CHAPTER XX . PYRRHUS

I.

ROME AND MAGNA GRAECIA

AT the end of the Third Samnite war, in 290, Rome had created a safety barrier between north and south by annexing Sabine and Praetuttian territory to the city, and planting Latin colonies at Hadria and at Castrum Novum to guard the Adriatic littoral. The utility of this barrier was demonstrated when in 285 the Gauls for the sixth time crossed the Apennines in search of land and booty. The Senones of the Ager Gallicus, the tribe which had sacked Rome a century before, led in this raid, but when we remember that Brennus was at the same time marching toward Macedonia and that several Celtic tribes were on their way to Asia Minor we may suppose that the driving force came from the pressure of migrating peoples behind the Alps. The Senones first besieged Arretium with a view to detaching it from the Roman alliance. Caecilius Metellus, the consul of 284, marched up to relieve Arretium, but was slain in a battle which cost Rome more than half the military tribunes and thirteen thousand men. The news of this defeat spread rapidly and caused some of the Samnites and Lucanians, as well as the Etruscans of Vulci and Volsinii (Orvieto), to repudiate their treaties. But the rebels could no longer effect a union of forces, nor did the Senones, who were feared by their neighbours, find any allies near at hand. Manius Curius, elected to complete the term of Metellus, sent envoys to the chiefs of the Senones to treat for the return of prisoners. When these envoys were treacherously slain, the Roman army marched into the Ager Gallicus and defeated the Senones, pursuing them without mercy and driving them completely out of the country. A citizen colony was planted at Sena above Ancona to act as a garrison until Rome should decide what to do with the vacated territory.

The neighbouring Gallic tribe of the Boii now took up the quarrel and marched far enough south to connect with contingents of the Etruscan cities which were in revolt. Cornelius Dolabella, the consul of 283, met the united forces at Lake Vadimo, south of Volsinii, routing them completely. Nevertheless, the Boii advanced again the next year, having called out every able-bodied man of the tribe. Defeated again, they now sued for peace, and the Romans, having no concern for affairs in the Po valley and deeply committed in Etruria and southern Italy, were eager to make peace. Of the Senones we hear no more in Italy; since Caesar later found a tribe of these people in central Gaul (Sens) it is probable that they migrated thither after their defeat. The Etruscan cities of Volsinii and Vulci held out for two more years, when they surrendered a part of their territory and entered the Roman federation.

In the south the news of these raids had encouraged some of the Samnites to rise again, and even the Lucanians who had for a while been Rome’s allies. The Latin colony of Venusia, planted on their common border in 291, stood as an ever-present reminder of Rome’s growing power. The Lucanians had for a century been pushing southward against the cities of Magna Graecia. This drive had probably not been caused merely by the natural growth of a prolific people; the Lucanians were being pressed on by their Sabellian cousins who, farther north, were being driven on by the Gauls of the Ager Gallicus and the Po-Valley, as they in turn were crowded down by the constantly oncoming hordes from the seething areas of central Europe. In fact the turmoils that had involved the Etruscans, Latins, Campanians and Greeks one after the other during the last hundred years, were merely repercussions of the great folk-migrations beyond the confines of Italy. Rome had come out of the resulting scrimmage better than the rest because she alone had discovered the solution. While the Etruscans had fallen through lack of unity, the Campanians had survived with diminished power by weakly accepting dependence, and the Greeks, jealous and unarmed, had relied upon unloyal mercenaries, Rome had faced her foes, and organizing a federation of neighbours, had taken the initiative and slowly advanced a barrier of safety till a solid defensive wall had been erected along the northern Apennines.

To settle with the Lucanians now meant the adoption of a definite policy toward the Greek cities to the south with which the Lucanians had kept up a desultory warfare for 1 century. Rome’s customary procedure was to make alliances with common combatants in the rear of her enemy. In the present instance this policy would be the more reasonable since Rome s long friendship with Massilia and Neapolis gave her a good name among the Greeks. That she had already made some overtures of the kind seems likely, for we hear that the people of Thurii had honoured a Roman tribune with a statue and golden crown (apparently in 285) for proposing some measure of assistance in their favour against a Lucanian invader.

By the third century the Greek cities of the south had long since passed their vigour. In the preceding century Dionysius I had nearly wrecked Rhegium, Hipponium and Caulonia and had weakened the flourishing cities of Locri, Croton, and Thurii . The Bruttian and Lucanian barbarians had therefore found several cities quite powerless to withstand them. During that century they seized Posidonia, Laus, Tempsa, Terina and Hipponium. On the western coast only Rhegium, now rebuilt, and Velia survived. On the south coast the flourishing commercial city of Tarentum had assumed a protectorate over the league of Italiote cities which had its seat at Heraclea, but her policy of hiring mercenary kings and troops to fight their battles proved disastrous. First Archidamus of Sparta had come, but he fell in a battle with the barbarians in 338. Four years later Tarentum bargained with Alexander of Epirus, an uncle of the great Alexander of Macedon. Defeating the Lucanians and Bruttians, he restored Heraclea, Consentia and Terina. Ambitious to establish an empire in the south, he even entered into friendly relations with Rome, and it is probably this treaty, made in conjunction with Tarentum and the Italiote league, that pledged the Romans never to sail east of the Lacinian headland. It is not a plausible assumption that Rome would have agreed to such a clause after the foundation of Luceria in 314, but before the Samnite wars Magna Graecia was an unknown world to them. Alexander, however, quarrelled with his employer when his own ambitions became known, and he moved the headquarters of the league to Thurii, where it would be under his own control. When therefore he had to meet the barbarian hordes again he received no aid from arentum, and in the defeat of his forces he was slain (330). For a generation the Tarentines held their own against the Lucanians; then, needing help, they invited Cleonymus of Sparta to lead them (303); he too came in the hope of empire. There followed the usual imbroglio: since Metapontum refused to send him a contingent Cleonymus entered the town, exacted a heavy penalty, and abused and insulted the citizens. The Greeks deserted him and he was defeated by the barbarians and compelled to depart. Livy states that the defeat was due to Rome. This, though somewhat startling, is by no means impossible, for the Lucanians had aided Rome in the Samnite war, just now coming to an end, and their allies had a right to expect aid in return. Certainly the Romans, who had recently planted a colony at Luceria south of Samnium, could hardly have looked with favour upon Cleonymus’ ambitions to establish an empire in Italy.

Failing to learn from all these experiences Tarentum next invited Agathocles of Syracuse. He operated, though with little success, against the Bruttians c. 298. Some two years later he treacherously seized the friendly city of Croton, frightened the Iapygians into a promise to keep the peace, and c. 295 liberated Hipponium and forced the Bruttians to accept terms.

