

A

HISTORY OF GREECE.

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VOL. I.

*FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
END OF THE PERSIAN WAR.*

LONDON :
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1874.

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P R E F A C E.

IN TWO VOLUMES I have related the history of Greece from the earliest times, of which we can be said to have any knowledge, to the end of the long struggle between Athens and Sparta known as the Peloponnesian War.

In a third volume I purpose to bring down the story to the death of Alexander the Great. A fourth will, I hope, suffice to trace the fortunes of the Hellenic people to the revolution which ended the reign of the Bavarian Otho.

To the death of Themistokles the history of Greece is wholly a traditional narrative; and the task of the modern historian with regard to it must for the most part be confined to an examination of the evidence. The ascertainment of fact is his first duty; his second duty is to provide for his readers the amplest means for testing his own narratives and conclusions.

Under a constant sense of these obligations I have written the chapters relating that portion of the history for which we possess no strictly contemporary evidence. These chapters may, I trust, supply to the critical student all that is essential to a knowledge of the earlier Greek history, and to the general reader a narrative which,

embodying in a moderate compass the results of modern research, may exhibit the Greek tribes not as vague abstractions, but in the fulness of a life to which our own owes all or nearly all that it possesses of grace and culture.

I need scarcely disclaim all thought of diverting the reader from the study of the great histories of Greece written during the present century.*. My notes will on this matter speak for themselves: but I must frankly express my conviction that, even as related by Mr. Grote, the history of Greece to the formation of the confederacy of Delos calls for further scrutiny, and that a larger measure of historical truth will be the reward of the inquiry to which my first volume is devoted. In these earlier chapters I have striven to do for the traditional history of Hellas what Dr. Ihne, with unflinching honesty and singleness of purpose, has already done for the traditional history of Rome.

I believe that on many questions of great, and even of the utmost, importance this examination has brought me to conclusions which must impart a new character and complexion to the narrative, and which cannot fail to affect materially our conceptions of the origin and growth of Greek, and indeed of all Aryan, civilisation. All these I submit to the judgement of the reader, to whom my references may, I hope, supply ample means for verifying or refuting them. In this respect I am bound to admit that my plan is essentially different from that of Dr. Curtius: but I believe that it is more likely to secure the attainment of truth.

* On this point I cannot refrain from referring to some remarks of singular justice and force, by Mr. Freeman, *Historical Essays*, ii. 148, and by a writer in the *Quarterly Review*, July 1873, page 128.

The purely mythical traditions of the Hellenic tribes I have noticed only in so far as they bear on the life and culture of the people. That they are not history, nor quarries out of which we may dig history, I have sought to show in my volumes on the 'Mythology of the Aryan Nations;' and it seemed to me unnecessary to give again a summary of narratives which I had minutely examined elsewhere.

Nor have I inserted the popular chronology for alleged events lying beyond the range of contemporary historical testimony or beyond that period during which, before the growth of written records, oral tradition may reasonably be trusted. The chronology which Thucydides gives of Hellenic colonisation in Sicily can be set down only as plausible fiction; and the Olympic era of Koroibos may be useful as a starting point, if we regard it simply as the algebraical symbol of an unknown quantity.

At the close of the Persian wars we enter practically the period of contemporary history; and from this point the task of examining evidence becomes subordinated to the narration of well-ascertained and generally acknowledged facts.

The remarks made in these volumes on the subject of Assyrian and Egyptian history have been extracted from articles contributed by me to the 'Edinburgh Review.'

For the permission to make use of them I am indebted to the kindness of the Editor.

A full Index for the History to the end of the Peloponnesian war makes the first and second volumes an independent work.

* * * So far as it was possible to do so, I have given the Greek names in the Greek form, retaining the English dress for those names which, like Athens, Thebes, Corinth, have become familiar English words.

It is scarcely necessary to say more than that the Greek spelling involves practically no difference of sound from that of the true Latin pronunciation now again coming into general use. The sound of the name *Kelainai* as uttered by Herodotos was probably not to be distinguished from the sound of the same name in its Latin form, *Celænæ*, as uttered by Cicero. By both the diphthongs were pronounced as we pronounce *ai* in *fail*, the sound of the C and K being identical.

I may refer to Mr. Freeman's remarks in his 'History of Federal Government,' vol. i. page xiii., and to those of Mr. Gladstone in 'Juventus Mundi,' page x.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

BOOK I.

THE FORMATION OF HELLAS.

CHAPTER I.

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF CONTINENTAL HELLAS.

To the Greek of the historical ages the idea of Hellas was not associated with any definite geographical limits. Wherever a Greek settlement existed, there for the colonists was Hellas; and for the Greeks generally the vast, though not continuous, extension of their race from Tanais, Trapezous, and Sinôpê to Aleria, Massalia, and the Spanish Zakyntos or Saguntum, was a subject of legitimate pride. Of a Hellas lying within certain specified bounds, and containing within it only Greek inhabitants, they knew nothing. Not only were some of the most important Greek states planted on the soil of barbarian tribes, but for ages the title of many so-called Greek clans to the Hellenic name remained a matter of controversy. Nor in the description of Greece can we start with an historical order, as though there were some definite region which could be styled the mother country of the rest. In the prehistoric age the name Hellas is confined to the small and mountainous territory from which Achilles, it is said, went forth with his Myrmidones to fight at Ilion;¹ but it is absurd to regard the land of the Phthiotic chieftain

CHAP.
I.

Hellas not
a geographical
name.

¹ *Iliad*, ii. 688. ix. 447.

BOOK
I.

as the original seat of the Hellenic people, and all attempts to determine the course of the migrations which brought about the geographical distribution of the historical Greeks can yield at best only conjectural results.

Mountain systems.—
The Thessalian mountains.

For the sake of convenience Greek geographers drew a distinction between the lands which they regarded as the continuous or continental Hellas and the Sporadic or scattered Hellas of the Egean sea and of the Asiatic, Sicilian, and other coasts.² Adopting this division, we have in the former a country with an area not so large as that of Portugal, stretching from the gigantic range of Olympos and the Kambounian mountains on the north to the southernmost promontories of the Peloponnesos, and exhibiting, throughout, a singularly distinct and marked geography. Olympos itself, rising to a height of nearly 10,000 feet, forms with its neighbouring hills only the northern wall of a lower region which may be roughly described as a square 60 miles in length and breadth, the western rampart of these Thessalian lowlands being the chain of Pindos, which runs southward at right angles to the Kambounian range about halfway between the Ionian and the Egean seas, until at about the 39th parallel of latitude the southern barrier juts off eastwards from Pindos, under the names of Tymphrestos and Othrys, and ends in the highlands between the Malian and Pagasaian gulfs. From the latter gulf northwards the eastern wall of Thessaly is formed by the mighty masses of Pelion and Ossa, to the east of which lies the narrow strip of Magnesian coast, terrible for its ruggedness and its storms. The waters of this mountain-locked basin are carried off by the stream of Peneios through the far-famed vale of Tempe which separates Ossa from Olympos.

The ranges of Oita, Othrys, and Parnassos.

Starting almost from the point whence Tymphrestos shoots eastwards from Pindos, the great chain of Oita trends for a few miles in a more southerly direction and then, running parallel with Othrys, reaches the Malian gulf, leaving between its base and the sea only the narrow pass of Thermopylai,

² Ἑλλάς συνεχής. According to Dikaiarchos this continuous Hellas extends from Ambrakia to the river Peneios and the Magnesian mountain Homolê. The other name, Ἑλλάς σποραδική, is seldom used. Grote, *History of Greece*, part ii, ch. 1. Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, i. 208.

and shutting in between itself and Othrys the fertile valley of the Spercheios. To the southwest of Oita the lands to the north of the Corinthian gulf are for the most part occupied by the wilderness of mountains which formed the fastnesses of Aitolian and Akarnanian tribes, and which still shelter a marauding and lawless population. To the southeast the range extends with but little interruption under the names of Parnassos, Helikon, and Kithairon, leaving to the north the rugged territory of Phokis and the more fertile region of Boiotia.

Separated from mount Parnes to the east by the pass of Phylê, Kithairon forms with that mountain the northern wall of Attica, which stretches from the eastern end of the Krisaian or Corinthian gulf to the headland of Rhamnous, and rises up as the back-ground of the Marathonian plain. To the southwest of Kithairon the ridges of Aigiplanktos and Geraneia run as a backbone along the Corinthian isthmus, and by the Akrokorinthos are joined with that labyrinth of mountains, which, having started as a continuation of the Aitolian highlands from the western end of the gulf, rise up as an impregnable fortress in the heart of the Peloponnesos, leaving to the north at the base of Kyllênê and Erymanthos the long and narrow region known as the historical Achaia. To the south of this mass of mountains, and dividing the southern half of Peloponnesos into two nearly equal portions, the huge and rugged chain of Taygetos, forming a barrier between the lowlands of the Eurotas on the one side and the splendidly fertile plains of Stenyklaros and Makaria on the other, runs on to its abrupt termination in cape Tainaros. Following a nearly parallel course about 30 miles to the east, another range, striking southwards from the Arkadian mountains under the names Parnon, Thornax, and Zarex, leaves between itself and the sea a strip of land not unlike the Thessalian Magnesia and ends with the formidable cape of Maleai, to reappear in the island of Kythera, and again as the backbone of mountains running along the island of Krete. Much in the same way the ridge of Othrys is carried through Euboia in a southeasterly line to the islands of Andros, Tenos, Mykonos, and Naxos, while the range formed by

Mountains
of Attica
and the Pe-
lopon-
nesos.

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I.

Pentelikos and Hymettos, running down Attica to the silver-bearing hills of Laureion and the Sounian cape, is extended to the islands of Keos, Kythnos, Seriphos, and Siphnos, which thus form a parallel line to the eastern islands of the group known as the Kyklades (Cyclades). To the north of Eubœia the islands of Skyros, Skopelos, and Skiathos are in like manner an extension of the mountain chain of Pelion.

The rivers
of conti-
nental
Greece.

The whole of this country, which may be described generally as consisting of grey limestone, exhibits almost everywhere the same features. Less than half the land is even capable of cultivation; and of this land, of which a mere fraction is at present in use, a large portion probably even at the best of times lay idle. Of the mountains not a few are altogether barren, while others, if not well wooded, supply pasture for flocks when the lowlands are burnt up in summer. If, again, these mountain masses, leaving room for few plains and even for few valleys of much length, raise barriers practically fatal to intercourse between tribes who in a plain country would feel themselves near neighbours, this difficulty is not removed or lessened by the presence of any considerable rivers. The Greek streams are for the most part raging torrents in winter and dry beds in summer; and the names Charadrai and Cheimarroi commonly applied to them attest the fury with which they cleave their way through the limestone rocks, when they carry off the mountain drainage in the rainy season. Of these rivers the most important are the Peneios, which drains the Thessalian valley, and the Achelôos which separates Akarnania from Aitolia. The Kephisos and Ilissos pour in summer a scanty tide³ not much surpassed by that of the Eleian Alpheios; and the persistent flow of the Argive Lyrkeios⁴ when the neighbouring streams are absorbed in the marshes of Lernai was recorded in the myth of Lynkeus and the Danaid Hypermnestra.

Marshes
and lakes.

Marshes like those of Lernai and waters which have a better title to the name of lakes make up in some slight measure for the lack of large running streams. Of these

³ Byron, *Corsair*, Canto iii.

⁴ The Lyrkeios was the name given to the Inachos in the upper part of its course. For the explanation of the myth I must refer the reader to my *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, book ii. ch. vi.

the most considerable is the lake Kopaïs, to the north east of the Boiotian Helikon, separated from the Euboian Sea by mount Ptôon. Its waters have partially worked their way through the limestone mass: but the Katabothra or subterranean channels thus produced never sufficed to carry off the surplus waters poured into the lake by the Kephisos; and the greatness of the prehistoric Orchomenos as well as the wisdom of its rulers is attested by the artificial tunnel which, driven through the solid rock, accomplished this purpose in times preceding the formation of the Theban confederacy. Stupid neglect or deliberate malice choked up this artificial channel before the days of Alexander, who wished to reopen it. This scheme was abandoned at his death, and has never again been taken up. The phenomena of Katabothra, not found in the Thessalian lake Boibéis through which the drainage from Pelion passes into the Peneios, are exhibited by a large number of basins formed amongst the mountains of Arkadia; and the sudden disappearance of waters, which after a while emerge again, gave rise to myths such as those which ascribed to the Sikyonian Asopos a source in the Asiatic Phrygia, and saw in the Ortygian fountain of Arethousa the waters of the Peloponnesian Alpheios.⁵

This country, so broken by mountains, so imperfectly penetrated by rivers, was inhabited by a race, which, as we shall see, had advanced from the notion of the family to that of the clan, from that of the clan to the tribe, and from the union of tribes to the idea of the Polis or City, and which, having assumed this as the final unit of society, stuck to the belief with an apparent unconsciousness that any alternative was possible. In the geographical features of their country there was everything to foster that love of absolute isolation which was the inevitable result of this political creed. But for one circumstance this centrifugal tendency would have kept them much on a level with the half-civilised or wholly savage tribes of Thrace or Epeiros. From this monotony of feeble self-

Land and
sea commu-
nication.

⁵ Pausanias, v. 7, 2, was firmly convinced that the geographical fact gave rise to the myth which Shelley has embodied in one of the most exquisite of his poems. The myth is only a reflexion of that of Daphné and Phoibos, *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 29. There were not wanting men who affirmed that the Arkadian Alpheios had its source in the island of Tenedos.

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I

sufficing units they were saved by being brought almost everywhere within reach of the sea. Less in area than Portugal, continental Greece alone has a coast line equal to that of the whole Pyrenean peninsula.⁶ The gulfs of Pagasai and Ambrakia are practically inland lakes: but the island of Euboia with an area of less than 1,500 square miles furnishes with the opposite shores of Lokris, Boiotia, and Attica a coast line of not less than 300 miles, while the island itself in its whole length lay so near to the mainland that after the revolt of the Euboians from Athens (B.C. 411) a bridge was thrown across the narrowest part of the strait. Still more important was the isthmus which separated by a narrow neck, three miles and a half in width, the waters of the Corinthian from those of the Saronic gulf, thus affording to merchants and travellers the advantages of a transit across the isthmus of Panama as compared with the voyage round Cape Horn. So too the Lokrians, Phokians, and Boiotians had access to the sea both to the northeast and to the southwest, while all the cities on the Corinthian gulf itself had a common highway altogether more easy and safe than any road by land. Pre-eminently favoured in situation, Attica was practically an island from which ships could issue in all directions, while they could cut off access through the narrow strait of the Euripos. A voyage of two or three hours would take them to Aigina, and from Aigina to the coasts of Argolis, while vessels of moderate size going from Peiraiæus to Corinth or Korkyra might be conveyed across the isthmus and thus be saved the perils of navigating the dangerous waters of Maleai and Tainaron. Two Greek states alone had no access to the sea. These were the Dorian tetrapolis to the north of the Krissaian gulf, and the Arkadians of Peloponnesos, to whom the alliance of Lepreon gave only temporary possession of a coast line; and these states remained far in the rear of Hellenic development generally. The maritime cities were indeed exposed to perils from roving corsairs; but against these they could guard themselves by walls. Thus it came about, as Thucydides remarked, that the maritime cities were fortified, while the inland inhabitants continued to live in scattered

⁶ Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, i. 2.

villages;⁷ and this security in turn gave a sensible impulse to political as well as to commercial growth. The inland villager lived and died with the ideas and impressions inherited from his fathers, probably without adding any thing to the stock. The citizen of the maritime town, even if he never left his home, was brought into contact with men of different tribes and different races; and if he sailed to other lands, he was still more constrained to accommodate himself to foreign manners and modes of thought. Most of all would he find himself compelled to do so, if he joined the great religious gatherings at Delos, Olympia, or Delphoi. In short, while the men of the village communities exhibited from age to age the rudeness of the swineherd Eumaios in the *Odyssey* without his kindness, the seafaring Greek was continually receiving new impressions and was continually drawn into new lines of thought and into comparisons not always favourable to the state of things which he had left at home. In other words, he became a being in whom the merely conservative impulse was rapidly weakened; and thus the nautic crowd at Athens became an object of dread not merely to oligarchs and despots, but to philosophers like Plato, who felt that their presence would be a disturbing element fatal to the stability of their ideal commonwealths.

Speculations on the influence of soil and climate upon the character of tribes and nations are always dangerous and may be altogether delusive. Peoples widely differing from each other may be found under the same climatic conditions, and the present state of the Hellenic people is sufficient evidence of the degree to which the inhabitants of the same country may be changed in the course of ages.⁸ But when we know from other evidence the general character of the earliest Hellenic civilisation, we are fully justified in marking the con-

Effects of
maritime
activity on
the Greek
character.

⁷ I. 7. Thucydides regards the maritime cities as of later growth than the inland towns or villages. We shall find that his statements on such subjects are to be received with great caution.

⁸ From this point of view it becomes immaterial whether the theory of Fallmerayer be received or not. Probably it will be found that the imputation of a general Slavism to the modern inhabitants of Greece cannot be maintained. That the Hellenic element vastly preponderates over the Slavonic in modern Greek folk lore, has been abundantly proved, and is by some regarded as a conclusive refutation of Fallmerayer. At the least it must be admitted that this ascendancy of the old mythology, like that of the ancient language, shows that the Hellenes of the middle ages had not lost their old power of enslaving or absorbing their conquerors.

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I.

ditions which would give additional force to impulses already received. When the Greeks come before us as an historical people, no Aryan tribes had risen to the notion of a wider political unit than the city, unless an exception is to be found in the Persians. But the Persians of Cyrus are rugged and hardy clansmen, willing enough to lord it over others but not much inclined to yield up their own independence; and in whatever degree, they continued to maintain it. Submission to the will of an absolute military leader they were easily brought to regard as an indispensable condition of wide and permanent conquests; but this submission was not that utter prostration of body and soul before the throne of a despot which marks the empires of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon. If the subjects of these empires could be said to constitute nations, they were nations without political life; and nowhere could a state be found coextensive with a large territory, yet securing to each man freedom both of thought and action. The idea of a representative government as a means for achieving this result had nowhere been awakened in the human mind. The Greek was determined to have freedom; and as it never occurred to him that he might be represented by another man in an assembly composed of the representatives of other men,⁹ the new ideas gained by intercourse with foreigners only made him cling with greater obstinacy to the conditions by which alone, as he believed, individual freedom could be maintained. This political disposition was greatly fostered by the configuration of the Greek coast line which furnished a multitude of harbours, and therefore of sites for maritime cities which could only with great difficulty have any intercommunion by land. To Aristotle the idea of a Polis or State consisting of myriads or millions was as absurd as the idea of a Polis with only ten or twenty citizens; but the mountain-barriers which shut off almost every city from its neighbours had probably much to do with the strength of this conviction.

Climate and
products of
Greece.

For the growth of states confined within these self-imposed limits no country could have been found more favourable than Hellas. It could produce all or nearly all that the needs of

⁹ Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, vol. i. ch. 2.

Greek life required ; and its powers of production, whether of grain, wine, or oil, were turned to account with a diligence and skill in marked contrast with the obstinate stupidity of modern Greek statesmanship. Ages of oppression and mismanagement have probably in their turn affected the climate more than the climate has affected the inhabitants ; but although the country generally is perhaps less healthy now than it used to be, there were at all times differences more or less marked in the physical conditions of the Greek towns. These differences gave rise to epithets and proverbial sayings or to sarcasms, many of which probably had the slenderest foundation in fact ; but these fancies served to keep up the fatal antipathies of which such phrases were the expression.¹⁰ In reality, the feuds and jealousies of the Hellenic tribes made them practically a mere aggregate of independent, if not hostile, units ; and until we reach the traditional history of these tribes separately, it is unnecessary to fill in with more minute detail the outlines of a geographical sketch which is intended to convey a mere general notion of the physical features and conditions of the country lying between the ranges of Olympos and the southernmost promontories of Peloponnesos. This country, as we have seen, is not the whole of Hellas, nor did it contain the wealthiest or the most splendid of Hellenic cities ; but it is the country in which the wretched centrifugal tendencies of the Greek character were most nearly overcome and to which the growth of political wisdom, of science, and of art imparted a lustre altogether more brilliant than the magnificence of Syracuse, Akragas, or Kyrênê.

¹⁰ Thus Tanagra was supposed to be the abode of envy, Thebes of insolence, Haliartos of stupidity, and so with the rest of the Boiotian towns. Dikaiarchos, *Fragm.* 145. Horace, *Ep.* ii. 1, 244. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 310.

CHAPTER II.

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF HELLENIC CIVILISATION.

BOOK
I.Character
of ancient
civilisation.

ENGLISHMEN, it is said, are tempted to regard their constitution as something possessed of a necessary and eternal existence. If they care to take their stand on facts, it would be more safe to assert that the forms and principles to which the most ancient polities in the world may be traced are altogether in antagonism with the principles not of English law only, but of the laws of all civilised nations of the present day. Modern law, if we speak roughly, raises no impassable barrier between men who belong to different nations or even different races, far less between the inhabitants of different cities or the members of different families. The Frenchman may, if he choose, become an Englishman, and foreign descent is no hindrance to the career of the statesman or the pleader. Each may marry, as it pleases him; but be he married or unmarried, the state alone claims his allegiance, and to the state alone can his life or his freedom be forfeited. In all the states of that which we call the ancient world, as in some which are not yet things of the past, absolute isolation stands out in glaring contrast with the modern tendency to international union. The member of one country or city or even family had nothing to do, and according to the earliest ideas could have nothing to do, with the members of any other. For the primitive Aryan, whether in the East or in the West, the world beyond the limits of his own family contained nothing, or contained his natural and necessary enemies. With all who lay beyond the bounds of his own precincts he had nothing in common. They were by birth foes, for whom in the event of war he could feel no pity and on whom he could have no mercy. In such a state of things war meant

to the defeated utter and hopeless ruin. Their lives were at the absolute disposal of the conqueror; and if these were spared, the alternative was the doom of life-long slavery. In peace the barriers between them were scarcely less rigid. The stranger could have no rights whether of intermarriage or of inheritance; nor could the lapse of generations furnish the faintest legal ground for the relaxation of these conditions. If, again, the old society was thus hard in its relations with all who lay beyond its narrow boundaries, it was not less imperious within its own limits. The father was the absolute lord within his own home.¹¹ He was master of the lives of his children, who, so long as he lived, could be nothing but his subjects; and his wife was in theory his slave.

Facts such as these have not escaped the notice of historians and political economists; but their explanations seem for the most part, if not altogether, to put effects for causes. If it be said that community of place could no more convert aliens into citizens than it could change domestic beasts into men,¹² it is obvious that we have before us the result of certain principles, not their origin. If we are told that among the free commonwealths of the ancient world property was derived from political rights rather than political rights from property,¹³ we have yet to ascertain the basis on which these political rights were founded. Nor can we be said to solve the problem by alleging that particular races worshipped particular gods and in a particular manner, or that the different gods had different attributes, when the point to be determined is, why these things should be so. If it be asserted that the mixture of persons of different race in the same commonwealth tended to confuse all the relations of life and all men's notions of right and wrong,¹⁴ we are driven to ask how notions of right and wrong, liable to be disturbed by such intermixture, could have come into existence; and to these questions the assertion of the later historical fact furnishes no answer whatever. If we are told that the pro-

Conditions of citizenship in the Greek and Latin states.

¹¹ The word *father*, *πατήρ*, denoted, at first, mere power, without a trace of the holier feeling since associated with it. It is but another name for the potent man, and reappears in the Greek *δεσπότης*, *desa-pati*, the lord or conqueror of enemies. Precisely the same notion of mere power is expressed in the Greek *ἄσους*, a husband. Max Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, ii. 22 et. seq.

¹² Arnold, *Thucydides*, vol. iii. p. xi.

¹³ *Ib.* *History of Rome*, i. 267, note.

¹⁴ *Ib.* *Thuc.* vol. iii. p. xii.

BOOK
I.

hibition of intermarriage was an insuperable hindrance to the development of national life, we cannot but wish to know the real ground on which intermarriage between the inhabitants of different cities or even between members of different houses was prohibited. The most prominent characteristic of Greek history is that the ancient Hellenic communities never coalesced into a nation. In spite of all the points of agreement furnished by the use of kindred dialects, by religion and laws substantially the same, by like tastes in art which found expression in the festivals common to all the Hellenic tribes, political disunion or isolation was a settled maxim for the Greek. But if we speak of the relations between these Hellenic tribes as interpolitical¹⁵ rather than national, we are as far as ever from really knowing why an Athenian citizen was an alien when he arrived as a visitor in Corinth, although he was not a foreigner. If, again, we are horrified by the tradition which relates that Spurius Cassius, the author of the first agrarian law at Rome, was put to death by his father, our perplexity is not removed when we are told that, however rarely the right may have been exercised, the *patria potestas* of the old Roman law was unquestionably a power of life and death over all members of the family; nor can we be satisfied until we have some clear notion of the state of things to which such phrases as 'imperia Postumiana' and 'imperia Manliana'¹⁶ owe their origin. That the punishment of exile should have been regarded as an adequate recompense for the crimes of the worst political offenders may seem strange to our modern notions; but to find, as we go back to the earliest conditions of the Hellenic states, that the idea of property was in the first instance attached to the soil and afterwards appropriated the harvest, is more perplexing still; and of all these facts we cannot but desire to have an explanation.

The family
the original
unit of
society.

This explanation can be furnished in full only if we trace the society and laws of all the Aryan tribes to their earliest forms; and in this task we may be greatly aided by an ex-

¹⁵ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 345.

¹⁶ Sir G. C. Lewis, *Credibility of Early Roman History*, ii. 282, 424. As an historical narrative, the story of Cassius is worthless, Lewis, *ib.* ii. 182-5; but its worthlessness as history makes it even more significant as marking a stage in the social growth of the Roman people.

amination of social conditions which even at the present day exhibit the primitive type. Such conditions may be found in the village communities of India and other countries ;¹⁷ but the inquiry is obviously one which extends beyond the limits of Greek history, and we may here start from the fact as proved¹⁸ that the narrow limitations and absolute intolerance which were rather forced on than congenial with the legislation of the Greek or Roman states,¹⁹ carry us back to a time when the house of each of our Aryan progenitors was to him what the den is to the wild beast which dwells in it; something, namely, to which he only has a right and which he allows his mate and his offspring to share, but which no other living thing may enter except at the risk of life.²⁰

CHAP.
II.

This utter isolation of the primitive Aryan, as doubtless of every other, human home, is sufficiently attested by social conditions which we find existing in historical times. It is impossible that the Greek or the Roman or the Hindu house could have acquired its inviolable religious character, had it not been held as the stronghold of a family long before the religious sanction was devised. In Latium and Rome, as in Hellas, every house was a fortress, carefully cut off by its precinct from every other. No party walls might join together the possessions of different families ; no plough might

Exclusive-
ness of the
ancient
family.

¹⁷ Maine, *Village Communities of the East and West*.

¹⁸ The evidence for this conclusion is given in full by M. de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, translated by Mr. Barker under the title of *Aryan Civilisation*.

¹⁹ It cannot be questioned that the Roman patria potestas is not the creation of Roman state law. It is of the very essence of a state to be intolerant of private jurisdiction. It cannot possibly recognise in any except itself a right to deal with the lives and property of its members. If these do wrong, the state must claim to be their sole judge. If the right of judging them be under certain circumstances conceded to others, this must clearly be the result of a compromise. The same remark applies to the ancient laws of marriage and inheritance. Fustel de Coulanges, *ib.* Barker, *Aryan Civilisation*, 45. The history of investitures and of the legal immunities of the Clergy shows the natural workings of a state in reference to claims of private or alien jurisdiction.

²⁰ The historical priority of the family or house to the village community or the clan, and of both to the Polis or City or State, is fully recognised by Aristotle, *Polit.* i. 2, 5, et seq. For the monarchies with which the history of these states begin he accounts by the fact that the state is an aggregate of bodies each of which had been from the first subject to one absolute ruler,—*αἱ πόλεις ἐκ βασιλευμένων συνήλθον*. When he goes on to speak of the natural priority of the state to the tribe or of all the world under a single government precisely as we regard the union of cities in a nation, and as Aristotle regarded the union of tribes in a city. In short, these alleged natural definitions cannot be upheld by a mere reference to final causes of which we cannot possibly have any adequate knowledge.

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I.

break the neutral ground which left each abode in impenetrable seclusion. The curse attached to the removal of a neighbour's landmark was itself the growth of a later age, which had begun to veil under the sanction of law the savage instinct which in earlier times had trusted to mere brute force; and in its turn the special boundary god of each household gave place to a common deity which guarded the boundaries of the whole community.²¹ The myth which tells us that the Roman Terminus was a power too mighty to be assailed even by the Capitoline Jupiter²² is a proof that the notion of which Terminus was an embodiment was far older than the religion of which Jupiter, Zeus Patêr, the common father or lord, was the necessary expression. The action of the state, as such, must be to unite its citizens, so far as may be possible, into a single body, by common interests, by a common law, and by a common religion. When then we have before us a condition of society in which each house or family stands wholly by itself and is only accidentally connected with any other, worshipping each its own deity at its own altar, and owning no obedience to a law which may extend its protection to aliens, we see that the materials out of which states have grown are not those which the state would have desired as most suitable for its work. Such as they were, they must be rough hewn to serve a wider purpose; and the history of the Greek and Latin tribes is the history of efforts to do away with distinctions on which their progenitors had insisted as indispensable.

Origin of
the religious
character of
the family.

But the den which the primitive man defended for his mate and his offspring with the instinctive tenacity of a brute would have remained a den for ever, if no higher feeling had been evoked in the mind of its possessor. This impulse was imparted by the primitive belief in the continuity of human life. The owner of the den had not ceased to live because he was dead. He retained the wants and felt the pleasures and pains of his former life; his power to do harm

²¹ The Zeus Herkeios to which Demaratos (Herod. vi. 68) appeals, and the Zeus Ephestios invoked by Kroisos (Herod. i. 44) are thus generalisations for a multitude of deities who presided each over his own scanty domain, the representatives of the isolated being who had once guarded his den, as the dog guards his manger, against all comers.

²² Livy, i. 55.

was even greater than it had been;²³ but above all, his rights of property were in no way changed. He was still the lord of his own house, with the further title to reverence that he had now become the object of its worship, its god.²⁴ This religious foundation once laid, the superstructure soon assumed the form of a systematic and well-ordered fabric. If the disembodied soul cannot obtain the rest which it needs, it will wreak its vengeance on the living; and it cannot rest if the body remain unburied.²⁵ This last office can be discharged only by the dead man's legitimate representative,—in other words, by his eldest son, born in lawful wedlock of a woman initiated into the family religion. Thus, as the generations went on, the living master of the house ruled simply as the vicegerent of the man from whom he had inherited his authority; and he ruled strictly by virtue of a religious sanction which set at defiance the promptings and impulses of natural affection. His wife was his slave. He might have sons grown up about him, and they might even be fathers of children; but so long as he lived, they could not escape from the sphere of his authority. Nor even, when he died, could he leave his daughter as his heiress or co-heiress with her brothers; and for the younger brothers themselves the death of their father brought no freedom. They became now the subjects of the elder brother, as before

²³ That this belief would become a source of frightful cruelty, it is easy to imagine. The dead man would still hunt and eat and sleep as in the days of his life; therefore his horse, his cook, and his wife must be dispatched to bear him company in the spirit world. He must be clothed: and therefore the costliest raiment must be offered to him and consumed by fire, as in the story of Periandros and Melissa. Herod. v. 92, 7. If he be slain, his spirit must be appeased by human sacrifices, as by the slaughter of the Trojan captives on the pyre of Patroklos. In short, the full development of Chthonian worship with all its horrors would follow in a natural and rapid course. *Aryan Mythology*, ii. 144.—Paley, *On Chthonian Worship*. *Cambridge Journal of Philology*, No. 1, June, 1868. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. i. ch. xi.—Mr. Grote ascribes to the fear of the wrath of the departed the Solonian law which forbade all evil speaking against the dead. *History of Greece*, iii. 191.

²⁴ It was doubtless of this deified progenitor that Hekataios was speaking, when he asserted that his sixteenth ancestor was a god. Herod. i. 143. Some families, it is true, might claim descent from Zeus; but there is no reason to suppose that Hekataios regarded himself as Diogenes; but whether the line was heroic or not, the founder of the family would still be the god of the house. See Grote, iii. 177. The historical consanguinity of the members of these γέν or Gentes has been both affirmed and denied. The assertion would probably in every case be incapable of proof; but the point chiefly to be noted is that this consanguinity was implicitly believed, and that apart from this belief the whole fabric of Athenian and Roman polity would have fallen to the ground. On the other hand, it is likely that the blood-relationship extended much further than we may be disposed to imagine.

For the worship of ancestors as forming the basis of Slavonic family life and thus of Slavonic polity, see Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*, 84.

²⁵ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ii. 24.

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I.

they had all been at the absolute disposal of their father. At once, then, the master of each household became its priest and its king. He alone could offer the sacrifices before the sacred hearth; and so long as these sacrifices were duly performed, he was strong in the protection of all his predecessors. In the worship which he thus conducted they only who belonged to the family could take part, as the lion's cubs alone would have a right to share the lion's den. The approach of a stranger to the sacred things was a profanation, his touch was pollution. Hence the continuity of the family became an indispensable condition for the welfare and repose of the dead. These could neither rest nor be rightly honoured, if the regular succession from father to son was broken. Hence first for the father of the family and then for all its male members marriage became a duty, and celibacy brought with it in later times not merely a stigma but political degradation. At Sparta²⁶ and elsewhere the man who refused to marry lost his rights as a citizen; and if the natural succession failed, the remedy lay in adoption. But this adoption was effected by a religious ceremony of the most solemn kind; and the subject of it renounced his own family and the worship of its gods to pass to another hearth and to the worship of other deities. Nor can the solemnity of this sanction be better attested than by the fact that except in case of failure of natural heirs resort could not be made to adoption.

The house
and its de-
pendents.

Thus each house became a temple, of which the master or father (for the two terms have but the same meaning) was also the priest, who, as serving only the gods of his own recesses, knew nothing of a ritual common to other families, or of any religious bonds which linked him with anyone beyond the limits of his own household. These, of course, were extended with each generation, the younger sons becoming the heads of new families which were kept in strict subordination to the chief who in a direct line represented the original progenitor and who thus became the king of a number of houses or a clan. But it was indispensable that the same blood should flow or be thought to flow through

²⁶ The Polyandry, enthusiastically lauded by Xenophon, *De Rep. Lac.* ch. i. is a feature peculiar probably to the Sparta of later times. See further, Döllinger, *The Jew and the Gentile*, book ix. i. 2.

the veins of every member of these houses, and that they must worship the same gods with the same sacrifices. All who could not satisfy these conditions were aliens or enemies, for the two words were synonymous; and thus we have in the East the growth of caste, in the West that of a plebs or a clientela, beneath whom might be placed the serf or the helot.²⁷

CHAP.
II.

Hence in the primitive Aryan states whether of the East or the West the distinction of orders was altogether based on religion; and if in these states citizenship was derivable, as it has been said, only from race, this was the necessary result of the action of the earliest religious faith, and nothing more. The question of property was at the first merely a secondary consideration. The home of the family must, it is true, have its hearth and its altar; but the notion of property in the soil was fully developed only when the death of the founder made it necessary to set apart a certain spot of ground as his tomb and as the burial-place of his successors; and from the inviolability of the grave followed necessarily the doctrine that the soil itself might not be alienated,—a doctrine which had its natural result in the ponderous machinery of Greek and Roman law.²⁸

Ideas of
property.

From the reverence or the worship paid to the master or the founder of the family after death followed, thus, that strict law of primogeniture which made the eldest son, as his father had been, the absolute lord of all other members of

Laws of in-
heritance.

²⁷ The position of the domestic slave was in one sense higher. He was initiated into the family worship, and so far had a community of interest with his master. The plebeian, as such, could have no worship at all, and had therefore no title to the consideration of those who were above him.

²⁸ It seems strange, at the present time, to find a writer like Arnold (*Thucydides*, vol. iii. p. xiii.) asserting that the ancient legislators were compelled to seek in sameness of race the bond and test of citizenship, 'because thus only could they avoid the worst of evils, a confusion and consequent indifference in men's notions of right and wrong.' We have seen that this bond or test, far from being chosen by them, was forced upon them, and that the stress laid on sameness of race was not the cause but merely the effect of a religious sanction. But in a previous sentence Dr. Arnold had asserted that the ancient commonwealths made 'agreement in religion and morals the test of citizenship.' The two expressions betray some indefiniteness of view. The lapse of thirty years has made his assertion that none but Christians can lawfully be English citizens still more strange. The name can scarcely be given to those who would repudiate the title any more than to Jews, and few probably would be disposed now to maintain that to admit men like Gibbon or Hume to the rights of citizenship 'tends in principle to the confusion of right and wrong, and lowers the objects of political society to such as are merely physical and external.' To say that all who hold that the objects of society are not merely physical and external are Christians, whether they call themselves so or not, is at once to beg the question and to concede the point at issue.

BOOK
I

his house. It was impossible for the father to divest him of his sacred character, and impossible for him to admit any of his younger sons to a share of his dignity. All that had come to him from his own deified ancestor must pass on to his legitimate successor. In other words, no room was left for any testamentary power; and accordingly we find that the prohibition against wills was no peculiarity of Athenian or early Roman legislation, but may be found in the laws of the Hindu and other Aryan tribes. At Athens the prohibition was absolute; and when a partial right of bequest was conceded by Solon, it was conceded, we are told, only to those who were childless. For those who had children the principle of division was determined by the law. If a man left only a daughter, the nearest kinsman, as being the lawful heir, was not only to take the inheritance but to marry the daughter who went with it;²⁹ and if he were married already, he must quit his wife for the woman who was of kin to him. The history of later legislation at Athens and elsewhere is the history of attempts to modify the hard rule which at Sparta deprived younger sons of all share in the patrimony, and which everywhere hedged in the eldest son with a divinity which none might presume to share with him. From this root sprang that exclusive and intolerant spirit which pervaded the whole civilisation of the ancient world and which in its intensity is to us almost inconceivable. The institution of caste is not peculiar to Egypt or India. The history of Greece in some part and the history of Rome in a greater degree exhibit a series of conflicts, in which the lower orders in the state seek to throw down the barriers which religion had raised between themselves and their betters. If the father of the family ruled wholly by a religious sanction, the same sanction could alone constitute the authority of every magistrate who might bear rule over any aggregate of such families,—in other words, over the state, so far as at that time the idea of a state could be said to be conceived. The first duty of every such officer was to the

²⁹ This is strictly the meaning of the word *ἐπίκληρος*. An heiress in the modern sense of the term was a personage unknown to Hellenic law. On the Solonian laws respecting wills and inheritances see, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. xi.

gods, whose priest he was by virtue of his birth and blood ; and in the claim of the plebeian to fill his place, if chosen by the suffrages of the community, he would see not merely a political movement which might end in the rule of the Demos or mob, but a direct insult offered to the majesty of the gods. Hence that fierce opposition which at Rome resisted the admission of plebeians to the curule magistracies, long after the plebeians had shown as great a fitness to fill those offices as could be shown by any members of the patrician houses.

But if the walls of separation between the orders in the state or city slowly crumbled away, the barriers which cut off the stranger from the rights of citizenship were never removed. The Athenian, the Spartan, the Megarian, and the Theban were as closely akin as the men of Kent and Essex, of Norfolk and Lincoln. Yet out of the bounds of his own city each was a stranger or alien who had no proper claim to the protection of the laws, who could not become an owner of land in a soil sacred to the worship of other gods, or inherit from the citizens, because all inheritance involved the maintenance of a particular ritual. In short, to the citizen of the ancient communities the city was not merely his home ; it was his world. Here alone could he live under the protection of law, that is, of religion. All that lay beyond was a strange land where he must seek in vain for all that he held dear, and where he must lead, in literal strictness of speech, an utterly godless life. Hence the doom of banishment became not less terrible than that of death, and was regarded as an adequate punishment for the gravest political offences, for the banished man was wiped out from his family and from the worship of the family gods. He was no longer husband or father ; and his wife and children were free to act as though he had never lived.

Identity of religious and civil penalties.

The same religious feeling ran through every relation into which the citizens of one state could be brought with those of another. Each city remained as much an isolated unit as each original family of the state had ever been ; and the process of consolidation never went further than the immediate territories of the great cities. The union of the Attic Demoi, attributed to Theseus, could furnish no precedent for

Influence of religion.

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I.

the fusion of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes with their dependencies into a single state. The centrifugal tendencies of Hellenic society rendered impossible an union which would have changed the history of the world. But the effects of the old religion did not stop here. If it denied to all strangers the right of intermarriage, it fed the feelings of jealousy, suspicion, and dislike which the citizens of one state felt for those of other states even in times of peace, and intensified all the horrors of war. Each war was, in short, a crusade, not a struggle for the attainment of some political end; and the contending armies approached each other with curses as ferocious as any which may be read on the cylinders of Tiglathpileser. The duties of mercy and pity to the conquered were things unknown. The life of the vanquished was at the disposal of the victor who, if he did not slay him, sold him as a slave; and if terms were made with the enemy, the contract went for nothing if the religious ceremonies were neglected. The conscience lay asleep under the burden of technicalities; and the Roman never accused himself of injustice for breaking with the Samnites the agreement which he had made after the disaster of the Caudine Forks. The treaty had not been ratified in the blood of a victim; and it was mere waste of breath to invoke the good faith of honourable men.

Obstacles
hindering
the growth
of civil
society.

This absolute isolation in which the family life of the ancient world had its origin might well be supposed to constitute an insuperable hindrance to the growth of any society beyond the limits of the family; and with this tendency the state, so soon as it can be said to have any existence, came into perpetual collision. So soon as the idea of this wider society had been once fairly formed, the old state of things received a deadly wound. But the history of every form of Aryan polity, although it exhibits the working of a more generous feeling, points unmistakeably to the time when each house existed in utter loneliness and in necessary antagonism with all around it. All indeed that the state could do was to modify the rules of the ancient family life to suit its own purposes, and to work out its own ends rather by means of compromise than by open opposition to principles which de-

rived their sanction from religion. To propose that one house should abandon its worship for that of another house would have been sheer impiety; but it was possible to induce a group of families to unite in the common worship of a god whom they jointly chose as their protector, and thus a number of houses became grouped in a society capable of indefinite expansion. Still, though thus alone was the way opened to that wider conception of political life which seems to us almost a self-evident truth, the principles in which the original family was rooted exercised their influence even in minute details of later constitutions. The Greek Phratriai and the Latin Curiae were but clubs in which a number of houses were combined. No change was made in the character of the houses themselves; and their alliance seemed scarcely to bring men a single step nearer to forms of social life in which blood ceases to be the indispensable condition of citizenship. All that was done was to provide a common ground on which certain families might meet to promote their secular interests, while their religion and their morality remained unchanged. This morality was simply the fruit of a religious belief which touched neither the heart nor the conscience. If it had its good points, these were due simply to the necessary conditions of the primitive family, not to any conscious perception of the distinctions between moral right and moral wrong. If it guarded sedulously the chastity of the wife of the lord, it was because any violation of it might involve the confusion of its most sacred offices and render the worship of its gods a mockery. Whatever might be thought of the relations of the master with women who were aliens to his family, the wife and the daughter must necessarily be beyond even suspicion. In short, the virtues which it seemed to foster had their root not in any spontaneous feeling or instinct but simply in a technical discipline; nor was there a single direction in which the member of an ancient household could turn without finding himself confronted by external restraints. If a certain act was to be done or left undone, this was not because they had in themselves a certain sense which told them that the one was right and the other wrong, but because a wolf or a rabbit had

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crossed their path, or because they had heard a crow chatter or seen the lightning flash on one side rather than on the other. Their only idea of the gods whom they worshipped, that is, of their own ancestors, was that of beings who retained their human appetites while they had acquired superhuman power and superhuman malignity. It was impossible that kindly affections could have any real scope among men who breathed such a moral atmosphere as this, or that the society to which they belonged could fail to exhibit the intolerance, harshness, and cruelty of the principle, which lay at the root of their family life, if not of their social order. Nor would these principles be confined to one district or country. They may be traced in every Aryan land; and if they still retain their full power over a large proportion of the human race, no room is left for doubt that they once exercised an absolute despotism over all mankind. The extent of their influence might not be everywhere the same; but each picture displays in turn a harsh and repulsive outline, and all that can be said is that, if the Greek appears to advantage when compared with the Roman, it is at the cost of those qualities which made the Roman the master of the world. In both alike we see the same hard and un pitying character: in both we can trace this result to a religion which appealed to no generous human feeling and proscribed all human sympathy, which was founded on fear and had its natural fruit in exclusiveness and cruelty.³⁰

Slow
growth of
the state.

By bearing in mind this origin of Hellenic polity, we shall be able to find our way with comparative ease through the complicated forms which that polity assumed at different periods and to determine the real character of some changes which seem to have been generally misunderstood. We might

³⁰ The most ancient Aryan faith stands much on a level with the religion of Balak as depicted in the book of Micah, vi. 6-7. Its work began and ended with the performance of purely external rites: but this ancient type was more suited to the temper of some Aryan tribes than to others, and the Romans exhibited to a comparatively late age the tone of thought which characterised their forefathers before the foundation of any civil society whatsoever. 'They were therefore,' as Dr. Inne rightly insists, 'even to the end, a heartless, cold, calculating, and uncharitable people, without enthusiasm themselves, and awakening none in others, great and powerful only by their self-control, their intelligence, and their iron will.' *History of Rome*, i. 120. The Greek advanced further: but his aim was the embellishment of his own life; and even the best among them can scarcely be said to have even thought of attaining their own happiness by promoting the good of others.

indeed have thought that the constitution of the primæval Aryan family could never depart from its ancient simplicity: and of itself possibly it might never have done so. But the members of these families recognised no duties beyond the limits of their own homes; and on others who were not so strong or not so cunning they could prey without hindrance or scruple. Hence the natural inequality of mankind allowed the most powerful families to lay the foundations of an irresponsible despotism, while the weaker were brought into a condition of clientship which differed from slavery in little more than its name. But in all those classes of men which, when they had been brought into subjection, became different orders in the state, we may safely assert that the same constitution of the family prevailed. Even among the lower Indian castes we find an exclusiveness fully equal to that of the higher, and it is only the force of circumstances which has placed one at the mercy of the other.

But so far as these original families were actually or nearly on a level in point of power, it was possible that they might combine for the purpose of extending that power and increasing it; and by the establishment of a worship which in no way interfered with that of the family this union was at once accomplished. Thus united, the Hellenic γένη or houses formed a Phratría or brotherhood.³¹ But while the circle of interests was widened, the bond of union remained not less strictly religious; and each group of families had a common altar erected in honour of a common deity who was supposed to be more powerful than the gods of each separate household. The principle of combination thus introduced was capable of indefinite extension; and as the grouping of houses or families had formed the Phratría, so the union of Phratrías alone was needed to form in the tribe a religious society strictly analogous to the Phratría or the family. The societies thus formed would always have their own territory, the fields in which each family had its own tomb with the common

The Family
and the
Clan.

³¹ There seems to be no reason to doubt that the houses united in the Phratrías were originally connected by ties of blood, although the time would soon come when this connexion could no longer be traced, and perhaps no longer even existed. The name seems to imply this consanguinity: and M. de Coulanges finds confirmation of this in the Roman name Curia, in which he sees a κούρια or band of (κοῖροι) sons.

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I.

ground which lay between their several landmarks; but the principle of these combinations was essentially not local, and thus the dependents of these houses could never acquire interest or possession in the soil on which they lived, toiled, and died. At best they might be suffered to retain a certain portion of the produce on condition of their laying the rest at the feet of the lord; and thus a perpetual burden was laid not on the land but on tillers of it who, if they failed either to yield the amount demanded, or in any other way, might be reduced to personal slavery. We shall see that it is possible, and even likely, that in this fact we may have the true explanation of the most remarkable measure in the legislation attributed to Solon as well as of some of the reforms carried by Kleisthenes.

The Clan
and the
Tribe.

But as the worship of the family was subordinated to that of the Phratría, and that of the Phratríai to the worship of the tribe, so tribes which were locally near to each other could not fail to desire for themselves a union similar to that of the phratríai or the houses.³² This final union of tribes constituted the Polis or State, the society which, founded on a common religion, embraced all its members within the circle of a common law, and which was destined in the end to sweep away those distinctions of blood in which its foundations had been laid. But this was a result hidden far away in the distant future. In itself the Greek Polis and the Latin Civitas was, like the tribe and the phratría, strictly a confederacy, in which each unit retained all its original rights and powers. With these the larger society could not in theory interfere. The Roman citizen was still lord in his own house and held the power of life and death over its members: the Greek, who had been initiated into the family on the tenth day after his birth, had to wait for years before he joined the phratría and after another long interval was admitted into the state.³³

³² In later traditions the numbers of the tribes, phratríai, houses, and families are arranged with arithmetical symmetry, each tribe being divided into three phratríai, each Phratría into thirty-clans or Gentes, each *γένος* or gens into thirty houses. This exact division Mr. Grote regards as 'the fancy of an antiquary who pleased himself by supposing an original systematic creation in times anterior to records, by multiplying together the number of days in the month and of months in the year.' *Hist. Gr.* iii. 78.

³³ De Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*. Barker, *Aryan Civilisation*, 75.

With the formation of the state, in other words, of the individual city, the political growth of the Greek may in strictness of speech be said to have ended; and his inability to advance to any other idea of Parliament than a Primary Assembly³⁴ involved a fatal hindrance to the growth of a nation. The members of other cities might be sprung from the same stock, and their affinity might be shown by a common language, common customs, common tastes and feelings: but to advance beyond the idea of a confederation of states which remained free at any time to shake off the connexion was for them an impossibility. In blood and in religion the men of Athens, Thebes, and Sparta were as closely connected perhaps as the men of London, Manchester, and Liverpool; but in going to war with each other Athens, Thebes, and Sparta could not even be charged with that violation of duty which during their great civil war was urged against the southern states of the American Union. Hence the country which was called Hellas remained practically throughout its whole history a territory in which a certain number of cities inhabited by people more or less resembling each other might or might not be allied together. The local Athenian state might embrace a wider area; but the tribes among whom it was divided formed strictly this religious confederacy which in the eyes of the Greek was the indispensable condition of political life; and when in the days of her greatness Athens established or sought to maintain an empire which we might be disposed to compare with our own, she did so at the cost of trampling conventional notions under foot and setting up an admitted tyranny.³⁵ Thus the Greek states remained an assemblage of units, not all of which could be combined even to repel the Persian invasion, and which were unable to resist the incroachments of the Makedonian kings. The theory of Greek citizenship was the same as that of the Latin city which achieved the conquest of the world; but Rome attained her power not by calling nations into existence but by numbering Italians or Gauls among her citizens by a process which would intitle

CHAP.
II.
The Tribes
and the
City.

³⁴ Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, vol. i. p. 67.

³⁵ *Τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν.* Thuc. iii. 87.

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I.

Course of
political
develop-
ment in
Greece and
in Rome.

Englishmen or Prussians to their rights only as possessing the freedom of the cities of London or Berlin.

This device secured to Rome universal dominion: the refusal or the failure to adopt it insured the reduction of the Hellenic land to the form of a Roman province. But whatever might be the extent of Roman or Athenian power, the character of each was the same. It was a power which they only could share who were citizens, and a vast body of men lay at all times beyond the circle of citizenship. The powerful families, who were able to domineer over their weaker neighbours and whose confederation was essentially religious, drew between themselves and their dependents a line of separation, to pass which was an impiety and a sacrilege. The attempts to pass it sum up the history of the political contests between the patricians of Rome and the plebeians; in other forms the same struggle marks the history of Athens, and in greater or less degree that of all the other cities of Greece.

Religious
character
of this
develop-
ment.

That this struggle may be traced wholly to religious causes, it is impossible to doubt. It was religion, and religion alone, which placed a seemingly impassable barrier between even one family and another and which marked all aliens and strangers as necessary enemies. It was religion which shut off the plebeian from the patrician as something common or unclean, and made slavery the inevitable doom of the conquered. Acts and ceremonies which seem to us purely political had at first a merely religious meaning. The object of the Roman census was not to ascertain the number of the citizens, but to insure first the attendance of every citizen at the lustration which was to atone for all previous shortcomings in the service of the gods, and, still more, to guard against the intrusion of strangers whose presence would deprive that lustration of all its efficacy. Without a knowledge of the will of the gods, obtained by auguries or omens or in any other way, no operations of war could be undertaken; and the Spartans refused to advance at Plataiai, even though the Persian arrows had begun to fall among them, until the signs from the entrails were satisfactory. It was religion which gave to the father or lord of the house his

authority and power; and the king, who came into existence after families had been grouped in clans and clans in tribes, was but the representative of the father, while all other magistrates did but reflect the authority of the king. It was religion which led tribes and cities to regard each other with suspicion, dislike, or hatred, which rendered the outbreak of war between them at any time likely, which intensified its horrors and indefinitely extended its results. It was religion which cramped the action alike of states and individuals, and confined the freedom of the citizen within limits which to us would be insufferably narrow. In short, religion, as it existed for the ancient Aryan world, fully justified the indignant accusation of Lucretius; but it is not easy to see how the fabric of modern civilisation could have been built up, if the ancient polity had had any other origin. The idea that the wild men of the woods were tamed by some one who possessed the sacred gift and magic power of eloquence³⁶ is a mere dream. Neither law nor language has sprung from a deliberate convention; and the religious character of the family, rooting in men the conviction of law as an inviolable principle, was the only foundation on which after the efforts of unnumbered generations a solid superstructure of order and government could be raised.

³⁶ Cicero, *De Invent.* i. 2.

CHAPTER III.

THE MYTHOLOGY AND TRIBAL LEGENDS OF THE GREEKS.

BOOK
I.General
character
of Greek
mythical
tradition.

OF all the Aryan nations, and therefore, it may be said, of all the nations of the world, none has amassed so rich and varied a store of popular tradition as the Greek. The freshness of the earliest Vedic hymns must carry with it a sense of exquisite beauty; but their childlike descriptions of phenomena had not yet been crystallised into a mythology, and in its later developement the mythology of the Hindu assumed forms so cumbrous and so grotesque that the gracefulness of earlier conceptions was buried almost out of sight. When we read that Krishna rescued from the dark giant Naraka and then wedded sixteen thousand one hundred maidens and multiplied himself into so many forms that each of these damsels thought that he had wedded her alone,³⁷ we can see how truthfully the story describes the dew which, becoming visible only when the darkness of night is dispelled, reflects the sun in its thousands of sparkling drops; but we feel that an immeasurably deeper and purer feeling underlies the story of Prokris, the child of the dew (Hersé), slain by the spear of him whom she loves, far down in the thicket where the last drop flashes as the sun rises high in the heaven.³⁸ Into this magnificent storehouse of his thoughts the Greek gathered together all that he knew, or thought that he knew, of the heaven and the earth, of day and night, of fire and frost, of light and darkness, of the bright and the swarthy gods, of giants and nymphs and men. All were there, endowed with life and with all the feelings and the passions of men. But if this rich harvest sprung with a random or irregular growth, it was destined to be garnered up not only

³⁷ *Mythology of Ar. Nat.* ii. 137.³⁸ *Ib.* ii. 91.

by the greatest of epic, lyric, and tragic poets, but by the more systematic hands of mythographers who wove the whole into a connected history from the awful confusion of Chaos, the parent of Erebos and Night, to the settlements of the Herakleids in the Peloponnesos and the founding of every Hellenic city. It follows then that this vast mass of popular tradition was not all of one kind. If in portions it expressed the religious or philosophical thought of the people, in others there were blended stories of tribal wars and heroic exploits which may have had some foundation in the world of historical fact. But all rest upon the same authority, and the achievements of Hektor, Achilles, and Sarpêdôn are as much or as little attested as the terrific combats of Zeus with Typhon and the Titans or the torturing of Prometheus on the crags of Caucasus. All therefore lie far beyond the domain of history, and the attempt to extract from this vast heap of folk-lore the grains of fact which may lie hidden within it is a task not more hopeful than that imposed on Pyschê as the condition of restoration to the lost Eros. Our time will be spent to little purpose until we can have the aid of the army of ants to gather up the scattered millet seeds.³⁹

But if these stories yield no historical knowledge of the origin or the dispersion of the Hellenic tribes or of any events which precede by more than two or three generations the rise of a genuine contemporary history, they acquire an historical importance on which it would not be easy to lay too much stress, as illustrating the growth of Greek thought, civilisation, and law. From them we learn what at least they thought of themselves and their earliest progenitors, and by their aid we can trace the line which with whatever irregularities marked off their mythology from their religion. These myths were brought together, as a whole, in the Theogonies taken along with the great epic cycle which, embracing the whole body of Greek epic poetry, professed to give in chronological order the history of heroic achievements from the day on which the first hero wrought his first exploit.⁴⁰

Greek
theogonies
and epic
cycles.

³⁹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 404-7.

⁴⁰ Of this epic cycle our Iliad and Odyssey form a part. It is unnecessary to plunge

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I.

But as the epic cycle consisted of a vast multitude of poems put together in different lands and at long intervals of time, so these theogonies were the artificial growth of comparatively late periods, when poets set themselves to hew into shape and cement together the rough stones which lay scattered about them like boulders on a mountain side. We shall therefore fail to form a true idea of the way in which these tales took shape, or of the way in which they were regarded by the people themselves, if we accept the Hesiodic or Orphic theogonies as expressions of the general belief of early ages.

Greek ideas
of nature.

It is enough to say that for the Greek, as for the Aryan conquerors of India, the whole world of sense was alive. For him there was no real distinction between organic and inorganic matter, and scarcely any gradations of animation. The trees, the clouds, the waters were all sentient beings: the dawn and the gloaming were living persons, connected with the brilliant god whose daily approach waked all things from slumber and whose departure left them in darkness repulsive as that of death. For him, as for the poets of the Vedic age, the blue heaven over his head was the living husband of the earth on which he seemed to descend each evening. He was Zeus, Dyaus, the glittering or shining god, whose bride Gaia or Ida was the teeming mother of growths awful or lovely, healthful or deadly; or he was Ouranos, Varuna, the being who spreads his veil over the earth which he loves. For him the sun was Helios, the inhabitant of a house so dazzling in its splendour that no mortal might look on its glory and live; or he was Phoibos the lord of life who sprang into light and strength in Delos or Ortygia, the

into the controversy on the origin and date of these poems. Their influence on the lyric and tragic poets is a question of far greater moment: and on this point Bunsen does not hesitate to say that they are 'the canon regulating the Hellenic mental development in all things spiritual, in faith and custom, worship and religion, civil and domestic, poetry, art, science. Homer is not only the earliest poet, but the father of all succeeding poets. The Iliad is the sacred groundwork of lyrical poetry not less than of the drama.' *God in History*, book iv. ch. viii. For the general examination of these assertions or assumptions I must refer the reader to my chapter on 'Modern Euhemerism,' *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 170, contenting myself here with the brief and naked summary of the conclusions there reached,—namely, that the materials of the Iliad and Odyssey are taken from the vast stores of mythical tradition common to the Aryan nations; that the substance of the Iliad and the Odyssey existed from an indefinitely early time; that these poems were not composed at once or as a coherent whole; that they exercised little influence on the mental development of the Greek lyric and tragic poets, and that their present form cannot be traced to any age much earlier than that of Plato.

land of the morning ; or he was Herakles toiling along up the steep path of heaven, laden with blessings for mankind ; or he was Sisyphos, the wise or crafty, doomed to roll daily to the mountain summit the stone which then rolled down again to the abyss, or Tantalos sentenced to parch into slime the waters from which he would drink, or to scorch the fruits, which were his own children, before the eyes of Zeus, the broad heaven. For him the corn came up from the living bosom of the earth or the dawn mother, and the summer was her child, torn from her arms as Persephoné each winter and restored to her at Eleusis, the joyous trysting place, in the spring, or mangled like Zagreos in the autumn only to rise in renewed beauty and vigour on the death of winter. For him the golden grape was the gift of the wine-god Dionysos, the wonderful being who, gentle at his birth as a babe, could change himself into a fierce lion and rouse his worshippers into irrepressible frenzy. For him the sea was the realm of Poseidon, the brother of Zeus, the lord of the bright heaven ; and among his children were beings like the Kyklops, uncouth and fantastic in form as the storm-clouds looming over the line of the ocean. But more frequently present to his thoughts were the bright inhabitants of the dawn land,—the flashing-eyed maiden who springs fully armed from the cloven forehead of her sire and who has her home on the sunlit rock of brilliant and happy Athens,—the queen of loveliness and grace who, as Aphroditê, rises in faultless beauty from the sea foam,—the rosy fingered Eôs who leaves the couch of Tithonos to gladden the eyes of mortal men,—the pure Artemis whose spear never misses her mark,—the shortlived Daphnê who vanishes away before the fiery breath of her lover,—the beautiful Arethousa who plunges into the blue waters in her flight from the huntsman Alpheios,—the glowing Charites who tend the bath of Aphroditê or array in a robe of spotless white the form of the new-born Phoibos,—the tender Prokris who dies loving and loved, because earth has no longer a place to shelter her ;—and over all these, rather oppressive in her greatness than winning in her beauty, Hêrê the majestic queen of heaven, whom Ixion woos to his ruin, bringing on himself the doom which binds

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him to his blazing wheel for ever and ever. With these beings of the dawn land came the harper Hermes, the babe who can soothe all cares away as he sings softly in his cradle, the Master-Thief who, when a few hours old, steals the bright cattle of the sun god, the mighty giant who in his rage can dash the branches of the forest together till they burst into flame but who, be he ever so hungry, cannot eat of the flesh which his fire has roasted. But the Greek could allow no deadly feud between the lord of song and the lord of light, and the compact between Phoibos and Hermes gave to the latter the rule over the gleaming herds which, as clouds driven by the breeze, move across the blue fields of heaven. For the Greek, lastly, Hephaistos, the youngest of the gods, limping from his birth, yet terrible in his power, was the lord of earthly fire, while the spotless Hestia dwelt in the everlasting flame which gleamed on the sanctuary of each household hearth.⁴¹

Religious
festivals of
the Greek
tribes.

All these beings with a thousand others were to the Greeks objects of love or fear, of veneration, reverence, or worship; and the worship of some among them may be regarded as the very foundation of the brilliant social life on which in some of its aspects, in spite of its failure to waken the Greeks to a national life, we still look with undiminished admiration. At Delphoi, at Abai, at Dodona was gathered all that was sumptuous and beautiful in art, and there the great and the wealthy, the ambitious and the careworn came under an influence which, whatever may have been its shortcomings, was in the main wholesome. In the magnificent gatherings of Olympia, in the contests of the Corinthian isthmus, in the Nemean and Pythian games, the Hellenic race received an education, which, regarded in the light of the purpose which it was designed to serve, has fallen to the lot of no other people upon earth. Here strength of body was used not as a means for supplying the bloody and brutal pleasures of a Roman amphitheatre, but as an instrument for

⁴¹ In this brief summary I have named a few only of the beautiful or awful beings who peopled the mythical world of the Greeks. Except in its bearing on the intellectual and religious growth of the people I cannot regard this mythology as a part of Greek history. For the myths connected with these gods and heroes, and their origin, I must refer the reader to the *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*.

a systematic training which brought out all its powers. Here the painter and the sculptor could feed his genius in the study of the most splendid of human models; ⁴² and here the simple wreath which formed the prize of victory in the games carried with it a glory which kings might envy and a power which struck terror into the mind of the barbarian. ⁴³ Here were gathered bards, lyric and epic poets, historians, whose names have never grown old; and here also were gathered multitudes whose quickness of perception and keen sensibility to impulse have never been equalled, and to whom the highest human genius here supplied from year to year an impulse, the force of which it is impossible for us fully to realise. Here in spite of the wretched isolation which sundered city from city and at last left them exhausted to become the prey of foreign invaders and oppressors, there grew up a feeling of Hellenic brotherhood which tended at least to lessen the causes of strife and feud, if it could not do away with the horrors of ancient wars when these wars were once begun. Here as they listened to the songs of Pindar and the lofty morality of historians like Herodotos, ⁴⁴ there was fostered a love of thought in singular contrast with the exclusiveness, sternness and cruelty of the Roman mind. If such was the power exercised by the festivals opened to all Greeks, the influence of some other feasts to which only particular races or tribes were admitted was, as being confined within a narrower circle, even more intense and, under the general conditions of Hellenic society, more beneficial. Nothing could possibly weld the Greeks into a nation with a central representative government, leaving to each municipality free action within a certain range: and as this might not be looked for, it was well that a portion of the Hellenic race should, like the Ionians at Delos, be impressed with a feeling of closer brotherhood than that which could be

⁴² The other aspect of this subject, treated of by Dr. Döllinger, *The Jew and the Gentile*, vol. ii. p. 243, Eng. Tr., must not be lost sight of. At the least, it may be safely affirmed that the monstrous evils which he indignantly depicts could not have arisen or have reached this pitch in countries where the condition of women is what it should be.

⁴³ Herod. viii. 26.

⁴⁴ Not much is to be said in favour of the story that Herodotos himself recited his histories at Olympia; nor must it be supposed that these recitations formed any part of the Olympic contests. The fact that they did not form part of the games gives them a greater value, as an index of the popular taste.

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awakened in them for the non-Ionic tribes. The sanctity of each of these festivals was guarded by a truce solemnly proclaimed; but the Truce of God is an obligation apt to be more often honoured in the breach than in the observance; and hence it may be unwise to lay stress on these direct restraints. But there can be no doubt that the great Delian festival was the means of keeping alive and strengthening a feeling of unity which turned the scale against the barbarian in the invasion of Xerxes and furnished a basis for the great fabric of Athenian empire.

Inconsistencies and contradictions of Greek myths.

For working purposes then it may be said that the mythical or popular beliefs about the gods and the heroes formed a kind of religion, which no one felt it to be to his interest, and perhaps none regarded it as his duty, to gainsay or to weaken. But in no other sense can we identify Hellenic religion or morality with Hellenic mythology.⁴⁵ The so-called Hesiodic poems give us some of the most repulsive of these legends, and string together the loves of Zeus, his fight with his father Kronos, his struggles with the giants, and his cheating of mankind. But when the poet betakes himself to his work as a teacher, we hear no more of these stories; and we are told simply that the eyes of Zeus are in every place beholding the evil and the good; that his even justice requites every man according to his work, and that all are bound to avoid the smooth road to evil and to choose the strait path of good which, rough at first, becomes easy to those who walk in it.⁴⁶ Nor can even those myths which seem to embody popular thought on the subject of mankind, their origin, their growth, and their fortunes, be fairly regarded as the deliberate expression of their belief. If such

⁴⁵ The real nature of Greek religion is exhibited, as we have already seen, in the principles which determined the conditions of their social and political life. This system was, necessarily, altogether ceremonial and external, and showed its worst side in the horrible developments of Chthonian worship (see note 23). Happily even the popular mind soon rose above this rigid and merciless faith; and the practical religion shown in the conversation of the swineherd Eumaios in the *Odyssey* is quite in harmony with the pensive morality of the Hesiodic *Works and Days*.

⁴⁶ *Works and Days*, 35, 215, 263. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 351. How far the Greeks with the Hindus or other Aryan nations may be regarded as monotheists, is a question which cannot be dismissed in a few lines. I am bound to express my conviction that even the most cumbersome developments of Hindu mythology never clouded the monotheistic convictions of the real thinkers among the people, and that Brahma, Vishnu, Dyaus, Indra, Varuna, with all the rest, were to these men names for the One God. The phenomena are much the same in Hellas as in the land of the Five Streams. —*Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 332; ii. 102, 110, &c.

a philosophy be embodied in the myth of Prometheus, this philosophy is set at nought elsewhere. In the legend adopted by Æschylos man is represented not as having lost high powers, but as never having been awakened to the consciousness of the powers with which he was endowed. From the first, until Prometheus came to their aid, men were beings to whom sight and hearing were wholly useless, and for whom life presented only the confused shapes of a dream.⁴⁷ The sunless caves in which they lived like ants were not wrought into shape by their hands.⁴⁸ For them there were no distinctions of seasons, no knowledge of the rising and setting of the stars.⁴⁹ Of the decencies of life, of the sacredness of marriage, of the bonds of kinship or affinity, they knew nothing. It was impossible for the poet to show more clearly that Prometheus was the friend who bestowed on man, originally a creature more helpless and feeble than any of the brute beasts, all that can give value to life or even make it bearable. With this tale and with the story of Pandora which follows as its sequel,⁵⁰ the legend of the Hesiodic ages is in complete antagonism. In this legend the existence of man upon earth begins with a golden age during which the earth yielded her fruits of her own accord and in which plagues and sicknesses were unknown. In this series of the golden, silver, brazen, and iron ages, the old age does not fade off insensibly into the new. It is wholly swept away, and the new takes its place as virtually a new creation. But this series the poet found it necessary to break, in order to meet the popular sentiment of his time. That sentiment would never be satisfied with a system which would degrade to the iron age that race of heroes who were indeed men, but men altogether beyond the puny mortals known in later tradition. If Hektor and Herakles, Perseus and Bellerophon belonged not to the happier times of the golden or the silver age, they must have a time of their own; and this place was assigned to them after the age of brass, care being taken that those among them, who failed to meet their doom at Troy or in their homeward

⁴⁷ *Prom. V.* 448.⁴⁸ *Ib.* 453.⁴⁹ *Ib.* 458.⁵⁰ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 201, *et seq.*

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wanderings, should slay each other at Thebes fighting in the miserable quarrels of the sons of Oidipous. So readily were even the philosophic legends of the moralists adapted to suit the popular feeling of the day.

Dynastic
and tribal
legends.

But if these popular traditions are not to be taken as embodiments of either religious faith or moral convictions or philosophical thought, by the vast mass of the Greeks they were unquestionably received as genuine and veritable history. We shall find the men of Tegea on the eve of the battle of Plataiai appealing gravely to the exploits of their forefathers in the days of Echemos and Hyllus, and the Athenians meeting their claim with averments of better deeds done at the same time. The strongest sentiment of the Hellenic mind was that of the absolute independence of each city from all other cities; and each town had its founder or heroic Eponymos whose name it bore and whose exploits shed a lustre on his descendents for ever. The Argives looked back to the glorious days of Perseus, the child of the golden shower, who, bearing the sword of Chrysaôr in his hand and the sandals of the Nymphs on his feet, journeyed away to the land of the gloaming and there by the merciful stroke of his weapon brought to an end the woes of the mortal Gorgon.⁵¹ Of the deliverance which he wrought for the beautiful Andromeda, of his vengeance on Phineus and Polydektes, and of his triumphant return to his ancient home to work out the doom of Akrisios, they could suffer no man to breathe a doubt. The Theban legend told the woeful tale of Laios and Oidipous from the day when the babe was cast forth to frost and heat on the slopes of Kithairon to the hour when, after the slaughter of the Sphinx and his unwitting offence against the sanctities of law, the blind old man departed on the wanderings which were to end in the holy grove of the Erinyes.⁵² The Megarian told of the marvellous power which lay in the purple locks of king Nisos and how, for love of the Kretan Minos, Skylla robbed the city of its priceless safeguard and brought on herself the due reward of her treachery.⁵³ The Athenian pointed proudly to a richer inheritance. He could tell of the Dragon-kings Kekrops and Erechtheus and re-

⁵¹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 58, *et seq.*

⁵² *Ib.* ii. 68, *et seq.*

⁵³ *Ib.* i. 223.

count the sorrows of the gentle Prokris and the wrongs done to the beautiful Aithra. He could dwell on the glorious career of the child Theseus, how, on reaching the vigour of full manhood, he raised the great stone and, taking in his hand the sword of destiny, proved, like Arthur, that he was rightwise born a king,⁵⁴ how he cast in his lot with the doomed tribute-children, and sailing to Krete trod the mazes of the labyrinth and smote the horrible Minotauros.⁵⁵ Spartans and Arkadians could tell the stories of Pelops and his children, of Telephos, and Iamos; and if the cities had each their several heroes and each some peculiar achievement recorded of them, the same wealth of mythical tradition belonged to the Hellenic divisions of race, whether Aiolians, Ionians, or Dorians. The Aiolian legend, telling of the impious presumption which drew down on Salmôneus the doom of Tullus Hostilius in the Roman story, related also in one of its forms how his daughter Tyrô was won by Zeus Poseidon on the banks of the Enipeus, and became the mother of Dioskouroi, Pelias and Neleus; how these her children, saved from death like Cyrus, Romulus, and Remus, rescued her from the savage cruelty of the iron-hearted Sidêrô; how Pelias reigned in Thessaly, and Neleus made for himself a kingdom in Pylos; how by the aid of the powerful Melampous Bias obtained as his wife the beautiful Pêrô the daughter of Neleus; how, when his other sons had been slain by Herakles, Nestor the wise man and invincible warrior still remained to recount his exploits against the Kentauri and the Lapithai, and how his descendents went to Athens, and there ruled as kings until Kodros shed on the royal name so great a lustre that none henceforth was suffered to bear the title. But the great Aiolian race included also the lines of Kretheus, Sisypnos, and Athamas, and each of these had its own ancestral glories. The name of Admetos the grandson of Kretheus is linked with that of the beautiful Alkêstis and the story of her death and resurrection, while in the fortunes of his brother Iasôn the legend passes into that mighty stream of mythical history which widens into an ocean in

⁵⁴ *Popular Romances of the Middle Ages*, Introduction.

⁵⁵ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 61.

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the tale of the Trojan war. Another branch of the Aiolic race looked back to Sisyphos, whose exploits or whose crimes doomed him to endless toil with the rolling stone, while the traditions of the house of Athamas told the tale of Phrixos and Hellê, and thus again touched the Pan-Hellenic myth of the Argonautic expedition. So for the Kretan the mythical greatness of Minos was evidence that the empire of Krete had once reckoned Athens and Megara amongst its subject cities, while the men of Aigina boasted of the glories of the house of Aiakos the father of Peleus and the grandsire of the mightiest of the heroes who fought at Ilion.⁵⁶

Greek
tribal
names.

But the mere naming of a few such mythical stories can scarcely give an idea of the stupendous fabric reared by later poets and mythographers, when they came to cement together the stones which they found more or less ready hewn to their hand. Not only were there myths which belonged to particular families, clans, or cities; but around these flowed the stream of a tradition which in a certain sense may be called national, and which professed to furnish a continuous history in the tales of the Kalydonian boar hunt, of the voyage of the Argonauts, of the rescuing of Helen, the returns of the heroes, the banishment of the Herakleidai, and their triumphant restoration to their ancient home. But the fact on which we have now to lay stress is that all these stories were to the several tribes or cities genuine records of actual events, the independent chronicles of kings and heroes whose fortunes ran each in its own peculiar channel, and that this conviction was from first to last a delusion; that, regarded as a whole, these traditions strictly resemble a prism in which a thousand pictures flash from a few planes while all are reflected from a single piece of glass.⁵⁷ But, further, the keen rivalry and the bitter feuds which sprung from the centrifugal tendencies of the Greeks were at least intensified by the multitude of names which seemed to draw a line of marked distinction between the several branches of one and the same race. By their very names Ionians,

⁵⁶ For all these myths I must refer the reader to the several sections of the *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, where each is treated at some length, in its relations to other myths of the same class.

⁵⁷ See further *Myth. Ar. Nat.* book i. ch. x.

Arkadians, Argives, Delians, held themselves to be distinguished, not only the one from the other, but more particularly from Dorians, Achaians, Lykians or Phenicians; and here, again, these feuds and enmities were fed by mere dreams. The Athenian name denoted simply the worshippers of the dawn, and the title Iostephanoi, or men of the violet crown, in which most of all they gloried, declared merely that Athenians were also Ionians who had come from the violet land of the morning, where also the Phenicians had their dwelling in the purple regions of the East. The Argive again is but a sojourner in the realm of Aphrodité Argynnis, or Argennos the favourite of Agamemnon, or of Arjuna the brilliant, the comrade of Krishna in whom⁵⁸ we have seen the counterpart of the Hellenic Kephalos; and his name is but another form of that of the Arkadians, which reappears not only in the name of the wonderful ship Argo but in the Greek Arktouros, the Latin Ursa and Ursula, the queen of the eleven thousand virgins, the goddess of the Horselberg.⁵⁹ Still more manifestly do the Lykian and Delian names translate each other, and Phoibos who is born in Delos is also Lykegenes, the child of light, the Lykia through which flows the golden stream of Xanthos, lighting up the realm of Glaukos and Sarpêdôn, beings closely akin to Memnon who comes from Ethiopia, another morning land. Nay more, the name which the several Greek tribes claimed as their common patrimonial title is no more distinctive than that of Ionians, Delians, Lykians, or Argives. The philological identity of the names Hellen, Hellas, Hellê, Helloi and Selloi, Sellêcis, and Hellôtis as a name of Athênê, and of all these with Helios, Eelios, and the Latin Sol, is not disputed; and thus the mythical genealogy of the Hellenes plays throughout on the ideas of light and darkness. Hellen himself is, in one form of the legend, the son of Deukalion and Pyrrha, names which connect themselves with such words as Polydeukes, Phoinix, and Ion; in another, he is a child of Zeus the glancing heaven. Of his children one is the dusky Xouthos, another the flashing Aiolos whose name carries us to the Aither (Ether) of Zeus and the Aithiopians (Ethio-

⁵⁸ See page 28.⁵⁹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 218.

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pians) of the Odyssey. Thus with the Delians, Lykians and Ortygians, the Hellenes are, like the people of Khorassan, simply the children of the light and the sun, and the Hellespont marks their pathway.⁶⁰ But the very fact that the Greek tribes spoke of each other under this name explains also how the Latins came to give them the title of Graii or Græci. Of any such people to the east of the Hadriatic the first notice is in the statement of Aristotle that the people dwelling round the Thesprotian Dodona were called Graikoi before they were called Hellenes.⁶¹ The tribes who regarded themselves as sun-children would scarcely fail to speak of tribes lying to the west of their own homes as children of the dusk or the gloaming, Graioi or Hesperioi. As Perseus journeyed westward, he came to the land of the Graiai, or grey beings, before he reached the gloomier dwellings of the Gorgons. To the inhabitants of Thessaly Epeiros was the land of the setting sun, and here accordingly we find the Graioi. But this name, it would seem, must have been accepted as a local name for the country to the west of Pindos, before the Latin tribes had any knowledge of their eastern neighbours. The name Hesperia which the Hellenes necessarily applied to Italy the Latins never acknowledged for themselves. Graians and Hesperians are thus alike the people of the dusky land, the Epeiroi tribes acknowledging the name because it was applied to them by their immediate kinsfolk, the Italians rejecting it, or probably not knowing it, as a word belonging to another language. We can therefore no longer look to the mythical movements of Aioliens, Argives, or Herakleids, as throwing light on the distribution of the Hellenic tribes in historical times. The facts of that distribution in historical ages must be received as they are given to us by the most trustworthy historians and geographers: to reason back from history into the regions of

⁶⁰ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 237.

⁶¹ A town called Graia is, however, mentioned along with Thespiæ and Mykalessos, as furnishing its contingent for the Trojan war. *Iliad*, ii. 498. See further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 359. The name is found again in the Hesiodic Theogony 1013, under the form of Agrios, the eponymos of the Agraioi or Graioi, who is joined with Latinos the eponymos of the Latin tribes. The Agraïans appear in the Akarnanian campaign of Demosthenes in the Peloponnesian war. The alleged spuriousness of this passage in the Hesiodic Theogony cannot detract from the value of the mythical statement.

myth is an occupation not more profitable than the attempt to fill a sieve with water.

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It is therefore no part of the historian's task to relate at length the mythical tales which make up the great fabric of Hellenic tradition. Grains of fact may lie buried in its stupendous mass; but the means of separating the fact from the fiction are lacking. It is impossible to apply any satisfactory method of analysis to the narrative of that great struggle which was to end in the restoration of Helen to her western home. She herself is the child of Zeus, the destined source of delight and woe to myriads, the sister of the twin-gods Kastor and Polydeukes; and the heroes who fight in her quarrel belong to the same world with Herakles and Bellerophon. Achilles is the child of the sea nymph Thetis; his horses are the immortal steeds of Zeus, endowed with powers of thought and speech. Paris is the beautiful being who is set up to adjudge the merits of Hêrê, Aphroditê, and Athênê, and for whom Oinônê, the daughter of the stream Kebrên, mourns in solitude until the evil dream of his life is ended. Sarpêdôn is the lord of the bright land where the dawn creeps over the heaven. His home is on the shores of the golden river, and when, as representing the early day, he dies by the spear of Patroklos, Glaukos, the more brilliant sun of noontide, remains to avenge his friend whom Hypnos and Thanatos, Sleep and Death, are bearing away to the dawn land.⁶² So it is with all; and tempting though it be to wander among the radiant scenes of this enchanted region, the historian must deny himself the delight, unless he deliberately undertakes the task of relating the myths of the whole epic cycle, not as a chronicle of events, but as throwing light on the mental condition of the Greeks and on the growth of their polity and law. The analysis of these myths on the hypothesis of their historical character is a task which has been attempted by a multitude of writers ancient and modern: and the result is hopeless antagonism and confusion in the

Historical
value of
Greek
myths.

⁶² So in the myth of Phrixos and Helle, which represents the passage of the light from the West to the place of its reappearance in the East, Hêllê, the brilliant twilight dies, while the colder Phrixos (whose name we have in our *freeze* and *frost*) reaches the shores of Kolchis.

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interpretations thus arbitrarily put on narratives from which all their essential features have been mercilessly torn away. The introduction to the history of Herodotos tells a very probable,⁶³ though dull, story of an Argive princess who went down to buy wares from a Phenician merchant ship, and either with or against her own will was carried off by the captain. The refusal of the Phenicians to make reparation leads to retaliation, and the Argive chiefs steal away Eurôpê from Tyre. The game being thus equal, as neither side would make amends, the quarrel was renewed by the Greeks who took Medeia from Kolchis, and thus led to the seduction of Helen by Paris. This crime brought about the expedition to Troy, in requital of which Xerxes, as lord of Asia and therefore of Ilion, invaded Europe. On turning to what are called the original authorities for these events we find that the Argive girl was one of the many loves of Zeus who changed her into a heifer; that in this form, chased by the gad-fly of Hêrê, she wandered over mountains and deserts until she came to the desolate crags where Prometheus was paying the penalty for his love of man; that the Phenician maiden is the sister of Kadmos the dragon-slayer, and is borne on the back of the white bull across the western waters; that the daughter of the Kolchian king is the wise woman who enables Iason to overcome the fire-breathing bulls after destroying the offspring of the dragon's teeth, who is carried through the air in her dragon chariot, and who possesses the death-dealing robe of Helios. If on being thus brought into the regions of cloudland we ask whether Herodotos had not before him some evidence different in kind from that which has come down to us, the answer is that he obtained his prosaic and wearisome story from precisely those legends and those legends only, with which we are scarcely less familiar than he was. In these legends we have a singularly circumstantial and complicated narrative, in which

⁶³ This likelihood is confined to each story separately. The Herodotean history of Io may have been repeated in the fortunes of many women; but if the same incident be assigned as the cause of a series of great political movements, the improbability of the narrative increases indefinitely at every step. We may perhaps believe that the rape of Io might be avenged by that of Eurôpê; we become more unbelieving when we are told that the wrongs of Eurôpê led to the abduction of Medeia, and altogether incredulous when it is said that these crimes had their punishment in the stealing away of Helen, and that the fall of Ilion was avenged by the invasion of Hellas by Xerxes.

the motives of the actors and their exploits are detailed with the most minute care, and in which no distinction whatever is drawn between one kind of causation and another. This narrative Herodotos reduces to the merest *caput mortuum*; nor have the experiments of other writers whether in his or in later times been rewarded by results materially different. In the history of Thucydides, as in that of Herodotos, Helen is gone and Paris and Achilleus. Hektor and Sarpedon have vanished, with Memnon and Athênê and Aphroditê, and there remains only a chieftain who undertakes the expedition not at all to rescue a woman who may never have existed, and a war which lasted ten years not because Zeus so willed it, but because want of men made it necessary that part of the forces should betake themselves to tilling the ground and raising crops on the Thrakian Chersonesos while the rest carried on the siege. From these earlier writers modern Eumerists differ chiefly in being more destructive. If we are told that from our Homeric poems we may assuredly infer the historical reality of a kingdom of Priam on the coast of the Hellespont, of a naval expedition undertaken against this power by combined forces of European Greeks and islanders of the Egean under Agamemnon chief of Mykenai, of a real quarrel between him and Achilleus the Phthiotic leader, of the disasters caused by this quarrel, and of the victory achieved after their reconciliation, we are told by other or even by the same writers that it is a matter of extreme insignificance whether Achilleus and Agamemnon were generals in the same expedition, or distinct captains of two separate armaments confounded in the popular imagination. Even on this hypothesis it is urged that, so far as the essentials of the history are concerned, both the men and the facts remain. The argument can be admitted as valid only when it is conceded that the essentials of English history remain where they were, whether we are told that Laud and Strafford were fellow conspirators against the liberties of England, or whether we say that they lived in successive centuries and never met at all.⁶⁴ It is, of course, possible

⁶⁴ This subject is examined more fully in the *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, book i. ch. ix.

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I.

that there may have been a war undertaken to avenge the wrongs of an earthly Helen, that this war lasted ten years, and that ten years more were spent by the leaders in their return homewards, and even that the chief incident in this war was the quarrel of the greatest of all the heroes with a mean-spirited king, a quarrel in which a time of gloomy inaction is followed by the magnificent victory and early death of the hero. But for this war we have confessedly no contemporary historical evidence, and it is of the very essence of the narrative, as given by the poets, that Paris, who had deserted Oinônê, and before whom the three queens of the air had appeared as claimants of the golden apple,⁶⁵ steals from Sparta the divine sister of the Dioskouroi; that the chiefs are summoned together for no other purpose than to avenge her woes and wrongs; that the sea-nymph's son, the wielder of invincible weapons and the lord of undying horses, goes to fight in a quarrel which is not his own; that his wrath is roused because he is robbed of the maiden Briséis; that henceforth he takes no part in the strife until his friend Patroklos has been slain; and that then he puts on the new armour which Thetis brings to him from the anvil of Hephaistos and goes forth to win the victory. But this is a tale which we find with all its essential features in every Aryan land:⁶⁶ and therefore, if such a war took place, it must be carried back to a time preceding the dispersion of the Aryan tribes, and its scene can be placed neither in the land of the Five Streams, nor on the plains of the Asiatic Troy, not in Germany, or Norway, or Wales. It has, therefore, in strictness of speech, nothing to do with Greek history. The poems may, and undoubtedly do, tell us much of the state of society and law at the time when they took shape. The pictures of Andromache and Nausikaa may be fairly taken as proof that the condition of women in the days of the poets was indefinitely higher than that of Athenian women in the days of Perikles. The Boulê or Council of the chiefs may be regarded as the germ of the

⁶⁵ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 11.

⁶⁶ The proposition is a sweeping one. For the proof of it I can but refer the reader to my *Aryan Mythology*, and the *Introductions to the Popular Romances of the Middle Ages*, and the *Tales of the Teutonic Lands*.

great assemblies of the future Athenian people; ⁶⁷ and in spite of the manifest working of feudal tyranny we see in the Achaians the forefathers of the conquerors of Xerxes. We may even allow that the poet rightly gives the names of dynasties of which he speaks as flourishing in his own day; but if the prophecy of Poseidon ⁶⁸ may be taken as showing that a family calling themselves Aineiadaï were then reigning in Troas, we have not the faintest warrant for asserting that their ruling chief was the actual grandson of the child of Anchises and Aphroditê who visibly interferes to rescue her son on the field of battle; ⁶⁹ nor can the ruins of Mykenai and Tiryns, even if they attest the fidelity of Homeric epithets and the existence of an ancient and powerful state in the Peloponnesos, reveal the names of kings who have left no inscriptions behind them, or prove that they were successful in all their expeditions. For all that we learn from the Gate of Lions or the Treasury of Atreus Agamemnon may have failed at Ilion, or he may never have gone thither; and thus later poets and historians may have been justified in their denial that Helen ever sailed across the sea or entered the house of Priam.⁷⁰ In short, there is scarcely a single incident in the lives of all the Greek heroes which may not be found, and generally in far more than one form, in the wide field of Teutonic or Celtic or Hindu tradition; and this mythical identity, which deprives these incidents of all historical value, marks the narrative of events which are supposed to lie almost on the threshold of genuine history. It is true, indeed, that the marvellous colouring which sheds a supernatural splendour on the chief actors in these dramas affects in a much slighter degree some scenes or incidents which are kept in the background of our Iliad or Odyssey. But these scenes or events were themselves the subjects of poems in which they were exhibited with all the fulness of supernatural causation which marks the career of Achilleus;

⁶⁷ The pictures drawn of the political condition of the Argives, Achaians, and Danaans, (Thuc. i. 3, 3), in the so-called Homeric age, are perhaps not to be altogether trusted. It is not easy to determine whether or how far they may have been modified by poets of a later time. But if the ground may be regarded as safe, we must receive the conclusions of Dr. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, vol. i. ch. vi., and of Mr. Gladstone, *Homer and the Homeric Age*, vol. iii. 1, 'Agorê.'

⁶⁸ *Iliad*, xx. 378.

⁶⁹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 92, 453.

⁷⁰ *Ib.* i. 183.

BOOK
I.

and if to incidents so clothed no credit is to be given, the tissue of wonders in which all are inwrapped puts completely out of sight any historical facts on which they may have been founded and makes them for us as though they had never been.⁷¹

The return
of the
Herakleids.

Pre-eminent among these traditions for which a larger amount of credibility has been claimed, stands the legend which relates the return of the Herakleidai. Of this event it is enough to say that it is the last in the series of movements which balanced each other in the popular stories of the Greeks, and that the object of all these movements is to regain a stolen treasure or to recover a lost inheritance.⁷² The flight of Phrixos on the ram from which Hellê falls into the sea is followed by the expedition of the Argonautic heroes to the far eastern shores of Kolchis. The stealing away of Helen and her wealth provokes the siege of Ilion; and victory in each case is followed by homeward journeys full of toil and peril. After the restoration of Helen to her western home the series of alternate movements is carried on in the mythical records of the Herakleidai. But we cannot venture to say that we have these traditions in their original form. They were altered, almost at will, by later poets and mythographers in accordance with local or tribal prejudices or fancies, and forced into arrangements which were regarded as chronological. The story ran that when Herakles died, his tyrant and tormentor Eurystheus insisted on the surrender of his sons, and that Hyllos the son of Deianeira with his brothers hastily fled and after wandering to many other places found a refuge at last in the only city where the children of Herakles could be safe. Eurystheus marches with his hosts against Athens, and the Athenians come forth to meet him led by Theseus, the great solar-hero of the land, who is accompanied by Iolaos the son of Iphikles the twin brother of Herakles as well as by the banished Hyllos. Eurystheus is slain, and Hyllos carries his head to Alkmênê. In other words, the children of the sun return to the evening land with the treasure which the dark powers had carried

⁷¹ Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* vol. 1. ch. v. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 197.

⁷² *Myth. Ar. Nat.* book ii. ch. iii.

away to the east; but day and night follow each the other, and thus the Herakleidai cannot maintain their footing in the Peloponnesos for more than a year and then by an irresistible necessity find their way back to Athens. These alternations, which represent simply the succession of day and night, might be, and would have been, repeated any number of times, if the myths had not at length become mixed up with traditions of the local settlement of the country,—in other words, if certain names found in the myths had not become associated with particular spots or districts in the Peloponnesos. To follow all the versions and variations of these legends is a task not more profitable than threading the mazes of a labyrinth; but we may trace in many, probably in most of them, the working of the same ideas. Thus the version which after the death of Eurystheus takes Hyllos to Thebes makes him dwell by the Elektrian, or Amber, Gates. The next stage in the history is another homeward journey of the children of Herakles which ends in the slaughter of Hyllos in single combat with Echemos; and the Herakleidai are bound by compact to forego all attempts at return for fifty or a hundred years, periods which are mere multiples of the ten years of the Trojan war and of the Nostoi or homeward wanderings of the Achaian chiefs. Once more the children of the dawn-goddess give them shelter in Trikorythos, a region answering to the Hypereia or upperland in which the Phaiakians dwelt before they were driven from it by the Kyklopes.⁷³ The subsequent fortunes of Kleodaios and Aristomachos, the son and grandson of Herakles, simply repeat those of Hyllos; but at length in the next generation the myth pauses, and the repetition of the old drama is prevented by the gradual awakening of the historical sense in the Hellenic tribes. For this last return the preparations are on a scale which may remind us in some degree of the brilliant gathering of the Achaian chieftains with their ships in Aulis. A fleet is built at the entrance of the Corinthian gulf, at a spot which hence bore the name of Naupaktos, and the three sons of Aristomachos,—Aristodemos, Temenos, and Kresphontes,—make ready for the last great enterprise.

⁷³ *Od. vi. i et seq.*

BOOK
I.

But Aristodemos is smitten by lightning before he can pass over into the heritage of his fathers, and his place is taken by his twin sons Eurysthenes and Prokles, the progenitors of the double line of Spartan kings, in whose career we see that rivalry and animosity which, appearing in its germ in the myths of the Dioskouroi, is brought to a head in the story of the sons of Oidipous.⁷⁴ The sequel exhibits yet other points of resemblance to the tale of the Trojan war. The soothsayer Chryses reappears in the prophet Karnos, whose death by the hand of Hippotes answers to the wrong done to Chryses by Agamemnon. In either case the wrath of Apollon is roused, and a plague follows. The people die of famine, nor is the hand of the god lifted off them until, as for Chryses, a full atonement is made. Hippotes is banished, and the chiefs are then told to take as their guide the three-eyed man who is found in the Aitolian Oxylos who rides on a one-eyed horse. But as the local myth exhibited Tisamenos the son of Orestes as at this time the ruler of Peloponnesos, that prince must be brought forward as the antagonist of the returning Herakleids. A great battle ensues, in which he is slain, while, according to one version, Pamphylos and Dymas, the sons of the Dorian Aigimios, fall on the side of the invaders. With the partition of the Peloponnesos among the conquerors the myth comes to an end. Argos falls to the lot of Temenos, while Sparta becomes the portion of the sons of Aristodemos, and Messênê that of Kresphontes. A sacrifice is offered by way of thanksgiving by these chiefs on their respective altars; and as they draw near to complete the rite, on the altar of Sparta is seen a serpent, on that of Argos a toad, on that of Messênê a fox. The soothsayers were, of course, ready with their interpretations. The slow and sluggish toad denoted the dull and unenterprising disposition of the future Argive people; the serpent betokened the terrible energy of the Spartans; the fox, the wiliness and cunning of the Messenians. As indications of national character more appropriate emblems might perhaps have been found; but it may be noted that

⁷⁴ For the nature of these twin heroes and correlative deities see *Myth. Ar. Nat.* book. ii. ch. ii.

the toad or frog reappears in the myth of Bhekî, the frog-sun,⁷⁵ and in the German story of the Frog Prince; that the serpent in this legend belongs to the class of dragons which appear in the myths of Helios, Medeia, and Iamos; and that the Messenian fox is an animal closely akin to the wolf which we meet in the myths of the Lykian Apollon and the Arkadian Lykâôn.⁷⁶

The legends which relate to this so-called Dorian Migration have lost in great degree the freshness and charm of the myths which gathered round the fairhaired Helen and the wise Medeia. This poverty may arise from their comparative nearness to an historical age, and from the intermixture of real incidents on which the floating myths of earlier times had fastened themselves. That this may have occurred again and again, is matter less of conjecture than of certainty, although the fact of the intermixture furnishes no ground of hope for those who think to find history in mythology. Unless they are known to us from contemporary writers, the real events, whatever they may have been, are disguised, distorted, and blotted out as effectually as the stoutest trees in American forests are killed by the parasitical plants which clamber up their sides. Whether the eastward migrations, which are said to be caused by the return of the Herakleids, represent any real events, we cannot tell, although we cannot in terms deny it; but the fact remains that they are movements eastward, corresponding in many of their features to other movements which are said to have preceded them. All that can be said further about these legends as a whole is that the historical character of any of the incidents recorded in them can be attested only by evidence distinct from these myths; and no such evidence is forthcoming.⁷⁷ The pendulum which had marked the lapse of the mythopœic ages is here arrested in its even beat. The mighty stream which had brought down on its waters the great epical inheritance of

Movements
following
the Dorian
Migration

⁷⁵ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 165, 400; ii. 26.

⁷⁶ *Ib.* ii. 183.

⁷⁷ It is forthcoming in the case of the stories told about Roland and the Great Karl, and the result is to prove the impossibility of deriving any history from the myth if the independent historical testimony had been lost. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 188. For the Arthur myth, see the Introduction to the *Popular Romances of the Middle Ages*. The alleged historical evidence in favour of the story of the Nibelungenlied is examined in the Introduction to the *Tales of the Teutonic Lands*.

BOOK
I.Greek
settlements
in Asia
Minor.

the Hellenic tribes is lost in the barren sands of the generations which intervene between the primitive legend-making age and the period of genuine contemporary history.⁷⁸

These eastward migrations which followed the Herakleid conquests led, it is said, to the founding of those Hellenic settlements which studded the western coasts of Asia Minor, the shores of the Hellespont and the Propontis, and which were found even on the banks of the Borysthenes and the Tanais. These settlements are grouped under the three classes of Aiolian, Dorian and Ionic colonies. Of these colonies we shall speak more particularly hereafter. It is enough to remark here that the chronology of many of these events is given with an assurance which might well mislead the unwary, and that Thucydides has as little hesitation in assigning dates to events following close on the Trojan war or to the successive settlements of non-Hellenic and Hellenic inhabitants of Sicily as to the expulsion of the Peisistratidai from Athens or the formation of the confederacy of Delos. The assertion that the first sea-fight took place 260 years before his own time, or that 40 years earlier still the Corinthian Ameinokles had taught the Samians to build triremes,⁷⁹ can be justified only if Thucydides had before him a history of those times based on contemporary registration. In the absence of all such records the whole of this chronology must be banished to the regions of plausible fiction, and we must content ourselves with the conclusion that the bald lists of colonies with the names of their Oikistai or founders are as little to be trusted historically as the stories which recount the love of Selênê for Endymion or the exploits of Bellerophon among the Solymoi. We may, if we please, string together the names of colonies founded by the Pelopid leaders of the Aioliens at Daskyleion on the Propontis, in Lesbos, and at

⁷⁸ Enough has perhaps been already said to show that the stories of the Iliad and the Odyssey, whatever they may be, form no part of Greek history; and I need only fall back on the verdict long since given by Bishop Thirlwall that the unity of Homer, even if universally conceded, would add little or nothing to the value of these poems as historical records. *Hist. Gr.* vol. i. ch. v. On this subject I must refer the reader to my *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, book i. ch. ix., and on the unit or composite character of the Iliad, to ch. xi. of the same book. Some further remarks on the historical value of 'Homer' will be found in Appendix B of the same volume, while in Appendix A the reader will find the grounds on which the assertion that the Iliad was from the first a written poem is positively denied. See also note 40.

⁷⁹ *Thuc.* i. 13.

Kymê. We may tell the story of that great migration which, as headed by Ionians, has borne their name, and which led to the settlement of the Kyklades islands, of Chios and Samos, and of the Ionic dekapolis on the opposite continent. We may speak of the gathering which almost rivalled the vast throng of the Argonautic and Trojan heroes, when Kadmeians and Minyai of Orchomenos, with Phokians and Boiotians, with Dorians of Epidauros, Molossians, and others, ranged themselves under the banners of the Athenian Oikistai, Androklos and Neileus, to carry to their new homes the sacred fire taken from the Prytaneion of Athens. But we must remember that this great movement is assigned to the generation next after Kodros, and that even according to the traditional chronology four centuries had passed away from that time before the historical sense can be said to have been awakened even in the most advanced of the Hellenic tribes.

CHAP.
III.

As Minyai of Orchomenos had taken part in the so-called Ionic migration, so Minyans from Lemnos shared, it is said, the Dorian movement which led to the settling of Melos, Thera, Krete, and Rhodes, with Kos, Knidos, and Halikar-nassos on the Asiatic coast. But whether in the strange and fantastic adventures of these Lemnian wanderers, or in the scanty incidents related of other settlers, we seem to be suddenly and completely removed from the vivid colouring and vigorous action of Ionic legendary narratives. If the Spartan version which represented the Rhodian Oikistes Althaimenes as a descendent in the third generation from Temenos and therefore a Herakleid prince, was contradicted by the Rhodian assertion that he was a son of Katreos and a grandson of Minos the wise Kretan king, the inconsistency is noteworthy only in so far as it exhibits the nature of the materials out of which these legends were woven.

Dorian
colonies in
Asia
Minor.

CHAPTER IV.

HELLÈNES AND BARBARIANS.

BOOK
I.

Growth of
a common
Hellenic
sentiment.

THE foundations of all Aryan society were laid, as we have seen, in the isolated life and utter exclusiveness of the primitive family. But along with the influences which tended to keep up the fierce selfishness of the beast in his den, there were others at work which first counteracted and at last in greater or less degree overcame them, and the measure of the victory determined in each case the standard of civilisation. But the action of these softening and fusing influences was both partial and capricious, and in general it throws but little light on the earliest conditions of Hellenic life. It is, however, clear, that long before the dawn of contemporary history a certain feeling of kinship had sprung up among the tribes which were in the habit of calling themselves Greeks or rather Hellenes, and that this feeling found expression in customs and usages which separated them from other tribes by which they were surrounded.

Greek
dialects.

There was first the bond of a common language; but this connexion was acknowledged, necessarily, only in so far as one tribe understood the dialect of another, and the frontier was soon passed in an age which regarded only the practical uses of speech in the common business of life. All who could not be thus easily understood were cut off from the great Hellenic society by barriers which were supposed to be impassable. They were speakers of barbarous tongues, and belonged, therefore, virtually to another world. But these convictions rested on no solid historical grounds. The comparison of languages in their grammatical forms and their phonetic laws has determined the affinities not only of the many Greek and Latin dialects, but also of all others which are comprised in the great Aryan family of languages. We

can therefore afford to dispense with the meagre information which has been left to us by ancient historians and travellers; nor need we feel either surprised or disappointed when we find that that information is not unfrequently deceptive. In speaking of the Asiatic dodekapolis of the Ionians Herodotos could assert that the language spoken by four of the cities was in every particular unlike the dialect spoken by the other eight.⁸⁰ He could assert, as we shall see more fully hereafter, that the dialects common to the distant towns of Plakia and Kreston, settlements reputed to be Pelasgic, proved that the old Pelasgic speech was barbarous, that is, non-Hellenic;⁸¹ but he could also maintain in a far larger number of passages that there was no essential difference between the Pelasgic and Hellenic dialects, and that the Pelasgians formed common names from strictly Hellenic roots by etymologies not always very obvious.⁸² In short, it may be safely said that, in spite of one or two disclaimers, Pelasgians and Hellenes were in his eyes one and the same people.⁸³ Inconsistencies such as these suffice of themselves to show that the ethnological traditions of the Greek tribes are not to be trusted, and that the attempt to extract history from the genealogies of eponymous heroes is a mere waste of labour. The genealogies were the expression of local convictions often wholly at variance with the not less strong convictions of neighbouring tribes or states; and the evidence of language would only go to establish affinities between clans which regarded each other as aliens in blood and therefore in religion. The Athenian would never admit that a Thrakian was a Hellen: yet the speech of the Thrakian was perhaps as nearly akin to the dialect of Athens as was that of the Aitolian mountaineer.

All that can be said, then, is that long trains of circumstances, which it would be impossible to trace or to account for, led certain tribes to acknowledge in some cases a relation-

The
Hellenes
and the
barbarian
world.

⁸⁰ Herod. i. 142.

⁸¹ *Ib.* i. 57.

⁸² *Ib.* ii. 52. Dr. Curtius, *Hist. Greece*, i. 33, Eng. tr., having noted the points of likeness between Hellenes and Pelasgoi, adds that Pelasgians and Hellenes are nevertheless by no means identical, or merely different names for one idea. Such a view, he insists, is made untenable by the manifest fact that from the Hellenes sprung entirely new currents of life. But these currents came only from a very few among the Greek tribes: and the argument would deprive Arkadians, Aitolians, Akarnanians, Thessalians, and many others of all title to the Hellenic name.

⁸³ Mure, *Critical History of Greek Literature*, vol. i. p. 51, *et seq.*; and vol. iv. p. 434.

ship which they repudiated in others, unconscious that their tests of union, if logically applied, would carry them far beyond the range of the Hellenic horizon. So far as this relationship was recognised, a common speech was regarded as evidence of descent from a common stock. But this evidence was not admitted in many cases where we see the affinity clearly enough; and thus to the Dorian or the Ionian a Roman was not much less a barbarian than were the Phenicians or the Gauls. Still, as time went on, the character of many of these tribes was so far modified by like influences as to present features which sufficiently distinguished them from other tribes. The several Hellenic clans may be separated by indefinite degrees of rudeness or refinement; but, as a whole, they exhibited a marked contrast to their near or distant neighbours in their feeling of respect for the human person. To the Asiatic generally the human body was a thing which, if he had the power, he might insult and mutilate at will, which he might despoil of its manhood, or disgrace by unseemly and servile prostrations, or offer up in sacrifice to wrathful and bloodthirsty deities. In his eyes woman was a mere chattel or instrument of his pleasures; and while he might have about him a multitude of wives, he might make profit of his children by selling them into slavery. Of these abominable usages the Greek practically knew nothing; and as he would have shrunk from the gouging out of eyes, the ripping up of stomachs, and the slitting of ears and noses, which have yielded a righteous delight to Persians and to Englishmen, so he rejoiced to look upon the vigour and beauty of the unclothed body which carried to the Oriental a sense of unseemliness and shame, and the exhibition of this form in games of strength and skill became through the great festivals of the separate or collected tribes bound up intimately with his religion.⁸⁴ Above all, with him this respect for the person was accompanied by a moral self-respect which no adverse conditions could ever wholly extin-

⁸⁴ But see note 42. It was alleged that the Athenian generals had intended in the event of their being victorious at Aigos Potamoi to cut off the right hands of their enemies in order to make them useless for military service. But for this assertion no proof is adduced. Another version said that they intended to cut off only the thumbs of their right hands. In either case, utterly un-Hellenic though their conduct would have been, it cannot, for a long series of centuries at least, be denounced as un-English.

guish. The Boiotian oligarch who could oppress his serfs still refused to submit to the rule of one absolute master; and the most powerful of Greek despots, though he might be guarded by the spears of foreign mercenaries, still moved familiarly among his subjects who would as soon have thought of returning to primitive cannibalism⁸⁵ as of approaching him with the slavish adoration of Persian nobles. Looking at these points of marked contrast with the nations of Asia whether Aryan or Semitic, we may speak broadly of a Greek national character, and this contrast would, we cannot doubt, have crossed the mind of every Athenian and Spartan on being asked to what race he belonged.⁸⁶

This feeling of nationality, which, however, was never allowed to intrude into the region of politics, was sustained and strengthened, as we have seen, by a common religion. The primitive hearth and altar had been from the first the sacred spot where the members of the family might meet on all occasions of festival; and these feasts were marked by games which in the course of ages began to attract visitors from other clans now recognised as sprung from the same stock. Such was the simple origin of those splendid and solemn gatherings which made the names of Pytho and Olympia famous. Here with the influx of wealth grew up temples which became constantly more and more magnificent; and the guardianship of these shrines furnished yet another bond of religious union. For their preservation and for the general regulation of the festivals some of the Greek tribes formed themselves into societies called Amphiktyoniai, as denoting the nearness of their abode to the common sanctuary. Of the many societies thus formed some attained a wide celebrity. Among these was the amphiktyonia of the seven cities (Athens, Aigina, Prasiai, Nauplia, the Boiotian Orchomenos, Epidauros and Hermionê) in the island of

Religious
associations
among the
Greek
tribes.

⁸⁵ The expression put into the mouth of Zeus, *I.* iv. 35, seems to point significantly to earlier practice. The metaphor answers to the symbolical rites which were substituted for the more terrible realities of earlier times. The immortalising Getai, Herod. iv. 94, tossed on spears the man whom they sent as a messenger to the dead; in China the men and horses dispatched on this errand are only paper figures, but the sign attests the true character of ancient usage. Survivals, to use Mr. Tylor's term, are necessarily very faint reflexions of primitive customs. See his *Primitive Culture*, i. 94, &c.

⁸⁶ The Athenians, Herod. viii. 144, are represented as pointedly referring to this common character and to common customs and habits as a sufficient warranty for their fidelity to the Hellenic cause.

BOOK
I.

Kalaureia near Troizen; that of Poseidon at Onchestos in Boiotia, and of the dodekapolis in Asia Minor, together with the Pam-Boiotia, or union of all the Boiotian clans at the temple of the Itonian Athênê near Koroneia, and the still more illustrious society of Ionic tribes which held its festivals in the holy island of Delos.⁸⁷

The Amphiktyonia.

The two last named unions were not formally called Amphiktyoniai, and the rest were distinguished by the name of the place in which the meetings were held. There was, however, another which from the completeness of its organisation became so far preeminent as to be styled expressly the Amphiktyonia. This was the alliance of which the representatives met at Delphoi in the spring, and in the autumn at Thermopylai, and which included the twelve tribes of the Dorians, Ionians, Thessalians, Boiotians, Magnetes, Perrhaians, Oitaians, Lokrians, Achaïans, Dolopes, Phokians and Malians. Each of these tribes, represented by Pylagoroi under a president called Hieromnemon, had two votes and no more; and thus the great cities of Athens and Sparta carried in theory no more weight than the obscure village communities of the Dolopes and the Malians. The chief work of this council was to watch over the safety and to guard the interests of the Delphian temple; and the discharge of this office sometimes involved the carrying on of war against those who were supposed to have injured them. But it is obvious that, unless this alliance rested on a thorough national union, its action or inaction would be far more mischievous than beneficial. Its powers might be diverted to promote the schemes of the predominant states, or they might be kept altogether in abeyance, as they seem to have been during the whole of the Peloponnesian war, while on the other hand the plea of defending the weaker members of the Amphiktyonia might be used to justify the interference of the Makedonian kings in the politics of the Greek cities. Under these conditions the alliance was at one time prominent, at another obscure; but at no time did it achieve that

⁸⁷ The feeling which could not rest without assigning an heroic eponymos to every city, invented, as the author of the oldest of these societies, a mythical Amphiktyon who in the traditional genealogy is the brother of Hellen, and succeeds Kranaos as king of Attica. Apollodoros, i. 7, 3.

subordination of separate cities under a central representative government, without which nations cannot exist.

CHAP.
IV.

These twelve tribes (for as such they were enrolled, not as states or cities) did not include all who were intitled to be called Hellenes. The Arkadians and Eleians were shut out along with Aitolians, Minyai and some others; but all these could make use of the oracle at Delphoi or contend in the games at the Olympic and Pythian festivals. All Greeks therefore were admitted to share the large intellectual inheritance which placed them in the front ranks of mankind. The full influence of these great gatherings on the education of the people at large cannot be easily realised; but to some extent we may understand the charm which attracted to them all that was noble and generous through the wide range of Greek society, as we read the stirring strains of the great Delian hymn, and throw ourselves into the feelings of the men who heard from the lips of the poets themselves the exquisite music of lyric songs such as no other age or land has ever equalled. But although from Pytho or Olympia, from Delos or Nemea or the Corinthian isthmus, the Greek returned to his home ennobled by the stirring associations with which these splendid festivals were surrounded, he was brought none the nearer to that English feeling which would regard as treason the mere thought of war between Birmingham and Manchester. He felt a justifiable pride in being a Hellen; but he was as far as ever from wishing to merge the sovereign authority of his city under a central government which should check the feuds and rivalries of all the Greek cities alike. Nay, although for the most part he had learnt to look with contempt on anything wider than the city and on anything narrower than the city, it cannot be said that all relics of a ruder state of society had wholly passed away. In various portions of Hellas the system of village communities still kept its ground. The Spartan boasted that his city had no walls, and the historian pointed to the four hamlets of which it was composed, with the remark that the ruins of Sparta would never tell the tale of its ancient greatness.⁸⁸ This life of villages was kept up not merely throughout Epeiros, where it has continued to our own day, but in

The great
games.

⁸⁸ Thuc. i. 10.

BOOK
I.

Arkadia, Achaia, and Elis. Thus Tegea arose from the conflux of eight hamlets; and the foundation of Megalopolis by Epameinondas was a protest against the policy of isolation by which Sparta had in past ages sought to prevent the building of the walls of Athens after the retreat of Mardonios. In following the ancient instinct the Spartan was more consistent than the Athenian; but at the cost of a logical inconsistency the Athenian gained an intellectual and political, as well as a moral, education of which the other was altogether deprived.

Greek
ethnology.

This great Hellenic aggregate, in one sense a nation, in another a mere fortuitous combination of isolated and centrifugal atoms, must be accepted as the starting point of our history. Of previous conditions of society the Greek historians had no more real knowledge than ourselves. They spoke of tribes who had preceded the Hellenes in the occupation of the land; but with their confused accounts of Pelasgians, Lykians, and Karians, we dare not lay down any positive conclusions about beings so shadowy as the Kaukones, Temmikes, Kouretes, Aones, Telchines, Phlegyai and others. Some of these may with good reason be banished to that aerial region which is peopled by the Erinyes and the Valkyrien, where the Phaiakian barks journey from shore to shore without oar or sail or helm.⁸⁹ Of the changes which preceded the advent or growth of this Hellenic people we know nothing. The record of them was never made, or it has been lost irretrievably; and these tribes appear in the earliest dawn of their history separated by certain strongly marked features from the inhabitants of the countries round about them, and little, if at all, affected by the civilisation of the great empires which had come into existence on the banks of the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates, and along the narrow strip of fertile lands at the base of the mighty range of Lebanon.

It would be easy to fill a volume with speculations on the

⁸⁹ For the Telchines, the Kourêtes, and other kindred beings, see *Myth. Ar. Nat.* book ii. ch. vii. sect. 4. The Phlegyai were localised in the region stretching from the lake Kopâis to Delphoi. The eponymos of these great enemies of Apollon is Phlegyas the father of Ixion and Koronis. The kinship speaks for itself. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*, ii. 14.

origin and the early movements of these several tribes: but history is not a legitimate field for speculation, and the result of such speculation must be a pretence of knowledge in place of the reality. In any attempts of this kind we can but take their traditions, and these traditions betray not merely complete ignorance but the fixed idea that they might be moulded at will to suit the sentiment of each tribe, of which indeed they were only the expression. If we examine the genealogy of the Iapetids, we find Doros and Xouthos as the children of Hellen, the son of Deukalion and Pyrrha, while from Xouthos spring Ion and Achaios,—a statement which, if it is to go for anything, gives to Ionians and Dorians an equal title to the Hellenic name. But this genealogy assigns as sister to Doros and Xouthos the Early Dawn (Protogeneia) who, wedded to Zeus (the gleaming heaven), becomes the mother of the toiling sun (Aëthlios), who is followed by Eudymion, the sun god sinking to sleep in the land of forgetfulness (Latmos). So closely are these shadowy progenitors of tribes blended with the misty personages for whom the Greeks themselves would scarcely have claimed an existence beyond the realms of cloudland. If from this ancestral tree we turn to that of Attica, we find Ion, Xouthos, and Achaios as sons of Kreousa, the daughter of the dragon Erechtheus, the child of the Earth and the Fire,⁹⁰ while in the place filled in the Iapetid line by Protogeneia, Aëthlios and Eudymion, we have Prokris, the dew, wedded to the sun (Kephalos), by whose spear she is slain. In short, it may almost be said that there is not one tradition of mythical descent which is not flatly contradicted by others, while of many we have three, four, or more inconsistent accounts. When to these we add the confusions of historians who, drawing a sharp contrast between Ionians and Dorians, call the former a Pelasgic and the latter an Hellenic race, and tell us that, moving from their original home in Phthiôtis, to the country under Ossa and Olympos the Hellenes were called Dorians but that in their expulsion from Histiaïôtis they took refuge in Pindos and were called Makedonians and that, passing thence through Dryopis, they at last re-

CHAP.
IV.

Tribal
genea-
logies.

⁹⁰ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* book ii. ch. v.

BOOK
I.

assumed in the Peloponnesos their ancient Dorian name,⁹¹ we see at once that we are chasing a mere Will of the Wisp, if we attempt to extract historical facts from statements which may make anything mean anything. On all such traditions there must be a complete suspension of judgment, if not a positive refusal of belief; and in this neutral or negative attitude we must look even upon those alleged connexions of eastern with western, or of northern with southern Hellenes or Greeks, in which we are most tempted to see the historical germs of later Hellenic society. We have Achaians in Phthiôtis, and we have Achaians in the Peloponnesos: and it was asserted not merely that the men of Phthiôtis passed across the Corinthian isthmus but that they chose for their leader Pelops the barbarian of Phrygia. The same system linked the Dorians of the Peloponnesos with the scanty Dorian clans who dwelt between Oita and Parnassos, and bestowed on their four little towns (Boion, Kytinion, Erineos, and Pindos), as the metropolis of Sparta, an importance which historically they never attained. Magnesians inhabited the strip of land beneath Pelion and Ossa; and as there were Magnesians also on the banks of the Hermos below mount Sipylos and again on those of the Maiândros below Messôgis, the story was told that these were colonies of Magnesians from Thessaly, one version saying that they came on their return from Troy, while another asserted that they were fugitives flying from the Thesprotian invaders of Thessaly, and yet another brought them not from Thessaly but from Delphoi.

Evidence
of geo-
graphical
names.

There are, indeed, other sources from which we may obtain sure historical results and from which we may be justified in drawing important inferences. Of these the most trustworthy is language. From the speech of Greeks and Romans, Teutons and Hindus, we infer with certainty not merely their common origin from a single home, but their mode of life, and the stage which they had reached in civilisation, science, and law.⁹² From identical geographical names, however widely separated may be the regions in which we find them, we infer that they have been given by the same or

⁹¹ Herod. i. 56. Lewis, *Credibility of Early Roman History*, i. 282.

⁹² *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 36. See, more fully, Max Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. ii. pp. 1-52.

nearly cognate tribes, and thus we assert that Keltic races have dwelt on the banks of the Don and the Danube, of the Teign and the Tyne, the Tagus, the Tavy, and the Tay, while their kinsmen have sojourned on those of the Axios and the Achelôos, of the Oxus and Jaxartes, of the Eux and the Esk.⁹³ But although, when we find Helots in Lakonia and Penestai in Thessaly, we infer the fact of conquest and from gradations of serfdom may infer even a series of conquests, we are not justified in drawing any positive conclusions as to degrees of ethnical difference between the conquering and the conquered tribes and races. The Normans, who fought for William at Hastings, were sprung from the same stock with the earlier Teutonic invaders of England, and both alike held their kinsfolk in serfdom or slavery. If we have the evidence of their several dialects, we may classify them accordingly; but we can make nothing of confused or meaningless statements like those which Herodotos in all honesty regarded as expressions of historical fact.

Confining ourselves within these limits, we may yet form a clear idea of the actual condition of the several countries collectively regarded as Hellas, at a time when history was in its dawn. The statement of Thucydides⁹⁴ that the Spartan colony of Herakleia in Trachis, founded early in the Peloponnesian war, was planted on Thessalian ground proves the fact of Thessalian supremacy from Thermopylai to the pass of Tempe, while the wall built by the Phokians to bar the pass at Pylai⁹⁵ may be taken as evidence that long before the Persian war the Thessalians threatened to make further conquests to the south. But in this region were found Magnesians to the east, Achaians and Malians on the south, and Dolopes in the western highlands of Pindos and Tymphrestos. Whatever may have been the precise affinities of these

Early condition of Thessaly.

⁹³ These names are simply equivalent to the Sanskrit âpa, the Latin aqua, water. The Peneios, in the same way, is but the Strymon, *stream*, from which men drink, (*πίνεν*), the Gunga Pani, or ganging drink, of the Hindu. See, further, Flavell Edmunds on *Traces of History in Names of Places*,—a book, however, which must be read warily. Much yet remains to be done towards tracing back the names of rivers and mountains to their sources. We find the Nith not only in Nithsdale but in the Messenian Neda, the Severn not only flowing into the Bristol Channel but as the Kebren watering the plains where Paris wooed Oinone. So too the Dart, representing the Keltic *dwr*, *water*, is seen again in the Kentish and Yorkshire Derwents, in the Durance, and the Douro, and the Avon in the Greek Euênos. See *Quarterly Rev.* July 1873, p. 141.

⁹⁴ iii. 92, 93.

⁹⁵ Herod. vii. 215.

BOOK
I.

tribes with each other or with the Thessalians, they were certainly in a state of more or less dependence on the latter, who were lords of the rich plains watered by the Peneios and studded with cities among which Pherai and Pharsalos, Krannon and Larissa are historically the most prominent. In these towns dwelt a nobility who, drawing their revenues from the rich lands round about, spent their time in feuds and feasting and the management of their splendid breed of horses. These haughty oligarchs Herodotos⁹⁶ brings from Thesprotia,—an assertion which, if it be worth anything, would go far to prove that the tribes to the west of Pindos spoke an Hellenic dialect; but the fact itself must remain as uncertain as the origin of that third class of the Thessalian population, which, as contrasted with the subject tribes already named, was known by the title Penestai, or working men. That these were earlier inhabitants reduced to serfdom, there is perhaps little doubt; but whether they were, as some said, Perrhaibians and Magnetes, or Pelasgians, or, as some would have it Boiotians, driven from the territory of Arnê, it is impossible and would be unprofitable to determine.⁹⁷ The legends which brought them from the south of the lake Kopais are contradicted by others which reverse the process. From the turbulent oligarchs, of whom the Skopadai of Krannon and the Aleuadai of Larissa may be taken as fair specimens, not much unity of action was to be expected. The Thessalian Tagos answered to the English Bretwalda or to the Dictator chosen, like Lars Porsena, to head the Etruscan clans; but fierce feuds often made the election of a Tagos impossible, and even in the Peloponnesian war not all the Thessalian cities sent their forces to aid their ancient Athenian allies.⁹⁸ In short, the normal condition of Thessaly was much like that of the Thrakians whom union, in the emphatic judgement of Herodotos,⁹⁹ would have rendered invincible, but of whom for lack of it no memorable achievement is recorded.

The Lok-
rians,

To the south of the rich and beautiful valley of the Spercheios, bounded by the luxuriant slopes of Othrys to the

⁹⁶ Herod. vii. 176.

⁹⁷ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 375.

⁹⁸ Thuc. ii. 22.

⁹⁹ Herod. v. iii.

north and the more barren range of Oita to the south, dwelt the Lokrians, Dorians, and Phokians, of whom it cannot be said that we possess any continuous history. Separated by the territory of Daphnous, a small corner of ground to the north of mount Knemis which gave to the Phokians their only access to the Euboian sea, lay the lands of the Epiknemidian Lokrians to the west, and of the Lokrians of Opous to the east. With these sections of the Lokrian name must be taken another isolated portion of the same race inhabiting the corner of land which ran up northwards from the Corinthian gulf between Aitolia and Phokis, and also the town of the Epizephyrian Lokrians at the southern extremity of the Italian peninsula. These Lokrians were regarded as Hellenes; but their name seems to point to an affinity with the Ligurians of the gulf of Genoa and the Lloegry of Britain and Gaul. To the south of mount Knemis lay the Phokian plain of the Kephisos, which, flowing from Parnassos, receives the stream of the Euénos near the town of Elateia and runs into the lake Kopais near the Boiotian Orchomenos. This plain may be regarded as the theatre of the religious wars of the Greeks. With Spartan help the Delphians threw off their connexion with Phokis, and thus one great sanctuary passed from the dominion of the Phokians. The other sanctuary of Abai in the extreme east of their land was perhaps the only Phokian town not broken up into villages at the end of the second Sacred War.

CHAP.
IV.

Dorians,
and
Phokians.

To the west of the Ozolian Lokrians and of the little state of Doris lay the fastnesses of mountain tribes, some of which were allowed to be Hellenes while to others the title was refused,—on what grounds, it would perhaps be not easy to determine. According to Thucydides¹⁰⁰ the Aitolians, eaters of raw flesh, spoke a dialect almost unintelligible to an Athenian; but we have already learnt to be cautious in drawing inferences from the statements both of Thucydides and Herodotos on the speech of Hellenic and non-Hellenic tribes. Probably both in their language and their usages the Aitolians and Akarnanians were as much or as little intitled to be regarded as Greeks as were the Agraians and Amphilocheians

The Aito-
lians and
Akarna-
nians.

¹⁰⁰ iii. 94.

of the Ambrakian gulf, who were classed among barbarians.¹⁰¹ The two Aitolian towns of Pleuron and Kalydon were associated with the mythical career of Meleagros; but when these savage mountaineers become prominent in history, their ferocity provokes a controversy on this very point, which, if awakened two or three centuries earlier, would have gone more decidedly against them.¹⁰²

With these rude and savage clans the comparatively orderly people of Doris and Phokis stand out in marked contrast; but in historical importance all these are far surpassed by the Boiotians, whose theory even from prehistoric times seems to have been that the whole country stretching from Chaironeia and Orchomenos to the Euboic sea and from the lands of the Opountian Lokrians to the Corinthian gulf was the inalienable possession of the Boiotian confederacy. Whether this confederacy was coeval with the greatness of Orchomenos, we cannot say; but certain it is that Orchomenos was the seat of a powerful people at a time when Mykenai and Tiryns stood foremost among the cities in the Peloponnesos. The huge works by which the imperfect drainage of the lake Kopais through the natural Katabothra¹⁰³ was rendered complete point to a government as stable as that which produced the Cloacæ of Rome,¹⁰⁴ nor could Orchomenos have been included in the Amphiktyony of Kalaureia, if its territory had not stretched to the sea. But before the dawn of the historic ages the greatness of Orchomenos had passed away, and Thebes becomes the leader of the confederacy, from which by the aid or the connivance of Sparta Plataiai seceded to form its splendid but disastrous alliance with Athens. Such unwilling members were sure to draw down upon themselves the bitter enmity and vengeance of the Boiotarchs, the magistrates chosen annually by each of the autonomous cities to manage the affairs of the alliance; but the tyrannical oligarchies which ruled in these towns were probably, like the Skopads and Aleuads of Thessaly, the leaders of an indifferent, if not of an actually hostile, people.

¹⁰¹ Yet these Agraians are in name simply the Graioi or Graikoi, whose name the Latins adopted as the common designation of the Hellenic tribes. See note 61.

¹⁰² Freeman, *Hist. Fed. Government*, p. 326, *et seq.*

¹⁰³ See page 5.

¹⁰⁴ Arnold, *History of Rome*, i. 53.

If from these communities to the north of the Corinthian gulf we turn to the Peloponnesos at the beginning of the genuine historical age, we find that the preponderant state is Sparta. Her territory includes nearly half the peninsula in a line extending from Thyrea on the east to the mouth of the Neda¹⁰⁵ on the west. She has thus swallowed up all Messênê, and no small portion of land which, as the tradition asserts, had once been under the dominion of Argos. There had, indeed, been a time in which the name Argos had denoted not merely the city which held aloof from the struggle with Xerxes but the whole of the Peloponnesos and many a district lying beyond its limits;¹⁰⁶ and therefore the power of Argos was already shrunk when she was deprived of that long strip of land which, stretching from Thyrea to cape Malea, is cut off, like Magnesia, by the mountain range of Thornax and Zarex from the lands which lie to the west. This ancient supremacy of Argos may be indicated in the myth which in the Herakleid conquest assigns the north-eastern portion of the peninsula as the prize of Temenos the eldest surviving son of Aristomachos; and thus the Dorian conquerors would become inheritors of her ancient greatness. But of the mode in which this conquest was effected, we have no knowledge. Three miles from the town of Argos, and nearer to the sea, stood on a slight hill the Temenion, or shrine of the hero, of which tradition spoke as the fortified post occupied by the Dorian invaders. On the Solygeian hill stood, it was said, another fortress from which the Dorians advanced to the conquest of Corinth. We may, if we please, take these two traditions as evidence that these invaders came by sea and making simultaneous descents on different parts of the peninsula carried on the work of a slow and laborious conquest. The fact is likely, but all direct historical evidence is lacking for it, while the story of the Herakleid partition of the Peloponnesos is completely opposed to the hypothesis.¹⁰⁷ Not far from Argos itself the towns of

¹⁰⁵ This name seems to reappear in the Scottish Nith. If so, it is, of course, non-Hellenic. See note 93.

¹⁰⁶ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 230.

¹⁰⁷ Mr. Grote assumes this hypothesis as a certainty, and reconstructs the narrative of the conquest accordingly. *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. iv. For the Temenion see Pausanias,

BOOK
I.

Hermiônê, Eîôn, and Asiné are said to have been inhabited by Dryopians; and hence we may infer that these Dryopian settlements were made by roving bands who found their way to the Euboian Styra and Karystos and the islands of Kythnos and Kypros (Cyprus). But conjectures founded on the dispersion of a name are scarcely rendered safe by their seeming likelihood. The Galatian or Gallic name is far more widely scattered; but the history of the early wanderings of the Gallic tribes is wrapped up and hidden in the mists of ages.

Pheidon of Argos, and the Pheidoneian measures.

It is more than possible that the myths of the Herakleid migration may as unduly exaggerate the rapidity of the Dorian conquest, as the later ascendancy of Sparta may tempt us unduly to depreciate the former power of her decaying rival. It is not unlikely that the points of invasion may have been far more numerous, and the opposition of the old inhabitants far less easily overcome; nor is there any reason why Argos should not have established in the peninsula a confederation answering to that of the Boiotian Thebes. But in the absence of contemporary testimony even likelihood cannot be converted into fact; and we must rest contented with the presumptions furnished by traditions such as that which asserted that Argos imposed upon Aigina and Sikyon a heavy fine for giving aid to the Spartan king Kleomenes, and that its right to impose the fine was admitted although the fine was held to be exorbitant in amount.¹⁰⁸ The traditions of the reign of Pheidon are less trustworthy. This king, it is said, achieved a greatness and a fame for wisdom which place him nearly on a level with the Kretan Minos. Earlier kings had allowed the royal authority to dwindle away until it became little better than a name. Pheidon not only made himself despot in his own city, but claimed to be the lord of every city in the Peloponnesos which had ever been conquered by his progenitor Herakles, or, in other words, of nearly the whole peninsula. His dignity as head of the Herakleid house he established by marching to Olympia and placing himself in the president's seat at the great games; and the evidence

ii. 28, 1; and for the alleged Dorian occupation of the Solygeian hill, see Thucydides, iv. 42.

¹⁰⁸ Herod. vi. 92.

for this event was supposed to be found in the fact that the Eleians refused to insert the names of the victors of the eighth Olympiad in the register headed by the name of Koroibos. Finally, he was the first who coined gold or silver money in Hellas, and introduced the scale (afterwards known as the Aiginaiian) which corresponded closely with the Phœnician, Hebrew, Babylonian and Egyptian scales. But the circumstantiality of these traditions adds nothing to their value. Except in times for which we have strictly contemporary history the dates of great inventions and the men who are said to have made them must be regarded with extreme suspicion; and there is nothing to justify an exception in the case of Pheidon.¹⁰⁹ The kings who had reigned before him are mere names. If Herodotos places him in the generation preceding that of the Sikyonian Kleisthenes, i.e. about a century before the battle of Marathon, the Parian marble refers him to a time nearly three centuries earlier, while Theopompos and Ephoros represent him, respectively, as the sixth and the tenth descendent of Temenos. In short, we know nothing whatever of the man or of his time; and the attempt to reconcile Herodotos with the Parian chronicle by supposing that two kings named Pheidon reigned at Argos savours too much of the method by which Egyptologists cut up or multiply Sesostris.¹¹⁰ Nor are we on firmer ground when we turn to the barren lists of Corinthian kings who traced their line to Alêtês, son of Hippotes the slayer of the prophet Karnos. These kings are mere shadows, known as Aletiadês for 150 years, and then as Bacchiadai, from Bacchis the fifth in the series, until, at a time preceding by nearly three centuries the birth of Herodotos, the dynasty was overthrown by the Bacchiad oligarchy which in its turn was subverted ninety years later by Kypselos. Not more substantial are the Spartan kings before the first Olympiad, which marks, it is said, the tenth year in the reign of the joint kings Alkamenes and Theopompos at Sparta.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 545.

¹¹⁰ lb. *Astronomy of the Ancients*, 369. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 425, refuses to believe that the Argive Pheidon is the same person with the Corinthian legislator of the same name mentioned by Aristotle, *Polit.* ii. 6, 4.

¹¹¹ This first recorded Olympiad is assigned to the year 776 B.C. There is no historical evidence to support the date.

BOOK
I.

The
Eleians
and the
Arkadians.

Here then, as in the Hellenic lands to the north of the Corinthian isthmus, we must content ourselves with that grouping of states which is revealed to us at the dawn of the historical ages ; and this grouping in the Peloponnesos exhibits Dorians as possessing the whole peninsula with the exception of that portion to the northwest which included the lands of the Triphylians, Pisatans, Eleians, Achaians, and Arkadians. The Triphylians, separated from the Dorian states by the river Neda, fell, it was said, like the men of Pisa, under the yoke of the Eleians, later immigrants from Aitolia, while the Achaians retained in their dodekapolis some fragments of the ancient inheritance won from Ionians whom they had driven from their homes.¹¹² In the belief of Herodotos, the Achaians and the Arkadians were with the Kynourians indigenous inhabitants of the peninsula ; but his belief is as much and as little to be trusted as his counter-assertions respecting the relations of Pelasgians and Hellenes. It is of more importance to remark that the tribes who occupied the central highlands of the Peloponnesos exhibit, at the time when we first become historically acquainted with them, social conditions much resembling those of the highland tribes to the north of the Corinthian gulf. Girt in within the mighty ranges of Kyllênê and Erymanthos to the north, of Pholos to the northwest, of the Mainalian and Parthenian hills to the southeast, this bare and rugged region furnished a home to village communities ordered after the primitive Aryan model. It is only on the eastern sides where the mountains slope off into a more accessible country that we find the more important Arkadian towns of Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenos. But if Arkadia could boast of no beautiful or magnificent cities, it was rich in its wealth of popular traditions. The birthplace of Hermes was in the Kyllenian hill, and here lay the cradle to which the child returned when wearied with his work of destruction. Among these same hills, near the town of Nonakris, flowed the awful stream of Styx, the water which imparted a deadly sanction to the oaths of those who swore by it, while far away on the Lykaian heights rose the town which the simple faith of the people maintained to be the

¹¹² Herod. viii. 73.

most ancient of all cities and the first which Helios (the sun) had ever beheld. Here, as they would have it, Zeus had been nourished by the nymphs Theïsoa, Neda, and Hagno, and here in Kretea, and not in the Egean island, was the mighty son of Kronos born. Half conscious that he was but saying in other words that the blue heaven is seen first in the morning against the bright mountain-tops on which the sun's rays rest before they light up the regions beneath, the Arkadian, localising in his Lykaian Temenos the old faith that no man might look on the face of Zeus and live, averred not only that all living things which might enter it would die within the year, but that not a single object within it ever cast a shadow.¹¹³ This primæval city was built by Lykáôn the son of Pelasgos, who gave to Zeus his epithet Lykaïos, instituting the Lykaian festival in his honour.

Lastly, to the west of the great mountain-chain of Taÿgetos which runs down to Tainaron the southernmost cape of the peninsula, lay the richest land to the west and south of the Corinthian isthmus, the plains of Stenyklaros and Makaria, watered by the Bias and the Pamisos. This fertile Messenian land (for no city called Messênê existed in the days of Herodotos) must once have been independent both of Argos and of Sparta, if there be the least foundation for the belief that it was assigned as the portion of the Herakleid Kresphontes. But long before Athens had shaken off the yoke of her despots, this fertile and happy land had been ravaged by Sparta, and its people enslaved or driven away; and thus of their polity we know little more than what we may learn from the traditions of the Dorian migration and the Messénian wars. For the latter we have some little historical evidence in the elegies of Tyrtaios; but it is the fatal defect of traditional history that even when the narrative seems likely, we can have no adequate assurance of its ac-

The Mez-
senians.

¹¹³ I do not hesitate to say that the chapter in which Pausanias (viii. 38, 1) describes the phenomena of Lykosoura is one of the most important in the whole range of Greek literature in its bearing on the mythopœic stage of Aryan civilisation. The myths tell their own story, *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 363; but Pausanias not only accepted the fact of this shadowless Temenos, but goes on to note that even in the tropics this phenomenon is seen only once a year, whereas here it was permanent,—thus deliberately giving his own sanction to the belief. Hermes is, of course, the wind-god, the harper, who under other aspects appears as Orpheus, Pan, or the piper of Hameln. See page 32. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* book ii. ch. v.

curacy and cannot even tell whether or how far the story may have been warped to suit the political or social feelings of later ages. This later sentiment has probably coloured the tradition that Eurysthenes and Prokles incurred the hatred of the Spartans for seeking to extend to the conquered people the freedom of their Dorian invaders, that their policy was summarily reversed by their sons Agis and Eurypon, and that the names Agiad and Eurypontid were substituted in place of the earlier titles for the double line of Spartan kings.¹¹⁴ So, again, there may be some foundation in fact for the tradition that Amyklai, a village distant not three miles from Sparta, retained its ancient independence until it was at last subdued by Teleklos; but if there be, the traditions of the Herakleid conquest cannot be reconciled with the fact that these isolated Achaians could hold their ground against the Dorians for a period of more than three centuries after the Dorian invasion and for more than a century later than the alleged lifetime of Lykourgos. We may balance the story that Teleklos founded three towns on the banks of the Nedon, near the Messenian gulf, and the description of Oxythemis (a conqueror in the eleventh Olympiad) not as a Messenian but as a Koroneian, against the traditions which represent Kresphontes as subduing all Messenia at once; and we may conclude that Teleklos, or the men whom Teleklos may represent, possessed at least some soil which afterwards became Messenian and that for an indefinite time after the conquest Korônê, a city on the western shore of the Messenian gulf about 15 miles to the north of cape Akritas, was still an independent state. But we have no ground beyond that of likelihood for preferring the one tradition to the other; and if we reject the myth of the conquest because it is inconsistent with tales which have more the air of likelihood, we are scarcely justified in laying stress on the story that Kresphontes married the daughter of the Arkadian chief Kypselos and thus received powerful aid in the task of conquering Messenia.¹¹⁵ The legends associated

¹¹⁴ See further Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 445.

¹¹⁵ Paus. iv. 3, 3; viii. 29, 4. Mr. Grote looks upon this alliance as productive of important political consequences. *Hist. Gr.* ii. 441.

From Aipytos, the son of Kresphontes and Meropê the daughter of Kypselos, the Messenian kings were called Aipytidai.

with the Temenion near Argos and the Solygeian hill near Corinth must, as evidence of simultaneous or successive maritime attacks on the Peloponnesos, rank on a level with the legends of Scarborough, as evidence of Cromwell's blockade of a castle at which it can be proved that he was not present.¹¹⁶ But the geography of the western portion of the peninsula furnishes better warrant for the belief that the invaders, whoever they may have been and whenever they may have come, found their way through the country of Elis and Pisa, and that thence one portion advancing due south laid the foundations of the Messenian kingdom, while another portion ascended the valley of the Alpheios the source of which is not far distant from that of the Eurotas, and thence, marching along the course of the latter river, reached Sparta. We are on more perilous ground, when we infer from the tradition of the prophet Oxylos, that the invaders consisted of Aitolian and Dorian bands and that the Aitolians received Elis as their portion and became the guardians of Olympia, or when we assert that in the alleged existence of a temple of Artemis Limnatis on the Messenian border we have evidence of the old friendship which was followed by deadly enmity between the two peoples.¹¹⁷ Pausanias may be wrong in ascribing to the Spartans in the days of Teleklos expeditions to the Arkadian Kleitor as well as against the Argives and Kynourians; but if he be, we have no better ground for following him when he prolongs to the same period the independence of Amyklai, Pharis, and Geronthrai. Nor for these traditions will the evidence of language help us much. There are no reasons for supposing that the Dorian conquerors brought into the Peloponnesos a dialect differing materially from those of the tribes which they dispossessed; and even to the north of the peninsula Doric dialects were spoken by peoples who made no claim to the title of Dorians. The differences between them may have been more or less marked than those which distinguished Pelasgian speech from Hellenic; but if they indicate possible ethnical affinities, they

¹¹⁶ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 187.

¹¹⁷ When Pausanias, ii. 4, 2, tells us that only Messenians and Spartans had access to this temple, he is speaking of a state of things which had come to an end in the days of Teleklos, that is, at a time preceding his own by perhaps ten centuries, for more than three of which we have not even the pretence of contemporary history.

BOOK
I
The
Spartans.

can tell us little either of the time or the mode in which the conquest of the Peloponnesos was achieved.

But whatever may have been the origin of the Messenian state, certain it is that its fortunes were precisely opposed to those of the half savage hamlets which together formed the city of Sparta. Messênê after a long and desperate struggle went down before her austere rival; Sparta, having extended her borders to the Western and Eastern seas, became not merely the head of the Dorian tribes, but a power which made itself felt throughout all Hellas, and in some sort succeeded in enforcing a common law. Distinguished from all other states by the rigidity of its system and the peculiarity of its institutions, it has, perhaps from the mere fact of its prominence, come to be regarded as the type and model of a Doric state, and as exhibiting in their logical completeness the general principles of that which, in the absence of a national Hellenic sentiment, must be termed Dorism.¹¹⁸ This reputation is altogether undeserved, and probably would have been thoroughly distasteful to the companions of Leonidas or Archidamos. In her chief characteristics Sparta stood alone. Neither in Argos nor in Corinth nor even in Krete from which she was supposed to have derived her special institutions, do we find that military and monastic system which converted Sparta into an incampment of crusading knights, and waged an impartial war not only against luxury but generally against art, refinement, and speculation. This lack of sympathy with the general Hellenic mind was shown in her whole polity; and this polity, it was believed, was brought into permanent shape by the legislation of Lykourgos.

Lykourgos.

The historian who lived nearest to the alleged time of the great Spartan lawgiver is Herodotos; and the account which he gives is briefly this,—that Lykourgos became guardian of his nephew the young king Leobotas or Labotas, while Sparta was still utterly disorganised and unruly; that, resolving to put an end to this shameful anarchy, he went to Krete, and thence returned to change all Spartan manners and customs; that when afterwards he visited Delphoi, the priestess, al-

¹¹⁸ This is the general conclusion of K. O. Müller in his *History of the Dorians*. The theory is strenuously opposed by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. vi.

though she confessed some hesitation, ranked him among gods rather than among men, and that after his death the Spartans built a temple in his honour and speedily became the orderly and mighty people which he wished to make them.¹¹⁹ He adds that, although this was the Spartan tradition, yet many maintained that he owed to the Pythia at Delphoi the remedies which he applied with so much success to the maladies of his countrymen; and all that we need remark here is that Labotas according to the popular chronology began to reign perhaps half a millennium before the birth of the historian. Thucydides, who does not in terms ascribe to Lykourgos the polity and the greatness of Sparta, believes that the legislation which put an end to Spartan factions preceded by little more than four centuries the close of the Peloponnesian war,¹²⁰ in other words, that it must be assigned to about 800 B.C., a date differing by nearly 200 years from that of Herodotos, while Eratosthenes places him about 70 years earlier, and Clement of Alexandria 40 years earlier still. But between the days of Herodotos and these later writers the narrative of the life of Lykourgos was drawn out into vivid personal detail. Xenophon¹²¹ had thrown back the era of Lykourgos to the age of the Herakleid invasion, that is, to a time preceding that of Herodotos by nearly 700 years; but this was a trifling matter. According to Herodotos, the Spartan tradition made Lykourgos the guardian of Labotas, of the Agiad or Eurysthenid line of kings; but the writers whom Plutarch followed would have it that the child intrusted to him was not Labotas but Charilaos, of the Prokleid or Eurypontid house, and that Lykourgos, having been appointed regent on the death of his brother Polydektes, had rejected the proposals of his widow who wished him to marry her and make himself king. According to this version the love of the widow was thus turned to hate, and the charge which she brought against him, of seeking the life of the babe whom he had presented to the Spartans as their king, drove him into exile. Going first to Krete, he there found in working order

¹¹⁹ Herod. i. 65.¹²⁰ i. 18. Like Thucydides, Hellenikos does not mention Lykourgos; but unlike Thucydides, he ascribes the existing constitution of Sparta to Eurysthenes and Prokles.¹²¹ *Rep. Lac.* x. 8.

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the institutions which he transferred to Sparta, and thence wandered on to Ionia, Egypt, Libya, Iberia, and India, obtaining in the first of these countries a copy of the Homeric poems which with his laws he was the first to introduce into Peloponnesos. The framers of this narrative had heard of his visit to Delphoi, and it was their business to find a reason for his going. This reason was the appalling confusion which astonished him on his return to Sparta and drove him to take counsel with the Delphian god.

Mythical
lawgivers.

In short, of Lykourgos, of his life, and of his works we know absolutely nothing. To us he is a mere phantom; and so unsubstantial did his form appear to Timaios and to Cicero that they made two Lykourgoi, as others made two Argive Pheidons, and simplified matters by assigning to the one all deeds and schemes which would not suit the other. The Delphian priestess is made, as we have seen, to address him as a god rather than as a man; and Plutarch is obliged to admit that of every single incident in his life there are conflicting and contradictory narratives, the controversy extending not merely to what he said or did, but to the period to which he is to be assigned. So thorough is the inconsistency between these stories as they were circulated in the days of Plutarch and Pausanias, that we may fairly doubt whether they represent any genuine local beliefs. Had there been at Sparta any genuine popular tradition respecting him, it could scarcely have branched out into so wild a growth of antagonistic assertion; nor would Hellanikos have passed him by in utter silence or ascribed to Eurysthenes and Prokles the organisation and laws of Sparta. But if on the application of historical tests the form of Lykourgos vanishes away, we are left free to note further that he is one of that band of ideal lawgivers who are common to most of the Aryan nations and whose names denote their origin or their office. Like Drakon and Zaleukos, he is the bright being who drives away the darkness of anarchy.¹²² Like Minos, and Menu, and the Teutonic Mann, he is the measurer, the thinker, the man;¹²³ and like Numa Pom-

¹²² Drakon, the keensighted, (dragon): Za-leukos, the gleaming: Lykourgos, the lightbringer. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 72.

¹²³ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 87.

pilius,¹²⁴ he is the lawgiver who prescribes the customs and ceremonies of the people. His reputed wanderings which take him, like the mythical Solon, to Egypt and India seem to betray the shaping of the tale by those who had the great Hindu lawgivers in their mind. But the mythical Lykourgos is not, like the mythical Solon, a person for whose historical existence we have contemporary documents and of whose constitutional changes we have accounts on the whole adequately attested, but around whom the mists of oral tradition have gathered as they have gathered round Karl the Great and Hruodland, the Roland of Roncesvalles. Solon lives and dies among men, of whom we have at least some historical knowledge. Lykourgos is removed from the period of genuine history by a gulf of centuries, and he belongs to the ages in which Mann, like Prometheus, Hermes, and Phoroneus, bestows on his kinsfolk that boon of fire without which they would never have attained to social order and law.¹²⁵ The Spartan lawgiver must therefore be banished to the cloudland; and we must content ourselves with such knowledge of the early condition of Sparta as may be furnished by statements relating to the working of the Spartan constitution at a time which may be said to mark the dawn of contemporary history.

¹²⁴ The name Numa is akin both to the Latin *numerus* and the Greek νόμος, *law*. Pompilius is the proponent of ceremonies or *pomps*, and is equivalent to Pontifex, another form of Pontifex as πόντις is of πόντος. The word Pontifex has, therefore, nothing to do with bridgemaking. Ihne, *History of Rome*, i. 31.

¹²⁵ *Myth. Ar. Nat* ii. 191.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONSTITUTION AND EARLY HISTORY OF SPARTA.

BOOK
I.

The
Spartan
Gerousia ;
the Ephors,
and the
Kings.

THE Spartans in relation to the inhabitants of the country generally formed strictly an army of occupation; and their whole polity may be said to be founded on the discipline of such an army. In its earlier stages the Spartan constitution, according to the accounts given of it, much resembled the constitution of the Achaians as described in the Iliad. Externally, then, the Spartans occupied a position closely analogous to that of William the Conqueror and his Normans in England: internally they were governed by a close oligarchy. But the Spartan constitution differed from that of the Achaians in its peculiar feature of two co-ordinate kings, both Herakleids, and referred by way of explanation to the twin sons of Aristodemos. The kings certainly followed in the paths of their mythical progenitors;¹²⁶ but the Spartans may have patiently or even cheerfully put up with these dissensions, as a security against any violent usurpation of despotic authority by either of the two. The power of the kings, whatever it may have been (and it certainly had been far greater than that which they retained in the time of Herodotos), is said to have received some limitations from Lykourgos to whom the Spartans attributed the establishment of the Gerousia, or senate of twenty-eight old men (the whole number of the assembly being thirty, as the kings sat and voted with them), and also of the periodical popular assemblies which were held in the open air. In these meetings the people were not allowed to discuss any measures, their functions being bounded to the acceptance or the rejection of the previous resolutions of the Gerousia.¹²⁷ To

¹²⁶ See note 74.

¹²⁷ Hence it became difficult or impossible for other states to learn the plans or details of Spartan policy. This characteristic of secrecy is marked by Thucydides, v. 68.

this earlier constitution, according to Plutarch, two checks were added a century later in the reigns of the kings Polydoros and Theopompos, the first being the provision that the senate with the kings should have the power of reversing any 'crooked decisions' of the people, and the second the institution of a new executive board of five men called Ephoroi (overseers or bishops). This board was elective; but of the mode of election little more can be said than that in the opinion of Aristotle it was exceedingly childish.¹²⁸ It is certain, however, that they acquired, if they did not at the first receive, powers which in the issue became paramount in the state. Nor can it be doubted that in its origin the office was popular, in the sense in which the main body of the oligarchical families stood out in contrast with the two ruling houses. By the oath interchanged every month, the kings swore that they would exercise their functions according to the established laws, while the ephors undertook on that condition to maintain their authority. This oath could have been instituted only at a time when the kings still possessed some independent power; it was retained long after the period when their authority became almost nominal as compared with that of the ephors. The latter stood on so firm a basis that the ephors were enabled to exempt themselves during their year of office from the common discipline, while the kingly prerogative was cut down practically to the command of the Spartan armies in time of war. According to Herodotos¹²⁹ the kings had the right of declaring war at will; but this power was gradually usurped by the Ephors, two of whom always accompanied the kings on military expeditions, thus still further tying their hands, even while they appeared to strengthen them by giving effect to their orders.

Still, in their extensive domains, in their perquisites at sacrifices, in their power to vote in the senate by proxy, and more particularly in the religious feeling of the people who saw in them the living representatives of Herakles, the kings enjoyed a position by means of which they could exercise, as Agesilaos exercised, great influence in the state.

Political
influence
of the
kings.

¹²⁸ *Polit.* ii. 9, 23.

¹²⁹ vi. 56.

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I.

But when more impetuous and less prudent kings, like Agis III. and Kleomenes III., acted on the conviction that by the Lykourgean constitution the ephors were merely deputies of the kings, it was seen not only that the contest was hopeless, but that that constitution had become a purely ideal one, and that the idea formed of it by one mind might differ indefinitely from that which might be formed by another.

The Spartiatai, the Perioikoi, and the Helots.

When we reach the times of contemporary historians, we find the population of the Spartan territories marked off into three classes, the Spartiatai or full citizens, the Perioikoi, and the Helots. The distinctions between these classes severally are sufficiently clear; but it seems impossible to attain any certainty as to the mode in which they grew up. The explanations given by Pausanias, Isokrates, and other writers, are inconsistent.¹³⁰ In the age of Herodotus no distinction of race existed between the full Spartan citizen and the Perioikoi, while a large proportion of the Helots was also Dorian, if the fact that they were conquered Messenians gave them a claim to that title. We are therefore left to mere guesswork, when we seek for the reason why the Dorians of outlying districts did not share the privileges of the Spartans, and why certain other Dorians, with other inhabitants whose very name of Helots we cannot account for, should have been reduced to the condition of villenage. The Dorian conquest of the Peloponnesos is shrouded, as we have seen, in the mists of popular tradition; and when we reach the historical ages, we can but accept facts as we find them. These facts exhibit to us an oligarchical body filling towards the other inhabitants the relation of feudal lords to their dependents, supported, like the Thessalian nobility, entirely from their lands, and regarding all labour, whether agricultural or mechanical, as derogatory to their dignity. In their relations with one another, these lords were the soldiers of an army of occupation and subjected, as such, to a severe military discipline. In fact, they retained their citizenship only on condition of submitting to this discipline and of paying their quota to the Syssitia or

¹³⁰ These statements are examined in detail by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. vi.

public messes, which supplied the place of home life to the Spartans. Failure in either of these duties intailed disfranchisement: and it may be readily supposed that the multiplication of families too proud to labour, and even forbidden to labour, had its necessary result in producing a class of men who had lost their franchise merely from inability to contribute to these public messes. These disfranchised citizens came to be known by the name Hypomeiones or Inferiors, and answered closely to the 'mean whites' of the late slaveholding states of the American union. The full citizens were distinguished by the title of Homoioi, or Peers.

Thus while the oligarchic body of governing citizens was perpetually throwing off a number of landless and moneyless men, the condition of the Perioikoi and even that of the Helots, was by comparison gradually improving. The former carried on the various trades on which the Spartan looked with profound scorn; the latter, as cultivators of the soil, lost nothing by the increase of their numbers, while they differed altogether from the slaves of Athens or Thebes as being strictly 'adscripti glebæ,' and not liable to be sold out of the country, or perhaps even to be sold at all. They were the property not of individual owners but of the state, which could at any time call upon them for military service, and which they sometimes served in the capacity of heavy armed troops.

Gradual improvement in the condition of the Perioikoi and the Helots.

Such a polity was not one to justify any great feeling of security on the part of the rulers. We find accordingly that the Spartan government looked with constant anxiety to the classes which it regarded with an instinctive dread. The ephors could put Perioikoi to death without trial: crowds of Helots sometimes disappeared for ever when their lives seemed to portend danger for the supremacy of the dominant class; and the Krypteia (even if we reject the idea of deliberate annual massacres of the Helots) was yet a police institution by which young citizens were employed to carry out a system of espionage through the whole of Lakonia. But with all its faults the Spartan constitution fairly answered its purpose, and challenged the respect of the Hellenic world. In the belief of Herodotos and Thucydides Sparta,

The Krypteia.

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I.

in times ancient even in their day, had been among the most disorderly of states ; but since the reforms of Lykourgos none had been better governed or more free from faction. The fixity of their political ideas or sentiments won for them the esteem of their fellow-Hellenes, among whom changes were fast and frequent, while this esteem in its turn fed the pride of the Spartans and inspired them with a temper as self-satisfied as that of the inhabitants of the Celestial Empire, but far more arrogant and exclusive.

Land
tenure in
Lakonia.

If from the social gradations among the inhabitants of Lakonia we turn to the subject of property and the tenure of land, we find ourselves confronted with questions which we have to face in the early history of Athens, of Rome, and of England. All the conditions of primitive Aryan society were, as we have seen, unfavourable to, if not altogether inconsistent with, the equal subdivision of real property. While they tended to shut out a majority of the inhabitants from any share of the land on which nevertheless they must live, the amount of land possessed by any given owner depended either upon accident or on the strength of his arm or his sword. The tradition or rather the conviction that society had started under very different conditions was found indeed almost everywhere ; and the prevalence of this notion has been assumed as proof that the tradition is based on historical fact, and that in the matter of real property the principles of ancient law differed fundamentally from those of mediæval and modern legislation. But there is really no evidence that either at Athens or Sparta or elsewhere possession of land was conferred strictly and solely by society which assigned a given portion to each of its members. Such divisions may have been carried out in the establishment of colonies ; but in such cases we have a definite number of citizens for whom the distribution is made in a strange or a conquered country from which the inhabitants are forcibly dispossessed, and thus the ground is left free for the new state of things. A plan practicable enough in such cases would be impossible or visionary, if applied on an extended scale amongst tribes which have grown up through a confederation of families starting each with the possessions which it may previously

have acquired. But if these earlier social conditions seem wholly opposed to the idea of equal distribution of land, it is not less certain that those social conditions would be fruitful in evils for which such a distribution would appear a heaven-sent panacea.¹³¹ To this equality the oppressed and the impoverished would turn with the same intensity of feeling which would be stirred in them by tyranny and injustice generally, and the same sense of prevalent iniquity which exhibited the history of mankind as a process of degeneration from golden ages of peace and happiness¹³² found expression also in the thought that the prosperity of the early time arose from the equal distribution of land amongst all the citizens. That the evils so keenly felt were followed by some attempts at reformation, we may well believe; and we shall perhaps be able to understand more fully both the nature of the evil and its remedy, when we reach the history of Athens in the days of Solon. How far the same remedy was applied in Sparta, it is impossible to say, as for centuries following the so-called Lykourgean era the traditions of Sparta are as little to be trusted as the story of the Argonauts or of the exploits of Perseus and Herakles.¹³³ But in the case of Sparta we may say, further, that the notion of a land-law of Lykourgos is of late growth. Hellanikos, as we have seen, knows nothing of the great lawgiver; and earlier still, the poet Alkaios, far from looking back to a happier age, speaks of the predominance and tyranny of the wealthy as weeds which find a kindly soil in Spartan society.¹³⁴ This supposed Lykourgean re-distribution is unknown to Herodotos, while Thucydides and Xenophon lay stress on the condescension of

¹³¹ When Dr. Arnold says that 'the division and assignation of lands to the individual members of the state by the deliberate act of the whole community was familiarly recognised as the manner in which such property was most regularly acquired,' *Hist. Rome*, i. 263, he is right as regards the popular belief or conviction; but we cannot argue back from the belief to the fact.

¹³² See page 85.

¹³³ Mr. Grote's reasoning on the nature of the Lykourgean reform lacks therefore an historical basis. The statement of Plutarch that Lykourgos re-divided all Lakonia cannot be answered by asserting our *knowledge* that Lakonia was not then in possession of Sparta. We know nothing about the fact, for we cannot speak of Teleklos, who is supposed to have come later than Lykourgos, as a real personage.

Nor can we argue from the supposed later introduction of coined money by Pheidon to the improbability of the banishing of gold and silver from Sparta by Lykourgos. The traditions of Pheidon are as visionary as those of Teleklos.

¹³⁴ According to the poet, money made the man, and no poor man could be either good or honourable. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 581.

the great in submitting to the rigid discipline imposed upon their poorer countrymen.¹³⁵ Of the opinions of Plato or of Aristotle it is unnecessary to speak.¹³⁶ In treating of historical facts they had no further sources of information than those which were open to earlier writers. Nothing therefore can be gained by examining the accounts given of measures ascribed to Lykourgos, or by supposing that he carried a land-law which stopped short of equal re-distribution. If we reject the assertion of Plutarch that Lykourgos parcelled out the whole country into 3,900 lots, 900 for Spartans and the rest for the Lakonians, that this number was never diminished, and the size of these lots never lessened or increased, until lust and luxury invaded the state after the Peloponnesian war and the ephor Epitadeus carried a Rhetra enabling proprietors to devise and bequeath their lands as it might please them, we are little justified in adopting other versions of the story, and assuredly we have no right to form any other hypothesis at our will. It is enough to say that if for at least four centuries the soil of a country remained in the hands of precisely the same number of owners, no subsequent law would have been able to reverse at once an order of things thus stereotyped by immemorial usage. In point of fact we find at work from the first dawn of history influences which not only compel us to dismiss these statements as mere fictions, but which show that great inequalities of property must from a very early age have marked the society of Sparta. The citizen who could not pay his quota for the maintenance of the public messes was disfranchised and took his place among the mean Lakonians. Public sentiment was against the buying or selling of the lands, and the smaller lots became constantly less and less capable of maintaining families as they grew larger. Nothing more than this, taken along with the feudal notion that it was as disgraceful to work as to be able to write, would be needed to account for the rapid lessening in the numbers of the citizens from 8,000 in the time of Herodotos¹³⁷ to 1,000 in that of Aristotle¹³⁸ and

¹³⁵ Thuc. i. 6. Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 7. The picture of extreme monastic rigour drawn by Xenophon must be taken for what it may be worth.

