruscan rule to find themselves as lowlanders and dwellers in towns face to face with a common foe in the ruder hill tribes on their borders. The exact terms of the treaty cannot, any more than the precise circumstances under which it was concluded, be stated with certainty, but two points seem clear. There was at first a genuine equality in the relations between the allies; Romans and Latins, though combining for defence and offence, did so without sacrificing their separate freedom of action, even in the matter of waging wars independently of each other.² But, secondly, Rome enjoyed from the first one inestimable advantage. The Latins lay between her and the most active of her foes, the Æqui and Volsci, and served to protect her territories at the expense of their own. Behind this barrier Rome grew strong, and the close of the Æquian and Volscian wars left the Latins her dependents rather than her allies. Beyond the limits of the Campagna, Rome found a second ally, hardly less useful than the Latins, in the tribe of the Hernici ("the men of the rocks"), in the valley of the Trerus, who had equal reason with the Romans and Latins to dread the Volsci and Æqui, while their

¹ Livy, ii., 33; Cic., *Pro Balbo*, 23.

² Livy, viii., 2.

position midway between the two latter peoples made them valuable auxiliaries to the lowlanders of the Campagna.

The treaty with the Hernici is said to have been concluded in 486 B.C.,¹ and the confederacy of the three peoples—Romans, Latins, and Hernicans—lasted down to the great Latin war in 340 B.C. Confused and untrustworthy as are the chroniclers of the early wars of Rome, it is clear that, notwithstanding the acquisition of these allies, Rome made but little way against her foes during the first fifty years of the existence of the republic. In 474 B.C., it is true, an end was put for a time to the harassing border feud with Veii by a forty years' peace, an advantage probably due not so much to Roman valor as to the increasing dangers from other quarters which were threatening the Etruscan states.² But this partial success stands alone, and down, to 449 B.C. the raids of Sabines, Æqui and Volsci continue without intermission, and are occasionally carried up to the very walls of Rome.

Very different is the impression left by the annals of the next sixty years (449–390 B.C.). During this period there is an unmistakable development of Roman power on all sides. In southern Etruria, the capture of Veii (396 B.C.) virtually gave Rome the mastery as far as the Ciminian forest. Sutrium and Nepete, "the gates of Etruria," became her allies,

266 A. U. C.

414 A. U. C.

280 A. U. C.

305 A. U. C.

305-64 A. U. C.

Capture of
Veii,
396 A. U. C.

¹ Livy, ii., 40.

² From the Kelts in the north especially.

and guarded her interests against any attack from the Etruscan communities to the north, while along the Tiber valley her suzerainty was acknowledged as far as Capena and Falerii. On the Anio frontier we


hear of no disturbances from 449 B.C. until
 308 A.U.C. some ten years after the sack of Rome by the Gauls. In 446 B.C. the Æqui appear for the last time before the gates of Rome. After 418

B.C. they disappear from Mount Algidus, and in the same year the communications of Rome and Latium with the Hernici in the Trerus valley were secured by the capture and colonisation of Labicum. Successive invasions, too,

broke the strength of the Volsci, and in
 361 A.U.C. 393 B.C. a Latin colony was founded as far south as Circeii. In part, no doubt, these Roman successes were due to the improved condition of affairs in Rome itself, consequent upon the great re-

forms carried between 450 and 442 B.C.;
 304-12 A. U. C. but it is equally certain that now as often afterwards fortune befriended Rome by weakening, or by diverting the attention of, her opponents. In particular, her rapid advance in southern

Etruria was facilitated by the heavy blows
 Decline of Etruscan power. inflicted upon the Etruscans during the fifth century B.C., by Kelts, Greeks, and Samnites. By the close of this century the Kelts had expelled them from the rich plains of what was afterwards known as Cisalpine Gaul, and were even threatening to advance across the Apennines into Etruria proper. The Sicilian Greeks, headed by the tyrants of Syracuse, wrested from them their mastery of the seas:





and finally, on the capture of Capua by the Samnites in 423 B.C., they lost their possessions in the fertile Campanian plain. These conquests of the Samnites were part of a great southward movement of the highland Sabellian peoples, the immediate effects of which upon the fortunes of Rome were not confined to the weakening of the Etruscan power. It is probable that the cessation of the Sabine raids across the Anio was partly due to the new outlets which were opened southwards for the restless and populous hill tribes which had so long disturbed the peace of the Latin lowlands. We may conjecture, also, that the growing feebleness exhibited by Volsci and Æqui was in some measure caused by the pressure upon their rear of the Sabellian clans, which at this time established themselves near the Fucine Lake and along the course of the Liris.

But in 390 B.C., only six years after the great victory over her ancient rival Veii, the Roman advance was for a moment checked by a disaster which threatened to alter the course of history in Italy, and which left a lasting impress on the Roman mind. In 391 B.C. a Keltic horde left their newly won lands on the Adriatic, and crossing the Apennines into Etruria, laid siege to the Etruscan city of Clusium (Chiusi). Thence, provoked, it is said, by the conduct of the Roman ambassadors, who, forgetting their sacred character, had fought in the ranks of Clusium, and slain a Keltic chief, the barbarians marched upon Rome. On July 18, 390 B.C., only a few miles from Rome,

331 A.U.C.

Sack of Rome
by the Gauls,
363 A.U.C.

was fought the disastrous battle of the Allia. The defeat of the Romans was complete, and Rome lay at the mercy of her foe. But in characteristic fashion, the Kelts halted three days to enjoy the fruits of victory, and time was thus given to put the Capitol at least in a state of defence. The arrival of the barbarians was followed by the sack of the city, but the Capitol remained impregnable. For seven months they besieged it, and then in as sudden a fashion as they had come, they disappeared. The Roman chroniclers explain the retreat in their own way, by the fortunate appearance of Camillus with the troops which he had collected, at the very moment when famine had forced the garrison on the Capitol to accept terms. More probably the news that their lands across the Apennines were threatened by the Veneti, coupled with the unaccustomed tedium of a long siege and the difficulty of obtaining supplies, inclined the Kelts to accept readily a heavy ransom as the price of their withdrawal. But, whatever the reason, it is certain that they retreated, and, though during the next fifty years marauding bands appeared at intervals in the neighbourhood of Rome, and even once penetrated as far south as Campania (361-360 A.U.C. B.C.), the Kelts never obtained any footing in Italy outside the plains in the north which they had made their own.

Nor, in spite of the defeat of the Allia and the sack of the city, was Rome weakened except for the moment by the Keltic attack. The storm passed away as rapidly as it had come on.

Annexation
of southern
Etruria.

The city was hastily rebuilt, and Rome dismayed the enemies who hastened to take advantage of her misfortunes by her undiminished vigour. Her conquests in southern Etruria were successfully defended against repeated attacks from the Etruscans to the north. The creation in 387 B.C. of four new tribes (Stellatina, Sabatina, Tromentina, ³⁸⁷ A.U.C. Arniensis) marked the final annexation of the territory of Veii and of the lands lying along the Tiber valley. A few years later Latin colonies were established at Sutrium and Nepete for the more effectual defence of the frontier, and finally, in 353 B.C., the ⁴⁰¹ A.U.C. subjugation of South Etruria was completed by the submission of Cære (Cervetri) and its partial incorporation with the Roman state as a *municipium sine suffragio*—the first, it is said, of its kind.¹

Next to the settlement of southern Etruria the most important of the successes gained by Rome between 390 and 343 B.C., were those won against her old foes the Æqui and Volsci, ^{Successes against Æqui and Volsci.} and her old allies the Latins and Hernicans. ³⁶⁴⁻⁴¹¹ A.U.C. The Æqui, indeed, already weakened by their long feud with Rome, and hard pressed by the Sabellian tribes in their rear, were easily dealt with, and after the campaign of 389 B.C., we have no further mention of an Æquian war until ³⁶⁵ A.U.C. the last Æquian rising in 304 B.C. ⁴⁵⁰ A.U.C. The Volsci, who in 389 B.C. had advanced to Lanuvium, were met and utterly defeated by M. Furius

¹ For the status of Cære, and the "Cærite franchise," see Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 28 sq.; Madvig, *R. Verf.*, i., 39; Beloch, *Ital. Bund*, 120.

Camillus, the conqueror of Veii, and this victory was followed up by the gradual subjugation to Rome of all the lowland country lying between the hills and the sea as far south as Tarracina. Latin colonies ^{369, 375 A. U. C.} were established at Satricum (385 B.C.), ^{406, 396 A. U. C.} at Setia (379 B.C.), and at Antium and Tarracina some time before 348 B.C. In 358 B.C. two fresh Roman tribes (Pomptina and Publilia) were formed in the same district.¹

Rome had now nothing more to fear from the foes who, a century ago, had threatened her very existence. The lowland country — of which she was the natural centre, from the Ciminian forest to Tarracina—was quiet, and within its limits Rome was by far the strongest power. But she had now to reckon with the old and faithful allies, to whose loyal aid her present position was largely due. The Latins and Hernicans had suffered severely in the Æquian and Volscian wars; it is probable that not a few of the smaller communities included in the league had either been destroyed or been absorbed by larger states, and the independence of all alike was threatened by the growing power of Rome. The sack of Rome by the Kelts gave them an opportunity of reasserting their independence, and we are consequently told that this disaster was immediately followed by the temporary dissolution of the confederacy, and this again a few years later by a series of actual conflicts between Rome and her former allies. Between 383 B.C. and 358 B.C.

Re-organisa-
tion of the
Latin league.

^{371-96 A. U. C.}

¹ Livy, vii., 15.

we hear of wars with Tibur, Præneste, Tusculum, Lanuvium, Circeii, and the Hernici. But in all Rome was successful. In 382 B.C. Tusculum was fully incorporated with the Roman State ^{372 A.U.C.} by the bestowal of the full franchise¹; in 358 B.C., according to both Livy and Polyoius, the old alliance was formally renewed with Latins and Hernicans. ^{396 A.U.C.} We cannot, however, be wrong in assuming that the position of the allies under the new league was far inferior to that accorded them by the treaty of Spurius Cassius.² Henceforth they were the subjects rather than the equals of Rome, a position which it is evident that they accepted much against their will, and from which they were yet to make one last effort to escape.

We have now reached the close of the first stage in Rome's advance towards supremacy in Italy. By 343 B.C. she was already mistress both of the low country stretching from the Ciminian forest to Tarracina and Circeii and of the bordering highlands. ^{411 A.U.C.} Her own territory had largely increased. Across the Tiber the lands of Veii, Capena, and Cære were nearly all Roman, while in Latium she had carried her frontiers to Tusculum on the Alban range, and to the southernmost limits of the Pomptine district. And this territory was protected by a circle of dependent allies and colonies reaching northward to Sutrium and Nepete, and southward to Sora on the upper Liris, and to Circeii on the coast. Already, too, she was beginning to be rec-

¹ Livy, vi., 26.

² Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 347, note; Beloch, *Ital. Bund*, cap ix.

ognised as a power outside the limits of the Latin lowlands. The fame of the capture of Rome by the Kelts had reached Athens, and her subsequent victories over marauding Keltic bands had given her prestige in South Italy as a bulwark against northern barbarians. In 354 B.C. she had formed her first connections beyond the Liris by a treaty with the Samnites, and in 348 B.C. followed a far more important treaty with the great maritime state of Carthage.¹

Rome had won her supremacy from the Ciminian forest to the Liris as the champion of the comparatively civilised communities of the lowlands against the rude highland tribes which threatened to overrun them, and so, when her legions first crossed the Liris, it was in answer to an appeal from a lowland city against invaders from the hills. While she was engaged in clearing Latium of Volsci and Æqui, the Sabellian tribes of the central Apennines had rapidly spread over the southern half of the peninsula. Foremost among these tribes were the Samnites, a portion of whom had captured the Etruscan city of Capua in 423 B.C., the Greek Cumæ in 420 B.C., and had since then ruled as masters over the fertile Campanian territory. But in their new homes the conquerors soon lost all sense of relationship and sympathy with their highland brethren. They dwelt in cities, amassed

**Advance
beyond the
Liris, and
the Samnite
wars**

331-334 A.U.C.

¹ Livy, vii., 27. For the whole question of the early treaties with Carthage, see Polybius, iii., 22; Mommsen. *R. G.*, i., 413, and *R. Chronol.*, p. 320; Vollmer, *Rheim. Mus.*, xxxii., 614.

wealth, and inherited the civilisation of the Greeks and Etruscans whom they had dispossessed¹; above all, they had before long to defend themselves in their turn against the attacks of their ruder kinsmen from the hills, and it was for aid against these that the Samnites of Campania appealed to the rising state which had already made herself known as the bulwark of the lowlands north of the Liris, and which, with her Latin and Hernican allies, had scarcely less interest than the Campanian cities themselves in checking the raids of the highland Samnite tribes.

The Campanian appeal was listened to. Rome with her confederates entered into alliance with Capua and the neighbouring Campanian towns, and war was formally declared (343 B.C.) against the Samnites.² While to the Latins and Hernicans was entrusted apparently the defence of Latium and the Hernican valley against the northerly members of the Samnite confederacy, the Romans themselves undertook the task of driving the invaders out of Campania. After two campaigns the war was ended in 341 B.C. by a treaty, and the Samnites withdrew from the lowlands, leaving Rome the recognised suzerain of the Campanian cities which had sought her aid.³

First Sam-
nite war.
411 A.U.C.

413 A.U.C.

¹ For the Samnites in Campania, see Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 353; Schwegler-Clason, *R. G.*, v., 98 sq.; Beloch, *Campanien*, Berlin, 1879.

² Livy, vii., 32.

³ For the difficulties in the traditional accounts of this war, see Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 355, note; Schwegler-Clason, *R. G.*, v., 14 sq.

There is no doubt that the check thus given by Rome to the advance of the hitherto invincible Sabelian highlanders, not only made her the natural head and champion of the low countries, south as well as north of the Liris, but also considerably added to her prestige. Carthage sent her congratulations, and the city of Falerii voluntarily enrolled herself among the allies of Rome. Of even greater service, however, was the fact that for fifteen years the Samnites remained quiet, for this inactivity, whatever its cause, enabled Rome triumphantly to surmount a danger which threatened for the moment to wreck her whole position. This danger was nothing less than a desperate effort on the part of nearly all her allies and dependants south of the Tiber to throw off the yoke of her supremacy. The way was led by her ancient confederates the Latins, whose smouldering discontent broke into open flame directly the fear of a Samnite attack was removed. From the Latin Campagna and the Sabine hills the revolt spread westward and southward to Antium and Tarracina, and even to the towns of the Campanian plain, where the mass of the inhabitants at once repudiated the alliance formed with Rome by the ruling class. The struggle was sharp but short. In two pitched battles¹ the strength of the insurrection was broken, and two more campaigns sufficed for the complete reduction of such of the insurgent communities as still held out. The revolt crushed, Rome set herself deliberately to the task of re-

¹ At the foot of Mount Vesuvius, Livy, viii., 9; at Trifanum, *id.*, viii., 11.

establishing, on a new and firmer basis, her supremacy over the lowlands, and in doing so laid the foundations of that marvellous organisation which was destined to spread rapidly over Italy, and to withstand the attacks even of Hannibal. The old historic Latin league ceased to exist, though its memory was still preserved by the yearly Latin festival on the Alban Mount. Most, if not all, of the common land of the league became Roman territory¹; five, at least, of the old Latin cities were compelled to accept the Roman franchise,² and enter the pale of the Roman state. The rest, with the Latin colonies, were ranked as Latin allies of Rome, but on terms which secured their complete dependence upon the sovereign city. The policy of isolation, which became so cardinal a principle of Roman rule, was now first systematically applied. No rights of *connubium* or *commercium* were any longer to exist between these communities. Their federal councils were prohibited, and all federal action independent of Rome forbidden.³

In future they were to have nothing in common but the common connection with Rome, a connection based in each case on a separate treaty between the individual Latin community and Rome. The Latin allied state retained its internal independence, and the old rights of intermarriage and commerce with Rome, but it lost all freedom of action in

¹ Livy, viii., 11.

² Livy, viii., 14; Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum, Pedum, Tusculum.

³ *Id.*, *loc. cit.*, "*ceteris Latinis populis connubia commerciaque et concilia inter se ademerunt.*"

external affairs. It could wage no wars, conclude no treaties, and was bound, so the phrase ran, to have always the same foes and friends as Rome and of Campania. herself. In Campania and the coast-lands connecting Campania with Rome, a policy of annexation was considered safer than that of alliance. Of the two frontier posts of the Volsci, Antium and Velitræ, the former was constituted a Roman colony, its long galleys burnt, and their prows set up in the Forum at Rome, while the walls of Velitræ were razed to the ground, its leading men banished beyond the Tiber, and their lands given to Roman settlers. Farther south on the route to Campania, Fundi and Formiæ were, after the precedent set in the case of Cære, declared Roman, and granted the civil rights of Roman citizenship; while, lastly, in Campania itself the same status was given to Capua, Cumæ, and the smaller communities dependent upon them.¹ During the ten years from 338 B.C. 416-26 A.U.C. to 328 B.C. the work of settlement was steadily continued. Tarracina, like Antium, was made a Roman colony. Privernum, the last Volscian town to offer resistance to Rome, was subdued 424 A.U.C. in 330 B.C., part of its territory allotted to Roman citizens, and the state itself forced to accept the Roman franchise. Lastly, to strengthen the lines of defence against the Sabellian tribes, two colonies, with the rights of Latin allies, were established at Fregellæ and at Cales. The set-

¹ For the controversy as to the precise status of Capua and the *equites Campani* (Livy, viii., 14), see Beloch, *Ital. Bund.*, 122 sq.; *id.*, *Campanien*, 317; Zumpt, *Comment. Epigraph.*, p. 290.

tlement of the lowlands was accomplished. From the Ciminian forest to the southern extremity of the Campanian plain, the lands lying between the sea and the hills were now, with few exceptions, Roman territory, while along the frontiers from Sutrium and Nepete in the north to Cales in the south stretched the protecting line of the Latin allied states and colonies. As a single powerful and compact state, with an outer circle of closely dependent allies, Rome now stood in sharp contrast with the disunited and degenerate cities of northern Etruria, the loosely organised tribes of the Apennines, and the decaying and disorderly Greek towns of the south.

The strength of this system was now to be tried by a struggle with the one Italian people who were still ready and able to contest with Rome the supremacy of the peninsula. The passive attitude of the Samnites between 342 B.C. and 327 B.C. was no doubt largely due to the dangers which had suddenly threatened them in South Italy. But the death of Alexander of Epirus in 332¹ B.C. removed their only formidable opponent there, and left them free to turn their attention to the necessity of checking the steady advance of Rome. In 327 B.C., the year after the ominous foundation of a Roman colony at Fregellæ, a pretext for renewing the struggle was offered them. The Cumæan colony of Palæopolis² had incurred the wrath of Rome by

Second Samnite war.
412-27 A.U.C.

422 A.U.C.

427 A.U.C.

¹ Livy, viii., 3, 17, 24.

² Livy, viii., 22.

its raids into her territory in Campania. The Samnites sent a force to defend it, and Rome replied by a declaration of war. The two opponents were not at first sight unequally matched, and had the Sabelian tribes held firmly together the issue of the struggle might have been different. As it was, however, the Lucanians to the south actually sided with Rome from the first, while the northern clans, Marsi, Vestini, Pæligni, Frontani, after a feeble and lukewarm resistance, subsided into a neutrality which

⁴³⁰ A. U. C. was exchanged in 304 B.C. for a formal alliance with Rome. An even greater advantage to Rome from the outset was the enmity existing between Samnites and the Apulians, the latter of whom at once joined Rome, and thus gave her a position in the rear of her enemy, and in a country eminently well fitted for maintaining a large military force. These weaknesses on the Samnite side were amply illustrated by the events of the war.

The first seven or eight years were marked by one serious disaster to the Roman arms, the defeat at the

⁴³³ A. U. C. Caudine Forks (321 B.C.); but, when in

⁴³⁶ A. U. C. 318 B.C. the Samnites asked for and obtained a two years' truce, Rome had succeeded not only in inflicting several severe blows upon her enemies, but in isolating them from outside help. The Lucanians to the south were her allies. To the east, in the rear of Samnium, Apulia acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome, and Luceria, captured

⁴³⁴ A. U. C. in 320 B.C., had been established as a base of Roman operations. Finally, to the north the Romans had easily overcome the feeble resist-

ance of the Vestini and Frentani, and secured through their territories a safe passage for their legions to Apulia. On the renewal of hostilities in 316 B.C., the Samnites, bent on escaping from the net which was being slowly drawn round them, made a series of desperate efforts to break through the lines of defence which protected Latium and Campania. Sora and Fregellæ on the upper Liris were captured by a sudden attack; the Ausones in the low country near the mouth of the same river were encouraged to revolt by the appearance of the Samnite army; and in Campania another force, attracted by rumours of disturbance, all but defeated the Roman consuls under the very walls of Capua. But these efforts were unavailing. Sora and Fregellæ were recovered as quickly as they had been lost, and the frontier there was strengthened by the establishment of a colony at Interamna. The Ausones were punished by the confiscation of their territory, and Roman supremacy further secured by the two colonies of Suessa and Pontia (312 B.C.). The construction of the famous Via Appia,¹ the work of the censor Appius Claudius Cæcus, opened a safe and direct route to Campania, while the capture of Nola deprived the Samnites of their last important stronghold in the Campanian lowlands. The failure of these attempts broke the courage even of the Samnites. Their hopes were indeed raised for a moment by the news that Etruria had risen against Rome (310 B.C.), but their

¹ Livy, ix., 23.

daring scheme of effecting a union with the Etruscans was frustrated by the energy of the Roman generals. Five years later (305 B.C.) the
 449 A.U.C. Romans revenged a Samnite raid into Campania by an invasion of Samnium itself. Arpinum, on the other frontier, was taken, and at
 450 A.U.C. last, after a twenty-two years' struggle the second Samnite war was closed by a renewal of the ancient treaty with Rome (304 B.C.).¹

The six years of peace which followed (304-298 B.C.) were characteristically employed by Rome in
 450-56 A.U.C. still further strengthening her position. Already, two years before the peace, a rash revolt of the Hernici² had given Rome a pretext for finally annexing the territory of her ancient allies. The tribal confederacy was broken up, and all the Hernican communities, with the exception of three which had not joined the revolt, were incorporated with the Roman state as municipia, with the civil rights of the Roman franchise. Between the Hernican valley and the frontiers of the nearest Sabellian tribes lay what remained of the once formidable people of the Æqui. In their case, too, a
 450 A.U.C. revolt (304 B.C.) was followed by the annexation of their territory, which was marked in this case by the formation there (301 B.C.)
 453 A.U.C. of two Roman tribes (Aniensis and Terentina).³ Not content with thus carrying

¹ Livy, ix., 29.

² Livy, ix., 45.

³ Livy, i. 45.

the borders of their own territory up to the very frontiers of the Sabellian country, Rome succeeded in finally detaching from the Sabellian confederacy all the tribes lying¹ between the north-east frontier of Latium and the Adriatic Sea. Henceforward the Marsi, Pæligni, Vestini, Marrucini, and Frentani were enrolled among the allies of Rome, and not only swelled her forces in the field, but interposed a useful barrier between her enemies to the north in Etruria and Umbria, and those to the south in Samnium, while they connected her directly with the friendly Apulians. Lastly, as a security for the fidelity at least of the nearest of these allies, colonies were planted in the Marsian territories at Carseoli and at Alba Fucentia. A significant indication of the widening range of Rome's influence in Italy, and of the new responsibilities rapidly pressing upon her, is the fact that when in 302 B.C. the Spartan Cleonymus landed in the territory of Sallentini, far away in the south-east, he was met and repulsed by a Roman force.²

452 A.U.C.

Six years after the conclusion of the treaty which ended the second Samnite war (298 B.C.), news arrived that the Samnites were harassing the Lucanians. Rome at once interfered to protect her allies. Samnium was invaded in force, the country ravaged, and one stronghold after another captured. Unable any longer to hold their own in a position where they were hedged round by enemies, the Samnite leaders turned as a

Third
Samnite
war,
456 A.U.C.¹ Livy, x., 9.² Livy, x., 2.

last hope to the communities of northern Etruria, to the free tribes of Umbria, and to the once dreaded Kelts. With a splendid daring they formed the scheme of uniting all these peoples with themselves in a last desperate effort to break the power of Rome.

For some forty years after the final annexation of southern Etruria (351 B.C.) matters had remained unchanged in that quarter. Sutrium and Nepete still guarded the Roman frontier; the natural boundary of the Ciminian forest was still intact; and up the valley of the Tiber Rome had not advanced beyond Falerii, a few miles short of the most southerly Umbrian town Oriculum. But in 311 B.C., on the expiry, apparently, of the long truce with Rome, concluded in 351 B.C., the northern Etruscans, alarmed, no doubt, by the rapid advances which Rome was making farther south, rose in arms and attacked Sutrium. The attack, however, recoiled disastrously upon the heads of the assailants. A Roman force promptly relieved Sutrium, and its leader, Q. Fabius Rullianus, without awaiting orders from home, boldly plunged into the wilds of the Ciminian forest, and, crossing them safely, swept with fire and sword over the rich lands to the north. Then, turning southward, he met and utterly defeated the forces which the Etruscans had hastily raised in the hopes of intercepting him at the Vadimonian Lake.¹ This decisive victory ended the

¹ Livy, ix., 39. Ihne (*R. G.*, i., 351 *sq.*) throws some doubts on the traditional accounts of this war and of that in 296 B.C.

war. The Etruscan cities, disunited among themselves, and enervated by long years of peace, abandoned the struggle for the time, paid a heavy indemnity, and concluded a truce with Rome (309-308 B.C.). In the same year the promptitude of Fabius easily averted a threatened attack by the Umbrians, but Rome proceeded, nevertheless, to fortify herself in her invariable fashion against future dangers on this side, by an alliance with Ocrinum, which was followed ten years later by a colony at Nequinum,¹ and an alliance with the Picentes, whose position in the rear of Umbria rendered them as valuable to Rome as the Apulians had proved farther south.

Fourteen years had passed since the battle on the Vadimonian Lake, when the Samnites appeared on the borders of Etruria, and called on the peoples of northern Italy to rise against the common enemy. Their appeal, backed by the presence of their troops, was successful. The Etruscans found courage to face the Roman legions once more; a few of the Umbrians joined them; but the most valuable allies to the Samnites were the Kelts, who had for some time threatened a raid across the Apennines, and who now marched eagerly into Umbria and joined the coalition. The news that the Kelts were in motion produced a startling effect at Rome, and every nerve was strained to meet this new danger. While two armies were left in southern Etruria as reserves, the two consuls, Fabius and Decius, both tried soldiers, marched

Battle of
Sentinum,
295 B.C.
459 A.U.C.

¹ Narnia, Livy, x., 10.

northwards up the valley of the Tiber and into Umbria, at the head of four Roman legions and a still larger force of Italian allies. At Sentinum, on the farther side of the Apennines, they encountered the united forces of the Kelts and Samnites, the Etruscans and Umbrians having, it is said, been withdrawn for the defence of their own homes. The battle that followed was desperate, and the Romans lost one of their consuls, Decius, and more than 8,000 men.¹ But the Roman victory was decisive. The Kelts were annihilated, and the fear of a second Keltic attack on Rome removed. All danger from the coalition was over. The Etruscan communities gladly purchased peace by the payment of indemnities. The rising in Umbria, never formidable, died away and the Samnites were left single-handed to bear the whole weight of the wrath of Rome. During four years more, however, they desperately defended their highland homes, and twice at least, ^{461, 462 A.U.C.} in 293 B.C. and 292 B.C., they managed to place in the field a force sufficient to meet the Roman legions on equal terms. At last, ^{464 A.U.C.} in 290 B.C., the consul M. Curius Dentatus finally exhausted their power of resistance. Peace was concluded, and it is significant of the respect inspired at Rome by their indomitable courage that they were allowed to become the allies of Rome, on equal terms, and without any sacrifice of independence.²

¹ Livy, x., 27.

² Livy, *Epit.*, xi., "*pacem potentibus Samnitibus fœdus quarto renovatum est.*"

Between the close of the third Samnite war and the landing of Pyrrhus in 281 B.C., we find Rome engaged, as her wont was, in quietly extending and consolidating her power. In southern Italy she strengthened her hold on Apulia by planting on the borders of Apulia and Lucania the strong colony of Venusia.¹ In central Italy the annexation of the Sabine country (290 B.C.) carried her frontiers eastward to the borders of her Picentine allies on the Adriatic.² Farther east, in the territory of the Picentes themselves, she established colonies on the Adriatic coast at Hadria and Castrum (285-283 B.C.).³ By these measures her control of central Italy from sea to sea was secured, and an effectual barrier interposed between her possible enemies in the north and those in the south. North of the Picentes lay the territories of the Keltic Senones, stretching inland to the north-east borders of Etruria, and these too now fell into her hands. Ten years after their defeat at Sentinum (285-284 B.C.) a Keltic force descended into Etruria, besieged Arretium, and defeated the relieving force despatched by Rome. In 283 B.C. the consul L. Cornelius Dolabella was sent to avenge the insult. He completely routed the Senones. Their lands were annexed by Rome, and a colony established at Sena on the coast. This success, followed as it was by the decisive defeat of the neighbouring tribe of the

¹ Dion. Hal., *Exc.*, 2335; Vell. Pat., i., 14.

² Livy, *Epit.*, xi.; Vell. Pat., i., 14.

³ Livy, *Epit.*, xi.

Boii, who had invaded Etruria and penetrated as far south as the Vadimonian Lake, awed the Kelts into quiet, and for more than forty years there was comparative tranquillity in northern Italy.¹

In the south, however, the claims of Rome to supremacy were now to be disputed by a new and formidable foe. At the close of the third Samnite war the Greek cities on the southern coast of Italy found themselves once more harassed by the Sabellian tribes on their borders, whose energies, no longer absorbed by the long struggles in central Italy, now found an attractive opening southward. Naturally enough the Greeks, like the Capuans sixty years before, appealed for aid to Rome (283–282 B.C.), and like the Capuans they offered in return to recognise the suzerainty of the great Latin republic.

War with Pyrrhus, 281–275 B.C., 473–472 A.U.C.
 In reply a Roman force under C. Fabricius marched into South Italy, easily routed the marauding bands of Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites, and established Roman garrisons in Locri, Croton, Rhegium, and Thurii. At Tarentum, the most powerful and flourishing of the Greek seaports, this sudden and rapid advance of Rome excited the greatest anxiety. Tarentum was already allied

471–2 A.U.C.
 by treaty (301 B.C.) with Rome, and she had now to decide whether this treaty should be exchanged for one which would place her, like the other Greek communities, under the protectorate of Rome, or whether she should find some ally able and willing to assist in making a last stand for inde-

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, xii. ; Polybius, ii., 20.

pendence. The former course, in Tarentum, as before at Capua, was the one favoured by the aristocratic party; the latter was eagerly supported by the mass of the people and their leaders. While matters were still in suspense, the appearance, contrary to the treaty, of a Roman squadron off the harbour decided the controversy. The Tarentines, indignant at the insult, attacked the hostile fleet, killed the admiral, and sunk most of the ships. Still Rome, relying, probably, on her partisans in the city, tried negotiation, and an alliance appeared likely after all, when suddenly the help for which the Tarentine democrats had been looking appeared, and war with Rome was resolved upon (281–280 B.C.).¹

King Pyrrhus, whose timely appearance seemed for the moment to have saved the independence of Tarentum, was the most brilliant of the military adventurers whom the disturbed times following the death of Alexander the Great had brought into prominence. High-spirited, generous, and ambitious, he had formed the scheme of rivalling Alexander's achievements in the East by winning for himself an empire in the West. He aspired not only to unite under his rule the Greek communities of Italy and Sicily, but to overthrow the great Phœnician state of Carthage—the natural enemy of Greeks in the West, as Persia had been in the East. Of Rome it is clear that he knew little or nothing; the task of ridding the Greek seaports of their barbarian foes he no doubt regarded as an easy one; and the splendid

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, xii.; Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 13.

force he brought with him was intended rather for the conquest of the West than for the preliminary work of chastising a few Italian tribes, or securing the submission of the unwarlike Italian Greeks. Pyrrhus's first measure was to place Tarentum under a strict military discipline; this done he advanced into Lucania to meet the Roman consul Lævinus. The battle which followed, on the banks of the Liris, ended in the complete defeat of the Roman troops, largely owing to the panic caused by the elephants which Pyrrhus had brought with him

474 A.U.C. (280 B.C.).¹ The Greek cities expelled their Roman garrisons and joined him, while numerous bands of Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians flocked to his standard. But, to the disappointment of his Greek and Italian allies, Pyrrhus showed no anxiety to follow up the advantage he had gained. His heart was set on Sicily and Africa, and his immediate object was to effect such an arrangement with Rome as would at once fulfil the pledges he had given to the Greeks by securing them against Roman interference, and set himself free to seek his fortunes westward. But, though his favourite minister, Cineas, employed all his skill to win the ear of the senate, and, though Pyrrhus himself lent weight to his envoy's words by advancing as near Rome as Anagnia (279 B.C.),

475 A.U.C. nothing could shake the resolution of the senate, and Cineas brought back the reply that the Romans could not treat with Pyrrhus so long as he remained in arms upon Italian soil. Disappointed

¹ Plin., *N. H.*, viii., 6.

in his hopes of peace, Pyrrhus in the next year (278 B.C.) turned his forces against the Roman strongholds in Apulia.¹ Once more, at Asculum, he routed the legions, but only to find that the indomitable resolution of the enemy was strengthened by defeat. Weary of a struggle which threatened indefinitely to postpone the fulfilment of his dreams of empire, Pyrrhus resolved to quit Italy, and, leaving garrisons in the Greek towns, crossed into Sicily. Here his success at first was such as promised the speedy realisation of his hopes. The Sicilian Greeks hailed him as a deliverer; the Carthaginians were driven back to the extreme west of the island, and Eryx and Panormus fell into his hands. But at this point fortune deserted him. His efforts to take Lilybæum were fruitless; the Carthaginians recovered their courage, while the unstable Greeks, easily daunted by the first threatenings of failure, and impatient of the burdens of war, broke out into open murmurs against him. Soured and disappointed, Pyrrhus returned to Italy (276 B.C.) to find the Roman legions steadily moving southwards, and his Italian allies disgusted by his desertion of their cause. One of the consuls for the year (275 B.C.) M. Curius Dentatus, the conqueror of Samnium, was encamped at Beneventum awaiting the arrival of his colleague. Here Pyrrhus attacked him, and the closing battle of the war was fought. It ended in the complete victory of the Romans. Pyrrhus, unable any longer to face his opponents in

¹ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 21.

the field, and disappointed of all assistance from his allies, retreated in disgust to Tarentum, and thence crossed into Greece.*

A few years later (272 B.C.) Tarentum was surrendered to Rome by its Epirot garrison; it was granted a treaty of alliance, but its walls were razed and its fleet handed over to Rome.

In 270 B.C. Rhegium also entered the ranks of Roman allies, and finally, in

269 B.C. a single campaign crushed the last efforts at resistance in Samnium. Rome was now at leisure to consolidate the position she had

won. Between 273 B.C. and 263 B.C. three new colonies were founded in Samnium and Lucania—Pæstum in 273 B.C., Beneventum in 268 B.C., Æsernia in 263 B.C.

In central Italy the area of Roman territory was increased by the full enfranchisement (268 B.C.) of the Sabines,¹ and of their neighbours to the east, the Picentes. To guard the Adriatic coast, colonies were established at

Ariminum (268 B.C.), at Firmum, and at

Castrum Novum (264 B.C.), while to the already numerous maritime colonies was added that of Cosa in Etruria.²

Rome was now the undisputed mistress of Italy.

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, xiv. ; Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 26.

² Vell. Pat., i., 14, "*suffragii ferendi jus Sabinis datum.*"

³ Vell. Pat., i., 14 ; Livy, *Epit.*, xv. I have followed Beloch (*Ital. Bund.*, 142) in identifying the "Cosa" of Vell., *loc. cit.*, and Livy, *Epit.*, xiv., with Cosa in Etruria ; cf. Plin., *N. H.*, iii., 8. 51. Mommsen and Madvig both place it in Lucania.

The limits of her supremacy to the north were represented roughly by a line drawn across the peninsula from the mouth of the Arno on the west to that of the *Æsis* on the east.¹

Rome as the
mistress of
Italy.

Beyond this line lay the Ligurians and the Kelts; all south of it was now united as "Italy" under the rule of Rome.

But the rule of Rome over Italy, like her wider rule over the Mediterranean coasts, was not an absolute dominion over conquered subjects. It was in form at least a confederacy under Roman protection and guidance; and the Italians, like the provincials, were not the subjects, but the "allies and friends" of the Roman people.² Marvellous as are the perseverance and skill with which Rome built up, consolidated, and directed this confederacy, it is yet clear that both her success in forming it and its stability when formed were due in part to other causes than Roman valour and policy. The disunion which in former times had so often weakened the Italians in their struggles with Rome still told in her favour, and rendered the danger of a combined revolt against her authority remote in the extreme. In some cases, and especially in the city states of Etruria, Campania, and Magna Græcia, where the antagonism of the two political parties, aristocrats and democrats, was keen, Rome found natural and valuable allies in the former. Among the more backward peoples of central Italy, the looseness of their political organisation not only lessened their power

¹ Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 428 note; Nissen, *Ital. Landeskunde*, p. 71.

² Beloch, *Ital. Bund*, 203; Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 428, note

of resistance, but enabled Rome either to detach tribe after tribe from the confederacy, or to attack and crush them singly. Elsewhere she was aided by ancient feuds, such as those between Samnites and Apulians, or Tarentines and Iapygians, or by the imminent dread of a foe—Kelt, or Samnite, or Lucanian—whom Roman aid alone could repel. And, while combination against her was thus rendered difficult, if not impossible, by internal dissensions, feuds, differences of interest, of race, of language, and habits, Rome herself, from her position in the centre of Italy, was so placed as to be able to strike promptly on the first signs of concerted opposition. All these advantages Rome utilised to the utmost. We have no means of deciding how far she applied elsewhere the principle upon which she acted in northern Etruria and Campania, of attaching the aristocratic party in a community to Roman interests, by the grant of special privileges; but it is certain that she endeavoured by every means in her power to perpetuate, and even to increase, the disunion which she had found so useful among her allies. In every possible way she strove to isolate them from each other, while binding them closely to herself. The old federal groups were in most cases broken up, and each of the members united with Rome by a special treaty of alliance. In Etruria, Latium, Campania, and Magna Græcia the city state was taken as the unit; in central Italy, where urban life was non-existent, the unit was the tribe. The northern Sabellian peoples, for instance,—the Marsi, Pæligni, Vestini, Marrucini, Frentani,—were now constituted

as separate communities in alliance with Rome. In many cases, too, no freedom of trade or intermarriage was allowed between the allies themselves, a policy afterwards pursued in the provinces. Nor were all these numerous allied communities placed on the same footing as regarded their relations with Rome herself. To begin with, a sharp distinction was drawn between the Latini and the general mass of Italian allies. The Latins. The Latins of this period had little more than the name in common with the old thirty Latin peoples of the days of Spurius Cassius. With a few exceptions, such as Tibur and Præneste, the latter had either disappeared or had been incorporated with the Roman state, and the Latins of 268 B.C. were almost exclusively the Latin colonies—486 A.U.C. that is to say, communities founded by Rome, composed of men of Roman blood, and whose only claim to the title Latin lay in the fact that Rome granted to them some portion of the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed by the old Latin cities under the Cassian treaty.¹ Though nominally allies, they were, in fact, offshoots of Rome herself, bound to her by community of race, language, and interest, and planted as Roman garrisons among alien and conquered peoples. The Roman citizen who joined a Latin colony lost his citizenship—to have allowed him to retain it would no doubt have been regarded as enlarging too rapidly the limits of the citizen body; but he received in exchange the status of a

¹ For the *colonia Latina* founded before the first Punic war, see Beloch, 136 sq.



favoured ally. The Latin colony did not, indeed, enjoy the equality and independence originally possessed by the old Latin cities. It had no freedom of action outside its own territory, could not make war or peace, and was bound to have the same friends and foes as Rome. But its members had the right of *commercium*, and, down to 486 A.U.C. 268 B.C.,¹ of *connubium* also with Roman citizens. Provided they left sons and property to represent them at home, they were free to migrate to Rome and acquire the Roman franchise. In war time they not only shared in the booty, but claimed a portion of any land confiscated by Rome and declared public. These privileges, coupled with their close natural affinities with Rome, successfully secured the fidelity of the Latin colonies, which became not only the most efficient props of Roman supremacy, but powerful agents in the work of Romanising Italy. Below the privileged Latins stood the Italian allies; and here again we know generally that there were considerable differences of status, determined in each case by the terms of their respective treaties with Rome. We are told that the Greek cities of Neapolis and Heraclea were among the most favoured²; the Bruttii, on the other hand, seem, even before the Hannibalic war, to have been less generously treated. But beyond this the ab-

The Italian
allies.

¹ The year of the foundation of Ariminum, the first Latin colony with the restricted rights; Cic., *Pro Cœc.*, 35; Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 421, note; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 53. Beloch, 155-158, takes a different view.

² Beloch, *Camp.*, 39; Cic., *Pro Balbo*, 22.



sence of all detailed information does not enable us to go.

Rome, however, did not rely only on this policy of isolation. Her allies were attached as closely to herself as they were clearly separated from each other, and from the first she took every security for the maintenance of her own paramount authority. Within its own borders, each ally was left to manage its own affairs as an independent state.¹ The badges which marked subjection to Rome in the provinces—the resident magistrate and the tribute—were unknown in Italy. But in all points affecting the relations of one ally with another, in all questions of the general interests of Italy and of foreign policy, the decision rested solely with Rome. The place of a federal constitution, of a federal council, of federal officers, was filled by the Roman senate, assembly, and magistrates. The maintenance of peace and order in Italy, the defence of the coasts and frontiers, the making of war or peace with foreign powers, were matters the settlement of which Rome kept entirely in her own hands. Each allied state, in time of war, was called upon for a certain contingent of men, but, though its contingent usually formed a distinct corps under officers of its own, its numerical strength was fixed by Rome, it was brigaded with the Roman legions, and was under the orders of the Roman consul.²

¹ For the relation of the *socii Italici* to Rome, see Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 422; Beloch, *Ital. Bund*, cap. x.

² Beloch, 203. The importance of this duty of the allies is expressed in the phrase, "*socii nominisve Latini quibus ex formula logatorum milites in terra Italia imperare solent.*"

This paramount authority of Rome throughout the peninsula was confirmed and justified by the fact that Rome herself was now infinitely more powerful than any one of her numerous allies. Her territory, as distinct from that of the allied states, covered something like one-third of the peninsula south of the Æsis. Along the west coast it stretched from Cære to the southern borders of Campania. Inland, it included the former territories of the Æqui and Hernici, the Sabine country, and even extended eastward into Picenum, while beyond these limits were outlying districts, such as the lands of the Senonian Kelts, with the Roman colony of Sena, and others elsewhere in Italy, which had been confiscated by Rome and given over to Roman settlers. Since the first important annexation of territory after the capture of Veii (358 A.U.C. (396 B.C.)), twelve new tribes had been formed,¹ and the number of male citizens registered at the census had risen from 152,000 to 290,000.² Within this enlarged Roman state were now included numerous communities with local institutions and government. At their head stood the Roman colonies (*coloniæ civium Romanorum*), founded to guard especially the coasts of

¹ Four in South Etruria (387 B.C.), two in the Pomptine territory (358), two in Latium (332), two in the territory of the southern Volsci and the Ager Falernus (318), two in the Æquian and Hernican territory (299). The total of thirty-five was completed in 241 by formation of the Velina and Quirina, probably in the Sabine and Picentine districts, enfranchised in 268. See Beloch, 32.

² Livy, *Epit.*, xvi.; Eutrop., ii., 18; Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 423; Beloch, cap. iv., p. 77 sq.



Latium and Campania.¹ Next to these eldest children of Rome came those communities which had been invested with the full Roman franchise, such, for instance, as the old Latin towns of Aricia, Lanuvium, Tusculum, Nomentum, and Penum. Lowest in the scale were those which had not been considered ripe for the full franchise, but had, like Cære, received instead the *civitas sine suffragio*, the civil without the political rights.² Their members, though Roman citizens, were not enrolled in the tribes, and in time of war served not in the ranks of the Roman legions, but in separate contingents. In addition to these organised town communities, there were also the groups of Roman settlers on the public lands, and the dwellers in the village communities of the enfranchised highland districts in central Italy.

The administrative needs of this enlarged Rome were obviously such as could not be adequately satisfied by the system which had done well enough for a small city state with a few square miles of territory. The old centralisation of all government in Rome itself had become an impossibility, and the Roman statesmen did their best to meet the altered requirements of the time. The urban communities within the Roman pale, colonies and *municipia*, were allowed a large measure of local self-government. In all we find local assemblies, senates, and magistrates, to whose hands the ordinary routine of local administration was confided, and, in spite of differences in

¹ Ostia, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnæ, Sinuessa, and, on the Adriatic, Sena and Castrum Novum.

² To both these classes the term *municipia* was applied.

detail, *e. g.*, in the titles and numbers of the magistrates, the same type of constitution prevailed throughout.¹ But these local authorities were carefully subordinated to the higher powers in Rome. The local constitution could be modified or revoked by the Roman senate and assembly, and the local magistrates, no less than the ordinary members of the community, were subject to the paramount authority of the Roman consuls, prætors and censors. In particular, care was taken to keep the administration of justice well under central control. The Roman citizen in a colony or *municipium* enjoyed, of course, the right of appeal to the Roman people in a capital case. We may also assume that from the first some limit was placed to the jurisdiction of the local magistrate, and that cases falling outside it came before the central authorities. But an additional safeguard for the equitable and uniform administration of Roman law in communities, to many of which the Roman code was new and unfamiliar, was provided by the institution of prefects (*præfecti juri dicundo*),² who were sent out annually, as representatives of the Roman prætor, to administer justice in the colonies and *municipia*. To prefects was, moreover, assigned the charge of those districts within the Roman pale where no urban communities, and consequently no

¹ For details, see Beloch, *Ital. Bund*, caps. v., vi., vii. The enfranchised communities in most cases retained the old titles for their magistrates, and hence the variety in their designations.

² For the *præfecti*, see Mommsen. *R. G.*, i., 419, and *Röm. Staatsrecht*, ii., 569; Beloch, 130-133.

organised local government, existed. In these two institutions, that of municipal government and that of prefectures, we have already two of the cardinal points of the later imperial system of government.

A word must lastly be said of the changes which the altered position and increased responsibilities of Rome had effected in her military system.¹ For the most part these changes tended gradually to weaken the old and intimate connection between the Roman army in the field and the Roman people at home, and thus prepared the way for that complete breach between the two which in the end proved fatal to the republic. It is true that service in the legion was still the first duty and the highest privilege of the fully qualified citizen. Every *assiduus* was still liable to active military service between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, and *proletarii* and freedmen were still called out only in great emergencies,² and then but rarely enrolled in the legions. But this service was gradually altering in character. Though new legions were still raised each year for the summer campaigns, this was by no means always accompanied, as formerly, by the disbandment of those already on foot, and this increase in the length of time during which the citizen was kept with the standards had, as early as the siege of Veii, necessitated a further deviation from the old theory of military service—the intro-

¹ Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 438; Madvig, *Verf. R. Reichs*, ii., 467 sq.; Livy, viii., 8; Polybius, vi., 17-42.

² *E. g.*, before the battle of Sentinum (296 B.C.), Livy, x., 21.

duction of pay.¹ Hardly less important than these changes were those which had taken place in the organisation of the legion itself. In the early days of the republic the same divisions served for the soldier in the legion and the voter in the assembly. The Roman army in the field, and the Roman people in the *comitia* on the Campus, were alike grouped according to their wealth, in classes and *centuriæ*. But by the time of the Latin war the arrangement of the legion had been altered. In the new manipular system, with its three lines, no regard was paid to civic distinctions, but only to length of service and military efficiency, while at the same time the more open order of fighting which it involved demanded of each soldier greater skill, and therefore a more thorough training in arms than the old phalanx. One other change resulted from the new military necessities of the time, which was as fruitful of results as the incipient separation between the citizen and the soldier. The citizen soldiers of early Rome were commanded in the field by the men whom they had chosen to be their chief magistrates at home, and still, except when a dictator was appointed, the chief command of the legions rested with the consuls of the year. But, as Rome's military operations increased in area and in distance from Rome, a larger staff became necessary, and the inconvenience of summoning home a consul in the field from an unfinished campaign became intolerable. The remedy found, that of prolonging for a further period the imperium of the consul, was first

The pro-consulate.

¹ Livy, iv., 59.


applied in 327 B.C. in the case of Q. ^{427 A.U.C.} Publilius Philo,¹ and between 327 and 264 B.C. instances of this *prorogatio im-* ^{427-490 A.U.C.} *perii* became increasingly common. This proconsular authority, originally an occasional and subordinate one, was destined to become first of all the strongest force in the republic, and ultimately the chief prop of the power of the Cæsars. Already, within the limits of Italy, Rome had laid the foundation stones of the system by which she afterwards governed the world—the municipal constitutions, the allied states, the proconsuls, and the prefects.

¹ Livy, viii., 23. " *ut proconsule rem gereret quoad debellatum esset.*"



BOOK III.

ROME AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
STATES—265-146 B.C.



ROME AND THE MEDITERRANEAN STATES—265-146 B.C.

INTRODUCTION.

WE have now reached the period during which the Latin community on the banks of the Tiber, already the mistress of Italy, established her suzerainty over the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. For the history of this period we are no longer dependent on tradition. The events of the struggle with Carthage, the wars with Macedon, and with Antiochus, the relations of Rome with the states of western Asia, were recorded by contemporary historians, Greek and Roman, and in contemporary official documents. Of these contemporary authorities indeed, only a few fragments are now extant. We cannot read the very words of Fabius Pictor, of L. Cincius Alimentus, the prisoner of Hannibal, or of Hannibal's companion and historiographer, the Greek Silenus, or handle the original text of the treaties with Carthage or Antiochus. But the important fact remains, that it is on these records that

our two chief extant authorities, Polybius and Livy, based their narratives, while of the last thirty years of the period, Polybius himself writes with the authority of a contemporary.

The chief interest of the history naturally centres in the great wars which for a hundred years absorbed the energies of Rome. In the internal affairs of the state there is at first sight nothing of striking importance to record. The strain and stress of foreign war left little energy or leisure for political debate, or reforming zeal. The great controversy which had divided men in the previous period was closed; those which were to divide them in the next had not yet taken definite shape. Yet beneath this outward political calm changes were silently at work of the utmost moment for the future of the state. The Rome which emerged victorious from the conflicts of a century was still, as regarded the form of her political system, a Latin city state,—in fact, she was an imperial power ruling wide and distant provinces, and with a citizen body scattered over the coasts of the Mediterranean. Nor could the disproportion between the primitive machinery of the old republican constitution and the administrative necessities of an empire which stretched from the pillars of Hercules to the river Halys, long escape notice. To these administrative difficulties were added others, created directly or indirectly by the rapid expansion of Rome during this period; for this expansion brought with it a revolution in the conditions, habits and beliefs of Roman society, which undermined the very foundations on which the republican system

rested. The statesmen of the Gracchan, and still more of the Ciceronian, age had consequently to face the fact that the ancient constitution was almost as ill-suited to the temper and tone of the Roman people as it was inadequate to the task of governing the civilised world. In the following chapters we shall then, first of all, trace the growth of Roman dominion outside Italy, and, secondly, consider its effects upon the Roman state itself.

8

CHAPTER I.

ROME AND CARTHAGE—THE CONQUEST OF THE WEST.

THOUGH marked out by her geographical position as the natural centre of the Mediterranean, Italy had hitherto played no active part in Mediterranean politics, but, now that she was for the first time united, it was felt throughout the Mediterranean world that a new power had arisen, and Rome, as the head and representative of Italy, found herself irresistibly drawn into the vortex of Mediterranean affairs. With those of the eastern Mediterranean, indeed, she was not immediately called upon to concern herself. Her repulse of Pyrrhus, and the news that the Greek cities of South Italy had acknowledged her suzerainty, had, it is true, suddenly revealed to the Eastern world the existence of a powerful Italian state. Egypt sought her alliance, and Greek scholars began to interest themselves keenly in the history, constitution, and character of the Latin republic which had so suddenly become famous. But this was all, and not until fifty years after the retreat of Pyrrhus did

Rome seriously turn her attention eastward. Westward of Italy the case was different. The western coasts of the peninsula were the most fertile, populous, and wealthy ; it was westward rather than eastward that the natural openings for Italian commerce were to be found. But it was precisely on this side that Rome had serious ground for anxiety. The great Phœnician republic of Carthage was now at the height of her power. To a commercial and maritime supremacy, as great as that of Tyre and Sidon had ever been, she had added a dominion by land, of a kind to which they had never aspired. Not content with her wide and fertile territories in northern Africa, she had planted her feet firmly in Sardinia and Sicily, in close proximity to the shores of Italy, while her fleets swept the seas and jealously guarded for her benefit alone the hidden treasures of the West. In the east of Sicily, Syracuse still upheld the cause of Greek independence against the hereditary foe of the Greek race ; but Syracuse stood alone, and her resources were comparatively small. What Rome had to fear was the establishment, and that at no distant date, of an absolute Carthaginian domination over the Western seas—a domination which would not only be fatal to Italian commerce but would be a standing menace to the safety of the Italian coasts. Rome had indeed long been connected with Carthage by treaty, and the older purely commercial treaties had quite recently been replaced by a close alliance formed in face of the common danger to which both had been exposed by the adventurous schemes of Pyrrhus. But this danger was

past, and it is probable that others besides Pyrrhus foresaw that on the old battle-ground of Greeks and Phœnicians a struggle must soon be fought out between the Phœnician mistress of the Italian seas and the Latin rulers of the Italian peninsula.

— First Punic War, 265-241 B.C. 489-513 A.U.C. 482 A.U.C. It was above all things essential for Rome that the Carthaginians should advance no farther eastward. But already in 272 B.C. Tarentum had almost fallen into their grasp, and seven years later Rome was threatened with a danger at least as serious, the establishment of Carthaginian rule in the east of Sicily, and within sight of the Italian coast. In 265 B.C. a body of Campanian mercenaries, who had seized Messina, found themselves hard pressed by Hiero, King of Syracuse. One party among them appealed for aid to Carthage. The Carthaginians readily responded, and a Carthaginian garrison occupied the citadel of Messina. But at Messina, as once at Tarentum, there were others who turned to Rome, and, as Italians themselves, implored the aid of the great Italian republic, offering in return to place Messina under the suzerainty of Rome. The request was a perplexing one. Both Hiero and the Carthaginians were allies of Rome, and Messina, if rescued from the latter, belonged of right to Hiero and not to Rome. Apart, too, from treaty obligations, the Roman senate naturally hesitated before acceding to an appeal which would precipitate a collision with Carthage, and commit Rome to a new and hazardous career of enterprise beyond the sea. Finally, however, all other considerations gave way

before the paramount importance of checking the advance of Carthage. The Roman assembly voted that assistance should be sent to the Mamertines, and in 264 B.C. the Roman legions for the first time crossed the sea. ^{490 A.U.C.} Messina was occupied, and, after sustaining a defeat, the Carthaginians and Syracusans were forced to raise the siege and withdraw. The opening years of the war which was thus begun gave little promise of the length of the struggle, and it seemed likely at the outset that Rome's immediate object, the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily, would be soon attained. The accession to the Roman ^{491 A.U.C.} side of King Hiero (263 B.C.) not only confirmed the position which Rome had already assumed in Italy of the champion of the western Greeks against barbarians, but provided her in eastern Sicily with a convenient base of operations and commodious winter quarters, and in Hiero himself with a loyal and effective ally. In the next year (262 B.C.) followed the capture of Agrigentum, and in 261 B.C. the Roman senate resolved on supplementing these successes on land by the formation of a fleet which should not only enable them to attack the maritime strongholds which defied the ^{492 A.U.C.} assaults of their legions, and protect their own coasts, but even to carry the war into Africa itself. In the spring of 260 B.C. the first regular Roman ^{493 A.U.C.} fleet, consisting of one hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes, set sail¹; and the bril-

The first
Roman fleet.

¹ Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 515.

liant naval victory of Mylæ, won by the consul C. Duilius in the same year, seemed to promise the Romans as much success by sea as they had won by land. But the promise was not fulfilled; and in 256 B.C. the senate, impatient of the slow progress made in Sicily, determined on boldly invading Africa. It was a policy for which, if Africa were once reached, the defenceless state of the Carthaginian territories, the doubtful loyalty of her Libyan subjects, and the unwarlike habits of her own citizens gave every hope of success, and, but for the blunders of the Romans themselves, it might have succeeded now as it did fifty years later. The passage to Africa was opened by the defeat of the Carthaginian fleet off Ecnomus; the two consuls, L. Manlius Vulso and M. Atilius Regulus, landed in safety and rapidly overran the country. But these successes led the senate, at the close of the summer, into committing the serious blunder of recalling one of the consuls, Manlius, with a large portion of the troops. It was one of many instances in which the rules and traditions of the old republican system proved themselves inconsistent with the new requirements of an extended warfare. The consul came back to hold the elections; his soldiers returned, as the custom had been, to their homes after a summer's campaign; but the efficiency of the expedition was fatally impaired. The rashness and over-confidence of Regulus aggravated the effects of the senate's action. Emboldened by further successes, and notwithstanding his diminished forces, he met the Carthaginian proposals for

498 A.U.C.

the slow

The invasion
of Africa by
Regulus.

peace by terms so harsh that the latter, though the Romans were almost at their gates, their soldiers disheartened, and the nomad tribes swarming on their frontiers, indignantly broke off the negotiations and prepared to resist to the last. At this crisis, so the story runs, the arrival of Xanthippus, a Spartan soldier of fortune, changed the face of affairs, as that of Gylippus had formerly done at Syracuse. His superior military skill remedied the blunders of the Carthaginian generals; confidence was restored; and in 255 B.C. he triumphantly routed the Roman forces a few miles outside the city. Regulus was taken prisoner,¹ and only a miserable remnant of two thousand men escaped to the Roman camp on the coast. Here they were rescued by a Roman fleet, but their ill-fortune pursued them. On its way home the fleet was wrecked, and all but 80 vessels out of a total of 364 were lost.

Still, though abandoning the idea of invading Africa, the Romans were unwilling to renounce all thoughts of facing their enemy on the sea. But fresh disasters followed. The hopes raised (254 B.C.) by the capture of Panormus were dashed to the ground the next year (253 B.C.) by the total destruction in a storm of the victorious fleet on its way home from Panormus to Rome. Four years later a second fleet, despatched under P. Claudius to assist in the blockade of Lilybæum, was completely defeated off Drepana, while, to make matters worse,

¹ For criticisms of the story of Regulus, see Mommsen, i. 523; Ihne, ii., 69; Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, ii., 185.

Claudius's colleague, L. Junius, who had been hastily sent out with reinforcements, was wrecked near the dangerous promontory of Pachynus.

Disheartened by these repeated disasters, the senate resolved to trust only to the legions, and by sheer force of perseverance slowly to force the enemy out of the few positions to which he still clung in Sicily. But, though for five years (248-243

506-511 A.U.C. B.C.) no fresh naval operations were attempted, no compensating success by land

followed. Hamilcar Barca, the new Carthaginian commander, not only ravaged with his fleet the coasts of Italy, but from his impregnable position at Ercte incessantly harassed the Roman troops in the west of the island, and even recaptured Eryx. Convinced once more of the impossibility of driving the Carthaginians out of Sicily as long as their navy swept the seas, the Romans determined on a final effort. The treasury was empty; but by the liberal contributions of private citizens a fleet was equipped,

and C. Lutatius Catulus, consul for 242

512 A.U.C. B.C., started for Sicily early in the summer of that year with two hundred quinqueremes. From Drepana, whither he had gone to aid in the blockade, he sailed out to meet a Carthaginian fleet despatched from Africa against him; and a battle took place at the Ægates islands, some twenty miles

from the Sicilian coast, in which Catulus completely defeated his enemy. The end of the long struggle had come at last. The Carthaginian government, despairing of being able to send further aid to their troops in Sicily, authorised

End of the
war.

Hamilcar to treat for peace. His proposals were accepted by Catulus, and the terms agreed upon between them were confirmed in all essential points by the commissioners sent out from Rome. The Carthaginians agreed to evacuate Sicily and the adjoining islands, to restore all prisoners, and to pay an indemnity of 2,300 talents.

In its duration and severity the first Punic war is justly ranked by Polybius above all other wars of his own and preceding times, though neither in the military talent displayed nor in the importance of its results can it be compared with the war that followed. It was distinguished by no military achievement comparable with Hannibal's invasion of Italy, and with the single exception of Hamilcar it produced no general of the calibre of Hannibal or Scipio. It was in fact a struggle in which both Rome and Carthage were serving an apprenticeship to a warfare, the conditions of which were unfamiliar to both. The Roman legions were foes very unlike any against which the Carthaginian leaders had ever led their motley array of mercenaries, while Rome was called upon for the first time to fight a war across the sea, and to fight with ships against the greatest naval power of the age. The novelty of these conditions accounts for much of the vacillating and uncertain action observable on both sides, and their effect in this direction was increased by the evident doubts felt by both antagonists as to the lengths to which the quarrel should be pushed. It is possible that Hamilcar had already made up his mind that Rome must be at-

Character
and lessons
of the war.

tacked and crushed in Italy, but his government attempted nothing more than raids upon the coast. There are indications also that some in the Roman senate saw no end to the struggle but in the destruction of Carthage; yet an invasion of Africa was only once seriously attempted, and then only a half-hearted support was given to the expedition. But these peculiarities in the war served to bring out in the clearest relief the strength and the weakness of the two contending states. The chief dangers for Carthage lay obviously in the jealousy exhibited at home of her officers abroad, in the difficulty of controlling her mercenary troops, and in the ever-present possibility of disaffection among her subjects in Libya—dangers which even the genius of Hannibal failed finally to surmount. Rome, on the other hand, was strong in the public spirit of her citizens, the fidelity of her allies, the valour and discipline of her legions. What she needed was a system which should make a better use of her splendid materials than one under which her plans were shaped from day to day by a divided senate, and executed by officers who were changed every year, and by soldiers most of whom returned home at the close of each summer's campaign.

The interval between the first and second Punic wars was employed by both Rome and Carthage in strengthening their respective positions. Of the islands lying off the coast of Italy, the most important, Sicily, had fallen to Rome as the prize of the recent war. The eastern end of the island was still left under the rule

The interval
between the
first and
second
Punic wars.

of King Hiero as the ally of Rome, but the larger western portion became directly subject to Rome, and a temporary arrangement seems to have been made for its government, either by one of the two prætors, or possibly by a quæstor.¹ Sardinia and Corsica had not been surrendered to Rome by the treaty of 241 B.C., but three years later (238 B.C.) on the invitation of the Carthaginian mercenaries stationed in the islands, a Roman force occupied them; Carthage protested, but, on the Romans threatening war, she gave way, and Sardinia and Corsica were formally ceded to Rome, though it was some seven or eight years before all resistance on the part of the natives themselves was crushed. In 227 B.C., however, the senate considered matters ripe for the establishment of a separate and settled government, not only in Sardinia and Corsica, but also in Sicily. In that year two additional prætors were elected; to one was assigned the charge of western Sicily, to the other that of Sardinia and Corsica,² and thus the first stones of the Roman provincial system were laid. Of at least equal importance for the security of the peninsula was the subjugation of the Keltic tribes in the valley of the Po. These, headed by the Boii and Insubres and assisted by levies from the Kelts to the westward, had in 225 B.C. alarmed the whole of Italy

Annexation
of Sardinia
and Corsica.
The first
Roman
provinces.

513 A.U.C.
516 A.U.C.
527 A.U.C.

Subjugation
of the Boii
and Insubres
in N. Italy.

529 A.U.C.

¹ Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsver.*, i, 92; Mommsen, *R. G.*, i, 543; Appian, *Sic.*, 2.

² Livy, *Epit.*, xx.

by invading Etruria and penetrating to Clusium, only three days' journey from Rome. Here, however, their courage seems to have failed them. They retreated northward along the Etruscan coast, until at Telamon their way was barred by the Roman legions, returning from Sardinia to the defence of Rome, while a second consular army hung upon their rear. Thus hemmed in, the Kelts fought desperately, but were completely defeated and the flower of their tribesmen slain. The Romans followed up their success by invading the Keltic territory. The Boii were easily reduced to submission. The Insubres, north of the Po, resisted more obstinately, but by 222 B.C. the war was over, and all the tribes in the rich Po valley acknowledged the supremacy of Rome. The conquered Kelts were not enrolled among the Italian allies of Rome, but were treated as subjects beyond the frontier. Three colonies were founded to hold them in check—Placentia and Cremona in the territory of the Insubres, Mutina in that of the Boii; and the great northern road (Via Flaminia) was completed as far as the Keltic border at Ariminum.

The Via
Flaminia.

Chastisement
of the Illyrian
pirates.
Rome and
Greece.
525 A. U. C.

On the Adriatic coast, where there was no Carthage to be feared, and no important adjacent islands to be annexed, the immediate interests of Rome were limited to rendering the sea safe for Italian trade. It was with this object that, in 229 B.C., the first Roman expedition crossed the Adriatic, and inflicted severe chastisement on the Illyrian pirates

of the opposite coast.¹ But the results of the expedition did not end here, for it was the means of establishing for the first time direct political relations between Rome and the states of Greece proper, to many of which the suppression of piracy in the Adriatic was of as much importance as to Rome herself. Alliances were concluded with Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Apollonia; and embassies explaining the reasons which had brought Roman troops into Greece were sent to the Ætolians, the Achæans, and even to Athens and Corinth. Everywhere they were well received, and the admission of the Romans to the Isthmian games² (228 B.C.) formally acknowledged them as the natural allies of the free Greek states against both barbarian tribes and foreign despots, a relationship which was destined to prove as useful to Rome in the East as it had already proved itself to be in the West.

526 A.U.C.

While Rome was thus fortifying herself on all sides, Carthage had acquired a possession which promised to compensate her for the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. The genius of her greatest citizen and soldier Hamilcar Barca, had appreciated the enormous value of the Spanish peninsula, and conceived the scheme of founding there a Carthaginian dominion which should not only add to the wealth of Carthage, but supply her with troops, and with a base of operations for that war of revenge with Rome on which his heart was set. The conquest of southern and eastern

The Carthaginians in Spain.

¹ Polyb., ii., 8 *sq.*

² Polyb., ii., 12.

518-536 A.U.C. Spain, begun by Hamilcar (236-228 B.C.), and carried on by his kinsman Hasdrubal 536-533 A.U.C. (228-221 B.C.), was completed by his son Hannibal, who, with all his father's genius inherited also his father's hatred of Rome, and by 219 535 A.U.C. B.C. the authority of Carthage had been extended as far as the Ebro. Rome had not watched this rapid advance without anxiety, but, probably owing to her troubles with the Kelts, she had contented herself with stipulating (226 B.C.) 538 A.U.C. that Carthage should not carry her arms beyond the Ebro, so as to threaten Rome's ancient ally, the Greek colony Massilia, and with securing the independence of the two nominally Greek communities, Emporiæ and Saguntum,¹ on the east coast.

But these precautions were of no avail against the resolute determination of Hannibal, with whom the conquest of Spain was only preliminary to an attack upon Italy, and who could not afford to leave behind him in Spain a state allied to Rome. In 535 A.U.C. 219 B.C., therefore, disregarding the protest of a Roman embassy, he attacked and took Saguntum, an act which, as he had foreseen, rendered a rupture with Rome inevitable, while it set his own hands free for a further advance.

A second war with Carthage was no unlooked-for event at Rome; but the senate seems to have confidently expected that it would be waged at a distance from Italy—in Africa and in Spain, where Saguntum would have given them a convenient point of support; and to

Second Punic War. 218-201 B.C. = 536-533 A.U.C.

¹ Livy, xxi., 2, 5; Polyb., iii., 15, 31.

this hope they clung even after Saguntum was lost. In 218 B.C., the first year of the war, one consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, was despatched ^{536 A.U.C.} to Spain, and the other T. Sempronius Gracchus, to Sicily, and thence to Africa. But Hannibal's secrecy and promptitude baffled all their calculations. Leaving New Carthage early in 218 B.C., in the space of five months he crossed the Pyrenees, reached the Rhone just as Scipio arrived at Massilia on his way to Spain, passed the Alps in spite of endless difficulties and hardships, and startled Italy by descending into the plains of Cisalpine ^{Hannibal} Gaul. In two battles on the Ticinus and the Trebia he defeated the forces hastily collected to bar his progress southwards; the Keltic tribes rallied to his standard; and at the beginning of the next year he prepared to realise the dream of his life and carry fire and sword into Italy itself. His own force numbered 26,000 men; the total available strength of Rome and her allies was estimated at over 700,000.¹ But Hannibal's hope lay in the possibility that by the rapidity of his movements he might be able to strike a decisive blow before Rome could mobilise her levies, or get her somewhat cumbrous military machinery into working order. From a first success he expected no less a result than the break-up of the Roman confederacy, and the isolation of Rome herself, while it would also increase the readiness of his

¹ Polybius (ii., 24 sq.) enumerates the forces of Rome and her allies at the time of the Keltic invasion of 225 B.C. For a criticism of his account, see Mommsen, *R. Forsch.*, ii., 398; Beloch, *Ital. Bund*, 80. For Hannibal's force see Polyb., iii., 35, 56.

own government to render him effective support. His trust in himself and his army was not misplaced, for to the last he had the advantage over the Roman legions wherever he met them in person. Except, however, in South Italy, his brilliant victories and dashing marches brought him no allies, and it was his inability to shake the loyalty of northern and central Italy and of the Latin colonies everywhere, even more than the indomitable perseverance of Rome and the supineness of Carthage, which caused his ultimate failure.

In the spring of 217 B.C. Hannibal crossed the Apennines and marched southwards through the

lowlands of eastern Etruria, the route taken before him by the Keltic hordes.

In April he annihilated Flaminius and his army at the Trasimene Lake,¹ and pushed on to Spoletium, only a few days' march from Rome. But Rome was not yet his goal; from Spoletium, which had closed its gates against him, he moved rapidly eastward, ravaging the territories of Roman allies as he went, till he reached the Adriatic and the fertile lands of northern Apulia, where supplies and especially remounts for his Numidian cavalry² were plentiful, communication with Carthage easy, and where, moreover, he was well placed for testing the fidelity of the most recent and the least trustworthy of the Italian allies of Rome. A second victory here, on the scale of that at the Trasimene Lake,

¹ For the date see Ovid, *Fast.*, vi., 765; Weissenborn on Livy xxii., 5; Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 594.

² Livy, xxiv., 20.

might be the signal for a general revolt against Roman rule. It was not, however, until the summer of the next year that his opportunity came. The patient tactics of Q. Fabius Cunctator had become unpopular at Rome ; and the consuls of 216 B.C., L. Æmilius Paulus and C. Terentius Varro, took the field in Apulia, at the head of a larger force than Rome had yet raised, and with orders to fight and crush the daring invader. The result realised for the moment Hannibal's highest hopes. The Roman army was annihilated at Cannæ ; and South Italy, with the exception of the Latin colonies and the Greek cities on the coast, came over to his side. Nor did the Roman misfortunes end here. Philip of Macedon concluded an alliance with Hannibal (215 B.C.), and threatened an invasion of Italy. In the very next year, Syracuse, no longer ruled by the faithful Hiero, revolted, and a Carthaginian force landed in Sicily ; lastly, in 212 B.C. came the loss of the Greek cities on the south coast. But the truth of Polybius's remark, that the Romans are most to be feared when their danger is greatest, was never better illustrated than by their conduct in the face of these accumulated disasters. Patiently and undauntedly they set themselves to regain the ground they had lost. Philip of Macedon was first of all forced to retire from the allied city of Apollonia which he had attacked (214 B.C.), and then effectually diverted from all thoughts of an attack on Italy by the formation of a coalition against him in

Battle of
Cannæ.
Revolt of
South Italy
and of Syra-
cuse from
Rome.
538 A. U. C.

539 A. U. C.

542 A. U. C.

549 A. U. C.

Greece itself (211 B.C.); Syracuse was recaptured in 212 B.C. after a lengthy siege, and Roman authority re-established in Sicily. In Italy itself the Roman commanders took advantage of Hannibal's absence in the extreme south to reconquer northern Apulia; but their main efforts were directed to the recovery of Campania, and above all of Capua. The imminent danger of this town, which he had named as the successor of Rome in the headship of Italy, recalled Hannibal from the south, where he was besieging a Roman garrison in the citadel of Tarentum. Failing to break through the lines which enclosed it, he resolved, as a last hope of diverting the Roman legions from the devoted city, to advance on Rome itself. But his march, deeply as it impressed the imagination of his contemporaries by its audacity and promptitude, was without result. Silently and rapidly he moved along the course of the Latin Way, through the heart of the territory of Rome, to within three miles of the city, and even rode up with his advanced guard to the Collina gate. Yet no ally joined him; no Roman force was recalled to face him; no proposals for peace reached his camp; and, overcome, it is said, by the unmoved confidence of his foe, he withdrew, as silently and rapidly as he had advanced, to his headquarters in the south. The fall of Capua followed inevitably (211 B.C.),¹ and the

Siege and re-capture of Syracuse.
543, 542
A.U.C.

Recovery of Capua.
543 A.U.C.

¹ Livy, xxvi., 16, 33, gives the sentence passed on Capua: "*Agri omnis et tecta publica P. R. facta, habitari tantum tanquam urbem, corpus nullum civitatis esse.*" For the condition of Capua subsequently, see Cic., *L. Agr.*, i., 6; compare *C. I. L.*, 566 sq.

Roman senate saw with relief the seat of war removed to Lucania and Bruttium, and a prospect opening of some relief from the exhausting exertions of the last five years. Their hopes were quickly dashed to the ground. The faithful Massiliots sent word that Hasdrubal, beaten in Spain, was marching to join Hannibal in Italy. Defeat of Hasdrubal at the river Metaurus. The anxiety at Rome was intense, and every nerve was strained to prevent the junction of the two brothers. Equally great was the relief when the news arrived that the bold march of the consul Claudius had succeeded, and that Hasdrubal had been defeated and slain on the river Metaurus (207 B.C.). 547 A.U.C. The war in Italy was now virtually ended, for, though during four years more Hannibal stood at bay in a corner of Bruttium, he was powerless to prevent the restoration of Roman authority throughout the peninsula. Sicily was once more secure; and finally in 206 B.C., 548 A.U.C. the year after the victory on the Metaurus, the successes of the young P. Scipio in Spain (211-206 B.C.) were crowned by the complete Expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain. 549-548 A.U.C. expulsion of the Carthaginians from the peninsula. Nothing now remained to Carthage outside Africa but the ground on which Hannibal desperately held out, and popular opinion at Rome warmly supported Scipio when on his return from Spain he eagerly urged an immediate invasion of Africa. The senate hesitated. Many were jealous of Scipio's fame, and resented his scarcely concealed intention of appealing to the people, should the senate decline his proposals.

Others, like the veteran Q. Fabius, thought the attempt hazardous, with exhausted resources, and while Hannibal was still on Italian soil. But Scipio gained the day. He was elected consul 205 B.C., and given the province of Sicily, with permission to cross into Africa if he thought fit. Voluntary contributions of men, money, and supplies poured in to the support of the popular hero ; and by the end of 205 B.C. Scipio had collected in Sicily a sufficient force for his purpose.

Invasion of Africa by Scipio.
549 A.U.C.

In 204 B.C. he crossed to Africa, where he was welcomed by the Numidian prince Masinissa, whose friendship he had made in Spain.

551 A.U.C.

In 203 B.C. he twice defeated the Carthaginian forces, and a large party at Carthage were anxious to accept his offer of negotiations. But the advocates of resistance triumphed. Hannibal was recalled from Italy, and with him his brother Mago, who had made a last desperate attempt to create a diversion in Italy by landing in Liguria. Mago died on the voyage, but Hannibal returned to fight his last battle against Rome at Zama, where Scipio, who had been continued in command as proconsul for 202 B.C. by a special vote of the people, won a complete victory. The war was over. The Roman assembly gladly voted that the Carthaginian request for peace should be granted, and intrusted the settlement of the terms to its favourite Scipio and a commission of ten senators. Carthage was allowed to retain her own territory in Africa intact ; but she undertook to wage no wars outside Africa, and none inside without

Battle of Zama.
553 A.U.C.

the consent of Rome. She surrendered all her ships but ten triremes, her elephants, and all prisoners of war. Finally she agreed to pay an indemnity of 10,000 talents in fifty years. Masinissa was rewarded by an increase of territory, and was enrolled among the "allies and friends" of the Roman people.¹

The battle of Zama decided the fate of the West. The power of Carthage was broken, and her supremacy passed by the right of conquest to Rome. Henceforth Rome had no rival to fear westward of Italy, and it rested with herself to settle within what limits her supremacy should be confined, and what form it should take. The answer to both these questions was largely determined for her by circumstances. For the next fifty years Rome was too deeply involved in the affairs of the East to think of extending her rule far beyond the limits of the rich inheritance which had fallen to her by the defeat of Carthage; and it was not until 125 B.C. that she commenced a fresh career of conquest in the West by invading Transalpine Gaul. But within this area considerable advance was made in the organisation and consolidation of her rule. The rate of progress was indeed unequal. In the case of Sicily and Spain, the immediate establishment of a Roman government was imperatively necessary, if these possessions were not either to fall a prey to internal anarchy, or be recovered for Carthage by some second Hamilcar. Accordingly, we find that in Sicily the former dominions

The West
under Ro-
man rule.

609 A. U. C.

Sicily and
Spain.

¹ Livy, xxx., 43; Polyb. xv., 18.

of Hiero were at once united with the western half of the island as a single province, under the rule of a Roman prætor (201 B.C.),¹ and that in Spain, after nine years of a provisional government (206-197 B.C.), two provinces were in 197 B.C.² definitely established, and each, like Sicily, assigned to one of the prætors for the year, two additional prætors being elected for the purpose. But here the resemblance between the two cases ends. From 201 B.C. down to the outbreak of the Slave war in 136 B.C. there was unbroken peace in Sicily, and its part in the history is limited to its important functions in supplying Rome with corn and in provisioning and clothing the Roman legions.³ It became every year a more integral part of Italy; and a large proportion even of the land itself passed gradually into the hands of enterprising Roman speculators. The governors of the two Spains had very different work to do from that which fell to the lot of the Sicilian prætors. Although the coast towns readily acquiesced in Roman rule, the restless warlike tribes of the interior were in a constant state of ferment, which from time to time broke out into open revolt. In Sicily the ordinary prætorian authority, with at most a few cohorts, was sufficient, but the condition of Spain required that year after

¹ Livy, xxvi., 40. The union was apparently effected in 210; but the first prætor of all Sicily was sent there in 201.

² Livy, xxxii., 27; cf. Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 100, and Hübnert in *Hermes*, i., 105 sq.

³ Livy, xxvii., 5, "*pace ac bello fidissimum annonæ subsidium*"; cf. xxxii., 27.

year the prætor should be armed with the consular authority, and backed by a standing force of four legions, while more than once the presence of the consuls themselves was found necessary. Still, in spite of all difficulties, the work of pacification proceeded. To the elder Cato (consul 195 559 A.U.C. B.C.), and to Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (prætor and proprætor 180-179 B.C.), 574-575 A.U.C. father of the two tribunes, is mainly due the credit of quieting the Celtiberian tribes of central Spain; and the government of Gracchus was followed by thirty years of comparative tranquillity. The insurrection headed by Viriathus in 149 605 A.U.C. B.C. was largely caused by the exactions of the Roman magistrates themselves, while its obstinate continuance down to the capture of Numantia in 133 B.C., was almost 621 A.U.C. as much the result of the incapacity of the Roman commanders. But the re-settlement of the country by Scipio Africanus the younger in that year left all Spain, with the exception of the highland Astures and Cantabri in the north-west, finally and tranquilly subject to Rome. Meanwhile the disturbed state of the interior had not prevented the spread of Roman civilisation on the seaboard. Roman traders and speculators flocked to the seaport towns and spread inland. The mines became centres of Roman industry; the Roman legionaries quartered in Spain year after year married Spanish wives, and when their service was over gladly settled down in Spain, in preference to returning to Italy. The first Roman communities established outside Italy were both

planted in Spain, and both owed their existence to the Roman legions.¹ Spain even in 133 B.C. gave promise of becoming in time "more Roman than Rome itself."

In Africa there was no question at first of the introduction of Roman government by the formation of a province. Carthage, bound hand and foot by the treaty of 201 B.C., was placed under the jealous watch of the loyal prince of Numidia, who himself willingly acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome. But it was impossible for this arrangement to be permanent. Every symptom of reviving prosperity at Carthage was regarded at Rome with feverish anxiety, and neither the expulsion of Hannibal in 195 B.C. nor his death in 183 B.C. did much to check the growing conviction that Rome would never be secure while her rival existed. It was therefore with grim satisfaction that many in the Roman senate watched the increasing irritation of the Carthaginians under the harassing raids and encroachments of their favoured neighbour, Masinissa, and waited for the moment when Carthage should, by some breach of the conditions imposed upon her, supply Rome with a pretext for interference. At last in 151 B.C. came the news that Carthage, in defiance of treaty obligations, was actually at war with Masinissa. The anti-Carthaginian party in the senate, headed by M. Porcius Cato, eagerly seized the opportunity; in spite of the protests of Scipio Nasica and others, war was de-

Africa—
third Punic
war.
153-146 B.C.
=608 A.U.C.

195 A.U.C.
183 A.U.C.

603 A.U.C.

¹ Italica (206), Appian, *Her.*, 38; Carteia (171), Livy, *xliii.*, 3.

clared, and nothing short of the destruction of their city itself was demanded from the despairing Carthaginians. This demand, as the senate, no doubt, foresaw, was refused, and in 149 B.C. the siege of Carthage began. During the next two years little progress was made, but in 147 P. Cornelius Scipio Æmilianus, son of L. Æmilius ^{607 A.U.C.} Paulus, conqueror of Macedonia, and grandson by adoption of the conqueror of Hannibal, was, at the age of thirty-seven, and though only a candidate for the ædileship, elected consul and given the command in Africa. In the next year (146 B.C.) ^{608 A.U.C.} Carthage was taken and razed to the ground. Its territory became the Roman province of Africa, while Numidia, now ruled by the three sons of Masinissa, remained as an allied state under Roman suzerainty, and served to protect the new province against the raids of the desert tribes. Within little more than a century from the commencement of the first Punic war, the whole of the former dominions of Carthage had been brought under the direct rule of Roman magistrates, and were regularly organised as Roman provinces.

In Italy itself the Hannibalic war was inevitably followed by important changes, and these changes were, naturally enough, in the direction of an increased Roman predominance. In ^{Italy.} the north the Keltic tribes paid for their sympathy with Hannibal with the final loss of all separate political existence. Cispadane Gaul, studded with colonies and flooded with Roman settlers, was rapidly Romanised. Beyond the Po in Polybius's time,

about sixty years after the Hannibalic war, Roman civilisation was already widely spread. In the extreme north-east, the Latin colony of Aquileia, the last of its kind, was founded in 181 B.C., to hold in check the Alpine tribes, while in the north-west the Ligurians, though not finally subdued until a later time, were held in check by the colony of Luna (180 B.C.), and by the extensive settlements of Roman citizens and Latins made on Ligurian territory in 173 B.C.¹ In southern Italy the effects of the war were not less marked. The depression of the Greek cities on the coast, begun by the raids of the Sabellian tribes, was completed by the repeated blows inflicted upon them during the Hannibalic struggle. Some of them lost territory²; all suffered from a decline of population and loss of trade; and their place was taken by such new Roman settlements as Brundisium and Puteoli.³ In the interior the southern Sabellian tribes suffered scarcely less severely. The Bruttii were struck off the list of Roman allies, and nearly all their territory was confiscated.⁴ To the Apulians and Lucanians no such hard measure was meted out; but their strength had been broken by the war, and their numbers dwin-

¹ Livy, xlii., 4.

² *E.g.*, Tarentum, Livy, xliv., 16. A Roman colony was established at Croton in 194, and a Latin colony (Copia) at Thurii in 193 (Livy, xxxiv., 45, 53).

³ Brundisium was established after the first Punic war. Puteoli was fortified during the second Punic war, and became a Roman colony in 194 (Livy, xxxiv., 45).

⁴ Appian, *Hann.*, 61; Gell., x., 3.

dled; large tracts of land in their territories were seized by Rome and allotted to Roman settlers, or occupied by Roman speculators. That Etruria also suffered from declining energy, a dwindling population, and the spread of large estates is clear from the state of things existing there in 133 B.C. ^{621 A. U. C.} It was indeed in central Italy, the home of the Latins and their nearest kinsmen, and in the new Latin and Roman settlements throughout the peninsula, that progress and activity were henceforth concentrated, and even within this area the Roman, and not the strictly Latin, element tended to preponderate. Of the twenty colonies ^{353-608 A. U. C.} founded between 201 B.C. and 146 B.C. only four were Latin.

CHAPTER II.

ROME AND THE EAST—200—133 B.C.

EVER since the repulse of Pyrrhus from Italy, Rome had been slowly drifting into closer contact with the Eastern states. With one of the three great powers which had divided between them the empire of Alexander, with Egypt, she had formed an alliance in 273 B.C., and the alliance had been cemented by the growth of commercial intercourse between the two countries.¹ In 228 B.C. her chastisement of the Illyrian pirates had led naturally enough to the establishment of friendly relations with some of the states of Greece proper. Further than this, Rome for the time showed no desire to go. The connections already formed were sufficient to open the eastern ports to her trade, and the engrossing struggle with Carthage left her neither leisure nor strength for active interference in the incessant feuds and rivalries which had made up Eastern politics since the falling asunder of Alexander's Empire. In 214 B.C.

¹ Egypt had supplied corn to Italy during the second Punic war (Polyb., ix., 44).

the alliance between Philip and Hannibal, and the former's threatened attack on Italy, forced her into war with Macedon; but even then she contented herself with heading a coalition of the Greek states against him, which effectually frustrated his designs against herself; and at the first opportunity (205 B.C.) she ended the war by a peace which left the position unchanged. Yet the war had important consequences; it not only drew closer the ties which bound Rome to the Greek states, but inspired the senate with a genuine dread of Philip's restless ambition, and with a bitter resentment against him for his union with Hannibal. The events of the next four years served to deepen both these feelings. In 205 B.C. Philip entered into a compact with Antiochus of Syria for the partition between them of the dominions of Egypt,¹ now left by the death of Ptolemy Philopator to the rule of a boy king. Antiochus was to take Cœle-Syria and Phœnicia, while Philip claimed for his share the district subject to Egypt on the coasts of the Ægean and the Greek Islands. Philip no doubt hoped to be able to secure these unlawful acquisitions before the close of the second Punic war should set Rome free to interfere with his plans. But the obstinate resistance offered by Attalus of Pergamum and the Rhodians upset his calculations. In 201 B.C. Rome made peace with Carthage, and the senate had leisure to listen to the urgent appeal for assistance which reached her from her East-

First Macedonian war.
540 A. U. C.

549 A. U. C.

549 A. U. C.

553 A. U. C.

¹ Polyb., iii., 2, xv., 20; Livy, xxxi., 14.

ern allies. With Antiochus, indeed, the senate was not yet prepared to quarrel; and though Egypt was assured of the continued friendship of Rome, Antiochus was allowed to work his will in Cœle-Syria.¹ With Philip it is clear that the senate had no thoughts of a peaceful settlement. Their animosity against him had been deepened by the assistance he had recently rendered to Carthage. Always an unsafe and turbulent neighbour, he would, if allowed to become supreme in the Ægean, prove as dangerous to her interests in the East as Carthage had been in the West; nor, lastly, could Rome, in honour, look quietly on at the ill-treatment of states, which, as Greeks and as allies of her own, had a double claim on her protection. To cripple, or at least to stay the growth of Philip's power was in the eyes of the senate a necessity; but it was only by representing a Macedonian invasion of Italy as imminent that they persuaded the assembly, which was longing for peace, to pass a declaration of war² (200 B.C.), an ostensible pretext for which was found in the invasion by Macedonian troops of the territory of Rome's ally, Athens.

554 A.U.C.

The war commenced in the summer of 200 B.C.; and, though the landing of the Roman legions in Epirus was not followed, as had been hoped, by any general rising against Philip, yet the latter had soon to discover that his allies, if they were not enthusiastic for Rome, were still less inclined actively to assist

Second
Macedonian
war.
200-197 B.C.
= 554-557
A.U.C.

¹ Livy, xxxiii., 19.

² Livy, xxxi., 6, 7.

himself. Neither by force nor diplomacy could he make any progress south of Bœotia. The fleets of Pergamum and Rhodes, now the zealous allies of Rome, protected Attica and watched the eastern coasts. The Achæans and Nabis of Sparta were obstinately neutral, while nearer home in the north the Epirots and Ætoliens threatened Thessaly and Macedonia. His own resources both in men and in money had been severely strained by his constant wars,¹ and the only ally who could have given him effective assistance, Antiochus, was fully occupied with the conquest of Cœle-Syria. It is no wonder, then, that, in spite of his dashing generalship and high courage, he made but a brief stand. T. Quinctius Flamininus (consul 198 B.C.), in his first year of command, defeated him on the Aous, drove him back to the pass of ⁵⁹⁶ A.U.C. Tempe, and in the next year utterly routed him at Cynoscephalæ. Almost at the same moment the Achæans, who had now joined Rome, took Corinth, and the Rhodians defeated his troops in Caria.² Further resistance was impossible; Philip submitted, and early the next year a Roman commission reached Greece with instructions to arrange terms of peace. These were such as effectually secured Rome's main object in the war, the removal of all danger to herself and her allies from Macedonian aggression.³ Philip was left in possession of his kingdom, but was degraded to the rank of a second-rate power, deprived of all possessions in Greece,

¹ Livy, xxxiii., 3.

² Livy, xxxiii., 17.

³ Polyb., xviii., 44-7; Livy, xxxiii., 30-4.

Thrace, and Asia Minor, and forbidden, as Carthage had been in 201 B.C., to wage war without the consent of Rome, whose ally and friend he now became. Macedon thus weakened could no longer be formidable, but might yet be useful, not only as a barrier against Thracians and Kelts,¹ but as a check upon anti-Roman intrigues in Greece.

The second point in the settlement now effected by Rome was the liberation of the Greeks. The "freedom of Greece" was proclaimed at the Isthmian games amid an outburst of enthusiasm,² which reached its height when two years later (194 B.C.) Flamininus withdrew his troops from the "three fetters of Greece"—Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth.³ There is no reason to doubt that, in acting thus, not only Flamininus himself, but the senate and people at home, were influenced, partly at any rate, by feelings of genuine sympathy with the Greeks and reverence for their past. It is equally clear that no other course was open to them. For Rome to have annexed Greece, as she had annexed Sicily and Spain, would have been a flagrant violation of the pledges she had repeatedly given both before and during the war; the attempt would have excited the fiercest opposition, and would probably have thrown the Asiatic as well as the European Greeks into the arms of

¹ Polyb., xviii., 37.