A decade after the departure of Agathocles we find that the Bruttians had again captured Hipponium, and Thurii was being threatened by the Lucanians. Three years before the Thurians had, as we have seen, received the moral support of Rome. Since they had usually suffered misfortune at the hands of the mercenary kings who had been summoned to Italy by the rival city of Tarentum, they now appealed not to Tarentum but to Rome for aid and a garrison. Fabricius, the consul of 282, accordingly came to their relief. The Tarentines, who looked upon themselves as protectors of the Greek cities, were deeply offended, and the Romans probably knew enough of southern politics to surmise that there might be trouble. Indeed, the very fact that it was a tribune who first advocated the cause of Thurii at Rome implies that the slow-moving senate had hesitated to enter upon a new far-reaching venture, and that the young democratic leaders—the plebeian assembly attained sovereign powers only in 287—took matters into their own hands and overrode the senate. It is significant throughout this war that the senate was inclined toward peace and that plebeian leaders like Fabricius and Manius Curius, and the Claudii who acted with them, bore the brunt of the fighting and negotiating.

II.

TARENTUM: THE COMING OF PYRRHUS

Shortly after the relief of Thurii, a Roman fleet of ten ships anchored before the harbour of Tarentum. This is the first time we hear of Roman war-vessels in these waters, and we do not know why they were there. They had perhaps been sent to support Fabricius before Thurii and were now cruising on a tour of inspection, as Appian implies, or perhaps, as Mommsen surmises, they were on their way to the three colonies recently planted on the Adriatic coast. The Tarentines, reminded of the old treaty that excluded Roman ships from their waters, attacked the Romans, sinking four ships and capturing one. Such an improvident assault could only have been caused by a storm of ungovernable anger at Rome’s intervention in their sphere of influence. It could hardly have been due to fear of an attack upon their strongly fortified harbour, which would have been impossible with only ten ships, or to anger at the mere formal infraction of an old treaty on this very occasion, a treaty which could not be other than obsolete as soon as Rome had established her three harbours on the Adriatic. To be sure, Rome was under obligation to bargain for a revocation, but it is likely that her statesmen were by now quite oblivious of the terms of the treaty which had been made in the first instance with a foreign king when Italy presented a wholly different complexion. The animus in the act is revealed by the fact that the Tarentines immediately marched upon Thurii and forced the Roman garrison to withdraw.

Rome at once sent envoys to demand reparations for her losses and those of Thurii. That she did not demand anything more, or fix terms that would establish her power in the south, is again a revelation of the senate’s attitude, for it was the senate’s province to conduct such negotiations. The envoys were insulted and sent back without satisfaction. The senate then instructed the consul Aemilius Barbula, who was operating in southern Samnium (281), to march with his army to Tarentum and repeat Rome’s demands. The Tarentines had meanwhile bargained with Pyrrhus the king of Epirus for aid, but, now quite frightened, placed their government in the hands of one of the nobles friendly to Rome with instructions to reach an understanding. Before he succeeded, however, the first contingent of 3000 Epirote troops arrived with the king’s envoy, Cineas, who succeeded in raising a counter-revolution, and Tarentum decided upon war.

Pyrrhus was now about forty years of age and at the height of his reputation. By inheritance and temperament a fit chieftain of primitive and courageous mountain tribes, he was by accident of intermarriage a relative of the Great Alexander. Lured into nebulous ambitions by this fatal propinquity he was constantly driving into adventures which taxed his resources and his staying powers. Courageous and reckless, a magnetic leader of men, a very skilful tactician—Hannibal called him his master—he might well have changed the course of Rome’s advance had he comprehended the world outside of Epirus as well as he knew his own people, and had he possessed an endurance in facing adversity equal to the exuberance of his temporary outbursts of optimism. When he left his native mountains his behaviour at times suggests that of some viking chieftain running amuck in a Renaissance city. He had twice lost and twice gained his throne, the second time by a dastardly murder of the kind that seems not to have been incompatible in his world with certain exacting rules of chivalry. By engaging bravado, by intrigue, and by many well-planned marriages he had united Epirus and extended its boundaries from Leucadia well into Illyricum. Lanassa, the daughter of the powerful Agathocles, had brought him Corcyra as her marriage portion. He had even seized the throne of Macedonia and held it for a few weeks. Cheated of his high hopes there however he was glad to try his fortune in Italy. To be sure he pledged himself to depart as soon as he had relieved Tarentum, but his contemporaries who knew him did not take his promises seriously, for they expected him to build himself an empire in the West as had Alexander in the East. In view of Tarentum’s previous record in hiring kings we need not suppose that the promises exacted were very precise. In his later conferences with Rome he seems to have felt bound only to respect the autonomy of Tarentum.

As we have seen, the consul of 281, Aemilius Barbula, had no instructions to capture Tarentum. His mission was merely to frighten the city into granting restitution and signing a treaty of peace. For this purpose he invaded Tarentine territory and devastated as he saw fit, taking care however to spare the property of those who were known to favour peace with Rome. Unsuccessful in his mission, he departed before Pyrrhus’ arrival, going back to his former field of operations farther north. Pyrrhus, with the aid of Tarentine transports, came over early in the spring of 280 with a well-trained army 25,000 strong, including 3000 horse and 2000 archers. He also brought with him twenty elephants, from which much was expected, for the Romans had never met these beasts in battle. A thorough drill-master, he summoned the Tarentines to enter his army, and when he found them indifferent, he closed the theatres and the gymnasium and compelled them to drill. While he was training his forces, the new consul of 280, Valerius Laevinus, marched down through central Lucania planting garrisons in the Greek cities which had thrown in their lot with Rome. We are not given a list of them but we hear later of such garrisons stationed at Rhegium, Locri, and Thurii.

III.

THE WAR AND PEACE-PROPOSALS

Early in the summer the opposing armies met on the Siris river near Heraclea. The story of this battle and the subsequent events comes to us largely from late Greek historians who had drawn upon both Greek and Roman sources. It is unusually dramatic, but not on that account as untrustworthy as the ubiquity of anecdote might imply1. The whole account had first been given by Hieronymus of Cardia, a contemporary, who, though not friendly to Pyrrhus, had written with a scrupulous regard for the facts. On the Roman side Fabius Pictor and Ennius first wrote the story as they heard it from survivors or found it told in Timaeus. Strange as it may seem, it is the Roman tradition which goes farthest in picturing the chivalry and generosity of Rome’s antagonist. This peculiarity, which one finds only too infrequently in Roman history, becomes especially patent in Plutarch’s biography of Pyrrhus where the story of the Roman war, drawn largely from Roman sources, presents a more engaging personality than the beginning and end of the biography, which rest upon Greek sources. The explanation seems to be that Ennius, whose Annals became the favourite schoolbook of Rome’s youth for two centuries and influenced historical tradition more than any other book, had portrayed Pyrrhus with great sympathy and had told this story very fully and effectively. Ennius in fact was himself a Messapian, the grandson of one of the princes who had probably served as officer under Pyrrhus. He had heard the story of that war told as a household tale. This fact then accounts in some measure for the fullness of details and the colour, which, in this instance, are not signs of apocryphal invention. Ennius, following a custom of his day, versified history, but the rules of this literary genre did not permit of wilful insertions; he tells as effectively as he can what he has heard and read. We may infer, however, that in this instance his portrait is somewhat too sympathetically drawn. If we had the Greek story in its purity from Hieronymus—Diodorus is too fragmentary, and Justinus too recklessly condensed to give us any conception of what it was—we should probably have the order of events as presented with a fair degree of congruity by Plutarch, Livy’s epitome, and Zonaras, though the story would be more soberly told and with less friendly sympathy for both of the contestants.