¹³⁶ They are discussed by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 532.

¹³⁷ vii. 234.

¹³⁸ *Polit.* ii. 9, 16.

to 700 in that of Agis III.,¹³⁹ even if no account be taken of the constant intermarrying within a narrow circle or of the infamous polyandry permitted by Spartan custom or law. If, however, the original properties, whatever they may have been, were being constantly re-divided among all the sons in a family, we can well imagine that a state of things would follow which at last would become intolerable; and the proposed reforms of Agis as well as the violent changes of Kleomenes would be naturally described as a return to a better order of things which should never have been broken. If we needed further evidence of the great social inequality of Sparta, it would be found in the victories of Spartan citizens at the Olympic games,—victories which imply the existence of a larger number of unsuccessful competitors, and which show that there were not wanting men in Lakonia who could vie with the wealthiest in Hellas. If, again, the authority of Aristotle can count for little in his descriptions of pre-historic legislation, it is paramount for statements of facts with which he was himself acquainted; and Aristotle speaks emphatically of the fatal mistake which encouraged the growth of large families by privileges answering to the Roman ‘jus liberorum,’ while no effort was made to enable the children to pay their quota to the public tables.¹⁴⁰ Nay, more, he represents fathers of families as bestowing dowries on their daughters and arranging their marriages at will, while wealthy foreigners came to Sparta and allied themselves with wealthy Spartans, thus more and more concentrating increased wealth in a smaller number of hands. Of judicial interference to check or repress these tendencies there is no evidence which is not contradicted by weightier statements on the other side.

But when we have cast aside the pictures drawn by later writers, we are not free to frame theories as to the object and extent of the Lykourgean system or even to affirm the fact of such legislation. We are not at liberty to say that the reforms of Lykourgos preceded the campaigns of Teleklos, because we know nothing of either Lykourgos or Teleklos. We cannot maintain that the Lykourgean constitution or

CHAP.
V.

Alleged effects of the Lykourgean legislation.

¹³⁹ Plut. *Agis*, 5.

¹⁴⁰ Aris. *Polit.* ii. 9, 18.

discipline was intended to apply only to Sparta on the ground that at the time when it was put forth, towns so near to Sparta as Amyklai and Geronthrai were independent,¹⁴¹ because the accounts of the conquest of these cities belong to times not more historical than those of Nestor or Achilleus. Still less can we venture to assert that it was the Lykourgean legislation which supplied to Spartan courage a stimulus as powerful as that which the Saracen received from the faith that there is no god but God and that Mahomet is the prophet of God. We cannot assume the impulse, when of the source of that impulse we know nothing; but we are fully justified in asserting (because all history warrants the assertion) that Spartans could be great only while, like the Saracen followers of the prophet, they continued to be conquerors, and that when this career was interrupted, all devices for propping up the existing system by the introduction of new citizens called Mothakes or Trophimoi were seen to be utterly worthless. How or when this career of conquest began, we cannot say. In our 'Homeric' catalogue Amyklai and Helos with some towns of which in later ages we hear nothing are regarded as worthy of being named along with Sparta herself; and it is possible or even likely that the story which makes Amyklai independent for centuries after the Herakleid invasion may point to a stubborn resistance of the ancient people to the Dorian conquerors. That the Theban Timomachos took part in the attack on this city, we can neither affirm nor deny; but the monument to Zeus Tropaios commemorating its fall, which was seen by Pausanias,¹⁴² is little better evidence for the fact than was the pickled sow at Lavinium for the wars of Æneas and Turnus.¹⁴³ Nor do we stand on firmer ground when we turn to the tradition which represents Alkamenes, a king assigned to a period preceding by more than two centuries the birth of Herodotos, as the conqueror of Helos, whose people became henceforth, as Helots, the serfs of their Dorian lords.

The empire of Sparta was extended to the western sea by the result of two wars with the Messenians, the second of

¹⁴¹ *Il.* ii. 584.¹⁴² Paus. iii. 12, 7.¹⁴³ Varro, *De R. R.* ii. 4. Lewis, *Credibility of Early R. H.* i. 334.

which ended in their utter ruin. Of these wars we have some scanty knowledge from the fragments which remain of the elegies of Tyrtaios. This poet who belonged to the Attic deme of Aphidnai was for the Spartans in the later war what Solon was to the Athenians in the struggle for Salamis. From him we learn that the two contests were separated by an interval of two generations. The fathers of our fathers, he said, conquered the Messenians; but this first conquest, he tells us, was achieved at the cost of a war which lasted for twenty years and in which the most eminent of the Spartan warriors was the king Theopompos. The second war he describes as not less obstinate and dangerous for Sparta, against which the Messenians were supported by the aid of other states in the Peloponnesos. This is practically all that we learn from Tyrtaios, and it is not much. Of Tyrtaios himself later writers related that he was a lame schoolmaster sent by the Athenians to aid the Spartans who had been commanded by the Delphian priestess to find a leader at Athens. These statements may be true or false; but similar stories accounted for the presence of the Lesbian Terpander and the Kretan Thaletas at Sparta; and they may all point to the one quarter in which the Spartan economy left a narrow opening for the culture of other Hellenic cities.

Of these wars we learn nothing from writers preceding the age of Epameinondas; and the inference seems to be that for the wealth of incident and splendour of colouring thrown over the narrative of this long struggle we are indebted not to traditions of the time but to fictions which grew up with a natural luxuriance after the restoration of Messenia and the founding of the city of Messênê. If either from Herodotos or Thucydides or Xenophon we had heard of the treasure buried by Aristomenes as a pledge of the future resurrection of his country, we might have pointed to the later story of Pausanias as a genuine sequel of an old tradition. As it is, we can but take as we find it the tale which tells us how, when the battle of Leuktra justified the hopes of Aristomenes, the Argive Epiteles was bidden in a dream to recover the old woman who was well nigh at her last gasp beneath the sods of Ithome; how his search was rewarded by the discovery of

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of the
Messenian
wars

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I.

a water jar in which was contained a plate of the finest tin; how on this plate were inscribed the mystic rites for the worship of the great gods, and how the history of the new Messênê was thus linked on with that of the old.¹⁴⁴

The first
Messenian
war.

That the first war lasted twenty years and ended in the abandonment of Ithome by the Messenians, we learn on the authority of Tyrtaios; but the causes and the course of the war are wrapped in the mists which gather round all popular traditions, if the accounts of these conflicts can be called traditions at all. We can make nothing of stories which speak of disputes at the border temple of Artemis Limnatis, arising, as the Messenians said, from the license of the Spartan youths, or, as the Spartans retorted, by the insolence and lust of the Messenians. In one of these disputes the Spartan king Teleklos, it is said, was slain; and the war broke out in the reign of Theopompos and Alkamenes on the refusal of the Messenians to surrender Polychares, who, to avenge himself of wrongs inflicted on him by the Spartan Euaiphnos, had invaded and ravaged Spartan territory. The sequel of the war exhibits a series of battles by which the Messenians are so weakened that they send to ask aid from the god at Delphoi. When the answer came that a virgin of the royal house of Aipytos must die for her country, Aristodemos slew his daughter with his own hand; but for a time the sacrifice seemed vain. Six years had passed when the Spartans advanced against Ithome, and a drawn battle took place in which the Messenian king Euphaes was slain. Aristodemos was chosen to fill his place, and in the fifth year of his reign at length won a decisive victory over his enemies. From this point the narrative is lost in a recital of oracular responses, visions, and prodigies. A headache restored the sight of the blind prophet Ophioneus, and the wonder seemed a portent of good. But the statue of Artemis dropped its brazen shield; and as Aristodemos in his panoply stood by the altar of sacrifice before going forth to battle, his slaughtered child stood before him in black raiment and pointing to her wounded side stripped him of his armour and, placing on his head a golden crown, arrayed him in a

¹⁴⁴ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 121.

white robe. Aristodemos knew that not for nothing had she thus wrapped him in the garb of the dead, and going forth to her tomb, he slew himself upon it. Why he should thus despair, it is not indeed easy to see. Pausanias who tells the story is obliged to admit that his career had been almost uniformly successful, and winds up with the statement that on his death the Messenians instead of electing a king appointed Damis dictator, that in a battle which Damis was compelled to fight owing to failure of supplies in the stronghold, he, his fellow generals, and the chief men of the Messenians were all slain, and that five months later the garrison abandoned Ithômê.¹⁴⁵ So far as we may see, there was no more reason for this than for the death of Aristodemos: but it was necessary to kill them off somehow, and we have here manifestly the lame ending of a fiction framed to glorify the Messenians by representing them as practically victorious throughout the war and ascribing the catastrophe at its close to the direct interference of the gods.

The story of this struggle was told in verse by the Kretan Rhianos and in prose by Myron of Priênê. But the latter, it is said, confined himself to the chronicle of the capture of Ampeia and of other events down to the death of Aristodemos, while Rhianos began with the revolt of the conquered Messenians and carried on his tale to the final destruction of the Messenian state.¹⁴⁶ Both, however, introduce into their narratives the hero Aristomenes; but in the pages of Myron this Messenian champion is no very extraordinary personage, whereas in the poem of Rhianos his glory is surpassed only by that of Achilleus. Myron, again, assigns the hero to the first war, Rhianos to the second; and as according to Tyrtaios¹⁴⁷ the second war was waged by the grandchildren of those who had fought in the first, it follows that either Myron or Rhianos is wrong. If Diodoros¹⁴⁸ adopts the version of the former while Pausanias upholds the authority of Rhianos, we have still but poor evidence for events which preceded by six or seven centuries the birth of the poet and the chronicler; and we may be sure that both Diodoros and

The second
Messenian
war.

¹⁴⁵ Paus. iv. 7-13.

¹⁴⁶ Ib. iv. 6, 1.

¹⁴⁸ xv. 66.

¹⁴⁷ See the fragment of Tyrtaios quoted by Pausanias, iv. 15, 1.

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Pausanias would have claimed for their narratives the sanction of Tyrtaios, if his elegies had dwelt at all on Aristomenes and his marvellous career. These elegies throw indeed a gleam of light on the interval which separates the first war from the second. It was, the poet assures us, a time of intolerable oppression for the Messenians, who were constrained to stoop like asses beneath heavy burdens, to yield to their conquerors a full half of all the produce of their land, and to appear in mourning garb at the funerals of Spartan kings. At length the Messenians resolved to strike a blow for freedom, and the war thus begun ended after nineteen years, so Tyrtaios said, in the final subjugation of the country. The story of the struggle is the glorification of Aristomenes, whose final defeat, inexplicable otherwise, is accounted for by a series of treasons from his friends and his allies. Throughout this narrative we are carried away into the world of the Argonautic or the Trojan heroes. Like Kekrops, he is the dragon's son;¹⁴⁹ and no sooner is he made dictator after the drawn battle of Derai, (king he would not be), than he achieves a series of exploits which rival those of Herakles or Samson. Entering Sparta by night, he went straight to the temple of Athana of the Brazen House, and in the morning a shield was seen nailed up on the wall with an inscription which declared it to be an offering by Aristomenes from Spartan spoil. When in the next year his enemies met him by the Boar's Grave (Kaprou Sema) in the plain of Stenyklaros, they were saved from utter destruction only because Aristomenes sitting down under a wild pear-tree was robbed of his shield by the Dioskouroi. Still so splendid was his victory that the Messenian maidens crowned him with garlands and gave utterance to their joy in songs which told how into the midst of the Stenyklarian plain and up to the summit of the hill Aristomenes chased the flying Lakedaimonians.¹⁵⁰ Open force, it was clear, could avail nothing against him, and the Spartans found it easier to work their way by corruption. Ample bribes secured the treachery of Aristokrates the Arkadian ally of the Messenians, who in the battle of the Great Trench (Megalê Taphros) played the part of Mettus

¹⁴⁹ Paus. iv. 14, 5. *Myth.-Ar. Nat.* ii. 309.¹⁵⁰ Paus. iv. 16, 4.

Fuffetius in the Roman legend.¹⁵¹ Thus defeated, Aristomenes gathered his routed forces, and taking refuge on mount Eira, as Aristodemos had maintained himself on Ithome, he held his ground for eleven years longer. But although it was necessary to show that he was defeated in the end, his greatness must not suffer eclipse in the meanwhile. Far from reaping any benefit from the victory, the Spartans saw their lands ravaged, their people worn down by famine or by seditions more fatal than famine, and learnt at length that Aristomenes had surpassed his former exploit in the Brazen House by the capture of Amyklai not three miles distant from Sparta. He had plundered the city and was retreating with the spoil when the enemy overtook him in overwhelming numbers, and made him prisoner with fifty of his fellows. With these he was thrown into the Keadas, a pit used like the Barathron at Athens for the execution of criminals. The fifty were at once killed. Aristomenes alone reached the bottom alive, borne, as some said, on the outstretched wings of an eagle.¹⁵² Rescued from this dismal cavern, like Sindbad in the Arabian tale, by following a fox which came to prey upon the dead, the hero appeared once more at Eira and offered up for the second time the Hekatomphonia or sacrifice for the slaughter of a hundred enemies. But he must again lose by the craft of his foes what he had gained by his own prowess. In a time of truce he is seized by some Kretan bowmen; but a maiden had dreamed the night before that wolves had brought into the city a chained and clawless lion and that she had given him claws and set him free. The sight of Aristomenes amongst his captors revealed the meaning of her vision, and having made the archers drunk, she placed a dagger in his hands and cut his bonds. Seizing the weapon, the hero slew his enemies; and the maiden was rewarded by becoming the wife of his son Gorgos. But the fated time was now drawing near. The Pythian priestess had warned him that the god could no longer defend Messene if the he-goat (Tragos) should drink the waters of the Neda. The Messenians thought of beasts

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V.

¹⁵¹ Liv. i. 27.

¹⁵² Paus. iv. 18, 4. The Euemerists maintained that his fall was broken by a shield bearing an outstretched eagle as its device.

and felt no fear; but a fig tree sprang up, and, instead of spreading its branches in the air, let them droop into the stream, and the seer Theoklos, as he looked upon it, knew that this was the deadly sign, for in the Messenian dialect the fig tree was called Tragos. Warned by the prophet, Aristomenes buried in Ithome the pledge of the restoration of his country and hastened away to Eira. Here again treachery accomplished what strength could not achieve. Yet so terrible was Aristomenes, as he stood at bay with his men formed in square round the women and the children, that his enemies readily suffered him to pass free with those whom he still guarded. Retreating into Arkadia, he planned another attack upon Sparta, and was again foiled by the treachery of Aristokrates, who was now stoned to death by his countrymen. But the spirit of the Messenians was broken. Many of them had been made Helots; some had taken refuge in Kyllênê, a port of the Eleians; others turned their thoughts to Sicily and besought the hero to become their leader. This he refused to be. There was still a hope that he might yet be able to do some hurt to the Spartans; and with this hope he went to take counsel at Delphi. Here he met Damagetos the king of the Rhodian Ialysos, who had been bidden to marry the daughter of the bravest of the Hellenes. Damagetos, knowing that none could challenge the right of Aristomenes to this title, besought of him his child and offered him a home in the beautiful island which rose up from the sea to be the bride of Hélios.¹⁵³ To Rhodos therefore he went, and thus became the progenitor of the illustrious family of the Diagoridai. The dull notion of synchronising the tale with the history of other countries prompted the fiction that Aristomenes was prevented by sickness from visiting the Lydian king Ardys the son of Gyges at Sardeis, and the Median Phraortes at Egbatana. A peaceful end in the happy island of the sun was the fittest close of a career in which, as in a stormy day, the blackness of darkness is from time to time broken by outbursts of dazzling light.

This narrative is not history, and as lacking even the

¹⁵³ Pind. *Olymp.* vii. 127.

characteristics of ordinary popular tradition, ought perhaps to be passed by in silence. But it is noteworthy as exhibiting the way in which the sentiment of later ages throws itself into the form of a chronicle. The story of Aristomenes belongs precisely to that class of legends in which we have been already obliged to place the account of the land laws ascribed to Lykourgos. The golden age of early Spartan society grew out of the visions and schemes of Agis and Kleomenes. The victories of Aristodemus and the exploits of the more illustrious hero of the second war embodied the feelings of the people when the Theban Epameinondas had broken the yoke which had weighed them down so long. In the elegies of Tyrtaios we may have fragments of genuine history; but taken along with the stories related by Pausanias and Diodoros after Myron and Rhianos they are like the cloth patched on to the old garment, altogether inharmonious and incongruous. It is possible, or even likely, that the Pisatans may have availed themselves of the opportunity furnished by this strife to re-assert their claims over their rivals the Eleians; and their chief Pantaleon may have been among the allies of the Messenians. But the star of Elis was in the ascendent not less than that of Sparta; and the town of Lepreon alone continued to maintain down to the Peloponnesian war a certain independence which both Pisa and Triphylia had been constrained to sacrifice.¹⁵⁴ The story of the treasons and death of Aristokrates may be true or false; but the hatred of the Arkadians for the treacherous king may perhaps rather reflect the sentiment of these mountain tribes after the restoration of Messene. In short, the whole narrative betrays the feeling of an age far later than that of Perikles, not that of an age preceding by many generations the period of the Persian wars; and the awkwardness of all attempts to harmonise these fictions with the popular traditions of earlier times is thus fully accounted for. If Epameinondas had never lived, Aristomenes even in the world of myths would have been but a mere name.

Far older than the comparatively modern romances of the Messenian wars were the legends which told the story of

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Rivalry of
Elis and
Pisa.

Spartan
aggressions
against
Arkadia.

¹⁵⁴ Thuc. v. 31.

Spartan aggressions or conquests in the direction of Arkadia and Argolis. These aggressions were directed against the southern and eastern portions of the country; for here only had the primitive village communities been blended into townships such as those of Tegea and Mantinea. Not less naturally, the time chosen for these conquests was the period immediately following the legislation of Lykourgos. If we are to believe Pausanias,¹⁵⁵ Tegea was attacked by Charilaos, the king whose rights were maintained by the incorruptible lawgiver; but the invader was taken prisoner by the Tegeatan women who had placed themselves in ambush near the scene of battle. According to Herodotos,¹⁵⁶ the unity and discipline of the Lykourgean system so materially added to the strength of Sparta that nothing less than the conquest of all Arkadia could satisfy her ambition. But when they asked Phoibos at Delphoi, how this ambition could best be gratified, the answer was that the larger scheme must be given up, although they might dance on the plain of Tegea and measure it out with ropes. If the expedition undertaken in the faith of this response was that in which Charilaos failed, we must suppose further that the Spartans carried with them fetters to be worn by the conquered Tegeatans, and learnt by bitter experience that the chains were to be worn not by their enemies but by themselves. Among the curiosities exhibited in the temple of Athana Alea in Tegea were the bonds in which those ill-fated Spartans were made to work; nor did Herodotos question the genuineness of these relics any more than Cato felt a misgiving about the memorials of Æneas preserved at Lavinium. The long series of defeats which the Spartans underwent at the hands of the Tegeatans was at length brought to an end in the reigns of Anaxandridas and Ariston. The Pythian priestess had told them that they would win the day if they could bring back to Sparta the bones of Orestes which lay on a level spot in Tegea where two winds were made to blow by main force and where stroke followed stroke and woe was laid on woe. The riddle set the wit of the Spartans to work, and at length it was solved by Lichas, one of their roving

¹⁵⁵ iii. 7, 8.¹⁵⁶ i. 66.

police who, happening to visit a blacksmith's forge, gazed in wonder as the hammer fell with mighty power on the anvil. The smith told him that he would have had better cause for wonder if he had seen the coffin, seven cubits long, and the body as gigantic as the coffin, which he had found beneath his forge. Hastening home, Lichas said that the blows of the blacksmith's hammer must represent the stroke on stroke and woe on woe of the Delphian enigma; and bidding them pass on him a sentence of banishment, he departed, like Zopyros or Sextus Tarquinius, to work the ruin of an unsuspecting enemy. Obtaining after some difficulty a lease of the forge, he dug up the gigantic bier and departed with a treasure as precious as the bones of Oidipous or the purple locks of Nisos. Henceforth the success of the Spartans was as great as their disasters had been; but what may have been the result of their victories, it is not easy to see. If Tegea was conquered, it still remained independent. In the Persian wars we shall find the Tegeatans serving as the equal allies of Sparta and claiming as their right the post of honour on the left wing which in the battle of Plataiai was for the first time yielded to the Athenians.

Not more, and perhaps not less, likely, and certainly not better attested, is the tradition which asserted that before the last Lydian king Kroisos sought alliance with the chief state of Western Hellas, Sparta had gained possession of that long strip of Argive territory which, lying between the range of mount Thornax and the sea, stretched from Thyrea to the Malian cape. The dispute about the Thyreatis was settled, it is said, by a duel in which three hundred Spartans fought with three hundred Argives on a field from which all but the combatants were rigidly shut out. The combat was as fierce and fatal as that of the Clans Chattan and Key on the Inch of Perth before Robert III. of Scotland, and at sundown the only survivors were the Spartan Othryades and the Argives Chromios and Alkenor. The latter hastened home, claiming the victory; the Spartan plundered the bodies of the dead and kept his post until on the next day the Spartan and Argive armies came to see the result. The Argives declared that by the terms of the agreement Thyrea

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must remain with them as two of their champions had returned home. The Spartans argued that the victory must be adjudged to the side which held the ground, and the controversy ended in a battle which rendered the previous duel superfluous. The countrymen of Othryades were again conquerors; but Othryades, ashamed to return to Sparta as the sole survivor of the three hundred, slew himself on the field. The combat is as much and as little historical as that of the Horatii and Curiatii; and the confidence with which in the course of the Peloponnesian war the Argives claimed the right of settling their quarrel with the Spartans by a similar duel tells as much for the truth of the story or against it as the controversy between the Tegeatans and Athenians on the eve of the battle of Plataiai tells for the legends of the Herakleidai.¹⁵⁷

Military
position of
Sparta.

However it may have been acquired, the conquest of Thyrea marked the utmost extension of Spartan territory within the limits of the Peloponnesos. Over two-fifths of the peninsula the Spartans were now supreme; and if their state had its weak side in the discontent of the Helots or the Perioikoi, it had its strength in a geographical position which made it practically secure against all attacks from foreign enemies. Built on a plain girded by a mighty rampart of mountains broken only by the two converging passes of the Eurotas and the Oinos, Sparta could afford to dispense with walls, while the lack of these defences might be adroitly urged as a reason why Athens and other extra-Peloponnesian cities should remain unwallled also. But between the circumstances of Sparta and Athens there was indeed a vast difference. The latter was exposed to attack both by land and sea: Sparta not only lay far inland, but the coast of the Peloponnesos generally is as dangerous as any part of those ironbound shores which proved so fatal to the fleet of Xerxes. But still more the power of Sparta depended, as we have

¹⁵⁷ Herod. i. 82. Thuc. v. 41. Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. Hist.* ii. 514. Niebuhr, speaking of this battle, says that 'three hundred Spartans fight against three hundred Argives for no other reason than that both nations, being Dorians, are divided into three Phylai and are subdivided according to the decimal system into curiæ and gentes. Othryades . . . is as little historical as Horatius the conqueror of Alba. I will not on that account deny his personal existence, but the account of him lies beyond the domain of history.' *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* i. 269.

seen, on the steadiness with which her citizens behaved as an army of occupation in a conquered territory; and the un-walled Komai, villages, or Demoi, which composed the city, were the best guarantee for the maintenance of a drill and discipline altogether beyond that of any other Hellenic state.¹⁵⁸ Bringing obedience to perfection, this system at the same time so exercised the sagacity of the individual citizen and called into action his power of judgment that no disaster in the field could prevent the Spartan companies from returning at once, if broken, to their fighting order. The Athenian fought among the men of his tribe, an unwieldy mass imperfectly under the control of the Taxiarchos; the Spartan system, caring nothing for social or political distinctions, distributed the citizens into small companies in which every man knew his place and his duty. Thus even if

¹⁵⁸ The four komai composing the Polis of Sparta were Pitana, Limnai, Mesôa, and Kynosoura. Each of these komai furnished that portion of the Spartan army which was called a Lochos; but the existence of a Lochos bearing the name of Pitana, which Herodotos, ix. 53, mentions in his story of the battle of Plataiai, is denied by Thucydides, i. 20, 4. This denial Dr. Arnold, *ad loc.*, regards as 'in other words a denial of the demus of Pitane ever having been of sufficient importance to allow its inhabitants to form a constituent part of the national army; the military divisions in the old system of the Greeks, as well as of the Romans, corresponding entirely with the civil ones.' This last statement is denied by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. 8, who speaks of the establishment of military divisions quite distinct from the civil divisions as 'a grand peculiarity, observable from the beginning, in the Lykourgean institutions.' If we suppose that this fact was known to Thucydides, then his words would mean that no Lochos was named either from Pitana or from any other Demos. Bishop Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* i. 445, suggests that as the six Morai, or larger divisions of the army, had reference to the six districts into which Lakonia was divided, and as each Mora was subdivided into four Lochoi, the four Lochoi for the district of Sparta may have been distributed on the same principle among the four Demoi or boroughs already named. These differences of opinion sufficiently show the intricacy of a subject for which our sources of information are very scanty.

But whatever may have been the basis of the division, the Spartan army was certainly divided into six Morai, and each of these into four Lochoi. Each Lochos in its turn was subdivided into two Pentekostyes, each Pentekostys finally being composed of two Enomotiai, companies of men bound together by a solemn oath. If each Pentekostys contained fifty men, as the name implies, the Enomotia must have had half that number; and the whole Spartan army on this numeration would not exceed 2,400 heavy armed troops out of a body of citizens, whose numbers, Herodotos, vii. 234, mentions as being in his own time 8,000. But this numeration was not adhered to, the number of the Enomotia being given differently at twenty-five, thirty-two, or thirty-six. Hence the numbers in the Lochos and the Mora were also variable. These are the divisions as given by Xenophon; but at the battle of Mantinea there were, according to Thucydides, v. 68, seven Lochoi, each Lochos containing four Pentekostyes, and each Pentekostys four Enomotiai, thus giving a total of 4,032 heavy armed troops. The Pentekostys had thus retained its original signification as little as the Latin *centuria*.

It must be remembered that these were divisions not for times of war only, but for the permanent classification of Spartan citizens during their whole life. Herodotos, i. 65, speaks of Enomotiai, Triakades, and Syssitia as the Lykourgean military divisions. Of the Syssitia we have already spoken: the Triakades are not mentioned elsewhere, and Mr. Grote admits candidly that we cannot distinctly make out what they were. It is possible that each Enomotia, or each Pentekostys, may have constituted one of the Public Messes; but it is more important to notice that the lowest subdivision was employed as the great instrument for carrying on the Spartan military system.

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Achaia.

their ranks were broken by overwhelming numbers, there could be no confusion, and therefore no panic; and thus the Spartan armies gained a reputation for steadiness and pertinacity of resistance which left no room for rivalry.

With these conditions there is nothing to surprise us, if, as we approach the age of genuine history, we find Sparta not merely supreme in the Peloponnesos but tacitly or openly recognised as the head of the ill-cemented communities which claimed the Hellenic name. Her superiority was marked, and was so far to the benefit of the Greek tribes generally as it supplied a bond of union to societies which would never have submitted themselves the one to the other. The true narrative of the events which brought about this result may be lost irretrievably; but the result itself stands out as the most important fact in the early history of the Greeks. Whatever may have been the old Argive dominion in the days of Agamemnon, the city of Argos in the Persian war was unable to enforce for its king the claim of a co-ordinate authority with the two Spartan sovereigns:¹⁵⁹ nor can her power have been straitened only in the south, if it be true that at Plataiai contingents from Tiryns and Mykenai took part in a struggle in which Argos held herself ostentatiously neutral.¹⁶⁰ But if it be hard to trace the decay of a city whose name had been once coextensive with the whole peninsula, we have even less knowledge of the changes which may have passed over the narrow strip of land lying to the north of the Arkadian mountains. Herodotos speaks of a dodekapolis of the Achaians who, as he says, drove out the Ionian possessors of the land; but apart from the vagueness which marks his ethnology, his enumeration of these cities does not agree with that of Polybios or Pausanias:¹⁶¹ and the inconsistency justifies a suspicion that these political and social classifications may have been not unfrequently made and carried out in defiance of facts which betrayed their arbitrary origin.

¹⁵⁹ Herod. vii. 148-9.¹⁶⁰ Ib. ix. 28.¹⁶¹ Ib. i. 145. Polyb. ii. 41, 8. Paus. vii. 6, 1.

CHAPTER VI.

THE GREEK DESPOTS.

ALTHOUGH the foundations of Aryan society were laid, as we have seen, in an intense selfishness which regarded all persons not actual members of the family as beyond the pale of law, yet from the first it was possible that two or more of the heads of such families might enter into a league either for mutual protection or to advance their own interests,—a task which in these primitive ages would mean simply interference with and opposition to the interests of others. These heads of families thus combined would naturally, in the absence of counteracting causes, form a close and exclusive order,—in other words, an oligarchy, exacting from all who lay within the range of their dominion the same absolute and unquestioning obedience which each claimed from the members of his own house. But these confederated masters would also be sole owners of the land on which their families lived; and as soon as all the houses within a given district were combined in this league, the name of Landholder, Gamoros or Geomoros, would become a general designation for the ruling class, as contrasted with the main body of people whom they may have been able to subjugate. Thus the members of the dominant houses would be called Gamoroi and Eupatridai indifferently. But the growth of population would by increasing the number of younger sons and their families multiply the number of so-called Gamoroi who would not be owners of land, but who by virtue of their common descent from the same sacred stock would belong to the great patrician order. Thus far the natural tendency of Hellenic as of other Aryan society would be towards oligarchy. The chiefs of the houses thus formed into clans, having been originally independent of each other, would be theoretically

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at least on an equality. Each would of necessity have his seat and his vote in the council, and his voice would carry equal weight with that of the wealthiest and most powerful of his fellows. But if equal among themselves, in relation to their subjects they would be a college of kings, owing no duties except to the members of their own houses, acknowledging no responsibility even to them, and extending the benefits of law to their dependents, so far as they extended them at all, as a matter not of right but of favour which might at any moment be withdrawn.

Theory of
the divine
right of
kings.

This oligarchical tendency, with all its closeness and oppressiveness, was in reality a tendency to that which we call a free or constitutional government. It was this which prevented in Hellas as well as amongst the Latin and Teutonic tribes the growth of that servile spirit on which Asiatic despots securely raised the fabric of a permanent tyranny. In Europe as well as in Asia any head of a tribe or clan, who found himself possessed of the power, would be as naturally tempted to make himself master of his fellow chiefs, as with these he had formed a confederacy for the purpose of crushing all others. Such a chief would claim from his former colleagues the submission which they exacted from their own subjects. He would, in short, be the irresponsible holder of an authority founded on divine right, not on the joint will of the people, and, as such, he would claim the further right of transmitting his power to his heir, even if that heir should not be possessed of the physical force needed to maintain his sovereignty. Thus in the East, where slavery seems indigenous, would grow up the servile awe of kings who, as representatives of the deity, showed themselves only on rare occasions in all the splendid paraphernalia of barbaric royalty, and otherwise remained, in the solemn seclusion of the seraglio, objects of mysterious veneration and dread. No such Basileis or kings as these ever established themselves beyond the bounds of Asia and Africa; and although many, perhaps most, of the Hellenic states came to be ruled by hereditary sovereigns, the distinction between the Basileus and the despot or tyrant was at the best or the worst of times very faintly drawn. It is true that for the former, as such, the

Greek professed no special aversion, while the latter,—the man who had subverted a free government,—was a wild beast to be hunted down or destroyed by whatever weapons in whatever way;¹⁶² but practically the Greek regarded a Basileus, apart from the checks imposed upon him at Sparta or Argos, as a growth which could not well be produced on Hellenic soil, nor could he easily be brought to look on Hellenic kings with the respect which he willingly paid to the sovereigns of Sousa, Nineveh, or Babylon.

We are justified, therefore, in regarding Hellenic kingship as a comparatively late developement which carried with it the signs of its speedy decay. If the description in the *Iliad* may be accepted as a faithful picture of early Hellenic society, the Basileus is one who holds his power in direct trust from Zeus, and who, if he takes counsel with his chiefs, is still free to reject their advice. But, whatever might be its seeming insignificance, the gathering of subordinate chiefs was the germ of those democratic assemblies in which Athenian citizens learnt to respect themselves and to obey the law. There was therefore always a principle at work which must slowly or quickly sap the popularity of the kings and weaken the feeling of reverence towards them. So long as the king was really the best man of the state, a brave and wise leader, a sober and impartial judge, impatient of wrong doing in others and holding his own passions well under curb, he might not only maintain his position but win for himself the enthusiastic love of his people. But the very causes which insured his own popularity involved a fatal peril for such as might fall much below his standard. The king might become more arrogant and licentious in proportion as he became more incompetent as a general and a statesman; but the chiefs whom he might seek to oppress would not forget that their prince was but one of themselves, that their own power had once been not a jot less than his, and the limits of their forbearance might be soon reached. When therefore an Hellenic dynasty was set aside and an oligarchy set up in its place, this was strictly nothing more than a return to the earlier form of government. The great

Decay of
the kingly
power in
Hellas.

¹⁶² Arnold, *Hist. Rome*, i. 476.

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chiefs resumed the full rights, of which they had conceded, or been compelled to yield, some portion to the king. For this reason also the change from monarchy to oligarchy seems to have been effected generally without any great convulsion and even without much disturbance. The power of the chiefs was growing while the regal dignity and authority were waning; and thus at Corinth, for instance, the inglorious Bacchiad kings are thrust aside, like the Merovingian sovereigns of Paris, without an effort on their part to avert a downfall which they felt to be inevitable. This quiet displacement of the ancient dynasties is set forth in the popular traditions under different forms; and where, as at Athens, the kings were guiltless of much active wrong, the story ran that the last sovereign had devoted himself like the Decii of Rome for the good of his country, and therefore had made the office too sacred to be borne by any mortal man. So amicably might the arrangement be made that the heir of the last king, if the tradition can be trusted, might be elected for life as the chief magistrate or archon of his city. The change might appear slight; it was in reality immense. The man who would have been king was now a magistrate and nothing more, elected by those of his own order and responsible to them for the exercise of his power; in other words, the line was now drawn, never again to be permanently obliterated, between executive government and legislation. The latter function was now the inalienable right of the great body of the Eupatrids; and it was for the latter to see that the man whom they had chosen as their president did not betray his trust.

Subversion
of the
Greek oli-
garchies by
tyrants.

It might be supposed that the Greek cities which were thus governed by oligarchies were now on the high road to constitutional order and freedom; but many an English citizen who would rise against the tyranny of men above him with the energy of Hampden and who would even spend his life in pulling down the shattered fabric of feudalism, may yet show to his inferiors not a little of feudal imperiousness. In these such conduct is, of course, grossly and unreasonably inconsistent; to the ancient oligarch the charge of such inconsistency would have seemed simply ludicrous. It was

true that there lay a large multitude beyond the sacred circle of his order, a multitude constantly increasing from many causes which kept his own class stationary or even lessened its numbers; but then it was a sacred circle and beyond its limits he recognised no duties. Between him and these men whom his forefathers had reduced to subjection or to slavery there was no bond of blood, and therefore there could be no community of religion. They could not therefore share his worship; and as without worship no single function of government could be carried on, their admission to political power would be utter profanation. In this unfranchised crowd lay the sunken rocks on which oligarchies must sooner or later make shipwreck, for, happily for the advancement of mankind, these close and exclusive bodies are pre-eminently liable to the plagues of jealousy and dissension, and divergence of interest is sure to create an opposing minority which, if it cannot gain its own ends, may yet clog the movements of others. Of the general effect of oligarchical rule on the subject population we shall be better able to judge when we reach the early history of Athens. It may be enough to say here that whether under the kings or under the oligarchs the subject classes were alike shut out from the benefits of an equal and impartially administered law. The change from kingship to oligarchy had been in theory no change for them; and the later state of things differed from the former only in this, that even in the ruling class there were persons whose discontent and disaffection might break out at any time in revolution and who to achieve their own selfish purpose might court the favour of the people and enlist their aid by promising them justice. This was, in fact, the most potent, and perhaps the most frequently employed, of the modes by which some ambitious or discontented member of the ruling class succeeded in making himself absolute. In some instances the lineal heir of the old kings might succeed in winning back the forfeited dignity; or the Eupatrid who, as Aisymnêtês or with any other title, had been invested with unusual powers, might refuse to return to his private station and even hand on his usurped power to his son. There might also be instances (possibly that of the

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Athenian Kylon is one) in which a man from sheer lust of power might risk his wealth and his life in the attempt to make himself despot. But more commonly the man who aimed at supreme power came forward in the character of the Demagogue, and declaiming against the wanton insolence and cruelty of his fellow Eupatrids, perhaps exhibiting in his own person the real or pretended evidences of their brutality, induced them to take up arms in his behalf and to surround him with a bodyguard. The next step was to gain a commanding military position; and then if, like Peisistratos in the Athenian Akropolis, he could gather round him a band of foreign mercenaries, his task was at once practically accomplished.

Ancient
and modern
notions of
monarchical
government.

That a people could thus be fooled more than once into placing on their own necks a yoke worse than that of the many masters who had thus far oppressed them, might seem perplexing and even scarcely credible, were it not that all history attests the slowness with which political wisdom is acquired. The violent changes thus effected were of the nature of experiments: and the history of the French nation for three generations has exhibited a series of such experiments of which we have not yet seen the end. The devices by which the elder Bonaparte made himself tyrant have been repeated successfully by his nephew; and the disaster of Sedan has by no means extinguished the hopes of those who still hanker for the pleasures and the profits of imperialism. But though they might be easily cheated and misled, the Greeks of the age of Peisistratos were for the most part made of different stuff from the Frenchmen of our own day. Both among the oligarchs and among the unfranchised people were some in whom the sense of law and of duty as arising from law seemed almost intuitive, men who were animated by the conviction that law is an eternal power, being the expression of divine righteousness.¹⁶³ In the eyes of such men any attempts to subvert law and in its place to introduce the caprice of an irresponsible despot was a crime of the very deepest dye; and the man who thus enslaved men who were rightfully his equals put himself beyond the pale of justice and might be hunted down like a noxious beast. Such a conviction must be re-

¹⁶³ Soph. *Oid. Tyr.* 863-871.

pressed by stern and prompt persecution, or it will spread like a slow fire ready to burst out at any vent: but so long as this feeling existed, it was impossible for the tyrant to rule with impartial justice, even if he might desire to do so.¹⁶⁴ He dared not dispense with his body-guard, for he knew that to the great body of his subjects he was an outlaw and a public enemy. He might gather round himself men great in science or in art; but he dared not to appear in person at the great games in which his own chariots might win the prize. Living thus in constant fear of unknown dangers and unseen enemies, he was tempted to trust more and more to terrorism and to seek his own safety by cutting off the tallest among the ears of corn.¹⁶⁵ By slaying or banishing dangerous or suspected citizens and by confiscating their property, he might maintain himself in power during his own lifetime; but the chances were always against the establishment of any permanent dynasty, and when at length the tyrants were put down, the feelings of hatred long pent up burst forth with a vehemence which showed plainly the bent of the popular mind. The despots had really done good service. They had made the idea of irresponsible power inexpressibly odious, and they had made the name of the monarch or tyrant the most hateful and contemptible of titles. For them the rule of one man was henceforth associated with the ideas of lawlessness and violence, and with nothing else. It was vain to appeal to their sense of the beautiful and the magnificent, and to point to the splendour of princes who had adorned their cities with the choicest works of the painter and the sculptor. They knew that under the equal rule of the sovereign people art would speak a nobler language, and rise to heights which slaves and courtiers could never reach. But when they expressed for the despot the loathing which is felt for a deadly snake, they were not thinking of the modern monarch who, irresponsible in theory, is in practice restrained by a multitude of checks which leave him simply the office of chief magistrate of a free people. If they were unconscious of the advantages

¹⁶⁴ The working of this feeling is strikingly exhibited in the traditional story of the Samian Maiandrios, Herod. iii. 142.

¹⁶⁵ This is the counsel ascribed to the Milesian Thrasybulos, Herod. v. 92, 6, and to Tarquin the Proud, Livy. i. 54. Arist. *Polit.* iii. 13, 16; v. 10, 13.

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which according to our notions are derived from a constitutional monarchy, they may at least be forgiven. The conditions of Hellenic society rendered any other result impossible. The benefits which we prize so highly belong strictly to a highly intricate and complicated organisation. When from our own land we turn to the great American commonwealth, we may feel keenly the advantage of the system in which the executive government goes on undisturbed while the real rulers are changed at the will of the people, and we may regard with complacent pity the agitation and confusion, the place-hunting of mercenary politicians and the open avowal of selfish and interested motives, which attend the election of a king for four years, with a possibility of re-election for four years more. But Americans and Englishmen are alike members of vast nations which can rule and legislate for themselves only through their elected representatives. The narrow limits of Greek states involved no need of representative assemblies, and therefore left no room for the idea of a king who should be simply the mouthpiece of the national will. Directed thus against monarchs who owned no law but their own lust, the Greek hatred of tyrants was a righteous feeling akin to the pride which we have in the thought that the slave becomes free when he sets foot on English soil; and if we condemn (and rightly condemn) the morality which eulogised the assassins of such despots, we have to remember that the men thus slain were for the most part habitual transgressors and contemners of all law.

The power
of the kings
in Sparta.

We may thus ascribe to the tyrants the greatest impulse given to Greek democracy. If the despotism of Peisistratos had not followed the legislation of Solon and made the Athenians realise the full extent of their loss, the reforms which were carried in the days of Kleisthenes might not have been accomplished before the time of Perikles, and a different turn might have been given to the history of the Persian invasion. As it was, a state of feeling was produced eminently unfavourable to the schemes of the Persian monarch. The mind of the people was constantly becoming more and more awake to the need of legal safeguards for all their rights, and more and more averse to that stolid servility

which, seeking no further remedy for unbearable oppression, is well satisfied when Tibni dies and Omri reigns. Sparta with its two hereditary kings, the *ex officio* commanders of her armies, might seem to be an exception. The theory of kings ruling by divine right was there acknowledged down to the days of Agis and Kleomenes: but it was acknowledged, even in words, only because they had never been suffered to make themselves despots and because the jealousies and contentions of the kings presented an effectual hindrance to common action for the purpose of setting up a tyranny. Still the Spartans were not satisfied with these negative checks. There was fair ground for thinking that the council of twenty-eight old men holding office for life might be rather an instrument in the hands of the kings than an independent assembly; and this danger was averted by the appointment of a board of annually renewed commissioners.¹⁶⁶ When the kings had been made directly responsible to the Ephors both in peace and in war, the Spartans might well feel that there was no need to interfere with the style and dignity of chiefs who, as lineal descendents of the mighty Herakles, were pre-eminently fitted to be the generals of a state depending for its safety on the perfection of its military discipline,—a discipline which pressed alike on the wealthy and the poor, and thus tended to keep up a feeling not wholly unlike the democratic sentiment of Athens.

The history of the Peisistratidai at Athens, in spite of some perplexing passages in the narrative, sufficiently illustrates the means by which tyrannies were established and put down; and when we find stories more or less resembling the Athenian traditions told of other Greek cities at the same or in earlier times, we may fairly infer that throughout Hellas generally the change was going on which by the substitution of oligarchical for kingly rule, followed by the usurpation of despots who made the sway of one man still more hateful, fostered the growth of the democratic spirit, until it became strong enough to sweep away every obstacle to its free development. But when we examine the tales which profess to relate the deeds of these tyrants and to determine their

History of
the Greek
despots.—
Kleisthene
of Sikyon.

¹⁶⁶ See p. 76.

characters, we find ourselves in that misty twilight which marks the province of oral tradition, and especially of oral tradition warped and coloured by strong political passions and prejudices. That the narratives have some foundation in fact, there is no reason to doubt; but the precise amount of history which they may contain it is impossible to determine. From the stories related of the Orthagorid Kleisthenes of Sikyon we may be tempted to infer the existence of a bitter feud between that city and Argos; but how far the acts ascribed to the tyrant are his own and how far they may be reflexions of popular antipathies among his Dorian and non-Dorian subjects, we have no means of ascertaining. As in Argos and in all Dorian towns, so in Sikyon we encounter the three Dorian tribes Hyllaeis, Dymanes, and Pamphyloi, — a fact which, if it be accepted, may imply that Sikyon had once been confederated with or subject to Argos, and that an attempt of the Argives to re-establish their old supremacy may have roused the vehement opposition of Kleisthenes, who is represented as being himself non-Dorian. If there was such a quarrel, we can understand how Kleisthenes or his clansmen chose to call themselves Princes, Archelaoi, while they reviled the Dorian tribes as asses, swine, and pigs.¹⁶⁷ But Kleisthenes, it is said, was the last of his dynasty; and if we accept the statement of Herodotus that these nick-names were applied to the Dorians not only during his reign but for sixty years after his death, we must further assume that the despotism of Kleisthenes was followed by the rule of an oligarchy strong enough to keep up the use of these names. If this tale be true, it is clear at least that his dynasty was not brought to an end through Spartan influence, for the Spartans would at once have abolished this stigma on their Dorian kinsfolk, and it is absurd to suppose that the latter ever applied these epithets to themselves. If, again, we believe that at the end of the sixty years the Dorian and non-Dorian tribes made up the feud, the former reverting to the old tribal names of Sikyon and Argos, while the latter accepted the name Aigialeis from Aigialeus¹⁶⁸ the

¹⁶⁷ Oneatai, Hyatai, Choireatai, Herod. v. 68.

¹⁶⁸ Aigialeus is a mere eponym, and the name is really geographical. The people of

son of the hero Adrastos, we must infer further that this agreement was the result of a change which substituted the rule of the people for that of the oligarchs. These are large assumptions or inferences from loose and uncertain data.¹⁶⁹ Nor can we venture to say how far the antagonism of these tribes may have given colour to the singular story which ascribes to Kleisthenes the expulsion of Adrastos from Sikyon. This hero of the Theban wars who is regarded as personally present in Sikyon is represented as exciting the violent hatred of the tyrant who sees in him the tutelary genius of Dorism. Everything must be done to get rid of him; but Kleisthenes seeks in vain to get his plan of direct banishment sanctioned by the Pythian priestess. Her answer is that Adrastos is king of Sikyon while Kleisthenes is a murderer; and the despot, sending to Thebes, invites the hero Melanippos, the inveterate enemy of Adrastos, to come and take up his abode in Sikyon. The invitation is accepted, and when the festivals hitherto kept in honour of Adrastos had been transferred to Melanippos, it is concluded that the former has deserted a place which could no longer have any attractions for him.¹⁷⁰ Of Kleisthenes we are further told that he took part in the sacred war against Kirrha, that he gave his daughter in marriage to the Alkmaionid Megakles, and that thus the name of the Sikyonian despot became connected with the reforms carried out at Athens by his grandson Kleisthenes the son of Megakles and Agaristê. But the strange story¹⁷¹ which tells us how this marriage was brought about, belongs apparently to the class of legends framed to explain proverbial sayings and only adds to the darkness which has gathered round the last of the Orthagoridai.¹⁷² If there be any truth in the statement

a maritime city like Sikyon are necessarily Aigialeis, dwellers on the shore where the waves break, as they break at Aigai, Aigion, Aigina, Akte, and elsewhere.

¹⁶⁹ Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 538.

¹⁷⁰ Herod. v. 67.

¹⁷¹ *Ib.* vi. 126, *et seq.*

¹⁷² Dr. Curtius, *Hist. Gr.* i. 268 tr., discerns in the gathering of the suitors an anti-Dorian confederation, by which the continued existence of the Sikyonian dynasty was incidentally to be secured. The possibility of such a confederation cannot be denied, but we are not justified in speaking of it as a reality.

The dynasty of Orthagoras is said by Aristotle to have lasted for 100 years, the traditional chronology assigning to the reigns of the three despots Orthagoras, Myron, and Kleisthenes the century from 670 to 570 B.C. This chronology is, as we might expect, full of difficulties. See Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 51.

of Herodotos ¹⁷³ that the Athenian Kleisthenes borrowed the idea of his reforms from his grandfather, then the alleged changing of the Dorian tribal names may point to far more important measures; and why the Orthagorid dynasty which had been distinguished by the moderation and strict equity of its rule ¹⁷⁴ should come to an end with a prince who with political virtues equal to those of his predecessors achieved a greater renown in war, it would be hard indeed to say. The accounts given of Kleisthenes serve but to convince us of the fact that lost history cannot be recovered.

The Bacchiad oligarchs at Corinth

The same lesson is brought home to us still more forcibly by the contradictory legends of the despots of Corinth. According to Herodotos the Bacchiad oligarchs of that city had been warned by the Delphian priestess to be on their guard against the lion which should be born of an eagle among the rocks (Petrai); and when Eetion one of the Lapithai and a descendant of Kaineus sent to Delphoi to learn the fortunes of the child of his wife Labda the lame daughter of the Bacchiad Amphion, the answer that he would be the bane of the Corinthian oligarchs determined the latter to slay the babe as soon as it should be born. Ten of them accordingly went to the house of Eetion in the demos of Petrai (the rocks among which the lion should be born), and there received the child from the unsuspecting Labda. But the man who took him from his mother's hands, unnerved by a smile of the babe, handed him on to the next man, and this man to the third until, when all had in turn taken him, the tenth restored him to Labda who, pausing to listen at the door, heard them chiding each other for their faint-heartedness until they agreed to enter the house together and slay the child. But before they went in, the mother had had time to place him in a chest; and the murderers thus foiled went back and informed the Bacchiads that they had done the work for which they had been sent. The child grew up, and as having been saved from his pursuers in the coffer was called Kypselos. Having reached manhood, he became tyrant of Corinth and verified the predictions of the Delphian priestess. Many of the Corinthians, we are told, he drove into exile, many more

¹⁷³ v. 67.

¹⁷⁴ Arist. *Polit.* v. 12, 1.

he deprived of all their goods, and a larger number still he put to death.¹⁷⁵ The story refutes itself. That ten of the Bacchiad chiefs should be faithless to their own body, is simply incredible; nor can it be supposed that they could have the least scruple or difficulty in compassing the death of the child at some later and more convenient season. But the tradition is only one of the thousand forms in which the tale of the Babes in the Wood has come down to us; and the Bacchiads represent the uncle who plots the death of the infants and is in due course punished for his iniquity. The chest of Kypselos reappears in the myths of Perseus, Oidipous, and Dionysos, while the murderers who charge themselves with a crime which they have not committed are seen in the stories not only of Oidipous and Kypselos but of Cyrus, Romulus, and many another hero of Aryan and Saracenic fiction.¹⁷⁶

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Writing at least two centuries later, Aristotle¹⁷⁷ places Kypselos in the ranks of those tyrants who rose to power by courting the favour of the people, and ascribes to him so firm a hold on their affections that he never needed or used the protection of a body guard. The two traditions, if they be such, exclude each other; and as we have no reason for preferring the account of Aristotle to that of Herodotos, we are compelled either to reject them both, or to suspend our judgment about them. But strange as may be the inconsistencies of these Kypselid legends, the stories told of his son Periandros are far more astonishing. Like Aristodemos of the Italian Cumæ, he is a model tyrant,¹⁷⁸ chastising with scorpions where his father had scourged with whips; and a portion at least of the story of Oidipous and Iokastê was by some mythographers imported into the tradition to account for that excess of cruelty which Herodotos traced to the influence of Thrasyboulos tyrant of Miletos. This despot, he tells us,¹⁷⁹ on receiving from Periandros a request for counsel in the general management of his affairs, gave no verbal answer to his messenger, but going into a cornfield cut

Kypselos
and Periandros.

¹⁷⁵ Herod. v. 92.

¹⁷⁶ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 162; ii. 72.

¹⁷⁷ *Polit.* v. 12, 4.

¹⁷⁸ Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 521.

¹⁷⁹ Herod. v. 92-6.

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off and threw away the tallest and richest of the ears of corn. Like Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii, Periandros knew that he should deal with the first men of his city as his friend had dealt with the ears of corn, and the mildness of his previous rule was followed by a savage and merciless oppression. Whatever the father had spared, now fell by the hand of his bloodthirsty son who in one day stripped of their raiment all the women of Corinth, whether free or enslaved, and burnt the dresses that their ghosts might clothe the shivering phantom of his beautiful wife Melissa the daughter of Prokles tyrant of Epidauros.¹⁸⁰ Melissa had been murdered by her husband; and on hearing of the crime Prokles sent for her two sons, and having kept them for some time, bade them at parting remember who it was that had slain their mother. On the elder son the words made no impression: in the younger they awakened a feeling of ineradicable hatred for his father, whom he treated with silent contempt. The patience of Periandros was at last exhausted, and the young man was driven from his home, a heavy penalty to be paid to Apollon being denounced on all who might speak to him or give him food or shelter. Undismayed, Lykophron lived as best he might in the porticoes, where his father came to see him when he was half starved. Contrasting his present misery with the luxury which he had forfeited, Periandros prayed him to return home. The only answer of the young man was that his father was debtor to Apollon for the penalty denounced on any who might speak to him. Wearied out with his obstinacy, the tyrant sent his son to Korkyra, and then marching to Epidauros made Prokles a prisoner. But still yearning for his younger son, he sent his sister who in a speech garnished with a profusion of proverbs worthy of Sancho Panza besought him to return to Corinth. The answer was that he would never look on its walls so long as his father was there; and Periandros in his despair proposed that he should go to Korkyra while his son took his place as despot at Corinth. So great, however, was the dread or the hatred of Periandros that on hearing of the proposed arrange-

¹⁸⁰ See note 23.

ment the Korkyraians at once put Lykophron to death, and Periandros in requital seized three hundred of their noblest youths and sent them away to undergo the worst indignities of Oriental slavery.¹⁸¹ It is pleasant to be told that the youths were saved from the degraded and wretched lot which he had designed for them ; but we must feel as if walking on quicksands when we learn that this outrage was committed in the same year in which the Samians stole a large mixing bowl sent from Sparta to Lydia, and a linen tunic which Amasis king of Egypt was sending to Sparta ; that this theft was committed just when Kroisos was besieged in Sardeis ; but that nevertheless the three hundred Korkyraian youths were sent to Asia in the time of Alyattes the father of Kroisos.¹⁸² But, further, we have other versions of the story of Melissa and the burnt garments, first in the tale that Periandros at a feast stripped the women of their golden ornaments because he had made a vow to dedicate a statue of gold at Olympia if he won the chariot race, and secondly in the statement that he obtained the gold by exacting for ten years a property tax of ten per cent. In short, from first to last, Periandros lives in a world of marvels and wonders ; and the story of Arion¹⁸³ carried from the Italian seas to Tainaron is a worthy pendant of the legends of Lykophron and Melissa. Whether these stories were or were not known to Aristotle, we cannot say ; but in a few words he ascribes to him¹⁸⁴ a reign of 44 years, and if he speaks of his rule as tyrannical, he praises him as a successful general. We need only to note further that this rigid ruler or bloodthirsty murderer is in other legends ranked among the seven wise men of Hellas and that from this point of view he is represented as compelling his subjects to support themselves by honest industry and to make a report of their means of livelihood. The dilemma is clearly not to be solved like the quarrel of the two knights about the shield with the brazen and silver sides. Lastly, as with the Sikyorian Kleisthenes, the Kypselid dynasty comes abruptly to an end almost immediately after the death of Periandros.

¹⁸¹ Herod. iii. 50-53.¹⁸² Ib. iii. 48 ; cf. i. 70. Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 535-537.¹⁸³ Ib. i. 94. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 26, 245.¹⁸⁴ Arist. *Polit.* v. 12, 4.

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He is said to have been succeeded for three years by Psammetichos, son of Gordios,¹⁸⁵ whose name indicates some connexion with Egypt. Plutarch adds that Psammetichos was put down by the Spartans; but this story was probably unknown to Herodotos who takes no notice of it.

Theagenes
of Megara.

We can scarcely be said to know more of the Megarian despot Theagenes. Like Kypselos, he is represented as acting the part of a demagogue, and thus obtaining from the people a body guard which he employed after the fashion of Peisistratos at Athens. Less fortunate than Peisistratos, he was expelled, never to be restored; and his expulsion was followed by disturbances in which the people passed a measure injoining the refunding of all interest paid on debts already discharged by borrowers.¹⁸⁶ But although Theagenes had traded on his popularity, he seems to have done little for the tillers of the ground, if we may form a judgement from the verses of Theognis who was himself a sufferer in these revolutions. The picture which he draws of their condition is as gloomy as the description which Tyrtaios gives¹⁸⁷ of the Messenian labourers under Spartan dominion. But it furnishes apparently no evidence that a re-division of land was included in the measures whether of Theagenes or of those who put him down. At best the traditions are uncertain and obscure; but Megara, as the mother-city of colonies so important as Byzantion in the east and Thapsos in the west, stands forth as a state fully able to hold its ground against Athens which only after a desperate struggle succeeded in wresting the island of Salamis from her dominion. The result of this struggle may well have been prefigured by the shearing of the purple locks of Nisos.¹⁸⁸ Henceforth, as with Argos, her greatness belonged to the past; and it is possible that the prosperity of these cities may have been promoted by the friendship or alliance of the despots who governed them.¹⁸⁹ But while the general course of developement from oligarchy to despotism, and from despotism through oligarchy to democratic rule is perfectly clear, it is strange that the

¹⁸⁵ Arist. *Polit.* v. 12, 4.

¹⁸⁶ Plut., *Quæst. Gr.* 18, p. 295. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 60.

¹⁸⁷ See p. 88.

¹⁸⁸ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 262.

¹⁸⁹ Herod. vi. 128.

history of individual despots should have come down to us in forms so fragmentary and distorted with a colouring so unreal and deceptive. That the government of these despots and oligarchs secured to their cities for the time a large amount of wealth and power, although it may have hastened their decay or their downfall, there is no reason to doubt; and with this conclusion we must be content.

CHAPTER^s VII.

THE INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION OF THE GREEKS.

BOOK
I.

The great-
ness of the
Ionic race,
and the
settlement
of Eubœia.

In the historical ages Athens stands pre-eminent above all the states or cities whose people belonged to the Ionic stock. But before we reach these ages the glory of the Ionic name had in great part passed away. The time had been when all the Ionian tribes regarded as an honourable title the name by which the Greeks generally were known to the barbarian world of the East. But the sons of Javan on the western coasts of Asia Minor and in many of the islands of the Egean sea had fallen under the power of local despots or of the Lydian kings, and with these had been brought under the harsher yoke of the Persian monarch; and if constant oppression had not, as some said, destroyed the spirit and bravery of the Asiatic Ionians, it had so far weakened their judgement and their powers of combination and action that the Western Ionians, and more especially the Athenians, no longer cared to be distinguished by the name.¹⁹⁰ The Athenians, indeed, still delighted in being known as the men of the violet crown:¹⁹¹ but they had probably forgotten that in ages not very far removed from their own they were not the foremost or the greatest of the Ionian race. In this respect the history of Athens bears no distant likeness to that of Rome, the insignificant Latin town which was destined to extend its empire first over Italy and then over the world. But in the times of the despots and the oligarchs the power of Athens was eclipsed by that of many cities which in the days of her own greatness had almost vanished from the political stage. On the western side Megara was sovereign, holding not merely the border passes of Attica

¹⁹⁰ Herod. i. 143.¹⁹¹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 228. Arist. *Acharn.* 606.

and the Corinthian isthmus but the much-coveted island of Salamis. On the East the great cities of Euboia far surpassed her in material resources and military strength. Not ten miles apart from each other, at either end of the Euripos, stood the town of Chalkis to the north and of Eretria to the southwest. Between these two cities lay the plain of Lelanton, the only piece of arable land of any great extent in this beautiful island, along which the ridge of Othrys is carried as a backbone, facing the whole coast of Lokris and Boiotia and the eastern shores of Attica. Here lay the lands of those wealthy Hippobotai on which the Athenians settled four thousand Klerouchoi, after a victory gained over the partisans of Hippias.¹⁹² There were, indeed, other cities in the island, of some of which, as of Histiaia in the north and Karystos in the south, we shall hear in the later history; but there were none whose geographical position left room for any rivalry with these two great towns. In each there may have been, as there certainly was in Chalkis and Eretria, a class of rich men who rented for their cattle the abundant pasture of the public lands lying among mountains never visited except by the shepherds; but nowhere else was there the mineral wealth which made the Chalkidian weapons and wares so renowned, or the luxuriance of population which extended the name of Chalkis over the great Makedonian peninsula. Nowhere else was there the maritime enterprise which brought under the dominion of Eretria not a few of the neighbouring islands of the Egean.¹⁹³ Of the foundation of these and the other Euboian cities the accounts are not more consistent or trustworthy than the traditions of Ionic colonisation in Asia; and Aiklos and Kothon, the reputed Athenian Oikistai of Eretria and Chalkis, are not more known to us than Hellops the son of Ion, whose children are said to have occupied the northern portion of the island.

The prosperity of these cities belongs manifestly to that golden age of the Ionic race in which Delos was a centre of attraction not less brilliant than Olympia became for all the

Pan-Ionic
festival of
Delos

¹⁹² Herod. v. 77.

¹⁹³ These two cities seem generally to have agreed fairly well together; but we hear of a war between them, in which the Milesians and Samians took part as allies, the former of the Eretrians and the latter of the Chalkidians. Herod. v. 99. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 228. The war is also noticed by Thucydides, i. 15: but he assigns no date to it.

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I.

Hellenic tribes. Here in the craggy island where Phoibos was born and to which after his daily wanderings he returned with ever fresh delight,¹⁹⁴ were gathered at the end of each fourth year the noblest and the most beautiful of the children of men. Here, as he looked on the magnificent throng of women¹⁹⁵ whose loveliness could nowhere be matched and of men unsurpassed for splendour of form and strength of nerve, the spectator might well fancy that he gazed on beings whom age and death could never touch. Here on the sacred shore were drawn up the ships which brought thither the riches and the treasures of distant lands, and which had already made the Ionians formidable rivals even of the Phenician mariners.¹⁹⁶ But in the days of Thucydides the glowing descriptions of the blind old bard of Chios were those of a time which had long since passed away. The splendour of the Delian festival had long faded before the growing popularity of the Ephesian games; and when in the days of the brilliant Pan-Athenaic celebrations of their own city the Athenians made some attempt to renew the glories of the Delian feast, the Hymn which spoke of those ancient gatherings was the only document from which Thucydides could obtain any knowledge of that time.¹⁹⁷ To this period probably belonged the more luxurious or more costly linen dress which, as he tells us, the Athenians had discarded for the homely woollen garb of the Spartans, abandoning at the same time the fashion of binding up their hair with broaches of golden grasshoppers.¹⁹⁸ But if in this hymn we have the evidence that alike in the East and the West the Ionic name was a proud distinction, that in Delos was a centre of union for tribes always too prone to fall away from each other, and that this union was maintained with a constancy which made the Pan-Ionic gathering second to no other Hellenic festival, we derive from it just that kind of knowledge which we may receive with the surest trust, a knowledge obtained not by means of inconsistent or contradictory legends but from the

¹⁹⁴ Hymn, *Apoll.* 146.¹⁹⁵ Hence the miserable change which before the days of Perikles had secluded the women of Athens had not yet taken place among the Ionians; and the Delian festival presents a pleasant contrast to that of Olympia from which women were excluded on pain of death.¹⁹⁶ Hymn, *Apoll.* 148-155.¹⁹⁷ Thuc. iii. 104.¹⁹⁸ *Ib.* i. 6.

faithful description of a state of society in which the bard himself lived and moved. It is a history without incidents; and a narrative rich in incidents not recorded by contemporary writers lies on the borders or within the confines of fiction; but we have to bear steadily in mind the limits of the knowledge possessed by Thucydides; and to give up the thought that we can acquire anything more.

At no time was the Delian festival more than a Pan-Ionic gathering. But similar restrictions had been common to those festivals which afterwards became Pan-Hellenic, just as the feasts open to the Ionic, Aiolic, or Dorian races respectively had once been strictly local celebrations of cities or villages; nor can we doubt that but for its geographical position Delos would have become the resort of a congress not less general. But the conquests of the Lydian kings first broke up the Ionic society, and their downfall left the Egean waters open to the Phœnician fleets of the Persian despots; and thus the especially ennobling influences of the gathering at Delos passed for the time away. The genius of Athens had as yet been very partially called forth, and at Olympia there was neither that free mingling of men and women which is one of the redeeming features of the so-called heroic age, nor that rivalry of art and poetry in which the bard of the Delian hymn expresses so keen an interest.¹⁸⁹ Far removed, not only as an inland city but by its position in the western corner of the Peloponnesos, from all danger of attack by Persian fleets, Olympia rose to greatness as the glory of Delos waned. Starting with the simple competition of runners in a single race from end to end of the stadion, she added prizes for the runners first for the double and then for the long course, and at length for the Pentathlon, in which the victor must have beaten his antagonist in running, leaping, wrestling, and in throwing the javelin and the quoit. In all these, as well as in the Pankration and other matches afterwards added, success depended wholly on personal endurance and skill. It was otherwise with the chariot-races which were instituted, it is said, about two

Pan-
Hellenic
festivals.

¹⁸⁹ Hymn, *Apoll.* 167-175. The enumeration of the Olympiads begins with the alleged victory of Koroibos, B.C. 776. The era may be convenient as a chronological basis, but it represents no well-attested historical fact.

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I.

centuries before the battle of Marathon, and which allowed the wealthy to compete by the agency of hired charioteers, so that despots who dared not leave their fastnesses might be enrolled as victors in games which gave them a reputation co-extensive with the Hellenic world. In marked contrast with the shortlived prosperity of Delos, the quadrennial celebration of the Olympic festival was never interrupted until the Christian Theodosius decreed its abolition 800 years after the death of Herodotos and Thucydides. But long before the days of the Christian emperor it had been thrown open to tribes or nations who, though they may have prided themselves on following Greek fashions, had little in common with the old Hellenic character; and the spell which never failed to stir the sentiment of earlier ages had utterly lost its power.

The Delian
Hymn to
Apollon.

The so-called Homeric Hymn to Apollon combines with the poem which speaks of the Delian festival another and a later poem in which Apollon is represented as journeying westwards, seeking a home which he cannot find either in Iolkos or the Lelantian plain, in Mykalessos or in Thebes. At last he is advised by the nymph of the Telpousian stream to go further still until in one of the glens of Parnassos he should reach the village of Krisa. There beneath the mighty crags which beetled over it, he marked the spot on which Trophonios and Agamedes raised his shrine, and there he slew the mighty dragon, the child of Hêrê, and leaving his body to be scorched by the sun commanded that thenceforth the place should be called Pytho, the ground of the rotting. But though his temple had been reared, priests were lacking to it, and spying a Kretan ship far off on the sea, he hastened towards it and assuming the form of a dolphin brought the vessel without aid of wind or helm or sail along the Lakonian coast by Helos and Tainaron to Samê and Zakynthos, and then through the gulf which severs the Peloponnesos from the northern land to the haven of Krisa with its rich soil and its vine-clothed plain. There coming forth from the sea like a star, he guided them to their future home where their hearts failed them for its rugged nakedness. 'The whole land is bare and desolate,' they said; 'whence

shall we get food?' 'Foolish men,' answered the god, 'stretch forth your hands and slay each day the rich offerings, for they shall come to you without stint and sparing, seeing that the sons of men shall hasten hither from all lands to learn my will. Only guard ye my temple well, for if ye deal rightly, no man shall take away your glory; but if ye speak lies and do iniquity, if ye hurt the people who come to my altar and make them go astray, then shall other men rise up in your place and ye shall be thrust out for ever.'²⁰⁰

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VII.

It is easy to see that this beautiful legend which is designed to account for the names of Pytho from the dragon and of Delphoi from the dolphin or fish-sun²⁰¹ draws no distinction in name between the vine-growing Krisa on the coast and the barren and rocky Krisa far up in the cliffs of Parnassos; nor can we from the words of the hymn venture to determine whether the poet regarded Pytho, Delphoi, and Krisa as three places or as one, although it is certain that the worship of the god had even then made the people of Krisa both renowned and wealthy. If we are to follow the popular traditions, we must suppose that there was a port under mount Kirphis, and an island city on the mouth of the Pleistos, either both named Krisa, or the former Kirrha and the latter Krisa; that, as time went on, the town rose in importance and wealth, while the men of Krisa were deprived of the guardianship of the temple by the Delphians who had also passed them in the race for riches; that the people of the harbour made use of their position to exact heavy tolls of pilgrims and were guilty of even worse offences; that the Delphian Amphiktyonians at the instigation of Solon proclaimed a sacred war against Kirrha, in which the Sikyonian Kleisthenes took part; that, although Solon by throwing hellebore into the Pleistos caused the death of thousands by diarrhoea, the Kirrhaians held out for ten years and, when the Sikyonian fleet had cut off their supplies by sea, betook themselves to the heights of Kirphis; that, when they were finally subdued, the vengeance of the Amphiktyonians was shown by the destruction of the city and in a curse which

The sacred
war against
Kirrha.

²⁰⁰ Hymn, *Apoll.* 132-554. The conduct against which they are warned is precisely that of Hophoi and Phinehas in their dealings with the congregation.

²⁰¹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 25.

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I.

anathematised all who might dare to till or plant their territory.²⁰² Of this narrative it is enough to say that for not one single incident in it have we any adequate evidence. It is absurd to suppose that the solitary town of Krisa could defy for ten years the joint efforts of Thessalians, Athenians, and Sikyonians, aided by the neighbouring Phokian tribes. The ten years of this struggle are the ten years of the Trojan and other mythical wars; nor is there anything to surprise us if from this time we hear of Delphians rather than Krisaians as connected with the shrine of Apollon, since in the 'Homeric' Hymn there is little more than a hair-breadth difference between Krisa and Delphoi. We may feel relieved on learning that the story of the atrocious stratagem attributed to Solon comes to us from a writer who lived some seven or eight centuries after the Athenian lawgiver; but there is in truth little need to seek for such means of escape from a painful conclusion. If Pausanias accepts the geography of the Hymn, Strabo has no scruple in rejecting it.²⁰³ By Æschines the Kirrhaians are associated with the Akragallidai,²⁰⁴ as nations beyond measure impious; but except from the sentences of the orator, the Akragallidai are unknown to us even in name; and thus, as with the Trojan legend, we have here a war which may have taken place, but the knowledge of which, if it ever did take place, has been lost beyond recovery.

The Ne-
mean and
Isthmian
games.

But if the Hymn speaks of Pytho or Delphoi as rich in wealth of offerings and as crowded with pilgrims from all lands, it seems to draw out almost with anxious care the contrast between this rock-bound sanctuary and the broad Olympian plain with its splendid Stadion and vast race-course. Here among the glens of Parnassos, the ear of Phoibos, it is said, can never be vexed with the tumult of beasts of burden or the stamping of war steeds; and we are thus prepared to learn that the Pythian festival was designed to call forth rather the rivalry of poets than the competition of the chariot race, such races being celebrated for the first time

²⁰² Paus. ii. 9, 6; x. 38.

²⁰³ According to Strabo, and to him alone, there were two sacred wars. See further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 81.

²⁰⁴ c. Ktes. 207 (68).

on the devastated land of the ruined Kirrha. It is perhaps only an accident that traditions not less rich in marvels have failed to reach us respecting the origin of the games which the Kleoniaians or the Argives celebrated in the Nemean valley in honour of Zeus, or of the festival which the Corinthians kept at the isthmus in honour of Poseidon. These feasts, unlike those of Pytho and Olympia, were held every two years; but all four were instances of local celebrations which, having passed through the stage of tribal popularity, had become centres of attraction to the whole Hellenic world.

If the dignity of these great commemorations was not actually assailed, it had to maintain itself against formidable antagonists. Even distant cities like Kroton and Sybaris strove, it is said, to break the current of their popularity by celebrating games still more splendid at the same time. Holding aloof from the exclusiveness which led the Spartans to keep all strangers away from their worship, the Athenians extended to all Hellenes who might choose to receive it the right of initiation into the mysteries of the Great Mother at Eleusis,²⁰⁵ and in the Attic Dionysia exhibited a noble emulation in all that may excite and stimulate the highest genius. The sun of the Attic drama had scarcely yet risen above the horizon, and Solon, if we may believe the tradition, boded little good from the signs which heralded its approach; but in the songs and dances which enlivened the celebration even in the time of the great lawgiver we have the earnest of those brilliant triumphs which have imparted to the feast of the wine-god an imperishable renown. That the full force of all these influences on minds so sensitive and impressible as those of the Greeks can scarcely be realised under our changed conditions of society, we have already admitted; but powerful as they may have been, they could not even tend to produce the convictions which seem to us the very basis of our political beliefs. However vivid might be the glow of Pan-Hellenic sentiment at Eleusis or Olympia, it left untouched the veneration paid to the city as the first and the final unit of human society, and in no way interfered with the local

The
Athenian
Dionysia

²⁰⁵ For the supposed secret doctrines taught in these mysteries see *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, ii. 126, &c.

jealousies and the strifes of towns which challenged for their quarrels the high-sounding title of wars. Even the sacred truce proclaimed before these games might be used to further the interests of one belligerent city against those of another. So far therefore as there was a common national feeling and any national action among Greeks, it was created and kept alive by influences with which their political tendencies were in complete antagonism. These threatened to keep down the Hellenic tribes to that level of monotonous isolation which must always be the chief characteristic of village communities; and to the strength of this isolation must be ascribed the slow and wearisome course of Hellenic life in the days of the kings, the oligarchs, and the despots. In these imperfectly known ages we discern little more than a number of cities, maritime or inland, each with its own interests which, as it was supposed, could be promoted only at the cost of the interests of others. A strong counteraction to this selfish and brutal instinct which arrested the growth of Thrakians, Aitolians and Epeirots, was indeed furnished by the ambition of Persian kings; but it is obvious that the ill-organised resistance made in fact by Athens and Sparta would have been no resistance at all, if they had not been so far educated as to value their national life above the mere independence or wealth of their own cities.

The influence of art on the growth of a Pan-Hellenic sentiment.

This education even before the days of Peisistratos was of a very complex kind. Imperfect in all its parts, it exhibited the germs of the mighty growth of after ages; and the great festivals with their tribal or Pan-Hellenic gatherings were without doubt the most powerful instruments in promoting it. These supplied a constant incentive to genius, and the activity awakened in one direction led by a necessary consequence to greater energy in another. The old heroic lays,²⁰⁶ which told the tales of Ilion and Thebes, of the Argonauts and the Herakleidai, were followed by a school of poetry which unveiled the mind of the poet himself, and lit the torch which has been handed down from Hellas to Italy and from Italy to Germany and England. The task of tracing the several steps in the developement of the lyric and tragic poetry

²⁰⁶ See note 40.

of Hellas belongs to the history of Greek literature; but it may be noted that the new movement was owing in great measure to changes and growth in the art of music and that perhaps the chief impulse came from the military and illiterate Spartans. Hence arose that variety of metres which served as vehicles for the expression of thought and feeling in every shape and mood, and allowed the poet a choice between the indefinite range of the heroic hexameter and the measured limits of the stanza or the strophe. But it must not be supposed that each metre was regarded as having its own special function. The story that the keen feeling of personal wrong drove Archilochos to take his revenge in biting Iambics,²⁰⁷ may or may not be true; but the Iambic metre was used by poets for the expression of their saddest and gentlest as well as of their most vehement and impetuous feelings. The hexameter which seems to sweep everything before it in the indignant eloquence of Achilles moves with a strangely sluggish current in the didactic moralising or preaching of the Hesiodic poets. These poets belong to a class the growth of which marks a certain stage of civilisation, and owe their popularity to the metrical conciseness with which they sum up the wisdom and philosophy of the people. The sayings ascribed to the Seven Wise Men and the maxims of the Gnostic poets generally reflect a condition of thought which seems to become stereotyped in certain nations;²⁰⁸ and the form into which they are thrown is the nearest approach to prose which can be made among a people destitute of a written literature. In Greece we can scarcely throw back the origin of such written literature to a time much preceding that of Herodotos;²⁰⁹ and for all practical purposes the education of the Greeks was for some time longer confined to the restraints of metre and the necessity of retaining by memory the compositions which represented all their knowledge. Of the sculpture and painting of the ages preceding the Persian wars we know very little. The dates and the inventions assigned to Glaukos of Chios and Theodoros of

²⁰⁷ Hor. *De Art. Poet.* 79.

²⁰⁸ As among Jews, Saracens, Persians, and Spaniards.

²⁰⁹ Fennell, 'First Ages of a written Greek Literature,' *Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, 1868. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 449.

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I.

Samos are only less uncertain than those of Daidalos; but even the myths which speak of impossible palaces point to a growth of artistic feeling which must in the end be rewarded by substantial achievement. Between the rude log which probably represented the Athene of the Iliad ²¹⁰ and the glorious statue of Zeus which burst on the eyes of wondering worshippers at Olympia the gulf seems almost impassable; but the sculptors of Athens, Aigina, and Krete were slowly working their way across it while Alkman and Tyrtaios were opening a path for Simonides and Pindar; and the two temples of Hêrê at Samos and of Artemis at Ephesos, of which Herodotos ²¹¹ speaks as the greatest in his own day, assuredly exhibited not a little of that majesty and grace which dazzled and charmed the eye of the beholder on the rock of the virgin goddess at Athens. Influences such as these were all Pan-Hellenic. Along with the poet, the sculptor, and the painter the orator was daily attaining to wider power; but the eloquence even of Themistokles was necessarily directed first and chiefly to promoting the individual interests of Athens. Art cannot be thus selfish: and the sense of beauty, springing as it did from a thoroughly patient and truthful observation of fact, was combined with the possession of a common treasure of poetry, linking together by a national bond tribes which could never be schooled into our notions of political union.²¹²

Growth of
physical
science.

But beyond the province of the heroic and the lyric, the gnomic or the didactic poets, beyond the world of the rhetorician and the statesman, there lay a boundless field in which the Greek first dared to drive his plough; and the very fact that this attempt was made at the cost of whatever failures or delusions, marked the great chasm between the thought of the Eastern and the Western Aryans, and insured the growth of the science of modern Europe. The Greek found himself the member of a human society with definite duties and a law which both challenged, and commended itself to, his obedience. But if the thought of this law and these duties might set him pondering on the nature and source of his

²¹⁰ *I.* vi. 303. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* i. 233.

²¹² See further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. 29.

²¹¹ iii. 60.

obligations, he was surrounded by objects which carried his mind on to inquiries of a wider compass. He found himself in a world of everlasting change. The day gave place to night; the buds and germs put forth in the spring ripened through summer into fruits which were gathered in autumn tide, and then the earth fell back into the sleep from which it was again roused at the end of winter. By day the sun accomplished his journey in calm or storm across the wide heaven: and by night were seen myriads of lights, some like motionless thrones, others moving in intricate courses. Sometimes living fires might leap from the sky with a deafening roar, or the earth might tremble beneath their feet and swallow man and his works in its yawning jaws. Whence came all these wonderful or terrible things? What was the wind which crashed among the trees, or spoke to the heart with its happy and heavenly music? These and a thousand other questions were all asked again and again, and all in one stage of thought received an adequate answer. The subject was one which admitted of no doubt, and the system thus gradually raised had the solemn sanction of religion. This system was the mythological, and it was marked by this special feature that it never was, and never could be, at a loss for the solution of any difficulty. All things were alive, most things were conscious beings; and all the phenomena of the universe were but the actions of these personal agents. If in the clear heaven the big drops fell from the suddenly gathered clouds, these were the tears which Zeus wept for the death of his son Sarpedon.²¹³ If in the autumn time the leaves fell from the trees and the earth put on a mourning garb, this was because Persephonê, the summer-child, had been stolen from the Great Mother, and because her sorrow could not be lightened until the maiden should be brought back at the joyous trysting place of Eleusis. If the sun which plunged into the sea in the evening came back after a few hours to cheer the earth with his radiance, this was because during the night he had journeyed round the ocean stream in his golden cup, and had been gladdened with the sight of his wife and his children.²¹⁴ For the Greek the

²¹³ *Il.* xvi. 459.²¹⁴ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 39. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i. 303.

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I.

moon 'wandering among the stars of lesser birth' was Asterodia surrounded by the fifty daughters of Endymion, the attendant virgins of Ursula in the Christianised myth. All the movements of the planets were for him fully explained by this unquestioned fact; and with the same unhesitating assurance he would account for all sights or sounds on the earth or in heavens. The snow-storm was Niobe weeping for her murdered children;²¹⁵ the earthquake was the heaving caused by the struggles of imprisoned giants who were paying the penalty for rebellion against the lord of heaven. Such a belief as this might seem to give a dangerous scope to utterly capricious agents; but even here the theological explanation was forthcoming. There was a fixed and orderly movement of the sun through the sky, a stately march of the stars across the nightly heavens; but this was because the great Zeus ruled over all, and all were his obedient or unwilling servants. The movements of some were penal; with others they were the expression of gladness and joy. The stars and the clouds were the exulting dancers who clashed their cymbals round the cradle of Zeus;²¹⁶ the sun was the hero compelled to go his weary round for the children of men,²¹⁷ or crucified daily on his blazing wheel,²¹⁸ or condemned to heave to the summit of the heaven the stone which thence rolled down to the abyss.²¹⁹ This system might be developed to any extent; but it amounts to nothing more than the assertion that all phenomena were the voluntary or involuntary acts of individual agents. Its weak point lay in the forming of cosmogonies. It might be easy to say that the great mountains and the mighty sea, that Erebus and Night were all the children of Chaos;²²⁰ but whence came Chaos? In other words, whence came all things? The weakest attempt to answer this question marked a revolution in thought; and the man who first nerved himself to the effort achieved a task beyond the powers of Babylonian and Egyptian priests with all their wealth of astronomical observations. He began a new work and he set about its accomplishment by the application of a new method. Hence-

²¹⁵ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 279.
²¹⁶ *Ib.* ii. 36.

²¹⁶ *Ib.* i. 364; ii. 314.
²¹⁹ *Ib.* ii. 27.

²¹⁷ *Ib.* ii. 42, et seq.
²²⁰ *Hes. Theog.* 123.

forth the object to be aimed at was a knowledge of things in themselves, and the test of the truth or the falsity of the theory must be the measure in which it explained or disagreed with ascertained facts.²²¹ His first steps, and the steps of many who should come after him might be like the painful and uncertain totterings of infants; but the human mind had now begun the search for truth, and the torch thus lit should be handed down from Thales to Aristarchos²²² and from Aristarchos to Galileo, Copernicus, and Newton.

Such was the mighty change wrought by the oldest Hellenic philosophers. The severance of science from a mythology which had grown into a theology was insured, when the method of accounting for phenomena by the volition of unseen beings was first consciously set aside. The Greek had laid the foundation on which has been raised the vast fabric of modern scientific knowledge. But was the Greek himself reaping on a field where others had sown the seed? Was his work confined to the introduction of a philosophy which had grown up elsewhere? Greek traditions of a later day pointed to foreign lands as the sources of their science: and the admission was eagerly welcomed by Egyptian priests who boasted of observations extended over more than 600,000 years, and claimed to have unlocked the secrets of heaven to the stargazers of Chaldæa. We find these in their turn vaunting the possession of observations taken during nearly 15,000 centuries; and both in Egypt and in Syria we have an alleged historical chronology based upon these computations, running back to a time compared

CHAP.
VII.

Source of
Greek phi-
losophy.

²²¹ It is scarcely necessary to say that Macaulay, when writing his essay on Lord Bacon, never thought of this aspect of early Greek philosophy; but it is unfortunate that for many the true facts should be kept out of sight by the fallacies of a popular writer. For the real picture see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. chs. lxvii. lxviii. Mackay, *Tübingen School*, Appendix C, p. 382.

²²² The protest of Aristarchos against the intricate system of Eudoxos of Knidos is perhaps the most noteworthy fact in the whole history of ancient philosophy. Archimedes rejected his theory, and is therefore a witness beyond suspicion, when he tells us that that most illustrious man believed the earth to revolve in a circle of which the sun was the immovable centre, the fixed stars being also motionless, and that he explained the apparent annual motion of the sun in the ecliptic by supposing the orbit of the earth to be inclined to its axis. In short, with the exception of a formal enunciation of the principle of gravitation, he put forth the Copernican or Newtonian system of astronomy. Lewis, *Astronomy of the Ancients*, 190. *Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art*, s.v. Ptolemaic System. Scarcely less remarkable is the assertion of Aryya Bhatta, one of the most ancient scientific astronomers of India, that the alternation of day and night is the result of the rotation of the earth on its own axis. Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, part iv. ch. ii. sect. 2.

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with which the remoteness of the Homeric or the Vedic ages would be but as yesterday. Thus the Egyptian claimed to be the teacher of the Greek, and the later Greeks made no resistance to the claim. It remains to be seen whether it had any foundation in fact. At the outset we may note that the Egyptians are said to have been taught how to measure the height of the pyramids by Thales²²³ who is stated to have gained his knowledge in Egypt. The assertion is not more likely than the statement that he discovered the seasons,²²⁴ while his speculations on the risings of the Nile would not prove that he had even seen it. Herodotos²²⁵ speaks of these risings as caused by the Etesian winds without mentioning Thales; and the phenomenon was one which attracted the attention of Greek observers in general. The reports of the sojourn even of Anaxagoras²²⁶ in Egypt are mere figments of later writers; the words of Marcellinus would equally authenticate the golden thigh of Pythagoras. The Egyptian origin of the Metonic cycle rests on the authority of the scholiast on a passage of the astronomical poet Aratos.²²⁷ Demokritos of Abdera unquestionably visited Egypt as well as other countries; but he affirms his own superiority whether to Egyptians or others in geometrical demonstrations.²²⁸ Plato, who speaks of some of the planets as being first named by Egyptians, yet calls them by names which are distinctively Greek.²²⁹ The accounts given of the visit of Eudoxos are inconsistent, and it is at the least clear that he could not have been in Egypt in company with Plato.²³⁰ We may admit that the Egyptians had accumulated a stock of astronomical observations indefinitely larger than that of the Greeks; but Aristotle makes no mention of Egyptian astronomical treatises, or indeed of anything received from them in writing. It is not pretended that Aristotle or later writers derived their knowledge from Egypt; and the plea that they revealed to Hipparchos the precession of the equinoxes discovered by that illustrious astronomer is a purely gratuitous assumption.²³¹ Of the visit of Pythagoras it has been well said that, like mediæval chroniclers, each

²²³ Lewis, *Astronomy of the Ancients*, 80.²²⁵ ii. 20.²²⁶ Lewis, *Astronomy of the Ancients*, 104.²²⁸ *Ib.* 137-8, 272.²²⁹ *Ib.* 144.²³⁰ *Ib.* 145.²²⁴ *Ib.* 81, 85.²²⁷ *Ib.* 121, note 240.²³¹ *Ib.* ch. iv.

successive writer seems to know more about it than his predecessors.²³² But if Egypt was not the parent of Greek science, it cannot claim with greater truth to have originated that of Rome. It is said that Cæsar who wrote a learned treatise on the motions of the stars received instruction in Egypt; but he received it not at the hands of Egyptian priests but in the Greek school of Alexandria. If on the other hand the relative precedence of Egyptian and Asiatic astronomers were to be determined by their own assertions, we should have simply to reject a mass of claims and counter claims, all equally incredible and absurd. The wildest legends may have some foundation in fact. The tale of Troy may conceivably have arisen from some historical war; but no test is at hand by which we may sever the fact from the fable. We can make nothing of statements which tell us that Zeus Belos taught the Syrians astronomy or that Egyptian and Chaldean observations extended over half a million years. The legend that Belos son of Libya led a colony from Egypt to Babylon²³³ may mean that the people and the science of the former country are older than those of the latter; but we cannot affirm or deny it. The debt due from Greece to Egypt was expressly repudiated by Hipparchos; but if taken in their widest meaning, the statements of Greek writers come to no more than this,—that in their time the Egyptians had amassed a store of observations, that they had a calendar scarcely so accurate as the Greek, and that they used sundials for the notation of time. The accounts of Herodotos, Diodoros, and Strabo do not agree as to the length of the Egyptian year or the number of its days.²³⁴ If there is nothing to contradict Herodotos when he says that the Egyptians were careful in recording unusual phenomena,²³⁵ there are yet the more significant facts that no single Egyptian astronomer is known to us by name and that even Ptolemy never mentions any observations made by a native Egyptian.²³⁶ They had gathered materials for scientific induction; and of these the Greeks, so far as they had access to them, may doubtless have availed them-

²³² *Astronomy of the Ancients*. 269.²³⁵ Herod. ii. 82. Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 70.²³³ *Ib.* 414.²³⁴ *Ib.* 267.²³⁶ Lewis, *ib.* 287.

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selves. Of an Egyptian science which attempted to explain the movements of the heavens there is not the faintest trace. With the records of phenomena they began; and in accordance with all the characteristics of eastern intellect, with these they ended. The most that can be said for Egypt is that if its science was meagre and its influence weak, it seems to have been at least harmless. It was otherwise with the Babylonians. The great gift of Syrian science was the boon of genethliac astrology. The Egyptians drew from the day of birth omens of the life which was to follow; but these signs were not connected with the stars. The Greeks observed the heavenly bodies; but they went no further than to associate them with the recurrence of certain seasons and to see in them tokens of atmospheric changes. The divination of the Greeks and Romans lay in the interpretation of oracles and dreams, in augury and meteoric signs as well as prodigies of every kind.²²⁷ It was the special work of Chaldean astronomers to link the fortunes of man with the position of the planets at his birth, and to draw out into elaborate system a superstition which almost more than any other dwarfs and cripples the human intellect. Against this system the Greek astronomers raised their voice; the laws of Rome forbade its practice. But the superstition of Sulla was a type of the temper of his countrymen; and the Greeks, instead of regarding the rising of stars as accompanying signs, had only to look on them as the causes, of atmospheric change, to open the door for the astrological system of Assyria. In Egypt then that system was an exotic, not less than at Athens or Rome; but Egyptian vanity, or the weakness of Egyptian intellect, was dazzled by the mysterious art; and forged treatises sprung up in abundance to prove that it was of ancient and indigenous growth.²²⁸

Greek
astronomy

These characteristics of the so-called science whether of Egypt or of Assyria dispose effectually of the assertion that it was the parent of the really historical and always progressive science of Greece. While the names of Chaldæan, Baby-

²²⁷ Ihne, *History of Rome*, i. 117, *et seq.*

²²⁸ See at length Sir G. C. Lewis, *Astron. Anc.* chs. i. and v.

lonian, and Egyptian astronomers remain wholly unknown, with Thales begins a long line of philosophers who contributed to the advance of practical astronomy as much as they failed to improve it in theory. Among other tenets Thales is said to have held that the fire of the sun and stars was fed by watery exhalations; his practical science was shown, it is said, in his prediction of an eclipse which broke off a battle between the armies of Kyaxares and Alyattes.²³⁹ The statement will not bear criticism; ²⁴⁰ but the tale is only a sample of many which extol the scientific knowledge of the earlier Greek astronomers. To his supposed disciple Anaximandros is ascribed the discovery of a gnomon or sundial, showing the time, the seasons, solstices and equinoxes.²⁴¹ By Anaximenes the chain of wild and arbitrary hypotheses is said to have been extended. With him the sun, it is said, was a body of fire and in shape flat like a leaf, while the moon, being fiery, shone with her own light, and the form of the earth as a flat trapezium prevented it from sinking in space. Improving upon him, Herakleitos, we are told, taught that the stars were fed by exhalations from the earth, that the sun was shaped like a bowl and that its width was not greater than the length of a man's foot.²⁴² To Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic school, is ascribed the opinion that the stars were fiery clouds, lit at night like coals and put out in the morning, and that the sun, resembling these in substance, was likewise renewed every day.²⁴³ According to Empedokles, as also in the doctrine of Philolaos, there were two suns, one in the invisible sphere below the earth, the other in the upper hemisphere, sharing the motion of the invisible sun. The distance of the moon from the sun he judged to be twice as great as its distance from the earth.²⁴⁴ His guess was followed up by later philosophers, sometimes on grounds which were strictly astronomical, sometimes, as by the Pythagoreans, on the strength of mysterious ideas respecting the essential powers and virtues of numbers. Like Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, the teacher and friend of Perikles, held that the earth was a plane, and believed the sun to be a

²³⁹ Herod. i. 74.
²⁴² *Ib.* 96.

²⁴⁰ Lewis, *Ast. An.* 85-88.
²⁴³ *Ib.* 98.

²⁴¹ *Ib.* 92.
²⁴⁴ *Ib.* 101.

mass of ignited stone larger than the Peloponnesos. From him probably Thucydides derived his knowledge that an eclipse of the sun takes place at the new moon, and an eclipse of the moon when it is full.²⁴⁵ But as in so explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies Anaxagoras substituted the action of mechanical forces for the direct agency of the gods, the influence of Perikles himself hardly sufficed to save him from the charge of impiety. So keenly was the theological instinct alive to the danger involved in the application of this method to the facts of the physical world. The plain speaking of Xenophanes and Euripides might be pardoned, when the former denounced as loathsome the Homeric descriptions of the gods and their doings, and when the latter declared plainly that if the gods did aught unseemly, they were not gods at all.²⁴⁶ Such assertions were at worst directed only against human conceptions of the gods, and these conceptions might be mere libels. To assert that sun, moon, and stars performed their functions as machines by virtue of some hidden law was to cast down the gods from their ancient thrones and leave the world desolate in the presence of One incomprehensible Being infinitely too high exalted to have any care of mortal men.

Thales and
the Ionic
school.

That this was the general course of Greek thought on this subject, there is no reason to doubt. But most of the philosophers here mentioned are to us little more than shadows. They belong to that happy band who, in the words of Euripides, have given their lives to the task of scrutinising the everlasting order of immortal nature, and by their task have been raised far above the murky regions of meanness and vice.²⁴⁷ But they lived before the age of a written history; they left behind them no writings of their own, and the outlines of the picture have in each case become faint and blurred. The lifetime of Thales is said to belong in part to the age of Solon, who with him was numbered among the Seven Wise Men; but Solon as a philosopher recedes far into the mists of popular tradition. We shall come across Thales hereafter in the stories of the two last Lydian kings and

²⁴⁵ Thuc. ii. 28; iv. 52; vii. 50. Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 106.

²⁴⁶ Fragm. *Belleroph.* 300. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 85. Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, i. 40.

²⁴⁷ Fragm. (965) 136. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iv. 25, § 157.

again in the disastrous revolt of the Ionians against Dareios.²⁴⁸ But what is there said of him proves no more than that his name was associated with ideas of great knowledge and power; and Aristotle who speaks of him as the founder of philosophy cites his opinions from hearsay.²⁴⁹ Nor are we justified in saying that he established a definite school, for the series of the so-called Ionic philosophers were independent thinkers, not much indebted perhaps the one to the others and exhibiting wide differences of belief; nor is this question one of much importance. It was not likely that a man breaking for the first time the fetters of ages should advance far from his starting point; but Thales did a work greater almost than that of any later philosophers when, in his efforts to learn the nature of things, he reached the conclusion that in moisture or water we have the origin of all things. There is force in his argument that wherever there is life there is moisture, that from moisture comes warmth, and that the condensation of moisture yields earth. It is more than possible that he ascribed this vivifying power to moisture by virtue of the soul residing in it; but the basis on which he builds and the method by which he works are infinitely more important than the character and quality of his conclusions. We shall feel this the more when we remember that with reference to the theological thought of his age he stood at a terrible disadvantage. Theology had professed to account for everything, and it had an apparatus equal to any demands that might be made on it. Thales faced the world of fact, and his task was to hunt about for the theory which should best fit in with the phenomena. He plunged into the question of origins, but his outfit and his weapons were altogether inadequate; and we shall find this inadequacy of means to ends influencing strongly the course of later Greek philosophy. But for the growth of the human mind the plunge itself was the one thing needed. The right to examine things in themselves was established by the man who first attempted to do so. Hence the details of their systems

²⁴⁸ As according to the reputed chronology some sixty years intervened between the death of Solon and the Ionian revolt, Thales must have been a mere child in the last days of the Athenian lawgiver.

²⁴⁹ Lewes, *Hist. Phil.* i. 7.

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have but little interest except as pointing out the directions in which their thoughts were working; nor can we say that their systems have been handed down with much distinctness.

Anaximandros and Anaximenes.

Of the personal history of Anaximandros, another supposed contemporary of Solon and Thales, we know nothing; but if, putting aside the theory of his master, he upheld an Infinite or Indefinite Principle as the Origin of all things, (he is said to have invented this term *Archê*), his conclusion is memorable as removing the problem of nature from the observation of phenomena to the region of metaphysic.²⁵⁰ Thus between his view and that of Thales there is a radical opposition, for the Indefinite (*Apeiron*) of Anaximandros seems to be a mixture of all elements, whereas Anaximenes, like Thales, seeks to simplify phenomena by reducing all to a single element. With him this element was Air; and his arguments were at the least as forcible as those of Thales for his hypothesis of Water. But we have no historical warrant for assigning to Anaximenes the second instead of the third place in the series of so-called Ionic philosophers, on the strength of this logical affinity. We know nothing of his life, and inconsistent traditions assign his birth to different portions of the sixth century B.C.²⁵¹

Diogenes of Apollonia.

But taking these names as denoting not so much persons as forms of thought, we may see in the philosophy of Diogenes of Apollonia the complement of that of Anaximenes. Like the rest, Diogenes is to us little more than a shadow, the vague tradition that somehow or other or at some time or other he got into some trouble at Athens pointing probably to incidents resembling those which marked the career of Anaxagoras.

Xenophanes.
585-493
B.C. (?)

With Xenophanes of Kolophon, the supposed founder of the Eleatic school of thinkers, philosophy passes into a new phase.²⁵² Thus far it had been purely dogmatic; henceforth it was to be deeply penetrated by that scepticism which is a virtual confession that the mind lacks adequate powers for solving the problem of Being. The doctrines of Xenophanes

²⁵⁰ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. xxxvii. vol. ii. 521. Lewes, *Hist. Phil.* i. 13, et seq.

²⁵¹ Lewes, *Hist. Phil.* i. 8. ²⁵² *Ib.* vol. i. ch. iii. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 523.

became the heritage of a real school of philosophers, and were indefinitely developed by Zenon, Parmenides, Melissos, and last of all by Pyrrhon. Happier than the men of the so-called Ionic school, Xenophanes was a poet as well as a philosopher; and the fragments of his poems throw some little light on his life, while they give us also some of his thoughts in his own words. In one of these he speaks of a Median invasion as an event of his own age,—probably the expedition not of Xerxes but of Harpagos. But in spite of the almost despairing doubt by which he is sometimes oppressed the chief characteristic of the man is the intense earnestness which sends him from land to land as the apostle of a truth without which man cannot rightly be said to live. It was this vehement conviction which led him to denounce the Homeric theology as utterly hateful and to condemn the immoral distinctions underlying the exoteric and esoteric systems attributed to Pythagoras. For him there could be no economical adaptations of a truth which, if it be truth at all, was to be proclaimed upon the housetops in the ears of all the people. The system of Anaximandros was metaphysical; but his Infinite was the source of incessant change and apart from the change could not be conceived as existing. With Xenophanes the Kosmos was one unchangeable, immovable whole, knowing neither death nor decay,—the seeming phenomena of change and motion, of decay and death being mere impressions made on the minds of the percipients and varying indefinitely with individual percipients. All nature was thus one Being, the shifting scenes of human or other life being simply the thoughts wakened (if the word may be used when all words must be inadequate) in this conscious passionless whole. All nature thus was God, and God was nature, the sum of all Being.²⁵³ To divide natural operations among a number of subordinate or independent deities was to degrade the One who is All that exists; and against this prevalent superstition Xenophanes wars with a crusading zeal. Thus far he had no doubt. There could be but one existence, and

²⁵³ Hence the monotheism of Xenophanes was sharply and emphatically defined.

*εἰς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίος οὔτε νόημα.*

Hence also his uncompromising hatred of the anthropomorphism of the popular theology.

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all conditions were but modes of that existence; but his monotheism or pantheism (for the two are with him synonymous) found an antagonist in his logic. The One Being was neither Infinite nor Finite, neither Moved nor Unmoved,—not Infinite, for this can be predicated only of non-being as having neither beginning, middle, nor end, nor Finite because limit implies at least duality, and God is One. The same logic showed that the One could not be Un-moved, this being applicable only to non-being which can neither go to another nor be approached by another, nor Moved, because movement implies an external moving agent, and again, God is One. In these speculations, to us only verbal, there was a seeming halting between two opinions which Aristotle²⁵⁴ regarded with some impatience; but although as he approached the tenth decade of his life Xenophanes spoke of the doubt and distraction which heavily oppressed him in a world where error was spread over all things, he never questioned the existence of Truth or the reality of his own convictions of Truth, so far as he could bring himself to believe that he had apprehended it. The absolute scepticism which held that truth is wholly beyond human attainment belongs to a later age.

Parme-
nides.

460 B.C.(?)

According to a tradition noticed by Aristotle²⁵⁵ the high born and wealthy Parmenides of the Italic Elea was a pupil of Xenophanes; and according to the same or another legend he visited Athens towards the end of his long life, accompanied by Zenon, then, it is said, in his fortieth year, and there conversed with the youthful Sokrates. Like Xenophanes, he expressed his thoughts about nature in verse, but, unlike him, in verse which could scarcely be dignified with the name of poetry. As a philosopher, he probably surpassed his teacher. The variations in his own perception of phenomena and their causes had left on the mind of Xenophanes the impression of a painful, if not an overwhelming, uncertainty. Parmenides was able to see that these changes were the result of human opinion, not of anything in the world of fact beyond a man's self; but along with these opinions he felt in his mind certain convictions which could

²⁵⁴ Met. i. 5. Lewes, *Hist. Phil.* i. 49.²⁵⁵ Met. i. 5. *Ib.* i. 50.

not be rooted out or shaken, and these convictions related to necessary truths,—in other words, were practically the same as the innate ideas of more modern philosophy.²⁵⁶

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The human mind had thus reached another stage in its history in this clearly drawn distinction between truth and opinion. In Zenon (whatever be the value of the stories which represent him as bringing about the death of the tyrant who had made himself despot of Elea²⁵⁷) we have the teacher of Perikles and the inventor of that method of Dialektic which became so powerful an instrument in the hands of Sokrates and Plato, and which may be described as a mode of establishing truth by reducing to an absurdity the opinions of opponents.

Zenon.

460 B.C. (?)

The so-called Ionic school is connected with a more widely extended and more celebrated society, if the tale be true that Pythagoras, the contemporary of Solon and Thales, was a pupil of Anaximandros and of Pherekydes of Syros. Tradition assigned him to the age of Polykrates and of Tarquinius Superbus; but association with these misty personages can scarcely impart an historical character to a being still more shadowy. If we say that of his personal life we have no trustworthy information, we call into question neither his own existence nor that of his school or brotherhood. The Minos of the Daidalean or Theseid myths belongs to the land of Menu and the Seven Rishis of India and of the Seven Wise Men of Hellas; but the pre-historical greatness of Krete is not denied, because we regard the Minos of Thucydides²⁵⁸ as a fiction. The naval superiority of Krete during the ages in which powerful chiefs ruled in Tiryns and Mykênai is at the least as likely as that the myth of Helen has been localised in the scene of some real contest on the shores of the Hellespont, though whether that Kretan power was Hellenic or Phœnician may be another question. Nor can we even venture to say that the tradition is more trustworthy which assigns Samos as the birthplace of Pythagoras. There were some who called him a Tyrrhenian of Lemnos or Imbros; and if Herodotos²⁵⁹ speaks of him as the son of the Samian

Pythagoras
and the
Pythago-
reans.

²⁵⁶ Lewes, *ib.* i. 54, *et seq.*
²⁵⁸ i. 4.

²⁵⁷ The story is given by Mr. Lewes, *Hist. Phil.* i. 58.
²⁵⁹ iv. 95.

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Mnesarchos, it is only to name him as the master of the Thracian Zalmoxis, the god of the immortalising Getai.²⁶⁰ But the stories told of Pythagoras must be classed along with the tales which related the exploits of the Messenian Aristomenes. These tales, as we have seen,²⁶¹ were seemingly unknown to the historians who lived before the re-establishment of Messene, and thus are rather the deliberate manufacture of a later age than the genuine growth of popular tradition. The revival of Pythagorean doctrines by the Neoplatonists answers to the political changes wrought by Epameinondas; and the result was that the person of Pythagoras became the centre of a throng of myths which had been applied to many before him and were yet to be applied to many after him. He now became the son of Phoibos, whose glory rested everlastingly on his form. He had a golden thigh, as Indra Savitar had a golden hand,²⁶² and the Hyperborean Abaris²⁶³ flew to him on a golden arrow. He was present in more than one place at the same time, and his ears were soothed with that music of the spheres to which duller mortals are deaf. Clad in robes of white and crowned with a golden diadem, he became the embodiment of that impassive and eternal calm which the worshipper feels stealing over him as he gazes on the majestic face of Buddha. If then we are told that this man spent his early life seeking wisdom from land to land, we are told only what is said of all mythical philosophers and lawgivers. He is described as gathering his doctrines as a bee gets its honey from scattered flowers and bushes; and the only question is whether there be greater reason for tracing his teaching to Eastern sources than there is for admitting the influence of Assyria or Egypt on Greek science generally. Whatever Pythagoras himself may have taught (and like Thales or Herakleitos he left nothing behind him in writing), the chief doctrines ascribed to him are a necessary consequence of those of Anaximandros. That philosopher had assigned as the cause of things the principle which manifested itself in constant change. In the mind of Pythagoras or of the men denoted by that name

²⁶⁰ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 135.

²⁶¹ See p. 85.

²⁶² *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 370: see also references in index s.v. Maimed Deities.

²⁶³ *Ib.* ii. 114.

the idea of the unvarying existence which underlies all these changes became predominant. Take away every mode or condition, and there remains still the one Being, which cannot be made either more or less than one. Resolve a thing into its particles, and each particle remains one thing. Hence numbers lay at the root of being, or rather were the cause of all phenomenal being. The relations of beings were those of numbers, two denoting simply the reference of one to one. The numbers, in fact, ceased to be symbols, or rather were never recognised as symbols. The Greeks knew no language but their own, and the tendency to regard words not as signs but as things marks the philosophy of a much later age than that of Pythagoras, whose whole numerical system rests on a mere verbal quibble.²⁶⁴

But this mysterious being was, it is said, the first who called himself a philosopher.²⁶⁵ The Peloponnesian Leontios wished to know his art. The sage replied that he had none. He was the lover and the seeker of wisdom, that source of happiness more precious than fine gold, sought by so few among the children of men who have all come down from heaven to sojourn upon this earth for a little while. The answer points to the doctrine of Metempsychosis, which became prominent in the system bearing his name. But his name is for us more closely linked with the sect or brotherhood or secret society of which he is the real or the reputed founder. How far this society reflects a tone of thought and feeling borrowed from Asiatic sources, it is unnecessary to inquire. Such foreign influence may be manifested here not less than in the changes denoted by the myths which describe the introduction of the orgiastic worship of Dionysos and the vehement opposition first made to it.²⁶⁶ So far as we may see, the system taught to the initiated was a mathematical mysticism, while the mode of life enjoined on them was scarcely less strict than the rule of Benedict of Nursia.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Lewes, *Hist. Phil.* i. 30.

²⁶⁵ With Herodotos, iv. 95, Pythagoras is a Sophist, in the primary and obvious meaning of the word, which denoted a man of large powers of thought and observation honestly used for the discovery of truth, without any of those secondary and selfish considerations which in later times formed part of the connotation of the term. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 530.

²⁶⁶ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 294.

²⁶⁷ The command to abstain from fish and beans, from whatever source it may come is practically a precept of celibacy. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 120.

The Pythagorean brotherhood.

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I.

In the Italian peninsula this brotherhood became a political organisation, and rising to vast power fell beneath the indignation called forth by a society, which, leaving philosophy in the background, sought to be supreme in the ordering of the state.

Influence
of the phi-
losophers.

The teaching of all these schools, Ionic, Eleatic, and Pythagorean alike, is thus seen to be marked by fancies and notions which may seem to us as grotesque as they are strange. But the mere propounding of the first guess was the emancipation of the human mind from the yoke of mythological belief; and each successive guess, linked as it was to the theories which had preceded it, and having further a certain logical justification, had the effect of strengthening the mind and widening the range of its knowledge. The numerical mysticism of the Pythagoreans laid the foundations for those mathematical and geometrical inquiries which have unlocked many a potent secret of nature and are destined to unlock many more. The influence of these philosophical schools must be carefully distinguished from those general influences which, culminating in the great games and festivals, wrought so powerfully towards the formation of a Panhellenic, although unhappily not of a really national, sentiment. It was not a popular influence. The schools themselves were liable at any moment to be drawn into deadly collision with the popular belief; and this collision became inevitable when from the condemnation of human conceptions about the gods they went on to deny the functions of the gods in the production of physical phenomena. But they did, nevertheless, a mighty work. They moulded the highest thought of their countrymen; and the teaching of Xenophanes and Anaxagoras had its fruit in the statesmanship of Perikles and in the judicial criticism of the greatest of Greek historians. It has borne even a wider fruit, for the science of modern Europe could not have been what it now is, if the Greek thinkers had not first broken the ground and taught men that the powers of the human mind have been given to brace it for tasks immeasurably more formidable than the climbing of the Glass Mountain in folk lore.

CHAPTER VIII.

HELLAS SPORADIKĒ.

At the beginning of the historical age we find the whole of the Peloponnesos with the islands of the Egean sea and the lands lying between the ranges of Pindos and the Corinthian gulf in the possession of tribes claiming the common title of Hellenes.²⁶⁸ Beyond these limits lay a vast number of Hellenic cities in countries which contained among their inhabitants tribes either non-Hellenic or barbarian. The former were regarded by the geographers Skylax and Dikaiarchos as continuous or continental Hellas; ²⁶⁹ the latter were sometimes, but very rarely, described as scattered or Sporadic Hellas. The distinction is, however, convenient, and even important as pointing to the fact that wherever the Hellen went, he carried his country with him. Hellas thus became a land which had no borders, for, inserting itself in wedge-like fashion amongst indifferent or hostile races, it was found on the banks of the Tanais and under the ranges of Caucasus to the mouth of the Rhone and the shores of Spain. At Trapezous and Sinope, in Massalia, Aleria, and the Iberian Zakyntos (Saguntum) were seen societies of men who in language and religion, in manners and in forms of thought, acknowledged some common bond; and the citizen of the Tauric Cherson or the Scythian Olbia, although he might know nothing of our modern national life, might yet take pride in the thought that he belonged to a people which stood in the front ranks of mankind. But if the light of

CHAP.
VIII.Early
Hellenic
migrations.

²⁶⁸ The claim was sometimes disputed, or was admitted by some and rejected by others. We shall find this to be the case with the Thesprotians and Molossians. The Thessalian title was a matter of controversy to a time later than that of Aristotle. Niebuhr (*Lect. on Anc. Hist.* i. 208; ii. 244) decides summarily against it on the score of the Thessalian dialect and the lack of culture in the people. This is the argument used by Dr. Curtius in reference to the Pelasgians, but we have seen (note 82) that it would prove too much.

²⁶⁹ See note 2.

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Greek civilisation shed some lustre even on these distant settlements, it shone out with full splendour in the magnificent cluster of cities which lined the eastern shores of the Egean sea, and gave to the southern portion of the Italian peninsula its name of Megalê Hellas (Magna Græcia). How these tribes found their way into the lands of the Kephisos and the Eurotas, we cannot say. The Greek saw in the Latin an alien, and in the Persian a barbarian: yet the evidence of language points unmistakably to a time when the ancestors of the Greek, the Roman, the Persian, the Teuton, and the Hindu, all dwelt together as a single people. It shows us further that before this ancient people was separated, they had made no small progress in the decencies of life and in the developement of morality and law. We know that they could build houses, tend cattle, plough, sow, and reap, that they had devised for relations of affinity names more precisely accurate than those which we have retained ourselves,—nay, even that they had stored up a vast mass of phrases and maxims, and of popular tales illustrating these maxims and forming now the folk lore of tribes and nations which since the separation have been cut off utterly from all communication with each other. We find the Hindu in the land of the Five Streams; we find the Hellen in the valleys of Phthiotis and the cliffs of Olympos and Parnassos. But we have no means of tracing the stages of the journey which carried these offshoots from the same stock to their eastern and western homes. Geographers may point to the path of Helle²⁷⁰ and connect the name of the river Sellêcis with that of the Helloi who dwelt in the wintry Dodona; but while such reasons would lead us to ascribe to the Hellenic cities of Asia Minor an antiquity greater than that of Sparta or of Athens, the popular tradition regarded these Ionic, Aiolic, and Dorian towns as colonies from Western Hellas and made some of them younger even than settlements lying beneath the mighty masses of Etna and Vesuvius. From one point of view the question may be of very slight importance. There is little either to instruct or

²⁷⁰ Hellespontos,—*πόντος* being to *πάρος*, path, as *βένθος* to *βάθος*. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 287.

to interest us in the fortunes of a number of independent and isolated societies which might go on for ever without adding a jot to the sum of a common experience; but if we find that in every case the traditions which profess to relate the origin of these scattered cities are either inconsistent or wholly contradictory, we may well learn the lesson that we are safe only when we pass within the borders of genuine contemporary history.

When Thucydides was about to trace the course of that disastrous expedition which the sagacity of Perikles had by anticipation emphatically condemned, he thought it right to give a brief sketch of Hellenic colonisation in the island of Sicily. This sketch is drawn with all the confidence of a man who feels sure of the trustworthiness and completeness of his evidence. That at the time when Nikias and Demosthenes landed on the island there were tribes called or calling themselves Sikeloi, he positively asserts; and we need have no hesitation in believing him. But he asserts not less positively that the Sikeloi who had given their name to the country had displaced the Sikanoi, a far more ancient people who regarded themselves as indigenous but who were really Iberians driven by the Ligyans or Ligurians from their homes on the Sikanian river; that from this Sikanian conquest the island which had been called Trinakria was now known as Sikania; that the Sikeloi had passed the straits of Messène three hundred years before the first landing of Greeks in the island; and that the Phenicians who before their coming had occupied many of the promontories and the islets off the coast had withdrawn themselves to the towns of Motyê, Soloëis, and Panormos, not from any feelings of hostility to the new comers with whom they maintained a very friendly intercourse, but from the convenience of these settlements for communication with Carthage.²⁷¹ He gives with the same assurance the precise dates for the founding of the several colonies which are said to begin with Naxos about four centuries before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. To the year following the establishment of this colony from the Euboian Chalkis under Thoukles he as-

Greek colonisation in Sicily.

²⁷¹ Thuc. vi. 2.

signs the founding of Syracuse by the Corinthian Archias who, expelling the Sikeloï from the islet of Ortygia, built there the town which was afterwards connected by a bridge with the far greater city of later growth on the other side of the little strait. Five years later, he tells us, the Chalkidian Thoukles set off from Naxos and, having driven out the Sikeloï, founded the settlements of Leontinoi and Katana. The example of Chalkis and Corinth was at once followed by Megara, and Damis became the founder of Trotilos and Thapsos, while the Thapsians, driven from their new home, built the Hyblaian Megara by the aid of the Sikel chief Hyblon. A century later these Megarians colonised Selinous near the southwestern end of the island, having obtained Pamillos as their Oikistes from their mother city. Forty-four years after the founding of Syracuse Gela came into being near the southern end of Sicily, as a joint colony of Rhodians and Kretans led by Antiphemos and Entimos; and one hundred and eight years later the men of Gela laid the foundations of Akragas,²⁷² about fifty miles to the west of Gela. The fortunes of Zankle were more remarkable. This town at the northeastern corner of the island had been at first a mere stronghold of robbers or pirates from the Italian Cumæ a colony of the Aiolic Kyme, and from its situation had been called by the Sikelians Zankle, a sickle. The

²⁷² It is scarcely necessary to say that the Latin names for Akragas and other words similarly declined were formed from the Greek genitive, Akragas becoming Agrigentum, Taras Tarentum, Soloeis Soluntum, Maloeis in this way becoming Maleventum, a word of evil sound to Latin ears, which was therefore abandoned for Beneventum. After the same fashion Epidamnos, owing to its phonetic likeness to the Latin damnum, loss, was called by them Dyrrachium, a name now modified into Durazzo.

Phalaris, the tyrant of Akragas, may with his bull be dismissed in a note. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. xliii., seems to believe in this bull; but the image of the beast restored to the Akragantines by Scipio proves no more for the popular history of Phalaris than the pickled sow at Lavinium proves for the reality of Æneas. The testimony of Pindar (*Pyth.* i. 185), who mentions the bull, is conclusive only for the fact that his name had become a by-word for cruelty. The words of Stesichoros, if rightly reported by Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 20, would prove the existence of a Phalaris in his own day, against whom, by the fable of the horse and the stag, he warned the people of Himera; but this tells nothing for the acts and life popularly ascribed to him. See also Watkiss Lloyd, *History of Sicily*, p. 60-1. Pindar was not, like Stesichoros, a contemporary; and in fifty years the bull and Phalaris might easily become associated. Polybios, xii. 25, merely reviles Timaios for daring to doubt the genuineness of his bull; and Diodoros, xiii. 90, only echoes Polybios. Neither of them says that the figure had any inscription or mark to connect it with the tyrant or the city of Akragas. Of the real nature of Phalaris and his bull there can be but little doubt. See *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, ii. 123. In short, the Phalaris of Stesichoros is not the Phalaris of tradition; and in all likelihood his mere name suggested a connexion with the horrid rites which accompanied the phallic worship of Moloch. It is not more surprising that a tyrant should be called Phalaris than that a freedman should be named Pallas.

Cumæan and Chalkidian settlers of this new colony were attacked by bands of Samian and other Ionians who had abandoned their Asiatic homes on the suppression of the Ionic revolt; ²⁷³ and these in their turn were reduced by Anaxilas tyrant of Rhegion who discarded the name of Zankle for that of his own country Messene. These Sicilian cities in due time sent out offshoots from themselves. Thus Himera, about thirty miles to the east of Panormos on the northern coast, was colonised by men from Zankle together with a multitude of Chalkidians and some exiles from Syracuse, which had long since sent out settlers to Akrai, Kasmenai, and Kamarina, all to the south of a line drawn from Syracuse to Gela. Of these cities the last was destined to change masters. The Kamarinaians revolted from the mother city which gave their lands to Hippokrates, afterwards tyrant of Gela, who now became the Oikistes of the place. ²⁷⁴

Nothing can be more precise than the ethnology thus given by Thucydides, nothing more definite than the dates which he assigns to the several Greek settlements in the island. From first to last the narrative is to all appearance thoroughly probable; but the account which he gives of the Trojan war has the same air of likelihood. In the latter case we know the process by which this result has been obtained, and we have no guarantee that his early Sicilian history may not be of precisely the same kind. This at least is certain that for none of it was there any contemporary registration and that most of the events recorded in it took place by his own admission more than four hundred years before his own day. The story of Archias, the leader of the colony to Syracuse, is one of those highly coloured pictures which nothing less than contemporary evidence can render trustworthy; ²⁷⁵ nor can anything show more clearly the looseness of the materials from which these dry summaries were compiled than the traditions (if such they may be termed) of Aristodemos of the Italian or Tyrrhæian Cumæ. If we are to follow Dionysios, ²⁷⁶ we must believe that about twenty years after the fall of Kroisos an

Value of the traditions relating to the foundation of these colonies.

²⁷³ Herod. vi. 22, *et seq.*

²⁷⁴ Thuc. vi. 3-5.

²⁷⁵ Plut. *Narr. Amat.* p. 772. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 487.

²⁷⁶ vii. 2-11. See further, Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 521.

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army of Etruscan, Daunian, and other invaders, amounting to half a million foot soldiers and eighteen thousand horsemen, was repulsed by about 5,000 Cumæans under Aristodemos who bore a name much belied by his later history—Malakos, the effeminate or the gentle. His mildness was blended with so much bravery, and his bravery was rewarded with such signal success, that he slew the Etruscan general with his own hand. The prize of valour was rightfully his, and his claim was supported by the people; but as the nobles demanded it for Hippomenes, Aristodemos became a popular leader, and when twenty years later the men of Aricia sent to ask aid against Aruns Porsena the Lucumo of Clusium, these nobles dispatched Aristodemos as the admiral of ten rotten ships, hoping, like Polykrates when he sent help to Amasis, that they might founder on the way. The fates were not thus kind. Aristodemos again slays the general of the enemy and returns to Cumæ more illustrious than ever. But now he had matters more in his own hand. He murders the senate with the aid of accomplices whom he brings into the assembly with swords hidden under their clothes and then, having promised the people a re-division of lands and remission of debts, is appointed dictator with a body guard. The usual results follow. The chief men of the city are put to death and their sons driven away, while care is taken to prevent any trouble from the people by compelling them to dress and live like women. This story is but another version of the tale which represents Cyrus as treating the Lydians in the same way on the suggestion of Kroisos,²⁷⁷ while the romance of his life is brought to an end by a repetition of the stratagems of Zopyros at Babylon and of Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii.²⁷⁸ In all Roman history, again, the Spolia Opima are said to be only thrice gained;²⁷⁹ but the tyrant of Cumæ has the incredible good fortune of twice slaying the leaders of overwhelming armies. The tale is thus seen to be internally weak: it becomes worthless when, turn-

²⁷⁷ Herod. i. 155. The same scheme is ascribed also to the Egyptian Sesostris. Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 523.

²⁷⁸ Herod. iii. 156, *et seq.* Livy, i. 54. Compare the stratagem practised on the emperor Julian, Gibbon, ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 368, ed. 1846.

²⁷⁹ Livy, i. 12; xx. 55.

ing to Plutarch, we find that Aristodemos is sent to aid not the Aricines but the Romans, that the war, far from being decided in a single battle, is a long one, and that a wholly different account is given of the tyrant's death.²⁸⁰

If the alleged history of Sicilian colonisation is thus rendered uncertain, it is not therefore to be hastily rejected as a whole. Of the long series of events recorded a few belong to a time sufficiently near to the historian's own day to impart to them a greater or less degree of credit; and the remembrance of mother cities may be expected to last as long as the memory of most things which may be made the subject of popular tradition. But when we examine the Sicilian ethnology of Thucydides, we find ourselves plunged in bog and quicksand; and the sharply drawn distinction between Sikels and Sikans becomes as shadowy as the borderland which separates the Pelasgic from the Hellenic tribes. According to Thucydides the Sikeloï from whom the island was named crossed the straits of Messene three hundred years before the colonisation of Naxos, in other words, nearly six centuries before his own birth. Hellanikos, who threw the event back to the third generation before the Trojan war, that is, to the beginning of the twelfth century B.C. according to the chronology of Eratosthenes, assigns to the twenty-sixth year of the priestess Alkyone at Argos (so precise is his knowledge of these ancient times) an invasion of Sicily by the Elymōi, followed by a migration of Ausonians under a king named Sikelos. By Philistos of Syracuse these immigrants are said to have been neither Elymōi nor Ausonians nor even Sikeloï, but Ligyes or Ligurians who were led by Sikelos son of Italos. The Syracusan Antiochos tells quite another tale. At a time when the lands lying to the south of a line drawn from Taras to Poseidonia were held by the Oinotrians, they received from a king named Italos the name of Italians: after his successor Morges they were called Morgetes, and in his time there came from Rome an exile named Sikelos who left his name to a portion of the people.²⁸¹ These are events belonging to a time long before the Trojan war; and thus the Halikarnassian Dionysios²⁸²

The Sikeloï
and
Sikanoï

²⁸⁰ Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* ii 522.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.* i. 277.

²⁸² i. 12; x. 72

concludes that Rome was founded thrice, once before and twice after that war; but both of these later foundations precede by three or four centuries the date which Livy and others with him chose to adopt. The truth is that, for all events which cannot be attested by the living evidence of language, these ages are hidden from us by an impenetrable veil. Philological analysis will at least enable us to determine the relationships of Latin, Greek, and other dialects, and by classifying the words by which each dialect may denote the common objects of daily life and more especially the instruments of agriculture and war may trace the influences to which each tribe or race has been exposed and the measure in which they have been blended with other clans. It may further throw, and it has thrown, invaluable light on the social and moral condition of the people and on the sources of their ancient civilisation. It may even show the meaning of the tribal names: but far from helping us to maintain the distinctions by which these tribes or clans justified their incessant feuds, it will teach us that Athenians, Arkadians, Argives, Lykians, Delians, Ionians, all had names with a common meaning and differing only in subtle shades of that meaning.²⁸³ How worthless these names are as a basis for a scientific ethnology, we can scarcely fail to see as we trace the speculations by which Niebuhr reduces to a single root the names Danaoi, Daunii, Launus, Lavinus, Lakinus, Latinus,²⁸⁴ and with more sweeping results finds a common source for the group Sabini (Savnis, Saunis, Saunitai, Samnites), Apulus (Sap, Sab), with its correlative *Æquus*, passing into Iapyx, Opicus, Opiscus, Oscan, Olsus, Volscus, further into Ausones and Aurunci, and finally into Ombri and Umbri, as *fibra* by a corresponding change becomes *fibria*.²⁸⁵ If, following out the hints or more direct statements which speak of the existence of Pelasgians in different lands, we choose to say that at one time Pelasgic tribes were extended over a space stretching continuously from the Arno and the Po to the little river Rhyndakos which flows into the Propontis some miles to

²⁸³ See p. 39.²⁸⁴ *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* xxii. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 235.²⁸⁵ *Hist. Rome*, vol. i. 'Ancient Italy.' *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 239.

the east of Kyzikos,²⁸⁶ we cannot from flatly contradictory accounts determine the degrees of their affinity with the Hellenic race with whose speech their own was, nevertheless, closely connected. The upshot of the whole is that in Hellenes, Latins, Oinotrians, Pelasgians, Sikanoi and others we have a multitude of tribes whose languages exhibit a dialectical relationship, but whose ethnical kindred cannot be ascertained from the traditions which they regarded as historical, because there is scarcely a single point on which the traditions of any given tribe are not contradicted by those of other tribes or even by other traditions of its own.²⁸⁷ If, however, we cannot recover their past history, we may trace the recurrence of the same names on the eastern and western shores of the Ionian sea, and from the existence of Chonians in the Italian peninsula as well as in Epeiros and from the fact that in both we find a Pandosia on the banks of an Acheron, we may infer a connexion of the tribes and their close affinity with the ruder Hellenes; nor may we dismiss as insignificant the belief of Sophokles, if it was his belief, that Oinotrians, Tyrrhenians, and Ligurians occupied the whole coast of the peninsula from the southern strait to the gulf of Genoa.²⁸⁸ But it is as useless to speculate on the origin of the Campanian Cumæ in the eleventh or twelfth century B.C. as on the myth which makes the Palatine hill of Rome a still earlier Greek settlement founded by Euandros.

But whatever may be the precise order in which these Hellenic colonies in Sicily were founded, the great prosperity which for the most part they enjoyed for generations preceding the despotism of Peisistratos at Athens, is beyond question. These new communities were established in a land of singular fertility, the resources of which, especially in its eastern and southern portions, had never been systematically

CHAP.
VIII.

Social conditions of the Greek colonists in Sicily.

²⁸⁶ Niebuhr, *ib.* 'The Pelasgians and Ænотrians.'

²⁸⁷ 'All the elaborate researches of modern scholars respecting the primitive history of the Pelasgians, the Siceli, the Tyrrhenians, the Etruscans, the Aborigines, the Latins and other national races, must be considered as not less novel than the speculations concerning judicial astrology or the discovery of the philosopher's stone and the elixir of life.' Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* i. 297.

²⁸⁸

τὰ δι' ἐξόπισθε χειρὸς εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ
Οἰνωτρία τε πάντα καὶ Τυρρῆνικὸς
κόλπος Λιγυστικὴ τε γῆ σε δέξεται.

Fragment of *Triptolemes*,

cited by Dion Hal. i. 12.

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drawn out. In a country where the people had thus far obtained from the earth just enough to supply the wants of a life spent in caves, there now sprung up cities secured by their walls against attack from without, and rich in all the varied appliances of Hellenic civilisation. The influence of this civilisation was brought to bear on the natives, the gradual blending of the new comers with these tribes being sufficiently attested by the adoption of a non-Hellenic system of weights and measures.²⁸⁹ But this blending had in turn its effect on the character of the Sikeliot Hellenes, who were left behind in the race by their eastern kinsfolk. In Sicily, as in Italy, the Greek colonies exhibit a proneness to change, and to violent change, far beyond that which is commonly seen in their mother cities; and while the genius of the eastern Greeks was fed by the stream of poetry which, starting with the old heroic rhapsodies, expanded into the majestic lyrics of Pindar and the immortal drama of Athens, the rude buffooneries which delighted and still delight the folk whether of Italy or of Sicily and which characterised the native literature of Rome,²⁹⁰ opened the way for the growth of comedy and the bucolic idylls of Theokritos. But unlike the Greek communities of Asia Minor or Africa, the Sicilian colonies soon acquired sufficient strength to insure the failure of any attacks which might be made upon them by neighbouring populations. The Asiatic Hellenes lost their independence under the Lydian kings; they passed under a far heavier yoke when Cyrus entered Sardeis in triumph. The great eastern despot had in Sicily no more powerful imitator than the Sikel prince Douketios, and the attempts of Douketios ended in nothing. Defeat would probably have had for him a sharper sting, if he could have foreseen that in the mercenary services of his countrymen future Hellenic despots would find the mainstay of their power.²⁹¹

Greek
settlements
in Italy.

Great as were the attractions of Sicily, those of the neighbouring peninsula were far greater. On either side of the mountain range which forms its backbone magnificent forests rose above valleys of marvellous fertility, and pastures green

²⁸⁹ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 494.
²⁹¹ Diod. S. xii. 8 and 29.

²⁹⁰ Ihne, *Hist. Rome*, i. 570-1.

in the depth of summer sloped down to plains which received the flocks and herds on the approach of winter. The exuberance of this teeming soil in wine, oil, and grain veiled the perils involved in a region of great volcanic activity. This mighty force has in recent ages done much towards changing the face of the land, while many parts have become unhealthy and noxious which in the days of Thucydides had no such evil reputation. When we allow for the effects of these causes and subtract further the results of misgovernment, if not of anarchy, extended over centuries, we may form some idea of the wealth and splendour of southern Italy in the palmy days of Kroton and Sybaris, of Thourioi, Siris, Taras and Metapontion. When, finally, we remember that by the conditions of ancient navigation every ship sailing from Athens or Argos, from Corinth or any other Peloponnesian port, worked its way coastwise to Korkyra and thence crossed the sea to the Iapygian or Sallentine cape,²⁹² we might well suppose that every Hellenic colony in southern Italy, with the exception perhaps of Brentesion (Brundisium) which lay to the north west of the cape, would have been established before any attempts were made to occupy the coasts of Sicily. According to the traditional chronology the course of Hellenic colonisation reversed this natural order, and the chief Sicilian cities had been established for years when at length Sybaris was founded by the Achaian Iselikeus (if so he was called ²⁹³) at the mouth of the river of the same name on a line almost due west of the Iapygian promontory. Ten years later, it is said, another Achaian named Myskellos led a colony to Kroton about forty miles to the south of Sybaris on the mouth of the Aisaros. But these cities in their turn sent out colonists to the western coasts of the peninsula. From Sybaris went forth the founders of Laos and of Poseidonia (Pæstum) near that river Silaros from which a line drawn to the Iapygian cape marked the northern limit of the primitive Italia. Terina on the Napetine gulf was in like manner an offshoot from

²⁹² Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 483.

²⁹³ *Ib.* iii. 504. Strabo, vi. c. 263. The founding of Rhegion would be more ancient than that of Sybaris if the story be true that it was built by Messenians who had been banished by their countrymen before the outbreak of the first Messenian war. Grote, iii. 513. But no argument can be based on the narratives of that war.

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Kroton; and Hipponion with other less known towns was founded by emigrants from the Epizephyrian Lokroi, a settlement (a few miles above the southernmost extremity of Italy) from the Lokrians either of Opous or of mount Knemis, for on this point the traditions are inconsistent, although they are agreed in assigning to the settlers a lawless and brutal character. The stories which assign to them an origin corresponding to that of the Partheniai²⁹⁴ at Sparta may be founded on fact; but as the story of the Epeunaktoi²⁹⁵ is repeated in the Herodotean²⁹⁶ tale of the Scythians who chased the Kimmerians into Asia, the reasons for rejecting it seem to outweigh those which may be urged in its favour. But the traditions of these Lokrians carry us into the regions of that wild mythology which we encounter in the story of the Thrakian Zalmoxis.²⁹⁷ Like the immortalising Getai, the Lokrians of Italy have their mythical lawgiver, and Zaleukos reflects the severity of Drakon and the wisdom of Numa, Minos, Menu, and Lykourgos. Modern criticism has proved his laws to be spurious;²⁹⁸ the comparative mythologist will scarcely hesitate to put aside the story as a mingling of the myths which underlie the traditions of Oidipous, Wuotan, and the Kyklops.²⁹⁹ The dates assigned to these settlements claim for them a comparatively modest antiquity; but it is clear that the tales which represented a vast number of the Hellenic colonies in Italy as founded by the heroes returning from Troy were not contented with these humble limits, while they also go far to prove that the later stories are not more trustworthy than the earlier. Of Siris or Herakleia, about forty miles to the north of Sybaris, we may note that Themistokles on the eve of the battle of Salamis speaks of it as an ancient Athenian possession.³⁰⁰ The story of the founding of Taras (Tarentum) by the Spartan Phalanthos must stand or fall with the corresponding traditions of the Scythians and Lokrians;³⁰¹ but

²⁹⁴ Arist. *Pol.* v. 7, 2.²⁹⁵ *iv.* 1.²⁹⁶ Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* i. 353.²⁹⁷ Herod. *iv.* 94. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 135, 412.²⁹⁸ Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 532. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 512. Charondas, the lawgiver of Katana, is as shadowy a personage as Zaleukos. Both are said by Seneca to have been disciples of Pythagoras. Diodoros, xii. 11, assigns to Zaleukos laws belonging to a later time. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* *iv.* 562.²⁹⁹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 72.³⁰⁰ Herod. viii. 62.³⁰¹ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 518.

Taras needed not the aid of any mythical splendours. Possessing the only perfect harbour of southern Italy, it grew into a democracy as pronounced as that of Athens, while it furthered in a greater degree perhaps than any other Greek colony that spreading of the new element into the interior which obtained for this portion of the Italian peninsula the name of Megalê Hellas (Magna Græcia).

Whether planted earlier or later than the Sicilian settlements, these Italian colonies soon attained to a far greater prosperity. Their dominion extended from sea to sea; but their predominance was secured much less by force than by the influence of that civilisation which had been moulded by the poetry, the worship, the tribal and in a certain sense national festivals, of the mother country. The opportunities for personal distinction which they had themselves enjoyed at Olympia and Delphoi, at Nemea and the isthmus, were now placed within the reach of colonists on Italian or Oinotrian ground, and the temple of the Lakinian Hêrê was thronged with pilgrims who could not journey to the sanctuary in Elis. How long the two great cities of Sybaris and Kroton had flourished before the friendly feeling between them gave way to furious hatred, it is impossible to say; but the story goes that, in the same year which witnessed the expulsion of the Peisistratidai from Athens, five hundred of the wealthier citizens of Sybaris fled for refuge to Kroton from the oppression of the tyrant Telys.³⁰² Fear of a power, which at this time, it would seem, far surpassed that of Athens, had almost impelled the Krotoniates to surrender the fugitives when Pythagoras came forward to denounce the impiety. On hearing that his demand for the exiles had been rejected, Telys advanced southwards, and on the banks of the Traeis³⁰³ a battle was fought in which 100,000 Krotoniates under the athlete Milon utterly routed 300,000 Sybarites. Hastening onwards after a victory pressed without mercy, the conquerors stormed Sybaris, scattered its people, and destroyed its power. Such as escaped fled to Laos and Skidros. The result was disastrous not only for Sybaris, but for the Italian Hellenes generally. Whether

War
between
Sybaris
and
Kroton.

510 B.C.

³⁰² Herod. v. 44. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 152, *et seq.*

³⁰³ Trionto.

BOOK
I

the destruction of the Pythagorean order should be reckoned among the evils thus caused, it would perhaps be rash to say. Pythagoras may have come to Kroton strictly as a preacher of philosophy; but his precepts and his discipline found here a kindly soil, and many of the noblest citizens became his followers. Formed into a strict, if not an ascetic, brotherhood, retaining their property, yet paying implicit obedience to their general, the members of this society resembled in some important points the great order of the Jesuits; and like the Jesuits, they acquired, whether justly or not, the reputation of using their religious organisation as a means for gaining political power and controlling the machinery of government. That this should be the case, is in no way surprising. The asceticism of Pythagoras was not altogether new in Hellas, while to the formation of clubs, secret or open, almost all Hellenes had been long familiarised. But the Eupatrid brotherhood of Kroton had been enrolled at a time of great depression, if we suppose that their defeat on the Sagra by the Rhegians and the Lokrians took place before and not after the overthrow of Sybaris.³⁰⁴ The power, which they may have gained by restoring the self-respect and confidence of the citizens, they retained until, after the great victory over Telys, the question of a division of the lands belonging to the conquered city came before the senate. The measure was vehemently opposed by the nobles and among these by the Pythagoreans, and as vehemently urged by their enemies Kylon and Ninon. The result was a tumult in which all but a few of the younger and stronger members of the brotherhood were slain, disturbances of a like kind in other cities pointing perhaps to a general outburst of popular indignation against the action of political clubs. The traditions of the death of Pythagoras himself are not more consistent than those which were related of Romulus. Some said that he was burnt in the temple of Apollon with his disciples; others extended his life to a much later time; and the faith of many was satisfied by the sight of his tomb at

³⁰⁴ Strabo, vi. c. 261-3, supposes that it took place after the destruction of Sybaris, and that the two events together permanently weakened and ruined Kroton. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 554. In fact, we have no real knowledge of this battle.

Metapontion.³⁰⁵ As a political power, the Pythagorean order had passed away for ever; as a scientific brotherhood, it had still a brighter future before it, and it recovered something even of its old influence in the person of the Tarantine Archytas.

CHAP.
VIII.

The effect of the destruction of Sybaris on the Greek world generally was a matter of greater moment. Thus far the Ionians had been the predominant race in Hellas. The prosperity of Sybaris and Kroton belonged to the golden age of the great Panionic festival at Delos. Among the representatives of the several Ionic tribes there assembled there is nothing to lead us to suppose that the Athenians filled the foremost place, and Sparta was as yet scarcely sensible of the position which the conditions of the Greek world were tending to secure to her. In the west the great Italian colonies had not merely planted themselves firmly on the coast, but were extending their influence and their power even over the inland regions of the peninsula. The defeat of Kroisos and the fall of Sybaris went far towards changing the face of things. The Asiatic Greeks became subjects of the Persian despot. The Italian Greeks became less and less able to extend their conquests, or even to maintain their ground against the pressure of native tribes; and henceforth the title of Megalê Hellas becomes confined to a strip of land running along the coast.

Effects of
the destruc-
tion of
Sybaris.

Sybarite luxury has passed into a proverb, and the name of the city carries with it the associations of Sodom and Gomorrah. How far this evil report was deserved, it is impossible to determine. Of no portion of the narrative can we say that it is genuine history. Sybaris had been swept away long before the birth of Herodotos, and for the character of its citizens we have only the traditions of their furious enemies. A hatred so fierce as that which desolated the most splendid city of the Italian Greeks must have sprung from no slight cause; and it is hard to believe that the only incentive to this internecine war was furnished by the demand of Telys for the surrender of the Sybarite exiles. All that we can say is that the struggle took place, whatever

Supposed
character
of the
Sybarites.

³⁰⁵ Cicero, *De Finibus*, v. 2.

BOOK
I.

may have been its origin, and that it ended with the complete victory of the Krotoniats. The effect which it undoubtedly produced on the history of the Italian Greeks and, through this, on the history of Rome and of the world is of greater importance than the details of the strife which are lost irretrievably. If it be true that the fall of the city excited a lively indignation throughout the Hellenic world and that the Milesians were especially zealous in the exhibition of their sorrow, we may perhaps infer that they were slow to put faith in those pictures of Sybarite corruption which may have been drawn by Pythagorean teachers intent not so much on libelling the Sybarites as on pointing the lessons of their own philosophy.³⁰⁶

The
Phokaian
colony of
Massalia.

In the Campanian Cumæ we reach the last of the Hellenic colonies which exercised any sensible influence on the political history of the countries in which they were founded. The traditions which link the history of Aristodemos with that of the second Tarquin may point to some real connexion between this city and Rome; but further to the north, until, having passed the gulf of Genoa, we reach the coasts of Spain, we come across some isolated Greek settlements, commercially wealthy but politically insignificant. Of these the most important was the Phokaian colony of Massalia, founded, it is said, early in the sixth century.³⁰⁷ The story of the Gallic chief Nanos and his daughter may attest the prudence of the Oikistes who saw the need of conciliating the tribes among whom he had come to live; but it is more important to note that the five Massalian colonies on the Spanish coast mark the westernmost extension of the Hellenic name in

³⁰⁶ Herodotos in his mention of this war, v. 44, takes no notice of the Pythagoreans and their share in the matter; but he adds that according to the tradition of the surviving Sybarites the struggle went against them owing to the interference of the Spartan Dorieus on the part of the Krotoniats. Polybios, ii. 39, must have worked from yet another version of the story, which represented the Greek cities of Italy as full of faction, anarchy, and murder on the suppression of the Pythagoreans, and as being at last brought to submit themselves to the arbitration of the Achaïans. The result was a confederation, of which the cities of Kroton, Sybaris, and Kaulon were the earliest members; but this statement must refer to a time after the destruction of Sybaris, when the place was left almost without inhabitants.

In short the war between Sybaris and Kroton is one for which we have no genuine history. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 561.

³⁰⁷ Pausanias, x. 8, 6, and Isokrates, *Archidam.* 94, assign the foundation of the colony to a time following the conquest of Phokaia by Harpagos,—about half a century later. See further, Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* i. 480, note. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 537. Thuc. i. 13.

Europe, as the settlement of Olbia marks the limit towards the northeast, and that in its stability and freedom from internal troubles Massalia may fairly be said to rival the steadiest even of Dorian communities. Another Phokaian colony at Aleria in Kyrnos (Corsica) we shall find connected with the history of the Ionic revolt of Aristagoras.

We might have supposed that the course followed by the navigation of the ancient world would have determined chronologically the order in which the several settlements would be founded. We have already seen that the popular traditions respecting the Hellenic cities of Italy and Sicily reverse this order, and the same inversion marks the traditions of the colonies scattered along the eastern shores of the Ionian sea. We might have supposed that the point from which all ships sailing from the Peloponnesos struck off across the open water to the Italian peninsula would have been chosen as the spot for the earliest settlement in this direction; but Korkyra³⁰⁸ is said to have been colonised about the same time as Syracuse, and therefore some years later than the Sicilian Naxos. The stern and rugged mountain country which on the main land rises to the magnificent Akrokeraunian range furnished, it is true, no great attraction for Hellenic colonists; but Korkyra with its broad plains and fertile valleys might have satisfied emigrants who had not been accustomed to the rich soil of Messene. Severed from the main land by a strait at its northern end scarcely wider than that of Euripos, it still had the advantage of an insular position against attack from without, while its moderate size, not exceeding forty miles in length by half that distance in width, involved none of the difficulties and dangers of settlement on a coast line with barbarous and perhaps hostile tribes in the rear. Nowhere rising to a greater height than 3,000 feet, the highlands of the northern end, which give to the island its modern name of Koruphō, Corfu, subside into a broken and plain country, now covered in great part with olive woods planted under Venetian rule, but capable of yielding everywhere abundant harvests of grain and wine. Here, it might be thought that a colony would have

CHAP.
VIII.

The
Corinthian
colony of
Korkyra.

³⁰⁸ The name is so given on the coins of the colony.

grown up which we might class among the most peaceful of Hellenic communities : here in fact grew up perhaps the most turbulent, if not the most ferocious, of Greek societies. Alliance with Athens did little to soften the violence of their passions ; and the rapid developement of the feud between the Korkyraian colony and the mother city of Corinth may be attested by the tradition that the first naval battle of the Greeks was fought by the fleets of these two cities. Thucydides is as ready with a date for this battle as he is with dates for the expulsion of the Boiotians from Arne or for other events which he assigns to the ages popularly called heroic : but although he could have no historical records of these events, it is quite possible that the Korkyraians may have been, as he says that they were, puffed up by the legend of Phaiakian maritime exploits into a notion of their own superiority over all sea-faring Hellenes, the Corinthians included among them.³⁰⁹ It is also possible that the character of the Korkyraian colony may have been determined by fusion with Liburnians who are said to have been settled in the island before the founding of the city by Chersikrates. So, again, we have no means of ascertaining the cause of that implacable enmity against the mother city of which the Corinthians bitterly complained. It is more than likely that it had its origin in jealousies of trade. The Korkyraians had acquired on the opposite side of the strait a strip of land which enabled them to anticipate the Corinthians in traffic with the Epeirotic tribes and to protect their own property within strong fortifications ; and it is not unlikely that this fact may have determined the Corinthians to found their colony of Ambrakia near the mouth of the Arachthos which after a due southward course runs into the Ambrakian gulf on its northern shore.

Joint colonies of the Corinthians and Korkyraians.

But in spite of their jealousies joint colonists from Corinth and Korkyra founded the settlement of Anaktorion at the southern entrance of the Ambrakian gulf, on the waters where the fortunes of the Roman world were decided by the victory of Octavianus at Aktion (Actium). Another joint colony was founded at Leukas, now Santa Maura, which be-

³⁰⁹ Thuc. i. 13 and 25.

came an island when, in the fourth century B.C., the Leukadians cut through the narrow isthmus between the city and the mainland. The slaughter of the Akarnanian settlers who, it is said, had invited the new comers may account for the hatred with which the neighbouring tribes regarded the colonies of Ambrakia, Anaktorion, and Leukas. The joint foundation of the two northernmost Greek settlements on the Epeirotic coast had more important results in the later history of Greece. These two Korkyraian colonies were founded the one at Apollonia on the mouth of the Aôos about sixty miles north of Korkyra, the other at Epidamnos,³¹⁰ about the same distance still further north, with the Corinthian Phalios as Oikistes.³¹¹ Corinth had thus a technical right of interference in their affairs, and the exercise of this right was one of the alleged causes for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. With little cohesion between themselves these six communities which all had their origin from Corinth rose either to fair or to great prosperity. The navy of the Korkyraians at the time of the Persian war was perhaps not inferior to that of Athens. How little they were disposed to use their strength for the common benefit of Hellas, we shall see when we reach the history of that great struggle.

About ten miles to the south of the southern promontories of Leukas lay the islet of Ithaka to the east and the island of Kephallenia in close neighbourhood to the west. About the same distance from the southern end of Kephallenia and facing the shores of Elis lay the island of Zakynthos, whose name we meet far to the west in the Massalian colony which, as Saguntum, became memorable in the history of Hannibal. Of the fortunes of these islands before the Persian wars we know nothing. Ithaka may have reposed on the mythical glories of Odysseus; and the traditions of the neighbouring island may have pointed to a time when Kephallenes had a better title to the dignity implied by their name, unless this name denoted in fact nothing more than the confederation of the four clans³¹² inhabiting the island.

Ithaka,
Kephallenia, and
Zakynthos.

³¹⁰ See note 272.

³¹¹ Thuc. i. 24, 4. The monetary system of Korkyra was thoroughly Greek, thus presenting a contrast with that of the Sicilian colonies. See p. 150.

³¹² Thuc. ii. 30, 4.

BOOK
I.Akarna-
nians and
other
neighbour-
ing tribes.

Between the coast extending from Leukas to Bouthroton (opposite the northernmost promontory of Korkyra) and the mountain range of Pindos lay a number of tribes, some of which were regarded as belonging in some sort to the Hellenic stock, while others were looked upon as mere barbarians. Socially and morally they stood probably on much the same level. The physical features of the country, broken up throughout by hills and mountains with mere glens or gaps but no broad valleys or plains between them, made the growth of cities an impossibility; and even the village communities scattered over this wild region were linked together, if joined at all, by the slenderest of bonds. Of these tribes the most reputable were the Akarnanians who, though they preyed upon each other, met together near the Amphiloichian Argos to settle their disputes, and, though they tended their flocks with arms in their hands, lacked the deep cunning and treachery which gave to their brutal Aitolian neighbours a decided advantage over them. Their history for many centuries may be summed up in a few words. Their hatred for the Corinthian settlers on their lands drove them into alliance with Athens; and the advice of Kassandros³¹³ who warned them that unless they abandoned their old fashions they could never make head against the Aitolians led them in some degree to modify their system of village life.

Epeirotai.

Of the tribes which lay to the north of the Akarnanian territory we need say but little. By the southern Greeks they were included under the common term Epeirotai, or people of the main land: among themselves they were distinguished as Chaonians, Thesprotians, Molossians, or by other names. Chaonians we find again in the Italian peninsula, and, it would seem, Pelasgians also; and we have seen what inferences these facts would seem to justify. The speculations of Herodotos and Thucydides about these tribes are as loose as their statements on the supposed history of the heroic age. According to Thucydides the Molossians and Thesprotians are barbaric; according to Herodotos they are Hellenic, and the Molossian king of the days of Themistokles bears the pure Greek name Admetos. In the Agraians

³¹³ Diod. xix. 68.

who held the eastern coast of the Ambrakian gulf we have manifestly the name by which the Hellenes generally became known to the Latins; but in the lack of means for determining their ethnical affinities there is little use in dwelling on the susceptibility of these and other mountain tribes to Greek influence. Here and there we find a village, or a cluster of villages which have grown into something like a city, as the Thesprotian Ephyрэ with its harbour called Sweet Haven (Glykys Limên), the Epeirot Phoinikê opposite to the northern coast of Korkyra, and the Molossian Passaron, the crowning-place of the Molossian kings.

Beyond these Epeirotic tribes stretched to the north and the east, from the Hadriatic to the Euxine seas, a vast region inhabited by races more or less nearly akin to each other, and all perhaps having some affinity with the ruder Hellenic clans. Of these tribes the most prominent are the Illyrians, Makedonians, and Thrakians, each of these being subdivided into several subordinate tribes, and all exhibiting characteristics common to the inhabitants of countries whose physical features present an effectual barrier to political union and the life of cities. By far the larger portion of this enormous region is occupied by mountains often savage in their ruggedness and almost everywhere presenting impassable barriers to the passage of armies. At best therefore we find the inhabitants dwelling in village communities; and of some we can scarcely speak as having attained to any notions of society whatever. So far as language may be taken as evidence of ethnical kindred, the means of measuring the distinctions between these rude mountain tribes are almost wholly wanting; nor should we gain much, if we were enabled to assert on conclusive grounds that this or that Illyrian or Thrakian tribe was more akin to Paionians or Epeirotes than to Aitolians or Thessalians, when each and all contribute so little to the history of the human mind whether in its social or its moral growth. If we are told that the Makedonian language differed from the Illyrian, and yet that the Makedonians found no difficulty in learning to speak Greek,³¹⁴ we are scarcely justified in saying that the Illyrian dialects

Illyrians
and Make-
donians.

³¹⁴ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 15.

BOOK
I.

were grammatically further from the Hellenic than were the Pelasgian; about which the testimony of Herodotos is so strangely inconsistent. Of these tribes many were, as they are still, mere robbers. Some made a trade of selling their children for exportation: many more were ready to hire themselves out as mercenaries and were thus employed in maintaining the power of the most hateful of Greek despots. The more savage Illyrian and Thrakian clans tattooed their bodies and retained in the historical ages that practice of human sacrifices which in Hellas belonged to a comparatively remote past. Without power of combination in time of peace, they followed in war the fashion which sends forth mountaineers like a torrent over the land and then draws them back again whether to reap the harvest or to feast and sleep through winter. Like the warfare of the Scottish Highlanders, their tactics were confined to a wild and impetuous rush upon the enemy. If this failed, they could only retreat as hastily as they had advanced. More fortunate in their soil and in the possession of comparatively extensive plains watered by the Erigon, the Haliakmon, and the Axios, the Makedonians, although in the time of Herodotos they had not yet extended their conquests to the sea, were still far in advance of their neighbours. Popular tradition (whether that of Greeks only, or of Greeks and Makedonians alike, we cannot say) represented them as a non-Hellenic race ruled by sovereigns of pure Hellenic blood. According to one story, the line of Makedonian kings began with Karanos brother of the Argive tyrant Pheidon; in the belief of Herodotos³¹⁵ it might be traced to three brothers of the Temenid family at Argos, who went into exile first among the Illyrians and then passing into Makedonia established themselves first in the gardens of Midas where Seilenos was taken³¹⁶ below the Bermian mountain, and finally made themselves masters of the country. But until it can be shown that the Argos named in this story must be the Peloponnesian city, these traditions are as worthless as the alleged belief of the Paionians that they were sprung from the Teukroi of Ilion.³¹⁷ If, again, the

³¹⁵ viii. 137-8.³¹⁶ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 316.³¹⁷ Herod. v. 13.

story be true that when the Makedonian king Alexandros sought to compete in the Olympic games, his claim was rejected on the score of his non-Hellenic descent,³¹⁸ it must at the least show that these Temenid chiefs had so completely adopted the ways of their people as to make it impossible to draw any ethnical distinction between them, and this fact in its turn would tend to bring the tale of their Peloponnesian origin into grave suspicion.³¹⁹

CHAP.
VIII.

A few generations after the time of Herodotos the Makedonians were to be lords of Hellas and almost of the world; but in his own they were not the most formidable of the tribes to the north of the Kambounian hills. In his belief³²⁰ the Thrakians might with even moderate powers of combination carry everything before them; but there was no fear of such united action on the part of these tattooed savages whose roving and desultory warfare was only once interrupted by the abortive expedition of the Odrysonian Sitalkes.³²¹ The precise relations of the Thrakian dialects with those of Hellas are unknown.³²² If, as it is said, they spoke the language of the Dacians, this, although Aryan, would not be Greek. If, as Herodotos affirms,³²³ their worship was paid chiefly to Ares, Dionysos, Artemis, and Hermes, we might look for some mental affinities between Thrakians and Greeks; but the statements of Herodotos respecting the gods of other nations are eminently delusive. It needed no effort on the part of the Egyptian priests to convince him of the identity of Greek and Egyptian deities; and although it might be rash to deny the ethnical connexion of Thrakians with the ruder Hellenic tribes, their utter deadness to the life of the

Thrakians.

³¹⁸ Herod. v. 22.

³¹⁹ Niebuhr holds that the ruling class among the Makedonians, being known as Argeadai, were naturally referred to Argos, that a hasty inference assumed this Argos to be the Peloponnesian city, whereas the Pelasgian Argos was nearer at hand, and that, when once they were traced to Peloponnesos, it was no longer a bold step to regard them as Temenids, and thus they at once became Herakleids, and were connected with the Herakleid Pheidon. *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* ii. 254. The name Argeadai must be placed in the same class with those of the Argives, Arkadians, and others which denote simply the brightness of morningland. See p. 39, &c.

³²⁰ Herod. v. 3. Thucydides, ii. 98, 7, asserts that this remark would apply even more strongly to the Scythians.

³²¹ Thuc. ii. 96.

³²² Like the Greek dialects, they belonged to the great Aryan family of languages: but we learn this fact from the analysis of language, not from the statements of Greek or Latin writers. 'It is lost labour to try to extract anything positive from the statements of the Greeks and Romans on the race and the language of their barbarous neighbours' Max Müller, *Lectures on Language* i. lect. iv.

³²³ v. 7.

BOOK
I.

family makes this connexion of the faintest and most remote kind. The Thrakian was a mere ruffian who bought his wives, allowed his children to herd together like beasts, and then sold them into slavery. With these habits was combined that fierce periodical excitement which, like the most savage of African or Polynesian tribes of our own day, they were pleased to call religious worship. The attraction of the frenzied rites which were thus celebrated among the mountains whether on the European or the Asiatic side of the Propontis was unhappily not confined to themselves. The madness spread westwards and southwards, and gave rise to one of the most disgraceful phases of Greek social life.

Greek
settlements
in Thrace.

The coast line of the regions occupied by these savages was dotted with Hellenic settlements; but Greek civilisation brought with it no charm for Thrakian tribes. Foremost in the enterprise was, it is said, the Euboian city which had founded the earliest colony in Sicily, and the whole of the country south of a line drawn between Thermê and Stagêiros received the name of Chalkidike in attestation of her activity. If the tradition followed by Plutarch may be trusted, the earliest foundation to the north of Olympos was the Eretrian town of Methônê not far from the mouth of the Haliakmon. Eretria also took part in the establishment of some other colonies in this territory of Chalkidike, which is cut off from the country to the north by a range of mountains sloping down to two of the three peninsulas which run out into the sea between the Thermaic and the Strymonic gulfs. On the easternmost of these projections called Aktê the magnificent mass of Athos, casting its shadow as far as the island of Lemnos, rises sheer from the coast to a height exceeding six thousand feet, the ridge connecting it with the mountains at the base being about half that height. The intermediate peninsula, though thickly wooded like that of Aktê, still has more of open ground; and on these spaces rose among other Chalkidian cities the towns of Torônê near the end of the peninsula and of Olynthos at the head of the Toronaic gulf. At the neck of the third or Pallenian peninsula, whose earlier name of Phlegra points to ancient volcanic action, stood the

Corinthian city of Potidaia, while the peninsula itself contained the towns of Skiônê, Mendê, Sanê, Aphytis, Aigê, Neapolis, and Therambôs. Stretching westwards from Potidaia to the Corinthian colony of Aineaia lay the Krossaian land with townships scarcely more important than those which occupied the scanty open spaces in the peninsula of Aktê. But between the isthmus of Athos and the mouth of the Strymon were the colonies of Sanê, Akanthos, Stageiros, and Argilos, all belonging to Andros which had itself been colonised from the Euboian Eretria. Near the mouth of the Strymon we shall find in the history of the invasion of Xerxes the Edonian township of the Nine Roads where after disastrous failures the Athenians at last succeeded in establishing their colony of Amphipolis. Further eastward and some miles beyond the mouth of the Nestos we reach Abdera (on the coast facing the island of Thasos), a colony from the Ionic Teos. On the shores of the gulf into which the Hebros discharges itself was the Lesbian colony of Ainos to the east, and the city or fortress³²⁴ of Doriskos on its western side.

The order in which these several settlements were founded is with scarcely more than a single exception purely traditional. The colony of Methone was referred to the age which saw the first occupation of Korkyra by the Corinthians.³²⁵ The cities of Stageiros and Argilos were supposed to have come into existence a century later. The incidents attending the colonisation of Amphipolis were almost within the personal knowledge of Thucydides;³²⁶ nor do we lack the same trustworthy evidence for at least some particulars connected with the far more ancient Parian colony of Thasos.³²⁷ If the life time of Archilochos is rightly assigned to the seventh century B.C., then in that century the Parians were masters of the gold mines which the Phenicians had worked before them in that island, and had acquired a strip of land with even richer mines at Skaptê Hylê (the trenched wood) on the mainland near Abdera.³²⁸ To this Peraia the

Chronology
of Greek
colonisation
in Thrace.

³²⁴ Herod. vii. 59.

³²⁵ This would carry it back to nearly the middle of the eighth century B.C. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 30.

³²⁶ i. 100; iv. 102.

³²⁷ The fragments of Archilochos are evidence of the same kind as that which is furnished by the fragments of Solon and Tyrtaios for the Salaminian and Messenian wars.

Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 34.

³²⁸ Herod. vi. 46-7.

BOOK
I.

Thasians looked probably not only for mineral wealth but for the food which could scarcely be obtained from an island described as a mere back bone of an ass, wholly covered with wild wood.³²⁹ From these mines the Thasians received a revenue which not only allowed them to dispense with taxation but even then left an enormous annual surplus. In the days of Archilochos, however, it was obtained at the cost of frequent and dangerous assaults from the neighbouring savages. In beating back one of these forays the poet candidly admits that he was compelled to throw away his shield.

Megarian colonies on the Propontis.

Further yet to the east we reach the Thracian Chersonesos which, starting from a base scarcely more than four miles in width, stretches to the southwest for fifty miles from the long wall near the Milesian colony of Kardia to Elaious at the entrance of the Hellespontos.³³⁰ On the European side of this strait and of the Propontis lay the Aiolic Sestos, and the Megarian settlements of Selymbria and of Byzantion, the future home of Roman emperors and Turkish sultans. The fact that a city like Megara could thus, in the century (it is said) preceding the lifetime of Solon, lay its hands on the key to the Euxine and the Egean, brings before us a picture in strange contrast with the familiar features of later Athenian history. In the extension of the Hellenic race along the Makedonian and Thracian coasts or along the shores of Epeiros, Illyrikon and Sicily, such cities as Chalkis, Eretria, and Megara seem by comparison everywhere, Athens nowhere. We might almost say that these states, which had thus reached their maturity before Athens had passed under the sway of the Peisistratidai, exhausted themselves in the multiplication of isolated units, while the strength of Athens was reserved for the conflict which determined the future course of European history.

Greek settlements on the Euxine.

The Hellenic world was carried far beyond the gates of the sea once guarded by the marvellous Symplegades.³³¹ Of no historical importance, a few Greek settlements sprung up on the western shores of the Euxine at Istria on the southern

³²⁹ Ὀρον ῥάχτις . . . ἕλης ἀγρίας ἐπιστεφής. Archil. Fr. 17-18. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 34.

³³⁰ Herod. v. 33.

³³¹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 152, note 3.

mouth of the Danube, at Apollonia and Odessos, at Kallatis and at Tomoi where Ovid groaned under the imperial hand from which the world offered no escape.³³² Further yet in the modern Crimea rose towns of which we hear something in the narrative of the Scythian expedition of Dareios. To the northeast the colony of Tanais marked the extreme limit of Hellenic enterprise. On the southern shores of the Euxine rose Sinôpê and Trapezous,³³³ places more or less famous in later history; but of the time when they were founded we know nothing.

The opening of Egypt to Greek trade by Pсаммитихос³³⁴ gave that impulse to Hellenic colonisation in Africa which raised up to the east of the Great Syrtis a city not unworthy to be the rival of Carthage. The fortunes of Kyrênê down to the times of Kambyses and Xerxes are related with a minuteness of detail, for most, if not all, of which we are bound to remember that we have no contemporary attestation. From the beautiful legend which represents Apollon himself as leading the lovely Kyrênê across the sea to her African home we turn to less attractive but scarcely more trustworthy stories of popular feuds and commotions. In the one we read of the invincible maiden who without a weapon mastered the lion in the glens of Pelion and who as the bride of the sun-god became the mother of the beneficent Aristaios the first king of Kyrene.³³⁵ In the other we have a tradition which connects its foundation not with Thessaly but with the island of Thera and through Thera with the mother city of Sparta, and which represents not Aristaios but Battos as the first ruler of Kyrênê.³³⁶ The assertion of

Greek
colonisa-
tion in
Africa.

³³² The expression is not less or more true than the same phrase as applied to modern Russian exiles in Siberia. Mr. Rawlinson has rightly laid stress on the fact that at no time was a check wanting to Roman power in the east, and that for three centuries this check was supplied by the Parthians. *History of Parthia*. The importance of this balancing power is not lessened, even if its effect be not felt everywhere.

³³³ The modern name Trebizond is formed, like the Latin names of many Sikeliot and Italiot cities, from the genitive case of the old name. See note 272.

³³⁴ Herod. ii. 178.

³³⁵ *Ibid.* *Pyth.* ix. Professor Max Müller regards this legend as a specimen of genuine mythological allegory which, expressed in modern language, would be equivalent to saying, 'The town of Kyrênê in Thessaly sent a colony to Libya under the auspices of Apollon.' *Chips, &c. Comparative Mythology*, vol. ii. p. 68. To carry out the explanation in this instance we have to invent the Thessalian town of Kyrene. *Tales of Ancient Greece*, note 10.

³³⁶ By Pindar, *Pyth.* v. 110, the myth is connected with a version of the Trojan story which takes Helen to Africa after the fall of Ilion.

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Justin that Aristaios was the original name of Battos must be classed with the desperate expedients which set up two or more persons named Pheidon or Sesostris in order to account for actions which could not possibly have been done by one Pheidon or one Sesostris. But in truth there is little to interest us in the wearisome narrative in which Herodotos³³⁷ relates the fortunes of the Minyai who, declaring themselves to be the children of the Argonautic heroes, receive at Sparta a welcome which they requite by efforts to make themselves despots, and are saved from death only through the mediation of Theras. Leading these Minyai away with him, Theras colonised the island which henceforth bore his name. Here the Minyad Polymnestos became the father of Battos, to whom Grinos the king of Thera handed over the task of Libyan colonisation which the Pythian priestess declared to be indispensable but which he felt himself too old to carry out. There was one difficulty in the way of obeying this command. No one knew where Libya was; and ignorance was the parent of forgetfulness. But the priestess was not to be thus balked. Thera was oppressed by drought, and one tree only in the island remained alive. The repeated prayers of the Theraians received the monotonous reply that Libya must be colonised; and as a last resource, they sent a ship to Krete to learn if any there knew where Libya was to be found. A seller of purple named Korobios here told them that he had once been carried away by a storm to the island of Platea off the Libyan coast. He was therefore taken to Thera and was thence dispatched with a few Theraians to Platea where they left him with a store of food, returning home themselves with their report.³³⁸ But the food was all gone long before any Theraian ship came in sight, and Korobios would have been starved but for the timely arrival of the Samian Koliaios whose voyage to Tartessos had made him a man of vast wealth and whose kindness to Korobios laid the foundations of a permanent friendship between the people of Thera, Samos, and Kyrênê.

In this tale no special meaning is connected with the name

³³⁷ iv. 145-6.

³³⁸ Herod. iv. 151.

of Battos. The Kyrenaian tradition, according to Herodotos, not merely insisted that he was so called from his stammering speech, but assigned as his mother Phronimê the daughter of Etearchos, chief of the Kretan city of Axos.³³⁹ This opinion the historian summarily rejects. Battos in his belief was the Libyan word for a king; and hence it was that the Kyrenaian chiefs, who by the fiat of Phoibos Apollon were to be precisely eight in number, were alternately known as Battos and Arkesilaos, the Greek equivalent for the Libyan title,—an ingenious compromise to soothe the prejudices of a mixed population of Greeks and Africans. The story exhibits the familiar features of prophecies framed after the event; and some allowance may therefore be made for a feeling of impatience with a narrative which brings Battos and his followers to the island of Platea where the faithful Korobios awaited their coming, and, having described their sojourn of six years as a time of utter wretchedness because an island off the Libyan coast was not Libya itself, at last takes them by night through the enchanting regions of Irasa (which by day would have charmed them like the Lotos-land) to the site of the future Kyrene, the spot where the piercing of the heaven³⁴⁰ is supposed to indicate the ramparts of mountains rising behind it to the sky. The description is somewhat forced for hills near Bengazi; but the tradition that their arrival at the fountain of Apollon was followed by a time of unbroken prosperity may have been shaped by the memory of long wanderings brought to an end in a rich and peaceful land.

The tale which follows on the reigns of the eight Kyrenaian kings must be taken as we receive it. It is useless to criticise the history of sovereigns for whose existence we have no adequate historical evidence; and hence we may lay the more stress on the fact that, as with the annals of the English conquest of Britain,³⁴¹ the chronology consists of multiples of eight. The first Battiad reigns forty years, his son Arkesilaos reigns sixteen. The third king is Battos the Happy who with the aid of the Pythian priestess obtained

CHAP.
VIII.

The found-
ation of
Kyrenê.

The Battiad
kings of
Kyrenê.

³³⁹ Ib. iv. 154.

³⁴⁰ Ib. iv. 158.

³⁴¹ Lappenberg, *England under the Anglo-Saxon Kings*, i. 75. See also *Popular Romances of the Middle Ages*, Introduction, p. 6.

from various parts of Hellas an immense addition to the numbers of his Greek subjects. The bait which he held out was a distribution of land to be taken from the neighbouring Libyan tribes. The lands were transferred; but so deep was the resentment of the Libyans and of their chief Adikran that they declared themselves subjects of Apries (Ἰοφραῖ) king of Egypt, and besought his help. In an evil hour Apries granted their prayer. With contemptuous confidence an Egyptian army marched to meet an enemy of whose tactics and discipline they knew nothing. The conflict took place at Irasa near the fountain of Thestê and was rather a massacre than a battle. Of the whole host only a miserable remnant returned to Egypt, and Apries lost his throne. The reign of the second Arkesilaos was marked by a disaster as signal as the victory of his father Battos. A quarrel with his brothers led not only to their leaving Kyrênê and founding a new settlement at Barkê, about seventy miles westward and twelve miles from the sea, but to systematic efforts to stir the Libyan subjects of Arkesilaos to revolt. Fearing to face the Kyrenaian forces, the Libyans fled in the direction of Egypt, hotly pursued by their enemies. Having reached Leukon, they resolved to make a stand, and they did so, it is said, to such purpose that six thousand Greek hoplites were left dead upon the field. Greek history presents no other instance of so great a slaughter of heavy armed troops; and although the extent of the disaster would prove the largeness of the recent immigration, the numbers of a purely traditional narrative must at least be received with caution. To Arkesilaos this defeat was as ruinous as that of the Egyptians had been to Apries. He was strangled by his brother Learchos, and Learchos in his turn was murdered by Eryxo his brother's widow. To the Kyrenaians subjection to a lame man in the person of Battos the third was even more humiliating than defeat in battle. In their misery they sent to Delphoi, where the priestess advised them to intrust the reconstitution of the state to an Arkadian of Mantinea. The Mantineians accordingly sent Demonax³⁴² who divided the population into three classes, the first including the original

³⁴² Herod. iv. 161.

colonists with the Perioikoi, the second containing the Peloponnesian and Kretan immigrants, the third being left for the colonists from the other Egean islands. The work of Demonax was crowned by the establishment of a democracy, the lame Battos being allowed to retain his lands with the dignity of the Rex Sacrificulus at Rome. His son the third Arkesilaos disdained this composition; but failing to regain his lost power, he went to Samos, while his mother Pheretimê sailed to the Kyprian Salamis to ask aid of the king Euelthôn. This chief gave her a golden distaff, a spindle, and some wool, and added that if she needed anything further he would send women who should help her to spin. At Samos Arkesilaos was more successful. A crowd of men, enlisted in his service by the offer of rich Kyrenaian land, recovered for him his lost dominion. The vengeance of Arkesilaos was cruel. Many of his opponents were banished: many took refuge in the tower of Aglomachos. Arkesilaos burnt the tower and all within it; and a prophecy after the fact attributed to the Pythian priestess the warning that if he found the oven full of jars and wasted them, he would rue the deed. Leaving Kyrênê he went to Barkê where his father-in-law, a prince bearing the Libyan name Alazir, was king. Here he was murdered in the Agora by some exiles from Kyrênê, and Alazir was slain with him. During the sojourn of her son at Barkê Pheretimê with unflinching energy had taken his place at Kyrênê, discharging all the functions of government and presiding in the council. On hearing that he was dead, she hastened to Egypt and besought the aid of the satrap Aryandes.³⁴³ Her son had deserved this boon by submitting to Kambyzes and binding himself to pay tribute. The first step of the satrap was to send to Barkê and demand the surrender of the murderers. The Barkaians declared that they had all shared the deed; and a vast army and fleet advanced to punish them. But a siege of nine months brought only disaster to the Egyptians, until at last the general Amasis resolved to accomplish by fraud what he could not achieve by force. Having dug a

³⁴³ In an evil hour Aryandes invaded the royal prerogative by coining money; and Dareios, charging him with rebellion, put him to death. Herod. iv. 166.

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I.

large trench and having placed over it bundles covered with earth, he invited the Barkaian chiefs to a conference, and over this trench an oath was sworn that while this earth remains the Persians would do the Barkaians no hurt, the latter promising to pay tribute as in times past to the great king. The Barkaians departed; the earth was removed; the Persians, admitted within the walls, became masters of the city, and Pheretimê enjoyed the sweetness of revenge. The murderers of Arkesilaos and all who were suspected of being their accomplices were impaled round the city, while on the wall fronting them the ministers of royal cruelty had nailed, it is said, the breasts of their wives. The city was abandoned to Persian license, and the staunch partisans of the Battiadai, whose property had been carefully guarded, were left to govern it. Having done his work at Barkê, the Egyptian admiral Bares wished to treat Kyrênê after the same fashion. While he still had the power to deal with the city as he liked, Amasis would not hear of it. Having passed through and left it, he repented to no purpose. A messenger from Aryandes recalled the army which, strangely enough, was supplied with provisions by the Kyrenaïans, and began its retreat. But the Libyan tribes were now roused, and all stragglers as well as the sick were cut off by roving plunderers until they had crossed the Egyptian border. The Barkaian prisoners, Herodotos adds, were sent to Dareios who gave them land in Baktria. The exiles called their village Barkê, and their Greek-speaking descendents were living there in the days of the historian. Pheretimê paid the penalty of her crimes, and died the death of Herod and Galerius.³⁴⁴

Influence of
the native
tribes on
the Greek
colonists

Of the history of Kyrênê Herodotos takes no further notice. The answer to the third Arkesilaos, which he puts into the mouth of the Delphian priestess, seems to imply that he had heard of a fourth Battos and a fourth Arkesilaos with whom the dynasty came to an end. But the lives of these princes are shrouded in a darkness which throws suspicion on the vivid pictures of the earlier kings and more particularly of the savage but sagacious Pheretimê. If the fourth Battos

³⁴⁴ Herod. iv. 162-167, 200-205.

was king while Barkê was being besieged by the Persians, it is unlikely that he retained the full authority of his predecessor. That an Arkesilaos, who was supposed to be eighth in descent from the first Battos, was reigning in the 98th Olympiad, 466 B.C., is certain from the express statements of Pindar ;³⁴⁵ but from the poet's ode we learn little more than the fact that he was a man who would be none the worse for following moderate or prudent counsels. The history of Pheretimê is more significant. It is probable that the character of the more remote Greek colonies would be more or less affected by that of the neighbouring tribes ; it is certain that the deeds of this fearful woman would never have been done by a genuine Greek. The Greek would kill his enemies, but he would not torture or mutilate them ; and the punishment of Artayktes after the fall of Sestos³⁴⁶ must be ascribed probably to the degrading influence of Thracian ferocity and to the wish to treat Persian tyrants as they treated others. The name of the Barkaian prince Alazir sufficiently proves that in these colonies Libyan blood was largely intermingled with that of Hellenes ; nor can we doubt that Pheretimê is as excellent a representative of African viragos as is Amestris of Asiatic sultanas.

So miserable and disgraceful is the history of that splendid city whose scattered fragments still attest its ancient magnificence. Placed on a mountain terrace nearly two thousand feet in height and commanding from a distance of ten miles a vast sweep of the sea, Kyrênê had in the loftier hills which rose behind it a source of wealth more precious than the richness of the most fertile soil. With water even poor soils will yield marvellously under an African sun ; and that boon was abundantly secured to Kyrênê by the constant vapours and rains condensed and precipitated by these beneficent mountains. With this moisture the plains near the sea yielded lavish harvests of grain, while the lower hills and valleys furnished never failing pasture. Nay, with the differences of climate between the higher and the lower lands, the fruits were ripening and harvest was going on all the year round ; and lastly in the Silphium, whose

CHAP.
VIII.

466 B.C.

Sources of
the pro-
sperity of
Kyrênê.

³⁴⁵ Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 116.

³⁴⁶ Herod. ix. 120.

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I.

leaves nourished cattle while the stalk furnished food for men and the root yielded a juice highly valued in all parts of Hellas, Kyrênê had a special source of wealth which, in spite of civil dissensions and tumults, carried the colony to a height of prosperity reached by no other African city except Carthage. With the power of that city the Greek emigrants were brought into contact when the Spartan Dorieus attempted to found a settlement on the banks of the Kinyps.³⁴⁷ The expulsion of these colonists by Libyan tribes with Carthaginian aid, and the comparative ease with which the Kyrenians established their ascendancy over the neighbouring native tribes, seem to show that these rovers of the desert had not in those days the fierce tenacity of hatred which has been impressed upon them by the bigotry of Mahometanism.

The colony
of Hesperides.

Thus in that fertile region which, lying between the island of Platea in the east to the settlement of Hesperides (Bengazi) in the west, stretched from the coast to the southern mountain ranges,³⁴⁸ Greek colonists had a field for enterprise which, if persistent, could not fail to be richly rewarded; and commercially, it must be admitted that these colonies were successful. They rose to wealth; but they did little, perhaps nothing, for that growth of the Hellenic mind which marks one of the most important phases in the history of the human race. In the settlement of Hesperides Greek colonisation in Africa reached its westernmost limit; but the time of its foundation is not known. Probably its fortunes much resembled those of Kyrênê and Barkê; and possibly the simple fact of its existence in the days of Herodotos conveys to us a knowledge as profitable as that which may be gained from the misty and uncertain chronicles of its more notorious neighbours.

Conflicts
between the
Carthaginians
and the Greeks.

The lands which lay to the west of Hesperides were manifestly regarded by Carthage as ground over which she could suffer no dominion to be established but her own. She had now been compelled to put down Hellenic incroachments in Africa. The same task awaited her in Sicily, calling for greater efforts on her part and involving a risk of more

³⁴⁷ Herod. v. 42.

³⁴⁸ The land to the south of these mountains is desert.

serious failure. Her first conflict in that battle-ground of opposing races was with the gallant but unlucky adventurer whom she had already encountered on the banks of the Kinyps. The history of Dorieus belongs to a class of traditions which would seem strange if ascribed to any Greek city but Sparta. But for the officious meddling of the ephors and the senate³⁴⁹ Dorieus would have been king instead of the mad Kleomenes. Thus deprived of his inheritance, he resolved, like Demokedes, to quit Sparta; but, unlike Demokedes, he left it with the temper not of a traitor, but of a brave man determined to extend the power of his country in other lands. With all the high spirit of his younger brother the illustrious Leonidas, he sailed to Libya without asking, it is said, the advice of the Delphian god; and this carelessness was probably regarded as fully explaining his expulsion by the Libyan tribes in alliance with Carthage. Thus driven out, he returned to Sparta, and had he chosen to remain there, he would have been the general in command at Thermopylai. But at Sparta he could not rest; and he departed, this time after consulting the god at Delphoi, to seek a new home in Sicily. He had the promise of Apollon that he should succeed in taking the territory of Eryx in the north-western corner of the island; and in the popular belief of the Sybarites who survived the fall of the city, he failed in so doing, only because, instead of going straight on his errand to Sicily, he must needs turn his sword against them in company with their deadly enemies the Krotoniats.³⁵⁰ The fact of this alliance

510 B.C.

³⁴⁹ Herod. v. 41.³⁵⁰ See note 306. Herod. v. 45-46.

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I.

tyrant Peithagoras made himself despot in his stead. His subjects were not altogether satisfied with this measure of freedom, for after a while they put him to death at the very altar of Zeus Agoraios.

Foundation
of the
Gelonian
dynasty of
Syracuse.

But the rivalry of Carthage had little effect in repressing those innate vices of the Greek character which seemed to gain strength in new soil. The Greek colonies in Sicily exhibit generally the same transitions from oligarchical government to tyranny which mark the history of the parent country during the generations preceding the Persian wars. The great power and prosperity attained by many of these Greek cities in Sicily, in spite of everlasting feuds and frequent revolutions, furnish sufficient evidence of the extraordinary advantages which they enjoyed in the soil, the climate, and the physical resources of the country. Among the despots who rose to power in these cities the most prominent was Gelon, the eldest son of Deinomenes of Gela, his three younger brothers being Hieron, Polyzelos, and Thrasyboulos. Born of a family which the craft or the bravery of Telines³⁵¹ had rendered eminent, Gelon was further endowed with high military genius; and when the despot Kleandros was murdered and his brother Hippokrates reigned in his stead, he gave to the latter in the sieges of Kallipolis and Naxos, Zanklê and Leontinoi, aid so valuable that the tyrant placed him at the head of all his cavalry.³⁵² All these cities passed under the dominion of Hippokrates. The Syracusans alone escaped, after a severe defeat on the banks of the Heloros, through the intervention of the Corinthians and Korkyraians,³⁵³ on condition of surrendering to Gelon the city of Kamarina, about forty miles to the west of the southern promontory of Pachinos. At Hybla, an inland town a few miles to the north of Kamarina, Hippokrates in his turn was murdered, and Gelon came forward as the champion of his young sons whose authority the Geloans refused to acknowledge. The men of Gela paid the penalty of their rashness on the field of battle; but the conqueror put aside the youths whose cause he had professed to maintain, and armed

491 B.C.

³⁵¹ Herod. vii. 153. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 142; v. 282. ³⁵² *Ib.* vii. 154.

³⁵³ This joint action for the common benefit of their Sicilian colonies seems to justify the suspicion that the squabbles between them were caused chiefly by the Corinthians.

with the supreme power, resolved to obtain possession of the one great city which had escaped the yoke of his predecessors. The Syracusan oligarchical landowners, called Gamoroi, had been driven out by combinations of the poorer free citizens with the Kyllyrans or predial serfs who represented the original inhabitants of the country. These gladly availed themselves of the help of Gelon for the recovery of their property and their power. The former they may have regained; the latter Gelon had resolved to keep as his own portion; and when the Syracusan demos opened the gates of the city on his approach, he reached the summit of his ambition. It was in Syracuse that he wished to rule. Gela was committed to the charge of his brother Hieron, and all his efforts were concentrated on the aggrandisement of his new home. He went to work with the energy and unscrupulousness of Asiatic despots to whom the transplantation of whole tribes became a pleasant pastime. Among his first steps was the demolition of Kamarina whose citizens he transferred in a body to Syracuse, and the same fate befell one half of the inhabitants of Gela. He next turned his arms against Megara and Eubœa, and was soon master of these cities. The provocation had been given wholly by the oligarchic nobles. These he transplanted and made citizens of Syracuse. The Demos, or small proprietors, who had given him no cause of offence, he also took with him to Syracuse, but only to hand them over to foreign slavedealers. In his eyes, the historian adds, the demos were but scurvy companions.³⁵⁴ From his own point of view he was perhaps wise in so thinking. Great works were done at Athens while democracy was in its most vigorous growth; but they were done only because all were animated by common zeal for a common purpose. No such union could be looked for at Syracuse, and there too great works must be carried on, in which freemen would be at best but troublesome instruments. His measures insured the splendour of the city which probably now outgrew the limits of Ortygia and began to spread on the opposite slopes of Achradina. No other Greek despot had ever risen to such plenitude of power; none had guarded that power with

³⁵⁴ Herod vii. 156.

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I.

such sagacity and resolution. He was virtually master of all Sicily east of a line drawn from the borders of Messênê, which was under the rule of the Rhegian Anaxilaos, to those of Akragas, then governed by his friend Theron. To the soldiers furnished by the native Sicilian tribes he added a force of Arkadian mercenaries; and to his land army he added a formidable fleet. Popular tradition ascribed to both a magnitude which made them even in point of numbers no contemptible match for the multitudes led or driven by Xerxes.³⁵⁵

Incroach-
ments of
Gelon on
Cartha-
ginian
ground.
481 B.C.

Four years later (481 B.C.) his aid was sought against this barbarian invader by the envoys from Athens and Sparta; and Gelon in his reply expressed his readiness to furnish them with a force such as no other Greek state was able to raise, and with a wealth of supplies wholly beyond the resources of all the Greek cities put together. But while in return for this aid he insisted on being recognised as supreme commander of the Greek confederation, he took care, we are told, to rebuke them for the selfishness which now made them his suppliants, when in his time of need they had refused to help him in his efforts to avenge the death of Dorieus and drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily.³⁵⁶ If these words point to historical facts, these facts fully explain the real reason for that refusal of aid to the continental Greeks which the tradition of the latter ascribed to their own rejection of his claim to the Hegemony. The efforts of Gelon had succeeded in pushing the Carthaginians back to the west of a line drawn between the Greek cities of Himera on the northern and Selinous on the southwestern coast of the island; but he had not succeeded in detaching these cities from their friendship for or their alliance with Carthage, a friendship shared further by the towns of Messene and Rhegion.³⁵⁷ Within this line the Carthaginians retained only the settlements of Motyê, Panormos, and Soloeis (Soluntum); and although their policy thus far had been to avoid all wars (for their contest with Dorieus was the result of open aggression), the rapid aggrandisement of

³⁵⁵ Herod. vii. 157. Paus. v. 27, 1.

³⁵⁶ *Ib.* vii. 158. Diod. xi. 20.

³⁵⁷ *Ib.* vii. 165. Diod. xi. 23.

Gelon made them fear that without a vigorous effort they would lose their hold even on this western corner of the island. The way was opened for such an effort by those internal feuds among Greeks which raised an insuperable barrier to the growth of a Greek nation. Combination on the part of the Greek settlers would have made them absolute masters of all Sicily. Sustained and systematic action would have secured the same result for the Carthaginians. Both alike failed in the conditions indispensable for permanent ascendancy, and the end was the absorption of both in the dominion of imperial Rome.³⁵⁸ Some advantages gained by the demos at Himera over the oligarchic faction enabled Theron of Akragas to expel the Himeraian despot Terillos; but here, as elsewhere, the demos gained nothing by the change. Terillos besought aid from Carthage, and the appearance of the Suffes or king,³⁵⁹ Hamilkar the son of Hannon, with a formidable army (tradition made it thirty myriads) chiefly of mercenaries,³⁶⁰ took away from Gelon the power, if he had the will, to aid the Hellenes in their struggle with Xerxes. If there be any truth in the Sicilian story that Gelon would have helped the Greeks if he could and that being unable to do so he sent them a supply of money by the hands of Kadmos of Kos,³⁶⁰ we may well feel thankful for the preservation of a record which convicts of singular malignity the tradition of the Eastern Greeks.

We shall find that but little trust can be placed in the minute details of the battles fought during the Persian war at Thermopylai, Salamis, Plataiai, or Mykalê. We are even less justified in giving credit to the narrative of the battle which, fought, it is said, on the very day of the fight at Salamis, left Gelon by the utter defeat of Hamilkar master, for the time, of all Sicily. Diodoros, who like Herodotos raised the Carthaginian army to 300,000, kills off half that number on the field of Himera where, seventy years later, the grandson of Hamilkar sacrificed three thousand Hellenic prisoners,³⁶¹ while he ascribes the result of the conflict to a

The battle
of Himera.
480 B.C.

³⁵⁸ Ihne, *History of Rome*, ii. 23.

³⁵⁹ The name Suffetes is that of the Hebrew Shofetim, judges. Ihne, *Hist. Rome*, ii. 15. Arnold, *Hist. Rome*, ii. 548.

³⁶⁰ Herod. vii. 164.

³⁶¹ Herod. vii. 165. Diod. xi. 20

stratagem suggested to Gelon by some intercepted letters from the Selinountians to the Carthaginian leader. The incident is in no way unlikely; but the ground seems to be less firm when we reach the tale which relates the death of Hamilkar. This ill-fated chief, it is said, was never seen again after the fight. The whole field was searched with minute care by the order of Gelon, but his body could not be found; and Herodotos was inclined to put faith in an alleged Carthaginian tradition that during the battle Hamilkar stood by a huge altar on which he was sacrificing whole beasts as victims, and that on seeing the day going against him he leaped into the consuming fires. The historian adds that his countrymen raised monuments to his memory in all their colonies as well as in Carthage itself and worshipped him as a god.³⁶² If this be true, it is of itself conclusive evidence that his defeat was not so overwhelming as his enemies would have it and that on the day of battle the general did something more than roast flesh to appease the hunger of Moloch. It was not the habit of Carthaginians to venerate men who brought their country to the verge of ruin. The tradition is throughout disfigured by the vanity of the Sicilian Greeks. As in one version of the eastern story Xerxes was suffered to reach the Asiatic shore with only one solitary boat, so with Diodoros a single vessel reaches Carthage with the miserable remnant of the army which Hamilkar had conveyed to Sicily in more than two thousand ships. There is, in fact, no limit to their humiliation. Carthaginian envoys fall in tears at the feet of Gelon, praying him in the name of humanity to have mercy upon them. His wife Damaretê plays the part of queen Philippa in the scene between Edward III. and the burgesses of Calais;³⁶³ and the Carthaginians are pardoned on condition of paying 2,000 talents as the cost of the war and building two temples in which the treaty of peace might be preserved. Like men reprieved from a sentence of death, they accept these terms with a gratitude which finds expression in the gift to Damaretê of a golden crown 200 talents in weight. To complete the fiction, we are told that Gelon was thus indulgent.

³⁶² Herod. vii. 167.³⁶³ Longman, *Life and Times of Edward III.* i. 287.

to the enemies whom he had crushed, because he was anxious to take part in the continental war against Xerxes; that, before he could set sail, the tidings came of the victory of Salamis and the retreat of the tyrant; that on receiving the news, he summoned the citizens to appear armed in the assembly, and going to that assembly not only without arms but even without an upper garment, entered into an elaborate review of his acts and of the policy by which they had been dictated. No Greek despot had ever thus thrown himself on the good faith of his people. The Syracusans knew how to appreciate such confidence, and hailed the tyrant by acclamation as their benefactor, their saviour, and their king.³⁶⁴ In striking contrast with this extravagant romance the lyric poet, writing at a time not many years after the event, prays that Zeus may put off as long as possible the conflict then impending with the Carthaginians which he feels must be a struggle for life or death.³⁶⁵

If the defeated Hamilkar was worshipped by his countrymen, the victorious Gelon deserved at least equal honours. He too was venerated as a hero, when a few months after his great triumph he died of dropsy. He had desired that his power should be shared between his two brothers,—Hieron whom he had placed at Gela succeeding to the tyranny, while Polyzelos was to have the military command. The arrangement was not to Hieron's mind. Polyzelos took refuge, it is said, with Theron of Akragas, who by refusing to surrender him drew down on himself the wrath of Hieron. It is scarcely necessary to follow the uncertain traditions of the time through the accounts of the revolt of the Himeraians and of their cruel punishment by Theron; ³⁶⁶ of the defeat of the Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian assailants of Cumæ by Hieron; and of the wholesale deportations in which this despot followed the example of his brother Gelon. He desired, it seems, the honours of an Oikistes, and he gained them by founding the city of Aitna on the site of Katana whose inhabitants together with those of Naxos he removed to

The fall of
the Gelo-
nian
dynasty.

³⁶⁴ Diod. xi. 21-26. It is clear that this story must have been invented after the time of Herodotos, according to whom, vii. 164, the Sicilian tradition is very modest, and therefore probably near to the truth.

³⁶⁵ Pind. *Nam.* ix. 67. Ihne, *History of Rome*, ii. 23.

³⁶⁶ Diod. xi. 48-9.

Leontinoi,³⁶⁷ After Hieron's death the expelled Katanaians allied themselves with the Sikel prince Douketios, and having regained their lost inheritance, defaced the tomb of the would-be founder of Aitna. In short, after the death of Gelon, the history of the Greek cities in Sicily falls back into the old round of faction, revolution, and war. Between Gelon and Theron of Akragas there had been a firm friendship: between Hieron and Thrasydaios the son of Theron there was a war in which the former paid a high price for his victory. Thrasydaios, it is said, withdrew to Megara where he wished to live in peace; but the Megarians felt themselves bound to act on the good old Greek maxim, and Thrasydaios was formally tried, condemned, and put to death as a tyrant.³⁶⁸ The death of Hieron a few years later was followed by further troubles. His brother Thrasyboulos had a rival, it is said, in his nephew the son of Gelon. He met and averted the danger by corrupting the boy, and then gave full play to his vindictive and merciless nature.³⁶⁹ The result was a revolt of his subjects who besieged him in Ortygia, and, if we are to believe the account of Diodoros, compelled him to yield up his power. Eighteen years³⁷⁰ only had passed since the foundation of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse when Thrasyboulos departed and took up his abode among the Epizephyrian Lokrians, who dealt with him more mercifully than the Megarians had dealt with Thrasydaios. But the expulsion of the tyrants tended little to the establishment of order and law. The citizens who had been banished by the Syracusan despots now returned and with the aid of their partisans in the city carried a law declaring all citizens introduced by those tyrants ineligible to any public offices. The wealthy oligarchs determined to resist the decree; but if they felt full confidence when first they found themselves besieged in Ortygia, the lapse of many months brought nothing to justify their hopes, and a battle which at last they ventured to fight ended, it is said, in a defeat, of the results of which we know nothing. It is unfortunate that we are left practically to the guidance of

³⁶⁷ The pride of Hieron in this unrighteous foundation is shown by the phrases of Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 117; iii. 121. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 310.

³⁶⁸ Diod. xi. 53.

³⁶⁹ Arist. *Polit.* v. 10, 31.

³⁷⁰ *Ib.* v. 12, 6.

Diodoros for the history of a popular reaction during which the condition of the country was apparently more than usually healthy and prosperous. But a general comparison of the Greek colonies in Sicily with those which were established in Africa shows that both were influenced by the tribes whose lands they occupied, while they retained and exhibited in an exaggerated form the inherent vices of the Greek character. In Sicily these vices were a perennial fountain of feuds and violence; in Africa they ran into the horrible barbarities for which Pheretimê won an infamous reputation. We have now to see how and with what results, on soil not much more promising at the first, the seeds of law, order, and freedom were sown at Athens.

CHAPTER IX.

EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ATHENS.

BOOK
I.
Contrast
between
Sparta and
Athens as
drawn by
Perikles.

WE have already seen that the constitutions of Athens and Sparta furnish abundant evidence of their common origin from the primitive Aryan household with its absolute subjection to the father of the family, or, in other words, to the priest who alone could offer the necessary sacrifices to his deified ancestors. But although the theory of this ancient family life remained intact in both, the differences in the growth of these two states were wide indeed. If we may accept as substantially true and fair the picture which Perikles in his great Funeral Oration³⁷¹ draws of the political and social condition of Athens in his own day, we shall find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that distinctions of time and place go for little indeed. All the special characteristics of English polity—its freedom of speech, the right of the people to govern themselves, the supremacy of the ordinary courts of law over all functionaries without exception, the practical restriction of state interference to the protection of person and property, the free play given to the tastes, fancies, prejudices, and caprices of individual citizens—may be seen in equal developement in the polity of Athens. Left to the full enjoyment of private life³⁷² and of all that makes it graceful and valuable, not vexed by the eternal drill and worrying discipline of Sparta, her people were yet more ready than Spartans to sacrifice everything on her behalf, for the simple reason that they had much more to sacrifice, and met hardships and dangers as bravely and with greater coolness and wisdom than the Spartans ever attained with their incessant military routine.

³⁷¹ Thuc. ii. 35-46.

³⁷² Unhappily it cannot, in the meaning which Englishmen attach to the phrase, be said that the Athenians had any home life at all.

As we find it in the days of Perikles, the Athenian constitution is a magnificent but complicated fabric which presents a startling contrast to the comparatively rude and barbarous constitution of Sparta. The arbitrary action of an irresponsible board, with power to put citizens to death without a trial, the joint kingship of two sovereigns who are practically no more than commanders-in-chief of the army in time of war, the slight influence of an assembly which, although oligarchic to the core, was yet endowed with the scantiest powers, make up a state of things which has few features in common with the absolute supremacy of the Athenian people and with a law which invested every citizen with judicial functions and made it not only his right and privilege but his bounden duty to take part in the great work of government.

CHAP.
IX.

Athenian
idea of
citizenship.

But, like the constitutions of England, the full development of Athenian democracy was the work of ages. It was no makeshift hastily adopted and modified at haphazard after the fashion of some European nations who expel kings and queens and then sit down to meditate on the forms of government which may best suit their interests or their fancies. Like the English constitution, it was the fruit of long and arduous struggles, slowly ripened as the people awoke more and more to that consciousness of law and order which can only be fully awakened among men who feel that the law which they obey is their own law and that they obey it because it aims more and more at being in accordance with a justice and righteousness higher than that of man.³⁷³ Like the constitution of England at once in its coherence and in its powers of adaptation to change of circumstances, it carries us back in the history of its growth to times of which we must candidly confess that we know very little; and we must on many matters be content either to suspend our judgement or to reason from signs which, as in the early history of English polity, seem to point to sufficiently probable conclusions. What the exact course of events may have been, or what may have been precisely the nature of the struggles which preceded the establishment of Athenian freedom, it

Complicated
character
of the
Athenian
constitution.

³⁷³ Soph. *Oid. Tyr.* 864.

BOOK
I.

would be hard to say positively. As in the long contests between the opposing orders in the Roman state, we cannot accept a narrative as historical because it is well defined in dates and details. In the early traditions of the city of Rome we are often told that a question is finally settled only to find it reopened again a few months or a few years later; and the sequel of a struggle has not unfrequently very little, if it have even anything, to do with its beginning.³⁷⁴ In Athenian history it may at the least be said that the mists are not so thick as in that of Rome.

Athens in
the time of
Kleisthenes.

The undoubted existence down to the time of Kleisthenes (a period preceding by only a few years the battle of Marathon) of a subdivision by clans and houses carries us back, as we have already seen, almost to the earliest form of human society. Whatever may have been the origin and meaning of the names which have been variously assigned to the Athenian tribes, the evidence already reviewed³⁷⁵ seems to leave it certain that the point of starting was from the house or family upwards, and not from the larger division downwards. We have here in fact the same growth as that of the English families into tithings, hundreds, and shires,—a division which preceded and survived the several kingdoms into which the country was from time to time parcelled out.³⁷⁶ Nor can we question that the principle underlying this grouping was one of blood and of religion, which could take no reckoning of those who were not sprung from the same stock. Hence if in later times there were superadded to the old clan names a further political grouping which took in the whole country territorially, still this grouping could not necessarily embrace all its inhabitants. All who could not share in the gentile sacrifices would be shut out; and the influx of strangers and foreigners would tend to swell a population to which the existing social order allowed no political rights. It was the growth of such a population which, owing to conflicts between the ruling classes, determined the form of Athenian democracy.

But when we have said thus much, we are still bound to

³⁷⁴ Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ch. xii. sect. 55, and *passim*.
³⁷⁶ Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, vol. i. ch. iii. § 2.

³⁷⁵ Chapter ii.

admit that of the details of Athenian history generally to the days of Solon, or even to a later time, we cannot pretend to any accurate knowledge; and here, as elsewhere, until we approach the times for which we have the evidence of contemporary writers, we can do little more than content ourselves with the thought that the vast mass of tradition which has come down to us cannot be without some solid historical foundation.

CHAP.
IX.
Absence of
historical
records.

On the origin of the tribal names whether of the Ionic or of other races something has been already said.³⁷⁷ If we are to follow inconsistent traditions, these names were by no means permanent. If in one Kekrops is said to have divided Attica into twelve districts, another speaks of the four Attic tribes in his day under the names Kekropis, Autochthon, Paralia, and Aktaia. In the time of his successor Kranaos the four tribes are said to have been called Kranais, Atthis, Mesogaia, and Diakria: under Erichthonios they bear the the names Dias, Athenais, Poseidonias, Hephaistias, while after the time of Erechtheus they were known as Geleontes, Hopletes, Aigikoreis and Argades after the four sons, it is said, of Ion and Kreousa, as being respectively the cultivators, the warrior class, the goatherds, and the artisans. This division, it is asserted, was maintained down to the days of Kleisthenes: nor can we doubt that these four names were found far beyond the limits of Attica and that they denote probably the four original tribes of the Ionians.³⁷⁸ But the meaning of each particular name it seems impossible to determine. The Argades are said by some to have been the artisans, by others they are regarded as the tillers of the soil, while the Geleontes, who also appear as Teleontes and Gedeontes, are in their turn taken by some to have been the cultivators, and by others to have formed the priestly class.³⁷⁹ Again among the tribal names of the days of Kranaos two, Mesogaia and Diakria, seem to be not less geographical than

The Attic
and Ionic
tribes.

³⁷⁷ Pp. 30, 59.

³⁷⁸ All four names appear in inscriptions belonging to Kyzikos on the Propontis; and the Geleontes are mentioned in inscriptions of the Ionic Teos. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. x. For Erechtheus, Erichthonios, and other mythical kings see *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, ii. 308, &c. The names denote the fruit-bearing power of the earth. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*, i. 159; ii. 137.

³⁷⁹ This last name is referred to an old verb γέλειν, to shine, by some who see in it a title corresponding to that of the Roman Luceres.

BOOK
I.

the titles of Pediaioi, Paraloi, and Hyperakrioi which become prominent in the Solonian traditions and which denote the men of the plains, the sea-coast, and the hills. But of the nature of this division we can say nothing positively. The appearance of these names chiefly in connexion with stories of the intestine disputes preceding and following the Solonian legislation has led some to regard them as mere titles of factions,³⁸⁰ while others discern in them a triple division answering to the Ramnenses, Titienses, and Luceres of the Romans.³⁸¹

The Trittyes and Naukrariai.

In the Trittyes and Naukraria we have a classification which clearly follows a downward course. The tribe must have been organised before it could be divided into three portions, and the twelve Trittyes obtained for the four tribes were then divided each into four Naukrariai, forty-eight in all. Solon, it is said, laid on each of these Naukrariai the charge of providing one ship for the public service; and hence it has been inferred that the classification itself was devised by him and was thus designated from its reference to the navy. But if Herodotos be right in saying that Kylon was removed from sanctuary by the Prytaneis, or presidents, of the Naukraroi, it would follow that the division existed before the days of Solon and that the Naukraroi were simply the chief householders charged with the levying and administration of the taxes in each district.³⁸² This classification, it is obvious, might be made to include all the inhabitants of Athenian territory; but it would follow further that no man possessed any political rights or privileges as being the member of a Naukraria or a Trittyes. The latter might chance to be geographically coextensive with a Phratia; but it was so only in order to obtain a financial hold on men who, as not possessing the title of consanguinity, could not be members of the religious societies called Houses or Families.

The union of the Attic Demoi.

We are still on doubtful ground when we come to the story of the settlement of Athens as related by Thucydides.³⁸³

³⁸⁰ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 127.

³⁸¹ Niebuhr, *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* i. 220.

³⁸² The word Naukraros would thus be only another form of Nauklēros in the sense of a householder, as *ναύλον* denoted the rent of a house, and as the Nautodikai were the officers charged with the duty of trying cases of unlawful admission into the Phraties. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 72.

³⁸³ ii. 15.

The story is as plausible as that of Robinson Crusoe: it really stands on precisely the level of the legend of Jack and the Beanstalk, if we leave out all about Jack, the giant, and the bean. Of the Theseus who is said to have made Athens the seat of a central government which superseded the independent action of a set of voluntarily confederated boroughs or cities, our knowledge comes only from the stories which tell us of his marvellous childhood, of the discovery of his father's weapons under the great stone, of his battle with the Minotaurus and his stealing of Helen, the fatal sister of the Dioskouroi. Still, although we may not regard the narrative as history, we are not free to say that no such change ever took place. It is far more likely that it did. The mere classification into Trittyes and Naukrariai is of itself proof that the need was felt of political divisions which should run counter to the religious and exclusive constitution of the houses and clans; and this feeling is brought out still more prominently in the accounts of the political changes attributed to Kleisthenes. There could have been no reason for substituting local Demoi for the existing tribes, if the latter could have been made as available for the purposes of the statesman.

The consolidation of the Attic Demoi into a single state would thus answer to the gradual absorption of the several English kingdoms under the sovereignty of the chiefs of Wessex. In the one case as in the other the task was not accomplished in a day, nor without violent struggles. The prohibition of intermarriage which is said to have existed among some of the Attic Demoi would point to the jealousy and animosity of communities originally independent; nor must we leave out of sight such legends as the story of the Athenian Tellos who falls in a battle between the men of Eleusis and of Athens³⁸⁴ and, more particularly, the evidence of poems like the Hymn to Dêmêtêr in which Eleusis is clearly still an independent state and in which the Athenians take no part in the mysteries of the Great Mother. The strength of this cantonal feeling is further shown in the eagerness with which the Athenians returned to their country

Right of
intermar-
riage.

³⁸⁴ Herod. i. 30.

BOOK
I.

The Eupa-
tridai, Geo-
moroi, and
Demiour-
goi.

life after the Persian invasion and in the reluctance with which they abandoned their homes to take up their quarters within the city at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.³⁸⁵

But when we come to the reforms of Theseus, we find in place of four tribes a new division under the three titles of Eupatridai, Geomoroï, and Demiourgoi,—in other words, the nobles, the yeomen, and the mechanics.³⁸⁶ Whatever else may be denoted by this classification, it represents with sufficient exactness the social order which prevailed for a long time both at Athens and at Rome, and which gave to certain families a preponderance over all other members of the state. Whatever may have been their relation to the tribes, we may fairly accept the fact that the substantial power in the state was in the hands of the Eupatridai. The days of kings had long been ended. The devotion of Kodros, it is said, had made the title too sacred to be borne by any after him, as the tyranny of Tarquin had made it too horrible to be tolerated at Rome. After him there were, we are told, archons for life,³⁸⁷ then for ten years, and then the office was put into commission,³⁸⁸ and a complicated constitution grew up, for which in the earlier stages we have no contemporary history, and to which writers who lived after the changes introduced by Aristides, Perikles, and Ephialtes, applied,

³⁸⁵ Thuc. ii. 16.

³⁸⁶ Dionysios, ii. 8, divides the Athenians into Eupatridai and Agroikoi or dependent cultivators, answering to the Latin patricians and clients. But he is clearly reasoning from Latin to Greek forms; and the looseness of his argument is sufficiently shown from his random guesses as to the meaning of the Latin Patres.

³⁸⁷ See p. 100, &c.

³⁸⁸ The names of these archons are in the eyes of some invested with an historical character, as being included in the Parian chronicle. The marble on which this record has been preserved exhibits, we are told, 'a chronological arrangement of important events in Greek history from the accession of Cecrops to the archonship of Callistratos, B.C. 355.' Rawlinson, *Manual of Ancient History*, p. 7. These words seem scarcely to inform the student that there is an essential difference between these two alleged historical events. So far as the form of the expression is concerned, they are both historical, and Kekrops would seem to succeed his predecessor as George IV. followed George III. Yet we cannot well speak of the accession of a king who is dragon-bodied, whose father was a snake, whose mother was the dew, and whose sister was married to the darling of the dawn. Mr. Grote, who holds that on the return of the Herakleidai we pass as at the waving of a magician's wand from mythical to historical Greece, regards the series of Eponymous Archons from Kreon downwards, B.C. 683, as 'perfectly trustworthy.' *Hist. Gr.* iii. 66. On the other hand, Niebuhr affirms that for the whole period down to the time of Solon 'we do not know a single fact, if we except the mention of the *ἀγος Κυλώνειον* and the legislation of Drakon.' *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 260. But the legislation of Solon is nearly a century later than the archonship of Kreon. In other words,—for the supposed period of some twelve or fourteen centuries, covered by the chronology of the Parian marble, there are only about two centuries and a half for which we have any history at all. See further, Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 548.

whenever it seemed necessary, the convenient method of conjecture.

CHAP.
IX.

But every confederation implies a council; and Aryan history generally furnishes ample evidence that the several combinations of families into a tribe and of tribes into a city would result in a subordination of the councils representing the clans and houses to the great council of the state. This council at Athens was that of Areiopagos or the hill of Ares. The fact that it is said to have been first constituted by Solon under this name proves only, as we might expect, that in the earliest times it had no distinctive title and, as in our Homeric poems, was known simply as Boulê, the Council. That its functions in the time of the kings answered to those of the heroic assembly, we may, if we please, suppose; that down to a much later time it exercised a wide legislative as well as judicial power, there is no reason to doubt; and the history of subsequent reforms would tend to show that the council and the magistrates included in it inherited the large and undefined powers which had belonged of right first to the master of the family, then to the chief of the clan, and lastly to the king. Of these powers the most sacred, if not the most important to the state, was that of the priesthood. As the name and person of the father and the king were most closely associated with the sacerdotal idea, so the kingly title both at Athens and Rome was assigned to the officer charged with the guardianship and direction of the state religion; and thus the Roman Rex Sacrorum answered to the Athenian Archon Basileus whose jurisdiction embraced cases of homicide and religious offences. Two other archons, belonging to the college of nine, who are said to have entered on their functions with Kreon, bore distinctive titles,—the first, who was also head of the college, being the Archon Eponymos, as giving his name to the year, or simply the Archon, and the Archon Polemarchos. Of these two the former settled all disputes arising from the relations of the family, the gens, and the phratría, while the latter dealt with all quarrels between citizens and non-citizens, and had the command of the army in war. All other matters not restricted to these were under the cognisance of the remaining

The Council of Areiopagos.

BOOK
I.

six archons who were known as Thesmothetai, a title, common doubtless to all the nine, which may be interpreted by the Homeric description of the judges who receive and maintain the laws for Zeus.³⁸⁹ These officers at the end of their year of office became, on passing the necessary test, permanent members of the great council of the Areiopagos.³⁹⁰

The Drakon-
ian legis-
lation.

The whole course of Athenian history seems to attest the gradual restriction of the powers of this body, which continued to retain its jurisdiction in cases of homicide long after it had been deprived of its legislative and administrative functions. The basis of its power was distinctly religious, and the power itself was necessarily exercised inflexibly. It was not competent for the Areiopagos to draw distinctions between the guilt of one homicide and that of another. There could be but one doom for all who were judged guilty of having shed blood, whether they might plead accident by way of excuse, or urge provocation by way of palliating the offence.³⁹¹ The hardness of the Drakonian laws has passed into a proverb;³⁹² but if we give credit to the tradition, it was a movement in the way of lenity, not of severity, when Drakon made the distinctions demanded by equity, and ordained that the court of the Ephetai,³⁹³ fifty-one in number, should sit in different places to adjudicate in different cases of homicide according to their complexion or to the plea

³⁸⁹ *Il.* i. 239.

³⁹⁰ That they were members of the council during their year of office is stated distinctly only by Lysias, *περὶ τοῦ Σηκοῦ*, p. 110, 111; Smith, *Dict. Antiq.* s.v. Areiopagos; and in the absence of direct statements contradicting this assertion, it is not easy to suppose that magistrates, who unquestionably shared between them the powers of the patriarchal king, were excluded from the council whose advice the king might ask, but whose judgment he was not bound to regard.

³⁹¹ To the objection to this view, which rests on the acquittal of Orestes for the death of his mother Klytæmnestra, Mr. Grote has replied at length. *Hist. Gr.* iii. 180. He is probably justified in concluding that the unqualified pledge given by Athênê that the Eumenides shall never again in like manner be deprived of their victim, is sufficient proof that the Areiopagos acted by the rule which is said to have been modified by Drakon.

³⁹² Of Drakon personally there is very little to be said. The saying put into his mouth that the least offences deserved death and that he could devise no greater punishment for the worst, is inconsistent with such traditions as we have of his legislation, if such it can be called, when Aristotle asserts that he made no changes in the constitution. *Polit.* ii. 12, 13. Mr. Grote accordingly regards him simply as one of the Thesmothetai who was employed to reduce to writing ordinances already in force. *Hist. Gr.* iii. 102. Comparative mythologists are charged with unduly restricting the conditions of historical inquiry; but it is not easy to avoid the comparison of Drakon (whose name is as suspicious as that of Medon or Kreon) with the Lokrian Zaleukos whom Mr. Grote regards as somewhat later than the Athenian legislator. See p. 74.

³⁹³ Whether these Ephetai were in any or in all cases members of the Areiopagos, it is impossible to say.

urged by the criminal. If he alleged accident, he was to be tried at the Palladion; if he pleaded provocation, he was to be arraigned at the Delphinion or consecrated ground of Apollon and Artemis. The religious scruples which regarded one spot as profaned by acts which might be lawfully done in another are exhibited still more clearly in the rules which prescribe that a person banished for homicide and charged with a second offence of the like sort should take his trial at a place called Phreattys in a boat hauled close in on the shore, while the animism of the earliest forms of thought which attribute life to all sensible objects³⁹⁴ is seen in the jurisdiction of the four Phylo-basileis or tribe-kings who meet in the Prytaneion to try inanimate objects which have caused the death of a human being, and if found guilty, to cast them solemnly beyond the borders of the land.³⁹⁵

CHAP.
IX.

That the rule of the Eupatridai exercised through this council and the College of Archons would be both harsh and irksome, is no more than what we might expect; and it was as likely that efforts to control or change it might come from those who wished to set up a despotism as from those who wished to introduce a democracy. Of the attempt of Kylon to seize the Akropolis, as it is said for the former purpose, the chief importance lies in the use made of it by the Spartans to counteract the influence of Perikles before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,³⁹⁶ as it had been employed in like sort against Kleisthenes.³⁹⁷ It is as likely that a vain attempt to erect a despotism should have been made by Kylon as that the exploit should have been achieved by Peisistratos. But the story itself is told with singular contradictions. In the brief summary of Herodotos Kylon tries in vain to seize on the Akropolis. When on his failure he takes refuge at the shrine, he is removed by the Prytaneis of the Naukraroi on the pledge that his life should be spared,

The conspiracy of
Kylon.

³⁹⁴ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. i. ch. ii.

³⁹⁵ 'The trial, condemnation, and banishment of inanimate objects which have been the cause of death was,' says Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 105, 'founded on feelings widely diffused throughout the Grecian world.' It may rather be said that these feelings are found everywhere, and are seen as much in the impulse which leads a man to kick a chair or a door, as in the old Jewish legislation (*Exod.* xxi. 28, &c.) and in the deodands on homicidal bulls or steam-engines, which have only recently ceased to be enforced by English law.

³⁹⁶ Thuc. i. 127.

³⁹⁷ Herod. v. 70.

BOOK
I.

but the covenant is disregarded by the Alkmaionidai who put him to death. In the more full report of Thucydides, Kylon, aided by his father-in-law Theagenes tyrant of Megara,³⁹⁸ succeeds in occupying the Akropolis, and is foiled only by a lack of the food needed to withstand a long siege, the blockade being intrusted to the nine archons, who at that time had virtually, we are told, the whole administration of the state. But according to this version Kylon and his brother escaped, and only his followers were slain in violation of the pledges given to them. With such evidence as this, we may accept the fact of the conspiracy and its failure; nor, although in its details the tradition is manifestly untrustworthy, can we question that the clan of the Alkmaionidai were permanently tainted for their bad faith in the opinion of the people, and that in times of trouble they were regarded as men on whom the divine wrath specially rested and who might fairly be treated as scape-goats to appease the anger of the gods.

The visit of
Epimenides
the Kretan.

But even the banishment of the living Alkmaionids and the ejection of the bones of such as were dead failed, it is said, to tranquillise the people under the effects of plague and sickness: and by the advice of the Delphian oracle Epimenides the sage was summoned from Krete. His remedies, which included human sacrifices (Kratinos and Aristodemos, it is said, presented themselves as voluntary victims³⁹⁹), were successful; but the wise man refused to bear away to his own country any costlier reward than a branch from the sacred olive-tree in the Akropolis. As it is manifestly impossible to determine with precision the facts on which this story may be based, we may place on the one hand the possibility that the influence of a philosopher may in the days of Solon have carried with it a weight which it would not have borne in the time of Perikles, and on the other hand the certainty that the stories told about Epimenides are found in many another Aryan land, and that the Kretan stranger belongs mythically to the wide group which includes Olger the Dane, Karl the Great, the Tells of Rütli, Sebastian, Arthur and Boabdil.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁸ See p. 112. The date of Kylon's attempt is quite uncertain.

³⁹⁹ Dr. Döllinger, *The Jew and the Gentile*, book iv. ch. 5, speaks of this offering as a well attested historical event. Assuredly we have no right to deny its occurrence; but it belongs to a time for which we have no genuine contemporary narrative.

⁴⁰⁰ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 413.

CHAPTER X.

ATHENS, AND THE SOLONIAN LEGISLATION.

WITH the name of Solon, the son of Exekestides, are associated some of the most momentous changes ever made in Athenian or in any other polity; and for even some details in his work we have indisputable evidence in the fragments of his poems which have been preserved to us. Evidence also remains in the fragments of his laws; but in examining the accounts given of his legislation we are met by the difficulty that later writers and orators attributed to him many changes and ascribed to him many institutions with which he had nothing to do. Even the vividness with which the misery of the Athenian people is depicted and the precision with which the Solonian remedies are enumerated cannot be regarded without suspicion. Between the age of Solon and that of the first writer who can really claim the title of a contemporary historian three generations at least had passed away; and centuries had gone by before some of the writers who have treated of his life and work put pen to paper. Hence, except when we have positive statements of Solon himself, it must be carefully borne in mind that in the descriptions given of his measures we are dealing rather with the views of men who lived under very different social and political conditions, than with actual historical evidence; and the conclusions which we are most justified in accepting will be those which are most easily reconciled with the words of Solon and most in harmony with what we know of the earlier conditions of society in Attica and Hellas generally.

If we are to trust the tradition which speaks of the war undertaken by Athens at the instigation of Solon for the conquest of Salamis, we must question the stringency of the

CHAP.
X.

Historical records of the time of Solon.

The conquest of Salamis. 595 B.C. (?)

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federation of Attic demoi attributed to Theseus. If that consolidation was what it is said to have been, we can scarcely suppose that the city of Megara alone could have been able for a period of six years to carry on a struggle against the whole power of Athens aided by all its townships. Solittle, it would seem, was Athens able to withstand Megara, that her citizens were expressly forbidden even to propose a renewal of the war, and only the enthusiasm of Solon, who professed to come as a herald from the coveted island itself, induced them to rescind the prohibition. The issue of the war went against Megara—mainly, it is said, owing to the cunning stratagems of Solon;⁴⁰¹ and the subsequent appeal of the Megarians to the arbitration of Sparta was rejected on the ground that Philaios and Eurysakes, the two sons of the Telamonian Aias, had made over the island to Athens and had themselves taken up their abode as Athenian citizens at Brauron and Melité.⁴⁰²

Misery of
the
Athenian
people.

But the chief interest of the life of Solon centres in the social condition of the Athenian people. If Drakon did something to soften the indiscriminate severity of the court of Areiopagos, no heed, it would seem, was taken of the frightful sufferings of the classes who were excluded from all share in the government. Whether the men of the Plain, the Coasts, and the Hills were so named as belonging to opposing factions or whether they were not, the intestine disorder of the country can be doubted as little as the misery of the lowest ranks can be called into question.⁴⁰³ But the only points of real importance which we have to determine are the nature and the cause of these dissensions; and it is on these

⁴⁰¹ One of these stories asserts that when the attack of the Athenians was prepared, Solon fell in with and took a Megarian ship which had been sent to watch the movements of the Athenian volunteers, and that, while the latter drew off the Megarians from the city, Solon, sailing in with the captured vessel, was taken by the garrison as belonging to their own side, and was thus enabled to surprise the town. Of such a tale we can neither affirm nor deny the truth; but we have already seen that popular tradition busied itself in ascribing to Solon tricks and stratagems some of which are not very creditable, and perhaps not even possible. See p. 119.

⁴⁰² We shall meet with a similar instance of appeals to mythical incidents in the quarrel between the Tegeatans and Athenians at Plataiai, Herod. ix. 26; and later still in the reference made by the Argives during the Peloponnesian war to the duel of Othryades and his comrades with the Argive three hundred. Thuc. v. 41. See note 157.

⁴⁰³ It is possible that the greater independence of the men in mountain districts may have led them to bear existing evils less contentedly than the men of the plains and the coast, and that thus the Hyperakrians were ready to join Peisistratos, while the Pediaioi and Paralci remained attached to Megakles and Lykourgos. Herod. i. 59.

points precisely that complete information fails us. If we confine ourselves to the words of Solon, we have before us the fact that the men who exercised power in the state were guilty of gross injustice and of violent robberies among themselves, while of the poor many were in chains and had been sold away even into foreign slavery. Nay, in the indignant appeal which, after carrying out his reforms, Solon addresses to *Gê Melaina*, the Black Earth, as a person, he speaks of the land itself as having been in some way enslaved and as being now by himself set free, by the removal of boundaries which had been fixed in many places. Many again, he adds, had through his efforts been redeemed from foreign captivity and brought back to their ancient homes, while those who on Attic soil were reduced to slavery and trembled before their despots were now raised to the condition of freemen.⁴⁰⁴ The whole question, it is obvious, turns on the meaning of the words, debtor, creditor, slavery, freedom, boundary and landmark, as used in these passages; and on this meaning it is not surprising that opinions not easily reconciled should have been held by writers living under later and very different conditions of society, or that these opinions should in greater or less degree have received the sanction of modern historians.

On the one side it has been maintained, by those who regard the representations of Plutarch as in the main trustworthy, that the system which tended to reduce English freemen to villenage was in the days of Solon converting the

Various opinions as to the causes of this misery

Δήμον θ' ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόσος. . . .
 . . . οὐδ' ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίων
 φειδόμενοι, κλέπτουσι ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος. . . .
 ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμῳ σφραγίζεται κακὰ· τῶν δὲ πενιχρῶν
 ἱκεύονται πολλοὶ γαίαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπὴν
 πρᾶβέντες, δεσμοῖσι τ' ἀεικελίῳσι δεδέντες.

These words show that the poor whom he sought to benefit were not members of the *demos*,—in other words, were men who by birth were excluded from all citizenship. The invocation addressed to the earth is even more significant:—

συμμαρτυροῖ ταῦτ' ἐν δίῃ Κρόνου
 μήτηρ, μεγάλην δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίῳν,
 ἀριστα, γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγὼ ποτὲ
 ἄρουσ ἀνέλεον πολυαχῆ πεπτηγῶς,
 πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα
 πολλοὺς δ' Ἀθήνας πατρίδ' ἐς θρόκτιον
 ἀνήγαγον πρᾶβέντας, ἄλλον ἐδικίως,
 ἄλλον δικαίως,
 τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα
 ἔχοντας, ἤδη δεσπότης τροχουμένους,
 ἐλευθέρους ἔδηκα.

See further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. xi.

Attic peasants into slaves. Arrears of rent or of produce payable to the owners of the soil were changed into debts, for which the tenant was allowed by law to pledge his own body or the bodies of his sisters or his children. That the smaller tenures generally should be heavily mortgaged was a circumstance, it is argued, not very favourable to the real prosperity of the country; but this was as nothing compared with a practice which aimed at establishing and extending a servile class by the offer of loans which the lender well knew would never be repaid in money, and for which he sought no other repayment than the bodies of the borrowers. Such a state of things must sooner or later eat out the life of a nation; and a legislator, who had the welfare of the people at heart, could see in it only a plague to be suppressed at all hazards. Doubtless the debts incurred by the Thetes or tenants were, it is maintained, legitimate debts, and the lenders were intitled to repayment. The repudiation of the debts must involve injustice to them; but their maintenance would bring with it the destruction of the whole people. The growth of discontent and rebellion had frightened the ruling class; and when Solon was invested with something like dictatorial power, he used it not to make himself a despot after the fashion of the luckless Kylon or the successful Peisistratos, but to put an end to the mischief at once by introducing his *Seisachtheia*, or Removal of Burdens,—a measure which, it is held, annulled all mortgages on land in Athens, restored to freedom all debtors who had been reduced to slavery, provided the means for recovering such as had been sold into foreign countries, and more particularly struck at the root of the evil by prohibiting all security for loans on the body of the borrower or of his kinsfolk. The losses of the lenders who may themselves have been indebted to others were, it is said, in some measure lessened or compensated by a depreciation of the currency, while the objections urged against these measures are sufficiently answered by the fact that the public credit was not shaken and that it never again became necessary either to debase the money standard or to repudiate a debt.

This view, it is maintained on the other side, involves some

great, if not insurmountable, difficulties. Pictures of social misery, closely resembling those which have been drawn of the condition of the poor in the days of Solon, are found in the traditions of the Roman city down to the Decemviral legislation, or even later; but probably few subjects might be named in which it seems less possible to arrive at any clear conclusion than the causes and extent of the financial embarrassments of the Roman Plebs.⁴⁰⁵ It is useless therefore to look to Roman history with the hope of receiving light on points which seem obscure and perplexing. But when the distress of the Athenian agriculturists is ascribed definitely to debts secured by mortgage, the assertion lies open to the retort that the security of mortgage can be given only by the owner of the soil, and that the distressed men of Attica were not owners of the land, but only the cultivators. The testimony of Plutarch is of value, manifestly, only in so far as it gives faithfully the traditions which had come down to him, and in so far as these traditions really represent the state of things with which Solon was called upon to deal. We can obviously have no guarantee that Plutarch or the writers whom he followed might not introduce into their narrative ideas which belonged to a much later age; nor is it impossible, or even unlikely, that of two consecutive sentences one may be true and the other wholly fallacious. But there can be no doubt that in the belief of Plutarch a large, if not by far the greater, part of the popular distress from the conditions of land-tenure imposed on the class called Thetes, or Hektemorioi, as paying to the owner one-sixth portion of the yearly produce,⁴⁰⁶ and that these distressed persons were not proprietors. Whether he is speaking of the same class when he mentions those who pledged their persons for the repayment of debts, or whether by the Daneistai, or money-lenders or usurers, he supposed the landlords and the landlords only to be meant, is not so clear; and when we look more closely into the facts of the earliest social history of Athens, so far as they are known to us at

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The question of debt and mortgage.

⁴⁰⁵ Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. II.* ii. 85.

⁴⁰⁶ Mr. Grote notes the scanty knowledge which we have of these Hektemorioi, adding that it has been doubted whether they paid to the landlord one-sixth or retained only that portion for themselves. The latter condition would probably make it impossible for the tenant to subsist at all.

all, we are confronted by two grave difficulties, the one turning on the question whether the more modern idea of mortgage was so much as known at that time, the other making it necessary for us to determine whether there existed then a class of professed money-lenders. It is at the least difficult, if not impossible, to imagine that capitalists could be found to advance loans in money to cultivators of the soil who were unable to pay even one-sixth of the produce; ⁴⁰⁷ nor can we well suppose that pressure caused simply by a somewhat excessive rent could assume very formidable proportions. If again lenders, being landowners, could be found to advance money to cultivators who could not pay to them even one-sixth part of the produce of the soil, we can but wonder at the superfluity of the loan, when the failure of the tenant to yield the stipulated portion of the produce involved in itself the forfeiture of his freedom. If on the other hand the landowners and the money-lenders were not the same persons, then it is scarcely a matter of doubt that the Hektemorioi would never have been allowed by the landowners to pledge to professed usurers their persons, (the value of which might far exceed the amount of the debt,) for this would be directly to defraud the landlord whose claim to their bodies on failure to pay the proceeds would be paramount; and to make two classes of men indebted to two classes of creditors, the Thetes or Hektemorioi being pledged to the landowners, and the free proprietors of small estates pledged to professional usurers, is to multiply gratuitous suppositions. What then were the pillars which beyond doubt Solon removed from the land? In the absence of direct evidence that they were mortgage pillars inscribed with the name of the lender and the amount of the loan, it is reasonable to suppose that they

⁴⁰⁷ Sir G. C. Lewis lays stress on the enormous difference between this usage and the custom of modern lenders. 'It is difficult for us,' he says, 'to conceive a state of society in which the poor are borrowers of money on a large scale. In modern states borrowers always have property in possession or expectancy, though it may ultimately be exhausted and they may become insolvent.' The practice of pledging goods to pawnbrokers on the part of the poor seems, he adds, to have been unknown to the ancients. He remarks further that when Plato in his Republic draws a striking picture of the political discontent caused by the pressure of money-lenders on insolvent debtors, these debtors are not poor tillers of the land but oligarchs who, once wealthy, had been impoverished by their own extravagance and folly. *Credibility of E. R. H.* ch. xii. sect. 18.

I am bound to express my conviction that the account which Dr. Curtius, *History of Greece*, i. 328, &c. Eng. trans., gives of the condition of Athens before the Solonian legislation can only mislead those who trust it.

were simply the boundaries or landmarks which, whether in Attica or in Latium, and throughout the Aryan world or even beyond its limits, it was sacrilege to touch. These landmarks represented those ancient patriarchal rights which received their whole sanction from religion and which naturally issued in the laws attributed to Pheidon of Corinth, forbidding any change in the number of families or properties, and resting on existing prohibitions of the sale or even the partition of lands.⁴⁰⁸ That the greater part of the Athenian soil was marked off by these landmarks, is asserted by Solon himself. In other words, the Eupatridai were still the lords of almost all the land; and thus we have on the one side a few heads of families who might in the strictest sense of the term be spoken of as despots, and on the other the dependents who trembled before them but who were suffered to draw their livelihood from the soil on condition of paying a fixed part of the produce to the lord. It can scarcely be doubted that even this fixed payment marks a step forward in the condition of the labourer who had started without even this poor semblance of right. It was, however, a mere semblance after all. So long as he could comply with the terms imposed on him, he might remain nominally free; but his real state was not changed. The lord might demand a larger portion of the produce; or a hard season might leave him unable to pay even the sixth part. In either case, he reverted necessarily to the servile state from which he had never been legally set free. So long as things continued thus, Solon might with perfect truth say that the land itself was enslaved, for the scanty class of small proprietors, even if any such existed at the time, would be powerless against the Eupatrid landowners, and would be liable to the same accidents which might at any moment make the client once more a slave.

If this be at all a true picture of the condition of Attica in the days of Solon, it was obviously impossible that things could go on indefinitely as they were. If even the concession which raised the slave to the state of the Hektemorios was wrung, as probably it was, from an unwilling master, it was certain that the man who had gained this poor

Actual
measures
Solon.

⁴⁰⁸ Arist. *Polit.* ii. 6, 13.

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boon would never rest content in a position which had not even the guarantee of law and which left him at the mercy and caprice of a despot who might, if he pleased, sell him into foreign slavery. One of two results must follow under such circumstances. Either the half-emancipated peasant must become a free owner of the soil, or he must fall back into his original subjection. Here, then, in dealing with grievances which every year must become less and less tolerable, Solon had abundant materials for his *Seisachtheia* or Relief Act; and the measures which such a state of things would render necessary are precisely those which seem to be indicated by his words. From all lands occupied by cultivators on condition of yielding a portion of the produce he removed the pillars which marked the religious ownership of the *Eupatridai*, and lightened the burdens of the cultivators by lessening the amount of produce or money which henceforth took the shape of a rent.⁴⁰⁹ In other words, a body of free labourers and poor landowners was not so much relieved of a heavy pressure, as for the first time called into being.

Lowering
of the cur-
rency.

Whether the lowering of the currency attributed to Solon be or be not merely the idea of later writers, it would seem that in their accounts of the relations of debtors with creditors at the time of the *Seisachtheia* they transferred to the Athens of Solon notions which belonged to a much later generation, and comprehending but faintly the tremendous power exercised by the ancient lords of the soil, concluded

⁴⁰⁹ That this fact lies at the root of the tradition which attributes to Solon a debasement of the coinage, it might be rash to affirm; but beyond the assertion of this debasement there is little agreement among ancient or modern writers. Böckh holds that Solon altered the weights and measures as well as debased the coinage: Mr. Grote thinks that his work did not go beyond the latter change. While, again, some have maintained that he rescinded all existing money contracts, others have thought with Androtion that, while he lowered the rate of interest and depreciated the currency about 27 per cent, he left the letter of the contracts untouched—in other words, that in the new currency 100 drachmas contained the same amount of silver with 78 drachmas of the old standard, of which 100 would extinguish a debt of 138 drachmas according to the new. The fact that Solon conferred a permanent financial benefit on the cultivators of the Attican soil, is abundantly clear; but of the details of the measure we have no positive knowledge. It would be unfair to suppress the fact that Mr. Grote, while he lays stress on the vast improvement which the *Seisachtheia* effected in the character and condition of the poorer population, cites the opinion of Böckh that Solon ‘abolished villenage, and conferred upon the poor tenants a property in their lands, annulling the seigniorial rights of the landlord.’ ‘This opinion,’ he adds, ‘rests upon no positive evidence; nor are we warranted in ascribing to him any stronger measures in reference to the land than the annulment of the previous mortgages.’ *Hist. Gr.* iii. 182. But the idea that mortgages, in the present sense of the word, were then known is itself unsupported by evidence, and the difficulties of the whole question on the supposition of their existence are multiplied indefinitely.

that the relief which Solon gave was chiefly through the abolition or the diminution of debts. The words of Solon point rather to a struggle between slavery and freedom; and the tradition that it was never afterwards found necessary to modify contracts or to debase the currency may be regarded as sufficient evidence that his work was done effectually.⁴¹⁰

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But Solon did more than redress existing wrongs. The tribes with their principle of religious association had remained thus far undisturbed; but the greater part of the population was not included in any tribe, and it was clear that if the statesman wished to avail himself of the full powers and resources of the country, it was indispensably necessary to introduce a new classification which should take in all the free inhabitants of the land without reference to affinities of blood and based wholly on property. The principle thus introduced was termed the timocratic, and its most important political result was that it excluded the poor Eupatrid from offices and honours for which richer citizens now became eligible who could lay no claim to the religious character of the old nobility. The Pentakosiomedimnoi, or men whose annual income was equal to 500 medimnoi (about 700 imperial bushels) of corn, the Hippeis or Knights (so called as possessing sufficient means to serve as horsemen) who had from 300 to 500 medimnoi, and the Zeugitai, or owners of a team of oxen, who possessed from 200 to 300, paid a graduated income-tax called Eisphora, on a capital

New classification of the citizens:—the Pentakosiomedimnoi, Hippeis, Zeugitai, and Thetes.

⁴¹⁰ On this supposition the Seisachtheia of Solon ceases to have any direct connexion with the question of loans and usury in ancient or modern times. This question has been admirably treated by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part. ii. ch. xi., who rightly insists that the whole usage of borrowing and lending must rest on the hypothesis that the transaction is advantageous on both sides; that a good law of debtor and creditor is the very reverse of that which is said to have led usurers like Shylock in the days of Solon to lend money to persons whom they hoped in default of repayment to reduce to slavery; and that to break up the confidence based on the condition that loans should benefit the borrower as well as the lender 'would produce extensive mischief throughout all society.' Except on this hypothesis it is impossible to justify the demand of interest for money lent; and as no man is bound to lend his money for nothing, the prohibition to receive interest becomes a virtual prohibition of all lending and borrowing. In our own time experience generally goes to show that the usage of loans is found to be of equal benefit to both parties, and the taking of usury to an amount representing this benefit is regarded as perfectly justifiable and right. In the days of Plato, and even of Cicero, the benefit of loans to the borrower was not so distinctly seen; and the taking of usury seemed therefore to them either a matter of doubtful morality or an act utterly immoral. The objection was likely to be felt more strongly by thinkers than by those who had practical experience of the working of the system; and accordingly it was urged by philosophers, long after the mass of the people had ceased to have any strong opinion on the subject.

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which for members of the first class was rated at twelve times their annual income, for those of the second at ten times, and for those of the third at five times their yearly income,—the Pentakosiomedimnos who had simply his 500 bushels being, for instance, rated at 6000 drachmas, the Hippeus with 300 medimnoi at 3000, and the Zeugitês of 200 drachmas at 1000, or five times his yearly income. In the fourth or Thetic class, so called as including, and not as consisting only of, the Thetes, were placed all citizens whose property fell short of 200 drachmas a year. The members of this, the largest, class in the state were not liable to the direct taxation of the Eispnora, although they shared with the men of the wealthier classes the more permanent burden of indirect taxation in the form of import duties. Nor were they called upon to discharge the unpaid services of the state called Leitourgiai, liturgies, while in war they served only as light-armed infantry, or in armour provided for them by the state. On the other hand, they were ineligible to all public offices,—the archonship and all military commands, and perhaps also the presidency of the Naukrariai, being open only to members of the first class, while certain minor offices might be filled by the Hippeis and Zeugitai, the former of whom were bound to serve as horsemen, the latter as heavy-armed infantry, at their own expense. Thus in the classification which excluded the Eupatrid whose income fell short of 500 medimnoi from the high offices which he regarded as his inalienable birthright, the spell of the ancient despotism of religion and blood was broken; and a further democratic element was introduced by the law which, while it confined the archonship to members of the first class, left the election of the archons to the Heliaia, or general council, which included not merely the men of the first three classes, but, as the Eupatrid would have termed them, the rabble of the fourth class. This law went even further, making the archons at the end of their year of office directly accountable to the public assembly and subject to an impeachment by it in case of misbehaviour.

The Probouleutic Council.

The power of this assembly was strengthened by the institution, attributed to Solon, of the Probouleutic Council of

Four Hundred (in the proportion of one hundred for each tribe) who, like the archons, were to be elected by the whole people from the first class. This council, as its name implies, was charged chiefly with the preparation of matters to be brought before the assembly, with the summoning and management of its meetings, and with the execution of its decrees.

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Such, in the main, seems to have been the great work of Solon, a work accomplished just at a time when attempts like those of Kylon or Peisistratos, if made at that moment, might have crushed for ever the rising freedom of Athens, and achieved by a man who was charged with madness for not following the example of those who had made themselves tyrants in other Hellenic cities. By giving to every citizen a place in the great council which elected the chief magistrates and reviewed their conduct at the end of their year of office, and by securing further even to the poorest citizen the right of personal appeal to the archon, while the alien could obtain justice only through the intervention of his Prostates or defender, he insured to the main body of the people a certain independence of the Eupatridai which might hereafter be built up into a compact fabric of civil liberty. But Solon himself scarcely more than laid its foundations, and it is a common error which ascribes to him developements of the constitution belonging to a time later even than that of Kleisthenes. The members of the fourth and far the largest class of citizens could have no further influence on the conduct of affairs than by the check, probably not always very effectual, which they exercised by electing the archons and examining them at the end of the year. During their time of office the archons remained, as they had been, absolute judges without appeal, while the powers of the Areiopagos were increased by a censorial jurisdiction which was extended to the private lives of the citizens and to the punishment of vice as distinguished from crime. But, more particularly, although a citizen of the first class who was not an Eupatrid was in point of money qualification eligible for the archonship, he could be neither archon nor a member of the Areiopagos, unless he also belonged to a tribe; and as the Pro-

Relation-
ship of the
four classes
to the
tribes.

bouleutic Council consisted of four hundred, or one hundred for each of the tribes, it followed that only members of the tribes could be elected to this council, and thus that the political position of non-tribal citizens, even if they belonged to the first class in the timocracy, was simply on a level with that of the fourth or Thetic class. All that the Solonian reform had done was to exclude from the archonship the poor Eupatrid and to admit to it the non-Eupatrid Pentakosiomedimnos, if he belonged to some tribe; but no one who did not possess the religious title could hold office, and thus Solon left the constitution, as he found it, practically oligarchic. That his reforms soothed for the time the popular discontent, was a favourable accident: but the factions which preceded the usurpation of Peisistratos showed that, if the archons were able to keep down the poorer citizens, they were practically powerless against the wealthy nobles and their partisans. The activity of these factions seems of itself conclusive proof that Solon did not call into being the Dikasteria or assemblies in which at a later time the people exercised their supreme power, even if we could imagine these courts, with their constant tax on the time of their members, as working without fixed payment, or if, under the supposition that all these later changes were effected in the days of Solon, we could explain the opposition by which democratic reforms were strenuously met during the whole period between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars.⁴¹¹

The general
legislation
of Solon.

Of the legislation of Solon generally we know too little to justify the expression of any positive opinion as to its principles or its objects. Of his measures for the relief of the poor enough has been said already: among the other laws attributed to him one of the most prominent is the law prohibiting the exportation of all produce of the Athenian territory with the exception of olive-oil, of which the supply was more than sufficient for the needs of the country. If this law was prompted by a desire to attract to Athens as much as possible the labour of the skilled artisan, and to encourage manufactures rather than agriculture on a soil naturally poor,

⁴¹¹ See further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. xi.

it indicates not only a sound appreciation of the best interests of such a country as Attica, but it is noteworthy in its opposition to the prevailing Hellenic sentiment. This sentiment regarded trade and the sedentary life of the artisan as incompatible with the dignity of the free citizen, and at Sparta, and perhaps elsewhere, sought to place a stigma on agriculture itself and reserved its approval for laborious, military idleness. The opposition to this feeling, exhibited in the general course of Athenian history, finds its fittest expression in the words put into the mouth of Perikles, that no man was the worse for confessing the fact of his poverty, but that he disgraced himself if he made no strenuous efforts to get out of it.⁴¹²

The law, or rather the curse, which invoked disgrace on the man who in time of sedition should hold aloof from all share in the contest, has attracted even wider attention from its seeming antagonism with the oath which, after the time of Kleisthenes, each citizen took to support the existing democracy against all who should attempt to overthrow it. But the difficulty vanishes when we remember that in the days of Solon the course of constitutional developement was not so strictly determined as to make adherence to a particular form of polity more important than the uninterrupted maintenance of public order. The choice lay between a modified oligarchy, an irresponsible despotism, or anarchy; and the first duty of the citizen was to throw his sword into the scale on the one side or the other, that the time of mere confusion might be cut short as soon as possible. If the law or imprecation of Solon should be effective, it would deal a strong discouragement to the man who might aim at making himself a tyrant; and in fact the same principle was in much later times applied in the act of ostracism which by the secret and irresponsible vote of a certain number of citizens (not less than 6,000) determined that one of two or more party leaders should go into banishment⁴¹³ when the presence of both or of all in the city might threaten danger to the constitution. The statesman who remained might be more

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Law
against the
neutrality
of citizens
in times of
sedition.

⁴¹² Thuc. ii. 40.

⁴¹³ No loss of property or civil disgrace attended this sentence of exile.

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I.Later years
of Solon.

powerful; but he would be less tempted to venture on courses of unconstitutional action.

Over the sequel of the career of Solon the mists of oral tradition have gathered thickly. His work as a legislator was done; but there remained the fear that others might destroy it or that he might be induced to impair it himself. He therefore bound the Athenians by solemn oaths that for ten years, or, as some said, for a hundred years, they would suffer no change to be made in his laws, and then, to make it impossible that this change should come from himself, he departed on the long pilgrimage which is associated with the names of other legislators as great as himself, though less historical. That he visited Egypt and Kypros (Cyprus) is proved by his own words: but the time of the visit is undetermined, and that he cannot have sojourned with Amasis, seems to be clear from the fact that the reign of Amasis began at least a generation after the legislation of Solon.⁴¹⁴ Not more trustworthy chronologically is the exquisitely beautiful tale which relates the intercourse of Solon with the Lydian king Kroisos. It is clear that in the belief of Herodotos Solon visited Sardeis not more than six or seven years before the fall of the Lydian monarchy. The death of Atys which marked the turning point in the unbroken happiness of Kroisos was followed, after two years only, by the war with the Persian Cyrus; and the catastrophe occurred scarcely less than fifty years after the legislation of Solon.⁴¹⁵ The story is manifestly a didactic legend setting forth the religious philosophy of the time, insisting on the divine jealousy which hates and punishes pride and self-satisfaction in mortal man, and virtually maintaining that happiness is

⁴¹⁴ Herod. i. 30. Plut. *Sol.* 26. Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 532, et seq.

⁴¹⁵ Mr. Grote, who allows the possibility that Solon may have visited Sardeis at an earlier time, maintains that Herodotos could not in this narrative have been speaking of that earlier visit, as he ascribes these conversations to a time when Kroisos was at the acme of his splendour. Niebuhr, as Mr. Grote remarks, supposes that Herodotos has here made a mistake of forty years, or ten Olympiads; but the chronology of other traditions relating to this period is, as Sir G. C. Lewis has pointed out, not less impossible. Pittakos cannot have given to Kroisos the counsel which Herodotos i. 27, puts into his mouth, for Pittakos died in B.C. 569, and the reign of Kroisos did not begin till nine years later. Similar reasons stand in the way of the legends which bring the fabulist Aisopos (Æsop) to Sardeis in the time of Kroisos, and make Rhodopis the fellow-slave of Aisopos, and again in the way of the traditions which speak of Peisistratos as having won distinction in the Solonian war for the conquest of Salamis. Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 581. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 202.

a state which cannot be predicated of any one before his earthly life has reached its close.

CHAP.
X.

The return of Solon to Athens was not to be followed by new reforms for the benefit of his countrymen. The tide had turned. The Eupatrid landowners of the plain were ranged under Lykourgos; the men of the coast had sided with the Alkmaionid Megakles, while Peisistratos headed the men of the hills. In the struggle which ensued Solon, it is said, foresaw that Peisistratos must be the conqueror; but he strove in vain to rouse the Athenians to combine against the tyranny with which they were threatened. To no purpose he stood in his armour at the door of his house, and he could but console himself with the thought that he had done his duty, and reply to those who asked on what he relied to save himself from the vengeance of his enemies, 'On my old age.' Peisistratos, as the story goes, did him no harm; and the man who had done more than any who had gone before him to make his country free died in peace, full of years and with a fame which is the purer for the unselfishness which refused to employ for his own exaltation opportunities greater than any which fell to the lot even of Peisistratos himself.

Usurpation
of Peisis-
tratos, and
death of
Solon.

CHAPTER XI.

THE TYRANNY OF THE PEISISTRATIDAI.

BOOK
I.Sources for
the history
of the time.

HALF a century had passed away from the death of Solon before the despotism established by Peisistratos was finally put down. The end of this period precedes only by a few years the births of Herodotos and Thucydides; but although the lives of the Peisistratidai approach thus nearly the domain of contemporary history, our knowledge of their career rests wholly on oral tradition. When Thucydides called attention to a popular error respecting the death of Hipparchos, he claimed to speak with authority solely on the ground that he had carefully sifted the testimony of those from whom he had heard the story.⁴¹⁶ All that can be said is that a tradition which satisfied so keen and dispassionate an inquirer as Thucydides may be accepted as substantially accurate.⁴¹⁷

Slow
growth of
the demo-
cratic spirit
at Athens.

The success of Peisistratos is of itself sufficient evidence of the slow growth of the democratic spirit at Athens. The people, which a few generations later appears in the satire of the comic poet under the guise of the rude and intractable old man of the Pnyx, now show themselves apt disciples in that school of indifference which Solon had branded as the worst of civil crimes; and the man who has crushed his rivals may count on their passive acquiescence under his sway.

In this instance the successful plotter was supported by

⁴¹⁶ ὅτι δὲ πρῶτος ὢν Ἰππίας ἤρξεν, εἰδὼς μὲν καὶ ἄκρο ἢ ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι, vi. 55.

⁴¹⁷ This accuracy must not be regarded as extending to details. In the judgement of Niebuhr 'the history of the Peisistratids is very much like many portions of Roman history, where the most minute narratives are for the most part unhistorical, while the indefinite statements are more correct.' *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* i. 291. Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 509.

the faction (if such it was) of the Hyperakrians or men of the hills, whose part he professed to take. As their champion, he avowed (if we are to follow the story of Herodotos) that he had narrowly escaped from the hands of his enemies who had fallen upon him in the country. Hastening to Athens, he pointed to the wounds, which he had inflicted on himself and on his mules, as attesting the truth of his tale, and prayed the people to grant him a body-guard to protect him against the weapons of the rival factions. His request was granted, according to one version, as a reward for his services in the war with Megara forty years before; according to another, the guard was obtained for him on the proposal of Ariston in the public assembly in spite of the strenuous opposition of Solon. The club-bearers by whom he was now attended may soon have become spear-bearers; but in any case the disguise was thrown off when with their help Peisistratos seized the Akropolis, and Megakles with the Alkmaionids fled from the city.

Whatever may be the value of these details, there is no reason to question the general statement of Herodotos that, having thus made himself master of Athens, Peisistratos ruled wisely and well, without introducing a single constitutional change.⁴¹⁸ With sound instinct he perceived that the Solonian forms were sufficiently oligarchic in spirit to suit his purposes: and Athens, although in the power of a despot, had the benefit of a despotism lightened as it had been lightened in no other Hellenic city. But although the praise of Herodotos is confirmed by that of Thucydides,⁴¹⁹ who asserts that with no direct impost beyond an income-tax of five per cent. Peisistratos and his successors found means to carry on wars, to pay the cost of sacrifices, and to embellish the city,⁴²⁰ their wisdom and their other good qualities failed to make the course of their despotism run smoothly.

⁴¹⁸ Herod. i. 59.

⁴¹⁹ vi. 54. The pointed way in which Thucydides speaks of the family relations of the Peisistratidai lends colour to the assertion that he was himself personally connected with them; but although he seems eager in his commendations, he has never been charged with distorting facts in their favour. See further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. xxx.

⁴²⁰ Among the public works of this dynasty was the decoration of the public fountain of Kallirrhoe, and the setting up of statues of Hermes in various parts of the country. The gigantic temple of the Olympian Zeus, begun by Peisistratos, was destined to remain unfinished to the days of the emperor Hadrian. To him also is ascribed the in-

CHAP.
XI.

Seizure of
the Akro-
polis by
Peisi-
stratos.
560 B.C. (2)

Character
of the ad-
ministra-
tion of Pei-
sistratos.

BOOK

I

Expulsion
and re-
storation of
Peisi-
stratos.

The first disaster, we are told, was not long in coming. They owed their power to the divisions among the people, and a coalition of the Pediaian and Paralian factions was at once followed by their expulsion. But this success served only to renew and whet the strife of these parties, and Megakles offered to restore the exiled tyrant on the condition that the latter should marry the daughter of the Alkmaionid chief. The terms were accepted; and to insure the assent and favour of the people, the conspirators, it is said, obtained the services of a tall and beautiful woman of the Paionian tribe, whom they placed in full armour on a chariot, and then made proclamation to the citizens that they should welcome Peisistratos whom Athene herself was bringing to her own Akropolis. Hastening to the scene, they saw a majestic woman about six feet high, and taking her at once to be the virgin goddess, gave her worship and received the despot.⁴²¹

Second ex-
pulsion of
Peisi-
stratos.

But the curse which rested on the house of Megakles cast its dark shadow on the mind of Peisistratos, who resolved that the marriage to which he had consented should be a barren one; and the discovery of this design led forthwith to the reconciliation of Megakles with Lykourgos and to the second expulsion of the tyrant who, it is said, spent the next ten years chiefly in the Euboian Eretria,⁴²² aiding Lygdamis to establish his despotism in Naxos, and in some way or other helping Thebes and other cities. The reward of these politic services was reaped in the form of contributions in money from these towns and in the arrival of Lygdamis with

stitution of the greater Panathenaic festival, celebrated at intervals of four years, the lesser feast of the same name being kept yearly as in times past. According to Thucydides, vi. 54, Peisistratos, the son of Hippias, added to the public buildings of Athens an altar to the twelve gods and an altar to Apollon in the Pythian Temenos.

⁴²¹ This woman, who is called Phye, is said to have become the wife of Hipparchos. The contempt with which Herodotos stigmatises the silliness of the Athenians for being thus duped seems to imply the existence of a general unbelief that manifestations of the gods could any longer take place. If we look to the narrative, the stratagem certainly seems superfluous. If the union of the two factions had at once brought about the banishment of the despot, nothing more than the adhesion of one of them to Peisistratos would be needed to accomplish his restoration.

Mr. Grote compares the opinion of Herodotos on this trick of Megakles with the feelings which led the Spartans to pronounce ridiculous the proposal of the citizens of Argos to reserve the right of deciding again by the combat of select champions the possession of Kynouria. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 141. But the objection of Herodotos is founded on the absurdity of believing that Athene would manifest herself in favour of Peisistratos. There is nothing to show that the Spartans called into question the fact of the traditional fight between the 300 Argives and their own 300 champions. See p. 93.

⁴²² The presence of Peisistratos in Naxos for the purpose of helping Lygdamis is asserted by Herodotos, i. 64.

both men and money, when in the judgement of Peisistratos and his sons the time was come for making another effort.

CHAP.
XL

Final re-
storation of
the Peisi-
stratidai.

The story of his restoration implies a singular indifference and inactivity on the part of the Athenians. The invader occupied Marathon without opposition; and when on his moving from that place the Athenians advanced against him, they allowed him to fall upon them while some were dicing and others sleeping after their morning meal. The sons of the tyrant rode towards Athens, and telling the citizens what had happened, bade them go home. The order was placidly obeyed, and for the third time Peisistratos was master of the Akropolis. He was resolved that this time no room should be left for the combinations which had twice driven him away. Megakles with his adherents left the country: the rest who had ventured to oppose him were compelled to give hostages in the persons of their children whom Peisistratos placed in the safe keeping of Lygdamis at Naxos; and the new rule was finally established by a large force of Thrakian mercenaries got together from the banks of the Strymon with Athenian money.⁴²³ The next step was to insure the favour of the gods; and this end was obtained partly through a purification of the island of Delos by the removal of all dead bodies which had been buried within sight of the temple of Apollon, and partly by the more congenial act of levelling at Athens the houses of the Alkmaionidai and of casting forth the bones of their dead.

For Peisistratos himself there were to be no more alternations of disaster and success. He died tyrant of Athens, three and thirty years, it is said, after the time of his first usurpation. His sons, Hippias and Hipparchos, followed, we are told, the example of sobriety and moderation set by their father.⁴²⁴ But their political foresight failed to guard them

Death of
Peisistra-
tos, and
subsequent
history of
his house.
527 B.C. (?)

⁴²³ The somewhat strangely constructed sentence of Herodotos, i. 64, is thus construed by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 145, viii. 568-9. There seems to be no reason whatever for thinking that Peisistratos was the owner of lands at the mouth of the Strymon, while the later history of Histiaios and Aristagoras seems to upset the notion. If he did not own property in Thrace, it is clear that his revenue came from Athens, the mercenaries only being brought from the Strymon. Nor is it likely that Herodotos would mention two places from which Peisistratos derived his resources, and be silent about the regions from which he obtained his mercenaries.

⁴²⁴ This picture must be qualified, if the story be true which Herodotos (vi. 103) relates of the cowardly murder of Kimon, the father of the celebrated Miltiades, who was slain at night by their emissaries. This Kimon was three times victor in the horse race at the Olympian festival. On his second victory he proclaimed Peisistratos as the con-

against dangers arising from their pleasant vices; and Hipparchos in an evil hour sought to form with the beautiful Harmodios the shameful intimacy into which James VI. wished, it would seem, to decoy Alexander Ruthven and which disgraced his relations with Ramsay and Carr.⁴²⁵ The fears or the wrath of Aristogeiton were roused by this attempt on his paramour; and the Peisistratid dynasty brought on itself the doom which befell many another dynasty in Hellas and elsewhere.⁴²⁶ The fire was fed by an insult which Hipparchos, wishing to show in an underhand way his indignation at the rejection of his addresses, offered to the sister of Harmodios. He invited her to take her place in a religious procession among the Kane-phoroi or basket-bearers, and on her coming for this purpose dismissed her as unfit for so honourable a service.⁴²⁷ By way of revenge Aristogeiton with his few partisans determined to await the greater Panathenaic festival, being sure that on seeing the blow struck the main body of the citizens would hasten to join them. When the day came and the conspirators drew near to their work, they were astonished to see one of their number talking familiarly with Hippias, and then, supposing that their design was betrayed, determined that at least the man who had injured them should die. They found Hipparchos near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and there they killed him. Aristogeiton for the moment escaped; but Harmodios was slain on the spot by the guards of the murdered man. Tidings of the disaster were soon brought

querer, and for this compliment the despot who had banished him brought him back to Athens under pledge of his personal safety. His third victory seems to have roused the jealousy of Hippias and Hipparchos; and Kimon was assassinated by their order.

⁴²⁵ The only difference between these two cases is that by his attempt Hipparchos brought about his own death, while James, to hide his own guilt, wrought the death of his victim. That the whole of King James's story on the subject of the so-called Gowrie conspiracy is a tissue of falsehoods and contradictions, is undeniable. It is enough to say that his tale was altogether disbelieved by archbishop Spottiswoode and Robert Bruce of Kinnaird; but less than this could not in fairness be said on a subject in which historians are still content to wrong the memory of two boys in order to save the credit of one of the worst tyrants that ever disgraced a throne. See Bisset, *Essays on Historical Truth*, p. 262, etc.

⁴²⁶ For instances see Aristotle, *Polit.* v. 9.

⁴²⁷ The Gephyraian tribe, to which both Harmodios and Aristogeiton belonged, is said by Herodotus to have been Phœnician, having come originally with Kadmos into Boiotia. They were admitted, he says, to citizenship by the Athenians on conditions involving disqualifications in some minor matters. Hence Dr. Arnold, *Thuc.* vi. 56, supposed that Hipparchos was led by these probably religious disqualifications to reject the sister of Harmodios; but in this case the candid admission of the truth would have deprived the act of its insulting character; and if it had not been meant as an insult, Thucydides, from his manifest wish to make out the best case for the Peisistratidai, would assuredly have mentioned the fact. See Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 151.

to Hippias, who was at the Kerameikos. With great presence of mind he simply commanded the hoplites who with shields and spears were to take part in the procession to lay down their arms and go to a certain spot. The command was obeyed under the notion that their general had something to say to them; and the arms being seized by the mercenaries, all citizens found with daggers were set aside as sharing in the conspiracy. With the torturing of Aristogeiton, who was soon taken, and of his mistress Leaina, a change came over the character of Hippias, who still remained for four years longer the despot of Athens. By the admission both of Herodotos and Thucydides, his rule, which had thus far been moderate, was henceforth marked by suspicion and harshness and by the murders of many citizens, until at length by the intrigues and efforts of the Alkmaionidai, aided by a Spartan army, he was compelled to leave Athens and to lay plots elsewhere for the recovery of his power, until the quarrel should be finally decided on the field of Marathon.

Such is, in substance, the story of the fall of the Peisistratidai, as it is told both by Herodotos and Thucydides; but credible as it may appear, we must remember that these historians were compelled to glean their facts from oral tradition, and that the popular tradition threw over it a very different colouring. It was the almost universal belief at Athens in the time of Thucydides that Hipparchos succeeded Peisistratos, as being his eldest son, and that the deed of Aristogeiton and Harmodios not merely avenged a private wrong but gave freedom to the land. Not only did the popular song hallow with the myrtle wreath the sword which had slain the tyrant and given back equal laws to Athens; but the honours and the immunities from all public burdens granted to their descendents attested the strength of the popular conviction that the dynasty came to an end when Hipparchos fell at the chapel of the Leokorion. The belief was, it would seem, a mere delusion; and Thucydides⁴²⁸ dismisses it as worthless. Hippias, not Hipparchos, was the elder son, and far from ceasing to rule when his brother died, he thenceforth made

Popular traditions and misconceptions on the subject.

⁴²⁸ vi. 56. With his motives for dwelling so emphatically on the narrative, or for introducing it in connexion with the career of Alkibiades, we are not here concerned.

BOOK
I.

Athens feel the scourge of tyranny. The inevitable inference is that, if it had not been for the two historians who took the trouble to sift the facts, the popular delusion would for all whose belief is easy have become an incontestable truth. The conclusion speaks volumes on the trustworthiness of legends which, like those of the war at Ilion or the return of the Herakleidai, recede still further into the mists of ages for which no written records ever existed.

Policy and
plans of
Hippias.

The death of Hipparchos and the circumstances which led to it warned Hippias that yet more disasters might be in store for him and that he would do well to provide betimes against the evil day. His decision led to momentous consequences in the history of Athens and of the world; and the great struggle between Asiatic despotism and western freedom was at the least hastened by his policy. His thoughts turned to the Persian king whose power after the fall of the Lydian monarchy had been extended to the shores of the Hellespontos, and to whom the Athenian settlement at Sigeion made in the lifetime of the poet Alkaios had thus become tributary. It may possibly have been the presence of Athenians at the entrance to the Hellespont which brought to Athens the envoys of the Thracian tribe of Dolonkians who then inhabited the Chersonesos and who were hard pressed in war by their neighbours the Apsinthians; but in the religious view of Herodotos⁴²⁹ it was the Delphian god who, when they besought his aid in their distress, counselled them to establish in their territory an Hellenic colony and to take as its Oikistes or leader the man from whom after leaving the temple they should first receive hospitality. This they sought in vain as they went along the sacred road through Phokis and Boiotia. At length they turned off in the direction of Athens where they received a kindly welcome from Miltiades the son of Kypselos, a man who to the fame of a victory at Olympia in the four-horsed chariot race added the renown of being sprung from Aiakos and Aigina whose descendent Philaios had been made an Athenian citizen. To the prayer of the Dolonkians Miltiades lent no unwilling ear. The despotism of Peisistratos had but lately been established;

⁴²⁹ vi. 34, 35.

but mild as it may have been, Miltiades was little inclined to rest patiently under it. All that he needed was the sanction of the Delphian god, and having received this he sailed away with a body of Athenian citizens to the Chersonesos where he hesitated not to accept from the people the title and power of a tyrant. His first work was the fortification of the Chersonesos by a wall carried across its neck between the cities of Kardia and Paktyê.⁴³⁰ His next step was to make war on the people of Lampsakos; but there he fell into an ambuscade, and was delivered from imprisonment or saved from death only on the threat of the Lydian king Kroisos that if the Lampsakenes refused to set him free, he would smite them like a pine-tree which, when cut down, never sends up a shoot again.⁴³¹

Miltiades the son of Kypselos died childless, leaving Stesagoras the son of his brother Kimon heir of his power and his wealth. Like Miltiades, Stesagoras engaged in war with Lampsakos and was murdered by a man of that city who professed to come as a deserter. But before this event Peisistratos had retaken Sigeion from the Mitylenaians who may have been suffering still from the defeat inflicted on them by Polykrates of Samos;⁴³² and his son Hegesistratos long maintained the place against the efforts of the Mitylenaians who attacked it from the city of Achilleion on the opposite shore of Chersonesos. Thus Athenians had at this time a port in the Troad as well as a colony on the Thracian peninsula to which Hippias had sent Miltiades, the future victor of Marathon, as governor on the death of his brother Stesagoras. Here Miltiades maintained himself with the aid of five hundred mercenaries,⁴³³ and married Hegesipylê, daughter of the Thracian chief Oloros.⁴³⁴ But

Connexion
of Hippias
with Lamp-
sakos.

⁴³⁰ This wall, like the walls built by Roman emperors in our own island, served its purpose for a time; but it failed to prevent the irruption of the Scythians in the days of the younger and more celebrated Miltiades. It was repaired by Perikles, and again by the Lakedaïmonian Derkyllidas, B.C. 397, but to so little purpose that in the days of Philip of Macedon the idea of cutting a canal across the isthmus was seriously considered, although it was never carried out.

The distance between the cities of Kardia and Paktyê is about four miles, and the distance between the wall and Elaious at the entrance of the Hellespont is about fifty miles.

⁴³¹ Herod. vi. 37.

⁴³² iii. 39.

⁴³³ vi. 39.

⁴³⁴ From the name of Hegesipylê we might infer that these Thracians spoke pure Greek; but the name may have been a mere translation of her Thracian name, and in any case it furnishes no safe ground for speculation.

BOOK
I.

Hippias had discovered that war with Lampsakos might be less profitable than peace. Hippoklos, the tyrant of that city, was in high favour with the Persian king Dareios; and though an Athenian might look down upon a Lampsakene,⁴³⁵ he gladly gave his daughter Archedikê in marriage to Aiantides, the son of Hippoklos. In Sigeion then he thought that he might have a safe refuge, and in the Lampsakene despot he found a friend through whom he gained personal access to the Persian king.

Intrigues
of the
Alkmaionidai
for the over-
throw of
Hippias.

While Hippias was thus guarding himself against possible disasters, the intrigues of the Alkmaionidai were preparing the way for the expulsion which he dreaded. About five and thirty years before the marriage of Archedikê the temple of Delphoi of which tradition spoke as the work of Trophonios and Agamedes⁴³⁶ had been burnt by accident; and the Amphiktyonic Council determined that it should be restored at the cost of three hundred talents, about 115,000*l.* of our money, one fourth portion of this to be contributed by the Delphians themselves.⁴³⁷ So large a sum was not likely to be raised in a short time, and the Delphians asked and obtained from other cities and from Amasis king of Egypt help which would have been probably far exceeded by the munificence of Kroisos, if he had come out victorious from his struggle with the Persian Cyrus. When at length the money was gathered together, the Alkmaionidai took the contract for carrying out the designs of the Corinthian Spintharos; but they executed the work with greater sumptuousness than the contract specified, and the front of the new temple instead of being built with common tufa shone with all the brilliance of Parian marble. Into this engagement they had probably entered long before their unsuccessful attempt, after the death of Hipparchos, to occupy Leipsydrion, a post on the mountain range of Parnes on the march between Boiotia and Attica.⁴³⁸ From this place they were dislodged by Hippias who seemed to be strong in the friendship of the Spartans and in his alliance with the Thessalians and the

⁴³⁵ This is probably the meaning of the words Ἀθηναῖος ὡν Λαμψακηνῶ. Thuc. vi. 59.

⁴³⁶ See p. 118. Paus. x. 5, 5.

⁴³⁷ Of course, out of money's received from pilgrims. The little town of Delphoi out of its own resources could not possibly have furnished nearly 30,000*l.*

⁴³⁸ Herod. v. 62.

Makedonian chief Amyntas. But of these friends the Spartans were soon to be turned against him. The Alkmaionidai had won for themselves a lasting title to the gratitude of the Delphians, which according to Herodotos was heightened by further gifts bestowed on the condition that to all Spartans who might consult the oracle the answer should be returned, 'Athens must be set free.'⁴³⁹ Wearied out by the repetition of this command, the Spartans, doing violence to their own inclinations in obedience to the divine bidding, sent Anchimolios by sea with an army which landed at Phaleron. But Hippias had been forewarned. With the help of a thousand Thessalian horsemen⁴⁴⁰ under their chief Kineas he utterly defeated the Spartans on the Phalerian plain, and Anchimolios found a grave on Athenian soil.

The attempt was, however, repeated on a larger scale under the Spartan king Kleomenes, the son of Anaxandridas, who invaded Attica by land. The first to meet him were the horsemen of Kineas, who on losing a few of their number turned and fled straight to Thessaly; and Kleomenes, advancing to Athens, shut up Hippias within the Pelasgic wall. But he had no idea of a permanent blockade, and the besieged were well provided with food. A few days more would have seen the departure of the Spartan force, when an accident brought the matter to an issue. The children of Hippias were taken in the attempt to smuggle them out of the country. The tables were effectually turned, and for the recovery of his children Hippias agreed to leave Attica within five days. A Spartan king, the natural friend of all oligarchs, if not of all tyrants, had accomplished a work which, if we may trust the traditional narrative, the Athenians could not at this time have achieved for themselves; and to this task he had been driven wholly against his will by the constraint of a divine command. The very completeness of the success which crowned the Alkmaionid intrigues seems to cast some suspicion on the tale: but in this instance we may perhaps be dealing with one of those true stories which are stranger than fiction. Thus, after the lapse of

Final expulsion of the Peisistratidai.

⁴³⁹ Herod. v. 63.

⁴⁴⁰ We hear nothing at this time of the Thrakian mercenaries on whom Peisistratos relied after his third occupation of the Akropolis, Thuc. vi. 55.

BOOK
I.

510 B.C.

fifty years from the establishment of the first tyranny of Peisistratos, the last despot of his house betook himself to the refuge which he had prepared on the banks of the Skamandros; and a pillar on the Akropolis set forth for the execration of future ages the evil deeds of the dynasty, and the names of all its members.⁴⁴¹

⁴⁴¹ Thuc. vi. 55. If the statement of Herodotos, v. 65, be true that the Peisistratidai were furnished with ample means for sustaining a long siege, and that Hippias left Athens under a definite compact based on the restoration of his children, it is obvious that the assertion of Andokides, *de Myst.* sect. 106, is to be rejected in which he says that their expulsion was followed by the deaths of many of their adherents, by the banishment of others, and by the infliction of political infamy, Atimia, on all the rest. That Hippias should make terms only for himself is to the last degree unlikely; and the authority of Andokides may be measured by the ignorance or the assurance which has jumbled together the events of the campaign of Marathon with those of the invasion of Xerxes ten years later; nor can we help suspecting that the orator was drawing merely on his own powers of invention, when he places two of his own great-grandfathers in command of the Athenian Demos who return from exile and pull down the tyranny of the Peisistratidai. The statement is probably an impudent fiction; but Andokides would scarcely have ventured to palm off the story, if he had been speaking of a time of which his hearers might consult the contemporary history. For a more detailed examination of the subject see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part II., note at the end of ch. xxx.

CHAPTER XII.

THE REFORMS OF KLEISTHENES.

THE outward forms of the Solonian constitution underwent, we are told, little or no change under the dynasty of Peisistratos. By that constitution a shock had been given to the religious sentiment which invested the Eupatridai with an incommunicable dignity. By his timocratic classification Solon made property the title to Athenian citizenship and insured to the poorest the right of voting in the Ekklesia, which elected the Archons as well as the members of the Probouleutic Council of the Four Hundred and which reviewed the administration of the magistrates at the end of their year of office. But he had not interfered with the religious constitution of the tribes, phratriai, and houses; and while none but the members of the first and richest class of citizens were eligible for the archonship, even the richest had no further political privileges than the members of the fourth or poorest class, unless they were also members of a tribe. Hence the Archonship, the Probouleutic Senate, and the Court of Areopagos were still confined to the sacred oligarchy of the ancient houses. All that the main body of the people had to do was to elect the archons and the senate from the members of the patrician tribes, and exercise a feeble judicial power on magistrates going out of office.

Such a constitution as this might, it is obvious, be speedily developed in the direction of democracy, by strengthening the powers of the Ekklesia and extending the rights of the poorest class of citizens; but it was no difficult task for a despot, who had hedged himself behind the spears of his mercenaries, to keep it effectually in check. With the necessary loss of freedom of speech the powers of the great council

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Oligarchical elements in the Solonian constitution.

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of citizens fell practically into abeyance, and the tyrant or his deputies were the real administrators, controlling the acts of the magistrate. The tradition which tells us that Peisistratos obeyed the summons which cited him to appear before the archons tells us also that his accuser failed to put in a presence on the day of trial.

Renewal of
factions
after the
fall of
Hippias.

With the expulsion of Hippias the Solonian laws, nominally at least, resumed their force. But the first fact which comes before us is a renewal of the strife which it was the object of the Solonian constitution to put down,—the contending parties being the Alkmaionid Kleisthenes, who was popularly credited with the corruption of the Delphian priestess, and Isagoras the son of Tisandros, a member of a noble house, who now appears on the political stage for the first time. The causes of the quarrel between them are not specified; but when we read that the defeated Kleisthenes took the people into partnership,⁴⁴² or rather made common cause with the Demos, and that his first act was to substitute new tribes in place of the old, we feel that the contest went to the very foundations of social order and government, and that the account which ascribes this change to a mere copying of the acts of his uncle, Kleisthenes of Sikyon,⁴⁴³ and to a growing contempt of the Ionian name, cannot tell us the whole truth about the matter. From Herodotos we learn only that he changed the name of the ancient tribes, and for four substituted ten, each tribe having its own Phylarchos or chief, and each tribe being subdivided into ten Demoi or cantons.⁴⁴⁴ The new classification must

⁴⁴² Herod. v. 66. *τὸν δῆμον προσεραὶ ρίξεται.*

⁴⁴³ See p. 106. In imputing to the Athenian Kleisthenes a contempt for the Ionian name, Herodotos was probably transferring to the age of Hippias a sentiment of his own time when, as he says, j. 143, all except the Asiatic Ionians seemed to be ashamed of the title. For the growth of this feeling see p. 114.

⁴⁴⁴ It seems impossible to suppose that by the words, *δέκα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δήμους κατένευε ἐς τὰς φυλάς*, Herodotos meant to say *τοὺς δήμους κατένευε ἐς τὰς δέκα φυλάς*; and if the fact was not such, it is better to say that Herodotos was mistaken, than to attempt to twist his words so as to make them bear the necessary meaning. On the other hand, Mr. Grote argues that if at this time there were exactly one hundred Demoi, and as in the time of Polemon, the third century B.C., there were 174, we should have had some positive evidence of this large increase of their number in the intervening centuries, and adds that while Kleisthenes naturally wished to render the amount of the citizen population nearly equal in each of the ten tribes, he had no motive to equalise the number of the demoi. Hence he concludes that the number of demoi remained practically unchanged, at least until B.C. 305, when the two new tribes Antigonias and Demetrias, afterwards called Ptolemais and Attalis, were added to the Kleisthenean tribes, whose names, borrowed from legendary heroes and not from existing kings, point to a spirit

have involved a new principle ; or else the opposition between Kleisthenes and Isagoras could never have assumed formidable proportions.

But if there be any truth in the accounts which we have received of the Solonian constitution, the fourth class contained practically not only all those whose annual income fell short of 200 drachmas, but all (no matter what their wealth) who were not members of phratriai or tribes. To such men wealth, while it added to their civil burdens, brought no political privileges ; and the influx of strangers, allured by Athenian commerce, was constantly increasing the numbers of a class which already contained by far the larger portion of the population. Many of these men would be among the most intelligent and enterprising in the land ; and the discontent with which they would regard their exclusion from all civil offices would be a serious and growing danger to the state. Nor could Kleisthenes fail to see that if he wished to put out a fire which was always more than smouldering and might at any time burst into furious flame, he must strike at the root of the religious organisation which rendered all true political growth impossible. He must by whatever means give full play to the intelligence and energy of the people, unless he wished to see Athenians relapse into that indifference which Solon had so bitterly condemned as the nursing mother of despotism. To create new tribes on a level with the old ones was an impossibility : to add to the numbers of phratries or families contained in them would have been resented as a profanation and a sacrilege. There was therefore nothing left but to do away with the religious tribes as political units, and to substitute for them a larger number of new tribes divided into cantons taking in the whole body of the Athenian citizens ; and into this body Kleisthenes, according to the express statement of Aristotle,⁴⁴⁵ introduced many resident aliens and perhaps slaves.

Need of a
new classification of
citizens.

very different from the servile temper of Athens 200 years later. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 177. But in truth the point must remain doubtful. The ten Kleisthenean tribes were called respectively, Erechtheis, Pandionis, Aigéis, Leontis, Qineis, Akamantis, Kekropis, Aiantis, Hippothoontis, Antiochis.

⁴⁴⁵ πολλοὺς ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. *Polit.* iii. 2, 3. The number of μετοίκοι, or permanently resident foreigners (passing strangers or travellers never bore this name), was very large at Athens. Of these foreigners many became Athenian citizens, many did not. What determining circumstance may have brought about the

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This classification the cause of the opposition of Isagoras.

Such a change, although it might, as the Kleisthenean proposal did, leave the houses and phratries untouched as religious societies founded on an exclusive worship, would be regarded by the conservative Eupatrid as virtually a death-blow to the old faith. Nothing more is needed to explain the vehement opposition of Isagoras; nor can we well avoid the conclusion that it was the proposal of this change which roused his antagonism, and that it was not the rivalry of Isagoras which led Kleisthenes to promulgate his scheme as a new method of winning popularity. The struggle at Athens is reflected in the strife between the plebeians and the patricians of Rome and again between the great families of the German and Italian cities in the middle ages and the guilds which grew up around them.⁴⁴⁶

The new

But Kleisthenes had learnt by a long and hard experience to guard against the outbreak of factions and local jealousies. His object was to unite all Athenians into one political body, but to prevent as much as possible all merely local combinations and all dangers arising from the excessive predominance whether of tribes or of individual citizens. These ends he endeavoured to attain by two means,—the one being the splitting up of the tribes in portions scattered over the country, the other being the Ostracism. So carefully did he provide that the cantons of the tribes should not be generally adjacent that the five Demoi of Athens itself belonged to five different tribes.⁴⁴⁷ The demos, in short, became in many respects like our parish, each having its own place of worship with its special rites and watching over its own local interests, each levying its own taxes, and each keeping its own register of enrolled citizens. This association, which was seen further in the common worship of each tribe in its own chapel, differed from the religious society of the old patrician

result in each case, it is impossible to say. Citizenship could at any time be granted by a public vote of the people; but even without this vote, wealthy non-freemen, Mr. Grote remarks, might purchase admission upon the register of some poor Demos, probably by means of a fictitious adoption. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 180. The δούλοι μεροῖσι may perhaps have been men living apart from their masters on condition of making to them a fixed annual payment, or possibly passing under this name even after they had fully bought their freedom, if the text be accepted as genuine. Men so freed, and indeed all non-citizens, had to pay a special impost called the Metoikion or stranger's tax, while they were also liable to the general taxation of the citizens, and to all the Liturgies, except the Trierarchia and Gymnasiarchia.

⁴⁴⁶ See at more length Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 175.

⁴⁴⁷ See further Grote, *ib.* iv. 178.

houses in its extension to all citizens ; but it served to keep up the exclusiveness which distinguished the polity of the most advanced of ancient democracies from the theory of modern citizenship.

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While the principle which avoided all unnecessary interference with existing forms left a nominal existence to the Trittyes and Naukrariai, the Probouleutic council of Four Hundred underwent more important changes. To that assembly only those citizens were eligible who belonged to the first class and were members of one of the four tribes, which had thus each a hundred representatives in the Senate. In the new council of Five Hundred, to which all citizens were eligible, each of the ten new tribes was represented by fifty senators, who seem now to have been elected by lot.

The
Council
of the Five
Hundred.

The command in war had been left by the Solonian constitution to the third archon called Polemarchos: by the reforms of Kleisthenes each of the ten tribes elected annually its own Strategos or general, together with two Hipparchoi for the command of the horsemen.⁴⁴⁸ With these Strategoi the Polemarchos continued for the present to exercise a co-ordinate authority, although the functions of the generals were gradually extended to the management of the foreign affairs of the state, while those of the archons were reduced to subordinate provinces of internal administration.⁴⁴⁹ Thus the democratic spirit was strengthened not only by the remodelling of the military service but by the increased authority of the Council of the Five Hundred, which now sat as a permanent court, fifty members under the title of Prytaneis taking their turn of attendance during each of the ten Prytaneiai into which the civil year was divided. These Prytaneis were further subdivided into five bodies of ten each, who served as Presidents (Proedroi) in the Senate for

The
Strategoï
and the
Prytaneis

⁴⁴⁸ The inferiority of this military system as compared with that of Sparta has been already noticed. See page 95.

⁴⁴⁹ Changes of precisely the same kind marked the financial legislation of Kleisthenes. Thus far the control of the revenue lay in the hands of certain officers called Kolakretai. These henceforth were confined to providing the meals in the Prytaneion; and when the Dikastai came to be paid, they received their fees from these officers. Their other functions were transferred to a board of ten Apodektai, one for each of the new tribes; but these in their turn became afterwards mere receivers of revenue, which they paid over to the ten treasurers of Athênê.

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seven days or one-fifth portion of each Prytaneia, of which six consisted of 35, and four of 36 days each : and lastly each body of ten elected daily by lot from their own number a president or Epistates who during his day of office held the city seal with the keys of the Akropolis and the treasury. But no meeting was valid without the presence of at least nine senators, one from each of the nine tribes whose representatives were not going through their month of office as Prytaneis.⁴⁵⁰ Thus a court was constantly sitting to do the work of the Probouleutic council of Solon : and the best securities were taken that all matters requiring discussion should be brought before the Ekklesia or general assembly of the citizens, who now met not at rare or uncertain intervals but probably once at least in each Prytaneia or ten times during the year, and who, further, met to deliberate with that freedom of speech which imparted to the decisions of the people the utmost majesty of law. In the result, whatever it might be, each man felt that he had a share ; and that result became therefore to him the expression of the will of the state, to which he yielded a perfectly voluntary obedience.

The
Hellaia
and the
Dikastai.

By the definition of Aristotle those only can be rightly called citizens, who exercise in their own persons a judicial as well as a legislative power ;⁴⁵¹ and this judicial authority was extended to all the citizens by the constitution of the Hellaia, in which, as we find it in the days of Perikles, 6000 persons called Dikastai or jurymen, above the age of thirty years, were elected annually by lot in the proportion of 600 for each of the ten tribes, 1000 of these being reserved to fill vacancies caused by death or absence among the remaining 5000 who were subdivided into ten decuries of 500 each. To each man was given a ticket bearing a letter denoting the pannel to which he was assigned, while the

⁴⁵⁰ The tribe whose representatives had the presidency for the month was called ἡ πρυτανεύουσα φυλή. The order in which the tribes should furnish the Prytaneis was determined by lot.

⁴⁵¹ πολίτης ἀπλῶς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. *Polit.* iii. 1. 6. It is scarcely necessary to repeat that the idea of a nation as distinguished from a confederation of autonomous cities is essentially modern. In the republic of Andorre Aristotle would find all that is needed to constitute a Polis ; the idea of a parliament like that of Great Britain would to him have appeared to involve impracticable complications. He could not indeed assign to the city an exact limit of numbers ; but he asserts distinctly that the limit of a State or Polis is passed if it has a population which would be far less than that of Birmingham. οὐκ ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων πόλις ἐστὶ ἐστίν. *Ἰβ. Νικ.* ix. 10.

distribution of the causes to be tried by the decuries was left to the Thesmothetai or six inferior archons. Thus no juryman knew until the time of trial, in what court or under what magistrate he might be called upon to sit; and in his ignorance lay the best guarantee that he would approach without prejudice the cause which he was pledged by his solemn oath to determine with strict justice and truth. In the discharge of this function each decury was regarded as the collective state, and like the whole body of Six Thousand was called the Heliaia. Thus each decision was the decision of the people, and from it there was no appeal.

How far this constitution was drawn out in detail in the days of Kleisthenes, we cannot positively determine. It is certain that from his time to that of Aristides these Dikastai or jurymen were not paid, and certain also that during that period their functions were not allowed to clash with the undefined jurisdiction of the public officers and magistrates. It is most likely that, while the Prytaneis of the Probouleutic Council formed a court of permanent session, the Dikasteria of the Heliaia were called into action only when civil cases of importance came on for trial. Before the invasion of Xerxes they had not received their powers as tribunals for dealing with criminal causes.

Payment
of the
Dikastai.

But the constitution which intrusted to the archons the assignment of the causes to the several Dikasteria or jury-courts, insured the downfall of their ancient power. The experience of these courts furnished a high legal education to the Athenian citizens, and the exercise of judicial power became for them more and more a necessary constituent of their civil liberty, while the functions of the archon became more and more subordinate to those of the Heliaia. Accordingly in the time of Perikles we find the Dikastai in receipt of a certain fixed, though small, payment for their services, while the archons are amongst the officers who are chosen by lot. Under the Solonian constitution which admitted to the archonship none but members of tribes who belonged to the wealthiest class, such a mode of appointment would have been more acceptable to the Eupatridai than

The
Archons.

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election by the Ekklesia in which the poorest had their vote, though they could not be elected themselves. But when all offices of state had been thrown open to the general body of citizens, it was clear that selection by lot could be applied to those offices only which needed on the part of those who filled them nothing more than the common honesty and average ability of ordinary citizens. This method, which had value for the poor as giving them a chance of obtaining offices to which they were legally eligible, was never applied to the appointment of the Strategoi, who were always chosen by show of hands of the people in the Ekklesia. The mere fact that it was applied to the selection of archons shows how completely the relative positions of the Strategoi and the archon Polemarchos had been reversed since the days when Miltiades appealed to Kallimachos to decide in favour of battle on the field of Marathon,⁴⁵² and further proves that their ancient powers had been cut down to the scantiest measure, as they could not fail to be, when the Dikastai had inroached on their judicial functions on the one side and the Strategoi had taken their place as military leaders on the other.

Election of
magistrates
by lot.

It seems clear then that the method of the lot could not be applied to the selection of the archons, until their office was thrown open to the whole body of the citizens. The conclusion follows that this was not among the reforms of Kleisthenes, who, while he admitted to the office citizens of the second and third classes, still excluded the fourth and largest class. The change which led to the adoption of the lot was not made until, some years after the battle of Plataiai, Aristides with all his oligarchical prejudices proposed that henceforth the magistracies should be thrown open to citizens of all classes alike.⁴⁵³ After the glorious close of that supreme

B.C. 467.

⁴⁵² It is true that Herodotos, vi. 109, speaks of Kallimachos as having been chosen by lot: but if (as Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 199, urges) it seems impossible to believe that the Strategoi were elected, as they always were, while the Polemarchos, at a time when his functions were the same as theirs, was taken by lot, it would follow that the historian has transferred to the year 490 B.C. the political conditions of Athens in his own day.

Dr. Curtius (*Hist. Gr.* i. 478, trans.) holds that the assertion of Herodotos must be conclusive as to the fact. It would be so if Herodotos had been speaking of a time for which he had before him a written contemporary history.

⁴⁵³ γράφει φήμισμα κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρεῖσθαι. Plut. *Arist.* 22. Mr. Grote holds that this important statement of Plutarch is in every way worthy of credit. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 196.

conflict, the issue of which had, in the emphatic words of Herodotos,⁴⁵⁴ been determined solely by the fearless energy, and unwearied self-sacrifice of the whole body of Athenians, the conviction forced itself on the high-minded Aristeides that the privilege of serving his country in the highest offices of the state should be denied not even to the poorest of that noble band by whose obedience to law the staff of the Persian despot had been broken. The measure was one of strict justice. It abolished a restriction which, as time went on, could not fail to become more and more irksome: but practically the poor were almost as seldom chosen at Athens to offices not filled by lot as in the Italian republics of the middle ages.⁴⁵⁵

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The law which made all citizens eligible to the archonship dealt the deathblow to the predominance of the Areiopagos. By the Solonian constitution this court remained strictly oligarchical, while during the usurpation of the Peisistratidai the archons by whom its numbers were recruited were necessarily mere creatures of the tyrant; and so long as only the wealthy members of tribes could be elected to the office, the Areiopagos would continue to be the bulwark and garrison of oligarchy. This character it retained at the time when Perikles and Ephialtes carried their measures of reform: but when its seats began to be filled with archons who had been chosen by lot, the safeguards of its ancient dignity were taken away, and it gradually became merely a respectable assembly of average Athenian citizens.

The Court
of Areio-
pagos.

But if these various reforms raised an effectual barrier against the abuse of political power whether by the tribes or the demoi, there remained a more formidable danger from the overweening influence which might be exercised by unscrupulous individual citizens. It was true that the Kleisthenean constitution could not fail to give to the main body of

Ostracism

⁴⁵⁴ vii. 139.

⁴⁵⁵ In these republics, as at Athens, the popular feeling was, for the time at least, satisfied with the law which declared the eligibility of the poorest citizens, and admitted all citizens to the right of electing the highest officers of the state. Certainly they did not ask for much; but even this was illegally withheld from them by the nobles. 'Ce n'étoit pas encore la possession des magistratures que l'on contestoit aux gentilshommes: on demandoit seulement qu'ils fussent les mandataires immédiats de la nation. Mais plus d'une fois, en dépit du droit incontestable des citoyens, les consuls regnant s'attribuèrent l'élection de leurs successeurs.' Sismondi, *Hist. des Républiques Italiennes*, ch. xii. vol. ii. p. 140. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 197.

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the people a political education which should build up in them a strong reverence for the principle of law: but there were many in whom this moral sense had not been formed. The aliens, or slaves (if any such there were) who had been admitted to citizenship, and the citizens generally of the poorest class who had been declared eligible to high offices, would find their interest in the new order of things; but the changes welcomed by them would rouse no feelings but those of indignation and hatred in the minds of the genuine Eupatrid oligarchs. For such men there would be an almost irresistible temptation to subvert the constitution from which they had nothing to expect but constant incroachments on their ancient privileges; and if one like Peisistratos or Isagoras should give the signal for strife, the state could look to the people alone to maintain the law. In other words, the only way to peace and order would lie through civil war, in which there would be everything to encourage the oligarch, and very little to inspire their opponents. The former had lived through many violent political convulsions, most of which had ended as he would have them end: for the latter there was still the fear that they might relapse into that indifference which Solon had regarded 'as the worst offence' of a citizen. It became, therefore, indispensably necessary to provide a machinery by which the plots of such men might be anticipated, and which without violence or bloodshed should do the work of the mercenaries or assassins of the despot. The feeling of this need is strikingly shown in the saying attributed to Aristeides that, if the Athenians were wise, they would put an end to the political rivalry between Themistokles and himself by throwing them both into the Barathron. The growth of a constitutional morality in the whole body of the citizens would certainly be the most effectual of all safeguards. But this growth must necessarily be a work of time; and they had to guard against a danger which they might be compelled at any moment to face. The difficulty was met by an appeal to that sense of the sovereign authority of the people which was soon to make Athens preeminent alike among all Hellenic and non-Hellenic states; and it was left to the citizens to decide,

once perhaps in each year, by their secret and irresponsible vote, whether for the safety of the whole community one of the citizens should go for a definite period of years into an exile which involved neither loss of property nor civil infamy. But against the abuse even of this power the most jealous precautions were taken. The necessity of the measure was most fully discussed in the Senate of Five Hundred; and even when it was decided that the condition of affairs called for the application of ostracism, the people were simply invited to name on the shells by which their votes were given the man whose presence they might regard as involving serious danger to the commonwealth. No one could be sent into exile, unless at the least 6000 votes, or in other words, the votes of one-fourth of the whole body of citizens, were given against him; and it was expressly provided by the Kleisthenean constitution that apart from this secret vote of 6000 citizens no law should be made against any single citizen, unless that same law were made against all Athenian citizens. On the day fixed for the voting the Agora was railed round, ten entrances being left for the men of each of the ten tribes, who placed their votes in a cask from which they were gathered in the evening. The result might be that a less number than 6000 votes demanded the banishment of an indefinite number of citizens, and in this case the ceremony went for nothing. If, however, more than 6000 votes were given against any man, he received warning to quit Athens within ten days; but he departed without civil disgrace and without losing any portion of his property. Thus without bloodshed and without strife the state was freed from the presence of a man who might be tempted to upset the laws of his country; and this relief was obtained by a mode which left no room for the indulgence of personal ill-will. The desire of Themistokles to procure the banishment of Aristides might set the machinery of ostracism into motion: but the result might be his own exile, or the exile of some other man whom perhaps neither Aristides nor Themistokles thought that they had cause to dread. The evil thus met belonged strictly to a growing community in which constitutional morality had

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not yet taken firm root; the remedy therefore was necessarily provisional. During a period of seventy or eighty years it removed for a time from Athens, besides the two distinguished statesmen just named, Kimon, Thoukydides the son of Melesias, Megakles, and Alkibiades, the grandfather of the brilliant but infamous Alkibiades of a later generation.⁴⁵⁶ When at length about ninety years after Kleisthenes the vote fell on Hyperbolos who, if we are to believe the story, sought the banishment of statesmen whom he was pleased to term his rivals, it was felt that the ceremony had bestowed on him an undeserved honour; but although this was the last vote ever taken, the Prytaneis were still invited yearly to determine whether the application of ostracism was or was not needed to clear the political atmosphere. On the whole, the Athenians had no cause to feel ashamed of a device which had wrought immeasurably more good than harm, and which at the cost of the least possible hardship to the banished men prevented the recurrence of the feuds and intrigues which had led to the despotism of former days. No shame can attach to a practice certainly less harsh than that which banishes pretenders from the countries whose crowns they claim,⁴⁵⁷ and which was so far from being the necessary fruit of democratic suspicions and jealousies that it fell into disuse just when the government of Athens was most thoroughly democratical.⁴⁵⁸

Expulsion
and return
of Kleis-
thenes.

It was this constitution with its free-spoken Ekklesia, its permanent Probouleutic senate, and its new military organisation, which Isagoras determined, if it were possible, to

⁴⁵⁶ There is no evidence to support the assertion that Kleisthenes himself and Xanthippos were ostracised. The first man on whom the vote fell was Hipparchos, a kinsman of the Peisistratidai; and this fact proves that if citizens belonging to the party of Hippias went with him into exile they departed of their own free will. Two others were thus banished between the time of Kleisthenes and that of Hyperbolos, the one being Kallias, the other the philosopher Damon, the teacher of Perikles. The vote which exiled Damon betrays the same vulgar temper which dictated the prosecution of Phaidias; but although the opponents of Perikles were able to turn popular feeling against sculptors and philosophers, they failed with all their efforts to touch Perikles himself. The votes in the cases of Damon and Hyperbolos furnish the only two instances in which Ostracism was turned from its legitimate purpose.

⁴⁵⁷ Of such exiles Mr. Grote asserts that there is more to be said in their favour, 'inasmuch as the change from one royal dynasty to another does not of necessity overthrow all the collateral institutions and securities of the country.' *Hist. Gr.* iv. 216.

⁴⁵⁸ A system somewhat similar, under the name Petalismos, is said by Diodoros, xi. 87, to have produced at Syracuse results so bad that it was speedily discontinued. This difference of results would be determined by the difference in the political conditions of the two cities.

overthrow. His oligarchical instinct left him in no doubt that, unless the impulse given by freedom of speech and by admitting to public offices all but the poorest class of citizens were speedily checked, the result would assuredly be the growth of a popular sentiment, which would make the revival of Eupatrid ascendancy a mere dream. Feeling that his resources at Athens were inadequate to the task, he appealed to his friend the Spartan king Kleomenes,⁴⁵⁹ who availed himself of the old religious terrors inspired by the curse pronounced on the Alkmaionidai for the death of Kylon or his adherents more than a hundred years before. This terror was still so great that Kleisthenes with many Athenian citizens was constrained to leave Athens. After his departure Kleomenes, having entered the city with a small force, drove out as being under the old curse seven hundred families whose names had been furnished to him by Isagoras. In his next step he encountered an unexpected opposition. The Council of Five Hundred refused to be dissolved, and the Spartan king with Isagoras and his adherents took refuge in the Akropolis. But he had no means of withstanding a blockade, and on the third day he agreed to leave the city with his Spartan force. The covenant included Isagoras, but his adherents were left to their fate; and the struggle had now become so exasperated that the Athenians would be satisfied with nothing less than their death. The departure of Kleomenes was followed by the restoration of Kleisthenes and the seven hundred exiled families; but impelled by the conviction that between Sparta and Athens there was a deadly quarrel, the Athenians made an effort to anticipate the intrigues of Hippias, and sent an embassy to Sardeis to make an independent alliance with the Persian King. The envoys on being admitted to the presence of Artaphernes were asked who they were and where they lived, and were then told that Dareios would admit them to an alliance on their giving him earth and water. To this demand of absolute subjection the envoys gave an assent which was indignantly repudiated by the whole body of Athenian citizens.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁹ If Isagoras be supposed to have known the circumstances noticed by Herodotos, v. 70, this friendship was utterly discreditable to him.

⁴⁶⁰ Herod. vi. 70-73.

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1.
Alliance of
Plataiai
with
Athens.
B.C. 509.(?)

But Kleomenes had not yet laid aside the hope of punishing the Athenians. On his retreat from the city he took the road which led him by Plataiai, a small Boiotian town which lay at a distance of about thirty miles from Athens to the south of the river Asopos on the northern slopes of Kithairon. This town the Thebans claimed as their latest colony; ⁴⁶¹ but the Plataians, who were probably unwilling subjects and certainly complained of ill-treatment on the part of the Thebans, availed themselves eagerly of the presence of Kleomenes to surrender themselves and their city on condition of being admitted among the allies of Sparta. ⁴⁶² For the Spartans he felt that the alliance had no attraction and must be a source of annoyance and trouble; but he was not unwilling to suggest a step which should transfer this annoyance to Athens and lead perhaps to a series of wars between that city and the Theban confederacy. The distance of Sparta was alleged as a reason why the Plataians should look out for nearer allies; and the Athenians were named as those who were best able to help them. The counsel was followed, and some Plataians reaching Athens during a festival of the twelve gods sat as suppliants at the altar and made to the Athenians the proposals which had been rejected by Kleomenes. A prayer thus urged was not to be resisted. The apostasy of the Plataians soon

⁴⁶¹ Thuc. iii. 61.

⁴⁶² Thucydides, iii. 68, states that Plataiai was destroyed by the Spartans in the ninety-third year after it made alliance with Athens. This would make that event to have taken place B.C. 519, i.e. nine years before the expulsion of the Peisistratidai, and probably at the very time when Hippias was sending the future victor of Marathon to govern the Chersonesos. We have to remember that for this as for other incidents belonging to this period, Thucydides had by his own statement, i. 20, only oral tradition as his authority; but, further, there is nothing to lead us to suppose that Plataiai was received into alliance with Athens during the despotism of the Peisistratidai, while the narrative of Herodotos is in complete agreement with the incidents of the story of Kleisthenes. It may be imprudent to lay much stress on the words of this historian, v. 76, when he asserts that the Spartans never entered Attica from the reign of Kodros to the time when in obedience to the Delphic oracle they came to drive out Hippias: but there can be no doubt that in this last instance they came sorely against their will to do the bidding of the god against men with whom they were in most intimate friendship, *ξείριους τὰ μάλιστα*. We cannot therefore suppose that Kleomenes would deliberately suggest a plan for the expressed purpose of bringing Hippias into trouble,—the motive assigned by Herodotos for the counsel given to the Plataians, if it was given at this time. But after his unsuccessful attempt to restore Isagoras, he would have the strongest possible reason for catching at any means of troubling the peace of Athens. When to this we add that if the Plataians had come to Athens in the time of Hippias, they must have addressed themselves to the tyrant, and that the tyrant, not the people, must have ratified the alliance, we seem to be fully justified in concluding that Thucydides was following a mistaken chronology, and that the alliance with Plataiai was made ten years later than the time to which he has assigned it. See further, Grote, iv. 224.

brought upon them an armed force from Thebes, and the Athenians hastened to their aid. But before a battle could be fought, both sides were induced to submit the matter to the arbitration of the Corinthians, who determined, according to the principle which underlay all Aryan social order, that the Thebans should leave to themselves all who did not wish to be members of their confederacy, and assigned certain limits to the Plataian territory. The Athenians were already on their way homewards, when the Thebans treacherously fell upon them; but they defeated their assailants, and altering the bounds marked out by the Corinthians they made the river Asopos itself the limit of the Theban or Boiotian land. Henceforth they remained faithful friends to the little Boiotian city; but the anticipations of Kleomenes were justified by the event. The alliance embroiled Athens with Thebes, and did no good ultimately to Plataiai.

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Foiled for the time in his efforts, Kleomenes was not cast down. Regarding the Kleisthenean constitution as a personal insult to himself, he was determined that Isagoras should be despot of Athens. With this view he gathered an army from all parts of Peloponnesos and arranged with the Boiotians a simultaneous invasion of Attica. The latter accordingly seized Hysiai and Oinoê, Attic cantons, the one about eight, the other about twenty miles from Plataiai, while the men of the Euboian Chalkis ravaged other parts of Attica. The punishment of these invaders the Athenians left to some future day. For the present they marched to Eleusis, which Kleomenes had reached with an army from which he carefully concealed the purpose of the campaign. The appearance of the Athenians, and possibly the tidings of the Boiotian invasion of Attica on the north, taught them what this purpose was; and Kleomenes found that his opponents were not confined to the Kleisthenean council of Five Hundred. The Corinthians, confessing that they had come on an unrighteous errand, went home, followed by the other Spartan king, Demaratos the son of Ariston.⁴⁶³ The rest of

Discomfiture of Kleomenes at Eleusis.

⁴⁶³ Herodotos attributes to this circumstance the Spartan rule that the two kings should not go out together on military expeditions, v. 75. His statement may be right: but ætiological legends are among the most suspicious things in traditional history; and the obstacle placed in the way of Kleomenes at Aigina, Herod. vi. 50, is said to arise from the fact that the two kings had not come out together.

BOOK
I.

the Spartan allies, seeing this conflict of opinion, at once abandoned Kleomenes.

Victories
of the
Athenians
over the
Boiotians
and the
Chalki-
dians.

The Athenians were now free to turn their arms against their other enemies. They marched against the Chalkidians; but as they fell in with the Boiotians who were hastening to their aid at the Euripos, they attacked these first, and having inflicted on them a signal defeat, crossed on the same day into Euboia and won another great victory over the Chalkidians. From the Boiotians they took seven hundred prisoners, for whom they received a ransom of two minai apiece, the same sum being obtained for the Euboians who were taken in battle. The Chalkidians were further punished. Four thousand Athenian settlers, who under the title of Klerouchoi retained all their rights as citizens, were placed on the lands of the wealthy Chalkidian owners called Hippobotai or horse-feeders, and served like the Roman *Colonia* as a garrison in a conquered country.

Warlike
activity
of the
Athenians.

Such were the first fruits of Athenian freedom; and contrasting this outburst of warlike activity with their supineness under the factions of the Eupatrids and the despotism of the Peisistratidai, Herodotos cannot repress the utterance of his conviction that liberty of speech is a right good thing, since the Athenians under their tyrants were in war no better than any of their neighbours, but on being rid of them rose rapidly to preeminence, the reason being that forced service for a master took away all their spirit, whereas on winning their freedom each man made vigorous efforts for himself.⁴⁶⁴ It was this vehement energy which was to turn the scale against the Persian king, and, having won the admiration of the Hellenes generally, to change into bitter hatred the indifference, or perhaps even the sympathy, which led the Corinthians to mediate between the Athenians and the Thebans and to abandon the cause of Kleomenes at Eleusis.

Alliance
between
Thebes and
Aigina.

This change in the Athenian character excited no such feelings in the Thebans, who, following the common fashion, sent to ask the god at Delphoi what they ought to do. The answer bade them seek the aid of their nearest neighbours.

⁴⁶⁴ Herod. v. 78.

The Thebans were perplexed. 'The men of Tanagra, Korôneia, and Thespiæ,' they said, 'live nearest to us, and are doing all that they can for us. Why ask them to do more?' Hereupon one suggested that the god might not be speaking geographically, and that he might mean the Aiginetans, inasmuch as Thêbê and Aigina were daughters of the stream Asopos. Accordingly envoys were sent to Aigina, and prospered in their errand. Whatever may have been their faith in the old genealogy, the Aiginetans had a long standing grudge⁴⁶⁵ against Athens which made them take eagerly to their long war-ships, when the Thebans complained that their first effort to help them had been to no purpose. With little cost to themselves they had sent to Thebes the Aiakid heroes, in other words, the images of Telamon and Peleus: but the heroes had not saved them from a series of disasters.⁴⁶⁶ The prayer which the Thebans now offered for help of another kind rekindled their old animosity against Athens, and sailing to Phaleron they ravaged that canton with others which lay along the coast. The great mischief which they are said to have done to these Demoi is of itself proof, were other evidence wanting, that the Athenian fleet was not yet in exist-

⁴⁶⁵ It can scarcely be said that the strange tale recounted by Herodotos, v. 82-87, belongs to the history either of Aigina or of Athens. As throwing light on the tone of Hellenic thought in times for which we have no contemporary records, it is singularly instructive. By the bidding of the Pythia, the Epidaurians, who had asked his advice in a time of dearth, make statues of Damia and Auxesia (deities of wealth and increase) out of olive-wood which they obtain from the Athenians under pact of making yearly offerings at the shrines of Athenaia Polias and of Erechtheus. This pact was faithfully kept until the Aiginetans, who had thus far been subject to the Epidaurians, came in their war-ships, and carrying off these images placed them in Oia. The Athenians, on demanding the reason for the failure of the Epidaurians to offer the sacrifices, were told that with the departure of the gods the pact had come to an end, and were referred to the Aiginetans, whose pithy rejoinder was that they had nothing to do with the Athenians. The sequel of the story relates, with some variations on either side, that the Athenians, looking on the olive-wood of the images as their own property, sent men in a ship to take them; that, being unable to lift the statues from their pedestals, these men put ropes round them to drag them away; that a thunderstorm coming on struck such terror into them that they fell upon and slew each other until one alone remained alive to carry the tidings to Athens. Here the widows of the slaughtered men plunged their long tunic pins into his body, each asking him where her husband was. This incident serves as an ætiological legend explaining the adoption of the Ionian dress for the Athenian women in order to do away with the use of the pins. On their side the Aiginetans caused their women to wear pins half as large again as those which they had hitherto worn, and to forswear the use even of Athenian pottery. The tale may be childish; but the bitter enmity of the Aiginetans towards the Athenians was sufficiently real, and ended in a terrible tragedy.

⁴⁶⁶ In the belief of the Aiginetans the heroes were really sent and really returned. See Mr. Grote's remarks, *History of Greece*, iv. 230; vii. 570. Assuredly something was sent from Aigina and something restored by the Thebans. The form of the thing sent is a matter of no moment. It may have been in human shape, or it may have been a mere block of wood. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. ch. xiv.

BOOK
I.Renewed
danger of
Spartan in-
terference
at Athens.

ence: but the new energy of Athens is seen in the continued maintenance of the war with Thebes and Aigina at once.

Two causes, we are told, withheld the Athenians for the present from putting forth their full strength in the contest. The first was a charge from the Delphian priestess to postpone their vengeance against Aigina for thirty years, and in the meanwhile to consecrate a Temenos or Close to the hero Aiakos. With the latter condition they willingly complied: the former imposed too great a tax on their patience or their endurance. The second and more constraining cause was the danger which again threatened them from Sparta. The anger of Kleomenes for his discomfiture at Eleusis was heightened by indignation at the discovery that in overthrowing his friend Hippias he had been simply the tool of Kleisthenes and of the Delphian priestess whom Kleisthenes had bribed.⁴⁶⁷ It was now clear to him and to his countrymen that the Athenians would not acquiesce in the predominance of Sparta, and that if they retained their freedom, the power of Athens would soon become equal to their own.⁴⁶⁸ Their only safety lay therefore in providing the Athenians with a tyrant. An invitation was, therefore, sent to Hippias at Sigeion, to attend a congress of the allies of Sparta, who were summoned to meet on the arrival of the exiled despot.

Predomi-
nance of
Sparta in
Hellas.

The words in which Herodotos relates these facts show not merely that Sparta regarded herself as in some sort the first city in Hellas, but that among the Hellenic states there were not a few who were disposed to look up to her as such. Her claim to supremacy is seen in the complaint that Athens

⁴⁶⁷ Herodotos adds another reason explaining the vehement zeal of Kleomenes against Athens. He had found in the Athenian Akropolis a number of old prophecies or oracular answers which spoke of many grievous injuries to be inflicted by Athens on Sparta. Even if the alleged discovery be a fact, the predictions were scarcely needed to strengthen a purpose which was already sufficiently strong. Mr. Grote remarks that, while the great activity of the Athenians seemed to show that there might be some truth in these prophecies, 'Sparta had to reproach herself that, from the foolish and mischievous conduct of Kleomenes, she had undone the effect of her previous aid against the Peisistratidai, and thus lost that return of gratitude which the Athenians would otherwise have testified.' *Hist. Gr.* iv. 233. It may be true to say that she ought to have reproached herself for this: but the evidence that she did so seems lacking. There is no indication that Kleomenes received any rebuke or incurred any unpopularity for his act^s against Kleisthenes. The only thing which he and the Spartans seem to have regretted is that they were duped into driving out the Peisistratidai.

⁴⁶⁸ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔαρον ἀξιομένους καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἐτοιμοὺς εἶντας πείθεσθαι σφί, νόφ λαβόντες ὡς ἐλεύθερον μὲν εἶν τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἰσθόρπον τῷ ἑωυτῶν ἂν γίνοντο, κατεχόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τυραννίδος ἀσθενὲς καὶ πειθαρχέεσθαι ἐτοιμόν. Herod. v. 91. This is given as the view and policy, not of Kleomenes alone, but of the Spartans generally; nor can too much stress well be laid on these words.

was not willing to acknowledge it; and the recognition of this claim in certain quarters is proved by the fact that the men of Corinth and other cities marched with Kleomenes to Eleusis even though they did not know the purpose for which they had been brought together. The Congress now summoned exhibits Sparta still more clearly as in some sort the head of a great confederacy, able to convoke her allies at will, yet not able to dispense with the debates in council which implied their freedom to accept or reject her plans. The assembly in which Hippias appeared to plead the cause of despotism seems to have gone through all the formalities needed to maintain the self-respect of citizens of subordinate but independent states.

CHAP.
XII.

The address of the Spartans to the allies thus convoked was brief after their fashion and to the point. It candidly confessed their folly in having been duped by the Pythia at Delphoi, and in having given over the city of Athens to an ungrateful Demos, which had already made the Boiotians and Chalkidians feel the sting of democracy and would speedily make others feel it also; and not less candidly it besought the allies to help them in punishing the Athenians and in restoring to Hippias the power which he had lost. The reply put into the mouth of the Corinthian Sosikles is an indignant condemnation of this selfish and heartless policy. 'Surely heaven and earth are going to change places' he said, 'and fishes will live on land, and men in the sea, now that you, Lakedaimonians, mean to put down free governments and to restore in each city that most unrighteous and most blood-thirsty thing,—a despotism. If you think that a tyranny has a single good feature to recommend it, try it first yourselves, and then seek to bring others to your opinion about it. But in point of fact you have not tried it, and being religiously resolved that you never will try it, you seek to force it upon others. Experience would have taught you a more wholesome lesson: we have had this experience, and we have learnt this lesson.' This moral is enforced by the strange stories which Sosikles goes on to tell of Kypselos and Perikandros,⁴⁶⁹ the memory of whose crimes made Corinthians

Congress of
allies at
Sparta.

⁴⁶⁹ The story here told of the ten Bacchiadai coming to kill the infant Kypselos, who escapes by being hidden in a chest, is 'nothing but an etymological legend explanatory

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I.

shudder; and he ends with Spartan plainness of speech by confessing the wonder which their invitation to Hippias had excited at Corinth, and the still greater astonishment with which they now heard the explanation of a policy, in the guilt of which the Corinthians at least were resolved that they would not be partakers.

Protest of
the allies
against all
interference
in the
internal
affairs of
autonom-
ous cities.

Nothing can show more clearly than this debate the nature of the political education through which the oligarchical states of Hellas were passing scarcely less than the democratic Athens. The Corinthians and the Spartans were agreed in their hatred of any system which should do away with all exclusive privileges of the ancient houses, and, breaking down the old religious barriers which excluded all but the members of those houses from all public offices and even from all civil power, should intrust the machinery of government to the herd of the profane. Both also were agreed in their hatred of a system which placed at the head of the state a man who owed no allegiance to its laws, and whose moderation and sobriety at one time could furnish no guarantee against the grossest oppression and cruelty at another. This horrible system was different in kind even from the hard and rugged discipline which a feeling of pride rendered tolerable to Spartans. That discipline was self-imposed, and the administration of it was in the hands of elected officers to whom even the kings were accountable. Hence Sosikles could say with perfect truth that the Spartans had no experience of a tyranny, and therefore no real knowledge of its working, which could find a parallel only in the crushing yoke imposed by the despotism of Asiatic sovereigns.⁴⁷⁰ But the Spartan in this debate differed from the Corinthian only in the clearness with which he saw that there was that in

of his name (from *καστός*, a chest). Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* i. 478; see page 108. The story of the raiment burnt in order to clothe Melissa in the world of the dead belongs to that deeply-rooted animism which Mr. Tylor regards as the source of all human fancy. *Primitive Culture*, vol. i. p. 443. In the efficacy of the burning of clothes (see note 23), the phantoms of which are to be worn by the phantom Melissa, Sosikles had possibly not less faith than Periandros: the tyranny lay in stripping all the women of Corinth for this purpose.

⁴⁷⁰ But even the Asiatic despot never excited in the Greek breast the feeling of loathing aroused by the Hellenic tyrants. The former was an hereditary ruler, governing according to the law of the land. The slavish submission of Persians and Assyrians to their despots was really the result of the national temper and will. All that the Greek could say was that his own temper and will had been formed in a very different school, and required a very different expression.

Athenian democracy which, if not repressed, must prove fatal to the oligarchical constitutions around it. To this point the Corinthian had not yet advanced, and he could urge now as a sacred thing the duty of not meddling with the internal affairs of an autonomous community. In the debates which preceded the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war the Corinthian deputies held a very different language. Their eyes had been opened in the meantime to the radical antagonism of the system in which every citizen is invested with legislative and judicial powers, and the system in which these powers are in the hands of an hereditary patrician caste.

That the Corinthians would be brought to see this hereafter, was the gist of the reply made by Hippias. The time was coming, he said, in which they would find the Athenians a thorn in their side. The warning is ascribed by Herodotos to the intimate acquaintance which Hippias had with ancient prophecies: but it would be strange indeed if the instincts of the despot had been less keen and sensitive than those of the oligarchic Kleomenes. For the present, however, his exhortations were thrown away. The allies protested unani- mously against all attempts to interfere with the internal administration of any Hellenic city; and Hippias went back disappointed to Sigeion.

CHAP.
XII.

Return of
Hippias to
Sigeion.

B O O K II.

*THE STRUGGLE WITH PERSIA, AND THE GROWTH
OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.*

CHAPTER I.

CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE TRADI-
TIONS OF THE PERSIAN WARS.BOOK
II.

Importance
of the
struggle
known as
the Persian
war.

WHEN in the year 463 B.C. the developement of Athenian democracy was completed by the constitutional changes of Perikles and Ephialtes, nearly fifty years had passed away from the time when Hippias turned his thoughts to the East and to the Persian king as to a natural ally in his warfare with the liberties of Athens. During that period the power of Persia, roused into action chiefly, if not wholly, by his intrigues, had put forth all its strength for the repression of western freedom, and had been beaten back after terrible disasters. This momentous struggle in which the hordes of an Asiatic despot were discomfited by a few Hellenic states acting with but little concert and with no definite plan marks a turning point in the history of the world. The victory of Xerxes would have been the deathblow to that vigorous political growth which through its influence on Rome has affected the subsequent history of all Europe: and in the resistance of Solon to the religious exclusiveness of the Eupatrid houses and in the impatience of Athenian citizens under the tyranny of the Peisistratidai we may trace the political causes which rendered the Persian invasion inevitable.

These causes are not left unnoticed by the great historian

CHAP.

I.

Real and traditional causes of the war.

to whom practically we owe our whole knowledge of this memorable conflict. The schemes of the banished Hippias and the aggressive tendencies of Oriental despotism are alike marked by Herodotos: but although it is possible that a history which shall take into account only these political motives may represent faithfully the events of the time, it would altogether misrepresent the narrative of the historian. If, further, it be true that the Persian war in its causes and its results forms the border ground between history and mere mythical tradition,⁴⁷¹ it becomes of the last importance to determine precisely not merely the degree of credibility to be attached to the narrative but the mental and moral conditions under which the history grew up. To this question an answer can be given only after a careful examination of this history and of the principles by which the writer seems to have been guided: and the supreme importance of the subject may be pleaded as a sufficient justification for entering into it with the fulness which may be needed to exhibit in a clear light the nature and extent of the evidence with which we have to deal.

When Herodotos undertook to tell the tale of the Persian war, he was in fact undertaking to write the history of the world. The recollections of his own childhood belonged to the last years of that great strife. The land of his birth had witnessed one of the noblest victories, and many of the worst disasters, which fell to the lot of the sons of Hellen. His own city had, as it was believed, sent forth the bravest woman and the wisest counsellor in the army of the great king; and the Persian satraps still gathered the tribute of the Asiatic Greeks in the days of his infancy.⁴⁷² His manhood

Object and scope of the history of Herodotos.

⁴⁷¹ The reasons which seem to destroy the credibility of the narrative of the Dorian migration or return of the Herakleidae, even in their general outlines, have been already given (see p. 46 *et seq.*); and the history of the Athenian factions in the days of Kylon, Peisistratos, and Kleisthenes, may be fairly regarded as falling within the limits for which, under certain reservations presently to be stated, Herodotos becomes a trustworthy witness.

⁴⁷² It is certain that no Persian collectors dared to enforce the tribute assessed on the Asiatic Greeks from the days of Dareios until the great Athenian efforts before Syracuse had issued in total ruin. For a period not very far short of seventy years, 477-412 B.C., the name and power of imperial Athens had secured safety of land and person to every member of her confederacy. Herodotos, therefore, during his whole life had no experience of the injustice and misery which attend on the supremacy of foreign tyrants, and his convictions of the great blessings of freedom, v. 78, could have been formed only from historical testimony, and not from any personal remembrance of the previous fortunes of his country.

BOOK
II.

was passed in that happiest time during which no Persian ship of war was ever seen in the waters of the Egean Sea, and when the Greek inhabitants of the coast were freed from all dread of robbery and cruelty through the wisdom and might of Athens. But this time of freedom, so fair in its promise, so disastrous in its early close, led him back to the day when the Greeks of Asia had not yet fallen beneath the sway of the kings who ruled at Sardes. In the space of little more than half a century⁴⁷³ these Greeks had passed with their conqueror under the power of that mightier despot who had brought the Persians and the Medes under a single sceptre. They had rebelled against a harder yoke than the Lydian had imposed upon them. Their rebellion had brought down prompt and fearful punishment; and their slavery had at length been broken by a war whose character and issue were as marvellous as they were unforeseen.

Mingling
of divine
and human
causes and
agency.

In this glorious result was closed for a time the rivalry of the Eastern and the Western world; and the many aspects of that long struggle were all noted by the historian. It was a strife between the Greek and the Persian,—between Europe and Asia,—between civilisation and barbarism. In it the force of a centralising despotism was balanced against the force of obedience to law,—the love of things noble and beautiful against the dread of a personal tyrant. It was the triumph of a society which placed few checks on the free growth of human intellect and affection, over one which could issue in nothing but an utter monotony of degradation.⁴⁷⁴ In this strife the working of human agency was not wanting. The expulsion of tyrants by an oppressed and indignant people, their intrigues in foreign courts and lands, the jealousies of citizens and the feuds of cities, the obstinacy and cowardice of the many, the keen-sighted wisdom and energy of the few, are notions of which Herodotus never wholly loses sight throughout his narrative. But by the

⁴⁷³ The year 546 B.C. has been assigned as the most probable date for the taking of Sardes: but the chronology of the reign of Kroisos betrays too much its artificial composition to be received without some reluctance. On this assumption the interval between the fall of Kroisos and the battle of Marathon was a period of not more than fifty-six years.

⁴⁷⁴ Thuc. ii. 37. So, speaking of the despotism of the Bonapartes, M. de Montalembert denounces the tyranny which parades its irresistible and pitiless level on a bed of human dust. *Latin and Teutonic Christendom*, 220.

side of this merely human action, or rather inextricably blended with it, there was another chain of cause and effect which is wholly and entirely divine, and which vindicates the supremacy of the gods over the wisest, the wealthiest, and the greatest of men. The links in this mysterious chain must, if sought for, be everywhere visible; and the necessity of tracing them out becomes paramount. This task may lead him into the region of marvels and miracles, of motives and thoughts which none probably would discover except those who feel them;⁴⁷⁵ it may bring before him gods and departed heroes working visibly or invisibly among men; it may lead him to see in signs and portents in heaven or on earth the shadows of coming evil. But between these two intermingling chains of causes, each producing its own proper result, he feels no contradiction or inconsistency. He can pass without any sense of incongruity from the one to the other. The merest political motives may be accompanied by operations altogether marvellous or divine. Between these two classes of events there is no separation: the one is as true and as historical as the other.

Hence it became necessary for the historian to trace back to the first links of this twisted chain the complications of this great struggle, and to vindicate the supernatural principle in the persons of all who are brought upon the scene. This theological or religious treatment of events and their causes gives to the history an unity which may not improperly be called *Epical*, if we are careful not to attach to the term the ideas of fiction or romance. It was no fondness for fanciful resemblances, no desire to embellish a tale, but a religious faith, which led the historian to link together the several events in the long series of his narratives. From the first to the last he sees at once the working of men and the hand of the gods; and the operation of the latter was not of a kind to which he would be drawn by any impulse of human feeling. The jealousy of the divine being

Promi-
nence given
to the
divine
element.

⁴⁷⁵ It is very difficult to understand how the secret thoughts and designs of such men as Demokedes, Histiaios, and Xerxes could become generally known in any age. The full knowledge which Herodotos professed to have obtained of them in an age of very slender historical information indefinitely increases the perplexity.

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II.

at the simple sight of human wealth or happiness,⁴⁷⁶ the punishment of the innocent for the guilty,⁴⁷⁷ the prostration of the gods themselves before an irresistible necessity⁴⁷⁸ are facts or doctrines which no man perhaps will be found to embrace with any eager consent of his will. In the most fictitious details, then, there was probably little conscious invention, and certainly no idea of deception or fraud. With such an historical method an abundance of material, self-created as it might seem, will never be wanting. Details grew up round the facts which they were intended to illustrate as naturally and luxuriantly as the leaves and flowers on a plant; and, as we might also expect, the result will exhibit that peculiar beauty which in a certain sense we may regard as poetical and romantic. But this distinction did not exist in the mind of the historian. He believed the dream and the portent as much as, if not more than, he believed in a political intrigue, a battle, or a siege. The measure in which a more exact historical sense was being formed, and the degree to which it led him almost unconsciously to set aside some supernatural details, involve distinct and curious questions: ⁴⁷⁹ but in the general sequence of double cause and effect his faith remains substantially unshaken.

Connexion
of mythical
and his-
torical
causes.

We cannot fail to see this, as we trace the course of his tale from the stories of the Argive, Kolchian, and Phenician maidens, onwards through the war of Troy, to the history of the Lydian and Persian dynasties. The long conflict of races and of Asiatic despotism with Hellenic freedom begins

⁴⁷⁶ This is the moral not only of Solon's discourse to Kroisos, Herod. i. 32, but more particularly of the whole history of Polykrates.

⁴⁷⁷ Herod. i. 13. It is Kroisos who pays the penalty for the successful iniquity of Gyges.

⁴⁷⁸ Ib. i. 91. Apollon himself can do nothing against the Moirai: but these at his prayer put off the fall of the Lydian power for thirteen years.

⁴⁷⁹ If the critical spirit even of Thucydides led him simply to strip mythological tales of their marvellous features, and then to take the *caput mortuum* so left as authentic history, i. 9 *et seq.*, we cannot be surprised that the criticism of Herodotos should be altogether more capricious and less determined. All that we can say is that the growing conviction of a natural order which made some things seem possible and others apparently impossible, led him to question some traditions which did not affect his own personal belief or the main course of his history. This will account for his rejecting, on the ground of physical impossibility, the Greek tale of the founding of the Dodonaian oracle, ii. 57, or of the wholesale slaughter committed by the yet mortal Herakles, while yet he receives with eagerness the story of Phylakos and Antonoös at Delphoi, viii. 39, or of the mysterious sign vouchsafed to the Athenian Dikaiois and the Spartan Demaratos, viii. 65, before the battle of Salamis.

with the wrong done to Inachos at Argos; and the retaliation is worked out at Tyre. But the balance is again left unequal by the piracy at Kolchis; and the loves of Helen and the downfall of Ilion are the consequence. For a moment the chain would seem to be broken. The Lydian kings have nothing to connect them with the robbery of Iô, or Eurôpê, or Medeia. But the spread of Persian dominion called into action a power which was only slumbering. The victories of Agamemnon and Achilleus had been won on soil which was the heritage of the great king; and the avenging of Priamos and Hektor becomes a part of his inalienable birthright. Lydia, Egypt, Babylon are conquered by his armies: the history of their kings and the fortunes of their people complicate the chain of cause and effect. The stream widens as it hurries on: but whether with the tyrant of Samos or the hereditary despots of Persia and Egypt, the same force is at work. The same being looks down with a jealous eye on their wealth and power; and the pride of good fortune is followed by inevitable chastisement or ruin. From a height of happiness to which no mortal man had before attained Kroisos falls in atonement for the sin of Gyges. The storm comes, but not without warning. The gods speak in words of significant ambiguity. Human advisers also are not wanting; and the historian delights to bring before us kings and generals with their good or evil genius by their side. The Athenian Solon bids Kroisos remember that death alone can place the seal of happiness on human life: and in his turn Kroisos, taught by his own calamity, becomes the teacher of Cyrus and Kambyses. Polykrates vainly seeks by self-inflicted sorrow to satisfy the forebodings of the Egyptian king: and Xerxes hurries to defeat and shame in spite of the wisdom of Artabanos. In these instances, as in others, the good genius never prevails. Oroites lures Polykrates into his snare: the craft of Demokedes draws even the wise Dareios into schemes which are not much to his liking. The words of Mardonios outweigh with Xerxes the forethought of Artabanos, Demaratos, and Artemisia, and the forebodings of Tritantaichmes. But if the pride of Cyrus calls for vengeance at the hands of a bar-

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barian queen, if the crimes and the madness of Kambyzes placed the Magian on the throne of Persia, if Dareios returned defeated from his Scythian journey, the Moirai were still preparing to bring on Hellas the vengeance due for the iniquities of Menelaos and Odysseus. The men of Athens had dared with their Ionian colonists to assault the citadel of Sardeis; and the overthrow of Datis and Artaphernes at Marathon gave a new force to the words which charged Dareios, before every meal, to remember the Athenians. At length the hour came. The life of Dareios had closed amid the din of preparation for his great scheme of vengeance. In him there was the wise mind and the sober forethought which saved him at once from excessive pride and excessive shame; and therefore he incurred this punishment only, that he was not suffered himself to lead his hosts against the land of Achilleus and Agamemnon.⁴⁸⁰ But the reign of Xerxes, the spoilt child of insolence and power, ushers in the execution of an enterprise which was avenged two centuries later on the fields of Issos and Arbela.⁴⁸¹ The nobles of Persia are gathered in council; the visions of Mardonios are balanced by the calm judgement of Artabanos. All the solemnity of Homeric imagery, the very language of the old epic poetry, is called in to heighten the great crisis on which are to turn the fortunes of Hellas and of the world. The childish folly, which rejected the words of Artabanos with anger and insult, is sobered down into grave misgiving during the dark hours of night. But the will of Zeus, or of the Moirai more powerful than Zeus, may not be turned aside; and the dream stands over the couch of Xerxes as it had stood of old over that of Agamemnon. The spell is again thrown over the king, and Artabanos himself yields to its power. There is nothing more

⁴⁸⁰ Herod. vii. 4.

⁴⁸¹ In the time of Herodotos, as well as in the ages which had gone before, this connexion of causes was held to be a real one. When Alexander proposed to carry his arms against the Persian king, the claim of vengeance for the invasion of Xerxes was, as we shall see, set up in part to flatter his vanity, and partly with the political purpose of keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. When Isokrates in his Pægegyric speeches urged the same motive on Athens and Sparta, he addressed himself to the common sentiment at least of his own city: it had come to be little more than oratorical affectation, when he put forward the Makedonian Philip as the champion of united Hellas against the barbarian. Mr. Grote dwells strongly on the miserable change which had come over Isokrates from the time of the former speech, in which he expressed his real opinion as well as the opinion of others on the nature of the policy which had brought about the peace of Antalkidas, *Hist. Gr.* xii. 68, 69.

to hinder him. From Sousa to the Phrygian Kelainai, from Kelainai to Abydos, the great king advances with an uninterrupted good fortune. Each day swells the numbers of his host; and the sea which dared to burst his bridge is scourged and branded for its presumption. His march is not checked by the rugged deserts or the wild mountaineers of Thrace. The Spartan Euainetos and the Athenian Themistokles fall back before him as he approaches the gates of Thessaly: and through the vale of the Peneios he advances to the passes of Pylai, while his fleet sails on in its fulness of strength and glory to the Euboian shores. But here the tide turns. The overwhelming might of his army and his ships must be so weakened and brought down as to make it possible for mortal enemies to contend against them.⁴⁸² The unseen hand of the gods, the invisible force of the winds, must begin the work of destruction which the wisdom and bravery of their worshippers must consummate. Obstinate men block up the defiles of Thermopylai and waste the blood of his bravest warriors, while the mighty Boreas so shatters his fleet that the rumour of its utter ruin is carried to his trembling enemies. The horrors of the storm are in some measure compensated by the slaughter of Leonidas and his comrades; but his rising hope falls again before the renewed wrath of the winds.⁴⁸³ A mightier arm is stretched out against the men who at his bidding dared to approach the sanctuary of Apollon. The lord of light himself wields the sacred arms in defence of his shrine. Rocks torn from the summits of Parnassos beat down the invaders of his holy precincts. The blasphemy of the barbarian could go no further; and the havoc at Delphoi was the prelude to a mightier destruction in the waters of Salamis. His hosts advance unopposed into the Athenian land. For a time they are kept in check by the few old men who guard the rock of the virgin goddess: but their wooden wall is devoured by fire, and soon the tidings are sent to Sousa that Athens is in the hands of the great king. The divine oracles had foretold his triumph: signs beyond nature foreshadowed his destruction. On the plain of Eleusis the Spartan Demaratos sees a cloud of dust

⁴⁸² Herod. vii. 188.⁴⁸³ Ib. viii. 12.

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raised by some mighty host, and learns from his friend that the Sacred Mother is herself making ready to destroy the fleet of Xerxes. Throughout the narrative almost every incident is now ushered in with its own peculiar signs. The disaster at Salamis determines the king to return home; and the Spartan demand of recompense for the slaughter of Leonidas prepares us for the coming doom of Mardonios. In dread of the wild Thrakians, amidst the horrors of plague and famine, Xerxes hurries to the straits of Sestos, while his generals revel in the halls of Attagiños. The end comes; but the signs which go before it are hidden from their eyes, and the man who alone can read them would announce its approach in vain. On the plains of Plataiai the two hosts are withheld from the onset by the warnings of their prophets: but Mardonios despises both their omens and their words, and threatens Artabazos with the vengeance of the king, while the shadow of death is stealing over himself. But when the slaughter of the Persians is ended and when the Greeks have laid hands on their tents and couches, on their golden vessels and embroidered hangings, the Spartan general in his turn foreshadows his own future ruin while, pointing to the two banquets, he draws the contrast between Spartan and Persian fare. The gods have fought against the barbarian; and they have done battle against him not only in the ancient land. At one and the same moment they are aiding in the fight at Plataiai, and cheering on Spartans, Athenians, and Ionians to the fight at Mykalê. The herald's staff thrown up by the waves upon the sea-shore is the token and the evidence that their kinsmen are conquerors far away on the Boiotian plain. The vengeance is indeed full. Athênê has requited the insults done to her sacred citadel. The slaughter of thousands has atoned for the dishonouring of Leonidas. Protesilaos has exacted a fearful penalty from the man who stole his treasures and defiled his tomb.⁴⁸⁴ It remains only to exhibit the home life of a Persian despot, to disclose the loathsome scenes to which that man returns who had waged war against the heavenly guardians of Hellenic freedom: and the palace

⁴⁸⁴ Herod. ix. 116.

doors of Sousa are opened to reveal the lust, treachery, and bloodshed which find a fitting consummation in the murder of the great king.

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The historian says nothing of the contrast: but the images come before us of Athens rising to her imperial glory, and of her enemy struck down by the assassin's dagger, and we cannot choose but feel that the recompense of each is as it should be. The picture is drawn out in more minute detail. If the Greeks collectively reap the reward of the struggle, each state among those which chose the right side fails not to win its own special honour. There is a stately and even march in the events of the narrative. Great deeds are done on the same day in distant places, and the good success of the one is sometimes conveyed by marvellous tokens to the others. The same deities watch in different lands over the defenders of their country. From the Herakleion at Marathon the Athenians hasten to another home of the same hero in Kynosarges.⁴⁸⁵ By his help they had beaten off their enemies at Marathon, and by it also they drive them away in terror from Phaleron. The same day witnessed the victory of Gelon over Carthaginians in Sicily and the destruction of the barbarian ships at Salamis.⁴⁸⁶ At Plataiai and at Mykalê but a few hours passed between the death of Mardonios and the victory of Eurybiades: and alike in both places Dêmêtêr nerved the hearts and strengthened the arms of her children.⁴⁸⁷

Epical contrasts and coincidences.

In these several victories the highest praise is distributed to each Hellenic city in its turn. Once only in the war does each state win an exclusive fame, unless Marathon makes an exception for the Athenians. But if there the name of Miltiades sheds a brilliant lustre on the valour of his countrymen, a greater glory rests on the brave band which came from the little city of Plataiai. Such a feeling seems to have moved the Athenians in after days when in memory of their brotherhood at Marathon the herald at every sacrifice united the names of Athenians and Plataians.⁴⁸⁸ At Thermopylai the Thespians are admitted to share in the glory of Leo-

Epical distribution of merit.

⁴⁸⁵ Herod. vi. 116.

⁴⁸⁶ Ib. vii. 166.

⁴⁸⁷ Herod. ix. 101.

⁴⁸⁸ Ib. vi. 111.

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nidas;⁴⁸⁹ at Salamis the greatest fame belongs to the men of Athens and Aigina together. Before Plataiai the Lakedaemonians retrieve the reputation which their sluggishness or their piety had endangered,⁴⁹⁰ while at Mykalê the paramount greatness of Athens⁴⁹¹ vindicates her title to that supremacy which for nearly seventy years banished the Persians from the lands of the Asiatic Greeks and the waters of the Egean Sea.

Historical
conception
of Hero-
dotos.

If the preceding sketch fairly represents the historical method of Herodotos, we have before us a chain of epical causes which place the real causes at work throughout the Persian war in great measure out of sight. But if we speak of those causes, on which the historian dwells most fully, as being distinct from the real or true motives, we acknowledge at once the existence of different historical standards, and are driven to ascertain the historical conception which guided the mind of Herodotos. At the first glance we cannot fail to see the harmony of that scheme of causation which begins with the rapes of Io and Eurôpê and ends with the vision of Xerxes and the evil counsels of Mardonios. But if in the Herodotean tale of Io or of Helen we have a treatment very different from that of Æschylos or of the Homeric poets, it is not the less certain that Herodotos accounts for the war and its issue by means of other motives than those which, nevertheless, he incidentally admits to have been at work. The crafty plans of Demokedes and Histiaios are more than co-ordinate causes with the intrigues of Hippias or the failure of Aristagoras at Naxos. These are not indeed put wholly out of sight: but the events turn rather on the homesickness of captives or exiles than on the plots of banished despots or the impulses of political ambition. The sequence throughout is either ethical or religious. It illustrates either the course of human passions and desires, or the working of unseen and heavenly powers. In the former case it is an advance on the critical standard of earlier times: but the connexion is direct and intimate. If a careful examination of physical laws or facts, so far as they came before him, seem to lead him into something like scepticism, he still

⁴⁸⁹ Herod. vii. 222.

⁴⁹⁰ Ib. ix. 71.

⁴⁹¹ Ib. ix. 105.

retains the old faith by which beings unseen were believed to defend and comfort, to deceive or destroy the sons of men. If a tyrant is driven out by the citizens whose rights and freedom he has trampled down, it is because some ancient oracle or prophecy must be fulfilled. A series of aggressive wars originates in the appeal which a woman's flattery makes to a sense of kingly duty. If a nation or a tribe claims a post of honour on the battle-field, the claim is founded on good deeds done in the days of the Amazons or of Herakles.⁴⁹² He has not lost the faith which believed that Thetis arose from the sea to console her child: and his narrative agrees mostly with the mental state to which agencies beyond nature, far from being unexpected or strange, appear the ordinary causes influencing the life of men. If he questions the possibility of a dove speaking with human voice⁴⁹³ or of crowds smitten by a single arm,⁴⁹⁴ he is not the less ready to believe that the Dream came by the will of Zeus to deceive Xerxes, or that the deified heroes of Delphoi were seen to slay the enemies of the gods.

Such motives and agencies the earlier ages had received not only without reluctance but with eager belief. The working of unseen powers formed the daily food of their minds; and a narrative which put this working out of sight or failed to bring it prominently forward would have met with neither praise nor credit at their hands. This age differed from the age of Herodotos in little more than an inability to see anything incongruous or strange in tales which contradicted the daily experience of their senses: but the absence of supernatural signs and wonders would have left a feeling of want in the mind of Herodotos scarcely less than that which would have been felt by the earliest hearers of the Homeric rhapsodists. It is not then his method of arrangement which distinguishes him most pointedly from Thucydides, to whom a real historical criticism owes at once its birth and its almost complete developement. The history of the Peloponnesian war has its climax not less than the history of Herodotos. If the sacrilegious pride of the barbarian reached its greatest height in the assault on Delphoi,

Growth of
an histori-
cal sense.

⁴⁹² Herod. ix. 26.

⁴⁹³ Ib. ii. 57.

⁴⁹⁴ Ib. ii. 45.

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the downfall of Athenian greatness is not less sharply traced from the massacre which followed the conference at Melos.⁴⁹⁵ We may re-arrange the narrative of Herodotos: but by no process of selection can we bring it into harmony with the general spirit of Thucydides: We may, if we please, maintain that political causes for the course of events are not omitted; but we cannot say that the excision of the supernatural phenomena recorded in it would leave his narrative in substance that which it now is.⁴⁹⁶ We cannot omit the swarming of the snakes before the citadel of Sardeis and the feast which they supplied to the horses, and then say that the capture of the city and the circumstances of the capture are untouched by the omission. Such a method may be applied as easily to the tales of the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*; and in the residue we should have a story as plausible as that which Thucydides has culled from the tale of Troy. If from the account of the fall of Sardeis we omit the prodigy of the snakes, with the parallel of the reign of fourteen years and the siege of fourteen days,⁴⁹⁷ if we put aside the tradition that a breach could be made in the walls only at the spot to which Meles had

⁴⁹⁵ We shall see hereafter that in this instance Thucydides has departed from his rule of not importing into his speeches materials which either were not or might not have been employed by the speakers. In short, in the so-called Melian conference Thucydides has expressed sentiments which he chooses to ascribe to the Athenians, not those of the Melians, or even those of the Athenian sophists, with which they are even less in agreement. In other words, a moral conviction had led him to insert in an historical form a parable designed to enforce his view of the causes which led to the downfall of Athens.

⁴⁹⁶ It is scarcely necessary to call the reader's attention to the list of defects or faults which Colonel Mure finds in the historical manner of Herodotos. If we speak of any writer as credulous, or as influenced by an excessive love of effect in exaggerated contrasts or historical combinations, we are either comparing him with others of his own time who were free from these faults, or else we project him beyond the age in which he lived. It is perhaps not too much to say that Colonel Mure was incapable of throwing himself into the mind and language of a myth-making or myth-loving age. His criticisms of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and the so-called Homeric hymns, or of the narrative of Herodotos, are criticisms which might with some fairness be applied to works of fiction or of history put forth in our own day. Throughout he seems to regard as peculiarities of the man the universal characteristics of his age. To speak of his historical combinations as expedients to heighten a contrast or give force to a story is to make him the inventor of that expedient. To dwell on 'his love of the marvellous, as observed or imagined by him in the ordinary phenomena of nature apart from divine or preternatural agency,' is perhaps to charge him with a fault of which he was guiltless; while his readiness to discern supernatural agency in ordinary phenomena was the necessary consequence of the universal belief of an age just passing away. It is not difficult to multiply instances which either wholly or in part overthrow Colonel Mure's positions: but it may be of more use to remark that by adhering to his method of judgement we preclude ourselves from entering into the mind of Herodotos, and from measuring the force of the influences which moulded it. See Mure, *Critical History of Greek Literature*, iv. 352 et seq.

⁴⁹⁷ For the fabrication of artificial chronology by the ancient chroniclers see Appendix A.

forgotten to carry the woman-born lion,⁴⁹⁸ and that a paroxysm of fear loosed the tongue of the dumb child of Kroisos, all the circumstances of the capture are gone. The legend is, indeed, connected immediately with the oracles and signs previously given and with the exquisite tale which vindicates the piety of Kroisos and the righteousness of Apollon; and to apply to it such a method is not less dangerous than to accept as fact the plague in the host of Agamemnon and the lonely musings of Achilleus, while we put aside the vision of Thetis and her prayer to the father of gods and men. The difference lies in this, that we have no means of proving any statements in the Homeric poems, while we are able to test perhaps the greater number of the facts which are found in the histories of Herodotos. In these, while we may still maintain the historical basis of the narrative, we can prove our right to reject either mythical details or entire mythical episodes. We cannot do so with the epics of an age altogether prehistoric.

But if a religious or supernatural causation of events was imposed on Herodotos by the necessity of his time, if at the utmost we can only say that human and political causes, while not wholly put aside, are yet subordinated to causes of another kind, then to bring against him charges of credulity or superstition, of an excessive love of anecdote and of exaggeration for the sake of pictorial effect, is to make use of erroneous terms. These peculiarities are not in him to be regarded as defects, because we find a very different spirit in Thucydides, while the latter deserves little credit for his higher critical standard, if we blame the older historian for a lower one. The vivid imagination of Herodotos may have embellished, but it did not create, the beautiful legends of Kroisos and Cyrus, of Amasis and Polykrates.⁴⁹⁹ The mightier genius of Thucydides may have strengthened, but it did not originate, the intellectual condition of his age. It was not merely a poetic or romantic turn of mind which

Intellectual condition of the age of Herodotos as contrasted with that of Thucydides.

⁴⁹⁸ Herod. i. 84. This impregnability of Sardeis except in one place is but another version of the dipping of Achilleus in the Styx. He fell by a wound in the only part of his body which the water had not touched. The myth has assumed countless shapes. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 156, 252, &c.

⁴⁹⁹ See the excellent remarks of Mr. Grote on this point, *Hist. Gr.* v. 15.

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compelled Herodotos to give us the tale of Atys and Adrastos: it was not altogether his own philosophical temperament which led Thucydides to analyse the effects of plague or sedition on the morality of a people. The few years which separated the youth of Herodotos from that of Thucydides had removed the latter further from the faith of the heroic ages than the four hundred years which in the belief of Herodotos⁵⁰⁰ intervened between himself and Homer. Had Thucydides written the history of the Persian war when Herodotos wrote his, we should have had indefinitely less of that keen philosophical analysis which marks his immortal possession; and Herodotos, if he had had to speak of Kleon and Brasidas, would have thought of other things than legends which illustrate the causeless jealousy of the gods. The mental and political state which produced Perikles and Phormion was at work in all the actors in the Peloponnesian war. If we compare these with the Greeks of Herodotos in the struggle with Persia, we see that their motives and plans, their forms of thought and expression are indefinitely different. The jealousy of the Tegeatans and Athenians at Plataiai is vented in appeals to mythical exploits in the days of the Herakleidai. Themistokles has to force the meaning of an oracle or to turn the religious sentiment of his countrymen, in order to carry out his wise designs. But in the days of Perikles no claim is urged but such as may rise from merely public or personal services; and the Athenians are swayed by well-balanced probabilities of political or military success or failure. If the massacre at Melos is related by Thucydides under the form of an epical climax, the conference which precedes it, whether historical or not, is a logical discussion as grave and calm as a debate of philosophers in the groves of Akademos.

But it is another question how far the epical method of Herodotos affects the credit of his narrative, or what amount of historical fact it leaves to us. If tested by the standard of Thucydides, it would be small indeed. If every motive must be purely human or political, the causes which in the opinion of Herodotos led to the Persian war would be greatly

Effect of this condition on the credibility of the history of Herodotos.

reduced in number. In his pages we fail to meet with any recognition of antagonistic political ideas founded on difference of race or produced by total diversity of circumstances: and we may therefore be tempted to regard as a defect in Herodotos himself this partial discernment of historical causes, until we remember that he had scarcely emerged from an age to which religious influences, under epical forms, were indispensable. This mode of thought was shaken only in the cities and among thoughtful men. In remote districts those portions of Herodotean history which exhibit some approach to the criticism of a later time would still have been unwelcome or repulsive.⁵⁰¹ To doubt the intervention of Phylakos and Autonoös at Delphoi would have offended the religious instincts of others as well as his own. But no such feelings were attached to the names of Io or Eurôpê or Medeia; and hence their history is presented under a disguise which utterly hides the spirit of the old heroic fables. Myths wholly unconnected one with the other are introduced as connected causes for the political events of his own day, while every single feature of the ancient legend is either obliterated or modified. The daughter of Inachos, changed into a heifer and chased by the gadfly of Hêrê over the mountains where Prometheus is paying the penalty for his love of man, becomes an Argive maiden choosing foreign wares close to a trading-ship on the sea-shore, and, possibly of her own free will, stealing away with Phenician sailors. The child of the Morning whom Zeus as a white bull bears away to the land of the Night comes before us as the daughter of a Tyrian king whom Argives steal in retaliation for the rape of Io. More strangely still, the uncontrollable love which led the wise Kolchian maiden to the Thessalian land,—the atmosphere of portentous miracle which enwraps her mythical history from beginning to end,—the marvellous power which tames the fire-breathing bulls,—the devouring robe,—the dragon chariot, are lost in the single statement that by the robbery of Medeia the Greeks reopened the causes

⁵⁰¹ The readiness of the men of Lystra to worship St. Paul as Zeus and St. Barnabas as Hermes will show what strength this sentiment possessed in remote places, when any practical belief in the old mythology had long been extinct elsewhere.

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of offence between the East and the West.⁵⁰² But to deal thus with the stories of Demokedes and Histiaios, with the visions of Xerxes and the miraculous repulse at Delphoi, would upset the whole historical method of Herodotos, and deprive his work of all its charm, if not of all its value. If a more sceptical tendency here and there betray itself, it is generally confined to those subjects of time and space in which the idea of a physical order was breaking in upon his mind. He is able to recognise the agency of Poseidon under the forms of periodical earthquakes: ⁵⁰³ he believes that the winds may have been lulled after the shipwrecks at Artemision, because the storm was spent.⁵⁰⁴ He accepts gladly and without question the coincidence of the battles of Plataiai and Mykalê; ⁵⁰⁵ he doubts not the heavenly Phêmê, the divine Rumour, which cheered the Greeks on the Asiatic coast with the tidings of victory then scarcely achieved in Boiotia.⁵⁰⁶ He is sure that the herald's staff was thrown up on the sea-shore as the visible token of the destruction of Mardonios; but, to give time for the passage of the rumour and the staff, he is careful to state that the fight at Plataiai happened early in the day, while that of Mykalê was fought as the sun was going down in the sky.⁵⁰⁷ The victory of Gelon had, indeed, been won in Sicily, as he thought, on the same day with the battle of Salamis; ⁵⁰⁸ but it called for no explanation, as neither side during the fight was made aware of the good success of the other.

Results of the application of modern critical tests to the history of Herodotos.

It is easy to take event after event, and to show that the details given by the historian are conflicting or impossible, that the alleged causes are fictitious or inadequate, and that the true cause is frequently kept altogether out of sight. But whether, and to whatever extent, we may reject his details, it must be remembered that they are most intimately blended with his narrative. If we scruple to receive the marvels which embellish the history of Kroisos, we cannot safely believe more than that after a conflict with the power

⁵⁰² *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 180 *et seq.*

⁵⁰⁴ *Ib.* vii. 191.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ib.* ix. 90.

⁵⁰³ Herod. vii. 129.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ib.* ix. 100.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ib.* ix. 101. It is not easy on any other supposition to understand why he should be at the pains to state this incident which, except by way of explaining the wonder, is wholly unnecessary.

⁵⁰⁸ Herod. vii. 166.

of Persia the Lydian dynasty was overthrown. If we reject the tale of the recovered ring with its antecedents and its consequences, we can say nothing more of the death of Polykrates, than that he was in some way or other intrapped by a crafty satrap and killed, if we may believe so much. If we cannot admit the fable of the childhood of Cyrus, we shall substitute national aversion or rebellion to account for the fall of Median supremacy. If further, after rejecting the many details and stories which yield to the tests of criticism, we still retain something more than a dry catalogue of isolated facts, it is because we believe the man and because we feel ourselves justified in according to him a credit which we refuse to yield to the lays of the old heroic ages. But this faith cannot be extended to those portions of his history which are constructed wholly on an epical or religious basis. We may possibly believe that Xerxes sent a detached force to Delphoi; but we cannot be sure from the tale of Herodotos how that force fared or whether the temple was plundered; and our distrust must be increased when we remember that the story of the flight of Xerxes seems to be wholly set aside by the account of the retreat of Artabazos. Of the councils of Xerxes we know nothing, and are left with a probability, which applies to all wars, that his invasion of Hellas was not undertaken without forethought. We may accept as historical the account given of the policy of Themistokles, (even if we reject the story of the oracle), because we have abundant proof of the character of that policy in subsequent history as well as in that of Herodotos; and we may readily believe that the necessities of the war with Aigina served his purpose better than a forced interpretation of the warnings of Apollon. But except where we have such additional testimony, there will be left, when the process of rejection is complete, only that bare and lifeless residue which remains of the Trojan tradition when Hektor and Achilleus have been banished from the tale. We can scarcely say that with Herodotos, as with Livy, the prodigies and miracles form no essential portion of the narrative, unless we exclude the stories of the Roman kings and the early times of the republic. The accounts of prodigies in later Roman history

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read like the official reports of men specially appointed to attend to them. No sensible effect is produced by the moving of a statue or the speaking of a cow, while in the history of Kroisos or of Xerxes the moral and religious element is everything.

The impar-
tiality of
Herodotos
a strong
argument
for his
credibility.

But Herodotos deserves and receives from us a wider and more generous credit than that which is warranted by the power of verifying certain statements in his history. He has to speak of a race broken up into many kindred tribes, under strange conditions of feud or friendship; and of all he has spoken with a singular impartiality.⁵⁰⁹ He has had to tell us of a war of races in which the East and the West, despotism and freedom, were set against each other; and he is as ready to acknowledge the merits of the despotic Persian as to admit the vices of his free kinsmen.⁵¹⁰ He has shown himself almost wholly free of personal bias; he has as large an admiration for Dorian as for Ionian valour. We can convict him of no interested motives in the performance of his task.⁵¹¹ We are justified, therefore, under certain restrictions, presently to be named, in according to him a ready belief on all points of which he had personal knowledge or on which he could exercise his own judgement, as also on all others in which he could avail himself of the testimony of eye-witnesses or of otherwise trustworthy informants.

Causes
tending
to modify
oral tradi-
tion.

If, however, we may generally admit his authority for contemporary events or for the results of his own observations, the case is greatly altered at every step which leads us backwards. It is not merely that personal feelings may influence the form of tradition; but we can define the length of time during which the memory of various classes of events may be faithfully preserved. The motives and the words of men, apart from their results, have the greatest influence over those who hear them, and are impressed most forcibly on their minds. It is precisely here that the memory of a later generation fails, while a fair recollection may be

⁵⁰⁹ Herod. vii. 152 *et seq.*

⁵¹⁰ *Ib.* vii. 238.

⁵¹¹ *Ib.* vii. 139. His expressions imply that his judgement on the paramount merit of the Athenians was extorted by his conviction of its truth against the sense of his own interest, and in spite of his knowledge that it would be fiercely disputed.

retained of the objects which they aimed at or achieved. There is a constant tendency to modify the details and features, and then to lose them, until there remains a barren fact, from which all that gave it life and interest has vanished. It is needless to enlarge on the wide difference between an age which derives all its knowledge from oral tradition and another which rests wholly upon written history. The comparison of their conditions presents a singular contrast. It has been said that among the common class of minds a son remembers his father, knows something about his grandfather, but never bestows a thought on his more remote progenitors.⁵¹² In an age of oral tradition his knowledge of public affairs would follow the same rule. The period immediately preceding his own would come before him in something like its real outlines; but in an age of written records the time which a little precedes our own birth is that with which we are least familiar. Its records have not yet been thrown into permanent historical forms, while its chief actors are passing away from the scene. The concerns of that time are less the subject of conversation than those of a more distant age, while few have reached so late a mark in the course of their historical study. Such a condition has this obvious disadvantage, that it deprives a man of that vivid realisation which almost turns the past into the present, and which must have brought before the eyes of Herodotos the Persian war in its most minute details. It checks the disposition to personal inquiry, and tends to hinder the intercourse of the rising generation with that which is passing away. But if in a time of oral tradition men realise more vividly the lives and fortunes of their immediate predecessors, there is danger that the picture may be partial or unfaithful. Personal motives, whether of favour or dislike, of jealousy or admiration, may enter in; their sympathies may be powerfully attracted towards the winning or the losing side; the imagination may fasten on one event to the distortion or depreciation of another. A further difference is caused by the form in which the tradition is cast. If the vehicle employed be mere ordinary

⁵¹² Mallet, quoted by Sir G. C. Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* i. 98.

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II.

conversation; such as that which imparted to Herodotos the tale of Thersandros and Attaginos, the chances of deviation from truth and of positive misstatements and contradictions are indefinitely increased. If it be transmitted in a rhythmical or metrical form, the danger of alteration is comparatively slight, whatever may be the credibility of the events recorded. The variations of Greek legend are great; but the oldest or the most beautiful tales might have been completely overlaid by the altered religious feeling of later days, if they had been intrusted to nothing 'more permanent than the common talk of the people. At the least there is only one supposition on which we can conceive of a vast mass of tradition as being faithfully preserved in a non-metrical form: and this alternative is supplied by the history of Sanskrit literature. But in this case the aid to the memory is supplied by converting the task into a religious duty, and the slightest perversion in the text of liturgical, grammatical, or devotional works incurs the ban of a religious anathema.⁵¹³ To this must be added an almost lifelong training to which probably not even an Homeric rhapsodist would have submitted; and even with these conditions the effort would scarcely have been successful, unless an inviolable sanctity had been attached to every word and every syllable. Not only must the Veda be learnt orally: but all benefit is lost, and never-ending torments are the penalty, if any attempt be made to learn it in any other way. The preservation of this literature is an achievement which could have been accomplished only by the despotic power of a sacerdotal caste acting upon minds to whom such control was wholly congenial, and under a form of religious belief to which all change and progress were alike alien and repulsive.

Such influences extend but in a slight degree even to the epical literature of the Greeks, and in no way affect that mass of floating tradition which ushers in the dawn of authentic history. The same national sympathies and jealousies, which might preserve the heritage of the rhapsodists, would here mould or modify those tales which formed the early annals of their country; and in the absence of any

Comparison of Greek and Mahometan tradition.

⁵¹³ Max Müller, *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 502 et seq.

authoritative documents we are reduced almost to the same rules of judgement which we apply to the legends of Troy or the old theogonies. A close parallel is furnished in the early Mahometan history. The Coran comes before us, on sufficient proof, as being substantially the work of a single man; ⁵¹⁴ and the religious factions which split up the followers of the prophet furnish a strong guarantee for the preservation, in their substantial integrity, of documents which were compiled into a single volume by his own immediate successors. ⁵¹⁵ But the Mahometan traditions which are hampered by no such restrictions and which grew up with every successive change of thought or feeling exhibit a luxuriance of miracle, marvel, and prodigy which may vie even with the legendary history of the Persian war. ⁵¹⁶ Most of them, indeed, we are able at once to reject, from the plain contradictions afforded by the Coran, while the rest stand either as plausible fiction or as mere possibilities. This parallel is the more valuable as showing the rapidity with which such fictions may grow up. The marvels attributed to Mahomet may all be matched and even surpassed by the miracles which attested the zeal and holiness of Benedict or Bernard, of Augustine or Columban. But marvels and prodigies formed the poetry of the middle ages; and it can scarcely be thought that the religion of Islam was as congenial a soil for the growth of miracle as the temper and circumstances of mediæval Christendom. The Coran gave little countenance to such representations; and two generations at most had barely passed away before a series of contemporary historians began to furnish means for detecting and refuting them. ⁵¹⁷ Yet, in spite of these obstacles, miraculous narratives shed their false light on the life of the great teacher, and invested not only his early years but the history of previous generations with the vivid colouring which cannot fail to be imparted by a profusion of minute and plausible details. The gorgeous absurdities of the night

⁵¹⁴ Muir, *Life of Mahomet*, I. xxvii.

⁵¹⁵ Sir W. Muir notes, as satisfactory evidence of the authenticity of Othman's version of the Coran, the absence of all opposition on the part of the followers of Ali. *Life of Mahomet*, I. xvi.; but see at length xix.—xxvi.

⁵¹⁶ Muir, *Ib.* I. lxiii.—lxvii.

⁵¹⁷ *Ib.* I. xxxii.

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II.

journey to Jerusalem were evoked by the recital of an ordinary dream,⁵¹⁸ while the tendency to localise the incidents of a memorable career was developed as strongly and as early as among the first Christians of Palestine.

Herodotos
not a con-
temporary
historian.

But if the historian of Mahometanism be justified in rejecting, in exact proportion to the fulness of their descriptions, not merely these miraculous legends but the detailed events of times anterior to the prophet or even of his earlier years, we are wielding a weapon which will fall with greater force on almost every part of Herodotéan history except its close. If we accept the year 484 B.C. as that of his birth, the historian was only six years of age when the last event recorded in his narrative took place.⁵¹⁹ That he was born much earlier is most unlikely, even if we put aside the statements of Dionysios and Pamphila. If his silence on the fate of the Aiginetans at Thyrea and on the occupation of Kythera by Nikias⁵²⁰ furnishes conclusive proof, if not of his death, yet of the completion of his work before the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, still his own statements show that his final corrections must have extended to some time within three or four years of that date; and the lot of Gorgias or Isokrates is not the portion of many. In strictness of speech, then, it is no tale of his own time which Herodotos gives to us. His own careful inquiries and conscientious judgement may warrant our acceptance of all those statements the truth of which it was in his power to verify; but the element of uncertainty comes in even with the latest events in a narrative which closes so soon after the time of his own birth. If we may not safely forget the propensity to invent or alter details which is common to every age, still less may we put out of sight the peculiar circumstances of a generation whose native atmosphere was that of mythology. No testimony of earlier writers can be adduced in proof of his assertions. It becomes a superfluous labour to give a list of such earlier or contemporary authors, with whom probably Herodotos was even less acquainted than we are. Of the Lydian Xanthos, as of Charon of Lampsakos, he seems

⁵¹⁸ Muir, *Life of Mahomet*, i. lxxvii.

⁵¹⁹ Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 501.

⁵²⁰ Herod. vi. 91; vii. 235. See also Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 307-8.

to have known nothing, or at least to have made no use of their works. With Hekataios, if not with Hellanikos, he was undoubtedly more familiar; but even the former can lay no claim to the title of an historian, while the latter is but one of that large company whose labours were mostly confined to collecting the several versions of the heroic fables. At the least it seems impossible to disprove the opinion that before the work of Herodotos was written there was no writing in Greece which could properly be called historical.⁵²¹ The dog of Orestheus illustrated Aitolian genealogy to Hekataios not less than the relics of the sow at Lavinium attested the legend of Æneas to Cato.⁵²²

CHAP.
I.

Special circumstances may indeed occur in the history of any people which may impress a series of events or a single event more forcibly on their memory. The institution of festivals or of civil or military offices, changes in the form of government, great national successes or calamities, must undoubtedly affect the common talk of the people and may quicken the fidelity of their recollections. But the serious departures from the truth of facts which Thucydides points out in the popular traditions of the age of Hippias⁵²³ will deter us from placing too great reliance on those which relate even to the most important political events; and we shall remember that the caprice of popular imagination might tamper with the history even of such men as Miltiades and Themistokles. But if the nearness of Herodotos to the times of which he speaks is no conclusive guarantee for the details of the fight of Marathon or the assault on Delphoi, and if all testimony of earlier writers be wanting, we can fall back only on his personal credibility, while we examine certain events which belong to any earlier generations than the one immediately preceding his own. To refer to public documents, to state registers or other inscriptions, is to adduce

Limits
to the
credibility
of Hero-
dotos.

⁵²¹ 'The question now is whether there existed previously a work on Greek history to which Herodotos could refer his readers for information on the earliest ages of Greece. I absolutely deny the existence of such a work.' Niebuhr, *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* i. 168. The question is closely connected with that of the introduction of a written literature in any form. On this subject I cannot do better than refer the reader to a very able paper by Mr. Fennell, whose conclusion is that among the Greeks prose literature was first committed to writing not earlier than the Persian wars, and metrical literature not for some years later. *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society.* 1868.

⁵²² Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* i. 334.

⁵²³ See p. 215.

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II.

evidence which is rather specious than real; nor are we justified in putting any faith in the monumental evidence to which Herodotos appeals for incidents in the history of Midas, Gordias, or Kroisos, of Kleobis and Biton, of Arion and other personages. That Herodotos rests his alleged facts on such testimony is indisputable; the question turns simply on the value of the testimony, and we are tempted to forget that public monuments and inscriptions must be judged by precisely the same tests as those which are applied to historical narratives. As evidence of facts long anterior to their own date, they can have, of themselves, no weight: as proofs even of contemporary events, they need to be checked not less strictly than the statements of individual historians. We have in each case to ascertain whether the inscriber had an adequate knowledge of the facts which he records, and whether or not there may be reason to suspect misrepresentation.⁵²⁴ The existence of contemporary writers at once imparts a higher value to the public monuments of their time. In their absence we have to invest such records with an intrinsic infallibility, such as we should be unwilling to allow to them in any age. In all early periods of history they are peculiarly liable to suspicion. The tendency of the people to receive mythical and historical facts with the same degree of belief, the temptation to forge or tamper with such documents to gratify national or personal vanity or malice, the habit of accepting, as genuine, records which referred to a purely mythical time, may well justify us in testing their credit by the statements of historians rather than in receiving the latter on any supposed proof which these monuments may furnish. Instances are not wanting whether of false inscriptions or of forged memorials. A sprinkling vessel, which Herodotos believed to have been the gift of Kroisos, was made by the forgery of a Delphian to testify to the piety of the Spartans.⁵²⁵ Empty sepulchres raised on the battlefield at Plataiai soothed the vanity of those Greeks whose fathers were not present at the fight.⁵²⁶ It would scarcely

⁵²⁴ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 56.

⁵²⁵ Herod. i. 61. In this case, if the fact be granted, a possibly true inscription is falsified.

⁵²⁶ *Ib.* ix. 85.

be more rash to admit a fact without hesitation on the evidence of such monuments or inscriptions than to accept as proofs of the historical existence of Herakles or Endymion, of Aineias and Niobe, the tombs and relics which were exhibited before the eyes of later historians and geographers. We are not able to test by collateral evidence such monuments as these any more than the proofs which Euemeros adduces for the human life and exploits of Zeus before his deification.⁵²⁷

Genealogies and official lists before the time of contemporary history are, if possible, even less trustworthy. If we accept the later names contained in them as historical, we do so not because they occur in the list, but because the list is supported by the authority of contemporary writers. We do not believe that Leonidas really lived and died because his ancestry is carried back through Herakles to Zeus, any more than we accept the personality of the logographer Hekataios, because his sixteenth ancestor was the deified founder of his family.⁵²⁸ The value of a Greek genealogy rose in proportion to its brevity; their faith in the reality of the superhuman stock was altogether stronger than their assurance of the truth of events which passed before their eyes. For historical purposes these genealogies are practically useless. We cannot tell where that which is mythical ends and where that which is historical begins. The existence of Hekataios is no guarantee for the existence of even the third or fourth man named in the list of his ancestors. If the table of Spartan kings becomes historical in its later entries, we cannot make use of them before the existence of collateral testimony with more safety than we may use the list of Athenian kings which ends as it began with a mere name. The lists of public officers, whether civil or sacerdotal, must be subjected to the same tests. A register was kept of the priests or priestesses at Argos and elsewhere: but the personality of Chrysis⁵²⁹ who lived in the time of Thucydides is no evidence for the historical character of her supposed predecessors in the days of Orpheus or Melampous. The

Nature and
value of
Greek
gene-
alogies.

⁵²⁷ Diod. v. 44-46.

⁵²⁸ Herod. ii. 143; see note 22.

⁵²⁹ Thuc. ii. 2.

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II.

early chronology of the Olympiads is shrouded in the same mystery. The first recorded Olympiad is marked by the victory of Koroibos: but of the reality of Koroibos we have no further evidence than a monument which was alleged to cover his grave; ⁵³⁰ and we have not only the tomb of Æneas but a hundred tombs all of which were asserted to contain his ashes. The life of Pheidon, the great Temenid king of Argos, is assigned, as we have seen, to several dates separated by an interval of about one hundred and fifty years.⁵³¹ To assume the existence of authentic records, wholly lost to us but corroborating these public monuments or inscriptions, is a dangerous and even desperate hypothesis.⁵³² It is a supposition which, as applied to Greek history, is even less plausible than when it is used to explain the contradictory traditions of Rome. The legends of the mythical ages in Greece had long since been embodied in a poetical form. At Rome, perhaps because they were preserved in the ordinary speech of the people, their astonishing variations and their fragmentary beauty may tempt us to regard them as relics of great national poems which are lost to us for ever. There is little evidence among the Greeks of that family pride which shows itself at Rome in pompous funeral orations and in bombastic family annals which fed their hereditary vanity: nor does Thucydides, any more than the later historians of Rome, refer to such sources of information.

The offerings at Delphoi, the votive statues in Tainaron and elsewhere, cannot be brought forward as evidence for facts, when they themselves stand in need of other testimony to prove their genuineness. That Herodotos saw at Athens or Corinth or Babylon that which he says that he saw, is not to be disputed. But we have had his own admission that the original inscriptions were sometimes displaced by forged titles, and that monuments were deliberately erected to commemorate that which never happened; and the tales which give the history of these monuments are in some instances hopelessly inconsistent. In gratitude for the

⁵³⁰ Paus. v. 8, 3; viii. 26, 3.

⁵³¹ See p. 66.

⁵³² It is maintained by Niebuhr, who supposes, *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* i. 169, that authentic 'annalistic tables' furnished to Thucydides the dates of certain facts mentioned in his Introduction, as the building of the first galley, etc.: and the authenticity of these tables he 'cannot allow to be attacked.'

friendliness of Kroisos the Spartans sent him a costly bowl. It came too late, according to one version, for Kroisos was a Persian captive before it reached Samos,⁵³³ while an event which is said to have happened at the same time with the sending of the bowl is referred elsewhere to the reign of his father Alyattes.⁵³⁴ If then we have any reason for believing in the order of succession of the last Lydian dynasty, it can be only because the facts may be regarded as sufficiently recent to be faithfully handed down by oral tradition. If the visit of Solon to the court of Kroisos be a mere legend which grew out of the epical tendency of the age, the existence of some statues at Argos can furnish no evidence for the tale of Kleobis and Biton, which thus becomes a legend within a legend. If, again, there is no reason for questioning the personality of Periandros, the votive figure on Tainaron tells nothing for the miraculous escape of Arion. The miracle is of the essence of the tale; and to substitute for his deliverer a ship with a dolphin's sign is mere arbitrary invention. The war between Tegea and Sparta may be historical: but it is no more proved to be so by the fetters seen by Herodotos in the temple of Athênê⁵³⁵ than the exploits or the existence of king Arthur are established by the alleged discovery of his tomb at Glastonbury. Nor could the tripod, which the allied Greeks dedicated after the victory at Plataiai, have enabled Herodotos to authenticate his list of the combatants in that battle. It seems to be generally admitted that the inscription on the pedestal contained the names not merely, as Pausanias⁵³⁶ supposed, of those who fought at Plataiai but of all who had given any real help to the Greeks throughout the war. This fact would seem to lend some countenance to the supposition that the list on the tripod, even more than the list of Herodotos, is an epical representation, made up to give to all the Greek cities a share in the final glories of that war through whose course they had

⁵³³ Herod. i. 70.

⁵³⁴ Herodotos, iii. 48, distinctly asserts that some Korkyraian youths sent to Alyattes by Periandros were seized by the Samians at the time of the capture of this bowl. Whether the incident be referred to the time of Kroisos or to that of his father, the chronology is full of difficulties. Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* ii. 535.

⁵³⁵ Herod. i. 66. *Popular Romances of the Middle Ages*, 3.

⁵³⁶ v. 23, 1.

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II.

exhibited so wretched a picture of meanness and disunion. A list, which included allies who could only have given aid at sea, could not have enabled the historian to draw up a correct list of those who were engaged in a land battle. While, therefore, we wonder at the principle of selection which is supposed to have excluded from the inscription the names of the Lemnians, Krotoniats, and Seriphians, because they each contributed only a single vessel, we cannot but look on a collective enumeration of all the actors throughout a war as of no use in determining the combatants of each successive battle. The inscription on the base of the statue of Zeus at Olympia involves the same difficulty, if it included all who had at any time taken part in the war. Still less can it be admitted that the paintings of Mandrokles or the pillar of Dareios prove the details of the Scythian expedition, or that the pictures in the Athenian Akropolis could have furnished a basis for historical descriptions of events in the Persian war. Of the inscriptions found and deciphered in Egypt, Assyria, and Persia it is unnecessary to say more here than that they impart no information on such subjects as the Scythian expedition or the suppression of the Ionian revolt. They tell us nothing of the motives which led to the long struggle between Greece and Persia; they take no notice of the intrigues of Atossa, of Demokedes, or of Histiaios.

Difficulties
connected
with the
oracular
responses.

One other class of monuments yet remains which, if not of much weight in determining the order of events, would yet, on the assumption of their genuineness, very clearly illustrate the condition of popular feeling and the line of policy adopted at the time of which they profess to speak. These monuments are the oracular responses, obtained from the Delphic or other shrines or hawked about by professed soothsayers. But the mention of these brings up subjects of controversy which it might not be easy to settle and into which it is unnecessary to enter at any length. Apart, however, from the moral or theological difficulties connected with them, there can be no question that, if the fact of their delivery could be established, they would go far to prove the reality of many events of which we cannot now speak with any sort of certitude. If Kroisos really obtained from Delphoi such answers

as those which are introduced into the story of his life, it would be difficult to resist the conclusion that he was the aggressor in the struggle which ended in his ruin. If the Spartans were really told that their success in the war with Xerxes depended on the death of their king, it would serve in great measure to explain the strange conduct of Leonidas in the passes of Thermopylai.

But it is obvious that evidence almost indisputable is required before such documents can be received as proving even the fact that such answers were delivered. Nor has this demand any necessary reference to the question of their inspiration whether by heavenly or by diabolic influence. The admission must be made that they were not always inspired either in the one way or in the other, if by inspiration be meant the faculty of discerning the real events of the coming time: and this admission renders it absolutely necessary to separate by the most stringent tests the false oracles from the true.⁵³⁷ Whether such a process will leave any as belonging to the latter class, is a question the decision of which may well precede the assertion of any supernatural agency.⁵³⁸ At the outset we are met by the fact that in the days of their highest glory the action of the oracles was confessedly very varied. If the responses appeared sometimes to justify an unquestioning faith, there were others which, as we have seen in the history of Kleisthenes, were mere utterances of earthly policy. With this changing and uncertain character, common caution would call for very clear and forcible evidence, not of the truth of their predictions but

Amount of evidence necessary to prove the fact of their delivery, in the forms handed down to us

⁵³⁷ By true oracles as distinguished from false, I mean those of whose *delivery* we have adequate proof. The character of their contents is another, and very frequently a less important, question.

⁵³⁸ The introduction of Christianity has sometimes been alleged as the sole cause for the failure of the oracles. But inasmuch as another cause had at least a co-ordinate influence, the assertion virtually places a part for the whole. If Plutarch mentions that in his time the oracles were consulted only on private questions and for the interests of individuals, he was not speaking of a state of things for which Christianity alone was responsible. The decay and extinction of Hellenic freedom and nationality sealed the doom of the Hellenic oracles. Henceforth they were of necessity confined to the solution of private difficulties, because all public action and all national enterprise were annihilated. The result, which may have been forced on by the introduction of Christianity, was insured by the political degradation of the preceding ages; and when we speak of Hellenic oracles, we do in fact speak of all. The Roman and the Italian sought for aid and counsel less from the human mouthpiece of an unseen god than from visible signs whether in the heavens or on the earth. He was under the sway of a sacerdotal system which was worked for purely political ends, and which therefore survived the public action of the Greek oracles.

of the fact of their enunciation,—in other words, they should be subjected to a test which can be met only by the testimony of contemporary writers. With such a criterion, there is perhaps not one oracular response of which we can affirm with any certainty that it belongs to the time in which it is alleged to have been uttered. We know that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war the soothsayers fed the hopes and fears of their countrymen by such predictions; but, with one exception, we do not know the nature or the form of those prophecies. From this one (with regard to which, however, we learn that there was a doubt as to the authority of the version), we know that Thucydides was acquainted before the time with the announcement that a Dorian war would bring with it either a famine or a plague.⁵³⁹ The ambiguity, which made it applicable to other wars besides the one then beginning, tells in this instance its own tale. We also know that before the influx of the country people into Athens there was a line which warned them not to meddle with the Pelasgic ground:⁵⁴⁰ but the faith which the historian displays in this almost solitary instance was based on an idea of political prescience which was altogether his own. Of the few remaining oracular sayings which are mentioned in his history some belong to a time for which he had no contemporary evidence,⁵⁴¹ while the greater number seem to be dictated under that foreign influence, supported by strong party feeling at home, which is betrayed by the promise of the god to aid the Spartans to the utmost throughout the war.⁵⁴² In the case of Pleistoanax his restoration to his country is enforced by a threat that otherwise the Spartans should turn the earth with a silver ploughshare.⁵⁴³ The expression is held to mean simply the pay-

⁵³⁹ Thuc. ii. 54. Between the words *Limos* and *Loimos* there would be no sensible difference of sound; and in the case of unwritten prophecies it would be impossible to determine which word the speaker meant to use. The ambiguity of the sound may have been its chief recommendation to the soothsayer.

⁵⁴⁰ Thuc. ii. 17.

⁵⁴¹ Among these are to be reckoned the answers given to the Athenian Kylon, i. 126, to the poet Alkmaion, ii. 202, and to Hesiod, iii. 96.

⁵⁴² Thuc. i. 118, 123; ii. 54.

⁵⁴³ Thuc. v. 16r. See Dr. Arnold's note on the passage. In the time of Pleistoanax the expression may have been equivalent to the Latin phrase '*aureo hamo piscari*.' Some generations earlier it might have received some such accomplishment as the other oracle to the Spartans:

δώσω τοι Τεγένη προσίκροτον ὀρχήσασθαι
καὶ καλὸν πεδίον σχοίνῳ διαμετρήσασθαι. Herod. i. 66.

ment of a heavy penalty. Two generations earlier some literal fulfilment would doubtless have been invented for it: but Thucydides knew that the answer was given simply in furtherance of personal designs and as the discharge of a previous debt.

CHAP.
I.

The same character and influence are prominent in not a few of the oracular responses which occur in the pages of Herodotos. In these, however, there is this difference, that we cannot ascertain the fact of their having been given at the time to which they are referred, or, at the least, that they were given in the form in which they have come down to us. They may indeed be classified under several heads, and they carry with them very different degrees of credibility. Some are mere puzzles wrought out by the ingenuity of a mythical age: some are nothing more than the expression of a shrewd and politic ambiguity. Others again serve simply for the carrying out of state intrigues, while another, and this the largest, class seems to give the form under which the events signified in them were represented after their occurrence. In all these there is no need to suppose that any other influences were at work than those which produce falsehood, craft, or treachery in the great mass of mankind.

Classifica-
of the
oracular
responses.

I. Enig-
matical
answers.

The strange tale which relates the discovery of the bones of Orestes⁵⁴⁴ serves well to explain the way in which these oracular details grew up around popular legends. It may be impossible to trace out the process: but the result may be strictly compared with the didactic narratives associated with the names of Solon and Kroisos, of Demaratos or Polykrates. The tale belongs to a war which precedes all contemporary history and for which at the utmost nothing more can be claimed than a certain degree of probability, while the subject of it is a man whose name and adventures are as mythical as those of Prometheus, Ogyges, and Deukalion. In itself it is a mere riddle, and its object is to account for a result which is capable of another and a very simple explanation. To the same class belong the elaborate answers which illustrate the story of the Corinthian Kypse-

⁵⁴⁴ Herod. i. 67. See p. 92.

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II.

los⁵⁴⁵ and the defeat of the Spartans by the men of Tegea;⁵⁴⁶ and we set them down at once as the mythical form under which alone the popular mind could receive and retain the traditionary history.

II. Am-
biguous
answers.

But no such antecedent objections apply to the larger class of responses which exhibit nothing more than a prudent ambiguity; and the fact of their delivery will be received without any great misgivings. Not much risk of detection was incurred by the soothsayer who told Peisistratos, as he drew near to Athens to recover his lost power, that the net was spread out to receive its booty.⁵⁴⁷ It was no unsafe prediction which told Kroisos that the passage of the Halys would be followed by the ruin of a great power.⁵⁴⁸ A guarded calculation of probabilities suggested perhaps most of the answers which the god returned to the kings and chieftains who came to ask his will or to learn their destiny. The wisdom which inspired the priestess at Delphoi had not deserted the guardians of the Sibylline books who told Maxentius that, when he came to fight with Constantine, the enemy of the Romans should perish.⁵⁴⁹

III. An-
swers dic-
tated by a
calculation
of probabi-
lities.

A prohibition might be safely given, which was grounded on a known or suspected impossibility: and the name of Zeus might without fear be used to deter the men of Knidos from their wish to convert a peninsula into an island.⁵⁵⁰ Pictures of wealthy plains and fruitful flocks might well be held up as temptations to the men who were bidden to colonise the distant lands of the Libyan Kyrênê.⁵⁵¹ This commoner method of dealing with important public or national questions may serve to indicate the almost universal method by which the questions and troubles of private men were answered or evaded. There is not much more reason to doubt that Kroisos consulted the god at Delphoi than that the meanest Boiotian sought to learn his fate at the cavern of Trophonios: but a very clear contemporary proof would alone justify the belief that the later answers to Kroisos were ever uttered at all. The tales themselves betray a strange amount of latent

⁵⁴⁵ Herod. v. 92.⁵⁴⁷ Ib. i. 62.⁵⁴⁹ Gibbon, *Roman Empire*, ch. xiv. Milman, *History of Christianity*, ii. 349.⁵⁵⁰ Herod. i. 174.⁵⁴⁶ Ib. i. 66.⁵⁴⁸ Ib. i. 53.⁵⁵¹ Ib. v. 154, 157.

scepticism. Before committing his faith to any, Kroisos puts all the oracles to a test which nothing but supernatural aid would enable them to meet successfully; and with but two exceptions, we are told, all the answers were untrue.⁵⁵² The faith of Herodotos himself is grounded not on the uprightness and honesty of the divine interpreters, but simply on the wonderful minuteness of predictions whose subsequent fabrication it was scarcely possible for him to detect. With the tales of Kroisos and Mardonios and the convicted forgeries of Onomakritos before him, he could scarcely have done more than express his reluctance to reject or to admit any doubt in others about predictions so distinct and unequivocal as those of Bakis.⁵⁵³

Yet more must his faith have been unconsciously shaken, as he recurred to the political or private intrigues which the Delphian priestess had furthered with no unwilling aid. Chiefly by her instrumentality, if we are to believe the tale, the Alkmaionidai brought about the overthrow of the sons of Peisistratos: ⁵⁵⁴ through her corruption Demaratos was driven from the Spartan throne to take refuge in the courts of Sousa.⁵⁵⁵ Such instances of venality may well make it a matter of wonder that any faith could have survived, even in the age of Herodotos, in oracles which could speak so corruptly. Yet that faith was retained to many a later generation; and if we have no reason to question its sincerity, we must look elsewhere for its justification. To suppose that anyone can have placed a moral trust in an oracle because it solved a riddle about a tortoise and a ram, is absurd. The false traditional story indicates a genuine conviction in Kroisos, who, when his glory had departed, is represented as admitting his own folly and the wisdom and goodness of the god.⁵⁵⁶

But if the whole action of the oracles had been such as was exhibited in their corrupt or ambiguous responses, such faith must soon have been killed. If they possessed any real influence, that influence must have been moral. They must have tended, however feebly or fitfully, to uphold a higher

IV. Answers extorted by political or personal influence.

V. Answers which enforce a moral principle.

⁵⁵² Herod. i. 49.

⁵⁵³ Ib. viii. 77.

⁵⁵⁴ Ib. v. 63.

⁵⁵⁵ Ib. vi. 66.

⁵⁵⁶ Ib. i. 91.

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standard of practice, a clearer distinction between right and wrong, before those who shrunk from the former and sought to confound the latter. The known instances of such interference may be few, but the occurrence of these few warrants the belief that there must have been many of which we know nothing: and we can be at no loss to account for the hold which they possessed over the minds of men, when we read such a tale as that of Glaukos, the son of Epikydes,⁵⁵⁷ and, still more, the parable which saved the life of Paktyas.⁵⁵⁸ It must have been no light blessing which taught men, feebly perhaps, but still really, to restore to the debtor his pledge and to let the oppressed go free. An influence so gained it would be monstrous to set down to diabolical agency. It was an influence lawfully and righteously acquired, although it may sometimes have been unrighteously and corruptly exercised. We may be sure also that the general action of the oracles was of this kind; and when their authority began to decay, we may well believe that in the general immorality which ensued the change was greatly for the worse, and that, whatever may be the falsehood or the emptiness of the oracular predictions, there are yet specimens of their moral doctrine preserved, which, it has been well said, exhibit a purity and wisdom scarcely to be surpassed.⁵⁵⁹

But if the tales of Paktyas and Glaukos illustrate the beneficent action of the Hellenic oracles (and we may note that in the Italian divination this action is wholly wanting), those answers which seem to be fabrications after the fact are eminently deceptive and misleading. They are so interwoven with the whole thread of the tale and furnish so often

VL Pre-
dictions
made up
after the
event.

⁵⁵⁷ Herod. vi. 86. When the Athenians refused to give up to one king the Aiginetan hostages which two Spartan kings, Kleomenes and Leotychides, had placed in their hands, Leotychides, the survivor, warned them against bringing down on themselves the wrath of the gods who had punished Glaukos for breaking faith with a Milesian who had placed in his hands half his property, together with certain tallies or tokens. The man who brought these tokens was to receive the property: but when the children of the Milesian came with the tallies, Glaukos replied that he knew nothing about the matter and put them off for four months. In that interval he made a journey to Delphoi to ask the advice of Phoibos. The god told him that he might, if he pleased, retain the deposit, but that the nameless child of Horkos (the Oath) who has neither hands nor feet would root out the house of the man who swears to his neighbour and disappoints him. Glaukos, thus warned, begged the god to forgive him. The answer was that the mere tempting of the god was in guilt equal to the commission of the crime contemplated. Glaukos surrendered the deposit; but his house nevertheless came speedily to an end.

⁵⁵⁸ Herod. i. 159.

⁵⁵⁹ Arnold, *Later Roman Commonwealth*, ii. 397.

the very turning point of the narrative, that it sometimes becomes almost impossible for the historian to exclude them altogether from his survey of the time: and if on these grounds he rejects some, there is yet the temptation to accept others which rest on no better evidence. If we put aside the oracular answers which surround Kroisos in his glory and in his humiliation, the history of his reign becomes brief indeed. We may speak of the Lydian king who subdued the Asiatic Greeks. We may say that his wealth and his power rendered a conflict with the growing empire of Persia inevitable, and that, whether from his own aggression or from the ambition of the Persian king, he was involved in a struggle which ended in his ruin. We may perhaps also say that, after the usage of oriental conquest, he lived to be the friend and the counsellor of his conqueror: but anything beyond this becomes mere conjecture or fiction, unless indeed we acknowledge further that the missions which he sent to Delphoi may be considered historical, although the same character cannot be claimed for the oracular responses which are said to have been given to him.⁵⁶⁰

This examination of the several sources from which it was possible for Herodotos to obtain information for his history will simplify the task of dealing with a narrative which must be given as we find it in his pages. At each step we shall be able to determine with tolerable accuracy the measure of the trust which we may place in it: and although some points must remain uncertain, others, and among these some of no slight importance, will be established on evidence which may fairly be regarded as conclusive. The result will in no way detract from the significance of the great strife which ended in the discomfiture of the Persian king and the establishment of the Athenian confederacy: but it will show that the temper of the age and the epical form in which it was driven to cast the traditional history have thrown over the scenes of the war a disguise which the statements of the narrative itself enable us in great part to remove. Nor is it among the least advantages of this scrutiny of the materials

Results of the examination of the materials employed by Herodotos in his histories.

⁵⁶⁰ Sir G. C. Lewis holds that these responses 'bear for the most part indubitable marks of subsequent fabrication.' *Cred. E. H.* ii. 525.

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accessible to Herodotos, that it will enable us to deal more summarily and more confidently with the traditional history, which we receive from him and from other writers, of the several nations of the non-Hellenic world down to the beginning of the strife which was settled at Salamis, Plataiai, and Mykalê.

CHAPTER II.

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE UNDER CYRUS AND KAMBYSES.

THE Persian king by whose aid Hippias hoped to recover his lost power was lord of a vast inheritance of conquest. Within the compass of a few years the kingdoms of the Medes, the Lydians, and the Egyptians had been absorbed into the huge mass whose force was soon to be precipitated on the ill-cemented confederacy of the Hellenic tribes. If we follow the popular chronology, Peisistratos made himself despot at Athens at the very time when Cyrus founded this great empire by the dethronement of the Median Astyages. But the figure of Cyrus emerges only for a time from the cloud-land to which the earliest and the latest scenes of his life belong. We may, if we please, say that the victory of Cyrus over his grandfather took place fourteen years before the fall of Sardes: but we must not forget how far the mists of mythical tradition, if not of deliberate invention, have gathered round the persons of all or almost all the actors in this rapidly shifting drama. Of the birth and youth of Cyrus Herodotos admits that he had heard four distinct and inconsistent narratives and that he chose the one which seemed to him most free from exaggeration.⁵⁶¹ Not one of these versions, probably, is represented by the romance in which Xenophon to suit his own purpose exalts Cyrus into an ideal ruler: but it may perhaps be safely said that among the three rejected by Herodotos was the version which to Ktesias appeared the most trustworthy. The slander of which Ktesias was guilty against Herodotos has rebounded with greater force on his own head: but when we see the nature of the materials with which they had to deal, we may account

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The historical and traditional Cyrus.

560 B.C. (?)

⁵⁶¹ Herod. i. 95.

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for the contradictions between their narratives without impugning the veracity of either writer. It is true that the history of the old Assyrian empire as given by Ktesias differs altogether from that of Berosos which is held by some to be more in accordance with the results obtained from cuneiform inscriptions: but for the opinion that Ktesias deliberately refused to avail himself of documents in the Persian archives which would have refuted his falsehoods, there is no warrant whatever. That these Persian archives were diligently ransacked by Ktesias is the positive statement of Diodoros; and the fact proves simply that Persian tradition did not harmonise with that of the priestly caste of the Chaldeans.⁵⁶²

The story
of Astyages
and Cyrus.

The version which Herodotos believed himself justified in trusting represents Cyrus as the grandson of the Median king Astyages, who, frightened by a prophecy that his daughter's child will be his ruin, gives the babe on its birth to Harpagos with orders that it shall be forthwith slain. By the advice of his wife Harpagos, instead of killing the child, places it in the hands of one of the royal herdsmen, who carries it home. Finding that his wife has just given birth to a dead infant, the herdsman exposes the corpse, and brings up Cyrus as his own son: but his high lineage cannot be hidden. In the village sports the boy plays the king so well that a complaint is carried to Astyages; and the severe judge is found to be the child who had been doomed to die but who turns out to be the man born to be king. Astyages is awestruck: but nevertheless he takes vengeance on Harpagos by inviting him to a banquet at which the luckless man feasts on the body of his own son, and his fears are quieted by the soothsayers who tell him that the election of Cyrus as king by the village children has fulfilled the prophecy. Harpagos, however, is resolved that there shall be a second and a more serious fulfilment; and he drives Cyrus into the rebellion which ends in the dethronement of the despot. To achieve this end Cyrus

⁵⁶² These facts have an important bearing on recent attempts to reconstruct Assyrian history. See *Edinburgh Review*, January 1867, pp. 121-151. Nor does Mr. Grote hesitate to infer from them the existence of discordant, yet equally accredited, stories: and noting that Herodotos himself had to choose one out of four, he adds, 'So rare and late a plant is historical authenticity.' *Hist. Gr.* iv. 250. It is a plant which has never thriven on Asiatic soil, and it can scarcely be said to have lifted its head above the earth in Persia.

convokes the Persian tribes, of which seven (Persians, Pasargadai, Maraphioi, Maspioi, Panthālaioi, Derousiaioi, Germanioi) are agricultural, and four (Daoi, Mardoï, Dropikoi, Sagartioi) nomadic. To these when they are assembled, Cyrus, according to the notion of a historian who is thinking only of the inhabitants of a small canton, holds forth the boon of freedom, in other words, of immunity from taxation, if they will break the Median yoke from off their necks. The contrast of a costly banquet to which they are bidden after a day spent in the severest toil so weighs with them, that they at once throw in their lot with Cyrus and presently change their state of oppression for the more agreeable power of oppressing others.

The latter part of this story is an institutional legend accounting for the fiscal immunities of the Persian clans. The former is a myth which reappears, amongst many more, in the tales of Oidipous, Telephos, and Paris, of Romulus and Remus, of Chandragupta, and of Othman the progenitor of the Ottoman Turks. It is true that these are suckled by beasts, whereas in the version adopted by Herodotos Cyrus is nourished by the herdsman's wife: but the historian, who gives her name as Kyno and regards it as the equivalent of the Greek word Kyon or hound, admits by a strange inversion of the real order that the dog was said by some to have taken him up, in order to impart a more sacred character to the legend.⁵⁶³

The rescue
of Cyrus.

* The story of Astyages himself involves a difficulty of another kind. Cyrus both in his name and in his great conquests is unquestionably historical: but the name of his grandfather carries us away to the earliest sources of mythology. To Cyrus he stands precisely in the relation of Laios to Oidipous: but Laios is the Vedic Dasyu, the enemy of the bright Devas or gods of the light, and the Median Astyages, Asdahag, is Azi-dahaka, the biting and throttling snake, who in the Vedic hymns imprisons the waters in his dungeon and is slain by the spear of the sun-god Indra,—the Zohak or bloody tyrant of modern Persian romance who gorges daily with human blood the snakes which grow on

Astyages
and Zohak.

⁵⁶³ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 260, 309; ii. 74, 83.

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his shoulders. The connexion of this Zohak with Jemshid, the Yima-Kshaêta of the Avesta and the Yama of the Rig-Veda, points still more forcibly to those old descriptions of the conflict of the sun-god or the rain-god with the powers of drought and darkness which have grown up into a forest of legends in every Aryan land.⁵⁶⁴

The story
of Deïokes.

The pertinacity with which these myths repeat themselves is still further manifested, when we turn from the closing scenes of the Median dynasty to those which in the Herodotean story belong to its beginning. Here again the narrative of Herodotos and his catalogue of Median kings differ almost wholly from the lists given by Ktesias: but this very difference, while it proves the existence of independent and contradictory narratives, leaves us still more free to trace the points of resemblance between the story of Herodotos and other Hellenic or non-Hellenic myths. At once, then, we may note that the dynasty begins and closes with the same name, Deïokes being the simple Dahak, or the biter, who bears the prefix of Ahi, or the strangler, as Asdahag. Of this Deïokes we are told, according to the same notion which regarded all the Persians as inhabitants of a single township, that, aiming from the first at despotism, he set himself to administer justice amongst the lawless men by whom he was surrounded, and having at length won a high name for wisdom and impartiality withdrew himself from them on the plea that he was unable to bear the continued tax on his time for no recompense whatever. The seven tribes or clans of the Medes then meet in council and resolve on making Deïokes their king. Their offer is accepted, and Deïokes at once bids them build him a palace with seven concentric walls, and taking up his abode in the centre becomes henceforth a tyrant as cruel and avaricious as ever the later Persian poet loved to represent Zohak, or as Ahi and Vritra appear in the hymns of the Rig-Veda. These seven walls have been regarded by some as having reference to the seven Median tribes: ⁵⁶⁵ by others they are supposed to signify the seven planets, the worship of the sun being denoted by the

⁵⁶⁴ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 354.

⁵⁶⁵ *Grote, Hist. Gr.* iii. 309.

royal palace in the centre.⁵⁶⁶ Deiokes in neither case retains any historical character: and when we see further that here also, in the details which do not belong to the myth, we have simply an institutional legend describing generally the origin of despotism, the credit of the whole narrative is gone. Nay, this very origin of Eastern monarchy is described not as it would be conceived by the Medes, but as it would present itself to Greeks acquainted only with the arts by which their own tyrants had worked their way to power: The turbulent independence and factiousness of the Median tribes in their small cantons, the rigid justice under which Deiokes masks the object steadily aimed at from the first, the care which he takes, as soon as the offer of kingship is made to him, to build himself a stronghold and surround his person with a body guard, are all features which belong to the history of Greek rather than of Oriental despots. The Greek ideal is still further shown in the ascription to Deiokes of a severe, laborious, and impartial administration which probably no Asiatic government ever sought to realise. The remaining features are more true to Eastern society: but the agency of spies and a secret police, the elaborate ceremonial and slavish obeisances of a court in which the king is a god, are too much the characteristics of all eastern royalty to leave any definite character to the picture here given of the mythical founder of Agbatana. Thus of Deiokes himself and of the incidents of his life we know nothing; and at the utmost the whole story can be regarded as nothing more than a tradition indicating some change in the political relations of the Medes and the Assyrians,⁵⁶⁷ though whether this change in-

⁵⁶⁶ Lenormant, *Manual of Ancient History*, transl., book v. ch. 3, § 3.

⁵⁶⁷ This change is by many called the revolt of the Medes. The event may be taken as well as any other for a sample of the utter uncertainty of Asiatic history before the fifth or sixth centuries preceding the Christian era. According to Herodotos the dynasty founded by Deiokes lasted for 150 years, a period which, according to his chronology assigns its commencement to the year 710 B.C. Clinton, who holds that the year 711 B.C. is determined by Jewish history as the date of the Median revolt, thinks that that revolt in the opinion of Herodotos preceded the elevation of Deiokes by one year only. The narrative certainly implies an anarchy of long continuance, and Diodoros, ii. 32, asserts that it lasted for many generations. But Josephos, x. 2, 2; x. 51, states that the revolt of the Medes was accompanied by the overthrow of the Assyrian empire; and according to Ktesias the Medes under Arbakes, joined with the Babylonians, attacked and destroyed Nineveh in the year 789 B.C. Hence M. Lenormant holds that Nineveh was twice destroyed,—in 789 B.C., and again by Kyaxares and Nabopolassar in 606 B.C. *Manuel d'Histoire Ancienne de l'Orient*, i. 451; Eng. tr. vol. i. pp. 387-416. Here Ktesias and Josephos are in substantial agreement: but according to Herodotos the Assyrian empire underwent by the Median revolt no further loss than

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volved the destruction of the city of Nineveh or was merely the revolt of some mountain tribes, it is impossible to say. According to Herodotos⁵⁶⁸ Nineveh itself had undergone no disaster, when Phraortes, the son of Deiokes, after a reign of two and twenty years met his death before its walls. His successor Kyaxares sought, it is said, to avenge his father by again besieging Nineveh, but was compelled to abandon or interrupt the blockade owing to an irruption of Scythians, under their chief Madyas the son of Protothyas, who had chased the Kimmerians out of Europe.⁵⁶⁹

that of her authority over some scanty clans of mountaineers. In the absence of direct testimony from inscriptions Mr. Rawlinson takes in part the view of Herodotos, and rejecting the first destruction of Nineveh as unhistorical, dismisses the monarchs assigned by Herodotos or by Ktesias to the period preceding 650 B.C. as being probably 'fictitious personages.' At this time Mr. Rawlinson sees reason to believe that a great Median empire may have been formed by the influx of fresh immigrants from the East. *Manual of Ancient History*, 32: but if we may not deny the fact, it must still remain a mere conjecture.

⁵⁶⁸ i. 102.

⁵⁶⁹ Herod. i. 103. These irruptions of nomadic hordes have happily only a remote and indirect connexion with the history of Greece. It is, therefore, unnecessary to enter into the subject with any minuteness of detail. The frequent occurrence of these invasions is a fact not to be disputed; but whatever may be our knowledge of the wanderings of Attila, Gengis, or Timour, our information about the earlier inroads is as uncertain as it is scanty. Herodotos distinctly states that the Scythians entered the Median territory, driving the Kimmerians before them, and that, instead of going through Kolchis and taking the passes to the west of Caucasus, they kept steadily to the east of the range. This account is set aside by Niebuhr on the ground that the Scythians would be little likely to pursue the Kimmerians when a vast extent of country lay before them without such trouble, and that the difficulties of the route here assigned to them are impracticable. Hence he concludes that the Kimmerians having been defeated by the Scythians on the river Tyras (Dniester) entered Asia Minor by way of the Thracian Bosphoros: but whatever may be the improbabilities of the narrative which he rejects, there is nothing more than likelihood to be urged in favour of his own. *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* i. 90. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 335. The Kimmerians, who in the Odyssey dwell in the dark land beyond the stream of Ocean and whose name is familiar to us in speculations connected with the migrations of the Kymry into northern and western Europe and thence into Britain, are known to Herodotos only as a tribe who had left the tokens of their former presence in the names of many places and in the tombs of their kings who slew each other near the banks of the Tyras, (iv. 11, 12) rather than fly at the approach of the Scythians. Of many tribes belonging to this latter people who appear in the Hesiodic fragments among the races of mare-milkers and milk-eaters, Herodotos speaks from personal knowledge, and his description assigns to them all the characteristics of Mongolian nomads. With these tribes the Greeks were brought into contact through their settlements on the shores of the Euxine, or in spots not very far removed from that sea, as far as Tanais at the northeastern end of the Maiotid Lake or sea of Azof. Their territory extended, according to Herodotos, over a square bounded by the Danube on the west and the Euxine on the south, by the sea of Azof and the Tanais to the east, and on the north by four tribes, two of which, the Neuroi and Agathyrsi, may be local names, while the two others are called Cannibals and Black-Coats (Anthropophagoi and Melanchlainai). The tribes included in this large area differed widely in habits and character, some being genuine nomads, and among these being reckoned the royal Scythians, like the Golden Horde or king-giving clan among the Tatars. Of the rest some lived by tillage, these again being subdivided into the Alazōnes and Kallippidai who reaped and ate their own corn, and the Arotēres, or ploughmen, who raised it only for sale. For their religion a few words will suffice. Herodotos, iv. 59, gives the Greek equivalents for the gods which they worshipped: but on a subject like this he is not more to be depended on than when he accepts the parallels suggested by Egyptian priests between their deities and those of Hellas. But the real object of their veneration was a sword, dedicated, as he says, to

Of this inroad we know but little. It is not likely that tribes who are described as indigenous to the country should mistake their road in the pursuit of enemies who make their way to the future site of the Greek settlement of Sinôpê, and that, passing to the east of the Caucasian chain, they should find themselves in Media. But although it is perfectly possible that both Media and Asia Minor may have been subjected to this terrible plague at the same or nearly the same time, we have nothing but a traditional assertion to fix the duration of this inroad at eight and twenty years. Even the time at which it occurred cannot be fixed with any approach to exactness. The wave of invasion thus driven to the West is said to have overwhelmed Sardeis with the fruitful plain of the Kaÿstros, and to have advanced as far as Magnesia and Ephesos. To these savages tradition assigns a leader Lygdamis who would seem from his name to have been a Greek, and who, having led his followers into the Kilikian mountains, was there defeated and slain.⁵⁷⁰ But the Kimmerian settlers on the southern shore of the Euxine still remained, and offered some opposition to the establishment of Sinôpê. Some have supposed that they were afterwards known as the Chalybes, of wide repute as workers in iron.⁵⁷¹

It may possibly have been before this inroad that the cause of quarrel arose between Kyaxares the Median king and Alyattes the father of Kroisos. It is impossible to forget that we are dealing with the annals of a sovereign who bears the same name with his grandfather Deiokes and his son Astyages:⁵⁷² and all that we can do is to repeat the

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merian in-
road into
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Scythian
invasion of
Media.

Ares, and worshipped on the top of a huge pile of wood, with libations and sacrifices of victims, which in time of war included every hundredth captive, iv. 52. In filth of person and ugliness of features they were not a whit behind the foulest of nomads; and the ghastly ceremonial which followed the death of their chiefs would satisfy even the appetite of an Attila or a Gengis, iv. 71-2. They are further said to have blinded all their slaves, Herod. iv. 2: but the reason given for this practice is unintelligible. For a more detailed account of the Scythian tribes or, as they are said to have called themselves, Skolotoi, see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. xvii.

⁵⁷⁰ Herodotos, l. 15, mentions Alyattes as the Lydian king who expelled the Kimmerians from Asia, his words implying that he knew of but one incursion of these nomads? Strabo and Kallisthenes speak of invasions by the Thracian Treres and by the Lykians who, like the Kimmerians, are said to have taken Sardeis about this time. It is in no way unlikely that the seventh century B.C. may have been a period of more than usually destructive activity among these wandering savages. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 341.

⁵⁷¹ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 340.

⁵⁷² 'Asdahag is the same name as Kyaxares; Ki or Kai is a prefix signifying in Persian *king*, as in the Persian and Seljukian names Kaikobad, Kaikaus, Kaikosru. . . .

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account of Herodotos who tells us that some fugitive Scythians found their way into the Median territory where they were well treated by the king as long as they brought the tribute imposed on their captures in hunting. The harsh punishment with which an accidental failure was visited led the Scythians, first, to place on the banquet board before the king the limbs of one of the Median youths who had been sent to them to be taught archery, and then to avoid the consequences of their revenge by taking refuge in the land of the Lydian king. Alyattes gave them shelter, and even refused to yield them up at the request of Kyaxares. The war which ensued lasted, it is said, for six years, and was brought to an end partly by an eclipse which took place in the midst of a battle, and in part by the mediation of Labynetos king of Babylon and the Kilikian chief Syenesis.⁵⁷³ These sovereigns determined that the doubtful reconciliation should be strengthened by a marriage between Aryenis the daughter of Alyattes and Astyages the heir to the Median throne. While the Median dynasty was thus connected with that of Lydia, the alliance with Babylon was cemented, according to Berosos, by the marriage of Nebucadnezzar, the son of Nabopolassar, with Amuhia the daughter of Kyaxares.⁵⁷⁴ Thus Kroisos became the brother-in-law of Astyages, and Astyages the brother-in-law of Nebucadnezzar. The chain might well have been deemed strong: but the links broke, and left to the brother-in-law of Astyages the

In this manner Kyaxares is formed of Kai-Axar: but Axar and Asdahag are the same names, as Artaxerxes and Arthachsastha are one and the same thing.' Niebuhr, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 37.

⁵⁷³ Eight dates have been assigned to the eclipse which on astronomical grounds must, it seems, be assigned to the year 610 B.C. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 305. Sir Cornewall Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 86, holds that Eudemos, who wrote a history of astronomy about 300 B.C., derived his information about this eclipse from Herodotos; that it needed an oral transmission of 155 years to bring it from 610 B.C. to the time when Herodotos probably collected his materials; and that the chances against the preservation of the exact truth during so long a time without contemporary registration are preponderant. He adds that unless the eclipse is total, the mere diminution of light is not, as Herodotos supposed, sufficient to create alarm, the darkness during the totality of a total eclipse lasting only three or four minutes. Still he allows that it might create a profound impression. The statement that Thales predicted it within a year is very suspicious from its vagueness.

⁵⁷⁴ This Amuhia, who is otherwise called Aroite, is in Niebuhr's opinion, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 37, 'evidently no other than the Nitokris of Herodotos.' But it is strange that Herodotos should never mention her husband, and also that he should carefully state that the motive for undertaking her vast works for the defence of Babylon was her dread of Median incroachments and the memory of the recent capture of Nineveh. i. 185. The truth is that we know nothing of Nitokris, who appears also as an Egyptian queen. Lewis, *Astron. Anc.* 357.

duty of avenging him,—a duty which seems not to have troubled Nebucadnezzar, but which, if we are to believe Herodotos, was to Kroisos the strongest motive for measuring his strength against that of the Persian king.⁵⁷⁵ For Kyaxares himself the troubles of the Scythian inroad were followed, if we may believe the story, by a brilliant triumph when with the aid of the Babylonian Nabopolassar he overthrew the ancient dynasty of the Assyrian kings and made Nineveh a dependency of the sovereigns of Media.⁵⁷⁶

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Over the vast territory thus brought under Median rule the Persian king became the lord, on the ending of the struggle which is described as the war between Cyrus and Astyages. Of the length or the obstinacy of this struggle we know nothing. There were traditions which spoke of the reduction of the Medes as effected only after a fierce resistance: and their submission seems to have made no material change in their lot. They may have lost that immunity from land-tax which Cyrus held out as the prize of victory to the Persians: but they remained the second nation in the empire, and were so closely associated with their conquerors that the Hellenic tribes spoke of their great enemy as the Mede rather than the Persian and branded as Medizers those Greeks who ranged themselves on the side of the invading despot. Agbatana also continued still to be a royal city and the summer abode of the Persian kings. But in truth the whole account which Herodotos gives of the non-Hellenic nations is marked by misrepresentations which from the nature of the materials at his command it was scarcely possible to avoid. The conflicting versions of the revolt of the Medes from their Assyrian lords have their parallel in the traditions which speak of the victory of Cyrus and of its effects on the habits of the Persian nation. According to one legend the rugged simplicity of their former life was not abandoned. Although the story of Astyages represents Cyrus as tempting the Persians by a day of feasting after one of toil, yet when the Lydian Sandanis seeks to deter Kroisos from his desperate enterprise, he speaks of the

Character
and habits
of the
Persians.

⁵⁷⁵ Herod. i. 73.

⁵⁷⁶ See Appendix A.

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Persians as of men inured to all severity, whose garments are made of leather, who eat whatever they can get, who drink no wine and have no figs nor anything else that is good.⁵⁷⁷ But when the ravenous greed or ambition of Cyrus drives him against the land of the Massagetai, the contrast is transferred to the wandering hordes of queen Tomyris. It is the intreaty of Kroisos that Cyrus should seek to tempt their poverty by Persian luxury and by the sight of wine and dainties such as they had never seen; ⁵⁷⁸ and Tomyris completes the contrast when in her bitter reproach she charges Cyrus with murdering her son by that juice of the grape with which the Persians were wont to fill themselves till they became mad.⁵⁷⁹ In short, we have in these traditions no evidence of the extent of a change to which we can do no more than apply the analogy of similar revolutions in Asiatic empires.⁵⁸⁰

Physical
geography
of Persia
Proper.

The supremacy in Asia thus passed into the hands of a king whose chief strength lay in that comparatively small country which still bears the name of Fars or Farsistan. This was the home of the dominant tribe in Iran or the land of the Aryans, a term already used in an indefinitely contracted meaning.⁵⁸¹ By Herodotos this region is called

⁵⁷⁷ Herod. i. 71.

⁵⁷⁸ Ib. i. 207.

⁵⁷⁹ Ib. i. 212.

⁵⁸⁰ Persians and Greeks not only were descended from a common stock, but possessed perhaps a longer line of common ancestors than even Greeks and Latins. It is also possible that at a time earlier by some centuries than that of Xerxes the Persian might have had a larger degree of freedom than the Greek. But this at least is certain that in the Homeric *Agora* we have more than the germ of the popular assemblies of the Athenian *Demos*, and that when we reach the times of Themistokles we find the Persians slaves to a despot, while the Athenians make and obey their own laws. The great Asiatic empires in whose neighbourhood the Persians found themselves may have had some influence upon them; but a more complete explanation of the change may perhaps be drawn from the rapidity and vast extent of the Persian conquests under Cyrus. The chiefs of the Persian clans would necessarily be chosen as governors for the conquered provinces; but while their individual importance was greatly increased, their power collectively was in the same proportion diminished. In short the very machinery which was needed for the government of the subject tribes insured the servitude of the conquering clans.

⁵⁸¹ That the Medes were called Aryans is expressly asserted by Herodotos, vii. 62, who adds that they changed their name on the arrival among them of the Kolchian Medea from Athens: and in Strabo, xv. 2, Bactria is the ornament of Ariana, a name which comprehends the whole country between the Indus on the east, the Hindukush and Paropamisos on the north, the Indian ocean on the south, and a line extending from the Caspian gates to the mouth of the Persian gulf on the west. The name Elymais is supposed to be a corruption of Airyana, with which the name Armenia may also be connected. The Anariakai whom Strabo, xi. 7-11, places on the frontiers of Hyrkania, were probably a non-Aryan tribe, their name answering to the An-iran of the modern Persians. Whatever be the meaning of the word, there is no doubt that it was a name used to designate the tribes sprung from the common stock whose speech was the parent stem of the dialects belonging to the Aryan family of languages. Thus India was *Arya-āvarta* or the abode of the Aryans; and the word appears as a title of

a scanty and rugged land,⁵⁸²—a description not altogether unbecoming a country which, with the exception of the hot district or strip of plain lying between the mountains and the coast line, consists chiefly of the high plateau formed by the continuation of the mountain-system, which, having furnished a boundary to the Mesopotamian plain, turns eastwards and broadens out into the high land of Persia Proper. Of the whole of this country it may be said that where there is water, there is fertility; but much that is now desert was doubtless rich in grass and fruits in the days when Cyrus is said to have warned his people that, if they migrated to a wealthier soil, they must bid farewell to their supremacy among the nations. Strong in a mountain-barrier pierced by astonishingly precipitous gorges along which roads wind in zigzag or are thrown across furious torrents on bridges of a single span, this beautiful or desolate land was not rich in the number of its cities. Near Murgab, about sixty miles almost due north of Shiraz, are the ruins of Pasargadai, probably in its original form Parsa-gherd or the castle of the Persians.⁵⁸³ On a larger plain, about half-way between these two towns, rose the second capital Persepolis. The two streams by which this plain is watered maintain the exquisite verdure which a supply of water never fails to produce in Persia. But rugged in parts and sterile as this plateau may be, it must be distinguished from that vast region which at a height varying between 3000 and 5000 feet extends from the Zagros and Elburz ranges on the west and north over an area of 1100 by 500 miles to the Suliman and Hala mountains on the east, and on the south to the great coast chain which continues the plateau of Persia Proper almost as far as the Indus. Of this immense region, nearly two-thirds are absolute desert, in which the insignificant streams

honour on Persian inscriptions. Darius boasts himself to be Ariya-chitra, of Aryan descent: and the same epithet occurs in the name of his great-grandfather Ariyârâmina (in Greek Ariaramnes), as well as in Ariomardos, Ariomanes (Eumenes), and Ariobarzanes (Euergetes). See, further, Max Müller, *Lectures on Languages*, i. lect. vi. Professor Müller, who traces the name through Europe in Aria, the ancient name of Thrace, in the Arian German tribe on the Vistula, and in such German names as Ariovistus, adds that 'modern researches have rendered it extremely plausible that it has been preserved in the extreme west of the Aryan migrations in the name Ireland.'

⁵⁸² Herod. ix. 122.

⁵⁸³ Mr. Rawlinson compares the name Parsa-gherd with the names Darab-gherd, Lasjird, Burujird, as well as with the Latinised names of the Parthian cities Tigranocerta, Carathrocerta. This termination is found again in our *girth* and *garth*.

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fail before the summer heats instead of affording nourishment to vegetation.⁵⁸⁴ In such a country the habits of a large proportion of the population will naturally be nomadic; and the fresher pastures and more genial climate of the hills and valleys about Agbatana would draw many a roving clan with their herds and tents from regions scorched by a heat which left them no water.

The Median and Lydian dynasties.

Into the vast empire ruled by the lord of these Aryan tribes there was now to be absorbed another kingdom which had grown up to great power and splendour on the west of the river Halys, the stream which, flowing from the Tauros range, discharges itself into the Euxine about sixty miles to the east of the Greek settlement of Sinôpê. This stream was the boundary which separated the Semitic inhabitants of Asia Minor on its eastern side from the non-Hellenic nations on the west, who acknowledged a certain brotherhood not only between themselves but with the Thrakian tribes beyond the Hellespont and the Chersonese. The conquests which had brought the Lydian king thus far placed him in dangerous proximity with a power not less aggressive and more formidable than his own. By a strange coincidence (if any trust at all may be placed on the narrative) the dynasty represented by Kroisos the last Lydian king had supplanted the ancient line of the Herakleidai (whatever this name may mean) about the same time when the Median power asserted its independence of the Assyrian empire. But the relations which existed between Kroisos and the Greeks of Asia Minor imparted to the catastrophe at Sardeis a significance altogether beyond that which could be attached to the mere transference of power from the despot Astyages to the despot Cyrus.

The Thracians and Phrygians of Asia.

The Lydian kingdom had grown up in a country inhabited by a number of tribes, between most or perhaps all of whom there existed some sort of affinity. Speculations on the history of their migrations are useless: but we have before us certain facts from which at the least some conclusions worth the noting may be drawn. The tribes who under the

⁵⁸⁴ I gladly acknowledge my obligations to the admirable geographical chapters of Mr. Rawlinson's work on the Ancient Monarchies of the East. I have been obliged to differ widely from him in his estimate of the results of historical researches in Mesopotamia: but the protest which I have felt myself bound to make against his method of dealing with his materials can in no way interfere with my admiration of his geographical chapters which leave nothing to be desired. For the physical geography of the Persian empire see the first chapter of his fourth volume.

names Thynoi and Bithynoi dwelt along the southern shores of the Euxine from the Bosphoros to the Halys were known as Thrakians:⁵⁸⁵ but tribes called Thynoi are found amongst the Thrakians of Europe, and to these the name Bithynoi stands in the same relation with that of the Bebrykes of the Troad to the Bryges or the Phrygians,—a name which reappears perhaps in that of the European Allobroges. The legend of the capture of Seilenos by Midas was localised at Thymbrion among the Asiatic Phrygians: it was also localised on the Bermian mountains in Makedonia. The river Odryses runs through the Mygdonian land into the Rhyndakos which discharges itself into the Propontis midway between Kyzikos and Kios; and the Odrysiian Thrakians rise to importance under their king Sitalkes who becomes the ally of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war.⁵⁸⁶ Hence we are not surprised to meet with traditions some of which take the Phrygians from Asia into Europe, while others bring them from Europe into Asia. According to Herodotos a vast body of Teukrians and Mysians crossed the Bosphoros before the Trojan war, and having subdued all the Thrakians advanced as far as the banks of the Peneios,⁵⁸⁷ the results of this great movement being the establishment of the Teukrian Paionians on the banks of the Strymon, and the migration of the Strymonians who in their Asiatic home assumed the Thynian or Bithynian name. On the other hand the Lydian Xanthos brings the Phrygians into Asia at a time later than the fall of Iliion. So again while some brought the Mysians from the Thrakian countries to the south of the Danube afterwards known as Mæsia, others made them offshoots of the Lydians of Asia Minor. But whatever may have been their origin, the wide extension of the Phrygians in Asia cannot be doubted. They are found on the west of the Halys, on the eastern coast of the Propontis, at Anaua, Kolossai, and Kelainai, on the upper course of the Maiandros.⁵⁸⁸ The facts that the Doliones as well as the Bebrykians were reckoned as Phrygians, and that the Bithynians were known also as Bebrykians, show

⁵⁸⁵ Herod. i. 28 ; vii. 74.

⁵⁸⁶ Thuc. iii. 29. In the Iliad, iii. 148, the Phrygians are seen under their chiefs Otreus (Odrysi) and Mygdon on the banks of the Sangarios.

⁵⁸⁷ Herod. vii. 20.

⁵⁸⁸ Ib. vii. 30.

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with sufficient clearness that the Phrygian name was a general title for tribes more or less closely related with one another. The differences of character which at a later time gave the Phrygians a reputation for slavish submissiveness may have arisen from the difference between their occupations in the more fertile valleys and the habits of the hardier Mysian mountaineers. But that the Phrygians and Lydians exercised through their music a powerful influence on all the Hellenic tribes, is a fact which cannot be questioned. From them the Greek musicians added to their own Dorian scale the Lydian mode of which the highest note was two notes higher than the highest note of the Dorian, the Phrygian note with one note higher than the Dorian scale coming between the two. But the close connexion of music with poetry, more especially in the earlier stages of Hellenic civilisation, and of both with religious emotions which were linked as by a chain of cause and effect with cognate musical sounds, proves of itself that the borrowing of musical modes implied the borrowing of a foreign worship or the modification of Hellenic rites to suit the music; and thus we seem to trace by a step nearer to its source the orgiastic worship of the Great Mother whose rites were connected with the two Dindymenian hills. That this music was common to Phrygians and Thracians seems to be indicated by the traditions which bring on the Phrygian Marsyas the vengeance of Apollon and which represent the Thracian Thamyras as seized, blinded, and deprived of voice by the Muses on his journey from the house of Eurytos at Oichalia. Midas, again, is a disciple of the Thracian Orpheus; and the names of Midas and of his father the first Phrygian king Gordios are connected with myths which are widely spread among the Aryan nations. The sovereignty over Asia destined for the man who should unloose the knot which fastened the yoke to the waggon of Gordios is the supremacy destined to the man who can draw from the oak-stem the sword of Volsung, or raise from the anvil the sword of Arthur, or lift the stone beneath which lies the sword of the Athenian Aigeus. The myth was localised in the waggon preserved in the citadel of Gordion, and its spell was broken by the blade of Alexander. Midas, again, is a being wholly of the

cloudland. His beautiful rose-gardens represent the glorious abodes of his kinsman Tantalos; and the wisdom imparted to him by the imprisoned Seilenos (a creature akin to Proteus and the wise Phenician fish-god) is the wisdom alike of Tantalos, Sisyphos, and Phoibos. His touch which turns everything to gold is the glory of the morning which spreads a radiance over all the earth. The command that, to free himself from the plague, he must go and bathe in the stream of Paktolos which thence retains its golden hue, points to the quenching of the sun's light in the waters which reflect his splendour after he is gone; and the strains of the Phrygian music are heard in the whispering of the reeds which betray the secret of his ass's ears, an emblem which, like the ass of Seilenos, was doubtless in the East the symbol of his wisdom and his prophetic powers, although western fancy converted it into a penalty for adjudging the prize to Marsyas in his contest with Apollon.⁵⁸⁹

These tribes, whatever may have been their origin, were spread over a region, of whose loveliness Herodotos speaks with a proud enthusiasm. The beauty of climate, the richness of soil, and the splendour of scenery which made Ionia for him the most delightful of all earthly lands,⁵⁹⁰ were not confined to the exquisite valleys in which for the most part the Hellenic inhabitants of Asia Minor had fixed their homes; and the only drawback even to the colder parts of this vast peninsula was that, while they yielded grain, fruits, and cattle, they would not produce the olive. These colder parts lay on the large central plain to the north of the chain of Tauros which, starting from the Chelidonian or southeastern promontory of Lykia, extends its huge mountain-barrier to the north of the Kilikian country, until its chain is broken by the Euphrates a little below the point where this stream receives the waters of the Kappadokian Melas or black river. This great plateau runs off towards the north, west, and south, into a broken country whence the mountains slope down to the sea, bearing in their valleys the streams which keep up its perpetual freshness. Stretching in a south-westerly direction from the mouth of the Hellespont, the

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of Asia
Minor.

⁵⁸⁹ For the origin and nature of these several myths I must refer the reader to my *Aryan Mythology*.

⁵⁹⁰ Herod. i. 142.

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mountains of Ida, Gargaros, Plakos, and Temnos form the southern boundary of the lands through which the Granikos, Aisepos, and Rhyndakos find their way into the Propontis or sea of Marmora. Striking to the southeast from mount Temnos until it meets the range of Tauros runs a mountain chain which sends out to the southwest a series of ridges between which lie the most celebrated plains of Asia Minor, each watered by its own stream and its tributaries. In the triangle formed by the mountains of Gargaros and Temnos on the north and mounts Pelekas and Sardene on the south, the streams of Kaïkos and Euênos flow into the Elaiatic gulf between Elaia and Pitanê, the latter place being about ten miles distant from the rocks of Argennoussai (disastrous in later Athenian history), opposite to the southeastern promontory of Lesbos. Again between mount Pelekas on the north and the mountains of Sipylos and Tmolos on the south lies the valley of the Hermos which, a few miles to the north of the citadel of Sardeis, receives the waters of the Paktolos, and flowing westward past the Sipylian Magnesia, turns to the south near the city of Temnos and runs into the Egean about midway between Smyrna and Phokaia. To the east of Smyrna rise the heights of Olympos and Drakon, which may be regarded as a westward extension of mount Tmolos, between which and mount Messogis the Kaÿstros finds its way to the sea hard by Ephesos and about ten miles to the east of Kolophon. Finally beneath the southern slopes of Messogis the winding Maiandros, having received not far from Tralleis the waters of the Marsyas, goes on its westward way until, a little below the Maiandrian Magnesia, it turns like the Hermos to the south, and running by Thymbria and Myous on its left bank discharges itself into the gulf which bears its name, precisely opposite to the promontory of Miletos. From this point stretch to westward the Latmian hills where, as the tale went, Selênê came to gaze upon Endymion in his dreamless sleep. Thus each between its mountain-walls, the four streams, Kaïkos, Hermos, Kaÿstros, and Maiandros, follow courses which may roughly be regarded as parallel, through lands than which few are richer in their wealth of historical association. Round the ruins of Sardeis gather the recollections not only

of the great Lydian kingdom but of the visionary conversations between Kroisos and the illustrious Athenian lawgiver, while from Abydos on the north to the promontory of Kynossema, facing the seaborne island of Rhodos, every bay and headland of this glorious coast brings before us some name sacred from its ancient memories, not the least among these being the birthplace of Herodotos, and among the greatest that spot on the seashore beneath the heights of Mykalê where, as fame would have it, the fleet of the barbarian was shattered at the very time when Mardonios underwent his doom at Plataiai.

It is scarcely necessary to say that of the dynasty of Lydian kings which came to an end with Kroisos we have no contemporary history whatever; and it seems useless to claim an historical character for events and persons whose reality, if we cannot in terms disprove it, it is yet impossible to establish. With Herodotos the history of the Lydians, who are said to have received this name in place of their earlier title of Maionians from Lydos son of Atys,⁵⁹¹ stretches back into an antiquity as misty as that of the old Chaldean dynasty of the Assyriologists. In truth, it would seem that some fragments of those Assyrian dynasties have been pieced into the narrative of Herodotos. The first of the so-called Herakleid line of Lydian kings is Agron the son of Ninus the son of Belos, and it is noteworthy that neither Ninus nor Belos occurs among the Assyrian kings of Herodotos, although in speaking of Babylon he mentions the gates of the Ninians and the Belidai,⁵⁹² and that in the mythology of the Greeks Belos is connected with Africa rather than with Assyria.⁵⁹³ This mythical dynasty ends with Kandaules of whom Herodotos speaks as known to the Greeks by the wholly different name of Myrtilos and whom we are thus tempted to identify with the charioteer whom the Phrygian Pelops threw into the sea which bears his name.⁵⁹⁴ Five centuries had passed away while these kings reigned in an uninterrupted succession of father and son until Kandaules,

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dynasties.

⁵⁹¹ The father of Atys (Herod. i. 94) is Manes, in whom probably we have another lawgiver or king bearing the name of the Kretan Minos and the Vedic Menu.

⁵⁹² Herod. i. 7; iii. 155.

⁵⁹³ Lewis, *Astronomy of the Ancients*, 414.

⁵⁹⁴ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 153, 310.

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as Herodotos believed, fulfilled his destiny by insisting on exhibiting the unclothed form of his beautiful wife to his spear-bearer Gyges. His queen, discovering the trick, offers to Gyges the alternative of death or of life and marriage with herself when he shall have slain his master. Of this story it is enough to say that we find quite another version in Plato who tells us that far beneath the surface of the earth Gyges takes from the hand of a gigantic corpse a ring which has the power of making the wearer invisible, and that having by means of this ring corrupted the wife of Kandaules he slew his lord and usurped his throne.⁵⁹⁵ This ring, discovered beneath the earth, is the magic ring of the dwarf Andvari in the Volsung tale, and its wonderful powers are seen in the Arabian story of Allah-ud-deen where a giant is its slave as in the story of Gyges he is its lifeless guardian; and the maiden whom he wins is one of those fair women who in a crowd of legends have been wedded to beings who represent the darkness, as Iokastê of Thebes to Laios, and who are all married afterwards to the spear-bearer armed with the rays of the glancing sun. The wife of Kandaules is, in short, Urvasi, the dawn-goddess, who is invested with the beauty, the daring, and promptitude of the Teutonic Brynhild.⁵⁹⁶

The Lydian
kings and
the Asiatic
Greeks.

For this murder of Kandaules the divine penalty, we are told by Herodotos, was to descend not on the head of Gyges but on that of his fifth descendant, the last who should sit on his throne.⁵⁹⁷ To this eponymos of the Gygaian lake near Sardeis are ascribed a war with Miletos, Smyrna, and Kolophon, and the conquest of Sipylos, the one on the authority of Herodotos and Pausanias,⁵⁹⁸ the other on that of

⁵⁹⁵ Plato, *Polit.* 359.

⁵⁹⁶ Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 302, notices the Aphrodisiac influence which is seen in many Eastern myths, as in those of Kybele or Rhea or Atys, of Aphrodite and Anchiises, of the Phrygian Gordios and the maiden who shows him the way to a throne, and contrasts these with 'the feminine aspects assumed at times by Midas, Sardanapalos, Sandon, and even Herakles,' while the Amazons and Semiramis achieve great exploits. To this list of womanly gods and heroes must be added the names of Theseus, Odysseus, Achilleus, Dionysos, Tristram, Hugdietrich, and others. See *Myth. Ar. Nat.* c. 248, 380; ii. 63, 163, 174, 295. *Popular Romances of Middle Ages*, introd. *Tales of the Teutonic Lands*, ib.

⁵⁹⁷ In other words, the sun kills the night: but the slaughter of the night cannot be avenged until the end of the day, when the sun in his turn must be conquered by the darkness. In short, the traditional history of the Lydian kingdom, like that of so many other dynasties, has been fitted into the framework of a solar myth.

⁵⁹⁸ Paus. ix. 29, 2. The date of Mimmermos who speaks of the battle between the

Nikolaos of Damascus.⁵⁹⁹ To the reign of his son Ardys is assigned that irruption of the Kimmerians which is said to have been contemporaneous with the Scythian invasion of Media and to have been brought to an end by his grandson Alyattes. His wars with Priênê and Miletos, like those of his father, may very possibly point to a long struggle which preceded the subjugation of the Ionian Greeks by the Lydian kings; but the history of these wars is gone beyond recall. The war, we are told, was carried on perseveringly by Alyattes after his father's death but with no very brilliant success, his plan being to destroy the harvests but to leave the homesteads unhurt in order not to deter the people from risking another disaster in the coming year. In this contest the Milesians are represented as having no aid but that of the Chians who thus requited the services of Miletos in their war against their Greek neighbours of Erythrai. In his twelfth year the divine wrath for the accidental burning of the temple of the Assesian Athenaia was shown in a severe illness which laid Alyattes prostrate. A message of inquiry sent to Delphoi called forth a command that he should rebuild the temple if he cared to regain his health. Alyattes, accordingly, proposed a truce to Thrasyboulos tyrant of Miletos, who by the advice of his friend the Corinthian Perikandros received the Lydian ambassadors in the midst of citizens who were enjoying themselves amidst all possible signs of abundance and luxury. A state of things so different from that for which he had looked led Alyattes now to propose not a truce but a peace, for the better cementing of which he built two temples in place of the one which had been burnt. But the occurrence of an eponymos amongst his sons, Adramytos the founder of Adramyttion, shows that we are still in the most suspicious grounds of oral tradition: and the self-contradictory account given by Herodotos of the building of the pyramid or cairn of Alyattes scarcely proves the social morality of the Lydians to have been such as he here represents it.

The accession of Kroisos brings us to the last act in the

Smyrnaians and Gyges cannot be fixed with certainty, and he does not speak of the event as a contemporary.

⁵⁹⁹ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 303.

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The last of
the Mernad
kings.

drama of the Mernnad kings. The heir of immense wealth and master of a stronghold, as invulnerable as Achilles, in the akropolis of Sardeis, living under the brightest of skies and amid the most beautiful of earthly scenes, he is depicted as from the first animated by the ambition of being a happy man, and by the conviction that he had really attained to the state at which he aimed. The golden sands of the Paktolos, or, as others said, the produce of his gold mines at Pergamos, speedily filled his treasure-houses, and throughout the world the fame went that Kroisos was the wealthiest and the happiest of men. The decision of his father had crushed the hopes of his half-brother Pantaleon, whose accession might in some measure have changed the fortune of the Ionian Greeks. The mother of Pantaleon was an Ionian: but the choice of Kroisos, the son of a Karian woman, insured the ascendancy of the tribes known as the Lydian and the Karian. The attempt to disentangle the traditions relating to these tribes would perhaps be hopeless: but the mere fact that in the ears of Greeks the Karians were a people speaking a barbarous jargon proves no more than that the Karian speech may have differed from the Hellenic dialects as these differed from the Latin or as both Latin and Greek differed from the dialects of the Teutonic nations. These with the Thrakians and Persians were all sprung from the same great Aryan stock: and the religious union of Karians, Lydians, and Mysians in the temple of Zeus at Mylasa⁶⁰⁰ was an acknowledgement of this affinity. Of the course of their early migrations we know nothing. In the belief of Herodotos⁶⁰¹ they had come to the shores of Asia Minor from the islands where they had been known as Leleges and, as such, were supposed to have manned the visionary navies of Minos: but that the Karian was a widely scattered name, may be regarded as certain. They were found, apparently, not merely in the islands of the Egean or in their Asiatic homes but on the north-western shores of the Peloponnesos, just as we find Leleges, Lokrians, Ligurians and Lloegry among the mountains of Knemis and Opous, in Sicily, on the coasts of the gulf of Genoa, on the banks of the Liger (Loire), and in the island

⁶⁰⁰ Herod. i. 171.⁶⁰¹ i. 171.

of Britain. But whatever may have been their origin, they were in the general spirit of their institutions far more in harmony with the Greek than with the Asiatic mind. To that isolation of autonomous communities which determined the character of Hellenic civilisation they united a determined resistance to despotism which distinguished them not merely from the Lydians but even from the Asiatic Hellenes at and after the time of the Ionic revolt.

CHAP.
II.

The Asiatic
Ionians.

These Asiatic Hellenes it was the destiny of Kroisos to bring under the yoke of the Persian king along with the people who had been subject to the rule of his forefathers. The traditions of the wars of Gyges and his successors against Miletos, Priênê, Kolophon, and Ephesos, may be taken as showing the existence of a design to reduce them under the Lydian rule. This design Kroisos determined vigorously to carry out. The political disunion to which the Greeks whether of continuous or of scattered Hellas seem to have clung as the most precious heritage of the ancient Aryan family type, insured his success now as at a later day it insured the triumph of Makedonian kings and Roman consuls. They had in fact nothing about them which could make a nation: and the tradition which assigned the Ionian dodekapolis of Asia Minor to a simultaneous emigration from Athens was contradicted by facts which forced themselves prominently before the attention of Herodotos. According to the story Medon and Neileus, the sons of Kodros, quarrelled after their father's death for the rule at Athens. The Delphian oracle decided in favour of Medon; and Neileus in disgust started with Androklos from the Athenian Prytaneion with all due solemnities to lay the foundation of a new Ionic society on the western shores of Asia Minor. The number of the cities thus founded was in the belief of Herodotos determined by that of the cities which formed the confederacy of the Ionians before their expulsion from the Peloponnesos.⁶⁰²

⁶⁰² I attach no historical importance to this statement of Herodotos, i. 145: but too great stress can scarcely be laid upon it, as showing the confused and contradictory notions entertained by him and by his contemporaries of the origin and early history of the Hellenic tribes. His assertions are often marked by a most confident dogmatism; and it is only on a comparison of these statements that we discover the extent of their inconsistency. In chapter lvi. of his first book he had stated positively that the Dorian was an Hellenic, the Ionian a Pelasgian race, and that the Dorian tribes had wandered about as much as the Ionic race had been stationary. Indeed he asserts that

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II.

Hence the Asiatic dodekapolis was a mere imitation of a supposed institution of former days and implied no genuine Ionian character for all its component parts. Any other supposition is with him⁶⁰³ a sheer absurdity, since in the so-called Ionian aggregate were included Abantes from Euboea who had no pretence to the Ionic name, Minyai from Orcho-
menos, Kadmeians, Dryopes, Phokians, Molossians, Arkadian Pelasgians, and Dorians from Epidaurus. If, again, he regards as genuine Ionians those only who came from Athens and kept the feast called Apatouria, he admits that this feast was not kept by the Ionic cities of Kolophon and Ephesos. In short, there was no standard by which the Ionic character of the confederation could be measured, for even that of language failed him. Not less than four dialects were spoken by the inhabitants of these twelve so-called Ionic cities. Of these one was spoken by the men of Miletos, Myous, and Priênê, cities which he mentions as built in territory inhabited by Karians. A second, which he regards as utterly different,⁶⁰⁴ was spoken by the people of Ephesos, Kolophon, Lebedos, Teos, Klazomenai, and Phokaia, settlements in Lydia; a third by the men of Chios and Erythrai, while the fourth was peculiar to the Samians.


The Ionic
dodeka-
polis.

That the character of the Ionians thus settled (if the story of their settlement may be relied on) in Asia Minor was modified by their contact with the tribes among whom they found themselves, we may readily admit. The extent of this modification is more open to doubt. No women, we are told, went from Athens with Neileus and his companions who are

Kroisos on inquiry found that up to his own day the Ionian race had not moved from its original abodes, *οὐδαμῆ καὶ ἐξέχωρησε*: and this was long after the time from which, in ch. cxlv. he dates their expulsion from the Peloponnesos by the Achaians who continued to maintain the dodekapolis. If, again, the Ionians are here Pelasgic or non-Hellenic, as broadly contrasted with the Hellenic Dorians, yet according to the Iapetid genealogy, Dorians, Achaians, Ionians, and Aioliens were alike children of Hellen, Xouthos the son of Hellen being the father of Ion and Achaios; and as these were therefore all equally Hellenic, and as the Ionians are Pelasgians, it follows that at least some Pelasgians were Hellenes. Again the brotherhood of Ion and Achaios according to this genealogy seems to be in direct contradiction with the notion of Herodotos that the Ionians were expelled from the Peloponnesos by the Achaians. The authority of the genealogy is equal to that of Herodotos: that is to say, neither has any authority at all. If Herodotos tells us that in his own time a given people in a given place called themselves by, or were known to others by, a given name, we may believe him implicitly: but of the ethnic affinities or pre-historic fortunes of the tribes which formed the Hellenic world of his day he knew no more, and could know no more, than Ephoros or Diodoros or Strabo. Like them, he was dealing only with a mass of floating, inconsistent, and untrustworthy tradition.

⁶⁰³ i. 146. *μυρίη πολλή.*

⁶⁰⁴ See Appendix B.



GREEK
SETTLEMENTS
IN
ASIA MINOR.

T H R A C E

Samothrace

Imbros

LEMNOS

Tenedos

LESBOS

CHIOS

Icaria

Patmos

Naxos

Anargos

Thera

Astypalaia

Rhodos

Lindos

Ainos

Eion

Abydos

M. Ida

Adramyttion

Methymna

Myrina

Smyrna

Ephesos

Miletos

Halikarnassos

Rhodos

Lindos

Kardia

Paktye

Lampsaques

Rhodos R.

Skopelos R.

Alamyria

Grynion

Magnesia

Sipylus M.

Ephesos

Miletos

Halikarnassos

Rhodos

Lindos

Prokonnesos

Ophioussa

Phokis

Skepsis

Adramyttion

Myrina

Smyrna

Ephesos

Miletos

Halikarnassos

Rhodos

Lindos

Rhodos

Lindos

Perinthos

Phokis

Skopelos R.

Skepsis

Adramyttion

Myrina

Smyrna

Ephesos

Miletos

Halikarnassos

Rhodos

Lindos

Rhodos

Lindos

Phokis

Skopelos R.

Skepsis

Adramyttion

Myrina

Smyrna

Ephesos

Miletos

Halikarnassos

Rhodos

Rhodos

Lindos

Rhodos

Lindos

Phokis

Skopelos R.

Skepsis

Adramyttion

Myrina

Smyrna

Ephesos

Miletos

Halikarnassos

Rhodos

Rhodos

Lindos

Rhodos

Lindos

Phokis

Skopelos R.

Skepsis

Adramyttion

Myrina

Smyrna

Ephesos

Miletos

Halikarnassos

Rhodos

Rhodos

Lindos

Rhodos

Lindos

Phokis

Skopelos R.

Skepsis

Adramyttion

Myrina

Smyrna

Ephesos

Miletos

Halikarnassos

Rhodos

Rhodos

Lindos

Rhodos

Lindos

Rhodos

Lindos

Rhodos

Lindos

said to have taken the wives of the Karians slaughtered by them, these women vowing by way of retaliation for this violence that they would never eat in the company of their new husbands or call them by their proper names. But we have seen how scanty is the evidence furnished by these traditions for distinctions of race; and no such distinction is needed to account for an antipathy which would probably be not less strong if the deeds ascribed to Neileus had been wrought by the men of Essex against the men of Kent. The influence of Phrygians and Lydians on the worship of the western Greeks has already been traced in the adoption by the latter of the musical modes in use among the former; and a like influence may have been exercised over the Asiatic Ionians by the worship, already existing, to which they adapted themselves in the temples of Apollon Didymaios at Branchidai near Miletos and of Apollon Klarios near Kolophon. The Panionic festival, celebrated on the promontory of Mykalê as furnishing a central point for the people of Kolophon, Ephesos, Samos, Priênê and Miletos, seems to point to the fact that these towns formed the earliest units and the main strength of the confederation, for the inconvenience of Mykalê as a point of meeting for the whole dodekapolis is attested by the advice attributed to Thales that for Mykalê they would do well to substitute Teos, a town a little way to the southeast of the neck of land which cuts off the peninsula of Erythrai and the Korykian mount. The religious bond thus furnished had no special strength. In the time of Thucydides the great Ionic gathering took place at Ephesos.⁶⁰⁵

The early history of these settlements brings before us a confused picture of violent changes or revolutions. The death of Androklos is said to have been followed by the putting down of kingly rule: but a tyranny was, at least once again, established by a man named Pythagoras before the time of Cyrus. The accounts of the foundation of Teos are noteworthy not so much for the transparent fiction which brings the colonists thither under the guidance of Nauklos, Damasos, and Apoikós,—the skipper, the tamer,

Internal
condition
of the
Ionian
cities.

⁶⁰⁵ Thuc. iii. 104.

BOOK
II.

and the settler,—as for the occurrence of the tribal name Geleontes in a Teian inscription, and for the distribution of the citizens in a certain number of burghs or boroughs which bear Asiatic rather than Hellenic names.⁶⁰⁶ The traditions of Erythrai speak of a severe oligarchy as set up by some leading men of the colony with the aid of the Chian king Amphiklos, and of the putting down of this tyranny by Hippotes, the brother of the Oikistes Kleopos or Knopos who had been murdered before he could land. Smyrna, a city built at the apex of the triangle which has for its base a line drawn from the mouth of the Hermos to the town of Klazomenai, was originally, we are told, not Ionic but Aiolic; and the story runs that the Smyrnaians received into the city a body of Kolophonian exiles who showed their gratitude by shutting the gates when the citizens had all gone out to keep a feast to Dionysos. The Kolophonians allowed them to take away their movable goods; and the Smyrnaians thus banished from their own hearths were distributed among the remaining eleven cities of the Aiolian dodekapolis.⁶⁰⁷

The Aioli-
lians of
Asia Minor.

No greater ethnic affinities may be inferred from the Aiolic confederacy which was scattered over the coast lands of Asia Minor and some of the islands to the north of the river Hermos.⁶⁰⁸ These towns on the mainland were Temnos, Larissa, Neon-Teichos (Newcastle), Kyme, Aigai, Myrina, Gryneion, Killa, Notion, Aigiroessa, and Pitanê, Smyrna having been lost probably as separated from the rest by the mountains of Sipylos. Taken collectively, these cities were of so little importance that Thucydides does not trouble himself to mention Aiolis as amongst the allies of Athens in the Peloponnesian war:⁶⁰⁹ but Temnos and Aigai are noteworthy as being able to bid defiance to Persian authority long after the close of that disastrous struggle.⁶¹⁰ The Aiolians might at the least vaunt the number of their settlements of which another group lay in the lands about mount Ida, the Hellespont, and even among the Thrakians to, the

⁶⁰⁶ Thus we have the tower or burg of Kinabalos (seemingly Hannibal), of Daddos, Kidys, and Sintys. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 251.

⁶⁰⁷ Herod. i. 150.

⁶⁰⁸ Temnos and Larissa are by some placed erroneously on the south bank of the Hermos. Paus. v. 13, 4. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 258.

⁶⁰⁹ Thuc. ii. 9.

⁶¹⁰ Xenophon, *Hellen.* iv. § 5.

north of the strait. These colonies came chiefly from Kymê, Tenedos, and Lesbos, the last island with its five cities, Methymna, Antissa, Eresos, Pyrrha, and Mytilene, (a sixth, Arisbê, was taken and destroyed by the Methymnaians) being the most prominent member of the Aiolic confederation. But here, as elsewhere, we have the old and wearisome stories of feuds and factions whose fury found vent in murder or open war. The despot Melanchrous may be slain by the brothers of the poet Alkaios: but he is followed by Myrsilos and others whose names the poet has handed down for the execration of future ages. In contrast with these, one Mytilenaian at least attained to a better fame. In the war with Athens for the possession of the coast of the Troad as far as Sigeion, Pittakos distinguished himself by slaying the Athenian leader Phrynon, while in the same war the poet Alkaios fled, leaving his shield in the hands of the enemy.⁶¹¹ The dispute, referred, it is said, to the decision of Periandros of Corinth, was settled by the covenant that each side should retain its own possessions at the time; and Alkaios had leisure to resume his political antagonism to Pittakos, until the latter, having been invested by the citizens with the authority of Aisymnetes or dictator for ten years, took effectual measures to secure the peace of the city and drew upon himself thereby the virulent invectives of the poet. Like his supposed friend Solon, Pittakos is also said to have been a legislator. A law ascribed to him imposed double penalties for offences committed by drunken persons; the activity of his rule furnished a theme for the chants of women working at the corn-mills;⁶¹² and perhaps the purity of his character won for him, as for Solon, a place amongst the seven wise men of Hellas, the counterparts of the seven sages of Leinster and the seven champions of Christendom.⁶¹³

To the south of the Ionian colonies lay the insular and

⁶¹¹ Archilochos before him and Horace after him confess the same fault.

This war Herodotos ascribes to the ambition of Peisistratos; but his chronology must be wrong, if, as he says, v. 95, the quarrel was settled by the arbitration of Periandros. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 269, thinks that there may have been two wars, one in the time of Pittakos and another in the time of Peisistratos, whose son Hegesistratos became in consequence despot of Sigeion.

⁶¹² Ἄλει, μύλα, ἄλει, καὶ γὰρ Πιττακὸς ἄλει, τὰς μεγάλας Μιτυλήνας βασιλεύων, 'grind, mill, grind, for Pittakos who reigns over great Mytilene grinds also.' Kleisthenes would scarcely have given to Peisistratos the title of king of Athens.

⁶¹³ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 413, &c.

BOOK
II.The
Dorians of
Asia Minor.

continental settlements of the Dorian Hellenes, six of which entered into an Amphiktyonic bond to the exclusion of all the others. These states, which held their religious festival on the Triopian promontory, were the islands of Kos and Rhodes, the latter with its three cities of Lindos, Ialysos, and Kameiros, and on the main land the towns of Knidos and Halikarnassos, thus shutting out the islands of Karpathos and Astypalaia with other Dorian settlements, and among these Myndos, a town on the same peninsula with Halikarnassos, which was itself cast off by way of punishment for the profanity of Agasikles who, being bound to dedicate in the Triopian temple the tripod which he had won, carried it off, perhaps with Karian insolence, to his own home.⁶¹⁴

The con-
quest of the
Asiatic
Hellenes
by Kroisos.

Against these isolated communities, centrifugal in all but a common religious sentiment which exercised no check on their political action, Kroisos, we are told, determined to put forth the full power of his kingdom. But while the Lydian king acted with more vigour than his father, Miletos had been woefully weakened by two generations of faction; and Thales in vain gave counsel (the wisdom of which would be seen after the ruin of Ionia), that Teos should be made the meeting place of a senate invested with authority over the whole confederation, and that the several autonomous communities should regard themselves as Demoi or cantons of the new city thus to be constituted.⁶¹⁵ The hand of Kroisos fell first on Ephesos,⁶¹⁶ where, it is said, his own nephew Pindaros was despot with a bad name for cruelty. But the Lydian king, who would not spare his kinsman, yielded something to the religious check put upon him by the citizens who carried a rope from the wall to the temple of Artemis and thus placed the city under the protection of the goddess. There were versions of the story which related that Kroisos promised to respect their rights and freedom. Herodotos simply says that Ephesos and after it all the other Hellenic cities of Asia were reduced to the payment of tribute, and thus Kroisos became king of all the land to the west of the Halys except that of the Lykians and Kilikians

⁶¹⁴ Herod. i. 144.⁶¹⁵ Ib. i. 170.⁶¹⁶ Ib. i. 26.

who were protected by the mountain-barriers of Tauros. His ambition, we are told, would have led him to attack the islands; but Pittakos, or Bias of Priênê (for the tale was related of both), being asked by Kroisos if he brought any tidings from Hellas, told him that the islanders were gathering immense bodies of cavalry to attack him in his own city of Sardeis. By the expression of his eager wish that he might catch the islanders on the mainland, Kroisos gave an opening for the retort that the islanders were equally anxious to catch Kroisos at sea and so to avenge on him the injury which he had done to their continental kinsfolk. The irony told, and Kroisos made an alliance with the islanders whom he had intended to enslave.⁶¹⁷

It is, at the least, not less strange that the people of Lesbos, Tenedos, or Samos, should accept the friendship of a tyrant whom they had been so eager to chastise: but probably the men of the mainland may have felt that there were worse evils than the payment of tribute to the lord of Sardeis. Unquestionably the conquest, whatever may have been its character, had wrought a momentous change in their position. They were now included in a vast empire which was at any time liable to the sudden and irreparable disasters which so frequently changed the face of the Asiatic world. If these Hellenes could so far have modified their nature as to combine with the decision and firmness of Englishmen, their union might have broken the power of Xerxes before he could set foot on the soil of Europe. But no danger could impress on them the need of such a sacrifice as this; their position on the borders of a vast undefended country deprived them of the advantages enjoyed by their kinsmen of western Hellas; and the whips of Kroisos were therefore soon exchanged for the scorpions of the Persian despot.

In the meanwhile their burdens were confined probably to the payment of a fixed annual tax and to the supply of a certain number of troops for the Lydian armies. By way of precaution also it would seem that Kroisos gave orders to some of the cities at least to breach their walls, for Herodotos mentions that they were obliged to rebuild them when

Effects of
the con-
quest on
the Greek
cities.

The drama
of the life
of Kroisos.

⁶¹⁷ Herod. i. 27.

BOOK
II.

they began to form the design of revolting from Cyrus. Otherwise the yoke of the Lydian king seems to have been light indeed; and he was soon himself to undergo a harder subjection than that which he had inflicted on the conquered Hellenes. But splendid as is the drama which Herodotus brings before us in his narrative of the life of Kroisos, we have to remember that it is strictly a drama, arranged in accordance with a fixed religious idea,—a drama which admirably illustrates the popular sentiment of the age, but of which, if we regard it as belonging to the every-day world of fact, we know neither the motives nor the incidents. It speaks of a time for which we have no contemporary history; and its most impressive scenes are inconsistent with facts for which we seem to have adequate testimony, and cannot therefore furnish grounds for any historical inferences. As the motives or causes tending to bring about this war we have first the ambition of Kroisos, then his desire to avenge the wrong done to his brother-in-law Astyages, and lastly the greed and covetousness of the Persian king, which yet, owing to the didactic purpose of the story, Cyrus in his conversation with Kroisos is constrained to disclaim.⁶¹⁸ To the facts that Kroisos was king of Lydia, that from some cause or other he became involved in a quarrel with Persia after having subdued the Asiatic Hellenes, that in this quarrel he had the worst, and that all his subjects passed at once under the dominion of his conqueror, there is probably not a single detail which we can add with any feeling of confidence that we are registering an historical incident. We have nothing to do but to follow the story, and to note such portions as may seem to point to real events, without venturing even here to say that these events have been satisfactorily ascertained. For we have to mark at the outset that Kroisos in the legend enslaves the autonomous Hellenic communities, that he can put to death with horrible tortures⁶¹⁹ those whom he regards as his enemies, and yet that he is loved not less by these Asiatic Hellenes than by the Lydians, and that the catastrophe which overwhelms him excites no other feeling than that of profound sorrow. In truth, as soon as he has

546 B.C. (?)

⁶¹⁸ Herod. i. 87.⁶¹⁹ ἐπι κνάφου ἔλκων. Ib. i. 92.

chronicled the fact of the Ionian conquest, the historian forgets that he is dealing with an Asiatic despot, and Kroisos becomes to him a being in whose life we read the sad and stern lesson that man abides never in one stay and that he is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward. Impressive as the tale may be, thus regarded as a parable, it can scarcely be said to have any other value. The very advice given by Sandanis⁶²⁰ at the outset of the struggle shows unmistakably how far we have wandered from the regions of history. It is simply ludicrous to suppose that any one could have represented to Kroisos the conquest of Persia as an enterprise in which he had nothing to gain and everything to lose. The conqueror of Media could not without absurdity be described as the ruler of a poverty-stricken kingdom; nor without even greater absurdity could Sandanis be said to thank the gods that they had not put into the minds of the Persians to go against the Lydians, when the whole course of the narrative implies that the one absorbing dread which oppressed Kroisos was the fear of that insatiable spirit of aggression which marks all Asiatic empires until they pass from robbery to laziness.

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But the task of preparing for the invasion of Persia or for the attack of the Persian king was not for Kroisos the beginning of troubles. In the warning of Solon that none might be called happy before his life was ended he saw the handwriting on the wall which foreboded the coming catastrophe. Thus far most things had gone well with him, and the dumbness of his younger son seemed as nothing to be set in the balance against the vigour of Atys the brave and fair, the pride and the hope of his life. But the word of the god had gone forth that Atys must be smitten by the spear and die. In vain Kroisos seeks by every means to prevent the threatened calamity. All weapons are put out of the lad's reach, and he is wedded to a maiden whose love may turn away his thoughts from any tasks involving the least danger. But there comes to the court of Kroisos a suppliant who prays the king to give him shelter and absolve him from the guilt of involuntary homicide. Such a prayer was never

The begin-
ning of
woes in the
death of
Atys.

⁶²⁰ Herod. i. 72.

BOOK
II.

made to Kroisos in vain; and when yet other suppliants came beseeching that Atys might be sent to hunt and slay the boar which was ravaging all their land, Adrastos, whose very name carried with it the omen of inevitable doom, is sent to guard the beautiful boy from the weapon which is laden with his death. But the god spake of no other spear than that of Adrastos; and when the Phrygian in his unutterable agony slays himself on the tomb of Atys, Kroisos owns that the instrument of the divine will is not to be condemned for a result over which he had no control. From his long and bitter mourning Kroisos is at length roused by the tidings of the fall of his brother-in-law Astyages: but before he enters on the task of avenging him, he resolves to have the counsel of the gods and further to test their oracles before he puts to them the question, the answer to which shall determine him to fight out the quarrel or to lay it aside.

The paying
of the
penalty due
for the
iniquity
of Gyges.

He sent therefore, so the story goes on to tell us (and it is useless to give it in any other words than those of the old historian), to Ammon in Libya, to Amphiaraios and Tropho-nios and the Milesian Branchidai, to Delphoi, to Abai of the Phokians and Dodona, charging his messengers to count one hundred days from the time of leaving Sardeis, and then to ask all the oracles at once what the Lydian king might at that moment be doing. What the other oracles answered, there were none to say; but at Delphoi, when the Lydians had asked as Kroisos bade them, the priestess answered:

‘I know the number of the sand and the measures of the sea;
I understand the dumb man and hear him who speaks not:
And there comes to me now the savour of a hard-shelled tortoise,
Which is seething in a brazen vessel with the flesh of a ram,
And brass there is beneath it and brass above it.’

These words the Lydians wrote and carried back to the king; and when all had returned to Sardeis from the other oracles, Kroisos took the answers and unfolded them; but none pleased him until he came to the words of the Delphian god, for he alone knew that on the hundredth day Kroisos went into a secret place where none might see him and boiled a tortoise and a ram in a brazen vessel on which he placed a

brazen lid. This oracle alone with that of Amphiaraos he held to have spoken truly; and therefore with mighty sacrifices he sought to win the favour of the god at Delphoi. He offered up three thousand cattle, and set on fire a great pile of couches broidered in silver and gold, with golden goblets and purple robes. He sent him also many talents of fine gold and silver and a lion made of gold ten talents in weight. Many other gifts also he sent to Delphoi and to Amphiaraos, and he charged his messengers to go to both these oracles and ask if he should march against the Persians and if he should get any others to help him in the war. Both gave the same answer that if he went against the Persians he would destroy a great power, and counselled him to find out the mightiest among the Hellenes and make them his friends. Still more pleased with this fancied assurance that he should throw down the kingdom of Cyrus, he sent two pieces of gold to every citizen of Delphoi; and in return for this the Delphians granted to Kroisos and the Lydians the right of consulting the god before any who might be waiting. After this Kroisos besought him for the third time, for when he found that he might trust him, he loaded him with questions; and now when he asked if his empire should last for a long time, the priestess answered:

‘When a mule shall be king of the Medes,
Then, light-footed Lydian, flee to the banks of the pebbly Hermos,
Flee and tarry not, neither care to hide thy fear.’

More pleased than ever from the supposed impossibility of a mule being ever king of the Medes, he sought now to learn who were the mightiest among the Greeks, and found that these were the men of Athens and of Sparta. To these, therefore, he sent a herald and made a covenant with them that they should help him in the war: and so he made ready to march against the Persians, though the wise Sandanis warned him that he would win no good by going against a people so poor and so greedy. Despising this counsel, Kroisos marched to the Halys where the army crossed over on the bridges which were there already, or, as some say, Thales of Miletos made a new channel for the river so that, when some part of the water was taken off, the men were able to

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cross it easily.⁶²¹ Thence he went on to Pteriê, taking many cities and ravaging their lands, until Cyrus came up with his armies and tried to draw off the Ionians from Kroisos. But they would not hear him, and afterwards a great battle was fought in which neither side had the victory, for the night came on and parted them. On the next day, as Cyrus came out again to the attack, Kroisos drew off his army to Sardeis, for he liked not the scantiness of its numbers, and he was minded during the winter to gather to his aid the Egyptians and Babylonians with the men of Sparta and early in the spring to march out once more against the Persians. So when he reached Sardeis, he sent away all the army which he had with him: but Cyrus, having learnt what Kroisos meant to do, marched straight after him and came before Sardeis when the allies of Kroisos were scattered. In a great strait the Lydian king led out his own people who were at this time the bravest of all the nations in Asia and who fought on horseback with long spears, and he drew them up on the large plain which lies before the city. These horsemen Cyrus greatly feared, and by the counsel of Harpagos the Mede he placed riders on all the camels and drew them up in front of his army: and so when the battle began, the horses of the Lydians saw and smelt the camels and fled, and the hopes of king Kroisos perished. Still the Lydians fought on bravely, until they were driven into the city and shut up there. Then Kroisos sent in haste to his friends and bade them come at once to his aid. So fourteen days passed away, and then Cyrus promised to reward richly the man who should first climb the walls. But the men tried in vain, until a Mardian named Hyroiades found the part where no guards had been placed and to which king Meles had not carried the woman-born lion, because he thought that no enemy would ever attempt to climb a rock so steep and rugged. But Hyroiades had seen some one come down and pick up his helmet which had rolled from the wall. By this same path he went up himself and other Persians with him; and so was Sardeis taken and

⁶²¹ This exploit is the parallel on the Greek side to the stories of the diversion of the Gyndes and of the Euphrates on the side of Cyrus. Herod. i. 189, 191.

Kroisos made prisoner, when he had reigned for fourteen years and had been besieged for fourteen days, and when, as the oracle had foretold, he had destroyed a great power, namely his own. Then Cyrus raised a great pile of wood and laid Kroisos upon it bound in chains with fourteen of the Lydians, either because he wished to offer them up as the first-fruits of his victory or to see if any of the gods would deliver Kroisos who, as he had learnt, was one who greatly honoured them. Then to Kroisos in his great agony came back the words which Solon had spoken to him that no living man was happy; and as he thought on this, he sighed and after a long silence thrice called out the name of Solon. Hearing this, Cyrus bade the interpreters ask him whom he called; but for a long time he would not answer them. At last when they pressed him greatly, he told them that long ago Solon the Athenian came to see him and thought nothing of all his wealth and how the words had come to pass which Solon spake, not thinking of him more than of any others who fancy that they are happy. While Kroisos thus spake, the edge of the pile was already kindled: but Cyrus, hearing the tale, remembered that he too was but a man and that he was now giving alive to the flames one who had been not less wealthy than himself, and when he thought also how man abideth not ever in one stay, he charged his people to put out the fire and bring Kroisos and the other Lydians down from the pile. But the flame was now too strong; and when Kroisos saw that the mind of Cyrus was changed, but that the men were not able to quench the flames, he prayed to Phoibos Apollon to come and save him, if ever he had done aught to please him in the days that were past. Then suddenly the wind rose, and clouds gathered where none had been before, and there burst from the heaven a great storm of rain which put out the blazing fire. So Cyrus knew that Kroisos was a good man and that the gods loved him: and when Kroisos came down from the pile, Cyrus asked him, 'Who persuaded thee to march into my land and to become my enemy rather than my friend?' 'The god of the Greeks urged me on,' answered Kroisos, 'for no man is so senseless as of his own pleasure to choose war in which the fathers

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bury their children rather than peace in which the children bury their fathers.' Meanwhile, the city was given to storm and plunder, and Kroisos, standing by the side of Cyrus who had loosed him from his chains, asked him what the Persians were doing down below. 'Surely,' said Cyrus, 'they are plundering thy city and spoiling thy people of their goods.' 'Nay,' answered Kroisos; 'but it is thy wealth and thy goods which they are taking as booty, for I and my people now have nothing. But take good heed. The man who may get the most of this wealth will assuredly rise up against thee: so place thy guards at all the gates and bid them take all the goods, saying that a tithe must first be paid of them to Zeus, and thus thou wilt avoid the peril and no hate shall accrue to thee thereby.' For this good counsel Cyrus bade him ask as a gift what he should most desire to have; and Kroisos said, 'Let me send these fetters to the god of the Greeks and ask him if it be his wont to cheat those who have done him good.' When Cyrus learnt the reason for this prayer, he laughed and said that Kroisos might do this and aught else that he might wish. So men were sent to Delphoi to show the chains and to ask if the Hellenic gods were wont to be ungrateful; and when they came into the temple, the priestess said, 'Not even a god can escape the lot which is prepared for him, and Kroisos in the fifth generation has suffered for the sin of him who at the bidding of a woman slew his lord and seized his power. Much did the god strive that the evil might fall in his children's days and not on Kroisos himself; but he could not turn aside the Moirai. For three years he put off the taking of Sardeis, for thus much only they granted to him; and he came to his aid when the flame had grown fierce on the blazing pile. And yet more, he is wrong in blaming the god for the answer that if he went against the Persians he would destroy a great power, for he should then have asked if the god meant his own power or that of Cyrus; and therefore is he the cause of his own sorrow. Neither, again, would he understand what the god spake about the mule, for Cyrus himself was this mule, being the son of a Median woman, the daughter of Astyages, and of a man born of the meaner race of the

Persians.' This answer the Lydians brought to Sardeis; and Kroisos knew that the god was guiltless and that the fault was all his own.

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Thus was the story of Kroisos made to justify the religious philosophy of the age. The older belief that Aisa (the spoken word) and Moira (the allotting power or the allotted portion) were ministers of Zeus no longer satisfied minds which were hastening to the conviction of Euripides⁶²² that high above Zeus himself rose the iron sceptre of an implacable necessity. Here the name of Zeus is not brought forward; but Phoibos is manifestly a suitor to the Moirai for the favours which he seeks to bestow on Kroisos, and the all-absorbing idea running through the tale is that of a compensation which takes no regard of the personal deserts of the sufferer, and of a divine jealousy which cannot endure the sight of overmuch happiness in a mortal man. Gyges may go down to the grave in peace; but his fifth descendent, a righteous man who fears the gods, is to pay the penalty of his iniquity. It is a doom which clearly does not affect the spiritual condition of the man. The prosperity of Gyges, the disaster of Kroisos, are no evidence that the former is approved, the latter rejected, by the righteous Being whose justice runs in a different groove from that of the Moirai. To Kroisos the catastrophe brings wisdom and humility. He is the better and the purer for his troubles, and henceforth he stands to his conqueror in the relation which Solon had filled to himself.

Theologica
purpose of
the story.

But the didactic purpose, not less than the materials of the story, strips its incidents of all historical character. The artless remark of Herodotos that until Kroisos was actually taken no one had paid the least attention to the plain warning, uttered five generations before, that the fifth from Gyges should atone the old wrong, proves at the least that the prediction grew up after the catastrophe, even if it proves no more; and the fabrication of one prophecy brings the rest under the same suspicion. But the narrative convicts itself in other ways. Unless when a literal acceptance of oracular responses is needed to keep up a necessary delusion, the

Unhistorical
character of all
the details.

⁶²² Alkestis, 965.

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recipients of these answers take it for granted that these utterances are, or are likely to be, metaphorical; and to Kroisos himself the facts shrouded under the guise of the mule-king were better known than they could be to any others. The Median sovereign was his brother-in-law, and the very matter which had stirred his wrath was that Cyrus the son of the Persian Kambyses had dethroned his grandfather and thus brought Medes and Persians under one sceptre. But the city of Kroisos, like the great cities and heroes of tradition generally, is vulnerable only in one spot; and the mythical records of the Merminad despots are brought to an end with the artificial chronology of a reign of fourteen years and a siege of fourteen days. The sequel of the tale Herodotos admits that he received from Lydian informants.⁶²³ Like the stories of the mad freaks ascribed to Kambyses in Egypt, we might well suppose that the tale of the rescue of Kroisos from the flames would be found in no Persian chronicle: and accordingly this tradition could not be traced in the pages of Ktesias. No Persian could represent his king as profaning the majesty and purity of Fire by offering to it the carcasses of dead men; and the one fact to which the whole story points is that in some way or other and by some means or other, of which we know nothing, the great Lydian empire was absorbed in the mightier monarchy of Persia.⁶²⁴

The revolt
of Paktyas,
546 B.C. (?)

The fall of Kroisos was followed, it is said, by a request of the Ionians to be received as tributaries of Cyrus on the same terms which had been imposed on them by the Lydian king. The petition implies the singular lightness of the

⁶²³ Herod. i. 87.

⁶²⁴ Gyges, as we have already seen, is the spear-bearer who marries the radiant wife of his old master,—in other words, he is Oidipous who marries the wife of his father whom he slays with a spear, i.e. the sun wedding the dawn who has thus far been the bride of the night or the darkness which cannot reveal her loveliness without bringing about its own destruction. This offence, it is clear, cannot be atoned until the day is done, and the sun must give way before night. When this myth was transferred to a dynasty of kings, it must represent the last as suffering for the misdeeds of the first. Into this framework more than one solar myth has been introduced. The story of Atys is a complete epos of the journey of the sun through the heaven; and another epos is brought before us in the story of Kroisos himself. The funeral pyre is the flaming heaven in which the sun seems to be consuming away, until the sudden storm of wind and rain blots out the fatal splendour. Of this tragedy it may be said with strict truth that it was from first to last inevitable. The sun must wed the dawn and slay the darkness: he must himself be slain like Atys by the spear of that same dark being whom he has already slain, but from whom he in his turn cannot escape (Adrastos); and thus the notions whether of divine jealousy or of inevitable destiny are traced to the impressions produced by phenomena passing daily before our eyes. These impressions led by a necessary result to the theology of Herodotos and Euripides.

Lydian rule and explains the stern refusal of Cyrus⁶²⁵ who grants these terms to the Milesians only. That they had no reason to dread anything more than the greed of the conqueror seems to be proved by the readiness with which Harpagos condoned the slaughter of the Persian garrison in the case of those Phokaïans who could not muster courage to carry out their self-imposed decree of exile.⁶²⁶ But the dread of extortion was, it seems, strong enough to induce many of the Ionian cities to repair their fortifications which had been breached on the conquest by Kroisos, and to send to Sparta a pressing intreaty for aid. It is, of course, impossible to prove that the petition was not made, and that the request was not refused; but when we remember that the first proposals of Kroisos for an alliance were readily accepted, and that, when on being besieged he sent his summons for their immediate help, their men were actually on board their ships and were prevented from sailing only by the tidings of his sudden catastrophe, we can but question either their former zeal or their present coldness. Clad in a purple robe in order to attract the greatest notice amongst the sombre throng of Spartans, the Phokaïan Pythermos,⁶²⁷ who was chosen spokesman, urged all his arguments in vain; but although they would take no active measures in their behalf, they sent one ship to ascertain generally the state of affairs in Ionia, the result being that one of them named Lakrines, whether with or without the knowledge of the Spartans, went to Sardeis and warned Cyrus that any attempt to injure an Hellenic city would bring down on him the anger of the Lakedaimonians. To this warning Cyrus replied by asking who the Lakedaimonians might be; and on hearing some account of them, he added that he had never feared men who

⁶²⁵ According to Herodotos, i. 141, Cyrus couches his refusal in a parable of the fisherman who, piping on the seashore, invites the fishes to dance; on their refusing (as the Ionians refused the first proffers of Cyrus) he throws in a net, and when the fishes caught by it begin to plunge about on the land he begs them to cease from the dancing to which he did not now invite them. Diodoros speaks of the application as made not to Cyrus but to Harpagos, who tells another story, namely that on rising to eminence he declined to receive except as a concubine a woman who had been refused to him in marriage when he was supposed to have little influence at court. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 168. So indefinite in detail is still the picture of which we may sufficiently trace the broad outlines.

⁶²⁶ Herod. i. 165. Without such condonation the fugitives could not have again established themselves in their old home.

⁶²⁷ *Ib.* i. 152.

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set apart a place in their city where they came together to buy, sell, and cheat.⁶²⁸ But Cyrus himself could tarry no longer in the west. There was work for him to do in Babylon, in Bactria, and in Egypt: and the task of punishing the Ionians might safely be intrusted to other hands. So having placed the Persian Tabalos in command of the garrison and having with strange indiscretion charged the Lydian Paktyas to bring the plundered treasures to Sousa, Cyrus, taking Kroisos with him, hastened away from Sardeis. No sooner had he set off than Paktyas, hurrying to the coast, employed the means thus placed in his power for the hiring of an army of mercenaries by whose aid he besieged Tabalos in the Sardinian Akropolis. So great was the anger of Cyrus on hearing of this revolt that he threatened to reduce all the Lydians to slavery: and so deeply were the fears of Kroisos roused for the safety of his people that he could think of no better way of serving them than by beseeching Cyrus to reserve his vengeance for Paktyas and to order the Lydians henceforth to wear tunics and buskins and take to harp-playing and shop-keeping. 'If thou wilt do this,' he said, 'the Lydians will soon be women instead of men.' The advice comes strangely from the man who had held that the duty of avenging his brother-in-law must be undertaken even at the risk of loss and suffering; but here, as elsewhere, we are dealing with floating stories which were attached now to one man, now to another. The same plan is attributed to the Egyptian king Sesostris⁶²⁹ and to the Cumean Aristodemos;⁶³⁰ and it was ascribed to Kroisos only by those who wished in later times to account for the change which, as it was supposed, had come over the national character of the once brave and formidable Lydian horsemen.

Flight and
surrender
of Paktyas.

But Paktyas was not a man to give the Persian king much trouble. No sooner had he heard that Mazares had been dispatched to enslave all who had taken part with him in the blockade of the Sardinian Akropolis and to bring Paktyas himself to Sousa, than he fled in terror to Kymê. On receiving the summons to surrender Paktyas, the Kymaians resolved to consult the god at Branchidai, an oracle near the harbour

⁶²⁸ Herod. i. 152.

⁶²⁹ Lewis, *Astron. Anc.* 352.

⁶³⁰ See page 146.]

of Panormos in the territory of Miletos. The messenger returned home in delight, saying that the god commanded them to give up the suppliant: but the answer so grated on the moral sense of one of the citizens named Aristodikos that he prevailed on the Kymaïans to send a second set of messengers of whom he himself should be one. The answer given to Aristodikos differed in no respect from that which had been given to the first inquirers. But Aristodikos would not trust even the evidence of his own ears against his sense of right and wrong, and therefore he began to pull down the nests of the sparrows and other birds which had built under the eaves of the temple. Then there came from the inmost shrine of the god a voice which said, 'Most profane of men, how darest thou to do these things? Thou art destroying the suppliants of my house.' But Aristodikos answered eagerly, 'Is this the way, O king, in which thou dost help thine own suppliants? and dost thou then bid the men of Kymê give up one who comes as a suppliant to them?' 'Yea,' answered the god, 'I do bid them do it, that their impiety may be their ruin, and that they may not come and put to me questions about the surrender of suppliants.' We are tempted, perhaps, to give too much historical credit to an oracular answer which exhibits the most favourable, probably because it is the most ordinary, action of the Hellenic oracles; but the moral value of the story is far beyond that of the insignificant aid which it may give towards recovering the actual outlines of the history.⁶³¹ It shows that in the Gentile as well as in the Jewish world there were some moral questions which were not regarded as open, and that on all such questions it was felt that God had shown to man by the teaching of his conscience the nature and extent of human duty.⁶³² Aristodikos had so far learnt this lesson as to prevail on his fellow-citizens to send Paktyas off to Mytilene; but the messengers of Mazares still followed him, and the

⁶³¹ See page 275. There is nothing to be urged against the likelihood of the question having been really put and really answered, beyond the objection which applies to the whole history of this time, that we have no contemporary evidence for it, and that the details of such traditional narratives must remain, more or less, matters on which we cannot speak positively.

⁶³² Micah vi. 8. Butler, *Sermons*, vii. 'That which is called considering our duty in a particular case is very often nothing but endeavouring to explain it away.'

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Mytilenaians were just going to give him up when the men of Kymê sent a ship to Lesbos and brought Paktyas away to Chios. The morality of Chios was lower even than that of Kymê; and the citizens of that island agreed to give Paktyas up, if in return they might receive the territory of Atarneus on the Mysian coast facing Lesbos. So the bargain was made and the suppliant surrendered, doubtless to be slain (although Herodotos takes no further notice of him) with frightful tortures at Sousa. But the curse of ill-gotten wealth clung to the Chians, who dared not offer to the gods anything that had been grown on a field of such bad repute. The resistance to Cyrus was now drawing towards its close; and Mazares, having enslaved Priênê, ravaged the beautiful valley of the Maiandros. But he had scarcely done his master's bidding in the lands of Magnesia when he was struck by sudden illness and died, and Harpagos, one of the prominent actors in the mythical history of Astyages, was sent down to take his place.

The story
of the
Phokaians.

The first city assailed by Harpagos was Phokaia, about twenty miles to the northwest of the mouth of the Hermos. This town was, in plain speech, a nest of pirates. Their long marauding expeditions⁶³³ had carried them to the shores of the Hadriatic, and even as far as the region of Tartessos, or Tarshish, hard by the pillars of Herakles, the westernmost bounds of the great inland sea. Here the goods which they brought for barter, or their usefulness as allies, won for them, it is said, the friendship of the Tartessian king Arganthonios, to whom the mythical chronology of the time assigned a reign of 80 and a life of 120 years. So great was the benefit accruing from this friendship that he offered to furnish lands for all the inhabitants of Phokaia, if they would in a body abandon Ionia. Failing to persuade them on this matter, he yet gave them, we are told, a large sum of money to fortify Phokaia against the aggressions of the Medes:⁶³⁴ but the walls thus raised or repaired were found

⁶³³ The foundation of Massalia (Marseille) by these commercial corsairs is ascribed to the year 600 B.C. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 465.

⁶³⁴ According to Herodotos, i. 165, Arganthonios had died before the foundation of Massalia in Kyrnos (Corsica) by the Phokaians, and Alalia had been founded twenty years before the siege of Phokaia by Harpagos. Either then the Ionians had reason to dread the ambition of the great Eastern despot for many years before the fall of Kroisos,

to be of but little use against the mounds, which the Persians raised to a height and on a slope which enabled the men literally to walk into the city. A natural desire for an easy conquest led Harpagos to express to the Phokaians his readiness to accept a single breach in their walls and the consecration of a single house in the town, as evidence of their submission. In reply the Phokaians demanded one day for deliberation, and the withdrawal of the Persians from the walls for that time. Although he knew, it is said, the meaning of this request, Harpagos did as they wished: and the Phokaians, hastily conveying their women, their children, and all their movable goods to their ships, made sail for Chios and left an empty town for the occupation of the Persians. From the Chians they sought to purchase some islets called Oinoussai lying off the northeastern end of the island: but the Chians refused, probably from the fear that they would be forcibly excluded from the mart which the Phokaians might establish there, and the latter thereupon determined to betake themselves to their Kyrnian or Corsican colony of Alalia. But they would not depart without striking a blow which should make their departure memorable. Sailing back to Phokaia, they slaughtered the Persian garrison left there by Harpagos, and, sinking a lump of iron in the harbour, bound themselves by a solemn vow never to revisit their old haunts until that iron should float to the surface of the water. But although all now set off for Alalia, less than half the Phokaians carried out the plan. The rest returned to Phokaia: and if we are to infer that even after the loss of his garrison Harpagos yet received them as tributaries of Cyrus, we have in this fact further evidence that the burdens

or the money, if given at all, was given for the general purpose of strengthening Phokaia against the enemies whom its piracies might bring on her. But we are scarcely justified in concluding with Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 274, that 'the Ionic Greeks neither actually did conceive, nor had reason to conceive, any alarm respecting Persian power, until the arrival of Cyrus before Sardeis; and within a month from that time Sardeis was in his possession.' Such a conclusion implies far too much trust in the details of a narrative of which the chronology is manifestly artificial, and which clearly states that it was the rapid spread of Persian power which roused the fears of Kroisos and convinced him that he must either conquer Cyrus or be conquered by him.

The fortifying of Phokaia, here mentioned, may be only the repairing of those breaches in the wall which had been ordered by Kroisos on the establishment of his supremacy over Ionia; or rather, if we may trust the narrative at all, it would seem that these breaches had been ordered by Alyattes; for the gift of Arganthonios, it is said, preceded the fall of Sardeis by more than twenty years, and therefore, when it was made, Kroisos, according to the traditional chronology, was not yet king.

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imposed on them by the Lydian king had been light indeed.⁶³⁵

The conquest of Lykia.

If the tradition followed by Herodotos may be trusted, the subjugation of the Ionians must have cost Harpagos some time and trouble. The men of Teos, the place which Thales had, it is said, sought to make the centre of a Pan-Ionian confederacy, followed the example of the Phokaians, and some, going into Thrace, established themselves at Abdera where Timesios had vainly attempted to set up a colony from Klazomenai, while others found a home at Phanagoria on the Kimmerian Bosporos. The Milesians had already made their paction with the Persian general. The remaining cities fought bravely for their freedom, but, failing to combine, were, each in its turn, subdued; ⁶³⁶ and the second conquest of Ionia was accomplished, if the conquest by Kroisos really deserve the name. But whatever the Lydian dominion may have been, the Ionians were now to feel the bitterness of the slavery which compelled them to take part in the enslaving of the kindred, although non-Hellenic, tribes of Karians, Kaunians, and Lykians. The resistance of the Karians, with the exception of the Pedasians, to whom the long beard grown by the priestess of Athênê on occasions of danger gave timely warning,⁶³⁷ seems to have shown but little energy. Of the fate of his birthplace Halikarnassos Hero-

⁶³⁵ The history of these Phokaians at Alalia furnishes a frightful sequel to the story of their fortunes in western Asia. For five years they so spread terror around them by an uninterrupted course of indiscriminate piracy, that the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians combined to put them down. A battle ensued in which the Phokaians lost forty out of their fleet of sixty ships, while the remaining ships were so injured as to be useless. Those who were fortunate enough to escape sailed away to Rhegion: the prisoners were stoned to death in the territory of Agylla, to the northwest of the mouth of the Tiber. Divine judgement, it is said, followed this terrible massacre. Men and beasts were alike crippled and paralysed throughout the land, and the plague was removed only when, in compliance with the counsel of Phoibos received from Delphoi, they built temples and instituted solemn festivals to appease the ghosts of the slaughtered Phokaians.

Missions from Agylla to Delphoi are less unlikely than those which are ascribed to the Romans in the days of Tarquinius or of the Decemvirs: the latter lie altogether beyond the bounds of probability. Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* i. 518; ii. 314. Ihne, *Hist. R.* i. 79

⁶³⁶ Their political disasters, we are told by Herodotos, i. 170, did not interrupt their meetings at the Panionion,—so little did the religious bond avail to create a national feeling. Nor did the plan ascribed to Bias of Priênê win more favour from them than that of Thales. The advice of Bias was that they should abandon Ionia altogether, and re-establish themselves in one city in Sardo (Sardinia) where he assured them that they would have a future of great wealth and power. If his design had been carried out, a check might have been put on the growth of the Roman power, which might have changed the history of western Europe.

⁶³⁷ Herod. i. 175.

dotos says nothing : but he relates that the Spartan colony of Knidos, a city built on the Triopian promontory, made an effort to convert their peninsula into an island, and that the splinters of the stone so hurt the eyes of the workmen that they sent to ask advice at Delphoi and obtained for answer that Zeus would have made the isthmus a channel of water if he had wished to do so.⁶³⁸ The resistance of the Lykians and Kaunians was as desperate as that of the Karians was feeble. As soon as the army of Harpagos took up its position on the plains of the Xanthos, they each brought their wives, children, and slaves into the Akropolis of their towns, and having set the Akropolis on fire, rushed out on the enemy, and fought till not a man of them remained alive.⁶³⁹

But while these isolated communities, whose civilisation was immeasurably beyond that of their conquerors, were being absorbed in the vast mass of Persian dominion, that dominion was being extended far to the east and the south by Cyrus himself, who swept like a whirlwind over all Asia, subduing, as the historian tells us, every nation without passing over one.⁶⁴⁰ Were it not for the epical plan on which the life of Cyrus is framed not less than that of Kroisos, we should infer that from Sardeis to Baktra, from the Caspian sea to the Indian ocean, his career of victory was unbroken ; but it was necessary for the historian's purpose that the fortune of Cyrus should reflect that of Kroisos in its overflowing wealth and success, until the Nemesis which dogs human pride and self-complacency smites him down by a sudden and deadly stroke. Of the details of these conquests, with one exception, we know nothing : and even in this solitary instance the mists which rest on Mesopotamian history generally leave little clear beyond the fact that the sceptre of

Later con-
quests of
Cyrus.

⁶³⁸ It would be rash to ascribe this attempt at excavation to this particular time on the mere strength of an oracular response which wears the look of a proverbial saying, and which may be compared with the warning :

μη̄ κίνοι Καμάριαν, ἀκίνητος γὰρ ἀμείνων.

⁶³⁹ Herodotus speaks of these Xanthians as strangers or immigrants. The eighty original Xanthian families, he says, i. 176, happened at this time to be away from home, and so escaped. This absence of so large a number of families would seem to point to a radical difference of habits caused by differences of race ; but the reasons of the absence are not mentioned.

This resistance of the Xanthians, which seems little in harmony with the Hellenic temper, may be compared with that of the Jews at Massada. Josephos, *Bell. Jud.* vii. 8, 6. Milman, *History of the Jews*, iii. 79.

⁶⁴⁰ Herod. i. 177.

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II.
Babylon
and its
people.

the old Babylonian or Assyrian kings was broken by the despot of Persia.

But as the historical scene changes from Ionia to Babylon, we are driven to note the contrast between the intense individual energy of the autonomous Hellenic communities with their woeful lack of political combination, and the iron system of Asiatic centralisation which could accomplish the most gigantic tasks by dint of sheer manual labour, the multitude as a political machine being everything, the individual man nothing. Between the Assyrians and Babylonians on the one hand and the Hellenic tribes on the other the Phenicians and Carthaginians occupy a middle ground, combining the rigid manipulation of masses with the exercise of those higher independent faculties which won for them both fame and wealth from the coasts of Tyre to the Mediterranean gates. But generally it may be said that in the measure in which it prevailed, the monotony of Eastern despotism became the seed-bed in which an imposing but utterly imperfect civilisation was forced to an early maturity. Long before the Hellenes and the tribes akin to them had emerged from the miserable exclusiveness of the primitive family life, long before the idea of the Polis or State had dawned upon their minds, the sovereigns of Assyria and Egypt could mass and move myriads at their will, could raise huge cities, and rear magnificent temples for a religion which prescribed to each man not merely the routine of his daily life but his social and political duties, and for a creed which left no room whatever for the independent exercise of thought and reason.⁶⁴¹ Thus in everything they achieved all that the collective action of multitudes trained by an unvarying standard could accomplish. In massiveness and strength of work and in gorgeousness of colour their buildings far surpassed the structures of Iktinos or Kallikrates: but they remained as dwellings of the dead in comparison with the beauty, the truthfulness, and the exuberant life, which breathed from the sculptures of the Parthenon, and

⁶⁴¹ Their science, as we have seen, p. 129, not less than their art, resembled the collective work of bees in a hive. The astronomy of Egypt and Assyria is always ascribed to the priests in the one country and to the Chaldeans in the other. No one man attains to eminence or leaves a name.

filled the beholder with awe and delight as he gazed on the Pheidian Zeus on his ivory throne at Olympia. Whether with the Assyrian or the Egyptian it was absolutely impossible that art should ever break the bonds of conventionality, although the standard of that conventionality might be indefinitely raised; and that in many respects it was far beyond that of the average Englishman of the present day, the carvings of Nineveh and Memphis abundantly show. There is a vigour in the human face and form as depicted in Assyrian art, which may be favourably contrasted with that of Egypt; but nowhere in the Asiatic world was truth and truth alone the object aimed at, and the ends sought by Eastern art were attained at the cost of that many-sided life without which true genius can never be called into being. But if Asiatic civilisation regarded as its deadliest enemy the temper which, without a single secondary motive or the desire to maintain an established system, seeks wisdom from the knowledge of things as they are, still in turning to account the physical resources of a country it has not seldom achieved a magnificent success. The plains of Bagdad and Mosul are now a dreary and desolate waste; but these arid sands were thrice in the year covered with a waving sea of corn, in the days when Sennacherib or Nebucadnezzar ruled at Nineveh or Babylon. Crushing and pitiless as may have been their despotism, they yet knew that their own wealth must be measured by the fertility of the soil, and thus they took care that their whole country should be parcelled out by a network of canals, the largest of which might be a high road for ships between the Euphrates and the Tigris. On the soil thus quickened grew the tree which attracted to itself an affectionate veneration: and while the date palm yielded both wine and bread, the grain of corn, of millet, or of sesame was multiplied, as the more cautious said, fifty or an hundred fold, or, as Herodotos believed, in years of exceptional abundance even three hundredfold. Scarcely less dazzling than this picture of cereal wealth produced in a land where rain scarcely ever fell is the description which Herodotos gives of the magnificence of Babylon; and he saw the great city after it had been given up to

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plunder by Dareios and robbed of its costliest treasures by Xerxes. The colouring of his sketch must be heightened, if we would realise the grandeur of that royal town inclosed amidst exquisite gardens within the stupendous walls which rose to a height, it is said, of three hundred feet, each side of the square extending to fifteen English miles, and giving the means of ingress and egress by five-and-twenty brazen gates. Within this wall rose at some distance another, less huge, but still very strong; and within this were drawn out the buildings and streets of the city in rectangular blocks reaching down to the wall which was carried from one end of the town to the other along the banks of the river, broken only by the huge brazen gates which at the end of each street gave access to the water. High above the palaces and houses around it rose the mighty temple of Bel, story above story, to a height, it is said, of six hundred feet, from a base extending over more than 1200 feet on each side, while the stream was spanned by a bridge, the several portions of which were drawn aside at night, but which was used during the day by such as might not care to enter the ferry boats stationed at each landing-place along the river walls. This bridge tradition (and after all that recent excavations have accomplished we are still left in Babylonian story almost wholly to tradition) ascribed to Semiramis, the daughter of the sea-goddess Derketo, whom the doves saved when, like Cyrus or Romulus or Oidipous, she lay exposed in her infancy,⁶⁴² while in the same way the great temple was

⁶⁴² The traditional Semiramis is as much a mythical being as Aphroditè or Athênè. She is the founder of Babylon, and the constructor of a vast number of stupendous works throughout the country. As the Egyptian Sesostris is a conqueror of Assyria, although no Assyrian monument mentions his name, so Semiramis conquers Egypt, although no Egyptian record speaks of her. Lewis, *Astron. Anc.* ch. vii. Mr. Rawlinson, acknowledging that this queen is wholly mythical, regards the tradition as suggested by the name of Sammuramit, the wife of a king whose name according to one interpretation is given as Iva-lush IV.,—'a very prosaic and common-place' person who, because, as a Babylonian princess (a point which is not proved), she gave her husband his title to the regions of the south (which is only an assumption), was first represented as an independent ruler, and then made the groundwork of 'the wonderful tale which was foisted into history by Ktesias,' and which Ktesias thought fit to throw back to the days of Ninus. *Ancient Eastern Monarchies*, ii. 334. The theory may at first sight seem plausible: but the mere recurrence of a name in later history is really no warrant for asserting that the person so named has given occasion to a mythical tale assigned to primitive ages. We might as well say that the myth of Romulus, the son of Mars, was suggested by the name of Romulus Augustulus,—the only difference being that here we could refute the assertion, as the myth is recounted by writers who lived before Augustulus. Still less are we justified in imputing to Ktesias the fabrication of a story which he no more invented than Herodotos invented the legend of the last Lydian king.

believed to contain contemporary astronomical observations extending over a period of nearly 500,000 years.⁶⁴³

But although the beautiful and brilliant atmosphere of Assyria was, like that of Egypt, singularly favourable for the observation of stellar phenomena, and although some of these phenomena were doubtless recorded from a very early time, we must yet be cautious in imputing to these early ages any real knowledge of astronomy. All our information comes from writers removed by not many centuries from the Christian era; and while the priestly caste was in both countries eager to throw back on the remotest periods of their traditional history the scientific attainments of their own day, we must remember that a pure astronomical science was not the object at which they aimed at any time. Throughout, its character was, as we have seen, astrological; nor does the invention of the sun-dial which Herodotos ascribes to the Babylonians indicate any remarkable proficiency. But, in truth, the facts which made 'Chaldean,' 'soothsayer,' 'wizard,' and 'magician' synonymous terms, must speak for them-

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⁶⁴³ The truth is that these alleged Babylonian stellar observations confer not the smallest credibility on the political history of Assyria. The era of Nabonassar was framed, as we have seen (Appendix A), purely for astronomical observations; and among the most important of these is the series sent to Aristotle from Babylon by Kallisthenes. These, Mr. Rawlinson holds, reached back 1903 years before the arrival of Alexander. In reality, they stretched over a space of 31,000 years. Lewis, *Astron. Anc.* 263. Mr. Rawlinson is constrained to make the significant admission that, instead of being a record, these observations may have been 'a mere calculation backwards of the dates at which certain celestial phenomena must have taken place,' *Eastern Monarchies*, i. 202; and it is obvious that nothing is gained by a reference to the statement of Philon Byblios, that Babylon was built 1002 years before Semiramis whom he regards as contemporary with the Trojan war, or by the assertion that, if to the latter event Philon assigned the date given in the Parian chronicle, we should have B.C. 2220 for the building of the city. The Parian chronicle, as we have seen, note 388, registered the accession of Erechtheus, the dragon-bodied king of Athens. Mr. Rawlinson himself insists that Herodotos and all other ancient writers are alike mistaken as to the lifetime and career of Semiramis; and how a computation from a siege which 'is but a repetition of the daily siege of the East by the solar powers,' Max Müller, *Lectures on Language*, Second Series, Lect. VII., and from the lifetime of a woman about whom Philon is affirmed to be in complete error, can help us to determine the date of the founding of a city not in Cloud-land but on the solid earth, it is hard indeed to imagine. Nor is there any use in contending that Berosos and Kritodemos are said by Pliny to have declared that the Babylonians had recorded their observations upon bricks for 480 years before the era of Phoroneus, or that at least the passage may be so understood. Sir Cornewall Lewis feels himself not less justified in saying that Pliny specifies a period of 490,000 years, and in support of this statement alleges the fact that Diodoros makes it 473,000 years, and Cicero 470,000, a difference of not more than 20,000 years, 'which, when we are dealing with such high numbers, must be considered as a trifling discrepancy.' *Astron. Anc.* 264. If again the era of Phoroneus be adduced as a basis for an historical chronology, the inference is that Phoroneus at least is historical: but Phoroneus is a being who, in Mr. Grote's words, 'is said to have imparted to mankind the first notions and habits of social existence and even the first knowledge of fire,' and whose name is identical with that of the Vedic fire-god known as Bhuranyu. See *Mythology of Ar. Nat.* ii. 101 &c.

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selves. The five planets were the Interpreters, as revealing the destiny of each mortal man: the thirty stars were the consulting gods, and the twenty-four stars which lay beyond them, half to the north and half to the south, the one visible and the other invisible, were the judges of the world, of the living and the dead.⁶⁴⁴ We may give the Assyrians full credit for the inventions of the pulley, the lever, and the roller, for a knowledge of the principle of the arch, and for its application to the building of tunnels, aqueducts, and drains: but for a progressive science founded on the patient registration and classification of facts we look in vain.⁶⁴⁵ The truth is that among the Babylonians, as among all the Semitic nations, the historical sense was at no time roused into real activity. Their historical instinct was in no way offended if a king exaggerated a conquest, or glossed over a defeat, or invented victories over imaginary enemies: and the form in which the lists of these kings have been preserved has left room for the growth of endless theories which seek to determine the geographical progress of Assyrian civilisation. According to some of these theories the ancient seat of empire was Babylon, from which Nineveh revolted, maintaining its independence, until at the era of Nabonassar Babylon recovered its ancient dignity and in the days of Nabopolassar wreaked condign vengeance on Nineveh. But of these independent sovereigns of Babylon no list has been recovered from the monuments; and the lists of Berosos and Ptolemy cannot be said to lend much countenance to these suppositions. We search the pages of Herodotos in vain for any definite distinction between Babylonians and Assyrians. With him Semiramis, Nitokris, and Labynetos are Assyrian sovereigns: and his assertion is fully borne out by a comparison of the Astronomical canon with that of Berosos who professes to give a list of the Assyrian, not of the Babylonian, kings. In this list the eighth king before Cyrus is Asordanos, who is clearly the same as the Asaradinos (Assarhaddan) of the Astronomical canon. In Berosos Asordanos is followed by Sammughes and Sardanapalos: in Ptolemy he is

⁶⁴⁴ Lewis, *Astron. Anc.* 293.

⁶⁴⁵ For the alleged connexion of Greek and Eastern science and philosophy, see Book I. ch. vii.

succeeded by Saosduchinos and Kineledanos, the time given to these three kings being 50 years in the former and 55 years in the latter. The remaining five kings, Nabopolassar, Nabucodrossor, Amil-marudoch, Neriglissar, and Nabodenos, of Berosos, correspond precisely in their order and the length of their reigns with the Nabopolassar, Nabocolassar, Illoarudanos, Nericasolassar, and Nabonadios (Laby-netos) of Ptolemy, nine years being assigned in both these lists to Cyrus. The conclusion is forced upon us that the Astronomical canon does not give a list of Babylonian as distinguished from Assyrian kings; ⁶⁴⁶ and we are left to conjecture alone or to mere probabilities, when we attempt to trace the history of the one city apart from that of the other, while traditions, more or less vague or inconsistent, alone remain as records of the first Persian invasion of Babylon.

It might have been thought that this great seat of theocratic despotism could within its network of canals and behind its stupendous walls have bidden defiance to the utmost efforts of Cyrus. For a year the coming of the invader was, we are told, delayed by the grave duty of avenging on the river Gyndes the insult which it had offered to one of the sacred white horses. This stream which joins the Tigris near the ancient Opis and the modern Bagdad dared to drown the beast which had rashly plunged into its waters, and the fiat of the king went forth that the river should be so lowered by the dispersion of its waters through a hundred canals that women should henceforth cross it without wetting their

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capture of
Babylon
588 B.C. (?)

⁶⁴⁶ Lewis, *Astron. Anc.* 429. For the whole period between Nabonassar and Cyrus the monuments seem to furnish next to no evidence: and in writers later than Herodotus we have not only not contemporary witnesses, but in some instances, as in that of Berosos, men who acquired an unenviable reputation for fraud and imposture, and in others men who had neither the will nor the power to sift and test the materials with which they had to deal. The evidence of such writers can avail nothing towards proving that the traditions which they followed were trustworthy contemporary records. The inscriptions thus far recovered serve only to state that Nebucadnezzar beautified the temple of Bel, that he repaired the great wall of Babylon of which Abydenos regarded him as the original builder, Rawlinson, *Anc. East. Mon.* iii. 497, and built temples to Nebo and other gods at Borsippa and elsewhere. Of his son Evil-merodach, the Amil-marudoch of Berosos, they tell us, it would seem, nothing. The name, and apparently only the name, of his successor Neriglissar has been found upon bricks. The luckless child Labrosoarchod who is said to have been beaten to death after a reign of nine months exists only in Berosos, Rawlinson, *ib.* iii. 507. His murderer Nabonadios (Laby-netos) calls himself on his cylinders Rab-mag, an officer, it is said, of importance, but whose functions are a matter of dispute. Of Nitokris the monuments give no information whatever: and with the statement that Bel-shur-azur (Belshazzar) was associated with his father Nabu-nadid in the government, the facts supplied by monumental inscriptions for the history of Babylon come to an end.

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knees. This seeming freak, which we might be tempted to compare with the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes, is ascribed by some to a wise and deliberate design by way of preparing his army for the more momentous task of diverting the Euphrates as the means for surprising Babylon. But we can scarcely suppose that Cyrus could know, a year before, that he would have either the need or the opportunity of putting this plan into action, or that with his unbounded command of labour, insuring the same results at one time as at another, he should find it necessary thus to rehearse the most troublesome scene in the coming drama. He might rather expect that he would have to fight his way inch by inch from one canal to another, and that a series of victories in the open plain might render a siege of the great city superfluous. If we may trust the traditional narratives, his expectations were in every particular disappointed. The road lay open before him without resistance to the very gates of Babylon; and Cyrus resolved to see whether the stream to which his enemies most trusted for their safety might not be made the means of achieving their destruction. But whether we take the narrative of Herodotos or that of Xenophon, we are following a story which is full of difficulties. On one point only are they agreed,—that the city was taken by surprise during a time of festival in which the king and his people dismissed from their minds all thought of the siege and of the precautions needed in the presence of a watchful enemy. This surprise was effected, according to Herodotos, by drawing off the waters of the Euphrates into a large reservoir dug considerably to the north of the city, like the lake ascribed to queen Nitokris. But this lake is said to have been designed only to receive the overflow of the river in seasons of flood; and a basin which might suffice for this purpose would be ludicrously insufficient to take off the whole stream so far as to leave the remainder easily fordable.⁶⁴⁷ In short, the mode by which Herodotos supposes

⁶⁴⁷ If Hillah may be taken as practically marking the site of Babylon, the operations of Cyrus were concerned with a stream which is described as being now 200 yards wide and 15 feet deep, with a current which, although not so rapid as that of the Tigris, is still considerable. Rawlinson, *Anc. East. Mon.* i. 13. These dimensions can scarcely be those of the ancient river, if any faith is to be placed in the descriptions of Diodoros. A stream only 200 yards wide, flowing through a land which scarcely rose above its banks,

the work to have been done may fairly be pronounced impossible: but this objection cannot be urged with the same apparent force against the account, given by Xenophon, that Cyrus drew off the water into two large canals or trenches, which ran round the walls on both sides of the river and discharged it again into its natural bed.⁶⁴⁸ There remain in this case two difficulties, one lying in the vastness of the labour of digging trenches to inclose an area as large as that of the Landgraviat of Hesse Homburg,⁶⁴⁹—trenches, moreover, deeper necessarily than the bed of the stream, in default of a dam or barrier across the river which would at once have betrayed his design to the enemy, and of which not a hint is given by any historian. The other difficulty is more serious. The whole design assumes that the feast would be accompanied by the incredible carelessness of not merely withdrawing all the guards from the river walls but of leaving open all the gates in these walls,—a carelessness, moreover, which made the whole task of canal-digging a superfluous ceremony, for, the gates being open and the guards withdrawn, boats would have furnished means of access for the assailants vastly more easy, rapid, and sure, than the cozy bed of an alluvial stream which would in all likelihood have insured the destruction of the whole army.⁶⁵⁰ In truth, here, as elsewhere, the main fact may rest on adequate evidence: the details must remain unknown. Babylon was surprised by Cyrus,—how, we cannot venture positively to say. If we may believe Herodotos, the idea of lessening or diverting the stream of the Euphrates was already familiar to the Babylonian mind: and if by boats or in any other way the Persians contrived to effect an entrance through the open river-gates, the tale

could not need a bridge 1000 yards in length: and Diodoros, ii. 8, says that this bridge of five stadia was built over the narrowest part of the stream. Herodotos who mentions the bridge, i. 186, does not give its length, and seems to know nothing of the tunnel under the river which Diodoros ascribes to Semiramis.

⁶⁴⁸ It is well to see the extent of work involved in this statement. The amount of water conveyed by the Euphrates at Hillah, according to the dimensions now assigned to the stream at that point, is not much less than that of the Thames at London Bridge. According to Herodotos, the walls of Babylon formed a square of which each side was about fourteen miles in length; and thus, if we follow Xenophon, Cyrus dug two canals, each capable of conveying half the contents of the Euphrates, and each about thirty miles in length, at the least. This, moreover, he did on the mere chance of being able to surprise the town in some unguarded moment on which he had no right to count.

⁶⁴⁹ I take Mr. Rawlinson's illustration, *Anc. East. Mon.* ii. 340.

⁶⁵⁰ See Appendix C.

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Last scenes
in the
drama of
the life of
Cyrus.

might very soon run that Cyrus had outdone the exploit of Nitokris and made the river-bed a high road for his troops.

So fell the ancient and mighty city. It was treated, it would seem, much like the cities of Ionia and Lydia. The walls, it is said, were breached,⁶⁵¹ and a tribute was imposed; but it underwent neither the cruelties nor the spoliation which followed the visits of Darius or Xerxes, and the population remained probably undiminished. From Babylon the thirst of conquest led Cyrus, according to Herodotos, against the Massagetai, a nomadic tribe whom he places on the further bank of the Araxes; ⁶⁵² and here he received the first and last check in his career of unbroken success.⁶⁵³ As an historical record, the narrative is worthless: but in its theological aspect it throws so much light on the plan of Herodotos that it would be unfair to give otherwise than he has given it the story of Cyrus and Tomyris.

The story
of Tomyris
and Spar-
gapises.

Receiving from the Persian king an offer of marriage, the barbarian queen, we are told, knew that he sought to wed rather her kingdom than herself and forbade him to approach her. Seeing that craft availed not, Cyrus marched openly to the Araxes and began to put together bridges of boats by which his army might cross over: but as he was thus busied, Tomyris sent a herald, bidding him cease from his toil, as he could not know its end. 'Rule over thine own people,' she said, 'and leave me to rule over mine: but if thou wilt not do thus, let us make a covenant together. Either we will go three days' journey from the river, so that thou mayest cross over into my land; or do thou depart in like manner from

⁶⁵¹ Mr. Rawlinson, *East. Mon.* iii. 519, affirms the fact: Mr. Grote denies it.

⁶⁵² Herodotos here, i. 200, seems to confound the Araxes, which flows into the Caspian from the west, with the Oxos and probably also with the Jaxartes which flow into the same sea from the distant east or northeast. It is useless to make any attempt to ascertain the geography of campaigns of which we have no historical knowledge whatever; but it is worth while to note that the confusion of one river with another was a common error both with historians and with military leaders. Thus the soldiers of Alexander mistook the Jaxartes for the Tanais or Don; and the history of African exploration furnishes instances of more modern mistakes with regard to the courses of the Joliba (Niger) and the Nile. Niebuhr, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 113.

The phonetic resemblance between the names of the Massagetai and the Mæso-Goths may or may not be the result of accident.

⁶⁵³ The plan of Herodotos rendered this arrangement indispensable. That the Persian or other traditions represented his course as less prosperous is clear from the statement of Arrian, vi. 24, that Cyrus lost his whole army in the attempt to invade India through Gedrosia. But when he says that as Cyrus escaped with only seven survivors, so Semiramis apparently from a similar expedition returned with only twenty, we see the nature of the materials with which we are dealing.

the river, and let us pass into thy country.’⁶⁵⁴ Then Cyrus called together the first men of the Persians who all besought him to let Tomyris pass over into their land: but Kroisos liked not their counsel. ‘O king,’ he said, ‘I promised at the first, when Zeus gave me into thy hands, to do all that I could in thy service. My sorrows have been my teachers; but there will be no use in my words if thou thinkest thyself immortal and that thou art leading an army of men who will never die. If thou knowest that thou art a man ruling over men, then learn this, that there is a cycle in human fortunes which, as it turns round in its course, suffers not the same man to be always prosperous. Now if we receive the enemy into our land, there is this danger that, if defeated, thou wilt ruin all thy kingdom, for the Massagetai will not care to return to their own country; and if thou gainest the victory, it will avail thee more to gain it where thou mayest follow them as they flee: and besides this, it is not to be borne that Cyrus, the son of Kambyses, should yield ground at the bidding of a woman. Cross the river then, and leave in the camp the weakest men in the army with plenty of food and wine; and the Massagetai who have but rough and poor fare will turn greedily to the feast made ready for them and leave thee to win glory elsewhere.’ Following this counsel, Cyrus, having intrusted Kroisos to the care of his son Kambyses whom he sent home, crossed the stream: and at night he saw in his visions Dareios, the eldest son of Hystaspes (Gushtasp), with wings springing from his shoulders, the one overshadowing Asia, the other Europe. This dream he took as a sure sign that Dareios was plotting against him; and Hystaspes was sent back with strict orders to guard his son until the king’s return. But Cyrus was never more to see his home again. He had gone a day’s journey from the Araxes, and there he left the sick and the useless portion of the army, with a profusion of luxuries to tempt the barbarians. The Massagetai fell into the trap and became an easy prey to the Persians. Many were slain, and Spargapises, the son of Tomyris, was among the prisoners. On hearing of

⁶⁵⁴ A similar proposal is said to have been made by the English to the Scottish army in 1327. Longman, *Life and Times of Edward III.* i. 14.

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this disaster, Tomyris sent a herald and said, 'O Cyrus, who canst not quench thy thirst for blood, be not proud and lifted up because thou hast taken my son, not in open fight, but by the fruit of the vine with which ye so fill and madden yourselves that, as the wine goes down into the body, vile words rush up to your lips. And now hearken to me. Give me back my son, and depart scatheless from my land, for, if thou wilt not do this, I swear by the Sun who is the lord of the Massagetai, that I will make even thee drink thy fill of blood.' But Cyrus heeded not her words; and in the battle which followed, the Persians were beaten after a hard conflict, and Cyrus himself was killed. Then Tomyris filled a skin with human blood, and when she had found the body of Cyrus among the dead, she thrust his head into the skin; and thus the words which she had spoken to him were fulfilled,⁶⁵⁵ and another illustration was added to the doctrine of the divine jealousy.

Designs of
Kambyses
upon
Egypt.

But the impulse which the career of Cyrus had given to the Persian tribes was as strong as ever. For them freedom, as they called it, meant immunity from taxation in time of peace and unbounded plunder and license in time of war. The motive thus supplied would account for the invasion of Egypt as readily as for the campaigns in Lydia and Babylonia. The provocations which are said to have brought the wrath of Kambyses on the Egyptians are not worthy of notice except as showing that we are dealing with a narrative of which the details are not historical, whatever may be said of its outlines. One version of the tale went that Cyrus demanded in marriage the daughter of Amasis king of Egypt who, fearing that Cyrus would not give her the dignity of a wife, sent Nitetis the daughter of Apries whom he had dethroned, and that when Nitetis disclosed the truth Cyrus determined to punish Amasis.⁶⁵⁶ Herodotos, who rejects this

⁶⁵⁵ If there be any truth in this story, it is not likely that Tomyris would yield up the body to the Persians; and therefore the tomb of Cyrus at Pasargadai would be only an empty monument. Xenophon makes Cyrus die peacefully in his bed. Ktesias sends him among the Derbikes, where he wins a complete victory but receives a wound from which he dies on the third day after the battle. 'This conflict of testimony,' Mr. Rawlinson remarks, 'clouds with uncertainty the entire closing scene of the life of Cyrus.' *East. Mon.* iv. 378. His opinion that Cyrus, giving up his designs against Egypt, met his death in a war against one of the nations on his northeastern frontier may be right: but we have no direct evidence in its favour.

⁶⁵⁶ This story was told by Polyainos, viii. 29. Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 316,

story on the ground that Kambyses, if he had been the son of Nitetis, would not have been allowed to succeed his father, and that the mother of Kambyses was not Nitetis but Kassandane, believes that Cyrus sent to Egypt not for a wife but for a physician to cure him of ophthalmia, and that this physician, growing homesick and still owing a grudge to Amasis, advised Kambyses to demand the daughter of the Egyptian king, and that the invasion of Egypt was the consequence of the trick put upon Kambyses by Amasis.⁶⁵⁷ We need only note here that this story is repeated in that of the physician Demokedes, who does his best to turn the arms of Darcios against Hellas because he wishes to escape from captivity. Another and a more constraining cause has, indeed, been assigned for this invasion, which is more in harmony with the ancient majesty of the lords of the Nile. Egyptian tradition delighted to tell of an invincible king who led his army of 700,000 men from the walls of Thebes and during nine years unclouded by a single disaster made himself master of an empire which extended from the cataracts of Syene to Bokhara and from the Indus to the Egean sea. It also loved to tell of the merciless fury of his warfare which, on the theory that war should be self-supporting, swept man and beast from his path and made the iron eat into the souls of the conquered. In this way, it was said, his armies swept over Libya and Ethiopia, Media and Persia, Scythia and Baktria. Such was the story to which on his visit to Thebes Germanicus listened as one of the priests read to him the hieroglyphical records which named the conquered tribes and the amount of tribute assessed on each. Unquestionably, the memory of these tremendous massacres might well set the hearts of nations on fire for many a generation, and awaken in Cyrus or any other king an insatiable craving for revenge. But it is a grave thing to assign causes of which the historians who (whatever be their merit) have treated the subject, have apparently no knowledge. No such motive is known to Herodotos or Ktesias,

⁶⁵⁷ Herod. iii. 1, 2. The historian notices another tale which related that Cyrus lavished his affection on Nitetis, and that Kassandane gave utterance to her vexation in the ears of her child Kambyses who, starting up, declared that when he should be full grown, he would turn Egypt upside down. The Persian scraglio never lacked scandal.

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to Manetho or Diodoros: and here, as elsewhere, the testimony of the conquered race is wanting. Not only does Persian tradition tell us nothing of this great Egyptian inroad: but the traditions of Egypt are silent on the conquests of Semiramis which Assyrian legend extended over the valley of the Nile. Each country in turn has its conquerors of whom the vanquished nations know nothing: and the evidence which, if any such ever existed, might have gone to prove the fact of their conquests has unfortunately disappeared. Herodotos was told, and, seemingly he believed, that the great Egyptian marauder marked his successive victories by the erection of pillars indicating by the emblems carved upon them the measure of the resistance which in each case he encountered.⁶⁵⁸ Of these memorials he says that he himself saw one in Palestine, adding that two rocks in Ionia exhibited carvings executed by his orders: but he admits that for the most part they had perished utterly.⁶⁵⁹ At best, the occurrence of these inscriptions in Egypt, if their genuineness be ascertained, can but prove that the inscriber advanced this claim of conquest for himself,—a claim certainly brought into some suspicion by the fact that, when the Persians deem the time come for the conquest of Egypt, the invasion is justified on the plea of some paltry insult recently received and not by the desire of a whole nation to wipe out in blood an ancient wrong.⁶⁶⁰ But who was this

⁶⁵⁸ These emblems sufficiently show to what class of monuments these pillars belonged. They are ascribed indifferently to Herakles and Dionysos as well as to Osiris and Sesostris. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 114.

⁶⁵⁹ In his work on Egypt Mr. Zincke takes for granted the fact that these pillars were erected in all the countries which the conqueror is said to have overrun. 'One of these inscriptions,' he says, 'remains to this day on the living rock to the northeast of Damascus, near the mouth of the river the Greeks called the Lycus and which is now known by the name of El-Kelb. Upon it are still legible the names of Rameses and of the gods Ra (the sun) and Ammon, whom especially he served as the gods of his great capital Thebes.' *Egypt of the Pharaohs and of the Kedié*, 153. But the existence of this inscription (whatever be its contents) in a country which is by comparison close to Egypt proves nothing for the existence of similar inscriptions in countries to the east of the terrible deserts which form the vast plateau between Persia Proper and Baktria. The further questions whether the monuments which Herodotos saw and which his informant ascribed to Sesostris were Egyptian at all, Mr. Zincke does not notice. The one which Herodotos saw near Smyrna is declared by M. Lenormant, who has personally examined it, to be decidedly not a work of Egyptian art. *Manuel d'Histoire Ancienne*, i. 266, note.

⁶⁶⁰ That the Persian kings readily seized on arguments furnished by ancient mythical history is, if the story may be trusted, sufficiently shown by the assertion of Xerxes that his invasion of Hellas was simply by way of requital for the invasion of Persian territory by Menelaos and Agamemnon. For this crime the shrine of Proteusilaos, the first man who set his foot on the soil of the great king, was deliberately profaned. Herod. ix. 116.

Unfortunately, the undoubted antiquity of Egyptian civilisation and the grandeur of

mighty conqueror, and when were his great deeds done? The inscription which is supposed to attest an Egyptian victory on the banks of the Lykos bears the name of Rameses; and it was this name which Germanicus heard from the priest who read to him the monumental record at Thebes. But the conquest of Persia and Media was assigned by Herodotos and by Manetho to Sesostris, and by Diodoros to Sesoösis: and it is impossible to insist too strongly on the fact that both Diodoros and Herodotos rest their narrative on the authority of the Egyptian priests, while Manetho, it is said, had a high position among the priestly caste. But in Herodotos Sesostris comes next after Moiris in the eleventh century B.C.: in Manetho he reigns nearly 2400 years earlier, as the third king of the twelfth dynasty: in Diodoros he is separated from Moiris by seven generations and appears under the name Sesoösis; but the notices appended agree precisely with those of Herodotos. It is obvious that here we not only have no fixed chronology, but that if two, three, or more kings, belonging to the same or to different dynasties, achieved the conquests of Assyria, Media, and Persia, the fact implies a series of rebellions in those countries which made their princes independent of Egypt, and renders the silence of Assyrian and Persian traditions on the subject of Egyptian conquest more and more astonishing. If the one conquest of Rameses II. be regarded as a sufficient explanation of the fury of the Persians who accompanied Kambyses,

Egyptian monuments leave on many minds (as we might well expect that they should) an impression so profound as to upset the balance of their judgement on the value of these monuments or of the inscriptions displayed by them, even if the genuineness of both is to be granted. Speaking of the merciless campaigns of the conqueror of Baktria, Mr. Zincke says that they were too dreadful, even for those times, ever to be forgotten. His work, he adds, 'was remembered some centuries after, when the tables were turned and Egypt was invaded by Kambyses. In the Persian army were contingents from many people who had treasured up the memory of what Rameses the Great had on this expedition done to their forefathers, and of what several of the successors of Rameses had done to many of the peoples of Asia. The day of reckoning came, and the reckoning was fearfully exacted. We see the marks remaining on the temples to this day of the retributive fury of the Persians against the gods of Egypt.' *Egypt of the Pharaohs*, &c. 154. This connexion of the two events (if the former ever took place) may throw life into a history of which we really know extremely little: but there is absolutely no evidence that the fury of the Persians (whatever it may have been) was designed to compensate the misdeeds of the Egyptians when they overran Persia. There is no evidence that the Asiatic nations generally treasured up the remembrance of this old wrong. The conquest of Egypt by Kambyses took place only a few years before the expulsion of the Peisistratidai,—in other words, during the lifetime of the generation preceding that of Herodotos. It would be strange indeed that he should never have heard that the Persians professed to act on a motive of such paramount force, and quite impossible that he should have failed to mention it, if he had heard of it.

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II.The valley
of the Nile.

what must the effect have been of a series of inroads as merciless as those ascribed to the son of Sethos?⁶⁶¹

But the true interest and significance of Egyptian history may happily be disconnected from the fortunes of its individual kings. Whatever be the sequence of its dynasties, one fact remains unshrouded by the mists which float about its traditional chronicles. Long before the first feeble notions of a polity were awakened in the nations of Europe, long even before Mesopotamian civilisation showed its cumbrous and ungainly proportions, the inhabitants of the Nile valley presented, in their wealth, their organisation, their science and their art, a marvellous sight which in after ages excited the astonishment of Herodotos more than all the vastness of Babylon. This wonderful exuberance of life, at a time when every other land was sunk in barbarism, was the result of the fertility of the Nile valley; and the Nile valley was the creation of the great river which first scooped out its channel and then yearly filled it up with mud.⁶⁶² The low limestone hills, which serve as a boundary to the narrow belt of luxuriant vegetation on either side of the stream, mark probably the course of the river which has been thrust hither and thither in its path according to the strength of the material with which it came into conflict. Where this material was soft, its channel is wide: where it presented a less yielding front, the stream narrows, until in the granite districts of Assouan it forces its way through the rock by plunging down a cataract. In all likelihood these falls which the traveller now faces only in the upper part of its course have receded gradually northwards from Cairo; and thus the Nile has only been beforehand in the process which is now slowly but surely eating away the ledge of rock which forms the barrier of Niagara. These cliffs, it is true, are now far above the level of the stream: but the markings which Egyptian kings have left at Semneh in Nubia show that at a time long preceding the visit of Herodotos to Egypt the river rose to a

⁶⁶¹ See Appendix D.

⁶⁶² This fact was perceived by Herodotos, ii. 11, with the clearness of a mind free from prejudice. Had he been shackled by the popular chronology which dates the creation from a period removed by scarcely sixty centuries from our own age, he could never have grasped the idea of processes which he clearly sees must have occupied many thousands or even myriads of years.

height exceeding by four-and-twenty feet that which it ever reaches now: and the deserted bed of a still earlier age proves that the inundation rose at least seven-and-twenty feet above its highest mark at the present day. Hence it may probably be said with literal truth that Egypt is the creation of the Nile. Throughout its long journey of more than a thousand miles after entering the region of the cataracts, this mysterious stream, receiving not a single affluent, lavishes its wealth on the right hand and on the left, not only affording to the people of each spot an easy and sure maintenance which called for the use of neither spade nor plough nor any nourishment beyond that of its life-giving waters, but furnishing the materials for an active commerce by the difference of its products in the northern and southern portions of its course and by the long prevalence of northerly winds which enable vessels to overcome the force of the descending current. All this it did, and it did even more. The ease and rapidity with which the crops were sown and the harvest gathered insured to the people an amount of leisure which to the barbarians of Europe toiling for bare subsistence was an unknown luxury. It was no wonder, therefore, that the inhabitants of the Nile valley should have grown into a compact and well-ordered state even while the beautiful banks of the Hermos and the Maiandros were still a solitude or peopled only by rude and isolated tribes. But more than this, the river which gave them wealth guarded them against their enemies. The belt of verdure which marks its course stretches to no greater width than two miles and a half on either side; and this happy region is shut in by arid deserts in which an abundance of nitre would render all rain-water, if any fell there, unfit for drinking.

But if the river insured the rapid development of the people who might dwell on its banks, it also determined the character of their civilisation. Allowance being made for some variation of climate in its long course, the physical conditions of their existence were throughout much the same. Everywhere there was the river with its nourishing stream, and the strip of verdure which was literally its child. Everywhere were the low hills girding in this garden and

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of the Nile
valley.

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marking off the boundless burning desert: and over all by day and by night hung the blue unclouded sky, across which the sun journeyed in his solitary chariot, to be followed by his bride the moon with the stars her innumerable sisters or children. When to this we add that from one end of the land to the other there was no stronghold where a discontented or rebellious chief might defy the king or the people and no spot which gave access to an invader across the fiery barrier to the east or the west, we have a series of conditions which we feel sure must produce a great people, but which will keep all on a dead level of submission to the one governing power. Whatever this power might be, it would be able to sweep the Nile with its ships, and by shutting off the water from the canals to reduce to starvation at any moment the inhabitants of a disaffected city or village. Thus from first to last we have a nation which could never make way against its rulers,⁶⁶³ and whose skill and labour these rulers might apply to any work however oppressive and unprofitable: nor can it for a moment be doubted that, however great may have been the blessings which the Nile brought with it from its mountain sources, these works involved an amount of hardship and tyranny which must at best have made life seem hard and the problem of life a strange riddle, if nothing lay beyond it. But this people, so shut off from all other nations, and thus rising into an astonishingly early greatness, exhibited few, if any, points of resemblance to the tribes of the vast continent in which their river ran. In colour less dark than the Arab, in features little resembling any Semitic tribe and displaying often a strange resemblance to the Greek, in habit utterly opposed to the roving Bedouin, the Egyptians embellished their life with arts which no negro tribe has ever known. They were spinners and weavers, potters and workers in metals, painters and sculptors. Their social order harmonised in its system of caste⁶⁶⁴ with that of India

⁶⁶³ In the time of Herodotos Memphis was the first city in Egypt: but in earlier ages the pre-eminence belonged apparently to Thebes. It is, however, unnecessary to plunge into the tangled thickets of Egyptian dynastic succession, or to make any attempt to determine the course which Egyptian civilisation followed either up or down the sacred Nile stream.

⁶⁶⁴ The enumeration of the castes given by Herodotos, ii. 164 *et seq.*, does not agree with that of Diodoros, i. 74. Herodotos, ii. 154, speaks of the Hermeneis or Interpreters, these being Egyptians who had been placed with the Karians and Ionians settled in the

and, it may very safely be added, with that of the Hellenic and the Latin tribes, for the struggles of the Athenian demos against the Eupatridai and of the Roman Plebs against the patrician houses is, after all, nothing more than the determined resistance of the dependent castes to a system which they had at length found to be intolerable. These castes were united in a firm and centralised polity in which the king ruled conjointly with, if not in submission to, the priestly order which surrounded his life and that of the people with a multitude of ceremonial rules invested with an appalling power by the terrors of an unseen world. But while this people claimed no affinity with the tribes of Arabia and Libya, with Phenicians or Syrians, the Greeks found so little difference between their own religion and that of Egypt, that they regarded it practically as only another form of their own, and the Egyptian priests had no difficulty in persuading Herodotos that Neith in name and in features was his own Athênê, and Amoun his own Zeus. If then we take these points of difference and of likeness, and add to them the fact that no clear connexion has been traced between the old Egyptian language and any Semitic tongue, the evidence of their Semitic origin seems to shrivel into the scantiest proportions: and the identity of Egyptians with any African tribe few probably will care to maintain. But if of these two hypotheses neither be tenable, then it falls at least within the compass of possibility that the Greek may not have been altogether mistaken in tracing an affinity between Hellenic and Egyptian belief, and that the people of the Nile valley may have sprung from the same stock with the Greek and the Latin, the Celt and the German. The change in their language furnishes no decisive evidence either way. The Northmen of Rollo shaped their speech to the Romance language which they found on the banks of the Seine: tribes of almost unmixed Indian blood abandoned in South America their own tongue for the dialect of Cortes

Camps near Boubastis on the Pelousiac mouth of the Nile; but he does not say explicitly that these became an hereditary caste. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 426, thinks that they did: Niebuhr, *Lect. on Anc. Hist.* i. 45, speaks of them as an unhappy people who belonged to no caste and were a kind of Mulattoes; but according to Herodotos they were genuine Egyptians, *παίδας παρέβαλε αὐτοῖσι Αἰγυπτίους τὴν Ἑλλάδα γλώσσαν ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι.*

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and Pizarro. Nor is there anything surprising in the fact that Egyptian tradition takes no note of their Aryan origin, and has in fact no recollection of the land from which the Egyptian nation had come. This would but show that the migration had taken place at a time so early that the popular mind, with oral tradition alone to trust to, could not possibly retain the remembrance of its origin. The loss was small, even if it was not a positive gain, as compared with the confusing and worthless genealogies which profess to account for the descent of some more modern tribes or nations. If this conclusion be true in fact, the enigma of Egyptian civilisation loses much of its mysterious character. It then becomes only another form of the polity which grew up into greater, though less abiding, brilliance on the banks of the Kephisos,—modified indeed, as we should expect it to be, by the peculiar physical and geographical conditions of the land. These conditions brought into more prominent relief the convictions exhibited by the Aryan mind in every age and country. The manifest imperfection of man in the present life, the palpable injustice which it is impossible for any system of human law at all times to avoid, the consciousness of powers which here have but small and fitful scope, the impulses of affection which here seem to be called into being only to be chilled and crushed, the tyranny of a ruling order which demanded the toil and slavery of the many for the idle luxury of the few,—all these were things which could not fail to impress themselves with singular force upon the Egyptian mind, and in this impression to furnish a basis on which a vigorous priestly order might found an ascendancy at once over the people and over their rulers. It is impossible to look at the art and the literature of ancient Egypt as it has come down to us without seeing that, whatever might be the outward splendour of the land, the power and luxury of the nobles, or the general comfort of the people, the mind of the Egyptian turned naturally and dwelt most constantly on the land which lies beyond the grave. Sins and offences which lay beyond the reach of human law were not therefore beyond the reach of punishment. The tribunal of Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aiakos was seen in that august assembly

before which every Egyptian from the Pharaoh to the meanest slave must appear for the great scrutiny.⁶⁶⁵ This belief exhibited itself in the magnificent temples, the elaborate ritual, the absorbing care bestowed on sepulture, which mark the Egyptians pre-eminently among all other ancient nations: but it was one which they shared with the Teuton as well as with the Hindu. With the Egyptian it shaped itself into a conviction of the permanence of all life; and the mummy of the cat or the dog was as scrupulously guarded as his own. The points of affinity with the Aryan nations can scarcely be said to end here. Their priests may, to whatever extent, have availed themselves of the popular temper to secure their own predominance: there is no evidence that they did not believe the doctrines which they maintained,—in other words, that they were impostors and charlatans. They may have exaggerated the achievements of their kings and multiplied their numbers: but the Egyptian people remained possessed of a scientific knowledge which may certainly be called their own and which they owed as little to Babylon as the Greek owed his to Egypt.⁶⁶⁶ Lastly, if Herodotos be right in saying that the Egyptians were monogamous, this characteristic, in a portion of the world where polygamy seems always to have been the order of society, tells more for their Aryan origin than their adoption of polygamy would tell against it.⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁵ It was the object of the well-known Book of the Dead to supply the guidance which the soul would need in its passage from the prison-house of the body to the prison-house of Osiris. It gave full warning of all the perils which must be encountered in the journey through the ghostly land, and of the mode by which they were to be overcome or avoided. The whole was as dramatic as Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, the spirit of the two books being indeed identical. A man's sins became concrete in demoniacal forms which sought to shut him out from the company of the blessed: and on his answers to questions referring to the forty-two commandments, which were supposed to comprise the whole duties of morality and which certainly upheld no contemptible standard of right and wrong, depended their acceptance or rejection. The latter was followed by a weary exile to be endured in the guise of animal forms lower than that of man.

⁶⁶⁶ Mr. Zincke states the case broadly when he says that science is a natural growth among the Aryan nations, but has appeared only occasionally, and then evidently as an exotic, among those of Semitic descent. However this may be (and Persian science has been but small indeed), he is fully justified in adding that 'the mechanics, the hydraulics, the geometry, the astronomy of the old Egyptians, were all their own.' *Egypt of the Pharaohs*, §c. 35. See, further, his remarks on the alleged discovery of writing by the Egyptians.

⁶⁶⁷ Herodotos, ii. 92, certainly speaks of the whole nation as monogamous. Diodoros, i. 80, limits the obligation of monogamy to the priests.

I gladly express my gratitude to Mr. Zincke, to whose pages on the *Egypt of the Pharaohs and of the Kêdivé* I am largely indebted in this account of the Nile valley and its inhabitants: but I cannot suppress my misgiving that he is sometimes unconsciously tempted to square facts to theory. Thus the distinction between the Jews or other Semitic nations and the Egyptians or other Aryans (if the two are to be connected) is said to lie mainly in the belief of the former that human law must have a literal

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Egyptian
kings from
Psammeti-
chos to
Amasis.

To the Greeks this country with its ancient and mysterious civilisation remained, it is said, altogether unknown down to a time preceding the battle of Marathon by about 180 years. At that time, so the story runs, Egypt was divided among twelve kings,⁶⁶⁸ who had been warned that the man who should offer a libation out of a brazen vessel in the temple of the god answering to the Hellenic Hephaistos would become lord of the whole land. This prophecy was fulfilled when the priest brought eleven golden vessels only for the use of the kings at the sacrifice, and Psammetichos, one of the twelve, made his brazen helmet serve the purpose of the ewer. The eleven in panic terror drove him away: and the banished prince, lurking in great wretchedness in the marshes, learnt from the oracle at Bouto that aid would come to him from brazen men. Such men, the tidings soon came, were ravaging the coasts of the Delta. They were Ionian and Karian marauders whose help by dint of large promises he succeeded in securing, and through whom he became master of all Egypt. These mercenaries Psammetichos placed as a kind of standing army in places called the Camps near Boubastis, while it is also said that in his reign a fleet of Milesians took possession of a harbour on the eastern shore of the Kanopic branch of the Nile and there built the city of Naukratis, which became a depôt of trade between Egypt and Europe. Certain it is that from this time the accounts of Herodotos and Manetho are in fair agreement, whereas even for the times immediately preceding the 'Dodekarchy' it is

Divine sanction,—in other words, that Divine justice must be completely wrought out in the present life,—contrasted with the Aryan conviction that human law can but aim at enforcing a certain standard of morality, while it tacitly points to the higher law of which it is but a feeble and utterly inadequate reflexion. It is obvious that the latter belief absolutely demands the continuous existence of man after death as its complement: to the former immortality becomes an unnecessary and superfluous adjunct. Mr. Zincke regards it as the mission of Moses to turn the thoughts of his mixed Jewish people from the former channel to the latter, as the connexion with Egypt must be finally sundered at all cost, and as it could never be sundered so long as the doctrine of immortality was retained; and he seems further to regard Moses as absolutely successful in impressing on them that God was their present lawgiver and judge. It seems rather to have been the constant complaint of their prophets that they could never be brought to see or believe this; but I fully agree with Mr. Zincke in holding that the belief in immortality is a strictly Aryan conviction, and that 'belief in God, in moral distinctions, in personal responsibility, in the supremacy of intelligence,—that is to say, that it is intelligence which orders and co-ordinates God, the universe, and man,—would all be powerless and unmeaning, were it not for this belief in a future life.' I cannot do better than call the reader's attention to the striking chapters which Mr. Zincke devotes to this most momentous of all subjects.

⁶⁶⁸ These twelve kings, in the belief of Herodotos, ii. 147–152, built the Labyrinth, which he regards as a work greater even than the Pyramids.

impossible to reconcile them : but the details of this subsequent history are less trustworthy than Herodotos doubtless took them to be. The introduction of the Greek mercenaries may well have awakened jealousy and discontent in a military caste who were forbidden to practise any trade and who seem to have been slighted by the king and kept too long in garrison at Elephantine : but the story that the whole caste consisting of 240,000 men revolted and went over to the Ethiopian king who allowed them to settle in his country, is sufficiently contradicted by the sequel. Psammetichos is said both by Herodotos and Manetho to have reigned 54 years, 29 of which he spent in the siege of Azotos or Ashdod. His presence there was of material use to his kingdom, if the story be true that he arrested the march of the Scythian hordes who were on their way to Egypt,⁶⁶⁹ and by dint of large gifts induced them to turn back on the road by which they had come. His son Nekos, to whom is assigned a reign of 16 years, has to contend with more formidable enemies for the possession of Judæa and Phenicia. The Median king Kyaxares had, it is said, destroyed the city of Nineveh, and the Babylonian sovereign claimed the submission of all the lands lying to the north of the desert of Sinai. But before Nekos measured his strength with that of Nebucadnezzar, he is said to have attempted two works, the success of which might well have rendered his reign memorable. The one was a canal to join the Red Sea with the Mediterranean, which he abandoned in compliance with an oracular warning only when 120,000 men had perished in its construction :⁶⁷⁰ the other was the circumnavigation of Africa,—an exploit which, like the legends of Atlantis and St. Brandan, cannot fail to excite the imagination, but for which it seems exceedingly rash to claim any historical character.⁶⁷¹ His campaign

672-618
B.C. (?)

⁶⁶⁹ Herod. i. 105. See p. 284 *et seq.*

⁶⁷⁰ A like attempt is ascribed by Aristotle, *Meteor.* i. 14, 27, to Sesostris and to Darius. Strabo mentions that the Ptolemies by carrying out the undertaking proved that the fears entertained on the score of a difference of level between the two seas were groundless. Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 497.

⁶⁷¹ The whole question has been most minutely and carefully examined by Sir Cornwall Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* ch. viii. His conclusion is that the reign of Nekos, (Necho) being anterior to the legislation of Solon, belongs to a period as to which our knowledge even of Greek history is faint and imperfect ; that we are not intitled to suppose that the tradition of such an event in Egyptian history could have reached Herodotos in an accurate shape ; and that this circumnavigation is too imperfectly

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in Palestine was in the outset more successful. Josiah, the Jewish king, fell at Magdolon (Megiddo), and Jerusalem⁶⁷² became the prize of the conqueror. As a memorial of his victory, he sent to the temple of Apollon at Branchidai (probably because his mercenaries consisted chiefly of Milesians) the garment which he wore during the siege. Of his subsequent defeat by Nebucadnezzar at Kirkesion (Carchemish) Herodotos takes no notice. To his son Psammis he assigns an uneventful reign of six years, while to his son Apries, the Hophrah of the Jewish Books of Kings, he ascribes a reign of great prosperity extending over four-and-twenty years. If we may trust the history, it is remarkable rather for its disasters. On the prayer of some Libyan tribes, who complained of being ill-treated by the Greek settlers of Barkê and Kyrênê, he undertook an expedition against the latter at the head of his native troops and was utterly defeated.⁶⁷³ This defeat, it is said, roused the wrath of the Egyptian military caste, whom a previous tradition had, as we have seen, carried away as deserters into Ethiopia, and who now, professing to believe that Apries had purposely led them into danger in order that by the diminution of their numbers he might firmly establish his own power, broke into open revolt and placed an officer named Amasis at their head. To the astonishment of Apries Patarbemis, whom he had sent to summon the rebel leader into his presence, returned without having discharged his errand, that he might the sooner put his master on his guard. Apries expressed his gratitude by ordering his nose and ears to be cut off: and this iniquitous deed roused such fury against him that he was deserted by almost all who had thus far remained with him. He could depend now only on his Ionian and Karian mercenaries, 30,000 in number; and these seem to have fought stoutly on his side. But they were ranged against forces vastly more numerous, and Apries was defeated and taken prisoner. By Amasis, who now became king, he was treated leniently, until the Egyptians demanded

attested and too improbable in itself to be regarded as an historical fact. *Astr. Anc.*

515.

⁶⁷² Herodotos, ii. 159, calls it Kadytis, i.e. El Khoddes, the name by which it is still known.

⁶⁷³ See p. 170.

570 B.C. (?)

his surrender. Apries accordingly, being given up to them, was strangled, and his body was buried in the sepulchres of his forefathers.⁶⁷⁴ The four-and-forty years of the reign of Amasis were for Egypt a breathing-time of comparative tranquillity before the storms of Persian invasion and conquest. For the Hellenic settlers in the Delta it was a period of singular prosperity. The number of mercenaries in the service of the king was greatly increased; and the four Ionian cities of Chios, Teos, Phokaia, and Klazomenai, with the four Dorian towns of Rhodes, Knidos, Phaselis, and the birthplace of Herodotos, as well as the one Aiolian city of Mytilene, were allowed to found a joint sanctuary named the Hellenion and to elect the guardians of the trade which passed through Naukratis. This settlement now received the privileges of a stringent monopoly. Foreign merchants, arriving at any other mouth of the Nile, were compelled to swear that they had been driven thither by stress of weather and to depart at once for the Kanobitic mouth, or in default of this their goods were sent to Naukratis by one of the inland canals.⁶⁷⁵ The leanings of Amasis towards the Greeks are still further shown by his alleged marriage with the Hellenic Ladike and by his alliance with Polykrates: but of the former Herodotos is unable to say whether she was the daughter of the Kyrenian Battos, or of Arkeisilaos, or of Kritoboulos; ⁶⁷⁶ and the story of the latter, as it is given by him, is only another illustration of that Divine jealousy, which dashes the cup of happiness from the lips of Kroisos and of Cyrus.

This ancient kingdom with its wonderful cities and its teeming soil was now in its turn to be absorbed into the wide sea of Persian dominion: but although the fact of its subjugation is clearly established, not much confidence can be placed

Invasion of
Egypt by
Kambyses.
525 B.C.(?)

⁶⁷⁴ Herod. ii. 169. According to the version of Polyainos, Kambyses restored the family of Apries to the throne.

⁶⁷⁵ Herodotos assigns the first settlement of Naukratis to the reign of Amasis; but there is little reason to doubt that it was open to Greek trade in the time of the Samian Kolaios and of the poetess Sappho and her brother Charaxos. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 451. This Charaxos is prominent in the story of Rhodopis whom he purchases and sets free, and who was supposed to have built one of the pyramids, Herod. ii. 184. Attempts have been made to identify Rhodopis with the Egyptian queen Nitokris. Lewis, *Astron. Anc.* 371. The story of her slipper connects her with the myth of Cinderella. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 15.

⁶⁷⁶ Herod. i. 181.

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in the details of the narrative. The stories of Herodotos and Ktesias cannot be reconciled; and the statements of the Behistun inscription, so far as it notices the reign of Kambyses, differ in some points from both; but there is no doubt that Herodotos received his version from Egyptian priests and that their account would be coloured by an intense national hatred against the man who had done all that he could to insult their religion and to profane their shrines. At once then we are driven to look with suspicion on statements which represent Kambyses as a man closely resembling the mad emperor Paul of Russia, while the facts related, if they be true, seem capable of an easier explanation as results of a scheme carefully laid and deliberately carried out. The two points which needed the most careful forethought in his plan of Egyptian conquest lay in the supply of water for his army during their passage across the desert which protects Egypt from the northeast, and in the co-operation of a fleet which should make it impossible for the Egyptian king to prolong the contest by obtaining supplies from the sea. In securing the first Kambyses is said by Herodotos to have followed the advice of the Halikarnassian Phanes, a deserter from the service of Amasis, who advised him to make a treaty of friendship with a chief or chiefs of the Arab tribes of the desert.⁶⁷⁷ The fleet, with the men who manned it, was supplied by the Ionian and Aiolian cities of Asia Minor and by the Phenicians of Tyre. Had Amasis lived, the struggle might have been prolonged, perhaps even with a different result: but he had died a few months before the invasion, and his son Psammenitos seems to have inherited neither his wisdom nor his vigour. Signs from heaven were not wanting to tell of the coming troubles. Rain had fallen at Thebes; and the horrible draught in which his Hellenic mercenaries had drunk the blood of the sons of Phanes⁶⁷⁸ may have added fierceness to the courage with which they fought for Egypt,

526 n.c.(?)

⁶⁷⁷ The water, he believes, was brought in leathern sacks on the backs of camels, and not by means of three canals which the Arab chief is said, according to another version, to have carried from the river Korys to three great reservoirs dug to receive it in the desert. iii. 9.

⁶⁷⁸ Herod. iii. 11. The indignation which Herodotos describes them as feeling against the man who had brought down strangers upon Egypt is strong evidence of the prosperity of the Hellenic settlement at Naukratis, and of the advantages which they derived from the trade with Egypt.

but it could not countervail the disparity of numbers which turned the scale in the great battle near the Pelousian mouth of the Nile. CHAP.
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The Egyptian king was now blockaded in Memphis: and a herald sent in a Mytilenaiian vessel demanded the surrender of the city. By way of reply the Egyptians seized the ship and tore the crew to pieces; and the first fuel was thus supplied for the great conflagration which was soon to follow. The capture of Memphis after an obstinate resistance led to the submission of the Libyan tribes and also of the Hellenes of Barkê and Kyrênê; but the tribute offered by the latter was not sufficient in the eyes of the conqueror, who scattered the money, it is said, with his own hands among his troops.⁶⁷⁹ Siege and
capture of
Memphis.

Thus had Kambyzes carried to its utmost bounds the Persian empire, as it was conceived by Herodotos, for according to his narrative all the wisdom and vigour of Dareios did not enable him to extend its limits or to guard against some grave disasters. But Kambyzes in Memphis was lord of all the nations from Baktra to the Nile, and it was now time that the Divine Nemesis should lay its hand not merely on Kambyzes as it had done upon his father, but also on that invincible army which both he and Cyrus had headed in a career of all but uninterrupted conquest. He must therefore now begin to make war not only against men, but, like Xerxes Expedition
against the
Ethiopians
and the
temple of
Amoun.

⁶⁷⁹ The historian appends one of those beautiful narratives which harmonise well with, and to an indefinite extent are the result of, the dramatic plan of his history. By way of testing the feelings of Psammenitos, Kambyzes sends his daughter to the river clad as a water-carrier and bearing a pitcher on her head, along with many other women. As they pass, the Egyptians around him weep and wail: but Psammenitos is silent. Kambyzes next makes the son of Psammenitos with other noble youths pass him on the way to execution; but Psammenitos utters not a cry. Last of all, Kambyzes sends one of his old friends who, brought to beggary, stretched out his hand for alms. Psammenitos now wept. He called him by his name: and to the question by which Kambyzes asked the reason for this conduct, the reply was that the grief at seeing his children suffering was too deep for the tears which were fitly shed for the sorrows of his comrade. With a passing feeling of pity Kambyzes ordered that the son of Psammenitos should be saved from the number of the men who were to be slain in requital for the murder of the crew of the Mytilenaiian ship; but his words came too late. The boy had been already executed.

Herodotos adds that Psammenitos himself was kindly treated and would doubtless have been made viceroy of Egypt, like the Libyan Thannyras the son of Inaros and Pausiris the son of Amyrtaios, had he not been found out in a conspiracy to throw off the Persian yoke. The discovery of this scheme was followed by his immediate death. iii. 15. This passage is referred by Clinton to an incident belonging to the reign of Dareios Nothos, and subsequent to 414 B.C.: but this hypothesis rests wholly on the assumption that the Amyrtaios here named is the same as the Amyrtaios mentioned in Manetho,—an assumption as unlikely as that Herodotos added to his history any notices of events later than 430 B.C. See, further, Dr. Arnold's note on Thucyd. i. 110.

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in his defiance of Phoibos, against the gods. The madness thus sent upon him was, according to the informants of Herodotos, shown first in the insults which he heaped on the mummy of Amasis,⁶⁸⁰ and then in the infatuation which led him from Thebes to march against the Ethiopians, while he sent 50,000 men to destroy the shrine of Amoun in the desert. Scarcely more than a fifth part of the march was to be accomplished towards the land of that mysterious people, who lay far beyond the Nile cataracts. They were going, as they thought, to a region where the earth daily produced, like the Holy Grail and the wonderful napkins and pitchers of Aryan folk-lore, inexhaustible banquets of luscious and ready-cooked meats.⁶⁸¹ But before they could cross the zone of burning sand which lay between them and those luxurious feasts, the failure even of grass for food drove them to decimate themselves; and this outbreak of cannibalism warned Kambyses that some tasks were too hard even for the great king. Probably before he could reach Memphis, he had heard of another disaster. The men whom he had sent to destroy the shrine of Amoun⁶⁸² were traced as far as the city of Oasis, where according to Herodotos a colony of Samians was established: but from the day on which they left it, not one was ever seen again. The guardians of the shrine asserted (and the guess was in all likelihood right) that they had been overwhelmed by a dust-storm and their bodies buried beneath the pillars of fiery sand.

Failure of
the pro-
posed
expedition
against
Carthage.

A third enterprise by which Kambyses proposed to extend the Persian dominion as far as the Tyrian colony of Carthage was knocked on the head by the blunt refusal of the Phœnician sailors to serve against their kinsfolk.⁶⁸³ With Baby-

⁶⁸⁰ The Egyptians who, in their attempts to soften down the great disaster, would have it that Kambyses was the son of Nitetis and therefore really one of themselves, Herod. iii. 2, asserted that Amasis, foreseeing what Kambyses would do, left orders that his own body should not be put in the royal place, and that thus the Persian king wreaked his fury on a substitute. Herod. iii. 16. The burning of the dead body by Kambyses is not more likely than the attempted burning of the living Kroisos by Cyrus. It was, of course, an act doubly odious, because to the Persian fire was a god, and to the Egyptian a wild beast which eats until there is nothing more to eat and then dies, and to which it is impious to give dead bodies as food.

⁶⁸¹ That this is one of the many stories of unbounded plenty connected with the earth and its symbols, there can be no question. See *Mythology of Ar. Nat.* book ii. ch. 2, section 12.

⁶⁸² It is possible that this expedition may have been prompted by zeal for the Zoroastrian monotheism which must have been his faith, if he was a true Persian.

⁶⁸³ For the myth of the colonisation of Carthage see *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 432.

lon Tyre which had been conquered by Nebucadnezzar had come under the Persian yoke: but their condition as tributaries left them probably a far higher degree of freedom than that which the Ionians of Asia Minor retained when they were compelled to man their ships against the western Greeks; and the Persian despot felt perhaps that he could not afford to quarrel with men who had practically the whole carrying trade of the Mediterranean in their hands, and whose treachery on the distant shores of northern Africa might involve a worse disaster than any which had thus far befallen his own arms or those of his father Cyrus. Like the Egyptians, the inhabitants of the great Phœnician cities on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean had acquired a reputation which carries their greatness back to ages long preceding the dawn of any history. So soon as we have any knowledge of Europe at all, the Phœnicians are prominent as the navigators of the great inland sea. Whence they had come, we know not. Herodotos brings them from the shores of the Persian gulf: but from the earliest times in which we hear of them they inhabit the strip of land which, nowhere more than twenty miles in breadth, lies between mount Lebanon and the sea for a distance stretching not more than 120 miles northwards from the bay of Carmel. At the extreme north and south, on two small islands, lay Arados and the great city of Tyre, which Alexander afterwards joined by a mole to the mainland. Between these two lay Sidon nearest to Tyre on the south, then Berytos and Byblos, with Tripolis which, like Panionion or the Hellenion,⁶⁸⁴ served as a centre for the confederation. But the disposition of this town was itself a singular proof of the centrifugal tendencies which marked these great mercantile communities not less than the autonomous societies of the Greeks. It was divided into three distinct portions, separated from each other by the space of a furlong, set apart severally for the three cities of Tyre, Sidon, and Arados. The order in which these Phœnician towns sprang into existence cannot be ascertained and is a matter of slight interest or importance. If Tyre was, as some legends said, a colony from Sidon, the great-

⁶⁸⁴ See pp. 116, 341, 345.

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ness of the mother city was soon eclipsed by that of her child. The singular energy of the individual communities, as contrasted with their scanty power of combination, is more noteworthy as furnishing thus far an exact parallel to the Hellenic character; and in fact the Hellenic and Phœnician tribes, whatever may have been the moral or religious influence exercised by the latter on the former, come mainly before us as powers which check each other in the most important stages of their developement.⁶⁸⁵ The first check to Phœnician commerce came from the establishment of the Hellenic cities on the shores of the Egean and their consequent exclusion from the waters of that sea. Phœnician colonies or emporia had been fixed in the island of Kypros (Cyprus), on the northern shores of Africa, in Sicily, in Sardinia, in the Balearic isles, and in the great Iberian peninsula. In all but the last two the intrusion of Greek settlements rendered necessary or at least prudent a contraction of Phœnician commerce. In Kypros the Greek colonies of Kitium, Paphos, Salamis and other places, cut short the old Phœnician monopoly: and the same result was produced on the Kilikian mainland by the colonies of Phaselis, Sidê, and Aspendos, and by their settlers in the Phœnician or Assyrian town of Tarsos. By the establishment of the Greek colonies in Sicily the Phœnicians felt themselves constrained to confine their posts to the north-western angle of the island in the towns of Soloeis, Panormos, and Motyê, and to the island of Melitê, the nearest point to the African colonies of Utica and Carthage,⁶⁸⁶ both lying in the same gulf which forms the northernmost portion of Africa, facing the Lilybaian promontory of Sicily. But the Phœnicians had been always foremost in the race; and while the most daring of the Greeks scarcely ventured further westwards than Massalia and Alalia, the Phœnician

⁶⁸⁵ I do not enter here into the vexed questions of the origin of Phœnician writing, of its priority to the Egyptian system of hieroglyphics, or of the time at which it was borrowed by the Greeks, the Latins, and the Etruscans; but I may refer the reader to Grote, *History of Greece*, part ii. ch. xxi.; Mure, *History of Greek Literature*, vol. i. ch. iv.; *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 447.

⁶⁸⁶ Carthaginian colonisation differed widely from that of Tyre and Sidon which was purely for commercial purposes. From the first Carthage dreamt of and aimed at empire: hence she fought, while the men of Tyre and Sidon contented themselves with retiring to their more distant settlements or depôts.

colonies of Gades or Gadeira had risen to eminence on the shores of the mysterious Atlantic ocean beyond the pillars of Herakles. With Karteia, to the east of the Mediterranean gates, and with the other Phenician trading-ports of this district, Gades, which has retained its name but little changed for perhaps 3000 years, formed the kingdom or region of Tartessos of which Arganthonios is said to have been the sovereign when the Phokaians came on their errand of commerce or plunder. To the east of Karteia we hear of no Phenician settlements beyond Malaka (Malaga): how far they advanced to the north of Gades on the Atlantic ocean, we cannot say. The name Ulyssipo (Olisipo), which was explained by the myth that the city had been founded by Ulysses, may be thought to favour the conclusion that it was a Phenician settlement: but the balance of probabilities seems to lie against the theory that they had established and maintained a regular coasting trade as far as Britain and Gaul, and even to the Baltic sea. The question turns wholly on the mode by which the products of northern Europe reached the cities on the shores of the Mediterranean.⁶⁸⁷

The refusal of these hardy mariners to serve against Carthage secured the freedom of the great city which under Hannibal was to contend with Rome for the dominion of the world: but in Kambyses this disregard of his wishes, following on the disasters which had befallen his army, stirred up, it is said, the tiger-like temper which must slake its rage in blood. The opportunity was supplied by the jubilant cries which greeted Kambyses on his return to Memphis. The people were shouting, not for him, but because they had found the calf in whom they worshipped the incarnation of the god Apis. If the time during which they had been without such a calf⁶⁸⁸ was long, their exultation would be greater on finding an animal which met the difficult tests of complete blackness of skin with a square of white on the forehead, double hairs on the tail, and a beetle mark on its tongue. But the tyrant would have it that they were making merry over his calamities. In vain did the natives

Kambyses
and the
Egyptian
priests

⁶⁸⁷ See Appendix E.

⁶⁸⁸ The calf was not suffered to live more than twelve years. If it reached that age, it was solemnly slain and its body reverently embalmed.

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whom he had himself intrusted with the government of Memphis strive to explain the real cause of the rejoicing. They were all put to death. The priests who were next summoned gave the same explanation; and Kambyses said that he would see this tame god who had come among them. The beast was brought, and Kambyses, drawing his dagger, wounded him on the thigh. 'Poor fools, these then are your gods,' he cried, 'things of flesh and blood, which may be wounded by men. Truly the god and his worshippers are well matched: but you shall smart^e for raising a laugh against me.' So the priests were scourged; an order was issued that everyone found in holiday guise should forthwith be slain; and the feast was broken up in terror. The calf-god pined away and died in the temple; and the priests in secret buried it with the wonted rites. From this time, so said the Egyptians, Kambyses became hopelessly mad. It is possible that his madness may have been not without method, and that these insults to Apis and his worshippers were only part of a deliberate plan, such as would commend itself to Nadir Shah or Timour, for crushing the spirit of the conquered nation: but the opinion must remain little more than a conjecture. It is to this period that Herodotos assigns the murder of his brother whom, in jealousy of his strength and beauty, he had sent back to Sousa. In the dreams which followed his departure the tyrant had seen a herald and heard from his lips that Smerdis sat on a throne and that his head touched the heaven. Putting on this vision the only interpretation which would suggest itself to a despot, Kambyses at once sent Prexaspes home with orders to slay the prince. When it was afterwards discovered that the deed had been done to no purpose, Prexaspes swore solemnly that he had not only slain but buried him with his own hands; but the historian admits that while one account represented him as murdering Smerdis on a hunting expedition, others said that he had enticed him out to sea, and thrown him overboard. The Behistun inscription shuts out both these tales by saying that the tyrant's brother was murdered long before the army started for Egypt.

We now come to the last act of the tragedy. Kambyses

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Kambyses
and the
Magian
Smerdis.

had crowned his iniquities by marrying two of his sisters, one of these being Atossa who will come before us again in plots which had, it is said, their outcome on the field of Marathon. The other who is not named fell a victim to his fury in Egypt. He had also shot the son of Prexaspes to the heart in his father's presence, by way of showing that a man who could take so true an aim could not possibly be mad. Once again Kroisos appears as the preacher: but Kambyses retorted with some glimmering of sense that his last advice to his father Cyrus had been followed by no very happy results, and taking up his bow shot an arrow at him. Kroisos stepped aside and escaped; but the order went forth for his death. The attendants kept him alive, thinking that the tyrant's temper might change. It did change, and Kambyses expressed his gladness that Kroisos still lived; but he put his preservers to death for daring to disobey his commands. It was time that retribution should come for all these things. The army had reached on its homeward march a Syrian village named Agbatana, when a herald coming from Sousa bade all Persians to own as their king not Kambyses who was deposed but his brother Smerdis the son of Cyrus. To a question of Prexaspes, put by the order of Kambyses, the herald replied that he had received his message not from the new king, whom he had never seen, but from the Magian who was over his household. A further question put by Kambyses to Prexaspes himself called forth the answer that he knew not who could have hatched this plot but Patizeithes, whom Kambyses had left at Sousa as his high steward, and his brother Smerdis. So then this was the Smerdis whose head was to touch the heaven: and the despot wept for his brother whom he had so uselessly done to death. Presently he said that he would march on at once against the usurper, and leaping on his horse gashed his thigh (the part where he had wounded the calf-god) with his sword from which the sheath had accidentally fallen off. 'What is the name of this place?' asked Kambyses, when he felt that the wound was serious. They told him that he was at Agbatana; and the tyrant, knowing now that only a misinterpretation of the oracle from Bouto which said that he must die at Agbatana

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had led him to indulge in pleasant dreams of an old age spent among the Median hills, confessed that his brother had been righteously avenged. His remaining days or hours were spent in bewailing his evil deeds to his courtiers, and in exhortations to them to stand out bravely against the Magian usurpation which, he clearly saw, was designed to transfer to the Medes the supremacy of the Persians. His words were naturally received with little faith, for Prexaspes, of course, swore as stoutly before the Persians that he had never harmed Smerdis as he had to Kambyses averred that he had buried him with his own hands; and thus the Magian Smerdis became king of the Persians.

The conspiracy of the Seven Persians.

Such is the dramatic version of Herodotos, which absolutely needs the doubling of the names Agbatana and Smerdis. The Behistun inscription, it is said, affirms that Kambyses killed himself purposely; that the name of the Magian was not Smerdis but Gomates; and that his usurpation was a religious, and not, as has been generally supposed, a national rebellion, its object being to restore the ancient magism or element worship, which the predominance of the stricter monotheism of Zoroaster had placed under a cloud. The details of the sequel may be passed lightly over. The false Smerdis, who had had his ears cut off, is discovered by the daughter of Otanes, who passes her hands over his head while he sleeps; and Otanes, taking counsel with Aspathines and Gobryas, gains over to the conspiracy Intaphernes, Megabyzos, and Hydarnes, Dareios being admitted last of all as the seventh, on his arrival from the province of Persia Proper, of which his father Hystaspes was the viceroy. The number of conspirators being complete, two debates follow, the first issuing in the resolution to slay the Magian and his supporters at once; the second, after their death, to determine the form of government which it would be wise to set up. Otanes, the author of the conspiracy, having proposed a republic on the ground that in no other way can a really responsible government be attained, is opposed by Megabyzos who, urging that the insolent violence of the mob is quite as hateful as that of any despot, recommends an oligarchy, while Dareios with the old stock

argument that, if the ruler be perfect as he ought to be, no form of polity can be preferable to monarchy, insists that the customs of the Persians shall not be changed. Upon this, Otanes, it is said, seeing that things would go as Dareios wished, made a paction that he would neither be king himself nor submit to anyone else as king. He and his successors with their families should remain independent for ever, while the king on his part must covenant to take his wives only from the families of the seven conspirators, who should have as their special privilege the right of entering the king's presence without being announced. The sovereign power was to belong to that man whose horse should neigh first after being mounted on the following morning.

All these conditions, it has been urged, furnish clear evidence that these seven conspirators are not, as Herodotos supposes, founders of seven families who form henceforth the highest nobility of Persia, but heads of seven existing princely houses, who thus carried into action their protest against the usurpation of the infidel.⁶⁸⁹ Such a national movement may have taken place: but we can scarcely venture to affirm the fact positively, while the Behistun inscription compels us to reject almost every portion of the story as given by Herodotos. Of the mutilation of the Magian by Kambyses, of his discovery through the agency of Phaidyme, of the conspiracy of the Seven, this monument says absolutely nothing. To the version of Herodotos, who represents Dareios as the last who joined the conspirators, it gives the most complete contradiction. Dareios asserts unequivocally that no one dared to say anything against the Magian until he arrived. To the seven he makes no reference, unless possibly in the words that 'with his faithful men' he fell on the Magian and slew him, while the legend of his election by the trick of his groom Oibares is put aside by his assertion that the empire of which Gomates dispossessed Kambyses had from the olden time been in the family of Dareios.⁶⁹⁰ The incidents so rejected are the chief and

The accession of Dareios to the Persian throne. 520 B.C.(?)

⁶⁸⁹ Niebuhr, who takes this view, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 131, says that as these seven grandees continue to be mentioned in later Persian history, and as Dareios, being an Achamenid, was one of them, only six would have remained, so that the families can not be the descendents of the seven conspirators.

⁶⁹⁰ This would mean that Cyrus, like Dareios, was an Achamenid.

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essential features in the narrative of Herodotos; and the rock inscription must, on the supposition of their truth, have made to them at least some passing allusion, if not some direct reference. The debates of the seven conspirators fall before another test. As speeches of Oriental chieftains, they are an impossibility. They have not even the merit of the legend of Deiokes, in so far as the latter exhibits the possible origin of despotism in Media or in any other country, while their expression of Hellenic thought becomes extravagantly absurd,⁶⁹¹ when put into the mouths of men whose sole idea of freedom is represented as lying in immunity from tribute and taxation.⁶⁹² But if such a monument as the inscription of Behistun overthrows on such important points a series of narratives in the history of one of the most trustworthy of men, and if other large portions are to be set aside as mere reflexions of Hellenic thought or feeling, alike absurd and impossible in the East, with what trust may we receive any story which paints the course of intrigue and illustrates the secret history of a Persian or Assyrian Court? for, with the exception of the march of armies and tales of foreign conquest, the annals of those courts are only a secret history. Hints of execrable cruelties may force their way into the outer air; pictures of fancied luxury and generosity may light up the dim recesses of the hidden harem: but what reason have we to suppose that of any single motive we shall have a faithful description, of any single deed a true report? We have arrived at a time in which such intrigues and hidden motives are said to be the mainspring of actions affecting all Hellas; and the answer to this doubt must seriously affect almost the whole history of Persia in its connexion with events which have changed the fortunes of the world.

⁶⁹¹ We may note here the firmness with which, in this instance, Herodotos insists on the truth of a tale which even to Hellenic readers might seem incredible, *ἐλέχθησαν λόγοι ἀπιστοὶ μὲν ἐνίοισι Ἑλλήνων ἐλέχθησαν δ' ὄν.* Herod. iii. 80.

⁶⁹² Herod. i. 126.

CHAPTER III.

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE UNDER DAREIOS.

THE death of the usurper who dethroned Kambyzes was followed, it is said, by a general massacre of the Magians, who, whether they represented the original inhabitants of Media, or whether they did not, are mentioned as forming one of the Median tribes. This massacre seems to point to a state of confusion and disorder which, according to Herodotos,⁶⁹³ prevented Dareios from taking the strong measures which he otherwise would have taken against some refractory or rebellious satraps of the empire. The statement is amply borne out by the inscription of Behistun, which describes the early years of the reign of Dareios as occupied with putting down a series of obstinate insurrections against his authority. The massacre of the Magian and his partisans seems in no way to have deterred the Medians from making a general effort to recover the supremacy of which they had been deprived by Cyrus. But the fortune of war went against them.⁶⁹⁴ The revolt of Babylon may have appeared a matter even more serious; but our knowledge can scarcely be said to extend beyond the facts that it broke out and that it was with great difficulty suppressed, the walls of the great city being now so far dismantled as to leave the place henceforth

CHAP.
III.The revolt
of Babylon.

⁶⁹³ Herod. iii. 126, 127, 150. The phrases ἡ παραχῆ, and οἰδιόνη των προηγημάτων, if justified by the facts, would indicate a partial anarchy.

⁶⁹⁴ There seems to be really no ground for doubting that the rising and defeat of the Medes mentioned by Herodotos, i. 130, belong to the reign of Dareios, the son of Hystaspes. The Medes can scarcely be said to have revolted under Dareios Nothos, 408 B.C., because they regretted the haste with which they submitted to Cyrus owing to their hatred of the alleged tyranny of Astyages, perhaps 150 years before. This cannot have been the motive for the rising mentioned by Xenophon, *Hellen.* i. 2-9; but, further, there is no sufficient evidence that Herodotos notices any events subsequent to 430 B.C., nor does he anywhere mention Dareios Nothos at all. The only other Dareios noticed by him is the son of Xerxes, ix. 108; but Dareios the son of Hystaspes is so prominent a person in his history that we may very fairly conclude that whenever Herodotos uses this name he means this prince only, except where he distinctly makes an exception, as in ix. 108.

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at the mercy of the conqueror. Beyond this, while we may admit that the incidents recorded by Herodotos may have occurred, we have no positive warrant for affirming that they really took place. The Babylonians had had, he tells us, ample time for preparation during the whole reign of the Magian and the confusion which followed his death, and of this opportunity they availed themselves to the utmost.⁶⁹⁵ They had probably even longer time than before the invasion of Cyrus who wasted or turned to good purpose a whole year on the banks of the Gyndes. Before Cyrus could reach Babylon, they had found no difficulty in laying up an ample store of corn for all the inhabitants for very many years;⁶⁹⁶ and whatever fears they may have felt on other grounds, on the score of food, there was manifestly no anxiety whatever. Now, for no apparent reason, things are altogether changed, and we read a horrible story that each Babylonian set apart his mother and one woman who was to bake his bread, and then that all the other women of the city were brought into one place and there strangled, lest if they lived they might make too great and rapid an inroad on their stores. We may, if we please, say that the tale is much exaggerated; but it may be more to the purpose to note that such a slaughter seems to be quite uncalled for, and that we have no better evidence for it than the hearsay of tradition. In truth, in reading these Eastern narratives we are wandering among mists and shadows. As in the time of Cyrus, so now we have the Babylonians dancing on their walls, and saying that they might feel some fear if mules could produce offspring.⁶⁹⁷ We have also the same obstinacy in the besiegers and the same endurance in the besieged, combined with an amount of caution which frustrates the attempt to repeat the stratagem by which Cyrus is said to have taken the city. The story is incredible. Writers who put most faith in the traditional narrative admit that Cyrus trusted the safety of his army to the hazard of a die and that the slightest alarm must have been followed

⁶⁹⁵ Herod. iii. 150.⁶⁹⁶ *Ib.* i. 190.⁶⁹⁷ As we have no possible means of tracing this to genuine Babylonian tradition, the recurrence of a similar idea in the oracular response said to be given to Kroisos, Herod. i. 55, is both noteworthy and suspicious. See p. 309.

by a dire catastrophe to the assailants. Here we have a complete failure of the attempt, but no catastrophe at all; and then follows the legend of Zopyros,—how, having himself cut off his nose and his ears and otherwise mutilated his body, he appeared before the astonished Dareios and concerted with him the number of sham defeats which the Persians should undergo before the consummation of his great treachery; how, presenting himself to the Babylonians as one who had been shamefully used by Dareios, he gradually gained their confidence and, having won the sham victories according to the list which had been drawn up, finally opened the city gates and let in the Persians to plunder the town and enslave the people. Apart from any presumed policy, which should prompt the Babylonians to adopt offensive as well as defensive measures, the story loses all colour; and of such a policy we have no evidence whatever. The Babylonians might fairly ask what advantage his plan might hold out to them, when they regarded the city as absolutely impregnable and knew it to be abundantly supplied with food.⁶⁹⁸ The story is properly capped with the saying of Dareios that he would rather have Zopyros unhurt than be lord of twenty Babylons. To the city Dareios was less merciful than Cyrus had been. Apart from the dismantling of the walls, and the imposition of heavy tributes, he crucified 3000 of the chief citizens,—a severity by no means without parallel in the annals of Eastern or, unhappily, even of European kingdoms. Babylon now became a Persian province with Zopyros himself as its satrap.

But the enemies of Dareios came sometimes from his own people. In Aryandes, who had been appointed satrap of Egypt by Kambyses, he found a rival rather than a subject: but the career of the viceroy who dared to have an indepen-

The despotism of Polykrates in Samos.

⁶⁹⁸ The whole of this story is reproduced in the narrative of the capture of Gabii by Sextus Tarquinius, Livy i. 54, with the insertion of a story which by Herodotos, v. 92, is placed in the annals of Thrasyboulos of Miletos. Unless we regard these tales as pieces of floating tradition common to the Aryan tribes generally, we must suppose that they were introduced into the Roman story by writers who, like Alimentus and Fabius Pictor, wrote in Greek and who may have been tempted to garnish the meagre Latin chronicles with incidents borrowed from Greek historians. Lewis, *Cred. E. R. II.* i. 30, 78, 513. It is possible that the story may reflect the conduct of another Zopyros, the reputed grandson of this Zopyros of whom Herodotos speaks as deserting from the Persians to the Athenians, iii. 160, but of whom we have no further knowledge.

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dent mint was soon cut short.⁶⁹⁹ Another formidable antagonist was Oroites, the satrap of Lydia, who has a wider fame as the murderer of Polykrates the despot of Samos. This unscrupulous tyrant had, it is said, seized on the government of the island some time before the Egyptian expedition of Kambyses,⁷⁰⁰ and had shared it at first with his brothers Pantagnotos and Syloson; but having afterwards killed the one and banished the other, he entered into a close alliance with Amasis king of Egypt,⁷⁰¹ and soon achieved a greatness inferior only to that of Minos, like whom he is said to have had a navy which was the terror of the islands and countries round about. In the emphatic words of Herodotos,⁷⁰² he was lord of the most magnificent city in the world. His warships plundered friends and foes alike; and the men of Lesbos who ventured to aid the Milesians paid the penalty by having to dig in chains the moat round the wall of the city of Samos. But in spite of all his iniquities Polykrates enjoyed an unbroken good fortune; and his well-doing became, we are told, a cause of grief and misgiving to his ally Amasis, who reminded him of the Divine Jealousy, and counselled him to inflict some pain on himself; if none were sent to him by the gods. 'Seek out,' he said, 'that thing for the loss of which thy soul would most be grieved, and cast it away so that it may never come to mortal hand: and if hereafter thy good fortune be not mixed with woe, remedy it in the manner which I have set before thee.' This counsel Polykrates thought that he could not follow more effectually than by rowing out into the deep sea and casting into the water a seal-ring of emerald set in gold, wrought by the Samian Theodoros. A few days later a fisherman brought to him as a gift a fish which seemed to him too fine to be taken to the market. Polykrates in requital bade the man to supper: but before the time for the meal came, his servants had found the seal-ring in its body. In great astonishment Polykrates sent to Amasis a letter telling him what had happened. The Egyptian king, feeling now that no man could deliver another from that which was to come upon him, sent a herald to

⁶⁹⁹ Herod. iv. 166. For the concern of Aryandes in the history of Kyréné, see p. 170.⁷⁰⁰ Herod. iii. 39.⁷⁰¹ Ib. iii. 55.⁷⁰² Ib. iii. 139.

Samos and brokè off the alliance, in order that, when some evil fate overtook Polykrates, his own heart might not be grieved as for a friend.

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It is possible, as some have thought, that the alliance was broken off not by Amasis' but by Polykrates himself, for the next thing which Herodotos relates of him is an offer to furnish troops for the army of Kambyses.⁷⁰³ The Persian king eagerly accepted the offer, and Polykrates as eagerly availed himself of the opportunity to get rid of those Samians whom he regarded as disaffected towards himself. The history of these banished men illustrates remarkably the uncertainties of oral tradition, even when the tradition relates to a time but little removed from that of the narrator. Two of the Spartans sent afterwards to aid these exiles forced their way into the city of Samos and, being there cut off from their less courageous or less ready-witted companions, were slain. As a tribute to their bravery, the Samians gave the bodies of Archias and Lykôpas a public burial. With the grandson of this Archias Herodotos was himself acquainted, and from him in all likelihood he received the accounts of these incidents in the career of Polykrates.⁷⁰⁴ They are conflicting enough, for some maintained that they went no nearer to Egypt than Karpathos, while others said that they escaped from durance in Egypt and returning to Samos were defeated in battle by Polykrates, a third version asserting that they defeated the tyrant. This last story Herodotos holds to be sufficiently refuted by the fact that the exiles were compelled after their return to seek for aid from Sparta, the city from which, as the natural head of Hellas, Kroisos and Hippias had each besought help in his necessity. But the narrative becomes no surer as it goes on. The exiles on reaching Sparta made, it is said, a very long speech to which the Spartans vouchsafed no further answer than that they had forgotten the first part of it and could not understand the rest. When on the next day the Samians appeared with an empty sack and said that their wallet lacked meal, the Spartans could not resist the temptation of telling them that they needed not to put their parable into words, as the

The fortunes of the Samian exiles.

⁷⁰³ Herod. iii. 44.

⁷⁰⁴ Ib. iii. 55.

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empty wallet would have told its own tale. But the rejoinder was accompanied by substantial help, and a joint expedition of Spartans and Corinthians was determined on. According to the Samians, the former thus expressed their gratitude for aid received during the Messenian wars; but the Spartans, it is said, declared that they went from no such friendly motive. Their object was to take vengeance on the Samians for their theft of the wine-vessel which they were sending to Kroisos and of the linen corslet which the Samians had intercepted on its way from Amasis to the Spartans, while the Corinthians sought to avenge an affront which, as they alleged, had been done to them at Samos in the matter of the Korkyraian youths whom Periandros was sending at the same time for a shameful purpose to Sardeis. But it is unfortunate that this identity of time should be asserted of two incidents, one of which is said to have taken place after the fall of Kroisos, while the other belongs to the reign of his father Alyattes.⁷⁰⁵ The sentiment of a later age ascribed this expedition to the more disinterested desire of putting down tyrannies throughout Hellas. But apart from this effort and apart from their share in the expulsion of the Peisistratidai from Athens, no other instances of such interference can be positively established; and we know that in the case of Hippias nothing but a dread of the wrath of Phoibos could have driven them to go on an errand which they loathed.

Restless-
ness and
isolation of
the Greeks.

Spartan incapacity in the blockade of cities became almost a proverb. At Samos they grew tired of the task after having persevered in it for forty days;⁷⁰⁶ and so the first Spartan expedition into Asia came to an end. The Samian exiles, thus deserted, sailed to Siphnos, an island lying about twenty miles to the northeast of Melos, and demanded of the inhabitants, who were then among the wealthiest of the Hellenes, a loan of ten talents. Their refusal was followed by a battle, and the battle by the exaction of a hundred talents, which the Samians employed in purchasing from the

⁷⁰⁵ See page 111, and note 534.

⁷⁰⁶ Herodotos, iii. 56, adds that there was another report, to which he gave no credit, that Polykrates had bribed them to raise the siege, the money employed being gilded lead. The conflict of details has an interest simply as illustrating the nature of the materials on which the historian had to work.

men of the Argolid Hermionê the little island of Hydreia, more notorious in recent than in ancient history. But instead of taking up their abode there, they left it in the hands of the Troizenians, and went to Kydonia in Kreta whence they expelled the Zakynthian settlers. After five years of prosperity they were enslaved by a combined force of Kretans and Aiginetans who bore a grudge against the Samians for depredations committed in Aigina in the time of the Samian king Amphikrates. These details point to a marvellous restlessness both among the Eastern and the Western Greeks, and bring out in strong light their utter want of combination and their long-standing quarrels and feuds.

But in the epical method of Herodotos the time was now come when the man who had been victorious over all his enemies, who had received enjoyment as well from the friendship of poets like Anakreon as from the great works for which he had rendered his island famous, should exhibit in his own person the working of that law which keeps human affairs in constant flow and ebb. In these portions of his narrative we are removed at once from the domain of history into that of theology; and we should only lose the interest of a life-like drama, if we were to give the story in any other form than that in which we receive it from the old historian. We can, therefore, only say, as he tells us, that Oroites whom Cyrus had left as satrap in Sardeis had made up his mind to intrap and slay Polykrates, although neither in act nor in word had he suffered any wrong at his hands, but only because, as Oroites sat before the doors of the king's palace and talked with another Persian named Mitrobates, who ruled over the province of Daskyleion, they strove with each other to know which was the braver. To the taunt of Mitrobates that Oroites had not gained for the king the island of Samos which was so easy for any to seize that one of the men of the island had taken it with fifteen heavy-armed soldiers and was now tyrant therein, Oroites made no reply; but instead of seeking to punish Mitrobates, he resolved on the destruction of Polykrates. Hence, as he abode in the Maiandrian Magnesia, he sent a messenger to Samos with this message,

The last scenes in the career of Polykrates.

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‘Thus saith Oroites to Polykrates, I hear that thou art set on great things, but that thou hast not money according to thy designs. Know then that king Kambyses seeks to slay me. Therefore come and take me away and my money, and keep part of it for thyself, and part of it let me have. So, if thou thinkest for money, thou shalt be ruler over all Hellas; and if thou believest not about my wealth, send the trustiest of thy servants, and to him will I show it.’ These words roused the greed of Polykrates, and Maiandrios his scribe was sent to test the words of Oroites who, when he had heard that the Samian was nigh at hand, filled eight vessels with stones all but a little about the brim, and having placed gold on the stones⁷⁰⁷ fastened the vessels and kept them ready. Maiandrios, having seen the jars, brought the tidings to Polykrates, who made ready to go, although the soothsayers with his friends forbade him to do so. His daughter pleaded that she had seen a vision which betokened disaster; but she pleaded in vain. Polykrates sailed from Samos, taking with him many of his comrades, and among them Demokedes, the son of Kalliphon of Kroton, a physician famed beyond all others of his time for the practice of his art.

522 B.C. (?) But he reached Magnesia, the historian adds, only to perish with an end befitting neither himself nor his great designs, for with the exception of the despots of Syracuse no one of the Greek tyrants deserved to be compared for greatness with Polykrates. The judgement which overtook Oroites is in his belief the effect and sequel of this catastrophe. He had sent away those of the followers of Polykrates who were Samians, bidding them to be thankful to him for their freedom; but he kept as prisoners taken in war those among them who were strangers or slaves. His mercy to the Samians was balanced by his severities against the Persians. He had probably sided with the Magian king,⁷⁰⁸ and perhaps to serve his cause killed Mitrobates who ruled in Daskyleion with his son Kranaspes. To crown his defiance of the new Achaimenid

⁷⁰⁷ A trick somewhat resembling this was actually played off by the men of Eggesta in Sicily upon the Athenians, and seems to have turned the scale at Athens in favour of their disastrous expedition to that island. Thuc. vi. 8 and 46. Mr. Grote refers to the trick of Hannibal at Gortys in Krete. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 330.

⁷⁰⁸ This seems to be implied in the words *ώφέλει μὲν οὐδὲν Πέρσας ὑπὸ Μήδων ἀπαραιρημέ-
τους τὴν ἀρχήν.* Herod. iii. 126.

king, he slew a messenger who came to him from Dareios because he brought a message which did not please him. But Dareios, we are told, shrunk from coming to open strife with him. His own power was not yet firm, and he had heard that Oroites had surrounded himself with a formidable body of guards. So he called together the chief men of the Persians, and asked which of them would do his bidding and slay Oroites or bring him alive to Sousa. Then there rose up thirty men, who were each ready to do his will; and as they strove which of them should do it, Dareios ordered them to draw lots, and the lot fell on Bagaïos the son of Artontes. Having written many letters and sealed them all with the king's signet, Bagaïos went to Sardeis, and gave the letters one by one to the scribe that he might read them. When he saw that they who stood round Oroites gave great reverence to the letters and to what was read from them, he gave to the scribe one in which were written these words, 'Persians, king Dareios forbids you to guard Oroites.' On hearing this the men lowered their spears; and Bagaïos, knowing now that they would obey the command of the king, took courage and gave the last letter to the scribe. Its message was that king Dareios charges the Persians who are in Sardeis to slay Oroites. As soon as they heard this, they drew their swords and slew him; and so the vengeance for Polykrates overtook Oroites the Persian.

Far more deplorable than the catastrophe which befell Polykrates is the confused yet significant record of subsequent events in Samos. The former affected those only who shared his infatuation: the latter shows that the stuff of which the Hellenic character was formed would only under the rarest conditions be of any real use in the education of mankind. The hatred of Persian despotism roused in the Athenians a feeling which brought into play all their high faculties; but in the Samians, in whom no such thoughts had been stirred, we see nothing but the hard and selfish isolation which must inevitably leave a people at the mercy of the man who has the readiest wit and the strongest arm. On the departure of Polykrates Maiandrios had remained in the island as his deputy: but no sooner had he heard of his

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The despotism of Maiandrios and of Syloson.

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master's death than he marked off a Temenos or close in the outer city, and, having there built an altar to Zeus the Deliverer, told the assembled people in a few simple words, that, having in his hand both the power and the resources of Polykrates, he could easily continue the old tyranny, but that as he would not himself do that which he had all along disapproved in his master and must disapprove in any one else, he would now lay down his rule and take his place among them as an ordinary citizen subject to all the laws, claiming for himself only the grant of six talents and the priesthood of Zeus Eleutherios to whom he had consecrated the altar with its close. A somewhat better issue attended the experiment of Kadmos of Kos⁷⁰⁹ some years later; but Maiandrios, in the brief phrase of the historian, was not suffered to be just and righteous as he heartily desired to be. His speech was greeted with the harsh rejoinder of a citizen named Telesarchos who called him a scamp unfit to bear rule, and bade him render an account of the money which he had fingered. The bystanders may have shown that Telesarchos spoke their mind, for Maiandrios, it is said, went back to the Akropolis, and then sent for the chief citizens, one by one, on the plea that he wished to submit his accounts to them. With a folly as great as their rudeness they fell into the trap and were made prisoners. Maiandrios soon after fell sick, and these prisoners were then all slain by his brother Lykarêtos. But the scene was presently changed by the arrival of a fleet containing a Persian force under Otanes, who was charged to establish as despot Syloson, the exiled brother of Polykrates, without slaying or enslaving any one or in any way hurting the island. On his banishment from Samos Syloson, it is said, went, like some other Greeks, with the army of Kambyzes to Egypt for the sake of seeing the country. At Memphis his scarlet cloak caught the fancy of Dareios, the future king, who offered to buy it. Syloson, speaking, as Herodotos believed, by divine impulse, refused to sell, but

⁷⁰⁹ Herodotos, vii. 164, simply says of Kadmos that he gave up the despotic power which he had received from his father, and sailed to Sicily where with some Samians he founded the colony of Zanklé, afterwards called Messene (Messina). If we may take this as the whole account of the matter, Kadmos had no intention of remaining as a private citizen in the place of which he had been the tyrant; and in this respect the patriotism of Maiandrios was more thorough and less selfish.

freely bestowed it on him as a gift. For a long time he regretted what seemed to him a fool's act; but when Dareios had become king of Persia, Syloson went boldly to Sousa and there had himself announced as one of the royal benefactors. Dareios had forgotten the man, but not his gift, and was eager to make a kingly return for the kindness done to him in Egypt. But Syloson would have no money. His wish was to take the place of his brother Polykrates and to become master of Samos with the least possible injury to the island. From Maiandrios himself Otanes encountered no opposition, and a paction was made for the peaceable departure of the tyrant and his followers. But Maiandrios had, it is said, another brother, a half-crazed man, named Charilaos, whom for some offence he had shut up in prison. Looking down from the grating of his dungeon on the Persian officers as they sat on their divans in the market-place, this man resolved on their destruction. Sending for the despot, he reviled him for quietly allowing himself to be expelled, and added that he was ready to strike the blow which should have been struck by his brother. Charilaos, it is added, promised to convey Maiandrios safely from the island,—a ridiculous proffer to a man who was master of an underground passage leading from the Akropolis to the sea. No sooner had Maiandrios departed⁷¹⁰ than the madman opened the gates and bursting with his followers on the unsuspecting Persians slew most of their men of note, before he could be driven back into the fortress. Otanes now diligently forgot⁷¹¹ the command of Dareios and ordered an indiscriminate massacre alike of men and children throughout the island. Such was the devastation of which the proverb spoke as wrought for the sake of Syloson; but either there were other versions which represented it as brought about by the tyranny of Syloson himself, or later writers drew a wrong inference from the old saying.⁷¹² But Maiandrios had not

⁷¹⁰ Herodotos says that Maiandrios was not sorry that his brother should bring down on the Samians the vengeance which he felt sure that Otanes would take for the massacre of his officers. This disinterested iniquity seems a strange outgrowth in one who had desired to be the most righteous of men.

⁷¹¹ *μενημένος ἀπελανθάνετο.* Herod. iii. 147.

⁷¹² *ἐκπερ Συλοσώντος εὐρυχωρίη.* This was the opinion of Strabo, xiv. 1, 17, and Herakleides Pontikos, Pol. x. 6. Lewis, *Cred. of E. R. H.* ii. 520. Herodotos adds,

lost all hope. He carried the story of his wrongs to Sparta, where he tempted Kleomenes by the sight of golden vessels of which he asked him to take as many as he liked. Kleomenes, fearing that the bait might catch others, if not himself, prayed the ephors to send the Samian away. Maiandrios was accordingly escorted by heralds across the Spartan border, while Syloson, it would seem, remained tributary despot of Samos, being succeeded by his son Aiakes who was deprived of his power by Aristagoras of Miletos.⁷¹³

Organisa-
tion of the
Persian
empire.

Thus the first whether of Hellenic or of barbarian cities passed in a state of desolation under the yoke of Dareios who was known among his subjects rather as an organiser than as a conqueror, or, as the Persians put it, rather as a huckster than as the father of his people. Under the former kings the several portions of the empire had sent yearly gifts. Henceforth the twenty provinces were to pay an assessed tribute, the silver to be paid according to the Babylonian talent, the gold by the Euboic talent. The system was a rough and ready method for securing to the king a definite annual revenue. The amount raised in excess of this sum would be determined by the rapacity or the cruelty of the satraps and their collectors who gathered the tribute from the native magistrates of the conquered tribes. Herodotos is naturally careful to state the measure of the burdens imposed on the Asiatic Greeks. Four hundred silver talents were demanded yearly from the Ionians, Magnesians, Aiolians, Karians, Lykians, Milyans, and Pamphylians, who were ranged in one department or Nomos. On the second which included the Mysians and Lydians was assessed the sum of five hundred talents. The third department which stretched from the Hellespont eastwards paid three hundred and sixty talents in silver. In fact, the only tribute paid in gold throughout the empire was that of the tribes of whom Herodotos speaks as the Indians and who are said to have brought three hundred and sixty talents of gold dust, the total revenue of the empire being thus about four millions

iii. 149, that Otanes, in the hope of thereby recovering from sickness, introduced fresh inhabitants into the island,—whence, he does not say.

⁷¹³ Herod. vi. 13.

and a quarter of English money.⁷¹⁴ A further step in advance of his predecessors was the introduction of coined money,⁷¹⁵ and of the system of royal high roads furnished with permanent posting establishments at fixed stages. A journey of ninety days on one of these roads brought the traveller from Sardeis to Sousa. But although something was thus done for the wealth and dignity of the king, the Persian empire remained, as it had been, a mere agglomeration of units, with no other bond than that of a common liability to tribute and taxation, with no common sentiment extending beyond the bounds of the several tribes, and with no inherent safeguards against disruption from without or decay and disorganisation within.

We have now to deal with two stories from which it is no easy task to extract much historical fact. When the Eastern tendencies to exaggeration or wilful misrepresentation or to the substitution of fictitious for real motives and results are fully taken into account, we are more than justified in submitting the narratives to a scrutiny more rigid than that which Thucydides would have applied to the evidence of informants whom he might regard as worthy of trust. In the expulsion of Hippias and in the relation of the Asiatic Greeks to the conquered Lydian kingdom we have causes amply adequate for that great struggle between Persia and Hellas which followed the battle of Marathon. Hence there is no historical need for the epical causes on which Herodotos delights to dwell; and while we admit that the facts related may in their outline have taken place, we can draw but one inference, if the probabilities of the narrative should be

The story
of Demo-
kedes.

⁷¹⁴ The present revenue of the Persian king is variously estimated at from one to three millions of English money. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 33.

The needs of this financial organisation may have suggested to Dareios the exploring expedition to the Indus which he sent out under Skylax of Karyanda, a city on the southwestern coast of Asia Minor. Skylax is said to have started from Kaspatyros, on the upper course of the Indus, and to have sailed down the Indus to its mouth, whence, sailing eastwards, at the end of two years and a half he reached the head of the Red Sea and the port from which Nekos (Necho) is reported to have sent the Phenicians charged with the circumnavigation of Africa. Nearchos, the admiral of Alexander the Great, sailed only from the Indus to the Persian gulf. The Periplus of Skylax is not noticed by Nearchos, Ptolemy, Aristoboulos or Arrian: but Mr. Grote regards their silence as no conclusive reason for questioning the positive statement of Herodotos that the Periplus was accomplished. In this instance it may not be: but Herodotos is not less positive about the Periplus of Africa ordered by Nekos, and we have seen that the balance of evidence is against the reality of this circumnavigation.

⁷¹⁵ This currency was known as the Dareik.

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found to be more than overbalanced by its incoherence or its inconsistency. Of the two stories now to be examined, the former is associated with the name of Demokedes, the Krotonian physician,⁷¹⁶ whom Polykrates carried with him on his last departure from Samos. When Oroites was slain, this man was carried to Sousa along with the other slaves found in his household and for some time remained there unknown and uncared for. But at length it happened, so the story ran, that Dareios in a hunt leaped from his horse, and so twisted his foot that the ankle-bone was moved from its socket. The Egyptian physicians, whom he kept about him, made the mischief worse than they found it; and it was not until he had passed eight wretched and sleepless nights that some one, who had heard in Sardeis of the great skill of Demokedes, told the king, at whose bidding the friend of Polykrates was brought before him, dragging his chains and clothed in rags. This man's heart, we are told, was filled with one absorbing desire, for the attainment of which he was ready to shape both his words and his actions and to work on persistently, no matter what misery and ruin he might bring on the land which he yearned to see once more. Hence when Dareios asked him of his craft, Demokedes denied that he had any, fearing that, if he should be found useful to the king, he should have no hope of setting foot again on Hellenic soil. But Dareios saw that he was lying, and scourges and goads, brought at his bidding, drew from Demokedes the admission that he knew the art of the physician, but that he knew it poorly. Such as it was, Dareios bade him use it at once on the injured limb, which Demokedes so handled that in a little while it was as sound as it had ever been. Persian despots are seldom ungrateful for benefits which add to their own comfort; and Demokedes was rewarded with a great house in Sousa and with the privilege of eating at the king's table. The Egyptian physicians who had tried their skill in vain were condemned to be impaled: Demokedes begged them from Dareios and

⁷¹⁶ That the distinction between the physician and the operator or surgeon was sharply drawn before the Hippocratic treatises were compiled, is clear from the oath imposed on physicians, as inserted in that collection. But the time at which this distinction was first fully recognised cannot be determined. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv, 348.

saved them alive. He also ransomed a soothsayer from Elis who had followed Polykrates and lay neglected among the slaves. He had, in short, every wish of his heart but one. The king would not part with him; and Demokedes would rather starve in Hellas than feast at Sousa. But the illness of Atossa, the ruling spirit in the seraglio of Dareios, brought an opportunity of escape of which Demokedes eagerly and deliberately availed himself. This daughter of Cyrus, who had been the wife of her brother Kambyses and was now the wife of Dareios and mother of Xerxes, was tortured by a tumour on the breast which from shame she concealed as long as she could. At length the pain became so great that she sent for Demokedes, who said that he could make her well, but added a condition which, he assured her, would involve no disgrace for herself. Atossa promised to do as he wished; and, after he had healed her, she went at his bidding to Dareios and reproached him with sitting idle on his throne without making an effort to gain nations or kingdoms for the Persians. 'A man who is young,' she said, 'and lord of great kingdoms should do some great thing that the Persians may know that it is a man who rules over them. Rouse thyself, then, whilst thou art young in years, for, as the body grows old, the mind grows old along with it and is dulled for all action.' Dareios hastened to answer that he had just resolved to do as she now desired him, and that he was making ready to go against the Scythians. 'Nay,' replied Atossa, in words which to the Athenians who heard or read the narrative of the great historian conveyed an exquisite irony, 'go not against the Scythians first. I have heard of the beauty of the women of Hellas, and I desire to have Lakonian and Argive and Athenian and Corinthian maidens to be my servants. Go then against Hellas: and thou hast here one who above all men can show thee how thou mayest do this,—I mean him who has healed thy foot.' Dareios so far yielded as to say that Demokedes should serve as a guide to the Persians whom he would send to spy out Hellas and bring back an account of what they might see there. These men were strictly charged to see that Demokedes came back with

them. Demokedes himself was also ordered to return with the spies, but Dareios bade him take as gifts for his father and his kinsfolk all the movable goods in his house, telling him that he would give him much more when he came back. Demokedes, fearing that this might be a trap to catch him, refused to do this; but he did not say nay to the offer of a ship laden with good things for distribution among his friends. Accordingly fifteen Persian officers left Sidon with Demokedes in two triremes, followed by a merchant-vessel carrying the gifts. Sailing along the coasts of Hellas, they made a record of all that they saw until they came to Taras, which the Latins called Tarentum, in Italy. There Aristophilides, the king of the Tarantines, at the suggestion of Demokedes took off the rudders of the Persian ships and shut up the Persians themselves in prison as spies; and while they were in this plight, Demokedes fled away to Kroton. Having given his friend time to escape, Aristophilides let the Persians go; and these, hastening to Kroton, found Demokedes in the Agora. But when they laid hands on him, the men of Kroton beat them with clubs, and took away not only Demokedes but the gift-vessel of Dareios. Thus, having lost their guide, the Persians prepared to return home; and Demokedes charged them as a parting message to tell Dareios that he had married the daughter of Milon the wrestler, a man whose name was very great with the king, and with whom, Herodotos adds, Demokedes was eager to ally himself by way of proving to Dareios his own importance in Hellas.⁷¹⁷ But the misfortunes of the Persians were not yet ended. They were wrecked on the Iapygian coast, and made slaves; but a Tarantine exile named Gillos ransomed them and took them to Dareios, who promised to give him whatever he might ask. More scrupulous than Demokedes, Gillos asked that the men of Knidos who were friends of the Tarantines should be charged to get the sentence of banishment against Gillos rescinded. But the Knidians were unable to effect this by persuasion, and they

⁷¹⁷ Of Milon it must be said that the exploits attributed to him by Diodoros could be received as facts only on some clear contemporary evidence. In this case we have none; and the stories told of him are much like reflexions of tales related about Herakles. See page 153.

were not strong enough to use force. So fared the first Persians who visited Hellas to the west of the Egean sea.

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It is useless to speculate on the amount of knowledge which we might have obtained from the records of this Persian Periplous, if they had been preserved, when the point to be determined is whether the Periplous was made at all. It is not easy to believe that two armed triremes convoying a rich merchant-vessel should be allowed to sail peaceably along the shores of the Peloponnesos (near those of Attica, as the Peisistratidai were reigning, they might be safe), still less to enter the ports of those who, probably, would gladly take the opportunity of exacting some vengeance for the wrongs done to Asiatic Hellenes. The results of Persian observation would probably in any case have had but little value: but when we remember the unlikelihood of the story, we must at the least place it amongst the tales of which we can neither affirm nor deny the reality. The plan of Demokedes was to obtain his freedom at the possible cost of the ruin of his country: the plan of Atossa clearly was to precipitate the whole power of Persia upon Hellas at a time when Hippias was still tyrant of Athens, and when the Persian could have encountered no serious resistance, unless perhaps from the mountaineers of the Peloponnesos. This plan confessedly failed: but there is no record that Dareios expressed any indignation at the treatment of his officers. The accidental mischief done by the Athenians at Sardeis during the Ionic revolt so roused his wrath, it is said, that he ordered a slave every day before dinner to bid him remember that people: but here we have no sign that the insults offered to his men are regarded as any reason for hastening a movement against the Greeks. As a political motive, these intrigues are thus superfluous, and it is clear that the testimony of Demokedes in his own behalf would be worthless, while that of the Persians who went with him could not in all likelihood be obtained. All that can be said in favour of the narrative is that, unlike the stories of Deiokes or of the seven conspirators against Smerdis, it is, at least in its earlier scenes, so strictly Oriental in its colouring as to come before us with a specially deceptive force. It

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and in-
trigues of
Atossa.

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is quite in accordance with the manners of the seraglio that great enterprises should spring from some passing whim of a favourite wife or slave, or that the vexation of a moment should give birth to gigantic expeditions without a thought of the result. But if the plausible form thus assumed by the story of Demokedes, as by the later episode of Histiaios, may tempt us to think that pictures thus true to Persian character cannot be without some historical value, it is none the less a necessary evil of all traditional history that it imposes on us the constant task of sifting evidence and balancing probabilities: and if even contemporary records so often involve the same necessity, the difficulty becomes vastly greater when we deal with records which with a certain amount of historical fact mingle not a little of deliberate fiction or falsehood. A conclusion of the greatest importance is thus forced upon us. The different impressions which even eye-witnesses receive of the same events and the same scenes, the effect of time whether in enhancing or weakening those impressions in the same mind, the irresistible temptation or the unconscious tendency to vary the colouring of a story at each successive recital, must justify a strong reluctance to admit the truthfulness of vivid or minute detail in any but a contemporary narrative. This reluctance must pass into positive unbelief, if the tradition involves an imputation of improbable or unaccountable motives or assigns some secondary or irrelevant causes where more simple and forcible motives are not wanting. There is nothing to startle us when we meet with instances of inordinate influence exercised by Oriental wives or slaves. There is nothing in itself unlikely in the tale that Dareios was incited by his wife Atossa⁷¹⁸ to an attack on Athens and Sparta. But the admission of her influence cannot necessarily lead us to admit motives which are improbable in the case of Demokedes, which are more unlikely still in the case of Histiaios, and fairly pass the bounds of credibility in that of Themistokles. The very completeness of the picture drawn for us in the story of the Krotoniate physician may reasonably lead us to question whether these

⁷¹⁸ This woman, in the emphatic phrase of Herodotos, vii. 3, had, like the Validi Sultanas of modern times, 'all the power.'

are the genuine movements which stirred the ancient world. Polykrates is undoubtedly an historical person : but the tale of his life is in great part a romance to illustrate an ethical or theological theory : and the image of Demokedes already grows more indistinct, when we see that his career is almost more legendary than that of his master. That he was carried to Sousa and that he there acquired influence first over Dareios, then over his wife, are statements which, however likely, need some better confirmation before we can regard them as certain. It is easier to impute a detestable treachery to Demokedes than to show the necessity of the motive. If from the general colour of the narrative we may believe that Polykrates and not Amasis broke off the friendship which existed between them, we may certainly adduce the aggressive necessities of all Eastern empires in their growth as explaining adequately the collision of the Lydian and Persian kings. The fall of Kroisos had brought the Persians into direct conflict with the Asiatic Greeks ; and through these a struggle was from the first inevitable with their kinsmen in the west. Hence Atossa needed not the words of Demokedes to make her seek Hellenic maidens as her slaves : and still more important is it to note that the inscription at Behistun is very far from bearing out her rebuke of Dareios for warlike inactivity in the first or in any other part of his reign. The matter is not mended if we say that the words of Atossa were true and that the records of the inscription are false. These may fairly be received as the genuine work of Dareios : for the words of Atossa we can have no evidence beyond that which is attributed to a vile and deliberate traitor.⁷¹⁹

When from the story of Demokedes we turn to the second tale, that, namely, of the Scythian expedition, the residuum of historical fact is found to be scarcely less scanty. That Artabanos⁷²⁰ should give to his brother Dareios warnings

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Scythian
expedition.
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⁷¹⁹ They are seemingly inconsistent with the words in which Herodotus himself describes the condition of things early in the reign of Dareios. See page 357.

Mr. Grote, having dwelt on the probable results of a Persian invasion of Hellas, while Athens was still in the hands of the Peisistratidai, remarks that 'the history of any nation, considered as a sequence of causes and effects affording applicable knowledge, requires us to study not merely real events but also imminent contingencies,—events which were on the point of occurring, yet did not occur.' *Hist. Gr.* iv. 352. Nothing can be more true : but it must in all fairness be added that the evidence, which is to prove that the invasion of Dareios as suggested by Demokedes was ever on the point of occurring, seems to crumble away when we touch it.

⁷²⁰ Herod. iv. 83.

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such as those which Solon gave to Kroisos, or Kroisos to Cyrus and Kambyzes, or Artabanos himself afterwards to Xerxes, is just what we should expect; and perhaps we ought not to be surprised at being told that Dareios gathered at the Thrakian Bosporos 600 ships and an army of 700,000 men. The presence of the tyrants of the Hellenic cities with their troops is better evidence that the Persian king reached the spot where by his order the Samian Mandrokles had thrown a bridge of boats across the Bosporos. But, in truth, with a narrative so full of difficulties nothing more can be done than to tell the tale as the historian has told it; and thus we follow the march of his land forces through Thrace past the sources of the Tearos, where the best of men sets up a pillar declaring that he has found the best of all waters, past the Artiskos where great cairns raised by the placing of one stone only by each of his men attested the greatness of his army, until they reach the spot where the Ionians whose ships had been sent round by the Black Sea had already prepared the bridge of boats by which he was to cross over. This bridge, after all had crossed over, Dareios, it is said, gave orders to break up: but Kôês of Mytilene warned him, not of the danger of defeat in battle, for this he professed to regard as impossible, but of starvation in a country where there were no settled dwellings and no tillage. The king, following his advice, commanded the Ionians to guard the bridge for sixty days, and, if he should not by that time have come back, then to break it up and sail away,—his notion being that he should, if successful, find his way back into Asia by marching through countries bordering on the Euxine, or that if he failed to find the enemy or to get food for his army, he should come back to the bridge, and that in either case his task would certainly be performed within sixty days. The story of the campaign which follows is told with an abundance of detail illustrating the plan of the Scythians to avoid all battles but to entice the Persians continually further from their base of supplies, if they thought of having any, through the countries of those nations who would not take part with them in the war. In this way the Persians are lured across the Tanais and to the banks of the Oaros, which,

like the Lykos, Tanais, and Syrgis, is represented as flowing into the Maïetian lake (Azoff). Near this river Dareios orders the construction of eight large walls or forts, which were left half-finished. At this point the Scythians who act as decoys begin to move westwards; and Dareios, taking it to be a general movement of the tribes, orders his army to march in the same direction. Accordingly, they wander on through the lands of the Black Coats (Melanchlainoi), the Cannibals (Anthropophagoi), and other tribes, whom the Scythians wished to punish, until Dareios in sheer weariness sent a herald to the Scythian king to beg him either to come forward and fight like a man or to give earth and water as a slave. 'Tell your master,' said the wandering chief, 'that he is quite mistaken if he thinks that we are running away from him. The fact is that we are only doing now what we always do, for it is our way to move about. If he wants to fight us, let him find out the tombs of our forefathers; and if he lay hands on them, he shall soon know how the Scythians can strike.' So Dareios was obliged to go on his way, finding his most efficient allies in the donkeys and mules of his army, which by their braying or by their odd look frightened the Scythian cavalry. But the monotony of his course was at last broken by the arrival of a Scythian herald who brought as gifts for the king not earth and water but a bird and a mouse, a frog and five arrows, and, having left them, went his way. Summoning his chief men, Dareios expressed his opinion that by these gifts the Scythians meant that they yielded up themselves, their land, and their water, because the mouse lives on the land and the frog in the water, and the bird signified the horses of warriors and the arrows showed that they gave up their power. But Gobryas, one of the six who rose up with him against the Magian Smerdis, gave another interpretation and warned the Persians that, unless they could become birds and fly up into heaven, or go down like mice beneath the earth or becoming frogs leap into the lake, they would be shot to death by the Scythian arrows. The words of Gobryas struck a chill into the heart of Dareios; but while he with his bulky army made what speed he could to reach the bridge on the

Danube, a body of Scythians taking a shorter road hastened to the Ionians who were guarding it, and urged them to abandon their trust, not only because by so doing they would free themselves but because they were acting unrighteously in aiding and abetting a wanton invader. The advice of Miltiades, the future victor of Marathon, was that they should do as the Scythians wished. But although the other despots there present gave at first an eager assent, they at once changed their minds when Histiaios of Miletos warned them that without the help of Dareios they could not possibly hope to retain their power; and thus Miltiades stood by himself against eleven tyrants, six of whom were from the Hellespont while four ruled over Ionian cities, the eleventh being the Aiolian Aristagoras of Kymê.⁷²¹ Still it was necessary to do something to get rid of the Scythian army on the banks of the river. The Ionians therefore pretended to accept their proposal, and setting to work to loosen the bridge on the Scythian side, urged them to go in search of the Persian host and destroy it. The Scythians accordingly hurried off, but were as unsuccessful now in finding the Persians as the Persians had been in tracking them. Nay, Dareios contrived to escape two Scythian armies, for, when after receiving the gifts and still more on hearing that the Scythians were running after a hare in their camp he felt that it was high time to retreat, he left all his sick or useless men in the camp together with the mules and asses, which in their comparative loneliness brayed more loudly than ever and convinced the Scythians that the Persians were still holding their ground. Meanwhile Dareios was hurrying to the Istros. It was night when they reached the bridge: and when they found that the boats were unloosed, they feared greatly that the Ionians had left them to perish. But Dareios commanded an Egyptian in his army who had a very loud voice to call Histiaios of Miletos; and at the first

⁷²¹ Among the Hellespontine despots was Hippoklos of Lampsakos, whose name is closely linked with that of Hippias (see p. 218). The marriage of Archedike the daughter of Hippias with Aiantides, the son of Hippoklos, took place probably 514 B.C., four years before the expulsion of the Peisistratidai from Athens. At this time Hippoklos is spoken of as a man of great influence with the Persian king; and as it is assumed that this influence was gained by his fidelity in the matter of the bridge on the Danube, it is inferred that the Scythian expedition must have taken place before that date, and probably about 518 B.C. The conjecture is plausible; but it is a conjecture.

cry Histiaios had the bridge fastened again. Thus the Persians got over in safety; and the Scythians on learning how they had been tricked comforted themselves by reviling the Ionians as cowards who hug their chains.

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We may smile at details which we might suppose that even children would despise; but only by a summary of the whole narrative can it be shown that no one part of the story is really more trustworthy than any other. It is quite true that the record of all that takes place on the Scythian side of the Danube is like a bewildering dream. The great rivers which water the vast regions on the north of the Black Sea are forgotten by the historian in his description of the wanderings of a million of men through a country which yielded no food and in many places no water. The Greek settlement of Olbia and the half-Hellenic half-Scythian population of that region are never mentioned, while it is stated that the Scythians, as they retreated, destroyed, so far as they could, even the herbage which might keep the beasts alive. An eastward march of 700 or 800 miles in which no great stream seemingly is crossed except the Tanais, and in which the Scythians never attack them, when to attack them would be to destroy them utterly, is followed by a march of a like length westward, with the same result. The tale is incredible from beginning to end; but there is nothing to justify the belief that we enter the world of reality on the Thracian bank of the Istros. The knowledge of the Greeks was undoubtedly confined to that bank of the river; but apart from contemporary evidence we have no means of determining what the extent of that knowledge may have been. The motive assigned for the expedition is the desire of Dareios to avenge the wrong done by the Scythians to the Median empire about a hundred years before: but this motive is scarcely more constraining than that which is supposed to have taken the Persians to Egypt to avenge the slaughter of their remote forefathers by Rameses or Sesostris. The story of the ignominious retreat of Dareios must be compared with that of the still more ignominious retreat of Xerxes; and if there be good reason for calling into question the later tradition, not much can be urged in favour of the older. It is possible

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narrative
of the
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that the Milesian logographer Hekataios, who afterwards took part in the Ionic revolt, may have been present at the bridge on the Danube; but there is no proof that any of his writings contained an account of the Scythian expedition. But in truth the incidents in the guarding of this bridge are even more bewildering than any which were supposed to have taken place in the rugged deserts of Scythia. Even under the circumstances as they are given in the narrative, there is no need to suppose a haste to cross the river so pressing as to make it impossible to wait till the day had dawned. Still more absurd is it, with the noise of a vast army in disorderly retreat, to introduce the Egyptian herald with his Stentorian voice to rouse the attention of Histiaios. If any debates took place among the guardians of the bridge, we cannot decide what amount of exaggeration or even of wilful falsehood may have been introduced into the report of them. If there were any debates, the Ionians by their refusal to unloose the bridge lost an opportunity of inflicting a great blow on the Persian power: but it is not easy to see why or how the death of Dareios should have emancipated them from Persian dominion, or more than temporarily deferred the invasion of Greece, when, if we are to believe the story, the death even of Cyrus himself after humiliating defeat in an enemy's country had no appreciable influence on the aggressive designs of the Persian kings. But we may bring the matter to a clearer issue. Either the Ionians were faithful to Dareios, or they were not. Either the Scythians were in earnest in their efforts to defend their country and to defeat the invaders, or they were not. Under either alternative it is impossible to give any credit to the story of the incidents which are supposed to have taken place at the bridge. Whether the Greeks wished to abandon Dareios or to save him, they would in either case have urged the Scythians to remain on the bank,—in the one case that these Scythians might destroy the Persian army in the desperate confusion caused by the efforts of an unwieldy multitude caught in a deadly snare,—in the other that they might fall victims to a host which in the belief of the Mytilenaian Kôês could not possibly be defeated by Scythian hordes. On the other hand, whatever

may be the stupidity of wandering tribes, the folly attributed to the Scythians exceeds that which might well be ascribed to Australian savages. An enormous and unmanageable army is lost in a trackless desert or has to cross rivers which may not be forded; and yet during a march of sixteen hundred miles not an effort is made by a determined enemy to intrap or crush them. Nay more,—the Scythians are represented as knowing perfectly well the position of the Persian army at every stage of their march; and therefore, as knowing that Dareios was in full retreat for the bridge, they knew that he and his army must cross it or speedily perish. Yet they are infatuated enough to depart at the bidding of the Ionians to go and look for an enemy, whom, if only they remained where they were, they might assuredly slaughter at their ease. Had there been in these Scythians, as they are here described, one spark of the wit and energy of Attila or Timour, their address to the Ionians might have called on them to loosen the bridge by way of giving material help in a work which without that aid they were quite able to bring to a successful issue. They had nothing to do but to concentrate their forces on the eastern bank, leaving empty a space of a few furlongs or miles in front of the bridge; and the Persian host must have run into the jaws of utter destruction.⁷²² The folly which could forego so sure

⁷²² Herodotos refers to the evidence of some monuments which in his belief had reference to this expedition,—the first being two columns of white stone, iv. 87, which Dareios set up on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont by the bridge of the Samian Mandrokles. But even this was a mere tradition. Herodotos, indeed, saw these pillars; but he saw them not on the spot where they are said to have been erected, but at Byzantion. The inscriptions on them, he tells us, translated each other, (the one being in Greek, the other in cuneiform characters,) and contained a list of the nations and tribes composing his army: but he does not say that the inscriptions specified the purpose of the expedition. The other monuments are the eight unfinished forts on the banks of the Oaros: but all that can be fairly inferred from the language of Herodotos is 'that he had seen near the sea of Azoff some remains of fortifications, the construction of which was attributed by the natives to Darius.' Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* ii. 507.

It would seem, at first sight, that Æschylos must have followed a different tradition. In his play of the *Persians* he makes neither reference nor allusion to the Scythian expedition, while the language which he puts into the mouth of Dareios seems altogether to exclude it. Dareios here speaks of the catastrophe which had befallen Xerxes as a fit retribution for his impiety in bridging over the Hellespont. It certainly is just possible that the poet may have purposely exhibited Dareios as lying by implication; and the conquests which, *Persians*, 864, he is said to have made without crossing the Halys or even without moving from his hearth can refer only to conquests achieved by his generals while he himself remained at home. But it seems more likely that neither Æschylos nor his audience knew anything of the Scythian expedition; and it must be remembered that no light whatever is thrown on it by the inscriptions at Behistun. As to the Athenians, we can scarcely suppose that they would have much greater regard for Dareios than for Xerxes, or that they would have allowed the poet to exhibit the latter as the first to lay profane hands on the sacred waters of the Hellespont, when

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and easy a means of vengeance is so stupendous that we are driven to dismiss the story of the Scythian campaign of Dareios as unhistorical in all its details, even if it be admitted that any such expedition ever took place at all. But it is perfectly natural that the Hellenic tradition should represent the defeat of the Persian king as more disastrous than it really was. That it has thus over-coloured the disorder of the flight of Xerxes, we shall presently see; but we may note here the significant circumstance that with the passage of the Danube on his return all the difficulties of Dareios disappear. It was his wish that the Thrakians should be made his subjects; and his general Megabazos bears down all opposition with a vigour which the incapacity of the Persians on the northern side of the Danube would not lead us to expect, and to which we might suppose that Scythian revenge would offer some hindrance. If the information of Herodotos be trustworthy, they made a raid as far as the Chersonesos, and even sent to Sparta to propose a joint attack on the Persian power.⁷²³ Is it likely that they would have sought rather to expel Miltiades⁷²⁴ than to smite down the army of Megabazos? But from the Scythians Megabazos encounters no resistance; and his course to the Strymon is one of uninterrupted conquest. Near the mouth of this river was the Edonian town of Myrkinos, in a neighbourhood rich in forests and corn-land as well as in mines of gold and silver. Here, when the great king announced his wish to reward his benefactors, Histiaios begged that he might be suffered to take up his abode, while Kôês contented himself with asking that he might be made despot of Mytilene. But Megabazos advanced still further westward, and there received, it is said, the orders of Dareios to transport into Asia the Paionian people, of whom he had seen at Sardeis a wonderful specimen in the form of a woman who was able with a water-jar on her head both to spin flax and to lead a horse to watering.⁷²⁵ Lastly from the lake of

they knew that the same offence had been committed by the man whose phantom upbraids his infatuated son. They would have demanded an equal sentence on both, illustrating the action of the Divine Nemesis in the cases of the son and the father alike.

⁷²³ Hero. d. vi. 40.

⁷²⁴ See Appendix F.

⁷²⁵ A like story is told by Nikolaos of Damascus of the Lydian king Alyattes. Such

Prasiai the Persian general sent envoys to the Makedonian Amyntas. This chief gave them earth and water, but was not able to save them from the vengeance which his son Alexandros took for insults offered to the women of the royal household. The supremacy of the Persian king was at the same time extended to Lemnos, an island inhabited, it is said, by a Pelasgian population; and Lykarètos, the brother of the Samian Maiandrios, was appointed governor. But Lemnos was not to remain long under Persian power. When the resources of the empire were being strained to suppress the Ionic revolt, the Athenian Miltiades, sailing from Elaïos in the Chersonesos, made a descent on the island, which with Skyros, subsequently conquered, remained henceforth most closely connected with Athènes. The tradition received by Herodotos represents the Pelasgian inhabitants of Hephaistiaia as yielding readily to the summons of Miltiades that they should quit the island in compliance with their own promise to depart so soon as a ship should accomplish the voyage between Attica and Lemnos in a single day. The Chersonesos was now Attic soil, and Miltiades had landed at Lemnos before the close of the day on which he had set off from Elaïos.⁷²⁶ The men of Myrina surrendered their city only after an obstinate siege. The island was filled with Athenian Klerouchoi, or settlers, who, as such, retained all their privileges as citizens, while they supplied a military force not included in the ordinary Athenian army.

repetition of striking tales, Mr. Grote remarks, has many parallels in ancient history: but it is safer to regard them as floating traditions than to assign them definitely to any fixed times or places.

⁷²⁶ That we have nothing to guide us in fixing a definite date to this conquest of Lemnos by Miltiades, the reader will see by referring to Appendix F.

CHAPTER IV.

THE IONIC REVOLT.

BOOK
II.
Dareios
and the
Athenians.

502 B.C.

WHEN after the outbreak of the Ionic revolt a joint expedition of Athenians and Ionians under the Milesian Aristagoras led to the accidental burning of Sardeis, Dareios, we are told, on hearing the tidings, asked who the Athenians might be, and, on being informed, shot an arrow into the air, praying Zeus to suffer him to take vengeance on this folk. About the Ionians and their share in the matter he said nothing. These he knew that he might punish as he might choose: but so careful was he not to forget the foreigners who had done him wrong, that an attendant received orders to bid his master before every meal to remember the Athenians.⁷²⁷ If the chronology of this period may at all be trusted, ten or twelve years had passed away since Hippias allied himself with Hippoklos, the Lampsakene despot, on the express ground that he stood high in the favour of Dareios; and eight years perhaps had gone by since Hippias, expelled from Athens, departed to Sigeion with the definite purpose of stirring up the Persian king against his countrymen. His intrigues were probably not less active than those of James II. at St. Germain's: and his disappointment at the congress in Sparta⁷²⁸ probably sent him back to the Hellespont not less determined to regain his power by fair means or by foul. We may be sure that the friendship of Hippoklos was taxed to this end to the uttermost; and we may well believe the words of Herodotos that from the moment of his return from Sparta he left not a stone unturned to provoke Artaphernes, the Sardian satrap, to the conquest of Athens, in order that the Peisistratidai might hold it as

⁷²⁷ Herod. v. 105.

⁷²⁸ See page 241.

tributaries of Dareios. The conclusion seems to follow irresistibly that Dareios had heard the whole story of their expulsion, and that he gave no such answer to their prayers as effectually to discourage their importunities. The acts, of which we have here a significant glimpse, were not done in a corner. The Athenians were perfectly aware of the way in which Hippias was employing himself at Sardeis; and their ambassadors, appearing before Artaphernes, laid before him the whole state of the case, and urged every available argument to dissuade the Persian king from interfering in the affairs of the Western Greeks. The answer of Artaphernes (and we cannot suppose that it was given without the full sanction of Dareios) charged the Athenians, if they valued their safety, to receive Hippias again as their tyrant. The Athenians retorted by a flat refusal, and interpreting the words of Artaphernes as a practical declaration of war⁷²⁹ were induced to aid Aristagoras with a force of twenty ships, which Herodotos regarded as a beginning of evils both to the barbarians and to the Greeks.⁷³⁰ Yet these are the people of whom Dareios, on hearing of the burning of Sardeis with the temple of Kybêbê, speaks as though he had never so much as heard their name. This is a sample of the details which form the greater part of the narrative of the Ionic revolt, and furnishes a measure of their general trustworthiness. In short, these details are essentially dramatic, not historical; and the question of Dareios balances the inquiry of Cyrus, when the Spartan Lakrines warns him against doing hurt to any Hellenic city.⁷³¹

For the Ionic revolt, as in the earlier portions of the history, the traditional narrative must be given in its integrity. In no other way can we hope to determine the degree of trust which may be placed in it. The story takes us back to the time when Dareios, having recrossed the Danube, rewarded his supposed benefactors Kôês and Histiaios, and Megabazos found his way to Sardeis with the Paionians whom he was charged to transport into Asia.

⁷²⁹ Herod. v. 96. It is in these incidental remarks that we have the real history of the time, for even in the narrative of the Ionic revolt the details are uncertain when they come from Hellenic sources, and perhaps altogether untrustworthy when the informants are Persians.

⁷³⁰ Herod. v. 96

⁷³¹ *Ib.* i. 152.

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502 B.C. (?)

This general carried with him the tidings that Histiaios was busily occupied in fortifying Myrkinos, and warned Dareios of the great imprudence of allowing him to establish there a power which might become formidable even to the great king. Unless the enterprise were nipped in the bud, the Greeks and barbarians round about the city would take Histiaios for a chief and do his will by day and by night. If therefore war was to be avoided, Histiaios must be removed beyond the reach of temptation. So a messenger was sent to Myrkinos with a letter in which Dareios told him that, as he purposed to do great things, he needed the help of his counsel forthwith at Sardeis. Thither Histiaios hastened, delighted with a summons which proved his importance, and was received by Dareios with the bland assurance that there is nothing more precious than a wise and kind friend. 'This, I know, thou art to me,' added the king, 'for I have learnt it not by thy words, but by thy deeds. So now thou must leave Miletos and thy Thracian city, and come with me to Sousa. There thou shalt sit at my table and all that I have shall be thine.' But although Histiaios was thus carried into splendid captivity, the causes of disquiet were not removed, for either he or the king had placed the government of Miletos in the hands of Aristagoras, a nephew of Histiaios; and the help of Aristagoras was now sought by some oligarchic exiles whom the people of Naxos had driven out. This island, we are told, was defended by 8,000 heavy-armed troops and had a large fleet of war-ships. But although Aristagoras would gladly have made himself master of Naxos and of the large group to which it belonged, he felt that his own power alone could not achieve the task, and he told them that they must have the help of Artaphernes, the brother of the great king. The exiles in their turn besought him to stint nothing in promises. They would pay him well for his aid and would further take on themselves the costs of the expedition. To Artaphernes, therefore, Aristagoras held out, with these inducements, the further bait that the conquest of Naxos would bring with it the possession of Paros, Andros, and the other islands known as the *Kyklades*, and probably of the great and wealthy island of Euboea, which would give him the command of a

large portion of the Boiotian and Attic coast. One hundred ships, he said, would amply suffice for the enterprise;—but Artaphernes, expressing a hearty assent to the plan, promised him two hundred vessels, while Dareios, when the report of Artaphernes was laid before him, expressed his full approval of the scheme. The general appointed to command the expedition was Megabates, a cousin of Dareios and Artaphernes, who sailed with the fleet from Miletos professedly for the Hellespont, but stopped at the Kaukasian promontory of Chios that he might sail down on Naxos with a north wind. But it had been destined, adds the historian, that the Naxians should not be destroyed by the army under Megabates and Aristagoras. That night, as it so happened, no watch was kept on board a Myndian vessel; and Megabates in his anger ordered Skylax the captain of the ship to be placed in one of the oar-holes with his head hanging out over the water. To the prayer of Aristagoras that he would release his friend Megabates would not listen. Aristagoras therefore released the man himself; and when the Persian on learning this became even more vehement, Aristagoras told him that Artaphernes had sent him as a subordinate, not as a master. Megabates made no reply; but as soon as it was dark, he sent a vessel to warn the Naxians of their peril and to acquaint them with all that had happened. The result was that, when the fleet approached the island, the Naxians were well prepared. Four months passed away. The money which Megabates and Aristagoras had brought was all spent, and the Naxians were not subdued. Aristagoras further suspected that Megabates meant to deprive him of his power at Miletos; and the result of his deliberations was a determination to revolt, in which he was confirmed, it is said, by a message which at this time he chanced to receive from Histiaios. This man, it seems, like Demokedes, was ready to sacrifice his country and his friends, if only he might win what he called his freedom. Having shaved the head of his most trusty servant, he tattooed a message upon it, and then having kept him till his hair was again grown, he sent him to Miletos with the simple charge that Aristagoras should shave his head and look at it. Aristagoras there read

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The mis-
sion of
Aristagoras
at Sparta
and at
Athens.
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advice which jumped with his own conclusions, and made up his mind to begin the revolt which Histiaios hoped that he might be sent down to suppress.

In the council which Aristagoras then convoked the logographer Hekataios warned them that they could not expect to cope with the Persian power, but that, if they resolved to run the risk, they should at the least take care that they had the command of the sea. He further urged them to seize the vast wealth of the oracle at Branchidai, if only to make sure that these resources should not fall into the hands of the enemy. His advice was rejected; but a ship was sent to Myous, where the army was encamped on its return from Naxos, with orders to seize on such of the Hellenic tyrants as might be found there. Among the despots thus seized were Aristagoras of Kymê and the more notorious Kôês of Mytilene, who had counselled Dareios not to break up the bridge on the Danube. These were all given up to the people of their respective cities by Aristagoras who, in name at least, surrendered his own power at Miletos, in order to insure greater harmony and enthusiasm in the conduct of the enterprise. Aristagoras of Kymê and the rest were allowed by their former subjects to depart unhurt, the only exception being Kôês who was stoned to death. Thus having put down the tyrants and ordered the citizens of the towns to choose each their own Strategos or general, the Milesian Aristagoras sailed away in the hope of getting help from that great city from which Kroisos and Hippias had alike sought aid and which had risen to a kind of natural supremacy in Hellas. The alliance with Kroisos had been readily accepted by the Spartans: they had done their utmost to promote the interests of Hippias: they had sent a commission to inquire into the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks when the Ionians prayed for aid against Cyrus. Aristagoras therefore went hopefully, bearing with him a brazen tablet on which was drawn a map of the world, as then known, with all the rivers and every sea. Having reached Sparta, he pleaded his cause earnestly before king Kleomenes. He dwelt on the slavery of the Asiatic Greeks as a disgrace to the city which had risen to the headship of Hellas, and on the wealth as well as the glory

which with little trouble and risk they could assuredly win. The trousered and turbaned Persians who fought with bows and javelins it would be no specially hard task to vanquish; and the whole land from Sardeis to Sousa would then be for the Spartans one continuous mine of wealth. From the Lydians and Phrygians, from the Kappadokians and Kili-kians, from the Armenians, Matienians, and Kissians, they might divert to more seemly Hellenic uses the tribute which now went to swell the hoards of a barbarian despot. As conquerors of such a country, they might vie with Zeus himself for riches and power: was it then worth while to wrangle with Messenians and Arkadians for the possession of a few rugged hills and stony valleys? The picture was tempting; but when Aristagoras appeared again, on the third day to receive the final answer, he was asked how far it might be from the coast to Sousa. 'A three months' journey,' said the unlucky Aristagoras, who was going on to show how easily it might be accomplished,⁷³² when Kleomenes bade him leave Sparta before the sun went down. There seemed to be yet one last hope. With a suppliant's branch Aristagoras went to the house of Kleomenes. Finding him with his daughter Gorgo, the future wife of the far-famed Leonidas, he asked that the child, then eight or nine years old, should be sent away. The king bade him say what he wished in her presence; and the Milesian, beginning with a proffer of ten talents, had raised the bribe to a sum of fifty talents, when the child cried out, 'Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not go away.' Kleomenes rose up and went into another house; and Aristagoras, leaving Sparta with the story of the easy march from Sardeis to Sousa untold,⁷³³ hastened to Athens. Here to his glowing descriptions he added the plea that Miletos was a colony from Athens and that to help the Milesians was a clear duty. The historian remarks that Aristagoras found it easier to deceive thirty thousand Athenian citizens than a solitary Spartan, for the Athenians at once promised to send twenty ships under the

⁷³² A feat perhaps even more hazardous was actually achieved in the march of the Ten Thousand with Xenophon.

⁷³³ In fact, the difficulties lay rather in the imagination of the Spartans than in the reality. There was an excellent road the whole way, of which Herodotos gives a minute account, with the number of the stages. v. 52-54.

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command of Melanthios.⁷³⁴ But he forgot that the circumstances of the two cities were widely different. The futile threats of Lakrines, if they were ever uttered, were probably no longer remembered: but the aid of the Persians had not only been invoked against Athens but definitely promised, and the Athenians had been assured that they were courting ruin if they refused to submit once more to the yoke of Hippias. Athens, therefore, as Herodotos himself had asserted, was already virtually at war with Persia; and in pledging themselves to help Aristagoras,[†] they were entering on a course which after a severe struggle secured to them abundant wealth and a brilliant empire.⁷³⁵

The
burning of
Sardeis.

At last Aristagoras reached Miletos with the twenty Athenian ships and five which were sent by the Eretrians in gratitude for help received from the Milesians during the war with their neighbours of Chalkis. There he set in order an expedition to Sardeis, at the head of which he placed his brother Charopinos as a colleague of Hermippos. These generals sailed with the Athenians to Koressos in the Ephesian territory, and there leaving their ships were guided by Ephesians along the banks of the Kaystros and across the ridges of Tmolos. Sardeis was occupied without any resistance, Artaphernes being unable to do more than hold the Akropolis; but the accidental burning of a hut (the Sardinian houses were built wholly of reeds or had reed roofs) caused a conflagration which so terrified all the Lydians and Persians that they rushed with frantic eagerness to the Agora. The Athenians, fearing to be overborne by mere numbers, retreated to the heights of Tmolos, and as soon as it was dark hastened away to their ships. The fire at Sardeis

⁷³⁴ Herodotos, v. 97, speaks of these ships as the beginning of troubles to the Hellenes and the barbarians. The statement is true if it be construed simply as meaning that this was the first actual step taken by the Western Hellenes in the already predetermined struggle with Persia. That these ships had nothing to do with bringing about the contest, the account given by Herodotos himself of the fortunes and intrigues of the Peisistratidai abundantly shows.

⁷³⁵ Herodotos describes as the next step of Aristagoras a measure from which the Ionians could expect no benefit but which would certainly annoy Dareios. The Paionians, whom Megabazos had brought into Asia, had been settled in some Phrygian villages. Aristagoras sent them a message that, if they would find their way to the sea, he would see that they were safely taken home. Most of them gladly accepted the invitation; and it is pleasant to learn that they had just reached the coast when a large Persian force came in chase of them, and that by the help of the Chians and Lesbians they once more saw the banks of the Strymon. Herod. v. 98.

by destroying the temple of Kybêbê furnished, it is said, an excuse for the deliberate destruction of the temples in Western Hellas by the army of Xerxes: but a more speedy punishment awaited the Ionians who were overtaken at Ephesos by the Persians and signally defeated in a battle in which among other notable men fell the Eretrian general Eualkidas, a man much praised, as Herodotos tells us, by the great lyric poet Simonides.⁷³⁶

The revolt now assumed a more serious character in spite of the desertion of the Athenians who refused absolutely to give any further help to the Ionians. The latter, sailing to the Hellespont, prevailed on the citizens of Byzantion and the neighbouring towns to take part in the revolt. The Karians for the most part also joined, and even the Kaunians threw in their lot with them when they heard of the burning of Sardeis. Still more important was the adhesion of Kypros (Cyprus), in which large and wealthy island the city of Amathous alone remained faithful to the Persians. In vain Gorgos the king of Salamis withstood all attempts to detach him from Dareios. His brother Onesilos waited quietly until Gorgos should chance to come out of Salamis, and then shut the king out of the city. Gorgos took refuge with the Persians, while Onesilos laid siege to Amathous.

The tidings of these events, so the story runs, roused the vehement indignation of Dareios who, sending for Histiaios, frankly expressed his strong suspicion that his old friend had had a hand in the business. 'Nay,' said Histiaios, 'had I been in Ionia, these things would never have happened, if they have happened at all; and even now I pledge myself, if thou wilt let me go thither, not only to bring this revolt to an end but to add to thy empire the greatest of all islands, Sardo (Sardinia).' 'Be it so,' answered Dareios; 'but be sure, when thou hast done thy work, to come back to me here at Sousa.' So Histiaios departed on his errand: but in the meanwhile, as Onesilos besieged the Kyprian Amathous, tidings were brought of the approach of a large Persian force under Artybios. Onesilos at once sent an urgent message to the Ionians, who landed in Kypros, while the

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IV.

Extension
of the
revolt to
Byzantion
and Karia.

The mis-
sion of
Histiaios to
Sardeis.

⁷³⁶ Herod. v. 102.

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Persians advanced on foot towards Salamis, and the Phœnician fleet kept watch on the promontory known as the Keys of Kypros.⁷³⁷ On the arrival of the Ionians the Kyprian despots, who with the exception of the Amathousian tyrant had all joined in the revolt, asked them whether they would fight the Persians by land or engage the Phœnician fleet at sea. The answer of the Ionians was that they had been sent by the central authority of the confederacy⁷³⁸ to guard the sea, and that they could not change the dispositions which had been made for them. c

The revolt
of Kypros.

The Kyprians with their allies now made ready for the great struggle with their antagonists. The men of Salamis and Soloi were ranged in front of the Persians, and Onesilos took up his position facing the Persian Artybios. In the sea-fight which followed, the Phœnicians, it is said, were worsted by the Ionians. On land the Kyprians fared not so well, although in his encounter with the Persian general Onesilos had the best. The horse of Artybios, we are told, had been trained to stand on his hind-legs and dash his forefeet on any heavy-armed soldier whom he might encounter; and Onesilos had agreed with his Karian armour-bearer that the latter should smite off the horse's legs while Onesilos himself struck down Artybios. The event answered precisely to the plan: but the brilliance of this exploit was balanced by the treachery of the despot of Kourion, who deserted to the Persians, followed by all the Salaminian war-chariots. A complete defeat of the Kyprians was the result. Onesilos himself was slain along with Aristokypros, the son of that Philokypros whom Solon had reckoned among his friends. By way of retaliation the Amathousians fixed the head of Onesilos on the gate of their city, where a swarm of bees made their hive in his skull. The oracle which they consulted advised them to honour Onesilos as a hero; and the Amathousians accordingly paid to the dead a reverence which they had refused to yield to the living.

From this time the history of the Ionian revolt is little

⁷³⁷ Kleides Kuprou.

⁷³⁸ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰωνῶν. Herod. v. 109. The words show that the sense of a common and terrible danger had in some measure overcome the wretched tendency of the Hellenic tribes to political isolation and incessant quarrelling. This is the only instance in which we hear of 'a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.' Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 394.

more than a chronicle of disasters. The Ionians, seeing that in that quarter there was nothing more to be hoped, abandoned the Kyprians to their fate; and after a year of precarious freedom the island was again brought under the Persian yoke, the city of Soloi being the last to yield after a blockade of more than four months.⁷³⁹ From Sardeis the Ionians were driven to their ships by Daurises, Hymeas, and Otanes, with other Persian generals, all of whom are said to have married daughters of Dareios. Advancing thence towards the Hellespont, the Persian force, it is said, took the five cities of Dardanos, Abydos, Perkôtê, Lampsakos, and Paisos, in as many days, and was on its way to Parion, when tidings came that the Karians had broken out into rebellion. The Persian generals at once turned their arms southwards; but the news of their approach reached the Karians early enough to enable them to take up a strong position at the White Pillars (Leukai Stelai) on the banks of the Marsyas, a tributary of the Maiandros. The Karians were, it is said, advised by Pixodaros, the son of Mausolos, to cross the Maiandros that, having the river in their rear, they might fight with desperation. This mad advice, on which Herodotus bestows high praise, was rejected; but although a hope was expressed that the Persians might, if they crossed the Maiandros, be driven back into the stream, we do not hear that any effort was made to attack them while in the act of fording it. In the ensuing battle the Karians were borne down by mere numbers. The survivors, flying to Labranda, a temple of Zeus the Lord of Armies (Stratios), were there besieged, and were holding counsel on the prudence of yielding or of abandoning Asia, when the arrival of the Milesians and their allies made them resolve on renewing the struggle. The result was a defeat more terrible than that which they had already undergone, the Milesians being the greatest sufferers. But the Karian spirit was not yet broken. Having heard that the Persians were about to plunder their cities one by one, they lay in ambush under the command of Herakleides of Mylasa and cut off, seemingly, the whole

⁷³⁹ For a comparison of this conquest with the conquest of the same island by the Turks in 1570, see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 396. The modern conquerors are altogether more brutal and bloodthirsty than the Persians of Dareios.

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Persian force with Daurises, Amorges, and Sisimakes at its head.

The death
of Arista-
goras.

This catastrophe had no influence on the general issue of the revolt. On the Propontis Hymeas took the Mysian Kios, with the Aiolic cities on the Hellespont, while Klazomenai and the Aiolic Kymê yielded to the arms of Artaphernes and Otanes. The golden visions of Aristagoras had now given way to the simple desire of securing his own safety, and he hastened to suggest to the allies that they ought to be ready, in case of expulsion from Miletos, with a place of refuge whether at Myrkinos or in Sardo.⁷⁴⁰ Hekataios stoutly opposed either plan, his advice being that they should fortify themselves in Leros, an island about thirty miles to the southwest of Miletos, and there wait quietly until an opportunity should occur for returning to Miletos itself and renewing the struggle on land.⁷⁴¹ But the mind of Aristagoras was really made up before he summoned the council, and leaving Pythagoras in command of the city, he sailed to Myrkinos, of which he succeeded in taking possession. Soon after, he attacked and besieged a Thrakian city, but was surprised and slain with all his forces.

Adventures
and
death of
Histiaios.

The career of Histiaios was brought to an end not long after the death of his nephew. The narrative reads like a wild and perplexing romance; and if it represents actual fact, it assuredly illustrates the adage that truth may be stranger than fiction. On reaching Sardeis Histiaios appeared before Artaphernes in seeming ignorance of all that had happened during his stay in Sousa. 'It is just this,' said Artaphernes bluntly; 'you stitched the slipper, and Aristagoras put it on.' Histiaios took the hint thus broadly given, and making his escape to Chios was seized by the Chians who, however, gave him his freedom when they

⁷⁴⁰ Mr. Grote thinks that the notion of the Sardinian settlement was rejected, because probably no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 400. It was after all not much more distant than the Hellenic colonies of Italy, not so distant as the Phokaian Massalia, and practically less remote than Olbia and other settlements on the Black Sea: but elsewhere, *ib.* iv. 402, he speaks of an expedition to Sardinia as one 'among the favourite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day.'

⁷⁴¹ Modern researches have brought to light an inscription in which the Leriens pay honour to Hekataios as their founder or benefactor. If this be the historian, it is at the least possible that the story of the advice here ascribed to him may have been suggested by his connexion with the island. See Mure, *Critical Hist. Gr. Lit.* book iv. ch. 3, § 3.

learnt that he had come to fight against Dareios, not for him. To the question of the Ionians who wished to know why he had so eagerly urged them to revolt, he answered that Dareios had intended to place the Ionians in Phenicia and bring the Phenicians to Ionia,—a figment invented, as Herodotos believed, on the spur of the moment. His next step was to send by Hermippos of Atarneus to the Persians in Sardeis letters which spoke of a plan for revolt already concerted between them and himself. Hermippos carried the letters straight to Artaphernes who told him to give them to the persons to whom they were addressed and to bring him the answers. These, we are told, were of such a nature that Artaphernes ordered many Persians to be executed. From Chios Histiaios was at his own wish conveyed to Miletos; but the Milesians, well pleased to be rid of Aristagoras, had yielded little obedience to the rule of his deputy Pythagoras and had still less any notion of submitting to their old master. It was night when Histiaios tried to force his way into the city, and in the scuffle he received a wound in the thigh. It was clearly necessary to try some other course. His request for ships was refused by the Chians; but he succeeded in persuading the Lesbians to man eight triremes and sail under his command to Byzantion where he seized all Ionian ships entering from the Black Sea except such as were at once surrendered to him. Here he remained until he received tidings of the last and crowning disaster to the Ionian cause in the fall of Miletos; and leaving Bisaltes of Abydos in charge of matters at the Hellespont, he sailed to Chios, where he seized Polichna, and did great mischief to the islanders, many of whom were slain. From Chios he sailed with a large force, it is said, of Ionians and Aiolians to Thasos, attracted possibly by its neighbourhood to his old haunts at Myrkinos; but abandoning the siege of the island on hearing that the Phenician fleet was advancing from Miletos against the other Ionian cities, he hastened back to Lesbos, whence he crossed over to Atarneus to reap the standing corn for his army which was now starving. Here he was surprised by a troop of cavalry under Harpagos, and being overtaken in his flight he confessed to the man who was

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going to kill him that he was Histiaios of Miletos. His motive in thus surrendering himself was, it is said, the hope that he would easily be able to make his peace with Dareios; but Harpagos and Artaphernes, determined that he should never have the opportunity, ordered him to be crucified, and sent his head to Sousa, where Dareios, upbraiding those who had put him to death, gave charge that it should be washed and buried as the head of a man who had been a great benefactor to himself and to the Persians.

Credibility
of the
stories of
Aristagoras
and
Histiaios.

It is impossible to read this narrative without perceiving that its value is by no means the same throughout. There is no need to question the reality of the political movements of the Asiatic Greeks after Aristagoras had unfurled the standard of revolt down to the time when the last embers of the rebellion were crushed after the catastrophe at Miletos. But these movements are mostly given in outline, or are brought before us in incidental statements like those which tell us of the strenuous and persistent efforts of Hippias to precipitate the power of Persia upon Athens. The main body of the narrative with its fulness of detail and the sharply defined motives of the chief actors is singularly inconsistent with the course of events indicated in the less dramatic portions of the story. That the despot Aristagoras should catch at the opportunity of extending his power over Naxos and through Naxos over the other islands of the group and possibly over Euboea is as natural as that Hippias should desire the restoration of his Athenian tyranny; nor is there anything surprising in the fact that both should seek to achieve their purposes by the help of the Persian king. But the intrigues of the Naxian exiles with Aristagoras, while they furnish an occasion for Persian intervention, do not in reality explain its cause. Their influence with the tyrant of Miletos would have availed them little with the Persian satrap, apart from other reasons which determined him to take an active part against the Western Greeks. But that which Artaphernes would at once have refused to the mere prayer of some homeless oligarchs, he had granted without hesitation to the exiles of the house of Peisistratos. The counsels of Hippias had long since filled him with the hope of bring-

ing Athens itself under Persian rule; and the restoration of the tyrant to the power which he had lost was desired as the means not so much of subverting a free constitution as of extending the dominion of the great king. Henceforth the idea of Hellenic conquest became a religious passion not less than a political purpose. It led Artaphernes, as we have seen, to insist on the restoration of Hippias, when the Athenian ambassadors came to plead the cause of their city against him. It moved Dareios not less than his satrap to embrace eagerly the proposals of Aristagoras for an expedition nominally against Naxos, really against the European Greeks. Unfortunately for Aristagoras the Naxians received tidings of the intended expedition too soon; and their complete preparation foiled the efforts of their enemies, while these efforts had involved the waste of a vast amount of money, not a little of which Aristagoras had himself undertaken to provide. This is the result as it is given in the traditional narrative; and when to these facts we add the unlikelihood that the Naxians would have no hint of the large armament which was being fitted out against them, nothing more is needed to make the whole story perfectly clear and consistent. But the tale told about the Myndian vessel and the punishment of its captain requires us to believe that the Persian officer placed in command of this large fleet, an officer who had thus far displayed a zeal and carefulness in his master's service very unusual in his countrymen, should in a moment become a deliberate traitor from a mere feeling of personal pique. In order to show Aristagoras that he will take no insult, he calmly sends to the Naxians tidings which he knew would in all likelihood defeat a scheme fully sanctioned by Dareios. In the camp the transaction which led to this quarrel was notorious; and it is scarcely credible that Artaphernes should hear not a word of the feud or institute any inquiry into the causes of a military failure which might seriously compromise him with his master. We are expected, moreover, to give credit to this strange tale, when the cunning of a spy or the generous instinct of an Asiatic Greek would supply an intelligible motive for putting the Naxians on their guard, and when the task of conveying these tidings

would certainly involve no gigantic difficulty. In truth, this story, like most if not all of the dramatic narratives of Herodotus, is, even if it be true, altogether superfluous. The story of Demokedes is not in the least necessary as one in a chain of causes leading to the battle of Marathon: the story of Aristagoras and Megabates is not needed to explain the fact that the Naxians were not taken at unawares, or even that the failure of the expedition tempted Aristagoras to revolt. He had not, indeed, as some have urged, deceived Artaphernes, for the result was not in his power; but he had promised to bear the cost of maintaining the fleet, and he no longer had the means of meeting it. This alone might well seem to him an offence which Artaphernes would never pardon; and his mind would naturally revert to thoughts which probably were familiar to the Asiatic Greeks from the time when they had passed under the dominion of the Lydian monarchs and still more under the heavier yoke of the Persian kings. A slight cause might at any time rouse the slumbering fires; and the position of Aristagoras involved a serious and immediate danger. We thus come to a second story which, whatever be the amount of truth in it, is as thoroughly superfluous as that of the Myndian captain and Megabates. This story of the Milesian Histiaios is perplexing even when it relates to his doings within the range of the Hellenic world. He had asked, and obtained, the definite sanction of Dareios to found a city near the banks of the Strymon; and this work certainly involved the building of strong walls to guard the city against Thracian mountaineers. Histiaios had done no more than what he had said he was going to do, when Megabazos wrote to warn Dareios that the growing strength of Myrkinos might become a menace to his empire; nor is it easy to see how, if left to himself in his Thracian home, he could ever have become really formidable to the Persian king. Still, for the offence of doing that which the gift of Dareios wholly authorised him to do,⁷⁴² he is at the instigation of Megabazos enticed away to Sousa and made an unwilling partaker in royal magnificence

⁷⁴² If we say that the story of this grant is a fiction, we strip the tradition of its authority not less than if we call into question any other portion of it or deny its credibility altogether.

and luxury. By night and by day the thought of the freedom which he had lost oppressed him. Scheme after scheme for escape from thralldom passed through his mind; but the fear of detection made him abandon all. Like Demokedes, he remained in misery at Sousa until he was cheered by the happy thought that he might perhaps secure his freedom merely by carrying out a scheme which risked nothing more than the ruin of his country. By a chance still more happy, his message, written on the head of his slave,⁷⁴³ reached his kinsman on the seacoast just when other forcible reasons had decided him to take the step which Histiaios in pure selfishness urged upon him. But the whole story of this man's doings from the time of his leaving Sardeis to the hour when in that city he again appeared before Artaphernes must come either from Histiaios himself who according to the narrative is a systematic and shameless liar, or from a Persian source: and the recesses of a Persian palace are not less an unknown land than the vast Scythian deserts beyond the Danube. We may believe that Histiaios was carried by Dareios to Sousa: we may believe that he was sent down to the coast when the failure of the Naxian scheme had driven Aristagoras to revolt. But Dareios had certainly no reason from his own experience to suspect secret plots or to fear an active resistance from the man who had rendered him such signal service on the banks of the Istros; and a natural disposition to employ Histiaios to check disaffection or suppress rebellion could scarcely be charged with folly. Nor is it easy to think that the expressed suspicions of Artaphernes could have been set aside by Dareios on the mere word of Histiaios, if there be any truth in the story that he had already so far suspected him as to take him away from Myrkinos and keep him under his own eye at Sousa. The very fact of his being sent down to Sardeis proves that the

⁷⁴³ In these stories the slaves are generally eulogised as trusty, and as carrying the letters of Bellerophon. But the Argilian slave of the Spartan Pausanias suspected, as we shall see, that no good was in store for him at Sousa; and he had to rely only on the circumstance that previous messengers seemed to have disappeared altogether. The slave of Histiaios knew that he was carrying on his head a message which, if dangerous, Aristagoras would be tempted to hide by the death of the messenger, and which, even if Aristagoras spared his life, might expose him to deadly risk at the hands of the Persian satrap, until his hair was again grown over it. The incident of the tattooing thus becomes misty and uncertain enough.

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traditional was not the real cause for the sojourn of Histiaios at Sousa, and that Artaphernes had not expressed to the king his suspicions that Histiaios was at the bottom of the revolt of Aristagoras. As to Histiaios himself, we may well be perplexed to explain how, on the hypothesis of his guilt, he could appear before Artaphernes at all. If that satrap really believed and said that Histiaios had stitched the shoe which his nephew had put on, he would have been more than justified as a Persian viceroy in ordering him to be instantly slain. The details of oral tradition are always uncertain, and the suspicions of Artaphernes were probably expressed in a less pointed phrase; but if they were expressed at all, they might determine Histiaios to take part in a rebellion which he found himself unable to repress, and it is quite possible that he might seek to ascertain whether any Persians in Sardeis might be disposed to join him in his plans, and actually enter into the conspiracy which brought these Persians to their death.⁷⁴⁴ The sequel of his history may have been as the tradition followed by Herodotos represents it; but it is scarcely necessary to say that among a people so utterly incapable of real and permanent combination as were the Hellenes of the islands and of the Asiatic coasts the narratives of events belonging to a time of intense hurry and excitement would assume innumerable shapes and run into intricacies which it might be impossible to disentangle. It is, at the least, expressly stated in the story that Artaphernes put Histiaios to death at Sardeis because he felt doubtful of being able to establish so clear a case against him as to insure his punishment at Sousa, and that, in fact, Dareios did not believe the accusation on the strength of which his old friend had been executed.

