READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

GEORGE GROTE'S HISTORY OF GREECE

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATAEA AND MYKALE.—FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

Though the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kyme and Samos : in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomestor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement Theomestor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection. Early in the spring they were reassembled, to the number of four hundred sail, but without the Phenicians, at the naval station of Samos, intending, however, only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such a belief in its enemies. Assembled at Aegina in the spring, to the number of one hundred and ten ships, under the Spartan king Leotychides, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychides to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the western waters of the Aegean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Herakles,—not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared fifty-two years afterwards to the Lacedemonian admiral Alcidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander, king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadae, and the Boeotian leaders, still remained in hearty cooperation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phocians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalcidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidaaa, situated on the isthmus of Pallene, together with the other towns in the long tongue of Pallene, declared themselves independent: and the neighboring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiaeans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general, Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabi­tants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalcidic Greeks, under Kritobulus of Torone. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest,' first became Grecian and Chalcidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidaea, the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallene. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, com­mander of the Skiontean auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenaean peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enter­prise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius, in Thessaly.

The latter, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Boeotia and Phocis. He sent a Karian, named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophonius at Lebadeia, Amphiaraus, and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at mount Ptoon near Akraephiae, and Apollo at the Phocian Abae. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent: but neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public: and the only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard was, that the priest of the Ptoian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself. It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plana for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus. The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens,—Alexander, king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers, to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King, and to holdout to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance. The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them, as a sincere friend, to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honorable: especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by its isthmus.

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians re­established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopylae the year before, might perhaps have been sufficient to detach them from the cause of Hellas : and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelm­ing terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would insure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing the winning same : while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt Moreover, the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together with the seed of the past autumn. The prudential view of the case being thus favorable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedaemonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succor during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: “Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours: we too know that, as well as thou: but we, nevertheless, love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alli­ance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue m his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burned Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us, even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands.”

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor : protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprized that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Boeotia to assist in the defence of Attica. The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request, and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering, combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants, and the frequent theme of applause by their orators. But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own Isthmus, which had so deeply endan­gered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing, and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence, and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Boeotia, and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius: indeed, their king Cleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died. Besides these two reasons,— indifference and unfavorable omens,—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object, says the historian, to fulfil “the exigences of the god.” As the Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.

Meanwhile, Mardonius, informed of the unfavorable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Boeotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavored to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies,—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardo­nius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice: about ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian head-quarters in Athens, May or June, 479 BC.

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Sala­mis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise, that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Boeotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis. The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them; but it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataea two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon: he thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychides, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal not less resolute than that of Alexander of Macedon when sent to Athens, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, and ventured to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychides. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the sus­picion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death: while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor: unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings. Murychides, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica: not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer,—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus,—had not a Tegean, named Chileos, whom they much esteemed, and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea. The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies, and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; and they despatched forthwith in the night five thousand Spartan citizens to the Isthmus,—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification,—the ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory. Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise,—the ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night-march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter,—who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to five thousand being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: five thousand Lacedaemonian Perioeki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also de­spatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was now collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders. We may reasonably doubt whether they ever made such a promise: but at any rate, the suddenness of the march as well as the greatness of the force prevented them from fulfilling it; and they were forced to content themselves with apprizing Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Boeotia, a country in every way more favorable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his prop­ositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to sur­prise a body of one thousand Lacedaemonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara, he withdrew all his army into Boeotia, not taking either the straight road to Plataea through Eleutherae, or to Thebes through Phyle, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the northeasterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asopus. and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, by a route longer but easier, in Boeotia, on the plain of the Asopus: along which river he next day marched westward to Skolus, a town in the territory of Thebes, seemingly near to that of Plataea. He then took up a position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asopus: his left wing over against Erythrae, his centre over against Hysiae, and his right in the territory of' Plataea : and he employed his army in constructing forthwith a fortified camp of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favorable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes in his rear,—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success: even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries. A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attaginus invited Mardonius, along with fifty Persians and fifty Theban or Boeotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present,—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged as that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted by his Persian neighbor in Greek, who inquired to what city he belonged, and, upon learning that he was an Orchomenian, continued thus: “Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions: the rather, in order that thou mayst be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few surviving.” Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied: “ Surely, thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers but the Persian rejoined: “My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings,—to be full of knowl­edge, and at the same time to have no power over any result.” “ This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him, even before the battle of Plataea.” It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign,—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack but jealous of his superior. Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Boeotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phocians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contin­gent of one thousand hoplites, under Harmokydes, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Boeotia: and some of the Phocians even remained behind in the neighborhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavorable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he then brought up his numerous cavalry all around them: while the pheme, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phocians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down. The general Harmokydes, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins,—when the cavalry rode up, apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, With uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phocians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phocians on their courage, and to assure them, by means of a herald, that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them: he at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behavior should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phocians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Boeotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithreron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedaemonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegea, fifteen hundred; from Corinth, five thousand,—besides a small body of three hundred from the Corinthian colony of Potidaea; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, six hundred; from Sicyon, three thousand; from Epidaurus, eight hundred; from Troezen, one thou­sand ; from Lepreon, two hundred; from Mycenae and Tiryns, four hundred ; from Phlius, one thousand ; from Hermione, three hundred; from Eretria and Styra, six hundred; from Chalcis, four hundred; from Ambracia, five hundred; from Leukas and Anaktorium, eight hundred; from Pale in Kephallenia, two hundred; from Egina, five hundred. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up three thousand Megarian hoplites ; and as toon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of eight thousand Athenian hoplites, and six hundred Plataean, under Aristeides, who passed over from Salamis. The total force of hoplites, or heavy-armed troops, was thus thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men: there were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen; but if we add those who are called light-armed, or unarmed generally,— some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armor,—the grand total was not less than one hundred and ten thousand men. Of these light-armed, or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, thirty-five thousand in attendance on the five thousand Spartan citizens, and thirty-four thousand five hundred in attendance on the other hoplites,—together with eighteen hundred Thespians, who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Plataea, which took place some little time afterwards: but it seems that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions contin­ued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis: at Eleusis, as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithaeron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asopus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythrae, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach,—but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows, and trained in such accom­plishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows,—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain. So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially three hundred chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general, Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicu­ous armor, and mounted on a Nisaean horse with golden trap­pings, charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athe­nians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the de­fences of his helmet and breastplate, however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass to recover the dead body. At first the. Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their pos­session.