² Livy. xxxiii., 32, 33.

³ Livy, xxxiv., 48-52.

Antiochus. But a friendly and independent Greece would be at once a check on Macedon, a barrier against aggression from the East, and a promising field for Roman commerce. Nor while liberating the Greeks did Rome abstain from such arrangements as seemed necessary to secure the predominance of her own influence. In the Peloponnese, for instance, the Achæans were rewarded by considerable accessions of territory; and it is possible that the Greek states, as allies of Rome, were expected to refrain from war upon each other without her consent. The failure of the policy, after all, was due to the impracticability of the Greeks, and the intensity of their civic and tribal feuds. To suppose as some have done that Rome intended it to fail is to attribute to the statesmen of the generation of Scipio and Flamininus even more than the cynicism of the time of L. Mummius.¹

Antiochus III. of Syria, Philip's accomplice in the proposed partition of the dominions of their common rival, Egypt, returned from the conquest of Cœle-Syria (198 B.C.) to learn first of all that Philip was hard pressed by the Romans, and shortly afterwards that he had been decisively beaten at Cyncephalæ. It was already too late to assist his former ally, but Antiochus resolved at any rate to lose no

War with

Antiochus

198-189 B.C.

562-565 A.U.C.

556 A.U.C.

¹ For the conflicting views of moderns on the action of Rome, see Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 718; and on the other side, Ihne, *R. G.*, iii., 52-63, and C. Peter, *Studien zur Röm. Gesch.*, Halle, 1863 pp. 158 *sq.*

time in securing for himself the possessions of the Ptolemies in Asia Minor and in eastern Thrace, which Philip had claimed, and which Rome now pronounced free and independent. In 197-196 B.C. he overran Asia Minor and crossed into Thrace.¹ But Antiochus was pleasure-loving, irresolute, and above all no general, and it was not until 192 B.C. that the urgent entreaties of the Ætolians, and the withdrawal of the Roman troops from Greece, nerved him to the decisive step of crossing the Ægean; and even then the force he took with him was so small as to show that he completely failed to appreciate the nature of the task before him.² At Rome the prospect of a conflict with Antiochus excited great anxiety, and it was not until every resource of diplomacy had been exhausted that war was declared.³ At a distance, indeed, Antiochus, the great king, the lord of all the forces of Asia, seemed an infinitely more formidable opponent than their better-known neighbour Philip, and a war against the vaguely-known powers of the East a far more serious matter than a campaign in Thessaly. War, however, was unavoidable, unless Rome was to desert her Greek allies, and allow Antiochus to advance unopposed to the coasts of the Adriatic. And the war had no sooner commenced than the real weakness which lay behind the magnificent pretensions of the "king of kings" was revealed.

¹ Livy, xxxiii., 38; Polyb., xviii., 50.

² Livy, xxxv., 43.

³ Livy, xxxv., 20, xxxvi., i.

Had Antiochus acted with energy when in 192 B.C. he landed in Greece, he might have won the day before the Roman legions appeared. As it was, in spite of the warnings of Hannibal,¹ who was now in his camp, and of the Ætolians, he frittered away valuable time between his pleasures at Chalcis and useless attacks on petty Thessalian towns. In 191 B.C. Glabrio landed at the head of an imposing force; and a single battle at Thermopylæ broke the courage of Antiochus, who hastily recrossed the sea to Ephesus, leaving his Ætolian allies to their fate. But Rome could not pause here. The safety of her faithful allies, the Pergamenes and Rhodians, and of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, as well as the necessity of chastising Antiochus, demanded an invasion of Asia. A Roman fleet had already crossed the Ægean, and in concert with the fleets of Pergamum and Rhodes worsted the navy of Antiochus. In 190 B.C. the new consul, L. Scipio, accompanied by his famous brother, the conqueror of Hannibal, led the Roman legions for the first time into Asia. At Magnesia, near Mount Sipylus in Lydia, he met and defeated the motley and ill-disciplined hosts of the great king.² For the first time the West, under Roman leadership, successfully encountered the forces of the East, and the struggle began which lasted far on into the days of the emperors. The

¹ Livy, xxxvi., 11.

² Livy (xxxvii., 40) describes the composition of Antiochus's army.

Settlement of western Asia. terms of the peace which followed the victory at Magnesia tell their own story clearly enough. There was no question, any more than in Greece, of annexation; the main object in view was that of securing the predominance of Roman interests and influence throughout the peninsula of Asia Minor, and removing to a safe distance the only Eastern power which could be considered dangerous.¹ The line of the Halys and Taurus range, the natural boundaries of the peninsula eastward, was established as the boundary between Antiochus and the kingdoms, cities, and peoples now enrolled as the allies and friends of Rome. This line Antiochus was forbidden to cross; nor was he to send ships of war farther west than Cape Sarpedon in Cilicia. Immediately to the west of this frontier lay the small states of Bithynia and Paphlagonia and the immigrant Keltic Galatæ, and these frontier states, now the allies of Rome, served as a second line of defence against attacks from the east. The area lying between these "buffer states" and the Ægean was organised by Rome in such a way as should at once reward the fidelity of her allies and secure both her own paramount authority and her safety from foreign attack. Pergamum and Rhodes were so strengthened—the former by the gift of the Chersonese, Lycaonia, Phrygia, Mysia, and Lydia, the latter by that of Lycia and Caria—as not only amply to reward their loyalty, but to constitute them effective props of Roman interests and effective

¹ Livy, xxxvii., 55, xxxviii., 38; Polyb., xxi., 17

barriers alike against Thracian and Keltic raids in the north and against aggression by Syria in the south. Lastly, the Greek cities on the coast, except those already tributary to Pergamum, were declared free, and established as independent allies of Rome.

In a space of little over eleven years (200-189 B.C.) Rome had broken the power of Alexander's successors and established throughout the eastern Mediterranean a Roman protectorate. ⁵⁵⁴⁻⁵⁶⁵ A.U.C. It remained to be seen whether this protectorate could be maintained, or whether Rome would be driven to that policy of annexation which she had adopted from the first in Sicily and Spain.

It was in the western half of the protectorate in European Greece that the first steps in the direction of annexation were taken. The enthusiasm provoked by the liberation of the Greeks had died away, and its place had been taken by feelings of dissatisfied ambition or sullen resentment. Internecine feuds and economic distress had brought many parts of Greece to the verge of anarchy, and, above all, the very foundations of the settlement effected in 197 B.C. were threatened by the reviving power and aspirations of Macedon. ⁵⁵⁷ A.U.C. Loyally as Philip had aided Rome in the war with Antiochus, the peace of Magnesia brought him nothing but fresh humiliation. He was forced to abandon all hopes of recovering Thessaly, and he had the mortification to see the hated king of Pergamum installed almost on his borders as master of the Thracian Chersonese. Resistance at the time was unavailing,

Third Macedonian war.
171-168 B.C.
⁵⁸³⁻⁵⁸⁶ A.U.C.

⁵⁶⁵⁻⁵⁷⁵
A.U.C. but from 189 B.C. until his death (179 B.C.) he laboured patiently and quietly to increase the internal resources of his own kingdom,¹ and to foment, by dexterous intrigue, feelings of hostility to Rome among his Greek and barbarian neighbours. His successor, Perseus, his son by a left-handed alliance, continued his father's work. He made friends among the Illyrian and Thracian princes, connected himself by marriage with Antiochus IV. of Syria and with Prusias of Bithynia, and, among the Greek peoples, strove, not without success, to revive the memories of the past glories of Greece under the Macedonian leadership of the great Alexander.² The senate could no longer hesitate. They were well aware of the restlessness and discontent in Greece; and after hearing from Eumenes of Pergamum, and from their own officers, all details of Perseus's intrigues and preparations they declared war.³ The struggle, in spite of Perseus's courage and the incapacity at the outset of the Roman commanders, was short and decisive. The sympathy of the Greeks with Perseus, which had been encouraged by the hitherto passive attitude assumed by Rome, instantly evaporated on the news that the Roman legions were on their way to Greece. No assistance came from Prusias or Antiochus, and Perseus's only allies were the Thracian king Cotys and the Illyrian Genthius. The victory gained by L.

¹ Livy, xxxix., 24 ff.

² Livy, xlii., 5.

³ Livy, xlii., 19, 36.

Æmilius Paullus at Pydna (168 B.C.) ended the war.¹ Perseus became the prisoner of Rome, and as such died in Italy a few years later.² Rome had begun the war with the fixed resolution no longer of crippling but of destroying the Macedonian state. Perseus's repeated proposals for peace during the war had been rejected; and his defeat was followed by the final extinction of the kingdom of Philip and Alexander.³ Yet Macedonia, though it ceased to exist as a single state, was not definitely constituted a Roman province.⁴ On the contrary, the mistake was made of introducing some of the main principles of the provincial system—taxation, disarmament, and the isolation of the separate communities—without the addition of the element most essential for the maintenance of order—that of a resident Roman governor. The four petty republics now created were each autonomous, and each separated from the rest by the prohibition of *commercium* and *connubium*, but no central controlling authority was substituted for that of the Macedonian king. The inevitable result was confusion and disorder, resulting finally (149–146 B.C.) in the attempt of a pretender, Andriseus, who claimed to be a son of Perseus, to resuscitate the ancient monarchy.⁵ On his defeat

¹ Livy, xlv., 36–41; Plut., *Æmil.*, 15 sq.

² Diod., xxxi., 9; Livy, xlv., 42; Polyb., xxxvii., 16.

³ Livy, xlv., 9.

⁴ Livy, xlv., 17, 29; Plut., *Æmil.*, 28; Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 769; Ihne, *R. G.*, iii., 216; Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverw.*, i., 160.

⁵ Polyb., xxxvii., 2; Livy, *Epit.*, I.

Macedonia a
Roman pro-
vince.
608 A.U.C.

in 146 B.C. the senate hesitated no longer, and Macedonia became a Roman province, with a Roman magistrate at its head.¹

Affairs in
Greece.

565-587
A.U.C.

The results of the protectorate in Greece, if less dangerous to Roman supremacy, were quite as unfavourable to the maintenance of order. But from 189 B.C. to the defeat of Perseus in 167 B.C., no formal change of importance in the status of the Greek states was made by Rome. The senate, though forced year by year to listen to the mutual recriminations and complaints of rival communities and factions, contented itself as a rule with intervening just enough to remind the Greeks that their freedom was limited by the paramount authority of Rome, and to prevent any single state or confederacy from raising itself too far above the level of general weakness which it was the interest of Rome to maintain. After the victory at Pydna, however, the sympathy shown for Perseus, exaggerated as it seems to have been by the interested representations of the Romanising factions in the various states, was made the pretext for a more emphatic assertion of Roman ascendancy. All Greeks suspected of Macedonian leanings were removed to Italy, as hostages for the loyalty of the several communities,² and the real motive for the step was made clear by the exceptionally severe treatment of the Achæans,

¹ For the boundaries of the province, see Ptolemy, iii., 13; Marquardt, *loc. cit.*, 161.

² Livy, xlv., 31.

whose loyalty was not really doubtful, but whose growing power in the Peloponnese and growing independence of language had awakened alarm at Rome. A thousand of their leading men, among them the historian Polybius, were carried off to Italy. In Ætolia the Romans connived at the massacre by their so-called friends of five hundred of the opposite party. Acarnania was weakened by the loss of Leucas, while Athens was rewarded for her unambitious loyalty by the gift of Delos and Samos.

But this somewhat violent experiment only answered for a time. In 148 B.C. the Achæans rashly persisted, in spite of warnings, in attempting to compel Sparta by force of arms to submit to the league. When threatened by Rome with the loss of all that they had gained since Cynoscephalæ, they madly rushed into war.¹ They were easily defeated, and a "commission of ten," under the presidency of L. Mummius, was appointed by the senate thoroughly to resettle the affairs of Greece.² Corinth, by orders of the senate, was burnt to the ground, and its territory confiscated. Thebes and Chalcis were destroyed, and the walls of all towns which had shared in the last desperate outbreak were razed to the ground. All the existing confederacies were dissolved; no *commercium* was allowed between one community and another. Everywhere an aristocratic type of constitution, according to the invariable Roman prac-

Settlement
of Greece.
146 B. C.
608 A. U. C.

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, li., lii.

² Livy, *Epit.*, lii.; Polyb., xl., 9 *sq.*; Pausanias, vii., 16; Mommsen, *R. G.*, ii., 47 *sq.*

tice, was established, and the payment of a tribute imposed. Into Greece, as into Macedonia ⁵⁸⁷ A. U. C. in 167 B. C., the now familiar features of the provincial system were introduced—disarmament, isolation, and taxation. The Greeks were still nominally free, and no separate province with a governor of its own¹ was established, but the needed central control was provided by assigning to the neighbouring governor of Macedonia a general supervision over the affairs of Greece. From the Adriatic to the Ægean, and as far north as the river Drilo and Mount Scardus, the whole peninsula was now under direct Roman rule.²

Beyond the Ægean the Roman protectorate worked no better than in Macedonia and Greece, and the demoralising recriminations, quarrels, and disorders which flourished under its shadow were aggravated by its longer duration, and by the still more selfish view taken by Rome of the responsibilities connected with it.³ At one period indeed, after the battle of Pydna, it seemed as if the more vigorous, if harsh, system then initiated in Macedon and Greece was to be adopted farther east also. The levelling policy pursued towards Macedon and the

The Roman protectorate in Asia, 189-146 B. C. 585-608 A. U. C.

¹ Mommsen, *loc. cit.*, note; Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverw.*, i., 164 sq.; A. W. Zumpt, *Commentt. Epigraph.*, ii., 153.

² North of the Drilo, the former kingdom of Perseus's ally Genthius had been treated as Macedonia was in 167 (Livy, xlv., 26); cf. Zippel, *Röm. Herrschaft in Illyrien*, Leipsic, 1877. Epirus, which had been desolated after Pydna (Livy, xlv., 34), went with Greece; Marquardt, i., 164.

³ Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 771-780, ii., 50-67.

Achæans was applied with less justice to Rome's two faithful and favoured allies, Rhodes and Pergamum. The former had rendered themselves obnoxious to Rome by their independent tone, and still more by their power and commercial prosperity. On a charge of complicity with Perseus, they were threatened with war, and though this danger was averted¹ they were forced to exchange their equal alliance with Rome for one which placed them in close dependence upon her, and to resign the lucrative possessions in Lycia and Caria given them in 565 A.U.C. 189 B.C. Finally their commercial prosperity was ruined by the establishment of a free port at Delos, and by the short-sighted acquiescence of Rome in the raids of the Cretan pirates. With Eumenes of Pergamum no other fault could be found than that he was strong and successful; but this was enough. His brother Attalus was invited, but in vain, to become his rival. His turbulent neighbours, the Galatæ, were encouraged to harass him by raids. Pamphylia was declared independent, and favours were heaped upon Prusias of Bithynia. These and other annoyances and humiliations had the desired effect. Eumenes and his two successors—his brother and son, Attalus II. and Attalus III.—contrived, indeed, by studious humility and dextrous flattery to retain their thrones, but Pergamum ceased to be a powerful state, and its weakness, added to that of Rhodes, increased the prevalent disorder in Asia Minor. During the same period we have other indi-

¹ Livy, xlv., 20; Polyb., xxx., 5.

cations of a temporary activity on the part of Rome. The frontier of the protectorate was pushed forward to the confines of Armenia and to the upper Euphrates by alliances with the kings of Pontus and Cappadocia beyond the Halys. In Syria, on the death of Antiochus Epiphanes (164 B.C.), Rome intervened to place a minor, Antiochus Eupator, on the throne, under Roman guardianship. In 168 B.C. Egypt formally acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome, and in 163 B.C. the senate, in the exercise of this new authority, restored Ptolemy Philometor to his throne, but at the same time weakened his position by handing over Cyrene and Cyprus to his brother Euergetes.

This display of energy, however, was short-lived. From the death of Eumenes in 159 B.C. down to 133 B.C. Rome, secure in the absence of any formidable power in the East, and busy with affairs in Macedonia, Africa, and Spain, relapsed into an inactivity the disastrous results of which revealed themselves in the next period in the rise of Mithradates of Pontus, the spread of Cretan and Cilician piracy, and the advance of Parthia. To the next period also belongs the conversion on the death of Attalus III. of the kingdom of Pergamum into the Roman province of Asia.

Both the western and eastern Mediterranean now acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome, but her relations with the two were from the first different. The West fell to her as the prize of victory over Carthage, and, the Carthaginian power broken, there was no

MAP II.



To face Page

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hindrance to the immediate establishment in Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and finally in Africa, of direct Roman rule. To the majority, moreover, of her western subjects she brought a civilisation as well as a government of a higher type than any before known to them. And so in the West she not only formed provinces, but created a new and wider Roman world. To the East, on the contrary, she came as the liberator of the Greeks; and it was only slowly that in this part of the empire her provincial system made way. In the East, moreover, the older civilisation she found there obstinately held its ground. Her proconsuls governed and her legions protected the Greek communities, but to the last the East remained in language, manners, and thought Greek and not Roman.



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CHAPTER III.

THE ROMAN STATE AND PEOPLE DURING THE PERIOD OF THE GREAT WARS.

AT the close of a century first of deadly struggle and then of rapid and dazzling success, Rome found herself the supreme power in the civilised world. "By all men," says Polybius, writing at the end of this period, "it was taken for granted that nothing remained but to obey the commands of the Romans." We have now to consider how this period of conflict and conquest had affected the victorious state.

Outwardly the constitution underwent but little change. It continued to be in form a moderate democracy. The sovereignty of the people finally established by the Hortensian law remained untouched in theory. It was by the people in assembly that the magistrates of the year were elected,¹ and that laws were passed²; only by "order

¹ Cic., *Leg. Agr.*, ii., 7. 17, "*omnes potestates, imperia, curationes, ab universo populo Romano proficisci convenit.*"

² Cic., *Pro Flacco*, vii., "*qua scisceret plebs, aut qua populus juberet; summota contione, distributis partibus, tributim et centurariim juberi vetarique voluerunt.*"

of the people" could capital punishment be inflicted upon a Roman citizen. For election to a magistracy, or for a seat in the senate, patrician and plebeian were equally eligible.¹ But between the theory and the practice of the constitution there was a wide difference. Throughout this period the actually sovereign authority in Rome was that of the senate, and behind the senate stood an order of nobles (*nobiles*), who claimed and enjoyed privileges as wide as those which immemorial custom had formerly conceded to the patriciate. The ascendancy of the senate, which thus arrested the march of democracy in Rome, was not, to any appreciable extent, the result of legislation. It was the direct outcome of the practical necessities of the time, and when these no longer existed, it was at once and successfully challenged in the name and on the behalf of the constitutional rights of the people.

The ascendancy of the senate.

Nevertheless, from the commencement of the Punic wars down to the moment when with the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. Rome's only rival disappeared, this ascendancy was complete and almost unquestioned. It was within the walls of the senate-house, and by decrees of the senate, that the foreign and the

Senate and assembly.

¹ A few priestly offices were still confined to patricians, *e. g.* those of the *rex sacrorum* and the *flamen dialis*. The first plebeian *curio maximus* was elected in 209 B.C. Only a patrician could fill the occasional office of *interrex*. On the other hand, no patrician could hold a plebeian magistracy (tribune or *ædile of the plebs*). Mommsen, *Röm. Forsch.*, i., 77-127.

domestic policy of the state were alike determined. It is true that the rights of a magistrate to propose, and of the people to pass, any measure, were never formally restricted. But, in the first place, it became an understood thing that a magistrate should not bring any proposal before the assembly, except with the approval, and by the direction of the senate; and the initiative thus conceded to the senate was before long claimed as a right. The action of the

522 A.U.C. tribune C. Flaminius (232 B.C.), in carrying an agrarian law in the teeth of the "senate's authority,"¹ and that of the prætor M.

527 A.U.C. Juventius Thalna (167 B.C.), in submitting the question of war with Rhodes to the assembly without having previously consulted the senate,² were condemned as dangerous and unprecedented. In the second place, there was an increasing tendency on the part of the magistrates to refer to the assembly only in those cases where the authority of the people was constitutionally necessary. In other cases, and even in some where a reference to the people had been previously customary, it was the senate alone that was consulted, and it was by a simple decree of the senate that the point was settled. Thus the prolongation of a magistrate's command (*prorogatio imperii*), though at the time of the Samnite wars it was held to require an order of the people, was during the Punic wars and afterwards effected as a rule by decree of

¹ Polyb., ii., 21; Cic. *De Senect.*, iv.

² Livy, xlv., 21, "*novo maloque exemplo rem ingressus erat quod non ante consulto senatu . . . rogationem ferret.*"

the senate alone.¹ Though a treaty could only be ratified or war declared by the people,² it was in the senate that the terms of peace were settled, and that audience was given to foreign ambassadors. It was the senate which made alliances,³ regulated the yearly levies of troops,⁴ decreed the annexation of provinces, and laid down the lines on which they should be governed.⁵ In matters of finance its authority was equally great. The control of the supplies, the most powerful weapon that a popular assembly can wield, was wielded at Rome, not by the people, but by the senate. To quote Polybius, "the senate was master alike of all the income and of all the expenditure of the State."⁶ Lastly, in the various departments of domestic administration, it was to the senate, rather than to the people that questions of difficulty or importance were referred.⁷

This monopoly of government by the senate, to the exclusion of the people, was accompanied by a change in the relations of the senate with the magistrates. The latter, from being Senate and magistrates. its superiors, became its subordinates, seeking its

¹ For the older practice, see Livy, viii., 23; for the later, Livy, xxvi., 1, xxx., 27, etc. Polybius (vi., 15) expressly includes the prorogation of a command among the prerogatives of the senate.

² Polyb., vi., 14; Livy, xxi., 18; Sall., *Jug.*, 39.

³ Polyb., vi., 13; Livy, xliii., 6.

⁴ Livy, xxiv., 11, "*de republica belloque gerendo et quantum copiarum et ubi quaque essent consules ad senatum rettulerunt.*"

⁵ Compare the decree as to Macedonia, Livy, xlv., 17, 18.

⁶ Polyb., vi., 13; Cic. *In Vatinius*, xliii., 36.

⁷ *E. g.* the prevalence of foreign worships, Livy, xxv., 1. See generally Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, iii., 1174-1193.

advice on all occasions, and yielding to the advice when given the obedience due to a command. It became the first duty of a magistrate to be the loyal minister of the senate, and to be always amenable to its authority.¹ Senatorial decrees gradually acquired something of the binding force of statutes. Many of them were acted upon year after year by successive magistrates, and were quoted as authoritative in the law-courts.² It was even held that a decree of the senate could suspend for a time the operation of a law.³ It was only natural that, as the senate acquired this new and commanding position, it should endeavour to get rid of everything in its composition and forms of procedure that savoured of inferiority or dependence. In one most important point it succeeded completely. Although the magistrate's original prerogative of creating senators was not taken away, he was gradually so restricted in its exercise as to leave him no freedom of choice.⁴ It is clear from the accounts we possess of the manner in which the vacancies in

The composition of the senate.

¹ Cicero (*Pro Sestio*, lxx., 137) states this view fully: "*senatum reipublica custodem, prasidem, propugnatorem collocaverunt (majores); hujus ordinis auctoritate uti magistratus et quasi ministros gravissimi consilii esse voluerunt.*"

² E. g. those which regulated the organisation and administration of provinces.

³ E. g. the law of appeal was held to be suspended by the decree "*darent operam consules ne quid respublica detrimenti caperet*" (*Sall., Cat.*, 29).

⁴ Festus, p. 246, describes the kings and consuls as freely selecting senators "*ut reges sibi legebant, sublegebantque quos in concilio publico haberent ita . . . consules . . . conjunctissimos sibi . . . legebant.*"

the senate were filled up in 216 B.C., that there was then a well understood order of preference, which the magistrate was expected to follow. Those who had held any curule magistracy, if not already senators, had the first claim; next after them came those who had been tribunes of the *plebs*, ædiles of the *plebs*, or quæstors; finally those private citizens who had won distinction in war.¹ But in that year, thanks to the losses at Cannæ, the number of vacancies was exceptionally large. Ordinarily, we may be certain that the magistrate had no need to travel beyond the list of those who, as having held a magistracy since the last revision of the senate, had by law or custom a preferential claim to a seat.² The senate thus ceased to be a body of advisers freely chosen by the magistrate from all ranks of the community. Instead, it was regularly recruited according to established rules, and the magistrate had practically no choice but formally to admit into the senate the persons entitled to a seat. But it was not only the magistrate's discretion in choosing senators that was restricted. It seems clear that, in some way or other, during this period his power of expulsion was limited also, and that a senator, once admitted, re-

¹ Livy, xxiii., 23.

² Livy (xxii., 49) speaks of those "*qui eos magistratus gessissent, unde in senatum legi deberent*," and these magistracies were evidently the curule offices. At what period the tribunate of the *plebs* first entitled its holder to a seat in the senate at the next revision is uncertain. The privilege was first legally attached to the quæstorship by Sulla. But in the time of the Gracchi it was clearly customary for a seat in the senate to follow as soon as possible after the quæstorship.

tained his seat for life, unless he were found guilty of some gross and scandalous conduct. One other point must also be noticed. The senate was, under this system, not only recruited without reference to the discretion of the magistrate, but it was recruited only from the official class, from those who had held a magistracy. The result was that the lay element disappeared. The senate of the latter years of this period consisted entirely of magistrates and ex-magistrates. It became an essentially bureaucratic and official body. Nothing more clearly proves the subordinate relation in which the senate originally stood to the magistrate than its rules of procedure. They were evidently based on the assumption that the senate could only advise the magistrate when consulted by him, that he might accept or reject its advice as he chose, and that its expression of opinion only acquired authoritative force when adopted and acted upon by him. But this assumption, in the period with which we are dealing, had ceased to correspond with the facts of the case, and it appears that some attempt was made to bring the forms and rules of senatorial procedure into closer conformity with the actual state of affairs. It was probably, to take a few instances, during this period that it became etiquette for a magistrate, when laying a matter before the house, to abstain from anticipating the decision of the senate by making any proposal of his own,¹ and that the

¹ The usual formula was "*quid de ea fieri placet.*" Cf. Cic. *Phil.*, x., 17.

anomalous permission was conceded to a senator, when asked for his opinion, of travelling beyond the question, an evasive mode of enabling him to introduce any business in which he was interested.¹ Equally significant is the fact that, whereas in earlier times the magistrate was said to act "in accordance with the opinion of the senate," he was now said to act "in accordance with the decree, or with the authority, of the senate."² But, as will be seen later on, these changes did not go far enough to remove an inconsistency which mattered little while the senate was strong, and the magistrates weak, but which had serious consequences when the case was reversed.

The causes of the ascendancy which the senate thus acquired at the cost both of the popular assembly and the executive magistracy are not difficult to discover. In the first place, the two assemblies, through which the Roman people exercised their sovereign prerogatives of election and legislation, the *comitia* of the *populus* by its centuries, and the *concilium* of the *plebs* by its tribes, were hampered in their action by one serious defect. Neither could act unless set in motion by a magistrate. They could only meet when convened by a magistrate, and though there were many days on which a magistrate could not convene an assem-

Causes of the
ascendancy
of the senate.
Nature
of the
assembly.

¹ For this privilege, "*egredi relationem*," see Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 38; Gell., iv., 10; Cic., *Ad Fam.*, x. 28.

² Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, iii., 994.

bly,¹ there were not, as at Athens, any fixed days on which he was obliged to do so. Moreover, when once assembled they could only act in response to the question (*rogatio*) addressed to them by the presiding consul, prætor, or tribune.² There were, of course, certain cases in which the magistrate was bound to convene an assembly and to ask the people to express their will. But there were a vast number of cases in which this procedure was not constitutionally necessary, and in these it rested with the magistrate to consult the people or not as he chose. A large field was thus left to his discretion, and in the exercise of his discretion he was guided by circumstances. As it happened, throughout this period circumstances were all unfavourable to a frequent consultation of the people. The assembly, whether of the *populus* or *plebs*, could only meet in the city, or just outside the walls in the Campus Martius. But the voters were a large body, many of them resident at a great distance from Rome; or away on service with the legions; to get them together was inconvenient and difficult; nor when assembled were they specially qualified to decide the intricate questions of military or foreign policy which occupied the attention of Roman statesmen at the time. By comparison with the assembly the senate appeared to great advantage. It could be easily and quickly

¹ *E. g. dies fasti and nefasti*, and days set apart as holidays or for thanksgiving. In Cicero's time the number of days on which *comitia* could be held (*dies comitiales*) was not large.

² Gell., x., 20, "*Caput ipsum et origo et quasi frons 'rogatio' est . . . nam ni populus aut plebs rogetur, nullum plebis aut populi jussum fieri potest.*"

summoned. It included within its ranks the most experienced soldiers and statesmen of the day. The fact that its members owed their seats ultimately to their having been elected by the people to a magistracy, gave it some sort of title to speak with authority in the people's name. Finally, in the senate-house, the careful and deliberate discussion which the forms of the assembly precluded were always possible.

But these were not the only considerations which led the magistrates of this period to turn to the senate rather than to the people for counsel and direction. The habitual deference which they paid to the senate was largely due to changes which had taken place in the magistracy itself, and in the nature and amount of the work which it had to do. Nothing is more characteristic of the Roman constitution than the width and completeness of the "power of command" (*imperium*) with which the Roman people invested their chief magistrates. The magistrate "with the *imperium*" was in theory and for the time all-powerful. Senate and assembly met only when he convened them, and considered only what he laid before them. He was equally capable of administering justice at home and of leading the legions abroad. While holding the *imperium* he was irresponsible and irremovable. But this plenary authority, though exercised to the full by the first consuls, and at a later time by the Cæsars, was exercised in a much more restricted fashion by the magistrates of the period of the great wars. It had been, as we have seen, the object of

Changes in
the magis-
tracy.

attack during the early days of the struggle between the orders. The Valerian law of appeal had taken away from the consuls the power of inflicting capital punishment upon Roman citizens within the city, and by the institution of the tribunate, their action inside the city bounds was rendered liable at any moment to interference. In 435 B.C. the important duties connected with the census were separated from the *imperium* and transferred to two *censores*. By the Hortensian law (287 B.C.) the plebeian tribunes finally obtained a rival and independent power of initiating legislation, and to this was added afterwards that of convening and consulting the senate.¹ But it was not only by these attacks from without that the position of the magistrates with the *imperium* was weakened. As Rome expanded, and the business of administration increased, it was found necessary to increase their number. The original "college" of two prætor-consuls was gradually enlarged. In 364 B.C. a third prætor, the *prætor urbanus*, was added, and the civil jurisdiction between citizens intrusted to him.² A hundred and twenty years later, a fourth was appointed to take charge of cases in which the "aliens," now becoming numerous, were concerned.³ The annexation of ter-

¹ Varro (*Ap. Gell.*, xiv., 8) implies that the tribunes obtained this right before the *plebiscitum Atinium*. Unfortunately the date of this plebiscite is unknown. Mommsen would assign it to the Gracchan period (133-102 B.C.).

² Livy, vi., 42 "qui *ius inter cives diceret*."

³ Livy, *Epit.*, 19, "*prætor peregrinus*."

ritories beyond the sea involved a further enlargement. In 227 B.C. two prætors were first elected to administer the newly-formed provinces of Sicily and Sardinia; in 197 B.C. two more were found necessary for the government of Hither and Farther Spain.¹ Thus, throughout the last fifty years of this period, there were no less than eight magistrates invested with the *imperium*, to whom must be added a variable but steadily increasing number of proconsuls and proprætors. The eight actual *magistratus cum imperio* elected each year formed a college, each member of which was capable individually of exercising any or all of the powers belonging to the *imperium*. The endless confusion which the existence of so many parallel authorities was likely to produce was partially guarded against by certain rules of precedence. To the two original members of the college, now known as "consuls," a certain priority was granted over the remaining six, to whom the old title *prætores* was confined. The consuls were said to have the *majus imperium*,—a convenient term of which the Cæsars made dexterous use,—and in any conflict of authority the lesser *imperium* of the prætors gave way to theirs.² So, too, a collision between equals, between consul and consul, prætor and prætor, was provided for by the rule that "he who prohibits is stronger than he who commands."³

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, 20; *ib.*, xxxii., 27.

² Cic. *Ad Att.*, ix., 9, "*prætores . . . collegæ consulum, quorum est majus imperium* ; Gell., xiii., 15, "*imperium minus prætor, majus habet consul.*"

³ Cic., *De Legg.*, 3.

It is obvious, however, that these rules did not go very far towards securing either the exact division of labour or the harmonious and well-directed co-operation, which was necessary for the right conduct of the ever-increasing business of Roman government. For this purpose some central regulative authority was needed, and nowhere but in the senate could such an authority be found. As early, at the latest, as the commencement of the second Punic war, it was the senate which, at the beginning of the year, determined what the departments to be filled should be, and decided which should be consular and which prætorian.¹ The individual magistrates, as a rule, readily conceded to the senate a control which relieved them of a heavy responsibility, and gave unity and cohesion to the action of the state, and the occasions were rare on which, during this period, a magistrate ventured to dispute its authority.

But though the ascendancy of the senate was mainly due to the fact that without it the government of the state could scarcely have been carried on, it was strengthened and confirmed by the close and intimate connection which existed between the senate and the nobility. This "nobility" was in its nature and origin widely different from the old *patriciate*.² Though every patrician was of course "noble," the majority of the families which in this period styled themselves

¹ At the first meeting of the senate each year the new consuls formally referred to it the question of the provinces; *c. g.* Livy, xxvi., 1.

² Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, i., 782.

noble were not patrician but plebeian, and the typical nobles of the time of the elder Cato, of the Gracchi, or of Cicero, the Metelli, Livii, or Licinii were plebeians. The title *nobilis* was apparently conceded by custom to those plebeian families one or more of whose members had, after the opening of the magistracies, been elected to a curule office, and which in consequence were entitled to place in their halls, and to display at their funeral processions the *imagines*¹ of these distinguished ancestors. The man who, by his election to a curule office thus ennobled his descendants, was said to be the "founder of his family,"² though himself only a new man.³ Legally, therefore, this "nobility" was within the reach of any citizen who obtained even the curule ædileship. Nor did it carry with it any rights or privileges whatever. It is certain, moreover, that during the first sixty or seventy years of this period it was generally accessible in practice as well as in theory, and that almost every year some fresh plebeian family was ennobled. It was, for instance, from the time of the Punic wars that the Caecilii Metelli, the Aurelii Cottæ, the Flamini, the Calpurnii, and other great houses of the later republic dated their nobility.⁴ Gradually,

¹ Cicero (*Verr.*, v., 14), speaking of his own election to a curule office, says that it gave him "*jus imaginis ad memoriam posteritatemque prodenda.*" Cf. Polybius, vi., 53.

² "*Auctor generis sui*" or "*princeps.*" Cic., *Ad Fam.*, ix., 21; *De Leg. Agr.*, ii., 100.

³ "*Novus homo,*" Sall., *Cat.*, 23; *Jug.*, 63, etc.

⁴ See the calculations of Willems, *Le Sénat Romain*, i., 274, 300.

however, a more exclusive spirit and policy prevailed. Office brought wealth and prestige, and both wealth and prestige were freely employed to exclude "new men" and to secure for the "noble families" a monopoly of office. The ennobled plebeians not only united with the patricians to form a distinct order, but outdid them in pride and arrogance. As early as 217 B.C. it was openly said that the only true plebeians were the "new men," and that the plebeian nobles had begun to despise the *plebs* ever since they themselves ceased to be despised by the patricians.¹ By the close of this period (133 B.C.) it was already rare for any one not of a noble family to attain high office, while the cadets of the noble houses looked forward to an official career as their birthright.² Thus both the magistracies and the senate to which they gave admission, though open in theory to all freeborn citizens, were in fact monopolised by a single class. And in return the whole wealth and influence of the nobility went to support the senate, whose ascendancy they regarded as essential to the maintenance of their own usurped position as the governing class, and which was identified with themselves in its sympathies and interests.

¹ Livy, xxii., 34, "*Non finem belli ante habituros, quam consulem vere plebeium id est hominem novum fecissent, nam plebeios nobiles jam eisdem (i. e. as the patricians) initiatos esse sacris, et contemnere plebem ex quo contemni a patribus desierunt, cepisse.*"

² The consulship in particular was regarded as reserved only for nobles. Sall., *Cat.*, 23; *Jug.*, 63.

The establishment of senatorial ascendancy was not the only result of this period of growth and expansion. During the same time the foundations were laid of the provincial system, and with this of the new and dangerous powers of the proconsuls.

The Provincial System and the proconsulate.

In dealing with the new dependencies beyond the sea, Rome did not adhere to the principles which she had followed in Italy. The transmarine communities, with few exceptions, were indeed like those in Italy, dignified with the honourable title of "allies" (*socii*) and in the case of some of them the alliance was, as in Italy, a real one based upon an actual treaty with Rome, and implying some sort of equality. But these "treaty states" ¹ were a small minority, and as Rome grew stronger it was but rarely that she condescended to admit any community to this privileged position. The vast majority of these new allies were allies only in name, and the "alliance" was little better than a fiction which imperfectly concealed their actual subjection.

Between them and the genuine allies of Rome, in or out of Italy, ² lay all the difference involved in the fact that they were disarmed, were taxed, and, above

¹ *Civitates federatae*; of the sixty-eight communities which in Cicero's time formed the province of Sicily, three were *federatae*. In Hither Spain, Pliny mentions only one, and in Farther Spain three, of which the most famous was Gades, whose treaty dated from the second Punic war. Cic., *Verr.*, iii., 6; Pliny, *N. H.*, xxxvii., 18-30.

² The only part of the Italian peninsula that was treated as a province was Cisalpine Gaul.

all, were grouped as provinces under the immediate control of a resident Roman magistrate.¹

The creation of a province, that is, of a separate and permanent magisterial department of administration, was a step which, as virtually implying annexation, Rome was often slow in taking.² But whenever carried out, the "reduction into the form of a province"³ of a group of communities was affected in much the same way. The main lines on which the new province was to be organised were usually laid down by decree of the senate, and the work of organisation then intrusted to a commission of senators."⁴ The result of their labours was embodied in what was called the *lex provincia*.⁵ This was in fact a provincial constitution, by which the extent of the new department, the number and status of the communities included within it,

¹ It was this creation of a separate department under a resident Roman magistrate which marked the "formation of a province." Thus Macedonia was disarmed and taxed in 167 B.C., but no province was created there till 146. *Provincia* meant properly the "department" or "sphere of command" assigned to a Roman magistrate.

² This was conspicuously the case in the East. See above, book iii., chap. ii.

³ "*In formam provincie redigere*" (Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 56).

⁴ *E. g.* in the case of Sicily, Cic., *Verr.*, ii., 16, 40; Macedonia, Livy, xlv., 29.

⁵ The *lex* was usually distinguished by the name of the chief commissioner (*e. g.* the "*lex Rupilia*" [Sicily], Cic., *J. c.*; "*lex Pompeia*" [Bithynia], Pliny, *Epp. ad Traj.*, 79), who was said "*dare leges*," Livy, xlv., 30. *Lex* (=fixed conditions) was similarly used of the municipal constitutions granted to towns by Rome, and of the terms fixed by the censors for the collection of the state revenues (*lex censoria*). Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, iii., 308, 309.

their rights and obligations, the mode and amount of the taxation, as well as a variety of details connected with the administration of justice and with local government were determined. Its provisions were binding not only upon the communities of the province, but also upon the Roman magistrate,¹ nor, apparently, could they be modified or supplemented without the sanction of the Roman senate or people.²

The general spirit of these provincial constitutions was far more liberal than the harshness which characterised the actual administration of the provinces would lead us to expect, though the liberality may have been mainly due to the reluctance of the Roman government to undertake more of the burdens of administration than was necessary, to its unwillingness to wound the susceptibilities of newly-conquered allies, and no doubt also to a sense of the danger involved in leaving too wide a discretion to its own officials in the government of great and often distant dependencies. A Roman province, as a glance at the lists in Pliny's *Natural History*³ will show, was an aggregate of separate communities

¹ Cicero charges Verres with violating the provincial constitution of Sicily (*lex Rupilia*) which all governors before him had respected. *Verr.*, ii., 16, 40.

² Not only were these constitutions frequently amended by decrees of the senate or statutes of the assembly, but occasionally a complete revision was found necessary. The Sicilian constitution, for instance, was thus revised after the great slave war by P. Rupilius (consul 132 B.C.). On the other hand, the constitution of Bithynia by Pompey (65 B.C.) was still in force when the younger Pliny was there as governor (111 A.D.). Pliny, *Epp. ad Traj.*, 79.

³ Books iii. and iv.

(*civitates*), and in fixing the number of these, and the extent of their territories, Rome evidently respected where possible, the already existing political divisions. It is true that federations which might prove dangerous were dissolved, or reduced to harmless religious associations; that some communities were rewarded by an accession, others punished by a loss of territory; but, in the more civilised provinces especially, the integrity of the existing *civitates* was, as a rule, preserved and even in provinces such as Hither Spain, where few or no city states existed, Rome did not refuse at starting to recognise the native tribes or clans, though, as time went on, these older lines of division were gradually obscured by the growth of towns, and the formation of new centres of life.¹

The communities, whether urban or tribal, within the limits of a province were all subject to the suzerainty of Rome. All alike were required, as indeed the Italian allies had been, to have the same friends and foes as the Roman people, to contract no independent alliances, and not to violate the Roman peace by waging independent wars.² The farther

¹ The *regiones* enumerated by Pliny (*N. H.*, iii., 18) along the seaboard of Hither Spain all bear the names of tribes, and appear to represent the original divisions of the Roman province. In parts of Macedonia, and in Gallia Narbonensis the old tribes remained intact as *civitates*, though, as happened also in Spain, the tribal name was superseded by that of the central town, the *caput gentis*, such as Vienna Allobrogum (Strabo, 186). In other cases two or more towns arose within the tribal canton and obtained recognition as independent *civitates*.

² Strabo, 189, notes the beneficial effect in Gaul of the stoppage by Rome of the incessant tribal wars.

step of prohibiting intermarriage and "commerce," between the separate communities of a province, seems to have been only taken by Rome in the earlier days of her empire, when her confidence in her strength was not yet fully established.¹

Under these limitations each *civitas* was recognised as a self-governing community, though the degree of self-government allowed varied widely. There was, in the first place, a ^{Local self-government.} wide difference between the "free states" and the rest. The former, whether treaty states, like Gades, or states to which Rome had voluntarily granted "freedom," as for instance Centuripæ in Sicily,² were, strictly speaking, outside the province. They were not subject to the authority of the resident governor, they paid no taxes, and they enjoyed complete local independence, subject only to the recognition of Roman suzerainty.³ The autonomy of the ordinary provincial community was of a much more restricted kind. They paid taxes, and were consequently often styled *stipendiariæ*, or in Sicily *decumanæ*. They were farther directly under the control of the Roman governor. It would also seem that, in many cases, it was left to the governor to decide what amount of local self-government could be

¹ The prohibition of *connubium* and *commercium* was enforced in Sicily (Cic., *Verr.*, iii., 40) and in Macedonia (Livy, xlv., 29).

² Cicero describes Centuripæ as "*sine fœdere immunis ac libera*" (*Verr.*, iii., 13).

³ They could be called upon to aid Rome in war with men, ships, and supplies. See for further details Marquardt, i., 347, 399. No Roman troops could be quartered on a free state.

conceded to them, and that he had the right to supervise the local officials, to examine the accounts, and to modify or even cancel the local constitution.¹ But the cases in which a provincial community was absolutely refused the privilege of using its own "laws and magistrates," must have been very few. In the relations made for the administration of justice by the Roman officials, a similar regard was shown for local usages and rights. Even in the matter of

Taxation. taxation, the Roman republic left things much as it found them. In Sicily, with the exception of certain communities, the existing system of tithes was retained unaltered²; and the same was the case at first in the province of Asia.³ In the other provinces in Spain, Africa, and Macedonia, Rome merely fixed the amount of the tribute⁴ to be paid annually, and left the local authorities to raise it as best they could in their own way. Nor, if the case of Macedonia was not exceptional, was the amount demanded excessive.⁵ It would indeed have

¹ Cicero (*Ad Att.*, vi., 2) describes himself as allowing the communities of his province "*suis legibus et judiciis uti*," and as having inspected the local accounts for the previous ten years. Apamea, on the contrary, protested against such an inspection by Pliny, on the ground that it was privileged "*suo arbitrio rempublicam administrare*" (*Epp. ad Tyaj.*, 47). Cicero declares that, in allowing "autonomy," he was following the policy of his predecessor Scævola (93 B.C.) "*ut Graeci inter se disceptent suis legibus*" (*Ad Att.*, vi., 1).

² Compare the regulations in Sicily mentioned by Cicero (*Verr.*, ii. 13).

³ Cic., *Verr.*, iii., 6. The "law of King Hiero" (*lex Hieronica*) continued to regulate the payment and collection of the tithes.

⁴ Cic., *Ad Q. fr.*, i., 1, 33, for the change made by the younger Gracchus.

⁵ Cic., *Verr.*, iii., 6: "*vectigal certumquod stipendarum dicitur.*"

been better had the republican statesmen gone further and anticipated the emperors by placing the taxation of the provinces on a sound basis, and bringing it directly under the control of the central authorities. The provincial taxpayer would probably have paid less, and the Roman treasury would certainly have received more.¹

On the whole, however, little fault can be found with the regulations made by Rome for her provincial allies. The misfortune was that she took no sufficient precautions to secure their observance, and in the autocratic power wielded by the governor in charge of a province lies the explanation of her failure.

The governor of a Roman province was no doubt in theory bound to respect the constitution of the province, as well as all other rules laid down for his guidance by senate or people; ^{The governor of a province.} and he was, like any other magistrate, expected to ask and to follow the advice of the senate on important matters. In fact, however, his position was such that these checks were of little use. He held the *imperium*, but the restrictions imposed upon its exercise in Rome ceased to operate across the sea. He shared his authority with no colleague; no law of appeal limited his power of life and death over the subject provincials; he was beyond the reach of the tribune's veto, and often at a safe distance from the senate. The supplies voted

¹ The Macedonian tribute was half that previously paid to the Macedonian kings. Livy, xlv., 18.

him from home¹ and the taxes paid by the provincials were at his free disposal.² If he needed more he had ample authority to requisition what he wanted from within the province³—while his demands were backed by the swords of his Roman troops. Even in matters of frontier policy a wide discretion was allowed him, and he could be warlike or pacific as his tastes and ambitions directed. Nor in the exercise of this absolute and undivided authority was he assisted or controlled by any body of experienced civil servants. The whole administrative staff⁴ came out and went back with him, and were strictly subordinate to him. Even the quæstor, though deriving his authority directly from the Roman people, was in the management of the finances subject to the governor's authority; he was, moreover, a young untrained man, and expected to pay to his chief the implicit deference of a son to a father.⁵ It must be remembered, also, that the men

¹ To each governor was voted by decree of the senate an equipment (*ornatio*) for his province. The decree fixed the number of his legates, the size of his army, and gave him besides money for the payment of his troops and the expenses of himself and his staff. Cic., *In Pison.*, xvi., 37; *Verr.*, ii., I, 13, 14, 17.

² Except in the case of the two tithe-paying provinces, Sicily and Asia. In no case does it seem that before the *Lex Julia* of 59, any strict account of his expenditure of public money was exacted from the governor.

³ These requisitions, especially those made for the expenses of the governor and his staff, were the curse of the provinces, and repeated efforts were made to check them by law, but in vain.

⁴ Of Verres' staff (*cohors prætoris*) Cicero says, "*plus mali dediti Sicilia quam centum cohortes fugitivorum.*"

⁵ Cic., *Pro Plancio*, 28; *Ad Q. fr.*, i., 1, 3.

to whom this absolute power was given were not necessarily experienced administrators, nor were they carefully selected for the posts to which they were sent. It must often have happened that a man went out to a province, as Cicero did, with no more knowledge of provincial administration than he might have picked up years before as a quæstor, while to which province he went was a point decided by mutual arrangement, or the chances of lot; nor did the brief term¹ for which he held his command, while it quickened the anxiety of the worsor sort to reap the golden harvest they expected, enable the better governors to master the varied duties of their office.

That an authority so wide, exercised at such a distance from home, and amid innumerable temptations to abuse² should have been frequently abused was inevitable. Yet for the abuse of his powers by a governor no really effective penalty was provided. It is true that the establishment in 149 605 A.U.C. B.C. by the Lex Calpurnia of a special court to try cases of magisterial extortion in the provinces³ gave the provincial for the first time a recognised means of obtaining redress. But the remedy did not fully meet the case. The new court

¹ The normal term was one year, though towards the close of the republic there was a tendency to extend it. Verres was three years in Sicily.

² A vivid picture of these temptations is drawn by Cicero (*Ad Q. fr.*, i., 1) in his letter to Quintus Cicero, then governor of Asia, "*provincia corruptrix*," as Cicero calls it.

³ This law established the first "*questio perpetua de pecuniis repetundis*." Cic., *Brut.*, 27; *De Off.*, ii., 21.

“for the recovery of monies” sat in Rome, and to bring documents and witnesses to Rome from Spain or Asia was a costly matter. It was, until 122 B.C., composed of senators,¹ that is, of men who either had been or were looking forward to being themselves governors of provinces, and who as Romans and nobles were more in sympathy with the accused than with his accusers. No proceedings, moreover, could be taken against a governor until his term of office was over, when the injuries inflicted were often already irreparable, or the evidence difficult to collect.

But extortion, whether it took the shape of illegal requisitions, of systematic blackmailing,² or straightforward robbery, was after all an evil which, under an honest governor,—and there were many such,—was mitigated if not removed. A far more serious defect in the system was that it rendered a comprehensive and consistent imperial policy impossible. Under it the provinces were not so much departments of one empire, as separate principalities, ruled by autocrats absolutely independent of each other, and virtually independent of the home government. Even within the limits of the single province one governor might undo what his predecessor had done. Neither a settled frontier policy, nor a proper adjustment of taxation, nor even a proper estimate and control of imperial expenditure were possible.

¹ By a law of Gaius Gracchus men of equestrian census (400,000 sesterces) were substituted for senators.

² *E. g.* the *vectigal pratorium*, the sum paid by communities to avoid having Roman troops quartered upon them (Cic., *Ad Att.*, v., 21), or the *vectigal adilicium*, *i. e.*, the requisitioning of beasts for the ædile's games in Rome (Cic., *Ad Q. fr.*, i., 1, 9; Livy, xl., 44).

But this independence of the provincial governors was, in addition, a source of ^{The proconsulate.} danger to the republican constitution. While the prevalent confusion and misgovernment brought discredit upon the authority of the senate and people of Rome,¹ their authority itself and that of the magistrates of the state was seriously weakened. To this result a change which was made towards the end of this period largely contributed. At the outset the government of a province was intrusted to one of the "magistrates with the *imperium*" for the year, and, unless special circumstances called for the presence of a consul,² to one of the prætors. But as the number of provinces, and also the amount of business devolving upon the consuls and prætors at home, increased, this arrangement broke ^{608 A.U.C.} down.³ After 146 B.C. the prætors were never employed abroad, and the consuls only in case of war. The place of both in the regular government of the provinces was taken by "pro-magistrates,"⁴

¹ Compare the words of Tacitus as to the acquiescence of the provinces in the rule of Augustus, *Ann.*, i., 2: "*suspecto sonatus populique imperio ob certamina potentium et avaritiam magistratum. invalido legum auxilio.*"

² Sardinia was intrusted to a consul in 177 B.C., "*propter Belli magnitudinem*" (Livy, xli., 8); for another instance, see Livy, xxxiii., 45.

³ In 167 B.C. a prætor was prevented from taking his province by press of judicial business in Rome (Livy, xlv., 16). The establishment of the *questio de repetundis* (149 B.C.) permanently reduced the number of prætors available for foreign service to three, since neither the pr.-urbanus nor the pr.-peregrinus could leave Italy. Meanwhile the number of provinces had risen to six.

⁴ For this convenient term see Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, i., 520. *Pro magistratu* was used as equivalent to *pro consule*, *pro prætore*, in

497 A.U.C. by men invested with the *imperium pro consule* or *pro prætor*. It is true that, as early as 327 B.C.,¹ Rome had been obliged to depart from the old principle that the *imperium* could only be exercised by a magistrate duly appointed by the people. But the departure was at first slight. The appointment of a pro-magistrate was an exceptional thing,—it required an express vote of the people,—and the pro-magistrates were, in fact as well as in name, the deputies and subordinates of the actual magistrates. It was during the second Punic war that they were first commonly employed,² and at the same time it became customary to appoint them simply by decree of the senate without reference to the people. Their real importance, however, dates from the time when to them was intrusted year after year the care of the provinces beyond the sea. The effect of this change was in the first place to deprive the people of any direct voice in the appointment of the men who were to govern their dependencies, an infringement of their constitutional rights against which the popular leaders of the following period effectively protested.³ In the next place, the old relations between the magistrates and

legal phraseology, e.g. in the *Lex Rubria* and *Lex Acilia de pecuniis repetundis*.

¹ See above, p. 97.

² In the year 214 B.C. there were at least seven (*Livy*, xxiv., 10). They were then, and until the year 52 B.C., usually the consuls and prætors of the preceding year.

³ E.g., in the case of Marius and the command in Numidia; Pompey in 67, 66, and 55, and Cæsar in 59 received their commands directly from the people.

the pro-magistrates were inverted. The pro-magistracies lost their occasional subordinate character. They became regular offices, filled up year after year, The pro-consul or pro-prætor, though still technically inferior in rank to the consul or prætor, was to all intents and purposes independent of him.¹ Nor was this all. The position of the real magistrates in Rome, of the responsible heads of the executive, could not compare in attractiveness with that of their supposed deputies abroad. The routine duties and restricted authority of the former contrasted unfavorably with the wide powers and splendid opportunities for acquiring wealth and fame open to the latter. By the close of this period even the consulship was by many valued chiefly as a stepping-stone to the pro-consulship, and the way was preparing for the time when the authority of a pro-consul would be invoked even by consuls for the maintenance of order in Rome, and finally be established in the heart of the city itself as the supreme power.

The opening of the world to Rome, and of Rome to the world, produced a change also in every department of Roman life, and every class of Roman society. The subjugation of the Mediterranean countries, by placing at the disposal of Rome, not only the great natural resources of Africa or Spain, but the accumulated treasures of Greece and Asia Minor, caused a sudden and rapid rise in the standard of wealth, and

The Roman
people — the
new wealth.

¹ Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, ii., 219. The consuls continued in theory to enjoy a paramount authority (Cic., *Ad Att.*, viii., 15; *Phil.*, iv., 9 "omnes enim in consulis jure et imperio debent esse provincia").

a marked change both in the sources from which that wealth was derived, and in the manner in which it was distributed. The Roman state itself no longer drew its revenues only from the public lands in Italy or from the "tribute" imposed upon its own citizens. In every province it was the owner of wide domains. The territory of Carthage in Africa, the mines of Spain, the crown lands of the Macedonian kings,¹ were all now the property of the Roman people. To them also belonged the tithes of Sicily, the yearly tribute of the five other provinces, and the proceeds of the customs duties throughout the empire. And though, thanks to a wasteful system of finance, these new sources of revenue did not greatly enrich the Roman treasury, they enabled the government to dispense for the future with all direct taxation of Roman citizens. After 167 ~~57~~ A.U.C. B.C. the *tributum* was never again levied in Italy, until Italy became in fact a province.² But the wealth drawn from the provinces by the state was, after all, trifling in amount compared with that which flowed into the pockets of individual citizens. Of the booty taken in war, by far the greater part was usually appropriated by the suc-

¹ See the list of properties owned by the Roman state in the provinces, Cicero, *De Leg. Agr.*, ii., 5.

² The *tributum* was an occasional tax levied to meet the cost of war. When the state of the treasury rendered it possible, it was remitted or even repaid, *e. g.*, in 293 B.C. (Livy, x., 46), and in 187 B.C. (Livy, xxxix., 7). That it was not levied after 167 B.C. is stated by Cicero, *De Off.*, ii., 22; Pliny, *N. H.*, xxxiii., 56. Its re-introduction, though in a different form, into Italy was the work of Diocletian. Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, ii., 158, 171, 217.

cessful general and his soldiers.¹ Nor was it only the great campaigns against Philip or Antiochus that were profitable; a rich harvest was yielded even by the "little wars" with Spanish, Illyrian, or Keltic tribes, and the gold ornaments of the latter were as welcome as the "royal treasures" of King Antiochus, and the statues and bronzes of Greek cities.² The spoils of peace were richer than those of war, and were more easily won. To every class the provinces offered a field for money-making. The nobles who, in one capacity or another, as governors, legates, or quæstors, served in the provinces, the contractors (*publicani*) who collected the customs duties or worked the state lands and mines, the "men of business" (*negotiatores*) who, as money-lenders, corn-brokers, speculators in land, or as merchants, penetrated to every corner of the empire, and even beyond its frontiers, rivalled each other in the success with which they exploited the provinces for their own profit. Even the population of the capital at home got their share of the spoil in the frequent distributions of corn and money, and in the

¹ This was an abuse, and Cato protested vigorously against this diversion of what was due to the state into private pockets. See the fragment of his speech, *De prada militibus dividenda*, *ap. Gell.*, ii., 18. In another speech Cato takes credit to himself for not dividing the spoils of war among his friends (Fronto, *Ep. ad Ant.*, i., 2). A glaring instance was the misappropriation of the "money of King Antiochus," Livy, xxxviii., 54.

² Livy, xxxiv., 4: "*jam in Græciam Asiamque transcendimus, regias etiam attrahimus gazas, signa ab Syracusis illata.*" In 184 B.C. C. Calpurnius Piso brought back from Spain eighty-three golden crowns and 12,000 lbs. of silver.

splendid spectacles provided for their benefit.¹ It is true that Horace contrasts the age of Cato with his own as an age of simplicity and frugality.² None the less is it certain that a conspicuous feature in that period was the introduction into Roman life of a sumptuousness and splendor unknown before. The speeches of Cato are filled with passionate protests against the new craving for wealth which had seized upon his contemporaries, and against the luxury and extravagance which the possession of wealth encouraged.³ It is significant that in 215
539 A.U.C. B.C. the long series of Roman sumptuary laws was opened by a plebiscite, the Lex Oppia,⁴ which was directed against the growing love of Roman ladies for gold jewellery, fine dresses, and carriages; and still more significant is the fact that in
539 A.U.C. 195 B.C. the Oppian law was, in spite of Cato's protests, repealed.⁵ The "luxury of the table," the favourite vice of Roman society for long afterwards, became a subject of legislation in 181 B.C., and the Lex Orchia,⁶
573 A.U.C. carried in that year, was supplemented before the close of this period by two others,

¹ Plut., *Cato*, 8, τὸν Ῥωμαίων δῆμων ὀρμημένον ἀκαίρως ἐπὶ βιουητρίας καὶ διανομᾶς. Cf. Livy, xxxii., 57. The first gladiatorial show was exhibited in 264 B.C. The *Floralia* were instituted in 238 B.C., the *Ludi Apollinares* in 212 B.C.

² Hor., *Od.*, ii., 15, 11.

³ Livy, xxxiv., 4: "*avaritia et luxuria civitatem laborare,*"

⁴ Livy, xxxiv., 1: "*ne qua mulier plus semunciam auri haberet, non vestimento versicolori uteretur, non juncto vehiculo . . . vereretur.*"

⁵ Livy, xxxiv., 8.

⁶ Macrob., *Sat.*, ii., 13: "*prima de canis lex prescribat numerum viviarum.*"

the Lex Faunia in 161 B.C., and the Lex Didia in 141 B.C.¹ A further symptom was the sudden and enormous increase in the number of slaves imported from abroad, some captured in war, many more purchased at the great slave-marts, such as that which during this period was established at Delos. In the Roman households, on the Roman estates, in every branch of Roman business, the slave became ubiquitous and indispensable.

But the effects of this influx of wealth did not end here. It gradually altered the whole structure of Roman society, by destroying the equality and homogeneity which had once been its chief characteristic. The Roman community, at the time when Pyrrhus landed in Italy, was still in the main a community of farmers, tilling their own small farms. Differences, of course, there were between patrician and plebeian, rich and poor, and the Licinian laws prove that the desire of "adding field to field"² had been growing, as Roman conquest offered fresh facilities for its gratification. But, on the whole, there was a remarkable equality of conditions and a uniformity in the mode of living. Not only the soldier in the ranks of the legions, but even the consuls who led them, were taken from the plough.³ This state of things could not long survive the acquisition of empire beyond the seas. While,

¹ Macrob., *l. c.*; Gell., ii., 24.

² Livy, xxxiv., 4: "*quid legem Liciniam excitavit nisi ingens cupiditas agrorum continuandi.*"

³ Cic., *Pro Rosc. Am.*, 50: "*illis temporibus, quum ab aratro arcescebantur, qui consules fierent.*" Manius Curius (consul 290, 275 274 B.C.) owned only a few fields and a poor homestead (Plut., *Cat.*

on the one hand, the harassing demands of military service in Spain or Asia,¹ the importation of foreign corn and foreign slaves, and the unequal competition with capitalists grown rich abroad, rendered farming in Italy, at least on the old lines, increasingly laborious and unprofitable,² the province offered an irresistibly attractive field for money-making on a scale unknown before. The result was not only that land ceased to be the sole or even the main source of wealth, but that the community began to be divided more sharply by differences in wealth, and in the manner in which the wealth was acquired and spent. From the government of the provinces the nobles returned no longer to live in honourable poverty on their farms, but to build themselves villas, which they filled with the spoils of Greece or Asia, to surround themselves with troops of slaves and dependants, and to live rather as princes than as citizens of a republic. Immediately below them a second "order" was beginning to assume a definite shape. It was composed of the state contractors (*publicani*) and the men of business (*negotiatores*). These men, it is true, had not yet acquired the influence which they afterwards enjoyed,³ nor were they

2). For the similar case of M. Atilius Regulus (cons. 256 B.C.), see Val. Max., iv., 4,6. But in Cato's time a patrician who, like L. Valerius Flaccus (consul 195 B.C., censor 184 B.C.), tilled his farm with his own hands was a rarity (Plut., *Cat.*, 3).

¹ Compare the case of Spurius Ligustinus, Livy xlii., 34.

² See below, p. 205.

³ The law of C. Gracchus (122 B.C.), which gave to the *publicani* the collection of the tithes in Asia, enormously increased their wealth and influence.

yet known as the "equestrian order."¹ But already the wide area of their operations opened to them by the expansion of Rome had greatly increased their wealth. They were already difficult to control,² and the Lex Claudia (218 B.C.)³ is a proof that the rivalry between them and the nobles, ^{536 A.U.C.} which in the next period inflicted such injury upon the state, was beginning to show itself. Below these "two orders," as they came to be called, a third class was rapidly rising into importance, that of the "plebs of the city," the populace of Rome. Its numbers were augmented by the artisans and traders who found employment in supplying the wants of the growing city, by the impoverished farmers and peasants who were attracted to Rome by the prospect of cheap bread and games, lastly, by the slaves who, year by year, were enrolled in its ranks as freedmen.⁴ It was a misfortune for Rome that this *plebs urbana*, though not the most numerous, and certainly not the most respectable section of the community, became, thanks to the peculiarities of the old constitution, a political force. Of the voters in the thirty-five tribes who legally constituted the Roman people, large numbers re-

¹ Pliny, *N. H.*, xxxiii., 34: "*judicium appellatione separare eum ordinem instituisse Gracchi.*"

² In 167 B.C. the senate refused to lease the Macedonian mines, "*nam neque sine publicano exerceri posse, et ubi publicanus esset, ibi aut jus publicum vanum aut libertatem sociis nullum esse*" (Livy, xlv., 18). For the money-lenders, see Livy, xxv., 7.

³ Livy, xxi., 63: "*ne quis senator, cuive senator pater fuisset, maritimam navem quæ plus quam ccc amphorarum esset, haberet.*"

⁴ In 220 B. C. the censors of the year ruled that freedmen could only be registered in one of the four city tribes. Livy, *Epit.*, xx.

sided at such a distance from Rome as to render their attendance at the *comitia* and the exercise of their political rights difficult if not impossible. In ordinary cases, consequently, it was the voters resident in or near the city who represented the sovereign people, who elected the magistrates and passed the laws. The results of this state of things were disastrous in more ways than one. To win the support of the city plebs became a necessity, and the means employed to win it poisoned the political life of Rome. The new wealth derived from the provinces was freely spent in bribery of every kind,¹ and the populace of Rome was encouraged to claim as the price of its support a share in the spoils of the empire, and to regard all political questions from a purely selfish point of view. Nor was this all. The absurdity and injustice of a system under which the sovereign authority of the Roman people was wielded by a corrupt minority could not long escape notice, and the attempts subsequently made to secure for the assembly a larger share in the government of the empire served only to place it in a clearer light.

But it was not only the structure and composition of the Roman community that underwent a transformation. In no other community have established custom and ancient usage played a more important part, and in scarcely any community have they been subjected

The new learning and manners.

¹In 181 B.C. the first law against bribery (*lex Cornelia Bæbia de ambitu*) was carried by the consuls (Livy, xl., 19). A second was passed in 159 B.C. (Livy, *Epit.*, xlvii.). Among Cato's speeches was one *De Ambitu* (Priscian, v. 12). Meyer, *Orat. Rom. Fragm.*, p. 157.

to a more sudden and serious assault than that to which they were exposed in Rome by the sudden breaking down of the barriers which had so long isolated Rome from all but occasional contact with the civilisation of the Mediterranean countries. Among the new influences which now swept like a flood over Roman society, the most powerful and lasting was that exercised by the Greek civilisation, which ruled supreme throughout the Eastern Mediterranean.¹ With this Hellenism Rome was brought face to face first of all with the Magna Græcia, and it is noticeable that the names with which the history of Roman literature opens are nearly all associated with the Græcised districts of South Italy.² But during the fifty years which followed the battle of Zama,³ a close and constant intercourse was established both with the ancient states of Greece itself, and with the scarcely less ancient Greek communities of Asia Minor. To Greeks of all classes the Italian republic, which had so suddenly become the greatest power in the Mediterranean, which had overthrown the Phœnician, and broken the power of Macedon and Syria, became an object of keen interest. On the side of Rome, along with the political sympathy felt for civilised city states, enjoying institutions not

¹ See besides Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., 873, Saalfeld, *Hellenismus in Latium*. (Wolfenbittel, 1883.)

² Livius Adronicus the dramatist was brought to Rome among the prisoners taken at Tarentum (272 B.C.). Nævius came from Campania, Ennius from Rudisæ in Calabria, Pacuvius from Brundisium.

³ Compare the couplet quoted by Gell., xvii., 21 : "*Panico bello secundo Musa pinnato gradu, Intulit se bellicosam in Romuli gentem feram.*"

unlike her own, and with a similar interest in keeping at a distance both despots and barbarians, there was also undoubtedly a genuine admiration and enthusiasm for the literature, the language, the art, and even the political life of Greece.

At the outset, especially, the results were good. The Hellenism which fascinated Rome in the days of the Scipios was comparatively pure. It came chiefly from the least degenerate seats of Greek civilisation, from Achaia, or Athens, or Rhodes, and its prominent representatives were such men as the philosopher Panætius or the statesman-historian Polybius. Among the Romans "Hellenism" had not yet degenerated into a fashion. It was still a real passion, which was strongest in the best minds of the day,¹ and its effects were seen most clearly, not in a mere affectation of Greek manners and habits, but in a quickened intellectual activity, in wider sympathies and a more humane life. It created a Roman literature which, even when its theme was the struggles and victories of Rome, borrowed its form, and occasionally its language, from Greece.² The study of Greek and of the great Greek authors became a regular part of Roman education.³ Roman politicians trained themselves

¹ As, for instance, in the younger Scipio Africanus, the friend of Polybius, in the two Gracchi, and their mother Cornelia, in L. Æmilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedonia.

² E. g. in the poems of Ennius. For the Greek chronicles of Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius Alimentus, see Teuffel, *Gesch. der Röm. Litt.*, pp. 143-146.

³ Even Cato learnt Greek in his old age, and the epitaph on Nævius complains that after his death "the Romans forgot to speak the

for the forum and the senate-house by mastering the rules of Greek rhetoric,¹ and did not disdain to seek counsel and advice in the writings of Greek philosophers, or from the lips of the learned Greeks whom they admitted to their friendship, or who lectured in Rome.²

Yet even during this period the influence of Hellenism was not without danger to the established order of things. As once before in Athens, so now in Rome, the "new learning" was a disturbing and unsettling force. The Roman citizen was not only confronted with new doctrines in politics and religion and new rules of conduct; he was invited to criticise and discuss, he was initiated in the subtleties of Greek dialect,³ and the daring speculations of Greek philosophy. The habits of mind thus formed, and formed too at a time when new opportunities of wealth and distinction were opening on all sides, inevitably weakened the hold of the "ancient usage." Above all, it created something of a revolt against the strict Roman discipline and the old Roman traditions of

Latin tongue" (Teuffel, *l. c.*, p. 100). Livius Andronicus earned his freedom by instructing Roman youth in grammar and rhetoric, and the Greek *καταγωγὴ* became an established institution in Rome.

¹ The Gracchi in particular were carefully trained as orators. Cic., *Orat.*, 103 (of Tiberius): "*gracis litteris eruditus.*" Comp. Plut., *C. G.*, 4.

² Crates, in 157 B.C., gave formal lectures in Rome (Saalfeld, 46). Diophanes of Mitylene was not only the teacher of T. Gracchus, but assisted him in his scheme of agrarian reform (Cic., *Brut.*, 103; Plut., *T. G.*, 8).

³ Cf. the story of Carneades' discourse on justice (155 B.C.), Plut., *Cato*, 22.

self-effacement, and of unquestioning obedience alike to established custom and to constituted authority. The desire, characteristic of Greek democracy, for liberty to "live as one likes,"¹ began to show itself in Rome. The great nobles who had conquered kings, or governed wide provinces with regal authority and splendour, could not contentedly fall back into the ranks of Roman citizens. The new craving for individual distinction exhibited itself in the eagerness with which triumphs were claimed even for victories which had never been won,² in the adoption of high-sounding titles,³ in the largesses heaped upon the people, and in the troops of slaves and dependants with which the nobles filled their halls. The wealthy contractor or financier returned from the provinces with as little inclination to conform to the simple life of his home-keeping forefathers. Among the lower classes, in Rome at any rate, contact with foreign slaves and freedmen, with foreign worships and foreign vices, produced a love of novelty which no legislation could check. Especially significant were the symptoms of revolt against the old order which now appeared among the women. In a speech delivered against the proposed repeal of the Lex Oppia (195 B.C.) Cato denounced not only their growing extravagance and love of

539 A. U. C.

¹ τὸ ζῆν ἕς βούλεται τις.

² Cato delivered a speech *De Falsis Pugnis* (Gell., x. 3) against Q. Minucius Thermus (consul 196 B.C.), "*quia multaprelia fugebat*" (Livy, xxxvii., 45).

³ Livy, xxxvii., 58, of L. Scipio, "*qui ne cognomini fratris cederet Asiaticum se appellari voluit.*"

finery, but their un-Roman freedom of manners, and their impatience of control.¹

These changes were not unopposed, though in most cases the opposition was prompted by a conservative dislike of innovation,² and a Roman contempt for and suspicion of everything foreign, rather than by any clear appreciation of the danger to the republican system involved in them. Repeated efforts were made by decree of the senate or by legislation to check the growth of luxury and license,³ or to exclude from Rome and Italy foreign religious rites,⁴ and the foreign teachers of the new learning.⁵ Of this opposition the heart and soul was M. Porcius Cato (consul 195 B.C., censor 184 B.C.), the type for all time to come of the old-fashioned Roman citizen. To all the new fashions of the day he offered an indiscriminate hostility, which his honesty, fearlessness, and his rude eloquence rendered especially formidable. He denounced the Roman official who carried the poet Ennius with him in his train,⁶ with scarcely less fer-

¹ Livy, xxxiv., 2; cf. the Lex Voconia (169 B.C.): "*ne quis mulierem heredem instituteret.*" It is said that the first instance of divorce at Rome occurred in 231 B.C. (Dionysius, ii., 25).

² Livy, xxvi., 22. Manlius Torquatus (consul 211 B.C.) declared: "*neque ego vestros mores ferre poterō, neque vos imperium meum.*"

³ See above, p. 188.

⁴ E.g., the Bacchanalian orgies (186 B.C.), Livy, xxxix., 18.

⁵ E.g., the expulsion of Carneades in 155 B.C. (Plut., *Cato*, 22. In 161 B.C. a senatus-consultum was passed against "*philosophi et rhetores Latini, uti Romæ ne essent*" (Gell. xv., 11).

⁶ Cic., *Tusc.*, i., 2: "*oratio Catonis in qua objicit ut probrum M. Nobiliori* (consul 189 B.C.) *quod in provinciam poetas duxisset duxerat autem—Ennium.*"

vous than he attacked those who robbed the treasury or the provincials, in their haste to grow rich. As censor (184 B.C.) he used the whole authority of the office, to which the duty of maintaining ancestral custom specially belonged, to discourage in high and low alike any departure from the ancient ways.¹ But the opposition, even when inspired by Cato, was powerless to stem the tide, and the feeble resistance offered by the republican system in the face of political revolution was largely due to the fact that Roman society was already in structure and temper thoroughly unrepublican.

¹ Livy, xxxix., 41: "*tristis et aspera in omnes ordines censura.*"

BOOK IV.

THE PERIOD OF THE REVOLU-
TION—133-49 B.C.



THE PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION— 133-49 B.C.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE GRACCHI TO SULLA—133-81 B.C.

FOR a century and a half the senate had governed Rome, but we have now reached the moment when its supremacy was first openly and seriously challenged, in the name and on the behalf of the constitutional sovereign, the Roman people. Throughout the greater part of the period included in this chapter, the political controversy which divided parties was that between the rival claims of the senate and assembly. In the next period, indeed, this controversy receded into the background before a struggle in which the supremacy of senate and assembly alike was threatened by foes from without, the legions and the proconsuls. But down to 81 B. C. the chief aim of the popular leaders was to reassert the independence of the assembly, while the re-establishment of senatorial ascendancy was the great object of Sulla's legislation.

In the position of the senate there was from the first one inherent weakness. Its authority had no sound constitutional basis, and with the removal of its accidental supports it fell to the ground. It could merely advise the magistrate when asked to do so, and its decrees were strictly only suggestions to the magistrate, which he was at liberty to accept or reject as he chose.¹ It had, it is true, become customary for the magistrate not only to ask the senate's advice on all important points, but to follow it when given. It was obvious, however, that if this custom were weakened, and the magistrates chose to act independently, the senate was powerless. It might indeed anathematise² the refractory official, or hamper him if it could by setting in motion against him a colleague or the tribunes, but it could do no more, and these measures, though as a rule effective in the case of magistrates stationed in Rome, failed just where the senate's control was most needed and most difficult to maintain, in its relations with the generals and governors of provinces abroad. The virtual independence of the proconsul was before 146 B.C. already exciting the jealousy of the senate and endangering its supremacy.³ Nor again

Weakness of
the senatorial
government.

608 A.U.C.

¹ The senators' whole duty is *sententiam dicere*. The senator was asked *quid censes?* the assembly, *quid velitis jubeatis?* Cf. also the saving clause, *Si eis videretur (sc. consulibus, etc.)*, in *Sca.*, e. g., Cic., *Phil.*, v., 19.

² By declaring his action to be *contra rempublicam*. The force of this anathema varied with circumstances. It had no legal value.

³ Livy, xxxviii., 42, of Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia, 189 B.C.; cf. also the position of the two Scipios.

had the senate any legal hold over the assembly. Except in certain specified cases, it rested with the magistrate to decide whether any question should be settled by a decree of the senate or a vote of the assembly.¹ If he decided to make a proposal to the assembly, he was not bound except by custom to obtain the previous approval of the senate,² and the constitution set no limits to the power of the assembly to decide any question whatsoever that was laid before it. The right of the people to govern was still valid; and though it had long lain dormant, any year might see a magistrate in office resolved on recalling the people to a larger share in the conduct of affairs by consulting them rather than the senate, and an assembly bent on the exercise of its lawful prerogatives.

And from 167 B.C. at least, onwards, there were increasing indications that both the acquiescence of the people and the loyalty of the 597 A.U.C. magistrates were failing. The absorbing excitement of the great wars had died away; the economic and social disturbance and distress which they produced were creating a growing feeling of discontent; and at the same time the senate provoked inquiries into its title to govern by its failure any longer to govern well. In the East there was increasing confusion; in the West, Viriathus had, single-handed, defied the

¹ Hence the same things, *e. g.*, founding of colonies, are done in one year by a *Scutum.*, in another by a *lex*; *cf.* Cic., *De Rep.*, ii., 32; *Phil.*, i., 2, of Antony as consul, "*mutata omnia, nihil per senatum, omnia per populum.*"

² There was no legal necessity, before Sulla's time, for getting the "*senatus auctoritas*" for a proposal to the assembly.

power which had crushed Carthage. At home the senate was becoming more and more simply an organ of the nobility, and the nobility were becoming every year more exclusive, more selfish, and less capable and unanimous.¹

The first systematic attack upon the senatorial government is connected with the names of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, and its immediate occasion was an attempt to deal with no less a danger than the threatened disappearance of the class to which of all others Rome had owed most in the past.² For, while Rome had been extending her sway westward and eastward, and while her nobles and merchants were amassing colossal fortunes abroad, the small landholders in many parts of Italy were sinking deeper into ruin under the pressure of accumulated difficulties. The Hannibalic war had laid waste their fields and thinned their numbers, nor when peace returned to Italy did it bring with it any revival of prosperity. The heavy burden of military service still pressed ruinously upon them,³ and in addition they were called upon

The Gracchi,
133-121 B.C.
621-623
A.U.C.

¹ See generally Mommsen, *R. G.*, i., bk. iii., cap. 6; Lange, *Röm. Alterth.*, vol. ii.; Ihne, v., cap. i. The first law against bribery at elections was passed in 181 B.C. (Livy, xl., 20), and against magisterial extortion in the provinces in 149 (*Lex Calpurnia de pecuniis repetundis*). The senators had special seats allotted to them in the theatre in 194 B.C. (Livy, xxxiv., 44, 54).

² Mommsen, i., bk. iii., cap. 12, bk. iv., cap. 2; Ihne, iv., 173 sq., v. 1-25; Nitzsch, *Die Gracchen*; Long, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Republic*; Beesly, *The Gracchi, Marius, and Sulla*; Greenidge, *History of Rome*, vol. i.

³ To Spain alone more than 150,000 men were sent between 196 and 169 (Ihne, iii., 319); compare the reluctance of the people to de-

to compete with the foreign corn imported from beyond the sea,¹ and with the foreign slave-labour purchased by the capital of the wealthier men. Farming became unprofitable, and the hard, laborious life with its scanty returns was thrown into still darker relief when compared with the stirring life of the camps with its opportunities of booty, or with the cheap provisions, frequent largesses, and gay spectacles to be had in the large towns. The small holders went off to follow the eagles or swell the proletariat of the cities, and their holdings were left to run waste or merged in the vineyards, oliveyards, and above all in the great cattle-farms of the rich, while their own place was taken by slaves. The evil was not equally serious in all parts of Italy. It was least felt in the central highlands, in Campania, and in the newly settled fertile valley of the Po. It was worst in Etruria and in southern Italy; but everywhere it was serious enough to demand the earnest attention of Roman statesmen. Of its existence the government had received plenty of warning in the declining numbers of ablebodied males returned at the census,² in the increasing difficulties of recruiting for the legions,³ in servile outbreaks in Etruria and

clare war against Macedon in 200 B.C., and also the case of Spurius Ligustinus in 171 (Livy, xlii., 34).

¹ Mommsen, i., 837 sq. Ihne (v., 16) thinks that Mommsen has exaggerated the depressing effects of foreign competition, but hardly makes out his case.

² Beloch, *Ital. Bund.*, 80 sq.

³ Livy, xliiii., 14; *Epit.*, xlvi., lv. During this period the minimum qualification for service in the legion was reduced from 11,000 to 4,000 asses.

554-594
A. U. C. Apulia.¹ And between 200 B.C. and 160 B.C. a good deal was attempted by way of remedy. In addition to the foundation of twenty colonies,² there were frequent allotments of land to veteran soldiers, especially in Apulia and Samnium.³

574 A. U. C. In 180 B.C. 40,000 Ligurians were removed from their homes and settled on vacant lands once the property of a Samnite tribe,⁴ and in 160 B.C. the Pomptine marshes were drained for the purpose of cultivation.⁵ But these efforts were only partially successful. The colonies planted in Cisalpine Gaul and in Picenum flourished, but of the others the majority slowly dwindled away, and two required recolonising only eight years after their foundation.⁶ The veterans who received land were unfitted to make good farmers; and large numbers, on the first opportunity, gladly returned as volunteers to a soldier's life. Moreover, after 160 B.C. even these efforts ceased, and with the single exception of the colony of Auximum in Picenum (157 B.C.) nothing was done to check the spread of the evil, until in 133 B.C. Tiberius Gracchus, on his election to the tribunate, set his hand to the work.

594 A. U. C.

597 A. U. C.

621 A. U. C.

Tiberius
Gracchus.

The new tribune was by no means the conventional demagogue. Though a plebeian, he came of a family which had ranked as noble

¹ Livy, xxxii., 26, xxxiii., 36, xxxix., 29, 41.

² Sixteen Roman and four Latin colonies. See Marquardt, *Stadtsverw.*, i., cap. I.

³ *E. g.* Livy, xxxi., 4, 12, 39; xxxii., 1.

⁴ Livy, xl., 38.

⁵ Livy, *Epit.*, xlvi.

⁶ Sipontum and Buxentum in 186 (Livy, xxxix., 23).

for several generations. His father had been both consul and censor. His mother, Cornelia, was the daughter of Scipio Africanus the elder, and the most accomplished woman of her time. His sister was the wife of the younger Scipio, and he himself married a lady of the great Claudian house. Among his friends were P. Mucius Scævola (consul 133 B.C.), the greatest jurist of his time, and P. Licinius Crassus, an orator, and, like Scævola, learned in the law. Gracchus himself had been carefully educated by his mother. He was a scholar, an eloquent speaker, and had already won a reputation as a soldier and administrator. His noble birth and connections, his abilities and accomplishments, his high character, all justified the expectation that he would be able to carry through the delicate task of reform which public opinion summoned him to undertake.

The lines on which any attempt to increase the numbers of small landowners in Italy would have to be made were sufficiently clearly marked. To confiscate private land for the purpose was out of the question, to purchase it would have been ruinously expensive. But the Roman state owned vast domains in Italy.¹ These "public lands" were the property of the Roman people, and intended for their benefit. In fact, however, the greater portion of them was either held in occupation by wealthy men or leased out, chiefly for grazing, to large cattle farmers. To abolish this monopoly of the public lands by a rich minority, and to use them for the advantage of the

¹ Mainly in S. Italy, where, as the evidence shows, the Gracchan commissioners did most of their work.

community was a course for which there was ample precedent. At the very outset of Rome's career of conquest, tribune after tribune had asserted the principle that the right method of dealing with the lands won by conquest was to parcel them out into allotments, and assign them to the poorer citizens.¹ The method encouraged agriculture, increased the number of landowners, and helped the poor. But the wealthier citizens had always preferred another and a very different method from that of allotment. In the case of waste lands, the custom had been to invite persons to settle down upon them (*occupare*) and cultivate them,² each man taking for himself³ as much as he could manage. There was no parcelling out or assigning of the land.⁴ The state remained the owner; while the squatter was only the possessor. He had no lease, but if he could show that he had "squatted" with the permission of the state, he was guaranteed against disturbance.⁵ This method was probably intended as a means for "settling up" lands

¹ Livy, iv., 48: "*ut ager ex hostibus captus viritum divideretur*"; and *ibid.*, iv., 51. The technical phrases were *agrum dividere*, *agrum dare*, *assignare*. The land was carefully surveyed and a map (*forma*) showing the lots and their boundaries was made. The allotments became the absolute property of the allottees.

² Appian, *B. C.*, i. 7: *ἐπεκλήρουτο τοῖς ἐθέλουσιν ἐκπονεῖν*; *ibid.*, i., 718: *κήρυγμα τὴν ἀνέμητον ἐξεργάζεσθαι*.

³ *Sibi sumere* (*Lex Agraria*, line 2, *C. I. L.*, i., 200)

⁴ *Agrimensores* (ed. Lachmann), p. 138: "*horum agrorum nullam est aes, nulla forma quoniam non ex mensuris actis quisque accepit sed quod aut excolvit, aut in spem colendi occupavit.*" Livy says of Rome when hastily rebuilt after its sack by the Gauls that it had the look of a city "*occupata magis quam divisa*" (v. 55).

⁵ By the praetor's interdict, the squatter had to show that he had not come into possession "*clam aut vi, aut precario*" (Bruns. *Fontes Juris Rom.*, p. 181). Against resumption of land by the state, the

which were unfit for allotment. But its character gradually altered. It became popular with the rich; to please them it was applied to other than waste lands; the occupations increased in size, and the occupiers in many cases, instead of tilling the land, used it for grazing, or even for pleasure-grounds. This monopoly of the state lands by a few wealthy occupiers was rendered more irritating by the fact that even from the open pastures belonging to the state the poor citizen was gradually excluded by the rich graziers. To meet these evils the Licinian law¹ had forbidden any one person to occupy more than 500 acres, or to turn out on the public pastures more than 100 cattle or 500 sheep. But the Licinian law had not been properly enforced, and of the wide tracts of land acquired by Rome after the Samnite wars, and again after the second Punic war, the greater part had either passed into the occupation of rich nobles, or had been leased for grazing to wealthy companies of cattle and sheep farmers.²

The remedy proposed by Gracchus³ amounted in effect to the resumption by the state of as much of

occupier could only plead the moral claim based on *vetustas possessionis*.

¹ It is probable that the Licinian law was of much more recent date than tradition would have us believe. The maximum of 500 acres implies a larger area of public land than could have been owned by Rome in 377 B.C.

² The extensive grazing-grounds (*saltus publici*) in Samnium and Apulia were mostly leased to *pecuarii*.

³ Plut., *T. G.*, 9-14; Appian, *B. C.*, i., 9-13; Livy, *Epit.*, lviii.; Cic., *L. Agr.*, ii., 31. Compare also Mommsen, *R. G.*, ii., 68 sq.; Ihne, v., 25; Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverw.*, i., 437, sq.; Lange, *Röm. Alterth.*, iii., 8 sq.; Nitsch, *Gracchen*, 295; Dureau de la Malle, *Écon. politique des Romains*, ii., 280.

The proposals of Tiberius Gracchus.

the "common land" as was not held in occupation by authorised persons and conformably to the provisions of the Licinian law. Unauthorised occupiers were to be evicted; in other cases the occupation was reduced to a maximum size of 1,000 acres.¹ The land thus rescued for the community from the monopoly of a few was to be distributed in allotments,² and a commission of three men was created for the double purpose of deciding what land should be taken, and of carrying out the work of allotment.³ It was a scheme which could quote in its favour ancient precedent as well as urgent necessity. Of the causes which led to its ultimate failure something will be said later on; for the present we must turn to the constitutional conflict which it provoked. The senate from the first identified itself with the interests of the wealthy occupiers, and Tiberius found himself forced into a struggle with the senate, which had been no part of his original plan. He fell back on the legislative sovereignty of the people; he resuscitated the half-forgotten powers of interference vested in the tribunate in order to paralyse the action of the senatorial magistrates, and finally lost his life

¹ Or possibly 750; it was in excess of the limit fixed by the Licinian law; App., *B. C.*, i., 9.

² Compare the inscription of Popillius Lænas, consul 132, *C. I. L.*, i., 551; Wordsworth, *Fragments of Early Latin*, p. 221.

³ The allotments were to be inalienable, and were charged with payment of a quit-rent (App., *B. C.*, i., 10; Plut., *C. G.*, 9). Their size is not stated. It is doubtful if the thirty *jugera* held *agri colendi causa* (compare the *Lex Agraria*, 111 B.C.) refer to the Sempronian allotments. See *C. I. L.*, i., 200, and Mommsen's notes.

in an attempt to make good one of the weak points in the tribune's position by securing his own re-election for a second year. But the conflict did not end with his death. It was renewed on a wider scale, and with a more deliberate aim, by his brother Gaius, who on his election to the tribunate (123 B.C.) at once came forward as the avowed enemy of the senate. The latter suddenly found its control of the administration threatened at a variety of points. On the invitation of the popular tribune the assembly proceeded to restrict the senate's freedom of action in assigning the provinces.¹ It regulated the taxation of the province of Asia² and altered the conditions of military service.³ In home affairs it inflicted two serious blows on the senate's authority by declaring the summary punishment of Roman citizens by the consuls on the strength of a *senatus consultum* to be a violation of the law of appeal,⁴ and by taking out of the senate's hands the control of the newly-established court for the trial of cases of magisterial misgovernment in the provinces.⁵ Tiberius had committed the mistake of relying too exclusively on the support of one section only of the community ;

Gaius
Gracchus.
631 A.U.C.

¹ *Lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus* ; Cic., *Pro Domo*, 9 ; *De Prov. Cons.*, 2, 7 ; Sall., *Jug.*, 27.

² *Lex de provincia Asia* ; Cic., *Verr.*, 3, 6 ; Fronto, *Ad Verum*, ii., p. 125.

³ Plut., *C. G.*, 5 ; Diod., xxxiv., 25.

⁴ Plut., *C. G.*, 4 ; Cic. *Pro Domo*, 31 ; *Pro Rab. Perd.*, 4.

⁵ *Quaestio de repetundis*, 149 B.C. See Plut., *C. G.*, 5 ; Livy, *Epit.*, ix. ; Tac., *Ann.*, xii., 60 ; App., *B. C.*, i., 21. For the kindred *Lex Acilia*, see *C. I. L.*, i., 198 ; Wordsworth, *Fragm.*, 424.

his brother endeavoured to enlist on the popular side every available ally. The Latins and Italians had opposed an agrarian scheme which took from them land which they had come to regard as rightfully theirs, and gave them no share in the benefit of the allotments.¹ Gaius not only removed this latter grievance,² but ardently supported and himself brought forward the first proposals made in Rome for their enfranchisement.³ The indifference of the city populace, to whom the prospect of small holdings in a remote district of Italy was not a tempting one, was overcome by the establishment of regular monthly doles of corn at a low price.⁴ Finally, the men of business—the *publicani*, merchants, and money-lenders—were conciliated by the privilege granted to them of collecting the tithes of the new province of Asia, and placed in direct rivalry with the senate by the substitution of men of their own class as judges in the *quæstio de repetundis*, in place of senators.⁵ The organiser of this concerted attack upon the position of the senate fell, like his brother, in a riot.