The scheme
ascribed to

Nor is the ground wholly free from difficulties when we turn away from the strange career of the Milesian Histiaios.

⁷⁴⁴ Mr. Grote holds that the letters which he wrote to the Persians in Sardeis were merely 'framed as if he were already in established intrigue with them for revolting against Dareios, and intended to incite them to actual revolt.' *Hist. Gr.* iv. 403. This would imply that he sent the letters on the most haphazard, and that these Persians were foolish enough to be caught by the proposals of a man of whose good faith they would have not the faintest assurance. If innocent, they would at once have taken the letters to Artaphernes and declared their abhorrence of the suggestions contained in them. If they were, on the other hand, thus ready to snap at his proposal, Histiaios is convicted of egregious folly for not staying to work so promising a mine instead of running off to his barren retreat at Chios. Dr. Thirlwall understands the words of Herodotos as referring to a plot actually laid, and thinks that Histiaios was writing to these Persians on the subject of their past conversations. *Hist. Gr.* vol. II. ch. xiv.

The whole address of Aristagoras to the Spartan king Kleomenes distinctly rests on the practicability of conquering the whole Persian empire. The deliverance of the Ionic cities from a foreign and oppressive yoke is made completely subordinate to the larger scheme which is to make the Spartans masters of the vast regions lying between the Hadriatic sea and the deserts of Baktra. Such a notion might perhaps have arisen in a Greek mind when the Persian tribute-gatherers had been driven from the coasts of Asia Minor: but at the time of the Ionic revolt such an idea, if put into words, must have appeared a wild and absurd dream. But if this be so, what are we to say of the story of the map which Aristagoras is said to have exhibited at Sparta? According to the narrative the only object of his so doing was to prove the ease with which they might march from Sardeis to Sousa. It is neither stated nor implied that the purpose of the map was to acquaint them with the geography of the Hellenic cities of Asia. Such information would have been no bait to the Spartans, and would probably have been despised by them. In short, we have here another incident which may possibly have taken place, but of which the record is so inaccurate that we cannot determine its real character. The refusal of the Spartans, perplexing though it may be, to aid their kinsfolk when they had been so ready to help Kroisos, is less perplexing than the sudden and complete abandonment of the Ionians by the Athenians who must have known that by aiding them at all they would in case of failure bring down on them a far heavier and more terrible punishment. Here, again, according to the narrative, we have a people who regard themselves as virtually at war with Persia for an irreconcilable quarrel, who boldly disown the obligations contracted in their name by their faint-hearted representatives,⁷⁴⁵ whose spirit never fails them when the struggle against Persian despotism is brought to their own doors, and who yet are described as deserting those whom they had promised to help, just when the position of things seemed to be most encouraging. The main facts may have been as they are stated; but we can scarcely avoid the impression that the details

⁷⁴⁵ See note 460.

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which would have explained these facts have been lost or overlaid by popular tradition.⁷⁴⁶ Of the Kyprian revolt we need say but little. The narrative may be accepted as substantially correct except perhaps in just those vivid details which seem to impart life to the picture but which, as in the story of the conflict between Onesilos and Artybios, are probably the result of popular imagination working on materials supplied by oral tradition.

Trust-
worthiness
of details in
traditional
history.

Still more vivid is the narrative of the incidents which immediately preceded the fall of Miletos. Few probably will regard the story as self-consistent; and for some of the most important of these events Herodotos himself admits that his information was conflicting and not to be trusted. But from the stress which he lays on the counsels given from time to time by the Milesian Hekataios, the inference has been drawn that for the account of these facts we are indebted to that logographer. Hekataios may possibly have drawn up a narrative of affairs in which he seems to have taken a prominent part: but we have absolutely no authority for saying that he did so, and the descriptions left to us of his lost writings seem to force on us the conclusion that he did not. As a geographer, he may have done good service in the composition of his *Periodos*; as a recorder of popular traditions he toiled at the vain task of rationalising the folk-lore of his countrymen: but of the events of his own lifetime we have no reason for supposing that he wrote even the most meagre chronicle. We are therefore left, as we are elsewhere, in the uncertain sea of oral tradition, in which an exuberance of pictorial detail should be regarded as the troubled water which betrays the reef beneath it. Indeed it must be said generally that nothing less than a contemporary record could justify us in accepting with confidence the minute detail here given even on the side of the Greeks. We are still dealing with events which preceded the birth of Herodotos by half a generation; and the unwritten tradition of half a century furnishes but a flimsy warrant for the belief that the Ionic fleet

⁷⁴⁶ This sudden and complete retirement is ascribed by Mr. Grote to 'some glaring desertion on the part of these Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas in 396 B.C.' *Hist. Gr.* iv. 392. It may have been so; but the narrative of Herodotos furnishes no warrant for this hypothesis.

consisted of precisely 353 ships, and that in the battle which took place off Miletos the Milesians with eighty ships held the right wing, the Prienians coming next to them with twelve ships, and the men of Myous with three; that next to these came the Teians with seventeen vessels, the Chians with a hundred, the Erythraians with eight, the Phokaians with three, to the left of these being the Lesbians with seventy ships, and, last of all, the Samians with sixty.⁷⁴⁷ That the Persian fleet, in which the Phenicians, probably from old commercial rivalry and jealousy, showed themselves most zealous in the cause of Dareios, should be said to consist of exactly 600 ships or some other number denoting infinity, is no more than we should expect.

On their fleet, we are told, the Ionians rested all their hopes. On land they despaired of making any stand against the Persian army. It was decided therefore at Panionion that no attempt should be made to oppose the Persian land forces, and that the Milesians should be left to defend their walls against the besiegers, while the ships should assemble at Ladê, then an island off the Milesian promontory to which by an accumulation of sand it is now attached. But even these resolutions take it for granted that the whole force of the Persians would be concentrated on the blockade of Miletos, or at least that the other towns had nothing to fear from such attacks as might be made on them. Yet of these towns Myous and Priênê were but a few miles distant from Miletos; and nothing within past experience of Persian generalship warranted the hope that the Hellenic cities would only be attacked in succession. But if the Ionians were afraid of the land forces opposed to them, the Persians seem to have been scarcely less afraid of the Hellenic fleet, although they had little reason to shrink from a comparison of their Phenician seamen with the Asiatic Greeks. This want of confidence in themselves led them, it is said, to resort to a policy which might cause division and disunion among their adversaries. The Greek tyrants, who were allowed to go free by their former subjects when the Mytilenaiian Kôês was stoned to death, were instructed to tell them that immediate

The Ionian
fleet at
Ladê.

⁷⁴⁷ Herod. vi. 8.

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submission would be rewarded not only by a full amnesty but by a pledge that they should not be called on to endure any burdens heavier than those which had already been laid upon them, but that if they should carry their resistance so far as to shed Persian blood in battle, the punishment which defeat would bring upon them would be terrible indeed. These proffers were conveyed to the Greek cities by messengers who entered them by night; and the citizens of each town, thinking, it is said, that the overtures were made to themselves alone, returned a positive refusal. For a time the debates at Ladê took another turn. The remnant of the Phokaians, who in violation of an awful oath came back to their old city while their kinsfolk sailed on their ill-omened voyage to Alalia, were brave enough or faithless enough to rise once more against their Persian masters; and their general Dionysios now came forward to give advice more vehemently, if not more earnestly, than the logographer Hekataios. Warning the Ionians that the issue whether of slavery or of freedom hung on a razor's edge, he told them that they could not hope to escape the punishment of runaway slaves, unless they had spirit enough to bear with present hardship for the sake of future ease; but at the same time he pledged himself that, if they would submit to his direction, he would insure to them a complete victory.⁷⁴⁸ Their acceptance of his proposal was followed by constant and systematic manœuvring of the fleet, while, after the daily drill was over, the crews, instead of lounging and sleeping in their tents on the shore, were compelled to remain on board their ships which were anchored. For seven days they endured this terrible tax on their patience: but at the end of the week Ionian nature could hold out no longer. Many were already sick; many more were threatened with illness. In short, rather than submit to be thus handled by an upstart Phokaian who had brought only three ships, they would gladly take their chances in Persian slavery, whatever these might be. What these would be, unless they submitted before fighting,

⁷⁴⁸ When Themistokles felt as strongly as Dionysios the dangers involved in the timidity or the vacillation of the Greeks at Salamis, he took the safer course of conferring privately with Eurybiades. Herod. viii. 58. He was at the least more sagacious than Dionysios, who can scarcely be credited with common prudence.

they had according to the story been distinctly informed. Their grown men were to be slain, their boys made eunuchs and with the women carried away into Persia, while their cities should be given to strangers. But their object was not, it seems, immediate submission. They were quite ready to fight, when the time for fighting should be come; but, rather than take any trouble to secure success, they would prefer death, mutilation, or everlasting banishment. In short, the two stories exclude each other, and come from two different sources. The one was apparently framed in the interests of the expelled tyrants by their partisans: the second certainly is a tale devised to account for the disastrous issue of the revolt. If the overtures of the tyrants were really made and if the consequences of refusing them were clearly pointed out, the subsequent conduct of the Ionians puts a strain on our powers of belief fully as great as that which the discipline of Dionysios laid on the endurance of the confederates. On the supposition that both these tales are true, the Samians, who sent hastily to accept the terms which they had previously refused, must be regarded as the only sane persons in a congregation of madmen. Nor is their prudence less commendable, if they were right in thinking that in the event of defeat to his present fleet of 600 ships Dareios could easily send against them a second fleet of 3,000 ships.⁷⁴⁹

Of the details of the battle which decided the issue of the revolt Herodotos admits that he knows practically nothing.⁷⁵⁰ Charges and counter-charges of cowardice and treachery were mingled up with the story that, as soon as the fight began, all the Samians, according to the paction with their deposed tyrant Aiakes, sailed off homewards, with the exception of eleven ships whose trierarchs refused to obey the orders of their generals.⁷⁵¹ This treacherous desertion led to the

The battle
of Ladé.

⁷⁴⁹ Herod. vi. 13.

⁷⁵⁰ Ib. vi. 14.

⁷⁵¹ If we may venture to draw inferences from incidental statements, which in traditional history are often the most important, we should be brought to the conclusion that the Persians had far less to do with the miscarriage of the revolt than they are said to have had. The story of the overtures made by them through the tyrants is, as we have seen, contradicted by the subsequent story of the hard drilling of Dionysios: and the narrative of the battle at Ladé clearly lays the blame of desertion on the Samian Strategoi or generals. Eleven trierarchs or captains of ships refuse to obey their orders, with the hearty approval of their crews. It is further manifest that a large, if not a strong, party at Samos was opposed to the policy of these Strategoi who are represented

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flight of the Lesbians whose example was speedily followed by the larger number of the ships composing the Ionian fleet. With this dastardly behaviour the conduct of the Chians stands out in honourable contrast; but although with their hundred ships they succeeded in taking many of the enemy's vessels, their own numbers were at last so far reduced that they were compelled to abandon an unavailing contest. Many of their ships were thoroughly unserviceable. These were run aground on the shore beneath the heights of Mykalê, and their crews began the journey by land towards the home which they were never to see again. Among the many difficulties in the narrative of this revolt, not the least perplexing is the apparent fact that the men of towns so important as Ephesos, Kolophon, Lebedos, and Erai, take no part in the common efforts of their kinsmen: but it is even more perplexing to find that when the Chians enter the Ephesian territory, they are at once attacked and slain, the excuse being that the Ephesians took them to be pirates in search of their women who were at that time keeping the feast of Thesmophoria in which the men were not allowed to share. The mistake, we might suppose, could have been set straight before the whole band was massacred.

That in spite of its confusion and inconsistencies the narra-

as enthusiastic supporters of Aiakes. The trierarchs of the eleven ships, who remained to fight, were rewarded by having their names inscribed on a pillar erected in the Samian Agora, Herod. vi. 14; and when the restoration of Aiakes became inevitable, a very large body of Samians determined to abandon their country rather than submit to his sway, Herod. vi. 22. These Samians were, it is true, no better morally than the men whom they regarded as their oppressors; and their behaviour in Sicily, whither they betook themselves, convicts them of the grossest and most disgusting treachery to the Zanklaians who had invited them. But not much is to be expected from slaves set free or from persons escaping from oppression. The men who, as Cromwell and Hampden would have done, left England rather than remain under laws which proscribed their religion, were not famed in their new homes for either mercy or good faith towards the Indians among whom they had come to live; and thus the whole of the Samian history is a narrative of the old struggle between the Eupatridai and those whom they regarded only as fit subjects for their tyranny. Here, as at Athens, the main body of the people favoured the insurrection against the Persians: but, as at Athens, they were at the mercy of tyrants who wielded an overwhelming military force, and so long as this state of things continued, the result both in Samos and at Athens was an utter prostration of spirit which left no room for the play of any but selfish passions. That the tyrants who sought to regain their lost power may have lied to their people about the intentions of the Persians towards those Greeks who might submit without fighting, is possible or likely; but the statement that these overtures came from the Persians is disproved not only by the story of Dionysios but by the sequel of the narrative in which that story has been inserted. Had they made the offer, the Persians would have carried out their threats against such as might reject it. It is enough to say that, on this hypothesis, they did not keep their word, for, in spite of the statement of Herodotos, vi. 82, the Greek cities of Asia Minor remained Hellenic and, in some instances, not inconsiderable, long after the suppression of the revolt.

tive points to an astonishing lack of coherence among the confederates, we cannot doubt. Almost everywhere we see a selfish isolation, of which distrust and treachery are the natural fruits: but, as in the intrigues of Hippias we have a real cause for Persian interference in Western Greece which makes the story of Demokedes utterly superfluous, so in this selfishness and obstinacy of the Asiatic Greeks we have an explanation of the catastrophe to which the episode of the Phokaian Dionysios fails to impart either force or clearness. The outlines suffice at least to show that the brief splendour of the Ionic revolt was closing in darkness and disaster. The old strife between patricians and plebeians, which had crushed the political growth of Athens, paralysed the Eastern Greeks in their struggle with Persia. The tyranny which left even Athenians spiritless until their chains were broken, compelled the Samian commons to take part in a treachery which they loathed. The fate of the revolt was sealed by the partisans of the banished despots; and Dionysios, like the Samians, determined to quit his country for ever. With three war-ships which he took from the enemy, he sailed straight to Phenicia; and, if the tale be true, he must have swooped down on some unguarded or weak port, for, having sunk some merchant-vessels, he sailed with a large booty to Sicily. Here he turned pirate, imposing on himself the condition that his pillage should be got from the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians and not from the Italiot or Sikeliot Greeks. The dispersion and ruin of the Ionic fleet left Miletos exposed to blockade by sea as well as by land. The Persians now set vigorously to work, undermining the walls and bringing all kinds of engines to bear upon them;⁷⁵² and at last, in the sixth year after the outbreak of the revolt under Aristagoras,⁷⁵³ the great city fell. The historian adds that

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Miletos.

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⁷⁵² We are not told what these engines were: but the statement points to an improvement in Persian operations. Their mode of assaulting cities had thus far been the erection of mounds against the walls at an inclination which enabled the men to walk up to the assault.

⁷⁵³ This date, the only definite indication of time in the narrative of the Ionic revolt, may be regarded as representing accurately the interval between the rebellion of Aristagoras and the destruction of his city: but while the chronology of earlier and later events remains uncertain, we can scarcely say more than that the fall of Miletos may probably be assigned to the year 496-5 B.C. It is useless to enter into the controversies of chronologists about matters in which the means of verification are lacking: but few conjectures are less excusable than those which involve the arbitrary alteration of an

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the grown men were for the most part slain; that the rest of the inhabitants were carried away to Sousa, whence they were sent by Dareios to take up their abode in the city of Ampê at the mouth of the Tigris; and that Miletos with the plain surrounding it was occupied by Persians, while the neighbouring highlands were given to Karians from the town of Pedasa. The shrine and oracle of the Twins at Branchidai were plundered and burnt; and the treasures which Hekataios had advised the Ionians to use to good purpose became the prey of the Persian. The picture is overcoloured, unless we suppose that new Greek inhabitants were afterwards admitted into the city, for, although its greatness was gone for ever, Miletos continued to be, as it had been, Hellenic. €

Third con-
quest of
Ionia.
495 B.C. (?)

The Persian operations of the following year were directed against the islands. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos were taken; and, if we choose to believe the story, the Persians, holding hand to hand and without even breaking their order, went from one end of each island to the other, caring for no hindrances of mountains, precipices, torrents and streams, and sweeping off every living thing that came in their way. This pleasant pastime of netting human beings Herodotos⁷⁵⁴ for some not very obvious reason pronounces impracticable on the mainland; and hence the Hellenes of the Asiatic continent escaped the fate of their insular kinsfolk. Thus was brought about that which Herodotos speaks of as the third conquest of Ionia, but which we must reckon as the fourth, if the suppression of the revolt of Paktyas is to be counted apart from the catastrophe which brought the Hellenic subjects of Kroisos under the Persian yoke.

Flight of
Miltiades to
Athens.

From the conquest of the Ionic cities the Persian fleet sailed on against the towns on the northern shores of the Hellespont. The towns on its Asiatic shore had already been reduced by Daurises and other Persian generals;⁷⁵⁵ and the

historian's text. Because some have thought that the events of the Ionic revolt cannot be extended over a longer period than four years, they have argued that instead of *ἔκρη ἐρεῖ* Herodotos must have written *τεράριον ἐρεῖ*. Mr. Grote, while he admits the uncertainty of the chronology of this time in its details, is fully justified in saying that 'the distinct affirmation of the historian as to the entire interval between the two events is of much more evidentiary value than our conjectural summing up of the details.' *Hist. Gr.* iv. 415.

⁷⁵⁴ vi. 31.

⁷⁵⁵ Herod. v. 117, 122.

subjugation of the European cities was apparently no hard task. Perinthos, Selymbria, and the forts on the Thracian march, were at once surrendered, while the inhabitants of Byzantion and of Chalkedon on the opposite Asiatic promontory fled hastily away and founded the city of Mesembria on the Euxine sea.⁷⁵⁶ The deserted towns, we are told, were burnt to the ground⁷⁵⁷ by the Phenicians who also destroyed in like manner the cities of Prokonnesos and Artakê and took all the towns of the Chersonesos except Kardia. Here the future victor of Marathon lingered, until he heard that the Phenicians were at Tenedos, when with five ships loaded with his goods he set sail for Athens. Off the promontory of Elaious he fell in with the Phenician fleet, and with some difficulty contrived to escape with four of his ships to Imbros, whence he afterwards sailed to Athens. The fifth ship, commanded by his son Metiochos, was taken by the Phenicians who sent Metiochos to Dareios in the hope of being largely rewarded for the capture of a man whose father had endangered the existence of the Persian kingdom itself at the bridge on the Istros. Dareios, it is said, not only did him no harm but gave him a Persian wife with a lavish dowry. It may not be pleasant to think of Miltiades as a grandfather of Eastern slaves; but the bounty of Dareios, if the tale be true, may be taken as sufficient evidence that the narrative of events at the bridge on the Danube is not to be trusted.

When, some years earlier, the Hellenic colony of Sybaris had been conquered by the men of Kroton, the men of Miletos had shaved their heads in token of their mourning. Miletos itself was a city built by colonists whom the Kodrid Neileus had, it is said, brought from Athens: but the great disaster which had now befallen it called forth no such signs of sorrow on the part of the Athenians. The drama in which Phrynichos exhibited the terrible scenes which accompanied its downfall brought involuntary tears to the eyes of the audience; but his only recompense, we are told, was a

The punish-
ment of
Phryni-
chos.
495 B.C. (?)

⁷⁵⁶ Herod. vi. 33. It is not easy to receive without strong qualification such statements about cities which unquestionably remained Hellenic in spite of the disasters which at this time they may have undergone.

⁷⁵⁷ *Κατακαύσαντες*. Herod. vi. 33. This word also must be probably taken in a very modified sense. Kyzikos, we are told, had already submitted to Oibares, the satrap of Daskyleion.

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fine of a thousand drachmas for daring to remind them of calamities which touched them so closely, and a decree that the play should never be acted again. Had this drama been preserved, it might possibly have explained the reason for that abandonment of the Ionic cause by the Athenians which may have been forced on them by the feuds and factions which led to the treachery of the Samians. It might also have taught us the nature of those evils or misfortunes, the remembrance of which so stung the Athenian hearers of Phrynichos. Although the subjects of tragedy had hitherto been chosen mainly, if not altogether, from the old legends or theogonies, it may be doubted whether their resentment was caused by any effort on the part of the poet to interest his audience in Persian success and Grecian suffering as such or by any dread of similar disasters for themselves, so much as by the intimation that they were in reality chargeable with the ruin of the most illustrious of their own colonies. Apart from this consciousness of their guilt or weakness, the picture of Hellenic misfortunes could have roused in them only a more strenuous patriotism, and stirred them under disappointment or defeat with an enthusiasm not less deep, although more grave, than that with which, after the victory at Salamis, they drank in the words of Æschylos.⁷⁵⁸

⁷⁵⁸ Niebuhr, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 318, expresses his belief that the true reason for the punishment of Phrynichos was that his drama 'represented to them their own inactivity,' and adds that 'they surely cannot have been such Sybarites as not to be able to endure the recollection of their grief.' Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 419, remarks, by way of palliating the conduct of the Athenians, that 'the sack of Magdeburg by Count Tilly, in the Thirty Years' War, was not likely to be endured as the subject of dramatic representation in any Protestant town of Germany.' This would entirely depend on the character of the drama and the motive of the poet. If this motive were the desire to brace his countrymen to more determined efforts, it is not easy to see how he could choose a better mode of attaining his end. The mention of national disasters is not likely to excite repugnance towards those who speak of them, unless the memory of these disasters causes a sense of shame for duty neglected or openly contemned.

CHAPTER V.

THE INVASION OF THRACE BY MARDONIOS, AND THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.

THE threats of terrible vengeance by which it is said that the Persians sought to chill the courage of the Asiatic Greeks might have prepared us for a long tale of wanton cruelty and oppression. But after the complete subjugation of the country the scene is suddenly changed; and the Sardinian satrap Artaphernes comes before us as an administrator engaged in placing on a permanent footing the relations of these Greeks with their masters. If the materials with which he had to deal had been of a different kind, if the Ionians of Asia Minor had had any of that capacity for establishing an empire on the basis of self-government which marked their western kinsfolk, he might have deserved blame rather than praise for striking at the root of the evils which had nipped in the bud the political growth of the Asiatic Greeks. By compelling them to lay aside their incessant feuds and bickerings, and to obey, if not a national, yet an inter-political law which should put an end to acts of violence and pillage between the Hellenic cities, he was enforcing changes which would soon have made men of a temper really formidable to the king, and which in any case must be regarded as a vast improvement of their condition.⁷⁵⁹ These changes, the historian remarks significantly, he compelled them to adopt, whether they willed to do so or not, while, after having the whole country surveyed, he also imposed on each that assessment of tribute which, whether paid or not, (and we shall find that for nearly seventy years it was not paid,) remained on the king's

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Adminis-
tration of
Artapher-
nes in Asia
Minor.

⁷⁵⁹ Herod. vi. 42. ἀρήσιμα κάρτα τοῖσι Ἴωσι.

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books as the legal obligation of the Asiatic Greeks, until the Persian empire itself fell before the victorious arms of the Makedonian Alexander. As the amount of this assessment was much what it had been before the revolt, the Persians cannot be charged with adding to their burdens by way of retaliation.

The reforms
of Mar-
donios.
493 B.C. (?)

Still more remarkable, in the judgement of Herodotos, were the measures of Mardonios who in the spring of the second ⁷⁶⁰ year after the fall of Miletos marched with a large army as far as the Kilikian coast, where he took ship, while the troops found their way across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. This man, whose name is associated with the memorable battle at Plataiai, was now in the prime of manhood. The son of that Gobryas who with the other great Persian chiefs rose up against the Magian Smerdis, he had married Artazostra, the daughter of Dareios. The errand on which he came was nothing less than the extension of the Persian empire over the whole of Western Greece; but before he went on to take that special vengeance on Athens and Eretria which was the alleged object of the expedition, he undertook and achieved, it is said, the task of putting down the tyrants and of establishing democracies in all the Ionic cities. A measure so little to be looked for from a Persian seemed to Herodotos ⁷⁶¹ to carry with it indisputable proof that the debate which he ascribes to Otanes and his fellow-conspirators after the death of Kambyses really occurred. If Mardonios could set up democracies in Ionia, there was no reason why some should argue that Otanes could never have recommended a republican government to Persians. Yet the work of Mardonios can mean no more than that he drove away, or possibly killed (as the more effectual mode of dealing with them) the Hellenic tyrants, on whose deposition the people would at once revert to the constitution subverted by these despots: nor is it easy to see wherein this task differed from that which Herodotos has just ascribed to Artaphernes. In his account of the changes enforced by that satrap no mention is made of tyrants. The cities are compelled to enter into permanent alliance with each

⁷⁶⁰ Herod. vi. 31, 48.

⁷⁶¹ Ib. vi. 43.

other, whereas, if these cities had each its sovereign, the engagements would have been made in the names of these rulers: nor could Artaphernes have failed to perceive that unless all the towns had tyrants or unless all were made to govern themselves, it would be impossible to maintain peace long, and that indeed, unless he expelled the tyrants whose fidelity could by no means be regarded as inflexible, his labour must be thrown away. All therefore that can be said is that, if Artaphernes really carried out his measures before the arrival of Mardonios, nothing more remained for the latter than to sanction changes of which he approved.

But Mardonios was not destined to achieve the greater work for which he had been dispatched from Sousa. Thasos submitted without opposition; and on the mainland the work of conquest was carried beyond the bounds reached by Megabazos. But when, having left Akanthos, the fleet was coasting along the peninsula of Akte, a fearful storm dashed three hundred ships, it is said, on the iron coast of mount Athos, about twenty thousand men being killed either by the force of the waves beating against the rocks or by the sharks which abounded in this part of the sea.⁷⁶² On land the army of Mardonios was attacked by the Brygoi⁷⁶³ who caused a great slaughter, but who nevertheless paid the penalty by being made subjects or slaves of the Persian king. Still the disaster which had befallen the fleet made it impossible to advance further south; and Mardonios returned home, where during the reign of Dareios he is heard of no more.

The failure of Mardonios seems to have made Dareios more than ever resolved to ascertain how far he might rely on the submission of the Greeks to the extension of the Persian empire. The first step came in the form of an order to the Thasians to take down the walls with which they were fortifying their city and to surrender their ships at Abdera. Their neighbours in this case did to them the evil turn by

Failure of
Mardonios
in Thrace.
492 B.C. (?)

Mission of
the Persian
heralds to
demand
earth and
water from
the West-
ern Greeks.
491 B.C. (?)

⁷⁶² Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 425, states that the men 'were devoured by wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land' at the southern end of which rises the huge mountain of Athos. But Herodotos is clearly speaking of a destruction of men in the water; and when he says that the sea abounded in beasts, it is not easy to see why his epithet should be applied to the land instead of to the sea.

⁷⁶³ If we are justified in drawing any conclusions from tribal names, these Brygoi stood to the Phrygians in the relation of the Lokrians and Ligurians to the Lloegy of Britain.

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which Megabazos had defeated the plans of Histiaios.⁷⁶⁴ but the jealousy which led to the charges brought against the Thasians rested on more tangible grounds than that of the Persian general. These wealthy islanders drew a revenue of perhaps 50,000*l.* yearly from their Thracian mines at Skaptê Hylê; and their neighbours at least, if not the great king, might have good cause to dread the power which such resources might enable them to attain. In the next step taken by Dareios we may fairly discern the influence of Hippias, who left nothing undone to fan the flame which he had kindled.⁷⁶⁵ The way would be in great measure cleared for the complete subjugation of Hellas if the king could, without the trouble of fighting, learn how many of the insular and continental Greeks would be willing to inroll themselves as his slaves. Heralds were accordingly sent, it is said, throughout all Hellas, demanding in the king's name the tribute of a little earth and a little water. The summons was readily obeyed, we are told, by the men of all the islands visited by the heralds, and probably also by those cities which we afterwards find among the zealous allies of Xerxes. Among the islanders who thus yielded up their freedom were the Aiginetans, who by this conduct drew down upon themselves the wrath of the Athenians with whom they were in a chronic state of war. Their commerce in the eastern waters of the Mediterranean may have convinced them that in a struggle with Persia they would have no hope of success: but hatred of Athens may with them, as with the Thebans, have been a not less constraining motive. Athenian ambassadors appeared at Sparta with a formal accusation against the Aiginetans. They had acted treacherously not towards the Athenians or towards any Greek city in particular but against Hellas: and the charge shows not merely the growth of a certain collective or almost national Hellenic life, but that Sparta was the recognised head of this informal confederacy. The charge is urged on the score not of any inability on the part of the Athenians to punish the Aiginetans, if they chose to do so, but of the duty of the Spartans to see that no member of the Hellenic commonwealth be-

⁷⁶⁴ See page 382.⁷⁶⁵ Herod. vi. 94.

trayed the interests of the society of which it formed a part. We have already seen Sparta summoning a congress of Peloponnesian allies before whom Hippias vainly pleaded the cause of tyranny against freedom: we have seen her appealed to for aid by the Lydian king Kroisos, by the Plataians against the Thebans, by the Ionians against the Persians. If the request of the Plataians was refused, the story of the mission of Lakrines to Cyrus, even if it be not a fact, proves the existence of a feeling that Sparta was the natural protector of Hellenic interests; and it must be said again that the repulse of Aristagoras is less perplexing than the desertion of the Ionian cause by the Athenians after the accidental burning of Sardeis.

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The embassy of the Athenians was followed by prompt action on the part of the Spartans, or rather on the part of their king Kleomenes, for the story of his interference in Aigina brings before us one of those strange intrigues which seem to be a natural growth on political soils resembling that of Sparta. The joint action of the Athenians and Kleomenes, it has been thought,⁷⁶⁶ can be accounted for only by the alleged treatment of the Persian heralds when they came first to Athens and then to Sparta, asking earth and water. In the former city, these men, in spite of the inviolability of the character in which they appeared, were thrown into the Barathron, in the latter into a well, and bidden to get there the earth and water which they wished to carry to the king. This treatment of the messengers of Dareios is alleged as the reason why Xerxes, when he sent his heralds again to the Hellenic states, excepted Athens and Sparta from the number of the cities to whom he offered his mercy;⁷⁶⁷ but the story cannot be dismissed without a reference to the difficulties which seem to be involved in it. Among the many perplexing statements in the history of the Persian wars not the least remarkable are the stories of occasional vehemence displayed by men who for the most part were little chargeable with any furious and unreasoning valour. The subsequent conduct of the Athenians may exhibit nothing inconsistent with their alleged treatment of the heralds of

The treatment of the heralds at Sparta and at Athens.

⁷⁶⁶ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 431.

⁷⁶⁷ Herod. vii. 133.

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Dareios: but neither pride (although at this time it seems not to have been great) as the acknowledged heads of the Hellenic world, nor security against Persian invasion, can wholly explain the strange agreement of the Spartans in a retaliation which it is unlikely that they could have devised for themselves, and which, while inconsistent with their subsequent conduct, was by no means rendered more prudent by the submission of their near neighbours. But this very circumstance warrants the suspicion that the story of the violation of the heralds is the unhistorical growth of a later tradition. We have, it is true, a circumstantial tale of the mode in which the Spartans sought to clear themselves of the guilt attaching to this crime. The wrath of Talthybios, the herald of Agamemnon, warned the Spartans that an atonement must be made; and two wealthy citizens named Sperthias and Boulis came forward to wash out the iniquity in their blood.⁷⁶⁸ On this errand of death they came to Hydarnes who asked them how they could be so silly as to refuse the friendship of a king who, as they might see from his satrap's splendour, knew so well how to reward his subjects. By way of answer the Spartans told him that he knew nothing of freedom, and that, if he did, he would fight for it not only with spears but even with hatchets. On being brought into the presence of the king, they withstood the force of those who wished to shove their faces in the dust. They were ready to be slain, but they had no mind to crouch like slaves. Xerxes, not to be surpassed in magnanimity by these foreigners, sent them away unhurt. But the date of their mission cannot be ascertained from the narrative of Herodotos, who says that it took place long after the violation of the heralds. All that is certain is that Nikolaos, the son of Boulis, and Aneristos, the son of Sperthias, were the Spartan envoys who along with the Corinthian Aristeus were seized on their way to the Persian king, in the second year of the Peloponnesian war, by the Thrakian chief Sitalkes and by him handed over to the Athenians who put them to death.⁷⁶⁹ From the disastrous issue of this later mission it would be rash to infer the nature of the errand on

⁷⁶⁸ Herod. vii. 134.⁷⁶⁹ *Ib.* vii. 137. Thuc. ii. 67.

which Sperthias and Boulis were sent to Sousa; but the point especially to be noted is this, that the political results would be precisely the same, whether the Athenians or Spartans killed the heralds sent to them or whether they were saved from this iniquity by not having any heralds to kill. It is not very likely that Dareios would send messengers to a people who, according to the story, had eagerly espoused the cause of Kroisos, had sent an imperious mandate to Cyrus himself, and had been warned by Cyrus that they should smart for their presumption. But it is altogether unlikely that any overtures for submission would be made to Athens. Had it been so, they must have taken the form of a demand that they should receive again their old master Hippias. But in truth Artaphernes had long since taken their refusal to receive him as a virtual declaration of war;⁷⁷⁰ and we can scarcely suppose that a summons addressed to those with whom the Persian king had not come into conflict should be sent to men who were his open and avowed enemies. If then these two great cities were exempted from the number of those who were bidden to acknowledge the supremacy of Persia, they would be as much driven to make common cause with each other as if they had slain the officers of Dareios. The unflagging zeal with which the Athenians in spite of all discouragements maintained the contest against Xerxes would readily account for the growth of a story which was in thorough harmony with their general conduct throughout the Persian war.⁷⁷¹

But whatever may have been the treatment experienced by the Persian heralds, Sparta might perhaps have shrunk, as she did in the case of Plataiai, from asserting her jurisdiction over the Aiginetans, if her old rival Argos had not already been humbled. This ancient city, which in times preceding the dawn of contemporary history appears as the

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War between
Sparta and
Argos.
496 B.C. (?)

⁷⁷⁰ See pp. 233, 385.

⁷⁷¹ As soon as the story grew up that the Athenians threw the heralds into the Barathron, it followed naturally that Themistokles should be represented as desiring that the interpreter who came with them should be put to death, because he had profaned the Greek language by making it the vehicle of a summons to slavery, Plut. *Themist.* 6, or that the proposal to slay the heralds should come from Miltiades who on grounds scarcely more solid had acquired a reputation for supposed service to the Greek cause at the bridge on the Danube. Paus. iii. 12, 6.

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predominant power in the Peloponnesos and which had probably regarded from the first with instinctive jealousy the growth of its southern neighbour, was now staggering under a blow which must be fatal to all hopes of continued supremacy in Hellas. Two or three years⁷⁷² before the arrival of the Persian heralds a war had broken out between these two states; and the Spartan king Kleomenes had advanced as far as the Erasinós which formed the Argive boundary. Here, finding that the sacrifices did not justify him in crossing the stream, he seized on some ships belonging to Aigina and Sikyon⁷⁷³ and conveyed his men to Nauplia and the territory of Tiryns, where he pitched his camp at a spot called Sepeia. Here for some days the two armies faced each other without fighting, the Argive generals in their fear of surprise having warned their men to follow the orders which the Spartans might receive from their commanders. This copying of the Spartan movements was at length disconcerted by Kleomenes who told his men that, when next the heralds should summon them to dinner, they should immediately seize their arms and attack the enemy. That the Argives should not see the Spartans coming towards them instead of eating their meal, may seem strange; but the result of the unexpected onslaught, we are told, was a disastrous defeat of the Argives, of whom a large body fled for refuge to the sacred grove of the Eponymos hero Argos. Not daring at first to violate the sanctuary, Kleomenes, it is said, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argives who were within the grove, and then invited them to come out singly on the ground that he had received their ransom. Fifty had gone out at his bidding and had been killed, when some one having climbed a tree saw what was going on.

⁷⁷² Neither the cause of this quarrel nor the time at which the war broke out is stated by Herodotos, who however gives, vi. 19, 77, a Delphian response one half of which relates to the Milesians, and the other half to the affairs of Argos. An oracular answer, framed in all likelihood after the events to which it points, is a scanty foundation for determining a date: but such as it is, it may perhaps warrant the inference that this war was going on in the Peloponnesos, while Miletos was being besieged by the Phœnician fleet, B.C. 496.

⁷⁷³ Herod. vi. 92. So angry were the Argives at this involuntary surrender of the ships that they imposed a fine of a thousand talents on Sikyon and Aigina, half to be paid by each city. The former, acknowledging itself in the wrong, agreed to pay a hundred talents; the latter rejected the award altogether; and thus the invasion of Kleomenes not only permanently weakened Argos, but set up causes of dissension between her and her allies.

The survivors now refused to leave the wood; and Kleomenes, setting it on fire, consumed all who remained within it.⁷⁷⁴

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This narrative may be regarded as sufficient evidence that Argos now lay practically at the mercy of the conqueror; but the sequel betrays the growth of inconsistent, if not contradictory, tradition. If we are to believe Herodotos, Kleomenes, having in answer to his question learnt that the wood which was burning before him belonged to the hero Argos, gave up in despair the further prosecution of his enterprise. He had been told by the Delphian priestess, before the war began, that he should take Argos; and her prophecy was now fulfilled.⁷⁷⁵ Accordingly, having sent the bulk of his army home, he went with a thousand men to the temple of Hêrê between Argos and Mykenai. The priest warned him that the altar must not be profaned by the sacrifice of a stranger: but Kleomenes had already forced his way to the shrine of the virgin goddess at Athens,⁷⁷⁶ and by his order the victim was offered and the priest scourged. At Sparta he received a sorry welcome. The ephors charged him with abandoning an enterprise in which, if he had persevered, he must have been successful. His reply was that, so far as the Delphian response was concerned, he could hope for no further victory since he had taken (the hero) Argos, but that he had been careful to ascertain the will of the gods by putting a fresh question to Hêrê whose priest he had scourged. The flame which flashed forth in answer to his prayer burst not from the head of the statue but from its breast, thus showing that he had already done all that the gods would suffer him to do, whereas the fire from the head would have assured to him the power of destroying the city utterly. The historian adds that this defence, whether true or false (and the mere expression of the doubt implies a covert disbelief), won for him an almost unanimous acquittal: but

The retreat of Kleomenes from Argos.

⁷⁷⁴ Herod. vi. 75.

⁷⁷⁵ This notion of the limited or verbal fulfilment of a prediction we find again in the advice of the magians to Astyages that he needed no longer to have any fear of Cyrus, since he had been appointed king by the children, see page 280. The satisfaction which Oidipous feels on hearing of the death of Polybos, Soph. *Oid. Tyr.* 964-972, betrays the growth of a sceptical spirit which takes its stand on the assertion that not all the oracular prophecies are fulfilled. The play on the names of the hero Argos and the city finds a parallel in the story of the death of Kambyses at the Syrian Agbatana, when he had interpreted the prediction of his Median summer home. See page 353.

⁷⁷⁶ Herod. v. 72.

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according to a later tradition he must, if tried at all, have answered to a charge not of turning back after the burning of the wood but of ignominiously withdrawing from Argos itself. According to Pausanias, Kleomenes led his army against the city whose adult male population he had almost wholly destroyed; but he found the walls manned by the women, the old men, the children, and the slaves, under the command of the poetess Telesilla. The obstinacy of their resistance convinced him that victory against such a force could bring him no glory, while defeat at the hands of women would cover him with shame; and as there was no escape from the dilemma but in immediate retreat, he forthwith went home.⁷⁷⁷ The story is instructive as attesting the growth of a tradition which seems to be certainly later than the age of Herodotos, who, far from representing the slaves as quietly obeying the orders of Telesilla, asserts that they assumed and wielded the whole power of the state until the children of the men burnt in the grove, having grown to manhood, expelled them, and that, being thus driven out, they occupied Tiryns for a time under a truce, until a soothsayer named Kleandros from the Arkadian Phigaleia prevailed on them once more to attack their masters. The struggle, we are told, was long and arduous; but at last the Argives gained the day.⁷⁷⁸

The deposition and exile of Demaratos.

But if this humiliation of Argos justified Kleomenes in making an effort to seize those Aiginetans who had been foremost in swearing obedience to Dareios, there remained other hindrances in his path which were not so easily put aside. To his demand for the surrender of these men Krios the son of Polykritos replied that he could take no heed to the words of a Spartan king who was acting illegally, not only as having been bribed by the Athenians, but as having

⁷⁷⁷ Paus. ii. 20, 7.

⁷⁷⁸ Pausanias says that Telesilla armed the domestic servants, οἰκέται. Herodotos speaks only of δοῦλοι, and says nothing of an attack on Argos by Perioikoi or serfs. Still his statement is significant, and may perhaps point, as Niebuhr, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* ii. 85, supposes that it points, to the fact that 'after the extirpation of the ancient citizens, many serfs, i.e. klarotai, obtained the franchise,' these serfs being 'the remnants of the ancient Achaians.' I hesitate to speak positively about a matter for which we have no clearer evidence than words which seem to indicate not a peaceful acquisition of the franchise of which these new Epigonoi would have but scant right to deprive them, but a violent uprising of the servile population. The story may be compared with that of the Spartan Epeunaktai and Partheniai, Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* i. 353, Arist. *Pol.* v. 7, 2, and again with that of the Seythians, Herod. iv. 1, 3. See page 152.

come without his colleague, the Prokleid Demaratos, the future companion and adviser of Xerxes in the wonderful epic of the Persian war. The point of law thus raised was not to be lightly disregarded. Kleomenes went back to Sparta, having warned Krios (the ram) that he had better tip his horns with brass as he would soon have sore need to use them.⁷⁷⁹ He returned fully resolved to bring about the downfall of the man who had thwarted and foiled him in his march to Athens;⁷⁸⁰ and he found the means in the stories told about his birth, for the tale went that his father Ariston, having no children by his first wife or by the second whom he had taken in her place, determined to win the fairest woman in Sparta, to whose once unshapely face and form the touch of Helen herself had imparted a beauty like that which charmed the Trojan Paris. This woman, it is true, was the wife of his dearest friend; but Ariston felt no scruples in gambling with him on the terms that the victor should choose whatever he pleased from the treasures belonging to the other. The friend thought of jewels or gold: but Ariston on winning the game demanded his wife, and the oath which he had sworn was not to be broken. Ten months had not passed when, as he was sitting with the ephors, a servant came to say that a son was born to him. 'He cannot be mine,' said Ariston, counting the time on his fingers. The ephors heard the words, but scarcely heeded them; and Ariston, regretting his hasty speech, welcomed the babe as the child for whom the people had prayed and named him Demaratos accordingly. Against this Demaratos who was now king in his father's stead Kleomenes entered into a conspiracy with the Prokleid Leotychides on the understanding that the latter, on taking the place of Demaratos, should enforce the demands of Kleomenes for the surrender of the Medizing Aiginetans. The hasty words of Ariston were recited; the evidence of the men who had been ephors when the child was born was brought to bear against him; and the proof was clinched by the direct assertion of the Delphian priestess that he was not the son of his reputed father. This answer was afterwards traced to direct corruption. The

⁷⁷⁹ Herod, vi. 50.⁷⁸⁰ Page 235.

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priestess was deposed from her office, and Kobon her corrupter fled from Delphoi: but meanwhile the plot of Kleomenes had succeeded. Leotychides, who had now wreaked on Demaratos the grudge which he owed him for snatching from him the woman to whom he had been betrothed, became the Prokleid king of Sparta and at once accompanied Kleomenes to Aigina, where no further resistance was made to the surrender of ten hostages, Krios with Kasambos the son of Aristokrates being among the number. These men were placed in the hands of their deadly enemies the Athenians; and Leotychides returned to Sparta to enjoy his triumph over Demaratos. While some games were going on, he sent a servant to ask how he liked the change from kingship to citizenship. Demaratos replied that the question would add greatly to the happiness of the Spartans or to their misery. Covering his face with his cloak, he hastened home, and, having offered sacrifice to Zeus, besought his mother to tell him who was his father. Her answer was that soon after she was brought to the house of Ariston there came to her one bearing his likeness and left her with the garlands which he had himself worn. These garlands were found to have been taken from the shrine of the hero Astrabakos. Either then Astrabakos⁷⁸¹ was his father, or Ariston, who had not taken into account the prematurity of his birth. Demaratos had heard enough, and he departed at once to Elis under the plea that he wished to consult the oracle at Delphoi. Fearing the effects of his influence elsewhere, his enemies availed themselves of a law which denounced death on any Herakleid who should dare to live beyond the bounds of Spartan territory,⁷⁸² and followed him to the island of Zakynthos. Here they seized his servants; but the Zakynthians refused to surrender Demaratos, and the only Spartan who had ever won the victory in a four-horsed chariot race at Olympia⁷⁸³ succeeded in making his way into Asia where we are, of course, told that Dareios assigned him a territory with cities to afford him a revenue. But the vengeance of heaven must

⁷⁸¹ This myth of Astrabakos is reproduced in the Scottish story of Tamlane. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 116.

⁷⁸² Plutarch, *Agis*, ch. xi. It is but a late authority for the existence of an ancient law. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 442.

⁷⁸³ Herod., vi. 70.

fall on Leotychides and Kleomenes as it had fallen on the Delphian priestess and her corrupter Kobon. Zeuxidamos, the son of Leotychides, died before his father, leaving a son named Archidamos. Leotychides, by his second wife Eurydamê, had a daughter Lampito whom he gave in marriage to her nephew, his own grandson, Archidamos. At a later time he was sent on an expedition into Thessaly where bribes induced him to abandon an easy enterprise. He was caught, like Achan, with the forbidden treasure; but although he had done the greater wrong, he was more mercifully treated than the Jewish transgressor. His house was razed to its foundations; but he was suffered to die in exile at Tegea. Kleomenes, the prime mover in these intrigues, tried to avoid by flight into Thessaly an inquiry into his conspiracy with Leotychides; but he was not content, like Leotychides, to remain quietly in banishment. His plan was to raise an army of Arkadians and to lead them against Sparta after making them swear fidelity to him by the waters of the Styx, a stream which works its way to the light at the city of Nonakris near Pheneos. An army hedged in by this mystic sanction the Spartans dared not face. Kleomenes was restored to his office and its honours: but his mind now gave way. He insulted the citizens whom he met in the streets; and when he was put under restraint, he obtained a knife from his keeper and cut himself to pieces. His death was attributed by some to his impiety in bribing the Pythian priestess, by the Athenians to his outrages at Eleusis, by the Argives to his cruel profanation of the wood of Argos, but by the Spartans to madness brought on by habits of drunkenness learnt from the Scythians when after the invasion of their country by Dareios they came to ask aid from Sparta.⁷⁸⁴

Against tribes thus agitated by the turmoil of incessant intrigues and habituated to an almost complete political isolation, the Persian king was now preparing to discharge the prodigious forces at his command. He had some old wrongs to avenge; but the Peisistratidai were at hand to urge him on by their still more importunate pleading. In place of the disgraced Mardonios he intrusted the command

Capture of
Naxos and
Eretria by
the Per-
sians.
490 B.C.

⁷⁸⁴ Herod. vi. 84.

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of the expedition to Artaphernes and to the Median Datis who, announcing himself, it is said, as the representative of Medos the son of the Athenian Aigeus and his wife the Kolchian Medeia, claimed of right the style and dignity of king of Athens. Their mission was to enslave the men of that city and also of Eretria and bring them into their master's presence. For this purpose a vast army was gathered in Kilikia. Here from the large Aleian plain between the rivers Kadmos and Pyramos the horses and cavalry were embarked on board the transport ships, while six hundred triremes (the number must always be complete) conveyed the foot soldiers to Ionia. But the memory of the awful storm which had wrecked the fleet of Mardonios off mount Athos deterred the Persian generals from any fresh attempts to coast along its iron-bound shores. Their first object was to punish the Naxians for daring to defeat Megabates,⁷⁸⁵ and the task was now by comparison an easy one. The suppression of the Ionic revolt had struck terror into the hearts of the Greeks generally; and the Naxians at the approach of the Persians fled to the mountains. Those who remained in the town were enslaved; and the city with its temples was burnt. The Delians alone among the islanders were otherwise treated. These also had taken refuge on the heights; but Datis bade the holy men return to their homes and till their soil without fear, as he had been strictly charged by his master not to hurt the land of the Twin Gods. Having offered three hundred talents of frankincense on their altar, he went on to execute his errand of devastation at Eretria. A sign of the coming woe was furnished by the earthquake which shook Delos on his departure;⁷⁸⁶ and the

⁷⁸⁵ Herod. vi. 96. This repulse, as we have seen, p. 387, is ascribed by Herodotos directly to the treachery of Megabates. This officer is never mentioned again; but had the story been true, we should probably have heard rather of the torturing of Megabates than of this late vengeance against the Naxians.

⁷⁸⁶ Herodotos, vi. 98, asserts explicitly that this was the first and last instance of an earthquake at Delos down to the time at which he was writing, and he notices events later than the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, which in the same passage he regards as having been portended by this earthquake. Fifty years, it is true, separated the Persian war from the great struggle between Athens and Sparta; but he insists that there was nothing unlikely in the occurrence of an earthquake as the forerunner of such perilous times for the Hellenic world. The phrase used by Thucydides, ii. 8, *ἄηλος ἐκινήθη ὀλίγον πρὸ τούτων*, must therefore in spite of the great exaggeration of the language be referred to this earthquake, as he asserts not less than Herodotos that he knew of but this one instance. By a like laxity in the use of words Thucydides speaks of the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, ii. 16, 5, as having only lately

Persian force was increased on its voyage westwards by men from the islands who were compelled to serve against their kinsfolk. The first opposition to Datis came from the people of Karystos the southernmost town of Eubœia. These men refused either to give hostages or to serve against their neighbours; but the blockade of their city and the ravaging of their lands showed them soon the hopelessness of resistance. From Karystos the fleet sailed northwards to Eretria, which had besought the aid of Athens. But fear had half palsied their courage. The Athenians had charged the four thousand Klerouchoi, whom they had placed on the lands of the Chalkidian Hippobotai,⁷⁸⁷ to aid the Eretrians: but Aischines, the son of Nothos, the foremost Eretrian citizen, could do them no better service than warn them to secure their own safety as best they could. The Athenian settlers accordingly crossed the strait and betook themselves to Oropos. Still the spirit of the Eretrians was not wholly broken. The Persian ships lay a little to the south off Tamynai and Aigilia; and for six days the Eretrians withstood the attacks made on their city. On the seventh day the place was betrayed by two citizens named Euphorbos and Philargos. Here, as elsewhere, the Persians plundered and burnt the temples and partially reduced the inhabitants to slavery.⁷⁸⁸

At Eretria the Persians might well have fancied their task practically done. Thus far their enemies had given way before them like chaff before the wind; and Hippias probably flattered their vanity by assurances that they need look for no more serious resistance at Athens or at Sparta. But meanwhile they must advance with at least ordinary care; and his knowledge of the land which he had once ruled might now serve his Persian friends to good purpose. The

Landing of
the Persians at
Marathon.

set their farms in order after the struggle with Xerxes, ἄρτι ἀνεληφότες τὰς κατασκευὰς μερὰ τὰ Μηδικά, the word ἄρτι meaning 'about half a century ago.'

⁷⁸⁷ Page 236.

⁷⁸⁸ Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 698; *Menezen.* c. 10, p. 240, says that the Persians netted the Eretrian territory by joining hands and thus catching all the inhabitants. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 449, regards this as incredible and looks on the statement as an idea illustrating the possible effects of numbers and ruinous conquests. Yet the enterprise would be more practicable on the Eretrian territory than in the more rugged islands which they are said to have treated in the same fashion. See page 408.

But either the Eretrians were not all enslaved by Datis, or new settlers were brought in, as the city appears again among those which resisted Xerxes ten years later.

best ground which it contained for the movements of cavalry was the plain of Marathon bounded by the northeastern Chersonesos or promontory of Attica; and at Marathon accordingly the banished tyrant of Athens landed with his Persian supporters to fight his Battle of the Boyne. Nearly half a century had passed away since in his early youth he had accompanied his father Peisistratos from the same spot on his march to Athens.⁷⁸⁹ At that time the Athenians had learnt no other political lesson than to submit to the man who surrounded himself with the iron hedge of mercenary spears, or else to keep themselves traitorously neutral while the nobles wasted their own powers and the strength of the state in feuds and factions. But those days happily were now gone for ever. The indifference which Solon had denounced as the worst crime of which a citizen could be guilty⁷⁹⁰ had given place to a determined resolution to defend the laws which gave to each man the right of free speech, free voting, and free action, and which filled him with the consciousness that he was working for himself and not for masters who looked on his efforts as on the movements of mere machines. If they had learnt to regard one thing more than another with utter aversion and dread, that thing was the irresponsible rule of one man who was at once lawgiver and judge; and in this conviction, which inspired them with an energy and perseverance never yet seen in any Hellenic community, lay an hindrance to his schemes which Hippias had not taken into account. During the years which had passed since his flight to Sigeion the spell of the old despotism had been broken. The substitution of geographical in place of the ancient religious tribes⁷⁹¹ had swept away the servile veneration which had once been felt for the Eupatrid houses; and every citizen had been taught that he was a member of an independent and a self-governed community. This radical change had not only brought forward a new class of statesmen from the middle or even from the lower orders of the state; but it had roused to a more generous and disinterested patriotism some who had grown up under the influence of the old tradition. Thus by a strange turn in the

⁷⁸⁹ Page 213.⁷⁹⁰ Page 207.⁷⁹¹ Page 222.

course of things the exiled despot of Athens in setting foot once more on Attic ground was confronted by the very man whom, as an apt pupil in his own school of tyranny, he had sent to govern the Thracian Chersonesos.⁷⁹² How far Miltiades, the son-in-law of a Thracian king, and the employer of Thracian mercenaries, had outgrown the ideas of his earlier years, we can scarcely venture to say. The whole history of the man from the time of his leaving Athens to his return is wrapped in an obscurity so strange⁷⁹³ that we can do no more than ascribe his election as one of the ten generals, at a time when Hippias and the Persians were known to be on their way westwards, to the reputation which he had acquired by the conquest of Lemnos. An inordinate imperiousness of disposition is not unfrequently found in men who are ready to fight and to die on behalf of equal laws and genuine freedom of speech. The equality with such men is a theory which they imagine that they carry into practice, while others may discern in them the true oligarchical temper; and thus in strict justice the citizens who on his escaping to Athens from the Phœnician fleet called Miltiades to account for his tyranny in the Chersonesos may have had full warrant for thus prosecuting him. But the history of the first Miltiades may on the other hand have countenanced the belief that, however willing to act the despot elsewhere, his descendent would have no wish to play that part at home. Miltiades, accordingly, was numbered among the generals for the year; and the twofold mortal dangers which he had escaped were followed by a brief outburst of dazzling splendour.⁷⁹⁴

A still more formidable hindrance to the plans of Hippias and Dareios was involved in the rise of statesmen at Athens like Themistokles and Aristeides the son of Lysimachos. Neither of these men belonged to the old Eupatrid nobility; and the wife of Neokles the father of Themistokles was even a foreigner from Karia or Thrace. But although neither wealthy nor by birth illustrious, these two men were to exercise a momentous influence on the history not only of their own city but of all western civilisation. Singularly

Rivalry of
Themis-
tokles and
Aristeides.

⁷⁹² Page 217.⁷⁹³ See Appendix F.⁷⁹⁴ Herod. vi. 104.

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unlike each other in temper and tone of thought, they were to be throughout life rivals in whom the common danger of their country could yet suppress the feeling of habitual animosity. It would have been happy for themselves, happier for Athens, if they had been rivals also in that virtue which Greek statesmen down to our own day have commonly and fatally lacked: Unfortunately Themistokles never attempted to aim at that standard of incorruptibility which won for his rival the name of the Righteous or the Just. The very title implies the comparative corruption of the leading citizens; and thus Aristekides might the more easily gain the reputation of which the rustic who asked him to write his name on the shell professed himself so heartily tired of hearing. He may, however, have deserved most fully that character for probity which attracted the people generally to a man who had been the intimate friend of Kleisthenes; but the praises of the Rhodian poet Timokreon lose much of their force as evidence, when we remember that his object in lauding the righteousness of Aristekides was that he might hold up to public scorn the faithlessness and ingratitude of his rival.⁷⁹⁵

Genius and
policy of
Themis-
tokles.

Of that rival it would be as absurd to draw a picture free from seams and stains as it would be to attempt the same ridiculous task for Oliver Cromwell or Warren Hastings. That he started on his career with a bare competence and that he heaped together by not the fairest means an enormous fortune, is a fact which cannot be disputed. That, while he was determined to consult and to advance the true interests of his country, he was not less resolved that his own greatness should be secured through those interests, is not less certain. Endowed with a marvellous power of discerning the true relations of things and with a seemingly intuitive knowledge of the method by which the worst complications might be unravelled, he went straight to his mark, while yet, so long as he wished it, he could keep that mark hidden from every one; and thus when Aristekides came to inform him that it was impossible for the Greeks to escape from Salamis

⁷⁹⁵ Timokreon who had been banished from Inlysos asserted that Themistokles had promised to bring about his restoration, and that he had chosen to forget this promise or to ignore it. It is at the least possible that the power of Themistokles may not in this instance have been equal to his good will.

without fighting the Persians, he could tell him calmly that this dead lock was entirely of his own devising. With the life of such a man popular fancy could not fail to be busy; and so the belief grew up that he knew every citizen of Athens by name. But however this may have been, he was enabled, as Thucydides tells us,⁷⁹⁶ by his astonishing powers of apprehension and foresight, to form the truest judgement of existing things and without toilsome calculation to forecast the future, while yet no man was ever more free from that foolhardy temper which thinks that mere dash and bravery can make up for inexperience and lack of thought. There was no haphazard valour in Themistokles. He may not have gone through, he may not have needed, the long and laborious training on which afterwards so much stress was laid: but we should utterly misconceive his character, if we ascribed to him the confidence of an inexperienced and therefore an impetuous mind. No man ever had a more clearly defined policy, and no man could enforce his policy with more luminous persuasiveness. But Themistokles did not always choose to do this; and at a time when it was impossible to organise into a single compact body an army made up of men almost fatally deficient in power of combination, he was compelled to take many a step which to the free citizens serving under him might seem to be but scantily justified in law. He knew what was good or hurtful for them better than they could know it themselves; and he was not the man to allow technical or legal scruples to deter him from measures which must be carried out at once and decisively, or not at all.

But the genius of Themistokles was not yet to shine out in its full lustre. We have but the slenderest reasons for thinking that he was the general of his tribe at Marathon,⁷⁹⁷ although he certainly fought there; but we shall see further, as we go on, how unsafe is much of the ground on which we have to tread in the history of one of the most momentous battles in any age. That history, after the arrival of the Klerouchoi or Athenian settlers from Euboeia, begins, it would seem, with an impossibility. It was necessary to obtain aid

Mission of
Pheidip-
pides to
Sparta.

⁷⁹⁶ 1. 138.

⁷⁹⁷ Plut. *Aristeides*, 5. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 461.

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at once from Sparta, and the messenger Pheidippides,⁷⁹⁸ being dispatched on this errand, is said to have reached that city on the day after his departure from Athens. The distance is not less than 150 miles, and the track, probably not very much less rough than now, leads the traveller over a succession of precipitous and rugged hills, where it is impossible to move at a greater speed than three or three and a half miles an hour. We cannot suppose that Pheidippides could walk on such a road or track in such a country during the dark hours of the night; and he was sent nearly at the time of the autumnal equinox, and on the eighth day of the moon when it would set not later than midnight. If then he left Athens at daybreak he must have walked at the rate of nearly five miles an hour, if he was to reach Sparta by ten o'clock of the evening of the next day, not more than two hours being allowed for his meals during the whole journey. No feats of Persian or Indian runners will bear comparison with such an exploit; and our only resource is to say that the story is mythical or that the time spent on the road was much longer.⁷⁹⁹ Some few minutes at least must have been taken up in listening to the god Pan who appeared to him on the Parthenian hill above Tegea, and bade him rebuke his countrymen for their neglect of a deity who had in many ways done them good and who would do them more good hereafter.⁸⁰⁰ But according to the story his toil was thrown away. In vain he told the Spartans that Eretria had fallen, and that its inhabitants were enslaved. They must obey the traditions of their forefathers, and they could not move until the moon should be full.⁸⁰¹

⁷⁹⁸ The word denotes a man who spares horses by using his own feet;—the name, therefore, if historical, must have been given to him after he had gained reputation as a runner.

⁷⁹⁹ A feat even more astonishing and therefore less credible is told of Euchidas who ran from Plataiai to Delphoi and back, a distance of 120 miles, over the rugged ground under Kithairon and Parnassos, and fell dead, as soon as he had reached the camp with the sacred fire. His exploit was commemorated in an epitaph: but of the time when the epitaph was composed we have no evidence. See Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 353: and also an article on Pheidippides in the *Saturday Review*, Nov. 4, 1865, p. 578.

⁸⁰⁰ This myth is only another form of the tale which represents Boreas as one of the most efficient allies of the Greeks against Xerxes. Pan is the light (puffing, Pavana, Favonius, Faunus) breeze which sings in the woods, as distinguished from the rude and savage north wind. *Myth. Ar. Nat.*, ii. 247. Gubernatis, *Zoological Mythology*, i. 385, &c.

⁸⁰¹ It has been maintained, and perhaps with truth, that the words of Herodotus, vi. 106, are not intended to assert the existence of a rule forbidding the Spartans to go out on an expedition during the second quarter of the moon in any month of the year, but

Meanwhile on the Persian side Hippias was busy in drawing up his allies in battle array on the field of Marathon. He had a vision which seemed to portend the recovery of his former power: but he lacked the readiness of the Norman William in turning to good account the fall of one of his teeth which a violent fit of coughing forced from his jaw. The Conqueror would have interpreted the accident as a presage of victory. Hippias could only bewail among his friends the fate which assigned to him no larger a portion of Attic soil than might suffice to bury a tooth. On the Athenian side a sign of coming success was furnished by the arrival of the Plataians with the full military force of their little city. They had come of their own accord; and the unselfish devotion which prompted them to dare the risk of bringing on themselves the vengeance of the Persian king in case of defeat must have convinced the Athenians that there was that in Hellas for which it was worth while to fight stoutly. From this time forth the zeal which they now displayed cemented the friendship which had already existed between the two cities for nearly twenty years; and in the solemn quinquennial sacrifices at Athens the herald invoked the blessing of heaven on Athenians and Plataians alike.⁸⁰² But the unanimity of the Plataians was not reflected in the councils of the Athenian leaders, if we may accept the story that Miltiades, who with four others wished for immediate battle, appealed to the Polemarch Kallimachos of Aphidnai to give his casting vote against the five generals who wished to postpone it. The appeal was made in stirring language. It depended on Kallimachos not only whether Athens should be the first of Hellenic cities, but whether she and Hellas should even be free. Delay would sap the energy of the faithful and swell the number of the traitors who even now counselled submission to the Persian despot. Yet the story

that they have reference only to this particular month, whether as being the Karneian or as having some special festival which called for their presence at home at the full of the moon. The supposition that this was the Karneian month has led some to the conclusion that the battle of Marathon was fought in Metageitnion, the Athenian month corresponding to the Karneian at Sparta. But Plutarch asserts that it was fought on the sixth day of Boedromion, with which Mr. Grote thinks that the full moon of the Spartan Karneios may in this year, 490 B.C., have actually coincided. The expression of Herodotos might seem to limit their objection to the ninth day, as though they would have gone if Pheidippides had come sooner.

⁸⁰² Herod. vi. 111.

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carries with it in some measure its own contradiction. Kallimachos decides to fight at once; yet the fight does not take place. The four generals who had all along agreed with Miltiades handed over to him the presidency which came daily to each in his turn; and still Miltiades would not fight until his own presidency came in its ordinary course. We can scarcely bring ourselves to think that the Athenian generals would deprive the city of its main military force, unless they had resolved already to fight on the first favourable opportunity. Still less can we think that when more than half felt the urgent need of immediate action they would allow nearly a week to pass before they took any step to bring matters to an issue. They must have known that by so doing they were putting it in the power of the Persians to detach an overwhelming force from their fleet and army and send it round cape Sounion against Athens, while they lay inactive at Marathon. Hence we might be tempted in this instance to accept the statement of Cornelius Nepos that the debates of the generals took place not at Marathon but at Athens, for we cannot doubt that, if they were to remain idle at all, Miltiades would, not less than the rest, have preferred to be idle within the walls of the city which they would thus at least be guarding with all their forces: but the words of Nepos furnish a slender foundation for historical conclusions which are not warranted by the words of earlier writers.⁸⁰³

The plain of
Marathon.

Here then in the broad plain which by the lower road

⁸⁰³ The wish to wait for the help of the Spartans is alleged by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 463, by Mr. Rawlinson, *Herodotos*, vol. iii. p. 537, as the certain reason for the long inactivity of the Athenians at Marathon. The latter adds that the fear of conspiracy at home, and the discovery that the Persian general had sent away his cavalry to forage in the plain of Tirkorythos or the valleys opening out of it, suddenly determined Miltiades to take advantage of this fatal error and lead his people to an assured victory. Yet even with this absence of the cavalry such assurance would have savoured, to say the least, of presumption, if the difference of numbers on the two sides was at all what it is stated to have been. But although Mr. Rawlinson insists that, unless we are to set aside altogether the narrative of Herodotos, the Greeks must have been encamped for several days opposite to the Persians, he is not more in accordance with that narrative as a whole than is Mr. Grote, who thinks that Miltiades would not and could not have postponed the battle for such a reason as the one here assigned to him. The tale may not improbably have been framed to heighten the glory of the Athenian general; but in the story of Herodotos the alleged fact of the delay is as prominent as any of the arrangements and incidents of the battle. If we may reject the former, we give up at the same time our title to retain the latter. We can scarcely suppose, however, that the huge Persian force would have remained for days idle in front of a handful of Greeks whom they had been charged to enslave and whom Hippias was eager to punish. As no attempt is made to explain an inaction which would seem to be inexplicable, we can but conclude that the true account of the debates among the Athenian generals has been lost or perhaps was never written.

between Hymettos and Pentelikos lay at a distance of about twenty-five miles from Athens, Miltiades and his colleagues prepared to strike a blow in defence of their own freedom and that of Hellas. At either end of this plain is a marsh, the northern one being still at all seasons of the year impassable, while the smaller one to the south is almost dried up during the summer heats; and although the vines and olives of Marathon have been celebrated by an Egyptian poet, the utter bareness of the plain at the present day may lead us to suppose that these trees were on the slopes which descended to the plain rather than on the plain itself.

On this broad and level surface between the rugged hills which rose around it and the firm sandy beach on which the Persians were drawn up to receive them, stood, in the simple story of Herodotos, the Athenian tribes. The Polemarch Kallimachos (for such was then the law of the Athenians) headed the right wing; the men of Plataiai stood on the left. But as with their scantier numbers it was needful to present a front equal to that of the Persian host, the middle part of the Greek army was only a few men deep and was very weak, while the wings were comparatively strong. At length the orders were all given; and when the signs from the victims were declared to be good, the Athenians began the onset and went running towards the barbarians, the space between the two armies being not less than a mile. The Persians, when they saw them coming, made ready to receive them, at the same time thinking the Athenians mad, because, being so few in number, they came on furiously without either bows or horses. But the Athenians on coming to close quarters with the barbarians fought well, being, the historian adds, the first Greeks who charged the enemy running and who endured the sight of the Median dress, for up to this time the Greeks had dreaded even to hear their name.⁸⁰⁴ Long

CHAP.
V.

The story
of the battle
as given by
Herodotos.

⁸⁰⁴ This is one of the few utterly astonishing and bewildering statements which we come across in the pages of Herodotos. Without the least qualification he here asserts that the Athenians were the first Greeks who could look without terror even on the dress of the Persians or dare to withstand them in the field. Not less sweepingly he affirms, viii. 132, that not only to the boorish and ignorant Spartans but to the Greeks generally the eastern waters of the Egean were as terrible as those of the western Mediterranean, and that in the imagination of the Greeks who had conquered at Salamis a voyage from Delos to Samos appeared as long as a voyage to the Pillars of Herakles,—the distance in the one case being a bare 100 miles, while the other by the methods of ancient navigation extended to 4000 or 5000 miles, with the further difference that in

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time they fought in Marathon; and in the middle the barbarians were victorious, where the Persians and Sakians were drawn up. These broke the centre of the Athenians, and drove them back on the plain; but the Athenians and Plataians had the best on both wings. Still they would not go in chase of the barbarians who were running away; but they closed on the enemy which had broken their centre, and fought until they overcame them. Then they went after the Persians as they fled, and slaughtered them until they reached the sea, where they tried to set the ships of the Persians on fire. In this struggle the polemarch Kallimachos fell fighting bravely; and there died also Stesilaos, one of the generals, and Kynegeiros, the son of Euphorion,⁸⁰⁵ whose hand, it is said, was cut off by an axe when he had seized the stern-ornament of one of the ships.⁸⁰⁶ In this way the Athenians took seven ships: with the rest the barbarians beat out to sea, and taking up the Eretrian captives whom they had left in the islet of Aigilia, sailed round Sounion, wishing to reach the city before the Athenians could return thither. But the victors hastened back with all speed and, reaching the city first, incamped in the Herakleion in Kynosarges as they had incamped in the Herakleion at

the one case they could scarcely move twenty miles without coming to some Greek island or some Hellenic city, whereas in the other they would have to grope their way along coasts on which they would find but two or three scattered settlements of their most venturesome kinsfolk.

The plain fact is that this statement of Herodotos is not true, although at the time of his writing it he made it doubtless in good faith; and we can make it even approximately true only by straining the word *ἀνέστησαν*, vi. 112, until we make it imply victory. It means, however, nothing more than that 'they stood their ground'; and we should in all fairness be obliged to apply the term to an army or a garrison which after doing all that it can is defeated or obliged to surrender. Now Herodotos had just related the history of the Ionic revolt; and although the whole narrative shows a pitiable lack of cohesion and very indifferent generalship on the part of the Asiatic Greeks, it certainly does not justify imputations of habitual cowardice. Nor is it easy to see in what sense Mr. Grote would have his words understood when he tells us, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 479, that 'down to the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had never yet been interrupted.' Even if we set aside the alleged defeat of Cyrus by the Massagetai, the disasters of Kambyses or his generals in Egypt, Ethiopia, and the deserts of Amoun, and the discomfiture of Dareios in the wastes of Scythia, we have still to bear in mind the repulse of the Persians under Megabates at Naxos, the resistance made to Mardonios in Makedonia, the bravery with which the Milesians and other Asiatic Greeks held out against the Persian generals, and the complete destruction of one large Persian force in Karia, when not less than three Persian generals were slain with their men.

We shall come across another statement even more glaringly improbable in the words put into the mouth of Pausanias on the eve of the battle of Plataiai.

⁸⁰⁵ He was thus a brother of the great tragic poet Æschylos.

⁸⁰⁶ The process of embellishment changed this simple tradition into the story of Justin that, when his right hand was cut off, he grasped the carved work with his left, and that, when both hands were gone, he seized it like a wild beast with his teeth.

Marathon. For a while the barbarians lay with their ships off Phaleron which was at that time the port of the Athenians, and then sailed back to Asia. In this battle there died of the barbarians about six thousand four hundred men, and of the Athenians one hundred and ninety-two; and in the fight there happened a marvellous thing. As Epizelos, an Athenian, was fighting bravely, he was struck blind without hurt or wound in all his body, and remained blind ever after. His story was that in the battle there stood before him a tall hoplite whose beard overshadowed all his shield, and that this phantom passed by himself but slew his comrade.⁸⁰⁷ So Datis and Artaphernes sailed away to Asia,⁸⁰⁸ and led their Eretrian slaves up to Sousa where Dareios, though he had been very wroth with them because they had begun the wrong, did them no harm, but made them dwell in the Kissian land in his own region which is called Ardericca. There, Herodotos adds, they were living down to his own time, speaking still their old language. As to the Spartans, when the moon was full, they set out in haste and reached Attica on the third day after they left Sparta;⁸⁰⁹ but although they were too late for the battle, they still wished to look upon the Medes. So they went to Marathon and saw them, and having praised the Athenians for all that they had done, went home again. Now Dareios had been very bitter against the Athenians because they had taken Sardeis; but when he heard the tale of the battle of Marathon, he was much more wroth and desired yet more eagerly to march against Hellas. Straightway he sent heralds to all the cities, and bade them make ready an army, and to furnish much more than they had done before, both ships

⁸⁰⁷ Herod. vi. 119. This is probably the myth which we find in Pausanias, i. 15, 4, and 32, 4, where the hoplite with the long beard becomes the mysterious Echetlos or Echetlaos who goes about striking down the men with his ploughshare (ἐχέτλη),—the difference being that in Herodotos the bearded hoplite smites or injures Greeks, while the hero of the ploughshare slays barbarians. A Greek could hardly have imagined any direct divine intervention on behalf of the Persians; and the anecdote of Herodotos may perhaps embody only the notion that man may not look on angels and live.

⁸⁰⁸ Herodotos, vi. 118, says that he stopped on his way at Delos, to leave in charge of the Delians a gilt image of Apollon with orders to restore it to the Theban Delion on the Boiotian shore opposite Chalkis, from which it had been stolen. The Delians kept the image for twenty years, when the Thebans took it away.

⁸⁰⁹ This would mean in Greek computation that they accomplished the march of 150 miles in certainly not more than 60 hours from the time of their leaving Sparta,—a feat for a large body of heavy-armed men even more astounding than that of Pheldippides. Herod. vi. 120.

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and horses and corn; and while the heralds were going round, all Asia was shaken for three years; but in the fourth year the Egyptians, who had been made slaves by Kambyses, rebelled against the Persians, and then the king sought only the more vehemently to go both against the Egyptians and against the Greeks. So he named Xerxes⁸¹⁰ his son to be king over the Persians after himself, and made ready for the march. But in the year after the revolt of Egypt Dareios himself died; nor was he suffered to punish the Athenians or the Egyptians who had rebelled against him.

The details
of the
battle.

Such is the epical, or rather the religious, form which Herodotos has imparted to a history of which the most exact and searching criticism can never diminish the splendour. That the great question of Hellenic freedom or barbaric tyranny was settled on the field of Marathon; that this battle decided the issue of the subsequent invasion of Xerxes; and that the glory of this victory belonged altogether to the men of Athens and Plataiai, are facts which probably none will dispute. The number engaged on either side, the precise position of the Athenians and the barbarians, the exact tactics of the battle, are points of little moment in comparison. The tale relates events of which we have confessedly no narrative written at the time; and it would appear useless to resort to later writers for information upon points on which Herodotos has kept silence and with which he was perhaps unacquainted, or of which he candidly admits his ignorance.⁸¹¹ The number

⁸¹⁰ The story told by Herodotos, vii. 2, is that Artabazanes claimed the succession as being the eldest son of Dareios by the daughter of Gobryas, while Xerxes urged his title as being the eldest born son after his father became king,—in short, on the ground that he was Porphyrogenetos. The historian adds, seemingly without believing it, that Demaratos supported the claim of Xerxes on the plea that at Sparta the succession was determined by this rule. There is no evidence that this was the case. Xenophon, *Hellen.* iii. 1, 6, mentions Eurysthenes and Prokles as descendants of Demaratos, ruling in his own day over Teuthrania and Halisarne, cities given by Xerxes to Demaratos. It is possible therefore that Herodotos may have received from the family of Demaratos much of his information respecting the invasion of Xerxes.

Although he lost the crown, Artabazanes retained his life. In modern Turkey he would certainly have been put to death. In the opinion of Herodotos the choice of Dareios in favour of Xerxes was determined by Atossa, the ruling spirit of his seraglio.

⁸¹¹ According to Plutarch the sixth day of the month Boedromion, roughly answering to our September (see note 801), was solemnly celebrated at Athens in his time as the anniversary of the fight at Marathon. I must refer the reader who may care to go into a question of minute chronology relating to a time for which we have no contemporary history, to the pages of Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 487, who gives his reasons for concluding that this date must be regarded as certain. The words of Herodotos say that Pheidippides reached Sparta *ισταμένον τοῦ μηνὸς εἰνάτην*. It seems at the least to be a straining of these words to apply them to the moon as distinguished from or contrasted with the month: but Mr. Grote is obliged to say that the council on the arrival of the Athenian courier was held on the evening of the ninth day of the moon, because

engaged on the side of the Greeks may have been more or less than twenty thousand; but neither Pausanias nor Plutarch, Trogus or Cornelius Nepos, had any means for ascertaining the fact which were not accessible to Herodotos, and their computations furnish but slender footing for the conjecture that the light-armed troops are omitted in their lists.⁸¹² The battle has its full tale of marvels. The old heroes of the land rise to mingle in the fight, while living men do battle with superhuman strength and courage. According to the traditional accounts no cavalry took part in the struggle: but every night from that time forth might be heard the neighing of phantom horses and the clashing of swords and spears; and the peasants would have it that the man who went to listen from mere motives of prying curiosity would get no good to himself, while the Daimones bore no grudge against the wayfarer who might find himself accidentally belated in the field.⁸¹³ With these wonders and with perplexities of a less extraordinary kind any elaborate description of the battle and its military incidents seems at best a superfluous labour. If we are told that Hippias guided the Persians to Marathon as being the best Attic ground for the action of horsemen, still we have seen that according to the story no horsemen fought there; and it would seem to be immaterial whether the conjectures which explain their absence should be formed by writers of the times of Pausanias or Plutarch or of our own day.⁸¹⁴ If, again, it seems clear

if he reached Sparta on the ninth day of the month Boedromion and if he had spent only some forty hours on the road, he must, according to Plutarch's chronology, have left Athens after the battle had been fought; or else he must have set out much earlier and spent a much longer time on his journey. But Herodotos says nothing about the day on which the battle was fought; and he wrote his account probably half a century after the event. The chronology of anniversaries is not always to be trusted; and it seems therefore of little use to raise a controversy on a point for which we cannot have the evidence of contemporary registration.

⁸¹² See Appendix G.

⁸¹³ Paus. i. 32, 2. This belief has never died away from the memory of the peasantry in the neighbourhood.

⁸¹⁴ Colonel Leake supposes that narrowness of space induced the Persian general to send away his cavalry to a neighbouring plain with orders to remain 'motionless in its cantonments,' while Mr. Rawlinson, *Herodotos*, vol. iii. pp. 533-4, thinks that their absence was accidental, and was caused by the conviction of Datis that the Athenians purposed only to stand on the defensive. But among the many perplexing things in the narrative none perhaps involves a greater difficulty than the idea that the Persian leaders would allow a handful of slaves to make them stand at bay for days together. Their business was to do their master's bidding with the least waste of time; and the story of their actions at Naxos and Eubœia would certainly not warrant the notion that they would stand idly looking on for a week or a fortnight until it pleased the Athenians to advance to the attack. Nepos asserts that the Persian cavalry were rendered useless in the battle

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that Miltiades was anxious to hasten the battle, (although there are no grounds for thinking that the Persians wished to put it off,) and even if we suppose that Hippias relied rather on the efforts of his partisans to produce disunion in Athens, we still remain without the means of analysing adequately the movements of the engagement itself. The event of the battle is made to turn on the rapid charge of the Athenians and on the success gained by their two wings while their centre was broken by the forces opposed to it. This ill-success of the centre and its cause have both been debated by recent historians; but although the inference seems to be fully warranted that their haste had something to do with their repulse, we are scarcely justified in attempting, without any distinct historical statements, to determine the extent of ground over which the Athenian centre was driven back. Whatever may be the exaggeration of Herodotos (and we have seemingly no reason to suspect any here), it is not easy to see how the narrative of Plutarch can possess any greater intrinsic authority.

The raising
of the white
shield.

But the tradition that the two armies faced each other for many days at Marathon is more seriously impugned by the incident which was supposed to point to the existence of dark and mysterious plots at Athens in favour of Hippias and the Persians. The banished tyrant, we are told, was not without partisans still in the city which he had ruled: and the story which Herodotos had heard was that these traitors had agreed with their former master to raise a white shield on some conspicuous point, in all likelihood on the summit of mount Pentelikos, as a signal that the Persians should at once begin an attack on Athens which they would second to the best of their power within the city. The raising of this shield Herodotos regards as a fact not to be questioned,

by a barrier of felled trees which Miltiades threw up to obstruct their approach. But on the plain of Marathon or even on the surrounding slopes there were few or no trees to fell; and thus no warrant is left for the story which professes to account for the popular phrase, *λευκῆ ἰσθμῆς*, by saying that the Ionians in the army of Datis got up on the trees and signified to the Athenians that the cavalry had been sent away, and that Miltiades, acting on this information, gave orders for the attack and gained the victory. These popular sayings are generally found to have nothing to do with the incidents to which they are referred. Other instances are furnished by the Latin phrases *Tulassio ferri* and *Va Victis*. Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* i. 421, and ii. 333, 356.

Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 240, believes that Herodotos could not have kept silence about the construction of this abatis, if the fact had been known to him.

although he admits that everything else connected with it is hopelessly uncertain, except the circumstance that it was raised when the Persians were already in their ships after their defeat,—in other words, that it was raised too late. It would follow then that the intention of the traitors was to give the sign before any battle could be fought, and, as we may fairly infer, with the purpose of bringing upon Athens a powerful detachment of the barbarian fleet and army, while the rest remained to oppose the Athenians and Plataians at Marathon. The mere employment of a signal is proof conclusive that time was held to be of the utmost consequence. But for this need, it would have been easier and far more safe to send by sea a messenger who would not, like the shield, have been seen by the Athenians whose return they wished to anticipate. Doubtless these partisans of Hippias would have preferred to raise the signal as soon as Miltiades and the other generals had left Athens and before they had reached a point from which the shield could become visible to them. The time needed for completing their preparations may have prevented their doing this: but they could scarcely have formed a bolder or more sagacious plan for furthering the interests of Hippias and Dareios than that of bringing down on the city an overwhelming Persian force, so soon as the main body of the Athenians had set out on their way to the field of Marathon. If on this momentous journey they had seen on the heights of Pentelikos a sign which they must have construed as an invitation to their enemies to fall on Athens during their absence, the judgement of their generals and the courage of their men must have been alike paralysed, for they would remember that the plain of Phaleron (the Phaleric wall was not yet built) was as serviceable for the action of cavalry as the plain of Marathon,⁸¹⁵ and that if the men left to guard Athens should be defeated there, there would be but faint hope of their being able to maintain the city against the machinations of traitors within it. All this is perfectly intelligible on the supposition that not more than about two days passed from the time when Miltiades left

⁸¹⁵ Anchimolios had been defeated and slain here by the Thessalian horsemen, when he was advancing against Athens on his most unwelcome errand of putting down the Peisistratidai. Page 219.

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Athens to the hour when he returned to it in the full flush of a victory which he could scarcely have hoped to win. But according to the narrative of Herodotos the armies faced each other for several days before the battle was fought: and it becomes impossible to understand why, after the Persians must with their own eyes have seen the Athenian force in front of them, their partisans in Athens should still have insisted on hoisting a signal which was now utterly unnecessary, and which, if it had any effect at all, could only tend to disconcert their plans by betraying them to the Athenian generals. It is absurd to suppose that any sign could under such circumstances be needed to inform Datis that the Marathonian army was absent from Athens, while their very absence would be a better surety to Hippias for the success of his schemes than any signal which might be exhibited by his friends. We can far more readily suppose that Hippias planned the landing at Marathon for the very purpose of withdrawing the main Athenian force from the city and thus leaving it defenceless against the real attack to be made from the side of Phaleron, than that he should idly waste day after day when the visible presence of Miltiades and his men showed him that thus far things were going precisely as he would have them go. If then we may conclude that the raising of the shield was unavoidably delayed for some few hours or perhaps for a day, that during this time Miltiades was able to complete his march, to engage the Persian army and to defeat them, and that on seeing the signal he at once guessed its purpose and hurried back so rapidly as to reach Kynosarges before the Persians could get round Sounion, this series of events becomes clear and coherent. But this supposition makes the anxious debates and the long delay at Marathon an utter impossibility. We can scarcely avoid the conclusion that in this instance Nepos has hit upon the fact, and that Miltiades and his colleagues held in Athens the council of war which the informants of Herodotos transferred to the field of Marathon.

The admission of Herodotos that beyond the fact of the raising of the shield he knew nothing of the affair would of itself be proof that he did not believe the rumours which

pointed to the Alkmaionidai as the traitors. The charge attests the strength of popular superstition; but Herodotos dismisses it with a righteous and emphatic scorn. Whatever may have been the merit or the fault of those who had to deal with Kylon, to the Alkmaionidai the Athenians practically owed their freedom and their very existence. By means certainly not the most scrupulous they had brought about the expulsion of the Peisistratidai, while to Kleisthenes they were indebted for the political reforms without which that change in the Athenian character could never have been brought about which raised an unexpected and insuperable barrier to the schemes and hopes of Hippias. As to Harmodios and Aristogeiton, the great historian treats their miserable conspiracy with contempt. They had done nothing but exasperate the surviving kinsmen of Hipparchos, whereas the Alkmaionidai had shown, throughout, not the spirit which acts only when stirred by a personal affront, but the patriotism which renders all attempts at intimidation or corruption impracticable, and which Herodotos quaintly compares to that of Kallias who was bold enough to buy at auction the property which Hippias left behind him when he went into exile.⁸¹⁶

For Miltiades the memorable battle, in which he had won an imperishable name, in which Æschylos fought by the side of his brother Kynegeiros, and which was depicted on the walls of the Poikilê or Beautiful Porch at Athens,⁸¹⁷ laid open a path which led to a terrible disaster. According to the narrative of Herodotos, (and the variations of later writers call for no notice,) the reputation of Miltiades, already great since his reduction of Lemnos, was immeasurably enhanced by the victory of Marathon. Never before had any one man so fixed on himself the eyes of all Athenian citizens; and the confidence thus inspired in them he sought to turn to account by an expedition which, he said, would make them rich for ever. Nothing more would he say. It

The expedition of Miltiades to Paros: his trial; and his death. 489 B.C.

⁸¹⁶ Compare the Roman sale of the goods of king Porsenna, Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* ii. 20, and the selling of the ground in Rome on which the reinforcement for Spain was incamped, while Hannibal lay in front of the city. Livy, xxvi. 11. Ilne, *History of Rome*, ii. 338, note 2.

⁸¹⁷ Paus. i. 15, 4.

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was not for them to ask whither he meant to lead them: all that they had to do was to furnish ships and men. These they, therefore, gave; and Miltiades sailed to Paros, an island lying a few miles to the west of Naxos, and, laying siege to the city, demanded a hundred talents under the threat that he would destroy the place in case of refusal. The alleged motive for thus attacking the Parians was their treachery to the Hellenic cause by furnishing a ship for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but in the belief of Herodotos he was actuated by a private grudge against a Parian named Lysagoras who, as he said, had slandered him to the Persian general Hydarnes. The matter might seem to be one about which Miltiades could not feel strongly, or which after his achievement at Marathon he might regard even with some pride and satisfaction. But, like the men of Andros when Themistokles came to them ten years later, the Parians had not the means of payment, and they put him off under various pretences, until by working diligently at night they had so strengthened their walls as to be able to set him at defiance. The siege therefore went on, and went on to no purpose. This is all that we can be said to know of the affair, beyond the fact that after a blockade of six-and-twenty days Miltiades was obliged to return to Athens with his fleet, having utterly failed of attaining his object, and with his thigh, or, as some said, his knee severely strained. The Parians, Herodotos adds, accounted for this wound by a story which related that Miltiades, in his perplexity at the long continuance of the siege, entered into treaty with Timo, a priestess of the Chthonian gods, who promised him victory if he would follow her counsels; that in order, as it would seem, to confer with her he went to the hill in front of the town, and being unable to open the gate, leaped the hedge of Demeter; and that on reaching the doors of the temple he lost his presence of mind, and rushing back in mortal terror hurt his thigh as he jumped from the stone fence. The Parians wished to requite Timo by putting her to death; but they asked first the sanction of the Delphian god, who answered that Timo was but a servant in the hands of the Fate which was dragging Miltiades to his doom. The Parians, there-

fore, let the priestess go. The Athenians were less merciful to Miltiades. No sooner had he reached Athens than the indignation of the people who professed to have been deceived and cheated by him found utterance in a capital charge brought against him by Xanthippos, (the son of Ariphron, and father of the great Perikles,) who by his marriage with Agaristê was connected with the family of the Alkmaionidai. Miltiades was carried on a bed into the presence of his judges before whom, as the gangrene of his wound prevented him from speaking, his friends made for him the best defence, or rather perhaps offered the best excuses, that they could. The charge of misleading the people was one that could not be rebutted directly, and before a court of democratic judges they had not the courage to say that in being misled the people were the greater offenders. But if an adverse verdict could not be avoided, the penalty might be mitigated;⁸¹⁸ and it was urged that a fine of fifty talents, which would perhaps suffice also to meet the expenses of the expedition, might be an adequate punishment for the great general but for whom Athens might now have been the seat of a Persian satrapy. This penalty was chosen in place of that of death: but his son Kimon would have been a richer man, if, like Sokrates, Miltiades had maintained that the proper recompense for his services to the state would be a public maintenance during life in the Prytaneion. As in the case of Sokrates, the judges would in all likelihood have sentenced him to die; and the death which the mortification of his thigh or knee brought on him a few hours or a few days later would have left Kimon free from the heavy burden which the Athenians suffered him to discharge. Miltiades died in disgrace, and the citizens whom he wished to enrich recovered from his family half the sum which he had demanded from the Parians. But there seems to be no ground for thinking that they subjected him to the superfluous indignity of imprisonment; and the words of

⁸¹⁸ The hypothesis that the money fine was proposed by his friends in place of the capital penalty regards this as an *ἀγὼν τιμωρός*, or a trial for an offence for which the punishment is not definitely fixed by the law,—the trial for cases in which the penalty was absolutely fixed being an *ἀγὼν ἀτιμωρός*. We shall see again in the trial of Sokrates the working of the system which left the defendant to propose a lighter penalty instead of the heavier sentence demanded by the prosecutor.

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II.

The alleged
ingratitude
of the
Athenians.

Pausanias⁸¹⁹ might almost warrant the belief that his ashes were laid in the tomb raised to his memory at Marathon.

If the history of the Persian war involves (especially in all that relates to the barbarian world) the task of sifting truth from fiction, difficulties of a very different kind present themselves in the lives and fortunes of the most eminent of the Hellenic leaders. They are difficulties caused not by any commingling of fiction with reality, not by any substitution of superhuman or accidental causes in place of human and political motives, but by the misrepresentations or misconceptions which ensue from changes of public feeling, and which must be especially powerful in an age which can make no appeal to contemporary history. In the case of Miltiades the charge of fraud and deception urged against the general has been almost thrust into the background by that of fickleness and levity commonly advanced against the people which condemned him. Such an accusation, it must be admitted, is eagerly welcomed by all to whom any form of democratical government seems repulsive. Our natural tendency to sympathise with the individual against an aggregate of citizens is so strong that we are disposed to forget that the most distinguished services can confer no title to break the law. At once, therefore, it must be acknowledged that a leader who has won for himself a wide fame for his wisdom and for success in war cannot on the ground of his reputation claim the privilege of breaking his trust and leading his countrymen with impunity blindfolded to their ruin.⁸²⁰ As little can it be questioned that fickleness and ingratitude, in the meaning commonly attached to these words, are not to be reckoned among the special sins of democracy, and, least of all, of such a democracy as that of Athens. A democratical society is precisely a society in which personal influence, when once gained, is least easily shaken, and confidence, once bestowed, is continued even in the teeth of evidence which proves incapacity or demerit. Had it not been so at Athens, the

⁸¹⁹ i. 32, 3. The silence of Herodotos, as Mr. Grote remarks, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 496, is a strong argument against the statements of Nepos, Diodoros, and Plutarch, that Miltiades was put into prison and died there.

⁸²⁰ This is the position taken and steadily maintained by Mr. Grote in his examination of the trial of Miltiades. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 500 *et seq.*

overwhelming ruin of the Sicilian expedition would have been avoided: but the respectability of Nikias first won and then retained for him an uncriticising trust to which nothing but the general correctness of his conduct in any way intitled him. The same confidence, accorded on the same inadequate grounds, continued to Phokion the office of general, until the opportunity of resisting the growing power of the Makedonian king was lost for ever. It was especially this feeling of gratitude for real or supposed benefits received, or an esteem for strict morality, which would seem deserving of still more gentle treatment, that prompted the people to retain in office men whom it was at once their interest and their duty peremptorily to dismiss. But because in a democracy a change of opinion, once admitted, must be expressed freely and candidly, the expression of that change is apt to be vehement and angry; and the language of indignation, when it comes to be felt, may be interpreted as the result of ingratitude when the offender happens to be a man eminent for former services. Yet more it must be admitted that the ingratitude and injustice of democracies (whatever they may be) are neither more frequent nor more severe than the iniquities of any other form of government. When the Spartans of a later generation condemned to death their king Pausanias for an issue over which he had no control, but really on a charge for which he had been tried and acquitted eight years before,⁸²¹ they exhibited an injustice and ingratitude fully equal to any of which the Athenians were ever guilty and which would almost do credit to king James I. of England. Further, although the custom of modern society permits the initiation of new laws without attaching to the proposer either a legal or a moral responsibility, yet it may be reasonably urged that before proposing a new decree or law the mover might fairly be required to see that his proposal contained nothing inconsistent with existing laws, or that, if it did, he should first propose the repeal of these laws. Such a rule, although it may sometimes appear a hard condition, might, when once recognised, be enforced without injustice; and it must certainly have

⁸²¹ 403-395 B.C.

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the effect of keeping down the body of statutes within something like reasonable compass, as well as of rendering impossible the retention of a mass of obsolete and contradictory legislation. It is, further, true that the dangerous tendency at Athens was rather to an excessive submission to the mere will of the popular leaders, and that it was of paramount importance to take all practicable securities against this besetting weakness.⁸²²

Faults of
the Athenian
character.

Still with all these safeguards and all these duties we may fairly ask whether there was not in the Athenian people a disposition to shrink from responsibility not altogether redounding to their honour, and a reluctance to take to themselves any blame for results to which they had deliberately contributed. When the Syracusan expedition had ended in utter ruin, they accused the orators who had urged them to undertake it.⁸²³ When they had condemned to death by a single vote the six generals who had just returned from their victory at Argennoussai, they decreed that the men who had intrapped them into the sentence should be brought to trial.⁸²⁴ Yet in both these instances they were finding fault for the result of their own verdict or of undertakings to which they had given their well-considered and solemn sanction. In the former case the remembrance of his original advice prevented them from uttering a word of blame against Nicias himself, although the magnitude of the disaster was due in great measure to his own exacting timidity.⁸²⁵ Yet citizens, who had been brought up in the daily exercise of a judicial and critical power, were surely not justified in throwing upon others the blame of their own inconsiderate vehemence or greed.⁸²⁶ Here, however, they

⁸²² I trust that in this summary I have done no injustice to the arguments urged by Mr. Grote in favour of the Athenian people with reference to their treatment of Miltiades.

⁸²³ Thuc. viii. 1.

⁸²⁴ Xenophon, *Hellen.* i. vii. 39. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 278.

⁸²⁵ The vast scale on which the effort was made was owing, as we shall see, almost wholly to Nicias, who staked practically the whole power of Athens on the hazard of this single die. Thuc. vi. 20-26. A more wonderful instance has perhaps never been known in which mere caution has enormously increased the evil which it dreaded.

⁸²⁶ No one, of course, will suppose that the whole plan of Miltiades was confined to the expedition to Paros and the paltry demand of a hundred talents from the inhabitants of that island. Such a sum would scarcely have enriched a dozen Athenians, far less have covered with wealth all the Athenians. There can be no doubt that the scheme which Miltiades had in his mind was the same as that which Themistokles carried out with greater success after the battle of Salamis, Herod. viii. 111-2, and that

knew what they were about to undertake. They gave their full consent to more than all that Nikias had ventured to ask, well knowing the object for which their preparation was to be made. The case is altered, when a leader, however illustrious, comes forward with enthusiastic hopes and seeks to lead his countrymen blindfold into some scheme of which he will not reveal the nature, and of which he would be more than mortal if he could guarantee the issue. It matters not what benefits his wisdom or his patriotism may have conferred: it matters not what surety his previous moderation may have given for his future success. No state or people can, under any circumstances, be justified in engaging the strength of the country in enterprises, with the details of which they have not been made acquainted. If their admiration for lofty sentiment or heroic courage tempt them to give their sanction to such a scheme, the responsibility is shifted from him who gives to those who adopt the counsel,—to this extent at least, that they cannot, in the event of failure, visit him in any fairness with penal consequences. Dismissal from all civil posts, and the humiliation which must follow the resentment or the contempt of his countrymen, may not be for such a man too severe a punishment; but a more rigorous sentence clearly requires purer hands on the part of the men who must be his judges. Nor are we justified in allowing much force to the plea that Athenian polity was then only in the days of its infancy and that peculiar caution was needed to guard against a disposition too favourable to the re-establishment of a tyranny. Such a sentiment could not be expressed or felt at the time and the imputation is not flattering to men who had lived for twenty years under the constitution of Solon, as extended and reformed by Kleisthenes. The grounds on which they

Paros was merely the first island on which the attempt was made. Then at Andros as now at Paros, the refusal to contribute money was followed by a blockade: and fearing the consequences, the Parians felt themselves constrained to pay to Themistokles the money which they refused to yield to Miltiades. In short, Miltiades was going on an expedition by which he thought to increase the revenue and to establish the naval supremacy of Athens. It is not easy therefore to suppose that the Athenians were quite so ignorant of the object of his errand as they pretended to be, or at the least as they are said to have been; but when they chose to say that they had been led blindfold into the plan, it was obviously dangerous whether for Miltiades or for his friends to contradict the Demos on a point on which they could not but be very sore. Regarded thus the case of Miltiades presents a striking parallel to that of Sir Walter Raleigh.

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condemned Miltiades would have amply justified any sentence in such a case as that of Alkibiades: but they are scarcely becoming towards a man of whose folly or guilt they had deliberately made themselves partakers.⁸²⁷ It may be true that the leading Greeks generally could not bear prosperity without mental depravation, and that owing to this tendency the successful leader was apt to become one of the most dangerous men in the community;⁸²⁸ but this fact cannot divest a people of responsibility for their own resolutions. Miltiades may have been utterly corrupted by his glory; but very shame should have withheld the hands of the Athenians from one whose folly they had not checked, and whose honesty they had not paused to question. It would be unjust to say less than this, even on the hypothesis that the popular tradition can be accepted as trustworthy: but a careful examination of the story seems to show that the alleged ignorance of the Athenians was rather a veil thrown over a line of action which, as being unsuccessful, they were disposed to regard as discreditable, and that in the scheme itself they were the accomplices rather than the dupes of Miltiades. In this instance the raid against the islanders failed, and failed utterly; and the unsuccessful general was crushed. The attempt of Themistokles was crowned with a larger measure of success, and was accepted as the earnest of a wide imperial sway for Athens in time to come.

Athenian
idea of
govern-
ment.

The root of the evil, as shown whether in their rash confidence or in their anger against the unsuccessful leader, lay really beneath the very foundations of Athenian polity, and perhaps, it may be said, beneath all the foundations of all systems of government ancient or modern, so far as the world has yet gone. The main objection brought against

⁸²⁷ Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 449, charges Miltiades with employing 'his prodigious ascendancy' over the minds of the Athenians 'to induce them to follow him without knowing whither, in confidence of an unknown booty.' It is a humiliating confession for any free people, even in the very infancy of their freedom. Comparisons are often dangerous; and the condition of the English people after Waterloo was not in all respects similar to that of the Athenians after Marathon. Yet we might not unreasonably have expected that the answer of the Athenians to Miltiades might have resembled somewhat more nearly the reply which any similar proposal would certainly have brought down from the English people on the Duke of Wellington. In following Miltiades blindfold, they went against the first principle of their political life and abandoned that birthright of Athenian citizens which alone could justify them in saying, *μόνοι γάρ . . . αυτοὶ ἦτοι κρίνομεν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὁρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἐργοῖς βλάβην ἡγοούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιχαρῆναι μάλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἂ δέῃ ἔργῳ εἰθεῖν.* Thuc. ii. 40.

⁸²⁸ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 505.

monarchical states, and still more against oligarchies, is that in these the machinery of government is employed chiefly or exclusively for the benefit of the rulers,—in other words, that government is regarded by these rulers as a privilege rather than a responsibility, and is used as such. But this fault is by no means confined to despotic or aristocratic forms of polity. It has been found in the most exaggerated proportions in the great republic of the United States of America: and the notion of privilege has thus given birth to an amount of incompetence and corruption, calling almost for a comparison with the dishonesty and luxuriousness which Livy bewails in the first generation of the Roman empire. This, again, is the result even where political power is granted to the whole people. The corruption goes on, although all may vote, because enormous majorities are anxious to advance their own interests, regardless of the interests of their neighbours. But at Athens political power was at no time granted to all the people, if this term is to be interpreted by the sense which is now generally attached to it. The great body of the *Metokoi*, or resident foreigners, was excluded, while the slaves were never thought of; and thus every political change, every military enterprise was considered with reference to the benefit which might accrue to the *Demos*,—in other words, to the governing class, and not to the great aggregate of all the inhabitants of Attica. It might thus be plausibly maintained that incompetence and corruption are the necessary results of democracy; and undoubtedly they are so in the sense which makes them likewise the result of all other forms of government. Really unselfish rule cannot be found, except where power is regarded not at all as a privilege but wholly as a responsibility; and except in a few isolated statesmen this idea has never been found to act as a constraining motive. Among the first results of such an idea would be the growth of a firm conviction that no enterprise shall be undertaken which may not after the closest scrutiny appear likely to promote the interest of every class in the land without exception. The blind eagerness with which the Athenians are represented as following Miltiades proves only (if the narrative be historical) that the greed of

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a supposed self-interest had not yet been counteracted by an unselfish regard to the general good of the country. We have even reasons for thinking it more likely that the Athenians were not so much blindfolded as they would probably have us suppose; but the rash confidence imputed to them in this heedless adoption of the secret plan of Miltiades is betrayed now by the masses who in this country submit unquestioningly to the leaders of the Trades-Unions; and their natural impulse on acquiring the power which they seek would be to use it for that class-aggrandisement, which the best American statesmen most heartily and emphatically deplore. The Athenians sinned, not so much by placing an undue trust in Miltiades, as by neglecting the duty of examining plans on which it was necessary to stake the credit and power of the State.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INVASION AND FLIGHT OF XERXES.

FROM the battle-field of Marathon we are carried back to the palace at Sousa and the closing days of king Dareios,—from a land imperfectly known to one of which we can scarcely with truth be said to know anything. In the long interval of ten years which preceded the march of Xerxes against Hellas the character of the drama is changed. Thus far the contest between Greece and Persia exhibits something like a connexion of political causes. The tales of Demokedes and Histiaios, whether true or false, turn on the working of human influence and supply motives not different in kind from the expulsion and intrigues of the Peisistratidai, the attack on Sardeis by the Athenians and Ionians, or the schemes and revolt of Aristagoras. But from the return of Datis to Sousa with his string of Eretrian captives the machinery of the tale becomes strictly ethical and religious, and we find ourselves dealing with a narrative coloured and framed according to that epical conception which, as we have seen, underlies the whole history of Herodotos, but which is brought before us in its full impressiveness only when Xerxes, the lordliest and most beautiful man in all his realm, becomes king in his father's stead.⁸²⁹ By Dareios the victory of Miltiades is received with a fierce outburst of rage; and his mind is henceforth concentrated on the one desire for revenge. All the might of his empire must be put forth for the destruction of the city which has dared to withstand his will. It is the crowning effort of human pride; and the gods come forth at once to curb and repress it. The vast schemes for which during three years gigantic preparations are made is

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VI.

Prepara-
tion for the
invasion of
Europe.

⁸²⁹ Herod. vii. 187.

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484 B.C.

first delayed by the rebellion of Egypt, and still more seriously checked by the death of the king himself. The harder experience of his earlier years had taught Dareios some useful lessons of sobriety: but his place was now to be filled by the spoilt child of luxury and splendour. The impulse of conquest has carried the Persian power to a height not safe for man; and the great king must be driven by supernatural forces to take up a ruinous scheme against the warnings of his better mind,—for, according to the not very consistent story related by Herodotos, Xerxes at first had no wish to carry out his father's designs against Hellas. During two years he made ready not for the invasion of Europe but for the re-conquest of Egypt; and at the end of that time he marched into that devoted land, and having riveted more tightly the fetters which had been forged for it by Kambyses, left it under the rule of his brother Achaimenes, who was afterwards slain by the Libyan Inaros the son of Psammetichos.⁸³⁰ But before Xerxes set out on his Egyptian journey, Mardonios, of whom during the reign of Dareios we lose sight altogether after his Makedonian failure, had urged upon him the paramount obligation of chastising Athens, and thus of getting a footing in a continent which, for its beauty, its fertility, and its vast resources, ought to be the possession of the great king alone. Mardonios, we are told, gave this advice, because he wished to be the viceroy of Europe: but there were not lacking others to bear out his words. The Thessalian chieftains who belonged to the family of the Aleuadai offered to aid the barbarian to the best of their power against their kinsfolk, while the Peisistratidai (we do not hear whether Hippias⁸³¹ was still among them) brought forward the Athenian Onomakritos who, as editor of the prophecies of Mousaios, was as ready to promise victory to Xerxes as the prophets of Baal were to cheat Ahab with dreams of success at Ramoth-gilead. Onomakritos, it is true, had been ignominiously banished from Athens after

⁸³⁰ Herod. vii. 7.

⁸³¹ Nothing is known with certainty of the career of Hippias after the battle of Marathon. Cicero and Justin speak of him as having fallen on that memorable field; but Herodotos, who mentions him as concerned in the preparations for the engagement, does not say that he personally took part in the conflict.

being caught by Lasos of Hermione in the very act of interpolating the predictions of Mousaios.⁸³² But the hope of recovering, possibly through these cheering prophecies, the inheritance of which they had been deprived by the revolution of Kleisthenes had led them to condone this offence; and the combined effect of the predictions of the soothsayer and the advice of the Peisistratidai constrained Xerxes, if we believe the story, to summon a council of his nobles and to lay before them his whole mind. He reminded them, we are told, of the conquests of his predecessors, and warned them that the Persian power could stand only so long as it remained aggressive. In short, he spoke as though Cyrus and Dareios had never had another thought than that of carrying out the policy, the neglect of which Ajossa is said to have thrown in the teeth of the son of Hystaspes; and he announced his definite determination⁸³³ to invade Hellas and inflict condign punishment on the Athenians whose city he would burn in retaliation for their impiety in setting fire to the shrine of Kybêbê in Sardeis. But this was not all. No other European tribes or nations could, for strength of will or keenness of mind or readiness in resource, be compared with the Hellenes: and if these could be conquered, there was nothing to stay the triumphant progress of the Persian king until he had made his empire commensurate with the bounds of the Ether itself. Nothing more, therefore, was needed but to sweep these wretched hindrances from his path and make the Persian name dreaded throughout all the world. The sharp decisiveness of this speech seems to leave little room for doubt or discussion: but Mardonios is said to regard it as a mere invitation to the assembled chiefs to express their independent opinion. He accordingly takes it up as an admission of faint-heartedness on the part of Xerxes. There was really no need for diffidence or hesitation. The Persian kings had conquered every Hellenic town in Asia Minor; and when Mardonios invaded Makedonia, not an effort was made by the Athenians to arrest an enterprise which, they were well aware, was directed against themselves.

⁸³² Herod. vii. 6.⁸³³ μέλλω, ζεύξας τὸν Ἑλλησποντον, ἔλάν στρατὸν διὰ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, Herod. vii. 8, 2.

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Yet more, there was probably nowhere a people who so sedulously invited others to attack them: Far from having any principle of union, far from attempting to settle their quarrels by peaceable or lawful means, they seemed to have no other object in life than to quarrel and to fight out their quarrels in the most fertile and beautiful spots of their several territories; and the appearance of the Persian or Phœnician fleet would at once convince them of the hopelessness of resistance.

The oppo-
sition of
Artabanos.

When the speech of Mardonios was ended, there was a dead silence until Artabanos, a brother of Dareios and uncle of Xerxes, ventured, much after the Greek but very little after the Persian fashion, to urge that there could be no decision on the merits of a question unless the arguments on both sides were heard and weighed, and that the Greeks were really far more formidable than the Scythians against whom his father had wasted his strength to no purpose. The Athenians alone had defeated the army of Datis and Artaphernes: what must the result be when all the Hellenic tribes are welded into a single confederacy? If the Persians should cross into Europe at all, it must be by such a bridge as that across which Dareios led his men over the Istros into Scythia; and he shuddered at the thought that the salvation or destruction of the Persian power should be made to depend on a single man, as at the Danubian bridge it was made to depend on the verdict of Histiaios. But every forest was eloquent with its warnings. Everywhere the tree which would not bend to the blast was snapped or uprooted, while the pliant sapling escaped; and as to Mardonios who much at his ease in Sousa slandered absent men who were better than himself, it would be but bare justice that he should be made to give up his children as hostages for the complete performance of his boasts against the Greeks, on the understanding that Artabanos and his children should be slain if Mardonios came back from Hellas in safety. No sooner had Artabanos sat down than Xerxes, forgetting utterly, as it would seem, that he had invited the expression of their unbiassed judgement, swore by the whole string of his ancestors from the generation of Achaimenes himself that Artabanos should remain at Sousa with the women and

children. But while he insists on the paramount duty of taking vengeance on the Athenians, he makes the startling admission that they will never rest content with merely keeping the invaders at bay, and that if the great king failed to invade Hellas, his carelessness or his neglect would be followed by the invasion of Persia itself.⁸³⁴

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The language of Xerxes was, nevertheless, more resolute than his mind. During the night which followed the council the dream-god came and stood over him as he lay on his couch, and warned him that it would be at his peril if he gave up the enterprise on which his father had set his heart: and Xerxes proceeds to obey the vision, precisely as Agamemnon in the *Iliad*⁸³⁵ obeys the word of Zeus, brought to him by the dream, by giving a command in direct opposition to it. The Spartan king is charged to arm the Achaians for the final assault on Ilion: in the Agora he tells them to take to their ships and sail home. Xerxes is bidden to persist in his scheme: but when on the next day he sits in presence of his assembled nobles, he tells them that they may remain quietly in Persia since the idea of invading Hellas has been definitely abandoned. But there was no Odysseus here to stir up faint hearts to great efforts; and the dream-god is again employed to warn Xerxes that, if he resist, his glory shall soon pass utterly away. Still his mind is not wholly free from doubts; and he tells Artabanos that if the dream-god be worth notice, he would come to him not less than to the king, if only Artabanos would put on the king's crown and his robes and lie down on the royal couch. Artabanos is not easily persuaded, partly because he shrinks from an act which seems to involve treason or sacrilege, partly because he thinks that the dream-god can scarcely be so silly as to mistake one man for another because they have made an interchange of dresses, and partly because he holds the theory that dreams can generally be traced to matters with which the mind has been occupied previous to sleep. In this case all was clear, because on the preceding day their whole attention had been fixed on the subject of the invasion of Hellas. The experiment is, therefore, tried; and the dream-god, coming to

The dream
of Xerxes.

⁸³⁴ Herod. vii. 11.

⁸³⁵ ii. 110 *et seq.*

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Artabanos, not merely blames him severely for daring to divert the king from the great scheme, but draws near with hot irons, manifestly with the purpose of searing out his eyes. This threatening movement probably prevented Artabanos from applying to his own dream the theory by which he had accounted for that of Xerxes; and on rising he hastens to inform the king that, although he had been somewhat discouraged by the defeat of Cyrus by the Massagetai and the discomfiture of Kambyses and Dareios in Egypt and Ethiopia, in the deserts of Amoun and in the wilds of Scythia, he would now make up for his former advice by a twofold zeal in carrying out the king's will. Yet another dream came to Xerxes. He thought that round his head was an olive wreath whose branches seemed to overshadow the whole earth and then vanished away. The story was probably put together after his utter discomfiture by some one who wished to show how completely the Magians could misinterpret signs which pointed not to the enslaving of Hellas but to the ruinous defeat of the king.⁸³⁶

Character
of the
narrative of
Herodotos.

The demoniac impulse⁸³⁷ had now driven Xerxes to the point from which there was no retreating. The whole strength of the empire was to be lavished on one supreme effort, and that empire extended now from the eastern limits which it had reached under Cyrus to the cataracts of the Nile and the shores and islands of the Egean sea. The invasions of Megabazos and Mardonios, whatever they may have failed to achieve, had subdued many Thrakian and Makedonian tribes and made their country tributary to the Persian king.⁸³⁸ Throughout Thessaly the chiefs were full of zeal in his cause; and in Hellas itself there were not a few states which were as eager to submit to him as later politicians of a certain school were to prostrate themselves before Napoleon Bonaparte. The subjugation of Thrace and Makedonia involved the submission of the Greek colonies on these coasts; and magazines stored up in places along the line of march attested the vast resources of the Persian

⁸³⁶ Herod. vii. 19.

⁸³⁷ δαιμονία ἔρμη. Herod. vii. 18. The phrase has very little to do with the notion of demoniac possession which became so fixed in the Jewish mind.

⁸³⁸ Herod. vii. 106, 108.

monarch. If we are to believe the historian, the preparations were not superfluous. There was not a single Asiatic tribe unrepresented in the army of Xerxes: there was not a stream which sufficed for the needs of his host except the largest rivers. In short, we are brought into a region where men disdain the puny scale on which mortals are ordinarily compelled to work, while by some wonderful means, in spite of the lack of contemporary records on either side, every portion of the picture which is drawn of it is filled with the most minute details. Personal anecdotes, revealing the most secret workings of the mind, light up the dry catalogues of fleets and armies; and lists of numbers, seemingly interminable, are given with a confidence which implies that it needed no effort to retain them in the memory for nearly half a century, and that no risk of error was involved in the process. Herodotos undoubtedly conversed with many who had been actors in the great struggle; but there is much in his narrative of which no Asiatic Greek could have personal knowledge, while for events which must have passed before the eyes of tributary Ionians or the free Hellenes of the West it must be admitted that inconsistent or contradictory accounts cannot carry the same weight with accounts which support each other. It is, in fact, impossible to ascertain generally the sources from which Herodotos derived his information; and in the tale which relates the death of Dareios and the council and visions of his son it is difficult to separate the contributions of Greek and Persian informants. That the story of the Dream was as familiar to the Persians as to himself, is expressly asserted by Herodotos;⁸³⁹ but although the form into which the incidents are cast reflects the spirit of the old Homeric legend, it seems impossible to determine how much of the beautiful imagery was grouped around them by the genius of the historian himself. To grope for the historical facts which may lie beneath this magnificent epical narrative, would be but ill-spent toil. The death of Dareios, the suppression of the Egyptian revolt, and the march of Xerxes to the Hellespont, are historical facts; but to trace out the secret influences at work in the court of

⁸³⁹ Herod. vii. 12.

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Sousa is beyond our power, nor is anything gained if we explain the visions of Xerxes and Artabanos by a plot in the palace.⁸⁴⁰ The evil influences of Mardonios, the blind obstinacy of thwarted passion, the conquering impulse of eastern empires in their youth, the desire to surpass the achievements of his ancestors,—all these are motives which, whether single or combined, appear equally probable and equally impossible to prove. Whatever may have been the truth of the facts, we may at the least suppose that the common belief of the Persians must inevitably have attributed the expedition to the interested counsels of some adviser to whom the blame of its failure might be transferred from the king. To Herodotos himself (although the marvellous beauty of the tale may be due to his fulness of Homeric inspiration) it is not less certain that we cannot impute the invention of the religious sentiment which pervades it. That sentiment was shared in common with him by most, if not all, of his contemporaries. The provocation of Divine Jealousy by Persian presumption, the irresistible impulse which drove Xerxes to his ruin by dreams and omens, were accepted as facts by all his informants; and it remained for him only to fill up the outlines of the picture, while yet he was careful to omit none of the human and political motives by which the Persian king and his counsellors might at any time have been guided.

March of
Xerxes to
Kelainai.

The expedition of Datis which had ended with the disaster of Marathon was strictly a maritime invasion. It was the design of Xerxes to overwhelm the Greeks by vast masses poured into their country by land, while a fleet hugely larger than that of Datis should support them by sea. For the passage of the former across the Bosporos and the Strymon wooden bridges were constructed: to save the latter from the catastrophe which befell the ships of Mardonios orders were given, it is said, to convert Athos into an island by a canal which might enable the fleet to avoid its terrible rocks. At length the host set out from Sousa in a stream which doubtless gathered volume as it went along; but in the story of the march we are at once confronted with that exuberance

⁸⁴⁰ Rawlinson, *Herodotos*, vol. i. p. 92.

of vivid detail which more than anything else must awaken suspicion of traditional narratives. The several nations met at Kritalla in Kappadokia, and having crossed the Halys marched to Kelainai near the sources of the Maiandros, where Pythios, who had bestowed on Dareios a golden plane-tree and a golden vine, welcomed the Persians with a magnificence which excited the astonishment of Xerxes. His wealth, Pythios said, amounted to 2,000 talents of silver, with a heap of golden Dareïks which lacked but 7,000 to complete the tale of four millions. All these he placed at the disposal of the king; but Xerxes, not to be outdone in generosity, bade his treasurer make up the lacking thousands. Pythios left his presence a proud and happy man; but when in the following spring Xerxes set out from Sardeis, the eclipse of the sun which the Magians interpreted as a sign of humiliation for the Greeks so frightened the wealthy Phrygian that he besought the king to let him keep one of his five sons at home. The answer was a stern rebuke for the presumption which demanded exemption from military service for the slave of a king who was taking the trouble to go all the way to Hellas himself. His own life and that of his four sons he should have for the sake of his former liberality: but the limbs of the child whom he had wished to keep should be hung up on each side of the road along which the army must pass.⁸⁴¹

Meanwhile Xerxes had crossed the Maiandros, and left near Kallatebos an Immortal to guard a plane-tree which from its extreme beauty he had rewarded with a wreath of gold. On reaching Sardeis he sent heralds to all the cities of Hellas except Athens and Sparta.⁸⁴² But before his host was to cross into Europe, a stream of blood was to flow on the shores of the Hellespont. In making their bridges of boats the Phenicians had used hempen ropes, the Egyptians ropes made from the fibre of papyrus. A severe storm de-

The bridge
across the
Hellespont.
480 B.C.

⁸⁴¹ The request made by Pythios is put also into the mouth of the Persian Oiobazos at the time of the Scythian expedition. The reply of Dareios, Herod. iv. 84, is that not only one but all should be left behind. He kept his word, but he left them dead. That such and worse things have been often done by Eastern tyrants, it is unnecessary to say: but we can rarely be sure that the anecdotes which relate them put these savage murders at the right time and place.

⁸⁴² For the reasons which seem to make it altogether unlikely that these two exceptions were now made for the first time see p. 417.

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stroyed the work of both. Xerxes ordered the engineers of the bridges to be beheaded, and, sitting in judgement on the Hellespont itself, passed sentence that it should receive three hundred lashes of the scourge, and that it should at the same time be branded by men who were bidden to inform it that, whatever it might choose to do, the king would cross over it, and that it deserved no sacrifice at any human hands, as being a treacherous and bitter water. His commands were obeyed; but Xerxes took the further precaution of having the new bridges constructed with far greater strength and care. This time, between the towns of Sestos and Madytos on the European, and Abydos on the Asiatic side, where the strait is about a mile in width, two lines of triremes and pentekopters (ships with fifty oars) mingled together were moored at some distance from each other by anchors at stem and stern, with their sterns facing the Egean towards which the current sets in strongly from the Euxine. In three parts of these two lines a space was left to enable small vessels to pass up or down the channel, while across the ships were stretched strong ropes, two of flax, and four of papyrus, held taut by capstans fastened on the shore. Crosswise on these ropes rested the planks on which a causeway was formed by means of earth laid down between strong wooden barriers which prevented the beasts, as they crossed, from catching sight of the water.⁸⁴³ Whether this be or be not an accurate account of the construction of these bridges, it is of more importance to note that in the opinion of the Western Greeks Xerxes was the first who attempted to accomplish this task, and that the bridge attributed to Darcios seems to fade away into the impenetrable mists which shroud his doings in the Scythian land.⁸⁴⁴

The
scourging
of the
Hellespont.

The scourging of the Hellespont seems to be as true to Eastern instinct as the influence ascribed to Atossa; but

⁸⁴³ It may be safely said that these minute constructive details could not have been accurately preserved to the time at which Herodotos could have become acquainted with them, unless they had been committed to writing soon after the construction of the bridge. Herodotos states that in the eastern bridge 360 ships were fastened together: in the western bridge 314 sufficed to span the channel. If the bridges were at some distance from each other, the difference of numbers could be easily explained by a variation in the width of the strait; but the obscure passage in which the historian describes the construction of these bridges has given rise to controversies in which Mr Grote has entered minutely in a long note to the 35th chapter of Part II. of his history

⁸⁴⁴ See page 376 *et seq.*

these bridges must have been raised and the punishment of the rebellious sea inflicted in the sight of European witnesses, if the bridges were raised and the punishment was inflicted at all. If we put any faith in the honesty of these witnesses, we are scarcely justified in asserting that the latter story sprang out of the former.⁸⁴⁵ No room is left for doubt that the philosophy of Animism, as it has been termed, has held sway at one time or another, or perhaps more or less in all times, over every nation and tribe on the face of the earth.⁸⁴⁶ The impulses which lead us to treat inanimate things as living entities lie very deep down in our nature; and the man who feels himself almost irresistibly tempted to kick the chair or table against which he has stumbled is neither more nor less dignified than the Persian king who brands and chastises the waters which have hurt his bridges.⁸⁴⁷ The system of deodands on butting oxen and runaway steam-engines has only recently come to an end in this country; and the Spaniard still reviles or scourges the images of the saints who have failed to answer his prayers.⁸⁴⁸ That this impulse was felt with peculiar strength by the Persians, the narratives of Herodotos seem sufficiently to prove. The scourging of the Hellespont is precisely paralleled by the vengeance of Cyrus against the river Gyndes, and is surpassed by the horrible punishment of the horse which threw Pharaohs. The poor brute, being taken to the spot where the accident happened, was left, with its legs cut off, to bleed to

⁸⁴⁵ This is the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall who asserts that the severity of Xerxes against the engineers would be credible enough in itself 'and is only rendered doubtful by the extravagant fables that gained credit on the subject among the Greeks who in the bridging of the sacred Hellespont saw the beginning of a long career of audacious impiety, and gradually transformed the fastenings with which the passage was finally secured into fetters and scourges with which the barbarian in his madness had thought to chastise the aggression of the rebellious stream.' *Hist. Gr.* ii. 252. In short, the story had its origin, on this hypothesis, in the metaphorical fashion of describing the building of the bridge which we find in the *Persai* of Æschylos, 745.

The bridging of the Hellespont could be scarcely regarded as the beginning of an audacious and iniquitous career by people who had witnessed precisely the same work in the preceding generation; nor is it easy to see how or why the story of the scourging should have sprung up now rather than in the time of Dareios.

⁸⁴⁶ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ch. xi.

⁸⁴⁷ The only difference between Xerxes and the Englishman is that the latter never delegates to others the wreaking of this instinctive vengeance.

⁸⁴⁸ The punishment of animals or of inanimate objects which cause mischief is common to the ancient laws of the Jews and the Athenians; and the pricking of the statue of Pan by unsuccessful hunters answers to the insults offered by Spaniards or Italians to the images of saints. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 23, cites the singular story told by Pausanias, vi. 11, 2, about the statue of the wrestler Theagenes of Thasos which happened to fall on and to kill the man who was flogging it, and which was accordingly tried and

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death.⁸⁴⁹ A feeling exactly similar in kind is shown in the treatment of the beautiful plane-tree by Xerxes near Kallatebos.

The canal
across the
peninsula
of Athos.

The bridge across the Hellespont served to bear the army of Xerxes from Asia into Europe: but the risk of disaster was not, as he thought, lessened by the canal which he is said to have dug across the peninsula of mount Athos. The testimony of Herodotos and Thucydides, it has been supposed, would of itself suffice to prove that the canal had existed really. That of Thucydides⁸⁵⁰ can scarcely prove more than that in his day there was a cutting or an appearance of a cutting which bore the name of the King's canal. In any case the attestation extends only to the naked fact, not to the time over which the work is said to have been extended or to the method of its accomplishment. The minuteness or vividness of detail which marks the Herodotean tradition tells no more in its favour than the same characteristic tells in favour of the story of Deiokes or of the early years of Cyrus. It is possible that the father of Herodotos may have been among the free men who were driven on to this work by the lash; and it is also possible that from him the historian may have heard of the comparative intelligence of the Phenicians who instead of making, as the others made, the top of their cutting of the same diameter with the bottom, avoided the increased toil caused by the crumbling of the sides by making the top of nearly twice the width of the required base. Nor can we say anything either for or against the assertion that Xerxes had this canal dug from the mere spirit of vainglory, inasmuch as at indefinitely less cost he might have had all his ships carried across the peninsula on grooves or slips. But unfortunately some direct historical evidence is needed before we can decide not merely whether the alleged facts are true, but whether the passage itself, if it be the work of man at all, was dug at the time and for the purpose here assigned for its construction. By Juvenal⁸⁵¹ the whole story is dismissed as a Greek falsehood; and his belief is countenanced by the conclusions of some

condemned for murder and cast into the sea. Famine followed this deed of the Thasians, who continued to suffer until they fished up the statue and set it up again in its place.

⁸⁴⁹ Herod. vii. 88.

⁸⁵⁰ iv. 109.

⁸⁵¹ x. 174.

modern archæologists that the canal of Xerxes is neither more nor less a work of man than Offa's dyke, and that neither of them is more artificial than Fingal's Cave or the Giant's Causeway.⁸⁵²

CHAP.
VI.

The march of Xerxes from Sardeis is presented to us in a series of impressive pictures. Between the cloven limbs of the son of Pythios advanced first the baggage train with the beasts of burdēn, followed by half the force supplied by the tributary nations,—all in confused masses. Behind these, after a definite interval, came a thousand carefully picked Persian horsemen, then a thousand spear-bearers with their lance-heads turned towards the ground. These were followed by ten of the sacred horses, magnificently caparisoned, from the Median plains of Nisa, after which, drawn by eight white horses, came the sacred chariot of Ahuromazdāo,⁸⁵³ or Zeus, on which no mortal might place his foot, the reins of the horses being held by the charioteer who walked by the side. Then on a car drawn by Nisaian steeds came the monarch himself, followed by a thousand of the noblest Persians, then by a thousand Persian horsemen, and ten thousand picked Persian infantry with golden and silver apples or pomegranates attached to the reverse end of their spears. Lastly came a myriad of Persian cavalry. Behind these, after an interval equal to that which separated the vanguard from the household troops, came the remaining half of the disorderly rabble which Eastern kings are pleased to regard as good military material. The line of march led them across the Kaikos by Atarneus to Karinē, whence they journeyed on to the Ilian land, keeping on the left the heights of Ida, beneath which a storm of thunder and lightning killed many in his army. The waters of the Skamandros failed to supply his host, or, as some have thought, were rendered by the trampling of the crowd too turbid for drinking. Here, if Xerxes was conscious of that chain of mythical causes to which Herodotos in his introductory chapters traces this great struggle between the East and the West, the associations of the place could not fail to stir his heart. He was now

The march
from
Sardeis to
Abydos.

⁸⁵² *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 92. Sir G. C. Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* i. 463, accepts the fact.

⁸⁵³ Ormuzd, the wise spirit, or the bright Being who is engaged in an eternal warfare with Angrō-Mainyus, Ahriman, the spirit of darkness. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 355.

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in that kingdom in which, when Priam reigned, his enemies had done deadly harm. Here, therefore, on the lofty Pergamos he is said to have sacrificed a thousand cows to Athenaia Ilias, while the Magians poured libations to the heroes. The army, we are told, passed a night of weird terror, and in the morning went on its way towards Abydos. Here the great king had the delight of sitting on the lofty throne of white stones which at his bidding the men of Abydos had built for him. Beneath him his vast fleet was engaged in a mimic battle in which the Phenicians of Sidon were the victors; and Xerxes, surveying the hosts which he had brought together, first pronounced himself the happiest of men, and then presently wept. Even in the brilliant radiance of morning the method of the historian required that the cloud should be seen which, though no larger yet than a man's hand, should rain down destruction hereafter on his mighty armies; and this shadow of coming evil makes itself felt in the dialogue which now passes between Artabanos and the king. In the simple story of Herodotos, Xerxes answers the wondering question of Artabanos by confessing that the thought of mortality had suddenly thrust itself upon him and that the tears found their way into his eyes because at the end of a hundred years not one of all this great host should remain alive. 'Nay,' said Artabanos; 'there are more woeful things than this. The sorrows that come upon us, and the diseases that trouble us, make our short life seem long, and therefore from so much wretchedness death becomes the best refuge; and heaven, if it give us a taste of happiness, yet is found to be but a jealous giver.' 'Let us speak no more of mortal life,' answered Xerxes; 'it is even as thou sayest. Yet let us not bring evil things to mind, when we have a good work in our hands. But tell me this. If thou hadst not seen the vision clearly, wouldst thou have kept thine own counsel, or wouldst thou have changed? Tell me the truth.' Artabanos could not but express his hope that all things might go as the king desired; but he added, 'I am still full of care and anxious, because I see that two very mighty things are most hostile to thee.' 'What may these things be?' asked the king: 'will the

army of the Greeks be more in number than mine, or will our ships be fewer than theirs? for, if it be so, we will quickly bring yet another host together.' 'Nay,' answered Artabanos, 'to make the host larger is to make these two things worse; and these are the land and the sea. The sea has no harbour which, if a storm come, can shelter so many ships; and we need not merely one haven but many along the whole coast. Chance rules men, and men cannot control chance. The land too is hostile; and if nothing resists thee, it becomes yet more hurtful, the further that we may go, for men are never satisfied with good fortune, and so the length of the journey must at last bring about a famine. Now that man is bravest who is timid in council and bold in action.' 'You say well,' answered Xerxes: 'yet of what use is it to count up all these things? for, if we were always to be weighing every chance, we should never do anything at all. It is better to be bold and to suffer half the evil than by fearing all things to avoid all suffering. See how great is the power of the Persians. If the kings who have gone before me had followed counsellors like thee, it would never have been what it is now. They faced the danger and gained this dominion; and we, like them, go forth at the fairest season of the year; and when we have subdued all Europe, we shall return home, having been vexed neither by famine nor by any other evil. We carry great store of food with us, and we will take the corn of the lands through which we pass.' But Artabanos was not convinced; and warning the king that weighty matters need many words, he besought him not to let the Asiatic Ionians serve against their kinsfolk. 'If they so serve,' he urged, 'they must either be most unjust in enslaving the land from which they spring, or most just by setting it free. If they are unjust, our gain is but little: but if they be just, they can do us great harm. Think then on the old saying that the end of a work is not always clear at the beginning.' But the king would have it that in this Artabanos was most of all deceived, since to the conduct of these Ionians at the bridge across the Danube Dareios was indebted not only for his own life but for the salvation of his army and his kingdom; and having with this assurance sent

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his uncle to Sousa to guard his house and his empire, he summoned his chiefs. 'Be strong,' he said to them, 'and of great courage. We are marching against brave men; and if we conquer these, there are none on the face of the earth who will be able to stand against us. Now then let us cross over, when we have prayed to the gods who guard the Persian land.'

The crossing of the Hellespont.

On the next day, as the sun burst into sight, Xerxes, pouring a libation from a golden goblet into the sea, greeted the god with the prayer that he would suffer nothing to check his course until he should have carried his conquests to the uttermost bounds of Europe. The cup, out of which he had poured the libation, he threw into the sea, with a golden mixing-bowl and a Persian dagger,—whether as gifts to the sun-god or as tokens of his sorrow for having scourged the Hellespont, the historian is unable to say. From the bridges rose the odour of frankincense: the roads were strewed with myrtle branches. By the eastern bridge the infantry began to cross with the cavalry, while the beasts of burden and the camp-followers passed over on the bridge facing the Egean. Ten thousand Persians, all wearing tiaras, preceded the confused rabble which crossed on the first day. On the next day Xerxes himself passed from Asia into Europe with the same pomp which had marked his departure from Sardeis. For seven days and seven nights the procession swept incessantly along: and the Hellespontian whose eyes may well have been wearied with watching the endless train gave utterance to abject fear or abject flattery, when he asked why Zeus had come in the guise of a Persian calling himself Xerxes; and bringing with him all the nations of the earth to overwhelm the Greeks whom he might have crushed with a few myriads. But special signs were not wanting to show that this seeming god was marching to his destruction. A mare brought forth a hare,—a manifest token, so Herodotos⁸⁵⁴ believed, that the expedition begun with so much confidence would end in disaster and ignominy. The historian forgot that it was as easy to put a fair interpretation on the omen as it was to parry the advice of Artabanos; and he

⁸⁵⁴ Herod. vii. 57.

never paused to consider whether the miracle was not born of the epigram which represented the catastrophe of Xerxes under the figure of the war-steed giving birth to the most timorous of beasts.⁸⁵⁵

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VI.

Thus, without thought of coming woes, the fleet sailed westwards from Abydos, until, having doubled the promontory of Elaious, it made for the Sarpedonian cape on the northern extremity of the Black Gulf (Melas Kolpos), while the land-forces, marching eastwards, passed on the right hand the tomb of the maiden who gave her name to the Hellespont, and on the left the city of Kardia, and having crossed the Black water (Melas Potamos), passed the Aiolian city of Ainos and at last reached Doriskos. Here on the wide plain, through which the Hebros finds its way to the sea, and which had been held by a Persian garrison from the time of the Scythian expedition of Dareios or rather of the more successful Makedonian campaign of Megabazos, Xerxes thought that he would do well to see of how many myriads he was the master. The sum total of that host he could ascertain in no better way than by bringing a myriad of men into the smallest possible space, and by raising an inclosure round this space, into which other myriads were successively brought, until the infantry alone were found to amount to not less than 1,700,000 men. But if the method of enumeration seem rude, the details of the physical characteristics, the dress, the weapons, the ornaments, the dialects, which distinguished the several tribes or nations, are given with a minuteness and a fulness which, to be trustworthy, must be the result of contemporary registration. There is, however, no solid foundation for the belief that Herodotos in drawing up his narrative had before him the official muster-rolls of

The review
of the army
and fleet at
Doriskos.

⁸⁵⁵ We have, obviously, to go back further still for the origin of the epigram. If, as Mr. Tylor urges, *Primitive Culture*, i. 248, the ultimate source of human fancy is to be found in the actual experience of nature and life, we may fairly doubt whether the origin of popular sayings and proverbs is to be ascribed to the mere caprice of an uncontrolled imagination rioting in nonsense. It, therefore, becomes at least possible that these popular fancies and proverbs may come from the same source to which we trace the stories of the Mahabharata and Ramayana, of the Iliad and the Odyssey. If it be urged that the nursery rime of the cow which jumped over the moon springs from the mere nonsense-making impulse of some old nurse, we may at the least reply that we must have some evidence of this fact, and that, if this evidence be not forthcoming, we are free to examine evidence which seems to lead us to a different conclusion. Without committing myself to any special theory on the growth of these popular sayings and fancies, I may refer the reader to the admirable and delightful work of Professor Angelo de Gubernatis, on *Zoological Mythology*, i. 348 *et seq.*

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the Persian army. We have no sufficient ground for thinking that such muster-rolls ever existed, or that, if they existed, they were left in any place where they would become accessible to the historian. Hence, although we may reasonably accept as true the statement of facts which would be most likely to impress strangers (among such facts being the mode of warfare ascribed to the Sagartians⁸⁵⁶), we have no warrant for putting faith in numbers and details which official registration alone could preserve for even a few months or weeks.⁸⁵⁷ We have already been made familiar with the motives which led Justin to diminish the number of the Greeks at Marathon, while he hugely exaggerated that of the Persians; ⁸⁵⁸ and we may well suppose that even defeat and disaster would not induce Persians to pare down the grand total of men which according to their notions of the fitness of things the great king ought to carry with him. It is represented as the boast of the Athenians that at Marathon they had conquered six-and-forty nations; ⁸⁵⁹ and accordingly these nations or tribes appear in the Herodotean catalogue, each with its special differences of physical formation, of language, garb, and manners. The aggregate of the men belonging to these nations, together with the crews and fighting men of the fleet, is obtained by a method of numeration which presupposes certain conditions as to the conduct of Eastern warfare. The number of the war-vessels (to the exclusion of all transport ships or small boats), belonging to the fleet of Xerxes, is said to be stated both by Herodotos and Æschylos at precisely 1207. The sum seems to be a departure from the round numbers by which the Persians, like all other Eastern tribes, seek to express the notion of completeness. But the familiarity of Herodotos with the drama of the great tragic poet will scarcely be questioned; and it is, to say the least, noteworthy that Æschylos seems at first sight to assert that the whole number of the Persian fleet was not 1207, but pre-

⁸⁵⁶ Herod. vii. 85.

⁸⁵⁷ Xerxes, we are told, was attended by scribes, Herod. vii. 100: but it is not said that their work went beyond the task of registering the names of the nations which furnished men for his army, or incidents which might happen specially to excite the attention of the king. Herod. viii. 90.

⁸⁵⁸ See Appendix G.

⁸⁵⁹ Herod. ix. 27.

cisely, as we should have expected, 1000. He adds indeed that the number of ships in his fleet noted for their swift sailing amounted to 207; but he certainly does not say, as most interpreters have inferred from his words, that these 207 ships were to be added to the grand total of 1000. Even thus, however, the simple enumeration of the total by Æschylos stands on a very different footing from the list of factors which in Herodotos are made to yield the same result. With the exception of the 17 ships which the islanders of the Egean are said to have contributed, there is not a single uneven number to be found among them. The Phenicians furnish 300, the Egyptians 200, the Kilikians 100, the cities along the shores of the Euxine 100, the Pamphylians 30, the Lykians 50, the Kyprians 150, the Karians 70. But if the grand total as given by Æschylos was (as we cannot doubt) well known to Athenians generally, there is nothing to surprise us in the fact, if it should be a fact, that some one who misunderstood the lines in which he sums up the numbers made out the several factors which were to yield the desired result and that Herodotos accepted these factors as historical.⁸⁶⁰ It is, however, quite possible that a spurious or forged list may contain factors which are accurately given; and if we may hazard a conjecture in the absence of direct historical evidence, we should surely be justified in supposing that the contingents of the Persian fleet which would be best known to the Western Greeks would be those of the Asiatic Dorians, Ionians, and Aioliens, together with the ships furnished by the islanders. We may, therefore, fairly lay stress on the fact that the number of ships supplied by these Eastern Greeks with the islanders amounts to precisely the 207 which Æschylos gives as the number of fast-sailing ships in the service of Xerxes.⁸⁶¹ Thus these ships would probably be the only vessels of which Æschylos would even

⁸⁶⁰ Dr. Thirlwall, while he asserts that the numbers of the Persian fleet at Salamis are ambiguously stated by Æschylos, *Persai* 347, admits that his words may mean either that the whole amount was 1000, including 207 fast-sailing vessels, or that these 207 ships were not to be included in the former number. He is fully justified in maintaining that the adoption of the latter account by Herodotos proves that this meaning does not strain the words; but their natural and obvious meaning seems to be that they were 1000 in all. Isokrates and Nepos both give the numbers at 1200; Ktesias, as we should expect, at 1000. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 53.

⁸⁶¹ According to Herodotos, vii. 89, the Ionians contribute 100 ships, the Aioliens 30, the Dorians 30, and the islanders 17,—in all *ἑκατὸν δὲ καὶ ἑπτὰ*.

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pretend to have any personal knowledge; and from his statement we should infer that this historical factor was merged in the artificial total of 1000, while a certain Hellenic pride may be traced in the implied fact that the Hellenic ships in the Persian fleet far surpassed in swiftness the vessels even of the Phenicians. The whole enumeration becomes still more suspicious, when we see that the 1000 (or, if so it be, 1207) ships mentioned by Æschylos are those which fought at Salamis, whereas in Herodotos this is the number which Xerxes reviewed with his land-forces at Doriskos. In the interval, according to the story of Herodotos, the Persians had lost 647 ships, while the accessions made to their fleet amounted to only 120: and thus a further justification is furnished for the conclusion that the notion of completeness suggested 1000 as the fitting number of a fleet which must far exceed that which co-operated with the army of Kambyses in Egypt or bore Dareios to the shores of Scythia. It is enough then to say that in the enumeration of Herodotos the ships conveyed 51 myriads of men, while the land-force had more than 180 myriads of footmen and horsemen and of Arabs who rode on camels. To these were added all those whom the king had gathered in Europe; and these, he maintains, could not be less than 32 myriads. The number of servants, traders, and camp-followers he regards as fully equal to that of the troops, so that in all Xerxes brought 528 myriads of men as far as Thermopylai and the shore of Sepias. Of the women, of all the beasts of burden, and of Indian dogs, it would, he adds, be impossible to count up the numbers, so that he marvelled not so much at the failing of the streams as that food could be found for so great a multitude, which must have consumed daily eleven myriad pecks of corn, even if nothing were counted for the women, the beasts of burden, and the dogs.

The tradi-
tional nar-
ratives of
Herodotos
and Æschy-
los.

We may, if we please, make attempts to reduce within more reasonable limits this gigantic and incredible total. We may urge that the whole enumeration is founded on the mistaken idea that the troops of an Eastern army generally are attended by a number of followers in proportion to the huge trains which accompany distinguished and wealthy

chieftains, and further that the consumption of their troops would equal that of average Europeans. It may be maintained with truth that Asiatic troops go through their campaigns generally with little or no attendance and live on a supply of food which would leave the European with little power of thought or action. By this or by other means we may knock off perhaps two-thirds of the total sum as given by Herodotos: but in truth even this reduction fails to bring the amount within credible limits. All historical critics acknowledge an indefinite amount of exaggeration in these lists: most of them believe that some groundwork is left by which we may obtain a reckoning approximately true. But we cannot bear in mind too carefully that the uncertainty and constant change in oral tradition are in nothing more conspicuous than in lists of names or numbers. The abundance of witnesses is no guarantee for the truthful preservation of such details, in the absence of written documents drawn up at the time. The lapse even of a few years will leave nothing but vague impressions, whose inaccuracy must be candidly admitted, or whose defects must be supplied by unconscious variations or wilful falsehoods. On such points as these no man could trust his own memory at a distance of half a century; and a tradition spread over more than a single generation must on such subjects lose all positive value. It can therefore be of little use to examine the lists given by Herodotos or to correct them by the statements of later writers. No written lists are known to have been drawn up at the time; and if they were drawn up, they would not have passed into the hands of those from whom Herodotos would derive his knowledge; nor was there any fresh source of information which would impart a greater worth to the statements of Diodoros and Pausanias. The Persian host may by its size have left everywhere an impression of irresistible force. But the fact of this impression is unaffected, whether the hosts of Xerxes are to be numbered by tens of thousands or by millions; and it seems rash to go beyond this general impression on the ground that Herodotos must have conversed with persons who had witnessed the review at Doriskos and had learnt the separate totals put forth by the

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enumerators.⁸⁶² Thucydides confesses that he could not learn the exact number of those who were engaged in the battle of Mantinea: it would be strange, therefore, if we had a more trustworthy census of the Persian hordes at Doriskos. But not only is the enumeration undeserving of credit. No greater faith can be put in the statements of time; and no aid is given towards estimating the amount of the Persian army, when we are told that seven days and seven nights without intermission were taken up with the passage of the host over the bridges across the Hellespont. However likely, regarded by itself, may be the number of the ships at Salamis as given by Æschylos, yet even his contemporary testimony cannot be taken as conclusive on a subject for which, at least on the Persian side, he could have had no written information. All that can be said is that he cast his own version into a form which would not easily be affected by the changing traditions of the people. His enumeration both of the Greek and Persian ships is comprised in four short lines, while the Homeric catalogue of the combatants at Troy stretches over more than 400. But the epic poet confesses instinctively the great difficulty of his effort to perpetuate this unwritten tradition even with the artificial aids and checks of metre and rhythm. If the catalogue of the Persian forces had been cast into a similar form, the numbers might have been preserved without material changes to a later day than that of Herodotos: but the adoption of this form was not more necessary than the solemn prayer for the help of the Muses in a matter wherein human memory was especially weak and deceptive.

The conference of Xerxes and Demaratos.

But in truth Herodotos, although without doubt convinced that in speaking of the millions now brought against Hellas he was speaking of an historical fact, had an object in view of a still higher and more solemn kind; and this purpose is set forth in a narrative which must be given as he has related it. No sooner was the great review ended than the king sent for Demaratos, the Spartan exile, and asked him whether the Greeks would venture to withstand him. 'Thou art a Greek,' he said, 'and, as I hear, of no mean city. Now therefore tell me, will they lift their hands against me? for I

⁸⁶² This is the argument of Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 40.

think that if they were gathered together with all the dwellers of the West, they would not be able to resist me because they agree not one with the other.' 'Shall I speak the truth,' asked Demaratos, 'or only pleasant things?' Xerxes gave his pledge that no harm should befall him: and the Spartan then assured the king that 'poverty always dwelt with the Greeks; but courage they have won from wisdom and from strength of law, by which they keep off both poverty and tyranny. But,' he went on, 'though all the Greeks are worthy of praise, yet now I speak of the Spartans only. Be sure that these will never receive thy words which bring slavery to Hellas and that they will come out against thee to battle, even though all the rest should take thy side: neither ask what their numbers are that they should do this, for if a thousand set out, these will fight with thee, be they more or be they less.' Xerxes laughed. 'What—will a thousand men fight my great army? Tell me now—thou wast once their king—wilt thou fight straightway with ten men? Yet if each of them will match ten men of mine, thou, their king, shouldst match twenty; and then it might be as thou sayest. But if in size they be like all other Greeks whom I have seen, thy speech is much like vain-boasting. Come, let us reason upon it. How could a thousand, or a myriad, or five myriads who are all free and not ruled by one man withstand so great a host? Nay, we are more than a thousand to one, even if they be five thousand. If, according to our custom, they were ruled by one, then through fear of this one they would become brave beyond their own nature, and being driven by the scourge would go against a larger host than their own. But now, left to their own freedom, they will do none of these things. Nay, if their numbers were equal to ours, I doubt if they could withstand us, for among my spear-bearers are men who will fight with three Greeks at once; and thus in thine ignorance thou speakest foolishly.' The answer of Demaratos is plain-spoken and simple. 'I knew at the first, O king, that the truth would not please thee; but since thou hast compelled me, I have spoken of the Spartans as I ought to speak. What love I bear to them, thou knowest well. They have robbed

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me of my power and of my honours and driven me to a strange land, where thy father received me and gave me a home and food. Is it likely, then, that I should set lightly by the kindness which he showed me? I say not indeed that I am able to fight with ten men or with two, nor of my own will would I fight with one; but if I must fight and if the stake were great, then would I choose to fight with one of those whom thou thinkest equal to three Greeks. So, too, the Spartans one by one are like other men: but taken together they are the strongest of all men, for, though they are free, they are not without a lord. Law is their master, whom they fear much more than thy people fear thee. Whatever Law commands, that they do: and it commands always the same thing, charging them never to fly from any enemy, how strong soever he be, but to remain in their ranks and to conquer or die. If I seem to speak foolishly, let me keep silence for the time to come.'

Signifi-
cance and
value of
this con-
versation
between
Xerxes
and Dema-
ratos.

As we may suppose, he was not suffered to hold his peace; and for the present Xerxes is said to have dismissed him with a kindly smile. Regarded as a fact, the conversation is worthless: but if we take it as the expression of the historian's conviction, it is impossible to exaggerate its importance and its value. This value lies in the truth of the lesson which it teaches: and this lesson enforces the contrast between the principle of fear and the principle of voluntary obedience. It is profoundly true that brute force driven by the lash cannot be trusted in a conflict with minds moved by the strength of a deep moral impulse. It is nothing to the purpose to adduce the sneering phrase of the greatest tyrant that has scourged the earth, and to disparage the efforts of a few men against myriads of slaves by the cynical expression that Almighty God is always on the side of the greatest battalions. In Napoleon Bonaparte human wickedness probably reached its acme: but no one will deny that he achieved his vast success because he used as his instruments not merely the sinews but the minds and souls of his men. He knew perfectly well that mere arms and mere discipline were of little use or none, unless his soldiers could be stirred by a fierce enthusiasm: and his great power lay in his

ingenious use of claptrap to stir up this enthusiasm. Far from using or threatening the scourge, Bonaparte would have his troops rush to battle with the notion that forty centuries were looking down upon them from the top of the pyramids; and the point of the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratos is that to such a height even as this—the standard of mere deception—it was impossible for a Persian despot to rise. To a certain extent the picture of Herodotos is a true one. When an Eastern conqueror has overborne all resistance and his army has swelled from the numbers of a formidable host to the magnitude of an unmanageable horde, he is apt to forget the conditions under which his own unwieldy power was acquired; and Cyrus, if not Dareios, might have reminded the magnificent Xerxes that the foundations of the Persian empire were not laid by men driven to battle under the scourge. He was making the confusion, which Eastern kings are apt to make, between the force of hardy warriors urged on by the irresistible impulse of conquest, and the force of multitudes whose only object is to do as little work, and to do it as badly, as they can. That Xerxes really made this blunder may be inferred, not from this conversation with Demaratos, which seems to be altogether imaginary,⁸⁶³ but from the unvarying course of all Asiatic history. Whether it be the empire of Cyrus or of Baber, of Attila, Genghiz, or Timour, the same fate awaits them all; and in all the principle of weakness is the servile fear of one man in place of a reasoning and hearty submission to law.

But the interest of these conversations lies not merely in

⁸⁶³ It is obviously unfair to regard any one incident in the alleged co-operation of Demaratos with Xerxes apart from others. If the whole story has an ethical rather than an historical meaning, we can scarcely claim an historical character for the several parts. We have no warrant for saying that Herodotos was personally acquainted with either Demaratos or his sons: but his narrative of the circumstances preceding the deposition and exile of Demaratos, as well as of the fate of his enemy Kleomenes, clearly rests on a very different basis from stories of things that may have taken place in the tents of Xerxes. Mr. Grote thinks that Herodotos received the skeleton of this conversation from Demaratos or his sons, on the ground that 'the extreme speciality with which the Lacedæmonian exile confines his praise to the Spartans and Dorians, not including the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Herodotos himself.' *Hist. Gr.* v. 56. It is enough to say that if Herodotos had put his own convictions into the mouth of Demaratos, his narrative would have lost the special merit of plausibility as a fiction. Throughout he has spoken of Sparta as the first city of Hellas,—recognised as such by other Hellenic states, and at last rising to a consciousness and an assertion of its supremacy. He could scarcely, therefore, make Demaratos speak like a man acquainted with the events which led to the formation of the great confederacy of imperial Athens.

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Functions
of Demara-
tos in the
narrative
of the Per-
sian war.

the political or moral truths which they set forth. The career of Demaratos may be said to be significant in the measure in which it is imaginary. Scarcely in any part of his history can Herodotos dispense with the usual ethical machinery, and least of all in that portion which is rapidly leading up to the point at which the barbarian draws down upon himself the signal vengeance of heaven. Accordingly, in this western journey, the part of Solon with Kroisos, of Kroisos with Cyrus and Kambyzes, and, of Amasis with Polykrates, is filled towards Xerxes by the banished Spartan king. If his existence be historical (and this is beyond question), his story is full of mystery from beginning to end. There may be nothing strange in his flight to Sousa, or wonderful in the favour shown to him by the Persian king: but it is perplexing that so little should follow from his deep resentment against his countrymen. To Xerxes he acts the part of a wise counsellor and a fearless friend: but his wisdom is set forth only as a foil to the obstinate imbecillity of the Persian. In him is the foresight which suggests, and the judgement which dictates, the right measures to be taken at every step and under all circumstances; but his counsels are never followed, and his rivals for the royal favour see treachery in the advice which, if taken, must inevitably have involved the ruin of his country. Still his friendly feeling receives ample acknowledgement, while yet it is from him (by a device which bears a suspicious likeness to that of Histiaios) that the Spartans receive the first intimation of the dangers impending over them.⁸⁶⁴ In the con-

⁸⁶⁴ The story is that Demaratos in the early days of his exile, learning the intentions of Dareios to invade Hellas, informed the Spartans of his plan,—as Herodotos, vii. 189, is inclined to think, by way of showing his exultation at the thought of their approaching ruin,—and that through fear of discovery he could hit on no other way of doing this than by sending them a wooden tablet on which he had carved the words of his message and which he had then covered again with wax. The young daughter of Kleomenes, who has already figured in the colloquy between her father and the Milesian Aristagoras, page 389, suggested that the message might be found in the wood as it was not visible on the wax: and it was deciphered accordingly.

Like the similar story of Histiaios and Aristagoras, with many others, the tale is altogether superfluous. No attempt had been made to keep the intentions of the Persian king a secret. Cyrus, if we believe the tradition, had long ago told Lakrines that he would give the Spartans quite enough to think about in their own concerns. The Athenians had been already warned to receive Hippias again as their tyrant, if they had any care for their own safety and interests; and the whole history of the Ionian revolt and its suppression was at least as likely to come to the ears of the Spartans and to alarm them, as this secret message from Demaratos, even if we say nothing of the treatment which the Persian heralds who came asking for earth and water received at

flicts at Thermopylai he prepares the mind of Xerxes for a determined resistance from his own countrymen, while the historian takes care that with characteristic Spartan pride he shall make no account of the noble courage of the Athenians; ⁸⁶⁵ and when the rejection of his advice to occupy the island of Kythera has sealed the doom of the Persian expedition, ⁸⁶⁶ his name no longer appears in a history which has no further room for his moral and religious functions.

With so singular a fulness of detail not only of personal incidents and secret conversations but of the numbers and composition of the huge Persian fleet and still more enormous Persian army, we should be fully justified in looking for a like minuteness of geographical detail for the march of Xerxes from the Hellespont to the fatal cliffs of Sounion. If we look merely to the number of the names mentioned, we shall not be disappointed. A vast horde journeying from the Thracian Chersonesos to the vale of Tempe must necessarily pass through most of the cities which lie in its line of march: but in default of genuine historical information we can but content ourselves with naming the places through which or near which the traditional narrative leads him. It mattered not that Xerxes was already dragging five millions in his train: he must needs add to his vast horde as he went along from Doriskos, passing first the Samothrakian burghs ⁸⁶⁷ and the stream of Lissos which his army drained dry, and then leaving on the left hand the Hellenic cities of Maroneia, Dikaia, and Abdera. Of the several Thracian tribes who lay in his path none offered any resistance with the exception of the Satrai, a set of hardy mountaineers living probably amid the forests and snows of Rhodopê: and thus without hindrance he reached the banks of the Strymon and the city of Eion then governed by Boges whom Megabazos had probably left in charge of it. This stream they found, it is said, bridged over for their passage: but they would not leave a spot which was called the Nine Roads, the site of

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VI.

The march
from Doris-
kos to the
Nine
Roads.

Athens and at Sparta. Of the vast work of cutting the canal beneath Athos (if the tale be true) and of the systematic storing of corn and other provisions along the line of march through Thrace, information would assuredly be at once conveyed to the Western Greeks.

⁸⁶⁵ Herod. vii. 102.

⁸⁶⁷ τὰ Σαμοθρακίκα τείχεα. Herod. vii. 108.

⁸⁶⁶ Ib. vii. 234.

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the future Amphipolis, without burying alive for luck's sake nine boys and nine girls taken from the people of the country.⁸⁶⁸

Forced contributions from Hellenic and other cities.

A line drawn from the mouth of the Strymon on the east to that of the Axios on the west cuts off to the south the region of Chalkidike⁸⁶⁹ with the three peninsulas of Aktê or Athos, of Sithonia, and Pallênê. At the base of Aktê lay the Hellenic cities of Stageiros and Akanthos, the people of which last place are said to have received special rewards from Xerxes for their zeal in promoting the digging of the canal under mount Athos. As this canal was dug for the special benefit of the Persian fleet, it must of course be used by them; and we hear of no such mischief as that which the storm on this iron-bound coast wrought on the ships of Mardonios. Doubling the Toronaian promontory of Ampelos, the fleet passed the Greek cities of Torônê, Sermylê, and Olynthos. Thence, having levied contributions of men and ships on Potidaia, Aphytis, Skiônê, Mendê, and other cities, it reached the city of Thermê, on the banks of the Axios,⁸⁷⁰ where by the order of the king the land-forces were to join again with the navy. In the meanwhile Xerxes had been journeying through the Paionian and Krestonian land to the banks of the Echeidoros which, like the Lissos, failed to supply the wants of the barbarians. But if the highland tribes were disposed to be submissive, lions and wild cattle, we are told, more than made up for their degeneracy; and the Persian camels suffered terribly from the onslaught of these unlooked-for enemies.⁸⁷¹ At last the army halted on the ground stretching from Thermê to the banks of the Haliakmon,—a distance of about 30 miles, which scarcely corresponds to the huge numbers of the traditional narrative. Of the support

⁸⁶⁸ Herod. vii. 114. Herodotos here relates a crime, if possible, still more atrocious and disgusting, perpetrated by Amestris whose name also brings to an end the infamous chronicle of Persian misdeeds which he is compelled to relate in his narrative of the Persian wars.

⁸⁶⁹ For the settlement of this region see page 164.

⁸⁷⁰ For the significance of the names Axios and Strymon see note 93.

⁸⁷¹ Herodotos gives, as the boundary of the region within which lions at this time ranged, a line drawn from the Thracian stream Nestos to the Akarnanian and Aitolian Achelôos. The myths of the Nemean lion may perhaps be taken as evidence that in earlier ages they had been found in the Peloponnesos. But in this narrative of Herodotos the perplexing thing is that these beasts should be allowed to get at the camels at all. A few Hottentots will keep their incampments safe against the attacks of lions: and camels picketed amongst large masses of men would run no risk whatever.

of this vast throng it was necessary that some account should be given in their long journey from the Thracian Chersonesos. It was scarcely enough that magazines of provisions should have been filled long since in forts or cities on the line of march. The war must be made in part at least to support itself; and thus we are told that a single meal for this enormous multitude cost the Thasians four hundred talents of silver;⁸⁷² that Megakreon of Abdera advised his fellow-citizens to go to the temples and thank the gods that Xerxes was not in the habit of dining twice a day;⁸⁷³ and that the inhabitants of all the cities in these regions had for months devoted themselves to the fattening of beasts and birds and to the preparation of splendid tents and costly services of plate for the use of the king and his great lords. Their only reward was to see their stores consumed as in a moment and their costly vessels and hangings swept off by the robbers, who, whether successful or defeated, would soon have to pass through their land again. Possibly the thieves, who expected shortly to return dragging with them myriads of Athenian and Spartan captives, might be expected to bestow a thought on the food which might be needed for themselves and their prisoners on their homeward journey, and may have deemed it at the least not worth while to strip the land through which they passed or leave in the hearts of the people a feeling of deadly enmity. These, again, it might be supposed, would not be sorry or slow to avail themselves of the opportunity for retaliation, when a few months later Xerxes hurried through their land in his ignominious retreat to Sousa. But in this wonderful war, beyond the great issue between freedom and law on the one side and despotism with the scourge on the other, everything turns out in a way which could never be anticipated. We shall find Xerxes with his army starving in regions where not a hand is raised against him, while Artabazos, who has to guard himself against constant attacks, makes his way successfully through Makedonia and Thrace. It might have been thought that the Persian invaders would leave among the highland tribes an accursed memory: but

⁸⁷² Herod. vii. 118.⁸⁷³ Ib. vii. 120

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instead of this we hear only of a singular worship paid to the very road by which he had passed and which none were ever allowed to break up or to till.⁸⁷⁴ Yet some of the chiefs are said to have been so fierce in their opposition to him that they wreaked a savage vengeance on those of their children or people who had dared to join him.⁸⁷⁵

Visit of
Xerxes to
the vale of
Tempe.