Pyrrhus was in no great haste for battle. His Italian allies had boasted of having more than three hundred thousand men available for the war, but none of these had as yet appeared. It seems that the consul of the preceding year, instead of going home for the winter as was usual, had camped in the vicinity of Venusia just to prove to the Samnite and Lucanian rebels that their services might be needed at home. It was the Roman consul Laevinus who took the initiative, crossed the Siris and forced a battle. For the first time the Roman legions met the solid Macedonian phalanx, and every legionary armed with a sword had to face five spear-points. The Romans, with two citizen legions, about 8000 men, and probably about twice that force of allies, fairly matched the enemy in numbers, but, having a thinner, longer line, could threaten the enemy’s flanks if only the first charge could be blocked. It has been remarked with surprise that Pyrrhus did not employ his elephants in the orthodox fashion, which was, as with the modern tank, to make breaches here and there in the line of the enemy. He rather stationed them on his wings to frighten the Roman cavalry that might presumably circle his short and compact line. He had no fear that his heavy phalanx would not take care of his centre. If he could shatter the Roman wings and strike terror in their cavalry, his own well-trained horse would be able to circle the legions and attack from the rear. And his plan succeeded. It is noteworthy that Hannibal, who considered Pyrrhus a master of tactics, employed his horse and elephants in this same manner at the battle of the Trebia, the only contest in Italy in which he had elephants.

The Romans were finally driven off the field with a loss of 7000 men, but Pyrrhus also lost 4000 and these would be more difficult to replace. His frank acknowledgment of what his victory had cost him passed into a proverbial phrase which is still current. At Dodona Pyrrhus recorded his victory in a modest inscription which has been found. It reports a gift to the god by ‘Pyrrhus the Epirote and the Tarentines’—no others are mentioned—of booty taken from ‘the Romans and their allies’. According to Ennius a dedication to Zeus at Tarentum scrupulously mentioned his losses as well as his gains. On the Italiote Greeks his victory made a strong impression. Croton swore allegiance to him, Locri dismissed its Roman garrison of 200 men which he permitted to return home, and Rhegium, which seemed also on the point of veering, was saved from his control only by the brutal massacre of its prominent citizens and the seizure of the town by its lawless Campanian garrison, an act of treachery which Rome later punished in the interest of her good name among the Greeks.

Presently Pyrrhus made a dash toward Rome. Like Hannibal, who later mistook the Roman federation for a conglomeration of unwilling subjects ready to fall away at the first excuse, he supposed that Campania and the northern Samnites would abandon the Roman alliance at his approach. But Capua and Neapolis refused him admittance, the Samnites did not flock to his standard and Coruncanius the other consul, having speedily completed his work in Etruria, made peace with Vulci and Volsinii and came to the relief of the city. The walls of the city were manned for defence, and for the first time men without property were recruited for army service. Pyrrhus, deceived in his expectations, turned back when only forty miles from the city, retreated southward and decided if possible to end by compromise a war which proved to be more tedious than he had expected. He had never been a man of patience. Earlier in Macedonia, later in Sicily, before Sparta, and in his final campaign at Argos, he was similarly impatient of delay. His successes were always won by surprises. Elated to unbounded hopes by a favourable turn of events, he could accomplish amazing prodigies of heroism, but he showed no endurance when plans failed. Overquick despair was his most effective enemy. Finding that he had underrated his task, he sent Cineas to Rome with offers of peace. He was ready to give up his prisoners and end the war if Rome would make peace with Tarentum, promise autonomy and liberty to the Greeks, and surrender what she had taken from his present allies including the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians. This doubtless would mean at least the withdrawal of the colonies of Luceria and Venusia. Following the custom of Oriental courts he also sent with Cineas an abundance of gifts to be presented to the noble ladies of whatever courtly society he might find. This assumption that Rome resembled Alexandria reveals his utter lack of information. The Romans, who had not dealt with royal servitors before, naively assumed that they were being bribed and rejected the gifts with a satisfactory display of dignity.

There was however a strong peace party in the senate. The old nobility could hardly have had great enthusiasm for a war which had been induced by a plebiscite contrary to all the customs of the mos maiorum. We need not suppose that the peace party was ready to grant Pyrrhus’ terms in full. The surrender of the lines established by the Second and Third Samnite Wars could hardly have been considered. But the subjection to Rome of all the south, including Greek cities, with which the Senate had always been traditionally on friendly terms, must have seemed unwarranted.

Now that the barrier of the Rubicon was firmly established, Italy was secure. The fact that Pyrrhus had offered terms implied that he wished to have peace, and a compromise satisfactory to the Romans might be attainable. But while the discussion was in progress, the aged Appius Claudius, who despite his patrician rank acted as his family had traditionally done with the plebeian coterie, was led into the chamber and rebuked the senators roundly for entertaining offers from a victorious enemy still on Italian soil. His speech, still circulated in Cicero’s day, was the most ancient record of a public address that Roman archives preserved. He convinced the wavering Senate, and overtures of peace were rejected, but Fabricius, who could be trusted not to re-open the discussion, was sent to offer a ransom for Roman prisoners. The prospect of slavery beyond the seas was not pleasant to contemplate. However, Pyrrhus saw no advantage in a bargain which would prolong the war when he needed peace far more than gold. Since Cineas had reported that the Senate, like an assembly of kings, was very jealous of its dignity, and their haughty representative Fabricius was there to demonstrate the fact, he thought a lofty gesture in his best manner might win for him what Cineas’ rhetoric and gifts had failed to get. The dignity of his answer lost nothing in the lines of Ennius who represents him as saying: ‘ I did not come to bargain: let us settle our dispute on the field of battle. As for your prisoners take them as a gift from me.’ It seems that Fabricius received them on the understanding that they should be returned unless peace were made. The gesture had its effect, though not immediately; the next year, after a second defeat, Fabricius was sent again, as we shall see, and this time with instructions to open negotiations for peace.

During the winter Rome trained new armies and in April 279 sent forth both the new consuls, P. Sulpicius and P. Decius Mus, the son of the consul who fell at Sentinum. Two consular armies with the usual allied contingent of about twice the legionary force would amount to about 40,000 men. Now that Pyrrhus had received respectable contingents from his allies, his forces were at least equally strong. This time he decided that the shortest road was not the most expeditious—Campania had proved too well riveted to Rome. By following the Adriatic coast northward and threatening the Latin colonies of Luceria and Venusia there was some hope of liberating Samnium and thus bringing Rome to terms. This Rome had foreseen. The consular armies met him east of Venusia on the banks of the Aufidus near Asculum in a rough and wooded region where the phalanx, cavalry and elephants would not have advantageous ground for effective action. The king alternated the companies of his phalanxes with Samnite and Lucanian maniples, either to attain a longer line with which to face the enlarged Roman army or to make a more flexible line in rough country. The elephants were again posted on the wings. The battle lasted all day without a decision. Early next morning, the king seized the fords of the river and chose a position better suited to his customary tactics. This time the solid phalanxes pushed the legions back, then the elephants were sent in to open the breaches in the legions and the light-armed troops wedged in to complete the wreckage. The Romans however managed to regain and hold their fortified camp and Pyrrhus again left the field with a costly and indecisive victory, unable to advance further. The Romans had lost the consul, Decius, and 6000 dead on the field, but Pyrrhus no less than 3500, and he himself had received a wound which, though not serious, added to his impatience.

Pyrrhus in fact was not only weary of the undertaking but he now knew that the Celts had made vacant the throne of Macedonia, and were threatening Aetolia and his own boundaries. He regretted ever having left Epirus for others to profit from such a crisis. And now to add to his perplexities he had received an invitation from several Sicilian cities to come to their rescue against the Carthaginians who had been threatening since the death of Agathocles to subdue the whole island. The king saw the opportunity for making himself like Agathocles, his father-in-law, a powerful tyrant of a Greek empire in Sicily, and thought that he might well succeed where Agathocles had failed and become the conqueror and ruler of Carthage as well.

The Romans probably did not hear of these perplexities, but the fact that Pyrrhus again withdrew to Tarentum and did not follow up his victory might evidence a willingness to offer better terms than those of the preceding year. Accordingly, during the winter 279-8, before the inauguration of his second consulate, Fabricius again visited Pyrrhus and a tentative agreement was drawn up. Just what these terms were is not clear in the confusion of our accounts, but Plutarch’s version that Pyrrhus would be satisfied if only the independence of Tarentum were safeguarded seems reasonable enough when we consider his eagerness to depart. Cineas went to Rome to represent the king in the discussion, for the terms of peace must be satisfactory to the Senate and ratified by the people. We are told that Fabricius actually agreed to a preliminary draft which was to be made the basis of the discussion.

IV.

CARTHAGINIAN POLICY: PYRRHUS IN SICILY

Meanwhile, however, a Carthaginian admiral, Mago, had hurried to Rome to prevent peace if possible and to induce the senate to keep Pyrrhus engaged in Italy. To make his words all the more impressive he had come with his whole fleet of 120 ships. Carthage had much at stake. She had just decided to take advantage of the civil war in Syracuse in order to gain possession of the whole island. The fleet had been manned to block the Great Harbour. The desire of two centuries seemed to be attainable if only Pyrrhus could be kept away for a few months more. How much of his secret fears and purposes Mago revealed we are not told; he probably concealed them as best he could. Nor does the treaty, which was finally agreed upon, betray many of these secrets. It says nothing of the funds that Mago gave for a continuance of the war, the silver which Rome now coined and stamped with the horse’s head of the Punic arms. It exacts no promise from Rome to help Carthage if she is attacked. The Senate was hardly so foolish as to make a binding defensive alliance with Carthage when there was good evidence that the war was nearly over. The treaty, which has so often been rewritten by modern scholars to suit their hypotheses, is after all readily understood without emendations. It reads in Polybius ‘If either signatory shall make a treaty with Pyrrhus he shall make a stipulation that he may aid the other in whichsoever country is attacked. Whichever one may need help, the Carthaginians shall provide the ships for transport and for attack, but each shall provide the pay for its own men. The Carthaginians shall also aid the Romans by sea if need be, but no one shall compel the crews to land against their will.’

What had Rome to win by such a treaty? All that she most needed; silver coins with which to pay the expenses of her southern allies and keep them encouraged, and a fleet which could block Tarentum’s harbour. As a result, Pyrrhus could be besieged effectively and starved into submission. If Pyrrhus on the other hand chose to go to Sicily, the treaty cost Rome nothing; for she was under no promise to participate in Sicily and presumably would not unless at a later day she chose to keep the enemy at a distance, in which case free transports were provided. Mago, though he had not received as much by the agreement as he might have wished, had kept Rome from making peace and had secured one reservation in the first clause which was likely to prevent Pyrrhus from making a hasty settlement with Rome.

Pyrrhus could not wind up affairs in Italy at once; there was a chance that he would not go to Sicily at all, especially as the phrasing of the treaty suggested that there might be a secret promise of definite aid in Sicily as well. The document reveals shrewd thinking on the part of both negotiators.

Cineas had to go back empty-handed. Mago sailed to Syracuse to blockade that harbour, transporting on his way 500 Roman legionaries as far as Rhegium, who were sent apparently to surprise the mutinous Campanian garrison of that city and restore it to Rome’s alliance. The surprise attack failed and Rome had to postpone the punishment till she could muster a sufficient force. For the rigorous prosecution of the war Rome chose two well-tried consuls for 278, the very two who had been colleagues in the relief of Thurii in 282, Fabricius and Aemilius Papus. They marched into the enemy’s country, but Pyrrhus, now busily engaged in making his contracts with Sicilian envoys and preparing his fleet, did not stir, nor was it time for Fabricius to invest the strongly fortified city before the arrival of the promised fleet. For the moment we hear only of the famous story—which is at least traceable to very early sources—of how an Epirote traitor promised Fabricius in return for gold to rid him of his opponent by poison, and how the Roman general, refusing to consider the offer, sent the treasonable letter to the king. The incident is wholly in character with the somewhat ostentatious rectitude of that day’s rustic nobility; a hundred years later a Roman general would doubtless have torn up the missive and thought no more about it.

The Roman consuls spent a part of the summer winning other tribes and towns that had given aid to Pyrrhus. An incidental remark in Cicero indicates that it was Fabricius who at this time secured for Heraclea its favourable alliance ‘of equality’ with Rome which left the city autonomous and immune from the burden of military levies. It was one of the few cities which in the year 89 did not desire to exchange its position for the Roman franchise. That winter, according to the Roman triumphal fasti, Fabricius celebrated a triumph over ‘Lucanians, Samnites, Tarentines and Bruttians.’ The next summer, after Pyrrhus’ departure for Sicily, the consul Junius must have continued the work of pacification, for on his return he triumphed over ‘Lucanians and Bruttians.’ What was more important, Croton and Locri dismissed their Epirote garrisons under compulsion and accepted Roman control during this year. That these cities are not mentioned with the barbarians in the triumphal records seems to indicate that it was Rome’s policy not to subject Greeks to the same treatment as barbarians.

When in the autumn of 278 Pyrrhus set out for Sicily, that island was in a state of anarchy. Agathocles’ power had kept the Carthaginians to the western end of the island, but after his death in 289 his mercenary army of Campanians had seized and sacked Messana and the adjacent territory which they were now ruling, and unscrupulous ‘tyrants’ had established themselves in several of the Greek cities with the result that the Carthaginians made ready progress eastward at several points. While Pyrrhus was in Italy, Sosistratus, the tyrant of Acragas, was besieging the Syracusan tyrant, Thoenon, and had in fact blockaded him on the island of Ortygia. The Carthaginians, believing this an opportunity to gain supremacy over the whole island, sent a fleet of 120 ships to attack the city. Then, fearing that Pyrrhus might make peace with Rome and turn his attention to Sicily, they had sent Mago to Rome, as we have seen, to reach some agreement which might keep Pyrrhus busy where he was. The Punic attack, however, brought the two Greek combatants to their senses. They united against the common enemy and with other Greeks sent a cry for help to Pyrrhus, promising to accept his overlordship and to place all their forces at his disposal. Pyrrhus had learned enough about Sicily and Agathocles’ successes through his former wife Lanassa to entertain the hope that he might win dominion over the whole of Sicily and perhaps also over Carthage. He therefore sent Cineas ahead to secure written promises, he planted a strong garrison in Tarentum as well as in the other Greek cities, and with some 10,000 troops sailed by way of Locri for Sicily. At Tauromenium and Catana he was greeted with enthusiasm and given troops; landing at the latter city he marched upon Syracuse where he was admitted and given the forces of the two tyrants. The Carthaginian fleet sailed away while the rulers of the Greek cities met in conclave at Syracuse and proclaimed Pyrrhus king of Sicily and generalissimo of the Greek forces. His army quickly rose from ten to thirty thousand men so that the Carthaginians did not venture to oppose him.

He proceeded to drive out the Punic garrison which held Enna and was soon welcomed to Acragas, Heraclea, Selinus, Halicyae, and Segesta. He took the strong fort of Mt Eryx by storm and captured the fort of Heirkte which commanded Panormus (Palermo). There was now only Lilybaeum left in Punic hands, and this was well-nigh impregnable from land and could be captured by sea only after a successful naval battle. When, therefore, the Carthaginians offered to surrender the rest of the island provided Pyrrhus would leave them that city and sign terms of peace, he was inclined to do so. The Greeks, however, shamed him into staying to complete his work. After a brief campaign against the Mamertines, in which he confined them within the city of Messana, he tried for two months to take Lilybaeum by storm. Since this could not be done, he decided to man an adequate fleet with which to destroy the Punic sea power, invest Lilybaeum by sea and invade Africa. To the Greeks this would entail contributions of ships, rowers, and money in a venture which seemed to them very hazardous. As there was already some discontent with Pyrrhus on account of his severe demands, his disregard of the native magistrates, and his preferential treatment of his own Epirote officers, rumours of mutiny were frequent. Sosistratus suddenly withdrew with his forces to Acragas depriving Pyrrhus not only of soldiers but of a city of military importance. Pyrrhus, fearing that Thoenon would also withdraw, had him slain. Misfortune betrayed the king into other acts of cruelty which only caused new revolts and several cities openly invited Punic and Mamertine garrisons. Meanwhile the Carthaginians received reinforcements and now had courage to face the reduced Epirote army. Pyrrhus, if we may believe Justin’s sole authority, again came off the victor but, unwilling to face the task of reconquering the rebellious island, he used the opportunity to embark and sail away. It was now the spring of 275; he had wasted over two years in Sicily.

The Punic fleet attacked him as he crossed to Italy, destroying more than half of his ships, and the Campanian garrison of Rhegium, aided by a Mamertine force, beset him on his march causing heavy losses. The city of Locri he took by a ruse and punished severely the members of the pro-Roman party who had caused the revolt two years before. Here, being in need of funds, he robbed the rich temple treasure of Persephone, an act of sacrilege to which he later attributed his continued misfortune in Italy until he in some measure made restitution. Croton was also retaken from the Campanians of Rhegium who had seized the city two years before.

V.

THE END OF THE WAR

On reaching Tarentum the king gathered what forces he could and advanced boldly northward. For three years the Roman armies had been forcing the Samnites and Lucanians to submission group by group so that he now found no barbarian contingents to aid him, and his Epirote army had suffered heavy losses. But it was known that the two Roman consuls were separated, that Manius Curius, who had been operating in Samnium, was guarding the passes of the eastern road near Malventum (Roman Beneventum), while Cornelius Lentulus seems to have been stationed in Lucania on the central Italian road. He struck out quickly against Curius and, aware of the inferiority of his numbers, he tried to gain a high position over his enemy by a night march. Losing time in the dark, however, he did not quite reach his objective by daybreak. Thanks to this brief delay, Curius had time to deploy his troops, and with great effort he repulsed Pyrrhus’ attack and captured several of the elephants. The other consul was now near at hand, and Pyrrhus, seeing that an attack of the united Roman forces would mean disaster, withdrew to Tarentum as hastily as he had come. He stationed a guard of Epirotes in the strong fortress of Tarentum under the command of Milo and his own son Helenus, whose presence was to suggest that he would return with reinforcements as soon as possible to succour the city. Then—probably in the autumn of 275—he embarked as quietly and quickly as he could his pitiful remnant of eight thousand foot and five hundred horse, less than one-third the force with which he had come six years before.

The defeat of Pyrrhus directed the attention of the whole Hellenic world toward Rome, for in the East Pyrrhus had been considered a possible empire-builder like Alexander. He had in his youth fought with distinction at Ipsus, had been the governor of Greece appointed by Demetrius Poliorcetes, had married the daughter of Ptolemy Soter in Egypt and with Ptolemy’s aid had secured his ancestral throne in Epirus, then had revealed his ambitions by seizing the throne of Macedonia and had finally announced his intentions to win the West from Tarentum to Carthage. And suddenly an unknown barbaric tribe of Latins had driven him back home. Who could the Romans be? Ptolemy Philadelphus, the most powerful monarch of the East, who comprehended the great significance of the event, sent envoys (273) to Rome to establish a record of friendship and Rome replied in kind. The Alexandrine court-poet, Lycophron, who may well have met the Roman envoys and learned from them the traditional stories of Rome’s foundation, inserted in his Alexandra a reference to the descendants of Troy who were destined in the West to balance the wrongs of Priam’s cit1. Rome was now in fact a world-power. 

Rome had decided that the federation must now be consolidated, and that all misunderstandings throughout Italy left at loose ends during the great peril must be composed in case Pyrrhus returned with reinforcements. The Samnite league, which had proved most troublesome, was broken apart. A wide strip of territory was seized along the river Calor, cutting the Hirpini and Pentri off from the rest of Samnium. Separate settlements were made with these tribes, and a large Latin colony was sent into the severing strip and planted at Malventum, the site of the recent victory. Since the name had an ill-omened sound the colony was called Beneventum. A century later the mountainous district round it was given to two Ligurian tribes of north Italy. Samnium was now at last thoroughly pacified, but the territory of the main tribe comprised only about half as much land as it had before the Samnite wars began. The population still numbered over 300,000, since the census of 225 BC records 77,000 able-bodied men of forty-five years and under. The Lucanians suffered less, but they were deprived of the territory of Paestum which still contained some of its Greek population. This city became a ‘Latin’ colony in 273. In the census of 225 the Lucanians enrolled 33,000 men for active service so that the total population of the tribe was probably over 150,000.

