UNIVERSAL BIOGRAPHICAL LIBRARY

LIFE AND WARS OF JULIUS CAESAR.

THE WARS IN GAUL

CHAPTER I. POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.

CHAPTER II. STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CaESAR.

CHAPTER III. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII. (Year of Rome 696.)

CHAPTER IV. CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS. (Year of Rome 696.)

CHAPTER V. WAR AGAINST THE BELGAE. (Year of Rome 697.)

CHAPTER VI. WAR OF THE VENETII.- VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI- . SUBMISSION OF AQUITAINE. MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII. (Year of Rome 698.)

CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.

There are peoples whose existence in the past only reveals itself by certain brilliant apparitions, unequivocal proofs of an energy which had been previously unknown. During the interval their history is involved in obscurity, and they resemble those long-silent volcanoes, which we should take to be extinct but for the eruptions which, at periods far apart, occur and expose to view the fire which smoulders in their bosom. Such had been the Gauls.

The accounts of their ancient expeditions bear witness to an organisation already powerful, and to an ardent spirit of enterprise. Not to speak of migrations which date back perhaps nine or ten centuries before our era, we see, at the moment when Rome was beginning to aim at greatness, the Celts spreading themselves beyond their frontiers. In the time of Tarquin the Elder (Years of Rome, 138 to 176), two expeditions started from Celtic Gaul: one proceeded across the Rhine and Southern Germany, to descend upon Illyria and Pannonia (now Western Hungary); the other, scaling the Alps, established itself in Italy, in the country lying between those mountains and the Po. The invaders soon transferred themselves to the right bank of that river, and nearly the whole of the territory comprised between the Alps and the Apennines took the name of Cisalpine Gaul. More than two centuries afterwards, the descendants of those Gauls marched upon Rome, and burnt it all but the Capitol. Still a century later (475), we see new bands issuing from Gaul, reaching Thrace by the valley of the Danube, ravaging Northern Greece, and bringing back to Toulouse the gold plundered from the Temple of Delphi. Others, arriving at Byzantium, pass into Asia, establish their dominion over the whole region on this side Mount Taurus, since called Gallo-Graecia, or Galatia, and maintain in it a sort of military feudalism until the time of the war of Antiochus.

These facts, obscure as they may be in history, prove the spirit of adventure and the warlike genius of the Gaulish race, which thus, in fact, inspired a general terror. During nearly two centuries, from 364 to 531, Rome struggled against the Cisalpine Gauls, and more than once the defeat of her armies placed her existence in danger. It was, as it were, foot by foot that the Romans effected the conquest of Northern Italy, strengthening it as they proceeded by the establishment of colonies.

Let us here give a recapitulation of the principal wars against the Gauls, Cisalpine and Transalpine, which have already been spoken of in the first volume of the present work. In 531 the Romans took the offensive, crossed the Po, and subjugated a great part of the Cisalpine. But hardly had the north of Italy been placed under the supremacy of the Republic, when Hannibal’s invasion (536) caused anew an insurrection of the inhabitants of those countries; who helped to increase the numbers of his army; and even when that great captain was obliged to quit Italy, they continued to defend their independence during thirty-four years. The struggle, renewed in 554, ended only in 588, for we will not take into account the partial insurrections which followed. During this time, Rome had not only to combat the Cisalpines, assisted by the Gauls from beyond the Alps, but also to make war upon the men of their race in Asia (565) and in Illyria. In this last-mentioned province the colony of Aquileia was founded (571), and several wild tribes of Liguria, who held the defiles of the Alps, were subjugated (588).

In 600, the Romans, called to the assistance of the Greek town of Marseilles, which was attacked by the Oxybii and the Deciates, Ligurian tribes of the Maritime Alps, for the first time carried their arms to the other side of the Alps. They followed the course of the Corniche, and crossed the Var; but it took, according to Strabo, a struggle of eighty years before they obtained from the Ligures an extent of twelve stadia (2'22 kils.), a narrow passage on the coast of the sea, to enable them to pass through Gaul into Spain. Nevertheless, the legions pushed their encroachments between the Rhone and the Alps. The conquered territory was given to the people of Marseilles, who soon, attacked again by the peoples of the Maritime Alps, implored a second time the support of Rome. In 629, the Consul M. Fulvius Flaccus was sent against the Salluvii; and, three years afterwards, the proconsul C. Sextius Calvinus drove them back far from the sea-coast, and founded the town of Aix (Aquae Sextiae)

The Romans, by protecting the people of Marseilles, had extended their dominion on the coast; by contracting other alliances, they penetrated into the interior. The Aedui were at war with the Allobroges and the Arverni. The proconsul Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus united with the former, and defeated the Allobroges, in 633, at Vindalium, on the Sorgue (Sulgas) not far from the Rhone. Subsequently, Q. Fabius Maximus, grandson of Paulus Aemilius, gained, at the confluence of the Isère and the Rhone, a decisive victory over the Allobroges, and over Bituitus, king of the Arverni. By this success Q. Fabius gained the surname of Allobrogicus. The Arverni pretended to be descendants of the Trojans, and boasted a common origin with the Romans; they remained independent, but their dominion, which extended from the banks of the Rhine to the neighbourhood of Narbonne and Marseilles, was limited to their ancient territory. The Ruteni, who had been their allies against Fabius, obtained similarly the condition of not being subjected to the Roman power, and were exempted from all tribute.

In 636, the Consul Q. Marcius Rex founded the colony of Narbo Marcius, which gave its name to the Roman province called Narbonensis.

The movement which had long thrust the peoples of the north towards the south had slackened during several centuries, but in the seventh century of the foundation of Rome it seems to have recommenced with greater intensity than ever. The Cimbri and the Teutones, after ravaging Noricum and Illyria, and defeating the army of Papirius Carbo sent to protect Italy (641), had marched across Rhaetia, and penetrated by the valley of the Rhine to the country of the Helvetii. They drew with them a part of that people, spread into Gaul, and for several years carried there terror and desolation. The Belgae alone offered a vigorous resistance. Rome, to protect her province, sent against them, or against the tribes of the Helvetii, their allies, five generals, who were successively vanquished: the Consul M. Junius Silanus, in 645; M. Aurelius Scaurus, in 646; L. Cassius Longinus, in 647; lastly, in the year 649, the proconsul Q. Servilius Caepio and Cn. Manlius Maximus. The two last each lost his army. The very existence of Rome was threatened.

Marius, by the victories gained at Aix over the Teutones (652), and at the Campi Raudii, not far from the Adige, over the Cimbri (653), destroyed the barbarians and saved Italy.

The ancients often confounded the Gauls with the Cimbri and Teutones; sprung from a common origin, these peoples formed, as it Were, the rear-guard of the great army of invasion which, at an unknown epoch, had brought the Celts into Gaul from the shores of the Black Sea. Sallust ascribes to the Gauls the defeats of Q. Caepio and Cn. Manlius, and Cicero designates under the same name the barbarians who were destroyed by Marius. The fact is that all the peoples of the north were always ready to unite in the same effort when it was proposed to throw themselves upon the south of Europe.

From 653 to 684, the Romans, occupied with intestine wars, dreamt not of increasing their, power beyond the Alps; and, when internal peace was restored, their generals, such as Sylla, Metellus Creticus, Lucullus, and Pompey, preferred the easy and lucrative conquests of the East. The vanquished peoples were abandoned by the Senate to the exactions of governors, which explains the readiness with which the deputies of the Allobroges entered, in 691, into Catiline’s conspiracy; fear led them to denounce the plot, but they experienced no gratitude for their revelations.

The Allobroges rose, seized the town of Vienne, which was devoted to the Romans, and surprised, in 693, Manlius Lentinus, lieutenant of C. Pomptinus, governor of the Narbonnese. Nevertheless, some time after, the latter finally defeated and subdued them. “Until the time of Caesar,” says Cicero, “our generals were satisfied with repelling the Gauls, thinking more of putting a stop to their aggressions than of carrying the war among them. Marius himself did not penetrate to their towns and homes, but confined him­self to opposing a barrier to these torrents of peoples which were inundating Italy. C. Pomptinus, who suppressed the war raised by the Allobroges, rested after his victory. Caesar alone resolved to subject Gaul to our dominion.”

It results from this summary of facts that the constant thought of the Romans was, during several centuries, to resist the Celtic peoples established bn either side of the Alps. Ancient authors proclaim aloud the fear which held Rome constantly on the watch. “The Romans,” says Sallust, “had then, as in our days, the opinion that all other peoples must yield to their courage; but that with the Gauls it was no longer for glory, but for safety, that they had to fight.” On his part, Cicero expresses himself thus: “From the beginning of our Republic, all our wise men have looked upon Gaul as the most redoubtable enemy of Rome. But the strength and multitude of those peoples had prevented us until now from combating them all.”

In 694, it will be remembered, rumours of an invasion of the Helvetii prevailed at Rome. AR political preoccupation ceased at once, and resort was had to the exceptional measures adopted under such circumstances. In fact, as a principle, whenever a war against the Gauls was imminent, a dictator was immediately nominated, and a levy en masse ordered. From that time no one was exempted from military service; and, as a provision against an attack of those barbarians, a special treasure had been deposited in the Capitol, which it was forbidden to touch except in that eventuality. Accordingly, when, in 705, Caesar seized upon it, he replied to the protests of the tribunes that, since Gaul was subjugated, this treasure had become useless.

War against the peoples beyond the Alps was thus, for Rome, the consequence of a long antagonism, which must necessarily end in a desperate struggle, and the ruin of one of the two adversaries. This explains, at the same time, both Caesar’s ardour and the enthusiasm excited by his successes. Wars undertaken in accord with the traditional sentiment of a country have alone the privilege of moving deeply the fibre of the people, and the importance of a victory is measured by the greatness of the disaster which would have followed a defeat. Since the fall of Carthage, the conquests in Spain, in Africa, in Syria, in Asia, and in Greece, enlarged the Republic, but did not consolidate it, and a check in those different parts of the world would have diminished the power of Rome without compromising it. With the peoples of the North, on the contrary, her existence was at stake, and upon her reverses equally as upon her successes depended the triumph of barbarism or civilisation. If Caesar had been vanquished by the Helvetii or the Germans, who can say what would have become of Rome, assailed by the numberless hordes of the North rushing eagerly upon Italy?

And thus no war excited the public feeling so intensely as that of Gaul. Though Pompey had carried the Roman eagles to the shores of the Caspian Sea, and, by the tributes he had imposed on the vanquished, doubled the revenues of the State, his triumphs had only obtained ten days of thanksgivings. The Senate decreed fifteen, and even twenty, (for Caesar’s victories, and, in honour of them, the peo­ple offered sacrifices during sixty days.

When, therefore, Suetonius ascribes the inspiration of the campaigns of this great man to the mere desire of enriching himself with plunder, he is false to history and to good sense, and assigns the most vulgar motive to a noble design. When other historians ascribe to Caesar the sole intention of seeking in Gaul a means of rising to the supreme power by civil war, they show, as we have remarked elsewhere, a distorted view; they judge events by their final result, instead of calmly estimating the causes which have produced them.

The sequel of this history will prove that all the responsibility of the civil war belongs not to Caesar, but to Pompey. And although the former had his eyes incessantly fixed on his enemies at Rome, none the less for that he pursued his conquests, without making them subordinate to his personal interests. If he had sought only his own elevation in his military successes, he would have followed an entirely opposite course. We should not have seen him sustain during eight years a desperate struggle, and incur the risks of enterprises such as those of Great Britain and Germany. After his first campaigns, he need only have returned to Rome to profit by the advantages he had acquired; for, as Cicero says, he had already done enough for his glory, if he had not done enough for the Republic”; and the same orator adds: “Why would Caesar himself remain in his province, if it were not to deliver to the Roman people complete a work which was already nearly finished? Is he retained by the agreeableness of the country, by the beauty of the towns, by the politeness and amenity of the individuals and peoples, by the lust of victory, by the desire of extending the limits of our empire? Is there anything more uncultivated than those countries, ruder than those towns, more ferocious than those peoples, and more admirable than the multiplicity of Caesar’s victories? Can he find limits farther off than the ocean? Would his return to his country offend either the people who sent him or the Senate which has loaded him with honours? Would his absence increase the desire we have to see him? Would it not rather contribute, through lapse of time, to make people forget him, and to cause the laurels to fade which he had gathered in the midst of the greatest perils? If, then, there any who love not Caesar, it is not their policy to obtain his recall from his province, because that would be to recall him to glory, to triumph, to the congratulations and supreme honours of the Senate, to the favour of the equestrian order, to the affection of the people.”

Thus, after the end of 698, he might have led his army back into Italy, claimed triumph, and obtained power, without having to seize upon it, as Sylla, Marius, Cinna, and even Crassus and Pompey, had done.

If Caesar had accepted the government of Gaul with the sole aim of having an army devoted to his designs, it must be admitted that so experienced a general would have taken, to commence a civil war, the simplest of the measures suggested by prudence: instead of separating himself from his army, he would have kept it with him, or, at least, brought it near to Italy, and distributed it in such a manner that he could reassemble it quickly; he would have preserved, from the immense booty taken in Gaul, sums sufficient to supply the expenses of the war. Caesar, on the contrary, as we shall see in the sequel, sends first to Pompey, without hesitation, two legions which are required from him under the pretext of the expedi­tion against the Parthians. He undertakes to disband his troops if Pompey will do the same, and he arrives at Ravenna at the head of a single legion, leaving the others beyond the Alps, distributed from the Sambre as far as the Saone. He keeps within the limit of his government without making any preparation which indicates hostile intentions, wishing, as Hirtius says, to settle the quarrel by justice rather than by arms. In fact, he has collected so little money in the military chest, that his soldiers club together to procure him the sums necessary for his enterprise, and that all voluntarily renounce their pay. Caesar offers Pompey an unconditional reconciliation, and it is only when he sees his advances rejected, and his adversaries meditating his ruin, that he boldly faces the forces of the Senate, and passes the Rubicon. It was not, then, the supreme power which Caesar went into Gaul to seek, but the pure and elevated glory which arises from a national war, made in the traditional interest of the country.

In reproducing in the following chapters the relation of the war in Gaul, we have borne in mind the words of Cicero. “Caesar,” he says, “has written memoirs worthy of great praise. Deprived of all oratorical art, his style, like a handsome body stripped of clothing, presents itself naked, upright, and graceful. In his desire to furnish materials to future historians, he has, perhaps, done a thing agreeable to the little minds who will be tempted to load these natural graces with frivolous ornaments; but he has for ever deprived men of sense of the desire of writing, for nothing is more agreeable in history than a correct and luminous brevity.” Hirtius, on his part, expresses himself in the following terms: “These memoirs enjoy an approval so general, that Caesar has much more taken from others than given to them the power of writing the history of the events which they recount. We have still more reasons than all others for admiring it, for others know only how correct and accurate this book is; we know the facility and rapidity with which it was composed.”

If we would act upon the advice of these writers, we must digress as little as possible from the “Commentaries,” but without restricting ourselves to a literal translation. We have, then, adopted the narrative of Caesar, though sometimes changing the order of the matter: we have abridged passages where there was a prodigality of details, and developed those which required elucidation. In order to indicate in a more precise manner the localities which witnessed so many battles, we have employed the modem names, especially in cases where ancient geography did not furnish corresponding names.

The investigation of the battlefields and siege operations has led to the discovery of visible and certain traces of the Roman entrenchments. The reader, by comparing the plans of the excavations with the text, will be convinced of the rigorous accuracy of Caesar in describing the countries he passed over, and the works he caused to be executed.

CHAPTER II.

STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CAESAR.

Transalpine Gaul had for its boundaries the ocean, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, the Alps, and the Rhine. This portion of Europe, so well marked out by nature, comprised what is now France, nearly the whole of Switzerland, the Rhine Provinces, Belgium, and the south of Holland. It had the form of an irregular pentagon, and the country of the Carnutes (the Orleanais) was considered to be its centre.

An uninterrupted chain of heights divided Gaul, as it divides modern France, from north to south, into two parts. This line commences at the Monts Corbières, at the foot of the Eastern Pyrenees, is continued by the Southern Cevennes and by the mountains of the Vivarais, Lyonnais, and Beaujolais (called the Northern Cevennes), and declines continually with the mountains of the Charolais and the Cote-d’Or, until it reaches the plateau of Langres; after quitting this plateau, it leaves to the east the Monts Faucilles, which unite it to the Vosges, and, inclining towards the north-west, it follows, across the mountains of the Meuse, the western crests of the Argonne and the Ardennes, and terminates, in decreasing undulations, towards Cape Griz-Nez, in the Pas-de-Calais.

This long and tortuous ridge, more or less interrupted, which may be called the backbone of the country, is the great line of the watershed. It separates two slopes. On the eastern slope flow the Rhine and the Rhone, in opposite directions, the first towards the Northern Sea, the second towards the Mediterranean; on the western slope rise the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, which go to throw themselves into the ocean. These rivers flow at the bottom of vast basins, the bounds of which, as is well known, are indicated by the lines of elevations connecting the sources of all the tributaries of the principal stream.

The basin of the Rhine is separated from that of the Rhone by the Monts Faucilles, the southern extremity of the Vosges, called Le trouée de Belfort, the Jura, the Jorat (the heights which surround the Lake of Geneva on the north), and the lofty chain of the Helvetic Alps. In its upper part, it embraces nearly all Switzerland, of which the Rhine forms the northern boundary, in its course, from east to west, from the Lake of Constance to Bâle. Near this town the river turns abruptly towards the north. The basin widens, limited to the east by the mountains which separate it from the Danube and the Weser; to the west, by the northern part of the great line of water­shed (the mountains of the Meuse, the Argonne, and the western Ardennes). It is intersected, from Mayence (Mains) to Bonn, by chains nearly parallel to the course of the river, which separate its tributaries. From Bonn to the point where the Rhine divides into two arms, the basin opens still more; it is flat, and has no longer a definite boundary. The southern arm bore already, in the time of Caesar, the name of Waal (Vahalis), and united with the Meuse below Nimeguen. To the west of the Ivasin of the Rhine, the Scheldt forms a secondary basin.

The basin of the Rhone, in which is comprised that of the Saone, is sharply bounded on the north by the southern extremity of the Vosges and the Monts Faucilles; on the west, by the plateau of Langres, the Cote-d’Or, and the Cévennes; on the east, by the Jura, the Jorat, and the Alps. The Rhone crosses the Valais and the Lake of Geneva, follows an irregular course as far as Lyons, and runs thence from north to south to the Mediterranean. Among the most important of its secondary basins, we may reckon those of the Aude, the Hérault, and the Var.

The three great basins of the western slope are comprised between the line of watershed of Gaul and the ocean. They are separated from each other by two chains branching from this line, and running from the south-east to the north-west. The basin of the Seine, which includes that of the Somme, is separated from the basin of the Loire by a line of heights which branches from the Cote-d’Or under the name of the mountains of the Morvan, and is continued by the very low hills of Le Perche to the extremity of Normandy. A series of heights, extending from north to south, from the hills of Le Perche to Nantes, enclose the basin of the Loire to the west, and leave outside the secondary basins of Brittany.

The basin of the Loire is separated from that of the Garonne by a long chain starting from Mont Lozèere, comprising the mountains of Auvergne, those of the Limousin, the hills of Poitou, and the plateau of Gatine, and ending in flat country towards the coasts of La Vendée.                                     

The basin of the Garonne, situated to the south of that of the Loire, extends to the Pyrenees. It comprises the secondary basins of the Adour and the Charente.

The vast country we have thus described is protected on the north, west, and south by two seas, and by the Pyrenees. On the east, where it is exposed to invasions, Nature, not satisfied with the defences she had given it in the Rhine and the Alps, has further retrenched it behind three groups of interior mountains—first, the Vosges; second, the Jura; third, the mountains of Forez, the mountains of Auvergne, and the Cévennes.

The Vosges run parallel to the Rhine, and are like a rampart in the rear of that river.

The Jura, separated from the Vosges by the Gap (trouée) of Belfort, rises like a barrier in the interval left between the Rhine and the Rhone, preventing, as far as Lyons, the waters of this latter river from uniting with those of the Saone.

The Cévennes and the mountains of Auvergne and Forez form, in the southern centre of Gaul, a sort of citadel, of which the Rhone might be considered as the advanced fosse. The ridges of this group of mountains start from a common centre, take opposite directions, and form the valleys whence flow, to the north, the Allier and the Loire; to the west, the Dordogne, the Lot, the Aveyron, and the Tarn; to the south, the Ardèche, the Gard, and the Hérault.

The valleys, watered by navigable rivers, presented —thanks to the fruitfulness of their soil and to their easy access—natural ways of communication, favourable both to commerce and to war. To the north, the valley of the Meuse; to the east, the valley of the Rhine, conducting to that of the Saone, and thence to that of the Rhone, were the grand routes which armies followed to invade the south. Strabo, therefore, remarks justly that Sequania (Franche-Comté) has always been the road of the Germanic invasions from Gaul into Italy. From east to west the principal chain of the watershed might easily be crossed in its less elevated parts, such as the plateau of Langres and the mountains of Charolais, which have since furnished a passage to the Central Canal. Lastly, to penetrate from Italy into Gaul, the great lines of invasion were the valley of the Rhone and the valley of the Garonne, by which the mountainous mass of the Cévennes, Auvergne, and Forez is turned.

Gaul presented the same contrast of climates which we observe between the north and south of France. While the Roman province enjoyed a mild temperature and an extreme fertility, the central and northern part was covered with vast forests, which rendered the climate colder than it is at present;  yet the centre produced in abundance wheat, rye, millet, and barley. The greatest of all these forests was that of the Ardennes. It extended, beginning from the Rhine, over a space of two hundred miles, on one side to the frontier of the Remi, crossing the country of the Treviri; and, on another side, to the Scheldt, across the country of the Nervii. The “Commentaries” speak also of forests existing among the Carnutes, in the neighbourhood of the Saone, among the Menapii and the Morini, and among the Eburones. In the north the breeding of cattle was the principal occupation, and the pastures of Belgic Gaul produced a race of excellent horses. In the centre and in the south the richness of the soil was augmented by productive mines of gold, silver, copper, iron, and lead.

The country was, without any doubt, intersected by carriage roads, since the Gauls possessed a great number of all sorts of wagons, since there still re­main traces of Celtic roads, and since Caesar makes known the existence of bridges on the Aisne, the Rhone, the Loirethe Allier, and the Seine. It is difficult to ascertain exactly the number of the population; yet we may presume, from the contingents famished by the different states, that it amounted to more than seven millions of souls.

Gaul, according to Caesar, was divided into three great regions, distinct by language, manners, and laws: to the north, Belgic Gaul, between the Seine, the Marne, and the Rhine; in the centre, Celtic Gaul, between the Garonne and the Seine, extending from the ocean to the Alps, and comprising Helvetia; to the south, Aquitaine, be­tween the Garonne and the Pyrenees. We must, nevertheless, comprise in Gaul the Roman province, or the Narbonnese, which began at Geneva, on the left bank of the Rhone, and extended in the south as far as Toulouse. It answered, as nearly as possible, to the limits of the countries known in modem times as Savoy, Dauphiné, Provence, Lower Languedoc, and Roussillon. The populations who inhabited it were of different origins: there were found there Aquitanians, Belgae, Ligures, Celts, who had all long undergone the influence of Greek civilisation, and especially establishments founded by the Phocaeans on the coasts of the Mediterranean.

These three great regions were subdivided into many states, called civitates—an expression which, in the “Commentaries,” is synonymous with nations—that is, each of these states had its organisation and its own government. Among the peoples mentioned by Caesar, we may reckon twenty-seven in Belgic Gaul, forty-three in Celtic, and twelve in Aquitaine : in all, eighty-two in Gaul proper, and seven in the Narbonnese. Other authors, admitting, no doubt, smaller subdivisions, carry this number to three or four hundred; but it appears that under Tiberius there were only sixty-four states in Gaul. Perhaps, in this number, they reckoned only the sovereign, and not the dependent, states.

1.  Belgic Gaul. The Belgae were considered more warlike than the other Gauls, because, strangers to the civilisation of the Roman province and hostile to commerce, they had not experienced the effeminating influence of luxury. Proud of having escaped the Gaulish enervation, they claimed with arrogance an origin which united them with the Germans their neighbours, with whom, nevertheless, they were continually at war. They boasted of having defended their territory against the Cimbri and the Teutones, at the time of the invasion of Gaul. The memory of the lofty deeds of their ancestors inspired them with a great confidence in themselves, and excited their warlike spirit.

The most powerful nations among the Belgae were the Bellovaci, who could arm a hundred thousand men, and whose territory extended to the sea, the Nervii, the Remi, and the Treviri.

2.     Celtic Gaul.The central part of Gaul, designated by the Greek writers under the name of Celtica, and the inhabitants of which constituted in the eyes of the Romans the Gauls properly so named (Galli), was the most extensive and most populous. Among the most important nations of Celtic Gaul were reckoned the Arverni, the Aedui, the Sequani, and the Helvetii. Tacitus informs us that the Helvetii had once occupied a part of Germany.

These three first peoples often disputed the supremacy of Gaul. As to the Helvetii, proud of their independence, they acknowledged no authority superior to their own. In the centre and south of Celtic Gaul dwelt peoples who had also a certain importance. On the west and north-west were various maritime populations designated under the generic name of Armoricans, an epithet which had, in the Celtic tongue, the meaning of maritime. Small Alpine tribes inhabited the valleys of the upper course of the Rhone, at the eastern extremity of Lake Lémon, a country which now forms the Valais.

3. Aquitaine.  Aquitaine commenced on the left bank of the Garonne: it was inhabited by several small tribes, and contained none of those agglomerations which were found among the Celts and the Belgae. The Aquitanians, who had originally occu­pied a vast territory to the north of the Pyrenees, having been pushed backward by the Celts, had but a rather limited portion of it in the time of Caesar.

The three regions which composed Gaul were not only, as already stated, divided into a great number of states, but each state (civitas) was farther subdivided into pagi, representing, perhaps, the same thing as the tribe among the Arabs. The proof of the distinct character of these agglomerations is found in the fact that in the army each of them had its separate place, under the command of its own chieftains. The smallest subdivision was called vicus. Such, at least, are the denominations employed in the “Com­mentaries,” but which were certainly not those of the Celtic language. In each state there existed principal towns, called indifferently by Caesar urbs or oppidum; yet this last name was given by preference to considerable towns, difficult of access and carefully fortified, placed on heights or surrounded by marshes. It was to these oppida that, in case of attack, the Gauls transported their grain, their provisions, and their riches. Their habitations, established often in the forests or on the bank of a river, were constructed of wood, and tolerably spacious.

 The Gauls were tall in stature, their skin was white, their eyes blue, their hair fair or chestnut, which they dyed, in order to make the colour more brilliant. They let their beard grow; the nobles alone shaved, and preserved long moustaches. Trousers or breeches, very wide among the Belgae, but narrower among the southern Gauls, and a shirt with sleeves, descending to the middle of the thighs, composed their principal dress. They were clothed with a mantle or saie, magnificently embroidered with gold or silver among the rich, and held about the peck by means of a metal brooch. The lowest classes of the people used instead an animal’s skin. The Aquitanians covered themselves, probably according to the Iberic custom, with cloth of coarse wool unshorn.

The Gauls wore collars, earrings, bracelets, and rings for the arms, of gold or copper, according to their rank; necklaces of amber, and rings, which they placed on the third finger.

They were naturally agriculturists, and we may suppose that the institution of private property existed among them, because, on the one hand, all the citizens paid the tax, except the Druids, and, on the other, the latter were judges of questions of boundaries. They were not unacquainted with certain manufactures. In some countries they fabricated serges, which were in great repute, and cloths or felts; in others they worked the mines with skill, and employed themselves in the fabrication of metals. The Bituriges worked in iron, and were acquainted with the art of tinning. The artificers of Alesia plated copper with leaf-silver, to ornament horses’ bits and trappings.

The Gauls fed especially on the flesh of swine, and their ordinary drinks were milk, ale, and mead. They were reproached with being inclined to drunkenness.

They were frank and open in temper, and hospitable towards strangers, but vain and quarrelsome; fickle in their sentiments, and fond of novelties, they took sudden resolutions, regretting one day what they had rejected with disdain the day before; inclined to war and eager for adventures, they showed themselves hot in the attack, but quickly discouraged in defeat. Their language was very concise and figurative; in writing, they employed Greek letters.

The men were not exempt from a shameful vice, which we might have believed less common in this country than among the peoples of the East. The women united an extraordinary beauty with remarkable courage and great physical force.

The Gauls, according to the tradition preserved by the Druids, boasted of being descended from the god of the earth, or from Pluto (Dis), according to the expression of Caesar. It was for this reason that they took night for their starting-point in all their divisions of time. Among their other customs, they had one which was singular: they considered it as a thing unbecoming to appear in public with their children, until the latter had reached the age for carrying arms.

When he married, the man took from his fortune a part equal to the dowry of the wife. This sum, placed as a common fund, was allowed to accumulate with interest, and the whole reverted to the survivor. The husband had the right of life and death over his wife and children. When the decease of a man of wealth excited any suspicion, his wives, as well as his slaves, were put to the torture, and burnt if they were found guilty.

The extravagance of their funerals presented a contrast to the simplicity of their life. All that the defunct had cherished during his life, was thrown into the flames after his death; and even, before the Roman conquest, they joined with it his favourite slaves and clients.

In the time of Caesar, the greater part of the peoples of Gaul were armed with long iron swords, two-edged, sheathed in scabbards similarly of iron, suspended to the side by chains. These swords were generally made to strike with the edge rather than to stab. The Gauls had also spears, the iron of which, very long and very broad, presented sometimes an undulated form (materis). They also made use of light javelins without amentum, of the bow, and of the sling. Their helmets were of metal, more or less precious, ornamented with the horns of animals, and with a crest representing some figures of birds or savage beasts, the whole surmounted by a high and bushy tuft of feathers. They carried a great buckler, a breastplate of iron or bronze, or a coat of mail—the latter a Gaulish invention. The Leuci and the Remi were celebrated for throwing the javelin. The Lingones had party-coloured breast­plates. The Gaulish cavalry was superior to the infantry; it was composed of the nobles, followed by their clients; yet the Aquitanians, celebrated for their agility, enjoyed a certain reputation as good infantry. In general, the Gauls were very ready at imitating the tactics of their enemies. The habit of working mines gave them a remarkable dexterity in all underground operations, applicable to the attack and defence of fortified posts. Their armies dragged after them a multitude of wagons and baggage, even in the less important expeditions.

Although they had reached, especially in the south of Gaul, a tolerably advanced degree of civilisation, they preserved very barbarous customs: they killed their prisoners. “When their army is ranged in battle,” says Diodorus, “some of them are often seen advancing from the ranks to challenge the bravest of their enemies to single combat. If their challenge is accepted, they chaunt a war-song, in which they boast of the great deeds of their forefathers, exalting their own valour and insulting their adversary. After the victory, they cut off their enemy’s head, hang it to their horse’s neck, and carry it off with songs of triumph. They keep these hideous trophies in their house, and the highest nobles preserve them with great care, bathed with oil of cedar, in coffers, which they show with pride to their guests.”

When a great danger threatened the country, the chiefs convoked an armed council, to which the men were bound to repair, at the place and day indicated, to deliberate. The law required that the man who arrived last should be massacred without pity before the eyes of the assembly. As a means of intercommunication, men were placed at certain intervals through the country, and these, repeating the cry from one to another, transmitted rapidly news of importance to great distances. They often, also, stopped travellers on the roads, and compelled them to answer them questions.

The Gauls were very superstitious. Persuaded that in the eyes of the gods the life of a man can only be redeemed by that of his fellow, they made a vow, in diseases and dangers, to immolate human beings by the ministry of the Druids. These sacrifices had even a public character. They sometimes constructed human figures of osier of colossal magnitude, which they filled with living men; to these they set fire, and the victims perished in the flames. These victims were generally taken from among the criminals, as being more agreeable to the gods; but if there were no criminals to be had, the innocent themselves were sacrificed.

Caesar, who, according to the custom of his countrymen, gave to the divinities of foreign peoples the names of those of Rome, tells us that the Gauls honoured Mercury, above all others. They raised statues to him, regarded him as the inventor of the arts, the guide of travellers, and the protector of commerce. They also offered worship to divinities which the “Commentaries” assimilate to Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva, without informing us of their Celtic names. From Lucan, we learn the names of three Gaulish divinities, Teutates (in whom, no doubt, we must recognise the Mercury of the “Commentaries”), Hesus or Esus, and Taranis. Caesar makes the re­mark that the Gauls had pretty much the same ideas with regard to their gods as other nations. Apollo cured the sick, Minerva taught the elements of the arts, Jupiter was the master of heaven, Mars the arbiter of war. Often, before fighting, they made a vow to consecrate to this god the spoils of the enemy, and, after the victory, they put to death all their prisoners. The rest of the booty was piled up in the consecrated places, and nobody would be so impious as to take anything away from it. The Gauls rendered also, as we learn from inscriptions and passages in different authors, worship to rivers, fountains, trees, and forests: they adored the Rhine as a god, and made a goddess of the Ardenne.

There were in Gaul, says Caesar, only two classes who enjoyed public consideration and honours, the Druids and the knights. As to the people, deprived of all rights, oppressed with debts, crushed with taxes, exposed to the violences of the great, their condition was little better than that of slaves. The Druids, ministers of religion, presided over the sacrifices, and preserved the deposit of religious doctrines. The youth, greedy of instruction, pressed around them. The dispensers of rewards and punishments, they were the judges of almost all disputes, public or private. To private individuals, or even to magistrates, who rebelled against their decisions, they interdicted the sacrifices, a, sort of excommunication which sequestrated from society those who were struck by it, placed them in the rank of criminals, removed them from all honours, and de­prived them even of the protection of the law. The Druids had a single head, and the power of this head was absolute. At his death, the next in dignity succeeded him; if there were several with equal titles, these priests had recourse to election, and sometimes even to a decision by force of arms. They assembled every year in the country of the Carnutes, in a consecrated place, there to judge disputes. Their doctrine, it was said, came from the isle of Britain, where, in the time of Caesar, they still went to draw it as at its source.

The Druids were exempt from military service and from taxes. These privileges drew many disciples, whose novitiate, which lasted sometimes twenty years, consisted in learning by heart a great number of verses containing their religious precepts. It was forbidden to transcribe them. This custom had the double object of preventing the divulgation of their doctrine and of exercising the memory. Their principal dogma was the immortality of the soul and its transmigration into other bodies. A belief which banished the fear of death appeared to them fitted to excite courage. They explained also the movement of the planets, the greatness of the universe, the laws of na­ture, and the omnipotence of the immortal gods.

“We may conceive,” says the eminent author of the Histoire des Gaulois“ what despotism must have been exercised over a superstitious nation by this caste of men, depositaries of all knowledge, authors and interpreters of all law, divine or human, remunerators, judges, and executioners.”

The knights, when required by the necessities of war, and that happened almost yearly, were all bound to take up arms. Each, according to his birth and fortune, was accompanied by a greater or less number of attendants or clients. Those who were called ambacti performed in war the part of esquires. In Aquitaine, these followers were named soldures; they shared the good as well as the evil fortune of the chief to whom they were attached, and, when he died, not one of them would survive him. Their number was considerable: we shall see a king of the Sotiates possess no less than six hundred of them.

The states were governed either by an assembly, which the Romans called a senate, or by a supreme magistrate, annual or for life, bearing the title of king, prince, or vergobret.

The different tribes formed alliances among themselves, either permanent or occasional; the permanent alliances were founded, some on a community of territorial interests, others on affinities of races, or on treaties, or, lastly, on the right of patronage. The occasional alliances were the results of the necessity of union against a common danger.

In Gaul, not only each state and each tribe (pagus), but even each family, was divided into two parties (factiones); at the head of these parties were chiefs, taken from among the most considerable and influential of the knights. Caesar calls them principes. All those who accepted their supremacy became their clients; and, although the principes did not exercise a regular magistracy, their authority was very extensive. This organisation had existed from a remote antiquity; its object was to offer to each man of the people a protection against the great, since each was thus placed under the patronage of a chief, whose duty it was to take his cause in hand, and who would have lost all credit if he had allowed one of his clients to be oppressed. We see in the “Commentaries” that this class of the principes enjoyed very great influence. On their decisions depended all important resolutions; and their meeting formed the assembly of the whole of Gaul (concium totius Galliae). In it everything was decided by majority of votes.

Affairs of the state were allowed to be treated only in these assemblies. It appertained to the magistrates alone to publish or conceal events, according as they judged expedient; and it was a sacred duty for any one who learnt, either from without or from public rumour, any news which concerned the civitas, to give information of it to the magistrate, without revealing it to any other person. This measure had for its object to prevent rash or ignorant men from being led into error by false reports, and from rushing, under this first impression, into extravagant resolutions.

In the same manner as each state was divided into two rival factions, so was the whole of Gaul (with the exception of Belgic Gaul and Helvetia) divided into two great parties, which exercised over the others a sort of sovereignty (principatus); and when, in extraordinary circumstances, the whole of Gaul acknowledged the pre-eminence of one particular state, the chief of the privileged state took the name of princeps totius Galliae, as had been the case with the Arvernan Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix.

This supremacy, nevertheless, was not permanent; it passed from one nation to another, and was the object of continual ambitions and sanguinary conflicts. The Druids, it is true, had succeeded in establishing a religious centre, but there existed no political centre. In spite of certain federative ties, each state had been more engaged in the consideration of its own individuality than in that of the country in general. This egoistic carelessness of their collective interests, this jealous rivality among the different tribes, paralysed the efforts of a few eminent men who were desirous of founding a nationality, and the Gauls soon furnished the enemy with an easy means of dividing and combating them. The Emperor Napoleon I was thus right in saying: “The principal cause of the weakness of Gaul was the spirit of isolation and locality which characterised the population; at this epoch the Gauls had no national spirit or even provincial spirit; they were governed by a spirit of town. It is the same spirit which has since forged chains for Italy. Nothing is more opposed to national spirit, to general ideas of liberty, than the particular spirit of family or of town. From this parcelling it resulted that the Gauls had no army of the line kept up and exercised; and therefore no art and no military science. Every nation which should lose sight of the importance of an army of the line perpetually on foot, and which should trust to levies or national armies, would experience the fate of the Gauls, without even having the glory of opposing the same resistance, which was the effect of the barbarism of the time and of the ground, covered with forests, marshes, and bogs, and without roads, which rendered it difficult to conquer and easy to defend.” Before Caesar came into Gaul, the Aedui and the Arverni were at the head of the two contending parties, each labouring to carry the day against his rival. Soon these latter united with the Sequani, who, jealous of the superiority of the Aedui, the allies of the Roman people, invoked the support of Ariovistus and the Germans. By dint of sacrifices and promises, they had succeeded in bringing them into their territory. With this aid the Sequani had gained the victory in several combats. The Aedui had lost their nobility, a part of their territory, nearly all their clients, and, after giving up as hostages their children and their chiefs, they had bound themselves by oath never to attack the Sequani, who had at length obtained the supremacy of all Gaul. It was under these circumstances that Divitiacus had gone to Rome to implore the succour of the Republic, but he had failed; the Senate was too much engaged with intestine quarrels to assume an energetic attitude towards the Germans. The arrival of Caesar was destined to change the face of things, and restore to the allies of Rome their old preponderance.

CHAPTER III

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII.

(Year of Rome 696)

I.

Caesar, as we have seen, had received  from the Projects of invasion Senate and people a command which comprised the two Gauls (Transalpine and Cisalpine) and Illyria. Yet the agitation which continued to reign in the Republic was retaining him at the gates of Rome, when suddenly, towards the spring of 696, news came that the Helvetii, returning to their old design, were preparing to in­vade the Roman province. This intelligence caused a great sensation.

The Helvetii, proud of their former exploits, confident in their strength, and incommoded by excess of population, felt humiliated at living in a country the limits of which had been made narrow by nature, and for some years they meditated quitting it to re­pair into the south of Gaul.

As early as 693, an ambitious chieftain, Orgetorix, found no difficulty in inspiring them with the desire to seek elsewhere a more fertile territory and a milder climate. They resolved to go and establish themselves in the country of the Santones (the Saintonge), situated on the shores of the ocean, to the north of the Gironde. Two years were to be employed in preparations, and, by a solemn engagement, the departure was fixed for the third year. But Orgetorix, sent to the neighbouring peoples to contract alliances, conspired with two influential personages—one of the country of the Sequani, the other of. that of the Aedui. He induced them to undertake to seize the supreme power, promised them the assistance of the Helvetii, and persuaded them that those three powerful nations, leagued together, would easily subjugate the whole of Gaul. This conspiracy failed, through the death of Orgetorix, accused in his own country of a design to usurp the sovereignty. The Helvetii persisted, nevertheless, in their project of emigration. They collected the greatest possible number of waggons and beasts of burden; and, in order to destroy all idea of returning, they burnt their twelve towns, their four hundred hamlets, and all the wheat they could not carry with them. Each furnished himself with meal for three months; and after persuading their neighbours, the Rauraci, the Tulingi, and the Latobriges, to imitate their example and follow them, and having drawn to them those of the Boii who had moved from Noricum to the neighbourhood of the Rhine, they fixed the rendezvous on the banks of the Rhone for the 5th of the Calends of April (the 24th of March, the day of the equinox).

There were only two roads by which they could leave Helvetia; one crossed the country of the Sequani, the entrance to which was defended by a nar­row and difficult defile, situated between the Rhone and the Jura (the Pas-de-l'Ecluse), and where the wagons could with difficulty pass one at a time. As this defile was commanded by a very lofty mountain, a handful of men was sufficient to prevent the access. The other road, less contracted and more easy, crossed the Roman province, after having passed the Rhone, which separated the Allobroges from the Helvetii, from Lake Léman to the Jura. Within this distance the river was fordable in several places. At Geneva, the extreme limit of the territory of the Allobroges towards Helvetia, a bridge established a communication between the two countries. The Helvetii decided on taking the most convenient road; they reckoned, moreover, on the co-operation of this neighbouring people, who, but recently subjugated, could have but doubtful sympathies for the Romans.

Caesar, learning that the Helvetii intended to pass through the Roman province, left Rome hastily in the month of March, hurried by forced marches into Transalpine Gaul, and, according to Plutarch, reached Geneva in eight days. As he had in the province only a single legion, he ordered a levy of as many men as possible; and then destroyed the bridge of Geneva. Informed of his arrival, the Helvetii, who were probably not yet all assembled, sent their men of noblest rank to demand a passage  through the country of the Allobroges, promising to commit no injury there; they had, they said, no other road to quit their country. Caesar was inclined to refuse their demand at once, but he called to mind the defeat and death of the Consul L. Cassius; and wishing to obtain time to collect the troops of which he had ordered the levy, he gave them hopes of a favourable reply, and adjourned it to the Ides of April (8th of April). By this delay he gained a fortnight; it was employed in fortifying the left bank of the Rhone between Lake Léman and the Jura. If we estimate at 5,000 men the legion which was in the province, and at 5,000 or 6,000 the number of soldiers of the new levies, we see that Caesar had at his disposal, to defend the banks of the Rhone, about 10,000 or 11,000 infantry.

The distance from Lake Léman to the Jura, following the sinuosities of the river, is the Rhone. 29’5 kilometres. It is on the space comprised between these two points that a retrenchment was raised which is called in the “Commentaries” murus fossaque. This could not be a continuous work, as the ground to be defended is intersected by rivers and ravines, and the banks of the Rhone are almost everywhere so precipitous that it would have been useless to fortify; them. Caesar, pressed for time, can only have made retrenchments on the weakest points of the line where the passage of the river was easy; indeed, this is what Dio Cassius tells us. The labours of the Romans were only supplementary, on certain points, to the formidable natural obstacles which the Rhone presents in the greater part of its course. The only places where an attempt could be made to pass it, because the heights there sink towards the banks of the river into practicable declivities, are situated opposite the modern villages of Russin, Cartigny, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. In these places they cut the upper part of the slope into a per­pendicular, and afterwards hollowed a trench, the scarp of which thus gained an elevation of sixteen feet. These works, by uniting the escarpments of the Rhone, formed, from Geneva to the Jura, a continuous line, which presented an impassable barrier. Behind and along this line, at certain distances, posts and closed redoubts rendered it impregnable.

This retrenchment, which required only from two to three days’ labour, was completed when the deputies returned, at the time appointed, to hear Caesar’s reply. He flatly refused the passage, declaring that he would oppose it with all his means.

Meanwhile the Helvetii, and the people who took part in their enterprise, had assembled on the right bank of the Rhone. When they learnt that they must renounce the hope of quitting their country sometimes, by night—they crossed the Rhone, some  by fording, others with the aid of boats joined together, or of a great number of rafts of timber, and attempted to carry the heights, but, arrested by the strength of the retrenchment (operis munitione), and by the efforts and missiles of the soldiers who hastened to the threatened points (concursu et telis), they abandoned the attack.

The only road which now remained was that which lay across the country of the Sequani (the Pas-de-l’Ecluse); but this narrow defile could not be passed without the consent of its inhabitants; The Helvetii charged  the Aeduan Dumnorix, the son-in-law of Orgetorix,to solicit it for them. High in credit among the Sequani, Dumnorix obtained it; and the two peoples entered into an engagement, one to leave the passage free, the other to commit no disorder; and, as pledges of their convention, they exchanged hostages.

When Caesar learned that the Helvetii were preparing to pass through the lands of the Sequani and the Aedui on their way to the Santones, he resolved to oppose them, unwilling to suffer the establishment of warlike and hostile men in a fertile and open country, neighbouring upon that of the Tolosates, which made part of the Roman province.

But, as he had not at hand sufficient forces, he resolved on uniting all the troops he could dispose of in his vast command. He entrusts, therefore, the care of the retrenchments on the Rhone to his lieutenant T. Labienus, hastens into Italy by forced marches, raises there in great haste two legions (the 11th and 12th), brings from Aquileia, a town of Illyria, the three legions which were there in winter quarters (the 7th, 8th, and 9th), and, at the head of his army, takes across the Alps the shortest road to Transalpine Gaul. The Centrones, the Graioceli, and the Caturiges, posted on the heights, attempt to bar his road; but he overthrows them in several engagements, and from Ocalum (Usseau), the extreme point of the Cisalpine, reaches in seven days the territory of the Vocontii, making thus about twenty-five kilometres a day. He next penetrates into the country of the Allobroges, then into that of the Segusiavi, who bordered on the Roman province beyond the Rhone.

These operations took two months; the same time had been employed by the Helvetii in negotiating the conditions of their passage through the country of the Sequani, moving from the Rhone to the Saone, and beginning to pass the latter river. They had passed the Pas-de-l’Ecluse, followed the right bank of the Rhone as far as Culoz, then turned to the east through Virieu-le-Grand, Tenay, and Saint-Rambert, and, thence crossing the plains of Amberieux, the river Ain, and the vast plateau of the Dombes, they had arrived at the Saone, the left bank of which they occupied from Trevoux to Villefranche. The slowness of their march need not surprise us if we consider that an agglomeration of 368,000 individuals, men, women, and children, dragging after them from 8,000 to 9,000 wagons, through a defile where carriages could only pass one abreast, would necessarily employ several weeks in passing it. Caesar, no doubt, calculated beforehand, with sufficient accuracy, the time it would take them to gain the banks of the Saone; and we may therefore suppose that, at the moment when he repaired into Italy, he hoped to bring thence his army in time to prevent them from passing that river.

He established his camp near the confluence of the Rhone and the Saone, on the heights which command Sathonay; thence he could equally manoeuvre on the two banks of the Saone, take the Helvetii in flank as they marched towards that river, or prevent them, if they crossed it, from entering into the Roman province by the valley of the Rhone. It was probably at this point that Labienus joined him with the troops which had been left with him, and which raised to six the number of his legions. His cavalry, composed principally of Aedui and men raised in the Roman province, amounted to 4,000 men. During this time the Helvetii were ravaging the lands of the Ambarri, those of the Aedui, and those which the Allobroges possessed on the right bank of the Rhone. These peoples implored the succour of Caesar. He was quite disposed to listen to their prayers.

The Saone, which crossed the countries of the Aedui and the Sequani, flowed, then as now, in certain places with an extreme sluggishness. Caesar says that people could not distinguish the direction of the current. The Helvetii, who had not learned to make bridges, crossed the river, between Trevoux and Villefranche, on rafts and boats joined together. As soon as the Roman general had ascertained by his scouts that three-quarters of the barbarians were on the other side of the river, and the others were still on his side, he left his camp towards midnight (de terbia vigilia) with three legions, came upon those of the Helvetii who were still on the left bank, to the north of Trévoux, in the valley of the Formans, towards six o’clock in the morning, after a march of eighteen kilometres, attacked them by surprise in the midst of the confusion of passing the river, and slew a great number. Those who could escape dispersed, and concealed themselves in the neighbouring forests. This disaster fell upon the Tigurini (the inhabitants of the Cantons of Vaud, Friburg, and apart of the Canton of Berne), one of the four tribes of which the nation of the Helvetii was composed, the same which, in an expedition out of Helvetia, had formerly slain the Consul L. Cassius, and made his army pass under the yoke.

After this combat, Caesar, in order to pursue the other part of the enemy’s army, and prevent its marching towards the south, threw a bridge across the Saone, and transported his troops to the right bank. The barques which followed him for the conveyance of provisions, would necessarily facilitate this operation. It is probable that a detachment established in the defiles on the right bank of the Saone, at the spot where Lyons now stands, intercepted the road which would have conducted the Helvetii towards the Roman province. As to the three legions which remained in the camp of Sathonay, they soon rejoined Caesar. The Helvetii, struck by his sudden approach, and by the rapidity with which he had effected, in one single day, a passage which had cost them twenty days’ labour, sent him a deputation, the chief of which, old Divico, had commanded in the wars against Cassius. In language full of boast and threatening, Divico re­minded Caesar of the humiliation inflicted formerly on the Roman arms. The proconsul replied that he was not forgetful of old affronts, but that recent injuries were sufficient motives for his conduct. Nevertheless, he offered peace, on condition that they should give him hostages. “The Helvetii,” replied Divico, “have learned from their ancestors to receive, but not to give, hostages; the Romans ought to know that.” This proud reply closed the interview.

Nevertheless, the Helvetii appear to have been desirous of avoiding battle, for next day they raised their camp, and, cut off from the possibility of following the course of the Saone to proceed towards the south, they took the easiest way to reach the country of the Santones, by directing their march towards the sources of the Dheune and the Bourbince. This broken country, moreover, permitted them to resist the Romans with advantage. They followed across the mountains of Charolais the Gaulish road, on the trace of which was, no doubt, subsequently constructed the Roman way from Lyons to Autun, vestiges of which still exist; the latter followed the course of the Saone as far as Belleville, where it parted from it abruptly, crossing over the Col d’Avenas, proceeding through the valley of the Grosne to Cluny, and continuing by Saint-Vallier to Autun. At Saint-Vallier they would quit this road, and march towards the Loire to pass it at Decize.

Caesar followed the Helvetii, and sent before him all his cavalry to watch their march. These, too eager in the pursuit, came to blows with the enemy’s cavalry in a position of disadvantage, and experienced some loss. Proud of having repulsed 4,000 men with 500 horsemen, the Helvetii became sufficiently emboldened to venture sometimes to harass the Roman army. But Caesar avoided engaging his troops; he was satisfied with following, day by day, the enemies at a distance of five or six miles at most (about eight kilometres), opposing the devastations they commit­ted on their passage, and waiting a favourable occasion inflict a defeat upon them.

The two armies continued their march extremely slowly, and the days passed without offering the desired opportunity. Meanwhile, the provisionment of the Roman army began to inspire serious uneasiness; wheat arrived no longer by the Saone, for Caesar had been obliged to move from it in order to keep up with the Helvetii. On another hand, the Aedui delayed, under vain pretexts, sending the grain which they had promised. The harvest, too, was not yet ripe, and even forage failed. As the day for distribution approached, Caesar convoked the Aeduan chiefs, who were numerous in his camp, and overwhelmed them with reproaches. One of them, Liscus, occupied in his country the supreme magistracy, under the name of vergobret; he denounced Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, as opposing the sending of provisions; it was the same Dumnorix who had heretofore secretly negotiated the passage of the Helvetii across the country of the Sequani, and who, placed at the head of the Aeduan contingent, had, in the last combat, by retreating with his men, led to the flight of the whole body of the cavalry. Caesar sent for Divitiacus, a man devoted to the Roman people, and revealed to him the culpable conduct of his brother, which merited an exemplary punishment. Divitiacus expressed the same opinion, but, in tears, implored the pardon of Dumnorix. Caesar granted it to him, and contented himself with placing him under surveil­lance. It was, indeed, good policy not to alienate the Aeduan people by any excessive severity against a man of power among them.

The Helvetii, after advancing northward as far as Saint-Vallier, had turned to the west to reach the valley of the Loire. Arrived near Issy-l’Evêque, they encamped on the banks of a tributary of the Somme, at the foot of Mount Tauffrin, eight miles from the Roman army. Informed of this circumstance, Caesar judged that the moment had arrived for attacking them by surprise, and sent to reconnoitre by what circuits the heights might be reached. He learnt that the access was easy, and ordered Labienus to gain, with two legions, the summit of the mountain by bye-roads, without giving alarm to the enemy, and to wait till he himself, marching at the head of the four other legions, by the same road as the Helvetii, should appear near their camp; then both were to attack them at the same time. Labienus started at midnight, taking for guides the men who had just explored the roads. Caesar, on his part, began his march at two o’clock in the morning (de quarta vigilia), preceded by his cavalry. At the head of his scouts was P. Considius, whose former services under L. Sylla, and subsequently under M. Crassus, pointed him out as an experienced soldier.

At break of day Labienus occupied the heights, and Caesar was no more than 1,500 paces from the camp of the barbarians; the latter suspected neither his approach nor that of his lieutenant. Suddenly Considius arrived at full gallop to announce that the mountain of which Labienus was to take possession was in the power of the Helvetii; he had recognised them, he said, by their arms and their military ensigns. At this news, Caesar, fearing that he was not in sufficient force against their whole army, with only four legions, chose a strong position on a neighbouring hill, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus, whose orders were not to engage in battle till he saw the troops of Caesar near the enemy’s camp, remained immovable, watching for him. It was broad daylight when Caesar learnt that his troops had made themselves masters of the mountain, and that the Helvetii had left their camp. They escaped him thus, through the false report of Considius, who had been blinded by a groundless terror.

Admitting that the Helvetii had passed near Issy-l’Evêque, Mount Tauffrin, which rises at a distance of four kilometres to the west of that village, answers to the conditions of the text. There is nothing to contradict the notion that Labienus and Caesar may have, one occupied the summit, the other approached the enemy’s camp within 1,500 paces, without being perceived; and the neighbouring ground presents heights which permitted the Roman army to form in order of battle.

That day the Helvetii continued their advance to Remilly, on the Alène. Since the passage of the  Saone, they had inarched about a fortnight, making an average of not more than eleven or twelve kilometres a day. According to our reckoning, it must have been the end of the month of June. Caesar followed the Helvetii at the usual distance, and established his camp at three miles’ distance from theirs, on the Cressonne, near Ternant.

Next day, as the Roman army had provisions left for no more than two days, and as, moreover, Bibracte (Mont Beuvray), the greatest and richest town of the Aedui, was not more than eighteen miles (twenty-seven kilometres) distant, Caesar, to provision his army, turned from the road which the Helvetii were following, and took that to Bibracte. The enemy was informed of this circumstance by some deserters from the troop of L. Emilius, decurion of the auxiliary cavalry. Believing that the Romans were going from them through fear, and hoping to cut them off from their provisions, they turned back, and began to harass the rear-guard.

Caesar immediately led his troops to a neighbouring hill—that which rises between the two villages called the Grand-Marié and the Petit-Marié—and sent his cavalry to impede the enemies in their march, which gave him the time to form in order of battle. He ranged, half way up the slope of the hill his four legions of veterans, in three lines, and the two legions raised in the Cisalpine on the plateau above, along with the auxiliaries, so that his infantry covered the whole height. The heavy baggage, and the bundles (sarcinae) with which the soldiers were loaded, were collected on one point, which was defended by the troops of the reserve. While Caesar was making these dispositions, the Helvetii, who came followed by all their wagons, collected them in one place; they then, in close order, drove back the cavalry, formed in phalanxes, and, making their way up the slope of the hill occupied by the Roman infantry, advanced against the first line.

Caesar, to make the danger equal, and to deprive all of the possibility of flight, sends away the horses of all the chiefs, and even his own, harangues his troops, and gives the signal for combat. The Romans, from their elevated position, hurl the break the enemy’s phalanxes, and rush upon them sword in hand. The engagement becomes general. The Helvetii soon become embarrassed in their movements : their bucklers, pierced and nailed together by the same pilum, the head of which, bending back, can no longer be withdrawn, deprive them of the use of their left arm; most of them, after having long agitated their arms in vain, throw down their bucklers, and fight without them. At last, covered with wounds, they give way, and retire to the mountain of the castle of La Garde, at a distance of about 1,000 paces; but while they are pursued, the Boii and the Tulingi, who, to the number of about 15,000, formed the last of the hostile columns, and composed the rear-guard, rush upon the Romans, and without halt­ing attack their right flank. The Helvetii, who had taken refuge on the height, perceive this movement, return to the charge, and renew the combat. Caesar, to meet these two attacks, effects a change of front in his third line, and opposes it to the new assailants, while the first two lines resist the Helvetii who had already been repulsed.

This double combat was long and furious. Unable to resist the impetuosity of their adversaries, the Helvetii were obliged to retire, as they had done before, to the mountain of the castle of La Garde; the Boii and Tulingi towards the baggage and wagons. Such was the intrepidity of these Gauls during the whole action, which lasted from one o’clock in the afternoon till evening, that not one turned his back. Far into the night there was still fighting about the baggage. The barbarians, having made a rampart of their wagons, some threw from above their missiles on the Romans; others, placed between the wheels, wounded them with long pikes. The women and children, too, shared desperately in the combat. At the end of an obstinate struggle, the camp and baggage were taken. The daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were made prisoners.

This battle reduced the Gaulish emigration to 130,000 individuals. They began their retreat that same evening, and, after marching without interruption day and night, they reached on the fourth day the territory of the Lingones, towards Tonnerre: they had, no doubt, passed by Moulins-en-Gilbert, Lormes, and Avallon. The Lingones were forbidden to furnish the fugitives with provisions or succour, under pain of being treated like them. At the end of three days, the Roman army, having taken care of their wounded and buried the dead, marched in pursuit of the enemy.

The Helvetii, reduced to extremity, sent to Caesar to treat for their submission. The deputies met him on his march, threw themselves at his feet, and demanded peace in the most suppliant terms. He ordered them to say to their fellow-countrymen that they must halt on the spot they then occupied, and await his arrival; and they obeyed. As soon as Caesar overtook them, he required them to deliver hostages, their arms, and the fugitive slaves. While they were preparing to execute his orders, night coming on, about 6,000 men of a tribe named Verbigeni (Soleure, Argovie, Bucerne, and part of the Canton of Berne) fled, either through fear that, having once delivered up their arms, they should be massacred, or in the hope of escaping unperceived in the midst of so great a multitude. They directed their steps towards the Rhine and the frontiers of Germany.

On receiving news of the flight of the Verbigeni, Caesar ordered the peoples whose territories they would cross to stop them and bring them back, under pain of being considered as accomplices. The fugitives were delivered up and treated as enemies; that is, put to the sword, or sold, as slaves. As to the others, Caesar accepted their submission: he compelled the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobriges to return to the localities they had abandoned, and to restore the towns and hamlets they had burnt; and since, after having lost all their crops, they had no more provisions of their own, the Allobroges were ordered to furnish them with wheat. These measures had for their object not to leave Helvetia without inhabitants, as the fertility of its soil might draw thither the Germans of the other side of the Rhine, who would thus become borderers upon the Roman province. He permitted the Boii, celebrated for their brilliant valour, to establish themselves in the country of the Aedui, who had asked permission to receive them. They gave them lands between the Allier and the Loire, and soon admitted them to a share in all their rights and privileges.

In the camp of the Helvetii were found tablets on which was written, in Greek letters, the number of all those who had quitted their country: on one side, the number of men capable of bearing arms; and on the other, that of the children, old men, and women. The whole amounted to 263,000 Helvetii, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobriges, 23,000 Rauraci, and 32,000 Boii—together, 368,000 persons, of whom 92,000 were men in a condition to fight. According to the census ordered by Caesar, the number of those who returned home was 110,000. The emigration was thus re­duced to less than one-third.

The locality occupied by the Helvetii when they made their submission is unknown; yet all circumstances seem to concur in placing the theatre of this event in the western part of the country of the Lingones. This hypothesis appears the more reasonable, as Caesar’s march, in the following campaign, can only be explained by supposing him to start from this region. We admit, then, that Caesar received the submission of the Helvetii on the Armangon, towards Tonnerre, and it is there that we suppose him to have been encamped during the events upon the recital of which we are now going to enter.

The forces of the two armies opposed to each other in the battle of Bibracte were about  equal, for Caesar had six legions—the 10th, which he had found in the Roman province; the three old legions (7th, 8th, and 9th), which he had brought from Aquileia; and the two new ones (11th and 12th), raised in the Cisalpine. The effective force of each must have been near the normal number of 6,000 men, for the campaign had only be­gun, and their ranks must have been increased by the veterans and volunteers of whom we have spoken in the first volume. The number of the legionaries was thus 36,000. Adding 4,000 cavalry, raised in the Roman province and among the Aedui, and probably 20,000 auxiliaries, we shall have a total of 60,000 combatants, not including the men attached to the machines, those conducting the baggage, the army servants, &c. The Helvetii, on their side, did not count more than 69,000 combatants, since out of 92,000, they had lost one-fourth near the Saone.

Tn this battle, it must be remarked, Caesar did not employ the two legions newly raised, which remained to guard the camp, and secure the retreat in case of disaster. Next year he assigned the same duty to the youngest troops. The cavalry did not pursue the enemies in their rout, doubtless because the mount­ainous nature of the locality made it impossible for it to act.

CHAPTER IV.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.

(Year of Rome 696.)

On the termination of the war against the Helvetii, the chiefs of nearly all Celtic Gaul went to congratulate Caesar, and thank him for having, at the same time, avenged their old injuries, and delivered their country from immense danger. They expressed the desire to submit to his judgment certain affairs, and, in order to concert mat­ters, previously, they solicited his permission to convoke a general assembly. Caesar gave his consent.

After the close of the deliberations, they returned, secretly and in tears, to solicit his support against the Germans and Ariovistus, one of their kings. These peoples were separated from the Gauls by the Rhine, from its mouth to the Lake of Constance. Among them the Suevi occupied the first rank. They were by much the most powerful and the most warlike. They were said to be divided into a hundred cantons, each of which furnished, every year, a thousand men for war and a thousand men for agriculture, taking each other’s place alternately: the labourers fed the soldiers. No boundary line, among the Suevi, separated the property of the fields, which remained common, and no one could prolong his residence on the same lands beyond a year. However, they hardly lived upon the produce of the soil: they consumed little wheat, and drank no wine; milk and flesh were their habitual food. When these failed, they were fed upon grass. Masters of themselves from infancy, intrepid hunters, insensible to the inclemency of the seasons, bathing in the cold waters of the rivers, they hardly covered a part of their bodies with thin skins. They were savages in manners, and of prodigious force and stature. They disdained commerce and foreign horses, which the Gauls sought with so much care. Their own horses, though mean-looking and ill-shaped, became indefatigable through exercise, and fed upon brushwood. Despising the use of the saddle, often, in engagements of cavalry, they jumped to the ground and fought on foot : their horses were taught to remain without moving. The belief in the dogma of the immortality of the soul, strengthened in them the contempt for life. They boasted of being surrounded by immense solitudes: this fact, as they pretended, showed that a great number of their neighbours had not been able to resist them: and it was reported, indeed, that on one side (towards the east) their territory was bounded, for an extent of 600 miles, by desert plains; on the other, they bordered upon the Ubii, their tributaries, the most civilised of the German peoples, because their situation on the banks of the Rhine placed them in relation with foreign merchants, and because, neighbours, to the Gauls, they had formed themselves to their manners.

Two immense forests commenced not far from the Rhine, and extended, from west to east, across Germany; these were the Hercynian and Bacenis forests. The first, beginning from the Black Forest and the Odenwald, covered all the country sit­uated between the Upper Danube and the Maine, and comprised, the mountains which, further towards the east, formed the northern girdle of the basin of the Danube; that is, the Boehmerwald, the mountains of Moravia, and the Little Carpathians. It had a breadth which Caesar represents by nine long days’ march. The other, of much less extent, took its rise in the forest of Thuringia; it embraced all the, mountains to the north of Bohemia, and that long chain which separates the basins of the Oder and the Vistula from that of the Danube.

The Suevi inhabited, to the south of the forest Bacenis, the countries situated between the forest of Thuringia, the Boehmerwald, the Inn, and the Black Forest, which compose, in our days, the Duchies of Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Coburg, Bavaria, and the greater part of Wurtemberg. To the east of the Suevi were the Boii (partly in Bohemia and partly in the north-west of Austria), to the north, the Cherusci, separated from the Suevi by the forest Bacenis; to the west, the Marcomanni (the upper and middle course of the Maine) and the Sedusii (between the Maine and the Neckar); to the south, the Harudes (on the north of the Lake of Constance), the Tulingi, and the Latobriges (the southern part of the Grand Duchy of Baden).

On the two banks of the Rhine dwelt the Rauraci (the territory of Bâle and part of the Brisgau), the Triboces (part of Alsace and of the Grand Duchy of Baden); on the right bank were the Nemetes (opposite Spire); the Vangiones (opposite Worms); the Ubii, from the Odenwald to the watershed of the Sieg and the Ruhr. To the north of the Ubii were the Sicambri, established in Sauerland, and nearly as far as the Lippe. Finally, the Usipetes and the Tencteri were still farther to the north, towards the mouth of the Rhine.

The Gaulish chiefs who had come to solicit the succour of Caesar made the following complaints against Ariovistus: “The German king,” they said, “ had taken advantage of the quarrels which divided the different peoples of Gaul; called in formerly by the Arverni and the Sequani, he had gained, with their co-operation, several victories over the Aedui, in consequence of which the latter were subjected, to the most humiliating conditions. Shortly afterwards his yoke grew heavy on the Sequani themselves, to such a degree, that, though conquerors with him, they are now more wretched than the vanquished Aedui. Ariovistus has seized a third of their territory; another third is on the point of being given up, by his orders, to 24,000 Harudes, who have joined him some months ago. There are 120,000 Germans in Gaul. The contin­gents of the Suevi have already arrived on the banks of the Rhine. In a few years the invasion of Gaul by the Germans will be general. Caesar alone can prevent it, by his prestige and that of the Roman name, by the force of his arms, and by the fame of his recent victory.”

Gaul thus came voluntarily, in the persons of her chiefs, to throw herself into the arms of Caesar, take him for the arbiter of her destiny, and implore him to be her saviour. He spoke encouragingly, and promised them his support. Several considerations engaged him to act upon these complaints. He could not suffer the Aedui, allies of Rome, to be brought under subjection by the barbarians. He saw a substantial danger for the Republic in the numerous immigrations of fierce peoples who, once masters of Gaul, would not fail, in imitation of the Cimbri and Teutones, to invade the Roman province, and thence fall upon Italy. Resolved to prevent these dangers, he proposed an interview with Ariovistus, who was probably occupied, since the defeat of the Helvetii, in collecting an army among the Triboci (towards Strasbourg) as well to oppose the further designs of the Romans, as to defend the part of the country of the Sequani which he had seized. Ariovistus, it will be remembered, had been declared, under Caesar’s consulate, ally and friend of the Roman people; and this favour would encourage the expectation that the head of the Germans would be willing to treat; but he refused with disdain the proposed interview. Then Caesar sent messengers to him to reproach him with his ingratitude. “If Ariovistus cares to preserve his friendship, let him make reparation for all the injury he has inflicted upon the allies of Rome, and let him bring no more barbarians across the Rhine; if, on the contrary, he rejects these conditions, so many acts of violence will be punished in virtue of the decree rendered by the Senate, under the consulate of M. Messala and M. Piso, which authorises the governor of Gaul to do that which he judges for the advantage of the Republic, and enjoins him to defend the Aedui and the other allies of the Roman people.”

By this language, Caesar wished to show that he did not violate the law, enacted a year before under his consulate, which forbade the governors to leave their provinces without an order of the Senate. He purposely appealed to an old decree, which gave unlimited powers to the governor of Gaul, a province the importance of which had always required exceptional laws. The reply of Ariovistus was equally proud:—

“Caesar ought to know as well as he the right of the conqueror: he admits no interference in the treatment reserved for the vanquished; he has himself Causes of complaint against the proconsul, whose presence diminishes his revenues; he will not restore the hostages to the Aedui; the title of brothers and allies of the Roman people will be of little service to them. He cares little for threats. No one has ever braved Ariovistus with impunity. Let anybody attack him, and he will learn the valour of a people which, for fourteen years, has never sought shelter under a roof.”

This arrogant reply, and news calculated to give alarm, hastened Caesar’s decision. In fact, on one side the Aedui complained to him of the devastation of their country by the Harudes; and, on the other, the Treviri announced that the hundred cantons of the Suevi were preparing to cross the Rhine. Caesar, wishing to prevent the junction of these new bands with the old troops of Ariovistus, hastened the collecting of provisions, and advanced against the Germans by forced marches. The negotiations having probably lasted during the month of July, it was now the beginning of August. Starting from the neighbourhood of Tonnerre, where we have supposed he was encamped, Caesar followed the road subsequently replaced by a Roman way of which vestiges are still found, and which, passing by Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Etrochey, and Dancevoir, led to Langres. After three long days’ marches, on his arrival towards Arc-en-Barrois, he learnt that Ariovistus was moving with all his troops to seize Besançon, the most considerable place in Sequania, and that he had already advanced three days’ march beyond his territory. Caesar considered it a matter of urgency to anticipate him, for this place was abundantly pro tided with everything necessary for an army. Instead of continuing his march towards the Rhine, by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort, he advanced, day and night, by forced marches, towards Besançon, obtained possession of it, and placed a garrison there.

The following description, given in the Commentaries, is still applicable to the present town. “It was so well fortified by nature, that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Doubs, forming a circle, surrounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred feet, which is not bathed by the water, is occupied by a high mountain, the base of which reaches, on each side, to the edge of the river. The wall which encloses this mountain makes a citadel of it, and connects it with the oppidum”

During this rapid movement of the Roman army on Besançon, Ariovistus had advanced very slowly. We must suppose, indeed, that he halted when he was informed of this march; for, once obliged to abandon the hope of taking that place, it was imprudent to separate himself any farther from his re-enforcements, and, above all, from the Suevi, who were ready to pass the Rhine towards Mayence, and await the Romans in the plains of Upper Alsace, where he could advantageously make use of his numerous cavalry.

During the few days which Caesar passed at Besançon (the middle of August), in order to assure himself of provisions, a general panic took possession of his soldiers. Public rumour represented the Germans as men of gigantic stature, of unconquerable valour, and of terrible aspect. Now there were in the Roman, army many young men without experience in war, come from Rome, some out of friendship for Caesar, others in the hope of obtaining celebrity without trouble. Caesar could not help receiving them. It must have been difficult, indeed, for a general who wished to preserve his friends at Rome, to defend himself against the innumerable solicitations of influential people. This panic had begun with these volunteers; it soon gained the whole army. Every one made his will; the least timid alleged, as an excuse for their fear, the difficulty of the roads, the depth of the forests, the want of pro­visions, the impossibility of obtaining transports, and even the illegality of the enterprise.

Caesar, surprised at this state of feeling, called a council, to which he admitted the centurions of all classes. He sharply reproached the assembled chiefs with wishing to penetrate his designs, and to seek information as to the country into which he intended to lead them. He reminded them that their fathers, under Marius, had driven out the Cimbri and the Teutones; that, still more recently, they had defeated the German race in the revolt of the slaves; that the Helvetii had often beaten the Germans, and that they, in their turn, had just beaten the Helvetii. As to those who, to disguise their fears, talk of the difficulty of the roads and the want of food, he finds it very insolent in them to suppose that their general will forget his duty, or to pretend to dictate it to him. The care of the war is his business: the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones will furnish wheat; in fact, it is already ripe in the fields. As to the roads, they will soon have the opportunity of judging of them themselves. He is told the soldiers will not obey, or raise the ensigns (signa laturi). Words like these would not shake him; the soldier despises the voice of his chief only when the latter is, by his own fault, abandoned by fortune or convicted of cupidity or embezzlement. As to himself, his whole life proves his integrity ; the war of the Helvetii affords evidence of his favour with fortune; for which cause, without delay, he will break up the camp tomorrow morning, for he is impatient to know if, among his soldiers, fear will prevail over honour and duty. If the army should refuse to follow him, he will start alone, with the 10th legion, of which he will make his praetorian cohort. Caesar had always loved this legion, and, on account of its valor, had always the greatest confidence in it.

This language, in which, without having recourse to the rigours of discipline, Caesar appealed to the honour of his soldiers, exciting at the same time the emulation both of those whom he loaded with praise and of those whose services he affected to disdain,—this proud assertion of his right to command produced a wonderful revolution in the minds of the men, and inspired the troops with great ardour for fighting. The 10th legion first charged its tribunes to thank him for the good opinion he had expressed towards them, and declared that they were ready to march. The other legions then sent their excuses by their tribunes and centurions of the first class, denied their hesitations and fears, and pretended that they had never given any judgment upon the war, as that appertained only to the general.

This agitation having been calmed, Caesar sought information concerning the roads from Divitiacus, who, of all the Gauls, inspired him with the greatest amount of confidence. In order to proceed from Besançon to the valley of the Rhine, to meet Ariovistus, the Roman army had to cross the northern part of the Jura chain. This country is composed of two very distinct parts. The first comprises the valley of the Doubs from Besançon to Montbéliard, the valley of the Oignon, and the intermediate country, a mountainous district, broken, much covered with wood, and, without doubt, at the time of Caesar’s war in Gaul, more difficult than at present. The other part, which begins at the bold elbow made by the Doubs near Montbéliard, is composed of lengthened undulations, which diminish gradually, until they are lost in the plains of the Rhine. It is much less wooded than the first, and offers easier communications.

Caesar, as he had announced, started early on the morrow of the day on which he had thus addressed his officers, and, determined on conducting his army through an open country, he turned the mountainous and difficult region just described, thus making a circuit of more than fifty miles (seventy-five kilometres), which is represented by a semi-circumference, the diameter of which would be the line drawn from Besançon to Arcey. It follows the present road from Besançon to Vesoul as far as Pennesières, and continues by Vallerois-le-Bois and Villersexel to Arcey. He could perform this distance in four days; then he resumed, on leaving Arcey, the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine by Belfort and Cernay.

On the seventh day of a march uninterrupted since leaving Besançon, he learnt by his scouts that the troops of Ariovistus were at a distance of not more than twenty-four miles (36 kilometres).

Supposing 20 kilometres for the day’s march, the Roman army would have travelled over 140 kilometres in seven days, and would have arrived on the Thur, near Cernay. (By the road indicated, the distance from Besançon to the Thur is about 140 kilometres.) At this moment, Ariovistus would have been encamped at 36 kilometres from the Romans, to the north, near Colmar.

Informed of the arrival of Caesar, Ariovistus sent him word “that he consented to an interview, now that the Roman general had come near, and that there was no longer any danger for him in going to him.” Caesar did not reject this overture, supposing that Ariovistus had returned to more reasonable sentiments.

The interview was fixed for the fifth day following. In the interval,, while there was a frequent exchange of messages, Ariovistus, who feared some ambuscade, stipulated, as an express condition, that Caesar should bring with him no foot soldiers, but that, on both sides, they should confine themselves to an escort of cavalry. The latter, unwilling to furnish any pretext for a rupture, consented; but, not daring to entrust his personal safety to the Gaulish cavalry, he mounted on their horses men of the 10th legion, which gave rise to this jocular saying of one of the soldiers: “Caesar goes beyond his promise; he was to make us praetorians, and he makes us knights.”

Between the two armies extended a vast plain, that which is crossed by the Ill and the Thur.  A tolerably large knoll rose in it at a nearly equal distance from either camp. This was the place of meeting of the two chieftains. Caesar posted his mounted legion at 200 paces from the knoll, and the cavalry of Ariovistus stood at the same distance. The latter demanded that the interview should take place on horseback, and that each of the two chiefs should be accompanied only by ten horsemen. When they met, Caesar reminded Ariovistus of his favours, of those of the Senate, of the interest which the Republic felt in the Aedui, of that constant policy of the Roman people which, far from suffering the abasement of its allies, sought incessantly their elevation. He repeated his first conditions.

Ariovistus, instead of accepting them, put forward his own claims: “He had only crossed the Rhine at the prayer of the Gauls; the lands which he was ac­cused of having seized, had been ceded to him; he had subsequently been attacked, and had scattered his enemies; if he has sought the friendship of the Roman people, it is in the hope of benefiting by it; if it becomes prejudicial to him, he renounces it; if he has carried so many Germans into Gaul, it is for his personal safety; the part he occupies belongs to him, as that occupied by the Romans belongs to them; his rights of conquest are older than those of the Roman army, which had never passed the limits of the prov­ince. Caesar is only in Gaul to ruin it. If he does not withdraw from it, he will regard him as an enemy, and he is certain that by his death he shall gain the gratitude of a great number of the first and most illustrious personages in Rome. They have informed him by their messengers that, at this price, he would gain their good-will and friendship. But if he be left in free possession of Gaul, he will assist in all the wars that Caesar may undertake.”

Caesar insisted on the arguments he had already advanced: “It was not one of the principles of the Republic to abandon its allies; he did not consider that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus any more than to the Roman people. When formerly Q. Fabius Maximus vanquished The Arverni and the Ruteni, Rome pardoned them, and neither deduced them to provinces nor imposed tribute upon them. If, then, priority of conquest be invoked, the claims of the Romans to the empire of Gaul are the most just; and if it be thought preferable to refer to the Senate, Gaul ought to be free, since, after victory, the Senate had willed that she should preserve her own laws.”

During this conversation, information was brought to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching the knoll, and were throwing stones and darts at the Romans. Caesar immediately broke up the conference, withdrew to his escort, and forbade them to return the attack, not from fear of an engagement with his favourite legion, but in order to avoid, in case he should defeat his enemies, the suspicion that he might have, taken advantage of their good faith to surprise them in an interview. Nevertheless, the arrogance of Ariovistus, the disloyal attack of his cavalry, and the rupture of the conference, were soon known, and excited the ardour and impatience of the Roman troops.

Two days afterwards, Ariovistus made a proposal for a renewal of the conference, or for the sending to him of one of Caesar’s lieutenants. Caesar refused, the more so because, the day before, the Germans had again advanced and thrown their missiles at the Romans, and that thus his lieutenant would not have been safe from the attacks of the barbarians. He thought it more prudent to send as his deputy Valerius Procillus, the son of a Gaul who had become a Roman citizen, who spoke the Celtic language, and who was on familiar terms with Ariovistus, and M. Mettius, with whom the German king was bound by the rights of hospitality. They had hardly entered the camp of Ariovistus, when he ordered them to be thrown into fetters, under pretence that they were spies.

The same day, the German king broke up his camp, and took another position at the foot of the Vosges, at a distance of   6,000 paces from that of Caesar, between Soultz and Feldkirch, not far from the Lauch. Next day he crossed the Thur, near its confluence with the Ill, ascended the left banks of the Ill and the Doller, and only halted at Heiningen, after having gone two miles (three kilometres) beyond the Roman camp. By this manoeuvre, Ariovistus cut off Caesar’s communication with Sequania and the Aeduan country, but he left open the communications with the country of the Leuci and the Lingones. The two armies thus encamped at a short distance from each other. During the five following days, Caesar drew out his troops each day, and formed them in order of battle at the head of his camp, but was not able to provoke the Germans to fight; all hostility was limited to cavalry skirmishes, in which the latter were much practised. To 6,000 horsemen was joined an equal number of picked men on foot, among whom each horseman had chosen one to watch over him in combat. According to circumstances, the horsemen fell back upon the footmen, or the latter advanced to their assistance. Such was their agility, that they kept up with the horses, running and holding by the mane.      .

Caesar, seeing that Ariovistus persisted in shutting himself up in his camp and intercepting his communications, sought to re-establish them, chose an advantageous position about 600 paces (900 metres) beyond that occupied by the Germans, and led thither his army drawn up in three lines. He kept the first and second under arms, and employed the third on the retrenchments. The spot on which he established himself is perhaps the eminence situated on the Little Doller, to the north of Schweighausen. Ariovistus sent thither about 16,000 of his light troops and all his cavalry, to intimidate the Romans and impede the works. Nevertheless, the third line continued them, and the two others repelled the attack. The camp once fortified, Caesar left in it two legions and a part of the auxiliaries, and took back the four others to the principal camp. The two Roman camps were 3,600 metres distant from each other.

Hitherto Caesar had been satisfied with drawing out his troops and backing them upon his retrenchments; the next day, persisting in his tactics of trying to provoke Ariovistus to fight, he drew them up at a certain distance in advance of the principal camp, and placed them in order of battle. In spite of this advanced position, Ariovistus persisted in not coming out. The Roman army re-entered the camp towards midday, and a part of the German troops immediately attacked the small camp. Both armies fought resolutely till evening, and there were many wounded on both sides. Astonished at seeing that, in spite of this engagement, Ariovistus still avoided a general battle, Caesar interrogated the prisoners, and learnt that the matrons charged with consulting destiny had declared that the Germans could not be conquerors if they fought before the new moon.

Next day, leaving a sufficient guard in the two camps, Caesar placed all his auxiliaries in view of the enemy, in advance of the smaller camp; the number of the legionaries being less than that of the Germans, he sought to conceal his inferiority from the enemy by displaying other troops. While the Germans took these auxiliaries for the two legions which occupied the lesser camp, the latter left it by the Decuman gate, and, unperceived, went to rejoin, the other four. Then Caesar drew up his six legions in three lines, and, marching forward, he led them up to the enemy’s camp. This offensive movement allowed the Germans no longer the choice of avoiding battle: they quitted their camp, descended into the plain, drew up in line, by order of nations, at equal intervals—Harudes, Marcomanni, Suevi, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, and Sedusii; and, to deprive themselves of all possibility of flight, inclosed themselves on the sides and in the rear by a circuit of carriages and wagons, on which they placed their women : dishevelled and in tears, these implored the warriors, as they marched to the battle, not to deliver them in slavery to the Romans. In this position, the Roman army faced the east, and the German army the west, and their lines extended over a space now partly covered by the forest of Nonnenbruch.