¹ They had succeeded in 129 in suspending the operations of the agrarian commission. App., *B. C.*, i., 18; Livy, *Epit.*, lix.; Cic., *De Rep.*, iii., 41; cf. *Lex Agraria*, line 81; *C. I. L.*, i., 200.

² Lange, *R. A.*, iii., 32; *Lex Agraria*, lines 3, 15, 21.

³ The Rogatio Fulvia, 125 B.C.; Val. Max., ix., 5, 1; App., *B. C.*, i., 21.

⁴ Plut., *C. G.*, 5; App., i., 21; Livy, *Epit.*, lx.; Festus, 290.

⁵ Hence Gaius ranked as the founder of the equestrian order. Plin., *N. H.*, xxxiii., 34: "*judicum appellatione separare eum ordinem . . . instituere Gracchi*"; Varro, *Ap. Non.*, 454: "*bicipitem civilitatem fecit.*"

The agrarian reforms of the two Gracchi had little permanent effect.¹ The agrarian commission, though between 129–122 B.C. its action was suspended in deference to the outcry raised by the occupiers, evidently made some progress with the work of allotment, especially in south Italy.² But the colonies which Gaius founded in Italy to supplement his brother's scheme came to nothing.³ Even in the lifetime of Gaius the clause in his brother's law rendering the new buildings inalienable was repealed, and the process of absorption recommenced.⁴ In 118 B.C. a stop was put to further allotment of occupied lands,⁵ and finally, in 111 B.C., the whole position of the agrarian question was altered by a law which converted all land still held in occupation into private land. The old controversy as to the proper use of the lands of the community was closed by this act of alienation. The contro-

Failure of the attempt at agrarian reform. 625–632 A.U.C.

636 A.U.C.

643 A.U.C.

¹ Traces of the work of the commission survive in the *Miliarium Popilianum* (*C. I. L.*, i., 551), in a few Gracchan *termini* (*ibid.*, 552, 553, 554, 555), in the *limites Gracchani* (*Liber Colon.*, ed. Lachmann, pp. 209, 210, 211, 229), etc. Compare also the rise in the numbers at the census of 125 B.C. (*Livy, Epit.*, lx.).

² *Livy, Epit.*, lx.; Appian, *B. C.*, i., 23. Two of them, Tarentum (*Plut.*, *C. G.*, 8) and Scylacium (*Vell. Pat.*, i., 15), were clearly intended to supply the new settlers in Calabria and Bruttium with convenient ports.

³ *Lex Minucia*, 121 B.C.; App., i., 27; Oros., v., 12; Festus, 201.

⁴ The so-called *Lex Thoria*; App., i., 27; Cic., *Brut.*, 36; cf. Wordsworth, *Fragm.*, 441.

⁵ The *Lex Agraria* still extant in a fragmentary condition in the museum at Naples. See Mommsen, *C. I. L.*, i., 200; Wordsworth, 441 sq.; Bruns, *Fontes Juris Rom.*, 54–67; App., i., 27.

versy in future turned not on the right of the poor citizens to the state lands, but on the expediency of purchasing other lands or distribution at the cost of the treasury.¹

But though the agraria reform failed, the political conflict it had provoked continued, and the lines on which it was waged were the main those laid down by Gaius Gracchus. The sovereignty of the people continued to be the watchword of the popular party and a free use of the plebeian machinery perfected during the old struggle between the orders, of the tribunate of the *plebs* and the *concilium plebis* remained the most effective means of securing their aims. At the same time the careers of both Tiberius and Gaius had illustrated the weak points in this machinery—the uncertain temper and varying composition of the assembly, the limited tenure of office enjoyed by the tribunes,² the possibility of disunion within their own body, and lastly, the difficulty of keeping together the divergent interests which Gaius had for a moment united in hostility to the senate.

Ten years after the death of Gaius the *populares* once more summoned up courage to challenge the supremacy of the senate; and it is important as marking a step in advance that it was on a question not of domestic reform but of foreign administration that the conflict

Marius
118-110 B.C.
896-654
A.U.C

¹ Cic., *Lex Agr.*, ii., sect. 65.

² Efforts were repeatedly made to get over this difficulty, e. g., by the Lex Papiria, 131 B.C.; Livy, *Epit.*, lix. Gaius was himself tribune for two years, 110-109 (cf. Sall., *Jug.*, 37: "*tribuni continuare magistratum nitebantur*"), and Saturninus in 100 B.C.

was renewed. The course of affairs in the client state of Numidia since Micipsa's death in 118 B.C. had been such as to discredit a stronger government than that of the senate.¹ In open defiance of Roman authority, and relying on the influence of his own well-spent gold, Jugurtha had murdered both his illegitimate rivals, Hiempsal and Adherbal, and made himself master of Numidia. The declaration of war wrung from the senate (112 B.C.) by popular indignation had been followed by the corruption of a consul² (111 B.C.) and the crushing defeat of the proconsul Albinus.³ On the news of this crowning disgrace the storm burst, and on the proposal of the tribunes a commission of inquiry was appointed into the conduct of the war.⁴ But the popular leaders did not stop here. Cæcilius Metellus who as consul (109 B.C.) had succeeded to the command in Numidia, was an able soldier but a rigid aristocrat; and they now resolved to improve their success by intrusting the command instead to a genuine son of the people. Their choice fell on Gaius Marius, an experienced officer and administrator but a man of humble birth, from the old Volscian town of Arpinum, who, though no politician, was by temperament and training a hater of the polished and effeminate nobles

¹ Sallust, *Jug.*, 5 sq.; Livy, *Epit.*, lxii., lxiv.

² Calpurnius Bestia; Sallust, *Jug.*, 28.

³ *Ib.*, 38, 39

⁴ *Ib.*, 40.

who filled the senate.¹ He was triumphantly elected, and, in spite of a decree of the senate, continuing Metellus as proconsul, he was intrusted by a vote of the assembly with the charge of the war against Jugurtha.²

Jugurtha was vanquished; and Marius, who had been a second time elected consul in his absence
 690 A.U.C. arrived at Rome in January 104 B.C., bringing the captive prince with him in chains.³ But further triumphs awaited the popular hero. The Cimbri and Teutones were at the gates of Italy; they had four times defeated the senatorial generals, and Marius was called upon to save Rome from a second invasion of the barbarians.⁴ After two years of suspense the victory at Aquæ Sextiæ
 688 A.U.C. (102 B.C.), followed by that on the Raudine plain (101 B.C.), put an end to the danger by the annihilation of the invading
 683 A.U.C. hordes, and Marius, now consul for the fifth time, returned to Rome in triumph. There the popular party welcomed him as a leader, and as one who would bring to their aid the *imperium* of the consul and all the prestige of a successful general. Once more, however, they were destined to a brief success, followed by disastrous defeat. Marius became for the sixth time consul⁵; of the two popular

¹ *Ib.*, 63; Plut., *Marius*, 2, 3. For the question as to the position of his parents, see Madvig, *Verfas.*, i. 179; Diod., xxxiv., 38.

² Sallust, *Jug.*, 73.

³ *Ib.*, 114. For the chronology of the Jugurthine war, see Mommsen *R. G.*, ii., 146, note; Pelham, *Journ. of Phil.*, vii. 91.

⁴ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxvii.; Plut., *Mar.*, 12; Mommsen, *ii.*, 171, sq.

⁵ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxix.; App., *B. C.*, i. 28 sq.

leaders Glaucia became prætor and Saturninus tribune. But neither Marius nor his allies were statesmen of the stamp of the Gracchi; and the laws proposed by Saturninus had evidently no other serious aim in view than that of harassing the senate. His corn law merely reduced the price fixed in 123 B.C. for the monthly dole of corn, and the main point of his agrarian law lay in the clause appended to it requiring all senators to swear to observe its provisions.¹ The laws were carried; the senators, with the exception of Metellus, took the oath; but the triumph of the popular leaders was short-lived. Their recklessness and violence had alienated all classes in Rome; and their period of office was drawing to a close. At the elections fresh rioting took place, and at last Marius as consul was called upon by the senate to protect the state against his own partisans. In despair, Saturninus and Glaucia surrendered; but while the senate was discussing their fate they were surrounded and murdered by the populace.

Saturninus
and the
Appuleian
laws.

631 A.U.C.

The popular party had been worsted once more in their struggle with the senate, but none the less their alliance with Marius, and the position in which their votes placed him, marked an epoch in the history of the revolution. The six consulships of Marius represented not merely a party victory but a protest against the system of divided and rapidly-

¹ For the *leges Appuleia*, see Livy, *Epit.*, lxix.; App. l. 29; Cle. *Pro Balbo*, 21; *Auct. ad Herennium*, l. 12, 21. They included also allotments to Marius's veterans; *Auct. de Vir.* III., 62.

changing commands, which was, no doubt, the system favoured by the senate, but was also an integral element of the republican constitution; and in assailing it the populace weakened the republic even more than they irritated the senate. The transference of the political leadership to a consul who was nothing if not a soldier was at once a confession of the insufficiency of the purely civil authority of the tribunate, and a dangerous encouragement of military interference in political controversies. The consequences were already foreshadowed by the special provisions made by Saturninus for Marius's veterans, and in the active part taken by the latter in the passing of his laws. Indirectly, too, Marius, though no politician, played an important part in this new departure. His military reforms¹ at once democratised the army and attached it more closely to its leader for the time being. He swept away the last traces of civil distinctions of rank or wealth within the legion, admitted to its ranks all classes, and substituted voluntary enlistment under a popular general for the old-fashioned compulsory levy. The efficiency of the legion was increased at the cost of a complete severance of the ties which bound it to the civil community and to the civil authorities.

The defeat of Saturninus was followed by several years of quiet; nor was the next important

¹ Sallust, *Jug.*, 86: "*ipse interea milites scribere, non more majorum neque ex classibus, sed uti cujusque libido erat, capite censes plerisque.*" For details, cf. Mommsen, *R. G.*, ii. 198; Mevrig *Verf.*, ii. 468, 493; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, ii. 417, 421.

crisis provoked directly by any efforts of the discredited popular party. It was due partly to the rivalry which had been growing more bitter each year between the senate and the commercial class; and secondly, to the long-impending question of the enfranchisement of the Italian allies. The *publicani*, *negotiatores*, and others, who constituted what was now becoming known as the equestrian order, had made unscrupulous use of their control of the courts, and especially of the *questio de repetundis*, against their natural rivals, the official class in the provinces. The threat of prosecution before a hostile jury was held over the head of every governor, legate, and quæstor who ventured to interfere with their operations. The average official preferred to connive at their exactions; the bolder ones paid with fines and even exile for their courage. In 93 B.C. 88: A.U.C. the necessity for a reform was proved beyond a doubt by the scandalous condemnation of P. Rutilius Rufus,¹ ostensibly on a charge of extortion, in reality as the reward of his efforts to check the extortions of the Roman *republicani* in Asia.

The need of reform was clear, but it was not so easy to carry a reform which would certainly be opposed by the whole strength of the equestrian order, and which, as involving Discontent of the Italian allies. the repeal of a Sempronian law, would arouse the resentment of the popular party. The difficulties of the Italian question were more serious. That the Italian allies were discontented was noto-

¹ *Livy, Epit.*, lxx.; *Vol. Pat.*, II., 13.

rious. After nearly two centuries of close alliance, of common dangers and victories, they now eagerly coveted as a boon that complete amalgamation with Rome which they had at first resented as a dishonour. But, unfortunately, Rome had grown more selfishly exclusive in proportion as the value set upon Roman citizenship increased. The political liberality with which the franchise had once been granted had disappeared. The allies found their burdens increasing and their ancient privileges diminishing, while the resentment with which they viewed their exclusion from the fruits of the conquests they had helped to make was aggravated by the growingly suspicious and domineering attitude of the Roman Government.¹ During the last forty years feelings of hope and disappointment had rapidly succeeded each other; Marcus Fulvius, Gaius Gracchus, Saturninus, had all held out promises of relief, but nothing had yet been done. On each occasion they had crowded to Rome, full of eager expectation, only to be harshly ejected from the city by the consul's orders.² The justice of their claims could hardly be denied, the danger of continuing to ignore them was obvious, yet the difficulties in the way of granting them were formidable in the extreme. The temper of senate and people alike was still jealously exclusive; and from a higher than a merely selfish point of view there was much

¹ Mommsen, *R. G.*, ii., 218; Ihne, iv., 151, v. 253; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 57, 58.

² *Lex Junia*, Cic., *De Off.*, iii., 11; *Lex Licinia Mucia*, Cic., *Pro Corn.*, fr. 10; Ascon., p. 67.

to be said against the revolution involved in so sudden and enormous an enlargement of the citizen body.

Marcus Livius Drusus, who as a tribune gallantly took up the task of reform, is claimed by Cicero¹ as a member of that party of the centre to which he belonged himself. Noble, wealthy, and popular, he seems to have hoped to be able by the weight of his position and character to rescue the burning questions of the day from the grasp of extreme partisans and to settle them peacefully and equitably. But he, like Cicero after him, had to find to his cost that there was no room in the fierce strife of Roman politics for moderate counsels. His proposal to reform the law-courts excited the equestrian order and their friends in the senate to fury. The agrarian and corn laws which he coupled with it² alienated many more in the senate, and roused the old anti-popular party feeling; finally, his known negotiations with the Italians were eagerly misrepresented to the jealous and excited people as evidence of complicity with a widespread conspiracy against Rome. His laws were carried, but the senate pronounced them null and void.³ Drusus was denounced in the senate-house as a traitor, and on his way home was struck down by the hand of an unknown assassin.

Marcus
Livius
Drusus,
91 B.C.
663 A.U.C.

¹ Cic., *De Orat.*, i., 25, and *De Domo*, 50; Appian, *B. C.*, i., 35; Diod. Cic., xxxvii., 10; Ihne, v., 242.

² For the provisions of the *Leges Livie*, see App., *B. C.*, i., 35; Livy, *Epit.*, lxi. They included, according to Pliny, *H. N.*, xxxiii., 3, a proposal for the debasement of the coinage.

³ Cic. *Pro Domo*, 16

The knights retained their monopoly of the courts, but this and all other domestic controversies were silenced for the time by the news which followed hard upon the murder of Drusus that the Italians were in open revolt against Rome. His assassination was the signal for an outbreak which had been secretly prepared for some time before. Throughout the highlands of Central and Southern Italy the flower of the Italian peoples rose as one man.¹ Etruria and Umbria held aloof; the isolated Latin colonies stood firm; but the Sabellian clans North and South, the Latinised Marsi and Pæligni, as well as the still Oscan-speaking Samnites and Lucanians, rushed to arms. No time was lost in proclaiming their plans for the future. A new Italian state was to be formed. The Pælignian town of Corfinium was selected as its capital and rechristened with the proud name of Italica. All Italians were to be citizens of this new metropolis, and here were to be the place of assembly and the senate-house. A senate of five hundred members and a magistracy resembling that of Rome completed a constitution which adhered closely to the very political traditions which its authors had most reason to abjure.

Now, as always in the face of serious danger, the action of Rome was prompt and resolute. Both consuls took the field²; with each were five legates, among them the veteran Marius and his destined

¹ For the Social War, see besides Mommsen, Ihne, Lange, also Kiene, *D. Römische Bundesgenossenkrieg*, Leipsic, 1845.

² App., *B. C.*, i. 39-49; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxii.-lxxvi.

rival L. Cornelius Sulla, and even freedmen were pressed into service with the legions. But the first year's campaign opened disastrously. In Central Italy the Northern Sabellians, and in the South the Samnites, defeated the forces opposed to them. And though before the end of the year Marius and Sulla in the North, and the Consul Cæsar himself in Campania, succeeded in inflicting severe blows on the enemy, and on the Marsi especially, it is not surprising that, with an empty treasury, with the insurgents' strength still unbroken, and with rumours of disaffection in the loyal districts, opinion in Rome should have turned in the direction of the more liberal policy which had been so often scornfully rejected, and in favour of some compromise which should check the spread of the revolt, and possibly sow discord among their enemies. Towards the close of the year 90 B.C. the Consul Cæsar carried the *lex Julia*,¹ by which the Roman franchise was offered to all communities which had not as yet revolted; early in the next year (89 B.C.) the Julian law was supplemented by the *lex Plautia Papiria*, introduced by two of the tribunes, which enacted that any citizen of an allied community then domiciled in Italy might obtain the franchise by giving in his name to a prætor in Rome within sixty days. A third law (*lex Calpurnia*), apparently passed at the same time, empowered Roman magistrates in the field to bestow the franchise there and

664 A.U.C.
Lex Julia
and Lex
Plautia
Papiria.
665 A.U.C.

¹ For the *Lex Julia* see Cic., *Pro Balbo*, 8; Gell., iv., 4; App. *B. C.*, i., 49. For *Lex Plautia Papiria*, see Cic., *Pro Archia*, 4, and *Schol. Bob.*, p. 353.

then upon all who were willing to receive it. This sudden opening of the closed gates of Roman citizenship was completely successful, and its effects were at once visible in the diminished vigour of the insurgents. By the end of 89 B.C. the
665 A.U.C. Samnites and Lucanians were left alone in their obstinate hostility to Rome, and neither, thanks to Sulla's brilliant campaign in Samnium, had for the moment any strength left for active aggression.

The enfranchisement of Italy was an accomplished fact, though the exact status of the new citizens was not settled until a few years later. Politically, Italy ceased to be a confederacy under Roman leadership, and the Italian allies of Rome entered as municipalities within the pale of the Roman state. But this act of enfranchisement, just and necessary though it was, added to the difficulties which beset the old republican constitution. It emphasised the absurdity of a system which treated the nobles and *plebs* of the city of Rome as the representatives of the Roman people, and which condemned the great mass of that people to a virtual exclusion from politics. Between the new citizens in the country towns and districts, and those in Rome a coolness sprang up. The contempt with which the latter regarded the *municipales* and *rustici* was repaid by a growing indifference on the other side to the traditions and institutions of a narrow polity in which they had only a nominal place, and by a growing mistrust of Roman politicians and politics. When the crisis came even Cicero's influence failed to excite among them any enthusiasm for the republican cause.

Meanwhile the termination of the Social War brought no peace with it in Rome. The old quarrels were renewed with increased bitterness, while the newly-enfranchised Italians themselves resented as bitterly the restriction,¹ which robbed them of their due share of political influence by allowing them to vote only in a specified number of tribes. The senate itself was distracted by violent personal rivalries, and all these feuds, animosities, and grievances were aggravated by the widespread economic distress and ruin which affected all classes.² Lastly, war with Mithradates had been declared; it was notorious that the privilege of commanding the force to be sent against him would be keenly contested, and that the contest would lie between the veteran Marius and L. Cornelius Sulla.³

It was in an atmosphere thus charged with the elements of disturbance that P. Sulpicius Rufus as tribune⁴ brought forward his laws. He proposed—(1) that the command of the Mithradatic war should be given to Marius, (2) that the new citizens should be distrib-

P. Sulpicius
Rufus,
88 B.C.
666 A.U.C.

¹ Vell. Pat., ii., 20; App. *B. C.*, i., 49, 53. Madvig (*R. Verf.*, i., 27) follows Appian in holding that the tribes to which the new voters were confined were newly-created tribes. Cf. Mommsen, *Rom. Tribus*, ii.

² App., *B. C.*, i., 54, and *Mithr.*, 22; Oros., v., 18; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxiv.

³ It had already been declared a consular province for 87, and early in 88 seems to have been assigned to Sulla by decree of the senate.

⁴ Cf. Cic., *De Orat.*, i., 25, iii., 31, and *Brutus*, 214; Vell. Pat., ii., 18, for Sulpicius himself. For his laws, see App., *B. C.*, i., 53 sq.; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxvii.; Plut., *Sulla*, 8, sq.

uted through all the tribes, (3) that the freedmen should no longer be confined to the four city tribes, (4) that any senator owing more than two thousand *dendrii* should lose his seat, (5) that those exiled on suspicion of complicity with the Italian revolt should be recalled. Whatever may have been Sulpicius's intentions, these proposals inevitably provoked a storm. The old voters bitterly resented the swamping of the existing constituency; the senate rallied its forces to oppose the alteration in the franchise of the freedmen and the proposed purging of its own ranks; and lastly, both the senate and Sulla himself, now one of the consuls, prepared to resist the transference of the Asiatic command to Marius. Both sides were ominously ready for violent measures. The consuls, in order to prevent legislation, proclaimed a public holiday.¹ Sulpicius replied by arming his followers and driving the consuls from the forum. The proclamation was withdrawn and the laws carried, but Sulpicius's triumph was short-lived. From Nola in Campania, where lay the legions commanded by him in the Social War, Sulla advanced on Rome, and for the first time a Roman consul entered the city at the head of the legions of the republic. Resistance was hopeless. Marius and Sulpicius fled,² and Sulla, summoning the assembly of the centuries, proposed the measures he considered

¹ App., *loc. cit.*, ἡμερῶν ἀργίας πολλῶν—a favourite stroke of policy. Cf. Cicero, *Ad Q. F.*, ii. 4, 4: "dies comitiales exemit omnes . . . Latina instaurantur, nec deerant supplicationes."

² Marius finally escaped to Africa (see Marius); Sulpicius was taken and killed; App., i., 60.

necessary for the public security, the most important being a provision that the sanction of the senate should be necessary before any proposal was introduced to the assembly.¹ Then, after waiting in Rome long enough to hold the consular elections, he left for Greece early in 87 B.C. 667 A.U.C.

Sulla had conquered, but his victory cost the republic dear. He had first taught political partisans to look for final success, not to a majority of votes in the forum or campus, Marius and Cinna. but to the swords of the soldiery; and he had shown that the legions, composed as they now were, could be trusted to regard nothing but the commands of a favourite leader. The lesson was well learnt. Shortly after his departure, Cinna as consul revived the proposals of Sulpicius²; his colleague Octavius at the head of an armed force fell upon the new citizens who had collected in crowds to vote, and the forum was heaped high with the bodies of the slain.³ Cinna fled, but fled like Sulla, to the legions. When the senate declared him deposed from his consulship, he replied by invoking the aid of the soldiers in Campania on behalf of the violated rights of the people and the injured dignity of the consulship, and, like Sulla, found them ready to follow where he led. The neighbouring Italian communities, which had lost many citizens in the recent massacre, sent

¹ App., *B. C.*, i., 59: μηδὲν ἐπὶ ἀπροβούλευτον ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐσφάρεσθαι. For the other laws mentioned by Appian, see Mommsen, ii., 258.

² Livy, *Epit.*, lxxix.; Vell., ii., 20.

³ Cic., *Pro Sestio*, 77; *Catil.*, iii., 24.

their new champion men and money¹; while from Africa, whither he had escaped after Sulla's entry into Rome, came Marius with one thousand Numidian horsemen. He landed in Etruria, where his old veterans flocked to his standard, and at the head of some six thousand men joined Cinna before the gates of Rome. The Senate had prepared for a desperate defence, but fortune was adverse, and after a brief resistance they gave way. Cinna was acknowledged as consul, the sentence of outlawry passed on Marius was revoked, and Cinna and Marius entered Rome with their troops. Marius's thirst for revenge was gratified by a frightful massacre, and he lived long enough to be nominated consul for the seventh time. But he held his consulship only a few weeks. Early in 86 B.C. he died, and for the next three years Cinna ruled Rome. Constitutional government was virtually suspended.

669 A.U.C. For 85 B.C. and 84 B.C. Cinna nominated
670 A.U.C. himself and a trusted colleague as consuls.² The state was, as Cicero³ says, without lawful authority.⁴ One important matter was carried through—the registration in all the tribes of the newly-enfranchised Italians,⁵ but beyond this little

¹ Tibur and Præneste especially.

² The consuls of 86, 85, 84 were all nominated without election. Livy, *Epit.*, lxxx., lxxxiii.; App., i., 75.

³ *Brut.*, 227.

⁴ The nobles had fled to Sulla in large numbers; Velleius, ii., 23.

⁵ This work was accomplished apparently by the censors of 86; but *cf.* Lange, iii., 133; Mommsen, *R. G.*, ii., 315; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxiv.

was done. The attention of Cinna and his friends was in truth engrossed by the ever-present dread of Sulla's return from Asia. The consul of 86 B.C., Valerius Flaccus, sent out to supersede him, was murdered by his own soldiers at Nicomedia.¹ In 85 B.C., Sulla, though disowned by his government, concluded a peace with Mithradates.² In 84 B.C., after settling affairs in Asia and crushing Flaccus's successor Fimbria, he crossed into Greece, and in the spring of 83 B.C. landed at Brundisium, with forty thousand soldiers and a large following of *émigré* nobles. Cinna was dead,³ murdered like Flaccus by his mutinous soldiers; his most trusted colleague, Carbo, was commanding as proconsul in Cisalpine Gaul; and the resistance offered to Sulla's advance was slight. At Capua Sulla routed the forces of one consul, Norbanus; at Teanum the troops of the other went over in a body to the side of the outlawed proconsul. After a winter spent in Campania he pressed forward to Rome, defeated the younger Marius (consul 82 B.C.) near Præneste, and entered the city without further opposition. In North Italy the success of his lieutenants Metellus, Cn. Pompeius, and Marcus Crassus had been fully as decisive. Cisalpine Gaul, Umbria, and Etruria had all been won for him, and the two principal leaders on the other side,

688 A.U.C.

669 A.U.C.

The return
of Sulla,
83 B.C.
671 A.U.C.

672 A.U.C.

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxii.; App., *Mithr.*, 52; Plut., *Sulla*, 23.

² Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxiii.; Vell., ii., 23; Plut., *Sulla*, 22.

³ In 84; App., *B. C.*, i., 78; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxiii.

Carbo and Norbanus, had each fled, one to Rhodes, the other to Africa. Only one foe remained to be conquered. The Samnites and Lucanians, whom Cinna had conciliated, and who saw in Sulla their bitterest foe, were for the last time in arms, and had already joined forces with the remains of the Marian army close to Rome. The decisive battle was fought under the walls of the city, and ended in the complete defeat of the Marians and Italians.¹

For a period of nearly ten years Rome and Italy had been distracted by civil wars. Constitutional government, whether by Senate or Assembly, had been in abeyance, while the opposing parties fought out their quarrels with the sword, under the leadership of generals at the head of legions ready and willing to follow them against their fellow-citizens and against established authorities of the state. The strife had spread from the Roman forum to Italy, and from Italy to the provinces; and for the first time the integrity of the empire was threatened by the conflicts of rival governors.² The tottering fabric of Italian prosperity had been rudely shaken by the ravages of war. Class hatreds and personal feuds distracted the community, while the enfranchisement

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxviii. : "*Cum Samnitibus ante portam Collinam debellavit*"; Plut., *Sulla*, 29, and *Crassus*, 6. According to App., i., 93, and Livy, *loc. cit.*, 8,000 captives were massacred. Florus (iii., 21) gives 4,000. Præneste surrendered, was razed to the ground, and its population put to the sword.

² In Asia between Sulla and Fimbria. In 82 Pompey crushed the Marian leader Carbo in Africa. In Spain, Q. Sertorius maintained himself for ten years (82-72).

of the Italians was in itself a revolution which affected the very foundations of the republic. Such was the situation with which Sulla was now called upon to deal. It was for him to heal the divisions which rent the state asunder, to set in work again the machinery of civil government, and, above all, so to modify it as to meet the altered requirements of the time.

CHAPTER II.

FROM SULLA TO CÆSAR—81-49 B.C.

THE victory at the Colline Gate was followed almost immediately by the appointment of the victor to the office of dictator. He was authorised to enact laws and resettle the constitution; he was given absolute power of life and death over Roman citizens, and his previous acts were formally ratified.¹ For the first time since the expulsion of the kings, Rome was placed under the rule of a single man.² Dangerous as the experiment was, the state of affairs justified Sulla's plain intimation to the senate that no other course was possible. The real charge against Sulla³ is not that he failed to accomplish a permanent reconstruction of the republican constitution, for to do so was beyond the powers even of man so able, resolute, and self-confident as Sulla, armed though he

¹ App., *B. C.*, i., 98: ἐπὶ θέρει νόμων καὶ καταστᾶσει τῶν πολιτειῶν. Cic., *Lex Agr.*, i., 15: "lex, ut dictator quem vellet civium impune posset occidere"; *ib.* iii., 2: "ut omnia quocumque ille fecisset essent rata." Comp. Plut., *Sull.*, 33.

² App., *B. C.*, i., 98.

³ Compare especially Mommsen's brilliant chapter, which is, however, too favourable (ii., 335-377), and also Lange (iii., 144 *sq.*), where most of the special literature on the Sullan legislation is given.

was with absolute authority, and backed by overwhelming military strength and the prestige of unbroken success. He stands convicted rather of deliberately aggravating some and culpably ignoring others of the evils he should have tried to cure, and of contenting himself with a party triumph when he should have aimed at the reorganisation and confirmation of the whole state. By the next generation the "reign of Sulla" was associated, not with the restoration of order and constitutional government, but with bloodshed, violence, and audacious illegality. His victory was instantly followed, not by any measures of conciliation, but by a series of massacres, proscriptions, and confiscations, of which almost the least serious consequence was the immediate loss of life which they entailed.¹ From this time forward the fear of proscription and confiscation recurred as a possible consequence of every political crisis, and it was with difficulty that Cæsar himself dissipated the belief that his victory would be followed by a Sullan reign of terror. The legacy of hatred and discontent which Sulla left behind him was a constant source of disquiet and danger. In the children of the proscribed, whom he excluded from holding office, and the dispossessed owners of the confiscated lands, every agitator found ready and willing allies.² The

Effects of the
Sullan pro-
scriptions.

¹ App., I., 95 sq. ; Dio Cassius, *fr.* 109 ; Plut., *Sulla*, 31. The number of the proscribed is given as 4,700 (Valer. Max.), including, according to Appian, 2,600 members of the equestrian order.

² *E. g.*, Catiline, in 63 ; Sall., *Cat.*, 21, 37. For the "*liberi proscriptorum*," see Velleius, ii., 28

moneyed men of the equestrian order were more than ever hostile to the senatorial government, which they now identified with the man who cherished towards them a peculiar hatred,¹ and whose creatures had hunted them down like dogs. The attachment which the new Italian citizens might in time have learnt to feel for the old republican constitution was nipped in the bud by the massacres at Præneste and Norba, by the harsh treatment of the ancient towns of Etruria, and by the ruthless desolation of Samnium and Lucania.² Quite as fatal were the results to the economic prosperity of the peninsula. Sulla's confiscations, following on the civil and social wars, opened the doors wide for a long train of evils. The veterans whom he planted on the lands he had seized³ did nothing for agriculture, and swelled the growing numbers of the turbulent and discontented.⁴ The "Sullan men" became as great an object of fear and dislike as the "Sullan reign."⁵ The *latifundia* increased with startling rapidity—whole territories passing into the hands of greedy partisans.⁶ Wide tracts of land, confiscated, but never allotted, ran to waste.⁷ In all but a few dis-

¹ Cic., *Pro Cluent.*, 151.

² Cic., *Phil.*, v., 43: "*tot municipiorum maxima calamitates.*" Cic., *Pro Domo*, 30; Cic., *Ad Att.*, i., 19; Florus, iii., 21; Strabo, p. 223, 254.

³ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxix.; App., *B. C.*, i., 100; Cic., *Catil.*, ii., 20.

⁴ Sall., *Cat.*, 28.

⁵ Cic., *Lex Agr.*, ii., 26.

⁶ Cic., *Lex Agr.*, ii., 26, 28; iii., 2,—the territories of Præneste and of the Hirpini.

⁷ Cic., *Lex Agr.*, ii., 27; iii., 3.

tricts of Italy the free population disappeared from the open country; and life and property were rendered insecure by the brigandage which now developed unchecked, and in which the herdsman slaves played a prominent part. The outbreaks of Spartacus in 73, and of Catiline ten years later, were significant commentaries on this part of Sulla's work.¹ His constitutional legislation, while it included many useful administrative reforms, was marked by as violent a spirit of partisanship, and as apparently wilful a blindness to the future. The re-establishment on a legal basis of the ascendancy which custom had so long accorded to the senate was his main object. With this purpose he had already, when consul in 88 B.C., made the *senatus auctoritas* legally necessary for proposals to the assembly. He now as dictator² followed this up by crippling the power of the magistracy, which had been the most effective weapon in the hands of the senate's opponents. The legislative freedom of the tribunes was already hampered by the necessity of obtaining the senate's sanction; in addition, Sulla restricted their wide powers of interference (*intercessio*) to their original purpose of protecting individual plebeians,³ and dis-

681 A. U. C.

Constitutional legislation of Sulla.

666 A. U. C.

¹ See especially Cicero's oration *Pro Tullio*. For the *pastores* of Apulia, Sall., *Cat.*, 28.

² For Sulla's dictatorship as in itself a novelty, see App., i., 98; Plut., *Sulla*, 33; Cic., *Ad Att.*, 9, 15; Cic., *De Legg.*, i., 15.

³ Cic., *De Legg.*, iii., 22: "*injuria facienda potestatem ademit auxilii ferendæ reliquit.*" Cf. Cic., *Verr.*, i., 60; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxix.

credited the office by prohibiting a tribune from holding any subsequent magistracy in the state.¹ The control of the courts (*questiones perpetuæ*) was taken from the equestrian order and restored to the senate.² To prevent the people from suddenly installing and keeping in high office a second Marius, he re-enacted the old law against re-election,³ and made legally binding the custom which required a man to mount up gradually to the consulship through the lower offices.⁴ His increase of the number of prætors from six to eight,⁵ and of quæstors to twenty,⁶ though required by administrative necessities, tended, by enlarging the numbers and further dividing the authority of the magistrates, to render them still more dependent upon the central direction of the senate. Lastly, he replaced the pontifical and inaugural colleges in the hands of the senatorial

¹ Cic., *Pro Cornel. fr.*, 78; Ascon., *In Corn.*, 78; App., i., 100.

² Velleius, ii., 32; Tac., *Ann.*, xi., 22; Cic., *Verr.*, i., 13.

³ App., *B. C.*, i., 100; *cf.* Livy, vii., 42 (342 B.C.): "*ne quis eundem magistratum intra decem annos caperet.*"

⁴ The custom had gradually established itself. *Cf.* Livy, xxxii., 7. The *certus ordo magistratum* legalised by Sulla was—quæstorship, prætorship, consulate; App., i., 100.

⁵ Pompon., *De Orig. Juris (Dig., i., 2, 2)*; Velleius, ii., 89. Compare also Cicero, *In Pison.*, 15, with *Id. Pro Milone*, 15. The increase was connected with his extension of the system of *questiones perpetuæ*, which threw more work on the prætors as the magistrates in charge of the courts.

⁶ Tac., *Ann.*, xi., 22. The quæstorship henceforward carried with it the right to be called up to the Senate. By increasing the number of quæstors Sulla provided for the supply of ordinary vacancies in the Senate and restricted the censors' freedom of choice in filling them up. Fragments of the "*lex Cornelia de XX quæstoribus*" survive. See *C. I. L.*, i., 108.

nobles, by enacting that vacancies in them, should, as before the Lex Domitia (104 B.C.), be filled up by co-optation.¹ This policy of deliberately altering the constitution, so as to make it pronounce in favour of his own party, was open to two grave objections. It was not to be expected that the new legal safeguards would protect the senate any more efficiently than the established custom and tradition which the Gracchi had broken down; and, secondly, it was inevitable that the popular party would on the first opportunity follow Sulla's example, and alter the constitution to suit themselves. Still less was Sulla successful in fortifying the republican system against the dangers which menaced it from without. He accepted as an accomplished fact the enfranchisement of the Italians, but he made no provision to guard against the consequent reduction of the *comitia* to an absurdity, and with them of the civic government which rested upon them,² or to organise an effective

¹ Dio Cass., xxxvii., 37; Ps. Ascon., 102 (Orelli). He also increased their numbers; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxix.

² He did propose to deprive several communities which had joined Cinna of the franchise, but the deprivation was not carried into effect; Cic., *Pro Domo*, 30, and *Pro Cæcina*, 33, 35. The inadequacy of the *comitia*, as representative of the real *populus Romanus*, was increased by the unequal manner in which the new citizens had been distributed among the old thirty-five tribes. Though each tribe had one vote and no more, in some cases the tribe represented only a small, thinly-populated district of the Campagna, with the addition of one or two outlying Italian communities, in others it included large and populous territories. Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, 3, 187; *Hermes*, 22, 101 sqq. Moreover, since, at the latest, 220 B.C., the "tribe" had been the basis, not only of the *concilium plebis*, but of the *comitia censoriata*.

administrative system for the Italian communities.¹ Of all men, too, Sulla had the best reason to appreciate the dangers to be feared from the growing independence of governors and generals in the provinces, and from the transformation of the old civic militia into a group of professional armies, devoted only to a successful leader, and with the weakest possible sense of allegiance to the state. He had himself, as proconsul of Asia, contemptuously and successfully defied the home government, and he, more than any other Roman general, had taught his soldiers to look only to their leader, and to think only of booty.² Yet, beyond a few inadequate regulations, there is no evidence that Sulla dealt with these burning questions, the settlement of which was among the greatest of the achievements of Augustus.³

¹ There is no evidence to show that Sulla's legislation touched at all upon municipal government in Italy; *cf.* Mommsen, ii., 361 *sq.* The first general municipal law was the Lex Julia of Cæsar, 45 B.C. The necessary resettlement of the local constitutions after the social war was possibly carried out by commissioners sent from Rome "*ut ei leges in municipio fundano daret*" (Lex. Jul. 159, Bruns, p. 113). The fragment of a municipal law found at Tarentum is probably a specimen of such "*leges datae.*" See *Ephem. Epig.*, lx., i.

² Sall., *Cat.* ii.: "*L. Sulla exercitum, quo sibi fidum faceret, contra morem majorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat.*"

³ There was a "*lex Cornelia de provinciis ordinandis.*" but only two of its provisions are known:—(1) that a magistrate sent out with the imperium should retain it till he re-entered the city (Cic. *Ad Fam.*, i., 9, 25), a provision which increased rather than diminished his freedom of action; (2) that an outgoing governor should leave his province within thirty days after his successor's arrival (Cic., *A. Fam.*, iii., 6, 4). A "*lex Cornelia de majestate*" contained, it is true, a definition of treason evidently framed in the light of recent experience. The magistrate was forbidden "*exire de provincia, educere exercitum, bellum sua sponte gerere, in regnum injussu populi ac senatus accedere.*" Cic., *In Pis.*, 21. Sulla also added one more to the long list of laws dealing with extortion in the provinces. But the

This omission on his part was the more serious since one undoubted result of Sulla's reign was to bring the idea of the rule of one man within the range of practical politics. The desire to play the Sulla, to do what Sulla had done, was at least attributed to M. Æmilius Lepidus, to Pompey, and to Cæsar, and Sulla's example gave a new and dangerous turn to the personal ambition of powerful nobles.¹ One administrative reform of real importance must, lastly, be set down to his credit. The judicial procedure first established in 149 B.C. for the trial of cases of magisterial extortion in the provinces, and applied between 149 B.C. and 81 B.C. to cases of treason and bribery, Sulla extended so as to bring under it the chief criminal offences, and thus laid the foundations of the Roman criminal law.²

605 A. U. C.

605-675
A. U. C.

danger lay, not in the want of laws, but in the want of security for their observance by an absolutely autocratic proconsul. I cannot agree with those who would include among Sulla's laws one retaining consuls and prætors in Rome for their year of office and then sending them out to a province. This was becoming the common practice before 81. After 81 it was invariable for prætors, as needed for judicial work, and invariable but for two exceptions in the case of consuls; nowhere, however, is there a hint that there had been any legislation on the subject, and there are indications that it was convenience and not law which maintained the arrangement. Mommsen, ii., 355; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 378. Compare also Cic., *Ad Att.*, 8, 15: "*consules quibus more majorum concessum est, vel omnes adire provincias.*" *Ibid.*, *Phil.*, 4, 9, "*in consulis jure et imperio omnes debent esse provincia.*"

¹ Cic., *Ad Att.*, 8, 11: "*genus illud Sullani regni pridem appetitur*"; *ib.*, 9, 10: "*quam crebro illud, Sulla potuit, ego non potero . . . ita sullaturit animus ejus.*"

² For this, the most lasting of Sulla's reforms, see Mommsen, ii., 359; Rein, *Criminal-Recht*; Zumpt, *Criminal-Prozess d. Römer*; Greenidge, *Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time*, pp. 415 sq.

The Sullan system stood for nine years, and was then overthrown—as it had been established—by a successful soldier. It was the fortune of Cn. Pompeius, a favourite officer of Sulla, first of all to violate in his own person the fundamental principles of the constitution re-established by his old chief, and then to overturn it. In Spain the Marian governor Q. Sertorius had defeated one after another of the proconsuls sent out by the senate, and was already in 77 B.C. master of all Hither Spain. To meet the crisis, the senate itself took a step which was in fact the plainest possible confession that the system sanctioned afresh by Sulla was inadequate to the needs of the state. Pompey, who was not yet thirty, and had never held even the quæstorship, was sent to Spain with proconsular authority.¹ Still Sertorius held out, until, in 73 B.C., he was foully murdered by his own officers. The native tribes who had loyally stood by him submitted, and Pompey early in 71 B.C. returned with his troops to Italy, where, during his absence in Spain, an event had occurred which had shown Roman society with startling plainness how near it stood to revolution. In 73 B.C. Spartacus,² a Thracian slave escaped with seventy others from a gladiators' training-school at Capua. In an incredibly short time he found himself at the head

Overthrow
of the Sullan
constitution,
70 B.C.,
684 A. U. C.

677 A.U.C.

682 A.U.C.

683 A.U.C.

Rising of
Spartacus.

684 A.U.C.

¹ *Plut., Pomp.*, 17; *Livy, Epit.*, xci.

² *App.*, i., 116; *Livy, Epit.*, xcvi.; *Plut., Crass.*, 8 *sq.*

of a numerous force of runaway slaves, outlaws, brigands, and impoverished peasants. By the end of 73 B.C. he had seventy thousand men under his command, had twice defeated the Roman troops, and was master of southern Italy. In 72 B.C. he advanced on Rome, but, though he again routed the legions led against him by the consuls in person, he abandoned his scheme and established himself in the now desolate country near Thurii, already the natural home of brigandage. At length, in 71 B.C., the prætor Crassus, who had been sent against him with no less than six legions, ended the war. Spartacus was defeated and slain in Apulia.

In Rome itself the various classes and parties hostile to the Sullan system had, ever since Sulla's death in 78 B.C., been incessantly agitating for the repeal of his most obnoxious laws, and needed only a leader in order successfully to attack a government discredited by failure at home and abroad. With the return of Pompey from Spain their opportunity came. Pompey, who understood politics as little as Marius, was anxious to obtain, what the senate was more than likely to refuse to give him, and what he was not legally entitled to, a triumph, the consulship for the next year (70 B.C.), and as the natural consequence of this an important command in the East. The opposition wanted his name and support, and a bargain was soon struck. Pompey, and with him Marcus Crassus, the conqueror of Spartacus, were elected consuls, almost in presence

of their troops, which lay encamped outside the gates in readiness to assist at the triumph and ovation granted to their respective leaders. Pompey lost no time in performing his part of the agreement. The tribunes regained their prerogatives.¹ The "perpetual courts" were taken out of the hands of the senatorial *judices*, who had outdone the equestrian order in scandalous corruption,² and finally the censors, the first since 86 B.C., purged the senate of the more worthless and disreputable of Sulla's partisans.³ The victory was complete; but its chief significance for the future lay in the clearness with which it showed that the final decision in matters political lay with neither of the two great parties in Rome, but with the holder of the military authority. The tribunes of the plebs were no longer, as the Gracchi had been, political leaders. The most prominent and active of them, Gabinius, Manilius, Clodius, and the younger Curio, were little more than the lieutenants of this or that great military leader, using their recovered powers to thwart his opponents in the senate, or to carry measures on his

¹ The exact provisions of Pompey's law are nowhere given; Livy., *Epit.*, xcvi. : "*tribuniciam potestatem restituerunt.*" Cf. Velleius, ii., 30. A *lex Aurelia*, in 75 B.C., had already repealed the law disqualifying a tribune for further office; Cic., *Corn.*, fr. 78.

² This was the work of L. Aurelius Cotta, prætor in this year. The *judices* were to be taken in equal proportions from senators, *equites*, and *tribuni ærarii*. For the latter, and for the law generally, see Madvig, *Verf.*, i., 182, ii., 222; Lange, *R. Alt.*, iii., 193. Compare also Cicero's language, *In Verr.*, i., 1, 15. The prosecution of Verres shortly preceded the *lex Aurelia*.

³ Livy, *Epit.*, xcvi. Sixty-four senators were expelled. Cf. Plut., *Pomp.*, 22; Cic. *In Verr.*, i., 1, 15.

behalf through the assembly. The change was fatal to the dignity of politics in the city. In proportion as the mass of the Roman community in Italy, and able aspirants to power, like Cæsar, became conscious of the unreality of the old constitutional controversies, they became indifferent to the questions which agitated the *forum* and the *curia*, and contemptuously ready to alter or disregard the constitution itself, when it stood in the way of interests nearer to their hearts. Of this growing indifference to the traditional politics of the republic, against which Cicero struggled in vain, Pompey is an excellent example. He was absolutely without interest in them, except in so far as they led up to important military commands, and, though he was never revolutionary in intention, his own career, in its quiet defiance of all the established rules of the constitution, did almost more than the direct attacks of others to render the republic impossible.

When his consulship ended, Pompey impatiently awaited at the hands of the politicians he had befriended the further gift of a foreign command. He declined an ordinary province, and from the end of 70 B.C. to 67 B.C. he remained at Rome in a somewhat affectedly dignified seclusion.¹ But, as before in the case of Marius, a crisis abroad now opened the way to the gratification of his ambition, and the popular party were enabled at once to thwart the senate, and to reward their champion by measures for which

Gabinian and
Manilian
laws.

684-7 A. U. C.

¹ Velleius, ii. 31; Plut., *Pomp.*, 23.

the safety of the empire could be pleaded as a justification. The ravages of the Cilician pirates, encouraged, in the first instance, by the inactivity which had marked Roman policy in the East after 167 B.C., and by the absence of any effective Roman navy in the Mediterranean, had now risen to an intolerable height, and the spasmodic efforts made since 81 B.C. had done little to check them. The trade of the Mediterranean was paralysed, and even the coasts of Italy were not safe from their raids.¹ Aulus Gabinius, 687 A. U. C. a tribune, and a follower of Pompey, now proposed (67 B.C.) to the people to intrust Pompey with the sole command against the pirates.² His command was to last for three years. He was to have supreme authority over all Roman magistrates in the provinces throughout the Mediterranean and over the coasts for fifty miles inland. Fifteen *legati*, all of prætorian rank, were assigned to him, with two hundred ships, and as many troops as he thought desirable. These powers were still further enlarged in 668 A. U. C. the next year by the Manilian law (66 B.C.) which transferred from Lucullus and Glabrio to Pompey the conduct of the Mithridatic war in Asia, and with it the entire control of Roman policy and interests in the East.³ The unrepubli- can character of the position thus granted to Pompey, and the dangers of the precedent established, were clearly enough pointed out by such moderate men as Q. Lutatius Catulus, the "father of the senate," and

¹ See the brilliant sketch by Mommsen, *R. G.*, iii. 39 *sq.*

² Plut., *Pomp.*, 25; Dio Cassius, xxxvi. 6; Livy, *Epit.*, c.

³ Cic. *Pro Lege Manilia*; Dio Cassius, xxxvi. 25; Plut., *Pomp.*, 30.

by the orator Hortensius; but in vain. Both laws were supported, not only by the tribunes and the populace, but by the whole influence of the *publicani* and *negotiatores*, whose interests in the East were at stake.

Pompey left Rome in 67 B.C., and did not return to Italy till towards the end of 62 B.C. The interval was marked in Rome by the rise to political importance of Cæsar and Cicero, and by Catiline's attempt at revolution. When in 70 B.C. the removal of the restrictions placed upon the tribunate restored to the popular party their old weapons of attack, Cæsar was already a marked man. In addition to his patrician birth, and his reputation for daring and ability, he possessed, as the nephew of Marius and the son-in-law of Cinna, a strong hereditary claim to the leadership of the popular and Marian party. He had already taken part in the agitation for the restoration of the tribunate; he had supported the Manilian law; and, when Pompey's withdrawal left the field clear for other competitors, he stepped at once into the front rank on the popular side.¹ He took upon himself, as their nearest representative, the task of clearing the memory and avenging the wrongs of the great popular leaders, Marius, Cinna, and Saturninus. He publicly reminded the people of Marius's services, and set up again upon the Capitol the trophies

Cæsar.
687, 686
A. U. C.

684 A. U. C.

¹ Professor Beesly, in his essay on Catiline, has vainly endeavoured to show that Catiline and not Cæsar was the popular leader from 67 to 63 B.C. That this is the inference intentionally conveyed by Sallust, in order to screen Cæsar, is true. but the inference is a false one.

of the Cimbric war. He endeavoured to bring to justice, not only the ringleaders in Sulla's bloody work of proscription, but even the murderers of Saturninus, and vehemently pleaded the cause of the children of the proscribed. While thus carrying on in genuine Roman fashion the feud of his family, he attracted the sympathies of the Italians by his efforts to procure the Roman franchise for the Latin communities beyond the Po, and won the affections of the populace in Rome and its immediate neighbourhood by the splendour of the games which he gave

689 A. U. C. as curule ædile (65 B.C.), and by his lavish expenditure upon the improvement of the Appian Way. But it is characteristic of Cæsar and of his time that these measures were with him only means to the further end of creating for himself a position such as that which Pompey had already won; and this ulterior aim he pursued with a skill and with an audacious indifference to constitutional forms and usages unsurpassed even by Sulla. His coalition with Crassus, soon after Pompey's departure, secured him an ally whose colossal wealth and wide financial connections were of inestimable value, and whose vanity and inferiority of intellect rendered him

689 A. U. C. a willing tool. The story of his attempted

691 A. U. C. *coup d'état* in January 65 B.C. is probably false,¹ but it is evident that by the beginning of 63 B.C. he was bent on reaping the reward of his exertions by obtaining from the people an

¹ The story is so told by Suetonius (*Jul.* 8). In Sallust (*Cat.*, 18), it appears as an intrigue originating with Catiline, and Cæsar's name is omitted.

extraordinary command abroad, which should secure his position before Pompey's return; and the agrarian law proposed early in that year by the tribune Rullus had for its real object the creation, in favour of Cæsar and Crassus, of a commission with powers so wide as to place its members almost on a level with Pompey himself.¹ It was at this moment, when all seemed going well, that Cæsar's hopes were dashed to the ground by Catiline's desperate outbreak, which not only discredited every one connected with the popular party, but directed the suspicions of the well-to-do classes against Cæsar himself, as a possible accomplice in Catiline's revolutionary schemes.²

The same wave of indignation and suspicion which for the moment checked Cæsar's rise carried Marcus Tullius Cicero to the height of his fortunes. Cicero, as a politician, has been equally misjudged by friends and foes. That he was deficient in courage, that he was vain, and that he attempted the impossible, may be admitted at once. But he was neither a brilliant and unscrupulous adventurer nor an aimless trimmer, nor yet a devoted champion merely of senatorial ascendancy.³

¹ Cic., *Lex. Agr.*, ii., 6: "*nihil aliud actum nisi ut decem reges constituerentur.*"

² That Cæsar and Crassus had supported Catiline for the consulship in 64 B.C. is certain, and they were suspected naturally enough of favouring his designs in 63 B.C., but their complicity is in the highest degree improbable.

³ Mommsen is throughout unfair to Cicero, as also are Drumann, and Professor Beesly. The best estimates of Cicero's political position known to me are those given by Professor Tyrrell in the Introduction to his edition of Cicero's *Letters*, and by Mr. Strachan Davidson in his recent volume on Cicero.

He was a representative man, with a numerous following, and a policy which was naturally suggested to him by the circumstances of his birth, connections, and profession, and which, impracticable as it proved to be, was yet consistent, intelligible, and high-minded. Born at Arpinum, he cherished, like all Arpinates, the memory of his great fellow-townsmen Marius, the friend of the Italians, the saviour of Italy, and the irreconcilable foe of Sulla and the nobles. A *municipal* himself, his chosen friends and his warmest supporters were found among the well-to-do classes in the Italian towns.¹ Unpopular with the Roman aristocracy, who despised him as a *peregrinus*² and with the Roman populace, he was the trusted leader of the Italian middle class, "the true Roman people," as he proudly styles them. It was they who carried his election for the consulship³ (63 B.C.), who in 58 B.C. insisted on his recall from exile,⁴ and it was his influence with them which made Cæsar so anxious to win him over in 49 B.C. He represented their antipathy alike to socialistic schemes and to aristocratic exclusiveness, and their old-fashioned simplicity of life in contrast with the cosmopolitan luxury of the capital.⁵ By birth, too, he belonged to the equestrian order, the foremost representatives of which were indeed still the *publicani* and *negotiatorcs*, but which, since the

691 A.U.C.

696 A.U.C.

705 A.U.C.

¹ Cic., *Ad Att.*, i., 491: "*locupletes . . . noster exercitus.*"

² Cic., *Pro Sulla*, 7; Sall., *Cat.*, 31: "*inquilinus urbis Romæ.*"

³ See the *De Petitione Consulatus*, passim.

⁴ *De Domo*, 23; *Pro Plancio*, 97.

⁵ Cic., *Pro Quinctio*, 31; *Pro Cluentio*. 46, 153.

enfranchisement of Italy, included also the substantial burgesses of the Italian towns and the smaller "squires" of the country districts. With them, too, Cicero was at one in their dread of democratic excesses and their social and political jealousy of the *nobiles*.¹ Lastly, as a lawyer and a scholar he was passionately attached to the ancient constitution. His political idea was the natural outcome of these circumstances of his position. He advocated the maintenance of the old constitution, but not as it was understood by the extreme politicians of the right and left. The senate was to be the supreme directing council,² but the senate of Cicero's dreams was not an oligarchic assemblage of nobles, but a body freely open to all citizens, and representing the worth of the community.³ The magistrates, while deferring to the senate's authority, were to be at once vigorous and public-spirited; and the assembly itself which elected the magistrates and passed the laws was to consist, not of the "mob of the forum," but of the true Roman people throughout Italy.⁴ For the realisation of this ideal he looked, above all things, to the establishment of cordial relations between the senate and nobles in Rome and the great middle class of Italy represented by the equestrian order, between the capital and the country towns and districts. This was the *concordia ordinum*, the *consensus Italiæ* for which he laboured.⁵ He failed

¹ Cic., *In Ver.*, ii., 73; *De Pet. Cons.*, i. He shared with them their dislike to Sulla, as the foe of their order; *Pro Cluentio*, 55.

² *De Rep.*, ii., 36; *De Legg.*, iii., 12.

³ *Pro Sestio*, 65; *De Legg.*, iii., 4.

⁴ *Pro Sestio*, 49.

⁵ *Ad Att.*, i., 18.

because his ideal was impracticable. The inveterate selfishness and exclusiveness of the nobles, the indifference of the Italians to constitutional questions, and their suspicious dislike of Roman politicians,—above all, the incompetency of the old machinery, even if reformed as he would have had it reformed, to govern the empire and control the pro-consuls and the army, were insuperable obstacles in his way.

Cicero's election to the consulship for 63 B.C., over the heads of Cæsar's nominees, Antonius and Catiline, was mainly the work of the Italian middle class, already rendered uneasy both by the rumours which were rife of revolutionary schemes and of Cæsar's boundless

ambition, and by the numerous disquieting signs of disturbance noticeable in Italy. The new consul vigorously set himself to discharge the trust placed in him. He defeated the insidious proposals of Rullus for Cæsar's aggrandisement, and assisted in quashing the prosecution of Rabirius. But with the consular elections in the autumn of 63 B.C. a fresh danger arose from a different quarter. The "conspiracy" of Catiline¹ was not the work of the popular party, and still less was it an unselfish attempt at reform; L. Sergius Catilina himself was a patrician, who had held high office, and possessed considerable ability and courage; but he was bankrupt in character and in purse, and two successive defeats in the

¹ For Catiline's conspiracy, see Sallust, *Catiline*; Cicero, *In Catilinam*; Plut., *Cicero*; Mommsen, *R. G.*, iii., 164 sq.; and especially C. John, *Entstehung d. Catilinarischen Verschwörung* (Leipzig, 1876).

The conspiracy of Catiline.
63 B.C.
691 A.U.C.

consular elections had rendered him desperate. To retrieve his broken fortunes by violence was a course which was only too readily suggested by the history of the last forty years, and materials for a conflagration abounded on all sides. The danger to be feared from his intrigue lay in the state of Italy, which made a revolt against society and the established government only too likely if once a leader presented himself, and it was such a revolt that Catiline endeavoured to organise. Bankrupt nobles like himself, Sullan veterans and the starving peasants whom they had dispossessed of their holdings, outlaws of every description, the slave population of Rome, and the wilder herdsmen-slaves of the Apulian pastures, were all enlisted under his banner, and attempts were even made to excite disaffection among the newly conquered peoples of southern Gaul and the warlike tribes who still cherished the memory of Sertorius in Spain. In Etruria, the seat and centre of agrarian distress and discontent, a rising actually took place headed by a Sullan centurion, but the spread of the revolt was checked by Cicero's vigorous measures. Catiline fled from Rome, and died fighting with desperate courage at the head of his motley force of old soldiers, peasants, and slaves. His accomplices in Rome were arrested, and, after an unavailing protest from Cæsar, the senate authorised the consuls summarily to put them to death.

The Catilinarian outbreak had been a blow to Cæsar, whose schemes it interrupted. To Cicero, however, it brought not only popularity and honour, but, as he believed, the realisation of his political

ideal. The senate and the equestrian order, the nobles of Rome, and the middle class in the country had made common cause in the face of a common danger; and the danger had been averted by the vigorous action of a consul sprung from the people, under the guidance of a united senate, and backed by the mass of good citizens.

But Pompey was now on his way home after successes more brilliant and dazzling than had fallen to the lot of any Roman general since the great wars. In a marvellously short space of time he had freed the Mediterranean from the Cilician pirates, and established Roman authority in Cilicia itself. He had crushed Mithridates, added Syria to the list of Roman provinces, and led the Roman legions to the upper Euphrates and the Caspian. Once more, as in 70 B.C., the political future seemed to depend on the attitude which the successful general would assume; Pompey himself looked simply to the attainment by the help of one political party or another of his immediate aims, which at present were the ratification of his arrangements in Asia and a grant of land for his troops. It was the impracticable jealousy of his personal rivals in the senate, aided by the versatility of Cæsar, who presented himself not as his rival, but as his ally, which drove Pompey once more, in spite of Cicero's efforts, into the camp of what was still nominally the popular party. In 60 B.C., on Cæsar's return from his proprætorship in Spain, the coalition was formed which is known by the somewhat misleading title of the

**Return of
Pompey
from Asia.**

**Coalition of
Pompey,
Cæsar, and
Crassus.
60 B.C.
694 A.U.C.**

first triumvirate.¹ Pompey was ostensibly the head of this new alliance, and in return for the satisfaction of his own demands he undertook to support Cæsar's candidature for the consulship. The wealth and influence of Crassus were enlisted in the same cause, but what he was to receive in exchange is not clear. Cicero was under no illusions as to the significance of this coalition. It scattered to the winds his dreams of a stable and conservative republic. Pompey, whom he had hoped to enlist as the champion of constitutional government, had been driven into the arms of Cæsar. The union between the senate and the equestrian order had been dissolved, and the support of the *publicani* lost by an untimely quarrel over the price to be paid for collecting the taxes of Asia, and, to crown all, both his own personal safety and the authority of the senate were threatened by the openly avowed intentions of Catiline's friends to bring the consul of 63 B.C. to account for his unconstitutional execution of Catiline's accomplices. His fears were fully justified by the results. The year 59 B.C. saw the republic powerless in the hands of three citizens. Cæsar as consul procured the ratification of Pompey's acts in Asia, conciliated the *publicani* by granting them the relief refused by the senate, and carried an agrarian law of the new type, which provided for the purchase of lands for allotment at the cost of the treasury, and

691 A.U.C.

695 A.U.C.

¹ Misleading, because the coalition was unofficial. The "triumvirs" of 43 B.C. were actual magistrates: "*IIIviri reipublica constituenda causa.*"

for the assignment of the rich *ager Campanus*.¹ But Cæsar aimed at more than the carrying of an agrarian law in the teeth of the senate or any party victory in the forum. An important military command was essential to him, and he judged correctly enough that in the West there was work to be done which might enable him to win a position such as Pompey had achieved in the East. An obedient tribune was found, and by the *lex Vatinia* he was given for five years the command of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, to which was added, by a decree of the senate, Transalpine Gaul also.² It was a command which not only opened to him a great military career, but enabled him, as the master of the valley of the Po, to keep an effective watch on the course of affairs in Italy.

Early the next year the attack upon himself which Cicero had foreseen was made. P. Clodius as tribune brought forward a law enacting that any one who had put a Roman citizen to death without trial by the people should be interdicted from fire and water. Cicero, finding himself deserted even by Pompey, left Rome in a panic, and by a second Clodian law he was declared to be outlawed.³ With Cæsar away in his province,

✓ Cæsar's
command in
Gaul.

Banishment
and recall of
Cicero.
58-57 B.C.
69-7 A.U.C.

¹ For the *lex Julia agraria* and the *lex Campana*, see Dio Cass., xxxviii., 1; App., *B. C.*, ii., 10; Suet., *Cæsar*, 20; Cic., *ad Att.*, ii., 16, 18.

² Suet., *Cæsar*, 22; Dio Cass., xxxviii., 8; App., *B. C.*, ii., 13; Plut., *Cæs.*, 14.

³ Both laws were carried in the *concilium plebis*. The first merely reaffirmed the right of appeal, as the law of Gaius Gracchus had done. The second declared Cicero to be already by his own act

and Cicero banished, Clodius was for the time master in Rome. But, absolute as he was in the streets, and recklessly as he parodied the policy of the Gracchi by violent attacks on the senate, his tribunate merely illustrated the anarchy which now inevitably followed the withdrawal of a strong controlling hand. A reaction speedily followed. Pompey, bewildered and alarmed by Clodius's violence, at last bestirred himself. Cicero's recall was decreed by the senate, and early in August 57 B.C., in the *comitia centuriata*, to which his Italian supporters flocked in crowds, a law was passed revoking the sentence of outlawry passed upon him.

Intoxicated by the acclamations which greeted him, and encouraged by Pompey's support, and by the salutary effects of Clodius's excesses, Cicero's hopes rose high, and a return to the days of 63 B.C. seemed not impossible.¹

Renewal of
the coal-
tion. 56 B.C.
698 A.U.C.

With indefatigable energy he strove to reconstruct a solid constitutional party, but only to fail once more. Pompey was irritated by the hostility of a powerful party in the senate, who thwarted his desires for a fresh command, and even encouraged Clodius in insulting the conqueror of the East. Cæsar became alarmed at the reports which reached him that the repeal of his agrarian law was threatened, and that

in leaving Rome "interdicted from fire and water,"—a procedure for which precedents could be quoted. Clodius kept within the letter of the law.

¹ Cicero's speech *Pro Sestio* gives expression to these feelings; it contains a passionate appeal to all good citizens to rally round the old constitution. The acquittal of Sestius confirmed his hopes. See *Ad Q. Fr.*, ii., 4.

the feeling against the coalition was growing in strength; above all, he was anxious for a renewal of his five years' command. He acted at once, and in the celebrated conference at Luca (56
 598 A.U.C. B.C.) the alliance of the three self-constituted rulers of Rome was renewed. Cicero succumbed to the inevitable, and withdrew in despair from public life. Pompey and Crassus became consuls for 55 B.C. Cæsar's command was renewed for another five years, and to each of his two allies important provinces were assigned for a similar period—Pompey receiving the two Spains and Africa, and Crassus Syria.¹ The coalition now divided between them the control of the empire. For the future the question was, how long the coalition itself would last. Its duration proved to be short. In 53 B.C. Crassus was defeated and slain by the Parthians at Carthæ, and in Rome the course of events slowly forced Pompey into an attitude of hostility to Cæsar. The year 54 B.C. brought with it a renewal of the riotous anarchy which had disgraced Rome in 58–57 B.C. Conscious of its own helplessness, the senate, with the eager assent of all respectable citizens, dissuaded Pompey from leaving Italy. His provinces were left to his legates, and he himself remained at home to maintain order by the weight of his influence. It was a confession that the republic could not stand alone. But Pom-

Death of
 Crassus.
 53 B.C.
 701 A.U.C.

700 A.U.C.

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, cv.; Dio Cass., xxxix., 31. For Cicero's views, see *Ep. ad Fam.*, i., 9; *Ad Att.*, iv. 5.

Pompey's mere presence proved insufficient. The anarchy and confusion grew worse, and even strict constitutionalists like Cicero talked of the necessity of investing Pompey with some extraordinary powers for the preservation of order.¹ At last, in 52 B.C., he was elected sole consul; and not only so, but his provincial command was prolonged for five years more, and fresh troops were assigned him.² The rôle of "saviour of society" thus thrust upon Pompey was one which flattered his vanity, but it entailed consequences which it is probable he did not foresee, for it brought him into close alliance with the senate, and in the senate there was a powerful party who were resolved to force him into heading the attack, they could not successfully make without him, upon Cæsar. It was known that the latter, whose command expired in March 49 B.C., but who in the ordinary course of things would not have been replaced by his successor until January 48 B.C., was anxious to be allowed to stand for his second consulship in the autumn of 49 B.C. without coming in person to Rome.³ His opponents in the

Pompey sole
consul.
52 B.C.
702 A.U.C.

705 A.U.C.

706 A.U.C.

¹ A dictatorship was talked of in Rome; Plut., *Pomp.*, 54; Cic. *ad Q. Fr.*, iii., 8. Cicero himself anticipated Augustus in his picture of a *princeps civitatis* sketched in a lost book of the *De Republica*, written about this time, which was based upon his hopes of what Pompey might prove to be; *Ad Au.*, viii., 11; August. *De Civ. Dei.*, v., 13.


² Plut., 56; App., *B. C.*, ii., 24.

³ For the rights of the question involved in the controversy between Cæsar and the senate, see Mommsen, *Rechtsfrage zw. Cæsar und d. Senat*; Guiraud, *Le Différend entre César et le Sénat* (Paris, 1878).

Proposed recall of Cæsar. senate were equally bent on bringing his command to an end at the legal time, and so obliging him to disband his troops and stand for the consulship as a private person, or, if he kept his command, on preventing his standing for the consulship. Through 51 B.C. and 703-704 A. U.C. 50 B.C. the discussions in the senate and the negotiations with Cæsar continued, but with no result. On 1st January, 49 B.C., Cæsar 705 A. U.C. made a last offer of compromise. The senate replied by requiring him on pain of outlawry to disband his legions. Two tribunes who supported him were ejected from the senate-house, and the magistrates with Pompey were authorised to take measures to protect the republic. Cæsar hesitated no longer; he crossed the Rubi- con and invaded Italy. The rapidity of his advance astounded and bewildered his foes. Pompey, followed by the consuls, the majority of the senate, and a long train of nobles, abandoned Italy as untenable, and crossed into Greece. At the end of March Cæsar entered Rome as the master of Italy.

Cæsar crosses the Rubicon. 49 B.C. 705 A. U.C.

¹ Cicero severely censures Pompey for abandoning Italy, but strategically the move was justified by the fact that Pompey's strength lay in the East, where his name was a power, and in his control of the sea. Politically, however, it was a blunder, as it enabled Cæsar to pose as the defender of Italy.



To face Page

John Bartholomew & Co. Edin'



CHAPTER III.

THE EMPIRE DURING THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION.

THE external history of Rome during the period covered by the two preceding chapters forms an instructive commentary on the course of domestic politics. The inadequacy of the old machinery to administer successfully the affairs of an empire was amply proved by the repeated disasters for which the incapacity or inexperience of the Roman generals was mainly responsible, by the insurrections which the exactions of Roman officials provoked, and by the financial exhaustion which maladministration produced even in such wealthy provinces as Sicily and Asia. On the other hand, the policy which the popular leaders favoured as a ready means of thwarting the senate, that of concentrating a wide executive authority in the hands of a single man specially designated by vote of the people, was justified by the brilliant achievements of Marius, Pompey, and Cæsar. At the same time, the position which such men were thus enabled to attain was fraught with danger, not only to senatorial ascendancy, and to the system of divided authority, and changing magistrates bound up with it, but equally so to the

supremacy of the popular assembly which had made, but could not unmake, its powerful favourites.

The circumstance that one of the two great parties in the state was thus always ready, for its own purposes, to set aside the rules and restrictions of the old system, and to give the freest possible hand to the men of its choice, helps to explain the fact that it was during this period of domestic conflict, and even of civil war, that the high-water mark of Roman advance was reached. With the nations outside who confronted her during the next four centuries, with the Germans on the north, and with Parthia on the east, Rome was brought face to face by the conquests of Cæsar in Gaul and of Pompey in Asia.

Between Rome and the Germans at the opening of this period lay the Keltic tribes, extending as they did in an almost unbroken line from the Atlantic to the Danube. Over the Kelts nearest at hand, in the plains of North Italy, Roman supremacy was already established, and in this district, apart from petty wars provoked by the raids of the highland Alpine tribes, or by the eagerness of Roman nobles to earn a triumph,¹ there is nothing to record but a steady progress in civilisation and prosperity, which made Cisalpine Gaul in the time of Cicero the most populous and thriving part of the Italian peninsula.² South of the Po, not

Rome and
the Kelts.
Cisalpine
Gaul.

¹ Cic., *In Pison.*, 26, of L. Crassus (consul 95 B.C.). "*speculis prope scrutatus est Alpes, ut ubi hostis non erat, ibi triumphum, causam aliquam quaereret.*"

² Cic. *Ad Att.*, i., 1; *Phil.*, ii., 30.

only a Roman civilisation, but even a Roman population must have been firmly established before the Social war. Along the line of the Via Æmilia, running from Ariminum westward, lay five great colonies, Bononia, Mutina, Parma, Placentia, and Cremona,¹ all founded between 218–184 B.C., while farther to the west was Dertona,² on the road leading southward to Genoa. To the colonies must be added not only the *fora*, established by Roman magistrates as centres for traffic, and for the administration of justice,³ but the numerous settlements of Roman citizens up and down the country, with their characteristically euphemistic names, Industria, Faventia, Pollentia, Fidentia, Valentia, Florentia. The construction of the first Roman road, the Via Æmilia, now as then the great thoroughfare through the valley of the Po, had been followed by that of others, such as those running along the coast past Genoa to the Maritime Alps, and northward from Genoa through the heart of the Ligurian highlands to Dertona⁴; north of the Po, there were besides Cremona

¹ Cremona lay north of the Po, but was founded at the same time as Placentia (218 B.C.), and as part of the same scheme of defence.

² The date of the foundation of Dertona is uncertain; Mommsen connects it with the construction of the Via Postumia (148 B.C.), *Corp. J. Lat.*, v., p. 831.

³ They bear, as a rule, the name of the consul or proconsul who established them, *e. g.*, Forum Cornelii, Forum Livii, etc.

⁴ The Via Æmilia from Ariminum to Placentia was made in 187 B.C. by the consul M. Æmilius Lepidus. The Via Postumia (Sp. Postumius Albinus, cons. 148 B.C.) ran from Placentia by Dertona to Genoa. M. Æmilius Scaurus (censor 109 B.C.) carried a second Via

only two colonies, Aquileia and Eporedia,¹ and the traces of Roman settlements are comparatively slight. But the Keltic tribes in this region were being rapidly Romanised. The old cantonal organisation with its open villages was breaking down. Old tribal centres, such as Mediolanium,² were becoming large towns, and rapidly superseding the tribes as the political divisions of the country. How great the advance had been was shown by the fact that, when
 665 A. U. C. in 89 B.C. the Roman franchise was granted to the Cispadane communities, the Transpadanes received Latin rights, and only ~~twenty~~ ^{1.5} years later were fully enfranchised.³ It was apparently by Sulla, in 81 B.C., that the whole
 673 A. U. C. of Cisalpine Gaul was formed into a province with a proconsul of its own.⁴ The reasons for the step are probably to be found in the increasing administrative needs of a populous region, and still more in its military importance as a frontier district. But the policy of the step was doubtful. The proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul, wielding the autocratic authority of a provincial governor, and backed not only by his legions, but by the great resources in

Æmilia from the end of the Via Aurelia at Volaterræ, past Genoa to Vada Sabbata; *C. I. L.*, v., p. 885.

¹ Aquileia founded 184 B.C., to protect the eastern frontier. Eporedia founded 100 B.C., in the extreme north-west.

² The "*caput gentis*" of the Insubres; Polyb., ii., 34: *κυριώτατος τόπος*.

³ The grant of the "*jus Latii*" was due to Cn. Pompeius Strabo, father of Pompey the Great; Ascon, *In Pis.*, p. 3 (Orelli). The Roman franchise was given in 49 B.C. by Cæsar; Dio Cass., xli., 36

⁴ Mommsen, *Rom. Gesch.*, ii., 371.

men¹ and money which his province possessed, was, as Cæsar showed, a dangerous neighbour.

As had so often happened elsewhere, it was a request for aid from a Greek city that first brought Rome into collision with the Kelts beyond the Alps. Among the oldest and most faithful of the allies of Rome was the Phocæan colony of Massilia. Whatever truth there may be in the tradition which dated the alliance from the time of Tarquinius Priscus, it is certain that from the close of the first Punic war onwards it was close and intimate.² For not only had Rome and Massilia a common interest in checking the raids of Ligurian free-booters and pirates, but from the moment when Rome acquired an interest in Spain, and still more after the formation of the two Spanish provinces (197 B.C.), Massilia became of the first importance to Rome from her position on the route to Spain. Roman governors on their way to or from their province found a welcome there,³ and the powerful aid of Rome was several times invoked by the Massiliots against their Ligurian neighbours.⁴ It was, however, not until 125 B.C. that Rome intervened decisively and effectually in Transalpine affairs. By that time the

The Transalpine Kelts: annexation of Southern Gaul.

657 A.U.C.

629 A.U.C.

¹ In 58 B.C. Cæsar was able in a few days to raise two legions in Gallia Cisalpina; Cæs., *B. G.*, i., 10, 24.

² Herzog., *Gall. Narbonensis*, pp. 37-42 (Leipzig, 1864).

³ Livy, xxxvii., 57 and xlii., 4.

⁴ In 154 B.C. a Roman force under the consul Opimius was sent to punish the Oxubii and Decietæ, who had attacked Antipolis and Nicæa; Polyb., xxxiii. 5; Livy, *Epit.*, xlvii.

Ligurian tribes on the Italian side of the Alps had been thoroughly subdued. Roman roads had been carried through the Ligurian highlands. Roman settlements have been planted on Ligurian territory, and Roman supremacy extended to the very frontiers of southern Gaul. The immediate object of the expedition, headed by Marcus Fulvius Flaccus
 699 A. U. C. (consul 125), the chastisement of the Saluvii, a Ligurian tribe occupying the highlands above Massilia, of whose raids the Massiliots had complained,¹ was easily effected by Flaccus, and by his successor, C. Sextius Calvinus, who finally
 631 A. U. C. defeated the Saluvii in 123 B.C., and established on the site of the old tribal stronghold a Roman military post, afterwards famous as Aquæ Sextiæ.²

But the area of the war rapidly extended to the neighbouring Keltic tribes. The Vocontii, immediately to the north, and in the rear of the Saluvii, had been reduced by Flaccus.³ Beyond the Vocontii lay the Allobroges, and with them and with their powerful patrons, the Arverni, across the Rhone,⁴ an excuse for war was found in the raids

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, lx. ; Florus, iii. 2. For the geographical position and nationality of the Salluvii, see Desjardins, *La Gaule Romaine*, i., pp. 65 *sqq.*

² Livy, *Epit.*, lxi. The *fasti* records a triumph of Fluvius in 123 B.C., and of Sextius in 122 B.C. The statement of Livy's epitomater, "*Coloniâ Aquas Sextias condidit*," is probably a blunder. See Herzog., *Gall. Narb.*, p. 50.

³ Flaccus triumphed "*de Vocontiiis*."

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, xi., 25. For the feud between the Arverni and Ædui, see Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 31.

which they continued to make upon the territory of their ancient rivals, the Ædui, now the allies of Rome, and in the shelter given to the fugitive king of the Saluvii.¹ The struggle was short and decisive. In 121 B.C. the consul, Q. Fabius Maximus, defeated the united forces of the two tribes at the confluence of the Isère and the Rhone.² The Allobroges at once submitted, and in the next year a second defeat at the hands of the proconsul, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, broke the spirit of the Arverni.³ The victory was apparently followed by the submission to Rome of the tribes lying between the Arverni and the coast on the right bank of the Rhone, over whom, as over the Allobroges, the Arverni had previously claimed suzerainty.⁴ It is significant of the importance which Rome attached to this conquest, that she proceeded at once to lay foundations of a regular provincial organisation.⁵ No precise settlement of the bounds of the new province seem to have been attempted, and the limits of the territory now brought within Rome's "sphere of influence" can only be roughly traced. The main

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, lxi. ; Florus, iii., 2.

² Pliny, *H. N.*, vii., 51 ; Livy, *Epit.*, lxi.

³ It seems clear that Fabius's victory on the Isère preceded that of Domitius. See the note in Herzog., *Gall. Narb.*, p. 46.

⁴ The most important of these tribes were the Helvii, the Volcæ Arecomici, and the Volcæ Tectosages, no conquest of whom is mentioned, but all of whom were included in the new province. Herzog. *l. c.*

⁵ The settlement of the new territory was intrusted to Cn. Domitius, who remained in southern Gaul for two years more. He celebrated his triumph at Rome in 218 B.C. Mommsen, *R. G.*, ii., 163.

portion of it lay eastward of the Rhone, and extended from the sea-coast along the left bank of that river to the northernmost limits of the territory of the Allobroges and the lake of Geneva, while to the east it was separated from Cisalpine Gaul by the still unsubdued tribes of the Maritime and Cottian Alps. Beyond the Rhone it included the coast-land as far as the Pyrenees, and stretched inland to the foot of the Cevennes, and to the southern borders of the Arverni. That this territory was now placed under the command of a resident Roman proconsul may be taken for granted, but how much was effected for the internal organisation of the province it is impossible to say.¹ The position of Massilia, as an independent ally, remained technically unaltered. The native Keltic and Ligurian tribes, though not broken up, and only imperfectly pacified, probably suffered some loss of territory, and were forced to pay tribute. Two Roman *castella* were established, one at Aquæ Sextiæ in the eastern, one at Tolosa in the western portion of the province.² The existing coast road from the Rhone to Spain was reconstructed under the name of the Via Domitia,³ and to guard it a Roman colony was founded at Narbo, as an outpost and "bulwark of the Roman empire."⁴

¹ Herzog., pp. 47-59, and p. 63 note; Desjardins, *La Gaule Romaine*, i., 287 sqq.

² Strabo, p. 180; Dio Cass., fragm. 90.

³ Polybius, 3, 39, mentions a coast road marked with Roman milestones. Cic., *Pro Fonteio*, 7, speaks of the Via Domitia as needing repair (circa 75 B.C.).

⁴ Vell., i. 15; Cic., *Brut.*, 43; *Pro Fonteio*, 5: "*Narbo Mar-
tius colonia nostrorum civium, specula P. R. ac propugnaculum.*"

Nine years after the foundation of Narbo, the eruption of the Cimbri and Teutones threatened Rome for the moment, not only with the loss of all she had won in southern Gaul, but with an invasion of Italy itself. This, the first recorded descent of northern barbarians upon southern Europe, was no doubt provoked, like those that followed it, by the need of more land, and a craving for the spoils of the south. Issuing from their homes by the northern sea, where their people still dwelt in the days of Augustus,¹ the Germans marched southward, with their women, children, and wagons, till they reached the barrier of Keltic tribes which covered the frontiers of the Roman empire, from the Rhone in the west to the borders of Thrace in the east. But this barrier had already been weakened by Roman attacks from the south, and at the point where the Cimbri first touched it the Keltic tribes had been in conflict with the legions and could offer little resistance.² At Noreia, in the heart of what was afterwards the province of Noricum, and in the territory of the Keltic Teurisci, the first conflict between Romans and Germans took place, and resulted in the defeat of the

641 A. U. C.

consul Cn. Papirius Carbo (113 B.C.).³

¹ Strabo, 292: "καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἔχουσι τὴν χώραν ἣν εἶχον πρότερον." Their home was the Cimbric Chersonese (Jutland); Desjardins, i., 303.

² In 115 B.C. M. Æmilius Scaurus celebrated a triumph over the Kelts of the Carnic Alps. In 141 B.C. Livy, *Epit.*, lxiii., mentions a campaign against the Scordisci; according to Strabo, p. 293, the Cimbri, after being repulsed by the Boii, crossed the Danube to the territories of the Scordisci and Teurisci "καὶ τούτους Γαλατας."

³ Livy, *Epit.*, lxiii.; Strabo, p. 214, mentions the scene of the battle

But although this victory appeared to lay Italy open to attack on its most defenceless side, where the colony of Aquileia alone guarded the entrance to the rich plains of the Po,¹ no advantage was taken of it. When the Germans reappeared, four years later, in 109 B.C., it was on the northern frontier of the territory of the Allobroges, where they a second time defeated a Roman consul, M. Junius Silanus.² It would seem that in the interval they had moved westward behind the screen of the Alps, and after being repulsed by the Belgic Gauls, had reached the frontiers of the Roman province through the land of the Helvetii.³ Again, however, the victorious Germans halted, and did no more than send ambassadors to the senate with an impossible request for lands.⁴ But their presence, and the sight of the booty they had won, stirred the ambition of the Helvetii,⁵ a section of whom had already joined them, and fought by their side against Silanus.⁶ Two years later (107 B.C.) the same Helvetian clan, the Tigurini, descended into

¹ Aquileia was founded to guard the entrance into Italy from Illyricum. Strabo, 214: "ἐπιτειχισθὲν τοῖς ὑπερκειμένοις βαρβάροις."

² Livy, *Epit.*, lxxv.

³ Strabo, 196, says that they were repulsed by the Belgæ, and p. 293, that from the land of the Teurisci they went to that of the Helvetii.

⁴ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxv.

⁵ Strabo, 193: "ἐπι ληστείαν τραπέσθαι τὰς τῶν Κίμβρων εὐπορίας δύντασ."

⁶ The Tigurini; Florus, iii., 3.

southern Gaul, swept across it as far as the Atlantic, and on their return met and routed the consul L. Cassius Longinus in the country of the Allobroges.¹ How much these successive defeats had weakened Roman prestige was proved by the insurrection (106 B.C.) of the Tolosates, who surprised and captured the Roman garrison at Tolosa.² But a far more serious catastrophe was at hand. In 105 B.C. the united hordes of Germans and Helvetians invaded the Roman province, routed and took prisoner the legate, M. Aurelius Scaurus,³ and, on October 6th, utterly annihilated at Arausio (Orange) two complete Roman forces, under the command respectively of the consul, M. Mallius, and the proconsul, Q. Servilius Cæpio.⁴ This disaster, following as it did on the defeats of Carbo, Silanus, and Cassius, raised to fever height the popular indignation with senatorial mismanagement, which the Jugurthine scandals had already excited.⁵ The popular hero, Marius, though still absent in Africa, was elected

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxv. : "consul Cassius a Tigurinis Gallis pago Helvetiorum . . . in finibus Allobrogum cæsus." Cf. Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 12. Strabo, pp. 183-293, mentions the Tougeni. Oros., v., 15, states that the invaders reached the Atlantic.

² Dio Cass., fragm. 90. The insurrection was crushed by Q. Servilius Cæpio, who carried off and appropriated to his own use the treasure in the temple at Tolosa (*aurum Tolosanum*); Cic., *De Nat. Deor.*, iii., 30; Strabo, p. 188.

³ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxvii.

⁴ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxvii.; Oros., 5, 16; for the date, see Plut., *Lucullus*, 27.

⁵ Cæpio was deprived of his command, and his property confiscated; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxvii.

650 A. U. C. consul for 104 B.C., and intrusted with the task of repelling the invasion of Italy, which seemed to be imminent.¹ Fortunately, however, for Rome, and for Marius, the Cimbri passed on southwards into Spain, ravaging as they went, while their kinsmen the Teutones, and their Helvetian allies, remained stationary and inactive in

Gaul.² Not until late in 103 B.C., on the 651 A. U. C. return of the Cimbri, was the attack which all Italy had been anxiously awaiting decided upon. It was arranged that while the Cimbri retraced their steps and endeavoured to force their way into Italy from the side of Illyricum, the Teutones and Helvetii should take the more direct route through southern Gaul. The duty of repelling the Cimbri was assigned to Q. Lutatius Catulus,

who had been elected consul with Marius 652 A. U. C. for 102 B.C. Marius himself, who had spent the two years 104 and 103 B.C. in quieting the Keltic tribes within the province,³ and in preparing for war,⁴ awaited the advance of the Teutones at Aquæ Sextiæ, the defences of which he had enlarged and strengthened, and here in two successive battles he not only defeated, but destroyed the invading force.⁵ But though all danger from the

¹ Sall., *Jug.*, 114: 'consul absens est factus et ei decreta provinciæ Gallia.'

² Livy, *Epit.*, lxvii.

³ The Volcæ Tectosages; Plut., *Sull.*, 4. That the Ligurians were also meditating revolt is implied by Frontinus, *Strategem.*, i. 2, 6.

⁴ Plut., *Marius*, 15; Vell., ii., 12: "tertius (consulatus) in apparatu belli consumptus."

⁵ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxviii.; Plut., *Marius*, l. c.

Teutones was over, the Cimbri had still to be met and repulsed. In the spring of 101 B.C., Marius, now consul for the fifth time, ^{653 A.U.C.} crossed into Italy and hastened to the assistance of his former colleague Catulus,¹ an accomplished man, and the head of the "optimates" party, but no soldier, who had been defeated by the Cimbri and driven back to the Adige. On July 30th, 101 B.C., a decisive battle was fought on the "Raudine Plains." One hundred thousand of the enemy were captured or slain, and the first German invasion was at an end.

From this time down to the moment when Cæsar assumed the command, the situation in Transalpine Gaul underwent but little change. The peace of the Roman province was indeed repeatedly disturbed by risings among the Keltic tribes.² But in spite of these, and of the distress and discontent caused by Roman misgovernment, Cicero's speech in defence of Fonteius, governor of the province ^{679-681 B.C.} 75-73 B.C., proves that southern Gaul was already becoming Romanised, and that a strong tide of immigration from Italy had set in. "Gaul," he declares, "is crowded with Roman men of business, farmers, graziers, money-lenders, and state-con-

¹ Vell., ii., 12; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxviii.; Plut., *Marius*, l. c.

² Near Vercellæ. Plut., *Marius*, 25; Vell., ii., 15. Of this campaign a good account is given by Ihne, *R. G.*, v., 188 sqq.

³ In 77 B.C. Pompey, then on his way to Spain, had to suppress a general revolt. In 66 B.C. a rising of the Allobroges was put down by Calpurnius Piso; Dio, xxxvi., 21. Cicero calls Piso *pacificator Allobrogum* (*Ad Att.*, i., 13). A second rising of the Allobroges occurred in 62 B.C.; Livy, *Epit.*, ciii.

tractors." "No money passed," he adds, "except through Roman hands."¹

In the year 59 B.C. Farther Gaul was, together with Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, placed under the command of Cæsar for a period of five years,² and the defence of the entire northern frontier from the Rhone to the Save and Drave was thus committed to his care, as the defence of the eastern frontier of the empire had previously been to Pompey. The wisdom of the step was quickly proved. In the spring of 58 B.C., the news reached Rome that the Helvetii were again in motion, but on this occasion it was not merely a raid by a single clan that was in prospect. The whole Helvetian people had deliberately resolved to leave their land and find a new home in Gaul. The resolution was taken in 61 B.C., and two years were devoted to completing the arrangements for what was intended to be a final abandonment of their native country. Their strongholds, villages, and crops were destroyed; provisions sufficient for three months were collected, and their neighbours to the north and east, the Rauraci, Tulingi, Latobriges, and Boii, persuaded to join them. Finally, the 28th of March, 58 B.C., was fixed as the day on which the whole body should assemble on the right bank of

Cæsar in
Gaul. 695
A. U. C.

The Helvetii.
696 A. U. C.

693 A. U. C.

¹ Cic., *Pro Fonteio*, 5: "*referta Gallia negotiatorum est, plura civium Romanorum; nemo Gallorum sine cive Romano quicquam negotii gerit; nummus in Gallia nullus sine civium Romanorum tabulis commovetur—ex tanto negotiatorum, colonorum, publicorum, aratorum, pecuvariorum numero.*"

² Suet., *Cæsar*, 22; Oros., vi., 7.

the Rhone, near Geneva, whence an easy and open route would lead them through the territory of the Allobroges.¹

The report of their intention reached Cæsar in Rome. Eight days later he reached the Rhone,² with a single legion, and such native levies as he had been able to raise on his way among the tribes of Farther Gaul. In front of him, across the river, lay the Helvetii and their allies, numbering all told 368,000 persons.³ Cæsar instantly destroyed the bridge not far from Geneva by which the motley host had hoped to cross, and then carried a line of entrenchments⁴ along the left bank of the Rhone, from the lake of Geneva to the foot of the mountains which enclose the Pas d'Ecluse. These precautions were effective, and the Helvetii were forced to attempt the difficult and toilsome route leading through the passes of the Jura into the territory of the Sequani,⁵ whence they hoped to make their way to the pleasant lands of Aquitaine, which the Tigurini had reached fifty years before.⁶ On

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 2-6.

² Plut., *Cæsar*, 17. He apparently travelled by the Great St. Bernard route; Desjardins, *La Gaule Romaine*, 74, 75, and ii., 597.

³ Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 29; the number of men capable of bearing arms was 92,000.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i., 8; for the position and nature of these entrenchments, see Desjardins, ii., 599.

⁵ Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 6; Desjardins, ii., 601.

⁶ Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 10: "*iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, quæ civitas est in provincia.*" The description of the Santones as "not far distant from the territory of Toulouse" is inaccurate. See Desjardins, ii., 603.

learning their intention, Cæsar left Labienus to guard the defences on the Rhone, and hurried to Italy to collect fresh troops.¹ At the head of five legions he recrossed the Alps,² and marched rapidly through the territories of the Vocontii and Allobroges, till he reached the Rhone near Vienne.³ Then turning northwards he overtook the Helvetii while crossing the Saône on their way westward, between Lyons and Mâcon,⁴ and cut to pieces their rearguard, consisting of Rome's former enemies, the Tigurini. This done, he crossed the Saône, and followed the main body of the enemy, until the difficulty of provisioning his army⁵ obliged him to turn aside, and make for the Æduan stronghold Bibracte, where grain in plenty was to be had.⁶ Finding, however, that the Helvetii, taking courage from his abandonment of the pursuit, had resolved in their turn to become his pursuers, he halted in a strong position, some eighteen Roman miles south of Bibracte, and awaited their attack. The battle which followed resulted in the complete defeat of

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 10.