Croton and Locri entered the federation once more. These cities had suffered much during the war. Croton for instance had accepted a Roman garrison before or during 280 but had seceded to Pyrrhus after his first victory. In 277, when Pyrrhus was in Sicily, the consul Rufinus took the town and restored the garrison, but within a year the Campanian rebels at Rhegium captured the city and plundered it. Then Pyrrhus returned, drove out the Campanians and placed his guard there. After his departure in 275, the city again passed into Roman hands, though we are not told how. We hear that in the Hannibalic War it had only 20,000 inhabitants. Locri’s misfortunes had been equally severe. The precise terms of Rome’s alliance with these Greeks are not known, but at any rate we may not infer from incidents belonging to the Hannibalic war that Rome stationed garrisons in the towns at the time. The coins of Locri which belong to the period of her restored alliance bear the legend “Faithfulness”, which implies a status of considerable dignity in the league. Indeed, there is reason to think that the conventional figure of Dea Roma on early Roman coins was adopted from these pieces. At a later date, after Rome had instituted a navy (probably in 267), we hear that all of these Greek cities are socii navales, that is, they are not called upon for regular military contingents, but provide a certain number of ships fully equipped and manned for the federal navy. What the precise requirements were we are not told. On one occasion, however, Rhegium, Velia, and Paestum together are said to provide ten ships of war; on another, during Rome’s war with Perseus, Locri sends two triremes, Thurii four, and Rhegium one. Their position in any case was always more favourable than that of the other allies who had to supply forces nearly every year for military service. And since their people were traders they gained much from Rome’s rising prestige in days to come. Unfortunately they suffered severely again during the Second Punic War for ten years when Hannibal devastated southern Italy.

What settlement was made with the Bruttians, who had so long harassed the Greek cities, we do not know, except that Rome confiscated half of their forest land, thereafter farming out the timber and pitch which was extensively used by the Greek shipbuilders of the coast towns. The coins which continued to be issued by the Bruttian league imply that it possessed some degree of autonomy, and this remained until after the Second Punic War when, in punishment for their adhesion to Hannibal, many of the Bruttians were deprived of their civil rights. Gradually, then, this conglomeration of diverse peoples down in the cul-de-sac of Italy, fugitive aborigines and Oenotri, migrant Siculi from across the straits, runaway Lucanians and Greek slaves, merged into the stable population of the empire.

In 272 Rome finally undertook the siege of Tarentum in earnest, sending the consul, Papirius Cursor the younger, to complete the work. The city was already divided, one part favouring Rome, the other, while hostile to the Epirote garrison, still refusing to open the gates to Papirius. Finally the garrison, coming to no terms with the citizens, surrendered the fortress to the consul and sailed off. Rome did not treat the city as one captured by force, but accepted it as a socius n avails though not with full autonomy, and captives must have been taken since we happen to know that Livius Andronicus, Rome’s first writer of tragedies, was as a child brought in captivity to Rome from Tarentum. Furthermore, a Roman legion was permanently placed in the citadel, not presumably to guard the city alone but to protect the whole of southern Italy. Tarentum was then the most important city of the south and possessed a very strongly built fortress commanding the harbour. This was the first standing garrison created by Rome. In late sources we hear that a Carthaginian fleet appeared in the harbour just before the surrender of the fortress, but sailed away upon learning that Rome had taken possession. When Roman writers later summed up the list of Punic treacheries, this act was generally cited among them in the belief that Carthage had intended to seize the city. That Polybius does not mention it in discussing the causes of the Punic war indicates that the interpretation given to the act by later writers was not in vogue in his day. Nor is it a plausible hypothesis that Carthage was ready to risk a war with Rome for one isolated harbour in Italy. The probabilities therefore are that the Carthaginian admiral had in all good faith appeared in obedience to the last clause of Mago’s treaty to discover whether his assistance was needed in the blockade of the harbour, and that he departed upon being notified that it was not.

For the present the peoples of Apulia and Messapia, which had helped Pyrrhus and Tarentum, were disregarded, but a few years later, in 267-6, Rome’s consuls marched through the region exacting written promises of allegiance. At Brundisium, which had an excellent harbour on the Adriatic, land was taken for a colony which was planted twenty years later and given the ‘Latin’ status. The census of 225 shows that the Apulian and Messapian coast was rather thickly inhabited during the third century, presumably crowded by people who had given way before the Lucanians during the preceding century. The potential military strength was reckoned at 66,000 able-bodied men. During the Hannibalic War much of this region became waste land.

In 270 the mutinous garrison of Campanians at Rhegium was also disposed of. Soon after their arrival, this force of four thousand men had seized the city in emulation of the Mamertines of Messana, and had murdered and plundered at will. The next year they had prevented Rome’s attempt to take the town by surprise, and later had driven the Roman garrison out of Croton and sacked that city. Now the consul, Cornelius Blasio, took the city by storm in a desperate battle in which most of the garrison fell. Some three hundred survivors were captured, brought to Rome, scourged and beheaded in the Forum. The city was handed back to its inhabitants and added to the list of socii navales with full autonomy. If the one trireme provided for the fleet in 171 represents Rhegium’s regular treaty obligations, it is not surprising that the city proved to be one of Rome’s staunchest allies during the Hannibalic War.

There was also much unfinished work to be done farther north. In 273 the Latin colony of Cosa was settled on land that may have been secured for the purpose from Vulci by the treaty of 280. In the same year a deferred dispute was settled with Caere with a loss to her of half her territory. This seems to be the district in which the maritime colony of Castrum Novum was planted nine years later, when the war with Carthage called attention to the importance of the coast line. In order to indicate the northern boundary below the Rubicon, a large Latin colony was sent in 268 to Ariminum at the extreme end of the Ager Gallicus which had been cleared fifteen years before. But this colony differed from those founded heretofore in that its citizens were not privileged to marry Romans or to attain Roman citizenship by registering residence in Rome. The purpose of these restrictions was apparently to stop migration to Rome and to keep the colonists where they were sent, for Ariminum was unattractively near the Gauls. From this time on, it seems, the new type of Latin colony invented for guard-duty at Ariminum was regularly employed.

In the same year the Fasti record triumphs over the city of Sarsina in Umbria (near the Ager Gallicus) and over the Picentes. Excavations have revealed traces of a Gallic settlement at Sarsina so that we may infer that the war was a last act in clearing out the Senones1. As for the Picentes we may hazard the conjecture that they had during the last few years crossed the Aesis to resettle the Ager Gallicus from which the Gauls had long ago driven them, and which was now Roman ager publicus. If so, they may have resented the colonization of Ariminum. This strange people, probably non-Indo-European, which had since the Stone Age succeeded in retaining their territory against all invaders until the Celts came, must for a century have been very uncomfortably packed, for archaeologists have found abundant evidence that their former territory extended from the Rubicon to the Praetuttian fields before the Senones drove them southward. If Rome now refused them the chance to re-occupy their lost territory, which many still called Ager Gallicus in Piceno, we may well understand a revolt from the treaty of 299. The struggle must have been bitter, for Rome ended it by herding off a group of them to the hills behind Salerno and Paestum on territory previously taken from the Lucanians. Asculum was the only one of their cities that received a treaty of alliance. On the land vacated by the emigrants a Latin colony was later (in 264) settled near the coast at Firmum. Rome now had five colonies of about 3000 families each on the Adriatic coast. In the same eventful year of 268 Rome elevated the Sabine tribes from half to full citizenship by granting them the franchise. This was a full recognition of their capacity to participate with the Romans in the governing of the unwieldy federation, but it must not be forgotten that in return Rome received much-needed assistance in the filling of her own legions year by year.