Caesar, still more to animate his soldiers, determined to give them witnesses worthy of their courage, and placed at the head of each legion either one of his lieutenants or his quaestor. He led the attack in person, with his right wing, on the side where the Germans seemed weakest. The signal given, the legions dash forward; the enemy, on his side, rushes to the encounter. On both sides the impetuosity is so great that the Romans, not having time to use the pilum, throw it away, and fight hand to hand with the sword. But the Germans, according to their custom, to resist an attack of this kind, form rapidly in phalanxes of three or four hundred men, and cover their bare heads with their bucklers. They are pressed so close together, that even when dead they still remain standing. Such was the ardour of the legionaries, that many rushed upon these sort of tortoises, tearing away the bucklers, and striking the enemies from above. The short and sharp-pointed swords of the Romans had the advantage over the long swords of the Germans. Nevertheless, according to Appian, the legions owed their victory chiefly to the superiority of their tactics and the steadiness with which they kept their ranks. Ariovistus’s left did not resist long; but while it was driven back and put to flight, the right, forming in deep, masses, pressed the Romans hard. Young P. Crassus, com­mander of the cavalry placed at a distance from the thick of the battle, and better placed to judge of its incidents, perceived this, sent the third line to the succour of the wavering legions, and restored the combat. Soon Ariovistus’s right was obliged to give way in its turn; the rout then became general, and the Germans desisted from flight only when they reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle. They descended, no doubt, the valley of the Ill as far as Rhinau, thus retracing a part of the road by which they had come. Caesar sent his cavalry after them; all who were overtaken were cut to pieces; the rest attempted to swim across the river, or sought safety in boats. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who threw himself into a boat he found attached to the bank. According to Plu­tarch and Appian, 80,000 men perished in the combat and during the pursuit. Two of the wives of the German king experienced the same fate; one was a Sueve, the other a Norician. Of his two daughters, one was killed and the other taken prisoner. Caesar says that, as he himself pursued the enemy with his cavalry, he experienced a pleasure equal to that given by victory when he recovered, first Procillus, loaded with a triple chain, and who had thrice seen the barbarians draw lots whether he should be burnt alive or not, and, subsequently, M. Mettius, both of whom, as we have seen, had been sent by him as messengers to Ariovistus.

The report of this glorious exploit having spread beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to its banks, returned home. The Ubii, who dwelt near the river, pursued their terrified bands, and slew a considerable number of the fugitives.

Caesar, having concluded two great wars in one single campaign, placed his army in winter quarters among the Sequani rather sooner than the season required— at the beginning of September—and left them under the command of Labienus. He then left, and went to hold the assemblies in Cisalpine Gaul.

There are several things worthy of remark in this campaign:—

1. The resolution taken by Caesar to gain possession of Besançon, and thus to anticipate Ariovistus. We see the importance which he attaches to that military position as a point of support and of supply.

2. The facility with which a whole legion transforms itself into cavalry.

3. The judicious use which Caesar makes of his light troops by assembling them in mass, so that the enemy should believe in a greater number of legions.

4. Lastly, this singular circumstance, that the third line, which serves as reserve and decides the fate of the battle, receives from young P. Crassus, and not from the general-in-chief, the order to attack.

The dates of the principal events of this year may be indicated in the following manner:—

Rendezvous of the Helvetii on the banks of the Rhone (the day of the equinox) : March  24.

Caesar refuses them a passage through the province : April 8.

Arrival at the confluence of the Rhone and the Saone of the legions from Italy and Illyria  : June   7.

Defeat of the Tigurini on the Saone : June 10.

Passage of the Saone by Caesar : June 12.

About fifteen days’ march From June 13 to June 27.

Manoeuvre of Labienus to surprise the Helvetii : June   28.

Battle of Bibracte : June 29.

Caesar remains three days interring the dead; marches on the fourth; employs six days in his march from the field of battle to the country of the Lingones, and there overtakes the Helvetii in their retreat,

From June 30 to July 8. Negotiations with Ariovistus (a month),

From July 8 to August 8. Departure of Caesar (from Tonnerre, to meet Ariovistus) : August 10.

Arrival of Caesar at Besançon : August 16.

Abode of Caesar at Besançon,

From August 16 to August 22. Departure from Besançon : August 22.

March of seven days from Besançon to the Rhine. From August 22 to August 28.

Interview (five days afterwards) : September 2.

Manoeuvres (about eight days), from September 3 to September 10.

Battle of the Thur (fought before the new moon, which took place on the 18th of September) : September   10.

CHAPTER V.

WAR AGAINST THE BELGAE.

(Year of Rome 697.)  

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The brilliant successes gained by Caesar over the Helvetii and the Germans had delivered the Republic from an immense danger,  but at the same time they had roused the distrust and jealousy of most of the nations of Gaul. These conceived fears for their independence, which were further increased by the presence of the Roman army in Sequania. The irritation was very great among the Belgae. They feared that their turn to be attacked would come when Celtic Gaul was once reduced to peace. Besides, they were excited by influential men who understood that, under Roman domination, they would have less chance of obtaining possession of the supreme power. The different tribes of Belgic Gaul entered into a formidable league, and reciprocally exchanged hostages.

Caesar learnt these events in the Cisalpine province, through public rumour and the letters of Labienus. Alarmed at the news, he raised two legions in Italy, the 13th and 14th, and, in the beginning of spring, sent them into Gaul, under the command of the lieutenant Q. Pedius.  It is probable that these troops, to reach Sequania promptly, crossed the Great St. Bernard, for Strabo relates that one of the three routes which led from Italy into Gaul passed by Mount Poerinus (Great St. Bernard), after having traversed the country of the Salassi (Valley of Aosta), and that this latter people offered at first to assist Caesar’s troops in their passage by levelling the roads and throwing bridges across the torrents; but that, suddenly changing their tone, they had rolled masses of rock down upon them and pillaged their baggage. It was no doubt in the sequel of this de­fection that, towards the end of the year 697, Caesar, as we shall see farther on, sent Galba into the Valais, to take vengeance on the mountaineers for their perfidious conduct and to open a safe communication with Italy.

As soon as forage was abundant, he rejoined his legions in person, probably at Besançon, since, as we have seen, they had been placed in winter quarters in Sequania. He charged the Senones and the other Celts who bordered upon Belgic Gaul to watch what was doing there and inform him of it. Their reports were unanimous: troops were being raised, and an army was assembling. Caesar then decided upon immediately entering into campaign.

His army consisted of eight legions: they bore the numbers 7, 8, 9,10,11,12,13, and 14. As their effective force, in consequence of marches and previous combats, cannot have been complete, we may admit a mean of 5,000 men to the legion, which would make 40,000 men of infantry. Adding to these one-third of auxiliaries, Cretan archers, slingers, and Numidians, the total of infantry would have been 53,000 men. There was, in addition to these, 5,000 cavalry and a body of Aeduan troops under the command of Divitiacus. Thus the army of Caesar amounted to at least 60,000 soldiers, without reckoning the servants for the machines, drivers, and valets; who, according to the instance cited by Orosius, amounted to a very considerable number.

After securing provisions, Caesar started from Besançon, probably in the second fortnight in May, passed the Saone at Seveux, crossed the country of the Lingones in the direction of Langres, at Bar-sur-Aube, and entered, towards Vitry-le-François, on the territory of the Remi, having marched in about a fortnight 230 kilometres, the distance from Besançon to Vitry-le-François.

The Remi were the first Belgic people he encountered in his road. Astonished at his sudden appearance, they sent two deputies, Iccius and Adecumborius, the first personages of their country, to make their submission, and offer provisions and every kind of succour. They informed Caesar that all the Belgae were in arms, and that the Germans on that side the Rhine had joined the coalition; for themselves, they had refused to take any part in it, but the excitement was so great that they had not been able to dissuade from their warlike projects the Suessiones themselves, who were united with them by community of origin, laws, and interests. “The Belgae,” they added, “proud of having been formerly the only people of Gaul who preserved their territory from the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, had the loftiest idea of their own valour. In their general assembly, each people had engaged to furnish the following contingents:—The Bellovaci, the most warlike, could send into the field 100,000 men; they have promised 60,000 picked troops, and claim the supreme direction of the war. The Suessiones, their neighbours, masters of a vast and fertile territory, in which are reckoned twelve towns, furnish 50,000 men; they have for their king Galba, who has been invested, by the consent of the allies, with the chief command. The Nervii, the most distant of all, and the most barbarous among these peoples, furnish the same number; the Atrebates, 15,000 ; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapii, 7000; the Caletes, 10,000; the Veliocasses and the Veromandui, 10,000; the Aduatuci, 19,000; lastly, the Condrusi, Eburones, Caeresi, and Psemani, comprised under the general name of Germans, are to send 40,000; in all, about 296,000 men.”

Caesar could judge, from this information, the formidable character of the league which he had now to combat. His first care, was to try to divide the hostile forces, and, with this view, he induced Divitiacus, in spite of the friendly relations which had long united the Aedui with the Bellovaci, to invade and ravage the territory of the latter with the Aeduan troops. He then required the senate of the Remi to repair to his presence, and the children of the principes to be brought to him as hostages; and then, on information that Galba was marching to meet him, he resolved to move to the other side of the Aisne, which crossed the extremity of the territory of the Remi, and encamp there in a strong position, to await the enemy’s attack. The road he had hitherto followed led straight to the Aisne, and crossed it by a bridge at the spot where now stands the village of Berry-au-Bac. He marched in great haste towards this bridge, led his army across it, and fixed his camp on the right side of the road, on the hill situated between the Aisne and the Miette, a small stream with marshy banks, which makes a bend in that river between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert. This hill, called Mauchamp, is of small elevation (about 25 metres) above the valley of the Aisne, and in its length, from east to west, it presents sufficient space for the Roman army to deploy. Laterally, it sinks to the level of the surrounding ground by slight undulations, and the side which looks upon the Miette descends by a gentle slope towards the banks of the stream. This position offered several advantages: the Aisne defended one side of the camp; the rear of the army was protected, and the transports of provisions could arrive in safety through the countries of the Remi and other friendly peoples. Caesar ordered a work to be constructed on the right bank of the Aisne, at the extremity of the bridge, where he established a post, and he left on the other side of the river the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus with six cohorts. The camp was surrounded by a re­trenchment twelve feet high, and by a fosse eighteen feet wide.

Meanwhile the Belgae, after having concentrated their forces in the country of the Suessiones, to the north of the Aisne, had invaded the territory of the Remi. On their road, and at eight miles from the Roman camp, was a town of the Remi called Bibrax (Vieux-Laon). The Belgae attacked it vigorously, and it was defended with difficulty all day. These peoples, like the Celts, attacked fortresses by surrounding them with a crowd of combatants, throwing from every side a great quantity of stones, to drive the defenders away from the walls; then, forming the tortoise, they advanced against the gates and sapped the walls. When night had put a stop to the attack, Iccius, who commanded in the town, sent information to Caesar that he could hold out no longer, unless he received prompt succour. Towards midnight the latter sent him Numidians, Cretan archers, and Balearic slingers, who had the messengers of Iccius for their guides. This re-enforcement raised the courage of the besieged, and deprived the enemy of the hope of taking the town; and after remaining some time round Bibrax, laying, waste the land and burning the hamlets and houses, they marched towards Caesar, and halted at less than two miles from his camp. Their fires, kindled on the right bank of the Miette, indicated a front of more than 8,000 paces (twelve kilometres).

The great numbers of the enemy, and their high renown for bravery, led the proconsul to resolve to postpone the battle. If his legions had in his eyes an incontestable superiority, he wished, nevertheless, to ascertain what he could expect from his cavalry, which was composed of Gauls. For this purpose, and to try, at the same time, the courage of the Belgae, he engaged them every day in cavalry combats in the undulated plain to the north of the camp. Once cer­tain that his troops did not yield in valour to those of the enemy, he resolved to draw them into a general action. In front of the entrenchments was an extensive tract of ground, advantageous for ranging an army in order of battle. This commanding position was covered in front and on the left by the marshes of the Miette. The right only remained unsupported, and the Belgae might have taken the Romans in flank in the space between the camp and the stream, or turned them by passing between the camp and the Aisne. To meet this danger, Caesar made, on each of the two slopes of the hill, a fosse, perpendicular to the line of battle, about 400 paces (600 metres) in length, the first reaching from the camp to the Miette, the second joining it to the Aisne. At the extremity of these fosses he established redoubts, in which were placed military machines.

Having made these dispositions, and having left in the camp his two newly-raised legions, to serve as a reserve in case of need, Caesar placed the six others in array of battle, the right resting on the retrenchments. The enemy also drew out his troops and deployed them in face of the Romans. The two armies remained in observation, each waiting till the other passed the marsh of the Miette, as the favourable moment for attack. Meanwhile, as they remained thus stationary, the cavalry were fighting on both sides. After a successful charge, Caesar, perceiving that the enemies persisted in not entering the marshes, withdrew his legions. The Belgae immediately left their position to move towards the Aisne, below the point where the Miette entered it. Their object was to cross the river between Gernicourt and Pontavert, where there were fords, with part of their troops, to carry, if they could, the redoubt commanded by the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus, and to cut the bridge, or, at least, to intercept the convoys of provisions, and ravage the country of the Remi, to the south of the Aisne, whence the Ro­mans drew their supplies.

The barbarians were already approaching the river, when Sabinus perceived them from the heights of Berry-au-Bac; he immediately gave information to Caesar, who, with all his cavalry, the light-armed Numidians, the slingers, and the archers, passed the bridge, and, descending the left bank, marched to meet the enemies towards the place threatened. When he arrived there, some of them had already passed the Aisne. An obstinate struggle takes place. Surprised in their passage, the Belgae, after having experienced considerable loss, advance intrepidly over the corpses to cross the river, but are repulsed by a shower of missiles; those who had reached the left bank are surrounded by the cavalry and massacred.

The Belgae having failed in taking the oppidum of Bibrax, in drawing the Romans upon disadvantageous ground, in crossing the river, and suffering, also, from want of provisions, decided on returning home, to be ready to assemble again to succour the country which might be first invaded by the Roman army. The principal cause of this decision was the news of the threatened invasion of the country of the Bellovaci by Divitiacus and the Aedui: the Bellovaci refused to lose a single instant in hurrying to the defence of their hearths.  Towards ten o’clock in the evening, the Belgae withdrew in such disorder that their departure resembled a flight. Caesar was informed immediately by his spies, but, fearing: that this retreat might conceal a snare, he retained his legions, and even his cavalry, in the camp. At break of day, better informed by his scouts, he sent all his cavalry, under the orders of the lieuten­ants Q. Pedius and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, and ordered Labienus, with three legions, to follow them. These troops fell upon the fugitives, and slew as many as the length of the day would permit. At sunset they gave up the pursuit, and, in obedience to the orders they had received, returned to the camp.

The coalition of the Belgae, so renowned for their valour, was thus dissolved. Nevertheless, it was of importance to the Roman general, in order to secure the pacification of the country, to go and reduce to subjection in their homes the peoples who had dared to enter into league against him. The nearest were the Suessiones, whose territory bordered upon that of the Remi.

The day after the flight of the enemy, before they had recovered from their fright, Caesar broke up his camp, crossed the Aisne, descended its left bank, invaded the country of the Suessiones, arrived after a long day’s march (45 kilometres) before Noviodunum (Soissons), and, informed that this town had a weak garrison, he attempted the same day to carry it by assault; he failed, through the breadth of the fosses and the height of the walls. He then retrenched his camp, ordered covered galleries to be advanced, and all things necessary for a siege to be collected. Nevertheless, the crowd of fugitive Sues­siones threw themselves into the town during the following night. The galleries having been pushed rapidly towards the walls, the foundations of a terrace to pass the fosse were established, and towers were constructed. The Gauls, astonished at the greatness and novelty of these works, so prompt­ly executed, offered to surrender. They obtained safety of life at the prayer of the Remi.

Caesar received as hostages the principal chiefs of the country, and even the two sons of King Galba, exacted the surrender of all their arms, and accepted the submission of the Suessiones. He then conducted his army into the country of the Bellovaci, who had shut themselves up, with all they possessed, in the oppidum of Bratuspantium (Breteuil). The army was only at about five miles’ distance from it, when all the aged men, issuing from the town, came, with extended hands, to implore the generosity of the Ro­man general; when he had arrived under the walls of the place, and while he was establishing his camp, he saw the women and children also demanding peace as suppliants from the top of the walls.

Divitiacus, in the name of the Aedui, interceded in their favour. After the retreat of the Belgae and the disbanding of his troops, he had returned to the presence of Caesar. The latter, who had, at the prayer of the Remi, just shown himself clement towards the Suessiones, displayed, at the solicitation of the Aedui, the same indulgence towards the Bellovaci. Thus obeying the same political idea of increasing among the Belgae the influence of the peoples allied to Rome, he pardoned them; but, as their nation was the most powerful in Belgic Gaul, he required from them all their arms and 600 hostages. The Bellovaci declared that the promoters of the war, seeing the misfortune they had drawn upon their country, had fled into the isle of Britain.

It is curious to remark the relations which existed at this epoch between part of Gaul and England. We know, in fact, from the “Commentaries,” that a cer­tain Divitiacus, an Aeduan chieftain, the most powerful in all Gaul, had formerly extended his power into the isle of Britain, and we have just seen that the chiefs in the last struggle against the Romans had found a refuge in the British isles.

Caesar next marched from Bratuspantium against the Ambiani, who surrendered without resistance

The Roman army was now to encounter more formidable adversaries. The Nervii occupied a vast territory, one extremity of which touched upon that of the Ambiani. This wild and intrepid people bitterly reproached the other Belgae for having submitted to foreigners and abjured the virtues of their fathers. They had resolved not to send deputies, nor to accept peace on any condition. Foreseeing the approaching invasion of the Roman army, the Nervii had drawn into alliance with them two neighbouring peoples, the Atrebates and the Veromandui, whom they had persuaded to risk with them the fortune of war: the Aduatuci, also, were already on the way to join the coalition. The women, and all those whose age rendered them unfit for fighting, had been placed in safety, in a spot defended by a marsh, and inaccessible to an army, no doubt at Mons.

After the submission of the Ambiani, Caesar left Amiens to proceed to the country of the Nervii; and after three days’ march on their territory, he arrived probably at Bavay (Bagacum), which is considered to have been their principal town. There he learnt by prisoners that he was no more than ten miles (fifteen kilometres) distant from the Sambre, and that the enemy awaited him posted on the opposite bank of the river. He thus found himself on the left bank, and the Nervii were assembled on the right bank.

In accordance with the informations he had received, Caesar sent out a reconnoitring party of scouts and centurions, charged with the selection of a spot favourable for the establishment of a camp. A certain number of the Belgae, who had recently submitted, and other Gauls, followed him, and accompanied him in his march. Some of them, as was known subsequently by the prisoners, having observed during the preceding days the usual order of march of the army, deserted during the night to the Nervii, and informed them that behind each of the legions there was a long column of baggage; that the legion which arrived first at the camp being separated by a great space from the others, it would be easy to attack the soldiers, still charged with their bundles (sarcinoe); that this legion once routed and its baggage captured, the others would not dare to offer any resistance. This plan of attack was the more readily embraced by the Belgae, as the nature of the locality favoured its execution. The Nervii, in fact, always weak in cavalry (their whole force was composed of infantry), were accustomed, in order to impede more easily the cavalry of their neighbours, to notch and bend horizontally young trees, the numerous branches of which, interlaced and mingled with brambles and brushwood, formed thick hedges, a veritable wall which nothing could pass through, impenetrable even to the eye. As this kind of obstacle was very embarrassing to the march of the Roman army, the Nervii re­solved to hide themselves in the woods which then covered the heights of Haumont, to watch there the moment when it would debouch on the opposite  heights of the Sambre, to wait till they perceived the file of baggage, and then immediately to rush upon the troops which preceded.

The centurions sent to reconnoitre had selected for the establishment of the camp the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. These descend in a uniform slope to the very banks of the river. Those of Boussières, to which they join, end, on the contrary, at the Sambre, in sufficiently bold escarpments, the elevation of which varies from five to fifteen metres, and which, inaccessible near Boussières, may be climbed a little lower, opposite the wood of Quesnoy. The Sambre, in all this extent, was no more than about three feet deep. On the right bank, the heights of Haumont, opposite those of Neuf-Mesnil, descend on all sides in gentle and regular slopes to the level of the river. In the lower part, they were bare for a breadth of about 200 Roman paces (300 metres), reckoning from the Sambre ; and then the woods began, which covered the upper parts. It was in these woods, impenetrable to the sight, that the Belgae remained concealed. They were there drawn up in order of battle: on the right, the Atrebates; in the centre, the Veromandui; on the left, the Nervii; these latter facing the escarpments of the Sambre. On the open part, along the river, they had placed some posts of cavalry.

Caesar, ignorant of the exact position where the Belgae were encamped, directed his march towards the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. His cavalry preceded him, but the order of march was different from that which had been communicated to the Nervii by the deserters; as he approached the enemy, he had, according to his custom, united six legions, and placed the baggage in the tail of the column, under the guard of the two legions recently raised, who closed the march.

The cavalry, slingers, and archers passed the Sambre and engaged the cavalry of the enemy, who at one moment took refuge in the woods, and at another resumed the offensive, nor were ever pursued beyond the open ground. Meanwhile, the six legions de­bouched. Arrived on the place chosen for the camp, they began to retrench, and shared the labour among them. Some proceeded to dig the fosses, while others spread themselves over the country in search of timber and turf. They had hardly begun their work, when the Belgae, perceiving the first portion of the baggage (which was the moment fixed for the attack), suddenly issue from the forest with all their forces, in the order of battle they had adopted, rush upon the cavalry and put it to rout, and run towards the Sambre with such incredible rapidity that they seem to be everywhere at once—at the edge of the wood, in the river, and in the midst of the Roman troops; then, with the same celerity, climbing the hill, they rush towards the camp, where the soldiers are at work at the retrenchments. The Roman army is taken off its guard.

Caesar had to provide against everything at the same time. It was necessary to raise the purple standard as the signal for hastening to arms,  to sound the trumpets to recall the soldiers employed in the works, to bring in those who were at a distance, form the lines, harangue the troops, give the word of order. In this critical situation, the experience of the soldiers, acquired in so many combats, and the presence of the lieutenants with each legion, helped to supply the place of the general, and to enable each to take, by his own impulse, the dispositions he thought best. The impetuosity of the enemy is such that the soldiers have time neither to put on the ensigns, nor to take the covering from their bucklers, nor even to put on their helmets. Each, abandoning his labours, runs to range himself in the utmost haste under the first standard which presents itself.

The army, constrained by necessity, was drawn up on the slope of the hill, much more in obedience to the nature of the ground and the exigencies of the moment than according to military rules. The legions, separated from one another by thick hedges, which intercepted their view, could not lend each other mutual succour; they formed an irregular and interrupted line: the 9th and 10th legions were placed on the left of the camp, the 8th and 11th in the centre, the 7th and 12th on the right. In this general confusion, in which it became as difficult to carry succour to the points threatened as to obey one single command, everything was ruled by accident.

Caesar, after taking the measures most urgent, rushes towards the troops which chance presents first to him, takes them as he finds them in his way, harangues them, and, when he comes to the 10th legion, he recalls to its memory, in a few words, its ancient valour. As the enemy was already within reach of the missiles, he orders the attack; then, proceeding towards another point to encourage his troops, he finds them already engaged.

The soldiers of the 9th and 10th legions throw the pilum, and fall, sword in hand, upon the Atrebates, who, fatigued by their rapid advance, out of breath, and pierced with wounds, are soon driven back from the hill they have just climbed. These two legions, led no doubt by Labienus, drive them into the Sambre, slay a great number, cross the river at their heels, and pursue them up the slopes of the right bank. The enemy, then thinking to take advantage of the commanding position, form again, and renew the com­bat; but the Romans repulse them anew, and, continuing their victorious march, take possession of the Gaulish camp. In the centre, the 8th and 11th legions, attacked by the Veromandui, had driven them back upon the banks of the Sambre, to the foot of the heights, where the combat still continued.

While on the left and in the centre victory declared for the Romans, on the right wing, the 7th and 12th legions were in danger of being overwhelmed under the efforts of the whole army of the Nervii, composed of 60,000 men. These intrepid warriors, led by their chief, Boduognatus, had dashed across the Sambre in face of the escarpments of the left bank; they had boldly climbed these, and thrown themselves, in close rank, upon the two legions of the right wing. These legions were placed in a position the more critical, as the victorious movements of the left and centre, by stripping almost entirely of troops that part of the field of battle, had left them without support. The Nervii take advantage of these circumstances: some move towards the summit of the heights to seize the camp, others outflank the two legions on the right wing.

As chance would have it, at this same moment, the cavalry and light-armed foot, who had been repulsed at the first attack, regained pell-mell the camp; finding themselves unexpectedly in face of the enemy, they are confounded, and take to flight again in another direction. The valets of the army, who, from the Decuman gate and the summit of the hill, had seen the Romans cross the river victoriously, and had issued forth in hope of plunder, look back; perceiving the Nervii in the camp, they fly precipitately. The tumult is further increased by the cries of the baggage-drivers, who rush about in terror. Among the auxiliaries in the Roman army, there was a body of Treviran cavalry, who enjoyed among the Gauls a reputation for valour. When they saw the camp invaded, the legions pressed and almost surrounded, the valets, the cavalry, the slingers, the Numidians, separated, dispersed, and flying on all sides, they be­lieved that all was lost, took the road for their own country, and proclaimed everywhere in their march that the Roman army was destroyed.

Caesar had repaired from the left wing to the other points of the line. When he arrived at the right wing, he had found the 7th and 12th legions hotly engaged, the ensigns of the cohorts of the 12th legion collected on the same point, the soldiers pressed together and mutually embarrassing each other, all the centurions of the 4th cohort and the standard-bearer killed; the standard lost; in the other cohorts most of the centurions were either killed or wounded, and among the latter was the primipilus Sextius Baculus, a man of rare bravery, who was destined soon after­wards to save the legion of Galba in the Valais. The soldiers who still resisted were exhausted, and those of the last ranks were quitting the ranks to avoid the missiles; new troops of enemies continually climbed the hill, some advancing to the front against the Romans, the others turning them on the two wings. In this, extreme danger, Caesar judges that he can hope for succour only from himself: having arrived without buckler, he seizes that of a legionary of the last ranks and rushes to the first line; there, calling the centurions by their names and exciting the soldiers he draws the 12th legion forward, and causes more interval to be made between the files of the companies in order to facilitate the handling of their swords. His example and encouraging words restore hope to the combatants and revive their courage. Each man, under the eyes of his general, shows new energy, and this heroic devotedness begins to cool the impetuosity of the enemy. Not far thence, the 7th legion was pressed by a multitude of assailants. Caesar orders the tribunes gradually to bring the two legions back to back, so that each presented its front to the enemy in opposite directions. Fearing no longer to be taken in the rear, they resist with firmness, and fight with new ardour. While Caesar is thus occupied, the two legions of the rear-guard, which formed the escort of the baggage (the 13th and 14th), informed of what was taking place, arrive in haste, and appear in view of the enemy at the top of the hill. On his part, T. Labienus, who, at the head of the 9th and 10th legions, had made himself master of the enemy’s camp on the heights of Haumont, discovers what is passing in the Roman camp. He judges, by the flight of the cavalry and servants, the greatness of the danger with which Caesar is threatened, and sends the 10th legion to his succour, which, re-passing the Sambre, and climbing the slopes of Neuf-Mesnil, runs in haste to fall upon the rear of the Nervii.

On the arrival of these re-enforcements, the whole aspect of things changes: the wounded raise themselves, and support themselves on their bucklers in order to take part in the action; the valets, seeing the terror of the enemy, throw themselves unarmed upon men who are armed; and the cavalry, to efface the disgrace of their flight, seek to outdo the legionaries in the combat. Meanwhile the Nervii fight with the courage of despair. When those of the first ranks fall, the nearest take their places, and mount upon their bodies; they are slain in their turn; the dead form heaps; the survivors throw, from the top of this mountain of corpses, their missiles upon the Romans, and send them back their own pila. “How can we, then, be astonished,” says Caesar, “that such men dared to cross a broad river, climb its precipitous banks, and overcome the difficulties of the ground, since nothing appeared too much for their courage They met death to the last man, and 60,000 corpses covered the field of battle so desperately fought, in which the fortune of Caesar had narrowly escaped wreck.     

After this struggle, in which, according to the “Commentaries,” the race and name of the Nervii were nearly annihilated, the old men, women, and children, who had sought refuge in the middle of the marshes, finding no hopes of safety, surrendered. In dwelling on the misfortune of their country, they said that, of 600 senators, there remained only three; and that, of 60,000 combatants, hardly 500 had survived. Caesar, to show his clemency towards the unfortunate who implored it, treated these remains of the Nervii with kindness; he left them their lands and towns, and enjoined the neighbouring peoples not only not to molest them, but even to protect them from all outrage and violence.

This victory was gained, no doubt, towards the end of July. Caesar detached the 7th legion, under the orders of young P. Crassus, to reduce the maritime peoples of the shores of the ocean: the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitae, the Essuvii, the Aulerci, and the Redones. He proceeded in person, with the seven other legions, following the course of the Sambre, to meet the Aduatuci, who, as we have seen above, were marching to join the Nervii. They were the descendants of those Cimbri and Teutones who, in their descent upon the Roman province and Italy in the year 652, had left on this side the Rhine 6,000 men in charge of as much of the baggage as was too heavy to be carried with them. After the defeat of their companions by Marius, and many vicissitudes, these Germans had established themselves towards the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, and had there formed a state.

As soon as the Aduatuci were informed of the disaster of the Nervii, they returned to their own country, abandoned their towns and forts, and retired, with all they possessed, into one oppidum, remarkably fortified by nature. Surrounded in every direction by precipitous rocks of great elevation, it was accessible only on one side by a gentle slope, at most 100 feet wide, defended by a fosse and double wall of great height, on which they placed enormous masses of rock and pointed beams. The mountain on which the citadel of Namur is situated answers sufficiently to this description.

On the arrival of the army, they made at first frequent sorties, and engaged in battles on a small scale. Later, when the place was surrounded by a counter-vallation of twelve feet high in a circuit of 15,000 feet, with numerous redoubts, they kept close in their oppidum. The Romans pushed forward their covered galleries, raised a terrace under shelter of these galleries, and constructed a tower of timber, intended to be pushed against the wall. At the sight of these preparations, the Aduatuci, who, like most of the Gauls, despised the Romans on account of their small stature, addressed the besiegers ironically from their walls, not understanding how a great machine, placed at a great distance, could be put in motion by men so diminutive. But when they saw this tower move and approach the walls, struck with a sight so strange and so new to them, they sent to implore peace, demanding, as the only condition, that they should be left in possession of their arms. Caesar refused this condition, but declared that, if they surrendered before the ram had struck their wall, they should be placed, like the Nervii, under the protection of the Roman people, and preserved from all violence. The besieged thereupon threw such a quantity of arms into, the fosses that they filled them almost to the height of the wall and the terrace; yet, as was afterwards discovered, they had retained about one-third. They threw open their gates, and that day remained quiet.

The Romans had occupied the town; towards evening, Caesar ordered them to leave it, fearing the violences which the soldiers might commit on the inhabitants during the night. But these, believing that after the surrender of the place the posts of the countervallation would be guarded with less care, resume the arms they had concealed, furnish themselves with bucklers of bark of trees, or wicker, covered hastily with skins, and, at midnight, attack the part of the works which seems most easy of access. Fires, pre­pared by Caesar, soon announce the attack. The soldiers rush to the spot from the nearest redoubts; and, though the enemies fight with the obstinacy of despair, the missiles thrown from the entrenchments and the towers disperse them, and they are driven back into the town with a loss of 4,000 men. Next day the gates were broken in without resistance, and, the town once taken, the inhabitants were sold publicly to the number of 53,000.

Towards the time of the conclusion of this siege (the first days of September), Caesar received letters from P. Crassus. This lieutenant announced that the maritime peoples on the coasts of the ocean, from the Loire to the Seine, had submitted. On the arrival of this news at Rome, the Senate decreed fifteen days of thanksgivings.

These successful exploits, and Gaul entirely pacified, gave to the barbarian peoples so high an opinion of the Roman power, that the nations beyond the Rhine, particularly the Ubii, sent deputies to Caesar, offering hostages and obedience to his orders. Anxious to proceed to Italy and Illyria, he commanded the deputies to return to him at the commencement of the following spring, and placed his legions, with the exception of the 12th, in winter quarters, in the countries of the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, neighbouring upon the localities where Crassus had been, making war. They were probably échelonnés in the valley of the Loire, between Orleans and An­gers.