From Thermê, as he looked westwards and southwards, the eyes of Xerxes rested on that magnificent chain of mountains which rises to a head in the crests of Olympos and Ossa, and leaving between these two hills the defile through which the Peneios rushes to the sea, stretches under the name of Pelion along the coast which was soon to make him feel the wrath of the invisible gods. His mind had been made up to take the inland road which would bring him over the Perrhaibian hills to the city of Gonnos: but the tidings that the channel of the Peneios was also a gate of Thessaly determined him to go and see the beautiful vale of Tempe. Here the historian represents him as gazing in wonder at the mighty walls of rock which rose on either side, and asking whether it would be possible to treat the Peneios as Cyrus had treated the Gyndes or the Euphrates. Among the Hellenic or semi-Hellenic tribes who stooped to yield him earth and water the Aleuad chieftains of Thessaly had been the most prominent and the most zealous. From them the question of Xerxes brought out the fact that they lived in a mere basin where it was needful only to stop the one outlet of its streams in order to make the whole land a sea and destroy every soul within its mountain barriers. Xerxes was not slow, it is said, in appreciating the force and meaning of Thessalian ardour. People who live in a country which can be taken without trouble do wisely, he maintained, in making a league betimes with the invader.⁸⁷⁶

⁸⁷⁴ Herod. vii. 115.

⁸⁷⁵ Ib. viii. 116.

⁸⁷⁶ Mr. Grote seems to reject this story. 'To suppose this narrow defile walled up was easy for the imagination of any spectator: to suppose that he (Xerxes) could order it to be done was in character with a monarch who disposed of an infinite amount of manual labour and who had just finished the cutting of mount Athos. Such dramatic fitness was quite sufficient to convert that which *might have been* said into that which *was* said and to procure for it a place among the historical anecdotes communicated to Herodotus.' *Hist. Gr.* v. 113. So far as mere likelihood goes, Xerxes would be more familiar with the diverting of rivers from their bed than with the idea of digging canals to avoid sailing round a mountain. It may perhaps be more safely said that all the personal anecdotes must stand or fall together.

From the pass of Tempe Xerxes returned to Thermê, where he was constrained to tarry some time, while his pioneers were cutting a path across the densely wooded hills. Here he received the reports of the heralds who had been sent to demand earth and water from all the Greeks except the Athenians and the Spartans; and from this place, eleven days after the departure of Xerxes with his land-forces for Gonnos, the fleet crossed in a single day to the Magnesian coast under Pelion, there to feel in a few hours the irresistible strength of the wrathful Boreas.⁸⁷⁷ Thus far the enterprise both by sea and land had been carried on with an unbroken good fortune which is scarcely less perplexing than the stories of subsequent disasters. We may ascribe to the epical method of Herodotos the picture which represents Xerxes as connecting his expedition with the fallen kingdom of Priam and as sacrificing a thousand cows to Athênê on the Ilian hill, thereby to win her favour in his efforts to avenge the invasion of Agamemnon. But his ignorance of the name and fate of Protesilaos would indicate a very imperfect acquaintance with the poems which told the story of Hektor and Achilles.⁸⁷⁸ More strange is the uninterrupted pomp and splendour of his march through the rough lands of the rude Thrakian and Makedonian tribes. If wild beasts are said to cause some damage to his baggage-camels, from the inhabitant of each town he experiences nothing but the most unbounded servility and a hospitality which in many instances, we are assured, ate them literally out of house and home. A few months later his army in its retreat followed once again the same track. He had some cause for fear and more for selfish anxiety; but the army which attended him had neither caused nor shared the disasters of the fleet at

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General success of the westward march, in its bearing on the narrative of the retreat of Xerxes.

⁸⁷⁷ Herod. vii. 183.

⁸⁷⁸ The very point of this offering to Athênê is that in the *Iliad* she is represented throughout as hostile to Ilium, i.e. to the Persian empire according to the theory which regarded all Asia as the inheritance of the Persian king. It was therefore necessary to disarm her opposition to a scheme which sought to avenge the woes not of Helen but of Paris and Priam. But such a notion implies more than a mere passing acquaintance with the story of the *Iliad*, if not with the *Ilias* and the *Achilleis* themselves. The way in which, if the tale be true, Xerxes allows himself to be cheated by Artaktes seems to show that he had not even this imperfect acquaintance with those poems. Herod. ix. 116. This man obtained from Xerxes a grant of the house and household goods of a stranger who, as he said, had been killed in an attempt to invade the king's territory. With this warrant he robbed the shrine and Temenos of Protesilaos, the first man of the army of Agamemnon who set foot on Dardan land.

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Salamis, while they could boast of something like victory in their encounter with the Spartans of Leonidas at Thermopylai.⁸⁷⁹ He had left behind him thirty myriads to carry out the scheme which he had only delegated to another; and there was nothing in the circumstances of his retreat to justify any marked change in the policy of the cities and tribes who had welcomed and aided him before. But in that retreat no mention is made of banquets and entertainments, or even of requests for such kindly treatment. The strong magazines which had helped to supply their wants on the westward march are all forgotten. The forcible plunder of stored grain takes the place of willing contributions; and where this is not forthcoming, the army are left to appease their hunger as best they may, while the diseases which follow on famine so thin his hosts that, in the phrase of Herodotos, he reaches Sardeis with the merest fraction of the troops with which he had started from Athens.⁸⁸⁰ Yet, unlike Artabazos in his flight from Plataiai, he has not, it would seem, to withstand any attacks from the Thracian mountaineers. The disasters which befall his army lie at his own door. He is robbed and cheated by the Paionians;⁸⁸¹ and this mysterious change in the circumstances and incidents of his homeward journey may justify a doubt in the uniform prosperity which is said to have characterised his march from Sousa to Thermopylai.⁸⁸²

Circumstances tending to develop the naval power of Athens.

Long before the departure of Xerxes from Sousa the course of events in Western Hellas had been determining the parts which Athens and Sparta were severally to play in the

⁸⁷⁹ Herod. viii. 100. Xerxes led home a portion of his land army: and it is the special argument of Mardonios that the land army was trustworthy and had in fact thus far been victorious. The whole blame of the defeat at Salamis is thrown on 'Phenicians, Egyptians, Kyprians, and Kilikians,' in other words, on subjects who had no personal interest in the issue of the struggle. If this be a true statement of the case, the fact must be held to weight the scale heavily against the narrative of the retreat of Xerxes from Athens.

⁸⁸⁰ His words are almost stronger, ἀνάγων τῆς στρατιῆς οὐδὲν μέρος ὡς εἶπεν. viii. 115.

⁸⁸¹ Herod. viii. 115. The sacred car of Zeus with its splendid horses which had figured so conspicuously in the stately procession which wound its way from Sardeis had been left by Xerxes in the care of the Paionians of Siris. These men gave the horses to some Thracian tribe; and when Xerxes on his return asked for them, the answer was that they had been stolen from their pastures. If the story be true, a strong suspicion is thrown on the numbers and quality of the forces which accompanied him. Yet if the Paionians could venture on such barefaced robbery, we might be tempted to think that they could have placed formidable hindrances in the way of his retreat.

⁸⁸² Herod. vii. 184. The only alternative conclusion is that the story of the retreat is untrustworthy throughout.

approaching struggle. The long and uninteresting feud or warfare between Athens and Aigina had at least one good result in fixing the attention of the Athenians rather on their navy than on their army. On the death of Kleomenes the Aiginetans had obtained a verdict at Sparta against Leotychides who was delivered up to them in place of the Aiginetans surrendered as hostages.⁸⁸³ They had laid hands on their prisoner and were about to lead him away, when the warning of a Spartan named Theasides that the Spartans might hereafter regret their sentence and punish the accusers of Leotychides induced them to set him at liberty on the condition that he should go to Athens and obtain the freedom of the hostages. Leotychides did their bidding; and on the reply of the Athenians that they had received the hostages from two kings and to two kings only they would resign them he read them a lesson from the story of Glaukos the son of Epikydes, whose bad faith had been requited by the uprooting of his whole house.⁸⁸⁴ The parable was thrown away upon the Athenians. Possibly the manner of Leotychides may have shown that he was speaking perfunctorily rather than from conviction. More probably, they were conscious of having a hold on the Aiginetans by means of these hostages, which they were in no way inclined to relax. The angry islanders by way of retaliation seized the Athenian theoric ship which attended a quinquennial festival at Sounion; and the prisoners or hostages were probably on both sides slain.⁸⁸⁵ The Athenians, now resolved on putting forth their full strength against their enemies, found a zealous ally in Nikodromos, who, resenting a banishment which he regarded as unjust, was eager to upset the oligarchs who had sent him into exile. A day was fixed for the descent of the Athenians on the island; and Nikodromos in accordance with this agreement seized on the old city. But the Athenians came just a day too late. They had no fleet which they could venture to oppose to that of the Aiginetans, and they were unable to complete in time their bargain with the Corinthians, then their intimate allies, for the supply of a sufficient number of ships. When at last they approached

⁸⁸³ See page 422.⁸⁸⁴ See note 557.⁸⁸⁵ Herod. vi. 87.

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the island with seventy vessels, Nikodromos had already fled with other Aiginetans. These fugitives, placed by the Athenians at Sounion, employed themselves in making raids from that promontory and plundering the men of Aigina. Those of the Demos who had been unable to escape with Nikodromos were seized by the oligarchs to the number of 700, and put to death. Henceforth a curse clave to the island, not for this frightful massacre, but because one of the victims ran to the temple-gate of Demeter Thesmophoros and seized the handles. All efforts to drag him from the door were vain; and the difficulty was settled by cutting off the man's hands and leaving the fingers still clinging to the knob.⁸⁸⁶ In their distress the Aiginetan oligarchs appealed to the Argives; but these either could not or would not help them, and a thousand Argive volunteers under Eurybates were for the most part slain by the Athenians in Aigina. Eurybates himself, a noted wrestler and conqueror in the Pentathlon, having killed three men who engaged with him in single combat, was at last struck down by Sophanes of Dekeleia. By sea the Aiginetans were more fortunate; and the Athenian fleet, being surprised in a state of disorder, was defeated with a loss of four ships with their crews.

Rivalry of
Themistokles and
Aristeides.

The victory of Marathon had long since taught the Athenians how much even the forces of a single Hellenic city (for here they had been aided only by the thousand Plataians) could do against the looser discipline or the weaker zeal of barbarian troops: and these rebuffs by the Aiginetans could not fail to impress upon them more deeply the need of developing the naval power of Athens,—a need of which Themistokles had from the very beginning of his career been conscious and which he persistently strained every nerve to supply. With him the maritime greatness of Athens was the one end on which all his efforts were concentrated; and the change of policy, on which he was thus led to insist, undoubtedly embittered the antagonism which had already

⁸⁸⁶ Herod. vi. 91. The phrase 'those hands were clinging to the handles' seems not only strange, but altogether unlike the manner of Herodotos. What is meant is that the mere hands were left without the arms. Mr. Grote cites *Iliad* iii. 376, *κεινή δὲ τροφάλεια ἀπ' ὄσπερο*, when the helmet comes off without the head of the wearer. We may compare vii. 131, where Herodotos speaks of the Persian heralds as returning to Xerxes at Thermē, *οἱ μὲν κεινοί, οἱ δὲ φέροντες γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ*.

placed a great gulf between himself and Aristеides. The growing wealth of Themistokles, the increasing poverty of his rival; the rigid integrity of the latter, the winning versatility of the former; the attachment of Aristеides to the old forms of Athenian life, the determination of Themistokles to make Athens pre-eminently a maritime power,—all presented a contrast involving so much danger to the state that Aristеides himself (if we believe a tradition already noticed) said that if the Athenians were wise they would put an end to their rivalry by throwing them both into the Barathron; and the Demos so far took the same view that by a vote of ostracism Aristеides was sent into exile. In him Athens lost a citizen, incomparably superior to his rival in every private virtue and in general morality; in Themistokles she retained the only man who could guide her, through seemingly hopeless difficulties, to victory and imperial power. The ostracism of Aristеides affirmed the adoption of the new policy in preference to the old conservative theory which regarded the navy as the seed-bed of novelty and change: and it cannot be doubted that Themistokles would strengthen this resolution by dwelling on the certainty of a fresh effort on the part of the Persian king to carry out the design on which, as they knew, his father Dareios had set his heart. From the petty strife with Aigina he would lead them to the momentous contest which awaited them with the whole power of Asia. He would not fail to impress on them the fact that this mighty force was to be directed especially against themselves, and that it was as necessary to be prepared against the formidable Phœnician fleet which had crushed their eastern kinsfolk as against any armies which might assail them by land. Nor would there be any difficulty in persuading them that the foundations of their naval supremacy should be laid in the fortification of Peiræus with its three natural harbours⁸⁸⁷ rather than in the open bay of Phaleron to the east of the promontory of Mounychia. It was a happy thing both for the statesman and for the city whose true interests he had so thoroughly at heart, that the proposed expedition of

483 B.C.

⁸⁸⁷ Thuc. i. 93.

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Dareios was delayed first by the revolt of Egypt, then by his death, and lastly by the long time spent by Xerxes before he set out from Sousa, while the internal resources of Athens were enormously increased by the proceeds of the silver mines of Laureion, a district lying between the triangle of which a line drawn from Thorikos on the east to Anaphlystos on the west forms the base with cape Sounion for its apex. During the feuds of the factions which preceded the days of Solon and during the military despotism of the Peisistratidai the wealth of these mines had been scantily used, if used at all: but the impulse given to enterprise by the free constitution of Kleisthenes had already been rewarded by a harvest of silver sufficient to yield ten drachmas to every Athenian citizen. This petty personal profit he induced them to forego; and by his advice this hoard of perhaps 300,000 drachmas⁸⁸⁸ was devoted to the building of 200 ships to be employed nominally in that war with Aigina which in the forcible words of Herodotos was nothing less than the salvation of Greece.⁸⁸⁹

Pan-hellenic congress at the stadium of Corinth.

This quickening of the Athenian mind under the guidance of Themistokles was not the only good effect produced by the shadow of the storm-cloud approaching from the East. Some at least among the other Greeks began to see that they were not fulfilling their true mission by wasting their years in perpetual warfare and feud; and in an assembly which deserved to be considered in some degree as a Pan-hellenic congress, they acknowledged the paramount need of making up all existing quarrels in presence of a danger which threatened all alike. In face of this common peril the men of Aigina laid aside their feud with the Athenians; but the joint action of the day was in their case followed unhappily by the renewed enmity of the morrow. In fact, whatever might be the outward look of things, the Hellenic character was not changed; and although invitations were sent to the Greeks

⁸⁸⁸ Herod. vii. 144. This would be the sum placed at his disposal on the supposition that the number of the Athenian citizens was now what it was said to have been when Aristagoras came to Athens after his repulse from Sparta; see page 589. But it is plain that no calculation can be made as to the mineral wealth of Attica, unless we suppose that after this division of ten drachmas to each man the treasury would have been left empty,—an assumption not justified by the words of Herodotos.

⁸⁸⁹ Herod. vii. 144.

of Sporadic Hellas from Krete to Sicily, the summons was by some disregarded, while even among the states which were prepared to sacrifice most in the common cause no further approach was made towards a true national union. It was a time of high excitement. Of all the Hellenic cities taken together the greater number were Medising, or taking sides with the Persian, while they who refused to submit to Xerxes were cast down at the thought of the utter inadequacy of their navy to cope with his Phenician fleet. In this season of supreme depression the great impulse to hope and vigorous action came from Athens. The historian asserts that his words, which he knows will give great offence in many quarters, are forced from him by strong conviction of their truth; and his emphatic judgement is that if the Athenians had feared the coming danger and left their country, or, even without leaving it, had yielded themselves to Xerxes, none else would have dared to withstand the king by sea, while on land, even if many walls had been raised across the isthmus, the Spartans would have been forsaken by their allies, as these submitted one by one to the Persian fleet; and thus after doing brave deeds they might have died nobly, or seeing all others yielding to the barbarian would have done likewise. Hence the Athenians are with him pre-eminently the saviours of Hellas. With them the scale of things was to turn; and they chose that Hellas should continue free, and raised up and cheered all those who would not yield to the Persian. Thus next after the gods, he adds, they drove away the king, because they feared not the oracles of Delphoi neither were scared by the great perils which were coming upon their country.⁸⁹⁰

⁸⁹⁰ Herod. vii. 139. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 85, says that Herodotos apologises for this judgement as wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence. The historian does indeed assert that truth compels him to speak out; but he does not say that he speaks against his will. Such passages, however, serve to show the conditions under which the history of Herodotos was written and published. He nowhere conceals the fact that his sympathies are altogether with Athens: but he does all that he can, consistently with the duty of speaking the truth, to spare the feelings of those who were in his day bitterly opposed to the Athenians, and to avoid giving offence either to these or to their enemies the Spartans. This is specially manifest in his singularly cautious remarks on the Medism of the Argives. When Herodotos was finishing his work in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, Argos was neutral, and both sides were equally anxious to secure her favour. Hence a flat imputation of treachery during the struggle with Persia would offend the Argives themselves scarcely more than the Athenians and the Spartans: and thus the historian contents himself with saying that he has no wish to dispute the statements of the Argives, but that if all

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The sending of the spies to Sardeis, and the answers received at Delphoi by the Athenians.

The Greeks, present at the Congress, followed up their resolution to make common cause together by sending, it is said, three men to Sardeis with orders to ascertain the numbers and quality of the Persian forces. This it is possible that they may have done: but the act involved a needless risk for scanty profit or for none. No secret had been made of the Persian preparations against Hellas. All Asia, it is said, had resounded for years with the din of business. The inhabitants of Greek towns in Thrace and Makedonia could furnish accurate accounts of the quantities of corn laid up in the several magazines; and not a city on the line of march could fail to form a tolerably clear notion of the numbers moving on before them to the conquest of Europe. It looks, perhaps, as though the tale had been put together for the purpose of exhibiting the magnanimity of Xerxes, who is represented as saying that the death of three men would not tell much in favour of the Persians, while their report of what they had seen in the camp at Sardeis might

men should agree to exchange their own burdens for those of their neighbours, they would, on feeling the pressure of these burdens, gladly depart with the weight which they had had to carry before. Thus, he argues, the conduct of the Argives was not necessarily worse than that of their neighbours, vii. 152. Elsewhere, when he enumerates the tribes which inhabit the Peloponnesos, far from naming the Argives among those who resisted Xerxes, he pointedly says that those tribes, whom he has not mentioned as taking part with Athens, remained isolated, or rather, to tell the truth, openly Medised. viii. 73. But although he carefully avoids committing himself to a belief of either story, he mentions the rumour that the Argives deliberately brought down the Persians on Hellas, to gratify their feeling of resentment against the Spartans, while he gives due prominence to the account which the Argives themselves gave of the matter. This account declared that when they first heard that the Persians were coming, they sent to Delphoi to ask what the god would advise them to do after having lost so many men in their war with Sparta. The answer of the Pythia ran thus,

O thou that art hated by thy neighbours, but dear to the undying gods,
Keep thy spear beside thee and sit still:
Guard thy head, and the head shall save the body.

In compliance with this counsel the Argives maintained their own dignity by informing the Spartans that they would join them in the struggle with Xerxes, waiving their own right to the supreme command during the war, provided that the Spartans would yield to them an equal share of power and make a peace for thirty years. The Spartans answered briefly that they had two kings, while the Argives had only one; and on their adding that they could do no more than give to the Argive king one vote out of three, the Spartan messengers were told that such an insult was not to be endured and that on pain of being treated as enemies they must leave Argos before sundown. Argos would rather submit to Xerxes than allow its king to be in a minority in councils of war. This, according to Herodotos, vii. 150, was the Argive version of the matter. He adds that the story commonly believed throughout Hellas ascribed their demand or their neutrality to a special request from Xerxes urged on the ground that the Persian eponymos Perses was a son of Perseus the Argive hero and his wife Andromeda, and that it was wrong for the children to fight against their fathers, or that the latter (the Argives) should oppose Xerxes by aiding others. The tale is probably mere fiction. It is not likely that Xerxes was conscious of his affinity with Greeks any more than Cæsar was aware of the affinity of his own tongue with the speech of Germans and Gauls: but the fiction nevertheless pointed to an historical fact of the utmost importance.

indefinitely deepen the terror which already weighed down the spirit of the Greeks. Hence, when these spies were about to be slain by the Persian generals, Xerxes, like other chiefs under similar circumstances, interferes to save them and orders that they shall be dismissed unhurt after having been led through every part of his army. But for the present the plan of the narrative rendered it necessary to bring out in the most striking contrast the seemingly irresistible might of the Persian king and the disunion and vacillation of his adversaries. This contrast becomes most forcible when the Athenians, who are regarded as the special objects of his wrath, betake themselves for counsel in the hour of need to the god at Delphoi. How little worth are the answers ascribed to the Pythian priestess, we shall see at once when we remember that the numerical majority of the Greek states was decidedly in favour of submission to Xerxes, that the policy of resisting chiefly by sea originated with Themistokles and was thoroughly distasteful to the strictly conservative citizens headed by Aristides, and that even those Greeks who were determined not to submit to the Persian were greatly depressed by the memory of the Ionic revolt and its disastrous issue. Here, as elsewhere, the epical feeling of the historian and his informants has exhibited itself in a narrative of singular beauty. We have first the very blackness of darkness in the pitiless response of the god to the Athenian messengers when first they approached the Delphian shrine.

O wretched people, why sit ye still? Leave your homes and the strongholds of your city, and flee away.

Head and body, feet and hands, nothing is sound, but all is wretched; For fire and war, which are hastening hither on a Syrian chariot, will presently make it low;

And other strong places also shall they destroy and not yours only, And many temples of the undying gods shall they give to the flame.

Down their walls the big drops are streaming, as they tremble for fear;

And from their roofs the black blood is poured down, for the sorrow that is coming:

But go ye from my holy place and brace up your hearts for the evil.⁸⁹¹

⁸⁹¹ This phrase is ambiguous, and designedly so: but the sense here given is that which the words seem most naturally to bear. See Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 82. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 294. Rawlinson, *Herodotos*, vol. iv. p. 119.

The messengers were dismayed ; but they received the first glimmering of comfort from the Delphian Timon who bade them take olive-branches and try the god once more. To their intreaty for a more merciful answer they added that, if they failed to receive it, they would stay there till they died. Their supplication was rewarded with these mysterious utterances,

Pallas cannot prevail with Zeus who lives on Olympos, though she has besought him with many prayers ;
 And his word which I now tell you is firmly fixed as a rock.
 For thus saith Zeus that, when all else within the land of Kekrops is wasted, the wooden wall alone shall not be taken ; and this shall help you and your children.
 But wait not until the horsemen come and the footmen ; turn your backs upon them now, and ene day ye shall meet them.
 And thou, divine Salamis, shalt destroy those that are born of women, when the seed-time comes or the harvest.

These words, as being more hopeful, the messengers, we are told, wrote down, and having returned to Athens read them before the people.⁸⁹² This fact is distinctly asserted by Herodotos ; and we have no reason for questioning it : but the very ease with which this response was made to coincide with the policy of Themistokles seems to throw a clear light on the influence which produced it. The mind of the great statesman had long been made up that Athens should become a maritime power. He had resolved not less firmly that the main work of beating off the Persians should be wrought at sea, as he saw little chance of its being done effectually by land only ; and his whole career supplies evidence that he would adopt with slight scruple or none whatever measures might be needed to carry out his resolutions. We have then no warrant for doubting that when the answer was read out before the assembled citizens, Themistokles could at once come forward and say, ‘ Athenians, the soothsayers who bid you leave your country and to seek another elsewhere, are wrong ; and so are the old men who tell you to stay at home and guard the Akropolis, as though the god pointed to our

⁸⁹² If we take these words in their strict sense, they would imply that the previous answer was not written down,—a conclusion which seems to involve the fact that that response was of later fabrication.

Akropolis when he speaks of the wooden wall, because long ago there was a thorn hedge around it. This will not help you; and they are all leading you astray when they say that you must be beaten in a sea-fight at Salamis, and that this is meant by the words which tell of Salamis as destroying the children of women. The words do not mean this. If they had been spoken of us, the priestess would certainly have said "Salamis the wretched," not "Salamis the divine," if the people of the land were doomed to die there. They are spoken not of us, but of our enemies. Arm then for the fight at sea, for the fleet is your wooden wall.' But if we may not question the fact that the response was susceptible of the interpretation put upon it by Themistokles, and indeed that it could not well bear any other, we have to remember the means by which the responses were produced which bade Kleomenes drive the Peisistratidai from Athens,⁸⁹³ or enjoined the deposition of Demaratos.⁸⁹⁴ It is notorious that Themistokles was at least as unscrupulous as Kleisthenes; and it is to the last degree unlikely that he should fail to avail himself of an instrument so well fitted to further his designs. What measure of influence oracles, portents, and prodigies may have had upon that commanding mind which bent all wills to its own, we have no means of determining: but of such influence there is little sign or none. His career, as related by Herodotos, agrees closely with the sketch of Thucydides; and every feature in his character as painted even by the earlier historian points to the mental condition of a later age. From the beginning of his course to its close he exhibits that knowledge of the real strength and weakness of Athens which marked the life and policy of Perikles. The Delphian responses serve in his case only to illustrate the method by which he guided the religious prejudices or the convictions of his countrymen, and to contrast his position with that of the man who after him raised to its greatest height the fabric of Athenian power. He will not let his countrymen swerve from the path in which alone he sees hope and safety: but he is compelled to extort a sanction for his own decision from the ambiguous verses of a Delphian

⁸⁹³ See p. 275.⁸⁹⁴ See p. 421.

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priestess prompted, it would seem, by himself. That to these grounds of encouragement he must have added arguments more akin to those of Perikles, that he must have convinced his countrymen, as he had convinced himself, of the stubborn vitality of Athens, so long as she continued in her own proper path, is certain from the results which he brought about. The mental condition of his time threw these arguments into the background; but assuredly he realised their future victory over the Persians as clearly as Perikles saw that Athens must come out triumphant from the struggle with Sparta, if only she would remain true to his counsels.

Faithless-
ness of the
Argives,
Kretans,
and Korky-
raians.

But although by adopting the policy of Themistokles Athens virtually insured her own supremacy in Hellas, the time was not yet come when it could be generally recognised. The position of Athens and the large number of ships which she was able to contribute seemed to justify her claim to the conduct of the war by sea: but the allies assembled in the congress at the isthmus declared bluntly that they would rather dissolve the confederacy than submit to any other than the Spartan rule; and the genuine patriotism of the Athenians led them at once to waive a claim on which they might fairly have insisted.⁸⁹⁵ They alone were ready to see their city burnt, their lands wasted, and their wives and children in exile rather than suffer the ill-cemented mass of Hellenic society to fall utterly to pieces. From Argos, from Boiotia generally, and from Thebes in particular they had nothing to hope. The Argives were content, as they said, to be neutral in a strife in which their kinsfolk on either side were antagonists. With the exception of Thespiæ and Plataiæ the Boiotian cities, it is clear, were passive instruments in the hands of their chief men; and these men were actuated by a vehement Medism which with them became the expression of an anti-Hellenic feeling beyond the power of defeat and disaster to repress or even to check. The Kretans urged as an excuse for not meddling in these matters a Delphian response which bade them remember how little they had gained by their efforts to avenge the death of Daidalos and the wrongs and woes of Helen.⁸⁹⁶ The men of

⁸⁹⁵ Herod. viii. 2, 3.

⁸⁹⁶ *Ib.* vii. 169.

Korkyra, carrying thus early into practice the tortuous policy of isolation for which they afterwards became notorious,⁸⁹⁷ met the messengers from the congress with eager assurances of ready help. They even carried their words into action: but the sixty ships which they manned were under officers who were charged to linger on their way along the southern coasts of Peloponnesos. Their conviction was that the Hellenic fleet and armies must alike be utterly defeated; and thus, when Xerxes had become lord paramount of Hellas, they might fall down before him and take credit for the goodwill which had withheld them from exerting against him a force not altogether to be despised. The event disappointed their expectations: but it was easy to satisfy the victors of Salamis that they were making what haste they could to the scene of action when the Etesian winds baffled all their efforts to double cape Malea.⁸⁹⁸

From Gelon, the tyrant of the great Corinthian colony of Syracuse, the continental Hellenes expected greater things. In this hope they were disappointed: but the inconsistent stories told to account for his refusal to help them, sufficiently show the stuff out of which popular traditions are made and the processes by which they take shape. The city of Syracuse had risen to a position and a power second only to that of Sparta or of Athens: and it was as natural to suppose that Gelon would stand on his dignity and insist on co-ordinate power with those two states as that they would refuse to admit his claim. This idea has taken shape in the tale which relates how the messengers from the Congress told him of the coming of the Persian,—professedly for the purpose of taking vengeance on Athens, but really with the design of enslaving all the Greeks,—and besought him, in his own interest as well as theirs, to unite hand and heart in the effort to break his power. ‘It is vain to think,’ they urged, ‘that the Persian will not come against you, if we are conquered. Take heed in time. By aiding us thou savest thyself; and a good issue commonly follows wise counsel.’ The answer of Gelon was a vehement outburst against their grasping selfishness. ‘When I sought your aid,’ he said,

Mission
to Gelon
tyrant of
Syracuse.

⁸⁹⁷ Thuc. i. 32–37.

⁸⁹⁸ Herod. vii. 168.

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‘against the men of Karchédôn (Carthage), and promised to open to you markets from which you have reaped rich gains,⁸⁹⁹ ye would not come : and, as far as lies with you, all this country had been under the barbarians to this day. But I have prospered ; and now that war threatens you, ye begin to remember Gelon. I will not, however, deal with you, as ye have dealt with me. I will give you 200 triremes and 20,000 hoplites, with horsemen and archers, slingers and runners. I will also give corn for all the army of the Greeks as long as the war may last : but I will do this only on condition that I be the chieftain and leader of the Greeks against the barbarians.’ This demand overtaxed the patience of the Spartan Syagros. ‘In very deed,’ he said, ‘would Agamemnon the son of Pelops mourn, if he were to hear that the Spartans had been robbed of their honour by Gelon and the Syracusans. Dream not that we shall ever yield it to you. If thou choosest to aid Hellas, do so under the Spartans : if thou wilt not have it so, then stay at home.’ But Gelon was ready with his answer. ‘Spartan friend,’ he said, ‘abuse commonly makes a man angry ; but I will not pay back insults in kind, and thus far I will yield. If ye rule by sea, I will rule by land ; and if ye rule by land, then must I rule on the sea.’ But here the Athenian messenger stood forth and said, ‘King of the Syracusans, the Hellenes have sent us not because they want a leader, but because they want an army. Of an army thou sayest little ; about the command much. When thou didst ask to lead us all, we left it to the Spartans to speak : but as to ruling on the sea, that we cannot yield. We grudge not to the Spartans their power by land ; but we will give place to none on the sea. We have more seamen than all the Greeks ; we are of all Greeks the most ancient nation, and we alone have never changed on land ;⁹⁰⁰ and in the war of which Homer sings, our leader

⁸⁹⁹ Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 92, thinking that Gelon must have dwelt more on the advantages which the Sicilian Greeks had derived from the possession of the sea-ports here referred to, suggests that Herodotos, vii. 158, wrote ἀπ’ ὧν ἡμῖν μεγάλα ὠφελία εἰ καὶ ἐπαυρέσιες γέγονασι, not ἀπ’ ὧν ἡμῖν, as the text stands. But the continental Hellenes would probably never have disputed that the Sicilian Greeks might derive great benefits from seizing Carthaginian ports, although they might very well assert that they themselves were not much the better for Gelon’s conquests. The very point, therefore, of Gelon’s argument is that the Eastern Greeks had been directly and largely benefited by the growth of the power of Syracuse.

⁹⁰⁰ See p. 59, and note 602.

was the best of those who came to Ilion to set an army in battle array.'⁹⁰¹ 'Athenians,' answered Gelon, 'you seem likely to have many leaders, but few to be led. But since ye will yield nothing and grasp everything, hasten home and tell the Greeks that the spring-time has been taken out of their year.' Such is the tale which Herodotos relates as most generally believed among the continental Greeks about the conduct of Gelon during the Persian war; but he has the candour to give other accounts which deprive the popular tradition of all its value. According to one of these stories Gelon sent Kadmos of Kos⁹⁰² with a charge similar to that which was given to the commander of the Korkyraian fleet. He was to go with a large sum of money to Delphoi; and if the Persian gained the victory, he was to present the money to Xerxes as a peace-offering. If the Greeks should gain the day, he was to bring it back again. The historian having added that to his great credit he did bring it back goes on to give the Sicilian version of the affair which asserted that in spite of Spartan supremacy Gelon would still have aided the Greeks, had not Terillos the banished tyrant of Himera brought against him under Hamilkar a host of Phœnicians, Libyans, Iberians and other tribes equal in number to the Persians who fought under Mardonios at Plataiai,⁹⁰³ and that therefore, being unable to help them with men, he sent a supply of money for their use to Delphoi.

But if Argos and Korkyra, Krete and Syracuse, were not to be trusted, and if Thebes with the Boiotian cities was bitterly hostile, it was still possible to preserve the Hellenic

Abandonment of the pass of Tempe.


⁹⁰¹ *Il.* ii. 554.

⁹⁰² See p. 179.

⁹⁰³ Herod. vii. 165. Not only is this invasion of Hamilkar placed in the same year with the invasion of Greece by Xerxes: but the battle of Himera in which Hamilkar mysteriously disappeared is said to have been fought on the same day with that of Salamis, or, as some said (showing the worthlessness of the tradition), of Thermopylai. With this coincidence we may compare the tradition which represented the battles of Plataiai and Mykalé as being fought on the same day. Herodotos simply notes these alleged coincidences, vii. 166, without pretending to trace a connexion between the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily by Hamilkar and the Persian invasion of Greece. This connexion is supplied by Diodorus, xi. 20, who speaks of the enterprise of Hamilkar as definitely connected with the plans of Xerxes. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 297, accepts the fact of this concerted action, although he admits that this alliance whether of the Phœnicians or the Carthaginians with the Persian king 'does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help.' Dr. Ihne, marking the silence of Herodotos on the subject, adds that 'Carthage was far too independent by her geographical position and by her power, to be determined in her policy by the wishes of her mother country, or by the dictates of the Persian monarch.' *History of Rome*, Eng. Trans., ii. 24.

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tribes which lay to the south of the pass of Tempe and to secure their aid against the invader. The Aleuad chiefs of Thessaly, who like the Peisistratidai seem to have been driven into exile, were like them vehement partisans of Xerxes: but that their designs were not received with favour by the Thessalians is proved by the earnest intreaty of the latter that a vigorous stand should be made against the barbarian in the defiles through which the Peneios makes its way to the sea. In any such effort they declared themselves eager to take part to the utmost of their power: but they admitted plainly that their geographical position left them absolutely dependent on the aid of their Hellenic kinsfolk, and that, if this aid were withheld, they must secure their safety by making a covenant with the Persian king which would assuredly constrain them to fight against those whom they would infinitely prefer to help. It might well have been thought that no post could have been more easily tenable than this Thessalian defile, along which for a distance of five miles a road stretches, nowhere more than 20, and sometimes not more than 13 feet in width. Hence no time was lost in occupying the pass with 10,000 hoplites, aided by the Thessalian cavalry, under the command of the Spartan Euainetos and the Athenian Themistokles. But they held the pass for a few days only; and popular traditions, as usual, assigned its abandonment to different motives. The one ascribed it to the intervention of the Makedonian chief Alexandros son of Amyntas, who warned them that, if they remained where they were, they would be trodden down under the feet of the Persians, while the other traced it to the more reasonable fear that the barbarians instead of attempting the impossible task of forcing their way through a defile in which they would be at the mercy of the defenders would take the road, which in fact they did take, through the Perrhaibian territory to the city of Gonnos. The fear then was, not that of being trampled down by the advancing hordes but of being taken in the rear when the army of Xerxes had made its way over the more western heights of Olympos. Under this constraining motive they abandoned the Thessalians who now passed into the absolute



THERMOPYLAI

5 English Miles

Approved by Edwd. Walker

London: Longmans & Co.

power of the Aleuadai, and, irritated probably by the desertion of their allies, became henceforth zealous partisans of the Persian king. Thus it came about that while Xerxes was still in Persia, his messengers returned bearing the submission not only of the Thessalians, but of the Dolopians, Ainianes, Perrhaibians, Lokrians, Magnetes, Malians, of the Phthiotic Achaians and of all the Boiotians except the two small cities of Thespiæ and Plataiæ.

We come now to a tale which, more than all that have preceded it, we are bound to relate as the historian has handed it down to us. Whatever doubts we may reasonably entertain as to the accuracy of the legend which tells the immortal story of Thermopylæ, all attempts to impart to it a more plausible character by throwing over it a colouring of our own must be utterly useless. If in spite of the vividness of geographical and personal detail which marks the narrative of Herodotos we still cannot bring ourselves to believe that he relates the facts as they really took place, we can but give the reasons for our doubt without meddling with the picture which he has drawn. Of all the important Hellenic states the Athenians alone seem to have resolved definitely on resisting the Persian at all costs: and of all the Athenians Themistokles alone perhaps had made up his mind as to the means by which this resistance could be brought to a successful issue. It is possible therefore that he with the Athenians may have induced the representatives of the other states at the Isthmian congress to declare that, if they conquered in the war, they would tithe to the Delphian god the property or even the persons of those who took the side of the Medes, although no great stress can be laid on the statement inasmuch as the non-medising Greeks are said also, whether now or after the battle of Plataiæ, to have sworn that they would leave in ruins, as a memorial for the ages to come, the temples profaned or burnt by the Persians, and as the genuineness of this oath was in later times called into question. But it is beyond doubt that when the thought of guarding the pass of Tempe had been abandoned, it was resolved that a stand should be made in the defile of Thermopylæ while the fleet should take up its station on the

The pass of
Thermo-
pylæ

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northernmost coast of Eubœia which received its name from a temple of Artemis. It would have suited better with the Greek tactics of this day to await the Persians in the narrower pass of the strait which separated Chalkis from the Boiotian coast:⁹⁰⁴ but to do this would have been to allow the Persian fleet to take the guardians of Thermopylai in the rear.

The mission
of Leonidas
from
Sparta.
June.
480 B.C.

The accumulation of mud at the mouth of the Spercheios has in the course of three-and-twenty centuries so changed the coast of the Malian gulf that some of the most material features in the description of Herodotos no longer characterise this memorable spot. In his day the Spercheios, which drained the plain between the range of Tymphrestos and Othrys on the north and that of Oita on the south precisely as the Peneios drained the great Thessalian plain to the south of Pindos, ran into the gulf near the town of Antikyra at a point about 22 miles due west of the Kenaian or north-westernmost promontory of Eubœia. From its mouth the coast, having stretched southwards for somewhat more than two miles, trended away to the east; and at short intervals the sea here received the small streams of the Dyras, Melas, and Asopos. These insignificant rivers are now discharged into the Spercheios which, flowing on the south instead of on the north side of Antikyra, reaches the sea at a point considerably to the east of Thermopylai. We look therefore in vain for the narrow space which, leaving room for nothing more than a cart track, gave access to the pass within which so many Persians were to meet their death. Close above the town of Anthela, the ridge of Oita, known there by the name Anopaia,⁹⁰⁵ came down so close to the water as to leave only this narrow pathway. Between this point, at a distance of perhaps a mile and a half to the east and a little to the west of the first Lokrian hamlet of Alpenoi, another spur of the mountain locked in the wider space within which the army of Leonidas took up its post, but which for all practical purposes was as narrow as the passes at either extremity which

⁹⁰⁴ In the Peloponnesian war we shall find the Athenians as anxious to obtain ample sea-room as they are here to wedge themselves into a corner.

⁹⁰⁵ Livy, xxxvi. 15, gives to this part of the mountain the name Callidromos, Kallidromos.

received the name of the Gates or the Hot Gates (Pylai, or Thermopylai). This narrow road was hemmed in by the precipitous mountain on the one side, and on the other by the marshes produced by the hot springs, which under the name of Chytroi, or the Pans, formed a resort for bathers and which Herakles is said to have brought to light.⁹⁰⁶ But to render the passage still more difficult than nature had made it, the Phokians had led the mineral waters almost over the whole of it and had also built across it near the western entrance a wall with strong gates. Much of this work had fallen from age; but it was now repaired, and behind it we are told that the Greek army determined to await the attack of the Persians. Here, about the summer solstice, when Xerxes had already reached Thermê, was assembled a force of Spartans and their allies under Leonidas who to his surprise had succeeded to the kingly office. Of his two elder brothers Dorieus had been killed in Sicily,⁹⁰⁷ and Kleomenes had died without sons.⁹⁰⁸ Thus Leonidas became the representative of Eurysthenes and, as Spartan custom permitted, married his brother's daughter who had foiled the efforts of the Milesian Aristagoras to bribe her father into undertaking a wild and desperate enterprise.⁹⁰⁹ He had set out on this his first and his last expedition as king with three hundred picked hoplites or heavy-armed citizens all of whom had sons.⁹¹⁰ On his march he had been joined, it is said, by 1000 from Tegea and Mantinea, by 120 Arkadians from Orchomenos and 1000 more from other cities, together with 400 Corinthians,

⁹⁰⁶ The neighbourhood of Oita with its stupendous heights and its inaccessible ravines was especially associated with the name of the hero who in one aspect of the myth became the ideal of patient and unselfish toil, while the other exhibited him as a careless seeker of pleasure. But as with all other solar heroes, the greatest benefit which he confers on men is regarded as consisting in the gift of water. According to the old phrase, he was pre-eminently clever in discovering and bringing together hidden waters (*δεινός περὶ ζήτησιν ὑδάτων καὶ συναγωγῆν*), Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 100; and the Chytroi of Thermopylai would be as surely connected with his name as the marshes of Lernê or the stable of Augeias. In short, like Kadmos, Oidipous, and above all like Indra, he is a destroyer of the monster (the drought), which steals away the watery treasures of the earth and locks them up in the cave or dungeon from which only his spear can set them free. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 48. Gubernatis, *Zoological Mythology*, i. 350, &c.

⁹⁰⁷ See p. 175.

⁹⁰⁸ See p. 423.

⁹⁰⁹ See p. 339.

⁹¹⁰ The Spartan customs, more than those of Greek states generally, carry us back to the primitive Aryan civilisation. According to our notions men who would be obliged to leave children at home would rather be exempted from military service than specially picked out for a dangerous mission. The Spartans thought only of the continuity of the family; and the man who had a son knew that he left behind him one who could rightfully take his place at the sacred hearth, as the priest of the domestic deity, and insure to himself the due performance of funeral rites. See Book I. ch. ii.

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200 from Phlious and 80 from Mykenai, the once proud city of Agamemnon. As he drew near to the pass, his army was increased by 1000 Phokians, by the whole force of the Lokrians of Opous, by 700 Thespians, and lastly by 400 Thebans (under Leontiades the son of Eurymachos) whom Leonidas was anxious to take with him as hostages for the good faith of a city strongly suspected of Medism. The demand for this force was made, it is said, with the set purpose of testing their intentions; but the time for open treachery had not yet come, and therefore it was complied with.⁹¹¹ The Lokrians and Phokians were induced to join Leonidas by the assurance that a large Hellenic army was coming up behind them and that the Athenians and Aiginetans were guarding the sea. If Leonidas sought further to cheer them with the thought that it was no god who was invading Hellas, but a mortal man; that no man lived who should never see evil, nay, that the greatest of men suffer the worst of evils; and that the Persian therefore, as being mortal, should fall from his great glory,⁹¹² he was using language which attested rather the resolution of despair than the existence of a reasonable hope of success. The fact remains, if the narrative generally deserve any credit, that at a time when they supposed the Persians to be coming against them almost with millions, they were content to send forward for the maintenance of a pass second in importance only to the defile of Tempe a body of troops not exceeding 10,000 men. It was the month, Herodotos tells us, of the Karneian festival, during which it was forbidden to Dorians to go out to war.⁹¹³ It was also the time of the great Olympic feast; and the conclusion is forced upon us that this was regarded at Sparta as a sufficient reason for sending on an advanced guard of only 300 heavy-armed citizens, and by the Athenians,

⁹¹¹ This is the distinct statement of Herodotos, vii. 205. In the conference which preceded the condemnation of the Plataians in the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans are represented as saying that the apparent Medism of the city was to be ascribed to the oligarchy which then had the whole power of the state and which compelled the main body of the people to submit to Xerxes against their will. Thuc. iii. 62. Mr. Grote holds that these oligarchs now sent 400 men, chosen from the party opposed to them, that is, from the citizens who wished to make common cause with the Spartans and Athenians. *Hist. Gr.* v. 104. The authority of Plutarch or of Diodoros is in itself worth very little in comparison with that of Herodotos; and we shall see that this hypothesis is at variance not only with the opinion of Herodotos but with certain facts which at least he gives as historical.

⁹¹² Herod. vii. 203.

⁹¹³ See note 801. •

who at this time are described as in great measure free from the rigid scrupulosity of Spartans or Jews, as a reason for sending none at all. Although they had despatched Themistokles with a body of citizens to guard the pass of Tempe, and although they knew that the Thessalians had been indignant at the resolution which left them and their country at the mercy of the Persians, not an Athenian or only one Athenian was present at Thermopylai. When at Thermopylai the proposal was made to abandon that pass as they had abandoned Tempe, and fall back on the Isthmus, the Phokians and Thespians spoke bitterly against the faintheartedness which would leave them to bear the brunt of the invasion. The Athenians were not less vehement in condemning the selfishness of the Spartan policy; and yet we nowhere find them making any attempt to explain or apologise for their absence, nor are they even reproached for having in this signal instance acted on a policy which they had scouted as not merely selfish but shortsighted. This difficulty meets us at the outset of the narrative; ⁹¹⁴ and it is perhaps one of the most perplexing in a story which for nearly half a century had to float down the uncertain stream of oral tradition. If with the Spartans ⁹¹⁵ they supposed that the insignificant vanguard sent on to Thermopylai would suffice to maintain that pass against the invaders until the Karneian month should have come to an end, this is at once conclusive evidence that fiction has been wildly at work in magnifying the numbers of the Persian force. If on the other hand they did not allege this as the excuse for their dilatoriness or their absence, the conclusion is not less clear that the traditional narrative is not an accurate record of the events as they occurred.

The form taken by this narrative seems to have been determined by that epical plan in the distribution of merit which we trace throughout the history of this great struggle. ⁹¹⁶ If the fame of Athens must be pre-eminent at Salamis and at Mykalê, if the Aiginetans must win renown in the battle

Encounter
of Greek
and Persian
ships off
Skiathos.

⁹¹⁴ Niebuhr, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 336, rightly lays the greatest stress on this point, of which Mr. Grote takes no notice whatever. He can scarcely have supposed that attendance at the Olympic festival would have left Athens utterly destitute of any citizens who could serve whether as heavy or as light-armed troops.

⁹¹⁵ Herod. vii. 206.

⁹¹⁶ See p. 251.

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fought before their own island, so Sparta must have her day of special heroism at Thermopylai, and Thespiæ must be admitted to share her greatness, as the Plataians shared with the Athenians the honours of the day at Marathon. But according to the story the power of the Persians was still too great to allow to the Greeks even the possibility of resistance; and the terror which already oppressed them was deepened when they heard that ten of the fastest sailing ships of the Persian fleet had fallen in, with the three scout ships which the Greeks had stationed off the island of Skiathos about three miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Magnesia. At the sight of the Persian vessels the Greek ships fled; but the Troizenian ship was soon taken, and the most beautiful man of the crew was led to the prow and sacrificed as an earnest of the happy issue of the war.⁹¹⁷ The Aiginetan ship gave them more trouble; and one of her men named Pytheas fought on until his whole body was a mass of wounded flesh. The Persians, it is said, overpowered him while he was still alive, and showed their admiration of his prowess by making every effort to heal him and by treating him with the most marked distinction, while all the rest were made slaves. The Athenian ship, commanded by Phormos, steered straight for the mouth of the Peneios, and, wonderful to say, found its way safely along a coast some eighty miles in length through the throng of Persian ships which were hurrying southwards. The crew left the stranded hull to the barbarians, and by a good luck still more wonderful contrived to march through Thessaly then occupied by some three or four millions of Persians, and so to reach Athens. But the tidings of this first encounter of Hellenes and barbarians at sea had been conveyed by fire signals from Skiathos to the fleet at Artemision; and the commanders at once sailed to Chalkis with the intention of guarding the Euripos.

Destruction of a portion of the Persian fleet by a

Starting from Thermê, eleven days after the departure of Xerxes with the land-forces, the Persian fleet reached, we are told, after a single day's sail the southern part of the

⁹¹⁷ Herodotos, vii. 180, thinks that he may have been selected as the victim partly for the sake of his name which was Leon, the Lion. The story seems to assume too much knowledge of Greek on the part of the Persians, if the crews of these ships were Persian.

strip of coast stretching from the mouth of the Peneios to the promontory which marks the entrance of the gulf of Pagasai. The whole of this narrow fringe of land is shut in by the mighty chain of mountains which bears the name of Olympos and Ossa to the north and south of the defile of Tempe, and of Pelion between the town of Kasthanaia and the Sepian shore opposite to the Artemisian coast of Euboia. Here, beneath the everlasting hills, the Divine Nemesis was to lay its hand on the overweening power of Xerxes as it had been laid on that of Kroisos, Cyrus, Kambyses and Polykrates. The priestess at Delphoi had bidden the Greeks to pray to the winds as their best allies; and the Athenians invoked the special aid of the Northern Blast. An oracle charged them to call on him who had married their kinswoman; and Boreas had for his wife Oreithya the daughter of Erechtheus. After the havoc done to the Persian ships he had his reward in a temple devoted to his worship on the banks of the river Ilissos. In utter unconsciousness of danger the Persian commanders moored upon the Magnesian beach those ships which came first, while the rest lay beyond them at anchor, ranged in rows eight deep facing the sea. At break of day the air was clear, and the sea still: but the breeze here called the wind of the Hellespont soon rose and gathered to a storm. Those who had time drew their ships upon the shore and escaped; but all the vessels which were out at sea were borne away and dashed upon the Ovens of Pelion and all along the beach as far as Meliboia and Kasthanaia. Four hundred ships were said, by those who placed the numbers lowest, to have been destroyed in this storm which raged for three days and then went down, either as being soothed by the incantations and sacrifices of the Magians, or of its own will.⁹¹⁸ The shore was covered with the costliest treasures of Eastern art and luxury; and the goblets of silver and gold gathered by Ameinokles the fortunate owner of this bleak domain made him a man of enormous wealth. Of the cornships and other vessels that were wrecked the numbers were never known: but with the wood obtained from them the captains threw up a strong fortification on the shore as a

⁹¹⁸ Herod. vii. 191.

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precaution, it is said, against attacks from the Thessalians.⁹¹⁹ Meanwhile the Greeks, who on the second day of the storm had heard of the mischief done to their enemies, plucked up courage and in the comparatively smooth waters of the Euboian sea sailed back to Artemision to which they now gave the name of Poseidon the Saviour. The barbarians, however, were not so sorely crippled as the Greeks had hoped to find them. When the storm abated, their ships, drawn down from the shore, sailed to Aphetai at the entrance of the Pagasaian gulf and took up their position precisely opposite to the Greek fleet at Artemision.⁹²⁰ Some hours later, fifteen ships, having taken longer to repair, mistook the Greek fleet for their own and sailing straight to Artemision were presently captured. On board of these ships were Sandokes the satrap of the Aiolic Kymê, Aridolis the tyrant of the Karian Alabanda, and the Paphian commander Penthylos. From these men, who with the rest were sent as prisoners to the Corinthian isthmus, the Greeks obtained useful information of the movements and plans of the Persian king.

The march
of Hydar-
nes over
Anopaia.

Xerxes in the meanwhile had advanced through Thessaly to the Achaian Alos on the western shore of the Pagasaian gulf where he listened to the story of Phrixos and Helle the children of Athamas and to the account of the strange rites connected with it. Thence working his way along the Pagasaian shore under the southern slopes of Othrys, he reached Antikyra, and about twelve days after his departure from Thermê incamped in the Malian Trachis between the streams of Melas and Asopos.⁹²¹ Here he was separated

⁹¹⁹ Herod. vii. 191. The statement is singularly inconsistent with the conduct ascribed to the Thessalians after the abandonment of the pass of Tempe by Themistokles. But is it credible that even Thessalian wreckers would venture on practising their vocation upon men whose wrongs might be avenged by an army of many millions or even many myriads then passing on the other side of the ridge which had proved so fatal to the Persian fleet?

⁹²⁰ Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 117, says that on reaching Artemision the Greeks 'to their surprise saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance on the opposite station of Aphetai.' This can scarcely have been the case. The storm lasted four days. The Greeks at Chalkis heard of the Persian mishap on the second day: and they at once set off with all speed for Artemision, which they reached therefore on that same second day, i.e. two days before any Persian ships reached Aphetai. Herodotos says that they expected to encounter only a few ships: but this does not show that they were convinced of their mistake as soon as they reached the northern coast of Euboea.

⁹²¹ His fleet, as we have seen, sailed from Thermê eleven days after he left that place. He had been three days in the Malian country when his ships, having spent one day

only by a few miles of ground from the defenders of Thermopylai which, if we may believe Diodoros,⁹²² the Lokrians, who had now gone over from the Greek side, had promised to keep open for the passage of the Persian army. He might well have supposed that the tidings of his near approach would drive his enemies away from Pylai, as it had already scared them from the defiles of Tempe.⁹²³ If here he paused; it may well have been less through fear of the mischief done to his fleet by the storm as from the expectation that the Greeks in the pass would think better of their prospects and prudently submit their necks to the Persian yoke. At this point the traditional narrative, as given by Herodotos, breaks out into one of those beautiful pictures which impart a marvellous life to his history. There was enough of disunion and dissension in the Greek camp, when a horseman sent by Xerxes came to learn their numbers and see what they were doing. The Greeks had repaired the old Phokian wall, and the horseman could advance no further: but outside of it were the Lakedaimonians with their arms piled against the wall, while some of them were wrestling and others combing their hair. The horseman having counted their numbers went back quietly, for none pursued him or took notice of him. His report seemed to Xerxes to convict his enemies of childish folly: but Demaratos was at hand to explain to him that when the Spartans have to face a mortal danger, their custom is to comb and deck out their hair. 'Be sure,' he added from that Spartan point of view which, as we have seen, was

in reaching the Sepian shore, and having been detained there for three days by the storm, sailed thence in a few hours to Aphetai. Herod. vii. 196. If the words of Herodotos are to be taken literally as meaning that the whole army of Xerxes was incamped between the two streams of Melas and Asopos, their numbers cannot at the utmost have exceeded three or four myriads: and even for such a force the space would be but scanty.

⁹²² xi. 4.

⁹²³ Mr. Grote remarks that the whole proceedings of Xerxes and the immensity of the host which he summoned show that he calculated on an energetic resistance. *Hist. Gr.* v. 119. But there is nothing to show that he expected this resistance especially at Thermopylai. Herodotos says expressly that the one pass was as tenable as the other; and if the defile of Tempe might be avoided by the track over the Perrhaibian hills, so Thermopylai might be turned by the path over Anopaia; and both these unfrequented paths were well enough known, as the story shows, to the people of the country. There seems to be therefore no reason for questioning the motive assigned by Herodotos for the delay of Xerxes before attacking Leonidas. The numbers of Eastern armies can never be taken as a gauge of the amount of resistance which the lords of those armies look for. Myriads are led to the field without any reference to the strength or character of the enemy to be encountered.

needed to throw a plausible colouring over the story, 'be sure that if thou canst conquer these and the rest who remain behind in Sparta, there is no other nation which shall dare to raise a hand against thee, for now thou art face to face with the bravest men of all Hellas.' 'How can so few men ever fight with my great army?' asked the king. The only answer which he received was that he might deal with Demaratos as a liar, if things came not to pass as he said. Still Xerxes could not believe him, and for four days he waited, thinking that they would assuredly run away. At last his anger was kindled and he charged the Medians and Kissians to go and bring them all bound before him. The time for testing the power of Hellenic discipline and the force of Hellenic weapons was now come. The messengers of Xerxes advanced to do his bidding. Many were slain, and although others took their places, their errand was not done. At last, like the Imperial guard at Waterloo, the Immortals under Hydarnes advanced to the attack. But their spears were shorter than those of the Greeks: linen tunics could avail little in an encounter with iron-clad men, and mere numbers were of no use in the narrow pass. On the other hand the Spartans by pretending to fly drew the barbarians into the pass where they turned upon them suddenly and slew great multitudes until they all fled back to their camp. Thrice the king leaped from his throne in terror for his army: but on the next day he sent them forth again, thinking that the enemy would be too weary to fight. The Greeks, however, were all drawn out in battle array, save only the Phokians; and these were placed upon the hill to guard the pathway. Again the Persians fared as they had done before, and Xerxes was sorely troubled until a Malian named Ephialtes in hope of some great reward told him of the path which led over the hill, and thus destroyed the Greeks who were guarding Thermopylai.⁹²⁴ This man fled

⁹²⁴ This path was well known to the people of Trachis, who had guided the Thes-salians over it, when the Phokians had built their wall across the pass of Thermopylai. Leonidas may have been ignorant of its existence when he set out for Sparta; but it was his business to have made himself acquainted with the geography of a spot which he knew to be of supreme importance for the Greek cause. The Athenians, according to the story, showed the same culpable ignorance at Tempe: but Leonidas could not have remained long unaware of this path which the Phokians volunteered to guard. These must therefore have pointed it out to him from the first. Indeed they could not

afterwards in terror to Thessaly, the Pylagoroi having put a price on his head when the Amphiktyons were gathered together at Pylai; and at last he was slain by a Trachian at Antikyra. There was another tale which said that two other men showed Xerxes the path; but the Pylagoroi put the price on the head of Ephialtes, and surely, the historian adds, they must have known best who betrayed the path to the Persians. Xerxes now regarded the conquest of the pass as practically achieved. As the daylight died away, Hydarnes set out from the camp with the troops under his command. All night long they followed the path Anopaia along the ridge which bore the same name, with the mountains of Oita on the right hand and the hills of Trachis on the left. The day was dawning with the exquisite stillness which marks early morning in Greece, when they reached the peak of the mountain where the thousand Phokians, who had charged themselves with this task, were guarding the pathway. While the Persians were climbing the hill, the Phokians knew not of their coming, for the whole hill was covered with oak-trees: but they knew what had happened as soon as the Persians reached the summit. Not a breath of wind was stirring, and they heard at once the trampling of their feet as they trod on the fallen leaves. Instantly they started up; but before they had well put on their arms, the barbarians were upon them. The sight dismayed the Persians at first, for Hydarnes had not expected any resistance: but learning from Ephialtes that these men were not the Spartans, he drew out his men for battle. The Phokians, covered with a shower of arrows, fell back to the highest ground, thinking that the Persians were coming chiefly against them⁹²⁵ and there they made ready to fight and die.

fail to do so. Between them and the Thessalians there was an enmity so bitter that Herodotos does not hesitate to say that the Phokians would have taken sides with Xerxes if the Thessalians had ranged themselves with the Greeks. Like the stories of Demokedes and Histaios, the introduction of Ephialtes or other traitors is altogether superfluous. There was no secret about the pathway; and Leonidas was guilty of grave neglect of duty in not guarding it more efficiently.

⁹²⁵ This statement may fairly be thought incredible. The Phokians had volunteered to guard this path, and they had done so as knowing that on its occupation and maintenance depended the salvation of the army in Thermopylai. They knew that if any force of the enemy ascended the hill, it could only be for the one purpose of taking Leonidas and his men in the rear, while the main body of the Persians attacked them in front. But no sooner do they feel the Persian arrows than without a thought of their allies they at once abandon the pathway, where their resistance would have been of the

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But the Persians, taking no more heed of them, hastened down the mountain.

The
heroism of
Leonidas.

In the pass itself the soothsayer Megistias, as he looked upon the victims, had told them, the historian assures us, that on the next day they must die. Deserters also came who said that the Persians were coming round; and as the day was dawning, watchmen ran to tell them the same thing.⁹²⁶ On receiving these tidings the Greeks took counsel, and some urged flight and went away each to his own city, while others made up their minds to remain with Leonidas. Another story was told that Leonidas sent them away himself lest they should all be slain: and to this tale the historian gave credit, adding that Leonidas knew them to be faint-hearted and so suffered them not to stay, but that it was not seemly for himself to fly. So he tarried where he was, and left behind him a great name, and the happiness of Sparta failed not. The priestess of Delphoi had told the Spartans, when the war began, that either Lakedaimon must be wasted or their king must die; and Leonidas, remembering her words, sent them away that so the Spartans might have all the glory. Of this, we are told, there is this further proof that he sought to send away the soothsayer Megistias because he was an Akarnanian, but that Megistias would not go. So all the rest departed, and the

utmost value and might have insured a signal Hellenic victory, and then make ready to fight to the death a little higher up where their resistance was worth no more than the mimic campaigning of children. It is impossible to restore the true history of all these incidents: but we are none the less driven to the conclusion that the true history has not been handed down to us. What became of these Phokians when Hydarnes and his men had passed on? We can scarcely suppose that they remained on the top of the hill in fighting attitude, when there were none with whom they could fight. We are not told how many men were under the command of Hydarnes: but had they been ten times the number of the Phokians, the latter might have taken them in the rear and committed fearful havoc among them. It is possible, but not very likely, that they might have been overpowered. English soldiers in such a position would withstand twenty times their own number: and the very point of the story is that the Phokians were prepared to fight till not a man of them should remain alive. The likelihood is that, had they followed Hydarnes at a moderate distance, they could have done so with perfect safety. These Persians would then have been caught both in front and rear; and not only would the scheme of Hydarnes have failed, but the destruction of his whole force would probably have been insured before the army of Xerxes could be made aware of what had happened, as it is obvious that when once Hydarnes had reached the base of the hill, no messenger could have escaped to tell the tale, if Leonidas himself opposed them in front and if the Phokians occupied the higher and therefore the safer ground in the rear. Either then the events are inaccurately related, or these Phokians were deliberate traitors: but this latter hypothesis is opposed to other facts which seem to be clearly ascertained. Their fidelity was sufficiently secured by the presence of the hated Thessallians in the camp of Xerxes.

⁹²⁶ Herod. vii. 219. These, we must suppose, were scouts placed on the eastern slopes of the hill, beneath the level of the ground occupied by the Phokians.

Thebans and Thespians alone remained. The men of Thebes Leonidas kept sorely against their will, as pledges for their people: but the Thespians would not save their own lives by forsaking Leonidas and his men.

CHAP.
VI.

When the sun rose, Xerxes poured out wine to the god, and tarried until the time of the filling of the market,⁹²⁷ for such was the bidding of Ephialtes, because the path down the hill was much shorter than the way which led up it on the western side. Then the barbarians arose for the onset; and the men of Leonidas, knowing now that they must die, came out into the wider part of the path,⁹²⁸ for thus far they had fought in the narrowest place. From the beginning of the battle the slaughter of the barbarians was great, for the leaders of their companies drove every man on with scourges and blows. Many fell into the sea and were drowned; many more were trampled down alive by one another. No thought was taken of those who fell, while the Spartans fought on with all their might, to slay as many of the barbarians as they could before they should themselves be slain. At length their spears were all broken and they slew the Persians with their swords, until at last Leonidas fell nobly, and other Spartans with him, whose names the historian learnt as of men whose memory ought not to be lost.⁹²⁹ Over his body there was a hard fight in which many great men of the Persians were slain, and among them two brothers of the king: but the Spartans gained back his body and turned the enemy to flight four times, until the traitor Ephialtes came up with his men. Then the face of

The victory
of the
Persians.

⁹²⁷ Probably not earlier than 9 or 10 A.M. The precise time denoted by this phrase is a matter of some controversy: but it is unnecessary to enter into it, as no one will maintain that the market was considered full at an earlier hour than 9 o'clock. Taking it at the earliest, we shall thus have four, if not five, hours from the time when Hydarnes left the Phokians on the heights of Anopaia,—a time sufficient to cripple his detachment, if not to destroy it, if it had been assailed by the Spartans in front, and by the Phokians, who should have followed them, in the rear.

⁹²⁸ On Anopaia the Phokians seek what they suppose to be a stronger position, looking simply to their own interest, and in utter forgetfulness, it would seem, of the purpose for which they were on the mountain at all. Having made this blunder, or rather having exhibited this weakness, they fail to make the best of the splendid opportunity which still remained of falling on the Persians in their descent. Leonidas now gives up a strong position for a weaker, in order, seemingly, to make a greater display of personal valour. In either case the generalship, if the story be true, is little better than that of savages.

⁹²⁹ For this reason, he adds with affectionate reverence, he learnt the names of all the Three Hundred. He has not handed them down; and probably there would not be more than three or four among them who would be known to us from other events in their lives.

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the battle was changed, for the Greeks went back into the narrow part within the wall, and there they sat down, all in one body except the Thebans, on the hillock on which in the days of the historian the lion stood over the grave of Leonidas. In this spot they who yet had them fought with daggers, and the rest as they could, while the barbarians overwhelmed them, some in front, some dragging down the wall, others pressing round them on every side. So fell the Thespians and the Spartans, the bravest of the latter being Dienekes who, as the tale ran, hearing from a man of Trachis just before the battle that whenever the Persians shot their arrows the sun was darkened by them, answered merrily, 'Our friend from Trachis brings us good news: we shall be able to fight in the shade.' They were all buried where they fell; and over those who died before Leonidas sent the allies away the inscription recorded that four thousand men of Peloponnesos here fought with three hundred myriads. Over the Spartans by themselves there was another writing which said,

Tell the Spartans, at their bidding,
Stranger, here in death we lie.

Of these three hundred Spartans two, it is said, were lying sick in the village of Alpenoi, their names being Eurytos and Aristodemos. The former, calling for his arms, bade his guide lead him into the battle, for his eyes were diseased, and plunging into the fight was slain. Aristodemos went back alone⁹³⁰ to Sparta where he was shunned by all. None would kindle a fire for him, none would speak to him; but every one called him Aristodemos the Dastard. Yet he got back his good name and fell fighting nobly at Plataiai. As for the Thebans, so long as they were with the Spartans in the battle, they were compelled, it is said, to fight against the king: but when Leonidas with his men hastened to the

⁹³⁰ Herodotos mentions another version which stated that these two men had been sent as messengers from the camp, that the one loitered on his errand and was late for the fight, while the other hastened back and was killed. vii. 230. With tales so inconsistent it is a perilous process to reject all incidents except one and receive this one as historical. There was yet another story that one of the Three Hundred, named Pantites, had been sent on some business into Thessaly, and was thus absent from the battle, and that finding himself in disgrace on his return to Sparta he hung himself. Herod. vii. 232.

hillock within the wall, they got away and with outstretched arms went towards the barbarians with the truest of all tales, saying that not only were they on the king's side but that they were the first to give him earth and water and that they had gone into this fight sorely against their will. As the Thessalians bore out their words, their lives were spared: but some had the bad luck to be killed as they came near to the Persians, and most of the others, beginning from their chief Leontiades, were branded with the royal mark as unfaithful servants.

The issue of this battle, which some⁹³¹ considered as a Kadmeian victory for Xerxes, set the despot pondering. Summoning Demaratos, he asked him how many Spartans might be left and whether they were all warriors like those who had fallen with Leonidas. The answer was that the Lakedaimonians had many cities, of which Sparta was one, and that Sparta had about eight thousand men all equal to those who had fought at Pylai. To the intreaty of Xerxes that he would tell him candidly how these men were to be conquered, Demaratos replied that there was no other way than to send a detachment of the fleet to occupy the island of Kythera, of which the wise Chilon had said that it would be better for the Spartans if it were sunk in the depths of the sea. This counsel, of which only an Eastern tyrant would need the suggestion, Achaimenes, the brother of Xerxes, ascribed to the envy and hatred which all Greeks felt for those who were better or more prosperous than themselves. They had already, he urged, lost four hundred ships in the storm; and if the fleet were further divided, the enemy would at once be a match for them. But Xerxes, though ready enough, according to the advice of his brother, to order his own matters without taking heed to the counsels, the doings, or the numbers of his enemies, bade Achaimenes beware how he spoke evil of Demaratos who, though less wise, was still his very good friend. This praise of the exiled Spartan king was followed by an order to behead and to crucify the body of the worthier Spartan king who had

The sight-
seeing in
Thermo-
pylai.

⁹³¹ Diodoros, xi. 12.

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died in Thermopylai fighting for freedom and for law.⁹³² Some time later, when the Greek fleet had retreated from Artemision and the Persian sailors were taking their ease on the shore of Histiaia, Xerxes arranged a sight for their gratification. Twenty thousand of his men had been slain at Thermopylai. Of these he left one thousand on the ground: the rest he buried in trenches under leaves and earth, so that they could not be seen. All being ready, he sent a herald who proclaimed that all who pleased might leave their posts and go to see how the king fought with those foolish men who sought to withstand his power. On this so many desired to go that there was a lack of boats to carry them. But even Persians were not so easily cheated as Xerxes thought that they might be. The trick was at once seen through, when they found the thousand Persians lying by themselves and the four thousand Greeks gathered into a single heap. One other picture belonging to the struggle at Thermopylai exhibits some Arkadian deserters as seeking for work from the king who asks them what the Greeks are doing. The answer is that they were keeping the feast at Olympia and beholding the contests of wrestlers and horsemen. On hearing this one of the Persians asked what the prize might be for which they strove, and was told that it was an olive-wreath. 'Ah! Mardonios,' exclaimed Tritantaichmes, who could no longer keep silence, 'what men are these against whom thou hast brought us here to fight, who strive not for money but for glory?' and for this saying the king held him to be a coward.

The generalship of Leonidas.

Such is the traditional narrative of the battles within Thermopylai. It is impossible not to feel the beauty and grandeur of the epical form into which it has been thrown:⁹³³ but from first to last we must also feel that in many most important particulars the true history of these events has been lost, and that of the incidents recorded not a few involve difficulties which seem to be insoluble. Among these is the alleged total absence of the Athenians from a place, the

⁹³² This treatment, so unlike that of the Aiginetan Pytheas (see p. 502), Herodotus, vii. 238, ascribes to a personal feeling of hatred for Leonidas on the part of Xerxes.

⁹³³ This halo of romance is, of course, brought out most vividly in the epitaph of Simonides. *Diod.* xi. 12.

maintenance of which was not only essential to their safety but enjoined by the policy for which they pleaded all along with the utmost eagerness. The barbarian was not to be suffered to ravage the lands of Greek cities, if it should be possible to prevent it. Yet here they cannot spare the smallest force for the defence of a post which ten men might hold against a thousand, although they had prudence enough to send with Leonidas a single citizen, Abronychos the son of Lysikles, with charge to inform the Athenians at Artemision of any events with which they ought to be made acquainted.⁹³⁴ But even without any Athenians Leonidas brought with him from Peloponnesos, if we follow the traditional story, a force of 3,100 heavy-armed troops, whose numbers with the addition of the Phokians, Thespians, and Thebans were raised to 5,200 men. If we allow to each Spartan citizen the same number of helots as those which accompanied the force sent afterwards to Plataiai,⁹³⁵ and take 1000 as the lowest number of light-armed troops,⁹³⁶ there was assembled under the command of Leonidas an army of not less than 8,300 men. At Tempe the idea of maintaining the defile was abandoned on the alleged discovery that there existed further to the west a pass practicable for the march of an army. At Thermopylai they must have known that it was possible for an enemy to effect an entrance into southern Hellas over the Aitolian roads. The occupation of these passes became, therefore, scarcely less a matter of necessity than the maintenance of Thermopylai. It is more than possible that the story of the miraculous overthrow of the Persians at Delphoi may point to a struggle not unlike that of the Spartans under Leonidas within the Phokian wall. But it is much more important to mark that with these forces Leonidas succeeded for ten or twelve days in checking the advance of the whole Persian army and in inflicting on them a very serious loss. Nothing could more clearly have proved the practicability of his position and the likelihood of success, if he kept his ground without lessening his numbers.

⁹³⁴ Herod. viii. 21.

⁹³⁵ Ib. ix. 10. If the text of this passage be authentic, the proportion of hoplite₃ to helots was one to seven.

⁹³⁶ This number would seem to be altogether below the mark.

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But still more strangely, the Greeks at Thermopylai not merely forget the Aitolian passes, but guard most inefficiently a pass close at hand which might at any moment be used to turn their position. The existence of this pass is made known to Xerxes through the superfluous treachery of Ephialtes : but although the loss of this pathway owing to the absurd, if not incredible, conduct of the Phokians destroyed, it is said, all chance of ultimate success, it still left open the possibility of retreat. The men of Corinth, of Phlious, and Mykenai, with all the Arkadian forces (including, as it would seem, their light-armed troops), were at once dismissed by Leonidas who retained along with his helots the troops furnished by Thespiæ and Thebes. The Thebans in the ensuing conflict did as little as they could ; but even without their aid 20,000 Persians are stated to have been slain by the 300 Spartans and the 700 Thespians. If to each of the former we allow, as before, seven helots as attendants, we have a number which seems to fall short, by five hundred, of the four thousand whose bodies Xerxes is said to have displayed to his seamen on the battle-ground of Thermopylai. If a loss so enormous was caused to the Persians by so scanty a band of antagonists, it is difficult to calculate the probable result, if Leonidas had kept his allies to share the danger and the glory of the struggle. Without lessening the force which he kept about himself to the last, he might have detached the whole body of his Peloponnesian allies to aid the Phokians in guarding Anopaia, with some better orders than that on the first attack from any enemy they should retire to higher ground and leave the pathway open to their advance. Four thousand men on the summit of the hill could easily have kept back twenty or forty thousand disciplined troops ; and from the nature of the land we may safely assume that the detachment of Hydarnes did not amount to anything like the lower of these two numbers, while their discipline was not to be compared with that of the Greeks. If after deserting the post they had followed, as their duty bound them to follow, the descending Persians, this portion of the enemy's force must have been cut off long before the hour at which Xerxes had ordered that the troops of the main army should

start from the camp. But as they failed to do this, it is hard indeed to imagine how the blunder of the Phokians still left time for the retreat of a body of perhaps 5,000 men along a narrow strip of ground which in some parts was scarcely wider than a cart track. Within an hour from the time of his leaving the Phokians on the top of the hill, Hydarnes with his men must have reached the eastern gates. When he had once come down on the more level ground, none could possibly have retreated from the Greek camp without fighting their way through his troops; and the narrative clearly speaks of a peaceable, or even a leisurely, departure, not of desperate efforts like those of an army struggling through a pass occupied by an overwhelming enemy.

Of the personal motives of Leonidas it might be rash perhaps to advance any positive opinion. We have no satisfactory evidence either of the circumstances in which he was placed or of the line of action which he adopted; and we are bound to give him the benefit of the doubt. But on the hypothesis that we have before us a true narrative, we can have no hesitation in saying that, if the Spartan military code forbade flight from a battle-field, it had no precept to sanction the abandonment or even the wilful weakening of a perfectly tenable post;⁹³⁷ and the imputation of bad generalship is the price which Leonidas must pay for the glory of his self-devotion. But if we may not throw over the tale a false colouring derived from an oracle fabricated probably after his death,⁹³⁸ we shall find it altogether a harder task to explain the facts related of the Thebans whom Leonidas retained by his side against their will. Their presence cannot be explained by the admission that the Thebans and Boiotians feeling little sympathy for either side, were passive instruments in the hands of their leaders who judged it imprudent in this instance to refuse the request of Leonidas: nor can

The motives of Leonidas and his allies.

⁹³⁷ If we are to suppose with Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 124, that 'his own personal honour together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend,' we can scarcely resist the inference that the Spartans had a code of honour for the land very different from that which they followed on the sea. Eurybiades at Salamis was scarcely less vacillating and timorous than the Corinthian Adeimantos. But it is easy to allege these rigid rules as explaining conduct which Spartans had an interest in exalting to the utmost, and of which we have no trust-worthy historical accounts.

⁹³⁸ This is Mr. Grote's opinion, *Hist. Gr.* v. 84, note.

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we safely adopt the conclusion that they were citizens of the anti-Persian party and so remained of their own free will, but that after the fall of the Spartan king they took credit for a Medism which they did not feel. We do not know that Diodoros or Pausanias had access to any information of which Herodotos was ignorant: and the latter distinctly contradicts any such supposition. He maintains that their profession of Medism was the truest of all pleas;⁹³⁹ and it is to the last degree unlikely that the Thessalians would have upheld the credit of men of whose Hellenic sympathies they must according to this hypothesis have been aware.⁹⁴⁰ If again they were thus kept wholly against their will, it is scarcely less surprising that they should remain quiet until the battle was at an end, when they might have either openly joined Hydarnes, or passively hindered the resistance of Leonidas. The care taken by the commanders of the Athenian fleet to obtain early tidings of the army at Thermopylai may imply that Athenian citizens were not lacking among the troops which defended the pass; and if we admit, as we can scarcely avoid admitting, that the narrative, as we have it, is framed for the special purpose of magnifying the Spartans, we are almost justified in inferring that the resistance in Pylai was on a far larger scale than Herodotos has represented it. A compulsory retreat of the allies might be veiled under the decent plea that they were dismissed; and if they were conscious of faintheartedness, they would not care to hinder the growth of a story which covered their remissness in the Hellenic cause, while it enhanced the glory of Leonidas.

The Greek
fleet at
Artemision.

If on turning from the tale of the fight in Thermopylai to the doings of the Greek fleet we find a somewhat clearer

⁹³⁹ λέγοντες τὸν ἀληθέστατον τῶν λόγων. Herod. vii. 233.

⁹⁴⁰ Of the personal anecdotes which enliven the story of the battle it is enough to say that they furnish us with matter not less questionable. The wit of Dienekes may have been invented to explain a popular saying. Cf. the Latin cry 'Talassio,' Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* i. 421, note 43, 'Væ Victis,' *ib.* ii. 333. The desperate form assumed by Spartan resistance in the pass, Herod. vii. 223, points to the source which has produced the anecdotes of the Athenian Kynegiros, Herod. vi. 114, and the Aiginetan Pytheas, Herod. vii. 181: see pp. 435, 502. The tales of Eurytos and Aristodemos serve at least to illustrate the ferocious military spirit of Sparta, whether the stories be true or false, and whether Herodotos, vii. 229, intends to impute to the latter any faintness of heart by the word which Thucydides employs when speaking of the swoon of Brasidas, λιποθυγόντα, Thuc. iv. 12. The story of Pantites, see note 930, is not less characteristic, and can scarcely be rejected on the mere ground that there was no one with whom his own return placed him in prominent contrast.

narrative, we are yet dealing with a tale clogged with some serious difficulties. If the account of Herodotos is to be trusted at all, the Greeks on board their ships heard of the disaster which befell the Persian fleet off the Magnesian coast on the second day after the beginning of the storm; and no sooner had they received the tidings than they set off with all speed to Artemision which they would necessarily reach on that second day. But the storm lasted four days; and thus the Greek fleet had been stationed at Artemision for at least forty-eight hours before the Persian ships could become visible as they sailed to Aphetai.⁹⁴¹ Here therefore the confederate fleet awaited their arrival, the whole number, exclusive of the pentekonteroi or vessels of fifty oars, being 271 ships. Of these the Athenians furnished 127, some of these being manned by the heroic citizens of Plataiai, whose inland town had cut them off from all training as mariners. Megara and Corinth sent each twenty ships, while twenty more, supplied by Athens, were manned by Chalkidians. From Aigina came eighteen ships, from Sikyon twelve. Of the rest ten belonged to Sparta, eight to Epidauros, seven to Eretria, five to Troizen. The Styrians sent two, the men of Keos two with two vessels of fifty oars, seven of these smaller ships being manned by the Lokrians of Opous. The supreme command of this force was in the hands of the Spartan Eurybiades; and the historian lays stress on the sentiment which, in contrast with the feeling of a later day, made the confederates insist on this arrangement as an indispensable condition of the alliance. To their lasting credit the Athenians at once yielded, and waited patiently until the turn of events opened the way to the most brilliant maritime dominion of the ancient world.

This fleet reached Artemision with crews cheerfully prepared, if not vehemently eager, for conflict; nor was there anything to damp their courage until the Persian ships hove into sight two days later. The invaders had heard already

Plan of the Persian leaders to cut off the retreat of the Greeks.

⁹⁴¹ Herodotos clearly says that the Persians found the Greek fleet off Artemision, *ὅτε δὲ ἐς τὰς Ἀφείτας περὶ δέλιαν πρώτην γυνομένην ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων, πνθόμενοι μὲν ἔτι καὶ πρότερον περὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμισίον ναυλοχέειν νέας Ἑλληνίδας ὀλίγας.* viii. 6. Hence his words at the beginning of ch. iv. must be taken as meaning that the Greeks had been two days at Artemision before they saw the Persian fleet off Aphetai and were frightened by the vast superiority of their numbers.

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that the scanty Greek fleet was awaiting their arrival off Artemision; and when on reaching Aphetai late in the afternoon they saw them near the opposite shore, they were deterred from attacking them at once only by the wish that not a single Greek vessel should escape. This result could be insured only by sending a detachment of two hundred Persian ships round the east coast of Eubœia to double the promontory of Geraistos and so take the Greek fleet in the rear at the Euripos. These ships the Persian commanders accordingly sent off that same afternoon;⁹⁴² and on the same day, it would seem, the diver Skyllias of Skiônê came⁹⁴³ as a deserter from the Persian fleet with the news of the damage done by the recent storm,⁹⁴⁴ and of the mission of the two hundred ships to prevent the flight of the Greeks by way of the Euboian strait. Thus on the very same day on which they first saw the enemy's ships, or at the latest on the morning of the next day, the Greek commanders were informed that they could not avoid a battle by retreating; and until the Persian fleet became visible off Aphetai, it is distinctly implied that they had no intention of retreating. It is not easy therefore to see what room is left for the circumstantial narrative that the Greeks on seeing the Persian ships resolved to retreat as they had come, and that the Euboians in their terror at being abandoned, as the Thessalians had been abandoned at Tempe, and having failed to obtain from Eurybiades a delay which might enable them to remove their families from the island, prevailed on Themistokles by a bribe of thirty talents to prevent this cowardly desertion. Of this sum it is said that he bestowed, as from himself, five talents on Eurybiades, while three sufficed to overcome the stouter opposition or more craven spirit of the Corinthian Adeimantos. The remaining twenty-two talents, we must especially note, he kept for himself, while the Spartan and Corinthian leaders both thought

⁹⁴² Herod. viii. 7.

⁹⁴³ The story ran that Skyllias dived into the sea at Aphetai and never emerged again until he reached Artemision, a distance of about eight miles. Herodotos, viii. 8, altogether disbelieves the tale which he seems to ascribe purely to his reputation as a diver, and dismisses it with the remark that he must have crossed over in a boat. It can scarcely be said that he exhibits the same amount of incredulity in relating the story of Arion.

⁹⁴⁴ This news cannot have been fresh, as the Greeks had already received full tidings of the disaster, Herod. vii. 192. *πάντα τὰ γενόμενα περὶ τὴν ναυμαχίαν.*

that they had been bribed with Athenian money. It must at least be said that the Euboian bribers kept their own counsel with astonishing secrecy and repressed by a silence not less wonderful the regret which they must have felt on learning, a few hours later, that their bribe had been a superfluous waste of money.⁹⁴⁵

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The tidings brought by Skyllias worked a sudden change in the minds of the Greek leaders. After a long debate they resolved to stay where they were until night came on and then under cover of darkness to move down the strait and meet the squadron sent round Euboia to cut them off. Finding, as the day wore on, that the Persian fleet remained motionless, they determined with greater vigour to use the remaining hours of light in attacking the enemy and thus gaining some experience of their way of fighting.⁹⁴⁶ As the Greeks drew nigh, the Persians, as at Marathon, thought them mad, so it is said, and surrounded them with their far more numerous and faster sailing ships, to the dismay of the Ionians who serving under Xerxes thus looked on their kinsfolk as on victims ready for the slaughter.⁹⁴⁷ But on a given signal the confederates drew their ships into a circle with their sterns inwards and their prows ready for the charge.⁹⁴⁸ On a second signal the onset was made, and a conflict ensued in which the Greeks took thirty Persian ships, the first captor

Indecisive
action off
Artemision.

⁹⁴⁵ We must take the story of this bribe along with the tales of the exactions of Themistokles in the islands of the Egean after the battle of Salamis. It is strange that in both cases we have simply the accusation without the faintest effort to obtain redress. It is not for a moment to be supposed that the Athenians would have refused to listen to the Euboians, had they demanded an account of the way in which their money had been spent; and if the answer that he had spent eight talents in winning Eurviades' and Adeimantos over to the interests of Athens would have been accepted as valid for this portion of the money, he would certainly have been compelled to yield up most of the remaining twenty-two talents, if not all. The fact that no such direct charge was brought against him either now or by the islanders of the Egean after the victory of Salamis seems of itself to be conclusive proof that these enormous sums were never given or exacted.

⁹⁴⁶ It is probably this fact which Diodoros, xi. 12, has dressed up into a formal challenge to the main body of the Persian fleet by the Hellenic leaders. His narrative of these events is generally marked by that vagueness which betrays a dull mind working on scanty materials and striving to give to his story a character of originality.

⁹⁴⁷ The whole policy of Xerxes towards such subjects as these Asiatic Greeks is singularly puzzling. When Kambyases wished to destroy Carthage by means of a Phœnician fleet, he was met by a flat refusal from the Phœnician seamen, page 348; and it is hard to understand how Xerxes could think it worth while to carry with him as seamen or as land troops men who never could be expected to do much and against whose possible treachery he must maintain a costly and troublesome watch.

⁹⁴⁸ The Corinthians and their allies formed their fleet in this array, when they had to face the ships of Phormion in the Corinthian gulf, some fifty years later. Thuc. ii. 83.

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being the Athenian Lykomedes. The desertion of the Lemnian Antidoros should have warned the Persians of the danger of trusting the Asiatic Greeks in a struggle with their western kinsmen: but we are not told that the indecisive result discouraged the Persians as much as it may fairly have satisfied the Greeks.

Destruction of the Persian squadron dispatched to the Euripos.

On the night which followed the battle the storm again burst forth with terrific lightning and deluges of rain. The wrecks and the dead bodies were carried by the waves to Aphetai where they became intangled with the prows of ships and the blades of oars. But if the storm caused great distress to the main fleet off the Thessalian coast, it was utter ruin for the ships dispatched round Eubœia to cut off the Greeks at Euripos. On these the tempest broke as they were passing the Hollows of the island. Not knowing whither they were going, they were dashed against the rocks, for thus, the historian adds, the Divine Nemesis had determined to bring their numbers more nearly to a level with that of the Greek fleet.⁹⁴⁹

Second action off Artemision, resulting in the victory and retreat of the Greeks.

The morning brought no cheering sight to the barbarians at Aphetai. For the present they deemed it prudent to remain quiet, while the Greek fleet was strengthened not merely by the tidings that the squadron sent to intercept them had been destroyed but by a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian ships. These, however, attempted nothing more than an attack on some Kilikian vessels which they captured, and then came back to their station at Artemision. Such presumption on the part of the Greeks was not to be endured; and two days later the Persian leaders, dreading now the wrath of Xerxes, determined to begin the attack which should decide whether they or their enemies should remain masters of the Euripos.⁹⁵⁰ The Persian ships were drawn out crescent-wise in order to surround and overwhelm the confederate fleet; but they failed, we are told, more from the mere multitude of their vessels, which dashed against and clogged each other, than from any lack of bravery

⁹⁴⁹ This statement, Herod. viii. 13, is in direct contradiction with the subsequent statement, *ib.* viii. 66, where Herodotos says that the numbers of the Persian fleet at Salamis were pretty much what they had been when they reached the coast of Sepias before the great storm.

⁹⁵⁰ Herod. viii. 15.

or spirit in their crews. The battle was a fierce one;⁹⁵¹ but although the Persians lost more both in ships and in men, the Spartans and their allies had been so severely handled and found themselves so seriously weakened that retreat once more appeared the only course open to them. Themistokles, it would seem, was unable to change their resolution, although possibly a few more of the Euboian talents remaining in his possession might have been not less potent than they had been some days before. Still he could make the best of matters, and while he assured the Euboians that he would see them safely taken across the strait, he also told them that it was better that they should eat their cattle than leave them to be eaten by their enemies. In spite of a prophecy of Bakis which had warned them to take their goats away from Euboia when the barbarian cast a yoke upon the sea, they had allowed their flocks to remain; and the islanders found themselves thus constrained to involuntary feasting before they left their homes. But if there had been any hesitation before, all doubt as to the necessity of retreat was removed, when Polyas of Antikyra, the scout from Trachis, and the Athenian Abronychos, who had been stationed in his ship off Thermopylai, came to tell them that Leonidas was slain and that Xerxes was master of the pass which formed the gate of southern Hellas. At once the Greek fleet began to retreat, the Corinthians leading the way, the Athenians following last in order. At each place where streams with water fit for drinking found their way down to the sea, Themistokles carved on the rocks inscriptions beseeching the Ionians either to desert bodily or to remain neutral, persuading the Karians to do the same, or, failing this, to do as little as possible in any battle in which they might be compelled to take part. The inscription, if it came to the knowledge of Xerxes, could scarcely fail to make him regard the Ionians and Karians, that is, the best of his seamen, with extreme suspicion: but the difficulty is to

⁹⁵¹ Herodotos, viii. 17, says that the most distinguished of the barbarians in this battle were the Egyptians, who took five of the enemy's ships with their crews. It is strange that Egyptians should so soon and so thoroughly have forgotten the frightful treatment which they had undergone at the hands of Kambyses as to become thus zealous in the service of a king by whom their revolt against Persian dominion had but a little while ago been suppressed.

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The fortification of the Corinthian isthmus.

understand how he could ever have looked upon them with any other feelings.

So ended the double conflict, which, we are told, was carried on at the same time, at Thermopylai and Artemision. The gates of Thessaly and Boiotia had been each in turn abandoned or ineffectually defended, and it was now the turn of the Athenians (who, if the popular story be true, had sent not so much as a troop of horsemen or footmen to Thermopylai) to address to their allies the indignant remonstrances which the Thessalians had vainly offered at Tempe. The one thought of the Spartans and Corinthians was now, it would seem, fixed on the defence not of Boiotia or Attica but of the Peloponnesos alone. By some strange hallucination, which took it for granted that no Persian fleet would visit the shores of Argolis or Lakonia, they had convinced themselves that the occupation of the Corinthian isthmus would suffice to insure their safety; and thither their ships would, it is said, have sailed at once, had not Themistokles, by words rather than bribes, persuaded them to make a stand at Salamis, and thus to give the Athenians time to remove their households from Attica and otherwise to form their plans.⁹⁵² Here then the fleet remained, while the full forces of the Spartans and Corinthians with the Arkadians and Eleians, and with the men of Sikyon, Epidauros, Phlious, Troizen and Hermione,⁹⁵³ were working night and day, breaking up the Skironid road and raising the wall across the isthmus. Stones, bricks, pieces of wood, mats full of sand, brought by myriads of labourers, soon raised it to the needful height; but the barrier thus completed imparted little confidence to its builders, and none, it would seem, to the Peloponnesian seamen in the ships at Salamis. We have, in fact, reached the time of the greatest depression on the side of the Greeks; nor can we doubt that this depression marks the moment at which the enterprise of Xerxes had been brought most nearly to a successful issue. That the history of this enterprise and of the resistance by which it was met cannot possibly have followed the course ascribed to it by popular traditions, has been made abundantly clear; and

⁹⁵² Herod. viii. 40.

⁹⁵³ Ib. viii. 72.

if the story of Thermopylai gives indications that the Persian host was not so large and the Hellenic army not so small as they are represented, we may not unfairly conclude that the inaction set down to the score of the Karneian and Olympian festivals was in great measure a plea put forth to cover the failure of more strenuous efforts. It is clear that to the mind of the average Greek the glory of the struggle lay in the defeat of millions by thousands: to us it is not less clear that the splendour of the achievement, whatever it may have been, is enormously enhanced, if the power of Xerxes lay not so much in his numbers as in the strength and spirit of his genuine Persian soldiers. There is good reason for thinking that this was the case, and that the interminable tales which represent his progress as that of a rolling snowball have their origin in the vulgar exaggerations of Eastern nations and in the fallacy which led the Greeks to adopt these exaggerations as heightening the lustre of their own exploits. The real strength of the army of Xerxes lay in the men whom Cyrus had led from conquest to conquest, and whose vigour and spirit remain unsubdued after the lapse of five-and-twenty centuries: and we can the better appreciate the character of the struggle and its issue, when we see that the Greeks were fighting against men little, if at all, inferior to themselves in any except the one point that the Eastern Aryan fought to establish the rule of one despotic will while his western brother strove to set up the dominion of an equal law. It is possible, or even likely, that Xerxes, a man immeasurably inferior to many of his own generals in the qualities which form a great leader, may have felt a stupid pride in dragging after himself a useless host of faint-hearted or ill-disposed subjects: but all these, whether gathered on the western coasts of Asia Minor, from the islands of the Egean, or from the cities of Thessaly and Boiotia, added nothing to his chance of success or the perils which his enemies were justified in dreading. The number of these pseudo-combatants is, by universal admission, hugely exaggerated; and we are fully justified in leaving them practically on one side, as we trace the history of an enterprise which all

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but succeeded in riveting on Europe the chains of Asiatic tyranny.

Migration
of the
Athenian
people.

Western freedom was, in truth, in far greater danger than it would have been but for this genuine element of strength in the Persian forces; nor was it necessary for the priestess of Athênê on the rock of Athens to announce that the sacred serpent had at last refused to touch its food. The tidings may somewhat have heightened the terrors of the moment: but there was a need for prompt action more constraining than the vague warnings of a Delphian oracular response. Immediately after the arrival of the fleet from Artemision a proclamation, we are told, was issued, warning all Athenians to remove their families from the country in all possible haste; and the task of removal, to whatever extent it may have been carried, was accomplished in less than six days, for within that time after the retreat of the Greek ships Xerxes was master of Athens. After the flight of the king the Samians are said to have sent back five hundred Athenians whom the Persians had taken prisoners in Attica:⁹⁵⁴ but we can scarcely infer from this statement that the whole land was searched with any rigorous scrutiny, or even that it was searched at all.⁹⁵⁵ Still from all those parts of Attica which lay in the immediate path of the invader the inhabitants doubtless fled in haste, most of them to the half-Ionic Troizen in the Argolic peninsula, some to Aigina, some to Salamis.

Feuds of
the Thessa-
lians and
Phokians.

Meanwhile Xerxes was advancing in his career of conquest, not without justification for the hope that he might remain master of the land which he had thus far traversed victoriously. To the north of Attica he had overcome practically all resistance. With the exception of the two small cities of Thespiæ and Plataiæ all the Boiotian towns had submitted to him, and the Thessalians are said to have professed a zeal in his cause which Herodotos ascribed wholly to their hatred

⁹⁵⁴ Herod. ix. 99.

⁹⁵⁵ Niebuhr confesses his inability to imagine how the Persians, being in possession of Athens, should not have advanced beyond it even as far as Eleusis, or why the Persian cavalry did not get beyond the Thriasian or Rharian plain. *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 339. If these facts be accurately reported, the extent of the Athenian migration may be as much exaggerated as the numbers of the Persian fleet or army; and thus the difficulties which most perplexed Niebuhr in this portion of the narrative in great part disappear.

of the Phokians. The wars of savages have in themselves little interest or none; but the barbarous feuds of the Thessalians and the Phokians are instructive as exhibiting the materials on which Hellenic statesmen had to work, and the strength of those centrifugal tendencies which no counter-influences ever wholly overcame. The cause of these feuds, if ever any adequate cause had existed, had probably been long since forgotten: but tribes more forbearing than the Thessalians would be slow to forgive such stratagems as those by which the Phokians had, not many years before, avenged an invasion of their territories. Shut up on the heights of Parnassos, the Phokians, by the advice of Tellias a soothsayer from Elis, had chalked the dresses of six hundred men who were charged in a night-attack to kill all who were not white like themselves. The Thessalians, taking them for ghosts, lost all power of resistance; and some colossal statues at Delphoi made from four thousand Thessalian shields attested the slaughter done that night upon their infantry. Their horsemen fared no better. In the pass of Hyampolis the Phokians had dug a deep trench which they filled with empty jars and then smoothed the earth over them. The device was as successful as that of Robert the Bruce at Bannockburn.

It was, therefore, not wonderful that the Phokians should now meet with a flat refusal the proffer of the Thessalians who pledged themselves on the receipt of fifty talents to insure the safety of all Phokian territory against the troops of Xerxes. So keen was the hatred between these tribes, that the Phokians would, in the judgement of Herodotos, have submitted at once to the Persians if the Thessalians had adhered to the Greeks. The historian therefore puts no high value on their lofty professions of disinterested patriotism, and goes on to tell us how the Thessalians requited the tricks of the chalked garments and the empty pitchers. At once these ruthless savages led the Persians through that narrow little strip of Dorian land, barely four miles in width, which lay between the Malian and Phokian territories, and then let them loose on Phokis. Some had taken refuge on that summit of the Parnassian range which bore the name of

The devastation of Phokis.

BOOK
II.

Tithorea ; but the greater part found shelter at Amphissa, a town of the Ozolian Lokrians to the north of the plain of Krissa. The Phokian towns were all burnt, and among these not merely Hyampolis, the scene of Thessalian disaster, but Abai, the shrine of Apollon, which was despoiled of all its magnificent treasures without awaking the vengeance of the god. The invaders had now reached Panopeai, a town lying to the south of the Eúênos, some ten miles to the west of the point where it empties itself into the lake Kopais near Orchomenos. Here the forces were divided. The larger and better portion, under orders to join Xerxes, went on through Boiotia, where Makedonian garrisons by the order of Alexandros guarded the several towns.⁹⁵⁶ The rest, led by local guides, marched, it is said, towards Delphoi to bear thence for the Persian king, among other treasures, the offerings with which the Lydian Kroisos had enriched the shrine. Here they hoped to fare as they had fared at Abai. The tidings of their approach, as they came on burning and slaying everywhere, so dismayed the Delphians that they asked the god whether they should bury his holy treasures or carry them away. "Move them not," answered the god, "I am able to guard them." Then taking thought for themselves, they sent their women and children across the gulf into the land of the Achaians, while most of the men climbed up to the peaks of Parnassos and the Korykian cave and others fled to Amphissa. In Delphoi there remained only sixty men with the prophet Akeratos. As the barbarians drew nigh and were now in sight, Akeratos saw lying in front of the temple the sacred arms, which used to hang in the holy place and which it was not lawful for man to touch ; and he went to tell the Delphians of the marvel. But there were greater wonders still, as the barbarians came up in haste to the chapel of Athênê which stood before the great temple, for the lightnings burst from heaven and two cliffs torn from the peaks of Parnassos dashed down with a thundering sound and crushed great multitudes, and fierce cries and shoutings

⁹⁵⁶ According to Herodotos, viii. 54, the motive of the Makedonian chief in giving this order was a desire to prove to Xerxes the sincerity of Boiotian Medism. The phrase goes far towards proving that the Medism was practically confined to the Boiotian Eupatridai who wished to protect their own property, while they were conscious that the people had no great claim to the favour of the Persian king.

were heard from the chapel of Athênê. In the midst of this din and uproar the barbarians in utter terror turned to flee; and when the Delphians on Parnassos saw this, they came down from the mountain and slew many more, while they who escaped hurried with all speed to the Boiotian land and told how two hoplites, higher in stature than mortal men, had followed behind, slaying and driving them from Delphoi. These, the Delphians said, were the two heroes of the land, Phylakos and Autonqös. The rocks which fell from Parnassos Herodotos believed that he saw lying in the sacred ground of Athênê, into which they were hurled as they crushed the host of the barbarians.

CHAP.
VI.

The inroad of the Persians on Delphoi is the turning point of the great epic of Herodotos. It is the most daring provocation of divine jealousy and wrath by the barbarian despot; and while it precedes immediately his own humiliation, it insures also the final destruction of the army which he was to leave behind with Mardonios. But the poetical handling of the tale has shrouded it with no uncertainty beyond that of most other incidents of the war. The words put into the mouth of Mardonios before the battle of Plataiai assert emphatically that the expedition never took place at all;⁹⁵⁷ and in the lack of any satisfactory evidence that these words were ever uttered, we can but say that here also we are reading only another part of the great heroic legend, how the gods made the prime mover of all the evil believe a lie and utter words of more than mortal pride in the hour of his doom. It was not the first time that the majesty of Zeus had come between the spoiler and his temple; and it would be ludicrous to explain the rending of the crags of Parnassos as an accident of nature like that which is said to have destroyed the army of Kambyses on their way to

The attack
on Delphoi.

⁹⁵⁷ Herod. ix. 42. Mardonios is here made to refer distinctly to the oracle which had declared that the Persians, coming to Hellas, would plunder the temple at Delphoi and then be utterly destroyed, and to assert that he had no intention whatever of bringing vengeance on himself for any such deed. 'So far then as this is concerned,' he adds, 'all who are kindly minded to me may rest satisfied that we shall win the victory.' It is absurd to suppose that he could have spoken thus, if he had known that the temple had been already plundered and the doom incurred; and the supposition is scarcely less wild that the expedition could have taken place without his being aware of it and of its result. The story that Mardonios sent to consult the oracle at Abai during the winter following the battle of Salamis seems, in like manner, quite inconsistent with the tradition of its alleged destruction while Xerxes was advancing into Attica. Herod. viii. 134.

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the shrine of Amoun, if even this is not to be regarded as the direct handiwork of the offended deity. The fall of the rocks at Delphoi cannot be separated from the other miraculous details,—from the unseen arm which laid the sacred weapons before the temple doors and from the visible aid of the deified heroes of the place. The same supernatural intervention recurs in the story of the later attack on Delphoi by Bran (Brennus) and his Gauls.⁹⁵⁸ In the narrative of Plutarch the Delphian temple was not only taken by the Persians but underwent the lot which befell the kindred oracle of Abai. On this point, however, the statement of Plutarch has little more weight than that of Ktesias. The splendid offerings of an earlier age, the magnificent gifts, bearing the names of Gyges and Kroisos which were seen in the Delphic treasury by Herodotos himself,⁹⁵⁹ seem sufficiently to prove that the temple was not plundered, far less burnt, by the Persians. But how the expedition came to fail and why its failure was not followed up by an attack with forces far more overwhelming, are questions to which no answer can be given. The epical conception of history made it indispensable that Xerxes should insult the majesty of Apollon; and the contradictions of the tale might almost tempt us to think that Mardonios spoke truly if he denied that any attack had been made on the sanctuary of Delphoi. On the other hand, the conclusion that in this miraculous narrative we have the popular version of a systematic but unsuccessful effort to pass into southern Hellas over the Aitolian roads seems to be not altogether unwarranted.⁹⁶⁰

The Greek
fleet at
Salamis.

The wrong done to Phoibos, the lord of light, had been punished in part on the spot. The more signal vengeance of the god was reserved for the shores of Salamis. Here were

⁹⁵⁸ It is, in fact, impossible to read the story of the Gallic overthrow as related by Pausanias, x. 23, without feeling that it is a mere repetition of the narrative of Herodotos. Doubtless Pausanias heard it and received it in good faith as a genuine narrative of what took place on the coming of Bran: but the identity of the two stories drives us to the conclusion that the myth of divine intervention was older than the days of Xerxes and was ready to fasten itself on anyone who might dare to lay hands on the temples of the gods. In the story of Bran, as in that of the Persians, we have the terror of the Delphians, the assuring answer of the god to their question that he can guard his own, the quaking of the earth, the thunder and lightning, the reappearance of the heroes (only that we have now four instead of two), and the rending of the crags which, with some attempt seemingly at explanation, is connected with a hard frost, the rocks accordingly being diminished in size and increased in number.

⁹⁵⁹ i. 50.

⁹⁶⁰ See page 496.

gathered together the ships of those Hellenic cities which had not submitted themselves to the invader or chosen to be neutral in the contest. Eighty-nine ships were furnished by Peloponnesian states, Sparta sending 16, Corinth 40, Sikyon 15, Épidauros 10, Troizen 5, Hermione 3. Of the extra-Peloponnesian cities Megara supplied, as at Artemision, 20 ships, while the Ambrakiots sent 7, the Leukadians 3, the Aigine-tans 30, the Chalkidians 20, the Eretrians 7, the Keians, as at Artemision, 2, the Naxians 4 which were dispatched to join the forces of Xerxes but which their commander Demokritos diverted to the Greek cause. Two ships were furnished by the Styrians, while one came from Kythnos, one vessel from Kroton being the solitary contribution of all the Greeks whether of Italy or Sicily.⁹⁶¹

The Persian fleet had not yet advanced so far to the south; and Xerxes was still moving on upon the path which, as he fancied, was to lead him to his final triumph. Four months had passed away since his army crossed the bridge over the Hellespont, when the tyrant set his foot on Attic soil. But

Occupation
of Athens
by Xerxes.

⁹⁶¹ These items would yield a total of 366 ships of war, excluding the pentekonteroi or vessels of 50 oars sent from such states as Kythnos, Siphnos, Seriphos, and Melos. Yet Herodotos sums the total at 378 triremes. Mr. Grote rightly says that 'there seems no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent change which we are not warranted in making.' *Hist. Gr.* v. 153. Æschylos, who was himself engaged in the battle, gives the whole number of the Greek war-ships as 310, ten of these being picked out for their strength and swiftness. His reckoning of the Persian fleet is even more important than that which he gives of the Greek fleet, although it is altogether more likely that he, an eye-witness, should be approximately correct in his numbers than that they should have stood as they are given by Herodotos. See page 468. But unfortunately, the conclusion follows that no dependence can be placed either upon this or on any other list of the combatants in any of the battles of the Persian war whether found in the pages of Herodotos or, still more, in those of later writers. The Athenians are represented by Thucydides, i. 74, as saying that the Greek fleet amounted to nearly 400 ships, and that of this number they contributed 'somewhat less than the two parts.' Mr. Grote rightly insists that there is no justification for converting *τετρακοσίας* in this passage of Thucydides into *τριακοσίας*, to make it harmonise with Herodotos, or to change *τριακοσίω* into *τετρακοσίω* in the speech of Demosthenes on the *Crown*, 70, to bring the latter into harmony with Thucydides. The main question is whether the phrase *τῶν δύο μοιρῶν* in Thucydides means necessarily two-thirds or simply two parts of any total that may have been mentioned. Dr. Arnold dismisses the latter interpretation as 'a most undoubted error,' *in loc.* On the other hand the commentators whom he condemns cite the passage in which Thucydides, i. 10, speaking of the Lakædaimonians, says *Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας νέμονται*, where the phrase indubitably means two-fifths; nor can it well be denied that *τετρακοσίας* is equivalent to *τέσσαρας ἑκατοντάδας*, and thus the phrase in Thuc. i. 74 is brought into perfect analogy with the passage in Thuc. i. 10. Hence the number of Athenian ships according to Thucydides would correspond very closely to the number as given by Herodotos, while the aggregate of the whole Greek fleet is raised. According to Herodotos, the Athenians in the congress at Sparta underrate the proportion of their own contribution.

The plain inference from all these scrutinies is that there was no contemporary registration, and, therefore, that we can have no assurance of the exact correctness of any of the numbers given, although we may fairly regard many of them as substantially correct.

we are told that he found the land desolate. The city was abandoned; and there remained on the Akropolis⁹⁶² only a few poor people and the guardians of the temples who, rather to carry out the letter of the oracle than from any serious notion of defence,⁹⁶³ had blocked with wooden palisades, planks, or doors the only side of the Akropolis which was supposed to lie open to attack. Behind these wooden walls this scanty garrison, besieged by Persian troops stationed on the opposite hill of Ares, underwent the dignity of a blockade. The offers of the Peisistratidai, who stood once again in their old home and regarded themselves as practically repossessed of their ancient tyranny, were rejected with contempt. Arrows bearing lighted tow were discharged against the fence in vain: and Xerxes thus foiled gave himself up to one of his frequent fits of furious passion. But on the northern side there is a fissure in the rock, in part subterraneous;⁹⁶⁴ and here some Persians managed to scramble up to the summit near the chapel of Aglauros the daughter of Kekrops. As soon as they saw their enemies, some of the poor men who occupied rather than defended the Akropolis threw themselves over the precipitous rock, while others took refuge in the temple of the goddess. They might, like the Roman senators seated in the forum, have met their fate with greater dignity: but the Persians were not more magnanimous than Bran and his Gauls, and as soon as they had opened their gates to their comrades, they hurried to the temple and cut down every one of the suppliants. Xerxes was now for the moment lord of Athens: and he lost no time in dispatching a horseman to Sousa with the tidings. The streets of the royal city rang with shouts of exultation when the news was received, and were covered with myrtle branches. The fears of Artabanos were falsified, and the harems of the king and his nobles could now await patiently the advent of the Spartan and Athenian maidens whom Atossa had long ago wished to have as her slaves.

⁹⁶² The Athenian Akropolis rises abruptly to the height of about 150 feet above the surrounding plain. The fable-land on its summit, which has been graced by so many magnificent works of consummate art, has a measurement, according to M. Beulé, *L'Acropole d'Athènes*, of 900 feet by 400 feet. Mr. Grote follows Kruse in adding 100 feet more to its length and its breadth; but Kruse never visited Greece himself *Edinburgh Review*, July 1859, p. 35 *et seq.*

⁹⁶³ Beulé, *L'Acropole d'Athènes*, i. 89.

⁹⁶⁴ *Ib.* i. 159.

But Xerxes, though he was eager to take full revenge on Athens for the wrongs done to the shrines of his gods in Sardeis, was yet anxious to avert the wrath of beings mightier than man. The temples on the Akropolis were burnt; but he charged the Athenian exiles who had returned with him from Sousa to make their peace with Athênê.⁹⁶⁵ Only two days had passed since the capture of the rock: but when the exiles came to offer sacrifice, the sacred olive-tree of the goddess which had been burnt with the temple had already sent up from its roots a shoot of a cubit's height. The Peisistratidai might well interpret this as a sign of the greeting with which Athênê welcomed them home; and probably they chose to give it this meaning when they reported the sign to Xerxes. But like many another prodigy, it might be read in more than one way; and it was time that some cheering token should be vouchsafed to the Athenians in their exile at Salamis. The fleet of the confederates had been gathered at that island rather to cover the migration of the Athenians than with any notion of making it a naval station; and now not only was the Persian fleet, larger in numbers (as some said) than it had been before the disaster on the Sepian shore,⁹⁶⁶ drawn up before them in the harbour of Phaleron, but Athens itself had been taken, and the shrine of Athênê had undergone the fate of the temple of Kybêbê at Sardeis. Hellenic alliances were at no time very firmly cemented; and on the receipt of these tidings something like panic fear drove not a few of the Hellenic commanders to dispense even with the formality of an order. These hastened at once on board their ships and made ready for immediate flight. The rest assembled in council; but their minds were already made up. A poor semblance of debate was followed by a decision to retreat on the following day and take up a permanent position off the Corinthian isthmus. Here in case of defeat by sea they might at least fall back on

⁹⁶⁵ He was careful to bid them offer sacrifice *πρὸς τῷ σφετέρῳ*. Herod. viii. 54.

⁹⁶⁶ When everything is exaggerated in a narrative, it seems useless to mark each new instance of exaggeration. We have already seen that the Persian tradition, p. 468, gave 1000 as the total of the fleet sent to invade Europe; and it is needless to repeat that on Persian numbers generally no reliance whatever can be placed. If we may give credit to Æschylos, the numbers even of the Greek ships were exaggerated both by Herodotos and Thucydides. Conjectures as to the total of the Persian fleet are therefore useless.

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the help of the land-forces. One man alone felt that this decision, if acted upon, might be the deathblow of Hellenic freedom. One after another defensible posts had been abandoned. Tempe, Thermopylai, and Artemision alike attested either a feeble patriotism or defective generalship. Thessaly, Boiotia, Attica had been allowed in succession to fall into the enemy's hands under the plea that prudence demanded a retreat to the south or the west. There could be no possible guarantee that a further retreat to the isthmus would be followed by greater harmony of councils and greater resolution of purpose, while there was the strongest reason for thinking that even such a victory as that which had been won at Artemision would lead to a general dispersion of Megarians, Epidaurians, Corinthians, Spartans, and all who might be anxious to protect their own cities against attacks whether from the fleet or from the army of the Persians. The abandonment of Salamis would be therefore a virtual confession that common action could no more be looked for; and Themistokles resolved that whether by fair means or by foul he would not allow this dastardly retreat to be carried out. But the narrative of the subsequent events must be given as it has been left to us in the pages of Herodotos.

The policy
of Themis-
tokles.



The council was over, and Themistokles returned to his ship. Here an Athenian named Mnesiphilos, on hearing the result, besought him at all cost to bring every power of persuasion to bear on Eurybiades and thus to get the order rescinded. Mnesiphilos saw clearly that retreat meant utter dispersion, and that dispersion must bring after it the complete ruin of Hellas. Without answering a word Themistokles hastened back to the ship of Eurybiades and by many arguments of his own added to those suggested by Mnesiphilos prevailed on the Spartan leader to summon the chiefs to a second council. On their assembling Themistokles, too impatient to wait for the formal opening of the debate, began eagerly to address the commanders, until Adeimantos the Corinthian reminded him sharply that they who rise up in the games before the signal are beaten. 'Yes,' said Themistokles gently; 'but those who do not rise when the signal is

given are not crowned.' Then, turning to Eurybiades, he began in a different strain, not dwelling now on the certainty of further dispersion if the fleet fell back on the isthmus, but telling him plainly that the safety of Hellas was now in his hands. At the isthmus, he insisted that they would have to fight in the open sea to the great disadvantage of their own heavier and fewer ships; and there they would lose the aid of the men of Salamis, Megara, and Aigina, for these must look each to the protection of their own land, while the advance of the Persian fleet to the Peloponnesos would certainly be followed by the advance of the Persian army. On the other hand he urged that a combat in closed waters would probably end in their winning the victory, and that a victory at Salamis would cover the Peloponnesos more effectually than a victory at the isthmus. At this point Adeimantos broke in again upon his vehement eloquence, and with savage rudeness told him that, as since the fall of Athens he had now no country, he could have no vote in the council and that Eurybiades was debarred from even taking his opinion, much more from following it.⁹⁶⁷ To this brutal speech Themistokles answered quietly that he had a better city than Adeimantos so long as the Athenians had two hundred ships which were fully able to bear down the resistance of any Greek city, whatever they might do against the Persian power. For Eurybiades he had yet one more argument. It was couched briefly in the form of a warning that, if the allies abandoned Salamis, the Athenians with their families would at once sail away to Italy and find a new home in their own city of Siris. The Spartan chief saw at once that without the Athenians the confederates could not resist the Persians even for a day; and at once he issued the order for remaining. Thus instead of preparing for flight they now made ready for battle: but their formal obedience could not kill their fears. In their eyes Eurybiades was a madman; and when on the following day, after an earthquake by sea

⁹⁶⁷ In the narrative of Plutarch the part here played by Adeimantos is transferred to Eurybiades, the further touch being added that when the Spartan leader raised his stick to strike Themistokles, the latter replied calmly, 'Strike, but hear.' It is clear that Herodotos could not have heard of a story which is inconsistent with the whole of this portion of his narrative.

and land, they saw in the Persian fleet movements in manifest preparation for a conflict, their discontent broke out into open murmurs, if not into mutiny. It became clear that Eurybiades must give way; and Themistokles resolved to hazard everything on a final throw. With the Hellenic leaders there was nothing more to be done: it might be of more use to address himself to the Persians. Without losing a moment, Themistokles passed quietly from the council and dispatched Sikinnos, his slave and the tutor of his children,⁹⁶³ in a boat to the Persian fleet. The message which he charged him to deliver was that Themistokles really desired the victory not of the Greeks but of the Persians and that on this account he now, without the knowledge of his colleagues, took this means of informing them that the Greeks were on the point of running away and that in their present state of utter dismay as well as disunion they could be taken and crushed almost without an effort. The Persian leaders, putting implicit faith in the message, at once landed a large force on the islet of Psyttaleia off the southeastern promontory of Salamis and precisely opposite to the harbour of the Peiraieus, the object of this disposition being that they might save the wrecks of ships and slay such of the enemy as might in the battle be driven upon the islet. Towards midnight a portion of the fleet lying off Phaleron began to move along the Attic coast until the line extended to the northeastern promontory of Salamis, the ships stationed off Keos and Kynosoura moving at the same time. It was thus no longer possible for the Greeks to escape into the bay of Eleusis and so retreat to the isthmus without fighting. But of this fact they were still unconscious; and the hours of the night were being wasted in fierce dissensions, when Themistokles was suddenly summoned from the council to speak with his rival and enemy Aristeides, who had just crossed over from Aigina. In few words Aristeides said that the only rivalry now befitting them was that of determining which could most benefit their common country. As to the notion of retreat, it mattered not whether they said much about it or little. The

⁹⁶³ Themistokles, it is said, afterwards obtained for Sikinnos the citizenship of Thespiæ, Herod. viii. 73, and also bestowed on him great wealth. This fact, if true, should be borne in mind, in forming a judgement on the character of Themistokles.



thing was impossible. He knew from his own knowledge that the Greek fleet was surrounded beyond all chance of escape. The reply of Themistokles was not less terse. He rejoiced at the tidings, and informed his rival that the movements of the Persian leaders were the consequence of the message sent by himself through Sikinnos. He begged him further to repeat before the council news to which in all likelihood they would give no credit if they heard it from the lips of Themistokles. Even as coming from Aristeides, it was well-nigh rejected as false, when a Tenian vessel deserting from the Persian fleet established the fact beyond all doubt. Once more they made ready to fight; and as the day dawned, Themistokles addressed not the chiefs but the crews, laying before them all the lofty and ignoble motives by which men may be stimulated to action, and, beseeching them to choose the higher, sent them to their ships.

This narrative may be scrutinised, as it bears on the character and the schemes of Themistokles, or as it throws light on the real history of this memorable time. The former question must be dismissed, until we have reached the close of his career; but it is impossible to read the story of Herodotus without marking the contrast between this portion of his tale with that which has immediately preceded it. If it had been necessary at Artemision to win his colleagues over to his plans, it was still more necessary to do so at Salamis. When the means employed at Artemision were not of the most honourable sort, it seems reasonable to expect that the same means might be employed again. We have to remember further the epical form into which the history has, as a whole, been thrown, and the tendency of the historian to put into the mouth of the counsellors thoughts which must necessarily be awakened in the minds of kings and generals without their intervention. In this light Mnesiphilos becomes as much a superfluous personage as Demokedes or Histiaios in the palace of Dareios. It is not easy to believe that the wavering resolution of Themistokles was fixed by the earnest remonstrance of his friend, that the failing firmness of the man who had clearly from the first marked out a definite line of action and adhered to it with

General
credibility
of the
narrative.

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inflexible pertinacity needed the support of one who suggests nothing with which he had not been long familiar. It would seem as though there were an epical necessity for the counsel of Mnesiphilos as for that of Demaratos and Artemisia. The one determines the resolution of the future conqueror, as the other convicts his enemy of a blind infatuation. From his friend Themistokles hears simply the arguments which he had just been urging in the council chamber; and Mnesiphilos appears only as the personified opinion of the great Athenian leader.⁹⁶⁹ The persistency with which in the subsequent discussions Themistokles confines himself to verbal arguments, is still more strange. If he had once employed bribes effectually, there was no reason, apart from scruples of conscience which he is not supposed to have felt, why he should not employ them again. If it was important for him to have his own way off Euboa, it was nothing less than a matter of life and death at Salamis. In his great strait his ready wit devises, we are told, with rapid decision a secret method for determining the action of the allies, so soon as he finds that warnings and prayers are alike thrown away. But it is strange that this device has nothing to do with bribery. From the narrative of Herodotos it would seem that not less than two-and-twenty talents of the Euboian money still remained to him; and his chief opponent is that very Adeimantos to whom at Artemision three talents had furnished an effectual argument for submission. But the contradictory accounts of the debate which preceded the battle tend to show how little reliance can be placed on the more minute details even of this part of the history. It was certainly a time in which the inducements which had prevailed on Adeimantos before might have been tried again with fair justification and perhaps with not less chance of success. Themistokles, however, now addresses his persuasion not to the Corinthian but to the Persian leaders. His stratagem, in sending the message by Sikinnos, was successful; but the accounts given

⁹⁶⁹ Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 167, speaks of Mnesiphilos as the 'inspiring genius' of Themistokles. He has applied expressions not very different to the counsels of Artabanos to Xerxes, which he is not disposed to regard as historical. He admits further that of Mnesiphilos personally we have no knowledge whatever. He appears here for the sole purpose of sending Themistokles back to Eurybiades, and we never hear of him again.

of it are by no means consistent. The contemporary poet Æschylos represents Themistokles as sending his messenger not to the Persian generals but to Xerxes himself,⁹⁷⁰ and speaks of Xerxes as charging his officers on their lives to see that none of the enemy escaped them.⁹⁷¹ If the message was sent (and of this there seems to be no doubt), the statement of the poet in this instance exceeds that of Herodotos in likelihood as much as his story of the passage across the Strymon passes beyond the region of fact into that of fiction. But throughout the narrative we are constantly obliged to resort to a balancing of probabilities. The orator Isokrates seems to know nothing of the stratagem of Themistokles: Herodotos seems to be as little aware of the fact, which Plutarch states, that the ostracism of Aristeides and other exiles had been revoked before the fight at Salamis at the urgent desire of Themistokles himself. The language of Herodotos even contradicts the supposition. He makes Aristeides speak as a man still under sentence of ostracism and represents the offer for the suspension of personal enmity as originating with himself and not with his more fortunate rival. It is impossible that he could talk of Themistokles as being still the bitter enemy of Aristeides the exile, if he had known that the decree of banishment had been cancelled, and this at the prayer of Themistokles himself.⁹⁷² Aristeides, it must further be noted, reached

⁹⁷⁰ *Persai*, 356. We have further to infer, for he does not state it, that the Athenian of whom the poet speaks was Sikiunos. He names indeed neither Sikiunos nor Themistokles; and for all that appears from the drama the Athenian may have been Themistokles himself. Æschylos moreover makes no mention of the utter disunion among the Greeks of which Herodotos draws so dreary a picture: but he would have no motive for so doing in a drama which was designed to exhibit the humiliation of the barbarian, and not the accidents which seemed to favour his plans.

⁹⁷¹ The strait between the northeastern promontory of Salamis and the opposite coast of Attica is only about one-fourth of a mile in width. We can scarcely suppose that Xerxes would need the advice of a Greek, or indeed any advice at all, to guard an outlet which he could block up with so much ease. That he had come with his mind made up to fight, cannot for a moment be questioned: and all that the message of Themistokles can be thought to have accomplished is the hastening of a movement which probably would in any case have been carried out in a few hours. It was, however, enough for the purpose of Themistokles, if he could succeed in thus hastening a movement, the postponement of which would have given the Peloponnesians time to effect a retreat to the isthmus.

⁹⁷² It is further stated by Plutarch that, like the Roman senate after Cannæ, the members of the Athenian Areiopagos by their own munificent contributions roused the generous zeal of their countrymen for the public weal at a time when the treasury was empty, and that Themistokles by pretending that the Gorgon's head from the statue of Athênê had been carried away by some one led to an examination of all baggage carried from the city and thus to the discovery of large sums of money which were now diverted to the service of the state. That at this time, again, we should hear nothing of the

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Salamis on this memorable night not from Athens but from Aigina. Unless we are to adopt the version of Æschylos which makes Xerxes send a detachment of his fleet (as Diodoros says, the Egyptian squadron ⁹⁷³) round the south of the island to close the western strait between Salamis and the mainland, he could not until he approached the islet of Psyttaleia have encountered any of the ships from which he alleged that he had had so much difficulty in escaping; nor could he have brought to Themistokles any more definite tidings than that there was an eastern movement of a portion of the Persian fleet, which would not necessarily prove that the outlet into the bay of Eleusis had already been blocked. As the Greeks were not to retreat before the dawn, they would they have seen the true state of the case without the intervention of Aristeides, which was of use only as inducing them to make ready, a few hours sooner, to fight rather than to fly. The passage in which the historian speaks of the movement from Keos and Kynosoura is far more perplexing and suspicious. Keos is an island lying nearly twenty miles to the southeast of cape Sounion and at least fifty miles from the scene of the impending action. Kynosoura was the name of a far more distant promontory to the north of the bay of Marathon. It is almost impossible to suppose, as some have thought, that Keos and Kynosoura were also names of two promontories in Salamis; ⁹⁷⁴ nor do we gain much by the conjecture that they may denote places on the opposite coast of Attica. The chapter in which Herodotos speaks of the movement from these two places is followed by one in which he cites an oracle of Bakis, evidently under a conviction (of which he scarcely likes to confess the depth) that it had been strictly verified by the events which he is here relating. The oracle ran thus,

When men shall span with ships the sacred shore of Artemis with the
golden sword, and Kynosoura on the sea,
After they shall have sacked beautiful Athens in foolish daring,

two-and-twenty Euboian talents still remaining in the hands of Themistokles, is indeed astounding.

⁹⁷³ Herodotos, viii. 100, represents the Egyptians as taking part in the battle. Had they been sent to the westernmost promontory of Salamis, they could not possibly have done so.

⁹⁷⁴ See further Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 176.

The divine Justice shall destroy strong Pride, the son of Wantonness
 As he rages in his fury, thinking to bend all things to his will.
 For brass shall clash with brass, and Ares shall tinge the sea with blood.
 Then the son of Kronos with the broad brow and mighty Nikê shall bring to
 Hellas the day of her freedom.⁹⁷⁵

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 VI.

The mind of the historian was swayed by a vague consciousness that the verification of the prophecy demanded the mention of Kynosoura; and the invention of the fact by a writer so severely honest speaks volumes on the influence exercised by these floating prophecies of the old Hellenic soothsayers.

The battle to which the words of Bakis were supposed to point was indeed to the historian a thorough confirmation of the truth that pride must have its fall; and the fall of the mightiest of all earthly kings must be ushered in by ominous sights and sounds on the earth and in the heavens. Each day and almost every incident has its own peculiar marvels. While the invader yet surveyed the desolation of Athens, the island of Salamis was shaken by an earthquake which upheaved the waters of the sea.⁹⁷⁶ On the ravaged plains of Attica the Athenian Dikaïos, who had returned from exile with Xerxes, was walking with the Spartan Demaratos, when they beheld a vast cloud of dust moving from the sacred city of Eleusis and heard the cry as of a mighty host. The ear of Dikaïos comprehended sounds which bore no meaning to the uninitiated Demaratos, and he knew that the Great Mother was going with her Child to execute justice upon her enemies. If they went towards the Peloponnesos, it would foreshow the doom of the Persian land-army: but as he saw the throng as of three myriads of men move slowly towards the sea, he read in that sign the coming ruin of the fleet whose overwhelming force the gods had, of wise purpose, beaten down on the rock-bound shores of Thessaly. But if Dikaïos could interpret the sign, Demaratos knew that it was altogether useless to bid the despot heed the warning. The day of disaster was, in truth, at hand for Xerxes; but no link must be wanting in the great preparation. He had taken Athens: he had seized the Akropolis. The prodigy

The story
 of Dikaïos
 at Eleusis

⁹⁷⁵ Herod. viii. 77.

⁹⁷⁶ Ib. viii. 64.

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of the sacred serpent had foreshadowed the capture of the Athenian citadel: the marvellous sprouting of the sacred olive-tree, the gift of the virgin-goddess herself, announced the coming retribution. But when the temples had been burnt, and his messengers had departed with the tidings of his glory to Sardeis and to Sousa, not one thing must be passed by, which might show how, as Artabanos had warned him, the lightning strikes ever the tallest tree.⁹⁷⁷ The great king must be made to choose his own destruction. He must hear from the wise what he ought to do; and he must deliberately reject the counsel which would have brought all Hellas under his dominion. As after the fight at Thermopylai he had neglected the advice of Demaratos to occupy the island of Kythera, so now he must despise the warning which sought to convince him of the weakness of his fleet. In short, the history becomes a moral or religious drama designed to vindicate the ways of God to man; and as being necessarily put together after the event, it may naturally exhibit rather the feelings of a later day than those which were roused by each incident, as it occurred.

The counsel
of Artem-
isia.

No sooner were all the Persian forces gathered together on Athenian ground or in the Athenian waters, than Xerxes went down to the ships to hear what the great chiefs and leaders, from the kings of Tyre and Sidon downwards, had to say. A vote for immediate battle was given, we are told, by all except the Halikarnanian princess Artemisia. Her voice was raised against all action by sea beyond the mere co-operation of the fleet with the land-forces. The Greeks, she urged, had very little corn in Salamis; and little more than the sight of his army was needed to scatter to their several cities the defenders of the Corinthian isthmus. To fight by sea was to give a decisive advantage to men who, as mariners, were as much stronger than the Persians as men are stronger than women. For the Egyptians, Kyprians, Pamphylians and Kilikians, she had nothing more to say than that they were evil servants of a good man,—of no use at all. This candid speech roused, we are told, the hopes of her enemies and the fears of her friends, both alike believing

⁹⁷⁷ Herod. vii. 10, 5.

that instant death would be the recompense of her rashness. Her counsel, however, was received with unmeasured praise by the king, although he felt himself justified in not following it, because he felt sure that his own presence would more than counterbalance the remissness which had marked the conduct of his subjects at Artemision. But in truth the words of the Halikarnassian queen, like much of the advice put into the mouth of the Spartan Demaratos, seem rather the expression of a later feeling among the Greeks than of convictions which, even if they were entertained by any at the time, could with any safety have been revealed to Xerxes. In the case of Artemisia we might infer that the historian must have had some knowledge of the life and actions of one who had ruled in his own city; but we can scarcely accept the fact that she advised Xerxes by every means to avoid a sea-fight, if we reject altogether the grounds of her opinion.⁹⁷⁸ It is difficult to suppose that the reasons which she gave could have been so utterly lost or misrepresented, while the nature of the counsel was so distinctly remembered. If we cannot believe that she delivered a judgement not merely disparaging but even insulting to those who heard it and at the time even unjust,⁹⁷⁹ we may with equal fairness question the fact that she gave advice for which on this hypothesis she had no adequate grounds. According to the traditional stories of the battles off Euboia the opinion of Xerxes was not unjustifiable; and he had further convinced himself that his own presence was alone needed to make his seamen invincible. The counsel of Artemisia may express what in the judgement of the Greeks at a later day Xerxes should have done: but its very agreement with this sense of fitness is the strongest reason for calling the fact into question.

The die was cast. The command of the king had already gone forth for battle on the following day, when Sikinnos delivered to him or to his generals the message of Themistokles. On the one side the Greeks put themselves under the guardianship of the Salaminian heroes Aias and Telamon,

The battle
of Salamis.

⁹⁷⁸ This is the conclusion of Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 163.

⁹⁷⁹ According to the traditional story, the Egyptian crews obtained the highest distinction in the action off Artemision. See note 951.

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and sent a ship to Aigina to beseech the aid of Aiakos and his children. On the other, a great throne was raised on one of the spurs of mount Aigaleos close to the sea, whence the Persian king might see how his slaves fought on his behalf.⁹⁸⁰ The day was still young when the trireme came from Aigina which had been sent to fetch the children of Aiakos; and at once the Greeks put out to sea, while the barbarians came forward to meet them. According to the Aiginetan tradition it was this trireme which after some hesitation began the fight, the form of a woman having been seen which cried out in a voice heard by all the army of the Greeks, 'Good men, how long will ye backwater?' The Athenians had their story that one of these men named Ameinias ran his ship into the enemy, and that, as it was thus entangled and could not get free, the rest came up to help him. So began the conflict, in which the Athenians found themselves opposed to the Phenicians who had the wing towards Eleusis and the west, while the Ionians towards the east and the Peiraieus faced the Lakedaimonians. Beyond this general arrangement and the issue of the fight the historian himself admits that of this memorable battle we know practically nothing. The event in his belief was determined by the discipline and order of the Greeks, while their enemies fell out of their ranks and did nothing wisely; but if the popular story may be trusted, it may have depended partly on the fact that the Persian seamen had been working all night, carrying out the movements for the complete circumvention of the Hellenic fleet, while the Athenians and their allies went on board their ships on the morning of the fight, fresh from sleep and stirred by the vehement eloquence of Themistokles. But in spite of his general lack of information Herodotos notes that the Persians as a whole fought far more bravely at Salamis than at Artemision, each man thinking that the eye of the king was upon him, and that few of the Ionians followed the advice of Themistokles by hanging back from the fight. Indeed many of the Greek ships, he adds, were taken by them, the Samians Theomestor and Phylakos being specially distinguished by

⁹⁸⁰ Æschylos, *Persai*, 473. Herod. viii. 90.

their zeal for the king. Such action, if coming from Thesalians against Phokians, would be intelligible enough: in the case of the Ionians it would seem to show, if the facts be true, that the desertion of the Spartans and Athenians in the revolt of Aristagoras still rankled in their minds and blinded them to the shame of revenge taken at the risk of defeat and ruin to their common country. But that there existed a counter-tradition seems to be clear from the charge which in the tumult of the fight the Phenicians brought against these Asiatic Greeks. They had destroyed, it was said, the Phenician ships and betrayed the Phenicians themselves. Happily for the Ionians, the words were scarcely out of the mouth of their accusers, when a Samothrakian vessel ran into an Athenian ship and sank it, while one from Aigina ran into the Samothrakian, whose crew with their javelins drove the men of the conquering ship into the sea and took their vessel. With this conclusive proof of Ionic fidelity, Xerxes in towering rage commanded the heads of the Phenicians to be struck off that they might not lay their own cowardice to the charge of braver men. The general character of Phenician seamen may well warrant the suspicion that their charge against the Ionians, if really made, was not altogether groundless. In truth, there is scarcely a single alleged incident of the fight of which we have not accounts more or less inconsistent with, if not exclusive of, each other. The Athenians would have it that at the beginning of the fight the Corinthian Adeimantos fled in a terror which belied his name and that the rest of the Corinthians lost no time in following his example. They were opposite to the temple of Athênê Skiras—so the story ran—when a boat which no one was known to have sent⁹⁸¹ met them, and the men in it cried out, ‘So, Adeimantos, thou hast basely forsaken the Greeks who are now conquering their enemies as much as they had ever hoped to do.’ Adeimantos would not believe:

⁹⁸¹ Mr. Rawlinson, *Herodotos*, vol. iv. p. 339, calls this ‘a phantom ship:’ but the words ‘a very strange apparition’ can scarcely be regarded as translating *θείη πομπή*: nor would the expression *θείον εἶναι τὸ πρῆγμα* necessarily mean, or even mean ordinarily, that ‘there was something beyond nature in the matter.’ The same phrase is used by Herodotos in describing the strange behaviour of the Egyptian cats in rushing into fire, ii. 66. But the unanimity with which this story of the unknown boat was discredited by all except those who put it forth makes it needless to go further into the question.

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but when the men said that they would go back with him and consent to die if their words were not true, he turned his ship and reached the scene of action when the issue of the fight was already decided. This circumstantial tale the Corinthians met by the stout assertion that they were amongst the foremost in the battle; and their rejoinder was borne out, we are told, by all the rest of the Greeks.

Artemisia
and the
Kalyndian
ship.

Another circumstantial story is related of the conduct of Artemisia. A prize of ten thousand drachmas had been promised to the man who should take her alive, so great, we are told, being the irritation that a woman should come against Athens. As it so chanced, her ship was chased by the trierarch who, according to the Athenian story, had begun the battle and who, had he known whom he had before him, would never have stopped until he had taken her or been taken himself. But before Artemisia there were only ships of her own side; and as Ameinias came close upon her, she ran into a Kalyndian vessel commanded by the king Damasthymos. We are not told that the whole Kalyndian crew perished; but Ameinias, it is said, on seeing this action thought that her ship was a Greek one or else was deserting from the Persians, and so turned away to chase others, while Xerxes, who chanced to see what was done, cried out, on being assured that the ship was that of Artemisia, 'My men are women, and the women men.' Yet although the historian represents her bravery or her good faith as by no means equal to her wisdom and foresight, it is almost incredible that such shallow selfishness should be successful. If we may not accept the grounds on which she is said to have urged her former advice to Xerxes, and if his remarks on her collision with the Kalyndian ship read like nothing but romance,⁹⁸² little is gained by asserting that the story of her exploit has the air of truth. If again we reject the other parts of the tale, it seems impossible that even the total destruction of the ship and crew could have saved her from detection. We are expressly told that other friendly ships checked her flight no less than that of the Kalyndian king.⁹⁸³

⁹⁸² See Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 186.

⁹⁸³ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτῆς ἦσαν ἄλλαι νῆες φίλαι. Herod. viii. 87.

They were present to see what was done; and we cannot suppose that all were tricked by the selfish device of Artemisia, and that none would have had the courage or the indignation to denounce it.

But, as at Marathon, whatever may have been the order and incidents of the battle, the issue was clear enough. The Persian fleet was practically ruined. Ariabignes, the commander-in-chief and brother of Xerxes, was slain with many great men of the Persians and the Medes, while most of his ships were destroyed, some by the Athenians, others by the Aiginetans. On the Greek side not many were killed. Unlike the Greeks, the barbarians were for the most part unable to swim; and the greatest slaughter took place just when their ships first turned to flee. Those which were drawn up behind pressed forward to reach the front, and so became entangled with the vessels which were hurrying away. In the midst of the frightful confusion thus caused Aristeides landed a large number of hoplites on the islet of Psyttaleia and slew every one of the Persians who were upon it. So ended the battle. The Greeks drew up all the disabled ships on the shore of Salamis, and made ready for another fight, thinking that the king would order the ships still remaining to him to advance against them. Many of the Persian wrecks were carried by the southwest wind towards the shore of Attica; and thus was fulfilled, it is said, the oracle of Bakis and Mousaios and the saying of an Athenian soothsayer many years before that the women of Koliass should bake their bread with oars. No one thus far had understood the saying; but it came to pass now on the flight of the king.⁹⁸⁴

Ruin of the
Persian
fleet.

The fears of the Greeks were not to be realised. The fancy of Xerxes that under his own eye the seamen would be invincible had been displaced by a conviction, which nothing now could shake, that no faith whatever was to be put in the subject tribes or nations which manned his navy. The accusations of the Phœnicians better attest the lukewarmness of the Asiatic Greeks in his cause than the words of Herodotos prove their zeal. But if we may trust the statement of

The
counsel of
Mardonios.

⁹⁸⁴ The story implies either that the fragments of oars and ship timber remained piled up on the shore till the Athenian women returned to gather them, or that the country-people had not left their homes. See note 995.

Diodoros⁹⁸⁵ that the Phenicians, in dismay at the threats of the king, sailed away to Asia during the night which followed the battle, all hope of carrying on the war by sea was practically at an end. For such fragments of his fleet as might yet remain Xerxes had a more immediate and pressing task in guarding the bridges across the Hellespont. Like Dareios, he looked upon the safety of the bridge as the condition of his own return home; and he could brook no delay in the carrying out of the measures which might be needed to secure it. There was no one now to dissuade him from his resolution; and although he made apparent efforts to carry a mole from Attica to Salamis and tied Phenician merchant-ships together to serve instead of a bridge and wall, Mardonios was not to be tricked by semblances which deceived others. The messenger had set out with the message which, like the torch in the feast of Hephaistos, was to be handed on from one horseman to another until the songs and shouts of triumph at Sousa should be exchanged for cries of grief for the king and of indignation against the stirrer-up of the mischief. This issue Mardonios clearly foresaw; and at once his mind was made up to carry on the war and either to succeed in it or die. For himself except as a conqueror there could be no return: and he might well suppose that his own chances of success would be indefinitely increased by the absence of a ruler so absorbed by the thought of his own personal safety as to be incapable of bearing up against reverses which still left him ample means of retrieving his fortunes. Mardonios was well aware that the conquests of Cyrus had not been achieved by a motley gathering of conquered tribes who had no bond of union among themselves and no common interests with their conquerors; and the speech put into his mouth by Herodotos attests, throughout, the strength of this conviction. The Persians, he insists, had maintained everywhere their old reputation: the rabble which followed in their train had been only a hindrance and a clog. He pledged himself, therefore, to subjugate Hellas, if Xerxes would leave him three hundred thousand men, while he took all the rest away to Asia. Such

a proposal was not likely to be rejected by a tyrant quaking in abject terror: but the historian adds that Xerxes submitted it to Artemisia who urged him by all means to accept it. If Mardonios succeeded, the glory would go to his master: if he and his men were all slain, it would be but the loss of a horde of useless slaves. The safety of Xerxes and his house would more than make up for all; and the Greeks would yet have, many times, to face a struggle for life or death with the power of Persia. Such is said to have been her counsel; we may assure ourselves that it was never given. Xerxes knew well that in leaving with Mardonios his native Persian troops he was leaving behind the hardy soldiers on whom the very foundations of his empire rested; and it is impossible that he should have rewarded with special praise and special honours the words of a woman who could speak of them as toys to be trifled with and flung aside without a thought. Artemisia may have been intrusted with the charge of the despot's children; but her counsel, by the admission of the historian, was superfluous, for not the prayers of all his generals would have shaken the selfish purpose in which he now stood immovable.

That very night the fleet sailed from the scene of its disaster, to guard the bridge across the Hellespont for the passage of the king and his army. When the ships had gone over half the distance between Peiræus and Sounion, their flight, it is said, became disorderly. The rocks which jut into the sea off cape Zoster (we must suppose that it was a moonlit night) seemed to them to be ships of the enemy; and it was long before they found out the mistake. When the day dawned, the Greeks saw the Persian land-forces in the same position which they had occupied the day before, and made ready for an attack from their fleet which they supposed to be still off Phaleron. The discovery of its flight was followed by immediate pursuit. The Greeks sailed as far as Andros without catching sight even of the hindermost among the Persian vessels. At Andros a council was called. To the intreaty of Themistokles that they should sail at once to the Hellespont and there destroy the bridge Eurybiades replied by pointing out the folly of driving a defeated enemy

Alleged second message of Themistokles to Xerxes.

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to bay. Out of Europe Xerxes could do little mischief: but if hindered in his retreat, he might turn with something like the spirit of Cyrus and take an ample vengeance for his recent disasters, while his forces could be sustained with the yearly harvests of Hellas.⁹⁶⁶ Silenced by this rejoinder, if not convinced, Themistokles made a virtue of necessity, and repeating to his countrymen the advice of Eurybiades besought them to turn their minds to the more pressing need of rebuilding their houses and sowing the seed for the next harvest.⁹⁶⁷ As to Xerxes he took up the strictly religious ground. The invader was an impious man who by his pride had wearied out the patience of the gods and provoked their utmost wrath by the profanation and the burning of their shrines; and his punishment had been inflicted not by the Athenians but by the gods and heroes.⁹⁶⁸ Having given this counsel, he despatched Sikinnos on a second embassy: but this time his message was addressed to Xerxes, not to his generals. It informed him briefly that the Greeks had wished to pursue his fleet and break up the bridge at the Hellespont, but that Themistokles had turned them from their purpose and insured to the tyrant, if he wished to go home, a peaceful and leisurely retreat. The historian so far anticipates the future history of the great Athenian leader as to ascribe both his counsel to his countrymen and his message to Xerxes to a deliberate design of establishing a title to the favour of the Persian king, if the need of so doing should at any time arise.

Alleged plans for cutting off the retreat of Xerxes.

So far as it affects the character of Themistokles, this charge cannot be examined here. But human nature is much the same in all ages; and the degree of faith which Xerxes would be likely to put in this second message may be measured by the caution of the child who has learnt to dread the fire by being burnt. The stupidest savage is not likely

⁹⁶⁶ Herod. viii. 108. Eurybiades must have been aware that this was impracticable. Nations suffering under permanent invasion refuse to till or sow their ground; and the resources of such a country as Hellas would be utterly inadequate for the support of the Persian armies, if the numbers given have even any approximation to the truth.

⁹⁶⁷ Whatever else he may have said, it is clear that he could not have urged this duty upon them at a time when Xerxes with his whole army was still in Attica, and when as yet he had no reason to suppose that the invaders had any intention of quitting it.

⁹⁶⁸ This feeling found its strongest expression in the synchronism which made the battles of Himera and Salamis, and again those of Plataiai and Mykalê fall, severally, on the same day.

to be trapped twice in the same snare by the same man ; and for Xerxes it is enough to say that he had already acted upon one message from Themistokles, and that the result had been the ruin of his fleet. We are not, then, justified even in saying that the second message would have the effect of hurrying his flight. If he gave any heed to his words at all, he would assuredly interpret them by contraries, for the memory of his first deadly wrong would be fixed in his mind with a strength which no lapse of time could weaken. The message in truth is as superfluous as the stratagems of Histiaios. The tyrant had set his face like a flint against any further sojourn in Europe ; and although this could not at the moment be known to Themistokles, we may safely assert that the idea of cutting off his retreat at the Hellespont could not so much as cross his mind, so long as the Persian host lay incamped upon Hellenic soil. No such plan could have appeared to him feasible even after he had ascertained that Xerxes with his bodyguard had already taken the road which was to lead him back to Asia ; and it is absurd to suppose that the mere departure of the Persian fleet should have awakened in him such extreme confidence or such extreme rashness as that which is ascribed to him after the victory of Salamis. The dark cloud of invasion had long brooded over Hellas ; but this cloud was in no way dispersed⁹⁸⁹ or even its gloom abated, so long as Mardonios with thirty myriads of men remained to carry out the work which his master had abandoned. To divert the strength of Athens for the sake of intercepting a miserable fugitive and so to leave the Hellenic confederacy powerless against an overwhelming foe would be nothing less than an act of sheer madness ; and as no charge of folly has been so much as urged against Themistokles, the conclusion becomes irresistible that no such plan was proposed by him and therefore that it could not be rejected by Eurybiades. The suggestion might indeed have been made so soon as the retreat of all the land-forces had been clearly

⁹⁸⁹ This is the meaning assigned by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 197, to the words put into the mouth of Themistokles, *εὐρημα εὐρήκαμεν ἡμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, νέφος τοσοῦτον ἀνθρώπων ἀνωσάμενοι*. But the expression can apply only to the defeat of the fleet ; and although it would be strictly true to say that they had scattered a cloud or swarm of men, there would yet remain another swarm which they could not afford to despise : still less could they leave them unwatched and unopposed, to run off on a useless errand to the Hellespont,

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of Xerxes.

ascertained ; but some days, we are told, passed before Xerxes began his retreat ; and it was then too late to pursue his ships even if the Greeks had desired to do so.

A few days later Mardonios chose out on the plains of Thessaly the forces with which he had resolved to conquer or to die. Here with an equal number of Persians and Medes and with the Sakian, Baktrian, and Indian troops, he took up his quarters for the winter, while Xerxes hurried onwards. But before they parted not to meet again, a messenger from Sparta had come to bid the king of the Medes stand his trial for the murder of Leonidas and make atonement for that crime. 'The atonement shall be made by Mardonios,' answered Xerxes with a laugh, pointing to the general by his side ; and the Spartan taking him at his word went his way. The tale might be dismissed as theatrical bravado, if it be not regarded, rather, as springing from the later religious sentiment which imparted to the narrative of the whole war a strictly epical character. Whatever may have been his losses by sea, his land-forces remained as formidable as ever : but the lord of this mighty host must be told that he is a criminal, and that the price of his crime must be paid. The summons of the Spartans is followed by a sudden plunge into utter misery. For five-and-forty days, we are told, the forces or rather the hordes rejected by Mardonios struggled onwards over their road to the Hellespont, thousands and tens of thousands falling as they went from hunger, thirst, disease, and cold. A few might live on the harvests of the lands through which they passed : but the vast crowds for which these lands could afford no sustenance were driven to feed on grass or the leaves and bark of trees. Disease came quickly in the track of famine ; and in Thessaly as well as in Makedonia Xerxes was constrained to intrust the sick whom he left behind him to the tender mercies of the natives. Humiliation followed on humiliation. The sacred chariot of Zeus, which he had left in the Paionian Siris, was now not forthcoming ; and when he reached the Hellespont just eight months after he had crossed over it to Sestos, the bridge over which he had passed in the plenitude of luxury and pride had been shattered by storms and rendered useless.

Boats conveyed across the strait the lord of all Asia with the scanty remnant of his guards and followers: but the sudden change from starvation to plenty was not less deadly than the worst of the evils against which they had thus far had to struggle, and the multitude so fearfully thinned in Europe dwindled more rapidly away. Such, in the belief of Herodotos, was the true story of the retreat of Xerxes: but he mentions another account which asserted that, having reached Eion on the Strymon, he left Hydarnes in charge of his army and embarked with his bodyguard on board a Phœnician ship. The vessel was soon overtaken by a heavy storm; and the king in dismay asked the pilot if there was any hope of safety. 'None,' was the answer, 'unless we can ease the ship of the crowd within it.' Xerxes turned to his Persians, telling them simply that his life depended on them. In an instant they had done obeisance and leaped into the sea; and the ship thus lightened reached Asia in safety. On landing, Xerxes gave the pilot a golden crown for saving the king's life and then cut off his head for losing the lives of his men. This story Herodotos without hesitation rejects on the ground that, even if the pilot had so spoken, Xerxes would assuredly have sent his Persians down from the deck into the body of the ship and cast out into the sea a number of Phœnician sailors equal to that of the Persians. Nor could he bring himself to believe the story of the men of Abdera that Xerxes there loosed his girdle for the first time since he left Athens, as thinking himself at last in safety, although he regards the fact of his rewarding their hospitality with a golden dagger and turban as conclusive proof that he had not embarked at Eion. With equal decision probably he rejected, for we can scarcely suppose that he had not heard, the marvellous story of the crossing of the Strymon as related by Æschylos in his drama of the Persians. A frost unusual for the season of the year⁹⁹⁰ had frozen firmly the

⁹⁹⁰ χειμῶν' ἄωρον. 496. If we follow the chronology of Herodotos, this could not have been later than November; but the poet may be allowed a wider license, and seemingly he places this incident after the battle of Plataiai. The expression that almost the whole army was destroyed in Boiotia can scarcely refer to any other event. The fleet, he says, had made its escape from Salamis; and he adds,

στρατὸς δ' ὁ λοιπὸς ἐν τε Βοιωτῶν χθονὶ
διῶλλυτο. 488. Compare also line 817.

But the fact, as he relates it, is impossible, to whatever season of the year it may be assigned.

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II.

whole surface of a river nearly two hundred yards in width; and on this frozen surface the army crossed in safety until the heat of the sun thawed the ice and the crowds were plunged between the shattered masses into the water. Ice capable of bearing tens of thousands for even two or three hours must be at least twelve or eighteen inches in uniform thickness: and the formation of such ice in a single night in the latitude and climate of the mouth of the Strymon is an impossibility. The story is simply the growth of the religious conviction that Zeus himself fought against Xerxes as the stars in their courses fought against Sisera.⁹⁹¹ It implies further that the Persians were hurrying away in frantic haste from an enemy almost at their heels: but there was, in fact, no pursuit, and for many years later Eion at the mouth of the Strymon remained in the hands of the Persians and was wrested from them only after a severe struggle by Kimon.

General
credibility
of the
narrative.

We can scarcely stop short here. In a narrative with which the historical criticism even of Herodotos has dealt thus roughly, the only remaining doubt relates to the amount of detail which must be rejected. If the account given by Æschylos is obviously impossible, there are difficulties fully as great in following the story of Herodotos. If we take his numbers as furnishing even a relative proportion, Xerxes must have led back from Athens a larger army than that which he left behind him with Mardonios. Yet his numbers were so far lessened that great suspicion is thrown on the tale of utter starvation and misery which his people are said to have endured from the time that he entered Makedonia. On his former march from Doriskos westward his men were fed, we are told, from the accumulated stores of three years as well as from the forced or voluntary contributions of the inhabitants. Of these magazines the story of the retreat in Herodotos says nothing; nor are we told that their contents were all consumed on the march into Greece. It is scarcely more safe to infer from his silence that they had been

⁹⁹¹ Not only does Æschylos ascribe this frost to direct divine intervention, but he adds that Xerxes and his people, having thus far been atheists, were now brought to confess their own folly.

θεός δέ τις
τὸ πρὶν νομίζων οὐδαμῶς τότε ἤνχητο
λιταίσι. 499.

emptied in the interval by the dishonesty of their guardians than to fill up his narrative with such incidents as the marvellous freezing of the Strymon. Yet Xerxes, as he journeyed westwards, unquestionably contemplated a speedy return to his own land, and had his dreams of leading back a long line of Athenian and Spartan slaves in addition to the hosts which he was driving on to conquest. His need of food would be increased by the measure of his success; and his care to preserve and to extend these stores would be stimulated by his hopes of immediate victory. On the other hand, in proportion to the fewness of his attendants would be the ease of maintaining them from these unexhausted or replenished magazines. Yet, as though submitting to an ordinary necessity, he leaves his army to subsist by plunder or to die by famine, in a land where, as it would seem, not a single arm was raised against him in spite of all this robbery and pillage,⁹⁹² and where we are told that he left his sick in the cities through which he passed, not without confidence in the kindly feeling of the inhabitants. Still, with this friendliness or at least neutrality of the people, perplexing though it be, his passage is more disastrous than that of Artabazos who, as we shall see, fought his way after the battle of Plataiai through the wild tribes of the Thracian highlands. The story of Herodotos would give some countenance to the Makedonian boast, of which probably he never heard, that they had slaughtered and almost cut off the whole army in its flight; and unless we assume some great hostility whether of Makedonians or Thracians, as accounting for the scanty numbers with which Xerxes is said to have reached the Hellespont, we might be tempted to draw the conclusion that he had brought with him into Europe not many more troops than those which he left under the command of Mardonios, and that he journeyed from Thessaly only with a moderate bodyguard.⁹⁹³ We have, however, the

⁹⁹² The terror of the Persian commanders who escaped from the hurricane on the Magnesian coast must be especially noticed in connexion with this narrative of the retreat of Xerxes. We are not told that the Persians had then committed any ravages on the land; and Magnesians and Thessalians had a better reputation than the rugged Thracian tribes. Yet the first measure of the Persians was to guard against their attacks by throwing up a stockade with wood from the wrecked ships. See note 919.

⁹⁹³ For some further remarks on the contradictory traditions of this time see Niebuhr, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 340.

distinct assertion that he was attended as far as the Hellespont by 60,000 men commanded by Artabazos, whose conduct after the fight at Plataiai won for him a high reputation for decision and adroitness.⁹⁹⁴ But however this may have been, the change which comes over the spirit of the narrative as soon as Xerxes is safely restored to the luxurious tyranny of his own land tends more than anything else to call into question the tale of misery and ruin which precedes it. From the moment that Artabazos has dismissed his master he appears as a man well able to hold his ground against all efforts of his enemies without calling on his troops to undergo any special privations. We hear no more of famine or disease, of men plucking grass and roots and then lying down to die. Instead of this, we find him deliberately resolving to remain in Makedonia, until the return of spring should allow Mardonios to move his army in Boiotia. So completely is he master of his position and his movements that he determines to attack the Greek colonies which had dared to revolt after the king had passed them on his retreat and when they had heard of the hurried departure of the fleet from Salamis. In truth, the real source of weakness was gone with Xerxes : and thus Artabazos had no hesitation in laying siege to Olynthos and no compunction in slaughtering its inhabitants when it fell and in handing the place over to the Chalkidians of Torônê.⁹⁹⁵ His next step was not that of a leader who alarmed for his own safety or for that of his men was anxious to fall back upon the main army. From Olynthos he turned his arms against Potidaia. During his siege of three months he was encouraged by the hope that Timoxenos the Skionaian general might succeed in betraying the town, as he had pledged himself to do. But the correspondence which by means of letters twined round arrows he had carried on with Timoxenos was discovered ; and he was glad to avail himself of an extraordinary ebbing of the sea to march across the ground which the waters had thus left bare between his camping-place and the walls of the city. But before they could reach the other side the sea came back with a flow as astonishing as its ebb, and all who could not

⁹⁹⁴ Herod. viii. 126.⁹⁹⁵ Ib. viii. 127.

swim were drowned,⁹⁹⁶ while those who escaped by swimming were slaughtered by the Potidaians who came in boats to complete the work of destruction. Of the extent of his loss by this disaster we are not informed: but as we find him after the battle of Plataiai with 40,000 men still under his command,⁹⁹⁷ we must suppose that these were a portion of the 60,000 who escorted Xerxes to the Hellespont, and that 20,000 represent the losses sustained in the siege of Potidaia and in the fatal fight which destroyed the army of Mardonios. This loss can scarcely be considered out of proportion with the greatness of his efforts and of his disasters. But if Mardonios retained the flower of the Persian army in Boiotia, some allowance must be made for the fact that Xerxes took with him men who would have been of little use under any circumstances. Still if these men were as worthless and as helpless as they are represented to have been, they cannot have been more helpless on the march to the Hellespont than they were on the barren lands of Attica, unless in despite of significant indications to the contrary we assume a constant active hostility from the cities and tribes whose lands they had to traverse. Nearly three months had passed away since his victory at Thermopylai and his defeat at Salamis. During that time his whole army, if we give credit to the traditional narratives, had lived in a land where he had no long established magazines and where the resolution of the people had seriously lessened the amount of material for plunder. Whatever, then, may have been the sufferings of the march, they could have differed not at all in kind from the hardships which they had to undergo during their sojourn in Attica. But the history of Artabazos is, in truth, conclusive evidence that, however intense may have been the hatred of the native tribes for their Asiatic invaders, they were unable to place any serious hindrance in his path, and that though the Persians may not have enjoyed the luxuries of Sousa, they were not reduced to the hard lot of an Arabian caravan in lack of food and water. Whatever wretchedness the tyrant underwent was a wretchedness of his own causing; and pro-

⁹⁹⁶ Herodotos, viii. 129, ascribes their fate to their profanation of the temple of Poseidon.

⁹⁹⁷ Herod. ix. 66.

BOOK
II.

Siege of
Andros by
the con-
federates.

bably not even the ignominy of his retreat was allowed to interfere with his sensual enjoyments.⁹⁹⁸

The alleged operations of the Greek fleet after the battle of Salamis seem to show that the aim of the commanders was not to dissipate their strength by expeditions to the Hellespont (which, however, they refused to undertake solely on the score of their inutility) but to repair their losses whether by the forced or the voluntary contributions of Hellenic cities. There may have been, and there probably was, little justice in the assessment or levying of these contributions: but it seems clear that the Spartans and Athenians with their allies were here engaged in a joint work for a public and recognised purpose. The narrative, however, is in part thrown into a form singularly resembling the story of Miltiades after the battle of Marathon. The disaster at Paros is closely paralleled by the failure of Themistokles at Andros, although Themistokles has for the present the good luck to escape all penalties. Still he was acting as spokesman for the Greeks generally, when he told the Andrians that the Athenians had come to them under the guidance of two very mighty deities Faith⁹⁹⁹ and Necessity, and therefore pay they must. The rejoinder of the Andrians that they likewise had two deities, Poverty and Helplessness, which would never leave their island and made it impossible for them to pay anything, was followed by a blockade. The result verified the prediction of the Andrians that the power of Athens could never exceed their own impotence; and the Greeks, compelled to abandon the siege, ravaged the lands of Karystos at the southern extremity of Euboia and then sailed back to Salamis. This fact, if it took place, sufficiently refutes the story that Themistokles had already extorted large sums from the Karystians

⁹⁹⁸ The picture drawn by Æschylos of the entry of Xerxes into Sousa has not even the semblance of likelihood. It was necessary for the epical climax of his drama to exhibit Xerxes as mourning and weeping like a woman: but a despot would be forced to treat the matter much more in the spirit of the speech put into the mouth of Artemisia after the defeat at Salamis. Herod. viii. 102. If we accept the story of his long sojourn at Sardis after crossing over into Asia, the despot was, as we shall presently see, much more intent on gratifying his own lusts than on bewailing the disasters which befell his army or his empire.