The period of settlement ends with a strange episode of which ancient historians seem to have known all too little. The Etruscan aristocracy of Volsinii had in the course of the Samnite wars freed their ‘slaves’ so as to enroll them in their army which was then fighting Rome. These ‘freedmen’ had now gained control of the city, were instituting a democratic government and, as Zonaras has it, they had seized all the magistracies, made themselves senators and intermarried with their former owners. What we seem to have in this account is a liberation of serfs and the consequences thereof, for the Etruscan princes had long ago reduced the Italic folk to serfdom in many cities. That the account is hazy is probably due to the fact that the Latin language had no designation for the serf. The narrative goes on to say that in 265 the aristocracy appealed to Rome for aid against their oppressors, but the rabble, hearing of this appeal, tortured and slew some of the lords and banished the others. The Romans however granted the request, stormed the city and razed it. They built a new city on the lake (Bolsena) for the lords and such of their serfs as were loyal to their masters. Apparently the aristocratic government and the former landlord system were again put into force. Whether the ex-serfs retained their freedom and accepted tenancies from the landlords, or were completely reduced to slavery in the war we are not told. When we find that the census of 225 records only 54,000 men serving as soldiers in the whole of Etruria and the Sabine country we may suspect that in many cities of the former serfdom had led to slavery rather than to freedom. By Cicero’s day at any rate we no longer hear of serfdom in Etruria. Had the Romans realized the fact that these serfs were descended from the same ancestry as the Latins they might have advocated a more liberal policy and in the end Etruria would have possessed a healthier body of citizens.

VI.

THE ROMAN FEDERATION

The Roman federation now extended the whole length of Italy from Ariminum and bore the character which it retained until the Social War secured citizenship to all the inhabitants of the peninsula. At this time the territory of full citizenship included Latium, a small portion of Etruria from below Caere and Mt Soracte, then a wide corridor across the peninsula including the Sabines and Praetuttians and a few maritime colonies. The inhabitants of this region could doubtless all speak Latin, since the Sabine dialect had been latinized, and the bulk of the population of Veientane Etruria were of Italic stock like the Latins and had not been under Etruscan domination much longer than the Romans. The territory of citizenship without franchise included Caere on the north, the coastland on the south as far as Neapolis and inland with an irregular boundary line extending about as far as Sora and Arpinum. These peoples were doubtless learning the Latin language especially in camp and in trade and were considered to be candidates for full citizenship at an early date. Intermarriage with Romans was legal, property rights were under Roman law and Roman judicial prefects held court in these regions, though their municipal governments were otherwise undisturbed. There should be included under Roman territory some strips of land which the Romans had taken as public property but not yet colonized, apparently for want of settlers, a large part of the Ager Gallicus, a part of Picenum, of Umbria, and of lower Etruria between Caere and Vulci.

The so-called Latin colony continued to be the chief device for garrisoning strategic points; including the original colonies of the Latin league there were some twenty-eight of these. The method adopted was to confiscate a portion of arable territory which was fertile enough to attract settlers at points which needed protection and possessed a strong site readily fortified. The colonists would serve as a garrison in time of need and were also liable to army service in the league forces at times when they could safely be called from home. The official language of such colonists was Latin, but the presence of foreign inscriptions in many of them proves that the settlers, drawn as they were from several of the allied states, might to some extent at least be more at home in Oscan, Greek, or Etruscan. These colonists seem to have had the rights of intermarriage and of property-holding with Romans and, at least up to the time of the foundation of Ariminum, they were readily accorded citizenship in Rome by residence in the city. But restrictions were later imposed upon them chiefly because the colonial governments complained that it was difficult for them to provide their military contingents when their citizens were permitted to take up residence at Rome and change their citizenship. Their magistrates, however, ipso facto received Roman citizenship and this privilege was never questioned. A glance at the map will show that by 264 these settlements had been founded mainly in order to surround Samnium and to protect lower Etruria and the Adriatic coast with cities friendly to Rome: about Samnium are found Interamna, Suessa, Cales, Saticula, Beneventum, Venusia, and Luceria; in lower Etruria, Nepete, Sutrium, and Cosa; on the upper Adriatic, Ariminum, Castrum Novum, Firmum and Hadria.

The rest of the Italian tribes and cities were allied to Rome by a great diversity of treaties similar only in the fact that, while such allies had local autonomy and were not subject to tribute to Rome or the league, they were under contract to contribute a contingent to the army which was under the command of a Roman consul. Although these treaties were in the form of alliances of mutual defence and Rome was always quick to respond if the allied territory was invaded—on the Gallic border for instance—the federation now was bounded by sea and mountains so that few wars were apt to arise because of disturbances on the boundary of an ally. Furthermore, all neighbours recognized Rome’s supremacy in the league so that, when disputes arose, the discussion was carried on at Rome and not in some allied city. Hence, from the time of Pyrrhus onwards it was seldom, except in theory, a question of mutual defence.

The diversity in the status of the allies was due to several causes: partly to the circumstances attending their entry, whether by voluntary adhesion as in the case of Neapolis, or by subjection after a war as in the case of Samnium; partly to the cultural status of the ally—Rome had always admired the Greek cities of Italy, and was apt to invite their goodwill; partly to the nature of the allied government. It has been noticed, for instance, that in Etruria and Umbria Rome preferred to see the larger tribes broken up into smaller units. This was doubtless in part due to the prudent principle of divide et impera, for Gallic raids would be far less dangerous if Etruria were not inflammable as a whole. But this is not the sole reason. In both Etruria and Umbria strong cities had long existed with separatist loyalties so that responsible united action was difficult to secure. In neither was any treaty of the whole league very dependable. Fractions would secede in times of danger. It was therefore essential that the treaties be signed with the fractions. Hence, while Rome did not disturb religious associations and leagues in Etruria and Umbria, she did insist upon having her treaties signed by the individual cities. Among the Sabellian tribes, however, which had not yet developed strong urban units and where the tribes of villagers presented responsible governments, there was far less segregating. Only in Samnium, where the Frentani, Hirpini and Pentri readily fell into separate groups, did Rome apply the device of severing. The Samnite tribe thus trimmed down was accepted as a unit, and so were also the mountain tribes that went under the names of Marsi, Marrucini, Paeligni, Vestini, Frentani, and Lucani. Finally, it is to be noticed that religion, language, and custom counted for something in determining the status of allies. The Sabines, whose customs and language most resembled the Roman, were among the first to attain the franchise, while the strange Etruscans, whose language has not yet yielded interpretation, and who, even when they adopted Italic gods, Tuscanized their names, were not hurried into close union. After the first experiments citizenship was not extended in Etruria till the Social War, and no colonies were planted in the heart of their country. Indeed, in the early days, though it was Rome’s custom to make her alliances for all time, her treaties in this region had always been made for a limited term of years. The Romans apparently felt that this people would not readily be assimilated.