Before he departed for Italy, Caesar sent Servius Galba, with a part of the cavalry and the 12th legion, into the country of the Nantuates, the Veragri, and the Seduni (peoples of Chablais and Lower and Upper Valais), whose territory extended from the country of the Allobroges, Lake Léman, and the Rhone, to the summit of the Alps. His object was to open an easy communication with Italy by way of these mountains, that is, by the Simplon and the St. Bernard, where travellers were continually subject to exactions and vexations. Galba, after some successful battles, by which all these peoples were subdued, obtained hostages, placed two cohorts among the Nantuates, and the rest of his legions in a town of the Veragri called Octodurus (Martigny). This town, situated in a little plain at the bottom of a glen surrounded by high mountains, was divided into two parts by a river (the Drance). Galba left one bank to the Gauls, and established his troops on the other, which he fortified with a fosse and rampart.

Several days had passed in the greatest tranquillity, when Galba learnt suddenly that the Gauls had during the night evacuated the part of the town which they occupied, and that the Veragri and the Seduni were appearing in great numbers on the surrounding mountains. The situation was most critical; for not only could Galba reckon on no succour, but he had not even finished his retrenchments, or gathered in his provisions in sufficient quantity. He called together a council, in which it was decided, in spite of the opinions of some chiefs, who proposed to abandon the baggage and fight their way out, that they should defend the camp; but the enemies hardly gave the Romans time to make the necessary dispositions. Suddenly they rush from all sides towards the retrenchments, and throw a shower of darts and javelins (gaesa). The legionaries line the rampart, and retort. Having to defend themselves against forces which are continually renewed, they are obliged to fight all at once, and to move incessantly to the points that are most threatened. The men who are fatigued, and even the wounded, cannot quit the place. The combat had lasted six hours: the Romans were exhausted with fatigue. Already they began to be short of missiles; already the Gauls, with increasing audacity, were filling up the fosse and tearing down the palisades; already the Romans were reduced to the last extremity, when the primipilus, P. Sextius Baculus, the same who had shown so much energy in the battle of the Sambre, and C. Volusenus, tribune of the soldiers, advise Galba that the only hope which remained was in a sally. The suggestion is adopted. At the command of the centurions, the soldiers confine themselves to parrying the missiles, and take breath; then, when the signal is given, rushing on all sides to the gates, they fall upon the enemy, put him to rout, and make an immense slaughter. Of 30,000 Gauls, about 10,000 were slain. In spite of this, Galba, not believing himself in safety , in so difficult a country, in the midst of hostile populations, brought back the 12th legion into the country of the Allobroges, where it wintered.

CHAPTER VI.

(Year of Rome 698.)

WAR OF THE VENETI—VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI—SUBMISSION OF AQUITAINE —MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII.

While Caesar was visiting Illyria and the different towns, of the Cisalpine, such as Ravenna and Lucca, war broke out anew in Gaul. The cause was this. Young P. Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th legion among the Andes, near the ocean; as he fell short of wheat, he sent several prefects and military tribunes to ask for provisions from the neighbouring peoples. T. Terrasidius was deputed to the Unelli, M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolitae, and Quintus Velanius, with T. Silius, to the Veneti. This last people was the most powerful on the whole coast through its commerce and its navy. Its numerous ships served to carry on a traffic with the isle of Britain. Possessed of consummate skill in the art of navigation, it ruled over this part of the ocean. The Veneti first seized Silius and Velanius, in the hope of obtaining in exchange for them the return of the hostages given to Crassus.Their example was soon followed. The Unelli and the Curiosolitae seized, with the same design, Trebius and Terrasidius; they entered into an engagement with the Veneti, through their chiefs, to run the same fortune, excited the rest of the neighbouring maritime peoples to recover their liberty, and all together intimated to Crassus that he must send back the hostages if he wished his tribunes and prefects to be restored.

Caesar, then very far distant from the scene of these events, learnt them from Crassus. He immediately ordered galleys to be constructed on the Loire, rowers to be fetched from the coast of the Mediterranean, and sailors and pilots to be procured. These, measures having been promptly executed, he repaired to the army as soon as the season permitted. At the news of his approach, the Veneti and their allies, conscious that they had been guilty of throwing into fetters envoys invested with a character which is inviolable, made preparations 'proportionate to the. danger with which they saw they were threatened. Above all, they set to work making their ships ready for action. Their confidence was great: they knew that the tides would intercept the roads on the sea-coast; they reckoned on the difficulty of the navigation in those unknown latitudes, where the ports are few, and on the want of provisions, which would not permit the Romans to make a long stay in their country.

Their determination once taken, they fortified their oppida, and transported to them the wheat from their fields. Persuaded that the country of the Veneti would be the first attacked, they gathered together all their ships, no doubt in the vast estuary formed by the river Auray in the Bay of Quiberon. They allied themselves with the maritime peoples of the coast, from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Scheldt, and demanded succour from the isle of Britain.

In spite of the difficulties of this war, Caesar undertook it without hesitation. He was influenced by grave motives: the violation of the right of nations, the rebellion after submission, the coalition of so many peoples; above all, by the fear that their impunity would be an encouragement to others. If we believe Strabo, Caesar, as well as the Veneti, had other reasons to desire this war: on one side, the latter, possessed of the commerce of Britain, already suspected the design of the Roman general to pass into that island, and they sought to deprive him of the means; and, on the other, Caesar could not attempt the dangerous enterprise of a descent on England till after he had destroyed the fleet of the Veneti, the sole masters of the ocean.

Be this as it may, in order to prevent new risings, Caesar divided his army so as to occupy the country militarily. The lieutenant T. Labienus, at the head of a part of the cavalry, was sent to the Treviri, with the mission to visit the Remi and other peoples of Belgic Gaul, to maintain them in their duty, and to oppose the passage of the Rhine by the Germans, who were said to have been invited by the Belgae. P. Crassus was ordered, with twelve legionary cohorts, and a numerous body of cavalry, to repair into Aquitaine, to prevent the inhabitants of that province from swelling the forces of the insurrection. The lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus was detached with three legions to restrain the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the Lexovii. The young D. Brutus, who had arrived from the Mediterra­nean with the galleys, received the command of the fleet, which was increased by the Gaulish ships borrowed from the Pictones, the Santones, and other peoples who had submitted. His instructions enjoined him to sail as soon as possible for the country of the Veneti. As to Caesar, he proceeded thither with the rest of the land army.

The eight legions of the Roman army were then distributed thus: to the north of the Loire, three legions; in Aquitaine, with Crassus, a legion and two cohorts; one legion, no doubt, on the fleet; and two legions and eight cohorts with the general-in-chief, to undertake the war against the Veneti.

We may admit that Caesar started from the neighbourhood of Nantes, and directed his march to the Roche-Bernard, where he crossed the Vilaine. Hav­ing arrived in the country of the Veneti, he resolved to profit by the time which must pass before the ar­rival of his fleet to obtain possession of the principal oppida where the inhabitants took refuge. Most of these petty fortresses on the coast of the Veneti were situated at the extremities of tongues of land or promontories; at high tide they could not be reached by land, while at low tide the approach was inaccessible to ships, which remained dry on the flats; a double obstacle to a siege.

The Romans attacked them in the following manner : they constructed on the land, at low tide, two parallel dykes, at the same time serving for terraces, and forming approaches towards the place. During the course of construction, the space comprised between these two dykes continued to be inundated with water at every high tide; but as soon as they had succeeded in joining them up to the oppidum, this space, where the sea could no longer penetrate, remained finally dry, and then presented to the besiegers a sort of place of arms useful in the attack.

With the aid of these long and laborious works, in which the height of the dykes finished by equalling that of the walls, the Romans succeeded in taking several of these oppida. But all their labours were thrown away; for, as soon as the Veneti thought themselves no longer safe, they evacuated the oppidum, embarked with all their goods on board their numerous vessels, and withdrew to the neighbouring oppida, the situations of which offered the same ad­vantages for a new resistance.

The greater part of the fine season had passed away in this manner. Caesar, convinced at length that the assistance of his ships was indispensable, came to the resolution of suspending these laborious and fruitless operations until the arrival of his fleet; and, that he might be near at hand to receive it, he encamped to the south of the Bay of Quiberon, near the coast, on the heights of Saint-Gildas.

The vessels of the fleet, held back by contrary winds, had not yet been able to assemble at the mouth of the Loire. As the Veneti had foreseen, they navigated with difficulty on this vast sea, subject to high tides, and almost entirely unfurnished with ports. The inexperience of the sailors, and even the form of the ships, added to their difficulties.

The enemy’s ships, on the contrary, were built and rigged in a manner to enable them to wrestle with all obstacles; flatter than those of the Romans, they had less to fear from the shallows and low tide. Built of oak, they supported the most violent shocks; the front and back, very lofty, were beyond the reach of the strongest missiles. The beams made of pieces of timber a foot thick, were fixed with iron nails, an inch in bigness; and the anchors were held by iron chains instead of cables; soft skins, made very thin, served for sails; either because those peoples were nearly or entirely unacquainted with linen, or because they regarded the ordinary sails as insufficient to support, with such heavy ships, the impetuosity of the winds of the ocean. The Roman ships were superior to them only in agility and the impulse of the oars. In everything else, those of the Veneti were better adapted to the nature of the localities and to the heavy seas. By the solidity of their construction they resisted the ships’ beaks, and by their elevation they were secure from the missiles, and were difficult to seize with the grappling-irons (copulae).

The Roman fleet, thanks to a wind from the north-east, was at length enabled to set sail. It quitted the Loire, and directed its course towards the Bay of Quiberon and Point Saint-Jaques. As soon as the Veneti perceived it, they sent out from the port formed by the river Auray 220 ships well armed and well equipped, which advanced to encounter it. During this time, the Roman fleet reached Point Saint-Jaques, where it formed in order of battle near the shore. That of the Veneti drew up in front of it. The battle took place under the very eyes of Caesar and his troops, who occupied the heights on the shore.

It was the first time that a Roman fleet appeared on the ocean. Everything conspired to disconcert Brutus, as well as the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions who commanded each vessel: the impotence of the beaks against the Gaulish ships; the height of the enemy’s poops, which overlooked even the high towers of the Roman vessels; and lastly, the inefficiency of the missiles thrown upwards. The military chiefs were hesitating, and had already experi­enced some loss, when, to remedy this disadvantage, they imagined a method having some analogy  with that to which Duillius owed his victory over the Carthaginians in 492: they tried to disable the Gaulish vessels by the aid of hooks (falces) similar to those which were used in attacks on fortresses. The falces was an iron with a point and sharpened hook, fixed at the end of long poles, which, suspended to the masts by ropes, received an impulsion similar to that of the ram. One or more ships approached a Gaulish vessel, and, as soon as the crew had succeeded in catching with one of these hooks the ropes which attached the yards to the masts, the sailors rowed away with all their strength, so as to break or cut the cords. The yards fell; the disabled vessel was immediately surrounded by the Romans, who boarded it; and then all depended on mere valour. This manoeuvre was completely successful. The soldiers of the fleet, knowing that no act of courage could pass unperceived by Caesar and the land troops, emulated one another in zeal, and captured several of the enemy’s vessels. The Gauls prepared to seek their safety in flight. They had already swerved their ships to the wind, when suddenly there came on a dead calm. This unexpected occurrence decided the victory. Left without the possibility of moving, the heavy Gaulish vessels were captured one after another; a very small number succeeded in gaining the coast under favour of the night.

The battle, which began at ten o’clock in the morning, had lasted till sunset. It terminated the war with the Veneti and the other maritime peoples of the ocean. They lost in it, at one blow, all their youth, all their principal citizens, and all their fleet; without refuge, without the means of defending any longer their oppida, they surrendered themselves, bodies and goods. Caesar, wishing to compel the Gauls in future to respect the rights of nations, caused the whole Senate to be put to death and the rest of the inhabitants to be sold for slaves.

Caesar has been justly reproached with this cruel chastisement; yet this great man gave such frequent proofs of his clemency towards the vanquished, that he must have yielded to very powerful political motives to order an execution so contrary to his habits and temper. Moreover, it was a sad effect of the war to expose incessantly the chiefs of the Gallic states to the resentments of the conquerors and the fury of the mob. While the Roman general punished the Senate of the Veneti for its revolt and obstinate resistance, the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii slaughtered theirs because it laboured to prevent them from joining the insurrection.

While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Q. Titutius Sabinus gained a decisive victory over the Unelli. At the head of this nation, and other states in revolt, was Viridovix, who had been joined, a few days before, by the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii. A multitude of men of no account, who had joined him from all parts of Gaul, in the hope of pillage, came to increase the number of his troops. Sabinus, starting, we believe, from the neighbourhood of Angers with his three legions, arrived in the country of the Unelli, and chose there for his camp a position which was advantageous in all respects. He established himself on a hill belonging to the line of heights which separates the basin of the See from that of the Celune, where we now find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier. This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north, the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000 paces (1,500 metres) to the banks of the See. Viridovix came and took a position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle, without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But, not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence of being a deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of Caesar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality, the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pur­sued by the cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately submitted.

Caesar and Sabinus received intelligence at the same time, one of the victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against the Veneti.

Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached, as we have seen, with twelve cohorts and a body of  cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which, according to the “Commentaries,” formed the third part of Gaul. He believed that he could not display too much prudence in a country where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Praeconinus had lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries, and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during its march. Their horsemen were at first re­pulsed and pursued; but, suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (in convalle), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the battle recommenced with fury.

Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans. Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the oppidum of the Sotiates (the town of Sos), attempted to carry it by assault; but the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers, they made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation, Adiatunnus, supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty men of the class called soldures, attempted a sally from another side of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and, after a severe struggle, drove him back into the oppidum; nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.

When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an oppidum fortified by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour and chiefs of the peoples of Citeri or Spain, which joined upon Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out detachments on all sides, who intercepted his pro­visions. At last, as he saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council, Which was of the same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.

At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the camp and formed in two lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans : they demanded with loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate, the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more easy. He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in the battle, and to lead them by a long circuit to the place reported to be least defended. While the barbarians are solely occupied with the principal attack, these cohorts rush into the camp; on hearing the clamour which arises from this attack, the assailants, led by Crassus, redouble their efforts. The barbarians, surrounded on all sides, lose courage, rush out of the retrenchments, and seek their safety in flight. The cavalry overtook them in the open plain, and of 50.000 Aquitaniaas or Cantabrians, hardly one quarter escaped, who only reached the camp very late in the night.   

At the news of this victory, the greater part of the peoples of Aquitaine submitted to Crassus, and sent spontaneously him hostages; some, nevertheless, who were more distant, and reckoned on the advanced period of the season, refused to make their, submis­sion.

Towards the same time, Caesar, in spite of the near approach of the end of the fine season, marched against the Morini and the Menapii, who alone, after the entire pacification of Gaul, remained in arms, and had not sent him deputies. These peoples had no towns: they dwelt in caverns or under the tent. Taught by the example of their neighbours, they avoided engaging in pitched battles, and withdrew into the recesses of woods and marshes. Caesar, when he arrived in their country, was attacked by surprise at the moment he was beginning to fortify his camp. He drove them back into the woods, but not without experiencing some loss; then, to open himself a wider road in the forest which had become their asylum, he caused the trees between him and the enemy to be cut down, and, heaping them up to the right and the left, he formed two ramparts, which secured him from attacks on the flank. This work was executed in a few days over a great space with incredible celerity. Caesar had already reached the place of refuge of the Morini and the Menapii, who retired further and further into the thickness of the forests; already he had captured their herds and baggage, which they were obliged to leave behind, when rain falling in torrents, no longer permitting the soldiers to remain under tents, compelled him to retire. He ravaged the country, burnt the habitations, and withdrew his army, which he placed in winter quarters (between the Seine and the Loire), among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the other peoples recently vanquished.

The war of 698, directed almost exclusively against the peoples on the shores of the ocean, shows clearly that Caesar already, at that time, entertained the design of making an expedition into the isle of Britain, for he not only destroys the only important fleet that could be brought against him, that of the Veneti, but he subjugates, either in person or by his lieutenants, all the countries which extend from Bayonne to the mouth of the Scheldt.

It is worthy of remark how much the Romans were superior to the barbarians, by discipline, tactics, and the art of sieges; with what facility they raised terraces, made dykes, or promptly cut down a forest to clear themselves a passage through it. Truly, it is to the genius of Caesar that the glory of all these brilliant successes belongs; but we must also acknowledge that he had under his orders the best army in the world, and the men most experienced in the military profession. Among these were the chiefs placed over the machines and siege operations, named praefecti fabrorum. They rendered him the most signal services. Mention is made of L. Cornelius Balbus, who prepared the material of his army during his consulate, and Mamurra, who, in spite of the bad character Catullus gives him in his satires, gave proof of his genius during the wars in Gaul.