⁹⁹⁹ Peitho, which is etymologically the English *faith*, is here the power which produces obedience or trust. The refusal of the Andrians to contribute to the expenses of the war was regarded, we are told, as so serious an offence against the welfare of Hellas that the confederates besieged it with the deliberate design of destroying the city altogether. The further charge of Medism, Herod. viii. 112, would probably have been condoned, if the money had been paid.

and Parians under the pledge, it must be assumed, that he would hold them scathless in person and property; but we are told further that while the siege of Andros was still being carried on, Themistokles by threatening the other islands with summary measures in case of refusal collected large sums of money without the knowledge of the other leaders and retained them for himself.¹⁰⁰⁰ The charge is incredible. Themistokles and the agents of his extortions might keep the secret: but there was nothing to stop the mouths of his victims, and Athens was not so popular with the confederates as to make them deaf to charges which accused Themistokles of crippling the resources of the allies for his own personal advantage. If he had carried out this systematic robbery throughout the islands, Sparta and Corinth at least would have rung with cries of indignation at the wrong done not to the islanders but to the allies in whose name he had cheated them. The vagueness of the charge is proved by the candid admission of the historian that with the exception of Paros and Karystos he could not assert that any other city paid anything, although he thinks that some may have done so.

The work of a memorable year was now ended. It only remained to dedicate to the gods the thank-offerings due to them for their guardianship and active aid, and to distribute the rewards and honours which the conduct of the confederates might deserve. Their first act was to consecrate three Phœnician ships, one to the honour of Aias at Salamis, another at Sounion, and the third, which Herodotos¹⁰⁰¹ himself had seen, at the isthmus. The firstfruits of victory sent to Apollon at Delphoi furnished materials for a statue, twelve cubits in height, which held in its hand the beak of a ship: but the god expressed himself dissatisfied with the contribution of the Aiginetans. To make up what was lacking they offered, accordingly, three golden stars, which were placed close to the great mixing-bowl of Kroisos. At the isthmus the question of personal merit in the war was decided, it is said, by the written votes of the generals each of whom claimed the first place for himself, while most of them (Plutarch says, all) assigned the second to Themistokles. But the

Distribu-
tion of
honours
among the
Greeks.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Herod. viii. 112.

¹⁰⁰¹ viii. 121.

incredibly silly vanity which thus deprived the Athenian general of his formal pre-eminence in no way lessened his glory or interfered with the honours paid to him. If an olive-crown was given to Eurybiades as the commander-in-chief, the same prize was bestowed on Themistokles expressly for his unparalleled wisdom and dexterity. The most beautiful chariot in Sparta, the gift of the citizens, conveyed him from that city, escorted by three hundred chosen Spartiatai, as far as the boundaries of Tegea. No other man, it is said, ever received such honours from the Spartans.¹⁰⁰² So ended the triumph of the confederates for that victory in which the names of Aigina and Athens were associated in pre-eminent lustre. Among the citizens of these two states the most distinguished for personal prowess were the Aiginetan Polykritos and the Athenians Eumenes and Ameinias the brother of Æschylos and Kynegeiros.¹⁰⁰³ Ameinias would, according to the tale, have been a wealthier man, had he not been deceived by the trick of Artemisia. The name of Polykritos¹⁰⁰⁴ is connected rather with those terrible feuds between Aigina and Athens, which were to end in a dire catastrophe for the island city; and the rivalry of patriotism only broke for a short time the course of abiding and savage hatred.

¹⁰⁰² There is something like bathos in the anecdote here added by Herodotos that on his return to Athens Timodemos, a citizen of the canton of Aphidnai, was careful to assure him that these honours were paid to him not personally but solely as the representative of Athens, but that he was silenced by the rejoinder of Themistokles that, as a man of Belbina, he himself would never have been honoured by the Spartans, while Timodemos would not have won the distinction had he been an Athenian. Herod. viii. 125. In Cicero, *de Senectute*, 3, the man who is thus put down is a Seriphian. The jealousy betrayed by this story is heightened by Diodoros, xi. 27, who states that the motive of the Spartans in thus honouring Themistokles was simply fear of the mischief which he might do to them unless he were soothed for his disappointment in losing the first place, and that the Athenians chose to regard the Spartan gifts as bribes and accordingly deposed Themistokles from his generalship which was bestowed on Xanthippos the son of Aripbron. But Themistokles would give up his office in ordinary course at the end of the year.

¹⁰⁰³ Diod. xi. 27. See page 544.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Herod. vi. 50, 73.

CHAPTER VII.

THE BATTLES OF PLATAIAI AND MYKALÊ.

THE winter which followed the defeat at Salamis was spent by the Persian fleet at the Aiolic Kymê on the Elaiatic gulf, about ten miles to the east of the ill-fated city of Phokaia. Early in the spring it moved forwards as far as Samos under the command of Mardontes and Artayntes. There was no intention of renewing the struggle in the waters of Western Hellas. Their whole attention was fixed on the repression of revolt in Asiatic Ionia, if the people who had, as it was said, shown so much zeal in behalf of the king at Salamis should be disposed to renew the trouble which they had given in the days of Aristagoras. Of any attack from the fleet of the Western Greeks they had no fear. Any such danger had in their belief passed away when their enemies gave up the idea of pursuing them from Salamis; and they believed further that by land Mardonios would succeed in taking ample vengeance for the mishaps of the Persian navy.¹⁰⁰⁵ The Greek fleet at the same time assembled at Aigina, 110 ships in all,—the Athenians under Xanthippos the son of Aripbron, and the Peloponnesians under Leotychides who traced his descent from Herakles through the line of the Prokleid kings. They had scarcely taken up their station off the island, when an embassy came from Chios¹⁰⁰⁶ praying them to hasten at once to the help of the Ionians. The confederates in compliance with their request sailed as far as Delos, beyond which they resolutely refused to advance. The waters which stretched away to the east were in their eyes, we are told, swarming with Persian or

CHAP.
VII.Movements
of the
Greek and
Persian
fleets.

479 B.C.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Herod. viii. 130.¹⁰⁰⁶ It consisted of six men who had failed in a scheme for slaying Strattis tyrant of Chios, the seventh conspirator having betrayed the plot to the despot.

BOOK
II.

Phenician cruisers; and Samos appeared to them as distant as the pillars of Herakles and the gates of the Atlantic ocean. Respecting this singular statement something has been said already:¹⁰⁰⁷ it is unnecessary to say more here than that when, a few months earlier, these hostile ships were in the waters to the west of Delos, no such fears were expressed, if the story be true that Themistokles proposed an immediate pursuit of the retreating Persians as far as the Hellespont and that the proposal was rejected only as being impolitic. It is impossible that the history of fifteen years should obliterate the associations and traditions of ages, or that a state of feeling should have sprung up six months after the fight of Salamis which was not in existence when Xerxes sent away his fleet to guard the bridge over the Hellespont.

Offers of
alliance
made by
Mardonios
to the
Athenians.

The occupation of Mardonios in his Thessalian winter-quarters consisted chiefly of attempts to ascertain the feelings of the Greek states towards himself and his master. These attempts took mainly the form of consultations of the Greek oracles. His agent Mys, accordingly, went to Leba-deia, to Abai,¹⁰⁰⁸ and to Thebes; but of the result the historian admits that he knows nothing beyond the prodigy that when Mys put his question to the Ptoan Apollon near Akraiphia on the banks of the lake Kopais, the prophet replied in a barbarous tongue which the scribes who attended him could not understand and which Mys pronounced to be Karian.¹⁰⁰⁹ The general spirit of these responses probably encouraged him to make the greater venture which betrayed a significant change in Persian policy. Mardonios had learnt that the aid of Thessalians and Boiotians was as nothing in comparison of the advantage which he would gain by an alliance with Athens: nor could he have failed to ascertain that, if the decision had rested with the Athenians, the decisive struggle between the two fleets would have been at Artemision, not at Salamis. It was Athens therefore which stood in the way; and until this hindrance should be

¹⁰⁰⁷ See note 804.

¹⁰⁰⁸ The story seems scarcely consistent with the desecration of this sanctuary by a Persian force only a few months earlier. Herod. viii. 134. See note 957.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Herod. viii. 135.

removed, tribute, the true end of Persian conquest, would never flow from Western Hellas into the treasuries of Sousa. It was worth while then to sacrifice much to turn a people so resolute from an enemy into a friend; and if the proposal ascribed to Mardonios was really made, the sacrifice which he professed himself ready to make must have cost his master, if not himself, no slight struggle. Nor was it a scanty recognition of Athenian greatness when the Make-donian chief Alexandros came to tell them that the great king was willing not merely to forgive all their sins against him if they would become not his servants but his friends, but to bestow upon them in addition to their own land any territory which they might choose for independent occupation and, further, to rebuild all the temples which his followers had burnt. These flattering promises Mardonios sought to make still more tempting by dwelling on the impossibility of any permanent resistance to Persian power which, if the armies now in Greece were swept away, could send still mightier hosts, not once only but twice or thrice, to take their place. For himself, speaking as an old friend, Alexandros expressed his conviction that prolonged resistance could end only in their ruin, and besought them to close with the honourable offers of which they alone were thought worthy.

The tidings of this change in Persian policy had reached Sparta and awakened there the liveliest alarm. Among the many prophecies hawked about at this time by soothsayers like Onomakritos was, it is said, one which declared that the Spartans with all the Dorians should be driven out of the Peloponnesos by the combined armies of the Athenians and the Medes. These prophecies were circulated as the genuine utterances of the gods or as predictions handed down from bygone ages; and in spite of their frequent falsification they seem rarely to have lacked a multitude of believers. How far this vaticination may have influenced the Spartans at this moment, is a matter of little consequence. The counter-proposal which they made through ambassadors hurriedly sent was that they would maintain the households of the Athenians as long as the war should last, if only they would hold out stoutly against Mardonios. But they pleaded

Embassy
of the
Spartans to
Athens.

further, it is said, that they had a right to expect this continued resistance, inasmuch as the Athenians had brought the war on Hellas, (doubtless by the aid given to the Asiatic Ionians under Aristagoras,¹⁰¹⁰) and that the aid which they now promised was not an acknowledgement that the horrors of the strife lay at their door but a token of their sympathy in the disasters which had deprived the Athenians of the harvest of one year and the seed-time of another.¹⁰¹¹ The reply of the Athenians to both their sutors is marked by that real dignity which springs from the consciousness of thoroughly disinterested motives. Whether it has been handed down as it was uttered, or not, we can well understand the glow of pride with which the Athenians of a later day recalled these utterances of exalted patriotism. To Alexandros they said, 'We know that the army of the Medes is much larger than ours, and there is no need to cast this in our teeth: but in the struggle for freedom we will beat them off with all our might. And now tell Mardonios what we say, "As long as the sun shall keep the same path in the heaven, we will never make peace with Xerxes: but we will face him, trusting in the help of gods and heroes, whom he has insulted by burning their homes and shrines."' To these words they added for himself personally the warning that if he valued their friendship he should refuse to be the bearer of any such messages in time to come. Then turning to the Spartans they said, 'It was perhaps natural that you should dread our making peace with the barbarian; but you know little of the mind of the Athenians, for not all the gold throughout all the world could tempt us to take the part of the Medes and help to enslave Hellas. Even if we were willing to do so, there are many things to hinder us, and chiefly the shrines and dwellings of the gods which they have burnt and thrown down. Yet more, the whole Hellenic race is of the same blood and speech with us; we share in common the temples of our gods; we have the same sacrifices and the same way of life; and these the Athenians can never betray. Be assured now, if you knew it not before, that so long as but one Athenian shall remain, we will never make any

¹⁰¹⁰ See note 734.¹⁰¹¹ Herod. viii. 142.

covenant with Xerxes. For your good will to us we thank you: but we will struggle on as well as we can without giving you trouble. All that we pray you to do is to send out your army with all speed, for assuredly the barbarian will soon be in our land, when he learns that we will not do as he would have us; and we ought to meet him in Boiotia before he can advance as far as Attica.'

Beautiful, however, though these words may be, yet either they were put together at a later day, or the sequel of the narrative has been falsified. At the time of the embassy to Athens the Isthmian wall remained unfinished, as it had been when Xerxes began his homeward journey: but the pledges which they had received of Athenian steadfastness encouraged them to the most strenuous efforts for its immediate completion. With its completion came back seemingly the old indifference; and the Persians were again in Attica before a single Spartan troop had advanced beyond the isthmus. Nay more, no sooner had the wall been finished than Kleombrotos led the Spartan army hurriedly back to Sparta¹⁰¹² because an eclipse of the sun had taken place. On his death, which happened almost immediately after, his son Pausanias was appointed general, and guardian of his cousin Pleistarchos the young son of Leonidas. Taken altogether, things looked better for Mardonios than ever they had looked for Xerxes. He was at the head of a more compact and manageable army; and his Hellenic allies seemed to be stirred by redoubled zeal in his cause.¹⁰¹³ If Thorax of Larissa pushed on the enterprise by every means in his power, the Thebans were not less eager in urging him to fight the decisive battle on the Boiotian plain; and on that plain it was indeed to be fought with a result very little to their mind. But Mardonios was feverishly anxious to repossess himself of Athens, partly, as Herodotos believed, because he was suffering from divinely inflicted frenzy, and partly because he wished to send the tidings of his own glorification to Sousa. His caution in avoiding acts of vio-

Re-occu-
pation of
Athens by
Mardonios.

¹⁰¹² Such a fact as this shows how little reliance is to be placed on the words which, put into the mouth of Leonidas, represent retreat as an impossibility for a Spartan leader. Herod. ix. 10. See note 937.

¹⁰¹³ Herod. ix. 1.

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lence on retaking the city sufficiently disproves these inferences. Mardonios was as steadily intent on winning over the Athenians as Xerxes had been on punishing them. There was yet the chance that their stubborn will might give way when they saw their soil again trodden by invading armies, while the care of the general in protecting their city might justify them in trusting to any covenant which they might make with him. To carry out this plan he crossed the frontiers of Attica. . Once more the Athenians conveyed their families and household goods to Salamis; and ten months after the capture of the Akropolis by Xerxes Mardonios entered a silent and desolate city. Still hoping that his scheme might succeed, he dispatched a Hellespontian named Mourychides to Salamis with the same terms which he had already offered through Alexandros. The ambassador was suffered to deliver his message before the council of Five Hundred; and in an evil moment for himself a citizen named Lykidas proposed that the matter should be brought before the assembly of the people.¹⁰¹⁴ His right to make the proposition was beyond dispute: but so enraged were not only the councillors but the people, as soon as they learnt what had passed, that they stoned him to death on the spot, while the women hurrying to the place where his wife and children were sojourning murdered them all in the same way. Mourychides was dismissed unhurt, charged, we must suppose, with a peremptory rejection of the offers of Mardonios. In the course of a hundred years the name of the citizen and the scene of this loathsome assassination had been changed; and Demosthenes¹⁰¹⁵ holds up to the admiration of his countrymen the murderers of the whole family of Kyrtilos and of Kyrtilos himself, because he counselled submission to Xerxes at the time when Themistokles urged the first migration to Salamis. If this horrible deed was ever done, it is more likely to belong to the time assigned to it by the later

¹⁰¹⁴ The phrase *δεξαμένους τὸν λόγον τὸν σφι Μουρυχίδης προφέρει*, Herod. ix. 5, cannot be said to mean necessarily more than that they should take his terms into consideration. It was this previous consideration of matters to be submitted to the Demos which was the special function of the senate. The decision rested with the people. Lykidas may have expressed his personal approval of the terms: but it is at the least possible that, without so committing himself, he may have spoken of the matter as one on which the Demos ought to give its own judgement.

¹⁰¹⁵ *De Corona*, p. 296.

orator, when the career of Xerxes had been one of almost unbroken success: but it becomes strange that the earlier historian should have the less likely version of the story. Happily it is unnecessary to examine this disgusting tradition further. The bodies of Lykidas and his family are hardly cold when not merely one or two citizens but the Athenian people inform the Peloponnesians that, unless they receive immediate aid, they must devise some means of escape from their present troubles. That these words indicate submission to Persia, is patent from the speech which at this point the historian puts into the mouth of the Athenian, Plataian, and Megarian ambassadors at Sparta. Here we have a recapitulation of the terms offered by Mardonios: but this is no longer followed by the impassioned declaration that the sun should fall from heaven sooner than Athens would submit to the enemy and that, if but one Athenian survived, that Athenian would rather die than make any paction with the tyrant. Instead of this, we have the tranquil declaration that they heartily desire the welfare of Hellas, and that they will make no paction with the enemy, if they can avoid the so doing. The speech is a wretched bathos after the lofty protestations uttered in the hearing of the Makedonian chieftain: but such as it is, it could never have been spoken by a people who had just been slaughtering women and children because a citizen had proposed not that they should yield to Mardonios but that the terms which he offered should be submitted to the consideration of the Demos. The two traditions exclude each other; and we are more than justified in rejecting the one which befits the character only of Andaman savages.¹⁰¹⁶

The reproaches of the Athenians, so the story runs, fell for the present on deaf ears. The Lakedaimonians were keeping the feast of the Hyakinthian Apollon; and exactness

March of the Spartans under Pausanias from Sparta.

¹⁰¹⁶ The traditionary history of every nation is full of circumstantial narratives which simply represent a proverbial saying in a concrete form; and the massacre of Lykidas and his family in which the men and women are alike included is practically nothing more than a new dress thrown over the reply to the Makedonian Alexandros. The saying that the Athenians would rather slay those who were dearest to them than yield might very soon and very easily take the form of a narrative saying that they had really done so. The same remark seems to apply strictly to the curses which Isokrates mentions as being periodically imprecated on all citizens who make any overtures to the Persians. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 211.

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of religious ceremonial was to them of greater moment than resistance to the barbarian. They could also comfort themselves with the thought that the Isthmian wall had all but received its coping stones and battlements. They could afford therefore to put off the Athenian ambassadors by specious excuses from day to day; and they succeeded in so putting them off for ten days until Chileos of Tegea, hearing from the ephors the substance of the Athenian demands, assured them that their wall would be of very little use, if by virtue of any covenant made with Mardonios the Athenian fleet should co-operate with the Persian land-army. As if this very obvious remark came with the merit of absolute novelty, the ephors, we are told, took the words of Chileos seriously to heart, and on that very night dispatched from Sparta five thousand hoplites under Pausanias, son of Kleombrotos, each hoplite being attended by seven helots,—in other words, a force amounting to 40,000 men. Early the following morning the ambassadors of the extra-Peloponnesian cities informed the ephors in few words that they were free to remain at home and keep festival to their hearts' content, but that the Athenians would at once make with the Persians the best terms which could now be obtained. To this point had the people come who had murdered Lykidas or Kyrtilos or both with their innocent children: but the Spartans indulged in no unpleasant references to the remarks which the Athenians had once made about the order of the universe. 'They are gone and are already in the Oresteion on their march to meet the strangers.' 'Who are gone, and who are the strangers?' asked the Athenians in reply to these mysterious tidings. 'Our Spartans have gone with their helots,' they answered, 'forty thousand men in all, and the strangers are the Persians.' In utter amazement the ambassadors hastened away, accompanied by 5,000 picked hoplites from the Lakedaimonian Perioikoi.

Faction of
the Argives
with Mar-
donios.

The explanation of all this mystery is found in the simple statement that the Argives were under a promise to Mardonios to prevent by force, if force should be necessary, the departure of any Spartan army from the Peloponnesos.¹⁰¹⁷

¹⁰¹⁷ Herod. ix. 12.

If any part of the narrative deserve credit, it would be the unadorned and simple story of the conduct of Mardonios on the second invasion of Attica. Feeling that with the submission or the independent alliance of Athens his task would be practically done, he saw further that the Athenians would be best won over if the pressure put upon them should stop short of the devastation of their country and the burning of their houses. But there would be no chance of preventing pillage and plunder, if Attica should be made a battle-field. Hence it became of the utmost importance to him that no Peloponnesian force should be allowed to advance beyond the isthmus: and the pledge given by the Argives seemed to assure him that from this quarter there was no danger to be feared. That the agreement between the Argives and Mardonios should come to the knowledge of the Spartan ephors, is not very surprising. Argos had from the first stood aloof in the contest; and her sympathies were known to be rather with the Persians than with their opponents. But the knowledge of this secret covenant between the Argives and the Persian general imposed on the ephors the need of absolute secrecy on their side in any military plans which they might desire to carry out, and made it scarcely less necessary to keep these plans from the knowledge of the Athenians than to prevent their being discovered by the Argives. If the latter were under any such pledge, nothing but secrecy could enable the Spartans to leave the Peloponnesos without fighting their way through Argive territory; and when owing to this secrecy their plan succeeded and the Argives sent word to Athens to say that they had failed to prevent the departure of the Spartans, Mardonios felt that his own scheme had likewise become hopeless. At once the whole land was abandoned to his soldiers. Athens was set on fire; and any walls and buildings which had escaped the ravages of the first invasion were dismantled and thrown down. He could not afford to stay and fight in a country which was ill-suited for cavalry and from which in case of defeat he would have to lead his army through narrow and dangerous passes. The order for retreat was therefore given; and Mardonios in a little while found himself once again on the plain of Thebes.

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March of
the Spar-
tans to the
Isthmus.

The epical arrangement of the history of this great struggle has thrust into the background a narrative which seems to exhibit in another light the alleged selfishness and backwardness of the Spartans and Peloponnesian allies. The warning given by Chileos to the ephors is as superfluous as the advice of Mnesiphilos to Themistokles or the counsel of Artemisia to Xerxes after the fight at Salamis. It is said to have produced a complete and sudden change in the policy and plans of the ephors. It is, however, entirely uncalled for, unless we assume that such a change really did take place: but it is precisely the fact of this change which the story of the covenant between the Argives and Mardonios brings most into suspicion.¹⁰¹⁸ It is indeed hard to understand how a force of 40,000 men could have been brought together and marched off in one night, if no preparation whatever had been made beforehand.¹⁰¹⁹ But if the sudden change and the want of preparation be rejected as alike incredible, the whole story is, at the least, placed on a consistent and plausible basis. Secrecy in counsel and execution was undoubtedly a special feature in Spartan government: but even if we refuse to admit that the conduct of the ephors in the story of Herodotus is adopted only to give point to a paltry and most unseasonable jest,¹⁰²⁰ still the historian must, it would seem, have discerned in it a desire to surprise the Athenian ambassadors and to startle them into admiration for efforts which, without forethought or preparation, would equal or surpass their own. Such conduct, although not positively childish, is yet, even from a Spartan view, unaccountable, if the only motive was supplied by Chileos who told them simply what they knew before and what the Athenians by their threatened migration to Siris had impressed upon them far more forcibly and solemnly. But the hostile designs of the Argives, if

¹⁰¹⁸ Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 212, assumes the fact of this change,—without any evidence, as it seems to me, in support of it.

¹⁰¹⁹ Mr. Grote, *ib.* 213, accepting the statement that no preparation had been made, thinks that the helots must have followed Pausanias. Probably Pausanias would hesitate to face the Argives at or near the isthmus with only 5,000 men; and if the latter were at all in earnest, they would certainly find it easier to deal with the Spartans in detail. Besides, if we take one part of the tale, we must take the rest: and the ephors are made to assure the Athenians that all the 40,000 had set off with Pausanias and were already well on the road.

¹⁰²⁰ This is maintained by Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 319, and denied by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 213.

known at Sparta (and, as we have seen, the cause for surprise would have been rather if they had remained unknown), fully explain the policy of the ephors; and the period of ten days during which they are said to have put off answering the Athenian ambassadors may give some measure of the time occupied in preparing for the march of Pausanias and his men.¹⁰²¹ If we suppose that the return and death of Kleombrotos took place during the detention of the Athenians at Sparta, this event may account still more for the delay in setting out:¹⁰²² but such a statement can in no way affect the other incidents of the story. The fact, if it be a fact, (and there is no reason to question it,) that in a single night they sent out of the country a force of 40,000 men, tends not only to prove that so great an effort was not made on the spur of the moment and without preparation but to acquit the Spartans in great measure of the vacillation with which they were charged as well as of an utter unconcern for the interests and welfare of every other state but their own.

Mardonios was already, it is said, on his road to Boiotia, when the news that a force of one thousand Lakedaimonians¹⁰²³ had advanced as far as Megara induced him to interrupt his northward march and enter the territory of that city. It may seem strange that he should consider the presence of his whole army necessary to repel so small a force, and still more strange that on hearing that Pausanias, after a march which could have been by no means hurried, had reached the isthmus, he should at once resume his retreat without crushing even this handful of men. Possibly to the Greek mind there may have been a special charm in the

Retreat of
Mardonios
into
Boiotia.

¹⁰²¹ The jest on the part of the ephors becomes still more ridiculous, when we note that according to the story of Herodotos they on the very morning of the day on which the force was sent out knew no more that they would have it in their power to make the jest than the Athenians knew that the jest would be made to them. According to Herodotos, for nine days they did absolutely nothing, putting off the ambassadors thus far only in the hope that the Isthmian wall would be completed before they gave a final answer. On the morning of the ninth day Chileos warned them of the consequences of losing the alliance of the Athenians: and not till then did the ephors think of sending any troops, and at the same time of enjoying the puzzlement of the ambassadors. The childishness of this behaviour calls for no further remark.

¹⁰²² This is the hypothesis of Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 319.

¹⁰²³ It is not easy to understand what this force may have been. Mardonios did not begin to ravage Attica or to burn and destroy the buildings at Athens and elsewhere, until he had heard from the Argives that the whole army of Pausanias had eluded them. Herod.: ix. 13. But when he has had time to devastate Attica and to advance some way on the road to Boiotia, he is informed that only 1,000 Spartans have advanced as far as Megara. Herod. ix. 14.

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tradition that Persian myriads advanced to this the nearest point reached by them towards the setting of the sun to encounter a thousand Greeks whom they never dared to face. Giving up the idea of a longer sojourn on Megarian ground, Mardonios retreated not by the road through Eleutherai to Plataiai, or by the pass of Phylé between Kithairon and Parnes, but along the road which leaving Parnes to the right leads by Dekeleia, a name associated not three generations later with the downfall of Athenian empire. Here he was met by Asopian guides, sent by the Boiotarchs, who led him by Sphendaleai and Tanagra and thence, after recrossing the Asopos, to Skólos, where he was compelled to do some mischief to the land of the Thebans, in spite of their zealous Medism. Even their friendliness seemed to him a poor compensation for the lack of a fortified camp in case of defeat; and this security could be obtained only by making the land stretching from Erythrai to Plataiai a desert. Thus beneath the northern slopes of Kithairon his hosts might in case of need find shelter in a camp ten furlongs square, which with its ramparts and stockade might bid defiance to all attacks of the enemy.

The feast of
Attaginos.

The epical method of Herodotos is again disclosed as he approaches the great battle in which, according to the promise of Xerxes, Mardonios was to give to the Spartans satisfaction for the death of Leonidas. The pride and arrogance of the Persian leader are strengthened, while the hopes of his followers¹⁰²⁴ are represented as dying away. But the tale which tells how a blindness sent by the gods was on his eyes while others foresaw the ruin, can be given only in the words of the historian.

‘While the barbarians were working on their fortified camp, Attaginos the son of Phrynon, a Theban, called Mar-

¹⁰²⁴ It must not be forgotten that all such statements reflect the sentiment of a later time. We have no historical evidence of the assertion that the army of Mardonios generally was not hearty in his cause and had little hope of success, still less for the fact that even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of Xerxes the year before and were depressed by the worst forebodings. It is to be regretted that Mr. Grote has allowed the traditional colouring thus imparted to the tale to affect his own narrative. Artabazos was certainly jealous of his chief; and the ability which he showed in all his independent operations may have made him chafe against the inferior generalship of Mardonios. But in the case of his troops there is assuredly no reason for thinking that they were disheartened in the absence of the cowardly despot of whom in all likelihood they were glad to be rid.

donios, with fifty of the chief men among the Persians, to a great banquet which he had made ready in Thebes. The rest of this story I heard from Thersandros, a great man among the Orchomenians, who told me that he had been invited to this feast with fifty men of the Thebans and that they lay down to meat, not separately, but one Persian and one Theban together on each couch. When the feast was ended, as they were drinking wine, the Persian who lay on the couch with him asked him in the Greek language who he was: and when he answered that he was a man of Orchomenos, the Persian said, "Thou hast sat at the same table and shared the same cup with me, and I wish to leave thee a memorial of my foresight, that thou mayest be able by wise counsel to provide also for thyself. Thou seest the Persians who are with us at this banquet, and the army which we have left incamped on the river's bank. Yet a little while, and of all these but a very few shall remain alive." As the Persian said this, he wept bitterly; and Thersandros, marvelling at him, answered, "Is it not right that Mardonios should hear this, and the Persians who are of weight with him?" But the other replied, "O friend, that which Heaven is bringing to pass it is impossible for man to turn aside, for no one will believe though one spake ever so truly. All this many of us Persians know well, but yet we follow, bound by a strong necessity: and of all the pains which men may suffer the most hateful and wretched is this, to see the evils that are coming and yet be unable to overcome them."¹⁰²⁵ This story I heard from Thersandros himself, who also added that he had told the tale to many others before the battle was fought in Plataiai.'

If this tale could be received as genuine history, it must certainly be regarded as disclosing to us, on testimony beyond suspicion, the real feelings of the native Persians,

Historical
value of
the story.

¹⁰²⁵ The words denote further the pain which must follow on the inability to carry out any schemes which a man feels sure must end in success, if carried out according to his conceptions,—or, as Mr. Grote puts it, when a man is full of knowledge and at the same time has no power over any result. But we are scarcely justified in following Mr. Grote, when he says that 'if fully carried out, this position is the direct negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics as to the superior happiness of the βίος θεωρητικός, or life of scientific observation and reflexion.' Aristotle's position is carefully guarded against any such attack. Unless a man is free from all disasters, Πραγματικὰ τύχαι, and unless he has all the physical advantages needed for εὐδαιμονία, there can in his belief be no Theoretic life at all.

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and even of the chief men among them at this crisis.¹⁰²⁶ That Herodotos heard it from Thersandros, that he received it substantially in the shape in which he has given it to us, and that Thersandros, when he related it to Herodotos, fully believed in its truth and in the accuracy of his own memory, is not to be doubted. But when we remember that probably more than a quarter of a century may have passed away after the battle of Plataiai before their acquaintance began, we may not unreasonably question the fidelity of an impression, of the truth of which he may nevertheless have been sincerely convinced. The anecdote is of special value as showing the extent to which the ethical and poetical sentiment of the historian was shared by many of his countrymen. The tendency to look at historical facts through the medium of philosophy and religion is sufficiently shown throughout the whole work of Herodotos: but this is perhaps the only instance in which we have his assurance that this tendency was not confined to himself. Unless we admit without reserve the truth of the story, its exquisite beauty not less than its touching simplicity and truthfulness of feeling shows further that this method of interpretation was carried by others to a perfection scarcely inferior to his own. What the facts may have been which it professes to relate, or whether they may not have occurred precisely as they are said to have occurred, it seems impossible to determine, not so much in this case from the circumstance that the narrative was not immediately committed to writing, as because we cannot trust even for a few months or days the memory of a man living under the influence of a system so hostile to the growth of the historical faculty. The sentiment put into the mouth of the Persian at the banquet of Attaginos seems to be not less distinctively Greek than those which are uttered by the seven conspirators against the usurpation of the Magians.¹⁰²⁷ The expression of any foreboding however slight, of any remark on the uncertainty of life as vague and general as that which is ascribed to Xerxes when he surveyed his fleet in its glory,¹⁰²⁸ would unconsciously shape itself in the mind of Thersandros into that moral or religious form which imparts to the tale its

¹⁰²⁶ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 217.¹⁰²⁷ See page 356.¹⁰²⁸ See page 464.

perpetual freshness. But if we may not, on such testimony, assume that this anticipation of utter ruin was present to the mind of the Persian leaders (and that it oppressed the Persians generally we have no evidence whatever), the anecdote from every other point of view becomes superfluous. In the ethical conception of the history Mardonios was already doomed from the hour when Artabanos warned him that from his westward journey there would for him be no return;¹⁰²⁷ and the parting words of Xerxes consecrated him afresh as the victim destined to expiate the slaughter of Leonidas. Nor can it be said that the remark of the Persian has force or meaning, if viewed in reference to the conduct or duty of Mardonios. To listen to vague presentiments of coming evil and in obedience to such presentiments to break up an army of overwhelming strength and fully supplied with the materials of war would in a general be an unpardonable offence. If the Persian who addressed Thersandros had any reasons or arguments to address to his chief, Mardonios would assuredly be bound to hear and weigh them; but it is of the very essence of the story that he had none, and it would be the duty of Mardonios to disregard presages and tears which to him must appear to have no other source than a diseased and unmanly mind.

The prophecy of the Persian at the feast of Attaginós is the prelude to the great fight which broke the power of the barbarian by land as the battle of Salamis had crushed his hopes by sea. But the narratives of the two battles stand by no means on the same level in point of trustworthiness. Of the engagement at Salamis we know practically nothing but its issue. The story of Plataiai, though not less graphic and vivid in details, not a few of which are suspicious or even incredible, brings before us a series of movements which explain themselves and which seem to be reported with tolerable accuracy. From the Corinthian isthmus the Spartans with their Peloponnesian allies advanced to Eleusis where they were joined by the forces of the Athenians who had crossed over from Salamis, and thence, cheered by favourable omens, resumed their march until from the southern slopes of

Advance of
the con-
federates
into
Boiotia.

¹⁰²⁷ Herod. vii. 10.

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Kithairon they looked down on the Persian camp near the northern bank of the Asopos. In this camp the sight of the Greeks, as their ranks were drawn out on the mountain side, seems to have caused but little excitement or alarm. The Persian troops were in excellent condition, and their Hellenic allies full of zeal, with the exception, it is said, of a troop of one thousand Phokians. Of these the story is told that a herald sent by Mardonios commanded them to take up a position by themselves; that, while they stood thus alone, they were surrounded by Persian horsemen who rode up with spears in rest, as if ready for massacre; that the Phokians formed themselves into close square by the command of their chief Harmokydes, who exhorted them to sell their lives dearly; and that their firmness impressed on their assailants the necessity of retreat. Herodotos confesses his ignorance of the objects and motives of a manœuvre with which a sojourn in Persia would have made him familiar: but it is hard to think that the confidence of Mardonios could have been thus increased in men whose valour he had put to this test. The mere presence of Phokians in his camp seems to betray that mad love of vast numbers which more perhaps than any other thing insured the final defeat of the Persian invasion. The addition of one thousand Phokians to his forces brought with it a greater danger than would have been involved in the departure of ten thousand Persians.¹⁰³⁰

Attack of
the Persian
cavalry,
and death
of Masi-
tios.

Here, then, on the plain beneath the mighty mass of Kithairon, Mardonios with his host, it is said, of 300,000 men, awaited with impatience the attack which he trusted that the Greeks, numbering in all 110,000, would begin.¹⁰³¹ If Persian boastfulness exaggerated his own numbers, those of

¹⁰³⁰ The statement of Herodotos, ix. 31, that some of the Phokians took an active part on the Greek side may imply that, as among the Boiotians, Medism was confined to the oligarchical Eupatridai. But if Mardonios could have been as sure of Harmokydes as of the Boiotarchs, he would scarcely have indulged in so dangerous a treatment of his men as that which is here ascribed to him.

¹⁰³¹ It is unnecessary to repeat the reasons for the conclusion that even on the Greek side the details of numbers, although probably in many cases accurate, are not to be always trusted. See Appendix G. The reckoning of Herodotos does not correspond with that of Pausanias; and tombs at Plataiai were inscribed with the names of states which took no part in the final struggle. But Herodotos is as well acquainted with the arrangement of the Persian forces as with those of the Greeks; and it is beyond doubt that nothing less than exact registration at the time would be needed to preserve the minute details of his description. The numbers of the Persian army generally may be dismissed with the remark that they never depart from the beaten track of even thousands and myriads and that the 300,000 of Mardonios are simply an expression of overwhelming strength like the 6,000,000 of Xerxes. It is likely enough that at the suggestion of the Thebans Mardonios may have placed his Persians, as his most formidable

his enemies were swollen not so much from carelessness of falsehood as from the desire that all the states which had not medised should be represented as taking part in the final struggle with the servants of the Asiatic despot. But whatever their numbers may have been when Mardonios threw the die for battle, they were less formidable when they first incamped on the lower slopes of Kithairon.¹⁰³² Still no time was to be lost in dislodging them from their vantage-ground: and on this errand the whole Persian cavalry was dispatched under Masistios, a leader noted for his bravery. Riding on a golden-bitted Nisaian steed magnificently caparisoned, Masistios led his horsemen on; and the nature of the ground made their attack specially felt by the Megarians, who sent a message to Pausanias to say that, unless they could be speedily supported, they must give way. The rigidity of Spartan discipline would lead us to suppose that Pausanias issued an order and that this order was obeyed; but instead of this we have the mere intreaty for the help of volunteers. All, it is said, including, it would seem, the Spartans,¹⁰³³ held back, although the Persian horsemen rode up and reviled them as women; and three hundred picked Athenians under Olympiodoros the son

troops, opposite to the Lakedaimonians, Herod. ix. 31, and the Sakians, with his Hellenic allies, facing the Athenians; but the minor details which confronted Baktrians and Indians with the men of Lepreon, Mykenai, and Tiryns, of Eretria, Hermionê, and Chalkis, must remain uncertain.

According to Herodotos the right wing of the Hellenic army was held by the Lakedaimonians with 10,000 hoplites, 5,000 of these, as Spartiatiai, being attended by 35,000 helots. Next to these, as in a post of honour, were placed 1,500 Tegeatan hoplites, then 5,000 Corinthians with 300 Potidaians from Pallênê, then 600 from the Arkadian Orchomenos, and 3,000 from Sikyon. Next to these were drawn up 800 Epidaurians, 1,000 from Troizen, 200 from Lepreon, 400 from Mykenai and Tiryns, 1,000 from Phlious and 300 from Hermionê. Next to these came 600 Eretrians and Styrians, 400 Chalkidians, 500 Ambrakiotês, 800 from Leukas and Anaktorion, 200 Peleians from Kephallene, 500 Aiginetans and 3,000 from Megara. Lastly, with 600 Plataians, 8,000 Athenians under Aristeides closed the left wing. All these being heavy-armed, with the exception of the 35,000 helots, made up a total of 38,700 hoplites: but with these there were further 34,500 light-armed troops, who with the surviving Thespians, unarmed and practically useless, raised the total to 110,000.

The inscription on the statue of Zeus at Olympia, seen by Pausanias, v. 28, 1, had, in addition to these combatants at Plataiai, the names of the Eleians, Chians, and Milesians, together with those of the Tenians, Naxians, and Kythnians, while it omitted the Peleians from Kephallene. But it is possible that Pausanias may have mistaken the word ΠΑΛΕΙΣ in an inscription 600 years old for ΠΑΛΕΙΟΙ, and possible also that the Eleians, as guardians of the Olympian sanctuary, may have abused their privileges by altering the inscription in their own favour. The contingents from Chios and Miletos must be fictitious: the Persian fleet was stationed off the Ionic coast for the express purpose of arresting all such movements; nor is the matter mended, if we suppose that instead of these names Pausanias wrote Keians and Melians. If these islanders named by him contributed any men, they would surely be sent to man the Greek fleet.

¹⁰³² Herodotos, ix. 28, makes a distinction between the Greeks who first came and subsequent additions, οἱ ἐμφοιτῶνες καὶ οἱ ἀρχῆν ἐλθόντες.

¹⁰³³ See notes 937, 1012. We have here another incident, which, if true, contradicts the supposed inflexible practice of the Spartans.

of Lampôn could alone be found to undertake the dangerous task. Aided by some bowmen, they moved to the Megarian ground, where presently the horse of Masistios struck by an arrow in its side reared and threw its rider. Throwing themselves upon him, the Athenians seized his horse: but his golden breastplate protected him from his enemies until a spear was thrust into his eye. So died Masistios, unseen by his men who at the time were falling back to make ready for another charge. When on halting they learnt their loss, with a fierce cry they rushed back to recover his body, of which for a little while they gained possession; but the three hundred Athenians were now supported by the main body of their countrymen, and the Persian cavalry was definitely beaten back. All Boiotia and therefore also, from the scene of the fight, all Attica, a circle with a radius of thirty miles, resounded with the piercing wail which went up for the loss of Masistios, while the body of the fallen general, stretched on a chariot, was carried along the ranks of the Greeks who crowded to see his grand and beautiful form.

Rivalry
of the
Tegeatans
and
Athenians.

To these the death of Masistios and the repulse of his cavalry brought great encouragement; and they resolved to move from Erythrai nearer to Plataiai, as a position far better both for incamping and for watering. Their road led them by Hysiai to ground stretching from the fountain of Gargaphia to the shrine of the hero Androkrates,¹⁰³⁴ and broken by low hills rising from the plain. Here a controversy sprung up between the Tegeatans and Athenians, both alike claiming the honour of holding the left wing, and both alike founding their claim on actions done in the days when the Tegeatan Echemos slew Hyllos and made the Herakleidai promise to return no more for a hundred years. In their reply the Athenians urged their own greater merit as being the only people who had welcomed and sheltered the exiled children of Herakles:¹⁰³⁵ but putting aside the rivalries of ancient times they alleged the victory of Marathon, their own achievement

¹⁰³⁴ Thucydides, iii. 24, speaks of this shrine as being within a distance of six or seven furlongs from Plataiai on the road to Thebes.

¹⁰³⁵ See page 46. For the mythical necessity which took the Herakleidai to Athens and rendered their welcome in that city inevitable, see *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 57. It was natural that the Athenians should be specially sensitive to the mythical greatness of their ancestors and of their city. *Ib.* i. 228.

against six-and-forty nations, as a conclusive title for the honour which they demanded as their right. The Spartans admitted their claim by acclamation; and the Tegeatans were invited to stand next to the Lakedaimonians with whom they had had many a sturdy struggle in former days.

The
counsel of
Tima-
genidas.

But although the two armies were brought thus near to each other, the final conflict was delayed by the omens which were interpreted by the soothsayers on either side¹⁰³⁶ as unfavourable to the aggressor. These answers may be classed in the number of those safe statements which include the warnings given to Kroisos or Maxentius;¹⁰³⁷ and the final disobedience of Mardonios not only accords with the epical method of the history, but also comes not unnaturally from a man who, if numbers were to decide the conflict, was conscious of possessing an immeasurable advantage. But if a pitched battle was not to be thought of, Timagenidas the Theban warned him against wasting more time in addition to the eight days which had already passed away. There were other things which might safely be undertaken. Every day the Greeks were receiving fresh convoys through the passes of Kithairon; and it was easy by occupying these passes to enrich the Persians and starve their enemies. His advice was promptly acted upon. Night had no sooner set in than the Persian cavalry were dispatched to the pass of the Oak Heads;¹⁰³⁸ and there 500 beasts laden with corn were cut off with the men who had brought them from the Peloponnesos.

¹⁰³⁶ The history which Herodotos gives of these soothsayers, the Eleian Tisamenos, of the family of the Iamidai, on the Greek side, and Hegesistratos, an Eleian of the Telliad family, on that of the Persians, exhibits strikingly the enormous influence exercised by these prophets. So indispensably needful in the eyes of the Spartans were the services of Tisamenos that to secure them they conferred their full citizenship, albeit sorely against their will, not only on him but on his brother Hegias, religious dread in one direction overpowering their deepest religious convictions in another. On the Persian side Hegesistratos was animated by a furious hatred of the Spartans; but, like Balaam, he could not, although largely bribed, give Mardonios the answer which he desired. Do what he would, the sacrifices could not be made favourable, Herod. ix. 45; nor need we question the accuracy of their system of interpretation, however much we may doubt the connexion of the phenomena, which they professed to interpret, with the course of action which they supposed to be in accordance with them. Hence, as the omens might easily be of the same character in the two camps, we can quite understand that the respective soothsayers should return to their employers the same answer.

¹⁰³⁷ See page 274.

¹⁰³⁸ Herodotos, ix. 39, says that these, the *δρυὸς κεφαλαί* of the Athenians, were called *τρεις κεφαλαί* by the Boiotians. These may at this time have supposed that the word was the numeral *τρεις*; but there can be little doubt that it was only a dialectical variation of *δρῖς*, exhibiting the same form with the English *tree*.

BOOK
II.

The infatuation of Mardonios.

Two days more passed by, each adding to the numbers of the Greeks. On the morning of the eleventh Mardonios, wearied out with the delay, consulted Artabazos, who advised him, it is said, to fall back on Thebes and there to trust rather to money than to men. In open battle, he urged, they were no match for their enemies; but not a Greek was to be found who would not sell his freedom for money, and Persian gold freely scattered among the chief men of all the non-medising cities would soon make them hearty in the Persian cause. Like the counsel of Artemisia, this advice is really the expression of later sentiment. The whole history of the war thus far had shown that, whatever might be their love of money, Spartans and Athenians were not to be conquered by the most tempting bribe, while it had not shown that in open fight the Persians must necessarily be discomfited. It is possible, of course, that Artabazos may have had other reasons for differing from Mardonios; but the latter was certainly justified in depending on the bravery of his countrymen and in deploring the inaction which was daily increasing the number and strength of his enemies. In short, whether like Appius Claudius Pulcher he expressed his contempt for omens and omen-mongers, we know not; but his mind was made up. Feeling that omens and auguries might exercise a powerful influence on others, he sent, we are told, or his officers, and asked them if they knew of any oracle which foretold the destruction of the Persians on Hellenic ground. All were silent, and Mardonios went on: 'Since you either know nothing or dare not say out what you know, I will tell you myself. There is an oracle which says that Persians coming to Hellas shall plunder the temple at Delphi and then be utterly destroyed. But we are not going against this temple, nor shall we attempt to plunder it: so that this cannot be our ruin. All therefore who have any good will to the Persians may be glad, for, so far as the oracles are concerned, we shall be the conquerors. We shall fight to-morrow.' By these words, in the belief of the historian, the victim was devoting himself. He had misinterpreted an oracle which had reference not to the Persians but to some Illyrian and Enchelean invaders; and he had for-

gotten the prediction of Bakis which foretold that the bow-bearing Medes should fall on the banks of the Asopos and the stream of Thermodon hard by. There remains, however, another point on which the silence of Herodotos is indeed astonishing. If we receive his story, the words of Mardonios must either bring the Delphian expedition altogether into doubt or prove that he was uttering a conscious lie on a matter which must have been as well known to his officers as to himself. On this supposition his implied unbelief would belong rather to a later day, and to such men as Claudius Pulcher or Lucius Saturninus.¹⁰³⁹

From this point the narrative which Herodotos followed resolves itself into a series of pictures as vivid as, it is to be feared, they are untrustworthy. The council was ended, and the night came on, and the guards stood at their posts. When all was quiet through the camp and the men were in a deep sleep, the Makedonian Alexandros rode in the dead of night to the outposts of the Athenians and asked to speak with their leaders. When these had come, he briefly but earnestly besought them to keep the fact of his visit a secret from all except Pausanias. He had come only because he had the welfare of Hellas at heart, as being by lineage a Hellen himself; and his errand was to tell them that Mardonios had made up his mind to fight on the coming day and to leave omens and oracles to take care of themselves. But he added that even if any reason should still constrain Mardonios to inaction, it would be their wisdom to remain where they were, for his supplies were all but exhausted; and so he bade them farewell, saying, 'If the war end as ye would have it, then remember to deliver me also, for in my zeal for the Greeks I have run this great venture, because I wished to show you the purpose of Mardonios, that so he might not take you at unawares. I am Alexandros the Makedonian.' The picture is full of life: but Aristeides at least could not have needed the announcement of his name. He must surely have remembered the man who but a little while ago had

The conference of the Makedonian Alexandros with the Athenian generals.

¹⁰³⁹ Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 3. Arnold, *Hist. Rome*, ii. 607; and *Later Roman Commonwealth*, i. 124. The sentiment which Cicero, *de Sen.* iv. puts into the mouth of Fabius is only an expansion, and therefore a weakening, of the words of Hektor which cheered on Epameinondas on the day of his victory and his death.

BOOK
II.

come to Athens as the envoy of Mardonios and had then as earnestly besought them to submit to Xerxes as now he prayed them to hold out. His love of freedom may have grown in the interval: but his warning, though kindly, was not indispensable. The Greeks had been watching intently for ten days every movement in the enemy's camp; and the preparation for battle would be no sooner begun than they would see it.

Changes of
position in
the Greek
and
Persian
armies.

The next picture brings before us the Greek commander in council. From Aristeides and his colleagues Pausanias learnt that the morrow would see the decisive struggle; and his request, urged without a moment's hesitation, was that they should change places. 'You,' he said, 'have encountered these Persians at Marathon and know their method of fighting. We have had no such experience, for no Spartan has yet been engaged with the Medes.'¹⁰⁴⁰ The veracity of the historian can be maintained only on the supposition that he had really heard this tale, which adds that the Athenians eagerly carried out at the prayer of Pausanias an arrangement which they had as eagerly desired, yet scarcely dared to propose; that when Mardonios became aware of the change, he likewise altered the disposition of his troops; that Pausanias, seeing his device discovered, led his own men back again to the right wing; and that the Persians were thereupon brought back to their old position, and things were again put as they were before the conference with Aristeides. But that such a tradition could have come into existence without betraying its glaring inconsistency with the whole history of the war, is indeed astounding. If the narrative of the war be not a fiction throughout, Spartans had not only fought with Persians at Artemision, at Salamis, and at Thermopylai; but in each place they had conquered, for, if we adopt the traditional view, the struggle at Thermopylai was for them the most magnificent of victories. The heroism of Leonidas and his men had thrice made Xerxes leap from his throne in dismay; and yet this later story could assert with unblushing effrontery that no Spartan had ever yet fought with a Persian.¹⁰⁴¹ But

¹⁰⁴⁰ Σπαρτιητέων οὐδεὶς πεπείρηται Μήδων. Herod. ix. 46. The words are an unqualified statement which becomes untrue if exceptions be made to it. See note 804.

¹⁰⁴¹ No one will seriously maintain that Pausanias wished to avoid not the Persians

whatever may be the amount of romance worked into the narrative, the fight at Thermopylai remains a fact; and whatever may have been the changes of arrangement before the fight at Plataiai, the conference of Pausanias with Aristeides and his colleagues remains a fiction.¹⁰⁴² It is moreover a fiction with a purpose; and this purpose the author of it sought with no mean adroitness to conceal. If Pausanias could be made to admit the superiority of the Athenian forces, the glorification of Athens would be insured: but if it had been asserted that the changed arrangement for the battle was also the real arrangement during the battle, this version would have found its way to Sparta and there roused an indignant protest for its falsification of fact. By bringing the Spartans back to their old position after the fashion of the shot exercise in military prisons, this danger would be avoided. Few Spartans probably would hear this tradition; and as it left untouched the fact which was of most importance to them, they would not much care to notice it. Hence it became necessary to represent the change of arrangement as begun before daybreak; as, further, the change is ascribed to the tidings that Mardonios intended to fight on the morrow, it became necessary to provide a bearer of this news: and thus the fictions of the conference and the change made it necessary to invent lastly the night-ride of Alexandros.

but the Medes. Xerxes is himself 'The Mede;' and although the bravery of the Medes is nowhere disparaged, still the Persians are always spoken of as the better soldiers.

¹⁰⁴² Mardonios is said, further, in the story to have sent a messenger charged with the most bitter and contemptuous abuse of Pausanias. He was, he said, miserably disappointed in the Spartans. He had heard of their immovable rules which made it impossible for them either to retreat or to desert their ranks in war. Here he found them doing both, and doing this deliberately in order that they might fight with his slaves, while they left the Athenians to fight with his free Persians. Herod. ix. 48. All this, it is clear, was put together for the glorification of the Athenians; but although in this instance Pausanias and his Spartans were slandered, Mardonios might have asserted with more justice that the profound rigidity of Spartan discipline stood out in awkward contrast with Spartan vacillation and timidity in practice. When Leonidas, as it is said, dismissed his allies from Thermopylai, it was because the Spartan must never retreat. Yet Eurybiades, as we have seen, had insisted on retreating both from Artemision and from Salamis; and Kleombrotos had led his army home ignominiously from the Isthmus. See notes 937, 1012, 1033. Savagery is no guarantee against attacks of cowardice; and we have heard more than enough of the lofty standard of Spartan bravery.

The tradition adds that Mardonios challenged Pausanias to a combat which would be precisely parallel to the duel of Othryades and his 299 Spartans with the 300 Argives, see note 402, and that to this challenge no reply was made. It was, to say the least, as deserving of notice as the renewed challenge of the Argives to the Spartans, 420 B.C.

It is much to be regretted that Mr. Grote and Dr. Thirlwall should have allowed this flagrant contradiction to pass unnoticed. The complete refutation of such inventions is a most important step towards the ascertainment of fact.

BOOK
II.Attacks
of the
Persian
cavalry.

The tacit refusal of the Spartans to accept the challenge of Mardonios to single combat or duel had, it is said, greatly raised the hopes and courage of the Persian leader, who ordered a fresh attack of his cavalry. Their charge, we are told, caused great distress to the Greeks, who, for some reason wholly unexplained, seem to have been without any horsemen at all. What had become of all the horses which the class of Hippeis were bound to maintain for the service of the state? When Kimon the son of Miltiades hung up his bridle on the Akropolis close by that of Xanthippos his father's accuser,¹⁰⁴³ was no effort made to save the horses which for the time they were no longer able to use? These are questions which it may be impossible to answer; but the very inability to answer them must be taken as proving that we have not received the genuine history of the time.

The resist-
ance of
Amompha-
retos to the
orders of
Pausanias.

On the morning of the eleventh day the battle of Plataiai may be said practically to have begun, although the traditional narrative confines it to the day on which the infantry of the Persians came to close combat with the Hellenic hoplites. During the whole of the day preceding this final conflict, the Greek army was terribly pressed by constant charges of the Persian cavalry; and early in the day it became clear to the confederate generals that a change of position was indispensably necessary. The stream of Asopos in front of the Greeks had all along been useless for watering, as it was within range of the Persian bowmen. The whole army was forced, therefore, to obtain its supplies from the fountain or stream of Gargaphia, which is said by Herodotos to have been two miles and a half distant from the town of Plataiai. This fountain was now completely fouled and choked up by the trampling of the Persian horses: but about half-way between Gargaphia and Plataiai¹⁰⁴⁴ was a spot of ground called the island, as lying between two channels into which for a short space the little stream of Oëroë is divided in its descent from Kithairon. The ground thus inclosed between the points where the waters divided and again met was barely half a mile in

¹⁰⁴³ This tradition, it must be admitted, comes to us from Plutarch. *Themist.* 10. 11: *Kimon*, 5. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 151.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Herod. ix. 51, 52.

width, and it may be supposed (for the measurement is not given) about a mile and a half or two miles in length. Here, however, they would have not only an abundant supply of water, for the Persian cavalry could not reach the channel in their rear, but they would be protected from their attacks by the stream in front. To this spot therefore the generals resolved that the army should be transferred on the coming night: but whether from confusion or from fear the Peloponnesian allies, when the time for retreat came, fell back not on this so-called island, but on Plataiai itself, about a mile and a half further from the Asopos, and took up their position by the temple of Hêrê. Seeing these in retreat (and as he supposed, for the island), Pausanias gave the order to the Spartans also: but he encountered an unexpected opposition from Amompharetos, the captain of the Lochos of Pitana.¹⁰⁴⁵ This officer complained that, not having been summoned to the previous council,¹⁰⁴⁶ he was now commanded to retreat not merely against his better judgement but in violation of duty which forbade retreat to all Spartans under any circumstances. The former plea might be valid: the latter has a somewhat ludicrous air, when we remember the conduct of Eurybiades at Artemision and Salamis and the retreat of Kleombrotos with his army from the Isthmian wall: but if this plea was urged, it furnishes additional evidence of the falsehood of the traditions which immediately precede the account of his resistance. If he objected now to fall back on Oëroê, with what fierce indignation must he not have resisted the ignominious change which was to leave Spartans face to face with Persian slaves? Yet in that tradition Amompharetos offers no resistance to arrangements in the carrying out of which he must himself have taken part. If such had been the fact, his boasting now might have been silenced by the retort that there was but little honour in refusing to do what he had already done without a word of objection only a few hours before.

¹⁰⁴⁵ See note 158.

¹⁰⁴⁶ The words of Herodotos, ix. 53, are *ἄτε οὐ παραγεγόμενος τῷ πρότερον λόγῳ*. This must mean that he had not been invited. If his absence was voluntary, his resistance to the order of Pausanias would be an act of flagrant mutiny. If, having a right to vote, he had not been summoned, he might argue that the decision of the council was informal and invalid, and might therefore be justified in resisting it.

BOOK
II.The battle
of Plataiai.

With this obstacle to retreat it became impossible for Pausanias to carry out the decision of the council; and the Athenians, beginning to suspect, it would seem, that Spartan vacillation might end in open Medism, sent a herald to ascertain the state of affairs. He found the Spartan leaders in hot dispute with Amompharetos who, taking up a huge stone with both hands, placed it at the feet of Pausanias and said that thus he gave his vote against the dastardly proposal to turn their backs upon the enemy. • Having bestowed on him the epithet of madman, Pausanias turned to the Athenian messenger, and bidding him to report to Aristides how matters stood urged the immediate union of the Athenian with the Spartan forces. Amidst these disputes the night had passed away; and the sky was already lit with the dawn, when Pausanias, wearied out with the folly of Amompharetos, gave the order for retreat. The Spartans immediately fell back, keeping as near as they could to the heights of Kithairon in order to avoid the attacks of the Persian horsemen, while the Athenians, less cautious or less timid, moved along the plain.¹⁰⁴⁷ Having gone about a mile and a half they halted to see whether Amompharetos would follow. The departure of the Spartans and Tegeatans had soon convinced him that he could do but little good by imitating the example of Leonidas; and the Lochos of Pitana accordingly joined the main body. But their retreat had now become known in the Persian camp; and the Persian cavalry at once advanced to harass them as they had done the day before. As for Mardonios, the hand of the gods was heavy upon him. Summoning Thorax of Larissa, he bade him look on the cowardly flight of the Greeks whom he had held up as brave and honourable men. Such an opinion, he added, might be pardoned in Thorax: but the fear which Artabazos had shown of the Spartans was an offence not to be forgiven, and the king should assuredly hear of it. The threat, if uttered and reported to Artabazos, would go far towards accounting for his conduct later on in the day. Common care and prudence were now thrown to the winds. The Greeks were in full flight; and Mardonios

¹⁰⁴⁷ Herod. ix. 56.

had nothing to do but to let his men loose upon them. Hurriedly crossing the Asopos, he hastened with his Persians towards the higher ground where the Spartan troops might be seen winding along under the hill-side, for from the river's banks he could not catch sight of the Athenians who were hidden among the low hills which rose from the level plain. Without order or discipline, the hordes of the Persian subject tribes rushed after him, as though nothing more remained for them to do beyond the butchering of unresisting fugitives. The last momentous strife was now begun. Hard pressed by the Persian horsemen, Pausanias sent to beg instant succour from the Athenians on the lower ground. He added, it is said, a vehement condemnation of the Peloponnesian allies who had basely run away,—a condemnation scarcely justified by the fact that these allies, according to the traditional narrative, were barely a mile removed from them and might have been as easily summoned as the Athenians. But eager as the Athenians were to comply with his request and to send him all their bowmen, the attack of the Greeks in the Persian army who now flung themselves on the Athenians,¹⁰⁴⁸ rendered this impossible. To the Spartans and Tegeatans, thus cut off from their allies, it was a moment of supreme distress. Fifty-three thousand in all, they were opposed to the overwhelming numbers of Mardonios; and the sacrifices even now forbade any action except in the way of self-defence. This merely passive resistance enabled the Persians to make a rampart of their wicker-work shields, from behind which they shot their arrows with deadly effect. At last Pausanias, looking in agony towards the temple of Hêrê, besought the queen of heaven not to abandon them utterly. Scarcely had his prayer been offered, when the sacrifices were reported to be favourable; and the charge of the Tegeatans was followed by the onset of the Spartans. After a fierce fight the hedge of shields was thrown down, and the defeat of the barbarian host virtually insured. The Persians fought with almost more

¹⁰⁴⁸ Herod. ix. 61. This is the only mention made of the Greeks on the Persian side in the account of this battle, with the exception of the statement in ch. 67, that none practically did anything in the engagement except the Boiotians. Hence we cannot venture to speak positively of the amount of energy which they may have thrown into this onset against the Athenians.

than Hellenic heroism. Coming to close quarters, they seized the spears of their enemies, and broke off their heads; but they wore no body-armour, and they had no discipline. Rushing forward singly or in small groups, they were borne down in the crush and killed. Still they were not dismayed; and the battle raged most fiercely on the spot where Mardonios on his white war-horse fought with the flower of his troops. But at length Mardonios was slain (it is said, by the Spartan Aeimnestos);¹⁰⁴⁹ and when his chosen guards had fallen round him, the issue was no longer doubtful. The linen tunics of Persian soldiers were no avail in a conflict with brazen-coated hoplites. With the utmost speed the defeated barbarians made their way to their fortified camp, and took refuge behind its wooden walls.¹⁰⁵⁰

The retreat
of Artabazos.

Artabazos had awaited the battle with very definite resolutions. He despised with good reason the military arrangements of Mardonios; and he had no intention of allowing himself and his men to be slaughtered, if Mardonios should, as he foreboded, lose the day. His troops, therefore,—the forty thousand still remaining to him of the six myriads who guarded Xerxes on his retreat to the Hellespont,—received strict orders to look only to him and to follow his movements with the utmost promptness; and no sooner had the battle begun than, inviting his men verbally to follow him into it, he led them from the field. The flight of the Persians soon showed him that the day was lost; and putting spurs to his horse he hurried away with all speed into Phokis. Without pausing to answer the questions of the people, he rode on

¹⁰⁴⁹ Herod. ix. 64. No argument can be made to rest only on proper names, when these generally have meanings which may suit the parts played by those who bear them. If Aeimnestos is to be pronounced mythical merely because he was so called, Perikles may be pronounced mythical for the same reason. But when nothing is known of a man except a single action and when this action is for other reasons brought into suspicion, then his name may at least be taken into account whether as increasing or as lessening that suspicion. It is on the whole more likely that the man who slew Mardonios should be henceforward called the Ever Memorable, than that a man already called the Ever Memorable should have the good luck to kill the enemy's general. A like suspicion hangs over the names Pheidippides and Mnesiphilos. See notes 798, 969.

The body of Mardonios disappeared the day after the battle, and all efforts to trace it were fruitless. Many, it is said, received large gifts from his son Artontes on the plea that they had buried it. Herod. ix. 84.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Herodotus remarks that although the fight raged round the temple of Demeter, not a Persian was found dead within the sacred close or Temenos; and he accepts the fact as proving that the goddess would not receive men who had burnt the shrine in Eleusis, ix. 65. The fact belongs perhaps to the class of phenomena ascribed by Pausanias, viii. 33, 1, to the shadowless Lykousoura. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 361. See page 72.

into Thessaly, where the chiefs insisted on having him as their guest at a banquet, and prayed for news of the army of Mardonios. But whatever faith he could put in the good will of the oligarchs, he had by no means the same confidence in the disposition of the people, and he felt that a true confession might seriously endanger the safety of his men. He told them, therefore, that he had been dispatched on an urgent errand into Thrace, and admitting, it is said, that he would soon be followed by Mardonios and his army, begged them to welcome him with their usual hospitality. In his onward march through Makedonia and Thrace he lost many men,—we must suppose, in conflicts with the wild mountaineers, as well as by hunger and disease. He had no time now to tarry and punish them as he had punished the Olynthians; ¹⁰⁵¹ but in spite of all that his enemies could do, he brought the bulk of his troops safely to Byzantion, and thence crossed over with them into Asia. Mardonios was no longer alive to carry out the threat which he had uttered on the morning of the fight at Plataiai; and Artabazos succeeded so well in justifying his acts to his master that we shall find him satrap of Daskyleion in the later history of the Spartan Pausanias.

One body of men alone held their ground when on the death of Mardonios and the defeat of his Persians all the rest of his army fled in utter confusion. These were the Theban oligarchs. They felt doubtless that they had gone too far to leave any hope of making their peace with the Spartans and their allies, and we may do them the justice to say that without the tyranny which the victory of Xerxes might have enabled them to exercise life was to them scarcely worth the living for. Three hundred of these patricians fell fighting on the field. The rest made their way as best they could to Thebes, but not before their horsemen had inflicted signal chastisement on those of the allies who had taken up their post at the Heraion. These Corinthian, Megarian, and Phliasian troops, on hearing that a battle was being fought and that the day was going against the Persians, hurried in disgraceful disorder to bear their part in the struggle: and

Obstinate
resistance
of the
Thebans.

¹⁰⁵¹ See p. 554.

BOOK
II.

The storming of the Persian camp.

six hundred were smitten down by the Theban cavalry under Asopodoros, while the rest were ignominiously driven back upon Kithairon.

If the Persians on finding themselves within their fortified camp hoped that its wooden walls would keep out the enemy, they were soon to be disappointed. To the Spartans, whose incompetence in all siege operations was notorious, they opposed an effectual barrier; but Athenian skill and resolution effected a breach after a terrible struggle. Headed by the Tegeatans, the allies burst like a deluge into the incampment; and the Persians, losing all heart, sought wildly to hide themselves like deer flying from lions. Then followed a carnage so fearful that of 260,000 men not 3,000, it is said, remained alive. On the side of the Greeks we are told that only 91 Spartan citizens had fallen, while the Tegeatans lost only 16, and the Athenians only 52. It may, of course, be urged that this list does not include the Lakedaimonians who were not Spartiatai; but all the figures seem alike unworthy of credit. The narrative has exhibited the Spartans as terribly pressed by the Persian horsemen on both days of the battle, especially during the time of passive resistance before the omens were pronounced favourable; and the Athenians were fighting with no contemptible enemies when they encountered the Theban oligarchs. The Mantineans and Eleians, according to Herodotos, had no pleasant memories of Plataiai. They arrived too late for the battle; and as Pausanias would not allow them to pursue the flying Persians into Thessaly, they returned home with feelings of anger which vented itself in sentences of exile passed upon their generals.

Personal details of the battle.

The work begun at Marathon was now brought to its fitting end. The shattered power of Persia could never attempt again on the same scale the conquest of Europe. The triumph of order and law is achieved; and the personal details of the victory lose their interest. But the allies may well have felt a legitimate pride in assigning the places of merit to those who had been pre-eminent in the fight: and the story of Sophanes of Dekeleia, the foremost Athenian, who caught his enemies with a brazen anchor and then smote them down, called forth

doubtless the plaudits of eager listeners throughout all Attica.¹⁰⁵² The Spartans likewise could boast of their champion Poseidonios, although by a refinement of cruelty they refused to pay any honour to the luckless Aristodemos who had committed the deadly sin of surviving the fight at Thermopylai. They had tortured him into weariness of life, and they now charged him with wantonly throwing it away, when he fell fighting like a man who plainly showed that he cared not to leave the field alive. One other name is mentioned. It is that of a man whose exploits, it may have been hoped, would match his exceeding beauty: but Kallikrates was wounded in the lungs by a Persian arrow while Pausanias was waiting for favourable sacrifices, and he died lamenting not that his life was cut short, but that he was unable to strike a blow for his country.¹⁰⁵³

The later history of Pausanias is full of disaster and disgrace: but the narrative of the battle of Plataiai brings before us a series of pictures which exhibit the Spartan leader in aspects strikingly contrasted with the closing scenes of his life. In these later scenes he is the selfish and sensual despot who cares for nothing but wealth and luxury: but in the hours of victory at Plataiai he appears as the severe and high-minded Spartan who feels that in stern discipline there is a power not to be overcome by irresponsible tyrants. Among the women found in the Persian camp is the daughter of Hegetoridas of Kos, who beseeches him to save her from the shameful lot which the fortune of war had inflicted upon her. Pausanias assured her that, as a suppliant, she was fully intitled to his protection, even if she had not been the child of one of his most intimate friends, and at her wish he sent her subsequently to Aigina. In the next picture the Spartan leader is represented as answering Lampon, who urges him to crucify the body of Mardonios in requital of the indignities to which Mardonios and Xerxes had subjected the body of Leonidas. Lampon, he said, might think himself happy in escaping scathless after giving advice better befit-

The gathering and division of the spoil.

¹⁰⁵² The circulation of the story cannot of itself vouch for the fact. The use of irregular weapons and modes of fighting is scarcely consistent even with Athenian discipline in the age of Themistokles;—with that of Sparta it would be impossible.

¹⁰⁵³ Herod. ix. 72. His name may be compared with that of Mnesiphilos. Note 1049.

ting savages than Greeks. Leonidas needed no such satisfaction. He and they who died with him at Thermopylai had been amply avenged in the death of the myriads whose bodies cumbered the plain. The third picture exhibits Pausanias as the impartial divider of spoils by whose splendour he is by no means dazzled. The Tegeatans had plundered the magnificent tent of Mardonios; and they dedicated to Athênê Alea the brazen manger at which his horse was fed.¹⁰⁵⁴ But with these exceptions all the spoil was by the order of Pausanias brought into one common stock. The helots accordingly gathered all the costly things with which the camp was filled,—a treasure far exceeding that which enriched Ameinokles, on the rock-bound shores of Magnesia.¹⁰⁵⁵ Tents and couches blazing with gold and silver, golden goblets and drinking vessels, were too large to be easily secreted: but there still remained to these helots a rich harvest of rings, bracelets, and jewels of gold which the Aiginetans, we are told, were willing enough to buy from them as brass, thus laying the foundations of the great wealth for which they were afterwards conspicuous. This vast treasure supplied the materials for a golden tripod at Delphoi, and for colossal brazen statues of Zeus and Poseidon at Olympia and the Isthmus. Of the rest each man received his due share, a tenth of everything being reserved for Pausanias who became at once the possessor of enormous wealth. But although he was thus subjected to the temptation which brought him to ruin, the epical conception which pervades the whole history of the time demanded yet another picture in which the future traitor should on the very verge of the precipice bear witness to the infinite superiority of Spartan poverty over Oriental luxury. The dazzling furniture which Xerxes left with Mardonios suggested to him, it is said, the idea of a banquet prepared after Persian fashion, to be placed alongside of a simple Lakonian meal on another table. Laughing at the absurd contrast, Pausanias sent for the Greek generals and bade them mark the folly of the man who, faring thus sumptuously, had come to rob the Greeks of their sorry food.

The next task of the Greeks was that of burying their dead.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Herod. ix. 70.

¹⁰⁵⁵ See page 503.

Of the disposal of the Persian bodies not a word is said, although the burial of nearly 400,000 corpses would be no light or easy task. For the Lakedaimonian dead there were three graves, while the Tegeatans, the Athenians, and the Megarians with the Phliasians, had severally one. These, the historian adds, were real graves: but empty tombs, he tells us, bore the names of towns whose citizens were not present at the battle. The fact speaks volumes on the value of public monuments for which we cannot adduce further evidence from contemporary writings. The Plataians had well deserved the gratitude of the non-medising states for the zeal with which in spite of all obstacles they had clung to the Hellenic cause. For the present this gratitude was sincerely felt and largely manifested. The sacrifice of thanksgiving for the great victory over Mardonios was offered by Pausanias to Zeus the deliverer in their Agora. The Plataians were declared autonomous, or, in other words, were freed from all connexion with the Boiotian confederacy, while from the spoil they received 80 talents, to enable them to celebrate fitly the yearly commemorative feast, to keep up the tombs, and to build a temple of Athênê. Finally, the allies bound themselves to regard the Plataian territory as inviolable and to combine for the prevention of any invasions of that territory by others. It would have been happy for Greece if this covenant had been kept. But treaties cannot eradicate the vices of a people; and disunion, jealousy, and selfishness were the incurable vices of all the Hellenic cities without exception, the only difference between one state and another lying in the degree of strength which these vices had acquired. For the present the sky was clear. The Spartans and Athenians with their allies renewed the oath which pledged them, it is said, never to make terms with the barbarian, to punish the medising states by the confiscation of a tenth of all their property, and to keep up an everlasting memorial of the great struggle by leaving in ruins all the temples which the Persians had thrown down or burnt. Lastly they decreed the maintenance of a definite force for carrying on the war, and the summoning of a congress each year at Plataiai,—so

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at Plataiai.

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of Thebes.

far were they from venturing to think that for purposes of aggression the power of Persia was already broken.

Eleven days after the battle the allied forces appeared before the walls of Thebes, and demanded the surrender of the citizens who were responsible for the Medism of the country, and more especially of Timagenidas and Attaginos. The refusal of the Thebans was followed not only by a blockade but by the systematic devastation of the land. Nine days later Timagenidas urged his fellow-citizens to ascertain whether Pausanias wanted money, and in this case to pay it to him out of the public treasury, inasmuch as the Medism with which they were charged was the common act of all the citizens (a statement, probably, strictly true); but he added that if this would not content the Spartans, he and the others who had been demanded were ready to surrender themselves. Attaginos, it seems, was of a different opinion. He made his escape; and his children were handed over in his stead to Pausanias, who refused to punish them for an offence of which they had not been guilty. The citizens surrendered relied, it is said, on their wealth: but Pausanias, fearing that bribery might bring impunity for their great criminals, hastily dismissed his allies, and taking these Thebans to the isthmus, there put them all to death.¹⁰⁵⁶

Movements
of the
Greek fleet
to Samos
and
Mykalé.

The Persian army had been destroyed, and no hope remained of retrieving the disasters which left them powerless on European ground. But the Persian fleet still watched the Ionian coasts, and Tigranes with an army of 60,000 men kept guard in Ionia itself.¹⁰⁵⁷ That the Persian fleet had been seriously crippled, if not left unserviceable, by the defeat at Salamis, was well known to the Asiatic Greeks and to the islanders of the Egean. In the previous autumn, much as Themistokles may have wished to sail straight to

¹⁰⁵⁶ That the influence of the Boiotian oligarchs even over their own countrymen fell short of their desires, is proved by the signal instance of the great poet Pindar, whose loyalty to Hellas never wavered. Pindar was thirty years old at the time of the battle of Marathon. He had therefore attained the full maturity of judgement, when Xerxes with his myriads sat down before Thermopylai; and with him, as with Herodotos, see page 487, Athens was emphatically the prop and mainstay of Greek freedom, ἐπίστυμα Ἑλλάδος. It is said that the Athenians rewarded him by making him their Proxenos, or, by another version of the tale, that they paid the fine inflicted on him by the oligarchs for refusing to join in their Medism. His feeling of intense relief and thankfulness on the triumph of the Greek cause is expressed in the last Isthmian ode. See, further, an article in the *Westminster Review*, October 1872, p. 311.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Herod. ix. 96.

the Hellespont and there to cut off the retreat of the Persians by a movement which might even throw the despot into his hands, there was an obstacle to this plan which both he and the allied commanders regarded as insurmountable. Mardonios still remained in Western Hellas with his huge army; and the Athenians might at any moment be compelled to quit their homes. But when after the second burning of Athens the Persian leader had withdrawn his hosts into Boiotia and had been followed by a Hellenic force fully capable of coping with them, the Greek fleet was no longer needed to co-operate with the army on land; and the commanders were free to comply with the prayers of the Asiatic Ionians for help against their barbarian masters.¹⁰⁵⁸ They sailed, accordingly, as far as Delos; and here for some time they remained; not certainly from the absurd fancy which the tradition of a later day assigned to them,¹⁰⁵⁹ but from the more reasonable desire for information which might justify them in venturing further. If Mardonios had been victorious in Boiotia as Xerxes had been at Thermopylai, the fleet would at once be needed for the protection of the Peloponnesos, even if the task of guarding Athens should be given up as hopeless. It would be rash also to infer from the mere departure of the Persian fleet that its strength was permanently broken, or even that it might not reappear as formidable as ever. On this point they received from a Samian embassy tidings which seemed to make their way sufficiently clear. The ambassadors, who had got off from Samos without the knowledge of the Persians and of Theomestor whom they had set up as despot of the island, assured them that the spirit of the Persian troops was broken; that the mere sight of their western kinsmen would rouse the Asiatic Greeks; that in all likelihood the barbarians would not remain to be attacked, and that, if they should remain, the allies could never hope to have hereafter a more

¹⁰⁵⁸ We can scarcely suppose that the movement of the fleet to Delos mentioned in Herodotos, viii. 132, took place before the final retreat of Mardonios from Attica. The Athenian commander Xanthippos joined the Spartan admiral Leotychides at Aigina in the spring; and at this time Mardonios, exasperated by the rejection of the terms which he had offered to the Athenians, again invaded Attica. It was probably not before midsummer that the final evacuation of Athenian territory left the admirals at liberty to carry on operations elsewhere.

¹⁰⁵⁹ See notes 804, 1040.

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favourable opportunity for crushing them utterly; that the Persian fleet was scarcely seaworthy, and at best was no match for that of the Greeks; and, finally, that they were perfectly willing to surrender themselves as hostages for the good faith of their report. Turning round to the speaker, Leotychides asked his name. 'I am called Hegesistratos (the leader of armies),' was the reply. 'I accept the omen of your name,' cried the Spartan, 'and I ask only for your pledge that the Samians will deal truly by us.' The promise was eagerly given, and the allied fleet, sailing to Samos, took up its position in battle array off Kalamoi, the southern point of the island facing a temple of Hêrê. The challenge was deliberately declined by the Persian admiral. The result of the fight at Salamis left him but slight hope of victory by sea; and he determined to disembark his men and join Tigranes for operations on land. Sailing therefore to the mainland barely ten miles distant, he drew up his ships on the shore beneath the heights of Mykalê between a temple of the Potniai or Mighty Beings who befriended Oidipous at Kolonos, and a shrine of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr.¹⁰⁶⁰ Here behind a rampart of stones, strengthened by stout stakes, which he cast up round his ships, he made ready at once to sustain a siege and to win a victory, for on the latter, it is said, he counted as surely as on the former.

The battle
of Mykalê.

The withdrawal of the Persians perplexed the Greek commanders: but the doubt whether they should return home or sail to the Hellespont was solved by a speedy decision to land their forces and decide the quarrel on shore. Each step, which showed that their enemies thought more of defence than attack, naturally raised their hopes and their courage; and with their gangways ready for landing their men they sailed towards Mykalê. On nearing the promontory they saw the Persian ships stowed away behind the rampart and the shore lined with troops. Repeating the device of Themistokles off the Euboian coast, Leotychides, it is said, ordered a loud-voiced herald to sail as near the shore as he could and pray the Ionians in the coming fight to strike boldly not for their Persian oppressors but for their

¹⁰⁶⁰ This seems to be the meaning of the expression of Herodotos, ix. 97: but the spot can no longer be identified from his description.

own freedom and for the aid of their kinsfolk. The device was scarcely needed to rouse the suspicions of the Persians. The charge brought against them by the Phenicians at Salamis had probably a fair foundation in fact; and it would be rash to look to them for faithful service in the scene of their old revolt. The Samians at best were not to be trusted.¹⁰⁶¹ These were accordingly disarmed, while, to get them out of the way, the Milesians were sent to guard the paths leading up to the heights of Mykalê. Thus having taken precautions against dangers on their own side, they awaited the attack of the Greeks behind the hedge of wicker shields on which Mardonios and his men relied at Plataiai. Their enemies were now fast advancing against them: but the Athenians with the allies who came next to them, moving along the more level ground near the sea, were able to begin the fight, while the Spartans were making their way with difficulty on the rugged slopes of the mountain. Here, as elsewhere, the Persians fought as they had fought in the days of Cyrus. But the conditions of the conflict were changed. They had now to face the orderly ranks of the Athenians, and of Athenians spurred to redoubled efforts by their eagerness to decide the day before the Spartans could come up and share the fight. After a desperate struggle the shield-wall of the Persians shared the fate of the English shield-wall at Hastings:¹⁰⁶² nor is it any disparagement to the countrymen of Harold to compare them with men whose bravery would have won them lasting fame in a better cause. The rampart of shields was broken, and the mighty mass of the Athenians burst in: but the Persians still fought on, until they were borne back to the wall of wood and stone which sheltered the ships of the fleet. The issue of the fight was now virtually decided. Behind this last rampart the Persians again made a stand: but Athenian determination and discipline burst this barrier also, and the main body of the barbarians fled in dismay. Still the Persians maintained the conflict, and in small knots strove

¹⁰⁶¹ They had set free and sent back to Attica the Athenians who had been found by Xerxes in Athens or Attica and who had been sent by him as prisoners to Asia. Herod. x. 99. See page 524.

¹⁰⁶² Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, iii. 492.

as they might to stem the iron torrent which was bursting through the breached wall. Here fell the generals Mardontes and Tigranes, while the admirals Artayntes and Ithamitres made their escape. Here also amongst many of the allies fell the Sikyonian leader Perilaos. But the Spartans had now joined in the fight. The disarmed Samians, probably seizing the weapons of the dead, took part with the Western Greeks, and with the Asiatic Ionians openly fell upon the barbarians. These, it is said, had intended in case of defeat to intrench themselves on the heights of Mykalé, a perilous post for men who could obtain no supplies while their enemies held the land beneath them: but to such straits they were never to be put. The Milesians, to whom they had trusted for guidance to these mountain strongholds, led them by paths which brought them down among their enemies, and at last, turning fiercely upon them, massacred them without mercy.

Foundation
of the
maritime
empire of
Athens.

The victory was achieved, and, as the story runs, achieved on the evening of the very day which had seen the destruction of Mardonios and his people at Plataiai.¹⁰⁶³ The glory

¹⁰⁶³ It was asserted that when the Greeks were making ready to attack the Persians, there passed instantaneously through their whole army a Phémê or Rumour that at that very moment their kinsmen were winning a victory over Mardonios in Boiotia, while a herald's staff seen lying on the sea-beach attested the truth of the impression. The historian adds that the battle of Plataiai was fought early in the day, that of Mykalé late in the afternoon: and it would almost seem that he notes this alleged fact in order to give time for the voyage of this staff from the Boiotian coast to that of Ionia. He further notes here the coincidence that a temple of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr stood on both the battle-fields, as in the story of Miltiades he has been careful to say that the Athenians who had camped in the Hêracleion at Marathon on the morning of the fight incamped in the evening of the same day near the Hêracleion in Kynosarges. See page 434. Such epical coincidences would have for him a special charm, and would be further illustrated by the alleged coincidence of the battles of Salamis and Himera.

Much stress has been laid on this Phémê or Rumour; and the ideas attached to it by the Greeks are fully set forth by Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* v. 263. But while it must be admitted that this Rumour was held to be a divine voice or vocal goddess, we may yet notice the differences in its operation. When the horsemen of Mardonios surrounded the men of Phokis, see p. 574, the Phémê went through all their ranks, as well as through the bystanders, that the hour of their death was come; but the appearance of the horsemen, and, even without this, the order of Mardonios commanding the Phokians to stand by themselves, would sufficiently account for the impression. At Mykalé it is not easy to determine from the words of Herodotos whether the Phémê preceded the coming, or rather the sight, of the herald's staff, or whether the sight of the staff conveyed to all the instantaneous knowledge of the victory at Plataiai. The two instances suffice to show that the Phémê was not always to be trusted. If the impression at Mykalé was proved to be correct, the anticipation of the Phokians was not realised. We may, if we please, connect this Phémê of the old Greek world with that apparently spontaneous impulse of a multitude which seems for the time to efface each man's individuality. The vehement language in which French writers not unfrequently give utterance to excited thought may impart a semblance of personality to the common impulse of a crowd. M. Michelet's account of the destruction of the Bastille, cited by Mr. Grote, is only an instance of a narrative which rejects a human originating cause, because we cannot ascertain by whom the scheme was set in motion. The crowd which attacked the Bastille may have been an extraordinarily large or powerful crowd; the impression may have become universal with a rapidity unknown before; and the separate wills of

of the day belonged chiefly to the Athenians, and foremost among the Athenians in merit was the pankratiast Hermolykos. The Persian ships were all burnt; and with the booty, which included some hoards of money, the allies sailed to Samos. Here a grave question demanded their care. Ionia was again in revolt against the Persians: how were the Western Greeks to defend their kinsfolk on the Asiatic continent? Insisting that such a task was beyond their power, the Peloponnesian commanders strongly urged the adoption of an Eastern fashion and the transference of the Asiatic Greeks bodily to the lands which the medising Greeks had righteously forfeited. Whatever might be the difficulty of carrying out so vast a plan, the Athenians expressed an invincible repugnance to the plan itself. They could not bear that Ionia should be abandoned to barbarians; and they denied the right of their allies to arrange the affairs of Athenian colonists. Delighted to be thus armed with a valid excuse for withdrawing from all interference in the matter, the Spartans at once gave way; and the oath of faithful and permanent alliance immediately given by the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and other islanders, laid the foundation of the maritime empire of Athens, and was doubtless followed by the immediate expulsion of the tyrants Strattis and Theomestor from Chios and Samos.¹⁰⁶⁴

Having finished its work at Mykalé, the Greek fleet departed on the main errand which had brought it eastwards,—the destruction, namely, of the bridges across the Hellespont. The mere statement of this fact is enough to show that they had not been deterred from undertaking the same task immediately after the battle of Salamis by any

The siege
of Sestos.

the men who composed the throng may have been merged to a pre-eminent degree in the execution of the purpose, or, in other words, may have been blended with unusual harmony. But with the features modified this is only the history of all crowds which seek to do anything; and it holds good of the Porteous mob only to a less extent than of the one to which M. Michelet boldly avers that no man gave the impulse. For this originating cause, however, we have not far to seek. The one absorbing passion of the day among the mass of the people was hatred of feudal tyranny; and for them this tyranny was embodied or personified in the Bastille. The upspringing of a simultaneous and universal resolution to destroy it seems to be a result neither supernatural nor wonderful.

¹⁰⁶⁴ It is perhaps scarcely worth while to note that Diodoros, xi. 37, represents the Athenians as agreeing at first in the proposal to transfer the Ionians to Western Hellas, and the Ionians themselves as heartily pleased with the plan. The Athenians, he says, changed their mind, fearing that the Ionians thus taken from their homes by the common act of the Greeks would cease to reverence Athens as their mother-city.

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fear that Xerxes, thus cut off from retreat, might become dangerous like a stag at bay. So far as they knew, the army of Mardonios still retained its power of mischief in Boiotia; but yet there was no hesitation in depriving his forces of the means of escape from Europe into Asia.¹⁰⁶⁵ It seems clear that they had been deterred from the work then, solely by their inability to leave the Attic coast, while Mardonios still remained master of the country as far as Peiraieus and Phaleron. On reaching the Hellespont they learnt that winds and storms had shattered the bridges and rendered them useless before the Persian king presented himself on its western shore; and Leotychides felt that here he had nothing more to do. But the Athenians could not thus abandon the Chersonesos. The heirs of its former Athenian occupants would be anxious to recover the possessions of which Persian conquest had deprived them; and the Athenians generally would need no arguments to convince them that they would do well to make themselves masters of the highway of trade between Western Hellas and the corn-growing lands of the Danube and the Euxine. To these political grounds, which led the Athenians to lay siege to Sestos, there was added a personal feeling of hatred to the satrap Artayktes. When Xerxes crossed the Hellespont in full pride of power, Artayktes had obtained from him as a gift the house of a man who, as he said, had been killed in invading Persian territory; and on the strength of this gift he had plundered the shrine of the hero Protesilaos at Elaious and defiled his Temenos.¹⁰⁶⁶ For this crime he now found himself suddenly blockaded in Sestos. He had made no preparations for a siege; but so stoutly did he hold out, that the Athenian leaders could still the murmurs of their men only by saying that they could not give up their post until they should receive a summons to do so from Athens. The end, however, was near. The miserable inhabitants of the place had been driven to eat the ropes of their beds when Oiobazos and Artayktes made their escape by night with the Persian garrison; and the people at daybreak gladly opened the gates to the besiegers. Oiobazos, making his way into Thrace,

¹⁰⁶⁵ See page 548.¹⁰⁶⁶ See note 878.

was taken by the Apsinthians and sacrificed to their god Pleistoros. Artaÿktes and his guards, intercepted in their flight at the Goat's River (Aigospotamoi), the Allia of later Athenian history, were defeated after a severe fight; and Artaÿktes with the survivors was taken back to Sestos. Here the story went that as one of his warders was cooking some salted fish, the fishes leaped and gasped as if they had but just come out of the water and that Artaÿktes applied the prodigy to himself. Protesilaos the hero was the fish who had been long dead but who still demanded vengeance on the man who had hurt him. He expressed his wish, therefore, to atone for his sin against that hero by offering a hundred talents at his shrine, and also to give two hundred talents to obtain his own freedom. It is possible, though, it is said, under the circumstances not likely, that Xanthippos might have accepted the ransom: but the men of Elaïous would be satisfied with nothing less than his death. He was therefore led away to the western end of the shattered bridge, or, as some said, to the hill above the city of Madytos. There his son was stoned to death before his eyes; and Artaÿktes, hung on some wooden planks nailed together, was left to die of hunger, looking down on the scenes of his former pleasures.¹⁰⁶⁷ This done, the Athenian fleet sailed home, laden with treasure and with the huge cables of the broken bridges, to be dedicated in the temples as memorials of the struggle thus gloriously ended.

The re-
wards of
Masistes.

A few of the Persians succeeded in reaching the heights of Mykalê after the battle; and these escaped afterwards to Sardeis, where Xerxes was still sojourning after his retreat from Attica. As they marched on, Masistes, the son of Dareios and brother of Xerxes, bitterly reviled the general Artaÿntes as worse than a woman for bringing this disaster upon the king. Artaÿntes had listened patiently for some time; but these words exhausted his forbearance, and he had drawn his dagger to kill Masistes, when he was dashed to the ground by the Halikarnassian Xeinagoras.¹⁰⁶⁸ Yet one more picture completes the wonderful narrative in which Herodotos has given

¹⁰⁶⁷ See page 173.

¹⁰⁶⁸ In requital for this service Xerxes made Xeinagoras satrap of Kilikia. It is not unlikely that from Xeinagoras Herodotos, like him a Halikarnassian, obtained the narrative of these incidents.

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to us the history of the world down to his own day. In Sardis Xerxes saw and sought to gain possession of the wife of Masistes. Failing in this, he betrothed the daughter of Masistes to his own son Dareios and then departed to Sousa, where he brought the bride into his palace.¹⁰⁶⁹ The despot's lust was now turned from the mother to the child, the wife of his son: but the Sultana Amestris, happening to see the girl with a robe which she had made and given to the king, determined to destroy not the young bride but her mother. On the birthday of Xerxes, when her request could not be refused, Amestris demanded the wife of Masistes; and Xerxes after a long dispute had to give way. Sending for Masistes, he requested him to yield up his wife and take the daughter of Xerxes in her stead. 'My wife,' answered Masistes, 'is the mother of my sons and of my daughters, one of whom thou hast given in marriage to thine own son. Why then should I give up my wife whom I love? There are others who deserve thy daughter better: leave me to dwell with my wife in peace.' 'Then,' cried Xerxes, bursting into rage, 'thou shalt neither marry my daughter nor keep thy wife.' Before Masistes could reach his home, Amestris had seized and mutilated his wife and sent her back shamefully mangled. Taking hasty counsel with his sons, the unhappy man, whose zeal in his brother's service had received this rich reward, set out for Baktra; and Xerxes, well knowing that this journey was only a prelude to war, sent after him and slew him with his children and all his army.¹⁰⁷⁰ So fared it with the loves of king Xerxes. Unhappily, we have but little reason for calling into question, at least in its general outlines, this disgusting tale of miserable weakness and loathsome brutality; but whatever be the measure of its truth, the scene is a striking close to the chronicle of a man who

¹⁰⁶⁹ This tradition may be taken as counterbalancing and setting aside the representation of Æschylos as a mere poetical picture. See note 998. A savage pondering these abominable iniquities would not have generosity enough to mourn the death of men who had fallen in his service.

¹⁰⁷⁰ If this phrase, Herod. ix. 113, be taken to mean more than a body-guard of moderate size, which could stand no chance against an overwhelmingly large force, there must have been a pitched battle. It is not likely that Masistes, having already made up his mind to revolt, would without a struggle allow the soldiers of Xerxes to do their errand of butchery. Probably not a single Persian tradition, and perhaps not a single tradition relating to Persian affairs, can be found in which anything can be received as historical beyond the general features of the story.

had sought to repress in the deadly bonds of Persian thralldom the intellect and freedom of the world. The contrast must likewise have presented itself to the mind of the historian unless, on little evidence or none, we hold that he did not intend here to end his narrative. If we cannot so believe, then we may think that Herodotos did well to portray in his last picture the physical and moral degradation of the despot who had sought to decide the long quarrel which began with the wrongs of Io and Medeia, of Eurôpê and Helen, and who decided it to his own cost.

Thus in this history of the Persian wars we have the narrative of a struggle, the general features of which stand out with sufficient clearness. But it is a tale in which every incident must be submitted to a searching test before we can admit it without reserve, and in which the most plausible statements will not unfrequently be found the least trustworthy. From the beginning to the end we trace an ethical or religious purpose overlying or putting out of sight all political causes and motives, and substituting appeals to exploits done in the mythical ages for less fictitious but more substantial services. Throughout we find narratives constructed to meet a popular saying or illustrate a popular belief. We find national struggles which are beyond doubt historical enlivened by imaginary combats of well-chosen champions, and momentous national changes in which a contradiction runs through the most important features. We find a sequence of events in which every step and every turn is ushered in by tokens and wonders or by the visible intervention of gods and heroes. We find legend and fable interwoven with the unadorned details of political intercourse and the movements of fleets and armies. But we find also in the great men of that city in which was centred the salvation of the Hellenic world a distinct and deliberate policy which neither sign nor portent, seer nor soothsayer, dream nor marvel, can avail to crush or even to turn aside,—a foresight which takes the true measure of their enemy's power and their own,—a character as real and as tangible as that of any of the great men who have done good service to our own country or to any other land in Christendom.

General
character of
the history
of the Per-
sian war.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A. (Page 287.)

RECENT RECONSTRUCTIONS OF ASSYRIAN HISTORY.

THE conquest of Nineveh by Kyaxares is assigned by Clinton to the year 606 B.C., but there is no basis for so definite a chronology. At the most, we can say no more than that it took place about this time. Assyrian inscriptions might have removed the matter beyond doubt: but thus far they are not forthcoming. The subject of Assyrian chronology and history is not directly connected with the history of Greece; but as the trustworthy reconstruction of Assyrian annals must more or less affect the landmarks of all ancient history, it becomes a duty to speak plainly of such attempts at reconstruction as appear to be not trustworthy. It is unnecessary to call into question the reading of any Assyrian inscriptions; but even if we grant that every one of them has been rightly deciphered and that the inscriber may, further, be trusted whenever he speaks of himself or of those between whom and himself we possess a series of contemporary registers whether in the shape of cylinders or in any other form, it cannot be too strongly asserted that the monuments discovered by recent excavators do not supply a continuous history or afford the help needed to clear up real difficulties. The date of the destruction of Nineveh is held by Niebuhr to be decisively fixed by the era of Nabonassar which is supposed to begin with the year 748 B.C. *Lect. on Anc. Hist.* i. 29. But in truth there is no reason for supposing that this era marks any political change whatever, the only revolution then effected being apparently the adoption of the Egyptian solar year for astronomical purposes. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 393, note. Sir Cornewall Lewis, who asserts that this era was never used for any other purpose, *Astron. Anc.* 27, adds that Nabonassar is nowhere else mentioned as king either of Assyria or of Babylon, and that of the eighteen kings between Nabonassar and Cyrus not more than five or six can be identified with any known name either in sacred or profane writers.

But more particularly every historian is bound to enter his em-

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phatic protest against the method employed in recent reconstructions of Assyrian history, unless he approves of that method: and it is impossible that any can approve it, unless they can bring themselves to look upon history as a field for ingenious conjectures and for the statement of things possible, or likely, as if they were ascertained facts. That this has been done by recent writers on Assyrian history, can scarcely be questioned. For vast periods in the course of the history, and generally for the critical periods, the inscriptions hitherto discovered furnish no information whatever. This is the case with all the earlier Mesopotamian kings: and their history is therefore settled by allowing them reigns of twenty years apiece. Luckily the dearth of events is so great that the arrangement makes little difference: but a mapping out of the kings of England between the Danish Cnut and the Norman William on this plan might lead us to separate by forty years the battles of Stamford Bridge and Senlac or Hastings. Not only has the succession been given of the dynasties of the Assyrian monarchy, of which Mr. Grote holds that nothing certain can be affirmed of its beginning, its extent, or even of the mode in which it was put down: but we are further told that it was preceded by an earlier empire set up by a people called Chaldeans, and that it was this empire which was restored in the person of Nabonassar, whose era furnishes the ground for asserting that Urukh, the seventh king of Nimrod's dynasty, reigned from about B.C. 2093 to B.C. 2070, and that Ismidagon was king as early as 1850 B.C. We have, however, no warrant for saying that the first Mesopotamian monarchy was set up by Ethiopian invaders from Africa or that the Chaldeans were a nation. Herodotos, i. 181, distinctly says that they were simply the priestly order among the Assyrians of Babylon; and to this assertion Mr. Grote adheres with Heeren. Mr. Rawlinson himself admits that in the native documents of the early period the name does not occur at all, *Ancient Eastern Monarchies*, i. 70, and that there is no evidence that they applied the name to themselves or that it was even known to them in primitive times, *ib.* i. 75. In this mode of reconstruction either no distinction is drawn between history and fiction, or it is drawn on purely arbitrary grounds. Thus while we are asked to trust the lower items in computations which run back to 490,000 or 500,000 years, we are told that Evechios and Chomasbelos, the two kings who stand at the head of the Mesopotamian sovereigns in the lists of Berossos, must be rejected, because the names seem mythical rather than real, and represent not men but personages in the Babylonian Pantheon—Rawlinson, *Ancient Eastern Monarchies*, i. 190. It may, I think, be fairly urged that Berossos is here too hardly dealt with,—that quite possibly and even probably the word ΕΥΗΧΙΟΣ may have been ΕΦΗΧΙΟΣ in the original manuscripts of Berossos,—that ΕΦΗΧ is clearly the same as the

Erech of Nimrod's empire, and the Uruk whose reign is the first on which the cuneiform inscriptions are said to throw any light; that in Chomasbelos we have a name compounded, after Assyrian fashion, of the two gods Chomas and Belos, and that the name is therefore identical with that of Shamas-vul, the seventh king in the monumental series.

But the names of the so-called Chaldean kings which have been deciphered from the monuments are not given in the lists of the chronologists: and thus we have to determine first whether apart from collateral testimony the inscriptions can in all cases be trusted. Sufficient reasons have, probably, been given already for answering this question in the negative, while a further allowance must be made for Assyrian bombast and exaggeration. But not only are there large periods of which no monuments remain. The Berosian lists are also full of gaps, which render them unavailable for chronological purposes unless they can be filled up. We might suppose that the deficiency is to be made good by the discovery of a contemporary historical literature for the times in question. The process is in reality much simpler, the object being not so much the ascertainment of fact as the raising of a coherent arithmetical fabric. This fabric, it would seem, has been raised by a German writer after the following fashion:—

‘Assuming that the division between the earlier and the later Assyrian dynasty synchronises with the celebrated era of Nabonassar, B.C. 747, which is probable but not certain, and taking the year B.C. 538 as the admitted date of the conquest of the last Chaldean king by Cyrus, he (Herr Gutschmid) obtains for the seventh, or second Assyrian, dynasty the term of 122 years, from B.C. 747 to B.C. 625. Assuming next that the year B.C. 2234 from which the Babylonians counted their stellar observations must be a year of note in Chaldean history, and finding that it cannot well represent the first year of the second, or Median, dynasty, since in that case the eleven kings of the third dynasty would have reigned no more than 34 years, he concludes that it must mark the expulsion of the Medes and the accession of the third, which he regards as a native Chaldean dynasty. From his previous calculations it follows that the fourth dynasty began to reign B.C. 1976, between which and B.C. 2234 there are 258 years, a period which may very fairly be assigned to a series of eleven monarchs.’ Rawlinson, *Ancient Eastern Monarchies*, i. 191.

Thus much, we are told, is to a great extent conjecture, although reasonable conjecture harmonising with historical facts; but at this point ‘the proof flashes upon us,’ and the proof, it would seem, is this.

‘If the numbers are taken in the way assigned and then added to the years of the first or purely mythical dynasty, the sum produced is exactly 36,000 years, the next term to the *sar* in the Babylonian system of cycles. It is impossible that this should be the result of chance.

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The later Babylonians clearly contrived their mythical numbers so that, when added to those which they viewed as historical, the sum total should be a perfect cyclical period. The date B.C. 2234 for the accession of the third dynasty may thus be regarded as certainly that which Berosos intended to assign, and as most probably correct. The other dates in the subjoined scheme, except the first and last, are more doubtful, since they depend on the assumed synchronism of the sixth (or second Assyrian) dynasty and the era of Nabonassar.' Rawlinson, *ib.* i. 193.

The supreme importance of the tests by which artificial chronology may be distinguished from a true contemporary registration of events must justify the bestowal of any amount of pains in the effort to clear the question of all considerations which tend to put out of sight the real point at issue. In the sentences just quoted we are told that a certain conclusion has been proved, *i.e.* firmly established. Then from the impossibility that the result so obtained should come of chance, we are to infer that certain events took place and that they followed in a particular order, as though no alternative were conceivable. Thirdly, we are informed that the Babylonians, who by adding two sums together produced a cyclical period, regarded as historical the period represented by the later sum,—a conclusion altogether unwarranted. Further, we are told that this amended scheme was certainly that which Berosos meant to set forth, and then that it may be regarded as probably correct, *i.e.* correct as an historical record. Beyond this remains the still more extravagant conclusion that of two factors in a scheme of chronology admitted to be artificial the smaller must necessarily be historical. For the Eastern mind such schemes have a special charm; and the analysis of some of these arithmetical puzzles attests the exercise of considerable ingenuity, while it also exhibits the play of very varied motives, some subtle, some trivial and childish. The general outline was in all cases easily drawn; but in most instances probably some angle would remain which it was not easy to fill up with exactness: or the scheme would be filled up systematically so far as the arithmetical idea would allow it to be carried, the remaining period being brought in to occupy the vacant space without much regard to the verisimilitude or the improbability of the arrangement. The latter is the case with the fabricated chronology of the early Roman history. But whatever be the method followed, the symmetry of the whole, not the historic exactness of the parts, is the object aimed at. In the annals of the Æscingas, or founders of the kingdom of Kent, the events take place in an eight times repeated cycle of eight years, the *ὀκταετηρίς* of the Greeks. Lappenberg, *History of England*, i. 77, 109. The Fabian computation is far more elaborate: and it is manifestly quite impossible that a system capable of such minute

analysis should be the result of chance. The destructive criticism, in spite of which Niebuhr could still place confidence in a shattered historical fabric, soon discovered to him that 'according to the chronology of Fabius the history from the founding to the taking of the city divides itself into two portions, 240 years under the kings, and 120 after them; or, to express it differently, into three periods, each containing ten times twelve years, twelve being the number of the birds in the augury of Romulus. This scheme was the bed of Prokroustes to which whatever was known or believed about the early times was fitted.' *History of Rome*, vol. i.: Beginning and Nature of the earliest History. The first thing to be done was to tabulate the kings. As these were seven in number, the middle of the reign of the fourth king was made to coincide with the middle of the period assigned to the kings, the end of the year 120. 'Now it is true that any number of years might have been arbitrarily allotted to him: but what decided for 23 was that this number with that of the first secle (of Romulus and Numa) makes exactly 100, and that 132, the year in which his reign was thus made to close, was the number of the astronomical years in a secle.' The details of the scheme can be arithmetically traced for every reign except that of the second Tarquinius, the period of which, Niebuhr thinks, may have been historical. Thus the reigns of Numa and Romulus were defined by the heroic secle of 77 years, while, to impart a more plausible historical colouring, 37 years were given to Romulus, because these with the one year of interregnum made up the 38 nundines of the cyclical year, 39 years being thus left for Numa, whose lifetime according to another account is extended to 81 years, the bi-quadrade of 3. On this chronology Niebuhr trenchantly remarks that it is, 'throughout, a forgery and a fiction.' We have no right, therefore, to regard any one of the factors as more historical than the rest. But according to the restorers of Assyrian history the Roman chronology from the expulsion of the kings to the burning of the city by the Gauls is 'proved' to be historical 'because' the preceding portion is shown to be fabricated for a particular purpose. Happily in the case of the Roman story we have not only a bare list of kings and magistrates, or a bare series of dates, but a detailed narrative, or rather a number of narratives, all of which on examination turn out to be a perfect web of contradictions, while each is more or less at variance with the rest. For most of the Chaldean monarchs, (if they were Chaldeans,) we have no narrative at all, while the reconstructors of Assyrian history reject the traditional accounts given by Ktesias and Diodoros. If then we must regard with great suspicion the chronology of Rome from the alleged banishment of the Tarquins to the invasion of Bran (Brennus), what are we to say to a period of 1920 years, which is simply one of the factors in a confessedly artificial scheme? If the new enumeration be right, the method

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of the Babylonian priests is, after all, only an extension of the Roman. In place of 7 kings we have 222, and for 360 years we have 36,000: and therefore in the absence of any trustworthy testimony to the contrary, the last stage in the process is as worthless as the first.

A few remarks must be made on the degree of information yielded by the Assyrian monuments: and these remarks, it is scarcely necessary to say, need not reflect on changes in the deciphering of names. It may be readily admitted that, where a symbol represents many sounds, a name may be deciphered in many ways; and therefore we need not object if the Bel-lush of one writer become the Bellikhish or Belnirari of another, or if the sovereign who is Iva-lush in one narrative appear as Hulikhkhus or Binlikhish or Binnirari in another. The difficulties of the subject are in no way connected with the decipherment of names. When it is asserted that because a sovereign named Kudurmabuk mentions a son called Arid-sin, therefore he was succeeded by Arid-sin, although no monument states this fact, the objection lies against the assumption of the fact, not against the decipherment which for Arid-sin substitutes the name Zikar-sin. It is this method of assumption against which a protest is entered, in the following attempt to determine the date of Ismidagon:—

‘Sennacherib, in a rock inscription at Bavian, relates that in his tenth year, which was B.C. 692, he recovered from Babylon certain images of the gods which had been carried thither by Merodach-iddin-akhi, king of Babylon, after his defeat of Tiglath-pileser king of Assyria 418 years previously. And the same Tiglath-pileser relates that he rebuilt a temple in Assyria which had been taken down 60 years before, after it had lasted 641 years from its foundation by Shamas-vul, son of Ismidagon: ‘It results from these numbers that Ismidagon was king as early as B.C. 1850, or perhaps a little earlier.’ Rawlinson, *Anc. Mon.* i. 207.

Here we are called on to accept first a view taken by Sennacherib of Assyrian history some 400 years before his own time, and, next, the opinion of Tiglath-pileser on the date of a certain temple which he thought fit to rebuild. The existence of contemporary registration between the days of Sennacherib and Tiglath-pileser is simply assumed, not proved; and the monuments fail to supply continuous information of the kings who reigned in the interval. If, then, the testimony of Sennacherib, however trustworthy for events in his own time, is no guarantee for events which took place four centuries earlier, much less can it warrant us in accepting statements relating to a time 700 years earlier still. But perhaps the inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser I. determine the time at which he lived. Such, however, seems not to be the case, and, in fact, the date of that king is made to rest entirely on the assertion of Sennacherib, Rawlinson, *ib.* ii. 291. For ~~his~~ reign, there-

fore, of Ismidagon we have simply the hearsay evidence of a king who lived nearly 1200 years later.

Nor is it of the least use to attempt to eke out the evidence of the monuments by appeals to Herodotos, Ktesias, or Berosos as 'distinct original authorities.' The truth is that they are not original authorities at all. They derived their annals or their schemes from materials set before them, into which we know that fiction and artificial chronology largely entered. In the words of Sir Cornewall Lewis, these schemes 'cannot be reconciled by any legitimate methods of criticism, and yet there is no satisfactory ground for preferring one to another. We are not intitled to assume that any one of our authorities was intentionally deceived by the priests, or that he reported or transcribed his information incorrectly. Having therefore no sufficient reason for selecting any one of these systems, we are compelled by the laws of historical evidence to reject them all.' *Astron. Anc.* 348.

A stronger protest must be made against the process which yields Tiglathi-Nin II. as the successor of Iva-lush III. The proof of this king's existence is thus obtained. Asshur-idanni-pal, the monarch who is placed next in the series, speaks of sculptures set up by his ancestors Tiglath-pileser and Tiglathi-Nin: but as Tiglathi-Nin is mentioned after Tiglath-pileser, it would seem that he is not the same as Tiglathi-Nin I., because the latter preceded Tiglath-pileser. The second Tiglathi-Nin is therefore created for the occasion and put in his proper place. Rawlinson, *Anc. East. Mon.* ii. 336.

In his more recently published *Manual of Ancient History* Mr. Rawlinson draws a distinction between the earlier and later portions of the second period, on the ground that while for the former, from about B.C. 1260 to B.C. 909, the monuments furnish only some nine or ten discontinuous royal names, for the later portion, from B.C. 909 to B.C. 745, the chronology is exact and the materials for history more abundant. The summary of this history in the *Manual*, p. 29, begins with these words—

'Line of kings:—Asshur-danin-il I. Reign ended B.C. 909. Successor his son Hu-likh-khus III. (Iva-lush). Reigned from B.C. 909 to 889. Successor his son Tiglathi-Nin II. Reigned from B.C. 889 to 886. Warred in Niphates. Asshur-idanni-pal I. (Sardanapalus), his son, succeeds.'

This summary is not justified unless some evidence of the existence of Tiglathi-Nin II. has been discovered since the publication of his *History of the Eastern Monarchies*. If such evidence has been found, it should have been given. If it has not been found, then assuredly this king has been called into being because it is not to be supposed that so careful a thinker and so accurate an historian as Asshur-idanni-pal would place after Tiglath-pileser a king who came before him,—

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a conclusion as valuable as the inference that there has been a first and a second queen Anne, if it should be found that some later sovereign has spoken anywhere of the times or acts of Anne or William III. In other words, the chronology is not exact, and for this king at least we have no materials at all. The monarch is a fiction, and the chronology a more or less ingenious arrangement of numbers.

In truth, we look in vain for a definite chronology even in accounts which a vain-glorious Assyrian despot may give of his own exploits. A catalogue of the campaigns of Sargon, with short comments on each, has been disinterred from the ruins of Khorsabad: but the inscription published by MM. Oppert and Ménant, under the title *Les Fastes de Sargon*, is confessedly not chronological. Another monument which, it is said, really gave a chronological order, survives in fragments which make the restoration of the document an impracticable task: and thus the order assigned to these campaigns must be purely conjectural, except in so far as the inscription itself represents one event as leading to another. It is obvious that we might have a similar catalogue of the wars of Napoleon: but we could derive from it no real historical knowledge, if we had no means of ascertaining whether Marengo and Austerlitz were preceded or followed by Jena, Leipsic, or Lodi.

Thus, after all the parade of cuneiform discoveries, we are as far from possessing a continuous contemporary history of Assyria as we were before a single brick was disinterred from the mounds of Nimroud. Of the monumental kings a large number, perhaps the majority, are mere names. That such kings lived, we may take for granted: but of their relations to one another, of the length of their reigns, of their motives and their acts, we are profoundly ignorant. Gaps of fifty or a hundred years divide one dynasty from another, and chasms even of two or three centuries sometimes yawn before us, like Tuscan ravines which show the traveller that his day's journey is but half done when he had thought it ended. Dates for events stretching back over a millennium are derived from the historical views of a despot like Sennacherib, while, to crown the whole, a starting-point is obtained for the history by means of arithmetical computation, and to this framework events are adapted and arranged at the will of the manipulator. In short, from first to last, the history is one which must be accepted not on evidence but on authority; and anyone who proposes to himself to find his way through it by an honest scrutiny of facts will find himself plunged in a Serbonian bog. In such a plight he may yield himself to the first man who claims to be an authoritative guide through the morass: but if his sense of truthfulness be not permanently weakened by the immersion, he may be forgiven if, when he has made his way out of the swamps, he should feel the resentment of a man who thinks that he has been deceived. See more at length *Edinburgh Review*, January 1867, Art. iv.

APPENDIX B. (Page 300.)

PELASGIC AND HELLENIC DIALECTS.

THE expression of Herodotos that the Ionic cities in Lydia spoke a dialect which had nothing in common with the dialects spoken in the other cities of the confederation (*αὐται αἱ πόλεις τῆσι πρότερον λεχθείησι ὁμολογέουσι κατὰ γλῶσσαν οὐδέ ν'*) is both significant and valuable as throwing light on his mode of distinguishing the speech of the peoples among whom he was thrown. I must refer the reader to the passages in which Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* part ii. ch. 2; and Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* vol. i. chaps. 2 and 4, discuss the question of difference between Pelasgic and Hellenic dialects. It is quite true that Herodotos, i. 57, comparing the dialect of Kreston (if it be not Kroton) near the Thermaic gulf with that of Plakia and Skylake on the Hellespont, asserts that the men of these places could understand each other but not the people around them, and that, judging from these, he supposes that the Pelasgic language must have been barbarous, *εἰ τοῦτοι τεκμαίρομεν δεῖ λέγειν, ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάββαρον γλῶσσαν ἰέντες*. But, hampered by his previous statement that the Ionians were Pelasgic, he now puts the matter hypothetically, and adds that, if the Pelasgic speech resembled that of Plakia and Kreston, then the Athenians, on becoming Hellenes, changed their language,—a fact invented on the spur of the moment without a shade of evidence. In truth, we have no sure ground in these inquiries except that which is furnished by the modern science of comparative philology. Against the opinion of Herodotos that the Pelasgic was a stationary and the Dorian a roving race, must be placed that of Strabo who describes the former as *πολύπλανον καὶ ταχὺ τὸ ἔθνος πρὸς ἐπαναστάσεις*, xiii. 3, 3, c. 621, and the popular saying which regarded Pelasgoi and Pelargoi (storks) as the same word, and supposed that the Pelasgians were called storks from their wandering habits. Lewis, *Cred. E. R. H.* i. 282.

But Herodotos is as inconsistent with himself as he can be with any other writers of his own or of later times. Here the Pelasgoi are barbarians, or at least the speakers of a barbarous dialect. Elsewhere, ii. 50, he asserts that the names of the Greek gods were obtained not from barbarians but from the Pelasgoi, and even holds that the latter named them Theoi, as orderers of the universe, *κόσμῳ θέντες τὰ πάντα*, thus implying not merely that the Pelasgoi spoke Greek but that they formed a name for the gods by a not very obvious analogy from an Hellenic root which they had not hitherto applied to this purpose. So when he brings to the Pelasgic Dodona the priestess purchased from the Phenicians, he makes her, ii. 56, there learn not the Pelasgic but

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the Hellenic language. In short, Colonel Mure, *Critical History of Greek Literature*, i. 56, has proved conclusively that, in spite of his statements when he runs off among the pitfalls of ethnology, Herodotos 'was under the habitual impression, common to the mass of his countrymen, that Pelasgians and Hellenes were radically the same people.'

All that can be fairly said is that the speech of Plakia and Kreston appeared to him to fall outside the circle of the dialects to which the name Hellenic might with any plausibility be given; and generally we have to remember that the four great classes of Greek dialects, named by grammarians the Doric, Eolic, Attic, and Ionian, are not merely forms of Greek which had risen to the dignity of written languages with a written literature, but that these exhibit indefinite shades of difference. Speaking broadly, we may say that the number of dialects might be measured by the number of the autonomous communities of Hellas. In truth, the dialect which has the good luck to be adopted by what is called polite society and which becomes therefore the vehicle for the literature of a country, is but one of many dialects which have quite as good a right to be regarded as Greek, or Latin, or English: and we are scarcely less in bondage to our literary language than we are to our modern maps. Side by side with the speech of Perikles and Demosthenes, of Cicero and Tacitus, the living dialects of the Hellenic and Italian peoples went on their way. The overthrow of the civilisation on which the literary dialect depended brought to the front these living dialects, and the result was the growth of what are popularly considered the new languages of the Romance or other nations, but which really represent more nearly forms of Hellenic and Italian speech in current use long before the age of Herodotos. Purity of speech is one thing, and a thing not to be taken count of lightly; but many a genuine idiom and much true national speech is set down as vulgar and therefore contemptible, merely because it has not been re-stamped in the mint of the literary language of orators, historians, and poets.

See further Grote, *History of Greece*, ii. 318 *et seq.*

APPENDIX C. (Page 329.)

DIVERSION OF THE EUPHRATES.

EASTERN tyrants are not supposed to take much thought about the waste of human life: but even a Persian despot would think twice before ordering his best troops to make their way through acres of slime. The very essence of the story, however, is the utter ignorance

of the Babylonians of all that was going to happen. No portion, therefore, of the waters of the Euphrates must be diverted, until the time had come for the final assault. In other words, a stream with the volume of the Thames at London Bridge must be diverted into two canals at the same moment. The task of providing the apparatus needed for this purpose would probably dismay the most able and fearless of modern engineers. Xenophon, perhaps, never paused to think whether any apparatus would be needed at all, or how many lives would be sacrificed in the attempt to open these Brobdingnagian sluices without this apparatus.

But, further, the narrative of Herodotus implies that the Persians had to wade through water for the space which intervened between the outer walls and the gates in the river walls, τὸ ἀρχαῖον ῥέεθρον διαβατὸν εἶναι ἐποίησε, i. 189. The story of Xenophon asserts that all the water was drawn off and speaks of a special report sent to Cyrus about the state of the bottom thus laid bare. *Cyropæd.* vii. 5, 19. But the main point is that for the success of his enterprise Cyrus relied on finding the gates not merely open but unguarded. Mr. Rawlinson rightly supposes that any alarm given while the Persian forces were floundering about in the bed of the river would have been fatal: and the danger of such an alarm was indefinitely increased by the length of time required for drawing off the water of the Euphrates, unless we suppose, as probably Herodotus and Xenophon supposed, that it could all be drawn off in a few minutes. 'Should such an alarm,' he says, 'be given, all their labour would be lost. If, when they entered the river-bed, they found the river-walls manned and the river-gates fast locked, they would indeed be caught in a trap. Enfiladed on both sides by an enemy whom they could neither see nor reach, they would be overwhelmed and destroyed by his missiles before they could succeed in making their escape.' *Eastern Monarchies*, iii. 518. An attack by boats would have involved no such danger, as in case of alarm they could at once row out into the mid stream beyond the reach of their weapons. Boats were ready to hand at the several ferries within the town: but in default of these Cyrus would have spent his time more profitably in making boats whether of wood or of leather or in seizing such as might come down the river. It is incredible that he should undertake one of the most gigantic works ever attempted by man with the deliberate design of placing his best men in a predicament in which any alarm would be followed by their certain and complete destruction. It was one thing to calculate on the astounding carelessness which left the city open to an invader, and another to take advantage of it, when the abandonment of the walls was discovered; but the latter hypothesis implies that no such gigantic task of diverting the river had been even thought of. Further, as there was no bridge outside the city walls,

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there was nothing to cut off access by boats at any time; and the risk of attacking the gates while shut and guarded would be nothing compared to that of having his whole army done to death in the bed of a river, even if we put out of mind the enormous toil needed to enable them to run this utterly superfluous risk.

APPENDIX D. (Page 336.)

THE TRADITIONAL OR MONUMENTAL HISTORY OF EGYPT.

THE conquests attributed to Sesos̄sis or Sesostris by Diodoros bring the subject of Egyptian history and chronology so far within the province of a historian of Greece as to justify a short examination of their nature and character. If the result tend to show that the monumental inscriptions and other documents thus far discovered and deciphered furnish the least possible help, if they furnish any help at all, towards a satisfactory reconstruction of Assyrian history, this of itself is a positive and important gain,—the great conclusion being briefly this that, after all the research and speculation lavished on monuments belonging to non-historical ages and countries (*i.e.* to ages and countries in which the historical sense has not been awakened, or which have no contemporary literature and no fixed era of computation), we are driven to confess that our earliest authentic continuous history is that of Greece and that this history begins at best but a few generations before the age of Perikles and Thucydides. Beyond this we may recover some outlines of earlier events whether in Greek or in other history: but an analysis of the details will show us at almost every step how yielding and untrustworthy is the ground on which we tread.

At the outset, one fact stares us in the face,—namely, that the ancient historical writers who treat of Egypt profess to have derived their information from the monuments of the country as interpreted by the priests, and that these historians hopelessly contradict each other. Thus the date assigned to Menes by Herodotos is 11,400 B.C.: in Manetho it is 5702 B.C.; in Diodoros 5000 B.C.; in Eratosthenes, 2600 B.C. According to Herodotos the number of kings from Menes to Psammetichos is 343, each reigning on an average about 33 years: in Manetho the average is about 11 years for 439 kings: in Diodoros it is about 9 years for 470 kings. But apart from the fact that many of the personages in this so-called Egyptian history figure in Greek mythology, these lists, as a whole, do not deserve the name even of lists. Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 356. Out of his 470 kings Diodoros names only 21, while Herodotos names not one of the 329 sovereigns who succeed Menes. The history of Egypt, so far as

it has been preserved by Manetho, may be given in about ten lines. His notices of the kings are utterly insignificant or contemptibly puerile, until we come to Sesostris whose career of conquest he, like Herodotos and Diodoros, extends as far as Thrace. One or two sentences speak of the Shepherd Kings. The remaining notices are not much more dignified than the entry which assigns to the reign of Bocchoris the solitary incident of the speaking of a lamb which, we are informed on other authority, had eight feet and two tails.

A very short survey will show that with all the aid which, as it is said, the monuments have afforded, the schemes of Egyptian history set forth by recent writers are just what we should expect them to be from the confused, inconsistent, and impossible accounts which the priests gave to men so honest as Herodotos. Without going back to the distant millennium in which Egyptian nationality is said to have begun with the foundation of Nomes or independent tribes as well as in 'Osirism or the psychical element of religion,' we may note that Bunsen gives 9086 B.C. as the date which closes the republican period. In his opinion a dynasty of sacerdotal kings, who reigned down to 7231 B.C., was followed by a series of elective monarchs, and these by a double contemporaneous line of hereditary princes whose rule ended in 3624 B.C., when under Menes all Egypt was united under a single government. This period, he thinks, marks the introduction of animal worship and the beginning of Egyptian literature. To the second or third dynasty belong Gosormies or Sesortosis, the great lawgiver 3319 B.C. (whom he identifies with the Sesostris of Herodotos), and Mares Sesorcheres, the builder of the oldest pyramid of Dashur.¹⁰⁷¹

¹⁰⁷¹ The names Suphis and Menkeres, it is said, have been deciphered in the pyramids of which Herodotos mentions Cheops and Mykerinos as the builders. If it may therefore be held that kings so named raised these structures, the pyramids tell us nothing to fix their date. A comparison of these with other Egyptian buildings may assign them to a particular age on architectural evidence; and if it can be proved on such evidence that the pyramids belong to the earliest period of Egyptian architecture, we should have some approximate notion of the time at which these kings lived. But architectural evidence by itself can do no more than give the order of styles. Supposing that English history were a blank, we might by a diligent comparison of Romanesque and Gothic buildings assert that the nave of Durham was older than that of Westminster, and the latter than the chapel of Henry VII. But unless we could further compare them with similar buildings in other lands of which the date was historically ascertained, we could not assign them to any particular century, still less to any particular part of a century. According to Herodotos, the pyramid kings reigned from about 913 to 813 B.C. Other writers assign them to an earlier date. Astronomers, who tell us that 3,980 years ago the star γ Draconis fulfilled the office of a pole-star, accept that date for the pyramids (2,123 B.C. for the great pyramid) because they have openings on the north side leading to straight passages which descend at an inclination varying from 26° to 27° , the direction of these passages being in all cases parallel to the meridian; now if we suppose a person to be stationed at the bottom of any one of these passages, and to look up it as he would through the tube of a telescope, his eye will be directed to a point in the meridian 26° or 27° above the plane of the horizon: and this is precisely the altitude at which the star γ Draconis must have passed the lower meridian at the place in question 3,980 years before the present time (1862). Chambers, *Handbook of Astronomy*, 270. It might have been thought that the astronomical argument would be especially acceptable to Bunsen: but it did not fit in with his scheme, and the pyramids are therefore thrown back by more than a thousand years.

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To the ninth dynasty, 2953-2948 B.C., belongs Nitokris, the rosy-cheeked queen whom some Egyptologists identify with the Hetaira Rhodopis mentioned by Herodotos, ii. 134. Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 371. The second king of the twelfth dynasty is Sesortosis Ammenemes, 2755-2733 B.C., in whose reign the regal power, with that of the priests, was consolidated by his viceroy Joseph,—the arrival of Jacob in Egypt taking place 2743 B.C. He was followed by Sesortosis, the author of the land-tax and of the canal-system which Herodotos ascribes to the warrior Sesostris, a king who according to his scheme reigned as late as the eleventh century B.C. The year 2547 B.C. marks the conquest of Egypt by the Amalika, or Amalekites, aided by the Philistæans. The Hyksos dynasties, thus established, held the native princes as their tributaries for about 900 years.¹⁰⁷² The rise of the eighteenth dynasty in 1625 B.C. was accompanied by the expulsion or the withdrawal of the Hyksos and the bondage of the Israelites. To the nineteenth dynasty belong Sethos the Great, the mighty conqueror who subjugates Kypros (Cyprus), Phenicia, Assyria, and Media, 1403-1391 B.C., and his son Rameses II. who, unworthily bearing the same title, was the builder of the temple of Karnak and the oppressor of the Hebrews. His son Menophthah, on the departure of the Jews after a sojourn in Egypt of more than 1,000 years, was compelled to retire into Ethiopia with his son who is also called Sethos. This Sethos has a son, Rameses III., whose conquests in Canaan, Phenicia, and Ethiopia fall about 1280 B.C. The twenty-third dynasty began with Petorbates 813 B.C., and closed with Zet, 725 B.C. The twenty-fourth consists of the single king Bocchoris in whose reign the eight-footed lamb speaks, and who, having attempted internal reforms, is defeated by the Ethiopians. The next dynasty is followed by the Dodekarchy: and the reign of Psamtik, the fourth king of the twenty-sixth dynasty, began 664 B.C. The names of his successors, closing with Psammekeres, are given in the order of Herodotos.

Such is the scheme put forth with great confidence by Bunsen: and if we confine ourselves to his reconstruction, we may fairly say that no greater certainty has been attained by aid of the monumental records than had been reached without them. Inscriptions have been found in which counsellors flatter kings and kings glorify themselves: lists of dynasties have been recovered with names of rulers, some with a scanty notice, many more with none. Buildings have been examined, and the titles of those who reared them deciphered on their walls. Here and there have been found some astronomical records, but with nothing on which we may frame a chronology. All the researches of Egypto-

¹⁰⁷² It has been urged that history furnishes no parallel to the hostile occupation of a country for so many centuries without either bringing about a successful rebellion, or the amalgamation of the conquering with the conquered race. Not more than one inscription is said to be the work of these invaders.

logists have, it would seem, failed to discover an era. No trace of an era is found in Herodotos or Thucydides; and we could scarcely expect to find one among the subjects of Cheops or Sesostris. The disappointment was keenly felt by Bunsen who mourns over lost books of Manetho, lost chronicles of the priests, lost historical songs, (the existence of which he assumes,) just as Niebuhr mourned over the lost epic of regal Rome and the lost annals of the Pontiffs. Like Niebuhr, Bunsen struggled hard to invest with an historical character books which were either legendary or liturgical. The volumes carried by the Chanter, the Horoskopos, and the Hierogrammateus, are exalted to a dignity which they merit far less than the mythical chronicles of Hekataios and Hellanikos. Nay more, he assumes the existence of a key, now lost to us, which might have unlocked the mysteries of the lists preserved by the Egyptian priests, and which was actually used for that purpose. But some misgiving still lurks in his mind. Although the national records were in the sacred guardianship of the priests, and although the predominant passion of the Egyptians was to preserve the history of their country in uncorrupted integrity, he admits that they exaggerated the dates of their history, *Egypt's Place in Universal History*, i. 6, that their chronology was not free from artificial elements, *ib.* i. 68, and that the priests were not altogether guiltless of imposture, *ib.* i. 102. He allows that the inscriptions on public buildings were not intended to convey any historical information, *ib.* iii. 101, and that by adopting 'a delusive pivot as the basis of his researches, Champollion was led astray in his dates to the extent of several centuries,' *ib.* i. 222. We need not cite further confessions that the ground on which he treads is treacherous, and that none can hope to follow him who are not prepared to readjust dynastic lists, to take a king from the place assigned to him by Herodotos and transfer him to that which is given by Manetho, or to put him in one which is allotted to him by neither, or to cut him into two or three kings whose lifetimes were separated by hundreds or thousands of years. This is pre-eminently the case with Sesostris, of whom, in the words of Sir Cornewall Lewis, Bunsen first takes a portion 'and identifies it with Tosorthrus, the second king of the third dynasty, whose date is 5119 B.C.,' differing from the date in Manetho by 1799 years, 'about the same interval as between Augustus Cæsar and Napoleon. He then takes another portion, and identifies it with Sesonchosis, a king of the twelfth dynasty; a third portion of Sesostris is finally assigned to himself. It seems that these fragments make up the entire Sesostris, who in his plural unity belongs to the Ancient Empire: but it is added that the Greeks confounded him with Rameses or Ramses of the New Empire, a king of the nineteenth dynasty, whose date is 1255 B.C., who again was confounded with his father Sethos.' *Astr. Anc.* 369.

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M. Lenormant speaks with equal confidence, and, it would seem, with similar results. He has no hesitation in saying that 'through the whole extent of the Nile valley the monuments have been examined, and in reply they have told us all the deeds of the kings who governed Egypt from the most ancient times,'¹⁰⁷³ words which must mean at the very least that they have yielded a history as full and well-ascertained as that of England during the Wars of the Roses. But in the very same page we read that 'we now know nearly the whole series of monarchs who reigned over Egypt during more than 4,000 years.'¹⁰⁷⁴ In other words, we are so far from knowing all their deeds or any of them, that we do not even know all their names. But in spite of this it is added that we can now relate the annals of Egypt 'on the authority of original and contemporary documents exactly as we relate the history of any modern nation.'¹⁰⁷⁵ We may soon see how this promise is fulfilled. The main part of the task is done by eulogising Manetho. 'Once,' we are told, 'he was treated with contempt: his veracity was disputed: the long series of dynasties he unfolds to our view were regarded as fabulous. Now, all that remains of his work is regarded as the first of all authorities for the reconstruction of the ancient history of Egypt.'¹⁰⁷⁶ On the other hand it may be urged that of the 439 kings numbered in his lists 346 are unnamed, Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 337, that the fragments preserved of his writings present simply 'a chronology of anonymous persons arranged in dynasties,' and that Syncellus stigmatises Manetho not less than Berosos as an impostor. But if all this be put aside, the question of the real value and authority of Manetho is not easily answered except by those who are prepared with unqualified submission to follow M. Mariette, whose sword cuts the Gordian knot, and who assures us that all the dynasties of Manetho were successive and in no case contemporaneous, and that this fact is removed beyond all possibility of doubt. Unfortunately, this assertion cannot get rid of the not less plain statements of Sir Gardner Wilkinson and Mr. Stuart Poole that 'there is no dynasty in Manetho's lists, from the first to the seventeenth, which did not reign contemporaneously with some other dynasty or dynasties named by him.' But M. Lenormant goes even further, and insists that Manetho not merely threw out all contemporaneous dynasties but 'admitted those only which he regarded as legitimate, and his lists contain no others,'—a process which, if really carried out, would make his lists as valuable as a history of the Popes which should

¹⁰⁷³ I give the words of the English translation of his *Manuel d'Histoire Ancienne de l'Orient*, vol. I. p. xi. His own words are, 'Dans toute l'étendue de la vallée du Nil, les monuments ont été interrogés, et ils nous ont raconté les actions des rois qui gouvernèrent l'Égypte depuis les temps les plus reculés. I. v.

¹⁰⁷⁴ 'Maintenant nous connaissons à bien peu de chose près toute la série des monarques qui régnèrent sur l'Égypte pendant plus de 4,000 ans.' I. vi.

¹⁰⁷⁵ 'Nous pouvons maintenant raconter ses annales d'après les documents originaux et contemporains, comme nous raconterions celle d'une nation moderne.' I. vii.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Eng. Tr. i. 196. *Manuel*, i. 186.

take no notice of the Anti-popes. But these positive assurances are followed by a series of ominous admissions. The Turin papyrus contains (not a history of the deeds, but) 'a list of all the mythical or historical personages who were believed to have reigned in Egypt from fabulous times down to a period which we cannot ascertain, because the end of the papyrus is wanting.' Tr. i. 199. The 'treasure' is 'inescapable;' but 'unfortunately' it 'exists only in very small pieces (164 in number), which it is often impossible to join correctly.' Another valuable monument is the chamber of Thothmes III.: but the inscriptions on its walls name only those among his predecessors to whom he chooses to make offerings. Such as they are, they have 'assisted to define more precisely than any other list the names borne by the kings of the thirteenth dynasty:' but they give us seemingly no knowledge of what they did. The tablet of Abydos from its 'mutilated state' would have lost 'nearly' (it might have been thought, quite) 'all its historical value,' had not M. Mariette discovered another copy 'which supplies nearly all the vacancies in the first:' but even thus it seems only 'to bridge over part of the monumental gulf between the sixth and eleventh dynasties.' It is a very bridge of Al-Sirat hung over masses of wreck and ruin. A tablet found at Sakharah is said to confirm the testimony of the second tablet of Abydos, although it exhibits 'some interesting differences.' 'Once or twice, a king omitted in one list is registered in the other: we even have sometimes two princes whose reigns were incontestably simultaneous: one figures at Sakharah, the other at Abydos.' 'Thus in the time of the nineteenth dynasty, among the competitors who are represented in the Egyptian annals, we cannot positively pronounce as to which were at the time considered legitimate sovereigns, and the list varies according to the locality, and, no doubt, according to the limits within which they exercised authority,' *Manuel*, i. 193. These feats may be fairly compared to the march of Egyptian viceroys over the bodies of prostrate pilgrims: but when the historians of Egypt are driven to such shifts to patch up their ragged chronicles, they are scarcely justified in upbraiding other nations or historians who have not left them a satisfactory chronology. I have already been obliged, p. 280, to notice the injustice with which writers on Assyrian history have treated Ktesias who according to the express statements of Diodoros ransacked the royal parchments at Sousa, and in these doubtless found a narrative which he gave as conscientiously as Herodotos wrote down what he learnt from his Egyptian guides. With somewhat more fairness M. Lenormant looks on Ktesias as 'unfortunate in receiving his information from the Persians, for these people have always been and still are (like their neighbours the Indians) incapable of recording true history:' but he goes on to deal a blow on the fabric which the

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reconstructors of Assyrian or Persian annals would have us regard as firm and sound. 'The historical instinct,' he insists, 'is entirely wanting in the famous annals engraven on the rocks at Behistun, where Darius records the days and months of the chief events of his reign, but has forgotten to mention the years.' *Manual*, Eng. Tr. i. 369. It follows that to place confidence in those assertions of Sennacherib and Tiglath-pileser which are supposed to determine the date of Ismidagon (see Appendix A, p. 608) is in the opinion of learned Egyptologists to build a house of cards on a quicksand, while the Assyriologists, not without some colour for their plea, retort that some at least of the conclusions of the former can be received only at the cost of a boundless credulity. For the sources of Egyptian history are either mere lists of names, like those of Manetho, or inscriptions which relate for the most part either to some isolated political event or to incidents in the lives of private citizens, which leave us as far as ever from the attainment of anything like a continuous history of the country; and, to crown the whole, if the Persians altogether lack the historical sense, M. Lenormant himself insists with admirable candour that 'the greatest of all obstacles in the way of establishing a regular Egyptian chronology is the fact that the Egyptians themselves never had any chronology at all. The use of a fixed era was unknown, and it has not yet been proved that they had any other reckoning than the years of the reigning monarch. Now these years themselves have no fixed starting-point, for sometimes they began from the commencement of the year in which the preceding king died and sometimes from the day of the coronation of the new king. However precise these calculations may appear to be, modern science must always fail in its attempts to restore what the Egyptians never possessed.' *Manuel*, i. 189. Eng. Tr. i. 196.

That the several documents deciphered by Egyptologists throw light on the manners, customs, and government of ancient Egypt, that they bear witness to the existence of powerful monarchies long before the country was laid open to the Greeks, and that thus or in other ways there is probably not one among them which has not some real value, it would be absurd to deny. But there is certainly no profit in stringing together a series of suppositions, in balancing probabilities, and in filling up gaps by ingenious and happy conjectures. The matter becomes more serious when we find the reconstructors of Egyptian history contradicting themselves or each other on points of cardinal importance. Thus, having given the narrative of the Deluge as it is found in the book of Genesis, and having stated that Shem, Ham, and Japheth entered and came out of the ark with Noah, M. Lenormant traces the several forms which the story of the Flood has assumed in the traditions of various tribes and nations, and reaches the positive conclusion 'that the narrative of the Deluge is a universal tradition, pervading all

branches of the human family, always excepting the black race. A remembrance so precise, and everywhere in such perfect agreement, cannot possibly be a myth invented for a purpose. It must of necessity be the recollection of a real, of a terrible, event, so strongly impressed upon the imagination of our first ancestors as never to be forgotten by their descendents.' If words have any meaning, these sentences assert that the remembrance of this catastrophe was so firmly fixed in the minds of Shem, Ham, and Japheth, and of their children for all time, that it never faded away; and they imply as a necessary consequence that nations which have no traditions of this catastrophe are not descended from either Shem or Ham or Japheth. But the Egyptians had no traditions of a flood. In the words of M. Lenormant himself, 'the original monuments and texts of Egypt, amidst speculations on the cosmogony, do not contain one single, even distant allusion to the recollection of a deluge.' *Manuel*, Eng. Tr. i. 14. Therefore the Egyptians are not descended from either of the three sons of Noah. Nevertheless we read that 'Ham, whose name signifies the sun-burnt, was the father of the great family from whom the people of Phenicia, Egypt, and Ethiopia were primarily descended,' *ib.* Eng. Tr. i. 57, and again that 'the Egyptians were a branch of the race of Ham,' 'a fact clearly established by science' and one which 'entirely confirms the statements of the book of Genesis.' *Ib.* Eng. Tr. i. 202. It follows irresistibly that Ham and his children at once lost all memory of the flood which swept away the ancient world,—a proposition which M. Lenormant emphatically denies. This glaring contradiction in terms can be avoided only by maintaining that the Egyptians ought to have had traditions of the deluge, and that they did wrong in never speaking of an event which more than all others was fixed in their memory. The readiness with which Egyptologists and Assyriologists draw inferences and find facts where they seem to be needed would make it perhaps the most 'scientific course' to say boldly that they had many such traditions but that all the records of them have unfortunately been lost, just as the monuments which should have told us 'the actions of all the Egyptian kings' have unfortunately disappeared; but perhaps we may be forgiven if we ask what the value of that science may be which seeks its ends by paths so tortuous. The case is not changed for the better, if with Bunsen we represent the settlement of Egypt as caused by a convulsion of nature in the middle of the eleventh millennium B.C., which expelled man from his first home and froze, while it drove back, the open northern sea, and if we say that as Egypt had been already peopled before the flood came, they had no tradition of that event,—for here also it would follow either that the Egyptians were not descended from Ham or that Ham was not in the ark with Noah. But when we come to more recent events, we find not much more harmony

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between the results obtained by the several Egyptologists. The hypothesis of simultaneous or successive dynasties applied to the lists of Manetho will yield for the reign of Menes dates differing from each other by more than 1600 years: but still more significant is the fact that the career of conquest which in the opinion of some historians of Egypt carried Rameses II. to Bokhara is with others a mere 'mirage.' Even as ascribed to Sesostris, these campaigns are in M. Lenormant's judgment extended grossly beyond their real limits: as ascribed to Rameses II., they are mere falsehoods. The legend, he insists, 'attributes to Sesostris not only the conquest of countries which, like Ethiopia, had been for ages under Egyptian dominion, but various achievements of earlier monarchs, as the creation of a navy and the subjugation of the tribes on the coasts of the Red Sea; but more especially it bears this king in triumph over countries which Egyptian armies never penetrated, as for instance over India and Persia as well as to the regions to the north of Armenia.¹⁰⁷⁷ These stories furnish an exact parallel to the mediæval romance which, in order to glorify Charles the Great, makes him take Jerusalem and snatch the Holy Sepulchre from the hands of the unbeliever.' *Manuel*, i. 266, Eng. Tr. i. 247. As to Rameses II., he was no conqueror at all. He may have spent all his time in war; but these wars were purely defensive. He added not a single province to his kingdom, and the glory of his reign is confined to his success in maintaining at an enormous cost the integrity of his empire, *ib.* 267. Thus vanishes into thin air that magnificent but terrible vision of Egyptian conquests in Persia and Media, of which in Mr. Zincke's belief the score was paid off when Kambyzes and his followers carried havoc over the valley of the Nile.

It is scarcely necessary to add that the chronology of Manetho is apparently constructed on precisely the same artificial method by which the fabrics of the ancient Assyrian, Babylonian, Roman, and English systems of chronology have been raised. The Egyptian Sothiac period contained 1460 Julian years, or 1461 Egyptian years. One of these periods, it is known, ended in 139 A.D., and began therefore in 1322 B.C.: hence the third preceding Sothiac period began in 5702 B.C.,—the date which Manetho assigns to Menes, the first human king of Egypt. The government of the gods and demigods who precede Menes is distributed over seventeen Sothiac periods, or 24,837 years. The time at which this calculation by Sothiac periods was introduced is not known, as we cannot tell when the fact that their year of 365 days was six hours too short was first noticed by their astronomers. See, further, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 454. Böckh, *Manetho und die Hundstern Periode*, Berlin, 1845.

¹⁰⁷⁷ M. Lenormant rejects therefore the tale, which Herodotos believed, that the Kolchians were colonists left by the army of Sesostris.

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EXTENT OF PHENICIAN EXPLORATION AND COMMERCE.

SOME remarks have been already made (note 671) on the alleged circumnavigation of Africa by the order of Necho king of Egypt. If the accuracy of the account could be established, the antecedent unlikelihood of the Phenician coasting voyages to the north of Europe would be greatly lessened. But the credibility of these narratives can scarcely be said to rest on a satisfactory basis; and thus, in the course of his survey of the *Astronomy of the Ancients*, Sir G. C. Lewis found it necessary to examine the evidence not only for the existence of a direct Phenician trade with Britain, but for the reality of Phenician voyages in general beyond the Mediterranean Gates. His conclusion is that, although there is no reason for doubting that the Phenicians penetrated to some extent to the west of the Pillars of Herakles, we cannot define precisely the course of any of their voyages, and that there is an overwhelming improbability in particular against the supposition that their ships ever circumnavigated Africa or sailed directly to Britain. He falls back, therefore, on the conclusion that the tin trade from Britain, which Mr. Grote thinks was in the hands of the Phenician mercantile marine, was carried on overland, and that the Phenician ships took it up at the mouth of the Rhone. On the other hand writers, who insist on the impracticability of an overland trade, hold that we are not justified in calling into question the wide extent generally attributed to Phenician discovery. This argument is a complete inversion of that of Sir G. C. Lewis; and if such writers, bringing no positive facts against the prevalence of an overland trade, devote themselves almost entirely to upholding the credit of Phenician explorers and traders, we have little to do beyond determining what we know and what we do not know about their adventures or their commerce.

Now it seems to be clear that if any given people fit out a naval expedition for express purposes of discovery, and if that expedition is admitted to be beyond a certain point a complete failure, then up to the time of that expedition that people or nation cannot have been acquainted with countries lying beyond that point. But this is precisely the acknowledged result of some voyages of discovery undertaken by the Carthaginians in the days of their greatest prosperity. So far as we can venture to determine the date, the Periplous of Hanno and Himilkon belongs to the year 470 B.C.; and, according to the testimony of the latter, the Western sea was at that time as formidable to them as it was unknown. Hanno mentions the tin-trade of the Tartessians with the Oistrymian islands, which lie off the coasts of Spain, but which

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are yet only two days' sail from the islands of the Hibernians and the Albiones, while, speaking of the dangers of the unknown Atlantic, he says that there was no wind to impel the ship; that its course was impeded by weeds; and that while it was in this helpless state, it was surrounded by marine monsters. If then the date of this expedition be correct, it follows inevitably that 'at a period subsequent to the expedition of Xerxes the Carthaginians, though there was a Phœnician establishment at Gades, had not carried their navigation far along the coasts of the Atlantic, and that they sent out two voyages of discovery,—one to the south, the other to the north,—at the public expense.' Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 455. It further follows that Himilcon was in the dark about the tin-trade, or at least that he supposed the tin to come from islands lying near the coast of Spain, while he asserted that it took four months to sail from Tartessos to the Tin Islands. Nor is it less clear that, like later writers, he conceived the Kassiterides to be distinct from Britain. In short, a Carthaginian navigator of the fifth century before the Christian era admits that the regions lying without the Mediterranean Gates were to him practically unknown; and we are left to wonder at his ignorance, if other Phœnicians had been familiarly acquainted with them for hundreds of years.

But if we bring Phœnician ships as habitual traders to Britain, we must carry them further,—to the Baltic and the mouth of the Elbe. The amber-trade of the ancient world is as much a fact as the tin-trade; and if the former was carried on overland, the unlikelihood of a land-transit for the latter is removed *pari passu*. But though the accounts given of the amber countries are contradictory enough, they agree in pointing to the northern coast of Europe as the place where the amber was found; and if we carry a direct Phœnician trade to the southern shores of the Baltic, we accept a still more unlikely fact than their direct trade with Britain on far more scanty evidence, or rather on no evidence at all; for, if we cannot set down the voyage of Pytheas as a pure fiction, it is equally certain that we can place no reliance on his statements of what he saw and what he did. It may be fairly concluded that the man who could recount as true the fables which he gives about the Liparean islands was not likely to be careful in his statements about regions altogether removed from the knowledge of his countrymen. From his account of Thule and the neighbouring sea we gather with certainty that he knew no more about it than Tacitus; but that which in the latter is merely an ignorance he admits is in the former simple falsehood. Nor may any greater reliance be placed on other portions of his narrative. 'Pytheas affirmed,' says Sir G. C. Lewis, 'that, in returning from his great northern voyage in which he first obtained accounts of the remote island of Thule, he had sailed along the entire coast of the ocean between Gadeira and the Tanais; that is, from Cadiz round Spain, Gaul,

Germany, and Scythia to the river Don, which was considered by the ancients as the boundary of Europe and Asia. This statement furnishes an additional proof of the mendacity of Pytheas, because it is founded on the belief received in his time, that Europe did not project far to the north and that the ocean swept along its shores to the north of Scythia and India.' *Astr. Anc.* 480. The accounts given of Phenician or other voyages round Africa are found to be as unsubstantial as those which carry the Phenicians round the northern coasts of Europe. When we read of the expedition which, having been sent out by Necho, sailed round that continent, we read the story with that idea of its shape which we have realised by the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope. But there is no room whatever to doubt that in the opinion of Strabo as of ancient geographers in general Africa was a right-angled triangle, 'the base being the distance from Egypt to the pillars of Hercules, the other side of the right angle being the line of the Nile to the extremity of Ethiopia, and the hypotenuse being the line connecting the latter point with the pillars of Hercules,' *ib.* 501. Now if the ships of Hanno, although provided with an immense force, failed confessedly to explore any very great extent of African coast to the southwest of the Mediterranean Gates, the success of an expedition undertaken nearly a century and a half earlier without any such precautions becomes indefinitely more unlikely. Sir G. C. Lewis remarks that 'the account of their landing in the autumn to sow their corn and of their waiting until the harvest implies that they relied for food on their own resources,' and that the crews of vessels thus circumstanced must inevitably have fallen a prey to the hostility of barbarous natives during a voyage which was extended from the Red Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar. *ib.* 511. Hanno took interpreters with him: but even he, after a certain point, could hold no intercourse with the natives by means of language, and with all his relative advantages he assigns want of food as the reason for his turning back. There remains the alleged report, disbelieved by Herodotos, that the navigators, as they sailed round Africa, had the sun on their right hand. On this Sir G. C. Lewis remarks that Herodotos, who may have visited places within the tropics where the shadows were vertical at the solstice, may have heard of the expedition from persons 'who might conceive that a sufficient progress southward would bring the navigator to a region where the shadows at noon inclined from north to south.' But we are told by more than one navigator or traveller that even north of the tropics the shadows have such an inclination, and as this is indisputably impossible, it follows of necessity 'that the imagination of the ancients was active in conceiving the solar phenomena of the Northern hemisphere to be reversed even in districts which lay to the north of the tropics.' Finally, the repeated failures which preceded the successful

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attempt of Vasco de Gama to round the Cape may well make us look with extreme suspicion on the alleged exploits of Phenician explorers two thousand years earlier.

But it is also beyond question that to the Greeks and even to the Romans down to the days of Julius Cæsar the countries with which the Phenicians had, as it is asserted, carried on a direct and constant trade for centuries, were for all practical purposes utterly unknown. Herodotos, iii. 115, could not tell whether the Kassiterides were islands or not. Tacitus says that the knowledge of the insular shape of Britain was obtained for the first time by the fleet of Agricola which dimly discerned Thule in the extreme distance to the north. All agree in assigning to the northern seas the same features and dangers which scared Himilkon when he emerged from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic, while most writers make a distinction between the Tin Islands and Britain, and Skymnos even places his tin islands in the upper part of the Hadriatic Sea opposite to the territory of the Istrians. Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 454.

On the other hand, writers, who wish to uphold the direct naval trade of the Phenicians with Britain, rest their case not so much on the distinct evidence adducible for their voyages as on the alleged difficulty or impracticability of the land-trade. But this difficulty seems to be set aside by the admitted fact of a land-transit for the amber-trade, even if we should not admit (what, nevertheless, it seems very hard to deny) that Diodoros, v. 20, 21, represents the præ-Roman tradition. Without the slightest apparent misgiving as to the truth of his report, he describes the existing course of a trade without writing a single word to imply that almost during his own lifetime that trade had undergone a complete revolution. This revolution is involved in the statement that in the days of Diodoros tin was brought overland to the mouth of the Rhone, coupled with the assumption that before Roman ascendancy was completely established in Gaul such overland traffic would have been impossible. But this assumption lies open to serious question. Commodities may be freely passed through countries where foreign political interference is fiercely repelled and where invading armies would have not the slightest chance of success. Caravans maintain a trade over deserts which to military leaders would present the most formidable, if not insuperable, dangers. But it is almost incredible that, if the tin-trade had been carried on for perhaps a thousand years by Phenician vessels sailing between Cornwall and Cadiz, and if then, within the memory of living men, this sea-traffic had been superseded by a land-transit, such a change should not have been so much as hinted at by Diodoros. But Diodoros certainly says that tin was brought by the natives to an island called Iktis; and from this statement an argument has been drawn for the reality of the direct Phenician trade with Britain, on the

ground that it is impossible to identify the Iktis of Diodoros with the Isle of Wight, because the channel between Iktis and Britain was left dry at low water,—a statement which would not be true of the channel between the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth either now or in the days of Julius Cæsar. But it is true of the passage between St. Michael's Mount and the Cornish coast: therefore, it is urged, the Iktis of Diodoros must be identified with the former of these, while the Miktis of Timaios must be Cornwall itself, because Timaios speaks of Miktis as a tin country six days' sail from Britain, and there is no country so situated. But if even on such grounds we should hesitate to admit that the Iktis of Diodoros must be St. Michael's Mount, we should have much greater difficulty in believing that the merchants who intended to convey the tin overland took it up at St. Michael's Mount rather than at the Isle of Wight, if not at Folkestone or Dover. It is further urged that the Isle of Wight was 200 miles distant from the tin mines, whereas Diodoros speaks of the natives as conveying tin 'to a British isle near at hand.' This, however, is not the case. Diodoros, v. 21, simply names Iktis as an island lying in front of Britain (*προκειμένην τῆς Βρεττανικῆς*),—a description which conveys no special notion of distance, but which applies much better to an island of the size of Vectis or Wight than to a mere rock like St. Michael's Mount. The conclusion seems to be that Diodoros knew very little about the geography of Britain; but his ignorance supplies no evidence for the historical character of Phenician navigation to the coasts of Cornwall, while his positive statement may be taken as proving that in his day the tin-trade was carried on by land and not by sea.

For a complete examination of the subject see Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* ch. viii. Among the works of writers who have maintained the direct connexion of Phenicians with Britain may be mentioned Dr. Smith's *Cassiterides*.

APPENDIX F. (Page 382.)

EXPULSION OF MILTIADES FROM THE CHERSONESOS.

It may be said with perfect confidence that if these Scythians could cross the Danube and in spite of the strong Persian forces which were overrunning the country to the south of that river could force their way to the Chersonesos, they must have been capable of inflicting frightful damage on the army of Dareios while it was roaming about in the Scythian deserts. The men who had energy enough to follow their enemies beyond their own borders in the face of formidable dangers would not have been slack in striking a blow which should be felt, when they could strike it at the cost of little exertion and no peril to them-

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selves. The alleged embassy to Sparta urging a joint concerted attack on the Persians ascribes to them a political sagacity of which the rest of the narrative exhibits not the faintest trace. These remarks certainly do not help us to reconstruct the history; but they tend to show that the history has been lost, and lost history is rarely, perhaps never, reconstructed. If after the return of Dareios to Sardeis Miltiades was, as Herodotos asserts, obliged to leave the Chersonesos, we must accept the fact, although we may not be able to assign the reason for it. He must have fled from fear either of the Persians or of the Scythians. But he can scarcely have fled from the latter motive, if the story of his conduct at the bridge on the Danube be true. According to this tale, he was the only man who had no reason to fear them. On the other hand he cannot have fled from fear of the Persians, if the tradition followed by Herodotos agreed with the facts. Herodotos asserts plainly that the Scythian invasion took place in the third year after the return of Dareios, vi. 40; and Miltiades was then living undisturbed in the Chersonesos. This is incredible, if Dareios was informed of what Miltiades had wished to do at the bridge, for his generals, Herod. v. 26, were actively engaged in these regions at this very time. Hence Nepos naturally represented the flight of Miltiades as taking place immediately after his return from the Scythian expedition: but unfortunately he did so, not as having any historical warrant for the statement, but simply because he thought that the matter was most satisfactorily explained on this hypothesis. Can we avoid the conclusion that of this portion of the life of Miltiades we have no historical knowledge? Mr. Grote holds that Miltiades could not remain in the Chersonesos after he had incurred the enmity of Dareios by exhorting the Ionians to destroy the bridge. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 370. But this assertion—if we put aside the difficulties, already noticed, in the narrative of the incidents which took place at the bridge—runs counter to the statement of Herodotos who says that he remained in the Chersonesos until the third year after the return of Dareios. These words may mean that he remained there for any time not exceeding thirty-six months: they must mean that he remained there for at the least twelve months with fractions of two others. Dr. Thirlwall maintains that, as he had not incurred the enmity of the Persian king before the Scythian inroad, he must have incurred it at some later time, and he thinks that the cause is to be found in his conquest of Lemnos. 'This conquest,' he argues, 'had dislodged the Pelasgians after they had become Persian subjects, Herod. v. 26: he had very probably at the same time expelled a Persian governor, Herod. v. 27: and at all events by annexing the island to his own dominions had been guilty of a formal act of rebellion which was as likely to provoke the indignation of Dareios as the treasonable proposal attributed to him on the Danube.'

Hist. Gr. vol. ii. Appendix II. But it can scarcely be supposed that Miltiades would have ventured to attack Lemnos before the Ionic revolt, while yet the whole Persian power could at once have been brought to bear upon him. When the revolt had fairly broken out and the Persians had enough to do elsewhere, the capture of Lemnos would become a comparatively easy affair: but then there would have been no need that he should fly from enemies from whom he had very little reason to dread any attack. Hence Dr. Thirlwall assigns his flight from the Chersonesos to the time when the Persian fleet under Harpagos; having taken Miletos, was advancing in its victorious course towards the Hellespont. But to bring this incident down to so late a date is to do still greater violence to the words of Herodotos who insists that it took place in the third year after the return of Dareios from Scythia. Again, then, we seem to have a sufficient reason for setting aside the whole narrative as full of inextricable difficulties. Dr. Thirlwall believes that the story of the advice given by Miltiades at the bridge was deliberately fabricated by Miltiades himself, partly as an artifice for soothing the Scythians while they were in possession of the Chersonesos, and partly for the sake of winning popularity at Athens. We need not perhaps shrink from this hypothesis through any feeling of respect for the political character of this great general: but it is unnecessary and useless to speculate about a tradition for which it is impossible to adduce any historical evidence whatever. Strabo asserts that Dareios caused the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont to be burned down in order to hinder them from affording means of transport to the Scythians in Asia. Mr. Grote regards this story as highly improbable, since these towns appear in their ordinary condition during the Ionic revolt. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 371. But we can scarcely say that it is more unlikely than almost any other of the traditions connected with this strange expedition of the Persian king to the north of the Danube.

APPENDIX G. (Page 437.)

NUMBERS OF THE PERSIANS AND GREEKS AT MARATHON.

WHEN we find Nepos giving the numbers of the Persians at 110,000, while Pausanias reckons them at 300,000, we need not be surprised if by Plato they are raised to 500,000, and by Justin to 600,000, of whom 200,000 are killed at Marathon, and killed, moreover, by the Athenians and Plataians who according to his veracious narrative did not exceed 11,000 men. As the proportion of the killed to the wounded in

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a battle is considerably less than half, these 11,000 Greeks on that day slew or wounded 500,000 Persians. Apart from the manifest absurdity of these fictions, we may see from the pages of Herodotos how defective were the traditional reports from which he had to draw up his narrative. No trust can, of course, be placed in the round number of 600 triremes, which brought the infantry from Kilikia to Naxos, Euboia, and Marathon; but in addition to these war-ships there was an indefinite number of horse-transports for the cavalry, of which no mention is made in the battle. But the tradition distinctly asserted that the front of the Greeks was made equal to that of the Persians, and that Miltiades took special care to strengthen the wings, in order to prevent the risk of his being outflanked. We can scarcely suppose that he would make his centre at its weakest point less than three or four deep, and the wings less than six or eight deep; but even thus he could not have stretched 10,000 or even 15,000 men over more than a mile, and the available ground between the marshes would probably not be made to contain even the numbers mentioned by Nepos. If the Persians outnumbered their opponents by five or six to one, this would be quite enough to account for the enormous exaggerations of Persian tradition, from which unquestionably the Greek historians must have derived their computation of the forces of Xerxes as well as of those commanded by Datis and Artaphernes. The very small number of ships taken by the Athenians at Marathon seems also to indicate that most of the 600 triremes existed only in Persian imagination.

We should be doing no wrong to Justin if we ascribe to him as deliberate a fiction in reducing the numbers of the Athenians, as that of which Asiatics are habitually guilty in dealing with figures. The result in the case of the European would be due to self-glorification; in the case of the Asiatic partly to this and in part to the utter lack of the historical sense. Herodotos (see page 389) gives the number of adult Athenian citizens at the time of the visit of Aristagoras as 30,000, a sufficient number of whom must of course have been left to defend the city; but to these must be added the 4,000 Klerouchoi or settlers who had returned from Euboia. We might fairly suppose therefore that the Athenian army, including the Plataians, might amount to 25,000 or 26,000 men.

There is nothing unlikely in the simple statement of Herodotos that the slain on the Persian side amounted to about 6,400, and on the Athenian to 192. But the number of the former would seem to show that the whole Persian force could not have much exceeded the half of the number assigned to them even by Nepos. The names of the slain Athenians are said to have been inscribed on ten pillars, one for each of the tribes to which they severally belonged. Paus. i. 32. 3. These

Athenians were buried in a tumulus or cairn which is now about thirty feet high and two hundred feet in diameter. The bodies of the slain Plataians were buried in another mound, those of the slaves in a third. According to Pausanias, i. 32, 4, the Athenians buried the Persian dead by simply throwing them into trenches.

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END OF THE FIRST VOLUME