The question has often been raised why, now that Rome’s imaginary walls extended to the Adriatic, the representative principle of government was not adopted in order to facilitate the effective participation of people who lived so far away. We may assume that the possibility was discussed from time to time, for at the very beginning of Rome’s expansion the Latins had asked to be represented in the Roman Senate, and again during the Punic war a similar proposal was made by Carvilius, a Roman senator. It is doubtful whether the people of Rome would have had much patience with this proposal. The town-meeting was an old Latin institution, one of the most sacred; direct participation of every citizen in the meeting which decided whether there should be war or peace seemed an unquestionable right. History seemed also to have proved the adequacy of this government. When hordes had poured in from the north, tribes within had quarrelled and ambitious tyrants had invaded from the south, other tribes and cities had proved ineffective, but the Roman assembly advised by the Senate had alone followed the prudent course, taken up arms for any sacrifice, and organized their neighbours for steadfast defence. The federation of the whole of Italy seemed a miraculous feat. Why change a government which had accomplished that ? Again, it seemed well that those nearest the city, who spoke the language, who worshipped and thought as the Romans did, should for the sake of united action control the government. Sabines of the Adriatic coast, Etruscans of Caere, Ausonians and the rest might in time bring into a representative parliament a predominant number which would destroy unity of purpose and create an ineffective government when, to control the vast federation, decision and speed were necessary. We may also suppose that the recent victory of the principle of popular sovereignty debarred the acceptance of the representative idea. It was naturally assumed that a representative group would form a body like the Senate, and it was the Senate which the assemblies had had to curb for over two hundred years. It was only in 287 that the complete victory had finally been won by which the people could, if they desired, override the Senate on any question of legislation and administration and make their own decisions. A representative Senate would become as conservative as the old one had been, for in the society of that day the landed nobility with their broad estates and many clients would win the seats in the Senate as surely as they now won the elections to the magistracy. And if such a parliament displaced the primary assembly, the struggle of centuries would apparently be lost. Such must have been the feelings of the Romans when the question was raised. It must be admitted that the primary assembly still deserved the confidence it expected and that a change would have been unwise until the federation was far more unified in language and custom than it was in the third century.

When the federation had finally been safely organized, Rome devised a currency which might be adequate for the needs of her citizens and their trade with their associates. The Roman government had always been laggard in providing coinage, partly because her agricultural people cared little for trade and had had no part in maritime commerce, partly because the government needed but little currency since magistrates gave their services without salaries, and soldiers, till the fourth century, provided their own armour and horses and served without pay. Although the Etruscans, the Campanians, and the Greeks had been coining money from the fifth century onwards, it was only after the Latin War that Rome issued any coins, and these were mostly bronze one-pound asses and some fractional pieces. During the Samnite and Pyrrhic wars Rome had needed silver coins for purchases made in Campania in the south, but Campanian and southern cities which had old mints provided these coins under contract. Such coins, while bearing the legend roma or romano, were issued in weights usual in the south and corresponded to the Greek drachma. There had been much trouble in keeping the Roman bronze pieces properly adjusted to them. The first Roman bronze asses had been issued in one-pound pieces, but in time the weight diminished successively to a third, a fourth, and finally to a sixth of a pound. The probability is that this reduction had been due to an effort to adjust the amount of metal used to the changing market value of bronze at a time when wars cut off the supply and increased the demand. This theory rests upon the observation that Rome in 268 and again in 217 observed market values carefully in adjusting the bimetallic system and also upon the fact that, since the bronze pieces were very crudely moulded, counterfeiting would at once have resulted unless the maintenance of intrinsic values had been an essential consideration in their coinage.

But simply because a varying market had been followed through the Pyrrhic War, the restoration of peace-prices after the departure of Pyrrhus made the old bronze pieces obsolete. Hence Rome in 268, deciding to sever official connections with the silver drachma currency and to strike a Roman coin to which an adequate Roman bronze currency could be attached, adopted a two-ounce bronze piece as the basis for a new currency. Since silver was now valued at 120 times bronze—and with peace throughout Italy values were not apt to shift much—a silver piece worth ten asses—a convenient unit—would weigh one sixth of an ounce, which proved to be a convenient size as well, and this was called the ten-piece or denarius. Fractional coins were also made, the quinarius or five-as piece, and the sestertius (semistertius) worth two and a half asses. The last, being too small for convenient use, did not remain long in circulation, though later when the decimal system was shattered by equating the denarius with sixteen asses, the imaginary sestertius became the unit of accounts because fours can be reckoned more conveniently than sixteens. Since Rome had accumulated considerable silver during the wars, she now issued a large amount of denarii from her new mint in the city, and also established mints at some of the far distant Latin colonies for the issue of both silver and bronze. Campanian cities, accustomed to the native ‘victoriati,’ were allowed to continue coining these which passed at the market value of silver according to weight. Some of the Greek cities of the south also continued for a season to issue their own coins until the Roman denarius came into general use throughout the federation. Since these coins eventually had to compete with the standard denarius and were then valued according to their weight, there was no profit in continuing their mintage and the non-Roman mints of Italy all ceased coining silver before the Hannibalic War.

The Roman government, despite the Hortensian law which gave the plebeian assembly an absolute right to legislate without the participation of the Senate or the consuls, continued in practice to be an aristocracy. The centuriate assembly, a conservative body in which the voters of the first class controlled elections, continued to choose the magistrates, and thus indirectly the Senate as well. To be sure, the necessity of electing into the consulship one plebeian every year was constantly bringing new blood into the senate, but the electors chose conservatively and with great care. Only nine new plebeians attained the office in the twenty-six years under discussion, and none of these could be accused of radical tendencies. The others belonged to families that had already attained to the higher nobility since the year 366. It is true that a plebiscite accorded aid to Thurii and thus brought on the Pyrrhic War, but there is not a hint of the flood of legislation and constitutional changes that might have been expected from the plebeian insistence upon the acceptance of the Hortensian measure. In fact there is no record of any purely legislative measure passed by either assembly during the twenty-five years following that drastic reform. Either the plebeians were now satisfied with the assurance that popular sovereignty had been recognized in case of future need, or the Senate had decided to take the warning and, making friends among the tribunes, to retain its power by inviting them into the Senate for consultation. There is at least one illuminating instance of such co-operation. When the traitorous Campanians of Rhegium had been captured, their punishment was decided upon by the plebeian assembly at the advice of the Senate. The Senate, therefore, continued to govern the state and the federation as before, to determine the policies of the generals, to decide upon the objective of each campaign, to receive legations and discuss with them offers of peace and of alliance, and to define the changing status of each member of the federation.

CHAPTER XXI

ROME AND CARTHAGE: THE FIRST PUNIC WAR