² He seems to have followed the route by Susa (Segusio) through the Cottian Alps; Desjardins, ii., 603.

³ Opposite to the land of the Segusiani. Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 10: "*abAllobrogibus in Segusianos—hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi.*"

⁴ Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 12; Desjardins, ii., 605.

⁵ The difficulty was mainly due to the intrigues of the Æduan chief Dumnorix; Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 16-19.

⁶ *Ibid.*, i., 23: "*oppido Æduorum longe maximo et copiosissimo.*" The site of Bibracte has been fixed at Mt. Beuvray. For its relation to the later tribal capital, Augustodunum (Autun), see Desjardins, ii., 609, note.

the Helvetii.¹ The survivors, after a vain attempt to make their way to the Rhone through the territory of the Lingones, surrendered at discretion. They were disarmed and ordered to return to their homes, but of the mighty host which in the spring had mustered on the banks of the Rhone, less than a third lived to recross the river.²

The task which Cæsar had undertaken of defending Gaul against invasion was not ended by the defeat of the Helvetii. By the Gauls themselves he was at once invited to rid them of a still more formidable intruder. Some fourteen years before,³ on the invitation of the Arverni and Sequani, a force of fifteen thousand Germans, under Ariovistus, had crossed the Rhine to aid these tribes in their ancient quarrel with the Ædui,⁴ and after a protracted struggle had completely defeated the Ædui in 60 B.C. at Magetobriga.⁵ In the extremity of their distress the latter appealed to Rome for aid, but with little effect, for in 59 B.C. Ariovistus was

Ariovistus
and the
Germans.

694 A.U.C.

¹ The scene of the battle is placed at Mont Mort, to the south of Autun. Stoffel, *Guerres des Cæsar et d'Arioviste*, p. 36 (Paris, 1891).

² Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 28, 29. The Boii were allowed, at the request of the Ædui, to remain in the territory of the latter. The re-occupation of Helvetia was desirable as a precaution against German inroads. Florus, iii., 10: "*gentem in sedes suas quasi greges in stabula pastor deduxit.*"

³ Cf. Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 35, where Ariovistus declares that his Germans had not slept under a roof for fourteen years.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i., 31.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *l.c.*; Cic., *Ad Att.*, i., 19.

695 A.U.C. formally enrolled among the "friends" of the Roman people, and the title of "king" which he had assumed was recognized by the senate.¹ The plight of the Ædui was bad enough, but that of Ariovistus's allies, the Sequani, was even worse, for one hundred and twenty thousand Germans were established in their territory, and Ariovistus had recently ordered them to make room for twenty-four thousand more. At a council of chiefs, the Ædian Divitiacus, whose unswerving loyalty to Rome had won him the full confidence of Cæsar, urged upon him that not only was Rome bound in honour to rescue her faithful allies from their imminent peril, but that she could not afford to stand by and allow Gaul to be overrun by the Germans. Cæsar was convinced, all the more easily as the territory of the Sequani, where Ariovistus was established, was only separated by the Rhone from the Roman province of Farther Gaul. Envoys were at once sent to Ariovistus, but brought back only messages of haughty defiance, while at the same time the news arrived that fresh swarms of Suevi were about to cross the Rhine and join their countrymen in Gaul. In order to crush Ariovistus before these reinforcements reached him, Cæsar started at once; he occupied and garrisoned Vesontio (Besançon), the chief stronghold of the Sequani, which Ariovistus was said to be intending to attack. Seven days later a series of forced marches brought him by a circuitous route within reach of Ariovistus, who was apparently encamped on the farther side of the Vosges moun-

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 34; Plut., *Cæsar*, 19.

tains in the plain country between that range and the Rhine.¹ After ten days spent partly in fruitless negotiation and partly in vain attempts on Cæsar's part to force an engagement, a decisive battle was fought. The Germans were defeated; Ariovistus escaped across the Rhine,² and the Suevi, abandoning their projected invasion of Gaul, returned home.

Gaul was now freed from invaders, but the legions which had chased the Helvetii to their homes, and driven Ariovistus across the Rhine, were not withdrawn from Gaulish soil. Though ^{The Belgæ.} Cæsar returned to Cisalpine Gaul, his troops remained in the territory of the Sequani,³ and this military occupation was naturally interpreted as implying an intention on the part of Rome to extend her suzerainty beyond the limits of the "province." By the Belgæ especially, the most warlike of the Gaulish peoples, the presence of six Roman legions so near their frontiers was regarded as menacing their own independence.⁴ A council of chiefs, summoned to consider the situation, declared enthusiastically for instant war, and contingents from the various tribes were promised, amounting in all to nearly three hundred thousand men.⁵ But the prospect of a stubborn resistance which these formidable preparations held out was by no means fulfilled.

¹ Desjardins, ii., 620-622; Stoffel, *Cæsar et Arioviste*, 53, 57.

² Cæsar, *B. G.*, 53. The scene of the battle was fifty miles distant from the Rhine.

³ Cæsar, *B. G.*, i., 54; probably at Besançon

⁴ *Ibid.*, ii., 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ii., 4.

597 A.U.C. When Cæsar, in the spring of 57 B.C., reached the Belgic frontier, at the head of an imposing force,¹ he was at once met by an offer of friendship from the Remi, the most southerly of the Belgic tribes. The alliance, which was eagerly accepted, opened the route to the river Aisne, on the farther banks of which Cæsar entrenched himself, with the friendly territory of his new allies in the rear.² The Belgic host advanced with great firmness against him, but after being twice repulsed, once in an attack on a stronghold of the Remi, and once in an attempt to cut off Cæsar's communications with the rear, their resolution failed. The host broke up, and the various clans marched back to their own territories, there to await the advance of the legions.³ But Cæsar's rapid movements disconcerted their plans. Tribe after tribe submitted on the mere appearance of his troops in their territory, and in spite of the desperate stand made by the Nervii, the end of the summer saw the suzerainty of Rome recognised throughout Belgic Gaul. An unmistakable proof of the Roman advance was the fact that the legions this time wintered, not in the country of the Sequani, but in the very heart of Northern Gaul, in the region of the Upper Loire.⁴

On starting for Italy in the autumn of 57 B.C. Cæsar had received through P. Crassus the submis-

¹ He had raised two fresh legions in Cisalpine Gaul, bringing the total number under his command to eight. *Ibid.*, ii., 2.

² *Ibid.*, ii., 5.

³ Cæsar, *B. G.*, ii., 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ii., 35: "in Carnutes, Andes, Turonesque."

sion of the tribes along the Atlantic seaboard from the Loire to the Seine. The subjugation of the Atlantic seaboard. During the winter, however, the news reached him that these tribes, probably encouraged by his absence, were in open revolt, headed by the Veneti,¹ a sea-faring folk at the mouth of the Loire, and had imprisoned the Roman envoy sent to collect provisions. In the spring of 56 B.C., as soon as the passes were open, Cæsar returned to Gaul. Troops were hastily despatched to prevent the revolt from spreading to other districts: Labienus was commissioned to maintain order among the Belgæ, while Crassus was sent to check any attempt on the part of the tribes south of the Loire to assist the insurgents. To a third force of three legions was intrusted the task of preventing any junction between the more northerly of the revolted tribes,² and the chief offenders, the Veneti. These last Cæsar himself prepared to subdue. Driving the enemy before him, he forced the whole tribe to take refuge among the islets and creeks at the mouth of the Loire.³ Here, and in sight of Cæsar and his troops on the mainland, they were attacked and defeated by the fleet which Cæsar had built for the purpose on the river.⁴ Of the survivors, the chiefs were put to death, and the rest sold as slaves, a warning to barbarians that they should in future respect

¹ *Ibid.*, iii. 9.

² *Ibid.*, iii., 11 : "in Venellos, Curiosolitas, Lexoviosque."

³ Cæsar, *B. G.*, iii. 14, 16; for the topography, see Desjardins, i., 278 sqq.

⁴ Cæsar, *B. G.*, iii., 13, 14.

the rights of envoys.' At the same moment Cæsar received the news that the insurgent tribes to the northward had, after a brief resistance, laid down their arms; while south of the Loire, P. Crassus had achieved even more important results by the reduction of the whole of Aquitaine, with the exception only of a few tribes in the extreme south-west.¹ A successful expedition, led by Cæsar himself, against the Morini and Menapii on the north coast, completed the work of the year.

The suzerainty of Rome was now established, in name at least, over nearly the whole of Gaul, but Cæsar had already reason to know how readily, on any favourable opportunity, the tribes would throw off an allegiance extorted from them by superior force. Above all, there was ground for fearing that, as a last resource, the Keltic tribes would take the desperate step of calling in the aid of their ancient foes the Germans. During the following winter these fears were realised. Two German tribes, the Usipetes and Tencteri, on being expelled from their own homes by the Suevi, crossed the Rhine near its mouth and settled in the land of the Menapii, and 699 A. U. C. on rejoining his legions in the spring of 55 B.C., Cæsar found that the Keltic tribes near the Rhine were already in treaty with the invaders. The expulsion of the latter from what was already in theory Roman territory was a necessity, and was easily accomplished. In a single battle fought near

¹ *Ibid.*, iii., 16.

² *Ibid.*, iii., 27.

³ Cæsar, *B. G.*, iv., 1, 6.

the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse they were defeated and cut to pieces.¹ The Rhine was now established as the frontier not only of Gaul, but of the empire of the Roman people.² Of a permanent advance beyond it there was as yet no thought; but for the safety of the frontier it was essential to impress the German tribes on the farther bank of the river with a wholesome fear of the power of Rome, and to show that even in their own homes they were not beyond the reach of her arm. These considerations, and the entreaties of the one trans-Rhenane tribe friendly to Rome, the semi-civilised Ubii, determined Cæsar to enter Germany, and for the first time in history the legions crossed the Rhine by a bridge specially constructed for that purpose.³ The German tribes, and even the invincible Suevi, retreated hastily to the shelter of their impenetrable forests; and Cæsar, after ravaging the territory of the Sugambri, and relieving the Ubii for the time from the assaults of the Suevi, re-crossed the Rhine.⁴

It was not, however, beyond the Rhine only that a military demonstration appeared desirable. The Kelts across the sea, in the island of Britain, had throughout actively aided their kinsmen on the mainland in their resistance to Rome, and it was time that they, as well as the Germans, should learn that Rome could tolerate no

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, iv., 12-15.

² *Ibid.*, iv., 16: "*populi Romani imperium Rhenum finire.*"

³ *Ibid.*, iv. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iv. 19: "*diebus decem et octo trans Rhenum consumptis.*"

disturbance of the peace within what were now the limits of her empire. It is clear, too, that Cæsar was curious to learn something of the almost unknown land whose cliffs were visible from the Gallic shore.¹ Although, therefore, the summer was drawing to a close, an expedition to Britain was resolved upon. A fleet was hastily collected, of which the vessels employed against the Veneti in the previous year formed a part. On this fleet Cæsar placed two legions, which he considered a sufficient force for what was intended to be rather a military reconnaissance than a serious invasion. Sailing from the Portus Itius, near Boulogne, he landed, in spite of the resistance of the natives, on the low shore, near Pevensey,² where he erected a camp. But the lateness of the season, and the damage inflicted upon his fleet by a high tide, decided him to postpone further operations in the island until the next year, and on "the day after the equinox" he re-crossed the Channel.

During the winter preparations were made for an expedition on a larger scale, and late in the spring of 54 B.C., after a delay caused by
700 A.U.C. symptoms of disaffection among the Gaulish tribes, he again set sail from the Portus Itius with five legions and 2,000 Gaulish cavalry.³ But this second expedition had scarcely more permanent results than the first. For though he advanced to

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, iv., 20.

² *Ibid.*, iv., 23; Desjardins, i., 348 *sqq.*; Ridgeway in *Journal of Philology*, vol. xix., p. 200.

³ *Ibid.*, v., 8.

the Thames,¹ and crossed it, and though he broke the power of his most formidable opponent Cassivelaunus, and received the formal submission of several tribes in the south-eastern regions, he returned at the close of the summer without having done more than prove for the benefit of his successors that an invasion of the island was feasible.²

It is probable, however, that Cæsar would not have remained satisfied with these meagre results, but for the ominous symptoms of disturbance and discontent which were showing themselves in Gaul. The attempted rising of the Treveri in 54 B.C. was followed by a series of insurrections in almost every part of the country. The first to raise the standard of revolt were the tribes in the north-eastern districts, who, finding that Cæsar had been compelled by the scarcity of corn to distribute his legions for the winter over an unusually wide area, determined to make a simultaneous attack upon the isolated camps.³ The Eburones,⁴ who struck the first blow, decoyed from its camp, and treacherously cut to pieces, the legion stationed in their territory; the Nervii attacked Q. Cicero; the Treveri besieged Labienus; while in the west, the Armorican tribes threatened the position of the single legion quartered among the Esvii. But the desperate tenacity with which Cicero defended his camp gave Cæsar time to march to his relief.

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, v., 11.

² *Ibid.*, v., 11-23; Elton, *Origins of English History*, pp. 105-111.

³ *Ibid.*, v., 24.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *B. G.*, v., 26-58.

The Nervii were defeated; the Treveri, who had vainly endeavoured to persuade the Germans to come to their aid, were routed by Labienus; while the Armorican tribes dispersed on hearing the news of the Roman successes. In spite, however, of this severe check, the insurrectionary movement was by no means crushed. Cæsar remained in Gaul throughout the winter, and early in 53 B.C. he learnt that not only were the north-eastern tribes again taking up arms, but that, south of the Seine, the Senones and Carnutes had thrown off their allegiance.¹ With characteristic promptitude he resolved to strike at once before the insurgents could complete their preparations. From his headquarters at Samarobriua (Amiens) he marched rapidly against the Nervii, who, taken completely by surprise, at once submitted. Moving southward he held a "durbar" at Paris,² in the immediate neighbourhood of the Senones and Carnutes. The chiefs of the latter abstained from attending, but on Cæsar's advancing against them, in force, their courage failed, and they laid down their arms. The rest of the summer was devoted to the pacification of the districts along the Rhine,³ where the Menapii, Eburones, and Treveri still held out. By the autumn order was so far restored that Cæsar, after holding his usual "durbar" at Reims, was able to revisit Italy.⁴

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, vi., 2 sqq.

² *Ibid.*, vi., 3: "*concilium Lutetiam Parisiorum transfert.*"

³ It was on this occasion that Cæsar for the second time crossed the Rhine; *B. G.*, iv., 10-29.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vi., 44.

His departure was, however, instantly followed by a fresh outbreak. The new revolt broke out, not in north-eastern Gaul, but among the tribes of the central and southern districts. The leaders in the movement were the Arverni, and with them were soon united most of the clans dwelling between the Seine and the Garonne.¹ The insurgents were thus able at once to threaten the Roman province of Southern Gaul, and to intercept communication between that province and the legions in the north. For the first time, moreover, the insurgent tribes were united under the leadership of a single able and resolute man, the young Arvernian chief Vercingetorix. Cæsar, who had recrossed the Alps on the first news of the outbreak, found himself as his enemies had calculated, with no other troops at his disposal but such as he had brought from Italy or could raise in the province. The hope, however, which the Gauls entertained of preventing a junction between the legions and their general was disappointed. Hastily posting garrisons to check the threatened invasion of the province by Lucterius, chief of the Cadurci,² and with only a small force of cavalry, he crossed the Cevennes in spite of the deep snow, descended as if from the clouds into the territory of the Arverni, pushed on to the Rhone, and then turning northward effected a junction with his legions in the country of the Lin-

Rising in
Central and
Southern
Gaul under
Vercin-
getorix.

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, vii., 4: "*Senones, Parisios, Pictones, Cadurcos, Turones, Aulercos, Lemovices, Andes reliquosque omnes, qui Oceanum attingunt.*"

² *Ibid.*, vii., 7.

goned, before the insurgents had recovered from their first surprise.¹ Once at the head of his legions, Cæsar assumed the offensive, and marching southwards, captured in rapid succession Vellaunodunum, Cenabum (Orleans), Noviodunum (Nouan), and after a protracted siege Avaricum (Bourges), the chief town of the Bituriges.² The winter was now over, and Cæsar (52 B.C.) resolved to force on a decisive battle with Vercingetorix before the revolt spread further. Sending Labienus with four legions to hold the Senones in check, and secure him against a rising in his rear, he resolved to march at once upon the chief Arvernian stronghold Gergovia,³ whither Vercingetorix followed him. But his hopes of thus putting a speedy end to the war were disappointed by the unexpected revolt of his old and faithful allies, the Ædui. Fearing that their example might be followed by a general rising of the tribes,⁴ which had as yet remained quiet, he reluctantly raised the siege of Gergovia, and marching northwards again joined Labienus and his legions in the country of the Senones. But his retreat, and the news of the defection of the Ædui gave the signal for the rising which he had feared. A council of chiefs from all parts of Gaul was held at the Æduan capital Bibracte,⁵ and Vercingetorix, who was elected commander-in-chief, explained the

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, vii., 9.

² *Ibid.*, vii., 13-31.

³ *Ibid.*, vii., 34. For the site of Gergovia, see Desjardins, *Œ.*, 678; it was five miles south of Clermont.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vii., 43.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vii., 63.

plan of campaign which he proposed to adopt. While he, with the main body, maintained a harassing guerilla warfare against Cæsar and his legions, the Roman province to the south was to be invaded at three separate points simultaneously.¹ On learning of the danger which threatened the province, Cæsar marched to its relief. The direct road was closed by the revolt of the Ædui, and he was forced to adopt a longer and more circuitous route through the territory of the Lingones and Sequani. On his way Vercingetorix attacked him in force, but was repulsed and forced to retreat to the impregnable fortress of Alesia.² Thither Cæsar followed him, and while Vercingetorix with his infantry held the town, emissaries were sent in all directions inviting the Gauls to rise in a body and crush the invaders. In response to the appeal, a force consisting of 250,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, drawn from every part of Gaul, assembled in the territory of the Ædui, and marched to Alesia.³ The struggle which followed was more desperate than any in which Cæsar had as yet been engaged. While the newly-arrived levies endeavoured to carry the Roman lines of entrenchment from the rear, Vercingetorix, issuing from Alesia, assaulted them in front. Twice the legions repulsed the enemy with great slaughter,

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, vii., 64.

² *Ibid.*, vii., 68: "*Alesiam, quod est oppidum Mandubiorum.*" The latter were a tribe dwelling on the borders of the Sequanian territory, and were possibly clients of the Ædui; Desjardins, ii., 468. Alesia is identified with Alise St. Reine; *Ibid.*, ii., 695.

³ Cæsar, *B. G.*, vii., 75.

only to find themselves attacked a third time with even greater fury than before. But their courage and discipline finally triumphed. Disheartened by their losses, the Gaulish levies dispersed in confusion to their homes, and their retreat sealed the fate of their kinsmen in Alesia. Vercingetorix counselled surrender, and chivalrously offered himself as a victim to appease the wrath of Rome.¹ Seated in front of the entrenchments which had been so gallantly attacked and defended, Cæsar received the submission of the garrison, and announced their fate. Vercingetorix himself became a prisoner, and was reserved to grace his conqueror's triumph in Rome, and die by the hands of a Roman executioner. His followers, with the exception of the Ædui and Arverni, whom Cæsar kept as hostages, were distributed as part of the spoils of war to the victorious legions.

The final effort made by the Gauls to recover their liberty had failed. The capture of Alesia had destroyed their confidence in the impregnability of their strongholds, the best of their warriors were dead or captured, and with Vercingetorix they had lost the one leader capable of enforcing even a temporary union among their tribes. From the close of the summer of 52 B.C. down to the moment of his final departure for Italy at the end of the year 50 B.C., Cæsar had merely to deal with local risings chiefly among the few tribes who had not as yet felt the full weight of the Roman

**Pacification
of Gaul.**

702 A.U.C.

704 A.U.C.

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, vii., 89.

arm, and of these all but two were checked or suppressed without difficulty. It was only by the Bellovaci¹ in the north, and by the Cadurci and their allies in the extreme south,² that any serious resistance was offered to the legions. By 703 A. U. C. / the autumn of 51 B.C. the pacification of Gaul was complete, even the Iberian tribes in the south-west of Aquitaine having acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome.³ The year 50 B.C. was, 704 A. U. C. except for a visit to Cisalpine Gaul, where he received an enthusiastic welcome from the people, devoted by Cæsar to strengthening and confirming the authority of Rome, more especially among the Belgic clans, whose love of war, as well as their proximity to the Germans, marked them out as the most likely to disturb the peace of the country. Late in that year, after reviewing his faithful legions in the territory of the Treveri, he left for Italy.⁴

The result of Cæsar's campaigns had been to bring the whole of Gaul within the Roman sphere of influence. The tribes were all enrolled as the allies of Rome, and bound to respect the majesty of the Roman people. It is also probable that Cæsar required from them both hostages and the payment of a tribute. But the establishment of a regular provincial system was delayed by the outbreak (49 B. C.) of the great Civil War, and 705 A. U. C. was in fact the work, not of Cæsar, but of Augustus.

¹ Cæsar, *B. G.*, viii., 7-20.

² *Ibid.*, viii., 26-45.

³ *Ibid.*, viii., 46.

⁴ *Ibid.*, viii., 55.

To the east of Italy, in the regions stretching northward from Epirus and Macedonia to the Danube, the advance of Rome had been slow and irregular. Nor had the frequent wars with Keltic, Illyrian, and Thracian tribes, which the defence of the frontier, or the ambition of Roman generals provoked, resulted in any large and permanent extension of Roman rule.¹

Roman
advance
towards the
Danube.

Had Cæsar lived, he would no doubt have brought under Roman authority the regions lying immediately eastward of Italy, and have carried Roman rule up to the Danube, as he had already carried it to the Rhine. As it was, however, throughout the whole of the period we are considering no great advance was made in this direction. Wars indeed were frequent, and triumphs scarcely less so: we read of expeditions against the tribes which lay immediately outside the "gate of Italy," Aquileia,² and against those farther south, along the Adriatic seaboard.³ But though Istria is said to have been conquered,⁴ and though the frontiers of the so-called province of Illyria or Illyricum were possibly pushed as far north as Salona,⁵ no real con-

Illyria.

¹ Zippel, *Röm. Herrschaft in Illyrien* (Leipzig, 1877); Cons, *La Province Romaine de Dalmatie* (Paris, 1882).

² Against the Iapudes in 129 B.C., the Stoëni, "*gentem sub radicibus Alpium sitam*," in 118 B.C., the Karni in 115; Livy, *Epit.*, lix., lxii.

³ Against the Dalmatæ in 119, 117, 85 B.C.; App., *Illyr.*, 10; Livy, *Epit.*, lxii.; Eutrop., iii., 7.

⁴ Pliny, *N. H.*, iii., 19, states that Sempronius Tuditanus (cons. 129 B.C.) subdued the Istri.

⁵ At what date Illyria was made a separate province is uncertain. It was already so when Cæsar received it in 59 B.C. See Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 141 sqq.

quest of the districts afterwards known as Upper and Lower Illyricum was effected. Very much the same was the case with the country lying between the province of Macedonia and the Danube. From 114 B.C. down to 92 B.C., Macedonia. raids by Keltic or Thracian tribes upon the province, and retaliatory expeditions led by the governors of Macedonia, follow each other in rapid succession.¹ The defeat of C. Sentius in 92 B.C. was followed by a series of attacks, some of them prompted and assisted by Mithridates, which endangered the very existence of Roman rule in Macedonia. Though checked for a time by Sulla's vigorous measures in the spring of 85 B.C.,² they recommenced with renewed vigour in 78 B.C., and several years of incessant war followed.³ The successes gained by Curio (75-73 B.C.), and by Marcus Lucullus (73-70 B.C.)⁴ broke for a time the strength of the most formidable tribes, and Curio actually penetrated to the Danube. But the defeat of Antonius (consul 63 B.C.) by the Dardani in 62, and the description given by Cicero of the state of affairs on the Macedonian frontier six years later,⁵ sufficiently prove that the situation had not materially changed. Over the regions afterwards included within the provinces of Thrace and Mœsia, as over Illyricum, the Republic never obtained any real hold.

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, lxiii., lxx.

² Eutrop., v., 7.

³ Eutrop., vi., 2; Livy, *Epit.*, xci.

⁴ Eutrop., vi., 6, 7, Oros., vi., 3.

⁵ Cic. *In Pisonem*, 16: "ut semper Macedonicis imperatoribus iidem fines provinciarum fuerint, qui gladiatorum atque pilorum."

The year which was marked in the domestic history of Rome by the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus, witnessed also the creation of the first Roman province on Asiatic soil. For though the province of Asia was not definitely organised until the suppression of Aristonicus's rising in 129 B.C., the year 133 B.C., in which Attalus III., king of Pergamus, bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people, was officially accepted as the year of its foundation.¹ The new province included Mysia, Lydia, Ionia, and Caria, the most fertile, wealthy, and populous districts of the peninsula of Asia Minor.² From the first it took rank as the most valuable and lucrative of Roman dependencies. The revenues derived from it became at once the mainstay of the Roman treasury, and a source of profit to the Roman *publicani* who collected them, while Roman officials and Roman men of business found there an inexhaustible field for money-making in every form. But the results of this first annexation of Asiatic territory did not end here. The creation of a Roman province of Asia brought home to the Eastern world the fact that the "lordship of Asia," which had anciently belonged to the half-mythical kings of Phrygia, which had since then been held in turn

¹ The official era of the province was reckoned from 133 B.C. It was actually organised in 129 B.C. by M. Aquilius and a commission of ten senators; Strabo, p. 646. Comp. Livy, *Epit.*, lvii., lix.; Plin., *N. H.*, xxxiii., 140; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 177.

² Phrygia was attached to the province in 116 B.C.; Justinus xxxviii., 5. Comp. the inscription edited by Ramsay. *Journ. Hell.* 1887, p. 496; Reinach, *Mithr.*, pp. 51, 457.

by Cyrus and Darius, by Alexander of Macedon, and by Antiochus, had passed to Rome, and that the place of the Great King, the king of kings, was now filled by an Italian republic.

At the time, indeed, there seemed little probability that this claim of a Western state to rule in Asia would be seriously disputed. Of the three powers which had once contended for supremacy in the near East, Macedon was a Roman province, the Ptolemies in Egypt were the obsequious allies of Rome, while the Seleucid monarchy with diminished territories was distracted by dynastic feuds, and menaced by foreign invasion. Nor within the peninsula of Asia Minor itself was there apparently any state strong enough to challenge, with any hope of success, the sovereignty of Rome. Yet, within little more than forty years after the annexation of the Pergamene kingdom, that sovereignty was all but overthrown by the ruler of a hitherto obscure principality beyond the Halys; and this danger past, Rome found herself face to face on the Euphrates with a new and powerful Oriental kingdom, whose pretensions were as lofty as her own, and whose rulers had assumed the titles and claimed to be the heirs of Cyrus.

The kingdom of Pontus¹ took its rise, like its neighbours to the west and south, Bithynia and Cappadocia, during the troublous times which followed the death of Alexander

**Mithridates
of Pontus.**

¹ Appian, *Mithridat.*, 9; Mommsen, *R. G.*, ii., 270; Th. Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator* (Paris, 1890); Wroth., *Coinage of Pontus* (London, 1880).

the Great. Its founder, Mithridates the First (281
 473 A.U.C. B.C.) claimed descent from one of the seven
 Persian nobles who conspired against the
 Pseudo-Smerdis, or, according to a later version, from
 the royal house of the Achæmenidæ itself.¹ More
 than a century later, in the reign of the fifth king, Mith-
 584-634 A.U.C. ridates Euergetes (156-120 B.C.), Pontus was
 enrolled among the allies of Rome, and
 both during the third Punic war and on the occa-
 621-625 A.U.C. sion of Aristonicus's² rebellion (133-129 B.C.),
 had loyally assisted her powerful patron.
 Euergetes died in 120 B.C., and six years later his
 634 A.U.C. eldest son Mithridates Eupator, after-
 wards famous as Mithridates the Great,
 suddenly appeared in the Pontic capital, Sinope,
 deposed his mother, the regent Laodicè, and reigned
 in his father's stead.³ But the narrow limits³ of his
 hereditary kingdom could not satisfy the boundless
 ambition of the young prince, nor, though from
 motives of policy he continued outwardly the loyal
 ally of Rome, was he the man to remain content
 with the inglorious position of a client king. The
 object which he set before himself was, if not at first
 the expulsion of the Romans from Asia, at least the
 creation of a powerful Asiatic monarchy, which should
 set bounds to European aggression, and reclaim
 Asia for the Asiatics. For such a task he was pre-
 eminently well qualified. His personal beauty, his
 marvellous bodily powers, his prowess as soldier,

¹ App., *l. c.* 9, 192 Sall., *Hist. fragm.*, 2, 6.

² Reinach, 55.

³ Strabo, xii., 3, 1.

and huntsman,¹ fascinated the warlike tribes, Thracian, Scythian, or Colchian, whom he enlisted under his banner. To the native populations of Asia Minor he appealed as the lineal descendant of the great Persian monarchs who had formerly claimed all Asia for their own,² while to the Greek cities he was recommended as the son of a father whose services to them had won him the title of "the Benefactor," and as a prince who, though Persian by descent, was Greek by education, who everywhere proclaimed himself their protector, and who posed as the successor, not only of Cyrus and Darius, but of Alexander. In the use which he made of these advantages Mithridates was, it is true, unscrupulous, treacherous, and cruel, but he showed also that, both as a statesman and a general, he had few equals among his contemporaries.

Fortune, too, favoured him; for during the first fourteen years of his reign the attention of the Roman senate was too much engrossed by affairs in the West, by the Jugurthine war and the Cimbric invasion, to be able to pay any close attention to the East. Mithridates thus succeeded, almost unobserved, in carrying out the first part of his great scheme. By 95 B.C. his authority was recognised along the coasts of the Euxine, from the mouths of the Danube to Colchis and Lesser Armenia, alike by the Greek cities and by the barbarian tribesmen. Once master of the Euxine and of its inexhaustible resources in men and supplies, he turned his atten-

¹ App. *Mithr.*, 112.

² Hdt., i., 4; τὴν γὰρ Ἀσίην. . . ἀκημεῖνται οἱ Πέρσας

tion to strengthening his position in Asia Minor, and it was his action here that first provoked Roman intervention. In 92 B.C., L. Cornelius Sulla,
 662 A.U.C. the future dictator, was sent to Cappadocia, with orders to restore King Ariobarzanes, whom Mithridates had deposed in favour of his own son Ariarathes.¹ Mithridates acquiesced, but only for the time; and when, in 90 B.C., the Social
 664 A.U.C. War broke out in Italy, he seized his opportunity, and not only once more expelled Ariobarzanes, but put a creature of his own on the throne of Bithynia, in the place of Rome's ally Nicomedes. Again Rome intervened, and again Mithridates allowed the exiled kings to be restored, and professed unalterable respect for the authority of Rome. Meanwhile, he laboured ceaselessly and secretly to consolidate and extend the great coalition which he hoped to lead against Rome.² The Greek cities of the Euxine, and their barbarian neighbours, Thracians, Scythians, Bastarni, and Sarmatæ, awaited his orders. The kings of Greater Armenia and Parthia were his allies, and emissaries of his were in treaty with Egypt and Syria. In Pontus itself he had collected and equipped an army of 250,000 infantry and 40,000 cavalry, as well as a fleet of 400 vessels.³ Nothing more was needed but a pretext for war, and this was supplied by the incredible rashness and folly of the Roman officials in Asia. Indeed, no better proof of the weakness of the republican system

¹ Livy, *Epit.*, lxx.; Plutarch, *Sulla*, 5; App., *Mithr.*, 10.

² App., *Mithr.*, 15.

³ App., *Mithr.*, 17.

could be given than the fact that by the unauthorised action of a few representatives abroad, the Roman government found itself, without any previous warning, suddenly engaged in a serious war against an opponent more formidable than any whom it had encountered since the fall of Carthage, and this in the midst of a serious domestic crisis. It was at the instigation of M. Aquillius¹ that, in 89 B.C., the recently restored king of Bithynia, ^{665 A.U.C.} Nicomedes, invaded the territories of Mithridates, and ravaged the country unopposed as far as Amas-tris. Mithridates formally protested against the injury inflicted upon him, but the Roman officers, possibly deceived by his pacific attitude, refused all satisfaction, and peremptorily ordered his envoy to leave the camp.² War was now inevitable, and early in 88 B.C. Nicomedes invaded <sup>First Mithri-
datic war.
666 A.U.C.</sup> Pontus. Oppius, proconsul of Cilicia, ad-
vanced into Cappadocia, while Aquillius and L. Cassius, proconsul of Asia, covered Bithynia and Phrygia. Numerically, their forces were formidable enough, but they consisted for the most part of un-trustworthy levies, hastily raised in Phrygia and Galatia, and the commanders were no match for Mithridates and his experienced Greek general, Neoptolemus and Archelaus. The cam-
paign was short and decisive: Nicomedes <sup>Successes of
Mithridates
in Asia.</sup> was utterly routed on the river Amnias,

¹ He had been sent out from Rome to effect the restoration of Nico-medes and Ariobarzanes. He was the son of the Aquillius who, in 129 B.C., organised the province of Asia.

² App., *Mithr.*, 16.

and fled first to Pergamus and then to Rome, leaving his kingdom at the mercy of the enemy.¹ His Roman allies, whose troops for the most part refused to fight, were even more easily driven from their positions. L. Cassius escaped to Rhodes, Oppius and Aquillius were both captured, and the latter put to death. The senate at Rome learnt, to their amazement, that Mithridates was already the undisputed master, not only of Bithynia, Cappadocia, and Phrygia, but of their own province of Asia, of Lycia and Pamphylia.² The announcement of this complete and unexpected revolution was followed by the still more terrible news of the simultaneous massacre by the Greek cities of the Romans resident among them, an act of deliberate barbarity suggested by Mithridates himself.³ Meanwhile the latter, though foiled in his attack on Rhodes, had reduced to subjection the islands near the coast of Asia Minor. But his dreams of conquest were not yet completely fulfilled, and he aspired to detach Greece itself from its western rulers, and unite it to Asiatic empire. Archelaus, who was despatched for the purpose, met with little resistance; and not only the Athenians, but the Bœotians, Achæans, and Lacedæmonians, became the allies of the king of Pontus.⁴ The suzerainty which Rome had won for herself a century before on the field of Magnesia was for the moment

¹ App., *Mithr.*, 18.

² *Ibid.*, 20; Livy, *Epit.*, xxvii.

³ App., *Mithr.*, 23; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxvii. Eighty thousand Romans and Italians perished; Val. Max., ix., 2-3. Plutarch puts the number at 150,000; *Sulla*, 24.

⁴ App., *Mithr.*, 27-29.

transferred to Mithridates. His success, however, had been largely due to the domestic troubles which occupied the attention of the Roman government, to the incapacity of the Roman generals opposed to him, and to the absence of any sufficient body of Roman troops in Asia Minor. All this was changed when, early in 87 B.C., Sulla, in conformity with a decree of the senate, assumed the command, and appeared in Greece at the head of five legions. His arrival was the signal for a hasty repudiation of their newly-formed alliance with Mithridates by the states of the Peloponnese, an example which, as Mithridates found to his cost, the Greeks of Asia Minor were ready enough to follow. It was against Athens, which Archelaus and his ally Aristion occupied in force, that Sulla directed his first attack. The defence was obstinate, and it was not until the spring of 86 B.C.¹ that the city itself first of all and then the Peiræus were taken. Sulla now marched northwards into Bœotia to meet the army despatched by Mithridates for the conquest of Macedonia, but which was now hurrying to the relief of Athens. A battle fought on the historic field of Chæronea ended in a complete victory for Sulla, and a few months later, at Orchomenos, he gained a second victory over the reinforcements sent from Asia to support Archelaus.² An end was thus put to Mithridates's short-lived supremacy in European Greece.

667 A. U. C.
Sulla takes
the com-
mand.

668 A. U. C.
Capture of
Athens.
Victories at
Chæronea
and Orcho-
menos.

¹ Athens was taken on March 1, 86 B.C.; Plut., *Sulla*, 14.

² App., *Mithr.*, 42-44, 49; Plut., *Sulla*, 15-21; Eutrop., v. 6.

In Asia Minor his cruelties and exactions had already made him unpopular, and the growing disaffection was increased by the news of Sulla's victory at Chæronea. The savage measures by which he endeavoured to intimidate his new subjects, his treacherous murder of the Galatian chiefs, and his brutal treatment of the Chians, alienated barbarians and Greeks alike. The Galatians expelled the satrap sent to govern them, and several of the Greek cities, following the lead of Ephesus, openly declared for Rome.¹ The defeat at Orchomenos was a fresh blow to his hopes, and he at once empowered Archelaus to open negotiations with Sulla.² Nor was Sulla without strong reasons for desiring peace. The counter revolution in Rome which followed his departure for Greece³ had placed his bitterest opponents at the head of affairs. He had been declared an outlaw, and his command transferred to L. Valerius Flaccus, consul for 86 B.C.⁴ It was true that he could trust his legions to follow him as readily against Flaccus as they had followed him from Nola to Rome in 88 B.C. But before engaging in a civil war, he was anxious to secure the fruits of his recent victories, and, destitute as he was of ships and money, there seemed no better method of attaining this object than the conclusion of an honourable treaty. The terms which he now pro-

**Negotiations
for peace.**

¹ App., *Mithr.*, 46-48. Ephesus declared for Rome at the end of 87 B.C. See the extant decree given by Reinach, *Mithr.*, p. 463. I.e. Bas and Waddington, No. 136.

² App., *Mithr.*, 54.

³ See above, p. 228.

⁴ Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxii.; App., *Mithr.*, 51; Plut., *Sulla*, 22, 23.

posed to Archelaus amounted, in effect, to the restoration of the *status quo* as it existed before the war. Mithridates was to abandon Cappadocia, Bithynia, Asia, and Paphlagonia, to hand over to Rome seventy fully equipped ships of war, and to pay an indemnity of 2,000 talents.¹ In reply, Mithridates asked² to be allowed to retain Paphlagonia and to keep his ships. Sulla, however, was firm, and the course of events during the early part of the year 85 B.C. increased the anxiety of both parties for a peaceful settlement. Sulla had spent the winter of 86–85 in Thessaly,³ and had apparently devoted the spring to chastising the various tribes, Keltic, Illyrian, and Thracian, who for the last four or five years had incessantly harassed the province of Macedonia.⁴ Meanwhile his destined successor Flaccus had, shortly after reaching Asia, been murdered by Fimbria at Nicodemia;⁵ the latter assumed command of the troops, and though a man of the worst possible character, showed himself no mean general. He advanced into the Roman province of Asia, captured Pergamus, and finally forced Mithridates to take refuge in Mitylene.⁶ These successes decided the latter to accept what

Murder of
Flaccus by
Fimbria in
Asia.

¹ App., *Mithr.*, 54; Plut., *Sulla*, 22.

² *Ibid.*, 55.

³ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 51; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxiii.; Eutrop., v., 7.

⁵ App., *Mithr.*, 55; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxii. Flaccus was murdered either at the end of 86 B.C. or early in 85 B.C.; Vell. Pat., ii., 24.

⁶ App., *Mithr.*, 52. In this campaign Fimbria sacked Ilium, though under Sulla's protection; Livy, *Epit.*, lxxxiii.

terms he could get from Sulla, while Sulla himself realised that no time was to be lost if Fimbria was to be prevented from carrying off the honours of the war. Advancing through Thrace to the Hellespont, where Lucullus joined him with the long-expected fleet, he crossed to Asia.¹ At Dardanus, in the Troad,² he met Mithridates, and peace was concluded on the terms originally proposed. Mithridates retired to Pontus, Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes were restored for the third time to the thrones of Bithynia and Cappadocia, and finally Fimbria, deserted by his legions, who went over to Sulla, fell by his own hand.³ In calm defiance of the sentence of outlawry passed upon him, Sulla had won two pitched battles, had concluded an important treaty with a foreign power, and now proceeded with unshaken confidence to settle the affairs of the province of Asia which he had recovered.

The measures he took, if partially justified by the savage massacre of 88 B.C., were at any rate not calculated to restore peace and prosperity to a country harassed by war and impoverished by the exactions of Mithridates. All persons who had been prominent as partisans of the king were arrested and put to death.⁴ The whole province was ordered to pay not only the arrears of the "tithe" which had accumulated during the last five

¹ App., *Mithr.*, 56. Lucullus, as quaetor, had been engaged for a year and a half in collecting ships from Phœnicia, Rhodes, Cyprus, etc.

² Plut., *Sulla*, 24.

³ App., *Mithr.*, 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 61; Gran. Licinianus, p. 35.

years, but also a further sum of 20,000 talents, as an indemnity for the costs of the war.¹ With a view to the payment of this indemnity, Sulla divided the province into forty-four districts,² and fixed the quota which each district should pay,³ as well as the time of payment. It is true that he did not omit to reward the fidelity of such communities as had remained loyal by a grant of "freedom," and in some cases of an extension of territory.⁴ But these favours counted for little by comparison with the financial ruin which his demands brought about in the province which he claimed to have reorganised.⁵ In order to meet them, the communities of Asia were

¹ App., *Mithr.* 61: πέντε ἐτῶν φόρους ἔδενέγκειν αὐτίκα . . . καὶ τὴν τοῦ πόλεμου δαπάνην. The amount of the war indemnity is given by Plutarch (*Sulla*, 25). There seems no reason to suppose, as Mommsen does (*R. G.*, ii., 351), that Sulla abolished the "tithe," or the collection of it by *publicani*. He demanded (1) the immediate payment of the arrears of unpaid tithe; (2) a war indemnity to be paid down within a certain date.

² Cassiodorus, *Chron.* ad. ann. 670 A.U.C.: "*Asiam in xliii. regiones Sulla divisit.*"

³ App., *l. c.*: διαιρήσω κατὰ πόλεις. Cic. *Pro Flacco*, 14: "*omnes Asia civitates pro portione descripsisset*"; *Ad Q. Frat.*, i., 1, 11; "*vectigal, quod iis aequaliter Sulla descripserat.*" The indemnity for war expenses exacted by Pompey in 64 B.C. was assessed according to Sulla's arrangement; Cic. *Pro Flacco*, *l. c.*

⁴ Appian (*Mithr.*, 61) mentions Ilium, Chios, Lycia, Magnesia; Tacitus (*Ann.*, iii., 62) Rhodes. To the Rhodians were assigned the Caunians on the south borders of the province, and some of the islands; Cic., *Ad Q. Fr.*, i., 1, 11. Laodicea (*ad Lycum*) and Ephesus were also declared free; *C. J. L.*, i., 587 sqq.

⁵ App., *l. c.* What the extent of the reorganisation was it is impossible to say, but the era in use throughout Phrygia and Lydia was reckoned from 85 B.C.; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 180; Ramsay, *Geog. of Asia Minor*, 441, 452.

forced to borrow at exorbitant rates from Roman money-lenders;¹ with the result that fourteen years later their debt had increased to six times its original amount.² To add to their difficulties,³ the Cilician pirates began, even before Sulla left the province, a series of devastating raids, which he took no measures to check⁴; while the legions which he left behind him were content to live in luxurious ease at the expense of the hard-pressed provincials whom they should have protected, and to carry out only too faithfully the demoralising lessons which Sulla had taught them.⁵ Greece, the scene of Sulla's victories, suffered only less than Asia. There, too, Sulla's course was marked by robbery, devastation, and distress,⁶ the traces of which were plainly visible forty years later.⁷ Even more characteristic of Sulla's cynical indifference to all but the object immediately in view, was his omission to guard against a recurrence of the danger which he had for the moment repelled. The province of Asia was left as defenceless, the restored kings of Bithynia and Cappadocia as helpless, as before, while Mithridates himself was free to recruit his strength, and plan fresh schemes of conquest.

It is probable, indeed, that neither side accepted the settlement made at Dardanus as final. In

¹ Plut., *Luc.*, vii., 20; it had risen to 120,000 talents.

² App., *Mithr.*, 62.

³ *Ibid.*, 64; Sallust, *Cat.*, 11—"Sulla exercitum . . . quo sibi fidum faceret . . . luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat . . . Ibi primum insuevit exercitus populi Romani amare, potare," etc.

⁴ Plut., *Sulla*, 12; Diodor., fr. 38, 37; Reinach, *Mithr.*, 155.

⁵ See Servius's letter to Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, iv., 5.

83, 82, and 81, L. Murena, then governor of Asia, conducted three expeditions into the territory of Mithridates;¹ and though these raids, which Appian dignifies with the title of the "Second Mithridatic war," were stopped by Sulla's orders, Murena was granted the triumph,² which had been his main object in making them, and the Roman senate steadily declined to grant the king's repeated requests for a formal written treaty. On the other hand, Mithridates retained his hold over at least a part of Cappadocia, and continued his preparations for a renewal of hostilities with Rome.

The Second
Mithridatic
war.
671, 672, 673
A.U.C.

The death of Sulla in 78 B.C., the success of Sertorius in Spain, and the outbreak of a serious frontier war in Macedonia³ (77 B.C.) emboldened Mithridates to make more overt steps for recovering his lost position. With all his old activity he sought allies in every direction against the common enemy. Once more he summoned to his aid the warlike tribes to the north of the Euxine.⁴ His son-in-law Tigranes, now the ruler not only of Armenia but of Syria, was persuaded to invade Cappadocia.⁵ The friendship of the Cilician pirates was assured by the efforts which Rome was at last making to crush them.⁶ Finally,

676 A.U.C.

677 A.U.C.

¹ App., *Mithr.*, 64-66.

² Cic., *Pro Lege Manil.*, 3.

³ Eutrop., vi., 2; Livy, *Epit.*, xci.

⁴ App., *Mithr.*, 69.

⁵ App., *Mithr.*, 67. Tigranes carried off 300,000 men to people his new capital Tigranocerta.

⁶ In 78 B.C. P. Servilius was sent against them; Oros., v., 23.

he solicited and obtained an alliance with Sertorius in the far West, thus uniting, as Cicero said, "the Atlantic with the Euxine" ¹ in his great coalition.

Early in 74 B.C. Nicomedes, the sorely-trying king of Bithynia, died, leaving his kingdom, as Attalus had done, to the Roman people, and the senate at once declared Bithynia a Roman province. ² Mithridates replied by invading the vacant kingdom, possibly in the name of a surviving son of Nicomedes, ³ at the head of a large force, and supported by a well-equipped fleet. Both the two consuls of the year were sent from Rome to repulse him, ⁴ a most unusual measure at the time, one of them, M. Aurelius Cotta, being specially charged with the defence of Bithynia. But Cotta was no general; he was easily defeated by Mithridates, and forced to take refuge within the walls of Chalcedon, leaving Bithynia at the mercy of the enemy. Mithridates next advanced against Cyzicus—the capture of which would have supplied him with an admirable base of operations by sea and land against the western and most wealthy districts of the province of Asia ⁵—while a second force invaded and overran Phrygia. But Mithridates was not destined to sweep all before him as he had done in 88 B.C. The citizens of Cyzicus obstinately

Third
Mithridatic
war.
68o A.U.C.

Siege of
Cyzicus.

¹ Cic., *Pro Mur.*, 15; App., *Mithr.*, 68.

² App., *Mithr.*, 69; Eutrop., vi., 6; Livy, *Epit.*, xciii.

³ See his letter to the Parthian king Arsaces; Sall., *Hist.*, 4. fr. 20, 9.

⁴ App., *Mithr.*, 70; Cic., *Pro Mur.*, 15.

⁵ App., *Mithr.*, 72; Eutrop., vi., 6; Cic., *Pro Mur.*, 15: "*Asia januam, qua effracta et revolsa, tota pateret provincia.*"

defended their city, and in the consul L. Lucullus he had to deal with a general far more able than those whom he had then defeated, and supported, not by raw Asiatic levies, but by five Roman legions.¹ While his colleague Cotta remained ingloriously at Chalcedon, Lucullus advanced to the relief of Cyzicus. Without risking an engagement with the more numerous forces of the enemy, he took up a position which enabled him to prevent any supplies from reaching Mithridates by land, while he trusted to the approach of the stormy season to intercept or delay those which came by sea.² His plan was completely successful. The winter drew on, Cyzicus still held out, and the vast army of Mithridates began rapidly to melt away under the effects of hunger and disease. At last, toward the close of 74 680 A.U.C. B.C., the king raised the siege, and with a part of his fleet and army retreated by sea to Nicomedia and thence to Pontus.³ Lucullus entered Cyzicus in triumph, having, as he had predicted, defeated the enemy without fighting a battle. A naval victory off Lemnos completed the ruin of the Pontic armament, and finally cleared Asia and Bithynia of the invaders. But Lucullus had no intention of leaving Mithridates, as Sulla had left him, in undisturbed possession of his hereditary kingdom, to prepare at his leisure for a third outbreak. In the autumn of 73 B.C. 681 A.U.C.

Invasion of
Pontus by
Lucullus.

681 A.U.C.

¹ App., *Mithr.*, 72. Two of them were the old legions of Fimbria, which had been quartered in Asia since 85 B.C.

² App., *Mithr.*, 72.

³ *Ibid.*, 76.

he led his legions into Pontus, and laid siege to Amisus and Themiscyra.¹ Learning, however that Mithridates had collected a considerable force at Cabira, in the valley of the Lycus, he resolved, if possible, to attack and crush him before his more distant allies, and above all, his son-in-law Tigranes, could come to his assistance. In the spring, there-

fore, of 72 B.C.,² leaving Murena to continue the siege of Amisus, he crossed the mountains into the Lycos valley, and avoiding the level ground, where Mithridates's swarms of light cavalry would have had the advantage, he occupied a position on the hills commanding the enemy's camp. Here, just as provisions were beginning to fail him, fortune came to his aid. A Roman foraging party repulsed with loss the cavalry sent by the king to intercept them. The repulse was mag-

nified by rumour into a serious defeat, and, with characteristic indifference to the fate of his followers, Mithridates prepared for flight. The discovery of his intention created a general panic, in the midst of which the Romans attacked and took the camp with all the royal treasure. Mithridates, however, escaped in the confusion to Comana, and thence made his way to Tigranes.³ But though the king had escaped, his kingdom became the prize of the victor. During

71 B.C. Lucullus rapidly made himself master not only of Pontus, but of Lesser

Defeat and flight of Mithridates

683 A.U.C.

¹ *Ibid.*, 78.

² *Ibid.*, 79; *Plut., Luc.*, 15.

³ *App., Mithr.*, 79-81; *Plut., Luc.*, 15, *sqq.*; *Eutrop.*, vi., 6.

Armenia, and received the submission of Mithridates's own son, Machares, king of the Bosporani.¹ This accomplished, he returned to the province of Asia, where he seems to have spent the greater part of the next year (70 B.C.). His policy there was a welcome contrast to that of Sulla. He had already given proof of his Hellenic sympathies by restoring its freedom to Amisus,² and he now set himself to mitigate the evils caused by Sulla's exactions. A frightful load of debt oppressed the unhappy provincials, who, to meet the demands of the Roman money-lenders and *publicani*, had been forced not only to part with their temple treasures and works of art, but to sell their sons and daughters into slavery.³ Lucullus at once prohibited the exorbitant interest hitherto charged; he fixed the maximum rate at 12 per cent., and forbade the creditors to add the unpaid interest to the capital of the debt. Where land had been mortgaged, the creditor was to receive only one fourth of the yearly revenue, and leave the rest to the debtor. A portion of the indemnity imposed by Sulla was still in arrear, and for the gradual payment of this Lucullus provided by taxation.⁴ The success of his measures, which enraged the Roman *negotiatores* as much as they gratified the provincials, was shown by the fact that, within four years, the burden of debt was

684 A. U. C.
Lucullus in
the province
of Asia.

¹ App., *Mithr.*, 82, 83, Plutarch (*Luc.*, 24), however, places the submission of Machares early in 89 B.C., on the eve of Lucullus's advance against Tigranes.

² And to Sinope in 69 B.C.; Plut., *Luc.*, 23.

³ Plut., *Luc.*, 20.

⁴ App., *Mithr.*, 83.

removed,¹ and that some of his arrangements were still in force in 45 B.C.²

Towards the close of 70 B.C., or early in 69 B.C., the young Appius Claudius, Lucullus's brother-in-law, returned from the dangerous mission on which he had been sent to Tigranes. He had reached Antioch in Syria, and delivered his message with an outspokenness new to the ears of the Eastern despot, but his demand that Mithridates should be surrendered and reserved to grace Lucullus's triumph in Rome was refused. The refusal was probably expected, and Lucullus at once resolved upon the bold step of invading Armenia. The undertaking was at first sight a rash one, and was so considered both by Lucullus's own troops and by politicians in Rome.³ The distance was great, Armenia itself was a broken and difficult country; its ruler, Tigranes, was for the moment the greatest of all the monarchs of the East, and the holder, by right of conquest, of the proud title "King of Kings."⁴ A century and a half before, Armenia, the mountainous district, bounded on the north by the Caucasus, on the west by Cappadocia, on the east by Media, and on the south by Mesopotamia, had been an appanage of the Seleucid kings. After the defeat of Antiochus at Magnesia (189 B.C.), it became independent, and grew in strength until,

684-685
A.U.C.
Invasion of
Armenia.


The kingdom
of Armenia.

¹ Plut., *Luc.*, 20.

² Cic., *Acad. prior.*, i. 1, 3: "*hodie stet Asia Luculli institutis servandis.*"


³ Plut., *Luc.*, 24.

⁴ Reinach, *Mithr.*, pp. 103-105, 311-313, 343-347; Plut., *Luc.*, 21.



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John Bartholomew & Co. Edin



towards the close of the second century B.C., when its growth was checked, and the existence of the kingdom endangered, by the advance of the Parthians, who, after wresting Media and Mesopotamia from the Seleucids, invaded Armenia, defeated the Armenian king Artavasdes, and annexed a considerable slice of his kingdom. In 95 B.C., when his son Tigranes ascended the throne, the fortunes of Armenia were at their lowest ebb. But the next twenty-five years witnessed one of those rapid revolutions characteristic of Eastern history. The new king, though inferior in ability to Mithridates, was to the full as ambitious, and circumstances favoured his ambition. The advance of the Parthians was arrested, and their power crippled for the time, by the attacks of Tartar tribes from the steppes to the north-east.¹ Tigranes seized his opportunity, and, about the time of the first Mithridatic war, he not only recovered the part of Armenia ceded in 95 B.C., but acquired also Media, and the opposite districts of Mesopotamia. To the northward he imposed his authority on the Iberians and Albanians. Syria in the south fell an easy prey to his troops (83 B.C.), while to the westward he penetrated into the lowlands of Cilicia and into Cappadocia (78 B.C.).² When the young Roman patrician Appius Claudius met him at Antioch (70 B.C.), he was the ruler of an empire which extended from the Caucasus to the frontiers of Judæa, and from the Taurus to

659 A.U.C.

King
Tigranes and
his empire.

671 A.U.C.

676 A.U.C.

684 A.U.C.

¹ Reinach, p. 310, where the authorities are given.

² Plut. *Luc.*, 21; App., *Mithr.*, 67; Reinach, p. 312.

the eastern limits of Media. Vassal kings waited upon him at table, or ran as footmen before him when he rode.¹ Under his banner were enrolled Greek *hoplites* from Asia Minor, Median archers, Albanians from the shores of the Caspian, and nomad Arabs from the desert.² As a monument of his wealth and greatness, he had built himself a great city, "the city of Tigranes," and, after the fashion of the old Assyrian kings, had transplanted thither a motley population drawn from the various subject provinces.³

But though as great a lord as Antiochus had been, he was scarcely better fitted to resist the shock of a Roman attack. No tie but the common fear of his power and cruelty held together the miscellaneous elements of which his empire was composed. Nor were his vast ill-disciplined armies any match for the legions of Rome.

In the spring of 69 B.C.⁴ Lucullus left Asia, re-
 685 A.U.C. joined his troops in Pontus, and led them
 through Cappadocia, across the Euphrates
 into Armenia. His march was unopposed, for his
 kindly attitude, and the strict discipline
 Lucullus in which he enforced upon his legions con-
 Armenia. ciliated the natives. Tigranes, intoxicated
 by a sense of overwhelming strength, refused even

¹ Plut., *Luc.*, 21.

² *Ibid.*, 26.

³ For Tigranocerta, see App., *Mithr.*, 84; Plut., *Luc.*, 23, 26; Strabo, II, 14, 16, 1; Reinach, p. 345. Mommsen and Kiepert, *Hermes*, 9, 129 *sqq.* It was situated on the right bank of the Upper Tigris, the confines of Armenia and Mesopotamia.

⁴ App., *Mithr.*, 84; Plut., *Luc.*, 22.

to believe in the rumours that the Romans whom he was preparing to drive out of Asia were actually invading his own territory. Even when convinced of the truth of the report, he merely sent a detachment of troops with orders to bring Lucullus before him alive.¹ The defeat of this force did indeed for a moment shake his confidence, but the sight of the vast host which rallied to his standard in obedience to his call² revived his courage and confirmed his resolution, in spite of the prudent advice of Mithridates to crush the invaders in a single battle. On the news of his approach, Lucullus, who was besieging Tigranocerta, and who with better reason was no less anxious to force on an engagement, left Murena to continue the siege, and with a force "too large," as Tigranes said, "for an embassy, and too small for an army,"³ advanced to meet the enemy. He forded the Tigris unopposed, and while Tigranes was still endeavouring to get his unwieldy host into order of battle, Defeat of
Tigranes;
capture of
Tigranocerta. he attacked the iron-clad cavalry, on whom the king chiefly relied.⁴ The battle was over almost

¹ Plut., *Luc.*, 25.

² The total numbers, as stated by the ancient authorities, vary considerably. Appian (*Mithr.*, 85) puts them at 300,000 men; Plutarch (*Luc.*, 26) at about 250,000; Eutropius (vi., 9) at 107,500; Memnon (*Frag. Hist. Græc.*, 3, p. 556) at 80,000. In any case they largely exceeded those of Lucullus's army, which, at the highest estimate, was only 15,000 strong (Plut., *Luc.*, 24). It consisted of two legions and 3,000 cavalry, mainly Thracian and Galatian.

³ Plut., *Luc.*, 27.

⁴ The *κατάφρακτοι*. They were chiefly drawn from Armenia, Iberia, and Albania; Reinach, p. 343.

before it had begun, for the cavalry, without awaiting the Roman attack, fell back in disorder on the crowded masses of the infantry. A general panic and rout followed, in which it is said that 100,000 of the enemy's infantry, and nearly all his cavalry, were slain, while of Romans only five were killed and a hundred wounded.¹ The victory was followed by the fall of Tigranocerta, which was surrendered to the Romans by the Greek mercenaries, who formed part of the garrison.² The half-finished city, which Tigranes had destined to be a lasting memorial of his greatness, was destroyed, and in the time of Strabo was only a small village.³

Late in the spring of 68 B.C.,⁴ Lucullus, who had spent the winter in the south of Armenia, marched northward across the Taurus in the hope of striking a final blow at Tigranes, who, assisted by Mithridates, had succeeded in getting together a second army, and was preparing for the defence of his hereditary kingdom. Finding that the two kings were resolved not to hazard a fresh defeat, he determined to march directly upon the ancient Armenian capital Artaxata, and thus, as he hoped, force Tigranes to fight in its defence. His plan succeeded. As he advanced up the valley of the Arsanius he was met by the two kings at the head of their forces. The battle that ensued was a repeti-

686 A. U. C.

Advance upon Artaxata; second defeat of Tigranes.

¹ Plut., *Luc.*, 28.

² App., *Mithr.*, 86; Plut., *Luc.*, 29.

³ Strabo, II, 14, 15.

⁴ Plut., *Luc.*, 31; App., *Mithr.*, 87.

tion of that fought the year before in the south. At the sight of the advancing legions, and the sound of their war-cry,¹ the Asiatics turned and fled in a disgraceful panic. The way now lay open to Artaxata, but the short highland summer was over, and the approach of winter, added to the unwillingness of his troops to risk a farther advance, compelled Lucullus reluctantly to turn southwards.² He re-crossed the Taurus into the warmer regions south of the Tigris, where the capture of the important city of Nisibis³ partially compensated him for his failure to reach the "Armenian Carthage."⁴ Up to this time his career of success had been almost unbroken. He had driven Mithridates from Asia Minor, and the senate at home was already preparing to add Pontus to the list of Roman provinces. He had led the Roman legions for the first time across the Taurus, had twice defeated Tigranes, taken his new capital, and wrested from him nearly all the provinces he had acquired since 95 B.C. To complete his success, and to bring all the near east under the suzerainty of Rome, it only remained to humble the Parthian king, and we are told that he was already planning an invasion of Parthia.

¹ Plut., *Luc.*, 31: οὐδὲ τὴν κραυγὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀνασχόμενος.

² Plut., *Luc.*, 32; App., *Mithr.*, 87.

³ Nisibis lay E. S. E. of Tigranocerta, in Mygdonia. It had been founded, or re-founded, by the Seleucids, and named Antioch in Mygdonia; Plut., *l. c.*

⁴ Its site was said to have been selected by Hannibal when a refugee at the court of Armenia; Plut., *Luc.*, 51.

But his good fortune now deserted him. Lucullus has always disdained to attach his soldiers to himself, as Sulla had done, by allowing them unbounded license, nor had he the art, which Cæsar possessed, of winning their affections. Wearied out with a seemingly endless war, they now flatly refused to follow Lucullus, not only against the Parthians, but even against Tigranes, who, during the winter (68-

586-687
A.U.C. 67 B.C.), had once more got together an army. It was only when the news arrived that Mithridates, taking advantage of Lucullus's forced inactivity, had re-entered Pontus and defeated Lucullus's legate, M. Fabius, that they consented to march, Lucullus led them at once through Cappadocia into Pontus, where he found that Mithridates had gained a second victory over C.

687 A.U.C. Triarius (67 B.C.). On his approach Mithridates retired eastward to Lesser Armenia; but when Lucullus attempted to follow him, his soldiers, headed by the two old legions of Fimbria, openly mutinied, encouraged by the news that the senate at home had superseded Lucullus in the command, and granted their discharge to his soldiers. Throughout the summer and autumn of 67 B.C. Lucullus was forced to remain passive, while Mithridates openly reinstated himself as king in Pontus, and Tigranes ravaged Cappadocia at his will. At the end of that year the Manilian law transferred the command of the war to

588 A.U.C. Pompey, and in 66 B.C. Lucullus finally left Asia for Rome.

His successor had already accomplished one part

of the task now intrusted to him, that of re-establishing Roman authority in the East. The pirates' power, who, for the last twenty years, has ruled supreme throughout the Mediterranean, owed much of their success to the indifference, or at least to the inactivity of the Roman Government.¹ But of late these masters of the sea had ceased to confine their ravages to the territories and the persons of Rome's allies. A pirate squadron had boldly sailed into the roadstead of Ostia, and burnt the vessels lying there; a pirate band had landed on the Latin coast, and carried off two Roman prætors as they travelled along the Appian Way. Worse than all, the corn supplies from the provinces were intercepted, and Rome itself was threatened with famine. Against an enemy so well organised and ubiquitous, the isolated efforts of the ordinary proprætor or proconsul were unavailing, and it was with the approval of every one outside the high official circles that Aulus Gabinius, ^{687 A.U.C.} tribune of the plebs (67 B.C.), carried a law intrusting the supreme command of the high seas to the popular favourite, who had crushed Sertorius, and restored to the tribunes the powers taken from them by Sulla. The commission thus given to Pompey was wider than any before intrusted to a single Roman. His "province" embraced the entire Mediterranean Sea, and the coasts for fifty miles inland. He had under him twenty-five legates of prætorian rank and authority, 10,000 legionaries, 4,000 cavalry, and a fleet of 270 ships. He was

¹ Plut., *Pomp.*, 24; Dio Cass., xxxvi., 22; App., *Mithr.*, 92.

authorised, in addition, to levy such contributions of men and supplies as he thought fit; and orders were sent to all governments of provinces, and to all allied kings, princes, and cities, requiring them to render him loyal assistance. The success of this new and startling experiment was complete. Forty days sufficed to clear the western Mediterranean of the pirate vessels; and then sailing eastwards, Pompey, while his legates swept the Levant, attacked the headquarters of the pirate power in Cilicia. Their ships were captured or destroyed, their strongholds razed to the ground, their arsenals and dockyards destroyed. It was while thus engaged in Cilicia that Pompey received the news that the grateful people had conferred upon their idol a fresh command, which opened even more dazzling prospects to his ambition than that which he had already held. By the

688 A.U.C. Manilian law (66 B.C.) he received, in addition to the control of the high seas, not merely the charge of the war against Mithridates, but a wide command-in-chief over the entire Roman East. The position was such that no Roman had occupied before him, and it opened to him indefinite possibilities of conquest and of triumphs which would throw into the shade all that he had achieved hitherto.

That Cæsar would have effected greater things with such resources as Pompey now had at his disposal is probable; yet Pompey's campaigns in Asia between 66 and 62 B.C. mark a decisive epoch in the history of Roman rule in Western Asia. His first movement

Pompey in the East.
688-692 A.U.C.

was indeed directed against Mithridates.¹ But though the old king's courage was unbroken, and his hatred of Rome as unquenchable as ever, his means of resistance were almost exhausted. As Pompey advanced into Pontus he retired eastward, and though overtaken and defeated in Lesser Armenia,² he escaped with a few followers to Colchis, and thence made his way along the northern shore of the Euxine to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, there to form wild plans for leading the tribesmen of Scythia and Thrace in a last attack upon Italy. Pompey, however, did not follow him; and intrusting to the Roman fleet in the Euxine the duty of watching his movements and intercepting his supplies, he turned southwards to regions where more attractive work awaited him than a toilsome and difficult pursuit of a fugitive king. Tigranes was still the Submission of Tigranes. normal ruler of all the territories lying between the Caucasus and the frontiers of Egypt; but he was in no condition to make a stand against the generalissimo of Rome. Disheartened by the desertion of his son and by his previous defeats, he abandoned all thought of resistance; and when Pompey, in the autumn of 66 B.C., entered Armenia, he went to his camp, and there in person tendered his submission. He was graciously allowed to retain his hereditary kingdom, but at the expense of surrendering all that he had acquired beyond its borders, in Asia Minor and in Syria.

¹ Plut., *Pomp.*, 32 sqq.; Dio, xxxvii. 53; App., *Mithr.*, 97.

² The city of Nicopolis was founded by Pompey on the site of his victory.

Pompey was unable at once to take advantage of this bloodless victory over the king of kings. The submission of Tigranes, and the encampment of a large Roman force in their immediate neighbourhood alarmed the independent tribes of the Caucasus; and during the winter (66–65 B.C.) the Albanians attacked his quarters in the valley of the river Cyrus (Kur). The summer of 65 B.C. was consequently devoted to the chastisement of these warlike peoples: first of all the Iberians, and then the Albanians were reduced to submission; and Roman troops for the first time penetrated northward into Colchis, to the fabled home of Medea, and eastward to the regions bordering on the mysterious Caspian Sea.

From the Caucasus Pompey returned to spend the winter (65–64 B.C.) in Pontus, and in the summer of 64 B.C. he was at length free to enter on behalf of the Roman people into the rich inheritance ceded by Tigranes, and to complete the circle of his triumphs by establishing the authority of Rome on the southern ocean, as he had already established it on the Atlantic seaboard and on the shores of the Caspian.¹ Entering Syria, he at once annexed it, and thus finally brought to a close the kingdom of the Seleucidæ; and then, advancing southward, he besieged and took Jerusalem. The Jewish prince Aristobulus was sent a prisoner to Rome, and his brother Hyrcanus placed on the throne as the friend

The tribes
of the
Caucasus.

689 A.U.C.

Annexation
of Syria.

690 A.U.C.

¹ Plut., *Pomp.*, 38.

and ally of the Roman people.¹ Farther south still lay the kingdom of Aretas, king of the Nabatæans. But Pompey's hopes of extending the sway of Rome southward to the Arabian Gulf were disappointed. A revolt of the Jews obliged him to retrace his steps northward; and while in Palestine, the news reached him that Mithridates, deserted by his troops, and closely besieged in the citadel of Panticapæum by his own son Pharnaces, had put an end to his life (63 B.C.). The death of Mithridates removed for the time all fear of any open resistance to Rome in Western Asia. Pompey returned first of all to Pontus, where he received the submission of Pharnaces, and thence by slow degrees through Greece to Italy.

From a military point of view, Pompey's achievements in the East cannot bear comparison with those of Cæsar in the West. But they impressed the public imagination far more deeply, and their historical results were at least as important. It is true that an air of Oriental exaggeration pervades the accounts which have come down to us of his triumphal return.² He was welcomed as a conqueror, not only of Mithridates, but of the kings and peoples of the East, and as the man who had extended the rule of Rome to the Euphrates and to the frontiers of Egypt. On a tablet, carried aloft in his triumphal procession, he claimed to have taken 800 vessels of war, to have

Death of
Mithridates.

63 B.C.

The results
of Pompey's
campaigns.

¹ *Ibid.*, 39; Dio, xxxvii., 15; App., *Syria*, 48.

² App., *Mithr.*, 114-118.

founded twenty-nine cities and conquered seven kings,—claims to which the long train of captive princes which followed his car, and the splendid trophies in gold and silver which were paraded before the eyes of the Roman populace, lent a powerful support.

And exaggeration apart, he had in fact achieved great things, and his name must be as closely identified with the rule of Rome in the East, as that of his future rival, Cæsar, was destined to be with the rule of Rome in the West. On this side the Euphrates no power was left capable of disputing with Rome the sovereignty over Western Asia. There were still kings, but there was no longer "a king of kings," for even the claim of the Parthian monarch to this title was explicitly rejected by Pompey.¹ The re-establishment of Roman suzerainty in the near East was, moreover, accompanied by important extensions of Roman territory. Bithynia, which had been bequeathed to Rome in 74 B.C., was
 680 A.U.C. together with the western half of the kingdom of Pontus, formed into a province, and the constitution now framed for it by Pompey, was still in force in the reign of Trajan.² Cilicia was placed permanently under a Roman governor, and the bounds of his province were extended to include Pamphylia and Isauria. Farther still to the east the fertile region lying between the sea and the Syrian desert was incorporated with the

¹ Plut., *Pomp.*, 38.

² Strabo, p. 541; Plin., *Epp. ad Traj.*, 112; Marquardt, *Stat. verw.*, i., 191.

empire as the province of Syria. Outside these provinces the area covered by the Roman protectorate was still left in the hands of native rulers, of whom, within Asia Minor itself, the two most important were Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, and the Keltic chief, Deiotarus of Galatia, whose services to Rome in the recent wars were rewarded by extensive grants of territory in the north-east. These two great native states were to be the chief props of Roman ascendancy in the central and eastern districts of the peninsula.¹

It is, moreover, to Pompey's credit that he recognised the fact that the natural allies of Rome in the East were the city communities rather than the native chiefs and tribesmen, and that in binding these closely to Rome, and in increasing their number lay the best security for the permanence of Roman rule. It is possible, indeed, that personal vanity quickened his sense of the value of this policy, and that the most recent conqueror of the East was not unwilling to appear as a founder of cities after the manner of Alexander and the Seleucid kings. But the policy was a sound one, and did as much to attach the Greek communities to Rome as Sulla's shortsighted harshness had done to alienate them from her. Even the Greek names given to the new cities are significant of the intentions with which they were founded. Pompeiopolis, Nicopolis, Magnopolis are as characteristic of Roman policy in the East as the Latin names of the new towns

¹ App., *Mithr.*, 114; Mommsen, *R. G.*, iii., 141 *sqq.*

in Spain and Gaul are of Roman policy in the West.¹

Not the least important result of Pompey's work was that Rome was now brought directly face to face with the Oriental kingdom, which, throughout the history of the empire, divided with her the allegiance of the eastern world. It was not, indeed, possible as yet for a Roman historian to write of the king of Parthia as the rival on equal term of the Roman Cæsar.² Pompey treated with contempt the claim of King Phraates to be styled "king of kings"; he refused the latter's request that the Euphrates should be recognised as the boundary between Rome and Parthia,³ and even assigned to Rome's now dependent ally, the king of Armenia, provinces nominally subject to Parthian rule. It is possible that he contemplated bringing the fertile district of Mesopotamia within the area of the Roman protectorate. But the fact remained that, with the collapse of Tigranes's power and the annexation of Syria, the responsibility devolved upon Rome of protecting the Greek East against the advance of a purely Oriental power.

What this responsibility might mean was shown clearly enough only eight years later, when M. Licinius Crassus was defeated and slain in Mesopotamia⁴ (53 B.C.). Under the

The defeat of Crassus.

¹ App., *Mithr.*, 115; Mommsen, *R. G.*, iii., 144.

² Tacitus, *Ann.*, ii., 56 of the Armenians: "*Maximis imperiis interjecti.*" Cf. *ibid.*, ii., 60: "*vi Parthorum aut Romana potentia.*"

³ Plut., *Pomp.*, 33.

⁴ Plut., *Crassus*, 17 sqq.; Dio Cass., xl., 12, sqq.

terms agreed upon in the conference at Luca, Crassus succeeded to Aulus Gabinius in the governorship of Syria. It was his ambition to perform exploits which should raise him to the same high level of fame as his two great colleagues in the coalition, Cæsar and Pompey, and to reconquer for the West and for Rome the vast regions stretching from the Euphrates to the Indus, once ruled over by Alexander. A pretext for invading Parthia had been supplied by the Parthian king, who had declared war upon Rome's ally, the king of Armenia. At the moment, too, Parthia was distracted by civil war, and the aid of the Romans had been invoked by the weaker party. With a force of seven legions Crassus crossed the Euphrates and plunged into the sandy wastes beyond it. A toil-some desert march exhausted his troops, and the Arab sheik who guided them proved faithless. Suddenly the enemy they were seeking appeared. On all sides the Parthian squadrons encircled the invading force. For a moment some relief was given by the young Publius Crassus, who, at the head of the Keltic cavalry he had brought from the far West, charged the Parthians and forced them to retreat. But it was only for the moment: Crassus, cut off from the main body, and surrounded by overwhelming numbers, fell by the hand of his shield bearer. Of the 6,000 men who followed him, 500 were made prisoners, and the rest slain. Throughout the rest of the day the Parthian lancers and archers wrought havoc in the dense ranks of the helpless legions; at nightfall they withdrew, and the

Romans, leaving their wounded behind, made their way northwards to Carrhæ, and thence to Sinnaka, hoping to find shelter from the pursuing cavalry in the mountains of Armenia. The Parthians followed, and, at the request of the Parthian leader, Crassus consented to a personal interview for the arrangement of terms of peace. The interview ended as might have been expected. The Roman officers who accompanied Crassus suspected treachery, attempted resistance and were instantly cut down, together with their general himself. Of the troops left behind in camp some were made prisoners, and the rest dispersed; of the splendid force which had crossed the Euphrates, scarcely a fourth part returned. Ten thousand Roman soldiers were carried away into captivity, and the eagles of the legions passed into the keeping of the Parthian king.

The defeat and death of Crassus were not followed, as might have been expected, by a Parthian invasion of Syria or Asia Minor. But they opened the eyes of Roman statesmen to the formidable strength of this new rival, and thenceforward Roman policy in the East aimed either, as under Cæsar, at crippling the power of Parthia, or, as under Augustus, at establishing a definite and defensible frontier along the line of the Euphrates.

The campaigns of Pompey and Cæsar had extended the sovereignty of Rome up to the natural geographical limits formed by the Atlantic and the Rhine in the west and north, and by the Euphrates in the east. On the south, the belt of fertile land stretching along the African

State of the
Empire.

coast westward from the mouth of the Nile was, by the close of the revolutionary period, either dependent upon Rome or directly subject to her rule. Egypt was a vassal state, while the former dominions of the Ptolemies in the Cyrenaica had been annexed by Rome and formed into a province (74 B.C.).¹ Westward of the Cyrenaica lay the old province of Africa, and westward again the kings of Numidia and Mauretania were the sworn allies and friends of the Roman people. 680 A.U.C.

But though the empire of Rome had been extended over the whole civilised Mediterranean world, and though its boundaries everywhere touched the confines of the surrounding barbarism, there had been no corresponding advance in internal stability. The defects in the administrative system which were noticed in an earlier chapter² had become more conspicuous than ever. The controlling authority of the senate had been fatally weakened by the attacks of the popular party. Political dissensions had led to civil war, and civil war had more than once threatened to bring about the disruption of the empire. In Spain, in Africa, and in Asia, the provincials had seen rival representatives of Roman authority in open conflict with each other, and their own resources squandered in the quarrels of their rulers. Even when this was not the case, the absence of any central authority strong enough to control the pro-consuls, and to enforce a stable imperial policy, produced chronic confusion

¹ App., *B. C.*, i., 111 ; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, I., 300.

² See above, Book III., chap. 3.

and misgovernment. In addition to the havoc wrought by civil war, by foreign invasion, or by the scourge of piracy, the provinces had to suffer from the inexperience and incapacity, or from the avarice and ambition, of the men whom the chances of lot, or of political party-strife in Rome, sent out to govern them, and who ruled each in his own province as an independent autocrat. The pictures which Cicero has drawn for us of Sicily under Verres, of Asia during the Mithridatic wars,¹ or of Macedonia under Piso,² cannot probably be taken as typical of the normal condition of a province, under a governor of average capacity and honesty. But the state of

703 A.U.C. Cilicia as he found it in 51 B.C. was a disgrace to civilised government. He describes in vivid colours the bankruptcy of the communities, the peculations of the native magistrates, the exactions of Roman money-lenders, and the blackmail regularly levied under one pretext or another by the Roman governors.³ Parts, at least, of Achaia were, as we learn from Cicero's correspondent, Servius Sulpicius, in no better condition. "Behind me," writes the latter, "was Ægina, in front Megara, the Peiræus on my right, on my left Corinth, in former days thriving towns, now prostrate and ruinous."⁴ That a government under which such misrule was possible should have been unpop-

¹ Cic., *Pro Lege Manilia*.

² Cic., *De Prov. Consularibus*, and *In Pisonem*.

³ Cic., *Ad Att.*, v., 16: "*In perditam, et plane eversam in perperum provinciam me venisse*"; *Ibid.*, *Ad Att.*, v., 21, 6, 2.

⁴ Cic., *Ad Fam.*, iv., 5.

ular was inevitable,¹ and it is probable that only the consciousness of their own weakness, and a sense of that Roman rule, bad as it might be, was yet preferable to the anarchy which would follow its overthrow, kept the provincials quiet. The danger to the republican government, however, lay not in the prospect of a provincial outbreak, but in the justification which its own maladministration afforded for the ambitious schemes and independent authority of powerful individuals. It was well enough for Sulla to carry a law declaring it to be treasonable for a provincial governor to leave his province, to lead an army across the frontiers, to make war on his own authority, or to enter a kingdom without orders from the people and senate.² But Sulla had done these things himself with impunity. The wide powers given to Pompey in 67-66 B.C. were a confession of the necessity which existed for a change in the old system, and Cicero himself recognised that, in the conflict which broke out in 49 B.C., the question at issue was not whether personal rule in some form was necessary, but by which of two powerful rivals it should be exercised.³

¹ *Ibid.*, *Pro. L. Manil.*, 22 : "*difficile est dicere . . . quanto in odio sumus.*"


² *Ibid.*, *In Pison.*, 21.

³ *Ibid.*, *Ad Att.*, viii., 11, 9, 7.



BOOK V.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE IM-
PERIAL SYSTEM AND THE RULE
OF THE EARLY CÆSARS—
49 B.C. TO 69 A.D.



THE FOUNDATION OF THE IMPERIAL SYSTEM AND THE RULE OF THE EARLY CÆSARS—49 B.C. TO 69 A.D.

CHAPTER I.

THE DICTATORSHIP OF JULIUS—49-44 B.C.

By the end of March 49 B.C. Cæsar was in Rome, and was master of Italy. But his position was critical in the extreme. From his camp in Epirus Pompey was summoning to his assistance the forces of the East, throughout which his name was all-powerful. The kings, princes, and peoples of Western Asia were arming in his defence, while in the seaport towns of the Ægean and the Euxine, on the Syrian coast and in Egypt, a fleet was being made ready for the blockade of Italy.¹ In the West, Spain, with its resources in men and

¹Cæs., *B. C.*, iii., 3; "*ex Asia Cycladibusque insulis, Corcyra, Athenis, Ponto, Bithymia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnice, Ægypto classem coegerat.*"

money, was held for Pompey by his three legates, Afranius, Petreius, and M. Terentius Varro, with seven legions. In Spain, too, as in Asia Minor, Pompey's name was familiar and his prestige widely spread, while Cæsar was comparatively unknown.

The latter's decision was soon taken. He resolved to secure the West, and remove all danger of attack upon that side before following Pompey across the Adriatic. Two of his officers occupied with ease Sardinia and Sicily, and to one of them, Curio, was intrusted the more difficult task of securing Africa.¹ Cæsar himself, after a brief stay in Rome, set out for Spain by way of Massilia, sending orders to his legate there, C. Fabius, to concentrate the six legions stationed in Gaul, and at once force the passes of the Pyrenees. After a short delay, caused by the refusal of the Massiliots to supply him with ships, or to admit him within their gates, he pressed on to Spain, with an escort of 900 horse; on June 23d he joined his legions, who were already within striking distance of the enemy. The Pompeian forces, under Afranius and Petreius, were massed at Ilerda (Lerida), on the Sicoris, with the view of barring the passage across the Ebro, while Varro, with two legions, held the southern province of Farther Spain.²

The opposing armies were of fairly equal strength, and both were encamped upon the right bank of the Sicoris. But the Pompeians had all the advantages

¹ Cæs., *B. C.*, i., 30, 31.

² *Ibid.*, i. 37-41. Cf. for this campaign, Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César*; *Guerre Civile*, vol. i. (Paris, 1887).

of position: they had a friendly province in their rear; they held the town of Ilerda, which was well stocked with provisions, and with it a stone bridge, which gave them easy and sure communication with the country on the left bank of the river. Cæsar, on the other hand, had to rely for supplies mainly on convoys from Gaul, which to reach him would have to cross the river by means of two temporary bridges hastily thrown across it by Fabius, while his own foraging parties were perpetually harassed by the Spanish auxiliaries of the enemy, mountaineers familiar with the country, and skilled in guerilla warfare. Cæsar's first move was an attempt to equalise matters by seizing a position midway between the Pompeian camp and Ilerda, and thus cut the enemy off both from the town and the bridge.¹ But the attempt failed, and a flood which swept away his two bridges increased the difficulties of his situation. His supplies ran short, and he was hemmed in by impassable rivers to the right and left, with a strongly entrenched hostile force in front. The exultant Pompeians regarded the war as already over, when by a brilliant manœuvre Cæsar changed the aspect of affairs. A convoy of provisions from Gaul had reached the left bank of the Sicoris some miles above his camp. Hastily constructing light coracles, such as he had learnt the value of in Britain,² he sent them by night up the right bank in carts. At a distance of twenty-two miles from the camp the soldiers crossed in the boats and fortified

¹ Cæs., *B. C.*, i. 43.

² *Ibid.*, i., 54.

a post on the other side; a bridge was built, and the convoy brought in safety to its destination. Cæsar was once more out of the reach of famine, his communications with the left bank were restored, while the news of this first success brought him welcome offers of alliance, not only from neighbouring Spanish communities, such as Osca, but even from those at a greater distance.

The Pompeian generals now resolved to abandon Ilerda, and re-crossing the Ebro, to transfer the seat of war to Celtiberia,¹ where the influence of Pompey's name was especially great. But Cæsar's rapidity of movement upset their calculations. They reached the rocky ground near the Ebro only to find the way closed by Cæsar's infantry, while his cavalry hung upon their rear. Despairing of being able to advance southward, the Pompeians attempted to retrace their steps to Ilerda, but with no better success. They were once more surrounded, their supplies cut off, and four days after the retreat had begun they surrendered at discretion.² Cæsar, anxious as ever to show that Sulla's methods were not his, and that he had no revenge to wreak on Roman citizens, contented himself with merely requiring that the troops should be disbanded. Those who had homes in Spain were discharged at once, the rest were escorted by two of Cæsar's legions as far as the frontiers of Italy, and there dismissed.³

¹ The central district of Hither Spain.

² *Cæs.*, *B. C.*, i., 84.

³ *Ibid.*, i., 85-87.

The surrender of Afranius and Petreius determined the fate of the peninsula. Farther Spain declared for Cæsar, and Varro, unable to resist the tide of opinion, himself submitted to the conqueror.¹ Cæsar returned to Rome, receiving on his way the submission of Massilia, and after devoting a few days in the capital to the holding of the consular elections, which he held as dictator, and to other necessary business, he left again for Brundisium, and the decisive conflict with Pompey (December, 49 B.C.).²

The campaign of Pharsalus.

The latter had been employed since the spring in strengthening his position. In addition to nine legions he had concentrated in Epirus a motley force of auxiliaries, whose barbaric appearance probably shocked others besides Cicero.³ Vast stores had been collected at Dyrrhachium, and a numerous fleet under the command of Cæsar's ancient enemy, M. Bibulus, was stationed along the coast. It seems clear that both Pompey and the *émigré* nobles who surrounded him looked forward to invading Italy at their ease when all was ready, and expected nothing less than to be themselves attacked by Cæsar. The shock to their confidence was all the greater when the news of Cæsar's success in Spain was rapidly followed by the still more startling intelligence that he had actually effected a landing unopposed on the Epirot coast, that Oricum first of all, and then Apollonia, had opened their gates to him, and that he was advanc-

¹ *Ibid.*, ii., 20.

² *Cæs.*, *B. C.*, iii., 1.

³ *Cic.*, *Ad Att.*, ix., 10.

ing on Dyrrhachium.¹ For the moment it seemed as if he would repeat in Epirus and Macedonia the brilliant march by which he had won Italy in the spring of 49 B.C. But Pompey arrived from Macedonia in time to arrest the enemy's advance at the river Apsus, and Cæsar, who had only half his army with him, was obliged to await the arrival of the rest of his troops, under M. Antonius, before resuming the offensive. At last came the news that they had landed, but at a spot considerably higher up the coast, at Lissus, so that Pompey might easily have prevented their junction with Cæsar. Once more, however, Cæsar was too quick for the leisurely pace of his dignified opponent. He not only succeeded in joining Antony, but, by a sudden dash, seized and occupied the neck of land by which alone Dyrrhachium could be approached, and thus cut off Pompey from his headquarters and his supplies. The latter, however, with forces numerically superior, and with absolute command of the sea, seems to have thought with Philip I. of Spain that time and he were a match even for Cæsar, and entrenching himself at Petra, a short distance south of Dyrrhachium, remained obstinately on the defensive. To this policy of masterly inactivity Cæsar replied by an attempt, which nearly succeeded, to blockade Pompey where he stood. But the extent of ground over which Cæsar had to carry his lines of circumvallation was too great. Just when Pompey was beginning to feel the pressure of scarcity, a weak point in the lines was discovered. Through this he forced his way, inflict-

¹ Cæs., *B. C.*, iii., 8-12.

ing such heavy loss on the enemy that Cæsar, by his own confession, was within an ace of complete and ruinous defeat.¹

With Pompey's escape from Petra the last stage of the conflict begins. Cæsar's object now was to draw his enemy away from his natural base of operations on the coast, and transfer the seat of war to the interior. Pompey was expecting reinforcements from the East by way of Macedonia, and Cæsar hoped by marching in force against these to oblige Pompey to move to their assistance. His plan completely succeeded. From Apollonia he marched into Thessaly, recalled the two legions previously despatched to hold Pompey's reinforcements in check, and encamped with his entire force near Pharsalus. Pompey followed him, and taking up the fresh troops from the East on his way, encamped at Larissa, in the heart of the Thessalian plain, some miles north of Pharsalus. Reluctant as ever to risk a decisive engagement, he would have halted there, but the nobles in his camp would hear of no delay,² and, against his better judgment, he advanced to Pharsalus. Even now, when the two armies were face to face, some days elapsed before a blow was struck. Pompey's position was too strong to be attacked, and he could not be induced to leave it. At last, on August 9, Cæsar, who had resolved by a feigned retreat to decoy the enemy from their vantage-ground, noticed that the Pompeians were drawn up in line at a greater

¹ *Cæs.*, *B. C.*, iii., 42 *sqq.* Stoffel, *Guerre Civile*, i., 764 *sqq.*

² *Cæs.*, *B. C.*, iii. 83: "*nec quibus rationibus superare possent, sed quemadmodum uti victoria deberent, cogitabant.*"

distance than usual from the hill on which their camp was placed. He at once abandoned all thoughts of a retreat, and, in spite of his inferiority in numbers, prepared for an instant attack.¹ Perceiving that his chief danger lay in the possibility that, while his centre was engaged, Pompey's numerous cavalry would turn his right wing and take him in the rear, he trusted that part of his line to the famous tenth legion, and supported it by his cavalry and a reserve force of infantry, the whole being under the command, strangely enough, of a nephew of the man from whose hands Cæsar had once barely escaped with his life, the dictator Sulla. Next to these troops Cæsar stationed himself, facing that portion of the enemy's line where Pompey himself was in command. The centre he intrusted to Domitius Calvinus, the left to Antony.² His own infantry numbered in all about 22,000 men, that of the enemy over 45,000. The disparity in cavalry between the two forces was still greater, and the Pompeians confidently awaited the moment when Cæsar's legions, exhausted by their charge, should be encircled and swept away by the horsemen of the East.

When the battle began it seemed as if Pompey's confidence in the result would be justified. His infantry received without flinching the charge of the Cæsarians, while his cavalry, supported by the archers and slingers, advanced on the left, drove back the cavalry opposed to them, and began the flanking movement which was to decide the fortune

¹ *Ibid.*, iii., 85.

² *Cæs.*, *B. C.*, iii., 89.

of the day. But at this moment the aspect of affairs was suddenly changed by the valour of the six cohorts stationed by Cæsar on his right wing. This reserved body of picked troops charged and routed the Pompeian horsemen, who fled in disorder: then driving before them the archers and slingers, they fell with fury upon the left flank of the infantry. At the same moment Cæsar ordered the whole of his reserve to advance, and this last movement was decisive. The Pompeian legions, exhausted by their gallant resistance to the first charge of the enemy, deserted by the cavalry and light troops, and now attacked both in front and on the flank, broke and fled. The victorious Cæsarians, pressing forward, in spite of the mid-day heat, stormed and took the Pompeian camp, and, without waiting to seize on the rich spoil it contained, started in pursuit of the main body of the fugitives. Early the next morning, what remained of Pompey's army, some 24,000 men, surrendered at discretion.