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailings so loud as to echo over all Boeotia; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart, and paraded it around the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions. And so much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply’ of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythrae in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithaeron, and passing by Hysiae, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Plataean territory along the Asopus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia, and their left wing near to the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Plataean hero, Androkrates. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name, —the Lacedaemonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them,—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hear­ing both sides, to Athens. In the field, even Lacedaemonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations : in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedaemonian troops in a body, who heard the argument, and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprized of this change of position, marched his armv also a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asopus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself, with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedaemonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedaemonians : Bactrians, Indians, Sakae, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre: and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right,—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at fifty thousand: nor can we place any confidence in the total of three hundred thousand, which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asopus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods ; the two first had men from the most distin­guished prophetic breeds in Elis,—the latter invited one from Lenkas. All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honored with a recompense above all pay,—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices,—favorable for resistance if attacked; unfavorable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Platea had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asopus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedemonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian su­premacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed by Aristeides, with a hand at once gentle and decisive. More over, the annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant: their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asopus, prevented the Greeks from using it for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position, near the Lacedaemonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader, Timegenidas, remarking the con­voys which arrived over the passes of Kithaeron, in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful: a train of five hundred beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp: nor was it safe for any farther convoys to approach the Greeks. Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed, this manoeuvre, which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith. in vain did Artabazus endeavor to dissuade him from the step,—taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them: he recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned,—which would allow time for distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persian as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected might arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavorable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them, whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but others. Herodotus intimates, knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, “Since ye either do not know or will not tell, I, who know well, will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground, therefore, we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye, therefore, ye who are well- affected to the Persians,—we shall get the better of the Greeks.” With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men’s minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus knew, though he does not cite it, the particular prophecy io which Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone, that it had no reference to the Persians: it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis, from whom he quotes four lines, and Musteus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruc­tion of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermodon and Asopus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out : it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise: but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander, king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced post in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeides and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name, and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, a well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit,—he apprized them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favor­able sacrifices, but was, nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. “Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he) remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke: I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved.”

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeides to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedaemonians in the line.

We Lacedaemonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Per­sians and Medes, against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Mara­thon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing, against the Boeotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar.” The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed: nor was it yet quite completed when day broke, and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedaemonians: upon which Pausanias, seeing that his manoeuvre had failed, led back his Lacedaemonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedaemonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy’s line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized: it is at the same time the highest compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops,—a reputation recognized by Herodotus, and well sustained at least by their personal bravery. Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style, casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedaemonians, and challenge them to a “single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedaemonians against Persians.” This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was fol­lowed by something very real and terrible,—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter, as has been before stated, had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedaemonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asopus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place: and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable  while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Cithaeron to join them.