So ended the first of the three historic battles, Pharsalus, Philippi, and Actium, which decided the fate of the Roman world. All three were fought in the debatable land of the Greco-Macedonian peninsula; all three were in some degree a trial of strength between East and West; and in all, Western discipline and courage triumphed over the less trustworthy levies of the East. Nor must it be forgotten that the success of Cæsar at Pharsalus, like that of his great nephew at Actium, was gained in defence of Rome and Italy, against a would-be invader, who, though Roman, relied chiefly on the

resources of the kingdoms of the East. It was consequently with the Cæsars, and not with their opponents, that the growing sentiment of Italian patriotism was allied.

Pompey himself had not perished on the scene of his first defeat. When his camp was stormed he escaped on horseback to Larissa, and thence to the coast. His case was not yet desperate, for his fleet commanded the seas, and the province of Africa was still his. But the shock of misfortune paralysed his energies: accustomed for years to unbroken success, and to be hailed on all sides as "Pompey the Great," he could not set himself to the task of rebuilding his shattered fortunes, and the conviction that his cause was lost, which Cicero tells us had filled the minds of "all kings and peoples"¹ was clearly shared by himself. From the Thessalian coast he crossed the Ægæan, over which eighteen years before he had sailed in triumph, to Mitylene, and thence to Cilicia and Cyprus, only to find that the power of his name was gone, and that the East would no longer rise at his call. From Cyprus he went to Egypt, hoping to find an ally in the boy-king Ptolemy, and there, as he landed at Pelusium, he was treacherously murdered.²

The victory at Pharsalus, followed as it was by the death of his great rival, might have been expected to secure for Cæsar undisputed supremacy, and set him free to reorganise the

Flight and death of Pompey.

The Alexandrine war.

¹ Cic., *Ad Att.*, xi., 6.

² Cæs., *B. C.*, iii., 103, 104; Plut., *Pomp.*, 77-79.

government of the state. But although the wiser men of the vanquished party, headed by Cicero, accepted defeat,¹ Cæsar's own rashness, in the first place, and then the irreconcilable animosity of some of the Pompeian leaders, involved him in a series of fresh conflicts. Hurrying in pursuit of Pompey, he reached Alexandria (October 48 B.C.) with a small force—only to hear of his death. 706 A.U.C.

His demand that the young king Ptolemy and his sister and rival Cleopatra should disband their forces and submit to his arbitration was resented as an unwarrantable interference,² and he found himself blockaded in Alexandria by the royal forces. Even when set free by the arrival of a relieving force under the command, strangely enough, of a reputed son of the great Mithridates, he lingered in Egypt, held a prisoner, it was said, by the charms of Cleopatra. It was not until June 47 B.C. that he left for Syria, and was there met by the news that Pharnaces, the son and heir of Mithridates the Great, taking advantage of the masterless condition of Asia to renew on a smaller scale his father's ambitious schemes, had defeated Domitius Calvinus, and recovered his hereditary kingdom of Pontus,³ Leaving Syria in the charge of Sextus Cæsar, he sailed to Cilicia. In a *darbar* held at Tarsus, he hastily arranged the affairs of the province, and then marched through Cappadocia to Pontus—where a

Defeat of
Pharnaces.

¹ Cic., *Ad Att.*, xi., 6 ; *Ad Fam.*, xv., 15.

² Cæs., *B. C.*, iii., 107.

³ *Bell. Alex.*, 34-40.

single battle decided the fate of Pharnaces, who was completely defeated at Zela.¹ Towards the end of 47 B.C., Cæsar at last reached Italy, but only to leave it again at once, for the enemies whom he had crushed in the East were now making head against him in the West. Africa was wholly in their hands, and the allegiance of Spain had been shaken by the misgovernment of Cæsar's legate, Cassius Longinus. The African campaign occupied the spring of 46 B.C. It was closed by the battle of Thapsus (April 46 B.C.) and by the suicide at Utica of the younger Cato, the inflexible stoic and republican, who, far more than the so-called "last of the Romans," Brutus and Cassius, represented all that was best in the opposition to Cæsarism.² Between June 46 B.C., when he left Africa, and the end of October in that year, Cæsar enjoyed a brief respite from campaigning; but in November he was again in the field. Farther Spain, irritated by the misrule of Cassius, and encouraged by the presence of Labienus and of Pompey's eldest son, was in open revolt. Cæsar hurried to the province, and the last of his victories was won at Munda, in southern Spain, on the 17th of March 45 B.C.³ Towards the end of the summer he returned to Italy, he received fresh honours from senate and people, and to take up again the work of reform so

The African War.
707 A.U.C.

708 A.U.C.

Death of Cato at Utica.

The second Spanish war.

709 A.U.C.

¹ *Ibid.*, 72-77.

² *B. Afr.*, 80 sqq.

³ *B. Hispan.*, 27 sqq.

often interrupted. His civil wars were over, and he was at leisure, not merely to restore order at home, but to frame schemes worthy of the wide authority he wielded, for the consolidation of the empire. In especial, he was anxious to secure it against attack from without, and it was no doubt with this view, as well as from a desire to avenge the defeat of Crassus, and recover the lost standards, that he planned an expedition against Parthia.¹

Murder of
Cæsar.

But his dazzling successes, and still more the avowed, though humane, absolutism of his government, were intolerable to the Roman nobles, who could see in his rule only the degradation of their order, and in the ruler nothing but a tyrant of the Greek type.² On the fated ides of March 44 B.C. he was attacked in the senate-house and murdered, leaving his task but half accomplished, and the Roman world a prey to renewed anarchy and civil war.

70 A.U.C.

Yet short as were the intervals of rest allowed him during the five stormy years which followed his entry into Rome in March 49 B.C., it is difficult to overrate the importance of the work he did. The fact that he dissociated the idea of personal rule from the evil Sullan traditions of party revenge, and made it rather the embodiment of imperial unity and good order, is sufficient of itself to justify his claim to be regarded as the founder of that system of government under which the civilised world lived contentedly for three centuries.

¹ Plut., *Cæs.*, 64; App., *B. C.*, ii., 110.

² Cic., *Ad Fam.*, iv., 5.

The task which he had to perform was no easy one. It came upon him suddenly; for Dictatorship of Cæsar. there is no sufficient reason to believe 48-44 B.C. that Cæsar had long premeditated revolu- 706-70 A.U.C. tion, or that he had previously aspired to anything more than such a position as that which Pompey had already won, a position unrepubli- can indeed, but accepted even by republicans as inevitable.¹ War was forced upon him as the alternative to political suicide, but success in war brought the responsibilities of nearly absolute power, and Cæsar's genius must be held to have shown itself in the masterly fashion in which he grasped the situation, rather than in the supposed sagacity with which he is said to have foreseen and prepared for it. In so far as he failed, his failure was mainly due to the fact that his tenure of power was too short for the work which he was required to perform. From the very first moment when Pompey's ignominious retreat left him master of Italy, he made it clear that he was neither a second Sulla nor even the reckless anarchist which many believed him to be.² The Roman and Italian public were first startled by the masterly rapidity and energy of his movements, and then agreeably surprised by his lenity and moderation. No pro-

¹ On this, as on many other points connected with Cæsar, divergence has here been ventured on from the views expressed by Mommsen in his brilliant chapter on Cæsar (*H. G.*, iii., 446 sq.) Too much stress must not be laid on the gossip retailed by Suetonius, as to Cæsar's early intentions.

² Cicero vividly expresses the revulsion of feeling produced by Cæsar's energy, humanity, and moderation on his first appearance in Italy. Compare *Ad Att.*, vii., 11, with *Ad Att.*, viii., 13.

scriptions or confiscations followed his victories, and all his acts evinced an unmistakable desire to effect a sober and reasonable settlement of the pressing questions of the hour; of this, and of his almost superhuman energy, the long list of measures he carried out or planned is sufficient proof. The "children of the proscribed" were at length restored to their rights,¹ and with them many of the refugees² who had found shelter in Cæsar's camp during the two or three years immediately preceding the war; but the extreme men among his supporters soon realised that their hopes of *novæ tabulæ* and grants of land were illusory. In allotting lands to his veterans, Cæsar carefully avoided any disturbance of existing owners and occupiers,³ and the mode in which he dealt with the economic crisis produced by the war seems to have satisfied all reasonable men.⁴ It had been a common charge against Cæsar in former days that he paid excessive court to the populace of Rome, and now that he was master he still dazzled and delighted them by the splendour of the spectacles he provided, and by the liberality of his largesses. But he was no indiscriminate flatterer of the mob. The popular clubs and guilds which had helped to organise the anarchy of the last few years

¹ Dio, xli., 18.

² App., ii., 48; Dio, xli., 36.

³ Plut., *Cæs.*, 51; Sueton., 37: "*adsignavit agros, sed non continuos, ne quis possessorum expelleretur.*" Cf., App., ii., 94.

⁴ For the "*lex Julia de pecuniis mutuis*," see Sueton., 42; Cæsar *B. C.*, iii., 1; Dio, xli., 37; App., ii., 48. The *feneratores* were satisfied; Cic., *Ad Fam.*, viii. 17. But the law displeased anarchists like M. Cælius Rufus and P. Cornelius Dolabella.

were dissolved.¹ A strict inquiry was made into the distribution of the monthly doles of corn, and the number of recipients was reduced by one-half.² Finally, the position of the courts of justice was raised by the abolition of the popular element among the *judices*.³ Nor did Cæsar shrink from the attempt, in which so many had failed before him, to mitigate the twin evils which were ruining the prosperity of Italy,—the concentration of a pauper population in the towns, and the denudation and desolation of the country districts. His strong hand carried out the scheme so often proposed by the popular leaders since the days of Gaius Gracchus, the colonisation of Carthage and Corinth. Allotments of land on a large scale were made in Italy; decaying towns were reinforced by fresh drafts of settlers; on the large estates and cattle farms the owners were required to find employment for a certain amount of free labour; and a slight and temporary stimulus was given to Italian industry by the re-imposition of harbour dues upon foreign goods.⁴ To these measures must be added his schemes for the draining of the Fucine Lake and the Pomptine Marshes, for a new road across the Apennines, and for turning the course of the Tiber.⁵ It is true that these vigorous efforts to revive the agrarian prosperity of Italy were made along the old lines laid down eighty years before

¹ Sueton., 42.

² Sueton., 41; Dio, xliii., 21.

³ Sueton., 40; Dio, lxiii., 25.

⁴ Sueton., 42, 43.

⁵ Plut., *Cæs.*, 58; Sueton., 44; Dio, xliii., 51.

by the Gracchi, and that their final success was no greater than that of preceding efforts in the same direction ; but they are a proof of the spirit in which Cæsar understood the responsibilities of absolute power, and their failure was due to causes which no legislation could remove. The reform of the calendar¹ completes a record of administrative reform which entitles Cæsar to the praise of having governed well, whatever might be thought of the validity of his title to govern at all.

But how did Cæsar deal with what was, after all, the greatest problem which he was called upon to solve—the establishment of a satisfactory government for the empire? One point, indeed, was already settled—the necessity, if the empire was to hold together at all, of placing the army, the provinces, and the control of the foreign policy in more vigorous hands than those of a number of changing magistrates independent of each other, and only very imperfectly controlled by the senate at home. Some centralisation of the executive authority was indispensable, and this part of his work Cæsar thoroughly performed. From the moment when he seized the moneys in the treasury on his first entry into Rome,² down to the day of his death, he recognised no other authority but his throughout the empire. He alone directed the policy of Rome in foreign affairs ; the legions were led, and the provinces governed, not by independent magistrates, but by his *legates*³

¹ See Mommsen, *R. G.*, iii., 550 ; and Fischer, *Röm. Zeitafehn.*, 292 sq.

² Plut., 35.

³ Dio., xliii., 47.

and the title *imperator*, which he adopted, was intended to express the absolute and unlimited nature of the *imperium* he claimed, as distinct from the limited spheres of authority possessed by republican magistrates.¹ In so centralising the executive authority over the empire at large, Cæsar was but developing the policy implied in the Gabinian and Manilian laws, and the precedent he established was closely followed by his successors. It was otherwise with the more difficult question of the form under which this new executive authority should be exercised, and the relation it should hold to the republican constitution. We must be content to remain in ignorance of the precise shape which Cæsar intended ultimately to give to the new system. The theory that he contemplated a revival of the old Roman kingship² is supported by little more than the popular gossip of the day, and the form under which he actually wielded his authority can hardly have been regarded by so sagacious a statesman as more than a provisional arrangement. This form was that of the dictatorship; and in favour of the choice it might have been urged that the dictatorship was the office naturally marked out by republican tradition as the one best suited to carry the state safely through a serious crisis, that the powers it conveyed were wide, that it was as dic-

¹ Sueton., 40; Dio., xliiii., 44. For this use of the title *imperator*, see Mommsen, *R. G.*, iii., 466, and note.

² See Mommsen, iii., 467, and Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, ii., 319 *sq.* According to Appian (ii., 110) and Plutarch (*Cæs.*, 64), the title *rex* was only to be used abroad in the East, as likely to strengthen Cæsar's position against the Parthians.

tator that Sulla had reorganised the state, and that a dictatorship had been spoken of as the readiest means of legalising Pompey's protectorate of the republic in 53-52. The choice, nevertheless, was a bad one. It was associated with those very Sullan traditions from which Cæsar was most anxious to sever himself; it implied necessarily the suspension for the time of all constitutional government; and, lastly, the dictatorship as held by Cæsar could not even plead that it conformed to the old rules and traditions of the office. There was, indeed, a precedent in Sulla's case for a dictator "*reipublicæ constituendæ causa*," but Cæsar was not only appointed in an unusual manner, but appointed for an unprecedentedly long period,¹ and the "perpetual dictatorship" granted him after his crowning victory at Munda (45) was a contradiction in terms and a repudiation of constitutional government which excited the bitterest animosity.² The dictatorship served well enough for the time to give some appearance of legality to Cæsar's autocratic authority, but it was not—even, it is probable, in his own eyes—a satisfactory solution of the problem.

A second question, hardly less important than the establishment and legalisation of a strong central executive authority over the army and the provinces,

¹ Cæsar's first dictatorship in 49 was simply "*comitiorum habendorum causa*," and lasted only eleven days. He was appointed dictator again for one year in 48, for ten years in 46, and for life in 45.

² Cicero (*Phil.*, i., 2) praises Antony, "*quum dictatoris nomen . . . propter perpetuæ dictaturæ recentem memoriam funditus ex republica sustulisset.*"

was that of the position to be assigned to the old constitution by the side of this new power. So far as Cæsar himself was concerned, the answer was for the time sufficiently clear. The old constitution was not formally abrogated. The senate met and deliberated; the assembly passed laws and elected magistrates: there were still consuls, prætors, ædiles, quæstors, and tribunes; and Cæsar himself, like his successors, professed to hold his authority by the will of the people. But senate, assembly, and magistrates were all alike subordinated to the paramount authority of the dictator; and this subordination was, in appearance at least, more direct and complete under the rule of Cæsar than under that of Augustus. Cæsar was by nature as impatient as Augustus was tolerant of established forms; and, dazzled by the splendour of his career of victory, and by his ubiquitous energy and versatility, the Roman public, high and low, prostrated themselves before him and heaped honours upon him with a reckless profusion which made the existence of any authority by the side of his own an absurdity.¹ Hence, under Cæsar, the old constitution was repeatedly disregarded, or suspended in a way which contrasted unfavourably with the more respectful attitude assumed by Augustus. For months together Rome was left without any regular magistrates, and was governed like a subject town by Cæsar's prefects.² At another time a

¹ For the long list of these, see Appian, ii., 106; Dio, xliii., 43-45; Plut., 57; Sueton., 76. Cf. also Mommsen, *R. G.*, iii., 463 ff.; Watson, *Cicero's Letters*, App. x.; Zumpt, *Studia Romana*, 199 ff. (Berlin, 1859). ² Zumpt, *Stud. Rom.*, 241; Sueton., 76.

tribune was seen exercising authority outside the city bounds and invested with the *imperium* of a prætor.¹ At the elections candidates appeared before the people backed by a written recommendation from the dictator, which was equivalent to a command.² Finally, the senate itself was transformed out of all likeness to its former self by the raising of its numbers to 900, and by the admission of old soldiers, sons of freedmen, and even "semi-barbarous Gauls."³ But, though Cæsar's high-handed conduct in this respect was not imitated by his immediate successors, yet the main lines of their policy were laid down by him. These were (1) the municipalisation of the old republican constitution, and (2) its subordination to the paramount authority of the master of the legions and the provinces. In the first case he only carried further a change already in progress. Of late years the senate had been rapidly losing its hold over the empire at large. Even the ordinary proconsuls were virtually independent potentates, ruling their provinces as they chose, and disposing absolutely of legions which recognised no authority but theirs. The consuls and prætors of each year had since 81
673 A.U.C.
been stationed in Rome, and immersed in purely municipal business; and, lastly, since the enfranchisement of Italy, the *comitia*, though still recognised as the ultimate source of all authority,

¹ Cic. *Ad Att.*, x., 8a.

² Sueton., 41: "*Cæsar dictator . . . commendo vobis illum, et illum, ut vestro suffragio suam dignitatem teneant.*"

³ Sueton., 41, 76; Dio, xliii., 47.

had become little more than assemblies of the city populace, and their claim to represent the true Roman people was indignantly questioned, even by republicans like Cicero. The concentration in Cæsar's hands of all authority outside Rome completely and finally severed all real connection between the old institutions of the republic of Rome and the government of the Roman Empire. And though Augustus and Tiberius elevated the senate to a place beside themselves in this government, its share of the work was a subordinate one, and it never again directed the policy of the state; while from the time of Cæsar onwards, the old magistracies are merely municipal offices, with a steadily diminishing authority, even in the city, and the *comitia* retain no other prerogative of imperial importance but that of formally confirming the ruler of the empire in the possession of an authority which is already his. But the institutions of the republic not merely became, what they originally had been, the local institutions of the city of Rome; they were also subordinated even within these narrow limits to the paramount authority of the man who held in his hands the army and the provinces. And here Cæsar's policy was closely followed by his successors. Autocratic abroad, at home he was the chief magistrate of the commonwealth; and this position was marked, in his case as in that of those who followed him, by a combination in his person of various powers, and by a general right of precedence, which left no limits to his authority but such as he chose to impose upon himself. During the

greater part of his reign he was consul as well as dictator.¹ In 48, after his victory at Pharsalus, he was given the *tribunicia potestas* for life,² and after his second success at Thapsus the *præfectura morum* for three years.³ As chief magistrate he convenes and presides in the senate, nominates candidates, conducts elections, carries laws in the assembly, and administers justice in court.⁴ Finally, as a reminder that the chief magistrate of Rome was also the autocratic ruler of the empire, he wore, even in Rome, the laurel wreath and triumphal dress, and carried the sceptre of the victorious emperor.⁵

Nor are we without some clue as to the policy which Cæsar had sketched out for himself in the administration of the empire, the government of which he had centralised in his own hands. The much-needed work of rectifying the frontiers he was forced, by his premature death, to leave to other hands, but our authorities agree in attributing to him the design of extending the rule of Rome to its natural geographical limits—to the Euphrates and the Caucasus on the East, to the Danube and the Rhine, or possibly the Elbe, on the North, and to the ocean on the West. Within the frontiers he anticipated Augustus in lightening the financial burdens of the provincials,

¹ Watson, *op. cit.*, App., x.; Zumpt, *Stud. Rom.*, *loc. cit.*; Sueton., 76: "*tertium et quartum consulatum titulo tenuit gessit.*"

² Dio, xlii., 20.

³ *Ibid.*, xliii., 14, Sueton., 76.

⁴ Sueton., 43: "*jus laboriosissime ac severissime dixit.*"

⁵ App., ii., 106; Dio, xliii., 43.

and in establishing a stricter control over the provincial governors, while he went beyond him in his desire to consolidate the empire by extending the Roman franchise and admitting provincials to a share in the government. He completed the Romanisation of Italy by his enfranchisement of the Transpadane Gauls, and by establishing throughout the peninsula a uniform system of municipal government, which, under his successors, was gradually extended to the provinces.

CHAPTER II.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE TRIUMVIRATE—44-27 B.C.

BETWEEN the day of Cæsar's murder in 710 A.U.C. March, 44 B.C., and the 1st of January, 27 727 A.U.C. B.C., when his great nephew restored the republic, under the presidency of himself The struggle for power after Cæsar's death. as *princeps*, or first citizen, lies a dreary period of anarchy and bloodshed.¹ The knot of jealous and resentful nobles who had assassinated the great dictator claimed, indeed, to have freed Rome from the rule of a tyrant, but the general feeling was one of dismay at the prospect of renewed confusion and conflict. "If Cæsar," writes a Roman man of business to Cicero, "could not find a way out of our difficulties, who will find one now?"² Even Cicero, earnestly as he strove to convince himself and others that a genuine restoration of the republic was now impossible, was forced to confess that the "libera-

¹ For this period see Merivale, *Romans Under the Empire*, vol. iii.; Gardthausen, *Augustus*; Lange, *Röm. Alterthümer*, iii., 476 sqq. The chief ancient authorities, besides Cicero, are Dio Cass., bks. xlv.-li., App., *B. C.*, ii.-v.

² Cic., *Ad Att.*, xiv., 1.

tors" had not half done their work,¹ and though he set himself with indefatigable energy to the task of re-establishing the old constitution, it was beyond his powers to alter the course of events. The tragedy of the Ides of March was followed, not by a republican restoration, but by a war of succession, a conflict in which even Cicero's eloquence went for little by comparison with the swords of the legionaries. Of the rival claimants to the place which Cæsar had filled, the most conspicuous at the moment of Cæsar's death

M. Antonius. was Marcus Antonius, once Cæsar's master of the horse, and his lieutenant in Italy, now sole consul, and as such the official head of the state. A brilliant soldier, an effective speaker, and the close friend of the great dictator, he was, as Cicero recognised, a far more formidable person than either

M. Lepidus and Sextus Pompeius. M. Æmilius Lepidus or Sextus Pompeius. The former, though a great noble, and governor of the two important provinces of Hither Spain and Narbonese Gaul, possessed neither ability nor resolution enough to win for himself the prize to which he aspired. The latter, though he had succeeded in collecting a force, and making good a position in Farther Spain,² was as yet an outlaw, bearing indeed a great name, but a man of whom little was known, and from whom little was feared. Moreover, with both Lepidus and Sextus Pompeius Antony had established friendly relations. He had given his daughter in marriage to Lepidus's son, and

¹ *Ibid.*, xiv., 12: ὃ πρόξενος καλῆς μὲν ἀτελοῦς δέ τ—*cf. ibid.*, xiv., 21.

² Dio, xlv., 10.

promised to secure for the father the office of *pontifex maximus* left vacant by Cæsar's death.¹ The bribe offered to Sextus was the repeal of the sentence of outlawry and the restoration of his father's property.²

Matters thus arranged with the only rivals whom he saw any reason to fear, Antony proceeded, in his own reckless fashion, to play the part of Cæsar in Rome. Cæsar's papers had been intrusted to his care by the dictator's widow Calpurnia, and of these he made unscrupulous use; laws were carried, provinces assigned, exiles recalled, property granted or confiscated; and for everything Antony professed that he found authority in the "Acts of Cæsar."³ The one thing wanting to establish his position, a military command, he proposed to secure by transferring to himself the province of Cisalpine Gaul, with the legions at present in Macedonia.⁴

But he had now to reckon with an opponent infinitely more dangerous than Lepidus or Sextus. Gaius Octavius was at Apollonia when his great uncle was murdered. On hearing that Cæsar had made him his heir he crossed to Italy (April, 44 B.C.), and travelled to Rome to claim his inheritance.⁵ He was only in his nineteenth year, and, as yet, had little to rely upon but his relationship with Cæsar. But from the first he displayed all the astuteness, self-control, and

Octavius.

710 A.U.C.

¹ *Ibid.*, xliv., 53.

² *Ibid.*, xlv., 10.

³ Cic., *Phil.*, i., 8-10.

⁴ Dio, xlv., 9; it had been assigned to Decimus Brutus.

⁵ *Ibid.*, xlv., 3; Sueton., *Aug.*, 8.

tenacity of purpose which made him ultimately far more than a match for his reckless and headstrong rival. While professing to have no other object than to claim his rights as Cæsar's heir and adopted son, and avoiding all risk of rupture with Antony,¹ he quietly strengthened his position, both with the veterans who eagerly welcomed a second Cæsar, and with the Roman populace. In October, Antony, already alarmed at the growing popularity of his young rival, went to Brundisium to meet the legions from Macedonia. Octavius seized the opportunity to tamper with the newly-arrived troops, and ultimately succeeded in detaching from Antony one whole legion. At the same time he raised a force from among Cæsar's veterans in Campania.² He was now at the head of a considerable body of troops, but what use he would make of them was still uncertain, and as yet he held no command from senate or people.³ In December, however, Antony arrived in Cisalpine Gaul, shut up D. Brutus in Mutina, and proceeded to take forcible possession of his province. Octavius saw his opportunity. He came forward as the defender of the republic against Antony, and marched northward to the relief of Brutus. On January 1, 43 B.C.,⁴ the senate formally recognised their

The war of
Mutina.

¹ Dio, xlv., 5.

² Dio, xlv., 12, 13.

³ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, i., 1: "annos undeviginti natus exercitum privato consilio et privata impensa comparavi; per quem rempublicam [do]minatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindica[vi]."

⁴ Cic., *Phil.*, v., 17; Dio, xlvi., 29. That this was Octavius's object Cicero clearly saw; *Ad Att.*, xvi., 8 (November 44 B.C.) "plane hoc spectat ut se duce bellum geratur cum Antonio."

self-appointed champion. Octavius was made a senator, with consular rank, invested with the *imperium*, and authorised to conduct the war against Antony in conjunction with the two consuls of the year.¹ The so-called "War of Mutina" was ended, toward the close of April, by a battle near Mutina, in which Antony was defeated and compelled to raise the siege of that town. But the consul Hirtius was killed in the battle, and his colleague Pansa died shortly afterwards of wounds received in an earlier engagement.² Octavius had now every right to expect that the sole command would be given to him; at Cicero's suggestion, however, the senate passed him over in favour of Decimus Brutus, and refused his demand to be elected consul.³ He replied by marching on Rome at the head of eight legions, and his arrival decided the matter. On August 19 he was elected consul, though only twenty years of age.⁴ Meanwhile Antony had already, in May, joined forces with Lepidus near Forum Julii. Later in the autumn they were strengthened by the adhesion first of Asinius Pollio, governor of Farther Spain, and then of Plancus, governor of Northern Gaul. A final blow to the hopes of Cicero and his

Octavius
elected
consul.
43 B. C.

711 A.U.C.

¹ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, i., 3: "*Senatus . . . in ordinem suum m[e adlegit] . . . con[sula]rem locum [simul dans] . . . imperium mihi dedit.*" App., *B. C.*, iii., 11.

² Dio, xlv., 38, 39; App. *B. C.*, iii., 71.

³ Dio, xlv., 41.

⁴ *Mon. Anc. Lat.* i., 7, 8; Dio, xlv., 44. He had been saluted as "imperator" after the defeat of Antony in April; Dio, xlv., 38; *C. I. L.*, x., 8375.

friends was the death of Decimus Brutus at Aquileia.¹ The legions of M. Brutus and Cassius were too far off to be of immediate service, and the senate could only await in passive helplessness the issue of the approaching meeting between the young Cæsar and his rivals. Octavius marched from Rome at the head of his legions, and met Antony and Lepidus in conference near Bononia.² A coalition was formed, and a division of power agreed upon. In November the three new masters of the Roman world appeared in Rome, and by a hurried vote of the terrified people the provisional government, usually known as the Second Triumvirate, was established, Antony, Lepidus, and Octavius being appointed commissioners "for the reorganisation of the state" for a period of five years.³ Their first acts were of evil omen for the peace and order of the empire. They revived the hateful Sullan traditions⁴ of proscription and confiscation, and among their victims was the great orator, Cicero, who for the last eighteen months had been waging an unequal contest "with words against swords,"⁵ on behalf of the ancient civic constitution,

The second
Triumvirate.

Death of
Cicero.

¹ He was murdered while making his way to join M. Brutus in Macedonia; Dio, xlvi., 53; App., *B. C.*, iii., 97.

² Dio, xlvi., 55; App., *B. C.*, iv., 2.

³ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, i., 9. Livy, *Epit.*, cxx.: "ut IIIviri reipublice constituende per quinquennium essent." Dio, xlvi., 56; App., *B. C.*, iv., 7.

⁴ Dio, xlvi., 3: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῦ Σύλλου πρότερον ἐπέπρακτο καὶ τότε συνεφέρετο.

⁵ Cic., *Ad Fam.*, xii., 22: "non pari condicione, contra arma verbis."

which he had once saved, and which he did not care to outlive. His murder was Antony's reply to the *Philippics*, and, brutal as the act was, it significantly marked the changed order of things. The irreconcilable puritanism of Cato found many imitators under the rule of the Cæsars, but the long line of orator statesmen, who swayed the destinies of free civic communities by the force of persuasive speech, closed with Cicero.¹

Throughout December 43 B.C., and through the early months of 42 B.C., the reign of terror lasted.² Its horrors are said to have exceeded those of the Marian and Sullan proscriptions, and they were aggravated by the desperate straits to which the triumvirs were driven in order to satisfy the demands of the turbulent soldiery³ who filled the city, and to prepare for the war with Brutus and Cassius. There is a certain grim irony in the fact that the authors of these enormities ostentatiously represented their work as one of righteous vengeance on the murderers of Cæsar.⁴ The name of the dictator was invoked to justify a policy of bloodshed and plunder—which was the very reverse of his own,—and while the forum swam with blood, and the streets were incumbered with corpses, the supreme

711 A.U.C.

712 A.U.C.

Reign of
terror in
Rome.

Honours
paid to
Julius.

¹ For Cicero's murder, see Plut., *Cicero*, 47; Dio, xlvii., 8.

² Dio, xlvii., 1-17; App., *B. C.*, iv., 5.

³ According to Appian (*B. C.*, iv., 3), the territories of eighteen Italian towns were selected, and lands assigned to the soldiery in them.

⁴ App., *B. C.*, iv., 8 *sqq.*

honour of deification was paid to the dead Julius.¹ The foundations of a temple dedicated to his memory were laid on the spot where his body had been burnt, and triumvirs, senate, and people swore always to observe and uphold his ordinances.² The chief responsibility for the atrocities is laid upon Antony and Lepidus, but the audacious fiction which described them as nothing more than an act of filial duty to a murdered father is at least characteristic of Octavius.³

The triumvirs were now masters of Rome and Italy; of the provinces, Spain and Gaul were also theirs. But they were far from being supreme throughout the empire.

War with
Brutus and
Cassius.

In the West Sextus Pompeius was daily growing stronger. His fleet commanded the western Mediterranean, he was in possession of Sicily, and the recent massacres had sent hundreds of fugitives to swell the ranks of his adherents.⁴ In the East, Brutus and Cassius had overborne all opposition, and were masters of Macedonia and Achaia, of Asia Minor and Syria. The attempt to dislodge Sextus Pompeius from Syria was abandoned as impracticable.⁵

¹ *I. R. N.*, 5014: "*quem Senatus Populusque Romanus in deorum numerum rettulit.*" The deification probably took place early in 42 B.C.; Mommsen, *St. R.*, ii., 717.

² Dio, xlvii., 18; the "*heroum Julii*," or "*edes divi Julii*," was dedicated by Octavius in 30 B.C.

³ The reference to the proscriptions in the Ancyran Monument is significant; *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, i., 10: "*quⁱ parentem meum [inter fecer] unt in exilium expulⁱ.*"

⁴ Dio, xlvii., 12, 36.

⁵ *Ibid.*, xlvii., 37.

and leaving Lepidus to look after Italy, Antony and Octavius sailed early in the autumn from Brundisium to face Brutus and Cassius at Philippi, in Macedonia, where the latter were already encamped within easy reach of the sea and of their fleet.¹ The circumstances of the final encounter bore a certain resemblance to those which attended the battle at Pharsalus. The forces of Antony and Octavius were, like those of Cæsar, drawn mainly from Italy and the West, while the more numerous army of their opponents was largely composed, as that of Pompey had been, of eastern auxiliaries.² Moreover, while it was the object of the triumvirs, as of Cæsar before them, to force on an engagement, Brutus and Cassius had, like Pompey, everything to gain by delay, and it was only the impatience of their troops which obliged them to fight. The first day's battle was indecisive. Brutus defeated the troops opposed to him under Octavius; but, on the other hand, Cassius was out-mancœuvred by Antony, and hastily imagining that all was lost, slew himself. Brutus now assumed the sole command, and prepared to wear out his enemy by a policy of masterly inactivity. The triumvirs found their supplies running short, and winter coming on; and their position was fast becoming untenable, when Brutus, like Pompey, was

The battle
at Philippi.
42 B.C.
712 A.U.C.

¹ *Ibid.*, xlvi., 37-49; App., *B. C.*, iv., 87 sqq.; Plut., *Brutus*, 38, 53.

² Gardthausen, *Augustus*, i., 170; App., *B. C.*, iv., 88. With Brutus and Cassius were not only Thracians and Illyrians, but mounted archers from Arabia, Media, and Parthia.

reluctantly forced by his officers to leave his entrenchments and fight. The battle ended in his complete defeat. The last of the republican leaders fell by the hand of a friend. His troops, to the number of some 14,000 men, surrendered at discretion; of his officers, some, like Horace, escaped by flight, others were captured, or avoided capture by suicide. The fleet alone sailed away unharmed, the greater part of it going to swell the growing forces of Sextus Pompeius, while a squadron under Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus remained in the Ægæan.

The victory was followed by a fresh division of authority between the conquerors.¹ Division of the Empire. Antony undertook what no doubt seemed at the time the more attractive and lucrative task of restoring order in the unsettled provinces and vassal states of the East, and of collecting there the funds needed to redeem the promises made to the victorious legions. To Octavius was intrusted the duty of allotting the promised lands in Italy to the veterans, and of crushing Sextus Pompeius. The arrangement had consequences which it is possible that Octavius at least foresaw. While Antony was launched on a wild career of extravagant adventure in the East, which gradually alienated from him the sympathies of the Roman world, Octavius, securely established at Rome, in the ancient seat of government, and with full control of the constitutional machinery of the state, became not only master of the West, but the recognised champion of Roman civilization and supremacy.

¹ Dio, *xlvi.*, 1.

At the outset, however, such results as these seemed remote enough. In carrying out the allotments of land to the veterans, a work which he commenced early in 41 B.C., Octavius provoked a crisis which, for a few months, threatened entirely to ruin his position. Antony's brother Lucius, encouraged and directed by the former's ambitious and unscrupulous wife Fulvia, after failing to get himself associated with Octavius in the business of allotment, came forward as the patron of all those who had been evicted or were threatened with eviction from their lands.¹ Supported by these malcontents, by such of the soldiery as bribes or their own attachment to his brother Marcus could detach from Octavius's side, and by a few senators, he formed a formidable party, seized one or two strong places, and prepared to supersede Octavius in the government of Italy. The outbreak of actual hostilities was delayed by fruitless negotiations, but, probably towards the end of the summer, Lucius marched upon Rome, and entered it. On Octavius's advance, however, he again left the city and moved northwards. At Perugia he was overtaken and blockaded. The siege seems to have lasted throughout the autumn and early winter, but in January 40 B.C. Lucius surrendered, and the last civil war waged on Italian soil for more than a century came to an end.² The victory at Perugia gave Octavius the

¹ Dio, *xlvi.*, 5 *sqq.*

² For the Perusine war, see Livy, *Epit.*, *cxv.*; Vell. Pat., *ii.*, 74; Dio, *xlvi.*, 13 *sqq.*; App., *B.C.*, *v.*, 21 *sqq.*

control of Italy, and he now hastened to secure for himself the entire West, before the news of his brother's defeat should rouse Antony to action. Spain and Numidia had been assigned to him by the agreement made after Philippi; but Gaul and the old province of Africa belonged, under the terms of the same agreement, to Antony. Nevertheless, in

714 A.U.C. July 40 B.C., Octavius crossed into Gaul and secured it, while Africa was offered to Lepidus in exchange for his nominal rule of Italy, an offer which Octavius hoped would bind both that province and Lepidus to his own side. Meanwhile he prepared to take decisive measures against Sextus Pompeius, whose power was daily on the increase, and whose fleet was not only ravaging the Italian coasts, but intercepting the corn supplies of Rome itself. Marcus Vispanius Agrippa, who now first appears as the ablest and most devoted of his lieutenants, was despatched to South Italy, with orders to dislodge Sextus from his formidable position in Sicily.

For the moment, however, all operations against Sextus were suspended by the news that **Antony in the East.** Antony, yielding at last to the entreaties of his partisans, was on his way to Italy to assert his rights. The period which had elapsed since the victory at Philippi he had spent in the East, where his conduct had been that rather of a reckless soldier of fortune than of a responsible statesman.¹ The enormous sums which he levied from the Greek communities he squandered in riotous living, and his

¹ Dio, *xlvi.*, 24 *sqq.*; Plut., *Anton.*, 24 *sqq.*

own extravagance was equalled by that of his favourites, male and female. Penalties and rewards were distributed, rulers set up and deposed, as the fancy of the moment dictated. Discarding the severe dignity of the Roman emperor, this new master of the East preferred to parade himself before the Greeks under the style and title of the god Dionysos. At Tarsus, where he had summoned the vassal kings and princes to appear before him and learn his pleasure, he first met the brilliant and ambitious princess who now claimed to be the representative and heiress of the Ptolemies, and in an evil moment for himself he became the devoted lover and obedient slave of Cleopatra. When she returned to Egypt he followed her, and lounged away the winter of 41-40 B.C. as the foremost of her favourites and courtiers at Alexandria.

Meeting with
Cleopatra.

713-714
A.U.C.

In the spring of 40 B.C. he at last nerved himself to leave Egypt: he sailed to Asia, and thence to Greece, where he learnt from Fulvia the news of the capture of Perusia. He at once crossed to Italy, and on being refused admission into Brundisium, landed with troops and commenced to lay siege to the town.

714 A.U.C.

A renewal of civil war seemed inevitable, but in reality neither Octavius nor Antony were anxious to push matters to an extremity. The former, though overwhelmingly superior by land, had every reason to dread a coalition between Sextus Pompeius and Antony, whose united fleets could easily blockade Italy, and cut off all sup-

The Treaty
of Brundisium.
714 A.U.C.
40 B.C.

plies from outside.¹ On his side Antony had comparatively few troops, and, above all, he was anxious to get back to the East, where a Parthian war had broken out. A formidable obstacle to peace was removed by the death of his wife Fulvia, and during the autumn the "treaty of Brundisium" postponed for nine years more the final struggle between the two rivals.² For the third time a partition of the empire was made. Octavius retained Italy and the western provinces, while Antony took over the whole of the East, including Macedonia and Achaia. Lepidus, whom neither of his colleagues cared even to consult, was obliged to be satisfied with the single province of Africa. Finally, as a pledge of their renewed friendship, Antony married his rival's sister,

735 A. U. C.
The Treaty
of Misenum.

Octavia. In the next year, 39 B.C., to the infinite relief of Rome and Italy, a treaty concluded at Misenum put a stop, though only as it proved, for a short time, to the piratical raids of Sextus Pompeius.³ In the course of the summer Octavius left Rome for Gaul, to resume the work of organisation there which the threatened war with Antony had interrupted, and about the same time Antony departed from Greece.

¹ Dio, *xlvi.*, 29. The two had, in fact, agreed to make common cause against Octavius.

² Dio, *xlvi.*, 28; Vell., *ii.*, 76; App., *B. C.*, *v.*, 60-65.

³ Livy, *Epit.*, *ccxvii.*; Vell., *ii.*, 77; Dio, *xlvi.*, 34. Sextus was confirmed in possession of Sicily and Sardinia, and was given in addition the province of Acadia, for five years. A free pardon and permission to return to Italy was granted to those who had taken refuge with him.

Meanwhile, in the East, matters had gone from bad to worse, and at one moment it seemed as if Rome was destined to lose all that she had won in Western Asia. The necessities of civil war had compelled Brutus and Cassius to seek the alliance of the Parthian king Orodes, and a body of Parthian cavalry had fought side by side with their legions at Philippi. The defeat of his allies, and the news that Antony was coming eastward, intent, it was said, on that invasion of Parthia which Cæsar had planned, no doubt deterred Orodes from seizing the reward of his alliance, and occupying the defenceless province of Syria. But Antony passed on to Egypt to waste precious time at the feet of Cleopatra, leaving both Syria and Asia Minor at the mercy of any invader. It was, however, by a Roman officer that Orodes was persuaded to seize this opportunity of ousting the Romans from Asia. Q. Labienus,¹ the son of the man who had been at first Cæsar's most trusted officer and then his bitterest enemy, had visited the Parthian court as the envoy of Brutus and Cassius, and after their defeat had remained there under Parthian protection. Forgetful, like his father, of his duty to Rome in his desire for revenge, he urged Orodes to strike at once, and promised himself to lead the armies of Parthia. His arguments, backed as they were by Orodes's fiery son Pacorus, prevailed, and the Parthian forces crossed the Euphrates. The Roman troops in Syria who had fought for Brutus and Cassius were easily won over by Labienus² and

The Parthian
invasion of
Asia Minor
40 B.C.
714 A.U.C.

¹ Dio, *xlvi.*, 24.

² *Ibid.*, *xlvi.* 25.

with the exception of the impregnable seaport of Tyre, both Syria and Judæa submitted to the invader. Crossing the Taurus, Labienus overran Cilicia, and entering the province of Asia, forced Antony's legate, Munatius Plancus, to abandon the mainland and take refuge in the islands. By the end of the year 40 B.C., while Octavius and Antony were celebrating their reconciliation by festivities in Italy, the provinces beyond the sea were in Parthian hands, lost as they had been once before in 88 B.C., thanks to the ruinous quarrels which paralysed the power of Rome.

The treaty of Brundisium, followed as it was early in 39 B.C. by the conclusion of peace with Sextus Pompeius, must have sorely disappointed Labienus, who had relied, with some reason, on the prospects of a destructive civil war in Italy. Antony, indeed, loitered as usual on his way eastward,¹ with characteristic indifference to his own reputation and to the plight of the unhappy provincials of Asia, who in the space of three years had suffered from the exactions of three different masters. Fortunately, however, he sent on in advance P. Ventidius Bassus, an officer of vigour and ability, whose career, with its marked vicissitudes, was characteristic of the stormy times in which he lived.² Made a prisoner as a boy at the siege of Asculum during the Social war, he had figured as a captive in the triumphal procession of Cn. Pompeius Strabo (89 B.C.); after earning a living, so

P. Ventidius
Bassus in
the East.
715 A.U.C.

¹ Dio, *xlvi.*, 39.

² Gell., *Noct. Att.*, *xv.*, 4.

his enemies said, as a dealer in mules,¹ he entered the army as a common soldier, where he attracted the notice of Cæsar. Thanks to Cæsar's patronage, he rose rapidly, becoming tribune of the *plebs* and prætor. After Cæsar's death he joined Antony, and was outlawed by the senate along with his leader. On the formation of the second triumvirate he returned to Rome, and at the close of 43 B.C. was rewarded with the consulship,² and ⁷¹¹ A.U.C. then with the governorship of Narbonese Gaul.

The duty now intrusted to him of reconquering the eastern provinces was discharged with brilliant success. He at once crossed to Asia, and Labienus, taken completely by surprise, at once evacuated the peninsula, and retreated to the Taurus,³ where he summoned the Parthian force in Syria to his aid. Ventidius followed, and in a single battle decisively defeated both Labienus and his allies. Labienus's army dispersed, and Ventidius, pressing forward a second time, routed the Parthians, who were holding the passes⁴ into Syria. The latter, however, were not yet reconciled to the loss of their acquisitions west of the Euphrates. In the following ⁷¹⁶ A.U.C. spring (38 B.C.) a Parthian army crossed the river, but only to be again defeated with fright-

¹ Gell., *Noct. Att.*, xv. 4: "*comparandis mulis et vehiculis . . . magistratibus qui sortiti provincias forent.*" According to Gellius, it was in the performance of these commissariat duties that he became known to Cæsar.

² Gellius (xv., 4) quotes the verses written in Rome on the occasion: "*mulos qui fricabat, consul factus est.*"

³ Dio, *xlvi.*, 39.

⁴ The passes of Mons Amanus; Dio, *xlvi.*, 41.

ful slaughter, among the dead being their prince Pacorus.¹ Ventidius had, in the course of little more than a year, restored Roman ascendancy in the East. In the autumn of 38 B.C. he returned to Rome, and rode in triumph through the streets, along which fifty years before he had been led as a captive.²

Ventidius's recall is said to have been due to Antony's jealousy of his lieutenant's success. At any rate, in the summer of 38 B.C. he left Greece and its pleasures, and started for the East. The two rivals, who parted from each other after the peace of Misenum in 39 B.C., were destined to meet but once again before the final conflict at Actium. The interval was spent by each in a manner thoroughly characteristic of their different characters. Octavius was engaged without intermission in patiently consolidating his power in the West, in restoring prosperity and confidence, and in obliterating by good government the memories of the bloodshed and robbery which had stained the commencement of his rule. On the other hand, Antony ran riot in a wild career of adventure and pleasure, better befitting an Eastern sultan than a Roman noble and senator. In the West Octavius succeeded at least in establishing order; while in the East the anarchy consequent on ten years of civil war was made worse instead of better by the reckless ambition and capricious extravagance of his rival.

¹ The battle was fought at Gindarus, on June 9, 38 B.C., on the same day of the year as the defeat of Crassus in 53 B.C.; Dio, *xliv.*, 21; Strabo, p. 751.

² Dio, *xlix.*, 21. It was the first Parthian triumph celebrated in Rome.

It was probably early in 38 B.C. that Octavius married Livia,¹ the wife of Tiberius Claudius Nero, once a warm supporter of L. Antonius, to whom she had already borne one son, the future Emperor Tiberius, and by whom she was already pregnant with another, when her husband was forced to surrender her at the bidding of her powerful lover. The second son, Drusus, born three months after the marriage, became famous as the conqueror of the Ræti, and as the father of Germanicus, and of the Emperor Claudius. Livia herself became the constant and prudent counsellor of her new husband, and after his death guided as empress-mother the policy of Tiberius.

Octavius in the West. 39-32 B.C. 715-722 A. U.C. His marriage with Livia.

The truce which had been patched up between Octavius and Sextus Pompeius (39 B.C.) was but a hollow one.² It was impossible for the former to leave Sicily longer than he could help in the hands of a rival, and the latter had every reason to suspect that Octavius would only respect the treaty of Misenum while it suited his convenience to do so. The inevitable rupture between them was provoked (38 B.C.) by the treachery of Sextus's freedman and admiral Menas,³ who surrendered Sardinia to Octavius, together with the fleet and troops under his

War with Sextus Pompeius.

716 A.U.C.

¹ Dio, *xlvi*., 44. He had divorced his wife Scribonia the year before; *ibid.*, *xlvi*., 34.

² Tac., *Ann.*, *i.*, 10; "*Pompeium imagine pacis . . . deceptum.*"

³ Dio, *xlvi*., 45. Appian (*B.C.*, *v.* 78) calls the freedman "*Menedorus.*"

command. Octavius had no scruple in profiting by this act of perfidy. Menas was rewarded with the rank of a Roman knight, and received a post in the service of his new master. War followed at once; but though Octavius can have expected no other result, he found to his cost that Sextus's well-equipped fleet and skilful admirals were far more than a match for his own clumsily handled vessels. In the first sea-fight, off Cumæ, neither side could claim any decided advantage; but in the second, off the Scyllæan promontory, the Pompeians, assisted by a storm, completely defeated their enemy. Sextus, elated with his success, was hailed by his Greek sailors as the son of Poseidon, and the invincible master of the sea.¹ Octavius abandoned his projected invasion of Sicily and contented himself with posting garrisons to protect the coasts of Italy, while he set about constructing a new and more numerous fleet with which to renew the war. With a wisdom justified by the result, he intrusted the duty of preparing this fresh armament to Marcus Agrippa, now consul (37 B.C.), whom he recalled from Gaul for the purpose.

It was during the year 37 B.C.² that the last friendly meeting between Octavius and Antony took place. The latter arrived off Brundisium with a fleet of three hundred sail, professedly in response to Octavius's ap-

Renewal of
the Trium-
virate.
37 B. C.
717 A. U. C.

¹ Dio, *xlvi.*, 48; Plin., *N. H.*, *ix.*, 55.

² The date is uncertain. Appian (*B. C.*, v. 93) places the meeting in the spring of 37 B.C. Dio (*xl.*, 1) puts it at the close of that year or the beginning of the next.

peal for assistance against Sextus Pompeius. But now, as before, in 40 B.C., the harbour of Brundisium was closed against him, and he landed instead at Tarentum, full of resentment against his colleague. For the second time, however, a reconciliation was effected, thanks to the mediation of Octavia, and probably also to the skilful diplomacy of Mæcenas, who from this time forward shared with Agrippa the confidence of Octavius.¹ The provisional government of the triumvirate was renewed for five years more.² Antony gave Octavius one hundred and twenty ships to assist him in the war with Sextus, and received in exchange twenty thousand Roman legionaries.³ Matters being thus amicably settled, the rivals parted; Antony sailed away to Syria, leaving his wife Octavia behind in Italy, and Octavius proceeded quietly with his preparations against Sextus.

By the summer of 36 B.C. all was ready. A numerous fleet had been built, the vessels being of unusual height and strength, and equipped with moveable wooden towers, from which the soldiers on board could command the enemy's decks.⁴ Twenty thousand slaves had been enlisted to man the ships⁵; and throughout the

718 A. U. C.
Invasion of
Sicily

¹ It was on this occasion that Horace accompanied Mæcenas to Brundisium; *Sat.*, i., 5.

² The period for which the triumvirs had been appointed expired on December 31, 38 B.C. It was now extended to the end of 33 B.C. Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 675.

³ App., *B. C.*, v., 95. The agreement was known as the "*fœdus Tarentinum*"; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 10.

⁴ Dio, xlix., 1; Serv., *Ad Ann.*, viii., 693.

⁵ Sueton., *Aug.*, 16.

winter the crews had been carefully drilled in the secure and spacious harbour which Agrippa had constructed in the innermost corner of the roadstead of *Baiæ*.¹

On July 1st the fleet set sail for Sicily; the island was to be invaded from three sides at once, by Octavius and Agrippa on the north, by the squadron which Antony had left behind on the East, and by Lepidus from Africa on the south.² The concerted attack was, however, at first a failure. Lepidus was in no hurry to assist his powerful colleague, and a gale obliged Octavius to seek shelter at Lipara. Leaving his fleet there he returned to Italy, and putting his legions on board the Antonian squadron, which had reached the Straits of Messina, he landed at Tauromenium. But here he was instantly attacked by Sextus Pompeius. Once more, it was said, his courage failed him, and he sought safety on the mainland. The legions, which he had deserted, were now harassed on all sides by the light troops of Sextus. Their supplies began to run short, and they were helpless before the attacks of an enemy who obstinately refused to come to close quarters.³ As a last resource, their leader Cornificius resolved to force his way across the island, to effect if possible

¹ It was in reality two harbours, the inner one being formed by the lake of Avernus, the outer by the Lucrine lake. A canal connected the two. Access to the Lucrine lake from the open roadstead was given by cutting through the dam known as the *Via Herculanea*. Dio, *xlvi.*, 50; Virg., *Georg.*, *ii.*, 161; Vell. Pat., *ii.*, 79; Gardthausen, *Aug.*, *i.*, 257; Beloch, *Campanien*, 169.

² App., *B. C.*, *v.*, 97, 98.

³ Dio, *xliv.*, 7; App., *B. C.*, *v.*, 116.

a junction with Agrippa, who, after defeating Sextus's Admiral Demochares off Mylæ, had captured both Mylæ and Tyndaris. The attempt succeeded, and from this moment the fortune of war changed. Sextus, now fully engaged with Agrippa and Cornificius, was unable to prevent Octavius from again landing in Sicily. At the same time Lepidus at last arrived in the island, and the two joined Cornificius and Agrippa at Mylæ. Against such a force Sextus could effect nothing, his only hope lay in recovering his mastery of the sea. On September 3rd, 36 B.C.,¹ off the promontory of Naulochus, and in full view of the legions on shore, his fleet engaged that of Agrippa, and was completely defeated. Sextus himself escaped with a few ships, but the rest of his vessels were captured or destroyed, and his land forces at once surrendered. Octavius had now to reckon with his colleague Lepidus. The latter had occupied

Victory at
Naulochus.
718 A. U. C.

Deposition
of Lepidus.

Messina; he was at the head of twenty-two legions,² and the moment seemed to have arrived when he might demand satisfaction for the wrongs which he had suffered during the past seven years at the hands of his colleagues in the triumvirate. But his soldiers were tired of war; they listened readily to the solicitations of Octavius, and deserted their leader. Lepidus had now no choice but to submit. His life was spared, but he was deposed from office, and sent a

¹ This date is given by the Kalendar of Amiternum, *C. I. L.*, x., 8375. But the reference may be to the surrender of Lepidus. If so, the battle at Naulochus was fought towards the end of August.

² Sueton., *Aug.*, 16; Vell., ii., 80; App., *B. C.*, v., 123.

prisoner to Circeii, where he resided until his death in 12 B.C.¹ The adventurous career of Sextus Pom-

742 A. U. C.
Death of
Sextus
Pompeius.
35 B. C.
719 A. U. C.

peius came to an end in the year following his defeat. He had escaped to Lesbos, intending to seek the protection of Antony. Encouraged, however, by rumours that the latter had met with disaster beyond the Euphrates, he was already forming plans for making himself master of Asia Minor, when he was arrested and put to death by Antony's legates.² If he achieved nothing else, he at least proved the value of that maritime supremacy, the advantages of which his father had thrown away after his defeat at Pharsalus. For seven years, with a fleet commanded by Greek freedmen, and manned by runaway slaves, he had held his own, and the son of the conqueror of the pirates made a name for himself as the last and the most formidable of the corsair chiefs in the Mediterranean.³

After thirteen stormy years, the West was at last peacefully united under the rule of a single man. The two provinces of Africa, so long the prey of contending parties, were quietly occupied and firmly governed by Statilius Taurus.⁴ In Spain the last echoes of disturbance had died away under the vigorous rule of Domitius Calvinus.⁵ In Northern Gaul Marcus Agrippa had assisted his

Octavius as
master of the
West:
36-33 B. C.
718-717 A. U. C.

¹ Sueton., *Aug.*, 16; Dio, *xlix.*, 12; Livy, *Epit.*, *ccxix.*

² Dio, *xlix.*, 17, 18; Vell., *ii.*, 79; Livy, *Epit.*, *ccxxi.*

³ Comp. Augustus's record of his victory, *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, *v.*, 1; "*mare pacavi a prædonibus.*" *Ibid.*, *v.*, 33; "*Siciliam et Sardiniam occupatas bello servili recipravi.*"

⁴ Dio, *xlix.*, 14.

⁵ Vell., *ii.*, 78.

master in building up the system of government to which Livia's infant son Drusus was destined to put the finishing touch twenty-four years later. In Italy itself there was no individual or party able or willing to challenge the supremacy of the conqueror of Sextus. Already men spoke as if the age of civil war was over, and a period of peace and prosperity about to begin.¹ But everything depended on the use which Octavius would make of his success. Would he, as in 43 B.C., be only a revengeful partisan, or would he follow the example of the great dictator whose name he bore? Octavius was now only in his twenty-seventh year, and he had as yet had little opportunity for showing that his claim to be Cæsar's heir was justified by his ability to carry on Cæsar's work. But his conduct during the four years of comparative quiet which followed the victory at Naulochus was a sufficient answer to all doubts; and when, in 32 B.C., war with Antony became imminent and inevitable, he had already won the complete confidence of the western world.

Before leaving Sicily he had succeeded in staving off a threatened mutiny among his soldiers. The huge force now under his sole command, consisting, we are told, of 45 legions, 24,000 cavalry, and more than 35,000 light troops,² could not safely be disbanded. But the veterans who had fought at Mutina and Philippi were discharged, and lands were found for them in Italy and in Southern Gaul.³ A handsome

¹ App., *B. C.*, v., 130.

² *Ibid.*, v., 127.

³ *Ibid.*, v., 128; Dio, *xlix.*, 13, 34; *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, v., 36; Strabo, p. 259.

donative temporarily satisfied the rest. His return to Rome in November was followed, not by proscriptions and confiscations, but by vigorous measures for securing the public safety and restoring confidence. Of the runaway slaves who had taken refuge with Sextus Pompeius 6,000 were crucified, and 30,000 sent back to their masters.¹ The brigands of all kinds, whether impoverished peasants, discharged soldiers, or men rendered desperate by the loss of property and position during the civil wars, were sternly repressed alike in Rome and in the country districts of Italy.² Some of the taxes recently imposed were taken off, arrears due to the treasury were cancelled, while, as a pledge of restored peace and harmony, the records of the reign of terror, the lists of suspected persons, the sentences of outlawry, and similar documents were publicly burnt.³ Octavius even professed now, as afterwards in 726 A.U.C. 28 B.C., his desire to restore the regular constitutional government, which had been virtually suspended since the creation of the triumvirate. Its formal restoration must, he declared, be postponed until Antony's return; meanwhile he encouraged the ordinary magistrates to resume their duties. It is true that during his own absences 719-720 A.U.C. from Italy in 35 and 34 B.C. the maintenance of order was intrusted, as it had been in

¹ App., *B. C.*, v., 129; *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, v., 1.

² Appian (*B. C.*, v., 132) dates the establishment of a regular police in Rome from this time. Sueton., *Aug.*, 32: "*grassaturas dispositas per opportuna loca stationibus inhiabit.*" For inscriptions referring to these patrols, see *C. I. L.*, ix., 3907, 4503. ³ App., *B. C.*, v., 132.

36 B.C., to Mæcenas, who was neither a magistrate nor even a senator.¹ But the ædileship of Marcus Agrippa in 33 B.C., with its splendid achievements for the well-being of Rome, was a testimony at once to the good intentions of the new authorities and to their respect for republican tradition.² At the same time public opinion already clearly pointed to the personal supremacy of Octavius as essential to the welfare of the state. The honours showered upon him on his return from Sicily in 36 B.C., and in particular the grant of the tribunician power, at once raised him above the level of a republican magistrate.³ He was already, over one-half of the empire, "master of all,"⁴ and with him were already associated the able ministers Agrippa and Mæcenas, whose names were to be inseparably connected with his.

The only war in which Octavius was engaged between 36–32 B.C. was waged, not against political rivals, but in furtherance of the work which now devolved upon him as ruler of the West, the rectification and defence of the frontiers. The tribes of Illyria had long been dangerous neighbours to Italy, and during the civil wars both the Iapydes immediately east of Aquileia and the Pannonians along the line of the

718 A.U.C.

721 A.U.C.

Pannonian
WAR
35-33 B.C.
719-721
A.U.C.

¹ Dio, xlix. 16 ; Tac., *Ann.*, vi., 11.

² For Agrippa's work as ædile, and especially his reformation of the water-supply of Rome, see Frontinus, *De Aquæductibus*, 9 ; Plin., *N. H.*, xxxvi., 24 ; Dio, xlix., 43.

³ Dio, xlix., 15 ; Oros., vi., 18.

⁴ *Mon. Anc.*, vi., 14.

Save had made frequent forays across the frontier.

719 A.U.C. In the summer of 35 B.C. Octavius marched against them.¹ The Iapydes were easily quieted, but the Pannonians, a warlike race, who could put 100,000 men in the field,² offered a more obstinate resistance. The capture, however, of their great stronghold Siscia (Sessik), on the Save, broke their spirits for the time, and with the occupation of Siscia by a Roman garrison the way was prepared for a final establishment of Roman authority along the lines of the Save and the Drave. Further than

721 A.U.C. this Octavius could not go. In the summer of 33 B.C. the menacing attitude of Antony obliged him to abandon all other schemes and prepare for the final conflict with his colleague and rival.

While in the western half of the empire men were already congratulating themselves on the restoration of peace, under the auspices of a second Cæsar, matters in the East had gone from bad to worse. Antony had indeed shown no reluctance to play the king; but his policy, when it ceased to be regulated by his own caprices, was dictated by the overmastering ambition of Cleopatra. He had set out 716 A.U.C. from Athens in 38 B.C. full of his intended Parthian war, but after a brief stay in the East had returned to Italy. Towards the end of 717 A.U.C. 37 B.C. he was again in Syria,³ and this

Antony in
the East.
38-33 B.C.
716-721
A.U.C.

¹ Dio, xlix., 34; App., *Illyr.*, 16.

² App., *Illyr.*, 22. For this war and its results, see Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., pp. 8, 9.

³ Dio Cass., xlix., 22 *sqq.*; Plut., *Ant.*, 36 *sqq.*

time everything seemed to favour the execution of his long-talked-of scheme. His legate in Syria, C. Sosius, had completed the work which Ventidius had begun, by taking Jerusalem and deposing the Parthian nominee Antigonus, while P. Canidius Crassus had temporarily re-established the suzerainty of Rome over the tribes of the Caucasus. In Parthia itself there was a new king, Phraates IV., whose cruelties¹ had alienated many of the Parthian nobles, and driven one of them, Monæses, to seek a refuge within the Roman province of Syria. Elated by the favourable turn of events, Antony resolved to invade Parthia; but again the enchantments of Cleopatra, whom he summoned to join him, held him spell-bound in the luxurious city of Antioch.² Here he spent the winter and spring (37-36 B.C.),^{717-718 A.U.C.} at one moment gratifying his vanity by putting down and setting up kings and princes, at another shocking Roman feeling by robbing the Roman people to enrich his Greek mistress. Herod replaced Antigonus on the throne of Judea; Amyntas, once the secretary of King Deiotarus, was installed as ruler of Galatia; in Cappadocia the old dynasty was ousted in favour of the Greek Archelaus, whose mother Glaphyra had for a moment caught the fancy of the amorous soldier. To Cleopatra were given grants of territory, not only in Arabia and Palestine, but even in the Roman provinces of Syria and Cilicia.³

¹ Dio, xlix. 23.

² Plut., *Ant.*, 36; Livy, *Epi.*, cxxx.

³ Dio, xlix., 22, 32; Plut., *Ant.*, 36

At length, early in the summer of 36 B.C., Antony started, at the head of an imposing force of sixteen legions and 40,000 allied troops.¹ He crossed the Euphrates, but instead of invading Parthia, he yielded to the request of Artavasdes, king of Greater Armenia, and marched northwards against Artavasdes's personal enemy, the king of Media. A long and circuitous route brought him to the frontiers of Media, and there leaving his baggage and two legions under Oppius Statianus behind him, he pressed forward to attack the Median fortress of Gazaca.² Scarcely, however, had he begun the siege when the news arrived that Oppius had been attacked by a combined Median and Parthian force. Antony hurried to the rescue of his legions, but arrived only to find that Oppius and his troops had been overwhelmed by numbers and cut to pieces. Returning to Gazaca, he resumed the siege. Gazaca, however, held out obstinately, while the Parthian and Median forces harassed him by constant attacks and cut off his supplies. The summer, too, was over, and the approach of winter made it impossible either to advance farther or to remain where he was. The inevitable retreat was commenced in October. Avoiding the plains, for fear of the Parthian cavalry, the legions marched toilsomely through a wild and mountainous country.³

The Parthian
war. 36 B.C.
718 A.U.C.

¹ Vell., ii., 82; Livy, *Epit.*, cxxx.; Plut., *Ant.*, 31.

² Or Phraaspa; Dio, xlix., 25; Strabo, p. 523; Gardthausen, *Aug.*, 2, p. 153.

³ The route was indicated by a Roman soldier who had been taken at Carrhæ; Vell., ii., 82.

For nearly a month they marched amid untold privations from cold and hunger, and harassed at every step by the light troops of the enemy. At last, on the 27th day, they reached the frontiers of Armenia.¹ But, whether in doubt of the good faith of the Armenian king, or from anxiety to rejoin Cleopatra, Antony would not halt here. Late as the season was, he hurried southwards, through the bleak Armenian highlands, to Syria. The invasion of Parthia had come to nothing, the "grand army" was a wreck,² and though amid the dangers and difficulties of the retreat he had proved himself once more a courageous and skilful soldier, the issue of the campaign inflicted a fatal blow on his prestige.

For these and all other troubles, however, Antony found consolation in the society of Cleopatra. It is true that he still talked of a "Parthian war," and in the spring of 35 B.C.³ he prepared for a second campaign. But the project was dropped, and it was not until 34 B.C. that he again put himself at the head of his troops. His object, however, this time was not the conquest of Parthia, but merely the humiliation of his former ally, the king of Armenia, to whose lukewarmness, if not treachery, he attributed the disastrous campaign of 36 B.C., and it was easily and cheaply attained. Artavasdes was induced, under pretence of a friendly conference, to enter the Roman camp, and was at once imprisoned

Antony in
Armenia,
34 B.C.
720 A.U.C.

719 A.U.C.

720 A.U.C.

¹ Dio, xlix., 28 ; Livy, *Epit.*, cxxx.

² Vell., ii., 82.

³ Dio, xlix., 33.

and deposed, while his son Artaxes, whom the Armenian troops had placed on his father's throne, found resistance hopeless, and fled to Parthia.¹ Antony returned to Alexandria, taking with him Artavasdes and his family, and there commemorated in due form his inglorious conquest of Armenia.

Of far more serious consequence were the events that followed. His proceedings in Egypt during the next few months (34-33 B.C.) gave convincing proof, not only of the ascendancy which Cleopatra had gained over him, but of her intention to use that ascendancy to wrest the sovereignty of the East from Rome. The Roman world was startled by the announcement that Cleopatra had been proclaimed "queen of kings,"² that to her and her sons had been assigned the Roman provinces of Syria, Cilicia, Cyprus, Africa, and the Cyrenaica; and that Cæsarion, her natural son by Cæsar, was openly put forward as the true heir of the great Julius, in opposition to Octavius.³ It was even rumoured that Cleopatra would not be content with the lordship of Asia, which she claimed as the heiress of the Ptolemies, but that she aspired to be enthroned as queen on the Capitol at Rome.⁴ It was in any case clear that Antony must henceforth be regarded, not as a

Antony and
Cleopatra in
Alexandria.

720-721 A.U.C.

¹ Dio, xlix., 39-40; Livy, *Ep.*, 131; Plut., *Ant.*, 50; Vell., ii., 82.

² Dio, xlix., 41; Plut., *Ant.*, 54; Cohen, *Médailles Rom.*, i., p. 57-
"regina regum, filiorum regum."

³ Dio, *l. c.*; Plut., *Ant.*, 54.

⁴ Horace, *Od.*, i., 37, 6.; Eutrop., vii., 7; Dio, i., 5.

Roman triumvir, but as the obsequious servant of a foreign potentate.

That a struggle with Antony was inevitable, Octavius had for some time foreseen, but that it should come in a form which enlisted Italian sympathy on his own side, as the defender of Rome against Oriental aggression, was more than he could have hoped for. As it was, he eagerly took up the challenge which Antony had rashly thrown down, and alike in the senate house and the forum he denounced his fellow triumvir as a traitor to the State. In the summer of 33 721 A.U.C. B.C. war seemed imminent, for Antony, after once more visiting Armenia, where he formed an alliance with his former foe, the king of Media,¹ turned westward to Ephesus, and with a large force crossed into Greece.² At Athens, however, he halted, and spent the winter feasting with Cleopatra. Meanwhile at Rome the tide of indignation against him rose rapidly; his will, in which Cleopatra's sons were named as his heirs, was discovered and published,³ and the discovery was followed by the news that he had divorced, evidently at the bidding of Cleopatra, his injured wife Octavia. While the indignation was at its height, Octavius struck 722 A.U.C. the decisive blow. Early in 32 B.C. the senate by decree deprived Antony of his command, and declared war upon Cleopatra.⁴

¹ Dio, xlix., 44.

² Plut., *Ant.*, 56. He had 16 legions and 800 ships.

³ Dio, l., 3; Suet., *Aug.*, 17.

⁴ Dio, *l.c.*, 4.

Once more Octavius had reason to be thankful for his rival's want of promptitude. Antony **The War of Actium.** was, in 32 B.C., far better prepared for war than his opponent. He was in Greece, within striking distance of Italy; he had a large army, a numerous and well-equipped fleet, and above all, the money, which Octavius could with difficulty raise by fresh demands upon the hardly tried population of Italy, was showered upon Antony by the lavish hand of Cleopatra.¹

Had Antony invaded Italy in 32 B.C. the issue of the war might have been different. As it was, he advanced no farther than Corcyra, and then, leaving the bulk of his fleet and army at Actium, returned to winter at Patræ. The spring of 31 B.C. **793 A.U.C.** found Octavius ready to take the field. His plan of campaign was simple. Sending Agrippa forward with a fast-sailing squadron, to occupy Antony's attention by harassing his garrisons on the Peloponnesian coast, and intercepting his supplies from Egypt and Asia,² Octavius himself crossed from Brundisium to the Epirot coast, hoping to shut up Antony's fleet in the land-locked gulf where it had lain through the winter, and thus prevent the threatened invasion of Italy. The plan was completely successful. The entrance to the narrow strait which gives access to the Ambraciot gulf is commanded by two promontories. The southern one, crowned by the ancient temple of Actian Apollo, was occupied by the Antonian troops, while close by,

¹ Dio, l., 10; Plut., *Ant.*, lvi., 58.

² Dio, *l. c.*, 12; Oros., vi., 19, 22.

and just within the straits, their fleet was moored in the bay of Prevesa.¹ Octavius on his arrival at once stationed his own vessels so as to close the mouth of the straits, while his legions were posted on the northern promontory, and protected by intrenchments from any attack on the landward side. Antony arrived from Patræ only to find his fleet imprisoned within the straits, while his enemy was unassailable by land, and in complete command of the open sea. It was still possible for him to withdraw his troops, and decoy Octavius, as Cæsar had decoyed Pompey into the open plains of Thessaly, where his superior numbers and greater military skill might have given him the advantage; and such was the advice pressed upon him by his Roman officers. Antony, however, refused to move, and instead wasted time in useless attempts to invest Octavius's position. Towards the close of the summer Agrippa arrived with his fleet off the mouth of the strait, and a second time his officers implored Antony to retreat, while there was still time, from a position which was fast becoming untenable. But though his supplies were failing, and though sickness and desertion were thinning his ranks,² Antony could not bring himself to take a step, which not only was opposed by Cleopatra, but would involve the sacrifice of his fleet, and possibly the withdrawal of his Asiatic allies, whose courage was visibly sinking, and some of whom, notably the astute Greek adventurer Amyntas, had already deserted his cause

¹ Dio, *l. c.*, 12.

² Dio, *l. c.*, 13-15; Vell., ii., 84; Hor., *Epod.*, ix., 11.

Battle of Actium.

He resolved instead to adopt the only alternative open to him, and force a passage to open sea through the blockading fleet. As many of his troops as possible and all his treasure were placed on shipboard,¹ and on September 2, 31 B.C.,² the fleet advanced in close order to the mouth of the strait. In front were the huge unwieldy galleys, which, with their six or even ten banks of oars, their lofty sides, and deck-towers crowded with soldiers, resembling floating castles rather than ships.³ In the rear was the fast-sailing Egyptian squadron attached to the service of Cleopatra herself. From the shores on each side the opposing legions watched the fight which was to decide their fate. The intention of the Antonian admirals was to await the enemy's attacks within the straits. Agrippa, who commanded Octavius's fleet, was equally resolved not to risk an engagement in a confined space, where his light cruisers would be of little avail against the huge vessels of Antony.⁴ At length, about eleven o'clock, fortune once more favoured Octavius. The wind freshened, and Antony, to obtain more sea room for his crowded ships, was forced to leave the shelter of the straits and advance into open water. He was instantly attacked in the front and on the flanks. The Antonian

¹ Plut., *Ant.*, 64.

² Kal. Amit., *C. I. L.* 10, 8375; Dio, li., 1.

³ Plut., *Ant.*, 61; Florus, iv., 11; Verg., *Æn.*, viii., 692.

⁴ Plut., *Ant.*, 65; Dio, *l. c.*, 16, 32; Florus, iv., 11; Agrippa's vessels were built on the model of the notorious Liburnian pirate galleys.

vessels fought like "hoplites in a square," while Agrippa's eight galleys darted hither and thither, now charging at full speed and then as quickly retreating out of reach of the fire from the deck-towers and of the deadly grappling irons. Suddenly, while the fight was at its hottest, the Egyptian squadron, headed by Cleopatra's own galley, was seen to hoist sail and make for the open sea, followed closely by Antony himself, a piece of selfish treachery and cowardice which, it was afterwards said, had been previously agreed upon between the two lovers. Still the Antonian fleet fought on, until towards the close of the afternoon, the fireballs, with which Octavius supplied his ships, decided the issue of the battle.¹ One after another the great ships of this earlier armada took fire, and the rising wind spread the flames with a rapidity which no efforts could check. By nightfall the splendid fleet was a wreck, and the morning light showed only smoking hulks and a sea strewn broadcast with the rich spoils of Egypt and the East. A few days later the Antonian troops at Actium, disheartened by the destruction of the fleet, and deserted by their leader, laid down their arms.²

The victory at Actium had been mainly the work of Agrippa; it now remained for Octavius, always more statesman than soldier, to reap the fruits. Above all, it was necessary to recover for himself and for Rome the

Octavius in
Asia, 31-30
B.C.
723-724 A.U.C.

¹ Dio, *l. c.* 34; Suet., *Aug.*, 17; Verg., *Æn.*, viii., 694.

² Florus, iv., 11; Oros., vi., 22.

³ Vell., ii., 85; Dio, li., 1; Zonaras x., 30

provinces and vassal states beyond the Ægæan which Cleopatra had audaciously claimed for her own, and to effect such a settlement of Eastern affairs as would at least secure order until he had leisure to undertake in earnest the work of reorganisation. Of any open resistance to the conqueror of Antony there was little fear, and Octavius' skilful diplomacy made submission easy. The Roman provinces were at once "recovered" for the Roman State,¹ and the Greek cities discovered to their relief that the new general of the republic had some other policy than that of plunder. Their stolen statues and treasures were restored, their municipal liberties respected, and the second Cæsar showed himself as warm an admirer of Greek literature and Greek traditions as the first.²

The rulers of the native states, many of whom had sided with Antony³ as much from necessity as from choice, were as ready as the provincials to tender their submission, and found, as the provincials had done, that they had now to deal, not with a reckless soldier of fortune, but with a prudent statesman. The more powerful among them had been placed on their thrones by the favour of Antony, and no doubt expected that his downfall would involve their own. One and all, however, Amyntas in Galatia, Archelaus in Cappadocia, Polemo in Pontus and Lesser Armenia, Herod in Judæa, were confirmed in the possession of

¹ *Mon. Anc. L.*, 5, 32, *provincias—reciperavi*. Compare the legend "*Asia recepta*" on coins; Cohen, i., p. 64.

² *Mon. Anc. L.*, 4, 49; Dio, li., 2.

³ Plut., *Ant.*, 61, gives a list of those who either accompanied Antony to Europe, or sent troops to his aid.

their dominions. Even Artaxes II., son of the Artavasdes whom Antony had treacherously seized and carried off to Egypt, though the ally and almost the vassal of Parthia, was for the present left undisturbed in Greater Armenia.¹ Nor, fortunately for Octavius, was Parthia herself in a condition to necessitate active measures against her. Phraates IV. had in 33 B.C. been expelled by a rival claimant and kinsman Tiridates, and though when Octavius reached Syria in 30 B.C. he was again on the throne, he was in no position to do more than solicit the friendship and alliances of Rome. Octavius, postponing to a future occasion the reclamation of the standards lost at Carrhæ, granted his request, but at the same time conceded to his rival Tiridates an asylum in the province of Syria, where his presence would serve as a wholesome check on any anti-Roman schemes which Phraates might form.²

781 A.U.C.

784 A.U.C.

To the conciliatory policy which Octavius adopted in the East there was one necessary exception. It was impossible to leave Cleopatra in possession even of the semblance of power, and the kingdom of Egypt could not be simply "mediatised" like a second-rate native state in Asia Minor. Indeed, Cleopatra had no sooner reached Alexandria in safety, and been there joined by Antony,³ than she gave ample proof that she was still dangerous. Treasures were collected, ships built, the kings and princes of the East were again invited

Octavius in Egypt.

¹ Dio, li., 16 ; Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 3.

² Dio, li., 18 ; Justinus, 42.

³ Dio, li., 1 ; Plut., *Ant.*, 69.

to enrol themselves under the heiress of Alexander, and vague schemes were formed of landings in Gaul or Spain, or of a new empire to be founded in the remote East.¹

Even when her newly-built ships were burnt, and her efforts to rally the East around her failed, she did not despair. Determined to save herself and her kingdom, and confident in her powers, she opened negotiations with Octavius (31–30 B.C.).
723-724 A.U.C.

But she had now to deal with a nature as crafty and as tenacious of its purpose as her own. Octavius, who was busy in Asia, accepted her gifts and amused her with empty promises of safety until his work there was done. But in the spring of 30 B.C.² he advanced from Syria and seized Pelusium, while from the west Cornelius Gallus, at the head of some of Antony's old legions, marched upon Alexandria. Antony, to whose offers of negotiation and most characteristic challenge to single combat Octavius had vouchsafed no reply,³ deserted by his former troops, and, it was rumoured, betrayed by the mistress for whom he had sacrificed everything, now made a last effort to stop the invaders. But the conflict was too unequal. His fleet went over to the enemy, and his inferior levies were easily routed. In despair, increased, it was said, by a false report of Cleopatra's death, he fell by his own hand. Octavius occupied Alexandria,⁴ but the proud princess, whom he had

724 A.U.C.

Deaths of
Antony and
Cleopatra.

¹ Dio, li., 6 ; Verg., *Æn.*, viii., 687.

² Plut., *Ant.*, 74.

³ Plut., *Ant.*, 72 ; Dio, *l.c.*

⁴ On August 1, 30 B.C. ; Dio, li., 4 ; Oros., vi., 19.

destined to be the choicest ornament of his triumph, eluded his grasp. From the unbearable ignominy of entering as a captive the city where she had hoped to be enthroned as queen, she saved herself by death.

Octavius was politic and perhaps chivalrous enough to pay due honour to the remains of his former colleague, and of the daughter of a line of kings, whose hold on the reverence of the Egyptian people was still strong. Antony and Cleopatra were buried together in the mausoleum of the Ptolemies. The two boy kings, who were to have divided between them the empire of the East, were sent to Rome, and found a shelter with Antony's injured wife, Octavia.¹ For Octavia's own daughters by Antony a more splendid destiny was in store. From one, by her marriage with Cn. Domitius, was descended the Emperor Nero, from the other, who became the wife of Drusus, the Emperors Gaius and Claudius.

Egypt itself, the splendid inheritance of the Ptolemies, was formally annexed as a province to the dominions of the Roman people, while,² as if to mark the fact that the sceptre of Annexation
of Egypt. Alexander had passed finally into Roman hands, Octavius had the head of Alexander engraved upon his signet ring, and in imitation of the great Macedonian, founded near Canopus a new city to commemorate his victory.³

¹ Plut., *Ant.*, 87; Dio, li., 15.

² Dio, li., 17; *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, v., 24; *C. I. L.*, 6, 701, 2. "*Ægypto in potestatem P. R. redacta.*"

³ Suet., *Aug.*, 50; Dio, li., 18; Strabo, p. 795.

CHAPTER III.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE PRINCIPATE AND THE RULE OF AUGUSTUS.

THE capture of Alexandria took place on August 1, 30 B.C. On January 11, 29 B.C., the temple of Janus was closed, for the first time for two hundred years.¹ In the summer of that year Octavius returned to Italy, and in August he celebrated in Rome a three days' triumph.² On all sides he was greeted, not as the successful combatant in a civil war, but as the man who had re-established the sovereignty of Rome throughout the civilised world, as the restorer of peace, and the saviour of the republic, and of his fellow-citizens.³ Nor was Octavius backward in showing that, so far as he was concerned, the long years of conflict and bloodshed were over, and a new and better age about to commence. Lands were allotted to the veterans, but the soldiers of Antony shared with his own in the distribution, and

724 A.U.C.

725 A.U.C.

Octavius's
return to
Italy.

¹ *C. I. L.*, i., p. 384; Dio, li., 20.

² *Mon. Anc. L.*, i., 21; Macrob., *Sat.*, i., 12, 35; Dio, li., 21; Suet., *Aug.*, 22.

³ Cohen, *Méd.*, i., p. 60. "*civibus servatis*," *C. I. L.*, 6, 753, "*republica conservata*."

the lands taken for allotment were obtained, not as in 43 B.C. by confiscation, but by purchase.¹ Antony's Roman partisans were allowed to return home in peace, and it was regarded as of happy omen for the future that Octavius's colleague in the consulship (30 B.C.), and his legate in Mœsia, M. Licinius Crassus, had been an adherent both of Sextus Pompeius and of Antony, and that Carrinas, who shared his triumph, was one of those "sons of the proscribed" whom Sulla had declared to be for ever incapable of holding office in the State.² Scarcely less welcome was the relief which the treasures of Egypt enabled him to give to the impoverished population of Italy. Arrears of taxation were cancelled,³ and a munificent largesse distributed among the *plebs* of Rome.⁴ As a proof of returning confidence it was noticed that the rate of interest in the capital fell from 12 to 4 per cent.⁵

Octavius was now as unquestionably supreme as Julius had ever been, and he had already shown that in the use of his power he intended to follow the example, not of Sulla, but of Julius. But he had still to solve the problem, which the latter had been forced to leave untouched, that of investing an authority won by the sword, with a constitutional character, and of har-

¹ *Mon. Anc. L.*, iii., 22, "*pecuniam [pro] agris quos in consulatu meo quarto . . . assignavi militibus, solvi municipis*"—the sum paid was 600,000,000 sesterces; Dio, li., 4.

² Dio, li., 4, 21.

³ Dio, li., 21; liii., 2.

⁴ *Mon. Anc. L.*, iii., 7; Suet., *Aug.*, 41.

⁵ Dio, li., 21; Suet., *Aug.*, 41; Oros., vi., 19.

monising it with the institutions and traditions of the old republic. That such an authority was necessary the experience of a century had conclusively shown; that as things stood, Octavius alone could wield it was equally clear. But it was also essential that, after twenty years of irregular and provisional rule, the State should have a government not only strong, but legitimate. An undisguised autocracy would have shocked public opinion in Rome and Italy, and might have involved the second Cæsar in the fate of the first. On the other hand, a literal restoration of the republic meant renewed anarchy. To the delicate task of reconciling personal rule with at least the forms of republicanism Octavius now set himself, and no man was ever better fitted for the task. By birth and temperament, in habits of mind and life, he had far more in common with the average Italian than his great uncle, whose daring genius and dazzling patrician descent from gods and heroes removed him to an infinite distance above the level of ordinary men. But Octavius belonged by birth to that municipal aristocracy,¹ of which Cicero had been the representative and the panegyrist.² With this Italian *bourgeoisie*, which, far more than the nobles or *plebs* of the capital, represented all that was most healthy and vigorous in the Roman people, Octavius was naturally in touch. He shared their thrifty habits, their simplicity of life, their respect for respecta-

¹ His grandfather was a burgher of Velitræ, "*municipalibus magistris contentus*"; Suet., *Aug.*, 2.

² See above, p. 248.

bility, and even the vein of homely superstition, which in him, as in Louis XI. of France, contrasted curiously with great political acuteness and resolute tenacity of purpose.¹ To them also his political ideal of a united and imperial Italy was infinitely more attractive than either the selfish narrowness of the nobles, who had ridiculed Cicero as a "foreigner," or the spirit of cosmopolitan comprehensiveness which animated Julius.² Nor would the more splendid qualities of the great dictator have served Octavius better in the work he had to do than his own inbred caution and self-control, his astuteness, and his invariable indifference to the mere externals of power. To these qualifications he added, as all authorities agree, the art of choosing his friends and ministers well, and retaining them firmly.

Both the constitutional settlement which he effected, and the mode in which he carried it out, were characteristic of the man.³ The political drama was skilfully arranged, and the chief actor played his difficult part with a success which deserved and has won the applause of the world. The drama opened with a series of measures all calculated to convince Roman society that a restoration of the old days was seriously intended. The overgrown senate was purged of its unworthy members, and restored to

The settle-
ment of Jan.,
27, B.C.
726 A.U.C.

¹ Suet., *Aug.*, 90-92.

² Suet., *Aug.*, 66.

³ Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 707 sqq.; Herzog., *Gesch. v. System d. röm. Verfassung*, ii., pp. 126 sqq.; Pelham, *Journal of Philol.* viii., 30.

its "ancient shape and dignity."¹ The temples and shrines of the gods throughout the city were restored, foreign rites were prohibited²; and after an interval of forty years, the solemn purification of the people was duly performed in the Campus Martius.³ In the course of his sixth consulship (28 B.C.), Octavius issued the famous edict,⁴ in which he cancelled the irregular enactments made under the triumvirate, and fixed January 1, 27 B.C., as the day on which he would lay down his extraordinary authority.⁵ On the day named, the first day of his seventh consulship, he entered the senate house and formally "gave back the Commonwealth into the keeping of the senate and people."⁶ In return, and unquestionably in accordance with his own intentions, Octavius received back from the hands of the senate and people the more essential of his former powers. He was given the imperium for

¹ Suet., *Aug.*, 35: "*senatorum affluentem numerum de formi et incuncta turba . . . ad modum pristinum et splendorem redegit.*" This purging of the senate was carried out by Octavius and Agrippa, in virtue of the "*ensoria potestas*," given them for the purpose.

² *Mon. Anc. L.*, iv., 17; Dio, liii., 2; Hor., *Od.*, iii., 6-1.

³ *Mon. Anc. L.*, ii., 2; Dio, liii., 1; *C. I. L.*, ix., 422.

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, iii., 28, "*sexto consulatu . . . quæ triumviratu jussu abolevit.*" Dio, liii., 2. *ὅτι ἐνὸς προγράμματος κατέλυθεν.*

⁵ This authority Octavius describes as resting on public consent. *Mon. Anc. L.*, vi., 14, "*per consensum universorum.*" Possibly the powers of the triumvirate which legally expired at the end of 33 B.C., were held to have continued. Tac., *Ann.*, i., 2 "*posito triumviri nomine.*"

⁶ *Mon. Anc. L.*, vi., 14; "*republicam ex mea potestate in senat[us] populique Romani a[ut]oritatem transtuli.*"

ten years, with the government of certain specified provinces.¹ He was, moreover, declared commander-in-chief of all the forces of the State, and granted the exclusive right of levying troops, of making war and peace, and of concluding treaties.² This authority abroad, an authority wider than that given to Pompey in 67-66 B.C., he was to exercise as consul; and he would consequently be also the chief magistrate of the State at home, with precedence over all other magistrates in Rome or in the provinces. Finally, in recognition of his pre-eminent services, he was authorised by decree of the senate to assume the cognomen of Augustus.³

Such in its original form was the famous settlement on which in theory the rule of the Roman Cæsars was based. It was a transaction which admitted, and was intended to admit, of different interpretations. According to the official version of things, there had been a restoration of the republic. The affair was so described by Augustus himself,⁴ and by the courtly writers of the time.⁵ The 13th of January 27, B.C., the day on which the settlement was completed, was marked in the calendar as the day on which the republic was restored;⁶ and on coins Augustus was

General
nature of the
settlement.

¹ Dio, liii., 12; Suet., *Aug.*, 47.

² Dio, *l. c.* Strabo, p. 840. Wilmanns, *Exempla*, 917.

³ *Mon. Anc. L.*, vi., 16.

⁴ *Mon. Anc. L.*, vi., 14.

⁵ Ovid, *Fasti*, i., 589: "*redditaque est omnis populo provincia nostro*"; Vell., ii., 89; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 9.

⁶ *C. I. L.*, i., p. 384: "*quod rempublicam P. R. restituit*," *ib.*, 6, 1527, "*pacato orbe terrarum, restituta republica.*"

honoured as "the champion of the freedom of the Roman people."¹ But, for the general public, the essence of the matter lay in the recognition by law of the supremacy of Cæsar, and in the establishment not of a republic, but of a personal government. Such was the view taken by the municipalities of Italy and the provinces, and by Greek provincial writers. To them Augustus was not so much the first citizen of a free commonwealth, as the "guardian of the Roman empire, and the governor of the whole world."² Both versions were, in fact, correct. The republic was in a sense restored; the old constitutional machinery was set going again; senate, assembly, and magistrates resumed their old functions.³ Nor was the position assigned to Augustus technically inconsistent with republican law and custom. He was not king, dictator, or triumvir.⁴ He could state truly that he accepted no office which was "contrary to the usage of our fore-fathers,"⁵ and it was only in dignity that he took precedence of his colleagues.⁶ Other citizens before him had been

¹ Eckhel., *Doctr. Numm.*, vi., 83: "*Imp. Cæsar divi f. cos VI. libertatis P. R. vindex.*"

² Wilm., *Ex.*, 883 (*cenotaphia Pisana*); *C. I. L.*, xii., 4333; Strabo, p. 840; Dio, lii., 1: *ἐκ δὲ τούτου μοναρχεῖσθαι αὐτὸς ἀκριβοῦς ἠρέσαυτο.*

³ Vell., ii., 89: "*prisca et antiqua reipublicæ forma revocata*"; Suet., *Aug.*, 40; "*comitiorum pristinum ius reduxit.*"

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 9: "*non regio tamen, neque dictatura, sed principis nomine constitutam rempublicam.*"

⁵ *Mon. Anc. Gk.*, iii., 17: *ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν παρὰ τὰ πάτρια εἶδη διδομένην ἀνεδέξασθην.*

⁶ *Mon. Anc. Gk.*, xviii., 6: *ἀξιώματι πάντων διηγνευκα ἐξουσίας δὲ οὐδὲν πλεῖον ἔιχον τῶν συναρξάντων μοί.*

invested by senate and people with special powers for a definite period, and so far his position was the same in principle as that given to Pompey in 67 B.C., or to Cæsar in 59 B.C. Though, moreover, the consuls of the year had for long been limited by custom to domestic duties in Rome, there was nothing unprecedented in the assignment to a consul of provinces and legions. More than twenty years earlier Cicero himself had argued in favour of such a constitutional "primacy" or "principate," as was now conceded to Augustus¹; and "*princeps*," the title of courtesy, which public opinion fastened on as best describing his position, was one sanctioned by republican usage.²

There was, however, another side to the picture. The powers now granted to Augustus were, in fact, so wide, that, coupled with the personal ascendancy and prestige naturally attaching to the heir of Cæsar and the conqueror of Antony, they constituted him the real ruler of the empire. By the side of the man who was generalissimo of the forces of the State, sole arbiter of peace and war, governor of Hither Spain, Gaul, Syria, and Egypt, who, as consul, was the

¹ In a lost book of the *De Republica*, referred to by Augustine (*De Civit. Dei*, v., 13): "*ubi loquitur de instituendo principe civitatis*"; and by Cicero himself (*Ad Att.*, viii., 11.).

² "*Princeps*" = "*princeps civitatis*" or "first citizen" was not an official title; the Greek equivalent is ἡγεμών. It had been used of Pompey and of Cæsar in a similar sense. Cic., *Ad Att.*, viii., 9; *Ad Fam.*, vi., 6; Sallust, *Hist.*, 3, fr. 81; Suet., *Jul.*, 26. As implying only primacy in a free commonwealth, it is contrasted with "*dominus*," Plin., *Paneg.* 55 and "*imperator*"; Dio, lvii., 8; See *Dict. Antiq.* s. v. *Princeps*.

acknowledged head of the executive, and who finally possessed in addition the tribunician power given him in 36 B.C., the existence of any other real authority was impossible. The ingenious compromise by which room was found for the master of the legions within the narrow limits of the old constitution, and the personal claims of the young Cæsar reconciled with the dignity of the republic, was from the first only a compromise upon paper.

Its unreality, and the ambiguities it involved, were increased by the modification which it underwent only four years later.

On June 27, 23 B.C.,¹ Augustus laid down the consulship which he had held year by year since 31 B.C. The *imperium* granted to him for ten years in 27 B.C. he still retained; but he now held it only "*pro-consule*," like the ordinary governor of a province,² and it therefore ceased to be valid within the city.³ His renunciation of the consulship entailed also the loss both of the precedence (*maius imperium*) over all other magistrates, which a consul enjoyed,⁴ and of the consul's rights of convening the senate, and of holding assemblies of the people. It struck, in short, at the

The revised settlement of 23 B.C.

731 A.U.C.

723 A.U.C.

¹ C. I. L., vi., 2014; Dio, liii., 32; Suet., *Aug.*, 26.

² The phrase "*proconsulare imperium*" (*i. e.*, consular *imperium* held by one who is not a consul) does not occur in republican writers; and Augustus in the *Mon. Ancy.* uses the orthodox "*consulare imperium*" (*M. A. Lat.*, xxv., 8).

³ Ulp., *Dig.*, i., 16.16: "*proconsul ad portam urbis deponit imperium.*"

⁴ He would only possess like Pompey in 67 B.C.: "*imperium æquum in omnibus provinciis cum proconsulibus*"; Vell., ii., 31.

very root of that administrative unity which was essential to the good government of the empire, and threatened to reintroduce the dual control, which had worked such evil before, of consuls and senate at home, and of powerful proconsuls abroad. In Rome and Italy the liveliest anxiety was excited by the prospect that Cæsar would no longer visibly reign over them, and they pressed upon his acceptance one extraordinary office after another. All alike were refused as unconstitutional¹; but what Augustus lost by resigning the consulship was made good to him by a series of enactments which determined the form of the "principate" for three centuries to come. In the first place, he was exempted from the disability which attached to the tenure of the *imperium* by one who was neither consul nor prætor—that is to say, he was allowed to retain and to exercise his *imperium* even in Rome.² Secondly, his *imperium* was declared to rank as equal with that of the consuls, and consequently as superior to that of all other holders of *imperium* at home or abroad.³ Thirdly, he was granted equal rights with the consuls of convening the senate and introducing business,⁴ of nomi-

¹ He was offered a dictatorship, a life consulship, a "*cura legum et morum*." The statements of Suetonius and Dio that he accepted the two last named are refuted by the language of the *Mon. Ancy. Lat.*, i., 31; *Gk.*, iii., 11; cf. *Suet.*, 53; *Dio*, liv., 10; *Pelham, Journ. of Philol.*, xvii., 47.

² In 23 B.C.; *Dio*, liii., 32.

³ *Dio*, *l. c.*

⁴ In 23 B.C. and 22 B.C.; *Dio*, liii., 32 and liv., 3; *Wilm.*, *Exempla*, 917 (*lex de imperio Vespasiani*).

nating candidates for election by the people,¹ and of issuing edicts.² Fourthly, he was placed on a level with the consuls in outward rank. Twelve lictors were assigned to him, and an official seat between those of the consuls themselves.³

The proconsular authority was thus for the first time admitted within the walls of Rome, and placed side by side with that of the consuls; and for the first time the *imperium* was wielded in the city, as it had long been wielded in the provinces and camps by some one else than the elected magistrates of the year. But Rome could not yet be openly governed by a proconsul, and Augustus was characteristically anxious to find a title for his authority which should savour less of military autocracy. This he found in the "tribunician power," which he had held since 36 B.C.; and which, from its essentially urban and democratic traditions, was well suited to serve in Rome as "a term to express his high position."⁴ From the year 23 B.C. dates its first appearance after his name in official inscriptions⁵; and the numbers appended, to indicate for how many years it had been held, are reckoned from that year.⁶ It was on this power, as he tells us, that he relied for carrying

¹ This is proved by the practice of Augustus and Tiberius; Tac. *Ann.*, i., 81.

² Wilm., *Exempla*, 917.

³ In 19 B.C.; Dio, liv., 10.

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, iii., 56: "*Summi fastigii vocabulum reperit . . . ac tamen appellatione aliqua cetera imperia præmineret.*"

⁵ See the coins with the legend: "*Cæsar Aug. tribun. potest.*"; Cohen, i., p. 117.

⁶ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, i., 29; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 9: "*continuata per septem et triginta annos (23 B.C.—14 A.D.) tribunicia potestas.*"

out the social reforms in Rome and Italy demanded by the senate.' Henceforward the *tribunicia potestas*, though far inferior in actual importance, ranked along with and even above the *imperium* as a distinctive prerogative of the emperor or of his chosen colleague.³

To sum up the result of these changes : Augustus was now placed by the act of the senate and people by the side of the regular magistrates. At home, though not consul, he possessed a rank and authority equal to theirs, and took precedence, as they did of all other magistrates, from the prætors downwards. Abroad, a wide department was committed to his care. His *provincia* included the government of the great frontier provinces, the command of the troops, the control of foreign policy ; while over the governors of the other provinces he enjoyed the same precedence' (*maius imperium*) which he enjoyed in Rome over all magistrates below the consuls. He was distinguished, in addition, by special marks of honour—the cognomen of Augustus, the laurels in front of his house, the "civic crown" above his door.⁴

The arrangement undoubtedly satisfied the requirements of the moment. It saved, at least in appearance, the integrity of the republic, while at the same time it recognised and legalised the authority of the

The
exceptional
character of
the Principate.

¹ *Mon. Anc. Gk.*, iii., 19 ; Dio, liv., 16.

² Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 1050 ; Dio, liii., 32 ; liv., 12 ; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 3. Of Tiberius as colleague of Augustus : "*Collega imperii, consors tribunicia potestatis.*"

³ Dio, liii. 52 : ἐν τῷ ὑπηκόῳ πλεον τῶν ἐκασταχόθι ἀρχόντων ἰσχύειν."

⁴ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, vi., 16, 18.

man, who was already by common consent "master of all things"; and this it effected without any formal alteration of the constitution, without the creation of any new office, and by means of the old constitutional machinery of senate and assembly. But it was an arrangement avowedly of an exceptional and temporary character. The powers voted to Augustus were, like those voted to Pompey in 67 B.C., voted only to him, and, with the exception of the tribunician power, voted only for a limited time.¹ No provision was made for the continuance of the arrangement, after his death, in favour of any other person. And though in fact the powers first granted to Augustus were granted in turn to each of the long line of Roman Cæsars, the temporary and provisional character impressed upon the "princiate" at its birth clung to it throughout. When the *princeps* for the time being died or was deposed, it was always in theory an open question whether any other citizen should be invested with the powers he had held. Who the man should be, or how he should be chosen, were questions which it was left to circumstances to answer, and even the powers to be assigned to him were, strictly speaking, determined solely by the discretion of the senate and people in each case. It is true that necessity required that some one must always be selected to fill the position first given to Augustus;² that accidents, such as

¹ Originally for ten years (Dio, liii., 13), it was afterwards renewed for successive periods of five, five, ten, and ten years (*Ib.*, liii., 16).

² *Vit. Hadr.*, 6: "esse respublica sine imperatore non potest;" *Fz Taciti*, 3: "imperator est deligendus quia cogit necessitas."

kinship by blood or adoption to the last emperor, military ability, popularity with the soldiers or the senate, determined the selection;¹ and that usage decided that the powers conferred upon the selected person should be in the main those conferred upon Augustus.² But to the last the Roman emperor was legally merely a citizen whom the senate and people had freely invested with an exceptional authority for special reasons. Unlike the ordinary sovereign, he did not inherit a great office by an established law of succession; and in direct contrast to the modern maxim that "the king never dies," it has been well said that the Roman "principate," died with the *princeps*.³ Of the many attempts made to get rid of this irregular, intermittent character, none were completely successful, and the inconveniences and dangers resulting from it are apparent throughout the history of the empire.⁴

Two other features in the original arrangement deserve notice. Under it Augustus was entrusted with a special department of administration, all outside of this remain-

Growing
power of the
princeps.

¹ *Journ. of Philol.*, xvii., 47, *sqq.*

² These powers were at an early period embodied in a form of statute, which was carried for each emperor in turn; Dio, liii., 32. Of the statute carried in favour of Vespasian, several clauses are still extant; Wilm., *Exempla*, 917. The statute is referred to by Gaius, i., 5, as the source of the emperor's authority: "*Ipse imperator per legem imperium accipiat*," and Ulpian, *Dig.*, i., 41: "*Lege qua de imperio eius lata est*."

³ Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 1038. He notices that the institution of the *interregnum* did not apply to the principate.

⁴ See below, Bk. vi., chap. 1.

ing under the control of those whom he himself calls his "colleagues."¹ Within this department he was as absolute as a provincial governor in his province. Its limits were fixed, and could be altered, in the ordinary way, by decree of the senate or vote of the assembly. In fact, even during the lifetime of Augustus these limits rapidly extended, and the extension continued under his successors. By the close of the first century A.D. the department assigned to the *princeps* covered three fourths of the area of the empire,² and included, in Rome and Italy, such important branches of administration as the control of the roads, of the corn supply, the water supply, and the police.³ But it was not only by the steady expansion of his own department that the authority of Cæsar grew. Augustus had been invested also with a *maius imperium* over all officials of state other than the consuls; and this was gradually interpreted as giving him and his successors a direct control even over those departments which technically lay outside their jurisdiction. The original independence of prætors in Rome, and of proconsuls abroad, was rapidly lost, and they became as completely subordinate to Cæsar as his own legates;⁴ even the consuls, though in law his equals, found the equality impossible to maintain, when the strength lay all on one side.⁵

¹ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, vi., 23.

² The number of provinces governed by Cæsar had reached twenty-five.

³ These had all been transferred to Cæsar by the end of the reign of Claudius, and most of them in the lifetime of Augustus.

⁴ See *Dict. Antiq.*, s. v. *Princeps*, ii., p. 437, and below.

⁵ Tiberius in one place describes the consul as the chief magistrate:

For a period of forty years Augustus himself presided over the working of the system which he had established. To gain a clear idea of what he accomplished during that time, it will be convenient to follow as far as possible the chronological order of events. Roughly speaking, it may be said that from 27 B.C. to October, 19 B.C., he was mainly occupied with the reorganisation of the provinces and of the provincial administration. From October, 19 B.C., until some time early in 16 B.C. he was busily engaged at Rome in the work of domestic reform, and to this period belongs the great series of the Julian laws. By the close of the ten years' term, for which his *imperium* had originally been voted to him, he had at least laid the foundations of that new and better order of things at home and abroad, the commencement of which was commemorated by the celebration of the Sæcular games in June, 17 B.C.¹ During the remainder of his principate, though many important reforms were made, the questions which came most prominently forward were those of the relations of

The rule of
Augustus.

735 A.U.C.

735-730 A.U.C.

737 A.U.C.

"*cuius vigiliis niteretur respublica*" (*Ann.*, iv., 19); in another (*Ib.*, iii., 53) he claims a higher dignity for the *princeps*: "*non ego consultis aut prætoris . . . partes sustineo, maius quiddam et excelsius a principe postulatur.*"

¹ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iv., 37; Dio, liv., 18. The official record of the celebration of these games, inscribed by order of the senate on a marble pillar, has recently been found at Rome. It states that the hymn sung on the third day of the festival was composed by Q. Horatius Flaccus. The text of the inscription and a commentary by Mommsen will be found in the *Monumenti Antichi*, vol. i., part 3, of the *Accademia dei Lincei* (Rome, 1892).

the empire to the northern barbarians, and of the designation of a successor.

To the existing number of provinces Augustus added thirteen, eight of which were created by him while reorganising the provinces between 27 and 19 B.C. With the annexation of Egypt, the north coast of Africa from the mouths of the Nile to the eastern frontiers of Mauretania became Roman territory. In Spain the highland tribes in the north-west of the peninsula were finally pacified,¹ and the hold of Rome on the Atlantic seaboard strengthened by the formation of the province of Lusitania.² In Gaul the whole country north and west of the old province of Gallia Narbonensis had been reduced to subjection by Cæsar. It was, however, by Augustus that the regular provincial system was first introduced, and to him without doubt was due the creation of the "three Gauls," as they were commonly called, Aquitania, Lugdunensis, and Belgica.³ In the eastern half of the empire the only important addition to Roman territory was made in 25 B.C., when, on the death of Amyntas, the dominions granted to him by Antony in 37 B.C., and secured to him by Augustus in 30 B.C., were annexed, and the two provinces of Galatia and Pamphylia established.⁴

The reorganisation of the provinces.

¹ Dio, liii., 25, 28; *ib.*, liv., 5.

² The colony "Augustus Emerita" (Merida) was founded in 25 B.C. Dio, liii., 25, App., *Hisp.* 102, Strabo, p. 166, imply that Lusitania was organised as a separate province by Augustus. Cf. Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 58.

³ Augustus was in Gaul 27-25 B.C.; Dio, liii., 22: ἀπογραφὰς ἐποιήσατο καὶ τὸν βίον τῆν τε πολιτείαν διεκόσμησεν.

⁴ Dio, liii., 26.

The work accomplished by Augustus during the first ten years of his principate was not, however, limited to the creation of these new provinces. Of still greater importance were the reforms he effected in the system of provincial administration. Among these the first place must be given to the establishment of an effective, central, controlling authority. Under the republic the provinces had been so many isolated principalities, each governed at discretion by its own proconsul, who, though nominally subject to the authority of consuls, senate, and people at home, was in reality an autocrat. But all the provinces were now subjected to the *imperium* of Augustus; they became departments of a single state, controlled by a single authority. Under the settlement of 27 B.C. Hither Spain, the whole of Gaul, Syria, and Egypt had been assigned to Augustus. To these were added, before 19 B.C., Lusitania in the west, and in the east Cilicia, Galatia, and Pamphylia. The group of frontier provinces formed after 16 B.C., Mœsia, Pannonia, Noricum, and Rætia, were also assigned to Cæsar. Over the whole of this immense area, which included the most warlike, populous, and wealthy territories of the empire, Augustus was absolute master; as absolute as Cicero in Cilicia or Verres in Sicily. Within what was really one great province the administration was conducted by men who were nothing more than his subordinate officers, appointed only by him, responsible to him alone, and holding office at his good pleasure. Highest in rank among them were the *legati*—senators of consular or prætorian rank—to whom was

The
provinces
of Cæsar.

intrusted the charge of the more important provinces.¹ Below the *legati* in dignity stood the *procuratores*, the agents or stewards of Cæsar, men, at the highest, of only equestrian rank, to some of whom was given the government of a minor province,² to others the management of the provincial finances and of the property of Cæsar. We meet also, as under Cicero in Cilicia, with *præfecti*, pre-eminent among whom was the prefect, who now ruled in Cæsar's name, and in the room of her former kings, over the wealthy province of Egypt.³ The importance of this change, which concentrated three fourths of the empire under the sole and direct control of Cæsar and his personal servants, can scarcely be over-estimated. Not merely was it a great step towards the unification of the empire, it also gave Augustus and his successors a clear field in which to develop a sound administrative system; and the system developed within the limits of Cæsar's own vast "province" became first the envy of the less fortunate territories outside it, and was finally extended over the whole area of the empire. It was conspicuously free from the graver defects of the republican method of administration. The men sent by Cæsar to govern his provinces did not owe their appointments to the chances of lot, but were freely selected by their chief. Efficiency was rewarded by promotion, and under Augustus as well as under

¹ Besides the *legati* in charge of provinces, we find *legati* in command of armies, *e. g.* those of Upper and Lower Germany, or of single legions, or intrusted with some special duty, *e. g.* the taking of the census.

² *E. g.* of Rætia and Noricum.

³ The reasons for this special treatment of Egypt are given by Tacitus, *Ann.*, ii., 59; *Hist.*, i.; 11.

Tiberius, a capable administrator was sure of continuous employment. Thus provincial administration became a career to which men devoted years of their lives, and these trained experts contrasted favourably with the amateur governors of republican days.¹ Nor did Cæsar's officials enjoy the dangerously irresponsible and absolute authority possessed by the republican proconsul. The legate of Cæsar had soldiers under him, but they were the soldiers of Cæsar, by whom they were enrolled and discharged, and from whom they received their pay during service, and their rewards on leaving it. The legate might have the conduct of a war, but it was waged under the auspices of Cæsar; it was Cæsar whom the soldiers saluted as *imperator* after a victory, and to Cæsar belonged the triumph.² In the ordinary business of government the legate was subject to the directions of his superior, whose mandates and rescripts carried infinitely more weight than decrees of the senate had ever done. From his decisions there lay that appeal to Cæsar, as the higher power, which gradually became as dear to the provincials as the old appeal to the people had been to the Roman citizen. Nor was the legate the sole authority within his province. The management of the finances, which had formerly been vested in the proconsul, was now intrusted to a *procurator*, who,

¹ Ummidius Quadratus was legate in Lusitania under Tiberius, in Illyricum under Claudius, in Syria under Claudius and Nero. He was also proconsul of Cyprus. Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.* 973. Cf. Tac. *Ann.*, i., 80; iv., 6.

² It was treasonable for a legate to levy troops or wage a war: "*injussu principis*," Dig., xlviii., 4, 3; Tac., *Ann.*, vi., 3: "*quid illi cum militibus quos neque dicta neque præmia nisi ab imperatore accipere par esset.*"

unlike the quæstor of former times, was not a mere subordinate, but an independent official, directly responsible to Cæsar himself, and in consequence a real check upon the legate.¹

In the provinces, which were not his own, the re-
 The "public forming energy of Augustus had less free
 provinces." scope; and in these "public provinces" the
 evils and abuses of the old system still lingered. But
 though the same careful selection of the officials and
 the strict personal supervision over them were not
 possible here, yet a considerable improvement was
 effected.² The proconsuls of the public provinces
 were still selected by lot from among the *consulares*
 and *prætorii*, of at least five years' standing; they
 still took out with them a quæstor and legate, and
 their term of office was limited to a single year.³
 Technically, too, they were responsible as before, not
 to Cæsar, but to the consuls and senate.⁴ On the
 other hand, the prerogatives reserved to Augustus
 by the settlement of 27 B.C. imposed considerable
 limitations on their authority. The majority of the
 "public provinces" were situate in the peaceful, cen-
 tral districts of the empire, where few troops were

¹ For the relations between legate and procurator, see Tac., *Agri-
 cola*, 15, *Ann.*, xiv., 39.

² Suet., *Aug.*, 47: "*provincias validiores ipse suscepit . . . cetera
 proconsulibus sortito permisit.*" Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 43; "*iis, que sorte
 aut missu principis obtinerent.*"

³ Tac., *Ann.*, iii., 58. "*unius anni proconsulare imperium.*"

⁴ Suet., *Tib.*, 31. A deputation from Africa to Tiberius was by
 him referred to the consuls. Tac., *Ann.*, xiii., 4, "*se (Nero) mandat
 exercitibus consulturum consulum tribunalibus Italia et publicæ præ-
 vincia adsisterent.*"

needed; and questions of frontier policy did not arise.¹ In any case the supreme military authority, and the exclusive control of foreign affairs now belonged to the *princeps*. In financial matters, too, the proconsul's powers were restricted. The right of making requisitions within his province, the most fruitful source of oppression under the republic, was taken away; and of the revenues drawn from the province, all those appropriated to Cæsar were managed not by himself or his quæstor, but by Cæsar's procurators. It would seem, too, that the discretionary power formerly enjoyed by proconsuls in granting freedom or immunity to provincial communities, and in enfranchising individual provincials, was, if not taken away from them, yet rarely if ever exercised. Above all, the *maius imperium* granted to Augustus over proconsuls was interpreted by both parties in such a way as to give the former a real control even over the public provinces. We read of instances in which appeals from such provinces are heard by him, and not by the consuls and senate, and of instructions issued by him to proconsuls, as well as to his own legates; while in the course of his journeys between 27-19 B.C, he visited and arranged the affairs of public provinces such as Sicily or Bithynia, as well as those of Gaul or Syria. Naturally enough it was to Cæsar rather than to the consuls and senate that both the proconsul and the provincials he governed looked for guidance or for redress. The division of authority in the provinces was

¹ Tac., *Hist.*, iv., 48: "*provincia inermes.*"

real enough to hamper and delay reform, but it can scarcely be said to have ever seriously impaired the supremacy of Cæsar.

Twenty years of civil war following upon a century and a half of extravagance, mismanagement, and speculation had produced complete financial exhaustion throughout the greater part of the empire.

The change from this state of things to the widely diffused prosperity, of which Pliny's *Natural History* gives perhaps the best picture, was not wholly due to the reforms which Augustus introduced into the financial system. We must take into account the cessation of the desolating wars which had left scarcely a single province untouched, the re-establishment of settled government, the suppression of brigandage by land and piracy by sea, and the improvements effected in the means of communication. Yet the financial system, of which he at least laid down the main lines, played an important part. Under the republic there was no possibility of estimating either the income or the expenditure of the empire as a whole, and neither over income nor expenditure was there any central control. It was Augustus who first attempted to lay a sound foundation for an imperial system of finance, by obtaining an estimate of the resources of the state. He compiled a statistical survey, which included great part, if not all, of the empire; and brought together a vast mass of information as to the number and status of the communities in each province.¹

The imperial census, which was so prominent an

¹ On the survey and census of Augustus, see generally Marquardt *Staatsverw.*, ii., 158-599; Hirschfeld, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 1-52.

institution in the second century A.D., with its elaborate returns of land and owners, was but a development of the census taken by Augustus's orders in his own provinces.¹ It seems probable, too, that on the basis of this census he established the two great imperial taxes which replaced the miscellaneous imposts levied under the republic, the land tax, (*tributum soli*.) and the tax on personal property, (*tributum capitis*). Over the revenue raised and over its expenditure Augustus had complete control within the limits of his own provinces; and even outside these limits, over the revenues accruing to the old state treasury, and over their expenditure, both in Rome, and in the provinces, he exercised an authority which, if less direct,² was not less real. From him dates consequently the first approach to anything like a comprehensive imperial budget. He published year by year the accounts of the empire,³ and he left behind him after his death a complete statement of the financial condition of the empire.⁴ In other ways, also, he brought relief to the provincials. The multifarious requisitions, legal and illegal, which Roman officials had been accustomed to levy were abolished, and fixed allowances substituted.⁵ The resources of the provinces were developed by a liberal expenditure on public works, while provincial commerce and industry were freed from the crippling restrictions which the republic had imposed upon them. Finally, whereas hitherto the burden of taxation had fallen mainly on

¹ *E.g.*, in Gaul, Livy., *Epit.*, cxxxiv.; Dio, liii., 22; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 31; in Syria, Luke, ii., 1; in Lusitania, Wilmanns, 1608.

² It seems to have been exercised through a decree of the senate.

³ Suet., *Calig.*, 16: "*rationes imperii ab Augusto proponi solitas.*"

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 101.

⁵ Suet., *Aug.*, 36

the provincials, Augustus, while maintaining the immunity of Italian soil from tribute, forced Roman citizens to bear a share, if not a large one, of the cost of governing and protecting the empire.¹

The aim which Julius is said to have placed before himself of welding the diverse communities and races of the empire into a single state, with equal laws and rights, was not the aim of Augustus. While improving the government of the provinces, he held fast to the political ascendancy of Rome and Italy, and to the distinction between the Roman state and its dependent allies. With the policy of assimilation, initiated by Julius, and revived by Claudius and the Flavian emperors, he had little sympathy.² But if the bond of union created by the spread of Roman citizenship, Roman law, and Roman municipal institutions was the work of his successors, it was otherwise with the powerful tie of allegiance to the central authority of Cæsar.

Cæsar-worship as a whole was not the creation of any Cæsar. It was the natural expression of a wide spread sentiment of homage which varied in form in different parts of the empire, and in different classes of society, and which had its roots in long-established ideas and customs.³ But the statecraft of Augustus

¹ Especially by means of the legacy duty, established in 6 A.D.: Suet., *Aug.*, 49; Dio, *lv.*, 25.

² Suet., *Aug.*, 40: "*civitatem Romanam parvisime dedit.*"

³ On this point see Mr. Bevan's article *Eng. Hist. Review*, No. 64 (October, 1901), also Kornemann in *Beiträge z. alten Geschichte*, *l.*, p. 51.

was conspicuously shown in the skill with which he made use of this sentiment to develop something like an imperial patriotism and connect it closely with the rule of the Cæsars. The worship of the deified Julius, alike in Rome and in the provinces,¹ was the starting point of that official worship of the deified Cæsars, the *divi*, which invested the long and irregular succession of the emperors with a certain sanctity and with an appearance at least of continuity. Of more importance politically was the worship of Rome and Augustus. As early as 29 B.C. this worship was formally authorised in Asia Minor²; but its definite establishment as the public official worship of a province or part of a province dates from the foundation in 12 B.C. of the famous altar to Rome and Augustus at Lyons, as a new religious centre for the "three Gauls."³ With the altar were connected the provincial council, the annually chosen priests of Rome and Augustus, and the annual festival. The gradual diffusion of this new imperial cult cannot be traced here.⁴ But by the commencement of the second cen-

¹ In 29 B.C. the worship of *divus* Julius and Rome was authorised for Roman citizens in Ephesus and Nicæa, Dio, li., 20.

² Dio, li., 20.

³ Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., p. 84; *C. J. L.*, xiii., pp. 227 sq. Cf. *ibid.*, no. 1674: "*Sacerdos Romæ et Augusti ad aram ad confluentes Araris et Rhodani.*"

⁴ The *ara Romæ et Augusti* in the territory of the Ubii was clearly meant to be the centre of the worship for the short-lived province of Germany, and must have been erected before the defeat of Varus in 9 A.D.

ture A.D. each province of the empire had its council, its priests, its altar and temple of Augustus; and Cæsar-worship in this form was the one official cult common to the whole empire, a symbol at once of imperial unity, and of the rule of the Cæsars.¹

In October, 19 B.C., Augustus returned to Rome from the East. The reorganisation of the provinces and of the provincial administration was practically completed, and he now turned his attention to Rome and Italy. But though the legislation of the next two years (18-17 B.C.) was regarded by himself and by the republic as inaugurating a new and better age for the Roman people,² it can only be fairly judged if taken in connection with his general domestic policy. The formal restoration of the republic nine years before was of little use of itself. The old constitutional machinery needed both repair and alteration before it could be adopted to the new situation. The fabric of Roman society, shattered by half a century of revolution and civil war, had to be reconstituted, and finally, alike in the city and in Italy, an efficient system of administration had to be created. In the performance of these difficult tasks Augustus followed steadily the policy

Domestic
reforms.
735 A.U.C.

736-737 A.U.C.

¹ See Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 366; Hardy, *Eng. Hist. Review*, vol. v., p. 221.

² This was the lesson taught by the celebration in June, 17 B.C., of the *Ludi Sæculares*, and in the *Carmen Sæculare* composed by Horace for the occasion.

which had guided his actions in 27 B.C. The political, social, and administrative order, which he established, was outwardly based on a restoration of what had existed before. In reality it was a new order, created by himself, subject to his control, and stamped inefaceably with the impress of his own name.

Not the least delicate of the problems with which he had to deal was that of adjusting the relations between his own authority and the ancient prerogatives of the assembly, senate, and magistrates. To abolish them was impossible, and it was as impossible to restore them to their former supremacy and vigour. Under the policy laid down by Augustus these venerable institutions were preserved as stately and picturesque survivals, but their sphere of action was carefully limited, and, even within the limits marked out for them, they acted, with rare exceptions, only on his impulse, and under his direction. It was a policy which saved the dignity of the republic, and gratified the *amour propre* of the Roman nobility and populace without seriously impairing the supremacy of Cæsar. At the same time it was a policy which scarcely any one but Augustus could have carried out, and which overtaxed the patience of his successors.

The ancient assemblies of the *populus* and *plebs* had long ceased to represent effectually the Roman people, and that the disorderly city populace, of which they were ordinarily composed, should exercise any real sovereignty was out of the question. It is true that Augustus "re-

stored their ancient rights,"¹ and while he lived they continued to elect the magistrates of the year, and occasionally to pass laws.² The corruption and disorder which accompanied their proceedings were checked,³ and the political clubs which were the chief source of both, were suppressed.⁴ But their power was gone, never to return. As electors they did little more than accept the candidates put forward by Augustus,⁵ in legislation they simply approved the measures introduced by him or at his suggestion. The consultation of the people had, by the end of his reign, become merely a troublesome formality, of little interest except for the students of Roman antiquities. The sovereignty of the people, as the ultimate source of all authority, was never denied; it was, indeed, the foundation on which, in theory, the authority of Cæsar rested,⁶ but it was in reality only a convenient fiction, and in the history of the empire the Roman *comitia* play no part.

Next in importance to the maxim of the sovereignty of the people was that of the supremacy of the magistrates, consuls, and prætors to whom, year by year, the people intrusted

The Magistrates.

¹ Suet., *Aug.*, 40: "*comitorum pristinum ius reduxit.*"

² Such as the *Leges Julia* proposed by Augustus himself, the *Lex Papia Poppæa* carried by the consuls of 9 A.D., or the *Lex Ælia Sentia*, 4 A.D.

³ For the *Lex Julia de ambitu*, Suet., *Aug.*, 34, 40; Dio, *liv.*, 16, *lv.*, 5; *Paulinus Sent.*, *v.*, 30.

⁴ Suet., *Aug.*, 32; Dio, *liv.*, 2.

⁵ Dio, *liiii.*, 21; *ου μέντοι ἐκραττετό τε ὁ μὴ καὶ ἐκίνε ἤρεσκε.*

⁶ Gaius, *i.*, 5: "*cum ipse imperator per legem imperium accipiat.*"

the *imperium*. It was true that for more than half a century these magistrates had ceased to exercise their authority outside Italy. But though they no longer led the legions or governed provinces, they were still the chief executive officers of the state, to whom all other officials were at least in theory subordinate, and above them there was no authority but that of the people from whom their powers were derived. But there was now in the state an authority the equal of theirs in rank, derived like theirs directly from the people, and backed by overwhelming force. Augustus was indeed careful to respect the dignity of his supposed colleagues, but a real partnership in the government of the empire was out of the question. Even during his lifetime their relation to him became that of subordinates rather than equals. Though still elected by the people, it was the approval of Cæsar rather than of the voters that was essential to success. His nomination, and still more his personal recommendation of a candidate were decisive.¹ The change by which these magistracies became merely places of preferment at Cæsar's disposal was gradual, but it may be said that, even by the end of Augustus's reign, the creation of consuls and prætors might be described in the words used by Ulpian two centuries later, as a matter lying wholly within the discretion of the *princeps*.² Once elected, consuls and prætors alike were necessarily

¹ For these two rights see *Dict. Ant.*, s. v., *Princeps*; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 860; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 14, 15, 81.

² *Dig.*, xlviii., 14: "*ad curam principis magistratum creatio pertinet, non ad populi favorem.*"

overshadowed by the dominant authority of Cæsar. From the wide department assigned to Cæsar abroad—the control of the legions, of the foreign policy, the administration of his provinces—they were absolutely excluded. Even the paramount authority over the “public provinces,” which belonged of right to the consuls, had in practice to give way to the *majus imperium* enjoyed by the *princeps*.¹ In Rome and Italy their position was not much better. The consuls could still be described as responsible for the safety of the commonwealth,² but the responsibility became nominal when one department after another of the home administration was transferred to Cæsar. Within the lifetime of Augustus the care of the corn and water supply of Rome, the maintenance of public order in the city and the public roads in Italy, the protection of the coasts, had passed into the hands of Cæsar and his officials.³ Even within the limited area left open to them, they had to face the dangerous rivalry of a co-ordinate imperial authority. Cæsar was equally competent with the consuls to convoke the assembly, to hold elections and propose legislation, to convene the senate, and consult it, and as able as the prætors to expound and administer the civil law. Under these circumstances independence was impossible. The old republican magistracies, though they continued to be attractive posts, conferring social distinction, and leading on to legate-

¹ See above, pp. 418, 419.

² Tac., *Ann.*, iv., 19: “*cujus vigiliis nitetur respublica.*” Even Pliny (*Paneg.*, 59) speaks of the consulship as “*summa f. testas.*”

³ See below, p. 445 *sqq.*

ships and proconsulships abroad, gradually became in all but the name subordinate offices, with purely departmental duties under the control and supervision of Cæsar.¹

Augustus had inaugurated his work of constitutional restoration by a purification of the senate. Its unwieldy numbers were reduced, and unworthy members expelled; decency and order were restored in its proceedings.² But it was no part of Augustus's policy to replace the senate in the position of ascendancy which it had formerly occupied. Its dignity was respected, the privileges and distinctions enjoyed by its members were maintained and enlarged, while the declining importance of the *comitia* and of the old magistracies increased its prestige. But its control of the policy of the state was gone for ever. The part assigned to it by Augustus was indeed dignified and useful, but it was a subordinate and not a leading part.

With the important question of the composition of the senate, Augustus dealt in a manner which enabled him, without too rudely wounding the pride of the old nobility, to bring the senate in this respect into harmony with the new system. In the first place, admission to the senate henceforward depended on his favour. Election to the quæstorship continued to entitle a man to a seat

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, iii., 53: Tiberius declares "*non ædilis, aut prætoris, aut consulis partes sustineo, majus aliquid et excelsius a principe postulatur.*" Comp. the phrase "*caput reipublicæ*," Tac., *Ann.*, i., 13.

² Suet., *Aug.*, 35. See generally *Dict. Antiq.*, s. v., *Senatus*; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 834 sqq., 875 sqq.; iii., 1252 sqq.

in the senate, but over the elections to the quæstorship Augustus's rights of nomination and commendation gave him full control. The direct admission of persons not so qualified was an ancient magisterial prerogative, which, during the last century of the republic, had fallen into disuse. By the dictator Julius, and by the triumvirs it had been on the contrary used with a freedom which shocked Roman opinion.¹ Augustus was more prudent. If we except the three occasions on which he carried out a wholesale revision of the senatorial register,² he seems to have abstained from the use of this method, which under the name of *adlectio* became so popular with his successors. The means he employed were more indirect but not less effective. From him apparently dates the rule, written or unwritten, that candidates for the quæstorship must be persons entitled to wear the *latus clavus*, the broad purple stripe distinctive of the senator.³ This right Augustus granted to all sons of senators,⁴ but he could at his discretion confer it upon any one he pleased, and thus indirectly open the door of the senate house to those whom he delighted to honour.⁵ Augustus, moreover, could not

¹ Suet., *Jul.*, 41; *Aug.*, 35: "*indignissimi, post necem Casarii per gratiam et præmium adlecti.*"

² *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, ii., 1: "*senatum ter legi.*" These *lectiones* took place probably in 28 B.C., 8 B.C., and 14 A.D. Mommsen, *Ad M. Anc.*, p. 35.

³ Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, iii., 466.

⁴ Suet., *Aug.*, 38: "*liberis senatorum protinus a virili togo latus clavum induere . . . permisit.*"

⁵ That the grant of the *latus clavus* not only entitled, but morally obliged the recipient to stand for the quæstorship and enter the senate seems clear from Ovid's case. *Tristia*, iv., 10, 35.

only admit, he could also expel, and that not only at the periodic *lectiones*, but on the occasion of his yearly revision of the senatorial roll.¹ Such powers clearly placed the composition of the senate at his mercy, and in his use of them a definite aim is plainly visible. He inaugurated the policy successfully pursued by his successors of creating in connection with the senate a new aristocracy,² whose claim to nobility was derived from him, and whose ranks he could recruit at his own discretion.

The senatorial order.

Under the later republic the senate had been closely identified with the nobles, from whose ranks the great majority of the senators were drawn. But the nobility, not only of a patrician Cornelius or Julius, but of a Sempronius Gracchus or a Cæcilius Metellus, was not derived from the seat in the senate, to which almost as a matter of course he attained. Noble they were born and noble they remained. This nobility Augustus proposed to replace by one based entirely upon the senate. Hitherto most nobles had become senators, in future only senators were to be noble. The change was gradually made. The republican nobility was left as it stood. But outside the narrowing circle of the old families a new aristocracy was slowly formed. The starting-point was the permission to wear the broad stripe. This privilege was granted to all sons of senators as a right, to others by special grant of the emperor. The recipients ranked thenceforward as members of the senatorial order, sharing many of

¹ *Dict., Antiq.*, s. v., *Senatus*; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, iii., 881; Dio, liii., 17.

² Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, iii., 466.

the privileges, and bound by many of the obligations attaching to actual senators.¹ On reaching the legal age,² they were expected³ to take their seats in the senate through election to the quæstorship, and their sons in turn inherited the same privileges and responsibilities. But even a senator's son, if through poverty⁴ or disinclination he abstained from taking his seat, forfeited his rank.⁵ This new senatorial nobility was thus in a sense hereditary, but its transmission from father to son depended on the approval of Cæsar; it could by him be given to those who had no claim to it by birth, and he could by expulsion from the senate take it away.

The senate had never, in law, possessed any other prerogative but that of advising the magistrates when consulted. This function it

Functions of
the senate.

¹ They were allowed to be present at meetings of the senate (Suet., *Aug.*, 38); in the legion they were distinguished from other officers as *tribuni latidavii*; they shared the exemption granted to actual senators from municipal burdens, and were prohibited like them from intermarriage with freedwomen. Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, iii., 473; *Digest.*, xxiii., 2, 44.

² The minimum age for the quæstorship was fixed by Augustus at twenty-five; Dio, lxii., 20. Tacitus (*Ann.*, xv., 28) calls this "*senatoria ætas*."

³ That there was no legal obligation as yet is certain. Ovid *Tristia*, iv., 10, 35; Tac., *Ann.*, xvi., 17. Dio (lxvi., 26) mentions a case in which Augustus compelled such persons to enter the senate.

⁴ A property qualification of 1,000,000 sesterces was necessary for candidates for the quæstorship, *i. e.*, for the senate. According to Dio (lxiv., 17), it was instituted by Augustus in 18 B.C. Cf. Suet. *Aug.*, 17; Tac., *Ann.* i., 75; Ovid, *Tristia*, iv., 10; "*curia pauperibus clausa est, dai census honores*."

⁵ "*Ordinem exuere*," Tac., *Hist.*, ii., 86; Ovid, *l. c.*: "*clausa mensura coacta est*."

continued to discharge. But its advice was no longer asked as a matter of course, nor when given was it equivalent to a command. It was still consulted, as formerly, by the regular magistrates on matters affecting their own departments. But the great questions of policy, which the republican consuls had habitually referred to the senate, were beyond the province of their successors under the empire, and even less important matters were not often brought forward by them unless at the suggestion or with the approval of the *princeps*.¹ Moreover, Augustus was not only a senator with the right to give an opinion to which his position gave decisive weight,² but in virtue of his tribunician power he could at any moment prevent or arrest discussion.³ He had, as has been said, been given power to consult the senate, himself, and in this way no doubt matters of the gravest importance were still brought before the senate.⁴ But in these cases the senate's part was limited to hearing announcements or passing decrees proposed by a confessedly superior authority. For these purposes both Augustus and the Cæsars who followed him made frequent use of the senate. To govern by decree of the senate rather than by edict gave a constitutional appear-

¹ The reluctance of the senate and magistrates to decide or even discuss questions on their own authority is evident in the reign of Tiberius; Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 35; iii., 32.

² Tac., *Ann.*, i., 74: "*quo loco censebis, Cæsar, si primus, habeo quod sequar.*"

³ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 13; iii., 70.

⁴ Compare the list of matters on which Tiberius consulted the senate; Suet., *Tib.*, 30.

ance to their rule, and lightened their personal responsibility. But between a decree of the senate passed on the proposal of Cæsar, and an edict issued on Cæsar's sole authority, there was little more than a formal difference. Of the senate it may be said, as was said of the *comitia*, that nothing was done which Cæsar did not approve.

In outward splendour and dignity the senatorial order gained rather than lost,¹ and the wealth and influence of its members made them not unfrequently formidable rivals to the emperor.² As an institution the senate itself commanded the respect of the empire, and the warm loyalty of men, who, like Tacitus, saw in it the one surviving representative of the free republic. But the position which it had enjoyed during the period of the great wars, and which Cicero claimed for it as its right, it never regained.

The religious and social reforms of Augustus exhibit the same spirit of compromise between the old and the new which appears in his treatment of the republican institutions. Just as he had refused to follow Julius in opening the doors of the senate-house to provincials, or in largely extending the Roman franchise, so he upheld the ascendancy of the old gods of Rome against alien deities,³ of the old Roman dress and manners against

Religious
and social
reforms.

¹ Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, iii., 886.

² Cf. Tacitus, *Ann.*, ii., 43, of Piso: "*vix Tiberio concedere, liberos ejus et multum infra despectare.*"

³ Suetonius (*Aug.*, 93) illustrates his contempt for strange deities and rites.

foreign fashions, and carefully maintained the distinctive pre-eminence of the freeborn Roman citizens, the imperial race, over provincials, freedmen, and slaves. But the Rome which he restored was not the narrow city-state which had refused to enfranchise the Italians, and which despised Cicero as a foreigner.¹ It was the wider Rome, co-extensive with the limits of Italy, whose faith and manners he re-established, and whose patriotic pride he endeavoured to stimulate. And with this revived faith in the old gods and loyalty to the old manners and traditions was dexterously and closely associated the new allegiance due to himself. On his scheme of reform, as on the altars in the provinces, the names of Rome and Augustus were jointly inscribed. The ideal which he presented to a community wearied with civil war, and sick of the faction fights and corruption which made up politics in the city, was that of a united and imperial Italy, proud of its great past, faithful to the gods and to the virtues by which "the Latin name and the strength of Italy had grown great,"² and performing its mission of ruling the world under the guidance of a man who, by descent, was on one side Italian to the core, and on the other traced his ancestry back to the founders of Rome and to the gods of the city, and who by divine favour and help had saved Rome and Italy alike from a foreign foe.

¹ Cic., *Pro Sulla*, 7.

² Horace, *Od.*, iv., 15, 12: "*veteres revocavit artes per quas Latinum nomen et Italia crevere vires.*" So *Od.*, iii., 5, 9 the Marsian and Apulian are heirs of the glories of Rome. Compare Sellars; Vergil, p. 327.

The lesson was taught in a hundred different ways.

The old
worships.

The gods whose ruined temples he rebuilt,¹ and whose ancient festivities he revived² were for the most part the older deities whose worship was common to all Italians. Such were Jupiter, Juno, Mars, the Dea Dia, the Penates and Lares.³ But side by side with the temples of the old national gods rose others which reminded the people of the debt which they owed to Cæsar and his house. The temple of the "deified Julius" in the old forum, and that of Mars the Avenger⁴ in the new forum of Augustus, commemorated the services of the great dictator and the vengeance which had overtaken his murderers. More impressive than either was the temple built on the Palatine Mount,⁵ on the site of the City of Romulus, and dedicated to the god Apollo who, from his shrine at Actium, had helped to win the day for Rome. To these memorial temples must be added the numerous public prayers, thanksgivings, and festivals, in which the safety of Augustus was prayed for, and his victories, his ser-

¹ *Mon. Ant. Lat.*, 4, 17: "duo et octoginta templa deum in urbe consul VI. . . refeci." Ovid, *Fasti*, ii., 59; Hor., *Od.*, iii., 6.

² Suet., *Aug.*, 31: "nonnulla ex antiquis cærimoniis paulatim abolita restituit ut Salutis augurium, Diale flaminium, sacrum Lupercale, ludæ Saculares et Compitalicia."

³ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iv., 1-26. The Dea Dia was the goddess honoured by the Arval Brethren, for the restoration of this priestly college. See Henzen, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium* (Berlin, 1874).

⁴ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iv., 21; Suet., *Aug.*, 29.

⁵ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iv., 2; Suet., *Aug.*, 39. Lanciani (*Ancient Rome*, p. 110) gives a graphic description of the temple and the buildings connected with it. Cf. also Propertius, ii., 31.

vices,¹ even the chief anniversaries of his life, were commemorated.

From this close association with the gods to his enrolment among their number was not a long step. Officially, indeed, Augustus was not added to the list of gods worshipped by the Roman people until after his death. Yet during his life he was clearly in the eyes of the people, and not only in the language of courtly poets, "a present deity."² In the country towns of Italy there were temples of Augustus and priests of Augustus.³ In private houses and in the wards of the city of Rome, the *genius* of Augustus was placed with the Lares, and shared the worship offered to them, as a "third god."⁴ That this homage was spontaneous there is little reason to doubt, but we cannot doubt either that Augustus himself realised the political usefulness of a worship which, without degenerating into direct adoration of a living man, conveniently expressed the common allegiance to the one ruler of the empire.

¹ Of the number of these commemoration prayers and festivals, the extant ancient calendars afford ample proof. See Mommsen, *C. I. L.*, i. pp., 382-410.

² With the language of Ovid (*Fasti*, iv., 949), Horace (*Od.*, liii., 5), "*præsens divus*," compare Suetonius's story (*Aug.*, 98) of the homage paid by the sailors in the harbour of Puteoli: "*candidati coronatique et tura libantes*."

³ At Pompeii (*J. R. N.*, 2231, 4, 5), Pisse (Wilm., 883), Perusia, (Orelli, 607), Pola (Orelli, 686).

⁴ Ovid, *Ep.*, ii., 8, 9; Hor., *Od.*, iv., 5, 31; Dio, li., 19; for this worship in the *vici* of Rome, Ovid, *Fasti*, v., 145: "*vici numina trina colunt*." Cf. *C. I. L.*, vi., 445-454.

The measures by which Augustus endeavoured to reform the morals of the time were as much dictated by political considerations as his reform of religion. In order to preserve the purity and vigour of the ruling race,¹ he endeavoured to bring back society to the simpler and purer life, which had once been the glory of Rome, and which still flourished in the country districts of Italy. At the same time, while reforming the society, he strove to bring its arrangements into harmony with the new order of things and with his own policy. Side by side with such measures as the *Lex Julia de adulteriis*,² with the regulations enforcing decency at public shows and games, and restricting extravagance in dress or at the table,³ we find provisions of a different character. Thus, for instance, in the famous law about "the marrying of the orders," over and above its ostensible object, the encouragement of marriage and the increase of the population, there is an endeavour to establish and perpetuate a particular social order, the peculiar feature of which is not republican equality, but a regular gradation of classes, each with its distinctive rights, privileges, and obligations, and each also with its own relation to himself as the head of all.⁴ It

Facial
reforma.

The two
orders.

¹ Suet., *Aug.*, 40: "*magni existimans sincerum atque ab omni colluvione peregrini ac servilis sanguinis incorruptum servare populum.*"

² Suet., *Aug.*, 34; Dio, liv., 16: it was carried late in 18 B.C. or early in the next year; Ovid, *Fasti*, ii., 139; Hor., *Od.*, iv., 5.

³ Dio, liv., 16; *Aug.*, 31, 44; Gell., ii., 24.

⁴ Suet., *Aug.*, 34: "*de maritandis ordinibus,*" it was carried in 18 B.C. and supplemented in 9 A.D. by the *Lex Papia Poppæa*. It

was a policy partly justified by the social anarchy which the civil wars had produced. To some extent, also, it merely followed the lines of class division already recognised in the days of Cicero; but in stamping these with the sanction of law it prepared the way for that rigid caste-system which in the third and fourth centuries paralysed the energies of the empire. The highest place in this social hierarchy was occupied by the senatorial order, which replaced the old nobility, and which gradually became known as the *amplissimus ordo*. Immediately below it stood the order of knights, an order which had existed in name under the republic. Round the ancient corps of the *equites* proper a class of titular knights had grown up, whose only claim to the title lay in their possession of the equestrian census, and who had not any more than the nobility an existence in the eyes of the law. This order of knights by courtesy shared the fate of the nobles.¹ As Augustus replaced the latter by a senatorial order with a legal status and privileges, so he now limited the rank and title of knight to members of the corps of knights itself.² The numbers of the corps were largely increased,³ and its internal organisation

The senate.

The knights.

imposed various penalties on celibates, and conceded privileges to parents of at least three children. Hor., *Carm. Sacul.*, 17.

¹ Mommsen (*Staatsr.*, iii., 476-569) has for the first time clearly explained Augustus's policy with regard to the *equites*.

² From the time of Augustus, all *equites Romani* are *equites equo publico*, i. e., members of the corps. The squadron to which a man belonged is often mentioned on inscriptions.

³ Dionys. (vi., 13) mentions 5,000 knights, *ταῶν ἐξόντων τον*

altered,¹ but its traditional military character was preserved. Of this corps of knights Augustus formed a second "order," even more closely dependent upon himself than the senatorial. Admission to it was granted only by him.² By him or by his officers the roll of the order was revised, the unworthy expelled, and the meritorious occasionally promoted to senatorial dignity.³ As at the head of the roll of senators his own name was placed,⁴ so the first place in the order of knights was filled by the younger members of his house.⁵ The titular knight-hood of Cicero's days had been hereditary, like the titular nobility, and the sons of senators possessed a presumptive claim to succeed to senatorial dignity. But the son of a Roman knight, under the arrangements of Augustus, had no such claim. The rank was strictly personal, and no one had any title to it unless himself admitted to the corps by the emperor. To this second order was assigned a career which in time became as definite and well under-

δημόσιον ἔκπον, as taking part in the procession on the Ides of July.

¹ It was divided into six squadrons (*turmae*) officered by "*seviri equitum Romanorum*," and into *decuriae*; Suet., *Aug.*, 38; Dio, *lv.*, 10; *C. I. L.*, v., 6360, 7447, 5810.

² Dio, *liii.*, 17; Suet., *Tib.*, 41. Qualified candidates presented a petition (*libellus*) to the emperor asking for admission, the qualifications were the equestrian census and free descent for two generations.

³ Suet., *Aug.*, 38: "*frequenter recognovit; unumquemque equitum vita rationem reddere coegit.*" *Ib.*, *Aug.*, 37, mentions a "*triumviratum recognoscendis turmis equitum*" instituted by Augustus.

⁴ *Mon. Anc. Gk.*, *iv.*, 2.

⁵ As "*principes inventutis*," *e. g.*, Gaius and Lucius Cæsar; *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, *iii.*, 5; Ovid, *Ars Amat.*, *i.*, 194.

stood as that assigned to the order above it. For the latter were reserved the old republican magistracies from the quæstorship upwards, the governorships of the public provinces, and of the more important of these belonging to Cæsar. It was, on the other hand, from among the knights that Augustus recruited his own service. Though the highest posts in that service, the legateships, were filled by senators, and the lowest by freedmen or slaves, yet to knights were given the governorships of Egypt, Rætia, and Noricum; the prefectures of the prætorian guard, of the city police, and of the corn supply. They commanded the naval squadrons at Misenum and Ravenna, and in some cases took charge, as procurators, of the revenues of Cæsar's provinces. Of the future development of this order of knights this is not the place to speak; but to Augustus it rendered valuable service by attaching to him the middle class of Italy, from whom its members were chiefly drawn, and to whom it offered a rank and career which at once gratified their ambition and bound them closely to Cæsar as their patron.

Below the two orders of senate and knights stood the *plebs*, a term which had long ceased to denote merely the non-patrician element in the community, and was used to designate the common people, the *tenniores* or *humiliores*, as they were already frequently styled.¹ Politically, however, the term had a narrower application still.

¹ Friedlaender, *Sittengeschichte*, i., 245 sqq.; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 444.

It denoted *par excellence* the populace of the city of Rome, the *plebs urbana*¹ which had, in the latter days of the republic, posed as the representative of the *populus Romanus*. It was this *plebs* which had, as a rule, exercised the prerogatives of the people, had elected magistrates and passed laws, and it was for its benefit that games were exhibited, corn distributed, and money lavished in bribery. At the same time it was in danger of ceasing to be Roman, except in name, owing to the admixture of alien blood. Augustus, true to his policy of maintaining the ascendancy and purity of the imperial race, attempted, though without much success, to check this evil. He placed a variety of restrictions on the emancipation of slaves, and slaves of bad character, even if freed, were debarred from Roman citizenship;² it is even possible that all freedmen were deprived of the right to vote, not, as things stood, a very serious penalty.³ In a similar spirit he strove to awaken self-respect by enforcing the wearing of the *toga*,⁴ and maintaining decency and order at the public shows and games. Their old political interests and activity he did not attempt to revive, and with the suppression of the political clubs, the restrictions on bribery, and the palpable unreality of the proceedings in the assembly, politics had lost

¹ Or *plebs Romana*; *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iii., 7.

² Suet., *Aug.*, 40. The reference there is specially to the *lex Ælia Sentia* (4 A.D.) and to the *lex Furia Caninia* (8 A.D.); Gaius., i., 13, 42; ii., 228.

³ Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, iii., 450.

⁴ Suet., *Aug.*, 40.

their attraction. The eager, stirring, municipal life, which in the Italian towns was an effective substitute for politics, was impossible in Rome, which, like London, had neither municipal life or organisation.

The *plebs Romana* was indeed only the city populace, and the annual magistrates whom it elected were in their duties not much more than local officials, but both alike still claimed to be the ruling authorities, not merely of the city of Rome, but of the Roman State: Rome could not yet be treated as one, if the first, of the municipalities of the empire. Nor on the other hand could Augustus safely deprive the *plebs* of its pleasures and emoluments. The distribution of corn, the largesses of money were continued, the games were more numerous and more splendid than ever.¹ Yet he did something to provide the Roman *plebs* with more wholesome interests. It is possible that his reconstruction of the city wards (*vici*) with their annually elected headmen (*magistri*) was meant as a step towards a system of municipal government, and though in this direction there was no further advance, yet the ward, with its common worship, chapel, and festivals, remained a centre of corporate life, and the position of *magister vici* an object of plebeian ambition.² Of far

¹ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iii., 7-21 and iv., 31-48, supplies a list of Augustus's largesses and games.

² Suet., *Aug.*, 30: "*spatium urbis in regiones vicosque divisit, instituitque ut illos annui magistratus sortito tuerentur, hos magistri e plebe cujusque vicinia lecti*"; Dio (lv., 8) assigns the measure to the year 7 B.C.; comp. *C. I. L.*, vi., 454, 761. Besides the care of the *Lares compitales* and the *compitalia* the *magistri* had to extinguish fires (Dio, *l. c.*), to inspect weights and measures (*C. I. L.* vi., 282),

more importance, however, as centres of plebeian life and interest, and that not only in Rome, were the guilds (*collegia*).¹ The disorderly associations which had multiplied in the declining days of the republic were suppressed, those which were "ancient and lawful" being allowed to remain.² For the future Augustus provided that any new guild might on certain conditions get itself recognised, and registered as legitimate by decree of the senate.³ That in addition to these registered guilds, he encouraged, or at least tolerated, the formation of associations among the *plebs*, provided they were useful or harmless, may be inferred from their rapid increase in numbers, of which fact, as of the prominent part they played in the daily life of the *plebs*, the inscriptions give ample proof. That Augustus was not unfavourable to them is also implied by their existence among the recipients of the imperial doles of corn, the *plebs frumentaria*, a body under constant supervision by imperial officials.⁴

and possibly to revise the lists of those entitled to share in the corn doles; Suet., *Aug.*, 40; Dio, *liv.*, 10.

¹ Liebenam, *Zur Gesch. und Organisation d. röm. Vereinswesen*, (Leipzig, 1890); Walzing, *Les Corporations Professionnelles* (Louvain, 1895-1903).

² Suet., *Aug.*, 32; Dio, *liv.*, 2.

³ A "*Lex Julia*" (*de collegiis*) is mentioned in an inscription of the time of Augustus, *C. I. L.*, vi., 2193, referring to a "*collegium symphonicorum quibus senatus coire, convocari, cogi permisit e lege Julia, ex auctoritate Augusti ludorum causa*"; Liebenam, *l. c.*, pp. 20, 225. The more usual formula was "*quibus ex S^{to}. coire licit.*"

⁴ For these corporations see Mommsen, *Röm. Tribus*, p. 194; *Staatsr.*, iii., 447; they were based on the old divisions of the thirty-five tribes. Cf. also the numerous inscriptions relating to them; *C. I. L.*, vi., *passim*.

Lastly this *plebs* was bound by special ties to the emperor. The "tribunician power" constituted him their official leader and protector.¹ It was he who provided them with "bread" and the games." His name and *genius* were associated with their ward worships, and festivals, and meetings.² They styled themselves his clients, and honoured him as their patron.³

The government of the city of Rome belonged of right to the annually-elected magistrates of the republic and to the censors. How inefficient their administration had been, readers of Cicero can judge for themselves. Rome, with a population of nearly a million,⁴ was without police, and without any adequate supply of water or corn. Against the frequent floods and still more frequent fires no proper precautions had been taken. In the forum and in the streets scenes of violence and rioting were of daily occurrence. As triumvir, Augustus, aided by Agrippa, when *ædile* in 38 B.C. had commenced the work of reform, and more had been effected in 28-27 B.C. It was, however, after 23 B.C. that he seriously took in hand a work, which, to

The admini-
stration of
Rome and
Italy.

721 A.U.C.

726-727 A.U.C.
731 A. U. C.

¹ Tac. *Ann.*, i., 2: "*ad tuendam plebem tribunicio iure contentum.*"

² The cost of the corn distributing was borne by Augustus after 22 B.C. Mommsen, *Ad Mon. Anc.*, p. 25.

³ The worship of the *genius Augusti* was associated with that of the *Lares compitales*, under the care of the *magistri vicorum*. The latter entered office on the first of August.

⁴ *C. I. L.*, vi., 1104, 5823, 10215. Among the corporations of the *plebs frumentaria* we find a *Corpus Julianum* and a *Corpus Augustale*.

⁵ Friedlaender, *Sittengesch.* i., 23.

quote the words of Ulpian, "especially concerned Cæsar, and which Cæsar alone could accomplish."¹ It was carried out with characteristic dexterity and caution. The care of the city was not formally taken out of the hands of the consuls, prætors, and ædiles, and even where a department of administration was transferred to Cæsar, the change was made with due regard to republican susceptibilities.

In 22 B.C. Augustus undertook the *cura annonæ*; the maintenance and regulation not merely of the monthly distributions of corn to the poor, but of the corn supply needed for the wants of the great city.² At first the execution of this double duty was entrusted to commissioners, who, though subject to imperial authority, were senators of at least prætorian rank, and elected by the people each year. Not till towards the close of his reign were they replaced by an officer of his own. This official, the *præfectus annonæ*³ was appointed by the emperor, and responsible only to him. He was selected always from among the knights, and the prefecture ranked with those of Egypt and the prætorian guard among the great prizes open to Roman knights in Cæsar's service.

The water supply of Rome had been reformed by

¹ *Digest*, i., 15.

² *Mon. Anc. Gk.*, iii., 5; Dio, liv., 1: *cf.* also Mommsen, *Al Mon. Anc.*, p. 25; Hirschfeld, *Untersuch.*, p. 128; Suet., *Aug.*, 37.

³ The office was in existence at the time of Tiberius's accession (14 A.D.); Tac., *Ann.*, i., 7. There were still commissioners in 6 A.D.; Dio, lv., 31.

Agrippa in 33 B.C.¹ On his death in 12 B.C. the "care of the public waters," traditionally the duty of the *ædiles*, was by decree of the senate transferred to a commissioner of consular rank, who was nominated by Augustus.² By Augustus also was now borne the cost of keeping the aqueducts in proper repair.³ In a similar fashion commissioners were also created for the care of the sacred buildings, of public works and places, and of the banks and bed of the Tiber, matters formerly left in a somewhat ill-defined fashion to the censors and *ædiles*.⁴

The water supply.
749 A.U.C.

The care of public buildings and of the banks of the Tiber.

A still more severe blow was struck at the authority of the old magistracies by the appointment of an imperial prefect charged with the duty of maintaining order in the city, a duty which had always rested with the consuls. The new enactments against disorder required enforcing, and Augustus himself declared that he could neither leave Rome without a master, nor remain there to keep order himself.⁵ He therefore chose

Police. The prefecture of the city.

¹ Pliny, *N. H.*, xxxvi., 121; Frontinus, ix., 10; Suet., *Aug.*, 42: "*satis provisum esse a genero suo Agrippa, perductis pluribus aquis, ne homines sitirent.*" Both the Aqua Julia and the Aqua Virgo were constructed by him. For the whole subject see Lanciani, *Comentarii di Frontino* (Rome, 1880) and Hirschfeld, *Untersuch.*, 161 sqq.

² Frontinus (100) quotes the *SCtum.*: "*de iis qui curatores aquarum publicarum ex consensu senatus a Casare Augusto nominati essent.*"

³ Frontinus, 125; *C. I. L.*, vi., 1243; *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iv., 10.

⁴ For these *curatores* see Hirschfeld, 149, 154; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 974 sqq.

⁵ Dio, liv., 6.

from among the consulars one who should keep in check the slaves, and the turbulent spirits among the citizens.¹ This officer bore an ancient title, "prefect of the city," but his office was in all but the name a new one. The prefect of the city was not a magistrate, but a servant of Cæsar's, and at first acted only in his absence.² It was not long, however, before the office became a standing one. Of its rapid growth we shall speak elsewhere,³ but no change made by Augustus was more significant of the revolution which had really taken place, than that which placed Rome, as if it were a small provincial district, under the control of a prefect.⁴

Lower in rank and importance than the prefect of the city was the *præfectus vigilum*.⁵ In 22 B.C. Augustus had created a body of slave firemen, whom he placed at the disposal of the ædiles, for the extinction of fires.⁶ In 7 B.C. this duty and the firemen with it were transferred to the *magistri vicorum*.⁷ Finally, in 6 A.D. Augustus was compelled to appoint a prefect of his own, who was not merely the chief of a fire brigade, but had also a police jurisdic-

The "præ-
fectura
vigilum."
73^a A.U.C.

747 A.U.C.

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, vi., 11; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 980.

² The first prefect, Messalla Corvinus, was appointed in 25 A.C. when Augustus was away in Gaul. Statilius Taurus was prefect in 16 B.C., also in the absence of Augustus; Dio, liv., 19.

³ The office became continuous, it appears, in connection with Tiberius's long absence from Rome after 27 A.D., and in the prefecture of Piso; Tac., *l. c.*: "*recens continuam potestatem.*" Seneca (*Ep.* 83) assigns to the prefect the "*tutela urbis.*"

⁴ Tac., *l. c.*, calls it justly "*incivilis potestas.*"

⁵ Dio, liii., 26; *Digest*, i., 15; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 978.

⁶ Dio, liv., 2.

⁷ Dio, lv., 8.

tion over incendiaries, burglars, and other nocturnal disturbers of the peace.¹ Both the city prefect and the *præfectus vigilum* had, moreover, what no republican magistrate had ever possessed in the city, a regular and numerous force of police.²

The establishment of an efficient local administration was not the only service which Augustus rendered to the city of Rome. The magnificent buildings erected, and the improvements made by himself and his friends, altered the whole aspect of the city. The list of them is too long to be given here,³ but it is characteristic of Augustus's policy, that while no gorgeous palace was built for the new ruler,⁴ his forum was adorned with statues of famous republican heroes,⁵ and that on the Campus Martius a splendid building was constructed for the convenience of voters in those *comitia*, whose importance as a political force was already gone.⁶

Italy stood scarcely less in need of reorganisation than Rome, but as to Augustus's work in Italy our information is but meagre. Yet

New buildings and improvements.

Administration of Italy.

¹ Dio, lv., 26.

² Under the city prefect were the "*cohortes urbanae*," under the *præfectus vigilum* the "*cohortes vigilum*"; Mommsen, *l. c.*

³ See *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iv., 1-25; Suet., *Aug.*, 28: "*marmoream se relinquere, quam latericiam accepisset*"; Lanciani, *Ancient Rome*, chaps. 4, 5; Friedlaender, *Sittengesch.*, i., 1.

⁴ Suetonius (*Aug.*, 72) remarks on the simplicity of Augustus's house on the Palatine.

⁵ Suet., *Aug.*, 31.

⁶ For the *Septa Julia* and the *Diribitorium* (where the votes were counted) see Pliny, *N. H.*, xxxvi, 4, 24; Dio, lvi., 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 43; Middleton, *Ancient Rome*, 390.

enough is known to justify the assertion that to him belongs a large share of the credit for its prosperous condition in the time of the elder Pliny. The political unification of the peninsula had been affected as early as 43 B.C., when Cisalpine Gaul ceased to be a separate province,¹ and became a part of Italy, a step fully justified by recent experience; thenceforward it could no longer serve as a convenient basis of operations from which an ambitious governor could overawe the authorities in Rome. But this step involved another. The farmers in the rich lowlands had been constantly harassed by the raids of the highland clans of the Alps,² and were even liable to attack from the Illyrian tribes at the head of the Adriatic. The former, the Inalpini, as they were called, were reduced to subjection, and the pacification of the highlands was commemorated by a trophy set up near Monaco, on which the names of the conquered Alpine peoples were inscribed.³ Towards Illyricum the bounds of Italy were extended to include the peninsular of Istria,⁴ and to the old frontier colony of Aquileia were added a group of military settle-

774 A.U.C.
Subjugation
of the Al-
pine tribes.

¹ Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 21.

² Pliny, *N. H.*, xviii., 182.

³ The inscription is quoted by Pliny, *N. H.*, iii., 136: it was set up in 7-6 A.D., but the pacification was probably completed by 14 B.C., *Cf. Mon. Anc. Lat.*, v., 12; Schiller, *Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit*, i., 215. Of the tribes some, *e. g.*, the Salassi, were almost exterminated, others were added to the territory of some neighbouring lowland towns such as Brixia or Verona, while others, *e. g.*, those of the Cottian Alps, were left as dependent native states under native rulers.

⁴ *C. I. L.*, v, 1, pp. 1 sqq.; Pliny, *N. H.*, iii., 126. It was included in the tenth of the Augustan *regiones*.

ments,¹ intended to guard the approaches to Italy on this side. The security of the "sacred land"² was rendered still more complete by the conquest and annexation of the districts lying on the farther side of the Alps, Rætia and Noricum,³ and by the final subjugation of Pannonia.⁴

To the peninsula itself Augustus gave not only the quiet for which it craved after twenty years of turmoil, but means and opportunities for developing its natural resources. The Roads and colonies. great roads, notably the great north road, the Via Flaminia, were repaired,⁵ the extension of the Italian road system to the provinces was taken in hand,⁶ and while these measures, and the suppression of brigandage stimulated traffic by land, the high seas were at length rendered safe for that sea-going commerce, the rapid extension of which, in his own day, struck Pliny as almost a sinful tempting of Providence.⁷ The practice of providing for time-

¹ Concordia, Tergeste, Pola, and possibly Parentium; *C. I. L.*, v., 1; iii., 5.

² Pliny, *N. H.*, iii., 138: "*Hæc est Italia diis sacra.*"

³ The Ræti and Vindelici were conquered by Tiberius and Drusus in 15 B.C.; Vell., ii., 39; Livy, *Ep.*, 138; Hor., *Od.*, iv., 4, 17; Noricum, by P. Silius in 16 B.C.; Dio, liv., 20; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 134, 155; Mommsen, *R. G.*, va., chap. 1.

⁴ In 9 A.D., after the great Pannonian war; Mommsen, *R. G.*, l. c.

⁵ Dio, liii., 22: cf. inscription on arch at Rimini (*C. I. L.*, xi., 365) "*V[ia flaminii]a [et reliquei]s celeberrimeis Italia vicis consilio [et sumptib]us [eius mu]niteis.*" *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iv., 19, places the repair of the Flaminian Way in 27 B.C.

⁶ Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 17: the communication thus established was, as Mommsen remarks, as important from a commercial as from a military point of view.

⁷ Pliny, *N. H.*, xix., 3-6.

expired legionaries by grants of land in Italy had, as carried out by Sulla, or by the triumvirs, been productive only of confusion, discontent, and distress. But Augustus, when founding colonies and allotting lands after the crowning victory at Actium, avoided the errors of which he himself, as triumvir, had been guilty. Where lands were taken from municipalities they were fairly paid for;¹ in other cases the opportunities were seized to repopulate and bring again into cultivation some of the districts which had been deserted and run to waste. Perugia rose from her ashes, and even Veii once more took her place among the towns of Italy.²

As regards administration, the military patrols in the country districts and the squadrons at Misenum and Ravenna were, of course, under Augustus's sole authority, and it is probable that the great high-roads were so also.³ Generally speaking, however, Italy remained still in theory subject to the supervision and jurisdiction of the consuls and prætors,⁴

¹ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iii., 22 : of lands taken in 30 B.C., and afterwards.

² For Perugia, see *C. I. L.*, xi., 1923 ; for Veii, *C. I. L.*, xi., 3797. In *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, v., 35, Augustus states that he had founded twenty-eight colonies in Italy, which were all thriving. A complete list cannot be made with certainty, but among them were, besides those mentioned above, Augusta Prætoria, Augusta Taurinorum, Brixia, Ateste, Fanum, Firmum, Hispellum, Tuder, Capua, Venafrum, Nola, Minturnæ, Beneventum. Cf. Mommsen, *Hermes*, xviii., 160.

³ Hirschfeld (*Untersuch.*, p. 109) following Suetonius (*Aug.* 37) includes the "*cura viarum*" among the new offices instituted by Augustus. The "*curatores viarum*" were senators of at least prætorian rank. They are mentioned in the *SCM* of 11 B.C., quoted by Frontinus, 101.

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, xiii., 4 : "*Consulum tribunaliibus Italia et publicæ provinciæ adsisterent.*"

to whom we may assume that the quæstors stationed at Ostia and elsewhere were subordinate.¹

But it was by the local authorities of the municipalities that the routine work of administration was carried on, and to Augustus must be assigned the credit of encouraging a healthy and vigorous municipal life as a substitute for those political interests and ambitions, from which, after all, the average Italian had been practically excluded by distance from Rome, if not by Roman law. Under his auspices the work begun by the great "Local Government Act" of Cæsar, the "Lex Julia Municipalis" was completed.² The account of Italy given by Pliny is confessedly based on Augustus's description of all Italy,³ and it proves that, with a few exceptions, the municipal system prevailed throughout the peninsula, even in the more backward districts of Transpadane Gaul. What modifications Augustus may have introduced into the municipal constitutions is uncertain, but one municipal institution which dates from his time is so characteristic of his policy as to require a brief notice. There is much that is obscure connected

¹ Dio, iv., 4; Tac., *Ann.*, iv., 27; Suet., *Claud.*, 24.

² For the Lex Julia, see *C. I. L.*, i., p. 119; it was carried in 45 B.C., probably only a few months before Cæsar's death. It can hardly have come into full operation until Italy settled down under the rule of Augustus in 36 B.C.

³ Pliny, *N. H.*, iii., 46: "*avctorem nos divum Augustum secutoros.*" His colonisation and allotments involved a considerable rearrangement of municipal territories. The *Agrimensores* (ed. Lachmann), i., 119; *ib.*, i., 18, refer to an "*oratio divi Augusti de statu municipiorum.*"

The **Augustales** with the origin and position of the Augustales,¹ but that they were instituted by Augustus cannot be doubted; nor that the object of the institution was to find an outlet for the social ambition of the freedmen, and to connect them with himself and his rule. True to his policy of defining clearly the line between the free-born citizen and the emancipated slave or alien, he declared freedmen to be ineligible for municipal office, or for a seat in the municipal council.² As a compensation, he created for their benefit a magistracy and a council, in which nothing was real but the cost and the outward show.³ The *sexviri Augustales* were freedmen,⁴ appointed each year by the local senate of their town.⁵ Their office was, in a sense, purely honorary, for its holders had no magisterial duties or authority, but the honour had to be paid for by a contribution to the municipal chest, and by the exhibition of games. Out of these annual *sexviri Augustales* grew an *ordo Augustalium*,⁶ a freedman-aristocracy, which ranked immediately below the genuine municipal aristocracy of the *decuriones*, much as the order of Roman knights did below the senate.⁷ To gain a place among the *Augus-*

¹ Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, iii., 453 sqq.

² Mommsen, *l. c.*, 453, note 1.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

⁴ For the exceptions, mostly in North Italy, see Mommsen, *l. c.*, 454, note 2.

⁵ *C. I. L.*, v. 5465: "*sevir Augustalis* [creatus] d[ecurionum] d[ecreto]. Cf. *ib.*, 5749, 5859.

⁶ *C. I. L.*, v. 1968, 4203, 5859: "*sevir et Augustalis qui inter primos Augustales a decurionibus Augustalis factus est.*"

⁷ Wilm., 1750: "*dedit ordini* [decurionum] *sing HS. VIII. item*

tales became an object of ambition to the richer freedmen, to whom it gave a recognised station in their community, and welcome opportunities of displaying their wealth and public spirit.¹

It was in the year following the celebration of the Sæcular Games in June, 17 B.C., ^{The frontiers of the empire.} that the question of the delimitation and defence of the northern frontier of the empire became acute,² and it continued to engross a large share of Augustus's attention during the rest of his life. The concentration in his hands of the control, both of the foreign policy and of the military forces of the state, rendered possible what, under the republic, had scarcely been attempted, the establishment of definite frontiers, of a system of frontier defence, and of a frontier policy. Under each of these heads Augustus left very much to be done by his successors, and the frontier defences in particular were due in the main to the emperors of the second and third centuries. Yet in many important points Augustus laid down the lines on which they worked. The frontier problem varied in kind and difficulty in the different quarters of the empire. On the west the Atlantic Ocean supplied a ^{The western and southern frontiers.} natural boundary, nor by Augustus was any attempt made to extend the rule of Rome be-

ordini Augustalium, etc.; 2038 ordo decurionum et Augustalium et plebs uniuersa."

¹ Trimalchio in *Petronius Satyricon* boasts that he has risen to be a '*sevir Augustalis*': *Ib.* (ed. Buecheler) p. 67. The institution rapidly spread beyond Italy into the western provinces.

² On the defeat of Lollius by the Germans, Dio, liv., 20; Suet., *Aug.*, 23.

yond the Channel into the island of Britain.¹ On the south, after the annexation of the kingdom of Egypt in 30 B.C. and of the kingdom of Numidia in 25 B.C., the coastland of North Africa from the Nile to the Atlantic was either under Roman rule, or as was the case with the kingdom of Mauretania, acknowledged Roman suzerainty, while behind this coastland stretched the interminable expanse of the African desert.² The only danger here arose from the incursions of the nomad tribes, Gætulians and others, and more than once during the reign of Augustus, we find the Roman forces engaged in frontier wars with these troublesome neighbours.³ But the elaborate system of frontier defence, with its permanent camps, frontier stations, and connecting roads, of which such splendid remains are still extant, belongs to a later period.

In the East, Rome was confronted, not by a disorderly mass of barbarous tribes, but by a single powerful state, whose ruler styled himself "King of Kings," and claimed to be the lord of Asia, a state which had once at least all but wrested from Rome her Eastern provinces. The annexation of Syria in 62
 629 A.U.C. B.C. had brought Parthia and Rome face to face. The disaster at Carrhæ (53 B.C.)
 701 A.U.C. had created a genuine fear of this new power, which the Parthian invasion in Asia Minor in 40 B.C. and the failure of Antony's expedition in

The eastern frontier.

¹ Tac., *Agv.*, 13: "*longa oblivio Britannia.*"

² Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., chaps. xii., xiii.: Cagnat, *L'Armée Romaine d'Afrique*, Paris, 1892.

³ Florus, ii., 31; Dio, lv., 28; Mommsen, *Ad Mon. Anc.*, p. 170: Cagnat, *l. c.*, chap. i.

36 B.C. had deepened and confirmed. On the other hand, the restoration of peace and unity to the empire after the victory at Actium, and the internal dissensions which temporarily crippled the power of Parthia,¹ relieved the public anxiety, and when in 20 B.C. the mere presence of Augustus in Syria was enough to induce Phraates to restore the lost standards, and "solicit the friendship of the Roman people,"² the Roman public at any rate ceased to alarm itself about the possible designs of Parthia. But Augustus, as the guardian of the Roman peace, must have realised the importance of arriving at some definite settlement of the future relations between the two powers which divided the allegiance of the East between them. The invasion of Parthia was an enterprise for which he had little taste, and which, even if successful, must have been both costly and hazardous. Nor was the frontier line very clearly defined. It is true that the province of Syria possessed natural boundaries to the eastward in the desert and the Euphrates, but north of this it was otherwise. Between the most easterly of the Roman provinces in Asia Minor, Bithynia, Galatia, and Cilicia, and the Euphrates lay the three native states of Pontus, Cappadocia, and Commagene, whose fidelity to Rome was tolerably secure, but whose value as a bulwark against invasion was more doubtful. Their annexation was unquestionably a necessary step if the Euphrates line was to be

¹ Comp. Nöldeke's article "Persia" in *Encycl. Brit.*; Gardner's *Parthian Coinage*, pp. 10 *sqq.*; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., chap. 9.

² *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, v., 40; Dio, liv., 8.

effectively defended; but it was one which Augustus left for his successors to take. Beyond the Upper Euphrates lay Armenia, a district which seemed marked out by nature as a debatable land. Its annexation could not be urged as a matter of necessity, and Augustus tells us that he deliberately rejected the idea.¹ He preferred to leave it a friendly and independent state within what we should now call the Roman "sphere of influence," and guided in its policy by Roman counsels. It was the restoration of Roman influence in Armenia and nothing more that prompted the expedition of 734 A.U.C. Tiberius in 20 B.C.,² and of Gaius Cæsar in 4 B.C.,³ and in this respect Augustus's policy was followed by all the emperors of the first 741 A.U.C. century. Like Afghanistan between England and Russia, Armenia remained planted between the two great empires of the world, inclining now to Rome and now to Parthia.⁴ On the eastern frontier,

¹ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, v., 24: "*Armeniam majorem, interfecto regis ejus Artaxe c[u]m possem facere provinciam, malui majorum nostrorum exemplo regnum id Tigrani . . . reddere.*" Of Armenia Tacitus remarks (*Ann.*, ii., 56): "*ambigua gens ea antiquitus hominum ingeniis et situ terrarum.*"

² *Mon. Anc.*, l. c. The investiture of Tigranes with the Armenian crown was described as a recovery of Armenia on the coins and by the historians. Cohen, *Médailles*, i., p. 64. Suet., *Aug.*, 21. Vell. ii., 95.

³ Since 20 B.C. Parthian influence had again become dominant *Mon. Anc.*, l. c.: "*Eandem gentem postea d[escis] centem et rebellantem, domitam per Gatium filium meum, regi Ario[barz]ani . . . regendam tradidi.*" Dio, lv., 9; Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 3.

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 3: "*inter Parthorum et Romanas opes infida* *Id.*, ii., 56: "*Maximis imperiis interjecti.*"

as on the southern, the organisation of an efficient system of frontier defence was not among the achievements of Augustus. But here, as on the north, he seems to have recognised the necessity of placing over the heads of the provincial governors a trusted officer, invested with the command of the East. This important command, entrusted to Agrippa for ten years (23-13 B.C.),¹ was analogous to those established on the ⁷³¹⁻⁷⁴¹ A.U.C. Rhine and the Danube; and in the East as in the West, it did much to remedy the evils which the decentralisation of authority customary in former days had produced.

On the north the considerations in favour of a forward policy were stronger.² The conquest of Gaul, and the increasing weakness ^{The northern} of the Celtic and Illyrian tribes which still ^{frontier.} lay between the civilised Mediterranean lands and the great rivers, had imposed upon Rome the duty of protecting the former against the northern barbarians. In this direction the traditional policy³ to which Augustus had adhered in the East was impossible, for with the single exception of the kingdom of Noricum,⁴ there were no states capable of filling the place of "buffer" between Rome and her foes. Annexation was inevitable, and Augustus ac-

¹ Josephus, *Antiq.*, xv., 9, 10; xvi., 3.

² Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., chaps. 1, 4, and 6.

³ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, v., 26: "*majorum nostrorum exemplo.*" Tac., *Agric.*, xiv.: "*vetere ac jam pridem recepta P. R. consuetudine, ut haberet instrumenta servitutis et reges.*"

⁴ Noricum, after its conquest, was still styled a kingdom, though administered by a procurator, as resident political agent. Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 136; *C. I. L.* iii., 4828: "*procurator regni Norici.*"

cepted the necessity. By the close of his reign a continuous chain of provinces had been formed along the line of the Rhine and Danube from the German Ocean to the Black Sea. These frontier provinces, Gallia Belgica, Rætia (15 B.C.), Noricum (15 B.C.), Pannonia (10 A.D.), Mœsia (6 A.D.),² completely covered the peaceful districts to the south, and all were under Cæsar's rule. The debatable land between Romans and Germans had thus been annexed by Rome, but a further question remained to be decided: Was the natural boundary line of the Rhine and the Danube³ to be accepted as marking the frontier? In the case of the Danube⁴ the question seems to have been at once answered in the affirmative, but with the Rhine it was otherwise. The Elbe offered an alternative frontier-line, which, if adopted, would have removed the danger of a German invasion farther from Italy and southern Gaul, and which Julius himself is said to have preferred.⁴ Nor can we doubt that the object of the campaigns carried on beyond the Rhine by Augustus's two step-sons, Drusus and Tiberius (13 B.C.-6 A.D.), had for their object the extension of Roman rule up to that river. For a time, too, this forward

¹ After the great Pannonian war, 6-9 A.D. Marquardt, *l. c.* i., 137.

² The first mention of a legate of Mœsia belongs to this year. Dio. lv., 29. The country had been subdued as early as 29 B.C. by P. Crassus, proconsul of Macedonia. Dio, li., 25.

³ *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, v., 45: "*protulique fines Illyrici [ad] r[iv]u[m] fluminis Dan[uv]i*" The expedition "*[tran]s Danuvium*" in *Ann. l. c.* 49, merely chastised the Dacians; it is placed by Mommsen in 5 A.D. Mommsen, *Ad Mon. Anc.*, p. 132.

⁴ Plut., *Cæsar*, 58.

policy seemed to be justified by success. Drusus reached the Elbe in 9 B.C.,¹ and after his death in that year Tiberius carried on his work. By 9 A.D. considerable progress had been made² towards the creation of a Roman province of Germany beyond the Rhine. Roman troops were regularly stationed there. Bridges, roads, and canals were in course of construction. Roman administration and Roman taxation had been introduced, and Roman civilisation was beginning to make way among the natives, and, most significant of all, the official worship of Rome and Augustus had been introduced, the chief seat of which was the altar of Augustus in the territory of the Ubii.³ But this gradual work of pacification was brought to an abrupt end by the defeat of Varus (9 A.D.),⁴ and Augustus, already failing in health and strength, had not the heart to renew it. He withdrew behind the Rhine, and in his last testament solemnly warned his successors against attempting to advance beyond it.⁵ Of the final adoption of the Rhine frontier, and of the system of defence organised both on the Rhine and the Danube by his successors, we shall speak in a later chapter.

¹ Dio, lv., 1.

² *Mon. Anc. Gk.*, xiv., 5: Γερμανίαν . . . μέχρι στόματος Ἀλβίου ποταμοῦ (ἢ) ἐν εἰρήνῃ κατέστησα.

³ Dio, lvi., 18. Tacitus mentions a fort of Drusus on the Taunus (*Ann.*, i., 56), a *castellum* on the Lippe (*ib.*, ii., 7); *pontes longi* (*ib.*, i., 63); *fossa Drusiana* (*ib.*, ii., 3), for the *ara Ubiorum*, see *Tac.*, *Ann.*, i., 57.

⁴ Dio, lvi., 18 *sqq.* On the vexed question of the scene of Varus's defeat, see Mommsen, *D. Oertlichkeit d. Varusschlacht* (Berlin, 1885); *ib.*, *R. G.*, v., 43. Höfer, *Die Varusschlacht* (Leipzig, 1888). It was near Paderborn in Münster.

⁵ *Tac.*, *Ann.*, i., 11: "addiderat consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii."

In the north, however, as in the east, Augustus followed the policy of centralising the administration. Throughout nearly the whole of his reign the command of the Rhineland was united with the governor-generalship of the "three Gauls,"¹ and for a time at least the Danubian provinces were similarly united under one authority.²

The military reforms of Augustus are inseparable from his frontier policy. At the close of the republican period the Roman army was at once
The army. a source of political danger to the home government and an intolerable burden upon the provincials. In theory, it was still a militia called out year by year for the defence of the state; in fact, it had become a standing army, and the result was complete confusion. The old regulations, under which every Roman citizen took his turn of service in the legion, and when the campaign was over returned home to resume his ordinary business, had become obsolete. Large numbers never served at all, nor for those who did was any definite period of service fixed. When discharged the veteran had no legal claim to pension or reward; his sole hope lay in the ability of his leader to procure from senate and people by political agitation a grant of money or land, in return for which he was expected to support by his vote, or even by his sword, his leader's political schemes. Nor was this army subject to any single control; it was, in fact, not so much an

¹ The command was held by Agrippa, Tiberius, and Drusus in turn. Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 116.

² Under Agrippa in 13 B.C. (Dio, liv., 28); Tiberius in 6 A.D. (Dio, liv., 20).

army as a group of armies raised, led, and maintained by independent and often hostile generals; faithful to these rather than to the state, but faithful even to them only while booty was plentiful. In the intervals of active service the soldiers lived at free quarters in the provinces at the expense of the provincials. During the stormy period of the civil wars the total number of troops arrayed under the banners of rival leaders increased rapidly, and at the close of that period there were no less than fifty legions on foot.¹ Augustus's first act was to reduce this unwieldy force by one half, the discharged soldiers being either granted lands or sent home with a gratuity in money.² The remainder, consisting of about twenty-five legions,³ he organised as a permanent, regular force for the defence of the empire. The supreme command was vested in himself. Only by his orders could fresh levies be raised.⁴ Each recruit took an oath of allegiance to Cæsar, according to a form drawn up by Augustus himself;⁵ from Augustus he received his pay while serving with the eagles, his formal discharge when his time

¹ Mommsen, *Ad Mon. Anc.*, p. 7.

² *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, i., 17-19. The number discharged he gives at more than 300,000, but these figures possibly include those disbanded after Philippi, and again after the defeat of Sextus Pompeius in 36 B.C. *Ib.*, *Lat.*, iii., 17, states that in 29 B.C. about 120,000 discharged soldiers in his colonies received gratuities.

³ Tac., *Ann.*, iv., 5, about 150,000 men.

⁴ Dio, liii., 17; *Dig.*, xlviii., 4, 3.

⁵ Dio, lvii., 3. Suet., *Aug.*, 49: "*ad certam stipendiorum, pramiorumque formulam adstrinxit, definitis pro gradu cujusque et temporibus militiæ, et commodis missionum, ne aut ætate aut inopia post missionem, sollicitari ad res novas, possent.*"

was up, and his reward in land or money. The conditions of service, moreover, were fixed. The old liability to military service resting on all Roman citizens was not abolished, nor could any one but a Roman citizen serve in the legions. But it was only rarely that a forced levy was necessary.¹ The establishment of peace diminished both the demand for fresh troops and the losses by war; the spread of the Roman franchise enlarged the area from which recruits could be drawn, and the fresh drafts required to keep the legions effective were, as a rule, obtained by voluntary enlistment. The term of service in the ranks was fixed at sixteen years, and four years' more were spent in the reserve.² After twenty years' service the legionary could claim his discharge and a gratuity—the money for the latter being provided out of a "military chest" created by Augustus in 6 A.D. and fed by special taxes.³

The legion now became in theory, as well as in practice, a standing corps, as is shown by the fact that of the twenty-five legions on foot at the accession of Tiberius, eighteen were still in existence in

¹ *E.g.*, after the defeat of Varus in 9 A.D. Tac., *Ann.*, i., 31. Cf., *ib.*, iv., 4; xiii., 7.

² This term was probably fixed when the "pension chest" was created in 6 A.D. *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, iii., 38, gives twenty years' service as the minimum period entitling to a gratuity, and this regulation was upheld by Tiberius. Tac., *Ann.*, i., 78.

³ "Sub vexillis." Tac., *Ann.*, i., 17; *ib.*, i., 36: "missionem et vicena stipendia meritis, exauctorari qui sena dena fecissent, ac rebus sub vexillo, ceterorum immunes, nisi propulsandi hostes."

⁴ The "ararium militare" established 6 A.D. *Mon. Anc. Lat.*, i., 36; Suet., *Aug.*, 49. It was fed by the legacy duty and the "crusima rerum venalium." Dio, lv., 25; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 78; ii., 42.

the third century; ¹ it bore a distinctive number and name, and was commanded by its own legionary legate.² Naturally, too, the characteristic features of the ancient civic militia disappeared. The old principle, according to which the people chose the men who were to "go before them" to battle,³ was finally abandoned.⁴ The Roman of senatorial or knightly dignity no longer entered the ranks, and the common soldiers only rarely rose to the rank of officer.⁵

The legions, under the system introduced by Augustus, formed the first line of the imperial army. Behind them stood the auxiliary forces, the "allies," as they continued to be called, in memory of the days when the Italian contingents had fought side by side with the legions of Rome. Auxiliary troops drawn from the provinces, or from vassal states, or even from warlike frontier tribes, had been largely used in the latter days of the republic, and still more during the civil wars. But from Augustus dates their institution as a regular supplement to the legions.⁶ They were

The
auxiliaries

¹ Dio, lv., 23; Plitzner, *Geschichte d. röm. Kaiserlegionen* (Leipzig, 1881). Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, ii., 430 sqq.

² The "*legatus legionis*" was a senator, and usually, though not always, of prætorian rank; Tac., *Hist.*, i., 48; *Ann.*, ii., 36.

³ The *prætor* = *στράτηγος*.

⁴ A proportion of the "*tribuni militum*" had been elected by the people, and these "*tribuni militum a populo*" occur on inscriptions of the Augustan period. It is doubtful, however, if they really served; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 543.

⁵ The two forms of service were distinguished as "*militia equestris*" and "*militia caligata*."

⁶ Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, ii., 448 sqq.

drawn from the more warlike provinces, and the martial spirit of Gauls, Spaniards, and Galatians was thus afforded an outlet, which compensated them for the dull days of peace, which had come with Roman rule, and at the same time bound them by the tie of military loyalty to Rome and to Cæsar. These auxiliary cohorts and squadrons bore the name of the tribe or district from which, at least in the early days of the empire, they were recruited, and retained in some cases their native equipments and mode of fighting.¹ But while their national or tribal pride was thus gratified, long service with the legions, usually under Roman officers, far away from their native land, helped to make them soldiers of Rome, while when his twenty-five years of service were over, the auxiliary received, on his discharge, the full citizenship of Rome for himself and his descendants.²

The distribution of this force clearly indicated the chief purpose which it served. Italy and the peaceful provinces in the heart of the empire saw little or nothing of the force which protected them, and gradually ceased even to contribute soldiers to its ranks. At the end of Augustus's reign³ twelve legions guarded the northern frontier, four were stationed in Syria, and four more garrisoned Egypt and the African provinces. There were, besides, three in Spain and two in Dalmatia.