In this dilemma, Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent, and after an anxious debate the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Plataea, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant: this island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroe, both of which flow from Cithaeron, and, after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a northwesterly direction to­wards one of the recesses of the gulf of Corinth,—quite distinct from the Asopus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Cithaeron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Subsea. When in this so-called island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asdpus. It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Cithaeron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy’s cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack: but his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedaemonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering; insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias, in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Pl at tea, and took up a position in front of the Heraeum, or temple of Here, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (i. e. between the course of the Asopus and that of the Oeroe), there appear to have been a range of low hills: the Lacedaemonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side. Pausanias, apprized that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honor of a Spartan; nevertheless, most of the taxiarchs, or leaders of companies, obeyed without murmuring; but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana, obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring “that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner.’' Pausanias, with the second in command, Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance: but they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions: for in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedaemonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised: the movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exag­gerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behavior of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding : yet it proved fortunate in its results,—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the island, the Grecian army would have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedaemonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus ; who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock, fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—“ This is my pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers.” Pau­sanias denounced him as a madman,—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedaemonians should also be in march. In the mean time the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the island, he commanded a halt,—either to await Amompharetus, if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Demeter. The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary, marching without halt and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence, which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuadae: “These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth . With that, he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack, with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asopus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for over­coming resistance : the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they wore overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward: but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighborhood of the Demetrion, or temple of Eleusinian Demeter, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse, and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprize the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. Nor were the Athenians slack in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him. Accordingly, the Lacedaemonians and Tegeates had to encounter the Persians single-handed, without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha, or long wicker shields, forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrow’s : their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias per­sisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavorable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks, among them the brave Kallikrates, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful dela. at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heraeum of the Plataeans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Here to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favorable : but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedaemonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge, and having no defensive armor, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks. They threw themselves upon the Lacedemonians. seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them : many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger. Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Aeimnertus : his thousand guards mostly perished around him and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp constructed by Mardonius behind the Asopus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Boeotians; especially the Theban leader with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of three hundred of their best troops. The Theban cavalry how­ever still maintained a good from, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp. With the exception of the Thebans and Boeotians, none of the other medizing Greeks rendered any real service: instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that, in point of fact, the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were the native Persians and Sakae on the left, and the Boeo­tians on the right: the former against the Lacedaemonians, the latter against the Athenians.

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of forty thousand men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprized that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success, and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be contradicted. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,— that he took no pains to insure the concerted action of his whole army : accordingly, before Artaba­zus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat: not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp, or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and tailing the direct road through Phocis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.

As the native Persians, the Sakai, and the Boeotians, were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Plataae instead of to the island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle, was, that the Lacedaemonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honor, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order; the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians, and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asopodorus, employed in checking the. pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously, and drove them back to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of six hundred men. But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the ruin of the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedaemonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athene Aiea,—while his silver­footed throne, and cimeter were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only three thousand men out of the three hundred thousand which had composed the army of Mardonius,—save and except the forty thousand men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat. Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of computation: about the Grecian loss, his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein, however, is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedaemonians, not Spartans, specified; while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than thirteen hundred and sixty Greeks were slain in the action, appears probable: all doubtless hoplites,—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle. Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army : but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery, while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other medizing Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through die interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia: the interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably ; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast. It will be seen that Artabazus afterwards rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedaemonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians, and the Phliasians, each buried their dead apart, erecting a sepa­rate tomb in commemoration: the Lacedaemonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial­places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus, the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikrates,—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedaemonians,— and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighborhood of Plataea by those cities whose citi­zens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honor, with the conni­vance and aid of the Platwans. The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Aeginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas. On the morrow, the body was stolen away and buried ; by whom, was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntes, the son of Mardonius: the funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of the traveller Pausanias.

The spoil was rich and multifarious,—gold and silver in Daries as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, etc., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included. By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Aeginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general,—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers. The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed: there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families ; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetorides, of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandates; and be had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father. Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Plataea an inhabi­tants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Plataea were the Lacedaemonians. Athenians, and Tegeans: the Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece. It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantineia, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Cithaeron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus : but the Lacedaemonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius,—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the medizing leaders should be delivered up, especially Timegenidas and Attaginus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory,—giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endur­ance, the latter at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A nego­tiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attaginus, who found means to escape at the last moment. Ilis sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous, that they were nowise implicated in the medism of their father. Timegenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth, and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices fort heir acquittal,—indeed, the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation. It is remarkable that Pausanias himself, only a few years afterwards, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta, under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money. In this hope, indeed, he found himself deceived, as Timegenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted, as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognized untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valor at the battle of Plataea, may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize,—that Aristeides appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies,—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Plataeans, to which proposition both Aris­teides and Pausanias acceded. But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacedaemonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedaemonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for L.s disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan, however, who had surpassed them all,—Aristodemus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylae. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Plataea he stepped forth single­handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valor, and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him. the same funereal honors as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burden to them. Subsequent valor might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodemus to a level with the most honored citizens.