*Distribution
of the army.*

¹ *Ib.*, *l. c.*, 454; Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 16; xiii., 37.

² Marquardt, *l. c.*, 525; and the numerous inscriptions giving the order of discharge granted to auxiliaries.

³ Tac. *Ann.*, iv., 5.

Augustus had used the powers entrusted to him well. He had reformed the administration both in the provinces and at home; he had at least marked out the frontiers of the empire, and organised an imperial army for their defence. Within these bounds the "Roman peace" was securely established, and the echoes of distant border wars scarcely reached the ears of the quiet populations of the central provinces. But his powers, though continued to him during his life, by successive renewals,¹ would expire with his death, and it was urgently necessary to provide beforehand that there should be some one able and ready to fill his place. He could not transmit his authority by any act of his own, nor on his death would the senate and people be legally obliged to grant such powers to any one at all. What he could do, was to make clear to every one who it was that he wished should succeed him, and to give him opportunities of gaining the necessary experience and prestige. This object Augustus kept steadily in view almost from the commencement of his principate, in spite of disappointments which might have daunted a weaker man.² The trusted friends of his early days, Mæcenas and Agrippa, were too old for his purpose, though both were valuable colleagues, and though Agrippa for fifteen years was his partner in the government of the empire, vested with the *imperium* and with the tribunician power.³ He had no sons

The question
of the
succession.

¹ Dio, liii., 16; *Journal of Philology*, xvii., 27.

² Tac., *Ann.*, i., 3.

³ From 28-12 B.C.; Dio, liv., 12: ἄλλα τε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ

of his own, and it was on his nephew Marcellus,¹ the son of his sister Octavia, that his choice first fell. But in 23 B.C. Marcellus died, at the
 731 A.U.C. age of nineteen, to the grief of the Roman people, by whom, for his own and his mother's sake, he was sincerely loved.² Augustus's thoughts seemed to have turned next to his two step-sons,
 742 A.U.C. Tiberius and Drusus. On the death of Agrippa (12 B.C.) both were promoted to high commands in Illyricum and in Germany.³ But
 745 A.U.C. Drusus died in 9 B.C., and though three years later Tiberius was invested with the tribunician power (6 B.C.) and entrusted with a mission to Armenia,⁴ Augustus's special
 748 A.U.C. favour was bestowed on the two young sons born to Agrippa by his own daughter Julia, whom he had adopted in 17 B.C.⁵ In
 757 A.U.C. spite of the fact that Julia had, after Agrippa's death, been married to Tiberius, the latter found himself thrown into the shade by the two young Cæsars.⁶ It was, however, only for a time. Lucius

καὶ τὴν ἑξουσίαν τὴν δημαρχικὴν (18 B.C.). At the Sæcular Games in the next year, the prayers and sacrifices were offered by Augustus and Agrippa, as the recently discovered record of the festival tells us. For the legal nature of the collegueship, see Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 1040 *sqq.*

¹ His father, C. Claudius Marcellus, was consul in 50 B.C.

² Dio, liii., 30; Plin., *N. H.*, xix., 6; Propertius, i i., 18, 15; Serv. *ad Æn.*, vi., 862; Vell, ii., 93; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 3.

³ Dio, liv., 31, 32.

⁴ Dio, lv., 9.

⁵ Dio, liv., 18; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 3.

⁶ Suet., *Tib.*, 10; *Mon. Anc. L.*, iii., 1-6; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 3; "*principes juventutis appellari, destinari consules.*" Cf. Wilmanns, 883.

Cæsar died at Massilia in 2 A.D., and in the next year his elder brother, Gaius, who had been consul in 1 A.D., died on his way home from Armenia, the death of both being hastened, it was said, by the arts of Tiberius's ambitious mother, Livia.¹ In the year following (4 A.D.), Tiberius was adopted by Augustus as his son; and reinvested with the *imperium* and the tribunician power.² Ten years later (13 A.D.) he was formerly authorised to 767 A.U.C. take the census, and to administer the provinces in conjunction with Augustus.³

On August 19, 14 A.D., the anniversary of his election to his first consulship, Augustus died at Nola, at the age of 75.⁴ During Death of Augustus. forty-one years he had successfully played the difficult part of ruling without appearing to rule, of being at once the autocratic master of the civilised world, and the first citizen of a free commonwealth. He had gained the affections of the provincials and of the Italian people, he had pleased the Roman *plebs*, and he had done his best to conciliate the nobility. He left behind him an adopted son, of whose fitness to fill his place there could be little doubt, a trained administrator, a tried soldier, and by birth as noble as any Cæsar. It was with good reason that he asked for the applause of his audience as he left the stage.⁵ His ashes were deposited in the Mausoleum

¹ Tac., *Ann.* i., 3; Dio, lv., 12.

² Dio, lv., 13.

³ Dio, lv., 28; *Mon. Anc. L.*, ii., 9; Vell, ii., 21: "*ut æquum ei jus in omnibus provinciis exercitibusque esset.*" Suet., *Tib.*, 21.

⁴ Tac., *Ann.* i. 9; Suet., *Aug.*, 100; Dio, lvi., 30.

⁵ Suet., *Aug.*, 99: "*ecquid videretur mimum vitæ commode trans-egisse,*" *et sqq.*

which he had erected at Rome,¹ and near which stood the bronze tablets,² on which were recorded by his orders, "his acts and all that he did, how he brought the world under the rule of Rome, and the moneys which he spent upon the commonwealth and the Roman people." Of this unique epitaph a copy is still extant, the famous "Ancyran Monument."³

¹ Suet., *Aug.*, 100: "*inter Flaminiam viam, ripamque Tiberis.*"

² Suet., *Aug.*, 101: "*quæ ante Mausoleum statuerentur.*"

³ So called from Ancyra in Galatia, where it was found. The best edition (with commentary) is that by Mommsen, Berlin, 1883. The extant copy is headed, "*Rerum gestarum divi Augusti, quibus orbem terra[rum] imperio populi Rom. subiecit et impensarum quas in rempublicam populumque Ro[ma]num fecit, incisarum in duabus athenis pilis, quæ su[n]t Romæ posite, exemplar sub[j]ectum.*"

CHAPTER IV.

THE JULIO-CLAUDIAN LINE. 14 A.D.—69 A.D.

FOR more than half a century after the death of Augustus, his place was filled by emperors who, either by blood or adoption, claimed kinship with himself and with Julius, and all of whom at least professed to rule according to the "maxims of Augustus."¹ The first and by far the ablest, Tiberius, was over fifty at the time of his accession.² He is described as tall and noble-looking, with great physical strength and an iron constitution.³ He was highly cultivated, and both on his father's and his mother's side he came of a distinguished line of ancestors.⁴ In addition, he had shown himself a brave and skilful commander; he had ruled great provinces,

The
Emperors.

Tiberius.

¹ Suet., *Nero*, 10: "*ex Augusti præscripto.*"

² He was born in 42 B.C. and was therefore fifty-six years old. Suet., *Tib.*, 5; Dio, *lvii.*, 2, 14.

³ Suet., *Tib.*, 68.

⁴ His father was Tiberius Claudius Nero; his mother Livia came of one of the noblest of the plebeian families. Among her ancestors were the consul of 207 B.C., M. Livius Salinator, the conqueror of Hasdrubal, and M. Livius Drusus, the tribune of 91 B.C. Before his adoption by Augustus he was styled "*Tiberius Claudius Ti. fil Nero,*" afterwards Tiberius Cæsar, finally "*Tiberius Cæsar divi Aug. f. Augustus.*"

and was thoroughly well-versed in the business of administration both at home and abroad. Yet few rulers have ever been more unpopular in their lifetime, or more violently denounced when dead. Of his unpopularity there seems no doubt, and it is not difficult to explain. Its causes are to be found partly in his personal temperament, partly in the circumstances of his position. Unfortunately for himself, he inherited to the full the hereditary pride, which had made the great Claudian house proverbially unpopular with nobles and commons alike.¹ Towards those who stood nearest to him, towards his mother Livia, his brother Drusus, and his first wife Agrippina,² he was capable of intense and enduring affection; but towards the rest of the world he showed himself cold, reserved, and taciturn, with something more than a tinge of cynical melancholy.³ These traits in his character had been developed and confirmed by the dangers, sorrows, and disappointments which clouded the first forty-six years of his life. The hardships of his childhood,⁴ the forced separation from Agrippina,⁵ his ill-starred marriage

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 4: "*maturum annis, spectatum bello, sed veteri atque insita Claudia familia superbia.*"

² Suet., *Tib.*, vii., 8; Tac., *Ann.*, v., 3: "*inveteratum erga matrem obsequium.*"

³ Our chief ancient authorities for Tiberius's character and policy are Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio; for modern literature see Schiller, *Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit*, i.; Furneaux, *Annals of Tacitus*, vol. i., Introd.; Freytag, *Tacitus u. Tiberius* (Berlin, 1870). Tarrer, *Tiberius the Tyrant* (London, 1902). Pelham, *Quarterly Review*, April, 1905.

⁴ Suet., *Tib.*, 6: "*infantiam laboriosam et exercitam,*" owing to the exile of his parents after the Perusine war.

⁵ Suet., *Tib.*, 7.

with Julia, the death of his brother Drusus, and the gloomy years of seclusion from 6 B.C. to 2 A.D., when he saw himself thrust aside in favour of the two young Cæsars, had all left their marks upon him.¹

It is easy to understand how irksome such a man must have found the difficult and delicate part, which tried the patience even of so accomplished and versatile an actor as Augustus. For the serious business of government he had both a liking and a rare capacity, but to govern, under the condition of respecting fictions, in which no one believed, of pampering the tastes of a populace whom he despised, and of conciliating a nobility whom he disliked and suspected, was a task which was for him "a wretched and oppressive slavery,"² and for which he was, of all men, the most unfitted. The *plebs* of Rome resented his contemptuous indifference to their pleasures, his parsimony in the matter of games,³ and, though far less deeply, the withdrawal from them of the right to play at electing the magistrates of the year.⁴ The nobles both feared and disliked the dour and stern Cæsar, whose exclusiveness offended, and whose somewhat cynical courtesies frightened them. Nor outside Rome, in Italy and the provinces, though respected as a just and vigorous ruler, did he win, or even care to win, popularity. Augustus was personally

¹ Suet., *Tib.*, 12; Dio, lv., 9.

² Suet., 24: "*miseram et onerosam servitutem.*"

³ Suet., 34; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 54: "*civile rebatur (Aug.) misceri voluptatibus vulgi, alia Tiberio morum via.*"

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 15.

known in every province; Tiberius's longest journey was to Capri.¹ His severe economy was an unwelcome contrast to the splendid liberality of Augustus. He exhibited no games; he gave but few largesses, and he was no munificent builder of temples, aqueducts, and bridges.²

The situation, too, was difficult: Tiberius did not enjoy the unbounded personal prestige which strengthened Augustus's hands in 27 B.C. The anomalous character of the princeps' position, which had been forgotten during the long reign of his predecessor, became evident the moment that it had to be created afresh for his successor,³ and even his claim to fill it might not impossibly be disputed by this or that wealthy noble,⁴ or even by his nephew and adopted son Germanicus.⁵ The mutinies in Pannonia and on the Rhine (14 A.D.), and the conspiracy of Libo Drusus (16 A.D.) indicated the quarters whence dangers threatened him as it threatened not a few emperors after him. The latter event specially deepened, if it did not first arouse, that suspicious mistrust of the old nobility, the irreconcilable foes of Julius, the secret rivals occasionally even of Augustus, which ultimately drove him into a violent onslaught upon them.⁶ Yet even Tacitus

¹ Suet., 38., 39.

² *Ib.*, 46: "*pecunia parcus actenaxe*"; 47: "*naga opera ulis magnificia fecit; neque spectacula omnino edidit*," *ib.*, 48.

³ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 12; Suet., 24.

⁴ Augustus had indicated three possible rivals. Tac., *Ann.*, i., 13.

⁵ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 7.

⁶ Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 27; Suet., 27: "*lupum auribus teneo*."

can praise his conduct of the government during the first nine years of his reign.¹ From that period onwards everything conspired to intensify the defects in his character. The deaths of his own son Drusus, his destined successor (23 A.D.), and of his mother and constant counsellor, Livia,² seemed to leave him alone among open or secret enemies. His court was distracted by palace intrigues and feuds,³ and even his closest adviser, the ambitious and unscrupulous Sejanus, proved faithless and unworthy. For the remaining six years of his life, the lonely old man, soured and disappointed, lived unattended, except by dependents in the island of Capri.

Such was one side of the picture, and it is the one which the genius of Tacitus has fixed in the memory of posterity. He drew his materials, for the most part, from writers bitterly hostile to Tiberius, who exaggerated his faults, misinterpreted his motives, and recklessly adopted any story, however baseless, which agreed with their view of his character.⁴ They belonged, as a rule, to the senatorial order, or to the literary and philosophic circles with whom republicanism was the fashion, or, like the younger Agrip-

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, iv., 6, 7.

² *Ib.*, v., 1. Livia died in 29 A.D.

³ These family feuds had begun earlier. Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 43.

⁴ *divisa namque et discors aula erat, tacitis in Drusum aut Germanicum studiis," cf. ib.* iv., 17, 40. The women played a prominent part, Livia on one side, and the two Agrippinas, Germanicus's wife and daughter, on the other.

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, iv., 11: as to the story that Tiberius poisoned his son Drusus, "*neque quisquam scriptor tam insensus existit ut Tiberio obiectaret, cum omnia alia conquirerent, intenderentque.*"

pina, had personal and family wrongs to avenge,¹ and they painted Tiberius as nothing but a treacherous and cruel tyrant. The version of his conduct, which they had set in circulation, Tacitus accepted, not, it is true, without doubts and reservations, but with far too ready a faith, and devoted himself rather to heightening its effects by all the devices of rhetoric, than to weighing the evidence on which it rested. It must be remembered, also, that it was in Rome, and in his relations with Roman society, that Tiberius was seen at his worst. Yet beyond these narrow limits, neither Tacitus nor his authorities cared to cast more than a passing glance. They judged of the emperor and of the imperial government from this point of view. Of the manner in which the empire was ruled, of the condition of the provinces, they tell us little, and probably did not care to know much. But a critical study even of their narrative, and still more of the comparatively impartial evidence supplied by provincial writers, and by inscriptions, enables us to form a more correct judgment. Tiberius was not a lovable man; he was morose and suspicious, and suspicion, as it increased its hold upon him, made him in his later years a terror to all who could be suspected of treason. He was hated in Rome, and not without cause. Yet there is no doubt that he was a capable and vigorous ruler, and that the empire fared well under his care. He enforced justice in the government of the provinces; he maintained the integrity of the frontiers

¹ Tacitus refers by name to the "Commentaries of the Younger Agrippina," as an authority. *Ann.*, iv., 53.

and the discipline of the legions; he husbanded the finances, and left a full treasury behind him. In the details of administration, and on questions of social and economic reform, he displayed judgment and common-sense. Utterly unlike as he was to Augustus, yet, as the ruler of a great empire, he justified the latter's choice of a successor, and his deliberate opinion that the virtues of his adopted son outweighed his vices.¹

A very different verdict must be passed on the three remaining emperors of the Julian line. All three were immeasurably inferior in capacity and force of character, and only one, the Emperor Claudius, has any claims to serious consideration as a statesman. Tiberius died in March, 37 A.D., and a few days later² Gaius Cæsar was saluted as imperator, and invested with the prerogatives once given to Augustus.³ The new *princeps* was accepted with enthusiasm. He was young⁴; he was the son of Germanicus, the grandson of Drusus, and, through his mother Agrippina, the great grandson of Augustus himself; a relationship on which he laid especial stress.⁵ The legions in particular welcomed the son of their favourite general, who had himself been brought up in their midst.⁶ At first, too, Gaius's own conduct served to justify the gen-

Gaius.

¹ Suet., 21.

² On March 18. *Acta Fratr. Arv.*, ed. Henzen, p. 63.

³ Dio, lix. 3; Suet., *Gaius*, 13.

⁴ He was in his twenty-fifth year, having been born in 12 A.D.

⁵ He frequently mentions it on coins, to the exclusion of other relationships. Cohen, *Méd.*, i., p. 237.

⁶ Suet., *Gaius*, 9; hence his cognomen "Caligula."

eral hope of a return to the liberal and genial government of Augustus. The senate was gratified by his declared intention of respecting its prerogatives and those of the magistrates,¹ though it probably laughed in secret at his idea of restoring to the people the elective duties which Tiberius had taken from them.² Equally popular were his remissions of taxation, his release of political prisoners, his removal of the ban placed on the writings of Cremutius Cordus, and, above all, the revival of the public largesses and games. But Gaius had sat but a few months in the seat of Augustus before the difference between the "young Augustus" as he was called, and his great namesake became clear to every one. Even Tiberius was regretted, for Tiberius, stern and gloomy though he was, had at least ruled,³ while Gaius was the slave of all who pandered to his pleasures, and neither in his good nor his bad actions knew any other guide than his own wild caprices and uncontrolled passions. If he posed at first as a liberal and popular ruler it was from a desire to insult the memory of Tiberius and glorify himself, rather than from any serious considerations of policy. But this mood soon passed, and his conduct during the rest of his brief reign was that of a madman intoxicated with a delirious sense of omnipotence, and with no other aim in the use of his power than the gratification of the fancy of the moment. He wasted the savings accumulated by Tiberius in countless excesses, and when they were

¹ Dio, lix. 3; Suet., *Gaius*, xv., 16.

² Dio, lix., 9; Suet., *l. c.*, 16.

³ Dio, lix.,

gone he plundered the rich,' and alike in Italy and in Gaul men were hurried to execution, whose only crime was their wealth. While claiming divine honours for himself, he heaped insults on the senate and magistrates, and preferred the society of grooms and jockeys. Abroad, the contrast with the firm rule of Tiberius was shown by his mock invasions of Germany and Britain,¹ by his reckless liberality to worthless native princes at the expense of the dignity and safety of the empire, and by the insult wantonly offered to the religious feelings of the Jews. That Rome tolerated him so long proves the helplessness of the community before the master of the prætorian guards; that he inflicted no more lasting injury on the empire was due partly to the stability which the administrative system had acquired under Augustus and Tiberius, partly to the small share of attention he cared to give to the affairs of the government. On January 14, 41 A.D., this parody of a reign was ended by the assassination of Gaius in one of the passages of the vast palace which he had built for himself on the Palatine.²

Tiberius Claudius Cæsar,³ the son of Drusus and the brother of Germanicus, was fifty years old at the time of his

Claudius.
41-54 A.D.

¹ Dio, lix., 10.

² Dio, lix., 21, 59; Suet., xliii. 44; Tac., *Germanicus.*, 37: "*ingentes C. Cæsaris mina in ludibrium versa.*"

³ Suet., *Gaius*, 58; *C. I. L.*, i., p. 385.

⁴ For the reign of Claudius see besides Merivale and Schiller, *Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit*, i., 314 sqq.; Lehmann, *Claudius u. ihre Zeit* (Gotha, 1858).

nephew's murder.¹ That he should ever wear the imperial purple had been considered by every one both improbable and undesirable. From his boyhood upwards his sluggishness, his ungainly figure, awkward manners, and indistinct utterance, had made him an object of contempt and ridicule.² Even his mother declared that "nature had begun but never finished him." His grandmother Livia heartily despised him, and Augustus despaired of ever making him a presentable figure in the eyes of the Roman public.³ Throughout the reign of his uncle Tiberius he lived in seclusion. He was known to be a student, with a love of curious learning, but with an equally strong love for low society and coarse pleasures, a combination of tastes in which, as in other points, he curiously resembled our own King James I. On the accession of his nephew Gaius he was made consul, to the amusement and surprise of Rome; but his consulship over, he relapsed into his former position. His constitutional timidity and indolence, and his boorish habits, made him the butt of the court, while even his life was not always safe from his nephew's wild outbreaks of fury against everybody and everything around him. When, after the murder of Gaius, he was dragged from his hiding-place in the palace, and carried to the prætorian camp,⁴ neither he himself nor the senate, which was

¹ Suet., *Claud.*, 2. He was born at Lugdunum on Aug. 1, 10 B.C., the day on which the altar to Rome and Augustus was dedicated.

² Suet., *Claud.*, iii., 7.

³ Suet., *l. c.*

⁴ Suet., 10; Dio, lx., 1. The discovery of the only surviving Cæsar is commemorated by the coins, bearing the legend, "~~imperator~~ [ator] recept[o]." Cohen, i., p. 254.

already discussing the restoration of the republic,¹ nor the passers-by, who imagined that he was being hurried to execution, thought of him as a successor to Augustus. But the populace and the guards demanded "a single ruler"²; the senate gave way; and after two days of painful suspense, Claudius was formally invested with the customary honours and powers of the principate.

Of his merits as a ruler during the thirteen years of his reign, it is not easy to form a clear opinion. On the one hand, our authorities are never weary of representing him as a dull, undignified, pedantic, and timid man, ruled by women and freedmen,³ and addicted to coarse pleasures. Yet even the ancient historians recognise that he was something more than this, and the record of what was achieved by him or in his name confirms the impression. No doubt the mixture of good sense and folly, which Suetonius notices,⁴ is as apparent in him as in James I. His blind belief in unworthy favourites frequently misled him; his pedantic antiquarianism, and fussiness, were constantly exciting ridicule, and occasionally marred the effect of his most statesman-like acts; it must be allowed, too, that his nervous timidity was apt to make him suspicious and cruel. Yet when all is said and done, the fact remains that

¹ Suet., *Gaius*, 60; *Claud.*, 10: "*asserturi communem libertatem.*" Dio, lx., 1.

² Suet., *l. c.*: "*unum rectorem exposcente.*"

³ Dio, lx., 2; ἔδουλοκρατήθη τε ἅμα καὶ ἐγυναικοκρατήθη. So the writer (? Seneca) of the skit on Claudius's apotheosis, describing his reception by the gods, '*putares omnes illius esse liberos, adeo illum nemo curabat.*'

⁴ Suet., *Claud.*, 15.

the rule of Claudius left a deep and abiding mark on the history of the empire. To his reign belongs the annexation of Mauretania, of South Britain, of Thrace, and Judæa.¹ The Romanisation of the frontier lands along the Rhine and Danube received its first powerful impulse from him,² by the foundation of Cologne (*Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensis*) on the Rhine, and the gift of Roman rights to several towns in Noricum. The chiefs of the Gaulish clan of the *Ædii* were admitted to senatorial dignity, and, if Seneca may be trusted, Claudius was as lavish of the Roman franchise as Augustus had been sparing.³ In Rome and Italy his name was commemorated by solid and useful works, which contrasted equally with the parsimony of Tiberius and the senseless extravagance of Gaius, the two great aqueducts, *Aqua Claudia* and *Anio Novus*, the harbour at Ostia, the draining of the Fucine lake, and the continuation along the Adriatic coast of the *Via Valeria*.⁴ It was under Claudius, too, that a most important advance was made in the extension and organisation of that imperial administrative machinery, which Hadrian was to develop still further.⁵ The quæstor at Ostia was replaced by a procurator of Cæsar,⁶ an imperial procurator of "the public waters" appears for the first time,⁷ and, more significant still,

¹ See below, p. 502 *sqq.*

² Plin., *N. H.*, iii., 146. The construction of the *Via Claudia Augusta* over the Brenner Pass, "*a flumine Pado ad fluvium Danubium*," Wilm., 818, was an important part of the work.

³ Tac., *Ann.*, xi., 23; *Class. Review*, 1895, p. 441.

⁴ Suet., 20: "*opera magna, potiusque necessaria quam multa perfecit.*" Dio, lx., 11; *J. R. N.*, 6256.

⁵ Hirschfeld, *Untersuch.*, 286 *sqq.*

⁶ Suet., *Claud.*, 24.

⁷ Frontinus, *De Aquad.*, 116, 115.

these private servants of Cæsar were now first invested with a jurisdiction which elevated them to the rank of public officials.¹ With Claudius also commenced the transformation of Cæsar's household servants into ministers of state. The power and influence wielded by his three famous freedmen, Narcissus, his secretary, Pallas, the comptroller of accounts, and Polybius, his director of studies,² were an offence and a scandal in the eyes of Roman society; but the way was thus prepared for the establishment of a central imperial ministry in Rome, in which before long even Roman knights were eager to fill a place. If we add to these achievements his reforms in the civil law, his assiduity in the administration of justice,³ and the numerous proofs which exist of the attention he paid to the details of administration,⁴ we must acknowledge that many greater and better men have been worse rulers, and that in spite of Seneca's sarcasms, it was not without reason that Claudius alone, of the Cæsars between Augustus and Vespasian, received the honour of deification, or that the Gaulish noble and Roman senator Vindex coupled his name with that of Augustus as deserving of allegiance and honour.⁵

¹ Suet., *Claud.*, 12.

² Suet., *Claud.*, 28: for the offices of the freedmen "*ab epistulis*" and "*a rationibus*," see Hirschfeld, *Untersuch.*, 31 *sqq.*; Liebenam, *Laufbahn d. Procuratoren* (Jena, 1886), 50 *sqq.*; Friedländer, *Sittengesch.*, i., 160 *sqq.*

³ Suet., *Claud.*, 14.

⁴ In the improved arrangement for the corn supply, Suet., *Claud.*, 18; the establishment of fire brigades at Ostia and Puteoli, *ibid.*, 25; and generally Schiller, i., 329 *sqq.*

⁵ Dio, lxxiii., 22.

With Claudius's successor, Nero, the "family of the Cæsars" ended. He was the son of Germanicus's strong-willed daughter Agrippina, and of Nero
54-68 A.D. Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus. He was thus descended, through his mother, from Augustus himself, and through his father from Augustus's sister Octavia,¹ a pedigree which, added to the respect felt for the memory of his grandfather Germanicus, stood him in good stead with the Roman public. His accession, on the death of Claudius in 54 A.D., was, indeed, mainly due to the indomitable and unscrupulous perseverance of his mother, who, after the fall of Messalina, had gradually acquired so complete an ascendancy over Claudius, that, in spite of their relationship, he married her.² Before Claudius died Nero was already looked upon as his successor, to the exclusion of Claudius's own son Britannicus; and on the announcement of his death he was at once, and without opposition, saluted as emperor.³ Nero ruled for fifteen years, and his reign, with its brilliant opening and tragic close, its fantastic revels and frightful disasters, left a deep impression on the imagination of men. The insolent splendours, the savage cruelty, the disgraceful vices of Nero, stood out in lurid contrast with the soberer, quieter times that followed. In pagan literature he became a type of *ἵβρις*, which

¹ Agrippina's mother, the elder Agrippina, was the daughter of Julia. Cn. Domitius's mother was Antonia, daughter of Octavia. Suet., *Nero*, 5.

² Tac., *Ann.*, xii., 5, 6.

³ *Ibid.*, xii., 69; Suet., *Nero*, 8; the date was October, 13, 54 A.D. Comp. *Acta Fr. Arv.*, p. 63; for the principate of Nero, see Schiller, *Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit*, i.; Henderson, *Nero* (Methuen, 1903).

justly provokes the anger of the gods ; to the Christians he was a persecutor, drunk with the blood of the saints, the very incarnation of the power of evil. Yet, in spite of all, the name of the last of the race of Augustus was always invested with something of romantic history, not unmingled with regret. His memory was long cherished by the Roman populace, as that of an open-handed patron, and in Greece the recollections of his magnificence, his liberality, and his enthusiasm for art, were still fresh when Pausanias visited the country.¹ Into the details of Nero's rule it is not necessary to enter. The first five years, before "the wild beast had tasted blood," and while his course was guided by the philosopher Seneca and his trusted ally Afranius Burrus, prefect of the prætorian guard, were prosperous and uneventful.² But from 59 onwards there was a rapid change for the worse. The murder of his mother Agrippina (59 A.D.) was followed by the death of Burrus (62 A.D.) and the retirement of Seneca, and their place was taken by Tigellinus and Poppæa, to make room for whom Nero's innocent wife Octavia was sacrificed. The forebodings of evil, excited by the earthquake at Pompeii, and the reverses which befell the Roman legions in Armenia, were confirmed by the great fire which broke out in September, 64 A.D., and which was universally regarded as a proof of the displeasure of the gods. Nor was the belief that the reckless Cæsar was doomed, or the discontent with his rule weakened by the spectacle of the

¹ Suet., *Nero*, 57.

² Both were by origin provincials, Seneca being a Spaniard, and Burrus a native of Vaison (Vasio), in Narbonese Gaul. *C.I.L.*, xii., 5842, gives his previous career, as procurator to Livia, Tiberius, and Claudius.

famous "golden house," which he built for himself, and to defray the cost of which both Italy and the provinces were ruthlessly pillaged. In 65 the failure of Piso's conspiracy directed the fierce fury of the emperor against the nobles, while a pestilence decimated the populace of Rome. But the end was not far off. The anxiety to be rid of an emperor who disgraced the name of Augustus had spread from Rome to the provinces. In the midst of a triumphal progress through Greece, which scandalised Rome and the West almost as much as his vices and crimes, Nero was startled by rumours of disaffection in the western provinces. He reached Italy (March 68 A.D.) only to learn first that Gaul, Spain, Africa, and the legions on the Rhine were in revolt against him, and then that Galba was marching upon Rome. Deserted by every one, by senate, people, and even the prætorian guards, he sought shelter in the villa of his freedman Phaon, outside the city. There he heard of the proclamation of Galba as emperor, and of the sentence of death passed upon himself, and there, on June 9, 68 A.D., he anticipated the vengeance of his enemies by suicide.

If we turn from the Cæsars themselves to the condition of the empire, we notice how comparatively slight was the effect produced even by the wild excesses of Gaius or Nero. On the whole, there was a stability, a tranquillity and even a prosperity, which contrasts curiously with the atmosphere of intrigue, bloodshed, and profligacy which surrounded the persons of the emperors themselves. The explanation is, no

Condition of
the empire.
14-68 A.D.

doubt, to be found in the fact that the provinces were on the one hand scarcely affected by the vices and crimes of the individual emperors, and were, on the other, keenly sensible that the only alternative to Cæsarism was anarchy, and that a bad Cæsar was better than none at all.

Outwardly, the concordat established by Augustus, between the old republican constitution and the authority of Cæsar, had been maintained under his successors; and Nero himself had openly accepted its fundamental principle, that Cæsar was only a citizen charged with particular departments of administration, and bound as such to recognise the independent authority of his colleagues, the regular magistrates.¹ But the unreality of this partition of power was not to be concealed by such professions of respect for the "maxims of Augustus";² and the tendency to make the temporary, exceptional, and limited authority given to Augustus, permanent, regular, and absolute, was irresistible. Augustus's powers had been granted to him for a certain number of years, and the grant was periodically renewed. But his successors received their powers for life. Strictly speaking, there was no necessity that any successor to Augustus should be selected, or that when selected he should receive

The
government.

The position
of Cæsar.

¹ Tat., *Ann.*, xiii., 4: "*teneret antiqua munia senatus, consulum tribunalibus Italia et publica provinciæ adsisterent . . . se mandatis exercitibus consulturum.*"

² Suet., *Nero*, 10: "*ex Augusti præscripto se imperatorum professus.*"

the same prerogatives. Except, however, for a brief interval after the death of Gaius, and again after the fall of Nero, the first question was not even raised, and from the accession of Gaius onwards, a customary list of powers and privileges was voted *en bloc* and with little change to each Cæsar.¹ Moreover, the "princiate" granted to Augustus in recognition of his great services, was not only in process of being converted into a permanent institution with recognised prerogatives; it seemed also in a fair way to become a hereditary office, and the house of the Cæsars was fast assuming the position of a ruling house, with exclusive claims to sovereignty. It may be said, indeed, that the princiate was never so near becoming a legitimate monarchy, as on the eve of the catastrophe which overthrew Nero.

If it ceased to be possible to treat the princiate as a temporary and exceptional addition to the constitution, which might be dispensed with or retained at the discretion of senate and people, it was even more difficult to keep up the fiction that a clear line could be drawn between the authority of the *princeps* and that of the regular magistrates. The department originally assigned to Augustus had, during his long rule, been so widened and extended as to reduce all others to insignificance, and under his successors during this period, it continued to grow, though at a less rapid rate. Abroad the number of Cæsar's provinces had by 68 A.D., risen to twenty-five. On the south he

The extension of Cæsar's power.

¹ Dio, lix., 3; Pelham, *Journ. of Phil.*, xvii., 45, where the significance of the fragment usually entitled "*Lex de imperio Vespasiani*" is discussed.

was master of Egypt, Numidia, and Mauretania; in the West, two thirds of Spain, three fourths of Gaul and South Britain were subject to him. Along the northern frontier his authority stretched in an unbroken line from the German Ocean to the Euxine, while in the East it covered the eastern half of the peninsula of Asia Minor, Syria, and Judæa. Within the limits of Italy the defence of the coasts, the maintenance of the public roads, and the management of the public lands were in his hands. In Rome itself he was responsible for the corn supply, for the water supply, and for the police. It is easy to realise that an authority, recognised as supreme over so vast an area, must have been virtually supreme everywhere.

Under the shadow of Cæsar no independent authority could flourish. The assemblies of the Roman people or *plebs* lost even the little reality they retained under Augustus. After the change made by Tiberius,¹ they ceased even in form to elect the annual magistrates from the prætorship downwards, and in the case of the consulship, they merely accepted the candidates nominated by Cæsar.² Assemblies, it is true, were still held to confer his authority upon each new emperor, but otherwise they ceased, with one or two excep-

The
assembly.

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 15: "*tum primum e campo comita ad patres translata sunt*"; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 360, iii., 347. According to Velleius Paterculus (ii., 134), the change had been planned by Augustus.

² Pliny in the *Panegyric*, clearly implies that the consuls were still elected with the old formalities in the Campus Martius.

tions, to exercise their ancient prerogative of legislation.¹ It was still the fashion to speak of the consulship as the "supreme power,"² but Tiberius could truly say that "something greater and higher was expected of the *princeps*."³ The consuls still gave their name to the year: from the jurisdiction of the consuls sitting with the senate, there was no appeal to Cæsar,⁴ and the consulship was still a coveted prize. Yet when Caligula made his horse a consul, he only expressed, in a coarse and exaggerated form, the actually dependent position of the ancient chief magistracy of state. The consuls were avowedly Cæsar's nominees;⁵ they held office at the most for six months,⁶ and their exclusive dignity was impaired by the growing frequency with which the emperors bestowed the consular rank and insignia upon favourites of their own. As presidents of the senate, they ventured but rarely to introduce business without Cæsar's previous knowledge and approval, and even the criminal jurisdiction which they enjoyed jointly with the senate became more and more dependent on Cæsar's sufferance. The relations which

¹ Instances of legislation by the *comitia* occur under Tiberius and Claudius. Tac., *Ann.*, iv., 16; xi., 13; *Dig.*, xl., 1, 24. A "*lex agraria*" of Nerva is also mentioned, Dio, lxxviii., 2.

² Suet., *Calig.*, 26: "*fuitque per triduum sine summa potestate respublica*"; Tac., *Ann.*, iv., 19; Plin., *Paneg.*, 59.

³ Tac., *Ann.*, iii., 53.

⁴ *Dig.*, xlix., 2.

⁵ Seneca, *De Ira*, iii., 31; Plin., *Paneg.*, 77 "*ipsum [sc. Cæsarem] qui consules facit.*"

⁶ Suet., *Nero*, 15.

existed between the emperors of this period and the senate, afford equally clear ^{The senate.} proof of the unreality of the compromise effected by Augustus. Tiberius, during the greater part of his reign, showed an unmistakable desire to make the senate of real use in the work of government. Not only did he habitually bring before the senate matters of importance within his own department, consulting it even on questions so entirely within his own prerogative, such as the grievances of the soldiers, or negotiations with foreign powers; but he encouraged it to deal independently with those matters which nominally belonged to its own province, with the administration of the "public provinces," or with the condition of Italy.¹ But the task was a thankless one. From a body at once so sensitive on the score of its dignity, so suspicious of the emperor's intentions, and so conscious of its own powerlessness, no effective assistance could be expected. The senate accepted Cæsar's proposals submissively, and when left to act by itself, it either did nothing, or, as Tiberius complained, "cast all its cares upon him."² During the gloomy years which followed his retirement to Capri, it merely awaited in trembling anxiety the despatches which announced the emperor's pleasure. Under Tiberius's successors things were much the same. Before the wild outbursts of Gaius or Nero it cowered in terror.³ In quieter times, its nervous readiness to do what Cæsar pro-

¹ Suet., *Tib.*, 30.

² Tac., *Ann.*, iii., 35.

³ Suet., *Gaius*, 26; Dio, lix., 24.

posed, was only equalled by its reluctance to do anything else. But powerless as the magistrates and senate were, by comparison with Cæsar, it was not yet possible for the latter frankly to treat them as subordinates, or to ignore them. And the reason lay not so much in the prestige, which still attached to these ancient institutions, as in their close connection with the old nobility, with whom, and not with the senate as such, the early Cæsars lived at feud.¹ The old noblesse were the natural enemies of the new *régime*, which had raised the Julii and Claudii so far above the rest of their order; they resented their diminished importance, and while afraid openly to oppose Cæsar, they no less disliked obeying him. Nor could the more powerful and ambitious among them forget that legally the position of *princeps* was as open to them as to any Julius or Claudius; while in his turn the emperor looked upon each of them as possible if not actual rivals.² Even the rule of Augustus himself was not borne always with acquiescence; under his successors there was a standing quarrel. While the nobles intrigued and conspired, Cæsar replied by a stringent law of treason, and by the hateful system of informers. It was a feud which harassed and hampered in turn Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius, and Nero, and which has left an ineffaceable mark on the records of their reigns. The task of the emperors, from Vespasian onwards, was

¹ G. Boissier, *L'Opposition sous les Césars* (Paris, 1875). Friedländer, *Sittengesch.*, i., 185 sqq.

² Tac., *Ann.*, i., 13.

as much facilitated by the virtual extinction of this noblesse, as that of our Tudor sovereigns, by the decimation of the English nobility in the Wars of the Roses. The senatorial nobility of their day was easily satisfied by a show of courtesy, while readily accepting a purely subordinate place.

The undeniable fact that even during this period Cæsar was master, gradually but inevitably told upon his position and upon his government. The former approached more and more nearly to that of a sovereign, the latter needed, and to some extent secured, a regular and recognised organisation. Augustus had endeavoured to enforce by example and precept the view that he was only a citizen among citizens,¹ and Tiberius set his face against the extravagant homage offered to him.² But the tendency to place Cæsar, and even Cæsar's house, on a higher level than that of private citizens, and to surround him with many of the outward accessories of royalty, was too strong to be resisted. It is true that no emperor but Gaius claimed to be a god, and that the grosser kinds of Cæsar-worship were discouraged both by the emperors themselves and by the republican traditions of Roman society. Yet, apart from the fact that to the provincials and to the half-servile *plebs* of Rome and Italy the omnipotent Cæsar was already more than human, Cæsar-worship in its official and recognised forms was gradually elevating Cæsar to a position very near that of the gods of the state.

Monarchical
tendencies.

¹ *Suet., Aug.*, 53, 56.

² *Ib., Tib.*, xxxvi., 27.

The deification of Julius and Augustus cast something of a special glory over their descendants, while the public and widespread worship of the *genius* or *numen* of Augustus consecrated the rule, if not the person, of Cæsar throughout the empire. The emperors from Tiberius to Nero were at least the sons and grandsons of gods, and ruled by something like a divine right. These emperors, moreover, were all, in one way or another, of the race of Augustus, and the house of the Cæsars thus acquired the prestige of a royal house. In direct violation of republican usage, and even of the theory

The "house" of Cæsar.
of Cæsar was shared by the members of his family. They were associated with him in the public prayers.¹ The males of his house were decorated at an early age, and in rapid succession with public offices and honours,² while even more significant was the public recognition given to the wives, daughters, and sisters. Their heads appear on the coins,³ they bear the title Augusta,⁴ a guard of honour attended them, and in one or two cases they were deified after death.⁵ A similar promotion awaited the "household of Cæsar": it acquired a privileged position and a public character. The

¹ This was so in the provinces even under Augustus. *Wile Exempla*, 104. From the time of Vespasian onwards the " *Domus Cæsaris*" appears in the Acts of the Arval College.

² Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 772 *sqq.*

³ *E. g.*, in the cases of Livia, of Gaius's sisters, of Agrippina after her marriage with Claudius.

⁴ It was given to Livia, Agrippina, Poppæa.

⁵ Livia and Poppæa. See Mommsen, *l. c.*

circle of Cæsar's friends¹ rapidly developed into a court. Even under Tiberius the *cohors amicorum*² was a recognised institution. Under Claudius the *cura amicorum* was a special office.³ Admission to Cæsar's friendship was a formal act; expulsion from it was equivalent to a sentence of exile.⁴ The "friends" themselves were ranged in classes, with varying privileges and emoluments, and in particular with rights of admission to Cæsar's presence, as nicely regulated as in the court of Louis XIV.⁵ In the magnificent palaces with which Gaius and Nero replaced the simple residence which had satisfied Augustus all the signs of royal state were visible—the crowds of courtiers, the elaborate court ceremonial, the household troops, who guarded the doors and lined the ante-chambers. It would be a mistake to ascribe these changes merely to the vanity of Gaius or Nero, or to the servility of those about them. There were reasons of policy also. The increased outward splendour of Cæsar's position was even more useful than the increased stringency of the law of treason in checking the ambition of aspiring nobles, and confirming the allegiance of the public. Nor was it less desirable that the Roman Cæsar should be able to challenge comparison in these respects with his great rival the King of Kings beyond the Euphrates.

The friends
of Cæsar.

¹ For the "*amici Cæsaris*" see Friedländer, *Sittengesch.*, i., 118 sqq. Mommsen, *Hermes*, iv., 120; *Dict. Antiq.* s. v. *Princeps*.

² Valerius Maximus (ix., 15) speaks of the "*Cohors Augusta*."

³ Orelli, 1588.

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, vi., 9; *ib.*, iii., 12, 24; Suet., *Tib.*, 56.

⁵ Plin., *N. H.*, xxxiii., 41; Seneca, *De Benef.*, vi., 34; *De Clem.*, i., 10; Suet., *Tib.*, 46.

The transformation of Cæsar's personal servants into officials of state was even more than the transformation of his personal friends into courtiers a political necessity.¹ The more important of the offices in Cæsar's service, such as the prefecture of the corn supply, the prefecture of Egypt, the provincial procuratorships, inevitably ranked from the first as virtually public posts, and were filled almost invariably by Roman knights. But, before the time of Vitellius, the domestic offices in his household and about his person were filled, as in private households, by freedmen and slaves.² The influence wielded by the imperial freedmen, especially under Claudius and Nero, was naturally a sore point with the Roman aristocracy.³ It was bad enough that a low-born prefect of the prætorian guard should be a greater man than the consuls and prætors,⁴ but the wealth and power of a Pallas or a Polybius were a worse scandal still. The truth, however, is that neither the weakness of Claudius, nor Nero's dislike of affairs, nor even their own ability, had so much to do with the prominence of these freedmen, as the vast importance of the outwardly humble posts they held. A great part of the

The freed-
men of
Cæsar.

¹ For what follows see Friedländer, *Sittengesch.*, i., 63; Hirschfeld, *Untersuchungen*, *passim*.

² Tac., *Hist.*, i., 58: "*ministeria principatus a libertis agi solita.*"

³ Tacitus, *Ann.*, iv., 7, says of Tiberius, "*modesta servitia, passim liberti.*" Cf. Claudius, *Ann.*, 12-60: "*libertos quos rei familiari prececerat, sibi que et legibus adaequaverit.*" Cf. *ib.*, xiv., 39 (Nero).

⁴ A newly-discovered inscription (*C. I. L.*, xii., 5842), gives the career of Afranius Burrus, Nero's prætorian prefect and minister. He was procurator to Livia, and then to Tiberius and Claudius.

business, which a modern sovereign transacts through his ministers, was performed for the early Cæsars by their freedmen. Through the hands of the freedman, *ab epistulis*,¹ passed the official correspondence from Rome, Italy, and the provinces, while the freedman, *a rationibus*, had the management of the vast revenues which accrued to Cæsar from all parts of the empire.² It was inevitable that posts of such importance should in time cease to be merely domestic household offices, and that the finance of two thirds of the empire could not long be treated as if it were a matter only of Cæsar's private property. Vitellius first took the important step of filling these posts with Roman knights, but before his time, Claudius had done something to place the financial department at least on a better footing. There is good reason for ascribing to him the formation in Rome, and under the care of the freedman, *a rationibus* of a central imperial treasury (*fiscus*), to which Cæsar's revenue officers (*procuratores*) throughout the empire had to render accounts.³ It was Claudius also who first gave something of a magisterial character to these agents of his by investing them with jurisdiction in fiscal cases,⁴ who largely increased their numbers, and even rewarded some among them with the consular insignia.⁵

¹ Hirschfeld, *Untersuch.*, 30 and 192 *sqq.*; Liebenam, *Laufbahn der Procuratoren* (Jena, 1888).

² With these may be ranked the freedman, *a libellis*, through whose hands passed all petitions addressed to Cæsar.

³ Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 933; Hirschfeld, *l. c.*, 30; Liebenam *l. c.*, 141.

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, xii., 60.

⁵ Suet., *Claud.*, 24.

It has been already said that the history of the empire at large shows but few traces of the bad effects which the vice or weakness of some of its rulers might have been expected to produce. The frontiers of the empire remained, for the most part, as Augustus had left them. The expeditions of Germanicus¹ beyond the Rhine involved a temporary departure from the policy adopted after the defeat of Varus (9 A.D.), but the departure was due rather to the exigencies of the moment, than to any change of view on the part of Tiberius. Over and above the desirability of gratifying the martial ardour of Germanicus, and of finding occupation for the mutinous legions, the recovery of the standards lost by Varus, and the infliction of a severe blow upon the growing power of Arminius, were of importance alike for the prestige of the new emperor, and for the safety of the frontier. These objects Germanicus accomplished, and was then recalled by Tiberius (16 A.D.). Thenceforward the Rhine was definitely accepted as the military frontier. Rome did not, indeed, abandon all claim to suzerainty beyond the river. The Frisii, in particular, were treated as a subject tribe, liable to taxation and conscription, and their occasional attempts to shake off the Roman yoke² were sternly repressed. Nor was

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, Bks. i. and ii.; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 45 *sqq.*; Knoke, *Kriegszüge der Germanicus* (Berlin, 1887). There were three campaigns in 14, 15, and 16 A.D.

² Under Tiberius, 28 A.D. (Tac., *Ann.*, iv., 72); under Claudius, 47 A.D. (*Ann.*, xi., 19); they were pacified by Corbulo, who gave them

it until the reign of Claudius, that the scattered military stations beyond the Rhine were abandoned.¹ But from 17 A.D. down to the time of Vespasian, the frontier line of defence ran along the left bank of the great river; nor was any important change made in the arrangements adopted for its defence. The army of the Rhine was divided into two corps, the armies of Lower and of Upper Germany,² as they were sometimes boastfully styled, each consisting of four legions, and of an uncertain number of auxiliary cavalry, and infantry. The headquarters of the former were at Vetera,³ those of the latter at Mogontiacum (Mainz). Each army was commanded by a legate, and with the command of the troops the legates united the administrative control of the frontier districts, the so-called provinces of Lower and Upper Germany; although for revenue purposes, these districts were included in the province of Gallia Belgica. The defence of the frontier was further strengthened by a military road, which ran along the left bank of the Rhine, and connected the military stations with each other; a flotilla of galleys was maintained on the river itself, and along the right bank a strip of territory was cleared of its inhabi-

senatum, magistratus, leges, and apparently confined them to a certain reserved territory.

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, xi., 19.

² Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 106; Hirschfeld, in *Comm. Philol. in honorem Th. Mommsen*, 433; Tac., *Ann.*, i., 31; "*duo apud ripam Rheni exercitus*"; *ib.*, iv., 73: "*legatus inferioris Germaniæ prætorii*." Wilm., 867: "*legatus exercitus Germanici superioris*."

³ Xanten, below Cologne.

tants, and probably of the forests, which might have sheltered a hostile tribe.¹

The state of things on the Danube was somewhat different. At the accession of Tiberius, it already marked the extreme northward limit of The Danube. Roman suzerainty, and among the tribes beyond it none were, like the Frisii, vassals of Rome. But it was not yet the military frontier, and even in 69 A.D. no system of frontier defence such, as existed on the Rhine, had been organised, mainly, no doubt, because the Roman government, during this period, was more concerned with the pacification of the tribes on their own side of the river, than with the prevention of incursions from beyond it.² It is true that by the annexation of Thrace, Claudius completed the chain of frontier provinces from the German Ocean to the Euxine, and it is possible that the two legions which formed the garrison of Moesia, had their camps on the Danube.³ But along the upper part of the river seems to have been the only military station before the time of Vespasian. In Noricum there were no legions, and the legions in Pannonia were stationed, not on the Danube, but along the lines of the Drave and the Save.⁴ The defence of the

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, xiii., 54: "*agros vacuos et militum usui sepositos.*" The *limitem a Tiberio captum* of *Ann.*, i., 50, may have marked the further boundary of this cleared land.

² According to Tacitus, *Ann.*, iv., 5, besides the two legions in Moesia, there were two in Pannonia and two in Dalmatia.

³ At Viminacium and Singidunum.

⁴ The legions were at the time of the mutiny in Pannonia (14 A.D.) stationed on the line of the Save and the Drave. Poetovio (Pettau)

Danube was the work of the Flavian and Antonine emperors.

On the eastern side of the empire, the difficulty of maintaining Roman ascendancy in the debatable land of Armenia increased rather than diminished, and at the commencement of Nero's reign it reached an acute stage. The occupation of Eastern frontier. Armenia by the Parthian king, Vologæses, provoked a war,¹ in which, as had so often happened before Armenia was recovered only to be lost again. In 66 A.D., a compromise was effected by which the crown of Armenia was given, not to a prince sent out from Rome, but to Tiridates, a brother of the Parthian king, who, however, came to Rome and there, in the Forum, was formally invested with his authority by the Roman emperor, Nero. This compromise was followed by the annexation of the three native states of Pontus, Cappadocia, and Commagene,² and the consequent extension of Roman territory, and Roman administration up to the frontiers of Armenia.

was the headquarters of the 13th legion in 69 A.D., Tac., *Hist.*, iii., 1; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 186.

¹ On the campaigns of Corbulo, see Tac., *Ann.*, xiii., 7 *sqq.*; Furneaux, *Annals*, ii., 107, Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 380; Henderson, *Nero*, Chap. 5.

² Cappadocia was annexed in 17 A.D.; Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 42. Commagene was annexed in 17 A.D. (Tac., *Ann.*, ii., 56), but was given back to Antiochus IV. It finally became part of the province of Syria in 72 A.D. (Vespasian); Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 240. Pontus (Polemoniæcus) was annexed in 63 A.D. by Nero, and incorporated with Galatia and afterwards with Cappadocia; Suet., *Nero*, 18; Marquardt, *l.c.*

On the southern frontier two changes of importance were made during this period. In 37 A.D. the command of the troops and of the frontier districts was taken from the proconsul of Africa and intrusted to an imperial legate.¹ Under Claudius the native kingdom of Mauretania was annexed and divided into two Roman provinces,² under the rule of procurators. These changes rendered possible the organisation of a system of military occupation and frontier defence, for the entire strip of territory lying between the sea and the desert, and extending from the lesser Syrtis to the Straits of Gibraltar, a step, the necessity for which had been amply proved by the insurrection headed by Tacfarinas, in the reign of Tiberius.

To the same emperor, Claudius, whose annexation of Thrace and of Mauretania completed the Roman occupation of the frontier territories lying along the Danube in the north, and the African deserts in the south, belongs also the credit of the one important advance made during this period beyond the bounds of the empire, as fixed by Augustus. For nearly a hundred years after the expedition of Cæsar no further attempt was made to conquer Britain, and we can only guess at the reasons which led Claudius in 43 A.D. to send a well-

¹ Tac., *Hist.*, iv., 48; Cagnat, *L'Armée Romaine d'Afrique* (Paris, 1892), 23 *sqq.*; Marquardt, *l. c.*, 308; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 626. Numidia, however, was not formally recognised as a separate province until the close of the second century A.D.

² In 41 A.D. Dio, *Cass.*, lx., 9; Plin., *N. H.*, v., 11.

equipped force of four legions across the Channel.¹ There are, however, one or two considerations which make this sudden intervention intelligible. During the period of what Tacitus calls "a long forgetfulness,"² Southern Britain was evidently regarded by the Roman government as within its sphere of influence, and between it and Rome there was a somewhat close political and commercial connection. The British chiefs in the southern parts of the island were the allies and friends of the Roman people. They sent embassies to do homage to Augustus in 27 B.C. They visited Rome and dedicated offerings in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. When worsted in feuds with their neighbours, they sought the protection of Cæsar.³ They had even begun to imitate the Roman emperors in the style and in the legends of their coins. The importance of the trade between Rome and Britain, towards the close of the reign of Augustus, is attested by Strabo, who tells us that the duties levied on goods crossing the Channel to and from Britain were a considerable source of revenue to the Imperial government. The existence of this political and commercial connection would naturally render the condition of affairs in South Britain a matter of direct interest to the Roman

¹ Dio, lx., 19 *sqq.*; Suet., *Claud.*, 17; Tac., *Ann.*, xii., 31 *sqq.*; Agric., 13; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 157; Furneaux, *Annals*, ii., 126. Of the four legions despatched in 43 A.D., two—the II. Augusta and the xx. Valeria Victrix—remained in Britain throughout the Roman occupation.

² Tac., *Agric.*, 13.

³ Dio, liii., 22; Strabo, iv. 5; Mon. *Ancyr. Lat.*, vi. 2.

government, and very shortly after the accession of Claudius a political crisis occurred which must inevitably have arrested the attention of Roman statesmen. The dominant power in South Britain was that of Cunobeline, chief of the Catuvellauni, who had made himself master of nearly all South-Eastern Britain, and who is styled by Suetonius, King of the Britons.¹ Cunobeline had been the ally of Rome, and his strong rule was no doubt regarded as a guarantee for peace and order in Southern Britain. His death, which must have taken place in the first or second year of Claudius's reign, seems to have been immediately followed by a war of succession amongst his sons, the ablest of whom, moreover, Caractacus, was probably already known to entertain feelings hostile to Rome. The situation was one which, as threatening the disturbance of peace, the disorganisation of Roman trade, and loss of property, and probably life, to Roman citizens, may well have seemed to the Roman government to call for armed intervention. The expedition, which in 43 A.D. crossed the Channel under the command of Aulus Plautius, evidently had for its object the annexation by Rome of Cunobeline's dominions, and its success was assured by the capture of Cunobeline's capital, Camulodunum (Colchester)—an achievement in which Claudius himself took part. The remaining years of Plautius's command (44-47 A.D.) seem to have been devoted to the settlement of South-Eastern Britain; but a

¹Suet., *Calig.*, 44; Dio, lx, 19 *sqq.*; Evans, *Coins of the Ancient Britons*, pp. 284 *sqq.*

Roman force under Vespasian,¹ after establishing Roman authority in the western portion of Cunobeline's kingdom, and capturing the Isle of Wight, penetrated further west; and there are reasons for thinking that before the end of Plautius's command Roman arms had penetrated as far as the hot springs of Bath and the lead-works on the Mendip Hills.² Aulus Plautius was succeeded in his command by Ostorius Scapula, who was legate in Britain from the latter part of 47 A.D. down to his death in 52 A.D. His first achievement would seem to have been the pacification of the midland districts lying to the north of the already conquered regions of South Britain, an undertaking rendered necessary by the constant raids made by the midland tribes upon the allies of Rome.³

His proposed disarmament and subjugation of these districts awakened the hostility of the powerful tribes to the east, north, and west, but the threatened disturbances were in two out of three cases easily averted. Neither the Iceni on the east, nor the Brigantes on the north, made any determined attempt to interfere with the Roman advance. Ostorius was thus left free to deal with the Silures on the west, an irreconcilable foe whose raids were a

¹ Suet., *Vesp.*, 4; Tac., *Agric.*, 13, 14.

² *C. I. L.*, vii., 1201.

³ *Ann.*, xii., 31, "effusus in agrum sociorum hostibus." It is only by supposing that the midlands were the scene of these operations that we can explain the resentment which they excited among the Brigantes and Iceni. I am inclined to prefer the reading "cuncta cis Trisantonam et Sabrinam fluvios cohibere parat," *i.e.*, east of the Severn and south of the Trent.

continual menace to the Roman peace.¹ In 50 A.D. he defeated Caractacus, who after the loss of his kingdom in the south-east had placed himself at the head of the western tribes opposed to Rome. Two years of guerilla warfare followed, but in 52 A.D. Ostorius died, worn out, it is said, with fatigue.² The most important result of his operations on the Welsh border was probably the foundation of a legionary camp on the Silurian frontier, which can hardly have been any other than that which remained for centuries the headquarters of the second legion, Isca Silurum, the modern Caerleon.³ During the six years which followed Ostorius's death, the Romans seem to have been mainly busied in strengthening their position on the Welsh border.⁴ It was probably during this period that a second camp was established at Viroconium (Wroxeter), and a military post may have been planted as far north as Deva (Chester). In the east of England, Camulodunum, from which the legion had been moved by Ostorius, became a Roman colony;⁵ Verulam, if Tacitus⁶ may be trusted, had acquired municipal rights, and London was already a populous centre. It seems also that a Roman road had been carried as far as Lincoln, and a Roman gari-

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 32, "non atrocitate non clementia mutabatur."

² Tac., *Ann.*, i., 39.

³ Tac., *Ann.*, l.c. For Isca Silurum, see *C.I.L.*, vii., p. 36.

⁴ Tac., *Agric.*, 14: "Didius Gallus (52-57 A.D. partos a prioribus continuit, paucis admodum castellis in ulteriora promotis." *Id. Ann.*, xiv., 29: "Veranius (57-58 A.D.) modicis excursibus Silures populatus."

⁵ Tac., *Ann.*, xii., 32, and xiv., 31.

⁶ "Municipio Verulamio," *Ann.*, xiv., 33.

son stationed there. The legateship of Suetonius Paulinus was rendered memorable by the revolt of the Iceni (61 A.D.) under Queen Boadicea. Prasutagus, king of the Iceni, had voluntarily become the friend and ally of Rome in 43 A.D., and his adhesion had been of the utmost value. On his death in 61 A.D. his kingdom lapsed to Rome, and his property was left to the Roman emperor jointly with his two daughters.¹ The Roman officials eagerly seized their opportunity, and proceeded to annex the Icenian territory as if it had been conquered in war. Their excesses provoked a rising which threatened to sweep the Romans altogether out of Britain. The insurgents pouring into Essex stormed the infant colony at Colchester, and cut to pieces the 9th legion which was hastily marching against them from Lincoln; nor was it until they had sacked Verulam and London that they were defeated and the revolt crushed by Suetonius Paulinus. That his victory was followed by the formal annexation of the territory of the Iceni, and the consequent inclusion within the Roman province of Norfolk and Suffolk, may be taken for granted. Otherwise the remaining years of Nero's reign witnessed no important advance, and in 69 A.D. Chester and Lincoln were still the most northerly posts held by Roman troops.

Within the frontiers the administration of the provinces were conducted, in the main, on the lines laid down by Augustus. Instances of misgovernment are mentioned, but almost without exception, in the "public provinces."

Internal
condition of
the empire.

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, xiv., 31 *sqq.*

and the superiority of Cæsar's administration over that of the proconsuls, was shown not only by the transference to him, early in Tiberius's reign, of Achaia and Macedonia,¹ but by the case of Sardinia, which in 6 A.D. was placed under the care of Augustus, and in 67 A.D. was restored to the consuls and senate in a prosperous condition.² Of discontent in the provinces the traces are few. Tacfarinas, in Africa, was the leader, not so much of an insurrection from within as of a hostile attack from without. The rebellion, headed by Julius Sacrovir, in North-Eastern Gaul,³ was almost entirely confined to the less civilised tribes near the Rhine frontier, who had to bear the burden of the German wars, to whom the orderly methods of Roman government, the census, and the regular taxation were irritating novelties, and who resented still more keenly the omnivorous activity of Roman traders and usurers. Elsewhere, too, the establishment of civilised government among a barbarous or half-civilised people produced, naturally enough, friction and disturbance.⁴ But against these isolated instances, must be set the abundant evidence which exists, of a widespread prosperity. The *Natural History* of the elder Pliny bears witness to a rapid development of commerce, to the advancing civilisation of the new, and to the revived prosperity of many of the old provinces; above all, to a marked

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 76.

² Pausanias, vii., 17.

³ In 21 A.D., Tac., *Ann.*, iii., 34.

⁴ In Cappadocia, Tac., *Ann.*, vi., 41; among the Frisii, *ib.*, iv., 72.

rise in the general standard of wealth. Spain and Gaul¹ were fast becoming Roman in language and manners, and beginning to contribute honoured names to the ranks of Latin oratory and literature. From Cordova came the two Senecas, and the poet Lucan. Autun (Augustodunum), and still more Lyons (Lugdunum), were rising into fame as schools of rhetoric. Valerius Asiaticus, a senator of high rank, and a great orator, was a native of Vienne,² while Gaius Julius Vindex, legate of Gallia Lugdunensis in 68 A.D., was an Aquitanian chief.

In the eastern half of the empire, in the "provinces beyond the sea," there is nothing corresponding to the rapid advance made by Gaul and Spain. Here, and especially in Asia Minor, the dominant civilisation was not Latin, but Greek, and the extension of Greek civilisation over the central and eastern regions of the peninsula belongs to the second and third centuries rather than to the first. In Asia Minor again the reforming energy of the Cæsars had less scope. Throughout great part of this period, there still existed important native states, under native rulers, and even within the limits of Roman territory there were still free towns, within whose bounds the Roman governor had in theory no jurisdiction, holy cities governed or misgoverned by priestly dynasts, and half-civilised tribes ruled by their own chieftains. But the East shared with the West the benefits of the Roman peace, and if not progressive, was at least prosperous.

¹ Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., chaps. 2 and 3; Jung, *D. römischen Landschaften*, chaps. 1 and 3.

² Tac., *Ann.*, xi., 1.

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BOOK VI.

THE ORGANISATION OF CÆSAR'S
GOVERNMENT AND THE FIRST
CONFLICTS WITH THE
BARBARIANS.



THE ORGANISATION OF CÆSAR'S GOVERNMENT AND THE FIRST CONFLICTS WITH THE BARBARIANS.

CHAPTER I.

THE FLAVIAN AND ANTONINE CÆSARS 69-193 A.D.

THE fall of Nero, and the extinction of the "progeny of the Cæsars,"¹ was followed by a war of succession, in which the legions of Spain, the household troops in Rome, the army of the Rhine, and, finally, the army of Syria, in turn awarded the imperial purple to the man of their choice, and in which Italy, after the lapse of a century, became once more the theatre of civil war.

The signal for revolt against Nero was given by C. Julius Vindex, legate of Gallia Lugdunensis (March, 68 A.D.). By descent he was a Gaulish chief of high rank, and this circumstance, coupled with the fact that he relied for support mainly, if not entirely, on Gaulish levies, gives some colour to the view, apparently held at the time, that his real aim was the restoration

¹ Suet., *Galba*, 1: "*progenies Cæsarum in Nerone deficit.*"

of Gallic independence.¹ But his hastily raised forces were no match for the legions of the army of Upper Germany, who, though indifferent to Nero, were ready enough to crush a Gaulish revolt. Defeated at Besançon (May, 68 A.D.), he fell by his own hand.

Somewhat better fortune attended on Servius Sulpicius Galba, legate of Hither Spain. In response to an appeal from Vindex he had, after a moment's hesitation, thrown off his allegiance to Nero, without at first himself claiming the succession. But early in April he was saluted "imperator" by his troops, and in June, on hearing of Nero's death, he adopted the cognomen "Cæsar."² His claims to sit in the seat of Augustus were considerable, for not only was he a consular and a patrician, but he was reputed to be a good soldier and an efficient and upright administrator; and when he reached Rome in October, it seemed as if these claims were generally recognised not only by the senate but by the army.³ On January 1, 69, Galba entered as emperor upon his second consulship, and on January 10th, in view of his advanced age, he provided, as he hoped, for a peaceful succession by adopting as his son L. Calpurnius Piso.⁴ But there were already two rivals. The nearest at hand and the first to strike was M. Salvius Otho, who, as legate of Lusitania, had joined Galba and accom-

¹ Mommsen, *Hermes*, xiii., 90; Henderson, *Nero*, pp. 395, 496.

² Suet., *Galba*, 9-11; Plutarch, *Galba*, 4-7; Dio, lxiv., 6.

³ Tac., *Hist.*, i., 6-11; *ibid.*, 49: "*omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset.*"

⁴ *C. I. L.*, vi., 1268, 2051; on adoption he took the name "Serv. Sulpicius Galba Cæsar." Cf. Tac., *Hist.*, i., 18.

panied him to Rome.¹ Taking advantage of the discontent existing among the prætorian cohorts, who looked coldly on a Cæsar, not of the old line, nor chosen by themselves, and whose frugality contrasted disagreeably with Nero's lavishness, Otho easily secured their support for his own claims. On January 15th he was saluted "imperator," and on the same day both Galba and his adopted son were murdered in the Forum.² On January 16th the new emperor was duly invested by the senate with the customary powers and titles.³ Otho was popular with the soldiery and populace of Rome, to whom the comparatively young and dashing noble was infinitely more attractive than Galba could ever have been; and outside Rome his accession was at least acquiesced in by the Illyrian legions, and by those of Syria and Judæa.⁴ But the armies of Upper and Lower Germany had, even before the adoption of Piso, put forward a candidate of their own. On January 2d the lower army, led by Fabius Valens, legate of the 1st legion, had saluted as emperor their newly arrived commander, Aulus Vitellius, and on January 3d the upper army followed their example.⁵ Without delay two strong columns under Valens and Cæcina were despatched southward, and when on March 14th Otho left Rome to encounter these formidable opponents the Vitellian forces had already crossed the Alps.

¹ Tac., *Hist.*, i., 13; Suet., *Otho*, 3; Plut., *Galb.*, 20.

² Tac., *Hist.*, i., 27.

³ Tac., *Hist.*, i., 47; the confirmation by the people was given on February 28, *Acta Fr. Arv.* (ed. Henzen), xcii. and p. 65.

⁴ Tac., *Hist.*, i., 76.

⁵ Tac., *Hist.*, i., 57.

A month later, at Bedriacum,¹ between Cremona and Mantua, Otho's troops were defeated, and Otho committed suicide. In July Vitellius entered Rome.

But the victory of the German legions and their leader was at once followed by the news that the East had declared for Vespasian. On July 1st, the day from which he afterwards dated his reign,² the troops in Egypt took the oath of allegiance to him; and before the end of the month he had been adopted as emperor not only by the legions in Syria and Judæa, but by those nearer to Italy in Mœsia, Pannonia, and Dalmatia. Early in the autumn the latter, led by Antonius Primus, swept into Italy; towards the end of October, Cremona, where the Vitellian legions had entrenched themselves, was taken and sacked.³ The fleet at Ravenna had already joined the Flavians, and on December 17th the prætorian cohorts, which were on their way northward to arrest the advance of Antonius, declared for Vespasian.⁴ Three days later the Flavian troops entered Rome. Vitellius was seized while attempting to escape and put to death. On December 21, 69 A.D., the senate for the third time within twelve months conferred the name of Augustus, the tribunician power, and the other prerogatives upon a new princeps.⁵

With the accession of Vespasian, the history of the empire entered upon a new phase. Although the

¹ For the topographical and other difficulties connected with the battle of Bedriacum, see Mommsen, *Hermes*, v., pp. 161 sqq.

² Tac., *Hist.*, ii., 79; Suet., *Vesp.*, 6. ³ Tac., *Hist.*, iii., 26-34.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iii., 67

⁵ Tac., *Hist.*, iv., 3; Dio, lxxvi., 1.

name and traditions of Augustus were still appealed to, yet in almost every department of government there was a departure from the Augustan policy, and a corresponding change in the aspect and condition of the empire.

The anomalous position of the *princeps* had not been without inconvenience, even under Cæsars whose relation to Augustus Position of Cæsar. silenced all questions as to their claims to inherit his powers. But it was found intolerable when, on the extinction of the old line, the principate became in fact, as well as in theory, a prize open to all comers. For the integrity, tranquillity, and good government of the empire, it was essential that the position and authority of the *princeps* should be placed on a more regular footing, that the rule of Cæsar, which was acknowledged to be indispensable, should be declared legitimate and recognised as permanent.

The necessity of in some way legalising Cæsarism, pressed with especial force upon Vespasian himself. He succeeded to power at The emperors of this period. a moment when public confidence had been rudely shaken by insurrection and civil war, and his low birth provoked contemptuous comparisons, not only with the Julii and Claudii, but with Galba, Otho, and Vitellius. Galba was after all a patrician ;¹ Otho came of an old and honourable Etruscan house, and both his father and grandfather had been senators; even Vitellius was at least the son of a senator, and the grandson of a Roman knight.² But Vespasian

¹ The Sulpician gens was patrician ; Suet., *Galba*, ii., 3.

² Suet., *Otho*, 1 ; *Vitellius*, 1.

was not even of equestrian rank. His grandfather, a native of the little Sabine town of Reate, had been a centurion, and then a collector of small debts. His father, after being a collector of customs duties in Asia, ended his life as a money-lender among the Helvetii.¹ Verginius Rufus, legate of Upper Germany, and the conqueror of Vindex, is said to have considered his birth a disqualification for the position of emperor, but compared with Vespasian, Verginius Rufus was noble. Of Vespasian's successors during this period none were so hopelessly plebeian as he was. Yet with the exception of Nerva, not one belonged by descent to the old governing class, and with the exception of Vespasian's two sons, Titus and Domitian, and of Commodus, none had any dynastic claim to the throne. Trajan and Hadrian were Spaniards, Marcus Aurelius was of Spanish descent, while the family of his predecessor, Antoninus Pius, came from Nemausus (Nîmes) in Transalpine Gaul.

For emperors so circumstanced, nothing was more natural than the endeavour to make of the principate a permanent office with a regular law of succession, and inherent prerogatives. There was, indeed, no open or formal break with the Augustan traditions, but the drift of their policy is unmistakable. Vespasian himself, the shrewd, thrifty, homely Sabine, who made no secret of his birth, and treated with equal contempt the sneers of Roman society and the clumsy compliments of courtly pedigree-makers,² was as conscious of the greatness of his position, and as firmly resolved to

Attempt to
legalise
Cæsarism.

¹ Suet., *Vesp.*, 1.

² Suet., *Vesp.*, 12.

maintain and transmit it, as any of the Cæsars.¹ From him dates the final transformation of the family names of the early Cæsars ^{The} _{titulaturæ.} into an official titulature, borne by all emperors in turn, and which, as such, not only expressed the continuity of the office, but distinguished the emperor from all private citizens, and placed him on a level with the Parthian "king of kings." Thenceforward, though additions were made by the vanity of later Cæsars, or the servility of their subjects, the "Imperator Cæsar Augustus" could challenge comparison with the βασιλεὺς βασιλέων δίκαιος ἐπιφανῆς φιλέλλην beyond the Euphrates.² To establish a law of succession was a more difficult ^{The} _{succession.} matter, and, in fact, no rule of succession was ever formally laid down. Yet the attempt was made, not without some measure of success, to establish at least the fiction of hereditary descent. Vespasian was fortunate in the possession of two grown sons.³ Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian, in default of any natural heirs, had recourse to adoption. Moreover, the son, whether real or adopted, was marked out as the intended heir in a somewhat novel manner. The old family surname "Cæsar" now began to be the distinctive title of the heir apparent, and it was conferred upon him by a formal and public act.⁴ His head

¹ Dio, lxi., 10.

² For the style and titles of the Parthian kings, see Gardner, *The Parthian Coinage*, London, 1877.

³ Vespasian frankly designated Titus as his successor; Dio, lxi., 12: ἐμὲ μὲν υἱὸς διαδέξεται ἢ οὐδεὶς ἄλλος

⁴ In the senate-house, Dio, lxi., 1; lxxviii., 4: ἐν τῷ συνέδριῳ Κατάρτα ἀπέδειξε (Nerva-Trajan); so Antoninus Pius received the name from Hadrian.

appeared on the coins, and his name was coupled with that of the emperor in the public prayers.¹ To the same desire to invest Cæsarism with an hereditary character, we may attribute the prominence given to the recitation, on inscriptions, of an official imperial pedigree, the apparent continuity of which concealed the actual breaks in the line. Just as Vespasian appropriated the names which belonged of right to the Julian emperors, so Severus not only adopted the name of Pertinax, but styled himself the son of Marcus Aurelius, and Caracalla was thus able to represent himself as the lineal descendant of Nerva.² This official pedigree was, moreover, dignified, and the sanction of religion given to the authority of the reigning emperor, by the deification of his predecessors. Of the nine emperors of this period, all but two, Domitian and Commodus, were deified, and thus a line of deified ancestors was formed, which linked each new Cæsar with the past. The official list of the "Divi," the public worship of the "Divi," and the commemoration of their birthdays, were symbols of the continuity of and legitimacy of Cæsarism.³

These attempts to disguise the fact that the authority of each Cæsar was a purely personal authority, which he had not inherited, which he could not transmit, and which expired with him, were powerfully aided by the practical necessities of administra-

¹ E. g., in *Acta Fr. Arvalium*. See generally, Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 1044 *sqq.*

² See Wilmanns, 989, *Acta Fr. Arval.* (ed. Henzen), p. 186.

³ *Acta Fr. Arv.*, p. 186, records a sacrifice to the "Divi," sixteen in number.

tion. The maxim that the "king never dies" was never explicitly laid down by Roman lawyers. But the permanence and continuity of Cæsar's authority were assumed as a working hypothesis alike by the officials who administered, and by the jurists who formulated and interpreted the law. The patronage which the emperors of this period extended to the latter, was amply repaid by the service which they rendered in making Cæsarism an integral part of the constitution.

The division of labour established by Augustus between Cæsar and the regularly constituted authorities of the state, the magistrates and the senate, had been unreal enough in the first century. In the second, even the professed respect for it shown, for example, by Nero on his accession, became superfluous, as the reasons of policy which prompted it, the desire to conciliate republican feeling, and to avoid wounding the pride of the old republican noblesse, ceased to exist. Though in certain circles of Roman society it was still the fashion to affect a Platonic admiration for the republic,¹ republicanism was extinct as a political force; and though the senate could still be offended by discourtesy, or goaded into hostility by persecution,² the applause of the new men, the municipals or provincials who filled the senate house, was easily purchased by a few compliments, while their acquiescence in the supremacy of Cæsar was

Cæsar and the republican institutions.

¹ An admiration quite compatible, as in the cases of Tacitus and the younger Pliny, with loyal service to Cæsar.

² As, for instance, in the latter part of Domitian's reign.

complete and unquestioning. The "dual control" set up by the Augustan system was always ^{The} ~~magistracies.~~ inconsistent with efficient government, and though not formally abolished, was systematically ignored in practice. On the one hand, the restricted sphere of administration which, at the close of the first period, had been left to the old magistracies, was still further narrowed. The administrative and judicial supremacy of consuls and prætors in Rome and Italy was destroyed by the ever-widening authority of Cæsar's prefect of the city,¹ and of the prefect of the prætorian guard. It may be taken for granted that, of the judicial business from Rome and Italy, which formerly came before consuls and prætors, the greater part now went to one or other of these two great officers. A further movement in the same direction is indicated by the appearance under Trajan of imperial commissioners intended to supervise the local government of Italian towns,² and by the creation under Hadrian and M. Aurelius of the *consulars* and *juridici*.³ By the close of the century such jurisdiction as remained to the consuls and prætors was of a strictly departmental and subordinate kind. Even the criminal jurisdiction of the consuls sitting with the senate, though still

¹ Under Domitian, the city prefect already exercised jurisdiction outside Rome. At the beginning of the third century, Ulpian states (*Dig.*, i., 12) "*omnia omnino crimina prefectura urbis sub vindicavit . . . extra urbem intra Italiam.*"

² For these *curatores* see Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 487.

³ Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., 72; *Vit. Hadr.*, 22: "*quattuor consulares per omnem Italiam iudices constituit*"; *Vit. M. Aur.*, 11: "*datis juridicis Italia consuluit.*"

exercised, was exercised more and more rarely, and, as a rule, only at the suggestion, or by the permission of the emperor.¹ Not less significant as a symptom of the decline of these magistracies was the growing importance attached to the obligation of exhibiting games,² a duty which survived all the more important functions. The senate suffered scarcely less. Apart from Cæsar, it rarely ventured The senate. to act, and though most of the emperors of this period attended its meetings when in Rome, laid business before it, and used its decrees as an instrument of legislation, the proceedings, as a rule, consisted only of the imperial speech, and the "acclamations" which invariably followed it.³ After Hadrian the senate, even as a channel of legislation, ceased.

In proportion as the importance of the old magistracies and of the senate, regarded as Cæsar's colleagues in the work of government, The senatorial order. declined, their importance as constituting an imperial aristocracy increased. The development of the senatorial order into an imperial peerage received a powerful impulse from Vespasian. The precedent set by him of freely admitting to the senate men not qualified by election to the quæstorship was followed by his

¹ Instances of the trial of a proconsul before the senate are rare after Trajan. Dio (lxxi., 28) represents the exercise of this jurisdiction as a concession on the part of Cæsar; comp. *Vit. Marci*, 10. Under Commodus, a proconsul of Sicily was tried by the *præfectus prætorio*.

² Tac., *Agric.*, 6.

³ Pliny, *Epp.* vii., 14; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, iii., 951.

successors.¹ The number of men thus ennobled directly by Cæsar, and the popularity of this short and easy road to senatorial honours, steadily increased. One result was to swamp the element in the senate, which had given the early Cæsars most trouble. The old Roman families gradually disappeared, and their place was filled by new men of a different stamp, with different traditions, and often of low birth.² Their claims to promotion were various: in some cases wealth and local influence, in others fame as an orator, sophist, or lawyer; in others again, good work done as an official in Cæsar's service.³ The senatorial dignity became an imperial order of merit open to the whole empire. At the same time its connection with the tenure of the old magistracies and with the senate became looser. It was no longer necessary, either for entrance into the senate or for promotion to a higher grade, to have held a magistracy. In many cases a man was placed on admission among the *prætorii*, and thus at once qualified for the consulship; and though in this period the highest rank, that of *consularis*, was not given, ex-

¹ For the use of the method of *adlectio*, see *Dict. Antiq.*, s. v. "Senatus"; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 877.

² *Vit. M. Aur.*, 10: *multos ex amicis adlegit*"; *Vit. Pert.*, 6: "*Commodus adlectionibus innumeris prætorios miscuisset.*" Pertinax himself was "*libertini filius*," and was a procurator in Dacia at the time of his promotion to senatorial rank.

³ Instances in point are Herodes Atticus, Fronto, Polemo, and Favorinus. Among those thus promoted, the inscriptions mention municipal magistrates (Wilm., 1151), a *præfectus virgilum* (*C. I. L.*, xii., 3166), a *subpræfectus vehicularum* (*ib.*, xii., 1357), a procurator of Lusitania (*ib.*, vi., 1359).

cept to those who had been actually consuls, the consulship was now held only for two months, so that there must have been many *consulares* whose tenure of office in Rome was limited to this brief period, and who had never been prætors, ædiles, quæstors, or tribunes. To such men the rank of *consularis* was of far greater importance than the consulship. There are indications also that the possession of senatorial dignity no longer implied that its holder sat and voted in the *curia*, or even resided in Rome. The provincial who had risen almost at a bound to consular rank had few ties with Rome, and probably little liking for the business of the senate-house. He preferred to return home, to air his new dignity among his neighbours, and transmit it to his children. Trajan, indeed, enacted that all senators of foreign birth should invest one third of their property in Italian land; ¹ but Marcus Aurelius reduced the portion to one fourth.² In the latter part of this period the senator of consular rank is a distinguished and not infrequent figure in provincial society.³ In proportion as the magistracies and senate tended to become municipal institutions of the city of Rome, the senatorial order became imperial in extent and distribution, while at the same time it was more closely connected than ever with Cæsar.

¹ Pliny, *Epp.*, vi., 19.

² *Vit. M. Aur.*, II.

³ Philostratus (*Vit. Sophist.*) supplies many instances of provincial families of consular rank (*γένος ὑπερτελῶν*); *C. I. L.*, ii., 1174 (Spain): "*consularis filia, senatoris uxor, soror, mater*"; *ib.*, ii., 4129: "*consularis filia*."

One more change in the machinery of government remains to be noticed, the complete organisation of Cæsar's own administrative service. Throughout the first century, but especially under Claudius, this service had steadily grown in numbers and importance, as the business which fell to Cæsar increased in amount. It was, however, from the emperors of the second century that it received its elaborate organisation, and its official recognition as a state service, and among these emperors the credit for the work belongs mainly to Hadrian.¹ Under him, the most important of the household offices were taken out of the hands of freedmen, and intrusted to Roman knights.² These offices thenceforward ranked as "procuratorships," and were incorporated with the regular civil service of the empire.³ Within this service a regular system of promotion was established, leading up from the lower to the higher posts.⁴ Its

¹ See besides Hirschfeld, *Untersuchungen*, and Liebenam, *D. Laufbahn d. Procuratoren*, Schurz, *De Mutationibus in Imperio Romano ab Hadriano Factis*. (Bonn, 1883.)

² *Vit. Hadr.*, 21; "*ab epistulis et a libellis primus equites Romanos habuit.*" To these must be added the office "*a rationibus.*"

³ *C. I. L.*, ix., 5440: "*proc. Aug. a rationibus*"; Orelli, 801: "*proc. ab epistulis.*" Comp. Friedländer, *Sittengesch.*, i., 160 *sqq.*

⁴ See the tables of precedence in Liebenam. M. Bassæus Rufus, prætorian prefect under M. Aurelius, was successively procurator of Asturia and Gallæcia, procurator of Noricum, procurator of Belgica and the two Germanies, *proc. a rationibus*, *præfectus annonæ*, prefect of Egypt, and prætorian prefect, *C. I. L.*, vi., 1599. In *ibid.*, 1625, the order is "*procurator moneta, procurator xx hereditatum, proc. Belgica, proc. a rationibus, præf. annonæ, præf. Egypti.*"

sphere of action was enlarged by the final abolition of the old system of farming taxes,¹ and by committing to the care of imperial officials the maintenance of the imperial post.² As its field of operations widened, a more minute subdivision of labour and a more complete official apparatus became necessary. The inscriptions of the latter part of the second century indicate an increase in the number, not only of procurators, but of the subordinate officials attached to them, and of the separate *bureaux*, each with its staff of clerks and assistants.³ It was no doubt in the department of The admini-
stration of
justice. finance that the organisation was most complete, but it is noticeable in all the various departments of government. In the administration of justice, especially, important changes were made. The amount and variety of the judicial business falling to Cæsar obliged even the most industrious of emperors to delegate a portion of it to others. Jurisdiction, indeed, continued to form an important part of the emperor's work, not only when he was in Rome, but when on his travels, or residing at one or another of his country houses in Italy. On the other hand, however, the practice of delegating jurisdiction to others became more regular and systematic. Such a delegated jurisdiction was already

¹ Dio, *lxix.*, 16.

² *Vit. H.*, 7: "*cursum fiscalem instituit.*" For the officials in charge, the "*præfecti vehiculorum*," see Liebenam, p. 50.

³ Thus we find a *sub-præf. annonæ*, *sub-præf. vehiculorum*, an "*adjutor ab epistulis*," a "*proximus a rationibus*." See Liebenam's tables. See also *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, v., p. 105.

exercised at the beginning of this period in Rome and over great part of Italy, by the imperial prefect of the city. In the course of the second century occurred the curious change by which the prefect of the prætorian guard was transformed into a high judicial officer.¹ At first occasionally used by the emperors as their representative, the prefect was, by the beginning of the third century, formally invested with both criminal and civil jurisdiction. He was occasionally in this period, and more regularly in the next, a trained lawyer, and he was assisted by a deputy prefect and by a council of expert advisers.²

The concentration of the supreme judicial authority in Cæsar's hands as the "fountain of justice" gave a new importance, not only to the judicial officers to whom he delegated jurisdiction, but to the assessors whom he consulted.³

Under the early emperors the practice had prevailed of inviting persons, usually senators, in whom the emperor placed confidence, to assist him with their counsel. It would seem, however, that it was in Hadrian's reign that the "imperial council" was first put upon a permanent footing. He admitted to it not only his personal friends, but professional lawyers,⁴ and after his reign the position of "*consiliaris*

¹ Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 907, 1205.

² The jurist Papinian was *advocatus fisci* under M. Aurelius, *proc. a libellis* under Sept. Severus, and then *præf. prætorio*.

³ Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, ii., 925; Hirschfeld, *Untersuch.*, 215.

⁴ *Vit. Hadr.*, 18. Among the jurists were Celsus and Salvius Julianus.

*Augusti*¹ was definite and well recognised. This council, consisting partly of high imperial officials and prominent senators, partly of jurists, rapidly became, in fact, the emperor's privy council. In the fourth and fifth centuries it was known as the "sacred consistory," and both the name and the institution were borrowed by the Popes of Rome from the Roman Cæsars.

Such is one aspect of the work accomplished by the succession of able and vigorous men who sat in the seat of Augustus during this period:—the legalisation of Cæsarism as a permanent institution, the practical abolition of the dual control shared by Cæsar with the regular magistrates, and the organisation under Cæsar of an elaborate administrative machinery, controlled exclusively by him, and deriving its authority from him alone, as the fountain at once of power and of justice. In one important point they failed. While they succeeded in defining and establishing the position of Cæsar, they left the question who the Cæsar for the time should be, dangerously open, and the omission to fix a law of succession again and again imperilled the unity of the empire in the stormy times of the third century.

To the emperors who thus consolidated the authority of Cæsar belongs naturally enough the credit of attempting to weld the empire into a single state under his supreme rule, and of abandoning the old theory which

The unification of the empire.

¹ The *consilarii* were, at the end of the second century, classified like the *procuratores*, according to the rate of their pay, as *centenarii* (100,000 sesterces), and *sexagenarii* (60,000 sest.); Hirschfeld, *l. c.*

regarded it as a federation of allied communities under the hegemony of the Roman Commonwealth. Their task was, no doubt, made easier by the gradual disappearance of distinctions of language and manners, by the assimilating influence of commercial and social intercourse, and by the extinction of national jealousies and aspirations. But it is equally certain that the tendency of imperial policy was in the same direction. The federal theory of the empire involved the maintenance of a clear distinction between the dominant Roman community and its alien allies. But the emperors of this period were as liberal as Augustus had been sparing in granting Roman and Latin rights, and in thus gradually assimilating the political status of all the free-born inhabitants of the empire. The enfranchisement by Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, of several cantons in the "three Gauls," was probably due rather to a desire to reward their own adherents, or to gain fresh ones, than to any more statesmanlike motive.¹ But the liberal policy enunciated by Claudius was consistently followed by Vespasian and his successors. Vespasian, besides admitting provincials to the senate, granted Latin rights to all the non-Roman communities of Spain,² and the inscriptions record the names of some forty "Flavian towns" in the Peninsula.³ It is probable that Hadrian completed the work by fully enfranchising his native country.⁴ Of similar wholesale grants of the fran-

Extension
of the
franchise.

¹ Tac., *Hist.*, i., 8, 51, 78.

² Pliny., *N. H.*, ii., 30.

³ See the indices to *C. I. L.*, ii.

⁴ Mommsen, *Hermes*, xvi., 471.

chise, we have no more instances until we reach the famous edict of Caracalla at the commencement of the next period. But apart from the sneer which Tacitus allows himself at the freedom with which the franchise was granted in his own time,¹ the large number of towns which owed their rank as Roman *municipia* or colonies to the emperors of the second century proves that Vespasian's successors continued his policy. They are to be found chiefly, no doubt, in the frontier provinces of the north, in Pannonia, Mœsia, and Thrace, and in Trajan's own creation, the province of Dacia,² but they occur also in Africa, and in the East.³ To these *municipia* and colonies must be added, if we are to form a just idea of the rapid extension of the Roman citizen-body, the allotments of lands in the provinces to veterans,⁴ the new openings for Roman settlers afforded by the inclusion of the *agri decumates* within the empire,⁵ and by the annexation of Dacia; finally, the liberality with which the franchise was bestowed on individual provincials must be taken into account.

The communities composing the empire exhibited,

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, iii., 40: "*olim cum id rarum nec nisi virtuti pretium.*"

² In Pannonia, Siscia and Sirmium were created colonies, Noviodunum and Scarbanti, *municipia*, by Vespasian. Poetovio became a colony under Trajan; Mursa (col.), Aquincum Vindobona, and Carnuntum (mun.) belong to Hadrian. In Mœsia, Œscus and Ratiaria (col.) date from Trajan, Viminacium and Nicopolis (mun.), from Hadrian. To Hadrian belongs also Augusta Vindelicorum, in Rætia.

³ Dürr, *Reisen d. K. Hadrian* (Wien, 1881), p. 40, mentions seven *municipia* incorporated by Hadrian in Africa.

⁴ *E. g.*, in Pannonia, by Trajan. *Agrimensores*, i., 121.

⁵ Tac., *Germ.*, 29.

at the close of the first century, great varieties in outward form and in their local institutions and laws. These varieties had not disappeared by the end of the second century, but they were to be found, for the most part, only in the remoter or more inaccessible districts: in almost every province the political unit was a town with a certain area of territory attached to it, and with a municipal constitution. These urban communities, moreover, exhibit a strong tendency to uniformity, both in their internal arrangements and in their relations to the central authority.

In the case of the Roman towns, this uniformity is unmistakable. In Italy, it is true, many of the older towns retained distinctive features, dating from the days of their independence. Yet these were, as a rule, limited to the titles borne by their magistrates, or to small points of local usage; in the main, the statement of a writer in the second century that the "distinctive rights of the municipalities have been obliterated" holds good.¹ In the Roman towns in the provinces, even these superficial variations are rarely traceable. The vast majority had been founded or incorporated by the Cæsars, and their constitutions were all framed upon the same lines.² Among the non-Roman towns—the "allied communities"—the case is much the

The municipal system.

Roman and Latin towns.

¹ Aul., *Gell.*, xvi., 13.

² These lines were laid down by the *Lex Julia Municipalis* (45 B.C.). The charters granted by Domitian to the two Spanish towns of *Salpensa* and *Malaga* are extant. See *C. I. L.*, ii., s. v. *Mommsen, Dei Stadtrechte, Salp. u. Malaga* (Berlin, 1855).

same. The Latin towns, once the most favoured allies, were under the empire not so much allies as Roman towns with inferior rights, and the grant of the "Latin rights" was a stepping-stone to the acquisition of the full franchise; the Latin town received, on incorporation, a constitution closely similar to that of the Roman colony or *municipium*, and was subject to Roman laws.¹

Among the genuinely foreign allied communities, the local differences were no doubt more numerous and more strongly marked. Here and there, among the communities of Gaul, traces of Keltic institutions and usages survived.² The Greek communities of the Eastern provinces retained their own institutions and laws, and the necessity of respecting local law and custom is insisted upon by both Roman emperors and Roman lawyers.³ But alike in the Greek East and in the Latin West, the tendency to uniformity was strengthened by the steady and continuous action of the authority of Cæsar. The interests of the empire were so intimately bound up with the prosperity of the municipalities, that the supervision of the latter became one of the first duties of the imperial government, and how close and constant this supervision became is shown by the letters of the younger Pliny from Bithynia, and by the numerous imperial rescripts quoted in the *Digest*. The first duty

The allied communities.

Imperial municipal law.

¹ Plin., *Epp.*, x., 93.

² Hirschfeld, *Gallische Studien*, I. (Wien, 1884.)

³ Plin. (*Epp.*, x., 109, 113, etc.) refers to the "*lex cujusque civitatis*," and the "*consuetudo provinciæ*." Gaius, i., 92: "*leges moresque peregrinorum*."

of the proconsul, or legate, was to see that the condition of the communities under his care was such as to enable them to discharge their duties to the empire. In serious cases a special commissioner was sent, and even the free towns were not exempt from inspection. As these officials were all responsible to Cæsar, and referred to him for guidance in all doubtful points, a code of regulations was gradually formed, which constituted a common municipal law for the whole empire, and superseded the old local or provincial constitutions, the decrees of the senate, and the edicts of former governors.¹ It is clear that when Ulpian wrote, there was already a body of law, based mainly on imperial edicts and rescripts, and current throughout the empire, which regulated all points in the internal government of the municipalities where imperial interests were even indirectly concerned, or on which the decision of Cæsar had been asked for and given.²

This increasing regulation of municipal affairs by imperial authority no doubt resulted in the reform of abuses, and quickened the sense of imperial unity. But at the same time it tended to weaken municipal patriotism and energy, and to produce an excessive dependence on the central power. The restless energy, the unceasing vigilance, and the profuse liberality of Hadrian were not without their

¹ For the universal authority of the rescripts of Cæsar, see Pliny, *Epp.*, x., 42: "*quod in perpetuum mansurum est, a te constitui debet.*" Ulpian, *Dig.*, xlvii., 12.

² Of this common municipal law, a good idea may be formed from the 50th book of the *Digest*, especially the sections, "*ad municipalem et de incolis*," "*de decurionibus*," "*de muneribus et honoribus.*"

dangers, and among the symptoms of weakness apparent, amidst the prosperity of the age of the Antonines, the flagging vigour of the municipalities was one of the most serious.

Not the least important achievement of the emperors of this period was that of developing and completing the system of frontier defence, which Augustus had sketched in outline, ^{The} ~~frontiers.~~ but to which his successors, in the first century, had added little. The care and attention which Vespasian, Trajan, and Hadrian bestowed upon the frontier defences were not entirely due to their own soldierly training. The visions of world-wide empire, in which the generation of Horace indulged, had passed away, and the prayer of Tacitus, "May the nations continue, if not to love us, at least to hate each other,"¹ contrasts significantly with the exuberant confidence of the Augustan age. The frontier lines which Augustus had marked out as fixing the limit of Roman aggression were now to be the defences of Rome against barbarian invasion. The pressure which, in the third century, drove one barbarian tribe after another into Roman territory, was making itself felt even in the time of Vespasian, and was the justification both for Trajan's annexation of Dacia, and for Hadrian's elaborate fortifications.

Recent researches have led to the conclusion that the share of the Flavian emperors in this work of frontier defence was larger than had been generally supposed. On the Rhine, Danube, Euphrates, and in

¹ Tac., *Germania*, 33; cf. his remarks on the camps by the Rhine, *Hist.*, iv 23.

Britain, Vespasian and Domitian laid the foundations on which their successors built.

On the Rhine, Vespasian, at the very commencement of his principate, was called upon to face the most serious crisis that had arisen there since the defeat of Varus sixty years before, the mutiny of the entire auxiliary force stationed on this frontier. The danger of the outbreak was increased, not only by the withdrawal of the picked troops which had marched with Valens and Cæcina to Italy, but by the peculiar composition of the auxiliary force itself. The regiments composing it were not, as was the case elsewhere, brought from some distant province, and consequently strangers both to each other and to the surrounding population. They were recruited from the neighbouring districts of Gallia Belgica and from the Delta of the Rhine. They were in regiments, each composed of men belonging to the same tribe. Batavians, Nervians, Lingones, or Treveri, and officered, as a rule, by their own chiefs or men of rank.¹ They were in addition distinguished for their martial spirit and warlike prowess. For more than seventy years this native army had loyally guarded the Rhine frontier side by side with the legions, and its fidelity had seemed to justify the policy of Augustus and his successors. Yet the risks were great, for disaffection might mean a conflagration on both banks of the Rhine, and the form assumed by the rising of Vindex had been a plain warning of

¹ Tac., *Hist.*, iv., 12; of the Batavians, "*vetere instituto nobilissimi popularium regabant*"; cf. *Ibid.*, iv., 19; iv., 55.

what these favoured and trusted troops might do, if for any reason they threw off their allegiance to Rome. But Vindex had to face the legions of Upper Germany in their full strength and under a capable commander. The outbreak of the great mutiny in the summer of 69 found the legionary camps depleted of their best men, the chief command in the hands of the incompetent Hordeonius Flaccus,¹ and the imperial government paralysed by civil war. The insurgent leader was Julius Civilis, at once a Batavian chief and commander of an auxiliary cohort; and he was supported at first only by his own tribesmen and their neighbours in the Delta of the Rhine. But the revolt quickly spread. Other native regiments, notably the eight Batavian cohorts which had marched to Italy, but had been sent home by Vitellius,² joined Civilis, and beyond the Rhine the German tribes nearest the river rose also. Early in the next year (70 A.D.) the Treveri, encouraged by the news of the burning of the Capitol, declared for a free Gaul.³ Finally, towards the close of the same year the great legionary camp at Vetera was actually taken, and the legions there and in Upper Germany swore allegiance to the *imperium Galliarum*.⁴ The capture of Vetera was the last as it was the greatest success obtained by Civilis. During the next few weeks dissensions weakened the mutineers, the Gauls showed signs of

¹ Tac., *Hist.*, i., 9.

² *Ibid.*, ii., 69.

³ *Ibid.*, iv., 55.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iv., 57-60.

wavering, and the imperial government, freed from the distraction of civil war, was able to take prompt and effective measures for restoring order. The arrival of Petilius Cerialis¹ was followed by the submission of many of the insurgent clans. Civilis was driven to take refuge in the "Batavian island," and his people renewed their allegiance to Rome.²

The reorganisation of the Rhine armies which followed, showed that Vespasian had taken to heart the lessons of the mutiny. The legions which had disgraced themselves were disbanded, and their places taken by others³; but, more significant still, the native army was completely reconstituted. After 71 A. D. hardly a trace is discoverable of the old native clan regiments on the Rhine; some were disbanded, others transferred to Britain, and Roman officers were substituted for native chiefs as commanders.⁴ Thenceforward throughout this period there was peace on the Lower Rhine.

On the Upper Rhine the rule of the Flavian emperors was made memorable by a successful annexation of territory beyond the river, the first since the abandonment of the short-lived province of Germany in 9 A. D. For though the forts and entrenchments constit-

**Annexation
beyond the
Rhine.**

¹ Tac., *Hist.*, iv., 71.

² *Ibid.*, v., 14-22.

³ The 1st and 16th legions.

⁴ Some of the Batavian regiments were disbanded. Regiments of Nervii, Menapii, and Morini were sent to Britain. We know the names of twenty-three regiments stationed in Upper Germany between 70-90 A. D. None of them was from Gallia Belgica.

ing the *limes Transrenanus*¹ date for the most part from a later period, it seems certain that it was by Vespasian and Domitian that the territory which they enclose was added to the empire.² The southern portion (Baden and Württemberg), once the home of the Helvetii and then of the Marcomanni, had, since the latter removed eastward, been a "no man's land."³ Settlers from the Roman side of the Rhine had found homes there, and it was presumably the necessity of protecting these emigrants that led the Roman government to depart from the policy of Augustus and annex the country. The annexation was an accomplished fact when Tacitus wrote the *Germania* in 98 A.D.,⁴ and we may connect it with a successful campaign made by Vespasian beyond the Rhine in 74 A.D.,⁵ and with the erection at Rottweil of the "Flavian altars," presumably as the centre of the official Cæsar-worship for the new territory.⁶

¹ *Vita Taciti*, iv. The fullest information as to the "*limes*" is to be found in the official publications of the "*Reichs-limes Commission*"; cf. also Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 136-146.

² Zangemeister, *N. Heidelb. Jahrb.*, 1893.

³ Tac., *Germ.*, 28: "*dubiæ possessionis solum.*"

⁴ Tac., *Germ.*, 28.

⁵ Cn. Cornelius Clemens, legate of Upper Germany in 74 A.D., received "*ornamenta triumphalia*" for a success in Germany (*C. I. L.*, xi., 5274). In this year also Vespasian was twice saluted "*imperator*" Eph. *Epig.*, iv., 807. Cf. Zangemeister, *N. Heidelb. Jahrb.*, 1893, for evidence of road-making beyond the Rhine at this time (a milestone at Offenburg, on a road from Strassburg to (?) Rætia).

⁶ Ptolemy, xi., 15; Tab., *Pent.*, ii., c. The "*ara*" were at cross-roads (Brambach, 1643) on the route from Vindonissa to Aug.

The annexation of the northern portion of this area, of the Taunus and the lowlands watered by the Main, was due to different causes, and was apparently the work not of Vespasian but of Domitian. Here, too, it is true there were Roman interests beyond the river which the imperial government could not neglect. The hot-springs at Wiesbaden, and the mines in "the land of the Mattiaci,"¹ had attracted Roman settlers and Roman capital before the accession of Vespasian. But the dominant factor in the situation was the ever-present danger of raids by the powerful tribe of the Chatti and their dependent septa nearer the Rhine, such as the Mattiaci of the Taunus.² As far back as the time of the elder Drusus two forts had been built, one to guard the passage of the Rhine opposite Mainz,³ and a second to keep open the road up the Main valley, by which punitive expeditions from Mainz would advance.⁴ But Domitian seems to have made up his mind that nothing short of annexation would be an effective remedy. He crossed the Rhine,⁵ and after some fighting not only annexed the Taunus district, but marked out a frontier, and protected it by forts and a dyke.⁶ He thus at once barred the advance of the Chatti towards the Rhine,

Vindelicorum. Strassburg and Windisch, as legionary camps would be the natural bases of the road system in the new territory.

¹ Plin., *N. H.*, xxxi., 30; Tac., *Ann.*, xi., 20.

² Tac., *Hist.*, iv., 37; *Ann.*, i., 56; xii., 27; *Germ.*, 29.

³ Dio, liv., 33. Now Castel.

⁴ Tac., *Ann.*, i., 56. Probably at Heddernheim.

⁵ Probably in 83 A.D. Frontinus, *Strat.*, i., 1, 8; Dio, lxxvii., 3.

⁶ Front., *Strat.*, i., 3, 10; ii., II. 7.

and cut off the tribes included within the area annexed from their natural allies.¹ Of the two tribes chiefly in question, the Mattiaci in 98 A.D. are described as loyal subjects of Rome, paying no tribute, but furnishing soldiers,² while the Usipii supplied a regiment for service in Britain under Agricola.³

The peaceful settlement of the country thus acquired by Vespasian and Domitian beyond the Rhine was for a moment arrested by the revolt of L. Antonius⁴ (88 A.D.), legate of the army of Upper Germany, and in immediate command of two legions at Mainz. The revolt excited serious alarm. Domitian himself prepared to start from Rome, and Trajan was summoned from Spain. Before, however, either could arrive, the rising was suppressed by L. Appius Norbanus, possibly legate of the 8th legion at Strassburg. His task was made easier by the sudden breaking-up of the ice on the Rhine, which prevented Antonius's German allies from crossing the river. One incidental result of the outbreak was the abandonment of the old system of double camps. Henceforward each legion was to have its own camp.⁵

The whole of the new territory was now placed under the control of the legate of Upper Germany; a cordon of forts garrisoned by auxiliary regiments protected the frontier, while in reserve on the Rhine were the legions at Mainz and Strassburg.

¹ Front., *Strat.*, i., 3, 10.

² Tac., *Germ.*, 29.

³ Tac., *Agr.*, 28.

⁴ Suet., *Dom.*, 6, 7; Dio, lxxvii., 3; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 137; *Hermes*, xix., 437; Schiller, *Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit*, i., 524.

⁵ Suet., *Dom.*, 7.

The frontier defences on the Danube were far less complete than on the Rhine. There were no legions in Rætia or Noricum; along the frontier of Pannonia, Carnuntum was the only legionary camp; while east of Oescus, along the entire course of the Lower Danube there was none at all. At the same time there were disquieting symptoms of unrest beyond the river, from the territories of the Marcomanni eastward to the shores of the Caspian. The movements and migration of peoples within this area are, as a rule, only known to us when for a moment the veil is lifted and some tribe or tribes are forced against the barrier of the Roman frontier by pressure from behind. Such a glimpse is given by the epitaph of Ti. Plautius Silvanus, legate of Mœsia under Nero.¹ He describes himself as having given shelter in Roman territory to 100,000 tribesmen from beyond the Danube with their wives and children, as having repressed a "movement" of Sarmatians, and taken hostages from kings of the Bastarnæ and Roxolani. In 69 A.D. the outbreak of civil war encouraged the latter people to make a raid in force into Mœsia, which, however, ended in their complete defeat.² In 70 the attempt was repeated on a larger scale, the Roxolani being on this occasion joined by Dacians and by their own kinsmen the Sarmatian Iazyges. They crossed the Danube, stormed the forts held by the auxiliaries, and were threatening the legionary camps when they were driven back by Mucianus,³

¹ *C. I. L.*, xiv., 3608.

² *Tac.*, *Hist.*, i., 79.

³ *Tac.*, *Hist.*, iii., 46, 47; Josephus, *B. Jud.*, vii., 4, 3.

then on his march from the East to Italy. As serious a matter, however, as these occasional raids was the rapid development of the highland kingdom of Dacia.

The accession of Vespasian was followed by some fifteen years of peace, but he did not entirely overlook the necessity for strengthening the frontier. The camp at Carnuntum was rebuilt and enlarged, and, probably, a new camp formed at Vindobona. The two legions hitherto stationed in Dalmatia were moved up to the front, and additional camps provided at Ratiaria and at Oescus.¹

Domitian, however, had to face something like a general rising, in which the Suevian Marcomanni and Quadi, the Sarmatian Iazyges, and the Dacians were all concerned, and which coincided significantly with the accession to the Dacian throne of the ablest of its kings, Decebalus.²

The Dacian war (85 or 86 A. D.) began with a Dacian raid into Mœsia, in which the legate of Mœsia, Oppius Sabinus, was defeated and killed. No better fortune befell Cornelius Fuscus, prefect of the prætorium, who, apparently in the next year, invaded Dacia with a large force. The relics of Fuscus and his troops were found by Trajan. Tettius Julianus in 88 A.D. was more successful, and advanced far enough to threaten the Dacian capital Sarmizegethusa. Decebalus sued for peace, and Domitian, already engaged in the Suebo-Sarmatian war, granted terms, usual enough in the history of

¹ Rhein. Museum, 1893, C. I. L., iii.

² Dio, lxxvii., 6; Suet., *Dom.*, 6; Jordanes, *Get.*, 13.

Roman frontier policy, though denounced as disgraceful by the panegyrists of Trajan.¹

Of the Suebo-Sarmatian war (89-92 A.D.) we know little more than that the tribes taking part in it were the Quadi, Marcomanni, and the Iazyges,² and that in the course of it a legion was cut up and its legate killed. It is also noticeable that Domitian celebrated no triumph for this war, and that the "Suevi" are found in arms again under Nerva. These renewed disturbances led naturally to fresh precautions on the Roman side. A legionary camp was formed at Aquincum to watch the Iazyges, and Mœsia was divided into two provinces, each with its own legate and legions.

In two other quarters of the empire the Flavian emperors accomplished results of importance, in Britain, and on the Euphrates frontier.

In the former case the recall of Suetonius Paulinus in 61 A. D. has been followed by ten years inaction. But with the accession of Vespasian a fresh stage in the history of the conquest of the island began. A succession of able legates, Petilius Cerialis (71-74), Julius Frontinus (? 74-78), and finally Cn. Julius Agricola (78-84), advanced the limits of Roman authority as far north as the line of the Forth and Clyde.³ The most permanent result of these campaigns⁴ was, however, the addition to Ro-

¹ Pliny, *Pan.*, 12. ² Dio, lxxii., 7, 12; Tac., *Hist.*, i., 2.

³ Tac., *Agric.*, 23.

⁴ The phrase, Tac., *Hist.*, i., 2, "*perdomita Britannia et sœcis missa*," may possibly refer to the abandonment, after 84, of the territory north of the "Wall," which Agricola had temporarily occupied.

man Britain of the area known as Brigantia, from the Brigantes, the most numerous and powerful tribe within it, and extending from the Mersey and the Humber northward to the line afterwards marked by Hadrian's Wall from the Solway to Tynemouth.¹ York was occupied, and served with Chester as a base for all operations to the northward.²

The annexation, under Nero, of the kingdoms of Pontus and Armenia Minor had extended Roman rule to the line of the Upper Euphrates and the borders of Greater Armenia. But The East. this new frontier was as yet unguarded by legions, and the responsibility for its safety seems to have been divided between the legate of Galatia, who had no legions, and the legate of Syria, whose legions had plenty to do elsewhere.³ In 71 or 72 Antiochus IV. of Commagene was deposed; his kingdom was annexed and added to the province of Syria,⁴ whose north-western limits were thus made coterminous with the south-eastern limits of the province of Cappadocia. The latter province, with Pontus and Armenia Minor, was placed under the legate of

¹ Tac., *Agric.*, 17: "*civitas numerosissima totius provincie.*" The territory of Brigantes extended east and west from sea to sea.

² The 9th legion must have been transferred to York from Lincoln. Chester was still a double camp occupied by the 20th and the 2nd (adjutrix) legions, and was the headquarters of the legate of the province. In Britain, as in Upper Germany, the frontier posts were garrisoned by auxiliaries, the legions remaining in reserve.

³ Tac., *Hist.*, ii., 81: "*inermes legati regebant, nondum additis Cappadociae legionibus.*"

⁴ Jos., *Bell. Jud.*, vii., 7.

Galatia, who had thus the charge of the eastern frontier from Melitene northward to Trapezus on the Euxine.¹ For its defence "legions were added,"² a legionary camp was formed at Melitene,³ and probably a second farther north at Satala.⁴ Cilicia was definitely organised as an imperial province under a legate, and the same fate befell Judæa after the capture of Jerusalem by Titus.

Trajan⁵ figures in history as the soldier-emperor whose exploits revived the military prestige of Rome.

Trajan. His brilliant campaigns threw into the 98-117 A.D. shade the comparatively uneventful annals of his predecessors, and recalled the heroic days of Cæsar and Pompey. But Trajan, though a soldier, and a soldier with a dash of Chauvinism in his nature, was something more. The author of the rescripts to Pliny, and the organiser of the "alimentary foundations" in Italy, was clearly a statesman. Nor as a soldier was he merely a reckless conqueror. The conquest of Dacia, the achievement by which he is best known, was anything but a mere military adventure prompted by vainglory. It was the result of a deliberate policy, which had for its principal aim the security of the Danube frontier, in view of the increasingly

¹ *C. I. L.*, iii., 291, 312.

² Suet., *Vesp.*, 8.

³ Jos., *Bell. Jud.*, vii., 7. The 12th legion was sent to Melitene in 70 A.D.

⁴ The 15th legion seems to have been transferred from Carnuntum to Satala before the accession of Trajan.

⁵ Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., chaps. vi., ix.; Schiller, *Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit* i., 543 sqq.; Francke, *Trajan* (Leipzig, 1840).

menacing attitude of the tribes beyond. The Dacian kingdom, as it stood, was the natural centre round which Suevians and Sarmatians rallied, and its king, Decebalus, was even better fitted than Arminius had once been on the Rhine to form and to lead a powerful coalition against Rome. But if this mountain fortress, overlooking the plains to the west, north, and east, were in Roman hands, Rome would gain a commanding position from which to watch and check all movements that might threaten danger. She would acquire also a territory rich in mineral wealth and in fighting men.

Moreover, war with Dacia was inevitable; the peace patched up by Domitian was hollow and unsatisfactory. Decebalus was notoriously arming, and his Suevic allies seem to have been actually in the field in 97.¹ That Trajan fully realised the situation is implied by what is known of his doings from the moment when he became legate of Upper Germany in 97, down to his return to Rome as emperor at the end of 99 A.D. On the Rhine frontier, it is clear that the development of civil life and municipal institutions went quietly forward.² But in proportion as the Rhine frontier ceased to cause anxiety, it became desirable to establish more direct communica-

¹ At the moment of Trajan's adoption by Nerva, news arrived of a success gained by Trajan on the Pannonian frontier (Plin., *Pan.*, 8; Dio, lxxviii., 3). *C. I. L.*, v., 7425, mentions the decoration of a tribune of leg. I adjutrix by Nerva for services "*bello Suebico.*"

² Eutrop., 8. Col. Ulpia Traiana was founded near Xanten. The transformation of the military districts occupied by the armies of Upper and Lower Germany into provinces was the work either of Domitian or Trajan.

tions between the camps at Mainz and Strassburg and those nearer to the probable theatre of war on the Danube. The natural route lay through the territory recently annexed beyond the Rhine, and a road had already been made leading from Strassburg eastward towards the frontiers of Rætia. This road Trajan continued certainly as far the legionary camps on the middle Danube, even if he did not, as a late writer asserts, carry it to the shores of the Black Sea.¹ While this important line of communication was being made, Trajan also made a careful inspection of the troops stationed along the frontier.²

In the spring of 101 Trajan left Rome for his first Dacian campaign.³ His army was divided into two columns, one of which, led by the emperor in person, followed the most westerly of the routes,⁴ leading to the highland plateau of Dacia and to the capital Sarmizegethusa, through the Irongate pass.⁵ The results of this first campaign were not decisive, but in the summer of 102 Decebalus was defeated and forced to sue for peace. He was left in possession of his kingdom, but he was obliged formally to acknow-

¹ Aurel, Victor, 13, 3: "*iter quo facile ab usque Pontico mari in Galliam permeatur.*" *C. I. L.*, iii., 1699. gives the famous inscription recording its completion in 101 A.D. Cf. Ephem., *Epig.*, ii., 334.

² *C. I. L.*, vi., 1548; Plin., *Pan.*, 12, 56.

³ For the chronology of the Dacian wars see Mommsen, *Herm.* iii., 130; Dierauer, *Gesch. Traians*, 72 sqq.

⁴ Dio, lxxviii., 6 sqq. Trajan's own line of march is fixed by a fragment of his commentaries preserved by Priscian, ed. Keil, ii., 205.

⁵ Dio, lxxviii., 8, *ῥαῖς Τάκταις*; Jordanes, *Getica*, 12, "*per Tarpal.*" See also Petersen, *Traian's Dakische Kriege*, Leipzig, 1899-1903.

ledge himself the vassal of Rome; he was required to pull down his fortresses, to surrender his arms and military stores, and to evacuate the territory he had occupied in the lowlands of the Theiss; for the future he was to have "the same friends and foes as Rome," to harbour no Roman deserters, and to enlist no recruits from Roman territory. As security for his good faith, a Roman garrison was left in Sarmizegethusa.¹

Trajan returned to Rome in time to open the year 103 as consul, but two years later he was compelled again to take the field. Decebalus was openly violating the treaty. He was reported to be collecting arms, rebuilding forts, and soliciting alliances, it is even possible that he had ventured on actual hostilities.² The senate declared war, and Trajan left Rome late in 104 or early in 105. But his journey was leisurely³; he spent some time in Mœsia, and it was apparently not until the spring of 106 that he crossed the Danube. The advance, as in the previous war, was made in two columns,⁴ and was slow and difficult.⁵ At some point not far from Sarmizege-

¹ Dio, lxxviii., 9.

² According to Petersen's plausible interpretation of the reliefs on the column, Nos. 92-100 (ed. Cichorius), *l. c.* part ii., pp. 41 *sqq.* Cf. *Eng. Hist. Review*, 1904, p. 134.

³ This journey is the subject of a series of reliefs, Nos. 79-91. The starting-point was certainly Ancona, whence he apparently sailed up the Adriatic to some port in Istria and thence marched overland to the Danube.

⁴ This is clearly indicated by the reliefs, Petersen, ii., 75.

⁵ Dio, lxxviii., 14. Trajan this time crossed the Danube by the famous stone bridge between Cladova and Turn Severin constructed for him by Apollodorus of Damascus. *Procop. de ed.*, p. 288; Dio, lxxviii., 13. It is represented on the reliefs, Nos. 99-101.

thusa the columns joined; Decebalus's capital was taken by storm, and he himself with many of his chiefs committed suicide.¹

This time there could be no question of the continued existence on any terms of a Dacian kingdom. The Dacian people were treated as Rome had often treated communities actually "subdued in war." Those who survived were sold as slaves, or driven to seek refuge in the unexplored wastes to the north, or sent to fight the battles of Rome on distant frontiers.² Dacia was annexed, and "reduced into the form of a province," with a promptitude and thoroughness which imply that Trajan had carefully thought out his policy. The new territory included primarily the district which both economically and strategically was of the first importance, the upland plateau of the Siebenbürgen.³ This became the heart and centre of the new province. Here at Apulum were the headquarters of the army of Dacia⁴ and of the legate of the province, while Decebalus's capital, Sarmizegethusa, became a Roman colony⁵ and the seat of the provincial council. Roads were made, the mines worked, and a new population drawn from all parts of the empire was settled on the land. But the province also in-

¹ Dio. lxxviii., 14. The closing scenes of the war are graphically reproduced on the reliefs, 118 *sqq.*

² A Dacian regiment served in the Parthian campaigns of Trajan, *C. I. L.*, iii., 600. Another was sent to Britain before 146 A. D. *Diploma*, 57.

³ For the organisation of the province of Dacia see Domaszewski, *Archäolog. Epigr. Mittheilungen*, vol. xiii. Rhein. Museum, 1893.

⁴ Legio 13 gemina was stationed at Apulum.

⁵ *C. I. L.*, iii., 1443.

cluded the strip of lowland to the south, through which ran the roads which connected the plateau with the Danube and the Illyrian provinces. To the westward of this strip the lowlands, as far as the Theiss, were to be watched by the legate of Upper Mœsia, and by his legions. Eastward beyond the Aluta, a similar duty was imposed on the legate and army of Lower Mœsia. Dacia became in fact an outpost resting on the Danube, and the legionary camps along its bank, as a base, and this base line was strengthened and the distribution of the garrisons altered to suit the new conditions. The camps at Ratiaria and Oescus were abandoned as unnecessary now that the territory on the opposite bank was Roman.¹ But to watch the Iazyges a new camp (Acumincum) was formed at the confluence of the Theiss and the Danube, and a second at Bregetio, to command the routes into the country of the Suevic Quadi. While the strip of Pannonia lying along the Danube northward from Acumincum was constituted a separate province (Pannonia Inferior),² eastward beyond the Aluta, the line of the Lower Danube was held by the three legionary camps of Novæ, Durostorum, and Troesmis.³ Finally to protect the Greek towns on the seaboard of Mœsia and Thrace against attacks from the north-east, a wall was built across the Dobrudscha from the Danube to the sea.⁴

¹ They became colonies: Col. Ulpia Ratiaria, Col. Ulpia Oescus.

² In 107 A. D.

³ Now Sistova, Silistria, and Iglitza; the legions were: i. Italica, v. Macedonica, xi. Claudia.

⁴ Jung, *d. rom. Landschaften*, p. 346.

This scientific reorganisation of the Danube frontier gave peace and prosperity to the Danubian provinces for the next fifty years, and is enough in itself to establish Trajan's claim to be more than an adventurous soldier.

**Eastern
campaigns
of Trajan.
114-116 A. D.**

A somewhat different judgment must be passed on Trajan's campaigns in the East, with their dreams of boundless conquest, their transient successes, and tragic issue.¹

Trajan's activity in this part of the empire was at first confined to developing the system of frontier defence, begun by the Flavian emperors. It was probably in 100 A. D. that Cappadocia, with Armenia Minor and Pontus, was separated from Galatia, and constituted as an independent command² under a legate of consular rank who had charge of the Upper Euphrates frontier from Trapezus as far as the northern limits of the province of Syria.³ South of this point the situation along the Syrian frontier was materially improved by the inclusion in the province of Syria of the kingdom of Herod Agrippa II.,⁴ and

¹ The chief authorities are Dio. lxxviii. 17 *sqq.*; John Malalas (*Script. Byz.*, ed. Bonn); Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 397 *sqq.*; Dieracker, p. 152 *sqq.*

² T. Pomponius Bassus (96-99 A. D.) seems to have been the last legate of Galatia who also governed Cappadocia. Liebenam, *d. R. Legaten*, p. 175.

³ He had under him two legions—the legion xv. Apollinaria moved from the Danube to Satala before 98 A. D., and legion xii. stationed at Melitene since 70 A. D. Cf. *Eng. Hist. Review*, 1896, p. 625 *sqq.*

⁴ Herod Agrippa II. died in 99 or 100 A. D. See *Prosopogr., Imp. R.*, ii., p. 164.

by the annexation, probably on the extinction of the native dynasty, of the Nabatæan kingdom (106 A. D.), a narrow strip of territory extending southward from Damascus to Petra, between Palestine and the desert. The new province was rather boastfully styled Arabia Petræa, but its acquisition was the one permanent and valuable addition to the empire made by Trajan in the East.¹

The very meagre records that we possess do not afford any very satisfactory explanation of the reasons which prompted Trajan to go beyond these practical measures for strengthening the Eastern frontier and engage in a war of aggression beyond the Euphrates. It is true that a Parthian prince, made king of Armenia by grace of Rome, had been deposed by the Parthian king, Chosroes, and another Parthian prince, Parthamasiris, had been installed in his stead by Parthian authority.² This was no doubt a breach of the agreement made in 63, but Chosroes was ready to compromise, and allow his nominee to be reinvested as king by Trajan. In any case, the situation so far, now that there were Roman legions on the banks of the Euphrates, scarcely demanded the personal presence of Trajan himself. The latter may have had a grudge against the Parthian king for his undue sympathy with Decebalus,³ but a more

¹ Dio, lxxviii., 14. It was annexed by A. Cornelius Palma, legate of Syria. The era of the province dates from March, 106. Eckhel, vi., 420. For its military and commercial importance, see Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 476 *sqq.*

² Dio, lxxviii., 17. Eutrop., viii., 3; Fronto, *Princ. Hist.* (ed. Mai), p. 227.

³ Plin., *Ep. ad Tr.*, 74.

probable explanation of his action may perhaps be found in the rather obscure hints given by the ancient authorities of an actual invasion of the province of Syria by Parthamasiris, resulting in disasters of some sort to the Roman arms, and even in a temporary Parthian occupation of Samosata.¹ In any case, Trajan clearly contemplated more than a mere demonstration when he left Rome for the East in October 113.² He took with him a large force of seasoned troops from the West, under some of his most experienced officers, as well as an imposing train of senators; and he turned a deaf ear to all proposals for negotiation.

In January, 114 he entered Antioch, and in the spring of that year he advanced and reoccupied Samosata.³ Thence he marched along the frontier road, constructed by the Flavian emperors, past Melitene to Satala, where he held a durbar, at which the kings and chiefs of Colchis, Iberia, Albania, and the Black Sea coast attended and did homage.⁴

¹ Fronto, *l. c.*, "*malis praeliis percussis.*" Dio, lxxviii., 18, speaks of Trajan as "recovering" Samosata: "*ἀμαχει παραλαβών.*"

² The fixed point in the chronology is the earthquake at Antioch, which took place after the Armenian and Mesopotamian campaigns, and before the Babylonian. Its date (given by John Malalas) was December 23, 115 A.D. The same authority states that Trajan left Rome in October, landed at Seleucia in December, and entered Antioch in January. Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 398, takes this to be January, 115, and compresses the Armenian and Mesopotamian campaigns into one year. I have followed Dierauer and Schiller in placing the entry into Antioch in January, 114.

³ Dio, lxxviii., 19.

⁴ Dio, *l. c.*, Eutrop., viii., 3. The coins with the legend "*regnum adsignata*" refer to this durbar. Cohen, *Med.*, 206, 207, 372. Arrian's

From Satala he crossed into Armenia, and at Elegeia he was met by Parthamasiris.¹ The dramatic scene that followed gives us one of our rare glimpses of Roman frontier life, and recalls the interview between Corbulo and Tiridates, or some of the reliefs on the Dacian column. Seated on a lofty tribunal at the entrance to the Roman camp, Trajan received the Parthian prince, who laid his crown at the emperor's feet, and waited in silence to receive it back. Alarmed by the shouts of the soldiers,² he turned to fly, but was brought back. After a fruitless private interview, he was again brought before the tribunal to hear his sentence. He was deposed and executed; Armenia was for the future to belong to Rome, and to have a Roman governor.³

In the next year (115) Trajan accomplished, with little more difficulty, the conquest of Northern Mesopotamia. We are told that he made terms at Edessa with Abgarus of Osroene, that he received the submission of the sheikhs of Anthemusia and of the neighbouring districts, and that he captured Nisibis and Singara in Western Adiabene.⁴ Mesopotamia, like Armenia, became a Roman province.⁵

Periplus, c. 11, mentions kings in this region who had received their crowns from Trajan.

¹ Dio, lxxviii., 19, 20.

² They saluted Trajan as imperator (= Imp. VII.).

³ Dio, *l. c.*, 'Ρωμαίων εἶναι καὶ ἄρχοντα Ῥωμαίων εἶεν: the new province was probably placed under the legate of Cappadocia, *C. J. L.*, x., 8291.

⁴ Dio, lxxviii., 21, 22.

⁵ Cohen, *Med. Traj.* No. 29. "*Armenia et Mesopotamia in potestate P. R. redactæ.*" Before the end of 115 Trajan was Imp. XI.;

The closing stage of Trajan's Eastern campaigns was significantly preceded, such was the ancient belief, by the destructive earthquake at Antioch, in December, 115; from which Trajan narrowly escaped, thanks, it was said, to divine interposition. It was a plain warning from the gods, but it was neglected.¹ The campaign of 116 opened with an advance across the Tigris; Eastern Adiabene was invaded, and apparently conquered, but it may be doubted whether any province of Assyria was ever really created.² Recrossing the Tigris, Trajan advanced down the Euphrates, unopposed, to Babylon, and thence to Ctesiphon, where the daughter of Chosroes, and also the throne of the Arsacid kings, fell into his hands. Here he was saluted imperator for the thirteenth and last time. Coins were struck bearing the legend *Parthia capta*, and Trajan assumed the cognomen *Parthicus*.³ From Ctesiphon Trajan journeyed on to the Persian Gulf in a style more befitting an Oriental sovereign than a Roman imperator, his head now filled with dreams of conquests which should outdo those of Alexander.⁴

the fact of four salutations during the Mesopotamian campaign indicates some fighting.

¹ Dio, lxxviii., 24.

² The only authority is Eutropius, viii., 3.

³ Dio, lxxviii., 28. In a diploma of September 8, 116 (Brambach, 1512), Trajan is Imp. XIII.; for the coins with "*Parthia capta*," see Cohen, *Méd. Traj.*, No. 184.

⁴ The voyage is described in an extract from Arrian's *Parthica*. Müller, *Frag. Hist. Gr.*, iii., 590.

At the height of his glory the offended gods struck. He was forced to hurry back to crush a widespread rising, which threatened him with the loss of all his recent conquests.¹ A legate was slain and a legion cut to pieces,² and though his brilliant Moorish officer, Lusius Quietus, was more successful, Trajan was forced to pacify the Parthians by giving them a king.³ His retreat into Northern Mesopotamia is described as "not without danger or bloodshed."⁴ He reached Antioch worn and ill, only to hear of an outbreak among the Jews.⁵ For a moment he thought of again invading Mesopotamia to punish the insurgents, but increasing illness obliged him instead to start homeward, and at Seleucia, in Cilicia, he died (August, 117 A.D.). "All in vain," concludes the ancient historian, "were the toils and the dangers."⁶

Hadrian⁷ was, like his kinsman and fellow-countryman Trajan, a soldier by training. He had served in the Dacian wars, and was at the time of Trajan's death legate of Syria. But he

HADRIAN.
117-138 A. D.

¹ Dio, lxxviii., 29. πάντα τὰ ἐαλώκοιτα . . . ἀπέστη.

² Fronto, *Princ. Hist.*, l. c.

³ Parthamaspatēs, a son of Chosroēs. This concession is represented as a success on the coins, "*Rex Parthis datus*," Cohen, *Méd. Trajan*, No. 328.

⁴ Fronto, l. c. "*haudquamquam securā nec incrementa regressio.*"

⁵ Dio, lxxviii., 32; Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, iv., 2; Oros, vii., 12. There were risings in Mesopotamia, Cyprus, Egypt, and Cyrene. Cf. Wilcken, *Hermes*, 27.

⁶ Dio, lxxviii., 33. μάτην ἐπόνησαν καὶ μάτην ἐκινδύνευσαν.

⁷ See, besides Mommsen and Schiller, Dürr, *D. Reisen d. K. Hadrian*. Gregorovius, *Hadrian* (Eng. Tr.), Macmillan, 1898.

was essentially a statesman and a lover of peace, who accurately estimated and carefully husbanded the resources of the State. Trajan's campaigns and their ignominious end had created widespread agitation and unrest. Hadrian set himself to the task of restoring order, of perfecting the defence of the frontiers, and consolidating the empire. Of Trajan's acquisitions in the East, only Arabia Petræa was retained. Chosroes regained the crown of Parthia, and a king replaced the Roman legate in Armenia. As a consequence of the Jewish outbreak, a Roman colony was founded on the ruins of Jerusalem, and after a last desperate insurrection (134-135) Judæa was ruthlessly cleared of its population. Of the care bestowed by Hadrian on the frontier defences, we get an interesting glimpse in the writings of Arrian, Hadrian's legate in Cappadocia.¹

Dacia was retained, and its internal organisation improved by the division of the province. The upland plateau became Dacia Superior, and here were stationed both the legate and the legion. The belt of lowland connecting the upland with the Danube was administered as Dacia Inferior by a procurator with auxiliary regiments only.² It has been said that Trajan had realised the importance of establishing more direct communication between the legionary camps on the Rhine and those on the Danube. It was probably to protect the line of communication constructed by him and also the territories beyond

¹ *Eng. Hist. Review*, 1896, 629 *sqq.*

² Domaszewski, *Rhein. Museum*, 1893.

the Rhine, annexed by the Flavian emperors, that the great boundary barrier was constructed, the remains of which can be traced from Kelheim on the Danube to Rheinbrohl on the Rhine.¹ It consists of two portions, one of which ran westward from Kelheim to Lorch and formed the northern frontier of the province of Rætia; the other, bending sharply northward from Lorch to the Main and enclosing the Taunus range, "separated" the districts annexed by Vespasian and Domitian from the barbarians beyond. In the construction of this great barrier, a large share may safely be attributed to Hadrian, who, as his biographer tells us—"in many places separated off the barbarians by wooden palisades."² A somewhat similar barrier erected by Hadrian was the well-known "wall" in Northern Britain from the mouth of the Tyne to the Solway.³

In Africa he created for the third legion (III. Augusta) a new and permanent home at Lambœsis, the extant remains of which supply us with the richest materials for constructing a picture of the composition and life of a Roman legion in a frontier

¹ The "*limes*" has been systematically studied, its course traced, and the forts excavated during the last twelve years. The results are recorded in the official *Limes Blatt* (Trier, 1892-1904), and in the more sumptuous *Obergermanisch Rœtische Limes* (Heidelberg), of which twenty-five parts have appeared.

² *Vit. Hadr.*, 12.

³ *Ib.*, 11, it is still a matter of doubt whether the existing stone-wall is the "*mur*" of Hadrian or a later substitute. The more northerly barrier from Clyde to Forth was certainly constructed by Antoninus Pius.

province.¹ Behind and in the neighbourhood of the frontier camps and stations stretched a line of Roman colonies and towns, most of which owed, if not their existence, yet at least their charters of incorporation, to Hadrian or Trajan, and which served at once as supports and as recruiting grounds for the frontier forces.

Hadrian's skilful policy, following on the impression produced by Trajan's feats of arms, secured a comparatively long period of quiet, broken only by little frontier wars. But it was the evil fortune of Marcus Aurelius to be called upon to face and repel a barbarian attack, which, in its audacity and strength, was the most formidable that any Roman emperor had yet encountered. For the first time the barbarian tribes beyond the Danube, pushed forward possibly by pressure from behind, united in a desperate attempt to force the Roman lines, and win homes in southern lands.² The most prominent were the Marcomanni, and with them were joined Quadi, Iazyges, Vandals, and others. Encouraged by the fact that a portion of the army of the Danube had been withdrawn for a Parthian war, they broke into Pannonia, and for the first time for more than two hundred years the sacred soil of Italy was trodden by barbarian invaders. Aquileia was besieged (167 A.D.), and Opitergium burnt.³

Marcus
Aurelius
161-180 A.D.

War with
the Marco-
manni.

¹ Cagnat, *L' Armée d'Afrique*, p. 501, chaps. i. and vii., p. 283.

² Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 209; Schiller, i., 643.

³ Dio, lxxi., 3, 2; *Vit. Marc.*, 14; *C. I. L.*, v., p. 186.

Rætia and Noricum were invaded at the same time, while, to complete the panic, the troops hastily recalled from the East brought back with them a devastating plague. The war lasted, with only slight intermissions, until Marcus's death at Vindobona (180 A.D.). The integrity of the frontiers was preserved, but the effects of the war, in exhausting the resources of the empire, were plainly visible in the next century. From this war, too, dates the policy, which had in the end such disastrous results, of transplanting barbarians to the Roman side of the frontier. Whole tribes were granted lands in the frontier provinces, in one case even in Italy, at Ravenna, and were enrolled as soldiers of Rome.¹

The Marcomannic war was not the only warning of impending trouble. The pretenders to the imperial purple, the so-called "tyrants" of the third and fourth centuries, found a prototype in Avidius Cassius, who, after successfully concluding the Parthian war (166-167 A.D.), made an unsuccessful attempt to win for himself the title and powers of emperor.²

Revolt of
Avidius
Cassius.

On the whole, however, despite the increasing pressure upon the frontiers, and the increased strain on the finances which the defence of the frontiers involved, the period from 69 A.D. to 193 A.D. deserves much of the praise which has been lavished upon it. The em-

General
character of
the period.

¹ Schiller, *Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit.*, i, 649; Dio, *lxxd.*, 16.

² *Vit. Avid. Cass.*, Schiller, *l. c.*

perors were, with few exceptions, able and vigorous rulers; the machinery of government was brought to a pitch of perfection never reached before or afterwards; civilisation, Latin or Greek, had reached every province in the empire, and at no time had literary activity and interest been so widely diffused.

Symptoms of decline. Yet symptoms of weakness are not difficult to discover, especially during the latter half of the period. In contrast with the rapid extension of the municipal system stands the fact that towards the close of this period, at any rate in the older provinces, **The municipalities.** municipal life was losing some of its vigour and attractiveness.¹ Municipal office was becoming a burden rather than an honour, and exemption from it, rather than admission to it, was the favour bestowed by the emperor on privileged individuals and classes.² The offices themselves had ceased by the close of the second century to be filled by popular election; they circulated along with various other public duties among the members of the local senates (*decuriones*).³ In Pliny's letters we already

¹ Kuhn, *Verf. d. röm. Reiches*, vol. i.

² Under Augustus veterans were declared to be eligible for the decurionate; at the end of the second century it is their privilege to be exempt from it. So, again, the Augustan legislation gave parents of three or more children a prior claim to office; in the law of this period such parents claimed exemption from office.

³ The laws of Salpensa and Malaga (Domitian) provide for the election of the magistrates in the old way. The speeches of Dio Chrysostom and Pliny's letters (Trajan) speak of popular assemblies in the Greek towns. But Ulpian clearly regards the offices (*honores*) as circulating among the *decuriones*, and popular election, if it survived at all, can have had little more reality than at Rome.

hear of persons compelled to become *decuriones*,¹ and the imperial law, as stated by Ulpian, enters with great minuteness into the grounds which justify exemption from these civic obligations. It is clear, too, that the "decurionate" was fast becoming not only a burden rather than an honour, but a hereditary burden not easily to be evaded.² Of the increasing subjection of the municipalities to imperial supervision, and of their increasing dependence on imperial bounty, something has already been said.

This tendency to lean on Cæsar, fostered as it was by the vigour of the emperors and the complete organisation of the imperial government is visible also in the literary life of the time. The old alliance, which even under Augustus had existed between the republican nobility and literature—an alliance which told hardly against the memory of the early Cæsars—had come to an end with the virtual disappearance of that nobility. The traces of the traditional feud with Cæsarism which lingered under the Flavian emperors³ disappeared before the reign of Hadrian. Even philosophy ceased to be irreconcilable; it kept aloof from political speculation, and devoted itself to teaching men how to live.⁴ The foremost writers and teachers of the time were not only favoured

Literature
and the
government.

¹ Plin., *Epp.*, 112. Comp. the rescript of Antoninus; *Dig.*, i., 1, 38.

² Ulpian (*Dig.*, 1) implies that the son of a decurion was liable in turn to enter the *curia*.

³ *E. g.*, under Domitian. Suet., *Dom.*, 10.

⁴ Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen*, iii., 651.

with the patronage and friendship of Cæsar, but for the most part they were paid servants of the government, holding chairs endowed by the emperor, and with special privileges accorded to them by his edicts.¹ Many of them were enrolled by his favour in the ranks of the new imperial nobility, and honoured with the consulship.² A somewhat similar change is noticeable in the great department of Roman law. Even during the first half of this period the foremost jurists were, as in republican days, men of good birth and position, with whom the study and exposition of the law was a pursuit rather than a profession.³ But the lawyers of the latter part of the second, like those of the third century, were men of humbler origin, trained in Cæsar's service, who rose to sit on his council, or to fill the post of prætorian prefect in virtue of their professional skill.

Alike in the literature and in the society of this period, two other characteristics deserve notice as being of historical importance. The affectation of what was archaic, at which Quintilian sneered in the field of literature, was

Archaism.

¹ *Vit. Hadr.*, 16: "*honoravit et divites fecit.*" *Vit. Ant. Pii*, II: "*per omnes provincias et honores et salaria detulit.*" The foundation of chairs of rhetoric dates from Vespasian; *Suet.*, *Vesp.*, 18. Quintilian was professor of Latin rhetoric, and received the "*ornamenta consularia.*" Among the exemptions and privileges granted to rhetoricians and sophists were immunity from costly offices and the right of free travelling.

² Instances are Fronto, Polemo, Aristocles of Pergamus. Herodes Atticus was consul and also "corrector" of the free towns of Asia.

³ *E. g.*, Julius Celsus and Salvius Julianus.

widespread.¹ The artificial republicanism of the younger Pliny and Tacitus, and of their fellows who drank to the memory of Brutus and Cassius while drawing Cæsar's pay, was closely akin to the literary purism which preferred Cato and Ennius to Cicero and Virgil.² In imitation of Cato, Hadrian wore a beard, and he is said to have quoted Cato in justification of his foreign policy.³ The fashion reappears in the field of art, though here, as was inevitable, it was to Greek and not to Roman models that men returned.⁴ In the same spirit we find some of the Italian towns laying official stress on their ancient traditions. Capena revived its ancient title of *urbis fœderata*, and Bovillæ its ancient tie with the extinct Alba Longa.⁵ Nor was this return to the past followed by any renewed creative energy, as in the fifteenth century. It was a confession of weakness and little more.

The policy of Augustus had aimed at the ascendancy not only of the Latin race but of Latin civilisation; and Greek culture, though liberally treated and allowed its own way in the ^{Cosmo-}provinces properly belonging to it, held only a subordinate place. Under the Flavian emperors, partly perhaps in reaction against Nero's phil-Hellenism,⁶ Latinism was still dominant, and even under

¹ Friedländer *Sittengesch.*, iii., 3.

² *Vit. Hadr.*, 16.

³ *Vit. Hadr.*, 5.

⁴ Friedländer, *l. c.*

⁵ *C. I. L.*, 14, s. *ovv.*

⁶ The "freedom" granted to Achaia by Nero was taken away by Vespasian; *Suet.*, *Vesp.*, 8; *Paus.*, vii., 17.

Trajan the two foremost names in literature are Italian. But this state of things could not long continue, as the barriers which separated Italy and the ruling race and the rest of the empire were broken down. The idea of a cosmopolitan civilisation common to the whole empire replaced the narrower theory. The Greek scholars in the time of Cicero were pensioners in the houses of Roman nobles; under Hadrian they were senators and consuls. Even professors of Eastern mysticism, from Eastern Asia Minor or Syria, were admitted to the imperial presence, and had their train of followers.¹

This cosmopolitanism accurately reflected the political change which had passed over the empire and the imperial unity under the rule of Cæsar, which the emperors of this period strove to bring about. But its result was a civilisation, widely diffused indeed, and which was outwardly brilliant and attractive, but which had no unity and no progressive energy. It flourished while protected by the vigorous government of the Antonine emperors; but in the troubled times of the next century it offered only a feeble resistance to barbarism, whether from the North or the East.

Of the two forces which for a time supplied the splendid administrative machinery, elaborated by the Cæsars of this period with motive power, neither owed much to the composite civilisation of which

¹ Philostratus, *Vit. Sophist.*, *passim*. Vespasian is represented as discussing the form of government, not as Augustus did, with Romans of rank, but with Apollonius of Tyana and Euphrates. See generally Schiller, i., 672 *sqq.*; Friedländer, *Sittengesch.*, iii., 271 *sqq.*

Hadrian's villa at Tibur was a typical product. The free use of barbarians for imperial defence prolonged the existence of the empire. Christianity infused new life into its various populations. The latter force was indeed as yet far from being accepted as an ally by the imperial government, and the Christian communities lay under the ban of the law, though the law was only occasionally and fitfully enforced. But their numbers were rapidly increasing. In Asia Minor, in Bithynia, Galatia, and Cappadocia, they formed a large and important element in the population, while the Christian community in Rome was numerous and influential.'

The Christian communities.

The period which witnessed the silent and steady diffusion of the Christian communities over the empire witnessed also the catastrophe which severed the Jews and Judaism from their own country. The capture of Jerusalem by Titus was scarcely more of a blow than the transformation of the holy city by Hadrian into the Roman colony of Ælia Capitolina, the erection of heathen altars where the temple of Jehovah had stood, and the exclusion of the Jews themselves from the city.'

The Jews.

¹ Schiller, *Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit*, i., 679 sqq; W. M. Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia* (Oxford, 1895-7), and *The Church in the Roman Empire* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1893).

² Dio, lxi., 12; Schiller, *l. c.*, 612; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 544.

CHAPTER II.

THE EMPIRE IN THE THIRD CENTURY, 193-284, A.D.

THE storms of which the irruption of the Marcomanni and the revolt of Avidius Cassius had been unwelcome signs fell with full force upon the empire during the third century. At the outset, it is true, the strong hand of the African soldier Septimius Severus kept the barbarian at bay, and maintained order within the frontiers. But between the death of Severus in 211 A.D., and the accession of Diocletian in 284 A.D., no fewer than twenty-three emperors sat in the seat of Augustus, and of these all but three died violent deaths at the hands of a mutinous soldiery, or by the orders of a successful rival. Of the remaining three, Decius fell in battle against the Goths, Valerian died a prisoner in the far East, and Claudius was among the victims of the chronic pestilence which added to the miseries of the time. The "tyrants," as the unsuccessful pretenders to the imperial purple were styled, reappear with almost unflinching regularity in each reign.¹

¹ Pollio, *Tyranni Triginta* (*Scriptores Hist. Aug.*, Teubner, 1865); Schiller, i., 705 *sqq.*

The claims of Septimius Severus himself were disputed by Clodius Albinus in the West, and by Pescennius Niger in the East, and at the bloody battle of Lugdunum and the sack of Byzantium rival Roman forces, for the first time since the accession of Vespasian, exhausted each other in civil war.¹ In 237-238 A.D., six emperors perished in the course of a few months. It was, however, during the reign of Gallienus (260-268 A.D.) that the evil reached its height. The central authority was paralysed; the barbarians were pouring in from the north; the Parthians were threatening to overrun the Eastern provinces; and the legions on the frontiers were left to repel the enemies of Rome as best they could. A hundred ties bound them closely to the districts in which they were stationed: their permanent camps had grown into the likeness of towns; they had families and farms; the unarmed provincials looked to them as their natural protectors, and were attached to them by bonds of intermarriage and by long intercourse. Now that they found themselves left to repel by their own efforts the invaders from without, they reasonably enough claimed the right to ignore the central authority, which was powerless to aid them, and to choose for themselves *imperatores* whom they knew and trusted. The first of these provincial empires was that established by Postumus in Gaul (259-272 A.D.), and long maintained by his successors Victorinus and Tetricus.² Their

Reign of
Gallienus
260-268 A.D.

Tyrants
in Gaul.

¹ Gibbon, i., chap. v.; Schiller, *Gesch. d. Kaiserzeit*, i., 660.

² Gibbon, i., chap. x.; Mommsen, v., 149; Schiller, i., 827.

authority was acknowledged, not only in Gaul and by the troops on the Rhine, but by the legions of Britain and Spain; and under Postumus, at any rate, the existence of the Gallic empire was justified by the repulse of the barbarians, and by the restoration of peace and security to the provinces of Gaul. On the Danube, in Greece, and in Asia Minor none of the "pretenders" enjoyed more than a passing success. It was otherwise in the far East where the

Odænathus and Zenobia at Palmyra. Syrian Odænathus, prince of Palmyra,' though officially only the governor of the East (*dux Orientis*) under Gallienus, drove the Persians out of Asia Minor and Syria, recovered Mesopotamia, and ruled Syria, Arabia, Armenia, Cappadocia, and Cilicia with all the independence of a sovereign. Odænathus was murdered in 266 A.D. His young son Vaballathus succeeded him in his titles, but the real power was vested in his widow Zenobia, under whom not only the greater part of Asia Minor but even the province of Egypt was forcibly added to the dominions governed in the name of Gallienus by the Palmyrene prince.

Restoration of unity by Aurelian, 273 A.D. Gallienus was murdered at Milan in 268 A.D., and the remaining sixteen years of this period were marked by the restoration of unity to the distracted empire. Palmyra was destroyed, and Zenobia led a prisoner to Rome by Aurelian in 273 A.D.; in the next year the Gallic empire came to an end by the surrender of Tetricus and the successors of Aurelian—Tacitus, Probus

¹ Gibbon, i., chap. x.; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 433; Schiller, i. 857; *Vit. Aureliani*, 26; Pollio *Tyr. Trig.*, 15.

and Carus (275–282 A.D.)—were at least rulers over the whole extent of the empire.

While rival generals were contending for the imperial purple, the very existence of the empire which they aspired to rule was imperilled by foreign invasion. As early as 236 A.D. a new enemy, the Alemanni, had crossed the Rhine, but had been driven back by the valour of Maximinus (238 A.D.), and in the same year the Goths first appeared on the banks of the Danube. It was, however, during the period of internal dissension and civil war from the reign of Philip (244–249 A.D.) to the accession of Claudius (268 A.D.) that the barbarians saw and used their opportunity. From across the Rhine, bands of Alemanni and Franks swept over Gaul and Spain, and even descended upon the coasts of Africa, until their raids were checked by the Gallic emperor Postumus (253–259 A.D.). Far more destructive were the raids of the Goths.¹ Towards the close of the reign of Philip (247 A.D.) they crossed the Danube, and overran Mœsia, Thrace, and Macedonia. In 251 A.D. they defeated and slew the emperor Decius; and, though his successor Gallus purchased a temporary peace by lavish gifts, the province of Dacia was finally lost to Rome.² The Gothic raids by sea which began under Valerian (253–260 A.D.) were even more ruinous. Their fleets issuing

Barbaric
invasions.

The Goths.

¹ Gibbon, i., chap. x.; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 216.

² For the loss of Dacia see *C. I. L.*, iii., p. 160; Jung, *D. roman. Landschaften*, 399. It was Aurelian who finally abandoned Dacia, *Vit. Aur.*, 39.

from the ports of the Black Sea ravaged the seaboard of Asia Minor, and returned laden with the spoils of the maritime towns. In the reign of Gallienus (290–268 A.D.) a fleet of five hundred sail appeared off the coasts of Greece itself; Athens, Corinth, Argos, and Sparta were sacked, and Epirus laid waste. On the death of Gallienus (268 A.D.) the Goths once more marched southward, but, in the new emperor, Claudius, they were confronted at last by an able and resolute opponent. They were decisively defeated and driven back across the Danube (269 A.D.). Claudius died of the plague in the next year, but by his successor Aurelian Roman authority was established in Mœsia and Pannonia, and the Danube frontier was put once more in a state of efficient defence. Five years later (276 A.D.) Probus repulsed a raid of the Franks and Alemanni, and restored peace on the Rhine. The rule of Rome, however, now stopped short, as in the reign of Tiberius, at the line of the two great rivers; all that had been acquired beyond since the time of Vespasian was abandoned, and on the further banks of the Rhine and Danube stood, in the place of friendly or subject tribes, a threatening array of hostile peoples.

At the close of the second century the growing weakness of Parthia seemed to promise an immunity from danger on the Eastern frontier. But with the revolution which placed the Sassanidæ upon the throne the whole situation was changed.¹ The new dynasty

The Sassanidæ in Parthia.

¹ Gibbon, i., chap. viii.; Mommsen, *R. G.*, v., 411; see art. *Persis* in *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

was in blood and religion Persian ; it claimed descent from Cyrus and Darius, and aspired to recover from Western hands the dominions which had once been theirs. In 230 A.D. Artaxares (Ardashir) had formally demanded from Severus Alexander the restitution of the provinces of Asia, had invaded Mesopotamia, then a Roman province, and even advanced into Syria. Twenty years later his successor Sapor again crossed the Euphrates ; in 260 A.D., ten years after Decius's defeat by the Goths, the Emperor Valerian was conquered and taken prisoner by the Persians, who poured triumphantly into Syria and captured Antioch. But here for the time their successes ended. Three years later Odænathus of Palmyra drove them back, and held the East securely in the name of Rome. On the fall of Zenobia (273 A.D.) they gained possession for a time of Armenia and Mesopotamia, but were driven out by the Emperor Carus (282 A.D.), and the frontier line as fixed by Septimius Severus was restored.

Although any serious loss of territory had been avoided, the storms of the third century had told with fatal effect upon the general condition of the empire. The "Roman peace" had vanished ; not only the frontier territories, but the central districts of Greece, Asia Minor, and even Italy itself had suffered from the ravages of war, and the fortification of Rome by Aurelian was a significant testimony to the altered condition of affairs.¹ War, plague, and famine had

State of the
empire at
the close of
the third
century.


¹ Zosimus, i., 49 ; *Vit. Aurel.*, 21 sq. ; Jordan, *Topog. d. Stadt Rom.*, i., 340.

thinned the population and crippled the resources of the provinces. On all sides land was running waste, cities and towns were decaying, and commerce was paralysed. Only with the greatest difficulty were sufficient funds squeezed from the exhausted taxpayers to meet the increasing cost of the defence of the frontiers. The old established culture and civilisation of the Mediterranean world rapidly declined, and the mixture of barbaric rudeness with Oriental pomp and luxury which marked the court, even of the better emperors, such as Aurelian,¹ was typical of the general deterioration.

¹ Schiller, i., 867; Aur. Victor, *Ep.* 50; *Dict. Antiq.*, s. v. *Principat.*

BOOK VII.

THE BARBARIC INVASIONS
284-476 A.D.



THE BARBARIC INVASIONS—284-476 A.D.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF DIOCLETIAN TO THE DEATH OF THEODOSIUS—284-395 A.D.

THE work begun by Aurelian and Probus, that of fortifying the empire alike against internal sedition and foreign invasion, was completed by Diocletian and Constantine the Great, whose system of government, novel as it appears at first sight, was in reality the natural and inevitable outcome of the history of the previous century.¹ Its object was twofold, to give increased stability to the imperial authority itself, and to organise an efficient administrative machinery throughout the empire. In the second year of his reign Diocletian associated Maximian with himself as colleague, and six years later (292 A.D.) the hands of the two

The reforms of Diocletian and Constantine.

Augusti and Cæsares.

Augusti

¹ See Gibbon, vol. iii., chap. xvii.; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.*, i., pp. 81, 336, 337, ii., 217 sq.; Madvig, *Verf. d. Röm. Reichs*, i., 585; Böcking, *Notitia Dignitatum*, Bonn, 1853; Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, i., 202 sq.; Preuss, *Diocletian*, Leipzig, 1869; Seck, *Untergang d. Antiken Welt*, vol. i.

were further strengthened by the proclamation of Constantius and Galerius as *Cæsares*. Precedents for such an arrangement might have been quoted from the earlier history of the empire;¹ and the considerations in favour of it at the time were strong. It divided the overwhelming burdens and responsibilities of government, without sacrificing the unity of the empire; for, although to each of the Augusti and Cæsars a separate sphere was assigned, the Cæsars were subordinate to the higher authority of the Augusti, and over all his three colleagues Diocletian claimed to exercise a paramount control. It at least reduced the too familiar risk of a disputed succession by establishing in the two Cæsars the natural successors to the higher position of Augusti, and finally it satisfied the jealous pride of the rival armies of the empire by giving them what they had so constantly claimed, *imperatores* of their own. The distribution of power between Diocletian and his colleagues followed those lines of division which the feuds of the previous century had only too clearly marked out. The armies of the Rhine, the Danube, and of Syria fell to the lot respectively of Constantius, Galerius, and Diocletian, the central districts of Italy, and Africa to Maximian.² A second point in

¹ Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, ii., 1065 sq. Verus was associated with Marcus Aurelius as Augustus; Severus gave the title to his two sons. The bestowal of the title "Cæsar" on the destined successor is at least as early as Hadrian. Mommsen, *op. cit.*, 1044, and above, p. 469.

² The division was as follows:—(1) Diocletian—Thrace, Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor; (2) Maximian—Italy and Africa; (3) Galerius—Illyricum and the Danube; (4) Constantius—Britain, Gaul, Spain. See Gibbon, ii., 68; Aurelius Victor, c. 39.

the new system was the complete and final emancipation of the imperial authority from all constitutional limitation and control. The last lingering traces of its republican origin disappeared. The emperors from Diocletian onwards were autocrats in theory as well as in practice. The divided powers, the parallel jurisdictions, the defined prerogatives of the Augustan system all vanished. There was but one legal authority throughout the empire, that of the emperor himself ; and that authority was absolute. This avowed despotism Diocletian, following in the steps of Aurelian, hedged round with all the pomp and majesty of Oriental monarchy. The final adoption of the title *dominus*, so often rejected by the earlier emperors, the diadem on the head, the robes of silk and gold, the replacement of the republican salutation of a fellow-citizen by the adoring prostration even of the highest in rank before their lord and master, were all significant marks of the new *régime*.¹ In the hands of this absolute ruler was placed the entire control of an elaborate administrative machinery. Most of the old local and national distinctions, privileges, and liberties which had once flourished within the empire had already disappeared under the levelling influence of imperial rule, and the levelling process was now completed. Roman citizenship had, since the edit of Caracalla, ceased to be the privilege of a minority. Diocletian finally reduced Italy and Rome to the level of the

Altered
character of
the imperial
authority.

Levelling
policy of
Diocletian

Degradation
of Italy and
Rome.

¹ Aurel. Victor, 39 ; Eutrop., ix., 26.

provinces: the provincial land-tax and provincial government were introduced into the former,¹ while Rome ceased to be even in name the seat of imperial authority.² Throughout the whole area of the empire a uniform system of administration was established, the control of which was centred in the imperial palace, and in the confidential ministers who stood nearest the emperor's person.³ Between the civil and military departments the separation was complete. At the head of the former, at least under the completed organisation of Constantine, were the four prefects;⁴ next below them the *vicarii*, who had charge of the *dioceses*; below these again the governors of the separate provinces (*præsides, correctores, consulares*),⁵ under each of whom was a host of minor officials. Parallel with his civil hierarchy of prefects, vicars, *præsides*, and smaller *officiales* was the series of military officers, from the *magistri militum*, the *duces*, and *comites*

The new administrative system.

¹ Marquardt, *Staatverw.*, i., 80-83, where a list is given of the seventeen so-called *provincia* into which Italy, together with Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, was divided. Each had its own governor, and the governors were subject to the two *vicarii* (*vic. urbis, vic. Italiae*), and they in turn to the prefect of Italy, whose prefecture, however, included also Africa and Western Illyricum.

² The seats of government for Djocletian and his three colleagues were Milan, Treves, Sirmium, Nicomedia.

³ For these last, see Gibbon, ii., chap. xvii., p. 325; *cf.* also *Notitia Dignitatum* and Böcking's notes.

⁴ *Praefecti praetorio*. The four prefectures were Oriens, Illyricum, Italia, Gallia, to which must be added the prefectures of Rome and Constantinople.

⁵ There were 12 dioceses and 116 provinces; *cf.* in addition to the authorities mentioned above, Bethmann-Hollweg, *Civil-Process*, iii., Walter, *Gesch. d. röm. Rechts.*, i., pp. 428 sq. (Bonn, 1845).

downwards. But the leading features of both are the same. In both there is the utmost possible subordination and division of property. The subdivision of provinces, begun by the emperors of the second century, was systematically carried out by Diocletian, and either by Diocletian or by Constantine the legion was reduced to one fifth of its former strength.¹ Each official, civil or military, was placed directly under the orders of a superior, and thus a continuous chain of authority connected the emperor with the meanest officer in his service. Finally, the various grades in these two imperial services were carefully marked by the appropriation to each of distinctive titles, the highest being that of *illustris*, which was confined to the prefects, to the military *magistri* and *comites*, and to the chief ministers.²

There can be little doubt that on the whole these reforms prolonged the existence of the empire, by creating a machinery which enabled the stronger emperors to utilise effectively all its available resources, and which to some extent even made good the deficiencies of weaker rulers. But in many points they failed to attain their object. Diocletian's division of the imperial authority among colleagues, subject to the general control of the senior Augustus, was effectually discredited by the twenty years of almost constant conflict which fol-

Effects of
these
reforms.

¹ For this and other changes in the military organisation, see Madvig, ii., 572; Marquardt, ii., 584 *sqq.*

² The grades were as follows: *illustres, spectabiles, clarissimi, perfectissimi, egregii*. For the other insignia, see Madvig, ii., 590, and the *Notitia Dignitatum*. See also generally Schiller, ii., pp. 23-115. For the *comites*, see the article in Pauly-Wissowa *Real Encyclopädie*, s. v.

lowed his own abdication (305–323 A.D.). Constantine's partition of the empire among his three sons was not more successful in ensuring tranquillity, and in the final division of the East and West between Valens and Valentinian (364 A.D.) the essential principle of Diocletian's scheme, the maintenance of a single central authority, was abandoned. The "tyrants," the curse of the third century, were far from unknown in the fourth, and their comparative paucity was due rather to the hold which the house of Constantine obtained upon the allegiance of their subjects, than to the system of Diocletian. This system, moreover, while it failed altogether to remove some of the existing evils, aggravated others. The already overburdened financial resources of the empire were strained still further by the increased expenditure which the substitution of four imperial courts for one necessitated, and by the multiplication in every direction of paid officials. The gigantic bureaucracy of the fourth century proved, in spite of its undoubted services, an intolerable weight upon the energies of the empire.¹

Diocletian and Maximian formally abdicated their high office in 305 A.D. Eighteen years later, Constantine, the sole survivor of six rival emperors, united the whole empire under his own rule. His reign of fourteen years was marked by two events of first-rate importance—

**Constantine
the Great,
323-353 A.D.**

¹ The passion for moulding everything after a uniform official pattern extended beyond the departments of civil and military administration to the professions and to society. Walter, *op. cit.*, i., 456; Marquardt, ii., 230 *sqq.*

the recognition of Christianity as the religion of the empire,¹ and the building of the new capital at Byzantium. The alliance which Constantine inaugurated between the Christian Church and the imperial government, while it enlisted on the side of the state one of the most powerful of the new forces with which it had to reckon, imposed a check, which was in time to become a powerful one, on the imperial authority. The establishment of the new "City of Constantine" as a second Rome, with a second senate, a prefect of the city, *regiones*, and even largesses, did more than proclaim once again the deposition of Rome from her old imperial position. It paved the way for the final separation of East and West by providing the former for the first time with a suitable seat of government on the Bosphorus. The death of Constantine in 337 A.D. was followed, as the abdication of Diocletian had been, by the outbreak of quarrels among rival Cæsars. Of the three sons of Constantine, who in 337 A.D. divided the empire between them, Constantine, the eldest, fell in civil war against his brother Constans; Constans himself was, ten years afterwards, defeated and slain by Magnentius; and the latter in his turn was in 353 A.D. vanquished by Constantine's only surviving son Constantius. Thus for the second time the whole empire was united under the rule of a member of the house of Constantine.² But in 355 A.D. Constantius reluctantly

Recognition
of Chris-
tianity.

Constan-
tinople.

Constan-
tius II.,
351-363 A.D.

¹ Gibbon, ii., chaps. xv., xvi.; Ranke, *Weltgesch.*, iii., 525; Schiller, ii., p. 204 and pp. 1-18, where the authorities are given.

² Bury, *Hist. of Later Roman Empire*, i., 50.

granted the title of Cæsar to his cousin Julian, and placed him in charge of Gaul, where the momentary elevation of a tyrant, Silvanus, and still more the inroads of Franks and Alemanni, had excited alarm. Julian's successes, however, during the next five years, were such as to arouse the jealous fears of Constantius. In order to weaken his suspected rival, the legions under Julian in Gaul were suddenly ordered to march eastward against the Persians (360 A.D.).

They refused, and when the order was repeated, replied by proclaiming Julian himself emperor and Augustus.¹ Julian, with probably sincere reluctance, accepted the position, but the death of Constantius in 361 A.D. saved the empire from the threatened civil war. The chief importance of the career of Julian, both as Cæsar in Gaul from 355-361 A.D., and during his brief tenure of sole power (361-363 A.D.), lies, so far as the general history of the empire is concerned, in his able defence of the Rhine frontier, and in his Persian campaign; for his attempted restoration of pagan, and in especial of Hellenic worships, had no more permanent effect than the war which he courageously waged against the multitudinous abuses which had grown up in the luxurious court of Constantius.² But his vigorous administration in Gaul undoubtedly checked the barbarian advance across the Rhine, and postponed the loss of the Western provinces, while,

¹ Schiller, ii., 321. The chief ancient authority is Ammianus Marcellinus, who accompanied Julian in his Eastern campaign.

² In especial against the overweening influence of the eunuchs, an influence at once greater and more pernicious than even that of the imperial freedmen in the days of Claudius; Schiller, *l. c.*

on the contrary, his campaign in Persia, brilliantly successful at first, resulted in his own death, and in the immediate surrender by his successor, Jovian, of the territories beyond the Tigris, won by Diocletian seventy years before. Julian died on June 26, 363 A.D., his successor Jovian on February 17, 364 A.D.; and on the 26th of February Valentinian was acknowledged as emperor by the army at Nicæa. In obedience to the expressed wish of the soldiers that he should associate a colleague with himself, he conferred the title of Augustus upon his brother Valens, and the long-impending division of the empire was at last effected; Valentinian became emperor of the West, Valens of the East. From 364 A.D. till his death in 375 A.D., the vigour and ability of Valentinian kept his own frontier of the Rhine tolerably intact, and prevented any serious disasters on the Danube. But his death, which deprived the weaker Valens of a trusted counsellor and ally, was followed by a crisis on the Danube, more serious than any which had occurred there since the defeat of Decius. In 376 A.D. the Goths, hard pressed by their new foes from the eastward, the Huns, sought and obtained the protection of the Roman empire.¹ They were transported across the Danube, and settled in Mœsia, but, indignant at the treatment they received, they rose in arms against their protectors. In 378 A.D. at Hadrianople, Valens was defeated and killed; the

Jovian
363-364 A.D.

Valen-
tinian I.,
364-375 A.D.

Division of
the empire,
364 A.D.

Valens,
364-376 A.D.

Revolt of
the Goths.

¹ Schiller, ii., 376 *sqq.*; Gibbon, iii., ch. 26; Hodgkin, i., 102 *sqq.*; *Amm. Marcellinus*, books xxvii-xxx1.

victorious Goths spread with fire and sword over Illyricum, and advanced eastward to the very walls of Constantinople. Once more, however, the danger passed away. The skill and tact of Theodosius, who had been proclaimed emperor of the East by Gratian, conciliated the Goths; they were granted an allowance, and in large numbers entered the service of the Roman emperor. The remaining years of Theodosius's reign (382-395 A.D.) were mainly engrossed by the duty which now devolved upon the emperor of the East, of upholding the increasingly feeble authority of his colleague in the West against the attacks of pretenders. Maximus, the murderer of Gratian (383 A.D.), was at first recognised by Theodosius as Cæsar, and left in undisturbed command of Gaul, Spain, and Britain; but, when in 386 A.D. he proceeded to oust Valentinian II. from Italy and Africa, Theodosius marched westward, crushed him, and installed Valentinian as emperor of the West. In the very next year, however, the murder of Valentinian (392 A.D.) by Arbogast, a Frank, was followed by the appearance of a fresh tyrant, in the person of Eugenius, a domestic officer and nominee of Arbogast himself. Once more Theodosius marched westward, and near Aquileia decisively defeated his opponents. But his victory was quickly followed by his own illness and death (395 A.D.), and the fortunes of East and West passed into the care of his two sons, Arcadius and Honorius.¹

Theo-
dosius I.,
378-395 A.D.

Division of
the empire
between
Arcadius and
Honorius.
395, A.D.

¹ See besides Gibbon, Hodgkin, and Schiller, Richter, *Das West Römische Reich.* Berlin, 1865.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE DEATH OF THEODOSIUS TO THE EXTINCTION OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE—395-476 A.D.

DURING more than a century after the accession of Diocletian, the Roman empire had succeeded in holding at bay the swarming hordes of barbarians. But, though no province had yet been lost, as Dacia had been lost in the century before, and though the frontier lines of the Rhine and the Danube were still guarded by Roman forts and troops, there were signs in plenty that a catastrophe was at hand.

From all the writers who deal with the fourth century comes the same tale of declining strength and energy. From Lactantius to Zosimus we have one long series of laments over the depression and misery of the provinces.¹ To meet the increased expenditure necessary to maintain the legions, to pay the hosts of officials, and to keep up the luxurious splendour of the imperial courts, not only were the taxes raised in amount, but the most oppressive and inquisitorial methods were adopted in order to secure for the imperial treasury every penny that could be wrung from the wretched taxpayer. The results are seen

Distress of
the provinces in the
fourth century.

¹ Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*.

in such pictures as that which the panegyrist Eumenius¹ draws of the state of Gaul (306–312 A.D.) under Constantine, in the accounts of the same province under Julian fifty years later, in those given by Zosimus early in the fifth century, and in the stringent regulations of the Theodosian code, dealing with the assessment and collection of the taxes. Among the graver symptoms of economic ruin were the decrease of population, which seriously diminished not only the number of taxpayers, but the supply of soldiers for the legions;² the spread of infanticide; the increase of waste land whose owners and cultivators had fled to escape the tax collector; the declining prosperity of the towns; and the constantly recurring riots and insurrections, both among starving peasants, as in Gaul,³ and in populous cities like Antioch.⁴ The distress was aggravated by the civil wars, by the rapacity of tyrants, such as Maxentius and Maximus, but above all by the raids of the barbarians, who seized every opportunity afforded by the dissensions or incapacity of the emperors to cross the frontiers and harry the lands of the provincials. Constantine, Julian, and Valentinian I. had each to give a temporary breathing space

¹ Eumenius, *Paneg., Vet.*, vii. For Julian's administration in Gaul see Ammianus, xv.-xvii.; Julian's own oration to the Athenian senate and people, *Juliana Opera* (ed. Hertlein, Leipzig, 1875), pp. 346 sq.; Zosimus, ii., 38. Cf. Gibbon, ii., 333, 412; Jung, *D. roman. Landschaften*, 264, 265; Hodgkin, i., 600 sq.

² Gibbon, ii., 323.

³ For the Bagaudæ, see Gibbon, ii., 69, and Jung, *op. cit.*, 264, where the authorities are given.

⁴ In 387 A.D.; Hodgkin, i., 178.

to Gaul by repelling the Franks and Alemanni. Britain was harassed by Picts and Scots from the north (367-370 A.D.), while the Saxon pirates swept the northern seas and the coasts both of Britain and Gaul. On the Danube the Quadi, Sarmatæ, and above all the Goths, poured at intervals into the provinces of Pannonia and Mœsia, and penetrated to Macedonia and Thrace. In the East, in addition to the constant border feud with Persia, we hear of ravages by the Isaurian mountaineers, and by a new enemy, the Saracens.¹

Even more ominous of coming danger was the extent to which the European half of the empire was becoming barbarised. The policy which had been inaugurated by Augustus Barbarians within the empire. himself, of settling barbarians within the frontiers, had been taken up on a larger scale and in a more systematic way by the Illyrian emperors of the third century, and was continued by their successors in the fourth. In Gaul, in the provinces south of the Danube, even in Macedonia and Italy, large barbarian settlements had been made, Theodosius in particular distinguishing himself by his liberality in this respect. Nor did the barbarians admitted during the fourth century merely swell the class of half-servile *coloni*. On the contrary, they not only constituted to an increasing extent the strength of the imperial forces, but won their way in ever-growing numbers to posts of dignity and importance in the imperial service.² Under Constantius the palace was crowded with Franks.³ Julian led Gothic troops

¹ Amm. Marcel., xiv., 4.

² Seeck, *Untergang d. Antiken Welt*, i., pp. 179 sqq., 368 sqq.

³ Amm., xv., 5.

against Persia, and the army with which Theodosius defeated the tyrant Maximus (388 A.D.) contained large numbers of Huns and Alans, as well as of Goths. The names of Arbogast, Stilicho, and Rufinus are sufficient proof of the place held by barbarians near the emperor's person and in the control of the provinces and legions of Rome; and the relations of Arbogast to his nominee for the purple, Eugenius, were an anticipation of those which existed between Ricimer and the emperors of the latter half of the fifth century.

It was by barbarians already settled within the empire that the first of the series of attacks which finally separated the Western provinces from the empire and set up a barbaric ruler in Italy were made,¹ and it was in men of barbarian birth that Rome found her ablest and most successful defenders, and the emperors both of East and West their most capable and powerful ministers. The Visigoths whom Alaric led into Italy had been settled south of the Danube as the allies of the empire since the accession of Theodosius. The

Barbaric
invasions.

Alaric and
the Visi-
goths.

¹ Accounts of the leading ancient authorities for the period 395-476 will be found prefixed to the several chapters in Hodgkin's *Italy and Her Invaders*, vols. i., ii. (Oxford, 1880), especially vol. i., pp. 234, 277. Among standard modern authorities are Gibbon, vol. iv.; Tillemont, *Histoire des Empereurs*, vol. v.; Milman, *Latin Christianity*, vol. i.; Thierry, *Trois Ministres des fils de Théodose* (Paris, 1865), and *Histoire d'Attila*; Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, vol. iv.—compare especially his criticisms (iv. [2] 249 sq.) on Eusebius Zosimus, Procopius, Jordanes, and Gregory of Tours; Bury's *Hist. of Later Roman Empire*. For barbarian migrations see Wietersheim, *Gesch. d. Völkerwanderung*, and Seeck, *Gesch. d. Untergang d. Antiken Welt* (Berlin, 1899-1902).

greater part of them were Christians at least in name, and Alaric himself had stood high in the favour of Theodosius. The causes which set them in motion are tolerably clear. Like the Germans of the days of Cæsar, they wanted land for their own, and to this land-hunger was evidently added in Alaric's own case the ambition of raising himself to the heights which had been reached before him by the Vandal Stilicho at Ravenna and the Goth Rufinus at Constantinople. The jealousy which existed between the rulers of the Western and Eastern empires furthered his plans. In the name of Arcadius, the emperor of the East, or at least with the connivance of Arcadius's minister Rufinus, he occupied Illyricum, and from thence ravaged Greece, which according to the existing division of provinces belonged to the Western empire. Thence in 396 A.D. he retreated before Stilicho to Illyricum, with the command of which he was now formally invested by Arcadius, and which gave him the best possible starting-point for an attack on Italy.¹ In 400 A.D. he led his people, with their wives and families, their waggons and treasure, to seek lands for themselves south of the Alps. But in this first invasion he penetrated no farther than the plains of Lombardy, and after the desperate battle of Pollentia (402 A.D.²) he slowly withdrew from Italy, his retreat being hastened by the promises of gold freely made to him by the im-

Alaric in
Italy.
400 A.D.

¹ Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, i., 275.

² According to others, 403; Hodgkin, i., 320.

perial government. Not until the autumn of 408 A.D. did Alaric again cross the Alps. Stilicho was dead; the barbarian troops in Honorius's service had been provoked into joining Alaric by the insane anti-Teutonic policy of Honorius and his ministers, and Alaric marched unopposed to Rome; this time, however, the payment of a heavy ransom saved the city. Several months of negotiation followed between Alaric and the court of Ravenna, but though Alaric's demands were moderate, Honorius would grant neither lands for his people, nor the honourable post in the imperial service which he asked for himself. Once more Alaric sat down before Rome, and this time the panic-stricken citizens discovered a fresh mode of escape. Attalus, a Greek, the prefect of the city, was declared Augustus, and Alaric accepted the post of commander-in-chief. But the incapacity of Attalus was too much for the patience of his barbarian minister and patron, who after a few months' reign formally deposed him, and renewed his offers to Honorius. Again, however, they were declined, and Alaric marched to the siege and sack of Rome (410 A.D.).¹ But his death followed hard on his capture of Rome, and two years later (412 A.D.) his successor Ataulf led the Visigoths to find in Gaul the lands which Alaric had sought in Italy. It is characteristic of the anarchical condition of the West that Ataulf and his Goths should have fought for Honorius in

The Visigoths in Gaul.

¹ For the treatment of Rome by Alaric, see Hodgkin, i., 370, with Gibbon, iv., 101, and Ranke, *Weltgesch.*, iv., 246. Allowance must be made for the exaggeration of ecclesiastical writers.

Gaul against the tyrants,¹ and in Spain against the Vandals, Suevi, and Alani; and it was with the consent of Honorius that in 419 A.D. Wallia, who had followed Ataulf as king of the Visigoths, finally settled with his people in southwestern Gaul, and founded the Visigothic monarchy.²

It was about the same period that the accomplished fact of the division of Spain between the three barbarian tribes of Vandals, Suevi, and Alani was in a similar manner recognised and approved by the paramount authority of the emperor of the West.³ These peoples had crossed the Rhine at the time when Alaric was making his first attempt on Italy. A portion of the host led by Radagaisus⁴ actually invaded Italy, but were cut to pieces by Stilicho near Florence (405 A.D.); the rest pressed on through Gaul, crossed the Pyrenees, and entered the as yet untouched province of Spain.

Vandals,
Suevi, and
Alani in
Spain.

Honorius died in 423 A.D. His authority had survived the dangers to which it had been exposed alike from the rivalry of tyrants and barbaric invasion, and with the single exception of Britain,⁵ no province had yet formally broken loose from the empire. But over a great

Death of
Honorius,
423 A.D.

¹ For these "tyrants" see an article by Prof. Freeman in the first number of the *English Historical Review* (Jan., 1886), pp. 53-86.

² The capital of the new state was Tolosa (Toulouse).

³ Jung, *Die romanischen Landschaften*, 73 sq.

⁴ For the connection between this movement and those of Alaric and of the Vandals, see Hodgkin, i., 282, 304; Gibbon, iv., 46.

⁵ The Roman troops were withdrawn from Britain by Constantine in 409 A.D.; Jung, 305.

part of the West this authority was now little more than nominal; throughout the major part of Gaul and in Spain the barbarians had settled, and barbarian states were growing up which, though they still recognised the paramount supremacy of the emperor, were in all essentials independent of his control. The question for the future was whether this relationship between the declining imperial authority and the vigorous young states which had planted the seeds of a fresh life in the provinces would be maintained.

The long reign of Valentinian III. (423-455 A.D.) is marked by two events of first-rate importance: the conquest of Africa by the Vandals,¹ and the invasion of Gaul and Italy by Attila. The Vandal settlement in Africa was closely akin in its origin and results to those of the Visigoths and of the Vandals themselves in Gaul and Spain. Here as there the occasion was given by the jealous quarrels of powerful imperial ministers. The feud between Boniface, count of Africa, and Aetius, the "master-general" or "count of Italy," opened the way to Africa for the Vandal King Gaiseric (Genseric), as that between Stilicho and Rufinus had before set Alaric in motion westward, and as the quarrel between the tyrant Constantine and the ministers of Honorius had opened the way for the Vandals, Sueves, and Alans into Spain. In this case, too, as in the others, the

Valen-
tinian III.
423-455 A.D.
Vandal
conquest of
Africa.
429 A.D.

¹ Hodgkin, ii., 233-290; Gibbon, iv., 176-188, 256; Jung, 183. The leading ancient authority is Procopius. See Ranke, iv., (2) 285: r'apencordt, *Gesch. d. Vandal. Herrschaft in Africa*.

hunger for more land and treasure was the impelling motive with the barbarian invader, and in Africa, as in Gaul and Spain, the invaders' acquisitions were confirmed by the imperial authority which they still professed to recognise. It was in 429 A.D. that Gaiseric, king of the Vandals, crossed with his warriors, their families and goods, to the province of Africa, a province hitherto almost as untouched as Spain by the ravages of war. Thanks to the quarrels of Boniface and Aetius their task was an easy one. The defenceless province was easily and quickly overrun. In 435 A.D.¹ a formal treaty secured them in the possession of a large portion of the rich lands which were the granary of Rome, in exchange for a payment probably of corn and oil. Carthage was taken in 439 A.D., and by 440 A.D. the Vandal kingdom was firmly established.

Eleven years later (451 A. D.) Attila invaded Gaul, but this Hunnish movement was in a variety of ways different from those of the Visigoths and Vandals. Nearly a century had passed since the Huns first appeared in Europe, and drove the Goths to seek shelter within the Roman lines. Attila was now the ruler of a great empire in central and northern Europe,² for in addition to his own Huns, the German tribes along the Rhine and Danube and far away to the north owned him as king. He confronted the Roman power as

Attila and
the Huns.
451 A.D.

¹ Prosper, 659; Ranke, iv. (1), 282.

² The principal ancient authorities are Priscus (Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.*, iv., 69); Jordanes (ed. Mommsen, 1882); Sidonius Apollinaris (ed. Barret, Paris, 1878).

an equal; and, in marked contrast to the Gothic and Vandal chieftains, he treated with the emperors of East and West as an independent sovereign. His advance on Gaul and Italy threatened, not the establishment of yet one more barbaric chieftain on Roman soil, but the subjugation of the civilised and Christian West to the rule of a heathen and semi-barbarous conqueror. But Rome now reaped the advantages of the policy which Honorius had perhaps involuntarily followed. The Visigoths in Gaul, Christian and already half Romanised, rallied to the aid of the empire against a common foe. Attila, defeated at Châlons' by Aetius, withdrew into Pannonia (451

**Battle of
Châlons.**

A.D.). In the next year he overran Lombardy, but penetrated no farther south, and in 453 A.D. he died. With the murder of Valentine III. (453 A.D.) the western branch of the house of Theodosius came to an end, and the next twenty years witnessed the accession and deposition of nine emperors. The three months' rule

**Sack of
Rome by the
Vandals.**

of Maximus is memorable only for the invasion of Italy and the sack of Rome by the Vandals under Gaiseric. From 456-472 A.D. the actual ruler of Italy was Ricimer, the

**Ricimer
supreme in
Italy.**

Sueve. Of the four emperors whom he placed on the throne, Majorian (457-461) alone played any imperial part outside Italy.¹ Ricimer died in 472 A.D., and two years later

¹ For the decisive battle of Châlons see Gibbon, iv., 234 *sq.*; Hodgkin, ii., 138, note A, 161, where the topography is discussed.

² Majorian was the last Roman emperor who appeared *in person* in Spain and Gaul.

a Pannonian, Orestes, aspired to take the place which Ricimer had occupied. Julius Nepos was deposed, and Orestes filled the vacancy by proclaiming as Augustus his own son Romulus. But Orestes's tenure of power was brief. The barbarian mercenaries in Italy determined to secure for themselves a position there, such as that which their kinsfolk had won in Gaul and Spain and Africa. On their demand for a third of the lands of Italy being refused by Orestes,¹ they instantly rose in revolt, and on the defeat and death of Orestes they proclaimed their leader, Odoacer, the Rugian,² their king. Romulus Augustulus laid down his imperial dignity, and the court at Constantinople was informed that there was no longer an emperor of the West.³

Orestes the Pannonian.

Romulus Augustulus.

The installation of a barbarian chief as ruler in Italy was the natural climax of the changes which had been taking place in the West throughout the fifth century. In Spain, Gaul, and Africa barbarian chieftains were already established as kings. In Italy, for the last twenty years, the real power had been wielded by a barbarian officer. Odoacer, when he decided to dispense with the nominal authority of an emperor of the West, placed Italy on the same level of independence with the neighbouring provinces. But the old ties with Rome

Odoacer.

¹ Hodgkin, i., 531.

² The nationality of Odoacer is a disputed point. Hodgkin, i., 528; Ranke, iv. (1), 372.

³ Gibbon, iv., 298. The authority for the embassy of Zeno is Malchus (Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.*, iv., 119).

were not severed. The new ruler of Italy formally recognised the supremacy of the one Roman emperor at Constantinople, and was invested in return with the rank of "patrician" which had been held before him by Aetius and Ricimer. In Italy too, as in Spain and Gaul, the laws, the administrative system, and the language remained Roman.¹ But the emancipation of Italy and the western provinces from direct imperial control, which is signalled by Odoacer's accession, has rightly been regarded as marking the opening of a new epoch. It made possible in the West the development of a Romano-German civilisation; it facilitated the growth of new and distinct states and nationalities; finally it gave a new impulse to the influence of the Christian Church, and laid the foundations of the power of the bishops of Rome.

¹ Gibbon, iv., 302; Jung, 66 sq.; Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, 24-33.