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch, that the Plataeans received by general vote the prize of valor, it is certain that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias, after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Plataean territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of this ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied. The Plataeans, now re­entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honorable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athene,—the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece. In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias, and the whole body of allies, bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Plataea, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Boeotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Plataea, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent: an aggregate force of ten thousand hoplites, one thousand cavalry, and one hundred triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified: moreover, the town of Plataea was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble. This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeides, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might reassemble, or be reinforced; indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykale had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable, nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still medizing, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendency in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeides and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defence which should cot er Attica as well as Peloponnesus, and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedaemonians to Plataea, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment, though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Plataea, projected by Aristeides from taking effect.

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Plataea, the naval armament under Leotychides and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important, at Mykale on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet, which numbered One hundred and ten triremes, having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Per­sians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia, — although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychides, that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomestor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychides was long  deaf to the treaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, “Hegesistratus, i.e. army-leader.” “I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychides, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us, let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith.” Engage­ments were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther encouraged by favorable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Deiphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.

When they reached the Heraeum near Kalami in Samos, and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy’s fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighboring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now; very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phenician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykale near Miletus.

Here they were under the protection of a land-force of sixty thousand men, under the command of Tigranes,—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia: the ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy’s fleet and again offer battle at Mykale. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea­force before them : but since muck of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychides was, to copy the previous manoeuvre of Themistokles, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Euboea. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did no ­listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land ; while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifesta­tion, and suspecting, either from his manoeuvre or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykale,— with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Boeotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day,—the fourth of the month Boedromion (about September) 479 bc. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Plataea in Boeotia had been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine pheme, or message, flew into the camp,—whilst a herald’s staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Aegean;—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Boeotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodo­tus, and doubtless universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of Mykale were alive to tell their own story: he moreover mentions another of those coincidences which the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity, there was a chapel of Eleusinian Demeter close to the field of battle at Mykale as well as at Platina. Diodorus and other later writers, who wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedaemonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine ; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Troezenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Plataea, employed their gerrha, or wicker bucklers, planted by spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged their arrows, and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it, and in driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardor of the pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots, with disadvantages of armor, such as had been felt severely at Plataea, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedaemonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack, that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat: first, the disarmed Samians; next, other Ionians and AeoIians; lastly, the Milesians who had been posted to guard the passes in the. rear, not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack; and the Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykale, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranes and Mardontes, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntes and Ithamithres, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the bands of the assailants, and were burned. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless : among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilous. The honors of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Troezenians; the Lacedaemonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.

The dispersed Persian array, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykale, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntes, whom Masistes, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly re­proached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat: the general was at length so maddened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his cimeter and would have slain Masistes, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras, who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Cilicia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistes; the consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amestris. But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast, so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet had full con­fidence in their power of defending the islands, and willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal en­gagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Stratis and Theomestor were expelled from Chios and Samos. But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless, not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the medizing Greeks from their seaport towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens. The Lacedaemonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honorable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute,—yet, at the same time, to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionian, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendency and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos,—next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge; for so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September. 479 bc., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before, about November, 480 BC. Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychides and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiades down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia: from the flight of the second Miltiades to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493-480 BC), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykale were now naturally eager both to reestablish the ascendency of Athens and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese,—probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon, son of Miltiades, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alcibiades had in after days, with private forts of his own. To this motive for attacking the Chersonese maybe added another,—the importance of its corn-produce as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Aegina. Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the cooperation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus,—the strong­est place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre in which all the neighboring Persian garrisons, from Cardia and elsewhere, had got together, under Oeobazus and Artayktes.

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elteus,—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore, was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elaeus, but also for the neighboring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings, and probable deposites for security, — money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran, that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktes, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him: “Master, here is the house of a Greek, who, in invading thy territory, met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade thy land,”—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktes, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. Nor was he content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment : he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines. Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison, which nevertheless still held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well-nigh exhausted; nor was it without difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept to­gether, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktes and Oeobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Oeobazus found his way into Thrace, where, however, he was taken captive by the Absinthian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistorus: Artayktes fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Aegos Potamos, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of one hundred talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of two hundred tal­ents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus and the citizens of Elaeus disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktes, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed. There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus, the Athenian fleet returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.

CHAPTER LIV.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERN­MENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND